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The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1950-1992

PhD. Thesis

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Abstract.

The decline of the Conservative party in Scotland has been nothing short of dramatic. In 1955 the party secured a half of the Scottish vote. At the last two elections - 1987 and 1992 - it won no more than a quarter. In contrast over the same period the party in England has more or less held its own. The decline of the party has also put a growing strain on the union between England and Scotland. The Conservative party has been able to run Scotland since 1979 thanks to the party's relative success south of the border. Inevitably the democratic legitimacy of such a state of affairs has been called into question. But despite its importance relatively little is known about why the Conservative party has declined so precipitously in Scotland. Many of the explanations for the party's decline have largely remained untested. These include that the party has lost its Protestant base, suffered for its opposition to devolution and become too right wing for a normally progressive Scottish electorate. Using a unique collection of survey data, doubt is cast on all three claims. Instead it is suggested the party has suffered from a leftward drift amongst the Scots electorate. Moreover, the desire of the party elite to rid itself of a putative sectarian image led to what may be termed, the throwing out of the baby with the bathwater. A crucial aspect of Scottish Unionism was an ability to appeal to powerful symbols in Scottish culture which gave the party a Scottish identity irrespective of its stance on devolution. And equally crucial has been the economic experience of Scots over the last forty years.

Contents

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Introduction.

The decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland has been nothing short of dramatic. In 1955 the party secured a half of the Scottish vote. At the last two elections it won no more than a quarter. In contrast over the same period the party in England has more or less held its own. The decline is not simply of concern to the Conservative party. It has also put a growing strain on the union between England and Scotland. The partisanship of the Scottish electorate has changed but who runs the Scottish Office has not. The Conservative party has been able to run Scotland since 1979 thanks to the party's success south of the border. Inevitably the democratic legitimacy of such a state of affairs has been called into question.

But despite its importance relatively little is known about why the Conservative party has declined so precipitously in Scotland. One reason is the lack of readily available material. To understand the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland we need first of all to understand the basis of its electoral success in the 1950s. Yet the first academic survey of electoral behaviour in Britain was only undertaken in 1963 while relatively little academic or commercial survey based research was conducted specifically into Scottish electoral behaviour before 1974. And while the October 1974 and 1979 elections were graced by full-blown academic studies in Scotland, the exercise was not repeated again until 1992.

One of the principle aims of this study will be to try and fill this information gap. To address the most crucial part of the story, what happened in the 1950s, the Gallup (British) monthly studies from that period have been employed. Individually, with Scotland constituting just ten per cent of the population, none of these surveys contains sufficient respondents to permit separate analysis of their Scottish respondents. But if we amalgamate a number of these surveys then we may be able to generate sufficient respondents. Of course that only works so long as the questions in which we are interested are asked in a sufficient number of different months in any time period. While this has imposed a constraint on what has been achieved nevertheless some crucial new time series trends in Scottish voting behaviour are presented here.

Record of Decline.

The electoral success of the Conservative party in Scotland in the 1950s was the high water mark of a seventy-year advance. Its foundation was the split in the Liberal party in 1886 following Gladstone's endorsement of Irish Home Rule. Thus Liberal Unionism proved particularly important in Scotland. In 1900 the Liberals failed to win a majority of seats. By 1929 the Conservative share of the vote was only three points lower than in England.

Table 1: Percentage Share of Conservative Vote, 1950-1992.

	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970
England	43.8	48.8	50.4	49.9	44.1	42.7	48.3
Scotland	44.8	48.6	50.1	47.2	40.6	37.7	38.0

	1974F	1974O	1979	1983	1987	1992
England	40.2	38.9	47.2	46.0	46.2	45.5
Scotland	32.9	24.7	31.4	28.4	24.0	25.6

Source : Kellas, J. (1989) The Scottish Political System and

Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D. (1992) The British General Election of 1992

In the immediate post war period the Conservative party in Scotland matched its performance in England, winning the support of a narrow majority of Scottish voters in 1955. But by 1959 the three point gap had re-emerged. Thereafter decline has continued almost - but not quite - unchecked. One such check was, of course, at the last election in 1992 when the Conservatives' share of the vote rose in Scotland for the first time since 1979. But less widely recognised as a check is the result of the February 1974 election. True, Conservative support fell by just over five percentage points but compare this with an eight percentage point fall in England. Throughout the study the view is taken that what needs explaining is not simply why Conservative support has fallen in Scotland, but why it has fallen more rapidly than it has in England.

The Thesis Outline.

We begin our study in chapter one by looking at the importance of social structure as an explanation of the decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. By looking at social structural variables of class and housing tenure and concentrating on two important correlates of the Conservative vote within them, namely the percentage of employers and managers and the percentage of owner occupiers within a constituency we can establish the extent to which social structure accounts for the decline of the party. The study then turns its attention in chapter two to the changes in organisational structure of the party and how those changes affected the fortunes of the party in Scotland. The chapter focuses on the changing power structures within Scotland, and between Scotland and England.

Chapter three and four then deal with the crucial aspect of religion. Denomination has always played a more influential role in voting behaviour in Scotland than in England. The received wisdom is that the importance of religion has declined in Scotland, as an influence on voting behaviour, with the result that one pillar of Conservative strength has been undermined.

Chapters five, six and seven examine important concepts such as identity and consciousness and how perceptions of such cultural concepts affected the changing fortunes of the party in Scotland. Chapter five deals directly with the claim that the good and the bad times for the Conservatives in Scotland coincide remarkably with the times when they were strongly identified with pro- or anti- devolution policies. It is claimed that playing this 'Scottish card' - offering some form of devolution - strengthened a Scottish identity and thus improved the Party's fortunes. With chapter five questioning the facile equating of devolution policy with a Scottish consciousness, chapter six offers an important new interpretation of the symbolic power of Unionism, namely, as a cultural pillar that had the ability to maintain a Scottish distinctiveness. An ability the term Conservative would singularly fail to achieve in Scotland. Chapter seven examines the importance of Empire to the changing fortunes of the Scottish party. We see that within the idea of 'Empire' varied cultural and social strands of Scottish Unionism coalesced in a Unionist synthesis.

Chapter eight, nine and ten examine the changing ideological positions of both the Scots and the Party. Chapter eight concentrates on the centrality of a Scots' social democratic culture. In short, one claim is that the Scots have always been more left

wing than the English and a Party which advocated right wing policies would necessarily face electoral difficulties. On the other hand, chapter nine concentrates on the changing policy agenda of the Party and analyses claims that the Party in the 1950s was merely more adept at rendering right wing policies more palatable for the Scots in contrast to the contemporary Party; particularly under Mrs Thatcher. It also considers the extent to which the state of the economy can be considered as a factor in the decline of the party.

It would then appear that chapter ten takes us full circle to examine again an aspect of organisation. In this chapter we look at long standing ideological divisions within the party, in the shape of 'factions and tendencies'. Concentrating on the New Right faction within the party illustrates the extent to which the party became divorced from the Scots electorate in the 1980s. However, interestingly, it refutes the idea that 'Thatcherism' as new right dogma was an alien import to the Scottish body politic.

Chapter One : Social Structure.

For Blondel (1963) politics was affected by all the forces which shape the social structure of a country, with some aspects having greater impact than others. The one aspect which had the greatest impact for this generation of social scientists was the principle social cleavage that underlies British voting behaviour, viz., social class. This was epitomised in Pultzer's now hackneyed phrase that anything other than class as an explanation of vote was mere embellishment and detail. However, the pre-eminent position given to such social structural variables as class within electoral studies has been continually questioned from the seventies onwards and a lively debate now ensues as to the continued efficacy of its position within the discipline. (Denver and Hands, 1992). The purpose of this short chapter is to establish how important social structure is as an explanation of the decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. By looking at social structural variables of class and housing tenure and concentrating on two important correlates of the Conservative vote within them, namely the percentage of employers and managers and the percentage of owner occupiers within a constituency, the class structural explanation as a fundamental factor in the Tory decline in Scotland can be confidently ruled out.

Class Difference Model .

The continual difference in social structure between England and Scotland is generally accepted, so much so in fact, that it has now become rather cliched to say that Scotland is more working class or that England is more middle class. Of course, the corollary of any such statement is that Scotland should therefore have a manifestly less Tory vote than England because of this difference. By viewing table 1:1 we do in fact see that Scotland's class structure differs from that of England.

Table 1.1 : Percentage of the Non - Manual Occupied Population, in England and Scotland, 1966 - 1991 .

	1966	1971	1975	1981	1991
England	39.7	42.3	47.5	57.0	66.1
Scotland	37.1	39.4	45.5	51.9	63.8

Source : Central Statistical Office : Regional Statistics No11,1975 ; No13,1977 .
Regional Trends 1983 and 1993 . (London : HMSO) .

Table 1.1 has the non-manual half of a simple dichotomous operationalisation of the occupied population from 1966 to 1991 and does indeed show that Scotland consistently had around 3 per cent less non-manual and 3 per cent more manual workers than England throughout the period. But both Scotland and England move significantly towards a greater non-manual sector at a similar pace. England from 39.7 per cent in 1966 to 66.1 per cent by 1992 and Scotland from 37.1 per cent to 63.8 per cent. If we accept the greater tendency of Conservative voting among the middle class - and the simplistic association of non-manual with middle class - an interesting question arises from the data displayed in the table. If the trend in the class structure is moving so forcefully in a direction putatively favourable to the Conservatives in both England and Scotland why has the Conservatives' support in Scotland not kept pace with that south of the border? After all, the Scottish Conservatives most successful years in the fifties were at a time of a huge manual sector in Scotland.

Table 1.2 : Partial Regression Co - efficients for Scotland vs England for each General Election, 1950 1992, with 'employers and managers '.

1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970
+4.1	+3.8	+2.8	+0.6	-1.2	-3.0	-7.0

1974F	1974O	1979	1983	1987	1992
-5.0	-11.0	-12.6	-12.8	-17.3	-14.9

Source: 1950-1970 , British Ecology File ,GB/50-70/01 : Social Statistics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde.
1974-1992, Parliamentary Constituency Results (1966,1981 Census Data) derived from British Ecology File together with data supplied by Mr John Curtice: Social Statistics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde.

Just how striking the Conservatives' success was in Scotland in the 1950s can be seen from table 1.2 above. Following Miller's (1978 and 1981) work Conservative support was regressed against the percentage of employers and managers in each constituency as measured by the Census. The percentage of employers and managers is a consistently important correlate of Conservative vote.[1] To identify how different Conservative support is in Scotland compared with England after taking into account differences in their class structure a dummy variable was introduced identifying all the Scottish constituencies. The table shows the value of the coefficient associated with this dummy variable. The coefficient can be interpreted as the amount by which Conservative support was higher or lower in the average Scottish constituency given

its class structure. And as can be seen from 1950 to 1955 Conservative support was actually three to four points higher than one might have expected. The support for the Party in 1959 reaches a level commensurate with what we should expect considering the percentage of employers and managers in Scottish constituencies and, thereafter there is a precipitous fall in Scottish Conservative support from the 1964 election onwards. The February 1974 election with a coefficient of -5 and 1992 at -14.9 are confirmed as the only two elections when any noticeable check to the fall is discerned. Already, by October 1974 the Conservative support is no less than 11 points lower than we might expect. And it remains in double figures throughout the Thatcher years after 1979 with a particularly disastrous figure of -17 for 1987. The crucial point which may not be obvious is that one is not searching for some 'norm' in the level of the Conservative vote vis-à-vis a social class level but emphasising the precipitate fall in the Conservative vote when social class is considered. In short, not a precipitate fall from a 'norm' but from 'success' to 'failure', and from this evidence it is evident that the decline of the Party in Scotland has relatively little to do with differences in social class between Scotland and England.

Different Class?

There may be a suggestion however that the political meaning of class differs between nations. This notion of a different class consciousness between Scotland and England is explicit in the work of McCrone (1992). Although a class consciousness is not, strictly speaking, part of a study of 'class structure', it is nevertheless salutary to examine it here, so that it can be ruled out as a factor contributing to the decline of the Scottish Conservatives. McCrone accepts that the occupational structure - and its trends - largely mirrors that of Great Britain as a whole, nevertheless, in Marxist terminology he states: "While classes 'in themselves' develop in the context of a capitalist world-economy, classes 'for themselves' make conscious claims to a place in a particular political, that is, national, order". He then quotes Arraghi et al (1983) to add weight to the assertion: "Irish workers (and, presumably, Scottish) were defined as a different group, because 'the construction of a "class" was ipso facto part of the construction of at least two "nationalities", the English and the Irish'". (ibid:1989:57).

Table 1.3 : Percentage of 'Manual' Class with Subjective 'Working Class' Identity, 1963-1992.

Year	Scotland	Rest of UK	% Diff	N
1963	87.0	83.4	3.6	2936
1974	85.0	79.4	5.6	1180
1983	84.0	77.3	6.7	1813
1992	89.7	79.5	10.2	798

Source : Gallup Interview Surveys 1963;
BES, October 1974,1983 and 1992.

It is difficult to obtain empirical evidence which would establish beyond doubt any differences in class consciousness between the UK nations. But with this caveat in mind, first, we list the percentage of the manual class who gave their 'self-rated' identity as 'working class' in table 1.3. Once again the trend of those believing themselves to be working class is very similar between Scotland and the rest of the UK, dropping from 1963 to 1983 and then rising again in 1992. Interestingly, more 'manual' Scots do indeed consistently describe themselves as working class compared to respondents south of the border and the percentage gap between Scotland and the rest of Britain actually increases over the period. From 3.6 per cent more Scots giving a working class identity in 1963, it increases to 10.2 per cent by 1992. However, crucially we cannot identify the causal pathway, what is the cause and what is effect. Does Scotland disproportionately support Labour in 1992 because 10.2 per cent more Scots describe themselves as working class. Or is it that Scots are more prone to choose the working class identity as a consequence of their Labour allegiance?

We cannot be sure and there are not sufficient survey data which could offer us greater clarity on the issue. However, there was one question in the British Election Surveys asked in 1964 to 1970 and then again in 1992 whose collective response to the question - "On the whole do you think there is bound to be some conflict between the different social classes or do you think they can get along together without any conflict ?" - suggests that Scots are no more a class 'for themselves' than their southern counterparts .

Table 1.4 : Percentage Believing , "Bound To Be Class Conflict ".

	1964-70	N	1992	N
Scotland	39.5%	491	56.3%	924
Rest of UK .	40.6%	4677	56.4%	2452

Source :1964 - 70 collapsed BES for 1964 ,1966 and 1970 and 1992 BES .

Table 1.4 gives the percentage responses to the above question on class conflict from the respondents who believed there was bound to be class conflict. On the issue of class conflict there appeared to be an homogenous British response, there was no difference between Scotland and the Rest of the UK, around 40 per cent in 1964-70 and 56 per cent in 1992 believed that there was bound to be class conflict. On this evidence one is extremely circumspect about the Scots having a completely different attitude to the notion of class .

Housing Tenure .

Another social structural variable which has a significant association with Conservative voting is housing tenure. As one electoral behaviour textbook points out: "But housing tenure is undoubtedly a strong influence on electoral choice in Britain, almost equalling class in its ability to predict votes". (Harrop, 1987:195) The higher the percentage of owner occupiers within a constituency the higher the level of Conservative support should be. The argument over housing tenure mirrors that of class above, a lower percentage of owner occupiers and a higher level of local authority tenants in Scotland should result in a lower vote for the Scottish Tories. One caveat must be of course that housing tenure is inextricably linked to one's social class position and status but once again the trend within Scotland can be described as moving in a direction favourable to the Conservatives. This can be seen in table 1.5 below where not only is there a significant move towards owner occupation within Scotland but also a narrowing of the gap between Scotland and England by 1991.

TABLE 1.5 : Proportion of Private Households in Scotland and England Living in Public-sector and Owner-occupied Housing, 1961-1991.

	Public sector			Owner occupied		
Year	England	Scotland	Difference	England	Scotland	Difference
1961	23%	41%	18	42%	25%	17
1966	27%	47%	20	49%	29%	20
1971	28%	52%	24	53%	31%	22
1975	29%	54%	25	55%	33%	22
1981	28%	52%	24	59%	36%	23
1986	24%	47%	23	65%	43%	22
1991	20%	38%	18	69%	53%	16

Source : 1961 , Kendrick and McCrone (1989) Political Studies ,XXXVII p 600
1966 to 1991 Central Statistical Office , Regional Statistics No 12 ,1976 and Regional Trends No 28 ,1993 (London : HMSO) .

Table 1.5 shows there is indeed a considerable difference in the levels of owner occupation and public housing between Scotland and England. This gap between Scotland and England remains steady between 20 and 25 per cent in both public and owner occupier sectors throughout a quarter of a century until 1991 when it drops back to the 1961 level of 18 and 16 per cent. Similar to the social class trend within Scotland the trend in the owner occupier sector should be one of optimism for the Conservatives. From just a quarter of Scots owning their own house in 1961 this has changed to over half at 53 per cent by 1991. With owner occupation in Scotland increasing by two to three per cent roughly every five years from 1961 to 1981 and by seven to ten per cent thereafter to 1991, one would have expected the Tories in Scotland to have reaped considerable benefit. But in reality, the percentage fall in Conservative voting at around 20 percentage points in Scotland between the 1960s and 1992 would appear to parallel the percentage increase in home ownership at around the 20 per cent. Kendrick and McCrone (1989:598-600) believe this to be the product of a qualitative change in the view of the Scots around the period of the 1970s to the issue of housing. Before then the issue of housing for the Scots was what Butler and Stokes describe as a valence issue - an un-opposed issue because of its perceived inherent benefits - from the 1970s onwards housing became an increasingly politicised issue for the Scots with Labour subsidising council rents and Conservatives proposing the sale of council housing. But as Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) have shown this is not just true of Scotland.

Table 1.6 : Partial Regression Co - efficients for Scotland vs England for each General Election, 1950 1992, with 'owner occupiers'.

1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970
+7.3	+7.9	+8.6	+8.2	+8.0	+7.5	+7.1

1974F	1974O	1979	1983	1987	1992
+0.3	-4.6	-6.2	-5.0	-9.4	-7.4

Source: 1950-1970 , British Ecology File ,GB/50-70/01 : Social Statistics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde .
1974-1992 , Parliamentary Constituency Results (1966,1981 Census Data) derived from British Ecology File together with data supplied by Mr John Curtice: Social Statistics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde.

Similar to the regression analysis undertaken on the class structure above we can now replace 'employers and managers' with the percentage of owner occupiers. And once again to identify just how different Conservative support is in Scotland compared with England after taking into account differences in housing tenure, a dummy variable is introduced which identifies all of the Scottish constituencies. In the average Scottish constituency, given its level of owner occupiers, we see from table 1.6 that the Conservatives from 1950 to 1970 perform on average eight per cent above what we might expect given the level of home ownership at that time. In stark contrast, after the February 1974 election when the Tories are performing at a level one would expect considering the level of home ownership, the Party in Scotland then under performs from October 1974 to the present day by around seven percentage points. Along with the evidence in table 1.5, it is evident therefore that it was not the level of owner occupation per se in Scotland relative to that in England which adversely affected Conservative fortunes.

Conclusion.

The above evidence offers very little in the way of support for a social structural explanation in the decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. The two principle social cleavages which underlie British voting behaviour, namely class and housing tenure, have been analysed and were found wanting in explanatory power in this particular instance. It is important to stress that both social class and home ownership trends in Scotland are moving in a direction generally thought to be favourable to the Conservatives while the difference in their percentage levels with

England were seen to be narrowing by the 1992 election. Although we had this favourable position relative to England by 1992, Conservative support in the average Scottish constituency was far lower than what we might expect given the social class and housing tenure composition.

Table 1.7 : Partial Regression Co - efficients for Scotland vs England for each General Election, 1950 1992, with 'employers and managers 'and 'owner occupiers'.

1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970
+4.0	+4.4	+5.9	+6.0	+6.0	+5.3	+4.7

1974F	1974O	1979	1983	1987	1992
-2.9	-8.3	-10.0	-9.2	-13.8	-12.0

Source: 1950-1970 , British Ecology File ,GB/50-70/01 : Social Statistics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde.
1974-1992 , Parliamentary Constituency Results (1966,1981 Census Data) derived from British Ecology File together with data supplied by Mr John Curtice: Social Statistics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde.

Table 1.7 shows the difference in Scottish Conservative support compared with England after taking into account differences in both social class structure and housing tenure. A clear shift in values or a sea change towards the Conservatives is discernible around the mid 1970s while considering the principle social structural variables of class and housing tenure. In February 1974 the coefficient turns negative at -2.9 and then remains in the five subsequent elections at an average 11 percentage points below what should be expected from the Scottish Conservatives considering the levels of class structure and home ownership.

Table 1.8 : Percentage Level of employers and managers, owner occupation and share of the vote in Fife and Canterbury constituencies.

	1955			1992		
	Empman	Owners	% vote	Empman	Owners	% vote
Fife	10.0	59.5	70.6	16.7	49.0	38.5
Canterbury	9.9	60.4	66.6	16.0	63.9	50.8

Source: Data derived from table 1.7 and Butler,D. (1955) British General Election of 1955 and Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D. (1992) British General Election of 1992.

To confirm the findings of our data we can focus on two constituencies in the manner of a small case study. In table 1.8 we see that Fife East in 1955, the year the

Unionists achieved their greatest success in Scotland, had a 10 per cent concentration of employers and managers within the constituency, with 59.5 per cent owner occupiers. This was very similar to the English constituency of Canterbury in Kent which had a 9.9 per cent level of employers and managers with its owner occupation at 60.4 per cent. The difference in the actual share of the vote for the Conservatives between this Scottish constituency and English constituency was 4 per cent in favour of the Scottish constituency of Fife East which had 70.6 per cent share of the vote to Canterbury's 66.6 per cent.

By the 1992 election there is now a 12.3 per cent deficit for the Scottish constituency, the Conservatives in Fife North East have just 38.5 per cent share of the vote compared to 50.8 per cent in Canterbury. The concentration of employers and managers in both constituencies remains similar around 16 per cent. Canterbury has 15 per cent more owner occupiers than Fife North East by 1992 which is about the 'national' difference of 16 points, as shown in table 1.5. The crucial point is that the differences in the actual share of the vote for the two constituencies, while considering the level of employers and managers and home ownership, is remarkably similar to the results for our data analysis in table 1.7. We expect Canterbury to be performing around 12 per cent better than Fife in 1992, and it is. Conversely, we should expect Fife East to be advantaged by around 5.9 per cent in 1955, and at 4 per cent it is not far off that figure.

The above evidence clearly shows that whatever has been responsible for the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland, one thing is clear; it has had relatively little to do with differences in class structure between Scotland and England. This chapter has also revealed the important point that there has not been a precipitate fall in the Conservative share of the vote from some hypothetical 'norm'. It emphasises the fact that we must explain why the Conservatives did so well in Scotland in the 1950s as well as explain why they did so badly.

[1] In table 1.2 (along with 1.6 and 1.7) 1966 Census data was used in the analysis for the elections 1950 to 1970. 1981 Census data was used for the data sets which gave the 'dummy' coefficients for the 1974Feb to 1979 and 1983 to 1992 elections. However, the R^2 and the coefficients for the employers and managers variables do not fluctuate so much within our data sets that our results would be deemed unreliable.

	'50	'51	'55	'59	'64	'66	'70	'74 feb	'74 oct	'79	'83	'87	'92
R^2	.44	.48	.47	.40	.37	.41	.36	.64	.73	.74	.77	.75	.77
E/M	.15	.16	.18	.18	.19	.21	.25	2.2	2.6	2.7	1.9	2.0	2.0

Source: 1950-1970 , British Ecology File ,GB/50-70/01 : Social Statisics Laboratory Archive, University of Strathclyde.
1974-1992, Parliamentary Constituency Results (1966,1981 Census Data) derived from British Ecology File together with data supplied by Mr John Curtice: Social Statisics Laborator's Archive, University of Strathclyde.

Chapter Two : Changes in Organisational Structure .

Panebianco (1982) laments the loss of an organisational approach to the study of political parties. For Panebianco contemporary political theorists lose an important aspect of analysis when they rely too exclusively upon sociological and teleological theories to explain the changing fortunes of political parties. Similar to the approach taken by the classical scholars to the study of political parties, Ostrogorski, Weber and Duverger, he believes that the 'organisational core' of the party must be brought to the fore.

> "My preference is for those theories and analyses that bring to the fore the dimension of organisational power, explaining the functioning and activities of organisations above all in terms of alliances and struggles for power amongst the different actors that comprise them". (Panebianco,1982:xii).

In this chapter we concentrate on this dimension; the struggles for power amongst the different actors that comprise the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. Changes in the organisational structure of the party had implications for the power relationships between the three constituent elements of the Party, the voluntary wing, the professional side and the parliamentary party. Moreover, these changes directly affected the different power bases of Glasgow, Edinburgh and London.

One reason for the apparent lack of interest of psephologists in an organisational explanation of the Tory decline in Scotland is the acute problem of establishing a direct causal association between the changing structure of a party's organisation and its electoral performance. Here we show that the overlapping tensions caused by the Party reforms did have a direct effect on the influential actors within the Scottish Party, particularly in the West of Scotland, with the corollary that morale, finance and efficiency all suffered - thereby affecting the ability of the party to appeal to its electoral environment. Lord Home of the Hirsel emphasised the point that "Conservatives forget at their peril: that year in, year out it is organisation which wins Elections". (Ward, 1982:3).

A second aspect of the changing organisational structure was the inherent centralising tendency of the reforms. This increasing centripetal movement of the organisational core was towards London via Edinburgh. The basic assumption was

that the Scottish organisation would benefit from imitation and closer identification with the more professional and efficient English party structure. Ever since Lord Woolton's organisational reforms as English Party Chairman in the 1940s, the English party was run as an increasingly centralised system with the English Chairman and the English Central Office having far greater central control over their organisation south of the border, the National Union, than was ever experienced by the Scottish Central Office and its 'absentee' Scottish Party Chairman before the 1965 reorganisation in Scotland. An important shibboleth of Conservative party discourse, is the emphasis placed upon the 'autonomy' of its constituent parts, particularly the autonomy of the constituency associations. Both the 'National Union' of Conservative Associations in England and the Scottish Unionist Association (SUA) in Scotland guarded this putative autonomy of the Constituency Parties which were affiliated to them but this autonomy was more myth than reality.

Blake (1985) describes one of Lord Woolton's reforms which restricted donations to local constituencies as democratising the Party. The constituency parties were not allowed to accept a donation over £25 to their local fund or £50 from a local member. The ostensible purpose was to force local parties to broaden their nets within the local area and it would curtail the possibility of undue influence over the local organisation by local 'big wigs'. But in reality the reforms were centralising , as they gave the Chairman and the Central Office in England greater control over the English organisation through greater control of the purse strings. Paradoxically, the Woolton reform on the raising of finance was presented as giving more control to the National Union as they would be encouraged to raise their own finance and not rely on Central Office. But if they could not accept a donation over £25 surely the beneficiaries of 'serious' monetary donations would be Central Office. And therefore McKenzie's (1964) critique of the pre-Woolton organisation would not only stand but be strengthened for the post Woolton era:

> "As long as the finances of the party were raised by the Central Office , the National Union was 'bound to be out of the picture , because although it may not have been democratic it was least logical that the person who paid the piper - that is central Office - should call the tune". (ibid:292).

But the structure in Scotland was very different. The Scottish Unionist Association had a bifurcated system of Eastern and Western Divisional Councils (EDC and WDC). Before the 1965 Reforms in Scotland the Western Divisional Council

firmly believed that it was they who principally paid for the piper. However, the subsequent strategy of imitating the English system of organisation had repercussions for a Party struggling to express a Scottish distinctiveness, part of which was always the idea of a jealously guarded independent organisation. We also find that the Scottish Unionist Association's bifurcated system of Eastern and Western Divisional Councils enhanced a Scottish distinctiveness by exemplifying the historical social division of Scottish society, between the professional, lawyer oriented East and the commercial, industrial centred West. This secured for the Unionists, particularly in the West of Scotland, a higher commitment and greater participation from influential and important activists than was ever encountered by the Conservatives after the Divisional Councils were abolished in 1965. Furthermore, there is a generally held view that these reforms were either accepted at the time without much demur (Urwin, 1966), (Stevens, 1990) or were not so important as to warrant a mention (Kendrick and McCrone, 1989); a contrary view is offered here. The public face of 'Conservative unity' hid fundamental objections within the Party to the 1965 reorganisation which left a feeling of resentment and disillusionment and especially within the ranks of the erstwhile activists who worked for the dissolved Western Divisional Council.

We shall find that power resided at different times, in different geographical locations, within the different elements of the party organisation. The reforms had more of an impact upon the susceptibilities of local areas than any direct effect on the local constituency organisations per se. But the idea of autonomy of the local constituency was overstated. What mattered was the power of the WDC and EDC. The Chairman's Office in Edinburgh which was effectively the Scottish Central Office was a weak institution in organisational terms before 1965. The WDC and the EDC operated on the belief that greater efficiency emanated from greater knowledge of their local area and they resented outside interference form whatever quarter, whether it be Edinburgh in the case of the WDC or from London in the case of both Divisions.

Unionist Organisation Prior to the 1965 Reforms .

When the Liberal Unionists amalgamated with the Scottish Tories in 1912 to form the Scottish Unionist Association, they were effectively absorbed into an existing organisational structure set up in 1893. This basic structure remained in effect until 1965 when, inter alia, the Party also reverted back to its pre-1912 Conservative appellation. The SUA had in theory six Divisional Committees: Eastern; Western; Tay District; North East District; Northern District; and South-West District. However, a

distinction was made between a Committee which could support an effective branch office, as only the former could collect subscriptions from individuals, administer its own finances and be termed a Divisional Council. It was the Divisional Councils therefore which appointed the party managers and employed the full time staff. There were two such bodies, the Eastern Divisional Council and the Western Divisional Council whose importance increased to such an extent that by the post war era they had carved up the administration of the whole country and the other committees between them [1]. (Urwin, 1965).

In reality then, the two Divisional Councils based in Edinburgh and Glasgow were the real power base of the organisation in Scotland. The SUA had a central council which met in the Western Divisional Council offices in Glasgow but it was merely a talking shop, a liaison committee between East and West, which was effectively controlled by the two councils who sent delegates along to it. But, in contrast to England where the Central Office (Smith Square) hired the professional staff as area agents, thereby maintaining central control of the National Union of Conservative Associations, the Divisional Councils hired their own permanent secretaries who had direct contact with the London central office. The Divisional Councils performed the tasks in Scotland that were undertaken by the Central Office in England. Urwin (1966) makes a crucial point when outlining the importance of the Divisional Councils in this era:

> "Furthermore, it must be emphasised that each Council raised its own fund, and that these were separate from those of the Chairman's office, which in fact received 'allowances' from the Councils, and the London Central Office. There was no one central Scottish fund". (Urwin, 1966:146).

There were in fact very few similarities with the 'English model'. The professional wing of the English structure with Smith Square at the apex worked in conjunction with the National Union. And as we have seen, Smith Square controlled both pyramidal structures through their appointed salaried staff. Urwin (1966:148) stated that "the two pyramids (in England, were) close together at all levels, assisting the process of integration, (but) such a parallel structure did not exist in Scotland". The professional wing in Scotland as represented by the Chairman's Office was a feeble specimen compared with its English central office counterpart. The Divisional Councils greatly influenced the Chairman's Office through the allocation to it of "allowances" and sections

of the Party, particularly the Scottish Parliamentary Party, resented its 'feebleness'; they wanted the professional centralised structure they saw in operation in London. The Party in Scotland may have shared the similarity with England of having its Chairman appointed by the leader of the Party. But in Scotland until 1963, that was in effect the Scottish Secretary of State who - because of his other Parliamentary duties - was perceived as an ex - officio head of an office with no base. In Scotland the Eastern and Western divisional councils were the base but with their salaried professional staff, they were also the apex .

Advantage or Disadvantage ?

What then, were the arguments in favour of retaining the bifurcated structure of the Unionist Party and the arguments of those advocating reform? One would be wrong - although it's entirely understandable - to assume that calls for reforming the organisational structure were a direct consequence of the decline in the Party's fortunes in the electoral arena. The agitation for reform was more to do with tensions between the different power blocs in the party and were long standing. In fact, the Parliamentary Party, the most vociferous protagonists for reform were actively inquiring into such a possibility at the height of the Unionist success in Scotland in the mid fifties. The Scottish Unionist Members' Committee (the Scottish MPs) wanted the Chairman of the Party, James Stuart (Secretary of State), to appreciate their concern and dissatisfaction about the state of the Unionist Party organisation. They wanted Stuart to examine the existing machinery "to see if its efficiency could not be improved in order to meet the challenge of the next election". (SUMC 15th June, 1954: Bodleian Library) This was one year before the Scottish Party's greatest electoral performance. No doubt their electoral success, securing 35 MPs in 1955, gave the Parliamentary Party not only the confidence but the necessary clout to campaign for internal reform. One surmises that the 11 MPs elected in 1992 would not, or could not, flex their muscles to the extent that their counterparts in the 1950s did.

