


STRATHCLYDE PAPERS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS



NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND VOTING IN SCOTLAND

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No. 15

1984

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STRATHCLYDE PAPERS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

(Series Editor: Jeremy Moon)

NO. 15

ISSN 0264-1496

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The past decade has seen a debate in Britain and the United States about the changes in voters' loyalty. In Britain, from the 1960s onwards, there has been a decline in the percentages of electors voting for the major parties. At least as significantly, there has been a sharp decline in those willing to call themselves 'very strong supporters'. In an early article Crewe and his colleagues said "Indeed the decade (1964-74) might be said to mark the decline of the party stalwart.[1] In the U.S. increasing numbers of electors thought of themselves as Independents.

In Scotland the argument took a special form. A large proportion of the electorate turned from Labour or Conservative to vote for the Scottish National Party (SNP). In the General Elections of 1970 and the two in 1974 the SNP did extremely well. In 1979 and 1983 it lost many of its votes.

Crewe and Sarlvik describe the change in the British electorate as a process of class dealignment.[2] Where working class voters had previously been very much more likely to vote Labour than Conservative there was now a movement from Labour. The "Core" working class appeared the most likely to move in this way. One explanation of this is that working people no longer felt that Labour could look after their interests. Labour could not produce the goods. Labour had become dangerously enmeshed in ideological arguments. Could it be that, in Scotland, the process went further? Did the SNP voters really decide that their nation was more important than their class? Did national identity take the place of class identity.

Various explanations rejected or downgraded the extent to which there was a stirring of national consciousness. The most prominent was that the SNP was a protest vote.^[3] It had nothing to do with being Scottish, much less with self-government for Scotland. People who really identified with the Labour or Conservative parties had become unhappy with that party, so the argument went, and voted Nationalist, but this was only to make their own party do better. When this was achieved to their satisfaction they would vote as they always had done.

We shall look at the relation between voting and identification with a social group. Does such an identification lead to a vote for the party which is believed to defend its interests? What is the content of this identification? What image do people have of Scotland or the working class?

The background of Scottish Identity

Human beings identify with many different groups. Only a few of these are relevant for politics. For the vast majority, politics is a marginal activity but there are occasions when they can be roused. A large increase in Council house rents can lead to a boost in the membership of tenants' associations. Normally, politically relevant identification is not made because of a specific stimulus like this. It can be inherited. Electors may vote because they learned a loyalty from their parents. At the beginning of this century, many who had voted Liberal moved to Labour because their class loyalty was

now more directly linked to the new Labour Party; or so it seems. These identities among which people move are not new but may become newly important. Scottish identity existed but, before the early sixties, it did not seem important to many.

There had been times in the past when Scottish identity, indeed straightforward nationalism, had been much more important. At the time of the Treaty of Union in 1707 there was passionate objection to joining England.^[4] Before that, during the Cromwellian period, this same antagonism existed.^[5] In the nineteenth century, there was a very important revival of Scottish feeling and, although it took a form which we might find rather trivial, such as the use of the Scottish form of the Royal Arms or the erection of statues to past heroes like Sir William Wallace, it had popular support.^[6]

Nearer our own time but before the recent SNP upsurge, many Scots supported home rule. The Scottish Covenant was a petition signed by a very large number.^[7] The estimates run between one and two millions and rallies held by the organisation had support from local authorities, presbyteries and many other Scottish bodies. In other words, even at a time when the SNP was making a derisory showing at elections, there was a great deal of Scottish consciousness and it had a political form.^[8]

The Nature of Scottish Identity

Let us recap. We know that Scots were conscious of their

national identity and that, at various points in the last three hundred years at least, they have drawn political implications from this perception. What was the content of this identity? What picture do Scots of various sorts have of Scotland.

This question is important for the development of nationalism. The competition of loyalties is between class and national identification. While these exist alongside each other, for most Scots, class is the identity which traditionally has been the one that is taken seriously. To claim to be a member of the working class carries overtones of the crusade for social justice. Many who believe that they are members of the middle class see that social category as the broad, central, balancing section of society: not so high that it is out of touch, not so low that it has no stake in society.

