Socialization into Conflict

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Chapter VIII The Local Political Environment

Within the sub-cultures of social class, religion and nationality other influences may be at work in political attitude formation. For instance, religious differences may have a less direct effect upon political attitudes because of the processes of learning about politics in the local political environment, or milieu.

The sample of children upon which Easton and Dennis carried out their analysis was collected in four major regions of America - Northeast, North Central, South, and West - and included a large and medium sized city in each region. Whilst searching for predictors of political learning they stressed the <u>similarities</u> between the cities and regions.[1] Commenting upon the cross group uniformity in political cognition and affect they write: "In part, this may be the product of the special character of our sample. It included only children from white, urban areas not seriously depressed economically."[2] Other American findings suggest, however, that local political influences may be seen to have a greater affect upon political attitudes where black respondents are included in samples. Langton and Jennings found that the local political environment of the American South may have convinced black students that the principles they learned in their civics courses would not apply to them, making them more cynical to government, whilst in the American North, black students taking civics courses became less cynical towards political authorities.[3]

People in Ulster often think and talk about politics in terms of particular places, whether these are trouble spots or examples of good community relations. The familiar remark that "There's no place like X" is, however, a half truth. It is correct in asserting that two towns, whatever their similarities, cannot be identical, if only by virtue of their name. It is incorrect insofar as it is meant to suggest that attitudes of, say, Protestants, will favour a United Ireland in one town, and a Protestant UDI in another. There are many things that are constant from place to place in Northern Ireland. By looking at political attitudes in terms of where people live, we will be able to see to what extent Protestant boys in different parts of Ulster have similar or dissimilar outlooks, and what holds true for Catholic boys. Given the importance of different religious 'mixes' in communities, different levels of disorder, and differences in distance from the Border, there are reasons to expect some local political influences, that is to say, that where a boy lives does influence his political outlook independently of his religion or national identity.

(1) Belfast and Beyond

Belfast, and a radius of approximately 30 miles around, contains the major industrial life of Northern Ireland. Belfast has been described as, "A dull city where men make money the way charwomen wash floors: dully, alone, and at a slow methodical pace;"[4] and also as "...the Glasgow of Ireland, a vigorous, hard driving, God-fearing masculine town with few feminine graces."[5] Among Belfast's troubles are bad housing, and unemployment.

Whether segregation along religious and economic lines is a problem or a solution depends very much upon the perceptions of those experiencing ghetto living. Add to this the eruption, generation after generation, of violent sectarian riots on the streets of the city and the recent interjection of the British Army as a peacekeeping force amidst escalating disorders and the picture of Belfast is depressing. But to anyone who has known Belfast intimately in times of peaceful co-existence it can be a warm, friendly City where 'differences' when noticed, are kept at a respectful distance.

The content of political learning in Belfast may be vastly different from that learned in the Provincial towns and rural areas of Northern Ireland. A schoolboy in Belfast may, through contact with City violence, become less amenable to established authority. Alternatively, the variety of City living may lead him to accept more secular values and thus be readier to accept institutions free from sectarian influence. The Loyalty Survey found that 'Degree of urbanization has no effect upon readiness to support the Constitution,' and that, 'people who live in Belfast are slightly readier to support illegal demonstrations than those who occasionally or never visit it.'[6] Thus a number of conflicting hypotheses regarding affect to government seem possible. But since the areas sampled outside Belfast did not include Derry City it is hypothesized that, owing to the greater frequency of disorder in Belfast, city boys will be more committed to political violence than their co-religionists elsewhere.

Table VIII: 1 Belfast and Beyond and Discord.

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	Belfast %	Beyond %		Belfast %	Beyond %	
Primary						
Violent	74	38		79	54	
Peaceful	25	61		21	46	
No answer	1	1	D.I.=36%	-	-	D.I.=25%
Secondary						
Violent	72	65		67	57	
Peaceful	25	31		31	41	
No answer	3	4	D.I.= 7%	2	2	D.I.=10%

Approximately one-third of Primary and two-fifths of Secondary schoolboys resided in Belfast. As noted elsewhere,[7] the Secondary schoolboys outside Belfast were much more likely to have friends in the other religion, and to respond that the police authorities were always willing to help them, than were boys in Belfast. There were, however, few differences between boys in Primary and Secondary schools regarding affect to government, by whether they lived in Belfast or beyond. One exception being that Catholic Secondary schoolboys in Belfast revealed lower positive affect to government than their 'country' co-religionists (D.I. = 18%). Generally, city living does not appear to either increase, or decrease, positive or negative feelings about government. As hypothesized, the Belfast boys are readiest to endorse the use of violence in politics, but this shows up most clearly among the Primary schoolboys (D.I.'s: Protestant = 36%; Catholic = 25%). (See Table VIII: 1)

Approximately three-quarters of Belfast Primary schoolboys found 'fighting' acceptable in a political context. Three-fifths of 'country' Primary School Protestants rejected violent methods for these goals as did 45 per cent of Primary school Catholics. Among Secondary schoolboys the differences are not so striking, but in each case, it is the Belfast boys who most favour physical violence in political disputes. This may suggest that living in Belfast has important consequences for the age at which schoolboys learn about political violence. While 'country' boys are less prone to identify themselves with violent politics whilst attending Primary school, than are their Belfast age-group, there is a leveling off process between these groups during Secondary school years. Alternatively, the Secondary schoolboys of Belfast may have become more committed to violence by early 1972 when the Primary school sample was collected.

(2) Gross Population

To differentiate boys outside Belfast, each Secondary (not Primary) schoolboy was asked to give some indication of the district in which he lived. Replies were later coded (with the aid of map and census) as being Belfast, Provincial town, or rural district. The Provincial towns surveyed contain populations of between 10,000 and 17,000 persons (1971 Census Preliminary Report). Boys in an urban districts, or village, with a population of 2,000, or less, were included in the rural areas. The few secondary schoolboys who did not complete this question were coded as living in the town or village where their school was situated. Approximately 40 per cent lived in different parts of Belfast; 35 per cent in Provincial towns; and 25 per cent in the rural areas. We might hypothesize that boys in the

rural areas will be more inclined to peaceful politics because they are more distant from the places where gangs can meet to contemplate disorder and because they are more isolated from one another. Alternatively, many of those classified as living in rural areas were extremely close to the Border which may have some effect in raising violent predispositions. Also, rural people, as Rosemary Harris so well illustrates, are often extremely suspicious of 'city government':

> Even many of the 'genuine' Ulstermen amongst the Belfast politicians were suspect in Ballybeg. Time and again it was made clear to me that Belfast Unionist politicians were suspected of being potentially ready to sacrifice the welfare of areas distant from the capital, and especially those on the border, for the sake of areas nearer Belfast where most Unionist supporters lived, and on whom, therefore, most Unionist politicians depended..... Moreover, it was quite widely believed that the 'Belfast men' might as a last resort hand some of the border areas, including Ballybeg, over to the Republic to get rid of a large number of Nationalist supporters. This suggestion was repeatedly denied by the Unionist leaders. This however, did not stop the suspicion of at least the less sophisticated people. Not appreciating the economic and other difficulties involved in any such idea, they believed that, as they saw it, they might be victims to be thrown to the lions to preserve the rest of the Province.[8]

Thus in the rural areas, one might hypothesize that positive affect to government will be at least, no higher than elsewhere in Ulstér.

Gross population differences reveal virtually no variations in affect to government between Protestant Secondary schoolboys. Rural and Provincial town Catholics are slightly more positive to government than their co-religionists in Belfast. Thus, it is not the rural boys and those most distant to the seat of government who held political authority in lowest esteem,

but those who were separated from Stormont by only a few miles. A few miles in Belfast, however, must be measured in psychological as well as geographical terms. The Secondary schoolboys living in the rural areas and Belfast are closer together regarding disorder approval than either are to their Provincial town co-religionists, who, especially among Catholics, are the most peaceful in political outlooks. Only half the Catholic boys in the Provincial towns accepted the rightness of violence for a United Ireland to three-fifths of their co-religionists in Belfast and the rural areas. (See Table VIII: 2) Generally, gross population may have only limited effect upon political attitudes. Protestant groups remain relatively stable in their attitudes no matter how many, or few, fill their immediate environment, whilst Catholics reveal only minor variations. This suggests that the population density of an area is of less importance for political learning than other local political influences, such as acquaintance with City violence.

Table VIII: 2 Gross Population and Discord (Secondary Only)

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	Belfast	Provincial Town	Rural	Belfast	Provincial Town	Rural
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Violent	69	60	66	63	50	60
Peaceful	28	36	31	35	47	38
No answer	3	4	3	2	3	2

(3) East and West of the River Bann

The most economically underdeveloped part of Ulster lies to the West of the River Bann which includes Fermanagh and Tyrone, most of Counties Armagh and Londonderry, and Londonderry City Borough. Arguments for concentrating economic development in the eastern areas have rested upon the thesis that only this area has the requirements necessary for rapid industrial development. Others have seen the policy as discrimination against the Catholics in the rural West of Ulster. The S.D.L.P. members of one local government in the West, who walked out of office as a protest against internment, labelled the Stormont government as irresponsible for the introduction of the internment measure and tell how their town, with one in every four out of work, has been neglected by central government down through the years. According to one such councillor, "Even without internment, there would have been a case for the people getting up off their knees."[9] One might hypothesize, that since economic development is more advanced in the East than the West, both Protestants and Catholics in the more prosperous areas will be more positive to government than their co-religionists where unemployment figures are higher. Also, both Protestants and Catholics in the East may see, due to the greater prosperity, that what one religion gains the other does not lose, and thus be less inclined to approve resort to physical violence in politics.

Excluding Belfast from the East, approximately one-third of Protestant Primary schoolboys resided to the East of the River Bann and one-third to the West. Among Primary school

Catholics, approximately one-fifth lived in the more prosperous Eastern areas and almost half to the West of the River. In the Secondary school sample there are four areas - East, West, Belfast, and one which does not fit easily, economically, into the East-West divide. Approximately one-fifth of all Secondary schoolboys lived to the East of the Bann (excluding Belfast) and one-fifth to the West.

Only among the Primary schoolboys does one find more positive feelings about government in the East. An exceptionally high proportion (more than half) of Primary school Catholics in the East felt that government would always want to help people like them whilst one-third took the more restrained view that government would sometimes want to help. These boys were drawn from economically developed areas to the East of the River Bann. In three cases out of four the boys in the East (excluding Belfast) are more pacific in political discord. Among Primary schoolboys the Easterners are much less likely to endorse disorder for political ends. (D.I.'s: Protestants = 14%; Catholics = 31%). Among Secondary schoolboys only Catholics are noticeably different in discord attitudes from their Western co-religionists. (D.I. = 23%) The differences between East and West have been caused more by boys in the East rejecting violence than by those in the West being extremely likely to approve it. For instance, where these differences do appear the Eastern boys are approximately 20 per cent below the general level of violence approval for their school types.

Table VIII: 3 East and West of the River Bann and Discord (Primary Only)

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	East %	West %	Belfast %	East %	West %	Belfast %
Primary						
Violent	31	45	74	33	64	79
Peaceful	68	54	25	67	36	21
No answer	1	-	1	-	-	-

Most of the Eastern areas within the sampling framework were relatively economically developed compared to the West of Northern Ireland. This suggests that higher levels of employment and prosperity has important consequences for political learning among schoolboys. An important qualification to this, however, appears among Secondary school Protestants whose political attitudes are relatively uninfluenced by economic conditions. This may suggest that governments in Northern Ireland can buy Catholic support for the regime through material rewards whilst regime symbolic gratifications, more important to Protestants, remain much the same under different economic conditions.

(4) The Border

The older criteria of political geography cannot be applied to modern state boundaries. Parts of diffeeent states may be in closer contact with one another than with their respective centres of government. The arbitrary boundary lines drawn between 'New Nations' by Western colonizers paid

little heed to ancient tribal boundaries or to the fact that nomadic tribes crossed and re-crossed such boundaries without acknowledging their existence. The Border of Ulster follows an irregular path and pursues a straight course for very few miles at a time. According to the Handbook of the Ulster Question (1923),'...the border, when it was set up, cut across twenty or more rail tracks and ran through no less than fourteen hundred agricultural 'holdings'.[10] Where the Border follows the River Termon it cuts through the village of Pettigo on the Donegal-Fermanagh frontier. One part of Pettigo went to Ulster to be known as Tullyhommon whilst the rest, in the Republic, continued as Pettigo. The Orange Hall is in the Republican part whilst the majority of Protestants live on the Ulster side. Thus, the Border, at places, for the practicalities of everyday life is as 'beguiling as a soft Irish mist.'[11] The Border, however, has a very real significance for many who live close to it. As Rosemary Harris in her study of Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster points out:

> ...The border, close physically and omnipresent psychologically, brought into sharp contrast not only those actually separated by it but those separated because their opinions about it were opposed.[12]

Protestants who live close to the Border are often extremely anxious through fear of cross-Border IRA raids. For instance rockets have been fired from across the Border and wires leading to ambush-bombs have been followed a few hundred yards into the Republic. This suggests that they may become less positive to a Government which, in their eyes, did little to protect them apart from recognising the legal standing of

their own defence corps (the now disbanded Ulster Special Reserve Constabulary). Also, since mobilized for their own defence they might be expected to favour political violence to maintain the Border. Catholics living close to the Border may be less positive to Government, since they are more likely to look to Dublin as their capital, and more prone to political violence, since any change in the Border would be to their political, if not economic, advantage.

Approximately 750 Secondary schoolboys in the sample lived relatively close to the Border. Two hundred and fifty of these attended school about ten miles from the Border whilst approximately one hundred lived right up against the State divide. In one school, a few miles from the Border, one boy informed me that he travelled to school across the Border every morning from a village in the Republic which led to his being excluded from the survey and to further enquiries as to exactly where the boys lived. Travelling, one evening in the school bus, along the Border, impressed upon me the extent to which the school catchment area was delimited by the Border.

Among both Catholic and Secondary schoolboys there are few differences regarding affect to Government by distance from the Border, and Catholic secondary schoolboys who live close to the Border are only slightly more likely to favour violence to remove it than their co-religionists who live closer to Belfast. When Belfast is excluded from areas far from the Border few differences regarding Government appear, but of Catholic Secondary boys close to the Border, 64 per cent

approved the use of physical violence in politics to only 41 per cent of those further from the Border (excluding Belfast). When the one-fifth of Secondary schoolboys who attended schools very close to the Border are isolated they are virtually the same in affect to government as others and bear a strong resemblance to all boys West of the River Bann regarding discord. Among Primary schoolboys approximately one-third of Protestants and two-fifths of Catholics lived relatively near the Border. When compared to their co-religionists in the North East (excluding Belfast) they are slightly less positive to government (D.I.'s: Protestants = 12%; Catholics = 11%), and, especially among Catholics, more violent in political predispositions (D.I.'s: Protestants = 14% Catholics = 30%). These differences are caused however, more by peace in the North East (outside Belfast) than by increases in violence approval on the Border. Catholics living relatively close to the Border are like most Catholic boys regarding violence (three-fifths approve its use in politics). It is the minority of Catholics in the North East who are unusual in that only approximately 35 per cent approved fighting for a United Ireland. Thus, it could be argued, that living relatively far from a symbolic dissatisfaction (the Border) and close to higher material benefits is associated with decreases in violence approval among Catholic schoolboys. Catholics living closer to the Border are more like their Belfast co-religionists and represent a major weakness in the Border as a national divide.

(5) Religious Populations

> The Falls is a self contained community. On the Road are schools for the mind, a hospital for the body, churches for the soul, and cemeteries to cater for what's left over. A man could be born, educated, married, hospitalized, and buried, and never leave the Falls - and many never do. But if a Fallsman does leave it's not to another part of Belfast he'll go, but rather to England, Australia, or America, for these he would consider les hostile territories than the wilder shores of his own city.[13]

Dr. Emrys Jones, in his study of "The Distribution and Segregation of Roman Catholics in Belfast", found a high degree of correlation between low socio-economic ratings and high proportions of Catholics.[14] A more recent study (1968) of segregation in Belfast revealed that socio-economic segregation of co-religionists was almost as great as that between working class districts of different religious composition.[15] And "Flight", a study of population movement in Belfast during August 1971, revealed that some areas, which were previously thought of as being mixed (by religion), thus serving as buffer zones between one religion areas, were themselves becoming segregated as families moved into the refuge of religious enclaves.[16] A more recent study showed that something like 60,000 people had been forced to move out of their homes during the period from August 1969 to February 1973. This mass flight is apparently considered by the researchers to be the largest fixed population movement in Western Europe since World War II.[17] An Alliance Party spokesman made a plea to families in mixed areas to stay where they were lest, by moving, they were "helping to build another riot area" and "a gunman's training ground."[18] Why

people want to live in religiously homogeneous areas in Belfast may be explained on the grounds of their fear of a conspiracy against them, actual threats involving movement, and attempts to reduce the tension levels within themselves and their families. The fight results in people flocking together. There is a positive attraction as well as a negative push.

One might expect that those who live in areas in Ulster where co-religionists are in a majority, will differ in political attitudes, to those who live where their "own kind" are in a minority. Findings elsewhere suggest that the greater the homogeneity one finds in a district the easier it is to predict political responses.[19] In Ulster, however, findings among adults suggest that the balance of religions has no significant influence upon political outlooks. "There was only a slight tendency for Catholics to be less in favour of illegal demonstrations where they are in the minority than where they are in the majority."[20]

A special effort was made when the samples were collected to interview in schools in Belfast that had a catchment area containing a majority in one religion or the other, and mixed areas. Outside of Belfast the areas sampled in the East were generally 'core' Protestant areas whilst those in the West were either Catholic majority, or mixed, areas. It might be hypothesized that where boys know their own religionists to be in a majority they will be more violent in political outlook, having less to fear from the 'others'. Alternatively, Protestants, in a minority, may be more committed to physical force politics

because local conditions do not reflect the Ulster-wide Protestant ascendancy. Where Catholics are in a majority they may be least positive to government because of a collective sense of discrimination, and where in a minority, they may be more positive, since they enjoy better economic conditions being less of a threat to the local Protestants. Protestants in a minority are more likely to be found in the West and probably reveal lower positive feelings to government because of economic conditions and may fear their interests are being sacrificed for those in the East, whilst, when in a majority, they probably feel more kindly disposed towards government since their local conditions mirror those of Protestant rule in Ulster. Alternatively, remembering the adult finding, the balance of religions may have little or no effect upon political attitudes.

Approximately three-fifths of Protestant boys lived in towns, or areas which contained a majority of their own co-religionists. One-fifth lived in Catholic majority, and one-fifth in mixed areas. About one half of the Catholic boys lived in places with a majority of co-religionists, whilst one-fifth stayed in mixed, and the remainder in Protestant zones. There is little variation in affect to government among Protestant Secondary schoolboys according to the religious complexion of their immediate environment. But Primary Protestant schoolboys living in Catholic areas are less extremely positive to government than their co-religionists elsewhere. Whereas approximately 70 per cent of Primary school Protestants in other areas say that government will always want to help people like them, this is found among only 50 per cent of those in Catholic areas. Catholic Primary schoolboys living as a majority are less positibr to government than their Primary school co-religionists elsewhere,

but all Catholic boys living in predominantly Protestant areas reveal better feelings towards government than their co-religionists elsewhere. Catholic Primary schoolboys in Protestant areas see government more benevolently than do Primary Protestant schoolboys in Catholic areas. Only among Protestant Secondary schoolboys does the local population mixture appear to make little difference to attitudes towards fighting for a Protestant Ulster. But, in the other school groups, boys are least violent in politics where they are in a religious minority (See Tables VIII:4 & VIII:5).

Table VIII:4 Religious Proportions and Affect to Government

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	Catholic Majority %	Protestant Majority %	Mixed %	Catholic Majority %	Protestant Majority %	Mixed %
<u>Primary</u>						
POSITIVE	50	67	70	21	52	32
positive	46	28	27	38	34	31
negative	-	3	3	24	11	15
NEGATIVE	3	1	-	17	3	20
no answer	1	1	-	-	-	2
<u>Secondary</u>						
POSITIVE	35	31	37	18	20	14
positive	50	53	48	45	51	43
negative	11	12	11	24	19	29
NEGATIVE	3	4	4	11	5	13
no answer	1	-	-	2	5	1

Table VIII: 5 Religious Proportions and Discord

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	Catholic majority %	Protestant majority %	Mixed %	Catholic majority %	Protestant majority %	Mixed %
Primary						
Violent	33	54	56	83	40	52
Peaceful	66	45	43	17	60	48
no answer	1	1	1	-	-	-
Secondary						
Violent	63	70	65	68	44	61
Peaceful	30	27	31	30	53	36
No answer	7	3	4	2	3	3

The clearest implications of these findings concerns Catholics. Those living in a Protestant majority area are both more positive to government and less inclined to political violence. This suggests that fear of retaliation may be just as important for political attitudes as material rewards (East River Bann) and living relatively far from a symbolic dissatisfaction (the Border). Yet the fact that Catholics in Protestant areas are also more positive to government suggests that one cannot discount improved economic conditions in lowering the violent temperature of Ulster. The dispersion of the Catholic population among Protestants may promote more peaceful attitudes than confining them to "ghettoes" in order to contain the violence. Protestant Primary schoolboys appear to be more politically sensitive to local conditions than their Secondary school co-religionists. When surrounded by a majority of Catholics they are both less positive to government and ready to endorse disorder. This may

suggest that whilst they are 'catching' a grudge against government from the adult Protestant community in Catholic areas ,they are more afraid to express this in violence approval than their older co-religionists. Alternatively, their parents may have taught them to be peaceful in an exposed position. Protestant Secondary schoolboys however, are relatively un-affected by the religious proportions around them. This suggests that Protestants all over Ulster may grow out of early caution into the more assertive stance of Province-wide domination.

(6) Level of Disorder

Civil disturbances in Northern Ireland appear to be having effects upon normal school life, examinations and educational progress. One school, for instance, has lost 140 pupils from its rolls principally due to the disorders.[21] David Bleakley, former Minister of Community Relations writes:

> The effects of the front line are felt at every level of school life. Security precautions, for instance, are now an important item on the list of duties. And they have to be taken seriously. It is not unusual for children to be caught in cross-fire or bomb blast, or for windows to be shattered. One five-year-old recently offered her teacher a bag filled with gelignite and detonators. The explanation: "Please Miss, I found it in the corridor." On some occasions schools have found themselves the unsuspecting site of an arms dump. First aid services have taken on a new urgency and a new language of instruction. The latest grim document on issue to staff warns: "If an explosion occurs pupils with superficial injuries who are able to walk should leave with the others; seriously injured pupils should not be moved unless they are in obvious danger." Special first aid boxes are now held ready and most schools have rendezvous

> positions for evacuation. Elaborate alarm systems and search procedures are also in operation. School bags, too, have become suspicious articles. No longer can they be left unattended by pupils; teachers are told to treat every unidentified bag with suspicion.[22]

Invigilators reports on irregular, or unforeseeable happenings attributable to the 'troubles' at the time of examinations have increased by over three hundred per cent between 1971 and 1972;[23] and when mathematical game-tests were given to intelligent children from Belfast when in refugee centres in Eire they were found, on average, to be two years behind children of the same age group in Dublin.[24] One teacher, writing of the effects of the 1971-72 disturbances on pupils in a Belfast Catholic school, comments:

> The effects are now clear. There is a high rate of absenteeism and latecoming; it is more and more difficult to interest boys in class-work; there is an upsurge of buffoonery, noisiness, excitability. Class-room work is suffering and teachers are feeling the strain. Teachers' authority is not being <u>directly</u> challenged - thankfully we had developed over the years fairly easy relationships with the boys - but a new and very significant factor is showing, one which bodes ill for the school in the long term; first year pupils, usually over-awed and very amenable in their first term, are rowdy and not receptive to rebukes.[25]

And another teacher, this time in a Belfast County (Protestant) school, comments:

> As Government and Citizenship is a school subject it would be impossible for me not to come to terms with the attitudes of the pupils and I would say that opinion hardened very rapidly in 1968-69 and it has remained that way. That is not to say that rational discussion of current issues is completely impossible but the range of opinion starts at 'Tartan' and rarely goes beyond official Unionist. It is clear that before 1968 there was very considerable mixing with the 'other side' but they have now severed all connections.[26]

And Morris Fraser, child psychiatrist in Belfast during the 'troubles' writes: "....scarcely any child living in riot conditions has escaped having at least some symptoms of acute anxiety - sleep disturbances, separation fears, school refusal, loss of appetite, bowel, gastric and urinary upsets, headaches."[27]

Although research evidence suggests that children living outside riot areas have knowledge of, and are affected by, disorders,[28] it seems unlikely that children in the quieter areas will respond in exactly the same way as those directly affected. For instance, some research reports that persons in the riot areas become adjusted to disorders whilst those in the quieter surrounding areas become highly anxious lest troubles spread to their immediate environment.[29] It also seems likely that adults and children in the Provincial towns and rural areas will respond differently to the disorders and that this response will bear some relationship to the level of civil unrest in their district.

When both the Secondary and Primary school samples were collected an effort was made to conduct interviews in areas experiencing different levels of civil disorder. Boys attending school either in, or just peripheral to, riot areas, were said to be experiencing a 'lot of trouble'; those in other parts of Belfast as having 'some trouble'. When boys in the Provincial towns and surrounding areas were classified it was possible, in both early 1972 and 1971, to designate certain areas (as compared with, say Andersonstown) as having experienced 'little' or 'no trouble'. This classification method yielded the following

distribution:

	Lot of trouble	Some trouble	Little trouble	No trouble
Primary				
Protestants%	22	16	31	31
Catholics %	18	14	46	22
Secondary				
Protestants %	13	29	19	39
Catholics %	19	21	5	55

One drawback about this method of classification is that many of the schoolboys travelled to school from areas experiencing different levels of disorder. For instance, I travelled with one Belfast schoolboy on a Belfast Corporation bus, right out of the 'harder' area where the school was situated, to one of the quieter parts of the City. Nevertheless, the boys were at a maximum in the catchment area of a trouble spot, and they would hear of events from class-mates. It might be hypothesized, therefore, that, because of local tensions, boys in areas with greater disorder will be readier to accept violence in their political relations. Also, because disorder may be associated with bad housing and with law enforcement among Protestants, and with rebellion among Catholics, those in the higher tension zones may be, at least, less positive towards government.

In three school types out of four, positive affect towards government is lower in high trouble areas. But only in the Catholic Primary schools is the difference from the total

distribution of affect very striking (23%) where 47 per cent are either grudging, or malevolent, in their affect to government. But overall, there is no steady increase in positive affect as one moves from the harder areas through those with less trouble. Generally, there is a decline in disorder approval from the harder areas to those with little, or no trouble. In the Catholic Primary schools there is a drop of 60 per cent in violence approval between the areas of highest and lowest records of violent "happenings". (See Table VIII: 6).

Table VIII: 6 Disorder Levels and Discord

	PROTESTANTS				CATHOLICS			
	Lot of trouble %	Some trouble %	Little trouble %	No trouble %	Lot of trouble %	Some trouble %	Little trouble %	No trouble %
Primary								
Violent	80	64	45	31	93	54	64	33
Peaceful	18	35	54	69	7	46	35	67
No answer	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-
Secondary								
Violent	84	66	65	65	73	60	57	57
Peaceful	12	31	31	31	25	38	38	41
No answer	4	3	4	4	2	2	5	2

In areas that have experienced a lot of disorder, boys were not asked to give hypothetical views about remote events, but to make judgements based upon local knowledge. Especially among the Primary schoolboys, one might hypothesize, that readiness to endorse violence would decline once they saw that tough talk could lead to bitter consequences. The interviews show that the opposite occurs. Boys who have seen disorder, or who have lived close to them, are readier to justify violent politics than others. That this phenomena is seen most clearly among the Primary, rather than

the Secondary schoolboys may be an indication that the earlier in life one becomes adapted to disorders, the more likely it is that physical force will become the accepted norm in basic political disputes. Or, alternatively, that Secondary schoolboys are that much more mature and likely to evaluate violence as good or bad rather than simply take it for granted as their younger brothers may. Such findings support Morris Fraser in his rejection of the "myth of catharsis". Catharsis implies that"...the act of witnessing or participating in a violent scene would make the subject less likely to behave aggressively afterwards."[30] In Northern Ireland, first hand knowledge of violence increases the likelihood that disorders will be indulged in upon some future occasion.

(7) Subjective Views of Disorder Levels

One model of the disorders in Ulster is based upon part of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.[31] This suggests, briefly, that awakened aspirations in some of the Ulster people were blocked by extreme Unionists, leading to frustration, stronger identification with religious communities, and disorder. Further frustrations followed when the police and the USC intervened and parades were banned causing further disorders. Finally, the intervention of the army, greatly increased the number of frustrations especially when people began to believe that the army was against them, and incapable of protecting them. At this stage two major ingredients of frustration are combined: the belief that political leaders are incapable, or unwilling to provide the social improvements

initially hoped for; and, frequent contact with 'aggressive stimuli' in the form of the British Army. Both these frustrations feed back into closer identification with religious communities, and further disorder which begins to be seen as legitimate. This model is based upon how a person <u>feels</u> about local conditions, rather than upon the conditions themselves. Whilst the objective measure of trouble in a district did find that boys in the harder areas were more violence-prone, it does not follow that all boys will see the same conditions in similar ways or react in like manner. But, it might be hypothesized, that the greater the number of 'aggressive stimuli' (police, army, disappointments, 'others', bad conditions, hostile images) that a schoolboy subjectively experiences, the more likely it will be that he will have lower positive affect for government, and greater readiness to approve disorder. In order to test this hypothesis, boys were asked to express how they <u>felt</u> about the level of disorder in their locality. This produced the following subjective distribution:

	PROTESTANTS					CATHOLICS				
	Lot of trouble	Some trouble	Little trouble	No trouble	NA	Lot of trouble	Some trouble	Little trouble	No trouble	NA
Primary %	24	14	33	27	2	34	17	24	21	4
Secondary %	16	14	25	44	1	11	14	24	49	2

There is little difference regarding how a Protestant boy feels about government by how he <u>rates</u> the level of trouble in his district. Catholic boys reveal lowest positive affect for government when they <u>feel</u> they live in a high trouble area. One quarter of such Catholic Secondary schoolboys had malevolent

feelings about government (government wants to hurt...) as had one fifth of Catholic Primary schoolboys. (See Table VIII: 7) This suggests that Catholics, in times of frustrations, are ready to turn their aggression against political authorities. The same does not apply to Protestants who may channel their aggressions more fully against the nearest 'others'. There is a steady decline in disorder approval, among <u>all</u> boys, as their perceptions of local trouble decreases. For instance, 77 per cent of Catholic Primary schoolboys who felt there was a lot of trouble in their area approved of political violence for a United Ireland compared to only 35 per cent approving disorders when they felt there were no local 'happenings'. (See Table VIII: 8)

Table VIII: 7 Subjective View of Disorder Levels and Affect to Government.

