Incorporating Emotion into Securitisation Studies: Fear-Based Psychological Models of Securitisation Attitudes

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Declaration of Author's Rights

'This thesis is the result of the author's original research. It has been composed by the author and has not been previously submitted for examination which has led to the award of a degree.'

Signed: Brendan McGillen

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Completing a PhD thesis is a paradox: it is a solitary pursuit made only possible by the support of countless other people.

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Abstract

Securitisation Studies seeks to explain the conditions in which security threat perceptions are created and support for security countermeasures established. However, due to the ontological and epistemological preferences of the two main approaches in the field, minimal attention has been paid to the role emotions may play in influencing securitisation outcomes. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by incorporating emotion into a refined securitisation framework to explain varying levels of securitisation attitudes - a concept created to denote an audience's security threat perception levels, and the extent of their support for a security response following a securitisation move.

Interdisciplinary theory building is first undertaken. With insight drawn from the fields of social psychology and affective science, hypotheses are proposed which offer to illuminate the dynamics of how emotions - namely threat-based and existential fear - affect securitisation attitudes. Four experiments are conducted to test these hypotheses. Data is examined via an innovative analytical strategy employing advanced statistical methods i.e., structural equation modelling and latent basis models to identify how the rate of change of an emotional experience over time affects securitisation attitudes.

A key finding is that securitisation moves which arouse then reduce fear are most effective. In contrast, securitisation moves which elicit fear, but fail to sufficiently diminish it, are associated with higher levels of defensive reactions from the audience, which contributes to lower levels of securitisation attitudes. Contrary to expectations, existential fear was not found to affect securitisation attitudes.

This theoretical contribution is formalised into two novel models which outline the configurations of securitisation move content, and emotional and cognitive responses associated with higher or lower levels of securitisation attitudes. This thesis therefore creates the foundation for an experimentally driven psychological branch of Securitisation Studies which complements the focus of existing approaches, while opening new, interdisciplinary research avenues.

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List of Acronyms

BAS	Behavioural Activation System
BIS	Behavioural Inhibition System
CS	Copenhagen School
DTA	Death Thought Accessibility
EPPM	Extended Parallel Process Model
FFS	Fight-Flight-System
FFFS	Freeze-Flight-Flight System
IR	International Relations
MS	Mortality Salience
o-RST	original-Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory
PANAS	Positive and Negative Affective Schedule
PRM	Parallel Response Model
PMT	Protection Motivation Theory
PS	Paris School
RST	Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory
RST-3	Reinforcement Sensitivity Brain Systems
r-RST	revised-Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory
RWA	Right Wing Authoritarianism
SEM	Structural Equation Model
SDO	Social Dominance Orientation
SDO-D	Social Dominance Orientation - Dominance
SDO-E	Social Dominance Orientation - Equality
TMT	Terror Management Theory
US	United States
VAS	Visual Analogue Scale
WD	Worldview Defence

Fear makes people inclined to deliberation, while no one deliberates about hopeless things.

Aristotle

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research and Theory Context

In his first Oval Office address to US citizens, then President Donald J. Trump warned of a 'growing humanitarian and security crisis at our southern border' (Address to the Nation on Border Security, 2019). Addressing an audience of 40 million citizens, he painted a stark picture of a 'tremendous problem' of drugs, criminal gangs, and illegal aliens, pouring unchecked across the border (ibid). Halting this flow, according to President Trump, was a matter of life and death: 'Over the years, thousands of Americans have been brutally killed by those who illegally entered our country and thousands more lives will be lost if we don't act right now' (ibid). The President underscored the magnitude of the purported threat with a graphic example: 'In Georgia, an illegal alien was recently charged with murder for killing, beheading, and dismembering his neighbor' (ibid).

The deaths, the President stressed, would continue unless immediate action was taken. The President's proposed solution to end this purported existential threat was extreme: the implementation of a wide-ranging border security bill, which included provisions for $5.7 billion to construct a 'physical barrier' spanning the Mexico-United States border. Despite the President's vivid rhetoric, his declaration of a national emergency, and the deployment of over 4000 troops to the southern border, public opinion polls illustrated that Americans remained firmly divided in their attitudes towards the threat, and also in their responses to the proposed policy. 51% of respondents to a Harvard Harris Poll (2019) agreed with President Trump that there was an escalating security crisis at the border, whilst 49% considered it to be a 'mainly a manufactured political crisis', whereas 49% of respondents favoured 'a new security barrier on the Mexican border', with 51% opposed to its construction.

The same phenomenon was therefore simultaneously considered, by a divided citizenry, to be a pressing security threat which required immediate, extraordinary security action, and a politically constructed crisis which masked a mounting humanitarian disaster necessitating an entirely different form of response. Why?

1.2 Existing Theoretical Framework and The Argument(s)

To guide analysis of such cases whereby elite actors seek to persuade an audience that a security threat exists, and that security countermeasures are required, the Copenhagen School (CS), inspired by speech act theory, introduced the 'securitisation framework' to Security Studies (Buzan et al., 1998). [1] The securitisation framework has since been complemented within Securitisation Studies by an alternative theoretical approach[2] - often referred to as the Paris School (PS) [3] - grounded in the sociology of Bourdieu (1990) and Foucault (1991) (Bigo, 2002; Bigo & McCluskey, 2018). This sociological branch of the field, whilst lacking an alternative model to compete with the theoretical parsimony of the securitisation framework, makes an important conceptual, methodological and ontological contribution to the study of security issues by examining the non-rhetorical, routine aspects of securitisation processes that are overlooked by the CS (Balzacq, 2010, 2011).

The primary argument of this thesis is that, despite the significant contributions of both the CS and the PS to Securitisation Studies, neither approach can satisfactorily explain and predict the relative effectiveness of securitisation moves i.e., an attempt, typically by an elite actor, to convince an audience that a security threat exists and requires immediate action, such as President Trump's pronouncement. The CS's framework would prioritise analysis of the President's speech, emphasising his framing of migrants as an imminent, and extraordinary threat, while the PS's sociologically

[1] Speech act theory, a branch of pragmatics within linguistics, denotes a lineage of philosophical and linguistic thought exploring the functional capabilities of communication i.e., the social effects of words and signs (Austin, 1955/1962; Searle, 1969).

[2] Securitisation Studies is defined by Buzan et al., (1998: 32) as the field of enquiry which 'aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions'. The term is often used interchangeably with securitisation theory (see Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2013).

[3] As with many attempts to categorise diverse theoretical contributions into neatly defined schools, there is considerable debate over the relative merits of essentialising heterogenous outputs into discrete 'Paris' and 'Copenhagen' schools (Bigo and McCluskey, 2018). The approach taken here, whilst sympathetic to critics, is to stick with tradition in the field and, refer - reductively - to those who are primarily inspired by speech act theory as belonging to the CS, and those who predominately draw on sociological influences as the PS.

influenced approach would likely ensure that researchers consider that the (in)securitisation of migrants occurs not only through set piece rhetoric, but also through the policies and practices of government bureaucracies e.g., militarised dawn raids, family separation policies etc.

However, conspicuously absent from both theoretical branches of securitisation is systematic consideration of the audience's *emotional* response to securitisation moves as an important variable in shaping their relative effectiveness (Van Rythoven, 2015). This conflicts with a long lineage of theory within Political Science, drawing on Aristotle and Plato, that identifies the capability of an intended persuader to arouse emotions (*pathe*) in their target audience as an effective, albeit ethically questionable communications strategy (Brinton, 1988).

It is challenging to avoid hyperbole when outlining the ramifications of the above. Put simply, the relative effectiveness of a securitisation move can produce profound political and social consequences. From climate change to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ability of actors to successfully securitise issues often has existential consequences for the securitisation message's audience, the referent object, and/or those associated with the proposed threat.[4] Developing a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics in question is therefore an analytical, political and ethical imperative.[5]

There are various possible explanations for the effective ontological exclusion of emotion from Securitisation Studies including the epistemological and methodological preferences of the CS and PS; a reluctance to pursue identification of causal mechanisms within the securitisation framework; and the sheer complexity of incorporating emotions into an already rich theoretical framework (Van Rythoven,

[4] This is not to imply that a successful securitisation is necessarily an inherently positive outcome. As Floyd (2011, 2019) comprehensively explores, whether a securitisation move can be considered 'just', is thoroughly case dependent.

[5] There is an extensive literature on the political and ethical responsibilities associated with studying securitisation (Huysmans, 1998; Sardoc, 2021; Taureck, 2006; Wæver 2000). Reflecting on these issues, attention is paid in chapter eight to considering the ethical dimensions of this enquiry.

2015; William, 2003).[6] Nonetheless, the absence of emotions unnecessarily hinders the field's capacity to study its subject matter, and also cuts it adrift from wider developments in International Relations (IR), whereby reductive rationalist models of political behaviour are being steadily challenged and supplanted with theories and frameworks which account for emotions' effects on a wide range of political phenomena (Bleiker and Hutchinson, 2008; Hall, 2015; Mercer, 2010). [7]

A secondary argument advanced is that not only is the inclusion of emotion overdue on its own merits, but that its inclusion into Securitisation Studies holds clear promise for also addressing other, interrelated shortcomings of the existing literature. Namely, 1) the under-theorisation of how variance in securitisation move content affects outcomes (Hansen 2011, Senn, 2016: Williams, 2003); 2) the tendency to prioritise analysis of elite speech over the agency of the audience when explaining outcomes (Bourbeau, 2011; Côté, 2016; Stritzel, 2014); and 3) limited efforts to identify clear causal mechanisms within the securitisation process (Baele & Thomson, 2017; Guzzini, 2011; Oliveira, 2017).

Placing emotional responses - which various social and political psychology models identify as products of message content, and antecedents of an audience's overall perceptions and attitudes - at the centre of the securitisation framework offers a mechanism to illuminate, in a holistic manner, the roles of these interconnected components of the securitisation framework, whilst enhancing Securitisation Studies overall explanatory power. [8] The purpose of this thesis is therefore to develop the first emotion centred psychological models of securitisation which, by focusing on emotional dynamics, advance understanding of the factors which influence the relative

[6] A causal mechanism can be defined as 'a (1) system of physical parts or abstract variables that (2) causally interact in systematically predictable ways so that their operation can be generalized to new situations' (Johnson and Ahn, 2017: 128).

[7] Van Rythoven (2015: 459) provides an informative analysis examining how emotions have featured within securitisation theory to date, and correctly identifies that 'securitization theory refers to emotion persistently but in an ad hoc manner without any systemic reflection on how to theorize the relationship between the two'. His proposed solution however i.e., to draw on social appraisal theory, as will be discussed in chapter two, does little to address this issue.

[8] Discussion of relevant theories and models is provided in chapters three and four.

success of securitisation moves. As an exploratory project, a decision is made from the outset to narrow the scope of this enquiry to examining and modelling how emotions experienced by an audience in response to a one-off securitisation move on an unfamiliar topic affect threat perceptions and levels of support for a security response (the term securitisation attitudes is coined to denote these two perceptions).[9]

To ensure theoretical coherence with current literature, and to mitigate concerns voiced by leading researchers in the field that a psychological approach risks fragmenting the research agenda and undermining the cumulative nature of Securitisation Studies, a decision is also made to develop these models by seeking to incorporate emotions into a refined, demystified version of the existing securitisation framework e.g., one which views securitisation communications not as speech acts, but as assemblages of strategic communications and practices (Balacq, 2011; Bilgin, 2010; Floyd, 2010).[10]

This, it is argued, should assuage such concerns, whilst generating the conditions for the development of a cumulative psychological approach to securitisation to emerge which bridges the top-down CS approach and the bottom-up PS with a meso level theory addressing the gap at the heart of Securitisation Studies by equipping the field with an enhanced framework with which to analyse empirical cases of emotively driven securitisation. To that end, it is also acknowledged, from the outset, that this psychological approach is a complement to, not a substitute for, sociologically informed insights on how the broader context and social phenomena such as identity, memory etc. affects securitisation move outcomes (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Paterson and Karyotis, 2020; Williams, 2003).

[9] This, undoubtably eschews the socially embedded, political contested ebb and flow of securitisation in the real world. Accordingly, the limitations of the external validity and generalisability of findings are discussed in chapter eight.

[10] The somewhat vague term 'practices' is a central to the PS's lexicon. Drawing on Reckwitz (2002: 249), the PS defines practices as: 'a routinised type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge' (Balzacq et al., 2010: 3).

These models are developed through a theory building and analytical strategy which rediscovers Securitisation Studies' original interdisciplinary energy by incorporating relevant concepts, theoretical insights, and methodological tools from select branches of social and political psychology to equip the field for this new research avenue. The theory building process advances in two phases. The first lays the conceptual and theoretical groundwork necessary to confidently incorporate emotions into Securitisation Studies. Its main argument is that - of the many proposed theories within affective science i.e., the scientific study of emotion - the constructivist theory of emotion is the most convincing, empirically supported approach, and will therefore be used as a foil with which to theorise, and examine, how emotions affect securitisation attitudes (Barrett, 2017a). Furthermore, drawing on a constructivist-aligned theory, two specific emotions with particular relevance to securitisation are identified: fear and anxiety.[11] LeDoux and Pine's (2016) framework of fear and anxiety is employed to conceptualise each emotion. Conceptual precision is required from the outset as the two emotions are predicted to produce different behavioural and attitudinal effects (Steimer, 2002). To that end, one important initial conceptual hypothesis is that fear, in both its threat-based and existential forms, will be a more significant predictor of securitisation attitudes than anxiety.

Adopting a constructivist understanding of emotions, it is argued, also emphasises that not all variations within the same emotional category should be expected to produce the same effects (LeDoux, 2014). The second phase of the theory building process therefore identifies proposed regularities between securitisation message content, threat-based fear, existential fear and securitisation attitudes in the pursuit of causal mechanisms. Drawing on selected aspects of the well-established fear appeal (Mongeau, 2013; Tannenbaum et al., 2015) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszcynski, 1991) literatures - previously unconnected with securitisation theory despite their clear relevance for addressing existing shortcomings - empirically informed hypotheses are identified to formalise the theory building process.

[11] The term constructivist aligned is purposefully employed to refer to theories which, whilst not self-described as Constructivist, share the same theoretical, conceptual and methodological principles i.e., that emotions are emergent phenomena which emerge in the cortex (LeDoux and Narain, 2014).

With regard to threat-based fear, it is proposed that peak levels of fear, experienced by an audience immediately following exposure to a threatening securitisation message, will likely have a small, positive, linear relationship with securitisation attitudes. It is also argued that a more significant emotional predictor of the relative effectiveness of a securitisation move is the trajectory of the overall threat-based fear emotional dynamic experienced whilst processing the message. Put simply, securitisation moves which initially frighten, and then reduce fear levels within message recipients, are proposed to be more efficacious than those which fail to assuage the audience. In the latter cases, individuals are hypothesised to be more likely to demonstrate defensive reactions to securitisation moves e.g., conclude that the securitisation actor is attempting to manipulate them.

In terms of existential fear, this emotion is theorised to produce distinct attitudinal effects, whereby securitisation moves which elicit negative affect by reminding individuals of their own mortality, will lead to increased levels of dogmatism - defined as enhanced commitment to prior held beliefs - within the audience. To that end, it is proposed that securitisation moves which run contrary to an individual's worldview - such as an attempt to convince climate sceptics that climate change is a threat - will be more effective if they seek to arouse only threat-based fear rather than the existential variant. Conversely, the efficaciousness of securitisation moves which are aligned to an audience's ideological beliefs is posited to be enhanced by the arousal of existential fear.

To test these hypotheses, it is put forth that an experimental approach is the most appropriate methodological strategy. However, experimental methods have been used sparingly within the field to date, and have been, to an extent, discouraged by the CS (Buzan et al., 1998). This, it is claimed, is likely a negative legacy of constructivist and post structuralist influences which have resulted in an overreliance on discourse analysis as a method.[12] Whilst discourse analysis is a powerful tool for discerning

[12] Unhelpfully, the term constructivist is used throughout this thesis with regard to both Securitisation Studies, and theories of emotion. In the context of securitisation, constructivism refers to an

meaning from text, and conducting linguistically focussed case studies, it is ill-suited to testing causal relationships between variables. This methodological imbalance within Securitisation Studies has also contributed to the disproportionate focus within the field on the production of positive case studies and the limited progress achieved on addressing various existing theoretical shortcomings e.g., the underdeveloped causal mechanisms within the securitisation framework. For the purposes of this thesis, and in pursuit of greater methodological pluralism within the field, online laboratory experiments using randomised stylised vignettes to manipulate emotional responses, are argued to be the most effective approach to inform robust theoretical development (Baele & Thomson, 2017).

In conclusion, these theoretical and methodological arguments, elaborated throughout this thesis, hold significant promise for addressing interconnected shortcomings within Securitisation Studies that have remained unresolved to date. These limitations have prevented the field from fulfilling its full potential by hindering its capacity to satisfactorily explain and predict political phenomena with profound social, political and ethical consequences. To orient the reader to this interdisciplinary project, which draws on sources ranging from affective science to social psychology to propose a solution to these issues, the following section now outlines the structure of this thesis and provides a short summary of each chapter. It concludes with a precis of the overall theoretical contribution.

1.3 Thesis Structure and Theoretical Contribution

Chapter two prepares the ground for the development of psychological models of securitisation attitudes by first outlining and interrogating relevant aspects of Securitisation Studies. The literature review charts the development of the field, highlighting the two main schools of thought which have since emerged: the CS and PS. Collectively, the two approach towards securitisation generate a rich body of theory which has contributed considerably to Security Studies (Balzacq, 2015;

ontological and epistemological approach within IR which emphasises the importance of studying both material *and* ideational influences on political phenomena (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1992). Within affective science, it denotes a school of thought that emotions are emergent phenomena, produced not via innate emotion modules in the brain, but through the complex interplay of socialisation, language, and biology (Barrett, 2017a).

Bourbeau, 2014). However, there remains several shared shortcomings within the field e.g., the lack of consideration given to how emotion affects securitisation outcomes. An exhaustive summary of these limitations is beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus of this project, instead, is to identify and improve those areas which can be enhanced by the inclusion of emotion into the securitisation framework. Chapter two concludes by setting out the case for developing a psychology of securitisation, initially focused on incorporating emotions into a refined securitisation framework, to better explain and predict securitisation attitudes. The relevance of this enquiry for cognate fields such as the threat perception literature within IR is also discussed.