By contrast with this, one problem of the Nationalist party is that national identity has not been simply second to class but it has been something of a joke. Murray and Barbara Grigor's exhibition "Scotch Myths" brought this out very well, largely by a collection of hundreds of picture postcards. In the catalogue to the exhibition, Duncan Macmillan comments, "What other nation that is reputed to treasure its history, projects such a grotesque and self-destructive image? But Scotch Kitsch is not just a popular culture gone berserk under the pressure of the tourist trade. It is an extraordinary amalgam that contains within it vestiges of what elsewhere would have been high culture."^[9] Murray Grigor also comments, "Up to the turn

of the century 75% of the unsolicited jokes printed by Punch came from Scotland and many caricatured such national traits as meanness, the plight of the Sabbath and the results of whisky." This, added to tartanry and the whole Jacobite Industry, led to an atmosphere which might raise a tear even while moderately sober but not any votes.

For the majority of Scots, then, their national identity was not quite appropriate for politics. It was too much associated with labels on shortbread tins and the stereotypes of Scotch comics. There was a group, at practically all times since the middle of the last century, for whom Scottish identity was a main consideration. The vast majority, however, were not particularly interested in politics and simply followed the lead of the British party.

It is only recently that respondents to a survey have been asked about their national identification. The upsurge of SNP votes made this a question of some interest. The data for this paper are drawn from the 1979 Scottish Election Study. This was funded by the SSRC. There were 729 respondents.

In our research, respondents were asked, "Do you consider yourself to be British or Scottish or English or Irish or something else?" About 35 per cent felt that they were British as against 53 per cent who believed that they were Scottish; 2 per cent identified as English, 1 per cent as Irish and 8 per cent could not answer the question. This question was not asked in the British Election Survey at the 1974 election and there are no other comparisons over Scotland

as a whole. In the Glasgow district, however, a survey was carried out every year between 1973 and 1976 which asked precisely this. Taking only the British and Scottish categories, which are clearly the dominating ones, the results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Perception of nationality in Glasgow

	<u>British</u> %	<u>Scottish</u> %
1973	29	67
1974	28	65
1975	30	65
1976	33	63

There is no increase shown in the numbers of respondents not born in Scotland and it is reasonable to interpret these data as a real fall in the percentage of Scots born people identifying first with Scotland. The 1979 result suggests that this has fallen even further although, of course, the sampling base is different. The most plausible explanations of the change is that the increase in the SNP vote has politicised the whole area of Scottish nationality. It may be that many now fear that to identify oneself as a Scot implies that one is a Nationalist. The Glasgow evidence shows that this change took place when the SNP was still gaining votes.

More important than the mere fact of national identification is its meaning for those who hold it. What does it mean to say that one is Scottish? Respondents were asked, "What is it, do you think, that makes you feel you are ...?" Among those who identified as Scottish,

62 per cent said they were Scottish because they were born in Scotland. A further 9 per cent said that it was because they lived there and only 15 per cent mentioned an emotional attachment. Barely 2 per cent mentioned the culture of Scotland and less than 1 per cent referred to some hostility towards the English. This fits in with our earlier suggestion of a widely held attachment but one with little saliency.

Let us explore this image of Scotland. Is it also so bland as to have no possibility of playing an important role in politics? Respondents were asked what made them most proud of Scotland. 27 per cent of those identifying as Scots mentioned the environment in some form and this was the modal class. By 'environment' we mean the natural topographical features of the country. A higher proportion, 37 per cent, of British identifiers mentioned the environment. 19 per cent of Scottish identifiers mentioned that the Scots were in some way nice people and only the third largest group, 18 per cent, mentioned the Scottish heritage of history. Just over 1 per cent mentioned patriotism and just over 2 per cent mentioned sport. If Scottish identity had nationalist overtones for these people, one would have expected more mentions of history. It is significant that 26 per cent of SNP voters identifying as Scots mentioned history and, for them, this was the modal class. It is also interesting that, even for them, the proportion was relatively small and the next largest category was exactly 20 per cent mentioning the environment. When respondents were asked the same question about pride in Britain, those identifying as British chose a political value most: justice and

democracy by 31 per cent of the British identifiers, as their modal class. The next most frequently mentioned by them was Britain's heritage and history by 12 per cent of the British identifiers. Only 2 per cent mentioned Britain's environment and just over 1 per cent referred to the legendary niceness of British people. Even more striking is the fact that the modal class for Scottish identifiers, both Nationalists and non-Nationalists, was also pride in Britain's justice and democracy (21 per cent and 24 per cent respectively). Britain as a political object seems more politicised for everyone.

