

POLITICAL LEARNING AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

The development of political orientations
among secondary school children in
Scotland : with special reference to the
teaching of Modern Studies.

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PREFACE

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SUMMARY

This thesis is concerned with the development of political orientations among adolescents attending secondary schools throughout Scotland. More especially we have investigated the influence that formal education in the curriculum, through Modern Studies, will bring to this process.

A framework for political learning is established, the basis of which stems from the cognitive development attained by the adolescent, although full allowance is made for the intervention of other inter-individual differences and social forces. We examine the growth which occurs in the acquisition of political orientations as well as their subsequent re-evaluation during adolescence. The objective is to see whether these movements occur in a predictable manner in one direction, but with a period of particularly intensive and rapid learning in middle adolescence as the child changes the basis of his thinking towards a more abstract level of conceptualisation. Not all political orientations are affected by the respondent's changing cognitive capacity and these others are closely studied for any variation in their pattern of growth. As the latter are thought to be more strongly influenced by social forces there is less likelihood that they will be characterised by qualitative development.

Our general conclusion is that political learning proceeds apace with age to an extent for which we had not been prepared by previous research. The changes which occur are generally consistent and even. The notion of qualitative development in political learning is rejected; in practice the whole spectrum of political orientations is found to grow in a monotonic fashion. The movement in political orientations

does not display any distinctive variation between those which may be linked directly to cognitive development and the remainder. Even in the young person's evaluation of the political world there is a predictable trend towards higher levels of attachment to the political norms associated with a democracy.

When we employ sophisticated multivariate techniques to examine the relative influence in political learning of inter-individual and intra-individual differences we discover that, while the impact which these forces bring can be considerable, they do not negate the basic relationship between age and political development. Political growth can be advanced with an appropriate background of advantages but there is little evidence that these additional predictors transform this into a qualitative movement.

The influence which Modern Studies brings to political learning is found to be small, insofar as it does little to promote the development of learning in directions in which it was not already moving. Where formal political education attempts to avert a normal pattern of growth it meets with negligible success. Modern Studies cannot therefore be regarded as anything other than a marginal agent in political socialisation. For this reason political education in the school must take more note of the political learning which takes place outside of the classroom.

Chapter One: The Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the political education of young people. The term 'political education' will be understood to comprise two uses. Firstly, it covers the general learning of political orientations and patterns of behaviour that all individuals experience, from whatever source; while more specifically it will be qualified to refer to formal teaching about contemporary political life that is given in regular courses in the school curriculum. The object of this thesis is to encompass both interpretations within a single investigation. The general aim is to examine the manner in which secondary schoolchildren in Scotland learn about politics, while more particularly, to detect the influence exerted on this process, relative to other major agents of socialisation, of formal political education, by studying individual pupils who have taken a course in Modern Studies.

In this chapter the intention is to examine the background to the two interpretations of political education and the manner in which they have been fused in our study. This will be achieved by posing two central questions for discussion - firstly, 'What constitutes a political education?', and secondly, the more general problem which we see as, 'How does political education take place?' The distinction is not meant to imply that the quest for answers will demand diverging lines of inquiry. Indeed our investigation presupposes that these questions overlap; the first casts the spotlight on the problems involved in evaluating a school course in political education, while the second pinpoints the need for a theoretical framework within which political learning generally may be understood. To isolate the question of what constitutes a political education in the school from the broader perspective is to cut oneself off from an informed

assessment of the potential, and limitations, within which the adolescent is operating. Indeed a central predicament for political education courses in Britain has been that so little is known of the main features of political learning. It is to this task, of setting the impact of formal political education, against a wider backdrop of political development, that we will address ourselves in this study,

What constitutes a political education?

A solicitous regard for the most efficient method of rearing 'good citizens' has been expressed by almost every political philosopher who has pondered over the problems involved in the creation and maintenance of a society, as the reader of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau can bear witness. In fact one of the most influential of the present day writers in the field of political socialisation, F. Greenstein, has stated his belief that, "No topic of political science has a more distinguished lineage than citizenship training." It can be traced back as far as Socrates and his inquiry as to whether virtue can be taught, and if so, by what means. It is doubtful that many modern writers would agree with the Greeks that individual and civic virtue are compatible but the issues which are currently raised in this area are nonetheless very much the same as those which faced Plato and Aristotle and which continue to provide the guidelines for those exploring the most appropriate political education for the members of that society. They are:

1. What are the aims of 'political education'?
2. Who is to be responsible for this instruction?

The debate on these questions has been characterised by a failure among the participants to agree on either the concepts used or the solutions advocated. That there should be a conflict over the interpretation of the aims of a political education is hardly surprising, just as there is

not a wide consensus on the precise role of the state, or its medium the school, in formal political education. Less predictable is the almost total agreement among political philosophers and educators that the reward to society of formal political instruction by the school will be greater unity and stability. Nowadays allusions to the importance of the school's role in civic education apply not so much to the content of what is taught in the curriculum but refer instead to the length of time which has been spent in educational institutions or the type of school attended. What we have to ask is whether the high valuation that is accorded to the school system for its power to communicate holds, in theory and practice, with formal political education.

To understand the general aims of political education courses it is worth remembering that many authorities have claimed that the term 'education' is a misnomer when applied to political affairs. For example, Bertrand Russell has distinguished, "Three divergent theories of education (which) all have their advocates in the present day. Of these the first considers that the sole purpose of education is to provide opportunities of growth and to remove hampering influences. The second holds that the purpose of education is to give culture to the individual and to develop his capacities to the utmost. The third holds that education is to be considered rather in relation to the community than in relation to the individual, and that its business is to train useful citizens.² The last two categories are regarded as variations of a 'positive' approach to education which unlike the first type attempts to 'put in' rather than 'bring out'. The negative leaning of the first approach has rarely found many adherents, and in no area is this more true than in political education, where the received wisdom has been that the objective is to train the child to an acceptance of existing norms

and codes of behaviour; but especially to the dissemination and encouragement of a stock of knowledge and values consonant with the subject's own social situation.

Given that 'negative' educational approaches are unlikely to take hold in the foreseeable future we find it more instructive to concentrate on the distinction which can be drawn between education and training. Peters argues that in common usage the word 'training' has (albeit correctly) quite different connotations from the term 'education', and it appears to us that this distinction may be profitably transferred to the realm of political education.³ With respect to 'training' we tend to think of standard situations where the individual is taught to accept certain patterns of behaviour and thinking which he will retain at all times and which are legitimised because of their supposed contribution to the general good. Individual freedom of action is thereby constrained. The essence of training is that one is directed to acquire ideas and patterns of behaviour appropriate across a wide range of situations. "It lacks the wider cognitive implications of 'education'. We talk naturally of the training of character when we wish to ensure reliability of response in accordance with a code; for character is exhibited in the things which people can decide to do and can manifest itself in a very rigid and unadaptive form of behaviour. But when we speak of moral education (or political education) we immediately envisage addressing ourselves to the matter of what people believe, and to questions of justification and questions of fact connected with such beliefs."⁴

The boundary line which is drawn between 'training' and 'education' is not always so clear cut. Yet when politics is introduced into this

debate some argue that no such distinction can be made. Using the terminology of Peters all political education schemes would be categorised as political training, or worse. For example, Oakeshott has concluded that, "The expression 'political education' has fallen on evil days; in the wilful and disingenuous corruption of language which is characteristic of our time (it) has acquired a sinister meaning. In places other than this, it is associated with that softening of the mind, by force, by alarm, or by the hypnotism of the endless repetition of what was scarcely worth saying once, by means of which whole populations have been reduced to submission."⁵ It is not only in recent times that the notion of political education has been misinterpreted as a pretext for political training. We read in Plato's 'Republic' of his conviction that formal teaching by the state of all its citizens was a pre-requisite to the successful establishment of his ideal state. According to the guidelines laid down by Peters this can hardly be described as an educational experience. It is directed to instilling in all individuals, from birth, the qualities of character necessary for effective citizenship; which means for the mass of the population, not an education but a political training, or more particularly, not participation in the affairs of the state, but total subjection to a ruling elite.

While we accept that schemes for political education in British schools are 'positive' in emphasis we do not accept that the communication of political ideas necessarily degenerates into a political training programme to support the status quo. Nonetheless we admit that the dominant force in political education has been towards training useful citizens rather than increasing the individual's capacity to learn, in the broader sense of that term. The actual goals decreed for such programmes will depend on the arrangement of power within that society - and most especially

with the role ascribed to the mass of the citizens. The tasks demanded of those responsible for education have typically been to engender a set of attitudes which is sympathetic to the controlling interest in that community. This does not necessarily mean rule by a small, restricted elite but may as Aristotle shows, involve the state in training all of its citizens to be capable of both ruling and obeying where necessary.⁶ While the general aim of political education is to rear citizens content with their lot the exact manner in which this is accomplished will depend on matching the type of citizen role that is regarded as acceptable with the educational programme. In a society where the reins of power are concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, the education of the population to a politically enlightened level is likely to be both unnecessary and an embarrassment, at the very least. A country such as Britain faces a particular dilemma, because by implication, if not definition, such a society does not champion political instruction for fear that it be charged with political indoctrination. In practice those with political authority have not shirked from stimulating civic support for the political order where they thought that this is not forthcoming in the required manner from the other major institutions with whom the young person is in regular contact.⁷

It is worth considering whether any scheme for political education designed to produce good citizens can be anything other than a very stultifying educational experience. For as Bertrand Russell again so succinctly notes, "The fundamental characteristic of the citizen is that he co-operates, in intention, if not in fact."⁸ The creativity which we have equated with the negative approach to education is absent and in its place one has a complete acquiescence in political affairs. Yet

while the goal of formal political education is, above all else, to rear an obedient citizenry faithful to the ideals of the existing political order, or who are not sufficiently motivated to bring about change through unconstitutional means, it does not always follow that other institutions have similar intentions, nor that the central political authorities are the only ones likely to be successful. Nor would we suggest that participation in political affairs is, ipso facto, disruptive or a threat to the political order. Even those concerned with imparting a political training will distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional change. Without the former the disjunction between the regime and the wider political environment will grow such that that regime is liable to collapse. Those involved with political teaching are therefore obliged to draw a distinction between political participation which is not perceived as a threat and other participation which is thought inconsistent with the survival of the system.

Let us then clarify the objectives of political education in Britain as we see them. We reject those conclusions which believe Britain's schools to be apolitical, at least in comparison with such politically conscious school systems as those in the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. The error is in part due to the greater preference in Britain for indirect political education both outside the school as well as through other courses in the school curriculum,⁹ and in part it may be attributed to the fact that in this country it has not been thought desirable that the mass of the population should have political ambitions. And certainly in comparison with the U.S.A. little attempt is made to involve or interest young people in political affairs and activities. The relevance of this approach must now be in doubt, "For a system of social aristocracy the English plan has admirably utilised its educational system for the training

of rulers on the one hand, and for the indoctrination of social priorities on the other. But for a democracy its utility is still to be tested."¹⁰

Formal political education in the British school has been restricted to the few. For the vast majority there has been a complete absence of such courses in the timetable. Yet in practice the indirect teaching of citizenship knowledge and values that is given by the schools may be at least as wide and perhaps more pervasive, though more discrete, than a single course in the curriculum dealing directly with political topics. The reason quite simply is that it is quite false to conceive of education, political or otherwise, as consisting solely of those experiences encountered within a single course, and to ignore the possibility of a transfer of learning from other experiences and relationships.¹¹

Yet in many respects formal political education consists of making explicit what previously constituted indirect or incidental learning. With regard to the latter a content analysis of texts and supplementary texts has pinpointed the heavy emphasis that is placed in British education on the achievements of past and present heroes.¹² In order to convey the strengths of the British way of life and government a wide range of courses has been utilised from English literature through to Geography, though in pride of place stands the History course.¹³ Seen through the last named are centuries of British power in the world; and given such a record of achievement who would then doubt that it was pure folly to query the merit of the political order which had made all of this possible? Patriotism and keeping to one's station in life were the goals that mattered. Indeed it might be that some history courses should more properly be described purely as instruments for citizenship training.

Needless to say the political education course does not always comprise direct exhortations to the children that they become model, obedient citizens, fully cognisant of their duties and responsibilities as members of the community but it is assumed that it will have a direct bearing on the manner in which they react to political problems, and on the cultivation of the skills which are useful if one is to perform a meaningful political role. Nevertheless there is a considerable novelty in the current wave of courses dealing with politics which are being provided by the schools to supplement the more traditional indirect approach to political education, which as far as possible sought to avoid any mention of the world of politics behind the institutional facade, besides ignoring foreign practices, except where these could be cast in an inferior light to the home grown product.

By accepting direct political education Britain is following a well-trodden practice that has existed for many years in other countries as divergent in their ideological commitment as the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. It is increasingly accepted that the school does act as a prime agent in political learning.¹⁴ In addition it is the case that a near consensus exists that the school should be concerned with giving a training in civic responsibilities, although it may well be that some countries demand, or can exert, more control than others in the presentation by the school of views which are anathema to it. For example, in the Soviet Union the view is that communism needs to be nurtured and that the school by working in harmony with the other agents of socialisation has a central role to play in speeding up the consciousness of communist man.¹⁵ Similarly in the United States, which like the U.S.S.R., has been faced with the task of assimilating peoples of many ethnic backgrounds, the

immediate need for a scheme of political education which will promote unity is self-evident.¹⁶ In fairness we should add that the situation in Britain is hardly comparable to that faced by either the Soviet Union or the United States. In this country the forces of habit and tradition have had ample opportunity to exert their influence in order to wield a common feeling and purpose among the people. It is only in Northern Ireland that there exists the diversity on which violent political conflict thrives.¹⁷ Yet if one accepts the proposition that formal civic instruction will be more prevalent in those countries unsure of their future, most probably because they are experiencing widespread social and economic changes, and where furthermore the traditional socialising institutions, such as the family or the church are not able, or do not want, to cope, it is not unexpected that calls should now have been made for a more direct political education in the school.

A close examination however indicates that the political education course category is an extremely broad one which includes both schemes which lay heavy emphasis on a civics approach as well as those others where the main focus consists of a study of the main institutions of British government. The civics course is without doubt a most unpopular method of political education among the teachers. Their objections are several; ranging from a dislike of any course which is both non-examinable, and abstract in content, to a decided distaste or reticence when forced to engage in discussions of political values.¹⁸ To act as the proselytizer of something even as classically democratic as the right to vote has been assiduously underplayed because of its supposed lack of connection with the traditional academic curriculum. A far more preferable refuge has always been found in the allegedly neutral workings

of the British Constitution. Unlike its counterpart in America which identifies roles which the individual citizen is expected to perform, the political education course in Britain has tended to ignore the relationship between the state and the individual, except in so far as the former demands support and conformity from the latter. Pride, rather than participation, in British society seems to have been the goal.

Not only is there a distaste for discussing issues in the sensitive area of moral, social and political values but there is much concern that teachers will lay themselves open to all manner of charges of political bias. As far as the school teachers are concerned hardly any component part of the school curriculum is as potentially fraught with so many explosive and controversial ideas and topics. This is mainly the quarrel with the civics course, though not exclusively so, since even in an institutional course large areas of political life have remained proscribed material.¹⁹ Of course it is no easy matter to draw a dividing line between those features of political life which are regarded as acceptable for investigation and other material which would be construed as unsuitable for transmission to young people. This unsuitability tag extends from a rejection of the view that the material in a political education course may be presented in, or approached in a dispassionate and objective manner, to the alleged incapability of young people to comprehend the ideas and information which would with profit be included in a course dealing with political problems. Even where one can convince the doubters that the school is not attempting to preach about political values which go beyond the 'good citizen' ideal there are strong grounds for questioning whether the teaching of political values and ideas, at least to younger children, will constitute a meaningful and worthwhile educational, not to mention political,

experience. The controversy which has surrounded the introduction of formal instruction in moral values and ideas into the school timetable has considerable relevance for the present debate over political education. Most particularly what we may translate as the 'paradox of political education' emanates from this conflict. According to R.S. Peters, "Given that it is desirable to educate people to conduct themselves rationally and intelligently, and with a fair degree of spontaneity, the brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative years in a child's development he is incapable of this form of life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on."²⁰ Schools have indeed sought to tread warily in the area of political education but this owes more to the alleged problems for the teacher when faced with a course in political education than with its educational unsuitability for the children. Nevertheless both civics and 'institutional' courses have been castigated for failing to provide a meaningful educational experience for pupils. The emphasis, critics say, has been on training rather than education, on learning a stock of ideas without at the same time generating an understanding of why such information is learnt or how it is to be applied. Whatever one's leaning in terms of pedagogical theory few would disagree that before new lines in political education are developed they should be harnessed to a soundly researched framework which clarifies how political attitudes, thinking and behaviour are learned.

Thus far we have talked generally about political education courses but how does the specific course which we have chosen to investigate fit into this category. Modern Studies may be thought of as representative of the new breed of political education course. Its basis in citizenship training is not in dispute although it has attempted to emerge from the

restricted horizons of the civics course. This does not mean that the good citizen notion in political education has been discarded; rather he has been upgraded in competence in preparation for a more active political role in society. It is as if in Britain there has been a delayed acceptance of those, "theorists of democracy from Aristotle to Bryce (who) have stressed that democracies are maintained by active citizen participation in civic affairs, by a high level of information about public affairs, and by a widespread sense of civic responsibility",²¹ although we admit that there has always been a marked gap between the theory of democracy as expressed above, and the actual practice of political life in Britain. Nevertheless it is to the attainment of broader aspirations such as those listed that recent innovations in political education, and here we include Modern Studies, have been directed.

And yet the effectiveness of the role performed by the school in political education is still a matter for informed conjecture rather than being based on empirical research. It is as if educationalists accept as faith that formal instruction is a sufficient condition for learning to occur. The new courses have moreover proceeded largely in a void where there is a wide ignorance of, "the technical problems in dealing with the development of civic interest and loyalty."²² As Merriam long since reminded us one must ask, "In endeavouring to train an individual what are the chief areas of resistance, and what are the centres most susceptible to suggestion, either in the individual or in the group?"²³ And if the course in political education does not have much of an impact to what factors can its failure be attributed? It is to this second and wider interpretation of political education, to the way in which young people learn about politics, that we will now turn.

How does political education take place?

Having concentrated on the more restricted interpretation of the aims of a 'political education' we will widen the basis of our discussion to ask how, in general, children acquire their political orientations and whether it is possible to discern any pattern in this process. In practice it might be more instructive to approach this problem from the perspective which asks why it should be that political scientists should acquire this interest in socialisation, and particularly only recently yet in such large numbers. It has been noted that one of the features of the 'revolution' in theory and methods which occurred in America in the 1950's was a commitment to empirical research into political activity rather than the institutions.²⁴ Although the latter is still a prime focus point, ever burgeoning fields of interest have grown up based on the attitudinal and behavioural manifestations of political life both within and outwith the traditional institutions of political investigation. A characteristic of this movement was the inspiration that it drew from associated social science disciplines. The foremost expression of this approach, at least in terms of the volume of output, consisted in the many voting studies which became popular in the 1950's.²⁵ The interest in such studies centred in relating and explaining the political party affiliation of adult respondents to various social, economic and sometimes psychological factors. These studies increased our awareness of a wide range of political activity, with one of the more conspicuous findings being that there is a far greater degree of stability in primary identifications, such as with a political party, than had formerly been supposed. Further studies which pursued this particular conclusion have shown that the party identification is not only relatively stable over the larger part of adult life but that in addition it seems to predate the age at which one becomes eligible legally to perform adult political tasks, such as voting. Political scientists then rediscovered some

pertinent observations by Charles Merriam nearly 39 years after their first appearance. In 1925 and again in 1931 he set down what he regarded as the relevance of, and the rewards likely to accrue from, political socialisation research. "The examination of the rise and development of the political ideation and the political behaviour of the child has in store for us much of the value in the scientific understanding of the adult ideal and conduct."²⁶ A few years later he wrote in concluding a nine country comparison of civic education techniques that, "...the process of politicalization begins far down the scale both in organization and in years. The point of departure for civic education is the child Social and political attitudes are determined far earlier than commonly supposed, many of them in fact in pre-school years. Observations show that political party allegiance in the United States is often fixed at the age of eight or ten years, as a result of social contact and pressure, but more fundamental attitudes determining the character of political behaviour may be reached earlier in many cases."²⁷

The above comments did not mirror the theoretical or research interests of his colleagues. It is now well documented that empirical studies in this area did not catch on until the late 50's. Yet since 1959 one can point to a near exponential growth rate in research in this general area. Inventories of the field conducted at the beginning of the 1960's and at the end of the decade illustrate the breadth of material which must now be incorporated within the generic term of political socialisation as a result of developments during that short time span.²⁸ The assumption, or conclusion, of this research has invariably been that an individual's early learning experience will act as a strong formative influence on his subsequent political attitudes and behaviour as an adult. If we take an example from the research into the development of a political party identification it has

been shown that this emerges at an age when there can be no pretense that the decision is an informed one or that it is based on any rational choice process. In addition it has been found that there is a close correspondence between a respondent's party affiliation and his recall of the political allegiance of his parents. This claim has been reiterated with great force by Butler and Stokes in their powerful tome on political change in Britain.²⁹ These authors found that the best predictor of the direction in which an individual would be voting is his recall of the political loyalties of his parents. If the focus of inquiry is to understand those experiences which are formative in an individual's life then it is argued that even a political scientist's inquiry must not neglect the respondent's childhood experiences. The genesis of political attitudes and behaviour is to be sought in the minds of young people as much as adults, or the latter's recollection of their early years. Relying on the recall of parental voting behaviour in elections long since past is necessarily a poor method on which to construct a theory about the importance of early learning in politics. For the majority of the population the political world is not a very salient segment in their overall belief system and psychological studies have clearly illustrated the need to approach the recall of such events with considerable caution.³⁰

Conducting research among pre-adults is fresh territory for the political scientist but there is much inspiration to hand in allied disciplines. Little more than a perfunctory reading is necessary to sensitize one to the mine of information which is available from psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists on the formative influence of early experience. It has also to be remembered that political scientists did

not possess a distinctive conceptual or theoretical framework within which to structure their socialisation research. It is therefore no surprise that political socialisation research should be in the vanguard of the trend toward inter-disciplinary study. The main source of theoretical inspiration was taken from a perspective most associated with sociology and anthropology. What had been lacking was a theoretical framework which would link an investigation of young people's attitudes with the more traditional interest in the manner in which political systems continue. The most popular answer was a framework derived from systems theory and functional analysis. Basic to such schemes is the assumption that political life may be best understood as a system of action where political phenomena are inter-related with each other. Phenomena and institutions are therefore not to be considered in isolation, but as parts of a more systemic whole.³¹ Such thinking is neither particularly useful thus stated nor original. Its beginnings may be traced back in embryonic form to the writings of Plato. He believed that the general prospects for the survival of society are at their optimum level when the political functions to be performed are quite clearly allocated to specific sub-groups in the population. The analogy which he made between the living organism and society has since become a favourite source of inspiration; out of this came the linked concepts of structure and function which underpin so much, if not most, socialisation research in sociology and anthropology, though they have been generally less pervasive in political science. The important point about the analogy between social life and organic life or mechanical systems is that it is not sufficiently close to provide valid explanations of social phenomena. For example, there is the important difference that societies can, and often do, change their political structures while organisms generally do not.

In political socialisation research functional analysis, rather than systems theory, has attracted more attention.³² This is not the full blown structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons but a diluted form best typified by the writings of David Easton.³³ The latter's work assumes particular significance because of the substantial amount of empirical research that has been conducted in accordance with, or motivated by, his approach. Although Easton claims originality for his work there must be strong reservations about this; indeed if we lead into his work via a potted version of functional analysis most of the apparent differences will be seen as illusory. What is more important at this stage is to try and spell out the peculiar slant which the adoption of functional analysis has given to political research, whether it be with children or adults.

There are, to be fair, variations among the functionalists in emphasis and especially in the completeness of their devotion to the organismic analogy of society; nonetheless there is a broad area of agreement that the prime concern should be with society and the inter-relations of its institutions, rather than on the individual. The main question with which they are concerned appears to be: "How is social life maintained and carried forward in time despite the complete turnover in membership of society with every new generation?" The answer it gives is this: "Social life persists because societies find means (structures) whereby they fulfill the needs (functions) which are either preconditions or consequences of an organised social life."³⁴ The objective of structural analysis necessitates freezing the political system at some point in time in order that the investigator may more easily dissect the subject into its component parts. This can involve one in studying institutions or practices to see how exactly these contribute to keeping the political system 'alive' and functioning normally. For example socialisation has been accorded great significance

because of its 'function' in bringing about an internalisation of political norms and goals.

The great drawback of this approach is that replication becomes its keystone and the researcher can easily come to neglect change or regard it as an aberration. Even Talcott Parsons, who is perhaps most immediately identified with such a position, has admitted that it is unsuited to explaining change but appears to dismiss criticism that this detracts from the scheme's overall value on the grounds that either change is of secondary importance in western societies or because a theory of change can only be generated after first formulating an equilibrium theory.³⁵ It does appear to be a contradiction that those who are attracted to the functionalist line of analysis because of its concern with how political systems survive over time should do this within a framework which is not geared to explaining change. In so doing they choose to ignore or dismiss the warnings that the identification of the key functions in the political system does not tell us how long it will continue.³⁶ Critics of functionalism would assert that this approach has not only made such assertions about the life expectancy of the system but furthermore has deflected attention away from social conflict and in this way the equilibrium of the model has become a prop for status quo oriented forces.³⁷

The validity of such criticism is increasingly accepted, even by some sympathetic to the functional approach. Almond and Powell, for example, have admitted that there is some substance in the view that functional and systems theories have a static and conservative bias. They conclude that their previous analysis of political systems was more strictly applicable to a given point in time only and that this formulation had not permitted them to explore developmental patterns, nor to account for such change.³⁸

To understand these main features of the functionalist approach to political science is to appreciate why its adoption in socialisation research has led many to believe that the only question worth asking, and which is the sole justification for research in this area, is the degree to which the socialisation of adolescents may be connected with the continuation of that particular society. Easton and Dennis, for example, argue in a recent book that we require a 'political theory of political socialisation';³⁹ the conclusion which they reach is that the political socialisation researcher who is not able to demonstrate the relevance of his research in explaining the persistence of the political system is wasting his time. In a similar vein, Dawson and Prewitt, having surveyed most of the literature on political socialisation conclude that, "Undue emphasis on the question, 'How does a child become politically socialised?', can hinder our understanding of more general political issues. Political scholars should guard against letting their intellectual energies be drained into social-psychological queries, however important the latter may be. The pay-off in political socialisation theory is not with the question posed as individual learning. More important are questions about the consequences of political socialisation processes for the society."⁴⁰

The cogency of this argument is greatly reduced because nowhere can these authors demonstrate how it is that one can talk of the consequences of political socialisation without greater understanding of how political learning proceeds. A related weakness of the systems maintenance theories which purport to spotlight the consequences of political socialisation is that their focus is a comparatively limited one which fails to include the full range of possible outcomes. By concentrating on such questions as how new members of a society learn the existing adult roles, it is assumed that a political structure is maintained through a continuity of its roles, with only the

occupants of these roles changing from time to time. This tends to result in a view of the political socialisation process as being 'successful' if a person slots neatly into one of the existing roles and 'unsuccessful' if he does not. It also leads to judgements being made about whether a particular pattern of orientations are 'adequate' or not. Rather than follow this line we believe that political socialisation needs to be regarded in a more neutral way as the process in which an individual's attitudes towards society develop. Our distrust of functionalism is that it has given forceful direction to study a quite specific and restricted range of questions in political research. This is not to argue that we are dismissing as irrelevant or uninteresting the question of whether a society will survive in a particular form or will change, but rather that so little is known of the manner in which orientations are learned during childhood and develop during adult life, that to start and end with these orientations is to ignore change, implicitly if not explicitly. We accept that a central goal of political science is to explain why one regime continues in much the same form and another crumbles or is overthrown: but if a socialisation researcher is going to claim that on the basis of his sample of pre-adolescents giving overwhelmingly favourable opinions towards the U.S. President that American society will continue in its present form, this is to assume total replication of one generation's views in the next and excludes the possibility of change in the future. It is hardly necessary to point out with reference to the socialisation research of the late 50's and 60's that the new generation which had been thought so enamoured with the ideals and institutions of American government at the age of 8 or 9 years has given evidence in the last few years that it has learnt quite new and contrary attitudes and behaviour. And who knows in what direction they will move during adult life? Obviously what is learned at 8 and 18 years is of

interest but what we require is a theoretical approach within which we can encompass change with age as well as change between generations. It is to some of the grosser inadequacies that have characterised the functional approach that Easton has addressed himself. His proposals for a fresh approach unfortunately do not match the strength of his criticism. Most important are his strictures on the shortcomings of static analysis. He regrets the tendency in socialisation research to concentrate on the disjunction between the political orientations of young people and adults while ignoring differences which manifestly exist between members of the same generation. At this time to ignore both vertical and horizontal discontinuities would be sheer folly as in some societies change has become so widespread that it, rather than replication, would seem to be an equal possibility in political learning. In this respect he is echoing the doubts expressed by those in the forefront of adapting functional imperatives to political realities. For example, Almond and Powell accept that functionalism has downgraded change in practice if not in theory and suggest that this may be overcome by defining political socialisation as the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed. It has therefore to be ascribed a system maintenance as well as system adaption function.⁴¹

Easton argues that an alternative to viewing socialisation as a static process may be reached by drawing a distinction between system maintenance and system persistence.⁴² He associates the former with stability analysis which he feels has led researchers into ignoring or excluding all change, even though this may be neither disruptive nor destructive. Persistence analysis, which he offers, is designed to include change as an integral element, or possibility, in any political system. Unfortunately 'persistence'

as it is presented by Easton is so vague that it conveys little more than what is commonly understood by the term 'survival'.⁴³ It is difficult to know when he would accept that a society is in fact dead and buried; quite obviously if his framework is to have any usefulness it has to be relativised in order that we may specify persistence in a particular state. What we require are guidelines which will enable us to determine when a particular society is persisting and when it has become another sort of system completely. According to Easton the British system has persisted over the past few centuries but what is the use of this as political analysis when one cannot then differentiate between Tudor, Victorian and present day Britain.

In addition, as Dennis and Easton largely admit, if the researcher is seeking evidence on the consequences, either positive or negative, for the stability of the system, it is very difficult to justify why the answers given are interpreted as indicating that the system will be moving in a particular direction rather than any other.⁴⁴ We find it hard to accept that Easton's scheme makes any great inroads on the criticism he himself has offered of functional analysis. As such his fresh theoretical approach comes through not as an empirical device which may be subjected to verification but as a heuristic tool suggesting interesting lines for investigation.

What we shall be doing instead is to make use of a more correctly named theoretical framework which is less susceptible to criticism 'on the grounds that it has encouraged, "social scientists from ever providing analyses which are precise enough to be testable."⁴⁵ Yet it is not our intention to redefine the area to be investigated. We accept that the need is to study the acquisition of political orientations irrespective of whether these are in accord with the adult viewpoint or in marked opposition. The interpretation that we shall be giving to political socialisation is

described by Dennis as, "...the more amorphous and untouched problem of how political learning takes place."⁴⁶ This takes us away from 'explaining' the consequences of political socialisation for the political system to tackle the problem of why some children have acquired one set of attitudes and others exhibit a completely different set and how these attitudes change during adolescence. We want to find out in what circumstances and by what methods people learn about politics as the primary focus and not as an afterthought when investigating system survival.

To consider learning is to examine the interaction between an individual, or group, and his environment to see how changes occur in the way in which he tends to think and behave. In this study we will regard anything as an instance of learning which exhibits a more or less permanent change of thinking which may be attributed to experience. Examples of learning can be divided into those situations which involve the explicit recognition by the learner of some objective he wishes to obtain and where specially created circumstances - such as the school - are often available to help him to do it. We spend the bulk of our lives during the pre-adult years in this sort of deliberate and self-conscious learning situation, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for learning to occur. Children, for example, learn a great many things at school even though that need not be their intention, nor indeed that of the teaching staff.⁴⁷

The application of learning theory raises many other questions which will be considered at greater length in the next chapter. For example, is political socialisation typically a gradual incremental process or is it better characterised as consisting of distinct qualitative changes or stages? Does it proceed in a set sequence or is it random with respect to what comes first, next and so on? Is the socialisation process a continuous one

spreading over the whole life span of an individual or is it discontinuous with some periods showing rapid growth in political awareness? Do each of these things vary with respect to their affective or cognitive content, between various subgroups, or across different societies? An understanding of political learning demands that one isolate those factors which produce different orientations among young people. This has led to the research spotlight being directed on the socialiser as well as the one being socialised. The point here is that where there is a relatively homogeneous political culture - and despite visible national differences within Britain this would seem to hold - more or less the whole range of agents in socialisation gell to produce a process where there is an acquisition of thinking and behaviour patterns which are acceptable or valued by the group and an avoidance or elimination of contrary disvalued patterns. The group in question could be an adult one or perhaps a peer relationship among friends of the same age. The significance of identifying the key reference group is that it can be argued that the adult controlled agencies are more likely to present a monolithic front in favour of replication while the peer group is a more likely contender as a vehicle of change. Therefore one wants to know which are the main agents of political socialisation and further in what areas and ways these agents exert their influence. This is a task of considerable complexity. Concluding his summary of the literature on the various forces in socialisation Dennis states this need for a broader view of the forces of political learning. At the present time we can do little more than repeat in the most general terms that the views of the adolescent will tend to follow those agents, "who most often interact with him, present more explicit content to him, and have higher saliency, prestige, and capacity to influence him generally."⁴⁸

A comparison of the various socialisation agents is particularly relevant to our study because a feature of this thesis is the close examination to be made of a deliberately contrived learning situation in the school; that is, exposure to a course in Modern Studies. We have isolated for closest study one out of the many settings in which the interaction for political learning occurs, while attempting to estimate the relative influence of other agents. The latter comprise both individual differences, such as the level of conceptualisation, I.Q. score, and sex of the respondent, as well as the various social forces that are expressed through the family, peer group and social background of the respondent.

While we have established this investigation as a study in political education we have interpreted 'politics' in the widest sense of that term. What we have done is to consider attitudes and behaviour to be political where they may be related to central areas of concern within the discipline. We appreciate that this begs the question of why or how some orientations are categorised as political and others as non-political but we feel that the areas included here fit in with the better defined areas of political concern for the political scientist as well as for the teacher of political education in the school. More practical considerations deem that the vastness of the political field is such that a narrow investigation in a limited area would not give the broad view of political development that we are seeking. Secondly, the complexity of the political world indicated that a narrow investigation would not do justice to the many facets of political learning. Thirdly, the very complexity of children's judgements made it no less apparent that investigation on a narrow front would be so limited and inadequate as to produce an over-simplified and erroneous picture. We therefore decided to attempt an investigation which covered a broad front, but which necessarily entailed relinquishing hopes for an intensive investigation of any one area.

We will conclude this discussion by bringing together the main threads which will structure this study. Our object is to examine the process, through which political learning develops; this covers both the nature of the orientations acquired as well as the manner in which these shift during adolescence. Furthermore we are asking what learning about politics involves whether it be generally or in a specific learning situation such as the school classroom.

We have sought to demonstrate that political education whether it takes place in the school or not should more properly be described as political training, since overwhelming emphasis is given to the transmission of existing practices, and of current notions of what constitutes the good citizen. At present there are signs that a more politically aware public is being encouraged and that the agency chosen to fulfil this task is the school.

It remains for us to add some substance to the framework described above. In the next chapter we will give a far more detailed exposition of the theoretical stance which we have taken in this study and of the hypotheses which we will be testing. Subsequent chapters will deal with our main independent variable, the school course in Modern Studies (Chapter Three); the study design (Chapter Four); and the analysis of the data and conclusions of the study (Chapters Five to Eight).

Footnotes to Chapter One:

1. Greenstein, F., Children and Politics, Yale University, 1965, p.2.
2. Russell, B., Education and the Social Order, Unwin, 1st Published 1932, London, p. 18.
3. Peters, R.S., in Archambault, R.D., Ed., Philosophical Analysis and Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
4. Ibid, p.99.
5. Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, London, Methuen, 1962, p.112.
6. Aristotle, Politics, translated by J. Warrington, Everyman's Library, 1959, pp. 210 - 212.
7. The authorities have to beware that training citizens for a particular civic role which is then denied them is one way to divert public sentiment from support and confidence in the political system to cynicism and alienation. It would seem more efficient for a state to discourage all expectations of effective political involvement than to frustrate officially encouraged views. The state which is trying to inculcate its citizens with ideals of obedience and discipline must further supplement this by creating an atmosphere in which there is satisfaction with one's lot or where advancement is neither expected nor desired.
8. Russell, op.cit., p.9.
9. For a discussion of the indirect nature of politics teaching in the school, see: Thompson, D., The Indirect Teaching of Politics, in Heater, D., Ed., The Teaching of Politics, Methuen, 1969, Chapter Five. The indirect nature of political education has been further born out in the National Committee for England and Wales of the International Education Association Civic Education Project, Goldsmith College, Curriculum Laboratory, Mimeo, 1967.
10. Merriam, C., The Making of Citizens, Chicago, 1931, p.288.
11. For example see Oakeshott, op. cit., pp. 129-130: "Long before we are of age to take an interest in a book about our politics we are acquiring that complex and intricate knowledge of our political tradition without which we could not make sense of a book when we come to open it... The greater part, then - perhaps the most important part - of our political education we acquire haphazard in finding our way about the natural-artificial world into which we were born, and there is no other way of acquiring it."

12. See: I.A.A.M., *The Teaching of History*, Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, 1965, p.17.
13. Gosden, P.J.H., *How They Were Taught*, Oxford, 1969, p.52. He quotes one popular text book in Geography by the Rev. Dr. Brewer of about 1870: "What is the character of the English People? Answer: Brave, intelligent, and very perservering."
14. See: Merriam, C., *op.cit.*, p.273. "The school emerges in recent times as the major instrument in the shaping of civic education". A more recent study has repeated this conclusion with great force: Hess, R., and Torney, J., *The Development of Political Attitudes*, Chicago, Aldine, 1967.
15. Shakhnarzarov, G., et. al., *Man, Science and Society*, translated by J. Riordan, Moscow, 1965, p.244.
16. See Greenstein, *op.cit.*, p.4. He reports finding that civic instruction is a compulsory feature in almost every state in the Union.
17. Rose, R., *The Authority of Regimes: An Irish Perspective*, Faber, London, Chapter XI, forthcoming.
18. See: Thompson, D., *The Teaching of Civics and British Constitution*, in Heater, *op.cit.*, Chapter 3. Thompson also highlights some of the definitional confusion in political education by suggesting a 'civics' course which is very akin to the Modern Studies syllabus; Heater, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-60.
19. The quandry is summarised by Crick as a, "disjunction between the constitution (good and teachable) and politics (bad and amorphous)," in the minds of the teachers at least: Crick, B., *The Introducing of Politics*, in Heater, *op.cit.*, p.7.
20. Peters, R.S., *Reason and Habit*, in W. Niblett, Ed., *Moral Education in a Changing Society*, Faber, 1963, p.54.
21. Almond, G., and Verba, S., *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, 1963, p.10.
22. Merriam, *op.cit.*, p.321.
23. *Ibid.*, p.231.
24. The standard accounts of this phenomenon include: Eulau, H., *The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics*, Random House, New York, 1962; and Dahl, R., *The Behavioural Approach*, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55, 1961, pp. 763-772.

25. A prime example is: Campbell, A., et. al., The Voter Decides, Peterson, 1954.
26. Merriam, C., The Making of Citizens, op.cit., p. 232.
27. Merriam, C., New Aspects of Politics, Chicago, 1925, p.85.
28. Hyman, H., Political Socialisation, Free Press, 1959; Dennis, J., Major Problems of Political Science Research, Mid-West Journal of Political Science, no. 12, 1968, pp. 85-114.
29. Butler, D., and Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain, Macmillan, 1969, p.47.
30. See: Hilgard, E., Theories of Learning, Methuen, 1948, pp. 313-318. Butler and Stokes admit the weakness of this sort of data in a footnote to p.46 of their book; see note 29 above.
31. See: Martindale, D., Ed., Functionalism in the Social Sciences, American Academy of Political Science, Philadelphia, 1965.
32. For a clarification of the distinction between systems theory and functional analysis see: Isaak, A., Scope and Methods of Political Science, Dorsey Press, 1969, Chapter 14.
33. Easton's views have modified considerably during the 60's: Easton, D., and Hess, R., The Child's Political World, Mid-West Journal of Political Science, 6, pp. 229-246, 1962; which should be compared with, Easton, D., and Dennis, J., Children in the Political System, McGraw-Hill, 1969.
34. Inkeles, A., What is Sociology? Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 34-35.
35. Parsons, T., The Social System, New York, 1951.
36. See the warnings contained in Levy, M., The Structure of Society, Princeton, 1952.
37. Barrington Moore, Political Power and Social Theory, Harper Torchbooks, 1965, pp. 100-103.
38. Almond, G., and Powell, G., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Little Brown, Boston, 1966, p.13.
39. Easton and Dennis, op.cit., pp. 47-70.

40. Dawson, R., and Prewitt, K., Political Socialisation, Little Brown, 1969, pp. 13-14. The same authors later devote considerable space to the problem they have just dismissed. At the end of one chapter they conclude, "A major gap in political socialisation theory, then concerns the actual learning mechanism. As one critic has put it, political socialisation, '...is a misnomer for what we study because we study what children have learnt.. not how they have learned it." Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit., p.80. Our position, which is contained at length in Chapter 2, is that political socialisation has failed to pay sufficient attention to the sequences of political learning. This does not mean that political socialisation's sole concern should be with the developmental process but rather that the application of general theories of human development do provide an opportunity to understand the background to the political orientations which constitute part of the base on which political systems operate.
41. Almond and Powell, op.cit., Ch. 3.
42. Easton, D., The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1968, Vol. 1., No. 2 pp. 124-146.
43. Stephens, J., The Logic of Functional and Systems Analysis in Political Science, Mid-West Journal of Political Science, No. 3., August 1969, pp. 367-394.
44. Easton and Dennis, op.cit., chapter 19.
45. Stephens, op.cit. p.393.
46. Dennis, op.cit. p.105.
47. Hilgard, op.cit., provides a comprehensive treatment of general learning theories.
48. Dennis, op.cit. p.109.

Chapter Two : The Theoretical Framework of the Study.


Socialisation is an experience of such fundamental significance for human beings that it has become an intersection point at which social science disciplines meet and overlap. The tendency has been for each to bring a different, though not distinct, view to the problem. Initially the over-riding concern for those studying socialisation was the induction of the child into his cultural environment but subsequent writings have successfully extended its application throughout adult life and to instances of membership in all manner of roles, both formal and informal.

Our objective in this chapter is to expand on the approach which we will take to political socialisation. The system maintenance perspective chosen by many researchers in this field has already been criticised, particularly because of the way in which change is belittled, albeit unwittingly. In this writer's opinion attempts to understand the continuance of societies by way of an investigation of pre-adults is a haphazard exercise which cannot but profit from insights into the manner in which individual political learning proceeds, rather than by comparing adults and adolescents and evaluating future stability simply as a function of the distance between the two groups.¹ In our study, political socialisation is seen as the process in which political orientations are learned; this covers the dimensions along which learning occurs as well as the agents with whom interaction takes place, and the individual characteristics which guide such interaction. Our notion of political development suggests areas in which predictable movements will occur, although generally nothing should be inferred about the outcome of the socialisation process. While we would agree that replication is of the essence of most agent's intentions, some may sway the young person in directions contrary to the dominant adult viewpoint. Easton is correct to draw attention to the overwhelming

assumption in much of the socialisation research that the transmission of orientations will occur only in a vertical direction from the adult generation to the next (and not apparently from the younger to the older generation), rather than allowing for perhaps significant horizontal transmission among members of the same generation.²

Our interpretation of, "...those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations and behaviour",³ is given a diagrammatic representation below:

Paradigm of the Political Socialisation Process



(The above is adapted from: McNeil, E., Human Socialisation, Wadsworth, 1969, p.5.)

Our view of political socialisation as an interaction-acquisition process raises a number of problems in the generation of a comprehensive learning framework. Learning itself, of course, is not a concept which generates much agreement among social scientists; in broad terms it is used to describe the process whereby a person establishes a connection between stimuli and a response where no connection existed before. The most usual ways in which learning occurs are through insight and understanding, as a consequence of reinforcement, and as part of the process of identification or imitation. The latter is particularly worthy of further examination because of a widespread feeling among learning theorists that the acquisition of social roles depends heavily on this method of learning.⁴

In its earliest years the young child models itself after its parents but with age this base is widened and a series of identifications are acquired from a variety of other sources; together these constitute the individual's outlook on life. The technique of learning social behaviour through identification means that explicit training is not necessary, since even without this the individual can acquire orientations which may be seen to derive from a variety of relationships and contacts that he has carried on. We accept that it is useful to distinguish between identification and imitation; the moulding implied in the former term is both more intense and lasting than any imitation would suggest. Each covers the process of dealing with the replication of orientations held by one's model but identification is further along a continuum which measures the extent to which the learning alters the kind of person one is.⁵

Some writers have expanded the term identification so that it involves a far less mechanical and imitative process in learning which has been characterised as a status envy hypothesis.⁶ Alternatively the motive force behind identification may be seen as a desire to win affection

and a greater degree of control over one's environment.⁷ Defensive identification of the kind described first occurs most often where the child is envious, or afraid of, his model. In contrast, the second type of identification - usually referred to as developmental - arises where there is a close bond between the child and the model, either a parent, teacher, or perhaps even a historical figure. One does not then have to be hostile or envious for identification to occur; it may instead be the result of love or respect. In this way the identification referred to can be seen as an attempt to guarantee that the valued relationship will continue.

The identification with which we shall be concerned is not so much that which deals with the individual's personality as the role behaviour and orientations which are adopted in the political field. What we must ask is whether the political learning which occurs in childhood is a transitory process with little impact on the basic structure of the self which should therefore more properly be interpreted as learning through imitation.

Our discussion of learning theory cannot be left with imitation and identification. Continued political learning can hardly occur except where one is forced to cope with challenging circumstances and experiences. That is why it is important to spell out the conditions under which the capacity to deal with the problems presented by the political world is, or is not, acquired and demonstrated. Coping is understood here as the term which covers the individual's ability to manage the problems and tension that are attendant upon political affairs. We can distinguish between primary and secondary coping. The former refers to the initial attempt to deal with a problem while the latter covers circumstances where the former attempts have been unsuccessful and the individual has to deal not only with the original problem but his failure to deal

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with it. Continued failure to cope with a problem is seen to be a cause of heightened tension and it is in order to combat such stress that individuals acquire a series of coping strategies. One particularly relevant study by Lois Murphy has suggested that a variety of favourite strategies may be identified as ways adopted by children for extricating themselves from awkward social situations, and several of these would seem the most likely contenders for explaining the course of development of a 'political self'.⁸ We will mention three coping strategies which we see as especially pertinent in our study. They are:

1. Children select from their environment what can reasonably be coped with in order to reduce stress to proportions that can be managed.
2. Evading excessive or unwelcome demands is another way of fending off the environment.
3. Restructuring the situation into one which is manageable.

While some doubt lingers as to whether these strategies are sufficiently distinctive to constitute separate categories, for example, the selection of tasks from the environment is much the same as evading stressful demands, they do sensitize us to a range of problems involving political learning among young people. The lack of interest for political affairs which has been found to fall off with increasing age may well derive at least in part from younger children evading tasks which are too complex or which do not provide fairly immediate gratification.

We would expect that in many cases the coping strategies learned will be developmental stage specific in that as the child grows older he will relinquish old methods for new ones; although the three coping techniques outlined above are not seen as age specific but as equally

likely of adoption by adolescents or adults. If the individual does not learn adequate coping strategies or if he employs a strategy which is found inappropriate for dealing with the problem facing him, he will stimulate the feelings of stress that he has been seeking to avoid.

Our objective must be to investigate which models give fullest force to political learning and if there is any transference of identification from one model to another during adolescence. In addition we will want to examine which adolescents are best able to cope with the political world and who, as we shall see next, move easily from one level of political thinking to another, more sophisticated, region. An example from the world of politics may make the points raised in this discussion less remote. An ever present item in political socialisation research is the early emergence of the political party affiliation. That the concept of identification in fomenting political learning is applicable to this field is demonstrated by the manner in which, for the most part, the party preference is passed on from parents to offspring. The fact that this is acquired at an age when alternative choices could not have been meaningfully explored and persists into adult life merely emphasizes the strength of identification in this area of political learning.⁹ Such a party identification is most important in helping the individual cope with the myriad of political stimuli which confront him during adolescence; it tends to become a refuge, or reference point, in structuring their evaluation of wider political issues, perhaps of little interest or too complex to understand. The same line of analysis may account for the the strong attachment to one's country, or central figures such as the Queen. In both instances, developmental identification is given full scope as not only are adults likely to exhibit similar opinions, if only in front of their children, but the children will be fully encouraged to display the 'correct' orientations with respect to these figures. Nor

do we imagine that the simple positive valuation of Queen and country presents any strains or stress for the young child.

It is when the child comes to see the world in slightly less authoritarian terms that a wider range of influences will bear upon the individual. Imitation and identification are not so comprehensive that they will determine the subject's thinking or behaviour in every situation. Indeed it is generally thought that political matters have such low saliency that children will have few guidelines with which to approach the political world if identification were the only means of political learning. Yet it is for this reason that identification does provide a good clue to political learning. Since the mass of the population in Britain are generally categorised as little involved in political affairs we should predict that there is little possibility that the new generation of children will themselves identify with any enlarged conception of their political role unless social circumstances change considerably or some agent with whom they subsequently identify parades a concern for political involvement among the populace. Where political messages and cues are generally disseminated, or where one group gives them particular emphasis, it has been found that children will pick these up - as research into the legitimacy of political authority illustrates.¹⁰

At least in the earliest years of life we anticipate that the political socialisation process will mean little more than a straight replication of parental views, or more correctly in so far as young children exhibit political views of any embeddedness, these will be in accord with those held by their parents, since it is with the latter that the child has most contact in his first years. With the onset of adolescence continued identification with parental views is challenged as contact is made with the wider range of experiences which coalesce during

this period and early adulthood. These include the growing autonomy of the child, and increased expectations on the part of society that the child will develop more independent reactions. What we have to discover is whether adolescents widen their political horizons or whether they withdraw and seek refuge in one of the coping strategies already outlined.

The young person is not to be thought of as merely the passive recipient of life themes originally held by his socialisers. Firstly, political roles operate in a complicated context of many minor roles and will fluctuate in intensity according to the particular circumstances in which an individual finds himself. In addition there may be contradictions between the political and non-political roles that we are expected, or want, to play while within each area further contrary roles may exist more or less side by side. Internal as well as external conflict in role performance is something with which all of us have to deal.

A further aspect to identification concerns the emphasis which is frequently accorded to the formative nature of early learning. What is learned first of all, or rather initial general perceptions, will often stay longest and affect the reaction to future experiences. It is nonsense to suggest however that learning occurs only in the first few years of life or that new directions may not be taken in adolescence or after. This study is in fact submerged in assumptions about placing learning within a developmental context; in addition politics itself is an activity which tends to demand continual reassessment or adjustments to one's store of knowledge and preferences.

'Development' in fact has been taken as a crucial concept in our theoretical framework and some of the subtleties associated with its use will now be elaborated. We see development as referring to, "the integration of constitutional and learned changes".¹¹ More vividly

development is distinguished from change. Whereas change implies no more than a transition from one orientation to another, development enables one to specify the direction which the individual will follow in his political growth. This means that development entails a degree of predictability and continuity which is not encompassed by the term change.

One conclusion which may be derived from the recent outpourings in political socialisation research is that the general proposition of differences in the political orientations of 7 and 17 year olds holds. Needless to say this is not an entirely original conclusion to reach! Perhaps because of this, most research has been directed to variation between selected groups of children of similar ages, or of children and adults; but without a clear theoretical appreciation of the significance of examining the development of political orientations. We obviously expect differences in political thinking between the primary school child and his secondary level compatriot. Confirmation is hardly required of this - although research has uncovered areas which the received wisdom had not suspected beforehand. Nevertheless scant attention has been paid to delving deeper into the development of political orientations among the young within a framework which specifies definite patterns in political learning.

Those familiar with the writings of developmental psychologists will realise just what complexities of argument are concealed within such an apparently simple concept as development. The work of Piaget has perhaps more than anything else contributed to the elevation and examination of this term.¹² With him its meaning tends to fluctuate but appears to have crystallised as the product of an internal process, referred to as equilibration, which itself is determined by both endogeneous and exogeneous factors. Echoing our original paradigm of political socialisation the

development of political orientations is seen as an interaction-acquisition process with growth in cognitive capacity as the prime force. Piaget does allow for the influence of social factors and other individual differences but generally believes them to be of secondary importance. Considerable criticism has been evoked by this approach; it is clarified by posing a few key questions about the nature of (political) growth:¹³

1. Does development follow an apparently pre-determined course or does it seem to be haphazard?
2. How much of an influence on the growth process is played by the various socialisation agents and individual differences?
3. Is development to be understood as a slow, uniform transition from lower to higher levels; or as a growth through political points, each of which marks the end of one stage and the beginning of another?

The first clue to determining the pattern of political development stems from asking how far the changes, if any, which occur during adolescence in political orientations are one-directional and predictable. Anything other than this which was essentially haphazard and non-sequential in its movements would not be construed as development but, following our earlier distinction, as change.

Immersed in an atmosphere which exhudes obvious political interest children might be thought far more likely to make inordinate advances in attaining levels of conceptual understanding normally only expected in someone much older. It has been argued that this implies that one can cultivate a particular skill or set of orientations in the young person just as the potter may shape a lump of clay into the required form.

Piaget rejects this proposition. He establishes a sequence of stages, based on different methods of cognitive reasoning, which must be passed through in the correct order if full maturity is to be achieved. To do otherwise would only produce the utmost confusion in the child's mind although Piaget would accept that this process, provided the fixed sequence is maintained, may be accelerated.

The second facet of political growth that we must consider revolves around the question of whether the movements found are to be attributed to nature or nurture. For some the child must be given as much care and attention as possible if he is to realise his full potential; others argue that the child grows according to the benefits which have accrued to him through heredity or nature and that because of this skill on the part of the teacher can only be of secondary importance.¹⁴ Clearly it must have a favourable environment or growth will be prevented, but the environment merely facilitates that growth, it does not determine its direction. The relative merits of these two interpretations are far beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless we have assumed that environmental factors are important and offer an exploratory study which will permit comparison of the relative impact of cognitive capacity and the wider range of socialisation agents.

By no means all researchers have agreed with Piaget that the growth of knowledge and conceptual understanding forms a pattern of development which can be divided into clear, qualitatively distinct stages.¹⁵ Many prefer to conceive of development as a progression of movements along a monotonic scale so that children of different ages, this latter being employed by Piaget as the means of categorizing stages, will associate with the same social models and thereby exhibit similar political orientations. The stage theorist, in contrast, minimizes

social factors and emphasizes the age of the subject as the important criteria of growth so that similarities of individuals in the same age group or stage are far more marked than similarities between persons plugged into the same socialisation agent but of a different age. In fact Piaget understands growth as proceeding by the negotiation of certain critical points, where one stage ends and another begins. Here we must emphasize that we do not suggest that all political orientations may be placed within a developmental perspective but rather those patterns of thinking which may be related directly to the level of conceptual understanding achieved by the individual. There may however be some spin-off effect of cognitive development over a wider area and we will be looking for the indirect as well as direct impact from cognitive development.

Stage theory cannot be left without further examination and comment. To start with chronological age is, by itself, an empty theoretical concept. Piaget has circumnavigated this drawback somewhat by relating his stages to meaningful developmental processes although he then sabotages his position by employing age to demark the various stages. This can only be accomplished by relegating social and cultural forces, other individual differences and experience in importance, relative to the forces of maturation. The theoretical inadequacies contained in 'explaining' orientations by saying that children of the age studied are established in a particular stage are obvious for their circularity.

It is not always clear however how much weight we are supposed to give to this sectionalisation of young people. Piaget repeatedly includes caveats; these leave the impression that growth through stages is only to be judged in terms of an overall perspective rather than as always present at the individual level. How far in fact can we go with

Piaget's framework? There is undoubtedly much attraction in his work if only because he does present a firm yardstick against which political development may be judged. Yet some of his conclusions are so much at variance with other research findings that we must depart from Piaget on certain points. To begin with we have already indicated that we cannot accept Piaget's unitary theory of development which tends to denigrate individual differences, such as sex and intelligence, and other social forces as 'minor oscillations'. Next, our understanding of the term 'stage' diverges from that of Piaget in several important respects. First, we do not use the term in the same sense as stages on a bus route, implying that each stage is left behind completely as a new stage is attained. Instead we see the political world as one of the more obvious areas where we may exercise different levels of judgement at different times. At one juncture we may be guided by fear of the law, at another by respect for public opinion and at another by our own inner principles of conduct. In other words, stage is used to identify patterns of thinking qualitatively distinct from both previous and subsequent judgements. A further problem which flows from this is that even within the same individual the stage attained will vary. This could mean that an individual exhibits traces of concrete as well as formal operations in his thinking. This process, which is known as horizontal decalage, would apply for example, where a person gave every indication that his mathematical thinking had developed to the full, whereas in political terms he might be ranked as retarded in comparison.

A distillation of the answers to the above questions allows us to identify two broad models of the manner in which political learning proceeds. One model is described as qualitative and the other as quantitative - these terms being indicative of the interpretation which each would give to the notion of development. A third alternative has

been suggested under the label of the 'interpersonal transfer model'.¹⁶ According to this the child approaches the period of explicit learning after he has acquired a fund of experiences from his primary relationships. The child will then apply the approach to personal relationships or authority figures that he has acquired in extra-political contexts, such as the family or the school, to the political world. This explanation was particularly popular in the early American studies of political socialisation, who were taken by surprise at the extent to which young people idealised or attributed general benevolence to the country's political leaders, such as the President. More recent findings, especially in Europe, have cast serious doubts on the validity of this model.¹⁷ Thus stated the interpersonal transfer approach is not only dubious in practice but, in addition, it is too restricted in scope for our investigation because it has little to offer in explaining how political orientations move during adolescence.

We will therefore be concentrating on the two frameworks already outlined. While we will refer to these as the quantitative and qualitative models the terms adopted by Hess and Torney for closely parallel approaches are equally vivid: the equivalent of the first named being referred to as the 'unit accretion model', and of the latter, the 'cognitive development model'.¹⁸ We can summarize their main characteristics as follows:

1. Quantitative (unit accretion) model:

In practice both models

begin with the premise that the young child commences his political learning lacking information or modes of interaction which can easily be applied to the political world. This version then denies that political growth will follow a pre-determined course or that the growth which does occur can be

broken down into distinct stages for which definite age ranges may be specified. Instead the incremental progression in orientations is emphasized as is the decisive influence of environmental factors.

Some exponents of this approach have gone further by asserting that any concept or piece of information can be acquired provided that this is made simple enough. They reject Piaget's assumption that what is learned should be geared to the individual's cognitive capacity and instead give full weight to the impact which an effective teacher, whether in the school or not, can elicit.

2. Qualitative (cognitive developmental) model:

The central precepts of this model are that political learning will be pre-determined and characterised by a growth through political points, all of which may be attributed to the changing capacity for dealing with concepts and information rather than environmental forces. In this sense the child's level of cognitive development is believed to determine the manner in which the young person perceives the political world.

The understanding of political growth in terms of stages implies that clearly discernible points in development will be evident in early adolescence. Until the child has overcome this barrier and achieved a more abstract and complex method of understanding the political world, and its inter-relationships, he will not be able to meaningfully acquire certain information or concepts.

The question at issue here is the adequacy of the qualitative and quantitative models in explaining political development. Unfortunately, Hess and Torney largely neglect to make any comparison of the relative merits of each as a predictor of political development and do no more than conclude

that the unit accretion model is useful for understanding the contribution of the school in building a fund of knowledge about governmental institutions while the cognitive developmental model is thought most useful in explaining how it is that the child becomes able to grasp the more complex and abstract concepts of political life.¹⁹ Each conclusion seems to be based more on the manner in which models were defined rather than being derived from an analysis of their data. Our argument centres on the view that the two models are in several respects geared to fundamentally different perceptions of political learning, and if the cognitive developmental model really is able to explain the child's contact with the abstractions of the political world then one cannot sustain the broad claims that have been advanced for the unit accretion model. It is realised that the theoretical relevance of the cognitive developmental model is limited to those areas of political learning which demand qualitative changes in cognitive structure. Our first task is to find out if the qualitative rather than the quantitative model is in practice more applicable to these areas. Secondly, we will want to examine those other areas where qualitative growth is not anticipated, such as the party affiliation of the respondent, to find if any movement occurs, and where it does, how far it might be described as quantitative. We should not fall into the error of treating all non-qualitative growth as quantitative since even the latter model specifies that there will be detectable development in some areas, particularly the cognitive domain and in the higher level of political skill to which we will be referring later. If it is found that discontinuous and unpredictable change characterises the adolescent's political learning even the quantitative model will have been refuted.

How then can we sum up our approach to political development?

It is fairly safe to draw the conclusion, based as it is on solid

empirical evidence, that cognitive growth holds, although this statement could be accepted by both the proponent and the critic of qualitative growth. What we have to establish is the nature of the linkage between cognitive growth and political learning in young people. In this context it is apparent that of the two models the qualitative version does more positively direct one to a set of predictions which may be investigated. In contrast the unit accretion model is more effectively evaluated where the results of attempts to 'contravene' the principles of qualitative growth may be assessed. Our approach will therefore be geared directly to an examination of the cognitive developmental model of political learning, while indirectly findings will bear on the quantitative model. The central attraction of the cognitive developmental model is that we are given a fairly specific programme of patterns in political learning whereas the quantitative approach offers hope for the teacher but little that the empirical study may refute.

While we have posited that the development in political orientations has its foundation in cognitive growth we would not contend that the individual will be completely retarded in his political sensibilities where he cannot provide evidence of increased cognitive capacity. Up to a certain level of sophistication we do not expect that cognitive growth will exert especial influence since it is our contention only that the more advanced political skills and abilities demand, or will vary with, a fresh cognitive structure. Of course it may turn out that the change in cognitive operations will provide a spur to the acquisition of even comparatively low level recall of political knowledge. For example, knowing the name of the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not require that the subject understand his role in British political life (nor vice versa), and it is of interest to

discover whether the lower level orientations grow in what might otherwise be construed as a qualitative movement, with rapid bursts at particular times in adolescence.

What exactly are the stages in the construction of operational thinking that have been identified by Piaget?²⁰

1. The Sensori-motor stage:

Up to the age of about 2 years the child is learning to deal with his own perceptual and motor functions, and to fit these together.

2. Pre-operational stage:

From approximately 2 years through to 6 years the young child demonstrates the ability to represent the world in terms of various symbols - one obvious example being language - but his understanding of causal relationships betrays his lack of understanding and experience. Typical examples are to explain rain as being due to the clouds crying or night coming when the sun has gone to bed. Indeed, the tendency to attribute life to all phenomena is a widespread feature of this group.²¹

3. Stage of concrete operations:

A third stage appears between 7 and 8 years which Piaget has designated as the period of 'incipient co-operation'. The young child now begins to use genuine concepts and to apply these to situations and problems, but only in so far as these relate to the world as it can immediately be perceived. More particularly the child is able to classify items. While egocentrism and precausality are being surmounted the child has not reached the point where we can say that his thinking is ideological. He has yet to develop the ability to reason from social

cause to effect although this stage does provide some evidence of a movement in that direction.²²

Growing ideologically implies in essence that actions and events that take place in this world are themselves attributable to a greater or lesser extent to the activity of man or wider social forces. A key feature in this development has been categorised by Adelson and O'Neil as 'personalism'.²³ This term covers in the first place a tendency among young children to, for example, represent British Government by the Queen or to think of the U.S. government in terms of the President. It is not until later that he draws the distinction between the occupant and the role, or gives weight in politics to institutions such as Parliament. A second drawback of personalism is that the child individualises the consequences of political decisions and is unable to realise the more general effects on the community as a whole - in jargon terms he has not yet acquired a socio-centric orientation.

4. Stage of formal operations:

Between 12 and 15 years Piaget argues that children will for the first time become capable of generalization, abstract thinking and hypothetical reasoning. In making political judgements the young person now demonstrates an inclination to weigh up the benefit of alternative choices, and not just in the present, but of their likely impact in the future as well. The community itself comes to be seen as temporal in that it will persist beyond the life span of its current members, but equally important, present decisions can influence society many years hence. The conclusion of the Adelson and O'Neil study supports the observation of Piaget that there is a period of substantial advance in early adolescence in political thinking patterns which may be explained by the sharp shift which is held

to occur in the cognitive basis of political discourse. Certainly they have few doubts that by the age of 15 years a firm grasp of hypothetico-deductive reasoning will have been established. Failures, they argue, are more prone to arise in content and fluency, rather than in abstract quality per se. This means that the 17 year old is not to be thought of as qualitatively distinct from the 15 year old in his political thinking but rather as someone more advanced in those trends which have first emerged among the younger age group. Thus the 17 year old is described as, "more philosophical, more ideological in his perspective on the political order."²⁴

The strides towards ideological thinking are moreover most noticeable during adolescence. At the beginning the child is unable, or unwilling, to maintain a position even in areas where formerly strong feelings had been expressed. Nor is there much evidence that the ideas expressed have been organised into any sort of comprehensive or hierarchical structure that would signify the birth of a political belief system, even if still at the embryo stage. Again, as we have previously noted, children of this age are not yet experienced in the ability to think in terms where events may be ascribed some meaningful causal sequence, nor are they fully aware that the political world is susceptible to change as a result of human activity.

Not all studies would agree that the late teenage years are characterised by the flowering of formal operations, or if this does occur, it does not manage to invade the political realm. On the one hand there is the conclusion of Adelson and O'Neil that the 17 year old is quite definitely sophisticated in political matters: "At times he is consciously, deliberately an ideologue."²⁵ The other side of the coin is represented by the conclusion reached by Converse on the basis of a

survey administered to American adults.²⁶ He arrives at a figure of 2½% of the population who he would describe as ideologues. Admittedly his notion of what constitutes an ideologue is based more on the use of 'psychological constraints' than hypothetico-deductive reasoning but there are obvious connections between the two terms and if anything one might have expected that the latter would demand the existence of meaningful constraints. Quite obviously there is fertile ground for study in this area.

A necessary first step has to be a more concise elaboration of the characteristics of a political belief system. Fortunately, a recent comprehensive dissection of political ideology conducted by Sartori offers three main properties; they are:²⁷

1. The relative articulation or richness.
2. The constraining power.
3. The stratification of the belief strata.

Sartori continues, "With reference to the first property, a belief system can be rich (articulate) or poor (inarticulate). A rich belief system is necessarily explicit and contains a relatively large number of elements. Conversely, a poor belief system has a low degree of explicitness and consists of relatively few elements... With regard to the second property, a belief system may be strongly constraining or feebly constraining: in the former the elements are tightly related in a quasi-logical fashion, while in the latter the elements are loosely connected and follow, at best, an 'idiosyncratic' syntax...As for the stratification aspect the various 'belief strata' can be identified by the amount of political information received and absorbed by each belief-public."²⁸

The division of each of these properties into two gives us two ideal type belief systems, one broad, rich, articulate, well informed and strongly constraining, and another the reverse of this coin (ignoring inconsistent patterns), inarticulate, badly informed and feebly constraining. Such broad stereotypes no doubt grossly oversimplify and even distort reality but nevertheless as a descriptive framework Sartori's design does direct us to researchable characteristics which may further be neatly assimilated within our broader examination of political development. Again we should not be over-optimistic in our expectations. The general movement that we predict is of an increase in high ratings on each of the properties of a belief system with age; though Sartori himself recognises that the higher group constitutes very much the belief system of a minority.

Another attraction of the qualitative model is that it predicts an evolutionary pattern which will occur in the making of political judgements. Again the theoretical inspiration derives from the work of Piaget.²⁹ He argues that the child experiences two main types of social relationship, first with adults and then progressively with his peers, and from this emerge two broad types of morality. The first is the morality of heteronomy where rules are regarded as sacred and unchanging, and which emanate from adults. Alterations in these rules are barely contemplated and most likely condemned out of hand. On top of this there is a further stage where acceptance of rules derives from mutual consent and where public opinion looms large as a corrective agency. The development of moral judgement may be broken down further into the following stages:

1. Anomy or pre-morality:

The first and lowest stage is in fact characterised by a complete absence of morality as we would understand it.

2. Heteronomy : external morality:

The border line between anomy and the subsequent stage of anomy is set in the emerging appreciation of rules and restrictions which govern the range of permissible thoughts and behaviour. The rules are established by adults and their sanctions are reward and punishment. General opinion or the circumstances of the individual are powerless against what Piaget calls 'the truth of Tradition'. From the point where they were quite unaware of any rules of the game, children travel to the opposite pole where rules acquire a sanctity of their own.

In what respects does such behaviour find expression in the world of politics? The image of the government and political figures as representing adult constraint is to be found most particularly in the studies of a sample of American children by Easton and Dennis, and by Hess and Torney.³⁰ The latter conclude that there can be little doubt that the youngest group of schoolchildren have an implicit trust in the benevolence of the government. They found that in grade 3, as many as 90% of the respondents agreed with the statement - 'What goes on in the government is all for the best'. The tendency to describe laws in the most flattering terms is particularly typical of this age group. Hess and Torney remark that the relationship of the young child to the political authorities is effectively structured by the fact that, "The young child sees laws as just and unchanging."³¹ Induction into the political system comes at a time when resistance to its demands would not be countenanced. The initial conception of their citizen role may be equated with the classical Greek position that there is no distinction between the 'good citizen' and the 'good individual'. Personal goodness and worth are stressed so that 74% of second and third grade children accept that the

'boy who helps others' is the best citizen. Moreover choice of this response declines with an increase in age and in its place emerges a view of the citizen in specifically political terms such as taking part in politics and voting.³² It is this absence of a distinction between personal and political behaviour which exemplifies the low level of differentiation in children's thinking.

If the first characteristic of political judgement is that goodness lies in obedience, the second is that the letter rather than the spirit of the law is to be obeyed. This accounts for the strong importance that young children attach to punishment for misdeeds, particularly where this allows the individual to atone for his crime. Socialisation research has found in this context that the role that the young child attributes to the policeman changes substantially with increasing age. Among the youngest groups, a majority were found to emphasize the punitive and enforcement aspects of the policeman's job, while in later years far greater support was given for the 'assisting people who are in trouble' role.³³

An associated feature of this idea of arbitrary, adult constraint is the concept of immanent justice. This holds that some cause of suffering, such as a natural calamity, is simply an extension of expiatory punishment because nature is thought to be in league with adults. Punishment in practice is taken as the criteria by which one ascertains wrongdoing; this implies that an act is not thought wrong unless some punishment is meted out. It further appears that the intentions of the perpetrator of a specific act are not to be judged by their intentions but by the material consequences of their action which transcends any concern with obeying or disobeying rules. This area has not been widely researched in terms of political activities although studies have reported a movement in early

adolescence towards a more contingent view of rules, morality and transgression. This new position requires both a consideration of the motives of those who do not conform to the law and that judgements vary according to these intentions. In sum, the early emphasis on punishment is increasingly supplanted by feelings of equity.

Other studies find that heteronomy tends to be characterised by a minimal reference, in children's replies to items dealing with authority or rules, to the significance of rewards. Piaget accounts for this by saying that rewards seek positively to encourage and to develop whereas the adult is in practice only interested in the child's continued subservience. Most data with which we are familiar does not support the applicability of this conclusion to the political world. The considerable positive affection for the Queen or the U.S. President found among young children does not seem to derive from the disciplinary potential of these authorities but rather from their general benevolence and ability to communicate themselves as the person most likely to help that child or his family. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that young children differentiate between those political authorities which they regard as basically coercive and others which are looked on as friendly providers; policemen being an instance of the former and the President or Queen examples of the latter.³⁴

3. Socionomy : external-internal morality:

Towards the age of

10 years, Piaget found that a new stage of morality comes into the picture. This arrives when the child becomes aware that rules can be changed for at that point he ceases to believe in their endless past or accept their adult origin. It is characterised by an increasing emphasis on co-operation and reciprocity. To be good means that one should be fair. No longer

is the child so guided by the crude external sanctions of reward and punishment - these being replaced increasingly by control through social praise and social blame. Its essential expression comes through the medium of public opinion, or from the group of which one is an aspiring member.

This does not mean that socionomy is the highest level of judgement, although few will move beyond this stage, and this is nowhere more the case than with regard to political judgements. The primary goal of education through the centuries has been to mould the child into a conforming member of society; and within socionomy morality is regarded as equivalent to what is politically acceptable. It is because of this that those who deny that socionomy is the upper limit in moral judgement constitute such a problem for those engaged in formal political education. Where morality is defined as what is politically or socially acceptable, it cannot tolerate any serious challenge.

We have mentioned our strong misgivings about the validity of transferring any strict time chart in terms of chronological age to the political field. As far as socionomy is concerned, we can report that in one of the rare studies of political judgements carried out up to now, Adelson and O'Neil found few adolescents of the age range mentioned by Piaget, exhibiting characteristics which we have used to categorize the stage of socionomy.³⁵ Their sample of American adolescents were, for example, relatively insensitive to such things as individual liberties, preferring instead to opt for essentially authoritarian solutions to political problems. In other words their findings imply that heteronomy continues to be a typical feature of political judgement for longer than has usually been found with research into moral development. While those investigating moral judgements have concentrated their attention on ways

of raising the individual above the stage of socionomy, there lingers a strong suspicion that the exponent of political education must set his sights lower - to concentrate in fact on bringing the majority out of the stage of heteronomy in their political judgements and into the stage of socionomy rather than starting from an assertion that the level of socionomy has already been attained.

4. Autonomy : internal morality:

The highest stage described by Piaget in moral development is that where the individual has his own inner ideals of conduct. It is felt that he is no longer dependent on the fear of authority or the fear of public opinion, but instead his sanctions are his own inner self-praise and self-blame.

We have already indicated that political judgements might be thought retarded in comparison with the schema outlined here and our focus will be concentrated on the changeover from heteronomy to socionomy and largely disregard talk of internal morality. Not that we mean to belittle the importance of achieving value autonomy; there is much evidence of the need for a political education which seeks to develop political skills by giving experience in the making of decisions in concrete political situations.

The framework described thus far constitutes only the bare bones of political learning. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the acquisition of particular orientations is determined in part by the rate and stage of cognitive development but is further influenced by other individual differences and social forces which may stimulate or inhibit the political learning process. What we are looking for are indicators of the relative impact of cognitive development, compared with environmental factors, in taking children from one stage to another; to accomplish this objective we shall have to estimate which orientations are little influenced by social forces and individual differences and which areas are most affected by these factors, in comparison with cognitive factors.

Part II - The Agents of Political Socialisation:

In our paradigm of the political socialisation process, the acquisition of political orientations derives from the child's interaction in primary and secondary relationships with an additional dimension provided by a multiplicity of other political experiences almost too wide to categorize. All of this is further structured by the individual's level of cognitive development. Variety is of the essence of political learning and it is a task of the utmost complexity to isolate and compare the relative impact of particular agencies or sequence of experiences. As far as the present fund of political socialisation research findings will allow, we shall distinguish the more important theoretical and empirical threads that can be woven into our study of political development.

The most obvious way to implement an examination of the agents of political socialisation is to state in turn, the direction and extent of the influence of each of the factors which have been included in this investigation.³⁶ It is, of course, difficult to imagine a situation in which only one agency is involved in political learning; indeed most of the settings in which socialisation proceeds involve so many variables that isolation of any one factor requires a design with so many controls as to resemble a military scale field operation. We can only claim to have travelled a short distance in overcoming this particular problem but the multivariate procedures which we shall be employing at the data analysis stage do offer the potential at least for dealing with a complex picture such as political socialisation typically presents.

We will begin with the distinction between primary and secondary relationships.³⁷ The characteristic features of the former group are that the relationships are most usually unstructured and highly personalised,

at least in relation to secondary relationships. Typical primary relationships exist within the family or between friends while secondary groups which we shall be discussing include those based on social class and religion. There can be little argument that modern industrial societies are a tangled mixture of primary and secondary relationships, all of which contribute to political socialisation, although not always directly or intentionally. On top of these, we shall be looking at one specialised secondary institution for carrying on political learning, namely the school, and its attempts to train future citizens through formal political education.

The significance of distinguishing between these two types of relationship lies in their alleged differential impact on political learning. It is argued that while the great bulk of social interaction takes place in primary relationships, in contrast, political relationships are secondary in character.³⁸ This places a question mark against the ability of the family and the peer group to fully prepare the individual for the political world; nevertheless there are those who claim that legitimacy in a regime - which is equated with a notion of 'successful' socialisation - arises where the state and its political relationships are consistent with the primary group mode of interaction.