Chapter three is the first of two theory-building chapters. It provides the theoretical grounding required to incorporate emotions into the Securitisation Studies. The chapter demonstrates that the constructivist school of emotion within affective science presents the most robust theory with which to hypothesise how emotions are likely to affect securitisation outcomes (Barrett, 2017a). It then draws on LeDoux and Pine's (2016) framework to conceptualise fear and anxiety. The theoretical and methodological ramifications of adopting a constructivist understanding of these two emotions are discussed, including the proposition that fear, in both its existential and threat-based varieties, is likely to act as the dominant emotional predictor of securitisation attitudes.

Chapter four sources inspiration from the fear appeal and Terror Management Theory (TMT) literatures to develop hypotheses regarding how differences in message content, and the fear responses they elicit, enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of securitisation moves. Chapter five then outlines the methodological approach employed to test the hypotheses presented in the preceding theory building chapters. The central argument proposed is that experimental methods present the most appropriate option for testing relationships between the proposed components of the psychological model. Due to the lack of precedent within Securitisation Studies for emotion focused experimental research designs, considerable attention is therefore paid to not only to ethical concerns, but also to presenting and explaining the methods and measures selected.

Chapter six presents the procedures, results and analysis of Study 1 - the largest, and most ambitious study conducted within Securitisation Studies - which tests the hypothesised relationships between threat-based fear/anxiety, cognitions, and securitisation attitudes. Chapter seven, a further empirical chapter, outlines the results from Studies 2-4 which examine hypotheses relating to existential fear and securitisation attitudes.

Chapter eight builds on these results to distil the theoretical contribution made by this thesis. It proposes two psychological models of securitisation attitudes - both centred on the role of threat-based fear (existential fear does not feature in either model because of a lack of empirical support for proposed hypotheses in Studies 2-4). These two models, the first of their kind in Securitisation Studies, locate the trajectory of within-persons fear episodes as a primary, emotional causal mechanism which affects securitisation moves' relative success. The first model identifies the configurations of message content, emotional trajectories, and cognitions most likely to lead to high levels of securitisation attitudes. It emphasises the necessity for a securitisation actor to raise but also reduce fear through convincing policy proposals. This curvilinear form of emotional episode predicts both higher levels of threat perception and support for government security action, and also reduced levels of defensiveness, an important negative mediator of securitisation attitudes. Conversely, the second model outlines when and why messages which fail to reduce fear are less effective - that is, when fear is aroused but not reduced – which leads to increased message derogation and perceived manipulation, compared to the curvilinear dynamic, and lower levels of securitisation attitudes.

Chapter eight also explores the ethical dimensions and limitations of this research project and identifies areas for future research. It concludes by arguing that, to build on these models, the next step towards a cumulative, experimental research agenda i.e., a new psychological branch of Securitisation Studies, individual variance should be included into the two proposed models. Individual variance barely features in securitisation theory at present. Nonetheless, a comprehensive, threat-based fear

centred, constructivist psychological theory of securitisation attitudes would likely benefit from furthering analysis to explore how differences at the individual level affect the emotional and cognitive processing of securitisation moves. There is a wealth of research on individual variance and political psychology which, whilst clearly related to Securitisation Studies' stated objective, has not been cross-pollinated. This thesis therefore concludes by offering several recommendations for future research to further the development of a holistic psychological school within Securitisation Studies.

Chapter 2: Literature Review: the case for a psychological theory of securitisation attitudes

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a literature review of the existing theoretical framework: Securitisation Studies. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 set the theoretical scene by charting the emergence of Security Studies as an academic field and its conceptual crisis following the end of the Cold War. Section 2.4 then introduces the CS's constructivist concept of security which enabled scholars to transcend the field's conceptual nadir by reconceptualising how security was understood, and in the process, made possible a new epistemological approach towards exploring security issues (Wæver, 1995). Section 2.5 outlines how the CS seized the theoretical opportunity presented by the adoption of a constructivist view of security by introducing the securitisation framework (Buzan et al., 1998).[13] Section 2.6 sketches the central tenets of the PS, an alternative approach towards securitisation, which, contrary to the CS's ontological preferences, focusses on the less spectacular, more routinised aspects of the securitisation process e.g., bureaucratic actors, surveillance systems and non-rhetorical means of (in)securitisation (Balzacq, 2005; Bigo, 2002; Bigo & McCluskey, 2018; c.a.s.e collective, 2006). The PS also offers an important reconceptualisation of securitisation not as a speech act, but as a 'sustained strategic practice' (Balzacq 2005: 173). This sidesteps issues associated with equating securitisation with an illocutionary speech act and enables analysts to account for both the discursive and non-discursive dimensions of securitisation cases.

Despite establishing a rich body of theory however, the collective field of Securitisation Studies is yet to reach its full potential. An exhaustive overview of its merits, inconsistencies, and points of contention is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Balzacq, 2010; Balzacq and Guzzini, 2015). Instead, section 2.7 highlights specific inconsistencies or gaps within the Securitisation Studies literature which are most relevant to this thesis. First, the starkest limitation of the existing literature is - despite

[13] The CS has inspired a wide range of theoretical contributions criticising or seeking to refine the framework's various components from both scholars associated with the PS, and unaligned second-generation securitisation researchers (Balzacq, 2005, 2010; Bourbeau, 2011; Côté, 2016; McDonald, 2008; Stritzel, 2007; Vuori, 2008).

a smattering of tentative theoretical reflections (Huysmans, 1998; Van Rythoven, 2015; William, 2013) - the overall neglect of emotions within the field. This leaves Securitisation Studies lagging behind advances in the wider study of IR, which is, belatedly, starting to meaningfully consider the effects of emotions on domestic and international affairs. Secondly, section 2.7 also highlights selected other widely acknowledged shortcomings within Securitisation Studies. These include the minimal attention paid to how variance in securitisation move content affects outcomes, the absence of clearly identified casual mechanisms in the securitisation process, and the relative deprioritisation of the audience compared to elite actors.

Section 2.8 argues that these interconnected limitations can be holistically addressed by incorporating insights from various fields of psychology within a refined, demystified securitisation framework. To prepare the ground for the first psychological models of securitisation, section 2.8 first addresses the historical reluctance within Securitisation Studies to engage with psychology, and challenges arguments, such as that made by Wæver (2015: 126), that the pursuit of a more explanatory Securitisation Studies risks derailing the field. It concludes by proposing a compromise position: that an initial meso level psychological securitisation theory - focusing on how emotions affect outcomes at the group level - can address gaps in the CS's securitisation framework in a theoretically coherent manner, while also providing an innovative complement to existing theories of securitisation to guide analysis of presently under examined causal relationships. The objective of this thesis is therefore to develop the first psychological models of securitisation attitudes: a concept introduced to signify an individual or group's attitudinal response to a securitisation move.

2.2 What is Security?

The subject of this thesis is security. What, therefore, is security? How can we distinguish security issues from other concepts such as humanitarian, social or political concerns? Historically, within Security Studies, a subfield of IR, convincing answers to these questions - despite an initial flurry of impressive conceptual work during the early years of the field's establishment - have not been easily forthcoming (Baldwin, 1997; Bock and Berkowitz, 1966; Rothschild, 1995; Wolfers, 1952). To orient the

reader to the conceptual contribution made by the introduction of the concept of securitisation, this section briefly introduces the emergence of the national security agenda, the establishment and ascent of traditional Security Studies, its post-Cold War definitional crisis, and finally, the Copenhagen School's transformational constructivist concept of security.

The Emergence of the National Security Agenda and the Security Studies Field

The word security, and its meaning(s), has travelled a long way (Dillion, 1996; Rothschild, 1995). In its Latin form, *securitas* primarily referred to an internal sense of tranquillity, and it was not until the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that it became a property associated with states (Rothschild, 1995: 61). During this period of state-building, 'the security of individuals was subsumed, as a political epigram, in the security of the nation' (Rothschild 1995: 64). Nevertheless, it did not become a motif of political rhetoric, and the stated objective of governments and institutions until the early 20th century (Neocleous, 2007). President Roosevelt was one of the term's early champions. Perhaps the clearest example of the elevation of security into the ultimate national, and global objective, and also the flexibility with which the term was now being used, can be found in the President's 1944 State of the Union address:

> The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each Nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: *Security*. And that means not only *physical security* which provides safety from attacks by aggressors. It means also e*conomic security, social security, moral security* [emphasis added] -- in a family of Nations (Neocleous, 2007: 93)

It was during this period that the 'national security' agenda emerged (Yergin, 1977). This new concept was purposefully introduced to provide a signifier that encompassed issues of war and peace, but also one which would be more inclusive than the then dominant concept of 'defence' (Yergin, 1977: 193-194). As Yergin (1977: 193) describes, national security policy included 'the total preparation for war as well as the waging of it…'. It therefore 'postulates the interrelatedness of…political, economic and military factors' (Yergin, 1977: 193). It was under the banner of this new term

that President Truman enacted sweeping changes to the US military and intelligence establishments, most notably through the 1947 National Security Act which, amongst other changes to the US defence establishment, created the National Security Council (Romm, 1993: 3).

The emergence of an academic field, self-styled as Security Studies, coincided with the public popularisation of the term and the institutionalisation of the US national security agenda (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Yergin, 1977; Williams, 2012). It was the overlapping drivers of the intensity of World War Two, the existential ramifications of recently developed nuclear weaponry, and the significance of the Cold War that provided the initial impetus for the emergence of this interdisciplinary research effort which incorporated military history, IR, Public Policy, and other fields under one rubric (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

This new Security Studies field, which emerged as a thoroughly applied field of research, sought to provide informed answers to pressing policy issues such as the relative merits of a deterrence based foreign policy (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). As Buzan and Hansen (2009: 66) describe:

> What emerged in the US, and to a lesser extent Europe, during the 1940s and 1950s was a category of work at the intersection of military expertise and university based social science, aimed at addressing the policy problems arising from nuclear weapons and the broad-spectrum challenge posed to the West by the Soviet Union. These problems were seen as urgent. Because of their crucial contributions during the Second World War, civilian experts, mainly physicists and social scientists, could now specialise in military issues under the heading of security, which unlike 'war' or 'defence' nicely bridged the military and non-military aspects of the subject.

This focus on pressing, external threats had a profoundly negative impact on the quantity and quality of early conceptual work defining security and exploring the ethical dimensions of the research agenda (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). There were

however a few notable efforts to address critical conceptual issues (Herz, 1950; Wolfers, 1952). For example, Wolfers (1952: 481) provided an early, rich conceptual discussion of security as an 'ambiguous symbol', which, without additional 'specifications…leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford' (Wolfers 1952: 484). Wolfers identified that this confusion arises partly due to the subjective and objective components of national security. For instance, security is an objective which all states desire more of, however security cannot be measured entirely objectively unlike related concepts such as military force, economic growth etc. (Wolfers 1952: 485).

As Wolfers (1952: 485) expanded, 'security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked'. He also raised important ethical and political questions around potential trade-offs between the pursuit of security and other values such as rights to privacy and freedom of expression. However, despite Wolfer's efforts at generating further consideration of what security means, and the political/ethical consequences of the burgeoning national security agenda, few others picked up the conceptual baton. Illustratively, in the following decade, the continuing paucity of conceptual work in the field led Bock and Berkowitz (1966: 124) to bemoan that 'whilst problems of definition…bedevil all sciences in their early stages of development…', in the case of Security Studies, 'such problems are especially acute and intractable'. In fact, during the mid-1950s to 1960s, as Baldwin (1995: 123) describes, Security Studies became:

> dominated by nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited war. The central question, according to one reviewer, "was straightforward: how could states use weapons of mass destruction as instruments of policy, given the risk of any nuclear exchange?" This question, it should be noted, represented a shift in focus from the previous decade…earlier research questions considered what security is, how important it is relative to other goals, and the means by which it should be pursued, the new focus was on how to use a particular set of weapons.

2.3 The Ascent and Crisis of Traditional Security Studies

As the Cold War intensified, this narrow focus on military force became the hegemonic understanding of security within the field, and 'traditionalists' who adhered to it - who can broadly be equated with neorealists such as Waltz (1979), Gilpen (1981) and Van Evera (1990) in the wider field of IR, dominated the research agenda (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 21). For these traditionalists, who were often thoroughly embedded in a state-military-academia nexus, the proposed legitimate unit of analysis for Security Studies was solely the state (Betts, 1997; Walt, 1992; Williams, 1998). The main argument put forward in defence of this position is that states, due to their monopoly on violence, were typically the most important actors in international politics and the most consequential regarding security policy (Walt, 1991). Traditionalists paired this state-centric ontology with a narrow positivist epistemology (Walt, 1991). As arch realist Mearsheimer (1994: 41) stated, 'realists maintain that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual'. The consequence of this positivism was ontological myopia i.e., a narrow focus on the observable military capacity of states which could be identified, measured, and modelled. This positivist, state-centric view of security is encapsulated in Walt's (1991: 212) oft-quoted definition of Security Studies, and by extension security issues as:

> the study of the threat, use, and control of military force ... [that is] the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war

This dominant approach to studying security however never reigned entirely unchallenged (Doyle, 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1977). Beginning in the 1970s, intensifying throughout the 1980s, and reaching a critical mass following the end of the Cold War, two broad lines of attack emerged (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). These two counter-hegemonic positions are often categorised into those who sought to 'widen' Security Studies' state-centric threat radar, and those aspiring to 'deepen' what the traditional Security Studies considered to be legitimate referent objects. Wideners contended that whist the security of the state should remain the primary referent object

for security analysis, Security Studies would be remiss if it failed to identify non-state threats e.g., those in the societal or environmental domains (Ullman, 1983). Deepeners however challenged the validity of the state as the sole, or primary referent object, a line of critique originated from various alternative approaches to security that had failed to gain traction in mainstream Security Studies during the Cold War - for example, feminist, post-structuralist and peace research - which challenged the analytical and moral value of state-centricity (Booth, 1991).

This twofold ontological challenge to traditionalism was unexpectedly bolstered by the widely unanticipated collapse of the Soviet Union, which traditional security analysts, by treating states as black boxes, had been widely incapable of predicting (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Moreover, the contemporaneous rise of ethno-national and intrastate strife forced traditional Security Studies to evaluate the aptness of Westphalian perspectives of states as unitary actors (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). The 1990s therefore witnessed a long overdue renaissance of conceptual work (Baldwin, 1997, Buzan, 1991, Rothschild, 1995; Wæver, 1995). This, as Baldwin (1997) observed, largely picked up from where Wolfers left off in previous decades. Nevertheless, few significant conceptual advances were made, indeed, Baldwin (1997) himself, after attempting to locate the essence of security, wearily concluded whether it may simply be an 'essentially contested concept'. It was during this period of conceptual malaise that the CS introduced their highly influential reconceptualisation of security which would reinvigorate a flagging field and inspire an entirely new field of research.

2.4 The Copenhagen School: introducing a constructivist concept of security

The CS moniker was coined by McSweeney (1996) to signify a unique approach towards security being developed by researchers associated with the Copenhagen based Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI). Through several important publications, such as Wæver's (1995) essay *Securitization and Desecuritization,* and the collective text, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), the CS first challenged existing concepts of security, and then, introduced their own constructivist security concept, which offered a means to transcend the ongoing debates within the field.

Wæver (1995, 2003) was the leading figure in this initial reconceptualisation process, identifying that much of the effort expended in the widener/deepener debates, simply redefined the existing concept by adding on new threats e.g., non-military concerns, or 'referent objects' such as ethnic groups. Therefore, even the most radical critics of the traditional state-centric view, accepted 'two basic premises of the established discourse' (Wæver, 1995: 46-47). The first, 'that security is a reality prior to language, which is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is "objective" or "subjective," is measured in terms of threat or fear)'. The second is that the 'more security, the better' (Wæver, 1995: 46-47). These two premises, Wæver convincingly argued, were products of the field's historically dominant positivism and state-centricity. The CS, in a critically important conceptual step, challenged this reigning epistemological approach. As Wæver (1995: 47) asked: 'In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of "security" as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage, why not try instead to put a mark on the concept itself, by entering into and through its core'?

The primary task of the constructivist inspired CS was therefore to examine what security means in practice, rather than what scholars would like it to mean in theory (Buzan et al., 1998). In other words, what are the distinguishing features that enable individuals to collectively identify an issue as a security concern and distinguish it from those issues which are merely political, or belong to a separate category e.g., a humanitarian issue? As Buzan et al., (1998: 27) argue: 'Our claim is that it is possible to dig into the practice connected to…[the] concept of security in international relations…and find a characteristic pattern with an inner logic'.

The CS's genealogy concluded with the assessment that phenomena are typically identified as security threats when they are considered to pose an existential threat to a political unit's functional independence. This, Wæver (1995), argued, is the primary criterion that distinguishes security issues from political, social, or economic ones. The CS also identified that perceptions of a security threat often legitimise 'emergency measures' outside the bounds of normal political practice (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). As Buzan et al., (1998) surmise, 'by saying "security", a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to

block a threatening development' (Buzan et al., 1998). The CS's then took a step further by proposing that this logic of security be used as a conceptual apparatus to identify security issues in the military, economic, political, social, and environmental sectors (Buzan et al., 1998).

This therefore offered a means to both bridge and transcend the debate between deepeners, and wideners, whereby, rather than simply dictating what exactly counts as a security threat or define what should be considered as a legitimate referent object - a constructivist understanding of security redirects the discussion towards the 'quality [that] makes something a security issue' (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 21). From a constructivist perspective, material reality, the sole focus of objectivists, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the perceived existence of security threats, instead, the CS proposed that it is shared social perceptions which are the defining criterion. The CS position is therefore intended to be a compromise between the traditional, and alternative views of security in that it permits analysis of new threats, to new referent objects, but prevents the concept from stretching beyond its traditional sense to mean everything, and nothing, by limiting security threats to those that bear the hallmarks of the traditional logic of security issues (Buzan et al., 1998: 27).

It is important to emphasise that the above is a 'concept of security', as such, it is not a definition per se (Wæver, 2003). The CS purposefully did not seek to generate an exclusionary definition of security that could be applied by analysts to decide, by fiat, when something is, or is not, a security threat based on their own epistemological or ontological preferences. As Wæver (2003: 9) states: '[t]he meaning of 'security' is not understood by setting up some ideal definition of how the concept ought to be used (and then possibly criticise practitioners for not being logicians)'. Rather, the CS identified *how* security issues are typically understood in practice and acknowledged that this is subject to change across time and space (Wæver, 1995).

