

**NATION-NESS, SUBJECTIVITY,
ETHNOGRAPHY: A POLISH-
BRITISH CASE STUDY**

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the relationship between nation-ness and subjectivity, and is based on nine months' ethnographic fieldwork in Poland. It pursues two main arguments: first, that post-modern ethnography should not only treat ethnographies as texts, but must also involve radical psychoanalytic questioning of the ethnographer as text; and secondly, that the modern occurrence of the nation and national identity can be explained by linking a Foucauldian epistemological analysis of the historical development of nation-ness to a Lacanian model of subjectivity. Chapter One comprises an autobiographical narrative about my interpretations of Poland in the 1980s. This exemplifies the argument in Chapter Two that post-modern ethnography should not only interrogate the temporal and historical assumptions of ethnographic texts, analyse their rhetoric, and foreground autobiographical material, but should also analyse the narratives of the ethnographer, reflecting rigorously on such factors in personal terms by drawing on psychoanalytic experience. Chapter Three provides an ethnographic account of Polish national identity in the mid-1990s, and is presented as a point of comparison with Chapter One in an attempt to avoid the impression of cultural stasis often otherwise created in synchronic approaches. In Chapter Four, I argue that macro- and micro- political approaches to nation-ness can usefully be integrated by articulating Foucault's epistemological analysis of culture with Lacan's structuralist analysis of the subject, and ask why nation-ness is a relatively modern phenomenon, and how and why subjects acquire national identity. In Chapter Five, I return to the key themes of the thesis and to two of its central metaphors - the Copernican Revolution and the Royal Castle in Warsaw - to suggest parallels between the construction and reconstruction of national, subjective, and ethnographic narratives, and to analyse why the relationship between these phenomena is currently undergoing change.

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*The images on the following pages are
'Widok Ogolny Warszawy od Strony Pragi'
(‘General View of Warsaw from the Praga Bank’),
Bernardo Bellotto (known in Poland as Canaletto), 1770,
and a detail from the same picture.*





Prospectus Varsaviae iniquicando de Villa
nova sig. ad Salsinum Comitum J...
p. dno. comendans p. dno. Friguo leano
J. dno. d. p. dno. B. B. de Camilleto

SECTION 1: ETHNOGRAPHY AND ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY

Chapter One

*Ethnography: the reflexive study of another culture over an extended period of time, by means of participant observation and informal interviews in an everyday context; a written account of that culture which both describes and explains its practices and meanings from within, and analyses and theorises them from without. Recent innovations have included interrogation of the temporal and historical assumptions of ethnographic texts, analysis of their rhetoric, and the foregrounding of autobiographical material. Such approaches have led to a questioning of naturalist, realist practices, and to the development of more constructivist, modernist and post-modernist perspectives; however, few ethnographic texts as yet exemplify these new development.*¹

*Cultural Studies: a discipline which is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between conceptions of subjectivity and objectivity, and which can be divided into three main phases: culturalism, structuralism and post-modernism. Culturalism takes a humanist approach, determining the object in terms of the subject, but essentially fails to explain how the individual is influenced by culture. Structuralism determines the subject in terms of the object, but is unable fully to account for the possibility of change, or for the apparent immunity of the theorist from the processes described. Post-modernist cultural studies pays renewed attention to individual narratives, and argues that subjectivity is not simply a position determined by ideology, but is also influenced by the processes of the unconscious.*²

¹ Cf. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), Clifford and Marcus (1986), Okely and Callaway (1992) passim.; this is a paraphrase of some of their key arguments rather than a quotation.

² Cf. Easthope in Bassnett (1997: 6 - 12 passim.); again, this is a paraphrase rather than a quotation.

First time

The first time Liz (as I was then called) went to Poland, it was almost by chance. She'd applied to take part in a UNESCO English language summer camp which she'd heard about at school, and it seemed as good a way as any of spending part of her year off before university. Like the other young assistants, Liz didn't know much about the political situation in Poland then, other than what she'd seen on the news, but she remembered clearly enough the awful murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko by the Security Forces, which had been widely reported ten months previously. And travelling through mile after mile of forest on the way to the camp in that Polish August of 1985, when the effects of Martial Law were still brutally evident, it was hard not to think of how he had died, and difficult not to wonder whether this was an entirely safe place to be for a visiting foreigner.³ It was also impossible to ignore the more everyday, less immediately apparent forms of oppression, which manifested themselves as much through the forlornly empty shops and the utterly basic conditions in which even the UNESCO camp lived, as through the fact that any political discussions with the young Polish students had to take place in the open air, far enough away from other pedestrians to be out of earshot, and never in the presence of anyone who wasn't a close friend. Occasionally, there was a lighter side to the trip, such as when waiters would sidle up and whisper urgently 'Change money, change money?', a strictly illegal activity in which most of the population seemed to engage, but more seriously, Liz could not help noticing the continuing political resistance of otherwise seemingly ordinary people, particularly when she went to mass with some of the students and

³ The term 'Polish August' usually refers to August 1980, when the first Solidarity strikes took place; as Garton Ash (1999a: 34) points out, 'In Poland, history - the real, people's history of People's Poland is remembered by months. Such is the cumulative arithmetic of the collective memory that one can almost express the causes of Solidarity as an equation of months: "August" (1980) = "June" (1956) + "March" (1968) + "December" (1970) + "June" (1976)'. The significance of these dates will be explained in the course of this and subsequent narratives.

found herself surrounded by a congregation with their arms held high in a defiant victory salute, chanting repeatedly '*Sol-id-ar-nosc ! Sol-id-ar-nosc !*'. It was intoxicating stuff for a Surrey schoolgirl. But there were other examples which pointed to a much greater complexity in the relationship between oppressors and oppressed. An art exhibition she'd found in a cellar which included a bleeding loaf of bread with a knife stuck in it - starkly political work which nobody seemed much bothered about censoring. ⁴ The steel monument made of three crucifixes outside the gates of the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk - a cool one hundred and forty feet high, it commemorated the twenty-seven unarmed demonstrators shot by the authorities during the 1970 Gdansk rebellion, they were told by a Solidarity representative who emerged warily from the shadows as twilight huddled round in the drizzle; it was a monument which had been erected by the shipyard workers at a ceremony of 'national reconciliation', he explained: the Head of State, Government Ministers, and members of the Politburo of the PZPR - as well as Church and Solidarity representatives - had all been present on December 16th 1980, when the eternal flame had been lit by Lech Walesa with a welder's torch. Just under a year before Jaruzelski had declared Martial Law. ⁵ Intrigued by the fact that such contradictions could exist so openly, Liz asked question after question of the young Polish students. Their usual reaction - which was to shrug their shoulders, burst into warm, infectious laughter, and to say that yes, life in Poland was a bit contradictory, wasn't it - intrigued her still further. There was something disarmingly attractive about that kind of openness and emotional spontaneity, about that willingness to acknowledge complexity.

⁴ Garton Ash (1999a: 11 - 12) throws light on the symbolic significance of bread in Poland, relating it to the Poznan protests of June 1956, during which workers' placards demanded 'Bread and Freedom'. It was at this point, he suggests, that the workers' freedom from poverty was linked to the country's freedom from foreign domination. At least fifty-three people were killed.

⁵ Ascherson (1988: 206). PZPR stands for *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza* - 'The Polish United Workers' Party' i.e. 'The Party'. Garton Ash (1999a: 43 - 44 and 69) provides further details of the negotiations about this monument.

(This thesis is a series of meditations on nation-ness.⁶ When thinking about national identity and how people acquire it, I found myself considering three main issues: the influence of subjective factors, the influence of historical factors, and how a particular national identity operates in relation to others. I began with personal identity, using psychoanalytic experience to reflect on the creation and functioning of my own attachments to Polish-ness, and on what this suggested about the operation of national identity more generally. I then approached the problem ethnographically, taking Poland as an example of a culture in which nation-ness is particularly important, and thinking about the methodological issues raised by fieldwork. Finally, I worked theoretically, using historical approaches to nation-ness on the one hand, and psychoanalytic approaches on the other, to explain how the nation came into existence, and how the subject identifies with it; I then used Foucauldian and Lacanian theory to articulate these approaches, so as to analyse how the relationship between the subject and nation-ness changes over time. These personal, ethnographic, and theoretical analyses all came back to the wider problem of the relationship between subject and object, that is, whether the subject determines the object, or the object the subject. This led me to consider narratives, and how and why changes in the relationship between subject and object might be connected to parallel changes in nation-ness, subjectivity, and ethnography).

There were other aspects of her first visit to Poland which Liz found equally fascinating, although for entirely different reasons. Suddenly, rather than feeling the odd one out in not being a 'proper' teenager, she felt at home in a culture where teenhood seemed relatively uncommercialised. She had always hated the usual pursuits of girls her age, despising discos, make-up, dating, pop music, and anything else advocated by *Jackie* magazine, all of

⁶ Given the 'multiple significations' of the word 'nationality', Anderson (1991: 4) substitutes the term 'nation-ness'. In this thesis, I shall use this term to refer both to the development and existence of the nation as a political and cultural entity, and to the phenomenon of national identity, that is, the process of identifying with such an entity.

which she'd been brought up to regard as forms of capitalist exploitation quite simply beneath her contempt, and so Elizabeth (as her father usually called her when displeased) thus always felt that she had only ever been a teenager in a strictly numerical sense. But in Poland this seemed altogether more acceptable, even admirable. Disliking popular culture was seen as something attractive, a sign of coming from a 'good family', and somehow, relationships between boys and girls seemed much more relaxed, much less commodified.⁷ With all this, admittedly, went some customs which Liz, like the other British girls, found it slightly embarrassing to be on the receiving end of, such as being greeted by young men who, in one elegantly fluid movement, would click their heels, bow, and kiss one's hand. But there was also something rather enjoyable about being the focus of such impeccable etiquette, about being thought worthy of such charming politeness.

Other things were equally odd and sometimes rather more uncomfortable. One girl, obviously unhappy about the recent break-up of her parents' marriage, had become determined that Liz should visit her home, meet her mother and sisters, and become a temporary part of the family for a week-end. Despite the wonderful hospitality, the mountains of Polish home-cooking, and the opportunity of seeing how a family in Poland lived, the week-end had left Liz with that feeling she sometimes got when she was with her mother and resident grandmother. A feeling of emotional claustrophobia, of struggling to breathe, of being tangled up in a drama that wasn't her own. The trip back to the camp after the week-end had proved equally confusing. Faced with an unbelievably overcrowded bus - the last from the village that day - the Polish girl who'd taken Liz home had virtually had to plead for them to be allowed on. Once she'd finally persuaded the resentful driver and they'd boarded the bus, all the passengers had immediately descended into an astonished and awed silence

⁷ Cf. Hoffman (1991) for a poignant description of traditional relationships between Polish young people.

(something, Liz was later told, that was to do with the Second World War and the BBC World Service - though she wasn't quite sure what). As the bus lurched forward, they started to murmur, and then to stare and talk, as if they were initially rather contemptuous, hostile even, then ever so slightly curious, then openly interested, and finally all patriotic about the fact that this English girl should be travelling from their Polish village on their Polish bus and after all why not, there was a lot to be proud of, wasn't there? Once again, she felt that she was being co-opted into somebody else's drama - only this time, it was a national one.

If the villagers on the bus had initially seemed a little awe-struck, then by the end of that month it was the turn of the British assistants, when they were invited to a formal debriefing at the Polish headquarters of UNESCO in the imposing Palace of Culture. A 'present' to the Poles after the War, the Stalinist wedding cake was enough to intimidate most people through its sheer ugliness, and the acres of empty, flagged space that had to be crossed to reach it. But once inside, once received by uniformed officials and conducted to what seemed like the twenty-somethingth floor of the enormous building, Lizzie (as she was also sometimes called) was quite at home with the faintly diplomatic air of the occasion: this was something she knew exactly how to deal with.

Although she hadn't much thought about it at the time, Liz was nevertheless aware that, if some of the Poles she'd met had reacted quite strangely to her, then there was also something rather complicated about the way she'd reacted to this first experience of Poland. For a start, the whole idea of going abroad before starting university - indeed the whole idea of university at all - was not something that would have occurred to her if John hadn't suggested it. Lizzie (as only he was allowed to call her) had known John since she was five, when he and his wife had become her family's neighbours and her parents' immediate friends. John must have been about nineteen or so when he'd moved in next door, and nobody had ever quite been able to work out where the money to

buy a house had come from, unless it was from his presumably rather wealthy family in India. But Lizzie had adored him immediately because he smelled right, and had beautifully dark skin and eyes and hair, and because he always talked to her, and played games, and held hands, and gave her cuddles. And in the summer, when the house was quiet, Lizzie would secretly squeeze through the gap between the garden fence and the conservatory and go to see John, which was something she liked doing, because nobody else ever knew where she was, until afterwards.

When John and his wife moved away a couple of years later, Lizzie was told it was because he was 'going-to-university-to-study-economics'. She hadn't known what that meant then, and she hated him not being there, but they would sometimes get in the car and drive to his house, so she still saw him quite a lot really. Then, though, John had stopped going to university, and had won - what had Mummy called it - an ODA scholarship to South America ? And although Lizzie's parents bought her a globe for her birthday so that she could see where he was, and although he sent her postcards and presents from all the countries he visited, and came back every few months, Lizzie missed him dreadfully for two whole years. So she began to ignore the times when he wasn't there, and to join together in her mind the times when he was, so that it didn't hurt so much. Eventually, he did come home, and, for a bit, things returned to normal. And as she got older, Lizzie would talk to him about school, and about her latest music exams, and about what she did with her friends. And what she loved most about him was his energy, the way he'd suddenly get passionate about something, or sing a fragment of Beethoven as if his life depended on it, grinning mischievously, the way they'd started to discuss politics, and his work, and the books they were reading. He had this way of talking to her which made her feel like the most important, most adored person in the world; she could do anything, go where she liked, be anyone she wanted.

By the time Lizzie was sixteen or so, it was hardly surprising that she had taken John as her mentor, or that he had suggested what and where she should study. He was enormously proud of her, and it was for him that she achieved academically. Lizzie, in turn, was enormously proud of him when he was seconded from the ODA to the Foreign Office: no mean feat - even if he had been to Gordonstoun - given that John wasn't white. Of course, the fact that he was a diplomat meant that John was away a lot again, but now Lizzie was rather impressed by the jet-setting, the formality, and the protocol. And she got used to him dropping by at their house on his way back from the airport with the odd foreign Minister of State in tow, and gradually learned how to have polite conversations with economists and aid workers, ambassadors and bankers, with various people from the UN. And she loved being around this urbane, cosmopolitan man, with his vitality and intensity, his energy and charm, and knowing that she was, most definitely, his protégée.

I wonder how I ended up with this obsession about Poland, which everyone considers so odd ? After all, it's not a place which features much in British culture, and I have no Polish family. Only my ordinary, English, home counties, suburban family, with a little bit of something slightly less parochial thrown in. People often ask me how I first became interested in Poland, and what so intrigues me about the place - questions I find it hard to answer, both in relation to myself and in more general terms. Why is it that some people identify with another nation's culture ? What do they feel about their own ? And how on earth would you go about researching such things ? Or answering the much more fundamental question of how national identity becomes part of personal identity ? But perhaps it is too early to be thinking about these questions; perhaps you need to know a bit more about the lens through which I see the world. Maybe I should tell you some other things about my background, my past.

Sometimes, when I think about it now, I find it difficult to reconcile what I see with what I know. There are my parents,

pleasant, affable, concerned, supportive, heralded by everyone as ideal parents and grandparents. There's my brother, extrovert, successful, loving every minute of popular culture, full of life. And here am I, with all these hard won, arduously acquired theories of how families work - or don't work - mine included. It doesn't seem fair to apply one to the other, better not to perhaps, let bygones be bygones. It's not really justifiable, is it? Too self-indulgent, too personal, not generalisable enough, not even interesting - after all, my family's not marginal, not ethnic minority, not working class, not even bloody Welsh. But there's always something about the past which won't go away. Even the privileged have their histories. So there's something about my past, too (though nothing particularly terrible? how do you compare?) which at times prevents me from separating the past from the present, from keeping each where it belongs. Perhaps it's what it tells us about the impact of one specific sort of background on the functioning of an individual subjectivity, or the fact that others have written in opposition to backgrounds like mine - often considered unproblematic - that makes it worth looking at.⁸ It's always difficult to keep a balance though, isn't it? On the one hand, I want to say that aspects of my experience are universal, and yet to recognise that there are important variations. Families are families, but all sorts of cultural (and not, of course, just national cultural) factors influence what happens in them. On the other hand, I want to hold on to my own experiences, and yet to recognise that they're not exceptional. There are aspects of my background which have produced this fascination with another nation, another national identity, but for all that it's unusual, it's not unique: though no-one will have followed exactly the same route, others have perhaps come to inhabit a similar location. But then as I've said, it's hard to know: the human mind covers its tracks, and it takes a long time to begin to retrace one's own steps, let alone those of others. So this is my history, and possibly, sometimes, yours as well: you'll have to decide for yourself if and when the two coincide.

⁸ Cf. Kuhn (1995).

So what *was* going on at that time in my own family ? Let's go back, first of all, to the time when John moved in next door, when I was a child of five or six. By that age, I had already learned several of the fundamental emotional lessons of a middle class, English childhood, some from my mother, some from my father, some from both. They both loved me and my brother fiercely; both worked enormously hard to be good parents; but, even though whatever shortcomings they had were almost certainly well beyond their conscious control, both inevitably replicated many of the problems of their own difficult, wartime childhoods. Our childhoods, after all, are tied up in complicated ways with our national cultures and histories; our parenting and our children's childhoods part of how those cultures and histories get passed down from one generation to the next.

From my mother, I knew that it was important to put a brave face on things: that if you insisted on showing your emotions, then you certainly didn't show the negative ones. Our relationship seemed mostly to centre around the practical elements of family life, and, although she undoubtedly did, I have few memories of her ever playing with me. Instead, I remember my mother always being busy in the kitchen, or rushing to get something done, or struggling to maintain what must have been impossibly high domestic standards. Perhaps, if I'd been able to ask her then, she would have told me that she enjoyed it all, and I think, in a way, she would have been telling the truth: perhaps it was too hard to acknowledge the feelings of resentment that must inevitably have accompanied the feelings of joy: the prevailing emotional orthodoxy was that you felt what you ought to feel, regardless of what it was that you actually felt. Maybe that was something she'd learned as a child from her own mother, whose husband had never quite recovered from being gassed in the First World War, who'd died when my mother was a little girl of eight. Even if her family hadn't quite approved of my grandmother marrying this rather left wing sort of a chap, up until then, they'd at least led a comfortable, secluded

enough sort of a life in leafy Surbiton. Until my mother had come home from school to be told by a neighbour that her Daddy had died. Until my grandmother had had to take in lodgers and cope as best she could. What choice was there but to grit your teeth, hide your anger, and cling on to what you had ? My grandmother never remarried, it wasn't done; instead, she undermined my mother at every opportunity, and never forgave her for leaving to marry my father.

If my mother taught me to hide my negative emotions, then from my father I learned to hide the positive ones, for I always had the feeling that there was a gentler, more vulnerable side to him that I was not permitted to see. Perhaps this came from the feeling that any little girl has at this age (if it wasn't for my Mummy, I would have my darling Daddy all to myself), but photographs from my early childhood suggest that, at one point at least, I enjoyed a much warmer, more relaxed relationship with him than I did by the time I was five or six. By then, he seemed unpredictable: sometimes he would play, sometimes he wouldn't, retreating angrily behind his newspaper and making it quite clear that he was not to be disturbed again. Certainly he did play with us, often for hours on end, but he also played the stern father - and there were times when you knew he wasn't play-acting at all. His childhood had been less than leafy: brought up in Sunderland during the fag-end of the Depression and the Second World War, he was frequently farmed out to relatives and moved from pillar to post while his parents looked for work. Yes, there were occasionally more stable periods, with his Scots Grandmother and Irish Grandfather - once a riveter in the shipyards and committed Trades Unionist by day, and leader of the Sunderland Municipal Orchestra by night. But there often wasn't enough of everything to go round, and a far from ideal childhood had been followed by a miserable adolescence and his parents' divorce. One thing he'd learned during his itinerant childhood, though, which in many ways stood him in good stead, was how to be a social chameleon (if you didn't speak and behave like the other boys, you soon got beaten up) and, when his mother had remarried

to a civil servant, and he'd finally received some sort of education, he'd learned well enough how to belong to another class. Not well enough, perhaps, to convince my mother's family, but well enough for everyone else.

From both parents, I learned some of the basic lessons of being a middle class child. Maybe, as a reaction against what they had been brought up with, my parents simply wanted to provide us with a sense of stability; perhaps it was a form of compensation, or a way of keeping their own childhood fears at bay; but for whatever reasons, they brought us up on the unquestioned premise that 'children like routine'. And so every event of my childhood, no matter how important, was slotted into a round of strictly monitored mealtimes, bathtimes, and bedtimes. There was even a sense of temporal appropriacy attached to crying, 'That's enough now !' being a frequently employed phrase when one had cried beyond the length of time presumably considered duly proportionate to any given childhood tragedy. So although I grew up in a secure and trusting environment in some respects, there was also a constant tension - which by its very nature it was impossible to acknowledge openly - between what was felt and what was said. Like all children, I knew the difference between the two, learned to read the emotional signs and to distrust the verbal ones, and tried to reconcile everything in my head.

By the time John appeared on the scene, then, what I probably wanted most of all was a replacement for the ideal and idealised father who, like most little girls that age, I felt I had already lost, and for the mother who, like all children, I knew I had long ago forfeited. With John's arrival, it must have seemed as if it was once again possible to love and be loved openly and unconditionally: I had his undivided attention (if only because I wasn't able to demand it constantly) and didn't doubt for a moment that I was utterly special. It's not difficult to see how all this relates to Poland. Here was a place where emotions and contradictions lay close to the surface and could be expressed - at least in private -

with a passion and openness which I found highly evocative; where things were not organised and predictable, but dangerous, intense, exciting; where life was highly complex and intricate, and had to be carefully negotiated. In all sorts of ways, it felt familiar.

As I got older, I discovered new ways of competing for praise and attention - my father's in particular. Achieving at school academically and musically and rejecting popular culture were both ways of negotiating sibling rivalry, while political discussions later became a useful weapon in battles with my mother. As far as beating my brother was concerned, school and music were the easy ones which I discovered early on: I was academic and musical, he was not, but I made sure by being extra diligent, just in case. When it came to popular culture, by the age of eight or nine, I had already divided the world into people like me, and those who knew all about the *Bay City Rollers*, while my brother, at a similar age, had demanded a drum kit and said he wanted to play in a pop group. When we were in our teens, we spoke with entirely different accents, and never to each other unless absolutely necessary; and had one of us developed an interest in the other's culture, I still doubt that the demarcation lines of our own private cold war would ever have been crossed. But if, for him, popular culture was a means of identifying with his peer group, then my determined rejection of it left me with a confused sense of exclusion. And given its undoubted role in British culture as a rite of passage in teenage sexuality, it also left me with an uncertain sense of where I stood in relation to conventional stereotypes of femininity. I needed to be angelic, then, my brother demonic, and for both of us, the various subject positions offered by contemporary culture were just another way of negotiating our family's difficult emotional terrain.

If popular culture provided the battlefield for wars with my brother, then it was political discussion which served in military manoeuvres against my mother. I didn't know why she felt she couldn't talk to my father about politics, but it soon became my role to discuss what was, for him, an all-consuming passion - and one

my brother and I had known about from the earliest age. At three or four, my brother - not unreasonably drawing on his own immediate experience of the birthday variety - had asked, did you get cake, candles, jelly and ice-cream at this Labour Party ? I, always the more analytical of the two, had demanded at a similar age to know the difference between Labour and the Conservatives, and must have been the only politically aware four year old at my kindergarten. It was not until I was about ten, however, that some of the trickier aspects of my family's political position began to dawn on me. Up on the bookshelves, among all the family photographs, was a picture of a kind looking man with dark eyes and a big, bushy beard, whom I had always assumed was some sort of great uncle or other. Although I'd heard his name often enough in conversation, I had somehow never associated it with this photograph, and it was only when a friend's father had come to baby-sit, and had blurted out the name in surprise, that I realised the Edgintons were not, in fact, closely related to Fidel Castro. Despite still being a little hazy about some of my political history, however, by the time I was twelve or so, I knew enough to start discussing politics with my father. Initially, my mother seemed amused by my precocious interest: later, it struck me that she might have felt excluded - and as a teenage daughter, part of me doubtless rather enjoyed usurping what I saw as her position. But by the time I was seventeen or so, my mother seemed actively to want me to amuse my father, and I found the situation decidedly uncomfortable: I wasn't his wife, she was; it was her duty, not mine. Yet I had also long ago transferred the usual rivalry between daughter and mother to a less immediately threatening context. Inevitably, it hadn't worked; rather, what in other circumstances would probably have gradually been resolved was, in my family, never really properly addressed, for I had unknowingly tried to square one Oedipal triangle by substituting it for another. At some level, then, I already knew that talking politics with my father was never just about national or international affairs: it was about negotiating the much more serious issue of family politics, too.

If I now retrospectively accord that first trip to Poland with a certain degree of significance, it was not, of course, at the time, separate from any other aspect of my life. But perhaps in a way that is precisely where its significance lay, because it was an experience which fulfilled many, if not all, of my childhood and teenage dilemmas and desires. Certainly, looking back at my account in the opening pages of this chapter, it isn't difficult to see the extent to which the things I remember from that first trip accord with what I think of myself as having wanted at the time. Here was a nation where a liking for popular culture was not an imperative for anyone who wanted to be considered normal, but an optional alternative that wasn't particularly approved; where education and etiquette mattered; and where politics was a part of everyday life. And if I had only the vaguest sense of it at that stage, going to Poland also made me part of John's diplomatic world, in which people were apparently powerful and confident, cosmopolitan and sophisticated, invulnerable and adult. Poland, then, was my rite of passage.

'Polonia mea est' ⁹

The second time Beth (as she was then called) went to Poland, it was more of a deliberate decision. Now at the end of her second year at university, she was beginning to think seriously about what she might want to do next: and returning to Poland would provide further useful experience for her c.v., particularly as this time she would be going as a teacher. That, at least, was the ostensible reason for going, so she set off once again, this time to Torun - birthplace, for what it was worth, of someone called Copernicus.

The atmosphere in Poland that summer seemed a lot more relaxed, the place more attractive, the weather less foreboding. There were none of the spectacular electric storms which, two years

⁹ Erasmus of Rotterdam to William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury, cited in Zamoyski (1987: 105).

ago, had seemed to reflect the tense political atmosphere of the country. Now, in this well-mannered, provincial university town, everything seemed leafier, balmy, and ominously still. To Beth, being responsible for her own class was a new and challenging experience, and outside lessons, there was the gingerbread city to explore. Perched precariously on just one bank of the treacherously shallow Vistula, once the country's life blood stretching from beyond Krakow in the south to coastal Gdansk in the north, the city had made its fortune from trade when Poland was the bread-basket of Europe, transporting timber and grain to the Baltic sea. Red bricked and ragged roofed, Torun was a place of solemn, looming churches, solid gothic merchants' houses, dilapidated hanseatic granaries, and a silent, omniscient river.

At first, Beth would only leave the camp accompanied by Polish speakers, fearful of getting irretrievably lost in a place where she was unable to utter a word in any language the inhabitants might understand. There was always something strange about coming to terms with the spaces of a new place. In the beginning, even a street corner could seem threatening, or a small park. Then tiny patches became comprehensible, gradually fragments melted into each other, streets congealed, and suddenly, it was impossible to recapture that initial sense of anxious, speechless innocence. But once an air of familiarity had begun to set in, once there was no turning back, Beth would explore by herself, trying to work out what a particular shop might sell from the odd collection of assorted items in the window, or wandering with a hard-won ice-cream through the trafficless, mediaeval back streets. Then, you might discover one of those small, desiccated sweet shops, selling the decorative, baked gingerbread pictures and heart-shaped biscuits for which the city was famous, or a *kaw-i-ar-ni-a* (was that how you said it ?) with delicious looking coffee and cakes, if only you knew how to ask. Or, once, the ruins of a Teutonic castle, sitting squatly between the Old and New towns, deliberating like a ponderous, old judge.

When she wasn't meandering through the long afternoons, this second visit also gave Beth a chance to renew friendships with some of the Polish participants, and to observe. The group of boys from the first camp was there again: one of their mothers had a friend in the Ministry of Education, so they came every year, even though they were well above the age limit. Beth concluded that quite a lot of people must have known someone in the Ministry, for although there were some participants who spoke excellent English, whose fathers were lorry drivers or whose mothers worked in factories, there were also a number of kids who barely spoke English at all, or who seemed to be there for entirely different reasons. Andrzej and his little brother Pawel were a case in point. The elder of the two could easily have been there on his own merit, as he already spoke beautiful English. He also, Beth noted, had excellent manners, a suave, slightly superior air, and a certain future mapped out for him as a diplomat. Young Pawel, though, who would without doubt eventually follow in his brother's footsteps, couldn't speak a word, for all his enthusiasm and puppyish charm. There was little that needed to be asked about their family's political background. And what about that handful of youngsters who spoke fluent American English? In a country where the state education system still stuck rigidly to English R.P., they would almost certainly have been to foreign schools while their parents worked abroad - another sign, it seemed, of having the right political connections. Whatever the rhetoric of UNESCO or of the Communist system, then, once you'd got past the honeymoon period, the corruption and inequalities of Polish society were glaringly obvious, and all the harder to deal with in a context where they didn't officially exist. Fascinated, Beth had asked what the main social classes actually were. Well, a Polish friend had started out helpfully, there was the old system: working class, middle class, aristocracy; what mattered there was background, upbringing, culture - of course, his own family had aristocratic roots;¹⁰ then

¹⁰ In Poland, it is not unusual to claim a noble background; according to Zamoyski (1987: 92), in the sixteenth century, the *szlachta* made up nearly ten percent of the population.

there was the Communist system: workers, peasants, intelligentsia, one of which everyone officially belonged to; oh, and then there was the *nomenklatura*, the *apparatchiks* - and it didn't matter which class you belonged to, just so long as you were a good Party member, did what you were told, and reaped the benefits. He had laughed at her puzzled expression, the same response to yet another unresolved Polish contradiction that you just had to live with.

Apart from the students, there was also the chance to get to know the Polish staff, who organised the social side of the camp's activities. Each of them Beth found intriguing in a different way, and each seemed inconsolably sad, but whatever their personal unhappinesses, they had worked hard to arrange the camp's domestic life and social events, and even if the organisation often seemed a bit last minute, it was made up for in charm and determination, creativity and spontaneity, enthusiasm and spirit.

On one occasion, they'd been taken on a guided tour of Copernicus's house, which was clearly meant to be an extremely educational experience and also, quite coincidentally, of course, allowed for the possibility of a little, nonchalant national modesty, for Nicholas Copernicus - or rather, Mikolaj Kopernik - had, without doubt, quite obviously been a Pole. Everyone was soon shocked, however, to discover that none of the British group was entirely sure exactly who Copernicus was, let alone when he had been born. It was no good trying to explain that British schools just didn't teach that sort of thing any more, that if they'd wanted to know, they'd have been told to look it up in an encyclopaedia: the Polish staff, overcast with a unanimously horrified look, simply became determined to instil into the British group at least the main facts, the most important dates about Copernicus (1473 - 1543), and while they were about it, the Teutonic Knights, the Battle of Grunwald (1410), the Peace of Torun, (1466). Surely they'd had to learn them for exams at school, and had simply forgotten? On another occasion, they'd made a valiant effort to teach the British group some Polish which, after all, really couldn't be that difficult.

At first, everyone had tried hard to learn a few useful phrases, but it was so hard to wind one's tongue around the lugubrious vowel sounds, as thick as the cabbage soup they'd had at lunchtime, and all those consonants that kept huddling together as if they were weathering a blizzard. No, it didn't help to have the word written down. How did you say *that* bit, and why *did* the endings keep changing every time you looked away? No, it was alright, they'd manage with 'please' and 'thank-you' for now, really, that was probably enough to be getting on with, wasn't it? *Proszę*. *Dziękuję*. You had to say the last bits through your nose, and it sounded so funny that they giggled like schoolchildren. No, it was no good. And then some of the Polish students had overheard them, and laughed with delight, saying some impossible tongue-twister or other, and then looking at them expectantly. *Chrzaszcz brzmi w trzcinnie!* Go on! Say it - say it! Or what about *Stół z powylamywanymi nogami*? But by the time they'd got to the end you'd already forgotten the first sound. No, it was impossible - really. Really. At the camp's Polish evening, however, the Polish staff had finally triumphed in their aim of instilling something of Polish culture into the British group, teaching them all a Polish folk dance, the *Krakowia*, in which couples clasped hands held high, like little mediaeval aristocrats, and proudly processed in a circle, bobbing slightly, with straight backs, on the first beat of each bar. Rather more impressive, it had to be said, than their own British evening, when the same air of occasion just wasn't achieved by some silly games and a few Beatles songs.

It was the Polish staff, too, who had taken them on the trip at the end of the camp. They had visited most of the main regions of contemporary Poland: Wielkopolska and Malopolska, Mazowsze and Mazury, Kujawy and the Karpaty. Of course, they'd been told, during the Golden Age, Poland had stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and even now there were some more regions in the West which Poland had got back after the War, and some which were now technically part of Russia but which still really belonged to

Poland - though they wouldn't, of course, be able to visit those.¹¹ Nevertheless, they had gone everywhere else - or at least, Beth reflected, with the knowing condescension of a second year undergraduate, everywhere that seemed to matter in the cultural history of Poland or that had even the remotest connection with Nicholas Copernicus. First, they went to Biskupin, the site of an Iron Age Polish settlement. Beth wasn't entirely convinced that those ancient people had really thought of themselves as proto-Polish, but she had liked the legend about the founding of Poland, when the three brothers, Lech, Czech and Rus, had set out on a journey, looking for a new homeland. How they had come to a dense forest and decided to split up, with Rus heading east, Czech heading south, and Lech looking for somewhere to settle in the forest. How one evening, Lech had come across a large clearing or *polana*, in the centre of which was an oak tree, had decided to take a short nap and, as the sun was setting and the sky growing red, had seen a beautiful bird fly in amongst the branches of the tree. How, seeing the white eagle against the red sky, he had taken it as a sign that he should stay there, and in that very clearing had built his city, giving it the name 'Gniezno', and his people the name *Polanie*.¹² There was something magical about that story, something resonant, which made it much more convincing than a collection of waterlogged huts, however scientifically accurate their reconstruction. It was to Gniezno, nest of the fledgling Polish State, and capital of Mieszko I, the first Piast King of Poland, that they had travelled next. Mieszko had converted to Christianity there in 966, they were told, and the ancient doors of the cathedral did indeed show in wonderful detail the story of St. Adalbert, a missionary who, on visiting the pagan Prussians, had not surprisingly failed to make it back in one piece. But Beth couldn't help smiling to herself when she read in the history book she had been given that the founding of the city of Gniezno, like almost every other historical event, paralleled with remarkable prescience

¹¹ For further details, cf. Davies (1981: vol. 1: 23 - 60).

¹² Topolski (1986: 21) points out that *gniezno* is an old Polish form of *gniazdo*, 'nest'.

the eventual establishment of the People's Republic of Poland. ¹³ Next, they'd gone to Frombork, where Copernicus had apparently lived and worked as a doctor, a lawyer, an architect, a soldier, and even as an economist, quite apart from being an astronomer. ¹⁴ They'd learned all over again how he had discovered the heliocentric workings of the solar system, and written *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium*; how he had - sensibly, Beth thought - died the year his life's work was published, and, dedicating it to the Pope just in case, had made it clear in the introduction that it was all just a theory anyway. ¹⁵ After that, they'd driven south past Malbork, seat of the treacherous Teutonic Knights, who had been invited to Poland in the thirteenth century to fight the troublesome Prussians, but had quickly established their own hostile military state. This, they learned, had led to the Poles joining forces with the Lithuanians, through the marriage of the twelve year old Princess Jadwiga to the thirty-five year old warrior Jagiello, founder of the Jagiellonian dynasty. ¹⁶ Could they recall the dates of the Battle of Grunwald, when the Poles had defeated the Teutonic Knights? And what about the Peace of Torun? They nodded dutifully, trying hard to remember. Driving further south still, they'd visited Krakow, a beautiful, fairy-tale city that had once been the capital, and another place full of enchanting stories. How it had been founded by the mythical ruler Krak, who'd killed the resident dragon by tricking it into eating sulphur. ¹⁷ How the quartered body of Stanislaw, Bishop of Krakow and patron saint of Poland, had miraculously grown back together, demonstrating that the divided country of Poland would always become one again. ¹⁸

¹³ Cf. Topolski (1986) for an example of a history book written in this style.

¹⁴ Zamoyski (1987: 123).

¹⁵ Sharman (1988: 272). Cf. also Davies (1981: vol. 1: 150 - 152 and 257 - 258) and Topolski (1986: 87) for further details of the life and career of Copernicus. For a brilliant fictionalised account, cf. Banville (1990).

¹⁶ Zamoyski (1987: 46). Cf. Davies (1981: vol. 1: 112 - 118 and passim.) for further details.

¹⁷ Sharman (1988: 108).

¹⁸ Zamoyski (1987: 18, 35).

They'd seen the ancient Wawel Castle, the Jagiellonian University, and the city's flower strewn Market Square and Cloth Hall, heard the city's haunting trumpet tune, the *hejnal*, played every hour from the towers of its barley sugar church, and been told how, in the thirteenth century, when the barbarian Eastern hordes had invaded the city during the Tartar raids, a watchman had sounded the alarm from that very same spot, only to be struck in the throat by a Tartar arrow mid-bugle-call: that was why the melancholy tune was still broken off abruptly at exactly the same point, taking the whole country back, every hour, to that moment of its centuries old history. ¹⁹ They'd gone to the little mountain village of Zakopane in the Tatras, and seen the profile in the mountain-tops of Giewont, the sleeping knight, who, so the story went, would rise up and defend Poland in her hour of need (in which case, Beth thought, his record thus far had been less than exemplary), and they had visited Auschwitz, a place which was oddly sterile and unmoving, until you got to the glass case showing hundreds of tiny children's shoes. Finally, they'd headed back north to Warsaw, calling in at Czestochowa on the way to see the famous picture of the Black Madonna - which, they were informed, had saved the Monastery of Jasna Gora, in the deluge of battles in the seventeenth century, from the pillaging and marauding Swedes. ²⁰ In Warsaw, they'd learned how, in 1573, (so many dates !) the nobility of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania had chosen the first of their Elected Kings - an oddly democratic way, Beth thought, of acquiring a monarch - ²¹ and that the ones to remember were Stefan Batory, who'd fought against Russian expansionism, and Jan Sobieski, who'd defended the whole of Europe against the Turks at the Battle of Vienna. It seemed as if, over the centuries, the Poles had been

¹⁹ The *hejnal* is Poland's radio time signal. For an amusing account of this ceremony, cf. Sharman (1988: 111 - 112).

²⁰ The wars with Sweden in the period 1655 - 1660 are literally termed 'The Deluge' in Polish; cf. for example Sharman (1988: 339), Ascherson (1988: ix), Davies (1981: vol. 1: 450).

²¹ Officially entitled *Serenissima Respublica Poloniae*, cf. Zamoyski (1987: 92 - 96 passim.), also Davies (1981: vol. 1: 331 - 336).

threatened with invasion, or actually been invaded, by just about everyone. Oh, and of course, there was the last King of Poland, Stanislaw August Poniatowski, who'd not been much of a fighter, admittedly, given what had happened with the Partitions (1772, Russia, Prussia, and Austria; 1793, Russia and Prussia; 1795, Russia, Prussia and Austria again) when Poland had finally been wiped off the map. ²² How often the borders must have changed. No, he'd not been much of a fighter, that Stanislaw August, he'd been deported and had subsequently abdicated, but nevertheless, it was important to remember, wasn't it, that he'd been a great patron of the arts. ²³ They hadn't been able to see his Royal Castle, though, because - they were told - well, because it was shut. Instead, they'd seen a stark, concrete monument in an eery, empty square, the site of the Jewish Ghetto, and had quietly been taken to the Party Headquarters, to see how the wall overlooking a neighbouring building was completely windowless. ²⁴ Even if they felt a bit overwhelmed by the sheer weight of Polish history, they'd certainly had a wonderful trip. And when, outside the Polish Academy of Sciences, they'd had to circle the statue of Copernicus no less than three times because of some roadworks, they hadn't complained. Perhaps it *was* interesting to wonder what it must have been like to have your perceptions of the world turned so radically upside down; to discover that the whole basis of your system of values could change, so that you could never be certain of anything ever again; to realise that your world revolved inharmoniously round other spheres; that you were not at the centre of things after all.

When Lizzie returned from that second trip to Poland, there had been so much to tell John. Before she'd left, he'd come to visit her at university at the end of the summer term, and had been delighted to hear about her travel plans, had wanted her to apply for

²² Cf. Davies (1981: vol. 1: 511 - 546), and Zamoyski (1987: 222 - 258).

²³ Cf. Zamoyski (1998) for a full treatment of King Stanislaw August.

²⁴ Now, ironically, the Polish Stock Exchange !

the Foreign Office. Lizzie, too, was keen on the idea, if rather daunted by the prospect. They'd had a wonderful week-end, though she'd been a little surprised that he'd turned up with perfume, wine, flowers. She must keep a diary, he said, he wanted to hear about everything when she got back. They'd agreed that she'd go and stay with him for a while before the start of term, now that he was based in London again, and on his own. They'd be able to discuss her Polish experiences, the civil service entrance exams, his new post.

When she'd got back from Poland, she'd travelled down to see John on the train, a slight knot in her stomach, half excited, half unsure. But when she'd got to the station, he hadn't been there to meet her, and when she'd rung, only an aged aunt had answered, and had refused to tell her why John couldn't come to the phone. She got a taxi, and everything was suddenly clear. He could hardly stand, barely articulate, was almost unconscious. Lizzie was frightened, had no idea what to do. It was Elizabeth who'd had to take over, establish whether it was alcohol, drugs, both ? Deciding there was no immediate danger, she'd put him to bed, had arranged all the discarded bottles into neat rows, gathered and folded the scattered dirty shirts. Then she had waited, with no clear idea of what she was waiting for, of how to proceed. It had been several numb hours later that a friend of John's had turned up, and that miraculously, the machinery of rescue had slowly ground into action.

John had been drinking heavily for some time now, the friend explained, since the woman he'd left his wife for had in turn left him; John had found the money to send the friend to The Priory a few years previously, when the same had happened to him, and now he was simply returning the favour: he would pay the bills, she was responsible for the persuading and the packing. The friend had pointed out a whole case of clean shirts. No, she had said, laughing at herself in spite of the situation, no, I just folded them up, it was something to do. She took them down to the washing machine. Fourteen hand-made silk shirts and not a washing label between

them: oh sod it, what did it matter now? The next day, John was driven away. She'd wanted to go with him, make sure he was alright, even though he so patently wasn't, but no, it would be better if she didn't, she was told, it would be easier that way. When she'd finally got back to her parents, they'd asked her, curiously, how the week-end had gone. Fine, she'd lied quietly, a bit hectic, there hadn't exactly been a chance to tell John about Poland, but fine. There were no words to describe how she felt about what had happened. She couldn't piece it all together, turn it into a coherent narrative. Couldn't explain what it felt like to have your position in the scheme of things turned completely upside down.

So why did I go back to Poland that second time, and what effect did the events that happened subsequently have on my later decision to live there? Again, I suppose we need to go back a bit to work it out, this time to when I was about fourteen or so, by which time the crisis threatened by that crossing of Oedipal triangles was already visible on the horizon like the first, cold, bright star of a Polish Christmas.²⁵ I'd already known, at that age, that I was jealous of John's wife, as she then still was, whenever I went to stay. More disturbingly, perhaps, he'd told me years later that he'd already known, by then, that he'd wanted me, though I'd scarcely been more than a girl. When he'd been posted to South East Asia, to no-one else's surprise, his wife had pointedly stayed at home, refusing to play the part of the diplomatic spouse. And when I was invited down before he left, at eighteen, I knew that what I'd been given was more than an ordinary good-bye kiss. I'd gone off to university, which had proved to be an eye-opening experience, where reading between the lines and picking up on the finest detail - strategies that had long been part of my domestic emotional survival kit - were suddenly useful. And on the first day, I'd changed my name, knowing only that I wanted to be independent of my family, that, if I was unsure of exactly who it was I wanted to

²⁵ Traditionally, Christmas starts with the sighting of the first star on *Wigilia*, 24th December, which is also when the main Christmas meal is eaten.

be, there was nevertheless plenty of scope for trying out some new identities.

It must have been at about the same time that my parents had received a letter from John, admitting that he'd left his wife and three year old daughter, had for some time been in love with a mutual friend, was thoroughly ashamed of himself; they themselves were so happily married, such ideal parents; he hadn't known how to tell me, could they do their best to try and explain? My mother had forwarded the letter with a one line explanation: thought you might like to read this. I hadn't. Yet however painful it was, I'd written back anyway, balanced precariously between childhood and womanhood, feeling oddly devastated by the break-up of his marriage, as if my own parents had just announced their divorce. Even John was no longer an emotionally dependent element of my mental universe. Yet I'd still needed him to acknowledge my new identity, my brave new womanhood, and had somehow already known for years that that would be his role, that he'd one day be the first man I'd sleep with. Certainly, by that time, I identified with him in ways that even now I still find it impossible to unravel, let alone understand: for almost as long as I could remember, John had influenced me, moulded me, decided for me. Displeasing him would have been unthinkable. I'd adored him for years - perhaps narcissistically: my values were his values, his ideas were my ideas. For me, the boundary between our identities was often blurred, frequently indecipherable: I wasn't sure if I wanted to have him or be him, but at that time, in any case, the two seemed utterly indistinguishable.

Once we'd established contact again, the letters that had come back from John had been funny, interesting, poignant. About his increasing disillusionment at the ridiculous etiquette and shallowness of diplomatic life, and, by implication, of his own. About trying, within the enormously frustrating constraints of the British aid programme under Thatcher, to get help not to those who were convenient in the establishment of some bilateral trade deal,

but to those who actually needed it most. About the sickening racism of many of his colleagues, most of whom were thankfully junior to him, towards the people in whose country they lived. About being stopped at Delhi airport by Indian officials who refused to believe his British diplomatic status because, after all... National identity. What did it mean to be British ?

I wondered, even then, what those experiences must have done to him. There is, I suppose, never a simple chain of causality with human emotions, with the human mind. It is never possible to say, ah yes, it was for this reason, because of that, there was the beginning. Maybe, understandably in many ways, he tried to deny one of his national identities, his Indian-ness, though in fact only one of his grandparents had been British. But he had always lived in Britain, except for the period when his estranged father had kidnapped him back to India for a brief spell and put him in the care of an ayah who spoke no English. He'd been educated at one of the most emotionally repressive British public schools, which he hated with all his being. Had penetrated the very heart of the British Establishment. Was more English, in some ways, than anyone else I knew. Perhaps he embodied for me the tensions of what it means to belong to a certain sector of the English middle classes: however spontaneous or bright or vivacious you were, in public and preferably in private too, you had to repress strong emotions, deny creativity, ignore your personal history. When I'd come back from Poland to find him broken and ill, I'd had no theories. Only a sense that my world had collapsed. And if I had found the unresolved contradictions simply too many, too difficult to deal with at that age, perhaps I somehow internalised them - until something happened a few years later that made it impossible to ignore them any longer.

That final year at university, when Lizzie had got back from Poland, had been a hard one. During his first few months at The Priory, John had wanted no visitors, no letters, no phone calls. She had no idea, in any case, how to respond to that depth of

depression. Then John had written saying that he hadn't been allowed any contact with anyone, had had this letter smuggled out, it was like being in prison. Somewhere in between, he'd twice tried to take his own life. Lizzie had long stopped feeling anything. Elizabeth churned out final year essays, dissertations, exams. Beth had gone into hiding. Gradually, he'd sounded a bit better, spoken to her on the phone. The other people there were nice enough, bright - mostly journalists, other diplomats. The programme was relentless, he hated it, he was trying. They'd worked out what they had to say to get out, he'd see her before Christmas. It had been several months after Christmas that he'd finally been allowed home, and only eventually that he'd been well enough to see her.

He'd had to leave the Foreign Office then, but to Lizzie's amazement, despite being aware of his recent history, an NGO had employed him as Field Director in the Sudan. It hardly seemed wise to take such a stressful job, it wasn't exactly an easy posting, but he was almost back to his old self, had made a full recovery, was looking forward to the challenge. She was still waiting to hear about her civil service exams, but perhaps she could look into doing voluntary work there; it wasn't exactly her area, but still, it wouldn't hurt for a year or two, would it? But she hadn't felt very sure, somehow, it had all seemed a bit uncertain, and she had written off to universities in Poland anyway, asking if there were any English language assistantships she might apply for. The letters and post-cards arrived from John as they always had done, though less frequently these days, which bothered her. Then, three weeks before her finals, another letter came. He wanted to get married. To the woman he'd left his wife for. They'd tried to stay apart but couldn't. Lizzie shut down. Worked. Worked harder. Middle class Surrey childhoods were training for this kind of thing, weren't they? She sat the rest of her finals, graduated without him there, without the only person who really mattered there. Then the civil service results came through, she hadn't got the Foreign Office, was offered Trade and Industry instead. The job seemed full of uncertainties, yet far from exciting: she wasn't interested in trade *or* industry, as a matter

of fact, and if she was going to be based in London, she'd have to live with her parents at the start. No. She'd heard nothing from John for a couple of months, when a letter arrived at the end of the summer, out of the blue, from Poland. Yes, actually, they were looking for someone, the Department of English Philology at the University of Nicholas Copernicus had just re-opened, they needed a junior lecturer, could she start at the beginning of October? Poland seemed more enticing, more definite, reassuringly elsewhere. She went.

I have always found it fascinating that people assume my going to live in Poland in 1988 was about arrival, not departure. For isn't travelling as much about what you leave behind as what you find when you get there? Certainly, in my case, there were good enough reasons for going, to do with temporal journeys as much as spatial ones, emotional as well as physical migrations, the ephemeral transitions between adolescence and adulthood. Confused about where some of my own boundaries lay, I needed to reject, to put on the other side of a border, what felt like the still cloying ties of childhood. Distance promised to make easier the exhausting task of constantly re-establishing emotional boundaries - between my own, actual and desired, identities, and those I perceived as having been imposed on me - the task of building up defences against the never ending raids, incursions, battles, invasions, attempts to kidnap me back into my childhood. None of it would have been so demanding, of course, had that not been, in some respects, precisely where I, too, wanted to be. Not back in my real childhood, of course, but in the comfortable, secure, idealised childhoods of all our imaginations. Going abroad was simply a way of trying to cope with the unthinkable, the quickest route to denial.

In one sense, of course, anywhere would really have done, but perhaps I returned to Poland because it promised to fulfil my demands so well, because it seemed to offer qualities that no other culture I knew appeared to have. On the one hand, Poland in 1988 was what, in John's world, might have been known as 'a hardship

posting', with the potential of keeping me busy enough not to have time to think about anything else. On the other hand, although I certainly didn't think in these terms then, I probably also had an intuitive sense from the two visits I'd already made, that Poland might give me things that I couldn't find in my own immediate culture, that there was room not only for the spontaneous expression of positive emotions, but also an understanding and respect for the fact that life was sometimes painful. This was a culture which was well used to grief, having had a tragic history - and whether it was the nation's history as a whole, or the way that it intersected with a particular individual's personal history that was at stake, Poland was a place where the past seemed to matter.

'Poland is a very strange country, in which I always feel at home' ²⁶

How am I to condense two years of Polish history (and, for that matter, of my life) into the next few pages? How am I going to answer all the questions you are likely to ask? What was it like to *be* there during the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, the last year of Communism and the first year of the Solidarity Government? How did it feel to live through those momentous political events, the very making of history? But questions like that, though natural enough, always make me smile. Remember that in those days, Poland wasn't considered nearly such an exciting country as it was to become in the next few years. True, some pretty interesting things had happened in August 1980 and since, with Solidarity and the imposition of Martial Law, ²⁷ but at that time, nobody knew how it was all going to turn out, that Poland's was to be the first in a whole series of revolutions which would bring down the Iron Curtain. It was only subsequently that Central and Eastern Europe, and by implication experiences like mine, became fashionable, ironically enough, and people said, Gosh, how

²⁶ Claude Lanzmann, French film director, quoted in Ascherson (1988: 1).

²⁷ Cf. Garton Ash (1999a) for a definitive and highly readable account.

interesting, what was it actually *like* ? What I always want to say is, well, most of the time, like everyone else, I was distractedly engaged in the tedious business of everyday life. Certainly keeping a weather eye on political developments (at least as much as I could), acknowledging, perhaps, that what was taking place was somehow important, but unsure, as everyone was, of its precise significance. History, after all, only gets made retrospectively, and meanwhile, the washing probably needed doing.

Working in Poland at that time meant that I inevitably lived through at least some of the events and in some of the conditions experienced by the majority of Poles. But in suggesting that I was simply surviving the quotidian like everyone else, I don't want to claim that I know or knew what it felt like to be Polish in those circumstances. True, I was paid a Polish salary which, had I exchanged it on the black market, would have amounted to all of about thirty pounds a month.²⁸ But as a foreigner, I automatically received fifty percent more than other junior colleagues,²⁹ and didn't have to do several jobs, as they did, to survive. Yes, I lived in an ordinary, cramped, two-room Polish university flat, with no phone and what I eventually worked out were cockroaches, got the same ration coupons, and shopped in the same sparsely stocked shops; but I had a flat to myself in a country with a chronic housing shortage and, subject to the university terms, my finances, and obtaining the appropriate entry and exit visas, could also come and go as I pleased. For a western foreigner, then, I probably lived closer to Polish conditions than most, but it is important to acknowledge that there were certain crucial differences. Quite apart from the economic, the linguistic, the cultural, the historical

²⁸ This was my approximate starting salary in October 1988, at which time there was no official exchange rate. With the rapid inflation, by the time I left in 1990, it had risen to about eighty pounds a month.

²⁹ This was apparent from a notice on the Departmental notice-board listing everyone's salaries, from the Professor to the secretary. *Ile zarabiasz / Ile pani zarabia ?* 'How much do you earn ?' was also a perfectly normal social question, and a common topic of conversation which inevitably led to heartfelt complaints about the appalling state of the Polish economy.

differences - it simply wasn't my nation. I don't want to imply some sort of homogeneous Polish experience: all the usual factors - gender, generation, class, region, ethnicity, religion, political allegiance - must have come into play, not to mention the different interpretations that each person made from day to day, depending on their mood, their frame of mind, the vagaries of their individual identities. Perhaps you would want to argue that a Pole similar to me - in age, social background, education - might have had experiences and reactions closer to mine than, say, those of a middle aged factory worker from Lodz.³⁰ But I think that would be taking it too far for then, and even for now. National identity, cultural difference, still count for something, after all. So what follows won't answer all those probable questions of yours, won't describe what Poland was *like* from 1988 -1990. It is simply what I can offer you in retrospect. And knowing what you know about me so far, you'll have to work out as best you can how that might influence what I experienced, the way I interpreted it then, what I remember, how I might think and write about it now, what I'm prepared to say. Sorry if that disappoints you, but what else can we do ? If you wanted something more objective, you could always try a history book.

So what were my experiences of the physical and psychological obstacles with which most people had to contend ? Which problems were shared, which could I escape, which were exacerbated ? Doubtless the problem most immediately apparent to anyone visiting Poland at that time would have been the on-going shortage - and frequently downright absence - of consumer goods, the continuing struggle (even if by that stage by no means as bad as it had been) to obtain some of the basic comestibles of everyday life. All sorts of things were difficult to get, and *Nie ma* was one of the first Polish phrases that I quickly came to understand. *Nie ma*. There isn't any. In 1988, meat was still rationed by mean little

³⁰ An industrial city in central Poland, then still functioning as the hub of the Polish textile industry; briefly capital of Poland after the destruction of Warsaw during World War II.

coupons, and it was always unpredictable as to what else was suddenly going to disappear for a week, two weeks, six weeks - no-one every really knew how long. One time it might be tea, another time cheese, sometimes sugar. It was as if the shortages were moved around the country, and you were left wondering whether this was for the sake of fairness, or simply a means of keeping the entire population evenly worn down. As for 'luxury' goods, unless you went to the hard currency *Pewex* shops - which were full of Mars Bars and whiskey, Barbie dolls and Tampax, Western cigarettes and cosmetics - then real coffee, chocolate and juice were almost impossible to find that first year. Fresh produce was still seasonal, and so out of season, anything that hadn't been grown in Poland simply wasn't available. Locally grown produce arrived with the months of the year, and although by then it was redundant in everyday usage, people still knew the word for the once dangerous period in the spring when the winter food stocks had run out and the new crops were not yet ready. I faintly remembered from my childhood which vegetables, which fruit came when, and so even Polish greengrocery had for me an air of nostalgia - until it got to February, cabbage and potatoes, and very little else.

When I first arrived, I was told by my Department that the easiest thing to do was to go to the university canteen for the main meal of the day, which was eaten in the middle of the afternoon, when most people finished work.³¹ Using the *stolowka* wasn't unusual, though the food was pretty grim: you simply exchanged your meat coupons and bought tickets for the month, saving hours of searching, traipsing from shop to shop, and queuing. At that time, not even the supermarkets were entirely self-service, and although you could get some things without having to ask - like flour, or vinegar, or jam - for other things you queued up again and again at different counters, to ask for bread, cheese, milk. *Prosze*

³¹ Working hours were usually from about 6.00 or 8.00 am until about 2.00 or 3.00 pm. People usually had what was termed a *drugie sniadanie* or 'second breakfast' mid-morning, their *obiad* in the afternoon, and *kolacja* in the evening.

chleb, prosze ser, prosze mleko. Despite the bareness of the shops, however, there always seemed to be plenty of food whenever you were invited to somebody's house. A guest in the house, God in the house, went the saying - making it a traditional obligation of Polish hospitality to fill the table (and the guest) to near collapse. Chivvied and cajoled into eating vast amounts of albeit delicious food, I eventually learned to say that I couldn't possibly eat another mouthful long before it was true, so that the whole game of refusal, persuasion, eventual acquiescence and final triumph could be started - and got over and done with - that much earlier. But the surprising abundance of food provided for guests still had to come from somewhere, and said a lot about how people had learned to cope with the unreliability, the inadequacy, of state provision. Some of it doubtless meant overnight queuing, but in addition, everyone seemed to have an allotment, and nobody ever grew just flowers. In the summer, whatever they'd grown they'd pickle, from cucumbers to plums, and whatever couldn't be pickled was otherwise preserved. True, you soon grew tired of vegetables in vinegar and bottled fruit in winter, but it was better than anaemic, wrinkled apples by the time it came to spring. I, of course, had neither access to a garden nor much in the way of pickling skills, but there were other strategies for dealing with the shortages that I did eventually learn from Polish colleagues and friends.

The first rule was that you bought things when you saw them, or, for that matter, heard about them, and you never waited. Nor was it considered rude to stop complete strangers in the street and ask where they had found something they were carrying, and for what price, or to discuss on the train or the bus where one might get some of the more difficult items. Indeed, whole journeys could pass while fellow passengers narrated past shopping triumphs, lamented the recent disappearance of, say, sellotape or matches, or advised each other on how to go about getting a bicycle, or building materials, or hardest of all, a car. It wasn't unusual, either, for a colleague to come into the Department and announce that they had just found a somewhat less exciting but nevertheless essential item

in such and such a shop - a certain sort of cheese, or lavatory paper, or good string - or that someone, somewhere, was selling plastic carrier bags. At which point, you dropped whatever you were doing if you could, and went to join the queue. Sometimes, if you were passing a queue you might join it anyway, and only then ask what it was for, because if people were queuing, then there must be something worth queuing for, and queues, in Poland, were in any case something of an art form.

I'd learned more about the subtleties of queuing when a friend had taken me to see a famous Polish painting, the *Panorama Raclawickiej*, for which it was usually extremely difficult to obtain tickets.³² Surprised and pleased to see that there wasn't a long queue of people waiting, I had assumed that we would be able to go straight in. My friend, being Polish, knew better, and casually asked a man standing near the entrance what the queue was like. In response, he surreptitiously drew out of his pocket a tatty scrap of paper, and consulted it seriously. Well, not too bad at the moment, were we thinking of joining? We were, and agreed to come back and take our turn as guardians of the queue at an allotted time, leaving me as amazed at the intricacy and efficiency of this system as I was later to be by the picture for which we had 'queued' so successfully. Spanning the walls of the huge circular chamber, the panorama showed an episode of Kosciuszko's National Rising in 1794, when the peasants had been awarded their freedom (at least until the Partitioning powers had regained control) for defeating the Russians armed only with scythes.³³ Nearly two hundred years later, it seemed highly appropriate that their descendants should be doing pretty much the same thing. Because Polish agriculture had never been successfully collectivised, many small farmers simply

³² Cf. Salter and McLachlan (1993: 391 - 92) for details of the collective creation and history of this painting.

³³ Emancipation was later granted by the Partitioning Powers at different times, with full freedom from feudal servitude only being gained relatively late on: in Austrian Poland, in 1848, in Prussian Poland in 1850, and in Russian Poland, in 1861, cf. Davies (1981: vol. 2: 171 - 206). Cf. Garton Ash (1999a: 117 - 141) for more recent peasant revolts.

refused to sell to the Communists - after all, the Government couldn't supply them with tractor parts or fuel, why should they bother to supply them with food ? ³⁴ So the peasants often ploughed with horses and kept their land and their dignity, and everyone else belonged to an informal network of family and friends who effectively bartered whatever they had, from food to favours, bureaucratic transactions to antibiotics, hard currency and *bony* (the *Pewex* shop vouchers which, with dollars, were virtually a second national currency) and much else besides. Most people seemed to have family who lived in the country, which in Poland never seemed very far away, or they had relations who lived abroad and sent money (the worse it is, the better it is, went the cynical saying); and so alongside the limping, state-run economy was a sprightly, black-market economy which effectively ran itself. Given their nineteenth century history and a hundred and twenty-three years of resistance to the Partitioning Powers, it was said, Poles really weren't too keen on centralised authority.

Finding the items that you needed and making sure that you had enough money to survive were essentially problems of physical survival, but they also inevitably added to the plethora of psychological barriers that the regime erected, inadvertently or otherwise. The endless bureaucracy involved in even the simplest of administrative tasks, and the constant communication problems, contributed considerably to the prevalent sense, during the last year of Communist rule, of general oppression and exhaustion. Whatever you wanted to do required countless documents, signatures, stamps, photographs, seals, and duplicates. Even something as simple as getting a photocopy made at the university usually took about a week, because not only did a form have to be completed for the man who ran the Faculty's sole machine, who had to be begged, cajoled, and flattered into making the copies, but a

³⁴ Cf. Garton Ash (1999a: 10 - 11, 110 - 111, 118 - 119, 121 - 123, 139 - 141 and *passim*.) for the history of failed attempts to collectivise Polish agriculture; also for reference to the common belief that Polish food and other goods were exported to the Soviet Union and that food distribution in Poland was used for political ends.

form also had to be filled in for the administrator, who, despite the fact that she spoke no English, censored everything that the English Department taught. Clearly, the petty bureaucracy was designed to waste both time and energy, the only reason that it worked so successfully presumably being that there were always enough people whose sole means of dealing with the frustrations of their own lives was exercising what little power they could over everybody else's. ³⁵

Eventually, however, I learned some of the strategies for dealing with the bureaucrats, too. It was usually no good showing impatience, nor implying that it was, after all, that person's job to provide you with what it was you were requesting: though these tactics would work on occasion, they could also result in a surly digging in of heels which only made things infinitely slower. Instead, the best thing to do was to attempt to maintain a dignified neutrality, to pretend that you had all the time in the world, and to go along with every possible document that could even remotely be demanded. Once, when the post office refused to let me pick up a parcel after half an hour of queuing, I simply went back to the Department, stamped a slip of paper with every university stamp I could lay my hands on, queued up again, smiled pleasantly, and collected my parcel. When it came to leaving the country with the Communists still in power, however, there was usually more skill involved than that. It was no good handing over all your documents at once to the passport official and smiling nicely at *him*. If you did that, you were left with no bargaining power at all, for not only was everything literally out of your hands, but you had already signalled your vulnerability by trying to appease. Instead, it had to be a stony-faced battle of wills, a matter of careful negotiation. Hand him one minor document, and wait. He would look churlish. Then the next, slightly more important document. And wait. He would

³⁵ Cf. Davies (1986: 179 - 180) and *passim*. for an explanation of co-operation with the authorities and its historical roots in loyalism; cf. Davies (1986: 274 - 278 and 348 - 352) regarding the idea of the 'divided conscience', political corruption, and 'careerism' in Polish life.

grunt. Another - a flicker of recognition. And so on, until the final trump card, when, if you were lucky, you would be allowed through. If you didn't have the right pieces of paper from the university and the police, then British passport holder or not, you weren't allowed out. And the rules never seemed to be written down anywhere, but rather to depend on the whim of the individual officer on a particular day - a fact of which both of you were fully aware throughout.

The communication problems were another source of intense frustration. Rumour had it that, when the phone lines had been cut on the imposition of Martial Law in December 1981, it had been done with axes - a fact utterly believable given that it often took about fifteen attempts and the best part of the morning to call from the Department to Warsaw - and that was one of the easier call routes. To make matters worse, the waiting list for private phones was years long, and many people simply didn't have a phone at home. Some managed to make calls from work, but for the rest, it was a case of trekking to the post office and the inevitable, tedious wait to make or receive a call.

In addition to these minor, and sometimes rather more major, irritations of daily life came the more overt forms of political oppression. By 1988, many of the people I knew treated this as a bit of a joke in private, but nevertheless took it extremely seriously in other ways, knowing that anyone who got on the wrong side of the authorities could still expect a rough ride. As ever, the most effective form of censorship was self-censorship, and people were careful about what they said on the phone, what they wrote in letters, and what they said to whom in person. When friends came round and the conversation turned to politics, there'd usually come a point when someone would look up at the tannoy, everyone would laugh, and the subject would be dropped. It was the uncertainty of the extent to which such monitoring was occurring, and of who was doing it, that made it so effective. On one occasion, I saw the 'extra-mural' mature student who'd joined my classes a

few weeks previously on the platform for the train to Warsaw - wearing full military uniform with rather a lot of braid on his epaulettes. The thing was, you never really knew.

(It's difficult, isn't it, to write about Poland in the late 1980s without being over dramatic, without ending up sounding like something out of a John Le Carré. But perhaps that's inevitable if you take things out of context, look at the more interesting bits, and telescope the rest of the time. It's hard not to turn it into a selected highlights - or lowlights, which is, after all, much more what people expect from a place like Poland, in spite of themselves. Like the friend who came to stay from Britain and demanded, tongue firmly in cheek, to be taken to join a queue, because otherwise it just wouldn't be the authentic experience. But then, narratives are always written for a particular audience, always told from a specific perspective, aren't they ? Just as I'm writing this because I know you (whoever you are) are the reader, because it's for a specific purpose. And who is this new, contemporaneous 'I' is who's crept into the narrative of late ? What's happened to all those other identities ? How do they relate to this voice speaking now ? You may well ask. It's hard to know though, isn't it, when you're telling stories).