Quite separate from the validity of such claims is the argument which insists that the manner in which political learning is approached in primary relationships is generally not explicit or organised. Both socialisation efforts as well as their effects are seen to be sporadic and varied in their scope. While research findings indicate that primary groups do not always make the most of their potential for influencing their members, at least in the political field, they are arranged at such a crucial point in the socialisation scheme that it is extremely difficult for secondary agencies to overcome this initial constellation of primary

forces, as their influence once sown does tend to take root.

Our discussion will begin with the influence of the family relationship in political socialisation.³⁹ We have already indicated that the parent-child relationship changes during the period of adolescence from constraint by the adult to increasing acceptance by the child of peer group sanctions, and other things being equal, it might be thought that the influence of the family in political learning would show a corresponding decline in effectiveness. Needless to say the thoroughness with which the family has stimulated political growth in the child will loom large as a factor in determining the effectiveness of this second wave of socialisation forces. Alternatively if these forces do not attribute much salience to political affairs, it may well be that the initial impact of the family will endure long after adolescence has passed. We believe that potentially, if not always in practice, the family constitutes the most important agent affecting the extent and direction of political learning in the younger child. When we attempt to assess the influence of the family in political socialisation, we are not able to provide a conclusion on its impact throughout childhood but merely during the period of adolescence - and this applies with all other factors. Our assumption is that the family will prove to be the first socialisation agent and that its impact should still be shining strongly in adolescence although some signs of it being on the wane among the older respondents should also become apparent.

The ability of the family to stimulate political learning across the whole spectrum of orientations is generally accepted. This combination of pervasiveness and strength is attributed to two factors.⁴⁰ In the first place the family has a near monopoly of the time and attention of the child during its formative years. This is rendered especially significant because it has been found that many of the orientations which the child acquires in

his earliest years endure throughout life; this applies most particularly with basic identifications such as national or ethnic loyalties, which in their turn will contribute to the structuring of political situations in later life.

The second reason for the impact of the family is traced to the type of relationship which is thought to exist among primary groups. In comparison with the relationships that exist in secondary groups they are characterised by far stronger personal and emotional ties. The significance of this fact is that learning theorists have argued that fertilisation of ideas is far more likely where there is a strong bond between the individuals in the relationship. "It is these joint phenomena of extensive access and strong emotional ties, occurring during the formative years, that give the family such a prominent part in political socialisation."⁴¹

It is the family moreover which has broad claims to be the most effectively placed agent for establishing young people in appropriate role behaviour. It is instrumental for example in establishing the child within its sexual role as well as providing it with an identification as a member of a social or religious group. The influence of the family can be expected to vary not only according to particular characteristics of individual units but superimposed on this are the differences which stem from families themselves being set in different social attachments which they reflect in their political training.

Whether or not the family is the most effective among the whole array of political socialisation agents has become a matter of some dispute. Following his review of the literature in 1959, Hyman was in little doubt about the family's pre-eminence in political learning.⁴² This did not mean that the family is the only agency of importance. While negative associations between the child's political orientations and those of his parents have rarely been found the strength of this association has been

reported as moderate or non-existent.⁴³ The point at issue is whether any other agency is able to offer evidence of a stronger level of association across such a wide range of orientations.

However, it has been established that the efficiency with which the family transmits political orientations varies quite considerably according to the level of cognitive sophistication demanded by the orientation as well as their domain of origin. It appears as if the family's influence is most potent in the affective domain and in those areas which require little skill in organization and interpretation. Hyman, for example, argues that the socialisation of an individual into a party identification is a much more direct and successful replicative process than that in more complex areas such as the perception of international conflict, and more recent research has borne out his conclusions.⁴⁴ The family also seems to be relatively more effective in engendering orientations in the affective domain than in the cognitive. At least this is the inference that is generally drawn from the particularly early acquisition of views on the political authorities.

More exact conclusions on the influence of the family have always been hindered by the over-concentration in political socialisation research on the transmission of the party identification and worse, the generalization of findings in this area to other political orientations. It is rather surprising that political scientists have been slow to appreciate that this could well be the source of considerable bias. It now appears as if the party identification is, above all others, the political orientation which will exhibit the closest correspondance between parent and child.⁴⁵ It further transpires that in America at least, the party preference is established at a surprisingly early age. The fact that children have acquired a political party affiliation by the time they are 7 or 8 years old, is a piece of solid evidence to support the

opinion that basic political orientations originate in the family relationship. It is not known whether British children are quite so precocious in their partisan views, although the percentage not identifying with a political party at 14 or 15 years, something in the region of 35%, does appear to be broadly the same in both countries.⁴⁶

Studies of the correspondance between the political views of the adolescent and his parents have always suffered from the lack of agreement among researchers about how the family's views are to be obtained. Some findings base their statement of the parental viewpoint on the child's report of their views, while others prefer to interview the parents directly. An associated problem in assessing the impact of the family is that little recognition has been accorded to the possibility of there being differences between the political orientations of the father and the mother. Studies have demonstrated that variation in the family can be important, either because the child choses to follow one parent rather than the other, or for the way in which internal dissension has been associated with a lower rate of acquisition of political orientations.⁴⁷ Indeed, studies of the transmission of the party identification, which is held up as the orientation most often transferred from parent to child, that have taken note of these problems have indicated that even this example of parental influence is not as strong as had previously been thought.⁴⁸

The significance and interest of a study into the development of a party identification in Scotland in recent years, gains especially from the upsurge in support for the Scottish National Party - at least when the interviews were conducted. Previous research reported above indicates that the direction of the parental vote is decisive where the offspring has fixed on a choice of party identification and can recognise the party supported by his parents. Where a change occurs in the parental affiliation, unless blatantly transitory, we anticipate that this will

instigate a corresponding movement amongst their children. The term 'immunization' has been offered to enable us to describe the different levels of readiness with which groups accept political change.⁴⁹ In our study it gains in relevance because of the prevailing belief that young people will be more susceptible to the contagion of political change. In terms of support for the parties in Scotland, this would mean that the numbers identifying with the S.N.P. will outstrip that which opinion polls have recorded among their elders. Conversely, lack of support, relatively speaking, amongst the younger generation for the S.N.P. would leave us with doubts about the strength of parental influence.

Evidence on the effectiveness of the family in stimulating an interest in political affairs is generally agreed that such an interest is most likely to emerge where the family unit is concerned with political affairs, while a disinterested family will produce a corresponding lack of involvement in their children. The only British study which has delved deeply into this relationship has been far less convinced of its strength.⁵⁰ However, their findings are based on interviews with both sides in this relationship and it may be an indication that the transmission has been complicated by the child modelling himself on an image of the parental viewpoint which the latter would reject. Certainly this is an area demanding further investigation.

Strong though the family may be in potential influence it is clearly dampened considerably in practice and we must search for possible confounding factors. In this context we have already mentioned the developmental forces which provide one clue as to why the family influence declines during the period of adolescence. Another possibility is the obvious one that other agencies, besides the peer group, are better able to prevail over the political learning of adolescents. One additional point which we would like to raise revolves around the characteristic

tendency among younger children to idealise authority, both in the field of politics and more generally. It may well be that parents encourage their children to espouse a favourable view of the political authorities, even though they themselves adhere to a more 'realistic' and possibly more cynical position. A discrepancy between the parental and the child's perception of the political world can therefore be attributed rather paradoxically to the strength of the family influence. Fortunately complications such as this are likely to be fast disappearing by the time the child enters adolescence since by then the parent feels it less necessary to 'protect' his offspring from the 'unpleasantness' of the political world.⁵¹

Almost the reverse of the above position is the description which has often been ascribed to adolescence as the period when rebellion against parental values takes shape and finds expression.⁵² Political socialisation research has generally uncovered little support for the proposition that children will adopt fresh political orientations during adolescence as a means of exhibiting their determination to assert themselves against parental authority. Whether the apparently heightened political involvement of young people in more recent years is an indication that rejection of the family viewpoint is taking a political slant, albeit somewhat late for talk of adolescent rebellion, is a moot point.

Our general impression is that in theoretical terms the family is established as one of the key structures through which political learning is channeled, although recent empirical studies have become sensitive to conclusions of dominant or strong, family influence. Hess and Torney fanned this trend with their conclusion that, "...the family transmits its own particular values in relatively few areas of political socialisation and that, for the most part, the impact of the family is felt only as one of several socialising agents and institutions."⁵³ The strongest influence that the family exerts is in the range of attitudes

which fall within the affective domain, such as the attachment to, and support for, the country and its national institutions. What these authors have termed as 'idiosyncratic attitudes' are less well transmitted, with the sole exception of the party identification.⁵⁴ If the child is not created in the political image of his parents, in anything more than a moderate fashion, what alternatives can we offer and will any of these prove more influential in the transmission process?

One final point to note about the family is that it has become customary to categorize this unit as one of the more conservative forces in political socialisation. While it is seen as the perpetuator of traditional political values and practices, this is quite different from claiming that it is a vehicle for systemic legitimacy and homogeneity. Families differ significantly, but most particularly they are to be contrasted according to the social setting in which they are established. This means that families with different social backgrounds will view the political world from different standpoints. In turn such variation will produce contrasting political orientations. If the offspring of families in these diverse conditions acquire broadly similar orientations to those of their parents, the original diversification will be reasserted. Political socialisation can in this way, as the case of Northern Ireland only too vividly illustrates, perpetuate disparate social and political ideologies and perspectives.⁵⁵ All manner of political conflict and outdated loyalties can therefore be entrusted to the family for transmission whereas political initiatives must be left to other forces.

The second primary relationship which we have included within this investigation covers peer, or friendship, groups. In contrast to the family unit, these are typically non-hierarchical, with the members enjoying a broadly similar status as well as relatively close ties. In

our discussion the term peer group will be restricted to friendship groups among adolescents.

There has been an ever growing amount of research into the importance of the peer group in modern societies, but this has found little implementation in political socialisation studies. The strong conviction espoused in major works by such authors as Riesman and Eisenstadt is that peer groups are steadily replacing the influence of the family in the socialisation of young people.⁵⁶ This trend is over and above any developmental reason; and may be attributed to the characteristic already noted which concerns the inability of socialisation agents like the family, to prepare their children for the world into which they will soon be moving as equal partners. The family is just not able to keep pace with fast changing social conditions. In contrast, the peer group is less grounded in a formal structural arrangement and can adapt itself more quickly to fresh circumstances. The sanctions of peer group approval which Piaget believed would become operative in the adolescent years do then seem to be increasingly typical of young people.

The underlying reasons which explain the potency of the peer group in political socialisation are essentially the same as those which helped to explain the importance of the family. They are, to recap, the high level of interaction within the group and the close personal ties which bind the members together. The combination of access and attentiveness is particularly strong in bringing about political learning through identification, and although the peer group is rarely able to match the family in these respects it does exceed most secondary relationships on both counts.

Moreover, it operates in much the same way as the family through the various social and cultural groups in which it is set. Individuals are thereby established in a particular role where they can relate their

own political self to the wider scenario. The individual, in other words, comes to see the world of politics in terms of identifications acquired in his primary relationships. Norms of a particular social or religious group can be transmitted as forcefully through the peer group as through the family relationship. Perceptions of social and political 'reality' which are not reinforced in this way through the primary groups will be typically unstable and liable to disappear.

The peer group may socialise its members through both defensive and developmental identification (or imitation). In some instances, peer groups pressure their members to conform to group norms by threatening to punish deviation from accepted standards. This pressure need not be heavy handed but could easily take more subtle forms, such as ridiculing the unfortunate or otherwise ignoring him. Indeed, peer groups are noted for the ingenuity of interpretation which may be placed on both words and deeds, to the total confusion of the non-initiated. Alternatively, peer group figures may be established as models. While it is unlikely that an adolescent will become so significant politically that other children will want to base their own actions his, it is quite feasible that children will be stimulated, for example, to take an interest in political affairs, because their friends have demonstrated a concern.

The width of research into peer group political socialisation has been depressingly narrow and few studies have advanced beyond that hardy perennial - the party identification. Investigations in that area have shown that young people will tend to adhere to the same party identification as their friends. It seems moreover that this relationship becomes stronger with increasing age, corresponding to a declining association with the family.⁵⁷

We are not in a position to report in any detail on the relative impact of the peer group between the cognitive and affective domains, nor on its influence in the gradations in sophistication within each area, quite simply because of the lack of empirical research. In the absence of contrary evidence we are persuaded that the peer group will be effective in those areas which have already been exposed as most amenable to influence through the family relationship. They are concentrated for the most part in the affective domain and in the lower echelons.

One study which has cast some light on the strength of the peer group relationship in the political field, by Langton and Karns, found that this exerted less force than the family.⁵⁸ In practice it would seem to act as a supplementary agent in political reinforcement in that once the family had established a basic interest in political affairs, the peer group might then raise the individual to an even more positive political reaction. This would be quite in accord with arguments which we have already advanced, but it remains to be seen how far this finding on a limited front has more general applicability.

The effectiveness with which the peer group is able to influence the political growth of adolescents will obviously depend on a variety of factors.⁵⁹ In the first place, groups which cannot themselves agree on a common political perspective are most unlikely to be as effective as politically harmonious groups in passing on their views. Equally, it follows that the effectiveness of the peer group in political socialisation will depend on the importance that is attached by the group to political affairs. A third factor will be the level and intensity of the attachment of the individual to the peer group under consideration. Assuming that the peer group places some value on political affairs and is not divided on the interpretations which it gives to these problems the extent of the

group's influence will be more powerful where the individual has strong ties with the peer group than where he is little more than a nominal member.

A further complication arises where the individual is plugged into several secondary groups at one and the same time. For example, the social background of the adolescent's close friends is potentially influential; if homogeneous then the original political outlook that has been acquired will be reinforced but if there are marked dissimilarities the individual will be stimulated to reassess, if not finally change, his current political perspectives. One such situation which springs to mind in Britain is the dilemma facing the working class child in what is essentially a middle class oriented school environment. How far the outlook which has been inculcated in the family situation is able to withstand the contrary or hostile environment engendered in the school and the peer group - assuming, of course, that no working class clique is able to form - has attracted a burgeoning literature.⁶⁰ Tapper has carried this over into the political field and in contrast to findings in other areas, concluded that he had little evidence to support the proposition that working class children will accommodate or assimilate the middle class political views emanating from the school or their fellow pupils.⁶¹ However, Langton found that heterogeneous peer groups did bring about an appreciable change in the political orientations of working class children in the direction of a transference to more 'democratic' orientations, or whatever political views are held by the dominant middle class group.⁶²

It has been said in connection with the influence of the family, that it tends to make political socialisation a replicative, conservative process. The emphasis is on continuity from one generation to the next. The same is unlikely to be true of the peer group. Of course the peer

group, like the family, cannot be disentangled from the broader social structure in which it is set; both of these combine with secondary groups to influence the political learning of the adolescent. Nevertheless the peer group does appear to offer a more flexible approach to changing social and economic conditions. The reason for this is that the family, which provides the young child with its first experiences in political socialisation, tends to emphasize a rigid view of the political world which is best fitted to former circumstances, while the peer group brings a more contingent view of these established guidelines. Again, we imagine that the extent to which the peer group supplants the family relationship in political matters will depend in large part, on the value which each places on political learning. It is also probable that breaks between the generations in their political perspectives will arise more on specific policy decisions than in broad predispositions toward the political system, such as are contained in questions dealing with feelings of efficacy or cynicism.

Our conclusion on the peer group in political affairs is that its importance is more widely accepted than it is supported by empirical research. Their period of influence will emerge in middle childhood and from then on is likely to gain in force. With respect to the specific impact of peer groups in political socialisation, they are much like the family both in reasons for their potency and in their tendency to make the process of learning haphazard, non-deliberate and generally difficult to manage through any central source.⁶³ Similarly, the learning which takes place in the political sphere is most likely to be of secondary consequence to other activities, and cannot, for that reason, be guaranteed.

At this juncture we will leave the primary groups and move on

to secondary relationships. Here we shall begin by distinguishing between secondary groups and categoric groups.⁶⁴ We use the term 'categoric groups' to refer to broad categories in the population, such as social class or religion. They are composed of individuals whose reason for membership is to be found in their exhibition of the particular characteristic, whether it be a common set of beliefs or similar social background, which is taken as the basis on which the group has arisen. Categoric groups as such have no institutionalised anchor. They are not characterised by formal structures and processes as is the secondary group. The latter may well draw their members from a particular categoric group, but in order to carry out their continuous promotional role they have taken on an institutionalised form. It is in this sense that being a member of the working class is distinguished from being a member of the Labour Party.

There is little argument that categoric groups exert a powerful influence on the growth of political orientations. Innumerable studies across the whole spectrum of political orientations attest to the influence produced by groups based on such characteristics as social class, religious affiliation or ethnic origin. However, endless and nearly insuperable complications ensue for the researcher, where an individual is a member of several categoric groups, and each has a different political message to convey.

We will commence our discussion of categoric groups with one whose political influence does appear to be more general than most, namely social class. It has been established that this characteristic will affect socialisation experiences across a broad range of social learning.⁶⁵ In sum, they act as 'reference points or conceptual filters' which enable the individual to develop 'self-identifications and self-interpretations'

with which to structure the political world.⁶⁶ "Members of different social classes, by virtue of enjoying (or suffering) different conditions of life, come to see the world differently - to develop different conceptions of social reality, different aspirations and hopes and fears, different conceptions of the desirable."⁶⁷

Nonetheless, social class does seem to be far more influential in some areas than others, while in addition, it is unclear how far social class differences in the political orientations of adults will be manifested among adolescents. The Hess and Torney analysis of American elementary school children found little indication of variations between children of different social class background with respect to basic attachments to the nation and in their acceptance of law and authority in the political arena. However they did find that, "...lower status children more frequently accept authority figures as right and rely on their trustworthiness and benign intent. There is, therefore, more acquiescence to the formal structure and less tendency to question the motivations behind the behaviour of government officials."⁶⁸ Continuing through the affective domain, there was found to be a positive association between social class and feelings of political efficacy. Again, higher status children were more ready to adopt a party preference. Similar conclusions to these were reached by Greenstein.⁶⁹ He notes that while differences in the direction of participation have received the greatest attention, it is the differences in the degree of participation that are most clearly brought out in any analysis of political orientations based on social class differences. Research findings on class and political participation are impressive for their uniformity; the conclusion being that the lower the individual in social status, the less likely he is to be involved in political affairs, or indeed in any other aspect of community life.

Turning to the cognitive domain, past research has presented a more impressive list still of the influence of social class. Few exceptions exist to the rule that higher status children will be better able to provide evidence of simple recall knowledge of political actors and relationships. Higher social class also stimulates the development of the more advanced political skills, and abstract levels of conceptualisation and reasoning will emerge at a faster rate.⁷⁰

Conclusions on the influence of social class in political learning have been divided on whether children exhibit social class differences in political orientations to the same extent, or with the same force, as their parents. Greenstein, for example, found that lower status children were far less issue oriented in their political opinions and that this gap widened during adolescence.⁷¹ The same holds where children were asked to identify foreign countries with a general ideological position. While the gap does not exceed that found among adults it does seem to come up to the same level. In contrast, Easton and Dennis found that social class was not a particularly powerful predictor of responses indicating politicization, such as confidence in understanding the idea of government, or of the difference between public and private sectors. Nor was it more than a modest force in explaining the movement from personalisation to institutionalisation. While the differences were in the directions predicted, they could not be described as large, nor as consistent.⁷²

The lack of growth in political terms among children from a lower social background has been explained in terms of numerous situational and personality differences. Lane, in a useful summary of the influence of social class, surveys the possibility of variation in the amount of available leisure, in financial resources, in verbal skills, and in

subjective confidence besides different propensities to belong to social groups or develop wide social contacts, not to mention the psychologists' favourite, differences in child rearing practices.⁷³ He concludes his examination of the significance of social class differences in political socialisation by commenting that, "...in general, the middle class child seems to receive at the same time, greater encouragement to explore and be ambitious and greater capacity for internal regulation and purposive action."⁷⁴ Kohn in another summary of social class differences in family values and practices reiterates these arguments.⁷⁵ Related to the tendency of higher status parents to encourage an internalised sense of responsibility in their children is the finding that upper class children are more likely than lower class children to think and plan with long term goals in view, rather than being restricted to the necessity of immediate gratifications.⁷⁶ It is a characteristic of the middle class family style that it demands a greater degree of socio-economic thinking than is the case with the working class unit; all of which is important because such differences constitute the capacity built up among young people for coping with the intricate and abstract world of politics.

As with every other socialisation agent, any conclusion on the influence of social class in political socialisation must be couched in provisos and exceptions. One point in particular which should not be forgotten is that the studies reported have, with few exceptions, been based on American data and it may be that social class is a less virulent force in that country than is the case in Britain. Our suspicion is borne out in most of the published material on political socialisation research conducted in Britain.⁷⁷ This affirms that class does exert a definite influence on the development of political orientations in both the cognitive and affective domains. To take one example, that of the respondent's reported interest in politics, all of the English studies find wide

variation between the social classes. Extending this conclusion would hardly be in dispute but for the fact that the only other study which we can find providing evidence of the influence of social class on political learning in Scotland did not find that this was a significant influence, even in the perception of the political authorities, where the American data had supplied one of the strongest indications of an association.⁷⁸

How then does the influence of social class fit into the overall picture of relative impact among the various socialisation forces? We have set down our belief that the child will obtain much of his approach to political matters from the primary relationships in which he is a member. It is now apparent that the social class to which the adolescent belongs will add a further dimension to the way in which the political world is structured. In conjunction, these two factors will produce distinct political stereotypes. The working class family passes on orientations in which the political world is not amenable to individual influence or one from which much positive improvement can be expected. The political arena does not interest the individual from such a background and he is content to neglect opportunities to acquire or pass on political knowledge. In comparison, the middle class child is presented with a self-identification which views the political domain as at least worthy of concern, if not more active involvement.

Another categoric group, which has already been mentioned several times in this discussion for illustrative purposes, and which is believed to have some influence in social learning, is the religious affiliation of the individual. However, little of the empirical research on the religious factor in adult political orientations has found its equivalent study among younger people.⁷⁹ Even so, the width of impact attributed by these studies to the religious affiliation is not very great. Findings

are generally restricted to the conclusion that the religious identification is related to the party preference even where one controls for such obvious confounding factors as the social class of the respondent. In Britain the association of the Catholic community with the Labour Party is well documented, while in America the same group has concentrated its support on the Democratic Party, especially during the Kennedy era.⁸⁰

If this association with the party identification were the only influence of religion to which we could point, there would be scant justification for its inclusion in our study. Influences of a wider theoretical concern have nevertheless been alleged to emanate from the religious affiliation - this being operationalised in our study as a straightforward dichotomy between Catholics and a more disparate group of non-Catholic children. In particular, some have suggested that young Catholics are more prepared to evaluate authority in glowing terms because of their confusing the political realm with the higher religious authorities, if not the highest. Hess and Torney, for example, note that young Catholics in their sample were more liable to describe the President as 'about the best person in the world' with absolute control over the country's affairs as well as being personally solicitous for the well-being of each individual citizen.⁸¹ We suggest that this is more likely to be the consequence of there being a Catholic President at that time than to any propensity towards idealisation of those in authority; certainly there is abundant evidence from Northern Ireland that Catholic children differentiate between the political authorities and those with power in their own faith.

Another incongruity has been offered by Bull, who in a study of moral development, found a tendency among young Catholic children to personify moral struggles as being between God and the devil - and for

this group, God and the political authorities were on the same side.⁸² The explanation that is given for this phenomena is that Catholic children are taught that it is important to distinguish between accidental and sinful actions, and so to evaluate a deed for its motivation. To think in such terms is to stimulate what we earlier described as objective responsibility.

In summary, we imagine that the religious group's influence in political learning will derive from the same factors which have been applied to social class. However, evidence in Britain that the religious group places any marked stress on political affairs is piecemeal and for that reason we do not expect to find that religious affiliation exerts much influence among adolescents.

From categoric groups we will turn to their institutionalised counterparts in secondary relationships. We have said that the features which distinguish secondary from categoric groups are the former's formal structures and processes. We can distinguish further among secondary groups between those which are openly and directly pursuing political aims and others where political messages are transmitted in an indirect and incidental fashion, if at all. Previous studies among Scottish youth have shown that membership of the former is miniscule and for that reason we have concentrated on the act of membership in any secondary group, and ignored whether or not these have overt political objectives.⁸³

Organizational membership is obviously an insensitive barometer for the influence of secondary groups. What we have hypothesized, despite this, is that membership in any such organization, where that is a voluntary act, will operate as a stimulant to participation in political activities. No doubt those with an interest in political affairs will demonstrate a strong willingness to join secondary organizations; what we would claim

is that, over and above this, the joining of secondary groups will itself act as a spur to political involvement. In respect of the way in which secondary groups affect political learning they, like categoric groups, act as reference groups for their members; but equally they have an important contribution to play by giving their members experience in relationships which are more directly related to the world of politics than is likely to be the case with primary groups. The experience and confidence that is developed has political pay-offs in terms of higher levels of interest in political matters and an increased feeling of competence with respect to the political world. In sum, participation in secondary groups is thought to generate skills, information and pre-dispositions which are ripe for transference to the realm of political relationships.⁸⁴

In addition to those secondary institutions for which membership is a voluntary act, there are others to which the adolescent will belong because this is required by law - the obvious example being attendance at school. While not established for specifically political purposes, the school has traditionally been involved with citizenship education, both directly and indirectly. Furthermore, in Britain, the school system has been so modelled to reinforce existing social cleavages and differences, that its political impact cannot be ignored. Thus, one type of school will be found preparing its membership for an essentially inactive political role, while others will be encouraging their pupils to believe that political involvement is not merely a right but a duty. While the political education offered by the school will vary between the type of school attended, it is also possible that continued membership of an educational institution will in itself be a stimulant to political learning.

Although the school will generally be reinforcing perspectives

developed in other contexts the instances where there exists a more heterogeneous social membership have proved a source of attraction for researchers. Of course this problem has considerable overlap with the influence of the peer group in political learning.⁸⁵

Membership in the primary or secondary group has been held up as a prime factor in political socialisation, but it will be supplemented by the child's experiences of political reality. One does not expect young adolescents to be involved in political activities in any direct sense, although it is far more probable that they will be exposed to events in the political world through other secondary sources such as the mass media. While there is little dispute about the communicator's power to transmit political messages, there remains the question of how, if at all, they will influence an individual's political thinking.⁸⁶ It has been suggested that the media do act essentially as reinforcing agents. That is, the messages not only originate in the main with other agents but in turn they are interpreted and received by individuals who are themselves in a particular social setting. Individuals will then tend to tune in to those agents which are purveying the same political predispositions as themselves, or the recipient will be more attentive and willing to believe messages which fit in easily with his own preconceptions of the political world and its relationships.

A number of studies of the influence of the media in social learning have found that the transmission of information is characterised by a two-way process.⁸⁷ The messages which are emitted by the media do not travel directly to the mass of the population, mainly because the latter do not pay much attention to such items, but instead reach a relatively small number of 'opinion leaders'. This latter group, which includes such people as political leaders, teachers and other local and national 'notables'

in primary and secondary groups, will be inclined to reinterpret political information transmitted through the media in a way which will contribute to a reinforcement of existing perceptions which that group has of the political world. Few studies have found that the media is an effective way of converting persons to new political ideas although it might be difficult to convince politicians or advertising men of the validity of this finding.⁸⁸

Insofar as political news consumption from the media will vary between groups, we expect that this will prove to be an influence on the acquisition of cognitive knowledge. The affective domain is not thought, at least at the lower levels of sophistication, to be much affected by the level of consumption so much as the political leaning of the sources from which its media information is taken. Unfortunately, in this study we were not in a position to report on the political predisposition of the various media isolated for examination.

It is an integral part of our theoretical perspective on political socialisation that the agents and forces, in both primary and secondary relationships, will be operating against a backdrop of individual differences in sex, intelligence as well as the rate and stage of cognitive development exhibited by the individual. Including these variables as individual differences does not mean that we are ignoring, or have rejected, the argument that some of these are themselves subject to the social forces already enumerated. For example, it is well established in the literature that tests designed to measure intelligence are biased towards those characteristics which have been found prevalent among middle class children.⁸⁹ While accepting that one's intelligence score, as measured by the so-called intelligence quotient, will be liable to social influence we do feel that intelligence and the forces already outlined are manifestly not one and the same thing and that intelligence, as with other individual differences, will in part transcend these social forces.

Chronological age as well as the rate and stage of cognitive development are closely bound together and these have already been considered at some length in the first part of this chapter. The discussion of individual differences will then be restricted to the effect of sex and intelligence on political orientations.

The learning of sex roles begins very early in the child's life.⁹⁰ Most children of three or four are aware that human beings are of two sexes. When the parents know that their child can recognise this fact, they begin in earnest to shape the child's behaviour to conform to the social and sexual role that he must occupy. The teaching continues as the child realises the full meaning of differing sexuality. Variation in political learning will be built on these sex roles which have been acquired in other social contacts.

Bull is in no doubt that girls have a more profound sensitivity in their personal relationships and social attitudes.⁹¹ In addition, boys exceeded girls in their residual anomy and in their greater dependence on heteronomy. The latter, in addition, demonstrated a far stronger sociocentric orientation and earlier progress towards autonomy. Even at the age of 17 years, Bull reports that significant differences between the sexes in the aforementioned areas still remain.

We report these findings at the outset, in part because they cover aspects of the central focus of our own study, but also because they contradict almost every documented sex difference in political socialisation research. Far from being more advanced in her political growth than the male, the female has always been categorised - at least during adolescence - as lagging behind and increasingly so. This applies in both the cognitive and affective domains, though discrepancies seem more pronounced in the latter area. There is an abundance of support for the proposition of

differential perspectives on the political world ranging from a lower rate of acquisition of political orientations to contrasting levels of interest in political affairs and support for democratic norms. Greenstein, in his study of fourth to eighth grade children, discovered that boys scored higher on a test of political information, were more interested in national than regional news, and when asked to name a news story, were more likely than girls to cite a political item.⁹² Again, where political advice was needed it was the father rather than the mother who was held up as the obvious source. While Greenstein detected general sex differences in political learning, others have tracked down a more differential impact. For example, Hess and Torney found variation with respect to political participation but not in the degree of political knowledge.⁹³ Easton and Dennis located differences in cognitive responses to developmental concepts such as personalism and institutionalisation. Girls were less sure of what the term 'government' covered and were more inclined to view this as a matter of personalities rather than to institutionalize the political authorities.⁹⁴ In the same area Hess and Torney report that girls are more prone to think of the political world in heterogomous terms.⁹⁵ All of which is a complete contradiction of the conclusions reached by Bull that girls would maintain their superiority, in purely developmental terms, throughout the period of adolescence. Turning to the affective responses Easton and Dennis spot marginal, but consistent, sex differences in such areas as basic loyalty and support for the country or the regime.⁹⁶

In a similar vein, Dowse and Hughes unearthed sex differences in the anticipated direction but were more struck by the weakness of this association.⁹⁷ What is more, the sex differences revealed did not seem to grow wider with increasing age as most socialisation studies conclude. This last finding is to be contrasted with another English study which found that girls narrow the knowledge gap between themselves and their male

counterparts as they grow older.⁹⁸

While allowing for disagreement about the strength of the sex difference in political learning, there does appear to be general acceptance on the direction in which any differences will run. What, we have to ask, are the reasons for this sex typing in political orientations? Dowse and Hughes offer two main lines of possible explanation.⁹⁹ The first points to the structural impediments to involvement felt by the female as she has to look after home and family, to the exclusion of opportunities for involvement in political activities. If rigorously interpreted, the structural explanation implies that sexual differences in the political field will not be evident until these structural constraints, namely marriage and a family, are present. Extending the logic of this argument as they see it, Dowse and Hughes suggest that sex differences in adolescence with respect to politics, would not be present.

The second course of explanation is the one which has in the main characterised political socialisation research. It emphasises that sex differences among adolescents in political terms may be attributed to the cultural norm, with which we are all familiarised through our primary and social contacts, that politics is the preserve of the male of the species rather than the female. Nevertheless, the reason why women are not encouraged to view the political arena as one in which they should show an active concern has to be attributed to something; the excuse most likely to be employed is that the woman's role is in the home and it is because of the constraints which this domestic role imposes on her that she is warned off from political affairs. The gap between the two types of explanation does not therefore seem to be especially wide, but rather part of the same problem.¹⁰⁰ Uncovering sex role differences in political orientations during adolescence does not in itself constitute a refutation of the structural explanation. Equally, there is a wealth

of post-school political socialisation for the young adult which may prove to be more decisive than anything acquired in one's adolescent years spent in the relatively protected and more egalitarian school system.

On a more general point we remarked that political socialisation research has all too often neglected change possibilities. Our examination of sex differences illustrates the way in which one can slip into the assumption that today's adolescents should exhibit the differences that characterise their parents. At a time when the role of women in British society is said to be undergoing a transformation, a narrowing of the gap between the female and the male in their approach to the world of politics is to be expected. Verification of such a trend demands a long term, longitudinal investigation, but we suggest that the adolescent sex differences which we locate in politics may be attributed to a complicated melange of cultural norms, anticipatory socialisation for structural constraints and differential post-school experience between males and females. Together these reflect the social change which is bringing women to a position of greater equality with men in the range of activity in which they may engage.

The final individual difference which we have encompassed in this study is the intelligence of the individual respondent. By intelligence we understand the level of mental awareness and quickness in understanding that is measured by the intelligence quotient score.¹⁰¹ We appreciate that intelligence tests are subject to criticism on the grounds that they are invalid, unreliable and guilty of class bias. Despite arguments that they are influenced by social factors and allowing for the underlying problems in operationalising intelligence we would claim that the obvious theoretical relevance to learning of 'intelligence' overrides these difficulties.

Piaget in his research, is rather ambiguous about the importance of intelligence, tending to dismiss it as one of the 'interfering factors' in the overall development process.¹⁰² This we would doubt; instead, it seems as if intelligence contains many of the characteristics of cognitive capacity in that the facility in understanding implied in the notion of intelligence will be similar to the force which stimulates growth through critical points in the process of development.

Where research has included intelligence in the overall design, the findings have consistently emphasized the significance of this construct. Hess and Torney conclude that intelligence is one of the most important mediating influences in the acquisition of political behaviour.¹⁰³ The overall effect is to accelerate the political growth found among adolescents. This is also the conclusion of studies into moral development. The function of intelligence is manifest, claims Bull. It is a factor in the development to the highest cognitive stages and in particular, it hastens the move into socionomy and reciprocity.¹⁰⁴

Back in the world of politics again, the facilitating nature of intelligence is seen as particularly noticeable in the rate of acquisition of political orientations. The emerging representation of government in non-personal and institutional terms has also been found to be more positively associated with the higher intelligence levels. This indicates that the child with a high I.Q. score is better able to absorb an abstract conceptualisation such as 'government'. Other differences emerge in this area which substantiate the impression that intelligence has an impact on political development. For example, children of high I.Q. tend to view the political authorities in less rigid terms. It follows that such children place less emphasis on the necessity of punishment or on the rigidity of laws. This should not be taken to imply that the high I.Q.

child is denigrating all laws since all children, irrespective of their level of intelligence, accept the obligation of the citizen to comply with the law. However, high I.Q. children are more likely to air their grievances about the injustice of some laws.¹⁰⁵

The conclusion on the influence of intelligence score is that it is positively related to political development; and this applies equally to the cognitive domain. Both simple recall of political knowledge and knowledge of issue awareness have been found to be significantly related to intelligence.¹⁰⁶ However, far less impact has been recorded in the affective domain. This is to be explained in terms of the more direct interaction between cognitive development and intelligence in contrast to the affective domain where evaluations of political relationships have little basis in the intelligence level of the respondent. This does not mean an absence of differences, but rather that they are not consistently in one direction. High I.Q. children have, for example, been exposed as less supportive of the political system, yet few studies have argued that they are more cynical of the competence of the political authorities. Some have found that high I.Q. children, though more realistic in their perception of political relationships, are nonetheless equally supportive of democratic norms such as toleration and efficacy. The latter area is subject to some dispute however, as American studies have produced contradictory findings about the relationship of feelings of efficacy and intelligence. Using data from that Chicago study again White, employing a most questionable statistical technique, concluded that some of the largest differences among the I.Q. groups appear in the area of political efficacy.¹⁰⁷ A more recent study however, concluded that political efficacy showed no significant association with I.Q. score.¹⁰⁸

With regard to showing the basic interest in political activity,

Hess and Torney report that high I.Q. children are more interested in governmental matters and also tend to emphasize the importance of this activity; this is manifested in their greater willingness to participate in political discussions and to express concern about contemporary questions. It is also revealed in their greater independence of family influence in political matters. They are not only more independent in their party identification, but are generally more willing to entertain the possibility of change in government. In sum, intelligence is associated with a greater immersion in the world of politics.¹⁰⁹

We mentioned at the outset that intelligence was seen as a major mediating influence in political learning, but many of the studies on which we have reported would attribute a more independent force to intelligence. A study which attempted some simple causal modelling based on I.Q., social class and a selected dependent variable from the political field, concluded that of the alternative models that could be composed from this triumvirate, the best fit was obtained where I.Q. mediates between social class and the political orientation.¹¹⁰ The use of intelligence as an independent variable was less successful, and in the light of this solitary piece of evidence, we reiterate our view that intelligence is to be seen more as a mediating force rather than as an independent factor.

With intelligence, we will bring to a close our discussion of the main agents of political socialisation, and the central individual differences through which the learning of political orientations is directed. Taken with the earlier section on the developmental aspects to political learning, we have completed our examination of the theoretical context in which learning proceeds, in so far as we have discussed the factors contained in our empirical study.

We do not claim to be talking in very specific terms of a theory

of political socialisation; nor has it been our intention to create one. Yet, we do believe that the approach followed in this thesis directs us to a set of questions and hypotheses which constitute a valid structure for an investigation of political education.

The question which presented the focus for this study was: by what methods, and in what ways, does political learning take place? We have, for the most part, ignored questions and deny that we directly supply answers, which will account for the way in which political socialisation processes affect the operation of the political system. At this stage, our interest is with the pattern of learning rather than the influence which orientations exert on the future stability of the political system. The overview which we have adopted, attempts to link together patterns in political development with changing cognitive capacity and the varying effect of the major agents and individual differences which are believed to influence this process. Those areas of political thinking, particularly in the affective domain, which will not be directly modified by changing cognitive capacity, will be examined from a developmental perspective although we expect far less evidence for consistent trends to emerge with increasing age. The resultant framework may well be considered an idealisation in certain aspects, in need of both theoretical and empirical renovation, but it does serve the essential task of suggesting a research line which poses questions central to an understanding of some of the central features of political learning.

The whole ethos of this study is that political socialisation should be viewed in developmental terms where the concentration on one age group cannot but give an incomplete and unsatisfactory picture. Yet many of the insights of political socialisation are derived from the empirical preference of survey researchers for college students or those

in middle adolescence. And this despite the findings of learning theorists that concept formation and the acquisition of orientations is a fairly continuous process - at least until the end of adolescence. By accepting a developmental perspective, we must question the theoretical justification of taking one age group and generalising one's findings to a much wider group of young people or taking several age groups and treating them as a uniform sample. Instead, we have argued that concepts and attitudes in the political field will be subject to a pattern of development as the individual grows older; there may even be points at which learning capacity increases markedly or alternatively falls off. The extent to which this pattern of growth is affected by social forces and other sources of influence is another unknown factor which is considered in our investigation. We suspect that, while political learning is a continuous process, social and individual circumstances operate in such a way that some groups make inordinate advances at certain periods or in particular areas. It is our task to find out whether this suspicion has any basis in the data provided by a sample of Scottish adolescents of secondary school age.

Summary of Relative Influence of Social Forces and Individual Differences.

	General Interest Support & Discourse	Interest & Discourse	Political Norms	Party Id.	Recall Knowledge	Issue Knowledge	Conceptual- ization
Family	S	S	S	S	M	M	W
Peer group	M	S	M	S	M	M	W
Social Class	S	S	S	S	S	M	M
Religion	W	W	W	M	W	W	W
Organisation	W	M	M	W	W	W	W
Mass Media	W	W	W	W	M	M	W
Sex	W	S	M	M	M	M	M
Intelligence	W	S	M	W	S	S	S

Key:

S = strong influence

M = moderate influence

W = weak influence

Footnotes to Chapter Two: The Theoretical Framework.

1. For this author there is a theoretical vacuum in some writings which makes one question the significance that has been attached to 7 or 8 year olds extemporizing on the 'benevolent' or malevolent' image of the United States President, e.g. Greenstein, F., The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority, American Political Science Review, 54, Dec.1960, pp 934-944.
2. Langton offers a similar approach which he calls 'micro-macro', in that he emphasizes political socialisation as an interaction-acquisition process, although he makes no attempt to tie in his conceptualisation of political socialisation with developmental problems as we shall be doing in this study. Langton, K., Political Socialisation, Oxford, 1969, pp 10-11.
3. Easton, D., and Dennis, J., Children in the Political System, McGraw-Hill, 1969.
4. See: Mussen, P.H., Early Socialisation; Learning and Identification, in G. Mandler et al., New Directions in Psychology, III, New York, Holt, 1967.
5. For a contrary opinion see: Bandura, A., and Walters, R.H., Social Learning and Personality Development, New York, Holt, 1963.
6. Whiting, J., Resource mediation and learning by identification, in I.Iscoe and H. Stevenson, eds., Personality Development in Children, University of Texas Press, 1960, p.118.
7. Kagan, J., The concept of identification, Psych.Rev., 1958, 65, pp 296-305.
8. Murphy, L., et al., The Widening World of Childhood: Paths toward Mastery, New York, Basic Books, 1962.
9. Langton, op.cit. pp 10-11.
10. Easton and Dennis, op.cit. chapter 8.
11. Maier, H., Three Theories of Child Development, Harper, Rev.ed.1969, p.3.
12. See: Piaget, J., Logic and Psychology, University of Manchester Press,1953.
13. See: Kay, W., Moral Development, London, 1968.
14. An extreme naturalist position is contained in: Gesell, A., & Thomson, H., Learning and Growth in Identical Twin Infants, Genet, Psychol. Monographs, 6, 1929, pp 1-124.

15. Bandura and Walters, op.cit.
16. See: Eckstein, H., A Theory of Stable Democracy, Princeton, 1961.
17. For critical comments on the 'inter-personal model see: Jaros, D., Hirsch, H., & Fleron, F., The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialisation in an American Sub-Culture, American Political Science Review, 62, 1968, pp 564-575; Rose, R., The Authority of Regimes: An Irish Perspective, Faber, London, Chapter XI, forthcoming.
18. Hess, R., & Torney, J., The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values toward Government and Citizenship during the Elementary School Year, Part I, Co-operative Research Project No. 1078, University of Chicago, 1965, pp 70-72.
19. Ibid. p.72.
20. Piaget, op.cit. Chapter II.
21. This topic is extensively reviewed in: Laurendeau, M., & Pinard, M., Causal Thinking in the Child, New York, 1962.
22. Merelman, R., The Development of Political Ideology, American Political Science Review, 1969, pp 750-767.
23. Adelson, J., & O'Neil, R., Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.4, No.3, 1966, pp 295-306.
24. Ibid. p.306.
25. Ibid. p.306.
26. Converse, P., The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in D. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, Free Press, 1964, p.207.
27. Sartori, G., Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems, American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No.2, June 1969, pp 398-407.
28. Ibid. pp 406-407.
29. Piaget, J., The Moral Judgement of the Child, Free Press, 1965.
30. Easton and Dennis, op.cit., pp 209-241; Hess and Torney, op.cit. p.91-113.
31. Hess and Torney, op.cit. p.116.
32. Ibid. pp 96-97.
33. See: Easton and Dennis, op.cit. Chapter 10.
34. Ibid. chapters 8 and 9.
35. Adelson and O'Neil, op.cit. p.295.

36. This discussion revolves around problems which are covered in more length in: Dawson, R., & Prewitt, K., Political Socialisation, Little Brown, 1969, pp 99-103.
37. Ibid. p.100.
38. Ibid. p.101.
39. Ibid. chapter 7; see too: Jennings, M.K., The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child, American Political Science Review, 62, March 1968, pp 169-184. and, Dowse, R., & Hughes J., The Family and the Process of Political Socialisation, Sociology, Vol.5., No.1., Jan.1971 pp21-47.
40. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit., pp 107-110.
41. Ibid. p.108.
42. Hyman, H., Political Socialisation, New York, Free Press, 1959, p.72.
43. Jennings and Niemi, op.cit. pp 183-184.
44. Hyman, op.cit. p.74; and Jennings and Niemi, op.cit. pp 174-175.
45. Jennings and Niemi, p.183.
46. Certain complications in interpretation ensue from the tendency in American studies to allow for a category of 'independents' whereas most British studies ignore this possibility: See Greenstein, op.cit. p.73; Hess and Torney, op.cit. TABLE 51; analysis of Tapper's data gives a non-identification total of 30.8%; Dowse and Hughes, op.cit. produce a figure of non-identification figure of 52% but give no breakdown by age.
47. Tapper, E.R., Secondary School Adolescents: A Study of their Role Aspirations and Attitudinal Patterns, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1968. Analysis of his data has been carried out by this author. See Langton, op.cit. Chapter 3.
48. Dowse & Hughes, op.cit.
49. Butler, D., & Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain, Macmillan, 1970, p.57.
50. Dowse and Hughes, op.cit. p.31; See for a somewhat different conclusion: Langton, op.cit., chapter 2.
51. See Greenstein, op.cit. chapter 3.
52. Middleton, R., & Putney, S., Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion, American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII, 1963, pp 527-535. Little evidence of adolescent political rebellion was found, although it will depend on the extent to which the family itself considers politics an important activity. See Langton, op.cit. Chapter 2.

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54. Hess and Torney, op.cit. pp.184-200.
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59. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit. p.137.
60. Jackson, B., & Marsden, D., Education and the Working Class, Penguin, 1966.
61. Tapper, op.cit.
62. Langton, op.cit. Chapter 5.
63. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit., p.140.
64. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit. chapter 10.
65. Hess and Torney, op.cit. pp 229-304; Greenstein, op.cit. chapter 5.
66. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit. p.184.
67. Kohn, M., Social Class and the Parent-child relationships: An Interpretation, American Journal of Sociology, 1963, 68, pp 471-480.
68. Hess and Torney, op.cit. pp 126-172 and p.235.
69. Greenstein, op.cit. chapter 5.
70. Adelson and O'Neil, op.cit. did not in fact have a wide background of social class background in their sample, pp 296-297. For an account of differences which do seem influenced by social class see: Easton and Dennis, op.cit. chapter 16.
71. Greenstein, op.cit. pp 95-97.
72. Easton and Dennis, op.cit., pp 351-354; pp 377-379.
73. Lane, R., Political Life, Free Press, 1959.
74. Ibid. p.288.
75. Kohn, op.cit. p.475.
76. Bull, op.cit. pp 37-45.
77. Tapper, op.cit.; Dowse and Hughes, op.cit.; Nossiter, T., How Children Learn About Politics, New Society, July 31st, 1969, pp 166-167.

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84. Almond and Verba, op.cit. p.309.
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86. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit. pp 194-200.
87. Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P., Personal Influence, Free Press, 1955.
88. Key, K.O., Public Opinion and American Democracy, New York, 1961, p.396.
89. Vernon, P.E., Intelligence and Attainment Tests, University of London Press, 1960.
90. Seward, G., Sex and the Social Order, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1946.
91. Bull, op.cit. pp 42-43.
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93. Hess and Torney, op.cit. pp 305-334.
94. Easton and Dennis, op.cit. pp 337-343.
95. Hess and Torney, op.cit. p.319.
96. Easton and Dennis, op.cit. p.378.
97. Dowse, R., & Hughes, J., Girls, Boys and Politics, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXII, No.1, March 1971, pp 53-67.
98. Nossiter, op.cit. p.166.
99. Dowse and Hughes, Girls, Boys and Politics, op.cit.
100. Ibid. pp 63-65.
101. Problems on the use of I.Q. scores are elaborated in: Harvey, S.K., and Harvey, T.G., Adolescent Political Outlooks: The Effects of Intelligence as an Independent Variable, Mid-West Journal of Political Science, Vol.XIV, No.4, Nov.1970, pp 565-595.

102. Piaget, J., *The Origin of Intelligence in the Child*, London, Routledge, 1953.
103. Hess and Torney, *op.cit.* p.382.
104. Bull, *op.cit.* pp 43-45.
105. Hess and Torney, *op.cit.* p.382.
106. Harvey & Harvey, *op.cit.* pp 580-582.
107. White, E., *Intelligence and Sense of Political Efficacy*, *Journal of Politics*, 1968, vol.30, pp 710-731. See too: Jackman, R., *a Note on Intelligence, Social Class and Political Efficacy in Children*, *Journal of Politics*, No.4, Vol.32, Nov.1970, pp 984-988.
108. Harvey & Harvey, *op.cit.* p.583.
109. Hess and Torney, *op.cit.* pp 382-383.
110. Harvey & Harvey, *op.cit.* p.593.

Chapter Three: Modern Studies: the theory and practice of a political education.

A school education is well established as a significant influence in the acquisition of political orientations; it affects both the transfer of information and values that relate directly to the political world as well as other information, values and methods of perceiving the world which may find expression as political dispositions. Research, has, for example, established a clear association between those having the highest level of education and a high level of interest in politics and participation in political affairs.¹ Significantly however this relationship has been formulated in terms of the length of time spent at school, or the academic and social characteristics of the institution and its pupils, rather than the content of the education as reflected in the school curriculum. Our concern is to rectify this omission by examining whether what is taught in political education courses has an effect consistent with its intentions. In order to obtain a fair and meaningful assessment of the course isolated in this investigation we shall begin by explaining in some detail the relevant theoretical objectives of Modern Studies and the background to their practical implementation in the school.

Earlier we described political education courses as being designed to encourage the development of good citizens. And yet the subject matter and method of presentation of such courses will vary considerably, although little is known of the nature and extent of any possible differential characteristics on the recipients. To be fair to both political education courses in general and to Modern Studies in particular, our discussion will pinpoint those features which make Modern Studies a rather novel course in political education - at least in so far as Britain is concerned.

To consider formal instruction in politics in the school curriculum in Scotland is to investigate the rise of Modern Studies. The teaching of politics at G.C.E. level in England has no counterpart in Scotland. Here direct formal political education has only recently been introduced and then it has been subsumed under the more neutral title of Modern Studies; this being interpreted to include not only the material of a British Constitution course but in addition wider social and economic events and trends of current national and international significance. The teaching of politics which existed before the introduction of Modern Studies in Scotland was almost exclusively of an indirect nature.² It is difficult to find any recognition among educationalists that they had in the slightest way been involved with the provision of a political education. Much of the confusion devolves from disagreements about what is meant by a political education. In common usage 'politics' is generally restricted to the world of inter-party dispute; and keeping a question 'out of (or above) politics' signifies that party politicians have not adopted bipartisan stands on that issue. This perspective has been a powerful influence on the reception accorded to political education courses in the schools. On the one hand we have those who restrict politics to a study of the British Constitution and on the other hand we have those who would so widen its scope that political education is little more than a synonym for character building. Yet both approaches exclude the world of party politics. In contrast Modern Studies was established to generate a more realistic and comprehensive examination of contemporary affairs encompassing important social and economic as well as controversial political problems.

How did it come about that Scottish schools should progress from dabbling with indirect civic education to direct schemes? The emergence of Modern

Studies raises general questions about the nature and variety of educational and curricula change. This latter has been described as, "a variety of educational change, which, in turn, is one form of social change."³ It is possible to show that such a conclusion may be applied in the case of Modern Studies. We can go further however. Not only may we view Modern Studies as a condition of social change (i.e. where the introduction of Modern Studies has been brought about as a consequence of broader social changes), but we can consider Modern Studies as an agent of social change (i.e. where social changes are brought about as a result of the introduction of Modern Studies). In addition Modern Studies may be viewed as an effect of other curricula changes, that is, where one part of the curriculum adjusts to changes occurring in other areas. We shall begin by examining how far Modern Studies may be regarded as a condition of social change or other curriculum changes and then look at the possibilities that it may itself be an agent of change.

Although no authoritative account exists of the emergence of Modern Studies in Scotland, there is no reason to believe that the situation is substantially different with that recounted by Channon on the fortunes of the social studies in England, for it is out of the social studies stable that Modern Studies has emerged.⁴ Obviously different school practices apply between Scotland and England but it is felt that the social pressures which gave birth to Modern Studies in Scotland are much the same as those which in England stimulated a whole range of social studies courses.⁵ Cannon pinpoints the Hadow Report of 1926 as the first recorded instance of official recognition of the need for more, "social relevance in the curriculum." Hadow appealed, sotto voce, that, "The general character of teaching should take account of the pupil's natural

and social environment."⁶ Cannon isolates two central reasons for, "this desire for more social relevance in the curriculum; the desire to educate citizens for democracy, and the sometimes dimly felt urge to equip young people to cope with the complex environment in which they will find themselves on leaving school."⁷ There seems to be little reason to doubt that in the period immediately preceding and just after the Second World War considerable urgency was added to the desire to disseminate formally the civic heritage on which British democracy was founded. Internal as well as external threats were seen to the very ideals of democracy which had been thought the bastions of the British way of life. It is as if the successful end to the conflict had produced a euphoria of egalitarianism - that those in the midst of the suffering should now share an appreciation of the system those gone before had been defending.⁸

Hitherto any specific proposals for reform of the social studies curriculum aroused considerable scorn. The Norwood Report in 1941 efficiently summarized the opposition to the spread of direct civic education.⁹ They argued that preparation for life would be best achieved through the traditional 'social studies' subjects - history and geography - but that even these were to be seen only as supplements to normal experience. Indeed for Norwood citizenship was best achieved not via the curriculum but through its practice in the 'microcosm of the school community'. By this they meant presumably a system of prefect, not pupil, power. The claims of any new social studies subjects for inclusion in the curriculum were rejected on the grounds that children were not yet ready to consider their political duties since this experience was still well in front of them. Instead they were to be prepared for their citizen role through the widely extolled virtue of the 'tone' of the school.

Of course it was recognised that the tone of some schools left something to be desired. It was really for these schools and their so-called non-academic pupils that fresh directions in the social studies came to be sought after. Educational reasons played very much second fiddle to the pressures being brought to bear on the school as a result of wider social and economic changes. The growth in the numbers staying on at school and the increased need by industry for a more literate work force were creating a group with rising expectations, both social and economic. The social studies course was seen as a vehicle for providing them with a more balanced perception of the world they were about to enter. Such courses were yet to be accepted as having relevance for the 'academic' child, who apparently was conditioned to political realities by the rigours of the examination system.

Those advocating the introduction of new subjects, specifically chosen for their social relevance, were spearheaded by the Association for Education in World Citizenship.¹⁰ As early as the 1930's this group had been calling for the addition of Economics and Politics to the school curriculum, largely because they were sceptical about the assumption that a more or less automatic 'transfer of training' occurs from other subjects or the school community. The growth of this unease with the traditional curriculum was echoed by the Report in Scotland of the Advisory Council in 1947.¹¹ This found justification for social studies on the grounds of their supposed 'relevance' to the pupil though they were equally emphatic that this 'relevance' should be attributed to the lesser demands which such courses were alleged to make of the pupils. The view was growing that young people needed to be more adequately equipped for modern life by the school and in a broader sense than ensuring an unswerving obedience to adult or established ways. Lanarkshire was in the vanguard of those providing

published evidence of this fresh direction in educational thinking. Even before the Advisory Council on Secondary Education had brought out their report, "a committee of Lanarkshire teachers was engaged on the preparation of a report on the 'Teaching of History' in their area. When the Advisory Council's report was published this committee decided to take up the proposal for a new subject to be called the Social Studies, and to try to make it more precise and concrete."¹² The report gives detailed suggestions for syllabii which overlap quite considerably with Modern Studies as it was first constituted. Needless to add experiments with these suggestions were restricted to the Junior Secondary school where they would not interfere with certificate examination work. Though the initial post-war fervour to improve the child's lot through changes in the curriculum was larger than previous movements it subsided quickly.

The novelty in these social studies lies as much in the reasons given to justify their introduction as in their content. There was a growing recognition of a new dimension in the school's repertoire of objectives - that it should engage in direct training in citizenship through courses which sought to break down some of the taboos concerning inter-disciplinary study and which also introduced new knowledge into the school curriculum. Cannon identifies three main reasons behind this trend: "...first, the practical one that school leavers should be aware of the facilities and opportunities of their local community; second, there is the stress on the inculcation of fixed standards in a world of shifting moral values; and third, the belief that it is possible to educate for social change in a more direct sense by encouraging the flexibility necessary to profit from and guide new social movements."¹³ If, as we read, the criteria for including a subject in the secondary school curriculum was to be its basis in changing

social conditions the future of social studies type courses seemed assured. Yet instead of firmly overcoming opposition a wave of reaction set in which made a victim of the attempts to branch out from the strict history or geography base. The social studies movement proved to be a bubble which burst as dramatically in the 1950's as it had arisen in the 40's. The schools and the teachers returned to the traditional curriculum - though it is not suggested that anything more than a small minority of teachers ever left the established one. Curricular change, then as now, has a tendency to promote more expectation than activity.

Why did these social studies courses fail to catch on in Scotland? In part this failure may be attributed to the considerable attachment in Scotland, even in the Junior Secondary schools, to the traditional academic and bookish curriculum. And yet the objections go even wider than one single cause. In addition there was a failure to identify a body of material which would not fall victim to charges that it was so amorphous as to become all things to all men. Social studies courses were criticised for being too broad and vague but they were equally sabotaged by the over-exaggerated claims of their proposals. Furthermore these courses ran foul of the old educational maxim that success should be attributed to the quality of the teaching whereas failure must be due to the shortcomings in learning - that is, the pupil or the course is blamed as deficient. The social studies have therefore borne the brunt of criticism that the pupils who have taken the course have not acquired an independent approach to, and judgement of current problems; a failing which the History teacher has always been allowed to dismiss as a function of the lack of ability of his pupils.

A complicating factor was that at this time there were no concerted attempts to engage the brighter pupil in the Senior Secondary School in the

new social studies courses. The pressure of exams especially precluded any non-examinable material acquiring valuable time in the curriculum, and as yet no-one was vociferous in claiming that these courses should receive academic acceptance. Indeed for some one of their main attractions lay in their freedom from the examination strait-jacket. Nevertheless there can be little doubt that if the social studies were to gain general acceptance they had to find a place in the examination timetable in order that their aspirations of intellectual respectability be legitimated. Traditionally social studies was associated with the Junior Secondary School and any course thus linked with the less able can look to a most insecure future.

Nevertheless when we move on in time to the mid-50's we find another wave of support for the social studies gaining strength, and this was to achieve some lasting impact. Change itself had now achieved some recognition as a desirable goal, and not merely in the curriculum but more generally in education. An H.M.I. during these years has claimed that the last 15 years have seen more change in Scottish education than any other comparable time period. "In the early 1930's, there was in most Scottish schools little questioning either about what to teach or how to teach it... Now the tables seem to have been completely overturned. In the last five years or so a process has begun whereby every nook and cranny of the school operation is receiving a thorough investigation. The content of almost every subject is under scrutiny; new subjects are being rewritten or rearranged, or merged with others."¹⁴

That writer is obviously in a better position to give an informed opinion on recent developments but it does seem an exaggeration of the welcome given within the schools to innovation. Unlike the fashion or scientific communities the norms of the educator are not typically receptive to fresh

ideas. We have yet to arrive at the stage where one can predict with total conviction, that in say 10 years, the whole body of educational knowledge and practice will be transformed; as the writer on medicine can confidently predict that new drugs, or diseases, will become part of his medical knowledge. Not only does such fresh information and ideas have to be assimilated but old ways must be discarded. Few would seriously contend that a similar position pertains in education. The teacher builds up a certain resistance to change, particularly in the curriculum, because the advantages of change are often dubious and minor in comparison to the cost in new uncertainties, in money, in mental tooling-up, not to mention the fear of unintended (harmful) consequences in the new methods. In an area such as medicine, it is usually far easier to estimate the costs and benefits of, for example, a new drug than in education where there is rarely even a consensus - particularly in the social studies - as to the criteria by which one decides whether a certain innovation is desirable or not. In practice the interest in educational circles with introducing new courses, methods of instruction and examination, often seems to bear an inverse relationship with proximity to the classroom.

The impetus behind the proposed revisions in the curriculum are the social and economic changes experienced in Britain. The curriculum is especially prone to reflect such changes although the actual innovations are likely to be structured by particular circumstances in the school and by the current educational philosophy relating to teaching content and practice. Pressures on the school are most clearly shown in the re-organisation of secondary institutions and the raising of the school leaving age, accompanied as this has been by an increase in the numbers voluntarily staying on at school beyond the minimum school leaving age. Reform of the curriculum does not figure much in public debate but it is nonetheless

dramatic.

Closely allied with changes in the curriculum are the reforms made in the examination system. It was in Circular 312 of 1955 that the decision to introduce an Ordinary Grade examination in the fourth year of the secondary school was announced;¹⁵ by now pressures for examination passes among pupils unlikely to stay on for the Senior Leaving Certificate, or in schools who would not normally present candidates, intensified and found expression. The Circular also announced that a Working Party would be set up to review the whole of the curriculum of the Senior Secondary school. Their Report, which appeared in 1959, amongst other things, proposed the establishment of a new hybrid social studies course which would culminate in a certificate examination.¹⁶ The emphasis behind its introduction had shifted over the years from direct exhortations to obey the political authorities to a more 'liberal' paternalistic approach which was phrased as helping the adolescent to deal with the complex world in which he would soon be thrown. Official pronouncements have been particularly prone to give vent to fears that the mass media, advertising and television are weaving a subtle web of deception and false values which threaten to subvert the younger generation. Both the Brunton and Newsom Reports echo these feelings, "...young people can hardly be aware of all the pressures that are brought to bear on them through the media of mass advertising and mass entertainment. It is the clear and urgent duty of social education to develop their critical faculties and exercise their powers of discrimination." We also have to note that political education is now propagated under the more neutral heading of 'social education'.

The 1959 Report on the Senior Secondary School Curriculum, dealing as it did with the more able children, was less than emphatic in its commitment to the social studies course. Both it and the Brunton Report

were influenced in their recommendations by their belief that the requirements of pupils on minimal certificate courses are far from being the same as those of the pupils of exceptionally high ability. It is argued that too many potential recruits to business and industry are being lost because of the unnecessarily wide gap between their ability and interests and the traditional bookish curriculum. This could mean that social studies had to be geared directly to the pupil's vocational interests; rather the typical course should be designed to promote a broad knowledge base which would enable the pupil to make more informed judgements in areas that are likely to face, "the reasonably well educated man or woman living and working in modern times." The method of marshalling facts and considering them objectively became the foundation upon which innovations in this area of the curriculum were to be built.¹⁸

Despite these high objectives the calls for innovation could hardly have been made in more muted or apologetic terms. With respect to the Senior Secondary pupil the 1959 Report argues that: "...while we consider that all pupils should include history and geography in their course, we realise that for many it will not be possible to continue the study of both subjects to the ordinary grade level. There is therefore a place for an alternative course in the social studies including something of both history and geography, the emphasis being on what it would be useful for a man or woman to know as a background to present day affairs. As in the case of biology, social studies would primarily be for pupils who did not intend to pursue the subject beyond the ordinary grade examination."¹⁹

When the syllabus of this proposed course was published the level of enthusiasm could not be described as any more than negligible. Yet it did have backing in certain crucial areas, most noticeably among the

inspectorate, although even there, much opposition was to be found, plus scattered individuals in the Training Colleges and the schools themselves. It is difficult to imagine that Modern Studies would have been successfully introduced and adopted in 1962 if a growing opinion had not found expression, or been mobilised through the 1955 and 1959 Reports. Yet despite these modest and unpropitious beginnings Modern Studies has achieved a success, at least in terms of numbers presented for examinations, which is most striking. Looking at the numbers presented for SCE Ordinary Grade in the period 1962-69, few innovations have made such an impact as Modern Studies. The number of candidates has increased by almost 20 times from 340 to more than 6000.²⁰ Its formal adoption by the school can hardly be in doubt but many voices have questioned whether the rise in presentations accurately reflects the rate of adoption by schools. From 1962, when approximately 2½% of all secondary schools presented in Modern Studies it is now thought that the current figure is somewhere in the region of 30%.

The diffusion of this course among the school does not mean that it is always being interpreted or functioning in the manner intended. The course has been promoted as an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of current issues and problems, harnessing new, or little tried, methods of instruction. Our interest here is not with the introduction of the latter but rather whether Modern Studies has been widely interpreted as the study of current issues and problems. How far has there been the marriage of Modern Studies' theory and practice in the school?

The picture as we see it is one of wide variation between schools. Generally one may distinguish those which have faithfully attempted to implement the objectives of Modern Studies from a narrow majority who

have made little effort to overcome the obstacles to innovation or who introduced Modern Studies for reasons other than those 'officially' desired.²¹

Four main factors are seen to inhibit the full acceptance of Modern Studies in the school. These comprise institutional, situational, professional and intellectual objections:-²²

1. Difficulties with the timetable.
2. Problems in finding suitable teachers.
3. General teaching problems - the syllabus, books, and other aids.
4. Qualms over the academic respectability of the course.

Firstly the timetable; of all the hindrances faced by teachers in our study this was the most frequently mentioned. Few schools provided more than a bare minimum of teaching while some did not provide any regular teaching time. The use of the timetable as an excuse, or veto, against Modern Studies obtaining parity with other subjects is hardly justified unless tied to some more pressing difficulty such as a shortage of teachers. Successful innovation in the curriculum is obviously dependent on finding staff who are both qualified and sympathetic to the innovation. This is especially the case, when like Modern Studies, the course involves both novel material as well as teaching methods.

Where were these teachers to be found? When the course started it was deliberately created in the fashion of a social studies centaur: half-history and half-geography. The short supply of social science graduates, who were particularly suited to a contemporary studies course, could then be temporarily overcome by utilising the already available pool of teachers.

Snags soon arose however. There was already a shortage of geography teachers and few could be found with any enthusiasm for a course which many perceived as a threat to their specialisation or professional ambitions. History teachers were more numerous and generally more favourably disposed to Modern Studies and it is on this group that Modern Studies has leant for assistance. Slowly expanding numbers of social scientists and those with appropriate joint degrees have been graduating from Scottish Universities but they still constitute a minority of all those in the schools actually teaching Modern Studies. At present the range of qualifications of the Modern Studies teacher is quite narrow. In the schools surveyed 38% relied solely on the History department and 10% on the Geography department. A further 35% utilised teachers from both disciplines while the remainder either had a separate Modern Studies department or went to the other extreme and chose teachers on what often appears to be little more than a random process.²³

The responsibility for the teaching of Modern Studies rests overwhelmingly with History departments - in our study the figure was 57%.²⁴ Geography alone, History and Geography together, and Modern Studies alone, account for the remainder in equal proportions. Modern Studies is therefore very much reliant on the good will of other departments and the tensions involved in such a relationship need not be spelt out. The situation is made even more difficult by giving responsibility for the teaching of Modern Studies to those without, or with little, means of influencing the distribution of resources in the school. 62% of schools in our sample made someone other than a Principal Teacher responsible. Given that the teaching of Modern Studies is not carried on through a Modern Studies department one must wonder about the number of teachers who actually possess any specific qualification to teach Modern Studies. Of the 57 teachers

on whom we obtained information slightly more than half (30) possessed some form of Modern Studies qualification. Three-quarters of these obtained this as part of their teaching certificate while the rest attended an in-service course. Those teachers thus qualified were well distributed throughout the schools and only 14% of the schools could not boast such a specialist.²⁵

Like the timetable the shortage of suitably qualified teachers can be relatively easily overcome. What is more debateable is the commitment of such teachers to the teaching arrangements for the course. The original intention that Modern Studies teaching should be characterised by much private research, the use of source materials and the mass media has struck a chord of sympathy with a sizeable group but they are nevertheless in a minority. In practice the teaching is dominated by the two officially promoted texts. The first, by Tumelty, deals with Section A of the Modern Studies syllabus covering Great Britain, and the second book by Wright, is intended to cover the World Affairs part of the course.²⁶ The former was used by every school in our study and Wright's book by 90%. Again only a minority use reference works, source materials, government publications, or the specially produced radio and T.V. programmes. This is somewhat surprising, not merely because of the official encouragement of such programmes, but because they act as a powerful counterbalance to books which soon fall out of date in a course such as Modern Studies.²⁷

A further hindrance to the diffusion of Modern Studies stems from its alleged lack of academic respectability. The attack comes from two directions. In the first place the course is criticised for its hybrid nature; and in particular the argument is made that it is difficult to state the criteria for deciding whether a certain topic is to be included in the syllabus,

and the method or perspective which will be used to analyse the problems that are chosen. In the second place Modern Studies has suffered from its designation by the Consultative Committee on the Curriculum as appropriate only for the less academically minded pupil. In addition the old established Scots universities have not been keen to accept the course for entrance qualification purposes. This should not be taken to infer that only the less able pupil will take Modern Studies where a school offers this alternative. Of those presented for the ordinary grade exam 40% were found to come from the fifth or sixth year and there is no indication that those presented in the fourth year were just about to leave school. On the other hand the large numbers that were found to be taking this course in some schools included many pupils who would not be expected to return in the fourth year.²⁸

We began by asking how far the teaching of Modern Studies in the school justified our categorization of the course as one dealing with political education. Our discussion has demonstrated that its presentation will often be affected by circumstances such as an unwilling or unqualified teacher, or indeed uninterested pupils. There is no reason to believe that there has been any widespread failure to teach the material in the syllabus that is to be thought as 'political'; the more likely sources of bias stem from the lack of enthusiasm or experience among Modern Studies teachers. This may result, in some schools, in the nature of the material presented being given a slant towards the historical or geographical aspects of the syllabus. It was because of such criticism that the Examination Board deprived the course of its more purely historical and geographical features. In consequence the syllabus has more clearly emerged as designed to provide a political education; it now stands as follows:-²⁹

Section A - Great Britain.

This section deals with Great Britain, and is concerned with the constitution, customs and ways of life of the homeland. It is sub-divided into four broad sections:

1. Agriculture.
2. Industry and Commerce.
3. Social Environment - including patterns of life, industrial relations and the social services.
4. Government - including parliament and the people, the executive, system of justice, finance, local government in Scotland.

Section B - World Affairs.

This section is concerned with international affairs, the great powers and Western Europe and with international organizations and associations including the Commonwealth. It is sub-divided into 5 sub-sections:

1. International Relations: including the world between the wars, post-war developments, changing commonwealth, and current problems.
2. U.S.A.
3. U.S.S.R.
4. Western Europe.
5. Emergence of Communist China.

Section C - Nominated Topics.

This includes several themes intended for more intensive investigation. At present they are:

1. Press, Radio and T.V.
2. Civil Aviation.
3. World Population and Food Supply.
4. Problems of West Africa (Nigeria and Ghana).

In the examination the candidate is required to answer two questions from both Section A and Section B, and one question from Section C.

It is perhaps not unexpected, given the general climate of opinion and confusion surrounding political education, that quite deliberate efforts should have been made to undersell Modern Studies as a course with any direct political content. Its supporters have generally thought it advisable to tread lightly through the minefields of antagonism which surround the discussion of political material in the classroom, littered as these are with the remnants of civics and social studies courses. Nevertheless we would agree that we are not discussing a typical British Constitution or civics course; Modern Studies constitutes a political education course but not in the narrow sense of that term, to cover the learning of, "...parliamentary procedure or civics or dead things like these."³⁰


What more specifically then are the areas in which we expect Modern Studies' influence to be concentrated?³¹ Dealing first with the cognitive domain, at its most elementary level we may identify the acquisition of political knowledge which demands an ability to recall or recognise ideas, groups or persons that have been before the subject on some previous occasion. On top of this we can see skills required to deal with political affairs such as identifying relationships and engage in more sophisticated analysis which may be associated perhaps with current notions of problem solving or critical thinking.

In addition there are the educational objectives which relate to the teaching of political values - the desire to generate a feeling, or a degree of acceptance or rejection. The individual will be expected to respond to various political stimuli and to ascribe some value to the phenomena by

expressing a preference for one of the standpoints offered, or by giving his own assessment, without suggestion. As the learner successfully internalises values he encounters situations where more than one value is relevant. It therefore becomes necessary that the individual organize his value system in such a way that relationships between the various values may be established and in order that some grading of values is made.

On the basis of this distinction between cognitive and affective objectives we may identify more vividly those areas in which the various 'politics' courses may be placed. The prime objective of the British Constitution course would seem to be to provide an opportunity to acquire knowledge about the workings of the British Constitution, illusory as the latter may be. This we would contrast with the typical Civics course which falls into the opposite quadrant in the taxonomy because its central aims hinge on the transmission of a particular set of political values. Nevertheless neither course can afford to completely ignore other objectives, and the British Constitution course would no doubt be expected to produce as an indirect spin-off of the acquisition of knowledge about parliament a reverence for that institution. However we believe that Modern Studies has attempted to find a more even balance of direct affective and cognitive objectives such that it occupies an intermediary position between the G.C.E. Constitution course and the Civics course.

Paradigm of stated objectives of various types of political education courses.



Sometimes it appears as if the cognitive objectives are in the ascendancy in official pronouncements while at other times the aims are manifestly affective in orientation. According to the Chief Schools Inspector for Scotland the teacher's mission is to help a bewildered and muddled generation to find a way, a frightened world to find sanity.³² Modern Studies is then for some more akin to 'moral studies'; it being concerned with not only the knowledge of problems but with a sympathetic

awareness of them that must inspire, or so it is hoped, the attempt to achieve solutions. One headmaster has even gone on record as seeing Modern Studies as applied Christianity.³³ Indeed in our survey of teachers, over 65% felt that the course is valuable because of its relevance and interest to pupils shortly about to go out into a highly complex and confusing world; another 40% (3 reasons were allowed), saw it as an essential means of educating our youthful masters - this last reason assumes especial relevance because of the recent lowering of the voting age to 18 years. When asked about the weaknesses of Modern Studies none saw fit to mention any dislike of its overt or indirect political role.³⁴ Our conclusion is that Modern Studies has achieved a considerable degree of acceptance as an exercise in political education.

Before making our final inventory of Modern Studies objectives we recognise that there will be variations between schools, and teachers within the same school, in the interpretation which should be given in the teaching of Modern Studies. For example it has been argued that the teacher's method of teaching and his own political convictions will produce differential results between schools.³⁵ This may well be the case, although Langton and Jennings report low correlations between the manner of teaching and trends in political learning.³⁶ Certainly such a study would require far more in the way of resources and co-operation from the schools than was forthcoming in this study. At this stage we will consider the published research findings most immediately relevant to our investigation of political learning among young people.

The power of the curriculum to effect change in social and political orientations is probably more widely accepted than is justified from the available empirical research. It is all too often forgotten that formal

education is but one variable in political socialisation and the curriculum but one factor subsumed under this general heading. Furthermore scant attention has been paid to the potency of formal political and social education courses across different areas. We began our own study assuming that there would be a differential impact of Modern Studies between objectives and for that reason we have followed the somewhat heroic distinction between cognitive and affective orientations. It has most usually been found that formal political education will discover that it is relatively easier to influence the growth of political knowledge than equivalent level orientations in the affective domain; this latter area, it is argued, being acquired earlier and consequently more resistant to attempts at conversion. Published evidence on this point is by no means conclusive however. In a quasi-experimental study of 3 Boston High Schools Litt found that while it strengthened support for the democratic processes the civics course did not affect attitudes toward political participation among the recipients. The author concludes, "Apparently attitudes toward political activity are so strongly channeled through other agencies in each community that the civic education programme's efforts have little independent effect."³⁷ In similar vein Somit found that an introductory course in political science which placed emphasis on political participation had no significant effect on a student's attitudes along that dimension.³⁸

Other studies have emphasised that formal education will not have the desired effect unless it is carefully tailored to an appropriate method of presenting the material. "American students who learned about West Africans by reading only historical and geographic accounts expressed more social distance from the Africans, and a desire to maintain such a distance, than did a class who read about the daily lives of the people, the problems they

faced, and the help being given to them through international aid bodies."³⁹ We detect some considerable despondency among researchers about the effectiveness of political education schemes; either the influence is not in the direction anticipated or there is no discernible effect whatsoever. This conclusion has received its strongest confirmation in the most recent American study by Langton and Jennings.⁴⁰ They studied the influence of exposure to civics courses in the high school with a methodological rigour in the design of the sample which inspires great confidence in the representativeness of their findings. Nonetheless they had considerable difficulty in controlling for variation of their main independent variable. Most important it was not possible for them to obtain the degree of uniformity of content that was obtained in our own study for example.