	PROTESTANTS				CATHOLICS			
	Lot of trouble %	Some trouble %	Little trouble %	No trouble %	Lot of trouble %	Some trouble %	Little trouble %	No trouble %
<u>Primary</u>								
POSITIVE	68	65	61	67	23	30	36	51
positive	26	33	36	27	37	37	38	28
negative	4	-	2	3	21	23	14	12
NEGATIVE	1	1	-	1	18	11	11	8
No answer	1	1	1	2	1	-	1	1
<u>Secondary</u>								
POSITIVE	31	32	32	35	15	11	18	19
positive	45	55	54	51	32	45	50	48
negative	17	11	10	11	27	31	20	24
NEGATIVE	5	2	3	3	24	12	10	5
No answer	2	-	1	-	2	1	2	4

Table VIII: 8 Subjective View of Disorder Levels and Discord

	PROTESTANTS				CATHOLICS			
	Lot of trouble %	Some trouble %	Little trouble %	No trouble %	Lot of trouble %	Some trouble %	Little trouble %	No trouble %
Primary								
Violent	60	58	46	46	77	68	58	35
Peaceful	39	42	52	54	22	32	42	65
No answer	1	-	2	-	1	-	-	-
Secondary								
Violent	79	73	70	62	77	69	62	53
Peaceful	16	24	29	35	20	28	35	45
No answer	5	3	1	3	2	3	3	2

How a boy interprets the 'happenings' of his locality will have consequences for his attitudes to disorders. When the local milieu is relatively 'normal' boys divide fairly evenly as to violence approval; as the violence in their environment 'heats up' more boys begin to approve disorders in politics; when the local political conditions become 'red-hot' prediction becomes easier: about three-quarters of the boys begin to think violence is justified; if 'warmer' days can be forecast there is reason to believe that total acceptance of violence will be reached. It is important to note, however, that even in low temperatures (no trouble perceived) combustible material is in plentiful supply (half the boys approved violence).

Morris Fraser also suggests that more than objective frustrations are involved in violence approval. He writes of the 'cultural Bogeyman' (Catholic, Protestant, British Soldier) who is accepted as evil long before the onset of actual disorders

or any unpleasant contact with such cultural anti-heroes. He further suggests that when the cultural bogeyman is close at hand and perceived as threatening, fear is aroused and fantasies of getting rid of all anti-heroes are entertained by young school-children.[32] Such a theory fits my own findings in that the greater amount of trouble (anti-heroes close at hand and perceived as threatening) a schoolboy subjectively feels in his own area the more likely it becomes that he will accept violent political relationships (fantasies of riddance). This does not, however, make light of the real institutionalized evils and actual happenings in the area, but draws attention to the affect of hostile images in socialization into conflict.

(8) Emigration

Asking children and young people whether they want to remain in Ulster after they have left school and/or university/college illuminates, to some extent, how they feel about their political environment. Barrit and Carter calculate that from 1951 to 1961 there was a net emigration of about 51,000 Catholics and 41,000 Protestants from Northern Ireland. They comment, '.....emigration is just about sufficient to drain off the excess births in the Catholic community, and keep the proportion of Protestants and Catholics almost stable; they are in fact still very close to the levels at which they stood at the foundation of the state forty years ago.'[33] They attribute this phenomena to '.....the difference in economic opportunity.....' which, they

suggest '.....is a regulator maintaining the status quo.'[34] Disorder is another reason for emigration. Each wave of civic unrest is followed by an upsurge of emigration applications.[35] For instance, in 1971, three times as many Ulster people applied to go to Australia as in 1967, before disorders began.[36] Of those leaving Ulster the main age group is between twenty and thirty years of age,[37] and are drawn from almost every social class. Figures for those moving to Canada indicate that 25 per cent are professional people, 50-60 per cent are highly skilled, and the others, semi-skilled.[38] It is difficult to emigrate without some sort of skill or other[39] so the manual workers remain behind. It is likely that children and young people will know something of their parents discussions regarding emigration and may have formed a commitment for themselves that, if their parents don't leave, they certainly will whenever they are able to do so. Schoolmasters, understandably, are extremely reluctant to speak about any dissatisfaction among their pupils. A head of a large Grammar school said, 'I have only known one or two students who have mentioned the troubles and said, I wan't to get out.'[40]

One might hypothesize that those boys desiring to leave Ulster will be those least satisfied with government and politics in Northern Ireland. Protestants who wish to leave may feel that not enough is being done to keep Ulster Protestant, and potential Catholic emigrants may be the strongest opponents of the Border in Irish politics. Alternatively, a large proportion of those leaving may be tired of sectarian politics

and be among those least prepared to see violence in political life. Richard Rose found '...no association between thoughts of emigration and attitudes towards the regime, thus suggesting that political problems are not consciously a motive for emigration.'[41]

Two-fifths of Secondary and one-third of Primary schoolboys indicated that they wanted to leave Ulster when they are older. This cannot be simply attributed to a boy's love of travel and adventure since, when the Secondary schoolboys were asked to record their life's ambition, only 16 per cent replied that it was to travel widely.[42] The majority of potential emigrants among schoolboys chose either Canada or Australia as their destination. Findings regarding affect to government are inconclusive. It is the boys who want to stay in Northern Ireland who are readiest to resort to violence in politics. This is some indication that the most peaceful boys desire to escape the disorders. Those who plan to stay on in Ulster are better adapted to a violent political climate since, if they will not exit, they may have to fight for their own.

Summary: Local Political Environment

Using the same methodology as that described in the summary of Chapter V produced the following:

Dependent Variable: AFFECT

CHARACTERISTIC	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Religious Proportions				
Catholic Majority	18-		16-	
Protestant Majority			19+	10+
Objective Disorder				
Lot			23-	12-
Some	19-		26+	
Little				15+
None			18+	
Subjective Trouble				
Lot				18-
None			18+	
East/West Bann				
East (excluding Belfast)			18+	11+
Mid				14+
Belfast				11-

\- = decrease in positive affect to government

\+ = increase in positive affect to government

Dependant Variable: DISORDER

CHARACTERISTIC	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Belfast/non-Belfast				
Belfast	23+		19+	
Non-Belfast	14-			
East/West Bann				
East (excluding Belfast)	21-		30-	19-
Objective Disorder				
Lot	29+	16+	33+	13+
Some	13+			
None	22-		30-	
Subjective Trouble				
Lot		12+	18+	18+
None			25-	
Religious Proportions				
Catholic Majority	19-		23+	
Protestant Majority			23-	16-
Mixed			11-	

\- = decrease in disorder approval

\+ = increase in disorder approval

The most important local influences associated with affect to government and discord attitudes are: the level of disorder, actual and perceived, in an area; religious population proportions; and living East of the River Bann, outside Belfast.

Where boys live in, or near, the front lines of the battle fields of Ulster they are more violent in political outlook and, if they are Catholics, less positive in affect to government. Near the front-line two essential characteristics of the political system are under stress - the government and the Constitution. The Catholics' boys view of government - filtered through the smoke screen of bombs and gas - is much more hostile than that seen by his co-religionists where the noise of battle is dimmer. And learning to oppose political opponents violently is most thoroughly taken to heart where the lessons are vividly illustrated near to, or just outside, one's front door. Thus, as violence spreads and/or intensifies, boys, rather than becoming pacifists, will endorse its use in politics more fully than before. And Catholic boys, in particular, will become more alienated from political authority as illegal violence increases.

Whereas Protestant boys, living in Catholic majority areas reveal lower positive affect to government than many of their co-religionists, it is the Catholics who live in Protestant areas who are among the most positively orientated Catholics towards government.. The Protestant boys in the Catholic areas may resent the fact that their local minority deviates seriously

from the Protestant position in the whole of Northern Ireland. Their lower positive affect to government may also be associated with the lower levels of economic development West of the River Bann and by their more exposed position close to the Border. Thus, a Protestant boy - seeing government through a filter of Catholics, economic underdevelopment and Border proximity - becomes less likely to think of that government as his benevolent protector and provider. The dispersion of Catholics evenly throughout Ulster may be associated with an all-round increase in positive feelings towards government. Also, living in an area, or town, containing a majority of the 'other' religion, makes it less likely that a boy will be violently disposed in politics. This may be because he has a better chance of knowing the 'others' on a friendly basis, or because he fears defeat should he indulge in disorders. The second option appears more plausible, especially among Primary school Protestants living in Catholic areas, because it is when Catholic boys have the weight of numbers with them that violent attitudes occur with greater frequency. Secondary school Protestants, on the other hand, reveal little variation in violence approval by the religious proportions surrounding them. If this suggests that Primary school Protestants will follow a similar pattern as they mature it may be possible to disperse Catholics throughout Ulster without affecting Protestant violence approval, whilst, at the same time, decreasing Catholic disorder acceptance. Alternatively, since the increased disorder of 1972-73 has raised disorder levels in Protestant majority areas a dispersion of Catholics would probably result in escalating sectarian bloodshed. Thus, until substantial political agreements

between Protestant and Catholic factions have been reached segregated living may be more of an 'answer' than a 'problem'.

Living in the more prosperous areas of the North East (excluding Belfast) appears to have socialization consequences for government, especially among Catholics. Seeing government through the economic build-up of more prosperous areas appears associated with higher support for political authority. This may be associated with being in a Protestant majority area and being less of a threat to the balance of power, hence, more economic advantages to Catholics: a Catholic gain is less likely to be seen as a Protestant loss. Both the younger Protestant, and Catholic boys of all ages, in the East, lack the psychological predispositions for disorder more obvious elsewhere. This may be, for Catholics, simply because they are in a minority, and, for Protestants, because they are satisfied that their predominance is unthreatened, and/or because the area has less unemployment. Dispersion of Catholics among Protestants, together with all-round economic development, seems likely to be associated with increased good feelings to government and violence approval reduction, or among Protestant Secondary schoolboys, no increase in disorder approval. Such dispersion however, would involve a mass exodus of Protestants to the West and would be preceded by massive economic development West of the River Bann.

Footnotes: Chapter VIII

1. Easton and Dennis, op.cit., (Chapter 1: fn.3); see chapter 17.

2. Ibid., p.379

3. K.P. Langton and M.K. Jennings, "Formal Environment: The School", in Political Socialization, K.P.Jennings, op.cit., (chapter 1: fn.7)

4. Community Forum, Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission, Vol.2, No.2, 1972, p.21

5. Ibid., p.21

6. Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., (Chapter 1: fn. 19) p.313

7. Civic Education in Northern Ireland: Second Report to the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission: "Belfast and Beyond", James L. Russell

8. Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster, (Manchester University Press, 1972) pp.189-90

9. "Rent Strike", Belfast Telegraph, September 20th 1971

10. Handbook of the Ulster Question (1923) (Issued by the North Eastern Boundary Bureau, Stationary Office, Dublin, 1923)

11. "With all this talk about the Border", Alf McCreary, Belfast Telegraph, 11th October 1971

12. Prejudice and Tolerance, op.cit., p.20

13. "Strolling up the Falls", John Rooney, Fortnight, 12th January 1972

14. "The Distribution and Segregation of Roman Catholics in Belfast", Emrys Jones, Sociological Review, December 1956, pp.167-89

15. Community Forum, No.3, 1972, "Close together and far apart: Religion and class divisions in Northern Ireland", Fred Boal and Alan Robinson

16. Flight, Community Relations Commission (Northern Ireland) Research Unit, C.R.O.P. (5) September 1971

17. Intimidation and Rehousing, A Report to the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission, February, 1973

18. "Don't quit mixed areas - plea", Belfast Telegraph, 26th September 1972

19. Political Change in Britain, op.ctt., (chapter VI:fn.3) p.149

20. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., p.305

21. ".....and then there were two", Belfast Telegraph, 19th October, 1972.

22. David Bleakley, Peace in Ulster, (Mowbrays : London & Oxford, 1972), pp.55-56

23. "Exams and Explosions", Colin Radford, New Society 31st August 1972

24. "What makes Jack a dull boy", This Week, 17th August 1972

25. "Children in Distress", E. Holmes and A.M. Thornton, The Northern Teacher, Summer 1972, pp.29-33.

26. Ibid

27. Morris Fraser, op.cit., (Ch.1: fn.21) page 61

28. "The Watts race riots (Los Angeles) and children", Ralph Dunlap, et al., Community Forum, Vol.2,No.2,1972

29. Morris Fraser, op.cit., (chapter 4)

30. Morris Fraser, op.cit., page 121

31. See "Intergroup Conflict and Violence", Sverre L.Nielsen, Psychosocial Studies, No.4 1971

32. Morris Fraser, op.cit., chapter 8

33. The Northern Ireland Problem, Barrit and Carter, op.cit.p.108

34. Ibid

35. "Goodbye Ulster", John Burns, Belfast Telegraph, 13th July 1972

36. "They are queuing up to quit Ulster" Chichester, Belfast Telegraph, 22nd March 1972

37. "Goodbye Ulster" op.cit.

38. "They are queuing up to quit Ulster" op.cit

39. "Goodbye Ulster", op.cit.

40. "Province not first choice for students", Robin Briggs, Newsletter, (Belfast) 13th March 1972

41. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., p.366-67

42. Civic Education in Northern Ireland, Initial Report to Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission, 1971, James L. Russell.

Chapter IX

Youthful Associations

> If I was the prime minister of Northern Ireland I would free Ireland and let the IRA shoot and hang the orangemen and shoot the informers and let the IRA shoot the orangemen. IRA Rule O.K. Rem. 1916. Join the IRA Provos.
>
> Ten-year-old Catholic gang-leader

> The thing I like most about Northern Ireland is to kill the Tage (Catholic).
>
> Ten-year-old Protestant gang-leader.

There are two crucial and complementary developments in the lives of schoolboys: first, they begin to spend less and less time with their families; second, there is a corresponding increase in their associations with boys (and girls) of their own age group. At first the separations from the family are brief, but increase in frequency, duration and social importance as they grow older. Such separations involve a shift in the centre of their social lives from family to friendship group. Although they continue to occupy the same world as their parents, loyalties are gradually transferred until the approval of youthful associates may become more important than that of the family of origin. This process is speeded by going to school where the schoolboy enters a new material culture; the population of his world is vastly extended and competition becomes more important; and new authorities appear - the schoolteacher and the peer-group. Associated with this stage of development are the claims that adult-created youth organizations begin to exert and the authority of the written and spoken word become more extended through education. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of these new experiences to which the schoolboys are introduced upon leaving the immediate and pervading influence of the family and to assess their importance for civic learning.

The Friendship Group

The schoolboy is not simply an individual who alone faces the Government and the Constitution and alone orients himself towards his political environment. Nor do the actions of Government or the Articles of Constitution directly influence individual schoolboys. Schoolboys, like others, are part of a social net-work - an important part of which is his friendship group - which both influences his attitudes to politics, and through which political entities and happenings must make their appeal. Political rebellion, for instance, is seldom undertaken alone, but is primarily thought of as a group activity.

The friendship group to which boys belong may have been created by the members themselves as neighbourhood groups, or gangs, or may be the creation of adults as in the case of junior branches of political organisations. But in the case of adult-created groups the boys may have a strong autonomy of their own and not always follow adult directives. Alternatively, when discord divides a population the old and young may find an identity of interests which overcomes the generation gap.[1]

The source and strength of peer group influence stems from the groups extensive access to the members based upon affective relationships. Stoning soldiers for several hours at a stretch could be viewed as an activity which both promotes hostility towards a common enemy and reinforces the affective links within the participating group. Information reaching group members will be evaluated in the light of group opinion; the behaviour of members will be influenced by the group's heroes and the actions of leaders; and when a boy deviates from group norms he will either be brought back into line through fear of punishment and isolation or win the group over to his point of view.

Whilst it is too mechanistic a view of friendship group influence to attribute all the members opinions and attitudes to the group it is not unrealistic to expect the attitudes of boys towards politics to vary according to whether or not they belong to groups, or gangs, and according to the position they see themselves occupying within groups. Whether, or not, such characteristics have any influence upon political attitudes depends, to a large extent, upon the salience of politics for the groups concerned. During a period of relative stability in politics peer groups may find politics of low salience for them and simply reinforce the views of their parents. When disorder occurs gangs may calculate their value by what they can contribute to the current violence.

Research findings regarding the influence of peer groups in childhood and adolescent political socialization are inconclusive. Whereas some studies have noted the political influence of friends and groups,[2] others have found no direct relationship between group membership and political activities and attitudes.[3] In general, it seems most likely from research findings that the politically interested boys are more likely to join groups than others since their political weight is increased by acting collectively; that they are more likely to join, or form, groups for which politics are salient; and that such groups serve to reinforce and deepen their earlier political outlooks. From this view one might hypothesize that, where politics are salient to group life, as in Ulster, the more involved boys become in their groups they will differ in important political respects from those on the fringes of, or outside, group life.

The difficulty of testing such hypotheses in Northern Ireland springs from the danger this might entail for interviewers and teachers.

Whilst it is possible to ask whether or not boys belong to groups, or gangs, and to enquire whether or not they are members of legal associations, it may be dangerous to ask for the names and activities of any groups. This could raise suspicions about the functions of the interviews (one could be suspected of being a Special Agent for the police) and to angering parents unnecessarily. Worse still, it could involve interviewers with the adult members of illegal organisations which would endanger future research, and, if too much information had been gleaned from school interviews , the lives of interviewers. Hence, no information was sought or collected concerning involvement in illegal organizations.

In both the Secondary and Primary school surveys boys were simply asked whether or not they belonged to a local gang, or group, without being asked to specify the name or activities of such groupings. Those replying that they belonged to groups were able to specify whether they felt at the centre of group life, near the centre, or a good bit from the centre. Those replying that they felt at the centre have been called 'leaders', not because they were all actual leaders, but because they thought of themselves as belonging to the leading group and were probably leadership material. In both samples approximately half the boys replied that they did not belong to a gang, or group, (outsiders). Approximately one-fifth said they felt at the centre of their group (leaders). Only five per cent belonged to a group, but felt a good bit from the centre (followers), whilst the remainder said that they were near the centre of their groups (supporters). In Ulster boys appear to be either very involved in a group or stand aside altogether. There were virtually no differences between religions regarding gang, or group, membership.

Belonging, or not belonging, to a gang or group, makes little difference to how a boy feels about Government. The Catholic gang leaders are slightly more negative to Government than others. For instance, 35 per cent of Primary school leaders are negative to Government compared to 22 per cent of supporters; and 45 per cent of Catholic Secondary school leaders are either grudging or malevolent in their views of Government compared to 29 per cent of outsiders. But involvement in a gang, or group, has greater consequences for discord attitudes, particularly in the Catholic Secondary schools, where leaders are much more committed to physical violence than those outside group life. Among Catholic Primary schoolboys the leaders are more violent in outlook than other group members and outsiders. (See Table IX.1).

Table IX.1: Friendship Groups and Attitudes to Discord

	Protestants				Catholics			
	Leader	Supporter	Follower	Outsider	Leader	Supporter	Follower	Outsider
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary								
Violent	53	53	56	49	68	67	54	56
Peaceful	45	46	44	49	25	27	43	43
No answer	2	1	-	2	7	6	3	1
Secondary								
Violent	76	71	62	66	75	70	48	54
Peaceful	23	25	34	31	23	30	49	43
No answer	1	4	4	3	2	-	3	3

Much has been written recently in Ulster, and particularly in Belfast, about the rise of the Tartan gangs. They appeared first in the Shankill Road in the late 1960s, but only since 1971 have they risen to prominence. They form as many as fourteen large gangs throughout Belfast and each is identified by its own tartan. Members are

between ten and twenty years of age, probably younger in many cases, and dress in denim jacket, jeans, and leather boots when possible. The tartan they adopt could be displayed as a scarf, handkerchief, tie, or just a strip of material attached to a belt or clothing. The name "Tartan" has been prefixed by the name of the area of operations such as "Shankill Tartans", "Woodstock Tartans", and "Falls Tartans". Other Tartan gangs have nicknames such as "The Nurks" and "The Shamrocks". They each claim to protect their own territory and several of them are highly organized with leaders and section commanders.[4] The gangs generally view themselves as fair fighters but see gangs of the other religion as using more violent methods.[5] Recruitment of Tartan members to adult organisations such as the IRA Provisionals and the Ulster Defence Association accelerated after the introduction of internment and Direct Rule from Westminster. The Tartans are generally seen as a product of more violent times.[6] Although many adults label Tartan members as "hooligans" they have been seen by others as playing a vital part in the protection of the area they claim to control. This is some indication that, in times of disorder, youth groups and adults are drawn together in defence and in the pursuit of political goals.

Since the Tartan gang upsurge to prominence took place in 1971 it might be hypothesized that schoolboys in Belfast, who proclaim themselves to be members of gangs or groups, will be much more violent in outlook than their co-religionists in the quieter parts of Ulster. Among both Protestant and Catholic Secondary school leaders there are virtually no differences regarding disorder between boys in Belfast and beyond. But Primary school leaders and supporters are more likely to approve the use of violence in politics when they live in Belfast. (See Table IX.2). This is some indication that the Tartan group activity in

Belfast in 1971 was not fully underway when the Secondary school sample was collected in early 1971, but had involved the Primary schoolboys by early 1972. It is plausible that the Secondary schoolboys were also caught in the upsurge of "gang warfare" by late 1971-early 1972.

Table IX.2: Friendship Group by Belfast/Beyond and Attitudes to Discord

	BELFAST			BEYOND BELFAST		
	Leader	Supporter	Outsider	Leader	Supporter	Outsider
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary Protestants						
Violent	83	78	67	35	40	39
Peaceful	15	22	31	65	60	60
No answer	2	-	2	-	-	1
Primary Catholics						
Violent	87	94	72	70	51	50
Peaceful	12	6	28	30	49	49
No answer	1	-	-	-	-	1

The groups, or gangs, of schoolboys most likely to be in contact with illegal adult organisations are probably most readily found in the segregated working class areas since such movements have not flourished so easily in middle class and/or integrated housing areas. One might hypothesise therefore that working class involvement in group life will have more violent consequences than organising middle class boys into voluntary associations. In fact, the working class leaders are more violent than their middle class counterparts in every case. (See Table IX.3). There are much larger differences regarding disorder between such boys than exists between social classes generally. Working class leaders appear to be most responsible for raising the level of violence approval among schoolboys. This suggests, at a minimum, that the

vast majority of working class schoolboys who take the responsibility of leading others do not see disorder reduction as part of their function.

Table IX.3: Friendship Groups by Social Class and Attitudes to Discord

	Working Class				Middle Class			
	Leader	Supporter	Follower	Outsider	Leader	Supporter	Follower	Outsider
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Protestant Primary								
Violent	62	58	67	48	40	45	47	50
Peaceful	37	42	33	49	56	55	53	48
No answer	1	-	-	3	4	-	-	2
Catholic Primary								
Violent	82	77	59	53	56	62	48	63
Peaceful	18	23	41	46	35	37	48	37
No answer	-	-	-	1	9	1	4	-
Protestant Secondary								
Violent	82	80	89	72	69	64	43	58
Peaceful	18	16	11	19	30	34	50	40
No answer	-	4	-	9	1	2	7	2
Catholic Secondary								
Violent	81	73	49	59	71	66	47	49
Peaceful	18	27	51	40	26	34	47	47
No answer	1	-	-	1	3	-	6	4

As noted earlier (Chapter VIII) some schoolboys are more prone to identify with violent political viewpoints when they are surrounded by a majority of their own co-religionists, and least likely to do so when in a religious minority. One might hypothesize that the same will hold true for gangs: leaders and supporters will be much more likely to justify political violence when they are in control of their own "patch" and have little to fear from incursions by gangs of the other religion. This is borne out in every case among Protestants and Catholics in each school group. Schoolboy approval of disorder appears to be raised by membership

of gangs particularly where the gang operates freely in an area where their own religion is in a majority. Schoolboy gangs, surrounded by their "own kind" do not become any less violent either through safety of numbers or the constraints of the adult community.

Exponents of the hooligan theory of violence in Northern Ireland argue that boys who are ready to throw bricks and petrol bombs in what appears as political disorder do so because they are predisposed to violence in non-political contexts too. Survey evidence reveals that, before the troubles, people in Northern Ireland were generally as law abiding as their English neighbours and that, political grievances aside, Catholics were as law abiding as Protestants.[7] When questioned about non-political violence approximately 60 per cent of boys disapproved of breaking windows in empty buildings and approximately 70 per cent disapproved of throwing stones at other boys <u>when no political overtones were attached to the questions.</u> Approximately 15 per cent replied "depends" to these two questions (indicating a sectarian motivation perhaps) and three per cent "don't know". Only approximately 15 per cent gave a firm indication that they regarded such activities as justified in any circumstances. Thus no large hooligan element appears. What is important in this context is whether the leaders of gangs or groups are more socially, as well as politically, violent than their supporters, followers, and those outside gang life. In fact, in reply to all questions relating to violence, political and social, the leaders are highest in approving such actions. The responses from leaders and outsiders are furthest apart (see Table IX.4). There is a general rise in the rejection of social violence as one moves from gang leaders, through supporters and followers, to those outside gang life. The same general pattern may be observed regarding attitudes to riots. (See Table IX.5). The proportions replying that they would move away from

Table IX.4: Difference Indexes between Leaders and Outsiders regarding attitudes to .....

	Primary		Secondary	
	Protestant	Catholic	Protestant	Catholic
... breaking windows in empty buildings	+19	+23	+18	+25
... throwing stones at other boys	+21	+37	+21	+21
... riots (leaders more ready to 'join in')	+32	+31	+27	+27

Table IX.5: Friendship Groups and Attitudes to Riots

	Protestants			Catholics		
	Leader	Supporter	Outsider	Leader	Supporter	Outsider
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary						
Move away	42	49	67	24	41	55
Watch from where I was	9	10	8	10	10	8
Go closer	5	8	7	9	7	6
Join in	45	33	18	56	39	30
No answer	9	-	-	1	3	1
Secondary						
Move away	22	39	43	17	29	42
Watch from where I was	18	18	21	8	15	14
Go closer	5	9	8	5	8	6
Join in	54	33	27	67	48	38
No answer	1	1	1	3	-	-

a riot generally rise steadily between leaders and those outside group life. The leaders exert greatest influence upon the members of groups because they are leaders. It is noteworthy therefore that the greatest approval of violence of any kind should emanate from gang leaders in a violent situation. Perhaps they helped to create such an environment. Alternatively, perhaps the violent atmosphere brought more violent boys to the fore. In the Ulster context groups can be as easily disloyal as loyal to the regime. Traditional concepts of community building, involving youth clubs and other forms of youth organisation, may heighten their sense of effectiveness in opposing the regime rather than doing things their sponsors might otherwise approve.

Adult-Created Youth Groups

In a country where the right of the elected Government to rule is hardly ever questioned youth organisations and activities are thought of as being complementary as far as building support for Constitution and regime are concerned. But in a land where widespread discord exists about basic political issues one expects that some youth organisations must function to recruit children and young people into the on-going political conflict. Since it was felt unwise to ask boys whether or not they were members, or junior members, of illegal organisations they were asked about membership in the Junior Orange Association, marching with Orange bands, and playing Gaelic Athletic Association (G.A.A.) games.

At the annual conference of the Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations the Church of Ireland Bishop of Clogher (Protestant) said that the Orange Order was "... something between an old-fashioned Sunday School, and a not very efficient Mafia".[8] But according to one writer of Orangeism - A New Historical Approach, the

Orange Order is "Neither Mafia Nor Moron";

> The Orange Order has always been something of a chopping block in Ulster Society. It has been blamed for bigotry, intolerance, rowdiness and downright stupidity. It has been maligned by those "liberal minded" people who regard it as a divisive influence in Ulster life and by some politicians who claim that is the malevolent force behind the Stormont "throne". Every repressive governmental decision, every biased utterance of an Orange brother, every noisy assembly has been described by some antagonist as being Orange inspired. 9

The two main aims of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland are to maintain the Protestant witness in Ulster and to maintain the British connection. Its aims are both religious and political. Although many persons join the Order for political reasons there are many others who proclaim to see the Order as primarily a religiously orientated institution in both purpose and practice.[10] The Loyalty survey (1968) found that 47 per cent of Ulster adults thought that the Orange Order stood for the Protestant religion, and 26 per cent that it stood for a Protestant and Unionist regime. Only one per cent saw the Order as standing primarily for friendship and charity.[11] According to Tony Gray "... there is a double-think running right through the fabric of the Orange Institution which blinds its members to the fact that their written aims, objects and aspirations bear little relationship to the actions of some, at any rate, of their members."[12] Certainly the lofty sentiments of the general qualifications for membership of the Order - such as, ever abstaining from all uncharitable words, actions, or sentiments towards Roman Catholic brethern - seem difficult to reconcile with some lines of Orange-Loyalist songs such as - 'You've never seen a better Taig* than with a bullet in his back.'[13] But the Order is not responsible for every

* Slang for Catholic.

extreme statement of members, or, in this case, ex-member.

The Orange Order, which has a membership of approximately 90,000 adults in Ulster, recently issued a new Covenant of Loyalty which Orangemen throughout Ulster were asked to sign. The Covenant pledges the defence of Northern Ireland by all lawful means, but warns that if the Constitution is suspended against the will of the people, action for its restoration will be taken "without tie or bond".[14] This appears to justify the use of physical violence in politics. One might expect, therefore, that any youthful association with the Orange Order would make it more likely that disorder would appear as a proper action in certain circumstances.