In the introduction, we spoke about the romantic image of Scotland. We suggested that this might be a disadvantage for the Nationalists in that it made Scottish identity irrelevant to the practice of politics. There is another aspect of Scotland: the economic one. Virtually three-quarters of our sample (73 per cent) perceived Scotland as not so well off compared with other parts of Britain. 81 per cent of those of thought that Scotland was not as well off believed that it was possible for Scotland to be as well off. Respondents were also asked whether they believed Scotland was now (in 1979) better off or worse off than she had been five years before. 40 per cent believed that she was better off and 33 per cent believed that she was worse off. In short, although there was a clear majority which believed that Scotland's economic position was unhealthy, there was not a clear majority which believed that it was getting worse. A much larger margin exists between those who believe that Britain's economy was getting worse (39 per cent) as compared with those who thought that it was getting better (22 per cent).

One important question is whether the Nationalist has a different vision of Scotland's economic position. Broadly, the Nationalist voter has a perception of Scotland which is in line with the majority of Scots but he also is more definite in these perceptions. 90 per cent see Scotland as poorer than other parts of Britain. 92 per cent of Nationalists believe that Scotland can be as well off. Only 50 per cent of Conservatives believe that Scotland can be better off.

From all this, Scotland is believed by the Scots to be a poor country but one which could be rich. SNP voters are especially likely to support these positions and, to a lesser degree, so are Labour and Liberal voters. Conservatives are more pessimistic about the possibility of improvement.

One factor which often feeds national identity and nationalism is hostility to other peoples. The obvious target here is Englishmen. Does Scottish national identity relate in any way to anti-English feeling? Respondents were asked a number of questions which touched on this. The most direct was, "On the whole, would you say that you like or dislike the English people?" 57 per cent said that they liked the English, 30 per cent said that it depended on the individual and 5 per cent said that they disliked the English. This hardly suggests a high level of feeling. Even among the SNP voters, only 12 per cent reported that they disliked the English but 48 per cent of them said that they liked English people and 32 per cent said that it depended on the individual.

In the course of a series of questions about perceived conflicts in British society, respondents were asked, "And what about the Scots and the English? How serious would you say conflict between them is?" 33 per cent of the sample thought that there was no conflict, 44 per cent thought that it was not very serious and 10 per cent thought it was serious. Among those who identified as Scots, the percentage perceiving very serious or fairly serious conflict rises to 18 per cent but, among SNP voters, their proportion is only 13 per cent. The general conclusion at this stage must be that, even among Nationalist voters, the English are not seen as opponents in a serious sense. Anti-English feeling does exist. Almost one-fifth of those who perceive themselves as Scots feel that there is a sufficiently serious situation but it cannot be said that SNP voting is built on hostility.

We asked, "What are the things you dislike about the English?" From this, there is one category which overtops all the others. 43 per cent of our sample thought the English were arrogant. 39 per cent of SNP voters felt this way. The next largest category among the total number of respondents was the 9 per cent who felt that the English were indifferent to Scotland. This was also the second largest SNP category (11 per cent).

In introducing this paper, we suggested that national identity conflicted with class identity for political relevance. We suggested that a problem for the SNP is that class holds the centre of the stage

to the exclusion of most other things. Although the picture is changing in Britain, class is still more closely associated with politics than nationality.

