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European integration in Italian and British newspaper discourse.

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I.

II.

Abstract.

Although the national public sphere communicates the concept of European integration, there is no clearly defined European public sphere. This paradox creates the possibility of governments, national newspapers and their publics having contrasting perceptions of integration. The study initially explores the tensions within the European Union over the competing regulatory and federal models within the development of the European Union. The study subsequently explores post-war Britain and Italy within the context of an integrated Europe – and how politicians and newspaper owners, Berlusconi and Murdoch, and their outlets perceived the concept of European integration. These explorations are the initial layers of the context of this study. A second contextual layer of the study consisted of interviews with politicians and journalists in the European Union, including professionals working for both Berlusconi and Murdoch outlets. Empirical data analysis using field theory and comparative theory illuminated how nations perceive and construct European integration. A third contextual layer consisted of applying a critical discourse approach to analyse the historic discourse of specific Berlusconi and Murdoch newspapers, in which coverage of specific EU events was subjected to scrutiny. The aim of using these three contextual layers of examination was to challenge: (i) the discourse of internalisation and socialisation of Europe within nations; and (ii) the 'common sense' coherence of *Il Giornale* (Berlusconi) and *The Times* (Murdoch) in articulating this discourse. The study shows two contrasting constructions of reality exist within the public sphere and, while both versions occasionally reflect the views of the proprietors Berlusconi and Murdoch, they crucially intensified, but never contradicted, their publics' perceptions.

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Chapter 1: Introduction.

The proposition being advanced in this investigation is that newspaper discourses relating to European Union integration in Italy and Britain are based on nationally-bound presuppositions, perceptions and judgements. This investigation takes a critical discourse approach, employing different theoretical and methodical vantage points to seek illumination and expose both the power struggles and resulting linguistic constructions belying the proposition (Wodak, 2004, Wodak, 2001, Wodak and Reisigl, 2001).

Critical Discourse Analysis.

This study uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which argues that the study of language isolated from context will not provide insights into social processes (Wodak, 2004: p185-6). CDA sees language as social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) and considers the context of language use as crucial (Wodak, 2004: p186; Benke, 2000). The study is concerned with de-mystifying ideologies and power through a systematic, empirical approach. As Fairclough and Wodak (1997: p258) argue: "Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations." CDA emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work, as problems in society are too complex to be studied from a single perspective and consequently methodologies need to be adapted to the data under investigation. In CDA, theories and methods are integrated that are adequate for the exposition of the object under scrutiny.

The contextual terrain covered in this investigation includes: (i) the post-World War II historical development of European integration, including events that relate to the subsequent foci in newspaper discourse analysis; (ii) an analysis of the public sphere and how the national public sphere prevails over the possibility of Europe developing a communicative space; (iii) an analysis of the EU's communication deficit; (iv) the inter-relationships of post-World War II national politics and the national press and

(v) an exposition of how Europe is understood in the specific newspaper cultures of *The Times* and *Il Giornale.*

The Public Sphere.

In Habermas's characterisation (1996: p360) the public sphere "can best be described as a network of communicating information and points of view". Habermas continues:

> The streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so too the public sphere is reproduced through communicative action, for which mastery of a natural language suffices; it is tailored to the general comprehensibility of every communicative practice.
>
> (Habermas, 1996: p360)

De Vreese (2007) catalogues how the conceptualization of the public sphere is greatly contested, but on a simple level, can be defined as an arena which enables citizens to interact and talk about (the same) political issues. Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) refer to how Habermas has conceived the public sphere as non-coercive, secular and rational. A central feature of the public sphere is its "reflexive character: it is how 'society' talks knowingly about itself." (Ibid.p3) However the authors do engage with the historical dimension in the equation, which they argue "alters the theoretical status of the public sphere." (Ibid. p4) The public sphere remains an ideal but becomes a contingent product of the evolution of communicative action, rather than its basis. The last stages in this evolutionary process are under scrutiny in this investigation. In probing the national public sphere in its communication over Europe, there are times when the discourse may be coercive and emotive, drawing from the internalised and socialised comprehension of Europe amongst the (national) audiences.

Context.

The rationale for unravelling the various layers of context in the initial literature review is to fully comprehend the background to the newspaper discourses, which this study will investigate. The literature review will chart unfolding histories. It will also challenge the naturalness, internalisation and socialisation of the knowledge and collective memory of European integration, *within* the respective nations *and* newspapers under scrutiny (Wodak, 2008, van Dijk, 2001, 2005).

Wodak and Weiss (2004) argue that the concept of context is an inherent part of discourse analysis. Wodak (2008: p11) argues that in investigating complex social problems it is necessary to draw on multiple theoretical approaches to analyze given contexts and relate these to texts. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) incorporated into this CDA study (Wodak, 2001; 2004) tries to transcend the purely linguistic dimension of discourse, to systematically include the historical, political, sociological and psychological dimensions in the analysis and interpretation of a discursive event. In this sense DHA is context-dependent, interdisciplinarily, multi-methodically, and is based on a variety of different empirical data. DHA, thus, minimizes the risk of critical bias, by following the principle of triangulation (Cicourel, 1969; Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p13).

An interdisciplinary approach of field theory (Bourdieu, 2005, Benson and Neveu, 2005) and comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) is used to conduct a systematic empirical study of *interviews* with relevant politicians and journalists in Italy and Britain, who have recently been communicating European integration. These are the last layers of context (van Dijk, 2001; 2005) before newspaper discourse analysis. CDA also requires an ethnographic element. The analysis of interviews is also approached ethnographically (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007; 2008), providing as much illumination as possible, especially concerning the specific newspaper cultures of *The Times* and *Il Giornale*.

Discourse.

DHA draws from the socio-cognitive theory of Teun van Dijk (1985; 1998), viewing discourse as both a form of knowledge and memory of social practices. Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) developed a cognitive model of discourse understanding in individuals. This cognitive model explains the construction of meaning at societal level. Van Dijk (1985) then turns specifically to media discourse. This specific investigation will draw on van Dijk's interest in critically analysing discourses and apply his thinking to encode (national) prejudice in relation to European integration (Wodak, 2004: p189). The 'common sense' newspaper understandings of Europe, which seem so coherent and cohesive will prove to be discursively constructed (Mautner, 2008). These newspaper comprehensions extend over many texts, forming patterns, which Lemke (1995) describes as discourses:

> When I speak about discourse in general, I will usually mean the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting…On each occasion when the particular meaning characteristic of these discourses is being made, a specific *text* is produced. Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings…When we want to focus on the specifics of an event or occasion, we speak of the *text;* when we want to look at patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of *discourses.*
>
> (Lemke, 1995: 7ff)

Lemke helps draw a clear distinction between *discourse* and *text* for this investigation. Discourse implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures, in accordance with van Dijk's explanation, whereas text is a specific and unique realisation of a discourse (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p7).

Bourdieu (2005) and Benson and Neveu (2005) described the socialised subjectivity of habitus and field theory, which will be integrated into the study's CDA approach. *Habitus* expresses the hypothesis that an individual's predispositions, assumptions, judgements, and behaviours are the result of long-term socialisation (Benson and Neveu, 2005: p3). Hence individuals have often become accustomed to viewing the world around them through the prism of their nation. Billig (1995) and Anderson (1999) wrote of how nation has become naturalised in the press. Hallin and Mancini

(2004) however extend Billig's (1995) and Anderson's (1999) arguments further, to a comparative analysis of how media systems have *also* naturalised nation and naturalised ways of media production *within* nation. Hallin and Mancini (2004) explore societal conventions and their contribution to the particular relationships between national politics and the press. An unravelling and critiquing of the social habits in Lemke's (1995) citation will therefore also be carried out via field and comparative theory and the integration of *habitus* and other relevant field theory concepts into the analytical framework applied to *interviews*.

Heer and Wodak (2008: p3) refer to van Dijk's socio-cognitive model and argue that knowledge and collective memories can be internalised by individuals, which can then take the form of schemata. Heer and Wodak (2008) argue that such schemata are internalised through socialisation. Once such cognitive schemata are internalised, Heer and Wodak argue individuals may perceive the world around them through conceptual patterns. One of the challenges for this study is to reveal how these patterns have come about. Wodak (2001) argues:

> On the one hand, the situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and on the other, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions. In other words, discourses as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, as being constituted by them.
>
> (Wodak, 2001: pp. 65-66)

This dialectic can work with all the social processes prior to newspaper discourse. However, the times when newspapers are constituted by social practices over European integration within nation or conversely when newspapers are forming social practices are of particular interest.

In this investigation, *intertextuality* refers to the fact that all texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and the present. Such interconnections can be established through continued reference to a topic or main actors, or to the same events. Wodak (2008: p3) also argues:

> By taking an argument and restating it in a new context, we first observe the process of decontextualisation, and then, when the respective element is implemented in a new context, of recontextualisation.
>
> (Wodak, 2008: p3)

Interdiscursivity indicates that discourses are linked to each other in various ways. If discourse is primarily topic-related, then for example a discourse on the European Constitution may draw on legal discourses or on other EU treaties (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2007, Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007). In this investigation, for instance, there is a national discourse on European integration. However, interdiscursively connected with it, there may be another national discourse seeking withdrawal from the EU.

The CDA approach is problem-orientated. In this study the thesis is that the cognitive-emotive pull of nation in newspaper discourse constructs a coherence and cohesion, framing how European integration is perceived. The problem is to lay this construction bare. Mautner (2008) stresses the importance of a design for analysis customised to tackle the questions being asked. The research questions in this investigation are:

1. Do interviewees demonstrate in either or both their own social practice and their observations and engagement with others that their perceptions of European integration are discursively constructed *within* nation?

2. Does the discourse analysis of the two selected newspapers demonstrate that perceptions of European integration are discursively constructed *within* nation?

3. Are the newspapers political actors discursively constructing perceptions of European integration *within* nation?

Chapter 2: Literature Review.

This literature review at the outset engages with the initial concepts of discourse and history relevant to this investigation. The review then maps out the relevant historical points on the path to European integration, before exploring concepts relating to the public sphere, and how a national public sphere has been established. A European version has still to arrive at its undisclosed and highly contested final destination (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: p12). Newspapers form part of the national public sphere and communicate Europe to national publics. The EU is one of the political actors in this communication, but is it effectively communicating to the national public sphere? The inter-relationships between national politics and the press have to also be unravelled, if it is to be understood how, within nation, producing news and comment on Europe becomes nationally distinct (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Recent media research on Europe is corroborated in this thesis – and partly challenged.

2.1 An introduction to discourse.

Discourse is a contested concept and has many interpretations. Hall and Gieben (1992: p291) argue:

> Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But it is itself produced by practice: 'discursive practice' – the practice of producing meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all social practices.
>
> (Hall & Gieben 1992: p291)

Meanings are attached by newspapers to the post-World War II European project of integration. What European integration means, is contested and understood differently in national contexts. This study is concerned with the 'how' and the 'why'. European integration can be interpreted as a scene of ideological struggle, with both EU institutions and member states, jockeying amongst themselves for position. As Fairclough (1997: p2) argues, the power to control the discourse can be seen as the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments. Newspapers play an important role within our societies, informing how

we conceptualise institutions and events. The taken-for-granted assumptions or presuppositions, upon which the coherence of texts and discourse depend (Mautner, 2008) will be scrutinised.

One of the key methods employed in this study is the discourse-historical approach. Wodak (2001: pp.65-66) argues this approach perceives both written and spoken language as a form of social practice, whereas Fairclough (1995: p14) contends discourse is a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective.

This chapter explores situational, institutional and social structures and theories, providing a platform for later empirical analysis of interviews using field and comparative theories. The dialectic between the social context (explored in this chapter and the subsequent analysis of interviews) and the media will be unravelled further, in a discourse analysis of newspaper texts. The newspaper discourse on European integration in the *The Times* and *Il Giornale* is constituted largely by nationally-bound presuppositions and framing of the European project. The newspaper discourse is embedded in the national contexts at several levels: (i) the specificities of newspaper culture; (ii) institutional structures within that (national) society; (iii) the mirrored interaction of journalists and their newspapers with national politics; and (iv) possible perceptions of national publics. In other words the newspaper discourse is partly constituted by the social practice of how Europe is conceptualised in a British or Italian context. But on another level, the newspaper discourse could also be forming how Europe is understood by British and Italian publics.

2.2 Conceptualising the history of Europe.

As previously mentioned, Fairclough (1997: p2) argues that the power to control the discourse can be seen as the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over other alternative (including oppositional) practices. Some have advanced that history is discursively constructed and can emerge from such struggles. Theodor Lessing argued that history is a conscious reflection of life, but it is not life itself (Heer and Wodak, 2008: p1). The authors suggest that what Lessing then formulated is a matter of general consensus:

> history as a retrospectively composed and meaning-endowed narrative is always construction and fictionalization. Historical phenomena resulting from social processes arise amongst contradictions and conflict; these determine which events from the past will become carriers of the consensual values and ideals, and which therefore have value as objects in collective memory.
>
> (Heer and Wodak, 2008: p1)

As various forces compete for an airing in the newspaper discourse on European integration, it is expected that political actors will endeavour to harness the voice of history to re-affirm and justify their social practices over Europe on the national stage. This investigation will further include how such protagonists may try to harness national public comprehension of the post-World War II European project.

Heer and Wodak, (2008: p2) refer to how the memory is a highly active system of connected cortical, sensory and motor processes (Schmidt, 1994). In this context, the repetition of specific stimulus patterns is seen as a significant structuring factor in perception and a basic element in learning processes. The visual system responds with heightened awareness to structures and sequences of events which have shown themselves to be coherent and ordered in earlier experience (Ibid. p245). In Fairclough's (1997: p2) understanding of discourse, assumptions and presuppositions also help texts to be understood in an ordered and coherent way.

Heer and Wodak, (2008: p3) also refer to van Dijk's (1998) socio-cognitive model, in which prejudices are internalised. For example, someone with anti-Semitic inclinations will interpret even positive experiences with Jews negatively, because of ingrained and internalised experiences and schemata. Hence prejudices, stereotyping and ideologies can be explained through the internalisation of cognitive schemata. Once cognitive and emotional schemata are acquired and reinforced through socialisation, they can only be prised open with the greatest of difficulty.

Heer and Wodak, (2008: p4) argue there are studies that show how "collective memory exists as the sum of 'real' group memories and how groups preserve their stability and construct of identity by integrating positive memories and rejecting negative ones." Nietzsche refers to *active forgetting* (Ibid. p6) as a normal way of dealing with the past. Political actors seeking to control the discourse on European integration may practice *Geschichtspolitik,* functionalising history for political ends. For this investigation, *Geschichtspolitik* will relate to the harnessing of national historical comprehension of the post-World War II European project (Ibid. p5).

Another historical concept employable in analysis of newspaper discourse, is that of *Vergangenheitspolitik*, concerned with the question of how, after overthrowing a dictatorial or authoritarian regime, do you come to terms with its immediate human and material legacy (Ibid. pp.7-8). One interpretation is that it is to make sense of the national past. Another is that it is to maintain continuity in the collective self-image, projecting an acceptable picture to the outside world. This could, however, result as Nietzsche describes in the rejection of negative memories or of *active forgetting* (Ibid. p6). Will Italy and Britain and the newspapers in question (*The Times* and *Il Giornale*), evoke aspects of post-World War II European history to re-affirm certain cognitive and emotive national responses, at the expense of other aspects of the past? Heer and Wodak (Ibid. p8) refer to how "national narratives generally possess a smoothing and mitigating character". Delanty (1995: p1) argues that Europe is a cultural construction and can not be regarded as a:

self-evident entity: it is an idea as much as a reality. Europe, I shall be arguing, is a contested concept and it was in adversity that it became a self-conscious idea. As the central and organising metaphor of a complex civilisation, the European idea expresses our culture's struggle with its contradictions and conflicts."

<p align="right">(Delanty 1995: p.1)</p>

As Heer and Wodak (2008) argue, some ideas become embedded in the (national) collective memory – while others quietly disappear. This thesis attempts to unravel how Europe is *contested* and how this manifests in newspaper discourse. Davies (1997: pp.25-6) argues that European history can be reduced to a tale illustrating the origins of themes most relevant to current concerns. Davies refers to the mechanisms of elimination, anachronism and presentation, found in the language. Heer and Wodak, (2008: p4) argue negative collective memories can be rejected, to which Davies concurs:

> These are the normal mechanisms of propaganda. They devalue the diversity and the shifting patterns of European history; they rule out interpretations suggested by the full historical record; they turn their readers into a mutual admiration society.

<p align="right">(Davies 1997: pp.25-26)</p>

Pertinent aspects of European history, prior to the post-World War II period, are now briefly referred to. The first example, demonstrates how Britain and Italy developed very different legal frameworks and this arguably has a bearing, much later, on how post-World War II Europe is perceived differently in national discourse. The traditions of constitution, a legal framework and implicit within this, values binding citizens, were borrowed and developed from Greece and brought to Rome. Here the concept of 'equal law' was created, binding on all its citizens. This gave rise to the science of jurisprudence, created by the Romans. The codification of these laws proved most successful in Byzantium, which survived from 330 to 1453 (Innis, 1986:p. xiii). In Byzantium there was a certain flexibility, as opposed to the rigidity of the earlier Roman administrative system and its denial of oral-based law. This earlier rigidity contributed to Rome's eventual break-up (Davies, 1997: p176).

Davies (1997) argues that Roman law immediately affected the formulation of Catholic canon law, but notes that the legacies of Roman law were only re-discovered in the Europe of the Middle Ages when a split occurred between English law and that of mainland Europe. Davies (Ibid. p173) noted that in England, exceptionally, common law modified from Roman principles of equity, was to gain a "virtual monopoly", whereas civil law in most European countries was based on codified principles in the Roman fashion – as opposed to the Anglo-American concept of legal precedent. In this regard, in Europe, the French Napoleonic Code (1804) became the most influential institution (Ibid. p173). In the early 19th century, Napoleonic influence was to result in Italy's first newspapers (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p90).

The legacy of Roman and Napoleonic law is still felt in Italy today (Haycraft, 1987: p240). **1** The process of European integration has borrowed from this legacy of codification, in the structuring of treaties and the plans for a codified EU Constitution, as outlined in the 2007 Reform Treaty. Conversely we see how English law in the Middle Ages, parted company with the Roman and subsequent Napoleonic traditions. Trenz sees the distinction between the common law tradition in Britain and continental constitutionalism, as problematic. "One could expect such different constitutional traditions to be an important obstacle in agreeing about the future shape of the EU polity." (Trenz, 2007: p95)

The second example relates to the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC). Heer and Wodak (2008: p5) suggest the EEC arguably demonstrates how post-World War II Europe may have, at various junctures, tried to functionalise more distant history for political ends (i.e. used the notion of *Geschichtsspolitik*). After Christianity had retreated from Byzantium, the newly constituted Church in Rome needed a political figurehead for its evocation of Europe and chose to crown Charlemagne as head of the Holy Roman Empire. Intriguingly, the borders of the Holy Roman Empire almost identically match the territory of the EEC's six founding members (Delanty, 1995: p39). One of the first times the word *Europa* was recorded was at Charlemagne's court in Aachen.

Duroselle (1990) was to write a book on European history, designed to share with 'European' children their rich and diverse history. Like TS Eliot before him, Duroselle (Ibid. pp.411-415) **2** spoke of Europe as an organic whole, as well as being rich in diversity. Commissioned by EEC and focused on the Community's members, the book failed to make any serious mention of either Greece or Central and Eastern Europe, which predictably caused an outcry because yet another selective European reality had been constructed. Yet this reality had been unable to withstand the need to change a year earlier with the end of the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin wall, (Davies, 1997).

2.3 The post-World War II European project of integration.

This section will catalogue key junctures in the development of the post-World War II European project of integration. In so doing it will chart the tensions between the two key opposing positions and traditions that have developed in relationship to the project: inter-governmentalism and federalism. This will have a bearing when newspaper discourse refers back to national historical contexts in Europe.

Inter-governmentalist member states have historically regarded the European project as the basis for co-operation between nations – but stop short of relinquishing too many national powers to supranational institutions, whose laws all member states can be bound by. Conversely federalist member states have accepted and in some cases embraced varying degrees of supra-nationalism. This explanation is an oversimplification of these two models. A series of variations will surface in the historical analysis and field and comparative analyses.

The historical analysis will serve several other purposes: a) demonstrating how, from its inception, the European post-World War II project contained and maintained a strong notion of the nation-state, *within* its structure and how; b) this structure has contributed to the maintenance of national narratives and collective memories that contribute to nationally-bound presuppositions, world views and framing over

European integration; c) conversely, some European institutions have attempted and thus far, largely failed, to construct a European collective memory and identity (the Duroselle, 1990, case being one example) **2.** In other words, a European discourse of integration has yet to create a discourse with the cognitive and emotive power conjured and established by the nation-state (over Europe).

The historical analysis offers some explanation of how national perceptions that surface in the Italian and British nation-states – and possibly subsequent media discourse – are partly due to the shortcomings in the development of the post-World War II European project. One should not assume however, that the current EU needs to develop along the same lines as a nation, as Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) point out. Instead the focus in this investigation is how and why national perceptions frame conceptualisations of European integration. In this sense the historical analysis in this chapter also offers an understanding of some of the shortcomings of the EU in its discourse on European integration – as opposed to the later national newspaper discourse on integration in Italy and Britain.

So what can be understood by the concept of integration? Dedman (1996: p7) draws a distinction between "integrated and interdependent organisations".
NATO, is for instance, an example of *interdependence*, with national governments co-operating in certain policy areas. Agreements are based on mutual co-operation, as organisations of interdependence do not interfere with or have the power to overrule national policies. Conversely, *integration* requires the creation of supranational organisations, such as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and subsequent European Economic Community in 1957, which were the key early institutional stages in post-World War II Europe.Member states transfer some policy decisions to a body representing all of them, whose decisions are binding. Nations within supranational organisations transfer some national sovereignty to them. The supranational body can impose sanctions on governments, in cases of non-compliance.

Dedman's (1996) first interpretation of *integration* draws from political science: the increased complexity of both the post-1945 international order and the range and functions of the modern nation state. Countries are inexorably entwined in a network of international bodies (e.g. NATO), in which the scope for independent action is curtailed by collective decision taking. Dedman (Ibid.) argues that once integrated organisations are formed further integration is inevitable and refers to the 1986 Single European Act leading to economic and monetary union (1992 European Union treaty) later resulting in the euro.The second interpretation attributes European integration to the ideas, growth and influence of European federalist movements, particularly from World War II onwards. Dedman (Ibid.) cites the work of Professor Walter Lipgens who undertook detailed studies of federalist movements. Dedman's (Ibid. p12) third explanation for European integration is entirely historical and is based on the work of political, diplomatic and economic historians. For example, Alan Milward's thesis, derived from empirical evidence drawn from a variety of national archives, explores the origins and motivations for European integration.

> the Milward thesis states that European integration only occurs and only works when it is actually needed by nation states, there being no fundamental antagonism between European integration, and the nation state.
>
> (Dedman, 1996: p12)

Dinan (1994: p3) concurs with the Milward thesis, arguing that "intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are not irreconcilable, rather they jointly characterise the European Community."

The federal movement in Europe surfaced during World War II. One of the potential motivations for integration was to prevent a future war, making nations answerable to an overarching body of European institutions, which accords with Dedman's (1996) second interpretation of integration. Lipgens (1980) argues that the resistance movements favoured a federal state with supranational powers. According to Lipgens (Ibid.), the French resistance movement hardly ever favoured a return to the pre-war

system of nation states. The *Europeenne de Federalistes* (UEF) subsequently emerged and its membership doubled between 1947 and 50, reaching 200,000. Resistance publications towards the end of the war, stressed wanting a supranational European federation, with political, military and judicial institutions to maintain peace and freedom (Lipgens, 1985: pp.674-5).

Winston Churchill in assisting Charles De Gaulle against the Nazis made a series of speeches, in which he spoke of the need to build a new Europe, with a great Germany and a great France at its heart (Dedman, 1996: pp.20-3, Judt, 2005). The UK's United Europe Movement was founded by Duncan Sandys, Churchill's son-in-law, and had Churchill (now out of office) as President. Churchill's speech in Zurich on September 19, 1946, called for:

> a kind of *United States of Europe*…(the) first step is to form a Council of Europe….France and Germany must take the lead together…Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, mighty America – must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe.
>
> (Brinkley & Hackett, 1991: p20)

Churchill, one of the founding members of the Council of Europe in 1949, worked closely with Italy's first post-World War II Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, as both countries shared a vision. The work of the Council of Europe was concerned with human rights, education and culture. In 1951, West Germany joined. This was an act of reconciliation suggested by Churchill (Bainbridge, 2000, Judt, 2005). The Council of Europe was the first post-World War II European institution formed. However, although Churchill put aside his earlier ideas and precluded direct, post-World War II British involvement in European integration, he remained an advocate of a strong Europe - but with Britain sidelined. Instead he advanced the cause of an English-speaking union, including America (Davies, 1997, Judt, 2005). British newspapers today instead evoke a one-dimensional Churchill, the national war leader, which Garton-Ash (2005, pp.31, 271) describes as the 'meta-story' of a plucky Churchillian Britain.

French President, Charles De Gaulle, was for *L'Europe de Patrie*, rejecting Churchill's vision of a United States of Europe and offering his own. De Gaulle regarded the possibility of European nation states merging into a United States of Europe, as "a dangerous delirium that could only lead to the disappearance of France" (Brinkley &Hackett, 1991: p170). America was in favour of close European economic integration, wanting Britain to advance the cause of federalism (Judt, 2005). Britain did not see the opening up of markets as its mantra but came to this view later (Gillingham, 1991: pp.134-5).

Gillingham argues (Ibid.) that Britain refused to play the federalising and open market role cast for it by American foreign policy. Instead Britain sought a return to the easygoing ways of empire and a resistance to viewing itself as anything but a component of Europe. The Americans felt European integration was stalled without Britain. There may have been an *active forgetting* (Heer and Wodak, 2008: p6). It is expected that Britain's discourse on Europe will speak of Britain the free marketeer, sidelining this initial reluctance.

Jean Monnet was the Frenchman who created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which meant coal and steel production, between former adversaries, would be pooled. Italy was among the six founding countries, together with France and Germany and the Benelux countries. Britain chose not to join. Monnet is often seen as the founding father of the modern European project. His vision was very different to De Gaulle's (Brinkley and Hackett, 1991, Judt, 2005). Monnet wanted close economic and political integration from the start, drawing from American ideas concerning federalism and the structuring of the economy. He also had close connections with the United States, having lived and worked there. Monnet struggled to reconcile French and German visions for Europe; France regarded much of the project as a means of containment of a previously aggressive Germany (Brinkley and Hackett, 1991, Judt, 2005).

France, and Germany under the new Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had different interpretations of how the initial coal and steel community could best create the climate for future economic integration (Brinkley and Hackett, 1991). Monnet was to later admit failure at being unable to create supranational economic control and the opening up of the market, thus allowing as Gillingham (1991: p157) explains, German protectionism to be maintained.French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, was the author of the initial ECSC text. Gillingham notes:

> His message was dramatic, as it was simple: France was willing to sacrifice national sovereignty for the common good, and thus invited her neighbours to join a venture that would end ancient rivalry, prevent war, and lead to a brighter future…At the very moment of its announcement, the proposal for a European coal-steel pool became an established part of the context of events, a force for change, and a myth.
>
> (Gillingham, 1991: pp.137-8)

Although Britain chose not to take part in the ECSC negotiations, Britain did send an observer to the Messina Conference of 1955, in Sicily, affording Italy an element of symbolism. Churchill felt that the subsequent supranational European Economic Community (EEC), formed in 1957, was also not for Britain. This presents us with the ambivalence of Churchill and a nation. De Gaulle was to subsequently be instrumental in blocking Britain's attempts to join the EEC in 1961 and 1967 (Judt, 2005: p307), which did not wholly concern Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who focused on the continuing relationship with America and on the Commonwealth (Judt, 2005). But economic necessities precipitated further engagement with Europe and eventually Britain applied to join the European project (Judt, 2005). Jean Monnet immediately and with deep conviction, supported Britain's candidacy. However as Gillingham points out:

> De Gaulle opposed it with equal determination, not only because, in his view, the British presence would complicate or even prevent the treaty's execution in full, but because Britain's entry would in effect be America's entry. The Common Market, he thought, would become a worldwide free trade area, that would be the end of Europe, which would cease to be European.
>
> (Gillingham, 1991: p169)

Britain finally joined the EEC more than twenty years behind the founding nations, in 1973 (Judt, 2005). At the post-World War II Congress of Europe, fundamentally different visions for a future European Parliament (EP) emerged. Dinan (1994: p12) notes that for unionists, that body would be a consultative assembly bound to defer to government ministers. Instead for federalists, the EP would be an assembly "charged with drafting a EU Constitution for the United States of Europe." Here we see tensions between inter-governmentalism and federalism, at the outset.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EEC misjudged the mood within Europe and in promoting "Euro-nationalism, as a new kind of bureaucratic patriotism"(Delanty, 1995: p141). This bureaucratic patriotism encouraged prospective entrants to embroil themselves in preparation for joining. The EEC approach instead fanned the flames of further regionalism and nationalism; in 1989 there were 34 states in Europe, and by 1992 there were 54 (Delanty, 1995: p141).

During the Iraq War a reference to *Old Europe* and *New Europe* by American secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, created a new European divide along a different fault line (Judt, 2005: p787). Germany and France (*old Europe*) were against the war but many of the accession states, such as Poland and Hungary, together with Britain, Italy and Spain (*new Europe*) advocated war. Two separate European positions emerged – at the precise time when Europe was no longer geographically divided. Protests against the Iraq war were planned across Europe on a specific day. Former French finance minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn declared: "On Saturday, 15 February, a new nation was born on the street. This new nation is the European nation." (Garton-Ash, 2005: p55) Here 'the people' were mobilised into Europe-wide action. That same summer Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (*old Europe*) made an appeal for a 'rebirth of Europe', which appeared in many European newspapers. This was also a response to the Letter of Eight, the pro-Atlanticist European leaders (*new Europe*), in support of the Iraq war (Garton-Ash, 2005: p55).

Italy's wartime experience was distinct from that of Britain's and in itself not uniform, with the north and south suffering in different ways (Judt, 2005). The north endured German occupation after the Italian armistice, half way through the war and the south was liberated by the Allies. It should be noted that Italy has often been invaded, occupied and divided many times (Haycraft, 1987: p16).

Judt (2005: p259) noted Italian distrust of bureaucratic structures and how its post-World War II economy succeeded in spite of, and not because of, Italy's institutions. This, coupled with a need for a fresh and peaceful start, made Italians enthusiastic proponents of Europe, as evidenced in involvement from the start. Dedman's (1996) interpretation of integration, helping to keep the post-World War II peace, was at least part of the Italian calculation. In Italy's case, some Italians wanted their fellow countrymen to be constrained by Europe. Judt (2005) noted how many fascist administrators during the war, could still be found working, many years later.

Italy secured pre-conditions at the outset of the post-World War II project. The ECSC had stipulated the need to eliminate the falsification of competitive conditions, while at the same time equalising wage and working conditions. Gillingham (1991: pp.144-5) notes that Italy gained a preferential ore arrangement, subsidies for coal and special tariffs for steel. He argues that: "though required to prevent massive dislocation, Italy's deal, like the one for Belgium, made a mockery of the equality principle, and eroded the substance of the community" (Ibid. p.144).
Italy showed a demonstrable commitment to Europe. On the left was Altiero Spinelli, the arch federalist, and on the right, Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi. Another national reason for Italian ECSC membership was as a means of facilitating emigration and to lessening crippling unemployment. Romero (1993: p132) argues that Italy's mistake was not to succeed in limiting this emigration right to EU citizens. Ginzborg argues:

> At the end of the twentieth century, Italy's image as a nation-state was ever more defined by its relation to Europe. It has long been the argument of the most distinguished historian of the European Community, Alan Milward, that the European nations who signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 were moved to action predominantly by self-interest, by the need to 'rescue' the nation-state.
>
> (Ginzborg 2003: p239)

Ginzborg (2003: p239) cites two key factors which have mitigated Italian progress in Europe First, an intensely inward-looking, localistic, clientelistic and power-seeking Italian political elite and secondly, the nature and failings of Italian public administration. The complex and labyrinthine nature of Italian politics and life has precluded many Italian initiatives on the European stage (Bainbridge, 2000). The Christian Democrats, under De Gasperi, consulted the Vatican on major political initiatives and indeed the Catholic Church is woven into the tapestry of Italy's post-World War II narrative. Berlusconi as Prime Minister, declared himself in favour of referring to a Christian Europe in the EU Constitution. Romano Prodi, Berlusconi's political adversary, is a devout Catholic who regularly met the Pope during his recent premiership (Ginzborg, 2003).

Milward's integration thesis, based on self-interest, has been evidenced at various junctures: France, reneged on much of its sovereignty, thus keeping Germany in check; Britain eventually responded to an economic imperative, and joined; Italy joined, gaining tariffs, subsidies and reduced unemployment (Dedman, 1996: p12).

One of the methodological tools for unravelling national perceptions concerning European integration is an analysis of conceptual metaphors. The audience draws on national historical contexts and collective memories in forming their 'common sense' understanding of Europe (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, Musolff, 2004).

Various attempts to conjure a supranational collective memory of Europe have been explored thus far: Strauss-Kahn's *European nation*; *bureaucratic patriotism*; Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (old Europe) appealing for a '*rebirth of Europe*'. However, subsequent analysis of the public sphere suggests the conjuring of a collective, internalised and socialised Europe, has some way to go (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). The study has mapped out such possible European collective memories – in case they surface later in the tensions between the national and supranational.

In 1993 the European Union was formed. The Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers, is the EU's main decision-making body. The EU member states take it in turns to hold the Council presidency, for a six-month period. Every council meeting is attended by one minister from each EU country depending on the topic on the agenda, e.g. agriculture or economics. The Council has legislative power, which it shares with the European Parliament. The Council has to agree unanimously on important issues, such as amending treaties and launching new common policies. However on other issues, there is a system of qualified majority voting, allowing progress if there is a working majority. Under the 1992 Maastricht treaty, which resulted in the EU, the European Council also became an initiator of the EU's major policies.

The European Parliament (EP), consisting of political groupings that are transnational, has several powers. The *cooperation* procedure enables EP to state its position on draft directives and regulations proposed by the European Commission (EC), which is asked to amend its proposals accordingly. The *assent* procedure ensures EP must give its assent to international agreements, negotiated by the EC and to any proposed enlargement of the EU. The *co-decision* procedure puts EP on an equal footing with the Council when legislating on many issues. The EP however, does not currently have the power to initiate legislation. Nevertheless the EP can throw out legislation proposed by the Council, if there is an absolute majority in opposition in the EP. The EP also shares responsibility with the Council over the EU's budget.

The European Commission (EC) is the third part of the institutional triangle, managing and running the EU. Commissioners are appointed for a five-year term, by agreement between member states and subject to approval by EP. The EC is answerable to EP and, if the parliament passes a motion of censure against it, the entire EC has to resign. Since 2004, the EC has been made up of one commissioner from each member state.

The EC's job is to uphold the common interest, which means it must not take instructions from any national government. As 'Guardian of the Treaties', the EC has to ensure that the regulations and directives adopted by the Council and EP are being implemented in the member states. In practice, the EC also initiates many policy proposals that are then considered by the EC and EP. The EC has wide powers to manage the EU's common policies. (Lesson 4. How does the EU work?) Newspaper coverage often focuses on European summits, when European Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers converge to discuss major internal or international issues, such as common foreign policy or security. The President of the EC is normally also present.

2.4 Integration: the euro and constitutionalisation.

The euro.

The European Monetary System came into operation in March, 1979. This included an initial reference currency (known as the ecu) consisting of the currencies of all the member states. The Exchange Rate Mechanism meant that the currencies of EU members were linked to the ecu. Following the re-unification of Germany and renewed currency pressures within Europe, the Italian lira and the British pound left the EMS in 1992. While Italy, under Romano Prodi, re-joined the EMS in 1996, Britain has remained outside.

Although 11 countries, including Italy, France and Germany, entered the euro-zone on January 1, 1999, euro notes and coins were not issued until January 1, 2002, by which time Greece had also joined the zone. The first newspaper discourse analysis covers these initial days of euro circulation in 2002. National currencies were withdrawn from circulation two months later, after which only the euro has been legal tender. The new EU accession countries are all due to adopt the euro, when they are able to meet the various convergence criteria. Slovenia was the first country from the 2004 enlargement to do so, joining the euro-zone on January 1, 2007, followed by Cyprus and Malta in 2008. Estonia is due to join in 2011. Britain remains steadfastly outside the euro-zone (Lesson 2. Ten historic steps)

Constitutionalisation.

It was the first EP elected by universal suffrage which really launched the debate on the constitutionalisation of Europe. On February 14, 1984, the EP adopted by a large majority, Altiero Spinelli's report proposing a draft treaty on the European Union (Bainbridge, 2000: p458). Spinelli, during imprisonment in World War II, had written a book arguing for a federal Europe: The United States of Europe. Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, then moved the debate forward again, when he made a speech about the future constitutionalisation of the EU at Berlin's Humboldt University on May 12, 2000. Fischer openly identified with a supranational model, based on popular sovereignty and citizens' rights and duties (Trenz, 2007: p96).

In December, 2001, the European Council established a European Convention, headed by Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The Convention debated in public between February 2002 and July, 2003. The process eventually created a consensus on the contents of a Constitution for Europe. This was treated as a unique ethnographic opportunity by Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, culminating in a book: (Un)doing Europe, Discourses and Practices of Negotiating the EU Constitution (2007). Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (Ibid. p1) note at the outset of 2001 that "high hopes were in the air. For the first time the highly contested "c-word" was formally placed on the EU's political agenda."

Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (Ibid. p4) find a contradiction at the heart of the constitutionalisation project, one that played out in discourse in their book. Constitutionalisation (Ibid.p4): "provided the Convention with a powerful discursive register for reflexively debating and making meaning of the fundamental values, objectives and institutions of the Europolity," and the possibility of a trans-national civil society, a European public sphere. Yet the final text of the proposed Convention remained in line with previous treaty revisions. Rather than addressing basic questions, such as the nature of justice, the Convention limited itself to the design of institutions (Ibid.p4): "Hence, the Convention was bound to disappoint those expectations of democracy and constitutional transformation which it had raised."

The discourse of constitutionalisation has remained deeply embedded in the nation-state tradition only (Ibid.p4).

An ethnographic approach, similar to the one adopted by Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007; 2008) is undertaken in the methodological framework for interviews in this thesis (see Chapter 3). Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007, 2008) interviewed an array of political actors, at the national and supranational levels, from within and external to the EU. The questions they asked themselves were 'would we find mainly nationally imprinted visions?' and 'Would references to history play a crucial role?' (2007: p20). They found that a clear or congruent picture of different visions and conceptions of the EU did not emerge. Many of their interviewees constructed distinct ideas on the current shape and future form of the Europolity, escaping the traditional national or institutional cleavages.

After the Convention process, the resulting draft treaty was brought before the Council presidency, headed by Italian Premier, Silvio Berlusconi, in 2003. This resulted in a stalemate – over ways of calculating the voting of member states on the Council(s) of Ministers (Oberhuber et al, 2005). This was perhaps symptomatic of the contradiction referred to, between an initial idealistic vision for change – and the institutional tinkering that actually resulted. A compromise was reached and on October 29, 2004, the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome by the 25 heads of state.

The planned EU Constitution included a Charter of Fundamental Rights, enshrining the rights of European citizens and also created the post of President of the European Council, doing away with the rotating presidency. In a bid to democratize further, the President of the European Commission was to be elected by the European Parliament – and not the governments of member states. The Commission was to be reduced in size and a new a Foreign Minister for Europe was to be appointed, strengthening common security and foreign policy.

However, votes against the Treaty in 2005, the French by 54.7 per cent in May and the Dutch by 61.6 per cent in June created a major ratification problem (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: p1).The European Council meeting of June, 2005 launched a 'period of reflection.' This eventually resulted not in a constitution but a reform treaty for the European Union. The treaty was approved at the informal European Council summit in October, 2007, an event explored in this study's newspaper discourse analysis. The 2007 EU Reform Treaty was controversial, especially in Britain, in that all the key elements of the EU Constitution (as set out previously) also surfaced in the Reform Treaty, consequently some objectors argued it was still a Constitution.

The EU, on the Europa on-line gateway has a section titled: Europe in 12 lessons. Lesson 1 concerns values relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Here, the EU makes clear that it favours "progressive values" and that with globalisation "people's needs cannot be met simply by market forces." The lesson goes on to refer to Europe's "rich heritage of values" including human rights, social solidarity, free enterprise and respect for cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, blending tradition with progress. Lesson 1 alludes to a possible future European public sphere, finishing in the following vein:

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was proclaimed in Nice in December 2000, sets out all the rights recognised today by the EU's member states and their citizens. These values can create a feeling of kinship between Europeans. To take just one example, all EU countries have abolished the death penalty.

(Lesson 1. Why the European Union?)

2.5 Towards a public sphere for Europe?

Could a European public sphere emerge and is it a communicative space in the making? Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) note the continuing importance of diverse histories shaping collective identities (Ibid. p.279). However, this diversity is linked to the "continuing vitality of Europe's dominant political framework: what we (not always felicitiously) call the nation state." (Ibid.p.279) With the EU not a nation, the challenge is "how to think about the public domain in relation to an entity that is in a process of continual transformation." (Ibid.p.279) Fossum and Schlesinger (Ibid. p2) also argue that the public sphere is imbricated in a set of legal-institutional arrangements traditionally linked to the nation state. For instance, in Britain, as previously mentioned, English law split in the Middle Ages from the codified Roman and Napoleonic traditions – understood in mainland Europe (Davies, 1997: p173). The EU consists of co-habitation between supranational and national institutions.

The 2005 rejections of the European Constitution by the French and Dutch publics were seismic events in the EU landscape. The subsequent summit agreement which modified the proposals is a focus in this study's newspaper discourse analysis (see Chapter 5). The 2005 rejections can be viewed through two interpretations, which ultimately precipitated the European Commission's search to improve its communications: Eurosceptics saw European constitutional polity as a dream and fiction that could not be realised; Euro-federalists saw the rejection as testimony to the inadequacy of the constitutional treaty as an instrument for establishing a federal EU polity. "This gap dramatises current debate over what is, and might be, the character of the EU"(Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: p1). The difference in perceptions is relevant, as subsequent analysis of data will investigate how national political actors perceive and respond to the EU (see Chapter 4).

Does democratic opinion have to rest on a set of pre-political values to produce decisions? Does democracy pre-suppose a '*we-feeling*' (Anderson 1999)? Indeed Miller (1995) contends communitarians do hold with the belief that political integration requires a deeper sense of belonging and commonality. However, Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) consider communitarianism is not necessary for the evolution

of a European public sphere, which resonates with the focus of this study on two levels: firstly by setting the stage for analysis of the constitutionalisation debate within the EU; and secondly, the study's key preoccupation concerning national perceptions over European integration.

Crises of credibility between national politics and the media compound problems for the functioning of a possible European public sphere. This already clearly developed sense of national self that may affect how European integration is perceived *within* nation. Fraser (1992) draws the distinction between: *strong publics* and weak publics. The former being spaces of institutional deliberation whose discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision making. The latter are are spaces whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not encompass decision-making. Eriksen (2007) refers also to *segmented publics* and a trans-national elite that will engage on EU issues (Ibid.p.34). Nevertheless Eriksen (Ibid.) does make the point that the wider public sphere can have an effect on decision-makers if they are subjected to protests, or as Eriksen describes it *kommunikativer Laerm* – communicative noise. The thesis will try to establish when newspapers are trying to communicate with (or indeed influence) weak publics irrespsective of whether newspapers are endeavouring to address (and influence) the strong publics.

Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) provide the topography of two alternative models for a future European public sphere (Ibid. pp.12-17). The first is the regulatory model, similar to the intergovernmental approach, sees the EU as a framework of trans-national governance, made up of specialist agencies and regulatory bodies. This framework compensates for the declining problem-solving abilities of the nation-state. The second is the federal model, which conceives the EU as a political community based on citizens' mutual acknowledgement of rights and duties. In the federal model, the EU forms the supranational level of government in Europe. The federal model consists of overlapping weak publics, grounded in diverse legal-institutional arrangements and supported by a range of strong publics.

The regulatory model sees the EU as promoting nations via trans-national rather than supranational institutions, which is effectively deliberative democracy. A regulatory EU derives its democratic aspect from the practices of a network of related issue-oriented and self-contained communities (i.e. the member states), which do not constitute an overarching European public at the supranational level. Indeed Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) argue that EU member states are relatively closed political spaces, which are maintained through patterns of socialisation.

> Citizens have the right to freedom of movement and the right to work, but they are accorded their political rights at the national level and it's from the nation state they also derive their key collective identities.
>
> (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007: p13)

The regulatory model is also based on relatively weak central EU institutions, none of which are able to properly counteract the continuing pull of territorial particularity. This model is more likely to address particular publics, closely linked to systems of mediated communication that privilege the national (particular) modes of address and that serve publics overwhelmingly constituted within national public spheres. The regulatory model is the European public sphere as nationally segmented, issue-specific and limited to particular topics. "This conception of a European public sphere has little obvious capacity to challenge the Union's democratic shortcomings or to generate an overarching public sphere" (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: p14).

The federal model, by contrast, implies complex co-existence, in which tasks are administered either jointly or singly and diversity is both acknowledged and protected. Yet as Fossum and Schlesinger (Ibid. p15) explain "[a]t the same time it presumes a measure of comity, generally associated with the 'federal spirit'. An atmosphere of harmony and respect requires political integration, necessary to cope with socio-cultural difference and to ensure collective decision-making. The federal model regards democracy and human rights not solely as representing shared meanings and cultural traditions but also as manifestations of cognitive-moral principles that command respect in, and of, themselves. Part of this is a written

Constitution, protecting the private autonomy of citizens, of which Heer and Wodak (2008, p3) ask whether this is an attempt to give Europe a cognitive and emotional ordering in its discourse, beyond nation. The federalists' assumption is that public support will reside in a constitutional patriotism (Habermas, 1998; 2001) deriving from a set of legally-entrenched fundamental rights and democratic procedures. The federal model sees the public sphere as a set of overlapping publics, with both strong and weak publics being the prerequisites to the proper functioning of the model. Federalism could foster a European public sphere. However, Fossum and Schlesinger argue:

> If the EU continues to develop along confined regulatory lines, the prospects for the emergence of a general public sphere look slim indeed. If the EU takes a further federalist turn, the development of a general public sphere is more likely, though not without difficulties.
>
> (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007: p17)

2.6 The European Union's communication deficit.

The EU is aware of its failure to communicate integration to national publics – and the media. This failure has re-affirmed national public spheres as key communicative spaces. The EU's acknowledged *communication deficit* (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007, Statham, 2008) is compounded by its *democratic deficit*. The EU is sometimes accused of not having enough power vested in the elected members of the EP. The Commission's White Paper on European Communication Policy (EC 2006) accepts that the communication deficit is compounded by a democratic deficit. The White Paper accepts that the public sphere for political life is largely national: "To the extent that European issues appear on the agenda at all, they are seen by most citizens from a national perspective." (EC 2006: p4)

The media are largely national and there are few European forums for interaction on common issues. The White Paper proposes building a European dimension into the national debate with expedient use of traditional and new media:

There is a sense of alienation from 'Brussels', which partly mirrors the disenchantment with politics in general. One reason for this is the inadequate development of a 'European public sphere' where the European debate can unfold. (EC 2006: p4)

The 1993 De Clercq Committee (Gavin, 2001:p302) outlined a provisional strategy for getting the EU message across to its citizens more effectively. De Clercq concluded that in order to convey achievements, the EU's message must be targeted directly at journalists and editors. The report urged the EU to be more pro-active, noting that leaving decisions to national governments was only effective when they were pre-disposed to the EU.

Statham (2008) includes an analysis of the quality of EU information, finding strong cross-national similarities and few differences between newspaper types. Statham (2008: p404) asked journalists to describe the frequency with which they were contacted by a list of political actors (including EU and national actors). *Never* was indicated by 0, *from time to time* could be for instance 0.33, *regularly* indicated by say 0.67 and *very often* by 1.

The most significant finding was the predominance of national actors. Four national actors ranked in the top five. National governments are the only actors who regularly (0.66) target journalists, followed by: national interest groups (0.61); political parties (0.57); and campaign and protest groups (0.44) (Ibid. p.404). Statham (Ibid.p406) notes the EU institutions (0.46) were the only actors above the nation-state who made noteworthy communication efforts. Yet this was only on par with national campaign and protest groups. Statham (Ibid. p406) found the EU targeted EU correspondents (0.76) considerably more often than 'normal' beat journalists (0.28). This limited targeting by the EU has implications for a more pervasive communication of European integration conveyed, above and beyond any institutionally-related story (Statham, Ibid. p406). National governments however, targeted EU correspondents (0.64) and 'normal' journalists (0.67) at similar levels.

As a political actor, 'Europe' seems to make relatively little effort to penetrate the information resource-pool of journalists and, to the limited extent that it does, 'institutional' not 'civil society' voices are the ones heard.

(Statham, 2008: p406)

Statham (Ibid.p406) also found that the 'trans-national press' received significantly more information from European institutions. These results lend support to the idea of a restricted, elite public space for Europeanized political communication. Indeed, as Fossum and Schlesinger (2007: pp.80-1) note traditional print journalism, seeking a wider audience, has struggled to transcend national borders, as the brief existence of *The European* (1990-98) demonstrates.

Statham provides two categories of EU sourced information for journalists to respond to. (i) Information provision - consisting of objective content, e.g. material usable as news copy, is accurate and contains either or both specialist knowledge and expertise. (ii) Political communications which have the clearly defined qualities of 'having a clear political line', 'being transparent' and 'being open to discussion' (Statham, 2008: p407). Statham argues: "The ranking of journalists' perceptions clearly shows that the EU's information-provision is seen as better than its political-communicative performance" (Ibid. p408). Statham's study found that trans-national journalists also held strong reservations over the EU's political-communicative performance (Ibid.).

In tracing the EU's engagement in communication, Gavin (2001) refers to continuing language barriers, for which reason the Council of Ministers tends to meet *in camera*. Gavin (Ibid.) argues that the EU's communication breakdown and the perceived democratic deficit have resulted in mistrust and hostile coverage in the British media. Morgan (1995) demonstrates that British journalists and EU officials often differ in their expectations of one another. Some EU officials expect a degree of deference, which is not a commonplace characteristic of British reporters that creates friction. Conversely, EU officials are unused to dealing with the exceptionally high levels of British agnosticism towards Europe. As one British

journalist remarked of information officials "they are true believers and expect to address an audience of true believers" (Morgan, Ibid. p331).

Statham's (2008) study, which has a bearing on the data analysis of this thesis, can be critiqued. Statham argues that journalists would adapt if politicians made European governance more salient in the "hearts and minds of citizens" (Ibid. pp.418-9). Yet Statham does not engage with the shortcomings of national politicians in this regard. Statham (Ibid.p419) concludes that there is relatively little to criticize in journalists' performance, beyond an occasional lack of innovation and imagination. The market and political context provide few organizational incentives for producing news generating Europeanized viewpoints. He adds:

> it is unrealistic to expect journalists to take this step as some individual transformative leap of consciousness. Nor, from a normative viewpoint, would it be especially desirable for them to do so.
>
> (Statham, 2008: p.419)

Statham (2008) argues that politicians should take the lead in making European governance relevant to people - a necessary pre-condition for journalism to 'Europeanize'. Political engagement may be needed, but journalists may also be contributing to the construction of how Europe is perceived, and also perhaps need to modify their conduct. A commission official once complained of ministers holding press conferences for their national journalists:

> (They) have a disgraceful habit of presenting the outcome as a victory of their national delegation against the Commission. That's not the best attitude to adopt if you want to create a European spirit.
>
> (Dinan, 1994: p2)

In the 1980s, the UK office of the European Commission was downgraded, with its promotional role transferred to the British government. The head of the UK European Commission office is still expected to mix with opinion formers, including journalists and politicians. But British journalists prefer to gain their stories from the

the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP), the British government's permanent civil service office in Brussels (Weymouth & Anderson, 1999). Although the British government is expected to 'promote' Europe to the British public, the research literature thus far does not suggest that government is engaging over the issue. Dougal's explanation for his resignation as head of the European Commission office in London, was that he should not be given the task of promoting Europe and that this should be done by the British government Dougal 2004). Yet Dougal felt ministers were failing to do so, which contributes to the lack of information provided to the general public.

Unlike the EC's practices, UKREP press releases are not placed online, indeed the UKREP website consists mainly of lengthy contact details for press officers. The approach is low key and definitely not aimed at promoting the EU. The main focus of the European Commission's office in London is to respond to negative EU press reports and compiles a section called *Euromyths* on its web site, looking at misrepresentations in the British press (Weymouth and Anderson, 1999, Garton-Ash, 2005). Geoffrey Martin, former head of the European Commission's UK office, (see interview analysis) cited countless attempts to address serious misinformation at the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), which looks into complaints of inaccurate and unethical reporting. The PCC never upheld any of Martin's complaints, indeed Lord Wakeham, PCC chairman at the time, asked him why he did not proselytize Europe (Rowinski, 2005), a role that officially falls to the British government.

The situation is somewhat different in Italy. Carlo Corazza (see interview analysis), as the press attaché for the European Commission in Rome, deals with the daily requests from the national and regional media. Corazza's web site provides the press with daily updates concerning developments affecting Italy and Italian radio and television interview Corazza about three times a week. The demand by Brussels for rapid information is irritating, as far as Corazza is concerned, because a great deal of the communication is in English. If speed is of the essence, Corazza has to pass the communiqué on to Italian journalists untranslated. This is an EC employee citing language as a problem.

2.7 The British Eurosceptic Press.

Morgan's research suggests that British journalists report European issues with a "developed sense of what will be considered acceptable first to their London editors and then to the British public" (1995, p303). Morgan argues that direct editorial input is made easier by modern communication technology, which enables constant input and re-writing from London. Morgan concludes that copy can attain a "direct, Eurosceptic inflection where London-based editors think this is necessary." Reports then sometimes lack the "sympathetic touch that journalists on the ground sometimes feel appropriate " (Morgan Ibid. p324).

Weymouth and Anderson (1999) debate Euroscepticism in Britain, and the perception of continental Europe as an external *Other* and refer to its manifestation in the British press (Ibid.pp.5, 91). Weymouth and Anderson argue there can be a deliberate exaggeration of the principles, beliefs and intentions of the European *Other*. They cite the euro as an example, which will be one of the focuses in this thesis. Weymouth and Anderson also refer to ineffective EU communication, contributing to negative reporting of integration in the British press, e.g. "the Council has failed to build the level and quality of popular respect and support that would otherwise limit the scope for such action" (Ibid. p163)

Garton-Ash (2005) argues that some 22 million people in the UK – nearly three out of every four daily national newspaper readers, "pick up a dose of Euroscepticism" (Ibid. pp31, 271). The combined readership figure of 22.4 million comes from 2003 National Readership Survey conducted for the broadly 'Eurosceptic' newspapers. The *Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Daily Express and The Daily Star,* whereas as the total for all national dailies is 30.8 milion readers. (Ibid. pp.31, 271). Garton-Ash (Ibid.) argues the distinction between fact and opinion in these newspapers has long disappeared and that the British press is reflecting the Euroscepticism of the wider society. Gifford (2008: p.vii) argues that the distinction between anti and pro-European arguments is not sufficient for understanding

Eurosceptic Britain. Euroscepticism has become fundamental to constituting Britain and Britishness in the post-imperial context, *despite* EU membership.