The main conclusion they reach, is that, "There are certain grounds for believing that exposure facilitates a small movement in the intended directions but while the association is present there is little strength to this relationship."⁴¹ They report that the highest positive eta coefficient obtained was 0.06, and the highest partial beta coefficient was no higher than 0.11 - this was for political knowledge. So horrified were the authors by these results that they comment that, "... increments are so miniscule as to raise serious questions about the utility of investing in government courses in the senior high school, at least as these courses are presently constituted."⁴² However they do provide the interesting observation that when sub-groups within the total population are isolated quite marked differences are found. The influence of the curriculum is more evident where the pupil is a negro, because, the authors suggest, it is the media deprived who benefit most from such courses and the negro is most likely to fall into this category. Their explanation is that for

the white student the material presented in a civics course is more or less redundant, either because the pupil has heard it all before or because political education within the school is unrealistic in that so much of obvious political concern is avoided at all costs. Zeigler and Peak argue that, "We can conclude that, with few exceptions, the formal education of youths makes no difference in regard to their image of the political world. Such courses are redundant; they are largely symbolic reinforcements of the 'democratic creed' - a liturgy heard by most students so many times that sheer boredom probably would allow for, at the most, slight increments in loyalty, patriotism and other virtues presumed to be the goal of such courses."⁴³

Suitably purged of unwarranted optimism about the influence of Modern Studies we will complete this discussion of our main independent variable by indicating the main dependent variables selected for analysis. These are an amalgam of the stated objectives of Modern Studies plus a limited number of areas where political socialisation literature suggests that we might find some unintended consequences of taking a political education course:-

A. Cognitive Domain

1. Political Knowledge:

The knowledge of specific facts, terminology and classifications will be included here at the lower levels of sophistication although it is connected to the appreciation of highly complex theories of political moment. It is assumed that the growth of the latter will be determined, or depend on, a certain level of development in the former type of political knowledge.

For this lower level a scale was constructed which provided an indication of the subject's familiarity with domestic and international political figures, with their roles and their party affiliation. Further questions probed their appreciation of the international leanings of various foreign countries and the policy attachments of the main political parties. Allowing scope for comprehensive knowledge we constructed an index of policy ideologue.

2. Abilities and Skills:

The question as to how far a political education course is able to establish groundrules in addition to basic knowledge which will enable the pupil to organize and interpret material is of especial importance in Modern Studies. In a rapidly changing world it is seen as important that children be provided with a critical faculty which will enable them to go to the heart of any problem and avoid entanglement or confusion brought about by a particular method of presentation. Given an ability to analyse relationships and to deal with new material it is important that individuals be prepared for making political decisions on an informed basis. We took as our examples questions on the role of the Queen, parliament, and trade unions, as well as items on the nature of democracy and communism. In addition we undertook a more detailed examination of a theme which is closely identified with Modern Studies - that of the problems of international conflict - its causes, character and possible means of resolution.

B. Affective Domain

1. Political Interest and Awareness:

At the basis of political learning is the notion that an awareness of, and an interest in, the material being presented is a valuable adjunct to the development of political

orientations, both in the affective and in the cognitive domains. Thus we find it difficult to believe that there is much possibility of marked political learning taking place where this topic is considered irrelevant or boring. Interest may be expressed in a variety of ways, from paying attention to political news, to discussing political matters, to actively participating in political affairs. In the United States reviews of civics' objectives by Litt, and by Langton and Jennings have shown that a hall mark of such courses is the desire to stimulate an active interest in political affairs.⁴⁴ In Britain this tradition of mass involvement has not been given any credence; the citizen is expected to perform a minimal range of political duties, such as voting, but for the main he is supposed to let his government get on with the job of running the country.

Although widespread participation is not an intended consequence of Modern Studies we should expect that the study of contemporary affairs be channeled into an increased level of discussion about political and general news items. This may be with parents, teachers or friends. A further feature of political interest may be judged by heightened efforts to become informed on current affairs through the mass media. Any index of political activity for the pre-adult is extremely difficult to construct because of the restriction of most political activities to the adult. Identification with a political party might be one indication of political activity but we prefer Langton and Jennings' suggestion that the frequency of political discussions and amount of information acquired are not improbable surrogates for forms of adult political activity.⁴⁵

2. General Support for the British Political System:

The ability

of adolescents to appreciate the niceties of the political world will

generally find first expression in a simple attachment to political practices in Britain; that the government for example, is fair, honest and generally efficient. Such general approval, or rejection, is to be expected even where the subject could not have based this judgement on anything like a full understanding of the workings of the British system of government. Indeed at its crudest level it constitutes little more than a blind patriotic attachment to the system because it is British and for little other reason.

3. Political Efficacy:

The belief that each individual has the potential for influencing political decisions is central to most interpretations of democratic theory by researchers in political socialisation although British experience gives meagre support for this interpretation. Nonetheless increasing recognition has been attributed to free and frequent elections of political leaders, universal suffrage, majority rule, etc. Indeed it would be difficult to base a political education course on anything other than a supposition that a nation's leaders and representatives are anything other than receptive to popular demands and pressures. Quite obviously even within the western democracies there is a difference of opinion on how much weight individual views should be accorded. We imagine that British practice is more directed to an acceptance of the competence of those with political authority rather than a general civic competence.

4. Political Cynicism:

Rather than being guided by considerations of individual competence in a positive sense it is more likely that the political education course in Britain follow a roundabout route which attempts to reduce political discontent and disillusionment with the country's leaders. Political cynicism as we understand it involves both

a distrust of the motives of politicians and of their suitability to be running the country.

5. Political Toleration:

A persistent theme in democratic theory is the need to protect individual and minority political rights, such as the freedom to dissent from majority opinion and criticism of existing policies, leadership and institutions. Even though Modern Studies is deliberately vague on what it means by the rights and obligations of citizens it is definite that the spirit of toleration - including most especially political and racial toleration - are central objectives.

6. Political Cosmopolitanism:

The emphasis in recent schemes of political education has shifted noticeably to include the consideration of foreign powers and international organizations and problems. Formerly political education had not shown much concern for anything other than strictly domestic affairs. Modern Studies is typically associated with the movement to take children out of their national 'parish' in order that they widen their political perspectives. We will therefore examine the preference orderings among our respondents for local, Scottish, British and World Affairs.

It is in the above areas that we shall be looking for the influence of political education, to see how far the theory and the practice of political education match up.

Footnotes to Chapter Three: Modern Studies and Political Education.

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3. Hoyle, E., *How does the Curriculum Change?*, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, Summer, 1969, pp. 132-141.
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28. Ibid., p.3.
29. This is taken directly from the official outline.
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43. Zeigler, H., & Peak, W., The Political Functions of the Educational System, *Sociology of Education*, 1970, Vol. 43. no.2. p. 126.
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Chapter Four: The Research Design.

Where an empirical study is contemplated a decision has to be made as to the design to be followed, which in turn determines the manner in which the data is collected, processed and finally analysed. The scientist, whether pure, applied or social attempts to arrange the conditions of his research in such a way that the data obtained will bear most effectively on the hypotheses he proposes testing, or the information for which he is searching. This means that studies will vary greatly in their scope, design and content. As in any other piece of research the specific characteristics of the study will be determined by its basic objectives. The statement of the essential questions which the research is intended to investigate delineates in large part the universe to be studied, the size and nature of the sample, the type of interviewing to be used, the content of the questionnaire, the coding procedures and the nature of the analysis.

That individual survey methods will vary according to the objectives of the projected research is then public knowledge among survey researchers.¹ Equally it follows that if the researcher is to produce findings in which both he, and his readers, can place their confidence it is necessary that he plan his research design with as much care and attention as we would expect him to devote to generating the hypotheses which he will be testing. For the sake of clarity, as well as convenience, I will in this chapter be setting down the planning procedure for my own design according to the widely accepted ideal-type pattern of separate stages of activity. In practice we recognise that most studies will find that the sequence outlined is rarely followed exactly because the key problems identified are most often inter-related. The important point to remember is the need to undertake research with these activities in mind rather than that

they should be followed in a particular order - ensuring that one step has been completed before moving on to the next.

According to one widely accepted text on social research we should address ourselves to the following problem areas:-²

1. Selection of a topic for research.
2. Formulation of a research problem.
3. Relating our own problems to the findings of previous studies.
4. Defining concepts and working definitions.
5. Formulation of hypotheses.

The above objectives have guided the discussion in the previous chapters. Here we shall move on to consider how the data was collected and prepared for analysis. The quandry facing the empirical researcher has been neatly summarized as being placed in a situation where one is forced to choose a cut-off point at which the improvement in one's data for which one is striving is not justified by the rising marginal cost in expenditure of resources. In practice this outlay is limited and data is 'bought' with various assumptions being made about its quality. It is an important part to a chapter on the research design to spell out where such assumptions about the quality of the data collected have been made.

But first: "In order to secure the relevant data, we must have a clear notion of the questions we want to answer, and the hypotheses we want to test."³ In this study, to recap briefly, we are concerned with the development of political orientations during adolescence. This process is set against a general backcloth of cognitive growth and in the light of the differential impact of the various agents of political socialisation,

but most particularly formal political education. The focus of our investigation is then the learning of political orientations. "By orientations we imply all the perceptions (cognitions, knowledge) affect (feelings and attitudes) and evaluations (values and norms) through which a person related himself to social objects."⁴ We do not want here to become embroiled in a discussion of the relationship between any such orientations and political behaviour; suffice to say that the political orientations that we identify are not intended to constitute anything more than dispositions to behaviour, at the most, since we assume that overt political behaviour is contingent on the situational factors as well as the individual's orientations.

We accept that in our understanding of the term 'orientation', the term or construct itself can become so complex that it is not always convincing to talk of 'measuring' orientations. What one is in fact doing is to measure particular properties offered in the formulation of the term 'orientation' such as the following:⁵

1. Direction
2. Intensity
3. Complexity
4. Flexibility

Once the problem to be investigated is formulated the researcher must decide on the most efficient method of data collection that he can 'afford'. The sample survey is one well-tried and trusted way of gathering one's information. It is not of course the only method, and some branches of social science, particularly psychology, have tended to eschew the sample survey in preference for an experimental approach. This does not mean

that a simple dichotomy exists for the researcher in the choice of his research design. Other techniques and a variety of modified versions of the two methods already mentioned are available. Furthermore, no design is clear cut, nor is it possible to say that one can only draw causal inferences from one type of design rather than another. As Moser has pointed out, "Rather should one view research as being ranged along a scale, with the most completely controlled experiment at one end, and uncontrolled observation at the other."⁶ The dispute over which method to make use of is not merely based on a disagreement about the quality of data collection instruments - given the emphasis in psychological research on the individual one would tend to anticipate a design suited to intensive research with small samples, while in political science the emphasis on institutional and group influences is more likely to direct attention to larger samples and less intensive interviewing.

The emphasis on purity in research design which this argument implies is not accepted here. Instead we have quite intentionally mixed elements from an experimental design with what is essentially a typical social survey. It is felt that this is a most effective way of obtaining the large numbers required in our analysis while at the same time providing most appropriate data in terms of the problem which we had set out to investigate.

What exactly are the particular features from each type of design that we decided to bring together? Firstly the experimental design; by this is understood a procedure which involves the experimenter in manipulating the independent variable(s) while controlling for others - in contrast to the survey design which covers the observation and association but not the manipulation of variables. The experimenter is then, "able

to observe and measure the effect of the manipulation of the independent variable in a situation in which the operation of other relevant factors is held to a minimum."⁷ In practice it is admitted that one, "must include under the term 'experiment' a wide range of studies with varying degrees of control and precision";⁸ within this category one can distinguish between laboratory and field experiments - the latter, which includes this study, being less able to exclude miscellaneous stimuli, and it is only by the application of such a wide ranging definition that we would claim to have included some features from the experimental design in this study.

Of the several types of experimental design available to researchers as set down by Sellitz et. al., the most commonly used by social scientists are the so-called 'after-only' design and the 'before and after' design; both of these may be sub-divided to include an experimental and control group(s).⁹ In our study respondents were fitted into both of the main designs indicated in TABLE 1, as well as into control and experimental groups within each of these. The experimental group consisted of pupils who were taking, or had taken, Modern Studies; because this course is not offered to pupils below the third year at school no distinction was possible in the first two years of school. Again our 'before and after' design was restricted to pupils in the third and fourth years at school. The actual numbers included in the two designs are illustrated in TABLE 2.

TABLE 1: Experimental Designs used in this study

'After Only' (with one control group)		'Before and 'After' (with one control group)	
Experimental Group	Control Group	Experimental Group	Control Group
Prior Selection of groups	NO	NO	NO
'Before' measurement	NO	YES(Ya)	YES(Yb)
Exposure to experimental variables	YES	YES	NO
Exposure to uncontrolled events	YES	YES	YES
'After' measurement	YES(Yx)	YES(Yc)	YES(Yd)
Change equals	$d = Yx - Yy$	$d = Yc - Ya$	$d = Yd - Yb$

Taken from: Sellitz, C., Jahoda, M., Deutsch, M., & Cook, S., Research Methods in Social Relations, Methuen, London, Revised One - Volume Edition, 1965, p.110.

Table 2: Distribution of Pupils in research design, by school year.

	<u>After Only</u>	<u>Before and After</u>
First Year	359	
Second Year	393	
Third Year	784	128
Experimental	449	78
Control	335	50
Fourth Year	554	145
Experimental	268	69
Control	286	76
Fifth Year	288	
Experimental	156	
Control	132	
Total: All Years	2378	273

(N.B. Some 51 6th year pupils who were interviewed are included in the 5th year totals; as far as the before and after sample is concerned this will be weighted for analysis purposes in order to combat differences between the two groups with respect to certain key variables).

We have to point to two main weaknesses in the experimental features of our design. Firstly, experimentalists have always emphasized that respondents should be assigned on a completely random basis to the control and experimental sections but needless to say we could have no say in

whether pupils were allocated to the experimental group, who would be taking Modern Studies, or not.

A second weakness in our design derives from our inability to ensure that there was exact uniformity in the presentation of Modern Studies between schools. We have already touched on this point in the previous chapter and concluded that there are in practice strong situational and institutional limitations on the individual's freedom to improvise with respect to course content. Nevertheless some variation in teaching methods and the political orientations of the teacher are bound to loom as possible sources of uncontrolled influence. In this study we were unable to obtain any hard data in these areas and we must wait for the much needed results of current research in this area.¹⁰


In the literature on research methodology there has been a lot of discussion about the relative merits of the 'after only' and the 'before and after' design, and their respective offshoots. The dispute centres on the amount of bias, or uncontrolled factors, that are brought out, or introduced, through testing on more than one occasion. One group holds that bias is most likely to crop up in the 'before and after' design because of the double testing involved. Solomon, for example, contends that, "The main difficulty relate~~s~~ to the possibility of an interaction between the pretest and the experimental manipulation. Subsequent research has failed to clear up the controversy: one study will find evidence that the pretest itself has changed behaviour while others declare that they have found no effect that would invalidate the use of such a design."¹¹

Such doubts as these have induced some to proclaim that the advantages of dropping any 'before' testing outweigh the disadvantages.¹² Quite.

obviously random assignment of subjects to the experimental and control sections is most necessary although an element of post-facto control may be introduced by 'matching' respondents with respect to the most important of the uncontrolled factors in the study.¹³

From the experimental features of our design we will turn to the central characteristics, which are concerned with an investigation based on a sample survey. Just as there are necessary steps in the design of an experiment so too the work of established writers in the field of survey research emphasizes the importance of breaking down the operation into several stages. The actual number of steps, the time taken, and whether any are repeated etc., will vary across studies. In our own, at least if the amount of time and effort expended is any criteria, the following stages provided definite focus points:-

TABLE 3: Stages in Survey Design



Our discussion will follow the sequence laid down in TABLE 3.

1. Formulation of hypotheses:

This study was planned as an investigation of the validity of a number of propositions about the acquisition and development of political orientations. The questionnaire that we have used is to be judged as good or bad in so far as it is effective in generating data on these hypotheses.

2. Data Specification:

The data required to test the hypotheses contained in this study had to be both well defined and relatively easy to obtain. Having decided that political orientations should be examined in terms of particular properties, such as their direction, intensity, complexity and flexibility, we decided on a further breakdown which would allow us to contrast cognitive and affective orientations, with some allowance for gradations of sophistication within each of these domains.

"Such specification of what is to be measured is a prerequisite to deciding how it is to be measured." ¹⁴

If the data collected is to be useful and convincing some indication should be provided that the information obtained is both valid and reliable.¹⁵ The notion of validity covers the question of whether the data collected, for example the direction of the subject's feelings for the British system of government, do actually bear directly on the respondent's orientations in this area. Whether in practice we have correctly identified the property in the responses obtained will depend on the reader's acceptance that the items employed in our questionnaire are geared directly to the prediction of the various political orientations, although in the subsequent chapters we can bring empirical evidence to support our contention that certain of the scales are measuring the same property, or the reverse, by reporting on the

correlation coefficients for the items in question.¹⁶

On another tack, Campbell makes an interesting distinction between external and internal validity, which clarifies some of the measurement problems in this area. According to Campbell, an experimental result has internal validity if, "the experimental stimulus has some significant effect within the experimental situation (or questionnaire). External validity refers to the generalizability of the effect-to what populations and settings it is applicable."¹⁷ The essential feature is to inject as much realism into the data collection period as possible. The questionnaire tried to avoid hitting cold, unreceptive respondents. It further had to be accepted as a worthwhile exercise, particularly as the respondents are children. Again we had to orient the questionnaire to become a test of what children know rather than what they do not know or cannot relate to. We had to take especial care, given the political slant of the questionnaire, that the subjects were not bored and that any initial enthusiasm that they might have for this alternative to school work was not squashed, by a lack of saliency towards the direction followed in the questionnaire.

Internal validity is especially threatened where the subject sees through the experiment or questionnaire, or for some other reason does not take it seriously, or if he responds 'like a subject' rather than naturally. It was found at the pretesting stage that young children, and the lower ability children especially, were prone to look for the 'correct' answer to all questions. In other words, they looked on every question as a test of their knowledge, even where it was clearly stated that we were looking for their opinions. That our respondents should think of each question in terms of a right-wrong dichotomy is

is not a complete surprise. The most effective way of avoiding this particular threat to validity seemed to derive from convincing the respondents that the questionnaire had nothing to do with the school or the teachers, and that the information obtained would not be used in any way to affect the child's school performance, nor would it be seen by their teachers. In addition the administration of the questionnaire was as far as possible, conducted personally by the researcher, and everywhere else under detailed instructions from the author.

One final point about the validity; the characteristic which we are intending measuring is not something which is to be identified with a particular sort of behaviour. Instead it is to be thought of as an abstraction or a construct. The implication in many such constructs is that they involve propositions about their general relationships to other variables. One major problem in examining construct validity involves the validation not only of the measuring instrument but of the theory underlying it. If the prediction is not supported one has no easy way of deciding whether it is the theory or the measuring instrument that is at fault. It is therefore necessary as far as possible to look for evidence that different measures of the construct yield similar results, and secondly that the construct measured in this way can in practice be differentiated from other constructs.

This is obviously a lengthy and involved procedure which necessitated placing great weight on scales generated in other studies - which had been shown by the researchers to have been evolved from repeated test runs.¹⁸ Validity is of course, but one side to the necessary characteristics of the instruments of measurement, for in addition, one must take note of the reliability of the techniques employed. The notion

of reliability directs the researcher to measurement which yields consistent results, that is to say, variation in scores should not be due to inconsistencies in measurement. Sellitz et al, make the point that, "If we knew that a measuring instrument had satisfactory validity for the purpose for which we intended using it, we would not need to worry about its reliability."¹⁹ Since little statistical evidence of validity is presented here, other than that indicated by content, we took care to assess the degree of reliability found in the more important of the constructs employed in this study. The simplest definition of reliability is to regard it as the extent to which a scale yields consistent scores when the attitude is measured on several occasions. The method employed for estimating the reliability of the scales was the test-retest method. Each scale was administered twice at the pre-test stage to the same respondents with an interval of three weeks in between, and a correlation coefficient calculated. This coefficient (Pearson r) is known as the reliability estimate. The test-retest scores for the final versions of the scales used in the survey proved to be generally within tolerable limits - see TABLE 4. (The reader is reminded that these scores were the single classification score accorded to each individual on the basis of several questions all purporting to be measuring the same construct, and not the correlation figures for the constituent items within the scale.)

TABLE 4: Test-retest reliability scores for main political scales.

1. Political knowledge	0.7	4. Political Toleration	0.8
2. Political Ideologue	0.8	5. Political Cynicism	0.6
3. Political Efficacy	0.6	6. General Support	0.6

3. Conceptualisation of Field Operations:

"The choice of the method for collecting one's data is governed by the subject matter, the unit of inquiry and the scale of the survey."²⁰ Any sort of field operation other than the self administered questionnaire was effectively ruled out on the grounds that there was a shortage of money, time and co-operation from the educational authorities. Once this alternative had been accepted as the only course open to the researcher there was little field work to be done above arranging for access to the schools.

4. Conceptualisation of the Sample Design:

We noted earlier that this study was geared to isolating and comparing the key variables which influence the development and change in children's political orientations as they pass through the secondary school. In the main two designs have been utilised in studies of development; they are the cross sectional design and the longitudinal or panel design.²¹ In our study we included both within the overall design. The cross sectional alternative involves taking respondents from different age groups, on the assumption that these comparisons can tell us what to expect will happen to the child's orientations over the time interval chosen. That is, we proceeded on the basis that today's 11 year olds will, in a year's time be just like the present crop of 12 year olds are now. Analysis of age development is thus made possible without actually having followed the progress of a particular child all the way through this period.

In the longitudinal or panel study there would be re-interviewing of the same subject over a particular period. The former term refers most commonly to the procedure of interviewing a respondent over a number of years - the shorter the time period and the lower the

the number of interviews the more likely the design is to be described as a panel study. The advantage of both types of design is that they permit one to relate changes to individual respondents rather than in the aggregate to whole groups, as is the case with the cross sectional design.

In our study a sample of pupils were interviewed twice, once at the beginning of the school session and again at the end, with some of this group having been exposed to our main independent variable, in this period. This sample will be referred to as the panel section.

3b. Conceptualisation of the Sample Design:

Having decided on the problem to be studied and the general research design we had to determine what population was to be sampled, and in what way. The original intention of a representative sample of all Scots schoolchildren proved unattainable. Obstacles were presented on all sides. To begin with research in Scottish schools has to be approved through the 'usual channels' - which means obtaining approval from the local education authority and from the headmaster of the school which one intends visiting. Preliminary inquiries made it plain that the necessary permission would not be forthcoming from a number of local authorities. It further transpired that the Schools Examination Board was not prepared to divulge the names of schools or the areas which presented candidates in Modern Studies; such apparently is the pressure on the time of schoolchildren and teachers for their 'co-operation' in educational research that this is regarded as classified information. No sampling frame therefore existed from which our sample could be drawn.

Further to these conditions which were imposed on us there were restrictions of our own which had to be considered in choosing

schools where the interviews were to be conducted. Certain practical and theoretical considerations necessitated biasing our sample in terms of the age, intelligence and type of school attended. Since we conducted the interviews only in secondary schools our age range was effectively curtailed to the age group 12-18 years, but this did not bother our investigation overly since the emphasis had been given to political development during adolescence. With respect to the intelligence level of this age range it was always obvious that those individuals at the lowest end of the ability spectrum would find it exceptionally difficult to complete the questionnaire without assistance. Conveniently, at least for our purposes, those individuals with an I.Q. score of below 80 have traditionally been placed within a separate category in Scotland, and these 'modified' pupils were excluded completely from our investigation.

The type of school attended by secondary schoolchildren provided another cut-off point. While we were able to obtain co-operation from the main types of school within the jurisdiction of the local education authorities no co-operation was forthcoming from other sectors.

3c. Design of the Data Collection Instrument:

We have indicated that the data collection instrument was to be a self-administered paper and pencil questionnaire; this of course is not the only alternative, but most practical considerations pointed to the use of this technique over all others. The actual design of the questionnaire was a substantial planning task. Few clear cut principles exist on which to base the scope of the questionnaire, the phrasing of questions and general problems to do with layout. There is nonetheless a wealth of experience and expertise that has been built

up in recent years and it was possible in our own study to draw on the mistakes and successes of such previous work, particularly that done in the area of political socialisation in America.²²

In addition to the general technical considerations to do with layout and instructions etc., we had to decide how best to guide the respondent into making meaningful replies. In practice it was found that the measurement of the higher order of political skills was best achieved by employing different types of question, particularly the open-ended variety. It further transpired that attitudinal measures which work satisfactorily with older or brighter children may be unsuitable for other respondents. The choice here is between administering the same instrument for different populations and thereby getting a high don't know response rate in the younger groups, or using different instruments appropriate to different age groups but whose content, and therefore measurement, may not be strictly comparable.

Political life covers a good many problems and concepts which some children find difficult to grasp because their own cognitive and affective development has not become sufficiently advanced. To take one example, the pre-test interviews demonstrated that some children found great difficulty in dealing with the abstract and often unfamiliar concepts of the political world and so ideas like 'human rights' and 'the rule of law' are quite meaningless to them. Furthermore, too many questions in this vein would be a shortcut to boredom in interviewee response. We tried, as far as possible therefore, to mix the more difficult open-ended questions with 'soft options'.

4. Pretest of the Instrument:

Given that few questionnaires have been designed for

schoolchildren in the area of civic and political orientations, we had to devote considerable attention to various problems of design which cannot be fully appreciated until the questionnaire has been administered to a 'real, live audience'. The pretesting stage provides an opportunity to indulge in setting a far wider array of questions than could possibly have been included in a single questionnaire. In our case we spent ten weeks interviewing children between the first and third years. These interviews and the conversations about the questions which followed, showed us that much of our original terminology, concepts and ideas were quite meaningless to, or misinterpreted by, the respondents. In addition, it became clear that the younger age groups, especially the less able pupils, had difficulty in answering a questionnaire of the intended length in the time we knew would be made available to us in the schools, namely, one school period, or 35-40 minutes.

We therefore decided that in order to minimize the above mentioned difficulties we should administer two versions of the questionnaire. Each would contain the central problems of interest to us, but one would be for the third year pupils and above, with another version for first and second year pupils, with some of the questions omitted and some of the language simplified and question instructions expanded in the latter.

Our conclusion on the pre-test stage was that the opportunity which it provided to administer what amounted to several questionnaires and then 'grill' the respondents on the meaning of the questions as they saw them, as well as explaining the meaning of their answers was a most indispensable exercise.

5. The Pilot Study:

The full dress rehearsal of the survey takes the form of the pilot study, although the sample is but a fraction of the intended sample population of the final version. In our case, the pilot work was carried out in two schools on all of the age groups in which we were interested, and included pupils taking Modern Studies.

The whole operation was conducted as if this were the 'real thing'. In retrospect the pilot study did not tell us so much about deficiencies with the questionnaire as shortcomings in its administration. With respect to the latter, it soon became obvious that the researcher himself would have to take full personal control of all facets in order that some degree of reliability and conformity be established between schools. Teachers were found to be a particularly disruptive force, either because they would not follow instructions as given to them because of sloth and ignorance or else they thought that they had found ways to improve on them.

In addition, the pilot interviews provided a set of data on which we could finally base our inclusion of certain questions, plus the first extended exercise of our data processing arrangements. In respect of the latter, a coding frame had been worked out on the basis of replies given in the pretests and according to the theoretical orientation of the study; now it was widened still further. As well as the arrangements for processing data, that is, the coding, punching on to cards and cleaning of the data, we were able to indulge in some limited data analysis. This consisted of simple column counts and crosstabulations only but it did enable us to obtain a more distinct picture of the way in which particular items were working, especially their power to discriminate between respondents. This data also provided evidence on the response rate of

particular groups and of particular items which led to some alterations.

6. Final Study Design:

With the satisfactory completion of the pilot stage we were ready to organize the final run. It had been possible during the preliminary stages to mull over the problems of the sample, design of the questionnaire, its administration, and the processing and analysis of the data thus obtained. In only one instance, that of the sample design, was there still a significant question mark against the procedure to be followed.

For obvious reasons we wanted to reflect in our sample the more likely confounding variables in the development of social and political orientations. These we believed included the part of Scotland in which our subjects reside, the type of school they attended, and the socio-economic background of their father. Against this we had in addition to ensure that there were analysable numbers of each sex, each intelligence category and sufficient numbers taking Modern Studies.

Names of schools willing to co-operate were obtained and the final sample was chosen on the basis of the type of school and the region in which it was situated. Once the schools had been decided upon, as far as possible a random selection of pupils took place among the pupils within the school, though consideration always had to be given to obtaining the distribution of the characteristics we thought important. In the end we achieved a satisfactory quota sample of Scottish secondary schoolchildren.

If we deal first with the regional factor, it is customary to divide Scotland into four areas - the northern, the east-central, the west-central and finally the southern region.²³ The Central belts dominate in terms of overall population and together they account for about 77% of the total population of Scotland. They are also significant

for sampling purposes because of the overwhelming concentration of the urban population in these two areas. Conversely, the rural population congregates in the northern and southern extremities of Scotland. The total secondary school population in these areas and the percentage in our sample are given in TABLE 5 and provide good grounds for believing that we have accommodated the regional factor in our sample, or more correctly, the urban-rural balance.

TABLE 5: Regional difference and the sample.

	% of secondary school population	% of respondents in our sample by area.
Central Regions	75.7%	74.2%
Northern & Southern	24.3%	25.8%

Educational literature in Britain abounds with the influence of the type of school attended over a wide area of learning. The strict division in educational establishments in the state sector in England between Grammar, technical and secondary modern schools is being eroded somewhat with the advent of the so-called comprehensive schools. In Scotland there has not been the same strict tradition of division, and the comprehensive system has been accepted earlier and more widely than is the case south of the border. Nevertheless one can see an entrenched tradition of selective education in the large Scottish cities where the fee paying schools have always hived off a social and academic elite. Because there is not any general acceptance of equality between types of school, we have followed the official categorization of schools and sampled according to the following types:²⁴

TABLE 6: School Type and the sample.

School Type	% Attending in whole of Scotland	% In our sample
Comprehensive	47.7%	51.4%
Selective:		
a. Certificate course only	19.5%	22.9%
b. Non-certificate courses only	8.8%	3.0%
Part-Comprehensive and Part-Selective	24.3%	22.6%

The main deficiency in our sample that can be seen from TABLE 6 is the under-representation of the old Junior Secondary type of pupil, which in turn implies a deficiency in the number of respondents with a low I.Q. and a manual class background. In order to counteract our difficulties in including Junior Secondary schools within our sample, we took a disproportionate number of less able children from the comprehensive schools.

The final category on which we are able to compare our sample with the broader national total is the socio-economic background of our respondents.²⁵ If we collapse the 17 categories of the Registrar-General into three groups - manual, non-manual and other - we find that our sample reflects most closely the socio-economic differences in the adult population as a whole. There is a slight over-representation of the non-manual section but this was to be anticipated as many studies attest that the children of manual workers leave school in far larger numbers at the end of the third and fourth years. In the third year and below, our sample is a near accurate representation of the national figures.

While emphasizing again that we in no sense would claim to have drawn a random sample of secondary school children in Scotland, we did

manage to obtain a close approximation to a quota sample, at least according to the important factors of region, school type, and the socio-economic background of the father.

TABLE 7: Distribution of sample according to socio-economic background.

	% in National Totals	% in Our Sample
Non-manual	34.3	38.0
Manual	56.5	51.0
Other	9.5	10.0

Other factors were also to influence the drawing of our sample, but here the motivation was above all else to obtain a large enough number of pupils within important sub-groups in order that meaningful analysis would be possible. This applied in particular to the sex and ability level of our respondents within each school year.

TABLE 8: Distribution of sample according to sex of respondent, by age.

		Male		Female	Total
	%		%		
12 Years	47.1	(98)	52.9	(110)	208
13 Years	51.5	(194)	48.5	(183)	377
14 Years	43.1	(262)	56.9	(346)	608
15 Years	43.5	(269)	56.5	(350)	619
16 Years	40.7	(154)	59.3	(224)	378
17 Years	41.1	(67)	58.9	(96)	163

TABLE 9: Distribution of sample according to I.Q. Score of respondent, by age. 26

	High %	Medium %	Low %	D.K. %	Total
12 Years	29.8 (62)	38.9 (81)	26.0 (54)	5.3 (11)	208
13 Years	27.6 (104)	48.8 (184)	19.4 (73)	4.2 (16)	377
14 Years	20.6 (125)	52.1 (317)	20.1 (122)	7.2 (44)	608
15 Years	21.0 (130)	49.4 (306)	13.2 (82)	16.3 (101)	619
16 Years	35.7 (135)	49.2 (186)	4.2 (16)	10.8 (41)	378
17 Years	37.4 (61)	41.7 (68)	2.5 (4)	18.4 (30)	163

Both TABLES 8 and 9 indicate that our objective to obtain a good representation among sub-groups of the population has been achieved except where, for obvious reasons, we could not be expected to exercise much control, namely the negligible number of low I.Q. respondents among the older school children. Less satisfying is the somewhat haphazard way in which the proportion with a particular characteristic changes between age groups, although nowhere does this reach extremes.

A final consideration was to establish a good distribution of pupils according to whether or not they had taken the course in Modern Studies. In the end we obtained ample numbers of pupils taking Modern Studies as can be seen below:

TABLE 10: Distribution of sample according to whether Modern Studies was taken, by age. 27

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies		
	%		%		
14 Years	59.4	(262)	40.6	(179)	(441)
15 Years	52.8	(327)	47.2	(292)	(619)
16 Years	43.9	(166)	56.1	(212)	(378)
17 Years	61.3	(100)	38.7	(63)	(163)

6c. Data Collection:

The actual administration of the questionnaire was undertaken during three different time periods. The 'after only' sections were split into two groups, one of these was interviewed at the end of the 1969 school session and the other was dealt with a year later. The groups falling into the quasi-experimental design, involving 'before and after' measurement were first interviewed at the beginning of the school session in September 1969 and again in the summer of 1970.

The maximum time allowed for the completion of the questionnaire was 40 minutes and after that time had elapsed they were collected in even if the respondent had not answered all of the items - this in fact resulted in about 2.4% of the respondents not providing replies to all questions.

6d. Data Processing:

The processing of the data continued as each wave was completed. This meant that it was not until the summer of 1970 that all of the data had been coded, punched on to cards and then cleaned ready for analysis. All of the 10 page questionnaire, 2378 in all, were coded by the researcher himself, after initial checks by an outsider.

7. Data Analysis:

The analysis of the data commenced in exploratory fashion after the first wave was completed in 1969, but did not finally take shape until after the summer of 1970. It is to the conclusions of this analysis that we will be turning in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, having set the stage in these first four chapters for the lines of investigation that will be taken.

Footnotes to Chapter Four: The Research Design.

1. For an excellent comprehensive treatment of the problems involved in social research the following was extensively consulted by this author: Sellitz, C., Jahoda, M., Deutsch, M., & Cook, S., Research Methods In Social Relations, Methuen, London, Revised One-Volume Edition, 1965.
2. Ibid. Chapter two.
3. Ibid. Chapter three.
4. Easton, D., & Dennis, J., Children in the Political System, McGraw-Hill, 1969, p.5.
5. See: W. Scott, Attitude Measurement, Chapter 2, vol.2, Lindzey, G., & Aronson, E., Eds., Research Methods in Social Psychology, 2nd edition, New York, 1969.
6. Moser, C., Survey Methods in Social Investigation, Heineman, London, 1958, p.6.
7. Festinger, L., Laboratory Experiments, in Festinger, L., & Katz, D., Eds., Research Methods in Behavioural Science, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1953, Chapter 4, p.137.
8. Ibid, p.137.
9. Sellitz et al. op.cit. chapter 4. According to: Wiersma, W., Research Methods in Education, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1969, pp.245-248, our design is more strictly referred to as a 'non-equivalent control group design'.
10. A study currently being undertaken by A.Morrison, Department of Education, University of Dundee.
11. Solomon, R., An Extension of Control Group Design, Psych.Bull.1949.46. pp 137-150.
12. Campbell, D., Factors Relative to the validity of experiments in social settings, Psych. Bull. 54, 1957, pp.297-312.
13. Obviously we have not included an exhaustive treatment of the potential sources of bias in our research design. For example, many demand characteristics, - "the totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject" - and possible lines of experimenter bias were contemplated and every attempt was made to minimize these forces, although I do not think it necessary to enumerate them. See: Insko, C., Theories of Attitude Change, New York, 1967, pp 6-11.

14. Sellitz, op.cit. p.147
15. Upshaw, H., Attitude Measurement, in Blalock & Blalock, Eds., Methodology in Social Research, McGraw-Hill, 1968 Chapter 3.
16. See Chapter Five,
17. Ibid, p.392.
18. The source of scales taken from previous studies are noted in Chapter five.
19. Sellitz, op.cit. p.166
20. Ibid. Chapter six.
21. Oppenheim, A.N., Question Design and Attitude Measurement, Heinemann 1966.
22. Sellitz., op.cit. especially chapter seven.
23. Credland, G., & Murray, G., Scotland, A New Look, Scottish Television, 1969, Chapter two.
24. Scottish Educational Statistics 1969, H.M.S.O.
25. 1966 Sample Census of Scotland, H.M.S.O. 1969.
26. High I.Q. = 115 or above; low I.Q. = 95 and below. These are V.R.Q. scores; the division is of course necessarily an arbitrary one.
27. The figures provided in the Tables 5-10 are for the cross sectional design only. Figures for the panel sample are provided in chapter seven.

Chapter Five: The Development of Political Orientations.

The guiding structure to this investigation has been a developmental framework which both sensitizes us to central theoretical problems in political socialisation as well as having the invaluable effect of directing us to a range of questions which are of immediate relevance to formal political education. The reader will recall that 'development', the key concept in our theoretical framework, has been variously interpreted. In this study we are concerned with the relationship between political learning and cognitive growth in a setting of wider interindividual differences. The perspective on political development that we have chosen to employ is a qualitative one. Its essence is illustrated by distinguishing it from change. While both terms cover a transition in attitudes from one state to another development implies an ordered, consistent and typically predictable pattern of growth to adult levels of sophistication (though not necessarily the same orientations). Change, on the other hand, suggests that the transformations which occur in a young person's information and ideas are essentially unpredictable, haphazard movements. The qualitative aspects of our theoretical approach highlight the rate at which stage-like growth occurs. The traditional guide to the stage at which the child has arrived in his cognitive growth is chronological age. Yet, although it might appear from our analysis that the whole basis of political development is seen in terms of age changes, chronological age is without great explanatory power of its own. Its use is attributable to claims that it is by far the most efficient indicator of the stage of cognitive growth attained by the individual. Nor should it be thought that the overriding concern of this thesis is with nature rather than nurture. It is not our view that cognitive capacity is the sole predictor of political learning in young people - indeed its influence over some orientations is not thought

to be anything more than marginal - and this should become apparent in the subsequent chapters where political development is cast within a much wider range of powerful social factors and individual differences.

In this chapter, we shall examine the nature of the development of political orientations during adolescence. Initially, we will want to document the simple proposition that there is a definite pattern of growth in the acquisition of such orientations. This means that increasing age will be associated with a greater number, and an expanding range of political orientations. In addition there will be a tendency for these to become a more accurate reflection of adult reactions, while allowing that there will be differences in group perceptions of the political scene. Initially we will be looking for the following signs of political development:

1. The number and range of orientations acquired will increase with age.
2. Orientations acquired in both the cognitive and the affective domains will be consolidated; incorrect and idiosyncratic political reactions will diminish relatively, with age.

Extending our interpretation of development to look at its qualitative aspects leads us to consider the progression of the individual from one plane of political thinking to another. It entails:

3. A decline in the personalization of political authority, and an increase in an institutionalised view. This will be associated with a declining idealisation of political authority.

4. There will be a decline in authoritarianism or heteronomy; and a corresponding increase in socionomy, insofar as this involves an increased grasp of the demands that the community makes on the individual.
5. There will be a growth in the higher cognitive perspectives on political problems, and most especially an increased tendency to think in abstract terms.
6. There will be a growth in objective responsibility or equity.
7. We will be able to distinguish the birth of a political belief system.

We indicated in a previous chapter our intention to draw a distinction between those political orientations which may be ranked as cognitive and others which fit into the affective domain. We now propose to make a further division within each domain, on the basis of the level of increased internalization, as is implied in Bloom's taxonomy.¹ The political examples which we intend using within each domain, and the level at which they have been cast, include the following:-

	<u>Cognitive Domain.</u>	<u>Affective Domain.</u>
Low:	Simple recall of political knowledge	Awareness of the world of politics. Support for the British system of governing.
Medium:	International symbols Political Ideologue	Interest in politics. Political values and norms; efficacy, toleration, cynicism.
High:	Analysis of abstract ideas and systems	Organization of political values into a belief system.

Before plunging into the analysis of our findings, we should clear up one point about the stance adopted in this study; this pertains to the method chosen to operationalise the age of our respondents. The first and obvious strategy is to take the exact chronological age of the subject. However, the general practice in political socialisation research has been to follow a different ploy and not use the actual chronological age, but one that is inferred from the school year, or form class, from which the children have been drawn. It is a paradox of those studies of political socialisation which affirm their adoption of the developmental framework that when analysing their data they should use the school year (or grade level) of their respondents as the distinguishing criteria. Quite clearly, chronological age is the exact measure; what then is the bias that is introduced by the use of the alternative measure?

Criticism of the practice of using school year emphasizes that the latter includes pupils whose actual ages may well vary by more than one calendar year. The use of pupils from several schools obviously increases the possibility that bias will be introduced because one has no guarantee that practice between schools on this point is similar. Overall there can be little doubt, as the following tables illustrate, that there is a high correlation between the chronological age of our respondents and their school year. The product moment correlation for this relationship in our sample is as high as +0.9; but further examination demonstrates that within one school year, the actual range of ages, calculated on the basis of years and months, far exceeds the acceptable 12 month span in every case.

TABLE 11: Relationship of age and year at school (percentaged vertically).

	First Year	Second Year	Third Year	Fourth Year	Fifth Year	Sixth Year
12 Years	57.9	-	-	-	-	-
13 Years	42.1	57.5	-	-	-	-
14 years	-	42.5	56.3	-	-	-
15 Years	-	-	43.7	50.0	-	-
16 Years	-	-	-	47.7	48.1	-
17 Years	-	-	-	2.3	51.9	51.0
18 Years	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>49.0</u>
N =	<u>359</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>784</u>	<u>554</u>	<u>237</u>	<u>51</u>

TABLE 12: Relationship of age and year at school (percentaged horizontally).

	First Year	Second Year	Third Year	Fourth Year	Fifth Year	Sixth Year
12 Years	100.0	-	-	-	-	- (208)
13 Years	40.1	59.9	-	-	-	- (377)
14 Years	-	27.5	72.5	-	-	- (608)
15 Years	-	-	55.3	44.7	-	- (619)
16 Years	-	-	-	69.8	30.2	- (378)
17 Years	-	-	-	8.0	75.9	16.1 (163)
18 Years	-	-	-	-	-	100.0 (25)
N = 2378						

Tables 11-13 spotlight the difficulties contained in any study which bases its analysis of development on the school year of its respondents. Children in every school year are quite evenly spread between two chronological ages, except in the fourth year where three age groups are included. Taking actual age as the criteria produces the pattern presented in TABLE 12. This demonstrates that, whereas the majority of a chronological age group are strongly concentrated in one

school year, on the other hand, no school year is so dominated by one age group.

TABLE 13: Mean age and range in months, by school year.

	Average Age	Age Range
First Year	12 Years 10 months	12.00 - 13.11 months
Second Year	14 Years 1 month	13.00 - 14.11 months
Third Year	14 Years 11 months	14.00 - 15.11 months
Fourth Year	16 Years 1 month	15.00 - 17.02 months
Fifth Year	17 Years 1 month	16.00 - 17.11 months
Sixth Year	18 Years	17.03 - 18.08 months

It is TABLE 13 which perhaps best of all illustrates the limitations which stem from building a developmental framework on age where this is inferred from the school year of the respondent. By taking actual age, we limit the average age range to $10\frac{1}{2}$ months, whereas using school year would have increased this to 22 months.

The choice of school year to derive chronological age has the effect of disguising the influence of this latter factor in the most obvious of ways. We are especially perturbed that the use of school year allows more scope for the intervention of social factors - which is exactly what we are trying to minimize at this stage. Our employment of the subject's actual age goes some way to randomize the influence of social forces and permits a more exact measure of cognitive factors.

On both theoretical and practical grounds therefore we feel justified in our use of chronological age as the criterion for analysing the development of political orientations. Our concern with this problem may seem an over-reaction, but it is particularly important for evaluating the theoretical framework adopted in this study, as well as being highly

relevant if we are to compare our own findings with those presented in other research - particularly cross-national research. Unfortunately, even though some of the authors to whom we refer constantly espouse a developmental framework, none in practice is committed to the use of chronological age as the distinguishing criteria. Dennis, for example, uses chronological age as his criteria for growth in one study and school grade in another, which leads one to suppose that the distinction to which we have pointed is not a significant one for him, particularly as he claims to adhere to a developmental framework in each study.² The same strictures may be applied to the English socialisation studies that have, or will be, referred to in this discussion. To be fair, none of these espouse a developmental approach and this is underlined by their vague references to a chronological age which is characteristic of the school year in which they have been interviewing.

We will commence our analysis of political orientations by investigating the widely accepted proposition that these emerge apace with age, and that adolescence is a period which is characterised by a rapid rate of acquisition. Before documenting the patterns of growth in political learning, we have to substantiate our premise that we are dealing with an age group who have acquired at least some identifiable political orientations. Those socialisation studies in America which have interviewed children from a younger age group than we have sampled, all conclude that such orientations will emerge before adolescence, although this conclusion applies only to the lower levels of internalization. Easton and Dennis, for example, suggest that some political values are evident in children only just started at primary school, although the same group's knowledge of political life has hardly achieved the embryo stage, even at the lowest level of recall of political facts and events.³

We want to know firstly then about the timing of political learning - or rather the extent of political orientations at the age of 12 years and the movement which occurs up to the age of 17 years. Dealing for the moment with the cognitive domain, we will ask for example, when knowledge of who is the Prime Minister is general and when the young person acquires an understanding of complex political ideas such as democracy and communism.

We have interpreted the level of don't know responses as an index of non-acquisition of political orientations, although it is necessarily an inexact measure. This may reflect a lack of information, unfamiliarity with the concepts or terminology or again a refusal to commit oneself to a stranger. Bias may also be introduced from another direction, since if the 'don't know' response is taken as an index of non-acquisition, this means that all responses which have been made are accepted as indicators of political awareness. Yet these responses may be little more than inspired guesses or essentially incoherent and highly flexible opinions. We therefore decided to add a corrective measure by including, where appropriate, a record of the level of incorrect responses made by our subjects.


If we deal firstly with the cognitive domain, we can see in Figure 1 that the ability to produce the simple recall of political facts, which must rank as the lowest form of political skill in this area, proceeds in a manner which is both consistent and dramatic, although individual items fluctuate occasionally.⁴ Moving on to the numbers giving an incorrect response, we see that a significant minority amongst the youngest age group answer incorrectly, but this falls off to a negligible proportion by the age of 17 years. There are furthermore, quite considerable differences in the level of don't know response and

incorrect replies between items in the political knowledge scale. This is best demonstrated where we divide the items into 3 groups. The first, which covers items 1 and 2, has both a very low don't know response rate as well as a very low incorrect response rate. The second group of items 3-5, has a higher incorrect response rate and the highest don't know figures, while the last three items, 6-8, also exhibit a high don't know response level in the younger age groups and by far the greatest incorrect response rate. However, it is not possible to draw any conclusion about whether young people find it more difficult to attach a politician to a political office than to a political party.

Overall, the consistent fall-off in don't know responses could hardly be more vividly recorded. The same conclusion may be drawn about the trend in incorrect responses, although here there is a slight reversal in the pattern of decline between the 13 and 14 year olds. A summary of the level of non-acquisition of political orientations is presented in Figures 1; while TABLE 14 provides an indication of the extent to which the actual level of non-acquisition in each area differs from the level predicted from the regression line.

What of the rate of acquisition at the medium level in the cognitive domain? Our examples included items which assessed the respondent's ability to choose the correct international name tag, from three alternatives, for selected countries.⁵ These 'tags' follow the simplified shorthand descriptions which are attached to countries in popular usage to indicate the general alignment of that country in international politics - or more specifically its position vis-a-vis the confrontation between East and West. Seven countries are included in the index and the growth of political knowledge is seen from the findings presented in Figure 1 to bear a strong relationship to age changes. As with all of the regression lines, the coefficients are negative, and often

FIGURE 1 : Level of Non-Acquisition of Political Orientations.



markedly so, indicating that the non-response rate falls off quite definitely as we move upwards to our older respondents, while in addition it declines evenly with no substantial deviations from the regression line (see TABLE 14).

On a further question, which we rated of comparable difficulty to the above, we asked the respondent to relate a political party to a particular policy programme.⁶ The three items which we felt would not give rise to much disagreement among informed adult opinion encompass the issue index in Figure 1. Again we discover that the average non-response rate across these items falls off in the manner achieved in those areas previously reported. Individual items might not always fit exactly into this pattern of consistency, but it is surprising that the sole exception is the item dealing with the party most in favour of Scottish independence; and even more inexplicable, it is among the older subjects that the reversal in the trend occurs.

When we progress from those questions demanding a recall of straightforward information, we have to admit that it is far less convincing to talk in terms of right and wrong replies, since the latitude of individual and group perception as to what is correct increases markedly. We have to be far more cautious therefore in our designation of a particular response as incorrect; nevertheless, we do feel that if we take the items included in the international name tags question referred to above, associations, such as China being thought a 'Western' power, are manifestly wrong and may be classified as incorrect. Some others might rank as borderline cases, but in the end a majority of the eldest subjects agreed with the designations we had afforded to each country and we have felt confident in categorizing all responses as either right or wrong. The same reasoning motivated our analysis of the policy oriented questions.

The classification of these replies as correct or not, demonstrates the contradiction involved in accepting non-response as the sole index of non-acquisition in political orientations. That such high numbers are able to give a reply and for example, identify a particular political party with a policy position, does not necessarily mean that even a simple majority of those respondents have acquired the 'correct' perception of this relationship. Indeed, for most items though not always among the younger respondents, the level of incorrect response even outstrips the don't know figure. Allowing for both indicators of non-acquisition, the patterns which emerge in the medium level of response in the cognitive domain exhibit much the same characteristics as those already described in the lower level. Again we detect the steady and consistent growth of political orientations with increasing age.

Our final perspective on the acquisition of political knowledge comes from responses given to questions which require an understanding of complex political ideas such as democracy and communism. If we look at the children's ability to comprehend what is meant by communism we find at this level the highest extent of don't know responses in all age groups. Yet the reasons that make this the most demanding question in the cognitive domain and give the highest level of non-acquisition also mean that this area provides most scope for the steepest decline in the non-acquisition rate. Even where we make an allowance for totally incorrect, or otherwise nonsensical answers, which could not be construed as indicating an appreciation of the term under consideration, we still have definite confirmation of the view that age will show its most dramatic association with the acquisition of political orientations in the more complex skills in the cognitive domain.

TABLE 14: Deviation of the actual non-acquisition scores the predicted scores from the regression equation. (The figures given are obtained by subtracting the predicted score from the actual score).

	Political knowledge	Internat. tags	Issue items	Communism	Political interest	Political discourse	Efficacy	Tolerance
12 Years	0.5	0.6	2.3	0.2	-0.2	-2.0	1.2	0.9
13 Years	-0.8	0.3	-1.7	-1.2	-1.9	-1.4	-1.1	-0.6
14 Years	-1.5	0.9	0.0	0.1	2.2	4.0	-1.7	-0.3
15 Years	1.2	0.9	-1.6	1.0	0.6	1.9	-0.8	-0.6
16 Years	-0.5	-2.8	-1.3	1.7	1.2	-0.3	-2.3	-0.1
17 Years	-0.3	1.3	2.4	-1.8	-1.7	-2.2	1.2	0.7

Not only did we expect different rates of acquisition between the three levels of cognitive reasoning, but we should see much the same pattern in the affective domain. However, the level of non-acquisition should be lower and the rate of acquisition correspondingly less pronounced than in the cognitive domain. A ubiquitous conclusion of political socialisation research has been that political values pre-date the existence of relevant knowledge, although young adolescents are acquiring political information at such a rate that we do not expect there to be a significant gap in the level of acquisition between the two domains by the time the respondent is old enough to leave our sample.


While the acquisition of political knowledge advances more quickly than in the affective domain there is a strong suspicion that the highest level of operations, which demands the organization of political values into a comprehensive belief system, is a task guaranteed to test most adults let alone teenagers, and for that reason even less in evidence than comparable orientations in the cognitive domain. Be that as it may, the organization of political values does not lend itself to the construction of a non-acquisition index and we will content ourselves at this stage with an examination of the low and medium levels only.

The lowest level of affective orientation involves demonstrating an awareness of the political world and making some form of evaluative response. Our questionnaire asked respondents to indicate their interest in current political and economic problems and the numbers indicating that they are not the least bit interested in such matters is covered in Figure 2. As predicted, the level of non-interest in political affairs is lower than anything recorded in the cognitive domain, while in addition the fall-off in non-interest is correspondingly less rapid. The exact relationship of interest to general learning of values and knowledge is a matter for some dispute but if, as most people argue, interest is a pre-requisite to extended political learning, the quality of the orientations attributed to the younger respondents must be in question. The relatively high unwillingness to attend to political affairs is not only expressed in the above question but is further illustrated by the extent to which children familiarize themselves to the raw material of political life through the mass media. Construction of a mass media consumption index implies that as many as 46.6% of the 12 year olds had what can only be designated as a poor level of familiarity with media communications and this falls quite slowly so that even among the 17 year olds there are as many as 25.2% ranked at this lower level.⁷ Closer inspection of use made of the media indicates that the watching of T.V. news programmes, though it may not constitute an accurate gauge of attending to political affairs, is nevertheless most likely to stand out as the common denominator for children in the transmission of current news, it being able to attract a greater number than who report that they regularly read the papers.

This ties in with the readiness of young people to discuss political matters with either their friends, teachers or parents. Contrary to predictions our use of the level of discourse as an indicator of

Figure 2 : Political Scale Scores

(derived from regression line)



political awareness or interest produces non-acquisition levels as high as those recorded at comparable levels in the cognitive domain, though the steepness of the decline in the regression line is less marked.

Moving on from a general evaluation of political affairs to specific orientations we shall consider the rate of non-acquisition found in the items that comprise the political efficacy and political toleration scales.⁸ Examination of the former shows that there is a much greater preparedness to demonstrate political learning among the youngest children than is the case with the cognitive domain; this encompasses a less pronounced trend for acquisition which means that the younger respondent is far more like his elders in his political thinking. Nevertheless, there is the same association between age and level of non-response, as Figure 1 illustrates.

Our general conclusion is that the pupils in our sample are more ready, and able to respond to value positions than they are to demonstrate political knowledge at this level. While the children on entry to our sample at the age of 12 years are less able to deal with political knowledge questions, this gap in the acquisition of cognitive and affective orientations will have narrowed by the age of 17 years, and in some instances will actually have been reversed. Although political knowledge increases continuously, it is as if a barrier exists for a minority which prevails against their acquisition, or readiness to admit, political interest or preferences. The pattern is the same in the don't know figures for the items in the scales directed to their evaluation of other democratic norms, such as political toleration.

The level of non-acquisition that we have located does look broadly comparable to that unearthed in other British studies;⁹ although examination of some political preferences suggests that our sample are

more reluctant, or less precocious, in the statement of their opinions. We have said that non-identification with a political party affects approximately 35% in middle adolescence, yet in our study the 15 year old group exhibit a non-affiliation level of 50.9%¹⁰ Over the whole sample supporting a political party is an action which becomes more likely as one gets older with as many as 57.7% indicating that they do not have a political preference at the age of 12 years.

We began this discussion by saying that the acquisition of political orientations, at least in so far as this is operationalised in terms of the decline in the don't know response rate and supplemented, where appropriate, by the incorrect response rate, will proceed rapidly during adolescence. This has been substantiated. We further argued that it is possible to distinguish different levels of acquisition and rates of growth between the cognitive and affective domains. The proposition that there will be greater room for advance in the cognitive domain also holds - though it is important to remember that we know little as yet about the relative embeddedness or flexibility of the orientations acquired in these areas.

The regression coefficients reported in Figures 1 and 2 back up the picture presented. Among the cognitive orientations, in the lower levels, the regression slope is much the same across all areas, although in the higher levels the slope increases quite noticeably. In the affective domain, the coefficients are generally lower, but this less dramatic spurt in acquisition is somewhat compensated by the fact that the absolute level of acquisition is higher when children enter our sample. Nevertheless, by the age of 17 years most of these differences between domains in absolute level of acquisition have been ironed out.

As far as the deviations of the actual scores from those predicted by the regression line are concerned, TABLE 14 demonstrates that the fit is extremely good across both domains. There is nothing in the figures to suggest that any one age group is more consistently out of line with the trend for one orientation than any other; the average deviation from the trend line for each age group runs from 1.0 for the 12 year olds to 1.5 for the 17 year old children. This is hardly the data from which conclusions about especially large jumps in political learning at particular ages may be drawn.

In answer to the question, 'When is it possible to say that children have acquired political orientations?', we can reply with some confidence that by the time the child is old enough to be included in our sample, the majority will be able to recall at least simple political information and express preferences over a not insignificant range of political values. While we can show that the acquisition of political orientations proceeds in a most predictable fashion away from the base point, the notion of development in political thinking rests primarily on the pattern of the orientations acquired rather than the rate or extent of acquisition per se. It is to the patterns of political learning, the hub of our developmental framework, that we now turn.

Cognitive responses commence with the ability to recall quite specific political facts, such as dates, events, and names of political figures. In our questionnaire we constructed a scale of political knowledge based on eight items which are intended to assess the recall of selected officeholders and the party tie of established politicians. Thus far we have set down the rate at which our respondent's inability to supply answers declined, and here we will examine the replies which we took as evidence of political awareness. None of the answers is the subject of

any dispute; when analysed they illustrate what we would expect, that, as children grow older, their wealth of political information and knowledge increases apace. The association, though not always a perfect one where items are considered singly, is nonetheless very strong.

TABLE 15: Political Knowledge items; % correct by age.¹¹

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Prime Minister	Richard Nixon	Secretary of State Scotland	Leader Cons. Party	Jeremy Thorpe	E.Powell's pol.party	W.Ewing's pol.party	B.Castle's pol.party
12 Years	97.1%	87.0%	22.6%	42.8%	20.7%	27.4%	37.5%	49.0%
13 Years	96.6	81.7	38.7	59.4	37.1	36.9	58.4	65.8
14 Years	98.2	87.7	54.0	68.8	41.8	45.1	60.2	68.3
15 Years	99.5	89.5	53.6	75.3	50.0	53.2	70.1	80.0
16 Years	99.2	94.7	67.5	88.1	69.3	68.5	82.5	90.5
17 Years	99.4	94.5	77.3	95.1	79.1	86.5	95.7	97.6

Several points are worthy of mention in the above table. To begin with we note that the differences in correct response between the youngest and the oldest groups is very small in some questions, such as that asking the name of the Prime Minister, where the gap is less than 3%, and very large in others, as for the items requiring the position occupied by Jeremy Thorpe and the party affiliation of Enoch Powell where the difference amounts to almost 60%. That 97% of the 12 year olds should know the name of the Prime Minister and only 20% the name of the Liberal party leader is a tribute to the importance of the former's role and the amount of exposure that he receives in the mass media and public discussion generally; if anything however, it is rather more surprising that so many are able to identify Mr. Thorpe's position, given his infrequent appearances in the public eye - particularly in Scotland.

Exposure in the national media rather than being restricted to the Scottish scene seems to be the important criteria for recognition. A fellow member of Mr. Wilson's Cabinet, and the longest ever serving Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr. William Ross, is consistently less well known to our respondents than the (then) Leader of the Conservative Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath, and in the eldest groups of 16 and 17 year olds, more anonymous even than Mr. Thorpe. It should follow from this that the task of identifying the party affiliation of M.P.'s is more easily accomplished where the politicians are national rather than local (i.e. Scots) celebrities. When asked to which of the political parties Enoch Powell, Winifred Ewing and Barbara Castle belong, the pattern of correct answers underlines the importance of national exposure, although as the example of Mr. Powell illustrates, difficulties are experienced in associating even such a well known figure with a political party. In fact in the 12 year old group more affiliated him with the Labour Party than with the Conservative Party, and even among the oldest children in our sample, as many as 8% wrongly identified Mr. Powell's political loyalties. The same confusion permeates the answers given to questions dealing with Mrs. Castle, and most surprisingly with Mrs. Ewing, although in their case the correct affiliation comes into focus far earlier. Comparing the three figures one finds that for every age, the highest percentage of correct responses is received by Mrs. Castle and the lowest by Mr. Powell, although the gap between them narrows considerably during adolescence. It might be argued that Mr. Powell's relatively weaker recognition pattern is due to his English base. This does not explain another consistent feature whereby Mrs. Ewing, at the time Scotland's lone National Party M.P., is not as well recognised as Mrs. Castle. The key to recognition of politicians, and this is particularly true of the younger respondents, tends in the main to derive from exposure through the

national media rather than being restricted more to Scottish affairs.

Yet if the difference in correct responses between the age groups depends to a great extent on the national prominence of the person concerned it is clear that whatever the question the overwhelming tendency is for the level of correct response to be positively associated with age. In addition the difference between the neighbour age groups in terms of the average level of correct response across all of the items shows several spurts towards increased growth. Political development at this level of cognitive task is continuous but particularly rapid among the youngest and oldest children. Those with no more than a minimal political knowledge decline to negligible proportions after the age of 15 years, while the percentage scoring high on our political index increases by more than four times between 12 and 17 years, including almost doubling between 12 and 13 years.

TABLE 16: Political knowledge scale score, by age.¹²

	High (1)	Medium (3)	Low (5)
12 Years	22.1%	49.0%	28.9%
13 Years	43.0	33.7	23.3
14 Years	49.8	34.5	15.6
15 Years	59.3	31.2	9.5
16 Years	77.2	19.6	3.4
17 Years	92.6	6.1	1.2

Pearson's $r = -0.36$

Regression equation is $Y = 3.80 + (-0.37) X$

How far does the dramatic growth in political knowledge recorded in TABLE 16 take place in higher levels of cognitive task? The comprehension of political material involves translating items presented to the subject into some part of a more meaningful whole.

This necessitates breaking down the material presented and recognising relationships and methods of organization. We designed an item which demands of the subjects that they attach one from several international name tags to selected countries. The common currency of international language has been to stereotype nations in terms of their position in the supposed confrontation between East and West. As we are aware that the classification of some countries would be in dispute, we have been careful to select countries on which informed opinion will reach wide agreement. The countries and percentage of correct responses by age group are shown in TABLE 17.

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TABLE 17: International Name Tags: % Correct by age.

	Britain	Canada	Russia	India	China	Switzerland	Poland	Average
12 Years	36.1%	41.8%	68.9%	30.3%	54.1%	24.6%	48.4%	43.5%
13 Years	46.2	48.0	78.9	34.5	70.9	39.5	54.3	53.2
14 Years	53.8	55.1	84.3	40.0	69.2	46.0	57.6	58.0
15 Years	66.2	60.4	88.9	46.7	79.0	67.4	54.1	66.1
16 Years	83.1	70.1	97.8	52.7	90.7	79.6	66.4	77.2
17 Years	91.4	76.1	99.4	59.5	93.9	81.0	79.1	82.9

Regression equation is $Y = 27.9 + (7.9) X$ (for average correct response)

As with the earlier scale of political knowledge we spot the same distinct progression in correct responses with age and equally the steady rate of increase across items. Even more noteworthy about the above table is the high level of correct response. Irrespective of whether the country is a major power, like the Soviet Union, or a relatively minor one like Switzerland, even the youngest pupils in our sample show high information levels and good powers of comprehension and classification. It is as though the ingredients of international conflict are more readily accessible and familiar to them than the domestic political variety.

Where confusion does seem to exist is in the notion of what constitutes a neutral country. Many children place both Britain and Canada in this category, possibly because they feel that the United States represents the 'West' and that countries geographically distant from that country are also ideologically removed. It may alternatively be part of an unconscious desire - when the item under consideration is one's own country - to express a determination to remain slightly removed from the heart of international conflict.

Another feature which stands out is for the younger children to more clearly perceive the 'opposition', namely the communist bloc, than they do either their own country or others nearer both ideologically and geographically. Having identified those with whom one does not fraternize, a bolder perspective of one's own position develops; even in the 17 year old group more subjects give a correct label to both Russia and China than they do when the country under consideration is Britain. This is borne out by an open ended question set to a group of 12-15 year olds asking them to name two communist countries. Over 80% were able to name one country (although almost 12% gave incorrect replies) and 60% offered two countries. It is pertinent to set down that apart from the Soviet Union and China no other country is named by more than 4% of the respondents. The recognition of the major communist countries should not be accepted, at least without further study, as implying even a minimal understanding of the principles of communism. As we will see when we move to the highest levels of cognitive activity the vast majority of respondents are unable to deal with the substance of communism although already willing to place it in a little box labelled, 'the opposition'.

We mentioned in passing that it seemed as though our subjects are almost more familiar with international labels and relationships than they are with the domestic political scene and we will now pursue this point by looking at the ability of young children to relate a political party with a particular issue position. Again we realise that even among informed adults the stance of political parties with respect to some policies, such as for example entry to the Common Market, may not provoke any wide agreement. We had, therefore, if our analysis was to carry any validity, to choose areas which are commonly accepted as the preserve of one of the political parties. The party most in favour of Scotland becoming independent, the party supported by most businessmen, and the party most in favour of nationalisation are clearly recognisable to adults and not the subject of much dispute. These items were supplemented by a further question about which little adult consensus was thought to exist - namely which of the political parties is most opposed to Scotland gaining complete independence.

The ability demanded in these questions constitutes an integral step in the general process of marshalling political facts into a comprehensive system. Investigations by other researchers in this area have found that below the age of 12 years there is only a poor appreciation of the nuances in ideological leaning between the major parties. Greenstein concluded that this task required a more advanced level of cognitive growth than was to be expected from the age range in his sample.¹⁴ Responses given in our investigation from an older group support his conclusion since it is not until late adolescence that this particular skill emerges with any force.

TABLE 18: Association of Political Parties with an issue position.¹⁵

Party most in favour of Scotland becoming independent.

	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.N.P.	DK/NA
12 Years	0.5%	4.3%	11.1%	4.8%	54.3%	25.0%
13 Years	1.1	5.0	5.0	2.4	71.6	14.9
14 Years	0.5	5.6	4.1	1.6	77.0	11.2
15 Years	0.0	4.2	2.8	1.8	82.7	8.6
16 Years	0.5	5.0	2.4	1.3	84.9	5.8
17 Years	0.6	4.9	0.6	6.8	79.1	8.0

Party most supported by businessmen.

	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.N.P.	DK/NA
12 Years	0.5%	25.0%	32.7%	3.4%	3.9%	34.6%
13 Years	1.9	34.5	30.5	4.8	2.4	26.0
14 Years	1.2	42.8	26.8	5.1	3.0	21.2
15 Years	1.1	61.2	15.7	3.4	1.6	16.8
16 Years	1.3	71.7	15.6	1.1	1.1	9.0
17 Years	0.0	82.8	7.4	0.6	0.6	8.6

Party most in favour of nationalisation.

	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.N.P.	DK/NA
12 Years	2.4%	11.1%	19.7%	6.7%	6.7%	53.3%
13 Years	3.2	16.2	32.1	2.9	3.5	42.1
14 Years	5.4	13.2	37.5	3.3	3.8	36.7
15 Years	5.2	9.1	50.1	3.1	1.1	23.4
16 Years	10.9	9.0	61.1	2.4	0.8	15.6
17 Years	11.0	4.9	74.9	0.6	0.0	8.6

The items covered in TABLE 18 give strong backing to the view that a growing consensus develops among young people as they come to grips with the intellectual tasks involved in relating two separate political phenomena, that is, a political party and a particular policy position, or group leaning. Even a complex term such as nationalisation is recognised correctly by about three quarters of the 17 year olds in our sample and there is some evidence that a large body of the remainder are aware of the general notion underlying the term by their belief that it is a plank in the platform of the Communist Party. Perhaps they are becoming overly sensitive to party differences. The same remark might equally be applied as an explanation for the fall-off in the numbers in the oldest age group reporting that the S.N.P. is the party most in favour of Scotland becoming independent. Here we see a noticeable rise in the appreciation of the Liberal Party's stand on this issue, but there is a subtle confusion of independence with the Liberal Party call for Home Rule - as previously the Communist Party's programme had been mistaken for a limited system of state ownership.

The characteristic feature of all of the items in TABLE 18 is for a narrowing latitude of perception, with age, about what constitutes the correct response; and most interestingly this also applies to the item for which we said there is no great agreement among adults, namely which of the political parties is most against Scotland becoming independent.

TABLE 19: Perception of party most against Scotland becoming independent, by age. 16

	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.N.P.	DK/NA
12 Years	7.7%	8.6%	34.6%	6.3%	4.8%	37.9%
13 Years	5.6	12.2	42.4	1.9	3.5	34.5
14 Years	4.9	19.1	45.4	3.1	1.6	25.8
15 Years	4.5	19.6	43.5	2.8	1.8	27.8
16 Years	6.1	25.9	46.3	0.8	0.5	20.1
17 Years	5.5	28.2	47.9	0.6	0.6	17.0

If we consider the distribution of replies across all of the parties at different ages we can see that the tendency is for a growing concentration of replies around the two major parties, at the same time as the non-response rate is falling considerably. While we know of no survey evidence to support our contention that the 17 year olds view is a closer approximation of the adult viewpoint than that exhibited by the youngest group we do feel confident in the general conclusion of a growing correspondence between adult and teenage perception. This is a function not only of the increasing interest in political affairs but also of the growing cognitive capacity that chronological age encompasses which enables the individual to deal with the more complex operations involved in associating a political party with a specific ideological position.

This far we have dealt with the items individually, and it is instructive and illuminating to inquire how many of our respondents can be rated as having a comprehensive knowledge of issue positions through their choice of the S.N.P., the Conservative Party and the Labour Party respectively in the three items covered in TABLE 18. The same procedure may be applied to the international symbols items in so far as those reporting that Britain is a western country, Russia a communist country and Switzerland a neutral country are classified as international ideologues.

TABLE 20: Number of Party Ideologues, by age;¹⁷
and international ideologues, by age.¹⁸

	% Issue Ideologue (1)	% International Ideologue (1)
12 Years	6.7%	18.0%
13 Years	17.8	34.5
14 Years	22.4	36.7
15 Years	35.4	49.0
16 Years	46.0	68.0
17 Years	48.5	74.2

Party Ideologue:

Pearson's $r = -0.28$

Regression equation is $Y = -0.12 + (0.09) X$

International Ideologue:

Pearson's $r = -0.34$

Regression equation is $Y = -0.03 + (0.11) X$

The number that may be classified as issue ideologues increases consistently through the groups included in our sample but it is not until the age of 15 years that even a third of our respondents fill this category, while by the age of 17 years the figure still has not reached 50%. That fewer subjects in our sample should be classified as issue ideologues than as international ideologues is explainable in terms of the amount of information and political skill involved. That is to say, issue positions cover relationships of far greater complexity than those which exist between an international name tag and a particular country. In addition issue positions of political parties are probably more blurred than is the case with countries as these tend to be viewed more parsimoniously in terms of a pro-anti dichotomy, with occasional allowance being made for a half-way house of neutrality.

Nonetheless the clear association of age with the numbers ranked as international ideologues completely fulfils our predictions. That the association is quite consistent does not mean that it is a steady movement and both ideologue indices produce relatively large deviations from the regression trend line. In each case the middle years are times of apparent retrenchment with the more rapid advances coming in the 13 and 16 year old ranges.

An aspect that is closely related to issue awareness concerns the extent of the disagreement that the respondent believes exists between the main political parties in Britain. We imagine that at the lower age end of our sample there will be a relatively greater tendency to minimise inter-party conflict. This is due in essence to the child not having acquired a clear political self-image which will enable him to relate to possible disagreements between political protagonists. This trend will be supplemented by another which characteristically has the younger child interpreting the political world as a clash between personalities rather than institutions, groups or political ideas. However as the child begins to find his feet in the political world he will display a growing appreciation of conflict on the domestic political front. The basis for distinguishing political parties is presumably attributable to an emerging recognition that different groups in society may hold contrary political opinions. The reader who is unconvinced of the growing issue orientation of young people should consult TABLE 18. There he will detect evidence of the heightened discrimination in policy matters.

To demonstrate that political parties are associated with a specific policy is one thing but it is another step to argue that this is translated into a growing perception of conflict between the parties as the table following illustrates:

TABLE 21: Differences between political parties, by age.¹⁹

	A lot of differences	Some differences	Very few differences	DK.
12 Years	21.6%	35.6%	15.9%	26.9%
13 Years	18.6	44.6	17.5	19.4
14 Years	24.3	43.9	14.3	17.4
15 Years	20.0	52.8	15.8	11.3
16 Years	16.9	55.3	21.4	6.4
17 Years	14.1	62.6	21.5	1.8

This table leaves the impression that while the vast majority of our respondents believe that there are indeed differences between the parties, movement with age between categories is both marginal and most inconsistent. The only distinct trend with age is for the category marked here as 'some differences' to almost double between the age groups 12 and 17. Of course the nature of the differences is left unspecified and no doubt encapsulates a myriad of perspectives. When is a difference a difference? We took precautions against possible criticism along these lines by supplementing this first assessment of party conflict by a further question asking more specifically about the breadth of agreement or disagreement between the political parties. The figures on these questions are only available for 14 year olds and upwards as the phrasing of the question is such that too many of the younger children were confused by the instructions. The replies display a revealing perspective on the amount of conflict perceived between the parties:

TABLE 22: Perceived disagreement between political party pairs,²⁰ by age.

1. Conservative and Labour:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK
14 Years	0.3%	12.8%	34.5%	34.8%	17.7%
15 Years	1.5	10.2	36.1	36.9	15.3
16 Years	0.0	4.5	48.7	37.1	9.8
17 Years	1.1	9.7	50.5	38.7	-
2. Labour and S.N.P.:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK
14 Years	2.6	20.0	33.9	20.9	22.6
15 Years	1.3	16.5	36.9	26.5	18.8
16 Years	0.5	16.5	38.0	28.1	16.5
17 Years	-	15.1	54.8	24.7	5.4
3. Communist and S.N.P.:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK
14 Years	2.6	11.9	22.9	33.6	29.0
15 Years	2.8	13.0	23.9	40.0	20.4
16 Years	2.7	13.0	23.7	47.8	11.5
17 Years	-	16.1	30.1	41.9	11.8
4. S.N.P. and Conservative:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK
14 Years	3.5	25.2	31.0	14.5	25.8
15 Years	2.8	21.4	35.1	17.8	22.9
16 Years	3.1	28.6	36.2	15.6	16.0
17 Years	-	22.6	55.9	15.1	6.5
5. Conservative and Communist:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK
14 Years	2.0	11.6	25.5	35.4	25.5
15 Years	3.6	5.6	17.6	50.9	22.4
16 Years	2.2	3.6	18.8	62.1	12.9
17 Years	-	3.2	22.6	66.7	7.5
6. Communist and Labour:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK
14 Years	4.6	13.9	18.8	36.5	26.1
15 Years	4.1	14.8	24.7	37.7	18.8
16 Years	6.3	21.4	22.3	35.7	13.8
17 Years	5.4	28.0	29.0	31.2	6.5

Unlike other items presented thus far the analysis of the above table in terms of correct or incorrect responses would be extremely contentious given the lack of agreement among adults on the relative distance which exists between parties. Nevertheless it is most interesting that the party comparison where the lowest level of inter-party agreement is recorded is between the Conservative and Labour parties, when the youngest respondents are isolated, while among the older respondents least agreement is perceived between the Communist and Conservative parties. Whether this change is due to the fact that the two parties in the comparison are more in the public eye as protagonists and therefore are able to give the fullest exposure to the differences between them or whether the children are relatively oblivious to the ideological positions adopted by the Communist or S.N.P. parties can only remain a matter for conjecture. Nevertheless, for every comparison bar one, the trend with age is for an increased proportion of the respondents to agree on the general distance level between the parties. The sole exception exists in the comparison between the Communist and Labour Party, which shows definite increases in both the number perceiving agreement as well as those detecting disagreement between the two parties. Again the level of agreement perceived between these parties is far more likely to increase than in any other comparison.

The conclusions which we draw from these findings are firstly of an increasing tendency among adolescents to adopt a less diffuse perception of political issues, even in an area as difficult to interpret and as complicated by value preferences as the area of inter-party conflict undoubtedly is. Bound up with this we discover that the movements that may be identified, and most interesting in this context are the reversals which occur, fit in with what we have previously described as an increasing appreciation of ideological or policy differences in political life. Thus

there is an especially large advance in the numbers describing the Communist-Conservative relationship as one of strong disagreement while the movement in the comparison covering the Communist and Labour parties is towards the 'disagree' options and out of the 'agree' alternatives.

These pairs comparisons of the extent of inter-party conflict also cast an interesting reflection on the findings illustrated in TABLE 21. In the latter it appeared as if the numbers perceiving marked differences between the political parties is actually on the wane with increasing age. Yet in Table 22, each of the items displays a majority who claim that disagreement characterises the relationship, with only item 6 showing a marked increase in the absolute level of agreement; in addition the level of 'disagree strongly' responses consistently outstrips the equivalent - 'a lot of differences' - category from TABLE 21. Particularizing inter-party conflict obviously has the effect of decreasing the reluctance among adolescents to admit the existence of disagreement.