The post war minute books of the Scottish Members at Westminster and the minutes of the organisation in Scotland are replete with references to the debate over organisational reform. The Parliamentary Party continually raised the subject of reform, with the organisation in Scotland continually defending their position. One caveat must be that minute books by their very nature at times conceal more than they reveal but nevertheless, here they offer a valuable and fascinating insight into the

tensions within the Scottish Party over reform, tensions certainly not meant for public consumption.

The Parliamentary Party believed that the dichotomy of the organisation in Scotland was anachronistic and reflected badly upon a modern party which had to appeal increasingly to the electorate through national radio and television. It is apparent that the MPs had little official contact with the SUA. When a delegation consisting of the President and Past President of the SUA along with the EDC and WDC Convenors held a crunch meeting with the Scottish Members at Westminster on the 9th June 1964, the MP's Committee Chairman could refer to it as a unique event. (SUMC Minute 9th June, 1964). In contrast the MPs had regular contact with Smith Square to elicit information from the research department for their parliamentary and constituency business. In the eyes of the MPs the English model with a professional trained staff and a central fund used to achieve Party goals, appealed far more than the impotent Chairman's office in Scotland with two divisive monoliths controlling funds for their own ends.

Conversely, the SUA believed they were more attuned to the nuances of Scottish distinctiveness and Scottish localism and, they perceived the danger of an 'integrated English type' machinery. If centralising reforms permitted for greater London control it might not have been long before the organisation appeared to the Scots electorate as a quasi English one. Therefore, the SUA continually stressed the fact that the "the Scottish Unionist Association (was) financially and in its organisation independent of England". (SUA Yearbook, 1955:22). The Divisional Councils' interpretation was one of healthy rivalry between the two divisions, and that the dichotomous structure, as mentioned above, fitted a socially and culturally divided Scotland. Behaviour which may have been perceived by some as puerile and contributing to organisational stagnation had a completely different gloss put on to it by the activists working at the 'chalk face ' in Scotland.

A typical example of such behaviour is to be found in the SUA Western Office minute book under an entry from the Education and Propaganda committee, dated the 30th September, 1953. The Western Office was concerned that leaflets published by the Eastern Divisional Council had been distributed in the Western Divisional Council area, the minute continued:

"After discussing these leaflets the Committee unanimously agreed that they were unsuitable for distribution in this area and that in future if the Secretary had any doubts as to the propaganda value of any publication he should bring it before the Committee before distribution to agents". (National Library of Scotland, Account 10424).

Admittedly, this action could be construed as churlish and sectional. Many Scottish MPs did believe that this was exactly the type of action that interfered with the efficiency of the Party in Scotland and would be overcome when overall control shifted to a powerful Scottish Central Office. The WDC refuted the charge that their actions were some sort of visceral reaction from an introverted and myopic group. For the WDC, if such actions were sectional, it merely reflected the truth that there were different communities with different interests within Scotland and therefore, the Party's approach and propaganda had to reflect such differences. Scotland was heterogeneous and the main fault line was the different social and cultural development between East and West .

The modernisers and reformers believed that any cultural difference reflected an archaic sectarianism and in particular the disproportionate influence of the anachronistic Orange Order on the west. However, the Western Divisional Council activists argued that the Orange legacy was overstated but that there were other sound reasons for continuing with the present decentralised structure. Mr Andrew Strang[2], the organising secretary of the Western Divisional Council from 1945 until its demise in 1965, stressed that it was beneficial in Scotland not only to boast of an organisation independent of London but to boast of an organisation independent of other areas in Scotland. Strang continually emphasised the point that prominent local activists felt they had a hands on approach in the Divisional Councils which they thought would be lost in any organisational reform. For example, in the WDC area this 'local control' resulted in greater participation by those who mattered, that is, the people who bankrolled the Western Council were also the activists who oversaw the administration of the accounts, particularly expenditure. Strang stressed the fact that the WDC was a very powerful organisation compared to the EDC, it was generally more efficient and effective and had more money and more members. One reason for this was that Glasgow was a great industrial centre while Edinburgh was a professional centre. Glasgow had very powerful and influential men available to it, 'captains of industry', who were not only prepared to come in and work in the organisation but were prepared to be seen to be working in the organisation.

A brief look at some of those 'captains of industry' neatly illustrates Strang's point. Sir Murray Stephen of the Clyde Shipbuilders was a prominent worker and Honorary Treasurer of the WDC. A member of the Lithgow family (Shipbuilding magnates) was a President of the Bute and North Ayrshire constituency organisation. Vera Findlay, a President of the SUA, was the daughter of another Shipbuilder and Unionist activist Peter Hutchinson, (Ailsa Shipbuilders). The steel magnates, Colvilles, were also prominent Unionists, one member of the family being an Unionist MP in the thirties. There were also Francis Beattie (Beattie Bakeries) and Morris Bloch (whiskey). Sir William Burrell (of the Burrell Collection fame) was also Honorary Vice President of the Glasgow Unionist Association. According to Andrew Strang there was hardly a firm in the West who were not connected in one way or another to the Unionists and the WDC.

Strang reiterates that this was a fundamental factor underpinning the success of the Party in the West in the fifties. These people participated in the WDC and the Glasgow Unionist Association because of the control they were afforded at the local level. They could raise their own funds, decide how to spend their own funds and make their own appointments; basically, they could run their own organisation. They were also encouraged to participate at the national level through the disproportionate influence the WDC exerted within the Scottish Party structure overall. True, indigenous Scottish industry was in such a state of decline by the mid sixties that support from it and particularly finance, may well have dropped off in any case. However, Mr Strang holds steadfast to the view that after the 1965 reforms the opinions of those influential activists had become circumspect: "why bother taking a position or office in the organisation, or be prepared to work for the organisation, when you don't have control over it and can't influence it in any way".[3] Evidence supporting this interpretation is to be found in the Conservative publication the *Crossbow* of August 1973. Just eight years after the 1965 reforms and the once glorious Western Divisional Council area of the West of Scotland, Mr Strang's jewel in the Scottish Tory crown, is marginalised as a second rate outpost. Instead of it being the chief paymaster of the Scottish party, a derisory sum is now allocated to it by 'Central Office' in Edinburgh. R.E.Dundas, Tory candidate for Greenock 1966 and Kelvingrove 1970, and former chairman of the UK Federal Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations stated in *Crossbow* : "From the Scottish Conservative Party's annual income of between £75,000 and £100,000 only £10,500

is allocated to the West of Scotland, where very few constituencies are self-supporting". (The Crossbow, 1973:18)

Sir Teddy Taylor was a prominent and populist Glasgow Unionist MP at the time of the 1965 reforms. (Local Progressive Councillor for Cathcart 1959-64 and MP for Cathcart 1964-79) It is useful to quote him at length here, firstly, his opinions share an uncanny resemblance to Mr Strang's. Secondly , it is an example which illustrates how important localism was to Scottish Tory politics.

> "I remember that we used to have a very strong and active office in Glasgow and basically decisions were made in Glasgow and I found it was a great strength to campaigning in the West of Scotland. When, basically it moved to Edinburgh and became a united national party, first of all, we didn't have the direct access to the decision making and secondly, I think there was a feeling that because the East Coast tended to be more of a, how could I put it, a class situation than it was in the West of Scotland, it didn't help us in the political battle. I was infinitely happier when we had the Western Divisional Council based in Glasgow and genuine power and responsibility there. I think this was one of many factors which made life difficult for us.
>
> Andrew Strang and John Cranna (WDC organising secretaries) were absolutely super in getting money and getting the party well organised. I would say that there's no doubt at all that the West of Scotland was in fact the provider of the cash, I think no one denies that. But, in addition to that, by having John Cranna and Andrew Strang in the West of Scotland they were about the best political organisers that I have ever come across in my life and made a significant contribution.
>
> In fairness, John George[4] (who became the SUA Chairman 1963-'65) was a chap who had come in, had great ideas, wanted to turn everything upside down and one had a certain sympathy with him. But, certainly as far as I was concerned the loss of the West of Scotland office was very significant and the loss of Andrew Strang and that kind of person, switching over to the Edinburgh scene was I think, a mistake.
>
> I think you'll find when someone like John George comes along the Conservative party tend to accept advice given to them. The argument was that the advantage, just like the Common Market argument, that by becoming bigger, and more linked with London that all kinds of exciting

things would happen and instead we unfortunately went down and down in consequence. But, certainly one of the factors given was that the Party would become stronger, it would also have the access to this great power and money machine from England and the feeling was that instead of being an amateur party we would become a professional party. This was the argument put forward, lets become professional because the English do well don't they and if we get linked up to them, we shall somehow get their success. And it certainly didn't work. I think they were actually having a battle to solve a problem which didn't exist".[5]

Sir Teddy Taylor's remarks are instructive in highlighting the underlying geographical tensions within the party which were best served by a decentralised structure; a structure which respected a Scottish distinctiveness, as well as a Scottish localism. In the next section we examine the actors involved and the strategies employed in the 'battle ' for reform.

The Road to Reform Paved with Political Chicanery.

The story surrounding the 'battle for reform' begins in the early 1950s and continues until the Parliamentary Party's success in obtaining reform in 1965. The minute books of both the Scottish Unionist Members Committee (The SUMC was the Scottish Unionist MPs committee which met at Westminster) and the Scottish Unionist Association's WDC and EDC - along with reports in the press - highlight the constant struggle concerning the issue of reform of the party's organisation. We saw above that the Parliamentary Party wanted an integrated organisation long before Unionist support began to ebb in Scotland around 1959. Astonishingly, the meeting of the Scottish Unionist Members' Committee which wanted the Secretary of State, James Stuart, to examine the party's existing machinery, on the 15th June 1954 (as mentioned above), is one month after a similar meeting in May of 1954 which initiated a veritable slanging match in the pages of the *Glasgow Herald* throughout that month. The SUMC used the now familiar technique of a judicious leak to the Westminster lobby correspondent with a view to achieving their aims and later the same week followed up with an "unprecedented official statement". (Glasgow Herald, 7th & 12th May, 1954). The Parliamentary Party once again made the point that unless new life was breathed into the Scottish organisation then seats would be bequeathed to Labour at the next General Election. A step in the right direction would be to appoint a Vice-Chairman who would have day-to-day control, with constant inspiration and initiative

from the top. Moreover, it was suggested that serious thought should be given to fighting local elections as a party and not just supporting a hotchpotch of anti - socialist groups.

The SUA sent an official reply to the *Glasgow Herald* on the 10th May 1954 regarding, what was for the SUA, the damaging report published on the 7th of May. The indignant letter signed by the three leading office bearers of the SUA - Lillian Chrichton, President of the SUA; C.S. McFarlane, Convenor of the WDC and A.D. Buchanan Smith, Convenor of the EDC, refuted the SUMC criticism of the Scottish organisation and deprecated the SUMC's hostile manner. They pointed out that the losses in the local elections of May 1954, which ostensibly triggered the SUMC criticism, were more to do with the Socialists' successful exploitation of the Government's 1954 Rent and Repairs Bill. This was a Bill which allowed landlords to make limited rent increases in respect of repairs or improvements in their property (Butler, 1955:9), and the measure provoked numerous attacks. According to the SUA officers the *Glasgow Herald* article of the 7th May 1954 entitled "Doubts over Scottish Unionist machine" was evidently based on misconceptions and ignorance, and it was calculated to be discouraging and offensive. Their letter of 10 May continued:

> " Whoever, the few persons may be who, according to your correspondent, propose that Mr James Stuart (The Scottish Secretary of State) should cease to be the Chairman of the Unionist Party in Scotland, we who are the responsible leaders of the Scottish Unionist Association most emphatically repudiate any such idea. The occupancy of this post we consider to be of the very greatest advantage to the Unionist Party in Scotland ...
>
> We particularly resent the allegation that many constituency associations 'are in the hands of county people and local big-wigs who have allowed themselves to get out of touch with current political issues and only come to life when there is an election in the offing". Nothing could be further from the truth'". (Glasgow Herald, 10th May, 1954).

Much of the manoeuvring from both sides surrounded the post of vice-chairman. It is perfectly clear that both sides understood the strategic importance of the proposed post of vice-chairman. The proposal envisaged the vice-chairman taking over the day-to-day running of the Scottish organisation, a task the present chairman did not have the time for as Secretary of State. For the Parliamentary Party it would be

a significant breach of the SUA power base, which would hopefully initiate an inexorable trend towards integration and centralisation, with professional executive control. For this reason the SUA consistently opposed any shift of power to the Chairman's office. Their resolute defence of an anti - socialist accord at the local level may have been based on principle but they were also acutely aware that a concession on this could mean central party control from "Whitehall to town hall." (Urwin , 1966:157). Until the mid sixties the Unionists did not fight local elections under the Unionist label. The Progressive, Moderate or Independent labels were preferred as this approach maintained a local anti - socialist power base. (see chapter six) The Divisional Councils continually opposed any erosion of this connection, because a uniform national controlled local election campaign would after all undermine the argument for a distinctive decentralised system.

We see this opposition to a centralising trend once again reiterated at an important executive meeting of the SUA on 6th September, 1954. The minute recorded the "feeling that an appointment of a Deputy Chairman would affect the position of the President of the SUA and tend to increase the influence and authority at the centre at the expense of the Organisation in the country". (SUA, minute book, 6th Sept., 1954). Another significant reason for this meeting was that Mr. C.S. McFarlane (by this time President of the SUA) gave a report of a meeting with the SUMC over the previous May's debacle. He believed that the exchange of views had removed many misapprehensions and misunderstandings. Moreover, he was greatly encouraged by his reception and the assurances he had received of the Committee's goodwill and desire to cooperate in the Association's work. This assurance was tantamount to the proverbial assurance given by a football board of directors to its club manager, although, the SUA would mount stiffer opposition over the next decade than the proverbial condemned football manager.

The extent of SUMC scheming is evident in a minute of the 20th February, 1956. Once again the MPs are busy sniping at the SUA organisation in Scotland. It is worth quoting this minute at length because it clearly delineates the MPs' position while dispelling any ambiguity surrounding their ultimate goal concerning the organisation in Scotland.

> "Captain Duncan : said that Colonel Blair's[6] office (Chairman's Office) in Edinburgh had produced and was producing - a good deal of useful

literature etc., but many constituencies either knew nothing about these services or did not bother to use them.

Sir Thomas Moore : Secretary of State should not also be Chairman of Party in Scotland, no time etc., for party organisation, vice chairman could be appointed for the purpose.

Sir Alan Gomme Duncan : agreed that a Scottish Central Office was needed. He said that he was pretty sure that Col. Blair would resign rather than agree to the appointment of a vice-chairman for the purpose that Members had in mind.

Mr Duthie : by any business analogy the office in Edinburgh was badly run and compared most unfavourably with the organisation in London built up by Lord Woolton.

Mr. Spencer Nairn and Mr Ian Clark Hutchinson : Col. Blair, excellent for "inside work", but was not good at public relations.

Cmdr. Donaldson : said that in his view one cause of the trouble was that the West and East Councils were invariably working in different directions. A Central Office would resolve this problem by providing proper co-ordination.

Sir Ian Clair Hutchinson : The trouble was that any Central Office would have to be situated either in Edinburgh or Glasgow and this would prejudice its success from the start".

(SUMC Briefs, 20th Feb., 1956, Bodleian Library).

However, in 1960 the long awaited opportunity to implement a change arrived with Colonel Blair's retirement. Viscount Stuart of Finhorn (James Stuart, the Secretary of State was elevated to the Lords in 1959) acquiesced under relentless pressure from the Parliamentary party and appointed Sir Alick Buchanan Smith (Lord Balerno) as vice - chairman, with Jack McDonald Watson as political secretary. The appointment of Jack McDonald Watson reveals the wish to imitate the Smith Square model. Before the war McDonald Watson was a part time worker for the WDC. At the end of the war he managed to return from South Africa early and took over as head of the Junior Unionists. From there he went South to work in the Central Office in London returning to Edinburgh to be successor to Blair in 1960.[7] A portent of the future relationship between the Chairman's office and the SUA, was the umbrage taken by the SUA over the use of the anglicised term 'Scottish Chief Agent' by *The Scotsman* newspaper to describe McDonald Watson's position. Overt hostilities re-commenced in 1961 when the SUA condemned both Buchanan Smith and McDonald

Watson for usurping SUA authority by implementing a directive from the General Director in London that constituencies should be circulated through the Chairman's office. To add insult to injury the SUA reported that on three occasions members of the Chairman's office had visited constituency parties which, in the opinion of the SUA, were outside the Chairman's remit, as that office was only an advisory body. (Stevens, 1990:82-83).

One may be surprised that Buchanan Smith, a former President of the SUA and a signatory to the 'indignant' letter sent to the Glasgow Herald in 1954, could have performed such a volte-face but the WDC executive would find to their chagrin and cost that others would follow. In 1963 the convention of appointing the Secretary of State as Chairman was broken when Sir Alex Douglas Home appointed Sir John George the MP for Glasgow Pollok to the position. The Pollok MP was perceived as an enthusiastic reformer. (Mitchell ,1990:53). He lost no time in preparing the final push which would eventually see the dissolution of the Divisional Councils. The cause of the Parliamentary Party was aided by the fact that their new leader Douglas Home was the MP first for South Lanark and then Lanark between 1931 and 1950. Moreover, on his succession to the House of Lords in 1950 he became a Minister of State at the Scottish Office until 1955. He was then well aquainted with the demands for change.

On the 9th June, 1964 there took place an important meeting at Westminster between the SUMC and a delegation from the Unionist Party in Scotland consisting of, Mr William Hunter, President of the Unionist Association, Mrs J.Vera Findlay, Convenor of the Western Divisional Council, Mr T. Russell Fairgrieve, Convenor of the Eastern Divisional Council and a Past President, Neil Pattulo. As we noted earlier, this was the first time such a meeting had taken place. From this lengthy minute, one gets the distinct impression that the SUA are on the defensive, fighting a rearguard action to defend an already enervated position. Mr. Hunter welcomes the appointment of Sir John George and the use that was now being made of a Chairman's Committee which brought them all together. Mr Hunter and Mrs Findlay point out that the organisational framework was better than ever before but emphasised that organisation can only go so far and it was policy and leaders which count most. It was pointed out that the Party had suffered tremendous hammer blows in the shape of the pay pause, the dismissal of seven Cabinet members overnight, the Common Market failure, the Profumo and Vassal cases, the row over resale price maintenance, and the leadership crisis. All these had caused dismay and distress to the voluntary workers in Scotland.

As in 1954 it would appear that the SUMC had again resorted to the old trick of manipulating the press in order to undermine the SUA. The SUA delegation refuted allegations made in an article in the Sunday Telegraph that the organisation in Scotland was "feudalistic" and that the West and East Councils were divided. With regard to this matter of the Telegraph article, the Chairman (Cmdr Donaldson MP) on behalf of the MP's Committee stated that after an investigation, it had appeared that the article had been written by a Scottish press man, and doctored somewhat by a lobby corespondent. He also stated that the article, which purported to echo the views held in Unionist quarters in Westminster, did not in any way reflect the views of the SUMC Committee. (SUMC, 9th June, 1964, Bodleian Library). This was of course a rather disingenuous statement as this was the same Cmdr Donaldson who as we saw earlier complained in 1956 about the Councils working in different directions, and called for a Central Office to resolve the problem.

In the first quarter of 1965 the Divisional Councils bowed to the inevitable . Sir John George's proposals for reform were publicised in January 1965, and were finally accepted by the party Conference in April 1965. George worked so assiduously between January and April that by the time of the Party Conference the reorganisation was a fait accompli. Even before the Conference in April the Chairman had already appointed individuals to the most important posts in the proposed structure (Urwin, 1966). Furthermore, there was plenty of interference from Smith Square who supported the work of John George. This is noticeable in the WDC's last ditch attempt to block the proposals for reform at a special private session of the Scottish Unionist executive committee in early March 1965.

The WDC believed that the EDC were just as much opposed to reorganisation as themselves. However, they appreciated the EDC's acute difficulty in that they shared an office with the Chairman in Edinburgh. On account of this they were not overly surprised to find that the EDC had been successfully coerced into acceptance and, that Ian Mowatt the EDC organising secretary had already accepted a lucrative resignation deal. Moreover, they were well aware of Sir John George's determination to force through reorganisation. At a previous encounter, believing they still held the ace card of finance, they were told in no uncertain terms by George that they could burn their money for all he cared as London was financing the whole scheme. Indeed it is rumoured that the SUA money of the period was placed in a trust fund and was never given to the new National Treasurer in the Central Office in Edinburgh. Even in the

face of such adversity the WDC hoped they could orchestrate an eleventh hour rethink at the special meeting. Vera Findlay (WDC Convenor) in conjunction with Andrew Strang had worded a motion of opposition to change at the special meeting in March; and were relying on a respected Past President of SUA, Sir Gilmour Menzies Anderson, to intervene on their behalf. At the crucial meeting they were totally astounded when Sir Gilmour Menzies Anderson spoke on behalf of reorganisation, contrary to what had been agreed previously with them. There appeared to be no logical explanation for Sir Gilmour Menzies Anderson's change of heart, as President of SUA he previously travelled to Westminster where he emphasised at a SUMC meeting on the 19th July 1960 that: "There was no demand within the Party in Scotland for a change to the sort of organisation which operated in London. And, that the existing arrangements of East and West having their own separate collecting systems should be preferred to the SUMC's proposal of finance being collected centrally". (SUMC, 19th July 1960, Bodleian Library).

Interestingly, in 1967 Sir Gilmour Menzies Anderson became Chairman of the Scottish Conservative Party. The cynic may suggest that it was a reward for the crucial intervention on behalf of reform in March 1965. However, Sir John George was jubilant and the press and public were informed of the unanimous approval given to the Chairman's proposals.[8]

Post '65 and Further Centralisation.

In 1965 , after 89 years , the Divisional Councils ceased to exist. The voluntary wing would now be known as the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association. The new SCUA structure consisted of five regional councils: City of Glasgow; Highland (Inverness); North Eastern (Aberdeen); Central & Southern (Edinburgh) and South Western (Paisley). The new structure was ostensibly decentralised but in reality the Chairman's office (now referred to as the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office) had much greater authority over the regional councils than it had over the Divisional Councils. This was achieved by appointing an 'area agent', answerable to the Chairman, to oversee each region, similar to the system operating in England from the time of Woolton. A single, centralised Scottish fund was established and the 'National Treasurer' along with the Chairman, were appointees of the Party Leader. Sir John George had achieved the objectives continually advocated at SUMC meetings. Firstly, the Scottish Conservative Party organisation was linked far more closely to the English leadership and English organisation, and secondly, there was

now a central direction and central control of the Scottish organisation. (Urwin, 1966).

Under the guise of rationalisation the dynamic of reform was now towards even greater central control, both from Edinburgh and London. In 1969 the Highland and North Eastern regions combined as the 'Northern' area and in 1972 a West of Scotland office swallowed up Glasgow and Paisley, leaving the three Area Councils which are still in existence today. The disastrous election results of 1974 occasioned a further examination of the Scottish organisation prompted by a new leader Margaret Thatcher. She set up a committee of enquiry on the Scottish organisation in 1976, headed by Russell Fairgrieve, MP for West Aberdeenshire. It was to be a comparative analysis, comparing the relationship between the National Union and Central Office with that between SCUA and the Chairman's Office in Scotland. Its presumption was to be one of further integration, any differences between the two organisations would have to be justified. The Fairgrieve Committee reported in April, 1977[9] and proposed even further integration with Smith Square. But the report also recorded reservations similar to those voiced in 1965 by the WDC, over what they saw as the deleterious effects that centralisation would have on the fortunes of the Party.

For example, Professor Ward (1982:41), the Scottish Tory historian and authority on the Scottish organisation, believed that the transition towards the Fairgrieve reforms was a smooth one but then felt the need to qualify that view by stating that some activists were concerned: "that under the Fairgrieve Report Scotland would become a mere satellite of London". The activists' cause for concern is clearly observed in the Fairgrieve recommendations. There would be a Scottish Director of Organisation in overall control of organisation, administration and finance who would work directly with the Central Office in London. This would free the Chairman and his deputies to concentrate on political activity. In order not to jeopardise the monies collected in Scotland because the party in Scotland was independent, the office of National Treasurer in Scotland was continued. However, the Party's finances in Scotland would be controlled as in England by the Treasurer's Department in Smith Square. The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association would align its constitution with that of the National Union, any residual differences would be of form rather than of substance. Moreover, SCUA constituency affiliation fees would be paid directly to Central Office which would automatically affiliate the Scottish constituencies to the National Union. In short, the Scottish Party was now an integral

part of the London machine, in stark contrast to the degree of autonomy which had characterised Scottish Unionism. (Stevens, 1990) The length to which the integrationist road had been travelled by the Party is evident in the astonishing admission by the deputy - chairman Bill Hughes in the Sunday Times Scotland on the 12 August 1990: "We are only a branch office of the UK party and are centrally funded from head office in London. We do not account independently and are not even registered for VAT in Scotland". We can be reminded of how different this was from the protestations of the Scottish Unionists: "The Scottish Unionist Association is financially and in its organisation independent of England, although it is represented in the Council of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations". (SUA, 1955:22). Crucially then, the Fairgrieve reforms continued an integrationist process started by Sir John George in 1965 which considerably weakened the party's Scottish identity.

Party Introspection and Retrospection.

The disastrous Tory performance of 1987 occasioned further examination of the Party's 'three Scottish legs'. The professional leg took an unilateral initiative and declared a further shake up of organisation at the Scottish Central Office in August 1987. There were to be five new directors with portfolios for, finance, organisation, research, communication and campaigning. John MacKay (later Lord MacKay of Adbrecknish) was given a leading role in presentation as Chief Executive. Of greater significance was the loosening of financial control from London. It was declared that all monies collected in Scotland would be retained in Scotland. (Stevens 1990:86).

This pre-emption by the professional wing was no doubt intended to deflect the mounting criticism from the voluntary leg. Many on the SCUA executive council were concerned that the Central Office reorganisation had been an arrogant step, carried out without consulting SCUA.[10] SCUA was also increasingly concerned about the loss of a Scottish identity and a week after Mrs Thatcher had visited Scotland in the first week of September 1987, a confidential SCUA report was leaked to the press. This twenty one page report - entitled 'The Policies, Questions and Options: The Way Forward' - was a damning indictment on many aspects of the Scottish party but it particularly concentrated on the party's perceived 'anglicisation' in the eyes of the Scottish electorate. Significantly, it called for a return to the historical Scottish position that the Secretary of State become an ex-officio Chairman of the Party, although the authors of the report, both vice - presidents of SCUA, Mrs Margaret Walker and Mr

John Purvis, may not have been conscious of the fact that they wanted to turn the clock back to pre-1960. This made an allowance for a radical proposal that the president of SCUA would be elected by the party and have responsibility for the professional staff thereby bringing together the voluntary and professional wings of the party.(The Scotsman , 10th September, 1987).

After the 1987 Election a 'post mortem' questionnaire was sent to constituency chairmen. The responses were very critical of the Scottish Central Office and exuded the general angst within the party organisation over the perception of being an 'English Party'. An example of such a response, is the response from Falkirk East. The constituency activists were not at all happy with the level of support from Edinburgh Central Office. There was not enough attention focused on Scotland, one example they gave was the lack of Scottish issue advertisements in the press. But piquantly, the introspection concludes:

> "This questionnaire by not having a place for the SNP sums up to our members exactly what many people are saying - that the Conservatives are becoming too much of an English oriented Party, and have written off Scotland. Not true we know but this conception is growing".[11]

Conclusion.

The 'rationalisation' of the Party structure, no doubt strengthened central control. By any business analogy - to quote Mr Duthie of the SUMC above - organisational control was more efficient, both after the 1965 and the 1977 reforms. But, the crucial question surely must be, was the organisation more effective? It is the contention of this chapter that strengthening of the Party's organisation by professional central control was at the expense of social and cultural ties, particularly at the local level. Panebianco, makes the point that innovations can have 'counter-intuitive' (unforeseen) effects. (1982:245) What was unforeseen by an expanding professional bureaucracy was the alienation of the Party activist to the increasing central directives from Edinburgh and London. The remoteness of, and unwanted intrusion of Edinburgh and London left a wellspring of discontent and disillusion at the local level particularly in the West. The evidence presented here by Mr Andrew Strang and Sir Teddy Taylor, combined by the revealing machinations of the minute books, dispute the long held assumption that organisational reform was accepted with "very little dissent" (Urwin, 1966:159) or "without any real dissent". (Stevens,

1990:83). A Dumfrieshire activist in the Glencairn Branch made the following prescient statement in opposition to the 1965 reforms:

> "They are acting undemocratically and we are determined to see that members - who are after all the people who win elections - have a right to make any radical changes in the association without being rushed into them and without knowing exactly what the changes will involve in the future". (Glasgow Herald, 23 February, 1965).

A wellspring of discontent at the 'local level' for the Tories hindered the party's appeal to its electoral environment. It became a reinforcing alienation, as the party increasingly 'centralised' it lost the important local activists, spoken of by Mr Strang, who could assuage feelings of alienation at the local level. The fact that the WDC and EDC delivered victory in 1955 and 1959 no doubt contributed to their success in resisting change and pressure from the Parliamentary party. But the appointment of Douglas Home as leader, inculcated with the values of the Scottish Parliamentary party together with the subsequent defeat in the 1964 election, no doubt sealed the Divisional Councils' fate.

There has been a terminal decline in Scottish Party membership, the Party today operates around a projected figure of 40,000 members for Scotland overall. Yet, in 1953 the Western Divisional Council was not satisfied with the figure of 148,770 members for the *West of Scotland*. The WDC thought there were a number of constituencies where the figures could be substantially increased. (SUA, Western Office Minute Book, 26th May, 1953: National Library of Scotland). We can also highlight the diminution of local party effectiveness. The 1964 British Election Study shows that 46 per cent of the sample was canvassed by a Unionist activist only, with only 18 per cent receiving a canvass from the Labour party only. The corresponding figures for England were 51 per cent for the Tories and 33 per cent for Labour. But, by 1983 the BES figure for the Conservatives in Scotland had dropped to just 17 per cent with 64 per cent of the sample now being canvassed only by Labour. Conversely, the figures hold up in England, 43 per cent for the Tories and 32 per cent for Labour. (N=363 for 1964 and N=955 for 1983). This is a phenomenal drop in the level of Party activism in Scotland and the Party in the West of Scotland admitted as much when launching a new campaign on the 11 June 1991: "At the campaign launch, officials revealed some Tory voluntary wings in the West of Scotland have not distributed General Election literature to households since the heady days of Harold

Macmillan in the fifties". (Glasgow Herald, 11 June, 1991) The evidence outlined above in conjunction with the quantitative data strongly suggests that the centripetal trend of Party reform had an adverse effect on Party activity and the Party's appeal to its electoral environment.

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[1] Western Disional Council, 30 constituencies: Counties - Lanarkshire (6); West Renfrew; East Renfrew; North Ayr; South Ayr; Bute; Argyll; Dunbarton; Stirling; Dumfries; Kirkcudbright; Wigton; Burghs - Glasgow (7); Greenock; Paisley; Ayr Burghs; Kilmarnock Burghs; Falkirk Burghs; Dumfries Burghs.

Eastern Divisional Council, 39 constituencies: Counties - Berwick; Roxburgh; Peebles & Selkirk; East Lothian; Midlothian; West Lothian; West Fife; East Fife; Clackmannan & Kinross; West Perth; East Perth; Forfar; East Aberdeen; West Aberdeen; Banff; Kincardine; Moray & Nairn; Inverness; Ross & Cromarty; Sutherland; Caithness; Burghs - Edinburgh (4); Hawick Burghs; Leith Burghs; Kirkaldy Burghs; Stirling Burghs; Dundee (2); Perth City; Montrose Burghs; St Andrews Burghs; Aberdeen (2); Elgin Burghs; Wick Burghs; Inverness Burghs.

There were constituency boundary changes from 1893 but the areas under WDC & EDC control remained the same.

Source: Adapted from Urwin (1965:99) 'Conservative party Organisation in Scotland'

[2] Interview with Mr. Andrew Strang, 19th February, 1993.

[3] ibid.

[4] Sir John George was a Fife pit boy who had made good as a coal and glass works director. He represented Glasgow Pollok from 1955 to 1964. Bob Kernohan, a former editor of the Kirk's Life and Work journal and leading Unionist and Conservative said of him in an interview on the 24 September 1992: "He was given the job by London of moving things in Scotland but he was short tempered and irrascible and he displayed all the characteristics later associated with Margaret Thatcher ".

[5] Interview with Sir Teddy Taylor, House of Commons, 30th June, 1993.