Certainly, like most people, I was nervous of the Army, even though, like nuns and priests, they were a common enough sight on the streets, and the Army certainly seemed to feature large in the collective consciousness: after all, it was they who'd taken over the country in December 1981. Feelings, though, appeared to be highly mixed. On the one hand, there was a proud historical tradition: countless battles and rebellions; Dabrowski's Legions from the Napoleonic Wars commemorated in the Polish national anthem; the Polish Cavalry charging Russian tanks on horseback; the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; Marshal Pilsudski's Legions in the First World War, his Presidency from the rebirth of Independent Poland until 1922, and then again - after a famous military stand-off on Warsaw's Poniatowski Bridge and a popular coup d'état - from 1926

to 1935; Monte Casino, the Polish pilots, the Partisans, the Warsaw Uprising. On the other hand, Jaruzelski, the much hated military lessons at school and university, and - even more loathed - compulsory National Service. But there was no escaping the military presence. Wanting to go swimming, and being offered a ticket for 6.00 a.m. on a Tuesday morning - as long as I didn't mind sharing the pool with the Polish Army. Waking up one night to the sound of thunder and the sight of tank after tank after - *Russian* tank passing my window - no Chopin on the radio, it must be okay, go back to sleep - and finding out the next morning that it had been the Soviet Army, under cover of darkness, finally pulling out.³⁶

(Peculiarly, perhaps, in Poland I was never actually scared: in my head, John had reverted to that delightful, dependable figure he'd been for most of my life, and recent events were, if not forgotten, then somehow put to one side. My parents were still in touch with his ex-wife, he was getting on fine, working now for the UN: so I always knew, or thought I did, that if anything ever happened, my parents would simply call John, and if need be, he'd know how to get me out. Strange how history gets concertina'd.)

If shortages, queues, bureaucracy and brutality were some of the obstacles with which people had to contend on a daily basis, then in addition to practical strategies, Poles also manifested a variety of coping attitudes and behaviours which I found myself intuitively categorising: one - rudeness and bloody-mindedness; two - extreme etiquette and formality; and three - various types of withdrawal.

The first seemed to be apparent everywhere: in shops, at the station, in offices, with workmen. It was quite usual to have to wait to be served at a counter because the assistants were chatting, and would only deign to notice you after several minutes, looking up

³⁶ When Martial Law was imposed on 13th December 1981, there was nothing but patriotic music on the radio; cf. Ascherson (1988: 209).

with a cursory *Slucham* ? I'm listening - what do you want ? and a glance as derisory and insolent as they could probably muster. Visiting some office or other, one would often find the entire staff sitting around drinking coffee. *Czy sie stoi, czy sie lezy*.³⁷ There was time, and there was money - and one didn't equal the other. The decorator who, in order to decide whether the paint in your flat was water-based or oil-based, simply spat at the wall, the workers who were drunk on vodka by eight o'clock in the morning. You couldn't blame people, life wasn't easy, but there were times when your patience wore distinctly thin.

The second type of behaviour was usually displayed by members of the older generation, though by no means exclusively, for everyone used the traditional forms of address of the nobility - *Pan* and *Pani* - to address men and women respectively - never with a surname in speech unless they intended to patronise, never with a first name unless the other person had agreed. Confusingly, such politeness also appeared to be a form of resistance, as if maintaining pre-war standards of etiquette was a way of refusing to be affected by, even to acknowledge, what had happened since. Even manners, then, were political, and, although I suspected there were other, more complex reasons for the persistence of customs which would probably have died out long before had circumstances been different, it seemed that to be conservative *was* to be radical. Maybe this kind of behaviour also belonged to the third category, withdrawal, which appeared to be the most complicated and diverse of the three, and the main purpose of which seemed to be the establishment of a kind of 'internal exile' from those aspects of Polish reality that were presumably too difficult, too wearing, to cope with on an ongoing basis. Included on my list for this one were the Church, what my students always rather endearingly insisted on referring to as 'the nature', anything foreign and

³⁷ *Czy sie stoi, czy sie lezy, sto złotych sie na lezy*: 'Whether you're standing or whether you're lying, you still get one hundred zloty'.

particularly Western - language, books, radio, music, people - and whatever was connected with Polish language, tradition, or history.

To me, the Catholic Church in Poland was simultaneously repulsive and fascinating, and I could never really decide in the end whether I thought it played a beneficial or malignant role. On the one hand, though at the time I don't think I ever heard direct censure from Poles, it seemed to deserve many of the criticisms levelled at the Catholic Church elsewhere in the world - excessive wealth, reactionary attitudes to women, dubious political involvement, anti-semitism - and yet the Church also seemed to provide a degree of practical support in the provision of medicines and social work, and was undoubtedly an enormously important source of psychological support. It was impossible to ignore the combination of extraordinary emotional intensity and, at times, almost comical everydayness involved in the major religious festivals: the spare place laid at the Christmas table for absent loved ones, for the stranger who might appear at any moment, for Christ; the firemen who stood guard, a tableau vivant, at the models of Christ's tomb in the churches at Easter; a father taking the hand of his tiny infant and making the sign of the cross, the very first stitch in a richly embroidered tradition before the child could even walk or speak; the group of boys, eight or nine years old, angelically dressed in white first communion robes, competing as to who could spit last out of the closing doors of a bus; the Communists who sent their children to confirmation classes in a neighbouring parish; people's pride that the Pope was Polish; an old woman at a makeshift shrine to Maksymilian Kolbe and Jerzy Popieluszko, chanting a life's worth of prayers learned by rote, on and on.³⁸ From the cradle to the grave, whatever its rights and wrongs, Catholicism was a golden thread of Polish experience, binding the nation together.

³⁸ Maksymilian Kolbe, a Polish priest who gave his life in exchange for someone else's at Auschwitz; cf. Davies (1986: 108), or Ascherson (1988: 105).

'The nature' seemed to inspire similar extremes and combinations of emotion, one moment sacred, the next profane. That Polish attitudes were entirely different for their British equivalent was immediately apparent from the autumn I arrived, when everyone I'd recently met seemed obsessed with dashing off to the woods to go mushroom picking. Though I found it difficult to appreciate the sublime joys of traipsing about for hours on end in a cold, damp wood searching for deliberately dissembling and potentially lethal fungi, I eventually learned to recognise that Polish feelings about the countryside were altogether less pragmatic than the brisk walks with a little didactic identification of birds and trees with which I had grown up. Attitudes to winter seemed slightly more familiar, though I was disappointed that the winters for those two years were relatively mild. Perhaps I had wanted deep snow, horses and sleigh-bells - and had I gone to a distant Polish village somewhere, I might well have found them - but instead, I had to content myself with fabulous tales of what proper winters had been like ten or twenty years ago, and with the *portierka* at reception shouting at me well-meaningly whenever I tried to leave the building without a hat. The arrival of spring was altogether a different affair, and seemed to be treated with a combination of the utmost reverence and frivolous gaiety. There was no way of ignoring the change of season, of trying to be practical about it, of pointing out that after all, it did happen every year. Spring was not only to be acknowledged, but enjoyed, indulged - and for a day or so the university would suspend classes, and graciously give in to the traditional bacchanalian revelries - knowing, as it did so, that once classes resumed, the students would be entirely incapable of concentration unless their remaining lessons were held outside, under the magnolias. Yet as soon as we had recovered from the arrival of spring, the most exhausting season of the year, there was talk among the students of their annual holiday pilgrimage to the mountains, the lakes, the sea. It all seemed to have little to do with the private, aristocratic, English rural idyll, and much more to do with a collective, conscious awareness of Polish Romanticism - the idea of which seemed genuinely popular - and perhaps with the fact

that many people's peasant roots were only a generation or two away.³⁹ Poland, no-one was ever shy of telling you, had everything in terms of landscape that anyone could possibly want, yet there was always a sense that this enthusiasm involved some sort of compensation for all the places outside Poland that ordinary people couldn't get to. Some people did travel abroad, on official business, to relatives, to the black labour market, in organised *wycieczki* to Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, or in their tiny Fiat cars, packed to the hinges with tinned fish and dried sausage, to save on food bills when they got there. But leaving the country was nevertheless difficult: passports had to be obtained each time you wanted to go abroad - a process which often took months; you had to get a visa, which had been virtually impossible during Martial Law and was still very difficult; and there was the sheer, prohibitive cost involved in buying a ticket and having enough money to survive on once you got there.

Most people, then, had little direct experience of anywhere outside Poland, and this, combined with the relative scarcity of other forms of external influence, whilst by no means as extreme as in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe, meant that things foreign, and particularly Western, held a special fascination. For some Poles at least, whether in the form of languages, books, radio, music, or people, foreign-ness seemed to serve as a means of forgetting some of the less palatable aspects of their personal or national reality, and as a way of keeping in touch with a European heritage from which they felt they had been rudely annexed by the treacheries of geography and history. If they could, people would buy foreign books and newspapers, though they were inevitably out-of-date and expensive. But it was foreign radio stations - Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, the BBC World Service - which often provided the main source of commentary on political events

³⁹ According to Davies (1986: 118 - 119), during the Second Republic (1918 - 1939), almost seventy-five percent of the population were agricultural labourers or peasants living in the countryside.

both outside and inside Poland, while for the younger generation, foreign radio stations were also a source of pop music which, in an industrial sense, didn't seem to exist in Poland in its own right.

As well as foreign languages, books, media and music, foreigners themselves were often also a source of fascination, though with notable exceptions: Germans and Russians were usually disliked or distrusted on principle for obvious historical reasons; there was suspicion of Czechs; and there was usually the most basic of racist reactions to Arab or Black students, and to Jews. Given half a chance, my students would tell me how their (rare) Black counterparts lived in mud huts or trees when they went home, and how they hated Arab students because they used their money to 'corrupt' and 'steal' Polish girls. And if some of my students and one or two of my colleagues told me that, as for the Jews, well, they'd made a terrible fuss about the Holocaust and appropriated it for their own ends - it was, after all, a Polish tragedy - then that was mild compared with what I might have heard from villagers in the remoter parts of Poland, who apparently still held that it was the Jews who had killed Christ, and that was good enough for them. Most other 'foreigners' (Polish Jews, it seemed, were seldom thought of as Polish) and particularly Westerners, usually received a friendly enough reception, and aroused a good deal of interest. There were traditional ties with Hungary - *Wegier, Polak, dwa bratanki, Tak do szabli, jak do szklanki*, went the saying.⁴⁰ There were historical connections with France, not least because of the Napoleonic Wars and the fact that, particularly between the November and January Uprisings of 1830 - 31 and 1863 - 64, the Polish exile community had largely operated out of the Hotel Lambert in Paris.⁴¹ There was also a good deal of respect for Britain, or England, as it was inevitably called: the Government in Exile had eventually settled in London, and of course, Britain

⁴⁰ 'The Pole and the Magyar like brothers stand, Whether with sword or with tankard in hand'; cf. Davies (1981: vol. 1: 114).

⁴¹ Davies (1981: vol. 1: 276, 287).

had come to Poland's aid during the Second World War. But if Britain was still undoubtedly considered an honourable ally, then I was gently but frequently reminded of Chamberlain's infamously broken Guarantee, which had meant that for several weeks in September 1939, Poland had had to fight alone.⁴² So actual did these events seem to some of the Poles I knew that I often had to remind myself that I was not, in fact, personally responsible for what Britain had or had not done during the Second World War. Perhaps, though, it was part of a more generalised inferiority/superiority complex that many people seemed to have in relation to Western foreigners. On the one hand, the West was a beacon of civilisation (except, of course, for America), a haven of political stability, had a higher standard of living; on the other, Poles were so much more cultured and better educated, Poland had defended an ungrateful Europe time and again against the infidel, Poland was the Christ of nations whose suffering would eventually bring redemption for all.⁴³

Much to my surprise, with one or two notable exceptions, I found myself getting on much better with Polish men than with Polish women, who on the whole I could never quite work out. At that stage, I had little inclination to learn, let alone conform to, what seemed to be considered appropriate feminine behaviour - though when I left, I found myself lengthening a stride I had shortened quite unconsciously. I disliked the expectation, at friends' name-day parties,⁴⁴ that I would join the other *dziewczyny* making sandwiches in the kitchen, and preferred to talk politics with the boys. But it was surprisingly difficult to be the only one in leggings and sweatshirt rather than frothy party-frock and make-up, and the idea that women might not want to stay at home with the children, or to have their coats held and their hands kissed, or to be toasted as

⁴² Cf. Davies (1986: 65 and 1981: vol. 2: 431).

⁴³ On Polish Messianism, cf. Ascherson (1988: 6 - 7, 27).

⁴⁴ In Poland, the day accorded to the saint after whom one is named is celebrated in addition to one's birthday.

the beautiful ladies, was met with genuine puzzlement and the straightforward question - but why on earth not ? Polish women had had to survive, had been forced out to work by the Communists, these were signs of respect - how very odd English women must be. Those of my male friends whom I knew well enough I teased relentlessly on these issues. Any attempt by Michal to hold a door open for me would result in a decidedly inelegant race to get to the next door first, so that I could open it for him. And when, with immaculate good manners, Piotr would kiss my hand and present me with flowers (always without the paper, always an odd number, much to the *portierka's* evident approval) I would accept them graciously, bow, click my heels, and kiss his hand back. *Nie, nie Elzbieto !* he would say disapprovingly, before we both collapsed into giggles. One close female friend did her best to instil into me some of the basics of Polish femininity: we must, she sighed, firmly sitting me down one day, do something. I was not to whistle in the corridor, which was unladylike, not to wear trousers and jumpers, but dresses or at least skirts, I should certainly put my hair up - and then, with a little less patience - could I not, for heaven's sake, make a bit of an effort ? When I had done my best with a motley collection of Polish hair-grips, however, it rapidly transpired that I could not, and eventually, much to my relief, I was clearly given up as a lost cause. Polish femininity, it seemed to me, required rather more than a bit of an effort, and besides, most of the Polish women I knew appeared to be insufficiently assertive, domestically overburdened, generally hostile martyrs. Confusingly, though, they also seemed to be professors, doctors, engineers, and lawyers, without being thought in the least bit unfeminine, and from what I could tell, considered themselves as altogether more competent than their menfolk. They deserved the respect of Polish men, and anyone who didn't show it was a *Cham*.⁴⁵ After all, the women's contemptuous looks seemed to ask, who was it who had effectively kept the country going during those periods of Polish history when the men had been off fighting in some hopeless campaign or other ?

⁴⁵ After the biblical character, Ham.

Who was it who got on with the practicalities of life while they sat around drinking and dreaming up impossible plans ? So in the end, I wasn't at all sure what to make of Polish women, and it was difficult to know what they made of me: as is always the case when you're part of the equation, it was a difficult issue to judge.

The final, and perhaps most strategic, of Polish withdrawal tactics appeared to be a retreat into language, literature, tradition, and the past - a defensive position from which people could fight under even the most oppressive of circumstances. Polish was a notoriously complicated language and, Poles would proudly tell you, had been judged one of the most difficult in the world - quite as if that made them exceptionally talented to have learned to speak it. It was certainly hard to learn for a foreigner, and made all the more so by the dearth of decent teaching materials. The situation was not helped by the fact that you could never tell which of two basic reactions your faltering Polish would elicit in public. A hesitant attempt at asking directions might be met with an emotional embrace in celebration of the fact that you were learning the language at all, or a look of blank incomprehension from someone who had perhaps never heard their language being spoken by a foreigner before. Given what the Father of Polish literature, Mikolaj Rej, had said, if you mispronounced something or got a case ending wrong, you might indeed be considered as stupid as a goose.⁴⁶ But there was more to it than that. During the one hundred and twenty three years that Poland had been partitioned, Polish literature, the Polish language, had kept the very culture alive: for the Polish intelligentsia in particular, all those historical novels, all that Romantic poetry, constituted an essential component of Polish identity, and grammatical correctness was almost a point of national honour.

⁴⁶ Mikolaj Rej (1505 - 69) is attributed with the saying *Polacy nie sa gesi, maja swoi jezyk* - 'The Poles aren't geese, they have their own tongue'. Cf. Davies (1986: 296 and 328).

When it came to tradition, I found it hardest to understand the relationships between collectivity and individualism, pragmatism and impracticality, sheer joie de vivre and complete dejection. Issued with an external threat, everyone seemed to be able to pull together, and class distinctions and personal differences were quickly forgotten. Yet if it came to organising anything in any other circumstances, divisions quickly appeared, everything fragmented, and everyone seemed to go their own sweet way. At times, people could be down-to-earth, at others, completely whimsical. One minute there was wild optimism, the next, profound melancholy. Ah, everyone said, history, history. Hadn't each member of the (extensive) Polish nobility possessed the personal right to veto the passing of any law ? Hadn't there always been respect for the individual ? Wasn't there a long tradition of insurrection, when Poles had fought together and sat plotting long into the night, even if most of the time it had all come to nothing ? Hadn't they always lived for the moment, and sacrificed their lives for *Honor, Bog, Ojczyzna* ?⁴⁷ Yet when I had first arrived and gone to fill in forms at the Dean's office, when I had said in my faltering Polish that, rather than an electronics engineer, my father was an electrician, then whatever the role of a certain electrician in recent Polish history, my colleague had looked oddly appalled. Nobody talked about the fact that the nobles had misused the *liberum veto*, and ended up plunging the country into anarchy. And when people started discussing politics, and inevitably ended up arguing and offended, didn't someone always smooth things over with the joke - two Poles, three political opinions ? And didn't the pictures of Matejko, one of Poland's most famous painters, include not only a portrayal of the declaration of the Constitution of the 3rd of May in 1791, when, in defiance of the Partitioning Powers, the *Sejm* had announced a comprehensive, liberal constitution,⁴⁸ but also a portrait of Stanczyk, the Royal Jester, contemplating the defeat by

⁴⁷ 'Honour, God, Fatherland'.

⁴⁸ Davies (1986: 310).

the Muscovites at Smolensk in 1513, and foreseeing all the subsequent tragedies to come ? ⁴⁹

But if all that was hard to understand, then harder still was that very obsession with the past, the way in which time seemed to get concertina'd - leapfrogging either from golden age to golden age, or from tragedy to tragedy, quite as if whole periods of history hadn't happened in between. The way in which, when the economy was falling apart and the whole constitution needed rewriting, the new Solidarity Parliament spent week after week debating whether the national symbol, the Polish Eagle, should or should not have its crown restored. The way in which people would tell you that Poland was such a tolerant country, because after all, there was a long tradition of the population being multi-ethnic - see how forms still asked you for your ethnicity as well as your nationality ? - and of course, a law had long ago been passed granting religious freedom. Yes, you wanted to say. In the sixteenth century. ⁵⁰ Hadn't a few other things happened since ? The way Katyn was a running sore in the nation's history, and festered each time it was attended to, a traumatic event which skewed and syncopated the trajectories of narrative both back into the past and forward into the future. ⁵¹ The way Walesa was said to model himself on Pilsudski. The way the crane driver pulling down the statue of Dzierzynski in the square named after him in Warsaw had put the rope round the statue's neck like a noose. ⁵² The way, once Solidarity came to power, the names of streets changed back to their pre-Communist equivalents overnight, so that *Plac Dzierzynskiego* once again

⁴⁹ Micke-Broniarek (1993: 69); cf. also Davies (1986: 294).

⁵⁰ Cf. Zamoyski (1987 : 90).

⁵¹ The bodies of Polish officers who had had their hands tied and been shot in the back of the head were found in mass graves in 1943 in the village of Katyn, in the district of Smolensk. Katyn was on Soviet territory, but from 1941 was under Nazi occupation; most Poles, however, consider the murders to have been the responsibility of the Russians. Cf. Ascherson (1988: 120). For details of Lacan's concept of retroactive temporality, see Bowie (1991: 180).

⁵² Feliks Dzierzynski, a Pole, became the first leader of Lenin's political police, the Cheka; cf. Ascherson (1988: 52).

became *Plac Bankowy*, and trams' destination boards said they were running to places that no longer - or didn't yet ? - exist on the map. The way that in Poland, time and history, in those days, often seemed to have a logic all of their own, which had very little to do with linear chronology.

Most peculiar of all, perhaps, was the Royal Castle in Warsaw, which had been deliberately destroyed by the Nazis in the Second World War, and reconstructed brick by brick in the 1970s and 80s to look, so it was thought, exactly as it had in 1795, the date of Poland's disappearance from the map. There were those pictures in the Canaletto Room which had been painted during the reign of Stanislaw August using camera obscura, the precision and historical accuracy of which had rendered them indispensable for the reconstruction of the Old Town and of the Castle itself. And there was the most compelling of all, yet more tautological, showing a view of the Castle from the Praga Bank of the River Vistula and, in the bottom left-hand corner, Canaletto sitting with his back to the viewer, talking to the King, and painting exactly the same scene in miniature.⁵³ There was, of course, no sign of the camera obscura through which Canaletto would really have viewed the entire scene, and only a deftly cast shadow over the bottom left-hand corner of the tiny painting prevented the scene's infinite repetition. Though I had no idea why, I found both context and painting utterly haunting, as I did the fact that some people discussed the Royal Castle as if it had been there all along, as if the intervening tragedies of Polish history had somehow been completely eclipsed. It wasn't simply that the past cast a shadow over the present momentarily, every so often, but that the present also seemed to influence the past, with the two overlapping each other so thoroughly that it was as if history was in orbit, and came round to the same point time and time again. Perhaps Copernicus had been right after all.

⁵³ *Widok Ogolny Warszawy od Strony Pragi* 'General View of Warsaw from the Praga Bank', 1770, Bernardo Bellotto, cousin of Canaletto, and known in Poland by this name.

So what was it like to *be* there during the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, the last year of Communism and the first year of the Solidarity Government ? How did it feel to live through those momentous political events ? Yes, I remember hearing Kuron and Michnik speaking at the university, and the Round Table talks between the Communists and Solidarity. ⁵⁴ History in the making. Being woken up at five a.m. by someone setting up polling booths in the room next to my flat for the first semi-free elections, the peculiar calm once the results were finally announced, going round afterwards and asking in the shops for the Solidarity posters. ⁵⁵ History in the. Inflation running at one thousand percent, the comical indecision of the then still President Jaruzelski over his last minute announcement that, in addition to May 1st being a national holiday, as it always had been under the Communists, May 3rd, Constitution Day, would be one too. Everything having to be seen within a much larger context, a much longer time-span. History.

. It had been three years later, when I was working abroad in another country and had come back for a friend's wedding, that I'd got the news about John. He'd gone back to the Foreign Office, starting drinking again, had been found dead yesterday morning, had committed suicide. Something odd happened to time and space then. They were still there, for a start, which seemed peculiar really, because you'd have thought that they ought to have stopped. But no, they carried on. Only they didn't go in straight lines any more. There would have to be a post mortem, an inquest, nobody knew when the funeral would be. Two days later, I'd had to get back on a plane. It was only then that I finally understood why people are so attached to their land: the people they love are buried in it. For the

⁵⁴ Both key figures in Polish underground opposition politics since the 1970s; cf. Ascherson (1988: 186 - 189 and passim.) and Garton Ash (1999a) in particular; on the Round Table talks, cf. Garton Ash (1999b: 25 - 46).

⁵⁵ On the elections, cf. Garton Ash (1999b: 25 - 46).

rest of that summer, maybe that year, time would play tricks: sometimes it would go forwards, pretending to be normal, then suddenly it might concertina, take you back to the day it happened, to years ago, to the middle of nowhere. I couldn't face the funeral, didn't want to be alive, went to the memorial service. Even then, I still thought I might bump into him at stations, at airports. It was years before I realised in my dreams that he was dead. Odd how time, how grief, does that to you, when somebody you love dies.

History. So what is history, anyway ? Ah, we say, history is ideology, history is over, nobody believes in history any more. Same with national identity - all reconstructed retrospectively you know, pure nonsense really. And in one sense, of course, I would agree, but only in one sense. You'd have thought, wouldn't you, that a nation which had had its history rewritten, erased, rewritten again, would have given up on history, would have acknowledged, more so than any other, that there was no such thing as historical truth, only a variety of interpretations, that an accurate record of events was impossible. And if people were creatures of intellect alone, you'd be right - but then, things don't quite work like that, do they ? Intellectual accuracy (if that indeed is what it is) is not the same as emotional veracity: one cannot be substituted for the other, they do not amount to the same thing. Does it matter whose version of events gets recorded ? Is one historical account ethically more acceptable than another ? Try telling people who feel they've had others' interpretations of their history, their identity, forced down their throats that it's all relative, that every account is a falsification, that they're all much of a muchness. If your history was full of falsehoods, mysterious gaps, papered over cracks, silenced fissures, I suppose you'd want to know the truth, to tell it the way it was, wouldn't you ? Oh of course, you'd realise the impossibility, the futility of the task, but you'd also recognise that people, you included, need believable stories, working metaphors; that a sense of continuity with history, however fictional, helps us all carry on. That it is only when you feel relatively at ease with the past, when you can narrate it at least half convincingly, from beginning to end

without too many breaks, that it begins to take on a more balanced significance in the present - the future, even. And if that's the case with national history, national identity, then isn't it the same with personal history, individual identity? Would you share my dilemma that, in spite of being intrigued by all those theories of fractured subjectivity, the impossibility of a unified self, the multiple pleasures of post-modern identity, we do still have to get up in the morning? That it's easy enough to say that all histories, identities, narratives are constructs, until you have to apply that to yourself - because they may all be constructs, but they're emotionally necessary ones. Yes, but if we want to explore those ideas any more than superficially, we cannot stop at the borders of the self.

Chapter Two

*Among the authorities it is generally agreed that the Earth is at rest in the middle of the universe, and they regard it as inconceivable and even ridiculous to hold the opposite opinion. However, if we consider it more closely the question will be seen to be still unsettled, and decidedly not to be despised. For every apparent change in respect of position is due to motion of the object observed, or of the observer, or indeed to an unequal change of both.*¹

Recent debates in ethnography concerning interrogation of the temporal and historical assumptions of ethnographic texts, analysis of their rhetoric, and the foregrounding of autobiographical material have led to a questioning of naturalist, realist practices, and to the development of more constructivist, modernist and post-modernist perspectives. This chapter aims to take the debate a stage further, arguing that post-modern ethnography should analyse not only ethnographic texts, but also the ethnographer as text, involving the ethnographer in rigorous reflection on his or her own autobiographical narratives and cultural locations through the use of psychoanalytic experience, in order to provide the reader with a sense of the lens through which the culture under consideration has been interpreted and reconstructed. The chapter will contextualise such an approach within the wider history of ethnography by considering how various schools have tackled the subject/object split at the heart of the discipline, and by suggesting that post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography belongs to, but also begins to go beyond, this particular trajectory. By so doing, the chapter will also implicitly provide justification for the techniques adopted in the first and third chapters of this thesis. As is often the case with developments in ethnographic theory, the argument arises from retrospective reflection on doubts experienced during fieldwork;² at the same time, however, as I shall be arguing in the conclusion to

¹ Copernicus trans. Duncan (1976 [1543]: 40).

² See Chapter Three of this thesis.

this thesis, my argument can be seen as part of the much wider epistemological revolution predicted by Foucault.³

The debates in ethnography over the last twenty years or so can be characterised as anthropology's manifestation of the contemporary crisis in representation, while some critics have seen those of the last forty as being symptomatic of a much more general crisis in modern knowledge.⁴ These crises, and the debates they have engendered, are related to the collapse of key concepts dominant since the end of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the Modern era, the most central of which is that of a rigid distinction between subject and object. Indeed, for some, this distinction is fundamental to the very existence of anthropology, and the disciplinary divisions it produced a key to understanding many of its practices and problems. Rabinow suggests that it was only with the modern subject/object split that 'a knowing subject endowed with consciousness and its representational contents became the central problem for thought',⁵ while Clifford argues that this new figure of "'Man'" became the '*telos* for...[the] whole discipline'.⁶ Both go on to argue that the subject/object separation was accompanied by a division of knowledge into distinct disciplines: with the work of Kant, a 'fully elaborated conception of philosophy as the judge of all possible knowledge appeared', such that a "'demarcation of philosophy from science was made possible";⁷ with the separation of 'subjectivity (in the name of objectivity)', 'rhetoric (in the name of "plain", transparent signification)' and 'fiction (in the name of fact)', the 'qualities eliminated from science were localized in the category of

³ Foucault (1970 [1966]).

⁴ Marcus and Fischer (1986: vii), and Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 1 - 26 passim).

⁵ Rabinow in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 235).

⁶ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 4).

⁷ Rabinow in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 235).

"literature".⁸ Anthropology, then, can be seen as emerging at about the same time as some of the key disciplinary divisions with which we still work today, and can in certain respects be viewed as straddling them rather uncomfortably.

If it can be argued that the subject/object split effectively produced anthropology as a cross-disciplinary area of study, then one way of viewing the development of its various schools is as so many attempts to come to terms with the questions that this split presents: what is the relationship between the ethnographer and the culture under consideration? how is this relationship to be represented? and what is the articulation in more general terms between any individual and his/her culture? The aim of the first part of this chapter will be to consider these questions in relation to three key periods in the history of anthropology: the initial phase of the discipline, from its beginnings until the early part of the twentieth century; the functionalist and historicist era, from the 1920s until approximately the 1950s; and the structuralist, materialist and interpretive period of the 1960s and 1970s along with the crisis in representation of the 1980s and 90s. Given the constraints of space, no attempt will be made to answer all of the above questions in relation to every period; rather, each period will be considered in terms of its most relevant characteristics. The second part of the chapter will then focus on the kind of post-modern, psychoanalytic approach to ethnography that I want to advocate, and will suggest why it is, in certain respects, simply a further playing out of the tensions inherent in the subject/object split.

Part One

The most interesting aspect of early anthropology in the context of this chapter is the relationship between the ethnographer and culture suggested by its conception of temporality. Although

⁸ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 5).

some historians of the discipline propose a later date, Fabian argues convincingly that early ethnography failed to adopt the radical temporality of the mid-nineteenth century and instead reverted to a late-eighteenth century understanding of time, denying the co-temporality of researcher and researched, to create a distanced and hierarchical relationship between the ethnographer and those belonging to the culture under consideration.⁹ Rather than embracing Lyell and Darwin's new conception of temporality as merely 'a way to order an essentially discontinuous and fragmentary geological and paleontological record', Fabian proposes, early anthropologists carried on viewing time as 'the vehicle of a continuous and meaningful story', and became preoccupied with seeing other cultures as representing the 'stages leading to civilization'.¹⁰ In so doing, he suggests, they 'accomplished a major feat of scientific conservatism', 'saving an older paradigm from... "the irruptive violence of time"' by returning 'to Linnaeus and eighteenth-century natural history'.¹¹ To put it another way, 'they *spatialized* Time'.¹²

Fabian's explanation of the relationship between this older temporal paradigm, the discipline of natural history, and the development of anthropology is somewhat complex, but his basic argument is that late-eighteenth century time was the result of the secularisation and universalisation of its predecessor, Judeo-Christian time,¹³ and was connected to a reconceptualisation of the Other, to the development of the idea of 'travel as science',¹⁴ and to visualism. Fabian argues that Judeo-Christian time presupposed 'contemporaneity', assuming relationships between, for example,

⁹ Cf. Moore (1997), Kuper (1996) and Fabian (1983).

¹⁰ Fabian (1983: 14 - 15).

¹¹ Fabian (1983: 16).

¹² Fabian (1983: 15).

¹³ Fabian (1983: 2).

¹⁴ Fabian (1983: 6), italics removed.

'the living and the dead, or...the agent and object of magic operations',¹⁵ in such a way that it can be portrayed in terms of 'concentric circles of proximity to a center in real space and mythical Time, symbolized by the cities of Jerusalem and Rome'.¹⁶ Enlightenment time, in contrast, was based 'on the rejection of ideas of temporal coexistence',¹⁷ and can be represented 'as a system of co-ordinates (emanating...from a real center - the Western metropolis) in which given societies of all times and places may be plotted in terms of relative distance from the present'.¹⁸ The shift from sacred to Enlightenment time was accompanied by a change in attitudes towards the Other, Fabian proposes, because, whereas pre-modern, cyclical time saw the pagan as '*already* marked for salvation', taxonomic time saw the savage as '*not yet* ready for civilization'.¹⁹ This in turn resulted in a different way of perceiving the very purpose of travel, because, whereas religious travel 'had been *to* the centers of religion, or *to* the souls to be saved', secular travel was '*from* the centers of learning and power to places where man [sic] was to find nothing but himself'.²⁰ The 'idea and practice of *travel as science*', Fabian concludes, 'was definitively established toward the end of the eighteenth century',²¹ and was subsumed 'under the reigning paradigm of natural history',²² while the traveller as scientist, 'sailing to the ends of the earth', was seen as 'travelling in time...[and]... exploring the past'.²³ Visualism, meanwhile - the tendency to equate 'the ability to "visualize" a

¹⁵ Fabian (1983: 34).

¹⁶ Fabian (1983: 26).

¹⁷ Fabian (1983: 34).

¹⁸ Fabian (1983: 26).

¹⁹ Fabian (1983: 26), Fabian's emphasis.

²⁰ Fabian (1983: 6), Fabian's emphasis.

²¹ Fabian (1983: 6), Fabian's emphasis.

²² Fabian (1983: 8).

²³ Fabian (1983: 7).

culture or society' with 'understanding it' - was associated with natural history's 'ethos of detached observation and...fervor to make visible the hidden relations between things'.²⁴

What is interesting about this argument, then, is that Fabian traces the temporality of ethnography to the same period as the subject/object split associated with anthropology by Rabinow and Clifford. The connections that he makes between Enlightenment time as a rejection of the co-temporality of its pre-modern counterpart, temporal and spatial distancing of the Other, the paradigm of natural history, visualism, and the emergence of anthropology, then, do not occur by chance: it can be argued that they are the direct result of this particular epistemological moment.

If early anthropology is interesting because of the relationship between the ethnographer and culture implied by its attitudes towards temporality, then the functionalist and historicist era is relevant because of the relationship between the ethnographer and culture implied by the development of fieldwork, because of the representation of that relationship achieved by its adoption of specific textual strategies, and because of its theories about the articulation in more general terms of the individual and his/her culture.

In many respects, the development of fieldwork served only to exacerbate the Modern era's rigid subject/object dichotomy through its intensification of visualism and through its change in attitude towards the perceived function of anthropology. Clifford points out that:

The predominant metaphors in anthropological research...participant observation, data collection, and cultural description, all...presuppose a standpoint outside -

²⁴ Fabian (1983: 106 and 87).

looking at, objectifying, or, somewhat closer, 'reading', a given reality. ²⁵

Kuper argues that Malinowski's tripartite system of data collection and analysis - which of course subsequently became a cornerstone of the discipline - reflected 'a perception of a systematic divergence between what people say about what they do, what they actually do, and what they think'; ²⁶ because the ethnographer as scientist was exempted, this approach conferred on the Other:

...a discrete identity, while also providing the knowing observer with a standpoint from which to see without being seen, to read without interruption. ²⁷

When it came to the function of anthropology, participant observation and the professionalisation of the discipline effectively meant a move away from the development of overt, overarching theories, towards a systematic description of cultural diversity. ²⁸ According to Marcus and Fischer, the new aim of anthropology in the functionalist and historicist era was (and for some still is) 'to represent a particular way of life as fully as possible'. ²⁹ As Clifford points out, however, the fact that holistic description required the ethnographer's presence in the field, while scientific objectivity required the same ethnographer's self-effacement in the text, resulted in an inherent disciplinary contradiction:

...the 'method' of participant-observation...enacted a delicate balance of subjectivity and objectivity. The ethnographer's personal experiences, especially those of

²⁵ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 11).

²⁶ Kuper (1996: 15).

²⁷ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 12).

²⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 19).

²⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 22).

participation and empathy, are recognized as central to the research process, but they are firmly restrained by the impersonal standards of observation and 'objective' distance.³⁰

The development of fieldwork as a central practice of ethnography also complicated the temporal attitudes of early anthropology by uniting what were previously conceptualised as the two distinct time frames of fieldwork and writing up, again suggesting a particular sort of relationship between the ethnographer and the culture being analysed. Marcus and Fischer argue that Malinowski's approach brought together in 'an integrated professional practice the previously separate processes of collecting data...done primarily by amateur scholars or others on the scene, and the armchair theorizing and analysis, done by the academic anthropologist'.³¹ It was the uniting of the processes of 'field research and the communication of findings in writing and teaching...in the same person',³² Fabian suggests, that led to a 'remarkable divergence' in the mind of the individual anthropologist,³³ an 'aporetic split', and a 'schizogenic use of Time'.³⁴ The problem was exacerbated, he argues, by anthropology's construction as a specifically scientific discipline, which meant that the coevalness of the field (in other words, the 'common... "occupation," or sharing, of time' by both researcher and researched),³⁵ had to be further denied in the production of a supposedly objective discourse.³⁶

³⁰ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 13).

³¹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 18).

³² Fabian (1983: 72).

³³ Fabian (1983: 21).

³⁴ Fabian (1983: 35).

³⁵ Fabian (1983: 31).

³⁶ Fabian (1983: 33).

If the introduction of fieldwork and development of ethnography as a 'scientific' practice meant that its claims to authority were based on a fundamental epistemological and temporal contradiction, then for the contributors to *Writing Culture*, these tensions are betrayed in the very textuality of ethnographies of the era.

For some, it is the broad generic conventions of ethnographic texts, and particularly of functionalist texts, which are most interesting. Tyler suggests that the 'urge to conform to the canons of scientific rhetoric...made the easy realism of natural history the dominant mode of ethnographic prose' during this era,³⁷ while Fischer suggests that realism played a crucial role in facilitating the ethnographer's apparent removal from the text.³⁸ For Pratt, ethnographers of the period used a variety of strategies to reconcile the need for authority based on subjective experience with the need for authority based on 'objective' representation. Whereas Malinowski and Firth dealt with the problem by excluding '[p]urportedly irrelevant personal or historical circumstances', whilst nevertheless merging the personal with the scientific,³⁹ practitioners such as Evans Pritchard and Maybury Lewis tackled it by uncomfortably attempting to keep the scientific and the personal rigorously apart. 'What Malinowski and Firth...seem to be after', Pratt argues, is:

...a kind of *summa*, a highly textured, totalizing picture anchored in themselves, where 'self' is understood not as a monolithic scientist-observer, but as a multifaceted entity who participates, observes, and writes from multiple, constantly shifting positions.⁴⁰

³⁷ Tyler in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 130).

³⁸ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 232).

³⁹ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 7).

⁴⁰ Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 39), Pratt's italics.

In contrast, the ethnographer in Evans-Pritchard and Maybury-Lewis comes across as straightforwardly 'frustrated and depressed': 41

The scientific ideal seems to press on them acutely, calling for codified field methodology, professional detachment, a systematic write-up...As methodology gets increasingly codified, the clash between 'objective and subjective practices' becomes increasingly acute. 42

In most ethnographies, Pratt argues, narrative is used to establish personal authority in the opening few pages, but is rapidly replaced by analytical description in order to convey scientific rigour. Although ethnographic writing 'as a rule subordinates narrative to description', 43 however, personal narratives 'play the crucial role of anchoring that description in the intense and authority-giving personal experience of fieldwork...[and]...often turn out to be the most memorable segments of an ethnographic work'. 44 For Pratt in particular then, there is a clear link between generic conventions and ethnographic epistemology:

...personal narrative persists alongside objectifying description in ethnographic writing because it mediates a contradiction within the discipline between personal and scientific authority, a contradiction that has become especially acute since the advent of fieldwork as a methodological norm. 45

41 Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 39).

42 Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 41).

43 Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 35).

44 Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 32).

45 Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 32).

The epistemological complexities of fieldwork are also seen by the contributors to *Writing Culture* as being manifested in allegorical structures. Arguing that ethnographic texts are 'inescapably allegorical',⁴⁶ Clifford suggests that one of the things that makes them 'realistic', 'convincing' and 'rich' is the fact that their 'extended metaphors, [and] patterns of associations...point to coherent (theoretical, esthetic, moral) additional meanings'.⁴⁷ One of the most deeply ingrained and pervasive ethnographic allegories, he argues, is that of salvage,⁴⁸ an allegory which can be 'located within a long Western tradition of pastoral' usefully analysed by Raymond Williams.⁴⁹ Clifford sees Williams as tracing in this allegory 'the constant reemergence of a conventionalized pattern of retrospection that laments the loss of a "good" country, a place where authentic social and natural contacts were once possible';⁵⁰ but he soon notes 'an unsettling regression':

For each time one finds a writer looking back to a happier place, to a lost, "organic" moment, one finds another writer of that earlier period lamenting a similar, previous disappearance. The ultimate reference is, of course, Eden.⁵¹

Clifford goes on to suggest that the self associated with this pastoral/salvage allegory is a subject who has 'internalized loss' and who is thus 'in search of wholeness', which 'by definition becomes a thing of the past (rural; primitive, childlike) accessible only as a fiction, grasped from a stance of incomplete involvement'.⁵² He also argues that, just as the realist fiction of George Eliot describes

⁴⁶ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 99).

⁴⁷ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 100), Clifford's emphasis.

⁴⁸ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 113).

⁴⁹ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 113).

⁵⁰ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 113).

⁵¹ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 113).

⁵² Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 114).

'whole cultures (knowable worlds) from a specific temporal distance and with a presumption of their transience', salvaging '[h]istorical worlds...as textual fabrications disconnected from ongoing lived milieux', so '*ethnographic pastoral*' generalises this textualizing structure 'beyond the dissociations of nineteenth-century England to a wider capitalist topography of Western/non-Western, city/ country oppositions'.⁵³ For Clifford, what is most problematic about this practice is that it relentlessly places others 'in a present-becoming-past'.⁵⁴ Yet ethnographic allegory is not simply an allegory of 'cultural loss': because ethnography 'embalms the event', the 'making of texts from events and dialogues' becomes in itself 'a kind of death in life'.⁵⁵ This relationship between 'loss' and 'restoration' is usefully summarised by Marcus in the following terms:

The two most common modes for self-consciously fixing ethnography in historic time are...the salvage mode and the redemptive mode. In the salvage mode, the ethnographer portrays himself [sic] as 'before the deluge', so to speak. Signs of fundamental change are apparent, but the ethnographer is able to salvage a cultural state on the verge of transformation...In the redemptive mode, the ethnographer demonstrates the survival of distinctive and authentic cultural systems despite undeniable changes. The redemption of cultural authenticity is often undertaken and measured against some imputed pre-modern or pre-capitalist state - the 'golden age' motif - or else a spatial, rather than temporal, preserve is found for cultural authenticity amidst transformation - the anthropologist's odyssey up-river or to the back country to situate fieldwork where 'they still do it'.⁵⁶

⁵³ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 114), Clifford's emphasis.

⁵⁴ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 115).

⁵⁵ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 115 - 116).

⁵⁶ Marcus in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 165), footnote 1.

Clifford himself concludes, then, that ethnography is essentially a structure of 'textual rescue': ⁵⁷

Modern allegory, Walter Benjamin...tells us, is based on a sense of the world as transient and fragmentary. 'History' is grasped as a process, not of inventive life, but of 'irresistible decay.' The material analogue of allegory is thus the 'ruin'...an always disappearing structure that invites imaginative reconstruction. ⁵⁸

The generic and allegorical conventions of traditional ethnographies outlined above are themselves constituted for the *Writing Culture* critics by a wide range of specific rhetorical and stylistic techniques, the most important of which for the purposes of this argument being denial of the use of rhetoric and adoption of a relatively plain prose style, the presentation of a supposedly totalistic reading, and the merging of events and subjectivities.

With regard to rhetoric and style, Crapanzano argues that one of the problems faced by the ethnographer is that '[h]e [sic] must make his message convincing' whilst nevertheless pretending that '[h]e...has no cunning and no tricks': ⁵⁹ the ethnographer, then, must not draw attention to rhetorical or stylistic devices. A supposedly totalistic reading is meanwhile conveyed through the portrayal of the ethnographer's 'presence at the events described, his [sic] perceptual ability, his "disinterested" perspective, his objectivity, and his sincerity', ⁶⁰ but, Crapanzano asserts:

⁵⁷ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 115).

⁵⁸ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 119).

⁵⁹ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 52), italics removed.

⁶⁰ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 53).

His 'disinterest', his objectivity, his neutrality are in fact undercut by his self-interest - his need to constitute his authority, to establish a bond with his readers, or, more accurately, his interlocutors, and to create an appropriate distance between himself and the 'foreign' events he witnesses.⁶¹

One of the main ways in which this is achieved is via the amalgamation of events and the merging of subjectivities.

The amalgamation of events is relatively straightforward: we are not offered an account of what the ethnographer actually experienced; rather, 'many observations, taken from many vantage points, are conflated into a single, constructed performance, which becomes a sort of ideal, a Platonic performance'.⁶² The merging of subjectivities occurs via the more complex processes of pronoun switching and temporalization.

With regard to pronoun switching, Crapanzano argues that a 'switch from... "I"... to "you"' anticipates the ethnographer's disappearance in subsequent sections, serves as 'an appeal to the reader to empathize', and decentres the ethnographer as narrator 'in the space of intersubjective understanding'.⁶³ The effect of such switching in Geertz's 'Deep Play', for example, is that 'there is a continual blurring of Geertz's understanding and the understanding of the Balinese as he describes them'.⁶⁴ Despite Geertz's 'phenomenological-hermeneutical pretensions', then, Crapanzano argues, 'there is in fact...no understanding of the native from the native's point of view':

⁶¹ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 53).

⁶² Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 75). Although Crapanzano is discussing a text written later than the period under consideration here, the technique is nevertheless common in functionalist and historicist texts.

⁶³ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 71).

⁶⁴ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 72).

There is only the constructed understanding of the constructed native's constructed point of view. Geertz offers no specifiable evidence for his attributions of intention, his assertions of subjectivity, his declarations of experience. His constructions of constructions of constructions appear to be little more than projections, or at least blurrings, of his point of view, his subjectivity, with that of the native, or, more accurately, of the constructed native. ⁶⁵

Geertz's own statement about this relationship, Crapanzano concludes, is highly pertinent:

...as if to give his, or any anthropologist's, constructions a certain, if you will, substantialized authority, Geertz refers in 'Deep Play' to culture 'as an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulder of those to whom they properly belong'...The image is striking: sharing and not sharing a text. It represents a sort of asymmetrical we-relationship with the anthropologist behind and above the native, hidden but at the top of the hierarchy of understanding. ⁶⁶

With regard to the merging of subjectivities achieved via temporalization, ('the complex praxis of encoding Time' in texts), ⁶⁷ Fabian argues in favour of close analysis of the use of the 'ethnographic present', ⁶⁸ and of the way in which pronoun use influences its locutionary attitude. He suggests that use of the ethnographic present may both 'give rise to doubts concerning...

⁶⁵ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 74).

⁶⁶ Crapanzano in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 74).

⁶⁷ Fabian (1983: 74).

⁶⁸ Fabian (1983: 80).

statistical validity', in as much as its use suggests generalisability, ⁶⁹ and may be 'taken to imply a static view of society...that is unattentive [sic] to the fact that all cultures are constantly changing' - in that it "'freezes" a society at the time of observation'. ⁷⁰ Fabian goes on to propose that choice of tense is also related to 'the "locutionary attitude" (or the rhetorical intent) of the speaker/author', and that this in turn is affected by choice of pronouns. ⁷¹ Arguing that 'the present tense...signal[s] the writer's intent...to give a *discourse* or *commentary* on the world', whereas '[e]thnographic accounts in the past tense...situate a text in the category of *history* or *story*, indicating perhaps a humanistic rather than scientific intent', ⁷² Fabian suggests that 'the first person singular *I* should co-occur with tenses marking the genre discourse/commentary, e.g., the present', whereas 'history/story...'excludes every 'autobiographical' linguistic form":

The historian will never say *je* or *tu* or *maintenant*,...Hence, we shall find only the forms of the 'third person' in a historical narrative strictly followed. ⁷³

As Fabian points out, this means that 'a good deal of anthropological discourse confronts us with a paradox in the form of an anomalous association of the present tense and the third person', ⁷⁴ such that ethnography's 'obstinate use of the nonperson "third person"' tells us something 'about the relationship between the subject and object of anthropological discourse'. ⁷⁵ Rather than addressing the people written about, the implied '*you*' associated

⁶⁹ Fabian (1983: 80).

⁷⁰ Fabian (1983: 81); see also Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 111).

⁷¹ Fabian (1983: 83).

⁷² Fabian (1983: 83), Fabian's emphasis.

⁷³ Fabian (1983: 84), Fabian's italics.

⁷⁴ Fabian (1983: 84).

⁷⁵ Fabian (1983: 85).

with the present tense addresses other anthropologists, while the people written about are instead referred to in the third person.⁷⁶ Those who should logically be the dialogic Other of anthropological discourse instead become its object,⁷⁷ and thus visualism is encoded textually:

It presupposes the givenness of the object of anthropology as something to be *observed*. *The present tense is a signal identifying a discourse as an observer's language*. Such a language provides glosses on the world as *seen*. It depicts and re-presents another culture; it is its re-production by linguistic (symbolic) means.⁷⁸

The final aspect of the functionalist and historicist era that remains to be considered is the way in which it dealt with the articulation between the individual and culture in more general terms. For functionalism, what was important was the way in which the individual fitted into culture as social structure. As Moore puts it:

British social anthropology produced an ethnography of societies, analyzing their institutions and operations. The individual social actor was characterized by role and status and shown to act within predetermined sets of behavior.⁷⁹

This resulted in a bracketing of temporality because, as Fabian explains:

Functionalism, in its fervor to explore the mechanisms of living societies, simply put on ice the problem of Time.

⁷⁶ Fabian (1983: 85), Fabian's italics.

⁷⁷ Fabian (1983: 86).

⁷⁸ Fabian (1983: 86 - 87), Fabian's emphasis.

⁷⁹ Moore (1997: 114).

Synchronic analysis, after all, presupposes a freezing of the time frame. ⁸⁰

For historicism, what was important was the relationship between the subject and society in terms of 'values and cultural behaviour', ⁸¹ leading to an emphasis on specific cultural contexts and historical processes, ⁸² and to 'a greater interest in individuals, and...how cultural practices served to shape individual character'. ⁸³ As Moore again puts it:

In the United States, anthropologists tended to have a deeper diachronic perspective than advocated by the synchronic studies of British social anthropology. The idea of looking for systematic cultural changes through time fit[s] better into American anthropology... ⁸⁴

With regard to the articulation between the individual and culture more generally then, functionalism and historicism had somewhat different concerns: these were later to develop in broad terms into structuralism on the one hand, and materialism and interpretive anthropology on the other.

To summarise the argument with respect to the functionalist and historicist era of the 1920s to the 1950s, it has been suggested that fieldwork had a profound impact on the perceived relationship between the ethnographer and the culture under consideration, resulting in the adoption of complex strategies of textual representation, and leading to consideration of the relationship between the individual and culture in more general terms. Although

⁸⁰ Fabian (1983: 20).

⁸¹ Moore (1997: 113).

⁸² Moore (1997: 42 and 48).

⁸³ Moore (1997: 114).

⁸⁴ Moore (1997: 166).

it is possible to see fieldwork as having *produced* these changes, however, at a more fundamental level, it is also possible to argue that its development, and the changes that accompanied it, were the *manifestation* of a continuing anxiety about the subject/object split: just as early anthropology attempted to answer the questions this distinction produced by defining the relationship between the ethnographer and the culture in terms of time, so functionalist and historicist ethnography tried to respond to them by the development of fieldwork and general theories about the individual's relationship to culture, and more specifically, by the adoption of a particular language of representation. The split in ethnography between "'plain", transparent signification' and 'rhetoric', and between 'fact' and 'fiction' identified by Clifford, then, are again not accidental; rather, they can be directly linked to the subject/object distinction. ⁸⁵

When it comes to the third phase of anthropology, that is the structuralist, materialist and interpretive period of the 1960s and 1970s and the crisis in representation of the 1980s and 1990s, Marcus and Fischer usefully suggest a link with three key internal critiques of the discipline: a questioning of 'fieldwork as the distinctive method of ethnographic research', a contestation of 'the ahistoric and apolitical nature of ethnographic writing', and a shift 'away from behavior and social structure toward the study of symbols, meanings and mentality'. ⁸⁶

The most useful analysis of structuralist anthropology is provided by Fabian, who sees it as simply another way of attempting to deal with the problem of time: whereas historicism and functionalism '*circumvent* the question of coevalness', he suggests, structuralist anthropology '*preempts* that question', attempting to 'eliminate Time' by means of 'a radically taxonomic

⁸⁵ Clifford (1986: 5).

⁸⁶ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 33).

approach' to culture. ⁸⁷ Fabian briefly illustrates this with the work of Lévi-Strauss, ⁸⁸ asserting that the latter perceived structuralism as a break with 'such notions as process, genesis, emergence, production, and other concepts bound up with "history"', and instead saw anthropology as 'the study of relations *between* cultural isolates and of the rules or laws governing these relations'. ⁸⁹ Diachrony in structuralism then, 'does not refer to a temporal mode of existence but to the mere succession of semiological systems one upon another', such that 'Time is removed from the realms of cultural praxis and given its place in that of pure logical forms'. ⁹⁰ It is the very severity of this 'structuralist exorcism of Time', Fabian suggests, which means that it demands 'serious attention': ⁹¹

In the end, one comes to suspect that Lévi-Strauss' flailing attack on history might really be instigated by his difficulties with another problem. He is troubled by the role of subjectivity in the production of both culture and knowledge ...Lévi-Strauss' position on history and subjectivity...can be read in two ways: either as a rejection of history qua ideological prop for a misconceived subjectivity; or as a rejection of subjectivity for fear that history - and with it Time - might pierce the armour of scientific anthropology. ⁹²

If subjectivity lies at the heart of Lévi-Strauss' problem with time, however, Fabian argues, then this leaves him with a dilemma over fieldwork. Although Lévi-Strauss rejects the 'dogmatic fixation on fieldwork *in situ*' of the Malinowskian tradition, he nevertheless

⁸⁷ Fabian (1983: 38 and 52), Fabian's emphasis.

⁸⁸ Fabian (1983: 52 - 69).

⁸⁹ Fabian (1983: 56 and 53), Fabian's emphasis.

⁹⁰ Fabian (1983: 56).

⁹¹ Fabian (1983: 56).

⁹² Fabian (1983: 59 - 60).

finds it necessary to distinguish the anthropologist from the historian: ⁹³

He must...find a rationale for fieldwork which not only asserts the ethnographer's subjective experience as the ultimate instance of anthropology but also claims superior objectivity for such knowledge. Somehow there must be a way of showing that one person's immersion in the concrete world of another culture accomplishes the scientific feat of reducing that concrete world to its most general and universal principles. ⁹⁴

Lévi-Strauss 'gets around the problem with Time', by positing 'that the fieldworker's personal, concrete encounter with another culture is of a taxonomic nature', and that 'the true object of anthropological research' is the unconscious: ⁹⁵

Like rays focused by a lens...objective knowledge of the unconscious appears *through* the ethnographer's (conscious) activity, but it is not a result of it. Anthropological knowledge...thinks the anthropologist, not the other way round. ⁹⁶

Not surprisingly, at the heart of this approach lies observation:

For Lévi-Strauss the ethnographer is first and foremost a viewer (and perhaps voyeur). Observation...invokes the 'naturalist' watching an experiment...[and]...calls for a native society that would, ideally at least, hold still like a *tableau vivant*. Both images are ultimately linked up with a visual

⁹³ Fabian (1983: 60), Fabian's italics.

⁹⁴ Fabian (1983: 61).

⁹⁵ Fabian (1983: 65).

⁹⁶ Fabian (1983: 65 - 66), Fabian's emphasis.

root metaphor...the illusion of simultaneity (as between the elements of a picture that is contemplated, or between the visual object and the act of its contemplation) may lead to utter disregard for the active, productive nature of field-*work* and its inevitable implication in historical situations and real, political contradictions.⁹⁷

Ultimately, then, Fabian argues that structuralism fails to overcome the epistemological problems which anthropology faces. Because 'taxonomic description always consists of rewriting our ethnographic notes or texts', he suggests, structuralism is not 'a revolutionary alternative to other forms of anthropological discourse'.⁹⁸ Like 'historical philology which it wishes to surpass and replace', structuralism aims 'to provide a better reading of the original text', and is 'pervaded by an urge to restore...'.⁹⁹ Similarly, sign theories are not as radical as they might at first appear, because they 'have a tendency to reinforce the basic premises of an allochronic discourse in that they consistently align the Here and Now of the signifier...with the Knower, and the Then and There of the signified...with the Known'.¹⁰⁰ Demonstrating that 'sign theories...rest on temporal distancing between the decoding subject and the encoded object can obviously not be demonstrated "semiotically"', however, because 'such a project would necessarily get lost in an infinite regress of sign-relations upon sign-relations'.¹⁰¹

If structuralism was predominantly concerned with how things mean, then materialism was more concerned with how things change: '[c]hanges in the mode of production, whether caused by

⁹⁷ Fabian (1983: 67), Fabian's italics and emphasis.

⁹⁸ Fabian (1983: 97).

⁹⁹ Fabian (1983: 98).

¹⁰⁰ Fabian (1983: 151).

¹⁰¹ Fabian (1983: 151).

economic reorganizations or fluctuations in the environment' were seen as having 'consequences in other arenas of culture', and material factors were therefore viewed as possessing 'causal priority'.¹⁰² Historical and political-economic forces, Marcus and Fischer suggest, were increasingly considered not as having 'external impacts upon local, self-contained cultures', but rather as possessing 'thoroughly local definition and penetration'.¹⁰³ It thus became important to 'capture more accurately the historical context of...subjects, and to register the constitutive workings of impersonal international political and economic systems on the local level'.¹⁰⁴ A resurgence of interest in the Frankfurt School, meanwhile, resulted in reconsideration of 'the ways culture and psychology might be manipulated by political and economic processes',¹⁰⁵ the resurrection of a 'research paradigm focusing on the relationships among market economies, mass-society politics, and cultural forms',¹⁰⁶ and 'a lucid and self-conscious vision of the historical moment...[of]...writing'.¹⁰⁷

The third main school of this period, interpretive anthropology, is seen by Marcus and Fischer as emerging from the 'simultaneous impact of a number of philosophical and intellectual fashions, including phenomenology, structuralism...semiotics, Frankfurt School critical theory, and hermeneutics'.¹⁰⁸ This constellation, they argue, 'provided the elements for the appearance of unprecedentedly sophisticated discussions concerning the primary aspiration of ethnography...to elicit the "native point of view" and to elucidate how different cultural constructions of

¹⁰² Moore (1997: 166).

¹⁰³ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 39).

¹⁰⁴ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 39).

¹⁰⁵ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 120).

¹⁰⁶ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 122).

¹⁰⁷ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 120).

¹⁰⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 25).

reality affect social action'. ¹⁰⁹ At the same time, its theoretical influences were also applied 'to examinations of the communicative processes by which the anthropologist in the field gains knowledge of his [sic] subjects' systems of cultural meaning in order to represent them in ethnographic texts'. ¹¹⁰ 'The validity of ethnographic interpretation' thus came to rest 'on fuller understandings and discussions of the research process itself'. ¹¹¹ The influence of structuralism had led to a decline in the functionalist approach and to interest both in 'how institutions were constructed in conceptual terms by the cultures in question', ¹¹² and in 'how individuals formulate[d] understandings of the worlds in which they operate[d]'. ¹¹³ Nevertheless, structuralism was in turn subjected to critique for 'being too distant from the intentionality and experience of social actors', ¹¹⁴ while '[o]ther responses to dissatisfactions with the 1960s linguistics-dominated approaches to culture' led to attempts 'to conceptualize more precisely what it mean[t] to represent the native point of view' and to expose the procedures by which this was achieved, 'in order to allow the reader to monitor the reliability of ethnographic data'. ¹¹⁵ 'In anthropology', Marcus and Fischer suggest, 'phenomenology became a label for the detailed attention paid to the way natives... [saw]...their world, while bracketing as much as possible the ethnographer's point of view', while hermeneutics 'similarly became a label for close reflection on the way natives decipher[ed] and decode[d] their own complex "texts"', and also referred 'to the anthropologist's concern with his [sic] own reflexivity in the course

¹⁰⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 25).

¹¹⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 25).

¹¹¹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 25 - 26).

¹¹² Marcus and Fischer (1986: 28).

¹¹³ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 29).

¹¹⁴ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 29).

¹¹⁵ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 29 - 30).

of the task of cross-cultural interpretation'.¹¹⁶ Popularisation by Geertz of the 'metaphor of cultures as texts' intensified preoccupation with the ways in which interpretations were 'constructed by the anthropologist', who worked in turn 'from the interpretations of his [sic] informants'.¹¹⁷ In general terms, then, there was a shift from institutional structures and behaviours to 'personhood',¹¹⁸ which was accompanied by a movement from linguistic to literary models of analysis in the development of anthropological theory.¹¹⁹

Although it would be oversimplistic to attribute to any particular school the range of critiques which accompanied the development of structuralist, materialist and interpretative approaches to anthropology, their cumulative impact was such that the relationship between the ethnographer and culture enforced by fieldwork began to be questioned, the representational strategies of the functionalist and historicist period started to break down, and their understandings of the articulation between the individual and culture began to be renegotiated.

The precise history of the critique of fieldwork remains highly contested, with various claims being made about its exact derivation, but whatever its history, it essentially found expression in both personal narrative and academic argument. Marcus and Fischer assert that although 'elements of a methodological critique' can be read into works such as Bowen's classic *Return to Laughter*, it was the translation of controversial texts such as Malinowski's diaries and Lévi-Strauss's *Tristes Tropiques* in the late 1960s and early 1970s which 'were influential in opening a serious discussion

¹¹⁶ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 30).

¹¹⁷ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 26).

¹¹⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 45).

¹¹⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 5).

about the epistemology of fieldwork, and its status as a method'.¹²⁰ Callaway, however, argues that it is possible 'to discern what might be considered a submerged female tradition in "writing culture"', in as much as women such as Bowen:

...wrote against the prevailing ethnographic conventions by drawing more directly on personal experience to show the process of understanding, recording their own puzzlements, sometimes despair, and relating moments of discovery and revelation. By presenting narrative dramas of daily life in foreign settings, they illuminated the general through focus on the particular.¹²¹

'Gender differences', she proposes, 'can be traced here':

...not to any innate female characteristics, but to learned ways of relating and listening to others, learned modes of representing 'reality' in experiential forms rather than abstractions, the decisions of some to write for a wider readership than is reached by more conventional academic studies, and the marginal authority conferred on the publications by academic departments.¹²²

Pratt points out that, whilst personal narratives now constitute a recognised anthropological subgenre, it was and still is 'the formal ethnography...that counts as professional capital and as an authoritative representation', with personal narratives often being deemed 'self-indulgent, trivial or heretical in other ways'.¹²³ Nevertheless, despite such "'disciplining'", personal narratives 'have kept appearing, kept being read, and above all kept being taught

¹²⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 34).

¹²¹ Callaway in Okely and Callaway (1992: 31).

¹²² Callaway in Okely and Callaway (1992: 31 - 32).

¹²³ Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 31).

within the borders of the discipline, for what one must assume are powerful reasons'.¹²⁴ One is that ethnographers 'often lament that their ethnographic writings leave out or hopelessly impoverish some of the most important knowledge they have achieved':¹²⁵ the reason that personal narrative has 'not been killed by science', Pratt concludes, is that it 'recuperates at least a few shreds of what was exorcised in the conversion from face-to-face field encounter to objectified science'.¹²⁶

If the critique of fieldwork initially took the form of separately published personal narratives, it later manifested itself in purely theoretical terms in Scholte's classic paper, 'Towards a Reflexive and Critical Anthropology',¹²⁷ in which he advocates reflexivity both in terms of 'a searching probe of the discipline itself, questioning the conditions and modes of producing knowledge', and in terms of 'the self-reflecting anthropologist engaged in the interpersonal relations of fieldwork'.¹²⁸ With regard to the former, Scholte criticises scientism's 'professed and ultimate aim...[of]...transcending the sociocultural settings and particular time periods in which scientific activities are located and developed', which he suggests leads to anthropology's refusal 'to critically examine its own sociocultural circumstances and historicophilosophical limitations as a paradigm'.¹²⁹ 'Anthropological activity', he argues:

...is never only scientific...it is expressive or symptomatic of a presupposed cultural world, of which it is itself an integral part. As anthropologists, we cannot simply take this

¹²⁴ Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 31).

¹²⁵ Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 33).

¹²⁶ Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 33).

¹²⁷ Scholte in Hymes (1974).

¹²⁸ Callaway in Okely and Callaway (1992: 32).

¹²⁹ Scholte in Hymes (1974: 435 - 437).

Lebenswelt and its attendant scientific traditions for granted. We must subject them to further reflexive understanding, hermeneutic mediation, and philosophical critique. ¹³⁰

With regard to the self-reflecting anthropologist, Scholte proposes that recognition be given both to the fact that the 'ethnographic situation is defined not only by the native society in question, but also by the ethnological tradition "in the head" of the ethnographer', ¹³¹ and suggests that it be acknowledged that:

Once...[the ethnographer] is actually in the field, the native presuppositions also become operative, and the entire situation turns into a complex intercultural mediation and a dynamic interpersonal experience... ¹³²

He also advocates attempting to close the temporal and ontological gap between the collecting of data and the writing up of the ethnography. 'In response to the question "How is anthropology done ?"', he argues:

...we cannot simply reply: 'Anthropologists construct scientific and replicable theories on the basis of empirical data.' We must also explain how field work and subsequent analysis constitute a unified praxis, the first results of which are mediated by the 'in here' as much as by the 'out there'. ¹³³

Finally, Scholte recognises the importance to this process of language, which 'both mediates the communicative context and allows for its subsequent description': 'all ethnographic descriptions and ethnological analyses are', he argues, 'and must be, part

¹³⁰ Scholte in Hymes (1974: 431), Scholte's italics.

¹³¹ Scholte in Hymes (1974: 438).

¹³² Scholte in Hymes (1974: 438 - 439).

¹³³ Scholte in Hymes (1974: 438).

hermeneutics, that is, interpretive activities based on contextual information and mediated texts'.¹³⁴

The second critique to have arisen out of structuralism, materialism, and interpretive anthropology, that of 'the ahistoric and apolitical nature' of ethnography,¹³⁵ Marcus and Fischer see as having had two main strands. The first was concerned with the problem of 'how to represent the embedding of richly described local cultural worlds in larger impersonal systems of political economy', given that what are often perceived as "'outside forces'" are in fact 'an integral part of the construction and constitution of the "inside," the cultural unit itself, and must be so registered, even at the most intimate levels of cultural process';¹³⁶ the second was concerned with 'the representation of historic time and context',¹³⁷ the usual responses here being 'to finesse the historical context by the repetitive use of standard rhetorical devices' in a synchronic account, or 'to abdicate to history altogether' by writing social history.¹³⁸ Although some interest was shown in issues of history and politics during this period, however, Marcus and Fischer argue that the materialist tradition 'tended to isolate itself from cultural anthropology's concurrent development of a more sophisticated ethnographic practice on interpretive lines'.¹³⁹ Because the interpretive tradition came to dominate the discipline, they suggest, it is only now that historical and political issues are starting to be addressed more seriously.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁴ Scholte in Hymes (1974: 440 - 441).

¹³⁵ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 33).

¹³⁶ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 77).

¹³⁷ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 95).

¹³⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 95 - 96).

¹³⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 84).

¹⁴⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 78).