Needless to say the perception of inter-party conflict is related to other factors besides increasing age. One which immediately stands out as having a direct bearing is the political affiliation of the respondent. We are here touching on an obvious drawback of the sweeping generalization between cognitive and affective orientations. Although the extent of inter-party conflict has been categorized as a cognitive response it is probable that the subject's political preferences will 'cloud' his interpretation. To take one example, the subject may displace the party which he sees as constituting the greatest threat to his own preference. This 'threat' may derive from being more likely to win elections or alternatively he may look on the dispute in essentially ideological terms and employ some ideological dimension to judge the distance between one party and another. Our own data enables us to test speculation that

knowledge of political affairs, as measured by the subject's performance on the issue index, will be a more effective predictor of disagreement between parties than the subject's own choice of party. Taking the first item in TABLE 22, which deals with the Labour and Conservative parties, we find that the contingency coefficients of association are stronger where respondents are divided into one group of Conservative and Labour supporters and another group composed of every other affiliate, rather than on their knowledge of political issues. It is in addition plain that the relationship in the former case grows stronger with age, whereas the association between issue knowledge and the amount of disagreement perceived between the Conservative and Labour parties holds steady at 0.2 for every age group.

Our conclusion is that the party preference of the individual acts as a constraint on the level of disagreement that is believed to exist between political parties, so that in our example, the supporters of the Conservative and Labour parties see a much wider gap between the two parties than do those not affiliated to either group. This movement increases slightly with age, which does not occur where the association is made between level of political knowledge and inter-party differences.

Another impression of the subject's perspective on domestic political conflict in Scotland is obtained by inspecting the mean scale scores for each party, which are derived as an average of the level of support obtained by each party in the pairs comparison questions, which cover all possible pairs of the five main parties, (See pp. 79-80). Our findings are presented in Figure 3. They give a diagrammatic indication of the relative distance between parties. We concluded from the inter-party conflict items administered to a narrower age range, that maturity causes a greater displacement of the Communist Party from

FIGURE 3 : Mean scale scores for pairs comparison of political parties.



the remaining parties. Figure 3 supports this proposition, while extending our view back to the 12 year olds. Even among the youngest children however, the Communist Party receives little backing, but the distance between it and the next least preferred party increases during adolescence.

Our interest in comparing the answers to this question with the previous item also centres on whether the party affiliation of the respondent dramatically changes the scale values for each party as we would predict. Inspection of these figures largely substantiates the prediction of widespread changes in mean scale values, but there is little movement among supporters of the same party at different age points.

One more perspective that the adolescent brings to this area is obtained from his preference rank orderings of the parties. This we imagine will show a greater sensitivity to ideological differences with increasing age. The ideological continuum which we have postulated is only made possible by the exclusion of the S.N.P. from our analysis. Two alternatives seemed to us consistent with a left-right ordering of parties. They are: a) Communist-Labour-Liberal-Conservative, or b) Communist-Labour-Conservative-Liberal; individual rank orders were then examined to see if they were consistent with either of the above. Greatly to our surprise, even the youngest in our sample mostly choose to fit in with one of the alternative continuums. When we exclude non-respondents, 78.2% of the 12 year olds provide what we would categorize as an acceptable ideological ordering and this figure rises to 92.3% among the 17 year olds. This is a most vivid piece of evidence of adolescent sensitivity to party differences. Even at the age of 12 years the subject has an idea of the broad outlines of party difference, but it is with increasing age that he acquires the necessary information which gives meat to these bare bones.

The emerging facility with which children comprehend political relationships is again evident in the answers given to a variety of items covering the role that selected groups and individuals play in British society. The framework we have adopted suggests that age brings in its wake notions that will transcend the highly personalised view of authority that the primary school child typically holds. It has been said that prior to the onset of the teenage years the child's sense of the political order is erratic and incomplete, "a curious array of sentiments and dogmas, personalised ideas, randomly remembered names and party labels, half-understood platitudes".²¹ It is a feature of adolescence that such debilities in political competence should gradually be overcome and that by 17 years the individual should have begun to order and organize his political information and thoughts. We have identified two key dimensions in this movement. Firstly, adolescence will be a period when the individual begins to overcome his egocentric alignment towards political and other relationships, replacing it with a socio-centric orientation. This latter is characterised by an appreciation that political decisions have a wide ranging effect on the community as a whole, with consequences which are social rather than merely personal. Secondly, the world of politics will decreasingly be perceived in terms of personalities but instead will be interpreted more as a clash of ideas, and of institutional and social processes. Overall the movement is away from the tendency to personalise life, towards an appreciation of the wider consequences of political action.

Easton and Dennis provide supportive material on this trend, and conclude their discussion of the image of government among young children by emphasizing the far reaching changes which have occurred²². Beginning with the six year olds there is a most rudimentary picture of government as comprising a few high ranking officials such as the President,

and other equally visible, though to us minor figures, such as the policeman. By late adolescence the individual has become increasingly aware of the group character of government and of its major institutions. We anticipate much the same trend in our data, while allowing for the introduction of some local colour. We expect, to take one example, that young children will tend to equate British Government firstly with the Queen and subsequently with the Prime Minister and Parliament.

One section of our study is therefore directed to obtaining from our respondents, in their own words, a detailed specification of the role selected individuals and institutions play in the political life of the country, especially their part in the making of laws. The research already cited led us to believe that there will be moves in the pattern of answers towards minimizing the significance that is attached to individuals and enhancing the esteem that is accorded to institutional arrangements. In part this may be due to the growing differentiation that is managed by adolescents between public laws and private rules - established by a declining proportion of respondents who see teachers and businessmen as concerned with public law making. In our sample, very few children of any age believe that either of these groups is important.

TABLE 23: % who feel that the following make the law in Britain.²³

	Queen	Businessmen	Teachers	Policemen	Parliament	Judges	P.M.
12 Years	35.1	6.3	5.8	23.1	88.9	24.0	48.6
13 Years	29.2	6.9	6.6	17.8	93.9	17.2	49.3
14 Years	30.6	8.2	7.1	18.9	91.6	24.5	49.3
15 Years	25.0	7.1	5.2	13.6	94.4	16.6	44.1
16 Years	18.3	5.8	7.4	11.1	98.2	18.5	50.3
17 Years	20.9	5.5	3.7	4.9	96.3	15.3	41.7

The extent to which the youngest and the oldest in our sample agree in their assessments of the people and groups put forward as possible law makers is an indication that 12 year old children have acquired an image of who constitutes the law makers which is well fixed. None of the items demonstrates steady or consistent change although the nearest thing that we have to a non-haphazard trend is contained in the child's perception of the policeman. In the 12 year old group almost a quarter rate this figure as a law maker which we may attribute to their confusing administration with legislation. They are interpreting the immediate and visible consequences of law making rather than the actual activity which make the policeman's actions possible. The same pattern is expected for judges, with the younger respondents not being able to distinguish the interpretation of law as practised by the judiciary from the law making function of the legislature. Contrary to expectations, while this fault is slightly more evident among the youngest in our sample, the margin is not great and the trend is extremely inconsistent.

While there may be little evidence of widespread changes in the importance of the above groups, and individuals, in law making, closer questioning on some of the items does illuminate a widening appreciation of the relative importance of those who wield political authority and influence. One such example is the Queen. According to our framework there should be a decline not only in the numbers who see the Queen as the maker of laws - because of the declining tendency to personalize government - but also an increase in the numbers who view the Queen's role as that of a figurehead rather than as a lone political ruler actually running the country. This we attribute to the heightened realisation of the significance of the community in political affairs.

The numbers who feel that the Queen actually rules the country, to a greater or lesser extent, falls off from a significant minority among our younger respondents to a negligible proportion in the upper age groups.

TABLE 24: % believing Queen rules country;²⁴
two responses allowed.

	1st Response	2nd Response	DK/NA (1st response only)
12 Years	35.1	5.7	25.0
13 Years	23.6	4.2	21.2
14 Years	16.3	3.8	19.2
15 Years	12.8	1.9	16.3
16 Years	5.3	3.4	8.5
17 Years	2.5	1.8	5.5

The figures reported in TABLE 24 are such that a corollary to TABLE 23 is in order, since the latter implies that the Queen is perceived as a major law maker by a considerable minority even among the 17 year olds. In practice it appears as though the difference of emphasis may be due to the question in TABLE 23 being interpreted too broadly. Strictly speaking it is permissible to argue that the Queen is concerned with law making, at least when one considers her signature as necessary before a bill can become law. We nevertheless suspect in the light of the figures presented in TABLES 24-27 that the children who mention the requirement of obtaining the royal assent to all legislation are probably aware that this is little more than a ritual function; this is particularly true if the number repeating the snappy aphorism that the Queen 'reigns but does not rule' is any yardstick.

TABLE 25: % Mentioning Queen's role as to sign bills;²⁵
two responses.

	1st Response	2nd Response	Total
12 Years	5.3	3.9	9.2
13 Years	10.3	8.5	19.3
14 Years	10.5	13.0	23.5
15 Years	9.9	17.1	26.7
16 Years	11.4	16.9	28.3
17 Years	4.9	28.8	33.7

The Queen's role in signing bills before they become law remains as a relic of former glory and constitutes but one activity that may be subsumed under her role as figurehead. This comprises those traditional and ceremonial duties which have no direct bearing on policy making, and which she is expected to perform without discussion. Regardless of whether the first and second responses are taken individually or are taken together the pattern remains the same in nearly all respects. To begin with, the number feeling that British government is personally controlled by or carried out by the Queen falls off dramatically. In place of this conception of government in terms of an individual ruling we can see a compensating rise of the opinion that the Queen is little more than a symbol. This does not necessarily mean that respect for the Queen or the monarchy falls off in relation to the individual's perception of the extent of her power. On the contrary, the numbers producing a negative evaluation of the Queen (although this is supposed to be the cognitive domain) - that she is a waste of taxpayers' money or does nothing but attend ceremonial and social functions - remain at much the same level throughout the age range sampled in this survey.

One advantage of taking two responses is that one may compare these for pointers regarding their internal consistency. The relative

embeddedness of the role elicited may be gauged from the degree to which contradictory images are presented in the two responses; manifest for example in one response that the Queen rules and another that she is no more than a figurehead.

TABLE 26: Comparison of the Queen's role: 1st and 2nd responses.²⁶

	AR/F	AR/NE or F/NE	Both Same	Total N
12 Years	29.1	2.8	68.1	72
13 Years	12.9	3.6	83.6	140
14 Years	13.0	6.9	80.0	275
15 Years	8.6	9.0	82.4	301
16 Years	7.0	7.5	85.5	214
17 Years	3.5	9.7	86.7	113

By including in TABLE 26 only those respondents who gave at least two responses, we effectively cut our sample in half but from the answers obtained it is possible to draw a tentative conclusion about the pattern of contradictory responses, that is, the actually rules/figurehead (AR/F) category. It can be seen that overall the numbers giving what amounts to inconsistent responses drops significantly between 12 and 17 years from almost 30% to 3.5% with a particularly marked jump between 12 and 13 years. This we take as a further vivid confirmation that the orientations of the youngest groups in our sample are quite obviously in a state of flux. The other prominent feature is that negative evaluations of the Queen are related essentially to the perception of her role as a figurehead without discretionary political power. In other words, the pretense of power is the cause of more contempt and ill feeling than where she is actually thought to be exercising such power.

Continuing the division of the figurehead category we see that children move increasingly from a perception where her role consists of

the performance of quite specific activities such as opening new buildings, receiving foreign visitors or making trips abroad herself, towards a more generalised view as a symbol or titular Head of Government, where specific roles are cast wider into a more sociocentric orientation. Again we anticipate that the latter set of more generalised abstractions of the Queen's role will be in greater evidence, relative to the remainder, with increasing age. This pattern is illustrated in TABLE 27.

TABLE 27: Categorization of the Queen's role as a Figurehead.²⁷

	Generalised role	Mention of specific activities	Total
12 Years	11.1%	22.0%	33.1%
13 Years	14.9	34.2	49.1
14 Years	22.7	34.0	56.7
15 Years	28.4	34.9	63.3
16 Years	41.3	38.6	79.9
17 Years	55.8	29.4	85.2

Answers to the question on the role of the Queen as a figurehead are contained within a steady and consistent movement. At the age when they first become eligible for inclusion in our sample a majority of children mention the Queen's personal exercise of political power but quickly relegate her to the position of a figurehead carrying out essentially non-political activities. Even more important, children move beyond specific activities to the more generalised role which they see the monarchy playing in British political life. The monarch is transformed into the monarchy.

This general pattern which sees a dampening down of the tendency to personalise political matters and its replacement by a growing awareness of institutionalised factors, and is evidenced by the changing perception of the role of the Queen, should be seen in other areas of political life.

To find out whether this applies even with an institution which provokes intense partisan controversy, we decided to look at the child's perception of the role of trade unions. We expect the trade union to be the source of some considerable confusion in the early years because its work is not of the sort which makes it salient to young adolescents, and is certainly not to be thought of as equivalent to the Queen or even Parliament in the amount of publicity received in the mass media or public conversation. Furthermore, the trade union is related to an area of life, namely work, with which those still approaching or only recently entered into adolescence will not have been directly involved nor yet have seriously contemplated. While recognising this we nevertheless feel confident enough to predict that the trade union will be perceived increasingly as the performer of generalised roles and most particularly as mediator between its members and the employers or the government. This latter description we consider to be more sophisticated than one which nebulously refers to the role of the trade union as a protector of the workers or in improving conditions. We take, 'helping the workers' not as the specification of a generalised role but the summation of a vague notion.

Although asked for their understanding of the role of the trade union, this did not preclude respondents from giving vent to their disenchantment with the topic under consideration. Such a response cannot be meaningfully placed within a developmental framework unless it is sufficiently detailed and explicit. With the Queen we noted that age is obviously associated with a changing response pattern and the same conclusion applies equally to trade unions, as can be seen in TABLE 28. The numbers expressing a generally positive evaluation of the role of the trade union increases rapidly with age but then levels off to a plateau. The perception of the trade union in the role of mediator also increases with age, as predicted, in a steady and consistent fashion.

If the perception of the role of the trade union as a mediator, which we associate with cognitive growth, does indeed blossom with age, so too the growing consensus in political knowledge brings about a complete fall off in wrong answers, which in the 12 year old group constitute a sizeable proportion. Incorrect interpretations usually consisted of literal translations so that a trade union is described as a union which trades with foreign countries. The negative evaluation of the role of the trade union - as a troublemaker, ruining the country by continually going on strike - is slightly more noticeable in the older groups although even here it remains very small.

TABLE 28: Role of the Trade Union (two responses)²⁸

First response:					
	General Positive	Disruptive	Wrong	Mediator	DK/NA
12 Years	21.2%	1.9%	10.1%	4.8%	62.0%
13 Years	37.4	2.4	4.7	6.4	49.1
14 Years	52.6	2.8	3.8	9.2	31.6
15 Years	56.7	2.1	2.3	12.9	26.0
16 Years	68.2	2.1	-	15.9	13.8
17 Years	67.5	4.9	0.6	22.7	4.3
Second Response:					
	General Positive	Disruptive	Wrong	Mediator	DK/NA
12 Years	6.2%	0.5%	1.0%	4.8%	87.5%
13 Years	17.5	0.3	0.5	6.1	75.6
14 Years	21.7	2.0	0.5	11.8	64.0
15 Years	30.5	1.8	0.5	17.8	49.4
16 Years	37.3	2.4	-	19.8	40.5
17 Years	38.0	4.3	-	33.1	24.5

By providing the children with an opportunity to make two

responses to the question on trade unions we again provided room for contradictory response patterns. The most obvious are where the general positive or mediating role of the union is coupled with a disruptive or incorrect interpretation. Analysis of our data shows that only 33 of the 858 (3.8%) respondents give answers which could be described as inconsistent. This is far less than were detected in the item on the role performed by the Queen - indicating most probably that the welter of situations in which the Queen is involved induces some degree of confusion as to her exact role, if indeed it can be narrowly defined. This is far less likely to occur in the case of an organization like a trade union which presents a far less diffuse role image to adolescents.

The growing appreciation of political relationships is again seen in the answers to a question asking how money spent by the government on such things as the social services is obtained. No more than 13% of the 12 year old group gave what we regarded as incorrect replies (court fines, rising prices, and the Queen are typical) and this figure falls dramatically to about 3% in the 13 year old group and by the age of 17 years has disappeared altogether. Indeed by this upper age limit all of the respondents report that the government gets its money from taxation, both direct and indirect, (85%), or from the rates, (7.1%). The latter is an instance of the respondent confusing central with local government finance, but if we may talk in such terms, it is of a higher order of mistake than talking about the government increasing prices to supplement its income.

Nevertheless this question strengthens our impression of a rapidly growing fund of political knowledge in adolescence. The same conclusion may be drawn from TABLE 29 which gives the findings from an item dealing with the role of parliament.

TABLE 29: The role of Parliament, by age.²⁹

	Runs the country	Debates Issues	Oversees Finance	Abusive /Wrong	DK/NA
12 Years	60.1%	4.3%	7.7%	2.4%	25.5%
13 Years	70.4	1.1	3.5	1.9	23.1
14 Years	71.4	3.6	4.6	0.5	19.9
15 Years	75.5	4.0	2.3	1.1	17.1
16 Years	85.5	5.3	2.9	1.8	4.5
17 Years	92.0	3.1	2.5	0.6	1.8

Further investigation of the areas of disagreement which are believed to exist in domestic politics between the political parties is considered more likely ground where the increasing ability to conceptualise in abstract terms should have free rein to develop and make itself felt. To our mind the younger the child the more weight he will tend to give to disputes about who should be the Prime Minister or which party should run the country, but with increasing age, attention will be turned to the differences in policy that exist between the parties. The rationale for this movement is the already stated belief that children, as they progress through adolescence will personalise political authority less. And with the institutionalisation of political life on the increase, they should in like manner be less inclined to view political conflict as a sort of gladiatorial contest between party champions.

TABLE 30: What do the political parties in Britain disagree³⁰ about most?

	First Response:					
	General Philosophy	Economic	Foreign & Defence	Other Domestic	Leaders & Performance	DK/NA
12 Years	1.0%	40.4%	5.8%	8.7%	7.2%	37.0%
13 Years	0.5	43.2	6.4	7.4	6.3	36.1
14 Years	1.0	41.0	6.2	12.8	7.3	31.6
15 Years	0.6	43.0	6.5	13.6	6.8	29.6
16 Years	1.3	38.4	9.8	16.1	12.2	22.2
17 Years	0.6	41.4	8.0	22.7	12.3	15.3

	Second Response:					
	General Philosophy	Economic	Foreign & Defence	Other Domestic	Leaders & Performance	DK/NA
12 Years	-	12.5%	4.3%	9.6%	6.8%	66.7%
13 Years	0.5	16.5	4.8	9.6	7.4	61.2
14 Years	0.5	16.4	8.2	11.3	6.1	57.1
15 Years	0.2	19.7	6.3	7.6	7.6	51.4
16 Years	1.9	22.0	9.0	15.4	8.5	43.1
17 Years	0.6	24.5	9.8	14.7	11.6	38.7

Several points are worth making on the above table. In the first place, while the don't know response rate falls off in the now expected pattern with age, and although it is relatively low in the youngest group, it does not fall off with the rapidity which we have come to expect.

More significantly age does not exert the influence which we have predicted, and as reflected in an increasing tendency to think of parties disagreeing not so much about specific policies as over general political philosophies. The pattern would, we felt, have been given

the necessary impetus by the increasing ability to deal with abstract concepts which is a pre-requisite for considering general philosophies, such as socialism or nationalism. In practice no such trend is evident, despite the upsurge in support which was then taking place for the Scottish National Party, and which might have generated discussion of broad political platforms. It is not even that a minority of upper age children generalise about political conflict because in our sample no adolescents, bar the most negligible proportion, conceive of political life in terms of basic philosophies. Quite obviously we have been expecting too much; yet if the adolescent shows no inclination to think of party disagreement in terms of general philosophies then we believe they will increasingly view the conflict as one comprising policies and performance and less and less a matter of personalities. To perceive party differences as revolving around the party leaders and their respective capabilities for running the government is a good instance of concretisation of political conflict and an avoidance of policy abstractions. For those little able to deal with, or interested in, political affairs, there may be a tendency to transform public policy making into a clash of two individuals. These hypotheses are also found to be less than adequate. Contrary to our prediction, the 'leaders and performance' category holds at much the same level throughout our sample until the age of 16 years when it rises somewhat. Performance consistently outranks leaders as the main constituent of this category however; a similar effect was found by Blumler and McQuail - educated people watched politics on television as a gladiatorial contest, whereas less educated people watched to learn something about issues.³¹

We are here touching on the heart of the developmental problem insofar as many of the age groups who should be well advanced in their political thinking, if cognitive capacity is any guide, are not in practice

fully extending themselves. How far we wonder is this a mis-reading of their overall intellectual powers and how far is it a case of individuals compartmentalizing their thinking so that some areas are less amenable to abstract thinking than others? Quite obviously we will have to look closely at the relative influence of age and the level of conceptualisation in combination with other social forces on the nature of political development.

While the total numbers reporting specific policy areas as the main region of difference between the political parties increases with age the only significant increase in category of response is that which sees inter-party disagreement as having a basis in issues other than economic - this comprises increased references to the social services, housing, transport and immigration policies, with the latter accounting for a steady 5% of the respondents at each age group. The other areas of policy that are delimited, the economy, foreign affairs and defence, hold remarkably steady throughout the sample. Why should one area change while others hold constant? The growing number of references to social policies may be construed as support for the proposition that age brings with it a growing social conscience but all of the main areas of policy identified could equally well be taken as criteria for the level of community awareness in our respondents, as heightened sophistication in political terms cannot be thought of as the preserve of any one policy domain. What is more predictable is the order in which the categories are ranked by our respondents, with the economy and economic issues well in front of other domestic issues and further ahead still of foreign and defence disagreements, but this ordering is not derived from any developmental framework, but from a knowledge of adult preferences. Our conclusion on the material reported from the medium level of the cognitive domain is that it provides ambivalent support for our theoretical framework.

There can be little doubt that this is a time of growing agreement about what constitutes 'correct' political knowledge but there is lukewarm support for the view that there will be a distinct pattern emerging in the political orientations acquired which may be associated via age change with a growing sophistication of cognitive operations.

Contradictory and haphazard patterns are nevertheless extremely rare.

The development which we do notice is, for the most part, consistent and steady suggesting a quantitative growth process where stores of information and sophistication increase incrementally rather than in dramatic spurts.

One final point worth raising concerns the reason which has been advanced to explain the relative lack of impact in some areas of cognitive response, but most particularly in the lower levels. This is that cognitive capacity has in such instances little scope within which it can operate. That is to say, while the lower levels demand the acquisition of information which can be recalled at some future date, the higher skills and abilities require a far more basic grasp of the underlying properties and relationships existing in the political world. This will enable the individual to move from concrete or specific examples to abstract and general instances, and back again with reasonable ease. What then of these higher levels of the cognitive domain? These entail measuring the ability of an individual to analyse and evaluate material in a manner which denotes a capacity to deal with a complex system of relationships.

Fair opportunity for the children to exercise these abilities is provided with two open-ended questions on the meaning of communism and democracy, leaving the respondent to go off on his own tangent according to his level of information and reasoning. Firstly we will concentrate on the substance rather than the nature of descriptions attributed by our

subjects to the terms, 'democracy' and 'communism'.

Our first point has already been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and concerns the high level of don't know response that is recorded for both items. Rather interesting in this respect is that, at least in the upper years, there is a higher tendency to give a don't know response where the item is democracy, than when it is communism. This upholds another conclusion arrived at on the basis of other questions, particularly that dealing with the international name tags, which is that communism as a descriptive label is evidently more salient than the system under which we are supposed to be living. Closer examination of the responses places this conclusion in perspective. It is then disclosed that the 'quality' of reply is higher to the question on democracy, and that with communism there is a propensity to avoid giving a positive report of what constitutes the essence of communism but instead to emphasize the negative implications of the practice in a communist country or otherwise make disparaging remarks which give no convincing grounds for believing that they have any real understanding of what it is that the communist believes. Looking at the numbers who couched their definition in negative terms, i.e. what either a democrat or a communist does not believe in provides a revealing contrast, with seven times as many giving a negative interpretation to communism as to the term democracy. We contend that the reason that a negative reply is preferred is explainable, in part, by the lack of any substantial knowledge of the term being considered. A positive definition which lays emphasis on the actual beliefs or workings of communism we take to be indicative of a greater understanding than one which refers to the shortcomings of communism - to the absence of political parties for example.

A further feature contained in the definitions given by our

respondents is the relatively low incidence of totally incorrect notions about either of these philosophies. False ideas are spread evenly between the two terms.

TABLE 31: What does Communism mean?³²

	Economic System	Equality	Totalitarianism	Wrong/DK/NA
12 Years	0.8%	6.5%	12.2%	80.5%
13 Years	4.9	17.0	11.7	66.4
14 Years	11.4	17.1	16.4	55.1
15 Years	12.7	24.2	19.8	43.3
16 Years	20.5	28.1	20.1	31.3
17 Years	28.0	33.3	23.7	15.1

If we consider first of all the substance of the replies given to the term communism, we find that the totalitarian aspects of this system, or the way it is practiced in some countries - where dictatorship and political control by a minority are mentioned - dominate in the youngest group and although overtaken by other categories in subsequent years, it is noticeable that in absolute terms there is still a doubling in the number giving this categorisation between the years 12 and 17. Its relative strength among the younger respondents is taken as evidence that the constraining features of authority will be dominant at this time. With increasing age and powers of abstract thought the authoritarian aspects are supplanted by a philosophy of communism based more on the theoretical precepts than the supposed practice in countries such as the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the numbers adhering to the totalitarian view decrease in absolute terms but rather that they are surpassed by those defining communism as an economic set of beliefs or as equality of opportunity or classes. Indeed as early as 13 years, communism is more widely equated with equality than with totalitarian

aspects; and by the age of 16 years the economic philosophy underlying communism has similarly overtaken the restrictive response.

It is not until the oldest age group reported here that we find a majority of the respondents talking in positive terms of what they understand by communism. Nevertheless the movements shown in TABLE 31 do occur in the direction and with a consistency predictable in a question allowing scope for their powers to accommodate complex ideas and relationships. Age brings in its wake an appreciation of the sense of community ethos which is a necessary element in the development of sophisticated political thinking. It is not the case that children think immediately of government and political authority in terms of repression and constraint, except where that government is a foreign and hostile one. Young adolescents repeat the theoretical merits of the system in which they live and the practical disadvantages of the systems they have been taught to distrust. In the uppermost age groups in our sample however, both systems are looked on as the inaugurators of a particular set of beliefs and policies.

It has been said that adolescence is characterized by a growth in time perspective so that a sense of history emerges in the child and he begins to understand that the past, present and future are all linked; and additionally that actions taken in the present will have future consequences. TABLE 31 supplies corroboration of this view with the increase in the first two categories although we cannot account for the continued references to the totalitarian aspects of communist practice - not because we believe that communism in practice or theory eschews totalitarian accoutrements but because the children who adopt this posture have quite blatantly turned an abstract question into a concrete one.

The subject's perception of democracy entails a rather different interpretation. The clearest feature in the replies given is the dominance of those answers which mention the political benefit that accrues from living under this particular system. This notion of democracy as implying political benefits, such as having a say in the choice of government, popular and free elections etc., is so well established among our sample at the age of 12 years, that it is actually the only response category that makes itself felt. The emphasis on political benefits increases throughout the age ranges, but most especially among the older respondents. Other replies are little in evidence. Small weight, for example, is given to democracy as a particular economic system. There is a small increase in the number summarizing the democracy in the vaguest possible terms such as, 'It's fairer', which is most inexplicable since these do not bear witness to increased sophistication and should be on the wane with increases in age.

TABLE 32: What is meant by the term 'democracy'?³³

	Political benefit	Economic system	General positive	Antagonistic	DK/NA Wrong
12 Years	26.0%	-	-	-	74.0%
13 Years	28.7	-	3.6	0.4	67.3
14 Years	35.1	1.9	2.9	0.2	59.9
15 Years	38.2	2.3	6.1	0.5	52.9
16 Years	54.5	4.0	6.7	1.3	33.5
17 Years	63.4	1.1	8.6	1.1	25.8

Unlike the answers given to the question on communism, it is not possible to identify any strong body of opinion which perceives democracy as implying some form of constraint. Plainly in our sample it is not a general characteristic that young people will look upon all political systems as entailing a limitation on their range of activities;

or perhaps it is that young people will make an exception of the system under which they are themselves living. The evidence of this answer does provide supportive material for the claim that in adolescence children increasingly become sensitive to the claims of the community. Democracy is associated with the freedom to choose, or to be involved in decisions which will determine, the sort of government under which they will be living. Significantly, there is little suggestion that democracy implies any wider or continuous process of involvement or consultation between government and the citizens. Equally, there is no recognition of a conflict between the personal and the public good, either because of this distinction not being drawn or because they are not seen as potentially incompatible.

Our developmental framework implies that we shall be able to distinguish patterns in the nature of interpretive perspectives; for example, the item on defining political belief systems allows scope for the employment of a more abstract approach which will become characteristic of older children in our sample. The growth which has actually been found is hardly qualitative although it is consistent, irrespective of whether the skill demanded in the orientation is from the lowest levels or from more advanced regions. Generally the movement is even, but it is difficult to be categorical on this point. There is nothing in the analysis conducted this far to confirm that certain age periods are characterised by particularly rapid surges in growth as the qualitative interpretation of development would have us accept. While the orientations do not seem to proceed in the manner suggested, at least as far as stage like growth is concerned, they do travel in the directions predicted. The most effective summary that we can offer of the progress that is accomplished by the children in our sample is demonstrated in the changing nature of the definitions already discussed, of the two terms, democracy and communism.

These were divided into two broad groups, with one containing those employing an abstract method of conceptualisation.³⁴

TABLE 33: Classification of definitions of Communism and Democracy, by age.

	Communism			Democracy		
	Abstract	Non-abstract	NA	Abstract	Non-abstract	NA
12 Years	5.7%	16.6%	78.1%	4.9%	25.2%	69.9%
13 Years	14.4	23.7	61.9	10.3	24.7	65.0
14 Years	20.2	27.8	52.0	20.7	22.8	56.5
15 Years	28.8	30.5	40.7	27.2	23.7	49.1
16 Years	40.2	31.7	28.1	38.0	29.4	32.6
17 Years	51.6	38.7	9.7	48.4	30.1	21.5

The rise in the number of respondents giving an abstract definition of the two terms is unambiguous, and it is reassuring too that the level of abstractness uncovered for each concept is broadly similar at each age range. Moreover the association between the type of definition given across the two concepts is extremely high; for the whole sample the gamma value is -0.85. This also promotes confidence in the validity of the classificatory scheme that we have used.

Not only is the level of abstractness much the same between definitions at each age group but in addition the level of abstractness is seen to exhibit considerable growth during adolescence. As the same time, the proportion providing us with a non-abstract definition - this category covers concrete definitions as well as others which indicated a tendency to reify the term or were otherwise miscellaneous - also increases through adolescence. Admittedly the growth of this category is not very large relative to the abstract group and is far less consistent and even. Returning to the growth of the level of abstract definitions,

we note that there are no especially large surges forward at particular ages; this reinforces our earlier impression that political development, as demonstrated on the basis of age changes alone, will advance towards greater abstraction in an inexorable movement but not in a series of clear stage-like progressions.

At this point we will turn our attention to the affective domain. This will also be divided into three levels corresponding to the high, medium and low levels of the previous domain. At the lowest level we are looking for indications that the respondent is aware of, and attending to the political dimension in life. He engages others in politically spiced conversations and attends to messages with a political content.

If we are to talk about demonstrating an awareness of the political estate we can hardly do better than return to our discussion of the rate of don't know response among our respondents. A failure to provide answers is one criteria by which we can estimate whether our subjects are attending and responding to political phenomena. As we have already seen, there is convincing evidence from both domains that this level of awareness rises quickly.

For example, TABLE 16, which reports the scores for respondents on the Political Knowledge Scale, shows that about 29% of the 12 year old group, with substantially fewer in subsequent years, can be categorised as extremely ignorant of the political world. The corresponding estimates for the affective domain are based on questions directed to gauging the subject's interest in political affairs and whether the subject manifests such interest by engaging in political discussions with adults in his family or teachers at school, or even his peers, or whether, on another tack, he is an avid consumer of current news through the mass media. At this juncture we wish to know how many of the children indulge in these

activities. We illustrated in Figure 2 that about one quarter of the youngest respondents may be designated as totally without interest in political affairs. This figure declines relatively slowly with age. Much the same conclusion may be drawn about the subject's consumption of newspapers and his viewing of T.V. news programmes, although the numbers reporting a high consumption of the mass media is more than the number recording their interest in political affairs.

Where an interest in politics is expressed, how strongly does it come across and how does it develop with age? In the realm of the respondent's self report of his interest in political and economic affairs, there is a definite increase in the number who espouse a high interest in these matters, just as there is a decline in the number expressing no interest, but the rise is not dramatic though it does speed up from the age of 15 years.

TABLE 34: Level of interest in political and economic problems.³⁵

	(1) High	(3) Medium	(5) Low
12 Years	8.2%	66.8%	25.0%
13 Years	10.3	68.7	21.0
14 Years	10.2	68.3	21.5
15 Years	15.2	67.3	16.5
16 Years	21.4	64.6	14.0
17 Years	26.4	65.6	8.0

Regression equation $Y = 3.46 + (-0.17) X$

Pearson's $r = -0.19$

A scale which would give an indication of the level of media consumption was constructed from the items on newspaper reading and T.V. news watching. It points to an increase in this aspect of political attending with over one half of the respondents, even in the youngest age

group, being categorised as at the level of high or medium media consumption.

TABLE 35: Index of Media Consumption.³⁶

	High & Medium	Low
12 Years	53.4%	46.6%
13 Years	57.8%	42.2
14 Years	61.8	38.2
15 Years	60.4	39.6
16 Years	66.9	33.1
17 Years	74.8	25.2

As far as the level of political discourse is concerned, all indicators lead towards the conclusion that the higher levels, be it with parents or friends, are associated with an increase in age. While the discussion of political matters shows significant moves upward with age, its most noticeable feature is to be seen in the rapid fall-off in the numbers classified as quite unwilling to respond to, or instigate political discussions. The growth of the highest levels of discourse varies markedly according to whether the conversations are with parents or friends. This is especially the case with politically spiced discussions between adolescents and their friends rather than with their parents.

TABLE 36: Level of Political Discourse with Parents.³⁷

	High	Medium	Low
12 Years	14.4%	50.5%	35.1%
13 Years	12.2	56.2	31.6
14 Years	15.0	51.0	34.0
15 Years	16.0	57.4	26.6
16 Years	19.3	59.8	20.9
17 Years	22.1	62.6	15.3

TABLE 37: Level of Political Discourse with Friends.³⁸

	High	Medium	Low
12 Years	6.3%	40.4%	53.3%
13 Years	9.6	42.2	48.2
14 Years	11.4	43.1	45.5
15 Years	12.9	51.1	36.0
16 Years	17.5	56.6	25.9
17 Years	33.7	52.8	13.5

What is equally interesting about TABLES 36 and 37 is the way in which the level of discourse with friends exhibits a steady and consistent growth with age, yet political conversation with one's parents is apparently far less receptive to developmental interpretation. This particular difference does nevertheless fit in neatly with the increasing notice which we have said will be paid by adolescents to their peers in comparison to their parents. Adolescence is a time when the peer group emerges as a powerful arena for political discussions and eventually supplants the family as the major partner in such conversations.

One enduring characteristic of the attending to political matters in which an individual engages at this lowest level is an acquiescence or passiveness. The pupil will make a response but is not exactly sure of the reasons for so doing. This blind acceptance of adult authority and institutions is evident in questions referring to the level of support for the system of government that we have in Britain. Subsequent to the characteristic of deference to adult authority, one reaches levels where ideas are valued for their own worth, as much as their source. The abstract concept of worth is effectively a social product that has been slowly internalised or accepted by the pupil as his own criterion.

Orientations ranked at this level are sufficiently consistent and stable that we may meaningfully talk of someone holding a value. We are not yet concerned with the relationships among values but rather with the internalisation of a set of specified, ideal values. Seen from another angle, the objectives classified here are the prime stuff from which the political belief system is organised. It follows that an important element of orientations characterised by valuing is that the individual is motivated not by the desire to comply or obey, but by the individual's commitment to the underlying value orientation.

At the lowest level of valuing, we find the lowest levels of certainty: that is, there is far less conviction about one's position than at the higher levels, so that value preferences are more likely to be flexible or transitional. Conversely, adolescence does bring a willingness to admit value preferences so that individual position can be identified. If we move on to the higher levels of commitment, we discover that orientations are less amenable to change as the various components are organised into some more generalised and consistent set of values.

Keeping our investigation for the present to the medium range of affective orientations, we administered an assorted battery of items designed to tap several dimensions in democratic theory. It has rightly been admitted by other socialisation researchers that, "Democracy is among the most complex concepts of the political science vocabulary. It combines a rich variety of philosophical meanings and historical experiences. The term serves many useful purposes as a comprehensive label for a broad class of political objects and happenings; and it is a key symbol of political life toward which profound feelings are often directed. The summary convenience of the term militates against its easy dismissal from

our analytical glossary, in spite of its patent ambiguity."³⁹ Yet if we are to refer to a young person's attachment to democracy we will have to specify particular qualities of democratic life we are measuring. Here we will be following the distinction previously made between a 'populistic' and participant democracy' and a 'liberal or libertarian democracy'. The former lays emphasis on elections and majority rule and the latter gives weight to the protection of individual and minority political rights. It is also possible to identify a third variation on the democratic theme, known as 'pluralist democracy'. This is operationalised solely in terms of the level of support generated for the notion that a healthy political system is characterised by several political parties, or by their ability to reflect contrary opinions in a constitutional and worthwhile manner.⁴⁰

The basic question that we have to ask is; How far does support for the general principle of democratic government and for the dimensions distinguished above develop with age in our sample? We would not claim that the dimensions listed constitute an exhaustive list of attributes of the democratic system of government, but we would contend that they are all important threads in democratic theory which are usually accepted as desirable, particularly in political education.

In order to measure these dimensions, we administered selected batteries of items which have in the main already been used in research with young people or adults. This provides a context for comparison of our findings with the existing fund from both this country and abroad. The actual scales employed were the following:

1. General support for the British system of government.
2. Participant democracy;
 - a. Political Efficacy scale
 - b. Political Cynicism scale
3. Liberal democracy; Political Toleration scale.
4. Pluralist democracy;

If we start with the level of support for the British system of government, in this we included six items ranging from the respondent's agreement with the proposition that the British system is the best in the world to whether he thought it efficient or dependent on other countries. Our view that in this domain and at this level, orientations elicited will have been established for several years even in the younger groups means that a consistency and embeddedness should have been attained which will preclude the extensive change that we uncovered in the cognitive domain. Backing for this prediction can only be described as lukewarm. It is apparent that there is nothing like the grouping with age of respondents around fewer categories. There are changes and they are more correctly described in that way since the variation found does not exhibit the characteristics previously noted in the cognitive domain of evenness or consistency. Overall, the tendency is for responses that are supportive of the present system to increase with age, and when comparing 12 and 17 year olds all of the items demonstrate this, except for the question asking the respondents to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the statement that Britain is dependent on other countries for help. Furthermore, the latter item is the only one where the majority opinion among the 12 year olds is not the same as that among the 17 year olds. The item which demonstrates the largest jump with age is illustrated in TABLE 38:

TABLE 38: The British System of Government is the best in the world. 41

	Agree Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	DK/NA
12 Years	1.0%	2.4%	26.0%	29.3%	41.4%
13 Years	4.8	4.2	29.4	26.8	34.7
14 Years	4.8	6.6	27.5	23.7	37.5
15 Years	3.6	8.1	30.2	25.5	32.6
16 Years	5.0	9.0	33.1	26.5	26.4
17 Years	9.2	15.3	27.6	25.2	22.7

That the largest increase in supportive views should come on an item which is perhaps the most emotively laden of all is of considerable surprise to us, given the climate of increased disenchantment and alienation from the 'system' that is supposed to characterize young people. Even so, a majority of our respondents in every age group do actually disagree with the proposition.

In contrast a majority of all age groups consider the British System 'fair', while a majority is obtained in the upper age groups for the statement that it is both 'honest' and 'weak'. Compared with respondents in other countries, our own sample would appear less overwhelmingly enamoured with the political system that pertains in their own country.

TABLE 39: The British System of Government is...⁴²

	(1) Favourable	(3) Uncommitted	(5) Unfavourable	NA
12 Years	17.8%	34.1%	16.8%	31.3
13 Years	21.8	37.1	15.1	26.0
14 Years	25.5	35.0	13.8	25.7
15 Years	20.0	39.4	15.0	25.5
16 Years	24.9	41.8	16.4	16.9
17 Years	28.2	42.3	12.3	17.2

Pearson's $r = -0.02$

Regression equation is $Y = 2.90 + (-0.02) X$

Dennis et al., concluded after their own cross national studies that there was a clearly defined tendency among the British (actually English) sample to opt for the don't know response when asked whether democracy is the best form of government. This is used by the authors to justify their conclusion that in England the term 'democracy' "is not a salient political symbol".⁴³ Our own analysis of the definitions for

this term suggests a somewhat higher appreciation of the practical implications of a democratic form of government. Equally important is to see whether British children, even if unsure of the term's meaning, are in practice wholly supportive of the underlying implications which are usually associated with this system. We suspect that while certain underlying dimensions that are associated with democracy have been assimilated, our respondents do not yet possess a wide appreciation of the theoretical precepts contained within the concept 'democracy'. Demonstrating differential value for a term which is in practice variously interpreted between countries is of limited worth. What we must try to do is to compare the political values to which young people adhere. Unfortunately some of our questions, most particularly in the Political Support Scale, are arranged in a more complex way than those administered by Dennis et al., and ceteris paribus, we expect that our sample has an even greater inclination to revert to a don't know response.

While democracy may be recognised as an efficient and fair system of government, the children in our sample appreciate that the term covers a number of possibilities; each country has to look to its own circumstances before making a choice about the perspective on democracy that it will adopt. The British system of governing may be alright for Britain, but it does not necessarily follow that it is equally appropriate for other countries. In our panel sample only 14.8% of the children thought that other countries would be better off if they adopted our system of government, although the children themselves were not alienated from the political system.

We do, in fact, have a population essentially ambivalent in their attitude towards the British system of Government - neither greatly in favour nor wholly opposed. It is pertinent to ask whether this is to be explained by a poor commitment to the norms of the democratic way of

life or whether our respondents actually neglect to distinguish between the practice of government as it is experienced in Britain and democracy as it might be in ideal circumstances. Our findings thus far from the Political Support Scale merely indicate that the level of support for the British system is not particularly large compared with other countries.

The first aspects of democracy that we shall consider contain the level of citizen participation and competence in the political arena. The two scales that we shall be utilising, political efficacy and political cynicism, have received a wide exposure both in adult political behaviour studies as well as in political socialisation research. In TABLE 40 the reader can see the overall scores for political efficacy that were computed on the basis of replies to a five items scale, TABLE 41. There is clear evidence in the former of an upward movement in feelings of subjective competence insofar as this is measured by the items in the political efficacy scale. Those respondents with no more than a minimum level of political competence have well-nigh disappeared by the age of 17 years and with this decline, one may note a corresponding upsurge in the percentage who are adjudged to score highly. Our evidence thus supports Dennis' contention that feelings of political efficacy increase during adolescence. What is not borne out is his conclusion that answers given to the constituent items vary widely between the age groups - or rather those included in his design. Our data shows no such trend; indeed the opposite impression is more appropriate since we detect little or no evidence of variation among the age groups he mentions. Our conclusions on the individual questions are that the feelings of efficacy show only small differences between the 12 and 14 year olds - which are the groups of whom he is talking - although where one stretched the age span to include up to 17 year olds, much more distinct differences do indeed emerge.

TABLE 40: Political Efficacy Scale Scores.⁴³

	(1) High	(3) Medium	(5) Low	NA
12 Years	12.0%	58.2%	19.7%	10.1%
13 Years	22.0	54.9	17.2	5.8
14 Years	21.6	61.7	13.5	3.3
15 Years	26.5	59.1	12.0	2.4
16 Years	37.8	53.4	7.7	1.1
17 Years	46.0	50.3	2.5	1.2

Pearson's $r = -0.22$

Regression equation is $Y = 3.59 + (-0.17) X$

Each of the individual items in the political efficacy scale shows a marked discrepancy in the level of agreement between 12 and 17 years. In some, the level of agreement becomes almost total, while in others movement produces a fairly even split between those agreeing and disagreeing, while item 5 exhibits a reversal in the distribution of support during adolescence. In every instance, however, the direction taken by these changes is towards the more 'democratic' response. Only item 4 maintains a majority in favour of the low efficacy viewpoint.

TABLE 41: Political Efficacy Scale Items⁴⁵

Item 1.	So many people vote in General Elections in Britain that it would not matter if my parents did not vote.	Agree	Disagree	DK/NA
12 Years		11.1%	67.8%	21.1%
13 Years		8.8	79.1	12.2
14 Years		11.5	78.6	9.9
15 Years		7.8	83.8	8.4
16 Years		8.5	89.2	2.4
17 Years		6.8	90.8	2.5
Item 2.	Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot understand what is going on.			
12 Years		76.0	12.5	11.5
13 Years		70.3	19.1	10.6
14 Years		70.6	20.7	8.7
15 Years		65.8	27.0	7.3
16 Years		60.1	33.9	6.1
17 Years		46.0	42.9	11.1
Item 3.	The political views of schoolchildren and young people are important.			
12 Years		68.8	14.9	16.3
13 Years		70.6	14.3	15.1
14 Years		73.7	12.8	13.5
15 Years		77.7	13.6	8.7
16 Years		81.5	12.2	6.4
17 Years		87.7	8.6	3.7
Item 4.	Voting is the only way people like my parents can have any say about how the government runs things.			
12 Years		62.5	16.4	21.1
13 Years		62.3	23.9	13.8
14 Years		65.6	25.2	9.2
15 Years		66.1	24.7	9.2
16 Years		61.4	32.0	6.6
17 Years		54.0	40.5	5.5
Item 5.	There are some powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people.			
12 Years		52.4	31.3	16.3
13 Years		46.7	39.0	14.3
14 Years		48.0	39.5	12.5
15 Years		42.7	41.5	15.8
16 Years		35.7	52.7	11.6
17 Years		36.2	51.5	12.3

A further test of the child's political orientations to populist democracy is a scale of five items designed to measure the child's level of political cynicism. We presume this to be the mirror of the political efficacy scale in that as political cynicism increases, so political efficacy will tend to decrease. Political cynicism refers to political discontentment and it is assumed that such discontent will be reflected in a feeling of political incapability, though it is nowhere implied that one follows the other in any sort of causal chain reaction. In practice our data, as TABLE 42 indicates, provides no more than lukewarm support for the proposition that political cynicism will decline with age. Firstly, a word of explanation however on the scoring of the cynicism scale since it was done on a different basis to that followed in the efficacy scale. Instead of the simple agree/disagree dichotomy plus a don't know category, the cynicism items asked for a choice between three substantive replies while excluding the pre-coded don't know response. The individual items scored in the following way:

TABLE 42: Political Cynicism Scale items.⁴⁶

Item 1. Over the years, how much attention do you feel that the government pays to what the people think when it decides to do something important?

	Pays a lot of attention	Sometimes pays attention	Hardly pays attention at all	NA
12 Years	16.3%	59.4%	22.0%	2.4%
13 Years	22.9%	56.5%	16.1%	4.5%
14 Years	25.4	49.6	20.0	5.0
15 Years	20.8	50.2	21.8	7.1
16 Years	22.8	53.2	18.5	5.5
17 Years	23.3	58.9	14.1	3.7

Item 2. Do you think that quite a lot of people in politics are dishonest, not very many are, or do you think that most of them are honest?

	Most are honest	Not many are honest	Hardly any are honest	NA
12 Years	69.1	24.4	4.1	2.4
13 Years	67.7	24.2	4.0	4.0
14 Years	62.5	26.6	5.7	4.6
15 Years	65.6	22.6	4.5	7.3
16 Years	65.6	24.6	4.2	5.5
17 Years	68.7	23.9	3.7	3.7

Item 3. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of money that is paid in taxes or not?

	Waste a lot of money	Waste some money	Hardly waste any money	NA
12 Years	35.8	48.8	13.0	2.4
13 Years	35.4	48.4	11.7	4.5
14 Years	34.7	48.9	11.2	5.2
15 Years	38.5	45.9	8.4	7.3
16 Years	41.3	47.1	6.1	5.5
17 Years	35.6	54.6	6.1	3.7

Item 4. How much of the time do you feel that people can trust Parliament to do what is right for the country?

	Can trust them most of time	Can trust them some of time	You cannot trust them at all	NA
12 Years	25.2	62.6	9.8	2.4
13 Years	33.2	54.7	8.1	4.0
14 Years	32.5	54.6	7.6	5.2
15 Years	32.2	50.9	9.7	7.3
16 Years	38.4	50.3	5.8	5.6
17 Years	42.9	47.9	5.5	3.7

Item 5. Do you think that most of the people in politics are clever people who seem to know what they are doing or not?

	Most know what they are doing	A few know what they are doing	Quite a few don't seem to know what they are doing	NA
12 Years	56.1	19.5	22.0	2.4
13 Years	54.7	22.9	18.4	4.0
14 Years	49.4	29.9	15.4	5.2
15 Years	49.1	27.1	16.3	7.3
16 Years	53.4	23.3	17.5	5.6
17 Years	55.8	25.8	14.7	3.7

The overwhelming impression left by an examination of the replies for each age group is of the lack of movement in value position during adolescence. There is no suggestion of any consistent pattern of development in the political orientations held; there are changes or fluctuations of negligible proportions between age groups, but they are essentially haphazard.

As far as the direction of the replies is concerned, there are few respondents at any period during adolescence who are likely to opt for the most cynical alternative. The highest scores for cynicism are in fact recorded by the 12 year old group for items 1 and 5; otherwise the figures indicate that our respondents do not feel particularly disenchanted with the political authorities. Thus we detect especially widespread support for the items suggesting that the majority of politicians are honest and can be trusted most of the time.

A closely similar measure of the respondent's level of alienation from political actors, that we see as equivalent to a Political Pluralism Scale, was administered to a group of 12-15 years. This followed the Efficacy Scale in being framed with a simple agree/disagree dichotomy and a specific don't know alternative, but in contrast consisted of only three items. As with the Political Cynicism Scale, we imagined that with age, the level of disenchantment with the political system would increase; our findings on the Cynicism Scale have already refuted this prediction, but the Pluralism items do in fact produce a trend of increasing alienation.

TABLE 43: Political Pluralism Scale.⁴⁷

<u>Item 1.</u>	Most political problems are created by politicians.			
	Agree	Disagree	DK/NA	N
12 Years	42.4%	27.1%	30.6%	(85)
13 Years	50.7	27.9	21.4	(153)
14 Years	58.2	24.2	17.6	(91)
<u>Item 2.</u>	Politicians never say in public what they are really thinking.			
12 Years	41.2	37.6	21.2	
13 Years	45.5	40.3	14.2	
14 Years	46.2	34.1	19.8	
<u>Item 3.</u>	Our country would be better off if there were no political parties.			
12 Years	12.9	51.8	35.3	
13 Years	22.7	57.8	19.5	
14 Years	19.8	58.2	22.0	

On the basis of the replies to the items in TABLES 42 and 43, we grouped our subjects into three categories of Political Cynicism and two categories of Pluralistic Concern. If we deal firstly with the former Cynicism Scale we can see a graphic reiteration of our earlier conclusion on the basis of replies to the individual items that there was no clear development with respect to political cynicism.

TABLE 44: Political Cynicism Scale Scores.⁴⁸

	(5) Cynical	(3) In-between	(1) Not Cynical	NA
12 Years	17.1%	35.0%	45.5%	2.4%
13 Years	14.4	39.9	41.7	4.0
14 Years	17.1	32.5	45.1	5.2
15 Years	17.0	36.2	39.7	6.6
16 Years	19.3	31.8	43.4	5.3
17 Years	14.7	35.6	46.0	3.7

Pearson's $r = -0.01$

Regression equation is $Y = 2.49 + (-0.01) X$

TABLE 44 demonstrates that the 12 year old is more like his 17 year old counterpart in the level of his political cynicism, than in any political orientation reported this far. This finding apparently renders void our assumption that as Political Efficacy increases, in the same manner, feelings of Political Cynicism will be on the wane. Efficacy certainly increases with age in our sample whereas cynicism shows no growth in any direction.

TABLE 45: Political Pluralism Scale.⁴⁹

	Favourable	Unfavourable	NA
12 Years	35.5%	48.2%	16.5%
13 Years	42.2	50.7	7.1
14 Years	31.9	59.3	8.8

The antagonism that is manifested in the scores in the Pluralism Scale towards political actors is not only higher than that detected in the Cynicism Scale but in addition is contrary to Dennis' findings about this aspect of democratic thinking among English schoolchildren. Even allowing for the breakdown into three categories in one scale and two in the other, there is a marked divergence of opinion between the two scales as to whether or not alienation is actually increasing with age. Alternatively our respondents perceive a distinction between the scales of which we are not aware.

Nor as yet can we explain why the scores on the Cynicism and Efficacy Scales do not exhibit the negative association hypothesized. Up to the present we have of course been dealing with the age groups as a whole and it may be that closer examination of individual scores on the two scales will provide some greater substantiation of this inter-relationship of democratic political values.

TABLE 46: Association between Scale Scores, by age group.

	Political Efficacy & Political Cynicism	Efficacy & Toleration	Toleration & Cynicism
12-13 Years	+ 0.36%	-0.07%	+ 0.16%
14-15 Years	+ 0.39	-0.23	+ 0.17
16-17 Years	+ 0.48	-0.34	+ 0.08

(All coefficients are gamma; NA respondents excluded)

The gamma measures of association that are included in TABLE 46 demonstrate, with the sole exception of the relationship between toleration and cynicism among the older respondents, that young people do move during adolescence towards a greater degree of consistency in respect of their attitudes towards democratic norms. While overall, the level of efficacy rises and the level of cynicism remains the same, the individual movement that occurs consists of a realignment of views along the dimensions previously hypothesized.

Our assumption of a heightened appreciation among adolescents for the demands of consistency among democratic values is particularly strong where we compare scores on the Efficacy and Toleration Scales, which each place an emphasis on different aspects of democratic theory. The latter, libertarian view concentrates on a perception of democracy which highlights the importance of the rights of the minority, including dissenting and highly unpopular groups or individuals. Dennis reports that among American children, as well as adults, great stress is placed on this construction of democracy, whereas we feel that little weight is given spontaneously to such an interpretation.⁵⁰ The overwhelming majority emphasize participatory aspects such as frequent elections and a choice of government. It is of course difficult in empirical research to distinguish between the abstract principles underlying democracy and their practical application. Consensus can be shown to exist on broad principles such as the necessity of permitting freedom of speech but an additional battery of items is required to motivate our subjects to ponder over the possible conflict

of interests that these principles entail.

The items used in the construction of the Political Toleration Scale are answered with a simple agree/disagree dichotomy, and a don't know alternative. The children in our sample score as follows:

TABLE 47: Items in Political Toleration Scale.⁵¹

Item 1. It is not right that coloured people should become judges and policemen.

	Agree	Disagree	DK/NA
12 Years	13.5%	74.0%	12.5%
13 Years	17.0	74.5	8.5
14 Years	14.6	78.6	6.7
15 Years	12.6	80.3	7.1
16 Years	13.0	80.7	6.4
17 Years	12.9	81.0	6.1

Item 2. It is dangerous to work with those who have different political views from you.

12 Years	10.6	64.4	25.0
13 Years	9.0	72.4	18.6
14 Years	9.7	72.5	17.8
15 Years	8.2	75.4	16.3
16 Years	6.9	79.9	13.2
17 Years	9.8	81.6	8.6

Item 3. We should not allow people to say that our government is bad.

12 Years	24.0	51.9	14.4
13 Years	19.6	63.7	15.9
14 Years	16.0	68.9	9.4
15 Years	13.7	75.4	7.6
16 Years	11.6	81.8	9.8
17 Years	8.6	82.8	6.7

Item 4. It is sometimes necessary to use force to advance an idea that one believes in.

12 Years	41.8	38.0	20.2
13 Years	39.3	43.5	17.2
14 Years	36.0	45.6	18.4
15 Years	42.0	44.6	13.4
16 Years	37.6	52.7	9.8
17 Years	36.2	54.6	9.2

Item 5. No-one in this country should be allowed to make speeches against the Church and religious people.

12 Years	50.5	35.1	14.4
13 Years	40.1	44.0	15.9
14 Years	34.7	55.9	9.4
15 Years	24.7	67.7	7.6
16 Years	13.0	77.3	9.8
17 Years	10.4	82.8	6.7

Individual inspection of the items which comprise the Political Toleration Scale convince us that there are interesting differences in the extent of political tolerance both between questions as well as between age groups. The respondents were asked to indicate their acceptance of discrimination in several areas including colour, religion and political party, and of these the religious issue proved the most contentious and gave rise to the highest 'intolerant' response. This conclusion is at odds with the one generated from the figures presented by Dennis, although it is recognised that in Scotland religion has not faded from the foreground of social and political debate to the extent that it has in England. As for the questions which relate to the method by which political goals are achieved, it is interesting to note the relatively high protective urge among the younger respondents towards the government when it is subjected to criticism. It is in addition, revealing to see the large number of young people who accept that force is sometimes necessary as a political weapon.

What is the picture obtained from combining these items into a toleration score? (See TABLE 48). Even among the youngest respondents the level of intolerant political response is, when all of the items are combined, very small, and moreover is halved between the 12 and 13 year old age groups. The medium level of toleration also halves, but in this case it requires the complete age span to bring about the decline. Greatest movement is therefore recorded in the highly tolerant category. From a base of 42.8% in the 12 year old group, it has almost doubled by the time we reach the 17 year old respondent. The development of political tolerance can hardly be more graphically illustrated. It is only among the youngest group of 12 year olds that there is not an absolute majority scoring highly on this scale.

TABLE 48: Political Toleration Scale Scores.

	(1) High	(3) Medium	(5) Low	NA
12 Years	42.8%	35.6%	12.0%	9.6%
13 Years	52.8	34.2	6.1	6.9
14 Years	59.9	30.1	5.7	4.3
15 Years	65.1	28.1	3.6	3.2
16 Years	73.8	22.2	1.1	2.9
17 Years	77.9	17.8	2.5	1.8

Pearson's $r = -0.20$

Regression equation is $Y = 2.53 + (-0.17) X$

The increase in political tolerance may be ascribed both to the growing assimilation of democratic norms that is merely part of the general increase in political knowledge but further to the growing appreciation in young people that constraint, per se, is not an appropriate means of achieving one's political ends. More generally, the development of political orientations in the affective domain does seem to be lacking in consistency; on the one hand the Political Cynicism Scale evinces no predictable change in orientations during adolescence, but movement on the Toleration Scale echoes the Efficacy findings with their emphatic report of steady and consistent growth with age.

Our previous discussion of the concept of democracy concluded that being attached to a symbol such as 'democracy' is of little value unless one knows what it is that the respondent understands by this term. Democracy is therefore broken down into several key dimensions of theoretical emphasis that may be classified as the participatory and the libertarian themes. These complement each other; while one society will give greater weight to one interpretation than another, or perhaps there will be a differential interpretation among the major social groups within the same society, we

nonetheless expect a positive relationship between the two themes. This means that those scoring highly on the political efficacy scale should at the same time be more likely to score highly on the Political Toleration Scale. This relationship holds, both in the sense that there is an association between the direction of the response but furthermore it becomes sharper with increasing age. (See TABLE 46). Even where there is not the clear indication of development in political orientations towards a more 'democratic' response, we detect moves with age towards greater consistency among the orientations which are held.

The political value preference which has always monopolised political socialisation research has been the emergence of a party identification. While we would expect an increase in the number supporting a party as this would fit into the general widening in the adolescent's political orientations which we have no reason to promulgate a particular trend in the actual partisan preference arrived at. Nevertheless what movement that does occur should be in line with our prediction that the adolescent years will see changes, even in the affective domain, which make the young person's political orientations a closer approximation to adult opinion.

TABLE 49: The Growth of party support, by age.

	% Supporting a party	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	SNP	NA
12 Years	42.3	1.9%	22.1%	26.0%	4.3%	32.7%	13.0%
13 Years	44.8	1.6	24.1	24.1	4.5	38.7	6.9
14 Years	47.9	1.8	20.4	30.6	4.3	39.1	2.5
15 Years	49.1	1.5	22.6	32.0	6.8	30.5	6.6
16 Years	55.6	1.9	32.5	32.8	7.4	21.2	4.2
17 Years	62.0	1.8	32.5	32.5	12.3	18.4	2.5

NB. The party preferences are derived from all respondents, including those who do not claim to support a political party.

In broad outline, the 17 year olds do seem to present a more accurate reflection of public opinion in Scotland than do the 12 year old children; though the Labour Party is less favoured presumably because of the greater exodus of working class children from school at the age of 15 years.

This far we have been concerned with the analysis of individual items of knowledge or value preferences, or perhaps a group of values bearing on one dimension among such preferences. At the higher levels of political skill we are looking for evidence that the individual is beginning to organize both his knowledge and his value preferences into a political belief system. Rather than saying that one person has a political belief system and another has not, we believe it more practicable to identify key features of a belief system, and then assess how far individuals have progressed in their political learning using these features as our criteria. According to Bloom et al., we shall discover two features in a belief system: (a) the generalization of the individual's orientations to the point that he may be described and characterised as a person whose thinking is controlled by these pervasive attitudes, and (b) the integration of these orientations into a total philosophy or world view. We do not think it feasible to investigate 'total philosophies' in a short pencil and paper questionnaire. However, we do consider the organization referred to by Bloom to be of central interest and believe that this may be profitably examined if broken down into its constituent elements in the manner outlined by Sartori.⁵³ He argues that a belief system may be characterised by three properties. These are:-

1. The level of articulation, or richness.
2. The constraining power.
3. The level of stratification.

These properties are thought to be highly correlated so that we can identify two broad belief systems, one which is rich, articulate, well informed and strongly constraining and another which is the reverse of this standard, being inarticulate, poorly informed and feebly constraining. Such broad stereotypes no doubt grossly oversimplify and distort reality, but as a descriptive framework Sartori's paradigm does direct one to identifiable and important characteristics in political thinking.

We will begin our discussion with the notion of richness. Initially richness will be translated as the number of identifiable elements in the belief system which in turn will be seen to be a function of the individual's political interest and experience, as well as the amount of formal education he has received.⁵⁴ Reference back to TABLES 34-37 should convince the reader that our sample of respondents do acquire these elements increasingly, as they grow older; although this movement only encompasses a minority. The number of elements is but one feature of richness however, since it is anticipated that for ideological thinking to become manifest these elements will gain in explicitness. This means that not only will more orientations emerge with regard to political affairs but that certain of these are particularly associated with growing ideological maturity. One such dimension which we have isolated is the individual's level of cosmopolitanism.⁵⁵ Our interpretation of explicitness bears close resemblance to the notion of constraint, but may be distinguished on the grounds that attributing the growth of a cosmopolitan perspective to an expansion in the number of elements in the individual's political repertoire is different from saying that this will follow because it can be deduced from some other opinion held by the same individual.

Recent research on the political socialisation of American youth indicates that by late adolescence the individual has acquired the ability to discriminate between governmental and non-governmental levels and our own study set out to corroborate this as a developmental feature. Pre-adults are no doubt differentially exposed to the various geo-political domains but it is assumed that young people will not be unfamiliar with areas such as local, Scottish, British and World affairs. The reader will note that this step-like gradation encompasses a geo-political dimension.

Although we expect the young respondent to be acquainted with the terms employed, his general lack of concern with political affairs should negate any inclination to distinguish one level of politics from another in anything but a random fashion; with increasing age however, these 'primitive' and haphazard methods for cognitive mapping should be superseded.

Ascertaining the interest orderings of the pupils with respect to the multiple levels of politics raises, as does the interest ordering of the main political parties which we already touched upon, several important problems of methodology and analysis which should be made explicit. The full range of difficulties are dealt with in the literature which has grown up with the sub-discipline concerned with preference theory, namely sociometry.⁵⁶ Exponents in this area have developed various techniques for obtaining sets of preferences, among which we may identify two major methods of investigation. In the first, the respondent is required to rank all or some specified number of items according to some specified criteria or without suggestion; in the second, usually referred to as the method of paired comparisons, the subject is asked to indicate a preference for one item between two or perhaps three items.

In both methods - either of rank order and of total rating - each individual has to evaluate all of the other individuals or items - and this usually means that he has to compare implicitly each individual or item with all of the other items or individuals in the choice area. Using the method of pair comparisons, such a comparison is made explicitly. Hence this latter method is generally thought to give an even more rigorous determination of status and may sometimes serve as a criterion of validity for other scaling methods.

Given this division among the users of sociometric techniques, we had to decide whether to use one or both of these techniques in our investigation of preferences among levels of cosmopolitanism and later with political parties. In the end we arrived at a compromise solution so that in our examination of preferences for political parties we use both methods while with cosmopolitanism we rely solely on a ranking of all items. With regard to the multiple levels of politics, the subjects were simply asked to rank the four types of political news according to their own interest in each. The rank order distributions on the saliency of governmental affairs at the four levels indicate that the first preferences throughout our sample are for world news followed by local news, with British news bringing up the rear in the younger age groups and somewhat surprisingly Scottish news coming last with the older respondents. But just as world and local news dominate the first preferences so too they constitute the majority of the last preferences, with local news more disfavoured than any other.

In general these conclusions apply through all of the age groups, thereby indicating a lack of transformation in these orientations. We recognise that classifying respondents on a dimension of cosmopolitanism purely on the basis of their first preference in news ordering is an

unnecessarily crude technique given the range of data available. One particularly intriguing approach is that derived from laying out the various rank orders given by the respondents; fortunately only 4% among our respondents could or would not discriminate in this way between the various levels of political domain.

The total number of rank orders that can be obtained with four stimuli is 24. All of these were in practice offered by members of our sample, and the interest lay in determining whether any particular ordering was more frequently chosen than any other. Though the popularity between preference orderings varies, there was little movement between age groups. These orderings also contain the drawback that they are not particularly revealing in terms of a cosmopolitan-localist spatial dimension, which we will require if we are to extract a more definitely located position. The unfolding technique developed by Coombs does offer one way to disentangle from the rank orders a position along the cosmopolitan dimension for each individual.⁵⁷ The assumption underlying this technique is that preference orderings themselves may be established at a specific point in psychological space. Coombs explains: "Each individual and each stimulus may be represented by a point on a common dimension called a J scale, and each individual's preference ordering of the stimuli from most to least preferred corresponds to the rank order of the absolute differences of the stimulus points from the ideal point, the nearest being the most preferred. The individual's preference ordering is called an I scale and may be thought of as a J scale folded at the ideal point with only the rank order of the stimuli given in order of increasing distance from the ideal point...The data consist of a set of I scales from a number of individuals, and the analytical problem is how to unfold these I scales to recover the J scale."⁵⁸

How can we apply this algorithm to derive an index of cosmopolitanism from our own data? Having identified the 24 possible orderings we have to inquire now how far a graduated J scale, with mirror images WBSL and LSBW actually receives increasing acceptance among our subjects. "Filling in the interior I scales proceeds directly from the requirement that, "...the I scales in a set are correctly ordered only if in passing from one to the next a pair of adjacent stimuli is reversed in order. "This becomes clearer by showing that the eight constituent I scales of the postulated J scale of geo-political domain:"⁵⁹

I scales contained within geo-political dimension.

I scale & Interval Number	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I7
Interest Ordering	WBSL	BWSL	BSWL	BLSW	SBLW	SLBW	LSBW
				SBWL			

If we add together the numbers of respondents fitting into those orderings contained within the geo-political dimension we find that it comprises but a bare majority of the pupil's orderings, at 50.7%, and this is dependent on omitting those who have not offered any analysable rank ordering. It remains all the same the best fit of all the possible orders where each of these is taken as constituting a J scale. The total number by each J scale are given in TABLE 50 below:

TABLE 50: Percentage fitting into every possible J scale.⁶⁰

WBSL	50.7	WBLS	32.3
BWSL	47.5	BSWL	30.1
BSLW	43.1	BWLS	27.7
BLSW	40.4	LBSW	21.8
LBWS	39.4	BLWS	20.0
SBWL	35.4	SBLW	11.7

N = 2285.

If the analysis is to support our prediction that age will bring an increase in richness as made explicit by the rise of more cosmopolitan perspectives, we anticipate a relative increase in the number who fit their rank order of the news items within the geo-political J scale. In fact, as TABLE 51 illustrates, the trend is in the reverse direction with fewer respondents fitting into the pure geo-political ordering, apart from the surge towards cosmopolitan feelings which occurs among our 16 year old respondents.

TABLE 51: Percentage fitting into the geo-political ordering,⁶¹ by age.

		N
12 Years	55.1	185
13 Years	53.3	360
14 Years	52.1	576
15 Years	48.1	605
16 Years	51.3	374
17 Years	44.4	162

The geo-political dimension must by definition cover only a section of the possible I scales indicated by our respondents. Our figures indicate that our sample is evenly split between those fitting into a location on the geo-political domain and almost the same number effectively outwith this cosmopolitanism dimension. One solution to this dilemma has been persuasively suggested by Jennings.⁶² This enables us to lay the additional I scales not included within the geo-political domain on top of the original orderings. This creates a continuum with the mirror images of the original J scale, namely WBSL and LSBW, still comprising the polar extremes but ensuring that the other positions on the original domain act as hosts for the remaining I scales. The actual assignments followed the procedure already employed by Jennings.⁶³ This entails placing the additional orderings at the location with which they

exhibit the greatest similarity - this being determined on the basis of comparisons of their relationship with selected variables, such as level of interest and of political discourse.

The modified scale locates individuals according to the degree to which they are oriented toward successively narrower domains of political phenomena. The resulting distribution of scores has been further collapsed from the seven positions into scores for high, medium and low cosmopolitanism.

TABLE 52: Level of Cosmopolitanism, by age.⁶⁴

	(1-2) High	(3-5) Medium	(6-7) Low	NA
12 Years	21.1%	37.1%	30.8%	11.1%
13 Years	26.5	39.8	28.9	4.5
14 Years	20.9	37.8	36.1	5.3
15 Years	25.3	42.5	29.9	2.3
16 Years	34.9	37.6	26.4	1.1
17 Years	30.1	50.3	18.4	1.2

Pearson's $r = - 0.08$

Regression equation is $Y = 4.56 + (-0.12) X$

The correlation coefficient and the regression equation confirm that the level of cosmopolitanism is able to manage no more than the most negligible association with age. Inter-age movements are both uneven and inconsistent. Our prediction that explicitness in the adolescent's political orientations will be made manifest is not then supported by our data. While there is some indication that young people are moving away from a position which we have categorised as localist, there is no detectable visual trend into the highly cosmopolitan categories.

This failure to spot a movement in the expected direction may be

due to a lack of validity in our measurement items and it does seem doubly relevant to our discussion to investigate some of the attitudinal concomitants of cosmopolitanism. The inference which may be drawn from being more interested in world affairs than local problems are thought to apply more to the cognitive than the affective domain. This means that cosmopolitanism is taken as a general perspective on political affairs, rather than a specific orientation, to be associated with higher levels of knowledge and particular approaches to political problems above all else.

This also brings us to the second property of a political belief system, as distinguished by Sartori, which concentrates on the degree to which individual items are related. We have previously argued that the child once having acquired an interest in political matters will learn that his political orientations should not be assigned to separate compartments of his mind but should 'hang together' in some sort of coherent whole. In the end, we should, as Converse puts it, be able to say, "If you believe this, then you will also believe that, for it follows in such-and-such ways."⁶⁵ The brittlety of the connecting line is manifest and as Sartori points out, "The inarticulate public not only lacks, without guidance, the grasp of what goes with what in the deductive chain of a high-flown, abstract argument; it equally and especially lacks the information and the inductive capability of deciding on his own how a specific event relates to a general principle, and specifically to what principle."⁶⁶ The concept of constraint though conceptually elusive, is operationally more simple, in that it may be derived from the statistical concept of independence. Thus constraint operates where knowledge of one belief helps to predict another in that same individual. Such a condition of constraint for a person can best be noted under conditions of change in his beliefs. If he is motivated to change one attitude and as a result changes a second, the two attitudes

may be said to constrain each other. Sartori talks of orientations being arranged in a quasi-logical fashion but we should remember that constraint in practice will derive from other sources besides logic. Measurement of how a particular belief system is strongly constraining, or consistent or logical, whichever is the term one prefers to employ, is a most complex undertaking. Whether it is the rules of logic or psycho-logic, or statistical measures of association, we shall attempt here to weigh in with some data on the 'what goes with what' problem in political orientations.⁶⁷

For example, those subjects who fit into the highest cosmopolitan ranking are thought of as being characterised by a definite orientation set, which when made explicit, will denote an informed individual who has carefully thought out the way in which his knowledge is to be organised. The prediction of one orientation from another is a hazardous business but we anticipate that those scoring high on cosmopolitanism will be more motivated towards acquiring information in the international arena than those who indicate that they are happier in the more localised context. Our assessment of whether the level of cosmopolitanism acts as a constraint will take us into the recognition of international labels, definition of communism and finally the most appropriate method for settling international conflict.

Firstly, we will examine the relationship of political interest and cosmopolitanism; even if we cannot point to a conclusive growth picture in cosmopolitanism among young people we should be able to demonstrate that the attitude towards cosmopolitanism will be conditioned by the demands of consistent organization in values and interests. High cosmopolitanism will therefore be linked with a greater recall of international information while problems and their solutions will be couched in more international terms. An interest in political affairs

as such does not tell us in which direction it will find articulation; in contrast, scoring highly on cosmopolitanism nevertheless implies greater ease in dealing with our more internationally oriented items. One obvious association is between the ability to classify foreign countries correctly: in TABLE 53 we see that there are several indications that those categorised as cosmopolitans will, during adolescence, make especially rapid progress in the acquisition of information and knowledge in the international field. Initially cosmopolitanism is not the efficient guide to the level of knowledge that it becomes in subsequent years, although again among the older pupils, this advantage is eroded. By that age the level of knowledge demanded is within easy recall for most 17 year olds and discriminating factors decline sharply.

TABLE 53: Average correct response (all items) to international symbols versus cosmopolitanism by age.

	Level of Cosmopolitanism.		
	High	Medium	Low
12 Years	42.9%	47.5%	41.7%
13 Years	59.2	53.6	52.4
14 Years	67.9	58.6	53.7
15 Years	76.9	67.3	57.1
16 Years	81.9	79.4	70.0
17 Years	83.7	84.3	77.6

Another area which we expect to show an association with cosmopolitanism is in the ability to give a meaningful definition of complex belief systems such as communism. In the discussion of replies to that term, we remarked on the large proportion who are either not able to provide any answer or who give a nonsensical reply. Such responses should be less characteristic of the more cosmopolitan children because they have acquired a greater understanding in such areas. Similarly

they are expected to refer less frequently to the coercive aspects or to define communism in negative terms; our explanation is that the individual who takes an interest in events on the international arena is more likely to be acquainted with the essence of internationalism than one whose interest is focused on the immediate locality.

TABLE 54: Cosmopolitanism and meaning of communism, by age.

	High Cosmopolitans			
	Economic System	Equality	Totalitarian	Other
12 Years	-	3.5%	17.2%	79.3%
13 Years	7.9	22.2	17.5	52.4
14 Years	22.2	20.0	18.9	38.9
15 Years	20.4	30.6	22.2	26.9
16 Years	25.9	39.5	16.0	18.5
17 Years	31.0	31.0	24.1	13.8
Low Cosmopolitans				
12 Years	-	5.6	11.1	83.3
13 Years	3.3	16.7	6.7	73.3
14 Years	7.8	14.2	15.6	62.4
15 Years	7.6	18.6	16.9	56.8
16 Years	10.0	23.3	18.3	48.3
17 Years	15.4	23.1	30.8	30.8

Again we find in TABLE 54 strong supportive evidence for our predicted relationships in the adolescent's belief system. In the first place, the acquisition of a classifiable orientation emerges with greater force as one proceeds upwards on the scale of cosmopolitanism and most interesting at the other extreme we find that the more sophisticated response pattern, where a definite picture of communist principles are presented, emerges far more quickly among those who score highly on the cosmopolitan scale, though the gap narrows in the upper age groups.

Equally impressive, the change from high to low cosmopolitanism produces a near equivalent reaction in emphasis between responses to the definition of communism. In summary, the differences between the high and low cosmopolitans are most clear and striking, and in the directions predicted in the majority of age groups.