[6] It would appear from the above minute that consideration of Colonel Blair's position was central to the MPs deliberations. This was probably less because of Blair's position as political secretary in the Chairman's office since its inception in 1950, than because of his close relationship with his fellow Royal Scot officer, James Stuart the Secretary of State.

[7] Interview with Mr. Andrew Strang, 19th February, 1993.

[8] ibid.

[9] Fairgrieve report was attached to the 1977 Conference handbook as Appendix A.

[10] Interview with Professor Ross Harper, 4th August, 1992.

[11] Information given to author at interview with Professor Ross Harper, 4th August, 1992.

Chapter Three : Religious Cleavage an Elite/Mass Level Divide?

In the following two chapters, the claim that religious dealignment can account for the decline of the Scottish Conservatives is challenged. The received wisdom in contemporary academic circles is to discount the importance of religion as a social cleavage reflected in voting behaviour in the UK - of course, with the exception of Northern Ireland. (Marshall,et al,1989:226) However, the evidence presented here demonstrates that the religious cleavage in Scotland has retained its influence on Scottish electoral behaviour. True, as this chapter shows attitudes to the religious cleavage in Scottish society have changed at the elite level. But it will be demonstrated that this has not had the impact on mass behaviour that has widely been presumed.

A Social Cleavage Maintained.

Any analysis of Scottish society ignores at its peril the Scottish Kirk. Over the centuries the Church has engaged in spiritual and physical conflict with both Roman Catholics and Episcopalians to maintain its Presbyterian character formed at the Reformation. At the end of the nineteenth century when most Presbyterians had re-united under the one Church of Scotland - after early nineteenth century schismatic splits - it was no exaggeration to term Scotland a homogenous Protestant nation. Indeed, as late as 1961, the Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland thought it was clear " that the Church of Scotland is looked to as the Church by at least three quarters of the population". (Church and Nation, 1961:430)

However, the Roman Catholic population had seen a steady increase in its number throughout the nineteenth century brought about by Irish immigration. In fact by the end of that century the Irish Catholics vastly outnumbered the small number of indigenous Catholics who lived mainly in the north west. A universal problem for any immigrant population is the speed of its acceptance by - and assimilation into - the host society. In Scotland, the religion of the majority of Irish immigrants appeared to militate against their acceptance, more so than their ethnic identity. The minority of Protestants mainly from the six Ulster counties experienced no problems in being accepted by their Protestant hosts. The Irish Catholics, on the other hand, settled mostly in demarcated areas of the large Scottish conurbations and were an easily identifiable target for non-Catholic clergymen and mob orators. (Walker and Gallagher, 1990)

Both the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic Church engaged in open hostility to each other into the 1950s. The religious divide within Scottish society was maintained and accentuated by the elite rhetoric of both churches. In the early fifties the Church of Scotland was in full cry against what they saw as the insidiousness of the Catholic Church in a most vitriolic and vituperative manner. The official Reports of the *Church and Nation Committee* of the Church of Scotland and articles within *Life and Work* , the official record of the Church of Scotland reflect this particular anti-Catholic and 'alien immigrant' symbolism and imagery. Two extracts one from *Life and Work*, the other emanating from the Official Report of the Church and Nation Committee clearly illustrate this elite ethos. The May 1951 edition of *Life and Work* stated:

> "The whole manner of life and outlook of these immigrants and their descendants differs fundamentally from that of the native population, and if proof were needed it is to be found in criminal statistics and in the experience of those who administer the funds of the National Assistance Board".

The article then proceeds to accuse the Roman Church of mendacity and sectarian aggression, particularly on their attitude to mixed marriages. It refutes the Catholic church's claim that conversions were responsible for the rise in its numbers of adherents: "A more likely explanation is the continuous influx of Irish immigrants - and their fertility, which is well known". But, the reality was that statistical data from the *Glasgow Herald* showed Irish immigration had slowed to a trickle as early as 1929. (Walker,1992:194) The 1951 *Life and Work* article then goes on to accuse the Catholic Church of extortion by means of moral blackmail. The article suggested that Protestants were obliged to give to Roman Catholics who were soliciting subscriptions for their Church despite not having the slightest sympathy for the RC church. This was mainly for "business reasons", as it was suggested that local Catholic Churches influenced their congregations to avoid Protestant businesses who did not contribute. It concluded with the warning:

> " There is a need for vigilance. Many Protestants, half - hearted about their own faith, turn an indifferent eye to the growing arrogance of Rome, or fail to recognise it for what it is. Nor are they concerned that the *Roman Catholics are working themselves into positions of influence everywhere.* (author's emphasis) "What concerns me most", said the late Professor

Daniel Lamont, writing on the subject, "is the complacency and apathy of many Protestants, both to the Roman Catholic invasion and to the Gospel itself. The two kinds of apathy", he added, "belong together " ". (Rev. W. Steven , Queen's Park , Glasgow. *Life and Work* , May 1951: 97-98).

Another passage which highlights these anti - Catholic values is taken from the 1952 Church and Nation Committee report on the growth of Roman Catholicism. The Committee accepted that the greater part of the country was hardly affected by the Romanist question and that it (the Romanist question) was confined to the large cities and industrial areas especially in the West. But the Committee was concerned that the native born Protestant Scots were being displaced from the industrial areas of the West through Catholic immigration. They were also concerned:

" Chiefly because of the influence which the Roman Church is coming to exercise upon public life and policy...What is disquieting about the Roman question today is not so much the increase in the numbers of Roman Catholics or the success of their propaganda, as the aggressive attitude of that Church in the social and political life of the community. In Scotland the Roman Catholic Church forms a compact community largely of alien origin with interests of its own. Its policy is to keep its people as far as possible apart from the general community, the better to serve these interests.

In a free democratic country like ours the right of a minority to organise itself politically and so to exert all the political pressure it can to attain its ends cannot be denied. But the belief that the Roman Church is coming to exercise an undue influence over public life is widespread and undoubtedly causing uneasiness even to many who shrink from giving public expression to it. This uneasiness was shown not to be baseless by a recent claim made by a Roman Catholic archbishop that soon his co-religionists would be in the position of holding the balance of power between the British political parties".

The report ends in similar style with the caveat:

" Those, therefore, who value liberal democracy ought to make themselves aware of the challenge and to be prepared to meet it frankly. Above all, those who cherish the Protestant heritage of our country should realise that

it is being definitely menaced. They should consider it a duty to interest themselves in the activities of the various local public bodies and to do their utmost to secure that the native Scottish element in the population be adequately represented in public life". (Church and Nation Committee, 1952 : 328-330) .

The Catholic Church espoused a similar truculent message. This extract from a pastoral letter from Bishop Douglas of Motherwell in 1952 epitomises the polarisation between the elites of both communities. The Bishop writing on the evils of mixed marriages used a language which not only reflected the fears of the Church and its belief that it was the subject of hate, but also was deeply offensive to Protestants, questioning their very Christianity:

"The Church has always forbidden Mixed marriages and considers them unlawful and pernicious. She (The Church) does allow mixed marriages to save individual souls from external damnation. This relaxation is possible only where the Faith of the Catholic party is safeguarded, and the welfare of the children guaranteed...Quarrels about religion always arise with the greatest of ease; and the enmity towards Catholicism, which is always there, comes out in the abuse of the Church, her priests, and her practices. The Protestant party is encouraged by relatives and friends. How long can the Catholic party hold out? Alas, they are not always the stuff of which fighters are made. They showed weakness of character to begin with in their choice of partner for life, and there is small hope that they will stand up very long to attack.

Bad enough that the Catholic party be exposed to danger, but infinitely worse that their children and their children's children be lost to God. We are living in a non - Catholic country, we form a minority of the population. It is then a more pressing duty on Catholic parents to see that their children avoid forming dangerous friendships with non - Catholics of the opposite sex. There is an atmosphere of hatred of things Catholic. Very often the poison weakens their faith, and destroys the effect of Catholic teaching on marriages and sex".(Glasgow Observer , 4 January, 1952)

This then was the religious animus, a historical legacy, which was sustained by both Protestant and Catholic elites well into the 1950s.

Church Rapprochement.

But by the beginning of the 1960s there was a distinct sea change in the theological atmosphere at elite level. Some of the early signs can be seen in *Life and Work* which in its April 1961 edition, praises the remarks of the RC Archbishop Gray of St Andrews and Edinburgh. The Archbishop had prayed for forgiveness for the faults of their forefathers which had precipitated the Reformation in Scotland. There had been serious misgivings about the fourth centenary celebrations of the Reformation held in 1960 and many Catholics had feared it might be an occasion for a fresh outburst of anti - Catholicism. But Gray is reported as saying he was glad to see that: "The result was in fact, a simple and very humble acknowledgement that things were not what they should be. Men did not look back in hatred and rancour; they looked forward in clarity to a means of unity". (*Life and Work* , April ,1961:90).

Gallagher, argues the Churches embarked on a fresh journey in this period:

> "The 2nd Vatican Council, inaugurated by the liberal Pope John XXIII in 1962, set in train changes which made the catholic church far less dogmatic and introspective in its style and teachings and opened the way for meaningful dialogue with many of the protestant churches. It thus signalled the end of the Cold War between protestants and catholics in all but a few parts of the world ..." (Gallagher, 1987:262)

By May 1962 *Life and Work* was extolling the virtues of meeting "with clergy and brothers of the Roman Catholic Church" and of "the Moderator paying a courtesy visit to the Pope in Rome". (Life and Work, May ,1962:105) Ten years later in 1972, we can see just how complete the volte - face within the Kirk was. The Roman Catholic Church is now praised for its exhortations to have local churches engage in politics and the Church and Nation Committee lays aside a whole section of their Report advocating the emulation of a 1971 Vatican decree by other churches:

> "...Local Churches should stimulate their members to align themselves in political life and take up political action. 'Commission on Justice and Peace - The Vatican, 1971'. The above quotations indicate the growing awareness on the part of all churches that political engagement is a matter of Christian obligation ". (Church & Nation Committee , 1972 : 144) .

In July 1982 rapprochement was complete *Life and Work* carried pictures celebrating the Pope's visit to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh. The Moderator of the Kirk said the historic meeting would help to heal the scars of past religious conflict and controversy. The journal though did also note that "the Pope's arrival and the Moderator's softly spoken welcome was punctuated with the rendering by demonstrators of the National Anthem and "The Sash". (Life and Work, July 1982:9) The religious confrontation which had previously been given respectability by both Church elites, was now regarded as an embarassment.

The Cleavage Politicised.

Although the issue of Irish immigration in itself caused much social rancour within Scottish society it was not an issue the Conservatives could hope to exploit in the nineteenth century. The Scottish Liberals had impeccable Presbyterian credentials and suffered no adverse electoral effects over the Irish immigration issue, or even over Irish support for the Liberal Party per se. However, political developments concerning the Irish issue fundamentally changed the partisanship of the Scots and threw up an opportunity for the Conservatives which the Party grasped with alacrity. Gladstone's endorsement of Irish Home Rule in 1886 split the Liberal Party asunder, particularly in Scotland. Irish Home Rule was a particular anathema to Scots Presbyterians. They not only feared for their familial and religious links to Ulster's Protestant community but were concerned about the potential threat to Scotland's trade and security from an independent Ireland. Thus the Liberal Unionist secession from the Liberal Party proved particularly important for the future of Scottish electoral behaviour. In 1900 the Liberals failed for the first time to win a majority of Scottish seats. Throughout Britain there were electoral agreements between the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives. In 1912 in Scotland the electoral pacts at the local level between the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives were finally consummated in the Scottish Unionist Association. The social cleavage was now undoubtedly a political cleavage and the Unionists exploited the 'Irish issue' mercilessly, for at least the first thirty years of the twentieth century.

The Scottish Unionist Party was undoubtedly a Protestant party. Conversely, from the party's inception in the late nineteenth century the Roman Catholics as a group overwhelmingly supported Labour. The reason for their support of Labour was twofold. As immigrants they had entered the labour market on the lowest rung of the ladder and supported the party which was offering ameliorative policies for such a

group. And as Catholics with a strong Irish identity they rejected both what they perceived as Scottish Liberal prevarication and open Unionist hostility to Irish Home Rule. When in 1900 Glasgow was secured for the 'Unionists' the Irish Catholic community moved their support solidly to Labour. The victories for Labour in 1906 in Glasgow Blackfriars and Hutchesontown along with Dundee, all seats with a large 'Irish' presence, were a portent of the acrimonious religious cleavage which would constitute part of the social and political base for both Labour and the Unionist Party for years to come.

The Unionists continued to benefit from the religious cleavage and from the 'Irish question', even in the aftermath of the Anglo - Irish Treaty of 1921, when it ceased to be a 'question' for Westminster. There was no let up in the rhetoric of leading Unionists. Some were also leading Scottish Orangemen of the time. For example, Sir Archibald McInnes Shaw, a Renfrewshire MP in the 1920s, was a Grand Master of the Scottish Orange Order who made an unsuccessful bid to remove Scotland from the provisions of the Roman Catholic Relief Act in 1926. His colleague Lt. Col. Sir John Gilmour, (2nd Bt..) who was the first Secretary of State for Scotland in 1924-29 and after that Home Secretary, was the deputy grand master of the Orange Order. He " announced his intention of seeking an amendment of the law in virtue of which an Irishman landing on these hospitable shores was immediately entitled to the benefit of the Poor law without the least risk of being returned to his parish and country of origin". (Gallagher , 1987:145).

These views represented the consensus among the Scottish Unionists throughout the twenties and the thirties. For example in 1932, the MP for Glasgow Hillhead and former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Horne, could dismiss the idea of Scottish Home Rule by the use of the Irish bogey. He believed the Irish would control the balance of power between the Scottish political parties which would result in the insidious Irish domination of Scottish politics. Another leading Unionist, Lord Scone (Perth) informed Parliament in the same debate that: "there is in the west of Scotland a completely separate race of alien origin practically homogenous whose presence there is bitterly resented by tens of thousands of the Scottish working class". (ibid:146).

There were also many instances of Protestant support for the Unionists being organised by the Orange Order at constituency level. For example, Walter Elliot thanked Kelvingrove Orangemen for their electoral support at an Orange function in 1931. Moreover, the local undertaker Jonathan Harvey, a leading Orangeman, fought

and deposed the sitting Labour councillor in the 1930 municipal elections in the Anderson ward of that constituency . (Walker, 1992 and McCracken, 1990)

The 1950s, the Political Cleavage Sustained.

There is no doubt that the divisive religious ethos - at both elite and mass levels - carried over into the post war world of Scottish politics. For example, it was no coincidence that Scotland (7% to Labour) and Glasgow in particular (2.5% to Labour), swung less towards Labour than the rest of the United Kingdom (12%) at the 1945 General Election. Liverpool, with a similar sectarian historical legacy, also produced a less than the national average swing to Labour at 6.5 per cent. (McCallum and Readman,1947) A little later, Butler and Rose in the 1959 'Nuffield Study' wrote of the campaign in Glasgow Kelvingrove:

> "Below the surface there was one, not unusual, theme in Glasgow politics: the conflict of Orange and Green. Mrs. MacAlister (Labour) was a Roman Catholic, and parts of the constituency were described as 'Orange territory'. Orange sentiment can be strong, and some canvassers apparently appealed to it. There was a certain tension over the siting of one polling station, and some Labour organisers hoped that the use of a Catholic school might discourage Orange supporters from voting there. But this issue was not prominent - and it was less obtrusive than in the past, although unbiased information on it is always elusive ".(Butler and Rose, 1960:171)

The elusiveness of unbiased information on the 'Orange and Green' was apparent in many of the interviews conducted for this study. It simply highlights the sensitivity of the subject, even for contemporary politicians and activists. Sir Teddy Taylor stressed that the religious cleavage was not present in Cathcart, although he was horrified that there seemed to be a barrier which prevented the Catholic community voting for a Unionist or a Conservative candidate. He adds, "but, if there was this huge Protestant bloc vote I genuinely did not come across it and if there was this immense vote it was not secure".[1] Malcolm McKenzie, the vice chairman of the Scottish Tory Reform Group, shared Sir Teddy's horror of any notion of religious sectarianism and discrimination but his reminiscences of canvassing in the Anderson ward of the Kelvingrove constituency as a young activist in the 1950s illustrates he was all too well aware of the cleavage; he admits that the content of religious graffiti

on the walls of a tenement building was often the arbiter of a decision of whether to canvass there or not .[2]

George Younger, (MP for Ayr, 1964-92) recalled that the change of name from Unionist to Conservative was partly a conscious decision by Sir John George to distance the Party from the religious and sectarian overtones of 'Unionism'. He admitted that he experienced surprise and naiveté at the extent to which religion was an issue in the 1959 Lanarkshire North campaign, where erroneously, he took supportive exhortations of "keep the other side out" to mean the deprecation of Labour policies. In reality it was a direct reference to Roman Catholics. However, in his opinion there was no comparable experience in Ayr; this is somewhat surprising, as his predecessor in the seat, Lt. Col. Sir T.C.R. Moore was a distinguished Orangeman.[3]

For Andrew Strang, cultivation of the 'Orange vote' appeared to end somewhere between 1939 and 1950. "When I came back after the war the Orangemen appeared to have no influence whatsoever, in fact the last active Orangeman I can remember holding office was Archibald McInness Shaw.[4] (Glasgow Unionist Chairman throughout the 1930s) Mr Strang was Mrs Kay Elliot's (widow of Walter Elliot) election agent in the 1958 Glasgow Kelvingrove by-election and he says he does not remember an Orange influence in the area. But he then readily concedes that, "there was a strong Roman Catholic presence, Irish immigrants settled in the south side of Argyle Street in Anderson's North Street area. We always knew the Roman Catholic Church influenced their flock but Unionists kept religion and politics separate".[5]

So even if the Scottish Unionists did not cultivate the religious divide in the fifties there is ample evidence that they certainly were aware of it; they were no strangers to its discourse, and did not refuse the harvest of votes it brought. An Unionist intelligence report of 1953 stated: "The bulk of Socialist propaganda was done by word of mouth and two Missioners reported that at present the Socialist Party appeared to be trying to consolidate their position among Roman Catholic electors. This, they thought, was mainly because of the Bevan split". (SUA Western Office Minutes, 9th Sept., 1953, National Library)[6]

It is clear then that the religious divide and its political associations were a generally undisputed phenomenon in the fifties. The Unionist elite had no need to cultivate it. As we saw above the established Kirk had carried out this task for them.

The attacks upon the Roman Catholic Church, and particularly its 'political traits', by the established Kirk could not fail but to sustain the Protestant support for the Unionists. At the time when Party missioners were commenting upon Catholic support for Labour the Church of Scotland who had helped to sustain the cleavage, was in full cry against what they saw as the insidiousness of the Catholic Church in such a most vitriolic and vituperative manner.

Post-1960s, the Political Cleavage Discarded by Elites.

In the immediate post-war period the Scottish Unionist Party was careful not to send any signals to the electorate which could place in jeopardy its relationship with the 'Protestant vote'. But this view changed in the 1960s. As Lord Younger pointed out above one of the reasons why the Party proposed changing its name from Unionist to Conservative in 1965 was to rid itself of any association with a sectarian image. John George (Scottish chairman, 1963-65) believed a modern Conservative Party should not condone, either implicitly or explicitly, a religious rivalry which belonged to an atavistic past. And this view has prevailed amongst the Conservative elite since 1965. The view was reflected in subsequent Party developments.The first Roman Catholic Tory MP in Scotland was Michael Ancram who held East Lothian between the February and October 1974 elections. Thereafter, he was given the position of Scottish vice-chairman from 1975 to 1980 and then Chairman from 1980 to 1983. He also represented the Edinburgh South seat between 1979 and 1987. The last Glasgow seat to be held by the Conservatives, Hillhead, was fought by a Roman Catholic, Gerry Malone, in the 1982 by-election. By then, the seat had incorporated all of the old Kelvingrove seat, scene of some of the bitterest rivalry between the 'orange and green' down through the years. Indeed the Kelvingrove Orangemen felt singularly insulted by Mr. Malone's candidature.[7]

A recent example of the Conservative elite's sensitivity to being identified as a Protestant party and of the speed with which the Party elite will move to eschew any such identification occurred just before the 1992 general election when they replaced their prospective parliamentary candidate in the Western Isles. The candidate, Andrew Price, stated that his Christian beliefs led him to the conclusion that Roman Catholics were non Christians; such sentiments were quickly disclaimed by Lord Sanderson (Scottish Chairman) in the press and on television. The Glasgow Herald reported:

" A spokesman for the Conservative Party in Scotland said: 'There is a lot of anger and concern as to the kind of remarks Mr Price is alleged to have made and there is no doubt that the party is anxious to speak to him. Our view is that a person's religion is a private and personal matter'". (Glasgow Herald, 15th February 1992; see also Scotsman of same date)

There was no ambiguity in Lord Sanderson's comment. Mr Price was subsequently replaced by a Mr. R. Heany. Mr. Price in fact stood as an independent receiving 491 votes to Mr. Heany's 1362.

There is no doubting the continuing sensitivity which attaches to any discussion of the role of religion in Scottish society. Gallagher (1987) in his pioneering work in this area, for example, believed he was turning over a stone which had lain undisturbed for too long. But even he also thought it prudent to use the lower case for the emotive religious terms of 'Catholic' and 'Protestant'. The crucial point is that the Conservative elite was no exception to the general feeling of uneasiness about Scotland's religious divide. The Party's role in the historical roots of the divide was played down, and contemporary Tory polemicists offered a revisionist history of the Unionist Party's active role in Scotland's religious cleavage. Two examples, one from an official history of the Party organisation and the other from a quasi-official history of the Scottish Tory Party, show the wish of these Tory polemicists to sanitise past history in order to fit the modern Party's non - sectarian approach. First, the late Professor Ward writes of the inter war period in his *History of the Scottish Tory Organisation*::

"One major concern was to consolidate and extend working-class support. In some Western constituencies this aim was partially met by collaboration with the Grand Orange Lodge - and contact was evident in Coatbridge and Airdrie as late as 1959. However, (despite West Renfrewshire's deep concern over Ulster) such associations ran against Tories' traditional non - sectarianism and have been grossly exaggerated by some writers. More important was the work of the Unionist Workers League of 1909, inspired by that unsung hero William Templeton (1876-1938), a Springboig wood turner who sat for Banff in 1924-9 and Coatbridge in 1931-5". (Ward, 1982:22)

Professor Ward however failed to inform his readers that William Templeton, was a populist Orange grand master and hero who had his praises sung in Orange circles. In contrast a contemporary Grand Orange Lodge official writes of the period: "With an MP as Grand Master, and the Scottish Secretary (later Home Secretary) in membership, the confidence of the Order had never been higher". (McCracken, 1990:39)

Our second example comes from Gerald Warner's *History of the Tory Party.* He uses one of Professor Ward's selective quotes to suggest that the so - called Orange Unionist vote was largely a myth:

> "Yet Irish influence (Orange and Green) has been over stressed. Certainly, there were Protestant 'hardliners' in the West and perpetually anti - Tory Roman Catholics in Dundee. This sectarian division was, of course, the continuation of a sorry tradition. But it was not universal: in 1900 Roman Catholic Blackfriars voted for Bonar Law, a teetotal son of the manse. And it was not of Tory making or compatible with Tory tradition". (Warner, 1988:186)

But Warner's fails to mention the fact that it was the United Irish League's (UIL) influence which gained the seat for Bonar law. The Blackfriars constituency in 1900 was swamped in emerald green posters supporting Bonar Law as punishment for the Liberal candidate's lukewarm stance on Irish Home Rule. (Gallagher, 1987:68) In fact Bonar Law was the consummate politician on the religious issue. At the same time that he was publicly stating his support for a Catholic University of Ireland he was generously donating to the building fund for the Cathedral Street Orange Halls in Glasgow. (McFarland, 1990 and McCracken, 1990) Moreover, Labour won the subsequent 1906 election when the UIL moved their support over to them. But this selectivity on the part of Conservative polemicists, is demonstrative of how far the Party's elite now consciously distance themselves from any notion of being the Protestant Party. In short, the elite agenda of Scottish society does not allow for pro-Protestant statements by the Scottish Conservatives. Scottish Conservative leaders now find it simpler and safer to denounce trenchant Protestantism than risk being denounced by society's opposing elites.

An 'Orange Card' at the Mass Level?

Such denounciation by opposing elites was clearly evident in the wake of the Conservatives' relative success in Scotland at the 1992 election. Claims of resurrecting past religious divisions to improve their fortunes were levelled at the Conservatives by contemporaty commentators and political opponents alike. The emphasis placed upon the 'Union' as a central tenet of the Scottish Tory approach at the 1992 election campaign, and since the election, awakened, at least in the eyes of the Scottish media, the sectarian associations of 'Unionism'. Two cogent examples illustrate the point. Ian Lang, the Secretary of State, in an article in the Tory Reform Group's journal referred to the Party rediscovering its Unionist soul. As the only truly Unionist party with Unionist beliefs he argued it had the potential to tap into and build upon, a rich vein of Unionism which transcends party allegiance. (Lang, 1992) Allan Massie writing for the *Scotland on Sunday* newspaper suggested that the 'Unionist' label could bring back what he called the Rangers vote in Glasgow. (27 September, 1992) The reaction by the Press to such 'sectarian connotations' reached as far afield as Ireland. For example, the *Irish Post* newspaper (10 October, 1992) used the headline 'Tory bid to woo Orangemen feared', to comment on the two articles. The previous week the *Herald* newspaper (3 October, 1992) reported that: "Political opponents are slightly concerned, however, that such an attempt to regain old ground could open up Scottish politics to sectarianism, which has been mercifully unheard of in recent years".

The *Herald* neatly encapsulates the elite presumption that the religious cleavage, so 'mercifully unheard of' in elite circles, was also true for the mass level. In fact, this *Herald* article was published at a time when the first reports of sectarian discrimination in the Monklands District Council were making the headlines. The alleged discrimination in Monklands eventually exploded in sectarian claims and counter claims. It was publicised throughout the UK as 'Monklandsgate' by the national exposure of the Monklands East by-election in June 1994, caused by the death of the Labour leader John Smith. But the Orange Order had for many years been strongly critical of the disproportionate number of Roman Catholics represented in Labour's elected positions, particularly at the local level. For example, they would criticise the situation in terms normally reserved for the heinous South African apartheid system: "Glasgow inevitably springs to mind. Here is a city with an overwhelmingly Protestant electorate and a powerful Orange presence. Yet it is a virtuely one-party statelet so successfully manipulated by the original "Greens" that a Protestant Lord

Provost is a distant memory"; (Orange Torch, June/July,1994) and, "Apartheid in South Africa hasn't got a look in compared with our rulers"! (The Drum No2 Summer, 1992). The Monklands district epitomised this blatant discrimination for the Order and it waxed lyrical on a cover up by elites in the media, the parties and the churches. The December / January, 1992/3 edition of the *Orange Torch* bemoaned that within Monklands the town of Coatbridge, with three times the Catholic population of neighbouring Protestant Airdrie, was being favoured with council projects, while relatives of councillors were favoured with jobs. The charges of nepotism levelled at the council and the local Labour Party carried religious overtones as the five Regional Councillors, the seventeen Labour District councillors (along with the defeated candidates) and one MP were all Catholic, yet the total Roman Catholic population was less than 40 per cent.

A Scotsman / ICM poll, just two days before polling, found a clear sectarian split. Support for Labour among Catholics was 82 per cent while 65 per cent of Protestants supported the SNP. (The Scotsman 28 June , 1994). Mrs Susan Bell, the Tory candidate, was the first to be accused of generating sectarian division and 'playing the Orange Card'. (The Scotsman and the Herald, 20-30 June, 1994 passim). The Orange Order claims to have supported the SNP candidate in the by-election to punish Labour's bias against Protestants.[8] This was somewhat ironic, that a 'Loyal Institution' such as the Orange Order should support a nationalist candidate, Mrs Kay Ullrich, who was credited with Republican sympathies and alleged derisory remarks against the Monarchy. But, this particular example emphasises an important point; although the religious cleavage was still an important influence on Scottish mass political behaviour, the Orange Order as an institution had long ago ceased to be a conduit for the Conservative vote.

A Bridge Collapsed.

There was a long tradition of the Orange Order supporting the Conservative party. The Order was attractive to both Irish and indigenous Protestants as a protective bulwark against perceived Catholic immigration and influence, particularly in the areas which experienced the highest levels of Irish immigration. (McFarland, 1990). The links between the Scottish Unionists and the Order were formalised before the first world war when an Orange representative was co-opted to the Western Divisional Council's executive committee. But the Order withdrew its representation in protest at the acceptance and active involvement by the Party in the 1921 Irish Treaty. This

decade or so of formal links was the sum total of 'official' involvement between Party and Order. However, as we noted above, between the wars many leading Unionists were also leading Orangemen and of course it was the Order that Walter Elliot thanked for electoral support. It was this capacity of the Order, its ability to mobilise and organise local support, which was to endear it to the Conservatives. The Roman Catholic community had their own equivalent esoteric organisatons - the Knights of Saint Columba, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the United Irish League and the Catholic Union. Although not as large as the Orange Order, the Catholic Union was nevertheless hugely successful in organising the Catholic vote and "ensuring that Catholic interests in matters like education were looked after in the political arena, which meant, in the Scottish context, that they would be looked after by the Labour party ". (Walker,1992:199).

We can view the Orange Order as an institution which provided an important bridge between the Protestant elite and the Protestant mass. But, it is obvious that today's Order plays no such role and that the bridge has effectively collapsed. For example, compare the attitude of the contemporary Order about the political 'direction' of its members with that of the Order in the inter-war years. In 1992 the Order stated: "Quite rightly the Orange Institution does not tell its members what party to vote for nor which union to join, or not to join". (The Drum, No2 , Summer 1992) But, after the 1923 election when Labour formed a minority government, the Grand Lodge intimated: "that any member, male or female of the Orange Institution who joins the ILP, Communist or other socialist political party or who allies themselves politically with those bodies is to be expelled from the Order. Disloyalty cannot be tolerated within our Order". (Walker,1992:190). We saw above that Andrew Strang (the Western Divisional Organising Secretary) was not sure when Orange influence declined in the Party but believed the cultivation of the Orange vote had halted by the 1950s. In contrast, there is no doubt in the minds of Orange officials that the Conservative Party shot themselves in the foot when changing the name to Conservative in 1965 and disassociating themselves from 'Unionism' and in the process weakening their appeals to the Protestant community.[9] The County Grand Lodge of Glasgow stressed this point while commenting on the criticism levelled at Ian Lang over the Tory Reform Group article. The relevant article in *The Drum* (No3, Winter 1992) is quoted here at length because it not only shows that the Order was a vehicle for sustaining the cleavage at the mass level but neatly illustrates why the Order does not now direct their members towards a specific political party. The article continues"

"...Even at the last general election, despite playing the "Unionist card" the word Unionist was a rarity on candidates' material and completely MISSING from background advertising at all T.V. and press conferences...Any last hope of the Tories holding the "Unionist" vote vanished with the Conservative government's signing of the undemocratic and treacherous "Anglo-Irish Agreement" which betrayed the Unionist majority in that part of the United Kingdom known as Ulster, a clear breach of Sovereignty, which shall never be forgiven by the very same people the Tories are now trying to entice.

As for the comment from the SNP through their director of communications Mr Chris McLean: "I very seriously hope that the Conservatives were not intending to play some sort of sectarian card." - this was a real howler, considering his Party's blatant playing of the sectarian card over separate Roman Catholic schooling and he never even blushed or choked on his words.

We cannot forget the Labour party which has long been recognised, particularly in Glasgow and the west of Scotland as being the vehicle of Roman Catholic Action; they have misused the votes of the Scottish working class to enable the establishment and encroachment of Popery as the real party of power (more power to Tommy Sheridan, at least his Militant Labour party puts people before Popery).

The article concluded by asking why it was only when the Protestant vote was vied for that such practice was loudly condemned as sectarianism. However, on this evidence the days of the Orange Order harnessing Protestant votes for the Conservative Party are truly finished.

The Constituency Party.

The Orange Order may not now offer unequivocal support for the one party, but that does not mean the religious cleavage in Scottish political behaviour has disappeared. Indeed, the Conservative elites' behaviour of distancing themselves from a pro-Protestant stance was not always mirrored at the grass roots; at the local constituency level. Apart from the Western Isles example quoted earlier, Lord McKay (who as John McKay had held Argyll and Bute 1979-87) is in no doubt about the effect the 1985 Anglo Irish Agreement had on the local constiuency parties. As Chief

Executive of the Scottish Party, from 1987 to 1989, he was given the job of troubleshooter in the constituencies. One of his tasks was to counter the 'anti-Scottish' perception of candidates selected by constituency parties. In reality, this meant advising against the adoption of young libertarian right wingers on the Thatcherite wing. But no amount of persuasion could budge the Glasgow Central constituency selection committee from adopting Allan Hogarth as candidate for a by election in June 1989. In Lord McKay's opinion, this was all because he expressed outright opposition to the Anglo Irish agreement.[10] He believed the new right candidates made great play, in their selection interviews, of their hostility to the Agreement with the local constituency parties. This is all rather ironic as it was their hero Margaret Thatcher who had actually put pen to paper .