The third main critique, that of the representational strategies of the functionalist and historicist era, Marcus and Fischer see as having been expressed in three main types of experimental texts: realist, psychodynamic, and modernist. Under the heading of 'realist texts', they consider what they term "'commonsense" frames or devices for ethnographic display', the most interesting of which for the purposes of this argument is the frame of 'life history', which they, and others, explore with particular reference to Shostak's *Nisa*.¹⁴¹ In addition to offering a staged history of one particular Kung woman's life, Marcus and Fischer suggest, *Nisa* also invokes 'a model of dialogue revealing how a life history is elicited and jointly constructed'.¹⁴² As Pratt puts it, *Nisa* 'tries to mediate the contradiction between objectifying ethnographic representation, in which all natives are equivalent and equal, and the subjective experience of fieldwork, in which all informants are not'.¹⁴³ Clifford similarly argues that *Nisa* 'exemplifies, and wrestles with, the problem of presenting and mediating multiple stories', suggesting that it 'explicitly stages three allegorical registers'.¹⁴⁴ The book's originality, he asserts, lies not so much in its subject matter as in the fact that 'it refuses to blend its three registers into a seamless, "full" representation',¹⁴⁵ thus enacting the predicament 'of many self-conscious ethnographic writers who find it difficult to speak of well-defined "others" from a stable, distanced position'.¹⁴⁶ The 'three, never quite manageable, "voices"', Clifford concludes, 'reflect a troubled, inventive moment in the history of cross-cultural representation'.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 57).

¹⁴² Marcus and Fischer (1986: 57).

¹⁴³ Pratt in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 45).

¹⁴⁴ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 103).

¹⁴⁵ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 104).

¹⁴⁶ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 104).

¹⁴⁷ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 109).

Under the heading of 'psychodynamic texts', Marcus and Fischer consider ethnographies concerned with 'reexploring, in the course of writing about other societies, the terrain first surveyed by Freud'.¹⁴⁸ Research conducted by ethnographers with psychoanalytic training, they propose, has tended to use psychoanalysis to generate questions and interpretive frameworks, and to analyse the speech, dreams, behaviour or social dynamics of their informants,¹⁴⁹ while recent psychodynamic texts involve 'self-reflective commentaries on experience, emotion, and self; on dreams, remembrances, associations, metaphors, distortions, and displacements; and on transferences and compulsive behavior repetitions'.¹⁵⁰ 'More intensively than any other kind of current experiment', they argue:

...these psychodynamic texts demonstrate how ethnographies can be specialized and organized around concepts of the person and indigenous discourses about emotions in order to reveal the most radically distinctive level of cultural experience for any society.¹⁵¹

Marcus and Fischer's analyses of Favret-Saada's *Deadly Words* and of Crapanzano's *Tuhami* are particularly useful here.¹⁵² In the former, they suggest, the author's demonstration of how peasant discourse works and of how she was initiated into it 'is an exercise parallel to an experience of psychotherapy, where one is attempting to pay attention at the same time to the language and the psychological dynamic in which one is involved'.¹⁵³ In the latter, the author describes 'the dynamic of the interviews between himself

¹⁴⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 48).

¹⁴⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 49 - 54).

¹⁵⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 54)

¹⁵¹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 54).

¹⁵² Marcus and Fischer (1986: 70 - 73).

¹⁵³ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 71).

and Tuhami...[as]...one of mutual transference'. ¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, they see this text as being:

...subject to the same sort of questions raised about Shostak's account of Nisa: Just how was the editing done ? Would it not be important to provide more commentary on the social locus of this individual ? In what ways are Tuhami's individuality, his expression of personhood, and his mode of discourse representative...? ¹⁵⁵

For Marcus and Fischer, then, even the more recent psychodynamic texts leave a number of important questions unanswered:

Under the heading of 'modernist texts', which might perhaps be more appropriately termed 'post-modernist texts', ¹⁵⁶ Marcus and Fischer consider ethnographies which question many of the conventions of realism, suggesting that:

If realist texts continue the convention of allowing the ethnographer to remain in unchallenged control of his [sic] narrative, modernist texts are constructed to highlight the eliciting discourse between ethnographer and subjects or to involve the reader in the work of analysis. ¹⁵⁷

The 'origin of modernist ethnography', they continue:

...might be imagined as if an ethnographer had begun with the goal of representing the experience of his [sic] subjects

¹⁵⁴ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 208).

¹⁵⁵ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 73).

¹⁵⁶ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 48). Although Marcus and Fischer use the term 'modernist' here, the texts they discuss are seen by Clifford et al. as 'post-modernist' - a term which seems more appropriate where there is a particular focus on an anti-realist and/or more playful use of textuality.

¹⁵⁷ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 67).

by one or another...[realist]...techniques, but came to the conclusion that this could not be done with authenticity... 158

Instead, (post)modernist ethnography is both 'radically concerned with what can be learned about another culture from full attention to the enactment of the research process itself', and 'focused primarily on delivering a message by manipulating the form of a text'.¹⁵⁹ Although there is a degree of overlap between the techniques used in realist ethnographies and those employed in their (post)modernist counterparts, then, the latter are more specifically concerned with using experimental textual strategies to produce theoretical insights. Among the most important techniques used are the staging of multiple textual voices, either in a coherent dialogue or in a series of fragments, and the use of irony and humour.

With the staging of multiple textual voices, space may be provided 'for the informants to have their own voices',¹⁶⁰ or may be used to 'specify the discourse of informants, as well as that of the ethnographer, by staging dialogues or narrating interpersonal confrontations'.¹⁶¹ The effect of this strategy, according to Clifford, is that it transforms 'the "'cultural" text (a ritual, an institution, a life history, or any unit of typical behaviour to be described or interpreted) into a speaking subject, who sees as well as is seen, who evades, argues, probes back'.¹⁶² 'Once cultures are no longer prefigured visually - as objects, theaters, texts', he asserts, 'it becomes possible to think of a cultural poetics that is an interplay of voices, of positioned utterances'.¹⁶³ This privileging of "'discourse"

¹⁵⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 67).

¹⁵⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 67 - 68).

¹⁶⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 67).

¹⁶¹ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 14).

¹⁶² Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 14).

¹⁶³ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 12).

over "text", then, 'emphasizes the cooperative and collaborative nature of the ethnographic situation in contrast to the ideology of the transcendental observer', ¹⁶⁴ but it is nevertheless important to recognise that the final products are only ever 'fictions of dialogue': ¹⁶⁵

...quotations are always staged by the quoter...a more radical polyphony would only displace ethnographic authority, still confirming, the final, virtuoso orchestration by a single author of all the discourses in his or her text. ¹⁶⁶

Juxtaposing the 'viewpoints of different informants and/or authors' does not necessarily create coherence, however. ¹⁶⁷ In Price's *First-Time*, for example, Clifford argues, the author undermines 'the completeness of his own account...by publishing a book which is a series of fragments'. ¹⁶⁸ 'Price self-consciously conceives of his book as experimental', Marcus and Fischer add, by interspersing 'Saramaka texts that he recorded with his own commentaries, which are presented simultaneously on the page'. ¹⁶⁹ The effect of such a strategy is that the reader 'is encouraged to play back and forth' between European and Saramaka knowledge, and thus becomes 'actively involved in the simultaneous operating modes of historical interpretation, textually orchestrated by Price as ethnographic writer'. ¹⁷⁰

The use of irony and humour are also characteristic of (post)modernist texts, but whereas irony is predominantly used in

¹⁶⁴ Tyler in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 126).

¹⁶⁵ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 14).

¹⁶⁶ Rabinow in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 246).

¹⁶⁷ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 213).

¹⁶⁸ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 8).

¹⁶⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 101).

¹⁷⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 102).

realist ethnographies to establish or maintain collusion between ethnographer and reader, in their (post)modern counterparts:

Irony is a self-conscious mode of understanding and writing, which reflects and models the recognition that all conceptualizations are limited, that what is socially maintained as truth is often politically motivated. Stylistically, irony employs rhetorical devices that signal real or feigned disbelief on the part of the author towards her or his own statements; it often centers on the recognition of the problematic nature of language; and so it revels - or wallows - in satirical techniques. ¹⁷¹

The task faced by contemporary ethnographers for Marcus and Fischer, then, 'is not to escape the deeply suspicious and critical nature of the ironic mode of writing, but to embrace and utilize it in combination with other strategies for producing...descriptions of society'; ¹⁷² the 'only way to an accurate view and confident knowledge of the world' is thus 'through a sophisticated epistemology that takes full account of intractable contradiction, paradox, irony, and uncertainty in the explanation of human activities'. ¹⁷³ 'Considerable potential still exists', Fischer proposes, 'to construct texts utilizing humor and other devices that draw attention to their own limitations and degree of accuracy, and that do so with aesthetic elegance...rather than with pedantic laboredness', ¹⁷⁴ but such practices still offer particular challenges, 'because editors and readers still need to be educated to understand such texts'. ¹⁷⁵ 'Subtlety', he concludes, 'is a quality that seems

¹⁷¹ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 224).

¹⁷² Marcus and Fischer (1986: 14).

¹⁷³ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 14).

¹⁷⁴ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 229).

¹⁷⁵ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 229 - 230).

often (but not necessarily) to run counter to the canons of explicitness and univocal meaning expected in scientific writing'.¹⁷⁶

Overall, then, the critique of the representational strategies of the functionalist and historicist eras constitutes for Marcus and Fischer one of the 'developing responses across disciplines to...[the] contemporary crisis of representation',¹⁷⁷ a crisis which 'arises from uncertainty about adequate means of describing social reality', and which has provided 'the intellectual stimulus for the contemporary vitality of experimental writing in anthropology'.¹⁷⁸ Such writing is not simply experimentation for experimentation's sake,¹⁷⁹ because the discipline's preoccupation with writing strategies has also 'been the medium for expressing an unprecedentedly frank self-critique of...[its]...theory and methods'.¹⁸⁰ '[I]n the most sophisticated critical works', then, 'content and form are intimately linked',¹⁸¹ and, through manipulation of textual strategies, may aim to 'make the situation of the fieldworker problematic and even disturbing for the reader, so as to explore philosophical and political problems of cultural translation'.¹⁸² In more general terms, the form of an ethnography can also reflect broad shifts in epistemology, because the 'ethnography as modern essay profoundly disrupts the commitment to holism that is at the heart of most realist ethnography':

It does not promise that its subjects are part of a larger order. Instead, by the open-endedness of the form, it evokes a

¹⁷⁶ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 230).

¹⁷⁷ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 15).

¹⁷⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 8).

¹⁷⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 42).

¹⁸⁰ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 5).

¹⁸¹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 137).

¹⁸² Marcus and Fischer (1986: 48).

broader world of uncertain order...A sustained tolerance of incompleteness and indeterminateness about the order in the world that lies beyond the experience of ethnographic subjects, intensely focused upon, seems to be a key rhetorical marker in [post]modernist ethnography. ¹⁸³

To summarise the third period of anthropology, then, we can say that preoccupations with the relationship between the ethnographer and the culture being analysed, with the relationship between the individual and culture more generally, and with questions of representation all occurred simultaneously. Concern with the relationship between the ethnographer and the culture under consideration was expressed via structuralism's interest in the elimination of time and in the status of fieldwork, via the fieldwork critique implicit in the use of personal narrative, via theoretical demands for reflexivity, via phenomenological and hermeneutic anxieties about the 'native's point of view' and the ethnographer's construction of the culture, and via psychodynamic experimentation. Concern with the relationship between the individual and culture more generally was expressed through structuralism's interest in the function of language, materialism's interest in historical and political context, and indirectly, through the adoption of textual strategies which made reference to wider epistemological shifts. Finally, concern with questions of representation was expressed by means of structuralism's interest in sign theories, a preoccupation with literary models of analysis for the development of anthropological theory, and by considerable textual experimentation involving multiple voices, irony, and humour, as well as fragmentation, and the interpolation of different forms of cultural knowledge. What is significant about this period of anthropology, then, is that it questioned many of the conventions and epistemological assumptions of earlier periods. In so doing, it contested the rigid subject/object distinction which founded the

¹⁸³ Marcus in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 192).

discipline, and can thus be seen as its manifestation of the crises in representation and modern knowledge.

Part Two

'I...wish your Holiness to know that I was impelled to think out another way of calculating the motions of the spheres of the universe by nothing else than the realisation that the mathematicians themselves are inconsistent in investigating them...in establishing the motions both of the Sun and the Moon and of the other five wandering stars they do not use the same principles or assumptions, or explanations of their apparent revolutions and motions...Thus in the process of their demonstrations, which they call their system, they are found either to have missed out something essential, or to have brought in something inappropriate and wholly irrelevant, which would not have happened to them if they had followed proper principles...If what I am saying is obscure, it will nevertheless become clearer in its proper place'.¹⁸⁴

So far in this chapter, I have considered three key phases in anthropological history from an epistemological perspective, by recasting some of their concerns in terms of the subject/object relationship. In this section, my aim is to outline some of the ways in which recent approaches are both moving towards, and resisting, a change in this relationship, and to propose that post-modern, psychoanalytic ethnography is both a way of addressing, and a manifestation of, such a change.

Some of the most radical insights of recent experimental anthropology include the proposition that ethnographic texts constitute not the representation but the construction of cultures, that such texts are essentially made up of hierarchically arranged discourses, that they must negotiate the constantly changing nature of cultures, and that their construction of the Other inevitably involves construction of the Self. Although these insights have been

¹⁸⁴ Copernicus trans. Duncan (1976 [1543]: 24 - 25) - 'To His Holiness Pope Paul III: The Preface of Nicolaus Copernicus to the Books of the Revolutions'.

applied to the ethnographic text and to proposals about the overall direction of ethnography, however, there seems to have been a reluctance to apply them to the figure of the ethnographer him/herself. Not only have experimental approaches consistently avoided analysing the ethnographer, but they have also at times expressed hostility, or at best theoretical naivety, about the possibility of so doing. Nevertheless, some of the comments and predictions about possible future trends do imply potential for a move in this direction.

It is Clifford who most usefully summarises the key insights of recent experimental ethnography relevant to this argument. First, he suggests that attention to textuality and rhetoric 'serves to highlight the constructed, artificial nature of cultural accounts', undermining 'overly transparent modes of authority', and drawing attention to the fact that ethnography 'is always caught up in the invention, not the representation, of cultures'.¹⁸⁵ Secondly, he argues that once textual space is given to contributors other than the author, allowing the possibility of multiple perspectives and viewpoints, 'we can ask new critical questions' about ethnography; nevertheless, we need to remember that, however 'monological, dialogical, or polyphonic their form, they are hierarchical arrangements of discourse'.¹⁸⁶ Thirdly, Clifford proposes that, although 'recognition of allegory complicates the writing and reading of ethnographies in potentially fruitful ways',¹⁸⁷ the 'marking off of extended...discourses...shows the ethnography to be a hierarchical structure of powerful stories that translate, encounter, and recontextualise other powerful stories' - in other words then, post-modern ethnography is 'a palimpsest'.¹⁸⁸ Fourthly, he asserts that there is now recognition that cultures 'do not hold still for their

¹⁸⁵ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 2).

¹⁸⁶ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 17).

¹⁸⁷ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 120).

¹⁸⁸ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 120 - 121).

portraits', ¹⁸⁹ but are rather 'contested, temporal, and emergent': ¹⁹⁰ they 'are not scientific "objects"', ¹⁹¹ and there is 'no whole picture that can be "filled in", since the perception and filling of a gap lead to the awareness of other gaps...And so forth without end'. ¹⁹² Finally, Clifford argues that there has also been a major shift in attitudes with regard to the Other: whereas '[e]thnography in the service of anthropology once looked out at clearly defined others, defined as primitive, or tribal, or non-Western, or pre-literate, or nonhistorical', it now 'encounters others in relation to itself'. ¹⁹³ In contemporary ethnography, then, he suggests, we 'struggle to confront and take responsibility for our systematic constructions of others and of ourselves through others'. ¹⁹⁴

Despite the application of many of these insights to ethnographic texts, however, there has not been a parallel experimental trend with regard to ethnographic reflexivity - or at least, whilst suggestions have been made about the overall reflexivity of anthropology as a discipline, and views have been expressed about the ethnographer's individual reflexivity in a very general sense, there have been few, if any, proposals as to how the ethnographer is to engage in reflexive praxis that is theoretically sophisticated and analytically rigorous. If we consider the two trends in contemporary ethnographic experimentation identified by Marcus and Fischer, for example, we find that they are concerned only with how 'to expand the existing boundaries of the ethnographic genre in order to write fuller and more richly evoked accounts of other cultural experience', and with finding 'more effective ways to describe how ethnographic subjects are implicated

¹⁸⁹ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 10).

¹⁹⁰ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 19).

¹⁹¹ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 18).

¹⁹² Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 18 - 19).

¹⁹³ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 23).

¹⁹⁴ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 121).

in the broader processes of historical political economy'.¹⁹⁵ Their recommendations involve 'meshing interpretive approaches and political-economy perspectives'¹⁹⁶ so as to pay 'attention to microprocesses without denying the importance of retaining some vision of larger world-historical trends',¹⁹⁷ and developing ethnographic reflexivity through epistemological questioning of the discipline and the 'repatriation of research projects'.¹⁹⁸ Notable by its absence in their scheme of things, however, is rigorous reflection by the ethnographer on his/her own individual, personal history and culture. Similarly, if we take a closer look at Scholte's classic call to arms, we find that, even though he recommends that 'every procedural step in the constitution of anthropological knowledge' be 'accompanied by radical reflection and epistemological exposition',¹⁹⁹ he only expands on the broader issue of 'questioning the conditions and modes of producing knowledge', and does not explain the concrete activities that must be undertaken by 'the self-reflecting anthropologist engaged in the interpersonal relations of fieldwork'.²⁰⁰ As Rabinow comments in relation to Clifford, then, 'metareflections on the crisis in representation' possess 'an interesting blind spot, a refusal of self-reflection'.²⁰¹

That there is anxiety about the issue of personal reflexivity is further illustrated by the fact that recent anthropological texts demonstrate either a marked hostility to autobiographical approaches, or a surprising theoretical naivety. Marcus and Fischer note that:

¹⁹⁵ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 43 - 44).

¹⁹⁶ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 78).

¹⁹⁷ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 81).

¹⁹⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 110).

¹⁹⁹ Scholte in Hymes (1974: 441).

²⁰⁰ Callaway in Okely and Callaway (1992: 32).

²⁰¹ Rabinow in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 251 - 252).

...the presence in the text of the writer and the exposure of reflections concerning both his [sic] fieldwork and the textual strategy of the resulting account have become, for very important theoretical reasons, pervasive marks of current experiments. ²⁰²

Yet they go on to comment that:

...there is also a tendency to dwell on the experience of fieldwork and its problems. The pleasure in relating fieldwork experience can be overplayed, to a point of exhibitionism, especially by writers who come to see reflexive mediation as not only the means but the point of writing ethnography. Useful to a degree, fieldwork introspection endlessly replayed can become a subgenre that both loses its novelty and payoff for developing knowledge of other cultures. ²⁰³

Similarly, Clifford associates autobiography with self-indulgence when he asserts that '[d]ialogical modes are not, in principle, autobiographical; they need not lead to hyper self-consciousness or self-absorption'. ²⁰⁴ In their handbook for trainee ethnographers, Hammersley and Atkinson adopt an equally censorious attitude, suggesting that, whilst a fieldwork diary can be used to record both the fieldwork process and 'the ethnographer's own personal feelings and involvement' (as if the two were entirely separable !), it should not become 'the basis for gratuitous introspection or narcissistic self-absorption'. ²⁰⁵ Moreover, they demonstrate a worrying tendency to differentiate between the likely behaviour and reflexive abilities of informants, and those of ethnographers. Thus, although

²⁰² Marcus and Fischer (1986: 42)

²⁰³ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 42).

²⁰⁴ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 15).

²⁰⁵ Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 192).

there is occasional recognition that ethnographers share some of the characteristics of their informants, with Hammersley and Atkinson noting that 'we too occupy particular locations and what we observe, what we record, and how we interpret it will be influenced by these', ²⁰⁶ they assume that, whereas members of the target culture are likely to attribute 'latent identities' to the ethnographer - ²⁰⁷ resulting in a need to assess 'the impact of any other audience the actor might be addressing, consciously or sub-consciously' - ²⁰⁸ ethnographers themselves will somehow be entirely free from such problems. Hence they happily advocate 'impression management' through the monitoring of dress, speech, and demeanour, and the careful control of self-revelation, ²⁰⁹ assuming not only that the ethnographer knows exactly how a particular impression will be interpreted within the target culture at any given moment, but also that s/he will be completely able to control both behaviour and emotions - and hence, presumably, his/her own unconscious.

A similar hostility and theoretical naivety can be detected in Okely and Callaway's *Anthropology and Autobiography*: where contributors do begin to treat ethnographers and informants more equally, they ultimately pull back from the full implications of their arguments. Of most interest here are comments made by Okely, Callaway, Spencer, Crick, and Cohen. Okely recognises that reflexivity 'has rarely been seen as significant for the total project in the same way that pre-fieldwork acquaintance with "the ethnographic literature" has been', ²¹⁰ but for her, the 'fullest sense' of reflexivity seems to be an untheorised version of autobiography which she simplistically suggests 'dismantles the positivist

²⁰⁶ Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 227).

²⁰⁷ Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 153).

²⁰⁸ Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 225).

²⁰⁹ Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 83, 87 and 92).

²¹⁰ Okely in Okely and Callaway (1992: 11).

machine': ²¹¹ like Hammersley and Atkinson, she seems to believe that the self can be managed and eventually dispensed with, asserting that the 'concern for an autobiographical element in anthropology is to work through the specificity of the anthropologist's self in order to contextualise and *transcend* it'. ²¹² Callaway recognises the impossibility of objectivity, commenting that 'the anthropologist is warned about bringing her [sic] own "cultural baggage" to the field, as if personal and cultural components of one's being could be shed like luggage left in a locker', ²¹³ and is keen to adopt an approach which 'rejects the division between subject and object, places the self within the field of investigation, evaluates positionality and power relations, and creates an intersubjective matrix for knowledge'; ²¹⁴ ultimately, however, she seems less interested in issues of epistemology than in questions of gender. Spencer recognises that his 'own accounts of the people of the Maasai region' are likely to have been 'distorted by unresolved dilemmas' of his 'own past and present', ²¹⁵ and draws several useful parallels between childhood and ethnography, suggesting that his adoption into a particular Samburu family was 'like re-entering the primitive world of childhood', ²¹⁶ that '[d]isengaging successfully from the Samburu had a therapeutic effect' because '[i]t replicated and in some ways marked the end of disengagement from...childhood', ²¹⁷ and that '[p]iecing together a self-contained argument out of fragmented field data was like piecing together a fragmented past', ²¹⁸ but he again ultimately backs off from the implications of his position by rather oddly

²¹¹ Okely in Okely and Callaway (1992: 3).

²¹² Okely in Okely and Callaway (1992: 2), my emphasis.

²¹³ Callaway in Okely and Callaway (1992: 30).

²¹⁴ Callaway in Okely and Callaway (1992: 44).

²¹⁵ Spencer in Okely and Callaway (1992: 53 - 54).

²¹⁶ Spencer in Okely and Callaway (1992: 59).

²¹⁷ Spencer in Okely and Callaway (1992: 62).

²¹⁸ Spencer in Okely and Callaway (1992: 60).

suggesting that it is only applicable to first-time ethnographers.²¹⁹ Crick, meanwhile, notes that if 'anthropology is about "otherness", then any definition of our subject matter necessarily involves a corresponding self-definition', that if the 'fact that anthropology has always been implicitly about "ourselves" is now clear', then 'what is required is that the implicit become explicit', that 'self' and 'other' are not discrete entities but 'partly constitutive of and constituted by the ever-changing bond' between them, and that, in any case, 'the self is less a thing than a process'.²²⁰ On occasion, his discussion also suggests an underlying psychoanalytic framework, such as when he states that, in addition to conscious impression management, 'there is the unconscious side',²²¹ that 'for both conscious and unconscious reasons one seeks out certain people and avoids others',²²² and that '[i]t has been said that the experience of other cultures may reawaken long-repressed memories'.²²³ Like Spencer, however, despite being aware of the superficiality of aspects of his argument, Crick does not pursue his psychoanalytic analogies any further. Finally, Cohen acknowledges the personal motivations of the ethnographer, stating that it 'would not be contentious to suggest that many anthropologists are motivated by a personal problematic as well as by mere intellectual curiosity', yet he seems to find the idea of pursuing this idea to its logical conclusions deeply threatening, ultimately arguing that:

...it would be impractical, tedious and a denigration of our expertise to have to provide an autobiography as the interpretive key to our ethnographies. If we are really saying that the only paths to the Yanomamo or the Whalsay islanders are through the life-histories and self-analyses of

²¹⁹ Spencer in Okely and Callaway (1992: 61).

²²⁰ Crick in Okely and Callaway (1992: 175 - 176).

²²¹ Crick in Okely and Callaway (1992: 176).

²²² Crick in Okely and Callaway (1992: 186).

²²³ Crick in Okely and Callaway (1992: 181).

their ethnographers, we clearly call into question the scholarly integrity of the entire ethnographic record. ²²⁴

Despite the apparent lack of anthropological interest in, and hostility towards, personal ethnographic reflexivity which is theoretically sophisticated and analytically rigorous, however, some of the comments and predictions made about the future of ethnography do suggest a move in this direction. Pointing to the fact that '[w]hen corridor talk about fieldwork becomes discourse, we learn a good deal', Rabinow advocates '[m]oving the conditions of production of anthropological knowledge out of the domain of gossip' - where 'what cannot be publicly discussed cannot be analyzed or rebutted' - and 'into that of knowledge'. ²²⁵ Fischer proposes paying attention to autobiographical ethnic fiction, noting that it has close parallels with textual theory, ²²⁶ and commenting that:

...[j]ust as the travel account and the ethnography served as forms for exploration of the 'primitive' world...and the realist novel served as the form for explorations of bourgeois manners and the self in early industrial society, so ethnic autobiography and autobiographical fiction can perhaps serve as key forms for explorations of pluralist, post-industrial, late twentieth-century [and presumably early twenty-first century] society. ²²⁷

Fischer also usefully draws attention to the fact that ethnicity is 'a deeply rooted emotional component of identity' which is 'often transmitted less through cognitive language or learning (to which sociology has almost entirely restricted itself) than through

²²⁴ Cohen in Okely and Callaway (1992: 223).

²²⁵ Rabinow in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 253).

²²⁶ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 230).

²²⁷ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 195).

processes analogous to the dreaming and transference of psychoanalytic encounters',²²⁸ and suggests that one way of seeing ethnography is thus as a 'search in another tradition' that 'can serve as a way of exploring one's own past':²²⁹ 'the most sensitive and best anthropological works', he concludes, 'are those that bring personal engagements of this sort into play'.²³⁰ Finally, Fabian points out that 'anthropological consciousness' is as subject to deformation and alienation as any other kind of consciousness, and may even 'verge on the pathological', involving 'psychological ingestion and appropriation', such that 'neither the person involved nor those to whom he [sic] reports his experiences can be sure of the nature and validity of his accounts and insights'.²³¹ Although, like Scholte, he is not methodologically specific about how this problem might be addressed, Fabian nevertheless makes a useful distinction between '*reflection*, as a sort of objective reflex (like the image in a mirror) which hides the observer by axiomatically eliminating subjectivity' and '*reflexion* qua subjective activity carried out by and revealing, the ethnographer'.²³² What the arguments of Rabinow, Fischer and Fabian all seem to suggest, then, is a further move in ethnography towards the personal, occurring within the context of recent, theoretically sophisticated textual analysis: despite resistance, there is thus evidence to suggest that the subject/object split is beginning to break down.

How, then, does the post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography that I am aiming to illustrate in the first and third chapters of this thesis fit into this trajectory? What are its key characteristics, and how does it answer the three questions raised by the subject/object split about the relationship between the

²²⁸ Fischer in Marcus and Fischer (1986: 173).

²²⁹ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 200).

²³⁰ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 199).

²³¹ Fabian (1983: 93 - 94).

²³² Fabian (1983: 90), Fabian's emphasis.

ethnographer and the culture under consideration, its representation, and the articulation in more general terms between any individual and his/her culture? The first characteristic is that it involves the ethnographer undergoing psychoanalysis and drawing on that experience - not in order to analyse 'the natives' - but rather so as to reflect rigorously on his/her autobiography and its likely influence on the ethnographic process. Hence attention might be paid to motivations for undertaking the research, to illustrating, whether implicitly or explicitly, how the ethnographer's behaviour patterns elicit particular fieldwork responses, and to how his/her understandings of the world are likely to affect fieldwork interpretation and subsequent (re)construction of the culture under consideration. Psychoanalysis then - in itself a kind of ethnography of the ethnographer - becomes a form of triangulation which enables ethnographer and reader to understand how the ethnographer's personal culture intersects with the wider culture to which s/he belongs; how both personal and wider cultures constitute a lens through which fieldwork experience is viewed; and hence how likely it is that the ethnographer's experiences and (re)constructions of the culture being studied will be shared by the reader. The second main characteristic of post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography is that it attempts to come to terms with the issue of history, that is, not just the ethnographer's personal history, but also history in a wider, public sense: rather than eliding time through the production of a synchronic account, it incorporates ways of acknowledging diachronic processes of cultural change - in this thesis, for example, by juxtaposing two temporally distinct experiences of Polish culture. Additionally, post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography allows for the complex interplay of various temporalities. It is not simply that there is a split between the time of fieldwork and the time of writing up; rather, the irruptive temporalities of the ethnographer as subject, of the subjects of the ethnography, and of the processes of textual production interrelate retroactively in difficult and unpredictable ways. The third main characteristic of post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography, again like any other post-modern ethnography, is that

it involves textual experimentation, not only in order to reflect on the fragmented nature of post-modern experience, but also in order to acknowledge the fragmented nature of post-modern identities - including that of the ethnographer. Shifting subject positions and personal pronouns, then, do not make the text cohere, but rather encourage it to disintegrate; allegorical structures are explored metaphorically so as to deconstruct them; a more highly stylised language is used to evoke alternative and possibly undermining meanings; and tense is played with as a way of questioning the status of the discourse. The answers of post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography to the three key questions with which this chapter opened are thus complex: the relationship between the ethnographer and the culture under consideration is transferential, palimpsestic, transtemporal, and that between any individual and his/her culture inevitably inflected through language, the family, and everyday experience. Representation of the first relationship necessarily involves that of the second, using techniques which convey subjectivities and the cultures to which they belong in all their radical instability. Epistemologically, then post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography makes three main moves. First, rather than splitting off subject from object through temporalization, it allows a dynamic conception of time, and interactions backwards and forwards between pasts and presents in the production of ethnographic discourse. Secondly, instead of enforcing a clear distinction between the subject and object of fieldwork via visualism and scientism, it acknowledges that the ethnographer needs to be an object of investigation as much as the culture under consideration. Thirdly, in addition to blurring the distinction between scientific and literary language so as to question the conventions of representing another culture, it does so in order to undermine the ethnographer's (and hence the reader's) supposedly coherent identity. What post-modern psychoanalytic ethnography essentially does, then, is not only to begin to collapse, but also to go beyond, the subject/object split from which the discipline started. As I shall be arguing in the conclusion to this thesis, it thus both

constitutes and enacts the epistemological shift predicted by Foucault at the end of *The Order of Things*.²³³

²³³ Foucault (1970: 387).

Chapter Three

...Here for a preliminary visit to set up the research. Staying with S. and N. from the first UNESCO camp, which is really nice...

...Watched a documentary about the birth of Solidarity, as it's that time of year. Felt nostalgic about it all, and asked S. and N. if it didn't make them feel proud of their country. 'Yes', said S. doubtfully, 'but you still can't get a decent plumber !'. Also discussed the current political situation - there are now one hundred and twenty-seven officially registered political parties...

Met R. today at the Institute where I'm going to be based - he seems to be officially responsible for me under the Polish Government Scholarship scheme that will support me while I'm here. We talked

1.1P. [My father] was born in a peasant family in [the] Podlasie region...[on] a big estate called Adamki, and he was a peasant boy...It was 1900. ¹ ...I was born in Warsaw, but I spent my childhood...in the region of Mazowsze,...and three years before the War, I was in Brzesc nad Bugiem, it is now [in]...Belorus, on the other side of the Bug river. I came back, we went over the border to...[the] Podlasie region...We stayed with the whole family, and in 1944, my father went to Warsaw again, alone, because he was being followed by [the] Germans. He was an officer in the Army, and he was killed in the Uprising in Warsaw, and I went to my friends...in the southern part of Poland...and there we went to...the group of partisans, with my friend,...until October 1944. And then...we were disbanded, because...the operation was meant to rescue [the] Uprising in Warsaw, but since [the] Uprising in Warsaw was simply finished,...the group of partisans were disbanded, and from the woods...I went to Krakow, and I was caught by the Germans and taken to the...labour camp...Fortunately it was [a] labour camp, not a concentration camp...and I was in this labour camp...until the end of the War, and we were rescued by the American Army, because I was in Linz in Austria, and then I went with [a] few of my friends...over the border to Italy, and joined the Second Polish Corps, it was...General Anders Corps. ²...And there I went to...cadet school...It was...autumn 1945 when we [were] all transported to

¹ Note on transcription and translation: the following are fragments transcribed from the ethnographic interviews I conducted during the fieldwork in 1995 - 96. Where interviewees spoke in English, I have frequently inserted articles (which do not exist in Polish) and changed prepositions (which are often different in Polish) to make the text easier to read, but I have indicated such changes in square brackets. At times, I have also changed tenses where interviewees were clearly influenced by tense choice in Polish. Where interviewees spoke in Polish, I have tried to make the translations as accurate and readable as possible, whilst nevertheless wanting to maintain a slight degree of 'foreign-ness'. In both cases, constraints of space have meant that I have frequently had to omit sections from the fragments. This has inevitably changed the narrative structure of the statements, but I have tried to be as faithful as possible to their original meaning and construction. The numbers refer to transcription tags.

² General Wladyslaw Anders commanded the 'Polish Army in the East', one of two separate armies made up in the USSR by ethnic Poles, and, in the case of Anders' army, comprising mainly released deportees. Cf. Davies (1981: 271 - 72).

mostly about practical things, but I'm not sure he took in the fact that I lived here from 1988 - 90. Then he told me all about his research, but didn't ask me about mine. I felt as if he'd already decided that I would be going to seminars and to the library: I don't want to offend the Institute (gatekeepers and all that) but I'm here to do fieldwork ! Though it felt rude talking about what I wanted to do without being asked, in the end I just launched into an explanation anyway: that I'm interested in the cross-cultural construction of national identity, want to find out about people's conceptions of Polishness and Britishness, to see whether people who have a particular interest in Britain have different conceptions of each from people who don't, and if so, why. Have also tracked down a Polish British Friendship Society - which sounds promising...

...Went out of Warsaw to see N. and A. today - friends from when I was living here in the late '80s. Had a really useful talk about the fieldwork. Preliminary things to consider which might influence conceptions of Polishness: ethnic origin, religious affiliation, regional derivation, social background. Also possible topics, e.g. the forthcoming Presidential elections, the new Constitution, the position of the family, Poland joining the EU, symbols of Polishness. So many possibilities - it's going to be difficult to know where to start when I come back and begin the fieldwork proper...

Britain...Then,...in 1947, I was in the Army in Britain, and in November 1947, I returned to Poland.

2.2A. My mother...was born in Lwow itself, into a mixed family: her mother was Polish, her father was Ukrainian, a doctor. My father's family, on the other hand...is a noble family, of German descent, who came to Poland from Westphalia, through the Baltic countries, here to central Poland. My father's father still had a country estate, but that went into decline, and so my father worked as a wage-earning employee - he'd completed polytechnic, and was an engineer...My father was also an officer in the reserves, and he fought in '39 at the front; during the Occupation, he co-operated with the Home Army, he was arrested, and spent time in the German concentration camps - Gross Rosen, Dachau, Belgen Belsen - and he was liberated by the British Army. Then he came back to Poland in '45.

4.3B. [My mother's] first husband was arrested by [the] Gestapo quite early in the War, and she was left alone with two small children...my half-brothers...[B]ecause times were very hard and she had no means to live,...and there was hunger and starvation,... she started doing...clothing alterations and embroidery...And... because it was under German Occupation,...she had to do it officially because...she could be punished if she was caught, so she opened [a] small...shop and...tried to learn how to make dresses... [A]fter the War, when [the] children - my brothers - were still young, and...I was born,...she opened a private shop...just to make dresses. And she employed several persons...But to have a private business and to employ other persons...was allowed...only for a few years...

5.4.J. My mother was born in...[the] Ukraine - now it is [the] Ukraine, but before the Second World War it belonged to Poland...

Fieldwork

...Arrived yesterday afternoon, after a fairly gruelling journey from London by coach - always a good idea to arrive by a humble form of transport, but...Got to Warsaw early, so stood and froze for an hour and a half - I had so much baggage that I was rooted to the spot. R. from the Institute came to meet me, kissed my hand, presented me with a rose, and made a formal welcome speech, all of which was very nice of him, but never mind finding my feet, I couldn't even bloody well feel them...!

...Was introduced to everyone at the Institute - the secretaries, the Director of Studies, etc. - nice, but being held by the shoulders and paraded about made me feel like a small child...

her parents were not originated [sic] from this place. They had come there [sic] to work because her father was a young lawyer and her mother was a teacher...They were quite poor,...and [in] the East, in those times, it was easier for people...there to live and to make some money. So they were saving, they were building a house, and then [the] Second World War came up and they...[had]...to leave everything and run,...because the Russians were coming...It was like now in Yugoslavia...Ukrainian and Polish [people]...lived together in peace, but when the War...[came], they started to fight, especially [the] Ukrainian[s], [who] felt downgraded. So they started to kill...all [the] Polish people. My father is from...[a] completely different part of Poland, because he was born...in Upper Silesia which belonged to Poland, but there was a lot of German influence. So...for example, [when] his mother...[said]...her prayers, she prayed in German. She was Polish, but she was taught in [a] German school...[My parents] were afraid of the Russians, so they escaped when the Russian Army was coming, because they were sending everybody to Siberia. So they escaped, and they were hiding somewhere, I don't know where, some place, because they hoped, when [the] War...[was] finished,...[that they would go] back to this home. But when it was clear that there...[was] no possibility, because it was already Russia,...they moved to [the] West which we got from Germany,...first to Swidnica...and then next to Wroclaw.

10.a14Dd. My grandfather was fighting with [the] Bolsheviks in 1920. But,...like ninety percent of Warsaw people, I'm first generation Warsaw born.

11.5F. My father spent thirteen years in Siberia, the NKVD took him away to Lagier [a concentration camp] in Russia. ³...He was there without trial. In 1944, the Russians...began...well, officially,

³ The Narkomvnudziel, Stalin's Secret Police.

...Have managed to think myself out of the little girl corner, remembering some of the things that George and I have discussed in sessions. ⁴ That not knowing is alright for an adult too: it doesn't mean being a small, powerless child. It's just that for perfectly good reasons, I don't know how certain things work here at the moment. Felt better, though worried that I got into this dynamic so quickly. Is it inevitable in this situation ? Is it me ? Is it R. ? A combination of these things ?...It seems to me interesting, this concept of being, in Hammersley and Atkinson's phrase, 'an acceptable incompetent'. Can see how the willing abandonment of power might be enabling for a man, but not sure how it works (or for that matter is read by others) in the case of a woman. Reminds me of Bowen's *Return to Laughter*, where she talks about being scolded for getting her shoes muddy...

..Met more people yesterday. C. from the Institute delegated to 'zalatwic' things for me - hard to translate - 'to arrange', 'to fix', 'to organise', 'to deal with bureaucracy', but it's immediately apparent that she knows how to ! Generally, though, whilst people are quite helpful about telling me where I need to go to get things arranged if I ask, they seldom offer the information, and are hardly ever specific. Seems odd...

⁴ George Crawford, psychoanalytic psychotherapist, The Scottish Institute of Human Relations, and my psychotherapist from October 1993 - February 2000.

to 'liberate' our eastern territories, and they took him away without trial and he was there for thirteen years without trial. During the War, for a year he was in a German concentration camp, on German territory, but there, because the Germans grabbed him off the street, the family managed to buy him back, and later, I don't know, it's hard to say, somebody...framed him...That's how lots of people extricated themselves, lots of people.

13.16Z. My father was born [in]...1912, and my mother was born two years later...They were born in my village,...[and] they were living [there] from...birth...[But] not until death, because both of them died in Warsaw...My mother...didn't want to come to Warsaw, because...it's not very easy to move,...but we asked mother to move to Warsaw,...and mother decided to move. It was the end of [the] eighties. It was very fine,...[but] only [for] four months...At the beginning of April, my father became sick, and at the end of April he died, and [my] mother [was] left alone. And [it] was for her [an] awful thing, because after four months of living in Warsaw, she lost the best person in her life, and she lost also perspective...My mother died one year ago, but to the end of her life, she always...[said] '[The] best place for me was my village'...And she very often... [looked out of] the window and expected 'Maybe somebody will come. Maybe somebody will tell me what happened in the village'. Who survived, who died, and so on. And sometimes I bec[a]me very nervous, because it's 'Mama, you are living with us, please' - 'No, no, it's no[t] my place, that...is there, where I was born, and I survived so many years'...It's one of the reasons why we say that...old trees shouldn't be moved...[It's] a Polish proverb...

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...Why is it that whenever I mention the word ethnography, people ask me which village I'm going to ?!...

...Spent the week-end with N. and A. - went into the countryside. An absolutely ageless scene - long avenues of trees, haystacks, an open landscape (there are hardly any roadside hedges or fences), tethered cows, one storey cottages, decorated roadside crosses, apple pickers carrying ladders to the orchards...

...Over the last fortnight, I've been going through the worst culture shock I've ever experienced. I've found a few more useful places - shops, a laundry, Polish lessons at the University - but everything feels like walking through toffee...Small things get me down. The currency's changed again, and two currency systems are running concurrently - 10,000 old zlotys equals one new zloty, which shouldn't be too hard to calculate, but somehow is. Other things, though, don't change - the Polish post-office is as grim as ever, though apparently wages there are pretty grim too. Still worried about issues of power and status at the Institute, because I don't know what's expected of me, nor which roles to play...

14.19M. What are the main social groups in Poland ? It depends on whether it's a question of economics, or a question of social strata, whether it's to do with certain social groups, or whether it's a question of earnings. Whether it's also a question...depending...[on] ...education. That's to say that in practice, in Poland we don't have obvious social groups at the moment. But if we're talking about workers, peasants and the intelligentsia, then my parents come from the intelligentsia, and so I also have an intelligentsia background.

16.34S. In Poland, there isn't a...clear split between...high class [and] lower class, [or] whatever. I think that the division is by education - people with high[er] education, people with...medium education, and people...with only primary education...People with higher education...are respected...if...they're able to earn good money,...[but] it is also important how they earn money, because if...[their]...higher education...helps them earn money, then it's fine, but if they earn money...in a way in which higher education is not really helpful, then that doesn't have respect.

17.18S. [My parents] belonged to the - I can say so I think - to the... higher social group...especially because of my father's job as an adwokat [barrister]. He was respected...Especially in the '70s and the '80s, he had a really good position...and we had many friends... coming to us every week or every two weeks,...paying visits, and we paid visits to other people, but all of these people...had higher education, so...they were, I would say, in the higher social group... Obviously, in the '70s and the '80s, because of the fact that the... politicians were closely connected with the Communist Party - or even came from the Communist Party,...were educated by the Communist Party - so obviously, we didn't have contacts with these types of people,...with the politicians, with the people who had political power... I think if, in the '70s and the '80s,...the situation had been different, then I would expect that...the people who were coming to us would have been also politicians...[But] lawyers -

...Met some more people at the Institute today, S. and B., who seemed nice enough. Ended up talking about social class - though getting a straight answer out of anyone on this seems virtually impossible. Felt depressed - how on earth am I ever going to choose people to interview ? B. talked about my being a guest at the Institute, which interested me: discussed this later on the phone with N., who told me that it means I can do what I like and have no responsibilities. That helped clarify things - I think I've been trying to be a British guest and to 'fit in' as much as possible...It's really hard to know how much to try and work things out, and how much to approach people at the Institute as informants. I want everything organised and neatly categorised, but I guess ethnography's just not like that ! I'll just have to be patient and see what emerges. I'm sure Simon would tell me just to pursue whatever seems most interesting. ⁵

...Feeling more settled these days...Lectures in Polish classes are interesting - stereotypical in terms of content (how much of this do people learn at school ?), but how it's all presented is fascinating. It's all performance, national storytelling. Is this just to outsiders, I wonder, or do Poles do this with each other ? And is the fact that people tell me things they must realise I already know actually to do with a kind of self-narrativisation, that perhaps developed as a way of maintaining national and cultural identity ? And/or an obsessive repetition of the national past, a way of coming to terms with individual and collective trauma ? We don't get to say much in Polish classes though, so I might need to get a private teacher to get my spoken Polish up to speed - asking good, nuanced interview questions is going to be demanding. People get very easily offended if you say the wrong thing, so there's not much room for manoeuvre...

⁵ Professor Simon Frith, thesis supervisor.

especially...adwokaci [barristers] - were on the other side of the barricade, basically, so they didn't want to appear as people who had contacts with...the people who had political power...The major part of advocates in Poland were against the Communist system... they had clients who were in some way...hurt, damaged, whatever - by the Communist system. They were fighting against the police, for instance. This is more or less what it looked like.

18.17U. [My father] started...as a teacher first,...then he became Director of [a] school, and he got involved in...[the] Communist Party, okay,...so then the career began ! So he became First Secretary of this small city, and at that time he started to attend University...He was a Party Worker, or whatever...And in 1989, he tried to do something for [the] future...You know that there is a party which was...created from the ex-Communist Party. So he thought about going there - SLD. Fortunately, we managed to convince him [that he should quit], and I think finally he understood that was not the...best way. In the meantime, now he's [the] Director of [a] very small bank.

25.33aU. I think it's very difficult to select [social] groups in Poland,...because in the past there was only average. Okay, there was some group of people that you couldn't include,...but in general, I think the level was more or less equal...So everything that happened after 1989 influenced [the] different...classes,...but...the process...has not [been] finalised... I think it's a question of a few years. But people like myself...will become thirty-five, forty, and then you will have a certain group of people that created something, you will have people that will get poorer and poorer, unfortunately, but that's reality...This is also the case in some Western countries. And you will have a group,...I will call them survivors,...that...earn and...spend everything they earned...And you will have a leading group, which is not related to money but to position...When I say leading group,...I think mostly they don't earn a lot of money,

...All Souls and All Saints holiday, so a chance to relax and reflect...Spent some time at N. and A.'s watching interviews with Presidential candidates...We talked about the research, and about interviewing people who belong to the Polish British Friendship Society and people who don't. But how to select them ? I can't do every permutation of Polishness, but I need to get a heterogeneous spread of ideas. There's no way of trying to match up people from inside and outside the PBFS according to particular variables, because there would just be too many of them, and anyway, I don't think national identity works like that - it's to do with other things than simply a particular combination of regional, social class, gender, and age variables. And then there's this whole issue of my own perceptions of the culture: I've been really struck, over the past few weeks, as to how impossible it is to adopt any sort of objective position. With small incidents at the Institute, I find myself wondering why I interpret things in the way that I do, how I'm being interpreted, whether someone's behaviour is because they're Polish or because they're them, and whether mine is because I'm English or because I'm me. What is the relationship between the

secondly, they are famous, so people want to listen to...their opinion. I think what Poland suffers from now is that we don't have...a real 'autorytet' [authority, respected individual] like we had in the past. For example, Walesa was this kind of 'autorytet' for Poles. Currently we don't have this...So I think in general, the position of [the] leading group is weak in Poland...

27.27R. Before [the] Second World War, the position of [the] intelligentsia was very high. After [the] Second World War, during the Communist period, the position of [the] intelligentsia, of course, was relatively low...in all kinds of senses. [Its] prestige was relatively good, [but] [its] financial position...was much, much weaker than before. But it was a special period, as you know, because it was official politics to promote...different social groups, ...and [it] stopped the influence of the [old] intelligentsia on Polish society. It was very systematic politics...Now, it is a difficult period for [the] intelligentsia, because in the time of Socialism, the prestige of [the] intelligentsia was still high. Now, the processes of commercialisation and free market economy rapidly change the position...and [the] social influence of [the] intelligentsia. But I think the position...of [the] intelligentsia is still high,...[but] not so strong like before [sic], because...social transformation, political transformation, and, first of all, economic transformation and social stratification, is different, and [the] position of [the] different social groups is changing, and this is what we can observe now. We don't know exactly what will be the end of those transformations, but all [the] sociological research...and sociological findings are very clear: the position of the intelligentsia is changing.

28.29bZ. There are very significant changes now because,...since [the]...changes,...[the] connections of [the] younger generation with [the] earth, with farms, are not so close as they were in the past;... now [the] younger generation dreams to leave [sic] [the] farms, to go to the city, and to earn money...And I think now the connections

ethnographer and the host culture ? What is the relationship between the ethnographer and his/her own culture, between any individual and his/her culture ? And how much of any of it is conscious, available for 'ethnographic reflexivity', anyway ?...I don't know how people produce these calm, confident ethnographies - the process just isn't that cut and dried...

...Quite a lot of useful conversations recently at the Institute - I'm finding it easier these days to ask directly about colleagues' opinions on Polish society...Finally beginning to feel that I'm getting a bit of a consensus on what sorts of factors might matter...

...R. at the Institute has just told me that I ought to have a clear set of research aims and to be doing questionnaires - told him that that is not how I'm approaching it, and that I already have a supervisor in Britain, thank-you ! Luckily, B. came to the rescue, and explained to him that I am doing something more anthropological. I was thinking about this afterwards, and how typical he is for me of a certain sort of Pole: a perfect example of the kind of superiority/ inferiority complex that B. was talking about ! And suddenly, something fell into place: I need to think not only about internal

of [the] younger generation...[are]...much...weaker than...in the past...We try to become [an] industrial society, not [an] agricultural society.

29.30Bb. We're aware that the position of farmers in Polish society is, and should be, very important. For lots of reasons. Here, we have a slogan which reflects our position - that's to say a certain essential element of our history, which you perhaps know, which in his time Kosciuszko wrote on the standard of the scythe-men - 'They provide and they defend', right ?...For example, the Polish farmers only succeeded once against the Germans - that was in the Zamosc area. The Germans succeeded with everything else. They destroyed the Ghetto, they destroyed the Warsaw Uprising...but in Zamosc - two, three Polish administrative districts, maybe two hundred thousand people all together - and the Germans didn't succeed in winning. A bit like with the Russians today in Ciechnya. [So] what were the German interests and why did they lose ? The Germans started to murder, to relocate these Polish peasants, right?...and they intended to settle this land with Germans. Because of course, they wanted to get rid of the Poles but to keep the buildings,...to keep the possibility of production, the animals. So what did these Poles have to do ? When the Germans came to the villages, they had to burn down their own places. And the Germans saw that their aim of replacing Polish farmers with German farmers wasn't going to be realised...And in this way, having killed some ten thousand people, ...they lost this battle for the land...

31.30bBb. It's as if this is the sector of society which naturally both preserves the thousand-year-old, traditional Christian culture of the nation...and...this living source of the culture...It's some sort of authentic cultural creation of the nation...However,...the economic... position of the farmers has significantly declined. That is, the share of GDP has shrunk from thirteen percent in 1985 to about seven percent now...and if we measure the income of 1945 against that of

versions of Polishness, but also about people's relationships to the West. Off the top of my head - people who think Poland needs to be defended from the West, people who would want to minimise differences between Poland and the West, people who think Poland needs to be 'civilised' by the West, traditional nationalists, more extreme nationalists. Some of the election poster slogans I've seen around seem to suggest various positions - Walesa's 'Always for Poland', Olszewski's 'Poland ! Wake up !', Gronkiewicz-Waltz's 'We'll Take Care of Poland' - and the graffiti on her poster saying 'Zydowska Grunbaum' - literally 'The Jewess Grunbaum': anti-semitism's never far below the surface here, despite the fact there are hardly any Jews left.

...Go to N. and A.'s for the elections, and with them to the polling station. Flags on the way in, and inside, a display of red and white carnations, and a huge white cardboard eagle, complete with gold foil crown, on a red background. Enormous voting slip, to take account of all seventeen candidates. Also a poster outside in the hall, giving details of each candidate - name, age, job, residency, and, interestingly, education...

1990, it's a fall of forty percent...at best, because maybe it's even worse...And what follows from this ?...Today, village children... have an even greater barrier to go to school than I did when I went,...and now there isn't any help from the State. The help was modest but it was enough to be sufficient...People without great financial resources could complete their studies in peace by virtue of the State grant. Now, the grant - which a few years ago amounted to one third of the average salary - has fallen to about ten percent. This is altogether unacceptable, because you can't survive... So, in short, the position of the peasants, or in the countryside generally, is such as hasn't been known for fifty years...Once again, there's the phenomenon of unemployment,...a lack of advancement...These are two very important factors, because a society can be very differentiated, it can even be very poor, but if there are open paths to advancement, everything's okay. But if the paths to advancement are closed,...then that's [no good]...The Republic would be better off profiting from this potential for its own good. Polish farmers can produce food for eighty to one hundred million people, right ? That has always been our potential - it's a question of making use of this potential.

32.23D. [My parents] are typical workers... I think that this is...a very important, fundamental group, because they create the national spirit...Without these people, without these workers and a skilled intelligentsia,...it wouldn't exist. We must have these workers, their position is very important...Who would organise the strikes ? Not the office worker, only the worker. So, I consider them to have a very important position...Miners are workers, steelworkers are workers, shipyard workers are workers, railwaymen are workers - that's how I understand it. I consider them to be a very important social group...I think they have a good position [in society], but they are not always appreciated. The role that they fulfil and what it creates is underestimated - that's my feeling, that they're not

...Went to my first meeting of the Polish British Friendship Society today ! They take place once a month...There were nineteen people altogether - twelve women and seven men, and a range of ages, from students to older people...Felt v. enthusiastic after the meeting. Getting to know people well enough to do interviews might be difficult if meetings are only once a month, but I'll have to see how it goes...

...Kwasniewski, a former Communist, won the final play-off for the Presidency, after a second round of voting against Walesa, though I'm not sure exactly when he'll take over...

...An amusing incident going in to the Instytut yesterday. Two older Frenchmen on the bus; one was looking at me, and the other said to him, 'Les jeunes filles polonaises sont très jolies, eh ?'. I was tempted to reply in my probably not very pretty French that I was, in fact, a 'jeune fille anglaise', but managed to keep a straight face and say nothing ! It felt strange being taken for a Polish woman. Only a foreigner would get this wrong. I've been watching carefully to see how young women behave in public, and I think you

appreciated. But it should be, I think...Without the miners, without the steelworkers, without the railwaymen, what would there be.?

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65.209R. For me, what's important in being a Pole is above all a knowledge of history, of the culture of the Polish nation. This is unusually important...Knowledge of, and respect for, the history of the nation...construct my identity, define my character, my existence...Understanding of the history, of the values, not only of my nation, but also of others'. I consider that if I don't understand the values of my own nation, I'm not in a position to understand the values of other nations. Because it's only by analogy that I can refer to the experience of others. So that's why that's important.

66.202R. Starting from the beginning,...there's the acceptance of religion, Christianity, Catholicism, that's a big event. Because it founded the Polish State, but simultaneously, from the beginning, it had great meaning for Poles...Then there were such great events as the Battle of Grunwald, that's the next victory, right ? the triumph over the Teutonic Knights, over the Prussians...There's also...the Jagiellonians, Jagiello and all that territory, then the great symbolic meaning of the Golden Age,...the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the era of the greatness of the Polish State...of Krakow as a metropolis, as a capital, of a strong State and everything associated with Polishness...Then later,...there's the era of the Partitions, and here, of course, there are the Uprisings - the November Uprising, the January Uprising, so those are great symbols, which of course express the Polish spirit. Then, of course, the era of the nineteenth century, which has many such symbols - Romanticism, literature - for Poles, names like Chopin, Mickiewicz, Slowacki, are terribly important - they're the names of symbols of Polishness, without

probably have to be fairly closed and disdainful in public. I'm not good at this yet - must practise !

...Big protests against the prospect of Kwasniewski becoming President, because, although he claims to have passed his final exams at Gdansk University, the University has confirmed on tv that he was never awarded a degree, and Walesa's camp is objecting to the result on the grounds that the level of education of presidential candidates was an important issue for about 30% of the electorate, so the whole thing's going to the High Court...

...A useful chat at the Instytut with S. about ethnography - for him it really is folk costumes and food and wedding customs...Have been given the name of a good Polish teacher, who teaches some of the British Council and Embassy staff...

doubt...⁶ The place of culture, of literature, in the history of the identification of the Polish nation is extremely important,...without that, it's impossible to understand [it]. And then later, of course, the twentieth century, that's Pilsudski, that's the twenty-one years [when Poland was independent between the First and Second World Wars], that's the Polish State, that's independence, everything that's associated with the rise of the Polish State, with getting independence, self-determination. And then, of course, '39 - here there are a number of places, names, dates, which identify Poland, which express history, which symbolise the defence...of '39 - ... Westerplatte is an important symbol, later, of course, Monte Casino, the names of Generals of armies are also a symbol which Poles remember, also the Battle of Britain, in which Poles participated in the West...These are very vivid symbols of Polishness, of this Polish spirit - that it's worth liberating other nations because freedom is all one...they'll have freedom and we'll have freedom, right ? Because 'Your Freedom and Ours' - please notice the order - yours first, and then ours, and not the other way round ! So that's something. And then, of course, our most recent history, lots of names like Cardinal Wyszynski,⁷ such positive [examples], which symbolise Polishness, which symbolise the patriotism of Poland. And then, of course, Solidarity, the Pope - these are contemporary symbols - Walesa.

67.204R. It's very hard to say [which period is the most characteristic], but I think that it's...the fifteenth/sixteenth century. It's a long time ago, but it constructed the...Polish soul,...the noble culture, Polish literature - which came into being then - ...Poland had a powerful army [then],...and this symbolism later appealed to a lot of poets, painters, philosophers, patriots...[The 'szlachta' (noble)

⁶ Mickiewicz (1798 - 1855), a well-known Polish Romantic poet; Slowacki (1809 - 49), a well-known Polish poet and dramatist.

⁷ Primate of Poland from 1948 - 1981, Cardinal Wyszynski's unrelenting defence of religious freedoms in post-war negotiations with the Communists led to his arrest and detention without trial from 1953 - 56.

...Had a v. interesting conversation with Y., who's studying here and is Polish, but from Lithuania, and who was telling me how her family had decided to stay in Wilno after the War, and how this had been a terrible mistake...Got an amazing sense of history from that conversation. Somehow made me think of Benjamin's Angel, and about homogeneous and messianic time. How does this relate to psychoanalytic time and narration - the way in which psychoanalysis somehow gets you to reorder things so that reactions that belong to the past get put back there, so that messianic time gets turned into homogeneous time ? Not sure how any of this relates to Polishness or ethnography, but...

...Had my first Polish lesson with the teacher who was recommended to me, and it went really well. We're going to do a mixture of conversation and working on interview questions...

...December 13th, the anniversary of the imposition of Martial Law...

mentality] has a number of negative and positive features...In the positive sense, the feeling of freedom, the feeling of pride in one's roots...the feeling of dignity...Besides this, it's important to emphasise here a certain noble democracy - it was a very limited democracy of course, but it was democracy. Maybe...it was taken a bit too far,...there was a certain chaos and a certain kind of noble anarchy - liberum veto - ...democracy was taken to absurdity, but nevertheless this era constructed the feeling of democracy, and we Poles had this very early, in the sixteenth century. Democracy, for the Pole, is ancient history.

69.177I. Definitely [in the] years just before Poland was... partitioned,...you can't...[talk]...about any State, I mean, everybody was doing whatever they want[ed], and the aristocracy was so powerful, and [the] King was absolutely powerless, and...the Polish so-called 'Golden Freedom' was just...like a grave for Poland, and [it] was a really, really sad period...It was [the] eighteenth century - end of [the] seventeenth and beginning of [the] eighteenth, and it ended up in 1772, when there was [the] First Partition.

71.188U. Well,...[the] Constitution [was an important event], because...[it] was [the] second constitution in the world, and the first in Europe, and I think this is an excellent example that we can do something. The way it was done and what happened after that is also an example of what we can do with ourselves !...So this proves that we can do a lot of things - important things.

72.175I. [When you're talking about important historical events], it depends on which part of Poland, because, as you know,...Poland was split...[into] three parts...It depend[ed] [on] which part of Poland was under which rule. For example, in the west[ern] part of Poland, where...Poznan [is], they...[didn't] fight - they work[ed]

...Met with the Professor of the one seminar I've been attending - on national identity - to discuss interview questions. She suggested things like 'What is typical behaviour for a Pole?' and 'What does it mean to be a real Pole?'. These would be okay, but I also want to get at things less rationally. She didn't seem very keen on a question about Poland joining the EU, saying that only people from the intelligentsia would be able to answer it! Apart from one or two of my sociologist colleagues, there does seem to be a sense - shared by most people I've spoken to - my cleaner, the man downstairs in the hostel shop, the 'portierki' - that the only people who are knowledgeable enough to discuss national identity are the intelligentsia. The members of the PBFS I've spoken to so far seem to belong to this group, so it might make sense to stick to it, but I'm feeling fairly confused about who to talk to - should I try to take a cross-section of society or not? Perhaps I should just choose people I want to talk to, and then work out why I'd like to interview them...

...Just a few days to Christmas, and suddenly, the political situation has gone haywire. Walesa is about to hand over power to Kwasniewski, but has just accused Oleksy, the Prime Minister, of being a KGB spy. The media's talking about Walesa declaring a State of Emergency to prolong his Presidency. Everyone at the

very hard, because their way of independence was just to work hard and establish Polish banks, Polish factories, and so on. Even though... [the] Germans rule[d]. And in our part,...[which] was under Russia, we were...always fight[ing], uprising, and stuff like that, and in Austria,...there was the biggest autonomy, because there...[were] Polish people sitting in the Government...So it depends in which part how they fight [sic]...we say that people from Poznan are very good workers, very honest, while here...[on the] Russian [Partition] border, there was always fighting against Russian rule, so the main point was to cheat them...to steal. And I think that unfortunately, ...this kind of division still works.

74.150C. For me, the most characteristic era [for Poland] would be the era...between the Wars, because then, after the First World War, Poland obtained independence, and between the First and Second War, it was an absolutely independent country, and it could shape its existence...

77.206R. A negative, tragic era is the Second World War...'Jeszcze Polska nie zginela' - [Poland has not yet perished] - that's what we have in our national anthem, right ?

76.150C. I think that [the most tragic] was the era of Nazi Occupation, because...there wasn't a Polish family who didn't lose someone during this time,...or a whole succession of people.

79.149C. When it comes to the most important events connected with Polishness, it's necessary to mention the continuation of...the Warsaw Uprising...and the whole battle for Warsaw...These memories of the Uprising Battle during the last War are very much alive - for me, perhaps, especially alive - because my father fought in the Uprising and he talked about it a lot...Of course, Katyn is also

Instytut discussing the situation when I arrive. N. says she's ashamed of her country, S. asks why they can't have a normal President with a normal Government, like a normal country. Phoned N. and A. in the evening, who said that December's are never good in this country politically, and that if anything happens, to try and get over to them somehow. The news says there'll be an announcement about Oleksy from the Army tomorrow. Then there's a political broadcast from Oleksy himself, who says it's all designed to create internal destabilisation...Still, no point in getting worried yet - if a State of Emergency's declared, the capital's probably the best place to be...

...Three days later, and no State of Emergency. But I've gone over to N. and A.'s anyway, to watch Kwasniewski being sworn in. Cardinal Glemp, ⁸ Walesa, and about a third of the MPs boycott the event. So that's alright then: back to the usual chaos !

...Wigilia. I am staying with N. and A. for Christmas. We talk about all the traditions - how the whole house has to be cleaned from top

⁸ Cardinal Glemp, Primate of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1981.

a symbol of Polishness, although this name didn't appear on the maps of history books of my generation. Even so, I without doubt basically had information about this both from my family and from people I knew. Friends of my family who were officers died at Katyn, so it was a tragedy which touched [a lot of] Polish families.

83.208R. The Castle was, of course, destroyed during the Second World War...And only very late on in the '70s was it rebuilt...But it functioned in literature, in painting...as a symbol of the nation. That's why it was rebuilt. Even though it wasn't there physically - there was only a little piece of wall and everything was destroyed, it functioned symbolically, as a cultural symbol. [When it was rebuilt], it was a symbol of the integration of the nation,...a symbol of this whole place historically, which integrated all Poles. Like the whole of Warsaw generally...It symbolised all these cultural values. It was essential for the whole of Polish culture. It symbolised history, the king, the kingdom,...a place of central importance to the Polish State,...but more for Polish culture than the Polish State.

84.234Cc. The whole of Warsaw was rebuilt, and so the question is not so much why was [the Royal Castle] rebuilt, as why was it rebuilt so late ? I think that...for the Stalinist powers, which wanted to change Polish identity [and] cultural continuity, that Castle, as a place which the monarchy inhabited, wasn't the most appropriate symbol, and since it was destroyed,...they didn't take the decision to rebuild it. However, Edward Gierek...tried...to make it acceptable to the Communist powers through appealing to national identity.⁹ ...And in political spheres,...I think that the reconstruction of the Castle was linked with the results of their politics - a certain

⁹ Gierek: First Secretary of Poland from 1970 - 81. Gierek's rule is associated with an initial period of successful economic and political reform, based largely on money borrowed from the West, which resulted in an economic boom and higher standards of living for many Poles, until the economy crashed in the mid '70s. Part of Gierek's strategy was to encourage investment by ex-patriot Poles through political 'normalisation'.

to bottom, how the Christmas candles have to be burned down otherwise there'll be a death in the house, how we can't eat meat all day. On the news, the usual stuff about animals talking on Christmas Eve and the crib competition held in Krakow - the nativity scene is reinterpreted in traditional folk models with contemporary elements, quite as if Christ was really born in modern Poland !

Christmas Day. Church isn't that busy because a lot of people were at midnight mass last night. I manage to join in some of the carols, usually about half way through ! The sermon is interesting - suffering, Katyn, 1970, 1981, and how it was all worth it - then some rather cleverly worded comments about the current political situation - how some people were perhaps feeling disappointed with their defeat, and others rather uncomfortable with their victory, the difference between the justice of the High Court, and moral justice. At the end, I go up to the alter to see the crib scene: there is a special angel that nods its head when children put money in the box it is holding...

national identification of the Party with national tradition. Because in those times, it was treated as a competitive, divisive thing... Gierk put a [strong] accent on this,...[because he wanted] to challenge the Church's monopoly on national cultural identity.

81.224Aa. The most important events in the history of Poland are linked with the Castle, and are related to the rule of Stanislaw August - that's to say, the Constitution of the Third of May...

86.184I. They said that Gierk need[ed] some money because the Polonia - I mean all those Poles [who] live[d] abroad - they sent money and he wanted their money...Anyway, he wanted to convince...Poles abroad that Poland was okay, and was [a] normal country, and 'You can come here and give us your money !'...It started in 1970, when Gierk came...to power, and they said... 'Poland's now [an] open country'.

88.155C. The Royal Castle was certainly...[important],...because I think that if it hadn't been [rebuilt], there would have been a gap, and, let's say, it wouldn't have been possible to return to certain things which are now possible... I remember very clearly the times when, in the place of the Castle, there was only...[the ruin] of a wall. Nothing more. And there was an empty place, and that was very sad...[There was] only a little heap of ruins,...only a column of walls which symbolised the fact that here, exactly, stood the Castle. But later,...the initiative to rebuild the Castle...was successful, and...it was a...fantastic thing... I think [it was rebuilt] because it is also some sort of symbol of Polishness...and that's why...they finally rebuilt it... I'm not sure, but it seems to me that before the War,...the inside was in the same style [as during the reign of Stanislaw August], and that's why it was rebuilt in that style after the War.

At N. and A.'s, and the priest comes round on his annual Epiphany visit to his parishioners, chalking on the door KMB - for *Kacper, Melchior, Baltazar* - as he leaves...

...Quite amused recently at the extent to which I'm using local behaviour patterns: developing that steely but bright determination that women have here for dealing with bureaucrats, saying hello and good-bye collectively to everyone present, barging onto buses. But lots of things still confuse me, like how to end group conversations, and use of personal space...