If the subject scoring well on cosmopolitanism is to be thought of as a more international animal so too we should expect that he would be more oriented to the settlement of international conflict through the good offices of international institutions or as a result of international co-operation. More specifically, an international organization should find especially strong backing from this group of respondents, such as, for example, the United Nations. Conversely we do not believe that those oriented towards a localist ordering in their political preferences will be so ready to look to international solutions, nor in such numbers.

The figures presented in TABLE 55 supply further corroboration of our thesis that there will be a growth in the articulation which political orientations demand as the construction of a political belief system take shape. In all of the tables presented on this point we find corroboration of our prediction that there will be an association between one key element in a belief system and other complementary orientations, though we have not always found the progression with age to have total consistency.

TABLE 55: Cosmopolitanism versus peace resolution, by age.

	High Cosmopolitans		
	Peace Oriented	War Oriented	Other
12 Years	39.1%	26.1%	34.8%
13 Years	49.1	32.7	18.2
14 Years	60.5	15.8	23.7
15 Years	63.0	21.0	16.0
16 Years	71.6	17.6	10.8
17 Years	81.5	3.7	14.8
	Low Cosmopolitans		
12 Years	35.7	46.4	17.9
13 Years	41.4	31.0	27.6
14 Years	53.2	27.0	19.8
15 Years	46.9	34.4	18.8
16 Years	55.2	31.0	13.8
17 Years	71.4	21.4	7.1

Not only are we confident that we have provided graphic evidence of the growing explicitness in children's political orientations, but in addition we can raise two cheers for the proposition that there will be an upsurge in the overall cohesiveness of the elements as the wider implications of holding a particular orientation are realised. This over and above the richness which can hardly now be in dispute to develop with age insofar as the number of constituent political elements in the individual's belief system expands.

Thus far we have analysed the growth of constraints in the young adolescent through statistical techniques. It has further been argued that the notion of constraints may be understood as a quasi-logical construct. If that is the case we should be able to detect in our respondents an increasing recognition of the rules of simple logic in their political thinking. The area which we chose to investigate is the relatively straightforward one of preferences for political parties.

Clearly our anticipation that the rules of logic will be applied to party choices does not mean that various extraneous social forces and other individual differences will not exert any influence. Their impact should diminish with age nevertheless. In addition, the individual's exercise of political logic will be made more likely by other factors which have already been isolated as more characteristic of the older respondents. They are a higher level of interest in, and knowledge of, political affairs; together these sensitize the individual to the choices that he is being asked to make.

In the analysis which we present here, we have taken eight widely ranging examples from the pairs comparison data to see how far the children in our sample make their preferences according to the simple syllogism outlined below:

A is preferred to B, and
B is preferred to C, therefore
A is preferred to C.

TABLE 56: Political Preferences and Logical Choice, by age.⁶⁹Relationship 1:

	a) S.N.P. is preferred to Labour	b) Labour is preferred to Conservative	c) S.N.P. will be preferred to Conservative
Therefore	% S.N.P.	% Conservative	N
12-13 Years	94.4 (60.6)	5.6 (39.2)	126
14-15 Years	97.3 (62.7)	2.7 (37.3)	260
16-17 Years	100.0 (43.6)	- (53.1)	66

Relationship 2:

	a) Labour is preferred to Conservative	b) Conservative is preferred to S.N.P.	c) Labour will be preferred to S.N.P.
Therefore	% Labour	% S.N.P.	N
12-13 Years	90.4 (37.1)	9.6 (62.8)	73
14-15 Years	95.6 (42.6)	4.4 (57.4)	160
16-17 Years	100.0 (55.9)	- (44.1)	106

Relationship 3:

	a) S.N.P. is preferred to Conservative	b) Conservative is preferred to Labour	c) S.N.P. will be preferred to Labour
Therefore	% S.N.P.	% Labour	N
12-13 Years	100.0 (62.8)	- (37.1)	119
14-15 Years	97.2 (57.4)	2.8 (42.6)	253
16-17 Years	97.3 (44.1)	2.7 (55.9)	75

N.B. Don't know responses are excluded; figures in brackets are for the whole sample, after the don't know responses have been excluded.

Relationship 4:

	a) Conservative is preferred to Labour	b) Labour is preferred to S.N.P.	c) Conservative will be preferred to S.N.P.
Therefore	% Conservative	% S.N.P.	N
12-13 Years	100.0 (39.2)	- (60.6)	50
14-15 Years	94.6 (37.3)	5.4 (62.7)	129
16-17 Years	97.8 (53.1)	2.2 (43.6)	90

continued.....

TABLE 56: continued.

Relationship 5:

	a) S.N.P. is preferred to Communist		
	b) Communist is preferred to Liberal		
Therefore	c) S.N.P. is preferred to Liberal		
	% S.N.P.	% Liberal	N
12-13 Years	95.8 (76.9)	4.2 (23.1)	72
14-15 Years	96.4 (71.0)	3.6 (29.0)	83
16-17 Years	88.2 (50.4)	11.7 (49.6)	17

Relationship 6:

	a) Liberal is preferred to Labour		
	b) Labour is preferred to S.N.P.		
Therefore	c) Liberal is preferred to S.N.P.		
	% Liberal	% S.N.P.	N
12-13 Years	73.3 (23.1)	26.7 (76.9)	30
14-15 Years	93.1 (29.0)	6.9 (71.0)	72
16-17 Years	95.5 (49.6)	4.5 (50.4)	66

Relationship 7:

	a) Conservative is preferred to Communist		
	b) Communist is preferred to Labour		
Therefore	c) Conservative is preferred to Labour		
	% Conservative	% Labour	N
12-13 Years	86.3 (48.0)	13.6 (52.0)	66
14-15 Years	96.3 (45.6)	3.7 (54.4)	82
16-17 Years	100.0 (48.7)	- (51.3)	31

Relationship 8:

	a) Communist is preferred to Labour		
	b) Labour is preferred to Conservative		
Therefore	c) Communist is preferred to Conservative		
	% Communist	% Conservative	N
12-13 Years	55.0 (14.3)	45.0 (85.5)	20
14-15 Years	90.9 (12.0)	9.1 (88.0)	33
16-17 Years	100.0 (10.9)	- (89.1)	13

The success of the predicted relationship can hardly be more definitely illustrated although the sophistication of the youngest respondents is far greater than imagined and consequently there is less distance for them to move than we suspected. The complete range of 24 predictions hold in terms of direction; but their true success derives where the replies from the sample as a whole are compared. Our conclusion is that in this instance, the application of the rules of logic does indicate the growth of constraints in the political orientations acquired by young people. Most confusion, but also most development with age, seems to pertain where the less salient, Liberal and Communist parties are involved, although even so these problems are soon eliminated.

It is to be expected that evidence of constraining power is likely to emerge earlier in the area of party choice than in, for example, preferred policy outcomes where the 'logic' permeating the relationships is less immediately obvious. Nor should we forget that while we have demonstrated initial support for the notion of increased constraining power, we have not enumerated a wide range of instances where constraining evidence has come to light.

This brings our discussion to the third and final property of a belief system with which we shall be dealing, namely the stratification aspect, where, "...the various 'belief strata' can be identified by the amount of political information received and absorbed by each belief-public." ⁷⁰ Quite obviously there is a wide area of overlap between this element and the two previously mentioned. In this section we shall concentrate on the way in which information is structured rather than the amount of information assimilated. That the level of political information increases with age has already been vividly documented and here we will distinguish between the absorption of political affairs in concrete terms

and that categorised by an increased use of abstract operations. Our argument rests then on the readiness to stratify political orientations according to a particular level of conceptualisation.

Our method of assessing whether or not the subject is thinking in abstract terms about political questions is based on the definitions of the terms communism and democracy - which have already been touched upon in this chapter. Those who give an abstract definition of either of these items constitute the group of high political conceptualisation respondents. Given the leaning of this study towards a developmental framework, we can accept nothing other than a clear progression towards a higher proportion in this category. This is illustrated in TABLE 57, below:

TABLE 57: Level of political conceptualisation, by age.

	(0) Low	(1) High
12 Years	88.9%	11.1%
13 Years	83.0	17.0
14 Years	28.5	71.5
15 Years	38.5	61.5
16 Years	46.3	53.7
17 Years	53.4	46.6

Pearson's $r = 0.28$

Regression equation is $Y = -0.10 + (0.09) X$

Not only does the aggregated index of abstraction or level of conceptualisation given in TABLE 58 show the predicted increase, but so do each of the constituent questions which comprise this index. None of these incidentally move in anything like a qualitative movement, but they provide, nonetheless, a consistent and even progression with age to the higher levels of political sophistication.

On identifying those who have generated a high level of (abstract) conceptualization, we want to look at possible avenues for the application of a formal or abstract level of thinking in political matters. This far we have skirted round the question of the extent to which increased conceptualisation is brought into use in political questions by taking age as a convenient, but nonetheless persuasive surrogate for such cognitive development. Chronological age is of course, the traditional control variable in developmental research and its basis for equating subjects is the supposition that calendrical time equates subjects on cognitive capacity. The studies that we have reported and indeed our own work, do point to different orientations appearing at different age points, attesting to the fact that age is a significant control variable. Yet we cannot overlook that with all these positive results there is also an overlap between age groups. We have detected children in the younger age group who are able to perform comparably to older children, while some of the developmental patterns predicted do not always come through as vividly as had been predicted. The lack of a better correspondance between chronological age and performance leaves us with the question, 'Why?'. Our reply is that the development of cognitive powers is most probably more affected by environmental factors than most developmentalists would have us believe, at least in political learning. What we require is a deeper examination of the nature of the association between age, the level of conceptualisation and political thinking.

We have repeatedly argued that children of the ages included in this sample will be in a transitional period - between a stage of concrete operations when adult constraint and discipline are uppermost, and when the present is of central concern and the future of little impact; and a subsequent period of formal operations. In this latter stage abstract thinking replaces the concrete, and self-discipline and socionomy

the heteronomy and constraint of the former level. We further expect an expansion in time perspective and a growth of objective responsibility as reflected in the wider sensitivity to the intentions as well as the consequences of political actions.

In the sphere of politics there is a welter of situations that lend themselves to investigation along these lines. We chose to pick out for closer analysis the development of views about conflict between countries. Only a limited amount of research has been conducted in this area and where feasible it will be instructive to compare our own findings with those presented by Cooper, using a sample of elite English school-children, and of Alvik and Rosell both of whom report Norwegian findings.⁷¹ The work of this trio by no means presents a common front on the matter of development in these areas, though certain threads may be identified. If we look at the antecedents of the orientations exhibited by our own 12 year olds it appears that as early as 7 or 8 years most children will be able to provide a fairly concise impression of what is meant by the terms 'war' and 'peace'. Understandably, the younger children are more concerned with the concrete aspects of war, but as they grow older there is a growing recognition that war produces long term actions and consequences. Nevertheless, even during middle adolescence, war is still associated with conventional action rather than with the nuclear, guerilla or civil war possibilities. Ideas about peace emphasize non-positive trends or states of existence rather than dynamic drives towards international co-operation or opportunities for development. It also provokes a more limited range of responses.

Whereas 8 year olds argue that war has no justification, only a small number of those in mid-adolescence appear to share this view. The 15 year old group seem to be quite firm in their belief that war is justified to punish an aggressor in order to bring his folly home to him. It should

be that with increasing age our subjects will show a greater awareness of the underlying motivations behind actions. Furthermore, human motivations of a negative sort multiply in number and subtlety with age; hence fewer restrictions are placed on justifications for war.⁷²

On another important point, according to our theoretical framework, growth in the ability to relate multiple perspectives with regard to conflict, and conflict prevention or resolution, is linked with the ability to relate multiple perspectives in general. Nevertheless, we suspect from the research known to us that horizontal decalage is at work so that while we have categorized an individual as being at a particular level in his cognitive structure, he will not necessarily perform within this structure when dealing with international conflict. Another aspect to the perception of war, peace and international conflict suggests that judgments of conflict will be transformed during childhood. In the period which concerns our sample, the child will have recently acquired a more rational conception of authority and a greater independence from the will of others. This independence is paralleled by increasing mutual respect for his fellows. From 13 years onwards, justice though it continues to be sought in reciprocity, takes on the characteristics of equity, i.e. a concern for the particular circumstances of the situation being judged. The child begins to evaluate intentions rather than deeds. The factors influencing development through this stage include an increasing peer group interaction on the one hand and a developing capacity for non-egocentric or reversible thought on the other. Our intention is to carry the analysis a stage further by comparing differences in orientation by analysing by both age and the level of conceptualisation.

The indices computed and utilised in our analysis comprise the following:

1. Index of abstract thinking
2. The concrete aspects of war
3. The concrete aspects of peace
4. Evaluation of war as a mode of conflict solution
5. Objective responsibility for war and peace (Equity)

The growth of abstract thinking has already been discussed in this chapter and we will proceed to the respondents' perception of war. The basis of our assumption is that the pattern of response will change in emphasis with age. The direction taken is away from a concern with the concrete aspects of war, such that the term makes them think of war itself, and all manner of weapons and the individual combatants or armies involved in that conflict. The goal is a perception which recognises the immediate activities and consequences of war - the fighting and the killing - while later we should expect to find an increase in emotive responses towards the term 'war'. If we consider the two categories, 'War and weapons', and 'Fighting, killing and dying', as encompassing the concrete aspects of war, we expected these to be in the ascendancy among the 12 year olds, but that their relative and absolute significance would diminish with increasing age. In practice we can see from the figures presented in TABLE 58 that our own data demonstrate the most striking discrepancies from the pattern just expounded upon. There is no sharp drop in the 'Fighting, killing and dying' category with age and indeed the general impression is of a minimum of change in the pattern of response with age. Nevertheless, it is true that the level of don't know response declines and that some interchange of position takes place in the three categories of less importance, in terms of absolute level of support at least. A point which should be emphasised is that not only is there little evidence of changing patterns of response among the categories, but one group dominates the response pattern at each age level, namely

'Fighting, killing and dying'.


TABLE 58: Perception of 'war' by age group.⁷³ (See Figure 4)

	Fighting, killing & dying	War, Weapons	Conflict between nations and peoples	General negative	Other & DK
12 Years	57.2%	11.1%	13.0%	3.4%	13.9%
13 Years	60.5	13.5	12.7	6.1	5.8
14 Years	59.4	8.7	13.8	5.6	9.9
15 Years	58.3	9.7	12.4	9.1	8.2
16 Years	54.8	9.8	14.6	12.4	6.4
17 Years	59.5	12.9	13.5	11.0	3.1

If we move on to consider the word associations to the term 'peace' we again discover that there is no qualitative transformation during adolescence in the perception offered to this cue. For this term we classified responses as concrete, or passive, if they fitted into the 'Respite from war' or 'reconciliation' categories. Again, we have to report no discernible movements with age among these responses. There is a slight trend of decline in the former category, but otherwise the overwhelming impression is one of stability.

In contrast to the perception of war, no single response category dominates the answers. Equally, there is more interchange with age among the various categories. Most interesting, since this category is perhaps the most indicative of a more positive conception of peace, is the 'Sociable activity' category, since it is this which most nearly represents a vigorous drive towards international co-operation and understanding. Cooper found that this category is largely subservient to the understanding of peace as inner understanding or peace of mind, whereas in our data we spot among the oldest children a simple majority prepared to talk of peace in terms of countries living together, but few go so far as to describe peace as a

FIGURE 4 : Responses to the cue 'war' .



positive state which yields rich opportunities for development.

TABLE 59: Responses to the cue 'peace' by age.⁷⁴ (See Figure 5)

	Respite	Reconciliation	Sociable Activity	Inactivity	Other	DK
12 Years	38.5%	4.3%	21.2%	5.3%	0.5%	30.3%
13 Years	44.0	6.1	14.6	7.2	0.8	27.3
14 Years	31.3	10.2	23.9	7.4	0.8	26.5
15 Years	35.2	5.2	28.1	9.2	1.8	20.4
16 Years	31.2	4.5	31.8	12.2	2.6	17.7
17 Years	32.5	4.9	36.2	11.7	3.1	11.7

The results presented so far in our analysis of war and peace constitute most convincing evidence against claims for marked absorption of cognitive sophistication in political learning. Not only have we found that the concrete aspects of war show no inclination to decline with age, but further when looking at 'peace' we find that the more abstract perceptions only advance in a most inconsistent manner, while the concrete categories generally hold to an unsteady equilibrium. The other feature of the responses to peace is the much higher proportion, even among the 17 year old group, who are unable to provide any indication of their conception of what constitutes 'peace'.

We are left wondering how far this tendency to underemploy one's cognitive capacity is a feature in the perception of international conflict alone or rather more generally applicable in politics. What, in fact, is the view of war as a method of conflict solution? Do the respondents consider that war is definitely wrong, or that it can be right under certain circumstances? Is war indeed regarded as an ever present phenomena or is it something that can be stopped?

FIGURE 5 : Responses to the cue 'peace' .




TABLE 60: Evaluation of War as a Method of Conflict Solution⁷⁵

	War is right under certain circumstances	War is definitely wrong	DK/NA
12 Years	23.1%	67.3%	9.6%
13 Years	31.3	63.1	5.6
14 Years	32.6	60.4	7.1
15 Years	35.2	58.6	6.1
16 Years	34.1	61.6	4.2
17 Years	49.1	49.1	1.8

Unlike the previous items we have discussed in this section on international conflict TABLE 60 does illustrate a trend with age in response pattern. The movement may be rather unsteady and not always consistent, but overall, young people are seen to move towards a greater acceptance of the view that retaliatory reciprocity is indeed a justifiable response; however, there remains a considerable majority opinion favouring the proposition that war is completely wrong. In fact, it is not until we reach the 17 year olds that the 'definitely wrong' category is counter-balanced by the upward movement mentioned.

It is felt that the evaluation of war as a method of conflict resolution will be related closely to the child's perception of the inevitability of war. This is not because we would classify the latter as a more sophisticated cognitive response, but follows from the progression towards greater internal consistency of views held. Thus the respondent who indicated that he felt that war is right under certain conditions should be more likely to believe that wars cannot be stopped. Firstly, the children's assessment of the omnipresence of war:-

TABLE 61: The Inevitability of War, by Age⁷⁶

	Wars can be stopped	Wars cannot be stopped	DK/NA
12 Years	51.4%	37.5%	11.1%
13 Years	53.3	39.5	7.2
14 Years	51.6	39.5	8.9
15 Years	55.6	37.8	6.3
16 Years	55.8	37.8	6.4
17 Years	54.0	42.9	3.1

In practice the evaluation of war and the perception of the latter's inevitability do not seem to be related in anything other than a very marginal way: This is covered in TABLE 62:-

TABLE 62: Justification versus inevitability of War, by age.

	War is right under certain circumstances			War is definitely wrong		
	Wars can be stopped	Wars cannot be stopped	NA	Wars can be stopped	Wars cannot be stopped	NA
12 Years	50.0%	50.0%	-	57.1%	38.6%	4.3%
13 Years	58.5	40.7	0.8	53.8	42.4	4.0
14 Years	52.0	45.0	3.0	55.6	40.0	4.6
15 Years	53.2	45.4	1.4	62.0	35.8	2.2
16 Years	51.2	46.5	2.3	61.8	35.2	3.0
17 Years	50.0	48.8	1.2	58.8	37.5	3.7

Examination of TABLE 62 shows that those responding that war can be justified are slightly more likely to say that wars cannot be stopped, while those believing war to be definitely wrong are somewhat more prone to the response that wars can be stopped. This movement is not something which grows with age however, but is established at the beginning of adolescence and continues at much the same level throughout our age groups.

The lack of any clear and consistent patterns in the development of political orientations with age in respect of international conflict means that this is a most appropriate moment at which to compare the strength of the association between age and the selected variables and the level of conceptualisation attained by the respondent and these same dependent factors. The principle underlying our approach has been that the measures of association should be broadly similar whether the independent variable is age or level of conceptualisation, and no matter what the dependent variable. In itself, age has no explanatory power, except through its supposed close correspondance with cognitive capacity, and we are lead to wonder how far those dependent variables most likely to exhibit a changing pattern of response will provide a picture of more definite development with the respondent's level of conceptualisation than with his chronological age. Alvik would actually reverse this; he argues that because children do not (or are not given occasion to) make use of their growing capacities of reciprocal reasoning when it comes to the conception of 'war as a matter of conflicting interests' and of a positive view of peace, the measures of association between such indices and the level of conceptualisation will be smaller than is the case with age and the more concrete aspects of war and peace. The following table presents our own expectations and actual findings:

TABLE 63: Age versus Level of Conceptualisation and selected hypotheses.

<u>Correlations between Level of conceptualisation</u>	Are supposed to be	<u>Correlations between Age</u>	Gamma Values
& Abstract aspects of war	Greater than	& Abstract aspects of war	-0.22 v -0.05
& Positive aspects of peace	Greater than	& Positive aspects of war	-0.23 v -0.23
& War as conflict of interests	Greater than	& War as conflict of interests	-0.10 v -0.12
& War responsibility	Greater than	& War responsibility	-0.20 v -0.14
& Peace responsibility	Greater than	& Peace responsibility	-0.34 v -0.24

The gamma values do not always work out as predicted, but interestingly enough the two exceptions to our predictions arise in the areas stipulated by Alvik as constituting a deviation from the expected pattern whereby the level of conceptualisation would give a higher measure of association with the more abstract response than chronological age. The variation is most pronounced when the stimulus is war, and applies whether we are talking about the straightforward perception of the term or when we are looking at the responsibility for war. Indeed, equity generally seems to be more strongly associated with the level of conceptualisation than with cognitive capacity as inferred through age. If for analysis purposes we restrict our interpretation of equity to the extent of objective responsibility thrown up in the replies to the item on war, we can examine more specifically the adolescent's perception of what, or who, is to be held to blame for the outbreak of conflict. As a topic, war is particularly amenable to analysis in terms of levels of objective responsibility. It is presumed that the tendency to ignore the significance of underlying intentions or motives is a characteristic of the younger child but that with maturity the inclination to blame specific actions or events on a few individuals, such as Hitler, will decline and be replaced by a response pattern which attributes blame to either general human failings or else to underlying forces or conditions existing in particular countries or perhaps to some general malaise such as poverty or the population explosion. The pattern to which we have referred is in practice barely discernible in our own data as is shown in TABLE 64:

TABLE 64: Perception of War Responsibility, By Age.⁷⁸

	Underlying forces	Human failings	Particular countries	Specific actions	Other	DK
12 Years	7.2%	13.9%	29.8%	13.5%	1.9%	33.7%
13 Years	6.6	21.2	28.4	11.4	4.2	28.1
14 Years	10.5	22.2	28.1	10.9	2.6	25.7
15 Years	9.2	22.6	31.3	11.0	3.1	22.9
16 Years	9.0	33.1	32.0	8.2	2.4	15.3
17 Years	11.0	41.7	30.1	7.4	1.2	8.0

Although the association between age and increasing attribution of blame for war to underlying conditions is non-existent, there is a far more definite increase among the older children in the number who consider human failings to be primarily responsible for human conflict. Again, while the proportion mentioning particular countries as the guilty party holds steady, specific instances conflict decline as a likely response category.

We have already said that war appears to young people as a far more salient concept than the term peace. This we should expect to be carried over into the children's perceptions of who, or what, can exert most pressure to stop wars. Clearly, responsibility for war is a far more prevalent topic for discussion than responsibility for peace, and that is probably why peace often comes across in our findings as an almost unnatural state of affairs; even among those who believe war to be definitely wrong, there does not seem to be much inspiration about offering ways for actively promoting peace.

If peace is so difficult to envisage as a thriving and valuable condition for human beings to be in, what is the substance that we can expect in the replies to our item on peace responsibility? Answers to this question are contained in TABLE 65.

Responsibility for peace is not a very widely used phrase and certainly the level of response is much lower in this question than with war. What sort of pattern are we expecting in the replies to this question? The child who is deficient in equity will probably answer that the correct way to achieve peace is to attack the immediate manifestation which is where conflict has actually broken out, and obviously in the short term at least, there is much substance in this viewpoint. It entails either making a direct appeal to 'the people' or going above their heads and

appealing to the leaders of the country or countries at war. A different line of thinking implies that when one looks at certain countries, one can see that some are more warlike than the rest. The way to achieve peace entails disciplining those countries most likely to start a war. This implies that little attention need be devoted to the active promotion of peace except indirectly through pressuring those responsible for wars. Furthermore, it seems as though war is particularized to a specific instance of international conflict, often well into the past, such as World War II, though our sample also referred to the armed conflict in Biafra and Vietnam. At the same time the position of blaming war on an individual continues to be a popular response. That Hitler should be held guilty for all international conflict demonstrates a classic deficiency in equity; but in contrast to this, we have responses which are directed quite definitely to peace rather than to war. Peace is to be attained through active international co-operation, and further, by attacking deeper causes which are suggested as responsible for the repeated appearance of conflict, such as inequality, poverty and the population explosion.

TABLE 65: Responsibility for Peace, by age.⁷⁹

	Combattants	Specific Countries	Underlying Conditions	International Organizations	DK/NA
12 Years	9.3%	39.3%	23.3%	8.4%	19.6%
13 Years	9.5	35.8	33.8	3.5	14.4
14 Years	8.6	31.5	36.3	6.4	17.2
15 Years	10.5	31.4	42.7	7.8	7.6
16 Years	9.0	20.4	60.1	7.6	2.8
17 Years	13.6	22.7	56.8	3.4	3.4

The suggestion that the more peace oriented response will come from the older age groups is borne out in TABLE 65; the proportions in favour of peace and war oriented solutions tend to be reversed over the

period from 12 to 17 years. It follows from all this that if the individual's view of peace is a positive one, he will in addition, consider that peace is something which is obtained by active promotion and international co-operation. That is, he adopts a conception of peace which is generally structured in positive terms. We consider it to be an example of a poorly constraining system if after having indicated a non-passive perception of peace, the respondent subsequently lapses into the argument that the answer to preventing future conflict is to stop present hostilities. Our interpretation of TABLE 66 is made difficult by the absence of any even or consistent movements with age in either group. In the important relationship between the two positive views on peace, we can only report that, while this holds among the 12 and 13 year olds, and then again in the oldest respondents, there is no pattern whereby those who conceive of peace in a passive way will be relatively less prone to appreciate that peace can only be attained by a process of active promotion.

TABLE 66: Perception of Peace and Responsibility for Peace, by age.

	Passive perception of peace		Positive perception of peace	
	Get peace through stopping war	Get peace through active promotion	Get peace through stopping war	Get peace through active promotion
12 Years	70.6%	29.4%	38.1%	61.9%
13 Years	63.6	36.4	42.2	57.8
14 Years	45.9	54.1	51.7	48.3
15 Years	41.6	58.4	50.0	50.0
16 Years	22.9	77.1	40.6	59.4
17 Years	52.9	47.1	26.1	73.9

Despite the apparent lack of consistency between orientations that is implied in TABLE 66, the following table which looks at the consistency among respondents in their replies to the responsibility for

war and peace items, does suggest that in this latter area there is a much greater level of equivalence. What is more, the movement towards high equity in both areas clearly expands with age.

TABLE 67: Objective responsibility in War and Peace, by age.

	High peace/high war	Split	Low peace/low war	NA
12 Years	8.6%	38.6%	52.9%	(66.3%)
13 Years	17.3	45.3	37.4	(63.1)
14 Years	23.6	48.1	28.4	(65.8)
15 Years	22.9	47.7	29.5	(58.3)
16 Years	30.6	58.9	10.6	(52.4)
17 Years	35.5	46.1	18.4	(53.4)

At this point we will conclude with a general summary of our findings and interpretations in the area of international conflict and consider how far this discussion has added weight to the distinction of political belief systems according to the level of stratification or conceptualisation.

The subject's associations with 'war' have been shown to concentrate upon the more concrete aspects (fighting, killing, dying, war and weapons), and seem to be connected to conventional rather than to nuclear war. The associations with 'peace' reveal that the bulk of subjects conceive of this as being a state of respite and inactivity; in other words, as a passive state, although the notion of active cross-national contact does emerge as the prevailing opinion in the upper age groups. Our conclusion is that a perception of both of these concepts has already become established with the subjects through the mass media and everyday conversation before they reach the age of 12 years, and that adolescence will see few transformations. Even if the younger subjects make less use of these sources than do their elders, the information received

is probably sufficient for all of the age groups to cover the concrete aspects of the topics.

The ability of abstract reasoning plays little more than a minor role in the perception of the terms raised, over and above that already noted for chronological age. Nevertheless, the relationship is such that there is confirmation of the existence of decalage in the subject's utilization of his growing intellectual capacities in the way he deals with these concepts. Manifestly the increase in the level of conceptualisation does not bring about anything like a commensurate development in the manner of perceiving important political terms.

Summary of findings:

We introduced at the beginning of this chapter a list of seven broad propositions which we proposed investigating in this section, and we will now examine each in turn to see whether our findings did substantiate them or not.

1. The number and range of political orientations acquired will increase with age.

Having sub-divided political orientations into those classified as cognitive and others which fit into the affective domain, we have found abundant evidence to support the general proposition that there will be an increase in the acquisition of political orientations. This conclusion applies to both domains, although growth is generally more rapid in the cognitive domain. The acquisition of affective orientations is more advanced at the age of 12 years, but exhibits less growth during adolescence, though development is greater than much previous research would lead us to suspect.

Further sub-division of each domain into three levels of

sophistication or skill demonstrates that the former conclusions do not apply equally across all levels of orientation. Most particularly, the higher levels in both domains display a resistance to acquisition which does not break down until late adolescence.

2. There will be a growing absorption of the political knowledge and values which characterise their main political reference group.

The political orientations reported by our respondents demonstrate far less diversity as the children get older. This applies not only as we would expect in the items of political knowledge, but furthermore in the range of political values given by our sample. In the cognitive domain the movement is towards the 'correct' response, while in the affective domain the respondents tend to gravitate towards the more democratically respectable answer.

3. There will be a decline in the personalization of political authority and an increase in an institutionalised view. This will be associated with a declining idealization of political authority.

Elaboration of this proposition is found in the perception of a variety of actors on the political stage. Reaction to the Queen is particularly amenable to analysis along these lines; her role is transformed through the years from one which sees her running the country into another where emphasis falls on the role rather than the individual in question. The Queen, as with everyone else, is increasingly viewed as a cog in a larger scheme in which political roles are defined and where the individual is less independent of the community in the range of activities he can follow.

4. There will be a decline in heteronomy, and a corresponding rise in socionomy.

The predicted pattern that we offered in terms of a decline in the constraining elements in political authority and a growth in the

awareness of the needs of the community has received no more than piecemeal support. In particular there is no precise evidence that our respondents consider the political world to be one of restriction, except perhaps when they refer to other countries.

Nevertheless our respondents do exhibit a more definite awareness of the needs and obligations of community living. This is displayed in the items dealing with the respondent's perception of the role played by a variety of political actors.

5. There will be a growth in the higher cognitive perspectives on political problems, and most particularly, an increased tendency to think in abstract terms.

Again, we can report that the indices employed to assess the level of conceptualisation employed by each individual illustrate that the tendency to think in abstract terms shows an unambiguous relationship with age, and increases steadily throughout adolescence.

It is quite another problem when we come to the association between the level of conceptualisation apparently obtained by the respondent and his perception of political affairs. There is no consistent relationship between level of conceptualisation and interpretation of political terms or problems. Generally it does appear as if the more abstract response increases with age, but such trends are neither consistent, nor greater than moderate.

6. There will be a growth in objective responsibility or equity.

Development to the stage of formal operations implies that the individual will become capable of reciprocal reasoning and increased application of equity in his understanding of political events and relationships. We have found moves in the predicted direction, but these are far from dramatic.

7. There will be a distinguishable growth of a political belief system.

Evidence for the emergence of a political belief system was based on three properties - richness or articulation, constraining power, and stratification. With respect to the first, there can be little dispute over the increasing number of political elements or orientations encompassed by our respondents, and further such items as cosmopolitanism do seem to be articulated more clearly as the respondent proceeds through adolescence. Constraining power is a most complex concept with which to grapple; its operationalisation in terms of logic has shown that the rules thereby determined are increasingly accepted in party choice, although the movement is not as large as we expected. Operationalised in terms of statistical association with other elements, there is slight evidence of increased constraint during adolescence.

The final component of a belief system which we saw as a changing pattern of political conceptualisation has been discussed previously in point 4. Suffice to repeat again that we could not find the dramatic examples of transformations in thinking that had been anticipated. The absorption of high levels of political conceptualisation simply had little or no effect on producing a more abstract perception of the political world.

8. Development will be qualitative rather than quantitative.

Our final conclusion must refer to the term 'development'. Our qualitative approach to political learning suggested that there would be particularly dramatic transformations in political orientations at certain ages periods, but especially in early adolescence, as cognitive capacity itself moves into the stage of formal operations. We could find no support for this proposition. In contrast, the overwhelming impression is of a growth pattern which is notable more for its consistency and evenness. Of course, when so many orientations are considered, there will be exceptions on both sides, but our conclusion applies in both

domains, at all levels of sophistication and even in areas which have been categorised as amenable to development in cognitive capacity as well as those unrelated to such a factor. On balance, the affective domain exhibits less change with age, or where inconsistent and haphazard movement occurs it will almost certainly be from the affective domain. Our final picture of political learning during adolescence is that there are definite movements from one response pattern to another but this readjustment of the direction of response with age is a gradual incremental process above all else.

Footnotes to Chapter Five:

1. See footnote 31, chapter 3 for the citation.
2. Easton, D., & Dennis, J., Children in the Political System, McGraw-Hill, 1969; and Dennis, J., et al., Political Socialisation to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.1, 1968, pp 71-101. For a critical view see: Prewitt, K., Muhl, G., & Court, D., School Experiences and Political Socialisation, Comparative Political Studies, vol.3, No.2, July 1970, pp 203-225.
3. Easton and Dennis, op.cit. pp 82-84.
4. Appendix A; Question 22; see TABLE 15.
5. Appendix A; Question 47; see TABLE 17.
6. Appendix A; Questions 26-29; see TABLE 18.
7. See TABLE 35 in this chapter.
8. Items in the Political Efficacy Scale are in Appendix A; Questions 34-38. Items in the Political Toleration Scale are in Appendix A; Questions 39-43.
9. See Dennis et al., op.cit.
10. The range of political parties into which the young person may fit varies greatly between countries and this may affect the non-identification figure
11. Appendix A; Question 22.
12. The scores were categorised on the following basis: high = 6 or more correct answers; medium = 3 to 5 correct answers; low = 2 or less correct answers. It should further be noted that the regression equation is based on an X score which is minus 10 years the figure reported in the table. Thus in TABLE 6 the score for the 12 year olds is $3.80 - 0.74 = 3.06$. This procedure is followed throughout in the calculation of the regression line unless otherwise stated; n.b. TABLE 17.
13. Appendix A; Question 47.
14. Greenstein, F., Children and Politics, Yale University Press, 1965, pp 67-71.
15. Appendix A; Questions 26, 28-29.
16. Appendix A; Question 27.

17. Constructed on the following basis: Party most in favour of Scottish independence = SNP; party most supported by businessmen = Conservatives; party most in favour of nationalisation = Labour.
18. Constructed on the following basis: Britain = Western: Russia = Communist; Switzerland = neutral.
19. Appendix A; Question 23.
20. Appendix A; Question 31.
21. Adelson, J., & O'Neil, Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, p 295.
22. Easton & Dennis, op.cit. chapter 6.
23. Appendix A; Question 33.
24. Appendix A; Question 49a.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Appendix A; Question 49b.
29. Appendix A; Question 49c.
30. Appendix A; Question 20.
31. Blumler, J., and McQuail, Television in Politics, Faber & Faber, 1968.
32. Appendix A; Question 50a.
33. Appendix A; Question 50b.
34. Based on the work of Rokeach, M., Prejudice, Concreteness of thinking, and reification of thinking, Jnl. of Abnormal & Soc. Psychology, 46, 1951, pp83-91.
35. Appendix A; Question 17; High interest = follows politics 'most of the time'; medium interest = follows politics 'some of the time' or 'only now and then'; low interest = follows political affairs 'hardly at all' or don't know.
36. Constructed on the following basis; high = reads newspapers and regularly watches the T.V. news; medium and low levels covers all other responses.
37. Appendix A; Question 16a. High = several times a week; medium = a few times a month or once or twice a year; low = almost never, etc.

38. Appendix A; Question 16b. Construction as for Question 37.
39. Dennis et al., op.cit. p.71.
40. Ibid. pp 74-75.
41. Appendix A; Question 48c.
42. Appendix A; Question 48. Scores constructed on the following basis:
For items a, c, d: agree strongly = 4, agree = 2, disagree = -2.
disagree strongly = -4; no opinion = 0. For items b, e, f, the signs
are reversed. Then High support = 8-24; medium support = 7 to -7;
and low support = -8 to -24.
43. Dennis et al., op.cit., p.79.
44. Constructed on the following basis; Q.34 = Agree; Q.35 = Agree;
Q.36 = agree; Q.37 = Agree; Q.38 = Agree. High efficacy = at
least three items as indicated and one don't know; medium efficacy =
two items as above; low efficacy = all other sets.
45. Appendix A; Questions 34-38.
46. Appendix A; Questions 56-60.
47. See Appendix A footnote.
48. Constructed on the following basis: Q.56 = 1; Q.57 = 1; Q.58 = 5;
Q.59 = 1; Q.60 = 1. Those obtaining a highly cynical score would
have less than two items scored as above, or two items as above and
at least one opposite; medium cynicism = at least three items as above
or two items as above and three in-between; low cynicism = no more
than two items scored as above.
49. The three items in the pluralism scale should score as follows; Item 1 =
disagree; item 2 = disagree; item 3 = disagree. At least two items
scored as above puts the respondent in the non-cynical category.
50. Dennis et al., op.cit.
51. Appendix A; Questions 39-43.
52. The Political Toleration items should all have been scored as disagree.
At least three the same and one don't know scores high; medium equals
at least two the same; low toleration is anything less than this.
53. Sartori, G., Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems, American Political
Science Review, Vol.LXIII, No.2, June 1969, pp 398-411.
54. Ibid. p.406.

55. Merton, R., Patterns of Influence; Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials, in Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, revised and enlarged edition: New York, 1957, pp 387-420. That Scots children are familiar with the terms mentioned is illustrated in Jahoda, G., The Development of children's ideas about country and nationality; British Journal of Educational Psychology, vol.33, pp 47-60, 143-53, 1963.
56. See: Bjerstedt, A., The Methodology of Preferential Sociometry, Sociometry Monographs, No.37, 1956. Confidence that the two methods will supply closely similar perspectives is demonstrated where we compare the rank order and pairs comparison methods for expressing preferences among the five main parties in Scotland.

Comparison of rank order and pair comparison methods of party choice.

	Pair Comparison: Number of preferences per party (max.= 4)					
	0	1	2	3	4	NA
First Party Preference						
Communist	-	3.9%	3.9%	11.5%	65.4%	15.4%
Conservative	0.3%	0.5%	1.5%	10.3%	84.3%	3.2%
Labour	0.2%	0.4%	1.1%	11.9%	81.8%	4.7%
Liberal	-	-	4.6%	16.9%	73.9%	4.6%
S.N.P.	-	0.3%	0.5%	3.5%	87.6%	8.1%

	Pair Comparison: Number of preferences per party (max.= 4)					
	0	1	2	3	4	NA
Last Party Preference						
Communist	92.7%	3.2%	0.6%	0.2%	0.1%	3.3%
Conservative	82.6%	5.8%	7.0%	2.3%	-	-
Labour	72.4%	15.5%	4.3%	1.7%	0.9%	5.2%
Liberal	50.6%	22.8%	8.9%	1.3%	-	16.5%
S.N.P.	67.7%	18.6%	2.0%	2.9%	2.0%	-

Inspection of the relationship of the first party preference with the number of positive affirmations given to that party in the pair comparisons technique demonstrates that the less popular the party is in the sample as a whole, the less likely it is to obtain the maximum number of preferences in the pair comparison method. Most confusion pervades the Communist Party supporters, and the distribution of their replies suggests a far less secure embeddedness of their identification than if reliance had been made on the rank order method alone. Conversely, other party supporters are adamant that the Communist Party is the least preferred alternative and this applies across both the rank order and pairs comparison techniques. Otherwise the smaller parties tend to be less reliably placed in the least preferred category.

57. Coombs, C., A Theory of Data, New York, 1964.
58. Ibid. p.80.
59. Ibid. p.86.
60. Appendix A; Question 21.
61. Ibid.
62. Jennings, M.K., Pre-adult orientations to Multiple Systems of Government, Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.XI, No.3, August, 1967, pp 291-317.
63. Ibid. pp 298-300.
64. Based on Question 21; Appendix A. Rank 1 = WBSL (17.2%); Rank 2 = BWSL (4.0%), WBLS (94.6%), BWLS (1.4%); Rank 3 = BSWL (1.9%), WSBL (8.9%), WLBS (2.5%), BLWS (0.6%); Rank 4 = BSLW (1.3%), SBWL (2.6%), WSLB (4.4%), WLSB (5.5%), BLSW (1.0%), LBWS (2.1%), LWSB (3.2%), SWLB (1.8%); Rank 5 = SBLW (2.1%), LBSW (2.1%), LWSB (3.2%), SWLB (1.8%); Rank 6 = SLBW (4.9%), LSBW (6.7%), SLWB (2.6%); Rank 7 = LSBW (16.7%).
65. Converse, P., The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in ed. D. Apter, Ideology and Discontent, New York, Free Press, 1964, p.212.
66. Sartori, op.cit., p.407.
67. See Luttbeg, N., The Structure of Beliefs among Leaders and the Public, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1968, No.3, pp 398-409.
68. For a discussion of psycho-logic see: Abelson R., & Rosenberg, M., Symbolic Psychologic, Behavioural Science, 1958, 3, pp 1-13. A further technique which might have been thought well suited to the examination of constraints is factor analysis. Luttbeg (for citation see note 67) employs this technique to assess the extent of consistency in attitudes between elite leaders and the less involved members of the population. Unfortunately, the number of items included in our study that might usefully be used in factor analysis is limited. Other practical considerations increased our reluctance; and in particular we had to take note of the strictures that this technique is not appropriate where the inter-correlation between items is low, and in our own sample this feature rather characterised our data. Nevertheless we can record the general statistical facts produced by factor analysis, using a varimax rotation routine. Our sample was divided into three age ranges - namely 12 to 13 years, 14 to 15 years and 16 to 17 years. If the notion of constraints increasing with age

is to have any validity we should find that a greater amount of the variance is explained by the factors in the 16 to 17 year old group. In fact after four rotations the variance explained is both similar between age groups as well as being very low; while the amount explained is greater among the younger respondents.

Amount of variance explained by four factors after four rotations:

12-13 Years	24.3%
14-15 Years	22.6%
16-17 Years	20.8%

Turning to the communality scores for the items included - these giving an indication of the variation in items scores by the factors - again there is an absence of any evidence that age will exert much influence.

More interesting is where we inspect the factor loadings by item for each age range to see whether theoretically meaningful clusters emerge. Quite arbitrarily we have isolated those items which have a loading of more than 0.25 on any factor and the picture we get is traced below:

Number of factor

age group	1	2	3	5
12-13 Years	9,12,13.	14,15.	1,2,3, 5,6.	1,2,4, 13.
14-15 Years	1,2,3, 5,6,7,8.	14,15.	1,2,4, 9,13.	12.
16-17 Years	1,2,4,8.	7,12.	14,15	1,3,5,6.

Key:	<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
	1	Interest	8	Media consumption
	2	Knowledge	9	Conceptualisation
	3	Cosmopolitan	10	Conflict wrong
	4	Ideologue	11	Conflict solution
	5	Efficacy	12	Cynicism
	6	Toleration	13	International knowledge
	7	Support	14	War
			15	Peace

Inspection of the areas in which higher loadings occur demonstrates that while in total the amount of the variance explained by the factors does not improve with age, there is instead a grouping of higher loadings within factors which makes more theoretical sense as we move upwards in the age range. Among the younger respondents there is a clear

tendency to produce scores which mix both cognitive and affective orientations. Yet among the 16 to 17 year old group a distinction between these two areas appears.

Notwithstanding this glimmer of support for constraints we do not claim that much weight should be put on this finding because of the problems mentioned at the outset.

69. Appendix A; Question 32.
70. Sartori, *op.cit.*, p.407.
71. Cooper, P., The Development of the Concept of War, *Journal of Peace Research*, 1965, No.1, pp 1-17. Alvik, T., The Development of Views on Conflict, War and Peace among Schoolchildren, *Journal of Peace Research*, 1967, pp 171-195. Rosell, L., Children's views of War and Peace, *Journal of Peace Research*, 3, 1968, pp 268-276.
72. Alvik, *op.cit.*, pp 171-172.
73. Appendix A; Question 51.
74. Appendix A; Question 54.
75. Appendix A; Question 53.
76. Appendix A; Question 55.
77. Alvik, *op.cit.* p.183.
78. Appendix A; Question 52.
79. Appendix A; Question 55.

Chapter Six: The Agents of Political Socialisation

In the previous chapter we focused on the association that exists between the growth of political orientations and changes in chronological age, or more correctly the variation which is identifiable as a product of cognitive growth, for which age is but an apt shorthand predictor. A central conclusion which we reached is that age does provide an excellent gauge of the extent to which political learning has developed in adolescence; contrary and haphazard movement is a rare phenomena, although there is evidence of stability or inertia in some areas. While age provides a measure of the adolescent's development it does not indicate that such learning will proceed in a qualitative manner with a distinct stage-like advance in early adolescence. While we have demonstrated that there are generally wide differences in political thinking between the 12 and 17 year olds in our sample the overall impression of the movement which brings about this gap is of a gradual, monotonic growth pattern, without a dramatic leap forward at a particular age to an abstract level of political reasoning.

In many respects we should have been surprised if analysis by age alone had produced evidence of clear-cut qualitative development. Our perspective on political growth is not a purely maturational one in which nature always triumphs over nurture. Instead we have described political development as an interaction - acquisition process. By this we mean that learning involves not only a view of the individual and his own internal development but also the interaction and influence exerted on the acquisition of particular orientations by the various agents with whom he comes into contact. The orientations which we are reporting are the end product of this process.

The intention in this chapter is to supplement the previous discussion where we concentrated on the influence of age change, with an examination of the influence of other key agents of socialisation, identified in Chapter 2, to see whether: a) these agents have an influence of their own on the development of political orientations - perhaps on one type of orientation or else are more potent at a particular age period, and whether b) these agents account for the apparent lack of association between age and certain orientations, particularly those most directly linked with changes in cognitive capacity.

We have already set down (Chapter 2) which factors have been isolated in the present study as most likely to affect the development of political orientations; our analytical procedure will consist of taking each of these variables in conjunction with age and examining the effect of this combination in a number of selected areas, in both domains and at all levels of sophistication or internalisation. Again if our prediction of qualitative growth is to have any validity there should be discernible differences in the nature of the movement which occurs in those orientations which we have linked with cognitive development and those other areas which are most influenced by changing social conditions, or by a simple increase in information.

The areas in which we have chosen to search for the impact of environmental forces comprise the following:

1. Political knowledge: recall, domestic and international issues.
2. Interest in political affairs.
3. Support for regime and political norms: efficacy, cynicism and toleration.
4. Cosmopolitanism.

5. Level of conceptualisation.
6. Perception of international conflict: war, peace and equity.

The above areas present an interesting cross-section of perspectives on political learning and growth. Most show evidence of a positive association with age although some, such as cosmopolitanism and the level of political cynicism, defy this generalisation.

It would obviously be most helpful to the political scientist, not to mention the planner of a political education course, if a firm indication could be provided of the relative impact which these social and individual differences produce in political development. Inevitably there are numerous possibilities for consideration but we have chosen to look at three broad alternatives. They are:

1. Differences are evident at the onset of adolescence and they remain constant throughout the period 12 to 17 years.
2. There are early differences between groups but with increasing age the gulf is narrowed if not closed completely.
3. Whatever the variation in learning between individuals and groups early in adolescence these will be accentuated with increasing age.

Our analytical strategy therefore involves us in viewing political development through adolescence while controlling for various social influences and individual differences as well as examining the impact

of these factors at specific age points during adolescence. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, we will move one step further into multivariate analysis in order to assess the interaction that exists between our predictors as well as their relative impact, while controlling for all other variables.

Having established our sensitivity to the distinction between the use of school year and chronological age in developmental research we will try to discover areas where the effect of school year is different to that of chronological age. As we have already indicated school year and age are highly correlated but more significantly school year is accepted as a most useful summary independent variable. In other words, as Easton and Dennis admit, school year acts as, "the surrogate of several maturational forces". It has become a blanket term which covers a welter of experiences that the child accumulates through the school in particular. This variable then acts as a counterbalance, in principle at least, to chronological age and cognitive growth because pupils in the same school year are treated as a homogeneous group rather than children of the same age. Analysing our data by school year therefore produces an immediate check on our assumption of the significance of internal as well as external forces. Nevertheless, lest we forget, the child in the first year at secondary school will already have 7 years of primary schooling behind him, not to mention even longer periods of television viewing, and accumulated experience in his family unit and social class.

In consequence of the problems raised the relative influence of age and school year is a matter of some considerable interest to us.

Firstly, we anticipate that because of the high correlation between these two variables they will exhibit a similar pattern of association with the dependent variables. Where differences exist they are thought to derive from the relatively greater impact of social forces on political learning, and in particular we see school year as accumulating and accentuating such differences - as is most vividly expressed in the high variation in early school leaving between social groups.

Analysis of school year and chronological age with the selected political orientations demonstrates that there is a similarity in the strength of association which is quite remarkable irrespective of the type of level of the orientation involved. The largest discrepancy between the two variables is no more than 0.04, although rather significantly it does occur in the correlation coefficients for the level of conceptualisation attained by the subject.

TABLE 70: Comparison of correlation coefficients between age and school year in selected areas.

	Age	School Year	Difference (Age minus school year)
Political Knowledge	-0.36	-0.36	-
Issue Ideologue	-0.28	-0.29	-0.01
Cosmopolitanism	-0.08	-0.09	-0.01
Political Interest	-0.19	-0.20	-0.01
Political Efficacy	-0.22	-0.22	-
Political Toleration	-0.20	-0.19	+0.01
Political Cynicism	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03
General Support	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03
Meaning of War	-0.06	-0.06	-
Meaning of Peace	-0.17	-0.17	-
Conceptualisation	-0.28	-0.32	-0.04
Equity	-0.12	-0.13	-0.01

With the difference between the coefficients so minimal in every case it does seem as if the broad overview of political growth encompassing the whole period of adolescence is not even moderately affected by taking school year rather than age. However a closer inspection of the variation in scores between school years opposed to the variation between neighbour age groups presents a picture with fewer close similarities.

TABLE 71: Percentage in each school year scoring high on selected variables.

Variable	School Year.				
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Political Knowledge ¹	30.9%	43.3%	52.1%	71.5%	88.4%
Issue Ideologue ²	9.5%	19.6%	25.4%	45.7%	46.8%
Cosmopolitanism ³	23.7%	24.7%	20.8%	30.0%	32.7%
Political Interest ⁴	8.6%	9.9%	12.1%	18.5%	27.6%
Political Discourse ⁵ with friends	6.1%	11.2%	11.6%	15.6%	28.4%
Perception of war ⁶	17.8%	21.6%	23.4%	25.5%	26.6%
Perception of peace ⁷	22.9%	29.3%	32.7%	45.5%	48.5%
Conceptualisation ⁸	10.6%	19.3%	31.8%	46.8%	48.1%

Two points immediately strike one about the difference between the pattern of the association between school year and a particular variable and chronological age and that same variable. In the first place the six age groups provide the opportunity for a wider gulf between youngest and oldest than do the five school years; therefore we find that the 12 year olds score less well than the first year sample just as

the 17 year olds generally do better than the fifth year group. A second and probably more significant point is that the gaps between neighbour age groups are less marked than those between different school years. We note most especially the consistently larger difference between third and fourth year pupils. If this had been discovered between age groups we would have interpreted it as evidence of a stage-like jump in political learning but because it is obtained between school years we attribute it to the influence of social factors that lead pupils with particular characteristics, such as those with parents little interested in school progress, from a manual class background, with a lower I.Q. score, etc., to leave school in disproportionately high numbers at the age of 15 years, or at the end of the third school year.

It is apparent from this brief examination that school year can act as a summary independent variable for various social forces, and particularly in the case of those areas which we have linked previously with cognitive development, such as the level of conceptualisation at which we believe the respondent to be operating. School year is necessarily a most crude measure of social experiences but it does give us a convenient lead into the more specific range of environmental factors that we have included in this investigation.

FAMILY INTEREST

The conviction that the family unit is a prime source of political orientations pre-dates all recent social research and is embedded in the folk lore of all manner of ancient and non-industrial societies. It is in addition a conclusion which almost all political socialisation research has reinforced; though disagreements have arisen over claims

that it constitutes the foremost agency in political learning. Stated in its crudest terms the explanation behind the importance of the family is that quite simply people who associate together over an extended period will come to think alike. And since individuals interact most frequently and intensely with members of their own primary group - but especially the family - it is postulated that within such groups the initial moulding of the individual's social and political predispositions will be contrived. If the family is the important determinant of basic orientations that it is pointed then it is reasonable to assume that the adolescent will acquire from his parents not merely his initial political allegiances towards the regime and democratic norms but will also influence the amount of interest generated by their children in the political world. Equally, family disinterest in politics will encourage apathy to flourish in their offspring.

We have already emphasized that assessing the impact of the family in political socialisation has engendered a methodological literature of its own. We have not been able to interview the parents of the children in our sample and our assessment of family politicisation is calculated on the basis of the saliency and level of discourse in political matters in which they indulge, as reported by their children. We do assume therefore that the extent, and in some respects the direction, of political learning can be inferred from the level of political interest in the family. Nevertheless the only direct comparison of the parent-child correspondence in political orientations that we can draw refers to the level of interest expressed in political affairs. Obviously in this case we predict that high family politicisation will stimulate relatively greater levels of political interest among their children.

But what about other political orientations? In the lower levels of the cognitive domain it is a simple matter to extrapolate from high political interest on the part of parents to predict that their children will acquire a higher level of knowledge about political questions. In other areas even the detractors of the family's pre-eminence in political socialisation accept that the family is important in promoting an early attachment to one's country and system of government. It is implied that by the age of 12 years, children will have come to accept the political system as legitimate irrespective of the level of family interest in political matters. Somewhat greater variation in political orientations should be exhibited in the adolescent's appreciation of political norms such as efficacy and toleration or through his not expressing cynicism towards the political authorities. All of the latter dimensions have been shown in studies of adults to be related to the respondent's level of interest in political affairs and we should see evidence of this in the children's differential acceptance of these norms.

The impact of the level of family interest in politics on the child's acquisition of cognitive knowledge is less certain. We have said that the family will exert most influence in the early years of life and it is for this reason that orientations in the affective domain which are thought to emerge earliest will be more susceptible to the level of politicisation in the family. In contrast knowledge about political affairs, even at the lowest level of recall, does not appear to make dramatic surges forward until the onset of adolescence. This suggests firstly, that knowledge will be only moderately influenced by the level of family interest and secondly, that this influence will

diminish the more demanding the level of knowledge. Carrying on this reasoning to the level of conceptualisation in political matters achieved by the respondent, we imagine that the family will provide a basis through its encouragement of an interest in political affairs but otherwise the connection will be a tenuous one and its influence will be less marked than in other areas.

Data provided in our study confirms that the transmission of political interest through the family is the strongest association for all age ranges covered in TABLE 73. If we then turn to TABLE 74 we can see that the strength of the relationship is such that the percentage fitting within the high political interest category from families which are ranked as highly politicised is greater among the 12 year old respondents than the percentage expressing a high interest, and aged 17, but from families little or even moderately concerned with political matters. This example of family influence in the transmission of political interest is particularly vivid.

What of the other orientations and the extent to which they can be matched with differential family politicisation? None in practice is as influenced by the family as the level of political interest. In part this may be attributed to interest levels being the only orientation in which direct comparisons were asked for; in all other areas comparisons are indirectly inferred from the measure of family interest. If we deal firstly with the cognitive domain and the level of simple recall of knowledge reached by the respondent we find that the scores obtained consistently favour those from a highly politicised background. This association holds moreover throughout adolescence. In the case of the more demanding ideologue index it is not until late

on in our sample that even a small association is established between the level of family interest and respondent's knowledge. This indicates that the family influence does not have even a moderate stimulating effect on the acquisition of medium level political tasks. This substantiates our prediction that family influence will be more powerful in the lower levels of knowledge but neither TABLE 73 nor TABLE 74 support our contention that the level of the association will drop with increasing age.

In the affective domain we mentioned that the family is generally considered to be a key agency responsible for providing young children with a strong acceptance of political authority and the regime. When we look at our own sample the evidence is for a complete rejection of the predicted association. Rather than a picture which offers few differences between children from families differentially interested in political life, TABLE 73 indicates not only wide variation but further that the direction of the association is reversed during adolescence. At the outset the children from highly politicised families are less supportive of the political regime yet among the oldest groups we discover that such children have become far more appreciative of the political system. It is not, as TABLE 74 demonstrates, that children from politically disinterested families have suddenly changed their minds about the value of the regime but rather that they do not move upwards to far higher levels of support as do the offspring of families with a strong involvement in political affairs. We cannot offer any convincing theoretical justification for this particular movement, particularly as it is quite inconsistent with the pattern of movement exhibited in other orientations. The

most plausible explanation is inferred from the manner in which high family interest appears to polarize opinion to a far greater extent than other levels of parental politicisation. Thus not only do we find higher levels of support for the regime in this category but in addition we also detect a greater readiness to indicate disenchantment. It may be therefore that we have attributed a direction to the impact of family interest in politics which is not justified. What we can conclude is that high family interest encourages the child to form an opinion on political support which is more clearly defined. In contrast medium and low levels of political interest among the parents instill feelings lacking in commitment. Why it is that the items on support for the regime should be the only ones to encourage such a reaction is presumably to be attributed to their rather more emotively laden nature, best typified for example by the item asking whether the British system of government is thought to be the best in the world.

Our respondent's reactions to the items which comprise the political efficacy, cynicism and toleration scales do fall more easily into the predicted pattern with the level of family interest in politics being associated with scoring 'more democratically' on each of these scales. Of the three, efficacy produces the strongest as well as the most consistent association throughout the age changes, while scores on toleration exhibit greatest inter-movement so that a negative gamma value among the youngest respondents is changed into a positive one among the oldest children (see TABLE 73). In this case the high interest families encourage an early appreciation of the norms of political toleration and little change occurs in this group from the

age of 13 years onwards. By way of contrast those children from families less well politicised show more gradual development, although in the end they exhibit the same orientations.

While TABLE 73 implies that the strength of the association between family interest and political learning will vary markedly both within and between domains, overall the pattern is for high parental politicisation to encourage earlier and more extensive political learning. More helpful therefore in this respect is TABLE 74 which does provide greater evidence of patterning. What emerges in the cognitive domain is for differences to be greatest in the middle years of adolescence and relatively small or indistinguishable among the youngest and oldest in our sample. Moreover the impact of family politicisation is not an exactly linear one; where differences occur they almost invariably derive from the effect of high family interest since the gap between medium and low levels of parental political interest does not generate any consistent impact, with respect either to the extent or the direction of political learning. Conversely the gulf between children from highly and medium politicised families is the most graphic.

In contrast the differences which families encourage in political values hold steady once established among 12 and 13 year olds. The sole exception is the level of support which is felt for the political authorities. Even the level of cosmopolitanism, which we said in Chapter 5 is not amenable to developmental interpretation, evinces a most emphatic influence of the level of family politicisation.

Transferring the spotlight to the level of conceptualisation attained by our respondents we expect to unearth little evidence of

the influence of family interest levels. Findings contained in both TABLES 73 and 74 support this proposition. Indeed if we compare the youngest and the oldest children in our sample those from a background which we have ranked as low in political interest provide a larger proportion at the high level of conceptualisation as well as producing the greatest growth pattern. Inspection of the perception of the two terms 'war' and 'peace' indicates that the probability that the respondent will provide a more abstract reply is a most haphazard process, for all groups. It is only in the item tapping objective responsibility that differences between groups emerge with age in a consistent manner.

This far our concentration has been on the extent to which the influence of family interest in politics will vary during adolescence between age groups. TABLE 72 presents the picture for political development where we control for this parental interest level rather than the age of the respondent. Of the 12 dependent variables isolated for examination only the level of political support score provides striking evidence of the impact of family interest. Interest, conceptualisation and peace provide a modicum of variation but otherwise the picture is of a most impressive similarity of scores between the three levels of family politicisation. From this we interpret that the extent of the differences which exist among the youngest respondents will tend to hold throughout adolescence. In addition the level of these coefficients is larger in the cognitive than in the affective domain indicating that more growth takes place in the former area. The level of conceptualisation also produces high measures but this pattern is not consistent throughout those orientations which we have included to tap the employment of more abstract operations, such as the perception of war or equity.

Our broad impression of the influence of the family interest in politics is that it is associated with differential political learning in adolescents but that its impact will be established by the early teenage years and overall does not seem to strengthen or weaken with increasing age. Needless to say there are individual exceptions to this conclusion but generally our findings support those who believe that the family is impressive more for the way in which its influence is spread across the whole range of low and medium level orientations than for the actual strength of this relationship.

Equally, that a child has parents who appear little interested in political affairs will dampen his political performance at particular age points in adolescence but it does not ruin his chances of political development. Manifestly such children continue to make progress and the question really is whether they can increase their relative rate of growth or continue to acquire political orientations after the more favoured children have come to a halt. Our evidence is that the initial gap is occasionally narrowed but rarely closed or reversed.

TABLE 72: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for political interest levels in the family.

	First Partial (High Interest)	Second Partial (Medium Interest)	Third Partial (Low Interest)
Political Knowledge	-0.33	-0.36	-0.36
Issue Ideologue	-0.28	-0.28	-0.26
Interest	-0.14	-0.17	-0.26
Efficacy	-0.24	-0.22	-0.19
Cynicism	-0.07	-0.01	-0.07
Toleration	-0.18	-0.20	-0.21
General Support	-0.15	-0.03	0.12*
Cosmopolitanism	-0.10	-0.07	-0.08
Conceptualisation	-0.30	-0.25	-0.31
War	-0.07	-0.05	-0.12
Peace	-0.12	-0.16	-0.20
Equity (gamma)	-0.10	-0.16	-0.09

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 73: Gamma measures of association between political interest among the family of the respondent and selected dependent variables controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political knowledge	-0.15	-0.22	-0.19
Issue Ideologue	0.06*	0.01*	-0.09
Interest	-0.59	-0.61	-0.37
Efficacy	-0.22	-0.33	-0.30
Toleration	-0.01	-0.18	0.04*
General Support	0.25*	-0.07	-0.16
Cosmopolitanism	-0.10	0.03*	-0.29
Conceptualisation	-0.001	-0.10	0.02*
War	-0.16	-0.09	-0.06
Peace	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04
Equity	0.05*	-0.12	-0.11

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 74: LEVEL OF FAMILY INTEREST IN POLITICS AND SELECTED VARIABLES

	<u>Family Interest</u>	<u>Knowledge</u> (high)	<u>Ideologue</u> (high)	<u>Interest</u> (high)	<u>Efficacy</u> (high)	<u>Toleration</u> (high)	<u>Cynicism</u> (uncynical)	<u>Support</u> (high)	<u>Cosmopolitanism</u> (high)	<u>Conceptualisation</u> (high)
12 YEARS	High	20.0%	10.0%	30.0%	30.0%	20.0%	30.0%	-	30.0%	-
	Medium	22.8	7.2	8.4	11.4	44.9	40.1	16.8	22.2	11.4
	Low	19.4	3.2	-	9.7	38.7	51.6	29.0	12.9	12.9
13 YEARS	High	56.0	16.0	44.0	36.0	76.0	60.0	24.0	44.0	16.0
	Medium	42.2	16.9	8.4	20.5	49.0	40.6	21.1	26.9	17.5
	Low	40.9	25.0	4.6	25.0	65.9	40.9	25.0	18.2	13.6
14 YEARS	High	63.3	32.7	36.7	22.5	71.4	49.0	26.5	18.4	36.7
	Medium	49.4	21.6	8.8	23.1	60.9	44.1	25.4	22.3	28.4
	Low	44.6	20.5	2.4	12.1	47.0	33.7	25.3	14.5	24.1
15 YEARS	High	81.5	35.2	55.6	48.2	72.2	48.2	35.2	42.6	40.7
	Medium	58.3	34.9	12.9	25.7	65.1	40.7	19.6	23.6	38.6
	Low	51.2	38.4	2.3	17.4	60.5	29.1	12.8	24.4	36.1
16 YEARS	High	89.2	56.8	46.0	56.8	78.4	56.7	43.2	54.1	54.1
	Medium	76.2	45.8	19.7	37.0	72.9	44.7	23.2	34.2	45.8
	Low	75.4	40.4	14.0	29.8	75.4	28.1	21.1	26.3	43.9
17 YEARS	High	95.2	42.9	52.4	61.9	81.0	52.4	47.6	47.6	42.9
	Medium	92.2	48.8	22.0	44.7	76.4	44.7	23.6	28.5	52.9
	Low	94.7	52.6	26.3	36.8	84.2	47.4	36.8	21.1	68.4

PEER GROUP INTEREST

Unlike the role that the family plays in the transmission of political orientations the secondary relationship between adolescents of a similar age range, which we have designated as the peer or reference group, has been poorly documented. Our premise that the peer group will prove to be a strong influence in this area is based in part on the findings of its impact on other social learning and in part on the similarities of the primary relationships within the family and the peer group. The ease of access and strong emotional ties which makes for facility of learning are both present in the peer group. Where the two primary groups will differ is not so much in the reasons for their impact but in the time period when their influence is most strong. In the first years of his life the child is largely held in sway by adult constraint but with adolescence the first cracks appear in the form of a growing importance of peer group reaction and approval. The peer group may in fact be instrumental in adjusting the individual to societal changes while the family is still promulgating orientations more appropriate to previous circumstances. This does not mean that the peer group has no part to play in the dissemination of adult norms and social patterns. We have pointed out in a previous discussion that social class and religious differences, among others, are transmitted through the family as well as the peer group. A child growing up in a working class family learns the working class way of life. If he enters a peer group composed of individuals from the same social class, as we would expect, this will both reinforce and elaborate the class attitudes and expectations already learned in other contexts.

As in our examination of the potency of the family in political learning we have deduced the extent of peer group politicization from

the level of interest and political discourse that the respondent indicates he carries on with his friends. This means that we do not claim to have direct evidence for the efficiency of the peer group except in the area of the respondent's own level of interest in political affairs. Therefore we will be following the procedure which we adopted when examining the family whereby we extrapolate on the basis of the level of interest expressed to a wider range of political orientations.

If we look firstly at the respondent's level of interest in political affairs we can see that, as with the family, this orientation exhibits the strongest association with the level of peer group politicisation. Among the younger adolescents the gamma measures of association are less strong than those uncovered with the level of family interest in politics but unlike the latter the impact of the peer group becomes stronger so that among the oldest respondents the peer group relationship is seen to be more powerful than the family in promoting political interest. The figures presented in TABLE 77 corroborate this conclusion. Nevertheless the proportion in the highly politicised peer group who are themselves highly interested in politics does not reach as high a level as we found among those respondents who came from a family who are strongly involved with political matters.

When we move on to consider other orientations in the affective domain it is apparent that there is no common pattern to the strength of the association between peer group interest and feelings of political efficacy, cynicism or toleration. Without exception the

relationship always turns on the highly politicised peer group encouraging its members to exhibit the more politically acceptable scores, such as high efficacy. Yet while the relationship with efficacy becomes stronger with age, that with toleration weakens. The result is that in the former area the initial gap in scores between the groups widens while in the area of political toleration this difference is narrowed to almost nothing. As far as we can detect any trend in the relationship of the level of peer involvement in politics and support for the regime it is for the association to materialise with age. This finding also arose in our discussion of the family but it still constitutes an expected feature of adolescent political development. Moreover it is not a question of a few percentage points difference because the children in the highly politicised peer group are more than twice as likely at the age of 17 years as those from the peer group with little or no concern for political matters, to be strongly supportive of the political authorities and regime. Once more we see that high interest provokes a more definite reaction so that the middle ground, which comprises a highly inconsistent or non-committal response set, is largely eschewed; and again as we detected with the family influence, high peer interest stimulates a similar level of total disenchantment with the political system to that expressed by those adhering to peer groups little involved in the world of politics. In other words interest in political affairs polarizes opinion with respect to one's attachment to the political regime; conversely those with little or less interest do not seem capable of summoning up a definite reaction.

When we turn to the cognitive domain we see that the high level of peer group interest in politics does not exert an impact until after 13 years of age, and this applies both to the political recall questions as well as to the ideologue index. From then on both levels of knowledge increase the higher the peer involvement in politics. However while the more straightforward knowledge items become progressively more strongly associated with peer group interest levels, the more demanding policy questions having established a gap in early adolescence do no more than maintain this through the rest of our sample. This is the reverse of the trend that we had predicted. With low level knowledge being effectively established by mid-adolescence but classification of party programmes only just emerging, and with the peer group itself only emerging as a strong force in socialisation from mid-adolescence onwards, everything points to a greater peer impact in the ideologue questions.

Just as the family lays the foundation for development to higher levels of political conceptualisation but cannot provide the range of experience which will actually bring about the transition, the peer group injects a fresh impetus at a crucial time. Even so this is not thought to constitute anything more than a marginal influence on the growth of political conceptualisation and the more abstract interpretation of political relationships. Our data implies that among the 12 and 13 year old respondents these impressions are justified and although there is a slight relationship between peer interest and conceptualisation this is entirely due to the less politically involved individuals being heavily concentrated in the low conceptualisation ranking. At the age of 14 years however the proportion from the highly politicised peer

group who have moved into more abstract levels of thinking jumps remarkably from 16.7% to 47.8%. The gulf thus established between it and the other groups is maintained throughout the sample although it does narrow at the age of 17 years.

With the perception of war and peace we have greater difficulty in establishing definite trends whereby the level of political interaction in the peer group determines whether the child will relate to political conflict in more abstract and formal terms. Generally those filling the medium interest category score higher on conceptualisation than do those who we have ranked as having little or no interest in peer group discussion about political affairs. The influence of the peer group interest level is not however linear. In particular those in the highly politicised peer group do not consistently outscore those in the medium category. When the stimulus term is war the younger respondents in the high category do relatively worse than those from the medium ranking but with increasing age this position is reversed, and the former group are more likely to be thinking abstractly. With respect to the understanding of the term peace the level of peer group politicisation shows most influence of a linear relationship among the younger respondents, and it is only with the older children that this conclusion falls down. A far more consistent relationship exists between the peer group and feelings of objective responsibility, or equity, with the younger group from a highly politicised background relatively more advanced along this dimension than the rest of the subjects, and while they maintain this distinction through to 17 years great strides are made towards reducing this gap by the other respondents.

Our general impression of the influence that the level of peer group interest has in the development of political orientations is that

there is evidence of a moderate impact. We had predicted that the strongest association would emerge from mid-adolescence onwards but there is no consistent pattern in this direction. Generally it seems as if the younger respondents will provide less variation in the predicted manner but that among the 14 and 15 year old respondents almost all dependent variables fulfil our expectations. Rather than increasing along the same course older children from the less politicised peer groups appear to fight back and substantially reduce the gap in political learning between themselves and the other groups. Once again this conclusion hides individual exceptions but it does enable us to substantiate our claim that the peer group will be overall of a similar order of importance in political growth. This applies both to the strength of their influence as well as to the areas in which it is felt.

In terms of the impact of differential peer group politicisation on political development taking into consideration the whole period of adolescence TABLE 75 supplies figures implying more interaction between peer group and age than we have uncovered for the family. Most growth appears to take place among the orientations in the cognitive domain and in the level of conceptualisation. In addition where high development is suggested from one partial it seems to mean that this will be echoed in the remainder.

Unlike the family however where we noted that the correlation scores for development among the low level interest category were at least as high as that in the other partials it is those children in the high interest peer group who are most prone to generate the

stronger signs of growth. Yet we have already said that the impact of the peer group does not appear to increase markedly with age, so how do we explain this apparent contradiction? In practice it would seem that the reason for the slightly greater tendency to growth of orientations among those from the highly politicised peer group is attributable to the relatively poor performance among the 12 and 13 year old children. This is suggested in the figures contained in TABLE 77. If we examine the scores for the 12 year old group it can be seen that it is only in the affective orientations covering political toleration, political cynicism and political support that the predicted linear relationship holds with those from the high interest group showing a greater preparedness to affiliate themselves with the more democratic response category.

That the level of peer group interest in politics should be relatively less potent on the political learning of our younger respondents fits in with our impression that at these more tender years the children will be held in sway by parental constraint. Significantly the first cracks appear in those orientations which we have said will be most characteristically moulded in the family relationship. It does not follow from this that because some orientations are just becoming meaningful to young people, while at the same time the peer group is challenging the family as the main social reference group, that therefore it is the peer group which will produce far greater variation in the orientations which are acquired. What is more likely is that the peer group will rapidly assume a similar level of importance to that of the family but it will not supercede the latter. The conclusion that we draw is that the peer group acts more to reinforce orientations acquired

in the family unit and does less relatively in extending this learning to new areas or in fresh directions. This conclusion is best substantiated from the strength of the gamma measures reported in TABLES 73 and 76 where the greatest differences occur in the cognitive knowledge questions, rather than in the affective domain. Orientations which we have said will not emerge with any clarity until adolescence are in fact more likely to show a stronger relationship with the peer group than with the family. This also applies, though with less strength, to the level of conceptualisation which most definitely does not change until mid-adolescence.

TABLE 75: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for political interest levels in the peer group.

	First Partial (high interest)	Second Partial (medium interest)	Third Partial (low interest)
Political Knowledge	-0.43	-0.31	-0.31
Issue ideologue	-0.27	-0.23	-0.28
Interest	-0.25	-0.13	-0.07
Efficacy	-0.27	-0.16	-0.14
Cynicism	-0.03	-0.01	0.06*
Toleration	-0.15	-0.15	-0.19
General Support	-0.11	0.02*	-0.01
Cosmopolitanism	-0.07	-0.04	-0.03
Conceptualisation	-0.28	-0.23	-0.31
War	-0.09	-0.01	-0.12
Peace	-0.07	-0.16	-0.17
Equity (gamma)	-0.09	-0.18	-0.07

An Asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 76: Gamma measures of association for peer group political interest and selected variables while controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political knowledge	-0.26	-0.33	-0.45
Issue Ideologue	-0.26	-0.16	-0.17
Interest	-0.43	-0.51	-0.50
Efficacy	-0.20	-0.21	-0.28
Toleration	-0.17	-0.15	-0.05
General Support	-0.05	0.001*	-0.27
Cosmopolitanism	-0.06	-0.21	-0.17
Conceptualisation	-0.15	-0.14	-0.06
War	-0.27	-0.02	-0.04
Peace	-0.12	-0.12	-0.04
Equity	-0.08	-0.18	-0.08

An asterick * signifies a positive association

TABLE 77 : LEVEL OF PEER GROUP INTEREST IN POLITICS AND SELECTED VARIABLES

	<u>Peer Interest</u>	<u>Knowledge</u> (high)	<u>Ideologue</u> (high)	<u>Interest</u> (high)	<u>Efficacy</u> (high)	<u>Toleration</u> (high)	<u>Cynicism</u> (uncynical)	<u>Support</u> (high)	<u>Cosmopolitanism</u> (high)	<u>Conceptualisation</u> (high)
12 YEARS	High	7.7%	-	-	15.4%	61.5%	53.9%	23.1%	15.4%	-
	Medium	29.8	13.1	15.4	17.9	46.4	48.8	21.4	21.6	15.5
	Low	18.0	2.7	6.3	7.2	37.8	34.2	14.4	20.7	9.0
13 YEARS	High	38.9	27.8	19.4	30.6	63.9	44.4	22.2	41.7	16.7
	Medium	54.1	23.9	14.5	24.5	56.0	45.3	22.0	25.2	20.1
	Low	34.1	10.4	5.0	18.1	47.8	38.5	21.4	24.7	14.3
14 YEARS	High	63.8	29.0	33.3	29.0	69.6	50.7	39.1	39.1	47.8
	Medium	58.8	22.5	11.1	24.8	63.7	42.4	25.2	21.8	26.3
	Low	37.9	20.6	3.6	16.6	53.8	41.9	22.4	15.5	25.6
15 YEARS	High	72.5	45.0	30.0	28.8	71.3	48.8	25.0	33.8	45.0
	Medium	63.6	36.4	15.2	29.4	67.7	41.5	19.6	24.4	37.7
	Low	48.4	30.5	9.9	21.5	59.2	34.1	18.8	23.8	37.2
16 YEARS	High	86.4	50.0	37.9	43.9	71.2	50.0	39.4	45.5	59.1
	Medium	82.0	48.6	22.9	41.1	77.1	44.9	23.8	31.7	40.7
	Low	61.2	37.8	7.1	26.5	68.4	35.7	17.4	30.6	50.0
17 YEARS	High	96.4	56.4	41.8	54.6	80.0	47.3	47.3	40.0	54.6
	Medium	89.8	45.4	19.8	44.2	76.7	48.8	17.4	24.4	51.2
	Low	95.5	40.9	13.6	31.8	77.3	31.8	22.7	27.3	50.1

SOCIAL CLASS

The social class of which the individual is a member has been shown to have important implications for his personality and general life style. Being born poor, for example, affects one's development in ways that are deep reaching and so pervasive that political orientations, like most others will be influenced. Quite briefly, membership of a social class will give a distinct experience of life which generates different perspectives on the political world; both with regard to the individual's expectations of the political world as well as his role within it.