A second example from the constituency of Glasgow Pollok in 1964, highlights the longevity of the cleavage at this level. After the 1964 election, the Organising Secretaries of the Western Divisional Council commented that in Glasgow Pollok: "From the Unionist point of view, the Branch Committees were, in general, too old and there were a dearth of younger workers. *The Candidate's name proved an electoral disadvantage* ..." (Minute Book, 1962-65, National Library) When this was put to Mr Bob Kernohan, he replied that there was no hard evidence to suggest his Irish sounding name mattered. However, when it was pointed out that his election address referred to his Church of Scotland membership - omitted from previous addresses in Paisley 1955 and Glasgow Provan 1959 - he conceded that: "it must tie in a wee bit ".[11]

Conclusion.

The issue of Catholic Irish immigration then was an important social cleavage for Scotland. The Scots Presbyterians feared Roman Catholicism would gain an influential foothold in Scotland. For over a hundred years, from around the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic religion was regarded more in the role of a demonic spectre than a Christian denomination by the Scottish Presbyterian elite. Moreover, many Scots workers not only despised the Irish immigrant's religion but were also concerned that unskilled Irish workers would undermine their position and wage levels. But, before 1886 the Liberal Party's hegemonic hold on Scotland offered very little hope of the Tories being able to exploit that concern. Gladstone's adoption of Irish Home Rule was to change that situation fundamentally. Liberal support for Irish Home Rule, coupled with the party's

sentiments in favour of the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland as the 'Scottish Kirk' allowed the Conservatives to inherit the Liberal Party's 'impeccable' Presbyterian credentials, through their association with the Liberal Unionists.

In the 1930s the Scottish Unionist elites' rhetoric still openly attacked the Roman Catholic Irish, even though immigration had actually slowed to a trickle and the issue of Irish Home Rule had lost much of its political resonance. But, the religious cleavage was still alive and kicking within Scottish society and Unionist politicians continually reinforced its politicisation. So successful were they that their legacy lasted well into the 1950s and the Unionist elite found it unnecessary to remind the Scots electorate of who was the Protestant Party. And, of course, if the religious divide was accentuated so well by such august bodies as the Churches themselves then there was no need for the Unionist elite to dirty their hands. The job of sustaining the cleavage was left to the Churches' elites. But from the 1960s there was a distinct sea change in the attitude of the Scottish elite to the religious divide. Increasingly it was regarded as abhorrent and reprehensible to engage in such overt sectarian behaviour, particularly if it was cynically exploited for electoral advantage. The Conservative elite accepted this watershed in elite opinion and duly distanced themselves from their Protestant past.

But just because the religious cleavage became reprehensible to society's elite did not necessarily mean it would attenuate at the mass level. The Orange Order still helps to sustain such a cleavage at the social level; and its impact can still be found within particular Conservative constituency organisations. And as the next chapter shows, it still seems to be just as important a cleavage in Scottish political behaviour.

[1] Interview with Sir Teddy Taylor, House of Commons, 30 June, 1993.
[2] Interview with Malcolm McKenzie, 13 June 1993.
[3] Interview with George Younger, (now Lord Younger) 21 December, 1990.
[4] Interview with Andrew Strang, 19 February, 1993.
[5] ibid
[6] Indeed the Catholic Press was extremely critical of 'Bevanism' in this period: "Mr Aneurin Bevan's book 'In Place of Fear', out today, is a direct and very serious challenge to Catholics in the Labour Party and trade unions".(Glasgow Observer, 4 April, 1952, see also 3 October ,1952)
[7] Confidential information to author from a prominent Kelvingrove Orangeman.
[8] Confidential information to author from a Coatbridge Orangeman.
[9] Interview with Mr Danny Houston , Orange Lodge official, 2 August 1994.
[10] Interview with Lord McKay of Adbrecknish, House of Lords, 30 June,1993.
[11] Interview with Mr Bob Kernohan, 24 September,1992.

Chapter Four : Religious Dealignment?

The fact that the religious cleavage was not sustained by elite rhetoric after the 1960s helps explain why many commentators argue that religious dealignment has occurred amongst the Scots electorate since the 1950s, and that this helps account for the decline of the Scottish Conservative party. Another crucial factor has been the dearth of data on religious voting trends at the Scottish national level. As a result some academics have relied on the seminal studies of Scottish denominational voting in the sixties, (Budge and Urwin, 1966 and Bochel and Denver, 1970) which recorded high levels of religious alignment, then offered a priori explanations of why religious dealignment should have occurred, and presumed that this was an adequate account of the existence of religious dealignment. However, using new unpublished longitudinal data this chapter clearly shows that religious dealignment has not taken place and if any trend can be discerned, it is actually one of a strengthening association between denomination and vote.

Religious Dealignment Or Religious 'Alignment'?

In their study of Scottish electoral behaviour, Budge and Urwin (1966) noted the divergence in religious behaviour between Scotland and England and used their data to emphasise 'religion' as a formative influence on Scottish voting. The figures produced by Budge and Urwin appear impressive (with over 60% of Protestants voting Unionist in their studies) but there is a crucial caveat - the very low numbers in this sample. The analysis of religion and vote in their 1955 'Scottish National Sample' was based on just 67 cases. In fact, when they wanted to control for class they could not do so for the middle class as they had only three Roman Catholic respondents belonging to the 'middle class'. A further caveat is that the 1955 National Sample they use is not a random sample and the authors freely admit that some electors had a greater chance of selection than others. One section of the sample which had a greater propensity of inclusion was "inhabitants of large cities". It may be that these are the very areas which may have a disproportionate tendency to have a religious cleavage due to a history of high Irish immigration levels. As a result they may well have exaggerated the true extent of the religious cleavage among the Scottish electorate at large. Meanwhile, Bochel and Denver's (1970) study of religion and vote in Dundee contained a larger number of cases (423) than Budge and Urwin's 1955 sample but Dundee (with 59% of Protestants voting Conservative) is also a large Scottish city with a history of a high level of Irish immigration. Despite these weaknesses, these

are the studies which are used to support the claim that religion was only a powerful influence on vote in Scotland until the 1960s. For example, Kendrick and McCrone (1989: 595) state that: "All the survey information which we have comes from the 1960s and later, when many of the social mechanisms underlying the Catholic-Labour voting and Protestant-Conservative voting associations were already losing their force.

Kendrick and McCrone (1989: 596) then go on to argue that:

> "The religious divide has become less rigid and, perhaps equally important, less visible. Above all, as politics have become more media and TV dominated, the weight of political influence has moved away from the organisational networks which virtually defined parallel societies in Scotland on either side of the religious divide".

while Mitchell (1990: 41) writes:

> " The demise of both the importance of Ireland in the minds of politicians and the electorate and the decline of religious affiliation as a determinant of voting behaviour have removed one bogey from the Conservative armoury. Indeed, Nationalists in the 1970s were often keen to point to the example of Eire and the attendant benefits of self-government".

But none of these claims are backed by the analysis of any long-trend data on religion and voting behaviour in Scotland.

There is in fact an uncanny resemblance between these statements and the claims that Labour's vote across Britain as a whole has declined because of a decline in the influence of class on voting behaviour. Labour it is argued is particularly dependent on class based appeals to garner in its support (Robertson, 1984). But those appeals have increasingly lost their resonance as the ties of social class have been eroded by, for example, increased social and geographical mobility. Meanwhile parties with non-class appeals such as the Liberal Democrats have prospered. So, it is argued, Labour has lost the support of its working class base in just the same way that it is claimed that the decline of religion in Scotland has led the Conservatives to lose their Protestant base. Even some of the reasoning as to why class dealignment has occurred echoes the claims made about religion in Scotland. Kendrick and McCrone

in the quotation above refer to the increased influence of television and the decline of the cohesive networks found in traditional working class communities, arguments which are also put forward to explain why class has declined. (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Crewe, 1984; Franklin, 1985; Rose, 1980)

The claims about class dealignment have been the subject of considerable controversy in recent years. (Heath et al, 1987; Heath et al, 1991; Evans et al, 1991). This controversy has underlined the need to observe two important distinctions in making claims that dealignment (of any kind) has been responsible in the decline in a party's fortunes. The first is that if we are to demonstrate that dealignment has been a *cause* of a party's misfortunes we need to examine the *relative* level of aligned voting, not the *absolute* level. Say the number of working class Labour voters and middle class Conservatives voters had declined while support for third parties generally rose. This would represent a fall in the level of absolute class voting. But say the number of middle class Labour voters and working class Conservatives voters declined by a similar amount. Fewer people would be voting Labour or Conservative, but the relative strength of Labour in the working class and Conservatives in the middle class would be just the same. And crucially, the fall in the level of absolute class voting might be a consequence of the rise of third party support rather than its cause. The decline in Labour and Conservative support in both the middle and the working class could be a reflection of political failures rather than the product of social trends.

So in examining whether religious dealignment has been responsible for the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland, it is not sufficient simply to examine whether Conservative support has declined amongst Protestants. Rather, we need to examine whether it has declined more rapidly amongst Protestants than amongst Catholics. And at the same time has Labour (or any other party) become less dependent on Catholic support? The second lesson of the class dealignment debate is that we need to draw a distinction between changes in the sizes of different social groups and the changes in their behaviour. Labour may not be suffering from class dealignment but it is being disadvantaged by a decline in the size of the working class. Thus, in Scotland we might find that the Conservative Party is still relatively successful amongst Protestants, but is disadvantaged by a decline in their number. In summary, what the class dealignment debate teaches us is that we need to be more specific by what we mean by the 'secularisation' of Scottish politics. On the one hand this could mean that there is just as many Protestants and Catholics in Scottish

society, but their religion has less influence on their politics than it once did. Alternatively, it may mean because of a decline in religious identification or a change in religious demography that there are fewer Protestants on whose allegiance the Conservatives can call. (Though note of course the same process might be also be reducing Labour's Catholic base.) Of course it is possible that both processes may have been occurring in tandem, but it should never be assumed that this is the case.

Table 4.1 below shows the relationship between religion and vote in Scotland for those elections between 1959 and 1992 where it has been possible to obtain the necessary data. The 1959 data comes from a series of Gallup surveys conducted in 1963 where respondents were asked to recall how they voted in 1959.[1] The data for the remaining years have been derived from the British and Scottish Election Study series; in some years the information on vote was acquired immediately after the election, but in others it is based on respondents' recall at a later election of how they had voted in the previous election. In all religion is the denomination to which the respondent feels he or she belongs; it does not necessarily indicate religious observance.

relationship bet

Table 4.1 : Religion and Vote in Scotland 1959-1992 .

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	Odds Ratio Con / Lab
1959				
Unionist / Con	52	29	38	
Labour	43	68	60	
Liberal	4	3	2	2.8
SNP	1	0	0	
	100%(N=567)	100%(N=88)	100%(N=28)	
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1966				
Conservative	37	20	0	
Labour	48	80	0	
Liberal	13	0	0	3.0
SNP	2	0	0	
	100%(N=114)	100%(N=10)	100%(N=0)	
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1970				
Conservative	47	17	27	
Labour	37	79	57	
Liberal	7	2	6	5.7
SNP	9	1	10	
	100%(N=592)	100%(N=114)	100%(N=199)	
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1974 FEB				
Conservative	38	16	22	
Labour	31	76	43	
Liberal	10	0	9	6.2
SNP	21	8	26	
	100%(N=640)	100%(N=119)	100%(N=241)	
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1974 OCT				
Conservative	32	11	15	
Labour	29	75	43	
Liberal	9	2	8	7.6
SNP	30	12	34	
	100%(N=616)	100%(N=121)	100%(N=246)	

TABLE 4:1 Continued .

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1979				
Conservative	45	12	27	
Labour	27	77	46	
Liberal	11	3	8	11.0
SNP	17	8	19	
	100%(N=356)	100%(N=76)	100%(N=177)	
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1987				
Conservative	38	10	19	
Labour	37	72	52	
Liberal	10	7	10	7.4
SNP	15	11	19	
	100%(N=461)	100%(N=120)	100%(N=150)	
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1992				
Conservative	35	7	19	
Labour	31	65	39	
Liberal	12	8	12	9.7
SNP	22	20	30	
	100%(N=477)	100%(N=122)	100%(N=185)	

Source : Gallup Interview Surveys 1963 , weighted data for 1959 .
BES Survey, 1966; SES surveys , 1970 , 1974 , 1979 and 1992 .

Table 4.1 confirms the relative success of the Conservatives amongst Protestants in the 1950s. According to the data over a half of Protestants supported the Conservatives in 1959, while less than a third of Catholics did so. But what is the picture now? Does the table show that there has been a decline in the relationship between religion and vote? The absolute level of support for the Conservatives amongst Protestants has indeed declined. By 1974 it was below 40 per cent and in 1992 was still only 35 per cent. But given the decline in the overall level of support for the Conservatives in Scotland, it is hardly surprising to find falling Conservative support amongst Protestants. The important question is whether Conservative support amongst Catholics has fallen less rapidly. And it is by no means obvious that it has. Despite the fact that it started off at a lower absolute level of support amongst Catholics, the Conservative party's support amongst Catholics was 22 points lower in 1992 than it was in 1959, whereas amongst Protestants it is only 17 points lower. Far

from religion becoming less important, the Conservatives appear if anything more of a Protestant party now than in the 1950s; it is just no longer a successful one.

We can analyse this table more formally using a statistic known as the odds ratio. This measure simply takes the ratio of the level of support for a party amongst any two groups and compares it with the level of support for another party amongst the same two groups. A whole host of such odds ratios can be calculated from table 4.1. On the right hand side of the table however the odds ratio of greatest single interest here is given; namely, the Conservative / Labour odds ratio of support amongst Protestants and Catholics. Thus for example the odds ratio of 2.8 in 1959 is calculated by taking the Conservatives' share of the vote amongst Protestants (52%) dividing it by their vote share amongst Catholics (29%) and then dividing the result by the equivalent figures for Labour (43% / 68%). The higher the odds ratio, the stronger the religious alignment . The crucial advantage of the statistic is that it provides a measure of the relative level of religious voting independent of changes in the level of party support or in religious identification.

Table 4.2 : Conservative/Labour Odds Ratios of Support Amongst Protestants and Catholics, in Scotland and England, 1959-1992.

	1959	1966	1970	1974 Feb	1974 Oct	1979	1987	1992
Scotland	2.8	3.0	5.7	6.2	7.6	11.0	7.4	9.7
England	1.7	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.5	1.3	2.2	2.3

Source: Table 4.1 and Table A.1 in Appendix 1.

With Labour's support also remaining persistently much stronger amongst Catholics than amongst Protestants, it can by now be of little surprise to discover in table 4.2 that the Conservative / Labour odds ratio shows no sign of declining over time. If anything it seems to have steadily increased over time reaching an all time high of 11.0 in Scotland by 1979, before falling back slightly to 9.7 in 1992.

Further, this religious cleavage in Scotland is also clearly stronger than it is in England. A similar table to table 4.1 for England can be found in appendix one. At no time does the English odds ratio reach the level of the lowest Scottish odds ratio of 2.8 for 1959. The average English odds ratio is 2.1 over the eight elections from 1959 to 1992, in contrast the Scottish average is 6.6.

These odds ratios can be modelled statistically by the statistical technique of loglinear modelling. Loglinear modelling takes all of the odds ratios in a table and helps us to identify whether there are any statistically significant changes. Table 4.1 contains three variables which can be modelled- vote, religion and year of the election. To take into account changes in the overall level of support in the parties over time we have to introduce into the model a term which measures that relationship - but also include a religion/vote measure - but one that assumes the relationship is constant. We also want to discount any changes in the sizes of the various religious groups so we also introduce into the model a religion/year term. What is not included in the model is a term which measures any *change* in the relationship between religion and vote between years. In other words, what the loglinear model attempts to do is to see how well it can replicate table 4.1 on the assumption that there is no such change. Of course, it does not replicate the table perfectly, but the question we have to ask is whether the error is sufficiently large for us to discount the possibility that it simply represents sampling error. It is not. In table 4.3 below, the chi-square statistic for the residual variation is 51.9, which with 39 degrees of freedom has an 8 per cent chance of occurring as a consequence of random sampling error . To accept the result as statistically significant we normally require that chance to be less than 5 per cent . The assumption that there is no change over time in the relationship between religion and vote provides an acceptable fit to the data.

True, the result is not far from being statistically significant. But if the residuals from the model are examined, they confirm the message from the impressionistic look at the Conservative/Labour odds ratio - that if anything what we are picking up is the fact that the Conservatives have become relatively more dependent upon Protestants for support.

TABLE 4:3 Residuals from the fitted model vote, vote by religion , vote by year .

RELIGION	CON	LAB	LIB	SNP
PROTESTANT				
1959	-2.8392	2.7698	-.7576	.9389
1966	-.9960	.4232	.6655	.2719
1970	-.4825	-.4089	.5079	1.0070
1974Feb	-.4972	-.2839	1.0092	.2114
1974Oct	.7056	-1.4140	.4100	.6759
1979	.5650	-1.7196	.9740	.7895
1987	1.0038	.4742	-1.0006	-1.0107
1992	.9443	1.5592	-1.4909	-1.6718
CATHOLIC				
1959	3.0391	-3.3319	1.5622	-.6554
1966	.9960	-.4232	-.6655	-.2719
1970	.7038	.2636	.0301	-1.7905
1974Feb	.4119	1.4566	-2.3997	-1.0644
1974Oct	-.1878	1.5431	-1.2806	-1.1220
1979	-1.2642	1.6098	-.8274	-.2936
1987	-.8153	-1.0071	1.5073	1.4417
1992	-1.9702	-1.1395	1.6747	2.4535
NONE				
1959	.6033	-.0975	-.5798	-.6323
1966	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
1970	.0711	.2690	-.5636	-.0722
1974Feb	.2873	-.7306	.2498	.3974
1974Oct	-.6658	.4268	.2806	-.0395
1979	.1810	.7052	-.5811	-.6551
1987	-.5551	.2692	.1362	.1486
1992	.3475	-.8224	.5750	.1861

Likelihood Ratio Chi Square = 51.87144 DF = 39 P = .081
Source : Data from table 4.1

The residuals for Protestant/Conservative voting move from negative to positive, -2.8 in 1959 to around plus +1 for the last two elections of 1987 and 1992; this confirms that the Conservative/Protestant relationship has strengthened.

In fact, the largest source of error lies in the pattern of SNP voting.[2] As we can see from table 4.1, by 1992 the level of support for the SNP amongst Catholics (20%) almost matched that amongst Protestants (22%). In the 1970s, by contrast, the SNP was clearly far more successful amongst Protestants than Catholics. In so far as there has been any religious dealignment in recent years it has been in a crumbling of traditional Catholic hostility to the SNP. This is borne out by the Catholic/SNP residuals in table 4.3 are negative until 1979 but then move to being positive for the

1987 and 1992 elections. In fact the residual for 1992 is statistically significant at nearly +2.5. (Norusis, 1988: chapters, 5 and 6) This is a clear indication of the threat that the nationalists now pose in Labour's traditional heartland (Mitchell, 1992).

But, its the Protestant Working Class?

So far however we have said nothing about social class. But many commentators have argued that it is Protestant working class support for the Conservatives, not Protestant support in general, which has declined. (Mitchell,1990:10) and (McCrone, 1992: 158). Fortunately, this hypothesis is quite easily tested by adding 'class' to the other variables present in table 4.1. Similar to the process we described for the log-linear model of table 4.1, we then introduce a term which measures the relationship between class and year, and class and vote. Again, what is not included in the model is a term which measures any *change* in the relationship between religion, class and vote.

Table 4.4 : Numbers, Percentages and Residuals for Non-manual and Manual Protestant/Conservative voting from fitted log-linear model vote, vote by religion, vote by class, vote by year .

	NON-MANUAL			MANUAL		
Election	N=	%	Residual	N=	%	Residual
1959	145	67	-0.1310	70	36	-1.1225
1966	9	27	-3.6580	27	38	+3.2405
1970	124	58	-0.0436	58	29	-0.8871
1974Feb	110	47	-0.4961	51	24	-0.4920
1974Oct	94	40	+0.5896	36	18	-0.3271
1979	82	52	+0.3468	34	30	+0.3486
1987	111	48	+0.4405	58	26	+0.7330
1992	108	44	+1.1544	50	22	+0.1753

Source : Gallup Interview Surveys 1963 , weighted data for 1959 .
BES Survey, 1966; SES surveys , 1970 , 1974 , 1979 and 1992 .

Table 4.4 contains the residuals for 'non-manual' and 'manual' Protestants voting Conservative, from our log-linear model, after 'class' was added to the model. Crucially, table 4.4 shows that the trend amongst manual Protestants is the same as the trend for all Protestants in table 4.3. If anything the religious alignment has strengthened amongst the working class and in the middle class. On this evidence it is clear that it is not the Protestant working class deserting the Conservative camp that accounts for the Conservative decline in Scotland.

Secularisation.

Attendance at religious services has undoubtedly declined. In 1955, the Church of Scotland's *Report to the General Assembly* listed a membership of 1,307,573 which was 25.5 per cent of the Scottish population. By 1991 the Report recorded a membership of 770,217; or just 15.5 per cent of the population. Roman Catholic figures - as recorded by the *Catholic Directory of Scotland* - over a similar time span were 745,125 (14.6%) for 1955 and 787,200 (15.9%) for 1991. One has though to be careful when measuring the trends in membership of religious groups, as different denominations use different criteria for classifying their membership. The Roman Catholic membership, for all intents and purposes, may be equated with the Catholic population as a whole, practising and non-practising. All who are baptised and confirmed within the Catholic Church are members, until such time as they are deleted from the Rolls on their death or have informed the local parish Priest of their departure from their faith. The Church of Scotland, on the other hand, record only communicant members in their 'Rolls' of membership. This explains the apparent rise in Catholic members in comparison to the Church of Scotland's 10 per cent fall. However as Brierley and MacDonald (1985) have shown the drop in Roman Catholic attendance at Church has been similar to that experienced by other denominations.

But a fall in religious adherence does not necessarily mean there has been a fall in the proportion with a religious identity. In fact, the British/Scottish Election Studies do not show any clear trend; 28 per cent did not identify with a religion in 1970 while 30 per cent did not do so in 1992. Moreover, the comparison does not appear to be confounded by differences in the wording of the question used to ascertain religious identity.[3]

So, if we do not have a substantive decline in religious identity which has created a smaller pool of Protestants on whose allegiance the Conservatives can call, what then of 'religious demography'? If both the main churches have experienced a similar decline in religious adherence and the proportion of those not identifying with any religion has not increased, there is still the possibility that 'movement' of the religious communities has had a significant effect. We want to examine if there has been a significant change in the concentration of Protestants and Catholics within specific areas.

Table 4.5 : Glasgow membership figures of Church of Scotland and Roman Catholic churches; and expressed as percentage of Glasgow population .

Year	Church of Scotland	% of Pop	Roman Catholic	% of Pop
1951	204 , 987	18.8	322 , 350	29.5
1955	209 , 844	19.4	330 , 410	30.5
1959	203 , 208	18.8	338 , 110	31.4
1961	197 , 435	18.6	332 , 310	31.4
1965	180 , 917	18.0	323 , 380	32.3
1969	162 , 103	17.4	322 , 690	34.7
1971	151 , 645	16.9	319 , 400	35.7
1975	127 , 984	14.5	306 , 200	34.8
1979	114 , 735	14.4	289 , 800	36.4
1981	108 , 500	14.1	291 , 000	37.9
1985	96 , 338	13.1	288 , 200	39.3
1989	85 , 228	12.3	281 , 100	40.7
1991	79 , 924	11.4	281 , 100	40.4

Source : Reports to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and The Catholic Directory for Scotland .

Table 4.5 looks at the demographic religious changes in Glasgow since 1951 to 1991. Glasgow as the largest Scottish city was the epitome of the 'large city areas' where the religious cleavage mattered most. It was where most of the Irish Roman Catholic immigrants settled. It is noticeable, common with most city areas of Scotland, that the population has declined. This development explains why the Roman Catholic population increased as a proportion of the overall population even though their actual membership figures have dropped by over forty thousand. If the proportion of Roman Catholics were to mirror that of Scotland as a whole then we should expect their percentage figure to rise by about one per cent from 1951 to 1991. The fact that it rises by around 11 per cent is not good news for the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. In an area where the Party badly needs its traditional religious base within which to appeal, the 'Catholicisation' of Glasgow works to their disadvantage. It is no coincidence that in the mid-1950s when the Catholic membership in Glasgow was around the 30 per cent mark, the Unionist party held eight out of fifteen Glasgow Parliamentary seats: Cathcart; Scotstoun; Hillhead; Kelvingrove; Woodside; Craigton; Pollok and Rutherglen. By 1991 when the Roman Catholic population in table 4.5 has increased by around 11 per cent, the Party held none. This would help explain the particular decline of the Conservatives in Glasgow. And, if the trend of Catholicisation was repeated for other Scottish cities, for example Edinburgh and Dundee, this would help explain the decline there also.

Conclusion.

The results set out in the above two chapters provide no support for the claim that the decline of the Conservative party has been brought about by religious dealignment. The decline in Conservative support has occurred in those of all religions and of none. The sensitivity which attaches to discussion of the religious divide has been an important factor in elite presumption that mass attitudes were in line with their own. But as we have seen, this was not the case. The explosion of claims and counter claims of sectarian discrimination at the Monklands East by-election simply provided a public reminder of what continued to be an important issue even now in contemporary Scottish society. And moreover, it is just as an important influence on Scottish electoral behaviour as it once was. Elite indignation at such reprehensible sectarianism, has been a contributory factor in the cleavage being given the status of a 'taboo' within the public domain. However, the above evidence undoubtedly shows that religion is still a formative influence on the Scottish voter, so it cannot account for the decline of the Scottish Conservative Party.

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[1]Asking people to recall how they voted some considerable time ago is methodologically less desirable than asking them immediately after an election (Himmelweit et al, 1977) However, data on respondents' religion was not available in our Gallup surveys before 1963.

[2] Indeed, if we model just Conservative and labour voting in Table 4.1 and collapse the 'year of election' into three distinct time periods: 1959-66; 1970-79 and 1987-92, we aquire a result which does have a less than 5% chance of occurring as a consequence of random sampling error. And, as we see below, the residuals bear out that the Protestant/Conservative relationship has strengthened (-3.6 to +1.5).

RELIGION	CONSERVATIVE
PROTESTANT	
1959 - 1966	-3.6036 (53%)
1970 - 1979	1.2741 (55%)
1987 - 1992	1.4671 (51%)
CATHOLIC	
1959 - 1966	3.6036 (29%)
1970 - 1979	-1.2741 (15%)
1987 - 1992	-1.4671 (11%)

Likelihood Ratio Chi Square = 11.95618 DF = 2 P = .003

[3] The wording used to ascertain religious identity in the Gallup surveys was a simple: What is your religious denomination? With further prompts for the 'main' religious groups , 'other' and 'none'. For the 1974 and 1979 Scottish Election Studies it was: Do you belong to any church or religious group and if yes, which denomination? For the 1992 SES it was: Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religin and if yes which?

Chapter Five : Devolution, A Scottish Card?

It is often argued that one reason for why the Conservatives were so successful in Scotland in the 1950s is that, although the party had no truck with legislative devolution, in practice it had done more than any other party to advance Scottish self-government since the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885. In particular, the inter-war period saw sweeping reforms culminating in the removal of the Scottish Office to Edinburgh in 1939. The Conservatives might be the unionist party, but it is claimed that they proved adept at playing the Scottish card and received due electoral reward for it. (for example, Miller, 1981 and Miller et al, 1981a. See below)

In this chapter we examine just how far the Party's electoral success and fortunes can be accounted for by its position on devolution. We will argue that it is by no means clear that the Conservative Party's electoral success has varied according to its position on devolution.

Devolution Equals Scottish Consciousness School.

To reiterate then, a school of thought which pervades the field of academic analysis on the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, and particularly on the party's decline, is one of the party being relatively successful when offering policies of administrative or legislative devolution in order to appeal to a Scottish consciousness. One clear example of this claim that the Conservative party prospered when it advanced devolution is the following quotation from Miller (1981):

> "From the Scottish Office reforms in the late thirties to Balfour in the mid-fifties the Conservatives bolstered up Scots national consciousness, used Scots nationalism as a weapon against socialism, and built up the Scottish office. And over the same period their electoral performance in Scotland was significantly better than they could normally expect". (Miller, 1981:26)

Similarly Miller et al (1981a:205) state:

> "The good and the bad times for Scottish Conservatives coincide remarkably with the times when they were strongly identified with pro- or anti- devolution policies".

However we will argue that this hypothesis is too simplistic and that devolution policy is not the only way of appealing to a Scottish identity or Scottish consciousness.

What is not in dispute is that both the Scottish electorate and the British electorate overall have continually shown a preference for Scots having greater control of their own affairs. For example *The Sunday Times* (1st December, 1991) maintained the media hype over the 'constitutional question', evident before and during the 1992 election campaign, with the headline that: "All Britain says Scots should get home rule". The report found that 53 per cent of Britons were in favour of the Scots having some form of home rule. This influential Mori survey, according to the *Sunday Times*, which would increase the pressure on John Major to review his devolution policies loses much of its punch and cogency when viewed against the response from a Gallup survey of February 1938 (Gallup,1976). Gallup asked, throughout Britain, if Scotland should have self-government. And as many as 48 per cent of the Gallup respondents believed Scotland should have self-government. In the light of these figures, more emphasis may be placed upon the continuity of views for over half a century .

The *Scotsman* (29 January, 1992) also found in their ICM opinion poll that the independence option for Scotland now won 50 per cent backing from the Scots for the first time. Under the banner headline that: "Support For Home Rule Soars", the Scotsman suggested that a Conservative strategy aimed at polarising the debate between independence and no major constitutional change could end up seeing the nationalists winning the debate and breaking up the Union between Scotland and England. In fact the actual election result saw the nationalists achieve 21 per cent of the share of the vote to the Conservatives' 25 per cent. One explanation for this apparent discrepancy between actual voting and opinion on the constitutional position of Scotland may lie with the voters' priorities. Similar to their brethren south of the border the Scots not unnaturally place 'bread and butter' issues first. When the Scotsman poll asked their respondents to prioritise the issues only 12 per cent placed the constitutional position of Scotland first. Much more important were the issues of unemployment (42%), followed by health (36%), the poll tax (34%), and both the standard of living and education (23%). Although not a major priority for the Scots then, nevertheless, a Scottish preference for greater control of their own affairs has played an important role in Scottish attitudes since the second world war. We now

examine its importance as a factor in the party's electoral success of the fifties and more importantly, the extent to which it later contributed to the party's decline.

Post War Developments.

The immediate post war years saw an attack on the Attlee Government's socialism which was equated with centralisation and London rule for most Scots. These are the years which provide the material to underpin the 'Scottish Card' thesis. Undoubtedly much material and rhetoric abound which supports Miller's view that proposing decentralisation, in the form of devolution policy, would endear a party to the Scots. Churchill's famous 1950 General Election speech at the Usher Hall, Edinburgh, implicitly, if not explicitly, accepted the idea of Scottish home rule if the centralising menace of socialism could not be thwarted.

> "The principle of centralisation of government in Whitehall and Westminster is emphasised in a manner not hitherto experienced or contemplated in the (1707) Act of Union ... I frankly admit that it raises new issues between our two nations ... *I would never adopt the view that Scotland should be forced into the serfdom of socialism as a result of a vote in the house of commons*". (Miller, 1981:21)

It is remarkable how similar the argument used by Churchill to question how far the concept of parliamentary sovereignty should extend north of the border, in the face of Scottish public opinion, mirrors that now used by the opponents of the Scottish Conservative party. But, at one time the fears of one party hegemony in Scotland were the inverse of those found today. In short, one criticism which is now levelled against the proposal for a Scottish Parliament is that it would be dominated by the Labour party. But paradoxically, Glasgow University's study of the 1950 election which reported on the topicality of home rule at Glasgow election meetings found that it was: "though often coupled with an expressed fear that a devolved Scotland would be permanently Conservative". (ibid: 25) Typical election addresses of this time also evince an attitude similar to Churchill's; an example is Mr T.G.D. Galbraith's who was the Unionist candidate in the 1948 Hillhead by-election, declaring under the heading, 'Scotland':

> "As one industry after another is nationalised we are finding that Scottish affairs are dominated by the control of Ministers and officials in England

who are often ignorant of the ways of our Country. Socialist MP's may say that they are good Scotsmen but there whole policy is one of centralisation and control by Whitehall. I will resist this and demand that in each industry which has been nationalised a Scottish Committee shall be set up with full executive powers to deal with Scottish problems". (General Election Addresses, Acc/10424, National Library of Scotland).