The Junior Orange Association, for Protestant boys between the ages of eight and seventeen, although it has some autonomy, is under the direct control of the senior body. Recently (1972) there was such a "vast flow" of young people into the ranks of the Association that they hope to form a Junior Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland in 1973.[15] Members of the Junior Association are, it would appear, socialized into the "principles of the big drum" (showing the colours anywhere in Ulster) since, despite warnings that parades in certain parts of Belfast might cause trouble near Easter, a Junior Orange Band marched straight up to the fringe of a Catholic area of the City and continued to march up and down for two hours before leaving for their parade.[16]

If the Junior Orange Association successfully socializes members into an active role in the on-going political discord regarding the nature and boundaries of the state one might expect boys who are members to be more positive to a Government intent on keeping the British connection, and British way of life. Alternatively, junior members may be taught to regard the Government as too accommodating towards Catholics and Eire and thus be lower in peetive affect than other Protestants

Two-fifths of Primary and approximately one-third of Secondary Protestant schoolboys replied that they were members of the Junior Orange Association. That ten per cent more were members among the Primary schoolboys in 1972 than among Secondary schoolboys in 1971 gives credence to the statements regarding an upsurge in membership over the last year. There were few differences between members and other Protestant boys regarding affect to Government. (D.I. = 10 per cent). But the Junior Orange members were much more violent in discord attitudes than other Protestants (See Table IX.6). In the Primary schools 64 per cent of members approved the use of physical violence in politics to 42 per cent of non-members; 84 per cent of Secondary school members felt it was right to use force to keep Ulster Protestant to 63 per cent of non-members.

Table IX.6: The Junior Orange Association and Attitudes to Discord

	Members	Non-members but Protestant
Primary	%	%
Violent	64	42
Peaceful	32	58
No answer	4	-
Secondary		
Violent	84	63
Peaceful	15	35
No answer	1	1

Research findings indicate that many boys who are not officially members of the Junior Orange Association take part in Orange parades.[17] These are not simply younger boys not yet eligible for membership, but those in the same age group as Junior members. Marching is regarded, in Ulster, as a precious part of one's heritage not to be surrendered without an intense and prolonged struggle and without an exceptionally good reason. To quote the Bishop of Clogher once more:

"During the last three years marching and flag waving have been, in my opinion, the curse of Ulster", and "They are activities which give the maximum opportunities for displaying aggressiveness, self-assertion, and group arrogance."[18] To others they are an excellent escape-valve for pent up aggression in a way which does no physical harm. But however a schoolboy views an Orange Parade - once the parade is under way and the music begins - influences are probably at work upon his civic character which are likely to make him more steadfast in his demands for the 'Protestant way of life' than he was before the parade began. Or if he only marches part of the way with the Orange band - then to stand aside and hear the music of band after band, and watch thousands of Orangemen in full regalia - probably creates in him a more inflexible political personality than would otherwise have faced the unbargainable political issues that are Ulster's. Thus, one might hypothesize, that schoolboys who have marched in an Orange Parade will have somewhat different attitudes to Government and discord than their co-religionists who have never marched. They are probably more committed to violence as a political means. It is not so obvious that they will be more positively oriented to Government, however, since the Government has banned parades on occasion.

Approximately half the boys in both samples had taken part in Orange Parades. At least ten per cent of Primary and 20 per cent of Secondary schoolboys taking part were not members of the Junior Orange Association. There are virtually no differences between marchers and non-marchers regarding affect to Government, but marchers are much more likely to favour political disorder than other co-religionists. (See Table IX.7). For instance, 82 per cent of Secondary school marchers justified violence for a Protestant Ulster compared to only 53 per cent

of non-marchers. Marching in step with the Orange drums and accordians may promote disharmony and may make it more likely that the roll of drums will become a volley of gun-fire. At a minimum one may conclude that membership in the Order and marching strengthens predispositions to violence.

Table IX.7: Marching with Orange Parades and Attitudes to Discord

	Protestants Only	
	Marcher	Non-marcher
	%	%
Primary		
violent	61	38
peaceful	35	61
No answer	4	1
Secondary		
Violent	82	53
Peaceful	17	45
No answer	1	2

A cartoon in an Ulster political review (Fortnight, 25 June, 1971) shows two Orangemen deeply engaged in a conversation in which one of them says, "I'm trying to organise a parade to get the government to ban government bans on parades." The Dungiven Affair (when Orangemen broke a Government ban on parades) shows, however, that some Orangemen, at least, are willing to assert their right to march through Nationalist areas whatever the Government rules. From this it might be hypothesized that schoolboys who had marched in Orange Parades would be readier to defy Government bans on parades than other co-religionists. When asked what they would do if a Government banned a parade planned by Protestants, twice as many of the boys who had marched replied they would defy the ban than non-marching Protestants. Thus marching in Orange parades is associated with non-compliance with Governments as well as with disorder.

The Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) is not the Catholic counterpart of the Orange Order. Many of the Catholic children in the pilot studies had never heard of the organisation. But most Catholic children and young people did know something about hurley and gaelic football; that these games were played in Eire and mainly by Catholics in Northern Ireland. An eminent member of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) wrote of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) as having, as an underlying idea, "... the physical fitness of the youth of the Nation as a preparation for achieving political independence by physical force methods."[19] Whilst many members of the GAA may disagree with this view it does lend plausibility to the belief that boys who play gaelic games will be more negative towards the Government of the "deviant" part of Ireland, and readier to resort to arms to take the Border out of Irish politics. Although the GAA have now abolished the rule that members must not play other games there is little doubt that English games are unpopular and that people in the GAA are likely to be exposed to Republican sentiments.

Approximately three-quarters of Catholic boys played some GAA games. The Primary school Catholics who played are more negative to Government (D.I. = 17 per cent) than co-religionists who did not partake. Both Primary and Secondary school participants are more violent in discord attitudes. (D.I.'s: Primary = 11 per cent; Secondary = 23 per cent). There is some evidence to suggest that participation in GAA games prepares youth for "... physical force methods" in politics. If GAA sportsmasters do not have this aim in view they may, at a minimum, be strengthening violent predispositions. (See Table IX.8).

In a land where 1690 and 1916 are remembered so well one would expect some agencies to recruit children and young people into the con-

tinuing political discord. Even if the Orange Order and the Gaelic

Table IX.8: Gaelic Athletic Association Games and Attitudes to Discord

	Catholics Only			
	Primary		Secondary	
	Plays GAA games	Non-participant	Plays GAA games	Non-participant
	%	%	%	%
Violent	64	53	66	43
Peaceful	36	46	32	55
No answer	-	1	2	2

Athletic Association were not designed to be such recruitment agencies they may, nevertheless, be functioning as such.

The Mass Media

Newspapers, radio, television, magazines and other communication media transmit various sorts of messages which affect political attitudes. The media can provide various group memberships by catering for the needs of particular sections of the population. Defining the political messages of newspapers by their religious readership, as can be done in Ulster, indicates that some part of the communication media serves to strengthen existing group links.

The schoolboy, through formal education, is introduced to the written word and to a wider understanding of the spoken word. Thus, the mass media is capable of making a greater appeal to him as his knowledge of language and literature increases. Research study of the mass media - television, press and radio - has, in the last twenty years or so, concentrated on two main areas of concern: (1) the place

of the mass media within society;[20] (2) functional theories of the media.[21] Subsumed within these broad approaches have been such research interests as the 'two-step flow of communication';[22] the effects of audience reaction upon the communicator;[23] and the 'uses and gratifications' approach.[24] The large amount of empirical evidence that has been gathered has failed to substantiate the extravagant claims often made regarding the effects of the mass media upon audiences. According to Klapper, "Mass communications ordinarily do not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather function among and through a nexus of mediating influences."[25]

When studying the potential influence of the mass media upon civic learning a number of factors must be borne in mind: the transmitted messages generally originated in agencies outwith the communications industry; messages may be distorted as they pass through a line of communicators;[26] the transmitted information goes through at least two steps before it effects the receiver;[27] most messages tend to reinforce existing attitudes rather than create new ones;[28] the messages received are interpreted in a social setting.

Although the mass media are a more distant and less effective influence upon attitudes than local friends and conditions one might expect to find some variations in the attitudes of those more, or less, open to the influence of the media. For instance, a person reading three newspapers may be expected to be varied in some important respects from those seeing only one. Those more open to information might be more understanding and therefore more tolerant of others. Schoolboys seeing more than one newspaper frequently probably see either the Newsletter (mainly Unionist) or the Irish News (mainly Nationalist) and the Belfast Telegraph which attempts to be ecumenical.

They may also see British newspapers which are generally used more for sporting and entertainments value than for political coverage. Most people in Belfast (1966) used the press media for sports and announcements of birth, marriages and deaths, before turning to other, including political, news.[29] Thirty-four per cent of Protestant Secondary schoolboys saw the Newsletter frequently to only seven per cent of Catholics of the same age; 59 per cent of Catholic Secondary schoolboys looked at the Irish News 'a lot' (frequently) compared to only three per cent of Protestant boys of the same age; 62 per cent of Protestant and 48 per cent of Catholic Secondary schoolboys saw the evening Belfast Telegraph 'a lot' and approximately 40 per cent in both religions saw some other newspaper frequently. Approximately one-fifth of Secondary schoolboys saw only one newspaper frequently, which is probably the Belfast Telegraph in most cases. Selling and delivering the "Tele" is the evening occupation of thousands of schoolboys. Approximately two-fifths of boys see two newspapers and only four per cent claim to see three frequently. Degrees of open-ness to newspaper media has no noticeable effect upon either affect to Government or attitudes to discord.

Televiolence

Schoolboys watching a television programme on mathematics may be questioned later to determine what they have learned. But when they view entertainment or news programmes it is more difficult to discover what has been learned due to the lack of precise measures of concept development in the social sciences. One type of television content that has aroused much interest is of a violent nature. In a study of one hundred hours of American television, shown when children watch most frequently, violent happenings included murders, attempted murders,

suicides, attempted suicides, gun fights, persons shot and stabbed, slug-gings, stranglings, people pushed or falling off cliffs, cars running off cliffs, attempts to run over pedestrians, mob scenes, and robberies.[30] Although the mass media do not create violence, as such, they may re-inforce aggressive and destructive impulses and teach the morality and methods of violence; violence on television may make it more likely that the already aggressive boys will also be the most likely to remember aggressive acts seen on television; and when the level of violence rises in the community schoolboys may then remember how violent acts were carried out.

In Ulster, a prominent politician assured fellow politicians of helping to create the conditions of violence and the mass media of helping sustain it.[31] A consultant psychiatrist told a murder trial at the Belfast City Commission that the 17-year old youth accused of stabbing a night-watchman was probably trying to identify himself with some of the characters he had seen earlier in a war film on television.[32] As noted earlier (Chapter IV) a supervisor of children's television in Ulster emphasised that care is taken to avoid showing children violent actions which they might imitate, although violence on television "... may make it become accepted as something ordinary and unremarkable."[33] But children and schoolboys do not confine their television viewing to children's programmes and, especially over the age of twelve, impose patterns on their use of television that are learned outwith the family.[34] And when asked to name programmes "where there is a lot of fighting" children frequently quote the 'News' and Current Affairs pro-grammes.[35]

In a society containing a lot of violence it is a circular question to ask whether children are learning about society or violence

from television. They are probably learning about both through television and experience of the society. What may be important here, however, is whether there are any substantial differences in attitudes to violence between those who watch different types of television programmes and between those who watch local televiolence more and less frequently. The schoolboys were asked to indicate the type of television programmes they 'look at a lot'. This produced the following distribution:

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
	%	%	%	%
News	25	31	25	30
Entertainments	47	43	59	41
Sport	48	58	47	56
War and Crime films	56	64	58	61
No T.V.	2	5	2	6

Percentages do not add to 100 because many boys frequently watch more than one programme type.

The number of programmes watched "a lot" has little, or very limited, effect upon basic political attitudes. The type of programmes watched has no influence upon how a boy feels about Government. But there is a limited suggestion that watching war and crime films frequently is associated with higher levels of disorder approval. Among those watching television programmes the "War and Crime" addicts are more likely to favour violent political solutions in three cases out of four. (See Table IX.9). In one case, the Catholic Primary schoolboys, they are joined in disorder approval level by those who watch television "News" regularly. War and Crime films are watched, in Ulster, more frequently than any other type of television. Such films may be popular because boys can relate them to their own lives. Certainly they do

not cause violence since they are also watched by boys where disorders do not occur.

Table IX.9: Type of T.V. programme watched Frequently and Attitudes to Discord

	News	Entertainment	Sport	War & Crime
	%	%	%	%
Primary Protestant				
Violent	54	48	53	59
Peaceful	45	50	46	41
No answer	1	2	1	-
Primary Catholics				
Violent	67	55	59	65
Peaceful	33	42	41	35
No answer	-	3	-	-
Secondary Protestants				
Violent	65	63	68	72
Peaceful	30	35	29	27
No answer	5	2	3	1
Secondary Catholics				
Violent	59	60	62	63
Peaceful	37	38	36	36
No answer	4	2	2	1

Following the foregoing limited evidence one might wish to hypothesize that schoolboys who specifically state that they usually watch riotious happenings in Ulster on television will be more likely to (1) favour political violence and (2) join in a riot should one break out near their homes. Approximately 75 per cent of Primary and 90 per cent of Secondary schoolboys "usually watch" Ulster televiolence. This leaves only a small minority who did not "usually watch" such coverage, but of sufficient numbers for comparisons with the other group. Among Catholics of all ages those who usually watched Ulster disorders

on television were more negatively oriented to Government (D.I.s: Primary = 18 per cent; Secondary = 19 per cent). Reciprocally those who watched local violence less frequently were more inclined to feel that Government was always willing to help people like them. (See Table IX.10). In every case those who report frequent disorder viewing are more violent in discord attitudes. (See Table IX.11). The most reliable comparisons can be made where the largest proportion reported that they usually did not watch Ulster disorders on television. (Catholic Primary school - 11 per cent not usually watching). Here there is a difference index of 21 per cent regarding discord attitudes with approximately three-fifths of frequent viewers of Ulster disorders favouring disorder themselves to only two-fifths of those boys who did not usually watch. Watching such programmes may also have consequences for attitudes to riots. In every case the boys who usually watch local violence on television are readiest to indulge in it should a riot break out near their homes. (See Table IX.12).

These findings regarding televiolence indicate that the mass media's exposure of violent situations may be having a greater effect upon schoolboys than has often been imagined. At a minimum there is no evidence that boys exposed to violence on television will react against disorder in their local context. But it must also be remembered that as many as half the boys who don't usually watch Ulster televiolence are ready to justify violence in politics and that the coverage of disorderly events on television may have less effect upon attitudes than would popular rumours in their absence.

Budge and O'Leary, commenting upon two general findings that emerged from their analysis of media usage among Belfast adults in 1966 state:

Table IX.10: Ulster Disorders on Television and Affect to Government

	Protestant			Catholic		
	Usually Watch	Usually Don't Watch	Don't have TV	Usually Watch	Usually Don't Watch	Don't have TV
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary						
POSITIVE	63	62	50	31	48	12
positive	32	35	12	36	30	18
negative	3	2	-	18	13	18
NEGATIVE	1	-	-	14	7	-
No answer	1	1	28*	1	2	52*
Secondary						
POSITIVE	32	35	35	16	33	27
positive	52	55	50	47	43	42
negative	12	8	11	25	17	23
NEGATIVE	4	2	-	10	3	5
No answer	-	-	4	2	4	3

* The large percentages of primary boys giving 'no answer' in the 'Don't have television' column is probably the function of being asked to give an identical answer on two occasions. This question was the second about TV programmes. The younger boys probably felt that, having given this information in an earlier question, it was unnecessary to give it again.

TABLE IX.11: Ulster Disorders on Television and Attitudes to Discord

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Usually Watch	Usually don't Watch	Usually Watch	Usually don't Watch
	%	%	%	%
Primary				
Violent	56	48	64	43
Peaceful	43	52	35	53
No answer	1	-	1	4
Secondary				
Violent	70	53	62	46
Peaceful	28	42	36	51
No answer	2	5	2	3

TABLE IX.12: Ulster Disorders on TV and Attitudes to Riots

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Usually Watch	Usually don't Watch	Usually Watch	Usually don't Watch
	%	%	%	%
Primary				
Move away	56	65	46	57
Watch from where I was	6	10	7	15
Go closer	6	2	7	5
Join in	30	23	39	20
No answer	2	-	1	3
Secondary				
Move away	38	61	33	54
Watch from where I was	19	21	13	8
Go closer	8	7	6	5
Join in	35	11	47	31
No answer	-	-	1	2

> Political events percolate through newspapers, giving residents some inkling of local issues. But purposive information-seeking through the media was limited, particularly in regard to local politics. Yet limited as such information-seeking appears, it was for over ninety per cent of residents the prime source of their knowledge about local affairs. Little wonder then that most were unable to specify either their councillors' names or their councillors' issue stands; or that the accuracy of residents' views about the parties depended more on traditional stereotypes than on their contemporary positions. Under such circumstances the Unionist moderates required to work very hard to get through to the masses. The evidence shows that their efforts were not sufficient. 36

One reason why views of politics depend more on "traditional stereotypes" than on contemporary politics is that people prefer the consistent, undisturbed, psychological states cognitive consonance gives to the disturbing emotional upsets connected with opinion change. Also, the more traditional picture is resistent to change because the communicators bringing news of changes (e.g. the Press) are distant and impersonal, whilst the people closer at hand, who hold traditional views, are personal and therefore more powerful in opinion reinforcement.

Among the boys interviewed in these surveys degrees of openness to media of any type had little or no influence upon basic political attitudes. Limited evidence suggested that watching War and Crime films may be associated in some way with violence approval. On the other hand, being in a gang or group, and thus under the influence of one's peers, is much more likely to influence political attitudes. There was, however, one exception to general beliefs and findings about the influence of the mass media. Those who watched local televiolence were more likely to hold violent political views, and ready to take part in a riot, than boys of the same age and religion who did not usually watch such coverage of street violence. The main reason for the apparent increased

influence of the television media, in this case, is probably due to boys watching people like themselves on television. What gang member, watching either his friends or enemies in a street riot situation could sit comfortably at home? Such programmes therefore might be expected to have a greater audience effect than those portraying more distant politicians and events. Showing local violence on television fuses the two steps of information (through the media and local opinion leaders) into one complementary message, thus making attitude and behaviour responses much more likely than those to only television messages. When television becomes the grapevine through which local leaders reach their potential supporters its influence appears to increase.

Summary of Affect to Government

Using the same methods described in the summary of Chapter V reveals very few characteristics, in this chapter, that may have an important influence upon attitudes to Government. Among Catholics of all ages, being in the leading group of a gang or organization appears to be related to decreases in positive affect to Government. The Catholic schoolboy leaders who emerge in a local situation are unlikely to persuade their followers that the civil authorities will treat them sympathetically. Living in a home that has no television may have different effects for Catholics and Protestants; younger Protestants without television at home are more positive to Government than their age group co-religionists; Catholics without access to this media at home are more negative than their co-religionists. Lack of television at home may signify greater poverty at home and malevolence to Government. It may also be associated with a more discriminating attitude towards the communication media. Whilst the finding may be of interest to social scientists it is not very important for politicians since only three per cent of boys report having no television at home. The Catholic boys who don't play Gaelic games are more positive to Government than players. This is not a function of a Belfast GAA sportsfield being taken over by the army since interviews were completed before that event. Boys who do not play GAA games may find it easier to support the Government of Northern Ireland since they may be less in touch with Republican sentiments.

Summary of Discord Attitudes

The most important predictors of discord attitudes appear among all the boys concerned. Those associated with increases in disorder approval are: (1) being a working-class leader of a gang or group; (2) being a Belfast leader of a gang or group; (3) being a member of the Junior Orange Association and (4) having marched in an Orange Parade. Indications of decreases in violence approval among all the boys concerned are found among Catholics who do not play gaelic games and among Protestants who do not march in Orange Parades.

Characteristics Associated with Increases (+) and Decreases (-) in Approval of Violent Political Discord among all the boys concerned*

CHARACTERISTICS	DIFFERENCE INDEX FROM THE MEAN DISTRIBUTION IN DISCORD ATTITUDES			
	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
Working-class leader of peer group	11+	14+	22+	20+
Belfast leader of a peer group	32+	11+	27+	18+
Marched with Orange Parade	12+	14+		
Has not marched with Orange Parade	14-	17-		
Member of Junior Orange Association	15+	19+		
Does not play G.A.A. games			9-	18-

* Of course, only Protestants were concerned with the Orange questions, and Catholics with the GAA question.

The next most important indicators of violent political attitudes investigated in this chapter - those which appear in three cases out of four - are: (1) being a Belfast peer group supporter;

(2) being a working-class supporter in a group; (3) being a group leader where co-religionists are in a majority; (4) being a supporter in a group in an area with mixed religious proportions. Indicators of a lowering of violent predispositions in three cases out of four are: (1) being outside gang or group life where the other religion is in the majority; (2) usually not watching Ulster violence on television.

Characteristics Associated with Increases (+) and Decreases (-) in approval of violent political discord appearing in three cases out of four

CHARACTERISTICS	DIFFERENCE INDEX FROM THE MEAN DISTRIBUTION IN DISCORD ATTITUDES			
	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
	%	%	%	%
Supporter in Belfast peer group	27+	-	34+	16+
Working-class supporter in peer group	-	12+	17+	13+
Group leader where co-religionists are in a majority	-	11+	36+	20+
Supporter in peer group in mixed religion areas	31+	-	22+	19+
Outside group life where other religion in majority	22-	-	26-	25-
Does not usually watch Ulster violence on television	-	15-	17-	14-

There are no other characteristics, not already mentioned in this chapter, that are associated with either increases or decreases in violent discord predispositions among <u>all</u> Protestants. Among <u>all</u> Catholics, however, there are a number of possible influences not already encountered in this summary. Those associated with increases in violent political outlook are: (1) being a peer group leader; (2) being a

peer group supporter where a Catholic majority exists; (3) being a peer group leader outside Belfast. The major influence associated with a reduction in violent predispositions among all Catholics is being a group supporter where a Protestant majority exists.

	Catholic Only	
	Primary	Secondary
	%	%
Peer group leaders	12+	15+
Peer group leader outside of Belfast	10+	13+
Peer group supporter where Catholic majority	34+	15+
Peer group supporter where Protestant majority	18-	17-

A number of characteristics exist - in two cases out of four (one Catholic and one Protestant) - which are associated with discord attitudes in one way or the other. The only one associated with increases in violent attitudes is being outside group life although living in Belfast. A number of characteristics are associated with decreases in violence approval and appear in two cases out of four.

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
	%	%	%	%
Outside group life in Belfast	16+	-	12+	-
Group supporter outside Belfast	13-	-	12-	-
Outwith group life outside Belfast	13-	-	12-	-
Group leader / other religion in majority	15-	-	13-	-
Middle class and Outside group-life	-	12-	-	11-

Footnotes: Chapter IX

1. See "Sons and Haters : Ulster Youth inConflict", Sue Jenvey, New Society, 20 July, 1972.

2. Peter Rose, "Student Opinion on the 1956 Presidential Election". Public Opinion Quarterly, 21, (1957), 371-76; Theodore Newcomb, Personality and Social Change, (New York: Dryden Press, 1943); and Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization, op. cit., ch. five.

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Chapter X

Social and Political Attitudes

There is no guarantee that political behaviour is a reflection of long-held social and political attitudes rather than a response to more immediate conditions. But when certain social behaviours persist over time and in a variety of social settings one may be reasonably sure that they are anchored to deeply held attitudes. In Ulster, persistent behaviour towards Government and discord have appeared under a variety of conditions and in different parts of the Province. Persons of widely differing social and economic backgrounds have responded similarly to political phenomena which leads one to suspect that entrenched social and political attitudes may be more important in explaining other attitudes and behaviour than some social-structural features. A number of studies have traced relationships between social and political attitudes[1] and between political attitudes and behaviour.[2] It will be the purpose of this chapter to investigate basic political attitudes in the light of social dispositions such as trust, optimism, and respect for social authority, and also to relate other political attitudes, such as deference to different types of leadership, to the basic variables examined herein.

Diffuse Authority Patterns

Eckstein proposes that a Government will be stable if the authority patterns in the segments of social life closest to Government bear a high degree of resemblance to those in Government and if there is a pattern of 'graduated resemblances' between authority patterns in Government and in social authority patterns more distant from

Government.

> Families, schools, and occupational contexts are the most basic (that is, the most absorbing and demanding) segments of life, and the patterns existing in them are bound to affect all other social relations. But perhaps a high degree of authoritarianism in these patterns would not matter from the standpoint of democratic government if there was interposed between them and government certain institutions having mixed authority relations - institutions which might mediate between the pervasive despotism of the primary segments and the pure democracy of government, so that individuals would not be tossed abruptly from stark domination in one segment of life to stark liberty in another. 3

Table X.1: Importance of Obedience to Authority Figures

	Primary		Secondary	
Percentage saying that it is 'very important' for	Protestant	Catholic	Protestant	Catholic
.. children to obey parents	81	73	63	66
.. pupils to obey teachers	73	61	46	44
.. boys to obey priests/ ministers	67	78	35	59
.. workers to obey employers	77	57	71	66
.. citizens to obey Government	66	28	47	23

In order to find how much respect Ulster schoolboys gave to various social and political authorities they were asked how important they felt it was that obedience should be given to specific authority groups. Catholic boys alone reveal a marked departure from attitudes to other social authorities when responding to Government. Although Protestant boys generally render lower obedience to Government than to most social authorities there is a resemblance of response to all authorities among them. Among Catholics, there is a decisive change in authority patterns between political and social life. This

suggests that Catholic boys see a basic incongruence between community and governmental authorities. Government in Northern Ireland before Direct Rule was announced from Westminster was thus more of a political counterpart for the Protestant than for the Catholic community. This is to be expected since Protestants are in the majority, but it may have been disproportionately Protestant. Authority patterns between the Protestant community and Government bear a marked resemblance. Catholics may be more likely to think of themselves as being dominated by Government whilst experiencing greater freedom in community life. Unless a Government of Northern Ireland can be fashioned closer to Catholic community standards, without alienating too many Protestants, sectarian community Government may be the most feasible way of governing Ulster.

One might hypothesize that those who accept authority in social spheres will render highest positive effect to Government and be least inclined to endorse disorder in politics. In fact, as one moves away from the very high levels of respect given to social and political authorities there is a marked and consistent drop in positive effect to Government. This is most clearly seen among those rendering the very highest positive effect to Government (Government will always want to help). Reciprocally, negative effect to Government rises consistently from those stressing the great importance of obedience to social and political authority to those who feel that it is 'not at all important' to obey. An average of 26 per centage points separate the 'great' and 'no respect' groups with the rise in negative affect between them being fairly smooth. Even though the less respectful groups only contain 15 per cent of boys, in most cases, the consistency of trends makes it possible to suggest that losses in respect for any type of authority is

clearly associated with a rise in negative orientations towards Government. (See Table X.2).

As hypothesized, as respect for social and political authority grows, the endorsement of political disorder decreases. A smooth curve drawn on a graph through the disorder approval lines for each specific social authority respect level generally shows a steady rise through 20 to 30 per centage points between those with high respect and those with none. The only exception to this is found in the Protestant Secondary schools where the curve is flatter, rising only ten to 16 per centage points between extremes of authority outlooks. This is in keeping with findings elsewhere in this study as many influences which may affect the attitudes of other boys leave Secondary Protestant schools firm in their outlooks. Although the proportion of boys in the lowest respect groups is small the consistency of the rise in violence approval makes it possible to suggest that respect for authority and more peaceful political outlooks are associated. (See Table X.3).

These findings confirm, to some extent, Morris Fraser's Macbeth Syndrome,[4] in which anti-authority attitudes generalise to include the persons who taught or condoned them by turning a blind eye. As far as Government is concerned, the concurrence applies more to Protestants than to Catholics who generally see a basic incongruence between community and governmental authorities.

Political deference

Bagehot believed that the English political system was stable because the lower classes deferred to the higher classes in political matters.[5] Recent studies argue that deference to high birth, and public school education have important political implications.[6] Kavanagh suggests, however, that many cultural studies have used weak indicators

Table X.2: Percentage with Negative Affect to Government in various Respect Categories

	Great	Lot	Little	None
	%	%	%	%
Protestant Primary				
Respect for Minister	3	4	4	-
Respect for Employer	1	6	28	21
Respect for Parents	2	6	-	24
Respect for Teacher	2	5	7	10
Respect for Government	1	4	11	11
Catholic Primary				
Respect for Priest	32	23		
Respect for Employer	25	26	45	67
Respect for Parents	28	33	38	60
Respect for Teachers	25	25	28	69
Respect for Government	15	14	32	53
Protestant Secondary				
Respect for Minister	14	12	15	26
Respect for Employer	14	13	41	42
Respect for Parents	15	15	28	36
Respect for Teachers	10	14	23	44
Respect for Government	6	14	20	55
Catholic Secondary				
Respect for Priest	30	35	52	44
Respect for Employer	30	38	45	69
Respect for Parents	31	36	56	63
Respect for Teachers	26	34	38	54
Respect for Government	18	21	47	60

Some respect categories contain so few subjects that their response to the affect to Government question has not been included.