2.8 Europe's constitutionalisation - and newspaper coverage.

Trenz's (2007) research presents a radically different picture. He argues the quality press has become a dynamic forerunner of European integration (albeit with Britain falling outside this rubric), but nonetheless relevant to Italy. Trenz (Ibid. pp.89-90) questions the "general wisdom" that national media are held responsible for preserving the national bias and sometimes for even spreading hostile and anti-European attitudes.Trenz (Ibid. p96) focuses on the coverage of the speech by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, on the importance of a European Constitution, held at the Humboldt University on May 12, 2000. Fischer identified with a supranational model, based on popular sovereignty and citizens' rights and duties.

Trenz (2007) argues that "newspapers apply a common distinction between news reporting and news commentating, the latter being allocated to specific editorial pages…" (Ibid. p89). This 'common distinction' is challenged, as there are very different comprehensions of what defines a news story in Britain and Italy. News stories in both countries are infused with comment - but in different ways (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, Hibberd, 2008). Commentary articles in both countries will also be analysed in this thesis. Further evidence for Trenz's (2007) commonality being flawed is that he does not make a distinction between editorial and commentary, transposing them continuously in his analysis. In a British context alone, there is a difference, with editorials remaining anonymous, whereas commentaries normally carry a named author. A more detailed exposition of the processes of producing newspapers in both countries, surfaces later in this chapter. Trenz (Ibid.) investigates the use of commentaries for political mobilisation of public opinion, sidelining professional standards of impartiality and objectivity. He also claims that the quality press is becoming engaged in overtly shaping and structuring public opinion (Ibid. pp.89-90).

Trenz (Ibid.p90) in analysing coverage of the EU Constitution expected tension in newspaper coverage between the regulatory and federal models. Trenz (Ibid.p95) finds, however, that such tensions were mostly framed as personal conflicts between national protagonists. He also finds that commentators make exclusive reference to federalism or inter-governmentalism, in advancing their position, with the federal model chosen in Italy, France and Germany and the intergovernmental model selected in Spain and the UK. Trenz (Ibid. pp.91-2) concedes that the mass media generate ideologies but denies that these manipulate the public in any meaningful sense. Instead the media produce and reproduce the semantic representations of society as a political unity.This concession accords with the political being congruent with the national (Gellner, 1983: p1).

Trenz' research (2007) included 10 articles focusing on the constitutionalisation of Europe in each of 13 newspapers, including *The Guardian* and *The Times* in the UK and *La Repubblica* and *La Stampa* in Italy. Trenz presents a complex set of criteria demonstrating the representativeness of the newspapers chosen. All newspapers except the *New York Times*, selected the constitutional debate for regular commentary, "which can be taken as a strong indicator of the converging thematic relevance of the issue" (Ibid. p93). Trenz (Ibid., p95) made a surprising finding that commentators, when speaking to a supranational entity in the making, do so on the basis of collective will. Trenz (Ibid. pp.106-7 argues: "The journalists' look at Europe was taken through a pair of European glasses. Only the British newspapers' vision of Europe was split by internal partisan conflicts." Conversely Statham's (2008) research based on interviews with journalists, finds little evidence of a supranational Europe in the making, albeit being a study with the different focus of personal interviews.

Trenz argues the contemporary newspaper discourse on the future of Europe builds on the lessons of a common European past. Trenz' findings challenge the restrictive assumption that:

> Memories can only be mobilised within a particular community with its own history. Against this restrictive assumption, the newspaper commentaries analysed become strongly engaged in a collective elaboration of memories *across* the European space.
>
> (Trenz 2007: p98)

Trenz finds that most commentaries opted for a positive identification with the past, especially in the evocation of the founding fathers of integration, and the Rome and Maastricht treaties. "This reveals a new identity practice in which the experience of successful integration is turned into collective memories" (Ibid. p98). He refers to the European community of memory formulated around the "good old success story of European [post-World War II] integration."

But crucially, Trenz (Ibid. p99) then argues that this positive evaluation of the past is turned into a "negative diagnosis of the present crisis and Euro-sclerosis." Eurosclerosis has come to denote paralysis within the EU, often caused by national and supranational tensions. Trenz notes newspapers often ironically illustrate the present crisis of integration and expose the bizarre EU decision-making procedures or the labyrinths of European bureaucracy. A common practice was "commission bashing." Trenz notes the consensus over a collective European memory transformed into a conflict about the future and the EU Constitution. A majority considered the proposals to be a draft EU Constitution – but others wished to fight against its potentially legally binding status.

In commentaries, newspapers express their opinion, or indeed perhaps try to harness the views of the public. Trenz (Ibid. p96) admits that "newspaper commentaries are only rarely the place to carry out conflicts and debates among ideological or national cleavage lines." This already mitigates the collective European memory. Trenz (2007) finds expressed in newspapers.

Britain has negotiated a protocol, in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which subsequently formed part of the 2007 EU Reform Treaty, which says that no court can rule that the laws of the UK are inconsistent with the principles laid down in the charter (EC, 2000; BBC, 2007). The charter creates no new rights enforceable

in the UK, over and above those already provided in national law. However, the future effectiveness of this protocol is highly contentious. Some MEPs have vowed to challenge Britain's protocol in the European Court of Justice, saying it violates a principle that EU law must be applied uniformly to all member states (BBC, 2007).

Blair's response, in June 2000, to Fischer's Humbolt University speech presented a new dimension to debate about the future of Europe. Blair saw the transfer of power to supranational institutions as non-democratic and counter-productive. "Thus the EU would become 'judge-governed' and not 'self-governed." (*The Times,* 5 June 2000, p.18) Hence instead of defending the EU, the Charter would destroy its precarious unity. Further resistance to Fischer's model was motivated by mistrust of the Franco-German motor and the fear of being pushed into a disadvantaged position. "Italy and Spain are highly sensitive towards the idea of an integration process at different speeds. Italian commentaries are rather self-confident that Italy would be among the front-runners" (Trenz, 2007: p103).

Oberhuber et al. (2005) find more national divisions over Europe in a study focusing on the subsequent agreement on the revised Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, on June 18, 2004 in Rome. This thesis will focus on the 2007 Reform Treaty agreement, replacing the now defunct EU Constitution – and the ensuing crisis of the Irish referendum rejection of the Reform Treaty. Oberhuber et al. (Ibid. p263) conclude, having analysed an array of newspaper texts:

> Our condensed discourse analysis illustrates that the press coverage of the EU summit in various countries differed substantially among others on the level of semantics, thematic structures (eg contested issues), and structures of relevance and argumentation (eg apportioning blame).
>
> (Oberhuber et al. 2005: p263)

As Stråth (2001) argues, the meanings of Europe remain unclear and contested, within each country a different EU seems to be represented and different issues debated. Oberhuber et al. (2005) are clear, however, of one common characteristic in the 15 newspapers they scrutinised: the understanding of the EU as an arena of a power struggle between member states. Delanty (1995) described the ball as Europe

and the players as the identity projects, with the pitch, the geo-political reality on which the game, (in this case the discourse), is played.

Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007) analysed the Convention which formulated a draft EU Constitution, and reach conclusions some way removed from Trenz' thesis. They find that different visions and conceptions of the EU have emerged. Many interviewees constructed distinct ideas on the current shape and future form of the Europolity, escaping the traditional national or institutional cleavages.

2.9 Field and comparative theory – the architecture for a political communications analysis.

Benson and Neveu (2005: p9) argue that the "public sphere, as an empirical concept, would be much improved through the kind of detailed specification of structures and processes that field theory could provide." Field theory is employed in this thesis to facilitate such a structured approach. Benson and Neveu (2005: pp.2-3) argue that an empirical approach is necessary to establish the inter-relationships between various actors in society. Bourdieu (2005) talks of fields, and his field theory draws from Weber and Durkheim, in portraying modernity as a process of differentiation into semiautonomous and increasingly specialised spheres of action, such as politics, economics, religion and cultural production. The argument is that both within and between such 'fields', relationships of power fundamentally structure all human action. Within fields, presuppositions, known as doxa, are internalised.

> These practical schemes – implicit, tacit, very hard to make explicit – are constitutive of the doxa, as the philosophers call it, in other words the universe of the tacit presuppositions that we accept as the natives of a certain society. But there is also a specific doxa, a system of presuppositions inherent in membership in a field.
>
> (Bourdieu, 2005: p37).

So when are journalists working with the presuppositions within the journalistic field, and more explicitly, the internalised presuppositions of their particular newsroom culture? When are journalists working along the lines of (national) societal presuppositions? We are returning to the notion of discourse being constituted by social practice – but also sometimes constituting it (Wodak, 2001: pp.65-66).

Bourdieu (2005) argues that fields are spheres of internal conflict and struggle, with competing actors seeking control. However Benson and Neveu (2005: p6) argue that the journalistic field is a crucial mediator between all the fields. Within fields there is sometimes 'symbolic violence,' as public perceptions are harnessed and wielded as a political weapon:

> When a bishop declares in a newspaper interview, that it will take twenty years for French people of Algerian origin to be regarded as French Muslims, he is making a prediction that is charged with social consequences. This is a good example of the claim to legitimate handling of the categories of perception, of symbolic violence based on tacit, surreptitious imposition of categories of perception endowed with authority and designed to become legitimate categories of perception, which is of exactly the same type as the symbolic violence performed by those whose labels slip imperceptibly from "Islamic" to "Islamicist," and "Islamicist" to "terrorist.
>
> (Bourdieu, 2005: p37)

The debate concerning symbolic violence will effectively compliment subsequent metaphor theory and discourse analysis. The symbolic violence notion runs parallel with van Dijk's earlier argument, concerning emotional and cognitive schemata, which Bourdieu (2005) describes as categories of perception. When such ideas, embedded in language, become ordered and internalised, they are hard to extricate (Heer, and Wodak: p3).

Internal struggles are of importance and will be unravelled both in Italy and Britain. Distinctions should be drawn concerning struggles between national governments and supranational EU institutions, such as the European Commission – and tensions between journalists and proprietors within a news organisation. In terms of comprehending the internal conflict within a field, it is worth considering sub-fields

(Benson and Neveu, 2005). Rather than focusing on different types of journalism, this thesis investigates the role of the proprietors of *The Times*, Rupert Murdoch, and *Il Giornale*, the family of Silvio Berlusconi.

A greater exposition of Bourdieu's field theory will now be undertaken, insofar as it helps our comprehension of how perceptions of European integration are discursively constructed and can be contested within and between fields. Bourdieu discusses the notions of cultural and economic capital. By economic capital Bourdieu means money or assets that can be turned into money. Cultural capital however, encompasses issues such as education, technical expertise, general knowledge, verbal and artistic abilities. Bourdieu sees fields as arenas of struggle between these two poles of capital. He also uses spatial, relational metaphors as a means of expressing his conceptualisation of the ordering of journalism, other fields and the broad social world (Benson and Neveu, 2005: p6).

Bourdieu's (2005) work is relevant therefore to critical discourse analysis on another level. The subsequent analysis of the newspaper discourse, in this thesis, will include an exposition of the use of metaphors in constructing a common sense understanding for the public, over Europe. Bourdieu does refer to the battle in the construction of common sense between journalists, politicians and others.

Briefly returning to the initial overview of critical discourse analysis, Fairclough (1997: p2) refers to the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance – over alternative ideologies and discourses. Bourdieu's field theory explores the specific social worlds in which such ideas are produced, and fought over and included in this theoretical approach is the employment of symbols (Benson and Neveu, 2005: p10).

Bourdieu's field approach also calls for the examination of 'institutional logics': the simultaneous analysis of social structures and cultural forms. Hence in the comparative approach of Hallin and Mancini (2004), employed in this thesis, the 'media logic' resulting from national newspapers and the national societies around

them – and the various perceptions of European integration that result – is part of the analysis. The thesis includes an analysis of the complex interplay between the journalistic and political fields (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). However, the results of the analysis show that the most significant effect is not only media logic but the complex interactions with the political fields. Marchetti (2005: p75) argues that news is never just the product of media logic. To avoid media-centric bias, comparative research examines journalism in its complex inter-relations with the other social spaces. Benson and Neveu (2005: p18) also argue that field theory offers the best defence against media-centricity, thus helping us situate journalism in its larger systemic environment.

Bourdieu (2005) refers to how, when we read a newspaper, we mobilise the resources of spontaneous sociology, imputing everything to the responsibility of individuals or the nature of institutions. He argues that these things can only be understood by "analysis of the invisibile structures that are fields" and the relations between fields (Ibid. p30). In rendering the invisible as visible, Bourdieu (2005) argues that when, for example, a social scientist is talking to a journalist, one has to go beyond a chat between individuals, but ultimately a journalist represents a determinate position in the journalistic field, and a social scientist doing likewise within the social science field. Darras (2005: p158) argues that the analysis of fields allows us to specify other types of relations "all the more effective in being less visible, which occur through affinities of habitus" but also refers to the similar social trajectories of politicians and journalists. The thesis subsequently discusses the concept of habitus at some length.

Bourdieu (2005), in the context of logic, argues that the amount that can be explained by logic within a field, varies according to that field's autonomy. He argues that although the political field is under constant pressure from electorates, it is nevertheless strongly independent and "more and more inclined to close in on itself, on its own stakes" in competing for national power and competing for power within parties (Ibid. p34). Bourdieu describes a concentration of powers, in which the electors delegate to parliamentarians, who then delegate to spokespersons, who "take

on a kind of monopoly of access to the means of legitimate manipulation of the vision of the world (which is the definition of political action)" (Ibid. p35)

Bourdieu (Ibid. p36) argues both journalistic and political fields lay claim to the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world and both undergo internal struggles in creating dominant visions. The earlier symbolic violence citation is an attempt to legitimise and categorise a particular construction of the social world. Bourdieu (Ibid. p39) argues that such categorisation often comes in the form of insults, yet this classification is often implicit and does not set out its criteria "in order to be consistent with itself." Bourdieu argues that field theory should endeavour to make these schemes explicit. Bourdieu (Ibid.p38) suggests there are commonsense taxomonies in Martin Heidegger's philosophical work, *das Mann*. Bourdieu (Ibid.p38) argues that ordinary class racism, such as mentioning 'distinguished' people and 'vulgar' people is "likely to pass unnoticed before the eyes of a philosophy professor". Bourdieu (Ibid.) also refers to such taxonomies also showing who is in and who is out, for instance who are the citizens, and who are the foreigners.

Developing his exposition of the political field, Bourdieu (Ibid.p39) argues that the most violent political struggles occur between political parties that are close to each other. Returning to the journalistic field, Bourdieu (Ibid.p41) argues that the journalistic field is increasingly heteronomous, subject to the constraints of the economy and of politics - yet is also increasingly imposing its constraints on all other fields. Bourdieu (Ibid. pp.43-4) argues that this commercial heteromony is gaining ground, so that journalism and other fields are governed by an "audience ratings mentality." Thus within the journalistic field there is permanent competition to appropriate the readership, but also to appropriate what is thought to secure the readership, such as early access to news and the use of big names.

Habitus, ideology and *Weltanschauungen* in the context of national identity and nationalism.

The historical analysis, thus far, has explored how the European post-World War II project contained a strong notion of the nation-state within its institutional structure. Also investigated was how national narratives and collective memories may have contributed to nationally-bound world views relating to European integration. This section explores some of these issues further, as the thesis continues to investigate how perceptions of European integration are discursively constructed within nation.

This section will engage with Bourdieu's (2005) concept of habitus, as well as the discursive construction of national identity and nationalism, in a bid to deepen the analysis and gain a better comprehension of how European integration, *within* nation is perceived. In engaging with habitus and the construction of nation and nationalism, the related concepts of ideology and *Weltanschauung* are integral to the analysis. There is a useful starting point in comprehending key components of identity construction: the function of being the same or being different from others. The former Czech President, Vaclav Havel, in a speech to the *Deutscher Bundestag*, the German national assembly, on April 24, 1997 (Wodak, 2006), referred to the unprecedented process of European integration

> which compels not only you and us but all Europeans to reflect again on what, in this new age, their homeland means or will mean to them, how their patriotism will co-exist with the phenomenon of a united Europe...
>
> (Bundestag 1997)

Wodak (2006: p105) argues that the analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, constitutes a first step when investigating discourses of national identities. Billig (1995) suggests that it is not only political elites that are involved in this discursive process. Billig (Ibid.) argues that ideological habits in everyday life, re-affirm positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, enabling nations in the West to be reproduced. Billig (Ibid) writes of a naturalisation of nation, with nation continually positively flagged by the media. Billig (Ibid. p15) also argues:

We must question – or put into ideological brackets - the very concepts which seem so solidly real to us and which enable us to understand the assumptions of the daily news. These include concepts such as a 'nation', even 'a language'.

<div align="right">Billig, (1995: p15)</div>

Billig argues such concepts should be used critically to analyse nationalism and that ideology operates to make people forget that their world has been historically constructed. "Thus nationalism is the ideology by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world – as if there could not possibly be a world without nations" (Ibid.p37). As Gellner (1983: p1) points out, nationalism sees the political and national unit as congruent. It is this naturalness that has to be negotiated in attempt to reveal that perceptions of European integration are discursively constructed within nation. As Massimo d'Azeglio declared "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians" (Hobsbawm, 1992: p44). Billig (1995: p25) notes how the creation of Italy was presented as a revival of something ancient, which accords with the concept of *Geschichtspolitik*, i.e. functionalising history for political ends. (Heer, and Wodak, 2008: p5)

Wodak (2006: p106) highlights a series of assumptions relating to discourses and national identities. The first assumes a dialectical relationship between discourses and nationalism, hence Benedict Anderson's notion of *imagined community* (1988) is taken to mean that national identities are discursively produced and reproduced. For instance, the newspaper reader at home identifies with a fellow countryman at the front fighting a war, although neither has ever met. The second assumption draws on Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*, and the premise that national identity is somehow distinctive. Benson and Neveu (2005: p3) describe habitus as socialised subjectivity. Habitus organises practices and the perception of practices, with the subjective as social and collective.

Habitus expresses the hypothesis that individual's predispositions, assumptions, judgements, and behaviours are the result of long-term socialisation, most importantly in the family and subsequently school and professional education. It is constantly modified. Bourdieu (1993; 1994) refers to a complex of common but diverse schemata of perception. The schemata refer to to the idea of a *homo nationalis,* a common national culture, a common history, in the present and the future. Such schemata include stereotypical images of *other* nations and their cultures and histories (Wodak, 2006: p106).

Wodak (1999) borrows from the concept of habitus to help comprehend national identity heuristically and how national identity has been internalised, in the course of socialisation (Ibid. p28). Here something of the complexity of perceptions needs to be unravelled. Wodak (Ibid.) refers to national identity including common or similar *beliefs or opinions*, with the national 'we-group' distinguished from certain out-groups. The complex also includes common or similar *emotional attitudes* and *behavioural dispositions*. Wodak (Ibid.p28) utilises Hall's 'narration of nation' (1996) to assist in unravelling this internalisation.

Hall (1996) presents five aspects inherent in the narration of nations. The first aspect is the *narrative of nation* presented in literature, the media and everyday culture generally, which creates connections between stories, historical events and national symbols. Hall's second aspect is the *emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness,*in which national identity is presented as an original identity, present in the nature of things, but sometimes dormant. This second aspect presents national character as an unchanging, unbroken and uniform entity. The third aspect is the *invention of tradition*, which enables rituals and symbols to make both historical confusion and defeats understandable by transforming disorder into community. The fourth aspect is the *myth of origin*, significant in inventing national culture, in which a nation 'exists' somewhere in the mythical past; yet this aspect is nevertheless employed in officially sanctioning narratives of nation. This fourth aspect is also used in antithetical narratives employed to found new nations. The fifth aspect is the fictitious idea of *a pure, original people or folk*.

Wodak (2007: pp.210-211) argues that habitus can be understood as those aspects of culture that are anchored in daily practices of individuals, groups, societies and nations. Habitus includes the totality of learned habits, perceptions and other non-discursive knowledge that might be said to "go without saying" for a specific group - thus it can be said to operate beneath the level of ideology. Through practices, fields condition habitus and habitus informs fields. Returning to Wodak's assumptions relating to discourses and national identities (2006: p106), the third premise is that a single national identity does not exist, but rather different identities that are discursively constructed, according to context.

At this juncture it is useful to distinguish between different forms of nationalism that can surface. Malešević (2006: p307) argues that the potency of nationalism comes from its ability to adapt and metamorphose, dovetailing with distinct and often contradictory official doctrines. Malešević (Ibid.p308) contends that nationalism, having been born in modernity, has cemented itself as the dominant ideology in the northern hemisphere. Malešević (Ibid.p309) argues that there are two principal layers through which political ideologies operate: the realm of the normative; and of the operative. The domain of the normative offers a template of fundamental goals and values. The normative is formulated to espouse key tenets of a particular *Weltanschauung,* providing elaborate statements about the past, present and future of an entire society. The normative offers uncompromising ethical prescriptions, and is predominantly universalistic. The normative also defines itself through reason and ethics, challenging other *Weltanschauungen*, by finding faults in their ethics and reasoning (Ibid.p308).

Conversely the domain of the operative is in the arena of everyday life, with all its complexities, contingencies and flux. Malešević argues:

> This is a domain of existential ambiguity and a constant value dynamism, where different images of the world and different diagnoses of reality compete for the 'souls' of each and all.
>
> (Malešević 2006, p310)

The operative addresses the majority of the population, using simplified concepts and language and is more likely to use emotional discourse. The key principles are also more likely to be personalised, referring to concrete individuals, so as to be recognizable and acceptable to the mass public. Malešević (Ibid.) also argues that the language used can be that of collective self-interest, which suggests Bourdieu's (2005) fields are in conflict.

Malešević's key argument is that despite key normative ideological differences between Islamic Iran, the former communist Yugoslavia and liberal democratic Britain, "there is a great deal of congruence between their respective operative ideologies, with all three articulated in strict nationalist terms" (Malešević 2006: p311). Malešević describes a Britain with a normative ideology transcending the particular, with a system of government founded on reason and the division of powers, with the concept of parliamentary sovereignty confirming that all are equal before the law (Ibid. p315). Malešević (2006) argues that Iran, the former Yugoslavia and Britain are very different in terms of normative ideological content – yet all three speak through the voice of higher reason and advanced ethics. However, when all three cases turn to the level of operative ideology, this is formulated in school textbooks and speeches of leaders. When looking at the operative, there is a shift from the universal message of liberal democratic values (in Britain's case) to the more restricted and particularist expressions of dominant values grounded in the discourse of state-centred nationalism (Ibid. pp.315-6).

There is also the additional aspect of Wodak's 'we-group' (2006, 1999). Tony Blair as Prime Minister said of the British in 1999 (Malešević, 2006: p316) :"what makes us different is our character: hard working, tolerant, understated, creative, courageous, generous." Malešević (Ibid.) sees the nationalism of operative ideology as not having achieved unity, but is involved in a contested and an unending struggle, shaped by politicial, social and historical contingencies. He then argues that nearly all societies legitimise their existence in nationalist terms. However: "This is not to say that nationalist discourse is the only one present in the rhetoric of state leaders, school textbooks or tabloid newspapers" (Ibid. p. 317). Instead what Malešević is arguing is that for normative principles to resonate with the general public, they have to be articulated in a nation-centric way "[t]he success of a particular normative doctrine lies in the process of its 'translation' into its operative counterpart" (Ibid.p317). Complimenting habitus and how it often manifests itself in metaphors and symbols, Malešević argues that near identical metaphors of kinship surfaced on an operative level, in all three national cases (Ibid. p318).

There is another way of dissecting the discursive and ideological construction of nationalism – and the implications of how European integration is perceived within this nationalism. Both Malešević (2006) and Wodak (2006) referred to the banal nationalism of Michael Billig (1995).

Hutchinson (2006) looks at nationalism through the notions of hot and banal nationalism, with some of his ideas overlapping with the work of others in this section of the thesis. Hutchinson argues that hot didactic nationalism instils the idea of a nation as sacred and a transcendent object of worship and sacrifice (Ibid. p298), which can become a community of sacrifice, in times of war (Ibid. p300). This nationalism is self-conscious, systematic and prescriptive. Hutchinson notes how war can deepen a sense of nationalism – as well as undermine it (Ibid.p301), which is relevant in this thesis focussing on the post-World War II European project of integration. Conversely, with banal nationalism, populations consume nationalism in a relatively unselfconscious way, in songs, political posters, bank notes and brand names. Hutchinson (2006) describes the appeal of nationalism as a constructor of

meaning that was able to trump attachments of family, class, region and religion. In this interpretation, national identities are not constructed from above but consumed from below, by an emerging civil society. Perhaps this is similar to Fossum and Schlesinger's notion of a national public sphere ((2007).

Wodak's (2006: p106) third premise is that there is not one national identity, but that different national identities are constructed according to context.
As Wodak (2006) argues national identities are not static, but susceptible to changes. By contrast Hutchinson (2006: p300) argues that nationalism as an ideological movement, is episodic, triggered when the nation is perceived to be in danger, such as sudden threats to autonomy, identity and territorial integrity.

Hutchinson (Ibid. pp.302-3) writes of competing ideological movements, arguing that episodically, national loyalties are challenged by those of religion, class or family – and at other times nationalism is re-enforced by them.

> The reactions to these episodic challenges are shaped in part by older ethnic memories and images that are triggered into life. These periods of nationalist mobilization, sometimes prolonged, in turn deposit further layers of 'experience' into collective memory.
>
> (Hutchinson 2006: p302-3)

Hutchinson (Ibid. p303) argues that the factors affecting national loyalties influence the texture of national culture, providing both inspiring and shameful reference points that members of the nation negotiate in their everyday lives. The result, according to Hutchinson (Ibid.p.304) is the banal nationalism of Billig (1995). This is a national identity so deeply institutionalized in the rhetoric of politicians, newspaper articles and the organisation of newspapers (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) that we are scarcely aware of it at all. This national identity Hutchinson (Ibid. p304) describes as the myth of the nation as a unitary and autonomous society. Furthermore, returning to the notion of the Other, Hutchinson (Ibid.p304) notes how nations are actually fluid, with self-ascription maintained by marking boundaries with 'others.' Hence banal nationalists will become 'hot' when defending elements,

such as cultural distinctiveness, homeland integrity, economic power and political autonomy.

Comparative theory.

The tool to concretise the nature of inter-relationships between nation and newspaper, post-World War II, in the specific Italian and British contexts, will be comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Mancini, 2000). Thus the thesis will have a better idea concerning a number of issues: (i) how and why news and comment is understood differently; (ii) how and why the relationship between governments, political parties and newspapers function in conflicting ways; (iii) why the resulting perceptions that can become embedded in conveying nations, and the European project within those nations, are articulated and structured in ways, which are completely at odds with each other. The thesis scrutinises the inter-relationships between nation, national politics and newspapers, and in turn the microcosm of newspaper cultures – and more specifically still, the cultures of *The Times* and *Il Giornale*. Statham (2008: pp.418-9) argues journalists would adapt if (national) politicians made European governance more salient (but he does not offer an analysis of those politicians and their interactions). Trenz (2007: p89) argues there is a "common distinction" between news reporting and commentating (but does not consider possibly distinct national interpretations and complexities).

Field theory (Bourdieu, 2005, Benson and Neveu, 2005) argues that journalism is heteronomous, lacking autonomy and closely linked to advertising, the commercial imperative of a wide audience and other outside concerns. Bourdieu's (2005) prime focus is whether the journalistic field has lost too much autonomy, whereas Hallin and Mancini (2004) look, more pragmatically, at the complexities of media systems.

One residual aspect of field theory that should be considered is the argument that journalists from very high cultural or economic capital backgrounds are most likely to have the motivation and capacity to change the field (Benson & Neveu, 2005: p6). This could prove relevant to specific journalists within the *The Times* and *Il Giornale*. Similarly, this aspect may be utilised when looking at the sub-field of

Murdoch and Berlusconi within these publications. Bourdieu uses the metaphor of Einsteinian physics:

> the more energy a body has, the more it distorts the space around it, and a very powerful agent within a field can distort the whole space, cause the whole space to be organized in relation to itself.
>
> (Bourdieu cited in Benson & Neveu, 2005: p6)

Both field theory and comparative theory refer to the overlap between the journalistic and political fields and how there can be considerable leakage in both directions, which this thesis explores. A further rationale for employing comparative theory relates to the context of fully comprehending the interactions between national politics and the press – and the resulting effects on final media discourse. Comparison can help the study challenge assumptions which can surface in media research. Hallin and Mancini point out:

> Most of the literature on the media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense that it refers only to the experience of a single country, yet is written in general terms, as though the model that prevailed in that country were universal.
>
> (Hallin and Mancini 2004: p2)

The problem of ethnocentricity (Hallin and Mancini ,2004: p2) is arguably more pervasive still, affecting social scientific research generally. Ulrich Beck (2003: p454) argues our assessments are easily distorted by the role of 'methodological nationalism.' The assumption Beck (2003) challenges, is that every nation has a right to self-determination within the frame of its own cultural distinctiveness. This normative claim he describes as methodological nationalism, which in turn is linked to the organisation of society and politics.

> These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of social science. Indeed, the social scientific stance is rooted in the concept of nation state. A nation state outlook on society and politics, law and justice and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of social science is a prisoner of the nation state. (Beck, 2003: p454)

Hallin and Mancini (2004) go on to make a point beyond the previously mentioned newspaper's naturalisation of nations (see Billig,1995), which is not inherent in what the media convey (Billig, 1995, Anderson, 1999). Hallin and Mancini (Ibid. p2) argue that certain aspects of media systems are so familiar they are not perceived at all. They argue that comparison forces us to de-naturalize, i.e. to conceptualise more clearly which parts of the media system actually require more explanation. Blumler and Gurevitch (1975: p76) say comparative analysis has the "capacity to render the invisible visible."

Hallin and Mancini (2004) suggest a further important reason for conducting comparative research is in order to test hypotheses about the inter-relationships among social phenomena, which concurs with Durkheim's (1965) notion that we have only one means of demonstrating that one phenomenon is the cause of another: it is to compare the cases where they are simultaneously present or absent.

Statham argues that we know little about political communication and news organisations, from a comparative perspective and "even less about how news differs cross-nationally in terms of the reporting of domestic and European political affairs" (Statham 2008: p121) This thesis tries to address these issues, albeit within specific parameters.

2.10 The post-World War II intertwining of Italian politics and the press.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) have formulated various models of media systems, of which the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model regularly refers to Italy, and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model to Britain. It should be noted that the authors are aware that generalisations can surface – yet do provide sufficient details concerning the two countries in question, to mitigate some of this problem.

Liberal institutions, including capitalist industrialism and political democracy, developed later in southern Europe than in the north. The forces of the church were stronger and liberalism only overcame protracted political conflicts in the twentieth century. Italian newspapers were historically the focus of literary minds sharing their thoughts with the elite of society. Alberto Asor Rosa (1992), an Italian historian, speaks of two *filoni* veins (in Italian journalism, the literary and the political with the market traditionally playing a minor role). Journalist Forcella (1959), argues in his essay, *Millecinquecento lettori*, (Fifteen Hundred readers) that newspapers in Italy have always focused primarily on politics and still serve a well-informed, discerning elite - despite the introduction of the mass-circulation newspaper. Forcella (Ibid.) argues that the whole system is organized around the relation of the journalist to that group of privileged readers. Fraser (1992) describes these readers as strong publics, the decision-makers.

Britain has 408.5 newspaper sales per 1,000 adult population compared with 121.4 in Italy (World Association of Newspapers 2001). The latter figure is significantly depleted if one removes Italian mass circulation sports newspapers from the data. One reason for this low figure in Italy, in comparison to Britain, is that the concept of subscribing to a paper is virtually non-existent. The readership of an Italian newspaper is therefore historically very different from the audience in Britain because newspapers have a different form of engagement with readers. In Italy there is a tradition of political advocacy, which historically meant that political journalists saw their role as publicists, influencing opinion (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p26). Often journalists would enter politics and until fairly recently, nearly all newspapers were closely linked to political parties and often subsidised by them or the Italian state. Under the *lotizzazione,* Italian state television channels were until recently significantly linked to political parties (Chiarenza, 2002).

Mussolini's brief pre-World War I career as a journalist is another reason for the politicised post-World War II newspaper climate in Italy The Fascist experience reinforced the need to be politically engaged, with the first post-World War II licences going to anti-fascist papers (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p100). The societal and news values of Italian journalists are likely to diverge from their British counterparts because the historical impetuses are different.

As Hallin and Mancini argue:

> party-press parallelism was the degree to which the structure of the media system paralleled that of the party system. It exists in its strongest form when each news organization is aligned with a particular party, whose views it represents in the public sphere.
>
> (Hallin & Mancini 2004, p27)

For example, the first issue in January 1976 of *La Repubblica* carried an article by founder Eugenio Scalfari declaring the paper to be a "journal of information that doesn't pretend to follow an illusory political neutrality, but declares explicitly that it has taken a side in the political battle…" (Poggioli, 1991: p6) In the 1990s, two new newspapers emerged, *Il Giornale* and *L'Independente,* both seeking wider readerships. *Il Giornale* produced Italy's first sensationalist headlines. Yet despite the sensationalism, *Il Giornale* remains the voice of Silvio Berlusconi's rightist Forza Italia. *L'Independente* is closely aligned to the right-wing Northern League, a party which has in the last two decades often held the balance of power in Forza Italia-led governments - yet still talks of independence for the north (Giordano, 2004). Hallin and Mancini (Ibid.p102) argue that despite Italian newspapers becoming more market-orientated, the rise of Berlusconi has now actually intensified partisanship. In much the same way that Italian society reacted to Mussolini, now it reacts to Berlusconi.

In nineteenth century Italy, Ricuperati (1981) estimates that half of newspaper journalists were priests; and the complex consequences of church and state converging is well documented (Ginzborg, 2003). Advocacy on another level, was sometimes a resistance to secularism by the values of the church, and was a topic

strongly conveyed in newspapers. The counter-trend was the important role of the Communists in post-World War II Italian society as they too had newspapers that were very much the voice of the Communist party. *L'Unita*, for instance, was at one point one of Italy's largest selling newspapers. The church and the Communists are arguably Italy's ever-present sub-cultures indeed the dominant political force in post-World War II Italy has been the Christian Democrats, the political arm of the Church, formed nearly all the Italian governments until the early nineties (Ginzborg, 2003).

The other link that should be made to advocacy is that of clientelism, (i.e. when an individual's connections have a bearing on how they progress in Italian society), contrasted with the Anglo-Saxon conceptualisation of professionalism. When clientelism is linked with advocacy, as traditional undercurrents in Italian journalism, the concept of objectivity ceases to resonate in the way it does in Britain. Indeed a news story has traditionally been expected to include comment, as part of the process of keeping readers informed. There is a strong tradition of writers and intellectuals providing the main article in Italian newspapers, which is still prevalent today. However, Hallin and Mancini (Ibid.p136) argue that clientelism is being increasingly undermined. This includes the effect of European integration, which is imposing common standards replacing particularistic ties and sub-cultures with a common professional culture. Ginzborg (2003: p239) argues that clientelism amongst the political elite is indeed one of the key factors which has mitigated the Italian contribution to Europe. There is therefore an Italian impetus within the political and journalistic fields, to embrace European integration further.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) refer to the influence of majoritarianism, (the concept of an electoral system resulting in a clear victor at an election), on the journalism produced in Britain. By contrast, Italian politics consists of complex coalitions and factionalism. Another crucial difference pertaining to majoritarianism that affects journalism is the clear political line from a victorious party with a normally large mandate, which enables the winning party to speak to, and for, the nation.

In Italy, political regionalism is very strong. The Northern League's manifesto still calls for the possibility of large parts of northern Italy forming a separate state (Ginzborg, 2003: p301). A clear political majority is never the outcome of an election and Italian newspapers naturally reflect the fractiousness of the body politic, contingent with a politically divided nation. In Britain, in comparison, a clearer, homogenous national picture in the press is easier to reflect, although Scottish devolution is changing the complexion however and perhaps modifying this sanitised picture a little (Brookes, 1999).

Hallin and Mancini argue that in Italy newspapers are typically identified with ideological positions and traditions of advocacy and commentary note "The notion of politically neutral journalism is less plausible where a wide range of competing world views contend" (Ibid. p61). On these specific levels, the notion of a cohesive set of national perceptions over Europe in the Italian public sphere, becomes less plausible. The notion of a clear, sanitised national (and media) discourse over Europe, in a way one thinks of Anglo-Saxon countries, is also called into question.

The *Tangentopol*i scandals in the 1990s revealed widespread corruption across the political class. Since Italian judges took centre-stage in the Italian press, systematically exposing the scale of the crisis, both the judges and the press became more powerful, as the traditional political partisanship was transcended, with both claiming to speak for public opinion (Pizzorno, 1998).

Instrumentalisation results in Italian journalists being influenced by powerful owners or other powerful interests, colouring their news judgement and compromising them. Journalist Pansa (1977) describes this as the "*giornalista dimezzato*" – the journalist cut in half – by which half of an Italian journalist belongs to powers outside journalism: media owners, financial backers, and politicians. Donsbach and Patterson (1992) in a survey of journalists in Italy, Germany, Britain and the United States, found 27 per cent of Italian journalists stated that pressures from senior editors or management created very, or quite important limitations on reporting, compared with 15 per cent in Britain.

Berlusconi succeeded, on becoming Prime Minister, in getting around competition laws for his burgeoning media empire despite claims of a conflict of interest. Some journalists argued it was a threat to Italian democracy. Three ministers resigned over what they regarded as unfair media competition laws, allowing Berlusconi to have a near media monopoly. Nevertheless Berlusconi is back in power (2010) for the third time and is widely acknowledged through overseeing state television and its appointees and his own highly popular private national television networks, is in a position to colour public thinking disproportionately (Ginzborg, 2003: pp.285-324). The dominant genre of Italian political reporting in the 1960s was the *pastone*, written by the most prestigious journalists and appearing on the front page (Dardano, 1976). *Pastone* combined a review of the major political developments of the day with comments by the journalist. Despite journalism's increased market-orientation this commentary-oriented journalism has yet to be abandoned (Roidi, 2001). Forcella (1959) began in journalism, thinking facts and news were paramount. Instead he learnt that:

> Facts for a political journalist never speak of themselves. They either say too much or too little. When they say too much you have to make them speak more softly, when they say too little you have to integrate them to give them their proper meaning. Clarity in this work is a cumbersome virtue.
>
> (Forcella, 1959: p454)

Putnam (1973: pp.81-2) conducted a comparative study of political elites in Britain and Italy. He notes in Italy that there was a distinctive discursive style, with adherence to explicit social and moral principles, connected with higher levels of partisanship. Putnam (1973: pp81-2) argues: "In journalism, this style is reflected in the fact that facts are not seen as speaking for themselves, commentary is valued, and neutrality appears as inconsistency, naiveté or opportunism." Essentially, Italian news values are a contrast to those found in Britain.

There were specific key eruptions over European integration in the Italian body politic in the last decade or so. These key exchanges act as a precursor to further fathoming the nature of the Italian discourse on integration in subsequent data. The recent debate that caused ruptures within Italy concerned the euro. The key protagonists provide further evidence of Italy's deep political partisanship. The divisions also demonstrated the surfacing of a particular Euroscepticism, mitigating the post-World War II federalism (Trenz, 2007, Statham, 2008).

Romano Prodi has been the Italian centre-left Prime Minister several times. In November, 1996, Prodi successfully negotiated Italy's re-entry into the European Monetary system, paving the way for euro membership. Two months earlier the Northern League, seeking secession, declared 'Padania' independent. Padania is the Latin term for the northern Italian region in the Po Valley (Ginzborg, 2003: p305). The declaration, by the league's charismatic leader, Umberto Bossi, carried no weight and nothing actually transpired (Giordano, 2004). At that juncture, the league was pro-European, seeing a chance of distancing itself from Rome – by developing links with Brussels (Giordano, 2004: p63). The league joined the EU's Committee of the Regions, giving a voice to those below the nation-state, but the EU was not to prove the panacea that Bossi had hoped. Bossi vociferously argued that Italy had to join the euro, fearing the damage of non-membership for northern trade. He coupled this fear, with again campaigning for independence (Giordano, 2004: p65), which subsequently proved to be a miscalculation.

Romano Prodi's centre-left government succeeded in meeting the euro convergence criteria. In 1998 Prodi left office to become President of the European Commission, with Massimo D'Alema becoming Premier for the centre-left coalition. Under the guidance of D'Alema's government – with Prodi co-ordinating the introduction of the euro, across the continent – Italy prepared to join the euro, and started using the euro in January, 2002, with Berlusconi then just back in power.

The introduction of the euro is one of the foci in this thesis' newspaper discourse analysis. The Northern League still argued for secession, but its economic justification was no longer viable (Giordano, 2004: pp.66-8). There was also a massive switch of support to Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia party. A key reason was that Forza Italia addressed economic issues concerning small and medium-sized businesses, which was very similar to the Northern League's claims. Yet the Northern League's central tenet of separation scared many voters, who felt their economic concerns were being increasingly met. the issue that had been the Northern League's central reason for existence and initially a basis for electoral success in the 1990s, became a liability and problem at the turn of the century (Giordano, 2004: pp.66-8).The Northern League subsequently made a *volte face*, arguing vociferously against the EU, claiming it was too bureaucratic and was taking too much sovereignty from member states, which the party combined with a strong anti-immigration policy (Ter Wal, 2002: pp.157-176). Milward's theory (see Dedman, 1996: p12) of European integration advancing only when it suits nations (or in this case a pivotal political party), resonates with the Northern League's actions.

On the several occasions Berlusconi has formed coalition governments, which were all reliant on the Northern League, as the League held the balance of power. In 1996, Berlusconi fought with other partners against the left. The league fought the Italian general election alone – and the left won (Ginzborg, 2003: p301). The Euroscepticism of the league is, therefore, of importance and may still surface as a strain in a range of arenas: the political discourse on Europe; in Italian society; the inter-relations between national politics and the press and the media discourse within Berlusconi's *Il Giornale* paper.

Giordano (2004: p73) comments on the negative climate towards Europe in northern Italy, in the late 1990s, referring to Diamanti (1998). Diamanti's paper is entitled "Less Italy, Less Europe". The negative climate may have contributed to the Euroscepticism of Forza Italia, regarding the euro with some caution and the Northern League going further still, with an anti-EU stance.

> This slight rise in EU-pessimism, then, was something that the league was reflecting but also increasingly trying to shape for its own political ends. The bottom-line, however, is that Italians, especially those in the North, have traditionally been Euro-positive and this is still overwhelmingly the case today.

(Giordano, 2004: p73)

However Giordano (2004) does go on to demonstrate how the continuing pivotal role of the league in Berlusconi-led coalitions may have influenced their complexion of the coalitions and their portrayal of Europe. Where the Euroscepticism of Berlusconi and Forza Italia stops and the Northern League continues, is hard to discern. Berlusconi has had to distance his coalition from the anti-Europe rhetoric of the Northern League's leader Bossi on several occasions (Giordano, 2004: p73). Berlusconi, although sceptical in some areas has also publicly professed his enthusiasm for Europe (Owen, 2002; Johnson & Farrell, 2003), nevertheless, on joining the euro in 2002, there was a distinctly lukewarm response from Berlusconi's coalition government (BBC, 2002), elected the year before. The political dynamics of the pro-euro Prodi as President of the European Commission and future national political adversary of Berlusconi combined with Berlusconi having to sometimes listen to Forza Italia's coalition partner, the Northern League, may have accounted for the government's negative response.

Berlusconi's minister, Antonio Martino, was a member of the Eurosceptic Bruges group, together with Margaret Thatcher, and as Forza Italia's chief economist, Martino was entirely hostile to monetary union. Martino, as Defence Minister in January, 2002joined with the Giulio Tremonti, Forza Italia's Economy Minister, to give the euro a cool reception. Foreign Minister, Renato Ruggiero, subsequently resigned from Berlusconi's government because of the response to the euro of his colleagues (Berlusconi calms cabinet row, 2002). It is worth noting what Berlusconi said around the time of the single currency entry, as it may help to establish if his tone is replicated by that taken by *Il Giornale*, in the thesis' newspaper discourse analysis. On standing accused of Euroscepticism, Berlusconi told *Corriere della Sera* on January 8, 2002:

> We are firmly convinced that the future of our country lies in a Europe that is stronger and knows how to speak with one voice and knows how to follow up economic integration with political integration, with a new constitution.
>
> (BBC, 2002)

Berlusconi told *The Times* on January 14, 2002 that he wanted Europe to be "strong, democratic, and able to speak with one voice", but not a "centrally run" superstate (Owen, 2002). Berlusconi also spoke of a future of "common European cultural values" but not of the "bloated and cumbersome machine" of "the Eurocentralisers". Martino as a member of the Bruges group was not alone in feeling negative towards the euro, for as Ginzborg (2003: p291) argues "Berlusconi advocated a basically neo-liberal, economic programme, with strong Thatcherite overtones."

However, as Owen (2002) notes, Berlusconi added that "no country is more European than Italy" as one of the founding six and that it was "rubbish" to call him Eurosceptic. "If anything I am a Euro-enthusiast. I am the elected leader of a country whose European credentials are second to none. When Italians voted for me – overwhelmingly – they were voting for an Italy in Europe." Berlusconi accepted that "states surrender pieces of their sovereignty in the interests of a greater identity." He also voiced support for subsidiarity "the principle that decisions are taken at the appropriate level, which derives from the Christian Democratic culture in which I grew up." (Owen, 2002)

Berlusconi accepted that Bossi, leader of the Northern League, had stepped out of line by saying that he "could not care less" about the euro, although Bossi argued the euro was "being imposed on the people from above." (Owen, 2002) Berlusconi defended Tremonti and Martino, who had "merely pointed out that if the introduction of the euro is not accompanied by economic growth, it will suffer in competition with the dollar…" (Owen, 2002)

However, in December 2003, Berlusconi told the BBC that the euro had "so far produced many negative effects," saying that the decision to join was not something decided by his government (BBC, Berlusconi, 2003). An interpretation is that Berlusconi was apportioning blame on his predecessor as Premier, Romano Prodi. Yet Berlusconi made sure that the symbolic signing of the European Constitution happened in Rome in 2004. The evocation of the original signing of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, founding the EEC, was possibly not lost on Berlusconi (Ginzborg, 2003). In a *Spectator* interview (Johnson and Farrell 2003: pp.14-15), some of the perceptions of Europe arguably prevalent in Italy, are re-affirmed by Berlusconi. He confirmed wanting a reference to "Europe's Christian culture or Judaeo-Christian culture" in the European Constitution and a common European foreign policy, which resonates with Ginzborg's (2003) reference to the interweaving of the church into the national political fabric.

Berlusconi's speech at the National Congress of the Young Forza Italia reflects the tension between the national and supranational in Europe. Berlusconi said "Our nation is Italy, but Europe will be our future. For that reason it is important that there are not others who will decide for us..." (Berlusconi 2000: p99). This is a recurring notion of Italy wanting to play an important part in the European arena. Trenz (2007: p103) notes, as mentioned earlier, that Italian concern over constitutionalisation was motivated by fear of being pushed into a disadvantaged position. But while addressing the National Congress of the Young Forza Italia, Berlusconi also said: "faced with the general phenomenon of globalisation, we should occupy ourselves with preserving and re-enforcing our local identity, our culture, our traditions." (Berlusconi 2000: p102). The issue of globalisation is one that vexed Italian interviewees in the subsequent analysis of the speech.

One of the newspaper discourses sought in *Il Giornale's* coverages of the euro, the Reform Treaty and the Irish rejection of that treaty, is that of an undercurrent of Euroscepticism. The context of Forza Italia's pivotal coalition partner, the Northern League, and its developing anti-EU discourse requires further exposition. Firstly, it should be noted that the two parties converge on several issues. Both Berlusconi's

Forza Italia and the Northern League were sceptical over the introduction of the euro, as has been evidenced. Secondly both parties in 2000 campaigned together in regional elections, with the intention of bringing in a draconian anti-immigration law (ter Wal, 2002: pp.162-5), in which the proposers, Berlusconi and Bossi, both claimed that their individual notions of society were 'Christian models of society'. Ter Wal (2002) notes how, in and out groups were clearly formed around immigration. The Northern League's electoral losses to Forza Italia, have been compounded in recent years, by parliamentarians of the former defecting to the latter (Ruzza, 2005). The Northern League has developed a popular anti-foreign discourse, but as ter Wal (2002) documents, the Northern League legitimises this populist discourse by using other 'anti' issues such as anti-Americanism, anti-globalisation and pertinently for this thesis anti-EU sentiment. Ter Wal (2002: pp.162-5) notes how the EU is stereotyped as a supporter of globalisation and multi-culturalism (foreigners), which threaten the ethnic nationalism the Northern League espouses.

There are further Forza Italia - Northern League parallels. Ter Wal (2002) notes how one of the reasons the league did gain a political foothold was because of its anti-establishment positioning, away from the perceived corrupt political mainstream. The *Tangentopoli* of the 1990s discredited much of the established political class, but it should also be remembered that the Northern League in distancing itself from that class also resulted in the populism of Berlusconi. The *anti-politica* sentiment of both parties resonated with large sections of the public.

 The Northern League has often claimed to be representing the silent majority, the 'common sense' of the ordinary man, in the face of the political establishment and Berlusconi often does likewise. Ter Wal (2002) notes that both the Northern League and Forza Italia in their anti-immigration discourses compare the nation to a human organism and the necessity of maintaining Italy's values and traditions. The Northern League communicates this adaption for the North of Italy the party's newspaper, *La Padania* and t *L'Independente*, which is closely aligned to the party. However *Il Giornale*, a Milan-based newspaper of the north with a predominantly northern readership, mainly supports Berlusconi's party, the Forza Italia, (Sani, 2001).

Nevetheless However *Il Giornale*'s discourse may converge along the various lines catalogued, with similar positions shared with the Northern League. So to what extent has Euroscepticism overall seeped into *Il Giornale's* media discourse on integration? As the newspaper develops as a more mass-circulation publication, will appealing to the 'common sense' of the ordinary (northern Italian) reader gain importance?

Table 1. Party-press parallelism in Italian Newspaper Readership, 1996.

Newspaper (political aspect)	Communist Refounding	Democrats of the Left	Popular Party (centre)	Northern League	Forza Italia	National Alliance (right)
Il Giornale (Right)	28	22	8	57	260	188
La Repubblica (Left)	124	156	122	54	34	62

Source: Sani (2001: p205).

Figures show the numbers of voters of a given party that read each paper, per hundred readers of that paper in the population as a whole. Thus figures over 100 indicate that voters of that party are over-represented in the paper's readership; figures below 100 indicate that they are under-represented.

The National Alliance is the third political force that regularly participates in Berlusconi government coalitions. The head of the National Alliance, until recently, was Gianfranco Fini. The National Alliance, that post World war II still supported Mussolini's ideas, has arguably moved, under Fini's leadership, away from its fascist past. The party is still nationalistic but is not Eurosceptic (Ginzborg, 2003: p289). The party's state interventionist policies and southern electoral support has always proved awkward for the separatist and very much northern Northern League. As well as the co-ordinated anti-immigration policies of the Northern League and Forza Italia (Ter Wal, 2002), the National Alliance also proposed a law tightening immigration with the Northern League. The so-called Fini-Bossi law tried to tie immigration to

the needs of the labour market (Giordano, 2004: p77). However, there is no suggestion that the clear anti-immigration of the National Alliance, or Forza Italia, have descended to the point of strong Euroscepticism, as is the case with their coalition partner, the Northern League (Giordano, 2004: p63). However, it does at least suggest a kind of 'Fortress Italy' mentality, to some extent on the political right, evidenced by the widely used word *extracommunitari* (non-EU citizen) entering the Italian lexicon in the last decade. It was Bossi who descended into a comment concerning the threat to the homogeneity of Padania, describing 'cosmopolitanism as the malignant tumour of the third millennium.' (Giordano, 2004: p69)

2.11 The post-World War II intertwining of British politics and the press.

This thesis challenges any naturalised assumptions that British-based readers have about the British press and European coverage. The tradition of party-press parallelism started in Britain and many aspects of it are still prevalent in British journalism. Britain, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004), falls within the Liberal model. However, because of its enduring party-press parallelism, Britain is atypical of the Liberal model. Britain has also proved the exception in its perceptions of Europe (Statham, 2008, Trenz, 2007).

The British press has always mirrored the divisions of party politics fairly closely. While the majority of the press support the Conservatives, although clear-cut party allegiance has weakened in recent years (Seymour-Ure, 1996), *The Times* (historically Conservative) supported New Labour under Blair. Regardless of party political support, Euroscepticism should be considered as the domain of the right-leaning press (Garton-Ash 2005; Weymouth & Anderson 1999), as there is a right-wing populist stance, emphasizing nationalism in the British tabloid press (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001). *The Times* (quality broadsheet) is in Murdoch's Newscorp as is *The Sun* (tabloid). Hallin and Mancini (2004: p211) argue that the popular press in Britain present the newspaper as "speaking for the common citizen and common sense" and Barnett and Seymour (2000) contend that tabloid news values are

increasingly found in traditionally non-tabloid media, including quality British newspapers.

Hallin and Mancini (2004: p211) note that quality newspapers, like *The Times,* have an interpretative style. Henningham and Delano's (1998: p153) survey of British journalists, found that 83 per cent felt it was "very or extremely important" for journalists to "provide analysis and interpretation of complex problems." Contrasting interpretations of British political events show different political orientations, as exemplified by the Parekh Commission, which reported on race relations in Britain in 2000. The press focussed on an argument in the report that the historic concept of Britain was associated with racial exclusion. The right-wing *Daily Telegraph* tried to tie the Labour government to the report, presenting Home Secretary, Jack Straw, as backing down - because the newspaper forced him to. Conversely the left-leaning *Guardian,* took at face value Straw's efforts to distance himself from the report.

Commercial British newspapers developed relatively early at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Høyer and Pöttker, 2005) expanding with little state involvement. Commercialisation not only resulted in mass circulation but transformed papers from small-scale enterprises losing money and requiring subsidies from wealthy individuals, into highly capitalised, profitable businesses. Altick (1957: p322) argues "the increasing value of newspapers as advertising mediums allowed them gradually to shake off government or party control and to become independent voices of public sentiment." However this commercialism is mitigated by the enduring party-press parallelism. There are significant links between newspaper titles, capital generated from advertising revenue and audiences. Access to audiences is sold to advertisers. "When journalism is viewed in such a way, the audience shift from being consumers of a product, to being the product themselves" (Richardson, 2007: p79).

Commercialization has been challenged as undermining democratic life, by concentrating power in the hands of particular interests and by shifting the purpose of the press from the expression of political viewpoints to the promotion of consumerism. De Tocqueville (1969: p519) wrote of an American newspaper that it

can only survive "if it gives publicity to feelings or principles common to a large number of men." Where does this leave *The Times* and how does its readers feel about Europe? Donsbach (1995) finds that 28 per cent of British journalists reported that stories had been changed to enhance audience interest, as opposed to 15 per cent in Italy. There is some evidence that party-press parallelism has declined in recent years "in favour of a more American-style coverage driven by journalists' market-oriented judgements of what makes a 'good story' (Franklin & Richardson, 2002). But, as Gifford (2008) asks, does not this mean that *The Times's* news values (over Europe) are more susceptible to popular Euroscepticism?

Instrumentalization is another parallel between Britain and Italy, in that in Britain there has been a decline in external influence. However, Rupert Murdoch, the owner of *The Times*, has partially reversed the decline, insisting on the political content of his media and using them to intervene in politics (Shawcross, 1992). Murdoch's positions on the euro and the EU Constitution are symptomatic of his instrumentalisation. Murdoch's Euroscepticism, including over the euro, is a matter of public record. The following is James Harding's text as it appeared in *The Financial Times*:

> Vote no," Mr Murdoch said is his message he would like to see spread by his newspapers, *The Sun, The News of the World, The Times* and *The Sunday Times*. "Europe is made up of so many diverse cultures and histories that to slam it altogether with a government of French bureaucrats answerable to nobody…I cannot see anything but benefit by waiting.
>
> (Harding, 2002)

This citation includes an evocation of British national sovereignty being suppressed by the French. This notion already surfaces in an example from *The Times* on October 18, 2007, used in the thesis' methodological framework for the newspaper discourse. The second sentence of that article, for example, reads: 'The Prime Minister sent a letter yesterday to fellow leaders calling for the EU to promote free trade and openness, a direct challenge to *(French President)* Mr Sarkozy's attempt at the June summit to move to a more protectionist Europe.'