2.5 Securitisation: a new framework for analysis

The CS's concept of security presented a radical constructivist, post-structuralist inspired reconceptualisation of security, which shifted analytical focus away from quantification of existing observable phenomena, towards the issue of how security threat perceptions emerge and dissolve (Wæver, 1995: 204). To describe these two

events, the CS introduced the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation (Wæver, 1995).[14] The former - the focus of this thesis – is, according to Buzan et al., (1998: 25): 'constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects'. It is a process which the CS, in a move that has since come to symbolize their unique approach to Security Studies, equated securitisation to a (illocutionary) speech act (Wæver, 1995: 54; Buzan et al., 1998).

To illustrate the significance of this theoretical step, a degree of background may be useful. In brief, the contribution of speech act theory to linguistics lies in demonstrating that words have the capability to *do* something. As Austin (1975: 1), a highly influential figure in speech act theory, described: 'It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely'. Instead, he explored the performative power of communication to produce social and legal effects e.g., decrees, pledges, promises (Austin, 1962). In summary, Austin emphasised that such speech can be more than mere rhetoric, and, in certain cases, can actually change social reality itself, for example, successful speech acts can create shared perceptions, obligations, and identities e.g., the pronouncement of a officiant at a wedding ceremony.

Wæver (1993, 1995) was the first to connect speech act theory to the study of security. As he wrote: 'we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done' (Wæver, 1995: 55). This passage closely resembles Austin's (1980: 12, emphasis in original) statement that 'in which to *say* something is to *do* something; or in which *by* saying something we are doing something'. It also demonstrates the post-structuralist influences on the CS, for example, Derrida and

[14] Despite notable contributions (see Hansen, 2012; Huysmans, 1998; Poe, 2004; Wæver, 2003), it is widely acknowledged that Securitisation Studies has disproportionately focused on securitisation rather than desecuritisation (Aradau, 2004). This thesis unfortunately contributes to furthering this imbalance, as, given the dearth of emotion centred theory within securitisations studies thus far, it appears sensible to focus on incorporating emotion, at least in the first instance, into the established securitisation framework compared to the less well elaborated desecuritisation process.

Butler who both emphasised the power of language to create identities and intersubjective meaning, through its performative power, regardless of material conditions and the speaker's intentions (Stritzel, 2007).

Returning to Austin's speech act theory, the CS assert that securitisation moves are illocutionary speech acts (Wæver, 2014). To provide context for this statement, it is relevant to distinguish between the three speech act categories proposed by Austin (1962: 2): 1) locutionary 2) illocutionary and 3) perlocutionary acts. Austin (1962: 2) also provided a concise summary of the differences between the three: 'We can […] distinguish the locutionary act 'he said that…' from the illocutionary act 'he argued that…' and the perlocutionary act 'he convinced me that….'.[15] Overall, the introduction of speech act theory epitomises CS's constructivist challenge to traditionalist Security Studies as it stresses that the establishment of security threats is a process which need not correspond to material conditions, but is rather, in the final instance, a product of discursive practices (Buzan et al., 1998: 28).[16] Building on this development, to analyse specific cases of securitisation in a structured manner, the CS also introduced the securitisation framework (Buzan et al., 1998).

This 'parsimonious schematic' can be summarised as: 'actors make a securitizing move, identifying an existential threat that requires extraordinary action; an audience either accepts or rejects that move; securitization occurs if that issue is accepted as a security issue' (Salter, 2008: 1). The key components of this framework, according to the CS, are securitisation actors, referent objects, speech acts/moves, facilitating conditions, and audiences (Buzan et al., 1998).[17] The securitisation process begins with

[15] This decision represents a foundational tension within the CS approach, and one which many critics have focused their attentions on. This shortcoming, and others, will be discussed in section 2.7.

[16] The somewhat vague term 'practices' is a central to the PS's lexicon. Drawing on Reckwitz (2002:249), the PS defines practices as: 'a routinised type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge' (Balzacq et al., 2010: 3)

[17] The CS also introduced the concept of 'functional actors' (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). These are defined as 'actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences

a securitising actor. This actor, also referred to in the literature as the 'securitizer', is any individual or collective, for example, the Department of Homeland Security, which initiates a securitisation move (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). Securitising actors, according to the CS, will likely differ by sector e.g., the armed forces may be the primary securitising actor in the military sector but not in the economic sphere where the Finance Minister may have more authority (Buzan et al., 1998). In the CS, actors are typically assumed to be state elites such as leading politicians, high-ranking public officials etc., but could also take the form of multilateral organisations, media outlets, or non-state organisations such as the Red Cross (Buzan et al., 1998). A securitising actor triggers a securitisation process by proposing that there is an immediate threat to a referent object, and that emergency measures are required (Buzan et al., 1998: 26)

The referent object is the entity that is alleged to be threatened. As Buzan et al., (1998: 36) describe: referent objects are 'things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival'. This, in theory, could be any socially valued object, in practice however: 'The referent object for security has traditionally been the state and, in a more hidden way, the nation' (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Successful securitisation moves, the CS argues, are more likely to occur when the referent object is neither too small/scale, or too large. For instance, it is rare for individuals, or particularly small groups to be viewed as critical referent objects. Likewise, securitisation moves which present more expansive referent objects are existentially threatened e.g., humankind, or the planet, also often struggle to resonate with audiences (Buzan et al., 1998: 36).

As referenced, drawing on speech act theory, the CS present such securitisation moves as speech acts. Drawing on Austin's linguistic theory, the CS propose several facilitating conditions - which closely reflect Austin's 'felicity conditions' - that they argue influence the effectiveness of a securitisation move (Wæver, 2003: 14-15). Buzan et al. (1998: 32) define facilitating conditions as 'the conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused'. These

decisions in the field of security' (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). However, as Floyd (2019) recently identified, this original component of the securitisation framework has received minimal theoretical attention to date – including by CS authors – and will not be considered further in this thesis.

conditions are divided between those internal and external to the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). In other words, those pertaining to either the message itself, or to the context. The CS propose that the main internal condition is that the act adheres to the 'grammar of security' and constructs a skilful narrative containing traditional security rhetoric components such as an 'existential threat, point of no-return, and a possible way out' (Buzan et al 1998: 33). External conditions are proposed for both the securitising actor, and the proposed threat. For the former, the CS assert that they must have sufficiently high levels of social capital and perceived authority to influence outcomes (Buzan et al., 1998: 33-35). With regard to the latter, whilst in theory any object can be constructed as a security threat, the CS proposed that threats which resonate with an audience based on their historical experience will be easier to successfully securitise (Buzan et al., 1998: 33-34). Threat construction within the CS model, is therefore, 'a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorises and recognises that speech' (Buzan et al., 1998: 32).

The group referred to by Buzan et al., (1998) is also known as the 'audience' within Securitisation Studies, a component of the framework which is critical to the intersubjective nature of the securitisation process. In the CS framework, the audience is defined as 'those who have to be convinced in order for the securitising move to be successful' (Wæver, 2003: 11). This definition illustrates that the CS are aware that audiences will vary by sector and by threat. As Wæver (2003: 11-12) states: 'Although one often tends to think in terms of 'the population' or citizenry being the audience…it actually varies according to the political system and the nature of the issue'. Regardless of the nature of the audience, its role in the securitisation framework is to consider the securitisation move and make a judgement over its validity. As Buzan et al., (1998: 31) describe: 'Successful securitisation is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act'.

Expanding on the issue of securitisation outcome, the CS propose a binary view of securitisation moves whereby they either succeed or fail (Bourbeau, 2008: 42). In the case of a successful securitisation, the audience is portrayed as agreeing that an

existential threat exists, and a policy platform is created from which 'extraordinary' policies can be enacted (Buzan et al., 1998: 38). A successful securitisation can therefore legitimise secrecy, extreme measures, and the overriding of normal democratic processes (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). This can have profound social and political effects, for example, a successful securitisation can lead to the perception of a particular ethnic group as a security threat, and the logic of security encourages a militaristic supra-legal response. On the other hand, if the actor is unable to persuade the audience that a threat exists, and the move fails, there will typically be no profound military or political implications. The main outcome is often the weakening of the securitising actor's authority. The main components of the securitisation framework, and the facilitating conditions (in italics) proposed by the CS are summarised below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Securitisation Framework



This elegant, idealised framework for analysis - anchored around speech acts, securitisation actors, moves, and audiences - supports researchers to identify and describe, at the meso and macro levels, how security threats come into being in different sectors. It has since inspired a vibrant research agenda that continues to demonstrate its theoretical and empirical value to Security Studies, through numerous case studies of successful and unsuccessful securitisation moves, on issues ranging from climate change, migration, to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Léonard, 2010; McDonald, 2012; Trombetta, 2008). This 'benchmark' approach to securitisation however is not without its critics (Bourbeau, 2014: 188). Immediately after the framework was introduced, it sparked considerable debate around both the CS's concept of security, and the framework itself (Huysmans, 1998; McSweeney, 1996).

2.6 The Paris School

Many of the criticisms of the CS originated from an alternative approach towards securitisation that developed primarily in Paris, and, at least initially, anchored around research driven by Didier Bigo (2002, 2005; case collective, 2006). The Paris School (PS) approach towards securitisation is based upon the principle, shared with the CS, that security and insecurity are socially constructed rather than objective realities (Balzacq, 2005; Bigo, 2000; Bigo and McCluskey, 2018). Beyond this shared foundation however, the PS and CS diverge considerably with regard to their conceptualisation of security, theoretical inspirations, units of analysis, and methodological approaches (Bourbeau, 2014; Wæver, 2014).

As discussed, the CS is heavily influenced by linguistic theory, and, as such, has been referred to as the 'linguistic', or 'philosophical' branch of securitisation (Balzacq, 2010; 2011). Bourbeau (2014) also identifies that a distinguishing feature of the CS's concept of security is that it adheres to a 'logic of the exception', meaning that the CS's conceptualisation of securitisation is a process whereby *existential* threats are constructed, and *extraordinary* measures are implemented (Bourbeau, 2014). Many commentators, including Williams (2003), have identified that this exceptionalism is rooted in the influence of Schmitt's (1985) political theory on the CS's concept of security.[18]

The sociological approach however is neither inspired by linguistic theory, nor Schmitt, rather, the main influences on this alternative approach to securitisation are Foucault (1991), and Bourdieu (1990), whose theories on governmentality, and *dispostifs* feature prominently, especially in the work of Bigo (2000, 2002). This grounding in fields tangential to orthodox IR, such as criminology, political sociology, etc., influences the PS's unique conceptualisation of security, and securitisation (Balzacq, 2008; Balzacq, et al., 2010; Bigo, 2010; 2011; Huysmans, 2014).

[18] Schmitt defined 'the political' as the moment when definitive identity categories e.g., friends and enemies, are created (Williams, 2003: 515). For Schmitt (1985: 5), this act is the function of state authorities: 'sovereign is he who decides upon the exception'. Therefore, as Williams (2003:515) describes: 'in the Copenhagen School the concept of security plays a role almost identical to that which Schmitt defined as his concept of the political' (Williams, 2003: 515).

The starting point of the PS's conceptual challenge to the CS is its critique of the exceptionalist conceptualisation of security on which the securitisation framework is built, which is self-consciously rooted in traditional, post-Westphalian understandings of international and state security.[19] For the PS, this fails to reflect the reality of how security is practiced, and experienced in the contemporary world (Bigo, 2000, Bigo and McCluskey, 2018). From a sociological perspective, globalisation, digitalisation, shifts in how sovereignty is understood, and the transnationalisation of intelligence and policing services all combine to create a situation whereby 'internal and external security are merging and de-differentiating after a period of strong differentiation' (Bigo, 2000: 320).

According to Bigo (2001: 91), security is therefore best understood as a 'Möbius strip'. This metaphor is used to convey the interconnected convergence and divergence between both security threat perceptions and policies felt by different audiences. The PS emphasize that the same phenomenon e.g. migration, can arouse experiences of security or insecurity depending on social relations e.g. minorities may feel (in)securitised by the introduction of new profiling policies intended to assure the other demographics, and that the policies employed to address perceived threats often traverse national borders and/or involve the practice of techniques in the domestic arena that are rooted in external practice e.g. unlimited detention and 'kettling' (Bigo, 2000). One significant difference between the PS and the CS is therefore the former's reluctance to essentialise the meaning of security due to the tendency of (in)security to change over time and the heterogenous manner in which it is experienced by different groups. For that reason, the PS adopt an audience driven understanding of security which changes from context to context (Bigo and McCluskey, 2018).

The PS also possess a unique ontological field of vision. For Bigo and collaborators, the main unit of analysis for securitisation analysis is not primarily elite state actors and their rhetoric, but a fusion of political actors opportunistically identifying 'new threats' to the public which they profess to solve, and bureaucratic actors working in

[19] This is evidenced in descriptions such as 'security is, in historical terms, the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence […]' (Wæver, 1995: 50).

a wide range of unspectacular institutional settings, from police departments to customs offices (Bigo, 2000; 2002; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 4). These political professionals and officials, according to the PS, are connected through their expertise and institutional relationships in a *field of power* which collectively exerts more significant effects on security dynamics than elite pronouncements (Bigo, 2008).[20] This concept, derived from Bourdieu, conveys the interconnected nature of the political and security landscape, within which security professionals collaborate across areas of policy specialisation, departments, and borders, while competing for resources, prestige, and dominance in terms of who can set the security agenda (Bigo, 2008). The field includes private security firms, public providers of security ranging from gendarmes, data analysts and secret service agents, transnational agencies such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and intelligence alliances such as Five Eyes (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018; Huysmans, 2006).

Furthermore, the PS argues that security professionals within this field often conduct securitisation processes without dramatic security enunciations at all (Bigo, 2000). As Bigo (2000: 194) describes: 'It is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known this for a long time'. The PS therefore emphasises that Securitisation Studies should take account of the non-verbal actions and practices through which threat perceptions become established (Bigo, 2011; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Huysman, 2006). Balzacq (2008: 79) refers to these non-verbal methods as 'tools' of securitisation, which include surveillance techniques, racial/population profiling, and the day-to-day behaviour of police officers etc. Accordingly, Bourbeau (2014) surmises that this alternative conceptualisation of the securitisation, in contrast to the CS, follows the 'logic of the routine' whereby the actions of border guards, and institutions are as relevant to understanding how securitisation occurs as the set piece speeches of prime ministers.

A clear summation of this sociologically informed theorisation of security is provided by Balzacq (2011: 2) who defines securitisation as:

[20] Illustratively, Bigo (2002: 86) describes performative speeches as the tip of the security iceberg.

> an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, *emotions*, [emphasis added] etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it

This definition also underlines that rather than being a one-off declaration - which is implied by the idealised CS framework - securitisation is a persuasive, iterative process (Balzacq, 2010, 2011). As such, it stands in stark contrast to the speech act inspired CS conceptualisation of security, a conceptualisation which has proven hugely influential by providing a rallying call for the linguistic turn in Security Studies (Huysmans, 2006). However, despite its value in challenging traditionally dominant realist approaches, Balzacq (2011, 2015) convincingly argues that the CS's decision to equate securitisation to an illocutionary speech act is: 1) inconsistent with linguistic theory and 2) theoretically restrictive.

To expand, presenting security as an illocutionary act contradicts the CS's position that securitisation is an intersubjective, argumentative process which cannot be externally imposed (Floyd, 2011: 428; Vuori, 2008: 66). This tension between the intersubjective, and declarative aspects of the CS's theory is evident throughout their work, e.g., when Wæver (1995: 54) emphatically states that '[b]y definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so' (Wæver 2004: 13). As the PS and several second-generation securitisation scholars have identified, equating securitisation to a speech act produces two, contradictory centres of gravity within the CS's framework and theory (McDonald, 2008; Stritzel, 2007; 2012). The 'internalist reading' leads to an elite, actor-centric, declarative model of securitisation (Stritzel, 2007). As Balzacq (2011: 23) identifies, this internalist reading suggests 'a belief in a "social magic" power of language, a magic in which the conditions of possibility of threats are internal to the act of saying "security".

The CS, however, rarely present securitisation in such reductive terms, and within their theoretical output, there exists a more grounded 'externalist' centre of gravity, illustrated by their prior mentioned acknowledgment that contextual factors will often affect the relative success of securitisation moves (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007: 358). Nonetheless, despite the theoretical tension produced by positioning securitisation moves as illocutionary acts, the CS have not conceded any ground in response to their critics (Wæver, 2015: 27). Indeed, Wæver (2015: 27) has sought to counter these criticisms by arguing that:

> Austin's theory of speech acts entails that the illocutionary effect ('done in saying') is co-produced by the audience in a more extensive sense than pure uptake, and the status transformation entailed in, for example, securitization is a redefinition of the rights and responsibilities of actors, not just a form of communication (as has become 'the received view' of speech act theory, through especially Searle).

The value in engaging further in this debate is likely to be limited: there may be aspects of Austin's contributions to language theory that legitimise the arguments above, however, a prima facie reading of speech act theory would clearly suggest that the securitisation process bares closer resemblance to a perlocutionary speech act. Nonetheless, presenting security as a speech act - beyond acting as a call to arms for discursive, constructively influenced alternatives to traditional Security Studies - ultimately adds little, additional analytical value in comparison to considering securitisation moves as standard strategic political communications and practices enacted within a field of power.

Accordingly, Balzacq (2010: 174) has proposed that securitisation should be reconceptualised as a 'pragmatic act' rather than a speech act. This removes the tension within the CS, and emphasises that securitisation is a socially embedded, iterative, argumentative process involving rhetorical, and non-linguistic means such as images and policy tools. It also stresses that actors and audiences are of equal ontological

importance. For Balzacq (2010: 60) securitisation can therefore be defined as a 'sustained argumentative practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it'.

However, although complementing each other in certain instances, and contributing to addressing specific shortcomings, it would be inaccurate to portray the PS and CS as a perfect match which comprehensively negate the other's limitations. Whilst an exhaustive critique of both bodies of work is beyond the scope of this thesis, the following section identifies the collective shortcomings of Securitisation Studies, which, it is later argued, can be holistically addressed through the development of psychological theories and models of securitisation.

2.7 The Collective Shortcomings of Securitisation Studies

Emotions

The role of emotions in shaping threat perceptions, mobilising support for policies, and affecting social relations e.g., the demonisation of out-groups, is an increasingly well-studied phenomenon in IR (Crawford 2000; Fierke 2013; Jeffery 2014; Mercer 2005; Ross 2014). It is therefore surprising that within Securitisation Studies – a field with clear thematic relevance to these topics – the role of emotions has received only limited attention from the CS, PS and second-generation securitisation researchers.