Political research among adults has not surprisingly produced ample evidence of social class differences. Our concern is to examine how far adolescents exhibit such differences in the areas isolated in this study. Previous research in political socialisation in America as well as Britain has tended to conclude that the effect of social class varies between political orientations. Hess and Torney typically conclude that social class has little influence on basic affective orientations connected to support for the political system under which the children are living. In contrast interest in politics and the medium levels of political knowledge and value organisation which such interest will foster is more affected by the social class background of the respondent. The overall tendency is therefore for the higher social class environment to stimulate children to be more advanced in their political growth, and conversely for the working class child to be retarded politically.

In our own study the broad overview of political growth obtained in TABLE 78, where we control for the social class of the respondent,

indicates no consistent or substantial influence attributable to this factor in political learning. In terms of their strength the political knowledge questions provide the strongest association with age, although both the level of conceptualisation and the level of equity, exhibit relatively more development than orientations in the affective domain. Nevertheless both social groups demonstrate these patterns.

When we alter the perspective to consider the way in which there is variation between the social groups at particular age periods in adolescence we are able to specify more definitely how social class affects political development. A higher correlation coefficient in TABLE 78 between age and political knowledge among the manual group respondents, while providing a pointer to relatively greater growth than takes place with the non-manual class children, does not enable us to infer that the manual children are more knowledgeable about political matters, even at the lowest level of orientation. The picture of more growth may hide the fact that the manual children are actually far behind others at the age of 12 years and this higher rate of improvement in knowledge may still not be enough to bring them on to the same level as those children from a non-manual background. Conversely if they had been more knowledgeable at the age of 12 years a higher coefficient would have meant that this initial gap would have widened further in their favour. What then of the relationship between social class and political learning at the three age levels 12-13, 14-15, and 16-17 years - for which we have calculated gamma measures of association? These indicate quite clearly that amongst the youngest group of children it is a predominant feature for the non-manual group to score more highly on knowledge, and to have a higher appreciation of democratic norms but yet not consistently be more advanced to abstract levels of political thinking. When we move up the age scale to the

14 and 15 year olds signs that the impact of social class is lessening appear although in their use of abstractions we see that reversals occur so that it is the child from the non-manual background who is overall more sophisticated in his political thinking. Finally in the 16 and 17 year old group the orientations split almost exactly into two groups - one where the manual children demonstrate their greater learning and another where they appear less developed in their political perceptions. It is of interest that the latter comprise entirely orientations from the affective domain plus that area which we have included as a measure of the respondents' use of abstract thinking. Overall there does not seem to be much doubt that the initial variation between the two social classes are effectively weakened so that even in the cognitive domain the relationship is far less strong among the older respondents than it is with the youngest children. No orientation that we have found indicates a consistent movement in the opposite direction which leads to the children from manual class backgrounds being relatively more deprived in their fund of political orientations than was the case at the beginning of the adolescent period. It is true that a few areas, such as the level of political interest expressed by the respondent and his feelings of political efficacy, do show a greater association with social class up to the age of 15 years but this trend does not continue.

If we did extrapolate from our findings to the political world of adults we would expect to discover that those with a manual class background had at least as much knowledge and were far more supportive of democratic norms than those from the non-manual class. Manifestly

this is the reverse of the position uncovered by research among adults. Our suggestion is therefore that because the trend in the growth of political orientations in our sample is so at odds with the position found in voting studies there is more than a suspicion that the children with a manual background who stay on at school are a most untypical sub-group of the class from which they come. The reasons are quite obvious; since the assumption is that because they are staying on at school beyond the school leaving age they are far more likely to be socially mobile. It may even be that as aspiring or prospective members of the non-manual group that they have taken on some of the orientations normally thought to be typical of the latter's political perspectives.

If we now transfer our attention from the level of the correlation coefficients and other measures of association to the percentage figures for each social group at different ages we gain a further perspective on the impact of social class. Beginning with the cognitive domain we can see that at the lowest level of political knowledge, and among the youngest children in our sample, twice as many children from the non-manual group score highly. Equally far fewer are ranked at the lowest scoring category. However by the end of our sample this gap has been completely closed. The reverse holds in the scores among the two groups on the ideologue index. At the outset there appears to be little advantage in coming from a non-manual class background but a differential acquisition of information in this area occurs and by the age of 17 years there is the widest distance of all between the two groups. Yet the trend is by no means an even one. Evidence of rather haphazard changes with age also occurs in the

respondent's level of interest in political affairs. Perhaps as interesting as the figures in TABLE 80 which show the percentage fitting into the high interest category is the proportion who express their total lack of interest. This is broadly the same for both groups although more exhibit little interest from the non-manual background when we inspect the data for the older children. Non-manual children are more polarized by the prospect of political involvement and while being relatively more inclined than others to high interest levels are in addition slightly more prepared to advertise their disinterest compared with those from a manual background. The same feature characterises the scores on the political efficacy scale. Reference to the scores for support of the political regime leads us to conclude that non-manual children will be more antagonistic to the system throughout adolescence, while after 15 years a smaller proportion than from the manual group are ranked in the high support category. Nevertheless these last differences do not stand out as having any great strength.

Rather more difficult to describe is the influence of social class in the central area of the level of conceptualisation employed by the respondent. On the straight conceptualisation index social class differences clearly operate in favour of the child with a non-manual background, but only up to the age of 15 years. After that point its impact suddenly tumbles and among the 17 year olds the position is markedly reversed. This is graphically demonstrated by the gamma measures reported in TABLE 79. In their perception of the terms war and peace the movement within both social groups is such that generalisation becomes impossible. What happens is that one group will have a higher proportion thinking in abstract terms at one age but in the next the

position will have been reversed. All talk of developing sophistication among the two social groups must then be rejected. Change occurs but this is both uneven and haphazard.

Our final conclusion on the influence of social class during the period of adolescence can only be to reiterate that we have found differences among the youngest respondents but that generally these will have been overcome by the time that the child is old enough to leave our sample. This means that children from different social backgrounds end up at 17 years with much the same orientations but we would be most surprised if the extent and direction of the political orientations accumulated by the working class children in our sample was typical of their counterparts who had left school as soon as allowed by law. In other words we suspect that after the age of 15 years the influence of social class will have been rather severely counteracted by other factors.

All the same there are aspects in the child's political perspective which do evince moderately strong relationships with social class. We have already been made aware that the family and the peer group level of politicisation will be equally powerful but hitherto we have not obtained the moderately strong measures of association that social class produces with respect to cosmopolitanism, level of conceptualisation and the child's ability move into greater use of equity in his perception of international conflict. All of these areas are we believe particularly important to, or are themselves indications of, political development. That social class can exert an influence in these areas attests to its potential but since these levels of association are only recorded as strong among the youngest respondents we must conclude that the initial advantage held by the child from a non-manual background can be broken down.

TABLE 78: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for the social class of the respondent.

	First Partial (Non-manual)	Second Partial (manual)
Political Knowledge	-0.33	-0.38
Issue Ideologue	-0.29	-0.27
Interest	-0.17	-0.20
Efficacy	-0.16	-0.15
Cynicism	0.02*	-0.05
Toleration	-0.17	-0.14
General Support	0.07*	0.01*
Cosmopolitanism	-0.06	0.01*
Conceptualisation	-0.23	-0.32
War	-0.16	-0.08
Peace	-0.09	-0.17
Equity (gamma)	-0.12	-0.17

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 79: Gamma measures of association between social class and selected dependent variables, controlling for age; non-manual group always row 1.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political Knowledge	-0.29	-0.21	-0.18
Issue Ideologue	-0.22	-0.09	-0.13
Interest	-0.09	-0.15	-0.01
Efficacy	-0.18	-0.21	0.01*
Toleration	-0.09	-0.18	-0.10
General Support	-0.02	0.03*	0.09*
Cosmopolitanism	-0.22	-0.17	-0.08
Conceptualisation	-0.32	-0.13	0.06*
War	0.05*	-0.16	-0.15
Peace	0.02*	-0.14	0.13*
Equity	-0.26	0.001*	0.01*

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 80: SOCIAL CLASS OF RESPONDENT AND SELECTED VARIABLES

	<u>Social Class</u>	<u>Knowledge</u>	<u>Ideologue</u>	<u>Interest</u>	<u>Efficacy</u>	<u>Toleration</u>	<u>Cynicism</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Cosmopolitanism</u>	<u>Conceptualisation</u>
12 YEARS	Non-manual	(high) 32.9%	(high) 7.3%	(high) 11.0%	(high) 15.9%	(high) 48.8%	(uncynical) 40.2%	(high) 20.7%	(high) 25.6%	(high) 17.1%
	Manual	16.1	6.8	5.9	9.3	40.7	39.8	17.0	17.8	6.8
13 YEARS	Non-manual	50.0	21.6	11.4	22.7	53.4	43.8	22.2	31.3	21.0
	Manual	36.7	14.7	9.4	21.4	53.4	39.8	21.5	22.0	14.1
14 YEARS	Non-manual	60.8	27.9	13.5	28.3	67.9	53.2	26.6	25.7	35.9
	Manual	43.3	18.9	8.3	17.2	55.0	37.0	23.8	17.8	23.5
15 YEARS	Non-manual	61.8	34.7	18.9	31.1	68.5	37.8	19.7	35.4	37.8
	Manual	58.6	36.8	13.3	23.2	63.2	42.9	20.9	18.8	38.6
16 YEARS	Non-manual	81.3	47.9	20.2	36.6	74.2	40.9	23.9	34.7	46.0
	Manual	73.3	44.7	23.6	39.8	73.3	46.6	25.5	34.2	46.0
17 YEARS	Non-manual	91.4	56.0	33.0	48.4	81.3	44.0	27.5	36.3	48.4
	Manual	93.9	41.5	13.9	40.0	73.9	44.6	30.8	24.6	58.5

TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED

One of the major studies of political socialisation in America concludes that the school rather than the family is the foremost agency in political learning.⁹ The exact reasons which lead the authors to this conclusion are not easy to follow but appear to derive from the way in which children's political orientations move with age in the direction of those held by their teachers. How far the teachers themselves are representative or untypical of the adult population as a whole remains unstated. Certainly in Britain such a general association of the independent influence of the school would be difficult to justify. In this country attention has concentrated upon the differential impact that is exerted between the various types of school. The importance of this distinction is emphasised by the way in which the division among educational institutions is closely allied with wider socio-economic differences. Each type of school draws a majority of its pupils from a particular social group which reinforces the norms and perceptions of that group among the inmates. The political pay-offs in such a division between the successes and the failures, or the upwardly and downwardly mobile, are that those falling into the latter category will be less interested in political activity, have less political information at their disposal, consider themselves to be less effective in political life and generally have less regard for the political system. In contrast the pupil in the local Academy, High School or Grammar School - whatever is the term for success - will operate on a more politicised plane, though they in their turn will be surpassed in political terms by those at the public school.

The spread of the so-called Comprehensive school has encouraged speculation that pupils in this type of school, because they cannot be slotted so automatically into either a clear success or failure category, will be less alienated from the world of politics. Few pieces of social research have failed to find evidence that the secondary modern (junior secondary) pupil is in practice less retarded in the range and sophistication of his social learning relative to his grammar school counterpart. The Comprehensive pupil is more difficult to bracket but a study by Tapper suggests that the stigma of failure entailed in attendance at a junior secondary school will be slightly less noticeable in the adolescent with a comparable background but attending a comprehensive school.¹⁰

Exact categorization of a particular school is frequently a most testing exercise; for example when we refer to the comprehensive school we are generally talking of a school type which is as deserving this label as the secondary modern school justifies the designation 'modern'. What we have done in this study is to follow the official Local Education Authority classification of schools. This divides schools into the selective types, on the one hand the Senior Secondary School, which creams off those of superior academic performance and which offers a full range of course work through from first to sixth year, and on the other, the Junior Secondary school, which is a three year school which does not offer pupils the opportunity of being presented for even ordinary grade subjects. In between these two extremes in selectivity there are the variations on a comprehensive theme. Some of these eschew streaming in the early years and provide the opportunity to their pupils for taking examinations up to Sixth

Year Studies. Other so-called comprehensives only partly fulfil the basic requirements of a broad intake of pupils and a full range of opportunities within the school for academic and non-academic work. Those which take in a broad base of ability but which do not provide scope for presentation beyond the ordinary grade examination will be described as part-comprehensives.

Since both the part-comprehensive and the junior secondary school pupil necessarily leave school in the fourth year at the latest the number of 17 year olds attending these schools is negligible and we have not been able to conduct a comparison of pupils at every type of school for all age ranges. This has to be borne in mind when we consider the figures for the development of political orientations in adolescence which are presented in TABLE 81. Comparison of the two six year types of school indicates several areas of quite marked differences. Generally more growth is suggested among the pupils of the senior secondary type of school but it remains to be seen whether this is because the youngest pupils attending such a school are relatively less conversant with the world of politics. When we turn to the part-comprehensive and junior secondary schools we find less dissimilarity, although as expected each of the latter contrast quite well with the strength of political development found among the senior secondary schoolboys.

In almost every case variation between school type centres on the level of political knowledge, political toleration, cosmopolitanism, and objective responsibility - a truly mixed bag of orientations. Of course less evidence of development will be possible in those

schools which do not accomodate the full age range of pupils and it is especially important to concentrate on the figures thrown up from alternative perspectives. Since the division between school types only allows us to draw the strength of the association from nominal measures we do not here use the gamma correlation coefficient but have calculated contingency coefficients instead. These are visually displeasing because their maximum value depends on the size of the contingency table; in a 2 x 2 table for example a perfect relationship will only score 0.7071.

Inspection of the knowledge items produces immediate and vivid confirmation of the prediction that those schools which present the adolescent with a greater opportunity for advancement will stimulate their pupils to acquire more political information. In TABLE 83 we can see that apart from a rather inexplicable lack of knowledge exhibited by 12 year olds at the senior secondary school the two six year school types far outdistance the others in the proportion scoring highly on the political knowledge scale. Indeed at the age of 15 years both part-comprehensive and junior secondary pupils are at least 20 percentage points behind the senior secondary group in the number obtaining the highest score. Differences between the senior secondary and the comprehensive child are negligible but in contrast with the part-comprehensive child the junior secondary pupil is not only far more ignorant of political life but in addition he is much slower to acquire even low level information. This is most clearly documented in the contingency coefficients in TABLE 82. Just as the low level of knowledge produces considerable variation the ideologue index reinforces this impression of the influence of school type in the acquisition

of political knowledge. If we disregard the 12 year old who in every group is poorly acquainted with policy matters then we detect that from 13 years onwards the simple progression from highest knowledge in the senior secondary pupil to lowest information levels among the junior secondary pupils holds. All groups advance, even if some do it in rather haltering fashion, but those in the six year schools acquire orientations most quickly and widen the gulf in knowledge between themselves and the remainder with each fresh age change. Once again however the differences are at their strongest between the six year schools and those in the three or four year types. It is the case that the 17 year olds in the senior secondary school reveal a mighty jump forward in knowledge but we have no way of knowing whether this is an isolated instance or if it is an indication that those selected for their academic excellence actually do consistently outdistance their sixth year counterparts in the comprehensive school.

When we turn to the affective domain, or more specifically to the level of interest expressed in political affairs, we see that the type of school attended will be associated with the direction of the orientation expressed. That is to say, those in six year schools will be relatively more inclined at all age periods to demonstrate their high involvement with political events whereas those in the junior secondary school, in even stronger fashion, signify that they have no interest whatsoever in the world of politics. Again we see from TABLE 82 that the greatest variation is between six and three year schools rather than within either category.

At the beginning of this discussion we said about the influence of the type of school attended on the development of political orientations

that the three year schools tend to institutionalise failure; one aspect of this will be manifested in the feelings of subjective competence which are tapped by the efficacy scale items. Our supposition is that there will be wide differences between school types from senior secondary down to the junior secondary. In practice there are negligible differences between the two six year school types as well as the part-comprehensive variety. That the latter should be able to instill, or avoid, the perspective on political competence that we had predicted constitutes a considerable surprise. In the scores of the junior secondary pupil we find that the pattern is far more consistent with our expectations; and in fact contrary to all other groups the feelings of high political efficacy among this group actually decline with increasing age. The latter appear relatively less imbued with feelings of political toleration as well but at least in this area they show more progress towards the democratically acceptable response than any other group. Among those attending the six year schools there is a reversal of position so that the early predominance among the younger respondents from the comprehensive school in the high tolerance category is turned about from 14 years with those in the senior secondary school displaying higher tolerance levels.

The level of support shown by the children in our sample presents a picture of utter confusion when broken down according to the type of school attended. While we hesitate to generalize we do feel that overall the difference in orientations between the four school types is not nearly as marked as in any other area discussed this far. Our conclusion is that the junior secondary pupil does not appear any less

attached to the political regime, although the opportunities it offers him or the benefits he derives are likely to be less than those received or anticipated by pupils in other types of school.

Up to now our examination of the influence of the type of school attended has established fairly conclusively that differences in political learning are sharpest where the six year schools are compared with the remaining two types - and most clear-cut where senior secondary pupils are contrasted with junior secondary children. Political information is far inferior, and the level of interest much lower, as indeed is the realisation of, and enthusiasm for, key democratic norms. The sole exception, where the less academic children are not to be outdone, is in their attachment to the political authorities. As we have remarked at another juncture, pride, rather than participation or interest in political affairs, seems to be an enduring characteristic of those who cannot but look ahead to constitutional acquiescence.

If we turn to the level of conceptualisation achieved by the adolescents in our sample we yet again find that those children from the junior secondary school lag far behind all others, although this is clearly not the case with the pupils from part-comprehensive schools. Indeed the number from the junior secondary school that we have classified as making use of abstract levels of thinking in the political sphere on any of the dimensions included in our investigation is nothing else but negligible. Apart from the straight index of conceptualisation on which they score comparatively well those from the part-comprehensive school similarly do little to convince us that they carry over this abstract thinking into their perception of international conflict.

Our final conclusion on the influence of type of school attended must be to reassert that the influence which we have attributed to different types of school will in turn derive from a number of confounding factors such as the social class of the respondent, the interest of his family and peer group in politics, as well as the individual's own level of intelligence. By bringing together pupils with characteristics such as those outlined above the school reinforces a particular perspective on the political world and particularly the individual's expectations within it. The characteristics of this relatively deprived adolescent, in political criteria at least, are low levels of knowledge, of interest, of efficacy and no evidence

that he has developed from his concrete perspective on political relationships and problems. The only orientation in which there is a similarity between respondents from different schools is in the level of his adherence to the nation's institutions and practices. The impression persists that failure in the educational rat race at the age of 12 years reinforces in the adolescent a conviction that he simply accept his political inferiority and of his own role of subject citizen, supporting but not actively participating in political affairs, even to the extent of taking little or no interest in political affairs.

Nevertheless the three year school is disappearing rapidly from the educational scene in Scotland and is being replaced by one of the variants of the comprehensive model. Our data implies that differences among the other types of school are not as great, but we cannot be sure of the exact influence of the type of school until we enter in our multivariate analysis where opportunities exist for the control of additional factors.

TABLE 81: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for type of school attended.

	First Partial (Sen. Secondary)	Second Partial (Comprehensive)	Third Partial (Part Compre- hensive)	Fourth Partial (Junior Secondary)
Knowledge	-0.39	-0.25	-0.28	-0.29
Issue Ideologue	-0.26	-0.25	-0.17	-0.11
Interest	-0.13	-0.19	-0.06	-0.11
Efficacy	-0.26	-0.21	-0.08	0.01*
Cynicism	0.00*	-0.02	0.03*	0.16*
Toleration	-0.33	-0.10	-0.14	-0.22
Support	-0.10	-0.00	0.03*	-0.03
Cosmopolitanism	-0.20	-0.06	0.06	0.13
Conceptualisation	-0.25	-0.29	-0.13	-0.05
War	-0.04	-0.08	-0.03	-0.08
Peace	-0.10	-0.17	-0.10	0.01*
Equity (gamma)	-0.15	-0.03	-	-

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 82: Contingency Coefficients of association for school type of respondent and selected variables while controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political Knowledge	0.23 (0.36)	0.09 (0.33)	0.06
Issue Ideologue	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.29)	0.00
Interest	0.08 (0.18)	0.05(0.17)	0.10
Efficacy	0.07 (0.35)	0.03 (0.18)	0.06
Toleration	0.12 (0.29)	0.12 (0.27)	0.15
General Support	0.07 (0.14)	0.09 (0.26)	0.08
Cosmopolitanism	0.05	0.08	0.09
Conceptualisation	0.05 (0.13)	0.18 (0.17)	0.03
War	0.02 (0.18)	0.04 (0.09)	0.02
Peace	0.11 (0.00)	0.10 (0.19)	0.01
Equity	0.09 (0.11)	0.08 (0.33)	0.06

The first relationship is between pupils in Senior Secondary schools and those in Comprehensive schools; the figure in brackets refers to the relationship between pupils in Senior Secondary and Junior Secondary schools at the age of 12 years and at 14 years. The designation of an association as positive or negative does not apply with contingency coefficients.

TABLE 83: TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED AND SELECTED VARIABLES

Type of School	Knowledge (high)	Ideologue (high)	Interest (high)	Efficacy (high)	Toleration (high)	Cynicism (uncynical)	Support (high)	Cosmopolitanism (high)	Conceptualisation (high)
12 YEARS									
Sen. Sec.	13.6%	4.6%	11.4%	15.9%	40.9%	38.6%	11.4%	22.7%	11.4%
Comprehensive	45.6	12.3	8.8	15.8	56.1	54.4	26.3	24.6	14.0
Part. comp.	14.0	5.0	7.0	8.0	39.0	37.0	17.0	20.0	10.0
Junior Sec.	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
13 YEARS									
Sen. Sec.	55.4	25.7	14.9	17.6	56.8	41.9	21.6	24.3	17.6
Comprehensive	57.3	18.9	9.8	23.1	60.1	50.4	21.7	28.7	10.5
Part. comp	29.0	15.3	9.9	26.0	48.9	37.4	20.6	28.2	26.7
Junior Sec.	3.5	3.5	3.5	10.3	24.1	20.7	27.6	13.8	3.5
14 YEARS									
Sen. Sec.	61.5	30.8	9.9	16.5	68.1	55.0	27.5	22.0	30.8
Comprehensive	53.6	23.1	12.9	25.2	61.7	41.9	28.1	19.8	29.6
Part. comp	39.4	20.0	6.5	20.0	54.8	43.2	20.7	23.9	28.4
Junior Sec.	25.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	39.3	17.9	14.3	14.3	7.1
15 YEARS									
Sen. Sec.	66.9	41.2	15.5	31.8	78.4	38.5	16.9	33.1	35.1
Comprehensive	60.6	38.4	15.9	26.3	62.2	42.2	22.2	21.9	43.3
Part. comp	44.4	17.2	12.1	21.2	57.6	34.3	14.1	28.3	28.3
Junior Sec.	42.9	14.3	14.3	0.0	42.9	14.3	57.1	0.0	7.1
16 YEARS									
Senior Sec.	79.2	46.4	18.4	40.0	81.6	41.6	30.4	44.8	48.8
Comprehensive	80.9	48.3	26.1	37.9	70.9	44.8	22.2	33.5	43.8
Part. comp.	58.0	30.0	10.0	32.0	66.0	42.0	22.0	16.0	50.0
17 YEARS									
Sen. Sec.	98.2	75.0	23.2	44.6	87.5	39.3	28.6	32.1	39.3
Comprehensive	89.8	49.5	28.6	47.6	72.4	49.5	27.6	28.6	60.0

SEX

It is believed that differences between males and females in political behaviour and orientations reflect sex roles learned in other social contexts. Initially, contrasting roles based on the individual's sex will emerge from his experience within the primary groups, but particularly the family and the peer group. With adolescence these differences in role perception will be extended to the political world and affect the manner in which the two sexes react to political stimuli. Hess and Torney provide a neat summary of the main distinguishing features between the sexes that have been thrown up in research among adults. "Women inflate the 'no opinion' and 'no information' response categories in public opinion surveys..... they are more interested in candidates than issues... and evaluate political objects on a lower level of conceptualisation than do men... Women feel less competent and efficacious in their political activity than men... and are less interested in political matters and elections.."

Our objective is to examine whether these sex differences are discernible in adolescence, and if so, whether these get stronger and also whether they spread across the whole range of political orientations. Certainly the greater part of the political socialisation literature abounds in findings which bolster the argument that adult sex differences in the political sphere will have their basis in childhood experience. Furthermore the two sexes may be distinguished across the whole range of political orientations, with the sole exception of those basic predispositions encompassing support for the political system.

On the first point of the impact of sex on the rate of development throughout adolescence our main impression is of a remarkable similarity

in the correlation coefficients (see TABLE 84). Growth where it occurs appears to flow equally among both sexes and it is only with the perception of war and peace that we catch anything other than the most negligible of variation. The conclusion which we derive from TABLE 84 is that whatever the differences established at the age of 12 years these remain between the sexes at least until the age of 17 years. What we have to see next is whether this impression is substantiated and secondly in which direction the main differences lie.

If we begin with the political knowledge questions it can be seen that there is a small correlation between sex and knowledge score but casting our minds back to other agents which we have discussed the strength of these coefficients is relatively poor. Nevertheless the association is maintained throughout the age changes with the males consistently outscoring the females at every age group. While more boys rate highly on the political knowledge scale it is also a feature of this area that the proportion scoring at the lowest level of knowledge is much the same for both boys and girls.

In the slightly more demanding questions which constitute the ideologue index we again see that the males outscore the opposite sex throughout the period from 12 to 17 years. While both groups are improving their level of knowledge in absolute terms it is the female who is acquiring information at a marginally faster rate so we find that the contingency coefficients drop off moderately with increasing age. That the female should make greater inroads into male dominance in the medium level of the cognitive domain rather than in the lowest level is a contradiction which we cannot explain. In the latter knowledge scale the difficulty of the items is such that while the younger

respondent will experience some problems the 17 year olds should not be taxed overly. It follows from this that the political knowledge items do not constitute a sound discriminating index between subjects - except, that is, until we looked at the variation in scores between the sexes. From this we would have inferred that even greater difficulty would be experienced with the ideologue index but this is plainly not so.

Moving on to the political interest level expressed by the respondent we spot increasingly substantial differences. Admittedly in the 12 year old group the female appears slightly more interested but this is a temporary phenomena so that by the age of 17 years the level of high interest among the males has risen to 40.3% while in the female group the number indicating a high rate of interest in political affairs has barely increased over the whole of this age period. Conversely the number of males indicating that they have no interest in political life is just as great as that emerging as the proportion found among the females. The male of the species therefore adopts a more extreme position very early in life, while the adolescent girls are far happier fitting into the uncommitted group, which we have already shown to have less knowledge and now is seen to be lacking in any definite reaction to political affairs. The way in which the contingency coefficients increase progressively in size with age suggests that the nearer the two sexes get to adulthood the more they come to exhibit the differences which others have detected among adults. In fact at the age of 12 years the female is as we have said marginally more interested in politics than the male. A small but relevant indication that children approach adolescence without the clear differentiation of the sex role in politics that exists among their adult counterparts.

If the sex of the respondent is to affect his or her perspective on the political world we may wonder how far this extends further through the whole range of political orientations.

The attachment of the two sexes to basic dimensions in democratic theory are likely to be affected because the female by adopting the position that politics is of little interest to her should similarly be expected to not bother about picking up the necessary cues which sensitize her to what is regarded as the more 'acceptable' orientation. In contrast the level of support for the political system should not give rise to much, if any, variation between the sexes as this will have been acquired at a time when the sex difference did not seem so relevant to political learning, before in fact the political sex role distinction has been assimilated by individuals.

Moving to the scores on the political efficacy scale we have a pattern which fits in with the development predicted. The boys in our sample are consistently more inclined to claim a higher level of subjective competence in political matters and as TABLE 85 points out the initial advantage in favour of the boys is accentuated with age, but not by very much. With another outlook on democratic theory, namely the level of political toleration established in the two groups, we have more damning evidence for the prediction that boys will outscore girls in their receptivity to political norms. Rather than being less sensitive to the rights of the minority in political affairs the girls in our sample are more likely to score highly on this scale, although the difference between the two sexes is in practice negligible, with a coefficient of 0.3 among the youngest respondents and one of 0.2 at the age of 14 to 15 years. That the girls have assimilated feelings

of tolerance rather than of efficacy is in itself a reflection that they are becoming the fount of sympathy and compassion rather than action.

The discrepancy between groups on the level of support index continue to confound our predictions. Again we remind the reader that the political socialisation literature abounds with comments asserting that early attachment to the political authorities is a feature which is acquired particularly early in life and for that reason at least is likely to prove a very weak discriminating item. Yet in this example of sex differences we are faced with relatively small but quite consistent margins between boys and girls with the former being more supportive of the political system. They are also less inclined to exhibit displeasure with the present set-up. Girls by way of contrast provide a relatively more stable picture when we isolate the percentage fitting into the highly supportive category although in the main they prefer to gather in the middle ground among the non-committal replies.

Political research with adults has tended to the conclusion that women are less inclined to employ a high level of conceptualisation in their political thinking. There is no suggestion that women are retarded generally in their achievement of formal operational thinking but rather that there is no great incentive to come to grips with the relationships characteristic of the political world because politics is thought of as essentially the preserve of the male of the species and this gives little motivation to women to develop an interest. Lack of interest we take to imply less information on political affairs and together these help to account for the fewer numbers of women achieving the highest levels of conceptualisation in politics. In our sample there is a difference between the sexes on the index of

conceptualisation, in favour of the boys through from 12 - 16 years, but this is reversed in the 17 year olds. The magnitude of the difference between the groups is rarely large, as is shown by the contingency coefficients, which in none of the age ranges reaches a figure of 0.1. The difference is not a constant one across these ages however. Having found sex differences in political response where it was not expected it is rather disconcerting to now find far smaller differences in an area where we anticipated a more considerable association.

If the respondent has achieved a high level of conceptualisation in his political thinking we should find that he is more inclined to employ this cognitive capacity generally, though the tendency will become clearer with age. Since we have now seen that there are small differences in the level of conceptualisation between the sexes we should imagine that differences in the perception of war and peace will not be great. Nevertheless judged by figures presented from previous research girls would seem to be heavily oriented to a perception of war as involving killing and dying, that is, one aspect of the concrete perspective, while at the same time having less notion of peace as a positive state rather than as a mere reversal, or lull between fighting. Dealing firstly with 'war' we find that between 12 and 14 years the females are more inclined to perceive of this term in abstract ways, while between 15 and 17 years, the reverse occurs and the boys far outstrip the girls in abstract response level. It is also noticeable that there is no pattern in the replies given by the girls which we could categorize as developmental, whereas the boys provide a steady and wholly consistent growth in formal operational thinking. When we look at the replies to the question on 'peace' we can see the same developmental

pattern, but in both sex groups this time. Contrary to their perception of 'war' girls show the greatest growth in positive replies through adolescence and outscore the boys in every age group but for the 12 year olds. The relative difference between the two groups in fact holds constant throughout.

With regard to the level of equity exhibited between the two groups we can find small differences but these are not consistently in favour of either the boys or the girls. Our conclusion on the influence of sex on the perception of international conflict is therefore a picture of confusion. On one term the boys seem to be more advanced while in the next the girls outstrip the boys, and then in the third area, we find that the association is quite inconsistent. More generally however we can conclude that sex does clearly exert an influence on political learning. It is of significance therefore that only when we come to the higher levels of political thinking that the girls stand on a par with boys in their orientations. Overall the tendency is for them to have acquired less information, though they do not run for the don't know response category as adult studies have suggested, to be less interested in political affairs, and to be less enamoured with political norms and practices. This does not mean that they are any more antagonistic however. While the boys show a tendency to move to one or other of the extremes in a particular question the girls show more preference for the middle ground - because perhaps they have less desire to be involved in political problems, or have been conditioned to avoid taking definite political stands.

TABLE 84: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for the sex of the respondent.

	First Partial (Male)	Second Partial (Female)
Political Knowledge	-0.38	-0.36
Ideologue	-0.26	-0.31
Interest	-0.23	-0.16
Efficacy	-0.22	-0.22
Toleration	-0.18	-0.21
Cynicism	-0.05	-0.02
Support	-0.03	-0.03
Cosmopolitanism	-0.08	-0.08
Conceptualisation	-0.28	-0.28
War	-0.12	-0.02
Peace	-0.09	-0.22
Equity (gamma)	-0.17	-0.16

TABLE 85: Contingency coefficients between sex and selected dependent variables controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political Knowledge	0.12	0.13	0.14
Ideologue	0.14	0.10	0.05
Interest	0.09	0.12	0.16
Efficacy	0.05	0.08	0.11
Toleration	0.03	0.02	0.09
Support	0.10	0.09	0.13
Cosmopolitanism	0.02	0.11	0.10
Conceptualisation	0.08	0.03	0.09
War	0.00	0.05	0.18
Peace	0.05	0.08	0.18
Equity	0.06	0.05	0.03

TABLE 86: Sex of Respondent and Selected Variables

	SEX	Knowledge (high)	Ideologue (high)	Interest (high)	Efficacy (high)	Toleration (high)	Cynicism (uncynical)	Support (high)	Cosmopolitan (high)	Conceptualisation (high)
12 YEARS	Male	28.6%	8.27	6.17%	13.37%	38.87%	49.07%	20.4	17.37%	12.27%
	Female	16.4	5.5	10.0	10.9	46.4	34.6	15.5	24.6	10.0
13 YEARS	Male	47.4	24.2	15.0	22.2	53.6	42.3	22.2	28.4	20.6
	Female	38.3	10.9	5.5	21.9	51.9	21.3	24.7	13.1	41.5
14 YEARS	Male	56.1	27.9	12.6	26.3	59.5	45.4	27.9	25.6	29.8
	Female	45.1	18.2	8.4	17.9	60.1	41.3	23.7	17.3	27.5
15 YEARS	Male	67.7	39.4	21.9	28.3	65.1	45.0	24.5	30.5	40.2
	Female	52.9	32.3	10.0	25.1	65.1	35.7	16.6	21.4	37.1
16 YEARS	Male	85.1	48.1	26.6	44.2	67.5	53.3	30.5	40.9	54.6
	Female	72.0	44.6	17.9	33.5	78.1	36.6	21.0	30.8	40.6
17 YEARS	Male	96.3	53.7	40.3	50.8	77.6	58.2	34.3	31.8	52.2
	Female	90.6	44.8	16.7	42.7	78.1	37.5	24.0	28.1	54.2

I.Q. SCORE

The intelligence level of individual children has long been recognised as an essential factor in explaining attitudes and general learning. Political research has spotlighted the importance of the amount of education, or the length of time spent in certain educational institutions, on the development of political orientations. Yet the relationship of measured intelligence, rather than the amount of time spent in educational establishments, has been slow to gain acceptance as a central force in political learning. Its immediate impact is obvious - learning should be made that much simpler and orientations demanding certain skills or classification or organisation, for example, should be acquired earlier in the child's life.

The evaluation and comparison of individual and personality differences on the one hand and social forces on the other has generally been a contentious business. The status of the individual I.Q. score as an independent rather than an intervening variable has already been discussed; here we emphasize the linkage between I.Q. and family interest in the child's development as well as the social background from which the child comes. This of course will be more fully examined where controls are made for these other contaminating social forces; but having made that point we are solely concerned at this stage with the association between the I.Q. score of the respondent and his rate and extent of political learning.

The areas in which we expect an influence to be manifest, if indeed I.Q. does have an independent impact, are for those with a high I.Q. to be more interested in political affairs, to have more information

at their disposal, and to be more aware of the underlying democratic precepts on which the present political system is supposed to be based. The I.Q. score will be instrumental in bringing about an acquisition of these features in early adolescence, or earlier than would be normally expected. An even more direct linkage is anticipated between I.Q. score and the level of political conceptualisation attained by the respondent. Because of this the clearest association should be made manifest in those orientations which may be immediately linked with cognitive growth.

A perusal of the correlation coefficients contained in TABLE 87 when controlling for the I.Q. score of the respondent demonstrates that both groups achieve a solid level of growth during the period from 12 to 17 years of age. There is no tendency for any greater movement to arise in one partial rather than another. Where differences do occur they are negligible, with the greatest, in the growth of cosmopolitanism, being of the order of 0.13, and the next no more than 0.7. The broad overview implies considerable similarity among the two groups in the extent of the improvement made between the ages of 12 and 17 years; we shall now investigate whether this means that high I.Q. individuals maintain an original advantage or not.

Commencing our discussion with the cognitive domain, we can see from TABLE 88 that in both the political knowledge scale and the ideologue index the I.Q. score of the respondent comes through with strong force at all of the three age ranges identified. Moreover the strength of the association holds more or less at the same level, with the obvious interpretation to be placed on these figures that in so far

as political knowledge is concerned, those with a high I.Q. maintain their original superiority in this area. Turning to TABLE 89 we can see in absolute terms the extent to which the proportion from the high I.Q. category is always more likely to attain higher levels of knowledge. While differences are least in the 12 and 17 year olds, that is at the two age extremes of our sample, the gulf in knowledge between 13 and 16 is particularly marked. The strength of the association, as well as the consistency with which it is maintained through adolescence, suggests that I.Q. scores do encompass a powerful explanatory variable in political learning in the cognitive domain.

Moving on to the respondent's awareness of the political world and his readiness to evaluate political ideas and events we are faced with a pattern where more areas demonstrate a high level of association with this factor than had been uncovered hitherto, with other social agents. Beginning with the respondent's level of interest in political affairs, we detect signs that I.Q. will have exerted relatively more of an influence from 12 to 15 years than from 15 to 17 years. It is not until after the age of 15 years that those from the medium and low I.Q. group exhibit any substantial improvement in their acceptance of political affairs as a subject worthy of their attention. Before, and at, the age of 15 years the level of high interest remains static at around 8% but other factors clearly then overcome this disinterest and after 15 years this produces the higher development figure that is seen in TABLE 87. One explanation which we can draw from these figures is that the I.Q. score of the individual is a good guide of that person's ability to cope with the intricate problems posed by the political world - the level of interest being taken as an approximate

surrogate or indication of the ability to cope. Alternatively it might be argued that the fact that the two groups do not differ so much after 15 years as before that age is attributable to the relatively greater numbers from particular groups, who will almost certainly be predominantly those with lower I.Q. scores as well, who leave school as soon as they are legally entitled to do so.

We predicted further that the influence of higher intelligence score will be to instill in our sample an appreciation of democratic norms which is both quicker to emerge as well as being more strongly held throughout. While the attachment to democratic norms should be evident as an area which in adolescence will be influenced by the I.Q. score of the respondent we do not believe that any great variation will be discernible in the underlying support for the political arrangements that exist in Britain today.

Investigation of the scores of the two groups for political efficacy does underline that a gap exists in the early years of adolescence although we again discover that this narrows considerably among the older respondents. Indeed among the 16 and 17 year olds the association is virtually nil. A similar pattern of decline in the predominance of the high I.Q. group is not found in the scores on the political toleration scale. TABLE 88 actually points to a widening in scores as the respondents grow older and TABLE 87 reinforces this point. Feelings of political cynicism on the other hand show hardly any consistent difference between the groups, nor indeed for either group to move in any direction in an even manner. Interpretation of the scores on the scale of support for the British system of

government demonstrates yet again the capacity of this particular dimension to confound predictions about a lack of growth or change during adolescence, including where the analysis is restricted to sub-groups of the adolescent population. In this example the high intelligence group outscore their counterparts in the proportion offering a favourable impression of British Government, except among the 17 year olds where a reversal occurs. Not only do the higher intelligence respondents gravitate more towards the highly supportive category but in addition they demonstrate a greater propensity to air their alienation from the present political practices. This trend is particularly strong among the older respondents so that whereas 16.4% of the higher intelligence group express their distaste, only 5.6% of the lower I.Q. children are similarly disenchanted.

Our first impression of the lower levels of political orientation, in both the cognitive and affective domains, is that I.Q. score is indeed capable of producing strong associations and, what is more, throughout adolescence. This means that our initial prediction of influence is supported to the extent that an association exists but its stamina is greater than we imagined, if its persistence up to the age of 17 years is any indication. Because of this consistency and pervasiveness the importance of the individual's I.Q. score comes out of this analysis with an enhanced reputation.

On a priori grounds we should suppose that the importance of the I.Q. score in these lower levels of political learning will be surpassed by its effectiveness in bringing individuals to that level of thinking which we have categorised as entailing the employment of

formal operations. This is because the lower levels of political orientation are as amenable to association with levels of information and interest as they are to different levels of conceptualisation.

The figures which we are able to present in TABLE 88 confirm our view that I.Q. score will have a strong influence in the more sophisticated perception of political terms and relationships. Firstly the level of conceptualisation index itself contains much higher measures of association than we have uncovered with other variables. Inspection of TABLE 89 demonstrates the clear and consistent association of I.Q. with the more abstract level of political conceptualisation, with the gap in the proportion of the two groups at this level not falling below a minimum of 10% throughout adolescence.

While the association is somewhat less strong in the perception of terms such as war and peace, or in the use of equity, the figures for this area are much stronger than anything recorded for any of the social factors with which we have dealt. This is particularly true of the variation between the groups in their readiness to use equity in their interpretation of international conflict. While the strength of the association is there for all to see it does not mean that it always operates in the direction anticipated. For example, in our respondents perception of war, our assumption, given the differences on the level of conceptualisation index, was that the high I.Q. group would be more inclined to opt for an understanding of 'war' which we would classify as abstract. The difference found between the two groups is again substantial, in that for every age group it is generally more than 10% in favour of the higher I.Q. children.

The correlation figures for this relationship serve to emphasize the validity of this interpretation. They indicate that the relationship holds firm in direction although its strength declines slightly during adolescence.

Interpretation of the term 'peace' is less simple. The preponderance of more abstract interpretations given to 'war' should have been echoed by a similar pattern in our respondent's interpretation of peace. Thus those with a high I.Q. will opt more frequently for a perception of 'peace' which signifies that they see it not as merely a passive state, or a lull between wars, but as a period which offers scope for positive action. Our data in TABLE 88 shows that up to the age of 15 years the pattern of which we have been speaking shines through in the replies given by our sample. The differences between the two groups in the numbers adopting the more abstract response are of the same order as those which we found in the perception of war. What happens in the later years however is that the gap narrows considerably among the 16 year olds and is actually reversed among the 17 year olds so that lower I.Q. children have a greater proponsity to opt for the more abstract reply. The marked influence of the I.Q. score therefore is dissipated with age in the area which most commonly has been the one to demonstrate an increasing association with age. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency in the pattern of response to the term 'peace' suggests that while the surfeit of information on political affairs that is evidenced by the high I.Q. group in the early age groups acts to stimulate a more positive perspective on peace increasing age counteracts this initial advantage. The term 'war' in contrast is one which does not alter with increased amounts

of information about political affairs but continues to be associated with level of intelligence.

While in general we may claim that high intelligence score increases the likelihood of perceiving international conflict in a more abstract manner we can also see that this factor influences the growth of equity in adolescents' political thinking. This relationship holds throughout the age ranges samples with a strength rare for this particular dimension. However as with the perception of war, increasing age sees a diminution of this association. The similarity of the findings on war and responsibility for war suggests that I.Q., while acting as a powerful force in springing children towards a more sophisticated pattern of political thinking, is gradually weakened in impact with increasing age so that initial advantages are gradually whittled away. The amount of erosion which occurs should not be overestimated, for at the age range 16 - 17 years I.Q. score continues to provide as much, if not more, variation than we have found in the agents already discussed.

TABLE 87: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for the I.Q. score of the respondent.

	First Partial (High I.Q.)	Second Partial (Low & Medium I.Q.)
Political Knowledge	-0.36	-0.36
Issue Ideologue	-0.29	-0.28
Interest	-0.16	-0.19
Efficacy	-0.21	-0.22
Toleration	-0.24	-0.18
Cynicism	0.01*	-0.02
Support	-0.01	-0.06
Cosmopolitanism	-0.15	-0.02
Conceptualisation	-0.30	-0.29
War	-0.04	-0.05
Peace	-0.14	-0.17
Equity (gamma)	-0.07	-0.14

An asterick * signifies a positive association

TABLE 88: Gamma measures of association between the I.Q. score of the respondent and selected variables controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political Knowledge	-0.46	-0.50	-0.45
Ideologue	-0.38	-0.35	-0.30
Interest	-0.28	-0.39	-0.14
Efficacy	-0.12	-0.23	-0.01
Toleration	-0.25	-0.31	-0.34
Support	0.03*	-0.08	0.03*
Cosmopolitanism	0.12*	-0.20	-0.11
Conceptualisation	-0.49	-0.41	-0.25
War	-0.34	-0.31	-0.19
Peace	-0.09	-0.30	0.05*
Equity	-0.35	-0.40	-0.27

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 89: I.Q. Score and Selected Variables

	<u>I.Q. Score</u>	<u>Knowledge</u> (high)	<u>Ideologue</u> (high)	<u>Interest</u> (high)	<u>Efficacy</u> (high)	<u>Toleration</u> (high)	<u>Cynicism</u> (uncynical)	<u>Support</u> (high)	<u>Cosmopolitanism</u> (high)	<u>Conceptualisation</u> (high)
12 YEARS	High	29.0%	9.7%	12.9%	17.7%	54.8%	46.8%	19.4%	16.1%	19.4%
	Medium & low	20.0	4.4	6.7	8.2	37.8	39.3	16.3	22.2	7.4
13 YEARS	High	63.5	27.9	16.4	23.1	64.4	48.1	29.8	26.9	28.9
	Medium & low	33.5	14.0	8.2	21.4	48.3	39.7	18.7	26.9	12.1
14 YEARS	High	68.8	33.6	14.4	31.2	73.6	48.0	36.8	22.4	43.2
	Medium & low	43.3	18.2	8.4	18.9	55.1	40.6	22.6	19.8	24.2
15 YEARS	High	79.2	46.9	20.8	30.0	75.4	39.2	26.2	34.6	56.9
	Medium & low	52.6	32.0	13.7	24.7	62.1	40.5	19.3	20.6	36.1
16 YEARS	High	86.7	58.5	23.7	37.0	78.5	49.6	31.9	37.0	52.6
	Medium & low	69.9	39.1	20.8	38.6	70.3	41.1	23.8	33.2	42.6
17 YEARS	High	95.1	52.5	29.5	45.9	88.5	44.3	26.2	32.8	70.5
	Medium & low	91.7	47.2	19.4	43.1	70.8	48.6	30.6	11.1	52.8

LEVEL OF CONCEPTUALISATION:

We have already spelt out at some length the nature of the relationship that we feel exists between cognitive development and chronological age. Having decided on our measure concerning the degree of operational formal thinking employed in political affairs by our respondents we said that we expect this ability to be strongly related to age and this has been demonstrated in a previous chapter. This means that the gamma measures of association will go in the same direction irrespective of whether we run the dependent variables against age or level of conceptualisation. However there is, as we found in our analysis of international conflict, a certain lee-way in both directions, and this lee-way is of importance when it comes to the various comparisons for political learning where we control for other factors.

If we consider firstly the correlation between age and the selected variables while controlling for the level of conceptualisation of the respondent we notice that in almost every case higher coefficients are recorded for the group of respondents who do not appear to have reached the level of formal operational thinking. This implies that this group though retarded in their political learning in early adolescence do produce more development so that by the age of 17 years the difference between the two groups is certainly not as great and may not exist at all.

Commencing our analysis in the cognitive domain we see that the level of conceptualisation is most graphically associated with the political knowledge scores attained by our respondents. At the age

of 12 years those respondents scoring well on conceptualisation have sufficient political information at their fingertips that an extraordinarily high proportion of over 56% score highly and less than 10% rank as low. The proportion in this group expand steadily to reach over 96% in the 17 year old age group. In contrast those who have not given any indication of abstract thinking start off at a much lower level but make particularly rapid strides in the last two years. Much the same story applies to the issue ideologue index. Again the high conceptualisation group have a large initial advantage and though the gamma figure drops from -0.55 to -0.11 between 12 and 13 years and 16 and 17 years, this is apparently due most to an extraordinary rise in knowledge among those in the low conceptualisation group, which cannot be maintained, as the gulf in knowledge at 17 years is again wide. And yet the theoretical line which links the level of conceptualisation and amount of political information that one is able to recall is not convincing. This task does not demand formal operational thinking though the issue ideologue index does require some higher level of sophistication involving comprehension and classification. With some justification therefore we expect that the latter index will show a higher association with the level of conceptualisation of the respondent than the less demanding political knowledge scale. Though this prediction holds in early adolescence it is not borne out among the older respondents; both scales display a strong association but the political knowledge scale continues to be the stronger as indicated by the gamma correlation figures in TABLE 91.

The explanation which seems to account for the influence of conceptualisation on political knowledge is that by providing young people with an enhanced ability to cope with political problems it encourages such individuals to accumulate more information. Conversely we assume that a certain store of knowledge is a pre-requisite to moving upwards to a higher level of political thinking.

When we turn to the affective domain there is even less theoretical justification for supposing that the level of conceptualisation attained by the respondent will exert an influence on his value position. This applies especially with his support for the present political system although he will be more familiar with the basic strands from which democratic theory is woven. A further candidate for variation lies with the political interest level of the respondent. We are presuming that an individual will interest himself in those subjects with which he finds himself able to cope; conceptualisation is one indication, albeit a rough measure, of whether an individual considers that he can deal with political stimuli. Therefore there will be at least a moderate connection between political interest and level of conceptualisation. The gamma figures suggest that this is graphically true in early adolescence but fades away with increasing age. TABLE 92 contains the percentages fitting into each category of political interest from each group. These are consistently higher in the high conceptualisation group but the gap is a marginal one in the 17 year old group. Up to 15 years of age a similar conclusion may be applied to the scores recorded for the political efficacy and toleration scales. In both there is a wide discrepancy with the high conceptualisation group consistently outscoring all others. Strangely however this

position is reversed after 16 years, slowly in the political toleration items but rapidly in the efficacy scale. We can see no reason why this trend should suddenly be reversed late in adolescence; it does not tally with the pattern presented for the I.Q. score of the respondent and is not echoed by the scores on the political cynicism scale, where the high conceptualisation group are consistently more cynical.

Equally strange, therefore, is that the level of conceptualisation besides influencing the hold on democratic norms further is associated with the tendency to record a higher level of support for the British political system. Again we find that the difference lessens among the 17 year olds but otherwise the high conceptualisation respondents often manage twice as many scoring high in support. Similarly far fewer indicate a strong disenchantment with the political arrangements in this support scale.

If the level of conceptualisation is able to exert such an influence in areas where its abilities are less immediately obvious we look for a particularly strong influence in areas selected for their amenability to the influence of formal operational thinking. Unless that is, other agencies or differences intervene to circumnavigate or intercept this simple transmission. Though weak at the start of our sample the strength of the measure of association with the term 'war' quickly gathers pace but then falls off in the 16 to 17 year old age group. Nevertheless the high conceptualisation pupil is always more likely to provide a more abstract interpretation but with age indicates possibly a greater level of

inconsistency in formal thinking the strength of this association is not impressive given the strong theoretical basis to this relationship.

In the remaining areas dealing with the perception of peace and responsibility for war the direction of the relationship is as predicted but its strength does not fit into the pattern predicted. Both of these relationships continue through our sample at a point not much different to associations already recorded with the family and the peer group. This seems to leave us with two possible lines of explanation. In the first place it can be argued that cognitive development is not as we have presumed strongly related to levels of political learning and judgement. Not only is the level of conceptualisation not markedly superior to that of other agents included in our discussion but it does not seem to have any greater impact in those areas which we have said will be most influenced because of their greater sensitivity to changes in cognitive operations. For those who have emphasised the almost total equivalence between I.Q. and level of conceptualisation we have offered several areas in which marked variation in political learning between these two factors may be noted.

The suggestion is that the level of conceptualisation achieved by the individual during adolescence is even more inter-twined with other social forces than we had previously allowed for, if indeed its influence will predominate as we have predicted.

TABLE 90: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for the level of conceptualisation of the respondent.

	First Partial (High)	Second Partial (Low)
Political Knowledge	-0.24	-0.33
Issue Ideologue	-0.16	-0.27
Interest	-0.14	-0.14
Efficacy	-0.11	-0.22
Toleration	-0.13	-0.19
Cynicism	0.02*	-0.14
Support	0.03*	0.01*
Cosmopolitanism	-0.06	-0.04
War	-0.02	-0.03
Peace	-0.15	-0.25
Equity	-0.08	-0.04

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 91: Gamma measures of association between the level of conceptualisation and selected variables controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political Knowledge	-0.49	-0.54	-0.25
Ideologue	-0.55	-0.47	-0.11
Interest	-0.50	-0.38	-0.12
Efficacy	-0.46	-0.25	0.05*
Toleration	-0.17	-0.25	0.23*
Support	-0.20	-0.32	-0.30
Cosmopolitanism	-0.37	-0.32	-0.16
War	-0.10	-0.29	-0.20
Peace	-0.19	-0.13	-0.19
Equity	-0.08	-0.16	-0.13

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 92: Level of Conceptualisation and Selected Variables

CONCEPTUALIZATION	Knowledge (high)	Ideologue (high)	Interest (high)	Efficacy (high)	Toleration (high)	Cynicism (uncynical)	Support (high)	Cosmopolitanism (high)
12 YEARS								
High	56.5%	26.17	13.07	30.47	52.27	56.57	30.47	21.77
Low	17.8	4.3	7.6	9.7	41.6	16.2	39.5	21.1
13 YEARS								
High	59.4	31.3	14.1	37.5	60.9	50.0	28.1	46.9
Low	39.6	15.0	9.6	18.9	51.1	20.5	40.3	22.4
14 YEARS								
High	69.9	39.3	15.6	28.3	68.8	36.4	57.2	27.2
Low	41.8	15.6	8.1	18.9	56.3	37.5	21.2	18.4
15 YEARS								
High	75.6	46.6	18.9	30.7	69.3	49.2	29.4	34.0
Low	49.1	28.4	12.9	23.9	62.5	33.9	14.2	19.4
16 YEARS								
High	80.2	46.9	24.0	36.0	73.7	33.7	49.7	39.4
Low	74.9	45.3	19.2	39.4	73.9	37.9	17.2	31.0
17 YEARS								
High	96.6	55.2	27.6	41.4	75.9	28.7	50.6	32.2
Low	88.6	40.8	25.0	51.3	80.3	40.8	27.6	27.6

RELIGION.

In the main research by political scientists into the influence of religion on political orientations has restricted itself in Britain to a discussion of the patterns which bear upon whether or not members of a particular religious affiliation are more inclined to vote for the same political party. The influence of religion is then believed to have significance because of its deep inter-relationship with other social factors as well as being derived from historical circumstances. Whatever the theoretical reasons for suggesting that membership of a particular religious group will effectively condition one's choice of party affiliation there are those in child developmental circles who have attempted to widen its applicability to areas which have only rarely, if ever, been explored in political socialisation research.

The chief areas which have been proffered for their greater receptivity to religious influence comprise the perception of political leaders and political authority generally, and secondly, the speed at which the individual attains the level of formal operational thinking. No theoretical basis has been advanced in anticipation of differences in other areas of political thinking, but nonetheless we shall trace the growth of all orientations according to the religious distinction, in order that we may convey the full picture for comparative purposes.

If we first inspect TABLE 93 which permits an impression of the development made by each group over the whole period of adolescence there do not seem to be any wide, and no consistent, pattern of difference between the two groups - that is, Catholics and non-Catholics.

When a discrepancy occurs, it is no more than marginal, although it is interesting that these crop up in the affective domain with greatest regularity. Again they almost always follow the same direction with the Catholic group producing a higher correlation coefficient. This we can interpret in either of two ways. It may mean that the Catholic group score higher on these orientations at the beginning of adolescence and continue to widen the difference throughout our age sample, or alternatively, the Catholic group may have lagged behind at 12 years and adolescence will see a narrowing of the gulf or its reversal. Overall the conclusion must be that the correlation figures indicate no differential growth rates of any magnitude.

Does the same picture apply when we control for age? What we have predicted is that the religious identification of the respondent will typically have a negligible effect over most orientations. The figures contained in TABLES 94 and 95 demonstrate the validity of this proposition. There are differences between the two groups in the early years, with the non-catholic group giving evidence of greater levels of knowledge but this gap is soon narrowed and the size of the contingency coefficients indicates that any variation is minimal. Thus an especially high measure of association, to which we have become accustomed in the cognitive domain, is nowhere to be found. Even allowing for the fact that the contingency coefficient value will be depressed in comparison with the gamma measure a maximum figure of 0.15 in the political knowledge scores and 0.05 in the ideologue index is a sound confirmation of the view that the religious affiliation of our adolescent sample is an insignificant factor in their acquisition of political knowledge, whether it be simple recall or a more demanding variety.

When we transfer the spotlight to the orientations in the affective domain we see that much the same picture applies. With respect to political interest for the political world there is perhaps a slightly higher coefficient than we might have anticipated but these quickly subside with increasing age. Perusal of TABLE 95 tells us that the higher levels of interest are not consistently throughout the sample with one of the religious groups. The Catholics in our study are more interested in politics in the younger groups but after 14 years the position is reversed. The Catholics in fact tend to exhibit more haphazard and inconsistent movement than is usually apparent in our sample.

Turning from the respondents basic evaluations of the political world to their attachment to democratic norms it can be seen that the contingency coefficients at each age range are again low. From the figures in TABLE 95 it appears that the non-Catholic group have both higher feelings of efficacy and less cynicism while no consistent pattern of dominance emerges in the scores on the political toleration scale. As far as the groups level of support for the basic political arrangements in Britain is concerned there is again a higher coefficient among the younger respondents than emerges with the older respondents. This hides a reversal in the relative proportions indicating a high level of support for the political system. Whereas up to the age of 16 years the Catholic group is relatively less supportive they become more enamoured with the political set-up when they are about to leave our sample at the age of 17 years. The hypothesis contained in the Hess and Torney study that Catholic children are somehow more attached to the political regime in America than other groups,

concluded that this trend derived from something essential about Catholicism which they thought encouraged more affective feelings towards authority in general, including the political authorities. The relationship present in our data between religious affiliation and systemic support agrees with those authors that this factor will produce variation, although this is no more than slight, but in our case the direction taken is the reverse of that stipulated by the American evidence. What we have found is that the Catholic children are not more supportive of the political system, with little enthusiasm for the regime being mustered among the 12 and 13 year olds although their elders do not seem in sympathy with such feelings.

We believe that what Hess and Torney conclude was a general feature of the religious factor was in practice little more than a consequence of having a Catholic President than any underlying affection ingrained in this group for those in positions of authority. It is far more likely therefore that it is not so much religion which is the determining factor in supportive feelings but the particular social and historical circumstances that have been experienced. To argue that the Catholics in Northern Ireland are more inclined to support the political authorities is a nonsense. Indeed the sympathy between the religious groups in Northern Ireland and their counterparts in Scotland may be such that the relative deprivations suffered by the Catholic community will have induced them to entertain less affection for the British political system, whether in Ireland or Scotland. Yet if the Catholic group is somewhat less supportive of the authorities, from the evidence in our sample, they do not appear to be markedly more cynical of the political world.

If we can partly explain the association between religion and the level of support for the political system in terms of past and present social circumstances experienced by the two groups it is not imagined that this explanation can be translated to the level of conceptualisation in political thinking. In practice the variation is not of a strength or consistency which makes a definite statement of influence a convincing proposition. Equally there is little association with respect to the actual interpretation of the terms 'war' or 'peace'. Allowing for the fact that the values which we are reporting are contingency coefficients the relationships do not evince many signs of life although they are no worse than the figures which we have presented in these areas for several other agents covered by this investigation. Nonetheless we conclude that there is little substance in the argument that religious affiliation has an influence on children's perception of these political terms. Although we are dealing with marginal differences between groups it does seem that smallest variation occurs in the perception of the stimulus 'war', while those areas, namely peace and equity, which we have designated as less salient to most people are differentially interpreted, but barely, by the two groups. However in both of these areas it is the Catholic population who are seen to hold the more sophisticated perception.

Our conclusion generally about the influence of the religious affiliation is that this score has no more than a marginal effect on the lower levels of political orientation in both the affective and cognitive domains. Certainly from the contingency coefficients reported in TABLE 94 the strength of the association is negligible,

with a largest coefficient of no more than 0.17, and no orientation providing evidence of consistent differences between the two groups throughout the period of adolescence of any more than a moderate order. Not that we anticipated finding many exceptions to the general rule that religious affiliation would have little impact to the overall trends in political learning. While we can offer an explanation for one area where moderate variation is uncovered, namely the level of support generated for the regime, we cannot understand why most other differences appear as random or haphazard fluctuations in the replies given. Unless that is, the religious affiliation is to be interpreted as a factor in political learning without constant or clear influence.

This first inspection of our data, where we examine patterns in political learning and controlling only for the religious affiliation of the respondent, implies that the influence which some have ascribed to Catholic education in either encouraging young people to think of problems with a greater sensitivity for the time perspective or underlying forces involved in the relationship does interestingly enough stand in the perception of certain areas of international conflict but the association while being in the direction predicted has little strength. Yet as the level of conceptualisation between the two groups only shows a noticeable difference amongst the youngest respondents, and then to the detriment of the Catholic group, this area is worthy of closer investigation. It may be that the Catholic group does then come through more distinctly, where other agents are controlled for, as an important factor in the employment of more formal operations in political thinking.

TABLE 93: Correlation coefficients between age and selected variables, controlling for the religious affiliation of the respondent.

	First Partial (Catholics)	Second Partial (Non-catholics)
Political Knowledge	-0.43	-0.39
Issue Ideologue	-0.33	-0.27
Interest	-0.24	-0.18
Efficacy	-0.28	-0.21
Toleration	-0.28	-0.19
Cynicism	0.03*	-0.01
Support	-0.15	-0.003
Cosmopolitanism	-0.00	-0.09
Conceptualisation	-0.34	-0.27
War	0.05*	-0.08
Peace	-0.18	-0.16
Equity (gamma)	-0.14	-0.09

An asterick * signifies a positive association.

TABLE 94: Contingency Coefficients between the religious affiliation and selected variables controlling for age.

	12 - 13 Years	14 - 15 Years	16 - 17 Years
Political Knowledge	0.17	0.08	0.04
Ideologue	0.05	0.04	0.04
Interest	0.15	0.04	0.07
Efficacy	0.12	0.07	0.08
Toleration	0.05	0.06	0.03
Support	0.13	0.07	0.05
Cosmopolitanism	0.04	0.13	0.01
Conceptualisation	0.13	0.01	0.02
War	0.00	0.04	0.06
Peace	0.07	0.02	0.10
Equity	0.06	0.07	0.03

TABLE 95: Religious Affiliation and Selected Variables

	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Knowledge</u> (high)	<u>Ideologue</u> (high)	<u>Interest</u> (high)	<u>Efficacy</u> (high)	<u>Toleration</u> (high)	<u>Cynicism</u> (uncynical)	<u>Support</u> (high)	<u>Cosmopolitanism</u> (high)	<u>Conceptualisation</u> (high)
12 YEARS	Catholic	10.8%	2.7%	13.5%	5.4%	24.3%	24.3%	5.4%	27.0%	5.4%
	Non-Catholic	24.6	7.6	7.0	13.5	46.7	27.5	20.5	19.9	12.3
13 YEARS	Catholic	26.7	15.6	13.3	6.6	48.9	17.8	11.1	26.7	2.2
	Non-Catholic	45.2	8.1	9.9	24.1	53.3	25.6	23.2	26.5	19.0
14 YEARS	Catholic	39.3	14.3	6.3	15.2	58.0	33.0	21.4	17.0	28.6
	Non-Catholic	52.2	24.2	11.1	23.0	60.3	39.5	26.4	21.8	28.4
15 YEARS	Catholic	52.6	34.7	13.7	23.2	69.5	41.1	13.7	13.7	43.2
	Non-Catholic	60.5	35.5	15.5	27.1	64.3	39.5	21.2	27.5	37.6
16 YEARS	Catholic	82.4	47.1	19.6	33.3	80.4	27.5	19.6	39.2	41.2
	Non-Catholic	76.5	45.9	21.7	38.5	72.8	45.9	25.7	33.3	47.1
17 YEARS	Catholic	92.3	46.2	7.7	38.5	80.8	34.6	42.3	19.2	53.9
	Non-Catholic	92.7	48.9	29.9	47.5	77.4	48.2	35.6	32.1	53.3

MEDIA CONSUMPTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

In addition to those variables already discussed which we have predicted will have an independent influence on the development of political learning, there are other variables which will tend to act more as mediating forces. This means that in the two examples included here, the level of media consumption and of organizational membership will in the first place be dependent on other social circumstances relevant to the individual, but once established in a particular category on these secondary forces these may act to reinforce existing trends. This we see as the more likely result although it is possible that for example, high media consumption, will counteract disadvantages in other areas. For this reason we do not wish to place great weight on the apparent independent influence of these variables.

Nevertheless while we do not wish to expand greatly on the impact of either organizational membership or level of media consumption the reader can quickly appreciate from TABLES 96 and 97 the practical reasons for including both factors in our multivariate analysis which follows this discussion. It is most evident that classification of respondents on both factors produces clear variation. Both variables exhibit a more pervasive influence than we had either been able to predict or had suspected. To our mind each should have exerted a somewhat concentrated influence - with the mass media only having a significant impact in the cognitive domain and the level of organizational membership being a more effective predictor of the respondent's acceptance of orientations in the affective domain.

In practice TABLE 96 contains figures which do not suggest that the variation produced by differences in media consumption are in the least way restricted to political knowledge. Certainly the variation is present in the latter area but it is also found in every other orientation for which we have produced percentages. This means that the media level is related to both affective orientations as well as the manner in which the respondent approaches his perception of the political world.

While the distinction on media consumption is made between two broad groups, organisational membership is broken down into three categories. The high membership group belong to organisations both within and outwith of school while the low level group do not have any organisational affiliations. The figures presented in TABLE 97 indicate that there are marked differences in knowledge with the level of organisational membership being an effective though not always linear predictor. Thus while the high level group consistently outscore all others, it does not always seem to be the case that those without organisational interests are consistently to be seen as the least knowledgeable group. This finding is carried over into the affective domain although we also detect more instances where high organisational membership does not bring respondents to the highest level of democratic response as we had imagined would emerge. Nevertheless with respect to the more advanced level of operations organisational membership again appears as a factor with some force.

It remains to be seen how far the association between media consumption and organisational membership holds where we control for other factors.

TABLE 96: Consumption of Media and Selected Variables

	MEDIA	<u>Knowledge</u> (high)	<u>Ideologue</u> (high)	<u>Interest</u> (high)	<u>Efficacy</u> (high)	<u>Toleration</u> (high)	<u>Support</u> (high)	<u>Cynicism</u> (uncynical)	<u>Cosmopolitanism</u> (high)	<u>Conceptualisation</u> (high)
12 YEARS	High	30.6%	6.3%	9.9%	14.4%	46.9%	17.1%	40.5%	18.9%	13.5%
	Low	12.4	7.2	6.2	9.3	38.1	18.6	42.3	23.7	8.3
13 YEARS	High	47.3	21.6	14.2	23.9	51.8	21.6	46.3	32.1	20.6
	Low	37.1	12.6	5.0	19.5	54.1	22.0	35.9	18.9	12.0
14 YEARS	High	57.7	24.2	13.3	23.9	62.2	29.3	47.3	23.9	33.2
	Low	37.1	19.4	5.2	17.7	56.0	19.4	36.2	16.0	20.7
15 YEARS	High	67.7	37.2	19.5	29.4	67.4	20.6	40.9	27.0	39.8
	Low	46.5	32.7	8.6	22.0	61.6	19.2	38.0	22.9	36.3
16 YEARS	High	84.2	49.8	26.9	38.3	75.1	28.1	45.9	36.0	48.6
	Low	63.2	38.4	10.4	36.8	71.2	18.4	38.4	32.8	41.6
17 YEARS	High	94.3	48.4	29.5	46.7	76.2	32.0	50.8	29.5	54.9
	Low	87.8	48.8	17.1	43.9	82.9	17.1	31.7	31.7	48.8

TABLE 97: Organizational Membership and Selected Variables

	<u>Organizational Membership</u>	<u>Knowledge (high)</u>	<u>Ideologue (high)</u>	<u>Interest (high)</u>	<u>Efficacy (high)</u>	<u>Toleration (high)</u>	<u>Support (high)</u>	<u>Cynicism (uncynical)</u>	<u>Cosmopolitanism (high)</u>	<u>Conceptualisation (high)</u>
12 YEARS	High	33.97	10.27	8.57	10.27	62.77	18.67	39.07	22.07	15.37
	Medium	21.3	4.3	9.6	17.0	39.4	19.2	43.6	20.2	9.6
	Low	10.9	7.3	5.5	5.5	27.37	14.6	40.0	21.8	9.1
13 YEARS	High	52.1	22.3	16.0	22.3	59.6	23.4	47.9	31.9	25.5
	Medium	41.9	15.2	8.7	23.4	48.9	20.1	39.7	29.4	14.1
	Low	36.4	18.2	8.1	19.2	53.5	23.2	40.0	16.2	14.1
14 YEARS	High	62.1	26.0	14.8	25.4	63.9	26.6	43.2	21.1	33.7
	Medium	47.1	24.0	8.7	21.5	58.3	27.2	43.3	24.4	26.9
	Low	40.2	13.4	7.9	16.5	58.3	19.7	42.5	13.4	25.2
15 YEARS	High	67.4	44.8	23.8	33.2	68.5	24.3	45.9	30.4	40.3
	Medium	53.7	30.6	10.2	25.5	60.5	16.7	36.7	22.1	36.1
	Low	60.4	33.3	14.6	20.1	70.1	21.5	38.2	25.7	41.0
16 YEARS	High	83.3	53.8	28.8	45.5	75.0	22.7	41.7	31.1	48.5
	Medium	75.2	45.5	18.2	33.3	71.5	29.1	44.2	35.8	40.6
	Low	71.6	34.6	16.1	34.6	76.5	19.8	44.4	39.5	54.3
17 YEARS	High	93.6	50.0	38.7	59.7	83.9	32.3	43.6	34.1	59.7
	Medium	94.4	46.5	19.7	42.3	69.0	25.4	46.5	26.7	47.9
	Low	86.7	50.0	16.7	26.7	86.7	26.7	50.0	30.0	53.3

This far we have followed the standard practice of minimising the complexities of analysis, and thereby producing a travesty of practical experience by restricting the number of variables that are predicted as exerting an influence in a particular political orientation to chronological age and one other factor. It remains for us to use the information derived from this analysis both to compare our findings at this level with those reported in other studies besides paving the way for our own multivariate analysis. This is designed to provide us with a more clearly defined picture of the inter-relationship of the variables included as agents of socialisation in this study.

In the variable by variable investigation which we have just completed the factors isolated as predictors of political learning do complement our earlier analysis where growth was analysed purely in terms of age changes. The discussion carried on with respect to each factor does provide some clarification of the differential influence of social forces in political development during adolescence. It will be remembered from Chapter 5 that chronological age exhibits a solid and generally consistent association with change in political orientations. In other words knowing the age of our schoolchildren respondents is an excellent criteria for predicting both the extent of an individual's political learning as well as the direction taken by the orientations which are acquired. Age was employed at stage to assess the possibility of qualitative growth occurring in the pattern of orientations held by the respondents. Age related changes of that order being attributed to changing cognitive capacity for which age is an excellent predictor. In practice chronological age does not

evince much evidence of qualitative development and for that reason we have looked to social factors as the reason for this dilution of the influence of cognitive capacity on political learning. Influence on the part of the latter is in fact assumed in the theoretical stance that we have adopted whereby political growth has been designated as an interaction process between the individual and the environment in which he is set. More specifically we asked which among the social factors and other individual differences speed up the process of development and which retard this movement or exert no influence whatsoever? In particular we are looking for clues that particular combinations of circumstances coalesce to permit a more definite impression of qualitative growth.

Our first conclusion is that no one factor pre-emptes all others in the growth of political orientations. Instead it has been demonstrated that three broad categories of predictors may be isolated. In the first we have those agents which are a relatively strong source of influence over a broad spectrum of political orientations. Of those factors which seem to exert a wide-ranging impact through both the cognitive and affective domains as well as in the higher levels of conceptualisation we would mention the level of family and peer interest in politics as the representative of the social forces and the respondent's level of conceptualisation and I.Q. score from the individual differences stable. Among the factors included in our investigation these four constitute the front line of political socialisation forces.

In the second order of agents we include those whose influence is either spread relatively thinly over the whole range of political

learning or those agents whose influence is concentrated in a few areas although where its impact is felt it may be relatively effective. This category really covers the remaining factors dealt with in this study, although a case can be argued for placing the religious affiliation in a separate grouping reserved for those agents whose influence is nowhere more than marginal and generally negligible.

It can be seen that the distinction which we have drawn between social forces and individual differences, such as sex and I.Q. score, does not mean that noticeable variation is more likely to be found among one category rather than another - in the amount or direction of political learning which occurs in adolescence.

In some respects more startling than our findings which point to the general influence of such factors as the family is that the numbers of the less influential, or more selective, factors include certain forces whose strong influence on political orientations has generally been recognised, or rarely contradicted. An obvious example is the social class background from which our respondents are drawn. This does not exert an influence of the strength, nor with a consistency through adolescence, which had been expected.

Nevertheless on the general principle of growth taking place in political orientations with age, and in a consistent manner, we find that all of the factors introduced act as complementary sources of influence. That is, no social factor so subverts the impression of growth in a particular area that we had gained where analysing by age alone. What generally occurs is for those children from the more endowed background, whether it be social class or I.Q. score,

to be more advanced in their acquisition and acceptance of particular orientations. The introduction of these additional predictors does not produce much evidence that breaking our sample down will allow us to draw a conclusion of qualitative development. Generally each group maintains a relatively even progress from the base point established at the age of 12 years. Again the variation induced by these socialisation agents does mostly decline with increasing age, but this may be due to the untypical group who continue their education after the age of 15 years. Certainly our multivariate analysis will throw some light on the extent of interaction among our variables which cause some factors to be influential at particular age points, and of negligible impact at other age points.

We have also found that the influence of a particular factor does not always operate in a perfectly linear fashion. While those ranked as high invariably outscore those relatively deprived on this feature it does not always follow that the lowest scores, say those from a very poorly politicised family background, will always be the least knowledgeable of the most liable to concrete perceptions of international conflict situations. The implication is that either our measures are ineffective or that disadvantages in political growth are not cumulative but substitutes. In other words deficiencies in some characteristic can be made up to a certain extent if the respondent scores well on some other characteristic relevant to political learning.

A variation on this theme of an absence of linear relationships in political socialisation is brought out in Langton and Karns' analysis

using a technique first employed by J.S. Coleman, which attempts to estimate the "relative effects of each level of the independent variable upon the movement into each level of the dependent variable."¹² The assumption of our own statistical measures utilised this far has been that the independent variable will affect the full range of the dependent orientation. In practice it may be as the authors imply, that this constitutes a distortion of the manner in which agents operate with one factor, say the family, bringing individuals from a low level of political knowledge to a medium level, and then being supplanted by the peer group, which is the crucial influence in raising the individual from medium levels of knowledge to the highest level. Such a pattern of influence can only be inferred indirectly from the analysis in which we shall engage. It remains now to turn to an exposition of the multivariate procedures adopted in the analysis of our own data.

The task of disentangling the influence of individual socialisation agents or combinations of agents demands the application of a multivariate analytical procedure. The technique on which we finally decided actually involves the application of two methods, which together complement one another and compensate for limitations which the use of one of the methods alone would entail. Both of these are highly complex computer routines; the first being Automatic Interaction Detection (AID), and the second, Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA).¹³

The AID programme is sequential in generating a so-called tree effect of two-way splits starting with the whole sample which continue until halted by stopping rules controlled by the researcher. A dependent variable is chosen and the objective turns on the search for

the predictor which will maximise between the sum of squares variance of the dependent variable on each occasion that a split is made. With this in mind AID inspects every possible two way split, for every predictor, and then divides the parent group into two smaller ones. This procedure is followed with every group and thereby a tree like pattern is generated. The important function of this programme is to reveal the differential effects of a particular variable within other sub-groups. "The structure provides the clues necessary to detect underlying interaction patterns of cumulation and substitution. Symmetric tree structures coupled with profiles for the variables involved which, for each variable show similarity, are evidence of the adequacy of the additive model and would be well fitted by the MCA algorithm."¹⁴

The MCA programme itself is a technique for examining the inter-relationships between several predictor variables and a dependent variable. Its attraction is that it is considerably more flexible than the more traditional multiple regression techniques; and in particular it allows the opportunity to detect the influence of individual predictors while controlling for other forces, as well as indicating the total impact of the variables named as predictors where these are taken together. Nevertheless while it permits us to introduce inter-correlated predictors it does not seem able to deal with interaction between these variables. This means that MCA is really only to be employed where one can rely on an additive model, and it is for this reason that AID should be used before one progresses to MCA.