...Met Professor O. yesterday, as someone suggested she would be a good person to talk to. We discussed the sampling problem, and whether I want to do a direct comparison between PBFS and non-PBFS interviewees. I don't think I do - rather, I want to locate the PBFS within a range of ideas about Polishness and Britishness. Then Professor O. suggested meeting with her Department to discuss the problem, and told me (!) to write a paper by the end of tomorrow outlining the PhD. Saying no would have caused enormous offence, so I had to agree...

93.183I. I remember, because I took part in [the] building at the beginning. There...[were]...a lot of youngsters [who] came there and...[dug]...[the] foundations. Because we treat[ed] it as...fun. And it was...very fashionable to go there and do something; I had a part in this. But this piece of wall with this empty window was more [important]...it speaks stronger [sic] to me that this new barn ! My friend from Krakow said 'Oh, you...[have built]...[a] new barn here !' [and] I said 'Jealousy, jealousy !'.

89.170H. It may have some symbolic value for [the] older generation more than for the younger...It was reconstructed because we wanted it to be exactly as it was before. The whole idea of rebuilding this Castle was to make it in the same form as it used to be.

92.223Aa. If we don't count the break when there was...only a wall with a little bit of window after '44, the Castle...has been there since it was built in the fourteenth century, that's to say, in its first, original, gothic form. Though it's been extended and reconstructed, of course, from those times it's existed.

95.211Z. I think the most tragic moments in Polish history were those in which Poles were fighting against Poles,...the beginning of [the] '50s, when Poles repressed...Poles. It was '56, it was '78, it was also...[in the] '80s.

97.176I. You were asking before what is the worst time in Polish history. I think [the] '80s, when Martial Law started - 1980 was great, but from 1981 to 1989,...everybody was like in [a] kind of lethargy, like in [a] coma...Life was just...like a nightmare...Nothing important happened, and...you...[were]... still waiting for something. Nobody...[knew] for what. I think that...[was]...the worst time.

...Writing the paper yesterday turned out to be quite useful - helped me to make a distinction in my own mind between finding out about different varieties of Polishness and attitudes towards Polishness - I think there is a difference between what people display in their behaviour and what they say they think and believe. Only that's as true of me as it is of any of the people I'll be working with, which is where it gets difficult...Also realised that with ethnography, you never belong - you're always going to be marginal - and nor can you control. Of course, you have to keep thinking about things and probing for information, and shouldn't just go along with the image that everyone wants you to have of them, but at the same time, you have to accept that the images people are offering are interesting in themselves...No way of working out why people at PBFS feel the way they do about Polishness or Britishness, though, given that most of their reasons will presumably be unconscious, and that I'm not a psychoanalyst any more than they're psychoanalysands...

...Giving the paper about the PhD was an awful experience - completely soul destroying. Some of the discussion was quite interesting, but there were three main problems. Everyone seemed in agreement that I shouldn't ask about Polishness unless I could define it, whereas for me, part of the research is about getting people to define what Polishness is ! Then there was this whole obsession with what Polishness is in isolation - someone even asked me if I thought national identity was something that could be

98.205R. It seems to me that this last era also, this era of the Solidarity years,...the beginning of the 1980s, this first Solidarity era and then this Solidarity era at the end of the 1980s, 1989 to 1990, this era...[was] positive. It...symbolises a fight for liberation, for independence, for identity, for national dignity - it's very emotional for Poles.

99.195M. A Polish symbol might be...a personality, like the Pope or Walesa,...people who are recognised throughout the world, who are the carriers of particular ideas...

100.247H. Walesa...did a lot for Poland and for all of us. And he's not appreciated by the Polish people now as he should be, because of his not very good manners, because he's not very well educated, [because] he does not speak Polish correctly...[But] he did a lot, because we owe to him...[our] liberty.

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103.200R. [A symbol of Polishness]...is the eagle with a crown...It's very easy to explain. It's connected to [the] history of the Polish State and nation which is a thousand years old, and that's history ! ...The crown symbolises history,...the continuity of the State, the continuity of the nation, and that's why it's so important for Poles, because in the context of the Partitions, in the context of the lack of a State, the crown symbolised that this nation had its own State. That it wasn't an unreal, small, weak, divided nation. The crown said that it was a strong, powerful State. In the sixteenth century, it was one of the most powerful States in Europe. And it's as if it appealed to this era and symbolised in this way the continuity, the identity, the unity of this nation, which had its own State. Which is why the eagle without a crown, such as we had in our history, is

defined in opposition to something else, whereas for me, identity is always about this. And thirdly, there's something about the way in which Poles tend to discuss things which I find absolutely infuriating: it's not a question of okay, here's this problem, how can we solve it ? but rather, everyone wants to tell you what you should be doing in terms of their own pet project, and nobody's satisfied until and unless the whole thing ends up in total fragmentation ! So everything just gets unpicked, until everyone concludes that in the end, nothing is possible, and the whole meeting just collapses in disarray. Spoke to N. in the evening, who said it was always like that, it was just Poland. An interesting comment from Professor O. at the end though - that they'd accept me as a Pole. Upset about the whole thing, but feel as if I've been through some sort of initiation...

...Met with Professor J., someone else who's been recommended to me, but decided not even to mention the word 'Polishness'. Instead, tried saying that I wanted to know what the main reactions were of Poles to the West since 1988. So was absolutely delighted when she said 'Sorry ! But if you ask people about their attitudes to the West, then they'll tell you about Polishness !'. At last, someone who understands what I'm on about !...

like some kind of pathology for Poland,...something that was a negative deviation...The eagle itself...is a symbol, because, in a way, it's strong; maybe it's also ambition...During the Partitions,...the nation was strong...Despite the fact that for two hundred years it lacked a State, its wholeness endured...That's why the eagle expresses a certain strength, and...a certain aggression as well, which is a defence, which shows that it is really resilient...There's also a certain element of flight, it's something which flies, which rises up, that's very important, that it soars to the mountain tops, that it's something that is able to ascend,...a symbol of motion, a symbol of the air, a symbol of flight...

102.199R. [The eagle] express[es], symbolise[s] the State, and not just the State, but also the nation...It seems to me that for Poles, and also for me personally, [it is] a symbol of the nation, and that that's more than simply a symbol of the State...

106.215Aa. Officially, of course, the flag, the emblem, [and] the anthem,...but certain symbolic places, certain monuments are also linked either with the Polish spirit or with very real events [taking place] on the territory of the country. Certainly, Warsaw has a... symbolic value, with such places as the Royal Castle, and certainly Wawel and the whole of Krakow, and certainly Czestochowa.

108.171I. Warsaw is special because of...historical events. I mean, [the] Warsaw Uprising...and...everything important during the War happened here in Warsaw. Krakow...is important because of... culture... Krakow University...is one of the oldest in Europe and the atmosphere of this city...is completely different. Warsaw is [a] completely new city, there...[are]...a lot of people [who] live in Warsaw [who] are not from Warsaw - it's rather a rarity to find somebody from a real Warsaw family... I know a family in Krakow...[who] have furniture from [the] sixteenth century... - they

...Had a useful chat with W. today, who explained what some of the problems had been at my paper. First, the word 'Polishness' is treated by some of our more nationalistic colleagues as if it's almost sacred. Secondly, that's how PhD students are treated here: it's about demonstrating who's in charge. Thirdly, because I'm a foreigner, some of the people at the seminar probably assumed that I was looking down on them, and therefore perhaps felt that they had something to prove. Lovely message from Simon, saying to remember that it is my research, and that I might have to justify my choices later, but that is part of the fun of the creative research process (!).

...An amazing sight in the canteen yesterday: a party for people who took part in the Warsaw Uprising in World War II - suddenly, there was history, staring you in the face again...

...Had lunch with N., and discussed with her the best way of requesting interviews with PBFS people. She said to get it on the agenda at the next meeting, which is the last thing I'd have done. Also asked her about direct questioning, as I've got the impression over the past few months that people tend to talk about themselves,

still have it. It's like...continuing history, which in Warsaw is absolutely impossible.

109.201R. There are a lot of religious symbols which are closely connected with the history of the nation. There's Czestochowa, for example...The whole history connected with Czestochowa, the defence of Czestochowa against the Swedes, and all those symbols - Matka Boska Czestochowska [the Mother of God of Czestochowa], these are religious symbols which, for Poles, are basically synonyms of the Polish nation.

110.218Aa. Next come the great military symbols: Grunwald, of course, which changed the fate of Europe, and also...Westerplatte - the German name, but after all, it's become a symbol of Polish endurance, not as the place where the biggest World War started, but as a certain general symbol of Polish destiny, that's to say, a readiness to fight for freedom in hopeless circumstances, which are considered very important. Because the defenders of Westerplatte defended not only these outposts, not only their country, but also European values.

112.173I. I think for many people, Lwow is very...[important],... because it was [a] very Polish city... I have no family there, no memories, but I have a lot of friends...[who have]...grandmothers and grandfathers from Lwow, and they have...very strong memories, and they are still very...connected with this city.

114.174I. Mazowsze landscape [is very typically Polish] - almost flat, fields - a little bit wavy,...with forest on the horizon:...this is typical. And...I don't know how you call this tree which was very, very typical for Polish landscape, this Chopin tree ?...[A] willow

and then expect you to reciprocate at a similar level of disclosure. N. said that was how it went in conversations, but in interviews, you asked directly. I think at some level, I've always understood about not asking directly in conversations, but hadn't worked it out the other way round - that you talk rather than waiting to be asked. So it's not that people at the beginning weren't interested in what I was doing, it was that they were being polite by not asking...Went to PBFS in the evening, and asked for my interview request to go on the agenda. N. was right - it worked really well - it was duly announced, and most people who were there signed up. I'll need to select from the list, but can do that on the basis of what I already know about people, so as to get a range of views...

...March 8th: someone brought flowers to the Department. Women used to be given small presents at work, too, but that doesn't seem to happen much now. Later, it turned out that the flowers were, in fact, in memory of the 1968 Student Demonstrations, and not for Women's Day at all ! Useful discussion with colleagues about Polish motherhood, which B. says is almost sacred. Also of 'Fatherland', though some disagreement as to whether this was a Party word, or a patriotic word. Also some discussion of the evils of capitalism, how tough it is for Poland. There's something about the 'poor little Poland' tone of the discussion which annoys me - yes, early capitalism's wretched, (and in a sense, with its reintroduction, that's effectively what Poland's going through), but there's this attitude that it's all the fault of the West, that it's somehow been imposed, which I'm not sure is entirely accurate. I am teased about a Czech friend who has come to stay, and everyone is very disappointed to find out that he is a friend. 'A friend from the

tree ? But [a] special kind of willow tree:...this is very typical for Polish fairy-tales...

115.238Dd. The second [thing] is probably our Goraly - Highlanders - and [the] Tatr[as] - and the symbol [of] Gierwont... There is this Gierwont - it looks like a sleeping...Highlander,... because even his nose is like [a] typical Highlander's. And the story is...[that]...some bunch of Highlanders...were defending Poland, and then they went to some cave...[to] sleep until Poland...need[s] them again so [then] they [will] wake up and help Poland...Some people say it's a knight, some people say it's a Highlander...And actually, some scientists said it was totally crap, because these Highlanders... were some Hungarians...[who]...came...[from]...the Carpathians - a Hungarian tribe which...came to Poland some centuries ago...But they are...symbols of Poland, because they are very specific...

117.217Aa. For me, 1st November is...the essence of Polishness: the Holy Day of the Dead...[is] one of the most Polish of the Holy Days. It's when homage is paid to all the dead, and when Polish cemeteries are thronged with thousands and thousands of people, who on this day are visiting the cemeteries, lighting candles in the evening - these cemeteries reflecting these thousands of candles - it's an expression of the continuity of the generations, a demonstration that those who have left us haven't left us completely, that they are with us but we are also a result of this previous generation - a great demonstration of continuity. Certainly, [it is] older in the Polish tradition than Christianity...And for me, this is outstanding - an outstanding Polish Holy Day. Please note that when there was no State, graves were also symbols of Statehood - for example, in the '80s, demonstrators on 1st November went from political grave to political grave or to the graves of those who had been killed, or, for example, of soldiers killed by the Communists...Here,...a feeling of continuity...is important, because unlike, for example England, or several other countries, Poland went several times through ruptures of continuity,

heart ?' asks T., perhaps hoping that I have simply got the wrong word in Polish ! Everyone is clearly dying to have me safely attached. Making sure everyone gets married is virtually a national obsession. Maybe it's connected to Polish history, the need for family to look after and protect each other ?...

...I've pretty much decided on who I want to interview and why, now. First, I'm going to stick to the intelligentsia, both because all the PBFS people seem to belong to it, from what I can tell, and because of this idea that national identity is really the preserve of the intelligentsia anyway. There are obviously arguments against this, but it seems fair enough to go along with what appears to be a reasonable cultural consensus, even if it's one I wouldn't necessarily agree with myself. Secondly, within the PBFS group, I'm going to go for a cross-section of ages and a representative mix of genders, because this seems to be the best way of getting a range of views. Thirdly, I'm going to interview an equal number of people from outside the PBFS, but I'm not going to match people up too precisely, because so many other factors could come into it, that you couldn't really control the variables anyway. I'll select non-PBFS in two main ways: one will be according to age and gender again - so that I get a range and some sort of balance; the other will be in terms of likely attitudes to Polishness, both internally and in relation to the West. Some people I know already, others I'll try to get from a spread of the most important political parties...

both political and even legal. You come from a country in which the law is from Magna Carta Libertatum - in Poland, the legal system has changed several times. That's an altogether different experience...So this demonstration of continuity,...this grave cult, is very important. In my opinion, it's linked to a certain unconscious declaration of mortality, a readiness for matters which are more important than everyday life, that are transient, matters which give life meaning, and are more important than the bare facts of mere biological existence.

131.162G. What's the source [of knowledge about these symbols ?]. Well, certainly the source...was...school books...and discussions at school...The real teachers were the ones who taught us these things, and they were the real Poles...There weren't lessons on Polish culture, but there were classes with your form...In my school,...there was a very old lady who had fought during the Second World War,...and we had lectures with her in my form about the Polish spirit...

132.207R. Polish school plays a large part...Even during the era of Communism,...school was very patriotic...And school basically educated us in the...explanation of these symbols, these signs...It was school, school, school which led the way in culture, in literature, in art, in history...It was all an integral component of our programme of education. It was, and is, in history, in Polish language, in literature, but also in geography. Various subjects have this special feature in Poland that they are comprised from the point of view of the education of the Polish spirit, of the patriotic spirit. That's the aim of the Polish education system.

133.182I. Of course, it was from school, but also...history...My father...[fought] in [the] Warsaw Uprising,...even though he didn't

...Start making phone calls to arrange interviews. Phones a nightmare, as usual - either they're not working, or there's a massive queue, or it's impossible to get hold of people. Arranging times seems complicated, too. Asking people what would be a good time seems to cause massive confusion: they seem to want me to propose a time and for them to say whether or not they can do it, but I would feel rude dictating when the interviews should happen, as they're doing me a favour. There also seems to be a problem around planning - nobody seems to know what they'll be doing beyond the next couple of days...

...Interviews going well. The language isn't proving as much of a problem as I'd thought it might - I ask people if they'd prefer to do the interview in English or Polish, and, unless they speak good English, most go for Polish. I don't always understand every single word, but can get most of what's being said - the odd patches where I don't I'll have to decipher when I'm transcribing. Getting hold of people by phone is still proving hard, though, because they are seldom where they say they're going to be, so you can easily spend half a day fixing up a couple of interviews. And then people might say 'Yes, tomorrow at 7.00 p.m. would be okay, but could you phone at 6.00 p.m. tomorrow just to make sure' - by which time, of course, it's too late to fix up anything else. On the one hand, they're doing me a favour, and I'm very grateful, but on the other, it's frustrating, because you end up endlessly juggling. Sometimes people invite me to their flats, which is nice of them: it's fascinating to see where they live, and people are very, very hospitable. Often,

like to tell us about it - he said just 'I want to forget about it'. But all...[those] films, all...[those] books,...and this feeling that we have to remember about our history, because if not, we just disappear...

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119.152C. [The Polish language] is a carrier of Polishness without doubt...[It's very important] that this language be used in a proper manner, that young people speak beautifully in a literary language, and nurture tradition with this language. I like...my language very much,...although...it's very difficult, and especially its grammar,... [but] it can link [us] to the past when Poland wasn't a free country, when the Polish language couldn't be used, [when] it was frequently forbidden...[when], during the Partitions of Poland,...the language was persecuted...And even so, Poles always did their best to use it; [they learned it] in secret classes,...and they fought for this language...

120.180I. [It] was...[a]...matter of survival to keep [the] language... During the last War,...there was hidden education. And...when there was Partition,...in the German part, [people were] taking care of [the] language...For example, there was a huge strike, because... religion was in Polish, and suddenly they decided no, the religion should be in German,...and the children refused, and...weré beaten up very badly, and it start[ed] a huge strike...And they said 'Okay, keep it, this Polish in religion'. And also in Russia, because [children were] using Polish in school, and in office[s] it was forbidden...in the Russian part.

121.212Z. We have many regions with many different dialects,... and when we speak about [the] Polish...language, we should take

they want to introduce me to their kids, and we have a bit of a chat so that they can practise their English. Many of the women also ask me after the interview whether I'm married, whether I have a boyfriend, whether I've found myself a nice 'przystojny Polski chlopak' [handsome Polish lad] yet. At first I was rather taken aback, but now I'm beginning to find this particular national obsession a bit tedious, so I just smile sweetly and say 'Ale nie szukam !' ['But I'm not looking !'].

...Really fascinated by the Royal Castle at the moment. Visit whenever I have free time. Even though, in general conversation, everyone says that the Castle is exactly as it was before the Second World War, and that it is therefore exactly the same as it was at the end of the 18th century, if you read the small information cards in the Castle carefully, it turns out to be much more palimpsestic. The Marble Room, for example, was stripped on the orders of the Tsar in the 19th century, but has now been returned to its 18th century appearance, while the King's Study was 'reconstructed' from a set of plans drawn up by Stanislaw August which were never actually executed ! Even the layout, furniture and decorations of the Castle are confusing - it's really hard to know where you are in the building, and you just don't know what is authentic and what fake. And in a sense, maybe it doesn't actually matter...

into consideration [these] different dialects. And now, we have liter[ary] language...and it's in the schools and so on, and it's our language...But people living in the mountains, living in [the] Kaszuba region, for example, even in [the] Mazurka region,...they know...this modern Polish language, but they didn't forget the dialects.

122.241Dd. Some consider it to be one of the most difficult [languages] in the world. And some say that we have one of the best poetries - French and Polish - in Europe. And of course, the grammar could be a little simpler !...But I think it's nice, you can express a lot of things, a lot of feelings, a lot of soft things and hard things. When you, for example, take a piece of wood and you start to...[bend]...it, it 'trzeszczy' [creaks] - exactly the sound...[that]...the wood makes. And [when] the wind goes on the leaves, they 'szelescia' [rustle] - it's the exact sound...And also the soft [things] - you can make a lot of soft ends, like 'kot' [cat], 'kotek', 'koczek' 'koczaczek', 'koczu' and so on, which I think doesn't exist so much in English, because you can only say 'cat', 'kitty', 'pussy cat' - and that's it !

123.190U. It's [a] complicated language,...it's not [a] single minded or clear language. You can say a lot of things via one sentence...In literature, it's very positive, in business, it's negative...

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148.48J. It used to be that [the] Church was a source of...some sort of education - different from the one you...[got]...in school. And a lot of young people...were keeping close to the Church...It was in good style to belong to [the] Church, to attend these meetings, and ...they spent holidays together, and it was quite good...Sometimes,

...Kieslowski was buried today. There's a small church just round the corner from the Instytut, and when I saw tv cameras, I asked a passer-by whose funeral it was. I identify so strongly with *Three Colours Blue* that it was disturbing, somehow, to be walking past just at the moment when Kieslowski's coffin was disappearing into the church...

...First day of spring, and everyone is in a silly mood. Oddly, though, there is also a big demonstration about a student who was murdered in Warsaw a few days ago. Awful, but of course the crime rate's gone up under a capitalist system - what do people expect ?

...Queen arriving today. Wake up early to watch breakfast tv. About how Lech Walesa had invited the Queen when he visited Britain, how it's the first time that a reigning British monarch has visited Poland, videos about the Beatles, London, a recent history of the Queen's family, a lot about her father and connections between the Poles and the Brits since the War, that the FCO wants to help Poland enter the EU, etc. Told that the Queen is going to open an

[the Church was] in opposition to what you learned...at school...It was a continuity from before the War, they were continuing the old Polish customs, the old Polish culture. They preserved it for [the] next generation. If there [had not been]...[the] Church in Poland, I think...society would be very different. Because [the] Communists tried to change everything. They wanted to start from...scratch,...so they made [a] clean break with the past...They were not successful because of [the] Church, because [the] Church preserved [the] old mentality,...like before the War, you know ? Before the War,... [Poles were]...first of all patriots - ...it was very characteristic for Polish people to love their country, because we were free just for twenty or thirty years before the War. So it was a very short time, but they relished this freedom...and it was very important,...because they were building a new Poland, [a] new free country, and it was [broken] by the War. And they were all full of hope, this Polish people, and then it was cut and the Communists tried to do the same thing, but [in a] different way. But 'kosciol' - [the] Church,...[kept] on what they did before the War, you know ? Patriotism, Christian values, and family values - they [kept]...to history,...they were very proud of our past, all these heroes like Sienkiewicz, Pan Wolodyjoski. ¹⁰...Because [the] Communists tried to give us different examples of heroes,...[a] different sort of mentality, of thinking. And in a way they succeeded, but what was preserved ...was because of our Church.

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134.148C. I would say that a symbol for Poles in general is the characteristic of national independence,...patriotism, the independence of the people, freedom...Because I consider that every person has the right to freedom, and if the nation doesn't possess

¹⁰ A fictitious character from Sienkiewicz's trilogy, Pan Wolodyjoski is an excellent fighter and a man of integrity and unrelenting moral principles.

exhibition about Britain and Poland at the Royal Castle, and that there's a lot of concern about whether or not Poles will manage the etiquette ! The usual inferiority complex - why on earth shouldn't they ?! Later, discuss the demonstration about the murdered student with my Polish teacher: he suggests that it was about creating a better society, but I remain cynical. Watch the Queen's welcoming ceremony on tv in the afternoon, which is absolutely hilarious in some ways, poignant in others. The commentator says that the Queen's visit shows that Poland is now a normal country. In the reception line, almost everyone seems to forget the etiquette and speaks to the Queen first. The Queen inspects the troops, and there's a moment of confusion when nobody seems to know what to do, as if they haven't practised this bit, then, all of a sudden, the soldiers bellow at the tops of their voices 'Czolem, Wasza Krolewska Mosc !' ['Good Afternoon, Your Royal Highness !']. At which point I stop being ethnographic and collapse into giggles, because, when it's somebody else's military tradition, it's all so ridiculous ! Later, planting a tree at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, meeting crowds in the Old Town, a visit to the Royal Castle, and mention of the fact that the Queen's staying at the Belweder Palace in Lazienki. As it's only five minutes up the road, I go up there later to see what's going on. A small but very enthusiastic crowd, and the police, for once, are friendly...

...More stuff on the Queen today: she's been to the British Council to see an English lesson, to one of the oldest schools in Warsaw to see children perform in English a fragment of *Pan Tadeusz*, a famous Polish drama, and, importantly, she's been to the Polish Parliament to give a speech. British etiquette finally triumphs over

such freedom, then the individual who is a member of that nation doesn't possess it either...For many long years, the Polish nation was imprisoned in a general sense - Poland was subject to the Partitions, and so it was in slavery. Poland never accepted that, and basically, it was always very courageous, and very consistently fought for freedom, and I think that that is a characteristic of Poles,...this nation's aspirations for freedom. It can't be in slavery - this is a nation which basically loves freedom so much that when it lacked it, it always fought for it - even to death.

143.67E. I don't know how to describe it, but among Poles there is...a certain ability to think unconventionally... I don't know where we get it from, but maybe it's because this is a cultural cross-roads, and because there were always diverse influences that there's this ability. It's hard to say,...[but we can] approach a problem differently and attack it in completely unconventional ways...

144.104T. You could treat this as a...joke, but I think that there is a second level of...what I want to tell. The certain unexpectedness of Poles ! So, in fact, you never know what Poles could do,...kind of being spontaneous...you know, it's a certain way of life, a certain way of protection of [the] 'self-ness' of people, and it's very difficult to manipulate...a society which is composed [in]...the majority of individualists, and I think that one of the features of Poles [is that] there is a certain individualism...Being independent...is one of the most important values for Poles...And there is a certain protection from any outside pressure - nobody will tell me what I should do...Well, and I think it's also connected with freedom [and] tolerance, and so on, and of course it's very often boring,... [because]...it's not possible to organise a group of three Poles, because all of them have [a] completely different idea what should be done or how [it] should be done...But I think there is enormous dynamism...in such [a] way...[of]...thinking...It's very creative...It's

Polish gallantry as the Speaker, Zych, puts his arm under the Queen's to help her up the steps, then realises that this is not done, and rapidly takes his arm away again ! But at least no-one has yet attempted to kiss the Queen's hand...Lots of faffing about and nothing being quite ready, and meanwhile the tv commentator mentions that not since the Pope has anyone been so warmly welcomed in Poland...Zych makes a short speech mentioning Westminster as the Mother of Parliaments, the two nations fighting together during the War, and the help from Britain during the 1980s, and then the Queen is asked to come before the Polish Parliament. Somebody has written her an amazing speech.

She says that she's conscious and proud of standing at the heart of Polish democracy, and that during the period when Europe was divided, the idea of a British Monarch doing so would have been fantastic; that both Poland and Britain were ahead of their time in creating Parliaments, with the 1791 Great Constitution being a model of Enlightenment thought; she talks about dynastic and commercial links, how Sikorski was a friend of her father, about the BBC, about how we will never forget the courage of the Polish pilots, that the War united us but later we were divided, that last year the Allied victory in Europe was celebrated, but for some the fruits of war were postponed (rather a diplomatic way of putting it !). That we are in sympathy with Poland's aims regarding NATO and the EU, that Poland needs Europe but Europe also needs Poland - which gets not only applause, but also a standing ovation. Then she talks about the last six years, and better contacts regarding trade, travel, cultural exchange, how both countries have taken their responsibilities with regard to Bosnia, how she's grateful for the

much...better to have ten people with ten different opinion[s] than only one opinion of ten people...The problem is how to manage it !

135.229bCc. There's an old saying about the late night conversations of Poles - Poles like to sit long into the night, talking about various things, and that's a symbol of Polishness, of a certain sort of cultural identification...Yes, that's how Polishness is understood. Through a certain hospitality, through cabbage soup and *bigos*, that's to say, through typical Polish dishes, through effusiveness, and, at the same time - 'Postaw sie i zostaw sie' - it's a Polish saying...'Postaw sie' means be hospitable, put lots of things on the table, present, show how a person doesn't begrudge anything - and 'zostaw sie' - that means get credit by pawning your house ! So even if you have to pawn things, you have to cram the table with dishes !

141.127P. It is considered in our country as a big fault if you...are not...faithful to your friend...This characteristic, this trait, probably really helped us...to go through the difficult times...Because otherwise, we would...simply [have been] dissolved,...we would...[have been]...German, Russian or Austrian. For what [other] reason...[would we have fought]...for over a hundred years for freedom ?

173.249I. We are brought up on this vision that Poland...can vanish, as it was before...In this...[sense],...we are like the Jews, [a] chosen nation, and very often people mention it, that [the] Poles are [a] chosen nation - like [the] Jews said they are a chosen nation for pain, for...suffering. We have the same. I don't know if it's good or not. Sometimes it's good, because we have...[a] strong sense of our origin, but on the other hand, it makes people live in [a] diaspora...for example, Polonia, I mean those people who live in Britain,...who stayed in England after [the] War, they are people [who are]

welcome given to the British Council, to the Know-How Fund, to the Prince of Wales' Fund. That national traditions must be preserved but we must nevertheless join the trends that are sweeping our continent, and then, looking nervous about her pronunciation, the Queen utters in Polish the immortal words 'Zeby Polska byla Polska'. Another standing ovation and enormous applause. Then, to finish off, she talks about resuming the task started in the 1791 Constitution but prevented by foreign powers (more diplomacy !), and says that the task ahead is truly historic but with faith and hope, Britain will be with Poland all the way. The speech goes down enormously well, and no wonder, because it basically pushes all the right buttons - recognising the historical importance of democracy, that Poland is a part of Europe, that there is a long history of links with Britain, acknowledging Polish heroism during the War, that Poland has something to contribute to Europe and mustn't just be turned into a colony of the European Union, addressing future political aspirations, and, with 'Zeby Polska byla Polska', summing up a whole swathe of Polish history in one fell swoop. It literally means 'Let Poland be Poland', a song which became a Solidarity anthem, when some people sang not 'Zeby Polska byla Polska', but 'Zeby Polska byla polska' - 'Let Poland be Polish', which was obviously a rather more political statement. So it's no wonder the Queen looked a bit nervous about her pronunciation ! As usual with Polish, one tiny slip of the tongue, and you've said something entirely different and potentially disastrous...

The Queen is thanked for her speech, and there is more massive applause, followed by a slow clap - a traditional expression of appreciation that one can only hope has been explained to the

completely out of [a] sense of reality. I mean, their vision of Poland,...their time, stopped in 1939.

136.920. For a thousand years, Poland has been an exceptionally tolerant country - there weren't any religious wars. When it comes to, let's say, relations between people, they were good...At the moment, things have changed a bit, but I still consider that there are things we could teach the West. Certainly this tolerance, which there used to be. At the moment maybe there's less tolerance, but I hope that we will again be a tolerant society as we once were. Once,...there were a lot of religions in Poland, but there were never any disputes...Nor was there anti-semitism in Poland - that's to say that a great number of Jews lived here, the most in the whole of Europe, maybe even the most in the world lived in Poland. They chose Poland not by chance, but because they felt good in Poland. Now, there is a certain anti-semitism, but to a much lesser degree than they say in the mass media in the West. They exaggerate the problem. It's linked to a lot of negative things historically [for Poles]: after the War, a lot of the people who worked for the [Stalinist] Government...were of Jewish descent, and this period was very difficult for Poles, and they always remember it.

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149.203R. 'Matka Polska' [Mother Poland] ? Well, you don't come across 'Matka Polska' so often now. We know that the Russians use 'Mother Russia'. 'Matka Polska' is rather 'Ojczyzna' [Fatherland],... it's the same...For me, it means my personal and cultural identity.

151.153C. I think that...['Matka Polska' is] used in the sense of the Fatherland, that the Fatherland is the mother of each person,...

Queen in advance. Next, there's the lunch, then tea with Walesa and his wife which of course overruns, and in the evening, the Polish ballet, to which all Warsaw's elite have been invited. The news coverage is ecstatic, as is Kwasniewski in his comments. For once, you get the impression that the diplomats have done their homework...

...Working now on the questions for interview two. The first interview was mainly about personal data - where people were born and grew up, which social group they saw themselves as belonging to, their family backgrounds - about the changes in Poland during the last six years, about Western influences on Poland and vice versa, and relationships between Poland and the European Union. The second interview is more directly about Polishness - symbols, what they say about the Poles, significant places and historical periods, borders, the Polish language, sources of knowledge about Polishness, 'Mother Poland', 'The Polish Mother' and 'The Fatherland', symbolic places in Warsaw, the Royal Castle, and the vices and virtues of the Poles. It'll be interesting to see whether people's more intuitive sense of Polishness, which I was trying to get at in interview one, is matched by the more learned variety that I want to elicit in interview two. I'm also thinking about how to make political contacts. Asked the Director of the Instytut for help, and it transpires that his wife has just done a substantial piece of research with MPs...

because the Fatherland means so much to Poles...[Throughout our] ...history, a lot of Poles were ready to give their lives...for the Fatherland,...so Poles treat it like their mother,...like a symbol of something thanks to which it's worth living, and for which it's worth dying...The Fatherland is the country in which you're a citizen, let's say it's a separate piece of earth, if I can put it like that, on which people of a specific nationality live...[with] their specific traditions, speaking their specific language, cultivating tradition, loving their separate character, and loving their country for which they are often ready to offer their sacrifices.

154a.160G. Mother Poland ['Matka Polska'] or the Polish Mother ['Matka Polka'] ? ['Matka Polka'] is a woman who hands down Polish traditions to her children. Each mother should behave like this, and a lot of them do. And she should hand down behaviour and culture, and teach the language, and also a way of looking at the world...

154c.294R. 'Matka Polka'...has a special meaning, [a] special significance in Poland, because we had a very difficult history, a lot of tragedies and so on, and so without [a] certain kind of attitude towards [the] family, towards children, it would be impossible to save families, to keep the family as a whole,...and a sense of family...It seems to me that that's the most important aim of Polish Mothers, who must think of everything connected with holding together, with integrating the family...She had to survive,...she couldn't perish, she...[was]...the central person,...not the father. Because the father...[was]...at war.

154j.295R. The father has to be very specific about the system - the hierarchy - of values. [He has to] define what is valuable, what the system of values is...within the family, and in relation to the nation. He has to be the guarantor of what is important, even if he goes to

...Easter. On the way to N. and A.'s, I notice ribbons on the roadside crosses and various small bonfires - it seems that before Easter, not only must you clean your house from top to bottom, but you must also burn all your garden rubbish ! I am struck by the fact that at mass, there seem to be many more women and girls than men and boys. A tiny domestic drama as a teenage girl comes in very late, wearing lots of make-up and a leather jacket, and joins an older woman, who I take to be her mother, and who glares at her disapprovingly. I am reminded that the maintenance of tradition here tends to be women's business.

...Easter Saturday, and we go back to church again, this time with a small basket containing Polish sausage, egg, salt, bread, and cake, all to be blessed by the priest. Holy water is flicked all over the baskets with a kind of small broom, and then over us too, for good measure. We go back to church in the evening, for the blessing of fire. N. and A. seem stunned by my complete lack of familiarity with Christian tradition...

war and even if he is killed. He's the personal representative of these values, he doesn't just declare them...

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155.210R. The vices of Poles are that there's an inability to get organised in situations which aren't dramatic or tragic, which aren't difficult,...which are only everyday. There's a lack of discipline in these everyday situations. Besides which, there's a certain kind of light anarchy in situations which aren't dramatic, in situations which demand a methodical approach, precision, action. These are the vices of the Poles, and maybe even an over-emotional relationship to our own values...Poles don't like to be criticised. Emotionally, they detest being criticised...

158.186I. Because of our complex of...inferiority, we feel small, so that's why we are aggressive against something. You try to improve your image, making somebody...feel worse...We are like children: naive, sometimes, aggressive,...unpredictable.

159.89B. I think that Polish people are a bit too...romantic, they should be more pragmatic, and realistic. We like to cry, to think about the past, how [the] past was bad, how we were harmed by everybody, but we are not able to help ourselves. I think the Polish people have [a] tendency to blame everybody around [them] for what is going on in Poland, or for what has been going [on] for centuries - for Communism, Russia, Germany - everybody's bad round us, and we are victims...[But] I do not agree with this. I think that...part of the fault is on our side, that we should look at things [in a] different way...

...Easter Sunday, and I manage to sleep through the boom of the cannon traditionally fired at 6.00am, which is presumably when we're supposed to go to mass. Again.

...Wake up exhausted, and for some reason thinking about time and Lacan, the relationship between the mirror stage and space, and the Symbolic, language and narrative. No wonder I'm tired ! Discuss political parties with N. She suggests SLD,¹¹ UW,¹² KPN,¹³ ZChN,¹⁴ and Solidarnosc, and says that all the political people I speak to should be the same age. There seems to be this assumption that generational differences are particularly important when it comes to politically defined versions of Polish-ness. At the station, we wait for the train in the car - Easter Monday is the day when men and boys throw water at women and girls...

¹¹ SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) The Democratic Left Alliance (former communists).

¹² UW (Unia Wolności) Union for Freedom (centre right).

¹³ KPN (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej) Confederation for an Independent Poland (nationalist).

¹⁴ ZChN (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe) National Christian Union (nationalist).

162.225Aa. Somebody very clever once said that in Poland, it was much more important how one died for Poland than how one lived for Poland. And that's a curse, because Poles exhaust themselves with patriotic gestures which are sometimes effective and sometimes heroic, but very often they are ineffective and impractical.

163.55I. We Poles...love problems, you know ? Everything is [a] problem...Even if there is no problem...

164.41K. In the West,...Socialist-funded part[ies], right wing... Conservatives - they can co-exist pretty nicely, and it's not a problem - you've got a Shadow Cabinet. Whereas here, there's always...havoc...We always say in Poland - there's a joke that when there are ten Poles, there are...ten different opinions...The one good thing about Poland is [that],...if we've got one common enemy, then everybody's one, [but] we can't sometimes co-exist in times of peace, 'cos everybody wants to create...the reality their own way. They've got the best idea, everybody's got...his or her best idea how to do it, you know,...and it doesn't work out sometimes.

167.235Cc. [Poles like] to discuss the validity of this or that ideology late into the night - but then,...we don't have a plan that... we can realise. We only prattle, and persuade each other of something, we smoke,...and it's been like that for centuries...We have great plans, and then we forget about them, and we sit and we don't realise them. That's a characteristic feature of Poles.

169.46J. I'm afraid there are still some lingering...old customs, like...when you can make money,...every way is good...It is...very bad, because we still don't obey rules in general, so if there's a rule, everybody will try to...get around [it]. And...it isn't perceived as a

...Over Easter, there's been an anti-semitic demonstration at Auschwitz, and now there's a discussion in the media as to whether or not the local mayor should have let it go ahead...

...Have been to a cultural studies conference at Wroclaw. Some fascinating papers, including one by Professor Tadeusz Slawek, which made reference to Poland's obsession with history being to do with an inability to mourn both the Communist and the distant past, so that people become victims of history, and walking graves. This is so uncannily familiar that it makes me shudder...

...I've been thinking recently about the 'Eagle and Lion' Exhibition at the Royal Castle, which the Queen opened while she was here, and which I've seen several times now. It's about Polish-British relations (though very much from a British perspective), and presented on what look a bit like big, overlapping plastic sails - the constructedness of the presentation matching the constructedness of the contents ! My fascination with it, I think, lies in the exhibition as narrative: I am intrigued by its elisions, its gaps, its spaces, precisely because it presents itself as a linear, chronological, neutral

bad thing. So people, even in a high position, are not very fair,...like for example Kwasniewski - he didn't do a degree - for me it's awful...what he did, you know ? Because...what kind of example [does] he give...for other people ?..What he did, for me,...is a scandal. But it is very symptomatic....that everybody is not so...truthful. Because it is alright - everybody say[s] 'Oh it's nothing, everybody would do it in his place'. It hasn't changed. Manage how you can, you know, any way you can...

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183.288R. [What would you have to change in your behaviour and way of thinking to pass as a British person ?] First of all, as a Pole, I have no reason to want to pass as a British person ! Being a Pole is a great enough honour for me !...At most, I want to be accepted as [an equal] partner,...but God forbid that I would be a Brit, because that would be very funny, very strange, and very stupid !...I don't have to be British and I don't want to be British !...[But] if I want[ed] to be socially accepted in Britain, I think what I should change in my attitude - that is a very difficult question,...[what] is my imagination about the perception of my person ?...it's very complicated ! - but I think [that]...on the bas[is] of my experience...with Britishness,... everything should be extremely precisely formulated, [and] determined in [a] very, very strict order.

185.280R. I think what is important and what is a feature of British culture...is, of course,...the great tradition of political life, political institutions, parliamentarism and rules, very distinctive, clear rules of parliament and [of] political life...Everybody knows the rules, and the rules are clear. For example, if we compare [it with] the situation in our country, everything is very...'plynny' [fluent], 'niestabilny' [unstable],...[the] principles also. Everything is in the process, under construction. In Britain, such rules are established.

narrative when it so obviously isn't. Some sort of parallel with narrating one's own story, and with psychoanalysis as a way of exploring silences and omissions. Some sort of parallel, too, between the nation's history and the history of the self. I've been thinking, also, about this idea of mourning - about the fact that WWII happened here, that each family was affected. So Bhabha's idea of the performative turning into the pedagogical is okay, but the performative also leaves emotional traces: there is a shared, emotional history, irrespective of what it says in the history books or the media. Somewhere like here, the tragedies of history have happened to almost everyone, and it all gets passed down, not just in books and stories, but emotionally, psychologically. If your grandmother is in mourning, it effects your mother, and the way your mother relates to you. Only imagine that on a national scale...

Pretty much finished working on the questions for the third and final interview now...The Director's wife and her colleague made some suggestions about political people to contact, and someone from Solidarity has invited me to the Parliament !...

It's extremely important, because it's possible to make plans,...and to plan your own...activities, because the word of rule, the law, is stable, it's the same, today and tomorrow. I think it is also especially important for [the] economy. This is extremely crucial...Comparatively speaking, these questions in Poland are unusually fluent, unstable. And it is extremely difficult to predict the behaviour of other people. However, in a situation where the rules are stable, behaviour is predictable - it has a great influence on stability, on the ability to plan, on the possibility of making a rational decision. Because if everything is fluent, unstable, unknown, uncertain, it's very difficult to plan, to take a decision, to optimise a decision. However, in a situation where politics, the economy, are stable,...life is predictable.

196.297M. I think that...a symbol of Englishness is tolerance for another person in the sphere of ethics. It's respect for another person...Not completely... - the Home Office...is a powerful political, police apparatus, which doesn't allow the immigration of people, but generally, I would say that when it comes to the British themselves, apart from this police apparatus,...there's a great tolerance...of [other] ethnic groups.

198.270Dd. English women...are more like, you know, concrete ...They are more like, serious and everyday life...It's not an explosion of 'kobiecosci' [femininity] !

197.269Dd. It's really funny that your favourite agent, James Bond,...is like [a] totally opposite vision of...English men !... Because...this agent is [an] absolutely great scorer with...women: ...in general, French [men] are a little more famous [in this], not English men...And he's...sophisticated,...[an] expert...[in]...wines and...[cuisine]:...but [the] English favourite is beer...And he's...a warm person with a big personality,...[while]...actually, most British are perceived as rather cold and closed people,...controlling.

...Starting to do some of the third interviews now: concerned with Englishness/Britishness - symbols, associations, sources of knowledge; the extent to which people think their attitudes are influenced by Polishness, similarities and differences between the English/British and the Poles, attitudes to history, and more about people's family relationships and childhoods. Though detailed analysis will have to wait until I have time to transcribe the interviews, I think the results are going to be interesting, and not at all what I expected. Answers on Polishness seem to have little to do with age, gender, or specific party political allegiance, and more to do with overall political attitudes, that's to say, with how traditional people are. Having a particular attachment to England/Britain - if that is what members of the PBFS do indeed have - doesn't seem to make much of a difference with regard to attitudes towards Englishness/Britishness or Polishness. Attitudes to Englishness/Britishness seem to be fairly similar irrespective of whether or not someone has lived in Britain, and ideas about symbols are mostly very stereotypical so far: the Queen, a man in a bowler hat, fog, football hooligans, Shakespeare, Drake, Elizabeth I, and so on. I'm more interested now, in any case, in the relationship between national and personal narratives, in how people talk about the past, and the way in which Polish history seems to be absolutely central...

...MPs are proving almost impossible to get, as most are now out of Warsaw, so I am sticking to people who work for the parties in some other capacity, and who are recommended by Press Secretaries. I'm getting used to arranging interviews at short notice - in the end, you just have to go along with it all. I am amused to discover that I am now almost getting used to the behaviour of

189.274Dd. What I like [is the] common sense,...what I don't like is sometimes this stiffness,...and also this idea of making a lot of fences and walls so...you have your own little garden... I prefer this Polish - or I don't know [the same with] other countries in Europe... - we have common ground and so socialisation. I really respect somebody's area, territory, because I also demand from people... [that they]...respect my own...But I think there should be some balance, and I found in London that this balance was broken... I...felt really limited...by the organisation of space.

192.291R....Vices:...it seems to me that there's - but it's only in certain situations, it's minimal - that what's British is best - such an imagination, such high self-estimation, looking down generally on all other nations, but especially those uncivilised [sic] nations... I wouldn't want to say that this is chauvinist,...because it isn't comparable to true chauvinism, but it is something like that. In our contacts with the British, they sometimes delicately signal this to us. Such very funny questions as 'Do you know Max Weber?', ...always [giving the impression that]...we can't manage,...[that] we don't know...[There's] a very subtle difference between proudness and national chauvinism,...[but] I think that British people have [a] very, very internalised feeling that their civilisation is one of the best in the world, especially in relation to people from Eastern Europe, [and] it's very, very easy to recognise that attitude.

186.321Cc. When it comes to...the stereotype of the English,...there was an anecdote which was certainly true...There was some town which lacked water, and the Mayor appealed to the inhabitants not to use water to water their lawns and their gardens, and they didn't use it, and their gardens wilted !...There's a very strong sense of the common good...They understand the law and the common good and their institutions, and that differentiates the English...from the Poles. I said in one of our previous conversations that for us, the State and the law were foreign institutions for a very long time. And

Polish men, too. I no longer feel embarrassed about being stared at, am entirely used to having my hand kissed, and, despite the swelteringly hot weather, now feel quite disgruntled if a colleague removes his jacket without first asking if I would mind !...

...Some Belorussian visitors have arrived in the Department, and it is fascinating to see how they are treated. They are given help with, and shown, absolutely everything they need, and I find myself wishing I'd been given that level of support when I first arrived - I was certainly given some assistance, but nowhere near to the same extent. I commented to R. on how differently guests from the West and East are treated, and the answer was interesting. They are like little brothers, he tells me: in the West you have everything, in the East they have nothing, and Poland is in between. Meanwhile, the Belorussians seem to be getting increasingly pissed off with being patronised, and some of my Polish colleagues look as if they are enjoying every minute...

linked with that is our political culture, which wasn't formed as a culture of public politics...[So] in relationships between people, maybe these things are foreign. If the authorities gave an order not to water our lawns because there was a lack of water, people here would water their lawns at night !...People wouldn't fear the authorities, and in front of their neighbours, they would feel proud...that they got round the authorities !

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171.275Dd. I think in Polish history, there is this very, very strong individualism,...and...[the]...British...also...had their endless area of oceans...[where]...they could go...and just start from [the] beginning ...In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we had these 'dzike pola' - these wild fields in our south eastern part...where the Ukraine is now...[In] Britain, there...[were these]...ships with...brave captains,...[in Poland], there were these groups of warriors, fighters, going around, so...[we share]...this strong individualism...That's why...both these countries...have...this great tradition of democracy and freedom...

174.129P. I think there is also a certain trait in the British character, ...always...looking for adventure:...the Charge of the Light Brigade, ...Dunkirk...There is the same kind of madness we have,...so this is probably...a common bond... I was told by the Polish officers...that when the British officers came to the cafés and drank wine with the Polish officers, and the German tanks came, then the British officers came out of these cafés and started shooting at the tanks with their pistols. All of them were killed...But this is a very nice bond, it's a very nice trait, I would say,...because it seems that these cool, phlegmatic English...have a certain kind of a romantic soul... Because what was the Second World War ? Churchill,...without having [an] Army...[or] aeroplanes,...said 'We will fight on the

...Have finally managed to find people to interview from KPN, UW, and PSL. ¹⁵ KPN was relatively straightforward: the black-shirts outside made me nervous, but the man I am to going to interview seemed nice enough. UW was relatively slick and organised, and said to phone back in a couple of days and they'll have found me someone. PSL was interesting: as I was negotiating an interview, an old peasant with one tooth marched in, carrying an enormous trug of strawberries which he presented to one of the office workers, and demanded to know what PSL was doing about defending Polish land and traditions ! Arranging the PSL interview took time, but in the end I got one. SdRP and ROP are proving a bit more complicated. ¹⁶ SdRp arose out of the old PZPR (the Party), and both Oleksy and the current Prime Minister, Cimosiewicz, belong to it, as did Kwasniewski before he became President. SdRP then joined forces with the Trade Union Confederation, which resulted in the SLD. SLD is itself in coalition government with PSL, but they're still separate parties. On the other side of the barricade is ROP, a collection of small parties who currently have no representation in Parliament, but who are considered a major political force nonetheless: they're fairly traditional, conservative nationalists, slightly more Church oriented than, but not as nationalist as KPN, yet not as close to the Church as ZChN. It is all horribly complicated...

¹⁵ PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) Polish Peasants' Party (left).

¹⁶ SdRP (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polski) Social Democrats for the Republic of Poland (former Communists); ROP (Ruch dla Odbudowej Polski) Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (right).

beaches'...It's the same trait, isn't it ?...It shows that the British have the ability to be unreasonable, romantic, you see, and very gallant.

175.279R. I think that British people have [a] very strong, very well identified, and very precisely determined notion of nationality. Britishness, especially England - I think they can explain...very, very distinctly what it is. It is, of course, connected very strongly with the Queen, with the whole Royal Family, [with the] royal castle, and [with]...a respect, a cultivation, of history... I think that this great respect...[for] history,...[for] traditions,...[for] national symbols, and the feeling that history has a great meaning in [the] contemporary world,...is important...for [the] creation [of] culture, [of] national values... I think we have in common this attitude toward our history - that history's extremely...important. I think that British people understood it completely, and from this point of view, they understand Polish people, I think, because...[of this]...great respect...[for]...tradition.

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199. 286R. [Does a connection exist between how you understand Britishness and Polishness] Yes...because of history, because of relations, because of the constant important significance of our military and national history during the Second World War. Here, there is an expectation that England is a certain source of democracy in Europe... I don't know whether the Italians have such an expectation - I think not. I think that the French definitely don't ! Nor the Spanish. But the Poles do. An expectation that this is a country which is a guard[ian] of freedom, democracy, and moral order in Europe...A hierarchy in the political sense, and also in the civilisational sense, but above all,...a country which has an exceptional tradition of parliamentary democracy. Because in spite

...Arranging the SdLP interviewee proved to be quite an interesting experience ! I arrived at the main headquarters, and was immediately faced by a very self-important, Communist-style porter. I told him I needed to read the list of offices on the notice-board, knowing I'd never get past him if I asked permission. When someone else came in, I nipped towards the staircase; he didn't call me back, so I raced upstairs. Once there, I asked a woman where the office I needed was, and she told me it was through the security door. Luckily, someone else was going through at the right moment, so I simply looked as if I knew where I was going, and followed him through. He asked me where I was going, but not aggressively, so I told him I was going to see the Press Secretary, and he seemed convinced. Strangely, there were several very nervous looking men in jackets milling about in the corridor. They looked at me hard, but I walked blithely past, used now to being stared at here. I talked to the Press Secretary, who said he would get hold of someone for me, and then walked back past the jackets. It was only then that I saw the name on the door of the office they were guarding: no wonder they were jumpy - it said 'OLEKSY'...

It is very hot. Wish I could go to a small village in the countryside for the Corpus Christi processions, but I'm far too busy: today I had an interview with U., who is seldom free. He turned up late and a little drunk from a party last night, but as a marketing man for a multi-national whose father is a former local Party First Secretary, he's an invaluable interviewee...

of these...social stratifications, there is such an expectation - there was and there always is. This is a democratic State that will always support us, that will always help us, and that will protect us in situations where [there is], for example, some negative anti-democratic power - whether Germany or Russia. The Poles... experienced a very big disappointment here,...but it's still in the mentality, in the psychology, in the sphere of expectations and in the sphere of images of England as a democratic country which has diffused, defended, [and] influenced the development of democracy in the whole of Europe.

200.268Dd. We signed a pact, yeah ? If there...[was]...any attack on one of the three participants... - ...France, Britain or Poland - each side...[would]...help...[the]...other...[B]ut you know, for seventeen days they...[did]...nothing...[On] 3rd September, there was the Declaration of War...but nothing was done...And of course, I know that...Britain...was already very weak at the end of the War, [and there] was not a lot...[it could] do...to help Poland: geographically it was really - they [would have] had to fight with the Russian Army to help us...But still - in the beginning and in the end - to sign this pact [and then] we feel like [we were] left...And also,...more than ten percent of [the planes] shot down in the Battle of Britain...[were shot down]...by [the] Polish [pilots] - more than ten percent - and we didn't even have a right to [participate in] the Victory Parade or the glory...[at]...the end of the War...The Polish forces were not invited.

205.272Dd. I think most of these things...come...just from books,... because you know, there...[were] not so many people in Poland who travelled to England 'til '89. Some of them...[have] started to travel now, and they have [a] totally...different opinion about it...Some of them...say that actually, [the] English - most of them - are without so much power...The Irish or Scottish...are more energetic, or like [the] Polish, you know...For Polish people, these English are

...Interesting talk with R. at the Instytut today. I mentioned that at times, Poland seems to me very post-modern - the Royal Castle, for example, with its palimpsestic mixture of authentic and fake - but he was aghast, saying that for him, Poland is barely modern, because it is only when a society no longer has to struggle for its basic everyday needs that it even enters modernity. I'm struck by the fact that Communism somehow takes societies out of the usual historical trajectories - maybe Poland is somehow not quite modern and post-modern simultaneously ?...

...ROP proved hard to track down today. I knew it stood for Ruch dla Odbudowy Polski, and that it was on the Aleje Ujazdowskie, but the sign outside the party's headquarters said Ruch dla Rzeczpospolitej Oboz Patriotyczny, so it was a bit confusing. Had a chat with the young secretary, who explained that, despite being newly set up, the party has recently split, and that Olszewski's lot have just moved out, but she wasn't sure where to. I went to the Instytut to see if anyone knew, but nobody did, so we tried Directory Enquiries, who didn't have a listing. Someone thought they might have relocated to above a book-shop in Plac Trzech Krzyzy, so I went there, but the book-shop said no, they'd just moved out, try Marszalkowska Street (one of the longest streets in Warsaw !). Eventually, by late afternoon, I found them, and managed to arrange an interview. Considering they are meant to be a major political force, they're not exactly easy to find...

just...less energetic, and very calm...Cooled down or something. Of course, [the] Polish will...[say they have] no eggs ?...no balls !

204.290R...It goes from generation to generation, from father to son. My grandfather always talked about this, and I'm an example of this - my grandfather loved Britain. He loved everything British as the best in the world - 'If it's British, it's good. And if you want something, buy British !'. It was the War, and he remembered this five year period as the best period in his life...And then he said this to my mother directly, and you learn that that's how it was...An inheritance, a transmission of certain attitudes, certain beliefs, and all the time, [this was] in opposition to Russia, in contrast to the devil...Here, you have a Western kingdom of freedom, of free speech, of democracy, of human rights, of parliamentarism, of education, of culture, of civilisation - everything that's good. And that was embodied, materialised, concretised in these symbols of Britain.

209.309G. I don't have much contact with, or conversation with people [about Britain], because I have very few people in my circle who have been there, lived there, or worked in Great Britain. Any acquaintances I have worked there a very long time ago, and they worked very hard with the exclusive aim of earning money. Earning money was linked to the time when it was so difficult [here] that they...got work there - times were so hard here and one earned so little, but if you worked nights there you could [earn a lot of money] in three months...Even if you were a student or you'd finished your studies, you went there to do this ordinary, grey work... ¹⁷

¹⁷ The implication here is of work that is semi-legal - *praca na czarno* - literally 'work blackly' - is working illegally.

...Have been doing some of my final interviews over the last few days - it is surprisingly difficult to have to keep on saying good-bye. But I have also been talking to people about who I should interview as authorities on Polishness when I come back in September, which makes it a bit easier to be leaving, somehow. Various names have come up, but the ones most often mentioned seem to be Ks. Prof. Jozef Tischner, a priest and academic based in Krakow, the sociologist Professor Antonina Kloskowska, the directors Andrzej Wajda and Kazimierz Kutz, and the novelist, Andrzej Szczypiorski. Have decided against asking Wajda, as people have also told me he's getting increasingly demanding to interview these days. But would really like to interview the others: Tischner has a Highland background, Szczypiorski a Jewish background, Kloskowska is from Central Poland, and Kutz is from Silesia, so this would be a really good mix. Have written to them, asking if I can interview them about some of my interview findings...

...Despite the hectic schedule, am enjoying seeing some of my interviewees socially, now the fieldwork is almost over. One turned up with a tape-recorder today, and wanted to ask me lots of questions. I could hardly say no, and it proved an interesting experience ! It's hard trying to come up with sensible answers off the cuff !...

210.296M. I think that...above all,...[these associations]...come from the mass media,...documentary films,...music. I associate Great Britain with...pop music - for example, with rock groups like The Beatles, Genesis, Phil Collins - the younger generation have these associations with the British.

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214.263Z. Maybe there...[is]...also some imagination in my image of...[Englishness],...because maybe I tried to put forward what I would like to see and would like to think,...not what I have really experienced...

215.313Aa. The stereotype of the Englishman is generally positive: a person who is precise, resolute, certainly phlegmatic, a great organiser...This stereotype still exists...Perhaps our observations select the most characteristic elements, and maybe they...are those we lack ourselves - Poles, for example, are generally not good organisers, right ?! Generally, they say something about our complexes;...the Pole subconsciously resents, that's to say, he has an inferiority complex in relation to,...countries in Western Europe...

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33.61C. It seems to me that a lot of things have changed, although there are still a lot of things that certainly need to change - but I think that...the most important changes are those concerning personal freedom. Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, the fact that you're allowed to say things:...that, perhaps, for me, is the most important.

...In lots of ways, I am ready to go home now - I have finished my interviews, said my good-byes, and, sending my boxes back to Britain, have had my last, stressful dealings with the Polish post office ! But my final Polish lesson today made me sad to be leaving - it's such a difficult language that I know I'll never master it, just as I will never understand the culture, except as a guest. It is the weight of history, the presence of the past, the ways in which personal and national historical narratives get intertwined, that have struck me most here. But perhaps trying to come to terms with another language, with another culture, helps you, in the end, to relate to your own past...

Polish British Friendship Society Interviewees:

Dates of birth:

1932, 1939, 1942 (x 2), 1945, 1947, 1948 (x 2), 1952, 1954, 1960 (x 2), 1967, 1968, 1976.

35.138Dd. Now, we can...travel free[ly]...Before,...when I wanted to go somewhere I was supposed to ask first my school or my... employer to allow me to travel,...and then I [had] to ask my military department and I...[had] to...apply to the Passport Office which was supposed to give me the passport...only for the...time I was wanting to travel, and mostly it took half a year to get it. And even in [the] '80s,...you were supposed to give back your passport three days maximum after you got back. My...parents were earning at that time five to seven dollars per month (because of the weird exchange rate), which for Poland was not good and not bad - enough to live, [but] travelling...wasn't possible at all, except, perhaps,...hitchhiking...Everything was limited - you had bons [coupons] for everything nearly,...the country was kind of totalitarian because they tried to control every aspect of life, yeah ? music, culture, everything...And now we have some more freedom and some...more chances, but I don't think these changes are enough,...they are not chances for everyone...

36.62D. The political system's changed. From Communism to democracy. That's fundamental. And the after effects of that. Democracy changed the way of thinking, behaviour - well, everything... I think that...money is to a great degree central to life,...not in terms of having a lot of money - only so as to survive, so as to live. In the sense of being a necessity. Money was important and it is important, but...in 1989, when massive inflation ensued, people didn't have enough money - so they had to get used to the idea that securing their own survival was the most important thing in life - that's to say, money. And that changed the way of thinking...[I]nflation...was running at a thousand percent,...so it was necessary to put money first. And that's...why today, people talk a lot about money - because without that, it's not possible to live. So...these are the fundamental changes which, until 1989, we lived differently.

Places of birth and residence:

Radom (a town 100 km from Warsaw), Warsaw; Warsaw, Slask (Silesia), Warsaw; Warsaw; Warsaw; Oleszyn (a village 40 km outside Warsaw), Warsaw, Oleszyn; Wroclaw, Warsaw; Majdan (a small village 100 km from Warsaw), Warsaw; Warsaw, Pruszkow (a village just outside Warsaw), Saska Kempa (a suburb of Warsaw), Warsaw; Warsaw; Wlodawa (a small town outside Lublin), Warsaw; Warsaw; Warsaw; Lodz, Warsaw; Warsaw; Boreslaw (a town outside Lwow), Krakow, Warsaw.

Professions:

Economist by education, now a housewife; Embassy clerk; retired journalist; accountant with own firm; pharmacist; journalist/ translator; teacher; pharmacist; solicitor with own firm; student; student and estate agent with own firm; employee of Warsaw City Council; senior civil servant; employee of foreign trade company; student and estate agent with own firm.

Genders:

11 women, 4 men.

37.82L. There are...hundreds of these new things,...people are too much ruled by money, basically, and spending money is the most important thing...They don't feel the need to go to the cinema, to the theatre - only to spend money. It's fashionable...to buy yourself a nice car, a flat, something like that. That didn't exist seven years ago - everyone had...about the same.

38.77A. Certainly, from an economic point of view, [Poland] has improved...You can buy everything. However, our earnings haven't changed, they're the same as they were in the time of the People's Republic of Poland. And because...the prices have gone up, [because] there's a market economy, the real value of our earnings has fallen. That's why a sector of the society has become impoverished. Besides, various social benefits got reversed...Old people used to get free medicines. That doesn't happen any more...

41.52I. It's like [a] completely new era...Before 1989,...even though you didn't earn enough, you...[had]...all those social privileges...Do you know Slawomir Mrozek ? ¹⁸ He said that...our lives...[were] miser[able] but safe. And now it's still misery and unsafe !...Before people felt more safe:...there...[was]...no problem with job[s], no problem with flats, even though you had to wait, but...[they were] quite cheap. But what makes me sad...[is]...this American way of living - easy money, easy living, you know ?...Ninety percent of people are Catholics - [it] should be like heaven ! No cheating, no robbery, no rudeness - but...[there's] an enormous amount of rudeness, [and] you can't trust [people]...It's not so simple now, because...very often, people cheat you, even your close friends... You don't trust people as you used to before. You don't feel so safe ...And I work with children, and I see this materialistic way of thinking,...to have something more, more, more, and more and more

¹⁸ Mrozek (b. 1930), a leading contemporary Polish dramatist.

Non-Polish British Friendship Society Interviewees

Dates of birth:

1925, 1946, 1950, 1955, 1956 (x 2), 1964 (x 2), 1966 (x 3), 1968 (x 2), 1973, 1976.

Places of birth and residence:

Opole, Wroclaw, Warsaw, Wroclaw; Biskupiec [Ryszelski] (a village/small town in north east Poland), Torun, Horoszki (a small village in the Podlasie region), Losice (a small town near Siedlice in eastern Poland), Warsaw; Warsaw; Bydgoszcz, Torun, Warsaw; Warsaw, Gostynin (120 km from Warsaw), Brzesc nad Bugiem (now in Belarus), Warsaw; Warsaw; Wilno (Lithuania), Warsaw; Dabek (a small village 120km from Warsaw), Mlawa (a small town in the same region), Warsaw; Prudnik (a small town near Opole), Glogowek (another small town near Opole), Opole, Katowice, Warsaw; Szczecin, Warsaw, a small village (unspecified), Gdansk, Warsaw; a village in Mazowsze (unspecified), Warsaw; Warsaw; Warsaw; Warsaw, Lublin, Warsaw; Warsaw.

and more...Money is the God now...Of course, there are cleverer children and sensible people, but mainly, you know, [it's a] rat-race. It's really sad.

40.135Ee. In Poland in 1989, more or less sixteen percent of the population lived below the social minimum. At the moment, according to some data published a month ago by the Institute of Employment and Social Politics,...forty percent of society - that's nineteen million people, half the nation - are living below the social minimum. And that social minimum in December 1995 was only three hundred Polish zloty. And that's not calculated very precisely, because the cost of a flat is presented there as being on average one hundred and ten a month, and on average, they're twice that. So generally speaking, in this country, the result of these transformations is poverty, basically.

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42.80A. [I'd like to protect Poland] from crime. In the West, there's an awful lot of crime...When money is the most important thing, it's always the same, there's always a lot of crime... I noticed that in England there's respect for the police - we still don't have that. In England, people help the police...here, there's still the influence of the time when people weren't free, when the police were the representatives of a foreign power...

44.102T. Let's assume that there are different cultures - mass culture and elite culture... I think that the impact of Western culture will be different on this mass culture and this elite culture. And of course, on this elite culture, I could say it's marvellous, it's okay, it's fantastic, it's working perfectly. It's good that this impact exists,... people who are in [the] elite...can evaluate it on [a] completely...

Professions:

Student; sociologist; doctoral student and junior lecturer in sociology; student and journalist co-operating with ROP; marketing firm employee associated with UW; employee of PSL; retired director of a foreign trade company, now part-time teacher of English; doctoral student in music; lawyer; demographer; employee of KPN; marketing manager in a multi-national; student involved in SdRP; doctoral student in sociology; politician/political advisor to Solidarity.

Genders:

6 women, 9 men.

different level from people who participate in mass culture...For the elite it doesn't matter,...because they have completely different criteria of judgement, of evaluation...The problem, of course, is connected with mass culture...Culture and national culture, if something like that exists, is connected with [a] certain set of values...Culture in some way is useful for...social organisation... Culture play[s] [a] very important role [in] building a certain link of communication among people who belong to the same group...So... national media...should pay attention...[to]...content...The problem is, to what extent the values...presented in foreign mass culture destroy or support [the] important value[s] of...Polish society. And that's the main problem.

47.133Aa. When it comes to culture, of course, [I want to protect Poland] from liberal permissiveness: that's obvious. That means against acceptance of the assumption that the goal of social existence is the happiness of the individual...

49.70G. I think that perhaps there is greater respect towards work, ...because it seems to me that, reading about, and looking at, and being in the West, people see that those who work achieve something, right ? and I think that the way of working has changed, that people take work more seriously. Because once, for example, in the...Socialist system, the [situation] was such that each person went to work, earned some money there, and took it home, and the time [in between] wasn't always filled up with work - sometimes merely with chat,...food, sometimes with a glass [or two]...: Generally, it was senseless. Senseless to sit there for seven, eight hours at work, and to perform work which could have been performed in four hours...And people then - well maybe they were happy that...they got a fixed amount of money for working like that. And so they worked less and less, it seems to me,...in the Socialist system. And now, they come to the conclusion that basically, in

Authorities on Polishness

Ks. Prof. Jozef Tischner, (1928 - 2000), one of the most prominent Catholic theologians and philosophers of his generation, best known for his work on Polish national identity and values in books such as *Etyka Solidarnosci* ['The Ethics of Solidarity'] and *Polska Jest Ojczyzna* ['Poland is the Fatherland'].

Andrzej Szczypiorski, (1924 - 2000), one of the best known contemporary Polish novelists, famous for works such as *Msza za Miasto Arras* [*A Mass for the Town of Arras*] and *Początek* [literally 'The Beginning', but translated as *The Beautiful Mrs. Seidenman*]; also an opposition journalist.

Prof. Antonina Kloskowska, (1919 -), an eminent Polish sociologist, best known for *Kultura Masowa: Krytyka i Obrona* ['Mass Culture: Critique and Defence'], *Socjologia Kultury* ['The Sociology of Culture'] and *Kultury Narodowe u Korzeni* ['National Cultures at the Grass Roots Level']).

Kazimierz Kutz, a well-known Silesian film and television director, kindly agreed to give an interview. However, when I returned to Poland in September 1995 to conduct the final stage of the fieldwork, he was unfortunately too busy, having just been elected to the Polish Senate.

order to earn money which has some meaning, it's necessary to work all the time, and to concentrate on your work.