For example, in *Securitization: A New Framework for Analysis,* Buzan et al., (1998: 26), state that it is the 'fear that the other party will not let us survive as a subject' which is the 'foundational motivation for the [speech] act'. In this instance, fear, of an existential hue, is presented by the CS as the trigger for securitisation itself, without further elaboration. This is illustrative of the tendency within the field, also reflected in Balzacq's (2011) definition of securitisation which notes appeals to emotion as a tool within a securitisation actors' arsenal, to use the language of emotion but not to accord it meaningful theoretical consideration or standing.

Beyond the CS, Huysmans (1998), a major contributor to Securitisation Studies who positions himself between the CS and PS, provides a somewhat more thorough

theoretical exploration of how fear and angst may affect securitisation. Worth quoting at length, Huysmans (1998: 236) writes:

> Security policy is a practice of postponing death by countering enemies…This modern externalization of death (for example, in the form of a disease of an aggressive state) and the rupture it implies, has two important consequences for the discursive formation of security - (a) it constitutes a desire for knowledge; death becomes an object like other objects which we try to know; and (b) it creates a space within which other agencies, such as the Church but also the state, can appear which mediate and represent our relation to death

This dense passage is a thought-provoking introduction to the various ways in which one particular form of fear - existential fear - may motivate securitisation processes. However, no further research has built upon this initial theoretical foray into the possible existential drivers of securitisation moves, and it remains a clear area for further exploration - especially in light of, as will be discussed in following chapters, the burgeoning body of social psychological work which concludes that thoughts related to death, and the existential fear they arouse, produce significant effects on political attitudes, including threat perception and levels of support for security policies (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015).

In addition to Huysmans' (1998) tentative theorisation of how fear of death may affect securitisation, there are also scattered contributions exploring how fear and anxiety, in their non-existential variants, may influence securitisation threat perceptions and support for countermeasures. Bigo (2002: 75), with reference to the security field of power, proposes that there is now a class of bureaucrats who act as 'managers of unease' who… 'have created considerable autonomy for their own field - the *management of fear*' [emphasis added]. These professionals, Bigo (2002) contends, make strategic decisions as to which issues should be ascribed a security framing to mobilise resources. This, he continues, typically becomes a competitive bureaucratic

process whereby institutions vie to 'sell to the others its own fears and to try to prioritize this fear upon the others' (Bigo 2002: 76). Therefore, security, according to Bigo (2002: 85): 'is what the professionals of unease management make of it'.[21] This line of argumentation, by explicitly prioritising, rather than excluding the role of fear in securitisation processes is an important step forward. However, whilst also helpful in raising the interesting issue of bureaucratic incentives in generating public fears, is ultimately a relatively superficial theorisation of the relationship between securitisation and emotion which replicates the 'commonsensical conclusion that fear in politics is necessarily equated with increased securitization' (Williams 2011: 454).

In an unconventional, intriguing line of theorising, Williams (2011) has challenged the reductive nature of this position. Drawing on the work of Shklar (1998), Williams provides an insightful theoretical account of how particular fears may also impede securitisation moves. As Williams (2011: 456) describes:

> the fear of the power of the politics of security and its consequences – is a core part of liberal theory and practice. Fear is not a one-way street to extremity, nor does it operate only in emergency situations. Instead, the fear of fear can act as a bulwark against such processes. In other words, the fear of fear can within 'normal' or even 'securitized' politics act to prevent or oppose a movement toward a more intense politics of fear – countering a shift toward 'security' in its more extreme manifestation.

However, despite these small number of notable efforts to hesitantly theorise how emotions affect the securitisation process, the role of emotion remains, surprisingly, effectively outside Securitisation Studies in general and the securitisation framework in particular. Van Rythoven (2015: 458) has sought to rectify this by drawing on social appraisal theories - a group of theories within psychology which locate the cause of emotions in individuals' evaluations of external stimuli - to offer 'a theoretical reconstruction of securitization where emotion, specifically collective fears, serve as

[21] This intentionally echoes Wendt's (1992) highly influential 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It' article.

the locus of an audience's judgment for the practice of securitization'. Inspired by appraisal theorist such as Moors et al., (2013) and Roseman and Smith (2001), Van Rythoven (2015: 467) proposes that:

> By positing that fear appraisals are generated through highly relevant and incongruent situations with low coping potential, the theory directs our attention to key constitutive features of successful securitizing moves. Such moves succeed, in part then, because they resonate with preexisting meaning in the local audience's security imaginary which satisfies the structural requirements for a fear appraisal. Audiences fear threats because they represent phenomena they have already learned to fear or imaginably foresee fearing.

This crosspollination of insights from social psychology and affective science must be welcomed. However, both the decision to use social appraisal theory as the theoretical foil to theorise how emotions affect securitisation, and the conclusions which Van Rythoven (2015) reach are problematic. To expand, Van Rythoven, drawing on appraisal theories encourages researchers to focus on securitisation message content and audience appraisals to identify whether a threat is presented and perceived as relevant, incongruent, and challenging. If these three conditions are met, Van Rythoven's (2015: 464) proposes that the audience will experience fear, and that this 'fear facilitates threat construction'. The twofold outcome of this line of theorisation is that fear itself remains firmly locked outside securitisation theory, as the proposed approach only directs analytical attention towards alleged appraisal antecedents of an emotional experience, and, in stark contrast with Williams (2011) - directly equates the generation of fear within a collective with a successful securitisation. Emotions, therefore, remain remarkably under researched within Securitisation Studies.

Causality

A further noticeable absence within Securitisation Studies is clearly identified causal mechanisms associated with the securitisation process. Indeed, the CS, initially at least, purposely intended not to develop a causal framework (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Wæver, 2011). As Buzan and Hansen (2009: 215) claim: 'the Copenhagen School is a constitutive, non-causal theory'. Wæver (2011: 476) deploys an ethical argument in favour of constitutive, rather than explanatory theory:

> critics often call for stronger causality to predict who will securitize what, and when attempts will succeed or fail. Yet, a non-deterministic, action conception is crucial for keeping the theory political and highlighting moral responsibility.

Wæver (2011) expands on this argument by proposing that the political nature of a theory manifests itself in what it casts light on, and what it ignores, and therefore, an agenda which focuses on causal mechanisms directs attention towards explanation and prediction, rather than discussion of the inherently political nature of securitisation. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a mature field cannot seek to accomplish both objectives i.e., a better understanding of how and why securitisation occurs, and what are the political/ethical consequences. Indeed, a counterargument could be advanced that a better understanding of the causes of an event will enhance the quality of any ethical discussion, as it enables analysis of the relative importance of structure and agency and proposes a means of reverse engineering ethically questionable securitisations (these arguments are elaborated in chapter eight).

It should be stressed however, that the CS do now (somewhat) concede that there are no inherent barriers to developing causal mechanisms within the framework: 'proponents of the theory were wrong to resist causality tout court' (Wæver 2011: 476). This loosening of their resistance however only applies to the effects of securitisation, not its antecedents, with the same ethical argument remade to justify this position. Balzacq (2010, 2015), Guzzini (2011), and Oliveira (2018) have rightly taken issue with this line of argumentation, with Balzacq (2015: 110) convincingly arguing that:

> The task of a sociological theory of securitization is not just to grasp what it means to say that a phenomenon is a threat, however; it wants to decipher the sequences of cause-and-effect in securitization

Minimal research however has been conducted seeking to identify causal relationships (Baele et al., 2018). This is a legacy of both theoretical and methodological preferences within the field which have effectively 'left 'explanation' and/or all versions of causality to the positivist other' (Guzzini 2011: 329 in Baele et al., 2018). It is argued

here that incorporating emotion into the securitisation framework and enhancing an understanding of causal relationships are mutually reinforcing ambitions. Moreover, due to the centrality of emotions in the processing of a securitisation move i.e., an audience's emotional reaction to a securitisation move will be a product of securitisation moves and an antecedent of their final evaluation of the move's convincingness, it is also put forth that they offer an organising mechanism with which to also advance understanding of causal roles played by other under-theorised aspects of the securitisation process, and framework, namely, securitisation move content and audiences.

Securitisation Move Content

The speech act is the centrepiece of the CS's framework. As Buzan et al., (1998) describe: 'the way to study securitization is to study discourse…'. Ironically however, this fixation on elite rhetoric securitisation has led to the under-theorisation of the content of securitisation moves themselves. The most obvious manifestation of this is the neglect of non-rhetorical securitisation content in the CS's theory (Hansen, 2011; Heck and Schlag, 2013; Williams, 2003). This clearly detaches the framework from the contemporary reality of political communications e.g., ISIS videos on YouTube, post-truth memes etc.

In addition to the exclusion of non-rhetorical securitisation content from analysis, the CS's speech act view also leads to the under examination of discourse itself. This is due to the internalist dimension within the CS which presents securitisation as a 'self-referential' process (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). This mystification of securitisation moves has resulted in minimal theoretical attention being paid to their practical dynamics. As previously outlined, there is only one 'facilitating condition' in the CS framework which directly pertains to securitisation move content, i.e., that they adhere to the 'grammar of security' (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). This 'grammar', according to the CS, is the proposal of an existential threat, a point of no return and a possible solution (Buzan et al., 1998: 33).

Beyond this high-level proposition, the CS offer little guidance on which forms of securitisation move content are likely to affect the relative success of securitisation

moves. This has therefore been identified by a number of scholars as an area for future development (Andersen and Möller 2013; Campbell and Shapiro 2007; Hansen 2011, Senn, 2016: Williams, 2003). The PS also has little to offer on this issue due to their methodological preference to focus on the practices of security actors, rather than their broader communications strategies. This therefore leaves the practicalities of how variance in securitisation move content affects securitisation outcomes significantly under explored, and due to the ability of securitisation discourse to elicit emotional response, proposes a latent causal relationship meriting examination as part of this enquiry i.e., how does variance in securitisation move content affect emotional responses?

Audiences

Finally, the illocutionary speech act position has also produced negative consequences for how the audience is theorised within Securitisation Studies (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau, 2011; Côté, 2016; Stritzel, 2014). In short, by adopting an illocutionary view of speech acts, the audience, at times, can be effectively rendered little more than a passive recipient of a 'felicitous' speech act, provided that a few facilitating conditions are met. This leaves the audience, as McDonald (2008: 3) describes, 'so under-theorised as to ultimately remain outside the framework itself'. Various attempts have therefore been made to further understanding of the audience's role in the securitisation process (Léonard and Kaunert, 2010; Salter, 2008). Salter (2008), for example, categorises audiences into different variants e.g., popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific. This is a positive move and raises the important issue of who exactly is required to provide assent to securitisations. In a similar vein, Roe (2008) uses the case of the 2003 Iraq War to introduce a distinction between formal and moral audience support. In this case, Roe argues that New Labour achieved the formal legitimisation of one audience, namely, the UK parliament, but, arguably, failed to gain the moral support of the electorate. Léonard and Kaunert (2010) offer another perspective on the same issue and propose incorporating Kingdon's (1984) public policy three streams model into securitisation theory to better 'distinguish among various audiences...while also considering how different audiences relate to one another and influence the development of a policy response to a threat' (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka 2015: 7).

These contributions to the literature provide a more nuanced approach towards theorising actors' roles in the securitisation process. There is, however, still an outstanding need to place the audience on an equal ontological footing with the securitisation actor within the framework. Relatedly, there is also minimal research exploring how differences - at the group or individual level - affects securitisation moves outcomes. As Balzacq (2005: 173) describes, the 'psycho-cultural disposition' of the audience is likely an important factor in determining whether a message succeeds or fails. Indeed, the Cambridge Analytica scandal evidenced that political communication firms now engage in micro-targeting based on psychological profiling (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). Incorporating emotions into securitisation theory therefore offers multiple possible contributions to these various audience related shortcomings. Most notably, a focus on emotional responses to a securitisation move centres the audience as the primary analytical actor. Moreover, as will be presented in chapter four, there are solid grounds to predict that an audience's emotional reaction will be at the centre of a dynamically entwined network of causal relationships connecting variance in message content, audience characteristics and reactions, and securitisation outcomes.

The following section now turns to outlining how these overlapping shortcomings of Securitisation Studies can be addressed through the development of a complementary psychological school of securitisation. This, it is argued, offers to bridge the field by tempering the CS's excessively philosophical tendencies and their consequences e.g., the marginalisation of the audience in their framework, whilst enhancing understanding of phenomena identified by the PS such as the 'management of fear', but which have received minimal theoretical attention to date, likely due to an often exhibited aversion within Securitisation Studies towards positivist methods (this issue is described in more detail in chapter five).

2.8 Towards a Psychology of Securitisation Attitudes

Securitisation Studies, from its inception, has been an interdisciplinary field; one which has significantly enhanced Security Studies by drawing on a wide range of influences, including linguistic theory, post-structuralism, and political sociology (Buzan et al., 1998; Bigo, 2000; Wæver, 1995). However, with few noticeable

exceptions, including Watson (2012) and Rychnovská (2014) who both connect framing theory to securitisation, Karyotis et al., (2021) who examine the effects of frames and personality, attitudinal and socio-economic differences on support for social distancing measures, and Hayes (2012) who explores how social identity affects securitisation moves, it is fair to surmise that psychology barely features within the field. This dearth of interdisciplinary dialogue between psychology and securitisation is unfortunate, as the application of insights from social and political psychology offers to contribute towards addressing all of the limitations outlined in the previous section.

However, before outlining a strategy for addressing these shared shortcomings, there are two main issues to be overcome. The first relates to an ontological issue i.e., humans themselves, not to mention their psychological processes, rarely, if ever, feature as a unit of analysis within Securitisation Studies. This is problematic, as, in McDermott's (2004: 3) words: '[w]hat unifies political psychology and makes it distinct from other forms of political analysis is the search for explanation, description, and prediction at the individual level of analysis'.

There are various explanations for the lack of ontological prioritisation of individuals with Securitisation Studies. For example, the theoretical vision of the PS approach is likely path-dependent on their sociological influences, which leads to their preference to focus on practices, institutions, and fields of power rather than people per se. Noticeably however, Bigo & McCluskey (2018) have recently proposed that Securitisation Studies should embrace political anthropology which suggests a clear interest in expanding the securitisation theory towards the individual level. As Bigo and McCluskey (2018: 7) state, one aim of their future approach is 'to concern itself with the lived experiences of people affected by the practices of those who claim they can decide what is security, insecurity, and fate'.

On the contrary, the CS have been explicit regarding their methodological preference to focus on 'collectivities' (Buzan et al., 1998: 47). This decision is rooted in their concept of security which reflects, as Buzan et al. (1998: 47) describe, a form of 'postsovereign realism' that is derived from the traditional state centricity of Security

Studies, but not beholden to it (Buzan & Wæver, 2009). Buzan & Wæver (2009: 255) also justify this ontological decision by stating that 'security action is usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to a collectivity'. This is a persuasive argument which the CS expand by identifying meso-sized collectives e.g., states, and ethnic groups, as the traditionally dominant actors in the security landscape. Accordingly, the CS have been overtly reluctant to expand analysis downwards towards the individual, arguing that disaggregating 'everything into individuals is not very helpful, because much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen as more than the sum or their "members" and are treated as social realities…' (Buzan et al., 1998: 40).

This, however, need not be insurmountable. The aim of political psychology is not to replace the systematic, structural analysis of collective political phenomena, but to complement it by 'asserting the importance of individual psychological processes to political outcomes' (McDermott, 2014: 3). Accordingly, a compromise approach is taken here where this thesis will seek to identify emotional regularities, and broader causal relationships, observable at the collective level of analysis, rather than focus on individuals or the roles of personality differences per se (this issue, however, is covered in areas for future research in chapter eight).

The second issue raised by the CS is that the pursuit of greater understanding of causal relationships, including those at the individual level of analysis, risks threatening securitisation theory's coherence. As Wæver (2015: 125) argues, the CS is concerned that a more explanatory research agenda could risk:

> ultimately drifting toward a reconstruction of individual dispositions and reactions, a sender–receiver view of communication, a mentalist conception of meaning and a cause–effect understanding of social relationships, including politics.

This is a valid concern i.e., that a causal securitisation theory risks directing attention towards the exploration of specific, micro relationships between variables at the expense of analysis of how securitisation - at the group level - actually occurs, and the

social effects it produces. However, this risk is mitigated here due to the decision to intentionally anchor the inclusion of emotions to a version of the existing framework, and to focus on addressing the existing limitations outlined in the previous section, rather than generate new, micro research questions. To that end, the initial theoretical step proposed here is to refine the securitisation framework by firstly replacing speech acts with securitisation moves which, inspired by the PS, can comprise of discursive and non-verbal elements. This minor step sets the stage for a developing a demystified framework with more explanatory rigour. The next step proposed here is the addition of a new concept i.e., securitisation attitudes, positioned theoretically within the component of the audience.

Securitisation attitudes, a concept inspired by the sizeable literature in social psychology which explores attitude formation and change in response to mass communications, is introduced to Securitisation Studies to represent an individual and/or group's *evaluation* of the two main components of a typical securitisation move, i.e., the extent to which they agree or disagree that a proposed threat exists, and their level of support for the implementation of countermeasures (see Albarracin et al., 2018 for a summary of research on attitudes and persuasion). There are various advantages to focusing on securitisation attitudes. First, as several authors have highlighted, Securitisation Studies would benefit from enhancing its capacity to explain and predict the *relative* success of securitisation moves, rather than viewing them as leading to two binary outcomes i.e., success or failure (Baele & Thomson, 2017; McDonald, 2012; Salter, 2010). Accordingly, a focus on attitudes directs attention towards variation in both static attitude levels e.g., the extent to which individuals believe that threat exists or not, and how they change dynamically over time e.g., following immediate psychological processing of a securitisation move, after exposure to alternative points of view etc.

Secondly, as implied in the previous section, a focus on emotional responses, and the securitisation attitudes they influence, centres analysis on the audience's reaction to securitisation moves rather than elite actors and their speech. Thirdly, there is a well-developed literature demonstrating that message content, the emotional responses it

produces, and group levels categories of variance such as prior-held audience beliefs, are interdependent antecedents to attitude formation and change (Dillard & Nabi, 2006; Nabi, 2002, Olney, Holbrook & Batra, 1991; Tannebaum et al., 2015). To that end, targeting attention at securitisation attitudes as the primary dependent variable of interest presents a means to explore and model the interactions between securitisation moves, audiences, and emotions in a holistic, systematic manner. The following chapters therefore introduce selected bodies of work which offer to theoretically illuminate how differences in these components affect securitisation attitudinal outcomes.