The basis of the additive model is that the predictors will have an even influence across dependent variable scores. Departures from additivity are to be expected in social research. For example advantages, "instead of adding their joint effects, may substitute for one another or they may act cumulatively."¹⁵ Cumulation implies that the sum of the effects of the predictors taken together is greater than that where one sums their separate effects. Conversely, substitution arises where the combined influence of one's predictors amount to less than the sum of the separate effects.

Out of the above deviations from the simple additive model Sonquist offers three ideal-type models for inspecting and utilising the results of the combined AID and MCA analysis. They are:¹⁶

1. Advantages are substitutes for one another and disadvantages are cumulative.
2. The complement of 1 above. Advantages are cumulative and disadvantages are substitutes.
3. Advantages and disadvantages are both additive.

The final list of variables which were employed as predictors in our multivariate analysis comprise the following:

1. School type (4 categories; Senior Secondary, Comprehensive and Junior Secondary).
2. Chronological age (6 categories; 12 to 17 plus).
3. Sex (2 categories; male and female).
4. Organisational membership (4 categories; high, medium, low and not available).
5. Peer group politicisation; (4 categories; high, medium, low and not available).

6. Respondent's interest in politics (3 categories; high, medium and low).
7. I.Q. Score (3 categories; high, medium and low, and not available).
8. Family politicisation (3 categories; high, medium and low).
9. Religious affiliation (2 categories; catholic and non-catholic).
10. Modern Studies (2 categories; taking Modern Studies, not taking Modern Studies). This variable is only used in the analysis presented in chapter 7.
11. Mass media consumption (2 categories; high and medium, and low).
12. Conceptualisation (2 categories; high and low).
13. Social Class (4 categories; high professional, managerial, etc., other non-manual, manual and not available.)

The areas in which we shall be applying the AID technique comprise all of those already identified in our previous analysis. First testing our data using AID tells us which orientations may be subjected to the MCA routine without the necessity of creating new variables.

Hitherto our analysis of the level of political knowledge attained by the individual has indicated that there is a definite association with age. Even where we introduced a variety of social forces and individual differences these did nothing to disguise or subvert the growth pattern although it could be advanced, if not accelerated. The splits which are generated in the lower level of political knowledge

present a picture which is some ways removed from a perfectly additive model. While age, level of political interest and the respondent's I.Q. score all produce splits on the main branches there is a tendency to greater activity in the upper arm. This feature is indicative of a model leaning to non-symmetry. In other words advantages appear to be cumulative and disadvantages substitutes. However the amount of variation that a predictor explains at each split does not fluctuate markedly nor do we find any tendency towards progression along one line with single groups being split off from the main stem of the tree. This would be due to the presence of some peculiar advantage or disadvantage, and would indicate deviation from additivity.

The partitioning which does take place produces the lowest scores for political knowledge in those children with the lowest I.Q. score who are 13 years old or below. In contrast the most knowledgeable section of our sample comprises those with a high or medium I.Q. score, who have at least a medium level of interest in political affairs and who are at least 15 years old. While there are few groups even remotely close in mean scores to those with the lowest level of political knowledge, splitting along other branches than the one referred to does bring to light a variety of ways in which forces interact to raise political knowledge scores. For example, the expression of low levels of political interest can be overcome if the respondent attends one of the two types of six year school, and if his peer group exhibit at least a medium level of politicisation. Yet while there are several routes that may be taken to a high score on political knowledge, the road in the other direction is quite clear cut, as the I.Q. score of the respondent offers little possibility of variation, except among the oldest respondents.

If we turn from the AID analysis of the lower level of recall knowledge to the ideologue index (Figure 7) we detect a pattern in the way in which partitioning has occurred which is strongly suggestive of an additive leaning model, above all else. Age, the respondent's I.Q. score and his level of interest in politics both emerge as generally effective although there is more splitting in the direction of the lower level of knowledge.

The assumption underlying the categorisation of an individual as highly aware of political nuances in the policy field is that the same predictors will emerge in this field as were identified in the lower level of the cognitive domain. This covers the three variables which we considered important, namely the respondent's level of conceptualisation produces one partition only, indicating that its impact in the higher levels of knowledge is more restricted. The order of the splitting reinforces our earlier conclusion about the significance of the age level of the respondent, and especially of the significance of the school leaving age siphoning off particular sections of the school population.

Since the objective of the AID routine is to let the data 'speak for itself' we have to be careful that the splits made fit in with good theoretical sense. No monotonic restrictions have been placed on the splitting procedure but despite this there is only one instance of a partition occurring in Figures 6 and 7 which we regard as difficult to justify. This occurs at group 10 in Figure 6. Rather than the split conforming exactly to a simple progression in knowledge with age, the 13 year olds leapfrog over the 14 and 15 year olds to join the two oldest groups in group 18. Otherwise the manner in which the

branches of the tree spread out are perfectly consistent with conclusions already reached in this chapter concerning the significance of age, of higher levels of interest, of conceptualisation, of school type and social class background.

The manner in which age, I.Q. score and level of conceptualisation predominate in the splits in the AID tree analysis leads us to the summary statistics produced in the MCA output. (See TABLE 98). These provide an indication of the extent to which each predictor is related to the dependent variable, both before and after adjustments have been made for the influence of the other variables included in the analysis. Of the statistics reported here, η^2 is an estimate of the proportion of the total sum of squares explained by that predictor, while β^2 corresponds to the former after allowance has been made for the effect of the other predictors. The authors of MCA emphasise that the beta coefficient is not the same as the partial correlation coefficient and is not to be interpreted as the per cent of variance explained. Indeed as our own figures indicate in some instances the explained sum of squares of all of the predictors can exceed the total sum of squares. Therefore the beta coefficients should only be interpreted as a guide to the relative importance of the predictors. This is of course quite sufficient for our purpose.

In contrast to the AID analysis the figures contained in TABLE 98 tend to elevate in importance those inter-individual social forces which had produced so little variation in the partitioning process. In contrast those characteristics which we have categorised as individual differences, such as age, I.Q., and level of conceptualisation are seen to rank as less important in comparison. Generally, though

TABLE 98: MCA Summary Statistics for Predictors of Orientations
in Cognitive Domain.

	Eta ² Political	Beta ² Knowledge	Eta ² Issue	Beta ² Ideologue
School type	0.11	0.23	0.39	0.56 (3)
Age	0.13	0.36	0.80	0.32 (4)
Sex	0.55	0.11	0.48	0.76 (2)
Organisation	0.29	0.27	0.13	0.16
Peer Group	0.69	0.75 (2)	0.25	0.91 (1)
Self Political Interest	0.91	0.15	0.50	0.17
I.Q. Score	0.17	0.60 (3)	0.50	0.12
Family	0.13	0.45	0.26	0.16
Religion	0.53	0.54 (4)=	0.13	0.14
Mass Media	0.42	0.90 (1)	0.75	0.18
Conceptualisation	0.87	0.15	0.55	0.14
Social Class	0.26	0.54 (4)=	0.92	0.27 (5)
Multiple R adjusted	= 0.60		= 0.39	
Multiple R square	= 0.36		= 0.15	

Ranking of first five predictors given in brackets.

not always, those factors which have produced splits on the AID analysis decline in relative importance when one moves from a consideration of the eta statistics to the beta coefficients. With such a contrast in the findings presented by the two techniques, we cannot provide a definite statement of the relative importance of our predictors in the development of political knowledge. More analysis is necessary

before we can tell how far the relative depression of those factors which we have associated with cognitive development can be explained by the interaction between these factors and the dependent variable. In so far as we felt more confident that the splitting of the sample on the ideologue index is consistent with an additive model we note that age does appear in the first ranking of factors along that dimension. Equally important according to the MCA statistics is the underemphasis given in AID to social class and the type of school attended. Even more impressive however is the dominance which the level of peer group politicisation appears to exert in this multivariate technique.

Following the last predictor in TABLE 98 one has two additional statistics. They are the multiple correlation coefficient (adjusted for degrees of freedom) and the same coefficient when squared. These indicate quite clearly that the proportion of variance explained by all of the predictors varies quite substantially between the two levels of knowledge. The less demanding the orientation the more the predictors included in our investigation are able to explain variation in the dependent variable. While the first area produces a moderately respectable statistic the level of issue knowledge is substantially less well accounted for by our predictors.

What sort of results do AID and MCA give in the affective domain? Our analysis of the effects of individual variables in accounting for variation in the respondent's level of interest in the political world pinpointed the major influence of both the level of family, as well as peer group, politicisation. When we look at the tree pattern contained in Figure 8 we see that AID reinforces the impression of most

influence stemming from the family and the peer group. Age, interestingly, does not enter the partitioning process, although the level of media consumption and of conceptualisation both demand consideration.

The actual pattern produced by the splitting process shows a heavy tendency to internal splitting within the central body of the tree, rather than continuing along the extreme branches. It leans towards the additive model when splits between the main segments tend to utilise the same variable. Thus we again have a structure which while not particularly close to an additive model nonetheless exhibits certain of its characteristics and few of its contraventions. Overall we do not gain the impression that either advantages or disadvantages are cumulative. Thus the least interested group comprise those from a background of low peer group politicisation but they also are the highest consumers of the mass media, yet come from the least politicised family background and operate at the lowest level of conceptualisation. In theoretical terms this is much more difficult to justify than the direction taken by those most interested in political affairs. These comprise those whose peer group is at least moderately interested in politics and whose family unit is highly politicised.

TABLE 99: MCA Summary Statistics for Affective Orientations.

	Interest		Support	
	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
School Type	0.27	0.11	0.19	0.19
Age	0.36	0.35	0.44	0.44 (3)
Sex	0.57	0.49 (3) =	0.82	0.40 (4) =
Organisation	0.21	0.45 (5) =	0.11	0.49 (2)
Peer Group	0.10	0.45 (5) =	0.78	0.40 (4) =
Self Political Interest	-		0.20	0.14
I.Q. Score	0.26	0.21	0.60	0.38
Family	0.85	0.49 (3) =	0.79	0.99 (1)
Religion	0.16	0.69 (2)	0.31	0.34
Mass Media	0.51	0.21	0.63	0.11
Conceptualisation	0.30	0.78 (1)	0.27	0.18
Social Class	0.99	0.29	0.29	0.36
Multiple R adjusted	= 0.47		= 0.23	
Multiple R square	= 0.22		= 0.05	

Figures in brackets are rankings for first five predictors.

The summarisation of the variation produced in the area of political interest corroborates the previous analysis in so far as the family and peer group are picked out as of especial significance. Equally MCA complements the importance that AID had accorded to the level of conceptualisation in raising political interest to a higher level. This ties in with our prediction that the respondent's interest in

politics will be linked with his ability to cope with the world of politics as is contained, or suggested, in his level of conceptualisation score. We can also provide solid reasons to explain the emergence of sex as a predictor of political interest. In contrast religion appears quite inexplicably in the first order of socialisation agents. This contradicts our earlier conclusion on the influence of the religious factor in political learning. Indeed the likelihood that religion would bring about a split in the tree analysis was quite remote. Again we prefer to rely on the evidence presented in the AID model because of the deviations from additivity which we have already outlined. Nevertheless it will be seen in TABLE 100 that the influence which MCA attributes to the religious affiliation of the respondent is not merely restricted in the affective domain to the level of political interest.

The multiple correlation coefficient for political interest is quite strong although the proportion of variance explained by all of the factors is not as large as that uncovered in the lower levels of political knowledge. Nevertheless this remains the highest amount of variation that will be achieved by our predictors in the affective domain.

Moving from the respondent's interest in political affairs to his acceptance of the political regime and of the political norms which characterise the democratic community there is less evidence of an additive model in the groups generated by the AID splitting process. We have said that the affective domain generally will be less directly linked to cognitive development and that this will mean not merely

less evidence of even development in one direction with age but further that greatest influence on the direction taken by the individual on these orientations will be exerted through various social forces. This pattern has not found considerable implementation in the analysis conducted this far and if we consider Figures 9 to 11 it will be seen that AID completely refutes this picture. Thus age, I.Q. score and the level of conceptualisation can be relied upon to produce splits in the tree. Instead of social forces emerging directly as sources of variation they only appear indirectly through the medium of the respondent's level of interest in political affairs.

The manner in which these orientations split causes considerable misgivings about the advisability of placing any great store on the summary statistics generated by MCA. The tree that is produced for the respondent's level of support for the political system is a highly effective epitaph to the general inconsistencies which have arisen wherever we have looked for variation in this area. The splits make no theoretical sense whatsoever, with partitions bringing together children with little in common according to our framework. In addition the unsuitability of this area for further analysis can be inferred from the paucity of branches to the tree and the similarity between the groups of their mean scores for political support.

TABLE 100: MCA Summary Statistics for Affective Orientations;
Efficacy and Toleration.

	Efficacy		Toleration	
	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
School Type	0.22	0.41 (4)	0.37	0.12
Age	0.52	0.20	0.41	0.20
Sex	0.18	0.12	0.12	0.26
Organisation	0.17	0.36 (5)	0.13	0.49 (3) =
Peer Group	0.35	0.46 (3)	0.17	0.24
Self Political Interest	0.62	0.20	0.18	0.34 (5) =
I.Q. Score	0.21	0.15	0.51	0.21
Family	0.23	0.66 (1)	0.37	0.34 (5) =
Religion	0.17	0.56 (2)	0.31	0.95 (1)
Mass Media	0.17	0.24	0.28	0.75 (2)
Conceptualisation	0.23	0.33	0.14	0.49 (3) =
Social Class	0.11	0.19	0.10	0.27

Multiple R adjusted = 0.35 = 0.31

Multiple R square = 0.12 = 0.10

Figures in brackets are rankings for first five predictors.

In contrast the pattern of splitting in the area of political efficacy is more in accord with our assumption of the linear influence which most agents will have. That is, high political interest will create high knowledge, and low interest implies low knowledge. This does not mean that the variables on which partitioning occurs are

those which we have said will have most influence. No social force emerges as important except for family interest in politics and the level of political interest expressed by the respondent himself. Instead those factors which we have associated with cognitive growth combine in a downward splitting pattern indicative of an accumulation of disadvantages. Those with the lowest political efficacy being those with a low level of political interest, of 15 years of age or below, from a poorly politicised family and with a medium, or below, I.Q. score. In the sense that MCA attaches less importance to these factors this may be due to its inability to deal with the assymetrical nature of the political efficacy tree.

The general lack of facility with which our predictors account for variation is inferred from the multiple correlation coefficients. Clearly the level of support remains oblivious to consistent impact from whatever source and moves in the haphazardly direction. It is more surprising that both political toleration and political efficacy should be barely affected by the same predictors. Again this is not the conclusion that we would have reached on the basis of the analysis which we conducted at the beginning of the chapter.

This far our analysis using both the AID and MCA techniques has done little to reduce the complexity of the arena in which political learning occurs. Generally however the advisability of using MCA statistics to rank individual agents varies considerably according to whether that orientation comes from the cognitive or the affective domain. The former is manifestly the more likely to fit in with the demands made by MCA for an absence of interaction among the predictors used in the analysis. Both methods imply that the affective domain will exhibit

less variation and more interaction although the respondent's level of political interest does seem appropriate for analysis by MCA.

The two techniques however tend to contradict each other even where an additive model is implied in the AID tree pattern. Instead of those factors which we have associated with cognitive growth being especially influential in the cognitive domain and rather less effective in the affective domain, their influence, at least according to AID, is maintained through both areas. Indeed if anything it becomes more strong in the affective orientations dealt with in this discussion.

In contrast the statistics produced by the MCA programme spread the order of influence more evenly between individual and inter-individual variables. Both techniques raise all of the predictors to the level of significance at some point in the investigation. Yet while the AID analysis concentrates on the influence of individual differences the only predictor to emerge consistently through both domains in the MCA analysis is the level of peer group politicisation.

How far does the movement among our sample towards higher levels of political conceptualisation tie in with these conclusions? It will be remembered that the growth towards more abstract levels of political thinking that we believe will be achieved during adolescence is dependent on the individual's rate of cognitive growth. The best indicators of the stage at which the individual had arrived were seen to be his age, and I.Q. score. A somewhat lesser consideration would seem to be the level of political interest indicated by the respondent himself. In combination, if not alone, these factors are generally sufficient to bring the individual up to the high level of political conceptualisation.

Inspection of Figure 12 which gives the AID tree analysis for political conceptualisation almost completely reinforces this picture of political development. Equally significant is that the sample splits in an order which is theoretically convincing. That is, the first group is partitioned into those of 14 years and below and others of 15 years and above. Both of these are then split on the respondents I.Q. score and finally each branch is supplemented either by the respondent's own level of interest in politics or that expressed in his peer group. That age is able to dominate the variation in the level of political conceptualisation is a late recognition, if needed, of the validity of taking age as the most useful surrogate for cognitive development.

The perception of both war and peace are far less amenable to our multivariate techniques although in the few instances in which partitioning occurs it does involve either the respondent's age or his I.Q. score or his level of conceptualisation. In no sense is the splitting on either of these terms to be thought of as additive.

What then of the MCA approach to the influence wrought by our predictors on the level of political conceptualisation? Their combined effect it must be pointed out is marginal with no more than 14% of the total variance being explained. However the variables which are considered by the MCA technique to be relatively more important do at least tally very closely with the outcome as suggested both by our theoretical framework, with its basis in cognitive development, and by our previously conducted analysis, including AID. Indeed when we compare the predictors picked out as important in the perception of peace we see that these too are equivalent to the picture derived from other investigatory methods.

TABLE 101: MCA summary Statistics; conceptualisation and perception of peace.

	Conceptualisation		Peace	
	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
School Type	0.18	0.53 (2)	0.24	0.19
Age	0.78	0.64 (1)	0.58	0.24
Sex	0.11	0.35 (5) =	0.13	0.85 (2)
Organisation	0.93	0.19	0.91	0.34
Peer Group	0.17	0.47 (3) =	0.38	0.83 (3)
Self Political Interest	0.31	0.10	0.11	0.13
I.Q. Score	0.59	0.47 (3) =	0.32	0.90 (1)
Family	0.17	0.35 (5) =	0.12	0.15
Religion	0.32	0.18	0.52	0.22
Mass Media	0.11	0.18	0.30	0.28
Conceptualisation -			0.20	0.58 (5)
Social Class	0.41	0.28	0.20	0.69 (4)
Multiple R adjusted	= 0.38		= 0.26	
Multiple R square	= 0.14		= 0.07	

Figures in brackets are rankings for first five predictors.

It is now an opportune time to call a halt to our analysis of political development and see what fresh light has been thrown on political learning as a result of the analysis conducted in this chapter.

We said at the beginning of this investigation that political socialisation encompassed such complexities of relationship and movement

that isolation of individual variables would be a most hazardous business. That conclusion has been supported to the full. More especially we have been struck by the fact that the attribution of importance to a specific agent must, as far as possible, take into account an agent's interaction with other variables. It is obvious that in some instances the age of the respondent will be crucial in understanding the impact of an agent, while with others the impact will be similar among respondents irrespective of the age group from which they have been taken. Equally the relative influence of the agents will depend on the particular area of political learning in which the investigation is being made.

Any conclusions which we draw must therefore be couched with provisos and caveats. It was believed that the theoretical justification for including an individual predictor in this study was sound, and based in the findings of the past socialisation research. Our analysis of political growth, where restricted to one factor in addition to age, emphasises that considerable superficial variation may indeed be attributed to each predictor. None however divert the picture of growth that we had derived from the analysis conducted in the previous chapter. Nevertheless some variation in the relative impact of the predictors dealt with in our analysis is to be seen.

What was required to our multivariate procedures was that they help us to disentangle the influence of these predictors so that we might, more confidently, refer to one agent as more important than another. At the same time we wanted to know how well the predictors, when taken together, account for variation in the dependent orientation. According to the cognitive developmental model the individual's political growth will be influenced most directly in those areas which imply a

movement to a higher level of conceptualisation. Less immediately connected with cognitive development, but also liable to be affected, are orientations in the cognitive domain. The criteria for cognitive growth has initially been established as chronological age but it is assumed that our index of political conceptualisation and the I.Q. score will also be closely correlated. We have in practice strong supportive evidence that this triumvirate will enhance political learning by increasing the number of orientations acquired as well as their range. Secondly, they provide a superior measure of the way in which the individual perceives the political world about him. Not anticipated is the similar impact of these factors in the affective domain.

Each of the above conclusions is derived from the findings produced by the AID analysis. This technique also indicates that the impact of social forces is much more concentrated in its emphasis, with particular inference being exerted in the respondent's level of interest in political matters. Otherwise they are not likely to split the tree until the variation accounted for by the cognitive factors has been covered.

The picture of the political socialisation process as presented by MCA is in several respects fundamentally different to that implied in the AID analysis. MCA indicates that ranking predictors according to their relative importance does not produce the same neat picture of cognitive factors in the first rank followed at some distance by other social forces. What MCA does is to reduce the status of our individual differences from independent sources of influence to a position

approximating more to that of an intervening or moderator variable. In their place it emphasises the significance of the more traditional sources of variation in social learning, such as the influence of the family and the peer group or the social background from which he comes.

Not only therefore do we have the problem of interpreting the statistics produced by these two techniques but we have to decide which of the pictures is the more accurate one. The essential difficulty with AID is that it cannot deal efficiently with highly correlated factors in that the variation explainable by two correlated predictors will be attributed almost completely to that which causes the first split to be made. Thus when family interest is used to make the first split, the amount of variation that is subsequently explained by another highly correlated predictor, such as the politicisation level of the peer group, will drop. In contrast MCA will apportion influence between two such highly correlated factors.¹⁷ Despite this we believe that AID is generally better suited to the data used in this study because it, rather than MCA, can deal with the tendency to interaction which we have uncovered.

If the two techniques do not agree on the amount of variance, or the ranking, that may be attributed to an individual variable, they both emphasise that the combined influence of our predictors is not to be exaggerated. Generally a simple continuum operates with most variance being explained among orientations in the cognitive domain and least among those taken from the affective domain. Overall therefore even such a comprehensive list of traditional and less conventional agents as has been used here are frequently quite impotent in dealing with variation in the dependent variable. This probably

demands that different and more efficient operationalisations of some of the predictors included in this study be attempted but also that the net be cast even wider to bring in more sources of influence in political learning.

We are not the first to recoil with some dismay that our multivariate analysis does not yield a simple and elegant solution to the problems of political development. Yet our finding of a null influence of several key variables and of the general lack of consistency in impact between predictors and the various political orientations, is, in its own way, a conclusion which may help to bring more reality to the problems of distinguishing influence in political learning.

Key to AID and MCA tables and figures:

<u>Predictors:</u>	Code	Meaning
1. School Type:	1	Senior Secondary
	2	Comprehensive
	3	Part-comprehensive
	4	Junior Secondary
2. Age:	2	12 years old
	3	13 years old
	4	14 years old
	5	15 years old
	6	16 years old
	7	17 years old
	8	18 years old (only used in third year and above sample)
	3. Sex:	1
2		Female
4. Organisational membership:	1	High
	2	Medium
	3	Low
	4	No information
5. Peer group interest in politics	1	High
	2	Medium
	3	Low
	4	No information obtained
6. Interest in politics	1	High
	2	Medium
	3	Low
	4	No information obtained
7. I.Q. Score	1	High
	2	Medium
	3	Low
	4	No information obtained
8. Family interest in politics	1	High
	2	Medium
	3	Low
9. Religious Affiliation	1	Non-catholic
	2	Catholic
10. Mass media	0	Low
	1	Medium and high
11. Social Class	1	Managerial and other professional
	2	Other non-manual
	3	Manual
	4	Miscellaneous and no information obtained
12. Modern Studies	1	Taking Modern Studies
	2	Not taking Modern Studies (This variable is only used in the third year and above sample)

<u>Dependent Variables:</u>	Code	Meaning
1. Political Knowledge Scale:	1	High
	3	Medium
	5	Low

The following are all coded as in political knowledge:

2. Interest in politics		
3. Political Efficacy		
4. Political Toleration		
5. Political Support		
6. Political Cynicism		
7. Issue Ideologue	1	High
& 8. Conceptualisation	0	Low
9. Peace	1	Abstract leaning
& 10. War	2	Concrete leaning

FIGURE 6 : Political Knowledge Score




FIGURE 7 : Issue Ideologue




FIGURE 8 : Political Interest




FIGURE 9 : Political Efficacy




FIGURE 11 : General Political Support




FIGURE 12 : Political Conceptualisation




FIGURE 13 : Perception of War





FIGURE 14 : Perception of Peace



Footnotes to Chapter Six

1. See Chapter 5, TABLE 16.
2. See Chapter 5, TABLE 20.
3. See Chapter 5, TABLE 53.
4. See Chapter 5, TABLE 34.
5. See Chapter 5, TABLE 37.
6. See Chapter 5, TABLE 58.
7. See Chapter 5, TABLE 59.
8. See Chapter 5, TABLE 57.
9. Hess, R., & Torney, J., The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values toward Government and Citizenship during the Elementary School Years, Chapter 5, University of Chicago, 1965.
10. Tapper, E.R., Secondary School Adolescents: A Study of the Formation of their Role Aspirations and Attitudinal Patterns, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1968.
11. Several explanatory points are in order in connection with these tables that deal with the development of orientations while controlling for some other agency than age or where we compare individuals on some other agency than age or where we compare individuals on some other predictor while controlling for age. The background to the computation on the statistics may be found in: Anderson, T., & Zelditch, M., A Basic Course in Statistics, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958; or Blalock, H., Social Statistics, McGraw Hill, 1960 Chapter 15 especially.
12. Langton, K., & Karns, D., Influence of Different Agencies in Political Socialisation in Langton, K., Political Socialisation, Oxford, 1969, Chapter Six.

13. Sonquist, J., Multivariate Model Building, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1970.
14. Sonquist, J., Finding Variables that Work, University of Michigan, mimeo, 1967, p.12.
15. Sonquist, Multivariate Model Building, op.cit., p.101.
16. Ibid. All of the Figures for AID are at the end of the chapter.
17. Ibid. p.91.

Chapter Seven: Modern Studies and Political Development.

The objective outlined at the beginning of this thesis involved looking at political education in both the general context as well as more specifically in the school curriculum. Having painted a picture of the political training which takes place on the broad canvas outwith of the school, it remains to investigate the influence which formal political education in the school is able to exert. This entails the addition of one more agency to the list already included within our study. It has already proven exceptionally difficult to disentangle the relative importance that we can attribute to a single agent in the development of political orientations but nevertheless, this constitutes the prime focus of our study. Fortunately we are able to bring to bear on this problem not merely the full range of analytical procedures employed in the previous chapters, but in addition we have data available from another sample. It will be remembered that in our research design we divided the sample into two groups, one that is designated as the 'after-only' design, and which constitutes the set of data on which the analysis this far has been conducted and another much smaller group who were interviewed both 'before and after' exposure to the course in Modern Studies. In this chapter we will make use of both sets of data. The panel sample is particularly important because it enables us to assess the individual, rather than the aggregate, effects of Modern Studies. Therefore we have ample data from which to conclude whether or not this particular scheme for political education has a significant effect in political learning by making young people more knowledgeable, interested and skilled in dealing with the political world than they would otherwise have been.

The specific objectives of formal political education as contained by Modern Studies have already been considered in Chapter 3. Advances have

been predicted in both the cognitive and affective domains. Its general aim is to encourage future citizens who will be more knowledgeable about political life as well as more interested in political problems and confident of their ability to deal with them. Equally important is that the children be seen to make progress towards the attainment of analytical skills which generate confidence in their ability to cope with the complex world of politics.

The aims of Modern Studies in respect of affective orientations are necessarily restricted and poorly articulated for it is in the whirlpool of shifting political preferences that so many schemes for political education have come to grief. There has even been a reluctance to admit the dissemination of orientations generally regarded as appropriate for the citizen in the civic culture. The degree to which a political education course will enter the arena of direct exhortation of the political creed of that country will obviously vary between countries and courses, not to mention schools and teachers. As far as we can establish a general impression of the manner in which Modern Studies is presented in the school, we anticipate that even though not always made quite explicit, the political norms associated with democracy will be held more firmly as an outcome of exposure to this course.

The ambitions held up for Modern Studies must be tempered by the situation in which the course is operating. We have already fully discussed the acquisition of political orientations as well as the directions in which these move during adolescence. And since Modern Studies is not taught to children until they reach the third year at school, we recognise that it is introduced when many orientations relevant directly and indirectly to the political world will have been established, or at least well past the embryo stage. For example, even by the time the child is

old enough to be included in our sample he has acquired a variety of predispositions towards the political system and his interest in the affairs of the political world. These indicate in part only the extent to which the young person's political education proceeds outside the school. It is not however the case that political orientations once acquired will then be maintained for life; it is manifestly apparent from our data that orientations continue to evolve. This applies moreover not just in the cognitive domain but in the individual's evaluations of the political world.

With political learning a continuing process, it might be thought that Modern Studies will be able to exert an impact of its own. Yet Modern Studies is in competition with a powerful array of social forces and intra-individual differences and we wonder why, and where, the addition of one more variable will bring about further change. No doubt there are considerable grounds for improvement in the directions in which Modern Studies is seeking to guide the children, but we have to note the research of others in America in this field which warns against any illusions one might foster about the potency of a few hours a week of civics instruction in making substantial inroads on the political orientations exhibited by a similar age group.

We have consciously presented the case against the possibility that Modern Studies will exert any influence because we feel obliged to reject the unbridled optimism which pervades some educationalists. For them, exposure at school to a particular set of ideas is tantamount to conversion, at least they would argue, for those pupils with any intelligence. Such a view may have some basis in the non-controvertible and school dominated presentation of subjects such as science or mathematics. The contentious area of contemporary problems and affairs is quite another matter. We have already raised the importance of social forces outside of the school.

This means that the schoolteacher of Modern Studies is not merely battling with the general problem of communication, but furthermore has to operate in an area where the recipient in the classroom already has prior knowledge, and more important, possibly contrary opinions. Moreover, the teacher of mathematics is above controversy as to the validity of the solutions he is bound to offer, whereas in political education the teacher may be extremely reluctant to supply answers to problems or else finds it difficult to provide solutions which will satisfy those whom he is supposed to be teaching.

The pattern of our investigation will proceed as follows: to begin with we will examine the influence of Modern Studies by comparing those pupils who have taken the course with those who have not. We will then seek to rank the influence of Modern Studies in comparison, and in combination, with other socialisation agents already found important in political learning. All of this analysis will be carried out on the larger 'after only' sample. It then will be the turn of the panel sample to come under our scrutiny. Finally, we will round off this chapter by engaging in further multivariate analysis of the main sample, making joint use of the AID and MCA techniques.

Before we actually get the full analysis under way, we will provide some figures which enable the reader to gain a picture of the differences, if any, in the characteristics of the pupils in the control and experimental groups. For obvious reasons it would be a rather futile exercise to engage in an evaluation of the influence of Modern Studies in political learning when pupils taking this course were found to comprise in disproportionate numbers, those with a low I.Q., from a manual background and from lowly politicised families. We would hardly need to engage in any further analysis to predict that Modern Studies would be without influence on the development of political orientations.

In practice the two groups split in the following ways:

TABLE 102: Numbers taking Modern Studies by age,
(third year and above).

	Taking Modern Studies	Not taking Modern Studies
14 Years	262 (30.6%)	179 (24.0%)
15 Years	327 (38.2%)	292 (39.1%)
16 Years	166 (19.4%)	212 (28.4%)
17 Years	100 (11.7%)	63 (8.4%)
Total	855 (99.9%)	746 (99.9%)

The first indication of numbers involved in our analysis at each age group indicates both that we have adequate numbers at all points in absolute terms as well as having a broadly similar proportion within age groups between the experimental and control sections.

Further comparison on the respondent's sex and his I.Q. score assures us of close similarities on these characteristics. Throughout all of the age groups, with one exception, there is a preponderance of girls. (See TABLE 103). With respect to the I.Q. score of the respondents we are faced with an uneven distribution of those pupils for whom no score was available. In addition, there is a tendency for the control group who are not taking Modern Studies, to have a slightly greater number of high I.Q. pupils within their ranks. The problem would be slightly less if the differences were always consistent between age groups, but unfortunately they are not. This implies that some caution is necessary, although when those whose I.Q. score is not known are excluded, there is far less variation between the two groups on this characteristic.

TABLE 103: Distribution of sexes among those taking Modern Studies, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
14 Years	38.2%	61.8%	50.3%	49.7%
15 Years	41.0	59.0	46.2	53.8
16 Years	47.0	53.3	35.9	64.2
17 Years	40.0	60.0	42.9	57.1
Whole Group	41.2%	58.8%	44.0%	56.0%

TABLE 104: Distribution of I.Q. scores, by age

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High I.Q.	Medium & Low	NA	High I.Q.	Medium & Low	NA
14 Years	21.4%	68.7%	9.9%	21.2%	72.6%	6.1%
15 Years	17.7	68.2	14.1	24.7	56.5	18.8
16 Years	29.5	64.5	6.0	40.6	44.8	14.6
17 Years	42.0	46.0	12.0	30.2	41.2	28.6
Whole Group	24.0%	65.0%	11.0%	28.8%	55.8%	15.4%

The last variable on which we propose comparing groups is the social class background of the respondent. This is obviously one characteristic on which comparisons would be expected of us, although as we have demonstrated in our own analysis, social class does not have the influence on the development of adolescent's political orientations that it has been shown to exert among adults. What we have done is to divide the sample into those who come from a manual background and those others from a non-manual background. The percentage who were either not able to provide the occupational characteristics of their father or whose fathers had too vague or otherwise unclassifiable jobs was so small that they have not been included in the table presented below:

TABLE 105: Distribution of social class background, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies	
	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual
14 Years	66.8%	33.2%	66.5%	33.5%
15 Years	62.9	37.1	60.5	39.5
16 Years	56.4	43.6	50.9	49.1
17 Years	58.3	41.7	42.6	57.4
Whole Group	62.3%	37.7%	57.7%	42.3%

The comparison of the two age groups on the social background from which the pupils come produces striking similarities. It is only among the 17 year olds that there is a marked contrast but overall on this feature as well as sex and the I.Q. score there is a considerable overlap which promotes confidence that a comparison of the two groups will not be unduly biased by differential characteristics between the groups.

By the time that the child is allowed the opportunity of taking Modern Studies he will be in at least the third year of his secondary school life. What does this mean in terms of his political growth? To recap on the discussion in the previous two chapters we have found that at the age of 14 years the adolescent is still accumulating information and ideas at a substantial rate. This applies most especially to the acquisition of political knowledge but even in the affective domain changes are anticipated in his orientations. The figures pertaining to the rate, as well as the level of political development, are particularly important because, as we have repeatedly stressed, the fourteen year old should have travelled well down the road which will take him from the level of concrete operations into the world of abstract reasoning. Our sample of 14 year olds do not in fact seem to have gone very far in this direction, and in common with their elders, demonstrate considerable flexibility in the application of formal operations between areas or stimuli.

The potential for influence from Modern Studies administered at this time is therefore not inconsiderable. One final proviso is in order. It has always been the conclusion of our findings on the development of political orientations that age acts as a most efficient predictor of growth. Few exceptions were found: but where they did come to light it is generally in the age change from 14 to 15 years. Explanations for this discrepancy do not seem to lie in the drawing of our sample nor in some peculiar quirk in the developmental process. Instead, the most likely reason lies in the school leaving age being set at 15 years. While this problem remains in the present sample, we see no reason on the basis of the distribution of I.Q. scores and the similarities in the social background of the two groups of respondents to believe that this feature will disproportionately effect, for example, the experimental, rather than the control group.

Firstly, we will look at the rate of acquisition of political orientations demonstrated by pupils in the two groups. TABLE 106 contains figures on the rate of acquisition across a wide range of political orientations in both the cognitive and the affective domains.

TABLE 106:: The Percentage recording non-acquisition of political orientations among those taking Modern Studies, by age. ¹

	Those taking Modern Studies					
	Political knowledge	Issue ideologue	Knowledge of Communism	Interest in politics	Toleration	Peace
14 Years	23.3%	22.0%	50.7%	18.7%	14.4%	28.6%
15 Years	21.0	20.2	43.4	13.8	11.9	19.9
16 Years	12.0	11.9	27.2	7.8	10.1	15.1
17 Years	5.9	7.3	9.2	5.0	7.8	11.0
	Those not taking Modern Studies					
14 Years	26.4	26.3	53.5	22.4	14.7	29.6
15 Years	21.3	22.1	35.6	19.5	10.1	20.9
16 Years	13.6	13.2	29.3	18.9	8.4	19.8
17 Years	8.2	15.1	11.8	12.7	7.9	12.7

Taking the orientations as a whole, it is seen that the control group of pupils not taking Modern Studies is always somewhat less likely to have acquired political orientations. In addition this tendency increases slightly with age. The magnitude of these differences is minimal however, and we will be looking for more visible variation if Modern Studies is to carry weight as an influence in political learning. More interesting is that the gap between the groups may be accounted for largely because of two orientations; they are the respondent's acquisition of the higher levels of political knowledge in the issue oriented questions and secondly, in the respondent's indication that he is completely lacking in any interest in the affairs of the political world.

If we move from the rate at which orientations are acquired, to their changing character, there is among the lower levels a most confused and often contradictory picture. In the items which comprise the political knowledge scale it is plain that some items, such as those referring to the name of the U.S. President or the Prime Minister, present so little difficulty that virtually everyone among the youngest of the children is able to supply the correct answer. With the remainder of the questions, no clear pattern emerges; the experimental group are better informed of the name of the Leader of the Conservative Party but are less likely to know the position held by Mr. Thorpe. Overall, the Modern Studies pupil is more likely to provide the correct reply to these items but the strength of this relationship is so small as to be negligible.

TABLE 107: Political Knowledge scale scores of those taking₂ Modern Studies, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
14 Years	53.8%	34.7%	11.5%	49.7%	30.2%	20.1%
15 Years	60.9	29.4	9.8	57.5	33.2	9.3
16 Years	77.7	16.9	4.8	76.4	21.7	1.9
17 Years	93.0	6.0	1.0	92.1	6.4	-

The pattern demonstrated in TABLE 107 again sees those pupils from the experimental group outscoring their counterparts of the same age. It also means that the differences subside among the older children to complete insignificance - in the statistical sense. Conversely, the variation in the youngest group is relatively more, though not very strong, with most difference occurring in the percentage who score very lowly, rather than very highly. The explanation for the relatively greater distinction among the youngest children is in part, due to the nature of the questions which were generally found to be well within the scope of knowledge of those in our sample over 15 years of age. Thus among the older children, there exist few powerful discriminating items. We also presume that the relatively better showing of the younger children who have taken Modern Studies is partly attributable to this course, but re-iterate that no strongly significant differences between the two groups on their political knowledge scores have been found, i.e. at 0.05 level or more.

Modern Studies is not merely directed to the study of domestic political problems but also includes a separate section dealing with World Affairs. Basic to an appreciation of the major forces at work in the international arena, is an ability to relate foreign countries to a particular position in the supposed confrontation between the major forces of communism, western-style democracy, and the non-aligned countries. Here the same pattern of response between the two groups emerges, as with

the previous questions in the cognitive domain. Overall, the strongest impression gained from an inspection of TABLE 108 is of the growth towards higher knowledge which is made with age, irrespective of whether we are considering the control or the experimental group. Where we do contrast the scores of the two groups, the largest gulf appears among the 14 year olds, but then declines to a negligible proportion among the older pupils. Nevertheless, this difference, taking the average figures, nowhere exceeds 5%. Indeed if it were not for the inclusion of India and Switzerland as items in this scale, the variation would disappear almost completely.

TABLE 108: Correct response rate to international labels³
by those taking Modern Studies, by age.

Those taking Modern Studies								
	Britain	Canada	Russia	India	China	Switzerland	Poland	Average
14 Years	57.6%	57.6%	87.4%	45.4%	72.1%	55.7%	47.7%	60.5%
15 Years	66.4	59.0	87.8	46.2	76.8	63.6	54.1	64.8
16 Years	83.1	71.7	98.2	59.6	91.0	74.7	65.1	77.6
17 Years	91.0	75.0	100.0	65.0	96.0	81.0	79.0	83.9
Those not taking Modern Studies								
	Britain	Canada	Russia	India	China	Switzerland	Poland	Average
14 Years	52.0	47.5	81.6	34.6	68.2	55.9	47.5	55.3
15 Years	66.1	62.0	90.1	47.3	81.5	71.6	54.1	67.5
16 Years	83.0	68.9	97.6	47.2	90.6	83.5	67.5	76.9
17 Years	92.1	77.8	98.4	50.8	90.5	81.0	79.4	81.4

If international appreciation is not improved significantly, are we to draw the same conclusion about knowledge of the issue orientation of the political parties in Britain? Again, we would point out that the section in the Modern Studies syllabus which refers to the political system quite specifically indicates the objective of increasing knowledge of the political party programmes. The three questions which we joined together in a simple index of issue knowledge, cover the party most in favour of

Scottish independence, the party most likely to be supported by businessmen, and lastly that party which is believed to be most in favour of nationalisation. These comprise the index score, and the two features are reported in TABLE 109 below.

Once again we detect that the balance of political knowledge is marginally tilted in the favour of those pupils taking Modern Studies. This applies both to the individual items as well as the ideologue index itself. The pattern is not consistently in the direction of the Modern Studies pupil providing the correct response, since the first item dealing with Scottish independence is more clearly perceived by the control group. In contrast, the higher appreciation of the second and third items rests with the Modern Studies section. This is an interesting feature which ties in with the common sense assumption that if Modern Studies is to produce variation in political learning, it will most likely occur in those areas not normally covered, or poorly covered, by other socialisation agents. Thus the first item dealing with the party most in favour of Scottish independence, which is also the issue most likely to have confronted the adolescent in the mass media or everyday conversation, is the one item where Modern Studies does not effect the higher level of knowledge. Conversely those items which are less central in terms of popular debate, but more relevant to the objectives of Modern Studies, produce the largest variation between the two groups. The greatest surprise really is that the gap between them is not wider.

TABLE 109: Issue orientation and those taking Modern Studies,⁴
by age.
(Percentage giving the correct response).

Those taking Modern Studies

	1. In favour of independent Scotland	2. Supported by businessmen	3. Favours nationalisation	Ideologue Index (high)
14 Years	78.2 %	47.0 %	43.5 %	25.6 %
15 Years	82.6	64.2	51.1	37.9
16 Years	81.3	70.5	65.1	49.4
17 Years	76.0	90.0	82.0	54.0

Those not taking Modern Studies

14 Years	74.3	40.8	34.1	19.8
15 Years	82.9	57.9	49.0	33.1
16 Years	87.7	72.6	58.0	43.1
17 Years	84.1	71.4	63.5	45.6

This brief examination of the lower levels of orientation in the cognitive domain points to a consistency in the impact attributable to Modern Studies which is quite remarkable. The next point to make, however, is that the strength of any variation is quite negligible. Generally it is relatively more marked with the younger children but among the older children we reject any suggestion that Modern Studies has a clear influence on the development of political knowledge.

What of the higher levels in this domain, where for example, one has to comprehend an abstract concept such as Communism? This item permits the respondent to not merely indicate his familiarity with the political world, but further provides him with the opportunity of answering at the level of sophistication in which he most prefers to operate.

TABLE 110: The Meaning of communism and those taking₅ Modern Studies, by age.

Those taking Modern Studies				
	Economic System	Equality	Totalitarianism	Wrong/DK/NA.
14 Years	11.3%	18.2%	17.3%	53.2%
15 Years	10.5	22.9	20.5	46.1
16 Years	17.6	26.4	24.8	31.2
17 Years	30.3	32.9	22.4	11.8
Those not taking Modern Studies				
14 Years	13.2	18.4	12.3	56.1
15 Years	17.0	26.7	18.5	37.8
16 Years	24.2	30.3	14.1	31.3
17 Years	17.6	35.3	29.4	17.6

If we concentrate for the moment on the information contained in the response rather than the manner in which the reply was phrased, we can see that in this instance we have a reversal of the trend outlined as arising in the cognitive domain. Instead of the Modern Studies pupil tending to provide the more positive appreciation of the beliefs of communism, by concentrating on the economic or egalitarian aspects, he seems less inclined to opt for such a response pattern, at least until the oldest age group is reached. Again, however, the differences of which we are speaking are negligible and quite lacking in consistency. Much the same conclusion may be applied to the replies given to the item on the meaning of democracy. In the main it is the non-Modern Studies pupil at the younger age levels who produces more evidence of political knowledge than his counterpart in the experimental group. This contravenes our earlier conclusion that, while Modern Studies did not appear to exert much of an influence on the growth of political knowledge, it can be expected to produce a relatively less negligible effect among the youngest pupils. In this

case it appears that the later acquisition of orientations at this more demanding level holds up the small variation that we have come to associate with Modern Studies until the respondent is 16 or 17 years old.

That Modern Studies should have little or no impact in the cognitive domain leads us to predict that there will be no more than negligible differences in the affective domain. Our reasons include the avowed objectives of the Modern Studies course as well as the greater variation which, with other socialisation agents always rests in the cognitive domain. It is also more likely that by the age of 14 years, the acquisition of fresh orientations in the affective domain will be slowing down.

We will look first at the crucial area of the amount of interest expressed by members of the two groups in the political world.

TABLE 111: Interest in Politics and those taking Modern Studies,⁶ by age.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
14 Years	12.2%	69.0%	18.7%	8.9%	68.7%	22.4%
15 Years	17.4	68.8	13.8	12.7	67.8	19.5
16 Years	25.3	66.9	7.8	18.4	62.7	18.9
17 Years	31.0	64.0	5.0	19.1	68.3	12.7

This initial incursion into the affective domain produces more definite evidence for the influence of Modern Studies than we have unearthed in the cognitive domain. From the outset there is a small but noticeable difference between the two groups in the amount of attention which they claim to pay to the political world. Moreover, the strength of the difference between the two groups tends to increase with age so that the most substantial variation is recorded among the 17 year olds.

When we turn from the basic awareness and interest in the political world to the spectrum of democratic orientations tapped in this study, namely political efficacy, toleration, cynicism, plus the level of support for the regime, we discover that this tendency to variation persists through the affective domain. This is quickly demonstrated by an examination of the scores on the political efficacy and toleration scales.

TABLE 112: Political Efficacy Scores and those taking₇ Modern Studies, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies				Not taking Modern Studies			
	High	Medium	Low	NA	High	Medium	Low	NA
14 Years	25.2%	59.2%	11.2%	4.2%	17.3%	67.6%	13.4%	1.7%
15 Years	29.4	54.4	13.2	3.1	23.3	64.4	10.6	1.7
16 Years	38.0	55.4	6.0	0.6	37.7	51.9	9.0	1.4
17 Years	52.0	46.0	1.0	1.0	36.5	57.1	4.8	1.6

TABLE 113: Political Toleration Scores and those taking₈ Modern Studies, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies				Not taking Modern Studies			
	High	Medium	Low	NA	High	Medium	Low	NA
14 Years	58.8%	30.5%	4.2%	6.5%	55.9%	35.2%	6.2%	2.8%
15 Years	64.8	29.7	1.8	3.7	65.4	26.4	5.5	2.7
16 Years	68.1	27.7	0.6	2.0	78.3	17.9	1.4	2.4
17 Years	74.0	21.0	3.0	-	84.1	12.7	1.6	1.6

Whereas the control group claim lower levels of political efficacy, they equally manage to outscore the Modern Studies pupils on the political toleration scale. While the differences in both scales tends to be more significant than anything found in the cognitive domain, they still do not obtain great strength. However, these are but a foretaste of the far more significant variation which occurs in the subjects' level of alienation

from the political system as contained in his replies to the political cynicism items. In this case it can be seen from TABLE 114,

TABLE 114: Political Cynicism Scores and those taking 9
Modern Studies, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies				Not taking Modern Studies			
	High	Medium	Low	NA	High	Medium	Low	NA
14 Years	47.3%	30.5%	18.7%	3.4%	43.0%	38.6%	11.7%	6.7%
15 Years	43.7	38.2	13.8	4.3	35.3	33.9	20.6	10.3
16 Years	51.2	32.5	14.5	1.8	37.3	31.1	23.1	8.5
17 Years	57.0	32.0	10.0	1.0	28.6	41.3	22.2	7.9

that the proportion indicating that they feel less alienated from the political world and its prime actors falls off in the experimental group. This corresponds to a rise with age in the numbers who are apparently quite satisfied with the world of the politician. A total reversal of these trends takes place among those who have not taken Modern Studies. This means that both the number happy with the political authorities declines with age as the number antagonistic to the system increases. Thus the relationship of political cynicism and age is positive in one group and negative in the other. Equally unexpected is that a further pattern of differences emerges among the two groups on the level of their support for the regime.

TABLE 115: General Support for British Government and 10
those taking Modern Studies, by age.

	Taking Modern Studies				Not taking Modern Studies			
	High	Medium	Low	NA	High	Medium	Low	NA
14 Years	27.1%	37.8%	9.2%	26.0%	23.5%	35.8%	12.9%	27.9%
15 Years	22.6	39.5	13.2	24.8	17.1	39.4	17.1	26.4
16 Years	27.7	44.0	12.7	15.7	22.6	40.1	19.3	17.9
17 Years	32.0	44.0	10.0	14.0	22.2	39.7	15.9	22.2

While the reaction of the two groups on the general support scale does not produce the reversal in trend with age that we detected in the cynicism scale it is noticeable all the same that the Modern Studies pupils are consistently more supportive of the British system of government than their counterparts in the control group. Having traced our way through four central areas of the respondents' acceptance of democratic norms, the conclusion is quite definitely that the Modern Studies pupil will demonstrate a higher acceptance of the more 'democratic' orientation. At the same time, differences widen with increasing age. These conclusions are in contrast to the findings produced from our examination of Modern Studies influence in the cognitive domain. Variation is stronger in the affective domain and often quite significantly so. Nevertheless, the influence of Modern Studies should not be exaggerated. If we cast our mind back to the analysis of these same areas in Chapter 6, using other more conventional socialisation agents, the influence of Modern Studies attains a clearer perspective. Without exception it does not induce the distinction between orientations or patterns of growth that we described as being achieved by the first order of socialisation factors.

There remains the question of whether this course can stimulate those in the experimental group to higher levels of political conceptualisation and more abstract perception of such key terms in the political vocabulary as war and peace. In the classification of responses we have distinguished between categories of response which are ranked as abstract and others which have been described as concrete (or passive).

TABLE 116: Perception of war and those taking Modern Studies, ¹¹ by age.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Concrete	Abstract	NA	Concrete	Abstract	NA
14 Years	66.4%	22.1%	11.5%	68.2%	21.7%	10.1%
15 Years	63.6	26.0	10.4	73.0	21.2	5.8
16 Years	63.9	30.1	6.0	65.1	28.3	6.6
17 Years	71.0	27.0	2.0	74.6	20.6	4.8

Neither of the groups provide a picture of change in orientations with age which could justifiably be categorised as political growth. Reversals and uneven movements abound. The unmistakable impression is of an absence of influence on political learning in this area from Modern Studies. A rather similar conclusion can be applied to the subjects' perception of the term peace, although here we do find a more clearly defined growth in the more abstract response pattern. This occurs in both groups but especially in the Modern Studies section.

TABLE 117: Perception of peace and those taking Modern Studies, by age. 12

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Passive	Positive	NA	Passive	Positive	NA
14 Years	39.7%	31.7%	28.6%	40.8%	29.6%	29.6%
15 Years	40.7	39.1	20.2	40.1	39.0	20.9
16 Years	34.3	50.6	15.1	36.8	43.4	19.8
17 Years	34.0	55.0	11.0	42.9	44.4	12.7

In our analysis of the development of reciprocal reasoning, as contained in objective responsibility or equity, we noted that this did not seem to be a feature of the learning that takes place in early adolescence but rather is something which has to wait until late adolescence before emerging with any speed or noticeable direction. Yet even among this oldest section there persists a considerable reluctance to engage wholeheartedly in applying their presumed powers of abstract thinking to the political world. This means that where the subjects are asked to attribute responsibility for war they persist in the belief that particular individuals or countries are always culpable. Similarly, they see peace as merely the discontinuation of war or other immediate manifestations of the conflict rather than blaming underlying conditions or currents of opinion which will tend to arise where a long term view of the problem is taken.

TABLE 118: Responsibility for War and those taking Modern Studies, by age. 13

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies	
	Underlying forces and human failings	Particular persons, countries and events	Underlying forces and human failings	Particular persons, countries and events
14 Years	51.9%	48.1%	52.4%	47.6%
15 Years	40.8	59.2	50.0	50.0
16 Years	60.9	39.1	54.1	45.9
17 Years	55.7	44.3	60.7	39.3

(NA are excluded)

TABLE 118 does not indicate that there is any clear trend in the move towards equity. In contrast the perception of the term peace, as well as the responsibility for peace, are both dealt with in an increasingly positive fashion by the group of pupils taking Modern Studies. The reason for their clearer perception of problems involving the term peace rather than war probably harps back to the earlier salience of war in the minds of young children. Violence and conflict characterise their early years of play situations. War games they can relate to, whereas peace causes consternation. Where an agency does promote a new perspective on international conflict, as we presume Modern Studies to do, there is some support for the belief that it can produce a pattern during adolescence in marked contrast to the line taken by those in the control group.

This brings us finally to consider the level of political conceptualisation that we believe the respondent to have attained.

TABLE 119: Level of conceptualisation and those taking Modern Studies, by age. 14

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies	
	High	Low	High	Low
14 Years	35.5%	64.5%	29.6%	70.4%
15 Years	42.8	57.2	33.6	66.4
16 Years	54.8	45.2	39.6	60.4
17 Years	66.0	34.0	50.0	50.0

It has always been emphasized by those concerned with the introduction of Modern Studies that a central objective of the course is to influence the way in which young people manage the complexities of the contemporary world. A constituent element in any such movement towards critical thinking is the changeover to a more abstract level in dealing with social problems. TABLE 119 indicates that the pupil who has taken Modern Studies is indeed more likely to exhibit a higher level of conceptualisation. Moreover, the gap widens with age and the significance of this difference becomes correspondingly greater. That Modern Studies should appear to exert an influence in this area may provoke some gentle optimism about the efficiency of formal political education to influence political thinking. Nevertheless, the general impression, which is derived from a view of the influence of Modern Studies after considering the whole range of political orientations, is that its impact is not to be construed as anything more than moderate, at the most. Not only is it uneven in its effect on political learning, but more noticeably, its strength is slightly more persistent in the affective domain than among cognitive orientations. This is the reverse of what we had expected. While the American studies in this area, to which we have referred elsewhere, see even less significance in formal political education than we have found, they do suggest that the greater impact will be felt in the child's acquisition of political knowledge. That is not our conclusion.

Nor do we find that Modern Studies acts with any great force in producing variation in the more demanding orientations, since although the differences are generally in the favour of the experimental group, they only attain statistical significance intermittently.

This far we have been considering the differences between those taking Modern Studies and the remaining pupils solely on the basis of age.

Our investigation of this data does not suggest that there is any tendency whereby the influence of the course will become greater with age, either because the pupils might be thought more interested in, and better able to deal with the political world as they became more mature, or because the influence of a political education course is regarded as cumulative. Immediate differences then become less important because Modern Studies has rather paved the way for future development by establishing underlying predispositions favourable for such growth. If these are implanted, our inquiry has no evidence that they will surface during adolescence.

We will now change the focus of this discussion from an investigation of differences between age groups, to a wider perspective where we can examine how far there is any interaction between the taking of Modern Studies and other socialisation forces which will accentuate or minimize the variation in political orientations.

Two main approaches may be taken. In the first we can inspect the relationship between a particular socialisation agent and a variety of selected political orientations after controlling for the taking, or not, of Modern Studies. An alternative procedure to the above is to examine the association between whether or not the respondent has taken the course in question and these orientations while controlling for the various socialisation agents.

In the first instance we are concerned with investigating how far taking Modern Studies appears to dampen or enhance the interaction between, for example, the I.Q. score of the respondent and his level of political knowledge. In the data covering this aspect, two relationships in particular interest us. To begin with we want to know how far Modern Studies goes towards producing a stronger relationship between the I.Q. score of the respondent and his political knowledge than would otherwise

exist, and then we will want a more definite impression of the level of political learning achieved by the two groups. As far as the differences which evolve where we control for the taking of Modern Studies are concerned, we are presented with some difficulty in interpreting whether a gap between the two partials is to be construed as noteworthy or not. We finally decided upon the figure of greater than 1.0 where the coefficient calculated is gamma, and more than 0.7 where a contingency coefficient was the measure of association used. The socialisation agents and dependent variables are the same as those considered in previous chapters. Of the 91 relationships involved, no more than 21 (22.6%) fall within our designation of noteworthy. Provided that our arbitrary distinction is accepted, the implication is clear; the impact of Modern Studies is to be regarded as slight even where we bring other socialisation agents into the analytical framework. There is no indication from these figures that interaction will be any greater with one agent above all others nor that more variation will become apparent in any of the political orientations selected, with the sole exception of the respondent's level of equity. Even here however, the Modern Studies group does not consistently provide a picture of greater political development.

Thus far, the figures produced tend to dismiss thoughts of an interaction between Modern Studies and other socialisation agents, but we must bear in mind that the measure of association can only deal with one aspect of the relationship between Modern Studies and these other forces. An alternative perspective may be obtained by inspecting the influence of this course within sub-groups of other agents. It has been found, for example, that controlling for Modern Studies does little to change the strength of the relationship between the I.Q. score of the respondent and his level of interest in political affairs. Yet, when we compare those respondents with a high I.Q. score who are taking Modern

Studies and those who are not we discover that there is a significant difference between them, as indeed there is between these two groups within the medium and low I.Q. category. What does this tell us?

The point is that the similarity in the partials where we control for Modern Studies might lead us to conclude that there is little impact or interaction between Modern Studies and other agents of socialisation. We now have evidence that among those with a high I.Q. score a significant difference exists, and is as it happens in favour of the Modern Studies group, so that these respondents are more likely to have a high involvement in politics than those with a high I.Q. but not taking Modern Studies. Our interest centres on discovering whether Modern Studies acts with greater potency among the more deprived or the more well endowed pupil. That Modern Studies can promote a more substantial difference in feelings of efficacy among the high I.Q. group than it is able to achieve among those with a lower I.Q. indicates to us that Modern Studies has little influence as a remedial factor in political learning. In fact, quite the reverse, since what it does in this case is to make those already more fortunate in their range of political stimulants more 'successful', in the sense that they either become more knowledgeable of political affairs or acquire more 'democratic' orientations, or a more abstract view of the political world.

A chart of the distribution of significant differences in this regard is included in TABLE 120. In the table as a whole the significant differences are seen to be in a definite minority (35.9%). They are, moreover, grouped strongly into particular orientations such as the level of political interest, cynicism and conceptualisation rather than being concentrated into a particular sub-group within a specific socialisation agent. Most internal variation appears to occur within the I.Q. score,

religious affiliation and sex categories. There is, however, no tendency whereby Modern Studies pupils are more likely to be significantly different from their counterparts in the better endowed, nor the more deprived, category for any particular agent. This seems to discount any suggestion that there is any widespread differential impact on the part of Modern Studies so that it either sweeps the more advanced pupils even further ahead in their political learning, or induces some sort of remedial reaction among the disadvantaged groups such as those with a low family interest in political affairs. Obviously specific instances of both patterns may be found, but they emerge with no regularity.

Another feature which clearly strikes one in TABLE 120 is that the Modern Studies pupils, even if they do not significantly outscore all others in the school, do generally exhibit a marginally superior stance in their political orientations. No more than 21.1% of the possible cases for variation indicate that the pupil not taking Modern Studies will score higher, and two thirds of these reside in the children's political toleration score and his perception of peace. The evaluation by the Modern Studies children of the toleration items is manifestly not in the least affected by the other socialisation agents into which they are tuned. This is the single exception however to the general rule that the pupil who has taken Modern Studies will have become more sensitive to the 'correct' evaluation of democratic norms. The perception of peace is unique in that it alone of the dependent variables does not produce a significant difference between those taking Modern Studies and those not taking the subject. We have already concluded in our analysis of international conflict in Chapter 5 that the concepts raised in that area were noticeable for the lack of variation that they produced even when we considered the whole adolescent period.

TABLE 120: Significance of differences in political orientations between those taking Modern Studies and those not.

Type of Political Orientation.

	Knowledge	Interest	Efficacy	Toleration	Cynicism	Support	Concept.	Peace	
<u>FAMILY INTEREST</u>									
High	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	-
Medium	--*	S*	--*	S	S*	S*	S*	S*	--*
Low	--*	--*	-	-	--*	--*	S*	--*	--*
<u>PEER INTEREST</u>									
High	-	S*	S*	-	-	-	S*	--*	--*
Medium	--*	S*	--*	-	--*	--*	S*	-	-
Low	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*	--*
<u>SOCIAL CLASS</u>									
Non-manual	--*	S*	--*	-	S*	S*	--*	S*	--*
Manual	--*	S*	--*	-	S*	--*	S*	S*	--*
<u>RELIGION</u>									
Catholic	--*	S*	--*	--*	S*	S*	S*	S*	-
Non-catholic	S	S*	--*	-	S*	S*	S*	S*	--*
<u>SCHOOL TYPE</u>									
Sen. Secondary	--*	--*	S*	--*	S*	S*	S*	S*	--*
Comprehensive	-	--*	--*	-	S*	--*	-	-	-
<u>SEX</u>									
Male	--*	S*	S*	-	S*	--*	S*	S*	--*
Female	--*	S*	S*	-	S*	--*	S*	S*	--*
<u>I.Q.</u>									
High	--*	S*	S*	-	S*	--*	S*	-	-
Medium & Low	--*	S*	-	S	S*	S*	S*	S*	-
<u>CONCEPTUALISATION</u>									
High	--*	S*	S*	-	--*	--*	-	-	-
Low	-	--*	--*	-	S*	--*	-	--*	--*
<u>WHOLE SAMPLE</u>									
	--*	S*	S*	S	S*	S*	S*	S*	-

Key: - Difference not significant at 0.05 level (Chi-square)
 S Difference significant at least at 0.05 level (Chi-square)
 An asterisk * means that the Modern Studies group has the highest percentage of its members in the high scoring category on that orientation, e.g. high knowledge or more abstract view of peace.

Instead of seeing Modern Studies as potentially widening existing differences in political learning between various sub-groups within the total population or closing these same gaps, it does seem on balance more likely that Modern Studies will have but a moderate impact in political learning but that this will be distributed evenly across all of the groups comprising a particular agent. In other words, it distributes its favours equally between, for instance, males and females and between those from a manual background and those from a non-manual background.

PANEL STUDY

The analysis that we have conducted this far has been concerned with the aggregate changes in political orientations which enable us to tell how far there are differences between groups with particular characteristics, such as all members coming from the same social background or in the case which interests us here, whether they have taken a course in Modern Studies or not. A particular drawback of such a design is that we are not able to say exactly how far individual changes in political learning fit in with the pattern which is seen from aggregate results.

The advantages of complementing the analysis of a cross sectional sample with an examination of individual changes through a panel study have been increasingly recognised in political research. A simple example will be sufficient to convince those who doubt the validity of this claim. If we consider some hypothetical figures on replies to a question of whether people who have seen a programme warning them of the dangers of cigarette smoking continue to smoke, we might get the following replies:

	Time 1		Time 2	
	Smokes	Does not smoke	Smokes	Does not smoke
Time 1				
Smokes	20	30	20	30
Does not smoke	30	20	30	20
	(50)	(50)	(50)	(50)

Analysis of the marginals alone indicates that exactly the same number smoke before being exposed to the film as did after. From this it would be reasonable to assume that the programme had not had any effect and that no change in behaviour had resulted. Closer examination of the individual cell entries presents a quite different picture. It is

then apparent that a majority of the people interviewed have altered their behaviour with respect to smoking but that an equal number moved away from smoking as took it up. This pattern necessitates a completely different interpretation being placed on the health film.

In our case, we interviewed children at the beginning of the school session, and again at the end of the year. Our sample then consisted of those in the experimental group who had been exposed to a year of Modern Studies teaching, and a control group who did not take this particular course.

In this section therefore, we will be examining the data for individual changes in orientation, and especially for any impact which Modern Studies may exert during this period. Of course, as with any other design, the panel study can have its drawbacks. In particular, one has to be careful that the children are not sensitized so much in the first interview to the problems that one is investigating that the questionnaire as much as the experimental stimulus induces changes in orientations. Again, one has to be particularly careful lest the individuals which comprise the experimental and control groups be composed of individuals with quite different backgrounds and characteristics, such as are likely to confound the influence that we shall be ascribing essentially to Modern Studies.

On the first point, we do not believe that our questionnaire is so obviously geared to assessing the influence of Modern Studies, nor so salient to the respondents, that appreciable learning took place as a consequence of answering the questionnaire. Again the content and format of the questionnaire was changed slightly between the first and second administration, as was the person responsible for conducting the interview in the school. The result was that few of the children appeared aware that

they had been answering much the same question nine months previously.

Our inability to randomise the selection of respondents to either the control or experimental group was, of course, unavoidable. This problem was exacerbated by our only being able to include two schools in the panel design. We have already indicated that practice varies quite considerably in the way in which Modern Studies is treated within the school. One answer was to restrict the age span of those included in the sample; this was done by only interviewing third and fourth year children. At the outset our sample comprised 296 respondents, but only 273 could be contacted when we returned to the school on the second occasion. Those pupils who were not interviewed twice were excluded from further analysis. We then had to inspect the characteristics of the sample that we had managed to obtain. It was thought essential that we had at least a fairly comparable distribution, between the two main groups, of school year, sex and I.Q. level. At the outset our original sample did not match up sufficiently closely on these criteria and we reverted to simple weighting in order to counterbalance original discrepancies and potential sources of bias. In the end we had a sample divided in the following manner:

TABLE 121: Panel Sample characteristics; Sex, School Year and I.Q. score; control and experimental groups, after weighting.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High I.Q.	Medium & Low I.Q.	NA	High I.Q.	Medium & Low I.Q.	NA
<u>Third Year</u>						
Male	12.0%	88.0%	- (50)	18.0%	72.0%	10.0% (50)
<u>Fourth Year</u>						
Male	33.3	66.7	- (48)	30.6	69.4	- (36)
<u>Third Year</u>						
Female	19.2	73.1	7.7 (52)	8.3	91.7	- (60)
<u>Fourth Year</u>						
Female	46.2	48.1	5.8 (52)	51.2	48.8	- (41)
	total = 202			total = 187		

The weighting carried out increased the size of the sample to 389 and in so doing has effectively minimised the most crucial sources of bias that emerged originally on the three factors included in TABLE 121. As presently constituted the sample has slightly more high I.Q. children in the modern studies group, but on the other hand there are more fourth year children in the control group.

Nevertheless, if Modern Studies has the fairly general effect that we concluded was the case, the differential impact in individual learning should not be distorted overly by these relatively small differences in sample characteristics. And it must be remembered that the prime consideration of this section is the individual changes which occur as a consequence of exposure to Modern Studies rather than the overall position of the total scores of these groups on a particular scale. It will nevertheless be nothing if not disconcerting if we discover that the aggregate variation between the control and experimental group pupils in our panel sample is markedly different from that previously reported in the larger cross sectional group.

The areas from which we shall be taking our data are the same as those already explored on several occasions, both in this chapter and in the two previous ones. This will allow cross comparisons to be made in order that we may see how far the findings on the panel sample bear out or contradict earlier conclusions. Two additional measures have been provided in this section to enable us to gain a clearer perspective of the amount and direction of the change in orientation induced by Modern Studies. From the basic matrix, we will be looking at the number of respondents who remain in the same position on the top left to bottom right cross diagonal to establish the amount of stability in that orientation across the two time periods. In addition, we shall be looking at the ratio of people who fit into positions to the left of

the same cross diagonal to those on the right of this line. This will provide an estimate of the amount of positive change that takes place in comparison to the amount of negative change. A figure of 1.0 indicates an equivalence between the two movements while anything over that figure tells us that positive change - that is more knowledge, or a more democratic position - exceeds any negative movement. A brief example will suffice to explain these indices:

Time 1	Time 2		
	High	Medium	Low
High	30%	20%	10%
Medium	10%	20%	5%
Low	2%	3%	2%

$$\text{Index of stability} = 30 + 20 + 2 = 52\%$$

$$\text{Index of variation} = (10 + 2 + 3) \div (20 + 10 + 5) = 0.43$$

Our analysis proper will begin with the replies to questions in the cognitive domain dealing with items in the political knowledge scale and ideologue index. We obviously anticipate that Modern Studies will be instrumental in expanding the individual's range of political information. If for the moment we concentrate on the eight constituent items within the scale rather than the score for the scale as a whole, we find that both the control and experimental groups do increase their extent of political knowledge at this basic level of recall. However, in each group two instances of an excess of negative change are uncovered. Neither of these is the same for both groups; the Modern Studies pupils appear to lose sight of who is the Secretary of State for Scotland but are no respecters of political parties since they also show a tendency to forget the political affiliation of Mrs. Winnifred Ewing, at that time the Scottish National Party's lone M.P. The pupil who does not take Modern Studies shows

higher negative movement in the item inquiring the position held by Mr. Richard Nixon, and of the political party to which Mrs. Barbara Castle belongs.

TABLE 122: Comparison of Control and Experimental groups¹⁵ on Political Knowledge scale items.

		Taking Modern Studies							
		Prime Minister	Mr. Nixon	Secretary of State Scotland	Conservative leader	Jeremy Thorpe	Enoch Powell	Win. Ewing	Barbara Castle
IS		94.1%	87.2%	69.8%	74.8%	62.4%	72.8%	84.6%	78.6%
IV		5.0	1.2	0.5	1.1	4.9	1.7	0.2	1.8
		Not taking Modern Studies							
IS		76.5%	89.9%	77.5%	85.1%	81.3%	75.9%	78.6%	86.6%
IV		6.3	0.6	1.8	4.6	14.1	2.8	2.1	0.8

(IS = index of stability; IV = index of variation)

The above table indicates two points in particular. Firstly, there is slightly less change in the orientations given by the non-Modern Studies pupils but that secondly, this group if anything show a relatively greater movement over the time period from an incorrect or don't know reply to the correct response. This implies that exposure to Modern Studies actually promotes a greater loss of political information than would occur if the children had not taken the course. The movement is no more than marginal but that it exists at all is a strong support for our earlier conclusion that Modern Studies pupils in the cross sectional design do not appear to exhibit any marked superiority in their ability to recall political facts.

Overall, we recognise that there is a relatively more substantial difference between the two groups at times 1 and 2 rather than within say the control group between the two periods. Thus no statistically

significant difference is found between the Modern Studies pupils at the beginning and the end of the course in their final political knowledge scale score or between the scores of the second group over this period. In contrast, there are statistically significant (at least at 0.05 level) differences between the experimental and control group pupils both at time 1 (significant at 0.001 level) and at time 2 (significant at 0.01 level). In both interviews the Modern Studies pupil is seen to be more knowledgeable in absolute terms of the political world, but this gap narrows in the time between the interviews.

TABLE 123: Political Knowledge Scores of Panel sample.¹⁶

Time 1	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
High	51.7%	10.4%	2.5% (64.6%)	36.9%	1.1%	1.6% (39.6%)
Medium	8.5	11.4	4.0 (23.9)	13.4	17.1	3.2 (33.7)
Low	1.5	6.0	4.0 (11.5)	0.5	9.6	16.6 (26.7)
	(61.7)	(27.8)	(10.5)	(50.8)	(27.8)	(21.4)
	IS = 67.1%			IS = 70.6%		
	IV = 0.9			IV = 4.0		

TABLE 123 demonstrates that while the percentage of pupils who maintain their political knowledge score across the time periods is much the same between the two groups, there is a greater likelihood that the control group pupil will move to a higher level of knowledge than fall backwards into a less informed position. Thus we have 16.9% of the experimental group backsliding in this area but only 5.9% of those of the control group. We cannot offer any explanation for this phenomenon and merely report the position that those taking Modern Studies give evidence of higher political knowledge at time 1 but the loss of information

during the interim period implies that this poorly embedded. It is not so much that this group once having provided the correct response then adopt another positive alternative at the second interview. Instead, they seem to be overcome by indecision and move into the don't know category.

This extraordinary finding presents a thought provoking introduction to the remainder of the panel data. We move next to consider the more demanding items in the cognitive domain which cover the relationship between political parties and specific policy lines. Given that these demand a more intimate acquaintance with the political world, it is expected that they will provide a wider opportunity for the influence of Modern Studies to be manifested. In addition, they will provide an indication whether Modern Studies influence in the cognitive domain is as retrogressive as the political knowledge scale items have suggested.

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TABLE 124: Policy items, and ideologue index.¹⁷Item 1. Party most in favour of Scotland becoming independent.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2			Time 2		
	S.N.P.	Other	DK	S.N.P.	Other	DK
Time 1						
S.N.P.	77.2%	5.4%	2.5% (85.1%)	74.3%	4.8%	7.0% (86.1%)
Other	5.0	2.5	2.5 (10.0)	4.8	-	1.6 (6.4)
DK	3.0	-	2.0 (5.0)	-	2.7	4.8 (7.8)
	(85.2)	(7.9)	(7.0)	(79.1)	(7.5)	(13.4)
	IS = 81.7%			IS = 79.1%		
	IV = 0.8			IV = 0.6		

Item 2. Party most businessmen support.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2			Time 2		
	Cons.	Other	DK	Cons.	Other	DK
Time 1						
Cons.	37.6%	10.9%	2.9% (61.0%)	36.4%	2.7%	3.2% (42½3%)
Other	19.3	12.4	4.5 (36.2)	11.8	12.8	8.0 (32.6)
DK	4.0	2.5	6.4 (12.9)	7.5	6.4	11.2 (25.1)
	(60.9)	(25.8)	(13.4)	(55.7)	(21.9)	(22.4)
	IS = 56.4%			IS = 60.4%		
	IV = 1.4			IV = 1.8		

Item 3. Party most in favour of nationalisation.

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2			Time 2		
	Labour	Other	DK	Labour	Other	DK
Time 1						
Labour	23.8%	5.4%	7.9% (37.1%)	29.9%	5.9%	2.7% (38.5%)
Other	23.8	9.4	1.5 (34.7)	9.6	4.3	5.3 (19.2)
DK	5.9	6.9	15.3 (28.1)	9.6	9.7	23.0 (42.3)
	(53.5)	(21.7)	(24.7)	(49.1)	(19.9)	(31.0)
	IS = 48.5%			IS = 57.2%		
	IV = 2.5			IV = 2.1		

Ideologue Index:

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies	
	Time 2		Time 2	
	High	Low	High	Low
Time 1				
High	30.2	9.4 (39.6)	24.9	10.1 (35.0)
Low	11.4 (41.6)	49.0 (60.4) (58.4)	11.1 (36.0)	54.0 (65.1) (64.1)
	IS = 79.2		IS = 78.9	
	IV = 1.2		IV = 1.1	

The figures for the three items included in TABLE 124 do not offer any support for the proposition that the Modern Studies group will decline generally in their level of political knowledge or at a faster rate than is found in other children. At the same time the amount of backsliding in the two groups is broadly comparable. However, in these items the experimental group compensate for their negative movement with a proportionately greater trend towards a higher level of information over the time period between the two interviews. Nevertheless, it does not reach proportions which produces significant differences after the year's exposure to Modern Studies between the two groups. The main reason for this appears to be that any increase in knowledge which is achieved by the experimental group is nearly matched by the control group. This applies even in the final item dealing with a political term, namely nationalisation, which those taking Modern Studies might have been expected to have appreciated more because of the particular focus which the course gives to such problems and which are far less likely to be raised elsewhere in the curriculum. Yet both groups exhibit much the same pattern of growth in knowledge for this item.

When we transfer our attention from the replies to the individual items to the consistency in correct response which we have brought together as the basis for an ideologue index, we uncover further confirmation of the view that Modern Studies will exert only a marginal influence in effecting an improvement in political knowledge. It is nevertheless somewhat stronger in producing a higher proportion able to give the correct response to all three items than with these same items when considered individually.

On the basis of this brief incursion into the cognitive domain, we cannot claim that Modern Studies will produce significantly greater political knowledge. It is particularly lacking in impact in the lower

levels of recall of political information, but not because there is no room in which to make its greater awareness felt, since there is ample opportunity for improvement in their political knowledge scores. Even when we turn to an area of knowledge which is most likely to be covered in the Modern Studies course we do not obtain the significant differences in response for which we had been looking.

We have already concluded that the ambitions of Modern Studies are distributed between the cognitive and the affective domains. Initiation into the latter, if not the former as well, derives from an awareness of the political world which if fully evolved will lead to an interest in political affairs. This is one area in particular where the influence of Modern Studies is expected to be felt. The findings which we are able to report tend to refute this prediction.