The Times editor, Robert Thomson, was interviewed by *The Guardian* (Greenslade, 2002). Thomson claimed that Murdoch left his editors alone on issues - but would also not commit to an editorial position on the euro. Murdoch, like Berlusconi, also made his position clear on a possible EU Constitution (BBC, 2003a). He was questioned over the possibility *The Sun* could back the Conservatives, at the next election (Ibid.) Murdoch replied: "It's a long way away, let's see what the government is doing with Europe, let's see how Mr Howard performs, how the government performs." In the television interview, he warned of the "great dangers" of the new European Constitution. Murdoch added: "I don't like the idea of any more abdication of our sovereignty in economic affairs or anything else." He said he would wait to see what was in the final EU Constitution, but that if it was anything like the draft "then we'll (*his newspapers*, author's italics) oppose it" (Ibid.)

Editorial autonomy within *The Times* was agreed when Murdoch bought the paper in 1979, but proved ineffective (Shawcross, 1992). Curran and Leys (2000: p232) note more centralised British editorial control has occurredgenerally, since the 1970s, which accords with Morgan (1995: p324) arguing that London news desks tend to give coverage a Eurosceptic inflection. According to *The Independent*, Blair was to be offered a place on Murdoch's board after he had stepped down as Prime Minister. Grice (2006) alleges that this was partly a 'thank you' for supporting the Iraq War, which all Murdoch papers had done. Former Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar was given a seat on Murdoch's board in June, 2006, a month before Grice's article was published. Spain, under Aznar's leadership, had also supported the American-led war. Grice (2006) alleges that Blair, during his premiership, met Murdoch two or three times a year. Under pressure from the Information Commissioner, Downing Street admitted to a telephone conversation between the two in 2003. Grice claims that Blair was keen for Britian to join the euro, but before being elected in 1997 had told *The Sun* of his love of the pound. According to Grice (Ibid.), the papers put pressure on Blair to drop his plans for a euro referendum. Grice (Ibid.) claims Murdoch lobbied hard for a referendum on the proposed EU Constitution. Murdoch allegedly only secured a u-turn with the help of Jack Straw,

the Foreign Secretary. While Blair did promise there would be a referendum, but the French and Dutch 'no' votes in referendums put the promise on hold (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: p1). This example catalogues the potential instrumentalisation by Murdoch.

There are further similarities, in terms of party-press parallelism and instrumentalisation between Italy and Britain. Henningham and Delano's (1998: p154) survey however, found that 44 per cent of British journalists said they had suffered "improper editorial interference" with a story, compared to Donsbach and Pattersons' (1992) 27 per cent of Italian journalists.

A distinctive strain in British journalism is an adversarial relationship between the media and the state, which is possibly due to the principle of freedom of the press being an adjunct to parliamentary sovereignty in Britain and somehow part of its legal constitutional framework. Morgan (1995: p331) demonstrates that British journalists and EU officials often differ in their expectations of one another. Some EU officials expect a degree of deference, not commonplace with British reporters, who view the role of the press as a watchdog, guarding the (national) public interest, which creates friction.

Hallin and Mancini (2004: p222) note that in the Liberal model, journalism is professionalised, with journalists having their own set of criteria for the selection and presentation of news, which is different to the situation in Italy where the standards of journalistic practice are less separated from politics. Yet the authors note that in Britain, journalists were less fussy about how they gathered news, than in America, with the British market being highly competitive and the ethical self-regulation and the notion of journalism as a public service "weaker in the British press." Professionalism in the British press can also take another form, with journalists mastering the skills of creating political news, appealing to popular sentiments (Smith et al, 1975: p35). In this scenario, journalists take collective pride in doing this well, sidelining their own political opinion. This professionalism is critical to understanding how it is possible that a strong majority of British journalists have

historically been on the left politically - while most of the newspapers are on the right.Yet how far is this from Forcella's (1959) commentary-orientated Italian journalism? Forcella started out, thinking journalism was all facts and news, but that: "facts, for a political journalist, never speak of themselves." When saying too much, they are tempered, when too little "you have to integrate them to give them their proper meaning." (Forcella, 1959: p454)

The thesis has previously mentioned the Euromyths web site compiled specifically to contend with British press coverage of Europe, by the commission's UK headquarters (Weymouth and Anderson, 1999). De-naturalising how we see British journalism is important (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Britain played a pioneering role in developing what Chalaby (1996) called fact-centred discourse, but this type of journalism can still be manipulative and actually infused with comment.

Hallin and Mancini (2004: p240) note the common ground in Britain, concerning parliamentary democracy, a market economy, a relatively strong welfare state and that British nationalism "is very extensive." They note that though the British press is characterised by partisan differentiation, it does nevertheless tend to present itself as representing "the people in general." This is compounded by the economic imperative of a very competitive market for readerships. Hallin and Mancini describe majoritarianism as implying the existence of a unitary public interest overriding particular interests "parties compete not for a larger or smaller share of power, but to represent the nation as a whole" (Ibid.p242)Britain has a fiercely autonomous legal system, as noted with the split with Roman law. This is coupled with a pronounced sense of national and parliamentary sovereignty. Combined, this creates the platform for belief in a homogenous state, represented by politicians and press alike (Ibid. p243).

Substantive differences appear in the inter-relationships between nations and newspapers in Britain – and in Italy. In Britain, one can see, in combining majoritarianism with consumerism, how the press could convey, reproduce and

perhaps even inflame national perceptions over Europe. Conversely in Italy, thinking back to Forcella (1959) and newspapers trying to reach the *Millecinquecento lettori*, 1, 500 readers, a different picture emerges. As suggested earlier, there is a national and newspaper dynamic in Italy, which does not (historically at least) lend itself to serving national perceptions on Europe, but more specific, factional, elite interests.

At this juncture a brief note is taken of specific key eruptions over European integration in the British body politic in the last decade or so. It has been noted how in Italy there is considerable political partisanship, in the press and in politics. Yet a very broad post-World War II pro-European consensus still appears to be holding (Ginzborg, 2003), despite some scepticism surfacing. Conversely in Britain, with its majoritarian two-party system, there is a structure which makes forming a consensus easier. Yet it will be seen how European integration causes deep divisions *within* the Conservative Party and to a lesser extent New Labour also. So in the British case, political partisanship is internalised, *over* Europe. It is also clear that British politics never moves close to endorsing federalism, shifting between Thatcher's vociferous Euroscepticism to the Brown's exceptionalism. One form or another of Euroscepticism is never too far away (Gifford, 2008).

Hard Euroscepticism can be defined as fundamental opposition to the idea of political and economic integration and expresses itself as a principled objection to the current form of integration of the EU, on the grounds that it offends deeply held values, or more likely, is the embodiment of negative values (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: pp1-27). In contrast *soft Euroscepticism* involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and may express itself in terms of opposition to specific policies or in terms of the defence of national interest. Taggart and Szczerbiak (Ibid.) accept these are only working definitions that are not without problems.

In Italy there has been a soft variant, as the specific issue of the euro met with objections within the Berlusconi government as it was introduced (Berlusconi calms cabinet row, 2002). Furthermore as Trenz (2007: p103) notes, Italy was sensitive to

the possibility of European integration at different speeds, confident it could be a front-runner, concerning the EU Constitution. Notably this is a national interest that wants Italy at the centre of matters European. It is only the peripheral (yet politically pivotal) Northern League that appears to have developed a broader form of hard Euroscepticism. And even so, let us not forget that the Northern League was pro-European in the past (Giordano, 2004).

In contrast, the most notable British rupture was Margaret Thatcher's speech in Bruges, in which she declared the pre-eminence of the nation-state. This had a whole series of consequences. The strength of this attack on federalism meant Britain's commitment to agreed supranational objectives was cast in doubt, threatening a resurgence of inter-governmentalism (Gifford, 2008), the speech was also viewed as a riposte to the federal vision of the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. A further consequence of the Bruges episode was the internal split within the Conservative Party, with the mobilisation of Eurosceptics, like Thatcher, against the pro-Europeans. The split resulted in the formation of the Bruges Group of Eurosceptic politicians, including Antonio Martino who had been Berlusconi's Defence Minister, during the euro's introduction in Italy. The tremors continued, with former Prime Minister, Edward Heath, launching attacks on Thatcher in the media and in Brussels. This distaste for European supranational institutions amongst the Eurosceptics precipitated disastrous results for the Conservatives in the European elections a few months later (Gifford, 2008).

The Conservative press, as well as the pro-Labour *Daily Mirror*, support anti-Europeanism (Gifford, 2008: p143). Thatcher did not speak of pulling out of Europe, but spoke of (a subsequently illusory) *European superstate* in which national identity would be submerged (Bainbridge, 2000). The press arguably took this further, culminating in a series of attacks in *The Sun* on Jacques Delors, during 1990 (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) And the discord in the Conservative party continued.

There was a populist re-imagining of Europe as the *Other*, which surfaced as Prime Minister John Major negotiated the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. This more virulent strain of Euroscepticism had taken hold of key sections of the party, and the grassroot supporters, resulting in Eurosceptics coming to dominate the party (Gifford, 2008: p143).

The undercurrent of Europe, the *Other*, is still buoyant and best epitomised in the success of the UK Independence Party, which defines itself by opposition to the EU and the drafting of the European Constitution. UKIP rallied Conservative Eurosceptics to the clarion call for a referendum on EU membership and succeeded in coming third in the European Elections in 2004 and second in 2009 (Taylor, 2009). As Gifford (2008: p143) notes, UKIP's policy of complete withdrawal from the EU, has allowed the Conservatives to position themselves as a middle way on Europe. It is this underlying discourse of seeking complete withdrawal from the EU that will be noted in the newspaper discourse of *The Times*.

The effects of this internal division within the Conservatives continue to the present. The current leader, David Cameron, has tried to move on to other issues, to cover the centre ground, yet large sections of the press, coupled with a widespread public Euroscepticism, keeps dragging him back to this issue (Gifford, 2008: p143). In January, 2009, Cameron appointed Europhile Kenneth Clarke to the Shadow front bench, as a result of which Europe re-surfaced as an issue in the press instantaneously.

Labour, in power from 1997-2010, was seen to be more pro-European than the Conservatives. Although, Blair governments initially tried to undermine Franco-German dominance, New Labour under both Blair and Brown was reluctant to fight right-wing Euroscepticism. As Rawnsley (2001) explains, the New Labour leadership was divided and unwilling to become entangled in a battle for an unpopular cause. Current Liberal Democrat leader and Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, described the vitriol of the press on Europe, and the cowardice of governments in not confronting it. Peter Stothard, as editor of *The Times*, did not get

the paper to back Blair in the 1997 election, as expected, instead *The Times* told its readers to *vote Eurosceptic*, and analysed every constituency in order to tell the readers which candidates shared *The Times'* position, to the left, right or centre.

Gifford (2008: p145) argues that Gordon Brown as both Chancellor and Prime Minister "re-asserted the advantages of British exceptionalism." Gifford (Ibid.) argues there is a coupling of an attempt to create an Anglo-Europe and reveal a flawed European federalism. The notion of an Anglo-Europe revolved around Britain's endeavours concerning free trade and subsequently globalisation. The notion offered an alternative to the political-economic integrative model of Germany and France (Gifford, 2008, pp.140-1). As Brown re-asserts this Britishness, the Europe presented is arguably similar to the one conveyed by Thatcher at Bruges.

> British values have much to offer, persuading a global Europe that the only way forward is inter-governmental, not federal, mutual recognition not one-size-fits-all central rules; tax competition, not tax harmonisation, with proper political accountability and subsidiarity, not a superstate.

(Brown, 2003)

2.12 News values – and their national contexts.

News values vary considerably in the contexts of Britain and Italy. This section will examine the role of globalisation and commercialisation, and engage with the argument that there is now greater homogeneity in journalism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), which has a bearing on our understanding of news. This section also examines Harcup and O'Neill's (2001) revisional analysis of the seminal study on news values by Galtung and Ruge (1965). The analysis of news values will also help in providing a framework for the thesis' later data analysis. Harcup and O'Neill (2001:p267) warn in the preface to their findings that "there is no objective or neutral way of deciding which categories should be used."

In their revision, Harcup and O'Neill (2001: p279) refer to a *relevance* category: stories about issues, groups and nations perceived to be relevant to the audience. This section has shown that the audience in Britain (despite party-press parallelism) may at least be perceived to be a 'national public' – and a small elite in Italy. *Relevance* already takes on two divergent interpretations. A second revised category is that of *newspaper agenda*: stories that set or fit the news organisation's agenda. As proposed at the outset, one of the quandaries this research faces, is to try to discern when a newspaper is constituting discourse from social practice, as commonly perceived by the national audience – and when it helps constitute it.

The following relates to the first category, *relevance*. Sonwalkar (2005: p263) argues that there is a vast reality beyond such constraints, not considered newsworthy. He argues we now have the phenomenon of *banal journalism,* which "presents one view as the world view of an entire society or nation." (Sonwalkar, Ibid.p263) It is such a construction this thesis is contending. Sonwalkar (Ibid.) argues that a news event has to cross the line between *us* and *them*, before being deemed newsworthy. This accords with Europe as the *Other* in the British press, as Weymouth and Anderson (1999) contend. Allan argues:

> Cultural specificity: events which conform to the 'maps of meaning' shared by newsworker and news audience have a greater likelihood of being selected, a form of ethnocentrism which gives priority to news about people like *us* at the expense of those who don't share our way of life.

> (Allan 2004: p58)

Billig (1995: p175) presents national identities as grounded in powerful social structures maintaining inequity. Sonwalkar (2005) argues banal journalism symbolises the ways in which journalism is actually practised – as opposed to how it should be practised. But does it apply to both countries, and if so, does banal journalism apply in equal measure?

2.13 The countervailing force of commercialisation and globalisation on the media - confronting national discourses over Europe?

The presentation of globalisation as a threat to nation (Collins, Garnham, and Locksley, 1988: p55) is arguably now dated. The authors wrote of global communications empires, mentioning Murdoch and Berlusconi and argued that the maintenance of national sovereignty and identity was becoming difficult, in the face of such transnational production and consumption. Billig (1995) has provided a counter argument, stating nation has proved robust, surviving the perceived threat from globalisation.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) look at the concrete environment in which journalism is being produced – and how it is changing, having implications for discourse. Hallin and Mancini (Ibid. p252) note that politics is also professional, with campaigns run by specialists in political marketing, often drawn from the media world. They describe Berlusconi's Forza Italia as the purest example of:

> a party originally built without members, in which political and media professionals play a key managing role, and that exists solely as a marketing vehicle for the individual leader.
>
> (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p252)

Ginzborg (2003: p290) argues the Berlusconi team poured over every detail, relating to marketing, advertising and polling techniques, as they constructed the Forza Italia political party in 1993. Never had a political party been so closely aligned to a single business. Hallin and Mancini (2004) include Tony Blair in this professional political phenomenon. But what, Gifford (2008) asks does this mean, in concrete terms, for a British political class apparently shying away from Europe? (This issue is coupled with British governments unwilling to take responsibility for communicating Europe, compounding the European communication deficit (Dougal, 2004). We live in a time when the public relations machines of political parties are getting forever more efficient. The communication deficit over Europe, in Britain, will subsequently be

described as the *national political communication deficit*. Is Berlusconi conversely, getting a specific message across on Europe to *Il Giornale* readers?

Hallin and Mancini (2004: p290) argue that story selection is increasingly not decided by political criteria, but by journalistic criteria of 'what makes a good story.' The authors point out however, that this media logic is also a hybrid logic, with the growth of professionalism coupled with commercialisation. Symptomatic of this new media-centred age, is the decline of the subcultures of the church and the Communists in Italy.

> The birth and the victory of Berlusconi's Forza Italia, relying almost completely on mass media for its connections with the electorate is an excellent illustration of this decline – and the tendency for media correspondingly to expand their social role.
>
> (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p264)

Yet Italian newspapers are not decreasing their political coverage, because of market-orientation, but in contending with the phenomenon of Berlusconi, are increasingly partisan but ironically, *Il Giornale* maintains a strong political identity. Former editor, Vittorio Feltri (2003) explained why he left *Il Giornale*: "When I understood that the Berlusconi family needed an editor of a party newspaper, I could not stay. It is not a job that I know how to do."

There are two other conflicting tendencies at work. Party-press parallelism appears on a certain level to be waning, as ideological differences between parties decrease; but this is countered by the rise of extreme right parties in Britain, e.g. the UK Independence Party (Taylor, 2009, Gifford, 2008) and in Italy, e.g. the Northern League (Ter Wal, 2002).Both these parties promote anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism and anti-European integration policies. Socialists in France in 2002 had to do the unthinkable and vote for the Gaullist Jacque Chirac, to ensure the possibility of an extreme right National Front President in the form of Le Pen did not occur (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p285).

Two other trends may also be developing in the personalisation of stories in the press (Trenz, 2007), focusing often on political personalities and a tendency to give privilege to the opinions of the *ordinary citizen* (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p278). The trend of personalisation is linked to focusing on the experiences and perspective of the *common citizen*, the reader, as opposed to official representatives. This thesis' newspaper discourse analysis of how European integration is presented will unravel how and why national perceptions are active in helping the audience to draw on national historical contexts and collective memories to arguably form '*common sense*' understandings of Europe (Musolff, 2004). In terms of personalisation of stories, Berlusconi has often dominated Italian news - as *the story*. Personalisation is strong in the British press and has increasing importance in the press globally. Harcup and O'Neill (2001) argue however, that personalisation was not in evidence in their study.

1. Haycraft (1987, p.240): "Another problem is the complicated nature of Italian law, which is based on Roman and Napoleonic codes. 'The trouble is that the law tries to cover every eventuality,' said a lawyer friend of mine in Sicily. 'As a result it becomes so complicated that it can't be applied to anything!' In hospitals No Smoking signs include the number of the law which justifies them and in Vigevano there is a notice, presumably legal, forbidding people to ride bicycles inside the cathedral!"p240

2. Duroselle (1990: pp.411-415) says: "Nationalism and the fragmentation of Europe into nation-states, are relatively recent phenomena: they may be temporary, and are not irreversible. The end of Empires and the destruction wrought by nationalism have been accompanied by the defeat of totalitarianism and the triumph of liberal democracy in Western Europe, completed in 1974-5. This has enabled people to begin to rise above their nationalistic instincts." Duroselle was convinced of Europe's basic 'unity in diversity'. "There are solid historical reasons for regarding Europe not only as a mosaic of cultures, but as an organic whole" (Davies, 1997, p43). Duroselle (1990: pp.411-415) received criticism, i.e. half-truths about half of Europe. J.Nicholas in The Guardian, 25th Oct, 1991.The Academy of Athens accused Duroselle of saying that non-Western meant something was non-European, questioning Duroselle's concept of European history.

Chapter 3.
Methodology and Analytical Framework.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has moved closer to the social sciences and away from its roots in linguistics. CDA regards the context of what is said or written as a necessary part of analysis – in order to provide insights into social processes (Wodak, 2004: pp.185-6). CDA can be described as a heterogenous school, not constituted by a single methodology or theory but often many, in a multifarious, interdisciplinary approach (Wodak, 2004: p185). It is useful to now engage with the notion of 'critical' both in critical linguistics (CL) and CDA, which has developed out of CL as both have a similar approach. Fairclough (1995) talks of CDA making visible the inter-connectedness of organisations, while Bourdieu (2005) argues for the need to render invisible power structures, visible.

CDA and CL seek to establish the structures of dominance and power relations, behind language, hence the need to engage with the context. On the issue of context, CDA and CL part company with pragmatics and traditional socio-linguistics and the concept of an autonomous system of language. For instance, Wodak (2001: p5) notes the limited attention of earlier sociolinguistic research such as Labov (1972) and Hymes (1974) to issues of hierarchy and power. As a means of underlining the distinction between CDA and earlier sociolinguistic approaches, a citation by Wodak (2001: p10) is perhaps useful: "For CDA, language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by the use powerful people make of it." CDA and CL seek to avoid a simple deterministic relationship between texts and the social (Wodak, 2001: p3). Instead the complexities of discourse: structured by dominance; being historically produced and interpreted coupled with the legitimisation of dominant structures by ideologies of powerful groups are part of the contextual topography that is analysed (Wodak, 2001: p3).

Habermas argues that language is also a medium of domination, serving to legitimize relations of organized power. Habermas argues such structures are not actually apparent, and in this sense language is 'ideological' (Wodak, 2004: p187). An analysis of metaphors will be one way in which this thesis tries to unravel such a legitimizing process, within a CDA approach. Straehle et al (1999: p68) refer to how metaphors provide a central role in implementing certain interpretations of situations – and excluding others. Metaphors help to define certain actions as legitimate and necessary (Straehle et al, 1999: p68).

Wodak (2004: p188) notes that different CDA approaches employ various grammatical theories. Wodak (2001: p7) shows the reliance of CDA on Hallidayan linguistics, Bernsteinian sociolinguistics, and the work of literary critics and social philosophers such as Foucault, Habermas and Bakhtin. Wodak (Ibid. p8) argues that regardless of whether a CDA approach is primarily philosophical, sociological or historical, in most studies there is reference to Hallidayan systemic functional grammar. Wodak (2001: p8) suggests "This indicates that an understanding of the basic claims of Halliday's grammar and his approach to linguistic analysis is essential for a proper understanding of CDA." Halliday stressed the relationship between the grammatical system and the social and personal needs that language is required to serve. Halliday distinguished three metafunctions of language, which are continuously interconnected: language lending structure to experience, with a dialectical relationship at work, with language both reflecting the social scructure and influencing it; secondly, the interpersonal function, constituting relationships between participants; and thirdly, the textual function, which constitutes coherence and cohesion in texts (Wodak, 2001: p8). The thesis embraces the Hallidayan approach to linguistic analysis and will be apparent in the frameworks for both analysis of interviews and the newspaper discourse. The latter analysis, for instance, uses argumentation theory (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001), which draws on systemic functional grammar (Halliday, 1994).

Some of the distinctions between a CDA approach and other forms of language study, can be further refined. As made clear close to the start of this thesis, a discourse-historical analysis forms part of this work's CDA. CDA approaches can draw on Foucault. But DHA (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: p31) does not align itself with Foucault and post-modernist theories of discourse and power "which reify or personify language and discourse as autonomous" (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: p31). DHA also draws on the work of van Dijk, endorsing his notions of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: p31), which form part of the field theory (used in interview data analysis) and argumentative theory (used in the DHA of newspapers).

Wodak (2001: pp.4-5) however, notes how CDA's hermeneutic approach receives criticism for being, at the societal level, incompatible with Van Dijk and Kintsch's (1983) emphasis on sociocognitivism (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: p31).
Van Dijk (1985, 1998) also focuses on a top-down causality of opinion forming from an allegedly homogenous elite (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: p31). Within this study, Mautner's (2008) notion of 'rapport with the reader' is considered in the formulation of the national newspaper discourse; and the field theory analysis of interviews forms part of the overall CDA in this thesis. Here also, interviewees revealed an awareness of an 'audience-ratings mentality' with both politicians and journalists sometimes pandering to the public.

In light of what has been said thus far, this investigation adopts a CDA approach, seeing language as social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) and considers the context of language use as crucial (Wodak, 2004: p186; Benke, 2000). How are national perceptions concerning Europe, embedded in the context of nation and how do they manifest themselves in language? Who is winning the ideological and political battle over language in newspaper discourse and how? Who is succeeding in presenting and framing a *common-sense* understanding of Europe? (Musolff, 2004)

The CDA approach, like other critical theories, is "aimed at producing enlightenment and emancipation" and rooting out a particular kind of delusion (Wodak, 2004: p187). Wodak (2007) refers to how different actors reflect their own needs and interests, as does Bourdieu (1998, 2005), with the concept of *symbolic violence*. CDA emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work, as problems in society are too complex to be studied from a single perspective and consequently methodologies are adapted to the data under investigation. CDA also requires an ethnographic element and an abductive approach, with constant movement between theory and empirical data.

It is useful to briefly note, at this stage, some examples of how CDA has been useful to the critical study of journalism, demonstrating an awareness of some of the issues raised. Van Leeuwen studied film and television production and Hallidayan linguistics (Wodak, 2004) and also produced publications relating to the language of television interviews and newspaper reporting and has since developed a methodological tool, actor's analysis (Van Leeuwen 1993), enabling the examination of both written and oral data. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) map out how CDA is useful in disclosing the discursive nature of much contemporary social and cultural change. Fairclough pinpoints the language of the mass media, with the media as a site of power struggle, where language is 'apparently' transparent (Wodak, 2004: p188). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) also challenge the notion that media institutions are neutral, providing space for public discourse by illustrating the mediating and constructing roles of the media. For instance, Fairclough (1995) argues there is a blurred boundary between the voices of the newspaper and the writer and the voice of the secondary source (individuals and organisations) being reported.

Research is continuously adapting CDA's multifaceted approach, including any relation to analysis of the media. For instance, Baker et al. (2008) have combined a CDA with corpus linguistics to examine discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the British press. On a more mundane level, however, the in-groups and out-groups advanced in van Dijk's approach to CDA and journalism, and re-articulated more recently in the DHA of Wodak and Reisigl (2001), are also now found in Baker et al. (2008).

3.2 Definitions.

Discourse.

Discourse is understood in this research, as undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rules, norms and conventions. Lemke (1995: 7ff) draws a clear distinction between discourse as the social activity of making meanings and a text referring to the specifics of an event . Discourse in Lemke's (1995) interpretation, implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures, according with van Dijk's explanation (1985,1998) – whereas text is a specific and unique realisation of a discourse (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p7).

The rationale for unravelling various layers of context in the literature review was to assist in understanding the backdrop to subsequent media discourses. But throughout the literature review, as well as charting unfolding histories there was also a challenging of the naturalness, internalisation and socialisation of the knowledge and collective memory of European integration, *within* the respective nations and newspapers under scrutiny.

Wodak and Weiss (2004) argue that the concept of context is an inherent part of discourse analysis and can contribute significantly. Wodak (2004) argues that in investigating complex social problems it is necessary to draw on multiple theoretical approaches to analyze given contexts and relate these to texts. The discourse-historical approach taken in this study (Wodak, 2001, Wodak, 2004) tries to transcend the purely linguistic dimension of discourse, to systematically include the

historical, political, sociological and psychological dimensions in the interpretation of a discursive event.

This research has included elements of: (i) historical revisionism; (ii) political communication; (iii) theories of nationalism and the public sphere; (iv) conceptualisations of history and (v) field and comparative theories. In this sense DHA is context-dependentand tries to work inter-disciplinarily, multi-methodically, and on the basis of a variety of different empirical data. DHA minimizes the risk of critical bias, by following the principle of triangulation (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p13). DHA follows a complex concept of social critique, which includes at least three inter-connected aspects, two of which are primarily related to the dimension of cognition and one to the dimension of action (Wodak , 2001: pp.64-5).

Text or discourse *immanent critique* aims at discovering inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures. For instance EU spokespeople quoted in newspaper articles may refer to the importance of supranationality – and the role of nation – in the same sentence. The *socio-diagnostic critique* is concerned with demystifying the possibly persuasive or manipulative character of discursive practices. With the socio-diagnostic critique, the analyst exceeds the purely textual or discourse internal sphere. The researcher makes use of their background and contextual knowledge and embeds the communicative or interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances. At this point the researcher is obliged to apply social theories to interpret the discursive events. The *prognostic critique* contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication, by for example, providing proposals and guidelines for reducing language barriers in media reporting. In this instance the research may:
 a) cause journalists to pause for reflection in how they are communicating Europe, working on the reporting principle of providing a full picture – and not just re-affirming common-sense understanding;
b) encourage the EU to engage more effectively with national public spheres and;

c) pressurise national governments to more openly convey the EU supranational level of governance to national publics (assuming government resistance, as appears to be the case in Britain, prior to analysis).

The approach focuses on a core perceived problem, that national perceptions are the basis on which European integration is conveyed in the final media discourse of the respective newspapers under scrutiny.

3.3 Interviews - the last layers of context.

Interviews with the various actors will provide the last layers of context before a systematic discourse analysis is undertaken of three (previously mentioned) specific events relating to EU integration. The contextualisation provided by the interviews is simultaneously part of the empirical analysis of this investigation (Bourdieu, 2005, Benson and Neveu, 2005). Issues raised in the earlier contextualisation in the literature review will be integral to the analysis of field and comparative theory. The minutiae of interaction between the different fields of action need to be understood, to avoid assumptions about social action or practice in the thesis' discourse analysis. This part of the study will also provide the basis for comparing and contrasting what interviewees believe is happening in terms of the internal dynamics of national discourses on European integration – and what is actually written in *The Times* and *Il Giornale*. This provides the platform for potential corroboration – or contradiction, which, alone may be illuminating.

3.4 Ethnography.

Wodak (2001: p69) states that DHA always incorporates fieldwork and ethnography to explore the object under investigation. Ethnography can be defined as the engagement of a researcher with his or her subject at the local level. Such an endeavour requires a commitment to actually being there in the field. This entails engaging with the people one wants to study, interacting with them and participating in the routines of their everyday life (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p186).

This thesis examines various fields of action that may have a bearing on what finally surfaces in the media discourse on European integration – and which have succeeded in attaining a voice. Moving from the macro to the micro level, honing in on the locality of the journalistic fields in both countries, and further still to the specific journalistic fields of *Il Giornale* and *The Times*, is a form of ethnography, establishing the particular socio-cultural dynamics at play. To draw a parallel, Wodak (2004) drew on data from semi-structured interviews to study the competing national and institutional identities that politicians and officials orient themselves towards, in the organizational context of the EU. This thesis is utilising interviews to further comprehend the nature and inter-relationships of competing fields of action, contesting to convey their messages in the scrutinised newspapers (Bourdieu, 2005). As Mautner (2008: p48) explains, textual analysis needs to be underpinned by a thorough understanding of the conditions under which the print medium to be investigated is produced and consumed.

Ethnography can assist this investigation on several other levels. Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2008: p189) refer to a commitment to transparency and reflexivity in the research process. The choices made, in relation to field and comparative theory, have been designed to: a) draw on the contextual knowledge attained in the literature review; and b) to systematically and empirically establish a detailed understanding of the dynamics of competing fields and of newspaper production in relation to the surrounding fields, in order to avoid assumptions in final newspaper discourse analysis. Just as Muntigl, Weiss and Wodak (2000) used ethnography to grasp the discursive practices of EU policymaking, so this study will do likewise, concerning newspaper production of discourse on European integration.

Data should also be used to actually challenge the previous knowledge (or prejudices) of the researcher, i.e. to avoid 'fitting the data to illustrate a theory' (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p197). In terms of reflexivity, the research process has already forced me to reconsider, for instance, the importance of communitarianism. Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) discussed communitarianism and its need for a pre-political cultural identity, prior to creating a possible European

public sphere. Yet they argued that such a notion was maybe unnecessary, a point I then considered.

The investigation has already criticised Trenz (2007: pp.106-7) and the 'consensus' he found, concerning a collective European memory in newspapers – which, it is argued, held only briefly. Statham (2008: pp.418-9) did not take issue with the journalists interviewed, arguing the politicians were not sufficiently engaged in winning over 'hearts and minds'. But as a critique of newspaper discourse over Europe was lacking there was the inherent danger of fitting the data to illustrate a theory. It is hoped the breadth of this investigation, including all the relevant parties; coupled with its multifaceted methodological and theoretical approaches, will at the least counter this criticism.

Furthermore, my ethnographic experience as a journalist will mitigate certain assumptions. I used to work for *The European*, an attempt at a trans-national newspaper in English. The London-based newsdesk, was at pains to make sure that the news values employed were somehow pan-European and avoided any particular British Eurosceptic inflections (Morgan (1995: p324). Conversely working on the *Daily Mail* foreign desk I was acutely aware of the need to present Europe from a very specific, Eurosceptic vantage point. Similarly working as a night reporter at *The Times*, all things European were given a specific Eurosceptic inflection by the newsdesk – and similarly reporters were already expected to present the news story in that vein, 'with the readers in mind.'

The importance of avoiding fitting the data to illustrate a theory works on several levels in this thesis. Firstly, the importance of the specificities of national context and the resulting world views can be quietly forgotten in media research on Europe that does not engage with these socio-political backdrops. My research tries to always consider this national hinterland, as Beck argues "To some extent, much of social science is a prisoner of the nation state" (Beck, 2003: p454).

The inter-relationship of the social context and how such social action manifests itself in language is central to DHA and a great deal of CDA. The data illustrating the theory is also addressed in the DHA approach in this thesis. The DHA approach attempts to be reflexive and transparent and comprehends the need for multi-disciplinarity, to address the complexities of the discourse, as reflected in the various interactions and inter-relationships of various political actors on the stage over Europe - including newspapers themselves. It will be a case of unravelling and analysing the various layers of context (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008: pp.13-14).

3.5 Fields of action.

Fields of action may be understood as segments of the respective societal reality, which may contribute to constituting and shaping the frame of a discourse, on the basis that reality is socially constructed. Wodak (2001: pp.65-66) assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and the specific fields of action (including situations, institutional frames and social structures), in which they are embedded. On the one hand, the situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and on the other, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions. The interviews will act as the last layers of context, contributing to our understanding of each field. Analysis of the fields is expected to inform the subsequent newspaper discourse analysis. A discourse about a specific topic can find its starting point in one field of action and proceed through several others.

This thesis and the analyses comprise the fields in Table 2.

Table 2. Fields of analysis covered by the thesis.

FIELD *Sub-field*	ITALY	BRITAIN
European Union	Yes	Yes
European Commission	*Yes*	*Yes*
European Parliament	*Yes*	*Yes*
National Political	Yes	Yes
Journalistic *Berlusconi* *and Murdoch Newspapers*	Yes *Il Giornale (Berlusconi)*	Yes *The Times (Murdoch)*
Ownership	*Berlusconi*	*Murdoch*

3.6 Discourses:

The EU discourse on integration:

between the European Commission and European Parliament (supranational);

The intergovernmental Council of Ministers (national);

British national political discourse on integration;

A further British national Eurosceptic political discourse on EU withdrawal (at the extreme end);

The Times newspaper discourse on European integration.

Italian national political discourse(s) on integration **1**

A further Eurosceptic Italian national political discourse, emanating from the

Northern League (at the extreme end);

Il Giornale newspaper discourse on European integration.

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1 I use the plural, noting the possible political fractiousness of the Italian political arena and do not assume one political national voice. Although under Berlusconi a greater constructed national homogeneity may have emerged.

The newspaper discourse is the macro-topic of European integration in both countries – and does not concern either the euro or constitutionalisation. These two topics are regarded as conduits by which national relationships with and perceptions of Europe can be scrutinised, rather than the topics being more central to the thesis. The debate on the euro engages with economic integration, although also the debate does contain political integrative elements. The debate on constitutionalisation engages with political and legal integration, which may or may not contribute to a cohesive Euro-comity (Trenz, 2007). The Irish referendum rejection revisits the 'dramatisation' of the European debate, drawn up by Fossum and Schlesinger (2007: p1) after the French and Dutch rejections. With this dramatisation, the Eurosceptics interpret the rejection as demonstrating the EU Constitution (or Reform Treaty) has having gone too far. Conversely, the Euro-federalists interpret the rejection as showing the EU Constitution (or Reform Treaty) is not substantive enough (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007).

3.7 Genre.

A genre may be characterised as the conventionalised, more or less schematically fixed use of language associated with a particular social activity (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008: p15). However Wodak (2008: p17) has observed a move from inherent textual characteristics, through to a more functional approach and finally an approach focused on social practices, conventions, rules and norms governing *certain* sets of groups of speakers and listeners. Trenz's (2007: p89) claim of a "common distinction" between news and comment has already been challenged. The thesis will include both the genres of news and comment. What has already been shown earlier is that when looking at the detail, news is often infused with comment (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, Harcup and O'Neill, 2001), and in very different ways in Britain and Italy, partly due to different societal impulses and norms of production and consumption of newspapers.

3.8 A framework for the analysis of interviews.

3.9 Field theory.

The analysis of doxa, the universe of tacit presuppositions that we accept as natives of a national society, (Bourdieu, 2005) are engaged in this section. It is expected that doxa will take several forms: personal doxa; doxa that may surface within the national political and journalistic fields and subsequently specific institutional doxa of *The Times* and *Il Giornale*. Scrutiny of doxa may also establish if federal or regulatory visions of Europe are presented (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007).

The use of symbols, and more specifically symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2005: p37) will be examined. A distinction should be drawn here between Bourdieu's example and what may surface in subsequent data. Interviews were conducted with only the interviewer as the audience. However, in Bourdieu's symbolic violence example (Ibid.p37), a bishop's comments were published in the press (and thus was already part of newspaper discourse). Nevertheless, if symbolic violence is interpreted as present in the interview data, it will still contribute to the comprehension of how perceptions of European integration can be discursively constructed within nation.

In unravelling a little the complexity of interaction between the various fields, the aim is to render some of the invisible struggles, visible (Bourdieu, 2005). If patterns emerge within or transcending fields, they will be noted and interpretations offered. In dissecting various fields and the interaction between fields, and the manner in which the journalistic field may be constrained (economically and politically), yet in turn constraining (politicians) will be examined. Marchetti (2005) makes the point that news is never just the product of the specific 'logic' of the journalistic world. Marchetti (Ibid.) argues that it is important to engage with the other social spaces, in comparative research, thus avoiding a media-centric bias. Other issues, drawing from the field theory architecture in the literature review, will be analysed, if they occur. For instance, Bourdieu (2005) argues that an 'audience ratings' mentality can take hold across fields, with the public's position influencing journalists and politicians alike.

An issuethat needs to be recalled is that both field and comparative theoretical analysis is seeking to investigate the discursive construction of European integration *within* nation –and render visible the ideological and cultural struggles in Britain and Italy. National habitus and its exposition in the field theory architecture will act as a basis for noting how national discourse is constantly modified, by changing contexts (Wodak, 2006). How negative *Other* presentations (of other nations and indeed Europe) are utilised, will also be investigated. Something of the complex discursive construction of national identity, nationalism (and European integration within those boundaries), will be scrutinised. A heuristic unravelling of national habitus will be one level, seeking to extricate something of the internalisation and socialisation of Europe within nation. Looking at the different manifestations and notions of nationalism: of the normative and the operative (Malešević, 2006) and the hot and banal (Billig, 1995, Hutchinson, 2006) will be other layers for analysis.

Field theory is an attempt to follow a more empirical approach (Benson and Neveu, 2005: p9) in comprehending the complexities of the national public sphere (and in this study the comprehension of perceptions of European integration within that sphere). Benson and Neveu (Ibid.p3) argue that an explanation of discourses should draw on structures within a field and in relation to other fields, coupled with the historical trajectories of those involved. The biographies of interviewees will be included, contributing to comprehension of individual historical trajectories.

3.10 Comparative theory.

Bourdieu's (2005) field approach calls for an examination of institutional logics: the simultaneous analysis of social structures and cultural forms. In a way, the second tier of the analysis of interview data, employing a comparative approach (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) performa that role. Scrutiny of 'media logic', by simultaneously analysing *Il Giornale* in Italy, *The Times* in Britain – and the newspapers' engagement and inter-relationships with the fields around them, is undertaken. Here analysis of the journalistic fields of *Il Giornale* and *The Times*, will draw on the sections in the literature review examining the post-World War II intertwining of

Italian and British politics and the press (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). A brief re-visit of key concepts that materialise is now undertaken.

Majoritarianism, with Britain's two-party tradition, returns strong majorities, with governments often speaking to and for the nation. Conversely in Italy, complex government coalitions form, with *clientelism* and factions, coupled with strong regional identities, accentuating problems, concerning formulating 'national' positions. Murdoch's and Berlusconi's positions concerning the euro and European Constitution have been catalogued. Their newspapers may reflect, to some extent their positions, hence providing *instrumentalisation. Editorial interference* may also be interpreted by interviewees to be a factor. If and how any particular political actors are in a position to dominate and distort a field (or even transcending fields), will be examined.

Evidence of any *party-press parallelism* (with newspapers conveying a political party's position on Europe), *advocacy* (with Italian political journalists overtly seeking to influence opinion) or conversely *professionalism,* when purported objectivity is maintained (and say British left-leaning journalists write from a right-wing Eurosceptic perspective) will be investigated further. Here a clearer comprehension of the discursive construction of Europe within the newspapers will hopefully emerge, as unravelled by the interviewees. It should be stressed that the aforementioned concepts, although more prevalent in one country, may also surface in another. For instance, Italian newspapers are becoming *professionalised.* These are the last layers of context and act as a precursor to the thesis' newspaper discourse analysis.

The last element in the equation is to establish if there is any evidence of an EU communication deficit (EC, 2006: p4, Statham, 2008); any national political communication deficit (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007, Dougal, 2004); a journalistic communication deficit (Trenz, 2007). If there is any interaction between these deficits, this too will be established. These deficits may contribute to how European integration is perceived and discursively constructed within Italy and Britain.

Deficits may create an absence of clear information to and from various fields, finally filtering down to *Il Giornale* and *The Times*. The idea is to renderas visible the invisible structures in and between fields (Bourdieu, 2005). The initial focus is Italy, working on the principle of de-naturalising the comprehension of initial British-based readers and their own national and institutional perceptions of European integration (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, Beck, 2003: p454).

I interviewed, between 2003 and 2004, 16 journalists and politicians from Britain and 5 journalists and politicians from Italy (see Table 3, which follows the format of Table 2 of indicating who represents each country and Field or Sub-field).

Table 3. Interviewees by Nationality, Field and Sub-Field

FIELD *Sub-field*	ITALY	BRITAIN
European Union		
European Commission	Carlo Corazza	Geoffrey Martin Dr Jim Dougal Christopher Bell Antonia Mochan
European Parliament	Luciana Castellina	Christopher Beazley Nick Clegg Richard Corbett Dr Martin Bond Simon Duffin
Journalistic	Paola Buonadonna Carla Cazaninni	David Walter David Sells Frederick Baker Angus Robertson
Il Giornale	Roberto Scafuri	
The Times		David Charter Rory Watson Anthony Browne
Ownership		

EUROPEAN COMMISSION sub-field.

Carlo Corazza *(Italy)* as the Head of Press for the European Commission in Rome, was in a position to comment and did so at length, concerning the Italian media landscape he engaged with on a daily basis. He is the opposite number to Bell in the European Commission's London office.

Geoffrey Martin *(Britain)* opened the European Commission office in Northern Ireland in 1979. From there he moved to become Head of the Commission's UK representation, until 2002. In May, 2000 he wrote an article in the *UK Press Gazette*, the trade magazine for journalists, arguing there was a need to police unfair reporting of EU affairs.

Dr Jim Dougal *(Britain)* succeeded Martin as head of the European Commission representation in the UK in 2002. He was previously a journalist for more than 30 years, including a spell as the BBC's Northern Ireland political editor for the BBC. He wrote an article in *The Guardian* in June, 2003, attacking *The Daily Mail* over its Euro referendum and complaining of the vilification of Europe in some of the British Press.

Christopher Bell *(Britain)* is a former *Daily Mail* journalist and former Head of Press for the European Commission office in London, working closely with Jim Dougal.

Antonia Mochan *(Britain)* was a European Commission spokesperson for Employment and Social Affairs, who then went to work specifically for a commissioner from one of the accession countries in central Europe.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT sub-field

Luciana Castellina *(Italy)* From 1947-69 she was a member of the Italian Communist party. In 1969 she was among the founder members of *Il Manifesto* a left-wing newspaper, which on forming was linked to a Communist splinter party. Castellina became a Communist MP in 1976 and in 1984 became an MEP. Her last book commemorated fifty years of the EU in 2007: "Fifty years of Europe, an anti-rhetorical reading".

Christopher Beazley *(Britain)* stood down as an MEP at the 2009 Euro elections, after more than twenty five years of service. He was Conservative spokesperson on Constitutional Affairs from 1999-2001. Beazley was more recently the Conservative spokesperson for Culture, Media, Education and Sport in the EP. Beazley used to teach European history at Sussex University.

Nick Clegg *(Britain)* is a Liberal Democrat. He was an MEP for East Midland, 1999-2004. As an MP he has represented Sheffield Hallam since 2005. He was elected leader of the Liberal Democrats at Westminster, in December, 2007. Currently he is the Deputy-Prime Minister in the UK Government of Prime Minister David Cameron. As an MEP, he was a senior policy adviser to the vice-president of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan. In 2000 he wrote a paper for the Centre for European Reform, setting out radical proposals for the reform of the EU. Clegg

has had a spell as a journalist, writing for the *Financial Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. He is of Dutch-Russian extraction and has a Spanish wife. He, like Baker, has therefore experienced Europe beyond Britain's national understanding of it. Clegg studied anthropology at Cambridge, political theory at the University of Minnesota and European Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges.

Richard Corbett *(Britain)* was Labour MEP for Yorkshire and Humber, until he was defeated in the 2009 Euro elections by a British National Party candidate. He was rapporteur on the European Constitution and was closely involved with its drafting and presentation. Corbett was a spokesman for both Labour MEPs and the whole EP Socialist group on constitutional affairs and the future of the EU. He is the author of the book "The European Parliament" published in 2003 by John Harper, which is a guide to how the EP works, and several other books on the EP and the Maastricht Treaty. On being interviewed he handed me a sheet he had written titled "The draft European Constitution summarised on one page".

Dr Martin Bond *(Britain)* Bond studied Modern Languages at university and attained a European Studies Sussex doctorate before teaching at a Northern Ireland university. In the 1960s he was a BBC producer. In the 1970s he worked as a Brussels-based press attaché for the Council of Ministers, just after the UK joined the EEC and in the 1980s had a spell as a BBC correspondent, including in Cold War Berlin. From 1989-99 Bond worked as head of the London press office for the EP. He now works for the Federal Trust, a think-tank contributing to the study of federalism and federal political systems.

Simon Duffin *(Britain)* is a press officer for the UK representation of the European Parliament.

JOURNALISTIC field
Paola Buonadonna *(Italy)* is an Italian, educated at Edinburgh and City universities and has worked in Britain for well over a decade. She worked for *The European* before developing a career with the BBC. She has worked for a plethora of BBC programmes on Europe, mostly now defunct. Buonadonna is a reporter on the EU for the BBC's *Politics Show*.

Carla Cazaninni *(Italy)* was a fellow founder member of *Il Manifesto*, with Castellina. Cazaninni had just spent over a year pouring over the draft European Constitution at the time of interview.

David Walter *(Britain)* is a former TV and radio correspondent and presenter. He has worked as a political correspondent for ITN, Channel Four and the BBC. He was the BBC's Paris correspondent and presenter of Radio Four's *Talking Politics* and *Europhile* (the name was subsequently changed to *Eurofile*). He has since worked for several years as director of communications for the Liberal Democrats and was a speechwriter for Charles Kennedy. Walter was educated at Oxford and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he was a JF Kennedy Memorial scholar.

David Sells *(Britain)* was a reporter specialising in foreign affairs. He was a *Reuters* correspondent in Rome, Warsaw, Bonn and then a manager in Brussels. Sells has been a BBC correspondent in France, Vietnam and the Lebanon. He used to work for BBC's *Newsnight* and Radio Four's *The World Tonight*.

Frederick Baker *(Britain)* is an award-winning Anglo-Austrian documentary maker based in Vienna, who makes films for the BBC, Channel Four and ORB Austrian state television. Baker made a controversial film about the Austrian nationalist, Jörg Haider. He has worked for BBC's Newsnight and has written about central Europe for *The Independent* and the defunct *The European*.

Angus Robertson *(Britain)* used to work for Radio Free Europe and the BBC in Vienna and various British media outlets. Robertson, who is Scots-German, also offers another perspective in being a Scottish National Party (SNP) MP at Westminster and was the SNP spokesperson for foreign affairs. He now heads the group of Westminster SNPs, replacing Alex Salmond, who has returned to Scotland to assume the role of First Minister in the SNP Scottish government.

NEWSPAPER Sub-field

Roberto Scafuri *(Italy – Il Giornale)* was chief political correspondent for *Il Giornale* and therefore David Charter's opposite number at *The Times*. He engaged daily with the national political perspective on Europe. Scafuri acts as a counterweight in *Il Giornale's* slightly more critical stance on Europe (in comparison to other Italian national newspapers). *Il Giornale* is firmly placed on the right. Scafuri however is openly of the left and less Eurosceptic than his newspaper overall. He is encouraged to write from this perspective.

Scafuri's personal narrative is interesting, reflecting the complexity of strong regionalism in Italy and that country's north-south divide. Naples-born Scafuri joked about 'emigrating' to the north and Milan from the deep South. I mentioned I was married to a Napoletan. This had an instantaneous effect on my rapport with Scafuri.

David Charter *(Britain – The Times)* has worked for *The Times* since the late 1990s and was initially their education correspondent before becoming the newspaper's chief political correspondent, based at Westminster. He recently became *The Times'* Europe correspondent, based in Brussels. His He was educated at Southampton University.

Rory Watson *(Britain – The Times)* is an established freelance who for several years has written for *The Times*. He also worked for the defunct *The European*.

Anthony Browne *(Britain – The Times)* was the *The Times* Europe correspondent, who subsequently went to work for a right of centre think-tank, Policy Exchange.

3.11 Rationale for interviewee selection.

The core selections were those of the chief political correspondents for *Il Giornale* in Rome (Roberto Scafuri) and *The Times* in London (David Charter). These two reporters have to deal with national politics daily and negotiate national perceptions of Europe and various positions from political actors, both national and EU. This selection created a consistency and meant the journalistic fields specific to these two newspapers could be explored. An established freelance who writes for *The Times* (Rory Watson) and a former *Times* Brussels correspondent (Anthony Browne) were also interviewed, deepening the understanding of *The Times* journalistic field.

In terms of the EU field, the head of press for the European Commission in both Rome (Carlo Corazza) and London (Christopher Bell) were selected for interview, to establish the specificities of how the two countries engaged with the commission and vice versa. In the British case it was possible to corroborate further, with a series of interviews with former heads of the EC's representation in London, (Geoffrey Martin, Jim Dougal). In terms of the EC sub-field it also proved possible to interview a Brussels-based EC press spokesperson (Antonia Mochan).

In terms of the European Parliament sub-field, I decided to interview an MEP from each country (Christopher Beazley, Luciana Castellina), aware that other than the EC, the other supranational institution was the EP. Further corroboration with other UK MEPs from the other two main political parties (Nick Clegg, Richard Corbett), proved possible, resulting in a more rounded picture. Two EP press officers (Martin Bond, Simon Duffin) were also interviewed.

I also decided to interview several other journalists from each country who have actively been engaged in covering the debate on European integration. One Italian journalist (Carla Cazaninni) had been examining the details of the European Constitution for their newspaper. Another Italian journalist (Paola Buonadonna) offered several perspectives, working for the BBC and as a former correspondent for *The European*.

In terms of the British journalistic field, two veteran journalists (David Sells, David Walter) provided a broader picture of post-World War II Britain in Europe. Two other reporters provided trans-national journalistic perspectives, as an Anglo-Austrian (Frederick Baker) and a Scots-German, the latter now active as a luminary in the independence-seeking Scottish National Party (Angus Robertson). These two were closest to my personal trans-national journalistic perspective. On this level Nick Clegg also provided a different perspective, being of Dutch-Russian extraction.

The interviews were structured conversations, which were interactive and open-ended. The aim was to gain deeper insights and understanding of subtle and complex perceptions concerning Europe. The informality allowed for greater flexibility and facilitated the exploration of areas precipitated by respondents, which enabled me to gain as full a response as was possible. This approach, for instance, allowed for an exploration of interaction between various parties in the development of institutional and subsequently national perceptions of Europe, such as between national journalists and EU press offices. Interviews were however structured conversations, so that I still retained control of the terms of the discussion (see Appendix 1 for an interview template).

3.12 A framework for newspaper discourse analysis.

A series of news stories and commentaries in *Il Giornale* and *The Times* are investigated in the newspaper discourse analysis. The analysis focuses on the: introduction of the euro (January 1-2, 2002); the summit agreeing the 2007 Reform Treaty (October, 20, 2007); and the Irish Referendum rejection of the Reform Treaty (June 14, 2008). In most cases, analysis initially focuses on the key news story, followed by scrutiny of the related commentary.

Specific categories are applied to the analysis of news. The approach taken is to scrutinise the use of specific words and phrases in the texts, as the initial building blocks of analysis. The categories address many of the issues raised in the theoretical sections and endeavour to establish the way European integration is discursively constructed within these two newspapers. The news analysis will include a

comprehension of *relevance* to the readership and the *newspaper agenda*. In analysis of the language, the focus includes: *lexis; intensification* and *mitigation; referential strategies; and modality*. In the modality category, a link will be made between the lexical and syntactic levels in analysis (Mautner, 2008).

Mautner (Ibid.) stresses the importance of a method customised to tackle the questions asked. An examination of news stories will help in unravelling something of the discursive construction of European integration. The study will bore deeper still into the more complex linguistic devices that are employed in the commentaries. In this type of article,the view point positions are put forward, endeavouring to persuade readers and possibly politicians to the same viewpoint. The use of argumentation strategies and conceptual metaphors by writers in persuading readers is investigated.

Mautner (Ibid.) utilises various examples to illustrate and concretise how categories outlined can manifest themselves in the language of newspaper discourse. Specific articles used by Mautner (Ibid.) to this end, are also referred to in this analysis, and reproduced in full. By doing this, the reader is offered (as is the case with Mautner) a full exposition of the usage of categories and their manifestation in concrete examples. Several of the newspaper articles Mautner (Ibid.) refers to, are extreme examples in *The Sun*, where certain prejudices are expressed.

Hence, to cater for the more subtle and nuanced persuasion and possible prejudices expressed in *The Times* and *Il Giornale*, it is useful to also apply the categories to other relevant articles from one of those two newspapers. An article in *The Times* on October 18, 2007, on the Reform Treaty summit is included. This news story was published a couple of days before the agreement was reached. The October 20 *Times* main news article forms part of the British newspaper discourse analysis. Initial analysis of the October 18 *Times* article serves as a means of: demonstrating the pertinence and application of the categories selected for news analysis; provides some context as a precursor to the October 20 coverage. Much as with the articles Mautner (Ibid.) used, it provides the reader with a concrete example.

It will be however in the commentaries that large 'meaning-making structures' (Mautner (Ibid. p 42), will be scrutinised. The rationale is that in these longer articles are given the space to, for example, formulate: (i) the persuaviness of the newspaper; (ii) the paper as a political actor;(iii) to advance the position of the government or their political opponents; (iv) to persuade either or both policy makers and the public to the papers argument. Hence argumentation (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) and metaphors (Musolff, 2004, Straehle et al, 1999) are possibly employed as linguistic devices utilised in persuasion and the construction of perceptions.

Oberhuber et al. (2005: p263) find a lot of divergence between national newspapers over constitutionalisation. This can be formulated as an issue for this thesis. Do Britain and Italy differ substantially on the level of semantics, thematic structures (eg contested issues), and structures of relevance and argumentation (eg apportioning blame) in newspaper discourse? Did articles debate very different issues?

3.13 Categories for analysis of news stories.

Mautner (2008) argues that in analysing newspaper discourse, two main areas deserve particular attention: *news values* and *news sources* and the chain of selection processes in production. Drawing from the news values section in the preceding chapter, the analysis will focus on the following news values (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001): *relevance* and *the newspaper agenda*

The rationale for the choice of each is as follows. *Relevance* to readership entails potentially large differences between the more historically market-driven *The Times* and a more politically partisan and elite readership for *Il Giornale*, despite the gap closing a little (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Thus on the level of production, there may be a different approach, the different historical and socio-political context will result in *relevance* being differentiated further.