51.71G. It seems to me that values such as respect for the family have changed...for the worse. Which is precisely why these families don't stay together. Once, there were certainly fewer divorces, right, and everyone...had more time for the family, and was occupied with their children in such a way that...there was closer contact - moreover, there was time for conversation. And now work has to be done, that has to be respected, [which] often...[means that] there isn't time for the family.

130.2S. The other thing that has changed is that...people who...work for private firms...do not work from 7.00 - 3.00 p.m., they work from 9.00 - 5.00 p.m.,...so [the] national habit...of working hours has changed...[And] if you work from 9.00 - 5.00 p.m., the meal that you have at one o'clock is not...'obiad', but 'lunch'.

52.96Z. Having no time for our children, we try to give them...other things... I think it started at [the] beginning of [the] '90s, maybe in the late '80s, that...everybody tried to give the children the most important things and the most modern things,...and they started to ask, 'Please give me that and that and that'. Because...when I was small,...I enjoyed the fact [that] I got [a] very small toy from our parents...Now, when we give our children something small, they think, 'Only such [a small] thing ?...I need...[a] gift for two million, or two hundred, and I only got [one] for two zlotys', or something like that. And I think that the majority of young people think that they need [things], and that their needs should be fulfilled.

53.73G. In Poland,...there's a...greater warmth between people, so social contact is greater...in comparison with the West... I think that

Szczypiorski: I understand Polishness as a certain sort of historical experience given to me and my generation in this...period which we had to live through, and the challenge of which we had to meet... Everything else follows from this fundamental experience. That means that I feel my Polishness through my memory, I would say. That means not only through my past, because I generally don't believe in a subjective past...Maybe there exists the past of the group, of the society, of the nation. And that's simply what we call history. The past of...the individual person, however, is firmly anchored in their memory. That means that it's not so much a question of the past, as of the memory of the past. What isn't remembered, what is forgotten, doesn't exist in life. And connected with this is the fact that the past is also selective,...that the past changes together with me...Connected with that is the fact that my memory is also different. And if my memory's different, what's remembered from the past has also changed in me. In that sense, it could be said that my Polishness, which is rooted in what I have behind me in terms of my experience, is also not fixed, is not a permanent value...But what, in fact, is Polishness ? Well, without doubt, it's my emotional and intellectual relationship to a certain community, in which I am rooted. What of that is mutual, and what are the limits of this mutuality ?...As the years pass,...I increasingly arrive at the conclusion that for me, Polishness is exclusively rooted in language and in culture. My Polishness determines my language. And because I think in Polish and also associate in Polish,...that determines me as a Pole and as a person rooted in Polishness...How can I put it ? Well, because damn it, what is this Polishness ?...That what ? That we have a shared past ? We don't have a shared past. That's not true...I don't have a shared past with any other person...What ? Some shared education ? I generally don't believe in that as a powerful influence. Well, what then ? Some sort of shared values ? If there are some sort of shared values, then those shared values arise from a shared culture. And culture expresses

this is a result of the fact that here, people...like social meetings, and the lack of money [now] means that they take place less often. But even so, each person deep down would like to meet with their friends...There are people who really want to meet, but others who don't,...because they work, because they don't have the money, and connected with this [is] our Polish hospitality, getting into debt in order to fill the whole table with food - that was hospitality from the heart...And now, there isn't the money for that, and dropping by has disappeared,...[and]...people won't admit that they can't do anything grander. All that's gone. Now, people don't drop by like they used to, and you in turn can't drop by sometime, maybe because people are busier, or sometimes you drop by and the people aren't at home - either they're working, or they're tired...

54.63D. In the West, people have always lived under capitalism, they've got accustomed to it, and they don't live at such a pace as we do - that's how it seems to me...We live too anxiously,...we haven't managed to switch over so quickly...We don't know how to behave and to adjust to this. We lose our way - not everyone, of course, but we lose our way.

55.75F. It's hard for me to say how it's changed. Everyone is much more experienced now. First, it's common knowledge that it's not possible to make such a smooth transition from one system to another - and that's now an obvious thing...You don't have to stand in queues for juice, to get clothes,...there's a much greater choice of all these things...But in spite of everything, from my observations, it turns out that after these latest Presidential elections, people are more used to the old system than could have been expected...

139.109R. Polish culture is a hierarchical culture, and everyday norms of communication - 'Pan', 'Pani' - are very persistent.

itself in language. So if these shared values exist (and I'm not at all sure that they do), then it's...language. And perhaps, damn it, only language...You know, there are a lot of people who, if you asked them, standing at the bus-stop, 'Why do you feel yourself to be a Pole?', would generally say, 'Well, what do I know? Because I'm a Pole!'. It was left to them, somehow, because they were born here and brought up here, and they can't see themselves as somebody else, right? Because they are who they are, basically. And of course, in this sense, they're right, because each of us is only who he or she is, right? Because the whole of my freedom lies in this, because as a matter of fact, it resolves itself into the consciousness that I am not somebody else. So on that relies my freedom, my separateness, my sovereignty: I know that I am not other, not somebody else, only me. For me, language is the foundation of my Polishness. It's what Tuwim wrote - 'My Fatherland, the Polish language'.¹⁹ He was right, that's the key to the matter...Because the whole tradition is transmitted through language. Because if one has some sort of tradition, and one is attached to it, it's thanks to language. The way of thinking, the way of reacting to the world, emotionality - it's all linked to language. Because it is expressed through language.

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Szczypiorski: There's no doubt that there's a...persistent inferiority complex which also manifests itself repeatedly in a superiority complex...It's an attempt at psychological compensation. When a person feels somehow humiliated by the outside world, right, they immediately say 'Well, we were at Samossiera, right?'²⁰ Not everybody was, but we were, and we're...admirable and wonderful!

¹⁹ Tuwim (1894 – 1953), a Polish poet.

²⁰ An important episode in the Napoleonic Wars: the charge of the Polish contingent opened the way to Madrid.

However, in a lot of international companies, for example, they use...first names...That's a kind of dehierarchisation of these everyday working relationships...Our Polish cultural norms and standards are...decidedly different,...at least officially, for old people, for the hierarchy, and also for women. The position of women in Poland is always formal, their cultural [position] is very high, which is where the hand kissing comes from, right ? This respect - there's something different in the mentality...And the position of the Church, of religion, is very high, of people who are authorities, which is linked to the history of the nation, the history of values,...and that's something which Poles demand is respected. This is a very ingrained reaction, and Poles are very sensitive to this, even over-sensitive, they have a lot of complexes [about this], and they perceive their position very sensitively, and if that position...is violated, they at once feel very frustrated...And so this post-feudal, post-traditional structure, where everyone has a voice, where everyone takes decisions democratically,...collectively, this is something that Poles have to learn now, in these new conditions.

127.88B. If you go [down] any street in Poland, the name[s] of the shops are usually in English. Sometimes, people cannot pronounce them, people do not understand them, but they use them. So I think that's bad. Because you have to preserve your own language, you have to take care of its beauty. I think that language is a tradition of your culture,...language is a living thing, and it's obvious that in the computer field you have to pick up some words, but if you change your own words for foreign [words] without any special reason, I think it's like taking weeds to the garden...Imagine that you have a mixture of many languages,...you lose something, I think...In a sense, you lose your identity. Probably, if you change your own words for foreign [words], after...several generations,...if you [went]...back to your own literature, you probably wouldn't understand it, because these...old Polish words would sound to you quite strange. Probably you wouldn't be able to understand them...

It's as if the whole of Polish nationalism is founded on that, right ? On the feeling of being threatened, and on the inferiority complex... And connected with that is the nationalist bluster which is generally laughable in the eyes of the West. Because we look like fools, right ? With this continual showing off, with this peacock's plumage, ²¹ with this exceptional superiority that we think we have. We generally think we saved England in 1940. If it hadn't been for Division 303, Hitler would have been in London. It's nonsense, right ?...When a normal English person hears that, they can only shrug their shoulders. Of course, in us, it's an attempt to react to the fact that when the English are talking about the War, few even mumble something about the Polish contribution. I can understand it, because why should they think about it ?...Now, in political debates about the Second World War, it's very often...said that Churchill and Roosevelt sold Poland at Yalta,...because they didn't care about our interests. I ask myself, did I pay Churchill's salary, that he should have looked after Polish interests ? He looked after the interests of the British Empire. Why do I have to bear a grudge against the Prime Minister of England, that he didn't fight for Polish interests ? The Poles should have fought for Polish interests, right ? But of course, these various complexes mean that now, we have these various nationalist goings-on. Please pay attention, however, to one very significant thing. We are encircled,...and we are threatened. But from what sides ? Only from the side of the West are we threatened in this vision. Because towards the Russian we have a lordly, contemptuous, patronising attitude - that's a rabble, a slavish, servile psyche, ignorance. And we're lords. Where do we get it from ? I've really wondered about that. Why there's this complex towards the Germans, and this complex towards the Russians. Well, here it's necessary to dot our i's. To tell the truth about what it looks like. It's a question of civilisational backwardness. We're altogether more civilisationally developed by far than the Russians. There's no doubt about that. But without

²¹ A complex reference: the traditional costume of the Krakow district includes a peacock's feather in the man's hat; there may also be a reference here to Wyspianski's 1901 play *Wesele* ['The Wedding'], in which, for all the boasting, the fight to regain independence is lost.

128.147D. I think that a lot of foreign words have flooded in from [the] West which are acceptable,...but some of them aren't [because] ordinary people...have problems with understanding [them]. The throwing of a lot of words from the West into our language isn't always good...If we're talking about the intelligentsia, where everyone learns languages, it's not a problem, the majority understands. However, if we're talking about the television, throwing foreign words into politics,...sometimes I talk to ordinary people,...and they don't understand. And that's a minus.

130.83L. There are lots of words from English in the area of business in particular...This is good...Lots of words are used all over the world, like 'businessman', and we shouldn't substitute our Polish words for these. The language is broadening,...it's becoming more dynamic...

58.59N. Before 1990, [the] Church was [the] Church. But after 1990, [the] Church is not [a] Catholic organisation, but [a] political organisation...

61.140Dd....The Church is changing: the funny thing is, that when you look at the Protestant countries,...you see that at the moment... they started to try [and] understand everything by reason, just by [the] brain, by intellectual debate, after a few hundred years, the religion...[has]...nearly disappeared...[But] when you look at the countries which are more Catholic, then there's also this brain and also there is a heart and emotions, [and] it seems that even in the capitalist countries like...Spain,...or France, or...Bavaria in Germany,...like Austria,...religion is still alive...In the West,...the old values have been undermined,...but there aren't any other propositions. For me, free love, and changing partner every night, or not being fair...[to] others,...not caring about your own family - it

doubt, we're civilisationally backward in comparison with the West. And that's the reason, that's the basis on which these kinds of attitudes arise. Because after all, it's a well known fact when a Pole goes to Germany,...or to France, or to England, or to Switzerland,... he always sees better organisation than at home, greater diligence than at home, cleanliness is more evident than at home, punctuality. Of course, I'm not maintaining that the Germans or the French are always punctual - no. I'm talking about some sort of average likeness...Without doubt, people there have a higher standard of living, they have more. And connected with that is the fact that, when one has more at a material level, one has greater margins of freedom. That's also extremely fundamental. Because the more you have, the more certain you feel. That awakens the Polish complex...So we must in some way compensate for that. Compensate in what way ? We go to the East. And in the East, we see less punctuality, a lot more slovenliness, a lot worse organisation, and a much lower standard of living. And we go round Moscow or Petersburg like millionaires, and we see this destitution and this poverty...We return to the Fatherland and we say, 'Well yes, we're lords'. That's how it is. Towards Russia we have a horrible attitude,...a lordly attitude which could take its revenge on us. After all, the Russians see it and there's no doubt that it hurts them...That's how we manage to be sympathetic towards the Russian[s]. We manage to be so, well, lordly, clapping them on the back: 'Well, you people are poor, well, we sympathise with that !'. But that's the height of our wealth, or our cleverness...Besides, we don't believe in any Pushkin or in any Gogol. There, there was nothing. There is emptiness, it's a Tartar country, Mongolia, there, there's no culture. However, in relation to Germany, we never show any sympathy. Never. Because that's somebody. In fact, we have encoded in us that the German is somebody better than us. Which obviously isn't true. Which is absolutely untrue. That's why our Polishness is distorted. It's hunch-backed.

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doesn't work,...it's something negative...[At the moment], we have [a] period of change [in Poland], [but] I think probably, people will come back to the old values...People are learning to be free. They... have to learn to be free from taking ideology, religion, too seriously...After forty years, we're now free for the first time and we want to stop to think, so of course, for a short time, we have to be anti-Church and anti-whatever, and after some time, we'll just choose what we like...[But] it seems also that this free will...is used partly by our political, post-communist forces to undermine [the] position of [the] Church and [the] old values,...because now there is a paranoia...[about] priests. They have...huge propaganda against... [the Church], and they use it, [these] post-communists...Some people from the Right...are very afraid, and I can understand them, but...I think we'll go through this, and afterwards,...come back.

62.58N. Money plays a greater role in Poland now than it did previously. And why ? Because until 1990, there wasn't the possibility to earn a lot, and to spend a lot. Now, however, it's changed, so that you can earn a lot and spend a lot, but I think that...six years,...four years, after the transformation, the most important [thing] was money - earning and spending money - but at the moment, I see that [it] is back to the former system of values, like education and social position. I think [that] during the next year, [there] will be [a] balance between social position and financial position...

63.68E. At the very beginning of the 1990s, we were really mesmerised by the West, that's to say that everything was treated uncritically, everything was patterned on the West; but now, in my judgement anyway, it's returning to a kind of balance, that's to say now, things from the West aren't approached uncritically, people try to...modify things to suit the Polish situation.

Szczypiorski: Without doubt, Poland was a tolerant country a long time ago. There was tolerance for one basic reason which is not talked about in Poland, because basically people aren't aware of it. One has to go deeper into it...Poland was very tolerant in the Middle Ages, and in the sixteenth century. Why?...Where did all the Jews that were here come from? And why? What were they doing here? Did the Lord God drop them by parachute? Well, there's no doubt that in the Middle Ages, there was a great migration of Jews, as a result of the monstrous persecutions which they experienced...When the Jews were driven out of Spain, first they moved to France. In France, they were very seriously persecuted. They moved to the plain of the Rhine. On the plain of the Rhine, there were pogroms. They went further, to the non-Latin countries...There it was already a little better,...because the Catholic Church was that bit weaker. Let's stop kidding ourselves, that's the truth. And the further East they went, the better it was. In the end, they came to Poland, in the twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, and they found here a country in which there were two factors which were extremely favourable to tolerance. The first was that at that time, the Church wasn't too deeply rooted...and the authority of the State was very weak, the authority of the King was very weak...At the same time as being weak, the monarch was poor, and he got credit from the Jews. And because of that, he granted them privileges...And that's the truth...Then comes the Reformation. In Poland, the Reformation is extremely widespread, as a result of the weak monarchy and the not very strong authority of the Church...But then comes the rule of the Wazas, and...the political authority of the State is weak, and the Church is getting more and more powerful. There follows the period of the Counter-Reformation in Poland,...and it's also the end of tolerance in Poland. But it's not just a matter of tolerance towards Protestants - towards Luther and Calvin...Poland is increasingly weak as a State, and as a result, towards the close of the eighteenth century, it stops existing as a State, as a sovereign state body. Then you have in this country three Partitions by foreign powers. And now - because this is the

64.50J. I spoke to one taxi driver, and he told me 'I took part in demonstration[s] against [the] Communists, but I...never really want[ed] capitalism'. Who...[fought]...for capitalism ? Nobody. We didn't want it at all. We just wanted a free country, but no[t] capitalism.

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177.66M. What's really needed [in Poland] is order, which I noticed...in the West. That order concerned with the organisation of professional life - some sort of internal orderliness.

180.131S. Probably it strikes you when you come to Poland...[that] the building and the streets...[are] grey, they're not nice...not worth looking at. So this is what I would definitely like to be changed, and the way...the shop assistants speak to you...But I think it requires another generation...In the old system, regardless of how hard you were working, you got the same salary, basically...Now it's not the case, but certain people do not realise...that they must change their...[mentality]...Obviously, we have unemployment here in this country, but for certain categories of jobs, it's really difficult to find somebody, so you cannot sack such people. For instance, 'sekretarki' in universities, schools, public institutions - this is terrible, this is really terrible.

181.132Aa. [I'd like to bring to Poland] everything that's connected to the Protestant work ethic, with...duty...in relation to the State... The phenomenon of public service doesn't exist in Poland. There isn't a body of officials along the lines of the English or French model. Of course, this phenomenon would be a very useful thing for the creation of a public model in the mass media,...like the BBC, for example...

key to the matter, and we don't talk about this, and we don't want to talk about this, you have the Orthodox powers of the Tzars, you have the Lutheran powers of the Prussian Kings, enlightened to be sure, but strict, and you have the Catholic, but extremely... loathsome Austrian powers...In the initial period, the Austrian annexation was the hardest, the worst. Only from 1867, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire came into being, was there... liberalisation...Consequently, you have Polishness, as it were, situated in a besieged fortress of Polish Catholicism. Because Polish Catholicism, the Polish Church, becomes established as the centre of Polishness. Each year, it's less and less Catholic, and more and more Polish...Problems in the moral, theological sphere generally don't exist. All that exist are patriotic problems associated with the annexing powers. The nineteenth century's Catholic, and everything that's not Catholic and not Polish is the enemy. The nineteenth century is the period of the fertile blossoming of Polish intolerance. That's the truth...Now,...today and in the twentieth century,...Poles are...exceptionally intolerant. To make use of the palimpsest of ideas that in the Reformation Poland was tolerant is idiotic, because you could equally well say that in the times before Henry the Eighth, England was Roman Catholic. So what follows from that, is it any longer? No it isn't, because it's Anglican. So that's rubbish, right? Polish tolerance finished. It slowly crumbled from the seventeenth century, in the second half of the eighteenth century, and through the whole of the nineteenth century, in order to reach some sort of apogee in the twentieth century. The role of Poles - here I must speak like a Pole... - the role of Poland and the Poles in the face of the extermination of the Jews during the Second World War is not good. However much we prattle on, it's not good. Well, of course, the whole time we say - and I also say, and I'm conscious that I tell the truth - there were a lot of people who tried to protect the Jews. There was Żegota,²² and there was this and there was that. And of course, it was exceptionally valuable and

²² An underground organisation, part of the Home Army, which aimed to help Jews, for which the usual punishment was to be shot.

182.79A. [Poland needs] some sort of ability to compromise,... above all in politics. Some sort of co-operation for a better society and for the country has been forgotten at the moment...Above all, we should learn from the West this political culture, because our country really lacks that at the moment, and we never had the chance to learn it during the years of the Partitions, the Occupation, and well, later,...there wasn't the chance to learn political culture then either, when one political option dominated. And so at the moment, this society lacks that.

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216.81A. National and cultural identity in Poland certainly won't weaken. Poles have a very strong feeling of belonging to their nation and to their culture. Because for one hundred and fifty years, Poland was deprived of Statehood,...and yet the culture was maintained.

217.43K. I think we've got too strong a tradition, too long a history, to suddenly lose our identity, because...Poland disappeared from the map of Europe at one time, and...people never lost a sense of being ...Polish... I think the Poles will at heart stay Polish.

218.118W. [The future of national identity in Poland]...depends on how much the national identity of the Poles is a State identity. For a long time, there wasn't a State - national identity depended on the State tradition, of course, but also on nationality in terms of language, customs, and so on. And it seems to me that later, it was very simple - during the German Occupation - well, that was short - but also later during the Soviet [Occupation], it was straightforward

noble...That's all true. But there was a considerable sector of Poles who treated the Jews with hostility during the period of Occupation and during the time when Jews were persecuted and murdered. And there was a sector of Poles who collaborated with the Occupiers in this. Of course, it could be said that they were five percent, or seven percent, who helped...But what about the rest ? Well, the rest displayed indifference and that's the worst sin...An enormous sector of Polish society...wasn't intellectually or emotionally engaged in the problem of the Holocaust. In that lies the sin of the Poles. Of course, we don't want to talk about that...We say incessantly...'Well, what did the French do ? The French gave up Jews to the Germans', ...that the Slovaks...murdered with their own hands, they didn't need the Germans for that, that the Latvians in Riga murdered all the Jews themselves...Only I ask myself,...'To what degree do the sins of others absolve our sins ?' Not at all. We should loudly and clearly talk about the sins that we ourselves committed. Of course, in this light, it could be said that Polish anti-semitism isn't anything exceptional, because this anti-semitism was widespread throughout Europe. And that ultimately, it wasn't the Poles but the Germans who murdered the Jews. And that's all the gospel truth...But we can't talk about our tolerance, because those are two different issues, right ?...Well, we weren't tolerant, and we aren't tolerant. We don't have a good attitude, not only towards Jews,...but generally towards foreigners, towards others...Here, there supposedly isn't any anti-semitism, that's what's said. Everyone says - it's a typical Polish saying - 'Me ? I'm not anti-semitic !' When someone makes that declaration to me, I always say 'Do you know what ? It would be good if the Jews said that about you. Not you about yourself. Only let the Jews say that about you !'. You know, here the Jews also matter. Various things are attributed to the Jewry. Mazowiecki was attributed to the Jewry.²³ A Jew in Poland is generally a mythological figure. Because there generally aren't any in this

²³ Mazowiecki: a member of the liberal Catholic intelligentsia, and the first President of Poland after the end of Communism.

...opposition to everything. And now,...there are difficulties with relating what's national because it's local, and what's national because the State is Polish. So do I identify myself with this particular [little] place, or more with my President ? And it seems to me that people have difficulties because, in the moment that they identify themselves more with the real State, then it's not a problem to identify with global structures...

220.107T. I'm jealous of...what happened in Britain,...the awareness ...of the potential danger of the external impact [on] the national culture...All of this Euroscepticism in Great Britain, at...very different levels, is a very positive movement...A certain... consciousness of potential danger, before, not later... I would like Poland to do something like that, and I think that there is only one positive element of the policy of our - sorry - fucking Government - these stupid peasants who are...in Government are conscious of this. But I think that they are conscious of this only unconsciously ! And according to them, there's [a] spontaneous awareness, which seems to be connected with [the] peasant way of thinking, which seems to be always...much more conservative than other groups. And I think that [this is the] only positive element of [the] contemporary politics of our Government !

219.86H. Well, I think this national identity will weaken. And it's [a] natural process, I think,...to become more European...Maybe the older generation in Poland are...against it - they...feel very Polish,... but [the] younger generation...feel European more than Polish. And...patriotism will be [an] anachronistic attitude.

222.117W. I'm afraid of the old nationalism, and not just in Poland, but in Europe generally...It's a reaction to a negative necessity, because a positive one is to join Europe...We are simply

country. I don't know how many of them there are. Five thousand, apparently, or four thousand. It's generally as if there weren't any. But...it's constantly said that here, the Jews rule...This 'Jew' generally isn't a Jew. Something foreign, something adverse, something secret, and something that isn't conducive to Polish interests is called a Jew. It has nothing in common with the genuine Jewry. Because that's some sort of mythological palimpsest. But it testifies to the fact that we aren't tolerant. Basically, we're just not.

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Tischner: [In my work], I try to throw light on what Polishness consisted of, and what it consists of now...In the seventeenth century, one of the Canons of the Krakow Chapter...introduced himself in the this way:... 'Krakovian Canon, of Polish nationality, of Ruthenian background, and by birth a Jew'. What did it mean then to be a Pole ? To be a Pole didn't preclude being at the same time both Ruthenian and Jewish...It's possible to be a woman and simultaneously a teacher or a doctor. One doesn't preclude the other. However, very often today, it's the opposite. That if someone's a Pole, it's not also possible to be a Ruthene, it's not possible to be a Jew, right ? And if they're a Jew, it's not possible to be a Krakovian Canon ! In other words, I attempt to wrest from the notion of Polishness those moments which joined but didn't divide.

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rationalising what we don't have a choice about - so we say we don't want to [join Europe]. However, the opposite reaction is also true, that somebody is making us, our Government is corrupting us, and so forth.

224.240Dd. Definitely it would be nice to go back to...Lwow or Wilno, but if it is...[at the]...cost of another war, [then] no thank-you. I think these borders are not bad. One city, Lwow, was a Polish city surrounded by Ukrainian...peasants. [The] other city, Wilno - in [the] 20's and 30s, there...[were]...not so many Lithuanians there, but there...[were]...a lot of...Jewish people, Polish people, [and] Russian people, and [in the] whole surroundings:...it was definitely, and still is, Polish peasants. Both these cities were taken from Poland, and of course, we took...Szczecin and Wroclaw. Okay, well, it happens. We shouldn't change any borders any more... Maybe it's not so great that the capital of Great Germany is 20 or 30 km away from our border now, but we'll see.

227.242Dd....Here, you're born...between area[s]. Between the materialistic West and the totalitarian, paranoi[d] East, and you can see the craziness of both systems...Like in the West, [for] you people,...the thing that most matters...is money, because you don't have to care about anyone, you just have money. And then in the East,...like Russia, we have this trend that money doesn't matter, you know, the most important [thing] is power, and equalness - that's why people will scream at each other quite often because they have their small territory on their own which they control. And Poland's a really weird place...We've been occupied by [the] Germans and by [the] Russians; in between, we've seen the totalitarianism of fascists ...and Communism. Actually, there's a story that there's two travellers - one is going [for the] first time

Tischner: Here, the role of language is different. For example, for a long time, Finnish literature developed in Swedish. However, in Poland, in my opinion, this would have been impossible. Why ? Because there's something else apart from words in the language, like the emotional atmosphere of the language. And the Polish language has its own emotional atmosphere, which is precisely that which can't be transferred. Poets express it best. Which is why poetry is exceptionally important in Poland. Particularly dramatic poetry, and so dramatic literature...There was a time that England - that was above all Shakespeare, right ? Then...there was John Stuart Mill, and also David Hume, and so on. And it changed. While Poland's...still Shakespeare. Of course, there are outside influences, but you can see how it jars.

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from France to Moscow, and...[the]...other is going [for the] first time from Moscow to Paris. And by mistake, they both stopped in Warsaw, and they both thought they [were]...where they wanted to go. So I think we are just like [an in-] between area...

228.137Cc. Maybe the West lacks something in spiritual matters. That's something that could be regenerated under the influence of Poland...Certainly in areas such as the development of technology, of economic and political structures, in the development of social representation, and the whole party political system, we're behind... But maybe something from our culture - in the sense of artistic culture - has been saved - art, cinema - well, they suffer from a lack of funding, that's obvious - but we don't lack directors with imagination, we don't lack music, fine arts practitioners, painters, poster designers...

229.143Dd. From the technical point of view, definitely we are behind. From the value point...[of view], I wouldn't be so sure that we're before or after - we're only at some other place... I think we have [a] pretty deep and rich...emotional life...Sometimes, when I travel in Western places, I can feel [a] lack of it:...emotions,... feelings,...being sometimes enthusiastic,...really warm, trust[ing] relations between family and friends...

231.106T. When you ask this question about [attitudes] toward[s] the West [in ten years' time], I think that there is a certain triangle: [the] West, Poland, [and the] East, [which] means Russia. So, trying to predict what our...relationship will be with [the] West in [the] next ten years, I could say...[that] the worse...[the]...situation with Russia, the better [the] situation with [the] West. It seems to be obvious,...but of course, there are relations between Russia and [the] West, and I may say the better [the] relation[s] [of] Russia

Tischner: There was a time of a great mythologisation of Poland in the West. And then each Pole in the West was at least a national hero. Then there came a reverse period. Each Pole was a thief, was shifty. However, we have a rational outlook on things now, although it's a problem. A problem of a shared language. There's some sort of gulf, some sort of misunderstanding - I'll be honest about this - in fact, for the Pole, people from the West are stupid. They're educated, they read a lot, but really, they're stupid. I can't help it, that's how it looks. And people from the West, well, they think differently. They also have the feeling that it's necessary to instruct us in something, to teach us something. And often, we agree that it's necessary to teach us something, like how to hold a fork. And we're patient about this German education. But the whole thing depends on the fact that both sides have a very deep historical experience. And it's a problem of the handing down of this experience. So that we don't make the mistakes you've made, and you those that we've made...In principle, we read the same books, but we find in these books something altogether different.

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with the West, the worse [the] situation of Poland - the worse [the] relationship Poland will have with [the] West.

226.144Dd....German investment in Poland...can...be negative - like buying ground in Poland, you know. But the problem [is], that the only...way towards [the] West is Germany. We didn't have a good history with Germany sometimes...It seems that Germany...[is] really looking forward to welcom[ing] Poland to [the] European Community. Of course, some Poles...are afraid that then they will buy us, you know, they will use us... I think that [the] Germans don't want to be the last...Western country. They prefer to have some other countries, you know, on the sides...And Poland would like to have some other countries - like [the] Ukraine - between us and Russia !...I hope that...[the West]...will be more and more disappointed with Russia, and they will be more and more nice...to Poland.

221.99Z. I think Poland was very popular in the '80s, and [at the]...beginning of [the] '90s, because...we started this fight against Communism...and with good results...Everybody...knew Walesa,... [the] West knew what happened in Poland, [and] everybody was very enthusiastic about that...But after that, after the fall of Communism, we started with the economic transition...and with many, many difficulties,...and I think the West'[s]...interest [became]...economic...But [the] West has not been interested in [the] difficulties now in Poland, which are very close to [the] economic transition,...and I think the West haven't changed their opinion that we are less developed...They still think that we are less developed, that our knowledge [about]...different things...[is] lower than in the case of Western societies...

Kloskowska: Some cities, some national songs, some elements of historiography [and] historical events are accepted as...national values by most...[people] - the knowledge, of course, varies. Now, the canon of literature, of Romantic literature particularly - which was very popular still between the two Wars, and also...[during]... the period of Solidarity - now it is perhaps losing its impact. In my research, people still - young people, even - verbally...acknowledge the existence of some important, common, cultural values, but it was lip service rather than...real knowledge...The common values for young people are coming from popular culture, from abroad, not from Polish culture, so this is changing. Perhaps at some moments again of crisis, there would be the resurrection of these national feelings, because this problem of national sovereignty is very...[sensitive] in Poland. I think it is important, even for the people of lower education,...but not at any moment - this problem of national identification is a...situational problem...In intelligentsia families, it was always a very important problem, but now, as younger generations will become parents, probably it will not be so very important. And the tv set will replace the grandmother, who was telling the stories of the past...

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234.60N. That slogan 'Return to Europe', which of course you can read all over the place in Poland - I don't understand that slogan. 'Return to Europe'. We are not in Siberia or Greenland. We're in... Europe !

238.91B. For centuries, we've been somewhere on the edge [of Europe], and I think it's been Poland's fault... You know, when Poland lost its liberty,... when Poland was... partitioned - because Poland was not on the map for a hundred years - it... [was]... our fault - nowadays everybody is saying... this openly... Maybe not everybody, but a lot of historians say that... it... [was]... our fault... So we were this poor cousin, always trying to get help from the West, but I think our mentality belongs to the West.

239.65D. I think we were always [in Europe], only our Socialist political system... blockaded us [in] - we were geographically,... but physically we couldn't be, because there was a border, a boundary, a barrier.

241.145Dd. We are in Europe... We created Europe... In the sixteenth [and] seventeenth century, we [were]... probably... the strongest country in Europe, you know... Our culture was covering half of Europe and half of... Russia, without... much [of a] problem !

242.4136Ee. Return to Europe ?... Well, starting from the Tartars, let's say, this is the question: how far would the Tartars have got if there hadn't been that battle at Legnica, in 1241 ? they'd definitely have got as far as France... Now, a second question: a few hundred years later, three hundred to be precise, the last delimitation by Sobieski at Vienna. If those forty thousand, if that really good army, hadn't gone to Vienna, and the Hussars, who were better,

Kloskowska: In my research on young Poles...done in the '90s, the objects, the subjects...were Poles with higher education aged between twenty-two and twenty-seven...Their attitudes towards other nations were very [open]...The research...was autobiographical...on the [basis of a] scheduled questionnaire,...but among fifteen subjects, I found almost fifteen types of...relations to the national problem - but they could also be grouped. Some of them were very open in their relations to foreign cultures, and to other nationalities. Some accepted, for instance, that a person... [could]...perfectly well at the same time...be a Pole and a German, Russian, Ukrainian, Belorus, a Lithuanian, or a Jew. Some accepted some double identifications but not all - for instance, they said that it is very difficult to feel at the same time...a German and a Pole. Some said only that it is possible to feel a European...and a Pole, but not a particular member of other nations and a Pole.

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perhaps, than today's American marines, right ? hadn't sorted things out – the question is, where would those Muslims have got to ? Even that Grunwald, which, as it were, contained German expansion, let's say - there's a question - [without it,] wouldn't there have been one big Germany, basically ? We unfortunately have such a location, that we must be in every battle, right ? That's our bad luck.

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243.303M. I think that...[a nation's history has] an influence [on it's contemporary thinking]. Especially in the history of Poland, which is linked to the fact that for many, many years, Poland was occupied by other nations, that Polishness was suppressed, that the Polish language was forbidden, and it wasn't possible to teach Polish, and generally, it was necessary to conceal all these elements of Polishness. Linked to that is...this desire to demonstrate Polishness ...and to cultivate the Polish language, and everything that's Polish. So we can say that this martyrdom of the Polish nation... - because lots of Poles perished in the battles for the nation's liberation... - resulted in this characteristic of [wanting] independence, [wanting] real freedom. So it seems to me that,...when a nation has such a tradition,...this has an influence on the psyche of that nation.

244.293R. Some objective facts are well known,...but history is a kind of interpretation of the past, and it influences our contemporary understanding of the present.

245.319Bb. Each generation writes its own historiography.

247.322Cc....How we remember something from childhood...is different from the subject of the history of the nation,...because it's one's memory, and...it's difficult to check.

Kloskowska: Well, after fifty years of Socialism, it was difficult...to think...about [the] future...So some years, perhaps decades, must elapse before people adjust to the new ways and possibilities,...to taking their own...economic lot in[to] their own hands. But there are also some studies in social psychology, made...in comparison with America,...[which] have found that...[a]...growing number of people are able...to orient themselves to the future, but on the whole, it is a thing to be learned, and learned on the basis of the regulation of practical, economic problems... I think that it is the result of [the] social system, that the very problem of regulation [was] close to the feudal state in Poland, when there were not many changes and there...[wasn't] the necessity to plan ahead; then [there was] the underdevelopment of Polish capitalism, and then...Socialism,... [when]...everything was planned from above and the planning was ...unrealistic,...so this discouraged people from planning. And now, young people are...planning their future, thinking about their future,...those who have higher education, particularly, but of course not those who are unemployed, and who see no possibilities... - on the contrary, this discourages people [from] looking ahead. But I do not think that it is in any way a national trait of Poles,...but simply the situation in Poland - and this situation is in the course of change.

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248.318Bb. There are various theories, as you know:
...psychological, psychoanalytical. There are even theories that [say that] the personality of an individual is shaped three generations earlier...

249.260U. Again,...you have examples of facts and you have examples of interpreting something...And you may interpret... events...in...childhood in a different way once you are twenty or thirty. You simply interpret it in a different way,...once you grow up:...you have a different viewpoint on the same thing...

250.320Bb. [History and childhood are] certainly different, because...a history is written by scholars who are educated for this through acquiring a certain...methodological knowledge...[that enables them] to evaluate events...in a way that's rather empirical... Of course, even if a person is a psychoanalyst, they can't completely analyse events from their personal life...But if you can't take truth from your own head about the past of your own country, you can research the past of another country, because as a researcher, you have a certain exteriority.

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(Fischer points out with regard to post-modern ethnography that 'texts utilizing...devices that draw attention to their own limitations and degree of accuracy, and that do so with aesthetic elegance ...rather than with pedantic laboredness' often receive a hostile reception, because '[s]ubtlety is a quality that seems...to run counter to the canons of explicitness and univocal meaning expected' in such writing. ²⁴ It is therefore perhaps worth foregrounding some of the textual strategies that I have employed in Chapters One and Three of this thesis, in an attempt to undermine textual authority, to question the position of the ethnographer as a unified and consistent subject and reliable narrator, and to disrupt the conventions of realism. These include: constructed initial quotations; insistent use of personal narration to draw attention to the ethnographer's experience and individual construction of the culture under analysis; irony and humour to defamiliarise; swapping between first and third person narration and different forms of focalization (external, character first person, character third person), and switching between different types of speech presentation (direct, indirect, free direct, and free indirect); ²⁵ switching pronouns, not so as to merge subjectivities, but so as to destabilise the reader's relationship to the text - the pronoun 'you', for example, is sometimes used to address the reader, sometimes the narrator, and is sometimes used generically; avoiding use of the ethnographic present as much as possible, except where employed by interviewees, and instead employing a variety of tenses to reflect the constant play between present, past, and future involved in everyday thought and experience; including several temporally specific experiences of Polish culture to avoid the idea of cultural stasis; at times using literary language to draw attention to the medium of narration; offering inconsistent points of view of Polish culture through staging multiple textual voices; arranging quotations in a repeated and cyclical historical

²⁴ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 229 - 230).

²⁵ On narrative, narrative point of view, and literary techniques for the presentation of speech in writing, see Montgomery et al., (2000: 211 - 241).

trajectory so as to demonstrate the way in which allegories of salvage and redemption are an important factor not only in ethnographic narratives, but also in narratives of nation-ness; including a fragmented fieldwork diary so as to encode the incompleteness and partiality of any experience and representation of a culture; using fragments of quotation from ethnographic interviews and occasionally including phrases which make it clear that the interviewee is responding to a specific question, in an attempt to encode the incomplete and partial nature of any ethnographic inquiry; including quotations from interviews with cultural commentators who, to a certain extent, were also analysing the culture as if from the outside; and pitching the fieldwork diary and cultural commentators' quotations against the interviewees' quotations so as to encourage the reader to become involved in the construction of knowledge. Thus, just as the ethnographer had to attempt to make sense of a culture, so too, the reader has had to make sense of a sometimes difficult text. Overall, then, in Section One of this thesis, I have positioned myself within a tradition of feminist anthropology which includes emotion as a means of attempting to disrupt positivism, and I have tried to take the idea of ethnographic reflexivity further by drawing on psychoanalytic experience (as Fischer points out, '[a]mong the most sensitive and best anthropological works are those that bring personal engagements...into play');²⁶ I have also intentionally used a variety of textual strategies to challenge the reader to think about ethnographic research and representation. There are doubtless other strategies that I have used quite unconsciously, so for all that post-modern ethnographies are 'hierarchies of discourse', with the ethnographer manipulating the text,²⁷ it is, ultimately, the reader who is situated at the apex of that hierarchy, and who looks over the shoulder of the ethnographer. As Marcus and Fischer point out, 'in the most sophisticated critical works, content and form are

²⁶ Fischer in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 199).

²⁷ Clifford in Clifford and Marcus (1986: 17).

intimately linked',²⁸ and may aim to 'make the situation of the fieldworker problematic and even disturbing for the reader, so as to explore philosophical and political problems of cultural translation'.²⁹

²⁸ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 137).

²⁹ Marcus and Fischer (1986: 48).

SECTION 2: THEORIES OF NATION-NESS

In the next four chapters, I want to develop a model of 'nation-ness' which draws on Foucault's epistemological account of history and Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of the subject in order to explain both how the nation has developed, and why the modern subject identifies with it. In so doing, I hope to bridge the gap between two of the main approaches to nation-ness: what might be termed the 'macro-' and the 'micro-political' approaches respectively.¹ The first tends to focus on the historical and socio-political development of the nation as an entity external to the individual, and goes some way towards explaining why the nation has only come into existence relatively recently; it does not, however, offer an emotionally convincing account of why, under specific conditions, nation-ness matters - sometimes mortally - to particular sorts of subjects. The second approach concentrates on nation-ness as an internal, mental phenomenon, and explores why the nation is psychologically significant; but it does not explain why nation-ness has not always mattered, nor why, at a given moment, it matters to some groups of subjects but not to others. The model that I shall be constructing here aims to resolve these difficulties, not by seeing the nation as the direct result of changes in class structures, religious attitudes, language choices or economic development, as the macro-political approach has frequently done, nor by seeing the subject's national identity as somehow isolated from his or her historical and material conditions, as the micro-political approach has tended to, but rather by arguing that the nation is a manifestation of epistemological change, (that is, shifts in the perceived relationships between 'order, signs,

¹ I shall be using Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Smith as examples of those taking a macro-political approach, and Kristeva and Bhabha as examples of those taking a micro-political approach. Obviously, it is not possible within the scope of this chapter to go into their arguments in great detail; rather, I shall be taking them as representatives of their overall respective approaches. Although these authors tend to discuss 'nationalism' rather than 'nation-ness', I am taking the two terms to be interchangeable here, in as much as 'nationalism' seems to me to be simply a more extreme version of 'nation-ness', rather than something entirely different.

language', knowledge, and people's material conditions and conceptions of space and time), ² and that such change influences the very structure of the human subject, and hence its ability to identify. Although Foucault's approach to history has certainly been subject to criticism - not least from historians who have questioned his choice of dates and definitions - his 'structuralist' analysis of the shifting episteme, ³ and of its connection to the perceived relationship between language and the world, nevertheless provides a useful basis for thinking about why pre-modern societies were not - indeed could not - be organised nationally, why the concept of nation-ness developed under the conditions of the Classical period, and why the nation came fully into existence with the advent of modernity. I shall therefore be arguing in chapters four, five, and six that epistemological change was instrumental in the creation of the nation. When it comes to explaining why the modern subject identifies with the nation, Foucault's account of history must be supplemented by a theory of the subject. A Freudian explanation would certainly be pertinent to an analysis of the function of identification in the construction of identity. However, Lacan's approach is preferable here because his use of structuralism makes it possible to relate Foucault's analysis of epistemological change to the psychoanalytic organisation of the subject in language, and thereby provides a useful means of linking historical processes to subjective experience. I shall be arguing in chapter seven, then, that, rather than being universal, the organisation of the human subject is dependent on the prevailing episteme of any particular era, and that modern conditions result not only in the existence of the nation, but also in a psychological structure of the subject which renders identification with the nation both possible and necessary.

² Cf. Gutting (1989: 140). I prefer a slightly wider definition because, despite its abstraction, Foucault's analysis is ultimately based on a materialist approach.

³ Foucault famously rejects the designation of his work as structuralist, presumably because he sees it as implying a position of knowledge which he takes to be impossible (1970: xiv). The term nevertheless seems relevant here, not least because it is his use of a structuralist notion of the sign which makes it possible to connect his epistemological account of history to Lacan's structure of the subject.

Chapter Four

The Macro-Political Approach

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault argues that there have been two particularly important changes in the relationship between language and the world: the first constitutes the shift from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme, while the second marks the transition to the Modern episteme. In order to link Foucault's argument to the macro-political approach, in chapters four, five and six I shall show how his three epistemes can be connected to the three main phases of the development of nation-ness, which can respectively be termed the 'pre-national' era, the 'early nation-ness' era, and the era of 'high nation-ness'. Taking each episteme in turn, I shall first summarise its key features, then identify the relevant arguments of the macro-political approach, and finally explain the development of nation-ness epistemologically. ¹

The Renaissance Episteme

Foucault argues that fundamental to the Renaissance episteme is an understanding of the universe based on resemblance. The precise differences between the various types of resemblance need not concern us here: what is important is that during this period, there was an entirely different conception of the relationship between objects, space, and meaning. Thus convenience 'brings like things together and makes adjacent things similar', so that 'the world is linked together like a chain'. ² Emulation is 'a sort of "convenience" that has been freed from the law of place', ³ so that 'things...imitate one another from one end of the universe to the

¹ As I shall be arguing in Chapter Seven, following Gellner, I do not see nation-ness as being linked intrinsically to any particular era, nor do I see it, as Anderson and Hobsbawm do, as being somehow 'infectious': what matters for the development of nation-ness are the epistemological conditions prevailing within a particular geographical area at any given time.

² Foucault (1970: 19).

³ Foucault (1970: 19).

other without connection or proximity', 'the world abolishes the distance proper to it', ⁴ and the question arises as to 'which of these reflections coursing through space are the original images ? [w]hich ...the reality and which the projection ?'. ⁵ Analogy 'makes possible the marvellous confrontation of resemblances across space' and has 'a universal field of application', through which 'all the figures in the whole universe can be drawn together'. ⁶ And finally, sympathy 'plays through the depths of the universe in a free state' and 'can traverse the vastest spaces in an instant', falling 'like a thunderbolt from the distant planet upon the man [sic] ruled by that planet', but also being 'brought into being by a simple contact'. ⁷

This conception of meaning as universal not only pervades space and time, but also inevitably pervades language. There is thus:

...no difference between the visible marks that God has stamped upon the surface of the earth, so that we may know its inner secrets, and the legible words that the Scriptures, or the sages of Antiquity, have set down in the books preserved for us by tradition. The relation to these texts is of the same nature as the relation to things: in both cases there are signs that must be discovered. ⁸

Language is essentially seen as an embodiment, rather than as a representation, of meaning and, being inseparable from the physical environment, demands constant interpretation; ⁹ it is not 'a totality of independent signs, a uniform and unbroken entity in which

⁴ Foucault (1970: 19).

⁵ Foucault (1970: 19).

⁶ Foucault (1970: 21 and 22).

⁷ Foucault (1970: 23).

⁸ Foucault (1970: 33).

⁹ Foucault (1970: 35).

things could be reflected one by one, as in a mirror, and so express their particular truths', but rather:

...an opaque, mysterious thing, closed in upon itself
...which combines here and there with the forms of the world and becomes interwoven with them...so that all these elements, taken together, form a network of marks in which each of them may play...the role of content or of sign, that of secret or of indicator...language is not an arbitrary system; it has been set down in the world and forms a part of it... ¹⁰

For Foucault, the status of language in the Renaissance is linked to the priority given to its written rather than its oral form, and hence to the development of printing, the primacy of Scripture, and the expression of a particular understanding of knowledge based on interpretation and commentary. Knowledge, he argues, consists 'in relating one form of language to another form of language; in restoring the great, unbroken plain of words and things; in making everything speak', ¹¹ while commentary, meanwhile, 'is directed entirely towards the enigmatic, murmured element of the language being commented on', and cannot exist:

...unless, below the language one is reading and deciphering, there runs the sovereignty of an original Text...which, by providing a foundation for the commentary, offers its ultimate revelation as...[its]...promised reward... ¹²

The Renaissance conception of the relationship between language and reality is thus one in which the two systems are intertwined and inseparable, with both being linked to an understanding of meaning as ultimately divine, spatially universal and presumably, temporally eternal. This understanding of meaning

¹⁰ Foucault (1970: 34 - 35).

¹¹ Foucault (1970: 40).

¹² Foucault (1970: 41).

is of immediate relevance to nation-ness, because it helps to explain the characteristics of pre-national societies identified by the macro-political approach.

The Pre-National Era

The macro-political approach to the pre-national phase of the development of nation-ness is predominantly concerned with the relationship between conceptions of language, religious and socio-political structures, and ways of conceiving territorial space and historical time. It was the sacred-language speaking elite who ruled pre-national societies, and Anderson sees their broad-ranging, religious cultures as having been largely imaginable 'through the medium of a sacred language and written script', ¹³ and their understanding of language as having been dependent on a non-arbitrary conception of the sign:

...The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were emanations of reality, not randomly fabricated representations of it...There is no idea here of a world so separated from language that all languages are equidistant (and thus interchangeable) signs for it. In effect, ontological reality is apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation: the truth language of Church Latin, Qur'anic Arabic, or Examination Chinese. ¹⁴

Because everyone had 'access to a pure world of signs', he suggests, 'the stretch of written Latin, Pali, Arabic or Chinese was in theory unlimited', ¹⁵ and membership of the religious communities therefore potentially infinite. Even though everyone was able to decipher the signs of 'the visible world', ¹⁶ however, only 'the

¹³ Anderson (1991: 13).

¹⁴ Anderson (1991: 14).

¹⁵ Anderson (1991: 13).

¹⁶ Anderson (1991: 15, footnote 10).

literati' were able to read the sacred scripts: it was thus they, who formed the elite 'in a cosmological hierarchy of which the apex was divine',¹⁷ alongside what Hobsbawm terms the "'political nation'" of 'the nobility and gentry'.¹⁸ For Gellner, this ruling elite was horizontally divided according to rank, and was 'loyal to a stratum which...[was]...more interested in differentiating itself from those below than in diffusing its own culture'.¹⁹ To accentuate the inaccessibility and mysteriousness of that culture, it used a liturgical language which was 'not merely recorded in an inaccessible script', but was 'also incomprehensible when articulated',²⁰ and it was this exaggeration of its 'diacritical, differential and monopolizable traits' which enabled the upper echelon to impose on the illiterate masses a 'corpus of doctrine [that]...was reinforced by claiming...not merely that it was true...but that it was the very *norm* of truth'.²¹ Being essentially the accompaniment of a faith sustained by a church or clerical guild, then, the high cultures of traditional societies 'tended to be trans-ethnic and even trans-political, and were easily exportable to wherever that court was emulated or that clerisy respected and employed';²² they were also, as Smith points out, essentially trans-temporal, because in pre-modern societies, it was 'the priests, scribes and bards...who recount[ed], re-enact[ed] and codif[ied] traditions', enabling them to be passed down the generations.²³

If the sacred-language speaking clerisy and political elite formed the upper stratum of the hierarchy, then below them were a collection of peasant communities, laterally divided according to

¹⁷ Anderson (1991: 15).

¹⁸ Hobsbawm (1992: 73).

¹⁹ Gellner (1983: 16).

²⁰ Gellner (1983: 11).

²¹ Gellner (1983: 11 and 77), Gellner's emphasis.

²² Gellner (1983: 77).

²³ Smith (1991: 38).

location. For Gellner, these '[s]mall peasant communities' were 'tied to the locality by economic need' and/or by 'political prescription', with local culture frequently being imperceptible, such that the 'ideal of a single overriding and cultural identity...[made]...little sense'.²⁴ Hobsbawm suggests that there was 'not much likelihood that peasants would identify with a "country" that consisted of the community of the lords who were, inevitably, the chief targets of their discontents', for if 'they happened to be attached and loyal to their particular lord, this would imply neither identification with the interests of the rest of the gentry, nor any attachment to any country larger than his and their home territory'.²⁵ 'Indeed', he argues:

...when in the pre-national era we encounter what would today be classified as an autonomous popular movement of national defence against foreign invaders, as in fifteenth and sixteenth-century central Europe, its ideology seems to have been social and religious, but *not* national.²⁶

If Gellner proposes that local peasant cultures were imperceptible, then Hobsbawm suggests that language was equally unlikely to have formed the basis of political units, because:

...Where there are no other languages within earshot, one's own idiom is not so much a group criterion as something that all people have, like legs. Where several languages coexist, multilingualism may be so normal as to make an exclusive identification with any one idiom quite arbitrary.²⁷

Moreover, the relationships between languages and the different social strata made a shared national language in pre-modern

²⁴ Gellner (1983: 10 and 13).

²⁵ Hobsbawm (1992: 74).

²⁶ Hobsbawm (1992: 74 - 75), Hobsbawm's emphasis.

²⁷ Hobsbawm (1992: 57).

cultures virtually impossible. As Hobsbawm points out, '[n]on-literate vernacular languages are always a complex of local variants or dialects intercommunicating with varying degrees of ease or difficulty, depending on geographical closeness or accessibility', and, prior to mass education, 'there was and could be no spoken "national" language except such literary or administrative idioms as were written, or devised or adapted for oral use'.²⁸ 'The size of this area of common potential communicability', he concludes, 'might vary considerably':

It would almost certainly be larger for elites, whose field of action and horizons were less localized than for, say, peasants. A genuinely spoken 'national language' evolved on a purely oral basis, other than as a pidgin or lingua franca...is difficult to conceive for a region of any substantial geographical size. In other words the actual or literal 'mother tongue', [sic] i.e. the idiom children learned from illiterate mothers and spoke for every day use, was certainly not in any sense 'a national language'.²⁹

Gellner offers a more nuanced argument, asserting that it was not simply a question of which language was spoken, but rather of how language itself was perceived. Whereas in high cultures, the 'scholasticism of the scribes' resulted in communication which was 'relatively context-free', in low cultures, he suggests, the 'self-enclosed community tend[ed] to communicate in terms whose meaning...[could]...only be identified *in context*'.³⁰ The localised verbal exchanges of traditional peasant societies safely assumed cultural and contextual familiarity, such that there was no need for

²⁸ Whereas Gellner argues that communities start from 'the same linguistic base-line' but develop 'dialectal and other differences' as a result of 'a kind of culture drift', (Gellner 1983: 10), Hobsbawm rather suggests that the linguistic differences of pre-modern societies were the result of geographical distance. Cf. Hobsbawm (1992: 52).

²⁹ Hobsbawm (1992: 52 - 53).

³⁰ Gellner (1983: 12), Gellner's emphasis.

language to be made sufficiently neutral or specific in order to ensure comprehensibility for outsiders:

...context, tone, gesture, personality and situation were everything. Communication, such as it was, took place without the benefit of precise formulation, for which the locals had neither taste nor aptitude. Explicitness and the niceties of precise, rule-bound formulation were left to lawyers, theologians or ritual specialists, and were part of their mysteries. Among intimates of a close community, explicitness would have been pedantic and offensive, and is scarcely imaginable or intelligible. ³¹

Traditional high cultures were thus relatively detached, movable, and hegemonic, while their low culture equivalents were relatively context dependent, static and localised, at least partly as a result of their relationships to language and the understandings of the world that these produced. These different ways of understanding and talking about the world resulted in a plethora of conceptual spheres:

In a traditional social order, the languages of the hunt, of harvesting, or various rituals, of the council room, of the kitchen or harem, all form[ed] autonomous systems: to conjoin statements drawn from these various disparate fields, to probe for inconsistencies between them, to try to unify them all...would [have been] a social solicism or worse, probably blasphemy or impiety, and the very endeavour would...[have been]...unintelligible. ³²

'The old worlds', Gellner subsequently continues:

...were, on the one hand, each of them, a cosmos: purposive, hierarchical, 'meaningful'; and on the other, not quite unified,

³¹ Gellner (1983: 33).

³² Gellner (1983: 21).

consisting of sub-worlds each with its own idiom and logic, not subsumable under a single overall orderliness. ³³

It is this fragmented conception of language and reality, he concludes, which constitutes 'the most striking trait of pre-modern, pre-rational visions' of the world. ³⁴

If the basic political units of traditional societies were 'local self-governing communities, and large empires', ³⁵ if each social stratum had its own specific conception of language, and if 'the double drive to uniformity and uniqueness' associated with the nation 'was lacking', such that, as Smith puts it, 'the village and the Church made the nation seem politically unnecessary', ³⁶ then for the macro-political approach, this is directly related to the way in which such societies conceptualised space and time. Smith touches on the issue when he argues that the borders of what he terms 'the lateral *ethnie*' 'were typically "ragged"', because they were 'geographically spread out to form...close links with the upper echelons of neighbouring lateral *ethnies*', ³⁷ but Anderson offers a more sophisticated explanation when he states that:

Kingship organizes everything around a high centre. Its legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations, who, after all, are subjects, not citizens. In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory. But in the older imagining, where states were defined by centres, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another. Hence, paradoxically enough,

³³ Gellner (1983: 23).

³⁴ Gellner (1983: 21).

³⁵ Gellner (1983: 13).

³⁶ Smith (1991: 69).

³⁷ Smith (1991: 53), Smith's italics.

the ease with which pre-modern empires and kingdoms were able to sustain their rule over immensely heterogeneous, and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of time.³⁸

What Anderson suggests with regard to space, then, is that 'conceptions about "social groups" were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal'.³⁹ With regard to time, he argues that traditional societies operated according to a mode of temporality in which 'cosmology and history were indistinguishable',⁴⁰ offering a wonderful description which is well worth quoting in full. Here, Anderson suggests:

...one can profitably turn to the visual representations of the sacred communities, such as the reliefs and stained-glass windows of mediaeval churches, or the paintings of early Italian and Flemish masters. A characteristic feature of such representations is something misleadingly analogous to 'modern dress'. The shepherds who have followed the star to the manger where Christ is born bear the features of Burgundian peasants. The Virgin Mary is figured as a Tuscan merchant's daughter. In many paintings the commissioning patron, in full burgher or noble costume, appears kneeling in adoration alongside the shepherds. What seems incongruous today obviously appeared wholly natural to the eyes of mediaeval worshippers. We are faced with a world in which the figuring of imagined reality was overwhelmingly visual and aural. Christendom assumed its universal form through a myriad of specificities and particularities: this relief, that window, this sermon, that tale, this morality play, that relic. While the trans-European Latin-reading clerisy was one essential element in the structuring of the Christian

³⁸ Anderson (1991: 19).

³⁹ Anderson (1991: 15).

⁴⁰ Anderson (1991: 36).

imagination, the mediation of its conceptions to the illiterate masses, by visual and aural creations, always personal and particular, was no less vital. The humble parish priest, whose forebears and frailties everyone who heard his celebrations knew, was still the direct intermediary between his parishioners and the divine. This juxtaposition of the cosmic universal and the mundane-particular meant that however vast Christendom might be, and was sensed to be, it manifested itself *variously* to particular Swabian or Andalusian communities as replications of themselves. Figuring the Virgin Mary with 'Semitic' features or 'first-century' costumes in the restoring spirit of the modern museum was unimaginable because the mediaeval Christian mind had no conception of history as an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separations between past and present.⁴¹

To prove his point, Anderson cites Auerbach's characterisation of a mediaeval conception of time, in which the sacrifice of Isaac was interpreted as prefiguring the sacrifice of Christ:

...a connection is established between two events which are linked neither temporally nor causally - a connection which it is impossible to establish by reason in the horizontal dimension...the here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of events, it is *simultaneously* something which has always been, and will be fulfilled in the future...⁴²

Finally, Anderson compares Auerbach's description to Benjamin's characterisation of messianic time as 'a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present',⁴³ thereby concluding that time had a universal conception in pre-modern societies.

⁴¹ Anderson (1991: 22 - 23), Anderson's emphasis.

⁴² Anderson (1991: 24), Anderson's emphasis.

⁴³ Anderson (1991: 24).

Having outlined the main features of the Renaissance episteme and the key points of the macro-political approach to the pre-national era, I would now like to explain how they might be connected. Anderson's analysis of pre-national societies is strikingly compatible with Foucault's account of the Renaissance episteme. The sacred languages, like resemblance, are seen as being both theoretically universal in scope and especially privileged: such languages facilitate the imagining of vast religious communities which stretch across the world, and they are an intrinsic part of reality, not arbitrary representations of it, because language and the world are inextricably intertwined. The illiterate are viewed as reading, if not sacred languages, then certainly the visible world, and the sacred languages themselves are seen not simply as a means of communication, but as an entire system for thinking about that world. Anderson is obviously more concerned with the eternity of interpretation across time than the universality of interpretation across space, but just as resemblance effectively criss-crosses the space of the universe, so the pre-modern conception of time results in an interpretative framework in which, whilst nevertheless distinctive entities, the past and the present can effectively become simultaneous. Foucault's analysis of the Renaissance episteme, then, provides a way of explaining the underlying reasons for some of the points that Anderson makes about pre-modern societies, while Anderson's account of the relationship between sacred languages, centripetally and hierarchically organised societies, and a lack of territorial borders begins to suggest ways in which it might be possible to link Foucault's epistemological argument to questions of nation-ness.

Gellner's account of the relationship between religious and socio-political structures and language in the agrarian world may initially seem completely at odds with Foucault's analysis of the Renaissance episteme; nevertheless, the two are not as incompatible as they might appear. Whereas Foucault provides a comprehensive theoretical account which facilitates understanding of how the

various high and low sub-cultures of pre-modern societies might have achieved some sort of overall linguistic and conceptual unity, Gellner offers concrete examples of how the different strata might have experienced language on a day-to-day basis, and thus provides a way of introducing an element of diversification. What is problematic in his account, however, is the suggestion that, whilst the language of the peasant communities was 'context-dependent', that of the upper echelons was 'relatively context free'.⁴⁴ If, as Foucault suggests, language and the world were perceived as being so closely intertwined as to be effectively inseparable, then presumably language and context would have been equally indistinguishable, and even though traditional societies were indeed highly stratified, it seems unlikely that the various social groups of which they were made up would have had such entirely different ways of thinking about language. Instead of explaining the ability of the upper strata to communicate trans-continently in terms of their language being 'context-free', then, it might be preferable to borrow Anderson's truth language argument and to see it simply as being dependent on a context that was not physical, but rather divine. Another way of arguing this would be to suggest that the linguistic sub-worlds of pre-modern high and low cultures were not only mutually compatible, but that one necessitated the other. Although achieved differently, linguistic and conceptual unity would doubtless in many ways have been as important in Renaissance thought as they are in its Modern equivalent: the series of sub-worlds that Gellner identifies must presumably have somehow been integrated in order for people to possess a coherent sense of reality. If, as Gellner later suggests, the arbitrary and referential nature of language in the modern world effectively dissolves the sub-worlds of Renaissance thought,⁴⁵ then in the pre-modern world, the existence of those same sub-worlds would presumably have made essential the kind of universal interpretative framework that Foucault proposes.

⁴⁴ Gellner (1983: 12).

⁴⁵ Gellner (1983: 21).

Hobsbawm's argument about the imperceptibility of language is also in keeping with Foucault's idea that in pre-modern cultures, language is closely intertwined with the world, and both Foucault and Gellner's accounts can be supplemented by Hobsbawm's point that an elite literary or administrative language can be used to draw together the different social strata of pre-modern cultures. If Gellner's account succeeds in breaking up the homogeneity of Foucault's analysis, then Hobsbawm's argument helps to explain both why, in pre-modern societies, linguistic fragmentation did not particularly matter, and how elite literary or administrative languages could be employed to attain whatever degree of linguistic coherence was required.

Finally, although Smith's account might seem to contradict Foucault's characterisation of the Renaissance episteme, there are again several common elements. His description of priests, scribes and bards as forming a 'network of socialization' begins to imply the vital role that language plays in suturing the individual into his or her specific culture,⁴⁶ and thus indicates a way in which Foucault's otherwise highly abstract model of Renaissance language can begin to take account of the subject. Like Anderson's, his characterisation of the lateral *ethnie* as being geographically diffuse and as possessing uncertain borders suggests ways in which Foucault's epistemological argument might be linked to questions of nation-ness. Finally, Smith's proposal that conceptual uniformity and uniqueness were incomprehensible in traditional societies is in keeping with Gellner's suggestion that they comprised a variety of apparently incompatible conceptual sub-worlds; Foucault's account can again be used to explain why conceptual uniformity and uniqueness were not epistemologically necessary to pre-modern cultures.

⁴⁶ Smith (1991: 38).

To summarise the first part of the argument, what I am suggesting is that the hierarchical and centripetal structures of pre-modern cultures were both reflective of, and dependent on, a conception of the relationship between language and the world that was based on resemblance, and that, ultimately, this made nationhood both practically impossible and intellectually inconceivable. If pre-modern cultures were hierarchical, then at the top of the chain were those who could read and interpret the sacred texts, the literate upper echelons. Fundamental to their position was the belief that signs were divinely ordained, and that knowledge was based on interpretation and commentary. Their trans-continental geographical scope and trans-temporal political continuity were dependent on their use of liturgical languages; this facility for dialogue across huge distances and vast time spans, however, was probably founded not on an understanding of language as independent of context, but rather on a conception of language as sacred and therefore as operating according to spatially universal and temporally eternal co-ordinates. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the peasant communities who could not read or interpret the sacred texts, but who instead read their immediate world and communicated in a manner that was highly dependent on physical context, activities that would presumably have been based on an assumption that language and the world were not only closely intertwined, but virtually indistinguishable. Despite this highly localised understanding of meaning, however, the peasant communities were nevertheless exposed to the ways in which the ruling elite understood the world via the networks of religious and political socialisation created by the literate strata. On a practical level, the different geographical scopes, understandings of the world, and uses of language of the various groups in the hierarchy presumably made a shared sense of territory and identity and a common language impossible; nevertheless, the imposition on the peasant communities of the ideology of the ruling elite presumably achieved as much social, political and conceptual integration as was necessary. On a conceptual level, the understanding of meaning of the upper echelons, underpinned by the idea of the sacredness of

signs and of the eternity of time and universality of space, probably made a finite view of group membership, a linear understanding of history, and a boundary-oriented view of territory at the very least unimportant, and quite possibly entirely inconceivable. Hence cultural homogeneity was promoted laterally rather than horizontally, identity was achieved within social groups rather than across them, and states were defined by their centres not their borders. For the lower strata, a close reading of the immediate environment intersecting with a much more expansive understanding of the world doubtless made nation-ness - a form of social organisation and identity which would have come somewhere between the two - effectively unnecessary. Any discontinuities in this profusion of apparently incompatible conceptual sub-worlds were rendered unproblematic by an overarching universal and eternal epistemology which complemented rather than contradicted them.

Chapter Five

The Classical Episteme

In Chapter Four, my aim was to demonstrate how the features of traditional, pre-national societies identified by Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith could be unified and understood in terms of the Renaissance episteme. In this chapter, I'd like to show how their explanations of the emergence of the nation in modern societies can be analysed in terms of the Classical episteme, and the transitional period leading to the Modern episteme.¹ Foucault argues that the Classical episteme developed (at least in the European context) 'roughly half way through the seventeenth century',² and sees its emergence as having been particularly tumultuous: whereas the Renaissance episteme was pre-occupied with resemblance, language as undifferentiated from other forms of signalisation, and a system of knowledge based on interpretation, the Classical episteme was concerned with difference, an understanding of language as a privileged form of representation, and a system of knowledge based on analysis - a set of concerns which he illustrates via the examples of general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth. The transition from the Classical to the Modern episteme Foucault sees as having taken place more gradually over a fifty year period which straddled the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.³ The Modern episteme, he suggests, continues to be influenced by, and in certain respects is a modification of, its Classical predecessor,⁴ but there are nevertheless some key differences, with representation

¹ Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith all structure their arguments about nation-ness in terms of the pre-modern and the modern eras, whereas Foucault divides his account of epistemology into the Renaissance, the Classical, and the Modern. It seems safe to assume, however, that for Anderson et al., 'early modernity' can be located somewhere within the boundaries of Foucault's Classical period.

² Foucault (1970: xxii); his reference to European culture occurs later (1970: 251).

³ Foucault (1970: 221).

⁴ Foucault (1970: 58).

gradually losing its central place to signalisation, and life slowly becoming permeated in a radically new way by time. There are two main points I want to argue in this chapter, then: first, that the changes described by Foucault in the shift from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme are essential to an understanding of why, in the conditions of early modernity, the nation became possible as an idea; and secondly, that the parallel changes he identifies in the transition from the Classical to the Modern episteme can be used to explain why, as the conditions of modernity began to take hold, the concept of the nation became a dynamic reality.

Just as convenience, emulation, analogy and sympathy are the cornerstones of Renaissance knowledge, so genetic analysis, mathesis, and taxinomia are their Classical equivalents.⁵ Their co-existence means that in its perfect state, the Classical system of signs is both a 'simple, absolutely transparent language which is capable of naming what is elementary', and a 'complex of operations which defines all possible conjunctions',⁶ a 'search for origins' and 'an instrument of analysis and combination'.⁷

Foucault (in Gutting's view) defines genetic analysis as knowledge of 'the process whereby the imagination transforms... [a]...flux of impressions into a preliminary ordered series',⁸ and sees it as involving two basic steps.⁹ The first "'gives an account of the resemblances between things...before their reduction to order'",¹⁰ and occurs when the 'perceptions, thoughts, [and] desires'¹¹ which bombard the mind are held up for comparison. The second deals with the creation of signs, and is synonymous with

⁵ Cf. Foucault (1970: 74).

⁶ Foucault (1970: 62).