TABLE 125: Level of political interest in politics.¹⁸

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	5.0%	2.5%	-	6.1%	-	-
Medium	10.6	52.3	9.0	8.3	48.9	6.1
Low	2.5	12.1	6.0	1.1	17.8	11.7
	(18.1)	(66.9)	(15.0)	(15.5)	(66.7)	(17.8)
IS =	63.3%			66.7%		
IV =	2.2			4.5		

The figures included in TABLE 125 are somewhat equivalent to those reported in the political knowledge scales (see TABLE 123). Those taking Modern Studies exhibit a greater tendency to move to a higher level of interest as well as a greater tendency to regress in the opposite

direction. This is clearly indicated by the relative size of the IV indices. While the experimental group are more likely to progress to a higher level of political interest the control group pupil is slightly more prone to move into the category of highest political interest. The validity of this impression is further supported by the fact that significant differences do not exist between the two groups at either time period although within each group, the level of reorganization of values is such that both produce significant differences (significant at 0.01 level).

That Modern Studies is able in this panel sample to make so little impact on the extent of the respondent's interest in the political world is a finding of some moment and theoretical significance. If the children taking a political education course do not acquire a taste for political affairs at any different rate to that pertaining among other young people, one must doubt the lasting power of Modern Studies in stimulating the acquisition of political orientations once the school classroom has been left behind. These findings also contrast with the figures presented in TABLE 111 where it did seem that there was a definite impact in this area.

If the respondent's interest in political activities is so little affected, we wonder how far there is any greater readiness to admit a behavioural impact in so far as the respondent adopts a higher level of political discourse with those in his immediate environment. This comprises discussions within the family and peer group as well as with the teachers in the school.

In each of these areas there is evidence of variation which may be attributable to taking Modern Studies. When we examine the respondent's level of political interaction within the family we spot moderate evidence of an influence at work.

TABLE 126: Level of political discourse with parents.¹⁹

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2					
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	0.6%	4.0%	- (4.6%)	5.9%	1.6%	- (7.5%)
Medium	10.4	48.0	4.0(62.4)	9.6	41.2	12.8(63.6)
Low	3.5	15.6	13.9(33.0)	2.7	8.6	17.6(28.9)
	(14.5)	(67.6)	(17.9)	(18.2)	(51.4)	(30.4)
IS =	62.5%			64.7%		
IV =	3.7			1.5		

The level of discussion with parents between the two groups is seen to move with relatively greater force in the experimental section. This comprises both the move into higher levels of political discussion as well as the even more noticeable move away from the lowest levels of discourse. Indeed its strength is such that although at time 1 there is not a significant difference between the groups in the level of discussion this has become significant (at the 0.01 level) after the year has passed. Much the same picture emerges when we examine the level of political conversations with their friends. There is however a stronger movement into the highest scoring category among the Modern Studies pupils. This is demonstrated in TABLE 127 below:

TABLE 127: Level of political discourse with friends.²⁰

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies				
	Time 2							
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low		
Time 1								
High	3.5%	1.0%	3.0%	(7.5%)	2.1%	0.5%	2.1%	(4.7%)
Medium	15.0	23.0	12.0	(50.0)	8.6	31.6	15.5	(55.7)
Low	2.5	11.0	29.0	(42.5)	2.1	19.3	18.2	(39.6)
	(21.0)	(35.0)	(44.0)		(12.8)	(51.4)	(35.8)	
	IS = 55.5%				IS = 51.9%			
	IV = 1.8				IV = 1.7			

As with the replies given in TABLE 126 the pattern of individual replies to the item dealing with the discussion of political matters with one's friends supplies a statistically significant difference at time 2 (significant at 0.01 level) whereas no such variation is discernible at the outset.

The third item covers an estimation by the children that they are in fact discussing political matters in the Modern Studies course. Since some of the children will have been taking Modern Studies for a year even at the time of the first interview, we would look for clear differences between the groups at both time periods. This is strongly borne out insofar as the gap between the two groups is even more substantial at time 2 (significant at 0.001 level) than it is at time 1 (significant at 0.01 level). Both groups in fact evince a high level of change in orientations but in each, the amount of negative movement is exactly equal to the amount of positive change. Despite this, it can be seen (TABLE 128) that among the control section the children are more prone to gravitate into the medium level category.

TABLE 128: Level of political discourse with teachers.²¹

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2					
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	18.3%	8.6%	7.1% (34.0%)	4.3%	7.1%	8.2% (19.6%)
Medium	8.6	22.3	6.1 (37.0)	3.8	25.0	8.2 (37.0)
Low	6.1	7.6	15.2 (28.9)	3.8	16.3	23.4 (43.5)
	(33.0)	(38.5)	(28.4)	(11.9)	(48.4)	(39.8)
	IS = 55.8%			IS = 52.7%		
	IV = 1.0			IV = 1.0		

The fact that continued exposure to Modern Studies does not bring about an even larger degree of variation between the two groups must promote some speculation about the way in which the course is presented in the school. Here we are concerned more with the hard core of respondents who remain unconvinced, or are oblivious to, the attention which Modern Studies gives to contemporary problems. It could be that we are making too much of an interpretation of 'politics' which is not accepted generally among our sample. If the concentration is not on the narrow world of inter-party politics, some may interpret what they are dealing with as not the preserve of political life. If the respondent does not look upon Modern Studies as a course having a political content it is hardly surprising that outside of the classroom the individual's level of political interest and discussion should not be more strongly affected. In order to investigate possible suspicion that the political aspects to Modern Studies are strongly underplayed in the two schools that comprise our panel design, we asked a question about whether the school offered a course which dealt with current political and economic problems. In reply, at the time of the first interview, over 60% indicated that they thought that there was such a

course, and of this group 94% provided the name of Modern Studies. This does not suggest that the nature of the course has been misinterpreted.

Given that the discussion of the political world does not seem to be greatly enhanced by the taking of Modern Studies, we must wonder about the ability of the course to stimulate a more supportive evaluation of the British system of government as well as a more democratic interpretation of various political norms. If we commence our discussion with the level of support among our sample for the present political set-up, it will be remembered from our previous examination of this area - contrary to impressions generated in other studies - change did occur during adolescence though not in any predictable fashion. Modern Studies has been shaped in the mould of political education courses whose intention is to stimulate admiration for the present political practices and opportunities for its influence to exist while flexibility remains. The first sign is an optimistic one. While the variation between the two groups at time 1 is not substantial it has become statistically significant at the conclusion of the year's teaching (significant at 0.01 level). This encompasses several noticeable movements of individuals within the two groups. To begin with the amount of change is greater in the experimental section but the variation indices for the two groups indicate that relatively more positive change is experienced by the pupil who has not taken Modern Studies. Modern Studies exhibits greater influence in removing children from the category where they are seen as disenchanted or hostile than in imbuing these adolescents with thoughts which we categorise as strongly supportive of the political system. In that sense Modern Studies is to be construed more as a remedial force eliminating disruptive thoughts rather than stimulating children to far higher levels of satisfaction with the political system. In itself this finding does contradict one suggestion about courses of political education which is

that they will actually increase political alienation. The reasoning behind this prediction is that exposure to the workings of the British political system may rebound on the proselytisers of political education. Instead of assuming that a favourable perception is encouraged, it is argued that imposed discussion leads some young people to reject the central objective. This possibility is rejected completely in our data.

Yet lest we forget about the control pupils, it can be seen that the movements contained within that group are for a higher level of support to become evident, just at the level of disenchantment declines. Modern Studies is clearly not a pre-requisite for feelings of support for the political arrangements in Britain to increase.

TABLE 129: Level of Support for the political system in Britain.²¹

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2					
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	16.5%	8.7%	0.9% (26.1%)	15.1%	2.8%	1.9% (19.8%)
Medium	13.0	41.7	2.6 (57.3)	13.2	38.7	3.8 (55.7)
Low	5.2	10.4	0.9 (16.5)	1.9	10.4	12.3 (24.6)
	(34.7)	(60.8)	(4.4)	(30.2)	(51.9)	(18.0)
	IS = 59.1%			IS = 66.1%		
	IV = 2.3			IV = 3.0		

If Modern Studies can exert some influence in the evaluation of the present political arrangements then it would seem to be more effective than American studies have found the pure civics type course to be. This support index was designed to tap orientations at a more basic level than the items dealing with the level of attachment to various political norms associated with democracy. The latter demand from the

respondent a deeper consideration insofar as the child is asked to evaluate the implications of particular policies or actions within a wider framework of democratic rules and conventions.

TABLE 130: Level of Political Efficacy.²²

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	15.8%	13.7%	- (29.6%)	11.1%	18.5%	4.3% (33.9%)
Medium	15.3	27.3	2.7 (45.3)	4.3	36.4	3.1 (43.8)
Low	2.7	17.5	4.9 (25.1)	1.9	13.6	6.8 (22.3)
	(33.8)	(58.5)	(7.6)	(17.3)	(68.5)	(14.2)
	IS = 48.0%			IS = 54.3%		
	IV = 2.2			IV = 0.8		

The distribution of feelings of political efficacy between the two groups is clearly affected by events within the period between the two interviews. At the beginning the two groups do not provide a significant difference but this is drastically altered by the time of the second interview. At this point the difference between the experimental and control sections is such that it has become significant at the 0.001 level.

The pattern of this movement is such that the indices of variation indicate that an excess of negative change occurs in the control group. Thus the proportion claiming high feelings of political efficacy in this section falls by almost one half. However, the number with the lowest feelings of efficacy also drops. In the Modern Studies section this latter movement is far more pronounced and in addition the proportion with the highest efficacy rating increases over the time period. This is probably the most dramatic evidence of variation between the two groups

that we have yet encountered. Why this should arise in the efficacy scale will perhaps become clear after we have examined the other democratic orientations. We will only add that our inspection of the cross-sectional sample has indicated that Modern Studies is associated with variation in all such areas.

TABLE 131: Level of Political Toleration.²³

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	38.9%	23.8%	1.1% (63.8%)	69.7%	12.3%	- (82.0%)
Medium	11.4	12.4	1.1 (24.9)	11.0	1.9	- (12.9)
Low	5.9	4.9	0.5 (11.3)	2.6	0.6	1.9 (5.1)
	(56.2)	(41.1)	(2.7)	(83.3)	(14.8)	(1.9)
	IS = 51.8%			IS = 73.5%		
	IV = 0.9			IV = 1.0		

The first of the additional perspectives on democratic thinking to be covered is the respondent's feelings of political toleration. It has been noted previously that exposure to Modern Studies appears to militate against a high toleration score. Equally, this is the finding that may be given to TABLE 131. Yet interpretation is complicated because the difference at time 1 between the two groups is as substantial, (significant at the 0.001 level), as it appears in the second interview (significant at the 0.001 level). The overwhelming picture presented by the control group is of an absence of change with the stability index as high as 73.5%. Any backsliding is minimal and no respondent appears in the intolerant category who was not there at time 1.

In contrast the Modern Studies pupil is inclined to move out of the most tolerant category as well as the lowest category into the middle ranking. Overall there is substantially more movement in this group. The peculiar reaction which appears between the Modern Studies pupil and the toleration items is most difficult to understand. It is as if increased information about the political world makes them react in a more authoritarian fashion. They are sensitised to political disputes but their reaction, far from becoming more considerate of the other person's point of view, is of greater keenness to root out or suppress any sign of dissension from the majority point of view.

TABLE 132: Level of Political Cynicism.²⁴

	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Time 1						
High	21.1%	11.9%	0.5% (33.5%)	18.3%	5.9%	5.4% (29.6%)
Medium	18.0	25.3	5.2 (48.5)	12.9	22.6	9.7 (45.2)
Low	2.6	8.2	7.2 (18.0)	5.4	8.6	11.3 (25.3)
	(41.7)	(42.4)	(12.9)	(36.6)	(37.1)	(26.4)
	IS = 53.6%			IS = 52.2%		
	IV = 1.6			IV = 1.3		

The level of political cynicism also provides us with a significant difference (at the 0.01 level) between the two groups at time 2 where no such variation had been in evidence at the time the first interview was conducted. Both groups contain a substantial amount of movement and in each the majority of this is in taking individuals to a less cynical perception of the political world. However, while both groups move into the realms of being highly uncynical, the experimental group alone transfers out of the most cynical response category.

It can now be seen that there is an influence in the taking of Modern Studies which applies across all of the orientations which we have covered dealing with democratic evaluations of political norms. That differences have been unearthed does not mean that these are necessarily in the direction predicted, as the political toleration example illustrates. Yet in every case the difference between the two groups is statistically significant at time 2, whereas this had not been the case at time 1. Yet if the reorganisation of views which takes place over the year leads the Modern Studies group to generally more democratic views, in the sense that they are more supportive of the supposed underlying dimensions of that term, they also appear as more prepared to move in the opposite direction. On balance therefore, the control group pupil is not to be thought of as being anti-system. He does not move with any less certainty to the higher scoring category and generally the fact that significant differences appear at the end of a year is attributable to the Modern Studies group being more prepared to move out of the least democratic response.

There are no consistent patterns across these evaluations for the experimental group to score higher on either the stability or variation index. There is then no confirmation of the proposition that exposure to political information in the school will cause the pupils to recoil in any way from the 'acceptable' political standpoint. Thus inspection of the top right hand cell entry reveals that the control group is more likely to experience this sort of dramatic falling off in the democratic orientation - from a high score in the first interview straight down to the lowest score in the second. Where negative movement is induced in the experimental group it involves the move downward into a neighbour category rather than a jump across category. Turning our

attention to the bottom left hand cell we find the reverse position. In this case the control group scores lower. This we interpret to mean that if dramatic surges forward to the highest level of response occur they are more likely to be present among the Modern Studies pupils. The course in Modern Studies does therefore seem to sensitise young people to the groundrules of the democratic system. Yet if these differences do emerge it can also be concluded that the differences induced are no more than moderate, and in some respects so slight that it would be difficult to maintain the stand of even moderate influence against the spectres of measurement error and general response instability.

If there is evidence of a small impact in the child's evaluation of the political world we wonder how far this spins off into other areas where Modern Studies has no direct ambitions. For example, what is the re-assessment in values that is induced in the respondent's perspective on the world of party politics? In particular we want to see whether the assimilation of more political information and the general discussion of political matters leads to a greater tendency to move into the mainstream of political life, as instanced by supporting a political party.

TABLE 133: Respondent's support for a political party.²⁵

	Taking Modern Studies		Not taking Modern Studies	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Time 1				
Yes	34.7%	19.3% (54.0%)	28.3%	17.1% (45.4%)
No	20.8	25.2 (46.0)	14.4	40.1 (54.5)
	(55.5)	(44.5)	(42.7)	(57.2)
	IS = 59.9%		IS = 68.4%	
	IV = 1.1		IV = 0.8	

Yet again we find that there is a statistically significant difference (at 0.02 level) when no such variation had existed at time 1. It can be appreciated from closer examination of the above table, however, that even at the beginning the non-Modern Studies pupil is more reluctant to commit himself to a political party and it is no more than a small arrangement in aggregate terms which transforms this into a significant difference. Inspection of the individual movements tells us that the pupil taking Modern Studies is more likely to change his position, with both a greater percentage moving away from supporting a political party as well as affiliating with such a group. It is then shown in the variation index that the experimental group demonstrate relatively more willingness to gravitate towards supporting a political party.

What now of the highly contentious problem of whether children are encouraged to direct this affiliation in the favour of one party rather than another. There is no suggestion whatsoever that it was ever intended that this course should raise the proportion identifying with either the Conservative or Communist parties, for example. Even if this was not substantiated it might be argued that by bringing the political world more to the notice of young people at a time when there was some considerable re-evaluation of the political parties in the favour of the S.N.P. this latter movement might be accentuated. If young people are liable to suffer from the contagion of political change then they might be thought more likely to join the nationalist bandwagon as an indirect consequence of taking Modern Studies. The first preferences for the members of the panel sample are included in TABLE 134, below:

TABLE 134: Most preferred political party.²⁶

Taking Modern Studies						
Time 2						
	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.N.P.	DK
Time 1						
Communist	-	-	0.5%	-	-	- (0.5%)
Conservative	1.0%	-	1.0	-	-	- (2.5)
Labour	-	1.5%	2.0	-	1.0%	- (4.5)
Liberal	0.5	5.4	7.4	2.5%	-	0.5% (16.3)
S.N.P.	0.5	15.3	31.2	1.0	15.8	1.5 (65.3)
DK	-	0.5	4.0	-	4.5	2.0
	(2.0)	(22.7)	(46.1)	(3.5)	(21.8)	(4.0)

Not taking Modern Studies						
Time 2						
	Communist	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.N.P.	DK
Time 1						
Communist	1.1%	-	1.6%	-	2.7	- (5.4%)
Conservative	-	2.1%	-	-	3.7	- (5.8)
Labour	-	1.6	3.2	-	2.7	- (7.5)
Liberal	0.5	1.1	4.3	-	3.2	- (9.1)
S.N.P.	1.1	14.4	19.3	2.7%	16.6	0.5 (54.6)
DK	-	2.7	3.2	2.7	3.2	5.9 (17.7)
	(2.7)	(21.9)	(31.6)	(5.4)	(32.1)	(6.4)

The indices of stability at 22.3% for the experimental group and 28.9% for the other pupils is the lowest recorded and indicates in part the high flexibility of this particular political preference. The dominant movement applies across both groups. This is for those who have

supported the SNP at the time of the first interview to move away from this party in great numbers by time 2. However, this movement is slightly more noticeable among those who have been exposed to Modern Studies. What these pupils appear to do is transfer their allegiance to either the Conservative or Labour party. Therefore the higher discussion of political affairs that is prompted by this course has heightened the movement of political preferences back to a position which more accurately reflects the adult figures for party affiliation.

In terms of the party which our respondents most dislike, it is apparent that both groups come to perceive the Communist Party as the object of their greatest displeasure.²⁷ While the proportion from both groups is around 35% at time 1, the Modern Studies pupils surge forward particularly strongly in the stream of opinion which represents the Communist Party as the most disliked party in Scotland. At time 2 as many as 73.8% avow this view, while the figure for the control group has climbed relatively more slowly to 59.8%. This change applies irrespective of the party perceived in the least flattering terms at time 2. Thus while extensive redeployment occurs it affects both groups in a similar fashion.

Any suspicion of an influence on the part of Modern Studies in the party affiliation of our respondents is severely complicated by the strong currents of change or fluctuation in opinion then affecting the Scottish population, as a whole. Without wishing to imply any great conviction in the strength of these conclusions, there is a suggestion that Modern Studies will be more influential in sensitising the children to a common domestic enemy in terms of political parties rather than instilling in them any desire to positively identify with one party rather than any other. Even in the item on the most preferred party, it appears

that the negative move away from the SNP is stronger than any move into support for a single party.

This suspicion that Modern Studies sensitises children to differences in the political world is substantiated in a direct item on the perceived disagreement between the political parties.

TABLE 135: The amount of difference perceived between the political parties.

Time 1	Taking Modern Studies			Not taking Modern Studies		
	A lot	Some Differences	Few	A lot	Some Differences	Few
A lot	18.0%	3.7%	1.2% (22.9%)	5.1%	13.0%	10.1% (28.2%)
Some	11.2	25.5	9.3 (46.0)	13.0	24.6	7.2 (44.8)
Few	8.1	16.8	6.2 (31.1)	3.6	12.3	10.9 (26.8)
	(37.3)	(46.0)	(16.7)	(21.7)	(49.9)	(28.2)
	IS = 49.7%			IS = 40.6%		
	IV = 2.5			IV = 1.0		

Both groups in practice report a substantial amount of change in their perception of the amount of difference that exists between the main political parties. Yet the internal changes operate in contrary directions between the groups. Among the control group there is a relatively greater tendency to report that the parties are less separated. Yet, the pupils taking Modern Studies not only show little inclination to perceive fewer differences but are far more likely to change substantially in their opinion on this matter, from few differences at the time of the first interview to a lot of differences at the time of the second. In this sense, and irrespective of any assessment of the validity of this perception, the experimental group do seem to be swayed as a consequence of taking Modern Studies to a view of the political world which emphasises the distinctions between constituent groups. It is this characteristic which also accounts for their far greater propensity to displace the Communist Party into the position of least preferred.

The final area in which we propose looking for the influence of Modern Studies comprises the level of conceptualisation attained by the respondent and the extent to which this finds general employment in the area of international conflict. If we recap briefly on the perception of political concepts it will be remembered that we have argued that the view which young people bring to such terms will be transformed from a more concrete to an increasingly abstract understanding. This should apply irrespective of whether the term concerned is war or peace although we have already indicated in the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 that the latter did appear to be more amenable to variation in terms of age change. In practice neither of these concepts produces significant differences between the two groups at either the first or the second interview.

TABLE 136: Perception of War.

	Taking Modern Studies		Not Taking Modern Studies	
	Abstract	Concrete	Abstract	Concrete
Time 1				
Abstract	5.9	15.8 (21.7)	6.5	10.4 (16.9)
Concrete	21.1	57.2 (78.3)	25.3	57.8 (83.1)
	(27.0)	(73.0)	(31.8)	(68.2)
IS = 63.1%			IS = 64.3%	
IV = 1.3			IV = 2.4	

Analysis of first term indicates that while the amount of change between the two groups is much the same, growth towards the more abstract category arises with greater probability among the control pupils. The

experimental group in contrast provide a higher proportion of individuals regressing in time 2 to a less abstract perception of war as well as fewer able to make the transformation out of the concrete leaning category.

However when we inspect the classification of the replies given to the term peace we discover a reversal of this pattern. Rather than the control group being more likely to move into the abstract category the amount of change is much the same in both directions though with a slight tendency for the backsliders to predominate. The Modern Studies group in contrast lean increasingly towards the more abstract response. Even so the percentage who regress from the abstract category at time 1 into the concrete classification at time 2 is much the same as the figure produced for the control group. Our conclusion therefore is of considerable movement in both directions within each group rather than that Modern Studies exerts a distinct influence.

TABLE 137: Perception of peace.

	Taking Modern Studies		Not Taking Modern Studies	
	Abstract	Concrete	Abstract	Concrete
Time 1				
Abstract	32.5	19.5 (52.0)	35.0	21.1 (56.1)
Concrete	27.6	20.3 (47.9)	19.5	24.4 (43.9)
	(60.1)	(39.8)	(54.5)	(45.5)
IS = 52.8%			IS = 59.4%	
IV = 1.4			IV = 0.9	

Essentially the same conclusion is derived from an examination of the respondents replies to the item dealing with the objective responsibility for war. In this case the indices of stability and variation are essentially the same for both groups although the Modern Studies group supplies the marginally superior scores. Again we must repeat that they are not substantial and in this example do not even attain statistical significance.

TABLE 138: Level of equity.

	Taking Modern Studies		Not Taking Modern Studies		
	Time 2				
	High	Low	High	Low	
Time 1					
	High	21.8	11.3 (33.1)	22.3	10.2 (32.5)
	Low	12.9	54.0 (66.9)	10.5	57.0 (67.5)
		(34.7)	(65.3)	(32.8)	(67.2)
	IS =	75.8%		IS =	79.3%
	IV =	1.1		IV =	1.0

This far we have not been able to supply any convincing evidence for even a moderate influence of Modern Studies in bringing children to a higher level of political conceptualisation in their perception of international conflict. If we turn from this area to the replies given by the subjects to the two terms communism and democracy, which provided the basis for classifying respondents as operating at a high level of conceptualisation or not, a greater amount of positive movement is achieved by the experimental group.

TABLE 139: Level of Conceptualisation.

	Taking Modern Studies		Not Taking Modern Studies	
	High	Low	High	Low
Time 1				
High	22.5	14.6 (37.1)	22.1	15.9 (38.0)
Low	20.5	42.4 (62.9)	15.8	46.2 (62.0)
	(43.0)	(57.0)	(37.9)	(62.1)
	IS = 64.9%		IS = 68.3%	
	IV = 1.4		IV = 1.0	

The orientations on which we are now reporting reinforce the impression that Modern Studies generates a change of thinking in the intended direction but that this movement has little force to it. In addition the trends in absolute terms towards higher levels of sophistication hide quite substantial movements both upwards and downwards. If the former in practice generally outnumber the backsliders, and particularly in the experimental group of pupils, we should not be diverted from the conclusion that the amount of such change also militates against any conclusion of especial strength to formal political education.

If the patterns of internal movement provide the most interesting aspect to the panel data we should not lose sight of the fact that there is also much in this discussion which confirms the impression of Modern Studies' influence that was derived from the cross sectional design.

One drawback to both areas is that we have not as yet attempted to control for the full range of predictors in political socialisation and therefore before we draw together a final conclusion on the influence of Modern Studies we shall turn to our more involved multivariate analysis.

Modern Studies, AID and MCA.

The analysis that we have presented on the influence of Modern Studies in the growth of political orientations, from both the cross sectional as well as the panel designs, indicates that some variation does appear where we divide our respondents on the basis of whether the individual has taken this course or not. The influence does not however appear to be a strong one although again our impression is that Modern Studies will have a more or less similar effect across social groups and other factors in individual learning. We now propose to investigate more thoroughly the question of how large Modern Studies influence is to be considered in relation to other agents, and whether some orientations are more easily influenced by the course than others. To this end we will be following the procedure adopted in the previous chapter of making joint use of the AID and MCA computer routines.

Our investigation will begin with the findings of the tree analysis produced by AID in the cognitive domain. It will be remembered that the objective of this procedure is to determine the nature of the interaction between the predictors in the course of splitting groups. The partition is made on the basis of the maximum variance that can be found after considering all of the possible two-way splits on every predictor. Our interest centres not only on the amount of variation that is explained in this way but also whether the pattern produced fits in with the demands of an additive model.

In the political knowledge scale there is a strong similarity between the initial splits made for this group of third year pupils and above (See Figure 15) and the pattern which materialised where we were considering the whole sample from 12 to 17 years (See Figure 6).

The first partition is produced by the I.Q. score of the respondent and in subsequent splits the age and level of conceptualisation of the individual reappear at several points. So too does the level of political interest reported by the respondent himself. While the direct route to high political knowledge leads through medium or high I.Q., medium or high political interest and finally encompasses those of 16 years or over, there are other avenues to obtaining extremely high political knowledge scores. Thus the male respondents may overcome their coming from a lower age group than the highest scorers; while high I.Q. compensates for being a female - at least in terms of political knowledge.

With one exception the sample splits into groups whose homogeneity reinforces our impression about the influence of the various factors. Again the exception rests with the upper branch of the tree, as was found in Figure 6. It consists of a quite inexplicable partition, if it is accepted that the influence of age is all powerful and that the key to political growth is the even movement from one age group to the next.

The pattern of the tree is for a concentration of activity to be found in the upper branch which indicates that advantages are to some extent substitutes for each other. While both main branches split on conceptualisation, age and political interest, they do not always occur at the same juncture. In addition it is noted that sex, peer group, school type and consumption of the mass media all appear in the upper trunk but not in the lower. The other main point of relevance in the predictors used for the partitioning is that at no

point is Modern Studies significant enough to generate a split. Admittedly it is a candidate in some of the final groups, and in both of the main branches, and probably would have emerged if we had decided to relax the stopping rules.

Our AID analysis does therefore confirm the claim made on the basis of earlier findings that Modern Studies does not exert an appreciable influence in the growth of political knowledge, at least at the level of recall of basic information. When we turn to the influence of Modern Studies in the more demanding area of placing the political parties in terms of policies we discover that its impact, far from appearing more probable, plummets to extremely low limits. Indeed at no point in the tree splitting does Modern Studies appear as a strong candidate. Those predictors which do explain most variance appear once again to be the level of conceptualisation, the I.Q. score, the respondent's age and level of interest in politics. By this time in adolescence it appears that the influence of age is beginning to wane relative to other individual differences such as the respondent's I.Q. score. In so far as these differences are closely related it might be thought that the tree does not diverge greatly from the additive model but since at no time does the same predictor appear in a partition on both of the main branches we cannot have any great confidence in the MCA statistics for the political ideologue score.

The latter, along with the same figures for the political knowledge score are contained in TABLE 140. With respect to the political knowledge statistics we see that the total amount of variance explained by the predictors is not much different for this sample than was uncovered for the adolescent population as a whole. The figure itself

TABLE 140: MCA Summary Statistics for Cognitive Orientations;
political knowledge and ideologue index.

	Political Knowledge (Fig. 15)		Ideologue (Fig. 16)	
	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
School Type	0.73	0.19	0.28	0.70
Actual Age	0.82	0.15	0.37	0.12
Sex	0.11	0.14	0.40	0.52
Organisation	0.28	0.19	0.15	0.31
Peer Group	0.73	0.10	0.14	0.48
Self Interest in politics	0.89	0.25	0.42	0.16
I.Q. Score	0.15	0.54	0.49	0.15
Family interest	0.11	0.75	0.22	0.40
Religion	0.15	0.37	0.11	0.25
Modern Studies	0.47	0.32	0.29	0.14
Mass Media	0.45	0.12	0.46	0.11
Conceptualisation	0.68	0.19	0.35	0.12
Social Class	0.25	0.78	0.11	0.52
Multiple R adjusted	= 0.56		=0.33	
Multiple R square	= 0.31		=0.11	

All of the Figures mentioned in this discussion are located at the end of this chapter. All of the variables are coded as indicated in Chapter VI, although no 12 or 13 year olds are included here.

implies that we have included predictors which have caught much of the variation in knowledge. It is when we turn to consider the beta² statistics, which provide a basis for ranking the factors according to their relative importance that we discover, much to our consternation, that Modern Studies emerges as one of the stronger predictors. This conclusion is reached after the influence of other factors has been taken into account.³⁴ Overall the impression is of little differentiation between the predictors in their ability to affect the amount of political knowledge attained by our respondents. The sole exception to this conclusion is the I.Q. score of the respondent which at least confirms the first partition produced in Figure 15 by the AID search.

More differentiation between predictors appears in the figures for the political ideologue index. In consequence Modern Studies settles down more into the middle ranking of importance, although according to the AID analysis it should have rated with the lowest category. While we do not wish to give much emphasis to the MCA statistics because the pattern of splitting contained in Figure 16 is not indicative of an additive model it may well be that we have been affording insufficient recognition to the limitations of the AID procedure. Nevertheless at this juncture while we do not feel diverted from our original conclusion that there would not be much that was noteworthy about the impact of Modern Studies in the cognitive domain we cannot now feel especially confident that this conclusion will apply so definitely when we have separated out the variation which is more correctly attributed to the influence of other factors.

If the power of formal political education courses is to be taken seriously then there should be some evidence of an impact in raising the level of interest in political affairs. The organisers of this course have always complained that there is already a fund of adolescent interest in contemporary problems but that the traditional curriculum did little, if anything, to foster this with relevant subject matter. Modern Studies was cast deliberately into this vacuum in an attempt to direct young people's interest towards a more sophisticated consideration of the complexities which characterize the modern industrial society. We should point out straightaway therefore that Modern Studies does indeed appear to have an importance in this area according to the tree analysis contained in the AID routine.

If we commence with the general pattern presented for political interest in Figure 17 we see that the initial partitions do occur in strict observance of the additive requirements of MCA. After an initial split on the level of peer group politicisation both groups then break on the respondent's consumption of the mass media, with further splits in both of the main branches occurring on the level of family politicisation. Modern Studies appears in the upper arm, as a sort of compensating factor among those respondents who do not provide evidence of a high level of media consumption. The impression derived from this tree is that there are several alternative routes to both high and low political interest, and particularly the latter. Thus groups 3,7,15,17,19 and 21 all have mean scores in excess of, or equal to, 3.0. We see, for example, that while Modern Studies is bringing those with a low media consumption up to a higher level of interest there is quite large variation within the Modern Studies group such that the youngest members are far more lacking in interest in politics than their elders.

Overall the highest scores on political interest are obtained by those respondents whose peer group interest in politics is at least moderate, who are heavy users of the mass media and who finally come from a highly politicised family background. This is a clear indication that the level of self interest in the world of politics will be firmly based in the level of primary group involvement in these same affairs. Individual differences appear to be of far less moment, with only age, among the three factors whose influence previously has appeared most general, entering the splitting process.

The pattern presented by AID in most respects backs up the conclusions that we have already reached in Chapter 6. This cannot be said of the statistics generated in MCA. Moreover all of the variables appear to have been advanced in their significance when we compare the beta² statistic with that obtained in the political knowledge questions. Apart from the level of organisational membership, type of school attended, sex, level of conceptualisation and peer group politicisation which form the first rank of predictors we have to move down slightly before coming to a second group which includes Modern Studies, as well as the family and social class. While MCA elevates to the highest order several predictors which do not threaten to bring about a split in the tree analysis, the only startling discrepancy which sees an important predictor in AID greatly reduced in significance by the MCA statistics occurs in the case of the level of mass media consumption. It is noticeable that on the eta² statistic mass media does come out far more strongly which suggests that it is probably strongly correlated with some other predictor.

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TABLE 141: MCA Summary Statistics: Affective Domain, Interest and Support.

	Political Interest (Fig. 17)		Political Support (Fig. 19)	
	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
School Type	0.23	0.68	0.21	0.36
Age	0.30	0.39	0.69	0.76
Sex	0.95	0.62	0.11	0.74
Organisation	0.30	0.78	0.12	0.77
Peer Group	0.11	0.55	0.11	0.59
I.Q. Score	0.23	0.29	0.16	0.10
Family	0.84	0.47	0.34	0.15
Religion	0.43	0.19	0.43	0.91
Self Interest in Politics			0.24	0.13
Modern Studies	0.12	0.44	0.88	0.34
Mass Media	0.54	0.21	0.65	0.54
Conceptualisation	0.24	0.57	0.30	0.18
Social Class	0.11	0.44	0.91	0.75
Multiple R adjusted	= 0.49		= 0.27	
Multiple R square	= 0.24		= 0.07	

We have already said that Modern Studies has been found more influential in directing children to a more highly supportive view of the political authorities and of the dimensions which form the basis of a democracy than it is in promoting higher levels of knowledge about the political world. How does this conclusion stand up under the spotlight of our multivariate analysis?

Inspection of the AID tree for the level of political support attained by the respondent does not lead us to Modern Studies. The partitioning is dominated by the respondent's level of conceptualisation, his I.Q. score, the level of peer group interest in politics and the sex of the respondent. Both I.Q. and sex emerge as factors inducing variation in the two main branches of the tree. In consequence we infer an absence of any great interaction between the predictors. The highest level of support is not to be found along the most direct line but is established among those with the highest level of conceptualisation who are female, and whose peer group takes a great interest in discussing political matters.

The beta² statistic in the MCA output does not substantiate this pattern. In particular we see that the first order of agents does not include either the respondent's level of conceptualisation or his I.Q. score, although the three other predictors produced in AID partitions also attain the first order of ranking in the MCA figures. In addition age, religion and the respondent's social class background are ranked as very important in the MCA analysis but not in the AID. Modern Studies assumes a half-way position between the uppermost and the lower order predictors.

Too much should not be made however of these distinctions. Most important it appears that the amount of variation which can be explained by all of the predictors taken together is exceptionally poor, if not almost non-existent. This figure is but marginally improved when we turn to the respondent's level of acceptance of such supposedly democratic notions as feelings of efficacy and toleration and an absence of any great cynicism for the political authorities. The AID splits for the first of these three areas is covered in Figure 18. This does not fit in with the pattern that we would have preferred, as it tends to be asymmetrical. Generally in the affective domain the level of political interest indicated by the respondent himself is the starting point from which further partitioning occurs. In the case of political efficacy the splitting is continued on the basis of variation produced by age and I.Q. score; while from then on the level of interest in politics, either in the peer group, the family, or as expressed by the respondent bring about the remaining partitions. At the extremities we find the group with the lowest mean score for efficacy to comprise those with the lowest level of political interest and the bottom I.Q. score. The reverse of this is the highest scoring category who are taken from the highest levels of political interest, the oldest age groups and who operate within a peer group who are at least moderately politicised.

Most of these variables also appear to be important in the partitioning of our sample with respect to their scores for political cynicism. However the sex of the respondent, his level of conceptualisation and his propensity to consume the mass media also bring about splits in this orientation. The most cynical respondents

TABLE 142: MCA Summary Statistics: Political Efficacy, and
Conceptualisation.

	Efficacy (Figure 18)		Conceptualisation (Figure 20)	
	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
School Type	0.23	0.66	0.97	0.23
Age	0.41	0.14	0.24	0.11
Sex	0.39	0.24	0.14	0.48
Organisation	0.19	0.41	0.84	0.40
Peer Group	0.38	0.63	0.14	0.59
Self interest in politics	0.76	0.29	0.26	0.99
I.Q. Score	0.26	0.55	0.68	0.59
Family Interest	0.27	0.82	0.16	0.10
Religion	0.10	0.36	0.24	0.75
Modern Studies	0.33	0.48	0.14	0.14
Mass Media	0.16	0.19	0.74	0.75
Conceptualisation	0.11	0.72		
Social Class	0.73	0.64	0.24	0.40
Multiple R adjusted	= 0.36		= 0.33	
Multiple R square	= 0.13		= 0.11	

then materialise as those with the lowest level of political interest and of conceptualisation. The least cynical respondents are a group of males with at least a medium level of interest in political affairs. As with the level of support for the system of government in Britain our respondents' scores on both efficacy and toleration do not appear to be at risk of being split by the Modern Studies predictor. This does not tally with our previous examination of these affective orientations where often quite large gaps emerged on the basis of whether or not Modern Studies had been taken at school. The relegation of Modern Studies to the middle ranking in importance is largely corroborated however by the size of the β^2 statistic for Modern Studies in comparison to that for the other predictors. Indeed the figures presented in TABLE 142 for political efficacy largely substantiate the impression already obtained from the inspection of Figure 18. The only predictor to fall in importance is the respondent's own level of interest in political affairs. However this is seen to decline quite substantially in value from η^2 to β^2 .

Our conclusion on the influence of Modern Studies influence in these lower level orientations is that it does appear according to the MCA statistics to fit consistently into the category comprising predictors with a middle or lower level ranking relative to our other factors. Generally the impression derived from the AID analysis is that either Modern Studies does emerge as a contender for splitting or it is of no significance whatsoever. Fortunately, where AID indicates that Modern Studies is important, this is substantiated in the figures produced by MCA - which is not always the case with other predictors. This conclusion may be tested in the final area of interest

to us. It comprises the respondent's leaning towards a more abstract perception of the political world. We have concluded quite consistently through the cross-sectional as well as the panel design that Modern Studies will provoke some measure of movement in the direction intended; yet this will really only apply to the level of conceptualisation index rather than the respondent's perception of such terms as war or peace. At this stage we can dismiss the latter concepts from all further analysis because the pattern of the tree presented is assymetrical to the extreme. In each case splitting only continues along one of the main branches although while with war the movement is for downward splitting only, in the example of peace all partitions arise in the upward branch. In neither instance does Modern Studies emerge as a factor in serious contention for splitting.

A different story emerges from the AID tree for the level of political conceptualisation index, and more in the manner expected. To begin with the splits are quite dominated by one predictor, namely the respondent's I.Q. score. This induces both the original break as well as the subsequent partition. Modern Studies then enters the picture to separate a category comprising those with the highest conceptualisation score.

Over and above the influence of I.Q. and Modern Studies, the respondent's expressed interest in political affairs is the only other factor to enter the AID tree. There is little variation therefore in the splits generated by this technique. On the one hand one has those from the lowest I.Q. category who constitute the group with the lowest level of conceptualisation, while on the other, the group with

the largest mean score comprise those with the highest I.Q. score and who are taking the course in Modern Studies. However if AID manages to pick up this course as a major source of variance this does not hold with the MCA statistics for conceptualisation.

According to the latter, religion, consumption of mass media, the peer group, I.Q. score and most important, the respondent's own level of interest in politics are the determining factors. In contrast among the least important one unearths Modern Studies.

We are again thrown into some confusion as to the actual extent of Modern Studies influence in comparison with the other predictors in our analysis. There has been no suggestion up to now, either from the previous analysis or the AID figures, that Modern Studies is so lacking in noteworthiness, at least in this area. We are led to employ one further technique in order to extract from MCA more information on this apparent discrepancy in our data. This involves repeating the MCA run with the level of conceptualisation as the dependent variable but eliminating Modern Studies as a possible predictor.³⁴ In this way we are able to obtain what pertains most closely to a partial correlation coefficient if we subtract the amount of variance obtained for all predictors in this second run from the amount of variance elicited where Modern Studies was included as a predictor. This produces a value for Modern Studies where the dependent variable is the level of conceptualisation index of no more than 0.01. This strongly confirms the unimpressive picture previously obtained of its impact on the basis of the beta² statistic. Yet since we have already concluded that MCA appears to attribute a slight, yet consistent, power to this course, our final conclusion about its general impact must be couched with provisos.

Certainly the multivariate analysis has not enabled us to draw a firm conclusion about the influence of Modern Studies, in part because the two techniques employed have not been unanimous in their findings but instead have raised contradictions or differences in emphasis. On one point there does not appear to be any doubt and that is that Modern Studies is far from being a major influence in political socialisation. The real point at issue is whether it is a slight rather than a negligible force, and secondly, how it stands in comparison with other predictors.

Our conclusion on the size of Modern Studies influence in political learning, is that it does bring about a slight change in political orientations. In no sense does Modern Studies induce a negative reaction, or in any other way hold back political development. Its influence is not exactly spread evenly across the whole range of political orientations but if its influence is anywhere to be regarded as minimal it is among the lower levels of political knowledge. This we find a most surprising conclusion, not only is it a contradiction of previous American research, but it does not marry well with a priori reasoning about the impact of a school course whose guiding direction is an examination with the attendant accumulation of general and specific knowledge of political life. In sum the course appears to have made a relatively larger impact in those areas for which teachers have always disclaimed any interest of entering. The conclusion we derive is that young people taking Modern Studies are more struck by the particular evaluations of the political world impressed upon them rather by the fresh factual material to which their attention is drawn. The novelty and the relative strength of this course is that it forces

them to rethink their value preferences in a way not demanded by the acquisition of new knowledge, which may be more easily swallowed up within existing preconceptions of the world. How far this means that one set of value preferences is acquired for use in the classroom and another employed outside is obviously a question demanding further investigation, but it is not beyond the bounds of possibility.

In respect of the relative impact of Modern Studies, this again is difficult to pinpoint because whereas Modern Studies appears to stay at much the same station in the pecking order all of the other agents fluctuate wildly in significance between orientations. It is quite impossible to relate Modern Studies to any of the other predictors which we have included and say that the two factors are broadly comparable in the amount of influence that they generate. What we can conclude instead is that Modern Studies will be situated in the lower-middle ranking.

With such high expectations and such low achievement we are forced to ask, 'Why?' The brief answer is that too much is expected of Modern Studies in too short a time at too late a stage in the individual's development. Most especially, Modern Studies has been established with too grandiose expectations which have ignored almost completely the possibility that factors outside the school will not only be a major source of political influence long before children are eligible to take Modern Studies, but while they are still taking the course and will continue to be significant long after the school has been left well behind. To saddle a single school course with the predominant responsibility for instilling political growth in all manner of directions is seen to be in blatant disregard of the features which

characterise political learning. In particular it seems necessary to point out the rather obvious, but often ignored fact, that the young adolescent may spend a majority of his time in the company of other individuals or groups who have little sympathy with the objectives of Modern Studies, and whose pre-eminence is not to be denied them, especially by a few hours teaching for eight months or so in the year. Nevertheless, lest it be thought that our message is completely pessimistic about the prospects for Modern Studies, we have isolated orientations where its influence can be detected. We have moreover identified difficulties both within and outwith of the school classroom which must be taken into account if the educationalist's assessment of the objectives of political education in the curriculum is to be placed on a more realistic footing.

FIGURE 15 :
Political Knowledge




FIGURE 16 : Issue Ideologue




FIGURE 17 : Political Interest




FIGURE 18 : Political Efficacy




FIGURE 19 : General Support for British Government




FIGURE 20 : Level of Conceptualization





FIGURE 21 : Perception of Peace



Footnotes to Chapter Seven

1. The figures reported in TABLE 106 are the average across every item in the case of the political knowledge (Appendix A; Question 22), issue ideologue (Appendix A; Questions 26,28 and 29), political toleration (Appendix A; Questions 39-43) scales.
2. Appendix A; Question 22.
3. Appendix A; Question 47.
4. Appendix A; Questions 26,28 and 29.
5. Appendix A; Question 50.
6. Appendix A; Question 17.
7. Appendix A; Questions 34 - 38.
8. Appendix A; Questions 39 - 43.
9. Appendix A; Questions 56 - 60.
10. Appendix A; Question 48.
11. Appendix A; Question 51.
12. Appendix A; Question 54.
13. Appendix A; Question 52.
14. This index is constructed from the replies to Questions 50; Appendix A as already indicated in Chapter 5.
15. Appendix A; Question 22.
16. In the tables which we include for the panel sample the figures presented for each cell are percentages of the total population in that group.
17. Appendix A; Questions 26,28 and 29. Those ranked as ideologues answered that the S.N.P. are most in favour of Scotland becoming independent, and that the party supported by most businessmen is the Conservative Party and that the Labour Party is the one most in favour of nationalisation.
18. Appendix A; Question 16a.

19. Appendix A; Question 16b.
20. Appendix A; Question 16c.
21. Appendix A; Question 48.
22. Appendix A; Questions 34 - 38.
23. Appendix A; Questions 39 - 43.
24. Appendix A; Questions 56 - 60.
25. Appendix A; Question 25.
26. Appendix A; Question 30.
27. Ibid.
28. Appendix A; Question 23.
29. Appendix A; Question 51.
30. Appendix A; Question 54.
31. Appendix A; Question 52.
32. See note 14 above.
33. The full range of possibilities and difficulties presented by the joint use of AID are explained in detail in: Sonquist, J. Multivariate Model Building, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1970.
34. If the interest is in explaining how much of the variance is explained by an individual predictor, over and above what can be explained by the remainder the beta coefficient is not the appropriate technique. Instead the whole run should be re-inserted with the predictor omitted on the second occasion. See: Andrews, F., Morgan, J., & Sonquist, J., Multiple Classification Analysis, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1969, pp. 117 - 122.

CHAPTER VIII - The Conclusion

As the Cheshire Cat said to Alice, if you want to know how to get someplace it's a good idea to know where you are going. This study began with the objective of placing the impact of a course in formal political education within a framework of political development during adolescence. This necessitated distinguishing between the pattern of political learning that proceeds irrespective of the school's teaching, and the growth of political orientations that might be attributed to the deliberately contrived learning situation in the school classroom. On completion of our analysis of a wide-ranging set of data what conclusions can we reach about the central problem posed above and about the utility of the framework in which we have cast political learning?

The reader will recall that we had chosen to test a qualitative perspective on political growth. This throws most emphasis on the sequence of such learning, with the underlying impetus in forward movement coming from the child's own cognitive development. In particular we concentrated on the claim, first expounded by Piaget, that early adolescence is to be characterised by a changeover from concrete to formal operations in the child's thinking. When applied to political orientations this transformation is manifest in a marked increase in the child's readiness to judge political affairs in abstract terms. As a consequence we should be able to record a drop in heteronomy in political judgements as well as a decline in the tendency to personalize and idealize the political system and the

authorities. Corresponding to these movements there will be an increase in the sophistication that the child employs in his conceptualisation of political relationships and concepts. This may be categorised by a growth in socio-economic thinking and of objective responsibility. At the same time there will be a marked increase in the amount of political information, of all sorts, stored by the adolescent. In turn these latter orientations, which have no direct linkage with cognitive capacity, will be moulded more effectively by the framework of socialisation agents in which the young person is contained. While we expect that those areas which we have connected with changing cognitive capacity will be less influenced by other social forces and individual differences, political learning as a whole is placed within an interaction-acquisition process which allows for the impact of both cognitive factors as well as the wider social environment in which the individual is located.

This means that if cognitive development is only related directly to certain orientations the process of qualitative, stage-like growth will be a characteristic of these areas alone. Our interest centres not merely on different patterns of growth between orientations but also on whether or not particular combinations of factors, cognitive and/or other, will facilitate political development, or conversely whether other combinations will retard political growth.

Specification of development as qualitative means that not only are distinct patterns in political learning evident but that they will evolve in a clear, step-like progression, categorised as stages which must be overcome in a set sequence. At one time it

had been customary to assign definite age ranges to the various stages of growth but that practice has aroused strong criticism. Our own study provides no substantiation of the hypothesis that, on its own, cognitive capacity as derived from age will create a qualitative impression in the political field. This applies irrespective of whether we take chronological age or our own level of conceptualisation index as the criterion for the cognitive stage attained. The movement that occurs during adolescence in those areas which we have said possess direct links with changes in cognitive capacity is, for the most part, in the direction predicted, but it does not emerge in the manner or with the consistency that Piagetian research has implied. Equally, application of a more abstract level of political conceptualisation in one field is no guarantee that it will be generalised across even a majority of orientations.

In addition we have to recognise that the change which we detect in those orientations not immediately dependent on cognitive development frequently exhibits a pattern of growth similar to that in areas which we have said are directly related. Not only is there an absence of spurts in learning at specific age points but where greater development is indicated it is as likely to arise in the lower level of orientations as in the more demanding ones.

Since adolescence is characterised as a period when the individual is particularly eager to expand his horizons and increase his knowledge we do expect growth in the cognitive domain. Again it should increase evenly with the individual's experience, for which age is a useful indicator. The same conclusion is less convincingly applied to the affective domain where orientations will be more dependent on the socialisation agent(s) from whom one takes one's cues. It is of

interest therefore that even in the affective domain there is evidence that political orientations will develop consistently and evenly with age. The direction in which the adolescents are moving is invariably towards what we have typified as the more 'democratic' viewpoint, or to the dispositions on which political stability is believed to thrive. This is not an across the board conclusion. The growth of support for the political authorities is most disjointed, just as the decline in feelings of cynicism and alienation from the system are haphazard. Another area which defies the conclusion of consistent growth is the emergence of more cosmopolitan feelings. This occurs in a most ponderous fashion.

Nevertheless on balance it is most striking how political orientations emerge with age in a consistent movement regardless of the level of the orientation or the domain in which the inspection is made.

Where changes in orientations do occur it is generally more appropriate to apply the term development because in almost every instance the movement tends towards the same direction, yet with an impressive degree of consistency and evenness. Haphazard and unpredictable change is the exception which is confined almost entirely to the affective domain. Notwithstanding the few discrepancies our conclusion is that the acquisition of values will demonstrate a one directional, monotonic movement, although generally less dramatic than in the cognitive domain. Nevertheless the amount of development that we have uncovered in the affective domain is both more general and marked than most previous research had led us to anticipate.

Whereas the growth attained by the young respondents in these lower level cognitive and affective orientations is most graphic we

uncover fewer patterns in the adolescent's perception of the political world. We have found that young people move to higher levels of conceptualisation with age in a consistent manner but that there is no evidence of qualitative growth in their perception of concepts such as 'war' and 'peace'. It is as if the young person drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters into the political world. He argues and analyses in a way which he himself would probably categorise as lacking in sophistication. "He becomes primitive again", is the conclusion that Schumpeter offers.

In part the lack of political growth may be attributed not so much to an inability to make use of one's cognitive capacity as to a lack of the requisite information on which the appropriate interpretation can be given. Another supposition is that while we have categorised our respondents as either operating in abstract or non-abstract terms there is much evidence that horizontal decalage operates with a vengeance in political thinking. Compartmentalization appears as a key feature, to which full account must be paid, in any discussion of political learning.

Why is there such an absence of qualitative growth? It may be that those studies which have referred to the movement towards abstract thinking in early adolescence are themselves grossly in error. An alternative explanation is that politics constitutes an activity which does not lend itself to a consistent employment of abstract principles. Or it may be that this latter feature is more dependent on interest and information levels than we have been prepared to admit. Whatever the reason the clear inference is that the political world does not benefit from the quality of response of which the respondents are thought to be capable. It seems as if

the political world is not a source of much attraction among the majority of respondents who are also defeated by its complexities, and adopt a coping strategy which rejects attempts to acquire information or reduces this to concrete terms when it is assimilated. Again political activity encourages a high emotional involvement and this may counteract the dispassionate employment of formal operations. Clearly there is a great need for further research into the understanding which is brought to bear on the making of political decisions.

Qualitative development - in terms of stage-like growth - may alternatively have been frustrated from making an appearance because we have conducted our analysis without making allowance for the intervention of social and individual differences. This far we have been concerned with the impact of cognitive capacity alone, as expressed in age changes, on political learning. Here we will turn to the findings which relate to the influence of various inter-individual and intra-individual factors acting in combination with chronological age.

The extreme complexity of the arena in which political learning takes place makes a multivariate analysis a necessity, although it also means in our case that generalization across a large number of orientations becomes perhaps more difficult than if we had been content with less ambitious procedures. Analysed alone each of the factors included in our study exhibits at least a marginal influence in one important aspect of political learning. Taken together in the AID technique we feel quite confident in drawing the conclusion that certain combinations of factors are especially potent. In particular we would mention the combination of cognitive factors, namely age, level of conceptualisation and I.Q. score which demonstrate a high

level of interaction according to the pattern in which the tree is built up. The impact of this combination is by no means restricted to the cognitive domain however but instead seems to produce variation throughout the orientations included within this investigation. The inference is that high scoring is brought about insofar as these factors, all of which constitute political learning advantages, complement each other and reinforce the movement towards the highest levels of sophistication. As far as the affective domain is concerned we have noticed that some interest in political affairs must be evident. This politicization may either be of the individual himself, or alternatively of his family or peer group. The impact of the variables in the affective domain also shows another interesting difference in emphasis; rather than advantages appearing as cumulative, as we detected in the cognitive domain, in this other area disadvantages come through as substitutes. This we deduce from the fluctuations in importance of the various predictors at different parts of the tree, and more especially from the shape of the tree itself. Indeed if disadvantages had come through as cumulative we would have not expected there to be any pattern of growth in the affective domain at all.

What does the addition of this multiplicity of predictors effect in the nature of the movement with age in those areas not directly connected with cognitive development? To us it seems that there is interaction between the predictors which accentuates the amount of variation between sub-groups within the sample. For the most part these are not in the affective domain, with the exception of the basic interest in political affairs. Otherwise it is in the cognitive domain that we find the influence of social forces and

individual differences to be at their strongest. While this reinforces our conviction that the amount of growth in the affective domain will be relatively less amenable to social influence some of the growth rates recorded in the cognitive domain are worthy of categorization as qualitative development.

From the relatively restricted analysis of political learning using just two variables through the analysis of interaction provided by the AID routine we can turn to the assessment of the relative impact of each variable using the MCA technique. We have already pointed out that the amount of interaction uncovered in several of our major dependent areas is such that to imply that the pattern of learning is so removed from the additive model that the MCA routine becomes redundant, unless new variables are created. Nevertheless MCA does generate a more powerful assessment of our predictors in those areas where we can be confident that the data is not too grossly distorted. In particular the beta coefficients, though they must be interpreted with caution, provide a useful guide to the relative importance of our predictors, after holding constant the variation created by all of the others. Not unexpectedly however, even these figures do not give a neat picture of the agents of political socialisation. What is discovered is that an agent will be in the first order of ranking in one dependent variable but in the same domain and at the same level of sophistication it will then fall to the sector of least importance when we examine another dependent variable. We cannot talk easily of one set of influences being more important than another in political learning unless we restrict this conclusion to one specific orientation. Over the whole range of orientations covered in our study, the strengths and weaknesses of particular predictors tend to cancel each other out. The only factor which does not slip

by the wayside is the influence brought about through the level of peer group politicization. Its all pervading influence may be thought surprising, given that the peer group has not received much attention in political socialisation research and because, even where its influence has been catered for, it has not been thought very significant.

If we return to the summary chart contained at the end of Chapter 2, and the comparisons with that made in Chapter 6, we see that the more general alterations suggested from our analysis are of a shading in emphasis, rather than of sharp refutations. That is, a particular factor will have been found to be a moderate rather than a weak influence or a moderate rather than a strong, while moves across categories, such as from strong to weak, are extremely rare. Nevertheless a substantial number of the original predictions about the amount of influence that is to be allocated to the individual predictors do not apply. In part this may be due to the more precise conclusions rendered possible in our multivariate analysis. Equally however, our operationalisation of some features has been different from the practice followed in other studies and this affects both the dependent and independent variables.

Despite this the importance attributed elsewhere to some factors does seem to be at variance with our own empirical conclusions. These contradictions comprise essentially the social class background of the respondent, his intelligence level, and the impact that the politicization of the family brings. All of these are somewhat relegated in importance by MCA in relation to previous studies, and in the case of the I.Q. score of the respondent, a discrepancy occurs with the initial conclusion of our own investigation. As far as the

cognitive source factors are concerned, that is the level of conceptualisation and the age of the respondent, each comes through in our analysis with moderately less force and with less pervasiveness than we had anticipated or indeed found in the AID tree analysis. None of the factors is markedly elevated in importance by the MCA technique, although the influence attributed to religion, and organizational membership in particular is far more general than we had suspected.

Discussion of the relative impact of the various predictors in our study leads us to the specific objective of this thesis. Having established more definitely how political learning proceeds we have to look at its development when the child is exposed in middle adolescence to a formal political education in the school curriculum. Firstly, we want to know if measurable differences occur and if so, where? If not, we want to understand why not.

On the direct question of Modern Studies influence we detected in the cross-sectional design few statistically strong differences. The exposure to this course does not appear to have any more than a marginal impact although where variation occurs it is in the direction categorised by a more advanced development and awareness or towards orientations which are regarded as more in line with democratic thinking. The panel data is extraordinarily interesting in this regard because of the way in which it provides evidence on individual, as well as aggregate, movements after exposure to Modern Studies. Our concentration on the nature of the former changes has broadly substantiated our initial finding about the moderateness of Modern Studies influence, either to reinforce the desired orientation, if already held, or to lead the respondent to the acquisition of this

orientation. Somewhat surprisingly the greater amount of positive change (i.e. towards the valued orientation, or piece of knowledge, does not appear to be a marked conclusion of taking Modern Studies. Both groups exhibit a large amount of flexibility and if generally the Modern Studies pupil is more likely to move in the required direction he also evinces a comparable degree of backsliding, both in knowledge and in his evaluations of the political world.

The cross-sectional design conclusions also link most conveniently with findings from the panel sample. Most particularly they reinforce each other in respect of the conclusion that Modern Studies will have a somewhat greater impact in the affective domain than in the cognitive domain, while in addition Modern Studies does stimulate movement towards the higher level of conceptualisation about political affairs. Nevertheless political learning proceeds without the help of Modern Studies. Indeed with respect to some orientations, such as the level of political knowledge, the amount of change recorded by those not taking the course is far greater than anything the Modern Studies pupils manage. The conclusion we derive from this evidence, as well as that presented in the larger sample, is that the growth of political orientations will proceed apace irrespective of exposure to formal political education.

We have already illustrated the way in which the use of different multivariate techniques can cast socialisation agents in a somewhat different perspective. What transformation, if any, takes place in the importance that we ascribe to Modern Studies? If we commence with the AID analysis Modern Studies does not emerge as a source of much variation. However the splits which are made on this variable occur in interesting areas. In the first place

Modern Studies enters the picture by splitting where political interest is the dependent variable and then again when the respondent's level of conceptualisation is the subject of the examination. The nature of these splits indicates that Modern Studies, does not operate with any consistency, either as a remedial force or as an agent which reinforces the development of those groups already well endowed with political advantages.

The MCA findings substantiate the conclusion that Modern Studies is of low level importance in the general rating of political socialisation predictors, although it is rarely at the bottom of the scale. In other words the influence of Modern Studies is elevated slightly where we adopt an analytical procedure which controls for the variation induced by the other predictors. In the lower levels of the cognitive domain it remains unsuccessful, as we have concluded previously, and though the picture in the affective orientations is most confused it is almost always seen to emerge as more important relative to the other predictors. When we turn to the respondent's level of conceptualisation there is a sharp contradiction with the picture derived from AID. With MCA Modern Studies influence in this area is washed out almost completely.

Modern Studies therefore remains in our mind as a moderate, or less, influence on political orientations. Given that it so sadly fails to meet up to the expectations attributed to it can we offer reasons for its apparent inability to fulfill these objectives?

The first and most convincing reason for Modern Studies' lack of impact is that it has grossly underestimated the currents of influence on political development taking place outside of the school across the whole range of social learning. Conversely, as well

or because of this, the impact of experience and exposure within the school appears to have been exaggerated.

Our conclusion is most definitely that political learning is age based both in terms of its emergence and in the directions which will be taken, but that environmental forces will have advanced some children along the scale, so that by middle adolescence a clear pattern of distinctions based on both of these will have been established. To assume that one can then bring in a new, and essentially contrived agent, into this process and attempt to make wholesale and sweeping transformations does not appear to us to be a realistic objective. Learning has occurred without Modern Studies, and will continue even while children are taking this course. Also the influences outside of the school may well be encouraging the young person in directions quite contrary to those chosen by formal political education. It is not so much that orientations cannot be changed during adolescence but rather that a momentum appears to have been created in a particular direction which it is difficult to see Modern Studies redirecting or averting to another goal. This finding goes against the grain for many in education who have to be reminded that exposure to ideas or information is not sufficient to bring about a change in attitudes.

If Modern Studies cannot alter existing trends in political learning can it do anything to accelerate movements in the desired direction? From the evidence presented it appears that this is the situation which will most frequently confront Modern Studies. Yet even when Modern Studies objectives and the underlying trends in political learning are going in the same direction we detect no substantial influence. It is as if the amount of improvement

achieved by Modern Studies is commensurate with the original growth rate indicated by the individual. This means that those already retarded will make smaller progress than those who are already more advanced in their political development. The end result is a widening of the gulf between individuals where Modern Studies is presented to a complete cross-section of young people.

Exponents of Modern Studies have argued that their main objective is not so much the dissemination of a particular set of political orientations but rather of an intellectual tool kit which will enable the adolescent to face up to the complexities presented by contemporary society. And in this area there is evidence that the influence exerted by Modern Studies is as marked as that uncovered in other orientations. We have already noted that the movement into hypothetico-deductive reasoning and from concrete to abstract levels of thinking is particularly resistant to widening implementation. That Modern Studies can exert even a moderate impact is one of the most compelling arguments for its introduction and expansion in the curriculum.

The appreciation demonstrated for these underlying currents in adolescent political development by those concerned with curriculum reform has not always been manifest in their public pronouncements. The immediate problem of whether Modern Studies covers the most appropriate topics or makes use of the most effective teaching methods is well beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless we do believe that too much optimism has pervaded the educational thinking in this area. This does not mean that Modern Studies is a worthless exercise as presently constituted. Yet it is little other than a moderate political stimulant. The curriculum by itself cannot be expected to

take on changing social conditions in some dramatic confrontation and necessarily come out on top. Quite the reverse, for the curriculum is most likely to be cast as both the loser and the scapegoat. Formal political education does seem to have had a rough deal in this context. Other courses such as geography and history are valued for their presumed relevance to the pupil's interests but no research, known to us, is available or thought necessary, to substantiate the claims made about their widespread impact. Yet the evaluation of political education has always been on dissecting its influence on the children's social and political orientations rather than on an assumption of worth which is accorded to the presentation of valued information. In this respect it is treated as equivalent to religious or sex education in the school since all of these are valued for instrumental reasons above all else. And in each of these incidentally extra classroom learning is especially important. Yet surely a case can be made for studying politics even though these instrumental objectives for making the child a 'better citizen' are not completely fulfilled, unless the interpretation of that term is given a far less specific boundary line in terms of either orientations or behaviour thought at that moment to be conducive to the well-being of the political system. When will a political education be considered interesting and valuable for the problems it presents rather than the outcomes it produces?

Nevertheless our own final conclusion is stated in terms of the objectives that are traditionally set down for political education, or specifically in this case for Modern Studies. It is that our investigation has tended to reinforce the conclusion arrived at on

the basis of American research that formal political education has far less impact than is intended. We do not however dismiss Modern Studies out of hand, as American research has inferred that civic education is little short of an unmitigated disaster. Clearly Modern Studies can exert an impact in political learning and instead of describing this as nil or negligible, we would elevate it to a marginal status with relatively greater influence in some areas, such as the level of interest in political affairs, which are commonly regarded as the heart of any scheme for political education.

APPENDIX A

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questionnaire comprised the basic data collection instrument that was administered to pupils in every section of our research design.

All alterations and modifications of substance are noted in Appendix B.

Write your name here in capital letters _____

The following questions are part of a study that is being made at the University of Strathclyde. We want to learn about the views of pupils in Scottish Secondary Schools. Therefore we are anxious that you answer the following questions as carefully and as truthfully as you can. Do not discuss the answers with others in the class because we want to know what you think about the questions.

This is not a test and your answers will not be seen by your teachers, nor will the answers be used by them in any way. Most of the replies that you are asked to give do not require a lot of writing as you usually indicate your choice of answer by making a tick, either in a box , or on a line ✓. Do not take any notice of the numbers beside some of the answers; they are there to help us read the questionnaire when you have finished it.

If at any point you cannot think of an answer, dont worry, just pass on to the next question.

First a few questions about yourself.

1. How old are you? years months

2. What class are you in at school?

3. What sex are you?

1 Boy

2 Girl

4. What country have you lived in for most of your life?

1 Scotland

2 England

(Tick one box only)

3 Ireland

4 Wales

5 Abroad

5. What job does your father do? (If your father is retired or dead, write down the kind of job he last did. If you dont know the name of his job, then write down as much as you can about it.)

.....

6. In what Year do you expect to be when you leave school?

3 Third Year

4 Fourth Year

5 Fifth Year

6 Sixth Year

7. Which of the following statements best describes the way you will feel when you leave school?

1 Glad to leave

3 Mixed feelings

5 Sorry to leave

8. Do you expect to pass any Scottish Certificate, or school craft or commercial examinations before leaving school?

1 Yes, ordinary grade

2 Yes, ordinary and higher grade

3 Yes, school craft or commercial exams

5 No

9. Are most of your friends staying on at school to the Fourth Year, or beyond, or are they leaving (or have they left) before that?

1 They are staying on to the 4th Year

2 They will leave (have left) in the 3rd year

3 Some are staying and some are leaving

7 Dont know

10. How interested would you say your parents are in your school work?

(a) Father

(b) Mother

(Tick one box for your father and one for your mother)

1. Very interested

2. Interested

3. Not interested

11. Do you belong to any clubs or organizations in school or outside school?

- 1 Yes, in school only
- 2 Yes, out of school only
- 3 Yes, both in school and out of school
- 5 No

12. Have you thought about the sort of job you would like to have when you leave school and start work?

- 1 Yes
- 5 No

If Yes: 12a. What job would that be?

.....

13. Have you read any books or pamphlets on the job opportunities for someone like yourself?

- 1 Yes
- 5 No

14. Have any of the following people given you any ideas about the sort of job to get when you leave school?

	1 Yes	5 No
a) Family	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b) Teachers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c) Youth Employment Officer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d) Friends	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

15. There is quite a lot of talk these days about different social classes. Do you think of yourself as belonging to a social class?

- 1 Yes
- 5 No

If Yes: 15a. What is the name of this class?

.....

16. Some people think that it is important to discuss what is going on in government and politics. Other people prefer not to bother about such problems. How often do you talk about what is going on in the country with the following people?

	1. Once or twice a year	2. A few times a month	3. Several times a week	5. Almost never
a. With your parents?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. With your friends?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. With your teachers?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

17. Some people seem to think about what is going on in the government all the time, whether there is an election going on or not. Others are not that interested. How often do you follow what the government is doing?

1 Most of the time
 2 Some of the time
 3 Only now and then
 5 Hardly at all

18. How interested would you say your parents are in current political and economic problems?

	(a) Father	(b) Mother
1. Very interested	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Interested	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Not interested	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

19. What are the names of the main political parties in Britain?

.....

20. What sort of things do British political parties most often seem to disagree about?

.....

21. Some people are interested in certain types of news but not in others. In the list below, put a number 1 in the box beside the type of news stories that you find most interesting, a 2 beside the second most interesting, a 3 in the box beside the third most interesting, and a 4 beside the events that you find least interesting.

- a British news
- b Local news
- c Scottish news
- d World news

22. Now for a few questions about people who are often in the news. (If you cannot think of an answer then go on to the next question).

- a. Who is the Prime Minister?
- b. Who is Mr. Richard Nixon?
- c. Who is the Secretary of State for Scotland?
- d. Who is the leader of the Conservative Party?
- e. Who is Mr. Jeremy Thorpe?
- f. In which political party is Mr. Enoch Powell?
- g. In which political party is Mrs. Winnifred Ewing?
- h. In which political party is Mrs. Barbara Castle?

23. Do you think that there is much difference between the political parties in Britain?

- 1 A lot of differences
- 2 Some differences
- 3 Very few differences
- 7 Dont know

24. Do you know which political party your parents generally support at election time?

(Tick one box for your father and one for your mother)

	(a) Father	(b) Mother
1. Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Does not vote	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

25. Do you support one of the political parties or haven't you made your mind up yet?

- 1 Yes, I support a political party
- 5 No, I do not support a political party

If Yes: 25a. Do you support the same political party as your parents?

- 1 Yes, same as mother and father
- 2 Same as father, different from mother
- 3 Same as mother, different from father
- 5 No, different from father and mother
- 7 Dont know

26. Which one of the political parties do you think is most in favour of Scotland becoming independent?

.....

27. Which political party do you think is most against Scotland becoming independent?

.....

28. Which political party seems to you to be most strongly supported by businessmen?

.....

29. Which one of the political parties is most in favour of the state owning some important industries, such as steel?

.....

30. Some people prefer one political party to another in Britain. In the list of five political parties which follows, put a number 1 in the box beside the party that you think ought to govern the country, a 2 beside the party that would be your second choice, a 3 beside your third choice, a 4 beside your fourth choice, and a 5 beside the party which you dislike most of all.

- a Communist
- b Conservative
- c Labour
- d Liberal
- e Scottish National

31. The supporters of one political party do not always agree with the supporters of another political party. Below you will see 6 pairs of parties. For each pair, show whether you think those two parties would agree or disagree with each other about how to govern the country.

	The two parties ...				
	1	2	4	5	7
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Neutral
a. Conservative & Labour	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Labour & Scottish National	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Scottish National & Communist	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Communist & Conservative	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Scottish National & Conservative	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Communist & Labour	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

32. In this question the political parties in Britain are arranged into 10 pairs; look at each pair in turn, and for every pair underline that party which you prefer. For example, in the first pair, if you like the Conservative Party more than the Communist Party, then you would put a line underneath the word Conservative. Now make your own choice for the first pair and then go on to the others.

- a. Communist or Conservative
- b. Conservative or Labour
- c. Labour or Liberal
- d. Liberal or Scottish National
- e. Scottish National or Conservative
- f. Conservative or Liberal
- g. Liberal or Communist
- h. Communist or Labour
- i. Labour or Scottish National
- j. Scottish National or Communist

33. We are all supposed to obey the law; but who, among the people below, actually make the laws in Britain?

	a) The Queen	b) Businessmen	c) Teachers	d) Police- men
1. Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	e) Parliament	f) Judges	g) Prime Minister
1. Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Here are some comments on current news in Britain. Read each statement and then put a tick on the line beside the answer which is closest to your view on that question.

34. So many people vote in General Elections in Britain that it would not matter if my parents do not vote.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

35. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot understand what is going on.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

36. The political views of schoolchildren and young people are important.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

37. Voting is the only way people like my parents can have any say about how the government runs things.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

38. There are some powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

39. We should not allow coloured people to become judges and policemen.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

40. It is dangerous to work with those who have different political views from you.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

41. We should not allow people to say that our government is bad.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

42. It is sometimes necessary to use force to advance an idea that one believes in.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

43. No one in this country should be allowed to make speeches against the Church and religious people.

1 Agree
5 Disagree
7 Dont know

44. A complete change of questions now. Do you regularly read a daily national newspaper?

- 1 Yes
- 5 No

If Yes: 44a. Which ones? (Do not tick more than two papers).

- 1 Daily Record
- 2 Daily Telegraph
- 3 Glasgow Herald
- 4 London Times
- 5 Scotsman
- 6 Scottish Daily Express
- 7 Scottish Daily Mail
- 8 Other (Which one?)

45. Do you regularly read a Sunday newspaper?

- 1 Yes
- 5 No

If Yes: 45a. Which one(s)? (Do not tick more than 2 newspapers).

- 01 News of the World
- 02 Observer
- 03 People
- 04 Sunday Citizen
- 05 Sunday Express
- 07 Sunday Post
- 08 Sunday Telegraph
- 09 Sunday Times
- 10 Other (Which one?)

46. How often do you watch television news programmes?

- 1 About every day
- 3 2 or 3 times a week
- 5 Hardly at all
- 8 Never

47. Most countries in the world are usually described as either WESTERN, or NEUTRAL, or as COMMUNIST. Below is a list of several countries. Put a cross in the box under the description which you think is best for each country. For example, in the first case if you think that Britain is a 'Communist' country you would put a tick in the box in column 5, but if you think that Britain is 'Western' then your tick would go in column 1. Now mark in your answer for Britain and the other countries.

	1 <u>WESTERN</u>	3 <u>NEUTRAL</u>	5 <u>COMMUNIST</u>	7 <u>DONT KNOW</u>
a) Britain	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b) Canada	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c) Russia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d) India	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e) China	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f) Switzerland	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g) Poland	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

48. In this country the way in which we are governed is different from the way in which, for example, the Americans or the Chinese are governed. Do you think that the British system of government is:-

	a. <u>Honest</u>	b. <u>Weak</u>	c. <u>Best in the world</u>	d. <u>Fair</u>	e. <u>Dependent on other countries for help</u>	f. <u>Out of date</u>
1. Agree strongly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Agree	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Disagree strongly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. No opinion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(You should now have one tick for each description from 'Honest' through to 'Out of date').

These questions are to be answered by writing in the space provided below the question. Imagine that a foreign pupil has just come to your school and asks you to explain a few things about life in Britain. Now write down briefly what you would say in reply. If you cannot think of an answer just go on to the next question.

49. a) What does the Queen do?
-
-
- b) What does a Trade Union do?
-
- c) What is the main job of Parliament?
-
- d) What does the word 'politics' make you think of?
-

50. Define Briefly the following words:-

- a) Communism -
-
- b) Democracy -
-

51. There have been several wars in various parts of the world in recent times. What does the word 'war' make you think of?

.....

.....

52. Who, or what, in the world, do you think is most to blame for causing wars?

.....

53. Do you think that war is right under certain conditions or that war is always definitely wrong?

- 1 War is right under certain conditions
- 5 War is definitely wrong

54. What does the word 'peace' make you think of? What does it mean to you?

.....

55. Do you think that anything can be done to stop wars?

- 1 Yes
- 5 No

If Yes: 55a. If you think that any person, or organization in the world can help to stop wars, who would that be?

.....

56. Over the years, how much attention do you feel that the government pays to what the people think when it decides to do something important?

- 1 Pays a lot of attention
- 3 Sometimes pays attention
- 5 Hardly pays attention at all

57. Do you think that quite a lot of people in politics are dishonest, not very many are, or do you think that most of them are honest?

- 1 Most are honest
- 3 Not many are honest
- 5 Hardly any are honest

58. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of money that is paid in taxes or not?

- 1 Waste a lot of money
- 3 Waste some money
- 5 Hardly waste any money

59. How much of the time do you feel people can trust Parliament to do what is right for the country?

- 1 Can trust them most of the time
- 3 Can trust them some of the time
- 5 You cannot trust them at all

60. Do you think that most of the people in politics are clever people who seem to know what they are doing or not?

- 1 Most know what they are doing
- 3 A few know what they are doing
- 5 Quite a few dont seem to know what they are doing

Just two final questions about your school work.

61. Are you taking any of the following subjects this year?

- | | 1 Yes | 5 No |
|--------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a) Geography | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b) History | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

62. Have you ever taken, or are you now taking, a course in Modern Studies at school?

- 1 Yes
5 No

If Yes: 62a. Which of the following Modern Studies courses have you taken, or are you now taking?

- 1 Non-certificate Modern Studies
3 Ordinary Grade Modern Studies
5 Higher Grade Modern Studies
6 Ordinary & Higher Grade Modern Studies

THAT IS THE END : THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION

APPENDIX B

ALTERATIONS TO QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR YOUNGER RESPONDENTS

The questionnaire recorded in Appendix A was subject to a variety of adjustments for pupils in the first and second school years. The actual differences are listed below:-

- i) Questions Omitted : Numbers 13, 14, 15, 31, 61 and 62.
- ii) Word Changes: Modifications to the question instructions were found necessary in questions 30, 32, 47, 48 and 49.
- iii) Additional Questions: The following questions were only asked of respondents below the third year. (The question numbers are as listed in the alternative questionnaire).

Q. 46b. Most political problems are created by the politicians.

- 1 Agree
- 5 Disagree
- 7 Dont know

Q. 46c. Politicians never say in public what they are really thinking.

- 1 Agree
- 5 Disagree
- 7 Dont know

Q. 46d. Our country would be better off if there were no political parties.

- 1 Agree
- 5 Disagree
- 7 Dont know

Q. 50c. Can you give the name of two communist countries?

- 1 _____
- 2 _____

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