And the 1950 General Election address of John McNicol in Springburn:

> "As a Scotsman, I would be actively concerned with the special needs of our Country and welcome the policy of devolution proposed by the Unionist Party which will enable the affairs of Scotland to be dealt with by ourselves in greater measure". (ibid)

Even Willie Whitelaw standing in Dumbartonshire East in 1950 demands decentralisation of authority and responsibility in the handling of "our affairs". (ibid) And Miller (1981:22 & 25) quotes a Daily Record debate between the Labour Secretary of State, Arthur Woodburn and the prominent Unionist, Walter Elliot, in which Elliot is quoted as castigating Woodburn for having to ring up London to get permission to have another bar turned on in his office radiator and for also attacking three Labour MP's for being born outside Scotland.

The devolution issue preoccupied the Conservative Scottish Members of Parliament while in opposition in the 1940s. One may even go as far as saying that the 'luxury' of opposition allowed the party to attack Labour for its centralisation policies while concealing its own substantial debate on devolution policy. Similar parallels may be drawn now with Labour's contemporary attacks on Conservative constitutional policy. The united front in opposition masks deep divisions of their own on devolution which may once again surface with the commencement of office. A minute of a SUMC meeting on the 15th February 1949, which was marked strictly confidential to all Scottish Unionist Members, highlights this diverse debate within the Scottish party. Some members even expressed support for a devolved legislature.

> It noted that the Chairman, Sir Basil Neven-Spence, reminded the Committee that its recommendations, approved by the Shadow Cabinet, had rejected a separate legislature in Scotland. However, Sir William Darling said he would be prepared to go as far as the Scottish Convention

had gone, (which as stated in the Scottish Covenant Association's aspiration was: "... in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs") and Mr Thornton - Kemsley said a Scottish Assembly, representative of local authorities, MP's, peers, the churches, nationalised industries, etc., in Scotland with advisory functions and sitting in Parliament House in Edinburgh, would appeal to the imagination of Scotsmen. It was noted that Ulster's "glorified county council" would be unsuitable for Scotland". Notably, when the Chairman put the question to the Committee, no one was in favour of a separate Scottish Parliament. (SUMC, Bodleian Library, Oxford).

However, after the Shadow Cabinet's approval, the Committee's recommendation not to pursue a proposal for a separate legislature became official policy, in fact the party's policy and proposals for near on twenty years did not deviate much from those outlined in the 1949, "Scottish control of Scottish affairs", statement of policy, in which, inter alia, there were proposals for a Minister of State for Scotland with Cabinet rank to be appointed, along with a third Under - Secretary for Scotland which would better distribute departmental duties and a proposed Royal Commission to examine Scottish affairs. But, the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (The Balfour Commission) which was appointed in July 1952 and reported back in 1954 was precluded by its terms of reference from considering Parliamentary separation. However, as Miller (1981) points out the 1950s were a quiescent period regarding home rule aspirations. It would appear that these Scottish Tory measures and the dismantling of Labour's centralising nationalisation were sufficient to meet Scottish aspirations at this time. In fact Miller provides a simple objective measure of the amount of public attention given to the issue. He records the number of lines devoted to the heading 'home rule ' in the Glasgow Herald index published until 1968. His conclusions were that there was very little until 1946; then, in response to MacCormack's assemblies, a swift rise to a peak in 1950, followed by a sharp drop in 1951 and 1952 and a progressive decline until 1960. Interest revived slightly between 1960 and 1966 and exploded in 1967 and 1968. (Miller, 1981: 24).

Tory Devolution Policy and the Electoral Reward.

Edward Heath was elected Party leader in 1965 and was far more receptive to calls for greater decentralisation to Scotland, although any policy initiative would have to be subordinate to the fact that the Tory Party's renewed commitment to membership of the Common Market made a nonsense of any attempt to turn the clock back to 1707. Nevertheless, he, like many members of the Party north of the border, was concerned about the perceived rise of nationalism. In the wake of the SNP's success in the 1967 Hamilton by-election the Nationalists more than doubled their share of the vote to 11.4% in 1970. The 1968 Party Conference at Perth reflected the concern over Hamilton. The fifth session of the Conference agenda, "Change in Scotland" announced, "in view of the large number and variety of motions submitted on the Government of Scotland, this session will be devoted to a wide ranging discussion on all aspects of the subject". Motion seventeen declared: "That this Conference believes there is a case for an elected assembly meeting in Scotland". Motion twenty-five stated: "That this Conference recognises the legitimate aspirations of the Scottish people for greater control of their own affairs and urges Her Majesty's Opposition to press for the eventual establishment of internal self-government for Scotland within a federal union of the United Kingdom ".

In light of such sentiment Mr Heath took the opportunity to reverse party policy at the 1968 Perth Conference. Mr Heath after studying Sir William McEwan Younger's Committee[1] report opted for the case for an elected Assembly meeting in Scotland. Supporters of the 'Scottish Card' thesis disparage this proposal as "it amounted to little more than an extension of the Westminster committee system". (Mitchell, 1990:65). The 'Declaration of Perth' may be criticised for being merely grandiloquent posturing, but nevertheless, it was reported at the time as a watershed in Conservative thought on the Governance of Scotland.

> "Even so, he (Heath) took Tory policy some considerable distance along a new avenue. He rejected separatism; he rejected federalism (which had some sympathy in the Party); and, significantly, he rejected the status quo. In its place he virtually committed a future Conservative Government to set up an elected Scottish Assembly, to sit in Scotland". (Glasgow Herald, 20th May, 1968).

This was a bold initiative which surely must have identified the Party with pro - devolutionary policy. Heath established a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Alex Douglas Home which reported shortly before the 1970 election in favour of an elected Convention that would be responsible for most of the scrutiny of Scottish Bills currently undertaken by the Commons. Although the proposals look pale by the standards of the 1980s, they represented a firmer commitment to change than anything offered by Labour at the time, led as it was in Scotland by the firmly anti-devolutionist, Willie Ross. The proposals were incorporated into the 1970 Manifesto, a three to one majority at the Scottish Conference of that year found in favour of them, and they were even acceptable to arch-Unionists such as Teddy Taylor. (Bogdanor, 1981:85). And crucially, the proposals refute the claim of Miller et al (1981a) that: "...a concession on devolution might make the Party so popular in Scotland that both British and Scottish mandate might go to the Conservatives thereby making the concession unnecessary". (Miller et al, 1981:210).

The Heath administration of 1970 - 74 has been much criticised for reneging on the commitment to set up a Scottish Assembly. However, extraneous events intervened which led to the failure to implement the policies promised at Perth. The Government believed it necessary to wait on the Kilbrandon Report (Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969-73) expected within a year of the 1970 election, for very good reasons:

> "It (the Government) felt itself compelled to wait for the report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution set up by the Wilson Government in 1969; for; if the Conservatives had proceeded with legislation on devolution, the Commission intended to resign, and this would have caused the government considerable embarrassment". (Bogdanor, 1981: 85).

Unfortunately the Commission did not report until October, 1973. This was an inauspicious time for the Heath administration who were dealing with domestic troubles in the shape of rising unemployment, a miners' strike, and a world recession as a consequence of the "oil crisis" caused by the Arab - Israeli conflict. Not unnaturally, Heath placed devolution low on his list of priorities in this climate of crisis.

Let us now look at the actual election results which would appear to refute the thesis that a concession to a Scottish consciousness, in this form of legislative devolution, would produce an electoral spin-off for the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. And we can also examine if there was a Scottish 'backlash' over the failure by the Heath administration to play the Scottish card.

Indeed, at first sight the 1970 result looks relatively good for the Conservatives. The party managed to defend its existing share of the vote in Scotland after three consecutive falls. (see Table 1 in Introduction) But comparison of the outcome in Scotland with that in England gives the lie to this view. In England Conservative support rose by over five points. The gap between the party's performance on the two sides of the border doubled. Further, one might have anticipated that if devolution was crucial to the fortunes of Scottish Conservatives, by February 1974 the Heath government would have been punished for its failure, whatever the circumstances, to deliver on its promises. Yet, although Conservative support fell, compared with England the party performed relatively well in Scotland in February 1974. If we look at Table 1 in the introduction we see that support for the party in England fell by 8 percentage points but in Scotland it fell by just 5 points.

By 1975, the Tories were in opposition under the new leadership of Mrs Thatcher. Mrs Thatcher spoke on behalf of a motion calling for a directly elected Assembly at the Scottish conference in 1976, which was passed by a substantial majority. (Campaign Guide 1977) But by the end of that year, her Shadow Secretary of State, Sir Alick Buchanan-Smith had resigned in protest at the Party's policy of opposing the Scotland and Wales Act. The policy was to deprecate Labour's Act as defective while not ruling out the principle of devolution, although Buchanan-Smith believed that ruling out devolution was exactly the attitude being conveyed to the Scottish electorate. Conservative literature of the period stressed that the Act would not remedy the genuine problems of Scotland and would only sow the seeds of discord and friction leading to the break up of the United Kingdom. *Scotland's Government Today* (1978) emphasised the dilemma of the 'West Lothian Question'[2], namely the role of Scots MPs after devolution: "After devolution Scots MPs will be able to vote on English housing, education and health but not on Scots housing, education and health. If the English are forced to accept policies they don't want, conflict will arise". Once again the Tories had the luxury of opposition to suggest a variety of options. An example is the document prepared by Francis Pym and Leon Britain in 1978 which offered 'four viable options' which would be submitted to an all party conference. The

options ranged from having glorified titles for the Scottish Grand Committee and the Select Committee system to federalism based on the Government of Ireland Act. In fairness to the authors they did try to address the West Lothian Question with their quasi - federal option.

> "Consequently, if a Scottish Assembly with executive and legislative powers is to be established, it should be based on the principles and practices of federalism so that it could evolve smoothly into such a quasi - federal system if in the fullness of time that was thought to be desirable throughout the United Kingdom. The Scotland Act does not meet that criterion". (Pym and Brittan, 1978) .

This attack on the Scotland and Wales Act explains, for Miller et al, (1981a:205) the widening gap between Conservative support in England and Scotland between 1975 and 1976. They use opinion poll data to show that this gap widened from around 9 per cent in 1975 to 12 per cent after the Party had strongly attacked the Scotland Act of 1976. However, over the longer term it appears that the Shadow Cabinet's policy of attacking the Scotland Act did pay dividends. Along with the highly efficient 'No Campaign' in the Referendum it may have been responsible for consolidating support for the status quo, a position which the Thatcher administrations would adopt for their policy on the governance of Scotland.

Table 5.1 : ORC surveys (October 1974 to April 1979)

	Oct 74	Dec 75	Oct 76	Feb 79	April 79
Keep the present system . %	21	14	23	32	35

Adapted from Kellas 1989:149.

From table 5.1 we see a significant rise in support for the present system of government by 1979. By April 1979 35 per cent wish to keep the present system of government compared to just 14 per cent in December 1975. On the 1st March 1979 the "Yes' vote in the Referendum on Scottish Government received a slight majority but fell short of the 40 per cent of the electorate required by an amendment to the Act. The immediate benefit to the Tories was a no confidence vote against the government on the 28th March 1979 which brought down the government, and the Conservative Party won the ensuing election in May. However, during the Thatcher era once again support for the present system of government dropped to 26 per cent by 1983 and

plummeted to just 15 per cent by March 1987. (Scotsman polls quoted in Kellas, 1989).

But the Scottish Conservatives entered the 1992 election battle, deprecating the independent and devolutionary positions taken by the other parties while emphasising that it was the only true unionist party. Ian Lang the Secretary of State urged the parliamentary candidates to champion the union (the Times 23 March, 1992) and Mr Major informed his biggest election rally at Wembley on the 6th of April:

> "If I could summon up all the authority of this office I would put it into this single warning - the United Kingdom is in danger. Wake up. Wake up now before its too late". (The Scotsman, 6 April, 1992)

Here was an election then when the party went out of its way to identify itself as the only party in defence of maintaining Scotland's links with Westminster. And the party managed to do better in Scotland relative to the performance in England. It increased its share of the vote by 1.6 per cent while the party in England support fell by 0.7 per cent. The actual election results appear to undermine Miller's 'systematic explanation' for the decline of the Party in Scotland.

Conclusion.

The devolution question may frequently dominate Scottish political debate, but this does not mean that it can swing the Scottish electorate. We saw that there was no discernible advantage for the Conservatives in Scotland at the 1970 election when they offered what surely must be "a concession on devolution (which) might make the Party so popular that both British and Scottish mandate might go to the Conservatives.." (Miller et al, 1981a) In point of fact the Party in Scotland managed to maintain its level of support but in England support rose by around six per cent. And at the 1974 February election the Party's performance in Scotland was better than that in England. Yet, this was an election when the Party in Scotland should have been punished for its failure to "bolster up a Scots national consciousness".

But a Scots national consciousness is not solely dependent upon the advocacy of devolution policy. More importantly, in the next chapter we see that a change in the Party's identity had a greater effect on a Scots national consciousness than any failure to deliver on devolution.

[1]"In 1967 a committee under Sir William McEwen Younger had been established to review the machinery of government in scotland in response to a resolution passed by the party's Scottish central council. The committee's first meeting was held on December 14 that year - six weeks after Hamilton". (Mitchell, 1990:55)

[2] The eponymous conundrum refers to the questions asked in Parliament prior to the 1979 Referendum debate by Tam Dayell, the Honoury Member for West Lothian. The questions surrounded "the retention of Scottish Members at Westminister after the establishment of a Scottish Parliament (which) raised problems for Cabinet Government. (basically) Would Scottish Members of Parliament be allowed to vote on English matters in Westminister while the equivalent Scottish matters were devolved to a Scottish legislature?" (ibid:44)

Chapter Six : The Unionist Party.

The previous chapter illustrated the fundamental flaws in the Scottish card thesis and chapter three showed the symbolic power of Unionism coupled with Protestantism. Here we examine the other cultural pillar of Unionism which all too often is dismissed or marginalised in explanations of the decline of the Party in Scotland. Unionism had the ability to maintain a Scottish distinctiveness which the term Conservative could not hope to achieve. That there has been a decline in the symbolic power of Unionism is revealed in the campaigning language of the Scottish Conservatives. The change in the party's name in 1965 was not simply a token one. It also heralded a significant change in rhetoric. The party exchanged a form of discourse that tapped a rich vein of Scottish culture for one that ran the danger of sounding dangerously English.

The Unionist Appeal.

At the heart of the Scottish Unionist Party's ability to appeal to powerful symbols of Scots culture was its use of the label 'Unionist' rather than Conservative to describe itself and the label 'socialist' when referring to the Labour party. It is the emotive nuances of political communication which are of interest here. Cohen (1985:14) informs us that "philosophers have long since drawn our attention to the capacity of language to express attitude as well as to denote object". Maurice Cranston's examples of 'hurrah' words as opposed to 'boo' words are used to highlight this practice within the Scottish Unionist party. (1954:16) Here we take the approach that Unionism is an example of what philosophers of the vernacular call a *hurrah-word* and Socialism a pejorative word or *boo-word*. In chapter two we saw a Dumfriesshire activist complain of the 1965 reforms that members did not know exactly what the changes would involve. One change involved the term Conservative displacing Socialist as our boo-word.

In their successful years after the second world war the Unionists were careful to maintain a distinct Scottish identity separate from the Conservative party in England. The Eastern Divisional Council when discussing 'suggested national symbols for Unionist posters' recorded in a minute: "... it was agreed in principle the idea was good, and the council felt that whatever design was used must be distinctively Scottish". (National Library of Scotland, Acc/10424, EDC minute book No6, 8th April 1949). We also saw in chapter two how Unionists emphasised the independence

of their party from London. To do so they would sometimes go to extraordinary lengths and extremely expensive ones at that. A few examples from the Scottish Unionist Association minute books clearly illustrate this. For example the Eastern Divisional Council of the Scottish Unionist Association, noted on the 16th January 1948:

> "It was reported that, on the instigation of the Peebles and South Midlothian Association, arrangements had been made with the central office in London for a revised Scottish edition of the leaflet 'Lifebelt for Britain'. In this the word 'Conservative' was everywhere replaced by the word 'Unionist' and certain photographs of leading members of the Scottish Unionist Organisation were inserted to give the leaflet a distinctive Scottish character". (National Library of Scotland, Acc/ 10424).

While the Western Divisional Council on the 29th September, 1954, recorded:

> "The Committee reviewed specimens of various publications which had been issued since the previous meeting. Particular consideration was given to a series of posters which had recently been sampled. It was agreed that many of those were effective but as they were all printed with the word 'Conservative' the Secretary was asked to ascertain what the cost would be to have them reprinted in the 'Unionist' version and whether there would be any objection to the 'Conservative' version being used in Scotland".

The following month's minute (25th October, 1954) contained the unequivocal reply:

> "Complaints about the use of the word "Conservative" in Party literature received from Rutherglen, Airdrie and Coatbridge and West Renfrewshire were considered. The secretary also called attention to a quotation for "Unionist" versions of new posters, which exceeded the English figure by one hundred per cent". (All National Library of Scotland).

This attitude was reflected in the Scottish MPs Committee at Westminster who had reason to discuss the issue while discussing agenda resolutions at the forthcoming party conference at Perth in 1956.

"Mr Thornton - Kemsley said that he had arranged for this item (change of name?) to go on the agenda in case Members wished to raise any points in connection with the resolutions to be discussed.

There was a short discussion on a resolution submitted by East Renfrewshire which sought to change the name of the Party in Scotland to 'Conservative'. Mr. Walter Elliot said that he thought that the reason why this resolution had been put forward was to save money; the use of the word 'Unionist' involved special printing so far as literature was concerned. A number of Members were of the opinion that it would not be advisable to change the name of the Party, as the word 'Unionist' involved an important matter of principle". (Bodleian Library: Scottish Unionist Members Committee, 24 April, 1956).

Contemporary Scottish Conservatives complain bitterly about their opponents ability to apply successfully negative connotations to the Party operating within a 'Scottish dimension'. In short, they complain about having an alien identity imposed upon them by their political opponents:

> "We should not need the disturbing example of Adolf Hitler to remind us that the ability to harness myth to current political consciousness can be a powerful political talent. Yet that is precisely what the opponents of Scottish Toryism have been able to do. To equate the Scottish Conservative Party with all that Scots dislike most about "Englishness" and root it in contemporary consciousness has been a remarkable political achievement". (MacKenzie, 1988:3).

But it was the Scottish Unionists who displayed this powerful political ability in the successful post war era. The advantages, as the party saw them, of using the term socialist are apparent in a motion submitted by West Fife to the party's annual conference in Ayr in 1947.

" That this Conference desires to impress on all Unionist Constituency Associations, on Unionist Speakers and Propagandists, and on Unionist Party Headquarters that the term 'Labour' as applied to the party now in power in this country is a misnomer which encourages the mistaken idea that only that party is concerned about the prosperity of Labour and the interests of the wage earners. This Conference, therefore, recommends

that in all Unionist publications, speeches, and propaganda the term 'Socialist' should be used to describe the Government Party ". (SUA Conference Agenda, Ayr 15th May, 1947)

After all there was a historical precedent to justify such an approach. Keir Hardie had triumphed over his rivals, such as Hyndman, in having the socialist term expurgated from the infant Labour Representation Committee for the very reason that in Hardie's eyes the term socialist was foreign and its use would alienate the British worker. The Scottish Unionist Association's Yearbook of 1955 neatly illustrates the strategy adopted by the party, under the heading "Origins of Socialist Theories" it states:

"Nothing could be a greater misnomer than the name "Labour" for Socialist policies. It is a name which attracts support; but let those who are misled by it ask themselves: what can the foreign doctrine of Socialism, with its denial of freedom of choice and of individual opportunity, profit the British people..."(SUA, Yearbook 1955:18-19)

It is significant that Unionism's distinctive symbolism and imagery was jealously guarded by the party in the fifties, to the extent that the term Conservative was expurgated from all official Unionist literature. Moreover, at the same time as the pejorative boo-word of socialist was being firmly rooted in the Scottish consciousness as alien and foreign, we should not forget that there was another complementary discourse with talk of compact communities largely of alien origin. As we noted in chapter three this was a discourse of the 1950s Kirk elite which attacked the alien origins of the Roman Catholic immigrants and a Unionist Party discourse which emphasised Labour's alien origins had a remarkable neat fit with it, as it was generally accepted that Catholics disproportionately voted "Socialist' in Scotland.

But the use of this language began to break down even before the party changed its name in 1965. In the 1964 election many constituency parties are freely using the term Conservative to introduce their candidate in their election addresses. The majority of the 1964 election addresses were printed in the same format but although the majority of these were "Introducing the Unionist Candidate" as in Glasgow Springburn, a substantial minority chose the introduction as the 'Conservative Candidate's such as in Glasgow Shettleston. This is confirmed by the amount of literature the Party in Scotland was now accepting without reservations about it

including the 'Conservative' term. The Organising Secretaries of the Western Divisional Council were informed about the literature "Now is the Time" on the 27th February, 1964: It is "not possible to reprint Unionist version of this leaflet and constituencies wishing to use it would have to avail themselves of the Conservative version produced in London". (National Library, Acc/ 10424)

The change can be seen quite clearly in table 6.1, which shows how frequently the terms 'Unionist', 'Socialist', 'Conservative' and 'Labour' appeared in the Scottish sections of the Party's Campaign Guides[1], published at each general election.

Table 6:1. The Campaign Guides - Scottish Sections, 1950 -1992.

		Number of references			
	Pages	Unionist	Socialist	Conservative	Labour
1950	1/2	7	2	2	nil
1951	11/2	3	nil	1	nil
1955	12	11	10	2	4
1959	15	13	28	3	3
1964	24	8	11	7	6
1966	14	1	12	45	18
1970	29	1	1	85	24
1974	26	1	nil	13	8
1977	24	nil	5	39	14
1983	22	nil	nil	5	17
1987	28	nil	nil	17	34
1992	34	2	4	17	46

Source: Adapted from Conservative and Unionist Party Campaign Guides.

Table 6.1 shows that the terms 'Unionist' and 'Socialist' give way in the mid - 1960s to 'Conservative' and 'Labour'. For example in 1964 the size of the Scottish section of the guide was roughly double that in 1955 or 1959. Yet there were fewer references to the term 'Unionist' than in either of those years. From 1970 onwards neither 'Unionist' nor 'socialist' makes much more than a fleeting appearance. In contrast, the term Unionist was perceived as largely irrelevant by the party in England as early as the 1940s. Lord Woolton the great reformer of the English organisation ruled out the proposal of a change of name to the 'Union Party' in the late 1940s because of its similarity to the "old but now irrelevant name of 'Unionist'". (Blake, 1985:261). Further, similar to the approach in Scotland, Lord Blake the Conservative historian emphasises that Woolton instructed party workers to use the alien, doctrinaire term of 'socialist' before Labour with its suggestions of British honest toil but the practice was discontinued in 1959 when it became apparent that some voters

thought that Labour and Socialist were two different parties. However, Andrew Strang offers a contrary view, he argues: "In England it was always the Labour party but we used the term socialist".[2] Crucially, we see that it was not discontinued in Scotland in 1959 with 28 references, the highest recorded.

Just how different the discourse of the Party was in Scotland can be seen below. In the absence of an 'English' section of the campaign guide a comparison has to be made with the discourse of the Welsh party in the Welsh section. The benefits of this are twofold. The Welsh Conservative party has developed as an integral part of the organisation run by Smith Square and the language should reflect that 'anglicised' development. But, we can also compare the development of Conservative discourse as used within the other historic nation of Great Britain.

Table 6:2. The Campaign Guides - Welsh Sections, 1951 -1992.

		Number of references			
	Pages	Unionist	Socialist	Conservative	Labour
1951	2	nil	nil	5	nil
1955	9	nil	3	9	1
1959	10	nil	3	7	nil
1964	10	nil	4	10	3
1966		No Welsh Section.			
1970	10	nil	nil	40	27
1974	12	nil	nil	20	21
1977	13	nil	4	51	27
1983	10	nil	1	5	11
1987	20	nil	1	9	22
1992	39	1	2	29	40

Source: Adapted from Conservative and Unionist Party Campaign Guides.

Lord Woolton was certainly right about the irrelevance of Unionism for the party south of the border. Even within the historical nation of Wales with its own traditions the term unionist is used only once and that was in a facetious capacity in the 1992 section which remarked that Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour party, called himself a Welsh unionist. The amount of use made of our socialist boo-word appears to bear out Andrew Strang's version of events. The Welsh section in 1955 and 1959 is two thirds of the size in the Scottish section but the references to the term socialist only appear one sixth as frequently as in Scotland. The evidence clearly points to the existence of a distinctive Scottish discourse until the mid-1960s.

Of course, we cannot presume that this change of language was a cause of the party's decline. It may have been an attempt to adapt to changes in public attitudes. Certainly, many within the mid - 1960s party elite felt that the traditional unionist appeal was anachronistic. It was argued that in an age of national (UK) television continued use of the term led to confusion and harboured a distasteful sectarian image which the party they thought would be wise to jettison. And certainly with the decline of the empire and the contraction of Britain's military role there is every reason to believe that some of the traditional pillars of unionism were losing their emotive power. But there was equally a danger that by scrapping its distinctive Scottish name in favour of one used south of the border the party would seem to be becoming anglicised.

The New Pejorative Boo-Word.

Certainly, there is no doubt that one of the problems of the contemporary party in Scotland is that it is perceived as "English". After the disastrous 1987 election result, losing eleven of their twenty - one seats in Scotland, the Executive of SCUA considered a damning twenty - one paged document on the state of the Party in Scotland. The document was entitled "The Policies, Questions and Options: The Way Forward" and was produced by two vice - chairmen of S.C.U.A., Mrs Margaret Walker from the West of Scotland and Mr John Purvis, the former European MP for Mid Scotland and Fife. (Scotsman and Glasgow Herald, 10th September, 1987). The report was compiled from internal questionnaires, and with intrepid frankness declared "that it is no use ignoring the perception that the Tories are seen as the English Party". Mrs Thatcher and her Ministers were viewed by some as an electoral liability in Scotland, in the main due to their Englishness. The attenuated Scottish identity is evident in a *Scotsman* - ICM opinion poll published on the 27th August 1990. It claimed that the Scottish Conservative Party had little relevance to Scotland and "a huge majority of Scots think that the Scottish Conservative Party is mainly an English Party ".

Table 6:3 : THE SOUL OF THE SCOTTISH TORY PARTY

	% Disagree	%Agree	Con	Lab	SNP	Lib	D/K
It is mainly an English party with little relevance to Scotland.	16%	79%	56	85	87	77	5
It ensures Scottish interests are properly served in the UK government.	79%	13%	37	7	12	3	8

Source : adapted from the Scotsman 27th August 1990 .

Table 6:3 clearly shows the extent of the crisis of identity facing the Scottish Party. 79 per cent agreed that the Party was mainly an English party with little relevance to Scotland. Astonishingly, confirming further the SCUA "Way Forward" report, 56 per cent of 'Conservative' respondents perceived their Party as being mainly English and having little relevance to Scotland. Moreover, only just over a third of Conservatives held the belief that their party was at least ensuring Scottish interests were being served in the United Kingdom government. Such results must be worrying for a Party operating within a Scottish context. When such responses are received from Conservative Party supporters and in such numbers, then the Party's identity crisis is clearly evident.

The populist Tory, Sir Teddy Taylor, commented lamentably on the situation, after a visit to his former constituency Cathcart, which he held from 1964 to 1979. He wrote in the *Guardian* (22nd June, 1987) that the main change was simply that the Conservatives in Scotland now seemed to be regarded in their former heartland, in some unusual way as the enemies of Scotland. He likened his return visit to addressing a Tsarist rally of Russian émigrés after the Revolution. The people were nostalgic about 'happy history' but: "What the Scottish Tories need to do is to change their policies and attitudes so that the Scottish Conservatives can be seen to be a group rather separate from the United Kingdom Tories, and seen to be a Scottish party fighting for Scotland and a peoples' party interested and concerned for the whole population". It is the contention of this chapter that the Scottish Unionist Party was such a Party as Taylor describes, its Unionist image was comfortable within the Scottish electoral environment and it adroitly used the negative connotations of 'alien socialism' to continually reinforce that image, and that this advantage was lost in the mid-sixties.

A Progressive Party.

We saw in chapter two that the Scottish Unionist Association assiduously defended itself against the perceived encroachment of centralisation by opposing any movement towards a national campaign for local government elections. The SUA took the view that overt organisation at the local level, particularly under the 'national' label, would have the corollary of national, central control of party electioneering, thus undermining the jealously guarded decentralised system of the SUA. A crucial concomitant aspect of this strategy, of not fighting local elections as the Unionist party, was to reinforce the anti-socialist message at the local level. A minute of the Scottish Members of Parliament in 1955 neatly illustrates the attempt of the Glasgow Unionist Association to bind the MPs closer to the principle of supporting local anti-socialist organisations:

> "Colonel Elliot read to the Committee a letter from Mr Cranna suggesting that there should be a closer co-operation between the Glasgow Unionist Association and Members of Parliament and the Glasgow Progressive Party. A general discussion followed. It was agreed that this matter should be remitted to the attention of the Glasgow members of the Committee and their decisions should not in any way commit other Members and other localities". (SUMC 8 March, 1955, Bodleian Library).

The Progressives along with the Moderates and Independents were the often mentioned 'local coalitions of anti-socialist forces' of the SUA minute books. The Progressive Party was a good example of this 'genre'. The Progressives were formed in Glasgow in 1936 and the *Glasgow Herald* reported the Party would fight to capture seats from the socialists.

> "The Progressive Party, by which name the Moderate Party will henceforth be known aims at winning a dozen seats from the Socialists. The Progressive Party aims at creating an efficient municipal election machine composed of those members of the public who are opposed to the policy of the Socialists in Glasgow Corporation". (The Glasgow Herald, 14th September, 1936).

This was reiterated in the Constitution and Rules of the Glasgow Progressive Party (1937) passed on the 17th May 1937. Rule 3 a)., contained the anti - socialist

sentiment outlined in the Herald report. The affairs of the Party were to be administered by a council composed of among others :

"g). two representatives to be nominated by the Glasgow Liberal Associations.

h). two representatives to be nominated by the Glasgow Unionist Association".(ibid)

The relationship between the Unionists and the Progressives was not always a smooth one. There were many instances when the Progressive candidate's political allegiance was not to Unionist liking. After the 1948 municipal by election in the Blythswood ward of Glasgow, when Mr Robert Grey of the Progressives polled 2,435 votes to the Co-operative Labour's candidate's 717, questions arose over Mr Grey's candidature because of his political allegiance. But the Glasgow chairman explained that the responsibility for the selection of candidates rested with the Ward committees and the Glasgow Progressive Party. (Glasgow Unionist Association, minute book No8, 26th April, 1948: National Library of Scotland). The Chairman then expressed the official line of the Unionist party on working with the local anti-socialists, first expressed in the 1940s and continually reiterated throughout the 1950s. Just one example of many is taken from a 1952 minute, on the forthcoming local elections of 1952.

> "The Chairman reminded the meeting of the dates of the Local Government Elections in May and of the part which should be played by Unionist Organisations in the campaign. In this connection he read a resolution which had been passed at the Annual Conference of the Scottish Unionist Association in 1946. The resolution urged that it should be the duty of local Unionist Associations to exert their utmost energies in promoting the return of men and women of sound Progressive and anti - Socialist opinions and for that purpose they should work wherever possible with other non - Socialist organisations in their respective areas". (28th Feb 1952, WDC Minute Book, 1949 -1962, National Library of Scotland).

The association between the party and the Progressives may have all too often been precarious, but it was highly regarded and safeguarded by the post war Unionists. It was not only a bulwark against centralisation (see above) but more importantly it aided the anti-socialist discourse which helped to underpin the Unionist appeal to the Scottish working class. Sir Teddy Taylor encapsulates the imagery and symbolism which is inextricably linked to our idea of hurrah-words and boo-words:

"Although the name is not the whole issue, I think it is a significant factor. There was a class problem, the Conservative party had an image of a party which had a tendency to put forward candidates who had doubled barrelled names and lived in big houses in country areas. Take Glasgow local council for example. We gained control of the Council for the Progressive party but when they changed to Conservative their representation all but disappeared. There is no doubt at all that the name had a very important factor in that. We used to go round winning seats like Mile End and places like that which are not in any sense Conservative areas, we did it with a great battle under the Progressive label but I think the moment it changed to Conservative they were knocked for six".[3]

Coupled to the 'Scottishness' of the Unionist label, it would appear by Sir Teddy's comments that the Unionist and Progressive labels also helped secure the working class vote in Scotland. The Unionists and Progressives were in fact separate parties, in fact we saw the Progressive constitution made provision for the Liberals, but the relationship was so close that even Sir Teddy Taylor, a Progressive councillor for Cathcart in 1964 could speak of them as one. Similar to our Unionist story above, there were constant calls for ending the use of the Progressive label by the party throughout the fifties but the Scottish Unionist party rejected them all, particularly on the ground of any parallel with England, as the minute of 1956 shows:

"In reviewing the results of the Municipal elections, Mr Cranna said that the position in Glasgow and the West of Scotland had been one of little change. A feature of the campaign had been the apathy of the electorate. This had not been peculiar to any one area but to the entire country. In Glasgow for example the average percentage poll had been 31.9 per cent and in Birmingham 34 per cent, despite the fact that in Birmingham the elections were contested by the Conservative party". (WDC, Organising Secretaries minute book, 31st May, 1956: National Library of Scotland).