⁷ Foucault (1970: 63).

⁸ Gutting (1989: 156).

⁹ Gutting (1989: 156).

¹⁰ Gutting (1989: 156).

representation, because 'it is precisely in virtue of relations of identity and difference...that things represent one another'.¹² As Foucault points out, initial analysis is unlikely to take place unless the phenomena concerned possess some degree of similarity, because 'no equality or relation of order can be established between two things unless their resemblance has at least occasioned their comparison'.¹³ The same is true of the second form of analysis, because:

If representation did not possess the obscure power of making a past impression present once more, then no impression would ever appear as either similar to or dissimilar from a previous one...This power of recall implies at least the possibility of causing two impressions to appear as quasi-likenesses...when one of those impressions only is present, while the other has ceased, perhaps a long time ago, to exist...¹⁴

There must therefore be 'in the things represented, the insistent murmur of resemblance; there must be, in the representation, the perpetual possibility of imaginative recall'.¹⁵

The signs produced by means of genetic analysis form the building blocks for the subsequent ordering of taxinomia and mathesis. Mathesis is 'the science of calculable order' and 'the science of *truth*',¹⁶ but taxinomia is more important here, in as much as the tables it produces provide a fictional space outside temporality where the imperfections and lacunae of the world of

¹¹ Foucault (1970: 73).

¹² Gutting (1989: 174).

¹³ Foucault (1970: 67).

¹⁴ Foucault (1970: 69).

¹⁵ Foucault (1970: 69).

¹⁶ Foucault (1970: 73 and 74), Foucault's emphasis.

experience can be filled in via logical deduction, thus providing the Classical episteme with a means of reconstructing the original, divine organisation of the world, which has become corrupted over time. As Foucault puts it:

Taxinomia...implies a certain continuum of things (a non-discontinuity, a plenitude of being) and a certain power of the imagination that renders apparent what is not, but makes possible, by this very fact, the revelation of that continuity. The possibility of a science of empirical orders requires, therefore...an analysis that must show how the hidden (and as it were confused) continuity of being can be reconstituted by means of the temporal connection provided by discontinuous representations. ¹⁷

With its identification of difference through comparison, the Classical episteme necessarily changes the function of similitude. On the one hand, it is seen as being 'a spent force', and is therefore marginalised; ¹⁸ on the other, because comparison is based on resemblance, the Classical episteme 'does not entirely eliminate it'. ¹⁹ The Classical episteme, then, effectively splits Renaissance resemblance down the middle:

The simultaneously endless and closed, full and tautological world of resemblance now finds itself dissociated...: on the one side, we shall find the signs that have become tools of analysis, marks of identity and difference, principles whereby things can be reduced to order, keys for a taxonomy; and, on the other, the empirical and murmuring resemblance of things... ²⁰

¹⁷ Foucault (1970: 72 - 73).

¹⁸ Foucault (1970: 67).

¹⁹ Gutting (1989: 156).

²⁰ Foucault (1970: 57 - 58).

As a result, there are changes in what constitutes knowledge, and in the relationship between the sign, space, and time, between the sacred and the human, and between the magical and the rational. In the sixteenth century, Foucault suggests, 'the fundamental supposition was that of a total system of correspondence (earth and sky, planets and faces, microcosm and macrocosm), and each particular similitude was then lodged within this overall relation'; in the Classical episteme, however:

...every resemblance must be subjected to proof by comparison, that is, it will not be accepted until its identity and the series of its differences have been discovered by means of measurement within a common unit, or, more radically, by its position in an order. ²¹

Previously, signs provided access to knowledge in ways that were unpredictable, infinite, and uncertain; now, '[c]omplete enumeration, and the possibility of assigning at each point the necessary connection with the next, permit an absolute certain knowledge of identities and differences', ²² and 'Hume has become possible'. ²³ Signs are no longer 'thought to have been placed upon things so that men [sic] might be able to uncover their secrets, their nature or their virtues', but rather 'can be constituted only by an act of knowing'; ²⁴ hence knowledge 'breaks off its old kinship with *divinatio*'. ²⁵ Finally, the Classical sign 'does not erase distances or abolish time', but rather 'enables one to unfold them and to traverse them step by step', and Western reason begins to enter 'the age of

²¹ Foucault (1970: 55).

²² Foucault (1970: 55).

²³ Foucault (1970: 60).

²⁴ Foucault (1970: 59).

²⁵ Foucault (1970: 59), Foucault's italics.

judgement'.²⁶ This 'new configuration' of "'rationalism"...marks the disappearance of the old superstitious or magical beliefs', then, 'and the entry of nature, at long last, into the scientific order'.²⁷ '[W]hat was altered in the first half of the seventeenth century, and for a long time to come - perhaps right up to our own day', Foucault concludes, 'was the entire organization of signs, [and] the conditions under which they exercise their strange function',²⁸ a situation which Gutting summarises when he states that '[t]he locus of signs has moved from the world to the mind'.²⁹

It is this shift which creates a new problem for the Classical episteme because, when signs become 'co-extensive with representation, that is, with thought as a whole',³⁰ representation becomes transparent, apparently neutral, and effectively invisible. This is illustrated by Foucault in his analysis of Velazquez's *Las Meninas*,³¹ in which Gutting interprets him as arguing that, if the focal point of the painting is the position occupied simultaneously by the spectator, the painter, and the King and Queen of Spain, then each of these figures 'corresponds to one element in the process of representation: the King and Queen to the object represented, the painter to the subject representing, [and] the spectator to the subject viewing the representation', such that 'none of the three are portrayed as performing their role in representation'.³² In his analysis of the painting, then, Gutting concludes, Foucault is illustrating 'an essential feature of the Classical Age: There was in

²⁶ Foucault (1970: 61).

²⁷ Foucault (1970: 54).

²⁸ Foucault (1970: 58).

²⁹ Gutting (1989: 148).

³⁰ Foucault (1970: 65).

³¹ Gutting (1989: 152).

³² Gutting (1989: 153).

principle no way of "thematizing" (explicitly representing) the act of representation itself.³³

Having outlined the main features of the Classical episteme, Foucault goes on to consider three key examples: general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth. In so doing, he not only illustrates his overview, but also provides the basis for his exposition of the final stage of epistemological history, which will be considered in Chapter Six.

With regard to general grammar, Foucault argues that what happened to the sign in the shift from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme also applied to language: instead of being an expression of divine knowledge, it loses its sacred status and becomes a tool, and a concomitant shift occurs in discourse, so that Renaissance commentary becomes Classical criticism.³⁴ The new, synchronic process whereby language both names and characterises Foucault explains as follows:

Originally, everything had a name - a proper or peculiar name. Then the name became attached to a single element of the thing, and became applicable to all the other individual things that also contained that element: it is no longer a particular oak that is called *tree*, but anything that includes at least a trunk and branches. The name also became attached to a conspicuous circumstance: *night* came to designate, not the end of this particular day, but the period of darkness separating all sunsets from all dawns. Finally, it attached itself to analogies: everything was called a *leaf* that was as thin and flexible as the leaf of a tree.³⁵

³³ Gutting (1989: 153).

³⁴ Gutting (1989: 154 - 155).

³⁵ Foucault (1970: 113), Foucault's emphasis.

The 'fundamental task of Classical "discourse"', then, becomes '*to ascribe a name to things, and in that name to name their being*'.³⁶ The new diachronic function of language Foucault illustrates in three main ways. First, he shows how language represents thought sequentially. 'What distinguishes language from all other signs and enables it to play a decisive role in representation', he suggests:

is...that it analyses representation according to a necessarily successive order: the sounds, in fact, can be articulated only one by one; language cannot represent thought, instantly, in its totality; it is bound to arrange it, part by part, in a linear order.³⁷

Secondly, he explains how language constitutes a record of thought from one generation to the next, thereby providing chronological continuity:

Language gives the perpetual disruption of time the continuity of space, and it is to the degree that it analyses, articulates, and patterns representation that it has the power to link our knowledge of things together across the dimension of time. With the advent of language, the chaotic monotony of space is fragmented, while at the same time the diversity of temporal succession is unified.³⁸

Thirdly, Foucault explains how, for the Classical episteme, the antiquity of a language, and hence its relationship to other languages, could be determined according to the way in which it analysed thought. In the Renaissance episteme, 'languages succeeded one another in history' and were thought of as being 'capable of engendering one another':

³⁶ Foucault (1970: 120), Foucault's emphasis.

³⁷ Foucault (1970: 82).

³⁸ Foucault (1970: 113).

The most archaic of all, since it was the tongue of the Eternal when he addressed himself to men, was Hebrew, and Hebrew was thought to have given rise to Syriac and Arabic; then came Greek, from which both Coptic and Egyptian were derived; Latin was the common ancestor of Italian, Spanish, and French; lastly, 'Teutonic' had given rise to German, English and Flemish. ³⁹

In the Classical episteme, however, 'external dating is determined by the internal forms of analysis and order', such that those languages with 'the most spontaneous order (that of images and passions)' are thought of as having preceded those with 'the most considered (that of logic)'. 'Time', then, 'has become interior to language'. ⁴⁰

Just as general grammar sees signs as representing rather than resembling, and treats language as possessing new kinds of synchronic and diachronic functions, so natural history sees living things as having identities in relationships of difference from each other, and becomes 'the science of the characters that articulate the continuity and the tangle of nature'. ⁴¹ Foucault suggests that in the sixteenth century, 'the identity of plants or animals was assured by the positive mark (sometimes hidden, often visible) which they all bore: what distinguished the various species of bird, for instance, was not the differences that existed *between* them', but rather the fact that 'each species...expressed its individuality independently'. ⁴² From the seventeenth century, however:

...all designation must be accomplished by means of a certain relation to all other possible designations. To know

³⁹ Foucault (1970: 89).

⁴⁰ Foucault (1970: 90).

⁴¹ Foucault (1970: 73).

⁴² Foucault (1970: 144), Foucault's emphasis.

what properly appertains to one individual is to have before one the classification - or the possibility of classifying - all others. ⁴³

As Gutting points out, a view of natural history which relied on such a closely interlocking system of differentiation was inevitably troubled by the problem that 'there might not be sufficient continuity from one individual to another' to allow them to be grouped 'according to shared characters'. ⁴⁴ As a result, 'natural history had to distinguish between two different groupings of living things', 'the ideal "spatial" grouping, expressed in the great tables of taxonomic orders, that represented the true continuity of nature', and 'the... grouping of living things that had resulted from the temporal series of events in the history of the Earth'. ⁴⁵ If the task of natural history 'was to reconstruct the ideal order of the former from the fragments presented by the latter', ⁴⁶ then any differences between them were thought to be 'the result of a chronological series of events' which had 'their primary locus of application, not in the living species themselves, but in the space in which those species reside[d]': ⁴⁷ changes occurred not as a result of the passing of time in living things, as they evolved from generation to generation and adapted to their environments, but rather as a result of the influence of time on their habitats, as climatic and geological changes led to the emergence of species pre-ordained in the taxonomic table. There was not, then, '...even the suspicion of an evolutionism or a transformism in Classical thought', for time was 'never conceived as a principle of development for living beings in their internal organization', but was rather 'perceived only as the possible bearer of a revolution in the external space in which they

⁴³ Foucault (1970: 145).

⁴⁴ Gutting (1989: 166).

⁴⁵ Gutting (1989: 166).

⁴⁶ Gutting (1989: 166).

⁴⁷ Foucault (1970: 148).

live[d]': ⁴⁸ it was thus 'impossible for *natural history* to conceive of the *history of nature*'. ⁴⁹

As his final example, Foucault considers the analysis of wealth. Whereas Renaissance coinage essentially had a price because it was precious metal, was hence a measure for all other prices, and was thereby exchangeable for anything else which possessed a price, ⁵⁰ he suggests, in the Classical era, 'it is the exchanging function that serves as a foundation for the other two characters (its ability to measure and its capacity to receive a price thus appearing as *qualities* deriving from that *function*)'. ⁵¹ Because the 'exchange rate' between money and commodities can fluctuate, ⁵² however, there is a 'controversy' between the proponents of the two main theories of value, the Physiocrats and the utilitarians. ⁵³ For the Physiocrats, who are basically the landowners, it is 'only in agricultural production that there is a net gain once all production costs have been deducted': ⁵⁴ all value is due 'to the fecundity of the land, which generates a surplus of commodities that have value as possible objects of exchange', and 'the process of exchange itself does not increase the value of commodities'. ⁵⁵ Thus, 'ground rent represents, or ought to represent, the net product', because it is 'this rent that permits the transformation of goods into values or into wealth', and which 'provides the remuneration for all other kinds of work and all the

⁴⁸ Foucault (1970: 150).

⁴⁹ Foucault (1970: 157), Foucault's emphasis.

⁵⁰ Foucault (1970: 169).

⁵¹ Foucault (1970: 174), Foucault's emphasis.

⁵² Foucault (1970: 183).

⁵³ In fact, Foucault argues that what conventional histories view as a 'controversy' between the Physiocrats and the utilitarians is merely what Gutting terms 'just inverse construals of the same basic elements' (Gutting 1989: 172); cf. Foucault (1970: 199).

⁵⁴ Gutting (1989: 171).

⁵⁵ Gutting (1989: 171).

consumption corresponding to them'.⁵⁶ For the utilitarians, who are basically the merchants and entrepreneurs, however, commodities 'have an initial value precisely because they would be useful for satisfying our needs', and the process of exchange augments value 'when it turns out that others are willing to give me commodities that I value more than what I give them in exchange':⁵⁷ 'the value of what the land produce[s]...[is]...increased when it...[is]...transformed or transported', and so the utilitarians are 'preoccupied ...with a market economy in which needs and desires create...the laws'.⁵⁸ For the Physiocrats, the wage of the agricultural labourer has to be deducted from what is produced by the land, while for the utilitarians, it has to be deducted from the increase in value that results from exchange;⁵⁹ for neither group, however, is it recompense for the amount of time spent working: rather, it 'corresponds to the worker's subsistence during the time he [sic] takes to do the work'.⁶⁰

Ultimately, Foucault argues, neither the Physiocrats nor the utilitarians were able to overcome the basic problem of the fluctuating relationship between money and commodities. Instead, attempts were made to devise a way of regulating prices which 'were linked to the problem of population growth and to calculation of the optimum quantity of coinage' through 'analyses of the circulation of money based upon agricultural revenue'.⁶¹ It is noteworthy that, as with the debate between the Physiocrats and the utilitarians, agricultural production plays a central role in this argument, because sufficient coinage must be available to circulate within a given population such that it completes its circuit within

⁵⁶ Foucault (1970: 195).

⁵⁷ Gutting (1989: 171 - 172).

⁵⁸ Foucault (1970: 200).

⁵⁹ Foucault (1970: 199).

⁶⁰ Foucault (1970: 193).

⁶¹ Foucault (1970: 185).

the time limits set by the agricultural year.⁶² In a self-sufficient nation, Foucault proposes:

...the quantity of money it would be necessary to put into circulation would depend on several variables: the quantity of merchandise entering the exchange system; the portion of that merchandise which...must at some moment during its journey be represented by money; the quantity of metal for which signed paper may be substituted; and finally, the rhythm according to which payments must be made...⁶³

'In order to make a calculation of this kind', he concludes, it is necessary to begin 'with what is produced by the land, from which all wealth is directly or indirectly derived', but 'this calculation is exact only on condition that our imaginary nation is wholly isolated'.⁶⁴ In a nation which trades with other nations, Foucault continues, 'it is also possible to calculate the relative quantity of money that it is desirable to put into circulation':

...in a country where prices are relatively low (because the quantity of money in circulation is small), foreign money is attracted by the greater buying power it acquires there: the quantity of metal increases. The state...becomes 'rich and powerful'...[and]...is able to maintain a fleet and an army, achieve conquests, and enrich itself further. The quantity of coinage in circulation causes prices to rise, while at the same time affording private persons the resources to buy abroad, where prices are lower: little by little, the metal disappears, and the state becomes poor once again...[meanwhile the]...population tends to move...out from the prosperous states into the regions where prices are low...[because]...men [sic] are attracted towards high wages, [and] therefore

⁶² Foucault (1970: 185).

⁶³ Foucault (1970: 186).

⁶⁴ Foucault (1970: 186 - 187).

towards countries that have an abundant coinage at their disposal. ⁶⁵

The importance of such analyses of the circulation of money, Foucault concludes, is that 'they introduce the notion of progress into the order of human activity', and 'provide the interplay of signs and representations with a temporal index'. ⁶⁶ This was inevitable 'as soon as money was defined...as a pledge and assimilated into credit', because:

...it then became necessary that the duration of the credit, the rapidity with which repayment fell due, the number of hands through which it passed in a given time, should become characteristic variables of its representative power...all this was merely the consequence of a form of reflection that placed the monetary sign, with relation to wealth, in a posture of *representation* in the full sense of the term. ⁶⁷

Having outlined and illustrated the changes which occurred with the advent of the Classical episteme, Foucault goes on to describe its gradual metamorphosis into the Modern equivalent, again using wealth, natural history and language as examples. In each domain, he suggests, 'we can perceive two successive phases, which are articulated one upon the other more or less around the years 1795 - 1800'. ⁶⁸ In the first, whilst 'men's riches, the species of nature, and the words with which languages are peopled, still remain what they were in the Classical age', ⁶⁹ there are nevertheless some important changes. In the second, however, these changes are more profound, such that 'words, classes and

⁶⁵ Foucault (1970: 187).

⁶⁶ Foucault (1970: 188 - 189).

⁶⁷ Foucault (1970: 189), Foucault's emphasis.

⁶⁸ Foucault (1970: 221).

⁶⁹ Foucault (1970: 221).

wealth...acquire a mode of being no longer compatible with that of representation'.⁷⁰ For the time being, it is the first stage which is of interest here.

In the domain of wealth, the shift from the Classical episteme to the first phase of transition occurs with the work of Adam Smith, who maintains the Classical system of exchange, but thinks in terms of labour rather than subsistence. Whereas in the Classical episteme, the value of a commodity was 'equal to the value of the quantity of nourishment necessary to maintain...[a man [sic]]...and his family for as long as a given task lasted', such that 'in the last resort, need - for food, clothing, housing - defined the absolute measure of market price',⁷¹ for Smith, the value of a commodity is measured 'not...by the money or the equivalent amount of goods that would represent the commodity in an exchange but by the amount of labour needed to produce it'.⁷² As Foucault puts it:

...if there is an order regulating the forms of wealth, if this can buy that, if gold is worth twice as much as silver, it is not because men have comparable desires...it is because they are all subject to time, to toil, to weariness, and, in the last resort, to death...⁷³

Because a change in agricultural or manufacturing processes means that 'the relation of the labour to the production of which it is capable' changes,⁷⁴ there starts to be a radical shift in the time of economics. A 'single worker who had to perform on his own the eighteen distinct operations required in the manufacture of a pin', Foucault argues, 'would certainly not produce more than twenty

⁷⁰ Foucault (1970: 221).

⁷¹ Foucault (1970: 222).

⁷² Gutting (1989: 187).

⁷³ Foucault (1970: 225).

⁷⁴ Foucault (1970: 223).

pins in the course of a whole day', but 'ten workers who each had to perform only one or two of those operations could produce between them more than forty-eight thousand pins in a day', ⁷⁵ and so economics enters 'the time of capital and production'. ⁷⁶ Smith's theory still falls within the Classical episteme because, even if 'he viewed labor as the *measure* of a commodity's value, he still held that the commodity *had* value because of its connection with the representational system of exchange'; ⁷⁷ nevertheless, in this transitional period, Foucault concludes, 'reflection upon wealth begins to overflow the space assigned to it in the Classical age'. ⁷⁸

When it comes to natural history, a similar shift occurs with the work of Jussieu, Lamarck, and Vicq d'Azyr, who maintain classification according to character in the taxonomic table, but think in terms of organic structure rather than external appearance. Whereas in the Classical episteme, character is established 'by comparing visible structures', such that 'the transition from described structure to classifying character took place wholly at the level of the representative functions exercised by the visible', for Jussieu, Lamarck, and Vicq d'Azyr, classifications are made according to the organs species employ in achieving hidden biological functions, such as respiration or reproduction. ⁷⁹ The concept of organic structure, then, 'modifies the methods and the techniques of a *taxinomia*; but it does not refute its fundamental conditions of possibility'. ⁸⁰ It does 'entail one major consequence' which will be of fundamental importance to the Modern episteme, however, because:

⁷⁵ Foucault (1970: 224).

⁷⁶ Foucault (1970: 226).

⁷⁷ Gutting (1989: 187).

⁷⁸ Foucault (1970: 225).

⁷⁹ Foucault (1970: 226 - 227).

⁸⁰ Foucault (1970: 231).

From the moment when organic structure becomes a basic concept of natural characterization...the opposition between organic and inorganic becomes fundamental...from the period 1775 - 95 onward...the old articulation of the three or four kingdoms disappears...The organic becomes the living and the living is that which produces, grows, and reproduces; the inorganic is the non-living, that which neither develops nor reproduces; it lies at the frontiers of life, the inert, the unfruitful - death. ⁸¹

Just as in the analysis of wealth, so too in natural history, time is reconceptualised - it is no longer merely an external factor: henceforth, because living things have a temporally delimited life-cycle, time begins to be conceived as an internal phenomenon.

With regard to language, the shift from the Classical episteme to the first transitional phase occurs with the work of William Jones. In the pure form of general grammar, Foucault argues:

...all the words of a language were bearers of a more or less hidden, more or less derived, signification whose original *raison d'être* lay in an initial designation. Every language, however complex, was situated in the opening that had been created, once and for all, by archaic cries. Lateral resemblances with other languages - similar sounds applied to analogous significations - were noted and listed only in order to confirm the vertical relation of each to these deeply buried, silted over, almost mute values. ⁸²

With 'the work of William Jones and others on inflections', ⁸³ however:

⁸¹ Foucault (1970: 231 - 232).

⁸² Foucault (1970: 233), Foucault's italics.

⁸³ Gutting (1989: 193).

...the horizontal comparison of languages acquires another function: it no longer makes it possible to know what each language may still preserve of its ancestral memory, what marks from before Babel have been preserved in the sounds of its words; but it should make it possible to measure the extent to which languages resemble one another...Hence those great confrontations between various languages that we see appearing at the end of the century... ⁸⁴

Just as with the analysis of wealth and natural history, the fundamental boundaries of general grammar are as yet retained, in as much as comparisons 'are still made exclusively on the basis of and in terms of representative contents', and:

...always refer back to [the] two principles...of *general grammar*: that of an original and common language which supposedly provided the initial batch of roots; and that of a series of historical events, foreign to language, which, from outside, bend it, wear it away, refine it, make it more flexible, by multiplying or combining its forms (invasions, migrations, advances in learning, political freedom or slavery, etc.). ⁸⁵

Even though inflection still has 'its place in the search for the representative values of language', however, it now begins to possess a new analytical function, because:

...language no longer consists only of representations and of sounds that in turn represent the representations and are ordered among them as the links of thought require; it consists also of formal elements, grouped into a system,

⁸⁴ Foucault (1970: 233).

⁸⁵ Foucault (1970: 234), Foucault's italics.

which impose upon the sounds, syllables, and roots an organization that is not that of representation. ⁸⁶

Hence, in a new way, time starts to become an integral part of language, because:

Languages are no longer contrasted in accordance with what their words designate, but in accordance with the means whereby those words are linked together...from now on there is an interior 'mechanism' in languages which determines not only each one's individuality but also its resemblance to the others: it is this mechanism, the bearer of identity and difference, the sign of adjacency, the mark of kinship, that is now to become the basis for history. By its means, historicity will be able to introduce itself into the density of the spoken word itself. ⁸⁷

Language, then, and the 'obscure but stubborn spirit of a people who talk', are beginning 'to escape from the mode of being of representation'. ⁸⁸

In conclusion, Foucault argues that there 'took place...towards the last years of the eighteenth century, in *general grammar*, in *natural history*, and in the *analysis of wealth*, an event that is of the same type in all these spheres'. ⁸⁹ What happened, he suggests, was that the new importance accorded to temporality rendered Classical representation defunct, because it meant that representation was no longer a sufficient means of understanding how things in the world could be connected or defined. The first stage of the metamorphosis has not yet resulted in the emergence of the Modern episteme in its

⁸⁶ Foucault (1970: 235).

⁸⁷ Foucault (1970: 236).

⁸⁸ Foucault (1970: 209).

⁸⁹ Foucault (1970: 236 - 237), Foucault's italics.

fully fledged form but, Foucault proposes, what is about to occur is anticipated by what is happening during this peculiarly hybrid period in the domain of philosophy, where the Classical and Modern epistemes temporarily occur simultaneously:

The co-existence of Ideology and critical philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century - of Destutt de Tracy and Kant - divides, into two forms of thought, exterior to one another, yet simultaneous, what scientific forms of reflection, on the other hand, hold together in a unity doomed to imminent dissociation...⁹⁰

As with the other domains of knowledge, the fissure develops along the fault-line of representation, because, whereas Ideology stays within the bounds of Classical thought and 'does not question the foundation, the limits, or the root of representation',⁹¹ with Kant, 'the representational character of thought is no longer taken for granted',⁹² and 'questions are raised as to how the mind is able to form thoughts that represent objects'.⁹³ This 'sanctions for the first time that event in European culture which coincides with the end of the eighteenth century', Foucault concludes: the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the space of representation', and from this 'there springs an almost infinite series...of unlimited consequences,...since our thought today belongs to the same dynasty'.⁹⁴ Although he seems sure that 'the Kantian critique...marks the threshold of our modernity',⁹⁵ however, Foucault seems less certain about what might have initiated it - or indeed, what causes epistemological transitions in general. He is

⁹⁰ Foucault (1970: 240).

⁹¹ Foucault (1970: 240).

⁹² Gutting (1989: 152).

⁹³ Gutting (1989: 151).

⁹⁴ Foucault (1970: 242 - 243).

⁹⁵ Foucault (1970: 242).

clear that the shift to the Modern episteme cannot be attributed to factual or methodological progress made within the respective disciplines, ⁹⁶ and similarly dismisses the idea that wider cultural movements such as 'romanticism' were a causative influence. ⁹⁷ Ultimately, however, Foucault argues that it is too early to attempt to deal with the issue of why epistemes change, ⁹⁸ and retrospectively acknowledges in the preface to the English edition his failure to provide a satisfactory explanation. ⁹⁹

The Early Nation-ness Era

As with the Renaissance episteme, I would now like to consider the era of nation-ness with which the Classical episteme corresponds, that is, the early nation-ness era. The macro-political approach to this era is predominantly concerned with the development of early modernity, ¹⁰⁰ and its changing conceptions of language, religious and socio-political structures, economics, and ways of rethinking time, space, and philosophy.

Just as the macro-political approach perceived sacred languages as being central to the organisation of traditional societies, so it considers a change in their status and function to be fundamental to the emergence of national societies. For Anderson, a slow erosion of 'the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth' ¹⁰¹ exemplified 'a larger process in which the sacred communities...were gradually fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized'; ¹⁰² at the same time, the

⁹⁶ Foucault (1970: 252).

⁹⁷ Foucault (1970: 238).

⁹⁸ Foucault (1970: 50 - 51).

⁹⁹ Foucault (1970: xiii). Cf. also Foucault (1970: 217 - 218 and 220 - 221) and Gutting (1989: 144 and 163).

¹⁰⁰ Hobsbawm (1992: 14).

¹⁰¹ Anderson (1991: 36).

¹⁰² Anderson (1991: 19).

rise of print-capitalism not only necessitated linguistically homogeneous markets, but also meant that individuals became aware of the 'hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people' who spoke their language. ¹⁰³ For Hobsbawm, the erosion of 'the self-sufficiency of the village' meant that 'the problem of finding a common language for communication became serious', with the easiest solution being to learn 'enough of the (or a) national language to get by'. ¹⁰⁴ For Gellner, the situation is more complex: because people had constantly to 'communicate with a large number of other men, [sic] with whom they frequently...[had]...no previous association', and with whom communication had consequently to be 'explicit, rather than relying on context', industrialization demanded the universalisation of a shared and standardized linguistic medium and script. ¹⁰⁵ Because it also demanded the development of mass education, which could only be sustained by a vast, state infrastructure, industrialization also produced specifically national languages, and effectively resulted in national, rather than local or regional, employability. ¹⁰⁶ A change in the status of the sacred languages also meant a change in the status of elite cultures and social hierarchies. Whereas in 'the closed micro-communities of the agrarian age the limits of the culture were the limits of the world', such that 'the culture often itself remained unperceived', Gellner suggests, the advent of modernity meant that culture became 'the limit of the individual's mobility, circumscribing the newly enlarged range of his [sic] employability', and thus 'the natural political boundary'. ¹⁰⁷ Moreover, because the stable 'social role structure' of agricultural societies was 'simply incompatible with [economic] growth and innovation', ¹⁰⁸ and '[c]onstant occupational

¹⁰³ Anderson (1991: 44 - 45).

¹⁰⁴ Hobsbawm (1992: 115).

¹⁰⁵ Gellner (1983: 35).

¹⁰⁶ Gellner (1983: 37 - 38).

¹⁰⁷ Gellner (1983: 111).

¹⁰⁸ Gellner (1983: 24).

changes, reinforced by the concern of most jobs with communication', resulted in 'a certain kind of social equality or diminished social distance', ¹⁰⁹ the old social structures were 'largely replaced by an internally random and fluid totality' to which 'the individual belong[ed]...directly...and not in virtue of membership of nested sub-groups', ¹¹⁰ so that the 'ultimate political community' of the nation acquired 'a wholly new and very considerable importance'. ¹¹¹ For Smith, this process is explained in terms of the 'military, administrative, fiscal and judicial apparatus' of the dominant lateral *ethnie* gradually incorporating the 'middle strata and outlying regions into the dominant ethnic culture', ¹¹² with the 'aristocratic ethnic state' welding together 'often disparate populations into a single political community based on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic core'. ¹¹³ Thus 'the period of the gestation of nationalism as language-and-symbolism, and as consciousness-and-aspiration' can be distinguished from the actual emergence of the nation as a cultural and political formation. ¹¹⁴

If national identity superseded the identities formerly conferred by local and regional affiliations, however, the question still remains as to why, 'having lost real communities, people should [have] wish[ed] to imagine this particular form of replacement'. ¹¹⁵ Although Anderson argues that nation-ness developed at the end of the eighteenth century as a result of 'the spontaneous distillation of a complex "crossing" of discrete historical forces', ¹¹⁶ Gellner sees it as being closely related to the

¹⁰⁹ Gellner (1983: 112).

¹¹⁰ Gellner (1983: 63 and 138).

¹¹¹ Gellner (1983: 63).

¹¹² Smith (1991: 55).

¹¹³ Smith (1991: 68).

¹¹⁴ Smith: (1991: 85).

¹¹⁵ Hobsbawm (1992: 46).

¹¹⁶ Anderson (1991: 4).

differential arrival time of industrialization. Industrialization, he argues, exacerbates any existing differences of opportunity between competing ethnic or cultural groups, because it does not 'arrive simultaneously in all parts of the world, nor in the same manner'.¹¹⁷ As the 'tidal wave of modernization' courses round the world, then, 'it makes sure that everyone, at some time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated', and if this sense of injustice can be linked to culture or ethnicity, then 'a nation is born'.¹¹⁸ Whereas agrarian society 'is Malthusian', in as much as 'both productive and defence necessities impel it to seek a growing population, which then pushes close enough to the available resources to be occasionally stricken by disasters', with 'food production, political centralization and literacy' engendering 'a social structure in which cultural and political boundaries are seldom congruent', industrial society, in contrast, 'is not Malthusian', but 'based and dependent on cognitive and economic growth which in the end both outstrips and discourages further dramatic population growth...[and] impel[s] it into a situation in which political and cultural boundaries are on the whole congruent'.¹¹⁹ Smith, meanwhile, keen to emphasise that analysis of the rise of nation-ness involves 'tracing complex processes that are never easy to periodize, let alone date',¹²⁰ sees nation-ness as being linked to 'the impact of rationalized states on outlying areas and market relations on subsistence economies'.¹²¹ 'The capitalist revolution', he proposes:

...involved vastly increased trading networks in the West and then in selected peripheries, which in turn encouraged the accumulation of capital and the rise of wealthy urban centres and merchant capital. European states, often at war with one

¹¹⁷ Gellner (1983: 52).

¹¹⁸ Gellner (1983: 112).

¹¹⁹ Gellner (1983: 110).

¹²⁰ Smith (1991: 85).

¹²¹ Smith (1991: 90).

another, benefited from the activities of their bourgeoisies, who enabled larger and better equipped armies to be raised and more efficient administrations staffed by 'experts' to be built up. ¹²²

Capitalism did not influence the development of the nation directly, then, but rather furnished it 'with new classes, notably the bourgeoisie, workers and professionals', who become 'the agents of the formation of nations out of pre-existing...*ethnies*'. ¹²³ Like Anderson, Smith sees the rise of the 'rational state' as having been connected to 'the decline of ecclesiastical authority in the wake of reforming movements in the Church and the wars of the Reformation', and links it to 'the development of secular studies, notably classical humanism and science'. ¹²⁴ The 'new philosophical, historical and anthropological languages or discourses' that emerged in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he argues, resulted in the development of the central nationalist concepts of 'autonomy, unity and identity'. ¹²⁵ The application of Kant's concept of autonomy by 'Fichte, Schlegel and the other German Romantics to groups rather than individuals' additionally gave rise 'to a philosophy of national self-determination and collective struggle to realize the authentic national will - in a state of one's own', ¹²⁶ while the development of a 'straightforward understanding of the concept of "identity" as "sameness"' meant that 'members of a particular group' were considered alike 'in just those respects in which they differ[ed] from non-members outside the group', such that this 'pattern of similarity-cum-dissimilarity' became 'one meaning of national

¹²² Smith (1991: 60).

¹²³ Smith (1991: 166).

¹²⁴ Smith (1991: 9 and 60).

¹²⁵ Smith (1991: 74), deitalicised.

¹²⁶ Smith (1991: 76).

"identity".¹²⁷ Moreover, Smith argues, there was a connection between 'rationalist and scientific thought' and new conceptions of time and space,¹²⁸ because, just as 'the discovery of new lands and cultures by eighteenth-century explorers opened up a new vision of space and spatial comparison, so the recovery of classical thought and art helped to create a new vision of time and to provoke historical comparison with the civilizations of the past'.¹²⁹ Historicism 'became increasingly attractive as a framework for inquiry...and as an explanatory principle in elucidating the meaning of events, past and present', and there was thus 'a significant increase in the number and range of works dealing with both classical and national history during the eighteenth century...and a much greater interest in questions of origin and descent of peoples and of their cultural distinctiveness and historical character'.¹³⁰ The precise appeal of historicism, then, he concludes, lay:

...in its ability to present as (apparently) comprehensive a picture of the universe as the old religious world-views without appealing to an external principle of creation, while at the same time integrating the past (tradition), the present (reason) and the future (perfectibility).¹³¹

For both Gellner and Anderson, this complex relationship between industrialization, philosophy, space, and time is again best explained by returning to the issue of language. Gellner argues that there is a direct connection between industrialization and the philosophy of this era, because what empiricism 'amounts to in the end' is that:

¹²⁷ Smith (1991: 75).

¹²⁸ Smith (1991: 96).

¹²⁹ Smith (1991: 86 - 87).

¹³⁰ Smith (1991: 87).

¹³¹ Smith (1991: 96).

...in the very nature of things, nothing is inherently connected with anything else. The actual connections of this world can only be established by first separating in thought everything that can be thought separately...and then seeing what, as a matter of experience, happens to be actually conjoined to what... 132

'Hume's account of causation', then, 'is not merely an admirable summary of the background picture facing the untrammelled, eternal inquirer; it is also an account of the comportment of his [sic] economic counterpart, the modern entrepreneur', because 'his progress and the advancement of the economy of which he is a part hinges...on his untrammelled selection of whatever means, in the light of the evidence and of nothing else, serves...the maximization of profit'. 133 The advent of empiricism also either necessitated or produced a different relationship between language and ways of understanding the world. 134 Because, under the conditions of modernity:

...all facts are located within a single continuous logical space...statements reporting them can be conjoined and generally related to each other...[so that]...in principle one single language describes the world and is internally unitary... 135

Rather than seeing this potential for context-free communication as something which developed with the advent of modernity, however, Gellner views this attribute of language as something which, if enigmatic, is nevertheless both inherent and permanent. 'Human language', he concludes:

132 Gellner (1983: 23).

133 Gellner (1983: 23).

134 Gellner wisely omits to specify which !

135 Gellner (1983: 21).

must have been used for countless generations in...intimate, closed, context-bound communities, whereas it has only been used to the full...for a very small number of generations. It is a very puzzling fact that...human language...should have this potential for being used...as a formal and fairly context-free instrument, given that it had evolved in a milieu which in no way called for this development, and did not selectively favour it if it manifested itself...This potentiality, whatever its origin and explanation, happened to be there. Eventually a kind of society emerged...in which this potentiality really comes into its own, and within which it becomes indispensable and dominant. ¹³⁶

For Anderson, 'the impact of economic change, "discoveries" (social and scientific), and the development of increasingly rapid communications, drove a harsh wedge between cosmology and history', such that 'the search was on...for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together'. ¹³⁷ What came 'to take the place of the mediaeval conception of simultaneity-along-time', he suggests, was a new understanding of temporality which was central to the development of nation-ness: 'an idea of "homogeneous, empty time", in which simultaneity...[was]...as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence,...measured by clock and calendar'. ¹³⁸ This homogeneous temporality was both embodied and propagated by two print forms new to the modern era: the novel and the newspaper. ¹³⁹ While the novel allowed 'the presentation of simultaneity in "homogeneous, empty time"', and its characters provided 'a precise analogue of the idea of the nation...conceived as

¹³⁶ Gellner (1983: 33).

¹³⁷ Anderson (1991: 36).

¹³⁸ Anderson (1991: 24).

¹³⁹ Anderson, (1991: 25).

a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history', ¹⁴⁰ the newspaper juxtaposed otherwise unrelated stories, suggesting that events could be conceived of as running in parallel 'calendrical coincidence', ¹⁴¹ and contributed to an imagined community of readers who all read their newspapers at roughly the same time as each other. ¹⁴² Whereas the 'pre-bourgeois ruling classes generated their cohesions in some sense outside language, or at least outside print-language', then, in some instances, at least, the emergence of the modern bourgeoisie was dependent on literacy, and closely associated with the development of vernacular print-languages, homogeneous empty time, and nation-ness. ¹⁴³ Previously, Anderson suggests:

Solidarities were the products of kinship, clientship, and personal loyalties...their cohesions as classes were as much concrete as imagined. An illiterate nobility could still act as a nobility. ¹⁴⁴

With the advent of modernity, however, the bourgeoisie 'came into being as a class only in so many replications': ¹⁴⁵

Factory-owner in Lille was connected to factory-owner in Lyon only by reverberation. They had no necessary reason to know of one another's existence; they did not typically marry each other's daughters or inherit each other's property. But they did come to visualize in a general way the existence of thousands and thousands like themselves through print-language. For an illiterate bourgeoisie is scarcely imaginable.

¹⁴⁰ Anderson (1991: 25 - 26).

¹⁴¹ Anderson (1991: 33).

¹⁴² Anderson (1991: 33 - 36).

¹⁴³ Anderson (1991: 76 - 77).

¹⁴⁴ Anderson (1991: 76 - 77).

¹⁴⁵ Anderson (1991: 77).

Thus in world-historical terms bourgeoisies were the first classes to achieve solidarities on an essentially imagined basis. ¹⁴⁶

Anderson goes on to look at this relationship between language and temporality in the development of both the 'pioneer' American nations and their later European equivalents. ¹⁴⁷ For the 'pioneer' nations, he suggests, specific national languages were not really an issue, in as much as they did not differentiate them 'from their respective imperial metropolises'. ¹⁴⁸ Paradoxically, however, language was also central, because the local administrative 'pilgrimages' on which the pioneer nations were based 'had no decisive consequences until their territorial stretch could be imagined as nations' with 'the arrival of print-capitalism'. ¹⁴⁹ Despite the importance of the first American newspapers, however, ¹⁵⁰ the pioneer nations did not initially think of themselves in historical time. 'The Declaration of Independence in 1776', Anderson points out, 'makes absolutely no reference to Christopher Columbus, Roanoke, or the Pilgrim Fathers, nor are the grounds put forward to justify independence in any way "historical", in the sense of highlighting the antiquity of the American people'. ¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Anderson (1991: 77).

¹⁴⁷ Here, it is Anderson's argument rather than his dates that fit in with the concepts that Foucault associates with the transition to the Modern episteme: Anderson dates the establishment of the prototype American nations between 1760 and 1820, and that of their European equivalents to post-1820. As Gutting points out, however, there is an epistemological time-lag when it comes to language: 'the development of modern philology', he suggests, 'proceeded more slowly because of the particularly central place of language in the Classical episteme' (Gutting 1989: 193).

¹⁴⁸ Anderson (1991: 47).

¹⁴⁹ Anderson (1991: 55 - 56 and 61).

¹⁵⁰ Anderson (1991: 62).

¹⁵¹ Anderson (1991: 193).

For the later European nations, in contrast, specific national print-languages and the dissemination of the national idea through print capitalism were of vital importance. It was in the late eighteenth century, Anderson points out, that 'the scientific comparative study of languages really got under way', with William Jones' 'pioneering investigations of Sanskrit' leading 'to a growing realization that Indic civilization was far older than that of Greece or Judea', while '[a]dvances in Semitics undermined the idea that Hebrew was either uniquely ancient or of divine provenance'.¹⁵² During this period, then, 'genealogies were...conceived which could only be accommodated by homogeneous, empty time',¹⁵³ and simultaneously, language "...became less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves",¹⁵⁴ such that 'the old sacred languages - Latin, Greek, and Hebrew - were forced to mingle on equal ontological footing with a motley plebeian crowd of vernacular rivals'.¹⁵⁵ 'Out of these discoveries', Anderson concludes:

came philology, with its studies of comparative grammar, classification of languages into families, and reconstruction by scientific reasoning of 'proto-languages' out of oblivion. As Hobsbawm rightly observes, here was 'the first science which regarded evolution as its very core'.¹⁵⁶

Advances in print-capitalism also had ramifications for later European nationalisms, enabling the American independence movements to become "concepts", "models", and "blueprints".¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁵³ Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁵⁴ Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁵⁵ Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁵⁶ Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁵⁷ Anderson (1991: 81).

Again, however, despite the fact that this presumably relied on an understanding of nations existing synchronically in homogeneous, empty time, the second generation nations did not initially think of themselves historically. Instead, Anderson suggests, they had a 'profound feeling that a radical break with the past was occurring - a "blasting open of the continuum of history"', as exemplified by:

...the decision, taken by the Convention *Nationale* on 5 October 1793, to scrap the centuries-old Christian calendar and to inaugurate a new world-era with Year One, starting from the abolition of the *ancien régime* and the proclamation of the Republic on 22 September 1792. ¹⁵⁸

This sense of newness was, however, nevertheless shortlived, and homogeneous, empty time soon took on a historical perspective:

Very quickly the Year One made way for 1792 A.D., and the revolutionary ruptures of 1776 and 1789 came to be figured as embedded in the historical series and *thus as historical precedents and models*...[There] thus began the process of reading nationalism *genealogically* - as the expression of an historical tradition of serial continuity. ¹⁵⁹

The new nationalisms, then, 'almost immediately began to imagine themselves as "awakening from sleep", a trope wholly foreign to the Americas', and:

Already in 1803...the young Greek nationalist Adamantios Korais was telling a sympathetic Parisian audience: '*For the first time* the [Greek] nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and trembles in measuring

¹⁵⁸ Anderson (1991: 193), Anderson's italics.

¹⁵⁹ Anderson (1991: 194), Anderson's emphasis.

with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors'
glory'.¹⁶⁰

This, Anderson concludes, perfectly exemplifies 'the transition from New Time to Old':

'For the first time' still echoes the ruptures of 1776 and 1789, but Koraes's sweet eyes are turned, not ahead...but back, in trembling, to ancestral glories. It would not take long for this exhilarating doubleness to fade, replaced by a modular, 'continuous' awakening from a chronologically gauged, A.D.-style slumber: a guaranteed return to aboriginal essence.¹⁶¹

What Anderson seems to be suggesting here, then, is that, when the earliest nations were being established, at a time simultaneous with the beginnings of philology, there was a brief, transitional period when the then novel idea of homogeneous, empty time existed in both non-historical and historical versions.

As with the previous chapter, I would now like to summarise the connections between the macro-political and the epistemological, by linking the era of early nation-ness to the Classical episteme. Anderson's analysis is compatible with Foucault's account in a number of interesting ways, particularly in relation to the issues of language, temporality, and wealth. In general terms, his suggestion that the development of nation-ness was accompanied by a decline in the sacred-script languages and a reconceptualisation of the relationship between language and ontological truth is paralleled by Foucault's assertion that language no longer had the potential to reveal truth, but instead lost its sacred

¹⁶⁰ Anderson (1991: 195), Anderson's emphasis, second emphasis removed.

¹⁶¹ Anderson (1991: 195). 'New Time' and 'Old' here seem to refer not to homogeneous, empty time and messianic time, but rather to the idea of the nation as respectively 'novel' and 'historical'.

status, became a tool, and took on a purely representative function. Given Anderson's previous argument that the sacred languages were related to hierarchical and centripetally organised dynastic realms, it becomes possible to see how Foucault's account of epistemological change and a shift in the relationship between language and truth could be related to the development of horizontal, boundary-oriented forms of social organisation. In more specific terms, Anderson's account of how, at the end of the eighteenth century, figures such as William Jones undertook the 'scientific comparative study of languages' ¹⁶² is also compatible with Foucault's description of changes in attitudes towards language in the gradual metamorphosis of the Classical episteme into its Modern equivalent. Anderson's proposal that linguistic genealogies developed 'which could only be accommodated by homogeneous, empty time' ¹⁶³ is paralleled by Foucault's argument that the internal forms of languages enabled them to be organised into historical series, ¹⁶⁴ while his suggestion that these linguistic genealogies metamorphosised into philology - 'the first science which regarded evolution as its very core' - ¹⁶⁵ is matched by Foucault's suggestion that 'with the work of William Jones and others on inflections', language starts to be seen as being permeated by time. ¹⁶⁶ In a related shift, the fact that language became "'less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker' and more of "'an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves'" ¹⁶⁷ is met by Foucault's argument that the comparison of languages at the end of the eighteenth century is no longer about establishing 'what each language may still preserve of

¹⁶² Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁶³ Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁶⁴ Foucault (1970: 90).

¹⁶⁵ Anderson (1991: 70).

¹⁶⁶ Gutting (1989: 193).

¹⁶⁷ Anderson (1991: 70).

its ancestral memory', ¹⁶⁸ but is rather about language as the expression of the 'obscure but stubborn spirit of a people'. ¹⁶⁹

Anderson's account of the move from messianic to homogeneous time is also in keeping with four of Foucault's key points about temporality. First, his argument that homogeneous, empty time is 'transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar' ¹⁷⁰ is compatible with Foucault's point that, in the Classical episteme, the sign 'does not erase distances or abolish time', but rather 'enables one to unfold them and to traverse them step by step'. ¹⁷¹ Secondly, the analogy that Anderson draws between a character in a novel 'moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time' and 'the idea of the nation...conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history' ¹⁷² is paralleled by Foucault's point that the new ability of language to represent means that systematic connections can be made by progressing down through time, such that 'the chaotic monotony of space is fragmented, while at the same time the diversity of temporal successions is unified': ¹⁷³ if the unification of temporal succession results in the fragmentation of space, then perhaps a shift from resemblance to representation, and from messianic to homogeneous time, can be used to explain the dissolution of the trans-continental realms into boundary-oriented national territories. Thirdly, the connection that Anderson notes between the shift to homogeneous, empty time and the development of the secular sciences is compatible with Foucault's suggestion that the transition from resemblance to representation meant that knowledge was

¹⁶⁸ Foucault (1970: 233).

¹⁶⁹ Foucault (1970: 209).

¹⁷⁰ Anderson (1991: 24).

¹⁷¹ Foucault (1970: 61).

¹⁷² Anderson (1991: 26).

¹⁷³ Foucault (1970: 113).

conceptualised as profane rather than sacred, and that magic and superstition were replaced by science and reason. Fourthly, there is also a potentially interesting connection to be made between Anderson's identification of a transitional period of 'exhilarating doubleness',¹⁷⁴ when homogeneous, empty time was simultaneously both non-historical and historical, and Foucault's identification of similar overlapping phenomena in the domains of general grammar/philology, the analysis of wealth/economics, natural history/biology, and Ideology/Kantian philosophy during the metamorphosis from the Classical to the Modern episteme. From a Foucauldian perspective, the double-time of the early nations should come as no surprise: just as in the other areas, there is a gradual move towards an understanding of homogeneous, empty time as historical.

Finally, Anderson's argument that print-capitalism and the bourgeoisie were instrumental in laying the basis for national consciousness can potentially be related to Foucault's epistemological explanation of the Classical analysis of wealth: this is an argument I would like to pursue at the end of this chapter, but at this point, I want simply to put down a marker indicating a connection between Foucault's utilitarians - who begin from human needs which are due to nature's finite fecundity, who see the process of exchange as augmenting value and are therefore preoccupied with a market economy, and who are basically merchants and entrepreneurs - and Anderson's bourgeoisie - whose solidarities are imagined rather than concrete.

If Anderson's argument is compatible with Foucault's, the main problem is that he nevertheless sees nation-ness as being the result of, rather than as co-terminous with, a new conception of time, the rise of vernacular languages and of the bourgeoisie, and the development of print-capitalism. Although they doubtless all contributed to the evolution of nation-ness (they can hardly have

¹⁷⁴ Anderson (1991: 195).

been detrimental), Anderson does not explain why print-languages and capitalism, the novel, (with its specific forms of narration and its connection with the rise of the concept of the individual), the bourgeoisie, the possibility of imagining and identifying with a wider community, and the nation itself should all have occurred at about the same time. Moreover, despite the fact that the configuration of events Anderson describes certainly represents 'the...distillation of a complex "crossing" of discrete historical forces', its supposed 'spontaneity' is another matter. ¹⁷⁵ As I'll be suggesting at the end of this chapter, there is a more complex relationship between these factors than Anderson's argument allows.

Gellner's account of the development of nation-ness is similarly both compatible with Foucault's analysis and epistemologically problematic. First, his suggestion that nation-ness is related to a particular complex of cultural conditions rather than to a specific set of historical circumstances or social changes, and his point that nationalism does not create, but rather appears on the surface of, cultural homogeneity 'imposed by objective, inescapable imperative', ¹⁷⁶ not only begin to address some of the problems with Anderson's argument, but also seem more in accordance with Foucault's archaeological approach, in as much as nationalism is viewed not as a product, but as a symptom, of broader cultural transformations. Secondly, Gellner's argument that state organised education in a shared national idiom defines the limits of employability seems in keeping with Foucault's reference to the idea that populations tend to move in the opposite direction to money: clearly, the further the population of an industrialized society can move, the larger the geographical area of employability, and, all other things being equal, the more likely it is that it will find work. Thirdly, Gellner's argument that the development of the nation was ultimately linked to the requirement of the industrial

¹⁷⁵ Anderson (1991: 4).

¹⁷⁶ Gellner (1983: 39).

labour market for context-free communication, and his assertion that industrial societies possess more flexible social class systems, both fit with Foucault's point that in the Classical episteme, language and the world ceased to be closely intertwined, such that language and context ultimately became separable, and with his suggestion that the divine - and hence by implication those associated with it - became less important. Fourthly, Gellner's proposal that there was a shift in the relationship between the nation and the individual - with important implications for the construction of identity - can potentially be linked to Foucault's argument that the sign moved from the world to the mind: the concept of the individual could presumably only really have begun to develop once this relocation had taken place. Finally, where Gellner relates industrialization to the emergence of nation-ness and suggests that the move to empiricism and teleology was accompanied by the unification of conceptual sub-worlds and their respective idioms, Foucault claims that the systematic analysis of similarity and difference and its relationship to language through naming made it possible to establish how things were linked, not by divine revelation, but by logical deduction, and that this epistemological shift was connected to a linear conception of time, a fragmentation of space, and the development of neutral and transparent forms of language. Gellner's empiricism can be connected to Foucault's rationalism, teleology can be linked to a linear conception of time (without which it would presumably not be possible), and the unification of conceptual sub-worlds and their idioms necessitates a standardised referential vernacular: if Gellner relates the physical and conceptual conditions of early modernity to the emergence of nation-ness and Foucault connects the new understanding of space and time to the reconceptualisation of signs, it seems possible to connect the advent of the nation to a shift in the perceived relationship between linguistic signs and the world. The parallels that can be drawn between Gellner and Foucault's arguments, then, suggest that, whilst on a socio-political level, the advent of nation-ness must be related to particular cultural and political circumstances, in an 'archaeological' sense, it can be linked to much

more fundamental epistemological transitions; rather than thinking of nation-ness as a contributory factor to, or result of, industrialization, rationalism, or related phenomena, therefore, it is appropriate to consider it as belonging to a similar order of change.

There are three main problems with Gellner's argument, however. First, despite relating nation-ness to cultural conditions rather than to specific historical circumstances, like Anderson, he sometimes seems to view the factors he discusses not as contributing to nation-ness, but rather as creating it. Whilst an education system which produces a relatively homogeneous idiom and ideology would obviously enhance nation-ness, it seems unlikely that it would single handedly engender it. Similarly, even though, as Gellner argues, the overlap between an industrial labour market, language, and culture meant that 'the age of transition to industrialism was bound...also to be an age of nationalism',¹⁷⁷ like most of the phenomena Anderson discusses, these are surface movements rather than more basic causes. Secondly, despite the fact that there is obviously a connection between empiricism and economic growth at the level of the entrepreneur rejecting traditional ways of doing things and working out from scratch how best to organise processes so as to make a profit, there is clearly a much more fundamental relationship between empiricism and industrialization which is worth exploring; and although it seems likely that education and the break-down of sub-cultures would have contributed to a more direct relationship between the individual and the state, a profound mental realignment must have occurred not only for Anderson's bourgeoisie to imagine each other, but also for Gellner's industrialized masses to find the idea of the nation acceptable and to identify with it. As I intend to demonstrate in Chapter Seven, it would only have been once a fundamental event of this nature had occurred that identification with the nation would have been possible. Thirdly, Gellner's argument that language has always possessed the potential to be used for context-

¹⁷⁷ Gellner (1983: 40).

free communication leaves us with the enigma of why this potential wasn't realised until relatively recently. Foucault's account of the development of language, on the other hand, with its gradual generalisation of specific linguistic designation (from this particular oak to trees in general, and so forth), suggests that the capacity of language for context-free communication might only have developed with the advent of the Classical episteme. This could well help to explain why it was only then that the concept of the nation began to emerge.

Smith's argument is similarly compatible with Foucault's in several key respects, but raises two main problems. His suggestion that nation-ness is not tied to a particular period but to specific cultural conditions is, like Gellner's parallel argument, in accordance with Foucault's epistemological approach. Indeed, it is even broader than Gellner's assertion that nation-ness is tied to 'changes in the overall relation between society, culture and polity',¹⁷⁸ because it makes it quite clear that nation-ness is not a phenomenon which occurs solely in a particular historical era. Secondly, by identifying a 'gestation period' in the development of the nation, Smith makes overt the two-stage evolution of the nation which Hobsbawm only implies,¹⁷⁹ thereby strengthening the possibility of mapping nation as concept onto the Classical episteme, and nation as dynamic political and cultural entity onto the Modern episteme.¹⁸⁰ Thirdly, the process whereby market relations impact on subsistence economies can be connected in particularly interesting ways to Foucault's account of the Classical analysis of wealth: Smith's suggestion that the vastly increased trading networks of Western Europe led to an accumulation of merchant capital, the raising of larger and better equipped armies, and the development of more efficient state administration, all

¹⁷⁸ Gellner (1983: 124).

¹⁷⁹ Hobsbawm (1992: 80).

¹⁸⁰ As a number of Hobsbawm's points are made by Anderson, Gellner and Smith, I will not include a separate section relating his argument to Foucault's here.

facilitated by the bourgeoisie, is supported by Foucault's reference to trading relationships between inter-dependent nations in which price differentials between countries facilitate the accumulation of wealth. ¹⁸¹ Similarly, Smith's assertion that the 'prime contribution of capitalism to the nation' was 'to furnish states with new classes, notably the bourgeoisie, workers and professionals', ¹⁸² again seems, as it did with Anderson, to suggest a potential link with Foucault's account of the utilitarians and, with the shift from workers' wages being considered as subsistence to their being thought of as recompense for time, with the evolution of the concept of labour. Fourthly, Smith's argument that the central nationalist concepts of 'autonomy, unity and identity were derived 'from the new philosophical, historical and anthropological languages or discourses that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe' ¹⁸³ provides a striking parallel with Foucault's subsequent discussion, in his account of the Modern episteme, of philosophy, history and ethnology, while Smith's example of the concept of "identity" as "sameness", whereby the 'members of a particular group are alike in just those respects in which they differ from non-members outside the group', ¹⁸⁴ has obvious parallels with Foucault's account of the roles of similarity and difference in Classical analysis. Moreover, the brief connection that Smith makes between nationalism and Kant fits in with Foucault's discussion of philosophical duality, and again suggests that there might be a connection between the rise of nation-ness, the development of the concept of the individual, and an epistemological shift involving a movement of the sign from the world to the mind. Finally, Smith's argument that nationalism is linked to a new conception of space and time is in accordance with Foucault's account of their reconfiguration in the Classical

¹⁸¹ Foucault (1970: 187).

¹⁸² Smith (1991: 166).

¹⁸³ Smith (1991: 74 - 75), italics removed.

¹⁸⁴ Smith (1991: 75).

episteme: Smith's point that historicism was concerned in particular with questions of origin, descent, and the integration of past, present and future seems especially pertinent here.

The main problems with Smith's argument are as follows. First, whilst Smith's brief reference to Kant is useful in as much as it suggests that his concept of the autonomy of the individual was used to develop 'a philosophy of national self-determination',¹⁸⁵ Smith nevertheless makes little of the possible relationship between the advent of the concept of individual consciousness and the rise of the nation. Secondly, as with Anderson and Gellner, whilst 'the discovery of new lands and cultures by eighteenth-century explorers' and 'the recovery of classical thought and art'¹⁸⁶ unquestionably contributed to the idea of nation-ness, it seems unlikely that they alone could have accounted for the radical reconception of time and space which occurred during the Classical period.

I would now like to summarise the argument of this chapter and to try to explain the emergence of the concept of nation-ness in epistemological terms. At one level, its advent can clearly be related to issues such as print capitalism, industrialism, and so forth; however, I want to suggest that what unites and underpins all these factors, as well as the development of nation-ness, is, at an archaeological level, the shift from an understanding of the relationship between language and the world based on resemblance to one founded on representation. When language took on a representative function, it seems likely that there were three main effects in terms of nation-ness: language became dissociated from ontological truth and lost its sacred status, resulting in the universalisation of high culture and the gradual breakdown of a centripetal and hierarchical social system; it became dissociated from the immediate physical world and became a mental

¹⁸⁵ Smith (1991: 76).

¹⁸⁶ Smith (1991: 86).

phenomenon, leading to the development of a standardised referential idiom and to a rise in the importance of empirical deduction and individual reason; and its role in the analysis of similarity and difference led to the unification of time into a homogeneous, empty, linear temporality, and hence to the fragmentation of space. Thus vertically organised, centripetal societies with little concern for boundaries or derivation were replaced by more horizontally structured, centrifugal countries in which borders and origins became increasingly important; the previously separate linguistic and conceptual sub-worlds of Renaissance culture were integrated, such that language, like social groups and time, was understood as being spread more horizontally and evenly over its referential surfaces; a new importance was attached to the idea of reason and thus to the concept of the individual; and trans-continental realms with a conception of time as eternal and an understanding of space as infinite were broken up into temporally teleological, spatially compartmentalised territories. The shift in linguistic function from resemblance to representation, however, did not only affect the ways in which cultures understood and formed their social class structures within time and geographical space - it also influenced the organisation of work and intellectual output. If temporality was conceived as finite, then, as Foucault points out in his subsequent analysis of the Modern episteme, life became a race against time (or, more accurately, against death): nature was no longer seen as infinitely and eternally bountiful, as it had been with the Physiocrats, but was instead conceived, as it had been with the utilitarians, in terms of lack. If certain commodities were viewed as being in short supply, then their scarcity meant that interchange and an associated increase in value became inevitable. Hence there was a growth in the importance of trade and of the merchants and entrepreneurs - in other words, the bourgeoisie - which served to exacerbate the demise of the upper echelons of society occurring as a result of the demotion of the divine. There was an intensification of trading relationships between countries and in the movement of working populations in pursuit of higher wages, with the former

concentrating wealth in particular states, leading to better living standards and employment prospects and to the development of armies and administrations, and the latter being limited by language - both factors strengthening the idea of the separateness of nations. The perceived poverty of nature meant that new ways had to be found to increase production without increasing costs, leading to the division of work, and, in the new world of representations and finite temporality, to work itself being thought of in terms of the exchange of money for time: subsistence toil became wage labour, and peasants became the new working classes. In terms of intellectual output, there simultaneously occurred the rise of the secular sciences, the advent of literary forms based on transverse, cross-time, such as the novel and the newspaper, and, in philosophy, the concepts of autonomy and identity-as-sameness. Finally, solidarities between individuals and social groups gradually ceased to be concrete and slowly started to be imagined: whether they were between members of the same social class or between the individual and the state, in the absence of physical solidarities, relationships themselves became representational. Nation-ness, then, was not the result of capitalism, industrialism, and so forth - it occurred in parallel with them because it, too, was a result of epistemological change.

There is nevertheless a problem with this account of the development of nation-ness and with the epistemological version of history on which it is based and, although it is, strictly speaking, beyond the concerns of this thesis, it is worth considering here briefly. By pursuing such an abstract philosophical argument without providing an adequate explanation of why a shift from resemblance to representation should occur, Foucault seems to imply that epistemological change takes place virtually spontaneously, without any form of human or material provenance. This is obviously problematic, suggesting as it does that language and epistemes possess some sort of independent existence of their own. Yet perhaps it is a question, quite literally, of the 'order of things', in as much as it seems possible to resolve the problem by

altering the sequence of the argument. Throughout his discussion of the Classical analysis of wealth, Foucault accords great importance to the agricultural cycle. Rather than starting with the shift from resemblance to representation, its eventual influence on the development of a finite conception of time, and the resulting perception of nature as impoverished, is it perhaps worth beginning from agriculture and working the other way round? In other words, is it possible that what begins the development of a new episteme is a reconfiguration of the relationship between agricultural production and the population, whether caused by natural disaster, the development of more efficient farming methods, or fluctuations in population growth? Perhaps a change in the relationship of human beings to the natural world results in a different understanding of time and space, and hence in a change in perception of the relationship between language and the world. Perhaps the development of nation-ness, then, like that of the perceived relationship between language and the world, ultimately has a material provenance.

Whatever the causes of the shift from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme, it seems likely that only the first stage of the development of nation-ness took place at this point: the nation was still only a concept, and had not yet become the basis of identification;¹⁸⁷ it was only at the very end of the Classical episteme, with the emergence of a critical philosophy which questioned the limits of representation, and with the full permeation of language by time, that the second stage of nation-ness - the nation as a dynamic and vibrant entity - began to develop.

¹⁸⁷ Clearly, in some respects, the nation is only ever a concept, in as much as it never has a concrete, physical referent; the distinction I want to make here, however, is between the nation as an idea (or indeed even a political structure) to which the population does not relate emotionally, and the nation as the basis of widespread identification.

Chapter Six

The Modern Episteme

Just as Foucault demonstrates the centrality of representation in the Classical episteme through the analysis of wealth, natural history, and general grammar, so, in order to illustrate the importance of a dynamic, linear conception of temporality to the Modern episteme, he focuses on their nineteenth and twentieth century equivalents, economics, biology, and philology. Inevitably, there is some overlap here with the transitional period between the Classical and Modern epistemes, the fully-fledged version of the Modern episteme essentially constituting the final evolution of changes already set in motion by the gradual breakdown of its Classical counterpart; but here, Foucault goes on to use these three domains of knowledge as the basis for a detailed exploration of the epistemological status of the related human sciences, sociology, psychology, and literary analysis, which he sees as being fundamentally concerned with the recently emerged figure of 'man'. Finally, although suggesting that we are still firmly located within the Modern episteme, ¹ Foucault outlines the potential of the 'counter-sciences' of ethnology, psychoanalysis, and linguistics to destabilise 'man', and briefly considers the extent to which their emergence heralds the distant beginnings of a new episteme.