Table X.3: Percentage approving disorder in Various Respect categories

	Great	Lot	Little	None
	%	%	%	%
Protestant Primary				
Respect for Minister	51	42	67	
Respect for Employer	49	53	57	71
Respect for Parents	53	35	80	71
Respect for Teachers	47	50	87	76
Respect for Government	45	51	63	83
Catholic Primary				
Respect for Priest	63	47		
Respect for Employer	58	59	64	83
Respect for Parents	62	54	62	60
Respect for Teachers	58	55	72	86
Respect for Government	42	49	66	83
Protestant Secondary				
Respect for Minister	71	67	71	65
Respect for Employer	69	65	87	53
Respect for Parents	69	66	62	86
Respect for Teachers	64	66	85	90
Respect for Government	61	71	80	83
Catholic Secondary				
Respect for Priest	60	61	70	67
Respect for Employer	59	64	55	76
Respect for Parents	60	60	77	69
Respect for Teachers	54	58	74	84
Respect for Government	43	54	72	81

Some Respect Categories contain so few subjects that their response to the disorder question has not been included.

of deference, have linked them poorly to the factors they were supposed to explain, and have emerged with conflicting data in support of deference theories.[7] The Loyalty Survey, probing for attributes most likely to be associated with political deference in Ulster, found that high birth and education were thought the most suitable political qualities.[8] Comparisons between schoolboys and their elders reveal that adults are much readier to defer to political authority of any kind, and that, whereas high birth and education are close favourites among adults, schoolboys clearly choose education as the most suitable grounds for political deference. An additional question put to Secondary schoolboys only regarding the suitability of simply being a Protestant as good grounds for political deference, reveals, as expected, that this was most popular among Protestants and least so among Catholics.

Table X.4: Bases of Political Deference

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Adults	Secondary	Adults	Secondary
Agree with statement:	%	%	%	%
Some people are born to rule	70	26	59	22
People with the best education are best to rule	64	42	66	35
People in upper classes are best to rule	40	11	34	9
Protestants are best to rule	-	59	-	2

Since the bulk of Northern Ireland's Members of Parliament were drawn from the middle classes and because the last two Stormont Prime Ministers had very different social backgrounds one cannot assume that one base of political deference will be more associated with positive affect for Government than another. There are, in fact, few variations between groups deferring to different types of political authority. If anything, those who defer to the upper classes are more posi-

tive to Government. One might more easily hypothesize that those deferring to any kind of authority will be less likely to endorse disorder. This is generally true for both religions. But Protestant boys who accept that simply being a Protestant is sufficient reason for ruling Ulster are 50 per cent readier to endorse disorder for a Protestant Ulster than their co-religionists, who cannot accept so simple a description of a political ruler. Thus, for three-fifths of Protestant Secondary schoolboys the right to rule Ulster is determined primarily by religion and four-fifths of such boys accept violent politics as justified. This suggests that where discord exists over the most basic political values, deference to certain types of authority is limited by issue-stands. For instance, a Protestant in the Vanguard Movement will not defer to high birth or education in a Republican. The greatest amount of deference will therefore be found within communities defined by religious labels. Thus, as Kavanagh suggests, "deference" may be based upon the perceived responsiveness of the political system and its elites rather than upon the political passivity of supporters.[9]

Reasons for supporting the Government

As noted earlier (Chapter IV) Protestants and Catholics may have very different reasons for supporting the Government in Northern Ireland. These reasons, in turn, may have important consequences for how a boy feels about Government and political discord. As expected, no matter what one may say in favour of Government in Northern Ireland, Protestant boys are more likely to accept it than Catholics. Only when the proposition is put that one has to accept Government whatever one thinks is there no difference between Catholic and Protestant boys, with approximately half of each religion accepting this view. When a number of propositions in favour of Government in Northern Ireland were put to

Secondary boys they responded in the following ways:

Table X.5: Reasons for supporting the Government (Secondary boys only)

	Protestants agreeing	Catholics agreeing	Difference
	%	%	%
It gives us a Queen to rule over us	71	17	-54
It usually tries to do good things	65	41	-24
It is what the people vote for	55	39	-16
We've got to accept it whatever we think	48	48	-
It usually provides lots of benefits	47	32	-15
It is in the hands of men who are good leaders	36	19	-17
It has been with us for a long time	34	20	-14

The proposition in favour of the Government concerning the Queen is most divisive suggesting that the regimes symbolic capacities do not increase its legitimacy. Whilst Catholic support for the Government is no where very strong, two-fifths find it possible to support it when it "tries to do good things" or when it can be seen as "what the people vote for". When these figures are compared to those of the Loyalty adult Survey[10] marked differences appear. Both Protestant and Catholic adults were much readier to endorse these reasons for supporting Government in 1968 than were Secondary boys in 1971. This may mean that people see more reasons for supporting Government as they mature or, what is more likely, that Government fell in the estimation of the population between 1968 and 1971. Apart from passive obedience the most likely way of raising Catholic support for Government is through the impression that a beneficent Government has popular consent expressed through voting. This suggests that Catholics in the

Northern Ireland Executive must become a regular feature rather than an intermittent gesture of goodwill.

As expected, those who endorse any reason for supporting the Government are also more positive towards political authority. There are few differences in levels of positive affect among boys accepting any reasons for supporting Government. Thus, it would appear that using any of these reasons to increase the legitimacy of Government in Northern Ireland would have an almost equal effect in raising positive feelings to Government among those who accept them. This is not to say that any reason will have an equal effect in increasing legitimacy as there are variations in the proportions of boys supporting Government for different reasons. Findings among Secondary schoolboys suggest that the best way to gain the support of half the Protestant and half the Catholic population is through strong Government leading citizens to believe that they must accept it whatever they think.

One might hypothesize that Catholic boys accepting any reason for supporting Government will be less disorderly. The position among Protestants, however, cannot be regarded as being so straightforward. Many of the reasons for support may, among Protestants, be associated with disorder in upholding a Protestant Ulster. In fact, Catholics who accept any reason for supporting Government are about ten per cent less likely to endorse disorder than those who reject such reasons. On average, only about 50 per cent of Catholics accepting statements in favour of Government endorse the rightness of disorder. Among Protestants, as expected, the picture is more complicated. Those who accept Tradition, the Monarchy and Voting as good reasons for supporting Government are readiest to endorse disorder. Those who favour Government because of its leadership and because it tries to do good are less disorderly than

co-religionists rejecting such reasons. These findings suggest that whilst Catholic acceptance of reasons for supporting Government leads them to allegiance, Protestant acceptance of some reasons leads them to Ultraism.[11] This has been amply illustrated by the Protestant Vanguard movement. Their leader, William Craig, stressed both Tradition and Voting (Protestant Ascendancy through simple majority elections) as well as warning that violence could be visited upon those who got in their way.

Social Trust

David Bleakley, former Minister of Community Relations and sole Northern Ireland Labour Party representative in the Assembly elected in June 1973, emphasized that "Acts of Parliament might be very important, but unless they were based on people's trust of one another, they could not bring success."[12] But in Northern Ireland where even the word "sweet" is sometimes used to denote someone who cannot be altogether trusted, levels of faith in other people are low when compared to Britain and America. The Loyalty Survey found that only 39 per cent of adults in Ulster were prepared to trust others compared to 55 per cent in America and 49 per cent in Britain. Nevertheless, there was much more social trust in Ulster in 1968 than in Italy, West Germany, and Mexico, in 1959.[13] Ulster schoolboys, however, were much less trusting in 1971-72 than adults a few years earlier. Less than 20 per cent of schoolboys were prepared to trust others. (See Table X.6). A surprisingly large proportion of Protestant Primary schoolboys gave a distrustful response (no answer) to this question.

Almond and Verba found in Britain and America (1959-60) that general social trust among adults was translated into politically relevant trust. But in Italy, Mexico and West Germany they found that "A

Table X.6: **Social Trust**

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
Most people can be trusted	14	17	21	10
Have to watch out for others	26	46	34	44
Depends	42	36	41	43
No answer	18	1	4	3

gap remains between general social attitudes and political attitudes". They attributed these differences to the closer fusion of the society in Britain and America which led to a more integrated political system.[14] Morris Rosenberg, in his study of students from eleven American Universities found that, irrespective of party affiliation or social class origin, students with a low level of trust were likely to think that the public was not qualified to vote, and that war was inevitable.[15] And David Zibblat found that the more socially trusting American teenagers in high schools had a more trusting attitude towards politics.[16] Richard Rose found in Ulster that there was no tendency for trusting attitudes to correlate with views about the Constitution.[17] In the split society in Ulster many socially trusting persons are alert to the possible danger to themselves resulting from the political actions of their best neighbours who belong to the other religion.

Among schoolboys there is only a slight tendency for the more socially trusting boys to be more positive to Government. Only among Catholic Secondary boys is there a marked increase in violence approval among the less trusting boys. To the 40 per cent endorsing disorder in the trusting group there are 60 per cent doing so among those replying that one has to watch out for others or that it 'depends'. Whilst being basically suspicious in social relations among older Catholic

boys does little to raise the levels of disorder approval much above the mean, having a good deal of social trust may lower the violence approval level by 20 per cent. Unfortunately only ten per cent of such boys possess much social trust. The more trusting Secondary Protestants are only slightly less likely to approve disorder. If one could assume that integrated Secondary education of Protestants and Catholics would lead to greater social trust one might be justified in expecting disorder to be reduced. In the Primary schools, however, trusting and suspicious youngsters are just as likely to find fighting justified.

Optimism - Pessimism

> The hope by which we live, and emigrate to the New Ulster, is not baseless optimism, with nothing to recommend it but itself, but a hope backed by reason, by necessity, and the reality of the Kingdom of God.
>
> D.G. Wigmore-Beddoes, Preaching to a Riot (1970).[18]

Since these words were written the optimism of those who seek a New Ulster has been severely shaken. People who fear the changes the future may bring cling tenaciously to attitudes of the past whilst those who have faith in the future may prepare to change their minds in a changing world. Alternatively, the more optimistic may have faith that they can change the world, or prevent it being changed, to suit their own attitudes. It might, however, be hypothesized that those who have an optimistic attitude to changes in society will be more positive to Government and less inclined to accept violence in politics.

Eighty per cent of Protestant Secondary and 70 per cent of Catholic Secondary boys felt, in early 1971, that almost all, or most, changes were for the better. Others replied that almost all, or most, changes

were for the worse. The most optimistic boys were most extreme in positive affect to Government (See Table X.7). There is a steady drop in the highest level of positive affect from the most optimistic, through the intermediate stages, to the most pessimistic boys. Also the boys who are generally pessimistic about the future are readier to endorse disorder than those who have faith that changes will not be against their interests. Thus the policy followed by the Community Relations Commission of helping people find confidence in themselves and in their ability to influence the future may have consequences for the most basic political outlooks.

Table X.7: Optimism-Pessimism and Affect to Government

Attitudes to changes	Almost all for better	Most for better	Most for worse	Almost all for worse
	%	%	%	%
SECONDARY PROTESTANT				
POSITIVE	37	33	23	22
positive	47	57	50	36
negative	9	7	23	31
NEGATIVE	6	2	2	11
no answer	1	1	2	-
SECONDARY CATHOLIC				
POSITIVE	25	20	7	9
positive	39	52	48	31
negative	23	20	36	27
NEGATIVE	10	5	7	31
no answer	3	3	2	2

Social Distance

Political differences in Northern Ireland are not reflected by social segregation between religions in all parts of the Province. The Loyalty Survey found that "Protestants are almost as likely to have some contact with Catholics as Catholics are to have some contact with Protestants."[19] Contact, however, may be maintained at the same time as keeping a social distance between persons. For instance, a Protestant may be quite happy to have Catholic friends, but would be very upset if his sister intended converting to Catholicism or marrying a Catholic. In order to investigate the social distance between religions at the schoolboy level respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their reactions to a number of cross-religion situations. (See Table X.8).

Both Catholics and Protestants at Primary and Secondary schools appear to have much the same priorities regarding social distance. Conversions and marriage across religious lines are the least entertainable propositions. Having friends in the other religion is the most acceptable social suggestion with the idea of having neighbours in the other faith receiving a more guarded acceptance. The reaction to integrated schooling comes midway between the conversion/marriage and the friends and neighbours propositions in acceptance levels. Only in the Catholic Secondary schools do more than half the boys accept integration of schools. About one-tenth of Primary boys who were quite willing to accept friends and neighbours in the other religion feel that, under the present circumstances, it would be better if boys in the other religion left the country altogether.

Since Protestants who feel socially distant from Catholics may be more concerned with "Protestant Supremacy" than their co-religionists one might hypothesize that they will also render greater positive affect

Table X.8: Social Distance

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Percentage saying that they wouldn'tmind if ...				
.. my brother or sister became a Protestant/ Catholic	16	19	15	17
.. my brother or sister married a Protestant/ Catholic	16	26	24	39
.. half the children in my school were Protestants/ Catholics	25	42	37	55
.. most of my neighbours were Protestants/Catholics	34	40	49	55
.. my friends were Protestants/Catholics	41	59	49	68
I think that Protestants/ Catholics should be sent out of Ireland/Northern Ireland	69	49	60	37

to Government (presuming they see Government working for Protestant Ascendancy) and that they will be readier to approve disorder for a Protestant Ulster. The Catholics who feel socially estranged from Protestants may feel discriminated against to a greater extent than their co-religionists; they may resent the Protestant presence in Ireland to a greater extent than Catholics who feel emotionally closer to the other religion; and may thus render more negative affect to Government and express themselves more prepared to countenance the use of violence for a United Ireland. In fact, there is little or no difference between Primary Protestants regarding affect to Government according to whether they feel close or far from Catholic boys. Contrary to what was hypothesized, there is

a limited but consistent tendency for the more socially integrated Secondary school Protestants to render higher positive affect to Government. As hypothesized, Catholics reacting negatively to social relations with Protestants are also more negative to Government in most cases. This is most noticeable among Primary school Catholics where negative social reactions are associated with 20 per cent more negative feelings towards Government. Among Secondary school Catholics there is a consistent, but limited, rise in negative affect to Government among boys more socially distant from Protestants (See Table X.9).

Table X.9: Social Distance and Percentage Negative to Government among Catholics

	Primary		Secondary	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Percentage of negative affect among those agreeing/disagreeing with ...				
Conversion of brother/sister into the other religion	9	33	34	34
Marriage of brother/sister into the other religion	12	35	33	35
Integrated schooling	20	35	30	38
Having neighbours in the other religion	15	44	28	40
Having friends in the other religion	20	39	31	39

That Protestant boys who react negatively to social relationships with Catholics render much the same affect to Government as their more socially integrated co-religionists is some indication that the Government was not seen by Protestants as bridge-building between the communities. That Catholic boys who react negatively to social relationships with Protestants are more negative to Government than their more socially integrated co-religionists is some indication that the ghetto mentality is is associated with local political autonomy largely to the exclusion of

central Governmental agencies.

As expected, boys who react negatively to social relations between religions are also more likely to accept violence in their political lives. In every case the difference index represents an increase in disorder acceptance among the more socially distant groups. (See Table X.10). Morris Fraser emphasises the importance of guilt riddance through imposing social distance upon out-group scapegoats carrying the undesirable qualities which the in-group wishes to ignore in themselves:

> The in-group member, to defend himself from any consequent guilt, imposes social distance, a process whereby he symbolically places the victim at a distance well below his own on the evolutionary ladder. 20

Table X.10: Difference Indexes regarding Political Disorder Acceptance between those Accepting and Rejecting Certain Social Relationships.

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Conversion of brother/sister into the other religion	+11	+41	+27	+25
Marriage of brother/sister into the other religion	+15	+39	+23	+17
Integrated schooling	+19	+42	+28	+18
Having neighbours in the other religion	+9	+34	+14	+21
Having friends in the other religion	+7	+29	+20	+16
Expelling other religion from Northern Ireland/Ireland	+15	+37	+30	+27

That the more socially distant groups are readier than others to accept violence may indicate that many political decisions designed for both communities will be rejected by large segments of the population. If, for instance, a policy of forced integration in housing and schooling

were introduced it seems likely that those least prepared for integration would resist it by civil disobedience. Those who are readiest for integrated living are already the most prepared for it. Survey evidence suggests that traditional patterns of housing and schooling will continue in Northern Ireland as schoolboys become fathers and socialize their own children into conflict. The integrationalists in Ulster may find themselves inhabiting the integrated islands in a largely sectarian

sea.

Summary of Affect

Influences associated with affect for Government which concern: (1) ten per cent or more of boys in school type and (2) increases or decreases in positive affect of ten per cent or more from the total distribution of affect within that school type will be considered noteworthy.

The most important of such potential influences are those which appear in all school types concerned. These are (1) thinking it is fairly important to obey Government and (2) feeling that most changes are for the worse. Protestants are much more likely than Catholics to say that it is very important to obey Government and any departure from this position is, among them, associated with a drop in feeling that Government is benevolent. Among Catholics, less respect for Government is more likely and increases in respect to saying it is fairly important to obey Government is associated with higher positive affect. Thus in Ulster one cannot predict affect to Government from respect to Government without knowing the religion of the respondents. Only Secondary schoolboys were asked to record their feelings about general changes and among both Protestants and Catholics those saying that most changes are for the worse rendered lower positive affect to Government. In the case of attitudes such as respect, affect and pessimism, it is difficult to say which is causing what. One can say, however, that a number of attitudes appear together in a political character which is either positive or negative to Government. Social pessimism and negative affect to Government in many boys suggests that, where discord is common, many in each generation are socialized into scepticism about a better future through political initiatives.

Characteristics	Difference index from the mean distribution for affect			
	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Fairly important to obey Government	12-	11- (B)*	17+	13+
Most changes for worse		12-		14-

* (B) = benevolence. Where (B) occurs it signifies that increases or decreases in affect concern levels of positive affect rather than an increase in negative affect.

Influences associated with increases and decreases in positive affect to Government in three cases out of four are: (1) feeling it is fairly important to obey parents; (2) and that it is very, not very, and not at all important to obey the Government. One would expect that levels of respect and affect to Government would be closely associated. The decrease in positive affect among Catholics is more important at the lower respect levels since larger proportions of Catholics fall into these categories. For instance, two-fifths of Catholics reply that it is not very, or not at all important to obey Government and they reveal large drops in positive affect from the Catholic norm in both Primary and Secondary schools. Among the one-tenth of Secondary Protestants who reveal lowest respect for Government positive affect drops off dramatically until more than half are negatively oriented to Government. The vast majority of boys felt it very important to obey parents and their affect to Government is about the norm for their school types. The minority of boys stating that obedience to parents was only 'fairly important' reveal a decrease in positive affect to Government, especially at the benevolent level.

Only one potential influence upon affect appearing in half the cases concerned effects Protestants. Those Secondary Protestants who feel that the upper classes provide the best political rulers are most

Characteristics	Difference index from the mean distribution for affect			
	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Fairly important to obey parents	12-	10- (B)	10-(B)	-
Very important to obey Government	-	12+ (B)	20+	17+
Not very important to obey Government	-	15- (B)	15-(B)	16-
Not at all important to obey Government	-	40-	24-	26-

positive to Government especially at the benevolent level (Government always wants to help people like me). All other characteristics appearing as potential influences in half the cases concerned are among Catholic boys at the Secondary level. Lack of faith in the benevolence of the future is strongly associated with low regard for Government. The other influences appearing are associated with increases in positive affect among Secondary Catholics. Such boys reveal higher affect when they accept any reason for supporting Government, but increases in positive affect are not easily contained with categories of reasons for support as good feelings towards Government rises for both material and emotional reasons.

Summary of Discord Attitudes

Potential influences considered here are those which concern ten per cent or more of schoolboys in the groups concerned and which are associated with either increases or decreases in disorder approval of ten per cent or more from the total distribution of discord attitudes within the school type considered.

Influences associated with decreases in disorder acceptance levels in all the cases concerned are: (1) acceptance of the conversion of a brother or sister across religious lines; (2) acceptance of the marriage of a brother or sister across religious divides; (3) rejection of the idea that those of the other religion should be expelled from either Ulster or Ireland.

Characteristic	Difference index from the total distribution for discord attitudes			
	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Doesn't mind Conversion	10-	34-	23-	21-
Doesn't mind Marriage	12-	29-	18-	11-
Does not want to Expel	11-	19-	18-	11-

Approximately 20 per cent of all boys wouldn't mind the conversion or marriage of members of their families across religious lines. Such acceptance of cross-religious situations are associated with dramatic drops in the level of violence acceptance. Major fears associated with ecumenism and integrated schooling are probably that conversions and marriage into the other religion will occur. Only a minority of schoolboys (20 per cent) seem unafraid of the possible consequences of ecumenism and integrated schooling. But they are an important minority because of their rejection of violence in politics. Alternatively, they may be disproportionately unimportant in a violent situation. Approximately half the boys rejected the expulsion of members of the other religion

from Ulster or Ireland. This may indicate a willingness to share what is valued and is associated with lower levels of violence acceptance. Alternatively it may represent a desire to contain members of the other religion in clearly distinctive pockets of Northern Ireland, or Ireland, so that they are no threat to the predominant way of life thus rendering the use of violence unlikely. Probably around one-fifth of all boys in Ulster see sharing the same political territory in terms of mixing the communities through conversions and marriage. If the attitudes of such boys are reflections of parents' views this suggests that a peaceful minority exists in Ulster who wish to make a break with tradition in favour of integrated schools. But a policy of integration of any social service could not be carried through with the support of only one-fifth of the population.

The next most important indicator of decreases in disorder (appearing in three cases out of four) is acceptance of school integration. Approximately one-third of the boys concerned replied that they would not mind if half the boys in their school belonged to the other religion and their endorsement of disorder is approximately 18 per cent below the norm. Those who accept the idea of integrated education are also the most prepared for it.

Characteristics associated with increases (+) and decreases (-) in disorder approval appearing in three cases out of four

Characteristics	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Doesn't mind integrated education	14-	23-	18-	-
Does mind integrated education	-	17+	10+	11+
Does mind having friends in the other religion	-	18+	11+	11+
Not at all important to obey Government	-	15+	23+	21+
Wants other religion expelled	-	20+	12+	17+

Increases in disorder levels appear among boys who would mind integrated education, having friends in the other religion, and who would like to expel Catholics or Protestants from Ulster or Ireland. It is noteworthy that these negative expressions are not associated with increases in disorder among the Protestant Primary boys who make them. On the other hand, Catholic boys appear to learn earlier in life than Protestants, to generalize social relations to violent politics. This is probably due to the violent learning conditions affecting Catholic schoolboys in the weeks after Bloody Sunday when most of the Primary boys were interviewed. Protestant Secondary, and all Catholic boys, who reveal least respect for Government, are also the most violent in politics. Approximately 25 per cent of Catholics and 10 per cent of Secondary Protestants felt it was not at all important to obey Government. Thus it is not only among Catholics that rejection of the authority of Government goes hand in hand with disorder.

Influences which are associated with decreases in disorder approval appearing in half of the groups investigated are: (1) acceptance of friendship across religious lines; (2) feeling it is 'very important' to obey Government; (3) accepting Government because of tradition and the Monarchy. As noted earlier better relations between religious communities reduces violence acceptance. Catholic Secondary boys in particular who accept Government because of tradition or the Monarchy and who think it very important to obey Government are among those who least approve violence in politics. Thus, among Catholics, expressive reasons for supporting Government may be most likely to reduce disorder suggesting that portraits of the Queen in Catholic schools might have a mellowing effect upon some boys. Influences associated with increases in

Characteristics associated with increases (+) and decreases (-) in disorder approval appearing in half the cases concerned

Characteristic	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Doesn't mind friends in the other religion	-	12-	10-	-
Does mind neighbours of the other religion	-	15+	-	13+
Not at all important to obey teacher	-	-	24+	24+
Very important to obey Government	-	-	20-	18-
Not very important to obey Government	-	12+	-	12+
Most changes for worse	-	12+	-	-
Accepts Government because of tradition	-	-	-	10-
Accepts Government because of Monarchy	-	-	-	15-

violence approval among half the groups examined are: (1) rejection of neighbours of the other religion; (2) thinking that most changes are for the worse; (3) feeling it is not at all important to obey a teacher; (4) and not very important to obey Government. One influence which concerns all the Catholics concerned is very low respect for teacher. This concerns only 11 per cent of Catholic boys, but they are 85 per cent in favour of political violence. The only influence associated with increases in disorder among all the Protestants concerned is pessimism about the future.

Presuming that Catholic civic educators (school-teachers and others) wish to increase positive affect to Government in Northern Ireland and decrease disorder they might put an additional stress upon obedience to Government. Half of the Catholic boys accept Government passively (we've got to accept it whatever we think) whilst another half find this an insufficient reason for supporting Government. In

order to raise the level of obedience to Government among Catholic schoolboys Government must appear to be fashioned closer to Catholic community patterns. This, in turn, may provoke retaliations from Protestants who interpret such accommodations of a minority as a 'sell out' to the enemy. In order to reduce violence Catholic civic educators could encourage conversions and marriage across religious lines (both ways) and urge a wide sharing of political territory. This could, conceivably, provoke Protestants who resist ecumenism and integrated schooling through fear of absorption into a Green Ireland. Such actions might also provoke Catholics who resist integrated schooling and favour Catholic areas within Northern Ireland. If, on the other hand, Catholic civic educators wished to increase negative affect to Government and political disorder they might stress the unimportance of both Government and teachers and oppose social relationships between religions until boys discard ideas of having Protestant friends and neighbours and going to integrated schools. Catholic integrationalists might object peacefully and, in an atmosphere where the threat of violence is ominous, have little influence upon the course of events.

Presuming that Protestant civic educators (schoolteachers and others) wish to increase positive affect to Government and reduce political violence they, also, might stress the importance of obedience to Government. But the reason why most Protestant boys favour Government (because it gives us a Queen to rule over us) is also the most divisive aspect of Government encountered. Thus, raising the level of Protestant obedience to Government may provoke many Catholics who find little symbolic gratification through the Monarch. In attempting to reduce disorder Protestants might encourage conversions and marriage across religious lines (both ways) and emphasize sharing schools and political

territory with Catholics. Some of these actions could conceivably cause resistance from Catholics who feared being a permanent minority in Northern Ireland and anger some Protestants who might regard Protestants who advocated such courses as "Lundies" (Lundy was executed after trying to betray the beleaguered Protestants in Londonderry in 1689). But if some Protestant civic educators wish to increase disorder and lower positive affect for Government they might stress that it was less than very important to obey Government and suggest that it was only fairly important to obey parents. Particularly among Secondary schoolboys they might be successful in increasing disorder by opposint community relations and by discouraging those schoolboys who would accept integrated schooling, friends and neighbours in the other religion, and by emphasising that any changes in the status quo could only be for the worse. Particularly among Protestant Primary schoolboys positive affect for Government could conceivably be lowered by teaching, by word and example, that it is less than very important to obey various social authorities such as teachers, employers and ministers of religion.

Whether Protestant and Catholic civic educators try to raise or lower positive affect for Government, or to increase or decrease disorder, they are likely to provoke reactions from others both within and without their religion. It would be interesting to see how many integrationalists in Northern Ireland would oppose sectarian community Government to the same extent as separatists have opposed mixing.

Footnotes: Chapter X

1. See Eckstein H., Division and Cohesion in Democracy, Appendix B, (Princeton University Press, 1966); Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., Chapter XI: pp. 345-55.
2. Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver, Angels in Marble, (Heinemann: London, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, The Working Class Tories, (MacGibbon and Kee, 1967).
3. Eckstein H., op. cit., pp.249.
4. Morris Fraser, Children in Conflict, (Secker and Warburg, 1973), p. 124.
5. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (Fontana Library, 1963).
6. Angels in Marble and The Working Class Tories, op. cit.
7. See Dennis Kavanagh, "The Deferential English: A Comparative Critique", Government and Opposition, No. 3, 1971, pp. 333-60.
8. Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., p. 348.
9. Dennis Kavanagh, "The Deferential English", op. cit.
10. Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., p. 244.
11. For discussion of Ultraism see Governing Without Consensus p.33, where an Ultra is defined as "... an individual who supports a particular definition of the existing regime so strongly that he is willing to break laws, or even take up arms, to recall it to its 'true' way."
12. "We must put our trust in each other - Bleakley", Belfast Telegraph, 31.5.71.
13. See Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., p. 349; and Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, op. cit., (Ch.I - Fn. 9), pp. 228-29.
14. The Civic Culture, p. 230.
15. Rose Goldson, Morris Rosenberg, et al., What College Students Think, (Van Nostrand: New York, 1960).
16. Zibblatt D., "High School Extracurricular Activities and Political Socialization", The Annals, op. cit., (Ch.IX - fn.3).
17. Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., p. 349.
18. D.G. Wigmore-Beddoes, Preaching to a Riot, (The First Presbyterian Church, Belfast, 1971), p. 36.

19. Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., p. 307.

20. Morris Fraser, op. cit., p. 96.

Chapter XI The Aggregate Pattern

In order to sort out the relative importance, taken together, of various influences considered separately, it is convenient to use a statistical technique known famialiarly as 'tree analysis'[1]. Essentially, the 'tree analysis' is a 'step-wise regression programme'. It operates by finding that dichotomy based on any predictor which gives the lowest within group sum of squares (= 'unexplained variance') for the dependent variable. Essentially this is the dichotomisation which 'accounts for' more of the variance of the dependent variable, (i.e. has a larger correlation with the dependent variable) than any other dichoto-misation based on grouping the categories of a single predictor into two groups. Having made the first dichotomy, the A.I.D. Programme then takes the 'eligible' group with the largest within group sum of squared deviations for the dependent variable, and splits it in a similar manner. The process of dichotomising groups continues until there are no eligible groups which can be split to yield the specified minimum within group sum of squared deviations reduction, or until some specified maximum number of groups have been created.

The first thing we must do is to select a number of pot-ential influences from the information coded for the groups under consideration. The computer systematically considers which of these influences divides the boys into two groups as far apart as possible in their views of Government and Discord. The potential influences included in this analysis are shown in Table XI: 1. These influences have been grouped into broad categories together with the BSS/TSS ratio before the first split in the analysis.

This highlights the 'near miss' influences and is, in effect, a simple correlation type statistic. For instance, among Protestant Secondary schoolboys marching/not marching with the Orange Parades is the most divisive influence upon attitudes to disorder (10.8) followed by strength of nationality (8.3). Among Catholic Secondary schoolboys, strength of nationality (7.3) is the most divisive influence upon attitudes to disorder, followed by national identification, friendship with Protestants, and playing Gaelic sports. Which characteristics of these predictors cause the splits can be found by looking at the categories on each side of the split in the 'trees'. (See figures 1-6) Calculating the mean variance explained within each of the bread categories in Table XI:1 shows that community influence (religious and national) explains most of the variance, followed in explanatory power, by local political influences. School and social class influences accounts for only a small proportion of the variance between schoolboys regarding government and disorder.