It should be stressed, however, that modelling the relationship between securitisation moves, emotions, and securitisation attitudes, will, as all models do, idealise the complexity of securitisation in the real world. As the PS and many second-generation researchers emphasize, securitisation does not occur in a vacuum. It is a deeply contextual, iterative process, comprised of discursive and non-rhetorical strategies that rarely, if ever, occurs due to one-off, elite proclamations. Moreover, there is often lively political and civic debate over the validity of securitisation moves, with supportive or oppositional counter-narratives put forth by various political and societal actors (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010). For this reason, psychological modelling of securitisation attitudes should not be viewed as a replacement for contextually informed case studies.

Finally, developing the psychology of securitisation will also contribute to cognate fields of enquiry within Political Science and IR which lack clear, predictive models vis-à-vis emotion, threat perception, and government security action support. As Bleiker and Hutchinson (2008: 116) bemoan: 'While central to many aspects of world politics, the role of emotions has received surprisingly little attention in International Relations (IR) scholarship'. 'Fear', they add, 'is pivotal to realist theorising of security dilemmas, but few authors explicitly identify this emotion, let alone examine it systematically' (Bleiker and Hutchinson 2008: 116).[22]

[22] There are a few notable exceptions such as Wagner and Morisi, (2019) who examine how emotion affects decision-making and Pagano and Huo, (2007) who explore how threat perception influences support for conflict.

2.9 Conclusion

Securitisation Studies has made a considerable conceptual and theoretical contribution to the academic study of security. The initial breakthrough, as demonstrated in section 2.2 was a conceptual one i.e., by incorporating constructivism into a field traditionally dominated by positivist materialism, the CS reframed unproductive debates over the exact definition of security, and in the process, offered a means to transcend the conceptual malaise affecting the field, whilst ensuring that the definition of security in the post-Cold War era did not stretch beyond recognition. Building on their conceptual advance, the CS introduced the concept of (de)securitisation, and a framework to guide analysis of how security issues emerge and dissipate. This framework has proven highly influential, but it is not without its limitations.

Many of the tensions or shortcomings within the framework, such as negative consequences of equating securitisation to an illocutionary speech act, have benefited from constructive criticism from those working in the alternative approach to securitisation which has since arisen. This sociologically informed branch of Securitisation Studies also adds significant value to the field by providing a more contextually informed conceptualisation of security, drawing attention to aspects of the security landscape ignored by the CS, and underscoring the unspectacular, prosaic actions and practices which (in)securitise certain groups of people at the expense of others.

Despite the complementarities between both approaches, section 2.7 highlighted that there are numerous unresolved issues in the collective securitisation literature including the effective exclusion of emotions from Securitisation Studies, a reluctance to identify causal relationships within the securitisation process, and related issues such as the under-theorisation of the audience and securitisation move variance.

Section 2.8 concluded that the application of insights from psychology - a field, which despite the clear relevance to virtually all aspects of the framework, barely features in Securitisation Studies - can address these shortcomings in a systematic manner. It argues that the most effective approach, which builds upon the existing framework,

whilst contributing to addressing its shortfalls, is to develop a psychological model of securitisation attitudes. This presents a clear opportunity to develop Securitisation Studies further in a cumulative manner which bridges the CS and PS approaches. The following chapters outline how this can be achieved.

Chapter 3: Theory Building Part 1 - Emotions and Securitisation Studies

3.1 Introduction

Chapter two presented the case to include emotion(s) in the securitisation framework. This, however, is a task for which Securitisation Studies is - at present - ill-equipped, as an informed understanding of the nature of emotions is lacking in both Political Science in general, and Security Studies in particular (Williams, 2003). To that end, section 3.2 briefly charts how the scientific study of emotion has advanced in sophistication over recent years (Barrett and Satpute, 2019). It demonstrates that, contrary to the flawed 'natural-kind' view of emotions which has long dominated affective science - an understanding which has also influenced the folk-psychology view of emotions in fields such as IR - there are no hardwired emotions in the brain, which, when triggered by external stimuli, unleash a suite of pre-programmed, universal behaviours in all individuals across all contexts (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008). Rather, emotions are better understood as emergent phenomena which are constructed when the brain's cognitive architecture conceptualises internal thoughts and sensations as representing instances of a learned mental category, which, in turn, guides - rather than determines - thoughts and behaviour (Barrett, 2017a; LeDoux, 2012).

Section 3.3 introduces LeDoux and Pine's (2016) constructivist theory of fear and anxiety to conceptualise these two primary emotions of interest to this thesis. This theory provides conceptual clarity on the nature of fear and anxiety and makes a crucial delineation between emotional experiences per se, and the automatic 'survival circuits' reflexes which underpin associated behaviours such as hyper-vigilance and fight and flight response. These two phenomena are often conflated in both the affective science literature, and the fields which draw on the affective science for inspiration (see the considerable literature on so called 'amygdala politics').

Section 3.4 then discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of adopting a constructivist approach for the examination of fear, anxiety and securitisation attitudes. These include the importance of precisely specifying which particular form of fear or anxiety is the unit of analysis; the mutually constitutive nature of cognition

and emotion (and the value of accounting for both in research designs and analytical strategies); the acknowledgment that some degree of variance is to be expected in how emotions guide behaviour and attitudes; and finally, the benefits of self-reporting for measuring emotions compared to other methods (extended discussion on the most appropriate form of self-report method for Studies 1-4 is provided in chapter five).

3.2 From (Flawed) Basic Emotion Theories of Emotion to Constructivism

Should emotions be considered as innate hardwired phenomena that can be inferred from their alleged universal anatomical manifestations such as facial expressions, as proposed by the basic emotion approach (Ekman, 1999; Tomkins, 1962)? Or, are they emergent experiences, produced - not through specific emotion centres in the brain - but by the interaction of affective feedback from the body and brain networks that underpin cognitive functions such as memory, attention and language (Barrett, 2017; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012)? These debates which have characterised affective science during the majority of its development are not esoteric. The predictions we make about emotions influence on securitisation attitudes, and the methods we employ to test hypotheses differ considerably depending upon which school of thought within affective science is followed (Quigley et al., 2013).

Over recent years however, the constructivist school of affective science has emerged as the most empirically grounded and compelling approach for understanding the nature and effects of emotions (Barrett, 2017; LeDoux, 2012, 2014; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Touroutoglou et al., 2015). The constructivist approach asserts that much of the confusion and debate in the field stems from the fact that emotions, in virtually all schools, have been mistakenly reified into biological objects (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012). In other words, researchers who follow this reductive approach assume that emotions are fixed ‘natural kinds’ with a clear biological essence (Barrett, 2007). In this ‘basic emotion’ perspective, emotions are considered to be innate, hard-wired modules, which, when triggered by an external stimulus, unleash a suite of evolutionarily pre-packaged, and universally shared, attitudinal and behavioural responses (Ekman, 1994; Tomkins, 1962).

This school within affective science has considerably influenced how emotions have been studied within the field, and how affective science has been applied to cognate

fields and policy practice (Barrett, 2017b). For example, a basic emotion understanding of emotion was the theoretical foundation for the $900m on Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) developed and implemented by the US Transportation Security Administration. This was modelled on the Facial Action Coding System developed by Ekman et al., (2012) which intended to identify suspected terrorists based on behavioural expressions of emotion. However, the programme's effectiveness has been widely criticised, with the Government Accountability Office recommending that funding for the programme be cancelled due to its lack of impact.

The ineffectiveness of the programme is likely due to its adoption of basic emotion principles (Barrett, 2017a). Put simply, there is now a critical mass of evidence which invalidates this approach. For example, despite hundreds of neuro-imaging studies, there is minimal evidence to support the basic emotion claim that there are specific, modular emotion centres in the brain (Touroutoglou et al., 2015). Decades of research have also concluded that there may not be any common physiological markers of emotions (Roseman, 2011). Finally, despite decades of research, convincing evidence on the purported universality of emotions has failed to materialise (Gendron et al., 2014). As the constructivist camp argues, these results demonstrate the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of emotions within affective science (and the broader fields which derive their theory and practice from a basic emotion approach).

Rather than innate, commonly shared reactions, all constructivist theories consider emotions to be emergent phenomena, comprised of bodily feedback, social learning, memory, language, and innate 'survival' systems, which are produced in/via consciousness (Barrett, 2017b). This view, in comparison to the basic emotion school, has considerable empirical support; most notably, meta-analyses of neuro-imaging evidence finds that emotional experiences are produced through the dynamic interaction of core brain networks which are also responsible for other general functions such as language, memory and perception, rather than unique emotion modules (Lindquist et al., 2012; Touroutoglou 2015).

In addition to considering emotions to be emergent phenomena, another key distinction between the constructivist and basic emotion view is that, for constructivists,

conscious thought is considered to be necessary condition for creating and experiencing emotions (LeDoux, 2012). Emotions, according to constructivists, occur when the brain uses acquired conceptual knowledge to categorise bodily sensations, such as negative affect, and other interoceptive sense stimuli, such as an increased heart rate, as representing a particular instance of an emotional category (Barrett, 2017b).[23] [24]These categories are created, akin to other forms of conceptual knowledge, through experience and socialisation processes (LeBois et al., 2018; Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2016).

Categorisation occurs from childhood as children quickly learn to conceptualise diverse behaviours as examples of discrete emotional categories. For instance, a child learns that a person shouting in the street, their parent coming home stony faced from work, or their own personal sensation of injustice following an unfair punishment are each examples of 'anger', despite the considerable differences between their outwards manifestations and the types of behaviour they guide (LeBois et al., 2018). This process is comparable to how a child learns to conceptualise other phenomena, such as vehicles of different sizes and colours all being instances of the socially constructed category 'car'. As children's language abilities develop, their emotional intelligence increases, and they typically become more adept at identifying subtle nuances in emotion in both themselves and others (see Lindquist, 2017 for a summary of evidence demonstrating the critical role of language in emotional perception and experience). Over time, individuals are exposed to multiple expressions of contextually nuanced emotion, and thus learn a diverse array of conceptualisations for a wide range of emotional hues.

Once formed, an emotion acts as a guide for behaviour (Barrett, 2017a). How exactly the emotion guides thoughts and actions depends upon prior experience, from which the mind generates a portfolio of concepts which is employs to make meaning, and

[23] Affect, commonly conflated with emotion, is used here to denote mood. Affect/mood can be experienced on two dimensions: valence and arousal (Barrett and Russell, 1999).

[24] To maintain and manage balanced internal resource distribution, the brain runs a constant internal model. Whilst much of this activity happens outside of consciousness, interception is the felt sensation of this process e.g., feelings of tiredness, thirst etc., (Barrett, 2017). This is the biological foundation of mood.

predictions about the present and the near future. This predictive ability – which has evolved to equip the body and mind to respond to environmental challenges in a manner that maximises adaptive responses while reducing the resource demands - is why when one merely looks at the image of a hammer, activity in the left ventral premotor cortex increases, an area engaged in motor activities (Chao and Martin, 2000) (notably however, it only primes the individual for action, it does not compel it).

The nature of the response is also affected by the situation in which the individual is experiencing an emotional event. For example, if a refereeing decision while an individual is playing sport is considered to be unfair, this may lead to an experience of anger, which, influenced by the past i.e., social learning of expected behaviour, and the nature of the situation, motivates motor systems to increase effort and aggression. Anger at work however may guide less overtly aggressive behaviours such as the avoidance of colleagues and reduced desire to communicate and socialise.

Finally, individual's cognitive agency can also be an important contributor to how a particular emotion is experienced and manifested. This role of this final factor in shaping emotional reactions is the premise behind cognitive behavioural therapy which posits that humans can exert a degree of cognitive influence over interoceptive sensations by actively seeking to construct positive rather than negative meanings from bodily sensations.[25] For instance, patients are often taught to try to understand physical signs such as jitteriness before an important event as a signal of excitement rather than anxiety.

Factors such as language, personal experience, culture and context are therefore just as important in informing how emotions emerge, and the behaviours that they guide, as our hardwired evolutionary brain systems (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013; Lindquist, Satpute, & Gendron, 2015). This constructivist view of emotions therefore has considerable implications for the longstanding debate on the nature of the relationship between emotion and reason/cognition (Barrett, 2017). From a constructivist perspective, contrary to the Enlightenment view that has long

[25] See the burgeoning research on the predictive nature of the brain (Chanes and Barrett, 2020; Hoemann, Gendron and Barrett, 2017). There is increasing evidence that the brain constantly predicts both the external environment and internal resource requirement based on past experience and sensory information. Emotions are proposed by the constructivists to be products of this predictive capability.

dominated scientific and folk thinking on the subject, emotion and reason are not trapped in an oppositional dialectic. They are mutually co-dependent. As Lindquist and Barrett (2008: 899) describe: 'cognitions about the world are not separate from and do not cause emotion—they constitute it'. This means that for research projects such as this one, a proper formulation of its objective is not exploring how *emotions* affect securitisation attitudes, but how *cognitions and emotions interact* to affect securitisation attitudes.

There are also methodological consequences associated with adopting a constructivist approach. Owing to their reductive stimulus-response view of emotion, basic emotion theorists assume that mixed or contradictory results on how emotions affect behaviours are typically due to flawed methods (Barrett, 2017a). Constructivists, on the other hand, anticipate a degree of non-homogeneity, and seek to understand variance in emotions, exactly because of their appreciation of the influence on individual differences in personality, life experiences, culture etc. (LeBois et al., 2017). However, constructivists also acknowledge that there are sufficient statistical regularities in how emotional experiences, in specific situations, guide behaviour across a population, which makes the pursuit of generalisable findings about their relationships with outcomes a worthwhile endeavour (LeBois et al., 2017). The following section deepens the investigation into conceptualising and defining – through a constructivist lens – the two emotions with most relevance for this thesis: fear and anxiety.

3.3 A Constructivist Theory of Fear and Anxiety

The study of fear and anxiety has not avoided the conceptual confusion and contentious debates that have plagued the broader study of emotion (Adolphs 2013; Fanselow and Pennington, 2017). However, consistent (and coinciding) with the progress cumulating in the development of the constructivist theory of emotion, LeDoux (2012; 2013; 2015) and collaborators (LeDoux and Pine, 2017; LeDoux and Brown, 2017; LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018), have proposed a new, constructivist-aligned framework that defines both of these negative emotions, identifies the difference between the two emotional categories, clarifies how they are produced, and illuminates the difference between them and other biologically driven reflexes. This two-system framework was motivated by the need to advance beyond an increasingly futile debate between advocates of the basic emotion camp - who root fear in biological

systems - which have evolved to enact threat management responses and behaviours, and those who argue that it, and other emotions, emerge in consciousness (LeDoux and Brown, 2017). In a highly influential rethinking of fear and anxiety, LeDoux (2012) proposed an elegant solution.

Their initial argument is the necessity of conceptually distinguishing between innate, hardwired threat systems and the conscious experience of fear and anxiety (LeDoux, 2012; LeDoux and Brown, 2018; LeDoux and Pine, 2016). LeDoux coined the term 'survival circuits' to describe the former systems. These survival circuits evolved to increase fitness by mobilising behaviours in specific situations (LeDoux, 2012). All organisms possess some form of survival circuit: even simple bacteria automatically withdraw from, and/or advance towards, specific chemicals (LeDoux, 2012). In humans, and other mammals, more complex survival circuits have evolved to guide a host of functions; for example, defence, reproduction, and thermoregulation (LeDoux, 2012). It is the defensive circuits which are most relevant to the production of fear and anxiety. As LeDoux and Pine (2016: 2) describe: these circuits 'are evolutionarily wired to detect and respond to innate threats and to respond to novel threats that have been learned about in the past'.

When activated by external stimuli, the defensive circuit triggers a cascade of innate cognitive and behavioural reflexes (LeDoux, 2012). For example, individuals become hyper-vigilant, and attention becomes biased towards perceived threats (LeDoux, 2012). Defensive circuits also drive threat-related automatic behaviour, such as freezing at the sight of a snake. LeDoux (2012: 665) describes the outcome of defensive circuit activation as a 'global organismic state'. The purpose of this state is to automatically monopolise and coordinate resources to enhance 'the organism's ability to cope with a challenge and/or benefit from opportunities' (LeDoux, 2012: 663). In this state, thoughts and behaviour change to meet the challenge at hand. As LeDoux (2015: 102) stresses, however: 'these circuits did not evolve to make feelings. They arose, and continue to exist, simply to help animals stay alive and well'. There is significant evidence that supports this description. It has long been acknowledged that the subjective experience of fear does not correlate well with observable

behavioural and physiological responses (Kozak and Miller 1982). Individuals with significant damage to their amygdala, or broader defensive circuit, remain capable of experiencing fear (Feinstein et al., 2013). Moreover, subliminal presentations of threat-related content increase amygdala activity despite no subjective experience of fear (Whalen et al., 2004).

How then, are fear and anxiety produced? This new framework proposed by LeDoux et al. proposes two paths, with consciousness a necessary condition in both for an emotional experience to occur. The 'low route' to fear is initiated by defensive circuit outputs, for instance, a fight response, which then becomes a potential physiological input to an emotional experience. The alternative 'high route' to fear and anxiety is achieved purely through conscious thought, with existential angst a clear example of this second pathway to an emotional experience (LeDoux & Pine, 2016).

Moreover, whilst fear and anxiety are often co-activated, LeDoux & Pine's (2016) framework makes it possible to distinguish conceptually between the two emotions. Fear is the emotion experienced when an individual consciously considers that a threat - i.e., a source of harm - is 'imminent' or 'immediate' (LeDoux & Pine, 2016: 1084). Anxiety, however, is experienced when a potential threat is thought to be 'uncertain' or 'distal in space and time' (ibid). A precise delineation is required as there is considerable evidence that each emotion contributes to different behaviour and attitudinal responses. As will be discussed in the next chapter, there is a substantial literature exploring threat-based fear's relationship to persuasion and attitude change (Tannenbaum et al., 2015; Witte, 1992). Whereas anxiety is more typically associated with information seeking and risk averse behaviours (Albertson et al., 2020; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013).