In the area of economics, Foucault argues that the work which broke the connection between the value of a commodity and the representational system of exchange still maintained by Smith was that of Ricardo, 'who presented labor not only as the measure

¹ Foucault states that the emergence of a critical philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century marks 'the threshold of a modernity that we have not yet left behind' (Foucault 1970 : xxiv) and that, from Kant's questioning of representation, 'there springs an almost infinite series...of unlimited consequences...since our thought today still belongs to the same dynasty' (Foucault (1970: 243).

of value but also as the sole source of value'. 2 'From this point on', Gutting explains:

things ceased to have economic value because they could be traded for money or other commodities that represent[ed] them in the system of exchange. They had value because (and to the extent that) people worked to produce them. 3

This shift has 'three fundamental consequences for the new science of economics', 4 two of which are relevant here. First, rather than being thought of in cyclical terms, economic history is now conceptualised as 'a linear causal series': 'the forms of production have themselves been produced by previous labor, which itself depended on previous forms of production', 5 and so, as Foucault puts it, the 'mode of being of economics is no longer linked to a simultaneous space of differences and identities, but to the time of successive productions'. 6 Secondly, there emerges 'a new conception of man [sic] as an economic agent' because, as Gutting explains, since 'economic values are created by the historical forces of production, man as seeking and depending on these values is now regarded as dependent on these forces'. 7 As Foucault puts it, 'economics...is related...to the biological properties of a human species which, as Malthus showed in the same period as Ricardo, tends always to increase unless prevented by some remedy or constraint':

Homo oeconomicus is not the human being who represents his own needs to himself, and the objects capable of

2 Gutting (1989: 187).

3 Gutting (1989: 187).

4 Gutting (1989: 187).

5 Gutting (1989: 187 - 188).

6 Foucault (1970: 256).

7 Gutting (1989: 188).

satisfying them; he is the human being who spends, wears out, and wastes his life in evading the imminence of death. 8

In biology, the work of Lamarck and his contemporaries is surpassed by that of Cuvier, for whom 'the structure of an organ is to be understood in terms of the function that the organ performs':

...what is of importance is no longer identities and differences in plants' and animals' properties but only functional similarities in their organs. Thus, organs (e.g., gills and lungs) that have no elements at all in common may nonetheless be grouped together on the basis of their similar functions. 9

As in the field of economics, there are three key consequences of this conceptual shift. The first is the impossibility of conceptualising living things as belonging to a logical and continuous series, with the result that they can only be grouped into broad and fragmentary categories: 'the continuum of Classical order' therefore comes to be 'replaced by a discontinuous proliferation of species of life'. 10 Secondly, whereas for natural history, the 'differentiation of species was not produced by any external causal factors operating on real plants and animals', 11 with the advent of biology, 'the separation of living things into different classes is due to the different ways that living things are linked to the surroundings on which they depend for their survival'. 12 Thirdly, as a result of this, living things are now seen as being thoroughly permeated by time:

8 Foucault (1970: 257).

9 Gutting (1989: 190).

10 Gutting (1989: 191).

11 Gutting (1989: 191).

12 Gutting (1989: 191).

For the Classical Age, living things were, so to speak, in but not essentially of time...natural 'history' was profoundly nonhistorical. With Cuvier, however, life is essentially tied to time; it is a thoroughly historical reality. 13

Foucault also reiterates the fact that the new importance accorded to function meant a further demotion in the analytical importance of the visible because, whereas the Classical taxonomy 'was constructed entirely on the basis of the four variables of description (form, number, arrangement, magnitude) which could be scanned, as it were in one and the same movement, by language and by the eye', from Cuvier onward, 'the possibility of classification...arises ...from those elements most hidden from view'. 14 Nevertheless, as with the shift from the analysis of wealth to economics, his key point here seems to be that the move from natural history to biology involved a new status being accorded to time. 15

When it comes to language, the turning point between eighteenth century general grammar and nineteenth century philology arrives with the work of Bopp. Although, as Gutting points out, words do, of course, continue to have representative functions, in as much as we 'use them to express what we mean', these functions nevertheless 'no longer define their basic reality as words':

Rather, words are understood as first of all elements in a grammatical system defined by the rules governing their use. Their power to represent derives entirely from their roles in this system. 16

13 Gutting (1989: 192).

14 Foucault (1970: 268).

15 Foucault (1970: 275 - 276).

16 Gutting (1989: 193).

Gutting goes on to summarise Foucault's account of the four main features of philology's new understanding of language. The first is that it makes distinctions between languages 'on the basis of differences in the formal features of their grammars'.¹⁷ The second is that 'the elements of a language are interior to it' -¹⁸ and thus philology analyses inflections. The third feature is its novel conception of the theory of the root, which is based not on the root as noun, but on the root as verb. Whereas for general grammar, 'primitive roots were nouns, names representing objects in man's [sic] environment', and 'the root of all verbs was *to be*, which asserted a connection between representations', then, for Bopp, 'verbs have their own roots', and 'nouns are...derived from verbs, so that the fundamental connection of language as a whole to reality is effected by the roots of verbs'.¹⁹ This is of great significance because 'verbal roots do not represent objects; they rather express the actions and volitions of a subject',²⁰ or as Foucault puts it, language 'is "rooted" not in the things perceived, but in the active subject'.²¹ As such, language:

...is a product of will and energy, rather than of the memory that duplicates representation...[it]...is no longer linked to civilizations by the level of learning to which they have attained (the delicacy of their representative grid, the multiplicity of the connections it is possible to establish between its elements), but by the mind of the peoples who have given rise to it, animate it, and are recognizable in it.²²

This has important constitutional ramifications, because it means that the mutations of language:

17 Gutting (1989: 193).

18 Foucault (1970: 288).

19 Gutting (1989: 194).

20 Gutting (1989: 194).

21 Foucault (1970: 290).

22 Foucault (1970: 290).

...no longer come from above (from the learned elite, from the small group of merchants and travellers, from victorious armies, from an invading aristocracy), but take their being obscurely from below... 23

Language is thus 'no longer linked to the knowing of things, but to men's [sic] freedom', and so, by 'defining the internal laws of grammar, one is simultaneously linking language and the free destiny of men in a profound kinship'. 24 'Throughout the nineteenth century', then, 'philology was to have profound political reverberations'. 25 Finally, the fourth feature of philology is its new conception of the relationship between languages. Whereas, for general grammar, 'the succession of languages in time - like the temporal series of species - is merely a matter of the sequential appearance of forms already determined apart from time and its laws', for philology, '...the mutations of language follow laws of temporal succession that are part of...[its]...account of their inner structure', and so, like living beings, languages 'become essentially historical realities'. 26

Having outlined the four main differences between general grammar and philology, Foucault argues that the Modern episteme's way of looking at language means that it is demoted from its previously exalted position as the arbiter of knowledge, but that this 'demotion of language to the mere status of an object' is nevertheless compensated in three main ways. 27 Thus language becomes 'a necessary medium for any scientific knowledge' and cannot 'itself be arranged, deployed, and analysed beneath the gaze

23 Foucault (1970: 290).

24 Foucault (1970: 291).

25 Foucault (1970: 290 - 291).

26 Gutting (1989: 195), cf. Foucault (1970: 293).

27 Foucault (1970: 296).

of a science'. 28 This, Foucault maintains, leads to 'the wish to neutralize, and as it were polish, scientific language to the point at which, stripped of all its singularity, purified of all its accidents and alien elements...it...[can]...become the exact reflection, the perfect double...of a non-verbal knowledge'. 29 Secondly, language once again begins to involve interpretation, 30 because it now always carries with it 'the whole backwash of history to which words lend their glow at the instant they are pronounced' - 31 that is, the unspoken (and unavoidable) historical traces and grammatical restrictions which constrain meaning:

Having become a dense and consistent historical reality, language forms the locus of tradition, of the unspoken habits of thought, of what lies hidden in a people's mind; it accumulates an ineluctable memory which does not even know itself as memory. 32

The third compensation for the demotion of language is the emergence of literature or, more precisely, 'the isolation of a particular language whose peculiar mode of being is "literary"'. 33 Just as there was a split at the level of the sign in the Classical episteme, so, too, in the Modern episteme there is a split at the level of discourse, and thus, whereas scientific discourse is associated with rationality, literature becomes associated with the murmuring vitality of the Renaissance episteme, and hence by implication with the unconscious. As Foucault puts it:

There is nothing now, either in our knowledge or in our reflection, that still recalls even the memory of that

28 Foucault (1970: 296).

29 Foucault (1970: 296).

30 Gutting (1989: 196).

31 Foucault (1970: 315).

32 Foucault (1970: 297).

33 Foucault (1970: 300).

[Renaissance] being. Nothing, except, perhaps literature - and even then in a fashion more allusive and diagonal than direct. It may be said in a sense that 'literature', as it was constituted and so designated on the threshold of the modern age, manifests, at a time when it was least expected, the reappearance of the living being of language...[T]hroughout the nineteenth century, and right up to our own day... literature achieved autonomous existence, and separated itself from all other language with a deep scission...by forming a sort of 'counter-discourse', and by finding its way back from the representative or signifying function of language to this raw being that had been forgotten since the sixteenth century'. 34

By way of concluding his reflections on economics, biology and philology, Foucault reiterates the fact that they share two common features. First, their central constitutive elements inevitably overflow the bounds of representation. 35 In the Modern episteme, then, 'representation has lost the power to provide a foundation...for the links that can join its various elements together'. 36 Instead:

...a profound historicity penetrates into the heart of things, isolates and defines them in their own coherence, [and] imposes upon them the forms of order implied by the continuity of time... 37

Secondly, they are all based on an understanding of linear time as dynamic because, whereas Classical time was thought of in terms of vast, rigidly inter-connected temporal continua, and therefore occupied a purely theoretical space, Modern time is seen as having

34 Foucault (1970: 43 - 44).

35 Foucault (1970: 237).

36 Foucault (1970: 238 - 39).

37 Foucault (1970: xxiii).

a direct impact on, and as being internal to, a variety of phenomena; now, the relationship between linear time and real objects is perceived as being one of dynamic interaction, and the 'order of time is beginning'. 38

For Foucault, the decline of representation and the growing importance of dynamic, linear temporality had four main consequences. The first was the emergence of 'man' and his twin, the unconscious. Arguing that in the Classical era 'there was no epistemological consciousness of man [sic] as such', 39 because it was only when representation could be represented that its subject came to the fore, Foucault claims that 'man' 'did not exist' before the beginning of the Modern episteme, 40 and is, therefore, 'an invention of recent date'. 41 Once 'man' came into being, however, so too did the unconscious, because '[m]an and the unthought are, at the archaeological level, contemporaries': 42

The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in man [sic] like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history; it is, in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality... 43

Foucault does not explain in very precise terms why this should be so, but, when he comments that 'the whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity...of lifting the veil of the Unconscious, ...of straining to catch its endless murmur', 44 he nevertheless

38 Foucault (1970: 293).

39 Foucault (1970: 309).

40 Foucault (1970: 308).

41 Foucault (1970: 387).

42 Foucault (1970: 326).

43 Foucault (1970: 326).

44 Foucault (1970: 327).

indirectly implies a connection between the Modern unconscious and Renaissance resemblance. If the Classical episteme effectively split Renaissance resemblance down the middle in the constitution of the sign, then with the advent of the Modern episteme, the birth of 'man' and the unconscious, we could say that what got pushed into the unconscious was the signified of the Classical episteme, which is in turn the cyclical resemblance of the Renaissance. There is, of course, no time in the unconscious, but if we look at the mind from a conscious perspective (which is really the only perspective from which we can knowingly do so), then what we essentially find in the conscious mind is thus the linear temporality of the Classical signifier, and in the unconscious, the cyclical temporality of Renaissance resemblance.

The second consequence of the decline of representation and the rise of dynamic, linear temporality is that questions are raised about the relationship between the subject doing the representing and the object being represented - questions which, Foucault argues, are at least partly (if ultimately unsuccessfully) addressed by the concerns of modern philosophy. 45 The attempts of modern philosophy to explain how 'man' can simultaneously be 'an object...of the empirical sciences...a finite being, limited by the environment, forces of production, and linguistic heritage that have formed him', and a subject who 'can also constitute the world of objects' Foucault terms the analytic of finitude, 46 the difficulty with which, Gutting explains, 'lies in the fact that the relation must somehow be both one of identity (since man [sic] is one being) and differences (since nothing can literally precede and produce itself)'. 47 On the one hand, then, 'man' is founded (i.e. is an object), in as much as he is, 'from the very first instant of his existence, burdened (even constituted) by a history that is not of his own

45 Gutting (1989: 199).

46 Gutting (1989: 1999).

47 Gutting (1989: 200).

making': 48 he can never fully know his own history, because the origin is constantly retreating 'to a calendar upon which man [sic] does not figure'. 49 As Gutting explains it:

If...man [sic] tries to discover his essential nature and identity by tracing back his history to its origin, he will be continually frustrated. Any point of apparent origin that lies on the line of *human* history will be found not to be the true origin. On the other hand, the true origin (the point of application of the conditions that in fact produced man) will be a point at which man as such is not present; it will not, strictly speaking, be *his* origin. This is the sense in which man's origin constantly retreats from him. It is a limit that he can never reach by going back through the series of events that make up his history. 50

'Man', then, 'is the being without origin, who has "neither country nor date", whose birth is never accessible because it never took "place"...[and who] is cut off from the origin that would make him contemporaneous with his own existence'. 51 On the other hand, however, 'man' is founding (i.e. is a subject), in as much as history only really exists as a mental phenomenon, because:

The world is, after all, constituted as a historical reality only through human consciousness. Apart from man, [sic] there is merely a succession of *events*...History begins only with the projects of human consciousness... 52

From this perspective, Gutting points out, 'man's [sic] origin does contain his essential identity', because it is 'precisely the point at

48 Gutting (1989: 205).

49 Foucault (1970: 331).

50 Gutting (1989: 205), Gutting's emphasis.

51 Foucault (1970: 332).

52 Gutting (1989: 205), Gutting's emphasis.

which he constitutes himself and his world'. 53 Consequently, he suggests:

...it would seem that we can overcome the retreat of our origin by reapprehending the original project whereby man [sic] constituted history. Such a reapprehension would be a return of the origin through which man would recover his original, essential reality as man. 54

Whereas in the Classical episteme, then, the unproblematic, theoretical nature of the origin means that time essentially goes forwards into history, in the Modern episteme, the impossibility of recovering the origin means that time is traced backwards through history towards something which is its 'source', yet which it is also logically impossible to reach:

It is no longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that, in its very fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin... 55

Simultaneously, however, time also moves forward towards the moment when it will be possible to apprehend the origin (not unlike Benjamin's Angel of History in reverse) because: 56

...the origin is that which is returning, the repetition towards which thought is moving, the return of that which has already always begun...it is the recession into the future, the injunction that thought receives and imposes upon itself to advance with dove-like steps towards that which has never ceased to render it possible, to keep watch in front of itself,

53 Gutting (1989: 206).

54 Gutting (1989: 206).

55 Foucault (1970: 329).

56 Benjamin (1992: 249).

on the ever-receding line of its horizon, for the day from which it came and from which it is coming... 57

For Foucault, these two problems of the emergence of 'man' and of his simultaneous existence as subject and object are already prefigured by Velázquez's *Las Meninas*. The idea that it is only when representation can be questioned that the concept of 'man' develops Foucault addresses in asserting that:

When natural history becomes biology, when the analysis of wealth becomes economics, when, above all, reflection upon language becomes philology, and Classical *discourse*, in which being and representation found their common locus, is eclipsed, then, in the profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, man [sic] appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator, he appears in the place belonging to the king, which was assigned to him in advance by *Las Meninas*, but from which his real presence has for so long been excluded. As if, in that vacant space towards which Velázquez's whole painting was directed, but which it was nevertheless reflecting only in the chance presence of a mirror, and as though by stealth, all the figures whose alternation, reciprocal exclusion, interweaving, and fluttering one imagined (the model, the painter, the king, the spectator) suddenly stopped their imperceptible dance, immobilized into one substantial figure, and demanded that the entire space of the representation should at last be related to one corporeal gaze. 58

Similarly, the problem of how it is possible for 'man' to be both 'an object produced by the world' and yet, simultaneously, 'also

57 Foucault (1970: 332).

58 Foucault (1970: 312), Foucault's emphasis.

somehow the subject that constitutes that world and all that is in it as objects' 59 Foucault addresses when he claims that:

All the interior lines of the painting...point towards the very thing that is represented, but absent. At once object - since it is what the artist represented in copying onto his canvas - and subject - since what the painter had in front of his eyes, as he represented himself in the course of his work, was himself, since the gazes portrayed in the picture are all directed towards the fictitious position occupied by the royal personage, which is also the painter's real place, since the occupier of that ambiguous place in which the painter and the sovereign alternate, in a never-ending flicker, as it were, is the spectator, whose gaze transforms the painting into an object, the pure representation of that essential absence. 60

Although Foucault considers that philosophy ultimately fails to explain the problem of 'man' as both founded and founding, 61 he suggests that the third main consequence of the decline of representation and the rise of linear temporality, the human sciences, nevertheless provide a solution, because, whereas philosophy 'treat's man's [sic] representations as they appear in his consciousness, the human sciences treat them as part of unconscious structures and processes'. 62 Foucault explains this by suggesting that the three human sciences of psychology, sociology, and the study of literature and myths are related to the empirical sciences of biology, economics, and philology respectively, because in each case, where the empirical sciences address concrete physical experiences, their human science counterparts deal with the ways in which those experiences are represented. 63 Each of the human

59 Gutting (1989: 199).

60 Foucault (1970: 308).

61 Gutting (1989: 212).

62 Gutting (1989: 209).

63 Foucault (1970: 355 - 356).

sciences borrows a conceptual model from its associated empirical science, such that psychology takes functions and norms from biology, sociology conflict and rules from economics, and the study of literature and myths meaning and a system of signs from philology. ⁶⁴ Functions, conflicts, and meanings (signs) are representable 'without appearing to consciousness', because they are organised 'by norms, rules, or systematic principles', and it is in this way that the human sciences are able to explain how 'man' as subject is able to represent objects to himself in the unconscious, whilst simultaneously being determined as an object:

Through unconscious functions, conflicts, and meanings, the human sciences are...able to develop an account of how man [sic] represents (though not consciously) the fundamental realities of life, labor, and language, which appear in the empirical sciences as determinants of man as an object. They now appear, on the level of the unconscious, as objects constituted by man as a subject. ⁶⁵

In turn, this process - by which 'man' as subject constitutes representations of the experiences which determine him - is itself 'represented in the unconscious through the structuring of functions, conflicts, and meanings by norms, rules, and systems.' ⁶⁶ (Another way of expressing this would be to say that we inevitably represent our personal experiences to ourselves via models of understanding that are pre-ordained culturally). The human sciences are thus always troubled by the unconscious, because 'the project of bringing man's [sic] consciousness back to its real conditions, of restoring it to the contents and forms that brought it into being, and elude us within it' is, in fact, inherent to them. ⁶⁷ This, for Foucault, is why 'the problem of the unconscious...is not simply a problem

⁶⁴ Gutting (1989: 210).

⁶⁵ Gutting (1989: 212).

⁶⁶ Gutting (1989: 212).

⁶⁷ Foucault (1970: 364).

with the human sciences which they can be thought of as encountering by chance in their steps', but rather 'a problem that is ultimately coextensive with their very existence'. 68

In the final stage of his argument, Foucault explains the recent emergence of a set of counter-disciplines which he sees as having the potential to undermine the position of 'man'. If the human sciences 'go no further than the unconscious representations through which man [sic] constitutes himself and his world', 69 he suggests, then the human 'counter-sciences' - psychoanalysis, ethnology, and linguistics - address the unconscious far more directly. Psychoanalysis 'stands as close as possible...to that critical function which...exists within all the human sciences' by 'setting itself the task of making the discourse of the unconscious speak through consciousness'. 70 Because it only accesses the unconscious via the relationship between therapist and patient, however, it is not appropriate to use psychoanalysis in an attempt to create a universal theory, in as much as:

...All analytic knowledge...is invincibly linked with a praxis, with that strangulation produced by the relation between two individuals, one of whom is listening to the other's language ...[and so] nothing is more alien to psychoanalysis than anything resembling a general theory of man [sic] or an anthropology. 71

Ethnology (cultural anthropology) 'deals with the conditions of possibility of such representations for individual cultures', showing in particular 'the precise form that a given culture gives to the norms, rules, and systems, which, by organizing functions, rules, and meanings, effect unconscious representations', and in so

68 Foucault (1970: 364).

69 Gutting (1989: 214).

70 Foucault (1970: 374).

71 Foucault (1970: 376).

doing, describes 'a culture's distinctive form of historicity'. 72 Because it 'arises out of concrete relations between human beings', as with psychoanalysis, we should 'not expect...[it]...to yield a general scientific account of the nature of man [sic]'. 73

Linguistics, ('a study of language in a pure state') provides the linchpin by means of which psychoanalysis and ethnology can be made to articulate: if both were to be developed as formal sign systems, Foucault suggests, then it would be possible for 'ethnology...[to]...pay explicit attention to the unconscious and psychoanalysis...[to]...employ ethnological methods of formal structural analysis'. 74 If the two disciplines 'have only one point in common', it is nevertheless 'an essential and inevitable one: the one at which they intersect at right angles':

...for the signifying chain by which the unique experience of the individual is constituted is perpendicular to the formal system on the basis of which the significations of a culture are constituted...75

As neither discipline comes 'near to a general concept of man [sic]', however, Foucault concludes that the 'idea of a "psychoanalytic anthropology"', in a universal, theoretical sense, is no more than a pious wish. 76 In fact, rather than producing a universal theory of 'man' capable of unifying the human sciences, these disciplines 'do without the concept of man [sic]' and 'always address themselves to that which constitutes his outer limits', because they always 'flow in the opposite direction...lead...back to their epistemological basis, and ceaselessly "unmake" the very man who is creating and

72 Gutting (1989: 215). Here, Gutting points out that 'Foucault has in mind Lévi-Strauss's structuralist anthropology'.

73 Gutting (1989: 215).

74 Gutting (1989: 216).

75 Foucault (1970: 380).

76 Foucault (1970: 379).

recreating his positivity in the human sciences. ⁷⁷ Psychoanalysis and ethnology then, are effectively the Modern episteme's equivalent of critical philosophy at the end of the Classical episteme, because '[j]ust as Kant's raising of the question of the conditions for the possibility of representation led to the decline of representation, so the raising of a similar question about man [sic] by psychoanalysis and ethnology is a sign of the collapse of his hegemony in our thought'. ⁷⁸ Moreover, if, at the end of the Classical episteme, the unity of language was fragmented and 'man' came into existence for the first time, then an approach in which language seems to be gaining ascendancy - and which simultaneously dissolves 'man' - might well suggest the advent of a new episteme:

If this same language is now emerging with greater and greater insistence in a unity...is this not the sign that the whole of this configuration is now about to topple, and that man [sic] is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon ? Since man was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion, will he not be dispersed when language regains its unity ?...Ought we not to give up thinking of man, or...to think of this disappearance of man - and the ground of possibility of all the sciences of man - as closely as possible in correlation with our concern with language ? Ought we not to admit that, since language is here once more, man will return to that serene non-existence in which he was formerly maintained by the imperious unity of Discourse ? Man had been a figure occurring between two modes of language; or rather, he was constituted only when language, having been situated within representation and, as it were, dissolved in it, freed itself from that situation at the cost of its own fragmentation: man composed his own figure

⁷⁷ Foucault (1970: 379).

⁷⁸ Gutting (1989: 215).

in the interstices of that fragmented language...If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility...were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did,...then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. 79

For Foucault, then, the counter-disciplines of psychoanalysis, ethnology and linguistics thus constitute a radical challenge to the Modern episteme.

The Era of 'High Nation-ness'

As well as providing a useful basis for discussion of the relationship between ethnography and psychoanalysis (a subject to which I'll return in the conclusion to this thesis), Foucault's account of the Modern episteme can be used to explain and supplement the macro-political approach to the era of 'high nation-ness', which considers the development of the nation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its likely future, and also addresses key issues such as the role of language, death, religion, the family, and memory and forgetting in the formation of national identities. With this era in particular, Foucault's account provides a way of underpinning and unifying a set of arguments which otherwise undermine themselves by the sheer variety of explanations they require to account for the occurrence of nation-ness in different geographical areas at diverse historical moments.

Although they employ somewhat different typologies, Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith all essentially divide the nation's development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into three broad phases, the first of which they tend to term 'linguistic', the second 'official', and the third 'colonial'

79 Foucault (1970: 386 - 387).

nationalism. 80 The first stage, Hobsbawm suggests, took place in Europe from the nineteenth century, and was 'purely cultural, literary, and folkloric': 81 although it 'provided the foundation for many a subsequent nationalist movement...in no sense was it a political movement of the people concerned', being rather 'the work of enthusiasts from the (foreign) ruling class or elite'. 82 Anderson makes a similar distinction between the interest taken by intellectuals in early nineteenth century Europe in philology, and, with rising literacy levels and the further development of print-capitalism, that taken by the masses later in the century in 'the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along'. 83 For Smith, the first of the three main waves of nationalism in the modern era is dominated by what he terms the "'ethnic" conception of the nation'. 84 Whereas the older, civic nations were created 'from a lateral community' by the aristocratic elites, the new, ethnic nations were 'created "from below" by excluded intelligentsias and some middle strata from a vertical community, using cultural resources (ethno-history, language, ethnic religion, customs, etc.) to mobilize other strata into an active politicized "nation"'. 85 'Generally speaking', he suggests, 'movements of ethnic self-determination...attempted to secure the secession of that community and its "historic" territory from large, unwieldy empires', 86 and led to a transformation in people's very sense of nation-ness:

Popular participation, rather than civil and political rights;
populist organization, more than democratic parties;
intervention by the people's nation-state, rather than

80 Because of the variety of typologies here, it seems best to use one approach as the basis of the argument. I have therefore structured this section around Hobsbawm's approach.

81 Hobsbawm (1992: 12).

82 Hobsbawm (1992: 104).

83 Anderson (1991: 80).

84 Smith (1991: 11).

85 Smith (1991: 123).

86 Smith (1991: 124).

protection of minorities and individuals from state interference: these became...the hallmarks of the newly formed ethno-political nations erected on the basis of pre-modern demotic *ethnies*. 87

Gellner makes a further sub-division here, arguing that, whereas in 'classical liberal Western' nationalism, all groups had access to education in the high culture versions of their respective languages, resulting in 'flourishing literatures, technical vocabularies... educational institutions and academies', 88 in 'the classical Habsburg (and points south and east) form of nationalism', those who held power had 'privileged access to the central high culture...(their own)', while the powerless 'share[d]...folk cultures' which were 'turned into...rival new high culture[s]' by 'intellectuals-awakeners [sic]'. 89 The first, which he associates with Western nationalisms and characterises as being 'relatively benign and nice', Gellner sees as 'acting on behalf of well-developed high cultures, normatively centralized and endowed with a fairly well-defined folk clientele', such that 'all that was required was a bit of adjustment in the political situation and in the international boundaries, so as to ensure for these cultures, and their speakers and practitioners, the same sustained protection as that which was already enjoyed by their rivals'. 90 The second, which Gellner associates with Eastern Europe, he views as being 'nasty and doomed to nastiness by the conditions which gave rise to it', because it 'did not operate on behalf of an already existing, well-defined and codified high culture, which had as it were marked out and linguistically pre-converted its own territory by sustained literary activities ever since the early Renaissance or since the Reformation', but rather acted 'on behalf of a high culture not as yet properly crystallized, a merely aspirant or in-the-making high culture' which 'presided, or strove to

87 Smith (1991: 131), Smith's italics.

88 Gellner (1983: 94 and 99).

89 Gellner (1983: 97).

90 Gellner (1983: 99 - 100).

preside, in ferocious rivalry with similar competitors'. 91 Even though the '[o]bjective conditions of the modern world' meant that Eastern European populations were obliged to identify with one of their emergent high cultures eventually, because they 'were still locked into the complex multiple loyalties of kinship, territory and region', he concludes, they continued to lack for some time 'the clearly defined cultural basis' enjoyed by their Western counterparts. 92 In many cases, then, it was only with 'population exchanges or expulsions, more or less forcible assimilation, and sometimes liquidation' that the 'close relation between state and culture which is the essence of nationalism' came about. 93

The second stage of nationalism in the modern era Hobsbawm sub-divides into a pre-democratic and a democratic phase, with the former occurring from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century, and the latter taking place in its last third. 94 In the pre-democratic stage, he argues, the state became increasingly interventionist and, whereas previously, political power had been wielded through 'intermediate systems of rulers and autonomous corporations', the state now 'ruled over a territorially defined "people"...its agents...reaching down to the humblest inhabitant of the least of its villages'. 95 The increasingly close links between state and citizen raised two key issues: first, 'the question of the written or even the spoken language or languages of communication', and secondly, 'the politically much more sensitive issue of citizen loyalty to, and identification with,...the ruling system'. 96 In the democratic phase, Hobsbawm argues, the weakening of such 'traditional guarantors of loyalty as dynastic

91 Gellner (1983: 99 - 100).

92 Gellner (1983: 100).

93 Gellner (1983: 101).

94 Hobsbawm (1992: 83).

95 Hobsbawm (1992: 80).

96 Hobsbawm (1992: 82).

legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right and continuity of rule, or religious cohesion' meant that:

...wherever the common man was given even the most nominal participation in politics as a citizen - with the rarest exception the common woman remained excluded - he could no longer be relied on to give automatic loyalty and support to his betters or to the state. 97

'The need for state and ruling classes to compete with rivals for the loyalty of the lower orders therefore became acute', 98 and 'ethnicity and language became the central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criteria of potential nationhood'. 99 Because states 'increasingly required more than passivity', they further strengthened the links between government and citizen, making use of 'increasingly powerful machinery' to communicate with their inhabitants, using primary schools in particular 'to spread the image and heritage of the "nation" and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag, often "inventing traditions" or even nations for this purpose'. 100 In a process that Anderson refers to as 'official nationalism', 'dominant groups...threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community' thus developed policies which 'concealed a discrepancy between nation and dynastic realm', 101 and consciously adopted national identities so as to shore up 'legitimacies which, in an age of capitalism, scepticism, and science, could less and less safely rest on putative sacrality and sheer antiquity'. 102 This was easily enough achieved, because the popular nationalisms created by lexicography and print-capitalism wanted to construct themselves as ancient

97 Hobsbawm (1992: 83 - 84).

98 Hobsbawm (1992: 83).

99 Hobsbawm (1992: 102).

100 Hobsbawm (1992: 85 and 91 - 92).

101 Anderson (1991: 101 and 110).

102 Anderson (1991: 85).

within a now thoroughly historicised version of homogeneous empty time. 'In an age in which "history" itself was...widely conceived in terms of "great events" and "great leaders", pearls strung along a thread of narrative', Anderson concludes, 'it was obviously tempting to decipher the community's past in antique dynasties'. 103

The third phase of nationalism is generally seen as having begun in 1918, when, Hobsbawm argues, 'the collapse of the great multinational empires of central and eastern Europe and the Russian Revolution...made it desirable for the Allies to play the Wilsonian card against the Bolshevik card'. 104 This had four main outcomes: first, it was found that, 'given the actual distribution of peoples, most of the new states built on the ruins of the old empires...were quite as multinational as the old "prisons of nations" they replaced'; 105 secondly, it was discovered that the 'national idea...did not necessarily coincide with the actual self-identification of the people concerned'; 106 thirdly, nationalism began increasingly to be adopted outside Europe; and fourthly, nationalism within Europe ceased to unify and began instead to fragment nations. 107

With regard to the first and second points, Hobsbawm argues that the 'logical implication of trying to create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by a separate ethnically and linguistically homogeneous population' was only realised after the Second World War, 108 when the 'plebiscites organized...in various regions of mixed national composition to decide on their inhabitants' membership of rival nation-states revealed significant bodies of those who spoke one language but

103 Anderson (1991: 109).

104 Hobsbawm (1992: 131).

105 Hobsbawm (1992: 133).

106 Hobsbawm (1992: 134).

107 Hobsbawm (1992: 139).

108 Hobsbawm (1992: 133).

opted to join the state of those who spoke another'. 109 The 'existence of Poles who preferred living in Germany to living in reborn Poland', for example, 'could not be denied, though it was *a priori* inexplicable to believers in the necessary identification of the members of a nationality with the territorial state that claimed to embody it'. 110 Such 'anomalies' were only resolved, however, with the subsequent 'mass expulsion or extermination of minorities':

After World War II, the Jews having virtually disappeared from the large belt of Europe between France and the Soviet interior, it was the turn of the Germans to be expelled *en masse*, notably from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The homogeneous territorial nation could now be seen as a programme that could be realized only...by barbarian means. 111

Gellner sees such changes in the position of pariah groups as tending to result in what he terms 'diaspora nationalism'. In pre-modern cultures, he argues, the socially excluded often voluntarily become 'politically and militarily impotent', taking up sensitive positions as, for example, 'palace guards and the providers of financial services', and being for the most part tolerated, despite their difference. 112 With the arrival of modern cultural conditions, however, 'it is no longer feasible to retain the monopoly of some activity for a particular cultural group', and so 'the erstwhile specialized minority groups' lose 'their monopoly and their protection'. 113 Although they tend to do well 'in the new economic free-for-all', their 'tradition of political impotence, and of the

109 Hobsbawm (1992: 134).

110 Hobsbawm (1992: 134), Hobsbawm's italics.

111 Hobsbawm (1992: 134), Hobsbawm's italics.

112 Gellner (1983: 101 - 105).

113 Gellner (1983: 103 - 104).

surrender of the communal right of self-defence', also puts them at substantial risk. 114 The rest, of course, is quite literally history:

The disastrous and tragic consequences, in modern conditions, of the conjunction of economic superiority and cultural identifiability with political and military weakness, are too well known to require repetition. The consequences range from genocide to expulsion. 115

With regard to the development of nationalism outside Europe after the War, Hobsbawm proposes that, despite some surface similarities, it was different from its European counterpart in as much as its function was primarily to achieve liberation from colonialism rather than to express specific national claims. 'Given the official commitment of the victorious powers to Wilsonian nationalism', he suggests, 'it was natural that anyone claiming to speak in the name of some oppressed or unrecognized people... should do so in terms of the national principle'. 116 Liberation 'was now seen everywhere as "national liberation"', 117 but those fighting for it were far from nationalist in the nineteenth century sense of the term - they were rather "'nationalists" only because they adopted a western ideology excellently suited to the overthrow of foreign governments'. 118 Even in recently independent former colonies, Hobsbawm concludes, 'it is far from clear that state separatism is what each of the peoples composing them or even their leaders or spokesmen [sic] have in mind': 119

The real problem of ethnic and communal groups, especially those facing dramatic socio-economic changes for which

114 Gellner (1983: 105).

115 Gellner (1983: 105).

116 Hobsbawm (1992: 136).

117 Hobsbawm (1992: 136).

118 Hobsbawm (1992: 137).

119 Hobsbawm (1992: 155).

their history has not prepared them, is quite different. It is much less like that of the formation of new nations than it is like that of mass migration into old (or new) industrial countries: how to adapt to the new world in an ethnically plural society... 120

Smith similarly questions the degree to which 'colonial nationalisms' are genuinely nationalistic, arguing that they are essentially 'imitative "nationalisms of the intelligentsia"', whom he sees as being 'influenced in their nationalist thinking by European sources'. 121 He nevertheless points out that the "'diffusion of ideas" thesis', which assumes that nation-ness is somehow 'infectious', only partly explains the rise of nationalism because, for it to take hold, 'sufficient numbers of the African, Latin American and Asian intelligentsias' had to be 'receptive to European romantic and nationalist influences at particular junctures'. 122 Anderson, meanwhile, accounts for colonial nationalisms in terms of centralised and standardised education systems, 'access, inside the classroom and outside, to models of nation, nation-ness and nationalism distilled from...more than a century of American and European history', 123 and educational and administrative pilgrimages. With colonial nationalisms, then, he concludes, '[i]n varying combinations, the lessons of creole, vernacular and official nationalisms were copied, adapted, and improved upon'. 124

When it comes to the fragmentary nature of subsequent European nationalisms, Smith suggests that their roots can be traced to their nineteenth century counterparts. These 'links and overlappings of classic and later ethnic "neo-nationalisms"', he suggests, 'reveal the kinship of the various "waves" of separatist

120 Hobsbawm (1992: 155).

121 Smith (1991: 108 - 109).

122 Smith (1991: 110).

123 Anderson (1991: 140).

124 Anderson (1991: 140).

ethnic nationalisms' in 'the presence and/or rediscovery of a distinctive "ethno-history"' which, where deficient, was 'reconstructed and even "invented"'. 125 Smith goes on to distinguish two main types of 'separatist' ethnic nationalism since the 1960s. The first, he suggests, seeks 'autonomy or secession from relatively new [post-colonial] states', 126 while the second has 'swept through much of Western Europe, reaching Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union', 127 and tends to be:

...directed against modern 'nation-states', that is to say, states that had for some time been regarded and regarded themselves as 'nations', even though from the standpoint of a strict interpretation of nationalism, they were national hybrids... 128

Although there are a number of 'fundamental similarities' between the two, 129 in as much as both share the basic characteristics of ethnic nationalism, with the former, he proposes, 'we are witnessing a straightforward trajectory in which the drive to create territorial nations in the new states evokes a reactive ethnic separatism', while with the latter, 'we have entered a second cycle in the drama of nationalism, reenacted on the ashes of former national hatreds'. 130 If the 'renewal of nationalism in industrial societies must...be understood not as something new...but as a new phase of the whole process of demotic vernacular mobilization that has been sweeping various parts of the world since the eighteenth century', and if there 'is really nothing surprising about this upsurge of ethnic nationalism ...within old-established, industrial states, just as there is no cause for wonder at the subsequent revival of nationalism in the

125 Smith (1991: 126).

126 Smith (1991: 133).

127 Smith (1991: 125).

128 Smith (1991: 139).

129 Smith (1991: 139).

130 Smith (1991: 138).

communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union', 131 then Smith nevertheless considers that the state is not single handedly responsible, but should rather be viewed as a 'powerful catalyst of underlying conditions and sentiments that must be sought elsewhere'. 132 He concludes, however, that:

...the earlier diffusionist models of historians and socio-demographers...[have] failed to explain why members of particular ethnic communities are available for vernacular mobilization and political activism... 133

Similarly, dependency models, 'which stress the processes of "internal colonialism" by which peripheral communities are economically and politically subordinated to core *ethnies*', 134 have failed 'to explain the incidence and timing of recent ethno-nationalisms'. 135 Because industrialization 'often long antedated the rise of such movements, and ethno-nationalism appears to correlate with no specific type of socio-economic background', he concludes, there would appear to be 'no correlation between degrees of ethno-nationalism and economic factors of any kind'. 136

Just as Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith explain the development of nation-ness in different ways, so each of them considers the future of nation-ness from a different perspective. Hobsbawm argues that, despite the apparently 'triumphant world-wide advance of "the principle of nationality"', recent nationalist movements have been fundamentally at odds with their nineteenth and early twentieth century counterparts, being 'essentially

131 Smith (1991: 141).

132 Smith (1991: 141).

133 Smith (1991: 125).

134 Smith (1991: 125), Smith's italics.

135 Smith (1991: 125).

136 Smith (1991: 125).

negative, or rather divisive'. 137 Such 'defensive reactions, whether against real or imaginary threats', he maintains, are linked to our repeated encounters with strangers, 'uprooted men and women who remind us of the fragility, or the drying up of our own families' roots', and are fuelled by 'a combination of international population movements with the ultra-rapid, fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformation so characteristic of the third quarter of our century'. 138 Suggesting that the era of nationally based economies has been 'situated between two essentially transnational eras', 139 he proposes that what we are now experiencing is a version of nation-ness which is economically and temporally palimpsestic, 'a curious combination of the technology of the late twentieth century, the free trade of the nineteenth, and the rebirth of the sort of interstitial centres characteristic of world trade in the Middle Ages. 140 The apparent spread of nationalism which 'derives from the fact that all states are today officially [called] "nations"', Hobsbawm concludes, conceals the fact that nationalism is 'of declining historical significance'. 141

In the second edition of *Nations and Nationalism*, Hobsbawm changes his argument slightly to take account of 'the apparent explosion of separatism' of 1988 - 92 in Central and Eastern Europe, which he explains as the '"unfinished business of 1918 - 21"'. 142 Hobsbawm views this resurgence of nationalism as being based on 'weakness and fear', and as an attempt 'to erect barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world' of 'a disoriented generation hungry for new certitudes to replace the collapsing old ones'. 143 In 'the case of the western ex-communist societies',

137 Hobsbawm (1990: 163 and 164).

138 Hobsbawm (1990: 165 and 167).

139 Hobsbawm (1990: 25).

140 Hobsbawm (1990: 174 - 175).

141 Hobsbawm (1990: 170).

142 Hobsbawm (1992: 165).

143 Hobsbawm (1992: 170 and 172).

Hobsbawm argues, 'this social disorientation is intensified by the collapse of life as most of the inhabitants have known it and learned to live it'. 144 Whereas previously, socialist economies were governed 'by the "economics of shortage"', giving 'ethnicity, like kinship, and other networks of potential reciprocity or patronage...a more concrete function', in contemporary, post-communist societies especially, 'ethnic or national identity is above all a device for... identifying the guilty who are responsible for "our" predicament': 145

'They' can be, must be, blamed for all the grievances, uncertainties and disorientations which so many of us feel after forty years of the most rapid and profound upheavals of human life in recorded history. And who are 'they' ? Obviously, and virtually by definition, those who are 'not us' - the strangers who, by their very alienness, are enemies: present aliens, past aliens, even purely notional aliens as in Poland where anti-Semitism continues to explain Polish ills in the total absence of Jews. 146

Late twentieth century nationalism, then, is a defensive reaction to rapid cultural change in societies which can no longer maintain organic continuity with their history, but must rather use the fragments left to them to reconstruct it. 147 'The anguish and disorientation which finds expression in this hunger to belong', Hobsbawm concludes, 'creates the illusion of nations and nationalism as an irresistibly rising force ready for the third millennium', 148 but 'the very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of

144 Hobsbawm (1992: 173).

145 Hobsbawm (1992: 173 - 174).

146 Hobsbawm (1992: 174).

147 Hobsbawm (1992: 174 - 176).

148 Hobsbawm (1992: 177).

nations and nationalisms' suggests that 'the phenomenon is past its peak'. 149

Gellner takes a similarly economic view of nationalism, but comes to very different conclusions. It is possible, he suggests, that 'all industrial societies [will] eventually come to resemble each other', 150 and if the industrial mode of production were to result in various societies sharing a very similar culture, if the same technology streamed people 'into the same type of activity and the same kinds of hierarchy, and...the same kind of leisure styles were also engendered by the existing techniques and by the needs of productive life', then:

Diverse languages might and probably would...survive: but the social uses to which they were being put, the meanings available in them, would be much the same in any language within this wider shared industrial culture. 151

In this kind of environment, he suggests, 'a man [sic] moving from one language to another might indeed need to learn a new vocabulary, new words for familiar things and contexts, and he might also, at worst, have to learn a new grammar'; nevertheless, 'he' would not need to learn any new 'thought styles', and 'interlinguistic adjustment would be a simple matter of exchanging one verbal currency for another, within a well-run international conceptual system in which exchange rates were fairly stable, fixed and reliable'. 152 In this case:

...nationalism would cease to be a problem; or at any rate, communication gaps engendered by cultural difference would cease to be significant and would no longer produce

149 Hobsbawm (1992: 192).

150 Gellner (1983: 116).

151 Gellner (1983: 116).

152 Gellner (1983: 116 - 117).

nationalist tensions. Nationalism as a permanent problem... would be removed, and cease to be an ever-present and acute threat. In this hypothetical global continuum of a basically homogeneous industrial culture, differentiated by languages...distinct only phonetically and superficially but not semantically, the age of nationalism would become a matter of the past. 153

This is not a situation Gellner believes will come to pass. It is similarly hypothetically possible, he proposes, that 'each culture or way of life...[will have]...its own standards...of reality...and no culture may ever legitimately be judged, let alone condemned, by the standards of another, or by standards pretending to be universal and above all cultures'. 154 Here, however, he argues that:

...we are not helplessly imprisoned within a set of cultural cocoons and their norms, and...for some very obvious reasons (shared cognitive and productive bases and greatly increased inter-social communication) we may expect fully industrial man [sic] to be even less enslaved to his local culture than was his agrarian predecessor. 155

Gellner concludes that the future of nationalism probably lies somewhere between these two poles. With the narrowing of 'the social chasms created by early industrialism', he suggests, 'the sharpness of nationalist conflict may be expected to diminish': the 'deep social abysses, which could...be activated by ethnicity' in early industrial societies will no longer exist in their future equivalents, while any cultural differences that persist will only be tolerated if they do not hamper social mobility. 156 Nevertheless, the 'shared economic infrastructure of advanced industrial society and

153 Gellner (1983: 118).

154 Gellner (1983: 119).

155 Gellner (1983: 120).

156 Gellner (1983: 121).

its inescapable implications' will mean that people will still rely on cultures which are standardised over fairly wide areas and serviced by centralised administrations, such that 'their employability and social acceptability' will continue to depend on a standardised and culturally homogeneous education. 157 Gellner thus believes that 'an international plurality of sometimes fairly diverse high cultures' will continue to exist, and 'late industrial society...can be expected to be one in which nationalism persists, but in a muted, less virulent form'. 158

Smith points out that many critics have heralded the imminent decline of nationalism in the twenty-first century, citing as evidence 'various experiments in multinational states...[and]... regional federation[s]', and 'the new transnational forces...that are spawning a "post-national" world'. 159 With regard to multi-national states, however, he argues that if anything, organisations such as the EC [sic] will 'accentuate existing national aspirations and consciousness', because 'cultural cross-fertilization is likely to provoke vigorous renewals of...national identity'. 160 With regard to transnational forces, he similarly argues that economic influences 'may end up reinforcing the nations and nationalisms they were expected to supersede', 161 while in the area of culture, ethnic styles and national discourses will continue to hold sway, because, however post-modern advanced capitalist and post-industrial culture may be, it will still draw its contents 'from revivals of earlier folk or national motifs and styles'. 162 Unlike 'previous cultural imperialisms', such as those of Rome, Byzantium or Mecca, which 'were bound to the time and place of their origins' and 'based on concrete historical traditions that had popular resonance over long

157 Gellner (1983: 120).

158 Gellner (1983: 121 - 122).

159 Smith (1991: 145).

160 Smith (1991: 153).

161 Smith (1991: 157).

162 Smith (1991: 157).

periods', 163 however, the 'new global culture is universal and timeless', and 'lacks any emotional commitment to what is signified'. 164 'It may be possible', Smith proposes, 'to manufacture traditions and package imagery, but images and traditions will be sustained only if they have some popular resonance, and they will have that resonance only if they can be harmonized and made continuous with a perceived collective past'. 165 It is therefore 'not enough to imagine the global community'; instead, 'new and wider forms of political association and different types of cultural community will first have to emerge'. 166 For Smith, then, 'the chances of transcending the nation and superseding nationalism are at present slim'. 167 Nation-ness will continue to be a 'potent and durable influence' for the foreseeable future and, until the needs currently met by national identity 'are fulfilled through other kinds of identification', the nation 'will continue to provide humanity with its fundamental cultural and political identities'. 168 Similarly, for Anderson, "'the end of the era of nationalism", so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight'. 169 Indeed, when he asks (presumably with reference to Benjamin's Angel of History), 'Who would have thought that the storm blows harder the farther it leaves Paradise behind', Anderson implies that if anything, nation-ness is likely to intensify rather than decline. 170

Despite outlining the broad stages of the development and future of nation-ness, Anderson, Hobsbawm, Gellner and Smith all appear dissatisfied with their own macro-political explanations. Anderson suggests that the availability of models of nation-ness

163 Smith (1991: 158 - 159).

164 Smith (1991: 158).

165 Smith (1991: 159).

166 Smith (1991: 160).

167 Smith (1991: 175).

168 Smith (1991: 175 and 177).

169 Anderson (1991: 3).

170 Anderson (1991: xi).

does not, in itself, satisfactorily explain why people become attached to nations, arguing instead that the creation of new nations has often involved 'a deep reshaping of the imagination'. 171 Even then, however, he concludes that 'it is doubtful whether either social change or transformed consciousness, in themselves, do much to explain the *attachment* that peoples feel for the inventions of their imaginations'. 172 Gellner likewise refutes the idea that a sense of nation-ness can be manufactured, 173 but nevertheless argues that the human psyche cannot be used to explain the advent of nation-ness because it 'can be assumed to have persisted unchanged through the many many millennia of the existence of the human race'. 174 Similarly, he suggests that identification has also always worked in the same way, and 'did not need to wait for some distinctive kind of economy': 175 patriotism, then, 'is...a perennial part of human life', and nationalism merely 'a very distinctive species of patriotism...which becomes pervasive and dominant only under...social conditions, which...prevail in the modern world, and nowhere else'. 176

Hobsbawm asks how 'a concept so remote from the real experience of most human beings as "national patriotism"' could 'become such a powerful political force so quickly' and, 177 despite suggesting that 'the mere fact of existing for a few decades...may be enough to establish at least a passive identification with a new nation-state', 178 nevertheless goes on to recognise that 'the mere setting up of a state is not sufficient in itself to create a nation'. 179

171 Anderson (1991: 201).

172 Anderson (1991: 141), Anderson's emphasis.

173 Gellner (1983: 125 - 126).

174 Gellner (1983: 34 - 35).

175 Gellner (1983: 138).

176 Gellner (1983: 138).

177 Hobsbawm (1992: 46).

178 Hobsbawm (1992: 86).

179 Hobsbawm (1992: 78).

To 'insist on consciousness or choice as the criterion of nationhood', he suggests, 'is insensibly to subordinate the complex and multiple ways in which human beings define and redefine themselves as members of groups, to a single option'. 180 Identification, however, is a multiple and shifting phenomenon which 'is neither linear nor necessarily at the expense of other elements of social consciousness'. 181 Nations might also partially be explained by the 'projection of the sentiments of genuine...identification with one's "little" homeland on to the big one', 182 and certainly operate 'in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development', 183 he concludes, but whilst they are 'constructed... from above', they must also be 'analysed from below', this being 'the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed'. 184

Finally, Smith suggests that nation-ness always operates on two levels, 'the cultural-psychological' and 'the socio-political', 185 and 'often fails to recognize the boundary between the private realm...and the public one': 186 the family of the nation, for example, can override and replace the individual's family, evoking 'similarly strong loyalties and vivid attachments'. 187 Arguing that the 'new concept of the nation was made to serve as a time-space framework to order chaos and render the universe meaningful by harnessing pre-modern mass aspirations and sentiments for local and familiar attachments', 188 Smith proposes that collective cultural identity refers 'not to a uniformity of elements over generations', but rather

180 Hobsbawm (1992: 8).

181 Hobsbawm (1992: 130).

182 Hobsbawm (1992: 90).

183 Hobsbawm (1992: 10).

184 Hobsbawm (1992: 10 - 11).

185 Smith (1991: 70).

186 Smith (1991: 99).

187 Smith (1991: 79).

188 Smith (1991: 78).

'to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture', such that changes in a group's cultural identity 'refer to the degree to which traumatic developments disturb the basic patterning of the cultural elements that make up the sense of continuity'. 189 He ultimately concludes, however, that the 'quest for the national self and the individual's relationship to it remains the most baffling element in the nationalist project'. 190

Both Anderson and Smith go on to consider a range of other factors which might help to account for the potency of the national idea, including death, religion, language, history, memory and forgetting, and narrative. The issues of mortality and religion are addressed by Anderson in an amusing discussion of why it is that 'cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers' work as national monuments when 'a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals' would be plainly absurd. 191 If nation-ness is concerned with death and immortality, he suggests, then 'this suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings': 192 the success of the great world religions can be attributed to 'their imaginative response to the overwhelming burden of human suffering', and to the fact that they effectively concern themselves 'with the links between the dead and the yet unborn, the mystery of regeneration'. 193 Whilst keen to avoid a simplistic association between the decline of religion and the rise of nationalism, Anderson nevertheless argues that what was required in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century 'was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, [and] contingency into meaning', to which

189 Smith (1991: 25).

190 Smith (1991: 17).

191 Anderson (1991: 9 - 10).

192 Anderson (1991: 10).

193 Anderson (1991: 11).

few things were better suited 'than an idea of nation'. 194 If 'nation-states are widely conceded to be "new" and "historical", he concludes, 'the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future'. 195 Smith makes a similar point, arguing that 'parades, remembrance ceremonies, anniversary celebrations, monuments...oaths, coinage, flags, eulogies of heroes and memorials of historic events' all serve to strengthen the illusion that nation-ness can overcome mortality; perhaps 'the most important of its functions', he suggests, 'is to provide a satisfying answer to the problems of personal oblivion'. 196

For Anderson, language plays a crucial role in these processes, because it is by means of the national language, which also 'looms up imperceptibly out of a horizonless past', that we are connected to the dead. 197 'If English-speakers hear the words "Earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust"', he concludes:

...they get a ghostly intimation of simultaneity across homogeneous empty time. The weight of the words derives only in part from their solemn meaning; it comes also from an as-it-were ancestral "Englishness". 198

It is thus 'language, encountered at mother's [sic] knee and parted with only at the grave' through which 'pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed'. 199

In terms of its apparent ability to provide a 'solution' to the problem of mortality, Anderson sees national history as fulfilling a

194 Anderson (1991: 11).

195 Anderson (1991: 11 - 12).

196 Smith (1991: 160 and 162).

197 Anderson (1991: 144).

198 Anderson (1991: 145).

199 Anderson (1991: 154).

similar function. Following White, he points out that 'the five presiding geniuses of European historiography were all born within the quarter century following the Convention's rupturing of time', and that Michelet 'clearly exemplifies the national imagining being born', in that 'he was the first selfconsciously to write *on behalf* of the dead'.²⁰⁰ The passage Anderson cites by way of illustration is well worth quoting in full:

Oui, chaque mort laisse un petit bien, sa mémoire, et demande qu'on la soigne. Pour celui qui n'a pas d'amis, il faut que le magistrat y supplée. Car la loi, la justice, est plus sûre que toutes nos tendresses oublieuses, nos larmes si vite séchées. Cette magistrature, c'est l'Histoire. Et les mort sont, pour dire comme le Droit romain, ces *miserabiles personae* dont le magistrat doit se préoccuper. Jamais dans ma carrière je n'ai pas perdu de vue ce devoir de l'historien. J'ai donné à beaucoup de morts trop oubliés l'assistance dont moi-même j'aurai besoin. Je les ai exhumés pour une seconde vie...Ils vivent maintenant avec nous qui nous sentons leurs parents, leurs amis. Ainsi se fait une famille, une cité commune entre les vivants et les morts.²⁰¹

The dead whom Michelet 'exhumed', Anderson notes, were precisely:

²⁰⁰ Anderson (1991: 197), Anderson's emphasis.

²⁰¹ Anderson (1991: 198). Anderson considers that White's translation in *Metahistory* is inadequate, but does not provide one himself; an approximate translation would be as follows:

Yes, each dead person leaves behind the small gift of his memory and asks that it be cared for. For the person who has no friends, it is necessary that the magistrate stand in. Because the law, justice, is more certain than all our forgetful affections, our too quickly drying tears. This magistrature is History. And the dead are, as Roman law puts it, these *miserabiles personae* with whom the magistrate must concern himself. Never in my career have I lost sight of this duty of the historian. I have given to many of the too [soon] forgotten dead the help of which I myself will have need. I have exhumed them for a second life...They live now with us who feel ourselves to be their parents, their friends. Thus is created a family, a city shared between the living and the dead.

...those whose sacrifices, throughout History, made possible the rupture of 1789 and the selfconscious appearance of the French nation, *even when these sacrifices were not understood as such by the victims.* 202

He thus concludes that not only did Michelet claim 'to speak on behalf of large numbers of anonymous dead' but that he 'insisted, with poignant authority, that he could say what they "really" meant and "really" wanted, since they themselves "did not understand"'. 203

If what Anderson terms 'Michelet's "second generation" formulations' were concerned with remembering, however, what preoccupied Renan in his declaration of 1882 'was precisely the need for forgetting':

Or, l'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun et aussi que tous aient oublié bien de choses... Tout citoyen français *doit avoir oublié* la Saint-Barthélemy, les massacres du Midi au XIIIe siècle. 204

Anderson comments that Renan both saw 'no reason to explain' either of the historical references, and that he viewed as perfectly normal his assumption that his readers would, as it were, 'remember' events which 'occurred 300 and 600 years previously'. 205 As Anderson also points out:

...the peremptory syntax of *doit avoir oublier* (not *doit oublier*) - 'obliged already to have forgotten' - ...suggests... that 'already having forgotten' ancient tragedies is a prime

202 Anderson (1991: 198), Anderson's emphasis.

203 Anderson (1991: 198).

204 Anderson (1991: 199).

205 Anderson (1991: 200).

contemporary civic duty. In effect, Renan's readers were being told to 'have already forgotten' what Renan's words assumed that they naturally remembered ! 206

'Having to "have already forgotten" tragedies of which one needs unceasingly to be "reminded"', Anderson continues, 'turns out to be a characteristic device in the later construction of national genealogies'. 207

When it comes to the issue of narrative, both Smith and Anderson offer convincing arguments. For Smith, 'widely believed tales told in dramatic form, referring to past events but serving present purposes and/or future goals' (which he terms 'myths') are central to an understanding of nation-ness, because the nation is 'one of the most popular and ubiquitous myths of modern times'. 208 In addition, the nation is based round a 'cultural collectivity...that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories', 209 with the metaphor of nation-as-family, 'linked by mythical ties of filiation and ancestry', 210 and that of the nation needing to be awoken 'from a long slumber', 211 being particularly important. It is 'myths of common ancestry, not any fact of ancestry', 212 'and the attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession of the land', Smith concludes, which matter for a sense of ethnic identification and for the construction of national identity. 213

206 Anderson (1991: 200).

207 Anderson (1991: 201).

208 Smith (1991: 19).

209 Smith (1991: 20).

210 Smith (1991: 22).

211 Smith (1991: 20).

212 Smith (1991: 22).

213 Smith (1991: 23).

For Anderson, the issue of narrative arises from a reappraisal of Renan's syntax, 'doit avoir oublier...' "obliged already to have forgotten", 214 and from the recognition that the first edition of *Imagined Communities* 'offered no intelligible explanation of exactly how, and why, new-emerging nations imagined themselves antique'. 215 'Supposing', he asks:

...antiquity were, at a certain historical juncture, the *necessary consequence* of 'novelty' ? If nationalism was, as I supposed it, the expression of a radically changed form of consciousness, should not awareness of that break, and the necessary forgetting of the older consciousness, create its own narrative ? Seen from this perspective, the atavistic fantasizing characteristic of most nationalist thought after the 1820s appears an epiphenomenon; what is really important is the structural alignment of post-1820s nationalist 'memory' with the inner premises and conventions of modern biography and autobiography. 216

From here, Anderson launches into what is, for me, perhaps the most promising aspect of his argument. Having earlier drawn attention to the fact that the nation is often referred to 'in the vocabulary of kinship (motherland, *Vaterland*, *patria*)', 217 he makes a direct comparison between the construction of the narrative of the subject and that of its national equivalent. Pointing out that 'nationalism in the age of Michelet and Renan represented a new form of consciousness...that arose when it was no longer possible to experience the nation as new', he comments that:

All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such

214 Anderson (1991: 200).

215 Anderson (1991: xiv).

216 Anderson (1991: xiv), Anderson's emphasis.

217 Anderson (1991: 143), Anderson's italics.

oblivions, in specific historical circumstances, spring narratives. After experiencing the physiological and emotional changes produced by puberty, it is impossible to 'remember' the consciousness of childhood...How strange it is to need another's help to learn that this naked baby in the yellowed photograph, sprawled happily on rug or cot, is you...Out of this estrangement comes a conception of personhood, *identity* (yes, you and that naked baby are identical) which, because it can not be 'remembered', must be narrated. 218

Such narratives, Anderson remarks, like novels and newspapers, 'are set in homogeneous empty time', which is why:

...so many autobiographies begin with the circumstances of parents and grandparents, for which the autobiographer can have only circumstantial, textual evidence; and why the biographer is at pains to record the calendrical, A.D. dates of two biographical events which his or her subject can never remember: his birth-day and death-day. Nothing affords a sharper reminder of this narrative's modernity than the opening of the Gospel according to St. Matthew. 219

Except in one aspect, narratives of nations, he continues, are just like those of modern people:

Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of 'forgetting' the experience of this continuity - product of the ruptures of the late eighteenth century - engenders the need for a narrative of 'identity'. 220

218 Anderson (1991: 204), Anderson's emphasis.

219 Anderson (1991: 204).

220 Anderson (1991: 205).

Where they differ is that in the biographical narrative, 'there is a beginning and an end', whereas in national narratives, nations 'have no clearly identifiable births and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never natural': 221

Because there is no Originator, the nation's biography can not be written evangelically, 'down time', through a long procreative chain of begettings. The only alternative is to fashion it 'up time' - towards Peking Man, Java Man, King Arthur... 222

National narratives are then, in a sense, the antithesis of the Angel of History, whose face is "'turned towards the past'" and whose wings are caught by the storm of progress which "'propels him into the future to which his back is turned"'. 223 'This fashioning, however', Anderson continues:

...is marked by deaths, which, in a curious inversion of conventional genealogy, start from an ordinary present. World War II begets World War I; out of Sedan comes Austerlitz; the ancestor of the Warsaw Uprising is the state of Israel. 224

In order to serve the narrative purpose, Anderson concludes, the biography of the nation 'snatches...exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts', which can and must 'be remembered/forgotten as "our own"'. 225 Whether he means that such deaths come to belong to 'us' as a nation, and/or that they do so in the sense that they represent to us our own mortality, Anderson clearly sees national narratives as

221 Anderson (1991: 205).

222 Anderson (1991: 205).

223 Anderson (1991: 162).

224 Anderson (1991: 205).

225 Anderson (1991: 206).

being the result of amnesias, and death as a central factor in the identification of the subject with the nation.

As in previous chapters, I would now like to identify the connections between the epistemological and the macro-political, this time by linking Foucault's account of the Modern episteme to the arguments of Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith with regard to the era of high nation-ness and the future of nationalism.

Anderson's argument about nineteenth and twentieth century nation-ness can be linked to Foucault's account of the Modern episteme via the four issues of time, death, language, and subjectivity. In addition, Foucault's theory helps to explain why the consciously adopted and deliberately imposed strategies of official nationalism, and the existence of modular examples, do not necessarily result in an emotional attachment to nation-ness.

With regard to time, three of Anderson's points seem particularly compatible with Foucault's argument: first, that the construction of nations as ancient was dependent on an understanding of homogeneous, empty time as historical; secondly, that such an understanding was the consequence of a new form of consciousness; and thirdly, that nations were (and are) seen as having infinite pasts and futures. These can be linked respectively to Foucault's distinction between non-historical linear time (the ideal time of the table) and historical linear time (time as exceeding the boundaries of representation, time as dynamic), to his assertion that this shift only occurred with the advent of the Modern episteme, and to his discussion of the retreat and return of the origin. It could be argued that the emergence in the Modern episteme of a historical conception of linear temporality made equally inevitable both the existence of the nation *per se*, and the particular ways in which it was (and is) thought of as existing in time. Foucault proposes that it was a new understanding of time

which led to the advent of history; 226 presumably, though, if the disruption of Classical temporality meant a move from ideal, non-historical linear time to dynamic, historical linear time, then it must also have meant a shift from ideal, 'tabular' space to 'real' physical space. If, as Foucault suggests, things began to be conceived as being 'of' rather than merely 'in' time, then perhaps they also began to be thought of as being 'of' rather than 'in' space, and hence the location of the events with which living things (including humankind) were considered to be dynamically interacting was no longer seen as purely theoretical but rather as geographical, resulting in a new importance being accorded to national territories. Similarly, the impact of the disruption of Classical temporality on the concept of the origin helps to explain why nations began to be thought of as stretching infinitely back into the past and forwards into the future. Foucault suggests that in Classical thought, the tracing of origins was a relatively straightforward affair: whether the origin was real or fictitious, a historical event or an explanatory hypothesis was largely irrelevant, because if time dispersed representation by imposing on it a linear sequence, then representation nevertheless subjugated time by reconstructing it imaginatively in its entirety; time in general therefore moved forwards, and, not surprisingly, so did the time of the first nations. With the disruption of Classical temporality, however, the tracing of origins grew more complex. The ideal origin was no longer conceivable (because life, labour and language were situated in dynamic time which exceeded the boundaries of representation), yet historicity made an origin necessary. At the same time, 'man' came into existence, but as a 'being without origin', 227 who was both object and subject, founded and founding: however much 'he' went back through the sequences of events that constituted history, 'he' would never reach the moment of 'his' own beginning, yet at the

226 As, for example, when he argues that the discontinuity of living forms discovered in the Classical era suggested a temporal current which could not be explained by the theoretical continuum of ideal structures and characters, leading to the continuity of the table being fractured, and natural history becoming the history of nature.

227 Foucault (1970: 332).

same time, events only became historical when they were so constituted. Temporality therefore moved towards the origin both by receding backwards into history and forwards into the future, and, predictably enough, the temporality of nations did likewise, on the one hand receding 'up time' from an 'originary present' 228 (from World War II to World War I, from Sedan to Austerlitz, from the state of Israel to the Warsaw Uprising), and on the other, being reconstructed 'down time' from an originary if mythical past (Michelet resurrecting the dead and frog-marching them into 'historical' national narratives).

Concerning death, Anderson's point that nation-ness takes on the role of attempting to overcome mortality is compatible with Foucault's assertion that in the Modern episteme, death takes on a new importance. If the Renaissance and Classical epistemes rendered death less problematic by conceptualising time as simultaneous and eternal and as theoretical respectively, then in the Modern episteme, the conception of time as a linear, historical, causal series makes the question of finitude particularly urgent, and an inextricable link develops between the eventual future end of history and the finitude of 'man'. Endings start to matter: history is seen as being directed towards some sort of conclusion and 'man' expends his life attempting to defer the moment of death. It is not simply that, as Anderson argues, the decline of religion meant that a new way had to be found of 'linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together': 229 whilst the demise of the sacred doubtless contributed to concerns about mortality, the advent of the Modern episteme also resulted in the foregrounding of finitude.

When it comes to language, the most interesting of Anderson's assertions are that language plays an important role in nineteenth and twentieth century popular nationalisms, that it is instrumental in the nation's ability to 'overcome' death, that radical

228 Anderson (1991: 205).

229 Anderson (1991: 36).

breaks and changes in consciousness involve amnesias and the production of national narratives, and that national languages provide the pivotal point between the public and the private realms. Anderson's suggestion that linguistic nationalism became increasingly popular is paralleled by Foucault's assertion that in the Modern episteme, language is no longer connected to the representation of objects - 'the knowing of things' - by a learned elite, but is rather linked to the temporary arresting and fixing of the 'actions, states and wishes' of the people and 'to men's [sic] freedom'.²³⁰ Anderson's argument that language provides a means of spanning the generations, thereby apparently enabling the nation to triumph over death, is compatible with Foucault's point that language becomes 'a dense and consistent historical reality' which forms a people's 'locus of tradition'.²³¹ Anderson's attestation that awareness of a break in consciousness and the forgetting which accompanies it produce narratives is matched by Foucault's argument that Classical thought is a form of consciousness that is no longer accessible to us,²³² and that the return of Renaissance resemblance after its dissociation by Classical representation is manifested in Modern literature. Lastly, Anderson's point that national languages provide the pivotal connection between the public and the private realms is supported by Foucault's argument that both language and finitude become internalised within individual subjects (verbal roots 'express the actions and volitions of a subject',²³³ and finitude is manifested as individual need and desire),²³⁴ and that culture and the individual are linked via the signifying chain.

Finally, as far as subjectivity is concerned, Anderson's main arguments are that there is some sort of connection between 'post-

230 Foucault (1970: 289 and 291).

231 Foucault (1970: 297).

232 Foucault (1970: 304).

233 Gutting (1989: 194).

234 Foucault (1970: 315).

1820s nationalist "memory" and 'modern biography and autobiography', 235 that individual identity narratives are set in homogeneous, empty time, that, as with the construction of national narratives, the construction of individual identity narratives involves remembering and forgetting the past in complex ways, and that there is a connection between the public/private and remembering/forgetting in as much as the construction of a national narrative involves remembering/forgetting certain public events as private ones. These points can be connected respectively to Foucault's assertions that 'man' is a recent invention who did not exist prior to the beginning of the Modern episteme, that historical, linear time only became important in the Modern episteme, that the unconscious emerged at the same time as Modern literature and 'man', and again that culture and the subject are connected by the signifying chain. What Anderson and Foucault between them seem to suggest, then, is that the nation, language, changing consciousness, remembering/forgetting, the private/public, desire, death, and narrative are all in some way connected, and, although neither of them suggests exactly how, it seems likely that language and the signifying chain play a central role.

For all that Anderson's account of nineteenth and twentieth nation-ness is richly suggestive, there are three main problems. First, his print-capitalism argument is emotionally unconvincing: after all, to put it bluntly, how likely is it that a person's awareness of reading the same newspaper-language over breakfast as their fellow citizens would make them willing to die for their country? Secondly, as Anderson himself admits, his argument does not fully succeed in explaining why it is only certain groups of people at any given time who feel an emotional attachment towards the nation: if the deliberate adoption of policies and models by official or colonial nationalist leaderships doesn't always result in nation-ness, then the only account that he offers of why this should be so is that states have very little control over the reconfiguration of the

235 Anderson (1991: xiv).

imagination that must occur if nation-ness is to develop. Thirdly, Anderson's argument that 'it is doubtful whether either social change or transformed consciousness, in themselves, do much to explain the attachment that peoples feel for the inventions of their imaginations'²³⁶ seems to me to deny precisely the mechanism by which the development of nation-ness might be explained. If, as I have been arguing, it is only with the arrival of the Modern episteme that a dynamic conception of the nation becomes possible, then this not only explains the prior non-existence of nation-ness, but also the lack of success experienced by educated, modern elites when they attempt to impose nation-ness on largely agrarian, nonindustrialized peoples: without the profound change of consciousness that the Modern episteme involves, the nation is difficult to imagine because of an absence of the necessary temporal and spatial conceptions, and it is probably also emotionally irrelevant because there is no need for the existence of the kinds of narrative that accompany it. Despite these problems with Anderson's argument, however, just as Foucault hints at the importance of the Lacanian signifying chain in explaining how culture and subject become intertwined, so too, whether intentionally or not, Anderson in his way implies a psychoanalytic model. The parallel that Anderson draws between Michelet's commandeering of the dead for the construction of national narratives on the one hand, and the individual's reclamation of a past they can't remember for the construction of a subjective narrative on the other, are certainly evocative of the psychoanalytic concept of retroactive causality. Similarly, Anderson's interpretation of Renan's statement as implying that ancient tragedies naturally remembered are obliged to be forgotten is itself reminiscent of the psychoanalytic idea that personal trauma which continuously erupts into consciousness tends to be repeatedly repressed.