Table XI:1 BSS/TSS Ratio before first split in AID analysis

Predictors	Dependent Variables					
	Positive Affect		Violence Approval			
	both religions		Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary	Second -ary	Primary	Second -ary	Primary	Second -ary
I. Religious and National Community						
Church Attendance/P*	10.5	5.4	0.5	1.3	-	-
Mass Attendance/C*	9.4	4.9	-	-	2.9	0.9
Respect for Minister/P	12.1	5.6	1.0	0.8	-	-
Respect for Priests/C	14.4	4.9	-	-	1.4	1.2
Religion	14.6	5.9	-	-	-	-
Strength of Religion/P	8.4	5.5	3.0	9.8	-	-
Strength of Religion/C	7.7	5.3	-	-	3.5	2.3
Friendship across religious lines/P	8.4	5.5	0.6	8.5	-	-
Friendship across religious lines/C	8.7	5.1	-	-	8.9	4.4
Membership of Junior Orange/P	8.3	5.8	4.7	4.8	-	-
Marching with Orange bands/P	8.8	5.8	5.2	10.8	-	-
Playing Gaelic sports/C	14.1	5.3	-	-	2.0	4.3
Irish Language/C	14.5	4.8	-	-	3.0	1.5
Nationality	6.9	4.3	3.4	5.8	10.9	6.1
Strength of Nationality	9.7	4.2	6.1	8.3	12.4	7.3
II. School and Peer Group**						
Respect for Teachers	6.6	3.8	3.6	3.0	3.7	4.1
Teacher perception of history course	5.1	1.0	0.6	2.6	2.2	1.7
Pupil perception of history course	3.6	1.4	3.2	1.4	5.0	0.6
Pupil interest in history	5.3	1.5	1.8	1.3	7.7	4.3
Social Class in School	0.01	1.2	5.0	6.2	2.0	2.6
Social Class in School Group (Class)	1.5	1.7	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.2
School Year	0.5	0.2	14.6	0.3	4.8	0.8
Schools Stream	-	1.0	-	0.4	-	2.2
Grammar or Intermediate	-	1.4	-	5.7	-	0.9
Position in Peer Group	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.6	1.4	1.0
III. Local Influences						
Subjective assessment of level of trouble in area	6.0	0.7	1.7	1.7	10.2	2.0
Religious proportions in area	8.2	1.4	2.8	0.4	12.2	3.6
Geographical area	0.5	0.5	12.2	0.5	12.0	3.8
IV. Social Class						
Socio Economic Group	3.5	0.7	1.0	3.5	1.5	1.6
Social Class	0.01	0.3	0.4	3.8	0.2	0.9

*Where questions concern one religion only this has been indicated by P = Protestant and C = Catholic.

**Classes in 'Civics' were not included in the analysis because earlier cross-tabulations showed that they make little, or no, difference to the political attitudes of those who take them.

First of all we wish to consider the ways in which the predictors under consideration can influence the emotional feeling that boys have about Government. In the total Primary school sample, 81 per cent showed a positive, or very positive, feeling towards Government. The first branch in the tree, as expected, separates Protestants and Catholics. (See Figure 1)

There are no predictors capable of splitting Primary school Protestants in their views of Government. This indicates, that immediately prior to the suspension of Stormont the Government held the almost unswerving loyalty of Protestant Primary schoolboys.

The question then arises: what influences Catholics feelings to Government? The social class composition of the school group (class) is second in importance among Primary boys: Catholic boys who belong to homogeneous social class school groups are much less likely to have positive feelings towards Government. Among Catholic primary schoolboys who belong to heterogeneous social class school groups those who have Protestant friends are more likely to have positive feelings towards Government. We cannot say that those without Protestant friends turn against Government through sectarian isolation, for 66 per cent of them still show positive feelings. But we can say that they are less likely to feel strongly positive about Government.

It is important to note which potential influences do <u>not</u> influence boys feelings to any great extent. Religion is independent of educational influences since it is ascribed at birth. The social class proportions in the school group is more a function of the social nature of the school catchment zone than of educational

planning. Among Catholics, there is little relationship between respect for teachers and Government and only 8 per cent in the homogeneous social class school groups had low respect for their teachers. Interest in history, more a function of community influence than school history courses, explains only a small part of the variance. Not least in significance is the absence of any influence of Irish language classes upon Catholic schoolboys.

Protestant primary boys show little difference: positive feelings for Government are strong everywhere. Among Catholics, by contrast, there are major divisions into sub-groups. At one end is a group (20 per cent of all Catholic primary schoolboys) in which four-fifths have positive feelings towards Government: they are boys who attend mixed social class school groups (classes) and have Protestant friends/friend. At the other extreme, there is a group of four per cent of Catholic primary schoolboys, where nine-tenths lack a positive feeling towards Government. They are boys who belong to homogeneous social class school groups (classes) and hold their teachers in low respect.

FIGURE E **Primary Schoolboys with Positive Affect for Government**

M = % in group with Positive Affect

N = Number of boys in group



Variance Explained = 31.6%

In order to submit Secondary school data to A.I.D. analysis the weighted sample (see appendix II) had to be proportionately reduced in numbers. Thus the weights of 49, 43, 30 and 16 in the Secondary sample were proportionately reduced to 4.9, 4.3, 3.0, and 1.6. This is reflected in the different numbers of boys in each school type than appears in the rest of the thesis. The proportionate changes in numbers, however, does not affect the distribution of attitudes among boys as can be seen by comparing the first divisions of the thees with tables in various parts of the study and with the basic distributions shown in the Questionnaires (Appendix III).

Among Secondary schoolboys 75 per cent showed a positive or very positive feeling towards government. The first branch of the tree, as with the Primary schoolboys, separates Protestants and Catholics. (see Figure 2)

Among Protestants respect for teachers is first in importance: boys who think it is not at all important to respect teachers are much less likely to have positive feelings towards government. The group of 'anti-teachers' and 'not very pro-government' boys is, however, small: it constitutes only eight per cent of the Secondary Protestant school sample. Among Protestant boys who do have respect for teachers those who have Catholic friends/friend are more likely to show positive feelings towards government. Protestant boys without Catholic friends do not turn against Government through sectarian segregation, for four out of five still show positive feelings. But such boys are, however, less likely to feel strongly positive about government.

Among Catholic Secondary schoolboys, Protestant friends and the lack of them shows up as an important influence, identifying a group of one Catholic in three who have no Protestant friends and half of which number are negative to Government. Those without Protestant friends are also affected by strength of national identification. Among those with a strong Irish or Ulster national identification only 40 per cent have positive feelings towards govern - ment, a proportion much lower than those who feel strongly British or who possess 'ordinary' national identifications.

Respect for teachers, among Protestant Secondary boys, is more related to respect for Government than it is among Catholics. Such respect, however, may be due more to the respect teachers receive within communities than to strictly educational effects within the schools. Interest in history, and perceptions of the main content of history courses, do not appear until the very end branches of the tree. Again, historical interests may have been generated more by the community of origin than by the school alone, and perceptions of one's history course, rather than what the teacher says about the course, is what separates boys in their attitudes to Government. Formal courses in civics have little or no influence upon schoolboys' attitudes to Government.

Among Protestant Secondary schoolboys there are major divisions into sub-groups. At one end is a group (more than half the Protestants) in which 90 per cent have a positive feeling towards government: they are boys who respect teachers and have Catholic friends/friend. At the other extreme, there is a group of two per cent of Protestant Secondary boys where three-quarters lack a positive feeling for government. They

are disrespectful boys who are 'strong' Protestants having little or no respect for Protestant ministers. This group illustrates how strong identification with a religious community and low respect for the religious leaders of the community is not incompatible.

Among Catholics, there are major divisions. At one end is a group (34 per cent of Catholics) in which three out of four boys have positive feelings for government: they are boys who have Protestant friends/friend and have either great or no respect for teachers. The majority of this group, however, is composed of those who have great respect for teachers. At the other end of the Catholic side of the tree there is a group (22 per cent of Catholics) where three-fifths have negative feelings towards government. They are boys with no Protestant friends/friend, who feel strongly Irish or Ulster. The majority of such boys, however, have an Irish national identification and those feeling 'strongly Ulster' may be thinking in terms of a nine county Ulster within a United Ireland.

FIGURE II Secondary Schoolboys with Positive Affect for Government

M = % in group with positive affect

N = Number of boys in group



Variance Explained = 16.6%

In order to investigate what effects schoolboys' attitudes towards conflict we must do separate tree analysis by religion. This is because Protestants were asked whether or not they endorsed fighting to keep Ulster Protestant, whereas Catholics were asked whether or not they would favour fighting for a United Ireland.

The most important influence upon Primary school Protestants' attitudes towards violence relates to age. Boys in Primary six are much readier to accept political violence as justified than their younger co-religionists.(see Figure 3) This suggests that the years between seven or eight and ten and eleven are important for learning about violent means of conflict. If schools were important for reducing violence endorsement then those in primary six might be expected to be less violent than those exposed to fewer years of school influence. Boys in Primary six will also be influenced in accepting violence according to where they live. Those who live in Belfast, or West of the River Bann (less economically developed area) are more likely to accept violence especially when they live in a Protestant, or mixed religious area, and are members of the Junior Orange Association. Boys in Primary four are least likely to accept violence when they are <u>not</u> members of the Junior Orange Association and believe they have no history lessons, or lessons drawn from outside the history of Britain or Ireland.

Here again it is important to note what does <u>not</u> influence attitudes towards violence. Among those most ready to accept violence no educational influences appear. Among those least ready to accppt fighting as justified semi-educational influences appear only after boys have been divided in their attitudes by the

Junior Orange Association. Again, it is the pupils' perceptions of their history lessons, rather than the teacher's view of them, that influences boys.

When we look at the end groups among Protestant boys we see that in the largest group (15 per cent) boys in Primary six, living in Belfast or West of the Bann, in a mixed or Protestant area, and who are members of the Junior Orange, almost all endorse the use of violence for a Protestant Ulster. But the second largest group (14 per cent) is found at the peaceful extreme where only 29 per cent of boys endorse the use of violence: these are boys in Primary four, who are not members of the junior Orange Association, who perceive a British, Irish, or mixed content in their school history lessons, and attend middle class or mixed social class schools.

Among Secondary school Protestant boys the most important influence upon disorder approval is marching with the Orange Order. Boys who march in religious/political parades are much more likely to approve of fighting to keep Ulster Protestant and they comprise the majority of boys interviewed: the difference between the two groups is 31 per cent. (See Figure 4) Among marchers boys will be influenced in rejecting violence if they have Catholic friends/ friend whilst 93 per cent of religiously estranged marchers favour political violence.

Among those who do not march with the Orange Order, strength of national identification appears to have some influence upon attitudes. Those who are strong national identifiers constitute 18 per cent of the Protestant Secondary boys among whom 66 per cent

FIGURE III Primary School Protestant Readiness to Endorse Violence

M = % in group endorsing violence

N = number of boys in group



Variance Explained = 34.7%

favour political disorder. Among less intense national identifiers those who refuse to call themselves Protestants (although they appear to belong to the Protestant community) are least likely to accept violent relations.

Again it is important to note what does not influence attitudes towards violence. Interest in history, perception of historical content of lessons, history curriculum according to the official view, school civics, do not appear influential enough to divide boys in their outlooks upon political disorder.

The largest end group among Protestant Secondary boys contains 27 per cent of boys of whom 93 per cent endorse violence. That this group cannot be further divided indicates a hard 'no surrender' attitude among Orange marchers who are socially estranged from Catholics. At the other extreme are five per cent of boys of whom only 12 per cent endorse the use of violence for a Protestant Ulster: they are boys who do not march with the Orange Order, have ordinary national outlooks, and do not confess Protestantism.

Among Primary school Catholics nationality is the chief influence upon attitudes to violence. The majority who identify with Ireland, are 38 per cent readier to endorse violence for a United Ireland than those who feel either British or Ulster. (See Figure 5) Among the 'Irish' Catholics, how boys feel about trouble in their home district shows up as an important influence identifying a group who sense trouble in their area of whom 78 per cent endorse violence themselves. Among the minority of 'Irish' Catholics who sense no

FIGURE IV Secondary School Protestant Readiness to Endorse Violence

M = % in group endorsing political violence

N = number of boys in group



Variance Explained = 30.7%

trouble in their local environment only 40 per cent endorse violence. When they live in such places as Ballymena or Antrim violence approval falls to only 24 per cent in favour. Among those with a British or Ulster national identification age is important for attitudes to violence: 23 per cent of such boys in Primary four accept violent conflict to 50 per cent in Primary six. Once again, sensing trouble in the local district causes more boys to favour fighting for a United Ireland.

The most violent group among Primary Catholics consist of 20 per cent of schoolboys of whom nine out of ten approve of political violence: these are boys who have a Irish National identity, sense trouble in the local district, are interested in Irish or British history, or have no historical interests, and belong to a school group (class) which has a working class majority. At the other extreme are 13 per cent of Primary school Catholics of whom only 16 per cent endorse violence. These are those possessing a British or Ulster national identity, who are in Primary four as opposed to Primary six, and who feel that there is less than a 'lot of trouble' in their local environment.

The most important single semi-school influence upon violent attitudes among Primary Catholics is interest in history. This influence, however, explains only a small part of the variance out of the variance explained. Once again, civic education appears of little importance. It is also worth noting that the teaching of Irish language has little influence even though it might be considered a means of educating boys into United Ireland aspirations.

FIGURE V Primary School Catholic Readiness to Endorse Violence

M = % in group endorsing violence

N = number of boys in group



Variance Explained = 28.4%

Among Secondary school Catholic boys the first division in the tree again divides boys by national outlook. The Irish and strongly Ulster Catholics (the majority of whom are Irish) constitute 76 per cent of the Secondary Catholic sample of whom 68 per cent favour violence compared to only 37 per cent of the British and 'ordinary' Ulster identifiers. (See Figure 6) Among the Catholic 'Irish' and strong Ulster identifiers those without Protestant friends constitute 27 per cent of the Secondary Catholic sample of whom 80 per cent favour violence. But even among the more violent boys, the minority who live East of the River Bann (outside Belfast) are much less violent than those in Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland.

Among the Irish and strongly Ulster group the possession of Protestant friends and non-participation in Gaelic games identifies a group of 10 per cent of the Secondary Catholic sample of whom 46 per cent approve of violence. Among the Irish and strongly Ulster group, playing GAA games and belonging to a predominantly working class school is associated with higher levels of violence approval among those with Protestant friends.

Among the British and 'just Ulster' boys a multiplicity of school streams and lack of streaming appears to divide boys more clearly than nationality. But because the division is difficult to structure the interpretation of the remaining branches on this side of the tree is confusing.

Once again, no direct school influences appear in the analysis. Interest in history, Irish language, and 'civics'

FIGURE VI Secondary School Catholic Readiness to Endorse Violence

M = % in group endorsing violence

N = number of boys in group



Variance Explained = 19.4%

fail to divide boys by attitudes to violence. The proportion against violence was actually three per cent higher among those without formal classes in 'civics' than among those who received such instruction.

An earlier A.I.D. analysis carried out for Secondary schoolboys only revealed that educational, and semi-school influences accounted for only approximately 15 per cent of the variation.[2] This means that schools cannot be the chief determinants of the attitudes boys have towards government and conflict. School influences also explain only a minor part of the variation among Primary schoolboys. This means that, although educational and semi-school influences are capable of explaining a small part of the variations between schoolboys, community influences are the chief predictors of attitudes to Government and political conflict.

Footnotes: Chapter XI

1. J.A. Sonquist and J.N. Morgan, The Detection of Interaction Effects, Monograph No.35, Survey Research Centre, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1964.

2. James L. Russell, Some Aspects of the Civic Education of Secondary Schoolboys in Northern Ireland, The Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission, November, 1972.

Chapter XII

The Sources of Conflict

Much of the literature of political socialization and of social reform in Northern Ireland has shared two assumptions: that it is of prime importance to understand how children learn about politics and that the schools are the chief socializing agents. This study shows the prime importance of content rather than the process of childhood and youthful political learning, and also emphasises the importance of community, rather than school, influences. For example, how white American children learn to support their government is similar to the way in which Ulster boys learn how to support or oppose their government. But what they learn is vastly different. Also, how Protestants and Catholics within Northern Ireland learn about national identity and regime assumptions is similar: what they learn is discordant. In Northern Ireland, there has been a renewed questioning of the liberal assumption that separate schooling is largely to blame for community tensions and disorders. For example, segregated housing estates, the formation of large gangs, para-military groups and discordant adult-created youth groups, have been seen as being much more effective in socializing conflicting cultural types, within Northern Ireland, than have the schools.

The first variable investigated in this study was affect towards Government which is an emotional disposition. In particular, it is the feeling one has, or thinks one should have, when considering the likely reactions of Government towards people like oneself. Such affect may be positive or negative. One may love or hate a Government long

before one has an accurate perception of how it works.

There is now little doubt that children of seven and eight years of age learn about the politics of emotional support or opposition to a regime's authorities, and that such support or opposition is not simply a generalization of obedience or disobedience learned within the family. Children learn distinctive political responses whilst they are still very firmly embedded within the family.

Politicization refers to the process by which children learn to accept or reject the presence, power, and legitimacy of authority, external, and superior to the family. By primary four, Ulster schoolboys can quite clearly distinguish between the private and public sectors of life. Children in primary three (ages six to seven years) found this more difficult, with only half being quite clear about such differences. Most boys of all ages above primary three also ascribed different priorities in qualities thought necessary for familial and political figures. This suggests that political learning had begun either very early in school life or before. In Northern Ireland children are particularly open to political learning at a very early age due to the incursions of the British Army into civilian life. Whether or not a child enjoys seeing his family deferring frequently to a power external and superior to it, does not diminish the prospect for early political learning.

Younger children in Northern Ireland and elsewhere approach the political system through the medium of personal authority figures.[1] Perceiving political power personally, however, is no guarantee that the authority will be liked by the child. As earlier research revealed, younger children are more extreme in views of political authority.[2] As children age and mature they pass from seeing Government in personal terms, such as the Queen and the Prime Minister, to perceiving it as

an institution, such as Parliament or the Cabinet. The hostile or ideal feelings that went with the personal figures, are then switched to the institutions. This may provide an important clue as to why older boys are less extreme in their views of political authority: it may be easier to hate or love a political figure than an informal political institution. Although one may never move from seeing government malevolently, to perceiving it as a benevolent power, between the ages of eight and sixteen, there is some reason to believe that extreme negative and positive views of Government are modified between these ages.

The lesson here is that schoolboys in Northern Ireland have begun to learn political responses whilst they are still firmly anchored to the family by deeply affective ties. The process by which Protestant and Catholic schoolboys learn about Government is similar -- the content of such learning discordant. It is the community derived content of politics that lies at the root of Ulster disorders.

The second variable investigated in this study concerned assumptions about the nature of the regime and how such assumptions should be achieved. The content of the most general assumptions about Northern Ireland are divisive. In the first instance only two-fifths of boys in different religions share what looks like similar national identities. Learning the assumptions associated with a nation include, among other things, the nature and boundaries of the regime. Such assumptions are learned early in life, within the family, through references to nationality and its implications for political life. The story of Ulster may be told and retold to children by parents who regard themselves as Irish or British/Ulster. The stories will differ dramatically according to the parents placement within the British-Irish

view of the Province. The child will unselfconsciously adjust to Union Jack, Red Hand, or Tricolor assumptions about Northern Ireland.

National differences are quickly picked up by children regarding the way the family feels about people in different nations. For instance, Protestant schoolboys felt more like people in England than did Catholic boys who felt closer to the inhabitants of the Republic of Ireland. Also about half the boys felt they were different from other Ulster boys who belonged to the other religion. Thus nationality is personalized: national spirit becomes a matter of feeling like or unlike other people who live across land and sea boundaries. Protestant British/Ulsterness and Catholic Ulster/Irishness, where it exists, is reflected within a land boundary in how boys in different religions feel about one another. The mechanics of learning a national identity are similar for Protestants and Catholics: the content discordant.

About half of the boys in Ulster say that those in the other religion are not only different, but hostile also. Thus we are confronted with a picture of more than half the boys in each religious community possessing different national priorities; feeling differently from persons associated with other nations making claims upon the territory the regime claims to rule; expressing differences between religions within that territory, and living with the image of total hostility directed towards them from the other religion. Such a picture supports a two-nations theory of Ulster. No matter how well mixed the Scots, English and Irish in Ulster may have been in the past there are substantial proportions of them today who are very far removed from any "melting-pot" conception of political life. Such feelings suggest that those identifying with separate nations within the regime's territory desire distinctive political counterparts for their nation/community.

The content of national identities within Ulster are divisive and produce hostility. The most general assumptions about the nature and boundaries of the regime often lead to the approval of disorder in realizing such assumptions. Schoolboys may learn the means towards their assumptions about the regime through identification with, and imitation of, important others in their community, or they may anticipate themselves in older political roles and conform to what they would expect themselves to be doing in later life. This may be casting a vote or throwing a petrol bomb. In Northern Ireland two-thirds of schoolboys endorse the rightness of disorder in politics either for upholding a Protestant Ulster or for achieving a United Ireland.

The boys who approve of political violence are not necessarily those who would take part in actual disorders, nor are they hooligans, and many of them dislike the civil disturbances. When Secondary schoolboys were asked what, if anything, they disliked about Northern Ireland approximately half cited the riots. Yet even among those who disliked the civil disturbances three-fifths were prepared to endorse the rightness of disorders over basic political issues within the regime's territory. Only 35 per cent of boys said they would join a riot if one broke out near their homes. Another 45 per cent said they would move away from the riot whilst the others either replied that they would watch from where they were or go closer to see what was happening. Yet of those who would move away, 45 per cent still approved of political disorder over the nature and boundaries of the regime. But, as one might expect, there is a steady increase in disorder approval as attitudes to riots change from simply watching, to going closer, until approximately 80 to 90 per cent of rioters approve of political disorder. This may indicate that a tiny proportion of rioters are

hooligans, uninterested in the political aspects of their actions. Exponents of the hooligan theory of violence in Ulster generally argue that boys who throw bricks and petrol bombs in what appears to be political disorders do so because they are predisposed to violence in non-political contexts too. The Strathclyde Loyalty survey found that Northern Ireland people generally respect laws, and, political grievances aside, Catholics are as law abiding as Protestants. When questions about non-political violence (with a political/religious option built in to possible responses) such as breaking windows in empty buildings, were put to boys, only 15 per cent gave a firm and clear indication that they regarded such activities as justifiable in a non-political or within-religion context. Thus no large hooligan element appeared. Within the number of boys who approve of political violence in certain contexts are those who would probably join such disorders, some social vandals or hooligans, and boys who, whilst disliking civil disturbances, and not prepared to join them, approve of disorders and thus form a sympathetic environment in which the actual fighters can operate.

The lesson here is that boys learn about national identity and regime assumptions whilst they are affectively bound to their families. By age eight, one-third of Protestant and one-half of Catholic boys approved of disorder for the realization of such assumptions. By age ten, approximately 70 per cent in both religions accepted disorder for certain political purposes. This suggests that boys learn basic political assumptions within their families, but that the propensity to express them violently increases as they become attached to gangs and other organizations operating within the community. Also, there is a similarity of progression to disorder approval among both Protestants and Catholics, but the assumptions upon which such violence breeds are

mutually exclusive.

The fault lines of the political life of Northern Ireland run deeply into the schoolboy generation. At the most inclusive political level of nationality less than half the schoolboys in the Protestant and Catholic communities share a similar national identity priority with someone across the religious division. A question about the Link with Britain revealed that this was accepted by approximately 90 per cent of Protestant, but only by 40 per cent of Catholic, boys. The unwritten constitutions -- as a Protestant Ulster or a United Ireland -- were approved by a majority in both religions who were also prepared to accept violence as justified in the pursuit of such discordant political goals. At a less inclusive political level -- the Government -- there appears to be more agreement between religions. Two-thirds of Primary and four-fifths of Secondary schoolboys in different religions share what appears to be similar feelings about Government. And the similarity of feeling about Government between religions does not disappear when one subtracts negative orientations out of the sum of affect. Among both Primary and Secondary schoolboys three-fifths in different religions share similar and positive feelings about Government. Protestant affect is everywhere more benevolent, but Catholic feeling is, nevertheless, positive among the majority of boys.

The Government towards which such seemingly common feelings emerge may not be, however, Government as adults understand it. Schoolboys often see Government as the Queen, the Prime Minister, or Parliament according to their age and political sophistication. When boys record their feelings about the Queen they may be recording their affect to Government as they understand it. But the sharing of emotional feeling about all sorts of political authority never falls

below half in each religion recording positive affect towards such an authority. (See Table XII.1). Perhaps it is at this level of political life -- the Government and its authorities -- that common allegiance in Ulster may most easily be confirmed and extended into the higher political regions of regime assumptions and nationality. Alternatively, schoolboys may have been socialized into accepting the minimum of political life while more ideal solutions are sought. Survey evidence tends to support this view. Although Protestants lend greater weight to emotional reasons for supporting the Government, the reason for favouring Government which involves the greatest sharing between schoolboys in both religions is - "We've got to accept it whatever we think". Whatever we think -- Protestant Ulster or United Ireland -- we've got to accept the Government in the meantime to have the distributions and/or regulations that make social life possible. Governments in Ulster may thus act as the temporary caretakers of a war over mutually exclusive political goals. Alternatively, the Government may be viewed as one side of the civil war by being both "too lenient with Catholics" and "discriminating against Catholics".

If the content of political socialization divides Northern Ireland -- is the population one social community divided by politics, or two social communities? At first sight it appears, among schoolboys at least, to be two political communities co-operating, for certain purposes, with a common Government. But in what other areas of life does what looks like co-operation exist? Looking at many of the social questions in the study would give, at first sight, an ambiguous answer. For instance, respect to social authorities -- parental, educational, economic and religious -- looks similar for both religious communities, as does social trust, attitudes about the future, and

Table XII.1: Attitudes towards Political Authorities

	POSITIVE	Positive	Negative	NEGATIVE
	Would always want to help people like me	Would sometimes want to help people like me	Would never want to help people like me	Would want to hurt people like me
	%	%	%	%
SECONDARY PROTESTANTS				
Police	62	34	1	2
Soldiers	49	42	5	3
Prime Minister	43	43	10	3
Parliament	31	54	12	2
Queen	71	23	5	0
Government	33	52	11	3
SECONDARY CATHOLICS				
Police	23	51	11	14
Soldiers	25	48	10	16
Prime Minister	21	45	23	9
Parliament	14	56	20	7
Queen	31	34	24	8
Government	17	47	24	9
PRIMARY PROTESTANTS				
Police	84	12	0	1
Soldiers	85	12	0	2
Prime Minister	68	27	2	2
Queen	84	13	2	0
Government	64	30	2	1
PRIMARY CATHOLICS				
Police	41	29	9	19
Soldiers	34	23	10	30
Prime Minister	34	32	17	13
Queen	43	24	18	9
Government	33	34	17	12

those to social vandalism. Likes and dislikes, too, seem very similar across religious divides with the major things pleasing to Secondary boys being the scenic beauty, the people, and the way of life. Among "dislikes" the riots take first place with half the boys of both religions expressing this view. There are a number of points however where what appears to be social agreement at first sight, reveals divisions. For instance, although Protestants and Catholics have similar attitudes to social trust, the majority say one has to watch out before trusting someone, or that it "depends" on who they are. This obviously conceals distrust of one another on religious and/or political grounds as anyone who has lived in Ulster for any length of time discovers. Again, high respect for religious leaders conceals divisions since such respect is directed towards either priests or ministers and does not necessarily flow across religious boundaries. Pessimism or optimism about the future -- although revealing similarities in both religions -- may be hope or despair about divisive aspects of life such as a United Ireland or a Protestant Ulster. And respect for educators, although similarly high in both religions, is respect for Catholic and Protestant teachers.

Perhaps the simplest way to examine the question of social community, within the confines of these surveys of schoolboys, is to select a number of measures of social distance such as willingness to have friends and neighbours in the other religion, and whether or not one would be willing to see a brother or sister marry or convert into the other religion. By applying the rule that good community relations exist where more than 50 per cent of schoolboys accept such cross-religious situations one is driven to the conclusion that Ulster is a divided social community as far as most schoolboys are concerned.

Only in the Catholic Secondary schools, by this rule, is there evidence of a willingness to have one social community. Although conversions and marriages are rejected by the majority of Catholic Secondary schoolboys, friendship, integrated schooling, neighbours, and similarity is positively accepted whilst the expulsion of Protestants from Ireland is rejected by the majority. Although 60 per cent of Protestant Secondary boys say they have Catholic friends, and positively accept Catholic friendship, only 52 per cent respond that they are similar to Catholics. They divide evenly on expelling Catholics from Ulster, the majority reject Catholic neighbours and integrated schooling, and clearly reject conversion and marriage across religious lines. Community relations in the Primary schools is at a still lower ebb. Catholic Primary boys are, in response to all social distance questions, readier to mix socially across religious lines than Protestant Primary boys who reveal the greatest social splits of all.

A great deal has been written about building the political community from the social community. There is, in fact, more sharing between religions at the political level of Government, and its agencies, than there is in the social life of the Ulster schoolboy. Much has also been written about the good relations in Ulster at the social level and that people generally get on well together except for a few weeks every year when politics and religion are brought out to be displayed in public. Neither of these surveys was carried out during the Marching Season. But they were certainly conducted when the very air was thick with politics (1971-72). This suggests that it is political dissimilarity rather than social differences that divides communities in Ulster.

The content of socialization is everywhere more important than

the process. What an Ulster boy learns about politics has greater significance than how he acquires his orientations. In Northern Ireland, a history of partially-legitimate government makes the process emphasize both support for, and opposition to authority, as well as stressing discordant political assumptions about the nature and boundaries of the regime. Thus, Protestant and Catholic schoolboys know little other than taking opposite sides in conflicts about the most basic aspects of political life.