Respondents were asked to choose between class and national identification in the question, "Would you say that you had more in common with (same class as respondent) English people or (opposite class to that of respondent) Scottish people?" 45 per cent of Scots identifiers said that they would have most in common with a Scot of a different class from their own. 37 per cent of them thought they would feel better with an English person of the same class. Among British identifiers, the order of percentages, as one might expect, were reversed. 51 per cent said they would feel most in common with an English person of the same class and 32 per cent with a Scot of a different class. The most interesting feature of this distribution is the existence of large minorities. In terms of one's view of a place in the world, both features are important. It is also interesting that, among Scottish identifiers who vote SNP, the proportion opting for a Scot of a different class (54 per cent), is only slightly above those choosing another person of the same class in the British category. Even for SNP voters, then, class is important.

There are two sets of questions in our questionnaire which reflect class conflict. The first sequence was introduced with this question, "People often say that trade unions and employers are in conflict with each other. Choosing one of the answers on this card, could you say how serious you think the conflict is here in Britain?"

61 per cent thought that the conflict was either very serious or fairly serious, 24 per cent thought that it was not very serious and only 3 per cent thought that there was no conflict. We also asked whether respondents perceived a conflict between high and low income people. 34 per cent perceived it as fairly serious or very serious, 29 per cent perceived it as not very serious and 25 per cent perceived no conflict at all.

There is a further source of identity which is important in many countries: the voters' religious community. In Scotland, it has been traditionally important in the area around Glasgow where large groups of immigrant Irish settled. It has been suggested that the Catholics among them would retain their Irish identity partly for political reasons while the Protestants would, as Unionists, feel British. We have no data about place of family origin but we can say something about the relations between religion and national identity and about the degree to which the religious split in Scotland is perceived to be important. 29 per cent of the sample said that they had no religious affiliation. Religion thus stands between class and nationality in terms of the proportion of the population recognising an identity. Religion has some importance for politics. The percentages believing that there was a conflict between Catholics and Protestants was higher than those perceiving a conflict between Scots and English. 12 per cent believed that this conflict was very serious, 17 per cent that it was fairly serious, 39 per cent that it was not very serious and only 20 per cent thought that there was no conflict at all. Especially in the West of Scotland, this reflects a

past religious discrimination in jobs and the Rangers and Celtic football teams continue to represent, often violently, divisions in the community. Of the perceived conflicts in the community, the religious base for conflict takes second place and the question of nationality is third.

The conclusion of this section must be that Scottish identity has a low priority among the Scottish voters in general as a source for political action. Presumably, the SNP voters did not think this. As the next table shows, this presumption would be wrong.

Table 2

SNP voters thinking that conflict was very serious or fairly serious

	%
Scottish-English conflict	13
T.U.-Employers conflict	62
High-Low income conflict	32
Protestant-Catholic conflict	21

SNP voters are no different from other Scots in their ordering of sources of conflict in Scottish life.

SOME MODELS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Up to now, we have shown that Scottish consciousness is widespread but that it is not salient politically. Other matters are of more concern to Scottish voters. We have also looked at the

content of Scottish Conservatives. In this section, we shall look at some models of the effects of national consciousness and try to reach conclusions about its importance in Scotland.

There are few explicit models concerning national consciousness in the literature. In some cases, they are not stated in such a way that they can be easily operationalised and tested. Gellner's theory comes into this category, certainly as far as our data are concerned. [10]. We shall look at two which are partially testable. First of all, there is the "protest vote model". It suggests that identity is unimportant for Scottish politics even for SNP voting. If this vote was a "protest" vote, then we should expect no relation between a feeling of Scottish identity and a Nationalist vote. We might find that SNP voters identified themselves as supporters of other parties but without a high level of support. This might take the form of hesitation about the policy of the party or the competence of its leaders. An SNP vote would be a way of showing the party one normally supports that one's vote cannot be taken for granted. Secondly, there is Hechter's original model of internal colonialism. [11]. Where a cultural division already exists between core and peripheral nations living within the same state, the division of labour is perceived as one in which the best jobs are dominated by the people of the core. When a sufficient number perceive this, national identity will become more salient and take off politically.