The respective *newspaper agendas* concerning European integration are equally complex, with many factors already mentioned: the charted instrumentalisation of

Murdoch and Berlusconi traditionally influencing their publications; *The Times* asking its readers in 1997 to vote Eurosceptically; the complex national political in-fighting over the last decade between Prodi and Berlusconi, much of which has revolved around Europe. Arguably transcending the areas of relevance and the newspaper agenda, is the role of the *common citizen* with a *common-sense* understanding of Europe (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, Mautner, 2008). Do the newspapers appeal to common sense (relevance); or furthermore mobilise it, to justify their own positions (newspaper agenda)?

Journalists, by their methods of newsgathering, tilt the balance in favour of powerful elite sources (Bell, 1991: p59). These news actors are capable of pushing their agendas and frames of understanding into the media (Tuchman, 2002: p89). Fairclough's (1995: p59) view is that this results in a predominantly establishment world view, which this thesis explored. Mautner (2008: p33) argues that "What discourse analysis aims to do is to show how language is instrumental in constructing this view and to challenge it through deconstruction."

Lexis.

Mautner (2008) refers to *ideologically-loaded keywords* surfacing in discourse. These can be *banner words,* signifying importance or conversely *stigma words,* alerting readers to negativity. Mautner (Ibid.) utilises two articles in *The Sun* on EU enlargement (Research Texts A and B). For the purpose of this investigation the work is also useful because of the subject matter (another EU focus) and choice of publication (as a part of Murdoch's Newscorps like the *The Times).* Hallin and Mancini (2004) note the populism of the tabloids was seeping into the quality newspapers. The framework analysis will draw on Mautner's (Ibid.) articles from *The Sun.* However, where possible the framework will also draw from *The Times* article on October 18, 2007 (Research Text C). Mautner (Ibid.p38) notes how *The Sun*'s articles supported an anti-EU enlargement agenda, "Yet one looks in vain for any explicit statement to this effect." Patterns in the choice of words will be sought, especially those with a distinctive *evaluative meaning* (Hunston, 2004: p157).

In *The Times* piece, although not explicit, in the context of the article – and the criticism it and the EU received in Britain a "document to replace the *failed EU constitution*" can be interpreted as carrying at least some negative evaluative meaning (Research Text C, Line 19).

Mautner (2008) refers to the *labelling of news actors* (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). In *The Sun*'s two articles, Eastern European migrants have an unequivocally negative semantic loading: *crooks, gangsters, mob, undesirables, Europe's criminal underclass.* In *The Times* piece, Neil O'Brien, the director of the *Eurosceptic* Open Europe think-tank, is labelled a *Eurosceptic*, denoting his position for the reader, rather than carrying any negative evaluation (Research Text C, Line 52).

One of the categories Wodak (2001) refers to in DHA, is that of *intensification and mitigation* of discriminatory utterances. Mautner (2008) refers to the heightening of the sense of urgency and crisis, by the use of adjectives with negative polarity: *soaring* violence and *rampant* immigration (Research Text B, Lines 1 and 2,).

There are *referential strategies*, in DHA, creating in-groups (us) and out-groups (them). Such groups can result in a whole series of discursive strategies in a text. Nevertheless, Wodak (2001: p73) regards the discursive construction of *us* and *them* as the basic fundament of identity and difference, and refers to the extreme right-wing populist politician, Jörg Haider, using a referentially ambiguous *we*, which could be interpreted as meaning his party (Wodak 2004: p197). However in the context (and the example shows the importance of this element) of Haider being an authoritarian figure, an alternative interpretation would be similar to the British monarchs' use of the Royal 'we'.

The interface of the lexical and syntactic levels.

Modality bridges syntax and lexis, *as* Stubbs (1996: p202) argues:

> language is used to encode meanings, such as degrees of certainty and commitment, or alternatively vagueness and lack of commitment, personal beliefs versus generally accepted or taken for granted knowledge.

<div align="right">(Stubbs 1996: p202)</div>

Markers of modality include modal verbs, such as: *can, might, must* and modal adverbials, such as *perhaps or certainly*. Depending on which markers are employed, the result may be:

i) a tentative proposition of low modality, such as: he *might* leave, *perhaps* they are too old;

ii) a proposition that the speaker fully commits to: he *must* have left; they are *definitely* too old;

iii) unmodalised declaratives, expressing the strongest form of affinity and commitment, with the speaker fully supporting the truth value inherent in the assertion, instance. eg. he *has* left.

On October 18, 2007, the day before the Reform Treaty summit, *The Times* declared: "Gordon Brown is planning to (*might)* pick a fight with President Sarkozy of France at this week's European summit as he tries to move the agenda on from demands for a referendum on the EU treaty" (Research Text C, Lines 1-3) This then becomes "French diplomatic sources confirmed that France was expecting (*there might be*) a row with Mr Brown and did not rule out a direct response from Mr Sarkozy" (Research Text C, Lines 45-46)

Neil O'Brien, the Director of the Eurosceptic Open Europe think-tank, said: "Downing Street *may* well be trying to cook up a fake row about something else like globalisation to distract from the enormous transfer of powers Gordon Brown *is about to sign up to*" (unmodalised declarative) (Research Text C, Lines 52-55) Notably the article later finishes with: Mark Francois, the Shadow Minister for Europe, said: "On the eve of the Lisbon summit, Gordon Brown *is clearly trying to*

divert attention (unmodalised declarative) away from his manifesto promise of a referendum and the fact that his much-vaunted red Lines are collapsing under detailed scrutiny" (Research Text C, Lines 78-81) Mautner (2008: p42) also noted the high level of certainty expressed by *will*-predictions, for example in *The Sun*: the government will NOT deport thousands of illegal immigrants (Research Text B, Line 6).

The focus of the news article gradually intensifies. We move from a series of tentative propositions, finishing more strongly with two unmodalised declaratives. The story is repeatedly saying Brown will pick a fight with France in order to distract readers from a referendum. The story also occasionally reminds readers how Brown is transferring British powers to Brussels. It should be noted that both the unmodalised declaratives come from Eurosceptic news actors – but not from *The Times*, which remains with the tentative propositions of low modality. Making a brief ethnographic observation, this means that if its tentative proposition is wrong, *The Times* is covered and not factually incorrect – leaving the much stronger declarative language to politicians. A second brief ethnographic observation is that newspapers often get others to make the assertions they do not wish to be seen to be making. Reporters (including myself) are then congratulated by the newsdesk: 'Did you get the quote? Well done, now we have the story.'

In the headline, *The Times* permitted an unmodalised declarative: Gordon Brown *picks fight* with France to divert attention from referendum. A final ethnographic interpretation is that if this proves to be inaccurate, the journalistic scapegoat in this instance is the sub-editor who finally put the headline on the story before it went to press. The reporter is normally absolved, as is newsdesk. It is normally the newsdesk that takes the complainant's call – and often blames the sub-editor's penchant for hyperbole. The newspaper is normally (in my experience) fully aware, however, of the overall impression the headline creates.

3.14 Categories for analysis of commentary pieces.

Argumentation Theory.

Mautner (2008: p42) describes *argumentative discursive strategies* as "larger meaning-making structures." These types of strategies can give a text a cohesiveness and coherence. Wodak and Reisigl (2001: pp.69-70) discuss argumentation theory, taking as heir starting point an analysis of the notion of persuasion. This they argue is the means of intentionally influencing a person so that they adopt, fix or chang their ways of perception, attitudes to and views on persons, objects and ideas. This could also affect one's disposition to behave or act in a specific way.

But as Wodak and Reisigl (Ibid.) note, persuasion can be double-edged. This is clearly apparent in German verbs *überzeugen* and *überreden* (Kopperschmidt, 1989: pp.116-21), which can both be translated into English as to 'persuade.' In addition *überzeugen* can be translated as to 'convince.' The notion of bringing about a rational, universal change, with such conditions that anyone should agree, essentially power-free communication, is expressed by *überzeugen*. Wodak and Reisigl (2001: p70) argue that such communication can be deemed to be critical, though mostly counterfactual and partly utoptian. These are models to which societies and speech communities should try to approximate as much as possible. Conversely *überreden* denotes a particular, restricted consent, under conditions of suspended rationality. Here, forms of non-argumentative compulsion, such emotionalisation, suggestion and brainwashing, can compel approval by repressing the ability of rational and logical judgement and conclusion. Wodak and Reisigl (Ibid.) are aware that this is primarily an abstract and theoretical distinction. However there are rules for characterising and discerning reasonableness in critical discussions (Kienpointner, 1996: p26, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 1994). I do not propose to present all these rules but an engagement with them when applying argumentation theory. On any occurrence, I present the particular rule.

Wodak and Reisigl (2001: p71) argue that there are violations of the rules in persuasive, manipulative, discursive legitimation of say ethnicist and nationalist discrimination, relevant to this study. Lurking in the hinterland of this current investigation, but arguably growing stronger in the current economic downturn, are the voices of the Northern League in Italy and the UK Independence Party in Britain.

In argumentation theory, such violations are called fallacies. The *argumentum ad verecundiam* is the mis-placed appeal to deep respect and reverence. This fallacy entails backing one's own standpoint, by means of reference to authorities considered competent, superior or sacrosanct. The appeal to such authority is always fallacious, if the respective authority is neither competent nor qualified, is prejudiced or quoted inaccurately (Ibid.p72). A special 'fallacy of authority' consists of presenting oneself as an authority if one is not, falsely parading one's qualities. This fallacy violates several of the rules characterising and discerning reasonableness in critical discussions (Kienpointner, 1996: p26, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 1994). One of the rules, number seven, stipulates that: a standpoint must not be considered to be conclusively defended, if the defence does not take place by means of commonly accepted schemes of argumentation, which are plausible and correctly applied. Another rule (number four) states that a standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint (Kienpointner, 1996: p26, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 1994).

Mautner (2008), in analysing *The Sun*, notes that an argumentative strategy is used to denounce immigration by linking it to crime. Wodak and Reisigl (2001) and Oberhuber et al. (2005) refer to *topoi*, in which such argumentative strategies are more fully explored. In argumentation theory, *topoi* can be described as parts of argumentation which belong to obligatory, either explicit or inferrable premises. They are content-related warrants or conclusion rules, connecting the argument with the conclusion and justifying the transition from the former to the latter (Kienpointner, 1992: p194).

The *topos of authority* is based on the following conclusion rule: X is right; or X has to be done; or X has to be omitted. This is because A (an authority) says that: it is right; or that it has to be done; or that is has to be omitted. Wodak and Reisigl (2001: p79) argue that the *topos of authority* is not easily distinguishable from the fallacy, *argumentum ad verecundiam*. The authors present an example of this fallacy. There was a debate about asylum in Austria, in April, 1991. Alois Huber, a representative in Jörg Haider's extreme right-wing party, argued against 'the mixture of races' in *Der Standard* newspaper, on April 6-7, 1991. Huber appealed to religious authorities: "I am opposed to this type of mixture. If the Creator had wanted a single race, he would have created only one race. However, there are several races of peoples, and the Lord must have meant something by that." Huber associated the concept of race with the biblical story of the Creation. Huber tried to justify the racist banning of racial mixing and this banning served as an argument against immigration.

The *topos of history* can be described as follows: history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences. Therefore one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation apparently comparable with the historical example referred to (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001: p80). *Topoi of history* are sometimes also used to warn of a repetition of the past, the historical analogies being more or less adequate. Wodak and Reisigl (Ibid.) refer to the example of comparing the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, Jörg Haider, with Hitler, whichthey argue is undifferentiated, counter-productive hyperbole, which does not serve anti-discrimination.

There are two further sub-types of the *topos of history* that were utilised in discourse, according to interpretations formulated in this study. In the *topos of centrality¸* the argumentation is as follows: history has taught us that as a result of our central role, as a nation, a trans-national concern (say, the EU, Commonwealth, or some form of empire) has advanced. Therefore we should remain central, otherwise the trans-national concern can not advance. This can be interpreted as a justification for self-interest.

The *topos of scepticism* is interpreted as a halfway house between the *topos of threat to national interest* (the subsequent topos) and the *topos of centrality*. The *topos of scepticism* is (at this stage) specific to the EU debate. The argumentation, in the *topos of scepticism* is: history has taught us that the European project is about economics and any straying from that into a more profound political and ideological comprehension, will have negative consequences, as evidenced by the bureaucracy of the commission. Therefore it is best to focus on economics.

Again returning to the article of October, 18, 2007 on the Reform Treaty in *The Times*, *a topos of threat* seems to be at work. The *topos of threat* is based on the following conditionals: if a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it. This can also be formulated differently: if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them. Wodak and Reisigl (Ibid.p77) argue there are many sub-types of this argument scheme.

The topos of threat, in the October 18 *Times* piece, is more specifically *a topos of threat to the national interest.* If the context of Britain's post-World War II reticence over European integration is indicative, then a *topos of threat to the national interest* may be articulated in *The Times* and possibly *Il Giornale*. The first three paragraphs set the stage for the topos of threat to the national interest. They portray Brown as creating an evasive tactic – to avoid calls for a referendum on the treaty. Finally, in the fourth paragraph (Research Text C, Line 16) it becomes apparent what is under threat: the national interest, which is why there should be a referendum, so the people can vote no (justification). There is a process of intensification, with the newspaper building up the pressure until the conclusion is reached:

> Gordon Brown is planning to pick a fight with President Sarkozy of France at this week's
> European summit as he tries to move the agenda on from demands for a referendum on the EU
> treaty. **(Argument relating to the need for a referendum)**
>
> **(Research Text C, Lines 1-2)**

The Prime Minister sent a letter yesterday to fellow leaders calling for the EU to promote free trade and openness, a direct challenge to Mr Sarkozy's attempt at the June summit to move to a more protectionist Europe. Mr Brown hopes that the letter will become a main talking point at the meeting in Lisbon tomorrow, when the leaders switch their attention from the treaty to the EU's response to globalisation. **(Research Text C, Lines 4-9, confirmation of Brown's evasiveness on the issue of the need for a referendum. Unspoken in this instance)**

It was released after Prime Minister's Questions, at which David Cameron again mocked Mr Brown's refusal to hold a referendum on the proposed treaty. "Why don't you admit the reason you will not have a referendum is that you are scared of losing it?" the Tory leader demanded. "If you break your promise on this, no one will trust you on anything else" **(Research Text C, Lines 10-14). Re-affirmation of argument relating to the need for a referendum, coupled with Brown's evasiveness.**

Mr Brown responded that the amending treaty did not represent fundamental change and that the '*national interest*' had been protected in negotiations. Agreement on the new treaty could be reached as soon as this evening when the 27 leaders sit down for a working dinner after a two-hour session on the document to replace the failed EU Constitution . **(Research Text C, Lines 15-19). Topos now apparent: threat to national interest is the conclusion.**

In *The Times* article, Britain as represented by Brown wants "free trade and openness", note the link. This is the portrayal of Britain the free marketeer, sidelining initial reluctance and silencing Britain the initial federalist – alongside the French (Gillingham, 1991: pp.134-5). The article is also re-asserting Anglo-Europeanism, revolving around free trade, and offering an alternative to the political-economic integrative model of Germany and France (Gifford, 2008, pp.140-1).

Mautner (2008: p43) refers to the argumentative device of *rapport between author and reader*, achieved, for instance, by the use of rhetorical questions such as: does anyone believe it (the government)? As Mautner argues, this is the supposedly unifying force of *common sense*. This discursive strategy is built on a commonality of interest between author and reader. *Rapport* relates to the potential role of the newspaper itself as a political actor – in certain instances, most obviously in commentaries – but also in news stories.

In the October 18 *Times* article the *intertextuality* is apparent and explicit in the second paragraph, referring the reader back to the June summit in 2007, when Sarkozy attempted to move to a more "protectionist Europe." (Research Text C, Line 6) This is later set against the free-market Europe vision of Britain, mentioned in the preceding chapter. This simultaneously creates coherence for the reader. The text refers to Sarkozy's eleventh-hour move (Research Text C, Line 31) to reverse a 'fundamental objective (s) of the EU:' open competition (as Britain intended). This arguably sets the reader on a 'common-sense' collision course with the French over Europe, with (national) emotion potentially enmeshed in the cognition.

Metaphors.

 Metaphors were also used in the articles, with immigrants conceptualised in *The Sun* articles as: an invading army, a new EU invasion. Mautner (2008: p43) argues that *chains of related metaphors* may extend over longer stretches of text, "creating powerful cohesion" which is a textual and not merely lexical phenomenon. Analysis of *conceptualising metaphors* will be conducted, but within certain parameters. Lakoff and Johson (1980: p159) argue that "metaphors play a central role in the construction of social and political reality." This can, in certain instances, allow reasoning and words from one domain to be used in another (Lakoff, 1996: p63).

Lakoff and Johnson (1996: p123) make the epistemological claim that metaphorical thought is primary and metaphorical language is secondary. Hence, if our social experiences and conceptualisations are organised, in terms of metaphors, then politics as part of the social (as is indeed journalism), must also be perceived and constructed metaphorically (Musolff, 2004: p2). Lakoff (1996) analyses the *Weltanschauungen* underlying political thinking in America, and argues that the family stands at the centre of the conceptualizations of society in US politics. This family metaphor of morality is connected to other concepts, such as the idea moral action gives a positive value. Lakoff (Ibid.pp.154-4) argues that when related to the 'target' concept of the nation-state, the family system of concepts provides a frame of reference, allowing us to reason about the nation, on the basis of what we know about the family. Hence the: "the Nation is a family, the Government is a Parent; the

Citizens are the Children." (Ibid.) Importantly, this metaphor of nation has two competing versions: the strict father model and the nurturing parent model. Both models concern parental authority over children and both more or less equate with authoritarian types of family education, grounded in long, cultural experience. Importantly, the two competing versions induce two corresponding "unconscious" patterns of moral belief systems. These yield competing 'conservative' and 'liberal' ideological and political *Weltanschauungen* within America.

Malešević's (2006) notions of normative and operative nationalism, also resulted in differing *Weltanschauungen*. Unlike Lakoff (1996), Malešević (2006) suggests that governments behave one way on the world stage (professing a more universalistic, ethical perspective), but relate and present ideas to the populous on another more nationalistic level (operative). Lakoff (1996) notes that Conservatives have developed an elaborate language of moral politics – wheras the Liberals lack a similarly powerful metaphor system, putting them at a disadvantage in the discourse (Ibid. p387). The implications are that cognitive metaphor analysis looks behind explicit utterances to find conceptual structures that the users themselves may not be aware of.

Musolff (2004: p4) argues that there is a lack of evidence in Lakoff's (1996) work concerning the unconscious conceptual framework Lakoff proposes. The answer, according to Musolff (2004) is to complement cognitive linguistic theory with corpus-based analysis, thus providing the necessary empirical element. Musolff (Ibid.) researched corpus data, concerning British and German discourses over the EU for a decade. In combining cognitive metaphor analysis with a corpus-based analysis, Musolff (Ibid.) argues that in his EU study, the whole ensemble of texts produced in public by politicians and media commentators, can be assumed conditionally to form a coherent whole. The argument is only valid, so long as the participants are discussing within a shared discursive context, referring to each others' statements, in order to advance their arguments. Musolff describes such debates in Britain and Germany, as "virtual conversations in the respective national public sphere" (Ibid. p5) Musolff also argues that this: "provides an auspicious

perspective for comparing conceptual metaphors that underlie public debates in different national cultures" (Ibid.)

What Musolff (2004) appears not to consider, as Lakoff (1996) did, are the competing *Weltanschauungen within* a nation, that can be expressed via conceptualising metaphors. What this investigation should perhaps also consider is if several *Weltanschauungen* over Europe can be in circulation at any one time, *within* Britain and Italy (Wodak, 2006). Musolff (2004: p5) argues Britain and Germany may have similar political cultures, but assumes that their ranges of conceptual metaphors are also similar. However, this does not mean that their metaphoric discourse is similar, as similar conceptual metaphors could be used for different ideological and argumentative purposes. Such similarities and differences may also be applicable to British and Italian politics.

Musolff (2004) tackles the problems of how to find metaphors in data and what to count as metaphors. A concordance system can reveal a high frequency of an expression, and their contexts, but this does not tell us whether they have metaphorical meaning. What we can discern is if metaphors are linked to political values systems and judgements, so meaning can only be gleaned from the use of "lexical and phraseological units in their socio-pragmatic context" (Ibid. p9). Musolff (2004) argues that any claims about specific metaphorical concepts, informing, organising or underlying the discourse, need to be related to empirical discourses data before any significant conclusions can be drawn.

Zoltan Kövecses (2002) draws up three levels of metaphor analysis: i) the individual level focuses on how individual speakers actually used the metaphors in communicative situations and created new metaphors. This can be linked to the concept of re-contextualisation, discussed earlier, with new meaning emerging – in a new text. ii) The supra-individual level consists of the conventionalised metaphors of a particular language, allowing linguists to arrive at generalisations about metaphor concepts that are language or culture-specific. iii) The sub-individual level is concerned with experiential grounding of metaphorical concepts, which are largely

unconscious, generic conceptualisations and often developed in the formative years. Here, the notion of national habitus and the internalisation of nationhood is relevant (Wodak, 2006, Bourdieu, 2005).

Musolff (2004: p13) notes that most of the major metaphors were common to British and German discourse communities. Musolff (2004) argues that it is only at Kövecses' individual levels (2002) that national discourses can start to demonstrate more distinct characteristic patterns, when debating EU politics.

Metaphor in this thesis will endeavour to note patterns of conceptual metaphors contributing to the cohesiveness of text. By the same token, wider conclusions that they are underlying, informing or organising the media discourses in either of the countries will not be made. The analysis of metaphor will not be sufficiently quantitative or empirical to draw such conclusions. Instead the analysis will be restricted to the commentaries focusing on specific EU events. Any conceptual patterns or recurring metaphorical structures will be analysed, with Kövecses' (2002) categories brought into play. Musolff (2004: p9) argues metaphors can be grouped into clusters, a kind of metaphorical or conceptual mapping.

An important point to consider for analysis is how conceptual clusters can develop into common-sensical story lines or *scenarios*. Musolff (2004: p17) argues that we can think of a *scenario* as a set of standard assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community. These assumptions can involve participants, their roles and dramatic story lines, as well as social and ethical evaluations concerning concepts. Musolff (2004) goes on to argue that *scenarios* aim to determine which aspects of metaphorical or conceptual mapping can be deemed to dominate public discourse for a particular topic area, such as EU politics, or in this study, European integration. Musolff (Ibid.) argues that *scenarios* compliment the central mapping of Kövecses (2002), providing the main story lines along which the central conceptual mappings are developed and extended. Musolff also argues that conceptual mappings and scenarios should be identified, to capture attitudinal and argumentative trends, characteristic for particular discourse communities.

Musolff (2004) finds in his pilot study that the largest cluster was formed by *path-movement-journey* metaphors, but in the EU discourse specifically clusters of *life-body-health* metaphors (Ibid.p.6) and in many of the debates surrounding the euro were framed in terms of *love-marriage-family* metaphors (Ibid.p14). The euro, for instance, was depicted as a child with the EU member states as parents. In other instances the euro was depicted as a wedding, with Germany and France portrayed as parents. Musolff (2004) notes how the British press is keen to replace one of these two partners, or to bring about a *ménage a trois*. Musolff (2004: pp16, 22, 27) notes the Eurosceptic attitude amongst the British quality press, concerning how the love-marriage scenario was framed. For instance Britain was the great catch, with Europe as the pushy suitor.

National symbolism is important. Musolff (2004: p20) mentions a German newspaper writer for *Die Welt*, bemoaning the loss of the Deutschmark as the national *mother currency*, analogous to the loss of a nation's *mother tongue*. Musolff (2004: p31) argues that analogically popular metaphors can be so powerful that they can possibly result in politicians and nations commiting to specific courses of action. Wodak and Reisigl (2001: pp.69-70) in discussing argumentation theory, refer to the notion of persuasion, possibly changing not only a person's perceptions, but also their disposition to behave or act in a specific way. In 1992, a popular metaphor was the *European train leaving the station* without Britain. Former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher deemed this to be a misleading analogy. Thatcher countered, that if the train was heading in the wrong direction (concerning European integration), Britain was better off not to be on it all. Later British press discourse would also conjure the metaphorical imagery of the train doing better to go *slowly and safely*, rather than *rushing* headlong into disaster. Thatcher warned that anyone dealing with the European Community should pay careful attention to metaphors, arguing Britain had learned the hard way by agreeing to apparently empty generalisations or vague aspirations, Britain was later deemed to have commited to political structures contrary to national interests (Thatcher, 1993: p319).

Musolff (2004) argues that there are three serious claims about political imagery that result from analogies: i) metaphors and analogies that either lead or mislead and commit users to certain practical consequences; ii) users may not even be aware of the commitments entered into, by subscribing to a particular metaphor; and iii) politicians (like Thatcher) are nevćessary to minimize the impact of metaphors, by guiding the populace back to the realm of practicalities.

Political metaphors are integral aspects of argumentative reasoning, which typically aims to prove a contested issue and thus also legitimize a certain course of action. Musolff (2004: p32) advances a similar position to that articulated in argumentation theory (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). If metaphors, in this case, can be deemed to lead to conclusions that bind politicians and states, they must function like warrants in an argument. They must appear to give a valid justification for using particular premises, in order to arrive at a certain conclusion. Musolff (2004: pp.33-34) argues this unconscious conceptual framework is a form of 'argumentation-by-metaphor.'

Musolff (Ibid.pp.34-35, 37) argues that the family metaphor in America and the married couple metaphor in the EU, draw on normative suppositions, such as a family being organised according to the morality of a strict father. The argument is that in traditional social settings such presuppositions are deemed normal or true, yet as warrants in an analogical argument, they take on a new significance because they are used to vindicate contentious evaluative conclusions. For example: the *father of European unity* must always be treated with unconditional respect; or we must join the *European train* as quickly as possible.

Returning to *path-movement-journey* metaphors, Musolff (2004: p60) refers to common-sense assumptions and everyday experience, serving as references in assisting conceptualisations of nation and the EU, for instance: punctuality in joining a journey; delay caused by obstacles on the path. Speed comparisons are also drawn. The British Eurosceptic press and politicians were the first to conjure a *two-speed or multi-speed* Europe and the associated scenario of missing the train, despite the presupposed perception of Britain as one of those nations slow to respond.

A 'problem' or a 'fight' can be interpreted as closely related to the metaphor of *struggle*. Straehle et al (1999: p71) argue that of the word 'struggle' means the coming together of competing positions. They also stress that it is not a case of using the definition of 'struggle', but rather as a descriptor of a topic (in the case of Straehle et al, 1999: unemployment). This is then constructed and acted upon, developing into a conceptual system of metaphor (Mangham, 1996: p27), based on the notion of struggle. As Straehle et al (1999: p72) argue, it is not a particular word or expression that constitutes the metaphor, although the words and expressions allow us to infer its presence.

In *The Times* article of October 18, 2007, the political value systems and socio-pragmatic contexts (Musolff, 2004) appear to relate to an external *fight* with the EU. This *struggle* metaphor has been historically constituted and is grounded in that context. Thatcher had previously fought with Jacques Delors, the President of the EC, opposing Delors' federal vision in her Bruges speech. Delors was French and a federalist and his nationality is relevant in this particular text's context, linking France to a (federal) vision of Europe. Britain is (still) battling in light of this history, in this particular 2007 article.

Brown is also struggling in the article against the 'common-sense' that dictates that there must be a referendum on the treaty. This is the other form of the *struggle* metaphor that gives the text its cohesion. Regarding the fight with France, the first line reads: Gordon Brown is planning to pick a *fight* with President Sarkozy (Research Text C, Line 1). In the second paragraph this becomes a "direct *challenge* to Mr Sarkozy" (Research Text C, Line 5) and in the seventh paragraph as Brown's "*riposte* to an eleventh-hour move by Mr Sarkozy" (Research Text C, Line 31). In the ninth paragraph, *The Times* reports that French diplomatic sources were "expecting a *row* with Mr Brown" (Research Text C, Line 45). However, in the tenth paragraph, this is labelled by the Director of a Eurosceptic think-tank, Neil O'Brien, as "a fake *row*" (Research Text C, Line 53-4).

In Brown's struggle with France, there are therefore many manifestations: *fight, challenge, riposte* and *row*. With the "fake row", this particular disagreement with the Frenchis presented as contrived by Mr Brown and is linked with the real reason for this contrivance: the real struggle (as *The Times* presents it) with the nation – which wants a referendum on the treaty. Hence we have the leader of the Tories, David Cameron, in the third paragraph, arguing the real reason Brown will not hold a referendum is because he is "scared of *losing* it?" (Research Text C, Line 13). In the fourth paragraph, Mr Brown responds "that the amending treaty did not represent fundamental change and the national interest had been *protected* in negotiation" (Research Text C, Lines 16-17). The second strand of the *struggle* metaphor concludes with the Tories allowed the final word, with one struggle, with the French (according to *The Times*) clearly designed to distract attention from the real internal battle: the need for a referendum. Mark Francois, the Shadow Minister for Europe, says: "Gordon Brown is clearly trying to divert attention away from his manifesto promise of a referendum and the fact that his much-vaunted *red lines* are *collapsing* under detailed scrutiny" (Research Text C, Lines 79-81). Brown is scared of *losing* over Europe; then claims he is *protecting* the nation over Europe; and finally Brown is *collapsing* in his defence of nation, against Europe. This is the conceptualisation that appears to be conveyed to the reader.

Walter and Helmig (2008) argue that only through a combined analysis of discourses and metaphors can a comprehensive understanding of the social construction of reality occur. Finally in this article, there is a reference to Italy, which reveals something of the EU's specific discourse on integration – and how Italy is perceived in relation to that discourse. Other than acting as yet another small amount of data of recent context for the research, the following text also suggests that other topoi could be mobilised in Italy, for instance in this case, a *topos of centrality*. The relevant part of the article reads:

José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, pleaded with EU leaders yesterday not to rock the boat over the new treaty so that they could put four years of wrangling behind them. "We need the Reform Treaty to give Europe strong institutions that give Europe the capacity to act in the 21st century. We need to put this institutional debate behind us."

He appealed in particular to the Italians, whose demand for more MEPs has emerged as the main possible snag to agreement on the treaty this week. "I really do not think a country like Italy, which has always been in the forefront of integration and where the European Union was founded [with the Treaty of Rome in 1957], would block the treaty," Mr Barroso said.

(Research Text C, lines 56-67. Charter and Elliott, 2007)

3.15 Research Texts A-D.

<u>Research Text A.</u>

The Sun (England)

July 24, 2006 Monday

Warning on new EU invasion

45,000 CROOKS ON WAY HERE

BYLINE: David Wooding, Whitehall editor

LENGTH: 560 words

1 AN army of 45,000 crooks and gangsters from Eastern Europe is set to
2 invade Britain, it was revealed yesterday.

3 The mob -many posing a security risk -will head here when Bulgaria and
4 Romania join the EU next year.

5 Worried ministers have drawn up a secret blacklist of "undesirables" they
6 fear may settle in Britain.

7 It has been compiled by immigration chiefs from records of criminals who
8 have already tried to enter the UK.

9 But from next year border patrols will be powerless to stop them settling
10 here - and claiming state benefits.

11 Fears that Britain will be flooded with Europe's criminal underclass are

12 revealed in leaked Whitehall papers.

13 They warn that up to 140,000 will flock here within 12 months of their
14 countries becoming EU members.

15 In one document, Home Office minister Joan Ryan, below right, warns the
16 new wave of migrants may spark a public backlash -and EU "enlargement
17 fatigue".

18 Labour is already under fire for underestimating the huge flood of
19 migrants from eight former Soviet bloc states that joined the EU in 2004.

Predicted

20 Officials revealed last week that 662,000 came here in the past two years –
21 20 TIMES the number they predicted.

22 Ministers have until October to decide whether to restrict work permits
23 for the new member states.

24 Most other EU countries have already capped the number of foreign
25 workers they will allow.

26 But so far Tony Blair has refused to do so.

27 Shadow Home Secretary David Davis said last night: "The Government
28 has already made an incredible mistake in under-estimating the number
29 of migrants from Eastern Europe at the first stage of enlargement.

30 "It is vital it doesn't make the same mistake with the second stage,
31 especially in light of the high levels of organised crime in these countries.

32 "The last thing Britain needs is for Labour to compound our crime
33 problems with even more immigration failures."

34 Experts fear the 45,000 figure is a gross underestimate because it includes
35 only those who have already been turned away.

36 Once Bulgaria and Romania join the EU it would be impossible to ban or
37 remove undesirables. Ms Ryan said: "They will enjoy the same rights as
38 other European economic area nationals, who cannot easily be deported.
39 In the past, they have been removed for immigration-related offences
40 which will cease to apply."

41 A Home Office spokesman said last night: "The Government will make a
42 decision on Bulgarian and Romanian nationals' access to the UK labour
43 market later this year once a firm date of accession has been determined."

44 The row overshadowed plans for uniformed border guards at ports and
45 airports yesterday.

46 Home Secretary John Reid wants the new force to spearhead a massive
47 shake-up of the shambolic immigration service. Spending on the service
48 will double to £ 280million by 2010 as he tries to get a grip on the crisis.
49 Much of the cash will be spent on extra patrols, new technology and raids
50 on firms using illegal workers.

51 Tories last night dismissed the move as a "cosmetic gimmick" to con the
52 public into believe action is being taken.

ENDS.

Research Text B.

Why Reid will fail on crime and illegals

BYLINE: Trevor Kavanagh

SECTION: TREVOR KAVANAGH ON MONDAY; OPINION

LENGTH: 600 words

24 July, 2006.

1 AS new Home Secretary John Reid flails around for   solutions to soaring
2 violence and rampant immigration, I make two predictions.
3 First, he will fail on both counts. Second, he won't be around long enough
4 to carry the can.
5 The Government will NOT build two prisons in five years.
6 It will NOT deport thousands of illegal immigrants -or stop millions more
7 entering this country.
8 Indeed the reverse will happen. Crime is rising -especially street violence
9 and Home Office insiders admit there is nothing they can do to stop it.
10 Immigration is out of control with official forecasts of more than SEVEN
11 million more on their way over coming years.
12 The two issues are directly linked.
13 A staggering 10,000 foreign prisoners are clogging our jails -one-in-eight
14 of the total.
15 A startling BBC probe claims ex-Communist states are exporting their
16 criminals to Britain.
17 Thousands of ex-lags from Poland, Latvia and other new EU states have
18 moved to London and are helping those in cells back home to head this
19 way when they get out.
20 In addition, 45,000 known "undesirables" in corrupt Romania and

21 Bulgaria are packing their bags for the day when they join the EU -with
22 plenty more to follow.
23 Free-and-easy Britain is fast becoming the organised crime capital of the
24 world.
25 According to security services, criminal gangs have infiltrated the sharp
26 end of the immigration service to wave through those who pay with cash.
27 More than 700 have been caught, but more are working the system from
28 the inside.
29 The rot is now so entrenched that virtually nothing can be done to reverse
30 or eradicate it.
31 Home Office officials privately admit crime figures are going to keep
32 climbing.
33 And this time, the Government cannot send thuggish Tony McNulty on to
34 the airwaves to deny it.

Damning

35 It was McNulty who scoffed at The Sun's sex-for-visas scoop, claiming it
36 was an"isolated incident". Now we know there are hundreds like that.

37 The damning facts on crime and immigration come from the
38 Government's own
39 sources -either the Home Office itself or the all-party Home Affairs
40 Committee of MPs.

41 The independent think tank, Reform, says street crime is now spreading
42 from inner cities to leafy suburbs.

43 And it rejects John Reid's claim that muggings are the result of affluent
44 youngsters carrying expensive iPods and MP3 players. "In America, just
45 as many youngsters have mobile technology, but there has been a fall in
46 robberies," says Reform director Andrew Haldenby.

47 Today's report by MPs on immigration is devastating.

48 It stresses the right of a "modern sovereign state to control who enters it"
49 and slams the Government for failing to do so.

50 It blames penny-pinching on frontline services, failure to enforce rules and
51 deport illegals and a refusal to outlaw firms who use illegal labour. None
52 of this will surprise anyone in Britain with eyes to see.
53 Ministers have been warned for years that illegal immigration and crime
54 go hand in hand. Even legal immigration has reached absurd levels when
55 one-in-ten citizens in cities like Plymouth and Southampton are from
56 Poland.

57 The only consolation for John Reid is that none of this is his fault.

58 This is his eighth ministerial job in nine years. He hasn't been around long
59 enough to make his mark in any of them.

60 The Home Secretary -along with the rest of us -is reaping the whirlwind of
61 a government in thrall to human rights, gender awareness and ethnic
62 diversity at the expense of public safety.

63 For ten years it has turned its face against the tough measures he is now
64 promising.
65 Short of cash, short of time, short of political will, does anyone believe it
66 has the guts to put those promises into effect now?

ENDS.

Research Text C.

Gordon Brown picks fight with France to divert attention from referendum
By David Charter and Francis Elliott
October 18, 2007.

1 Gordon Brown is planning to pick a fight with President Sarkozy of France
2 at this week's European summit as he tries to move the agenda on from
3 demands for a referendum on the EU treaty.

4 The Prime Minister sent a letter yesterday to fellow leaders calling for the
5 EU to promote free trade and openness, a direct challenge to Mr Sarkozy's
6 attempt at the June summit to move to a more protectionist Europe. Mr
7 Brown hopes that the letter will become a main talking point at the meeting
8 in Lisbon tomorrow, when the leaders switch their attention from the treaty
9 to the EU's response to globalisation.

10 It was released after Prime Minister's Questions, at which David Cameron
11 again mocked Mr Brown's refusal to hold a referendum on the proposed
12 treaty. "Why don't you admit the reason you will not have a referendum
13 is that you are scared of losing it?" the Tory leader demanded. "If you
14 break your promise on this, no one will trust you on anything else."

15 Mr Brown responded that the amending treaty did not represent
16 fundamental change and that the national interest had been protected in
17 negotiations. Agreement on the new treaty could be reached as soon as
18 this evening when the 27 leaders sit down for a working dinner after a
19 two-hour session on the document to replace the failed EU constitution**.**

20 Last night there were still several stumbling blocks to rapid agreement
21 because six countries had outstanding problems, but none was thought to
22 be insurmountable. The treaty will usher in a new EU foreign minister

23 and full time president of the European Council, as well as scrapping the
24 national veto over 50 policy areas and giving legal force to the Charter of
25 Fundamental Rights.

26 Mr Brown's letter, formally sent to the Portuguese Prime Minister, who is
27 hosting the summit, but copied to all countries, calls for a competitive and
28 dynamic single market for the EU. It added that the EU should, "promote
29 free trade and openness, with the EU leading by example in breaking
30 down barriers to create a free and fair multilateral trading system".
31 It will be seen as a riposte to an eleventh-hour move by Mr Sarkozy in
32 June to downgrade the role of competition in a section of the treaty that
33 dealt with the fundamental objectives of the EU. The constitution
34 proposed that the EU should have "an internal market where competition
35 is free and undistorted". The phrase was to be included in the new treaty
36 to make free competition one of the objectives of the EU, upgrading its
37 status from the Treaty of Rome, where it featured as a sub-clause.

38 When the first draft was printed, however, France successfully struck out
39 the phrase "where competition is free and undistorted" because Mr
40 Sarkozy wanted the treaty to strengthen protection for French businesses
41 from cheap foreign competition. Mr Brown's letter will be seen as trying
42 to steer EU policy back to free market competition and there were signs
43 yesterday that the French would argue against him tomorrow, creating a
44 fresh row about the role of the EU.
45 French diplomatic sources confirmed that France was expecting a row
46 with Mr Brown and did not rule out a direct response from Mr Sarkozy.
47 "Gordon Brown's attitude to globalisation has been part of our
48 preparations for this summit," an aide said. The Prime Minister's
49 spokesman denied that he was trying to provoke a row with Mr Sarkozy.
50 He said: "The Prime Minister has a great deal of respect for Nicolas
51 Sarkozy and will continue to work closely with him."

52 However, Neil O'Brien, the director of the Eurosceptic Open Europe
53 think-tank, said: "Downing Street may well be trying to cook up a fake
54 row about somthing else like globalisation to distract from the enormous
55 transfer of powers Gordon Brown is about to sign up to."

56 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, pleaded
57 with EU leaders yesterday not to rock the boat over the new treaty so that
58 they could put four years of wrangling behind them. "We need the reform
59 treaty to give Europe strong institutions that give Europe the capacity to
60 act in the 21st century. We need to put this institutional debate behind
61 us."
62 He appealed in particular to the Italians, whose demand for more MEPs
63 has emerged as the main possible snag to agreement on the treaty this
64 week. "I really do not think a country like Italy, which has always been in
65 the forefront of integration and where the European Union was founded
66 [with the Treaty of Rome in 1957], would block the treaty," Mr Barroso

67 said.
68 The Poles are holding out for a stronger voting mechanism for medium-
69 sized countries to block EU measures; they also want their own advocate-
70 general, a senior post at the European Court of Justice; the Bulgarians
71 want recognition that they can write "euro" in their Cyrillic script; the
72 Austrians want a cap on German students who are flooding into their
73 universities; the Czechs want greater powers to reject European
74 Commission proposals; and Britain's only outstanding issue is for a
75 change in the wording on the role of national parliaments, which at the
76 moment are told by the treaty that they "shall" work for the benefit of the
77 EU, a phrase seen as placing Westminister under the direction of Brussels.

78 Mark Francois, the Shadow Minister for Europe, said: "On the eve of the
79 Lisbon summit, Gordon Brown is clearly trying to divert attention away
80 from his manifesto promise of a referendum and the fact that his much-
81 vaunted red lines are collapsing under detailed scrutiny." **ENDS.**

I used a tape recorder to facilitate a free flowing exchange; the conversational approach and its open-endedness, was important in two other ways to the results obtained. The aim was to elicit a response to Europe and its institutional developments from the interviewees. My aim was to get the individual's interpretations and their own way of seeing, speaking of and understanding Europe (Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock, 1999). A more pedantic approach to questioning would have precluded the attaining of these more nuanced interpretations. For instance, I did not ask an individual how they saw Europe as a national newspaper journalist, and the institutional mindset, or doxa that can develop from within the journalistic field. I asked how they saw Europe. There is a schism later between what the two chief political correspondents said about Europe – and what they wrote. I noted if, for instance, any tension arose between an interviewee's personal doxa over Europe – and that of their news organisation.

The other way in which the approach to interviewing was important was as Deacon et al. explain "The ideal in the naturalistic or unstructured interview is to approximate the 'feeling' of the unforced conversations of everyday life" (Deacon et al., 1999: p288). On a certain level, I was asking how individuals felt about Europe and wanted to elicit an unfettered response. Billig (1995) referred to the importance that emotion plays in our judgements and interpretations, often linked to a sense of

nationhood and often a sense of an *us* and a *them*. It is expected that the responses of interviewees may sometimes be fuelled by national sentiment – or conversely a conscious escape from such perceptions (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007: p20). A more restrictive approach to interviewing would have precluded such responses.

Chapter 4.
Interviews – the last layers of context.

ITALY: field and comparative analysis.

The field and comparative analyses (see Table 2, page 91), starting with Italy intend to reveal if any significant patterns form.

The starting point was the interview with Italian MEP, Luciana Castellina. Much as Fossum and Schlesinger (2007: p1) used the positions of regulatory and Euro-federalist as polar opposites over the EU Constitution, to *dramatise* and create a basis for understanding, so Castellina provided something similar. Although this was not sought (the European Parliament was simply the first field to be visited), this proved useful.

4.1 Europe, economics and globalisation.

Italian MEP, Luciana Castellina, has to be understood in relation to her professional life, which has informed her personal and institutional doxa, in relation to European integration. Castellina is a doyen of the Reformed Communists in Italy and a founder of one of the papers supporting the left: *Il Manifesto*. Her last book commemorated fifty years of the EU in 2007: *Fifty Years of Europe, An Anti-Rhetorical Reading*. Castellina fits squarely into the Italian Euro-Communist sub-culture described previously (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Castellina's life experience helps to explain the following citation:

> To rebuild Europe in a different way from America, that identity. If Europe is totally fixated on the market, a piece of the global market, I can not understand why it needs to be Europe. In the sixties it meant the common market, now with the global market, to be a piece of that market. There is no need to be European. (Castellina)

Yet this conceptualisation negates and stands in juxtaposition to the contribution, which Gifford (2008, pp.141-7) notes that Britain has made to Europe in recent years – a different model to the political-economic integrative approach of France or Germany (and Italy). Castellina is indicating a negative *Other* presentation in referring to America (Wodak, 2006), mobilising it as a possible threat to Europe (Hutchinson, 2006). Castellina in appearing to have internalised a Europe that is different from America seems to be revealing a personal doxa, perceiving America – in relation to Europe, in a specific way. This citation may not exactly be representative of the Italian mainstream, but it will be useful to see where other Italian interviewees (and subsequent British interviewees) stand, in relation to this critique.

The European Commission sub-field is represented by Carlo Corazza, Head of Press for the European Commission in Italy. His biography is a contrast to the biography of Castellina. He studied at the College of Europe in Bruges, was briefly a lawyer and worked for Emma Bonnino when she was a European commissioner. Corazza commented: "A Briton is one who sees that the market is to his advantage and therefore the [European] Union may help him conduct business. I do not see a prejudice in that, they [the British] are islanders." This concurs with Castellina in perceiving Britain's allegiance to the American-led free market process. But unlike her, Corazza sees globalisation and the market less cataclysmically. Nevertheless Corazza presents a stereotypical Britain (Wodak, 2006) and its perceived economic pragmatism towards the European project. This can be interpreted as Britain the *Other* within Europe – at odds with political-economic integration, of which Italy, as a founder-member, was a part.

Carla Cazaninni is Castellina's former colleague. Cazaninni has worked for several decades for *Il Manifesto* and has spent the last couple of years very closely covering developments over the EU Constitution. She alludes to the picture of Europe as painted by Castellina. Cazaninni initially referred to the lack of progression on the European stage, thought back to the anti-fascists after the war and yet:

now we are going backwards, it really is the first time. My daughter has got it harder than me, something that has not happened since 1945. Now our children are worse off than us. It is everything, the chance of work, to get the measure of yourself, etc, etc. This is in Europe will be traumatic, let's see. The fact that we have taken on board a little of the American model, also the British [free market], however, that is not the European model.

Cazaninni has articulated what the previous two actors implied, coupling America with Britain into a common ideological position over the free market. Cazaninni is also indicating a negative *Other* presentation of America, but adding Britain, mobilising it as a possible threat to Europe (Hutchinson, 2006). Cazaninni also appears to have internalised a Europe that is different from America (and Britain), having absorbed that collective memory and developed that personal doxa.

Roberto Scafuri is chief political correspondent of *Il Giornale*. Scafuri does not comment on Britain's globalising role within the EU, but does refer to Britain's seat at the European table, in more generic terms:

> somebody said, also last night [on television] the *authoritative (Italian) commentator,* Sergio Romano said that, right from the start, 'Great Britain was *put in Europe*, not to do Europe', in the sense that Britain's bonds, let's say, are projected towards the Atlantic and it seems, *culturally, historically linked* by a *re-enforced thread* to America, clearly it [Britain] has a particular role in the European Union.

This vision of Britain in Europe is not dissimilar to what de Gaulle expressed in resisting British EEC entry (Judt, 2005: p307). As with Cazaninni, there is a negative *Other* presentation of Britain, coupled with America (Wodak, 2006), again mobilizing this *Otherness* as a threat to Europe (Hutchinson, 2006). However Scafuri goes much further than the other Italian interviewees. Scafuri employs symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2005) to construct a scheme of perception over Britain in Europe. The scheme is legitimised through the use of the phrase "authoritative" commentator. The phrase "put in Europe" is implying, implicitly, that America

forced Britain into Europe. The scheme is developed further by the phrase "culturally, historically linked" suggesting and constructing the origins of British identity. Scafuri is harnessing Hall's (1996) notion of the construct of an unchanging national character, as if there was a fixed British national character, similar to the United States "linked by a re-enforced thread." Finally as Bourdieu (2005: p37) expresses it, from: "surreptitious imposition of categories of perception, endowed with authority", Scafuri reaches his conclusion: "clearly it [Britain] has a particular role in the European Union."

What appears to be the case in this conclusion is a national habitus in Italy at work, which sees Italy as part of Europe – and Britain perceived as an *Other* (coupled to America) and mobilised as a threat to Italian nationalism and Europe. This is the hot nationalism of Hutchinson (2006), with the scheme of perception over Britain perhaps re-affirming Italy's national culture *in and part of* Europe. This example is what Bourdieu (2005) means by metaphors rendering invisible the construction of schemes of perception. This Italian national habitus and how it sees Italy in Europe and Britain negatively on the periphery, did surface in various Italian fields.

4.2 The EU Constitution – and the future for Europe.

Castellina referred to the Constitution that was to be signed in Rome a couple of days after our interview (October, 2004):

> From now on there is no more European community. There is an identity from the occident which is very vague and what is re-emerging instead in contention of this identity are nations, more localism, tribalism.

This position can be interpreted as emphasising how, at that pivotal moment, the normative doctrine of the EU, in demonstrating universalism, such as common values and ethics (Malešević, 2006) enshrined in the EU Constitution, was failing somehow. This can be gleaned from the context and debate over the EU Constitution at that moment in Italy. Malešević (2006) argues that the success of the normative doctrine lies in its translation to its operative counterpart: the state-centred

nationalism the public understands. Instead Castellina is arguing there is a more profound withdrawal into the particularistic and seems to be implying a more unpalatable dimension of nationalism is surfacing. One only has to think of the nationalistic anti-immigration stance transcending the Berlusconi-led rightist coalition (Giordano, 2004: pp.69-70, Ter Wal, 2002: pp.157-176). Castellina wanted a more effective integration, perhaps betraying a personal and EP doxa sympathetic to some form of federalism. In terms of Fossum and Schlesinger's (2007: p1) dramatisation, the quote suggests Castellina feels the EU Constitution did not (in terms of values and intellectual substance) go far enough.

Instead Corazza referred to how the EU Constitution would move Europe forward and a treaty in Rome that is indeed

> called constitution. And that is something everybody knows, also the British know it. If you tell me that you do not want to stay anymore and seeing as this union is democratic, it is pointless that you continue to complain, you can leave.

Corazza was initially referring to the sensibility in Britain over the name 'constitution'. Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007: p1) note at the outset of 2001 how the highly contested "c-word" was formally placed on the EU's political agenda. One of the critics was Britain. Corazza then goes on to raise the possibility of Britain leaving the community. This is a reference to the possible discourse of withdrawal. UKIP's fortunes (Taylor, 2009), coming second in the June, 2009 European elections in the UK, suggests this is not purely fanciful. Corazza does not betray any critique of the EU Constitution, one way or the other. However, what Corazza also articulates in the citation is again the mobilising (Hutchinson, 2006) of Britain as peripheral and a threat to the European project (and Italy within it) and again an *Other* in Europe. On both levels this is implicit, but again a scheme of perception is re-enforced.

Cazaninni also suggested the EU Constitution was not going far enough, but alluding to completely different elements to those discussed by Castellina. Cazaninni said: "Europe is at the moment in which it is trying to unify itself, constitutionally at a

time of great fragility and civil crisis, really." She added that the only thing that was certain was nobody had envisaged the nationalistic and regionalistic responses that were a threat to the EU Constitution. Cazaninni is concurring with Castellina over the failure of the EU Constitution, on a normative level, to translate to the operational level, understood by citizens in the public sphere. She articulates the development of a nationalism that is actually a threat to the EU Constitution. Again the unpalatable insular anti-immigration of Berlusconi governments is again implied as the context, but again not made explicit.

The position of both Cazaninni and Castellina, as part of the Communist sub-culture (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) has to be considered. An interpretation is that they perceive the particularism and anti-immigration nationalism of Berlusconi governments (Giordano, 2004: p69, Ter Wal, 2002:pp.157-176) as a threat to their brand of nationalism. Here perhaps, the internal struggles within the Italian national habitus are rendered more visible (Wodak, 2006).

Scafuri refers to being caught between several conflicting positions over the EU Constitution. He stresses the institutional doxa of *Il Giornale*, which he deemed was quite critical of Europe (more so than his personal position on the left of Italian politics). He understood the opposition of sections of the Italian left to the proposed EU Constitution and argued it was "well-founded" to critique the EU Constitution for focussing too heavily on the economy. Scafuri also criticised the EU Constitution for being "full of minute articles" demonstrating a "Eurocratic" approach. He said that the 'bent bananas' syndrome of the British press was often cited in the Italian press also, because it was felt the commission was far too bureaucratic. Trenz (2007: p99) in his study noted that 'commission-bashing' was prevalent in various EU countries. Scafuri was encouraged to write for his right-wing newspaper, offering the counterweight of his doxa on the left. This is in complete contrast with the 'professionalism', which Hallin and Mancini (2004) note, in the British press, where left-leaning journalists take pride in their 'professionalism' in conveying the position of the right held by the majority of British newspapers.

While it cannot be claimed that this sample was representative, the interviewees (except for Corazza in preserving his distance as part of the EC) revealed a critical approach to the EU Constitution, transcending different fields – because it was insufficiently substantive. This in, my view, is indicative at least of how the Italian left was critical of a EU Constitution focusing on economic minutiae and institutional tinkering, but falling short of creating a more concrete Euro-polity (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007: p4). All the interviewees were openly on the political left, except Corazza, who did not betray his personal politics.

4.3 The Italian people – enthusiastic over Europe?

In terms of popular sentiment towards Europe, did the interviewees also feel 'the people' were enthusiastic? Was there a sense of Europe – in relation to the national self? With the exception of Castellina who was busy intellectualising over Europe (no criticism intended), most of the interviewees did contribute. This time (for the reason just cited), the response of Corazza is scrutinised initially.

Here we have those responsible for the normative discursive construction of nation (the elite) commenting on what is translated to the operative level: the state-centred nationalism people identify with (Malešević, 2006). Another interpretation of the popular level is that people have internalised Europe (Bourdieu, 2005) so that it has become an ideological habit (Billig, 1995). Was Europe part of everyday Italian culture to the extent that the Italian public were scarcely aware of it ? What categories of perception had developed over Europe? Put another way, what kind of Europe did the Italian public relate to?

Corazza described Italy as a young country with a strong federal system, reflected in its history, with a population enthusiastic over Europe. "It is the same thing that we see on a European level, the template is the same." Corazza raises a congruency between nation and the nature of the body politic (Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1992). In the Italy portrayed, there is no tension over federal integration as there is with the British majoritarian political system (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Integral to this

particular conversation Corazza also spoke of Italy suffering various invasions – and the strong regionalism and federalism that resulted (Ginzborg, 2003). This is a very different national sense of self to Britain – and a viewing of Europe from a different vantage point. Unravelling Corazza's interpretation further, he alludes implicitly to the myth of origin and 'history' behind a new nation. This is a nation that 'existed' before it was embedded in the modern Italian state (Hall, 1996). At other junctures in the interview this was re-enforced further in explicitly referring to Italy, in relation to 'Rome.'

On another level Corazza's reference to a strong federal system, reflected in Italy's 'history', is the invention of tradition that is not as deep at it initially appears. Here any national defeats and confusion are eradicated in a transformation into a clear community (Hall, 1996). What of the fascism of the period preceding Italy's post-World War II federalism? Instead between Italy and Europe Corazza argues "the template is the same." Both are federalist. Here the invoking of tradition and myth construct categories of perception, presenting Italy positively, at the heart of Europe.

Corazza said Euroscepticism in Italy crept into the debate around 2000, concurring with Giordano (2004: p73). There was resentment over the euro and price hikes, hurting the average Italian family. Corazza argued the Northern League took advantage. An interpretation is that the Northern League succeeded in mobilising the notion of hot nationalism (Hutchinson, 2006), with the economic crisis creating a threat to the nation. The Northern League appears to have succeeded in apportioning some blame on the EU, in the eyes of at least some of the Italian electorate. Giordano (2004), however, demonstrates how this electoral success was short-lived. Paola Buonadonna, formerly with *The European* and now with the BBC, noted how Italians were historically favourable – but that the euro had created some scepticism, which was reflected in the media. Buonadonna claimed:

> the governing party [Berlusconi's Forza Italia] is now instructing the portion of the media that is under its direct control, to report this as an anti-Europe story. For the first time that I can remember, the Italian papers and television are full of anti-euro stories, in a classical Eurosceptic way, like the British Eurosceptics, blaming the euro for what has happened to prices in Italy.