3.4 Ramifications for Securitisation Studies

What are the ramifications of adopting a constructivist understanding of emotion for the psychological modelling of securitisation attitudes? First of all, due to the emergent quality of emotions, a significant degree of person-to-person variance in how emotions affect attitudes should be anticipated. This variance is a product of differences in the component parts of an emotional experience i.e., as discussed, the construction of an

emotion depends on individual experience, contextual factors including culture, and, often, subtle differences in innate biology. Individuals also exert a degree of agency over the construction of emotional experiences and reactions. However, if the effects of emotions were entirely idiosyncratic, there would be no value in attempting to integrate them into general frameworks. Due to their social embeddedness, it is reasonable to expect and predict regularities between emotions and attitudinal outcomes. Nonetheless, it is critical to recognize that whilst emotions can guide behaviour, they do not determine it (Barrett, 2009). The challenge is to identify and explain the regularities which do exist, and to account for variance where possible.

The starting point for accomplishing this challenging task, due to the variance in how different emotional and emotional sub-categories manifest themselves, is conceptual precision. With regard to emotions and securitisation, as outlined in chapter two, both anxiety and fear have been tentatively referenced as influential emotions in the securitisation process. However, based upon the definitions of fear and anxiety provided by LeDoux, the following hypothesis is presented:

> *Hypothesis 1:* A securitisation move presenting a specific, immediate threat will affect securitisation attitudes primarily through fear rather than anxiety.

This is not to imply that the securitisation move will not also likely arouse anxiety. However, there is a considerable literature demonstrating that fear tends to be the dominant emotional response when a direct threat is perceived and is also more likely to facilitate persuasion compared to anxiety which tends to guide further information seeking behaviours on the possible threat, rather than immediate attitude change of formation (Brader, 2005**;** Tausczik et al., 2011**;** Valentino et al., 2008).[26]

However, it is important to note that fear itself is a category within which there are many various hues with different effects (LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018). To that end, chapters four and five theorise how two specific forms of fear tentatively considered

[26] It is therefore possible that securitisation moves which are vague as to the immediacy or severity of the proposed threat, or signal a threat through the use of practices e.g., police tactics, without accompanying communications, will primarily affect securitisation attitudes via anxiety. This is covered in areas for future research in chapter eight.

in the securitisation literature to date - that is, threat-based fear and existential fear - may uniquely affect securitisation attitudes.

Second, constructivist theories emphasise the need to distinguish between the roles played by biological inputs into emotions experiences and the emotional experience itself (LeDoux and Pine, 2016). The two, as LeDoux identifies, are closely related, with defensive circuits often providing a key input into the global organismic state which leads to the cognitive categorisation of an episode of threat-based fear. It is likely that defensive circuits will also affect various aspects of the psychological processing of securitisation moves, and the nature of the cognitions and emotional responses that individuals experience. There is already considerable literature demonstrating that attention and cognitive resources are biased towards threatening content (March, Gaertner, and Olson, 2018). Indeed, this has been put forward as an explanation for the journalistic practice of prioritising distressing, violent, dangerous stories, encapsulated in the adage 'if it bleeds, it leads' (Kveraga et al., 2015). Analysis of whether these innate defence circuits do indeed affect securitisation moves is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, attention is focussed on fear(s) - experienced in consciousness - as the unit of analysis, with recommendations made for how the role of defensive circuits in the securitisation process can be examined when discussing areas for future research in chapter eight.

Third, whilst reason/cognition and emotion have long been considered - particularly in Western thought - to be oppositional, with 'emotional thinking' considered an aberration from the rational norm, this crude distinction should be avoided in theorising and methodological strategies within Securitisation Studies (Power and Dalgleish, 2015; Shackman, Fox, and Seminowicz, 2015).[27] From a constructivist perspective, cognition is a necessary component of emotional experiences (Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Pessoa, 2013). The two concepts, therefore, rather than being mutually exclusive, should instead be understood - and researched - as mutually constitutive (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Shackman, et al., 2011). These empirically driven developments within affective science provide further

[27] This distinction manifests itself throughout IR literature; for instance, in the debate over the validity of 'rational actor' models (Hutchinson, 2016 McDermott, 2004; Mercer, 2005).

evidence to support the case that IR broadly, and Security Studies specifically, should place emotion on an even ontological footing with reason (Hutchinson, 2016). Without taking this step, researchers will simply not be able to fully understand and explain the phenomena they purport to examine. The direct implication for this thesis is that emotions and cognitions will be explored with a complementary, holistic focus integrated into both methodology and analysis.

Fourth, expanding on the methodological implications of adopting a constructivist understanding of emotions, there is a long-standing practice within affective science of inferring emotions from their purported physical or behavioural manifestations (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011; Russell, Bachorowski, and Fernandez-Dols, 2003). Constructivists, however, challenge this stimulus-response view of emotion, arguing that there is questionable validity associated with this approach given the heterogeneity of physical and behavioural outputs of the same emotional category. Anger, for example, can be manifested in a variety of behaviours e.g., silence, shouting, frowning etc. Constructivists thus argue that the basic emotion approach can easily lead researchers to conflate the outputs of survival circuits e.g., widening pupils, and the actual experience of fear itself (Barrett, 2018). The more methodologically sound approach, therefore, given that emotions are psychological constructions, is to measure the subjective, conscious experience of emotion (LeDoux and Pine, 2016). This, despite its own limitations, is best conducted by using self-report measures (LeDoux and Pine, 2016).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter provides the crucial conceptual, theoretical, and methodological groundwork for incorporating fear(s) into a psychological model of securitisation attitudes. It first demonstrated that the basic emotion thesis i.e., that there are emotional faculties in the brain that, when triggered, initiate a suite of innate responses is not well supported by empirical evidence (Barrett, 2018). Emotions are instead better understood as compounds of language, personality, biology, and context which are constructed in consciousness, and which guide rather than determine behaviours (LeDoux and Pine, 2016).

Following an exposition of the general constructivist theory of emotion, the two-system framework of fear and anxiety was introduced to define these emotions, which have both been tentatively associated with the securitisation process, to clarify their relationship to biological inputs, and elucidate their differences. Building on this framework, it was hypothesised that, due to an idealised securitisation move emphasising an immediate threat, that fear is likely to be the primary emotional emotions which influences attitudinal responses to securitisation content.

The broader theoretical and methodological implications of adopting a constructivist understanding of fear were then presented. For example, it means that we should ensure that the effects of fear itself, and the outputs of innate threat-response systems, are conceptually distinguished. There are, of course, as the two system framework outlines, connections between the two, such as the activation of the defensive circuit being a 'low route' to an experience of fear (LeDoux, 2012). Fear, however, is always ultimately a cognitive construction which makes it highly dependent on variance in its component parts (Barrett, 2018; LeDoux, 2012).

Researchers should therefore anticipate and, where possible, account for some degree of variance where possible. They should also exhibit conceptual precision regarding units of analysis. To that end, the following chapters examine whether threat-based fear and existential fear produce unique effects on securitisation attitudes. To measure these emotions, it was concluded that self-report should be considered the most appropriate measurement method. Finally, the long-standing tradition of assuming that cognitive and emotional responses to political phenomena stand in opposition to each other should be discarded. Emotion and cognition are mutually constitutive, and any meaningful psychological model of securitisation attitudes must account for their interacting roles. With these foundations set, the next chapter hypothesises precisely how threat-based and existential fear experienced in response to a securitisation move, and the cognitions they guide, are likely to affect securitisation attitudes.

Chapter 4: Theory Building Part 2 - Threat-Based and Existential Fear and Securitisation Attitudes

4.1 Introduction

This chapter theorises how fears affect levels of securitisation attitudes. To propose informed hypotheses on potential relationships between threat-based fear, existential fear, and securitisation attitudes, it draws on selected theory and findings from two experimentally driven fields of social psychology: the fear appeal literature (Mongeau, 2013; Tannenbaum et al., 2015), and terror management theory (TMT) (Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszcynski, 1991). The fear appeal field is dedicated to understanding and explaining the effects of threat-based fear on persuasion. TMT is a separate school within social psychology which posits that reminders of mortality trigger a psychological effect which manifests itself as increased attitudinal dogmatism in message recipients (Burke et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2013).

A summary of relevant aspects of each literature is presented in sections 4.2 (fear appeals) and 4.3 (TMT). Section 4.3 also assesses the appropriateness of seeking to incorporate TMT insights into a theory building project predicated on a constructivist understanding of emotion. The primary challenge is that TMT's formal model presents only a cognitive, and not an emotional path to attitudinal effects. However, as will be argued, emerging evidence suggests a constructivist-aligned, alternative theorisation, wherein cognitive and emotional experiences are both necessary conditions for attitude change, rendering TMT sufficiently consistent with a constructivist epistemology to merit inclusion (Martin & van den Bos, 2014; Webber et al., 2015).

Section 4.4 concludes by demonstrating how insights from each field offer to illuminate interacting causal relationships between securitisation move content, emotional and cognitive responses, and securitisation attitudes. To formalise this theory building exercise, specific hypotheses are proposed which are then examined in subsequent chapters.

4.2 Threat-Based Fear - Fear Appeal Theories

Whilst fear has been assumed to be an enabler of persuasion for millenia, it is only since the mid 20th century that social scientists have sought to identify - through experimentation - exactly how, when and why messages intending to evoke fear lead to attitudinal or behavioural change in targeted audiences (Hovland et al., 1953). This research has developed into a body of work known as fear appeals, a field which has since progressed through a series of theoretical phases, each heavily influenced by shifts in the broader social psychological context (Witte, 1994).[28]

However, despite over half a century of study, only recently has the fear appeal research programme begun to succesfully answer its central research question, and to provide clear, empirically robust recommendations for practitioners (de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2007; Popova, 2012). Emerging evidence, accrued following the rediscovery of prematurely discarded hypotheses (discussed in more detail below), promises to clarify prior disputes, such as whether or not a persuasive fear appeal requires both threat and efficacy messages (i.e. the proposed response to the threat) to be effective, and provides an elegant, simple model explaining how and when fear can facilitate or inhibit persuasion (Shen, 2017). A brief overview of this rediscovery is now provided.

The original fear appeal theories - known as drive theories - proposed two curvilinear relationships between fear and attitudinal outcomes (Hovland, Janis, &. Kelly, 1953; Janis & Feshbach, 1953; McGuire, 1968). The first was a between-persons hypothesis that moderate levels of peak fear experienced in response to a fear appeal are more conducive to persuasion than low or high levels (Hovland et al. 1993). The rationale motivating this hypothesis was a belief that a moderate level of emotional tension - known as 'drive' in the parlance of the time - is required to motivate individuals to process and accept the content of a threat based message. Whereas, minor levels of fear were posited to likely fail to motivate the individual, and it was assumed that excessive levels of fear would lead to defensive outcomes whereby, in

[28] A fear appeal is defined as a communication 'designed strategically to invoke fear among the recipients and use fear as the basis for persuasion' (Shen and Coles, 2015: 226).

order to control the excessively unpleasant sensations elicited, message recipients would reject the message and/or the source (Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, 1953).

Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953) also proposed a second curvilinear hypothesis i.e., at the within-persons level of analysis, fear appeals which arouse and then reduce fear will be more effective at enacting attitude or behavioural change than flatlined or linear responses. Notably, the central mechanism identified here is not only the peak level of fear, but also its rate of change during message processing. As the fear appeal evidence base developed, both curvilinear hypotheses became widely rejected (Witte, 1994). Indeed, numerous meta-analysis confidently surmised that the relationship between fear and persuasion is positive and linear (Boster & Mongeau, 1984; Sutton, 1982; Witte and Allen, 2000). Witte and Allen (2000), for instance, concluded that: 'No evidence was found for any kind of curvilinear relationship between fear appeals and outcomes. The shape of the effects is most consistent with a positive linear-shaped function'.

Accordingly, drive theories - and the curvilinear hypothesis - fell completely out of favour within the field. Despite this consensus, no subsequent school within the field has managed to develop an empirically supported model which identifies when fear enhances or inhibits outcomes, and which message components are required to deliver an effective fear based message (Popova, 2012). As a small but growing number of fear appeal scholars have recently stressed, this is probably due to the limitations of methods used to date, and the premature abandonment of the second version of the curvilinear thesis (Dillard, Li and Huang, 2017; Shen, 2017). New evidence - developed by a group of authors here referred to as the Neo-Drive school - strongly suggests that this second curvilinear hypothesis should not only be reexamined, but that it appears to offer the most convincing explanation for the relative effectiveness of a fear appeal (Meczkowski and Dillard, 2018). The central claim of the neo-drive school is that the original within persons drive hypothesis never received a fair examination. As Shen and Dillard (2014: 99) describe:

> The vast majority of fear appeal investigations utilize cross-sectional research designs, typically either post-test only or pre-test/post-test. In the case of post-test only designs, participants are randomly assigned to a message condition, such as high versus low fear/threat, then asked to provide data on their emotional experience and the degree to which they accept the advocacy of the message. For any given individual, his/her score on fear is used to predict his/her score on persuasion. Because the design is between-subjects, it enables knowledge claims such as persuasion is a linear function of fear. That is, the people who are most frightened are also the people who are most persuaded. In other words, when fear and persuasion are considered across persons, they are positively correlated.

There are clear limitations to these traditional cross-sectional research designs. The most obvious drawback being that they simply do not enable researchers to test the within-persons hypothesis originally made by Hovland and colleagues (Shen, 2017). This hypothesis can only be tested by taking, at minimum, three measurements of fear: 1) pre-message 2) post-threat 3) post-recommendation, and then using advanced structural equation based methods to compare the effects of different rates of change on attitudinal outcomes (Shen, 2017). Several studies have now assessed fear appeals in this manner, with all finding strong support for the within-persons curvilinear hypothesis (Dillard, Li and Huang, 2017; Shen, 2017). This is a significant breakthrough, offering explanation of how, when and why fear appeals succeed.

Accordingly, the within-persons curvilinear hypothesis also offers a convincing clarification of the respective roles of the threat and efficacy components of a fear appeal, and the associated cognitions they elicit - an elucidation which has evaded the field to date. It thus also offers to resolve the long-standing debate over when and why fear appeals backfire or produce sub-optimum outcomes (Kok et al., 2017; Popova, 2012; Tannenbaum et al., 2015). The impact of both these message components upon outcomes is produced through their effects on how fear is experienced over the course of message exposure (Meczkowski and Dillard, 2018). For example, a highly threatening move that produces considerable fear, but lacks a

satisfactory efficacy component, is unlikely to engender the inverted U-curve fear trajectory that the neo-drive school has found to predict persuasive outcomes.

This is consistent with the findings of Shen and Coles (2015: 231) who identify the 'true cause of psychological reactance' to fear appeals i.e. a defensive motivational state which occurs when individuals believe another is threatening their freedom to think or choose (Brehm, 1989), as when 'fear remains at high levels after its activation'. This rediscovery of the curvilinear hypothesis, and the accumulation of supporting evidence, offers to clarify much of the long-standing confusion within the fear appeal field, and offers inspiration to those outside the tradition on how to theorise fear's role in processes such as securitisation by identifying an important regularity vis-à-vis threat-based fear and persuasion. Section 4.4 will expand on the importance of this rediscovery of the within-persons curvilinear hypothesis for incorporating threat-based fear into the securitisation framework.

4.3 Existential Fear - Terror Management Theory

Threat-based fear may only represent one form of fear aroused by securitisation moves. As Huysmans (1998) proposed, fear of death - also known as existential fear - may indeed be the primary emotional foundation on which the collective practice of security policy has developed over human history. Terror Management Theory (TMT) is the sole branch of social psychology dedicated to the study of how this specific form of fear affects human behaviour and attitudes (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). The origins of TMT lie in the work of Ernst Becker (1973, 1975). Becker, an interdisciplinary social anthropologist, proposed that the human capacity for advanced cognitive thought also enables full awareness of our own mortality, which, he argued, can be emotionally and psychologically debilitating unless individuals pyschologically invest in cultural 'hero-systems' - such as religions, nationalism etc. - that provide a sense of meaning and permanence from which they can derive self-esteem by living up to societally codified values and expectations.

Becker's theory was well-received, but largely viewed as a work of cultural anthropology rather than a psychological theory and had minimal initial impact in social psychology (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon, 1986). However, his ideas

later took shape as a social psychological theory of behaviour in the form of TMT. In developing TMT, Greenberg et al., (1986) first sought to experimentally examine the main thrust of Becker's thesis, conducting a number of landmark studies to explore three core hypotheses drawn from his work: 1) the mortality salience hypothesis, 2) the anxiety buffer hypothesis and 3) the death thought accessibility hypothesis (Darrell and Pyszczynski, 2015). These are now briefly outlined.

The first and most widely studied TMT hypothesis is the mortality salience (MS) hypothesis. It proposes that, if cultural worldviews - such as religion and national identity - do indeed provide an existential anxiety buffering function, then reminders of mortality should lead to a compensatory increase in levels of commitment to those cultural worldviews: an effect known as worldview defence (WD) within TMT (Routledge et al., 2010: 898). To examine the MS hypothesis, a typical study involves the experimental group being exposed to a death related manipulation - for instance, asking the experimental group to reflect on their feelings towards their own mortality, or exposing them to death related content in films or media (Pyszczynski et al., 2015) - while the control group reflects on thoughts of pain or other aversive, but non death-related, topics. Both groups are then asked for their attitudes towards a particular issue. Using this method, Pyszczynski et al., (2006) found that MS led to an increase in support for a military response to terrorism, including nuclear strikes, but only for those who self-identified as conservatives, whereas self-identifying liberals exhibited less support for conflict when reminded of mortality.

There are now a significant number of studies which support the MS hypothesis, ranging from views on climate change to attitudes towards preventative health measures (Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Landau et al., 2011; Solomon et al., 2015). In a comprehensive meta-analysis, Burke, Martens and Faucher (2010) aggregated findings from 244 experiments and found an average $r = 0.35$ effect size for MS studies, which ranks among the top 20% of effect sizes in social psychology (Pyszczynski et al., 2015: 10). Of particular relevance to Securitisation Studies, an even stronger effect size was found within studies relating to political-security issues: $r = .50$. Illustratively, following a reminder of death, right-wing Israelis indicated

greater levels of support for violent resistance to policies that would remove Israeli settlers from the Gaza strip in a MS manipulation group (Hirschberger and Ein-Dor, 2006), and Iranian students demonstrated higher levels of support for suicide missions against the US (Pyszczynski et al., 2006).