The Protest Model

A protest voter is one who votes for a party to administer a rebuke to another party to which he has a long term loyalty rather than because of what the first party stands for. Its very name suggests that the SNP stands for Scotland. Apart from any question of independence or home rule, one would expect those who believe that they are Scots to vote for the Nationalists if the SNP vote were not a protest vote. If it were, there would be no difference between the proportions of Scots and British voting for it. There is, in fact, a large difference: 8 per cent of British identifiers voted for the SNP while 22 per cent of Scottish identifiers did so. We conclude that there is some relation.

We decided to explore further the relation between Scottish identification and SNP voting. We argued that, if there was no relation between Scottish identification and SNP voting, then the proportions of identifiers with the SNP among those who also identified as Scottish and voted SNP ought to be significantly different from those who identified with Britain and voted SNP. The logic of this test is that those who believe themselves to be British and vote SNP are more likely to be protest voters. For this reason they would be less likely to identify with the SNP. If the vote of Scots for the SNP is also a protest vote, there ought to be a similar low percentage of SNP identifiers among them. Scottish identification should make no difference. In fact, it does. British identifiers who voted SNP contained only 27 per cent who identified themselves as

SNP supporters. The modal class of party identification among them was Conservative (40 per cent). Among Scots identifiers who voted SNP the proportion who also identified as SNP supporters went up very steeply to 71 per cent. The next largest group of party identifiers among them was the ten per cent who thought of themselves as Labour supporters although they had voted SNP this time.

One more piece of evidence can be examined to judge the appropriateness of the protest model. If this were the explanation for the SNP vote, we should expect relatively few SNP voters would mention support for the party's policies. If we accept again that there may be a proportion of protest voters among British SNP voters, then we should expect that support for SNP policies would be lower among them than among those who were Scots and voted for the SNP. The problem is made more difficult by the generally high percentages who say that they vote for a party because of its policies but, allowing for this fact, we still find that there is a higher percentage of Scots SNP voters who say that they support the party for policy reasons (55 per cent) than there are among British SNP voters (40 per cent).

We must also bear in mind other data which show that Scottish identity has a real effect on the electors nationalism with a small "n". Several pieces of data show that there are people who support other parties but who feel sympathetic to the SNP. This feeling seems to be affected by Scottish identity. We asked, "Whether or not you have ever voted for the Scottish National Party, do you think that

it has been good for Scotland?" Table 4 shows that there is a clear difference between those in other parties related to whether they feel Scottish or British.

Table 4

Has the SNP been good for Scotland?

	SNP & Scottish	Other party & Scottish	Other party & Britain
Yes	96	51	42

This also comes out when we look at preferences for the constitutional options.

Table 5

Support for Constitutional Options

	SNP & Scottish	Other Party & Scottish	Other Party & Britain
Independence	34	15	3
Assembly with most powers	40	36	20
Assembly with some powers	19	33	39
Ad hoc committee	7	16	20
No change	-	10	19

The addition of Scottish identity increases support for greater Scottish autonomy even among the Nationalists. For our purposes here, the important thing is that it increases this feeling among those who are not SNP voters.

Finally, we asked, "If Scotland did become independent some time in the future, do you think that this would be a very bad thing, a bad thing, a good thing or a very good thing?"

Table 6

Independence in the future

	SNP & Scottish	Other Party & Scottish	Other Party & British
Good thing	74	36	14

These three pieces of data suggest that there is a support for nationalism which is not expressed in voting for the SNP. It is related to a feeling of Scottish identity. Respondents with this identity were more prepared to contemplate nationalist solutions even if they did not vote for them.

We conclude from all the evidence above, that the SNP vote in 1979 cannot be described as a protest vote. Quite apart from the data presented in the last three tables national identity has a relation with SNP voting and Nationalist voting cannot be seen as purely a method of protesting to one's own party.

Internal Colonialism

We have suggested earlier that it is difficult to test some of these models. This comment applies to Hechter's statement of internal colonialism but we have certain data which we can use.