²³⁶ Anderson (1991: 141), emphasis removed.

Gellner's discussion of nation-ness in industrial societies can be linked to Foucault's analysis of the Modern episteme via the issues of language, economics, and the (im)mutability of human consciousness. His assertion that a genuine feeling of nation-ness cannot be manufactured, and that such a powerful and ubiquitous idea could not have been imposed by a handful of philosophers is mirrored, 237 as with Anderson, by Foucault's argument that 'language is no longer linked to civilizations by the level of learning to which they have attained...but by the mind of the peoples who have given rise to it', 238 that language 'is no longer linked to the knowing of things but to men's freedom', 239 and that 'mutations no longer come from above...but take their being obscurely from below': 240 in both instances, there is the idea of elitism being deposed by popularism. With regard to economics, there is another interesting series of (sometimes contradictory) connections between Gellner and Foucault's arguments. Here, Gellner's explanation of population control can be connected to Foucault's point about '*Homo oeconomicus*'. 241 Whereas for Gellner, agrarian society is Malthusian, has a growing population controlled by occasional disasters, and possesses a social structure in which cultural and political boundaries seldom match, and industrial society is not Malthusian, has a stable population level discouraged from rising by cognitive and economic growth, and possesses a social structure in which cultural and political boundaries are compatible, 242 for Foucault, European societies only became truly Malthusian at about the time they made the transition from the Classical to the Modern episteme. 243 Despite the apparent contradiction between Gellner and Foucault's arguments, what seems to be at issue again here is

237 Gellner (1983: 133).

238 Foucault (1970: 290).

239 Foucault (1970: 291).

240 Foucault (1970: 290).

241 Foucault (1970: 257).

242 Gellner (1983: 110).

243 Foucault (1970: 257).

the question of the relationship between food production, population control, modernity, and (in Gellner's case) the development of nation-ness. Perhaps it would be true to say that both pre-modern and modern societies are Malthusian, but that, whereas in the former, there is a subsistence economy in which a small but growing population is controlled by disasters, in the latter, an early, transitional, Classical phase with improving techniques of agricultural production initially results in an increasing population, while a later, fully industrial, Modern phase results in a large population whose further growth is effectively controlled by the scarcity of land. It is easy to see how territory might become an issue of national importance here.

When it comes to the issue of human consciousness, there are four main points of conflict between Gellner and Foucault's arguments which are particularly interesting. First, Gellner's assertion that the human psyche has not changed during the course of history because it has not been influenced by wider cultural change seems highly unlikely. Foucault's argument that, prior to the Classical era, human consciousness as we currently understand it did not exist, and that it was only with the split between thought and representation that the latter could become an object of knowledge and that 'man' - and hence contemporary human consciousness - could come into existence, seems much more plausible. Secondly, Gellner's suggestion that 'men' have always identified with groups in the same way is similarly open to challenge. Whilst Gellner is not referring to identification in a psychoanalytic sense, and Foucault's link between identification and the Modern episteme is merely implied, the assumption that identification has always existed in the same form must also be questioned. Thirdly, Gellner's denial of a link between nation-ness and a changing human consciousness results in the construction of a theoretical model of nation-ness which has little emotional resonance. Although it is possible to understand why being schooled in a language and culture on which economic survival might ultimately depend should be an important and potentially

powerful influence, Gellner's failure to provide a detailed explanation of how culture comes to be the core of the modern individual's identity makes it difficult to accept his argument that social experience is absorbed, processed, and then somehow simply manifested in terms of national identity. As with Anderson's newspaper reading over breakfast resulting in a willingness to die for one's country, it seems that a crucial step in the argument has been omitted. Finally, Gellner's explanation of the modular replication of the nation is paradoxical: on the one hand, he argues that nation-ness is not dependent on a change in human consciousness and that its diffusion is essentially based on borrowing by social elites, yet on the other, he views it as a powerful and ubiquitous sentiment which cannot be imposed at will.

The way in which Gellner attempts to overcome these problems begins to suggest how Foucault's analysis might usefully be employed. His proposal that particular emotional mechanisms come to the fore under specific cultural conditions, and that patriotism 'is a perennial part of human life' which 'becomes pervasive and dominant only under certain social conditions'²⁴⁴ is reminiscent of Foucault's suggestion that Renaissance resemblance went 'underground' during the Classical episteme, and only resurfaced in the Modern episteme as literature. What if this were true of other phenomena under discussion in the various chapters of this section? If resemblance never disappears but is rather temporarily submerged, only to reappear in a reconfigured form, and if the perceived location of the sign moves from the external world to the internal world of the subject, then might it also be the case that, under the epistemological conditions of the Classical and Modern eras, the relationship between cyclical and linear time is not one of replacement, but rather one of re-placement, such that in the mind of the Modern subject, both cyclical and linear time co-exist? If, as a psychoanalytic term, identification is associated with

²⁴⁴ Gellner (1983: 138).

a timeless trajectory which moves backwards and forwards in a non-linear fashion between originary alienation, desire and (through its association with narcissism), (self)-destruction, with the coming into being and ongoing transformation of the human subject, with the production of both initial and continuing senses of selfhood through relationships of similarity to and difference from others, and - for Lacan at least - with the construction of the ego through visual perception, the mirror phase, the Symbolic, and language, 245 then there are a number of obvious parallels with Foucault's argument: time becomes linear and dynamic but is also associated with the more cyclical movement of the retreat and return of the origin; 'the whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity of...ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own essence'; 246 death becomes paramount; the unconscious only comes into existence - as a kind of resurgence of the murmuring resemblance of the Renaissance - with the emergence of 'man'; the relationship between 'man' as founding and founded is 'both one of identity (since man is one being) and difference (since nothing can literally precede and produce itself)'; 247 'man' is an 'enslaved sovereign' and 'observed spectator' reflected 'only in the chance presence of a mirror', who demands that 'the entire space of the representation should at last be related to one corporeal gaze'; 248 and the individual and the culture 'have only one point in common...the signifying chain'. 249 Although Gellner argues against the idea of human consciousness being historically malleable and disagrees with the proposition that identification is a recent phenomenon, then, in so doing, he draws attention to two factors which, considered in conjunction with Foucault's argument, might well provide a key to understanding the existence and operation of national identity in modern subjects and societies. Additionally,

245 Bowie (1991: 30 - 36).

246 Foucault (1970: 327).

247 Gutting (1989: 200).

248 Foucault (1970: 312).

249 Foucault (1970: 380).

despite the fact that he only considers its link to nation-ness in terms of its ability to divide people into rival groups, Gellner's point about the differentiated arrival time of industrialization is also useful. 250 Perhaps it can be argued that the arrival of industrialization and the Modern episteme lead not only to a conception of time and space which makes the idea of the nation feasible, but also to the development of a particular kind of identification which makes the acquisition of a national identity likely. Finally, both Gellner and Foucault suggest that a change in epistemological conditions and social formations is at least theoretically possible in future. Thus, for Gellner, were industrial society no longer to prevail, then language would become homogeneous, and nation-ness might cease to exist, while for Foucault, under as yet unforeseeable circumstances, the ascendancy of language and the dissolution of 'man' might herald the advent of a new episteme.

Hobsbawm's discussion of nation-ness is compatible with Foucault's analysis of the Modern episteme in terms of three key issues: language, history, and identification. With regard to language, the connections that can be made between the shift from the cultural phase of nation-ness and social elitism to the political phase and social populism on the one hand, and Foucault's account of philology as involving a conception of language 'no longer linked to the knowing of things, but to men's freedom' 251 on the other, are similar to those made previously with regard to Anderson and Gellner. The emphasis here, then, will instead be on moving the argument forward through relating Hobsbawm's accounts of history and identification to Foucault's bipartite (and paradoxical) argument about temporality as an inherently fragmented yet linear 'causal series'. 252 If, for Foucault, the Modern episteme is 'essentially tied

250 Gellner (1983: 52).

251 Foucault (1970: 291).

252 Gutting (1989: 187).

to time', 253 making it possible 'to conceive of a great temporal current' 254 which is 'directed toward some sort of conclusion', 255 time is, nevertheless, simultaneously discontinuous: whereas, in the Classical episteme, 'representation was able...to subjugate time...to re-apprehend time in its entirety', 256 in the Modern episteme, time overflows the boundaries of representation, and the problem of 'man' being both founded and founding and of the origin receding into both the past and the future render continuity impossible. Here, Hobsbawm raises five main points which seem particularly relevant to Foucault's account: that nineteenth and early twentieth century nation-ness was conceived of in terms of unification and teleology; that later twentieth century nation-ness is connected to temporal discontinuity; that, in the Third World, it is only since decolonisation that 'the development of nationalism in the nineteenth century European sense of the term has occurred'; 257 that late twentieth century nationalism is a throwback to the unfinished business of the First World War, and a reaction to cultural change in societies which can no longer maintain organic continuity with their history; and that contemporary Western nation-ness is temporally and economically palimpsestic. On the one hand, Hobsbawm's point about unification and teleology can, of course, be related to Foucault's conception of time as 'a linear causal series', and suggests that the modern nation can only really exist within the trajectory of Modern temporality. On the other, his discussion of contemporary nation-ness as being connected to temporal discontinuity; as being a sign of a culture's failure to maintain an organic connection with its history, and as being temporally and economically palimpsestic, can be related to Foucault's conception of time as fragmented, suggesting that the modern nation is yet another symptom of the incoherence of the

253 Gutting (1989: 192).

254 Foucault (1970: 275).

255 Gutting (1989: 189).

256 Foucault (1970: 335).

257 Hobsbawm (1992: 153).

Modern episteme. What is particularly interesting about Hobsbawm's argument in relation to Foucault's, however, is the relationship it implies between Modern temporality, nation-ness, and capitalism. If 'nineteenth century' nationalism has only occurred in the Third World fairly recently, and if post-communist nationalism is a return to the unfinished business of the early twentieth century, then perhaps it is possible to adapt Gellner's point about the differential arrival times of industrialization in order to argue that particular stages of nation-ness develop in relation to the industrial, and therefore temporal, circumstances prevailing within a particular culture at any given moment. It is not, as both Anderson and Hobsbawm seem to argue, that the development of nation-ness is linked directly to particular eras, and that Third World and post-communist nationalisms are therefore inexplicably anomalous - there is nothing intrinsically 'nineteenth century' about the third phase of nationalism - rather, it is the arrival or re-arrival of capitalist industrialization in Third World and post-communist societies which engenders Modern temporality and therefore nation-ness or nationalism, and, in the case of some Western nations, the arrival of post-industrialism and a more fragmented, palimpsestic temporality which results in the development of a further variant. It is thus the differentiated arrival times of the various stages of modernity that account for the fact that different cultures experience different phases of nation-ness simultaneously.

Hobsbawm's discussion of identification can also be related to Foucault's dual analysis of Modern temporality. Here, it is useful to think of both nationalism and identification as functioning as "a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society": 258 identification can be considered, then, as operating not only at an external (political and often national) level, but also at an internal (psychological) one, the former being associated with linear, teleological time, and the latter with cyclical, fragmented time. On the one hand, Hobsbawm's arguments about the democratisation of

258 Hobsbawm (1992: 173).

politics, regular contact between individuals and the nation state and its agents, and the forging of community through the appropriation of 'common...places, practices, personages, memories, signs and symbols' 259 might all be ways in which societies attempt to address and analyse the social disintegration associated with the economics of capitalist industrialization occurring within linear, teleological time: identification with deliberately created external, political, collective phenomena re-creates a sense of community and maintains the grand narrative of the nation. On the other hand, however, Hobsbawm's points about the way in which membership of a historic state 'can act directly on the consciousness of a common people', 260 about identification as a multiple and shifting phenomenon, and about nationalism as a reaction to the disorientation associated with rapid modernisation, can all be seen as ways in which individuals deal with social disintegration at a personal, psychological level, and attempt to create and maintain themselves as unified and teleological subjects. In this instance, there might be a connection between identification, cyclical, fragmented time, and the individual's ability to offer him or herself 'a *representation* of the society in which...[economic]... activity occurs". 261

Foucault's analysis of Modern temporality can also be related to Hobsbawm's argument about national identification in a more complex sense, however. If, as argued above, cyclical time does not disappear during the process of epistemological change, but, like resemblance, is rather internalised in the mind of the subject, then we might ask precisely where cyclical temporality and resemblance actually 'go'. The emergence of 'man' and the unconscious at the same time as the development of linear, historical temporality offers us a useful clue. It is, of course, problematic to equate linear time and representation solely with the conscious mind, and

259 Hobsbawm (1992: 90).

260 Hobsbawm (1992: 75).

261 Gutting (1989: 209), my emphasis.

cyclical time and resemblance entirely with the unconscious, not least because there is no time in the unconscious, and because, as suggested by Foucault, resemblance and representation are in some senses inseparable. Nevertheless, the 'temporality' of the unconscious would surely be compatible with the kind of operation which Foucault describes in his analysis of the retreat and return of the origin, and if we think about the way in which the unconscious essentially operates through metaphor, then resemblance seems its natural ally. Perhaps, then, with the shift to the Modern episteme, linear temporality and representation become associated with the conscious mind, and cyclical temporality and resemblance become associated with the unconscious.

How, though, might this interpretation of Foucault sit with Hobsbawm's arguments about national identification? It certainly complicates his suggestion that a country's citizens become a community '[m]erely by dint of becoming "a people"', 262 and that 'membership of a historic...state present or past, can act directly on the consciousness of the common people'. 263 The process is clearly much more complex than that and, rather than seeing nation-ness as influencing consciousness in a cause and effect relationship, it might perhaps be more accurate to suggest that, within any particular culture, the concepts of 'the people', historicity, contemporary consciousness, and nationhood all emerge at about the same chronological moment. Nevertheless, my interpretation of Foucault's argument is compatible with Hobsbawm's in three key respects. First, Hobsbawm's suggestion that difference is a central factor in identification, and that identification is a multiple and shifting phenomenon which 'is neither linear nor necessarily at the expense of other elements of social consciousness', 264 can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that identification is largely an unconscious process. Secondly, Hobsbawm's conception of

262 Hobsbawm (1992: 90).

263 Hobsbawm (1992: 75).

264 Hobsbawm (1992: 130).

nationalism as a "substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society" 265 is compatible with the idea of a split in the Modern episteme between the unconscious and the conscious mind: perhaps the feeling that it is necessary to integrate society is symptomatic of the modern subject's desire for self-unification. Here, Hobsbawm's references to 'the force of sentiments which leads... "us" to...[have]... an...identity against the foreign and threatening "them"', 266 the 'attempts to erect barricades' of 'a disoriented generation hungry for new certitudes to replace the collapsing old ones', 267 to the 'anguish and disorientation which finds expression in...[the] hunger to belong', 268 and to 'strangers who, by their very alienness, are enemies', 269 might thus apply not only to the public and political world about which he writes, but also to the private, psychological world of the modern subject. Perhaps, then, the combination of our repeated encounters with strangers, resultant of massive 'international population movements', and 'the ultra-rapid, fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformation so characteristic of the third quarter of our century', 270 has a profound effect, by exacerbating our sense of fragmentation and disorientation, on our ability to perceive ourselves as unified subjects. Similarly, although there is not, as Hobsbawm implies, a direct connection between membership of a historic state and common consciousness, perhaps a pertinent and telling parallel can nevertheless be drawn between the retrospective reconstruction of local and regional histories into 'an all-national heritage' 271 and the constant reconfiguring and merging of the multiple and contradictory identity narratives of the individual to form a coherent sense of self. And finally, perhaps Hobsbawm's

265 Hobsbawm (1992: 173).

266 Hobsbawm (1992: 170).

267 Hobsbawm (1992: 170 and 172).

268 Hobsbawm (1992: 177).

269 Hobsbawm (1992: 174).

270 Hobsbawm (1990: 167).

271 Hobsbawm (1992: 90).

point that we are currently 'living through a curious combination of the technology of the late twentieth century, the free trade of the nineteenth, and the rebirth of the sort of interstitial centres characteristic of world trade in the Middle Ages', 272 implies not only a new conception of the nation, but also the advent of a new episteme and new structure of the subject.

Overall, then, what Hobsbawm's argument allows for is a separation of national identification into its component stages and a questioning of the generalisability of identification across epistemes. Although they do not necessarily occur in this order (and may in some cases occur simultaneously), the main stages involved in the creation of national identity, his argument implies, are the emergence of the nation, the establishment of a connection between nation and state (a stage which in some cases does not take place), and the development of the individual subject's identification with that nation/state. Because Hobsbawm's argument allows for the theoretical separation of these three stages, the key issue it raises when considered in conjunction with Foucault's account of Modern temporality is whether identification as we know it today has always existed, or whether it is a relatively recent phenomenon. We might ask, then, what the relationship is between identification and the structure of the Modern subject and whether, during previous epistemes, when the subject might have been structured differently, identification operated in the same way, or even, in the sense that we think of it today, whether it existed at all. Similarly, we might ask whether identification would continue to exist if, in a potential future episteme, the structure of the subject were to differ from that of its contemporary equivalent.

Smith's understanding of nation-ness can be linked to Foucault's analysis of the Modern episteme via four main questions: how culture and the subject become linked, what the bonds are between nation, history, territory, myth, memory, the family, and

272 Hobsbawm (1990: 174 - 175).

death, how the development of nationalism in different places at different times can be accounted for, and what the future of nationalism might be.

Concerning the connection between culture and the subject, Smith's puzzlement at the relationship between 'the socio-political and the cultural-psychological' 273 can be resolved by Foucault's point about the individual subject and his/her culture being linked by the signifying chain. Although Foucault's argument centres around a comparison between language, 'the structure proper to individual experience', and the 'social structures' of a culture in terms of their shared paradigmatic nature, his suggestion that it is the signifying chain which is the common point at which individual subjects and their cultures 'intersect at right angles' 274 provides a solution to Smith's dilemma. If the perceived relationship between language and the world changes with (or is indeed constitutive of) the advent of new epistemes, and if, as I'll be discussing in the next chapter, this is related, as Foucault implies, to a change in the structure of the sign, then perhaps the Lacanian signifying chain (and with it the unconscious and identification) can only come fully into existence in the Modern episteme.

With regard to the bonds between the nation, history and territory, Smith's suggestion that the nation served as 'a time-space framework to order chaos and render the universe meaningful' 275 might better be thought of in terms of the nation being a manifestation of a change in the way in which time and space were understood. Concerning the bonds between the nation, myth and memory, it is perhaps worth reframing both Smith's discussion of myths and Foucault's discussion of literature in terms of narrative, and thinking about them within a psychoanalytic context. Smith's point about memories of ancient national historical events is clearly

273 Smith (1991: 69 - 70).

274 Foucault (1970: 380).

275 Smith (1991: 78).

based on a premise which is metaphorical rather than actual: we do not, of course, 'remember' events from our nation's distant past, but rather, just as we 'recall' some events from our childhoods from the stories we have been told about them, so too, we 'remember' national historical events which pre-date our own existence from the learned collective narratives which have been related to us. If we think of Foucault's argument about literature in terms of narrative, then we can begin to make connections between the shift from resemblance to representation, what Brooks sees as the rapid foregrounding of narrative as 'a dominant mode of representation and explanation' at the beginning of the modern era, 276 and Foucault's analysis of the emergence of 'man' and the unconscious, all of which happen at about the same time. Narrative, then, like the signifying chain, becomes a linchpin between culture and the subject. If this is the case, it is not surprising that there is a similarity between the way in which myths refer 'to past events' but nevertheless serve 'present purposes and/or future goals', 277 and the way in which, through projection, individual subjects use personal narrative schemata to understand and interpret their current relationships and experiences. Nor is it surprising that there is a similarity between the way in which traumatic historical events disrupt the continuity of national identity narratives, and the way in which traumatic personal events disturb subjective identity narratives. 278 How, though, are these narratives connected to the family and mortality? At a simple level, as Smith suggests, such narratives provide a sense of trans-generational continuity, but, as I shall argue in the next chapter, a more complex set of links also exists which is concerned not so much with the content of narratives, as with their very *raison d'être*. Our fundamental family relationships are, of course, intertwined with our earliest

276 Brooks (1984: xii).

277 Smith (1991: 19).

278 Of course, at both the cultural and subjective level, identity myths are also subject to constant, everyday revision and, whether as a result of trauma or more mundane 'rewriting', are usually applied retrospectively, with the result that all previous events and experiences are reinterpreted from the latest contemporary viewpoint.

experiences of language and intimations of mortality. At the paradigmatic level of language, as Bowie explains, the subject, for Lacan, comes into being not only in relation to the mother and the name of the father, but also "'barred" by the signifier and thereby injected with a sense of death', 279 such that '[d]eath is endemic to the signifying chain'. 280 At the syntagmatic level of language, as Brooks suggests, narrative is essentially an attempt to defer the moment of mortality. 281 What I'll be arguing in the next chapter is that an understanding of the relationship between language and the world based on resemblance means that the role of the signifying chain and narrative on the formation, structure and operation of the subject and the unconscious is different from that constituted by an understanding of the relationship between language and the world based on representation. Another way of putting this would be to say that the signifying chain and narrative probably operate differently in relation to the subject of the Renaissance episteme from the way in which they functioned in relation to the subject of the Classical and Modern epistemes.

With regard to the development of nationalism in different places at different times, Smith's account is essentially modular in nature, but his questioning of the diffusionist model, his analysis of the relationship between the various waves of ethnic nationalisms, and some elements of his argument about the future of nationalism are nevertheless in accordance with Foucault's epistemological approach. Although he does not really provide an answer to the problem of why different groups adopt nationalism at different historical moments, Smith's recognition that the "'diffusion of ideas" thesis deals with only a part of the explanation of the rise of nationalism', and that 'African, Latin American and Asian intelligentsias were receptive to European romantic and nationalist

279 Bowie (1991: 162).

280 Bowie (1991: 202).

281 Brooks (1984: 22).

influences at particular junctures' 282 is compatible with Foucault's argument in as much as it allows for differences in the epistemological 'state of readiness' of various cultures to 'receive' or 'produce' nationalism. Similarly, although one might wish to question the 'infection' metaphor of Smith's statement that the second wave of nationalism has 'swept through much of Western Europe, reaching Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union' - 283 and indeed his inclusion of recent Central and Eastern European nationalisms in the second rather than the first wave - his argument regarding 'kinship' between the various 'waves' of ethnic nationalism does at least acknowledge that nationalisms which seek 'autonomy or secession from relatively new states' 284 are distinct from those which take place 'in well-established states enjoying a generally higher standard of living'. 285 Smith's subsequent argument that dependency models 'fail to explain the incidence and timing of recent ethno-nationalisms' because industrialization 'often long antedated the rise of such movements', and that there is therefore 'no correlation between degrees of ethno-nationalism and economic factors of any kind' 286 seems, rather oddly, to assume, however, that all states are locked into a similar phase of industrialization. Perhaps it is the case that states currently entering the first wave of nationalism are usually moving from an agricultural to an industrial, capitalist economy, and that those entering the second wave are either moving rapidly from a semi-industrial, semi-agricultural communist economy to a capitalist, industrial economy, or are moving equally rapidly from a capitalist, industrial economy to a post-industrial, post-modern economy. This would again be compatible with the connection which Foucault makes between the economic and the epistemological: different waves of nationalism, then, might occur in different places at

282 Smith (1991: 110).

283 Smith (1991: 125).

284 Smith (1991: 133).

285 Smith (1991: 139).

286 Smith (1991: 125).

different times because economic conditions, and a culture's understanding of time, space, and language, make the conception of various forms of nationalism both possible and acceptable.

Concerning the future of nationalism, Smith's argument again raises interesting points regarding identification, time, place and memory, which can usefully be considered in Foucauldian terms. The point he makes about the global culture of post-industrial society lacking 'any emotional commitment to what is signified', 287 and requiring 'new and wider forms of political association and different types of cultural community' if it is not to 'be only a memory-less construct' or to 'break up into its constituent national elements', 288 is open to challenge on three counts. The first is whether the conception of space and time in the great imperial cultures of the past was the same as it is in the Modern episteme; the second whether post-industrial culture really does draw its contents 'from revivals of earlier folk or national motifs and styles, torn from their original contexts'; 289 and the third whether the subject's relationship to time, place, and memory will remain the same in post-modern societies. As I have previously argued, the understanding of time and space in the great imperial cultures of the past was most probably radically different from their conception in the Modern episteme; it already seems to be the case that post-industrial global culture is developing forms which, relatively speaking, are temporally and spatially non-specific; and it is arguable that a gradual transition to a new episteme - in which our understanding of time, space and language might be radically different again - is already underway. Perhaps it is the case that the assertion of difference and second wave of ethnic nationalism currently manifesting themselves in some post-industrial societies represent an intensification of nationalism prior to its rapid demise - cultural parallels, if you like, to the strengthening of the ego when

287 Smith (1991: 158).

288 Smith (1991: 159 and 160).

289 Smith (1991: 157).

under attack or to the increased resistance which occurs prior to the resolution of a specific psychological complex in the individual subject. Although it is doubtless true that 'ethnic and national discourses and their texts set limits to human imaginative construction' because 'ethno-histories have furnished the very languages and cultures in which collective and individual selves and their discourses have been formed', 290 it is also the case that 'human imaginative construction' creates 'ethnic and national discourses', and that if the structure of the human subject changes, then so too will the types of discourses and texts that can be produced. If this is so, it might not be that different forms of political association and cultural community will need to develop prior to the decline of nationalism, but rather that different epistemological conditions might eventually lead to subjects for whom cultural memory and cultural history (in other words, cultural narratives and identification with them) are much less important. Although Smith argues that 'the nation...will continue to provide humanity with its fundamental cultural and political identities' until the needs currently met by national identity 'are fulfilled through other kinds of identification', 291 it may be that a new episteme will not only engender different needs, but might also be accompanied by an eventual change in the structure of the subject, such that identification will either work differently or not at all. Perhaps the withdrawal of 'need and desire...towards the subjective sphere' 292 characteristic of the Modern episteme will intensify, as will the extent to which language becomes inseparable from 'the whole backwash of history', 293 prioritising the language of the individual over that of a shared culture. This is not to say that nationalism will suddenly disappear - because for that to happen all cultures would presumably need to enter a post-modern episteme simultaneously - but rather that its importance in the various

290 Smith (1991: 160).

291 Smith (1991: 177).

292 Foucault (1970: 257).

293 Foucault (1970: 315).

cultures of the world might continue to vary depending on their respective epistemological statuses.

As with the previous epistemes, I would now like to summarise the argument regarding the relationship between nation-ness and the Modern episteme by considering the issues of time, space, language and subjectivity. It seems likely that, with the onset of industrialization, it was historical, linear, teleological time which became dominant in the Modern episteme, with the fragmented, cyclical time of the Renaissance episteme only continuing to exist in a vestigial and repressed form. Given Foucault's argument that a new understanding of time in the Classical episteme broke up Classical space, it also seems likely that the emergence of Modern temporality was paralleled by the advent of a Modern conception of space. Now that time overflowed the boundaries of representation and the origin could no longer be theoretically conceptualised, things were considered to exist 'in' dynamic, historical time; and precisely because the origin was inconceivable, its retreat and return meant that national histories were thought of as moving both 'up' and 'down' time - as stretching back infinitely into the past and forwards into the future. Presumably, ideal tabular space was equally inconceivable, such that things were also thought of as existing 'in' real geographical space and a new importance was accorded to the precise delineation of physical, national territories. There was, and is, nothing peculiarly 'nineteenth century' about all this: it therefore occurs in Third World countries at a much later date, when capitalist industrialization begins to have an impact on otherwise rural, agricultural economies, and is continuing to occur in post-communist states moving from semi-agricultural, semi-industrial economies to capitalist, industrial (and sometimes post-industrial) economies. As was the case in nineteenth-century Europe, the impact of early industrialization or reindustrialization produces particularly virulent forms of nationalism. The nation as we know it today, then, can only exist within the conditions of the Modern episteme, but at the same time, a new phase of nation-ness is beginning to develop in certain post-industrial nations which,

arguably, are beginning to move into a new episteme which might well involve the resurgence of the repressed forms of cyclical time and universal space mentioned above. It seems possible that, in these instances, nationalism is intensifying prior to its rapid demise, but it might also be the case that, if the next episteme is more chaotic, then such nationalism will continue to intensify.

Language clearly also plays a pivotal role in the functioning of nation-ness during the Modern episteme. A resemblance-based way of thinking about the relationship between language and the world gets further repressed, leading not only to the creation of 'man' and the unconscious, but also to amnesias and the production of narratives. Because language is no longer linked to the 'representation of things' but to the 'temporary fixing of actions', it is associated with the popular rather than the elitist. The simultaneous decline of religion and foregrounding of death means that language also plays a role in providing an apparent solution to the problem of mortality, both in terms of the individual sign carrying a variety of historically and traditionally determined meanings, and in terms of narratives being passed down from generation to generation. Although clearly not his primary intention in so doing, then, Foucault's discussion of the signifying chain thus implies a means by which it might be possible to explain how individuals internalise the cultures to which they belong. 294

With regard to subjectivity, phenomena previously thought of as occurring in the physical world are thought of in the Modern episteme as taking place within human consciousness, which has itself become further divided into the conscious mind and the unconscious. Although the unconscious must have existed at least to a certain extent prior to the Modern episteme, perhaps in the Renaissance episteme most of what is now considered to be 'unconscious' was externally attributed. If the conscious mind works largely in terms of Modern conceptions of time, space, and

294 Foucault (1970: 380).

language (producing, for example, unified and teleological narratives of the self, and rational relationships between words and things), then perhaps the unconscious still operates in cyclical, universal terms, which involve multiple, irrational relationships between words and things. Just as the production of individual identity narratives involves the remembering and forgetting of certain key events and their retrospective reinterpretation, and just as traumatic events can lead to their disruption, so the same is true of national narratives. It is thus because of the shift from resemblance to representation during the transition from the Renaissance to the Modern epistemes that the structure of the human subject changes, and that the process of identification as we currently understand it becomes possible, and perhaps necessary, as a means by which subjects can offer themselves unified self-representations.

As far as the future of nation-ness is concerned, it seems likely that, if a new episteme develops - presumably involving a change in methods of agricultural production, in conceptions of space and time, in the perceived relationship between language and the world, in the structure of the sign, in the operation of the signifying chain, narratives and identification, and in the structure of the subject - then nation-ness will operate differently or, possibly, not at all. If time and space are conceptualised differently, then it may not be possible or desirable to think the nation as a geographical space, while a further withdrawal of language towards the subjective sphere might mean greater importance being accorded to the individual, and less to the collective and the cultural. Perhaps, too, identification will cease to operate in the way that we understand it today, or the needs that identification currently fulfils will no longer matter. If this occurs, however, it is likely to do so at different rates in different geographical locations: nation-ness is not modular, but dependent on specific cultures' prevailing epistemes.

Chapter Seven

*For the benefit of the ego or its detriment, drives, whether life drives or death drives, serve to correlate that 'not yet' ego with an object in order to establish both of them. Such a process, while dichotomous (inside/outside, ego/not ego) and repetitive, has nevertheless something centripetal to it: it aims to settle the ego as center of a solar system of objects. If, by dint of coming back towards the center, the drive's motion should eventually become centrifugal, hence fasten on the Other and come into being as sign so as to produce meaning - that is, literally speaking, exorbitant.*¹

The Micro-Political Approach

Thus far, my aim has been to establish a connection between the three main phases of the macro-political approach to nation-ness and Foucault's account of the history of knowledge, so as to explain the development of the nation epistemologically. In this chapter, I want first briefly to consider Bhabha and Kristeva's psychoanalytic approaches to the relationship between nation-ness and the subject and to explain their basis in Lacanian theory, and then to link up my Foucauldian model of the development of nation-ness to this Lacanian model of national identity in order to explain why identification with the nation is a phenomenon which can only occur in the Modern episteme.

Bhabha

Bhabha's argument in *Nation and Narration* considers national narratives and their temporalities, and begins to explore the relationship between the public and the private by drawing parallels between the nation, the subject, and the linguistic sign. Bhabha is critical of Anderson's suggestion that the time of the nation is homogeneous and empty, rejecting it as a misinterpretation of Benjamin, an oversimplification of the relationship between

¹ Kristeva (1982: 14).

language and 'reality', and as a substitution of a rigid and repressive teleology for the much more flexible temporality of signification.² Instead, he analyses the time of national narration in terms of two distinct but inter-related temporalities: the 'pedagogical', which is connected with 'the process of identity constituted by historical sedimentation', and the 'performative', which is to do with 'the loss of identity in the signifying process of cultural identification'.³ Roughly speaking, then, Bhabha sees the performative as a process by which, and temporality in which, today's narratives are incessantly and heterogeneously generated within the nation in fluid form, and the pedagogical as a process by which, and temporality in which, they gradually but selectively solidify into nationally shared narratives through a kind of inspissation. He goes on to argue that there are basically two ways in which the performative and the pedagogical interact. The first is a process in which the 'scraps, patches, and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a national culture',⁴ (what we might otherwise call transforming the quotidian into the quotable), and here, Bhabha argues that there is a 'continual displacement' of the nation's 'irredeemably plural modern space, bounded by different, even hostile nations':

into a signifying space that is archaic and mythical, paradoxically representing the nation's modern territoriality, in the patriotic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism. Quite simply, the difference of space returns as the Sameness of time, turning Territory into Tradition, turning the People into One.⁵

² Bhabha (1990: 308 - 310).

³ Bhabha (1990: 304).

⁴ Bhabha (1990: 297).

⁵ Bhabha (1990: 300).

The second sort of interaction is a process in which the pedagogical influences the performative. Here, Bhabha proposes that 'the contemporaneity of the national present' is always haunted by 'the distracting presence of another temporality', and that 'the pedagogical presence of modernity - the Will to be a nation - introduces into the enunciative present of the nation a differential and iterative time of reinscription'.⁶ 'Does the will to nationhood circulate in the same temporality as the desire of the daily plebiscite?' he asks, or 'Could it be that the iterative plebiscite decentres the totalizing pedagogy of the will?'.⁷ It is this 'ghostly intimation of simultaneity across homogeneous empty time',⁸ in which 'the archaic emerges in the midst or margins of modernity', Bhabha concludes, that results in a form of repetition which defies the linearity of modern temporality, and in a questioning of 'the homogeneous and horizontal view familiarly associated with it'.⁹

With regard to connections between the public and the private, Bhabha draws on Jameson to argue that "'the telling of the individual story and the individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling of the collectivity itself'".¹⁰ He goes on to suggest three main sets of parallels between the nation, the subject, and the linguistic sign: first, that just as the subject and the sign are internally split, so too is the nation, and just as the subject and the sign possess unstable identities because they are involved in a process of constant change, so too the nation's identity is unstable and shifting; secondly, that just as the subject only possesses an identity in relation to other subjects, and signs can only mean in relation to other signs, so too the nation exists only in relation to other nations; and thirdly, albeit indirectly, that just as

⁶ Bhabha (1990: 310).

⁷ Bhabha (1990: 310).

⁸ Bhabha (1990: 309).

⁹ Bhabha (1990: 295).

¹⁰ Bhabha (1990: 292).

the subject's identity and the sign's meaning are based on lack, so too the identity of the nation is essentially founded on absence. ¹¹

What is useful about Bhabha's argument is that it begins to hint at a psychoanalytic, and more specifically Lacanian, model for exploring the ways in which subjects identify with nations. His account of the non-linear temporalities of national narratives, in which 'the deeply repressed past initiates a strategy of repetition that disturbs the sociological totalities within which we recognize the modernity of the national culture' is reminiscent of the more complex relationships between the narratives of past and present of the individual subject, ¹² while the parallels he draws between nation, subject, and sign clearly suggest a Lacanian model of subjectivity. ¹³

What is problematic about Bhabha's account is that he develops from Kristeva's 'Women's Time' a binary rather than a ternary conception of the temporality of national narratives, ¹⁴ and that, by eliding the nation, the subject, and the sign and discussing the nation as if it *were* a psychoanalytic subject or a linguistic sign, he fails to provide a detailed explanation of how the subject becomes interpellated into the national culture. Whereas Kristeva identifies a linear temporality which is 'time as project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding', a monumental temporality which is 'all-encompassing and infinite like imaginary space', and a cyclical time which is associated with 'gestation, [and] the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm', ¹⁵ in referring to 'a double temporality: the process of identity constituted by historical sedimentation (the pedagogical); and the loss of identity in the

¹¹ Cf., for example, Bhabha (1990: 298, 303), (1990: 301, 312 - 313), (1990: 292, 315 - 316).

¹² Bhabha (1990: 304).

¹³ Cf. Bowie (1991: 140 - 141) and Lapsley and Westlake (1988: 71 - 72).

¹⁴ Kristeva in Moi (1986).

¹⁵ Kristeva in Moi (1986: 191 - 192).

signifying process of cultural identification (the performative)', Bhabha appears to envisage only two temporalities. ¹⁶ What Kristeva refers to as 'the *parallel* existence of all three [temporalities]', then, ¹⁷ Bhabha reduces to an eternal dual between the performative and the pedagogical, in which 'a powerful repository of cultural knowledge...*erases* the rationalist and progressivist logics of the "canonical" nation'. ¹⁸ Although these criticisms of Bhabha's interpretation of Kristeva may seem pedantic, they are significant because it is precisely Bhabha's excision of cyclical temporality which prevents him from analysing some of the more complex ways in which the performative and the pedagogical might interact. Thus, although Bhabha discusses the transformation of the performative into the pedagogical and the influence of the pedagogical on the performative, he does not seem to allow for the possibility of retroaction, in which 'the newly produced past obliterates its predecessors', producing 'a backward-looking hope, a wish to create...a past that can be lived with'. ¹⁹ Meanwhile, his elision of sign, subject, and nation in phrases such as 'the narcissistic neuroses of the national discourse' and the 'splitting of the people' ²⁰ result not in a precise analysis of the means by which the subject acquires a national identity, but only in the suggestion that what 'interpellates a growing circle of national subjects' is 'the very act of the narrative performance'. ²¹ Bhabha, then, never really explains how this process occurs.

¹⁶ Bhabha (1990: 304).

¹⁷ Kristeva in Moi (1986: 209).

¹⁸ Bhabha (1990: 303), my emphasis.

¹⁹ Bowie (1991: 182).

²⁰ Bhabha (1990: 300 and 301).

²¹ Bhabha (1990: 297).

Kristeva

If Bhabha implies only some general means by which nation, subject, and sign might be connected through narrative, Kristeva draws more precise parallels between subject and nation whilst nevertheless recognising them as separate entities, and begins to hint at some of the ways in which the subject might become attached to the nation in specific, psychoanalytic terms. Proposing that nation-ness is one of the arenas in which the individual subject can potentially play out his or her own psychological conflicts, she maps the ways in which the infant develops and maintains a sense of identity separate from that of its mother onto the ways in which national subjects develop and maintain a sense of national identity distinct from those of neighbouring nations.

Initially, Kristeva draws only broad correlations between infant and national subject, stating that the 'contemporary individual' is 'jealous of his [sic] difference' which is 'not only national and ethical but essentially subjective',²² and implying a general connection between individual emotional confusion and a retreat into the apparent security of the collective when she argues that:

The values crisis and the fragmentation of individuals have reached the point where we no longer know what we are and take shelter, to preserve a token of personality, under the most massive, regressive common denominators...it is a rare person who does not invoke a primal shelter to compensate for personal disarray.²³

She goes on to link nation-ness and the split subject, suggesting that 'the core of the speaking being...is actually made up of a splitting, a clash between our symbolic identity having strong brotherly

²² Kristeva (1991: 2).

²³ Kristeva (1993: 2).

demands and our imaginary identity rooted in the original cell (family, race, biology)', but unlike Bhabha, she acknowledges them as separate phenomena, arguing that the 'problem that develops on account of national...conflicts...*touches* upon the fragile boundary that defines civilization and humankind'.²⁴ Although Kristeva is at pains to point out that the connection between individual and collective identity is not a straight-forward one, however, she nevertheless clearly considers unconscious factors to be central to both:

The complex relationships between cause and effect that govern social groups obviously do not coincide with the laws of the unconscious regarding a subject, but these unconscious determinations remain a constituent part, an essential one, of social and therefore national dynamics...[and] only a thorough investigation of our remarkable relationship with both the *other* and *strangeness within ourselves* can lead people to give up hunting for the scapegoat outside their group.²⁵

What Kristeva establishes, then, is that the psychoanalytic processes involved in the creation of personal identity are separate from, but provide the basis of, those involved in the formation of its national equivalent.

When it comes to a more detailed analysis of the connection between subjective and national identity, Kristeva briefly considers narcissism, identification, rejection, and abjection. She draws a parallel between the self-image that the infant obtains from its mother (and, through identification, develops into its sense of self), and the national image, suggesting that national pride 'is comparable, from a psychological standpoint, to the *good narcissistic image* that the child gets from its mother and proceeds,

²⁴ Kristeva (1993: 4), my emphasis.

²⁵ Kristeva (1993: 50 - 51), Kristeva's emphasis.

through the intersecting play of identification demands emanating from both parents, to elaborate into an ego ideal'.²⁶ Albeit refusing to articulate its full implications, she also plays with the familiar nation-as-parent metaphor, arguing that:

The transitional object - any child's indispensable fetish, which condenses its own evolving image with that of its mother from whom it is beginning to grow away - constitutes that area of play, freedom, and creation that guarantees our access to speech, desires, and knowledge. There are mothers (as well as 'motherlands' and 'fatherlands') who prevent the creation of a transitional object; there are children who are unable to use it.²⁷

There is also, however, the 'transitional nation' which 'offers its identifying (therefore reassuring) space, as transitive as it is transitory (therefore open, uninhibiting, and creative), for the benefit of contemporary subjects'.²⁸ Kristeva goes on to suggest that nation-ness is linked to the fact that the otherness of the foreigner always has the potential to arouse long forgotten memories of the psychological battles each of us fought so as to develop an individual identity. Thus 'the exclusion of "others"' is linked to the hatred whereby 'the human child differentiates itself from its mother through a rejection affect, through the scream of anger and hatred that accompanies it, and through the "no" sign as prototype of language and of all symbolism'.²⁹ Here, she also makes a useful connection between nationalism and exile which makes it possible to relate her more extensive analysis of the latter to questions of nation-ness.

²⁶ Kristeva (1993: 52), Kristeva's emphasis.,

²⁷ Kristeva (1993: 41 - 42).

²⁸ Kristeva (1993: 42).

²⁹ Kristeva (1993: 50 and 29 - 30).

Kristeva argues that exile and nationalism are essentially trajectories of the same emotional state because, as 'an expression of hatred the glorification of origins...finds its matching opposite in the hatred of origins'.³⁰ By hating others, nationalists engage in an attempt to maintain a sense of self-identity and to hold psychological conflicts at bay,³¹ while by hating their origins, exiles engage in an attempt to become foreigners so as to feel emotionally 'at home' in a familiarly hostile environment.³² The choice to go into exile, Kristeva proposes, is closely connected to early emotional experience, in as much as:

A secret wound, often unknown to himself, [sic] drives the foreigner to wandering...As far back as his memory can reach, it is delightfully bruised: misunderstood by a loved yet absent-minded, discreet, or worried mother, the exile is a stranger to his mother.³³

The subject's reaction to this experience, she argues, is essentially a defensive one, which causes him/her to be not only geographically, but also emotionally, distant - 'the foreigner's aloofness is only the resistance with which he [sic] succeeds in fighting his matricidal anguish' - and therefore to express a longing for emotional security in spatial terms:³⁴

Riveted to an elsewhere as certain as it is inaccessible, the foreigner is ready to flee. No obstacle stops him, [sic] and all suffering, all insults, all rejections are indifferent to him as he seeks that invisible and promised territory, that country that

³⁰ Kristeva (1993: 3).

³¹ Kristeva (1993: 3).

³² Kristeva (1991: 13 - 14).

³³ Kristeva (1991: 5).

³⁴ Kristeva (1991: 9).

does not exist but that he bears in his dreams, and that must indeed be called a beyond. ³⁵

The exile's quest, then, is not so much a geographical as a temporal one, representing a futile attempt to return to and rewrite the past, and suggesting a potential link between emotional events occurring in historical time and their expression in terms of contemporary space. 'We all know the foreigner who survives with a tearful face turned toward the lost homeland', Kristeva concludes:

Melancholy lover of a vanished space, he [sic] cannot, in fact, get over...having abandoned a period of time. The lost paradise is a mirage of the past that he will never be able to recover...the foreigner is a dreamer making love with absence... ³⁶

The exile is thus haunted by abjection because:

Instead of sounding himself [sic] as to his 'being', he does so concerning his place: 'Where am I ?' instead of 'Who am I ?' ...The abject from which he does not cease separating is for him, in short, a *land of oblivion* that is constantly remembered. ³⁷

The link that Kristeva establishes between nation-ness and the psychological conflicts of the individual subject and between exile and nationalism, then, suggest that nation-ness can be considered in parallel with the complex processes of the subject's individuation. Like Bhabha, Kristeva draws on a broadly Lacanian model, but the more precise connections that she makes suggest the centrality to the constitution of national identity of identification, narcissism and rejection.

³⁵ Kristeva (1991: 5).

³⁶ Kristeva (1991: 9 - 10).

³⁷ Kristeva (1982: 8 - 9), Kristeva's emphasis.

Lacanian identification

If Bhabha and Kristeva hint at a Lacanian model of subjectivity as a means of understanding national identity, then what would such a model look like, and how would it articulate with a Foucauldian explanation of the development of nation-ness to explain why national identity is a Modern phenomenon? In order to answer these questions, we need briefly to consider how identification works for the Lacanian subject, and how the structure of the sign has changed historically.

In Lacanian theory, the ability to identify is something which is acquired only gradually, beginning in the mirror phase, and continuing to develop with entry into the Symbolic. In the mirror phase, the 'child's relationship with the mother' is initially 'fusional, dual and immediate', and 'dominated by the desire to lose self in other'.³⁸ When the infant sees itself in a mirror and identifies with its own image or identifies with the body of another subject by seeing 'its behaviour reflected in the imitative gestures of an adult or another child',³⁹ however, it gains a 'newly acquired awareness of boundaries' and 'is then able to develop a sense of its own separate identity'.⁴⁰ This initial process of identification is vitally important to the subject's ongoing development because, as Bowie points out:

The identification of oneself with another being is the very process by which a continuing sense of selfhood becomes possible, and it is from successive assimilations of other people's attributes that what is familiarly called the ego or the personality is constructed.⁴¹

³⁸ Turkle (1979: 56).

³⁹ Bowie (1991: 21).

⁴⁰ Lapsley and Westlake (1988: 68).

⁴¹ Bowie (1991: 30 - 31).

Nevertheless, because it is based on a delusional relationship of self-*mis*-recognition, in as much as the child "can only conceptualise itself when it is mirrored back to itself from the position of another's desire", ⁴² identification is tainted with the sacrificial suicide of narcissism:

The original act of identification is the original narcissistic declaration too; into the very constitution of the ego its destruction is already woven... ⁴³

On entry into the Symbolic, the 'child's desire to be its mother's desire gives way to an identification with the father' through a process of repression which Lacan translates 'into linguistic terms as a process of metaphor formation'. ⁴⁴ 'One signifier (father's name)' thus 'comes to substitute for another (desire for the mother and desire to be the object of her desire)', a process which Turkle explains by comparing this psychoanalytic, paternal metaphor with a non-psychoanalytic equivalent. ⁴⁵ Here, she uses the classical Lacanian S/s notation for the relationship between signifier and signified, where 'S is the signifier and s...the signified and the line between them (the "bar") stands for the relationship of signification'. ⁴⁶ The 'word combination "brave man"', Turkle argues:

...is a signifier (S) for the fact that someone is a brave man (s). When we introduce the word 'lion' as a metaphor, the new signifier 'lion' (S') stands in place of the statement 'brave man' (the former signifier) and also signifies being a brave man

⁴² Lapsley and Westlake (1988: 69).

⁴³ Bowie (1991: 34).

⁴⁴ Turkle (1979: 56).

⁴⁵ Turkle (1979: 56).

⁴⁶ Turkle (1979: 252).

(the original signified). 'Lion' now signifies 'brave man' (just as 'father's name' now signifies 'desire for mother') but the original signifier has been pushed down to a deeper level...When we apply this reasoning to the origin of the paternal metaphor during the Oedipal crisis, 'pushing a signifier down to a deeper level' (below the bar of signification) means its repression into the unconscious. ⁴⁷

'In the course of a lifetime', then, 'the individual builds up' many such 'chains of signification', 'always substituting new terms for old and always increasing the distance between the signifier that is most accessible and visible, and all those that are invisible and unconscious'. ⁴⁸ Whereas, in the mirror phase, there is thus 'a one-to-one correspondence between things and how they are called', in the Symbolic, the 'symbol has intervened' and the 'word is no longer the thing'. ⁴⁹

As Bowie points out, the mirror phase and entry into the Symbolic are not only temporally specific phases in the infant's development, but also moments which stay with the subject throughout his or her life: what Lacan drew attention to as an important Freudian theme, then, was 'time skewed and syncopated by the traumatic event'. ⁵⁰ For Lacan as for Freud, it is not just that 'patterns of thinking laid down in childhood return to haunt and thwart the adult individual', ⁵¹ in such a way that the past can influence the present; additionally, in psychoanalytic time, the present has the ability to change the past:

⁴⁷ Turkle (1979: 252); the father's name is, of course, also the father's 'No !' to the child's desire to be what the mother desires, and a homonym in French.

⁴⁸ Turkle (1979: 56).

⁴⁹ Turkle (1979: 57).

⁵⁰ Bowie (1991: 180).

⁵¹ Bowie (1991: 74).

It is not...the case that the individual is simply rewriting the history of selected earlier epochs of his [sic] life, and keeping each successive version in a cumulative mental archive...at each moment of rewriting, the newly produced past obliterates its predecessors. ⁵²

When Lacan puns on the *stade du miroir* as both a 'stage' and a 'stadium', then, he does not do so merely for the sake of linguistic bravado, but rather because:

The mirror stage (*stade du miroir*) is not a mere epoch in the history of the individual, but a stadium (*stade*) in which the battle of the human subject is permanently being waged. ⁵³

There is also a temporal element to the Symbolic, in as much as 'death is intrinsic to it', because "'the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing, and this death constitutes in the subject the eternalization of his [sic] desire'. ⁵⁴ Death is thus 'endemic to the signifying chain', ⁵⁵ a situation best explained by Bowie when he says that:

The subject comes into being 'barred' by the signifier and thereby injected with a sense of death...The taste for death is not something that the subject acquires through experience, as one might say, or reaches towards as a last despairing manner of delectation, for it has been there from the start as a perilous gift from the signifier, and one that cannot be refused. The drive, as it circles round the excavated centre of being, is pulled outwards towards the objects that promise

⁵² Bowie (1991: 181 - 182).

⁵³ Bowie (1991: 21).

⁵⁴ Bowie (1991: 100).

⁵⁵ Bowie (1991: 202).

gratification, but inwards too towards the completest form of a loss that it already knows. ⁵⁶

Put another way, the experience of lack into which the child is born, and which it goes through again and again in the mirror phase and during its entry into language and the Symbolic, not only results in a desire to find objects which will (it thinks) allow it to regain a sense of plenitude, but also in a desire to experience the ultimate loss, mortality.

The Lacanian model of identification, then, is closely associated with both language and death, and involves a fluid and non-linear understanding of temporality. The initial structures of identification are laid down in the mirror phase (which, with its 'one-to-one correlation between things and how they are called' is obviously reminiscent of Renaissance resemblance), while subsequent identification processes occur with entry to the Symbolic (where the 'word is no longer the thing', and is thus reminiscent of Classical representation). Because this transition, and signification itself, are associated with loss, entry to the Symbolic and the signifying chain are pervaded by death, while the repetition of these identificatory processes throughout the life of the subject are connected to a palimpsestic and retroactive temporality.

Lacanian identification and the Foucauldian sign

From the above account, it is clear that the signifying chain through which identification operates is dependent on a binary structure of the sign. What implications, then, does this have for the operation of identification in Foucault's three epistemes? In the Renaissance, he argues, the sign comprised 'three quite distinct elements':

⁵⁶ Bowie (1991: 162 - 163).

...that which was marked, that which did the marking, and that which made it possible to see in the first the mark of the second; and this last element was, of course, resemblance: the sign provided a mark exactly in so far as it was 'almost the same thing' as that which it designated. ⁵⁷

Presumably, then, under these conditions, the processes of substitution in the formation of the signifying chain which Turkle outlines could not have taken place in the same way. With the advent of the Classical episteme, 'this unitary and triple system... disappears...and is replaced by a strictly binary organization'. ⁵⁸ What happens, Foucault suggests, is that the sign in the Classical episteme 'must represent', but 'that representation, in turn, must also be represented within it':

The signifying idea becomes double, since superimposed upon the idea that is replacing another there is also the idea of its representative power. This appears to give us three terms: the idea signified, the idea signifying, and, within this second term, the idea of its role as representation. ⁵⁹

'What we are faced with here', however, he continues, is not 'a surreptitious return to a ternary system, but rather an inevitable displacement within the two-term figure, which moves backward in relation to itself and comes to reside entirely within the signifying element':

In fact, the signifying element has no content, no function, and no determination other than what it represents: it is entirely ordered upon and transparent to it...[and so]...this

⁵⁷ Foucault (1970: 64).

⁵⁸ Foucault (1970: 64).

⁵⁹ Foucault (1970: 64).

new binary arrangement presupposes that the sign is a duplicated representation doubled over upon itself.⁶⁰

Although this suggests that the process of substitution by which the signifying chain operates might have been able to take place in the Classical episteme, its binary sign is essentially static, and thus presumably still precludes the Lacanian model of identification outlined above. Foucault does not explain how the Modern sign is different from its Classical equivalent, but given the rest of his argument, we can deduce that it is likely to involve a different form of temporality, and that it is therefore likely to be not just binary but also dynamic. It is thus only in the Modern episteme that the signifying chain, and hence identification (at least as outlined by Lacan) can operate. With regard to nation-ness, then, it is not simply that the Modern episteme is associated with a conception of time and space which makes the nation feasible as a geographical and historical entity, but also that it renders possible a process of identification that can result in national identity.

In Chapters Four to Seven, my aim has been to establish a connection between the macro-political approach to nation-ness and Foucault's epistemological account of history, and to make explicit that between the micro-political approach to nation-ness and Lacan's psychoanalytic structure of the subject. By putting the two together, I hope to have explained both why the nation only comes into existence under certain conditions, and how and why only particular sorts of subjects acquire national identity. In more general terms, I have also presented a way of thinking theoretically both about how the subject belongs to a culture at any given moment, and how and why cultures and subjects' relationships to them change in time.

⁶⁰ Foucault (1970: 64 - 65).

Chapter Eight

By way of conclusion, I want to return to the two central metaphors of this thesis - the Copernican Revolution and the Royal Castle in Warsaw - in order to suggest some parallels between the ways in which national, subjective, and ethnographic narratives are constructed and reconstructed, and to analyse why the relationship between these phenomena is currently undergoing profound change.

Copernicus

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues that, just as Copernicus was unable 'to get on with the explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies as long as he assumed that all the stars turned round the spectator', and thus 'tried to ascertain whether he could not better succeed by assuming the spectator to be turning round and the stars to be at rest', so a 'similar experiment may be tried in metaphysics so far as the intuition of objects is concerned'.¹ 'If the intuition had to conform to the constitution of objects', he continues:

I do not see how we could know anything of it a priori, but if the object, as an object of the senses, conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I can very well conceive of such a possibility.²

For me, this Copernican metaphor is powerful for three main reasons. First, it encapsulates the problems I faced when I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Poland: I was aware that I had strong personal attachments to the culture - or at least to my constructions of it - and that my observations and any conclusions I was going to draw could not, therefore, be as objective as classic

¹ Kant in Beck (1988: 98).

² Kant in Beck (1988: 98 - 99).

approaches to ethnography required. Yet I also wanted to make claims beyond the purely personal, and so needed to work out a way in which I could triangulate my own reactions in order to be able to produce an account which at least went beyond the bounds of solipsism. Of course, my original intention of researching the motivations of people who seemed, like myself, to have particular attachments to another culture only exacerbated this problem and, whilst I soon moved away from this line of research, realising that it was not feasible for me to attempt to discover the unconscious motivations of interviewees who were no more analysands than I was a psychoanalyst, the overall problem of the impossibility of an objective relationship to the culture was nevertheless the same. Secondly, the Copernican metaphor is useful because it represents the analytic of finitude, of how 'man' can be both 'an object produced by the world' and 'also somehow the subject that constitutes that world and all that is in it as objects'.³ In a sense, this is precisely the problem of ethnographic reflexivity that I faced during fieldwork. Thirdly, the metaphor works for me at a psychoanalytic level, in as much as it represents, in Lacanian terms, the shift from the mirror phase to the Symbolic, not just 'once' in the life of the infant, but repeatedly, in the life of the adolescent and beyond: the realisation that one is not at the centre of the emotional universe, the negotiation of the responsibilities of adulthood and the endless play of desire.

The Royal Castle

The second metaphor - that of the Royal Castle in Warsaw - is more complex, for not only is there the reconstructed Castle as it now stands, but also the original Castle of which it is supposedly a replica, and the Canaletto painting, housed, as it were, inside its own simulacrum. The painting itself is more complicated still: indispensable in the Castle's reconstruction because its use of camera obscura made it such a precise representation, it

³ Cf. Chapter Four.

nevertheless effaces its own technicalities of production by leaving the camera obscura out of the final text. Showing both its painter and its sovereign in miniature, as well as a tiny version of itself, the picture prevents infinite representation only by a deftly cast shadow; the king faces the spectator, seated in relaxed conversation with the painter, but we know that at some stage, he must have been standing with his back to us, looking at the picture over Canaletto's shoulder, just as we are doing now. For what, then, is this a metaphor ?

First, it is a metaphor for narratives: national, subjective, and ethnographic. Like any narrative, the Castle is repeatedly reconstructed, on closer inspection palimpsestic, involving an interplay between its various versions and temporalities that is cyclical, selective, difficult, retroactive. The Royal Castle, then, is about the impossibility of forgetting, the rehearsing and re-rehearsing of an obsession, the need to remember; but also, paradoxically, about the desire not to have to remember, and the need to forget. Its latest reincarnation is not simply filed away 'in a cumulative mental archive', but rather 'obliterates its predecessors': 4 at the same time, it retains traces of its own original, moving backwards and forwards between its various historical versions. The Castle is often thought of as an exact replica, but it has never existed in its current form, for it is a replica not of what it was, but of what we would have wanted it to be. Its existence is testimony to the traumatic moment, to which it repeatedly returns, yet simultaneously attempts to efface, going over it again and again, each time making it better, re-making it better. It goes forwards into the future, but its face is turned towards the past, for as Brooks points out, any narrative both 'delays and beckons' towards its end, 5 which is 'both its destruction and its meaning': 6 at the end of the

4 Bowie (1991: 182).

5 Brooks (1984: 61).

6 Brooks (1984: 58).

story, the narrative will cease to exist, but, because 'prior events, causes, are so only retrospectively, in a reading back from the end', 7 'only the end can finally determine meaning'. 8 Also, as with any narrative, the Royal Castle involves a difference between story and discourse: events are selected, reordered; time does not go in straight and continuous lines, but is rather concertina'd, unpredictable. For what is the Royal Castle if not a narrative of grief, a narrative of mourning ?

As a national narrative, it both represents and embodies some of the best and most difficult moments in Polish history: the Constitution of 3rd May, the Partitions, the one hundred and twenty-three years, the twenty-one years, the destruction by the Nazis, the rebuilding of Warsaw and of Poland after the Second World War, the troubled relationship between the nation and the State, between Poland and its diaspora, during the Communist era. Like any culture undergoing rapid cultural change which can no longer maintain organic continuity with its history, in rebuilding the Royal Castle, Poland used the fragments left to it to reconstruct a past. 9

As a subjective narrative, the Royal Castle is about the ways in which we constantly reinvent and retell ourselves, to ourselves and to others, whilst nevertheless still attempting to be coherent, teleological individuals; it is about the ways in which the conscious and the unconscious play backwards and forwards in the constitution of identity, about the ways in which, in the face of various, more or less traumatic events, we constantly try to piece together who we are.

As an ethnographic narrative, the Royal Castle is about the aporetic split between the time of fieldwork and the time of writing

7 Brooks (1984: 29).

8 Brooks (1984: 22).

9 Cf. Chapter Four.

up, the piecing together of field notes into a (sometimes) coherent text, the allegories of salvage and redemption, the desire to rewrite our notes into a more coherent reading, the urge to restore. ¹⁰ A (futile) attempt to restore the experiences of the field, certainly, but if the ethnographer, as exile, is engaged not just in a geographical quest but also a temporal one, then also an attempt to restore a more originary loss. ¹¹ The relationship between the original Castle, the new Castle, and the painting it contains is not just a metaphor for traditional ethnography, then, but also for post-modern ethnographies (for post-modern nations, for post-modern identities). As 'a palimpsest', a 'hierarchical structure of powerful stories', an attestation that cultures 'do not hold still for their portraits', a statement that cultures are 'contested, temporal, and emergent', the painting and its miniature, shadowed version illustrate the fact that there is indeed 'no whole picture that can be "filled in"'. ¹²

And what of the camera obscura used in Canaletto's painting, how does that fit in with the idea of narrative? In a national narrative, it perhaps represents the constructedness of the nation, an inventedness which is nevertheless subsequently effaced. ¹³ In a subjective narrative, it is connected with the specular nature of the mirror phase, with the image projected back from the position of the Other's desire, the image that is taken for something which it is not, delusional, but which nevertheless constitutes the foundations for the construction of the ego. In an ethnographic narrative, the camera obscura is linked to the objectification of observation, the distancing of visualism, the excisions of realism, the fictions of scientific objectivity, the culture holding still as a tableau vivant, the focusing of its rays in the production of knowledge. ¹⁴ Hardly

¹⁰ Cf. Chapter Two.

¹¹ Cf. Chapter Four.

¹² Cf. Chapter Two.

¹³ Cf. Kofman (1998) for the camera obscura as metaphor for ideology, the unconscious, the need to forget, visualism, etc. in Marx, Freud, Nietzsche and Descartes respectively.

¹⁴ Cf. Chapter Two.

surprising, then, that the use of camera obscura in the painting of this picture should have occurred in the Classical period.

If the Royal Castle is a metaphor for narratives, then it is also a metaphor for identification. Just as its various versions work in syntagmatic terms as an ongoing historical narrative, so they operate in paradigmatic terms, as a layering of images, a palimpsest of signs, a vertical series of signifiers. For the nation, a painting within a monument built on the ruins of another. For the subject, a collection of signifying chains which bind individual and culture. For the ethnographer, the complex transferences and counter-transferences of fieldwork. For all of them, 'the embalming of the event', a 'kind of death in life', the 'always disappearing structure that invites imaginative reconstruction', the 'freezing' of a monument, a figure of identification, a society, 'at the time of observation'. 15

Thirdly, the Royal Castle is a metaphor for language, for the sign, for representation. The signifier that is present for the signified that is not, the peculiar trail of traces through time, the constructions of constructions of constructions that language always involves, nations, subjects, ethnographies as "'an ensemble of texts'" that we "'read over the shoulder of those to whom they properly belong'", 'hidden but at the top of the hierarchy of understanding', or so we think, anyway. 16 Yet if, for Foucault, Velázquez's *Las Meninas* raises the Classical episteme's problem of the non-representability of representation and the Modern episteme's problem of 'man [sic]...in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows', 17 then what does this painting, and its incarceration within its own simulacrum, tell us about representation and 'man' in the Modern and Post-Modern epistemes? In Canaletto's painting, we see everything - the king,

15 Cf. Chapter Two.

16 Cf. Chapter Two.

17 Cf. Chapter Four.

the painter, the Castle, the painting - or at least almost everything, except the infinite re-presentation of the scene. We look over the shoulder of the painter, as the king has done before us, but now we are able to look the king in the face. Representation, then, has become representable, and 'man' essentially knowable. But what about that eery experience of standing inside the simulacrum of that which is represented, and the impossibility of seeing the bottom left-hand corner of the painting in miniature, cast in shadow as it is ? Perhaps that says something, in the end, about the counter-sciences, about how they address the unconscious directly, but can never quite get to the bottom of it. Perhaps, then, if Velázquez's painting predicts the position of 'man' in the Modern episteme, Canaletto's says something about 'his' plight in its Post-Modern equivalent.

Psychoanalytic Ethnography

At this point, it becomes possible to see why a psychoanalytic ethnography is epistemologically inevitable, and why its development is part of a much wider epistemological shift. Not, of course, a psychoanalytic ethnography which is a universal theory of 'man', but one which, through that strangulation between psychoanalyst and psychoanalysand, puts back into the picture the ethnographer's own camera obscura, creates, in a way, the ethnographer's own ethnography. If, for Foucault, the emergence and intersection of the counter-disciplines of psychoanalysis, ethnology, and linguistics herald the potential advent of a new episteme and the possible disappearance of the concept of 'man', then argued the other way round, the crises in representation and modern knowledge occurring in anthropology, as elsewhere, which suggest the emergence of a Post-Modern episteme, make the intersection of psychoanalysis, ethnology, and linguistics equally inevitable. Pretended objectivity doesn't work any more: we cannot stop at the borders of the self. Certainly, playing with some of the conventions of realist ethnography doesn't get us away from the fact that it is the ethnographer who stages the text, but perhaps the

reader knows more about why things have been perceived and presented in the ways that they have, and is thus able to understand meanings which go beyond those which the ethnographer necessarily intended. If the relationship between subject and object is changing as we move towards a Post-Modern episteme, then it is not surprising that the concept of 'man' is being replaced by that of the individual subject, and that objective, 'scientific' discourse is giving way to contradictory, autobiographical narratives.

Nation-ness

I started this project with a curiosity about national identity and how people acquire it, with how historical and subjective influences affect it, and with how it works in relation to otherness. In the end, I find that it is no coincidence that nation-ness, 'man', and ethnography should have come into existence at the same time, nor that they are all simultaneously undergoing transformation now, for they are all profoundly connected with subject/object relations, and with epistemological change. I began by thinking the problem through from a personal perspective, aware of my own attachments to another national identity, their complicated provenance, the ways in which they were interlaced with family issues, the temporalities of grief and mourning, with metaphors and death. I then explored the problem in relation to a specific case study, and to the methodological issues of ethnographic research. Poland clearly had special resonances for me, but it was also a rich example of nation as palimpsest and narrative, which displayed layer upon layer of vestigial elements from previous epistemes, in simultaneous resurrection, and told and retold its stories particularly intensely. Perhaps all nations do these things: maybe it is simply easier to identify them in somebody else's. Finally, I thought about the problem from a theoretical perspective, drawing on macro- and micro-political analyses of nation-ness to consider how and why nations come into existence, and how subjects become attached to them. In so doing, I have addressed one of the key issues of ethnographic and cultural studies theory, explaining how and why

the subject belongs to a culture synchronically, how and why cultures change diachronically, and what the articulation is between the two. In future, any serious work on nation-ness will have to consider these issues.

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