But by the 1960s the WDC Organising Secretaries' minutes were recording the mounting pressure to change the strategy for local elections. After the 1964 General Election result, one of many complaints was: "One reason for the Socialists' superior polling day organisation, was the fact that they habitually fought local elections politically and, therefore, knew exactly where their support lay ". (ibid: 29th Oct.,

1964). Miller (1985) offers a similar critique to explain Conservative intervention in local government elections:

> "The Conservative Party entered local government contests from 1967 onwards primarily in order to use them as an aid to success in parliamentary contests... Even hopeless local government wards were to be contested if they lay in marginal parliamentary constituencies so as to reinforce all potential Conservative voters' party identification, mobilise all the potential activists, and improve the party's parliamentary campaign machine. It was all done in self-conscious imitation of Labour's strategy a generation earlier". (Miller, 1985:206)

However, the contests initiated a reinforcement of an identification of party which the "new" Conservatives had not foreseen; viz., the reinforcement of the anglicised term of 'Conservative'. And this was the principle reason why the Party was, in Sir Teddy's terminology, "knocked for six".

One cannot be sure how influential the Liberals were in the decision to contest local elections because they also began to fight local wards on their own around this time. Nevertheless, the Party's divorce from the Progressives was messy and at times farcical. In Glasgow the irrevocable split came in 1971. Mr W. Douglas Carmichael's annotation in a 'Press Cuttings' file in the SCUA archives (Acc/10424 in the National Library of Scotland) illustrates the significance placed on it by the Scottish Conservatives: "This cutting and the one on the following page are very important. Both in the Evening Times and Evening Citizen dated the 14 September, 1971". The press cuttings basically told of the widening gap between the Conservatives and the Progressives, which was now very unlikely to be bridged. The articles predicted the extinction of a right wing on Glasgow Corporation unless there was a dramatic improvement in relations. But the Progressives were by now disillusioned by their erstwhile Tory colleagues and announced a move widening the gulf, contesting the seats fought in May 1971. In Glasgow, there was now two opposition Parties. "Within a short time of setting out to become the majority opposition party in the Corporation , the Tories have achieved this, having twenty - four members against the Progressives nineteen". (ibid).

The specifics for other localities may have differed somewhat but the overall story was very similar . Miller illustrates the resultant farce in Aberdeen in 1971:

"In Aberdeen the Progressives hit on the neat solution of relabelling themselves as Conservatives in 1971, forcing the Conservative Party candidates to call themselves 'Official Conservatives'. South Aberdeen Constituency Conservative Association supported the Conservative (i.e. the Progressives) while North Aberdeen Constituency Association backed the Official Conservatives. The two groups fought each other in four wards. Conservatives beat the Officials in three of the four wards and the dispute ended with the Conservative Party accepting the old Progressives as their representatives". (1985 :207).

Therefore not only was the reinforcement of the anglicised Conservative term firmly in place by the 1970s but just as complete was the passing of an idea of a 'local coalition of anti-socialist forces'. It would appear that the Scottish Tories instead of reinforcing their local base had inadvertently undermined it, with the disastrous repurcussions which are now all too evident.

Conclusion.

We have shown here that the Unionist *hurrah-word* had no difficulty with a Scottish consciousness. Unionists were all too well aware of the symbolic power of the Unionist term. That is why such scrutiny was applied by their 'propaganda and education committees' to keep the Conservative term out of the Scottish political discourse. The acceptance by the Party of the Conservative term undermined the party's appeal to the Scots. A crucial aspect of Unionism was an ability to appeal to powerful symbols in Scottish culture which gave the party a Scottish identity irrespective of its stance on devolution. This the Conservative *boo-word* could not do. And this is the crucial ingredient the party has lost.

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[1] In the words of the 1987 guide: "The Conservative Party's Campaign Guide is a venerable institution. It was first published in 1892 by a group of eminent Scottish Conservatives who were dissatisfied with material provided by Central Office in London (plus ca change, some may say)". Through the "Blue Bible", the Party provides detailed information on its policies and actions. The proposal was to analyse the Scottish sections of the post-war Guides, with a view to quantifying the terms Unionist, Socialist, Conservative and Labour; this would then elucidate any trend. Furthermore, one other benefit was the fact that, although the Campaign Guides can be purchased by the general public, implicitly at least, their 'consumption' and use were by the Party activists. The effect of this would be to give a more accurate picture of the trend within the Party, as the authors would not feel impelled to engage in overt polemic and propaganda.

[2] Interview with Andrew Strang, 19th February 1993.

[3] Interview with Sir Teddy Taylor, at the House of Commons, 30 June, 1993.

Chapter Seven : 'Wind of Change': The Imperial Factor.

Harold Macmillan when visiting Africa as Prime Minister in 1960 delivered a momentous speech in Cape Town on the 3rd of February which signalled the 'end of Empire'. He believed that: "The wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact". (Utley and Udal, 1960:8) Rather less clear was its significance for Unionist fortunes in Scotland. In this chapter we find a concomitant debilitating 'wind of change' blowing through Tory fortunes as a direct consequence of the disengagement from Empire. In previous chapters the religious pillar and the Scottish consciousness pillar were analysed as supports for the Unionist vote. Here we examine the influence of 'Empire' which gave support to those Unionist pillars. If devolution and independence are wrapped in the thistle and the saltire, Unionism it is argued was associated with equally powerful symbols of Scottish culture, the Union Jack, militarism, and the British Empire.

> "This was an age in which Conservative rhetoric in terms of British national and imperial identity and interests chimed quite naturally with a powerful strand of Scotland's national identity which, in the context of the militarism which ran deep through Scottish society, accepted happily and proudly its imperial nature". (Kendrick and McCrone, 1989:595).

However, Kendrick and McCrone (1989:596) later regret that: "There is very little in the way of direct empirical proof that this ideological complex underpinned the relative success of the Conservatives in Scotland in the mid-century period". This chapter contributes to the level of our empirical knowledge on this issue.

A British Reinforcement of a Scots Identity.

Much of things Scottish were exported to the four corners of the Empire, along with trade, particularly heavy engineering goods, went the martial spirit. The prowess of the Scots soldier and his collective identity in the renowned fighting unit of the Scottish regiment were potent themes that helped underpin the imperial ethos in Scotland. The Conservative and Unionist essayist, Allan Massie, could call upon such an idea as late as 1992 in defence of the Union. "Let those who pretend there has been no loyalty to the idea of Britain, consider the battle honours of the Scottish Regiments, all won in wars which were British, neither English nor Scots" (The Scotsman, 7

February, 1992). But importantly for Scots their religion was also given the chance to reach out in evangelical mission. The idea of the Scots Presbyterian mission was also of great significance to the Scot. Such stories as that of David Livingstone reinforced the general Scots belief in the benefits of Empire; here was a Scots Presbyterian missionary enlightening the Dark Continent, but he had gained this successful opportunity from lowly Blantyre roots because of the existence of the Empire. Such tales of glory were inculcated in the Scots psyche, not only by the official education agencies, but more importantly, by recreational organisations like the Boys Brigade, attached to the Church, parading in 'para-military' uniforms, they epitomised the coalescing of the different strands of the 'Imperial ethos'. Very short was the ideological distance between organisations like the Boys Brigade and the Junior Imperialists (the Unionist youth organisation). With the decline of Empire, the legacy of the Imperial partnership between Scotland and England became strained, the Scots distinctiveness would find alternative avenues to manifest itself in, the Conservative Party was not considered as one of those avenues in the same manner its Unionist predecessor was.

Scottish Nationalist antipathy for with the British State and the consequent equating by Nationalists of 'British' with 'English' in contemporary Scottish society, leaves a strong impression in today's Scottish society that any British identification necessarily dilutes one's Scottishness. But this successful Nationalist political agenda only dates as far back to the second half of the 1960s. The residual imperial ethos of the post-war world and its acceptance by the Scots carried no contradiction with being British. In fact, it may be argued that the Imperial vision reinforced a Scottish distinctiveness which then supplied a latent pool of support for a 'Nationalist Party' on the disintegration of Empire and the values associated with that Empire. Finlay (forthcoming) outlines much evidence for just such a scenario in his "Imperial Scotland: Scottish National Identity and the British Empire, c. 1850-1914":

> "Too narrow a definition of Scottish nationalism precludes a serious study of the ways in which the Scots were able to express their nationalism within the British Imperial framework and it ignores how British imperial endeavours both encouraged and satisfied Scottish national aspirations". (Finlay, forthcoming)

Today it is hard to imagine the Conservative Party as the natural repository of this mainspring of Scottishness but as we saw in the previous chapter the Unionist

Party had no great difficulty attracting and holding such support. The part played by Unionists in the formation of the Scottish National Party is now generally forgotten but it illustrates this particular element within the Unionist ideological bloc. Some Glasgow Cathcart Unionists, Kevin MacDowall, Marshall Love and William Thomson believed the National Government should adopt a more Protectionist line than the one already taken in the early thirties. Their Cathcart Imperial Committee (CIC) backed by the United Empire Party of 1930 proposed an Imperial Parliament - with United Kingdom federalism - with the principle policy of autarky within the parameters of Empire. The Unionist Party believed the CIC had over stepped the mark by open policy discussions with the National Party of Scotland, the erstwhile Tory Andrew Gibb and the Liberal 6th Duke of Montrose. The Tory polemicist J.T. Ward recounts:

> "Never having shared the Left's continuing penchant for 'disciplining' errant members, Tories had never invited expulsion procedures. But any bowling club would surely chuck out a minority playing rugby on its green! In November the Glasgow Central Council, under the Mercantile Law Professor John Craik Henderson, reluctantly expelled lawyer MacDowall. And in 1933 MacDowall led some 50 Cathcart Tories into a Cathcart Imperial Association, forming a new Scottish Party which in 1934 joined the National Party to form the SNP". (1982:34)

It is important to stress that the "rugby played on the bowling green" was more the contact with political foes from other parties than any hostility to a forceful Scottish dimension within an Empire framework. As Finlay points out Unionist candidates after 1912 were recommended to show "a full appreciation of the fine worth and patriotic importance of Scottish national sentiment when it was directed into legitimate channels". (Finlay, op.cit.,) Home Rule for Scotland was not considered a legitimate channel but the Empire most certainly was: "take up a positive and if need be aggressive policy, and point to the important part which Scottish national patriotism has played and must still play in the wider patriotism of the whole British Empire". (ibid.) The Empire therefore helped sustain a Scottish identification with the Scottish Unionist party.

The Importance of Empire.

There is no doubting the importance of the Empire as an issue in the immediate post war period, for the Unionists, as well as for the UK Conservatives in general. Macmillan may have accepted the wind of change in 1960 but the Tories certainly resisted it for at least a decade after the second world war. In contrast to Labour their election addresses continually referred to the benefits of the Empire. For example, in the 1950 General Election, the Unionist candidate in Glasgow Cathcart spoke of: "The Unionist Party aims at closer union of the Empire for the twin purposes of trade and defence". In Glasgow Hillhead Tam Galbraith echoed such sentiments with: "The Empire offers limitless economic opportunities if we have the imagination and enterprise to grasp them. I staunchly believe there are vast fields for further developing Commonwealth relations". Conversely, relative to this Unionist advocacy of greater imperialist integration, Labour when they did comment, used a language more in keeping with Macmillan's necessary "political fact" of ten years hence. For example, in the same 1950 election in Glasgow Hillhead the Labour candidate, Morgan Thomson, praised the previous Labour administration in: "granting freedom where Labour had the power to millions in India, Ceylon and Burma. And thus strengthened the commonwealth partnership". (all National Library of Scotland, Acc/10424).

Table 7:1. Percentage of Candidates Mentioning the Empire / Commonwealth as an issue.

1950		1951		1955		1959		1964		1966		1970	
Con	Lab	Con	Lab	Con	Lab	Con	Lab	Con	Lab	Con	Lab	Con	Lab
64	39	64	29	40	26	-	-	35	37	5	2	-	-

Source : adapted from David Robertson, 'The Content of Election Addresses and Leaders' Speeches' in Butler, D. and Pinto-Duchinsky , M. (1971:442) The British General Election of 1970 .

Table 7:1 gives the percentage of Conservative and Labour candidates mentioning the Empire / Commonwealth as an issue through the general elections of 1950 to 1970 in their election addresses. With the help of the parties in the period Robertson managed to obtain 95 per cent of the Conservative candidates' election addresses and 87 per cent of Labour's (1971:437). The data is for the whole of Great Britain and not just Scotland but it confirms for us that Tory candidates lent greater weight to the issue of empire in their election addresses more than Labour candidates, up until the mid 1950s. On average, Tory candidates mention it about double that of

Labour until 1955. It declines as an issue for the Tories at the 1955 election when only 40 per cent of their candidates mention it as an issue compared to 64 per cent at the two previous elections. After 1955, the election of 1964 appears to be a check on a spectacular decline of the issue of empire for both parties. Further, in 1964 Labour candidates were more likely than their opponents to mention the issue. At the time of Macmillan's disengagement from empire, he actively involved the Conservatives in seeking membership of the European Economic Community. This 1964 figure may have reflected that particular development, as Labour were opposed to European entry Gaitskell skilfully used the concern of the British people over its effect on the Commonwealth to attack Macmillan's European plans in 1962 and after. Thus, Labour had donned the mantle of protector of the Commonwealth by the 1960s:

> "Labour was thus being presented as the guardian of the British nation-state, hesitant to rush into new alliances with foreign powers. And, the party recognised electoral advantages in this image as well: as Richard Crossman later commented, 'if Mr Macmillan had gone to the country in order to obtain a mandate for entering Europe, he would have conceded to the Labour Opposition the unprecedented advantage of presenting itself as the only party that still stood for the Commonwealth and for national independence, and that still believed in British greatness'". (Featherstone, 1988:54).

This was a remarkable development, if not achievement, by Labour since the Tories had been adept at harnessing the residual imperial ethos of British greatness in the post war period. In the 1955 Yearbook the Scottish Unionist Party could even manage a reference to the empire when promoting the virtue of thrift and saving:

> "We must save, not only to preserve our own capital assets but also to be able to invest for development in the Empire and Commonwealth, which will be essential for the provision of food and raw materials needed not only by ourselves but also by the whole world". (SUA, Yearbook for Scotland, 1955:17)

With the benefit of hindsight it is easy for contemporary analysts to be amused at such rhetoric but the Unionists in 1955 were writing just ten years after a most horrendous war and facing the strong possibility of future nuclear conflict. Thus for them the empire was a bulwark against Soviet aggression; it was for the "twin

purposes of trade and defence". They could have no conception of the European Common Agricultural Policy or the end of the cold war. Robertson's data on election addresses show that the nuclear issue displaced that of empire in 1959 with 93 per cent of Tories and 74 per cent of Labour candidates mentioning nuclear weapons as an issue. It had been a 'non issue' in the 1950 and 1951 elections. (Robertson, 1971:442)

Conclusion.

In 1985 the Church of Scotland's Church and Nation Committee probably summarised the prevalent attitude the Scots now hold in a post Empire world: "Britain, shorn of Empire, is a country of moderate size, more heavily dependent than most on trade. In a technologically developed world the vision of Britain as one of the 'top nations' is not appropriate to the future". (Church and Nation, 1985:94) The above evidence would suggest that there is no coincidence between Scottish Nationalism's rise in the sixties and the retreat from empire. It was an opportunity for the Nationalists to redefine a Scottish identity in a way which has increasingly divorced it from its Britishness. Data from the Scottish Election Surveys appear to underpin the success of the nationalist agenda with deleterious effects for the Scottish Conservatives. In 1979, 34.7 per cent of the SES sample responded with a 'British identity' when prompted for their 'nationality'. By 1992 this had dropped to just 25 per cent. We have no similar data on nationality from the sixties but it is reasonable to assume that the loss of a legacy of empire has aided a process of decoupling a sense of 'Scottishness' from that of 'Britishness'.

How different the legacy was into the mid fifties, all the different ideological strands which underpinned the Unionist vote; Empire, militarism, 'Orangeism' and a Scottish distinctiveness sheltered amicably under the Unionist umbrella. Andrew Strang has no doubts that the 1930s Empire day parades on the last Monday in May were remembered with nostalgia well into the fifties.

"On Empire Day the Tory Party held its Empire Rally in George Square in Glasgow. Young Unionists from Unionist Rooms, which were all around Glasgow at the time, were dressed in their Sunday best. The Party had a procession with coal carts, pipe bands and flute bands. The famous Arthur Balfour quoir, seated in front of the cenotaph, would sing their hearts out with 'Land of Hope and Glory etc., the mass rally was addressed by the

President of the Glasgow Association, Sir Archibald Douglas McInness Shaw. He sat astride a 'White Charger'[1] in front of the cenotaph before parading up to the Orange Halls in Cathedral Street. It was a great day, thousands and thousands of people came out to watch it and they carried banners and all the rest of it. That grounding was important for the fifties and the sixties".[2]

This then was the ground that was lost along with the Empire in the early sixties which cost the Conservatives in Scotland dearly.

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[1] Of course some Orange parades to this day are led by the symbolic 'White Charger'; the white horse representing the mount chosen by William Prince of Orange to lead the Williamite forces at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.

[2] Interview with Mr Andrew Strang, 19 February, 1993.

Chapter Eight : A Social Democratic Culture?

In this chapter we examine the political values of the Scottish electorate. By examining the Scots' views on such issues as nationalisation and taxation as opposed to public spending, we establish that the Scots experienced an ideological shift in their views around the mid 1970s. We show in the following two chapters that this ideological shift affected the Party adversely as it increasingly offered a contrary policy agenda out of step with the views of the Scottish electorate. The final section of the chapter looks at the role of the press in Scotland, the results of which underpin our analysis that the Scots have moved from a relatively right wing position in the 1950s to being relatively left wing by the 1970s.

Nationalisation.

In Scotland, post war, the party opposed nationalisation not simply on the grounds of freedom and efficiency frequently invoked south of the border, but also because it meant Scottish industries being taken over from London. This argument, it is claimed, gave the Conservatives yet another string on which to play their tune of Scottish identity. Thus, as Mitchell (1992:620) writes, "In elections after the second world war, they...warned that nationalisation would 'denationalise' Scottish industries by placing control of private concerns in the hands of bureaucrats in London". Or, as Miller et al (1981a) writes, "It was a time the Conservatives argued that "for Scotland, nationalisation means denationalisation".

But these arguments gradually lost their credibility. In the 1950s Labour's plans to nationalise steel, shipbuilding or engineering meant that indigenous Scottish firms with names like Lithgow, Colville and Stephen were threatened with extinction. By the mid-sixties these industries were in crises and nationalisation was often seen by their workforces as the only way of restoring their jobs. The proportion of the Scottish workforce in indigenous industries was in continuous decline and passed below the 50 per cent mark sometime in the mid-1960s (Foster and Woolfson, 1986). In short, what had seemed a threat to Scotland in the 1950s was seen as its salvation by the 1960s, thereby undermining the Conservatives' position. But another argument is also made which would seem to sit rather uneasily with the thesis. This is that Scottish public opinion is more left-wing than in England and that the success of the Unionists in the 1950s lay in their ability to swim with the distinctive Scottish tide. Just before the passage quoted above Mitchell (1992:619) also writes that the difference between

'Unionism' and 'Conservatism' involved "much more than a difference of name. Unionism was a distinct ideology: moderate on socio-economic matters, interventionist ..." Indeed, when the possibility of changing the party's name from Unionist to Conservative was debated at the annual conference in Ayr in 1956, the prominent Unionist, Colin Thornton-Kemsley, argued that:

> "The word Conservative conveys an excessive fondness for the past, a reluctance to change, and a disharmony with any ideas of progress". (The Scotsman, 12 May, 1956)

This is of course in stark contrast to the stance taken by the party under Mrs Thatcher with her attempts to reduce the role of the state, a state which played a more important role in Scottish than in English economic life (Kendrick and McCrone, 1989). The decline of the Scottish Conservatives in the 1980s in particular has been blamed on the party's failure to adapt its message to Scottish political culture (Arnott, 1993). Although sometimes penned by the one and the same author, these are in fact two different arguments. In one it is argued that the success of the Unionists in the 1950s rested on their ability to match their message to the Scots' more left-leaning economic and social preferences, and their subsequent decline can be accounted for by their failure to maintain this balancing act. In the other it is argued that the Conservatives were able, by playing the Scottish card, to render a distinctly right-wing message more popular than it was south of the border but that economic change has destroyed the credibility of this argument. One explanation suggests that the Conservatives have moved away from the Scots electorate, the other that the Scots electorate have distanced themselves from the Conservatives.

Moving Left or Right?

To try and untangle the truth of these two perspectives a time series was constructed on attitudes towards nationalisation in Scotland since the late 1950s. Again the earliest results are from the combined Gallup polls. The data for later years come from the British and Scottish Election Study series together with the British Social Attitudes survey. Of course, nationalisation is but one economic issue. But it has the virtue of being the issue at the centre of the debate about how the Unionists secured their success in the 1950s. Further, attitudes to nationalisation are correlated with vote more strongly than any other issue (Heath et al, 1983). Thus if we have to rely on a

single issue in order to access this debate, nationalisation would be the one we would choose. Table 8.1 below lists the results of this time series.

Table 8.1: Attitudes to Nationalisation 1957-92.

	% favouring more nationalisation		% favouring more privatisation	
	Scotland	Rest of GB	Scotland	Rest of GB
1957-59	16	18	38	33 (160/1595)
1963-64	25	21	27	31 (371/3128)
1966	31	29	25	22 (144/1486)
Oct. 1974	33	32	21	22 (1007/1929)
1979	24	16	34	41 (137/1614)
1983	23	17	25	44 (320/3166)
1986-90	21	18	18	22 (381/3673)
1992	27	24	18	25 (904/2363)

The first figure in brackets is the number of respondents upon which the Scottish figures are based, the second is the number in the rest of Great Britain.

Sources: 1957-59: Gallup July 1957 and Dec. 1959 surveys. 1963-64: Gallup surveys March 1963 - August 1964. 1966, 1979 and 1983: British Election Studies. Oct. 1974 and 1992: Scottish Election Studies. 1986-90 British Social Attitudes surveys.

One thing is immediately apparent from table 8.1. With the exception of 1983, Scots attitudes towards nationalisation have tended to move up or down in tandem with attitudes in England & Wales. For the most part, the debate about nationalisation in Scotland seems to have been influenced by the British wide debate and shows little sign of being influenced by a distinctive Scottish debate. But there is one intriguing finding. In the two surveys from the late 1950s for which we have been able to acquire data, Scots proved to be marginally less keen on nationalisation than those living in England & Wales. Thereafter, in 1966 and October 1974 Scots attitudes were similar to those in the rest of Great Britain. It is not until 1979 that the Scots are clearly keener on nationalisation and less keen on privatisation. In short the data appear to suggest that the Scots have not been consistently more left-wing on this question, but have only become so in the relatively recent past.

We need however to undertake loglinear modelling of the data to check whether the findings could simply be the product of sampling error. We fitted a model to the data which included terms for a relationship between year and attitude to nationalisation (to reflect changes in level of support in both parts of Great Britain), between country and attitude to nationalisation (that is a constant difference between the two parts of Great Britain) as well as year/country term (which simply takes

account of differences in the ratios of Scots to non-Scots in the various sources). Excluded from the model was a year/nationalisation/country term, that is the possibility that the relationship between country and attitudes towards nationalisation differed between years. This model did not prove to give a good fit to the data (Residual Chi-Square = 46.1 with 14 degrees of freedom). In other words there is a significant change in the relationship between country and year over time. Further if we examine the residuals from the privatisation category of the model we can see a clear pattern.

Table 8.2: Residuals from the 'Privatisation' Category in Scotland.

1957-59	+2.8
1963-64	+0.8
1966	+2.4
1974O	+2.4
1979	-1.0
1983	-4.9
1986-89	-0.3
1992	-1.4

Source: Table 8.1.

In table 8.2 we see that more Scots than we would expect favour more privatisation in each survey until October 1974 but fewer thereafter. It should be noted that the difference between Scotland and the rest of Great Britain is particularly large in 1983. We therefore reran the model excluding the 1983 data. Indeed, in this case the residual variation was not quite significant at the 5 per cent level. (Residual Chi-Square = 20.3 with 12 degrees of freedom , p=0.06). However, if we then combine all the data for the 1957-66 period and similarly the data for October 1974 - 1992 (excluding 1983) we find that the residual variation is significant (Residual Chi-Square= 14.5 with 14.5 degrees of freedom, p=0.001). This indicates that we can reasonably conclude that Scots were relatively more left wing on the issue of nationalisation from the 1970s onwards than in the previous two decades. In other words the evidence is consistent with the argument that anti-nationalisation rhetoric was a foundation of the Conservatives' success in the 1950s but that subsequently public opinion turned against the Conservatives. It casts doubt on the claim that the Scots are always more left-wing than the English.

Further doubt is cast upon the claim that Scots were perpetually left wing when the issue of cutting taxes as opposed to spending on public services is examined. The

Scottish and English & Welsh respondents' attitudes on this issue, in the British Election surveys from 1966 to 1992, are found in table 8.3 below.[1]

Table 8.3: Attitudes to Cut Taxes / Public Spending 1966-92.

	% favouring Cutting Taxes		% favouring Spending on Services		
	Scotland	Rest of GB	Scotland	Rest of GB	
1966	69	59	31	41	(154/1461)
1970	72	71	28	29	(114/1067)
1979	24	26	66	64	(137/1657)
1983	15	18	50	45	(387/3427)
1987	12	13	64	60	(316/3353)
1992	11	13	70	67	(464/1245)

The first figure in brackets is the number of respondents upon which the Scottish figures are based, the second is the number in the rest of Great Britain.

Source: British Election Surveys, 1966-1992.

Again the attitudes of the Scots move up and down in tandem with those of England & Wales. But it is instructive that the Scots have a greater propensity to opt for the 'right wing' option of tax cuts as opposed to spending more on services until 1979. From 1979 onwards, the Scots on average choose the cut tax option by 2 per cent less than their southern counterparts and opt by an average 3 per cent more for the 'left wing' option of public spending compared to the responses found in England & Wales. This evidence further undermines the claim that the Scots were always more left wing.

The Scottish Press.

The role of the press, vis-à-vis the changing fortunes of political parties, has for long been a contentious issue. (Harrop,1987 and Miller et al,1991). The crux of contention being one of causal connection. Does the press have an independent effect upon the vicissitudes of Party, or does the changing support from particular newspapers merely reflect the changing attitudes and ideological position of their readership? The main purpose of this chapter, however, is to show that the Scots moved from being relatively right wing to left wing and our analysis of the Scottish press will confirm that this development took place in the seventies. While using the developments in the Scottish press as evidence that this change took place it is not strictly necessary to answer the conundrum of whether the Scottish press as an institution influenced the Scots in their move leftwards, or merely reflected the Scots'

changing ideological position. Either eventuality would still be evidence of such a value shift in Scottish society. But, although quantitative data is not produced here which could establish beyond doubt that a changing 'complexion' of the Scottish press had a deleterious effect upon the fortunes of the Scottish Conservatives, it is however a secondary theme of this section that this change of press partisanship was indeed significant, contributing to the decline of the Party in Scotland.

Seymore-Ure (1992) emphasised that the press was never a neutral observer, on the contrary, he viewed the press as an engine of party growth. For Seymore-Ure the role of the press and party are historically entwined; it is no historical accident that the Liberal Party declined in line with the Liberal Press. Below, we show that the decline of the Scottish Conservatives was similarly in line with a decline of a Scottish Tory press. Table 8.6 gives the circulation figures for four well known Scottish newspapers, over the period 1951 to 1992. It then lists the percentage circulation figure of that paper as a percentage of all four paper's circulation, and its editorial partisanship at each election.

Table 8.6 Circulation figures, percentage circulation and editorial support of the four main Scottish Newspapers at each general Election year since 1951.

	Scottish Daily Express	Scottish Daily Record	The Glasgow Herald	The Scotsman
1951	585,915 55.8% Conservative	372,568 35.5% Conservative	92,007 8.3% Conservative	- Conservative
1955	575,614 54.6% Conservative	345,441 32.8% Conservative	76,379 7.3% Conservative	56,091 5.3% Conservative
1959	572,938 49.5% Conservative	441,214 38.2% Labour	78,713 6.8% Conservative	63,300 5.5% Conservative
1965*	610,609 47.4% Conservative	522,656 40.6% Labour	83,910 6.5% Conservative	71,721 5.5% "Liberal"
1970	605,601 46.7% Conservative	528,399 40.8% Labour	84,875 6.6% "Neutral"	76,597 5.9% "Liberal"
1974	469,087 37.0% Conservative	619,721 48.8% Labour	93,968 7.4% Conservative	85,691 6.8% "Neutral"
1979	255,525 21.5% Conservative	720,096 60.4% Labour	120,280 10.1% Conservative	95,401 8.0% Liberal
1983	193,818 17.1% Conservative	740,420 65.3% Labour	110,170 9.7% "Alliance"	89,662 7.9% "Alliance"
1987	154,088 13.6% Conservative	764,485 67.2% Labour	123,720 10.9% "anti - Tory"	94,607 8.3% "Alliance"
1992	147,154 13.3% Conservative	755,406 68.1% Labour	121,297 10.9% "anti - Tory"	85,903 7.7% Lib - Dems

*1965 figures for 1964 and 1966 elections .
Source : Daily Record, The Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman, Audit Bureau of Circulation; Scottish Daily Express, Park House, Park Circus Place, Glasgow.

Whether we accept the explanation that the Scots were influenced by an increasingly leftward press, or, an increasingly leftward press was merely a reflection of the Scots' changing ideological values, we can see immediately from table 8.1 that the change in Scots views, as reflected by newspaper readership, is once again firmly in place by the mid 1970s. In 1951 and 1955 the Scottish Conservatives have 100 per cent editorial support from our four main Scottish papers. Labour made a significant inroad into this advantageous Tory position in 1959, securing 38.2 per cent of our 'four-paper' circulation. But, it is not until 1974 that Labour has the majority support through *Daily Record* sales, and thereafter Labour increasingly gains a hegemonic hold over press circulation in Scotland. The Tories' support, from securing one hundred per cent backing from the press in the early 1950s, drops to the derisory level of just over 13 per cent for the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, as Harrop (1987:51) points out many more people read newspapers than actually buy them. This is borne out by the data presented in table 8.7 below.

Table 8.7: Percentage of Scottish adults reading the Scottish Daily Express, and the Scottish Daily Record, 1964 - 1992.

	1964	1973	1979	1983	1987	1992
Express	51	43	20	14	10	8
Record	45	48	55	55	53	46

Source: Joint Industry Committee for National Readership Survey, 44 Belgrave Square, London.

Table 8.7 lists the percentages of Scottish adults who read the *Scottish Daily Express* and the *Scottish Daily Record* from 1964 to 1992. While over two and a half million Scots had claimed to have read the *Express* in 1964, by 1992 only 400,000 had. Conversely, the *Daily Record* managed to hold on to its two and a quarter million readers over the same period. The trend in the percentage of Scottish adults claiming to have actually read the *Express* and *Record* newspapers in table 8.7 is not that far removed from our trend in percentage circulation figures presented in table 8.6. Thus, we may extrapolate from these figures that at least over two and a half million Scots had no alternative but to read a Conservative supporting newspaper at the national level, in 1951 and 1955. When the *Record* changed its editorial support to Labour (in 1956) we see that by 1959 the Labour party's message now had the opportunity to reach just under two million Scots through the medium of a national newspaper. The Scottish Unionist Party were all too well aware of the significance of this change in

editorial support by the *Scottish Daily Record*. The concern of the Party with this particular development is clearly seen in the contents of a Scottish Unionist Association minute of January 1956:

> "The trends of Socialist propaganda was detailed and in this respect Mr Cranna directed attention to the change of ownership of the "Daily Record". Their left-wing bias had admitted Dr. Mabon, the Greenock MP, to their columns weekly. His writings were unashamed Socialist propaganda of extreme type. Letters to the correspondence column of the "Daily Record" had been sent to the Editor refuting many of Dr. Mabon's charges and giving a balanced view, but they were not printed". (Scottish Unionist Association Western Office Minute Book, No.9, 31st, January 1956: Scottish National Library).