The community, rather than the school, is the chief socializer of divisive political content. Divisions between Protestants and Catholics in the North of Ireland existed prior to the introduction of compulsory education and the setting up of the Stormont regime. Furthermore, since one's religion is acquired prior to schooling (ascribed at birth) religious schools only reinforce what is already there and do not create community differences. Also, many of the disputes over education in Ulster began during a time of political discord and disorder over Home Rule and the Partition of Ireland. Thus political differences between educators, and those interested in education, created discordant attitudes to the Stormont regime rather than education creating loyalists and republicans.

Outside of the school-family, social class, national community, religion, local political influences, peer groups, adult-created youth movements, para-military organisations, and violent events continue to shape the civic character of Ulster schoolboys. Some educationalists maintain that teachers should start knowing the social experience of the pupils, recognise this as something vital and significant, and reflect it back to the pupils.[3] From this view one should expect schools

to reinforce discordant views of national community. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect schools to create attitudes in pupils which are conducive to common allegiance in Northern Ireland in the absence of support from the adult community and the existence of a political institution which is generally accepted as fair and impartial.

These generalizations would appear to fit with American and British political socialization literature also. They certainly stress the importance of agreement on basic political norms between parents and children rather than between school teachers and pupils. The schools teach best what they have a monopoly upon: Greek, physics etc. They certainly have no monopoly on political or religious education in Ulster. For instance, this study confirms findings in Scotland that school "civics"has little effect upon basic political attitudes.[4]

The structure of the school system in Ulster further confirms the importance of extra-school determinants. The Catholic Church in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, demands separate schools. Only Catholic schools, staffed by Catholic teachers, can provide the necessary "religious atmosphere" from which "good Catholics" emerge. Furthermore, the Catholic Church demands that Catholics, who are taxpayers, should have their schools subsidised by the State. Until such times as conditions acceptable to the Catholic Church can be negotiated with the State in Northern Ireland, Catholic schools remain voluntary schools finding part of their finances from the direct contributions of the Catholic community. Also, priests would take a harsh attitude if parents wished to opt out of the Catholic school system. Catholic parents, for their part, often fear to send their children to County schools through fear of physical attack upon their offspring.

State schools become, by default, virtually Protestant schools

with a sprinkling of Catholics in some Protestant Grammar schools. Catholics were slow to recognise the Northern Ireland ministry of Education at the beginning of the Stormont regime thus leaving educational initiatives in the hands of Protestants. The Protestant clergy in particular made certain that County (State) schools would be inter-denominational Protestant schools rather than non-denominational schools. Thus, Protestants found the fully underwritten State schools acceptable, rendering free compulsory education suitable for Protestants only. Catholics, by standing aside from an unacceptable state school system had to pay for their objections by funding much school enterprise from the collections of the Catholic Church. The position in Ulster contrasts starkly with that in Scotland, the home of many Ulster-Scotsmen, where a 100 per cent grant accepts parity between schools attended predominantly by Protestants or Catholics.

If within-school differences are created by the communities in Northern Ireland what implications does this suggest for the future? There is little evidence in the schoolboy surveys to suggest inertia reducing conflict. Evidence suggests that aggression is a learned behaviour. Thus, there is some reason to suggest that the disorders from 1968 onwards will burn for half a century or more. On the other hand, para-military organizations in Ireland have a well-tried tradition of "hanging up the Guns" for a season. That is, whilst political violence is not renounced, it is discontinued on the tactical grounds that it will not work at present.

One possible inertia trend witnessed outside Ulster is the breakdown of authority of the Catholic hierarchy in some Continental countries and the ecumenical movement in many Protestant churches. Some anti-clerical Catholics and ecumenical Protestants are practically

indistinguishable in religious outlook and share many values which undercut community strife and separate religious schools. Neither of these movements has gathered sufficient force in Ulster to make it clear whether they will eventually become a power in the land.

If community influences are the main determinants of educational structures does it make sense to talk about total changes in the schooling situation which would make way for integrated schooling across religious lines?

First, how much difference would integrated schooling make to pupils holding discordant attitudes? This study suggests that since community influences are so much stronger than school influences, integrated schooling would make little difference whilst communities are in conflict. The study further shows that even boys who, at present, profess themselves willing to try experiments in integrated schooling, approximately two-fifths of them still accept disorder in politics.

Second, who would teach in integrated schools? Educators are themselves the products of the socializing experiences of their own community and only they can reinforce the diffuse community teachings thought necessary by the community of origin. If integration involves moving pupils it will also require the two-way traffic of teachers. Given the high likelihood that parents and religious leaders will object to their children being taught by Orangemen or Republicans indiscriminately, integration may simply involve the two-way movement of pupils and teachers without pupils being taught by someone of the opposite religion. Such a situation could involve playground battle-scenes that could make street riots appear as minor incidents.

Third, in an integrated system what would teachers actually

teach? Content of integrated education centres, first, on either abolishing religious instruction from the schools or the separation of pupils, at certain periods of the day, according to religion, for religious instruction, given by the representatives of the various churches. A second content area focuses upon classes in civics -- such as history, geography, modern studies, and literature. Through such classes differences in national outlook, and support and opposition to constituted political authority, can be directly, and indirectly, taught. Whilst most people who advocate integrated schooling insist that religious differences should be respected there is often an assumption that differences in civic education within the schools should be reduced, or eliminated. If the schools reflect and reinforce community preferences this last assumption flies in the face of reality.

If teachers opt for a neutralizing solution i.e. avoid conflict subjects, would integrated schooling alone be strong enough to resist what is learned outside the school about the conflict subjects? Moreover, "neutral facts" often cause strong and conflicting reactions. For instance comparative politics or religion may simply provide further proof that the "others" are as ignorant or heathen as was first believed. If, on the other hand, teachers opt for the common campus idea with shared facilities for expensive subjects which offer few opportunities for preaching to the unconverted, and separate classes for conflict subjects, would the common campus and sharing the same cookery or woodwork room be sufficient to offset what was learned in conflict subjects?

The purpose of integrated education depends very largely upon one's view of society in Ulster. If there is one society, education is to be used to prevent it separating. If two communities, then

education is to be used to bring them together, or to keep them from drifting further apart. Alternatively, integrated education may not be seen as a device for community harmony. Protestants may see it as a way of getting rid of Catholic schools and inculcating loyalty to Northern Ireland thus ensuring the predominance of their way of life. Catholics, on the other hand, may see integrated education as a good means towards economic advantage, conversions of Protestants through marriage, and eventual absorption of the Protestant community into a United Ireland.

Many of the divisions in education in Ulster over who educates, how, where, and for what purposes rests upon whether Northern Ireland is viewed as one or two communities. Presuming one community divided by religion, integrated education would not prove an unsurmountable barrier provided religious ideals were not exclusive. Whilst Protestants and Catholics share many religious beliefs that could be taught in a combined religious education syllabus there are exclusive doctrinal views which could be overcome by separate classes for religious instruction, or education. But Catholics hold an exclusive view concerning the religious atmosphere of a school which is foreboding to Protestant parents and forbidding to Protestant teachers. To preserve this atmosphere Catholics must be taught by Catholic educators in a Catholic school. Thus separate religious instruction within common schools falls short of the educational ideals of the Catholic Church and renders integrated education impossible whilst such ideals prevail. However, provided that Northern Ireland is one social and political community divided only at the religious level integrated education is unnecessary for community co-operation and religious differences can be respected without interfering with other aspects of community life.

Alternatively, in a community divided only by religion, Catholics may be more easily persuaded that Catholic education elsewhere has not been shown to be producing better Catholics.

Presuming Northern Ireland is one social community divided by religion and politics, the schools which are clearly separate by their insistence upon different religious values would become even more exclusive through civic education. The impossibility of integrated schooling appears when one considers that in this situation such schools would have to provide a number of mutually exclusive programmes such as a "Catholic atmosphere", an interdenominational Protestant Milieu, and history, geography, civics, and literature reflecting United Ireland and Protestant Ulster traditions.

Presuming that Northern Ireland is two social and religious communities seeking, or trying to maintain, political counterparts, can, or should one, create integrated schools catering for the mutually exclusive goals of a divided population?

If, however, we assume that integrated schooling is to be introduced in Northern Ireland, how would such a change occur? Professor Akenson suggests that if integrated schooling is to have any chance of success in Northern Ireland it must have four characteristics:[5]

1. It must be voluntary in the sense that only children of parents who desire their attendance are admitted.

2. The parents must have some shared beliefs in common.

3. Supportative techniques will be necessary to ensure continued co-operation between parents.

4. The management committees of such schools should steer clear of both local government and religious authorities.

Given that these conditions are necessary for integrated schooling in

Ulster it seems unlikely that the forceful integration of schools could succeed. This would include -

1. compulsory education as at present;
2. withdrawal of all state funds from voluntary schools;
3. fines or imprisonment for parents who did not send children to integrated schools;
4. bussing from non-integrated housing estates; or
5. the forced integration of housing estates;
6. nationalization of Church property;
7. making hedge schools illegal.

The problem of this alternative would be finding a Government with the will and power to carry such a policy through and sufficiently subduing the population.

The consequences of successful voluntary integration through improved community relations suggests that a time may be reached when the communities begin to question the need for integrated schooling. As political and social differences are accommodated the need for integrated schooling becomes less necessary since community tensions have been reduced. The consequences of forcibly using integrated schooling in an attempt to unite different communities, without community co-operation, will probably end by driving them further apart. The problems connected with creating mixed housing areas and/or bussing pupils and teachers with different religious complexions may provide confrontations and levels of intimidation as yet unseen in Northern Ireland. Thus, it ill behoves those who have not moved to touch English or Scottish religious schools, or to nationalise public schools, to lecture Ulstermen about integrated education. In the event of integrated schooling this will come after a solution at the

community level. Prior to ending the conflict any attempt to integrate may only increase conflict. Seeing integration as a palliative which would ease, if not attack the roots, of community divisions, fails to take account of the community obstacles to common schooling. The suggestion that a sick man does not despise palliatives assumes one man desiring ease. It is less certain that the population of Northern Ireland wish to attain a legal "health" based upon common remedies.

Integrated schooling after the causes of conflict between communities have been removed, or differences accommodated, is an entirely different matter to seeing integrated education as a cure, or palliative, for discord. The political parties, in favour of power-sharing, elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1973 all favour integrated education in some form or another. The Unionist, Alliance, and Labour parties stress integration within Northern Ireland. The Social Democratic and Labour Party emphasises that integration must be between religions in Northern Ireland and between schools close to the Irish Border. The success of the elected integrationalists in Northern Ireland depends upon their being able to agree among themselves; and their being able to carry any proposal in the face of such opposition as will doubtless emerge. The new Government of Northern Ireland may agree with the Burges Report on Secondary Education that "... it would be unrealistic to expect the introduction of integrated schools in the near future."[6] They may choose alternative educational measures as their first concern such as comprehensive education and curricular reform.

The Report of the Advisory Council for Education in Northern Ireland (Cmd.574) recommended, among other things, that the Minister

of State make now a declaration of intent to eliminate the selection at 11plus as soon as possible through a restructuring of the educational system (two members of the Council dissented from this recommendation).[7] Such a restructuring would involve changes in the Intermediate and Grammar schools in the direction of a fully Comprehensive Secondary system.

One of the prime sociological aims of comprehensive schooling -- of whatever structure -- is the promotion of a social mix of pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds. Comprehensivists argue that the present system in Northern Ireland tends to reinforce socio-economic divisions whilst their opponents maintain that the system allows children from any social class to enter any type of school according to aptitude and interest. Nevertheless a study by Boal in 1968 of two predominantly Protestant estates showed that: (1) In the first estate, where 72 per cent of the heads of households were either managers or professional people 100 per cent of the children went to Grammar school; (2) In the neighbouring estate, where 60 per cent of the heads of households were engaged in more manual occupations, only 14 per cent of the children went to Grammar school.[8] This suggests that the distinction between Grammar and Intermediate schools is not completely based on aptitude and interest.

Comprehensivists arguing for the all-through structure of Comprehensive school maintain that, due to length of education at one school, there is a better chance to build up a distinctive "culture" and impress this upon the pupils. Presumably this "culture" is a mixed social class milieu in which boys from different social class backgrounds find a great deal of common life. Evidence from these schoolboy surveys suggest that some degree of resocialization takes

place when boys attend heterogeneous social class schools. Working class boys may become less disorderly, and more positive to Government, through heterogeneous class schooling, but at the expense of middle-class boys becoming less positive and more disorderly. Only in the Catholic mixed "culture" schools is it possible to say that working class political disorder approval diminishes without increasing rebellion in the middle classes. Whilst comprehensive schooling among Protestants has nothing to lose, as far as basic political attitudes are concerned, it may, among Catholics, cause some rejection of disorder. The weight of survey evidence tends, if only slightly, to support the theory that comprehensive schooling may create attitudes conducive to common political allegiance in Northern Ireland.

Comprehensive schooling, however, is not comprehensive education which, as part of its aims, requires the abolition of streaming within schools. Streaming within schools, it is suggested, could enforce divisions between Grammar and Secondary Modern streams of a single school which were just as watertight as those between schools. Research findings indicate that streaming tends to be "self-confirming". Whereas the attainments of pupils placed in the upper streams improves, that of those placed in the lower streams deteriorates.[9] As far as common political allegiance is concerned, one may note, that boys in the higher streams (where streaming existed) were more positive to Government. This is more obvious in the Intermediate than in the Grammar schools. But in the Catholic Intermediate school first year, the boys in the higher streams are much more negative to Government than their lower stream co-religionists (D.I. = 34 per cent). Variations in attitudes to political discord between boys in different streams show that, out of the groups compared, in five cases out of eight, the boys in the

higher streams are more likely to reject violence. In two of the three remaining comparisons, where they are less likely to favour violence than the lower stream schoolboys, the differences are small, but in one case the difference rises to 20 per cent where first year Catholic Intermediate boys in higher streams are more in favour of violence. The survey findings tend, if only slightly, to support the thesis that placing boys in higher school streams may cause some shift in political attitudes towards a position conducive to common political allegiance in Northern Ireland.

A slightly different question is whether or not the abolition of streaming within schools and school years will have any effect upon basic political attitudes. When the Secondary school survey was conducted in 1971 streaming had been abolished in the first year of many Secondary schools. There were, however, few differences of note between schoolboys in streamed and unstreamed school years regarding either affect to Government or disorder. Thus, in most cases, streaming, or its absence, in school years, is irrelevant for political attitudes. It is possible however, that the boys in unstreamed school years had only limited experience of mixing with boys of higher and lower abilities, and that extended experience would lead to some changes in basic political attitudes.

Structural changes in education may create the conditions for attitudinal change, but structural change cannot be considered apart from changes in the society in which the school operates. This involves, among other things, changes in the attitudes of parents, teachers, and religious leaders. Adults who keep Northern Ireland divided as a nation cannot expect to unite society through education. Comprehensive education, for the foreseeable future, is comprehensive

Protestant and Catholic education. This suggests, at present, that the comprehensive schooling debate in Northern Ireland must take account of the spectacle of larger school groupings defined by religious labels which, in confrontations between religions, will provide larger and more easily accessible blocs of potential rioters. The larger comprehensive schools will be more accessible to illegal movements since they will contain pupils drawn from every level of society. Survey evidence suggests that Protestant approval of disorder will remain as it is in Comprehensive schools, whilst Catholic working class boys will be re-socialized towards the more peaceful position of their middle class co-religionists. Alternatively, Catholic working class boys, confronted by larger school blocs of Protestants, may begin to win their middle class co-religionists over to a more militant outlook. But evidence from these surveys, tends to support, if only slightly, the hypothesis that Comprehensive schooling will do more to create attitudes necessary for common political allegiance in Northern Ireland than the present system.

Attitudes conducive to common political allegiance among the schoolboy population of Northern Ireland cannot be created, if indeed they should be, without basic curricular reform. The two main areas of concern are (1) religious education or instruction; (2) civic education.

The Burges report notes that, "There is a general willingness to agree that at least at older age levels pupils should be given some knowledge of the religious beliefs held by others in the same community and in other countries."[10] Whilst it is doubtful whether Protestants and Catholics share the "same community" the above indicates that educators approve of the study of comparative religion

for older pupils (probably fifth and sixth year Secondary school pupils). The major point in favour of this approach is that pupils should be given a thorough understanding of their own religion before they can make meaningful comparisons with other religions. On the other hand, the majority of pupils leave school before their objective knowledge of the other religion in Northern Ireland is at all developed. Their hostility towards the other religion, based upon biased information, is very well rooted by the age of fifteen. And it is upon these misconceptions of the other religion that early school leavers will base their adult attitudes and behaviour. It is unlikely that early school leavers will exchange points of doctrine (if they understand them) across religious lines. Thus, if comparative religion is to be of any value in community relations it must begin earlier in school life than fifteen or sixteen years of age. Alternatively, comparative religion, at any age, may only serve to reinforce popular community opinions that "Protestants are heathens" and "Catholics ignorant, superstitious and priest-ridden".

School civic education in Northern Ireland is partly religious education since socialization into one religious community is synonymous with basic political beliefs and attitudes. Apart from religious instruction the other parts of the school curriculum most associated with politics are: (1) civics; (2) history; (3) Irish language; (4) sports. Even if such subjects could be manipulated in order to create a more common allegiance in Northern Ireland it may not be legitimate to so use them since survey evidence suggests that schoolboys in Northern Ireland are divided at comprehensive political levels and in social relationships. Given that the separate communities have exclusive political goals is it legitimate that the schools

of such communities should seek common political goals? Civic education, in this thesis, is regarded as having been succesful if it inculcates loyalty to the political counterpart of the community to which the schoolboys belong. Clearly, the majority of schoolboys desire separate political communities. Whether such desires are inculcated at school, or the community, or both is immaterial since schools are expected to reflect community interests and not to thwart them. Thus, one cannot say that a school which successfully teaches Orange or Green rebellion against Westminster has been unsuccessful in its civic education function.

Presuming that the schools were forced, with the threat of withdrawal of grants and salaries, to attempt to inculcate attitudes leading to common allegiance in Ulster who would be responsible? There are divisions between the teachers themselves who are the products of separate socializing processes. It is doubtful if attitudes conducive to common allegiance could be taught by those who had experienced little but division and discord in their childhood and youth. Presuming that schools could legitimately use civic education to inculcate attitudes leading to common allegiance, and teachers could be found to carry out such education, they would be faced by the serious question -- common allegiance to what?; to an unreformed or reformed Stormont; to Westminster; to various submissions of the White Paper of 1973; to Mr. Whitelaw's Bill; or to a power-sharing Executive composed of ..... ? Initiatives clearly do not belong to the schools even if they could agree to a common civic programme. Thus, some political institution must evolve which mirrors enough of the goals of each community before civic educators can devise a programme aiming at attitudes and beliefs conducive to common allegiance. Schools cannot create

attitudes leading to common allegiance in the absence of a political counterpart which unites the communities of Northern Ireland in common political goals.

This study revealed a wide sharing of formal content in school history courses. In the Primary schools two-thirds of all pupils, Protestants and Catholics, are reported to share a similar content in their history lessons. This was reported for three-fifths of Grammar and four-fifths of Intermediate schools. Thus, there is a wide sharing of formal subject content much of which may have been caused by examination pressures in the Secondary schools. For instance one would have to know something about every aspect of Irish history taught at school in order to pass formal examinations in the subject by answering Irish questions only, since the majority of questions concern British history and Anglo-Irish relations. But although the formal content of history courses may be similar the emphasis given to say, events in Dublin in 1916 and Londonderry in 1690, might vary a great deal, by religion. In some cases they may be neglected altogether since they concern Republican and Unionist events. But history -- as one of the prime curses of Ulster -- is less of a curse when taught at school. The interests a boy has in history -- much of which must be gathered outside school -- are much more divisive than school history lessons. Survey evidence suggests that more and better Irish history should be taught in school to offset what may be learned elsewhere. Alternatively, it may be no part of a school's function to off-set violent community patterns where the community clearly demonstrates the belief that its goals can only be reached through disorder. In this case educators should consider why their history courses are not more divisive and whether or not it is any part of

their function to create a sheltered and peaceful atmosphere for schoolboys who may be engaged in disorder out of school.

Catholic boys who do not play GAA games and have no classes in Irish language are both more positive to Government and less in favour of violent politics than their co-religionists. Those who play GAA games and learn Irish gaelic are more committed to physical force politics. These issues concern Catholic teachers and educators. There may be no causal connection between these influences and political attitudes, just as there may be no such connection between being a Junior Member of the Orange Order and readiness to fight for a Protestant Ulster. But the association exists and deserves special attention. Such findings, however, may not be in the least surprising to the organisers of the GAA or the Orange Order. Teachers of Cultural Studies and Sports may stress that part of their function is to teach the traditions of their community. If such traditions come into conflict with those of another community, this, they may argue, is but another indication of the irreconcilable nature of the conflict of which their teaching is but a minimal, but inescapable part. Catholic teachers may stress that if Protestants wish to respect their traditions their children should be taught Irish language and hurley. Likewise, Protestants may insist that the British tradition can never be respected until Catholics play cricket. If the war of the Bogside was won on the hurley field it is unlikely that GAA men will enthuse over the games of Eton while discord and disorder persist. Reciprocally, it is difficult to imagine an Orangemen waving a hurley stick. Thus respect for the traditions of each community, embodied in language and sports, seems unlikely without political accommodation.

The earliest political memories of approximately two-fifths of

Ulster adults in the Loyalty Survey were of violence and insurrection or of discordant activities. The tendency for those with more violent childhood memories to have more extreme attitudes in adult life was slight and within the range of ten per cent of those with more peaceful memories. This may suggest that the present youthful acquaintance with disorders will not result in a generation overwhelmingly committed to political violence. Also three-fifths of adults in Ulster, in both religions, feel that children should be allowed to make up their own minds about the Border question. Only one-tenth thought it very important that children should hold the same views as their parents. On the other hand, three-quarters of Ulster adults felt it was very important that children should be brought up with the same religious views as their parents.[11] This suggests that so long as religion can be used as an indicator of Constitutional views children are being socialized into conflict. And when violence breaks out it has its sympathisers. It has its sympathisers among many adults during the present disorders and another generation of stage setting has been prepared for other violent plays in Ulster.

Is civic education in Northern Ireland a symptom or a cause of community divisions? If civic education is defined narrowly to describe formal school teaching it must be regarded as a symptom of community division. If, however, civic education is defined more broadly to include the deliberate teaching of political information emanating from any source, including the school, it may be seen as maintaining community divisions. But in the second definition the school plays a subordinate role to the larger communities which they serve and whose values they reinforce.

Since the beginning of the Northern Ireland regime adults have

never been in agreement about the identity of the state, or who should govern, or how it should be ruled. Moreover such discord has been expressed violently since the seventeenth century. Schoolboys learn their national identity and general assumptions about the nature of the regime from parents and community first, and this is the concrete lesson which they affectively remember. Add to this, that the present reinforces the past so that conflicts since 1968 can be seen in terms of three centuries of disorders between Protestants and Catholics in Ulster. Catholic children fleeing from a school to get behind the barricades on the morning after "Bloody Sunday" need cast their minds no further back than the last retreat behind burned buses and paving stones piled high, or 1969. Alternatively they could "remember" the Plantations of the seventeenth century as Catholics retreated into the "mountainy" area before the on-coming Protestants. Protestant boys vacating a school, during yet another bomb scare, need only "remember" a similar happening a few days or weeks before; or the IRA Border campaign from 1956, or Londonderry, 1689. School events are thus penetrated by historical community disorders of the deepest significance.

The schools themselves depend upon central community institutions for their authority and direction. In Ulster there are two such centres -- the Catholic hierarchy and the Protestant state. The political history of education in Northern Ireland shows that such centres have held exclusive views of education and continue to clash over many basic schooling issues. Whilst schools in Ulster continue to acknowledge the authority of such discordant centres they cannot expect to create an integrated community through school initiatives. The initiatives do not, and cannot, exist.

In order to get common schools with common values one would

have to get common government in Ulster. Survey evidence may suggest that this is a possible alternative to the present situation. Schoolboys who are divided at very comprehensive political and social levels appear to share something in common regarding Government. Alternatively, since Protestants and Catholics appear to respond similarly to Government for somewhat different reasons it may prove impossible to create common attitudes to Government. This suggests that Government may have been regarded as having been sectarian, and common values will not occur beyond the lowest level of political life, i.e. distributions and/or regulations. Alternatively a power-sharing government, in word and deeds, may socialize common political attitudes.

An alternative solution partially follows the Dutch model of conflict regulation through management of unintegrable groups. Political leaders in the Netherlands continued in a position of stalemate over extending the franchise and state aid to denominational schools while tensions rose between the religious-ideological blocs. In this case, however, political leaders foresaw the dangers of disorder and accommodated their differences whilst the blocs maintained more or less segregated social patterns. In the Netherlands there was a readiness on the part of the masses to defer to political leaders, giving them leeway to get on with the "business" of politics, and a "separate but equal" doctrine was accepted by the communities by which the three blocs maintained their own distinctive social life under a common government.

Whether common values and common schools, or difference accommodation between communities, will emerge in Northern Ireland, either alternative is a change from the status quo and demands the re-socialization of adults. Thus the problem of civic learning in Ulster is

not simply "kids' stuff". Childhood and youthful political socialization is important if one can understand some of the post-youthful political roles one is expected to play. The family and the community of origin cannot always, however, anticipate all the adult roles a person will have to fill to meet his own changing needs and the changes in the polity around him. Conflicts which have been stable for centuries may become irrelevant; adults may successfully meet the strains of re-socialization; new cultural patterns may be laid in the rising generation.

This research shows that the need in Northern Ireland is not to prescribe for schools in seeking common values. They are necessary, but only a part, of the vast process of content socialization. Rather the need is that one should accept the differences on a separate-but-equal basis and regulate the conflict. The only other alternative is persistent socialization into conflict resulting in a prolonged cold war which erupts with regularity upon the streets and fields of Northern Ireland.

The implications of a "separate-but-equal" conflict-regulation alternative may suggest, for instance, that housing be used as a means to segregation and communal self-rule along sectarian lines. In a conflict situation such sectarian community facilities may provide that minimum of group security and cohesion to permit social accommodation between community leaders. Further research may reveal high satisfaction with segregated areas in the present circumstances, and a desire for sectarian community services and facilities.

Footnotes - Chapter XII

1. Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System, op. cit., p. 115

2. Ibid., p. 136

3. See, for instance, Basil Bernstein, "Education and Society", New Society, 26 February, 1970

4. G. Mercer, op. cit., (ref: Ch.V, fn. 6)

5. D.H. Akenson, op. cit., (ref: Ch.II, fn. 7), Chapter nine.

6. Reorganisation of Secondary Education in Northern Ireland. A Report of the Advisory Council for Education in Northern Ireland. (Cmd.574.1973), p. 21

7. Ibid., p. 25

8. F.W. Boal, "Close Together and Far Apart: Belfast", Community Forum, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1972

9. J.W.B. Douglas, The Home and the School, (MacGibbon and Kee: 1964).

10. Reorganisation of Secondary Education in Northern Ireland, op. cit., p. 21

11. Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, op. cit., see appendix "The Loyalty Questionnaire", questions 62a and 62b, and pp. 334-35.

Appendix I

The Civic Learning Sample

The largest quantitative study of political socialization of children is reported in Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy, by Easton and Dennis. The study concerns American children and is based upon a national sample, gathered in eight centres, of 12,052 white school-children from not too seriously depressed economic areas. Since the geographical area of America is approximately three-and-a-half million square miles, each data collection centre in the survey could be said to include, or represent, 437,500 square miles; and since the total population of America is approximately 177 millions, for each child respondent there are approximately 14,750 Americans. In the Civic Learning survey in Northern Ireland there are five basic data collection centres and three thousand young people from different religious, national and economic groupings. Since the geographical area of Northern Ireland is approximately 5,000 square miles, each data collection centre could be said to represent, or include, 1,000 square miles of Northern Ireland; and since the population of Northern Ireland is about one-and-a-half million, for each schoolboy in the sample there are approximately 500 inhabitants. Insofar as school-pupil samples are used to generalize to the whole population of the country concerned the Civic Learning sample is three times larger than the largest American sample. Or, expressed differently, if the Ulster sample had been gathered in America it should have included 36,356 respondents.

As far as quantity is concerned the survey analysed in this

thesis compares favourably with the largest quantitative political socialization study in existence.

Preliminary testing of questionnaires and pilot studies in Northern Ireland convinced me that any attempt to draw a sample of Ulster school pupils, which could be collected in a few months (by one researcher) should concentrate upon one sex only. Most Catholic schools in Northern Ireland are single-sex schools whilst most Protestant schools are "co-educational". This creates difficulties in administration. For instance, to collect data from both sexes in the Grammar schools of one Provincial town could involve visiting three, and sometimes four, schools, since many Protestants attend single-sex Grammar schools. If, however, one concentrated upon schoolboys only two schools would be sufficient to collect data from appropriate Grammar schools in one Provincial town. When schools were co-educational it was comparatively easy to collapse two classes into one male group whilst one group of girls simply changed places with boys. In single-sex schools no movement between classes was necessary.

It could, however, have been as simple to administer the questionnaires to girls only. The reason why boys were chosen was because it was thought, in 1970, that boys were slightly more likely than girls to be interested in political questions, and more likely to be engaged in the on-going disorders or associated with organisations recruiting children and young people into conflict. Revent events, however, have suggested that girls are becoming as politically involved as boys in Northern Ireland and perhaps no less violent on occasion. Nevertheless, once the original decision to include only boys in the sample had been taken it was necessary to adhere to this throughout the survey.

The ideal research design would have been to identify a repre-

sentative sample of boys who could be questioned over a number of years to record movements, if any, in their political beliefs and attitudes. Alternatively, a random sample of Ulster schoolboys could have been sought for one wave of interviews. Both these sample types presuppose an abundance of time and financial resources. But with limitations in both these areas it was thought appropriate to use a purposively selected quota sample. Furthermore, most socialization studies to date have been at best a crude quota type, with one or two pre-set criteria for inclusion, or "convenience" samples, chosen because respondents were close at hand and easily accessible, even though they were known to be unrepresentative.