The first prerequisite of this model is a cultural division of the society. Hechter is vague about this but, in so far as a large proportion of our respondents identify as Scots, as we have already shown, we must assume that they are conscious of differences, or a "division" in Hechter's terms, with the English. In non-survey terms, Scottish life is quite distinct from that of England. There are not only the institutions entrenched by the Treaty of Union of 1707 but also the more popular features of life such as football and mass entertainment. Again, in non-survey terms, it is evident that Hechter's second requirement also exists. Scotland is characterised by virtually every economic commentator as a "branch factory economy". [12] Firms like the Clyde shipbuilders or the heavy engineering works of the West Central belt, indeed industry in most places in Scotland, have been bought over by outside firms, or closed down altogether. Levels of unemployment and practically every indicator of social malaise are extremely high in Scotland. In many cases, they are among the highest in Britain.

We might assume then that the first part of the model applies to present day Scotland. The second stage is that people so affected would become alienated from those seen as their oppressors and a nationalist movement would grow.

We have shown that there is little anti-English feeling in Scotland. Even among SNP voters, it is very low. It might be, however, that the hostility would be to British institutions rather than to the English as individuals. In our research we asked, "How

many marks out of 10 would you give the following?" among which were certain major British institutions such as Parliament, the Royal family and the BBC.

Table 7
Mean Score of certain British Institutions by Party

	<u>Westminster</u>	<u>Royal Family</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>BBC</u>
Con.	7.5	7.5	8.4	6.6
Lab.	6.2	6.3	8.3	5.9
Lib.	6.3	7.0	8.6	6.3
SNP	5.3	6.0	8.0	5.4

The comparatively low score for Westminster was to be expected from the SNP voters although it is worth remembering that only a relatively low proportion of them want independence and those wanting less than independence share this low opinion. It is more significant that, on each of the items, the SNP voters have the lowest average score. It does indeed seem that SNP voters are the most alienated in this sense. It is also worth remembering that the Nationalists have not come out as a party against the Monarchy and, as a party with a gradualist, not a direct action, approach, they have not criticised the police: certainly not to the extent expressed by some sections of the Labour party.

We also have data to show whether perception of Scotland's economic condition is related to Nationalist voting. We have shown above that this relation exists but it is also true that there are very many who share these perceptions and who do not vote nationalist.


These and other assumptions can be tested by using a causal model. It can be used to test the internal colonialism hypothesis in a certain sense.

The variables in the model are those which we have already spoken about. "Scottish Identity" is dichotomised into whether they responded as Scottish or British. "Scottish Economy" is also dichotomised. First there are those who see Scotland's economy as poor but who believe that it could be as good as elsewhere in the UK. This might be characterised as a classical nationalist position. Secondly, there are those who believe that it is poor and that it cannot be as good as elsewhere. "Alienation from British Institutions" represents the score of each respondent on each of the British institutions discussed above. The whole is divided by four to give a total possible of ten. SNP vote is dichotomised according to whether the respondent voted SNP or not.

This model explains .25 of the variance. This is quite high for a social science model.

Figure 1

A causal model of Scottish identity and SNP voting



Let us look at its fit with internal colonialism. If this were

the appropriate model, we should expect the main path to be from Scottish identity to a perception of the bad but improvable status of the Scottish economy. There would be a causal connection either directly to SNP voting from this or indirectly through alienation from British institutions. The figure shows that this cannot be sustained; the path co-efficients between identity and the perception of the Scottish economy and from this to SNP voting are very low. So also is the co-efficient between perception of the Scottish economy and alienation from British institutions. From our model it seems that the economic motive for SNP voting is not strong. Instead the strongest direct effect on SNP voting (.184) is from alienation from British institutions. This variable is related to Scottish identity and through "alienation", Scottish identity has an effect on SNP voting (.036). It also has a direct effect (.137). One strong reason for voting SNP is, therefore, being Scottish. The "protest" model cannot be sustained since so much of the alienation also comes through a Scottish identification. If it were appropriate, we should expect no causal linkages between Scottish identity and SNP voting or between identity and alienation. The fact that these exist suggests that the protest model cannot be used.

Class and Nation

Before ending we shall examine the proposition that voters choose the object of their allegiance between class and nation. Until very recently class identity was dominant but national identity challenged it for a short time in the 1960s and 1970s. In whatever period we

search, the voter's main loyalty has to be given to one or the other. This is a point of view which fits well with the point of view of many Nationalists. They believe that the nation should work together irrespective of class. In the same way there are socialists who believe that the working man has no country. What we can do in this paper is to find out whether class and national identity are indeed alternatives.