This is in reference to Berlusconi's private television channels, his influence (as Prime Minister) over state television and his national newspaper: *Il Giornale*. The existence of instrumentalisation over the euro by Berlusconi, will be sought in the analysis of *Il Giornale's* euro coverage. Buonadonna's interpretation of events suggests that what may have started with the Northern League, spread to its coalition partner in government, Berlusconi's Forza Italia. This suggests that within the Italian political field, parties that were close to each other fought to harness the scepticism towards Europe felt by some of the Italian public at the introduction of the euro. Bourdieu (2005) argues that parties that are close struggle with each other the most. In endeavouring to harness public sentiment, this too is Bourdieu's (2005) point about an 'audience ratings mentality' setting in. On another level this is Wodak's (2006) notion of the national habitus being constantly modified. In mobilising against the threat of the euro (and Europe) another layer of experience in the Italian collective memory of Europe is internalised (Hutchinson, 2006). Arguably this was the first point, post-World War II, that Italians became sceptical towards Europe.

Cazaninni spoke of an Italian population that had a "prejudice in favour" revealing again the national habitus. She added however that although this prejudice had always been there, with the euro and the price hikes, the extreme right and the Northern League "would be given a hearing". The first citation suggests that a scheme of perception (Bourdieu, 2005) concerning European integration, has become so deeply internalised within the Italian habitus, to the extent that Europe is indeed an 'ideological habit' (Billig, 1995). However the second citation supports the interpretations of Buonadonna and Corazza, concerning the euro creating another layer of experience of Europe, within Italy, mitigating previous enthusiasm.

Scafuri said Italians, because of their history, felt much more European, emotionally, in comparison with the British. He did, however, concur that the problems with the euro had been the moment at which "Europe had been most unpopular", but despite this, he felt Italians "remained fundamentally close to Europe." He felt this closeness would be utilised by Berlusconi, because it was a "motivation linked to internal

politics". Scafuri is constructing a scheme of perceptions, regarding Italy in Europe with Britain again presented negatively as the *Other* (Wodak, 2006). As Corazza did previously, Scafuri utilises history as an explanation for Italians feeling more European, but exactly which part of Italian history is unclear. If an interpretation from the notion of banal nationalism (Hutchinson, 2006) is taken, this 'history' is conjuring the 'myth' of nation as a unitary society, with *all* Italians feeling Europe emotionally *because* of this history. Scafuri however, did corroborate the mitigating effect of the euro, modifying the national habitus (Wodak, 2006), in relation to Europe, as presented by previous interviewees in other fields.

Bourdieu (2005) does at times use spatial, relational metaphors to help explain field theory. In his reference to Heidegger's *das Mann,* he noted the distinction drawn between 'distinguished' people and 'vulgar' people. Instead Scafuri argues that despite the euro, Italians "remained fundamentally close to Europe." Much as with Bourdieu's (2005: p38) *das Mann* example, a 'common sense taxonomy' is at work, creating a scheme of perception that seems to be arguing that it 'goes without saying' that all Italians "remain fundamentally close to Europe." Here also, a spatial, relational metaphor is arguably conjured, with Italy 'close' to Europe, unlike and distinguishable from the British. Here the relational part of the metaphor is at work. Scafuri compares Italians to the British, immediately prior to this citation. The comparison, in this last instance, is implicit, but rendered visible, because of the immediately preceding comparative context with Britain.

4.4 Are Italians well-informed over Europe?
Castellina did not tackle this issue directly, but mentioned how major newspaper editors, across Europe, did not speak each other's languages and had no point of contact, compounding the insularity of the national public sphere. Corazza referred to the Commission office in Rome working closely with the Italian government's Ministry of Communications. "They probably do more television spots, we do more campaigns, etc, however we work together." He said the Italian government also worked closely with the European Parliament office in Rome. "On a symbolic level, we are there." This suggests at least, that there is no national political communication

deficit as appears to be the case in Britain (Dougal, 2004, Weymouth and Anderson, 1999).

Giuliani (2001) provides evidence of the many changes within the Italian political and economic infrastructure in recent years – resulting from European integration. Commissioner Mario Monti (1998: p13) says of this process: "Italy is changing. The deep influence of European integration is the major agent of change." Giuliani (2001) gives evidence of a dynamic with the EU inspiring Italian reforms – but by the same token various EU-imposed constraints exist, which compel the proposed reforms to happen. The reforms included attempts to move to a more majoritarian electoral system. All this presents Milward's thesis (Dedman, 1996: p12) of integration happening, when it serves nation, in an illuminating new light, regarding Italy.

These reforms suggest not just that the EC (and EP) are working with Italian national governments in communicating Europe (to either or both the press and the public) - it is a Europe assisting the Italian body politic to modernise from within. This is a far more profound, implicit level of communication directly to the Italian people, which in principle circumvents the need to talk to the populus via the normal key mediator - the media (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). However Giordano (2004) issues a cautionary note. The structural funds that helped the Italian economy have, since recent EU-enlargement, moved eastwards. This Giordano (2004: p74) sees as linked to causing more Euroscepticism in southern Europe.

What should also be noted is how, according to Corazza "on a symbolic level" co-operation between the EC and EP representatives in Rome and Italian governments (Corazza did not specify which ones), was working. On one level this is similar to Corazza's comments earlier, concerning federalism. In this instance also, an interpretation could be that some invention of tradition is at work. Hall (1996) argues that such invention can help construct community. and mentions the use of symbols in the process. Instead Corazza directly refers to symbolism, which could be interpreted as the conjuring of symbolism, constructed at the normative level, which

then filters down to the operative level and how the Italian public perceive of Europe within the nation-state (Malešević, 2006).

Corazza also said that in his daily dealings with the Italian media, national and regional newspapers were 'engaged', with the exception of northern separatist publications. He mentioned *La Padania*, a mouthpiece for the Northern League. He said Italian television was not really interested in Europe. Overall, Corazza concluded, there were very few attacks on the EU by the national media. The picture of 'daily dealings' suggests Italian governments interacting with a Europe that is visible for Italians, stitched into the tapestry of everyday culture (Hall, 1996). An interpretation is this is a banal nationalism that has quite possibly internalised Europe in speeches and newspaper articles – yet is scarcely noticeable (Hutchinson, 2006).

Cazaninni however, spoke of Europe being a relatively recent debate in the Italian media. She referred to the possibility of France rejecting the EU Constitution and that this issue was getting some Italian media coverage:"but in Italy, how do I put this, it should be stressed that most of the people do not know what it [the EU Constitution] is all about." I asked: But is it because of the media, how they communicate, or is it because of the [EU] institutions, who do not succeed in communicating well? Cazaninni responded:

> No, it is not that the (EU) institutions do not succeed, they do not even try to communicate particularly, probably also because they rely on the fact Italy has always been a country which is instinctively favourable to a European Constitution.

Buonadonna argued that the Italian media was, at worst indifferent to Europe. It is worth pausing and unravelling some of the strands prevalent here, especially as, employing the notion of de-naturalisation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) will help the investigation with later British comparisons. Firstly, what surfaces as far as Cazaninni is concerned, is a national public sphere that appears to be socialised to Europe (Ginzborg, 2003, Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In Italy the Italian national habitus has possibly internalised European integration in certain ways.

Corazza is painting a picture of a non-deficit of national communication over Europe, with an Italian government regularly conveying Europe (with the EU institutions) to Italians, in a co-operative spirit (despite a Berlusconi government accused of Euroscepticism). Cazaninni refers to Italy being "instinctively favourable." This comment renders visible a little more of how Europe is discursively constructed within the Italian habitus. An interpretation is that this is creating the impression of an unchanging 'national character' concerning Europe (Hall, 1996). Yet this is contradicted by Cazaninni saying earlier how the euro modified the national habitus (Wodak, 2006). Using the word *instinct* is suggesting Europe is deeply internalised as part of a unitary society, on a banal nationalistic level (Hutchinson, 2006). Yet the study has already demonstrated how within the political field, Berlusconi's coalition, of the Northern League and different parts of the left, see Europe very differently (Ginzborg, 2003, Giordano, 2004).

Corazza refers to good communication between his Commission Office and the Italian press. Yet Cazaninni argues the press is not actually reporting Europe that much. The Italian press may be attempting to become more mass circulation, but historically is not read that much (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, Forcella, 1959). Furthermore any lack of information to the Italian public from a paucity of newspaper coverage, is compounded by Italian television not really being that interested (Corazza). This is mitigated slightly, by an ethnographic observation, as a regular viewer. There are serious political and investigative programmes covering the EU, but these are broadcast late in the evening to small audiences.

So are the Italian public 'instinctively favourable' considering all these mitigating factors? The Italian public sphere seems to have absorbed Europe. Yet regular EU communication to the press (on this limited evidence) is not being passed on to the people that much. But the EU institutions and national governments do appear to have an understanding, which has fuelled public perception in the Italian public sphere since World War II on a daily, understood and taken-for-granted basis (Hutchinson, 2006). Italian post-World War II governments, of whatever political leaning, have conveyed Europe on one or another banal level. Something of this

appears to have been absorbed, internalised and recycled in the public psyche (Bourdieu, 2005). This suggests also that the normative level (and the apparent co-operation between the EU and national governments), has been translated successfully on an operative level, with Italians perceiving themselves as citizens of the nation-state, primarily – but absorbing something of the wider Europe within that nationalistic framework. This interpretation also calls into question the 'instinctive favourability' – instead demonstrating a little how Europe has been discursively constructed within nation and internalised over time (Wodak, 2006). Scafuri noted earlier how, for internal political reasons, Berlusconi would be engaged over Europe and indeed the constitutional signing did happen in Rome (Constitution, 2004), evoking the original signing of the Treaty of Rome and Italian national governments do appear to work with the EU (Ginzborg, 2003, Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

4.5 An EU communication deficit in Italy –language.

There is however one area in which both Corazza and Castellina argued that there was a form of EU communication deficit: language. Corazza argued:

> There are 60 million taxpayers that need to be informed. Italian is a language that is much older than English. It is absurd that the European Commission does not understand that a country [Italy] of 60 million people, with the most beautiful language in the world, pretends to have another form of communication.

Corazza is evoking the myth of origin (Hall, 1996), without detailing how Italian is actually older – yet utilising and legitimising this evocation to re-affirm Italy and Italians. Again a particular scheme of perception is at work. On another level it also the myth of nation and language as unitary and homogenous (Hutchinson, 2006). Yet the construction of perceptions is rendered visible, in that Corazza elsewhere in his interview referred to Italy as regionalistic and very diverse, with many regional dialects. This heterogenous Italy is quietly forgotten, in the citation above.

Corazza's comments also can be interpreted as constructing a particular perception of Italy (suffering an injustice), again in relation to the *Other* of Britain and English. It is implicit again, but this could be interpreted as another relational metaphor at

work (Bourdieu, 2005), with English readily used and accepted in the EU – unlike the implication that Italian is being unfairly treated. An interpretation is that the relational metaphor continues with the reference to Italian being the most beautiful language in the world (which means English is not).

Notably, the scheme of perception is not to re-affirm Europe within the national habitus – but to question it. Previously there was the mobilising of the perceived economic threats (Hutchinson, 2006) of the euro and the brief mention of EU-enlargement with structural funds now going eastwards. It appears to be the case that the Italian habitus concerning Europe, is in some quarters being modified again (Wodak, 2006) – according to another context: language. Corazza accepted that the working language of the EU is English, however, he added that communication to Italian citizens should be specifically in Italian: "I think that one day, this will become a serious political problem." Gavin (2001) refers to the problem of language in the EU but here the Head of Press for the EC in Rome is openly critical of the EU's handling of language barriers. Corazza was frustrated his office had to translate commission communiques from English to Italian for journalists. Antonia Mochan, European Commission spokesperson for Employment and Social Affairs, confirmed that press releases were normally either in French or English.

> The only culture that we have in common in Europe is that of America. The only thing that we all know is American cinema, with American-English the only vehicle of communication. Nobody goes to see a French or a German film. (Castellina)

Castellina did not agree when I spoke of European English. "It is American English essentially, much more American than English, the jargon of the computer." Castellina extends the argument into territory Corazza did not venture into. Corazza's thesis was that the use of English, at the expense of other languages, would become a political issue for the EU. By contrast Castellina is going much further for her interpretation is of language as an American imposition on a Europe that has lost its way.

4.6 IL GIORNALE journalistic field.

A full and in-depth analysis of the field, with particular attention to comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) will be systematically undertaken. Without this texture, the nuances inherent in the newspaper discourse could be lost.

Roberto Scafuri was the chief political correspondent in Rome for *Il Giornale* and was, therefore, at the time David Charter at *The Times'* opposite number. At the very outset, Scafuri indicates that he would have liked to have worked for his regional newspaper. Scafuri comes from Naples. He used the term *lotizzazione,* in reference to the main Naples newspaper, *Il Mattino*. Under the *lotizzazione* (Chiarenza, 2002), Italian state television channels were until recently, closely linked to political parties. Hallin and Mancini (2004) make the point that party-press parallelism, of which *lotizzazione*, is a part, has receded a little. Scafuri made it clear how *Il Giornale* was still aligned to such party-press parallelism, supporting Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, with the paper being officially owned by Berlusconi's brother Paolo.

In terms of Scafuri's personal doxa, as a southerner (with regionalism embedded into the fabric of Italian society) he said: "I emigrated to Milan", as *Il Giornale* is based in the northern city of Milan. Scafuri is, in this sense, an outsider who may not have fully absorbed the institutional doxa of *Il Giornale*, which is a newspaper with a distinct northern readership. Scafuri joined before it became a Berlusconi-owned newspaper in the 1990s and was, thus, well-placed to note any degree of instrumentalisation. Scafuri argued self-censorship was one of the ways in which Italian journalists responded to writing for newspapers which historically have been closely aligned to political parties. *Il Giornale* is no exception, but the complexities of how as a journalist, Scafuri responded, provided some insights:

> beyond the editorial line, there is the political line, continuously more clearly signposted, because Silvio Berlusconi is active in politics and is becoming more clearly visible, being in high office (as Prime Minister). Therefore this is creating an earthquake, let us say, creating self-censorship in the main. From one example to another, it is a case of how you interpret this. In my case, an atypical case, if you like, in the Silvio Berlusconi group, in my specific case, also if his (Silvio Berlusconi's) acquaintances are involved, I am reasonably fortunate.

From this it can be ascertained that Scafuri does not have to undergo as much self-censure as some of his less established colleagues. Indeed, in his case, he is encouraged to betray his personal doxa, as somebody aligned to the left of the political spectrum. This is shown in an article he wrote, that forms part of the thesis' newspaper discourse analysis. The above citation paints a picture of *Il Giornale* indulging in clear party-press parallelism, corroborating Pansa's (1977) image of the "*giornalista dimezzato*"(see Section 2.10). Yet Scafuri is nevertheless entitled to write according to his personal doxa over Europe, on the left, which is, he argued "atypical". This point endorses Hallin and Mancini's (2004) claim of Italian political journalists 'advocating' political positions.

Scafuri noted how Berlusconi employed the legendary Italian editor, Vittorio Feltri. Feltri's profile is important in understanding the historical texture of *Il Giornale*, which is relevant to the thesis' discourse analysis. Prior to editing *Il Giornale,* Feltri had been the editor of *L'Independente*, one of the newspapers supporting the Northern League. Yet *Il Giornale* and *L'Independente* were also attempts to create more mass-circulation newspapers, by Italian standards (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p102). Feltri then took up the editorship of *Il Giornale* in 1994 and in his four-year tenure the circulation went from 130,000 to 250,000. Feltri, on leaving, explained that: "When I understood that the Berlusconi family needed an editor of a party newspaper, I could not stay. It is not a job that I know how to do" (Feltri 2003). The citation paints a picture of an editor trying to relinquish the party-press parallelism of traditional Italian journalism and create a more liberal model, mass-circulation newspaper. Hallin and Mancini (2004) noted however that in Italy, such attempts are dogged by contradictions. Feltri, having come from *L'Independente*, would have been used to serving the readership of the Northern League – and not just Berlusconi's Forza Italia, although these two constituencies are intermeshed in northern Italy. In the late 1990s, *Il Giornale* readers were principally Forza Italia supporters, followed by the coalition partners, the National Alliance and considerably fewer from the Northern League (Sani, 2001: p205, Table 1, p66).

I asked Scafuri, if *Il Giornale* is quite Eurosceptic and does that reflect the mentality of Forza Italia? He replied:

> that of Forza Italia and that of the Northern League. However, careful, where is the place in which the political line of *Il Giornale* is born? It is born for sure in the location we have already mentioned, that being the politics of the Berlusconi government. It is also born from the ever stronger sound of a leading political party [holding the balance of power in Berlusconi governments], the Northern League.

Scafuri concurs with Giordano (2004) over the pivotal role of the Northern League. Scafuri explained that *Il Giornale* was a Milan-based newspaper (where Forza Italia has a sound grounding), but that *Il Giornale's* core readerships came from the pre-Alpine cities of nearby Brescia and Bergamo. "One tries to meet the needs of these readers also." Scafuri described such traditional Northern League supporters and readers. They felt threatened by foreigners and Europe generally. In the anti-immigration law, proposed by Berlusconi, and the Northern League leader Bossi, they claimed that theirs was a 'Christian model of society'. Ruzza, (2005) notes how Northern League MPs were defecting to Forza Italia, compounding the electoral haemorrhaging from the Northern League to the Forza Italia. The readerships and the fate of the two political parties are intermeshed, as are the discourses concerning Europe.

The possibility of Feltri distorting *Il Giornale* by his dominance, as editor, is considered. Scafuri referred to how Feltri decided not to offer him the main political desk job "I imagine because we did not have the same political standpoint". Instead Scafuri took the post of Head of the news desk. Later he became the chief political correspondent covering the Rome parliament. After that Scafuri offered to open a Brussels bureau. His offer was declined and *Il Giornale* is one of the few Italian national newspapers that does not have a Brussels correspondent, but instead sends a reporter sporadically to cover specific events.

The editorial line of *Il Giornale* over Europe is articulated by Scafuri: "If it is not Eurosceptic, considering the political party (Forza Italia), that considered, it is nevertheless quite Europe critical." He added that it was a discourse that: "did not believe in the possibility, effectively, of arriving one day at a united Europe." This accords with Berlusconi's protestations that he was not Eurosceptic, but wanted Europe to speak "with one voice" but also did not want a "centrally run" Europe (Owen, 2002). Scafuri argued this positioning on Europe was linked to the context of the 'new Europe' alliance over Iraq, in which Berlusconi was aligned alongside Bush and Blair.

Hallin and Mancini (2004: p252) described Berlusconi as typifying a new phenomenon of highly professional politics with media specialists in control. This understanding is further corroborated by Scafuri, who described the demise of the old political parties with the *Tangentopoli* scandal that discredited most of the political class. In their wake came Forza Italia and the Northern League. According to Scafuri, the Forza Italia fed off an American-style populism and responded to the grand movements, including the EU concept. The Northern League instead, he argued, withdrew back into the microcosm of the locality and a position of fear.

BRITAIN: field and comparative analysis.

The same pattern will be undertaken as with Italian interviewees, in a bid to maintain consistency. The analysis methodically moves from the EP sub-field, through to the commission sub-field, traversing the British journalistic field before examining *The Times* journalistic field. The first issue therefore concerns Europe, the free market and globalisation, as Castellina did at the outset of the chapter.

4.7 Europe, economics and globalisation. Britain's recent 'contribution.'

Christopher Beazley was a Conservative MEP critical of federalism and supporting the regulatory model. It was hard to discern if this was his personal doxa – or that of the British Conservatives in the EP. This however, did not prevent him from being vociferously critical of Britain's position on integration. Beazley referred to the European project trying to construct institutions "not only to realise the economic benefit, but to prevent competition leading to conflict." He argued this had not been the British view and not how the project "was promoted and sold in this country." He felt the British mind-set on joining the EEC was not "that here was a political model that was going to be supportive to them, at all. It really was economics…" He also felt this was the wrong mind-set to have. Clegg concurred, saying that Britain saw the post-World War II European project in terms of economics – perceiving the community "as a ghastly reminder" that, with the empire lost, Britain was no longer a world player.

Whether Britain, on a normative level (Malešević, 2006), has developed a *Weltanschaaung,* based solely on economics, seeing the post-World War II European project through that prism, is worth engaging with. Gifford (2008) argues that across the British political mainstream, degrees of Euroscepticism are prevalent – to the extent that Euroscepticism is part of how Britain has come to now define itself. Yet as these MEPs' responses suggest, not all those working on a normative level within Britain, have the same viewed of the project, as Gifford

When Beazley refers to a "political model," not deemed supportive of Britain, an interpretation could be that this observation relates to a perceived European threat to the majoritarianism and parliamentary sovereignty of Britain (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Beazley's interpretation was that the political dimension of the European project was not being 'sold' in Britain. Here, unlike the Italian interviewees, Beazley seems to be critically engaging with categories of perception over Europe, in this case emanating from the British elite - rather than supporting them. Instead of legitimising these perceptions (Bourdieu, 2005), he seems to be challenging them.

Moving to the EC sub-field Martin said of the British reaction, as the EU enlarged from the founding six members "(It) resulted in feelings, especially in the United Kingdom, of a foreign force introducing itself into a history of Britain, which was dominated by a colonial and imperial mentality."Martin is referring to a Europe that appears to be seen as an *Other,* from within Britain. The mutual compatability of the national and supranational (Dinan, 1994) is not how Martin sees the reaction within Britain. In citing 'feelings', one could interpret Martin's comments as describing the emotional attitudes, with the national habitus, distinguishable from the the out-group (*them*) of Europe.

The references by both Martin and Clegg to the former British empire, seem to be suggesting layers of experience within Britain, that have internalised Europe as a threat to Britain, post-World War II (Hutchinson, 2006). An interpretation is that this is a Europe, as an out-group, that has deepened the texture of national culture. When Martin refers to 'history,' it could be interpreted as the internalisation of Europe, the *Other,* within Britain.

Among Italian interviewees, specific threats were mobilised within Italy, i.e. the euro, which recalled hot nationalism (Hutchinson, 2006). Instead what British interviewees within the political field seem to be suggesting, is Britain has developed categories of perception that deem Europe as a (political) threat at a deeper and more generalised level. Martin added:

People say we joined a common market that should be economic, it has now become political, it was always both and the political side, in my personal view, is more important than the economic…It all stems from that pre-conception or assumption which inhibits the feelings amongst the (British) general public.

Cazaninni's earlier comment, about an Italian 'prejudice in favour' suggested a scheme of perception (Bourdieu, 2005) concerning European integration, so deeply internalised within the Italian habitus, such that Europe is an 'ideological habit' (Billig, 1995). However, in the above citation Martin seems to be suggesting the opposite in Britain: a deeply internalised perception of Europe as the *Other*, that has also become a habit (Wodak, 2006). Martin also noted how Lord Young had promoted Europe to the British public as *Open for Business*. Britain's advancement of free trade, post-World War II and more recently a more advanced globalisation, followed. Bond argued that what positions the EU took on globalisation and how it saw America were major issues.

Baker argued there was a contradiction at the heart of globalisation in that the multi-cultural post-World War II dream of Europe was in danger of being hijacked by global capitalism. The paradox was that national politicians were pushing globalisation *and* nationalism simultaneously. He cited Margaret Thatcher and her Eurosceptic attack on the Delors' vision, which was soon to be coupled with the advancement of an Anglo-Europe of free trade and globalisation (Gifford, 2008). Clegg, (who used to report for the trans-national Financial Times), argued that in Britain there was a 'touching obliviousness' to the contradictions of defending national sovereignty and advancing globalisation:

there is literally no nation in the developed world, that would sell off its utilities, sell off its trains, sell off its gas, sell off its water, sell off its media to Johnny Foreigner and then for God's sake worry that minister X might be outvoted once every blue moon in a sodding meeting in Brussels, it is completely crackers.

In the previous political field, various categories of perception within Britain, over Europe, appeared to be challenged by interviewees. This, in the main, related to presenting Europe to the public, as an economic endeavour. This also suggests a power struggle on the normative level within British society, over Europe, just as Gifford (2008) refers to the internal rifts amongst the Conservatives over Europe.

Yet Baker appears to be arguing how Britain, through globalisation, has been advancing a British vision of Europe – and has been seen to be involved with the European project. This can be interpreted as, at a normative level, a mobilisation of Britain on the European stage. Another layer of interpretation is that politicians like Thatcher then articulated something different on the operative level, and to the national public sphere (Hutchinson, 2006): Europe as a threat to national sovereignty. This could also be interpreted as politicians playing to the populous and what they have come to understand of European integration. This could be a pandering to the British (Eurosceptic) public, what Bourdieu (2005) called an audience-ratings mentality, within the political field. Yet, as Clegg argued, this creates a contradiction, embracing the free market (and Europe) on one level, yet arguing to defend British political sovereignty on another. This conflict between the normative and operative levels (Malešević, 2006) did not seem to be the case in Italy.

4.8 The EU Constitution – and the future of Europe: British perspectives.

The proposed EU Constitution then surfaces as a conduit, through which the investigation can probe further British institutional doxa and the national habitus in relation to Europe. Corbett argued that European identity was unlikely to be like a national identity, concurring with Fossum and Schlesinger (2007). "There are common interests evolving, a common system and common solutions to common problems." This interpretation accords with Dedman's (1996) initial interpretation of integration as something necessitated by the interconnections between organisations. This suggests Corbett views Europe as a regulatory system. He said there was a compelling need to work together with "some common values". Corbett concluded that he felt it would be a unique identity but a voluntary one. The voluntary aspect was mentioned by Corbett, arguing if Britain wanted to leave the community – it could.

Bond, former head of the EP's UK office, re-affirmed Clegg's point about the centrality of the federal-regulatory debate in the EP. He argued the debate was being reconstituted over the Constitution, as it had been previously over the Common Market. Bond said of the European future: "these things will take time and that there is a bit of chicken and egg to this, that you don't expect the demos to be enthusiastic for the state before the state has been constructed". Bond referred to the project evolving: "even formalising things, not necessarily changing the distribution of power, but having a Constitution." In various ways during his interview, coupled with his current work for the Federal Trust think-tank, Bond betrayed a federalist approach to Europe.

Baker commented on the debate about the EU Constitution: "should you have God in the European Constitution or not, and do we trust this Europe? Is it a Europe of big business and biotechnology and research on embryos or is it one of values?", the question reflecting Berlusconi's argument for Christian values to be included in the EU Constitution (Johnson and Farrell 2003). An interpretation of Berlusconi's position can be of evoking a Christian Europe, founded in Rome, which is an evocation of the myth of origin (Hall, 1996). A category of perception is possibly constructed, with Italy (and Rome) as a nation irrefutably linked with this Christian Europe. Charter instead took the side of the (British) people – against the perceived shambles that was the Constitution:

> I think when people see the attempts to get a Constitution, coming apart at the seams, *there is a lot of common sense around*, coming back to the new Europe, that was down to countries like Poland, taking a fresh look at Europe and saying, almost in a British way, we are part of Europe, we don't want to be pushed around, we want to get it right from the start. The British papers would identify with that quite strongly. It is a sort of sense of who our friends are.

Charter's comment can be interpreted as symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2005) surreptitiously imposing categories of perception and arguably using this as a basis to legitimize a Eurosceptic stance. Charter in his reference to 'common sense' seems to be implicitly referring to and re-affirming categories of perception amongst the

British people. Yet if this was articulated overtly, it could be something like: the British people can see the Constitution is a mess, it is Europe, it 'goes without saying' (Wodak, 2007: pp.210-11). The second part of the citation, arguing how Poland has come to see things 'almost in a British way' is to further legitimise how Charter is categorising British perceptions over Europe. A further interpretation could be that the EU Constitution acts as a relational metaphor in this citation (Bourdieu, 2005), demonstrating how Europe can get it wrong – from the position of the British national habitus (creating the impression of this habitus being more homogenous and unified than it perhaps is).

Charter finishes the citation by referring to how the British press would see things. It is hard to discern if what Charter is expressing here is a personal or institutional doxa (within *The Times)*. What is however apparent, is that he is not critically engaging with the categories of perception over Europe in Britain (as previous interviewees seemed to do) – but rather helping to re-enforce them. Charter's claim of 'common sense' appears to be suspect when juxtaposed with previous interviewees in the EU political field and Baker.

4.9 The British people – enthusiastic over Europe?

Did British interviewees also feel 'the people' were enthusiastic? Beazley chose to engage with the issue by comparing the Italian and British public spheres. He argued Italy was embracing Europe, because of a distrust of its own institutions, "not simply the wartime experience." Ginzborg (2003, p239) concurs. Beazley added that there was an Italian hope vested in the European superstructure and the rule of law. Conversely he said:

in Britain, people have looked at it the opposite way, that the national institutions, not only survive, but were the reasons for Britain's survival and success and therefore a European input into that could somehow diminish what was seen to be successful. I think each country and each government had a different view.

Beazley is re-affirming the internalisation of certain categories of perception over Europe, within Britain, he observed earlier. However, much as with Cazaninni in referring to the Italian 'prejudice in favour' a closer look at the last part of the citation reveals that this internalisation in Britain may have been precipitated by the *Weltanschauung* that emerged from consecutive British governments, re-enforcing previous layers of experience of Europe (Hutchinson, 2006). Beazley also draws the parallel between the people and the government (Gellner, 1983). The result, much as with Cazaninni's 'prejudice in favour', is a scheme of perception that seems to have internalised, within the British habitus, a Europe that is perceived as the *Other*. Clegg argues that there is a real tension between:

> the profound loyalties that people feel towards their own nation and the fact that so much authority, I think, on the whole rightly, gravitated upwards, towards the EU, so you have a dislocation between affinity, which creates legitimacy, and power.

This resonates with the 'commission-bashing' Trenz (2007: p99) notes in many countries, many of which were supportive of the EU. It is also reminiscent of the tension Dedman (1996) and Dinan (1994) note at the outset of this thesis, between the national and supranational, though as the latter author noted, the two concepts are not mutually exclusive.

Clegg, like Beazley felt that, in terms of Italy, the EU was seen as a "guarantor of peace and prosperity in a way it is not here (Britain)." Clegg argued Italians perceived themselves as of different nations and regions and where a sense of national identity is much weaker than in the UK. Clegg's interpretation of the Italian situation concurs with Corazza. Clegg did not comment however, on British national perceptions specifically over Europe.

Martin argued: "Enthused within British society is an anti-Europeanism or a lack of clarity about the real Europe." The latter point could be contributing to the former. Martin apportioned blame to national politicians. He argued that it would be negative if EU institutions tried to widen public understanding. He experienced, like Bond

(when he released EP literature about European elections) that such attempts can be branded by the British media as 'propaganda.' Martin added:

> people hate Europe here and the image about Europe in the public domain will not and can not change unless and until it is led from the government at the front. That has not happened since 1973 except for one or two periods of time and it certainly is not the case now.

This suggests again concerning Thatcher that despite what may or may not be happening on the normative level between governments in Europe – on the operative national level, British governments have not translated this into communicating to the public. Martin argues that in Britain 'people hate Europe.' He appears to again be critical of the discursive construction of European integration in Britain. A parallel can be drawn with Italy and when Cazaninni referred to Italians being 'instinctively favourable.' Martin however appears to be criticizing the construction of an unchanging British 'national character' concerning Europe (Hall, 1996) – rather than endorsing it. At various junctures, much like in Italy, the British habitus has modified over Europe. Earlier in the thesis it was noted how Winston Churchill, the federalist, was very much at the heart of creating the post-World War II project (Davies, 1997, Judt, 2005). There were moments when it looked as if the Blair's New Labour government would engage fully over Europe – but this came to nothing (Dougal, 2004) and the Tories have remained deeply divided over Europe (Gifford, 2008).

Dougal argued:"They [the British] do not understand it. It is never explained to them." Dougal explained it was slightly different in Northern Ireland, from where he hailed, partly because of the EU structural funds pouring into the region. Bell said at the end of his interview: "The EU is regarded as something that is done to Britain and not part of it." This accords with Clegg and how the EU reminds Britain of its diminishing status – and that includes the role of Britain's institutions.

Various Italian interviewees referred to how the euro had mitigated the traditional enthusing over Europe in Italy. The interpretation offered was that there was a modification of the Italian habitus, concerning Europe. Baker picks up the thread, concerning reaction to the euro in Britain:

> The euro has now become that debate. I feel there has been a backtracking, in that people are interested in the world and Europe as part of that and they are interested in Britain. I am talking about my experience as a British journalist trying to sell stories about the European continent. That is why I say that people are emotionally still at 1945. That is where you have to pick people up.... people cannot really handle that countries like France were on both sides. That gets really complicated. People in Britain are still very much on the feature film level of the Guns of Alamo and the British film industry is still driving that narrative.

An interpretation of the above citation is that it supports Bourdieu's (2005) notion of an audience ratings mentality. Baker appears to be contending with parts of the British media pandering to this audience. The citation suggests that the British public have internalised a national habitus that looks back to empire and Commonwealth. This is in juxtaposition to an Italy that appears to have harnessed Europe as a means of self-renewal (Ginzborg, 2003). Baker re-enforces his interpretation by reference to people still being emotionally in 1945. This appears to be Britain, as the we-group with certain emotional attitudes (Wodak, 2006) differentiating Britain from Europe. Baker also develops on Martin's interpretation, offering more categories of perception over Europe.

Baker's point about the war, and the lack of comprehension of its complexity, seems to reaffirm the notion of an undefeated Britain and the Churchillian narrative of a plucky Britain (Garton-Ash, 2005). This has to be considered in the context of British majoritarianism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) and how this has arguably contributed to re-inforcing further, categories of public perception over Europe. There is some evidence to support the idea that Britain, post-World War II, on a normative level was at various junctures, supportive of a wider Europe – but on an operative level (Malešević, 2006) communicated a Eurosceptic British nationalism. Churchill was a founder of the Council of Europe – yet resisted joining the post-World War II project (Davies, 1997, Delanty, 1995). Thatcher deepened Europe's commitment to the free market and globalisation with a so-called Anglo-Europe (Gifford, 2008). Yet at Bruges she condemned federalism and defended British national interests. Brown (2003), the former Prime Minister, spoke in almost

identical contradictory terms. Something of the complexity of Britain's discursive construction of European integration is apparent.

> I think we are losing ground steadily. If you take a rather more specific argument, like Britain joining the euro, I think that we spent quite a long time arguing the case for joining the euro and have been let down by the government on that, for several years and I think now we are having to retreat to defend the whole European project (with the people) and not just defending the euro, within these islands. (Walter)

Walter concurs with Baker's thesis that the euro has become 'that debate' over Europe. There are several strands here. Firstly Walter, like Martin re-affirms national government inactivity over public Euroscepticism. As discussed earlier, this could be interpreted as a failure to 'translate' the normative to the operative in Britain (Malešević, 2006), such that consecutive governments have not conveyed European integration to the public. Walter is suggesting that Euroscepticism within the national habitus is so pronounced that the underlying discourse of withdrawal could actually happen. One thinks of the UKIP electoral success of June, 2009 (Taylor, 2009).

Clegg, further corroborated the findings of many Italian interviewees, concerning the hiking in prices across mainland Europe perceived rightly or wrongly to be the fault of the euro; as indeed the euro created a crisis over Europe in Italy (Cazaninni, Scafuri). What is apparent is that the Italian habitus towards Europe was clearly modified - but arguably not to the extent that Italy stopped perceiving itself as fundamentally European. Conversely in the British case, as just shown, Britain is not even a euro member – yet the debate highlights the undercurrent of a British discourse of withdrawal.

In Britain, what appears to have happened is that the euro has been mobilised by various parts of the national political field to create a perception of Europe as an economic threat. Hence this threat facilitates a hot nationalistic response (Hutchinson, 2006). In Italy, the euro modified the national habitus. In Britain, the euro (with Britain not even in) could be interpreted as another layer of experience, deepening the texture of a national culture that is not predisposed towards Europe (Hutchinson, 2006).

4.10 The Iraq War – as Context.

 I think there is a slight, almost racist reaction in Britain, is that the Italians are always on the streets, the French are always on the streets, it is like French air traffic controllers, they are always on strike. It is not that it [the anti-Iraq demonstrations] were not reported, but I am certain that it was not reported as prominently as it was in the surrender monkey countries [anti-Iraq war].

Maybe there is that feeling that there are certain European nations which historically have been quick to demonstrate and slow to act, when the time for action is called for. There is also a feeling that because of certain countries, because of the way PR [proportional representation] works in Italy, because of the way German elections were timed, that you would wait forever. The European dimension was important because of France and Germany being on the UN Security Council. (Charter)

The omission of too much coverage of the protests across Europe in *The Times* can be thought of in relation to Strauss-Kahn's comments about that day of demonstrations giving birth to the *European nation* ((Garton-Ash, 2005: p54, Judt, 2005). *The Times* chose not to lend Europe such symbolism. An interpretation could be that, had *The Times* done so, it would have contributed to the invention of tradition (Hall, 1996) surrounding Europe, as well as contributing to the construction of a European community – against the war – giving this opposition a certain gravitas.

An interpretation is that, in terms of news values, the story had limited relevance (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001) to a Eurosceptic *Times* readership. Another interpretation could be that the extent of the demonstrations was very much at odds with the British government position over Iraq. *The Times* and Murdoch supported the Labour government over Iraq (Grice, 2006), an example of party-press parallelism. Is omission in coverage here also a form of distortion by *The Times*?

The second part of Charter's citation can be interpreted as a form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2005). In the first part of the citation, Charter is observing the categories of perception that have developed in Britain, over Europe, describing a 'racist reaction.' However the second part can be interpreted as an attempt to legitimise the imposition of such categories of perception (Bourdieu, 2005). Charter refers to the 'feeling' that certain European nations were: 'historically' quick to demonstrate but slow to act; and that their political systems (unlike the majoritarian system in Britain) meant they could not act quickly. This, is already distinguishing the we-group (Britain, acting over Iraq) and a communal emotional attitude (Wodak, 1999: p28) from 'Europe.' Yet as has been seen at various junctures the national habitus in countries is often modified. To categorise 'historically', as Charter does, is also to oversimplify. For instance, the Italians were on the streets – despite their government supporting the Iraq war.

Charter seems to be: implicitly distinguishing Britain from its Others in Europe; and also justifying Britain's actions. This imposition of categories of perception could also be interpreted as a relational metaphor at work (Bourdieu, 2005). This is a Britain implied and distinguished from others by its willingness to act hawkishly, when needed – a re-affirmation of self. What could also be argued is that Charter's attempt to legitimise and justify the categories of perception could be interpreted as simultaneously justifying the war – and *The Times'* support for that war.

I always intended to engage the thesis with the Iraq War, albeit at a latter stage. However, the context proved useful in exploring, in relation to war, how British nationalism – and any mobilising of nationalism in *The Times*, can be seen to categorise Europe on a series of levels. So do other British interviewees, concur or challenge Charter over the Iraq War, and his categories of perception? Regardless, the Iraq example has rendered more visible the construction of perceptions in Britain by the journalistic field, and in this case, *The Times*.

Clegg described former US President, George Bush (and more specifically his Iraq policy) as "one of the best foot soldiers for the European cause." Beazley's comment is a critique on the British journalistic field, in relation to media coverage of Iraq:

> it still looks as if we are wholly in a national theatre, the reasons that the French government took a different view to the British government, there are very few examples of that being explained, other than through British commentators. In that sense progress is pretty slow.

This citation suggests some distortion by the journalistic field in Britain, over Iraq, through omission (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Bond developed the argument over Iraq, saying it reflected a division that has been "in the heart of Europe" since the start of the integrative project: is Europe an independent polar or are we Atlanticist and fall in with the Americans? Sells portrayed Britain torn between the US and Europe, over Iraq, with a majority of the people against, but then the pressure of forming a consensus once Britain was involved "nevertheless once war had been declared, with our boys, all the rest of it." The various interviewees in the British journalistic field seem to be revealing the complexities, concerning Iraq and Britain's positioning, that Charter seems to gloss over, in his common sense taxonomy. Sells, in his interpretation, seems to be alluding to how such a taxonomy could have taken root in the British press – once the war had started.

Entering the Italian domain, Buonadonna concurred with Clegg's interpretation, describing the anti-Iraq demonstrations as a "tidal wave" with protests in every European country. She argued those with the largest demonstrations were countries

whose governments supported the war. Buonadonna spoke of the fall of the Berlin Wall through to Iraq as part of a continuum:

> the emotional impact of the wall coming down, meant the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It made Europe, for the first time in its recent political history, in a position where it did not need to be a political vassal of the US. Ten years later we have people marching in the streets saying we do not want this American war.

Scafuri referred to a future Europe, which could include Turkey, then extending to the Iraq border. If so: "Iraq is no longer a sphere of economic interests, the petrol refineries of the Americans and probably the British. Instead it becomes the defence of our borders." The wider context was a Europe re-defining itself and Scafuri's questioning of the Christian Europe wanted by Berlusconi, instead seeing greater ethnic and religious complexity.

One aspect should not be forgotten, in the analysis of the discursive construction of Britain, over the response to Iraq. For this study the most pertinent aspect is a comprehension of press reaction, yet arguably the majority of the British were opposed to the war.

4.11 An EU communication deficit in Britain – language.

Beazley argued that English was fast-becoming the *lingua franca* of the EU and portrayed this positively, with the French coming to accept that this did not have to be perceived negatively by France, but was necessary for reasons of practicality. Mochan referred to a Europe tending to work in English, French and German, but because of the importance of English, many EC employees (like Mochan) were mother-tongue English speakers. Mochan said journalists contacting the EC could get by in English and French. Those who could not speak either English or French,were phoning EC offices in member states, who then contacted Brussels, so they had a line to give to journalists. These bureaux were "becoming increasingly important for that reason." The increasing importance of his office annoyed Corazza, arguing it was unfair, with Italians paying taxes to Brussels, like everybody else. Mochan conceded that language was a "big issue".

Baker argued English was helping Europe grow, but lamented the loss of the English-speaking media outlets, *Guardian Europe* and *The European*, that he had worked for. Various British interviewees, from the political and journalistic fields, spoke of a Europe that could only benefit from the standardization of communication in English (both in the EU and the EU press). Instead the perceived threat of English provided a strange consensus between the establishment Corazza and the Communist firebrand Castellina. Language, as Corazza argued, could become a serious issue.

4.12 Are the British well-informed over Europe?

The number of Italian interviews conducted was much smaller, in comparison to the British. However, this differentiation in no way accounts for a noticeable difference that emerged between Italian interviewees and their British counterparts. Amongst various British interviewees, in different fields, the following issues surfaced: the EU communication deficit; the national political communication deficit; and indeed a strong critique of the British journalistic field. Yet amongst Italians interviewed, none of these issues loomed on a major scale.

Martin argued earlier that European institutions 'assisting' British public understanding would have the opposite effect: "because of the state of affairs that the public mind has got itself into, even believing that the expenditure of funds from Europe is in effect a propaganda effort, which it manifestly is not." He argued such attempts had to be British government-led – and had not happened (since joining the EEC).

Dougal concurred with Martin. The national government has to explain Europe (Dougal, 2004). Clegg argued that, in terms or re-attaching the concepts to the people, it fell to educationalists, the media and domestic politicians, *not* the EU institutions themselves. Clegg added: "It comes down to a much simpler problem, which is that, as long as the UK's own political elite is unprepared to appropriate Europe, as a positive theme, no institution, whether it is Brussels, or planet smurf, can reverse that. It is a national issue." Clegg spoke of the realisation among many

young MEPs that the fight over Europe had to be conducted in the national sphere, which is why many like him were returning home.

The Westminster village.

Martin spoke of: the infrequency and small number of debates in the House of Commons on Europe and the issue being consigned to an obscure European Scrutiny Committee (Robertson). Martin also referred to Ministers returning from Council of Ministers meetings and apportioning blame elsewhere, rather than taking a collective European responsibility for what had been decided. Martin argued the last point was an example of the British media "being manipulated by the [British] politicians."

Bell highlighted that, until around 2000, MEPs were not allowed into the House of Commons and had never met their MP counterparts. It fell to the EC to organise a formal meeting between the two groups. Martin accused the Blair's New Labour government of "not lifting a finger" on Europe, since 1997, saying it had been an exercise in hypocrisy (concerning the national benefits of Europe) by consecutive British governments.

Martin presented an internal Westminster dichotomy. There were Whitehall civil servants regularly fighting over the minutiae of the "conceptual nature of the evolving Europe," coupled with politicians delegated to tackle these tasks. Bond corroborated: "there is hardly a department in national government that is not touched by the Brussels effect and that makes people more European. They may be antagonistic when they go to negotiate, that does not matter." On the other hand, there were many top civil servants and ambassadors away from direct engagement with Europe "who do not know who or what to believe about Europe" (Martin). An interpretation is of an internal struggle over Europe within the British national political field. Some are well-informed and engage – whereas others are ill-informed. Malešević (2006) argues the success of normative doctrines lies in the process of their translation to their operative counterpart: the 'national' public. The Westminster scenario presented, suggests a British national political field that can not convey a clear message to the public, because of internal rifts and confusion.

Dougal is critical of the EU, including the Commission he resigned from, and the press. But, like Martin he reserved his strongest critique for the British government:

> If our government wants to be at the heart of Europe, to be decision-makers, it must take the initiative, and it should be on the offensive now. It has, after all, signed up to European legislation adopted in this country. British ministers should have the guts to explain why to the people. And they must initiate the debate. It cannot and will not be done by outsiders. (Dougal, 2004)

Instead Gifford (2008: p145) argues that Gordon Brown as Chancellor, and then as Prime Minister, "re-asserted the advantages of British exceptionalism." Gifford (2008: p145) argues there is a coupling of an attempt to create a (globalised and free market) Anglo-Europe and reveal a flawed European federalism. The following citation has echoes of Thatcher at Bruges.

> British values have much to offer, persuading a global Europe that the only way forward is inter-governmental, not federal, mutual recognition not one-size-fits-all central rules; tax competition, not tax harmonisation, with proper political accountability and subsidiarity, not a superstate. (Brown, 2003)

UKIP were national runners-up in the European elections, behind the Conservatives (Taylor, 2009). Gifford (2008) argues that UKIP's withdrawal position presents the Conservatives with the chance to present a Eurosceptic position – as the British centre ground.

Corbett mentioned how statutory instruments were sometimes used to amend a bill. To oversimplify, a statutory instrument is a device by which ministers can introduce further national legislation adding it on to a bill that has already been agreed by the British parliament. The added legislation does not therefore need be subjected to the scrutiny of the Westminster parliament in any form. Corbett noted how these instruments were used to add unpopular legislation to bills related to Europe. However Corbett stressed that such legislation, added by a minister, was nothing to do with Europe "but when we are interviewed it is our fault."

Brussels and the national political communication deficit.

In an observation of the dialectic between the political and journalistic fields, Browne re-affirmed the "disgraceful habit" noted by a commission official of ministers holding press conferences for their national journalists – and presenting the outcome as a national victory against the commission (Dinan, 1994: p2). Browne depicted the Council of Ministers representing individual countries horsetrading for benefits:"governments always represent their efforts as 'battling for Britain' fending off the designs of other countries – and this is how it is reported – and as such it is likely that in the public mind it just emphasises our different interests rather than our common interests."

Instead Cazaninni referred to an Italian people that are "instinctively favourable." This Italian national habitus should be coupled with even Berlusconi's arguably more Europe-critical governments working closely with the commission to present Europe to Italians, maintaining a post-World War II government tradition of engagement (Corazza). Conversely, British 'victories' in the Council of Ministers, re-enforce a very different British habitus.

A picture emerges of British governments not presenting Europe to the public, since joining the community in the early seventies. If one considers the response of Churchill and subsequent post-World War II governments not wishing to join the European project, this disengagement goes back further still (Dedman, 1996, Dinan, 1994). This could be interpreted as a layering of experience in the collective memory (Hutchinson, 2006). There appears to be a transferring of this disengagement into the actual processes and minutiae of British governance: the obscure European Scrutiny Committee; unpopular Westminster legislation slipped into European bills, using statutory instruments; MEPs excluded (until recently) from Westminster. Baker describes this overall as an "abrogation of responsibility." This government-led disengagement, over time, appears to have at least contributed to an internalisation of

Europe as the *Other* within the national habitus. Charter's example over Iraq is possibly indicative.

Hallin and Mancini (2004: p240) note the common ground in British politics over parliamentary democracy, a market economy, and a relatively strong welfare state, portraying British nationalism as "very extensive." Hallin and Mancini (2004) also noted that Europe precipitated internal rifts, within British political parties, but somehow a government would (despite in-fighting) end up 'talking for the nation' (Gifford, 2008).

Britain and the European communication deficit.

Beazley argued EU institutions needed to demonstrate the need for European co-operation in a way the public could readily respond to, "perhaps that is still a failing." Corbett accepted that Westminster was both more appealing and more adversarial than the EP. By contrast the EP had to contend with all the languages, the translations and the lack of a clear two-party system. In Statham's (2008) political-communicative terms, the EP struggled to get its point across to journalists needing a story that had: a clear political line; transparency, with political actors open to discussion.

Corbett linked the European communication deficit, with the democratic deficit. He found the EP's 12 annual trips to Strasbourg "wasteful." Corbett wanted the President of the Commission elected by MEPs, making them more "visible." He admitted the EP was a "hung" parliament, with no clear groups and many languages, and with British reporters used to the very different (majoritarian) Westminster. Corbett also wanted transparency on salaries and expenses, saying MEPS were paid according to what MPs at home were getting, adding that this was not equal and "it is illegal actually."Corbett argued such issues were "an excuse for (British) stories on the gravy train. We could do without that every six months".

Statham (2008: p409) found the political-communicative element was slightly better among individual MEPs who knew how to 'sell' politics. However Clegg corroborated Corbett's reservations, concerning: the EP in-session, communicating ineffectively to the press; but also Corbett's argument that nevertheless, the EP was a very successful legislative revising chamber. Clegg argued: "I think the EP is a phenomenally successful legislative revising chamber. I think it is a political pygmy, in terms of influencing the battle for hearts and minds that you are interested in. It is one of the reasons I decided to stop."Clegg argued that MEPs could also not undo the "very fundamental prejudices, inclinations, historical ambivalences" from outside. Clegg referred to a "weak semblance" of commonality between different parties in their "artificial family groups" in the EP. Yet he noted that the main division was over whether you were for the federal or regulatory model for the future of Europe. Clegg argued this debate was:"fantastically boring for the man on the street. It creates a very negative impression because it means the whole European debate is only explained or articulated, in terms of institutions."

Clegg's personal doxa appeared to be as a pro-European federalist (in line with his institional doxa, as a Liberal Democrat). While highly critical of the British government and press: "I actually parade pragmatic European scepticism", as a means of reforming Europe and improving the EU communication deficit. Mochan presented an example indicative of the vacuum the commission can leave in its communication: "The day after the Olympics finished, our duty spokesperson did what was a very tongue in cheek, light-hearted thing about how the European Union had won the most medals, it got translated into, now they are trying to take our medals away now" (Kavanagh, 2004 in *The Sun*). I prompted her on this, by asking if the London office was always on message with what was being said in Brussels. She said that without even a linguistic barrier, things can be 'translated' badly.

Dougal (2004) raised the different issue of the EU communication deficit manifesting itself in a lack of leadership and the commission's institutional doxa of pretending to work and live supranationally – when in reality what was being tended to and nurtured was the prevailing national public sphere, concurring with Fossum

and Schlesinger (2007). Dougal accused the big countries of selecting "a weak manipulable commission." He added: "It is the kind of spectacle which has given Europe a bad name." Dougal referred to the commission Presidents Prodi and Santer:

> As the current Commission was approaching the last six months of its term, three commissioners returned to jobs in their own countries. The outgoing President, Mr Prodi, was preoccupied with Italian politics. What kind of leadership is this? (Dougal, 2004)

Dougal argued: "I spent two years in London pushing paper around my desk, generally the same pieces of paper re-circulated, dealing with rules which appeared more to impede communication than facilitate it." He added that the Commission selling Europe to *le grand public*, was a myth, referring to "25 publics and perhaps many more. How many different publics are there in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland alone?" (Dougal, 2004) There was the more recent example of Peter Mandelson giving up as Trade Commissioner – to become Business Secretary in the British government. Here then is the continuing tension between the national and supranational within the EU, potentially impacting on media communication. This climate also reaffirms Milward's thesis of integration evolving – when it suits nations (Dedman, 1996: p12).

Walter cited the difficulty of reporting on an EP that debated an issue on one day – and voted the next. He also cited the Council of Ministers meeting in camera. Walter countered the criticism that some British reporters, including Charter, did not seem to know how the EU institutions worked:

> "No, it is the fault of the European institutions as much as the reporters, I think. They (EU) will go out of their way to make the thing as obscure and opaque as possible. I would put the blame fairly and squarely on the way the European institutions work." (Walter)

Watson referred to a lot of acronyms and that this complexity was not something that a British audience was comfortable with. He added: "You get a lot of information. You have to sift through a lot of information to decide what would make a story. You can also get very comfortable and think along tramlines." This is reminiscent of

a comment in Statham's (2008: p408) study: "They (European institutions) say 'take the whole thing and look for the focus', the national ones say 'take 2 sheets, it's our focus, and if you like I'll then give you the whole thing'. " (Editor, *El Mundo*)

A related point can be made. British reporters have possibly been influenced by the national habitus towards Europe. The tendency to turn to British political parties or national government, rather than EU institutions, for clarification is re-enforced further still, if the EU is not making information press-friendly. For instance, British journalists prefer to gain their stories from UKREP, the British government's permanent civil service office in Brussels (Weymouth & Anderson, 1999).

The British Journalistic field – and its communication deficit.
Beazley argued that the national public sphere prevails, with the British press focusing on the Commonwealth, the German media on central Europe and the French outlets on the former colonies. He added that journalists were rarely multi-lingual and didn't exchange information. Hence it was not surprising that stories reflected such insularity.

Clegg spoke of a "slightly frantic and shrill coverage of European issues, in large parts of the written (British) press" concurring with Garton-Ash (2005). He referred to the genuflection to things European in parts of the European press: "But you just don't have the same mixture of vitriol (form the press) and cowardice (the government not responding) which distinguishes the British debate and if you like, perverts or distorts every issue" Charter referred to the "obsessive" coverage over the euro and the possibility of a referendum on the issue. Trenz (2007) and Statham (2008) also found the British press outside of any rubric data threw up.
Corbett attacked the British journalistic field over its perceived instrumentalisation, and said that the three key owners of the British press "just happen to be anti-Europeans," including Murdoch.

Bond concurred with Clegg, over what he called "skewed ideas (in Britain)" and the need for "massively more clear information." He argued that editors found it much more convenient to choose conflicting ideas. "It is dead easy to demonise, it is slightly lazy journalism." This could be construed as to do with relevance (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001: p279) and the use of *them* and *us* to construct a story, especially if in Britain, Euroscepticism is possibly part of how many the British define themselves (Gifford, 2008). Bond conceded there was the difficulty of presenting complex information in a small space. Bond also felt there was far too much comment and not enough news. Bond does see some instrumentalisation, but more importantly finds more fault with editors. He referred to too few editors with Brussels experience. He couples this with lazy journalism and a lack of knowledge over Europe. Bond argued that although, for instance, Murdoch would oppose more anti-competitive EU regulatory powers, "it is not that he is worried about some detail on the agricultural policy. I think there the real issue lies with the editorial office." Bond cited his experience of presenting British editors with factual information about the European elections – and being accused of being pro and told the information could not be used.