The second TMT hypothesis - the anxiety buffer hypothesis - is that high levels of self-esteem accrued from an individual's belief that they are adhering to the values of their salient cultural system will mitigate death anxiety. In one of the earliest TMT studies, researchers first manipulated participants' self-esteem through curated feedback to a mock personality test, and then exposed them to MS content (Greenberg et al. 1992: 72). In support of the anxiety buffer hypothesis, the group receiving an artificial self-esteem boost reported less anxiety following MS, a finding repeated in other studies. Greenberg et al., (1993), for example, found that high natural self-esteem also reduced the likelihood of individuals thinking about death after exposure to mortaility reminders. Harmon-Jones et al., (1997) replicated these results and extended the hypothesis further by exploring whether self-esteem would moderate worldview WD effects. Their study concluded that boosting self-esteem does indeed minimise WD. Similarly, high self-esteem was also found to moderate the effect of WD, which has since been confirmed in a range of other studies (Du et al., 2013; Schmeichel et al., 2009).

As TMT developed, other moderators of WD, such as attachment security, have also been proposed (Hart et al., 2005). Attachment security is a concept drawn from attachment theory which refers to the extent to which an individual is confident that attachment figures - such as parents, romantic partners and friends - will be available when needed (Ainsworth et al. 1979; Bowlby, 1969; 1973; Solomon and George, 2018: 367). Mikulincer & Shaver (2001), and Florian, Mikulincer, and Hirschberger (2002) found that attachment security, consistent with predictions, also moderates the effects of MS. It has therefore been added to self-esteem and worldviews to create a tripartite TMT 'anxiety-buffering system' (Hart et al., 2005; Weise et al., 2008).

The final hypothesis that underpins TMT is the death thought accessibility (DTA) hypothesis (Hayes et al., 2010). This hypothesises that, given the anxiety buffering system appears to act to minimise distress experienced when presented with reminders of death, threats to any aspect of the system - worldviews, self-esteem, and close attachments - will increase individuals' death related cognitions (Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & Williams, 2008). This is commonly tested by inducing MS, and then employing a word-stem completion measure that contains words such as COFF_ _ which respondents can complete in either neutral e.g. COFFEE, or primed, death-related manner e.g. COFFIN. Providing support for the DTA hypothesis, threats to the anxiety-buffering system have been widely found to increase death related cognitions (Mikulincer et al., 2002; Schimel et al., 2007).

Examination of these three hypotheses has generated a considerable knowledge base supportive of Becker's theory. In the process of testing these central propositions, TMT also found a number of other effects that have been integrated into a model, formally known as the dual process model of defence against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts (hereafter the dual process model) (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Most notably, TMT studies repeatedly find that some WD effects are stronger after a delay between MS induction and measurement of WD (Burke et al., 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 1999: 58). To explain this phenomenon, the dual process model proposes that the psychological processing of death reminders occurs in two stages.

First, in an initial processing stage, according to the model, when thoughts of death are in the forefront of consciousness due to the recency of exposure to the messaging, individuals will engage in direct threat-orientated cognitions or behaviours, whereby they 'deny their vulnerability, exaggerate their health and hardiness, or simply suppress such thoughts' (Pyszczynski et al., 2015: 15). At this stage in cognitive processing, TMT proposes that the immediate psychological objective is to remove any mortality related thoughts that have the potential to generate unease from consciousness. There is considerable evidence which is supportive of this proposed processing stage. Gailliot, Schmeichel, and Baumeister (2006), for instance, found

that, immediately following an MS induction, individuals demonstrate impaired performance on two measures of analytical reasoning compared to neutral groups. Trémolière et al. (2012) found that mortality salience led to less utilitarian judgments (a frequent measure of rational versus emotional cognitive processing).

It is in the period following this phase of active thought suppression, that the dual process model proposes that death reminders will produce their strongest attitudinal and behavioural effects (Greenberg et al., 2015). TMT's model asserts that during this phase, as suppression begins to weaken, thoughts of death re-enter the cusp of consciousness. At this point distal defences are required, as while proximate defenses such as taking preventative measures, denying vulnerabilities, denigrating the source of threatening information etc., 'might create an illusory expectation of a few decades of additional life, it does nothing to combat the fact that death is inevitable and inescapable' (Pyszczynski et al., 1999: 838). Such existential angst requires psychological defences that can assuage the potential fear that thoughts of death could generate by encouraging individuals to think of themselves as a 'person of value in an eternal world of meaning' (Pyszczynski et al., 1999: 838). According to TMT, this is ultimately why individuals, when confronted with reminders of their own mortality, typically increase their commitment to prior-held cultural worldviews, and, as discussed, the nature of this attitudinal response is proposed to be dependent on the strength of the anxiety buffering system (Greenberg et al., 2015).

The dual process model, as outlined, has considerable evidence to support it. There are however aspects of TMT that are less convincing. For instance, despite 'terror' having a place in the theory's name, emotion has not traditionally been recognised by TMT in its dual process model (DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Lambert et al., 2014). However, experimental advances strongly suggest that an emotional response to a death reminder may indeed be a necessary condition for the WD effect to occur (Martin and van den Bos, 2014; Webber et al., 2015). In Becker's (1972) original theory, thinking about death is presented as a deeply unpleasant experience for most individuals, causing feelings of intense fear (or terror). In TMT, however, whilst thoughts of death are also presented as undesirable for most people, emotion per se is

not included in the dual process model (Greenberg, 2003). This decision was driven by evidence accrued through TMT studies which found that 1) whilst strong MS inductions can produce negative affect in recipiencts, this response does not mediate WD and 2) less vivid death reminders frequently produce WD but fail to generate an emotional response (Greenberg et al., 1997, 2003). To explain these findings, TMT presents WD as a cognitive event that occurs in anticipation of the negative affect which may be experienced when awareness of death conflicts with our innate desire for survival (Landau et al., 2007). In summary, as Greenberg et al., (2003: 516) describe, TMT proposes that WD is produced by 'the possibility of experiencing death-related anxiety rather than the actual experience of anxiety'.

This aspect of the theory has proven contentious and attracted significant criticism (Lambert et al., 2014; Leary, Juhl and Routledge, 2016; Tritt, Inzlicht, and Harmon-Jones, 2012; Webber et al., 2015). Lambert et al. (2014), for example, make a convincing argument, that, in most cases, the measures used to capture emotion following MS exposure have been insufficiently sensitive. Using a more refined method in a series of experiments, they found that MS content did in fact produce significant increases in fear, and insignificant increases in anxiety (Lambert et al. 2014). Webber et al. (2015) provide further evidence that the experience of emotion plays a role in the production of WD. Their innovative experimental work - which draws on the emotional misattribution literature (Schachter and Singer 1962) - identified that emotion is indeed a necessary component of both DTA and WD. The researchers found that when emotion elicited by exposure to death related content was redirected towards non-MS sources, DTA remained low and WD did not occur (Webber et al., 2015). This was not the case in the control group where emotion, aroused by the manipulation, mediated DTA and WD increases.

Webber et al., (2015) conclude that DTA will only increase when (a) an MS manipulation increases negative emotions, and (b) this reaction is correctly understood by the individual experiencing it as having been caused by the mortality related content. This presents a convincing, constructivist-aligned explanation for the relationship between emotion, cognition and WD, and offers a solution to an issue

which has not been satisfactorily addressed in the literature to date, that is, drawing on TMT, should we predict that *all* death related material will produce WD effects? For example, are we to expect that, for a representative sample of U.S. citizens, exposure to a Jolly Roger flag will produce the same psychological effects as exposure to reminders of 9/11? Drawing on Webber and colleagues (2015), perhaps an effective means to differentiate between types of content likely to produce WD or not is to assess whether it can produce perceptible increases in fear that the individual attributes to death related content. Encouragingly, TMT's original theorists, based on the findings outlined above, now acknowledge that reconsideration of the role of emotion in the dual process is required. As Pyszczynski et al. (2015:20) state: 'these recent findings indicate that further research on the role of affect and arousal in MS effects is surely warranted'.

4.4 Developing a Theory of Fears and Securitisation Attitudes

As chapter two identified, while numerous securitisation theorists have tentatively considered what roles fear(s) may play in the securitisation process, emotion remains outside the theoretical hardcore of the field (Huysmans, 1998; Van Rythoven, 2015; Williams, 2010). The result is a considerable gap in the literature, and a pressing need to conduct structured theory building to enable securitisation theory to reach its potential. This section addresses this gap by drawing on selected aspects of the fear appeal literature and TMT to elaborate a range of theoretically coherent, empirically informed hypotheses intended to incorporate threat-based fear and existential fear into the securitisation framework to predict securitisation attitudes, while illuminating the causal relationships between other framework components.

Addressing threat-based fear first, recent developments in the fear appeal field strongly suggest that conclusions on the relationship between fear and securitisation attititudes are contingent on the sophistication of the research method employed. Commonly used methods - such as measuring peak fear, or making a single post experiment measure following exposure to a securitisation move and regressing this onto levels of attitudes - will likely provide confirmation of the folk psychology assumption that there is a small-medium, positive, linear relationship between fear

and persuasion. Indeed, as discussed, this assumption has been endorsed by a number of meta-analyses (Sutton, 1982; Tannenbaum et al., 2015; Witte & Allen, 2000). In terms of modelling threat-based fear and securitisation attitudes however, these methods produce only a simple model whereby unsuccessful securitisation moves are explained by their inability to arouse sufficiently high levels of fear in recipients, with the practical conclusion that securitisation moves should seek to produce as much fear as possible in their intended audience to deliver their intended results.

However, recent findings, strongly indicate that the positive, linear relationship between peak fear and persuasion is likely only one aspect of a more nuanced relationship. Following Shen (2017) and Meczkowski and Dillard (2018), there appears to be considerably more explanatory value in adopting a within persons analytical approach which focuses on the ebb and flow of emotional episodes over time as the unit of analysis, compared to a snapshot between persons approach. When emotional episodes - rather than emotional moments - are the unit of analysis, neo-drive studies lead convincingly to the conclusion that the real relationship between fear and securitisation attitudes is curvilinear.

It is therefore proposed that securitisation moves which arouse threat-based fear, and then reduce it, will be most effective at establishing optimum levels of threat perceptions and a platform for security countermeasures. It is important to stress that this is not mere analytical or methodological conjecture. A dynamic approach focused on emotional episodes also has the potential to act as an organsing mechanism for developing understanding of the causal relationships within the securitisation framework. To that end, it is proposed that to deliver maximum effectiveness, securitisation moves should comprise of an initial threat component, which vividly emphasises the severity and immediacy of the threat in order to arouse initial levels of threat based fear within the audience, followed then by an equally - if not even more convincing - policy response to reduce the negative sensations that message receipients are experiencing.

A focus on the overall emotional dynamic also offers to explain and model when and why fear-based messages may be ineffective or sub-optimum. Shen and Coles (2015) found that threatening messages which arouse fear but do not reduce it are positively correlated with defensive reactions - that is, message recipients are more likely to report that the message is attempting to manipulate them, or denounce the message source as biased. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that, by rejecting the message (and thus negating the cause of their negative emotional state), individuals are able to restore psychological equilibrium (Shen and Coles, 2015). This therefore suggests a nuanced model of threat-based fear and securitisation outcomes i.e. messages which fail to evoke fear will be ineffective due to their inability to sufficiently motivate recipients, and those which arouse but fail to alleviate fear will fail to deliver maximum effectiveness due to increased defensiveness.

A focus on these varying outcomes also points towards a need for an enhanced role for securitisation move content within the framework. Based upon the theory articulated above, it appears that the relative strength of the threat and policy proposals within a move will be the primary message level determinants of the pattern of the emotional response. Therefore, conceptualising securitisation moves as comprising separate threat and efficacy components - standard practice in all modern fear appeal models - will likely enhance the field's understanding of when and why moves succeed or fail, and its predictive power whilst centering analytical focus on the audience.

There are numerous real world examples where differences in the perceived strength of these two securitisation move components may have contributed to sub-optimum securitisation move effectiveness. Political communications concerning climate change offer a clear case study, whereby one of the reasons securitisation actors may have failed to successfully securitise climate change, is their inability to match the threat component of their rhetoric with an equally convincing policy proposal. Therefore, the successful 'management of unease' maybe is a considerably more complex feat than simple 'fear mongering' (Bigo, 2002). To conclude this theory

building section on threat-based fear, various hypotheses are now presented theorising how threat-based fear may affect securitisation attitudes.

Fear Appeal Inspired Hypotheses

Hypothesis 2: In between persons data, there is positive, linear relationship between fear and securitisation attitudes

Hypothesis 3: In within persons data, there is a positive relationship between a curvilinear fear emotional episode over time and securitisation attitudes.

Hypothesis 4: In within persons data, linear fear emotional episodes will be associated with higher levels of defensiveness and lower levels of securitisation attitudes than curvilinear emotional episodes.

Turning attention to how existential fear may influence securitisation attititudes, the most obvious starting point is the observation that securitisation moves often contain reminders of mortality. President Trump's rhetoric regarding his desired border wall is an illustrative example:

> Our southern border is a pipeline for vast quantities of illegal drugs, including meth, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl. Every week, 300 of our citizens are killed by heroin alone, 90% of which floods across from our southern border. More Americans will die from drugs this year than were killed in the entire Vietnam war.
>
> In the last two years, ICE officers made 266,000 arrests of aliens with criminal records, including those charged or convicted of 100,000 assaults, 30,000 sex crimes, and 4,000 violent killings. Over the years, thousands of Americans have been brutally killed by those who illegally entered our country, and thousands more lives will be lost if we don't act right now (Guardian, 2019b)

Such clear, repeated references to mortality in the general sense, and the implied risk of personal death, are standard practice in securitisation discourse. However, securitisation moves often contain more subtle or indirect death reminders, for example, rhetorical flourishes whereby politicians may evoke the sacrifices made by previous generations when seeking to mobilise support for new security policies or make references to traumatic moments in the collective memory, likely to act as death reminders for their target audience. For instance, during a period of escalating violence between Hamas and Israel, Matan Vilnai, Israel's deputy defence minister, warned that: 'The more Qassam [rocket] fire intensifies, and the rockets reach a longer range,

they will bring upon themselves a bigger shoah because we will use all our might to defend ourselves' (Israeli minister warns of Palestinian 'holocaust', 2008).

As discussed, TMT experiments consistently find that both explicit and implicit death reminders can produce WD effects on political attitudes (Burke et al., 2010). Encouragingly, various studies have also elicited WD when using security content or issues as either a manipulation material, or a dependent variable. For example, Landau et al., (2004) found that in US participants, subliminal exposure to the letters WTC (a commonly used acronym for the World Trade Centre) and 9/11 increased death thought awareness and produced the WD effect. This manifested itself as increased support for George W. Bush and his counterterrorism agenda only for those in the experimental group (Landau et al., 2004). Collectively, therefore, the security relevant empirical evidence accrued by TMT suggests a new dimension to the notable summation by Buzan et al. (1998: 26) that: 'By saying the words, something is done'. Indeed, it may be that one of the effects of securitisation moves is to intensify prior held beliefs and attitudes.

TMT therefore potentially offers considerable value to a psychological model of securitisation attitudes by complementing the posited role played by threat-based fear in forming securitisation attitudes with a separate, distinct function played by the fear of death: a specific form of fear which may be the primary psychological driver of much of the security policy landscape (Huysman, 1998). However, beyond overarching theoretical reflections, exactly how fear of death affects the securitisation process has not been considered. To that end, incorporating aspects of TMT's dual process model offers to elaborate the dynamics of this possible relationship. One clear ramification of a TMT inspired psychological model of securitisation attitudes, is the importance of incorporating the audience's political worldview(s), into any explanatory framework. This aligns with Balzacq's (2005: 173) influential definition of securitisation as a 'strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, *based on what it knows about the world* [emphasis added], the claim that a specific development (oral threat or event) is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it'.

Following TMT's empirical results and model, it is predicted here that securitisation moves which include content that reminds the audience of death, and elicit existential fear, will be associated with more intensely polarised securitisation attitudes than moves which do not. This will occur due to the WD effect i.e., a compensatory attempt to reestablish a sense of ontological security. Such an intensification of prior held beliefs is not expected to occur when only threat-based fear is evoked. Therefore, by extension, when a securitisation actor seeks to successfully frame an issue as a threat requiring countermeasures to an ideologically unreceptive audience, non-existential, technically focused content is hypothesised to be more efficacious than a more heavily dramatised move, which threatens to increase death thought accessibility. These effects are only posited to occur when securitisation message content reminding individuals of death also produces significant increases in experienced fear. These insights from TMT are formalized below.

Terror Management Theory Inspired Hypotheses

Hypothesis 5a: Securitisation moves which contain death reminders will increase DTA

Hypothesis 5b: Securitisation moves which do not contain death reminders will not increase DTA.

Hypothesis 6: Death reminders in securitisation moves will increase WD i.e., enhanced commitment to prior held beliefs.

Hypothesis 7: Securitisation moves which are contrary to the audience's political worldview will be more persuasive in non-existential conditions than existential.

Hypothesis 8: WD and DTA will only occur if death reminders increase self-reported fear.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter presents the conclusion of the theory building stage of this thesis. It theorisied how two forms of fear may affect securitisation attitudes. First, it drew on the fear appeal literature to present empirically and theoretically grounded hypotheses relating to how threat-based fear may enable or obstruct securitisation move success. The central argument, inspired by the recent rediscovery and

validation of drive theory's curvilinear hypothesis is the importance of adopting an episodic understanding of how threat-based fear affects persuasion. It is proposed that a snapshot, between persons approach is likely to find a positive, linear relationship between peak fear, threat perceptions and support for a security response. This, however, is argued to have limited explanatory power compared to the within persons curvilinear hypothesis, whereby a fear episode experienced in response to a securitisation move that resembles an inverted U shape over time, will be positively associated with securitisation attitudes. On the contrary, it was hypothesised that securitisation moves which produce more linear forms of fear responses, will be less persuasive, with their efficaciousness negatively mediated by higher levels of defensiveness compared to those which elicit curvilinear emotional experiences.

The possible relationship between existential fear and securitisation attitudes was then explored. Actual death, and, existential angst, are core features of the security landscape. This is not a novel observation; since Thucydides, the personal and collective fear of annihilation have been posited as the cause of threat perception, and the grounds on which to justify the implementation of security policies. Huysmans (1998), amongst others, has therefore tentatively theorised on how such existential concerns may affect the securitisation process. Existential fear, nevertheless, similar to threat-based fear, remains outside the securitisation framework at present.