Earlier research and experience suggested that religion was the first criterion of selection necessary for any political survey in Northern Ireland. Thus, the sample was split almost evenly between Protestants (N = 1,516) and Catholics (N = 1,512). Since survey results for Protestants and Catholics were to be presented separately, there was no need to include extra Protestants as would have been done if results had been analysed together.

In order to study developmental trends in political cognition and affect schoolboys were selected from relatively close age intervals. In order to begin the study as early in a child's life as possible, pretests were carried out which suggested that by primary four schoolboys' cognitions of politics were formed and the ability to handle a questionnaire was evident. In the Primary schools boys from primary four and six took part in the survey and, in the Secondary schools, boys in first and fourth year. Time limitations made it impossible to include boys from each year of Primary and Secondary schools. Interviewing did not occur above fourth year of Secondary school since boys in Intermediate

schools were relatively scarce, compared to Grammar schools, above the minimum school leaving age.

Table Appendix I.1 School Year and Religion

Primary (N = 1,109)

	Protestant (N = 561)	Catholic (N = 548)
	%	%
Primary 4	54	48
Primary 6	46	52

Secondary (N = 1,932)

	Protestant (N = 955)	Catholic (N = 977)
	%	%
First year	49	56
Fourth Year	51	44

Besides religion and age, social class seemed an important variable in Northern Ireland warranting an effort to cover a wide cross section of schoolboys with different socio-economic backgrounds. In the case of both Primary and Secondary surveys interviews were conducted in areas having varying proportions of different socio-economic groups. For instance, in Belfast, schools were visited in both council house estates and where the majority of homes were privately owned. In the Secondary survey an equal number of Intermediate (mainly working class) and Grammar (mainly middle class) schools were included. The Secondary sample was later weighted to take account of the greater number of boys attending Intermediate schools over Grammar schools in Ulster (see Appendix II).

Because the sample was collected in different areas of Northern Ireland it was possible to include a "disorder" criteria in the sampling framework. This resulted in a four fold classification of objective disorder levels based upon actual "happenings" in the area concerned. Those attending school in, or near, areas experiencing disorders in the form of

riots, confrontations with the army, and shooting were classified as living where a "lot" of disorder occurred. Other areas were classified in comparison with these areas. For instance, parts of Belfast peripheral to riot zones were said to contain "some" disorder. Thus, boys who were personally experiencing various degrees of disorder were questioned about their attitudes to political violence.

Table Appendix I.2 Level of Disorder(compared to worst-hit areas in early 1971)

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
Lot	22	13	19	19
Some	15	29	11	21
Little	31	19	46	5
None	32	39	24	55

Another important variable in a schoolboy's environment in Ulster is the political colour of those around him. Although he may live in a segregated estate this may be within a Provincial town which is predominantly Protestant or Catholic or mixed. Because the attitudes of boys in areas of different religious complexions were thought to vary, information was collected in districts reflecting the following religious proportions:

Table Appendix I.3 Religious Proportions

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
Catholic Majority	16	17	44	54
Protestant Majority	68	63	34	24
Almost 50/50	16	20	22	22

Within Belfast the general school catchment area was used as an indicator of where boys lived. Some boys resided outside this area, but all boys were within the area for a maximum period during the school week. In the Provincial towns the religious population proportions of the whole town was used in classifying boys to areas which were predominantly Protestant, Catholic or mixed.

Since Northern Ireland displays an uneven pattern of economic development throughout it was thought important to interview boys from areas experiencing different levels of development and unemployment. Two general survey areas could be classified as "East Bann" (most developed area) and "West Bann" (least developed area). In the Secondary survey one Provincial town and its surrounding rural areas could not easily be classified as either and is represented by "Mid". The percentages of schoolboys surveyed in such areas are as follows:

Table: Appendix I.4 Economic Area

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
East Bann	68	63	53	58
West Bann	32	17	47	22
Mid		20		20

The reason why there are fewer Protestants in the Western sample than Catholics is because it is difficult to find a sufficient number of Protestants in the less economically developed areas.

When the sampling framework was devised an attempt was made to include boys from city, Provincial towns with different gross populations, and rural areas. Five major centres were used for data collection having the following gross populations in 1971:

1.	Belfast	360,000
2.	Ballymena	16,500
3.	Armagh	12,300
4.	Omagh	11,950
5.	Enniskillen	6,550

As well as collecting data from schoolboys in the Provincial towns several schools in the surrounding rural areas were visited in order to include the attitudes of boys in villages and isolated farms and cottages. Besides visiting a number of rural schools a substantial proportion of Secondary schoolboys travel daily from rural areas to schools in the Provincial towns.

Since schoolboy attitudes to politics were thought to vary by the distance they lived from the Republic of Ireland, the final criteria used in the sampling frame was distance from the Irish/United Kingdom Border. The following distribution was realized:

Table: Appendix I.5 Distance from Border

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
Close to border	32	37	47	42
Far from border	68	63	53	58

Data from boys classified as living close to the border was gathered from centres in County Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh. Those residing far from the border are to be found either in Belfast, the North of County Down, or in County Antrim.

Appendix II

Weighting the Secondary School Sample

When the Secondary school sample was collected early in 1971 an approximately equal number of boys in Grammar and Secondary Intermediate schools were included. There are, however, many more boys in Secondary Intermediate than in Grammar schools in Northern Ireland. Thus, in order to make the Secondary Sample more representative of Ulster schoolboys weighting after selection was necessary.

The problem of weighting by school-type was intensified by a need, on my part, to take Protestant-Catholic differences into account - differences not officially recognised in Northern Ireland Educational Statistics. In the case of Intermediate schools, however, it was relatively easy to determine which schools were predominantly Protestant or Catholic from the "Maintained Voluntary" and "County" categories in Educational Statistics. But in the case of Grammar schools - many predominantly Protestant and Catholic Grammar schools come under the "Voluntary" category, while many Protestant Grammar schools are "County" schools. Thus, from a straight reading of Northern Ireland Educational Statistics it was impossible to find how many schoolboys attended predominantly Protestant and Catholic Grammar schools in Northern Ireland. This difficulty was overcome with the help of the Statistics Branch of the Ministry of Education in Northern Ireland, who supplied me with a list of all Voluntary Grammar schools in Northern Ireland together with the number of boys and girls attending each school (arranged within groups of 25 pupils for the Secondary Departments of Grammar schools). From this list I discovered, with the help of an educationalist in Northern Ireland, which schools

were either predominantly Protestant or Catholic. From such information it was comparatively easy to calculate the approximate number of Protestant and Catholic schoolboys attending Voluntary Grammar schools in Northern Ireland in 1971. Such figures could only, however, be approximate since numbers attending the Voluntary Grammar schools were supplied in groups of 25 pupils. By adding the approximate number of boys attending County Grammar schools to the Protestant Voluntary Grammar schools I was able to obtain figures necessary for calculating the weights to be applied to the Secondary schoolboy sample in my possession. Allowing for a sprinkling of "others" in the Grammar schools the following is a fair approximation of the actual schoolboy population attending schools defined by religion in 1971 when the sample was collected:

	Protestant				Catholic			
	Population		Sample		Population		Sample	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Secondary Intermediate	23,516	62	478	50	20,228	72	474	49
Secondary Grammar	14,134	38	477	50	7,997	28	503	51

The weight for each of the above sample categories was determined by dividing the schoolboy population in each category by the sample size in the same category.

The following weights were attached to the categories concerned (rounded off to nearest figure):

	Protestant	Catholic
Intermediate	49	43
Grammar	30	16

Producing the following weighted Secondary Sample:

	Protestant		Catholic	
	N	%	N	%
Intermediate	23,422	62	20,382	72
Grammar	14,310	38	8,048	28

(1) Attitudes to Government

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Unweighted %	Weighted %	Unweighted %	Weighted %
POSITIVE	33	33	17	17
positive	52	51	47	46
negative	10	12	24	24
NEGATIVE	3	3	9	10
N.A.	2	1	3	3

(2) Attitudes to Discord

Violent	65	68	58	60
Peaceful	31	28	40	37
N.A.	4	4	2	3

Differences between Grammar and Intermediate schoolboys concerning affect to Government were small, therefore weighting makes little difference to basic distributions. The Intermediate boys in the sample were more prepared than their Grammar school co-religionists to accept violence as justifiable in pursuit of certain political goals resulting in a slight increase in disorder approval in the weighted sample.

The small differences between results reported here and in materials published earlier are due to the weighting of the Secondary Sample.

Appendix III

The Civic Learning Questionnaires

The text of the questionnaires analysed in this thesis follows here. Secondary school and Primary school questionnaires are presented separately. Although the questions in both questionnaires are intended to cover similar attitudes and values they have been worded slightly differently to facilitate understanding, particularly among the Primary schoolboys. The format of a number of questions has been altered to save space and coding numbers have been omitted. Wherever possible, the percentage distribution of replies has been given separately for Protestants and Catholics. Where questions were not asked of both religions this will be clearly indicated in what follows. Replies given to open-ended questions have not usually been reported. For instance, the initial classification of answers to the question about what one would do as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland employed 30 categories.

In every instance, the total number of replies have been percentaged in relation to all the Protestant and all the Catholic schoolboys in either Primary or Secondary schools in the sample. In the case of Primary schools this is 561 Protestants and 548 Catholics. The original Secondary school sample consisted of 955 Protestants and 977 Catholics. A total of 972 interviews were in Secondary Grammar schools and 946 in Secondary Intermediate schools. Since there were many more boys in Intermediate than in Grammar schools in Northern Ireland in 1971 the Secondary sample has been weighted to take account of these differences. Thus, where a difference of a few percentage points occurs between what follows and figures published elsewhere, this is due to

weighting of the Secondary school sample to make it more representative of schoolboys in Northern Ireland.

The following conventions are used in what follows and elsewhere when reporting survey findings:

1. All percentages have been rounded off to the nearest figure (e.g. 6.5 rounded down to 6 and 6.6 rounded up to 7).
   (a) columns may not total 100 per cent precisely because of rounding off adjustments.
   (b) The Difference Index was calculated after rounding off with columns totalling 100.
2. N.A. = no answer. In all cases this indicates the percentage of schoolboys who did not answer the questions involved. In multiple response questions the percentage not replying was small and has not been included.
3. An entry of 0 indicates that 0.5 per cent or less of all replies are in this category.
4. When totals in tables are substantially larger than 100 per cent this is because respondents could, and did, give more than one answer to a question.

During the administrations of the questionnaires to school classes boys were not confronted with questions designed for those of the other religion; separate documents were prepared for each religion.

I SECONDARY SCHOOLBOYS

			Protestant %	Catholic %
1.	Think about your ambitions			
1a	When you leave school what would you like to be?			
	"When I leave school I would like to be ... (coded as working or middle class career ambition) ...	W.C.	37	45
		M.C.	58	50
		N.A.	5	5
1b	How far would you like to go at school?			
	TICK ONE			
	Leave school at 15		32	35
	C.S.E.		3	5
	R.S.A.		-	-
	'O' levels		12	11
	'A' levels		17	14
	Teacher's Diploma		2	4
	University Degree		26	24
	Other		5	5
	N.A.		3	2
1c	Apart from what you would like to be, what is your main ambition in life?			
	_____			
2.	When you are older do you want to live and work in N. Ireland or move elsewhere?			
	Live and work in N. Ireland		56	54
	Move to		40	43
	N.A.		4	3

		Protestant %	Catholic %
3.	What are the things that you <u>like</u> most about living in N. Ireland?		
	_____		
4.	What are the things that you <u>dislike</u> most about living in N. Ireland?		
	_____		
5.	Who is the boss in your family?		
	PICK <u>ONE</u>		
	Father	37	34
	Mother	9	9
	Both equal	40	40
	Depends	13	15
	N.A.	1	2
6.	Which newspapers do you see often?		
	PICK <u>ONE OR TWO</u>		
	None	2	3
	Belfast Newsletter	34	7
	Irish News	3	59
	Belfast Telegraph	62	48
	Other	41	37
7.	Which pages of the newspaper do you look at a <u>lot</u>?		
	News pages	40	40
	Entertainment pages	29	34
	Sports pages	68	68
	Fashion & clothes pages	4	7
	None of these	-	-
8.	Which programmes on T.V. do you look at a <u>lot</u>?		
	News	31	30
	Entertainments	43	41
	Sports	58	56
	War & Crime Films	64	61
	Don't have T.V.	5	6

		Protestant %	Catholic %
9.	What is your Father's job? (If your father is not working now what did he do when he was?) Coded as Working or Middle Class		
	W.C.	45	55
	M.C.	55	43
	N.A.	0	2
10.	When your family is deciding to do something together do you have -		
	Some say in what to do	83	77
	No say in what to do	14	20
	N.A.	3	3
11.	Put an X in the box beside the sentence that comes closest to telling what your father's job is. (If your father is not working now put the X next to the kind of job that best describes what he did when he was working) MARK ONE BOX ONLY		
	He works in a labouring job	17	25
	He works with his hands in a job that takes a long time to learn ... like a carpenter, an electrician, a plumber, a machinist or something like that.	26	26
	He works in an office or a store or something else like that and usually wears a uniform or shirt and tie to work.	19	13
	He works in an office as a manager	8	4
	He is like a lawyer, doctor or teacher. He has a degree and special training for his job.	8	6
	He owns a good sized business, factory or store.	6	8
	He owns or rents a farm	15	12
	N.A.	1	6

	Protestant %	Catholic %
12. Here are some words about Government. Pick one word that shows best what Government in N. Ireland is. TICK ONE BOX ONLY		
The Police	7	6
Parliament	37	30
The Soldiers	19	22
Prime Minister	17	19
The Queen	7	3
Other (write in).....	6	17
N.A.	7	3

13. Look at the sentences in the following boxes and tick the one that comes closest to telling about the POLICE and people like you.

1	2	3	4
The Police Always want to help people like me	The Police Sometimes want to help people like me	The Police Never want to help people like me	The Police want to hurt people like me

1 ...	62	23
2 ...	34	51
3 ...	1	11
4 ...	2	14
N.A.	1	1

Now do the same with the following sentences about the soldiers, the Prime Minister, Parliament, the Queen and the Government.

14.

1	2	3	4
The Soldiers Always want to help people like me	The Soldiers Sometimes want to help people like me	The Soldiers Never want to help people like me	The Soldiers want to Hurt people like me

1 ...	49	25
2 ...	42	48
3 ...	5	10
4 ...	3	16
N.A.	1	1

15. Which sentence comes closest to telling about the Prime Minister of N. Ireland?

1	2	3	4	Protestant %	Catholic %
The Prime Minister always wants to help people like me	The Prime Minister sometimes wants to help people like me	The Prime Minister never wants to help people like me	The Prime Minister wants to hurt people like me		
			1 ...	43	21
			2 ...	43	45
			3 ...	10	23
			4 ...	3	9
			N.A.	1	2

16. Which sentence comes closest to telling about Parliament?

1	2	3	4		
Parliament always wants to help people like me	Parliament sometimes wants to help people like me	Parliament never wants to help people like me	Parliament wants to hurt people like me		
			1 ...	31	14
			2 ...	54	56
			3 ...	12	20
			4 ...	2	7
			N.A.	1	3

17. Which sentence comes closest to telling about the Queen?

1	2	3	4		
The Queen always wants to help people like me	The Queen sometimes wants to help people like me	The Queen never wants to help people like me	The Queen wants to hurt people like me		
			1 ...	71	31
			2 ...	23	34
			3 ...	5	24
			4 ...	0	8
			N.A.	1	3

18. Which sentence comes closest to telling about the Government of N. Ireland?

1	2	3	4		
The Government always wants to help people like me	The Government sometimes wants to help people like me	The Government never wants to help people like me	The Government wants to hurt people like me		
			1 ...	33	17
			2 ...	51	46
			3 ...	12	24
			4 ...	3	10
			N.A.	1	3

		Protestant %	Catholic %
19.	What sort of person do you think a Prime Minister should be. PICK THE WORDS WHICH SHOW THIS BEST		
	Strong	39	30
	Kind	19	32
	Patient	44	49
	Intelligent	72	69
	God-fearing	20	20
	Good	24	35
20.	If you were able to vote for a political party, which ONE would you support?		
	Unionist	22	4
	Protestant Unionist	48	1
	Nationalist	1	4
	Peoples' Democracy	2	9
	S.D.L.P.	1	7
	Sinn Fein	0	19
	N.I. Labour	5	20
	Liberal	2	2
	Other	1	4
	Don't Know	7	6
	N.A.	11	24

21. Tick the sentence that you agree with MOST

1	2	3	4
It is Very Important for children to do whatever their parents tell them	It is fairly important	It is not Very Important	It is not at all important for children to do whatever their parents tell them

1 ...	63	66
2	32	28
3 ...	2	2
4 ...	1	2
N.A. ...	2	2

		Protestant %	Catholic %
22.	Tick the sentence that you agree with Most		
	1 It is Very Important for ~~pup~~ils to do whatever their teachers tell them		
	2 It is Fairly Important		
	3 It is not Very Important		
	4 It is not at all important for pupils to do whatever their teachers tell them		
	1 ...	47	42
	2 ...	37	35
	3 ...	7	10
	4 ...	8	11
	N.A.	1	2
23.	Tick the sentence that you agree with MOST		
	1 It is Very Important for workers to do whatever employers tell them		
	2 It is Fairly Important		
	3 It is Not Very Important		
	4 It is not at all important for workers to do whatever employers tell them		
	1 ...	71	66
	2 ...	25	25
	3 ...	2	4
	4 ...	1	3
	N.A.	1	2
24.	Tick the sentence that you agree with MOST		
	1 It is Very Important for people to do whatever the Government tells them		
	2 It is Fairly Important		
	3 It is Not Very Important		
	4 It is not at all important for people to do whatever the Government tells them		
	1 ...	47	23
	2 ...	32	34
	3 ...	10	21
	4 ...	10	20
	N.A.	1	2

		Protestant %	Catholic %
25.	You may belong to a local gang, or school group which meets outside school hours. If you do belong to a gang, or group, how close do you feel to the centre of it?		
	PICK ONE		
	At centre	17	18
	Near the centre	19	20
	A good bit from the centre	5	5
	I don't belong to a gang	57	55
	N.A.	2	2
26.	Can you write in the names of the following people and the name of the political party to which they belong		
	(WRITE IN) Percentage correct		
	The Prime Minister of Britain	73	67
	His party	48	40
	The Prime Minister of the Republic	60	53
	His party	15	19
	Your M.P. at Stormont	28	23
	His or her party	27	15
	Your M.P. at Westminster	19	23
	His or her party	17	13
27.	Would you say that people in England are much different or about the same as you?		
	Different	43	58
	About same	56	41
	N.A.	1	1
28.	Would you say that people in the Republic are much different or about the same as you?		
	Different	68	30
	About same	30	68
	N.A.	2	2
29.	Which of the following sentences do you MOST agree with?		
	PICK ONE		
	Almost all changes are for the better	22	20
	Most changes are for the better	56	50
	Most changes are for the worse	12	15
	Almost all changes are for the worse	7	11
	N.A.	3	4

		Protestant %	Catholic %
30.	Here are a few things that people sometimes say in favour of government in N. Ireland. Do you Agree or Disagree with them?		
	% Agreeing ...		
	It's good because it has been with us for a long time	34	20
	It's good because it usually provides lots of benefits	47	32
	It's good because it gives us a Queen to rule over us	71	17
	It's good because it usually tries to do good things	65	41
	It's good because it is in the hands of men who are good leaders	36	19
	It's good because it is what the people vote for	55	39
	We've got to accept it whatever we think	48	48
31.	What kind of person do you think a father should be? TICK THE WORDS THAT SHOW THIS BEST		
	Strong	44	40
	Kind	62	67
	Patient	62	64
	Intelligent	53	51
	God-fearing	25	34
	Good	47	53
32.	If you were the Prime Minister of N. Ireland what would you do?		
	"If I were the P.M. of N. Ireland I would		
	_____		
33.	There are those who say that some people are born to rule. Others disagree. What do you think?		
	Agree	26	22
	Disagree	18	26
	Depends	40	36
	Don't know	14	15
	N.A.	2	1

		Protestant %	Catholic %
34.	There are those who say that the upper-class is the best to govern the country. Others disagree. How do you feel about this?		
	Agree	11	9
	Disagree	49	56
	Depends	29	23
	Don't know	9	11
	N.A.	2	1
35.	Some say that people with the most education are best to govern the country. Others disagree. What do you think?		
	Agree	42	35
	Disagree	20	27
	Depends	31	30
	Don't know	5	7
	N.A.	2	1
36.	Do you think it is all right ifyoung people break windows in empty buildings?		
	Agree	16	24
	Disagree	66	59
	Depends	13	14
	Don't know	3	3
	N.A.	2	0
37.	Do you think it is all right if young people throw stones at each other?		
	Agree	12	17
	Disagree	68	60
	Depends	16	21
	Don't know	2	2
	N.A.	2	0
38.	Are you studying history this year? If so, is that -		
	Mainly British history	30	12
	Mainly Irish history	4	17
	Both Irish & British history	31	21
	Other history	23	23
	Don't have history	9	23
	N.A.	3	4

		Protestant %	Catholic %
39.	Some people say that Protestants are best to govern the country. Others disagree. What do you think?		
	Agree	59	2
	Disagree	11	73
	Depends	24	20
	Don't know	4	4
	N.A.	2	1
40.	Do you think that Protestants and Catholics disagree most because -		
	PICK ONE		
	they think differently about God and the Church	27	33
	or		
	they think differently about Northern Ireland	69	63
	N.A.	4	4
41.	If pictures of street fighting in N. Ireland are shown on your T.V. at home do you -		
	PICK ONE		
	Usually watch	90	87
	Usually don't watch	4	6
	Don't have T.V.	3	5
	N.A.	3	2
42.	What would you do if you saw Protestants and Catholics fighting near your home?		
	PICK ONE		
	Move away	39	34
	Watch from where you were	19	13
	Go closer to see what was happening	8	6
	Join in	33	46
	N.A.	1	1
43.	Do you think that most people can be trusted or that you have to watch out for other people?		
	CHOOSE ONE		
	Most people can be trusted	17	10
	You have to watch out for other people	46	44
	Depends	36	43
	N.A.	1	3

	Protestant %	Catholic %
44. How do you think of yourself?		
PICK ONE		
Do you think of yourself as British	30	8
Do you think of yourself as Irish	11	75
Do you think of yourself as Ulster	48	8
Do you think of yourself as sometimes British and sometimes Irish	8	8
N.A.	3	1
45. If you answered 1, 2 or 3 to the last question do you think of yourself as -		
Strongly British	15	3
Just British	15	5
Strongly Irish	5	52
Just Irish	6	22
Strongly Ulster	32	2
Just Ulster	15	5
N.A.	12	11
46. Which of the following sentences do you most agree with?		
PICK ONE		
I accept the link with Britain with all my heart	40	5
I accept the link with Britain, but there are some things about it I don't completely like	46	34
I don't accept the link with Britain, but I see some good points in it	6	32
I reject the link with Britain with all my heart	4	27
N.A.	4	2
47. Has there been much trouble in your district in the last two years?		
CHOOSE ONE		
A lot of trouble	16	11
Some trouble	14	14
A little trouble	25	24
No trouble	44	49
N.A.	1	2

		Protestant %	Catholic %
48:	Which district is that (WRITE IN)		
49.	Are you interested in history? If so, is that -		
	Mainly British history	38	14
	Mainly Irish history	24	55
	Other history	2	4
	Not interested in history	33	24
	N.A.	3	3

50. Some say that people like my family can do nothing about changing what the Government in N. Ireland does. Others disagree. Which sentence comes closest to saying what you feel?

1	2	3	4
People like my family can usually get the Government to do what they want.	Sometimes	seldom	People like my family can never get the Government to do what they want

1 ...	7	5
2 ...	30	13
3 ...	36	33
4 ...	23	46
N.A.	4	3

PROTESTANTS ONLY

	Protestant %	Catholic %

51. Do you agree or disagree with the following sentences?

TRY TO ANSWER EVERY QUESTION

a I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother became a Roman Catholic

Agree	19
Disagree	80
N.A.	1

b I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother married a Roman Catholic

Agree	26
Disagree	72
N.A.	2

c I wouldn't mind if my friends were Roman Catholics

Agree	59
Disagree	38
N.A.	3

d I wouldn't mind if half the young people in my school were Roman Catholics

Agree	42
Disagree	56
N.A.	2

e I wouldn't mind if most of my neighbours were Roman Catholics

Agree	40
Disagree	57
N.A.	3

f I think that Roman Catholics should be sent out of Northern Ireland

Agree	49
Disagree	49
N.A.	2

52. How often do you go to Church?

TICK ONE

More than once a week	25
Once a week	41
At least monthly	7
Occasionally	16
Never	8
N.A.	3

	Protestant %
53. Are you friendly with Roman Catholic young people? TICK ONE	
Yes	58
No	37
N.A.	5
54. Would you say that Roman Catholic children or young people in Northern Ireland are much different or about the same as you?	
Different	45
About same	52
N.A.	3
55. Some people say that there is discrimination against Protestants in Northern Ireland. Others disagree. What do you think?	
Agree	47
Disagree	22
Don't know	27
N.A.	4
56. Sometimes the government bans parades planned by Protestants. When this happens, do you think it is still all right for these to be held?	
Yes	43
No	40
Depends	14
N.A.	3

57. Tick the sentence that you agree with most

1	2	3	4	Protestant %
It is very important for members of a Church to do whatever their Minister tells them	fairly important	not very important	It is not at all Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Minister tells them	
			1 ...	35
			2 ...	36
			3 ...	15
			4 ...	11
			N.A.	3

		Protestant %
58.	Do you belong to the Junior Orange Order?	
	Yes	30
	No	67
	N.A.	3
59.	Have you ever marched with the Orange bands?	
	Yes	56
	No	41
	N.A.	3
60.	Do you think that people have a right to fight in order to keep Ulster Protestant?	
	Yes	68
	No	28
	N.A.	4
61.	Some say that all Roman Catholics want to end the link with Britain. Others disagree. What do you think?	
	Agree	44
	Disagree	52
	N.A.	4
62.	Some say that all Roman Catholics want to destroy the Protestant religion. Others disagree. What do you think?	
	Agree	52
	Disagree	44
	N.A.	4
63.	Do you think of yourself as a strong Protestant or as an average Protestant?	
	Strong Protestant	41
	Average Protestant	50
	Neither	6
	N.A.	3
64.	How important do you think it is to believe all the Bible teaches ?	
	Very Important	45
	Fairly Important	34
	Not very Important	10
	Not at all Important	7
	N.A.	4

CATHOLICS ONLY

Catholic %

65. How often do you go to Mass?

PICK ONE

More than once a week	29
Once a week	65
At least monthly	2
Occasionally	3
Never	1
N.A.	0

66. Are you friendly with Protestant young people?

Yes	66
No	32
N.A.	2

67. Would you say that Protestant young people in Northern Ireland are much different or about the same as you?

Different	41
About same	57
N.A.	2

68. Sometimes the government bans parades planned by Republican groups. When this happens do you think it is still all right for these to be held?

Yes	42
No	36
Depends on	20
N.A.	2

69. Tick the sentence that you agree with most

1	2	3	4
It is Very Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Priest tells them	Fairly Important	Not Very Important	It is Not at all Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Priest tells them

1 ...	59
2 ...	29
3 ...	7
4 ...	3
N.A.	2

		Catholic %
70.	Do you take classes in Irish language at school?	
	Yes	51
	No	46
	N.A.	3
71.	Do you play any Gaelic Athletic Association games?	
	Yes	77
	No	21
	N.A.	2
72.	Do you think that people have a right to fight in in order to bring about a United Ireland?	
	Yes	60
	No	37
	N.A.	3
73.	Do you agree or disagree with the following sentences?	
a	I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother became a Protestant	
	Agree	17
	Disagree	81
	N.A.	2
b	I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother married a Protestant	
	Agree	39
	Disagree	58
	N.A.	3
c	I wouldn't mind if my friends were Protestants	
	Agree	68
	Disagree	28
	N.A.	4
d	I wouldn't mind if half the children in my school were Protestants	
	Agree	55
	Disagree	43
	N.A.	2
e	I wouldn't mind if most of my neighbours were Protestants	
	Agree	55
	Disagree	43
	N.A.	2
f	I think that Protestants should be sent out of Ireland	
	Agree	37
	Disagree	60
	N.A.	3

		Catholic %
74.	Some people say that there is discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland. Others disagree. What do you think?	
	Agree	71
	Disagree	8
	Don't know	18
	N.A.	3
75.	Some say that all Protestants want to keep the link with Britain. Others disagree. What do you think?	
	Agree	51
	Disagree	45
	N.A.	4
76.	Some say that all Protestants want to destroy the Catholic religion. Others disagree. What do you feel about this?	
	Agree	44
	Disagree	54
	N.A.	2
77.	How important do you think it is to believe all that the Catholic Church teaches?	
	Very important	67
	Fairly important	25
	Not very important	4
	Not at all important	2
	N.A.	2
78.	Do you think of yourself as a Strong Catholic or as an Average Catholic?	
	Strong Catholic	38
	Average Catholic	57
	Neither	3
	N.A.	2

		Protestant %	Catholic %
	ALL RESPONDENTS AGAIN		
	TO BE FILLED IN BY INTERVIEWER ONLY		
79.	**School**		
	Intermediate	62	72
	Grammar	38	28
80.	**Religious Proportions attending -**		
	Almost 100% Protestant	100	-
	Almost 100% Catholic	-	100
	Some mixing	-	-
81.	**Social Class Proportions attending School Class**		
	Predominantly W.C.	25	35
	Predominantly M.C.	40	25
	Some mixing	35	40
82.	**Grade of Child -**		
	1st year	49	56
	4th year	51	44
83.	**Stream of Child -**		
	Upper 1st	16	10
	Lower 1st	14	10
	Unstreamed 1st	19	37
	Upper 4th	28	23
	Lower 4th	23	20
	Unstreamed 4th	-	-
84.	**History Syllabus**		
a.	Secondary Intermediate		
	Mainly British	35	20
	Mainly Irish	0	0
	Mixed British/Irish	49	55
	Other history	6	3
	No history	10	22
b.	Secondary Grammar		
	Mainly British	41	24
	Mainly Irish	0	21
	Mixed British/Irish	19	3
	Other history	15	38
	No history	25	14

		Protestant %	Catholic %
85.	Area (Religious Proportions)		
	Catholic Majority	17	54
	Protestant Majority	63	24
	Almost 50/50	20	22
86.	Tension (compared to worst hit areas)		
	High	13	19
	Some	29	21
	A little	19	5
	None	39	55
87.	Geographical Area		
	East Bann	21	19
	West Bann	17	22
	Mid	20	20
	Belfast	42	39
88.	Streaming in School Year		
	Strict	80	64
	Unstreamed	20	36
89.	Civics		
	Yes	10	10
	No	90	90
90.	Belfast	42	39
	Non-Belfast	58	61
91.	Time 1. C. Clark P.M.	71	57
	1971 2. B. Faulkner P.M.	29	43
92.	Head & Staff -		
	Protestant	100	-
	Lay Catholic	-	32
	Religious Catholic	-	68
93.	Streaming by Entire School		
	Strict	47	40
	Modified	53	60
	Unstreamed	-	-
94.	Social Class Proportions by Entire School		
	Working class	38	45
	Middle class	30	28
	Mixed	32	27

II. PRIMARY SCHOOLBOYS	Protestant %	Catholic %
1. Who is the boss in your family?		
Father	57	48
Mother	8	15
Both equal	27	26
Depends	6	6
N.A.	2	5
2. When your family is going to do something together like going out somewhere do you have -		
Some say in what to do	59	50
No say in what to do	32	36
N.A.	9	14
3. Here are the names of some people Which THREE work for the GOVERNMENT?		
Policeman	97	94
Baker	1	3
Soldier	97	93
Butcher	1	2
Judge	92	89
Grocer	2	4

4. Here are some things people sometimes say about the SOLDIERS. Tick the one that comes closest to telling about the SOLDIERS and people like you.