The Party has always expressed concern with the putative damage that a hostile press could inflict upon it in Scotland. For example, the 1987 'Way Forward' post mortem document, while believing the anti-Conservatism of *The Scotsman* and *Glasgow Herald* as probably exaggerated, nevertheless thought it a good idea to: "try and engineer a more pro-Conservative Press in Scotland. Rather than at the quality end, it might be more relevant to encourage a Scottish Sun (as the Daily Record relates to the Daily Mirror)." (*The Scotsman*, 10 September, 1987) Ironically, the *Sun* in Scotland would later support the SNP's aspiration for independence at the 1992 election while criticising that party's left wing ideology. But this concern with the role of the Press in Scotland was expressed even in the years when the Party received overwhelming support from it. A minute of the Scottish Unionist Members Committee of 20th March 1956 demonstrates the concern. The Scottish Unionist MPs were informed that the SUA were to approach Outrams (owners of the *Glasgow Bulletin* and *Glasgow Herald*) to complain about the attacks on the Government appearing in the publishers' papers. After a lengthy discussion it was "agreed on an analysis of the Herald and the Scotsman reporting on speeches by Unionists and Socialists". However the results of the analysis showed:

> "The Glasgow Herald has for every single debate given more space to Unionist speeches than to Socialist speeches - the most usual division being 60 per cent of total space to Unionist speeches and 40 per cent to Socialist speeches...Except on the debates on Education and on the Home Department, the Scotsman too has given more space to Unionist speeches

than to Socialist speeches". (SUMC minute books, Bodleian Library, Oxford).

It would appear the Party placed great significance upon the 'power of the press' but crucially we have to examine if this power actually existed.

Does It Matter?

Most of the recent studies on the role of the press in society have found that it does have an independent effect upon political attitudes. For example, Miller (1991:198) found that: "Even with stringent controls for partisanship and ideology, multiple regression analyses show that the press, *but not television*, had a significant influence on voters' preferences". Moreover, in an age of partisan dealignment it is argued that the press has increased its influence, particularly among those who express no identity with a political party. (Miller, 1991 and Harrop, 1987).

While Curtice and Semetko (1994) echo the reservations expressed by Heath et al (1991) on the extent of partisan dealignment, some of the points they raise in their study, 'does it matter what the papers say', are just as significant for Scotland. Some of the arguments put forward in their study are paradoxically true for Scotland, when inverted. Firstly, as shown in the tables above, in the post-war period in Scotland the increase in the proportion of Press partisanship has been towards Labour rather than the Tories. And, *most significant* for Scotland has been the transmutation of the *Daily Record* from Tory broadsheet into a Labour tabloid, just as the Labour *Daily Herald* became the pro-Conservative *Sun* in England (Curtice and Semetko, 1994). Second, we fully agree with their premise that what is probably more important than the support in the leader columns on polling day is the general style and tone of that support. (ibid.) The Scottish Unionist Association executive may have thought the contents of Dr. Mabon's column in the *Daily Record* from 1956 onwards as blatant Socialist propaganda but it would appear that the complete transmutation in style and tone took place not at the 1959 election, as one would expect, but in 1964. This transmutation is recorded below as we see clearly the change in rhetorical support from Unionist to Labour.

The *Daily Record* editorial of 1950 is typical of such pro-Unionist rhetoric in that paper until 1956:

> "Scotland, according to a writer in an English contemporary, is one area where, the Socialist Party "bosses" feel, they can increase their hold as a result of to-morrow's voting. They haven't a ghost of a chance of doing that. But what a hope they have to imagine they can! In 1945 they won just over half of the 74 seats in Scotland. And Mr Attlee, speaking at the Musselburgh conference of the Scottish Labour Party a few months after the poll, complained how poorly Scotland had supported Socialism in comparison with England.
>
> The premier's rebuke to the Scottish Socialist leaders was likewise an indirect - and, of course, unintentional - testimony to the good political sense of the majority of Scotland's electors. That sound judgement has been confirmed by experience of nearly five years of Socialism in operation, which should ensure that even more Scottish voters should disown the Socialists to-morrow". (Daily Record, 22 February, 1950).

Although the paper was firmly placed within the Labour camp by the 1959 election, its editorial, in its style and tone, clearly acknowledges the fact that many of its readers are not of the same persuasion. While stating that Labour's policies would give a new deal to Scotland rather than a raw deal, it is careful to end with: "That is the Daily Record's view. But many of our readers may well have come to the opposite conclusion". (*Daily Record*, 8 October, 1959). Compare this rather guarded editorial of 1959 with the full front page spread on the eve of the 1964 election which declared in banner headlines:

> "Tomorrow the choice at the poll is simple yet absolutely vital. The years of neglect, decay, frustration and broken promises must be ended. Tomorrow you can help to build a brave new Scotland, by voting Labour". (*Daily Record*, 14 October, 1964).

Since 1964 this has been the style and tone of support given to Labour by the *Daily Record* in Scotland. Moreover, Curtice and Semetko (1994) have shown that the level of Conservative voting fell among the readership of Labour tabloid newspapers between 1964 and 1992; and, there was "clear evidence of the success of the *Daily Mirror* and its Scottish stablemate, the *Daily Record*, in winning over support for Labour".(ibid.) It is clear then that Labour's progressive hegemonic hold on the Scottish national press has adversely affected Conservative fortunes in Scotland. The leading Scottish Conservative, Bob Kernohan, is in no doubt that the

Scottish Daily Record was a success story of Scottish journalism, but it was a success story that cost the Scottish Conservatives dearly.[2]

The *Scottish Daily Express*, similar to its sister paper in England, remained loyal to the Conservative cause, its style and tone in support of the Scottish Tories was continually every bit as vitriolic as the *Record's* was in support of Labour post 1964. This example from polling day in 1951 is typical of such style.

> "Today is St Crispins' Day. On this glorious day, the British spirit magnificently prevailed at Agincourt...Before the day is done the votes of the nation will have opened the doors of a new era, a new dispensation bringing us joy and happiness. The Socialist power will be broken, Mr. Churchill will once again be Britain's Prime Minister". (*Scottish Daily Express*, 25 February, 1951)

However, to compound the problem for the Scottish Conservatives of an increasingly hostile press, the *Express* moved its base from Albion Street in Glasgow to Manchester in late March 1974. This was an extremely inopportune time for the Scottish Tories, as this was also the very time when the Nationalists were recording their greatest electoral success and successfully redefining a Scottish identity in a way which increasingly divorced it from its Britishness. On polling day (7 June) in 1983 the *Express* ran on their front page a photograph of Thatcher waving the Union flag, under the headline: " Only One Way for Britain, Maggie is the Man ". But, by then, the use of such 'British imagery and rhetoric' sat uncomfortable with a 'Scottish paper' published in England. There is no doubt that this relocation by the *Express* had a negative effect on its market share in Scotland. In table 8.7 we see that the percentage of Scottish adult readers fell from 43 per cent in 1973 to just 20 per cent by 1979. From 1974 onwards, unlike 1951, reference to such victories as Agincourt on St Crispins' Day by the *Express*, had lost all pretensions of being 'British'.

Conclusion.

The above evidence leaves us in no doubt that the Scots experienced a fundamental sea change in their views around the mid 1970s. From being relatively more right wing than their southern neighbours in the 1950s this disposition had changed to one of being relatively more left wing by the 1970s. Both the economic issues of nationalisation and cut taxes/spend on services showed this to be true.

Further, our analysis of the four main Scottish national newspapers confirmed this sea change of opinion to have taken place in the mid seventies. Both arguments, that the press merely reflect the opinions of its readership, or conversely, that the press have an independent effect upon that readership, can be used to show that the Scots did move leftwards in the seventies. However, it would appear from our evidence that the Scottish press did in fact help shape the views of Scots to embark upon that leftward journey. It would appear that we can state with confidence that the Scots have distanced themselves from the Conservatives. But, what of the Party? Did it move away from the Scots? To what extent can its' policies be held responsible for this leftward lurch in the Scottish electorate? The following two chapters attempt an answer.

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[1]The question for 1966 and 1970 was: If the Government had a choice betwen reducing taxes and spending more on the social services, which should it do? The percentage figures for 1966 and 1970 are for the answers in the categories 'reduce taxes' and 'spend more on social services'. In 1979 a third category was added to the choice of reply, 'doesn't matter'. this percentage figure has been omitted from table 8.3. From 1983 onwards an attitudinal scale to the issue of 'cutting taxes' and 'spending more on health and social services' was added. (see Heath et al, 1985) In this instance all respondents who chose the 'midpoint' were omitted, leaving all those who chose either the right hand side of the scale 'cut taxes' and the left hand side 'spend on health and social services'.

[2] Interview with Mr. Bob Kernohan , 24 September, 1992.

Chapter Nine : Party Policy and the Economy.

In the previous chapter we established that the Scottish electorate had undergone a sea change in their ideological views around the mid 1970s. In this chapter we examine the changing policy agenda of the Party. Rather than the Unionist Party having a distinct ideological approach (Mitchell, op. cit.), we find that the Party on both sides of the border followed the same policy line. It was not the case that the Unionists in the 1950s were able to render a right wing message more palatable for a left-leaning Scottish audience. The fact was that the 1950s right wing message found an already fertile Scottish soil in which to take root. The crucial change was the adoption by the Party of a dogmatic neo-libertarian approach - some would say a 'liberal' approach (see Scruton, 1982) - just as the Scottish economy began to experience some of the worst setbacks of a declining regional economy and just as the Scots began their subsequent move 'left'.

Pragmatic Unionism to Dogmatic Conservatism, An Overview.

The Party in Scotland has never deviated in any considerable way from overall UK economic policy. An explanation for this lies with the fact that full control of public spending in Scotland has never been devolved to the Scottish Office. Mitchell's (1990:99) criticism of the Scottish Office was even more true of the 1950s than of the Thatcher era of which he spoke. Mitchell stressed that the rhetoric of Scottish Office freedom hid the fact that much of the public expenditure was already allocated to ongoing programmes and in reality "the total amount is largely determined outwith the powers of the Scottish Office". (ibid.) Of greater significance for the success of Unionism in Scotland was the fact that it was co-terminous with 'New Conservatism'. The Cabinet Ministers who espoused this 'one nation' Conservative philosophy - Butler, Macmillan, Elliot, etc., - were advantaged by the fact that the 1950s were a relatively prosperous period; particularly when comparisons were made with the 'austere forties'. For example David Butler, in the 1955 Nuffield study, illustrates this relative economic prosperity by showing that the 'weekly earnings index' outstripped that of the 'retail price index' throughout the first half of the 1950s. (Butler, 1955:11).

But, it is a clearly wrong to place this one nation Conservatism on the left of the political spectrum. Rab Butler was amused by the equating of his 'Charters' - by the

Party's libertarian right wing - with such an incongruous concept as 'Pink Socialism'. Significantly, in his memoirs, 'The Art of the Possible', he went on to spell out what the New Conservatism of the Charters entailed for the post 1951 period:

> "the improvement of incentives through reduced taxation, the encouragement of a high level of personal savings, the steady and orderly reduction of physical controls, the overhauling of the top-heavy administrative machine and the shrinking of the Civil Service, the reopening of the commodity markets, the sharpening of competition by bringing what we called 'the floodlighting of publicity' to bear upon restrictive practices, and the empirical approach to denationalisation". (Butler, 1971:147).

In fact, there is very little in the above 1950s policy agenda with which even latter day Thatcherites could take exception. However, two crucial distinctions can be made. One, the Scots were of course more receptive to such policy in the 1950s. For example our evidence suggests that there was an already appreciative electorate for such right wing policies in Scotland when Butler as Chancellor cut taxes by six old pence (the equivalent of about 3 new pence today), just before the 1955 general election. But in contrast, by the 1987 election no similar agreement would be found amongst the left wing Scots for Nigel Lawson's two pence pre-election tax cut. Second, and just as important, the style of the 'New Conservatism' was one of pragmatism and flexibility. Butler stressed that the Conservative intention was one of reconciling individual effort with a proper measure of central planning.(ibid.) This pragmatic approach of New Conservatism which eschewed all dogma allowed it to exercise 'a proper measure of central planning'. Particularly when recession and the collapse of the old staple industries, (of which Scotland had a disproportionate share), called for ameliorative measures, measures usually associated with regional policy. In short, the policy agenda was right wing but it should not be confused or compared with laissez-faire extremism, which the party considered to be just as ruinous as state socialism at this time. This pragmatic approach to the economic problems of the 1950s and early 1960s led to the coining of the term 'Butskellism' by members of the *Economist* staff, to denote the similarities in the solutions being offered by both Butler and Gaitskell. Although Butler himself denied the extent of any such agreement and placed Gaitskell firmly within the Socialist camp. (Butler, op. cit.)

The relatively prosperous climate of the 1950s allowed for the implementation of a right wing political agenda as outlined by Rab Butler but when darker economic clouds cast a shadow on that favourable economic climate at the end of the 1950s, the Tory rhetoric of reconciling individualism with central planning facilitated the acceptance by the Party of central planning in the shape of regional policy. For example, by 1960 in a Scottish Tory pamphlet 'A Message to Scotland', one of the ends to which Butler wanted the Conservative and Unionist Government to direct itself to was:

> "affluence must not be concentrated in one part of the country at the expense of others. It must be more evenly spread both between town and country, and also between different industrial areas, so ensuring that the face of Britain is not pock-marked by ugly patches of unemployment and under-employment". (The Archives of the British Conservative and Unionist Party, Part 7, No. 1960:13)

And as late as 1969 the pamphlet 'Make Life Better In Scotland' eulogised the Party's role in regional policy:

> "It was the Conservative Party which pioneered regional development in Britain, and much of that pioneering work was done in Scotland, for example the Forth and Tay Bridges and the Clyde Tunnel, Dounreay, the pulp mill, Colville's strip mill, the motor industry at Bathgate and Linwood". (The Archives of the British Conservative and Unionist Party, Part 8, No. 1969:31)

However, as we shall see later this official policy was in sharp contradistinction to the neo-libertarian philosophy which was now being increasingly voiced within the higher echelons of the Party, finally becoming Party policy in 1970. Nevertheless, similar to the Party south of the border the Scottish Unionist Party was as much opposed to neo classical, free market economics as to socialist étatisme. As early as 1927 Walter Elliot dismissed both the laissez faire approach of the Manchester school

economists and the restrictive policies of socialism in the pithy remark: "Can one side of the Manchester sheet of blank paper be covered from top to bottom with restrictive covenants, without any of the writing showing through to compromise the virgin purity of the other side". (Elliot, 1927:20)

Similarly, the Unionists also used to great effect the rhetoric which purported to reconcile the two themes of individualism and collectivism, further enhancing an image of flexibility and pragmatism:

> "There are two fundamental instincts in human nature - Individuality and Social Service. Regard is paid to both of these in the Unionist Party's view of the object of politics and in its framing of policy. It is therefore wrong to describe the Unionist Party as being upon the Right in the political scale. It is not "reactionary". It is not out to "exploit". Rather it is on the Middle Road, between two extremes - the extremes of laissez-faire and Socialism. The Unionist Party realises the need for a synthesis of these two fundamental ideas of human individuality and of service to others and to the community. Remember that the Unionist Party initiated or supported most of the social reforms and the social services". (SUA Yearbook, 1955:13).

This was the Party's public ethos and approach throughout the post war period until the end of the sixties. Admittedly, one quickly realises that by examining too closely the rhetoric there may have been a perception that the Party followed a 'centre-left' agenda throughout the post-war period but the reality was more in keeping with Butler's account given in his memoirs. The Party adhered to an irrefutable 'rightist' agenda but quickly realised that by the end of the 1950s regional planning on a major scale was needed to offset the decline in the staple industries. The flexibility of the 'New Conservatism' facilitated the speedy incorporation of such policy by the Conservative Governments. The first wholehearted official reaction against the acceptance of such a 'corporatist model' by the Party was formulated at a Shadow Cabinet meeting in the Selsdon Park Hotel in late January of 1970. The decision was taken to move the Party towards the libertarian, free market, non interventionist approach. However, these policy proposals of re-invigorating British Industry and society by removing safety nets were adopted as early as 1965 but Seldsdon was the

first time they entered the consciousness of the electorate. (Butler & Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971:129)

The Party was as surprised as the opinion pollsters when six months later in June 1970 they found themselves back in power. The surprising victory may account for the lack of an in depth analysis given over to the consequences of implementing such polices as envisaged at Selsdon and not long into office Heath found them too excessive to contemplate. To the chagrin of the free market individualists Mr Heath embarked upon his now legendary 'u-turns' by intervening in the economy to save such 'lame ducks' as Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. Moreover, for the free marketeers, his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, added insult to injury by a dash for growth known as the 'Barber Boom'. Such Keynesian expenditure and planning were anathema to the classical economists but there was little dissent registered at the time from a Cabinet with Joseph and Thatcher as members. (Halcrow, 1989)

Labour's leader Harold Wilson disparaged 'Selsdon Man' in the 1970 election campaign. However, both the Wilson Governments' various corporatist initiatives - prices and incomes policy, the national plan, etc., - and Heath's initial dismantling of such initiatives (before once again accepting such a strategy), appeared as relative failures. (Gamble, 1988) In the 1974 February Election, the Conservatives once again vociferously extolled their record of intervention, public spending, regional development and central planning in Scotland. (Campaign Guide, 1974: 462-466) With the Tory share of the vote falling less in Scotland than in England, in February 1974, it would appear the 'u-turns' had less of a deleterious electoral effect in Scotland than in England. Not surprising when we consider what we know of the shift in the views of the Scottish electorate. But the new right now had a favourable opportunity to mount a challenge for control of the Party, criticising not the Selsdon approach but the cowardly capitulation of the Heath administration in the face of opposition to it for the electoral defeat in 1974.

After the October 1974 election the Conservatives were now confirmed as the opposition. The majority of the Shadow Cabinet were less than enamoured by the level of retrospective criticism levelled at the record of the Heath Government, particularly from two colleagues who had shared collective responsibility for policy

for three and a half years without demur. Insult was added to the pain and bewilderment caused by such criticism by the fact that Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher, now members of the Shadow front bench, were considered at the time of the 'Barber Boom' years to be prestigious spenders as Ministers of Social Services and Education respectively. (Halcrow, 1989)

> "Meanwhile the Government went on spending, not least at the Department of Social Services. Shortly before the Government fell, Joseph had to announce some cutbacks in Health Service spending but he pointed out (on 28 January 1974) that 'Over the last three years we have spent, on average, in real terms, 30 per cent more each year than the average of Labour's last three years'." (ibid: 55)

Although Heath still had many influential backers and the loyalty of most of the Shadow cabinet, his aloof persona with the Parliamentary Party and the loss of three out of four elections sealed his fate in the leadership contest of 1975. The contest was not an ideological one of monetarist versus interventionist but was far more prosaic, it was to resolve the question of who should replace Heath. By default, Mrs Thatcher became leader of the Conservative party on the 11 February 1975, it was more a vote against Heath rather than an endorsement of her. In fact, Airey Neave, Mrs Thatcher's extremely capable campaign manager, ranked her as third choice for leadership. His initial first and second preferences were for Edward du Cann and Joseph respectively. (ibid:88) Nevertheless, by virtue of the leadership position she could wield considerable power, in the words of Andrew Gamble: " Almost by accident the New Right found they had captured the most important position in the Conservative Party". (Gamble, 1988:83)

So to recapitulate, the Party began to accept the 'extremes of laissez-faire' at the very time when the Scottish indigenous industrial base was facing an acute crisis of survival. From 1964 to 1970 Labour effectively saved much of that industrial base by the use of nationalisation policy. It is little wonder then that from 1975 the Scots moved away from a party that not only advocated new right policies but turned a 'leave well alone' strategy into an art form. And Mrs Thatcher revelled in a dogmatic approach renamed conviction politics, which shook out the 'lame ducks' from a self-

regulating economy. This was emphatically made clear in the introduction to the Scottish section of the 1987 Campaign Guide, under the heading 'The Wrong Turn':

> "After the war, successive governments provided generous inducements to bring new industries into Scotland regardless of whether there was a long-term future for them there. This indiscriminate policy produced large numbers of jobs which from the start were most unlikely to prove permanent. In recent years Scotland has paid a heavy price for this shortsighted approach". (Campaign Guide, 1987:422).

However shortsighted the approach may have been, it had a much closer fit to the views of the Scots electorate. Thatcher's repudiation of regional policy was acutely felt north of the border (Smith, 1994) and this is reflected in the sharp decline of Scots supporting privatisation policies after experiencing Thatcher's first term of office. (see Table 8:2) But Mrs Thatcher's room for manoeuvre in Scotland was continually restricted by the small number of MPs from which she could choose a Secretary of State to oversee Thatcherite policy. Her Shadow Secretary of State, Teddy Taylor, had lost his Glasgow Cathcart seat, and there was no Member in the 1979 cohort of Scottish MPs - with the necessary seniority or kudos - who could be termed 'one of us'. She had little choice but to appoint as her first Secretary of State, George Younger (1979-86), who was more infused with the old Unionist pragmatic and paternalist style of political discourse and shared little of the radical right's dogmatic enthusiasm for implanting an enterprise culture within the Scottish body politic. Worse was to follow for Thatcher, Younger's successor, Malcolm Rifkind (1986-91), was deemed by the new right to be completely 'saturated' when placed on their ideological gauge of rising damp.

To have those in overall control of the Scottish Office who did not share the revolutionary zeal, animated the new right to such an extent that open warfare ensued with the appointment of Michael Forsyth as Chairman in 1989. (see chapter ten) The new right critics claimed that many lame ducks owed their survival to Younger and that the influence of 'wets' in senior positions was inimical to the success of the radical medicine. George Younger did in fact threaten resignation over the proposal to close Ravenscraig steel mill in Thatcher's first term. (Mitchell, 1990:104) However, it

is difficult to determine just how effective the Secretaries of State could be in ameliorating Thatcherite policy for Scotland. And, as was pointed out above, the allocation of public expenditure was largely determined outwith the Scottish Office. (Mitchell, op. cit.,) But, Mrs Thatcher was is no doubt about the hostility to her ideas from her second Secretary of State : "Whatever the obstruction from Malcolm Rifkind, Michael Forsyth and I were not alone in believing that real changes to reduce the role of the state in Scotland were both necessary and possible". (Thatcher, 1993:621) In her memoirs of the 'Downing Street Years' she focuses on the education policy of allowing schools to opt out of local authority control to illustrate such obstruction:

> "Malcolm claimed that there was not sufficient demand for opting out in Scotland. However, from my postbag and Brian Griffith's *[head of Mrs Thatcher's Policy unit]* enquiries I knew otherwise. I insisted and had my way". (ibid: 621).

This example simply illustrates how imperfect her postbag was as a barometer of Scottish public opinion and more importantly just how poor the advice was that she received concerning that opinion; particularly when generated by the ideologically pure Policy unit. Put simply, Malcolm Rifkind was correct, the 'opt out clause' was introduced in 1989 while Mrs Thatcher's memoirs were published in mid 1993, yet she fails to mention that by 1993 not one Scottish school had opted out.

One piece of Thatcherite legislation epitomises the extent to which the Party had moved in the opposite direction to that of the Scots electorate. The Community Charge had little resonance of 'community' for Scots and its pernicious electoral effects for the Party were felt in the election of 1987, even before its introduction.

The inclusion of a proposed 'poll tax' in the 1987 manifesto was surprising as the suggestion was roundly rejected in a 1983 green paper on the reform of the rating system, "on the basis that it would be hard to enforce, would require a complicated and expensive register and, in the absence of a rebate scheme, would bear harshly on people with low incomes". (Enston, 1990:100) The influence of the owner occupier interest within the Party was shown at the 1985 Party Conference, where they rebelled

against the 1985 local rates revaluation. The last revaluation in England was in 1973, in comparison 1985 was the second Scotland had experienced since that time. Thus, rateable values were set far higher in Scotland than for comparable property in England. (Mitchell, 1990) In theory the poll tax would spread the burden to each adult individual and create greater local government accountability, as the local voter would punish profligate councils or simply vote with their feet. The proposals completely overlooked the administrative problems associated with such a tax and added to the 'fear' of some sections of the Scottish population by passing a Bill which introduced the tax into Scotland one year earlier than south of the border. (ibid, 1990)

The Poll Tax was ascribed as the principle reason for the Conservatives disastrous result at the 1987 election. Paterson, Brown and McCrone (1992) point out that it was opposed by an overwhelming majority in opinion polls as the single most unpopular government policy in Scotland at the time of the 1987 Election. However much the rating revaluation disadvantaged Scotland, the implementation of the Act one year earlier in Scotland added to the sense that alien policy was being imposed on Scotland contrary to Scottish values. (ibid:628) But, the overall debacle of the Poll Tax - which contributed to Thatcher's demise after its introduction in England - highlighted the Party's problem of appealing to a narrow political base with ideological driven policies. (see chapter ten) This problem was behind the refusal of Ministerial Office by Alick Buchanan Smith:

> "One of the reasons I did not accept Ministerial Office after the 1987 General Election is that we weren't paying sufficient attention to what the ordinary people were thinking and feeling. And secondly, some of those things that have great value to us in Scotland over the generations, even centuries, we've always given a higher rating to them, such as education, such as the social services; I think people had a sense that they were perhaps not been given the full priority that they should have been given".[1]

The Economy and the Feel Good Factor.

Many psephological studies of the Thatcher era have shown that greater economic optimism was marked by greater commitment to the operation of a market economy. (for example see Curtice, 1992) We see in table 9.1 below that the Scots

were continually more pessimistic on the state of Britain's economy and its industrial performance since 1974. In the October 1974 and 1979 British Election Surveys - and the Scottish booster samples - respondents were asked about the state of Britain's economy, if it was likely to get worse, remain the same, or get better? In the British Social Attitudes surveys, respondents were asked about the state of Britain's industrial performance, would it get worse, remain the same, or get better? Table 9.1 lists the 'get better' and 'get worse' categories.

Table 9.1: Attitudes on the State of Britain's Economy and Britain's Industrial Performance, 1974 to 1991.

	% believing economy to get better		% believing economy to get worse		
	Scotland	Rest of GB	Scotland	Rest of GB	
1974 (Oct)	34	37	45	42	(1175/1922)
1979	37	42	34	32	(729/1529)
1983-85	32	40	27	18	(510/4316)
1986-87	25	33	29	21	(552/4923)
1989-91	24	25	31	25	(622/5975)

The first figure in brackets is the number of respondents upon which the Scottish figures are based, the second is the number in the rest of Great Britain.

Sources: Oct. 1974 and 1979 British Election Studies and Scottish Election Studies. 1983-91 British Social Attitudes surveys.

The fact that the Scots were continually less optimistic than their southern neighbours about the state of Britain's economic situation confirms for us that the new right's solution of a market economy would be less enthusiastically received in Scotland. Moreover, as we have argued, it is not surprising that the Scots should have developed a taste for economic intervention given that the performance of the Scots economy consistently failed to match that of its counterpart in the south of England. In other words we can expect the country's economic values to have been shaped by its long term economic experience. But there is also a much simpler way of looking at the relationship between the performance of the economy and voting behaviour. Ever since the work of Kramer (1971) a large literature has argued that voters reward governments for good economic news and punish them for bad (see also Sanders et al, 1987; Sanders, 1991). Further, it is not just the state of the national economy that

matters; voters appear to be sensitive to the relative performance of the economy in their area (Spencer et al, 1991). In table 9.2 below we compare the trend in unemployment in Scotland in the twelve to eighteen months before an election with that in the United Kingdom as a whole.

Table 9.2 The Performance of the Scottish Economy at Election Times.

	Change in % unemployment in	
	Scotland	UK
Feb. 1954-May 1955	-0.5	-0.3
Feb. 1958-Oct. 1959	+0.5	+0.1
Feb. 1963-Oct. 1964	-2.9	-2.4
Feb. 1965-Mar. 1966	-0.4	-0.1
Feb. 1969-June 1970	-0.1	-0.2
Feb. 1973-Feb. 1974	-1.3	-0.5
Feb. 1974-Oct. 1974	+0.0	+0.3
Feb. 1978-May 1979	-0.4	-0.5
Feb. 1982-June 1983	+1.4	+1.5
Feb. 1986-June 1987	+0.5	-0.6
Feb. 1991-Apr. 1992	+1.3	+2.9

Sources: *Monthly Digest of Statistics, Economic Trends.*

The findings are highly instructive.[2] The trend in Scottish unemployment was the same or better than in the United Kingdom as a whole at all four elections covered by the table in which Labour was the incumbent party. But of the seven elections covered where the Conservatives were the incumbent party, there are just two in which the Scottish economy was clearly outperforming the rest of the United Kingdom - in February 1974 and in 1992. And as we saw in the introduction these are the only two elections since 1959 at which the gap between England and Scotland in the level of Conservative support has narrowed[3]. So, part of the reason for the relative decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland may well be very simple. Its short term economic record at election times has been more unfavourable than Labour's. When Scotland has outperformed the United Kingdom economy under a Conservative Government the party has been able to reverse its decline (see also Curtice, 1992; Curtice and Steed, 1992). Bringing home the economic bacon is as powerful a 'Scottish card' as any the Party can play.

[1]Interview on 'Scotland A Restless Nation', a four part BBC Scotland series, October, 1991. Presented by Kirsty Wark and produced by Alan Clements.

[2] I would like to acknowlegde the fact that these findings originated in the work of Claire Morton, an undergraduate student at the University of Strathclyde.

[3] The trend in unemployment was also marginally better in Scotland in 1964 and the gap between England and Scotland widened only marginally.

Chapter Ten : The St Andrew's Mafia - Factions or Tendencies?

We have now established that the Scots moved to the left in the mid 1970s just as the Party embarked upon a laissez-faire project which hitherto was perceived as extremist dogma by previous Unionist/New Conservative administrations. In this chapter we examine the extent to which the adoption of this new right ideology created internal divisions contributing to the Party's decline in Scotland. It is after all generally believed that parties in decline are ideologically riven. (Rose, 1980) One's thoughts immediately turn to Labour's internecine strife due to the Bevanite factionalism throughout the 1950s and the Benn / Militant factions of the 1980s which considerably disadvantaged the Labour Party at the Polls. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1980s the SNP also suffered electoral setbacks due to '79 Group' and 'Seed of the Gael' factionalism. But, we do not usually associate the Conservative Party with fissiparous factions, however here, we not only map out long standing competing views within the Party but also view the remarkable developments at the end of the eighties when such divisions reached a crescendo.

We use Rose's (1975) typology of factions and tendencies to examine the consequences of a libertarian 'faction' - the Thatcherite wing - controlling the party machine while opposed by a centre-left 'tendency'. Moreover, in stark contrast to the view of Thatcherism being an alien import from England (for example see Paterson et al, op.cit.) we find that it was more of a Scottish export and not simply of the idea that an exegesis of Adam Smith contributed to Thatcherism. However fond Mrs Thatcher was of referring to this herself. (Thatcher, op. cit.) Paradoxically, in Scotland the 'Thatcherites' not only predated Thatcherism but were responsible in part for the intellectual and philosophical roots of that eponymous ideology. It may be argued that Thatcherism owes more to St Andrews University Conservatives than to Friedman or Hayek.

And, however much the Scots disliked Thatcherism such ideological purity from a party grouping in Scotland would no doubt commend itself to Thatcher, giving the group an advantage within the Scottish Party. At the height of its ideological influence in Scotland, the Thatcherite faction would have greater hegemony over the Party organisation and Government apparatus in Scotland than it ever accomplished South of the Border. Ironically, the Thatcher project in Scotland à la the 'St Andrew's School' and, to an extent the divisions created by it within the Party in Scotland, played a considerable part in her eventual downfall.

Formation of a Faction.