Henningham and Delano (1998: p154) found that 44 per cent of British journalists said they had suffered "improper editorial interference" with a story. If one thinks of the fierce competition for readers *The Times* contends with in a commercialised mass-circulation industry (Hallin and Manciini, 2004) this last figure does not appear so high. One also has to think about Hallin and Mancini's (2004) observation of left-leaning journalists in the UK taking pride in their professionalism, writing for mass circulation right-wing (and most likely Eurosceptic) British newspapers.

Bond spoke of the instrumentalisation of Murdoch and Berlusconi in historical terms: "It is a concern, but one should not limit it to Europe, they are communicating not only their messages on Europe, they are communicating their messages on the state. I think it comes cyclically." Bond argued that a hard-headed consumerism, much as Hallin and Mancini (2004) described it, had crept into the press. He added

however, that the above owners had discovered they could also employ their influence as political actors (in Berlusconi's case, very directly, as Prime Minister).

Dougal described the Commission office in London tackling mis-representation in the British press on an almost daily basis, in a section called Euromyths, on its web site (Weymouth and Anderson, 1999, Garton-Ash, 2005). This could be interpreted as a narrative of nation, in everyday culture, that sees Europe flagged habitually in a skewed light - yet which has been internalised (Hall, 1996). Both Martin and Dougal took various newspapers, including *The Sun, The Times* and *Daily Mail*, to the Press Complaints Commission, the ethical watchdog, over what they saw as contortions and caricatures over Europe. They lost all cases. Martin referred to defending Europe on Radio Four's Today programme and argued the BBC programme had attained its news angles from the tabloid press. Langer (1998) and Barnett and Seymour (2000) argue that tabloid news values are increasingly found in traditionally non-tabloid media, including quality British newspapers. Martin's comment suggests such a response to Europe may be surfacing on radio.

Walter corroborated the picture of other EU interviewees further. He argued that both Tory and Labour governments had been far too subservient and frightened of Murdoch, and "that has coloured the whole dialogue and the whole perspective of Europe in this country, for a long time and it is getting worse." Walter concurs with Clegg and Martin. This is the journalistic field as a key mediator, distorting the picture for the public:

> They feed off each other, the press, aided and abetted by politicians. I think Blair is frightened of the Murdoch press yes. I think the Blair government does contain some quite strong pro-Europeans, but they have been afraid to go with the message, because they are afraid of public opinion, and the reason for that is the Murdoch press and other right-wing papers are stirring it up. (Walter)

Arguably another way that distortion can become prevalent in the press is through omission. Both Walter and Baker noted how in the broadcasting field, the only programme on Europe that survived and remained consistently on air was *Eurotrash*. Various interviewees, in both political and journalistic fields, perceive that the British press is at least contributing to distortions over Europe. This picture clearly does not accord with that presented by Statham (2008, p419), who argued that little blame could be apportioned to journalists.

4.13 THE TIMES journalistic field.

I worked with Charter on a regional newspaper at the start of our careers and it was while working for the regional press that hewon a journalistic award for a story he had produced. On winning the award he had sought a job on *The Guardian*. Although voicing this preference can not be linked to his personal doxa on Europe – *The Guardian* is, nevertheless, amongst the most Eurofile broadsheets in the UK (Weymouth and Anderson, 1999). *The Guardian* did not have any vacancies, but *The Times* did. Charter started working for them in 1995. This is an example of a left-leaning journalist working for a more right-leaning openly Eurosceptic newspaper. This typifies Hallin and Mancini's (2004: p226) notion of professionalism. Charter recalled travelling on the Trans-Siberian express back to Europe, as the Berlin Wall came down: "Absolutely, the instant re-unification of Germany, the merger of the two economies is such a powerful image of east and west being re-unified and back together again. It was incredibly powerful…" Charter did not speak of the unification of Europe as a result, but he did say the "fall of communism made Europe a friendlier and more welcoming place".

However, on being asked about the euro and the possibility of it engendering a sense of Europeanness, Charter re-visited his comments above:
"I am still thinking of the whole wall thing and the euro thing, in terms of a continental affair, it did not really impinge on Britain…the militaristic threat of eastern Europe has been diffused." It is not easy to discern if this mitigation of the enthusing in the initial citation is in relation to his personal doxa – or that of assuming the institutional doxa over Europe at *The Times*. In the same citation in

which Charter referred to the fall of communism making Europe a friendlier place, he finished by saying:

> the machinations of setting up the euro, were seen as alienating Britain, and alienating Europe from Britain and justifying Britain's position to opt out, because, you know, look at them all, scrambling after their own self-interest, it is a good job we are not involved in that, we would have to give up. I am pretty certain that would be *The Times'* interpretation.

Here Charter is articulating a Eurosceptic doxa over the euro within *The Times*. As was corroborated earlier, the process did not create a sense of collective identity and was handled ineffectively by the EU (Delanty, 1995, Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). Charter also then immediately concedes to distortion:

> I think there is a schizophrenia in the British coverage. There is a tendency when it suits the British press, to see Europe ganging up on Britain, the Franco-German motor, you know, and then there is another tendency to see the perhaps, what Rumsfeld called the old Europe and the new Europe, Britain has got friends, in surprising places.

Such distortions in the press may also be linked to what is conveyed by politicians and the schizophrenia on that level also. Reference was made earlier to British Prime Ministers acting in contradictory ways: Churchill the founder of the Council of Europe – but who kept Britain out of the post-war project; Thatcher and a free market, globalised Anglo-Europe – but who then attacked federalism at Bruges.

The euro.

Charter conceded that there was an obsessive approach to any utterance on the euro, within the British journalistic field. He described it as a 'real Westminster issue': "Whenever Brown or Blair does a speech, which even if one sentence refers to the euro, it is the sentence that is picked over to see if there is a change in position". Charter argued that if there was a nuance in a speech, suggesting a euro referendum was more likely:

> *The Guardian* would have a leader backing it up, saying good news, finally it is happening. Whereas the leader in *The Times* would be, what on earth is the Treasury thinking about? This is not the time to do it. The main thing is the incredible fanatical interest in that particular issue.

He then referred to a story he did try to get in the newspaper on the euro a couple of times, describing its rejection as a "surprise". The story focused on EU expansion and how new member states would be programmed into the euro. "I thought it was a fascinating story, from the point of view that Lithuania could join the euro before Britain. If it is ready now and it wants to join the euro, two things that Britain does not have (laughs)." I asked Charter to expand on the story's rejection:

> it was a story saying, suggesting that if we want to join the euro, we ought to get our act together, otherwise we are going to find ourselves in a fourth or fifth wave of euro entry….I guess the reason it did not run in *The Times*, was it is something that a more Europhile newspaper would be more interested in pushing. It is more interesting to say, Lithuania is going to join the euro before us, therefore we must get a move on, if you are inclined to join the euro, because if you are Eurosceptic and you don't want to join, it does not matter anyway, so what, it is not a story is it, it makes us look stupid we better get a move on, it is a Europhile story, I never thought it through before, but that is probably the reason why it did not make, and I tried to put it up a couple of times. This was a year ago, Thomson was in charge, but it would not have reached his level, it was the desk.

An interpretation could be that the story's *relevance* (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001) for a Eurosceptic audience was in doubt. Put another way such a story would not be in tune with the British *Weltanschauung* over Europe (Malešević, 2006). Is such a story's omission by *The Times,* contributing to a form of distortion, contributing to a journalistic communication deficit? Charter could be construed to initially inadvertently challenge the institutional doxa on Europe, but on reflecting over the story's relevance, accepted the story was not suitable for *The Times*. The way Charter charts the train of events resonates with Hallin and Mancini (2004: p290) talking about professionalism and commercial considerations, considering relevance

to readers as paramount. This also resonates with Bourdieu's (2005) notion of an audience ratings mentality. The possibility of *The Times* journalistic field causing distortion within or beyond that field (Benson and Neveu, 2005: p6). Murdoch, the proprietors' comments (in the literature review) would suggest that they are a distorting factor, and a form of instrumentalisation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

Bond however regarded the role of newspaper editors as more important. Charter argued: "You are still covering the same stories as everybody else, but your analysis may be focussed on a particular area that the editor believes is the area closest to the hearts and minds of the readers."Charter referred to the Euroscepticism of the former editor, Peter Stothard. During the 1997 general election, Stothard urged voters to vote Eurosceptic in their constituencies, regardless of the hue of the incumbent politician or challengers. Demonstrating that his personal doxa was not in tune with this institutional doxa, Charter conceded that he found it an "extraordinary, strange decision". He argued that *The Times* under Stothard was "Hagueite", referring to the former Tory leader, William Hague, who campaigned to keep the pound, re-affirming a party-press parallelism, in this instance. Charter argued that former FT journalist, Robert Thomson, as the subsequent *Times* editor, was sceptical but not so anti-euro, being a free marketer. This accords more with Britain as a globalised free-market player, bringing a different approach to the European table (Gifford, 2008: pp.141-147).

Charter did cite resistance to the unilateralism of the U.S over steel tariffs from Thomson "partly because the editor has had a lot of experience of the Far East". Thomson would not commit in interview, to a position over the euro (Greenslade, 2002). Charter said Thomson's position was "rather than being never, it is no, but not yet." Charter added:

The choice of editor has a lot more bearing on the day-to-day flavour of *The Times'* coverage and editor, Peter Stothard, was more Eurosceptic. Papers do reflect the characters of editors, which people out there do not understand. Stothard was a total Atlanticist. He was totally fascinated with America. If our foreign coverage was only three pages a day, two pages would be on the States, no matter what the coverage was.

Charter argued that instead, under Thomson, if there were three pages of foreign coverage, only one was on the States, with another page covering Europe, although there was no set format. Charter said of Murdoch and the euro:

The very, very broad, very fundamental standpoints of the paper, who to back in a general election, broadly speaking, who to back on the euro, Murdoch would have, there is no doubt, would have a key say in those. He does not see the paper day-to-day. He does not approve the front page headline. Murdoch's empire is so big. He appoints people he knows are going to be doing pretty much what he wants them to do. Everyone knows his position on the euro.

The last point mitigates the notion of the editor as the distorting factor. This citation at least suggests that the editor is likely to distort (say on Europe) in a way similar to how the owner sees things. Charter conceded earlier in the interview, concerning Stothard: "It does make your approach incredibly sceptical and much more focussed on British self-interest, I think, when your editorial line is to take such a strong policy."

Party-press parallelism.

The Times was Hagueite in its positioning over the euro and in 1997 rather than backing Blair, backed Eurosceptics. This re-affirms to some extent Gifford's (2008) notion that Euroscepticism is central to how a post-empire Britain has come to define itself. In the subsequent election *The Times* backed Blair. Charter argued:

> *The Times* is completely with Blair on CAP reform. ..But *The Times* historically has been a
> supporter of Thatcher's rebate and would not be pleased that is running out…. It is a tightrope act
> between wanting the benefits and realising that there are benefits and being incredibly wary and
> sceptical and needing to keep biting at the heels of the EU to make sure.

Historically this corroborates *The Times* as traditionally a Eurosceptic Conservative paper which is now supporting Labour. But as noted by Gifford (2008) and Brown's (2003) article, the Eurosceptic narrative continues unabated from consecutive governments. It should be noted that *The Times* has supported the party in government over the last few decades, be it Labour or Conservative. In that sense it could be argued that there is a government-press parallelism evidenced in *The Times*.

EU communication deficit.

Charter described the commission as "famously opaque" guaranteeing nobody could name every European commissioner. "In a chicken and egg situation you have to change the henhouse. " Assuming that Charter is speaking through the prism of *The Times'* institutional doxa, this could be interpreted as *hard Euroscepticism* within *The Times*, wanting the EU changed, not a softer version, specific to say a particular policy issue (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004).

Charter argued: "It is a problem of relevance to people's daily lives. I am afraid that the debates in (the European) Parliament are not covered. PM question time is covered, because it is the big set piece slagging match of the week." This arguably re-affirms the perceived relevance of Westminster, and the ignorance of the relevance of the EP. Charter referred to the EP's very limited powers, inaccurately. It also reveals the perceived relevance, within the national public sphere, of the two-party majoritarian system (and weekly slagging match). Europe does not make the EP easily understood, but the complexity of what happens there, is not a negative, but a (British perception) to paraphrase Corbett.

4.14 Conclusions.

Interviewees in Italy and then Britain have demonstrated how, in their social practice and observations of others, that European integration is discursively constructed *within* nation. The dialectic of discourse constituting social practice – and also being constituted by it, is never far away (Wodak, 2001: p65). The discussion seeks to: comprehend the field theory (Bourdieu, 2005) analysis; moving on to the particularities of *Il Giornale* and *The Times* and the comparative approach (Hallin and Mancini, 2004); with the final part of the discussion analysing the communication deficits that seemed prevalent in Britain, comparing them to a different situation in Italy.Something of the interactions between fields (Bourdieu, 2005) in Britain and Italy is rendered visible. Something too of how the journalistic field can be constraining – yet is also constrained by other fields, including the political – is revealed.

What is apparent, with various Italian interviewees in different fields, is that, at times, they themselves contribute to categories of perception (Bourdieu, 2005). What emerges is how European integration has been internalised, to the extent that its discursive construction, *within* nation, is often no longer apparent at the outset. Hence such Italian notions as a 'prejudice in favour' or being 'instinctively favourable' are expressed by interviewees. Yet closer scrutiny revealed how this naturalness (Billig, 1995) has at least partly resulted from Italians internalising Europe, over a protracted time. There are, for instance, the 'symbolic' links mentioned, between the European Commission and EP in Italy (Corazza) – and Italian post-World War II governments, of whatever hue.

Some Italian interviewees in different fields, and in various sections, mobilized either or both Britain and the USA as threatening, negative *Others,* in different ways (Wodak, 2006, Hutchinson, 2006). In so doing, they re-affirmed perceived differences between either or both Britain and the USA , in comparison with Europe and Italy *within* that Europe. It should be noted, in this heuristic unravelling of how Italy is discursively constructing Europe, that most of the interviewees were openly

from the Italian left. Nevertheless Corazza, who did not reveal his politics, mobilised Britain as an *Other* more than most. In one instance (Scafuri) a mobilising of categories of perception to paint Britain and America as *Others* was interpreted as simultaneously legitimising Italy in Europe. This categorizing was construed to be a form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2005). What appears to be the case, on this limited evidence, is that those interviewed seemed to see European integration as part of how Italy and Italians, see themselves. For instance, at times Corazza constructed parallels between Italy, its history and its centrality to Europe.

However, what also emerged was a national habitus that was modified, mitigating Italian favourability. The euro was cited by various interviewees as such a factor, possibly partly due to the price hikes endured by the Italian public. How and to what extent the euro has re-calibrated the national habitus (in relation to Europe), is a source of debate. The tempering of Italian favourability by the pivotal Northern League in Berlusconi coalitions (Giordano, 2004), was also mentioned by various interviewees. Here an Italy becoming more particularistic, insular and xenophobic was articulated.

Employing the comparative approach (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), analysis of the *Il Giornale* field was undertaken. Here an examination of the post-World War II intertwining of Italian politics and the press was pursued in more detail. Something of the complexity was revealed. The importance of regionalism within the Italian social fabric surfaced, and the particular northern market *Il Giornale* served. The party-press parallelism of the newspaper, in catering for Forza Italia *and* the Northern League, was unravelled a little. Elements of possible instrumentalisation by Berlusconi, and editorial interference, were apparent at times.

Bourdieu's (2005) field approach calls for an examination of institutional logics: the simultaneous analysis of social structures and cultural forms. What emerges in the analysis of *Il Giornale*, is a complex dynamic, particular to Italy in Europe. A very particular dialectic between discourse and social practice can be interpreted as

emerging. This in turn, can be construed as creating a very specific platform for constructing European integration within Italy. In making some general observations, many *Weltanschauungen* appear to be in circulation and are in contention, e.g. Forza Italia struggles with the Northern League over Europe. How this manifests itself in the newspaper discourse of *Il Giornale* is analysed in the next chapter. How the Italian political-left in this interview analysis – and the right-wing political voices in Berlusconi's coalition, noted earlier, see national identity - and Europe - is already slightly at odds. For instance Britain and America were not perceived as *Others* in Berlusconi citations.

British interviewees, much like their Italian counterparts, were drawn from the elite. As Malešević (2006) would see it, such individuals are responsible for constructing nation, on a normative level, and endeavouring to translate this into an operative level: a nation understood by the public. Italian interviewees appeared to endorse nationally constructed categories of perception concerning Italy in Europe. Indeed, in specific instances, Italian interviewees helped to construct such categories of perception, such as perceiving Italians as 'instinctively favourable.'

Conversely, various British interviewees in different fields, and in various sections, seemed to *challenge* what they identified as categories of perception over Europe in Britain. Such categorisation, from their interpretation, was sometimes presenting Europe as an *Other*, mobilising it as a political threat. Various interviewees also seemed to take issue with what they viewed as European integration perceived as an economic endeavour, from a British vantage point. Interviewees seemed to paint a picture of a majoritarian Britain, tied to its institutions, lamenting the loss of empire and perceiving Europe as a threat. Interviewees observed and challenged this view of Europe – rather than endorsing it. An interpretation could be that this challenge is at least indicative of power struggles within the British political and journalistic fields over Europe. This challenge came not only from EU representatives, but also journalists who had engaged with the debate over Europe.

There is a further difference between the British and Italian analysis. My interpretation is that two examples of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2005) surfaced in the British analysis. Charter seemed to challenge the categories of perception over Europe at times. However there were two instances which were interpreted as symbolic violence. Charter appears to construct his own categories of perception, in these cases, with Europe presented in various ways as an *Other*. Different British interviewees portray a Europe internalised in Britain as a threat – a portrayal they took issue with. In the subsequent analysis of communication deficits in Britain, some of how that internalisation has been discursively constructed is at least partly rendered more visible.

The analysis also revealed other layers of complexity. As Wodak (2006) argued, one can work on the assumption of different manifestations of national identity surfacing, according to context. Over the EU Constitution, British interviewees often related back to the EU debate concerning federalism and the regulatory model (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). Britain has been seen to more strongly identify with the regulatory (Trenz, 2007, Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). Yet when it came to the euro, the discourse of possible British withdrawal also surfaced (Baker, Walter).

Malešević (2006) refers to Britain on the normative level, founded on such ideas as parliamentary sovereignty. The notion of British sovereignty perceived to be threatened by European integration was observed (and often challenged) by interviewees. An interpretation is that Britain, post-World War II on a normative level was at various points, supportive of a wider Europe – but on an operative level (Malešević, 2006) communicated a Eurosceptic British nationalism. Churchill was a co-founder of the Council of Europe – yet resisted joining the post-World War II project (Davies, 1997, Delanty, 1995). Thatcher deepened Europe's commitment to the free market and globalisation, with so-called Anglo-Europe (Gifford, 2008). Yet at Bruges she condemned federalism and defended British national interests. Brown (2003), the former Prime Minister, spoke in almost identical contradictory terms.

Bourdieu's (2005) field approach calls for an examination of institutional logics: the simultaneous analysis of social structures and cultural forms. What emerges in analysis of *The Times* is a complex dynamic, particular to Britain in Europe. A very particular dialectic between discourse and social practice can be interpreted as emerging. This in turn, can be interpreted as creating a very specific platform for constructing European integration within Britain.

In the comparative approach (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), analysis of the *The Times* field was undertaken. Here an examination of the post-World War II intertwining of British politics and the press was pursued in more detail. Britain appeared to see itself more through the majoritarian political system. What Hallin and Mancini (2004) noted seemed to emerge in the analysis. Britain, its political leaders, and indeed newspapers like *The Times* tried to speak to and for the nation. A very different sense of self seemed to manifest itself in regionalistic Italy. Yet, on another level, party-press parallelism, instrumentalisation and editorial interference surfaced in Britain, much as it did in Italy. What remained at odds was a different national dynamic, in terms of the dialectic between discourse and social practice. In Britain's case, it was a habitus (Wodak, 2006) that was modified at various junctures, but nevertheless internalised, perceiving Europe as a threat, in various ways.

The movement of political actors across fields.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) did make the point that in our media age, politicians are increasingly aware of how to sell themselves and employ former media professionals to assist in the process. Of the British interviewees, six had crossed over from the journalistic field to the political field in some capacity. Two had taken on a direct public relations role for a political institution: Bell for the European commission, as the head of press in London; and Walter working in the press office for the Liberal Democrats, and as former leader, Charles Kennedy's speech writer. Two more have become MPs at Westminster: Robertson and Clegg. Of the last two, one was head of the European Commission office in London (Dougal) and the other working for the Federal Trust think-tank (Bond). In this sense these interviewees were well-placed

to corroborate problems with the various communication deficits that surfaced within the EU, at a national political level and finally in the press. In terms of Italian interviewees, Castellina was a former journalist and it should also be noted that Scafuri had a two-year spell working for the Italian parliamentary press office, suggesting he also knew about the machinations of government over Europe, (albeit briefly), from the inside.

Britain and its communication deficits.

In today's media age it is not being contested the public sphere is a contingent product of communicative action (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: pp.3-4). What is suggested is that, in terms of that evolution, consecutive British governments, post-World War II, have re-enforced a national habitus which has externalised Europe, as a threat and an *Other*, in various ways. Gifford (2008) and Judt (2005) argued earlier that Britain looked to empire first and did not contemplate joining the European project until much later.

Various interviewees presented how prejudice against Europe has been socialised and internalised *within* British governance: MEPs were only recently allowed into Westminster; statutory instruments link unpopular home-grown legislation to Europe-related bills, with 'Europe' often getting the blame; and the European Scrutiny Committee remains in obscurity, with Parliament rarely directly and tangibly engaging (and admitting) that a lot of legislation now emanates from the EU.

Under Blair's premiership, various British interviewees felt that there had been a chance for a more mature conveying of Europe – but the opportunity was not taken. If Europe is being looked at through a *kaleidoscope,* what, it is argued, has happened is that in Britain, the kaleidoscope has been continuously rotated – but all the pieces of coloured glass are, for example, coloured red and all that is attained is a different shade of red. The first distorting prism which has resulted in the British public sphere seeing only different variations of red (Euroscepticism), is the prism of consecutive British post-World War II governments.

Bourdieu uses the metaphor of Einsteinian physics. The more energy a body has, the more it distorts the space around it. A very powerful agent within a field can distort the whole space, causing the field(s) to be organized in relation to itself (Benson and Neveu, 2005: p6). So the kaleidoscope is rotated, but what is seen is yet another shade of red over Europe, emanating from British governments.

At some point in the post-World War II period, maybe under Blair's government, there may have been an attempt to re-calibrate the kaleidoscope and offer other colours over Europe. Instead politicians faced the second distorting prism: the press. An interpretation of various British interviewees' comments is that the press has also contributed to distorting the picture. Interviewees from various fields demonstrated the minutiae of how the press have contorted Europe: from Euromyths, and the London office of the commission responding to press inaccuracies; to lost complaints to the Press Complaints Commission. British governments may have felt at some point that they wished to portray a Europe, other than a (regulatory) project of economic co-operation alone (as opposed to political-economic integration). Yet at some point since the war, the media arguably became the key mediator of communication (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), and governments became a contingent product of the evolution of communication (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007, pp3-4), rather than the basis for how the British national public sphere saw Europe. Clegg advanced the view of British government cowardice now in the face of press vitriol. Other interviewees across fields did corroborate what they viewed as government inaction over Europe – in the face of the British press.

The argument advanced, is that people have become socialised to looking through the distorting prism presented to them by British governments. An interpretation could be that to confront the internalised habitus, would be to jeopardise how the British see their nation and themselves. This is Gifford's (2008) thesis, Euroscepticism replacing the empire, and coming to be at least part of how Britain has re-invented and come to see itself. Indeed Gifford (2008: p148) argues that British exceptionalism, politically, is now being re-asserted and is "complicit in the

reproduction of Eurosceptic Britain." There is the discursive construction of national character (Hall, 1996) that appears not to change, in relation to Europe. Yet in reality, as argued earlier, Britain's scepticism is modified and re-calibrated continuously: Churchill, the founder of the Council of Europe, but keen to keep Britain apart; Thatcher advancing an Anglo-Europe, yet seen to simultaneously protect sovereignty at Bruges.

The second distorting prism- the press, is interpreted as also re-affirming the national habitus, in relation to Europe. In this sense the investigation does concur with Statham (2008: p419) in concluding his paper thus: "Politicians should take the lead in making European governance relevant to people. This would be a necessary precondition for journalism to follow suit and 'Europeanize'." What should be recalled is that Statham's (2008) research team interviewed journalists from many EU countries. It is therefore a problem not just in Britain. However in Italy there has arguably been considerably more engagement and communication over Europe from Italian governments since the war.

As Statham (2008) and Trenz (2007) noted, Italian journalists complained of the same problems as their British counterparts, concerning the European communication deficit. Both British and Italian journalists, for instance, complained of complex long-winded EU information not distilled to cater for the national public. Furthermore, Statham (2008) noted how national governments were the only political actors regularly targeting national journalists on Europe (the EU scored much lower). Indeed Italian interviewees painted a similar picture to Britain, with the EU not effectively communicating as a political actor (Statham, 2008), and the press and television in Italy not writing or broadcasting that much about Europe (Cazaninni).

There are key differences in Italy: the engagement of consecutive post-World War II Italian governments over Europe, as a founder member; Corazza's argument that at least 'symbolically', consecutive Italian governments have worked closely with the EU, in conveying Europe to Italians; a different habitus has arguably developed,

creating Italian "favourability" to Europe (Cazaninni); Ginzborg (2003: p239) demonstrates, for example, how European integration has helped tackle the inner ills of failing public administration and clientelism within the political class. Giuliani (2001) evidences many changes within the Italian political and economic infrastructure in recent years, resulting from European integration. Giuliani (2001) reveals a dynamic with the EU, inspiring Italian reforms – but by the same token various EU-imposed constraints compelling the proposed reforms to happen. The changes have included attempts to move to a more majoritarian electoral system. All this presents Milward's thesis (Dedman, 1996: p12) of integration happening, when it serves nation, in an illuminating new light, regarding Italy. These reforms suggest not just that the commission (and EP) are working with Italian national governments in communicating Europe (to the press and public) - it is a Europe assisting the Italian body politic to modernise from within. This is interpreted as a far more profound, implicit level of communication with the Italian people. Regardless, as suggested by Cazaninni, the Italian media may not be communicating Europe much more than their British counterpart.

All this is in stark contrast to Britain, where as Charter's constructed 'common-sense' over Iraq indicated (when compared with the positions of other interviewees), much contradiction and simplification is necessary to present such a clear picture to the people. It is again Dinan's (1994) point at the start of this thesis, that the supranational and national are not mutually exclusive. In Italy's case the EU is helping national re-newal – rather than being deemed a threat to that process (as arguably in Britain).

The second potential distorting prism of the Italian press, could do some collateral damage. However, the congruency between the body politic and the nation is nowhere near as homogenous, with both British and Italian interviewees corroborating earlier, evidence of a complex country, where strong regionalism and several world views of Europe are articulated (within broad support for Europe). Furthermore, newspapers in Italy do not traditionally speak to and for the nation and are not traditionally mass-circulation, but serve their specific constituencies (Hallin

and Mancini, 2004, Forcella, 1959). Indeed *Il Giornale* still remains an organ of party-press parallelism (Feltri, 2003, Scafuri) – despite seeing itself more in terms of the Liberal model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

A Eurosceptic Britain, which has Labourite exceptionalism at one end – and at the other the discourse of full withdrawal, is just not the case in Italy. In Italy several world views are conflated, collide and converse. The Northern League's discourse over Europe is expected to be different from Berlusconi's Forza Italia. Both, according to the research thus far, are anticipated to present various strands of Euroscepticism: Berlusconi not wanting a superstate and a bloated bureaucracy; the Northern League talking of a threat to nation from the EU (Owen, 2002, Giordano, 2004). A deeper Euroscepticism could develop, as Giordano (2004) and Corazza argued.

However, the Italian left (with interviews, if not representative, then at least indicative), appears to be pro-European. There is no Eurosceptic consensus pervading the main political class, as appears to be the case in Britain. In Italy several colours are presented in the kaleidoscope. If the press, as the second distorting prism, distorts, it is in the interests of the specific constituency being addressed, historically at least, as Forcella (1959) pointed out: one thousand, five hundred readers.

Chapter 5.

Newspaper Discourse Analysis.

5.1 Introduction.

In terms of consistency, an analysis of Italian newspaper discourse is undertaken first, employing again the notion of de-naturalisation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The initial focus was the day the euro became the official currency in Italy – pertinent also in that Britain did not join at that moment.

In Italy, price hikes followed the introduction of the euro. This seems to have created the perception that the two events are linked. This comprehension at least contributed to Italy developing some level of Euroscepticism for the first time, post-World War II (Giordano, 2004, Ginzborg, 2003, Scafuri).

The analysis will systematically focus on the key news story and then the main commentary for each newspaper, and their coverage of: the euro's introduction; and the 2007 Reform Treaty agreement. In order to span three key EU events, analysis of the main story in both newspapers, concerning the 2008 Irish referendum rejection, is also undertaken.

5.2 The introduction of the euro.

January 2, 2002.

<u>Front page:</u>

The euro is born and Italians use the lire.

Queues at cashpoints, 95 per cent of bills settled up with the old money. Tremonti: "There is no danger of inflation."

The message from the Quirinale (Rome): "the Government and opposition must talk."

<u>The first story on page three is headlined:</u>

On the day of the euro the lira still triumphs.

Queues at the cashpoints after 24 hours but only five per cent of bills are settled up with the single currency.

Michele Arnese in Rome.

A third headline in the middle of the page reads: **The first problems at the cashpoints: the banknotes stick together.**

<u>The article reads</u>:

1 Italians are still not managing to say goodbye to the old lira. Yes the

2 cashpoints have suffered the onslaught. There have been 500, 000

3 withdrawals, making a total of 60 million, (120 million in lire). But these

4 have been withdrawals governed by curiosity, in order to be able to feel the

5 new banknotes of the Twelve and not the desire to spend. Once in the bar

6 in fact the coloured cents in one's pocket are still the Italian lire which are

7 used to pay for the cappuccino. All for the happiness of the cashiers and

8 traders, who were often not ready to give change in euro. The result: out of

9 every hundred transactions yesterday, ninety five received change in the

10 old lira.

11 The data from Confcommerce is clear: few traces of the euro in bills paid

12 by Italians in restaurants and the 65,000 bars that played host to parties at

13 the end of the year. Some 95 per cent of tax receipts were paid in lire and

14 only a residual amount, settled up with credit cards, already converted

15 into the single currency. Confirming the picture, an opinion poll by Fipe

16 (the Federation of Public Practices) linked to Confcommerce, signalled

17 "some problems with electronic payment, linked in most cases to the

18 positioning of the comma.

19 One hundred and forty five bars, 135, 000 restaurants and 6,500 petrol

20 stations open yesterday, stressed the confederation of shopkeepers, " did

21 not notice any crises in the crossover to the euro." No problem was found

22 either by the organisation of petrol distributors, where they noted a slight

23 increase in the use of credit and debit cards.

24 It was confirmed. Few shopkeepers had collected in the preceding days

25 the starter kits, the result being that many customers were to hear from

26 shops that they could not give change in euros. For this reason

27 Confcommerce reminded traders of "the need to take steps as soon as

28 possible and take out the minikits, starting at 315 euro and the banknote

29 packs, starting at five euros, that in an emergency, which can not be paid

30 for by debit card."

31 "The wheels are in motion, regardless," confirmed the director-general of

32 Fipe-Confcommerce, Edy Sommariva,"with some problems in adapting to

33 the situation, which were to some extent expected, concerning

34 payment and the management of change, some queues at the tills were longer

35 than expected, some small mistakes some obstacles with the commas in

36 numbers." Yesterday morning the first coffees and cappuccinos were paid

37 with euro coins and in this case the shopkeepers recalled that it was more

38 about "symbolic exchanges" because the majority of customers continued

39 to use the familiar lira. The response of traders concerning change, assured

40 Fipe, "resulted in those paying in lire, receiving their change in lire, and

41 the same situation for the euro."

42 The lira still reigned at the tills however. From the north to the south,

43 passing through the centre, this remained constant. In Milan cashpoints

44 were busy, in particular from the thousands of people that crowded into

45 the city centre after the party in Cathedral Square. Those that were keenest

46 to have the single currency in their pockets seemed to be the young.

47 Already by the afternoon sales figures for the main city in Lombardy were

48 showing that the new money was being used for only five per cent of

49 transactions. Also in Rome the night of Saint Silvester saw many, above all

50 tourists, using the cashpoints after midnight, but in the city centre, in the

51 souvenir shops, at the kiosks or at the various watering holes, there were

52 very few people who then actually paid in euros.

53 Also in Arno there there was a note of caution. In Florence customers and

54 tourists continued to prefer payment in lire. Among them there were

55 pensioners who out of curiosity had wanted to try the novelty of paying

56 for breakfast or an aperitif with the euro money kit bought in the bank or

57 post office the day before. The foreigners instead were a small step ahead

58 and had preferred the euro. Article finishes.

The page three lead that follows (headlined: On the day of the euro, the lira still triumphs), is the first full story on the euro in the January 2, 2002 edition of *Il Giornale*. The full story consisted of several pages focused on the subject. This selection was made on the principle that, considering the first page focuses on something else, it would be the first subsequent page to catch the reader's attention

(as opposed to page two). The January 2nd edition was the first of the New Year, as no edition produced on New Year's Day. This is apparent from: the contents that follow; and in comparison to the January 1st edition of *The Times*.

Explanation of genre and context.

The genre to undergo analysis is in this instance, a news story. The context is the first time Italians could use the single currency, which made the story 'breaking news'. The article catalogues the train of events. The historical context is that Italy struggled to meet the convergence criteria to join the euro, but that the Prodi government in the late 1990s, secured Italy's place in the first wave of membership, alongside fellow European founder members, France and Germany.

In November, 1996, left wing Prime Minister Romano Prodi succeeded in negotiating Italy's re-entry into the European Monetary system, which paved the way for euro membership. Italy had been forced to leave in the early 1990s, together with Britain. By the time the currency was in circulation, Berlusconi had returned to power with his (more Eurosceptic) centre-right coalition. Among Berlusconi's Forza Italia coalition partners was the Northern League. The Northern League, since supporting the euro in the nineties, had undergone a *volte face*, and was now vociferously opposed to the single currency. One should remember that *Il Giornale* is a paper that courts the two constituencies of Forza Italia and the Northern League, in the Italian north (Ginzborg, 2003, Giordano, 2004). Meanwhile Prodi oversaw events in his new role (since 1998) as President of the European Commission.

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

In terms of the criterion of *relevance*, and in terms of frequency, the message repeated four times in the article, creating and subsequently re-enforcing a public perception, is that shopkeepers were *not ready* for the euro's introduction and carried on trading in lire: sub-headline - only five per cent of bills are settled up with the single currency, Lines 8, 17, 26. The perception is re-enforced but nevertheless it is based on a corroborated ill-preparedness for the currency, making this negative angle newsworthy. In terms of locality, the initial focus was cashpoints in Milan, as

opposed to elsewhere. This re-affirms Scafuri's pinpointing of the regional readership, corroborated further by Corazza.

In terms of the *newspaper agenda* – and running parallel to the *relevance* above – Italians are portrayed as not relinquishing the lire (or perhaps not wishing to). Mention is made of this on ten occasions (Headline: The euro is born and Italians use the lire; Lines 1, 6, 10, 13, 39, 40, 41, 42, 52). The first mention is pertinent, being the first to create a perception for the reader: Italians are still not managing to say goodbye to the old lira (Line 1). This creates the impression of not wishing to relinquish the old currency. With the context of the Berlusconi government's reticence over the single currency - resulting in accusations of Euroscepticism and the resignation of the Foreign Minister, the impression is created, for the reader, of lamenting the loss of the lira (BBC, 2002). All this should be considered in the nuanced context of: Berlusconi's subsequent opposition to the euro, as Prodi's project (BBC, 2003); his instrumentalisation and the party-press parallelism of *Il Giornale* (Feltri, 2003, Scafuri), also arguably exercised over the euro.

In terms of Oberhuber et al.'s (2005) point about thematic structures of relevance and argumentation, the issue debated was Italy being ill-prepared for the euro (and historically late to meet the convergence criteria) – but it was also Italy (being presented by *Il Giornale*) as unwilling to relinquish the lira. On another contextual level, it was also Italy the key advancer (and absorber) of European integration (Ginzborg, 2003). However, an interpretation is that Italy was not absorbing integration very well (again, much as over the ERM), a national lament, that was *newsworthy*. Prodi as premier in 1996, succeeded in negotiating Italy's re-entry into the ERM, but the success was unexpected (Ginzborg, 2003, Giordano, 2004).

Mautner (2008) refers to *ideologically loaded keywords* in discourse. The frequency of the words lira(e) and euro was on initial analysis understandable. The lira was mentioned nine times. However, in light of the *newspaper agenda*, mentioned previously, on three occasions reference to the lira can be interpreted as positively

and affectionately evaluative: Italians are still not managing to *say goodbye* to the *old lira* (Line 1); and again *old lira* (Lines 10) and then *familiar* lira (Line 39). Implicit here is perhaps the flip side: a negative evaluation of the euro.

In terms of the labelling of *news actors*, the key actor (the Italians) receives a mention twice (Lines 1 and 12). *Italians* are still not managing to say goodbye to the old lira (Line 1). Here the positive evaluation of the lira – is linked to its people: the Italians. In light of the previously explored instrumentalisation and party-press parallelism, this corollary appears 'natural' enough – but is interpreted here otherwise. It can be argued it is re-enforcing a quiet negative evaluation of the introduction of the euro.

There is no *intensification* or *mitigation* (Wodak, 2001, Mautner, 2008) beyond the frequency of reference to the 'parting' of the lira. The *news actor*, the Italians, is, on a base level the employment also of a *referential strategy* (Wodak, 2001: p73): *we*, the Italians are being linked with the (outgoing) lira (Line 1) and re-enforced: few traces of the euro in bills paid by Italians (*we*).

The BBC (2002) noted that: Italy was the only new euro country which did not organise celebrations; and one minister (Umberto Bossi, leader of the Northern League) said he "couldn't care a hoot" about the single currency. The BBC article finishes with: "On Saturday, the European Commission said Italy was still trailing in last place in terms of euro cash transactions." In the *Il Giornale* article, blame was apportioned to traders and their organisations. Conversely the BBC draws a correlation between a lack of Italian enthusiasm, with landing last place, in terms of transactions.

Modality can bridge syntax and lexis *(*Mautner, 2008, Stubbs, 1996: p202). With *unmodalised declaratives*, the speaker fully supports the truth value inherent in an assertion. There are such assertions in this article. What the analysis will not do is dwell on assertions which appear at least, to be based on the corroborated fact: that there were few transactions in euros on the first day in Italy. However based on this

'fact' the article went further, presenting further assertions as inherently true – but without supporting evidence of these specific points: Italians *are* still not managing to say goodbye to the old lira (Line 1 *unmodalised declarative*). This is an interpretation, which as argued earlier, (instrumentalisation, party-press parallelism) suits Berlusconi's *Il Giornale*. Berlusconi's personal scepticism was subsequently apparent (BBC, 2003). The article notes considerable withdrawals in euros (Lines 2-3). There is then however a mitigating interpretation: but these *have been* withdrawals *governed by* curiosity (Line 4 *unmodalised declarative*). How does *Il Giornale* know? The paper then claims: Those that *were* keenest to have the single currency in their pockets *seemed* to be the young (Lines 45-6). Again this is an assertion, with the *seemed,* mitigating a little, being a more *tentative proposition* (Mautner, 2008). Several other assertions follow. Customers and tourists in Florence: *continued* to prefer payment in lire (Lines 53-4 *unmodalised declrarative*). Pensioners there paid in euros however, but only: out of curiosity (Line 55 *unmodalised declarative*). Foreigners: *were* a small step ahead and *had preferred* the euro (Lines 57-8 *unmodalised declarative*)

Revisiting the category of *news actors*, what is apparent is that there is a marginalisation of those keen to use the euro: pensioners, foreigners, the young. This is also a *referential strategy*, linking the euro to Others, not the main body of Italians (*us*). This recurrence (Wodak, 2008: p8) creates cohesion for the reader.

Interpretation.

Overall, the text could be interpreted as demonstrating how Italians lamented the loss of the lira. The article could also be interpreted as creating a platform on which to highlight future problems. Frequent reference to the lira, is coupled with the Otherness or alien nature of the euro (used only by foreigners, curious pensioners and the youth). Hence a coherence (Chilton, 2005) surfaces for (possibly Europe-critical) Forza Italia readers and the (more Eurosceptic) readers of the Northern League.

In Bourdieu's (2005) terms, the categories of perception in this article, are highlighting the Otherness of the euro (and for some Europe) – for Forza Italia and Northern League readers. Conversely Italian interviewees (generally of the left) at times created categories of perception of an Italy and Europe fully at one. Here we see that there are several nationalistic responses in Italy and a national habitus (in relation to Europe) undergoing constant modification (Wodak, 2006). It could be that we have two discourses running parallel and intertwining throughout the article. There is the more reasoned sceptical discourse of Berlusconi and Forza Italia, still however pro-European; and the more caustic Eurosceptic discourse of the Northern League, marginalising foreigners and seeing the euro (and Europe) as the Other (Giordano, 2004).

Headline of commentary on page one, *Il Giornale*. January 2, 2002:

But the market is not unique.

Mario Comana.

<u>The article reads</u>:

1 "So finally the euro has arrived. We have seen it, touched it, spent it. We
2 have stood in a queue at the cashpoint to gain possession of some. We have
3 experienced the emotion of giving and receiving this curious money that
4 has an unusually high value, for those accustomed to the lira."

5 Everybodycelebrated the event in a more or less emphatic manner and even
6 some indomitable critics, like Milton Friedman, admitted that crossing the
7 threshold of substituting 12 sovereign state currencies was an historical
8 success.

9 In paying the necessary tribute to the solemnity of the event is it not worth
10 asking oneself what is behind this enthusiasm?

11 I am sorry to dampen the climate of euphoria, but it is probably right to
12 recall that the real revolution was the one three years ago, with the start of
13 the distribution of coins and banknotes. What we inaugurated yesterday
14 was nothing more than the enactment of that distribution. The euro was
15 born in 1999, as we well know and the postponement of its circulation was
16 only to make provision for a gradual introduction to encourage a
17 diffusion of the idea of the new currency and to allow citizens to gain
18 confidence in how to measure its worth. The history books indicate
19 January 1, 1999 as the date of birth of the euro, and not in 2002!

21 Some are expecting much from the circulation of the euro. To think that it
22 could help nurture the confidence of Europeans in their money, that it
23 could intensify the feeling of belonging to the European Union, more than

24 anything to show that is it is not only the domain of banks, but that one

25 can perceive it in a direct and tangible way like with marks, franks,

26guilders and lire and definitively surpassing them because these currencies

27 are joined in this new single currency.

28 Frankly this expectation is not shared, or it is better expressed by saying

29 that one should not expect that on physical contact some Europeans, with

30 their new money envisage consequences on an economic and financial

31 level or from exchanges.

32 The relationship with the dollar, the main point of reference, in terms of

33 valuation, is not influenced by the behaviour of Mrs Rossi, Madame

34 Dupont or Frau Schmidt, but from the flow of capital which for exactly

35 three years, has been in the euro denomination. The other level on which

36 all this is interesting is that of immediate price comparisons. Today it is

37 easy to precisely know that oil costs less in Spain, butter in Denmark and

38 that Rome is one of the less expensive capitals. But regardless of the

39compilers and the commentators of such statistics, also not to deprive their

40 interest in such banalities, they also realise that it is not possible to do the

41 shopping moving across a chessboard of thousands of kilometres!

42 The price comparison is not a novelty for firms and traders who have

43 always scrutinised in detail the price lists of all the countries, though in

44 separate and different denominations, seeking the cheaper components,

45 the most economic parts or the most convenient price lists. Price

46 differentiations based on the different audits will sometimes permit

47 margins of profit, not least because it will be easier to know that a Fiat

48 costs less in Italy than in Portugal. Residual barriers within the European

49 Union remain, with plenty of difficulty and bureaucratic complexity, other

50 than the cost of transactions that impede the complete and absolute

51 realisation of a market for a unified Europe.

52 If a hope comes from the substitution of this money, it is that a further

53 stimulation of markets comes from such a completion. It is welcomed, but

54 did 140 years of a single currency in Italy ever really create a uniformity,

55 from Bressanone to Canicatti?

Ends.

There were two commentaries on the introduction of the single currency on the front page of *Il Giornale* on January 2, 2002. The top one was selected at random and because it was slightly more prominent on the page. The focus of the article was not a consideration, in terms of selection.

Explanation of genre and context.

This commentary could be interpreted as a *pastone* (Dardano, 1976). Appearing on the front page, this *pastone* combined a review of the major new development - the euro - with comments by the journalist. With increased market-orientation, this commentary-oriented journalism was still not abandoned (Roidi, 2001). This is of relevance, in considering how *Il Giornale* did not cease using the genre of the *pastone*, or exercising party-press parallelism, in addressing its Forza Italia and Northern League supporters. If there are elements of persuasion in the article, it is these constituencies who are being appealed to.

The context of the new Berlusconi government also has to be considered. In subsequent days after the euro's launch (and this commentary), the government was seen to be more Eurosceptic, with the Foreign Minister, Renato Ruggiero, resigning over the lukewarm response of his fellow ministers to the euro. Such was the crisis that Berlusconi had to be seen to declare his loyalty to Europe to *Corriere della Serra* (BBC, 2002). The underlying habitus of an Italy which has internalised Europe, post-World War II may also be prevalent, regardless of this mitigating moment relating to the euro.

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

In the socio-pragmatic context just outlined (Musolff, 2004) it is argued that the commentary advances particular arguments relating to the introduction of the euro in Italy. Hence larger meaning-making structures (Mautner, 2008) are explored. Topoi utilised in formulating the arguments are investigated and these are arguably sustained and deepened by a series of conceptual metaphors coursing through this *pastone*.

Close to the start of the article, a *topos of history* is employed (Lines 11-18). In the *topos*, history teaches us that specific actions have specific consequences. Therefore one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation, allegedly comparable with the historical example referred to. In this instance the specific action was the introduction of the euro in 1999. The specific consequence was that a more effective marketplace was perhaps created – but nothing more. Therefore one should omit from interpreting the introduction of the euro to the wider public (January, 2002) as having more profound implications for creating a sense of belonging to Europe. It did not have this effect in 1999, so it will not have this effect now.

An interpretation is that this *topos of history* is re-enforced by a sub-group the *topos of scepticism*, formulated in this thesis. The *topos of scepticism* argues that history has taught us that the European project is about economics and any straying from that into a more profound political and ideological comprehension will have negative consequences, as evidenced by the bureaucracy of the EC. Therefore it is best to focus on economics. In Lines 48-51, readers are reminded that barriers to free trade remain within the EU. Bureaucratic difficulties still need to be addressed. At the end of the article the writer questions if the single currency will create uniformity, reminding readers that the lira did not have such a consequence for Italy (Lines 52-55). In Lines 11-18, the *topos of history* reminded readers that in 1999 no sense of belonging or uniformity resulted. This is re-affirmed at the end of this article, with the *topos of scepticism* arguing that the history of the lira also shows that currencies do not have such an effect.

A further interpretation, drawing from this analysis, is that what the writer is attempting, is a form of *überreden*, speaking over the *überzeugen* (Kopperschmidt, 1989: pp.116-21). The *überzeugen* is deemed by the writer (in the above *topoi*), to be the counterfactual, rather utopian notion of a deeper, more binding Europe, resulting (in this case) from the euro. Instead an interpretation could be that in this *pastone*, the writer is exercising a form of repression of this more utopian comprehension of the introduction of the euro, hence *überreden*.

Musolff (2004: p14) found that many of the debates surrounding the euro, were framed in terms of *love-marriage-family* metaphors. The interpretation advanced, is that this was the case in this commentary. The writer refers to the euro being *born* in 1999 (Line 15) and that the postponement of its circulation was to allow citizens to gain confidence in how to measure its worth (Line 18). At this stage a pragmatic approach is being recommended by the writer, over the *new birth*. The writer then however issues a caution to readers (arguably re-enforcing the warnings issued by the earlier topoi). The writer notes that 'some' are expecting much from the circulation of the euro, thinking it could help *nurture confidence* and somehow *intensify the feeling of belonging* to the EU (Lines 21-3). The writer re-enforces how some are mis-guided and warns that one should not expect too much on *physical contact* (Line 29). We are then reminded of the earlier *relationship* (Lines 32) with the dollar and are urged by the writer not to be swayed by the *behaviour* of various women (itself a stereotyping) mentioned in connection with the euro (Lines 33-4). A cluster of metaphors relating to the birth of the euro help create an initial conceptual mapping (Musolff, 2004). This now needs to be developed to see if this fits into a clear *scenario*, a story line or narrative the reader will be persuaded by, regarded as common-sensical.

An aspect of the particular Italian socio-pragmatic context should be considered further. The role the family plays in Italian society is a central one (Ginzborg, 2003). The writer is arguably feeding off this deeply internalised, unconscious, generic conceptualisation, as Kövecses (2002) described it, in his sub-individual level of metaphor analysis. It may be that the writer is feeding off the internalised

conceptualisation of the family, inherent in Italian society. An alternative interpretation is that this birth metaphor was already in circulation, on the euro being introduced. Perhaps the EU institutions started using this metaphor. Regardless of which it is, the author is taking this strongly internalised birth conceptualisation to arguably create a new metaphor, now working on the individual level of Kövecses' (2002) analysis. The context is of an Italy which has also internalised Europe. Much as Thatcher questioned the persuasive pull of 'the train leaving the station without Britain,' (Musolff, 2004) the author of this *pastone* is arguably trying to do something similar –persuading Italians in another direction from the one they are familiarised with.

The imagery created by the writer, Mario Comana, is of a family typically gathering around the new birth (the euro) and typical of that aspirational Italian family (as part of Europe), expecting too much from the new child. The family is hoping this baby will bring the family closer together, burying their differences. The expectation is so high within the family that just touching the baby is almost to start this healing process. But these European mothers (Mrs Rossi, Madame Dupont and Frau Schmidt) all crowding around the cot, are behaving in a silly manner. They are expecting too much from the new baby. Instead they will still have their differences. Instead they have all forgotten the older brother or sister, also present at the birth, already dependable and already doing well: the dollar. The writer is himself, dampening down the climate of euphoria (Line 11) surrounding the birth, pulling against the reaction of the family to a new birth within Europe.

Returning briefly to the party-press parallelism of *Il Giornale*, the constituencies of Forza Italia and the Northern League arguably already concur with the pastone's author. Both parties at that juncture had recently formed a new Berlusconi government coalition. An interpretation offered is that Comana is also trying to temper the traditional enthusiasm of Italians at large. He may also be addressing the third part of the Berlusconi coalition, the National Alliance, more pro-European than the other two parties (Ginzborg, 2003).

The birth metaphor is interpreted as a form of analogical argument in this media discourse. Musolff (2004: p31) argues that these popular metaphors can be so strong as to result in politicians and nations commiting to specific courses of action. In this case it would be to anticipate the euro would bind Europe ideologically and politically. Comana is interpreted as trying to move the birth metaphor into another direction – so this does not happen, doing some persuasion of his own.

Musolff (2004) also found *path-movement-journey* metaphors in his study. Although forming a much smaller metaphorical cluster in this commentary, it is still there. In Line 1, the euro has *arrived*, subsequently *crossing the threshold* of substituting 12 sovereign state currencies (Lines 6-7). However, any positive imagery at the outset is tempered by the impossibility of *moving across a chessboard of thousands of kilometres*, when shopping (Line 41), and mitigated further by bureaucracy *impeding* the realisation of the market (Line 50). This last point is re-affirming the earlier topos of scepticism.

Interpretation.

The scenario (Musolff, 2004), if one extends analysis across the two articles, is that: Italians should lament the loss of the lira (news) and furthermore not expect too much of the euro (*pastone*). It is on this level that the article tries to develop a rapport with the reader (Mautner, 2008). The scenario is a cautionary tale re-enforced by the topoi and the conceptual metaphors, warning the reader on a whole series of levels to understand the euro in an economic pragmatic context – and not as having wider binding, ideological implications. A further interpretation is that the *pastone* also reflects a position that is similar to that of Berlusconi himself, who expressed some cynicism concerning the euro and was also known for his criticism of Brussels bureaucracy (Owen, 2002, BBC, 2003). It should be stressed that this possible instrumentalisation is however one of many interpretations offered, as to why the writer reigned against an Italian habitus that up to that point had traditionally internalised Europe.

5.3 The 2007 Reform Treaty summit.

All the European press attack Italy as "ridiculous."

Alessandro M. Caprettini   Saturday, October 20, 2007

A chorus of criticism after the Lisbon agreement. For Prodi a semi-failure: parity with London but surpassed by Paris.

1 He made his entrance in the press conference with a dazzling smile, ready
2 to celebrate his "victory". Then he got irritated because somebody asked
3 him to comment on the reaction of the French press ("Italians ridiculous")
4 and took the flack when they asked him to note how the passage concerning
5 residents and citizens for 2014 that he exalted as arrived at during the
6 summit, was in fact the fruits of an amendment of Forza Italia voted on in
7 the European Parliament. ("But it is us that has applied it.") All until he
8 caved in all of a sudden when they let him know– demonstrating pity – that
9 while he was bragging about the exta MEPs, attained during a complex
10 night, Merkel, Sarkozy and Brown had meanwhile been conducting an
11 emergency meeting concerning the financial markets, with Italy kept to
12 one side. "I have not been informed as to what it is about," he exploded
13 angrily.

14 Of course Romano Prodi was not expecting the waving of the tricolore by
15 the Italian press, but neither the acrid animosity that he received after
16 having spent a night begging for some compensation for his Europeanness
17 and that of Italy. " We started to make the climb, but I was counting on
18 many years of work done in Europe and was hoping for an
19 acknowledgement of that. " All that eluded him at a certain point.
20 It almost seemed to depend on him personally and not on the litany of
21 protests that broke out all over the country and the restitution of parity

22 with at least Great Britain in the number of seats held at Strasbourg.

23 It did not go very badly but badly. Partly this is because the principle of
24 parity with Paris and London was not achieved with the French."They are
25 more," came the final admission that was certainly known at the time of
26 the announcement of a possible Italian veto. Then ironic comments rained
27 down on Italy from all over Europe. The Portuguese newspapers
28 commented ironically on how the ex-president of the European
29 Commission, Romano Prodi, was pretending to still conduct the orchestra.
30 A Spanish minister, Inigo Mendez de Vigo, spoke acidly of a "price paid
31 for Italian sentimentality." From Belgium they denounced a "ramshackle
32 solution," to satisfy "Italian pretensions.". And also in Rome, if one
33 excludes the necessary thanks of Veltroni (to cover the suspicion of
34 enjoying the moment in which the government is tearing itself apart), few
35 on the left have come out in congratulation.
36 The appearance of the London-Paris-Berlin directorship of proceedings
37 would have not given any pleasure to the professor (Prodi). This was also
38 because, as he decided to underline, he would like Italy to play a part in
39 2009, when, in one go, the EU should nominate a president (in charge for
40 two and half years, renewable once), a commission president, vice-
41 president and foreign affairs minister and president of the European
42 Parliament."It is a game open to all,"he added, probably thinking about
43 D'Alema. He did not know that at that moment Merkel was announcing
44 that the next time, it would be turn of the socialists to have a commission
45 president and that the right would take up the foreign minister post. Prodi
46 returns to Rome, less convinced of having won the day, as he had
47 maintained he had done, the night before. Instead he had one more worry
48 to handle: his Italy counts for little in Europe. **Ends.**

Explanation of genre and context.

This is another news article. The discourse analysis of *Il Giornale* now turns to the coverage of the Reform Treaty summit of October 20. With the original EU Constitution disbanded, the EU met to agree this treaty. Some voices regarded it as the EU Constitution in another guise (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007, Trenz, 2007). *Il Giornale* sent a special correspondent to cover the summit and it is the conclusion of the summit that is analysed here. The subject did not receive sufficient mention to merit a commentary in that day's newspaper (October 20, 2007). Romano Prodi's centre-left coalition government was still in power and negotiated Italy's position at the summit. It is expected that *Il Giornale*, as a supporter of the Berlusconi opposition, would have been critical of the Prodi delegation's handling of the Italian position at the summit.