One simple way of approaching this is to ask whether those who feel a national identity are any more hesitant than the rest to identify with a class. We hypothesise that, if this were so, a smaller proportion of those who identify as Scots as compared with those who identify as British, would choose a class identification. There is no significant difference. 55.4 per cent of Scots identifiers refuse a class affiliation as compared with 57.4 of British identifiers. SNP voting does not make any difference either. 55.6 per cent of SNP Scots identifiers name a class for themselves and 55.7 per cent of Scots identifiers from other parties do the same. It is striking that so many hesitate to identify with a class but national identification does not seem to be the inhibiting factor.

Several of the discussions of class identity emphasise the role of the great class institutions in confirming this identity: especially they mention the role of the trade unions. The SNP has tried hard to build an alliance with the Scottish trade unions but they have always been rebuffed. This suggests strongly that trades unions are strong supporters of a class basis to politics. In fact

there is no difference between those who identify as Scots and those who identify as British in their membership of trade unions. In terms of the index used before, those who identified as British had an index of 1.0 when looking at the effect of trade union membership on national identification. Scottish identifiers had an index of 1.2. They were rather more likely to be union members. We cannot argue that membership in the British wide class institutions, which the trade unions are, leads to a British identification rather than a Scottish one. One cannot say that Scottish identity is destroyed by class identity from the evidence we have here.

CONCLUSION

A recent poll, concentrating on Scottish identity, emphasised the extent to which Scots have an uncertain vision of themselves. They did not know whether they were hardworking or lazy, mean or generous. All this is really marginal. It may be useful for a people to have a unified vision of its main characteristics but it can get on without this. Much more important is the need for a vision of where the boundaries of one's nation lie. When we identify ourselves as members of a certain group we are distinguishing those who are not members of this group. It is not so much that we must have enemies but that we are conscious of an outgroup.

When one identifies as a member of the working class the outgroup is fairly clear. In some cases it may be the owners. More often it is management. They are different not only in the sense that they have a different culture but also that they are believed to

have different interests. Although Scots can identify an Englishman as different, it is much rarer that he will identify a difference of interests between them. In football and in one or two other spheres of life which are not salient for politics, this awareness of differences exists but not in areas which might normally affect the vote. More than this the boundary is often not clear. For the Scot, the archetypal Englishman is the upper class manager or administrator. National hostility is almost exclusively reserved for him and would not extend to the Geordie or the Mancunian. It is consistent with this that we found that there was little hostility to the English as people but a certain amount of opposition to all British institutions which can be portrayed as part of the English Establishment.

The basic problem which the SNP has, however, is that there are many people who share these identities and the alienation from British "Establishment" institutions but who do not vote for the SNP. There are many people, in particular, in both of these categories who vote Labour. The SNP's difficulty is twofold. First, the importance of the Scottish identity for politics is not fully developed for the majority of Scots. It has not, apparently, been possible to persuade them that there was a specific Scottish interest more important than their class interest. The Scots do not seem to have identified an enemy which could act as the unifier of the nation. The second difficulty is that the aim of the SNP is all too specific. Very few in the Labour Party really believed in the nationalisation of the means of production until very recently and in any case this is rather

a vague doctrine. The separation of Scotland from England seems spectacularly precise. Its enemies are able to make it even more precise with vivid accounts of customs posts and machine guns at the Border. The "interests of the working man" or "socialism" can be interpreted in a thousand different ways more convivially to the ordinary rather conservative voter.

It is for this reason that the SNP is not able to mobilise Scots on the basis of nationality for a long period. The SNP is quite a different party from Labour or the Conservatives or the Liberals in that it is based on a specific programme rather than generally on the interests of a group: the Scots.

FOOTNOTES

1. Partisan Dealignment in British. British Journal of Political Science, 7(2), April 1977, p. 335.
2. Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, Decade of Dealignment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
3. Exemplified in I. Macleod "The Rise and Fall of the SNP", Political Studies, 18(2) 1970, p. 357-72.
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