1	2	3	4	Protestant	Catholic
The soldiers ALWAYS want to help people like me	The soldiers SOMETIMES want to help people like me	The soldiers NEVER want to help people like me	The soldiers want to HURT people like me		
		1 ...		85	34
		2 ...		12	23
		3 ...		-	10
		4 ...		2	30
		N.A.		1	3

5. Which one comes closest to telling about the Prime Minister of N. Ireland?

1	2	3	4
The Prime Minister always wants to help people like me	The Prime Minister Sometimes wants to help people like me	The Prime Minister Never wants to help people like me	The Prime Minister wants to hurt people like me

	Protestant %	Catholic %
5. (continued)		
1. ...	68	34
2. ...	27	32
3. ...	2	17
4. ...	2	13
N.A.	1	4

6. Which one comes closest to telling about the Queen?

1	2	3	4		
The Queen always wants to help people like me	The Queen sometimes wants to help people like me	The Queen never wants to help people like me	The Queen wants to hurt people like me		
1. ...				84	43
2. ...				13	24
3. ...				2	18
4. ...				-	9
N.A.				1	6

7. Tick the one that comes closest to telling about the POLICE and people like you.

1	2	3	4		
The police always want to help people like me	The police sometimes want to help people like me	The police never want to help people like me	The police want to hurt people like me		
1. ...				84	41
2. ...				12	29
3. ...				-	9
4. ...				1	19
N.A.				3	2

8. Here are some things people sometimes say about the Government of Northern Ireland. TICK the ONE that comes closest to telling about the Government of Northern Ireland

1	2	3	4		
The Government always wants to help people like me	The Government sometimes wants to help people like me	The Government never wants to help people like me	The Government wants to hurt people like me		
1. ...				64	33
2. ...				30	34
3. ...				2	17
4. ...				1	12
N.A.				3	4

	Protestant %	Catholic %
9. Here are some words about Government Pick ONE word that shows best what Government in Northern Ireland is. TICK ONE BOX ONLY		
Police	2	8
Parliament	32	26
Soldiers	10	10
Prime Minister	25	32
The Queen	29	14
Other (write in) ...	2	5
I.R.A. (written in)	-	5

PROTESTANTS ONLY

10. Sometimes the Government tells Protestants to stop their parades or marches. When this happens do you think it is still all right for the parades to go ahead?	
Yes	34
No	64
N.A.	2
11. Do you think that people have a right to fight in order to keep Ulster Protestant?	
Yes	51
No	47
N.A.	2
12. How often are you at Church? TICK ONE	
More than once a week	22
Once a week	49
At least once a month	4
Sometimes	13
Never	9
N.A.	3

CATHOLICS ONLY

13. Sometimes the Government tells Catholics to stop their parades or marches. When this happens do you think it is still all right for the parades to go ahead?	
Yes	54
No	42
N.A.	4

	Protestant %	Catholic %
14. Do you think that people have a right to fight in order to bring about a United Ireland?		
Yes		60
No		37
N.A.		3
15. How often do you go to Mass?		
TICK ONE		
More than once a week		32
Once a week		57
At least once a month		2
Sometimes		3
Never		1
N.A.		5

ALL RESPONDENTS AGAIN

16. Would you say that people in England are much different or about the same as you?		
Different	35	58
About same	64	40
N.A.	1	2
17. Would you say that people in the Republic (the South) are much different or about the same as you?		
Different	71	35
About same	27	62
N.A.	2	3
18. Do you think it is all right if children break windows in empty houses?		
TICK ONE		
Yes	12	22
No	66	59
Depends	16	13
Don't know	5	4
N.A.	1	2
19. Do you think it is all right if children throw stones at each other?		
TICK ONE		
Yes	10	12
No	76	72
Depends	11	11
Don't know	1	2
N.A.	2	3

	Protestant %	Catholic %
20. Do you think that Protestants and Catholics disagree most because ...		
they think differently about God and the Church	31	39
OR		
they think differently about Northern Ireland	68	58
N.A.	1	3
21. What would you do if you saw Protestants and Catholics fighting near your home? TICK ONE		
Move away	59	47
Watch from where you were	8	9
Go closer to see what was happening	6	7
Join in	26	36
N.A.	1	
22. How do you think of yourself? TICK ONE		
Do you think of yourself as British	25	11
Do you think of yourself as Irish	14	69
Do you think of yourself as Ulster	51	9
Do you think of yourself as sometimes British and sometimes Irish	9	9
N.A.	1	2
23. Do you think of yourself as - TICK ONE		
Strongly British	13	6
Just British	13	6
Strongly Irish	6	52
Just Irish	9	20
Strongly Ulster	38	4
Just Ulster	18	6
N.A.	3	6

24. Tick the one that you agree with MOST

1 It is Very Important for children to do whatever their parents tell them	2 Fairly Important	3 not Very Important	4 It is not at all important ~~for~~ children to do whatever their parents tell them	Protestant %	Catholic %
			1 ...	81	73
			2 ...	14	19
			3 ...	1	3
			4 ...	3	3
			N.A.	1	2

		Protestant %	Catholic %
25. Tick the one that you agree with MOST			
1 It is Very Important for pupils to do whatever their teachers tell them	1 ...	73	61
2 Fairly Important	2 ...	16	21
3 not Very Important	3 ...	3	5
4 It is not at all important for pupils to do whatever their teachers tell them	4 ...	7	11
	N.A.	1	2
26. Tick the one that you agree with MOST			
1 It is Very Important for workers to do whatever employers tell them	1 ...	77	57
2 Fairly Important	2 ...	17	26
3 Not Very Important	3 ...	4	6
4 It is not at all important for workers to do whatever employers tell them	4 ...	2	8
	N.A.	-	3
27. Tick the one that you agree with MOST			
1 It is Very Important for people to do whatever the Government tells them	1 ...	66	28
2 Fairly Important	2 ...	20	22
3 Not Very Important	3 ...	5	13
4 It is not at all Important for people to do whatever the Government tells them	4 ...	8	32
	N.A.	1	5

		Protestant %	Catholic %

PROTESTANTS ONLY

28. Do you agree or disagree with the following sentences?

a. I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother became a Roman Catholic	Agree	16
	Disagree	82
	N.A.	2
b. I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother married a Roman Catholic	Agree	16
	Disagree	81
	N.A.	3
c. I wouldn't mind if my friends were Roman Catholics	Agree	41
	Disagree	56
	N.A.	3
d. I wouldn't mind if half the children in my school were Roman Catholics	Agree	25
	Disagree	72
	N.A.	3
e. I wouldn't mind if most of my neighbours were Roman Catholics	Agree	34
	Disagree	63
	N.A.	3
f. I think that Roman Catholics should be sent out of Northern Ireland	Agree	69
	Disagree	29
	N.A.	2

29. Tick the one that you agree with MOST

1	2	3	4	
It is Very Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Minister tells them	Fairly Important	Not Very Important	It is Not at all Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Minister tells them	
			1 ...	67
			2 ...	22
			3 ...	5
			4 ...	2
			N.A.	4

30. Do you belong to the Junior Orange Order?

Yes	40
No	59
N.A.	1

31. Have you ever marched with the Orange bands?

Yes	53
No	46
N.A.	1

CATHOLICS ONLY

		Catholic %
32.	Do you agree or disagree with the following sentences?	
a.	I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother became a Protestant	
	Agree	15
	Disagree	83
	N.A.	2
b.	I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother married a Protestant	
	Agree	24
	Disagree	73
	N.A.	3
c.	I wouldn't mind if my friends were Protestants	
	Agree	49
	Disagree	48
	N.A.	3
d.	I wouldn't mind if half the children in my school were Protestants	
	Agree	37
	Disagree	62
	N.A.	1
e.	I wouldn't mind if most of my neighbours were Protestants	
	Agree	49
	Disagree	50
	N.A.	1
f.	I think that Protestants should be sent out of Ireland	
	Agree	60
	Disagree	38
	N.A.	2

33. Tick the one that you agree with MOST

1	2	3	4	
It is Very Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Priest tells them	Fairly Important	Not Very Important	It is Not at all Important for members of a Church to do whatever their Priest tells them	
			1 ...	78
			2 ...	20
			3 ...	1
			4 ...	1
			N.A.	-

34. Do you have lessons in Irish language at school?

Yes	43
No	55
N.A.	2

35. Do you play any Gaelic Athletic Association games?

Yes	71
No	25
N.A.	4

PROTESTANTS ONLY

	Protestant %
36. Would you say that Roman Catholic children in Northern Ireland are much different or about the same as you?	
Different	56
About same	43
N.A.	1
37. Are you friendly with any Roman Catholic children?	
Yes	47
No	53
N.A.	-
38. Do you think of yourself as a strong Protestant or as an average Protestant?	
Strong Protestant	70
Average Protestant	20
Neither	10
N.A.	-
39. How important do you think it is to believe all the Bible teaches?	
Very important	82
Fairly important	12
Not very important	1
Not at all important	-
N.A.	5

CATHOLICS ONLY

	Catholic %
40. Would you say that Protestant children in Northern Ireland are much different or about the same as you?	
Different	47
About the same	49
N.A.	4
41. Are you friendly with any Protestant children?	
Yes	55
No	41
N.A.	4
42. Do you think of yourself as a -	
Strong Catholic	73
Average Catholic	18
Neither	5
N.A.	4

		Catholic %
43.	How important do you think it is to believe <u>all</u> that the Catholic Church teaches?	
	Very important	83
	Fairly important	11
	Not very important	1
	Not at all important	2
	N.A.	3

	ALL RESPONDENTS AGAIN	Protestant %	Catholic %
44.	When you are older do you want to live and work in Northern Ireland or leave?		
	Live and work in Northern Ireland	64	61
	Leave Northern Ireland	35	36
	N.A.	1	3
45.	Put a tick in the box beside the one that comes closest to telling what your father does, or did.		
	MARK <u>ONE</u> BOX ONLY		
	He works in a labouring job. He uses his hands and arms and body a lot. The job does not take long to learn	23	23
	He works with his hands in a job that takes a long time to learn ... like a carpenter, an electrician, a plumber, a machinist or some-thing like that	35	31
	He works in an office or a shop or something else like that and usually wears a uniform or shirt and tie to work	18	15
	He works in an office as a manager	6	7
	He is like a lawyer, doctor or teacher. He has a degree and special training for his job	8	7
	He owns a business, factory or shop	4	7
	He owns or rents a farm and has one or two men working for him	2	2
	He owns or rents a small farm and works on it by himself	2	3
	N.A.	2	5
46.	What sort of person do you think a Prime Minister should be?		
	PICK THE <u>WORDS</u> WHICH SHOW THIS BEST		
	Strong	38	21
	Kind	53	57
	Patient	26	24
	Wise	68	55
	God-fearing	11	12
	Good	48	44

		Protestant %	Catholic %
47.	If you were able to help a political party, which ONE would you help? PICK ONE ONLY		
	Unionist	12	3
	D.U.P. (Paisley - Boal)	36	2
	Nationalist	1	2
	Peoples' Democracy	4	5
	S.D.L.P (Fitt - Hume)	-	7
	Sinn Fein	-	26
	N.I. Labour	12	20
	Liberal	-	1
	Alliance	1	1
	Other	1	2
	Don't know	30	27
	N.A.	3	4
48.	Some people say that Protestants are best to govern the country. Others disagree. What do you think?		
	Agree	62	5
	Disagree	10	75
	Depends	19	9
	Don't know	7	8
	N.A.	2	3
49.	Has there been much trouble in your district in the last three years?		
	A lot of trouble	24	34
	Some trouble	14	17
	A little trouble	33	24
	No trouble	27	21
	N.A.	2	4
50.	What kind of person do you think a father should be? TICK THE WORDS THAT SHOW THIS BEST		
	Strong	59	53
	Kind	64	61
	Patient	21	17
	Wise	55	40
	God-fearing	8	12
	Good	44	45
51.	What is your father's job?		
	My father is ... (coded as)		
	Working class	61	56
	Middle class	39	39
	N.A.	-	5

		Protestant %	Catholic %
52.	You may belong to a local gang, or school group which meets outside school hours. If you do belong to a gang, or group <u>how close do you feel to the centre of it?</u> PICK <u>ONE</u>		
	At centre	22	16
	Near the centre	14	15
	A good bit from the centre	5	8
	I don't belong to a gang	58	60
	N.A.	1	1
53.	Do you have lessons in history at school, such as stories about people who lived before you were born? If you do have lessons like that are they mainly about -- PICK <u>ONE</u>		
	British History	30	9
	Irish History	7	28
	Both British and Irish History	28	25
	Some other sort of history	28	19
	Don't have history	4	17
	N.A.	3	2
54.	Which newspaper do you see often? PICK <u>ONE OR TWO</u> or more		
	None	4	4
	Belfast Newsletter	30	15
	Irish News	9	58
	Belfast Telegraph	56	44
	Other	31	30
55.	Which programmes on T.V. do you look at a <u>lot</u>? PICK <u>ONE OR TWO</u> or more		
	News	25	25
	Entertainment	47	59
	Sports	48	47
	War and Crime films	56	58
	Don't have T.V.	2	2
56.	Some say that people like my family can do nothing about changing what the Government in N. Ireland does. Others disagree. Which <u>one</u> comes <u>closest</u> to saying what you feel?		

1	2	3	4
People like my family can <u>usually</u> get the Government to do what they want	<u>Sometimes</u> get	<u>Seldom</u>	People like my family can <u>never</u> get the Government to do what they want
	1 ...		17 12
	2 ...		20 17
	3 ...		12 11
	4 ...		43 57
	N.A.		8 3

		Protestant %	Catholic %
57.	Do you think that most people can be trusted or that you have to watch out for other people? CHOOSE ONE		
	Most people can be trusted	14	21
	You have to watch out for other people	26	34
	Depends	42	41
	N.A.	18	4
58.	If pictures of street fighting in N. Ireland are shown on your T.V. at home do you -- CHOOSE ONE		
	Usually watch	71	83
	Usually don't watch	9	11
	Don't have T.V.	3	3
	N.A.	17	3
59.	Are you interested in history, such as reading about how people lived before you were born? If you are interested is that -- TICK ONE		
	Mainly British history	40	11
	Mainly Irish history	10	47
	Some other sort of history	19	14
	Not interested in history	16	22
	N.A.	15	6

	TO BE FILLED IN BY INTERVIEWER ONLY	Protestant %	Catholic %
60.	Religious Proportions attending.		
	Almost 100% Protestant	100	-
	Almost 100% Catholic	-	100
	Some mixing	-	-
61.	Social Class Proportions in School Class		
	Predominantly working class	46	28
	Predominantly M.C.	11	-
	Some mixing	43	72
62.	School Year of Child		
	Primary four	54	48
	Primary six	46	52
63.	History		
	Mainly British	75	-
	Mainly Irish	-	43
	British and Irish	25	35
	Other	-	-
	None	-	22

		Protestant %	Catholic %
64.	**Area**		
	Belfast	37	30
	Non-Belfast	63	70
65.	**Head and Staff**		
	Protestant	100	-
	Lay Catholic	-	52
	Religious Catholic	-	48
66.	**Social class proportions attending whole school**		
	Predominantly Working class	46	10
	Predominantly middle class	3	-
	Mixed	51	90
67.	**Religious proportions in school-catchment area**		
	Catholic majority	16	44
	Protestant majority	68	34
	Almost 50/50	16	22
68.	**Tension in comparison with worst hit areas in 1971**		
	High	22	19
	Some	15	11
	A little	31	46
	None	32	24
69.	**Geographical Area**		
	East Bann	31	23
	West Bann	32	47
	Belfast	37	30

Appendix IV

"Children in Conflict"

Since commencing writing up the results of these schoolboy surveys in Northern Ireland a book has been published - Children in Conflict - by Morris Fraser, which deserves some comment because its subject matter overlaps, in part, with this thesis. We both study similar problems, but by different techniques.

Before discussing the general propositions made by Morris Fraser I must outline four important differences between his work and my own. (1) Morris Fraser is a psychiatrist and, as expected, approaches the subject of children in conflict mainly from the standpoints of his own discipline. He is, for instance, more concerned with the psychological conditions leading to aggressive behaviour in children than I have been. My own work is more concerned with the content of political socialization and the influence of institutional agents and conditions under which such content varies among groups of children. (2) Morris Fraser bases his work mainly upon qualitative data from children in Belfast. My own work is based upon both qualitative and quantitative data, but concentrates mainly upon the latter approach. The quantitative approach is more accurate about the basic distribution of attitudes. (3) The samples upon which both works are based differ considerably. Morris Fraser's work is based upon responses from Belfast children and those referred to a child psychiatrist for guidance. This makes for a highly skewed sample favouring those most likely to be engaged in violence and/or suffering from its effects. My own sample consists of over 3,000 schoolboys drawn from different parts of the Province having different religious proportions and experiencing various levels of economic development

and disorder. (4) Morris Fraser concentrates upon children with aggressive tendencies and upon those suffering from the results of violence. My own study includes two-fifths of schoolboys who reject aggressive behaviour in pursuit of basic political goals. Further, the "Civic Learning" surveys include a wide range of social and political questions and also concentrates upon how schoolboys learn and feel about Government.

The central part of Morris Fraser's study of the development of aggressive behaviour in children is contained in Chapter eight - The Route from Fantasy - in which he takes his starting point from the Freudian position that children, like adults, project their undesirable qualities onto a scapegoat. Like St. Paul they are aware that the flesh/id/undesirable qualities come into conflict with the law of God/superego/conscience, causing conflict within themselves/St. Paul's "wretched man" or ego. In order to live with the undesirable qualities which cause conflict they are projected onto a scapegoat, or anti-hero, who then assumes all the undesirable qualities of the villain, or bogeyman. This process, Morris Fraser suggests, is harmless in most cultures where the villain, or bogeyman, is a distant and imaginary character like the American Indian to a Belfast schoolboy. From this fundamental position Fraser goes on to say that in Belfast the child's scapegoat, or bogeyman, is the adults perceived frustrator. That is - to the Catholic the British soldier and the Protestant, and to the Protestant - the Catholic.

Morris Fraser suggests that the frustration Belfast adults feel springs from socio-economic causes. For example, the Protestant "keeps the Catholics out of employment" and the "Catholics take jobs which Protestants should have". I doubt however if all adult frustrations can

be put down to socio-economic causes since adults were once children who were socialized into fearing the bogeyman of the other religion. This, however, is a minor point.

Fraser suggests that the process by which the child's anti-heroes are identified in Belfast is one by which children are socialized into Irish nationalist and Orange attitudes. Here my own evidence confirms what Morris Fraser maintains: children who have the strongest national identities are readiest to favour aggressive behaviour, as are those most involved in Irish cultural practices and Orange Order institutions and demonstrations.

Morris Fraser found that the fear of the cultural anti-hero, or bogeyman existed in the minds of children before the on-set of disorders. That is that Protestants feared Catholics, and Catholics feared Protestants and British soldiers, before they had first-hand experience of violence from the feared group. Rather than the violent actions of the bogeyman leading to fear - it was the fear which led to violent actions against the cultural villain. My own evidence would tend to support this view. Even boys who lived in relatively trouble-free areas in early 1971 were more prone to favour aggression when they believed that all the members of the other religion were willing to destroy their faith/way of life.

Morris Fraser continues his outline of how aggressive behaviour develops by maintaining that in the event of conflict the stereotype of the anti-hero is invoked and strengthened. This is, when Catholics or Protestants take part in violence they are seen as doing this because they possess the undesirable qualities originally ascribed to them, and the belief that they are unworthy of serious consideration is strengthened. I found, during the earliest part of my fieldwork, the tendency for

many boys, particularly in Belfast, to describe all Protestants or all Catholics as sharing similar undesirable qualities. Survey evidence revealed that boys who had friends across religious lines were much less likely to favour aggression. This may be put down to the fact that actual contact between boys in different religions had amended the stereotype of the cultural anti-heroes and thus reduced aggressive attitudes. Alternatively, perhaps contact between such boys was possible because they were never socialized into accepting such stereotypes.

Morris Fraser suggests that during conflict children and adults begin to entertain "fantasies of riddance". In this case the bogeyman is not a far distant figure, but someone who is close at hand and is perceived as frustrating by adults, and threatening by children. Both children and adults speculate upon the benefits to themselves if all the "others" or the British soldiers were removed. Survey evidence shows that there are, in both religions, substantial minorities of schoolboys who would like to see all Protestants/Catholics put out of Ireland/Ulster - fantasies of riddance - and that such schoolboys are among the most prepared to justify aggressive behaviour. What Morris Fraser sometimes calls fantasies are what others have called historical reality. In short, the root cause of aggression for this generation is not, strictly, in the id, but in the institutionalization of violence. If the psyche is fixed how does one remove the hostile stereotypes without resocialization of adults.

Having identified the psychological base for aggressive behaviour in Belfast children Morris Fraser discusses the conditions under which such fantasies are likely to be translated into violent acts. (1) Proximity: the bogeyman is close at hand and perceived as threatening. This may be the British soldier in the street, an Orange March, a

Republican Parade, or an anti-group across a "Peace-line" only a few hundred yards away. My own survey evidence suggests that this is the case. For instance, schoolboys who live in the areas of Belfast which have experienced disorders are themselves most ready to approve disorders among all schoolboys interviewed. (2) Modelling: children who witness aggressive behaviour in adults or hear verbal aggression are likely to respond in an aggressive manner. My own evidence suggests that schoolboys who are subjectively aware of a "lot of trouble" around them are much readier to approve aggressive behaviour than those who feel that their environment is relatively peaceful. (3) Aggressive drawing stimuli: where guns and national symbols are present, aggression is more likely in children. Whilst I have no evidence regarding the presence of arms I found that boys who were most associated with "provocative symbols" were among those most prepared to justify violence. (4) The family: lack of supervision and non-intervention interpreted as tacit approval of violence. Morris Fraser found that where family relationships were disturbed lack of supervision led to the formation of large gangs in Belfast where violence was a mark of approval. Schoolboy surveys revealed that boys who were gang members, especially the leaders, were more violent in outlook than those boys outside gang life. Morris Fraser also suggests that many parents have great difficulty in keeping their children out of riots and their non-intervention is taken as a tacit approval of aggressive activities. In Belfast, where local gangs are often seen as a first line of defence by adults this is to be expected among children and adolescents. During World War Two few mothers would have found it easy to describe the desirable features of the enemy. When the "enemy" is only a few streets away this becomes all the more difficult. (5) Frustration: Morris Fraser suggests

that frustration among adults is extremely important for socializing children into conflict and aggression. My own evidence suggests that schoolboys who get the impression that their families can do nothing to influence the Government are among the groups most ready to approve political violence. Frustration, in children however, as Morris Fraser points out, is more concerned with Secondary Frustrators - those which have appeared after the onset of violence - such as the occupation of schools and school-playgrounds by British soldiers. It was certainly my impression when visiting schools in Northern Ireland that the presence of soldiers in, or near, some schools considerably raised the tension levels above that which I normally experienced when administering a questionnaire which dealt with tension raising subjects. (6) Exploitation: children who are recruited into organisations concerned with the on-going conflict are readiest to approve aggression. Although I have no evidence regarding recruitment into illegal movements other evidence in the schoolboy surveys suggests that the more involved schoolboys become with the divisive aspects of the population of Northern Ireland the likelier it becomes that they will accept aggression as justified. (7) The Media: Morris Fraser rightly argues that one cannot assume a <u>cumulative</u> effect upon attitudes from the number of hours and types of television programmes portraying violence. He does maintain, however, that the closer the portrayal of violence to one's own situation the more likely it becomes that one will respond aggressively after seeing such a programme. Thus, in Ulster, where boys can watch the local riots on television the likelihood that violence will follow is increased. My own evidence suggests that the minority of boys who don't usually watch local violence on TV are less likely to approve of aggression than boys who report that they usually watch such programmes.

Writing of the consequences of years of violence in Northern Ireland Morris Fraser suggests two outcomes: (1) that since aggression is a learned behaviour its recurrence in the future is likely; (2) that aggression directed towards anti-heroes will generalize to those within one's own cultural group. Survey evidence suggests that those taking part in violence are not purged of aggressive tendencies thereby. I found that schoolboys who were prepared to take part in riots, and who lived in riot areas, were more likely than others to approve of aggressive political acts. Thus, hard consequences did not lead to peaceful attitudes, but to a predisposition to violence in the future. Survey evidence also suggested that those who were disrespectful to social, religious, and political groupings within their own culture were also among the readiest to approve of aggressive political behaviour.

I find myself basically in agreement with what Morris Fraser says about Belfast boys in the key theoretical chapter of his book. What he has learned from qualitative interviews with Belfast children I have seen on computer printout concerning the most violent sub-section of my schoolboy samples. I hold no brief regarding his views of the three parts of personality - id, ego, super-ego - but can accept this as a plausible assumption about why persons find the need for a scapegoat onto which to project their undesirable qualities. My survey evidence is <u>most</u> in agreement with Morris Fraser's theory of aggression in children when he writes of the content, process, agents, conditions, and consequences of socialization into conflict. He has approached the subject in a different way and from the viewpoint of another discipline and, using different methods, has come to conclusions about learning about aggression which I can accept.

In the Introduction to his book Morris Fraser calls the inhabitants of Northern Ireland "... a tiny tortured community of a mere one and a half million stateless men, women and children." Elsewhere (p.142) he suggests that "there can be no purely political solution to the Ulster problem", and that "total-integration of children from primary-school-age upwards would be the most potent single factor in breaking down community barriers and in restoring long term peace." (Italics mine).

Morris Fraser begins his book with one community, but ends with what appears to be at least more than one. His stateless men and women can find no purely political solution and may find total integration of schooling the most potent single factor in restoring peace. When he treats the inhabitants of Ulster as one community he is right in regarding them as stateless since survey evidence suggests that there are two communities seeking different states. If he treats them as two communities (also stateless) he is right in suggesting that there can be no purely political solution to the Ulster problem. When he writes of a purely political solution he is right insofar as no political decision is likely to be forced upon the people of Northern Ireland unless there is a change in attitudes conducive to accepting a common political decision. When he speaks of integrated schooling as the most potent single factor in breaking down community barriers he is visualizing a state in which barriers have been sufficiently broken down to allow integrated schooling to take place. That is, attitudes in both communities have changed sufficiently to allow the mass of community members to defer to political solutions reached by their representatives which will make integrated schooling possible. This ignores the problems of transition.

Morris Fraser suggests that fear between the two communities

precedes actual disorders between them and that this fear is based upon bogeymen stereotypes held by the conflicting communities. I would suggest that any political accommodation between such communities which would allow legislation for integrated schooling would, in itself, represent such a breaking of barriers between communities as to make integrated schooling unnecessary as a means to long-term peace. In short, political conditions in Northern Ireland conducive to integrated schooling would make integrated schooling an irrelevant issue. Denominational schools would be accepted in their own right and respected because they would not represent a threat to political accommodation.

On the other hand, political elites who gain sufficient leeway from their electors may, in an atmosphere where integrated schooling is possible, decide that integrated education may be a useful tool to prevent future outbreaks of disorder. This is, however, an entirely different matter to using integrated schooling to break down barriers between communities. Integrated education may be sought by those who remember a violent past to safeguard the future of children against the tales of violence which they may hear from their parents. In this case, political decisions are shaping the future rather than social occurrences, like integrated education, bringing about political accommodation between communities.

So long as there are two communities in Northern Ireland desiring to maintain distinctive traditions which are translateable into politics it seems unrealistic to speak of integrated schooling breaking down community barriers which community members wish to preserve. Moreover, it is unlikely that integrated schools would be peaceful so long as youths of 16-plus are around with guns, the British Army and the IRA. But when separate communities find enough in common to reach long-

term political accommodation it is realistic to expect denominational schools to be no threat to the existence of the State, because the children in such schools will find that the majority of their parents and teachers desire political accommodation between communities. As the Dutch Model suggests, segregation of the masses and accommodation between leaders of the communities may be more likely to produce long-term peace than attempted integration of masses with the dangers of traditional stereotypes being called into service in the proximity of the cultural bogeymen.

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