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

In the news article, the tone is set in the headline: All the European press attack Italy as "ridiculous." The *relevance* to readers was trained on the Italian Prime Minister (and key adversary of Berlusconi for power), Romano Prodi. There were two focal points that surfaced throughout the article: the 'failure' of Prodi to secure parity (with France) at the summit for the number of Italian MEPs in the parliament; and how Italy 'counted for little' (under Prodi), as the summit purportedly evidenced.

In terms of *referential strategy* (and in light of this negative portrayal of Prodi), the article in Line 2 referred to: *his* "victory" in quotation marks, with the subsequent context denoting how *Il Giornale* did not think it a victory at all. The article then refers to a passage in the treaty concerning citizens (Line 5) which Prodi exalted (Line 5). The author quickly points out that this addition was in fact the fruits of an amendment from Forza Italia (Line 6). This can be taken as a collective *we*: the newspaper and Forza Italia supporters. The article concludes: *his* (Prodi's) Italy counts for little in Europe (Line 48). The ellipsis, gleaned from the adversarial context in the article, could be interpreted as: but under Berlusconi we know it would be different. Here *Il Giornale's newspaper agenda* can be interpreted as prevalent.

There is essentially only one core *news actor* throughout the article: Romano Prodi. He is cast as: failing to secure the same number of MEPs as France; and unsuccessful, because Italy is sidelined at the summit. This construction of reality will be unravelled, with an *intensification* of discriminatory utterances surfacing, to compound the sense of failure.

After being ready to celebrate his "victory": he (Prodi) got irritated because somebody asked him to comment on the reaction of the French press ("Italians ridiculous," Line 3). Prodi's irritation is asserted, as an *unmodalised declarative* – but not supported by any corroborated fact. The reaction of the French press (collectively) is also presented as an *unmodalised declarative* and as inherently true. It is possible this was only one newspaper. Again though, no supporting factual corroboration is offered by the reporter. Then Prodi: took the flack (Line 4) for claiming the passage on citizenship in the treaty – when it was originally Forza Italia's. Again, this taking of flack is an *unmodalised declarative*, which can not be questioned – but is also again not factually corroborated.

This is followed by: Of course Romano Prodi was not expecting the waving of the tricolore by the Italian press, but neither the *acrid animosity* that he received after having spent a night *begging* for some compensation for his Europeanness and that of Italy (Lines 14-17). The *acrid animosity* here is an *unmodalised declarative*, it is also intensifying the sense of failure, by use of an adjective (acrid) followed by an emotive noun (animosity) heightening the referential strategy of Prodi, being on the wrong side of some imaginary line. The *begging for some compensation* is again an unmodalised declarative which is asserted, but not factually corroborated. The intensification is again further heightened (compounding the list of failures). Use of words such as *acrid animosity* and *begging* also are stigma words, alerting readers to negativity.

Italy announced the possibility of invoking its veto – if Italy did not attain the same number of MEPs as Britain and France (Line 26). Emotive language is used to intensify further the failures of Prodi, and the further use of stigma words (Mautner,

2008). Yet again there are *unmodalised declaratives* that are asserted but uncorroborated (Lines 27-32): the Portuguese newspapers (all) commenting ironically; and from Belgium they (all the media) denounced Italian pretensions. Prodi, the *news actor*, is cast as failing. For instance, Prodi: caved in all of a sudden (Line 8) on hearing that Merkel, Sarkozy and Brown were holding an emergency meeting concerning the financial markets (without Italy). The *begging* for some compensation (Line 16) compounds the failure of the *news actor*, Prodi.

Interpretation.

It is proposed to pause briefly to reflect on several points, firstly, the *news agenda*, surfacing in this article. The rivalry between Prodi and Berlusconi for the premiership has been documented previously, and they have alternated in the post, over the last decade (Ginzborg, 2003, Giordano, 2004).

The party-press parallelism of *Il Giornale,* as a Berlusconi supporter, is interpreted as prevalent in the article. The advocacy of the paper is arguably present, with reference to Prodi claiming something that was initiated by the Forza Italia (Line 6). What also comes to the fore is how Milward's thesis (Dedman, 1996: p12) surfaces again. Italy sees itself as central to European integration. This is part of how it defines its particular brand of nationhood (Giuliani, 2001, Clegg, Ginzborg, 2003).

The rapport between the newspaper – and its Forza Italia constituency – is of Italy's need to be at the centre of things. Prodi's well-catalogued (although mainly uncorroborated) litany of failure, is therefore failing the nation and what common sense requires: centrality and success. Overall, the constructed reality is of an Italy not assuming its rightful place (under this unfortunate premier). The national public sphere is interpreted as looming large. Italy sees itself as central to Europe. Browne noted how national newspapers often focused on completely different national concerns. Trenz's (2007) point about Europe being used to highlight the internal national *Other* is interpreted as relevant here. In this case Prodi is portrayed as having failed Italy on the European stage – from *Il Giornale's* perspective, at least.

Il Giornale. Tuesday, October 26, 2004.

Roberto Scafuri

Bertinotti: no to the European Constitution.

The leader of the RC: "The new treaty is the mirror image of a (European) Union where the market is king."

1 One can never make Europe without France, if France in its referendum
2 would say "no" to the constitutional treaty? Faustino Bertinotti uses the
3 rhetorical form to make it understood that a "no" to a document so
4 compromised is not blasphemous for a party that also carries the name
5 (European Left) and aspires to see a united continent.
6 "If it was not politically incorrect, I would like to say that Altiero Spinelli
7 would not have signed this treaty," he adds boldly.

8 But if it is not said that a document that "is the mirror image of the existing
9 Europe where the market is king" if it is not nevertheless better than
10 nothing is true of course that the "no" of Bertinotti does not put into
11 jeopardy the rebirth of Gad, the Great Democratic Alliance. "Europe is one
12 thing, Italy is another," says the head of the the Reformed (Communists).
13 The two levels are different, and proudly, the "no" to the first relevant
14 passage to serve the 25, is of no little use internally.

15 In its contents this is fundamental antithesis to the position of Prodi in
16 February's primaries. The "no" to the treaty is a "no" to the European
17 reality as it is today "with its absolutism of the market that renders the
18 population in variable levels, dependent upon it; with a democratic deficit,
19 a need for workers' rights, of women, of immigrants." And a principle
20 "no" to the European president in charge, Romano Prodi.

21 Is there a contradiction with the alliance just born in Italy? No, explains
22 Bertinotti: it is one thing to feel oneself represented by a leader, and
23 another to decide that that leader serves specific objectives. "If I am sat
24 around a table with all the parties of the coalition and I am asked if I accept
25 Prodi, I would say yes," re-affirms Fausto in the daily Aprileonline.info.
26 The problem with the primaries is not his, because "you can have the
27 primaries or not have them." But if you have them, "they should be a real
28 competition between different candidates who have in common a
29 declaration of intent, a common feeling as an alternative to Berlusconi.
30 Inside of this common frame the electors can decide. The winner represents
31 all and will co-ordinate the task of constructing a political programme,
32 guaranteed to have wide support, not only by the forces within politics…"

33 Bertinotti does not reveal himself to be particularly "hungry" for the
34 primaries. "If we want to guarantee the candidate a large popular
35 consensus from the start, there are many ways of achieving this. But if they
36 ask me to take part in the primaries…" Now he necessitates his candidacy
37 out of public service, for the good of democracy, to conspicuously take a
38 different approach and to embody an antagonistic leadership (but this
39 Fausto does not say it). He instead adds, in order to respond to his
40 detractors, recalling their weaknesses "If I stand, it is not I that is
41 contradictory. All those hues that say they agree over Prodi, but they still
42 want the primaries, with a single candidate…" A clear, logical picture that
43 has shaken the (Olive) tree to its roots and called into question the survival
44 of the Greens and the PDCI. The calamitous effect risks to finish up with
45 the coalition in the "bin" conjured up by Bertinotti on behalf of the bitter
46 internal camp of the radical left. On the other hand the strong personality
47 of the head of the Reformed (Communists), his imagination and political
48 wisdom do not leave space for illusions: in a "bin" in the end only one item
49 of content would emerge, him.

50 Fausto does not want to miss out on this prospect because of "wrecked

51 carriages" and "drained parties". Because of this he denies ever having

52 considered provoking a split in the DS (Democratic Socialists). "It would

53 be a thing that politically that would force us to revisit times and paths that

54 nobody want to return to. It would mean acknowledging that we are

55 incapable from different sides of constructing a unified political front. I

56 have a lot of respect for the political battle that the left of the DS is

57 conducting and I look with interest and comprehension of the values

58 inspiring them."

60So what does "bin" mean? "The use of the word bin can not be equivocal. I

61 am thinking of a space, an organised space in which those of all hues can

62 reside, starting with the political might of the left, movements,

63 associations, social realities, that with different links could construct a

64 single yet pluralistic laboratory constructing a power working towards the

65 prospect of building a different society. I am not thinking or saying a

66 party." Bertinotti has the model, Social Reform in mind, to give you an

67 example. A place to meet where, "my characteristics, the party of which I

68 form a part, is not nullified…" The interested powers, according to Fausto,

69 "automatically convene together."

70 A discussion that could have been well understood by the Communist

71 Oliviero Diliberto, who will today launch his radical left constituent

72assembly.An apparently similar place, but that will be difficult to join with

73 the place indicated by the Reformed (Communists). Old lack of

74 understanding divide personal paths and of that "place to meet" that all

75 say they want, the real "meeting" they will do when the time to talk

76concretely comes. It will be devoid of political judgement, like this as it has

77 been conceptualised up until now by the parties born in the eighties?

78 Probably yes, "There is a need to re-build the representative political

79institution,"Bertinotti has always said, coming across as the avant-garde of

80 his own party, that always plods along behind him. Nothing is certain or

81 definite still. But undoubtedly the "place" (probably still a way off being

82 built) in which Bertinotti thinks not to have to count leaders in relation to

83their accumulated seats, of the displaced functionaries of the organisations,

84 of the armchairs bound up by the administrators (every reference to the

85 tree is purely advised).

ENDS.

Il Giornale did not produce a commentary on the summit, to accompany the news story just analysed (All the European press attack Italy as "ridiculous"). The decision was therefore taken to analyse copy in October, 2004, written by Scafuri concerning the signing of the draft treaty that week in Rome. This created at least some equivalency and consistency, with an article on the Reform Treaty summit (October 20, 2007) written by Scafur's opposite number, Charter, part of subsequent UK discourse analysis.

Explanation of genre and context.

The genre, in this instance, falls slightly outside of the rubric, in a bid to have an article included by Scafuri relating to the Reform Treaty. This article is neither a news story, nor a commentary, but instead takes the form of an extended interview. The 'debate on the left' article by Scafuri is interesting. He is offering something in this article that lies outside of the party-press parallelism of Berlusconi and his newspaper, *Il Giornale*. What is also apparently lacking is the need to create a *rapport between the paper and the readership(s)* as it is not an article trying to court the Forza Italia or Northern League readers. The interview also re-affirms what Scafuri said about his role on the paper – encouraged to write about (and partly for) the left and that he is atypical in this regard.

The feature consists of an interview with the leader of the Reformed Communists, Faustino Bertinotti – providing the readers with an alternative 'world view' of the EU Constitution. The Reformed Communists form part of the sub-culture Hallin and Mancini (2004) refer to. Bertinotti reflects on the possibility of forming a coalition of the Left, with Prodi – and how it could be problematic. It contributes to comprehending how a lack of Italian majoritarianism plays its part. Instead Italy

speaks on Europe through its many political factions and this fractiousness creates various *Weltanschauungen.*

The article also contributes to understanding how constitutionalisation is perceived in Italy. Bertinotti re-affirms the relevance of the dramatisation advanced by Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) of the regulatory and federalist polars. For Bertinotti (at the federalist end) the EU Constitution does not go far enough, referring to the predominance of the market in proceedings (thus concurring with several left-leaning interviewees earlier).

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.
There is a notable lack of linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends. What follows are a series of interpretations, drawing on the context, in a bid to fathom why this is the case. Bertinotti, as the sole interviewee of the article, is the *news actor*. However, close to the start he argues that Altiero Spinelli would have voted against the treaty in its current form (Lines 6-7). Bertinotti's pro-federalist, pro-European credentials are laid out at the start of the article (Line 5), to avoid an assumption of Bertinotti's Reformed Communists being somehow Eurosceptic, in the sense one understands Berlusconi's Forza Italia or the Northern League. What can also be noted is that the text falls outside of the rubric of preceding texts, in that it is not persuasive in the same way. The mechanisms of *relevance*, evaluative and *loaded and stigma words* and *modality* just do not surface as they do elsewhere. What are also lacking, are the larger meaning making structures (Mautner, 2008) of argumentation theory and conceptual metaphors.

Interpretation.
An interpretation is that constructing such *coherence* is not necessary here, because the readership's support and votes are not being courted. This article is about an issue outside of the readership constituencies. It is all about, as denoted in the sub-headline: The Debate on the Left. This, on a certain level, is possibly revealing of how previous articles analysed were busy in constructing a common sense reality in

which the readership's perceptions of Europe were re-affirmed – through discursive construction. In this article such architecture for analysis does not apply.

5.4 The 2008 Irish referendum rejection.

Il Giornale. June 14, 2008. Front page.

<u>Double shock.</u>

Europe dies, the Europeans nearly (the latter having a double meaning, in Italian, one being: the European football championships)

Ireland rejects the Treaty of Lisbon. And the Italy soccer team already has a foot outside of the tournament.

THE DAY DREAMS ENDED.

1 The ball slides silently over the goal line. It's a joke, but it happened . It is
2 difficult, on a day like this, not to see dreams in a sad way. The blue-
3 painted faces that complain at their fate at the Zurich Letzigrund stadium
4 probably didn't pay attention to what happened a few hours earlier,
5 slightly further north, when the clear European sky was overshadowed by
6 Ireland.

7 Sir John Pentland Mahaffy, Oscar Wilde's teacher, said that in Ireland "the
8 inevitable would never happen, but the unexpected all the time". They are
9 strange people the Irish, even when they dream they are always down to
10 earth. This Europe made of paper, with its food mountains and its
11 bankers' grey suits, wastes millions of sheets of paper and words to
12 discuss the size of apples and the size of condoms. It has made the Irish
13 rich. But it has never really excited them. That's why when they were
14 called upon to vote for the treaty, the constitution, they said no, burying
15 all dreams under a pint of beer. Business is business and money has no
16 values, religion, or identity.

17 Money speaks different languages and doesn't look at the colour of the
18 Euro. But the heart is something else. The heart is held by blood and
19 country. It is the grave of the dead. It is the taste of those old stories that

20 James Joyce used to listen to through the night in Dublin. To take pride,
21 even though we have faults. It is to observe how, on an afternoon in late
22 Spring, how playing in Europe can result in defeat. Our Romanian
23 brothers may have an EU passport and speak a language that vaguely
24 sounds Latin-based, but in front of Buffon's goal area it is difficult not to
25 see them as illegal immigrants. And this is the sad truth. There lies the
26 Irish lesson: Europe is ok when we talk about money, but when we talk
27 about dreams we need more heart. A building, full of bureaucrats, built
28 on coal and iron, is not enough.

29 Europe was a dream. It was the monk Isidoro Pacensis, who described
30 "Europeans" the soldiers of Carlo Martello who stopped the Arabs. It was
31 the secular, moral and spiritual religion of Mazzini. There was Altiero
32 Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni at Ventotene. It was the
33 suicidal war and the dawn of the American century, with the will to re-
34 build, brick by brick, with the American dollars of the Marshall plan. It
35 was the redemption of the defeated, who looked ahead, turning to
36 Adenauer and De Gasperi. It was the common market as an ambassador
37 of peace, cancelling centuries of French, Prussian, Spanish, Dutch,
38 Scandinavian and also Italian soldiers fighting for a metre of land in the
39 name of their faith or country, or finding any other excuse to spit at each
40 other. It even was the positive utopia offered by Esperanto, a language
41 created in a laboratory, and genetically modified, with the soul of
42 Frankenstein. A language which was stillborn, aspiring to recapture and
43 inherit the lost universality of Latin.
44 The Europe of the dreamers was all this. It was the United States of
45 Europe.

46 Stories do not always end the way they should. It's enough to have a goal
47 cancelled by a bureaucratic oversight. It's possible to lose enthusiasm and
48 not to believe in it anymore. A small percentage can prove enough. The
49 Irish, who made the difference between a yes and a no, were just more

50 than one hundred thousand, a stadium full, maybe slightly overcrowded.

51 If you like statistics they say it was about 0.4% of the (European)

52 population. Dreams are like this, they can catch a cold.

53 Europe has been communicated badly. You receive directives from desks

54 far away, from faceless people. The man on the street, sympathises with

55 Cassano (Italian national team footballer), intolerant to any type of

56 bureaucracy and the impression that the men in grey suits are trying to

57 codify their lives. They tell you when and how to milk your cow, how

58 much air you can breath, who you can choose as your neighbour. This is

59 the problem with Europe. It is boring and a nuisance.

60 It is your mortgage that goes up each time they say to increase interest

61 rates. It is to appoint people who do not count but earn a fortune. It is to

62 have as a hero a banker. It is to ask yourself where Estonia is. It is to

63 nullify all the identities for something that floats. It is the disappointment

64 of an entire generation who really believed in Europe, who travelled on

65 Inter-rail trains and immersed themselves in idealistic nights on Erasmus

66 exchanges. They were told that we needed sacrifices. Europe is asking us

67 to make sure that our state deficit is within a certain budget, that we pay

68 and pay again and give up our pensions. We are the citizens of a dream.

69 And they have paid. They have made sacrifices. But every now and then,

70 they ask themselves: for what? For a dream - with Brussels as the capital?

71 You need lots of imagination to dream in Brussels. You need courage. The

72 dream is hanging by a thread, hanging in the balance, precariously,

73 between yes and no. Farewell Europe. Farewell now that Mutu (Romanian

74 football striker) has inflicted his punishment. The ball bounces back on

75 Buffon's hand (Italian goalkeeper) and then on his foot. All that is left is a

76 hope, hanging in the balance.

Ends.

Genre and context.

This main front page article fits squarely into the *pastone* tradition. It combines a review of the major political development that day: the Irish rejection of the Reform Treaty; with comments by the journalist (Dardano, 1976, Roidi, 2001).

Putnam (1973: pp.81-2) in his comparative study of political elites in Britain and Italy, noted that in Italian journalism, facts do not speak for themselves, commentary is valued and neutrality regarded as inconsistent and naive.

What *Il Giornale* readers would have expected is just such an analysis in this *pastone*. It is expected that the article will endeavour to persuade readers. It is the central article in that day's newspaper, with pages of related referendum news. This is indicative of the importance attached to Europe in Italy. But that is not to say that the coverage could be tinged with scepticism. This *pastone* is brimming with argumentation and metaphorical imagery.

The Irish referendum rejection of the Reform Treaty compounded the problem created by the earlier Dutch and French referendum rejections. On one level it is part of a continuum in this study: tracing the constitutionalisation of Europe. On another level the Irish rejection provides the opportunity to engage with a story in which both Italy and Britain were only observers. This may present another perspective.

The scene is set at the start of the article, with the headline: Europe dies, the Europeans, nearly. A rapport is developed with the readership, playing off a double meaning: with (political) Europe dead and Italy's chances of progressing (in the European football champions) nearly. Here the populism of *Il Giornale* and its attempt to speak to the common citizen and create a mass-circulation title are the most blatantly apparent. The intentionality (Bakhtin, 1982) is clear, playing off the understanding of readers, concerning the championships – to simultaneously also lament the state of the other Europe (that of politics).

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

The article begins with a *path-movement-journey* metaphor, with the ball sliding silently over the goal line (Line 1). This is to signal the possible exit of Italy from the championships. But in terms of analogical argument and metaphor, it is also arguably to utilise and harness the popular and emotive language of football – to make persuasive points about political Europe. Perhaps both Italy (on the football field) and Europe (on the political stage) are being propelled towards some kind of defeat.

At this juncture, the *path-movement-journey* metaphor is arguably working on the supra-individual level of conventional metaphors (Kövecses, 2002). What should be noted is if the conceptualisation moves off in another direction or changes somehow. Regardless, the scene has been set, with the language of football utilised to describe an arguably failing political Europe. Much as with the EU's 'train leaving the station without Britain' (Musolff, 2004), the imagery may subsequently have some persuasive force. What is then established is that the article's persuasion is articulated through other argumentative strategies and metaphors. The specific *path-movement-journey* metaphor is only re-visited at the very end of the *pastone*. Here the author writes: Farewell Europe. Farewell, now that Mutu (Romanian football striker) has inflicted his punishment (Lines 73-4). Paraphrasing, the ball then bounces back to the Italian goalkeeper, with hope left hanging in the balance (Lines 75-6). This hanging in the balance is also implicitly referring to the political future of the EU. The footballing imagery perhaps persuades the reader of the gravity of the political situation also.

Close to the start, a *topos of history* emerges, teaching us that specific actions have specific consequences – and that therefore these actions should be omitted in future. This is a Europe made of paper, food mountains and bankers' grey suits (Lines 10-11). This Europe has wasted millions of sheets of paper and words, in discussing the size of apples and the size of condoms (Lines 11-12). The developing of this argument then justifies the conclusion: that's why the Irish said no (Line 14). This argumentation is several things, depending on interpretation. It is: the evocation of a Eurosceptic view of bureaucrats and Brussels, as Buonadonna argued, in a classic

British way; it is however also the pervasive commission-bashing that Trenz (2007) found in many EU countries. It is possibly something else again. On closer analysis, a *topos of scepticism* may also be employed. At this stage in analysis, it is unclear. The topos constructs the argument that the post-World War II European project is about economics and that any straying into the political will have negative consequences, as evidenced by the bureaucracy. Hence, on the back of the initial *topos of history*, the author possibly employs the *topos of scepticism* to re-affirm the reason for the Irish no, when he writes of business being business, with money having no values, religion or identity (Lines 15-16). An initial interpretation would be that this is a pragmatic approach. The EU should remain focusing on economics alone.

On one hand the writer is arguing that the Reform Treaty was executed by bureaucrats – and that is why Ireland said no (the justification in the initial topos of history). What is unclear is if the author is also saying that the treaty showed too much (political) ambition, or not enough? The writer then goes on to talk of the Irish having taught Europe a lesson: that it is OK to talk about money, but that when we talk about *dreams*, more 'heart' is needed, with a building full of bureaucrats not being enough (Lines 25-28). The author is re-inforcing here, the initial *topos of history*: because of the bureaucrats the Irish said no (to oversimplify). Yet the writer is also writing about how *dreams* have been dashed. He continuously does so, in different contexts, throughout the text. Dreams are mentioned 11 times. This already suggests, concerning the previous conundrum, that the author wants a more effective Europolity and is lamenting the lack of ambition, with the EU Constitution overly focussing on economics. The *dream* collides with the *bureaucrats* and *bankers*, mentioned directly and indirectly seven times. The positive evaluation of the *dream* is dashed and juxtaposed with the negative evaluation of the *bankers* and *bureaucrats* of the EU. Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007: p4) argued that on the one hand, constitutionalisation was a chance to make meaning of the fundamental values and objectives of the Europolity – and the possibility of a European public sphere. Yet like previous treaties, it finally limited itself to the design of institutions.

Hence in revisiting what was initially thought to have been a topos of scepticism: business is business and money has no values, religion, or identity (Lines 15-16), it instead can be interpreted as an extension of the initial topos of history. This re-interpretation would suggest that the author is arguing the treaty should have had more 'heart' addressing values, religion and identity. Indeed, in Lines 18-21, the author refers to such 'heart' being offered only on the level of nationhood, with a reference to Irish writer, James Joyce.

This interpretation is re-inforced with another *topos of history* employed to re-affirm that the limited bureaucratic vision for the EU Constitution was indeed not enough. The author refers to a long role call of Italians who have contributed to Europe, including Mazzini and Spinelli (Lines 29-37). The topos is arguing that these individuals, followed by the post-World War II leaders Adenauer and De Gasperi (from the defeated Germany and Italy), built Europe on peace. Their post-World War II actions had that consequence. The author describes the: common market as an ambassador of peace (Lines 36-7). However the actions of those constructing the EU Constitution failed to act in a similar fashion. In this way the conclusion is justified: it has not been enough.

The consequence was the dream of Europe almost shattered. In re-affirming the author's attempts to persuade readers of the shortcomings of the EU and its lack of vision, concerning the Reform Treaty, it is also argued that a *topos of centrality* is employed. The argumentation in the topos of centrality is that history has taught us that as a result of our central role (as a nation) a trans-national concern has advanced (in this case the EU). Therefore we should remain a central player, otherwise the EU (in this case) can not advance. This is also a justification for national self-interest. The role call (Lines 31-36) can be interpreted as demonstrating Italy's centrality to Europe, and how as a result, Europe has advanced, stopping the centuries of warring in Europe (Lines 37-40). The need to remain central is not articulated explicitly in this instance.

In evoking this role call of Italians (Lines 31-36) that have contributed to the dream that was Europe, it could also be argued that a *topos of authority* is employed. In this instance the dream should be realized – because those in the role call would have wanted it. It was what they had worked for. This is implied, but arguably acts as a means of persuading the reader of the importance of that dream that was Europe.

What is also evoked is a Europe seen through the prism of nation, or more precisely the *Weltanschauung* of the centre-right Berlusconi coalition. Hence Carlo Martello stopped the Arabs (Line 30); the contradiction of the secular and religious aspects of Italian society, in mentioning Mazzini (Line 31). Berlusconi made it clear he wanted God in the EU Constitution (Johnson and Farrell 2003). In the anti-immigration law, proposed by Berlusconi and Bossi, they claim that theirs was a 'Christian model of society' (ter Wal, 2002: pp162-5). Earlier there was also the "sad truth" when the writer admits that Europe is seen through national eyes and in this case it proving difficult not to view the Romanian football opponents as illegal immigrants (Lines 22-5). This at least suggests that not only Berlusconi coalition supporters are being addressed.

Before establishing how the argumentation develops, it is useful to note how *life-body-health* metaphors assist in the conceptualisation of the arguments advanced thus far. The author notes how: the *heart* is held by *blood* and country. It is the grave of the *dead* (Lines 18-19). This can be interpreted as the construction of the reality of the nation-state re-affirmed. However, the author then goes on to argue: There lies the Irish lesson: Europe is ok when we talk about money, but when we talk about dreams we need *more heart*. A building full of bureaucrats, built on coal and iron, is not enough (Lines 25-28). An interpretation is that he is drawing on the *heart* metaphor in its conventional usage, what Kövecses (2002) described as the supra-individual level and applying this national conceptualisation to Europe. It is Europe that needs *more heart*. This suggests that a new meaning is attempted by the writer, a re-contextualisation on the individual level (Kövecses, 2002).

Indeed Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007: p4) noted in their study, the aspiration of some over the EU Constitution, in hoping to build a European civil society that

would result in a European public sphere. An interpretation is that the writer is aspirational in this way also.

Additions to this *life-body-health* conceptualisation is the reference to the 'soul of Frankenstein' and 'a language that was stillborn' in reference to the failed attempt to replace the lost universality of Latin (Lines 41-3) with the constructed language of Esperanto. This conceptualisation immediately follows the references to Adenauer and De Gasperi, and the building of the new post-World War II peace. In this sense the *life-body-health* metaphor is trying to present the extent of post-World War II ambition. It is not interpreted as having any particular persuasive force over the reader, beyond contributing to this post-World War II picture, in this instance, however. What is argued, does carry some weight, post-World War II, is the *life-body-health* notion of people having *sacrificed* (Line 69) and then they ask themselves: for what? For a dream (Line 70). An interpretation is that the writer is informing readers that their *sacrifice* (and those previously, especially in war) was not worth it. Not for this Europe lacking ambition, anyway.

Following on from the topos of history, there is arguably a re-inforcing of the argumentation that Ireland said no, because of bureaucracy, with a continuous reconceptualisation of Europe as a 'dysfunctional bureaucracy.' What is added to the dysfunctionality is how: Europe has been communicated badly (Line 53).

Hence, you receive directives from desks far away, from *faceless people* (Lines 53-54), with *bureaucrats* in *grey suits*: trying to *codify their* lives (Lines 56-7). The intensity increases with: It is to appoint people who *do not count* but *earn a fortune*. It is to have as a *hero a banker* (Lines 61-2). Finally: It is the disappointment of an entire generation who really believed in Europe (Line 64) – but whose *dreams* were dashed. At the outset this conceptualisation is drawing on the EU communication deficit (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007, Trenz, 2007). In terms of persuasive force, it could be argued that this continuously recurring notion at various points, of the dream being thwarted by a bureaucracy, re-inforces this particular construction of reality.

However, it could be argued that when this conceptualisation of a dysfunctional bureaucracy is coupled with the analogy of football, it proves to be at its most persuasive. Following on from the start of the article, the author refers to stories not always ending the way they should, with goals being cancelled out because of bureaucratic oversights and how it is possible to lose enthusiasm (Lines 46-7). In the Italy-Romania game, Italy had a goal disallowed. An interpretation is that the author is harnessing the emotional disappointment concerning the football result and linking it to the political disappointment of the Irish no vote, in a conceptualisation that is hard to resist, in terms of its persuasive pull, Musolff's (2004) argument.

The author articulates the analogy: The man on the street, sympathises with Cassano (Italian national team footballer), intolerant to any type of bureaucracy (Lines 54-56). Hence unjust decisions on the field are transferred to the political arena. The author could be interpreted as utilising his rapport with the reader (concerning football), to bring the other political injustice to light.

Interpretation.

Overall, the conceptual mapping of shattered dreams, and the parallels with injustices suffered on the football pitch, are all levelled at Brussels, its bureaucrats and their ineffectual communication. This is the scenario or narrative that is told overall. The article constructs a specific reality, employing argumentation and metaphor to re-affirm where blame should be apportioned. While the problems cited are evidenced elsewhere in this thesis (Statham, 2008) and indeed admitted to by the commission (2006), this is not the whole picture. The Irish press, the campaign of the Irish government are not considered, discarded, in advancing a particular conceptualisation of who was to blame and why.

On one level, an interpretation is that the writer concurs with the position of Berlusconi, in being vociferously critical of bureaucracy (Owen, 2002). Yet on another level, the author is advancing the need for a more cohesive Europolity, a dying dream, not less of one (as Berlusconi has argued). Although there maybe a

strain of scepticism, it is no more than that found amongst previous interviewees on the centre-left, and for similar reasons. Trenz (2007) also found 'commission-bashing' widespread. It is the notion of the EU Constitution as an opportunity missed that pervades the article.

5.5 The introduction of the euro.

January 1, 2002.
SECTION: Home news. **LENGTH:** 807 words

HEADLINE: Europe takes the plunge

BYLINE: Martin Fletcher, Tom Baldwin and Philip Webster

BODY:
  * 300m citizens start using new currency

* Blair seeks to woo women for 'yes' vote

1 WITH fireworks, soaring rhetoric and last-minute controversy, Europe last night

2 inaugurated its first single currency since the Holy Roman Empire.

3 As midnight ushered in the new year, the first of 304 million citizens from Lapland to

4 Lisbon began withdrawing euro notes from cash machines to start the biggest currency

5 exchange the world has seen. Within weeks the German mark, the French franc, the

6 Italian lira and nine other ancient currencies will be consigned to history.

7 Across the Continent leaders urged doubting populations to celebrate rather than mourn

8 an event that will bind Europe together as never before, establish the world's second

9 currency after the dollar, and the third largest monetary zone after China and India.

10 The introduction of 14.5 billion euro notes and 50 billion coins also represents the

11 biggest leap towards integration since the European Coal and Steel Community was

12 formed in 1951.

13 At home, Tony Blair is understood to be drawing up plans for a "yes" campaign for a

14 euro referendum in 2003 aimed directly at women and extolling the benefits of the EU

15 as much as those of the euro. But the Government will not move until Gordon Brown

16 has returned a positive verdict in his assessment of the five economic tests for entry.

17 That is expected to be completed this year and, for the moment, ministers want to

18 douse the flames of speculation for fear of enraging the Chancellor.

19 In an interview with *The Times* today Jack Straw sends his best wishes to the euro but

20 insists that tough hurdles will have to be crossed before a referendum can take

21 place. However, the Government continues to be criticised by pro-euro campaigners for

22 its hesitancy.

23 In an article for The Times today, Charles Kennedy says Britain is looking more and
24 more out of step and urges the Treasury to take immediate action to put "downward
25 pressure" on sterling so that the pound is not overvalued when the Government decides
26 to join.
27 Yesterday continental newspapers and politicians bade goodbye to the various
28 currencies: "Farewell Guilder" was the headline on one Dutch newspaper. "Le Franc Est
29 Tombe", proclaimed the front page of Belgium's La Libre. But Gerhard Schroder, the
30 German Chancellor, told his country: "We are witnessing the dawn of an age that the
31 people of Europe have dreamt of for centuries - borderless travel and payment in a
32 common currency.
33 "Many will be a bit wistful. The German mark meant a lot to us. We link the mark with
34 memories of good times in Germany. But you can be sure even better times are ahead."
35 Romano Prodi, the European Commission President, proclaimed: "The euro is your
36 money. It's our money. It's our future. It's a little piece of Europe in our hands."
37 Wim Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, urged Britain, Sweden and
38 Denmark - the three EU countries outside the eurozone - to "come and join us", and
39 Signor Prodi predicted that the introduction of coins and paper would have an
40 "enormous influence on public opinion" in those countries.
41 But he also gave ammunition to eurosceptics by saying the euro would inevitably lead
42 to greater economic harmonisation. "We have taken a major step which will lead
43 ineluctably to greater convergence of economic rules," he said.
44 Laurent Fabius, the French Finance Minister, went further and advocated Europe-wide
45 taxes to match the community's common monetary policy. He called for a "budget
46 federation" for euroland, saying co-ordination of tax and spending was not enough; a
47 common fiscal policy was needed. "This is a logical follow-up to the euro," he said.
48 The euro's arrival after thirty years as a dream and three as a virtual currency was
49 celebrated with fireworks, music and theatre at huge open-air parties at the
50 Cinquantenaire arch in Brussels, outside the ECB's Frankfurt headquarters, at Berlin's
51 Brandenberg Gate, in Rome's Piazza del Popolo, in Dublin's Grafton Street and in the
52 central square of the Dutch town of Maastricht, where almost exactly a decade ago EU
53 leaders signed the treaty approving the single currency. Signor Prodi and Wolfgang
54 Schüssel, Austria's Chancellor, attended an opera in Vienna before using euros to buy
55 flowers for their wives at midnight.
56 The first notes became legal tender in Reunion, a French island that rises from the
57 Indian Ocean 500 miles east of Madagascar, two hours before they were issued in
58 Greece and Finland.

59 Over the next eight hours they became the legal currency not just of the eurozone, but

60 of Montenegro, Kosovo, Andorra, the Vatican, San Marino, Monaco, the Portuguese

61 Azores, the French Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, French Guiana in

62 South America and the St Pierre et Miquelon islands off Newfoundland.

ENDS.

Explanation of genre and context.

This article is what is known in British journalism as a pull-together piece. Three writers are feeding copy to the newsdesk, under deadline pressure. The context is *The Times* fitting into the mainstream of the British quality press, known to be in large part, Eurosceptic (Garton-Ash, 2005, Weymouth and Anderson, 1999). What should be considered is how some of the writers may be more Eurosceptic and others less so. This may result in conflicting messages or complexity in the discourse. The London news desk can give the final story a Eurosceptic inflection (Gavin, 2001). The pull-together news piece also refers to other euro stories in the newspaper. This means that certain aspects of the article are only touched upon in passing, elaborated on elsewhere. Britain did not join the euro on January 1, 2002, instead observing the unfolding events. However that is not to underestimate Britain considering the implications of the euro for national sovereignty and the national interest.

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

Relevance to the readership takes two forms in the article. Initially there is a conjuring of the historical significance: the first single currency since the Holy Roman Empire (Line 2); 304 million citizens withdrawing euro notes in the biggest currency exchange the world has ever seen (Lines 4-5); an event that will bind Europe together as never before, establishing the world's second currency after the dollar (Lines 8-9). The earlier interpretation of the commentary on the euro in *Il Giornale*, was that of reminding the metaphorical family described, crowding around the newborn, the euro, that there was an older, already dependable sibling: the dollar.

The newsworthiness of the moment is first framed initially in the historical context and is interpreted as positively evaluative. A more negative interpretation could be formulated, when the evaluative word, *integration*, is used in the context of British

Euroscepticism: The introduction of 14.5 billion euro notes and 50 billion coins also represents the biggest leap towards *integration* (Lines 10-11). The conjuring of a *leap,* could also be interpreted as a rashness that is unwise.

For the first time in the newspaper discourse analysis, a series of *EU news actors* are quoted. This is surprising in that *Il Giornale* is supposed to be informed by a national political discourse favourable towards integration. Yet nearly more EU political actors are cited in this first *Times* article than the whole of the discourse analysis of *Il Giornale.* An interpretation offered is that there may be something in what Cazaninni claimed previously: that the Italian media has not been that engaged with Europe. Statham (2008) catalogued a low number of EU actors surfacing in newspaper copy in many EU countries. In this article three EU actors surface: the EC President, Romano Prodi; the President of the European Central Bank, Wim Duisenberg; and the French finance minister, Laurent Fabius, closely involved in the integrative process. If one considers others as also EU actors, the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and the Austrian Chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel, can also be included. Statham's (2008) point about EU actors not surfacing sufficiently is countered in this British article. In comparison there were four British national political actors mentioned or cited. Depending on interpretation, the 'Europeans' could even be in the majority.

The second strand of *relevance* for the readership, following on from the sense of history in the making, relates to the British government position. From Lines 13-20, Blair was 'understood' to be drawing up plans for a yes campaign on a referendum, in: extolling the benefits of the EU as much as those of the euro (Lines 14-15). The initial positively evaluative sense of history in the making is mitigated here. The British government will not move until Gordon Brown (Lines 15-16) has made his verdict concerning his five economic tests, prior to euro entry. Jack Straw also insisted there were tough hurdles (Line 20) before a referendum could take place. Grice (2006) claimed in *The Independent*, that Straw was instrumental in getting Blair to renounce his opposition to a referendum on the other contentious integration issue: the European Constitution.

The hesitancy is portrayed by *The Times*, as coming from the government. On the strength of the evidence presented - it is. This is reminiscent of the national political communication deficit in the interview analysis (not making the case for the euro), coupled with how consecutive post-World War II British governments were hesitant over Europe.

However, Blair's plans for a referendum (Lines 13-14) also refer to the campaign: extolling the benefits of the EU as much as those of the euro (Lines 14-15). It could have been the moment Martin sought, with government finally taking the lead on Europe, but it never happened. Had Blair moved, there would have been a government-led attempt to challenge the underlying discourse of EU withdrawal within Britain - head-on. Arguably even a Eurosceptic newspaper like *The Times* would have reported the position of the government in the campaign, albeit possibly critically. A campaign like that would have been progress for pro-Europeans.

In terms of *modality*, it is only *understood* (Line 13) that Blair was preparing for a 'yes' campaign – a tentative proposition with *low modality*. More affirmatively, the government: *will not* move until Gordon Brown *has returned* his verdict (Lines 15-16), higher modality followed by an *unmodalised declarative*. This is not confirmed. We have only *The Times* saying this is so.   Straw insists that tough hurdles *will have* to be crossed (Line 20), again high modality created by the newspaper.

A cynical view would be *The Times* is presenting the government as cautious - and re-assuring the Eurosceptic readership that nothing will be done hastily. A further cynical interpretation could be that the references and the *modality* were more a constructing of the government reality on the euro, rather than the actual position. An interpretation of such a discursive construction could be *The Times* signalling to the government, not to rush, just in case it had not understood. Supporting this interpretation is the apparent government cautiousness accords with the possible instrumentalisation of Murdoch in *The Times*, the message being: wait on the euro (Harding, 2002). A different interpretation is government hesitancy reflecting the

exceptionalism of Labour and its particular Euroscepticsm (Gifford, 2008) and therefore not influenced by either Murdoch or *The Times*.

On one level, there is a positive in the *news actors* of Duisenberg and Prodi both appealing to Britain, directly cited over the potential benefits of joining.
This is however soon mitigated. Firstly, Prodi gave ammunition to Eurosceptics by saying the euro would inevitably lead to greater economic harmonisation (Lines 41-2). Then Fabius saying that co-ordination of tax was not enough and a common fiscal policy was needed (Lines 46-8).

The British context of Euroscepticism and the perception of the 'project' as an economic endeavour should be recalled. Hence the further economic integration signalled by Prodi and Fabius is arguably presented as a threat to Britain, by *TheTimes,* signalling caution. An interpretation is *The Times* is implicitly warning readers, drawing on their Eurosceptic perceptions (Bourdieu, 2005). The warning goes something like: if we move forward too quickly, we could be pushed all the way to common fiscal policy, removing our right to economic self-determination.

An interpretation is that *The Times* is constructing categoriesof perception to re-enforce the Euroscepticism of the readership, a form of *symbolic violence* (Bourdieu, 2005). This is similar to the *symbolic violence* of Charter in arguing earlier that there was a lot of *common sense around*, with the British people noting how the EU Constitution was *coming apart at the seams*.

The reference to these EU actors is coupled with the mere 'noting' (and yet mainly unconfirmed speculation) of the government's earlier cautious positioning on the euro (Blair and Brown, Lines 13-21). A *coherent* picture is presented to the reader: the EU is pushing too hard and fast, it is alright reader, the British government is exercising caution. This could be interpreted as a clever and subtle *construction of reality*, re-affirming the reader's (Euroscepticism) and signalling to the government not to try to push too quickly. This accords with the earlier citations of Murdoch on

the euro (Harding, 2002) – and does suggest that there may be some instrumentalisation.

Interpretation.

The article initially highlighted the historical relevance and of the euro – but progressed by focusing on the perceived dangers inherent in the new currency. An interpretation is the Brussels correspondent started the article, and the inflections of the London newsdesk added the cautionary and more Eurosceptic tone subsequently.

Britain was a bystander. Hence a further interpretation, drawing on history, is *The Times* could applaud this unfolding chapter in Europe's post-World War II project. This is to acknowledge, in terms of universalism and sharing at least some common values with Europe, on one level, at this historical moment (Malešević, 2006). At some point however, this was translated in the article, into a more nationalistic tone, indicating to the wider Eurosceptic public (and a relatively pro-European government), the need to be careful.

January 1, 2002, Tuesday

Monnet's money

SECTION: Features

LENGTH: 683 words

1Today, 304 million people across Europe embark upon an unprecedented
2 political and economic experiment. Although the 12 currencies of euroland
3 have been locked for some three years now, the single currency was, until
4 this morning, a skeleton. Notes and coins are its flesh and blood. Tony Blair
5 argued in his new year message that a successful euro was "in Britain's
6national interests" while other ministers have indicated that they would like
7 a referendum on membership to occur while momentum is with the
8 advocates of monetary union.
9 The Prime Minister is right on the first point, in that economic convulsions
10 on the Continent would affect Britain. The referendum date, however,
11 should be subject to stringent conditions, not short-term political
12 circumstances.
13 The economic backdrop to the euro is not as pretty as its founders would
14 have wanted. Most of the major European economies are slowing, in part
15 because of the approach adopted by the European Central Bank. That
16 institution has placed the establishment of its own reputation for rigour
17 ahead of an expansionary monetary stance and as a consequence has
18 inspired neither confidence nor prosperity. European politicians hope that
19 once the new currency has been introduced the ECB will act more like the
20 US Federal Reserve Board and less like a caricature of the Bundesbank.
21 They may be disappointed.
22 The euro is at core a political project but it rests on some economic
23 assumptions. The notion has been that, despite evidence of diversity, the
24 European economies are similar. The discrepancies between them, the
25 thesis runs, are twofold. The first is that for historical reasons they have
26 been at different stages of the business cycle. The second is that, owing to
27 varying qualities of public administration, levels of debt have altered
28 significantly between them. The purpose of the convergence criteria
29 pursued over the past decade has been to realign the business cycle and
30 standardise debt. If these preconditions have been met, the theory states, a
31 single interest rate across the whole eurozone is perfectly practical.
32 These assumptions are both heroic and simplistic. They will be tested
33 forcefully in the years ahead. A truly "successful" new currency has to do
34 rather more than prove it can be swapped for another. The euro must
35 command confidence in those who use it and trade in it and the single
36 interest rate must be credible. If the euroland economies are more diverse
37 than has been conceded, or if the convergence criteria have been distorted
38 for political convenience, then a number of countries will pay a price for
39 abandoning their monetary autonomy. They will find themselves trapped
40 without the traditional weapon of flexible interest rates.

41 In political terms, however, the mere creation of the euro is a triumph for
42 those who support closer European integration. This currency is the child
43 of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, and more recently of Jacques Delors.
44 It will inevitably change the nature of the relationship between the 12
45 members of the monetary union. A vast swath of Europe has become a
46 form of enlarged Benelux. It remains to be seen, however, whether
47 Europe's elites have placed themselves too far ahead of public opinion in
48 their own nations. If they have then, ironically and tragically, a political
49 experiment born out of the determination to avoid further experience of
50 extremism and nationalism may yet fan both.
51 Britain is in the unusual yet fortunate position of occupying a ringside seat
52 at these proceedings. It would be wise to sit there for some time. For if the
53 assumptions about the compatibility of the 12 founder economies are
54 contestable, then that between the British economy and euroland is even
55 more so. If the risk of division between elites and electorates is high even
56 among those countries which shared the common past of wartime defeat
57 and occupation, then it is far sharper in a nation which has not. The Prime
58 Minister may be frustrated that he cannot participate in this experiment.
59 He at least retains the freedom to observe its course.
ENDS.

Genre and context.

The focus now turns to a commentary in *The Times*, entitled "Monnet's money".
There were two commentaries in that day's issue of *The Times*. One was a critique of
the government's position over the euro, by the Liberal Democrat (and extremely
pro-European) leader, Charles Kennedy. The other was the only 'voice' of *The Times*
surfacing that day on the issue, and that was the editorial entitled: "Monnet's
money". Earlier the discourse analysis included a feature by Scafuri, the rationale
being that it gave the analysis a chance to see what he wrote, as opposed to said
about the EU Constitution; there was no commentary to accompany the news story
analysed in that particular edition of the newspaper; it allowed for comparison with
Charter.

In this case also, the analysis falls outside of the rubric, in selecting an *editorial*.
However at least this is being made clear, as opposed to conflating this genre of
journalism with a *commentary* by a named writer, as Trenz (2007) appears to do.

The context in Britain is the possibility of a national referendum on the euro. In the editorial, it can be expected that the position of *The Times* will come to the fore, possibly addressing the public and the government on the issue. As outlined in the initial news story in *The Times* (Europe Takes the Plunge), the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was planning a referendum. The possibility of persuading readers, the wider electorate and the government on this issue, is perhaps an opportunity *The Times* may take in this editorial. The context is also the clear cautious approach to the euro of *The Times* owner, Rupert Murdoch (Harding, 2002, Charter).

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.
The text starts with a *life-body-health* metaphor, referring to the people of Europe embarking on an unprecedented political and economic experiment (Line 2). The editorial writer refers to how the euro had been a *skeleton* but with the introduction of notes and coins had become *flesh and blood* (Line 4). The article then refers to Blair's New Year message saying that the euro was in Britain's national interests (Lines 5-6).

An interpretation is that Blair meant possible future British membership. Yet immediately *The Times* offers an interpretation of its own, agreeing with Blair – up to a point. And then instead arguing that: economic *convulsions* on the Continent would affect Britain. What is signalled implicitly is that Britain should take notice because of the dangers (rather than the possibility of also joining). The socio-pragmatic context is a Eurosceptic Britain cautious over European integration. If one couples *experiment* with *convulsion* in the first few lines, an interpretation is that *The Times* is persuading and re-affirming the cautious approach of its readers. This could also be interpreted as transforming into an attempt to also address the government directly: the referendum date, however, should be subject to stringent conditions, not short-term political circumstances (Lines 10-12).

The Times also refers to the euro as the *child* of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors (Line 43). This is to evoke a child metaphor in a very different way from the equivalent euro commentary in *Il Giornale* (But the Market Is Not Unique). In *Il Giornale's* article the evocation of Italy being there at the birth (of the euro) and the subsequent way in which the child metaphor was constructed, was interpreted as a means of re-calibrating Italy's approach to the European 'family.' Another difference is that in the equivalent *Il Giornale* commentary, the *birth* of the euro was employed in what was construed to be a *love-marriage-family* conceptual map of metaphors, playing off the centrality of the family in Italian society (Ginzborg, 2003). Instead in this *Times* article, the child belongs to *Others* joining the euro and is furthermore an *experiment (*perhaps risking health) which may lead to *convulsions.* Instead in *The Times* editorial it is argued the conceptualising revolves around a series of *life-body-health* metaphors. In this instance the construction of reality by *The Times* is of a *child* born to these 'European' political actors – but not the British. Indeed, it is a: triumph for *those* who support closer European integration (Lines 41-2), the aforementioned actors for instance. It could be argued that this is similar to Charter's categories of perception, in several instances. Both here and then, the argumentation presents Europe as an *Other.*

The reference to Monnet, Schuman and Delors (Lines 43) and in the headline, is also constructing a *topos of authority,* in this instance, based on the following conclusion: the euro has resulted in greater political integration and is in this sense a triumph. This is because the authority, the aforementioned EU politicians, wanted closer political integration. When coupled with the child metaphor, it is re-enforcing a certain conceptualisation for readers – of this being a triumph for European *Others*. It could also be argued that the signposting of the phrase: in political terms (Line 41) at the outset of this section, and the mere mention of *Delors*, who famously incurred Thatcher's wrath in her Bruges speech, is all contributing to helping the reader perceive this Europe as a threat to British sovereignty – without actually saying so.

The *life-body-health* metaphor surfaces again close to the end of the editorial. In this instance *The Times* argues that a: *political experiment born* out of determination to avoid further experience of extremism and nationalism may yet fan both (Lines 48-50).This is perhaps to again implicitly indicate and persuade the readership of the importance of not rushing to join the *experiment.* Also referring to the euro as a *political* experiment, could also be interpreted as a signalling to a Eurosceptic readership in the socio-pragmatic context (Musolff, 2004) of Britain specifically regarding the post-World War II project as solely for economic integration. This is further highlighting a perceived danger of further political integration - at odds with British parliamentary sovereignty. Right at the end of the article, there is a reference to the Prime Minister possibly feeling frustration in not participating in the *experiment,* re-inforcing the conceptualisation of the precariousness of the euro's launch, for the last time. The *political experiment* can also be viewed as a *topos of threat to the national interest*: the political action of joining the euro is precarious, so one should not join (at least not yet).

This cluster of *life-body-health* metaphors can be interpreted as drawing on the unconscious, generic perception amongst many parts of British society, seeing European integration as precarious, drawing on that internalisation within the national habitus (Wodak, 2006). This could be seen as Kövecses' (2002) sub-individual level at work. Yet this internalised metaphorical conceptualisation of possible ill-health in relation to Europe (*experiment, convulsions*) is now transferred to a new situation: the introduction of the euro. This could be interpreted as a form or re-contextualisation, creating a new metaphor, with a slightly different meaning. It is argued this *life-body-health* metaphor is therefore working on Kövecses' (2002) individual level as well.

Topoi of history immediately follow the initial *life-body-health* metaphor. The initial topos of history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences. Therefore one should, in this instance, omit them. *The Times* advances the argument that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been drawing on its reputation as overly rigorous, rather than taking: an expansionary monetary stance. As a consequence the

ECB has inspired neither confidence nor prosperity (Lines 15-18), according to *The Times*. The conclusion is that the ECB is one of the reasons why major European economies are slowing (Line 14). Therefore Britain, it is concluded, would be wise to wait before joining the euro. This is implied.

The Times then develops a related topos of history. In this instance, history is teaching us that the euro is at core a political project (Line 22). History is also teaching us that various European nations are at different stages of the business cycle (lines24-26). History has also taught us that there is diversity (amongst the national economies). Instead the notion that they are similar is being pursued by the EU (Lines 23-24). History has also shown us that: owing to varying qualities of public administration, levels of debt have altered significantly between them (Lines 26-28). The conclusion, drawing from this argumentation, is that: These (EU) assumptions are both heroic and simplistic. They will be tested forcefully in the years ahead (Lines 32-33).

It is worth trying to unravel some of this argumentation's persuasive force and how it draws on Britain's socio-pragmatic context. The signalling of national diversity within the EU and how the EU is ignoring this, is interpreted as working on two levels. On one level it is presenting a picture of the current euro signatories – but it is also simultaneously arguing that British diversity would similarly be ignored. This is drawing on the national habitus of a Britain being what it is *because* of its separate institutions.On another level, the reference to varying qualities of public administration (Lines 26-28), could be interpreted as again drawing on the British socio-pragmatic context of perceiving its institutions as working effectively – in juxtaposition to the ECB here (and perhaps Europe in general).

This can be interpreted as quietly signalling again the threat of the euro. It could be further interpreted as *The Times* invoking a perception of say France, or Italy, not adhering to the rules – and thus causing Britain economic problems, were Britain to join. Arguably this is *The Times* following a similar line of argumentation advanced by its reporter Charter in the interview data analysis. The context is however

different. It was Charter and what was interpreted as his symbolic violence towards the EU, over Iraq. In that instance the French and Italians were perceived as always protesting, on the streets, but slow to act. Instead in the argumentation above, it is arguably the silent evocation of such countries again, not to be relied upon economically either.

The same topos is then at work later in the editorial: If the euroland economies are more diverse than has been conceded, or if the convergence criteria have been distorted for *political* convenience, then a number of countries will pay a price for *abandoning* their monetary autonomy (Lines 36-39). The reader is again reminded of the consequences of the (national) diversity that it is concluded, is being ignored. The conclusion however is explicit this time: paying a price for abandoning monetary autonomy (Lines 38-9). Arguably the topos of threat to national interest is also at work here, warning readers of how British monetary *autonomy* is facing a challenge.

What immediately follows this potential *abandoning* of monetary autonomy is the utilising of a *struggle metaphor* (Straehle et al., 1999) arguably to embed this conceptualisation of the train of events. A problem or fight can be interpreted as closely related to the metaphor of struggle. Straehle et al. (1999) argue that when they speak of struggle, they also take it to mean the coming together of competing positions. Hence the countries *abandoning* their monetary autonomy: will find themselves *trapped* without the *traditional weapon* of flexible interest rates (Lines 39-40). The imagery is constructing a perception of countries abandoning their freedoms and then trapped and left without the means to fight back. In terms of struggle, this is suggesting there could then be tensions with the ECB. A further source of struggle could then arise, as the: *political experiment* born out of the determination to avoid further experience of extremism and nationalism may yet *fan* both (Lines 48-50). Here an interpretation is that there is an evocation of the fanning of flames and the previous world war dividing Europe and that past experience of *extremism* and *nationalism*. It could also be argued that this is a further

conceptualisation of a Britain with a different experience (in the war) which avoided such *extremism* and becoming trapped.

Perhaps it also a return to the argumentation of the topos of history, with history teaching Britain that not to get embroiled – as then – is often better.
The powerful imagery of the last world war is thus harnessed to help the reader to reach such a conclusion, more than sixty years on.

Interpretation.

Here there is a link between the cautiousness expressed in the news story, again re-surfacing in the editorial. Another way of interpreting what has transpired here is to recall the two distorting prisms in the conclusions of the interview analysis. The government is tentatively raising possible euro membership (but historically has arguably distorted Europe in the national public sphere, post-World War II). The resulting Eurosceptic public (having internalised seeing Europe negatively) is principally responsive to this discourse. *The Times* can arguably be seen as the second distorting prism. The editorial is interpreted as employing a series of topoi and conceptual metaphors to convey to the reader (and arguably the government) the need for caution concerning the precarious euro launch – and the possibility of getting involved. This draws on the soci-pragmatic context of an internalized Euroscepticism in the national British habitus.