To reiterate, many political commentators and academics were fond of describing the Thatcher project in 'little Englander' terms while stressing its alien character for Scotland. "Issues of nationality as well as of class were mobilised against this alien attack". (McCrone, 1989:10) However, the initial impetus for Thatcherism owed more to Scotland and to St Andrews University in particular than is generally realised. The resignation of Macmillan's treasury team over the level of public expenditure in 1958, including Thorneycroft and Powell, was a portent of the future critique by the liberal economists within the Party. Powell became the St Andrews Tory Club's Honorary President and held the office throughout the sixties. Significantly, Ralph Harris (Lord Harris) an economics lecturer at St Andrews was founder of the right wing Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) in the mid fifties. Harris inspired many young Conservatives in the St Andrews University Conservative Association and influenced their pioneer monetarist manifesto of 1971 (Ward, 1982). In fact many of those young Conservatives were 'exported' to England, providing personnel for the UK government: Robert Jones; Michael Fallon and Christopher Chope. Moreover, Michael Forsyth served an apprenticeship with Westminister City council before returning to Stirling and eventually being given a Junior Ministerial position at the Home Office. But more importantly, Harris was Keith Joseph's mentor and guide in the conversion of Joseph to the liberal market economy. Printed on the cover of Halcrow's biography of Joseph is the epitaph:

> "The take-over of the Conservative Party in the 1970s was a close - run thing. Both Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph had the courage of their convictions; but in a sense it was he who provided the convictions to match her courage". (Halcrow, 1989)

Joseph may have provided Thatcher's convictions but it was Harris who shaped those convictions. One of the first ports of call for Joseph in his task of formulating an alternative approach to Heath's in 1974 was the IEA. The Institute levelled its own criticism at the Heath Government's level of public expenditure and planning and advocated the workings of a free market economy. Halcrow continues:

> "Joseph explained his mission. Could the IEA help with his self-education? Harris told him to feel free - this was an educational charity, and they had helped worse cases than Sir Keith... When he heard Joseph

> saying that he was only beginning to learn what it was to be a Conservative, Harris felt bound to point out that it would be more accurate to say that he was really learning about Victorian Liberalism". (ibid: 64)

Here was the first stirrings of a recognised faction - in Rose's terminology - within the post war Conservative Party. For Rose (1975:312-328) a faction displayed a consistent, disciplined and organised approach to policy but the Conservative Party was perceived as pre-eminently a party of tendencies. Tendencies are a group of politicians espousing a cluster of attitudes on a broad range of problems. Formation of a group could be ephemeral, with no expectation of further agreement by its members on future issues. This was the putative character of the amorphous, broad church of the Conservative party. Conversely a faction is described as " an element inside a party whose purpose is to control the personnel and policies of the party. But when a group attempts to control the governing party, then it is, by this definition, both a party and a faction". (ibid:313) Significantly, Rose's book was published in 1975 and has no mention of Margaret Thatcher in the index but importantly, it points out that the emergence of a leader can be the catalyst for a tendency to crystallise into a recognised faction. (ibid:316)

The catalyst for factional control of the Party emerged in 1974 when the now IEA educated Sir Keith Joseph, along with Margaret Thatcher, set up an alternative source of policy, the Centre for Policy Studies. (Gamble, 1988) It is well documented that the values of 'Thatcherism' did not permeate through the Conservative Party (Whitely et al, 1994) let alone change the values of the British electorate (Heath et al, 1985 and 1991). But, from the outset, in the true fashion of a faction, it was control of the Party that was envisaged by the Centre for Policy Studies, all the better if it was control of the governing party.

> "The argument that a Centre was essential ran something like this: to pull itself out of the rut, Great Britain needed a change of culture; the change could come only under the Conservative Party, but it was useless to rely on the Tory Party machine to inspire that change - the party machine was designed to win elections, not change a culture, and tended to be in the business of pragmatism and consensus... and(from 1974 onwards) what Keith Joseph wanted - and then what Margaret Thatcher wanted - was conviction politics, not consensus politics". (Halcrow, 1989:67)

So, Ralph Harris and the IEA can be considered as crucial elements in the sea bed of development for Thatcherism. But the 'St Andrew's Mafia' contributed even more to that sea bed. The Adam Smith Institute, established in 1977, was a new right think tank which had considerable influence upon the policy initiatives of the Thatcher administrations. But, it was also the product of St Andrew University graduates, Douglas Mason, Madson Pirie, Eamonn Butler and Michael Fallon. It professionally packaged the sentiments first espoused in the St Andrew's Union, where the students held 'parliamentary debates' in the late 60s and early 70s. The Tory students would put forward alternative manifestos whose free market suggestions were perceived as intemperate and fanciful for the time but later some of those suggestions came to be accepted as official Conservative policy. (Stewart, 1990) Douglas Mason and Madson Pirie are also credited with forming the blueprint of the 'Poll Tax', although, they eventually fell out with each other over the question of the Government retaining it when the tax had palpably become an electoral millstone around the neck of the Government. (The Sunday Times Scotland, 3 March, 1991) Moreover, another distinguished graduate, Michael Forsyth, also produced a paper in favour of a poll tax in the mid eighties. (Mitchell ,1990:117)

In an article for the Young Conservative Journal, 'Blue Moves' (May, 1991), Mason openly boasts about his opposition to the Macmillan and Heath Governments. And, he also informs us that the St Andrew's graduate and economics lecturer (1965-70), Alan Stewart, was part of the Mafia who criticised the "misconceived regional policy that saw the siting of a series of uneconomic industries in Scotland. In its death throws, Ravenscraig remains the sole surviving example". (Mason, 1991:11) Associated intermittently with the industry portfolio at the Scottish Office from 1983, and holding such views on Ravenscraig, Stewart was highly unlikely to threaten resignation over the demise of Ravenscraig. Similar to Harris, 'the Mafia' combined their intellectual pursuits with Party activism. This group achieved remarkable local government victories at the end of the sixties. Mason became the first ever Conservative councillor elected in Fife by winning a ward in Glenrothes New Town and Madson Pirie had a surprising victory in the Gorgie / Dalry ward in Edinburgh. Indeed, Christopher Chope, the former MP for Southampton Itchen was on the St Andrew's campaign team for those local elections. However, one is circumspect of any suggestion that the victories were as a result of the conversion to laissez-faire individualism by those predominantly working class wards. The more prosaic but more probable explanation involves the efficacy of the local campaign. We saw in chapter two the drop in the activity of local party canvassers and the admission by

Tory officials in 1991 that some constituencies had not delivered election leaflets since the days of Harold Macmillan. In contrast the Mafia's approach to the campaign was an "utterly unorthodox blitzkrieg".(ibid, 1991:14)

The Forsyth Saga.

Margaret Thatcher appointed Michael Forsyth as Scottish Chairman in July 1989. Of all her appointments to the position of chairman in England none, including Norman Tebitt, aspired to the ideological purity of Michael Forsyth. In her estimation Forsyth was the embodiment of 'one of us' and he remained her confidant and Scottish counsel until her demise. For the left, as well as for many in the amorphous centre, the appointment of Forsyth was 'the straw that broke the camel's back'. The left of centre Scottish Tory Reform Group (STRG) led the rebellion against Forsyth and aided their President, the Secretary of State, Malcolm Rifkind, to withstand the new right's onslaught on his position. The ideological battle became personified in the persons of Forsyth and Rifkind and the underlying tensions of both wings exploded in an extraordinary public display of blood letting, never before experienced in the history of the Party in Scotland. The pressure cooker's lid was precariously re-affixed in late 1990, with the arrival of John Major as Prime Minister, Ian Lang as Secretary of State and Michael Forsyth's move out of the Scottish Office to a UK Ministry in 1992. However, prior to that events had deteriorated to such an extent that, Gerry Malone, the future vice - chairman of the UK party, co-authored an article in the Sunday Times entitled, "Party woe as Tories feud tooth and claw ". It began:

> "Two of the most bitter opponents in British politics are this week unwinding on their summer holidays, preparing for the next round in a feud that is bringing their party managers close to despair. Yet the two men are not on opposite sides of the House, nor are they even warring departments of the government. Both happen to be Ministers in the Scottish Office, and the row is said to be so serious that only the direct intervention of the prime minister can sort it out. "Bringing the party to its knees north of the border" was how one insider last week described the row between Malcolm Rifkind, the Scottish Secretary, and Michael Forsyth, the chairman of the Scottish Tories". (The Sunday Times 12 August, 1990)

The party may have been on its knees north of the border due to factional squabbling but even worse was to follow. Channel Four's current affairs programme 'Dispatches' investigated the sinister activities of an ultra rightist group within the Tory Party, 'The Movement', whose alleged modus operandi was strikingly similar to the Militant Tendency's within Labour. Paradoxically, the Trotskyist Militant Tendency at the height of its 'entryist' powers was the quintessence of Rose's factional party within a party but even Militant did not reach the heady heights that the Movement allegedly reached. The programme singularly concentrated on the Movement's activities in Scotland, it revealed, claimed the introduction: "the existence of an organised group of right wingers determined to dominate the party; in their most audacious coup yet they came within an ace of taking over the Scottish Tories".[1]

The audacious coup alluded to by the Dispatches production which came within a hair's breadth of success was the Forsyth saga; a series of developments within the Party, so extraordinary, that they resembled more a tragi-comedy than the putative behaviour of a governing party. Adhering to the new right credo of action, Forsyth on taking office, immediately set about transforming the Scottish Central Office (SCO) in his own image. He staffed the SCO with colleagues from his Federation of Conservative Students' (FCS) days. (The FCS was the forerunner of the Young Conservatives and had the dubious distinction of being banned for extremism by, of all people, Norman Tebbit.) For example, the new Chief of Staff was Russel Walters, who had worked for the Adam Smith Institute and was a deputy director of the Economic League, the shadowy right wing organisation which allegedly snooped on left wing employees on behalf of employers.[2] The Director of Organisation was Simon Turner, a former election agent for John Redwood and Norman Tebitt. These two appointments alone, illustrate the concern of the left as well as the amorphous mass. The new right had reached heights in Scotland only previously dreamt of, and with Walters controlling access to the Chairman, and Turner administering the Candidates List, as well as acting as arbiter between the voluntary and professional wings [3], the left of the Party believed they had good cause for concern.

Further developments added weight to that concern. Party stalwarts were marginalised and then made redundant, or in some cases given immediate redundancy. John McKay, the Chief Executive, (later elevated to the Lords by Major and installed in Lang's Governmental team) was moved to the Glasgow office, an impotent outpost since the centralisation reforms of the sixties. Similar to others he later received a generous pay off package, when his position was no longer tenable. When McKay

and his secretary were on holiday locksmiths forced his confidential filing cabinets which contained sensitive information on prospective parliamentary candidates. At this time a symbolic touch was added by Walters, replacing the pictures of Heath with that of Thatcher and installing himself behind John McKay's desk in time for McKay's secretary's return. (Sunday Times Scotland, 9 September, 1990)

In contrast to the new right image of frugal housekeeping, a major criticism of Forsyth was the squandering of money on high salaries and generous redundancy payments, along with the alleged costs of his new glossy magazine the *Scottish Conservative*. (Kemp, 1993) The stark example of this profligacy was the hiring of his old FCS chum Douglas Young from the City of London on £50,000 a year, as campaign's director. He lasted just nine months, departing in August 1990 with the ubiquitous pay off, after it was quickly realised that his tenure of office was an unmitigated disaster. He was savaged by Gordon Brown of Labour and the SNP's Alex Salmond on a BBC 'Left, Right and Centre' current affairs programme, to such an extent that his next T.V. appearance was to announce his resignation. Ten years away from the cut and thrust of Scottish politics was all too evident. Anna McCurley, former MP for Renfrew West and Inverclyde, stated: "I am quite bewildered by what has happened in the past year at Central Office. What the Party needed was a shake up not a cock up... He (Forsyth) brought in all these weirdos and then he sheds them because they don't live up to his expectations". (Glasgow Herald, 2 August, 1990)

If the return of Anglo - Scots with Thatcherite intentions was regarded as alien, then the arrival of Grover Norquist must be considered as 'beyond the pale'. Norquist was responsible for Bush's 'negative campaigning' in the 1988 Presidential Election. He was credited with the unsavoury political advertisement, 'Bush and Dukakis On Crime'; when a convicted murderer, Willie Horton, murdered and raped other victims on weekend leave from prison.

For Arthur Bell, the Chairman of the Scottish Tory Reform Group, this was the unacceptable side of American Politics being brought to Scotland.[4] The STRG used this and the above criticisms to attack the libertarian wing. He was convinced that the next step of the new right was to capture the position of the Secretary of State for Scotland and to this end the new right were undermining Malcolm Rifkind's position. This was confirmed by the respected Scottish journalist, Derek Bateman, on the Dispatches programme:

"What you had really, was a whispering campaign against key individuals, one of whom was the Secretary of State for Scotland, Malcolm Rifkind. Whenever he made what might be regarded as a mild gaffe, we were told from within Chester Street (Central Office) that this was a major problem. The man was failing to give leadership we were told, so you had the extraordinary situation of the Scottish Conservative Party mounting a whispering campaign against their own cabinet minister ". [5]

The all out war continued with constant flak from both sides, the sniping resembled more the discourse of a public brawl than intra-party debate. Bell spoke of stormtroopers and 'blue trots' rampaging through Central Office. Allan Stewart called Bell, a pig-ignorant pipsqueak and then declared that on reflection that was unfair to pigs. Forsyth declared on Radio Scotland, that "it was well known that Bell was the stupidest man in the Scottish Conservative Party". (Kemp, 1993:204) The rows reached gutter level as smears abounded from both sides about personal lifestyles. But the tensions between Forsyth and Rifkind were a mirror image of those between Thatcher and Heseltine at the UK level. And, on the Dispatches programme, Douglas Smith, Russel Walter's flat mate in London, delineated the left wing conspiracy as viewed from the right. He mapped out the connections between Nick Kent, Michael Mates' researcher and Andrew Burnett the STRG vice - chairman. Heseltine was a TRG patron and Mates was his campaign manager in the contest against Thatcher. In the right's eyes the attacks on Forsyth were a dry run for the attack on Thatcher.[6] Thatcher did in fact fall two months after Forsyth in November, 1990 and Arthur Bell rejoiced in the words "Thatcherism is dead long live Conservatism". (The Sunday Times, 25 November, 1990)

At first glance this is factional politics par excellence. However, a distinction can be made using Rose's typologies. On October 22nd 1990, Alan Stewart while calling for the new right to ensure that MPs who do not support the STRG are returned, adds: "we all know what the real issue is: it is devolution. That is what the TRG is about". (Glasgow Herald) The STRG may have been disciplined and organised for the fight against the new right in this instance but as a group they never reached the level of policy consistency needed for a faction in Rose's terms. Since reforming in Scotland in the mid eighties, the STRG have had as many protagonists for, as against devolution. For example, at the 1991 Conference Fringe, the STRG held an eloquent debate on devolution, "Disaster or Deliverance?". Two speakers, Cllr., John Young and Cllr., Brian Meek, spoke on behalf of devolution with an STRG vice chairman,

Malcolm MacKenzie and the PPC for Glasgow Hillhead, Aileen Bates, arguing against. A true organised faction would discipline its members towards greater policy consistency . In contrast, the libertarian wing appeared to have all the attributes of a consciously organised faction. They were consistently anti-devolution, anti-Europe, and of course, consistently advocated free market policy for Scotland. The one curious departure from free market principles serves as further justification for labelling the libertarian wing an organised 'faction', in Rose's terms.

Paterson, Brown and McCrone (1992:631), to emphasise the alien nature of Thatcherite values to Scotland, use the example of "a clumsy attempt to reform the Scottish legal system in the spring of 1990". However, in reality it was the Thatcherites who paradoxically organised against the proposed Bill in order to embarrass and undermine the position of Malcolm Rifkind. The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Scotland Bill proposed to end the conveyancing monopoly of Scottish solicitors; ideologically pure in Thatcherite terms. However the libertarians, Bill Walker, MP for Tayside North and vice - chairman of the Scottish party, Nicholas Fairbairn, MP for Perth and Kinross, and Alan Stewart MP for Eastwood and Scottish Office Minister, all rebelled against the measure in parliament. Interestingly, at this particular time Nicholas Ridley resigned from the Cabinet over his derisive anti-German comments made in an interview to the *Spectator* magazine and the Chairman of the Party in Scotland, Michael Forsyth, publicly offered Ridley support. But, Brian Meek was quick to pose the question of why was it that Forsyth rushed to support Ridley while refusing such support to Rifkind, when Rifkind was fighting his way through the Law Reform Bill. (Glasgow Herald ,7 September ,1990)

The opposition to Forsyth increased and many laid claim to being the reason for Forsyth's departure. The President of SCUA, Michael Hirst, and his two Vice - Presidents, Adrian Shinwell and Brian Meek, confronted Forsyth the Saturday before his departure from the chairman's office in September, 1990 and told him bluntly he had to go. The STRG claimed that a dossier on new right activities, placed in the hands of Willie Whitelaw, George Younger and Timothy Renton (the Chief Whip) finally made Thatcher see sense. However , the conclusive factor was most probably finance and the views of the party paymasters:

> "The decisive voice, and one that Mrs Thatcher could not ignore, was that of the Scottish Conservative Business Group, chaired by James Gulliver. The public turbulence in the party was having a negative impact on

donations. Gulliver confirmed in conversation that the group, which he chaired, indicated its belief that the situation had become unsustainable and affirmed its support for Rifkind". (Kemp, 1993:205)

Lord Sanderson of Bowden took over as Chairman in Scotland and he wasted no time in re-engaging the locksmiths to lock out the remaining Forsyth acolytes from Central Office. The headlines announced the sacking of Forsyth by Thatcher but in reality Forsyth received a promotion to Minister of State at the Scottish Office. For members of the parliamentary party a junior minister's position is one to be coveted by the ambitious, aspiring politicians. For many in the Scottish Party Thatcher's solution was once again indicative of her haughty dismissal of any opinion not in tune with what she wanted to hear. The Sunday Times Scotland reported that:

"Thatcher's solution was simple, ruthless and ingenious - Forsyth leaves the chairman's office, but remains as minister of state in charge of every important Scottish department but industry. Her glowing letter to Forsyth made clear that she looks to him, not Rifkind, to frame policy in Scotland for the next election". (9 September, 1990)

The importance of this promotion is fully realised when one considers the department which appeared to allude him. Allan Stewart already had the portfolio of industry secured on behalf of the St Andrew's Mafia. At no time, in all of Thatcher's administrations, could the libertarians south of the border lay claim to achieving such governmental, ideological purity. One month later, Forsyth's direct line to the government fell, along with Thatcher.

Conclusion.

We noted in chapter two that the Party organisation was subject to increasing centralisation after 1965 and subsequently party activism dramatically declined within an increasingly diminishing organisational base. The increasing centralisation of the Party structure, as outlined in chapter two, was conducive to factional control of the Party. Such factional control of the Party consequent on a narrow political base, was to a large extent, responsible for the atrophy of much needed sensitive political antennae. The dysfunction of the Scottish Party's political antennae contributed to the disjunction of Party and electorate; an increasingly ideologically driven Party came to be evermore out of touch with the Scots electorate, as its political arteries, became

increasingly narrow and limited. Thus, once embarked upon an ideological and dogmatic factional approach, which was out of tune with the left-leaning Scots, instigated a reinforcing spiral of decline for the Party in Scotland.

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1 'The Movement' made by Hyndland T.V. for Channel Four. The Dispatches programme was broadcast on 12 June, 1991. Mr Forsyth, by recourse to law, was successful in obtaining an injunction to prohibit any further broacast of the programme.

2 ibid.

3 'Scottish Conservative', Quarterly Journal of the Scottish Conservatives, No1 Winter, 1989.

4 'The Movement' op. cit.,

5 ibid.

6 ibid.

Conclusion.

It would appear that we knew rather less of why the Conservative party declined so precipitously in Scotland than we thought. This lacuna in our academic knowledge is rather surprising, considering the importance of the party's fortunes in regard to the constitutional position of Scotland within the UK. The very fact that the party has been in control of Scottish government since 1979, due to a Westminster majority based upon English seats, while having such a shallow support base in Scotland, should have led to a far greater research output on the existence of this particular state of affairs. However, a contributory factor in this information gap was the lack of specific academic and commercial based survey research in Scotland, particularly prior to the October 1974 British Election survey. This study, therefore, not only aims to establish the fundamental reasons for the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland but is a long overdue contribution towards the narrowing of this particular lacuna in Scottish academic research. That the study has made considerable progress in this direction is evident in the amount of existing academic work it challenges. Much of this academic work, or 'received wisdom', we found wanting. This received wisdom was essentially a collection of less than adequate explanations, explanations which were hitherto held up as shibboleths of why the Scottish Conservatives were so successful in the 1950s and of why the party subsequently declined so precipitously.

At the outset of the study it was not envisaged that so many previously held views on the decline of the party would necessarily have to be challenged. But, it quickly became obvious that this was indeed the case. Subsequent analysis, as outlined in the above chapters, was shaped by such considerations. Consequently, the dominant theme of each chapter reflected a duality of approach; it either contested previously held shibboleths or it advanced new interpretations of why the party declined. And the overall methodological approach of the thesis can be viewed in this way. In this conclusion we start by reviewing the four main components of the received wisdom school, to both emphasise their particular shortcomings and to clear the debate of these long held misconceptions. Then, secondly, we offer alternative explanations to why the Conservative party declined so dramatically in Scotland.

First, we examined the difference in social structure between Scotland and England, as this is a recurrent theme of why the Conservative Party under-performs in Scotland. But instead of finding a divergent trend between England and Scotland in the social structure that could explain the decline in the party's fortunes, we actually

found that social class and housing tenure trends were similar on both sides of the border, and that such trends were moving in a direction commonly thought of as beneficial to the Conservatives. Regression analyses confirmed our first impressions that whatever has been responsible for the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland, one thing is clear, it has had relatively little to do with social structural differences between Scotland and England.

The universally held assumption that the explanation for the party's decline lies in the decline of religion as an influence on voting behaviour was one of the main shibboleths to be addressed. This widespread misconception no doubt arose out of the fact that the religious cleavage was not sustained by elite rhetoric after the 1960s and this helps explain why many commentators argue that religious dealignment has occurred amongst the Scots electorate since the 1950s. Allied to this has been the crucial factor of the dearth of data on religious voting trends at the Scottish national level. As a result some academics have relied on the seminal studies of Scottish denominational voting in the sixties, (Budge and Urwin, 1966; Bochel and Denver, 1970), which recorded high levels of religious alignment in Glasgow and Dundee, then offered a priori explanations of why religious dealignment should have occurred-particularly vis-à-vis the Conservatives' decline - and presumed that this was an adequate account of the existence of religious dealignment.

However, using new unpublished longitudinal data this study clearly shows that religious dealignment has not taken place and, if any trend can be discerned, it may actually be one of a strengthening association between denomination and vote. Admittedly, the absolute level of support for the Conservatives amongst Protestants had indeed declined. Around half of all Protestants supported the Conservatives in 1959, dropping below 40 per cent by 1974 and then to 35 per cent by 1992. But this is hardly surprising given the overall drop in support for the Conservatives. We argued that if we were to demonstrate that religious dealignment was responsible for the decline in the Conservatives' fortunes then we had to examine the relative level of aligned voting. Using log-linear statistical techniques we found that the Conservatives are still a Protestant party, simply not a very successful one. Interestingly, the largest source of change in denominational voting lay with the SNP support amongst Catholics. In so far as there has been any religious dealignment in Scotland in recent years it has been in the apparent crumbling of Catholic hostility to the Nationalists.

If a religious card was still very much in play then what of the other significant explanations that constitute the 'received wisdom'? One claim, often seen as the only systematic explanation of Conservative decline (Kendrick and McCrone, 1989), was the adept use of a 'Scottish card'. This entailed generating a Scottish identity or consciousness by the advocacy of devolution policy. As Mitchell (1990:131) writes: "In the past, advocacy of increased administrative devolution allowed the Conservative party to appear 'more Scottish' than the Labour party, but today legislative devolution is the principle yardstick by which the Scottishness is measured". And Miller et al (1981a:210) believed that "a concession on devolution might make the party so popular in Scotland that both British and Scottish mandate might go to the Conservatives thereby making the concession unnecessary".

But it is by no means clear that the Conservative party's electoral success has varied according to its position on devolution. We saw in chapter five that if this was the case then the Party might have been expected to have done relatively well in the 1970 general election in the wake of Edward Heath's call for a measure of legislative devolution at the 1968 Perth Conference. Whatever the retrospective criticism now levelled at the 'Perth Declaration', viz., that it was merely grandiloquent posturing, at the time it was seen as a firmer commitment than anything offered by Labour and in the context of the 'Scottish card' thesis, should have 'allowed for the Conservatives to appear more Scottish than Labour'. At first sight the 1970 result looks relatively good for the Scottish Conservatives. They do in fact sustain their share of the vote after three consecutive falls. But in England at that election the Party's share rose by five points. The English mandate did go to the Conservatives but significantly the Scottish mandate did not, at a time moreover, when the Conservatives offered a 'concession' on devolution which was hitherto unprecedented in the approach of the two major parties.

In the introduction we also noted that the two elections when the party did relatively well in Scotland were February 1974 and 1992. One might have anticipated that if devolution was crucial to the fortunes of the Conservative party then the Heath government would have paid the electoral price for failure to deliver its promises at the February 1974 election. Conservative support did indeed fall in Scotland by five per cent but in England it did so by eight per cent. And then, of course, we have the result of the 1992 election when the Conservatives again managed to do relatively well in Scotland after fighting an election campaign in which the party went out of its way to identify itself as the only party in defence of maintaining Scotland's links with

Westminster. The devolution question may frequently dominate Scottish political debate but this does not mean that it can either swing the Scottish electorate or permeate any one party with a Scottish consciousness or Scottish identity.

The fourth and final component of the received wisdom challenged, and part of which helps to underpin the Scottish card thesis, was the claim that the Scots had continually expressed values consistent with a social democratic culture. In short, it was claimed that the Scots were always more left-wing than their neighbours south of the border. The Conservatives were successful in their attacks upon nationalisation policy in Scotland because those attacks were wrapped in Scottish rhetorical nationalism, equating nationalisation with centralisation and control by London, rather than any notion of such attacks being ideologically acceptable to leftward leaning Scots. It is claimed that through a Scottish transmutation, right wing policies were rendered more palatable for a relatively left-wing electorate. It was shown, similar to the other claims from our received wisdom school, that this was not so.

Again, we were fortunate to have unpublished longitudinal data, which we used to construct a time series on attitudes towards nationalisation. The virtue of which was that this was the very economic issue at the very heart of the debate. Through this time series on nationalisation and the issue of cut taxes/spend on services - coupled with an analysis of the Scottish national press - it was clearly shown that the Scots were in fact relatively more right wing in the fifties and that they did not take a substantive move to the left until the 1970s. It was not the case that the party managed to match their message to the Scots' more left-leaning economic and social preferences in the 1950s.

The simple, but as yet unidentified, explanation was that the Scots were in fact relatively more right wing in the 1950s and therefore a right wing agenda was ideologically acceptable to them. Crucially, as the Scots took that substantive move to the left in the mid 1970s, the party simultaneously decided on a substantive move of its own towards what was hitherto regarded as extremism. The New Right ideology that took on the eponymous title of 'Thatcherism' became official Conservative policy after Thatcher's elevation to the leadership of the party, whereas the Unionist philosophy, like its New Conservative counterpart south of the border, eschewed such extremism from whichever quarter. This flexible approach to policy enabled the 'pre-Selsdon' party, particularly in the late 1950s, to intervene quickly to ameliorate the declining regional economies based on the old staple industries.

It was not surprising that the Scots should have developed a taste for economic intervention considering the perilous condition of those staple industries. Moreover, we saw in chapter eight that the proportion of Scottish workers which actually worked in indigenous industries was in continuous decline and passed below the 50 per cent mark by the mid-1960s. In the 1950s the Scottish worker shared an interest with their Unionist 'grandee' employers to oppose nationalisation, which they perceived as a threat to their security and relative affluence but by the 1960s, that same nationalisation policy was now perceived as the only lifeline on offer.

As one would expect the relatively depressed state of the Scottish economy was reflected in the greater pessimism of the Scots. It was shown just how hackneyed a soundbite the 'feel good factor' is. Ever since the work of Kramer (1971), a large literature has argued that voters reward governments for good economic news and punish them for bad. In chapter nine we compared the trend in unemployment in Scotland in the twelve to eighteen months before an election with that in the United Kingdom as a whole. And we found that it was highly instructive that of the seven elections covered where the Conservatives were the incumbent party, there were just two in which the Scottish economy was clearly outperforming the rest of the United Kingdom - in February 1974 and 1992. No coincidence that these were the two elections when the Conservatives did so relatively well in Scotland since 1959. So, part of the reason for the relative decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland may well be simple. Its short term economic record at election times has been more unfavourable than Labour's. When Scotland has outperformed the United Kingdom economy under a Conservative Government the party has been able to reverse its decline.

One could argue that the party merely tried to borrow Labour's clothes when it discovered economic interventionism and that the electorate was bound to prefer the original - viz., the Labour party - if a choice was made between it and an expedient imitation. Nevertheless, it would appear by looking at the results of the 1974 February election, that Mr Heath's u-turns from Selsdon man were less harmful electorally in Scotland than in England. But from the seventies onwards the 'pessimistic' left-leaning Scots would be less than enamoured with the rhetoric and dogma of Thatcherism. The dogmatic approach of the 'new right' Conservative party informed the Scots that regional policy and its generous inducements for new industries was a short-sighted approach. (Campaign Guide, 1987:422)

This new right ideology not only alienated the Scots electorate but created bitter factionalism within the Scottish party. It is after all an unwritten electoral law that poor performance is partly consequent on disunity of party. And ideological feuding within the Scottish Tory party exploded by the second half of the 1980s particularly with what became known as the Forsyth saga.

We also saw in chapter ten that it was rather simplistic to view Thatcherism as an alien ideology imposed upon the Scots. In fact we argued that the sea bed of Thatcherism owed more to St Andrew's school of 'Conservative thought' than the gurus of the Manchester or Austrian schools. But it is highly instructive that this notion of an alien ideology and culture being imposed upon the Scots should take root in the Scots' contemporary consciousness so easily.

It is the contention of this study that this was due in part to the party's own actions in the mid 1960s. By the time of Thatcher's first term of office the party was already identified with an 'alien', anglicised term of 'Conservative'. The new *boo-word* in Scottish political discourse was a self-creation. This is indeed extremely important because the decline in party fortunes started in the mid sixties. Crucially, the changing developments in party organisation and identity in the sixties are the link between the moderate slippage in support then and the start of the dramatic fall in the seventies. The desire of the party elite to rid itself of a putative sectarian image led to what may be termed, the throwing out of the baby with the bathwater. A crucial aspect of Unionism was an ability to appeal to powerful symbols in Scottish culture which gave the party a Scottish identity irrespective of its stance on devolution. This the Conservative *boo-word* could not do. And subsequently this was the crucial ingredient the party lost in the sixties.

Thus, this anglicised, 'alien', identity was in place by the mid sixties. It created a base of discontent with the party on which were built the other deleterious ideological and economic factors mapped out above. The Unionist party was a Scottish party, the fundamental mistake was - and is - to equate Scottish Unionism solely with its Irish Unionist antecedents. In the 1950s, when the Unionists did relatively well, there is far more evidence to show that the Unionist label found greater employment in a Scottish 'distinctiveness' incarnation than in any sectarian one. A conscious decision by the Party to dismantle the sectarian parts of the religious pillar

led to the erosion of the Party's Scottish cultural pillar, in short, the party lost its Scottish consciousness by default.

Moreover, we saw in chapter two that the strengthening of the Party's organisation by professional central control was also at the expense of social and cultural ties, particularly at the local level. What was unforeseen by an expanding professional bureaucracy was the alienation of the Party activists from the increasing central directives from Edinburgh and London. The remoteness, and unwanted intrusions, of Edinburgh and London left a wellspring of discontent and disillusion at the local level, particularly in the West. We make no apology in ending with the words of the Dumfriesshire activist in the Glencairn Branch at the time of the 1965 reforms, a prescient statement indeed. The new central professional elite of the party failed to see that dramatic decline in the future would be consequent on their 1965 changes:

> "They are acting undemocratically and we are determined to see that members - who are after all the people who win elections - have a right to make any radical changes in the association without being rushed into them and without knowing exactly what the changes will involve in the future". (Glasgow Herald, 23 February, 1965).

Appendix I : Religion and Vote in England 1959 - 1992.

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	Odds Ratio Con / Lab
1959				
Conservative	49	37	33	
Labour	44	59	61	
Liberal	7	4	6	1.7
	100%(N=5204)	100%(N=605)	100%(N=307)	

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1966				
Conservative	41	26	31	
Labour	51	69	55	
Liberal	8	5	14	2.1
	100%(N=1192)	100%(N=126)	100%(N=51)	

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1970				
Conservative	54	35	42	
Labour	38	60	53	
Liberal	8	5	5	2.4
	100%(N=924)	100%(N=136)	100%(N=506)	

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1974 FEB				
Conservative	44	25	33	
Labour	34	51	49	
Liberal	22	24	18	2.6
	100%(N=1008)	100%(N=148)	100%(N=581)	

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1974 OCT				
Conservative	43	28	32	
Labour	35	59	52	
Liberal	22	13	16	2.5
	100%(N=980)	100%(N=145)	100%(N=246)	

TABLE A.1 Continued .

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1979				
Conservative	52	51	43	
Labour	31	40	44	
Liberal	17	9	13	1.3
	100%(N=667)	100%(N=146)	100%(N=568)	

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1987				
Conservative	57	43	45	
Labour	28	48	40	
Liberal	15	9	15	2.2
	100%(N=1202)	100%(N=189)	100%(N=550)	

	Protestant	Roman Catholic	None	
1992				
Conservative	53	37	42	
Labour	29	48	39	
Liberal	18	15	19	2.3
	100%(N=1252)	100%(N=207)	100%(N=660)	

Source : Gallup Interview Surveys 1963 ,
BES surveys , 1970 , 1974 , 1979 and 1992 .

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