5.6 The 2007 Reform Treaty summit.

The Times

October 20, 2007

Gordon Brown says no to referendum and any more integration for ten years

Philip Webster, Francis Elliott and David Charter

1Gordon Brown ruled out further European integration for at least a decade yesterday as
2he sought to counter calls for a referendum on the latest transfer of power to Brussels.

3Mr Brown left Lisbon insisting that the treaty agreed did not presage "fundamental
4change."He was immediately contradicted by one of the architects of theoriginal EU
5 constitution, who said that the new treaty contained all of its essential measures.

6 Speaking at the end of the summit, Mr Brown said that he had won agreement for an EU
7 declaration in December ruling out further institutional changes "for many years".
8 Asked how long the moratorium would last, the Prime Minister pointed out that some of
9 the provisions in the existing treaty did not come into effect until 2017.

10 "I will not support further institutional change over the next period," Mr Brown said,
11 effectively threatening to veto any more treaties.

12 But Jose Socrates, the Prime Minister of Portugal, said: "This treaty is not the end of the
13 story because there is no end."

14 Mr Brown's task of selling the latest treaty to a domestic audience was made even more
15 difficult as it was hailed as making the same fundamental changes as the defunct
16 constitution. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing – the French President who oversaw the original
17 EU constitution – said that the Reform Treaty "takes up the entirety of the institutional
18 progress contained in the constitutional project . . . the proposed measures remain
19 intact."

20 As Mr Brown flew home to Britain, David Cameron repeated his demand for a
21 referendum. He said that lengthy parliamentary scrutiny was no substitute for seeking
22 the approval of the country. "I don't think members of Parliament have the right to
23 transfer that power away without asking the British people first,"he said. However, Mr
24 Cameron and his Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague, are not without problems
25 of their own. They face a backlash from Eurosceptics in their party after refusing to give
26 a commitment to scrap the Reform Treaty.

27 They are under pressure to promise that they would hold a referendum if they were
28 elected even if the treaty is ratified during the present Parliament.

29 Tory activists began protesting yesterday after Mr Hague again declined to spell out
30 what the Conservatives would do if the treaty went through the Commons and was
31 ratified across Europe. Several people writing on the Conservative website said that Mr
32 Cameron was risking a repeat of the grammar schools row.

33 The official Conservative line is that this is something that will be discussed in the
34 future and the priority now should be getting a referendum under this Government.
35 They believe that would almost certainly mean the public rejecting the treaty. But there
36 were signs yesterday that party leaders know they may have to move further. Asked by
37 The Times for clarification of the position, a Conservative Party spokesman said: "If the
38 EU treaty is ratified without a referendum it will clearly lack democratic legitimacy. We
39 will make our decisions about the implications of that in due course."

40 When he was asked on BBC Radio 4 whether he would repeal the treaty Mr Hague
41 replied: "That is something we will have to look at. But we are looking to get people to
42 realise now that we can get a referendum on this."

43 But that is not enough for a large number of Conservative MPs. Led by William Cash
44 and John Redwood, they have signed a Commons motion calling for a referendum on
45 the Reform Treaty "before or after ratification".

46 Tony Blair was proposed as the first "President of Europe", a post created by the EU
47 Reform Treaty, by President Sarkozy of France. Gordon Brown said: "Tony Blair would a
48 great candidate for any significant international job."

ENDS.

Explanation of genre and context.

An analysis of a news story covering the 2007 Reform Treaty summit follows. Both this news story and the subsequent commentary to be analysed, appeared on page four of *The Times* on October 20, 2007. The wider socio-pragmatic context is Britain's wariness over the contested C-word (Constitution) as Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski noted (2007: p1). Murdoch warned of the great dangers of the EU Constitution and did not like any more abdication of British sovereignty (BBC, 2003b). Shawcross (1992) and Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued that Murdoch sometimes uses his media to intervene in politics.

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

The news article is headlined: Gordon Brown says no to referendum and any more integration for ten years. The headline arguably sets the tone for the rest of the article. There is a *recurrence*, helping create *cohesion* over the following concepts: Gordon Brown *ruled out further* European *integration* (Line 1); Mr Brown said that he had won agreement for an EU declaration in December, *ruling out further* institutional changes (*integration*) (Lines 6-7); and then finally a direct Brown citation: "I will not support further institutional change over the next period." (*ruling out further integration*) (Line 10).

Brown, in not wanting further integration, could be interpreted as being in harmony with: *The Times* readers and *The Times* itself. However there is a notable difference between the position of Brown's government and that of *The Times*. The newspaper, drawing on all that has preceded, appears not to want to accept the current transfer of powers in the treaty. I suggest that this helps explain why in the news story the need for a *referendum* is continuously referred to: He (Brown) sought to counter calls for a *referendum* on the latest transfer of power to *Brussels* (Line 2); David Cameron repeated his demand for a *referendum*. He said that lengthy parliamentary scrutiny was no substitute for seeking the approval of the country (Lines 21-2); they (the Conservatives) *are* under pressure to promise that they could hold a *referendum* if they were elected even if the treaty is ratified during the present Parliament (Lines 27-8); the priority (in reference to the official Conservative line) now should be getting a *referendum* under this Government (Line 34).

The use of the word *Brussels,* in the context of the British habitus and how it has internalised a perception of Europe, is interpreted as negatively evaluative (Line 2). *The Times* then argues that: they (the Conservatives) *are* under pressure to promise that they would hold a *referendum* if they were elected, even if the treaty is ratified during the present Parliament (Lines 27-8)

What emerges from this citation is an *unmodalised declarative* which says that the Tories *are* under internal pressure to hold a *referendum*, regardless of ratification. The substantiation for this affirmative statement by *The Times*, precedes (Lines 24-26), with claims of a Eurosceptic backlash if the Tory leadership does not commit to scrapping the Reform Treaty. Whether this backbench groundswell is enough to de-stabilise the front bench position of not committing to a referendum, if the treaty is ratified, is open to interpretation. It can at least be questioned as not fully substantiated in the news story. In Lines 43-5 two specific Tory backbenchers are leading a Eurosceptic group calling for a Commons motion calling for a referendum, regardless of ratification. *The Times* describes this group as a: *large number* of Conservative MPs. This may be the case (considering the historical context) – but

this is not the same as offering corroboration, verifying this is as the situation. Here there is arguably another *unmodalised declarative*, moving the article in a certain direction. An interpretation could be that this is an attempt to persuade the readers of how many Tories are mobilised to fight the treaty.

The article refers to: Tory activists protesting to the leadership (Line 29); and then several people writing on the Conservative web site, warning the leader, David Cameron (Lines 31-2). This is to work up to (and re-inforce) the impression created by the calls by Tories for a parliamentary motion (Lines 43-5). A cynical interpretation would be that *The Times* is creating the perception of more internal Tory division than the reality. This *construction of reality* would serve *The Times* (in light of research compiled thus far), of securing a referendum, regardless of ratification. Despite no clear citation by Murdoch wanting a referendum, previous citations suggest such *instrumentalisation* could be at play (BBC, 2003a), in that his opposition to the EU Constitution was apparent.

A further interpretation is that *The Times* transcends clear-cut *party-press parallelism*, wanting a Eurosceptic line, and this is indicated here, to both the governing Labour and the future Conservative government. This is not unprecedented, when one refers back to *Times* editor, Peter Stothard, urging the electorate in 1997 to vote Eurosceptic (Charter, Gifford, 2008). Further evidence suggesting that *The Times* is trying to construct a certain reality for readers is to indicate to them that the treaty could mean more change than the Prime Minister is admitting. It is argued that various references to the *Constitution* help construct such a perception.

Hence Mr Brown insisting that the treaty did not presage fundamental change (Lines 3-4) – is then immediately contradicted by one of the architects of the *constitution* (Lines 12-13). This arguably creates the perception that this *is* indeed fundamental change. An interpretation is that this simultaneously paints the picture of Brown not to be trusted on this issue. This re-affirms the need for a referendum. *The Times* then cites Brown saying he "will not support further institutional change over the next

period" (Line 10), then offering its understanding: effectively threatening to veto any more treaties (Line 11). This interpretation is consistent with the analysis of the newspaper's positioning over the *referendum*. This *threatening* is another *unmodalised declarative* which is unsubstantiated. Brown did not say it – but it could be construed as what *The Times* is expecting him to do.

Further references to the EU Constitution, again arguably re-inforce certain categories of perception for the reader. Mr Brown's task of selling the latest treaty to a *domestic audience* was made even more difficult as it was hailed as making the same fundamental changes as the defunct *EU Constitution* (Lines 14-16). Valery Giscard d'Estaing – the former French President who oversaw the original EU Constitution – said that the Reform Treaty "takes up the entirety of the institutional progress contained in the *constitutional project*…the proposed measures remain intact." (Lines 17-19) Again the perception of Britain having signed up to more fundamental change than Brown is admitting to, is arguably re-inforced.

Much as the word *Brussels, constitution* (in the British context) could be interpreted as highly negatively evaluative. The message constructed in *the rapport* between the *The Times* and its readers (and the message to whatever government), is: we are still getting the *constitution therefore* we still need a *referendum.* Considering all the factors presented it is argued the *newspaper agenda* appears to be along these Lines.

Interpretation.
Here an interpretation is that *The Times* is signposting the Euroscepticism of the British people (and *The Times* speaking to and for the British people) more prevalent in British media communication, in comparison to Italy (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Here *The Times'* interpretation of what is in the 'national' interest is flagged. This is re-enforced further, with the help of the Conservatives and Cameron arguing against transferring power before asking the British people (Lines 22-3) and the likely rejection of that transfer (Line 35). An interpretation is that of a common sense constructed by *The Times* and conveyed to readers, in defending national sovereignty by rejecting the current treaty - as well as further integration.

In comparison to the earlier articles on the euro, this news article, it is argued, is less evaluative and emotive. An interpretation is that *The Times* under Thomson was less caustic over Europe (as argued by Charter), than Stothard previously. Thomson became editor in February 2002 (Greenslade, 2002) just after the euro's introduction. Bond argued that in his experience, in communicating Europe, the role of the editor was pivotal. Charter concurred with this view –but also conceded that Murdoch, while delegating decisions, would select an editor that essentially fell in line with his positioning (including over Europe) in the first place.

From The Times

October 20, 2007

This is a necessary battle - and one that he can win

Peter Riddell: Analysis

1 It will be a long and often tedious haul but Gordon Brown should win

2 parliamentary approval for the new European Reform Treaty without too much

3 trouble. But Westminster is only one of three tests: the other two are with the

4 media and the public.

5 Parallels with the debilitating 14-month battle in 1992-93 which the Major

6 Government waged over the Maastricht treaty are misleading. Admittedly, the

7 new Bill will be debated on the floor of the Commons and take up a lot of time.

8 Ministers have already allocated more than 20 sitting days, both to demonstrate

9 that it is being subject to full scrutiny and to exhaust all but the most diehard

10 opponents. (The Maastricht Bill took up 29 days in the Commons and 14 in the Lords.)

11 However, despite his recent troubles, Mr Brown is in a much stronger

12 political position. Labour's working majority in the Commons is 69, more

13 than three times the Tories' margin then. That should allow ministers to

14 control the passage of the Bill which the Major Government could not.

15 Professor Philip Cowley of Nottingham University, the leading chronicler of

16 revolts, believes that the number of Labour rebels may be smaller than many

17 people think, 40 at most. "Whilst there may be one or two (relatively) close

18 votes, we can't see how there will be any defeats – and for the most part we

19 suspect the Government will get this

20 through relatively easily."

21 The key vote will be on a referendum. There will be a sizeable Labour revolt,

22 but most of the 63 Liberal Democrat MPs will not back the call since the party

23 favours a referendum only on UK membership of the EU, not on the treaty.

24 This was confirmed by Nick Clegg. Kenneth Clarke and a few Tory MPs will

25 also not vote for a referendum. These cross-currents should ensure that it is

26 defeated.

27 This trench warfare will be against the background of vocal press campaigns.

28 However, both the media and politicians overestimate the influence of even

29 mass-selling tabloids: The Sun does not decide elections, and Mr Brown

30 should not worry too much about its sabre-rattling and cries of surrender.

31 The polls do show overwhelming support for a referendum and a clear

32 majority against a treaty. But, according to the most recent Ipsos/MORI poll,

33 Europe ranks 14th in the

34 list of important issues facing Britain, mentioned by 4 per cent of voters. The

35 details of the treaty are only likely to animate passionate Euro-sceptics. The

36 more potent issue will be "trust", over charges that Mr Brown is breaking his

37 promise. The Tories believe that this could cause lasting damage.

38 However, the Government hopes that the heat will have gone out of the row

39 for all but the most committed by the time an election is called in 2009 or 2010.

40 The legislation will have passed and the treaty will probably be in force

41 throughout the EU. Will the Tories try to reopen the issue then by promising a

42 referendum and withdrawal from the

43 treaty? This could divide the Tories by opening up the whole question of

44 Britain's membership of the EU, as some Euro-sceptic MPs want.

45 Mr Brown's firm decision to press ahead with the treaty will mean a long

46 defensive battle with the Tories and the sceptic press. But it is a necessary

47 battle and one he can win.

ENDS.

Explanation of genre and context.

The genre is a commentary by an established *Times* journalist expressing his view

concerning the prospects of Gordon Brown attaining parliamentary approval for the

new European Reform Treaty. Peter Riddell seems to directly challenge the analysis

offered in *The Times* the day before. On October 19, 2007, the front page story is

headlined: Battle of EU treaty to last for months. The context referred to in the

subsequent citation from the article, is that of John Major's 1992 government and

parliamentary crisis. Months were spent fighting over the Maastricht Treaty, which

resulted in the formation of the European Union. The October 19 introduction is now

cited. It appears as if it is to this that Riddell in his commentary, is responding:

Gordon Brown has set aside up to three months to ratify the EU Reform Treaty after it was agreed by European leaders last night, raising the spectre of the tumultuous parliamentary battles over Maastricht 15 years ago (Elliot and Charter, 2007).

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.

Riddell indeed challenges the parallel with Major fighting over Maastricht as: misleading (Lines 5-6). It is argued that Riddell is in effect countering the evocation of history employed by *The Times*, the previous day. Riddell argues that Brown is in a much stronger position, because of: a working majority three times the size Major had; this will allow ministers to control the passage of the bill in a way Major could not (Lines 11-14).

Riddell argues that the vote calling for a referendum is also unlikely to succeed. He referred to cross-currents in the main parties, preventing a consensus supporting a referendum (Lines 21-6). Riddell is also challenging support for a referendum, presented to the readers in that day's news story, analysed previously (Gordon Brown says no to referendum and any more integration for ten years). Riddell is arguably also questioning the support for the referendum from *The Times* itself, woven into the tapestry of that article.

However, Riddell's argumentation does not take the form of topoi, or fallacies, as was employed in the previous editorial on the euro: Monnet's money. Fallacies are discounted, in that there is no attempt to persuade or manipulate or legitimise discursively (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). It appears as if topoi are also not employed in that there are no content-related warrants, connecting the argument with the conclusion and justifying the transition from the former to the latter (Kienpointner, 1992). Instead rather than formulating a persuasive argument, or an attempt to justify his position, Riddell's approach is interpreted as attempting to counter such persuasion in his newspaper. Some metaphors are however employed.

Riddell mentions the long and tedious *haul* to get the treaty through parliament (Line 1). Close to the end of the article, he refers to the government hoping that the heat

will have gone out of the row by the time of an election in 2009 or 2010 (Lines 38-9). Finally Riddell finishes with mention of Brown's decision to press ahead with the treaty meaning a *long, defensive, battle* (Lines 45-6). An interpretation is that this cluster of journey metaphors, conjures the image of the government going on a long, arduous journey with the treaty. It however, like the interpretation of a lack of fallacies and topoi, does not appear to have any notable persuasive force. Perhaps it conjures the image of a government valiantly prepared to battle through, but little more.

Returning to the introductory paragraph in *The Times* front page story of the day before, October 19, it should be noted that there there was mention of: *tumultuous parliamentary battles*, in reference to Maastricht. Riddell's article also employs what is interpreted to be a cluster of struggle metaphors. Riddell clearly refers to competing positions (Straehle et al, 1999).

At the outset, in the headline, there is mention of a necessary *battle*. Then in the first line Riddell refers to a long and often tedious haul, which Gordon Brown should *win*. The author then argues that parallels with the 14-month *battle* the Major government *waged* over Maastricht were misleading (Lines 5-6). An interpretation is that Riddell is taking the struggle metaphor employed by *The Times* the day before – and utilising it to show a different reality from the one portrayed on the October 19 front page story.

Hence Riddell refers to the cross-currents (Line 25) over the important vote on whether to hold a referendum. He argues that despite an expected sizeable Labour *revolt* (voting for a referendum), the Liberal Democrats will oppose the referendum and there will also be some Tories who will do likewise. The conclusion is that the cross-currents will see calls for a referendum *defeated* (Lines 21-6). Riddell then immediately notes that such *trench warfare* will be against the background of *vocal press campaigns* – noting another aspect of the struggle.

Riddell then informs Brown not to worry too much about the *sabre-rattling* of *The Sun* and *cries of surrender* (Lines 29-30). An interpretation is he is consciously repeating the persuasive metaphorical imagery of the likes of *The Sun* to endeavour to demonstrate its exaggeration – and that the media and politicians can overestimate the influence of such tabloids. A further interpretation is he is simultaneously challenging his own newspaper in conjuring the image of the *battle*. Again he repeats such usage. What this suggests is that Riddell is in a position to challenge any possible instrumentalisation by Murdoch, in wanting his papers to persuasively challenge the Reform Treaty. It should be noted that Riddell concludes his analysis by arguing: it is a necessary battle and one he (Brown) can win (Line 47).

An interesting parallel could be drawn with Thatcher challenging the power of the metaphor of the European train leaving without Britain on board (Musolff, 2004). Thatcher was aware of this metaphor's persuasiveness and tried to challenge it, because the train was heading off in the wrong direction. It was better to go slowly and safely, than be on board, rushing headlong into disaster. It could be argued that Riddell is doing something similar, aware of the persuasiveness of the battle and struggle metaphors employed by the likes of *The Sun* and *The Times* in the Eurosceptic context of Britain. Instead of harnessing the persuasiveness of the metaphor however, then taking it into another direction, as Thatcher did, Riddell instead seems to lampoon the way the struggle metaphor is used to exaggerate differences with Europe, most notably in his reference to *sabre-rattling* and *cries of surrender* (Line 30).

Interpretation.
Unlike the implicit yet persuasive force of argumentation and metaphor, Riddell right at the start of the article, is explicit about the discussion he will have with the government and the wider public. He argues that attaining Westminster's approval is only one of three tests for the government over the Reform Treaty: the other two are with the media and the public (Lines 1-4). Riddell is an established voice within his newspaper. He appears to be given the space to counter the Eurosceptic position of *The Times*, in this instance, in relation to the Reform Treaty. Riddell seems in a position to comment in an unfettered way. An interpretation is that he is in a similar

position to Scafuri, that being: very established and respected on the newspaper; and as a result being in a position and perhaps even encouraged to challenge the newspaper's received wisdom over Europe.

The author refers to the British discourse of withdrawal from the EU. The Liberal Democrats, Riddell (Line 23) notes, would only want a referendum in such circumstances (to make the case for the EU). The Liberal Democrat position seems to chime with what one of its number, ex-journalist Walter said about the euro and how he felt that pro-Europeans (like him) were reduced to now defending the whole European project. Riddell returns to the British discourse of withdrawal, in arguing that if the Conservatives push for a referendum, regardless of ratification: This could divide the Tories by opening up the whole question of Britain's membership of the EU, as some Eurosceptic MPs want (Lines 43-44).

At this juncture Riddell is at odds with the presentation of a nation in full agreement over Europe. This was exemplified by Charter in his comments over Iraq. Arguably Charter's portrayal of Britain, concealed the rifts Europe causes *within* the British body politic, especially amongst Conservatives (Gifford, 2008, pp141-9). Riddell is instead challenging such categories of perception – as many interviewees did. With Charter there was arguably an attempt to create a congruency between the nation, the national body politic and *The Times*. This is in contrast to Italy, where factionalism in politics and the press is, historically at least, the norm. Instead, rather than what was interpreted as Charter's symbolic violence, in the Iraq citation, Riddell tries to reveal the complexity and wrangling over Europe within British politics.

Riddell in his comments relating to *The Sun*, (Lines 27-30) is directly challenging the notion of the media as such a key mediator (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The strength of the possible press attack over the Reform Treaty is however paid due homage by Riddell. British interviewees were frustrated with consecutive governments not standing up to the press over Europe. Clegg put it most graphically, describing it as cowardice in the face of vitriol. Yet in his analysis Riddell could be interpreted as asking Brown to stand firm.

5.7 The 2008 Irish referendum rejection.

The Times (London)

June 14, 2008 Saturday

Irish voters sign death warrant for EU treaty

BYLINE: David Sharrock, David Charter

SECTION: HOME NEWS; Pg.1   LENGTH: 349 words

1 European leaders look for way round decisive rejection

2 Irish voters tore up the European Union's blueprint for the future yesterday

3 in a dramatic and decisive rejection of the Lisbon treaty.

4 The result leaves Brussels' plans to streamline EU power - creating a

5 president and foreign minister and reducing the influence for smaller

6 countries such as Ireland - in tatters.

7 The 53.4percent "no"vote should in theory sign the death warrant of the

8 treaty which has been eight years in the making, since it requires

9 ratification by all 27 members.

10 Gordon Brown faced immediate calls to scrap British ratification.

11 But some European leaders remained determined to ignore the

12 result. Suspicions grew of a Franco-German plot to forge ahead and leave

13 Ireland behind after Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the French Europe Minister, said:

14 "The most important thing is that the ratification process must continue in

15 the other countries and then we shall see with the

16 Irish what type of legal arrangement could be found."

17 Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, and President Sarkozy of France –

18 seen as the architects of the treaty - issued a joint plea for the remaining

19 eight countries to complete ratification.

20 Mr Brown called both to say that Britain would comply, but there were

21 dissenting voices elsewhere. Vaclav Klaus, the Czech President, declared:

22 "The Lisbon treaty project ended today with the decision of the Irish

23 voters and its ratification cannot be continued."

24 Declan Ganley, the multimillionaire founder of Libertas, a group that

25 campaigned for a "no" verdict, told The Times that the result showed that

26 a chasm had opened up between Europe's political elite and its

27 people."Are we sending them back to the drawing board? Categorically

28 yes," he said.

29 The Irish Government and main opposition parties, who had campaigned for a "yes"

30 vote, suffered a resounding defeat. More than half the Irish electorate –

31 53.13 per cent –

32 turned out to vote, a significant improvement on past referendums.

Explanation of genre and context.

This is a news story and therefore the specific categories for news analysis should, in theory, be applied. However, what should be noted was that the equivalent front page article in *Il Giornale* analysed previously, was a commentary or *pastone*. Hence analysis sought to establish if argumentation and conceptual metaphors were employed.

On looking at the equivalent front page article on the Irish rejection in *The Times*, it too seemed to also be employing argumentation and conceptual metaphors to make various points. Hence the decision was made to maintain consistency in the analysis of *Il Giornale* and *The Times*, and to also investigate the use of argumentation and metaphors in making meanings in *The Times* article also - despite it being a news story. Another way of approaching this attempt to maintain consistency is that, like the front page article in *Il Giornale*, it is possible that *The Times* article is trying to persuade the reader (and or government) in being the first article that is probably

read, concerning the Irish rejection. The demarcation between news and commentary has already been called into question, including on the issue of Europe covered in the British press (Garton-Ash, 2005, Weymouth and Anderson, 1999).

The British context is that the Reform Treaty still needed ratifying by the British parliament and there were voices that were calling for a referendum on the issue, as outlined in the previous news story analysed (Gordon Brown says no to referendum and any more integration for ten years). Drawing on this socio-pragmatic context (Musolff, 2004) any attempts in the news story to persuade, should be explored.

Linguistic and argumentative means by which the text pursues its ends.
At the outset, the article's strapline (the second headline), should be noted: European leaders look for way round decisive rejection (Line 1). This argumentation strategy then relates back to Britain: Gordon Brown faced immediate calls to scrap the British ratification (Line 10). The story does not attribute these claims to anybody.

The impression left on the reader by the story's strapline can be interpreted as being re-inforced by a *fallacy of authority* or *argumentum ad verecundiam*. This fallacy entails backing one's own standpoint by reference to authorities considered as, say competent, superior or sacrosanct. The appeal to such authority is fallacious if say, the authority is not competent or qualified. The French Europe minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, is quoted: "The most important thing is that the ratification process must continue in the other countries and then we shall see with the Irish what type of legal arrangement could be found." (Lines 14-16) An interpretation is that the story re-inforces the impression in the strapline that indeed European leaders will look for a way around the decisive rejection (Line 1). An interpretation, in light of the context, is that *The Times* is backing its standpoint arguably expressed in the strapline, by reference to this competent authority: the French Europe minister. Therefore Europe will try to find a way around this rejection. However, an interpretation is that this appeal to authority is fallacious, in that the French Europe Minister is arguably not qualified to comment on a certain level. As the French Europe Minister, Jouyet can express his opinion, within the French government. However, one can not assume

that he speaks for the French government, which probably had not formulated a clear position on the rejection issue, at that early stage. Furthermore, this is a viewpoint from a specific national government within Europe. A clear response to the Irish referendum result would have to be finally formulated by a European summit of prime ministers, a council of ministers from all the EU member states, and the European Commission would also have a say in formulating a final position.

Immediately before the Jouyet citation, the authors of *The Times* article wrote: Suspicions grew of a Franco-German plot to forge ahead and leave Ireland behind, after Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the French Europe minister, said: ...(Lines 12-13). This is arguably an articulation of the perception being constructed: a Franco-German plot. This line, coupled with the citation itself, can be interpreted as suggesting that the Franco-German axis (and not Europe as a whole), will find a way around the Irish rejection.

Utilising the Jouyet citation could also be interpreted as a topos of authority: X has to be done, because Jouyet (an authority) says that it has to be done. To paraphrase, the Franco-German axis wants to find a way around the rejection because Jouyet (an authority) says they want to find a way around it. Wodak and Reisigl (2001) note that the topos of authority and the *argumentum ad verecundiam,* are not easily distinguishable. In light of the socio-pragmatic context (Musolff, 2004) an interpretation is that *The Times* is legitimising a certain category of perception over the Irish referendum rejection – by use of this authority, recalling the employment of field theory earlier.

The argumentum ad verecundiam and topos of authority are employed again, in referring to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel and French President, Sarkozy, issuing a joint plea for the remaining eight countries to complete ratification (Lines 17-19). They are saying this has to be done – so it will be done, coming from these authoritative sources. The perception of the Franco-German axis deciding, can be interpreted as being re-enforced further, by the two aforementioned leaders: seen as the *architects* of the treaty (Line 18). In light of this argumentation strategy, others

cited in resisting the Franco-German axis are then described as: *dissenting voices* (Line 21). An interpretation is that these are voices that will not be heard, but are nevertheless trying to resist where authority (and by implication, decision-making) lies: the French and Germans. The dissenting voices are Czech President, Vaclav Klaus (Line 21) and Declan Ganley, founder of the Libertas group that campaigned for a no vote in Ireland (Lines 24-28).

The argumentation is re-enforced by what are construed to be a cluster of *life-body-health* conceptual metaphors. The headline refers to the Irish signing the *death warrant* of the EU treaty. Then in the article's introduction: Irish voters *tore up* the European Union's *blueprint* for the future (Line 2). Then the EU's plans to reduce the influence of smaller countries, like Ireland, was left *in tatters* (Lines 4-6). An interpretation at this juncture, is that this is a re-affirmation of the French-German axis trying to drive through further integration. Here, it is argued the riposte, from an underdog, the Irish, is conjured.

A further interpretation is that this type of underdog conceptualisation appeals to how the British sometimes see themselves, potentially accentuating its persuasive force. It could also be argued that Britain is portrayed as also outside of the Franco-German alliance, and therefore what has happened in Ireland is being related back to the British. Indeed the authors then write, continuing the conceptual metaphor: Gordon Brown faced immediate calls to *scrap* British ratification (Line 10). This conceptualisation arguably does carry some persuasive force, along the lines of: the Irish have left the EU treaty *in tatters* and we should now *scrap* it. The analogical conceptualisation continues, with Merkel, the German Chancellor and Sarkozy, the French President: seen as the *architects* of the treaty (Line 18). Relating this back to an earlier reference, it is therefore their *blueprint* that has been torn up (Line 2).

Returning briefly to the *in tatters* conceptualisation (Line 6), it should be noted that as well as the Franco-German *architects* (Line 18) earlier, there is also mention of *Brussels' plans* to create a President and a Foreign Minister (Line 5). In the context of Britain's habitus, and how Europe has been internalised, an interpretation is that

reference to *Brussels' plans* already is an invoking of Europe the Other and reference to the two prominent posts could be construed to be a further undermining of British national sovereignty.

Musolff (2004: p31) argues that analogical popular metaphors can be so powerful that they could possibly result in politicians and nations committing to specific courses of action. It could be argued that the article is trying to persuade Brown to scrap ratification, aware of the persuasive force the life-body-health metaphor may have had with readers.

It could be argued that the analogical conceptualisation conjured by this life-body-health cluster of metaphors, is drawing on the conventionalised metaphors of a given language. A *blue print* by *architects* (in a figurative sense) being *torn up, left* in *tatters or scrapped*, is commonly understood. This is Kövecses' (2002) supra-individual level. Yet arguably this conventionalised cluster is utilised in the new context of the Irish rejection of the treaty – with new meanings possibly emerging. This is Kövecses' (2002) individual level at work, and therefore a re-contextualisation. The scenario or story being told (Musolff, 2004) is how Britain is correct to approach this new political integration cautiously. It is this context that could be interpreted as giving the analogical conceptualisation some persuasive force.

A struggle metaphor is briefly conjured within the news article, with mention of the Franco-German *plot* to forge ahead (Line 12) and close to the end of the article, how the Irish government had suffered a resounding *defeat* (Lines 29-30) in the referendum. The image of competing positions (Straehle et al, 1999) is apparent.

Interpretation.
It should be noted that *Il Giornale* had a similar headline – but that the subsequent argumentation developed in a different direction. Where the article on the Irish rejection in *Il Giornale* was a lament for the loss of the dream of Europe, the article in *The Times* could be interpreted as endeavouring to demonstrate how this re-

calibrated EU Constitution, should be scrapped by Britain - much as it has been rejected by Ireland. The analogical conceptualisation of the Franco-German alliance, trying to bully Ireland (and Britain) into a direction they do not wish to go, is arguably of pertinence in the article. Yet this particular construction of reality, utilising this alliance and a single French minister to corroborate, is perhaps not the whole picture. The position of Europe deciding collectively how to respond to the rejection, including Britain, is not given a voice. As has been said of journalism, it is in this instance the first draft of history – but one that seems to have precluded this wider perspective.

5.8 Conclusions.

A re-visiting of the arguments presented in the Italian newspaper discourse analysis is undertaken, to see if there is any commonality or pattern in the formulation of discourse over European integration. The initial news euro news story (The euro is born and Italians use the lire) was interpreted as trying to demonstrate how Italians were unwilling to relinquish the lira and ill-prepared for the change to the euro. The commentary on the euro (But the market is not unique) was interpreted as developing on the perception of Italians lamenting the loss of the lira. The commentary seemed to counter the perception of the euro as creating a platform for a 'deeper' Europe and a possible common identity. Instead what was stressed was the euro as an economic undertaking. Here we see a parallel with British Euroscepticism, seeing the 'project' in economic terms.

The news article on the Reform Treaty summit (All the European press attack Italy as "ridiculous") was interpreted as arguing how under Prodi, as premier of the left, Italy counted for little, with its perceived centrality in Europe undermined. The Scafuri interview article on the Reform Treaty was interpreted as not trying to persuade and argue.

The *pastone* on the Irish referendum rejection (Europe dies, the Europeans nearly), instead, was interpreted as critical of Brussels and bureaucracy (concurring with Berlusconi). However the article was interpreted as then parting company with

Berlusconi, in lamenting the loss of the dream of a Europolity, wanting much closer integration. The article seemed to fit in with Trenz's (2007: p98) findings. He discovered that most commentaries relating to the EU Constitution opted for a positive identification with the past. The evocation in the article was of the founding fathers and the success of post-World War II integration, much as Trenz had found.

In terms of patterns within the discourse, it is interpreted that the perceived centrality of Italy to the European project is recurring. In the initial euro news story Italy's ill preparedness, seemed to also be indicating how this was not good for Italy's image and importance in Europe. In the Reform Treaty summit news article the critique of Prodi is interpreted as working because of the importance of perceived centrality and relevance of Italy's standing in Europe. Finally, in the Irish referendum rejection *pastone* within the argumentation employed, it seemed as if Italian politicians who had historically contributed to Europe, were mentioned and utilised to demonstrate how the dream of Europe was evaporating. The central role of Italy to the 'project,' appeared to be re-affirmed.

Considering the context mapped out in this thesis, what is argued the discourse re-affirms is Italy's perceived centrality to Europe and how Europe appears to have been internalised within Italy. However beyond this commonality, there is inconsistency in the 'making of meanings' (Lemke, 1995). At times European integration was presented as something that needed to be held within certain parameters – and at other junctures, moving towards a much closer integration, seemed to be espoused. On the strength of this analysis, the newspaper discourse sometimes seems to lean towards a more regulatory and sceptical interpretation of integration - and at other times more closely aligned to federalism.

In drawing a distinction between the interview data analysis and the newspaper discourse, further complexity presents itself. Many Italian interviewees seemed to mobilise either or both Britain and America in constructing Others, and the resulting re-affirmation of Italy's nationalism and centrality to Europe. Conversely, either or both Britain and America were not utilised in the same vein in the actual newspaper

discourse analysis. It was argued by Scafuri and Corazza that *Il Giornale* was atypical and more critical of Europe than many other national newspapers. What is unclear is why either or both Britain and America were not mobilised as Others in newspaper discourse. Was the paper reflecting the party-press parallelism of its Forza Italia and Northern League constituencies? This conundrum will require further research.

A re-visiting of the arguments presented in the British newspaper discourse analysis is undertaken, to see if there is any commonality or patterns in the formulation of discourse over European integration. The initial euro news story (Europe takes the plunge) was interpreted as starting with a positive evaluation of the single currency's historical significance – but ending by outlining the perceived threats of the euro to Britain's national interest. In the euro commentary article (Monnet's money) it seemed as if the precariousness of the euro was re-enforced further in the argumentation.

The Reform Treaty news story (Gordon Brown says 'no' to a referendum and any more integration for ten years) was interpreted as arguing that the Reform Treaty was the *constitution* and that a referendum was needed. Again the perception of European integration as a threat was interpreted as prevalent. The commentary on the Reform Treaty was interpreted as not trying to argue or persuade but challenging some of the persuasion and perception of Europe as a threat, in *The Times* (This is a necessary battle – and one that he can win). The Irish referendum rejection story (Irish voters sign death warrant for EU treaty) was interpreted as re-affirming calls for a referendum and also re-enforcing perceptions of European integration as a threat.

In terms of patterns within the discourse, it is interpreted that the perceived threat of European integration is re-articulated and is recurring in various guises, in all the articles, except the Reform Treaty summit commentary by Peter Riddell – which tries to challenge such perceptions. In comparison to the Italian newspaper discourse, an interpretation could be that that there was more consistency in the 'making of meanings' (Lemke, 1995). Despite the differing events and contexts the British

newspaper discourse seems to remain with a regulatory interpretation of European integration, which could threaten national sovereignty, if not held to account. Gifford (2008) catalogued the British exceptionalism over Europe of both of Britain's main political parties. The exceptionalism and perceptions of European integration as a threat was challenged by various British interviewees. No such challenge was found in the newspaper discourse, except for the Riddell commentary.

Oberhuber et al (2005: p263) found a lot of divergence between 15 different national newspapers over constitutionalisation. Do *Il Giornale* and *The Times* differ substantially? Oberhuber et al. (2005) found national newspapers were at odds over: semantics; thematic structures (eg contested issues); structures of relevance and argumentation (eg apportioning blame); debating very different issues.

Il Giornale in the newspaper discourse undertaken, can be interpreted as moving on a sliding scale between seeing the European project as an economic undertaking (more similar to some British perceptions), and at the other end wishing to embrace a Europolity, and strong European cohesion. Despite this movement, what appeared to emerge from the texts was an Italy that saw itself and wanted to be a central player in Europe.

This last point is a very different premise on which to formulate arguments and persuade the public and politicians, from that interpreted to be the case in *The Times*. In *The Times* there appeared to be less movement between different positions over Europe, more similar to the paper talking to and for the nation, as discussed earlier, and unlike *Il Giornale* in Italy. In the British newspaper discourse it is argued that the most common perception created, was a Europe that threatened the national interest.

Different perceptions of Europe – in relation to nation, emerged in these two cases. And in the dialectic between social practice and discourse, there were also divergent contested issues. In Italy *Il Giornale* is interpreted as taking issue with the euro acting as a springboard for a deeper Europe. Yet in Britain and *The Times*, the focus

is somewhat different: the precariousness of even considering joining and the need to wait to see what happens with the single currency. In terms of contested issues, there is an even stronger contrast over the Reform Treaty summit, with *Il Giornale* interpreted as focusing on the perceived ineptitude of the centre-left Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, and how Italy needed to secure parity with Britain and France, concerning its number of MEPs. Instead the equivalent British story focused on the treaty meaning no more integration for ten years, and how the British Prime Minister was perceived to be trying to avoid a referendum on the treaty. Yet again the underlying perception in Italy of the need to be central, as opposed to regarding Europe as a threat, in Britain, could be interpreted as at least contributing to the selection of very different contested issues, just mentioned.

Chapter 6. Conclusions.

6.1 The comparative approach and interviewees.

What is apparent and evidenced on a series of levels, is that Europe has been internalised and is indeed integral to the Italian political fabric (Giuliani, 2001). Yet various perceptions of Europe are also seen to be conveyed, in a country where partisanship and factionalism are in the open and integral to how the nation sees itself. For instance, amongst interviewees a broadly pro-European, federalist approach was interpreted as emerging – at odds with some of the sometimes more sceptical views articulated in *Il Giornale*. Nevertheless a pro-European stance overall, appeared to be the norm.

In Britain however, the national interest is perceived to be threatened by Europe, although the British interviewees challenged this perception. They painted a picture of a country struggling to reconcile its fate within Europe. Yet, unlike Italy, politicians and the press alike, appeared to speak to and for the nation (despite the very apparent conflicting positions on Europe under the surface). The Tories remain divided on the issue (Gifford, 2008) and the interviewees presented, for instance, further divisions, between some in government that were well-informed over Europe, and others that were less so.

The process of de-naturalisation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) facilitated the possibility of challenging the (nationally) received wisdom that can inform social science research, as well as the pursuit of journalism. It forced me, as a researcher, to be aware that I could have personally been socialised to and had possibly internalised various national perceptions. The comparative approach resulted in a re-tracing of my steps on several occasions. The decision to start with analysis of Italian interviews, as opposed to British participants, was on one level counter-intuitive. Yet, as Beck (2003: p454) argues, we can indeed be, as researchers, and (not just as journalists), prisoners of the nation-state.

This study tried to draw on aspects of the media-politics typology Hallin and Mancini (2004) developed and thus makes some contribution to comparative political communication. Jones (2007) argues this relatively new field needs greater attention. Further research emanating from this study, could for instance seek to establish if a broad pro-Europeanism in Italy is undermined, if the pivotal anti-European Northern League remains crucial government coalition partners. Comparing this with the role of UKIP in Britain, may prove fruitful.

6.2 British interviewees – and living with the habitus in relation to Europe.
Unlike their Italian counterparts, British interviewees, seemed often vexed over how British politicians and the press communicated Europe. They corroborated diffuse and complex national political communication and journalistic communication deficits. Italian interviewees talked about Italy *and* Europe, whereas British interviewees talked predominantly about *the problem* of how Europe was communicated – in Britain. In other words, Italian interviewees did not find themselves at odds with the national habitus, concerning Europe, though noted how it had modified (as over the euro). Conversely, British interviewees were interpreted as being in conflict with their experiences and observations of the British habitus concerning Europe.

6.3 News and comment. Exploding some myths.

There is an inherent danger in making generalisations concerning 'the media' and indeed assuming normative positions, when in reality you have national interpretations within a social science environment (Beck, 2003) and the media (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Trenz (2007: p89) argues that "newspapers apply a *common distinction* between news reporting and news commentating, the latter being allocated to specific editorial pages…" This "common distinction" is challenged. There are highly different comprehensions of what defines a news story in Britain and Italy. Regardless, news stories in both countries are infused with comment - but in different ways.

The notion of 'neutral journalism' does not exist in Italy, where "a wide range of competing world views contend" (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: p61). Forcella (1959: p454) notes that "Facts for a political journalist never speak of themselves. They either say too much or too little." Putnam (1973: pp.81-2) in comparing British and Italian elites, notes high levels of partisanship in Italy : "In journalism, this style is reflected in the fact that facts are not seen as speaking for themselves, commentary is valued, and neutrality appears as inconsistency."

In Britain, this partisanship is prevalent below the surface (the Conservatives are continuously falling out over Europe). Yet what often seems to happen is that subsequently a united national picture is presented by the government and the press alike. In Britain, Hallin and Mancini (2004: p211) note that quality newspapers, like *The Times*, also had an interpretative style of writing, as Henningham and Delano (1998: p153) found that 83 percent of British journalists felt it was "very or extremely important" for journalists to "provide analysis and interpretation of complex problems."

Hallin and Mancini (2004) note that party-press parallelism was prevalent in both countries suggesting comment (or a specific political slant) can creep into 'news' copy. A further problem was noted amongst British journalists, suggesting some comment can surface within news, as Henningham and Delano (1998: p154) found

that 44 per cent of British journalists said they had suffered "improper editorial" interference with a story.

The picture is complex. In discourse analysis of both news stories and commentaries, copy was found to be continuously evaluative, constructing perceptions over Europe. In one example of the complexity from this study, *The Times'* front page article on the Irish referendum was a news story, yet it was interpreted as being full of persuasive argument. The article had more in common with *Il Giornale's* front page, which was a commentary. Further comparative research could perhaps explore the merging of news and comment in different national settings and shed light on the variations that may emerge. Such research could help establish if the liberal model, with its notions of objectivity and impartiality, is actually becoming more universal (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

6.4 The mirroring and differing of meanings over the euro.
Coverage of the euro was, on certain levels, highly similar between *Il Giornale* and *The Times*. In both newspapers the historical significance and a positive evaluation was initially presented to the reader, which was however quickly mitigated by negative economic assessments. The specifics of those assessments were also different in each newspaper. *Il Giornale* was trying to dissuade readers from thinking the euro would help create a deeper (more unified) Europe, because the common market needed good management. By contrast, *The Times* focused on questioning if EU countries were really as closely aligned, in terms of economic performance, as the euro (and greater economic harmonization) required. *The Times* employed such references to highlight the threat to Britain's economic autonomy and indeed political sovereignty (by portraying the euro as also the product of political integration). Hence the paper stressed the need to wait before joining the euro. *The Times*, in its economic critique, went much further than *Il Giornale*. A further interpretation of how *The Times* seemed to perceive the euro as a far more profound problem than that conveyed in *Il Giornale*, is a deeper, more ingrained Euroscepticism presented by *The Times*, than is prevalent in arguably Italy's most

sceptical national newspaper: *Il Giornale*. This interpretation is supported by the divergent national contexts.

6.5 Political issues and instrumentalisation informing discourse.

There are several political issues, which, it is argued, at least contribute to the more complex and less pointed Eurosceptic discourse in *Il Giornale* – in comparison to *The Times*. Berlusconi, for instance, was in favour of the EU Constitution (Johnson and Farrell, 2003, Berlusconi, 2000). Conversely, Murdoch was pressing for a referendum (Harding, 2002, Grice, 2006), with a view to rejecting the EU Constitution. Berlusconi countered the claim he was Eurosceptic and argued, similar to the *topos of centrality*, that Italy was a central European player (Berlusconi, 2000, Owen, 2002, Scafuri).

There is, furthermore, a re-enforcing of the earlier argument concerning the importance of the political field as the initial distorting prism, within the national public sphere. The Forza Italia's (and Berlusconi's) interaction with national newspaper journalism, and the wider public, has to now be revisited. The oscillation between a *topos of scepticism* and *a topos of centrality* (in the interpretations of newspaper discourse) arguably mirrors the national political situation in Italy. In Berlusconi's governing coalition, it is only the Northern League that has voiced regarding Europe as a threat to the national interest. Berlusconi's Forza Italia however has understood how European integration has helped Italy (Ginzborg, 2003, Giordano, 2004) and is sceptical on specific issues, such as the euro, and too much central bureaucracy. The Forza Italia is nationalistic, as is indeed the other coalition partner, the National Alliance. But neither party see Europe as a threat to nation (as does the Northern League).

The mainstream left in Italy appears to be pro-European essentially, as indicated by interviewees. The Forza Italia, the NA and the left mitigate against ending up with a newspaper discourse that matches the position of the Northern League (and a possible topos of threat to national interest). Instead *Il Giornale* stops short of this –

reflecting a much milder scepticism, relating to specific issues, but overall seeing Italy's role as a central player in Europe.

Conversely, looking at the same issues in Britain, an interpretation is there is a media logic (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) as to why Europe is more perceived as a threat. Murdoch regards both the euro and the EU Constitution as constituting threats to national sovereignty (Harding, 2002, Charter). Regardless of possible instrumentalisation by Murdoch, the parties of governance in the two-party system (Labour and Conservative) seem to have developed a post-World War II regulatory understanding of Europe, both sometimes articulating Europe as a perceived threat to the national interest. As Gifford (2008: p148) puts it, Euroscepticism has become the dominant position within the British political order.

6.6 Several Italian newspaper discourses?

The political fates of Berlusconi's Forza Italia, the Northern League and to some extent the National Alliance, are interpreted as becoming so enmeshed, say on immigration policy and Europe (Ter Wal, 2002, Giordano, 2004), that rather than distinct discourses over European integration, what has been found is more a variation on the same theme. Put another way, while some scepticism surfaced, this did not intensify into a newspaper discourse really seeing Europe as a threat to national interest, or worst still, espousing withdrawal. Only the Northern League has expressed such positioning over Europe. This suggests that the Northern League's stance, even in a newspaper like *Il Giornale*, partly addressing their voters, is currently being held in check. In Italy, newspapers often still address such political constituencies – rather than the nation as a whole (Hallin and Mancini, 204). An observation is that in social scientific literature the 'nation' is often similar to a consolidated northern European comprehension of national self (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). It also re-affirms why Beck (2003) is right to raise the issue, contending such methodological nationalism.

6. 7 The voices countering the construction of reality.

In both *Il Giornale* (Scafuri) and *The Times* (Peter Riddell) specific journalists were interpreted as being given a platform to voice views outside of the discursive construction the newspapers were developing over Europe. In both instances it illuminates, to some extent, the nature of that persuasive construction. In the Scafuri article there was no persuasive argumentation in the article and Riddell consciously challenged the persuasive arguments *The Times* presented, by drawing comparisons with Major and Maastricht.

A cynical interpretation is that in both the above instances, there is an exercise by the newspapers in being seen to 'allow' a contrary view – but without actually mitigating the overall 'making of meaning' in terms of the newspaper discourse. Scafuri is informing readers of how *the left* sees the EU Constitution (as revealed in the sub-headline). Scafuri's constituency of more sceptical Northern League and Forza Italia readers, are not necessarily going to change their view as a result. In the regurgitated argument of Europe perceived as a threat to British national interest, Riddell's countering is not going to change the overall continuous re-contextualisation of the same message in newspaper discourse.

6.8 Recontextualising Context.

The surfacing of previous contextualising events, as just challenged by Riddell, concerning Major and Maastricht, is now the focus. At various junctures it has been shown how history can be functionalised (*Geschichtspolitik*), to make a point. Over the euro, *The Times*'s editorial (Monnet's money) is interpreted as evoking history and Monnet and other founder members. Rather than using this to demonstrate how Britain was part of Europe, it was harnessed to demonstrate difference – and how Britain stood apart from that those seeking closer political integration. The mention of Delors, for instance, is interpreted as evoking a negative evaluation and is actually silently connecting the reader to another historical context when Thatcher in her Bruges speech directly challenged Delors' federalist vision, voicing the view that it was a threat to national interest (Judt, 2005, Bainbridge, 2000).

The recurring argumentation in *The Times*, of perceiving European integration as a threat to nation, can be interpreted as a recurring recontextualisation, returning to the various contexts of: the euro; Reform Treaty summit and the Irish referendum rejection. To offer an example, reminding readers about Delors, while presenting information about the introduction of the euro, re-enforces the threat to national sovereignty, when discussing how other EU leaders want much further economic harmonisation. This strategy creates an accumulative effect.

Conversely, and indicative of history being functionalised to another end (*Geschichtspolitik*), *Il Giornale*, is interpreted in its *topos of centrality* to utilise a roll call of honour, referring to a long list of Italians responsible for making post-World War II Europe, including Spinelli and de Gasperi (Europe dies, the Europeans nearly). This is a Europe which is perceived to need Italy. Here this list of the Italian great and good is juxtaposed to the bureaucrats (one of Berlusconi's concerns) who are blamed for destroying the dream of Europe (and Italy' central role within it).

6.9 Are newspapers imposing their ideologies over Europe?

Whether the newspapers themselves are political actors, discursively constructing perceptions of European integration *within* nation, and the form in which this construction is constituted, has been a recurring theme in this thesis. Fairclough (1997: p2) argues the power to control the discourse is seen as the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over other alternative (including oppositional) practices. This thesis has tried to challenge and unravel the construction of apparent 'common sense' over Europe that can be presented in national newspapers.

An infrequent occurrence is the ability of the two newspapers to address politicians directly, or in *Il Giornale's* case voicing the views of Berlusconi's Forza Italia. An example of the latter was the reminder for readers, in the context of the Reform Treaty summit, that a specific proposal had not come from Prodi (so he could not take the credit), but from Forza Italia (All the European press attack Italy as "ridiculous").

What I have also argued is how the social and political contexts are employed by the newspapers (and the perceptions of Europe that have resulted). Both newspapers sometimes address the common citizen, drawing on a particular context, to simultaneously indicate to the politicians where they should stand on Europe. This does at least suggest some instrumentalisation by Murdoch to make sure that the government waits on the euro or does hold a referendum on the EU Constitution. In that sense there has been at least some form of ideological investment evidenced. In *Il Giornale's* case, for instance, there was a relentless attack on Berlusconi's political rival, Prodi. An interpretation could be that this was to put media pressure on the Prodi government and indeed a year later, a Berlusconi government formed a coalition, in 2008, although one can not attribute this change to media pressure directly. Hall et al, (1978) and Enzensberger (1962) concur that the mass media generate 'ideologies', and are largely supported by Trenz except that

> we do not conclude that these 'ideologies' manipulate the public in any meaningful sense. Instead, in the course of political communication, the function of the mass media lies in producing and reproducing the semantic representations of society as a political unity.
>
> (Trenz 2007: p91)

Although this study both agrees and disagrees with Trenz (2007), the above statement accords with the political being congruent with nation (Gellner, 1983: p1). My interpretation of the results from the analysis of both newspapers has been a willingness to articulate perceived public opinion and use it in a sometimes adversarial way *against* government. Although this can be manipulative, it is not the same as advancing an ideology. I also conclude, contrary to Trenz (2007: p91), that newspapers are very clearly national political actors over Europe, harnessing the (perceived) opinions of their audiences to make a point to government, or the opposition.

As Eriksen (2007) argues, the wider public sphere can have an effect on decision-makers if they are subjected to protests, or as Eriksen describes it *kommunikativer Laerm* – communicative noise. The press, especially in Britain, as exemplified by

The Times, can be interpreted as sometimes constructing such *Laerm*, by intensifying Euroscepticism. Bell, himself an ex-*Daily Mail* journalist, put it succinctly: "the British press can push the pendulum further".

However, in terms of whether ideology is at work, it is perhaps more as Wodak (2007: pp.210-211) described it, in relation to habitus, operating below the level of ideology. On one level, that can be deemed dangerous, especially if as Neil argued (Grice, 2006) that ignoring the Murdoch papers means ignoring the electorate. But the public does not vote on Europe alone, and when politicians focus too heavily on Europe it results in very poor electoral results, as Gifford (2008: pp.145-7) notes happened with the Conservatives. The press is a key mediator now (although not replacing the importance of what politicians communicate on Europe), but crucially possess the ability to abuse that privilege of mediation – and construct certain realities. There is the instrumentalisation of Berlusconi and Murdoch, and their editors, harnessing (perceived) public sentiment to attack government (or in the case of Berlusconi, the opposition). However this is just one of many factors influencing what finally materialises in newspaper discourse.

6.10 A final prognostic critique

A final prognostic critique would suggest that the two main political parties in Britain should re-calibrate their comprehension of Britain, historically, and establish a healthier means of engaging with Europe. Political parties do not have to see Europe as a threat to nation, but as another way of expressing nationhood, as parts of the integrative process in Italy have demonstrated (Ginzborg, 2003, Giordano, 2004, Giuliani, 2001). Gifford (2008: p147) refers to Milward and the "interdependent relationship between national modernisation and European integration." British mainstream politicians have to, in this sense, act in the national interest, and modernise Britain, and arguably the true nature of its complex and undoubtedly historically difficult, but nevertheless potentially fruitful relationship within the EU.

As Clegg and Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) indicate, it is *within* the national public sphere (and initially politicians and government) that perhaps such a recalibration of

Britain's understanding of Europe has to be articulated. I suggest, rather cynically, that only when that re-articulation has become societally embedded will the press respond. The response will be due to the press initially noting their mass-circulation readerships may have developed a different perception of Europe, and secondly to Bourdieu's (2005) audience-ratings mentality.

I would argue *The Times* has demonstrated, over the last few decades, a government-press parallelism, in supporting the governing party. If the government moves, the press has a tendency to follow. Much as with national politicians, MEPs and the EU generally need to re-connect effectively in explaining how the supranational and national are not mutually exclusive, but can be mutually supportive. This argument has to be made *within* nation – but not the supranational talking down to nation, which would advance the myth of a supranational *grand public* (Dougal, 2004).

If national and supranational mainstream politicians do not act (with the press expected to partly convey, as well as challenge) then the Northern League and UKIP could move imperceptively closer to the core of the two national publics. These two fringe parties (as opposed to the mainstream) would be enabled to capture the public psyche and internalise a nationalistic, particularistic, and regressive approach to further European integration. In the current, deep crisis of trans-national EU perceptions, this scenario is possible, but avoidable and worthy of monitoring by future research.

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Appendix 1: Interview template.

1. Cast your mind back to 1989. What was the reaction to the events of that year? Did a sense of Europeaness manifest itself in any form? Were these purely national celebrations of liberation?

How did you feel these were reported? Were you reporting? How were they reported on?

2. Assuming you feel this point in time did result in some manifestation of Europeanness, when was the next point that you would cite when you felt there was again a sense of popular European identity? What form did it take? Was there any groundswell of European sentiment? What evidence is there for this? Were you reporting? How were they reported on?

3. If there are subsequent points, along the above lines, between 89 and now, please comment and qualify your comments, on these also.

Were you reporting? How were they reported on?

4. Have any of these above points created a sense of emotional attachment to being European, or is it basically nations involved in Europe?

5. Have European institutions hindered/helped a sense of attachment to European identity by its peoples? Cite examples of both, if possible. Are they the same points in time referred to earlier or not?

Were you reporting on these points in time? How were they reported on?

Appendix 2: Interview dates and bibliographies.

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