To address this, it was argued that securitisation moves which increase angst via reminders of death are likely to produce unique attitudinal effects. In such cases, message recipients will demonstrate enhanced commitment to prior held beliefs in an automatic attempt to compensate for their psychological unease. This implies that there are two categories of securitisation move: the existential and the technical. Existential moves will be more effective than technical moves when the audience is ideologically aligned with the content of the message. The opposite is proposed to be the case when the content within the securitisation move is contrary to existing worldviews.

Collectively, not only does the theory elaborated here offer to illuminate Securitisation Studies' understanding of the role of fear(s) in the securitisation process, but it also identifies a means to incorporate variance in message content and audience characteristics into the securitisation framework. In terms of message content, the distinction in the fear appeal literature between levels of persuasiveness of the threat and efficacy components of a message and their effects on emotional dynamics - in addition to whether existential content is present or not - presents a potentially important schema for analysing how securitisation message variance may affect outcomes. The inclusion of ideology as a key determinant of overall message, moreover, also contributes to the nascent literature seeking to fully bring out both the audience's role in the framework and to identify how group level differences in their traits and outlook may affect outcomes.

Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological strategy adopted for this novel enquiry, and the methods and measures used to conduct Studies 1-4 (detailed research designs for each study are presented in the following chapters). The primary argument advanced is that to develop a securitisation framework which is better equipped to explain the relative effectiveness of securitisation moves, an ambitious experimental research agenda is required. Section 5.2 first outlines the limitations of securitisation theory's existing methodological portfolio, demonstrating that whilst the introduction of constructivism into a traditionally positivist field, and the associated promotion of an unorthodox method within Security Studies, i.e., discourse analysis, made a considerable contribution to the field, over-reliance on this method has proven problematic. In brief, disproportionate deployment of discourse analysis, and the tendency for securitisation scholars to focus on positive outcomes, has impeded the development of a more advanced understanding of causal relationships within the securitisation framework. To facilitate the development of a more explanatory framework, it is therefore argued that Securitisation Studies should fully embrace an experimental agenda to complement existing methods.

Section 5.3 then presents the experimental strategy that will be adopted here to explore the hypotheses identified in previous chapters. It first demonstrates that online laboratory experiments are the most appropriate means to study the research questions at hand. This is due to experiments' ability to enhance causal explanation, whilst also being user-friendly and cost-effective. They can also enable recruitment of samples which are more representative of typical populations than standard convenience samples, often used in social psychological research (Berinsky et al., 2012: Mullinix et al., 2016). However, the limitations of online experiments are also considered, and the potential ethical concerns associated with the project are assessed, with mitigating actions, including debriefing, identified.

Section 5.4 specifies the measures that will be applied in each experiment. Given that this thesis represents the most ambitious experimentally driven project within

securitisation theory to date, a detailed explanation of the methods and measures used is provided. To that end, methods for measuring the key dependent variable (securitisation), and independent variables (emotion, and political ideology), and manipulation materials, are therefore presented. The relative merits of alternative methods, where applicable, are considered and explanations provided for each of the methods adopted.

5.2 An Incomplete Revolution: the limitations of discourse analysis and positive case selection

As discussed in chapter one, the orthodox approach towards studying security within the field rests upon positivist assumptions (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). For those working in this positivist tradition, security threats are considered to be quantifiable, observable phenomena (Walt, 1991: 212). Opposition to this hegemonic positivism originally stemmed from subjectivists, for whom, whilst material reality has clear ontological significance, also stressed the importance of subjective perceptions in their research (Jervis, 1976). This subjectivist approach, however, essentially accepted the basic premise of traditional positivism i.e., that security threats are quantifiable, military threats which may be misunderstood due to information asymmetries, cognitive biases etc.

Addressing this limitation represents the CS's main methodological contribution to the field of Security Studies, whereby, drawing from speech act theory, they advanced a revelatory, discursive understanding of security (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). This discursive approach invited researchers, contrary to the epistemological consequences of a focus on material phenomena, to examine how rhetoric is used to *construct* security threat perceptions, and gain support for proposed security policy countermeasures (Buzan et al., 1998). Security Studies thus gained a new dynamic dimension i.e., an emphasis on how security threats perceptions, due to elite discourse, emerge and dissipate. This challenge to Security Studies' epistemological foundations also necessitated a revaluation of methods. To analyse these rhetorical dynamics, the CS encouraged the use of a technique from outside the traditional Security Studies methodological portfolio. As Buzan et al., (1998: 177) state, when discussing how to study cases of securitisation:

> The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a threat. The defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse. We will not use any sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques.

To elaborate, discourse analysis is 'the study of language-in-use', a technique which emerged as a formal approach to analysis 1970s (Wetherell et al., 2001). It is however, a 'fuzzy-discipline', with various strands, and debate exists over whether analysts should focus on text and/or speech (Kaplan and Grabe, 2002). The CS did not dwell on these debates, and encouraged security scholars to simply identify, and analyse security discourse e.g., records of political speeches, newspapers etc., of successful securitisation moves where they found it (Buzan et al., 1998: 178).

Discourse analysis is a powerful, and appropriate tool for this specific purpose, and in combination with the epistemological shift driven by the CS, its introduction into the Security Studies opened an entirely new research agenda that has since inspired countless case studies exploring securitisation in a variety of contexts (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Poe, 2008). However, this strict adherence to discourse analysis advocated by the CS, and the emphasis on studying positive securitisation cases - an approach largely adhered to by subsequent researchers - is not without its drawbacks (Balzacq, 2011). First, the shortcomings of discourse analysis itself are well-established. Whilst discourse analysis can be an important method for interpreting meaning from text, and exploring how rhetoric is used to influence perceptions, it is a highly subjective approach, which inevitably raises questions concerning both the validity, and the reliability of analysis (Powers, 2001).

Secondly, the CS's argument that scholars should study successful outcomes is a clear case of selection bias i.e., the non-random selection of cases. Systematic selection bias can provide misleading, or un-generalisable findings, producing potentially 'devastating implications' for research programmes (Achen and Snidal, 1989: 60).

This arises because 'selecting extreme cases on the dependent variable leads the analyst to focus on cases that, in predictable ways, produce biased estimates of causal effects' (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 59). The opportunity cost of such a methodological decision is stark: despite inspiring numerous contextually informative case studies, minimal attention has been paid to the factors that influence failed securitisation moves.

These arguments against an over-reliance on discourse analysis and positive case bias in Securitisation Studies are not novel (Baele and Thomson, 2017, Balzacq, 2011; Balzacq and Leonard, 2011). Illustratively, Baele and Sterck (2015: 1122) have declared that: 'methods are the Achilles's heel of Securitisation Studies, casting doubt on their conclusions'. Despite the diagnosis however, remedial action has been in short supply, with only a select few (see Baele et al., 2018; Karyotis et al., 2021; Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010) rallying behind Balzacq's call for securitisation to embrace 'a proactive and non-biased attitude towards methodological dialogue' (Balzacq, 2011: 50). As the section below demonstrates, to address these long-standing shortcomings such as the exclusion of emotion from the framework and developing a better understanding of the causal process, Securitisation Studies stands to considerably benefit from embracing an ambitious experimental agenda.

5.3 The Value of Laboratory Experiments: developing a more explanatory securitisation framework

Experiments are the primary method of data gathering, and theory testing in the fields outside the Securitisation Studies tradition from which this thesis draws inspiration i.e., fear appeals, affective science and social psychology (Crawford and Pilanski, 2014; Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg, 2015; Siegel et al., 2018; White and Albarracín, 2018). Well-established experimental traditions also exist in various branches of Political Science, such as public opinion and voting behaviour (Gerber and Green, 2008; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo, 2020). The uptake of experimental methods within IR however, and its sub-fields such as Security Studies, has been slow (De Rooij et al., 2009; McDermott, 2011). In response, this section demonstrates that carefully designed experiments have much to offer Securitisation Studies and are the most appropriate research method for this particular enquiry. To ensure a balanced

account, the merits associated with experiments, are first presented. The section then outlines the limitations associated with an experimental approach, and the steps that should be taken to mitigate them.

Field, laboratory, and survey experiments are all employed in social science (Kittel, Luhan, Morton, 2012; Morton and Williams, 2009). At the highest level, the purpose of experiments is to explore causality via experimental control (Falk and Heckman, 2009). As Webster and Sell (2014: 10) describe, 'experiments are designed to determine how specific kinds of independent variables and antecedent conditions affect dependent variables (or consequents)'. Different forms of experiment vary with regard to the level of control that can be exerted, and all well-designed experiments select and/or identify which variables are present, and exclude those which are either not of interest, or those that confound with the factors under examination (McDermott, 2002; Webster and Sell, 2014). Using this approach, claims of causality i.e., the effect that one or more variable has on another e.g., that the arousal of emotional reactions is necessary for a successful securitisation attempt, can be examined with confidence. This level of control is rarely, if ever, present when researchers use non-experimental methods. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that Securitisation Studies has largely eschewed experimentation, especially given that the stated purpose of the field is to better understand 'who securitises…on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions' (emphasis added) (Buzan et al., 1998: 3).

The value of such control over variables is that it enables the researcher to generalise i.e., infer results from a sample to a broader population (Falk and Heckman, 2009). This is due to the presence of randomisation and representativeness in the (well-designed) experimental process. As Webster and Sell (2011) describe: 'The power of randomization is the power assured by probability theory: if extraneous influences (errors) are distributed randomly, they sum to zero'. If an experiment randomises 'the allocation of subjects to treatments, experiments solve the problem of internal validity, the validity of causal inference, better than any other method' (Morris, Jr., 2014: 192). The related concept of representativeness refers to the extent to which the participants

within a sample reflect the broader population (McDermott, 2002). If both are sufficiently accounted for in an experimental design, its findings vis-à-vis causality, will be considerably more valid than reflections derived from a collection of typically positive case studies.

Accordingly, experimentally driven results will enable securitisation to 'transcend context and case-specific results' that currently dominate the field (Baele and Thomson, 2017: 648). To illustrate this point, Baele and Thomson provide several notable examples of claims made in the securitisation literature that, whilst possessing a degree of theoretical plausibility, cannot be validly demonstrated based on a stand-alone case study. For example, Van Rythoven (2015) contends that the experience of emotion is a necessary condition to construct threat perceptions. This may be true; however, Van Rythoven (2015) relies solely on a qualitative case study of US foreign policy to support his assertion. Only an experimental agenda that assesses the role of emotions, in a controlled manner, in a variety of contexts over time, can provide confidence in such propositions, and enable the development of a cumulative understanding of causality (Stoker, 2010).

As Curran (2009: 77) describes: 'the goal of any empirical science is to pursue the construction of a cumulative base of knowledge upon which the future of the science may be built'. However, all science is conducted in a matrix of individual and organisational incentives and disincentives that influence what is studied, and how it is examined (Kuhn, 1962). This generates threats against what Hedges (1987: 443) defines as empirical and theoretical cumulativeness. The latter refers to the extent to which there is a widespread agreement regarding the validity of results. The former relates to whether theory, and proposed empirical laws, build on previous, peer-reviewed findings. Experiments contribute to both dimensions of cumulativeness i.e., if well-designed, they enable replication, and replicated results can then be relied upon, with confidence, to inform theoretical development. As such, experiments, with their focus on exploring clear hypotheses, facilitate research agendas that seek to increase both breadth and depth of theoretical knowledge on complex issues e.g., securitisation processes.

Experiments, however, are not without their own limitations and risks. They cannot, for example, replicate the best aspects of well conducted discourse analysis as they do not generative rich, descriptive, contextually informed findings, which is why they are ill-suited for such purposes (Druckman et al., 2006). As discussed, experiments should instead be considered when the objective is to better explain relationships between clearly specified variables. There are, however, myriad risks associated experimental methodological strategies. These risks relate to both the validity and replicability of findings. Whilst a discussion of all the possible risks associated with experiments is beyond the scope of this thesis, consideration is given to two particularly relevant threats: ecological validity and sample representativeness.

Ecological Validity, How to Securitise in the Lab, Deception and Consent

Ecological validity is: 'the extent to which the environment experienced by the subjects in a scientific investigation has the properties it is supposed or assumed to have by the experimenter' (Bronfenbrenner, 1977: 516). This concept applies to both the experimental setting and the nature of the stimulus materials (Schmuckler, 2001). In the social sciences, it is often difficult to ensure high levels of ecological validity due to financial and ethical considerations. Accordingly, there is debate over the value of findings produced in experiments that cannot comprehensively replicate 'real-life' conditions. Peters (1998: 48) thus cautions against experimental designs in social science for exactly this reason. To assess whether there are grounds for such a dismissal of the results of experimental findings based on their ostensible limited ecological validity, Anderson, Lindsay, and Bushman, (1999) conducted a seminal study in which they compared the results of 38 psychological effect sizes from field experiments i.e., events occurring in their natural environment, and laboratory studies, and found a robust correlation (r = .73) between the two. Recently, Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto's (2015) highly innovative study, also compared the results of vignette and conjoint experiments i.e., self-declared attitude preferences, to real world political referenda behaviour, and found that attitudes revealed by conjoint surveys can estimate field effects responses to within 2 percentage points. This is particularly encouraging in light of Baele, Coan and Sterk's (2017) introduction of the vignette approach i.e., the use of short descriptive texts intended to elicit specific

thoughts and feelings, into Securitisation Studies. Collectively, the aforementioned suggests that Securitisation Studies can indeed be relatively confident that findings generated from well-designed laboratory experiments reflect 'real world' attitudes and behaviour to a reasonable extent. However, in order to try and reduce the undeniable gap between effect sizes in the real world, and the lab, it is strongly encouraged that those designing lab-based securitisation experiments are mindful of their artificiality and seek to achieve as much mundane realism as possible i.e., content which reflects real world conditions (Schmuckler, 2001).

To that end, one notable characteristic of securitisation in practice, is that it often occurs through various media channels including print media, television broadcasts, political rallies, and social media (Gaufman, 2015; Vultee, 2011; Williams, 2003). This presents the researcher with a variety of options. It would be interesting, given the prominence of social media as a channel for political discourse, to examine how securitisation perceptions are affected by Tweets, Facebook posts etc. However, the decision made here is to emulate Baele et al., (2017) and stick with nascent tradition, i.e. use researcher created stylised newspaper vignettes, due to the fact that mock newspaper content has been found to act as a reliable stimulus in numerous related studies, and has acted as successful manipulation to produce significant differences, in relevant variables such as threat and policy efficacy perceptions, emotional experiences and death thought accessibility (Arceneaux, 2012; Arpan and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Das et al., 2009; Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). This decision is taken conscious of the fact that securitisation, as discussed in chapter two, can also be achieved via non-discursive means. However, as an exploratory project, a focus on the role of language is preferred due to its proven record as a reliable stimulus material.

This leads to the issue of what specific theme the experiments should seek to securitise in the online lab via vignette exposure. To assess the effects of fear, there are two requirements that should be met: 1) an issue which can produce variation in emotional responses and 2) one with which the participants are largely unfamiliar. The latter point is important as it reduces the likelihood of prior attitudes affecting the sensitivity of the manipulations. Accordingly, the first issue which vignettes used in this thesis will

seek to securitise is foreign corruption. Over the past decade, a small but growing number of foreign policy and international development practitioners have sought to create a narrative that corruption in foreign countries presents a global and national security threat to developed countries (Chayes, 2015; Ivanov, 2007). This has been effective at the bureaucratic level e.g., the UK's (2021) Integrated Review outlined illicit finance as a security threat to UK interests. However, there is no evidence that citizens in industrialised states currently consider corruption as a pressing threat. It therefore makes a suitable candidate for a *securitise-able* issue which will be unaffected by existing opinions. For the studies which examine the possible effects of existential fear, there no need to use an unfamiliar issue as the proposed threat. In fact, to test whether the presence of death reminders leads to attitudinal dogmatism, issues with which the audience is familiar are preferrable. For Studies 2-4, climate change will therefore be used due to its existential associations.

This use of stylised materials prompts discussion of the relative merits, and ethics of deception. Researchers conducting media effects experiments are often confronted with the issue of whether to employ deception i.e., 'the provision of information that actively misled subjects regarding some aspect of the study' (Adair et al., 1985: 62). Experimental deception can take several forms, including providing misleading information about the nature of an experiment, failing to disclose what is being measured, and presenting mock manipulation stimuli as authentic/accurate etc. (Bortolotti and Mameli, 2006; Sieber, Iannuzzo, and Rodriquez, 1995). Such forms of deception are an attractive option in cases where the researcher considers that full transparency would negatively affect validity. For example, informing participants that their emotional responses to stimuli is the primary independent variable, may lead to response bias i.e., participants providing feedback according to the researcher's intentions (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). It may also lead to reactance, popularly known as the 'screw you effect' where participants seek to sabotage an experiment (Masling, 1966)

Opinions vary as to whether it is ethical to employ deception in pursuit of greater validity (Kelman, 1967; Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002). Those against deception cite

several possible types of harm to participants, the field, and the researcher (Uz & Kemmelmeier, 2016). Possible harms relevant to the aims of this thesis include the potential for participants to feel that exposure to mock information experiments threatened their dignity and/or self-determination (Uz & Kemmelmeier, 2016). There is also the clear issue of creating lasting impressions that continue outside the experiment. As Baele and Thomson (2017: 662) rightly flag: 'participants in a securitisation experiment could be shocked or even led to believe and endorse the securitizing narratives put forward in the scenario they were exposed to since these should precisely have been tailored to…trigger a change in appraisals….'.

A compromise approach to these ethical issues is taken here: participants were informed that they are participating in an experiment where they will be asked to read a stylised newspaper article and give their views on it before consent is sought. This does not reveal the entire purpose of the experiment and it is also not deceitful. It also provides participants with an opportunity to withdraw. Those who completed the study or withdrew during it were fully debriefed (see Annex A for debrief messages used in Studies 1-4). There are two dimensions to debriefing: dehoaxing and desensitising (Smith & Richardson, 1983). The former refers to informing participants of the purpose of the study and clarifying any inaccuracies. The latter is the act of removing 'any emotional harm (e.g., discomfort, anxiety, or distress) that the study and specifically the deception may have caused' (Hegtvedt, 2014: 36). Following each study, a detailed explanation of its purpose was messaged to recipients with the researcher's contact details. This is consistent with the British Psychological Society's (BPS) Code of Conduct, which states that researchers can exclude information from consent procedures if 'deception is necessary in exceptional circumstances to preserve the integrity of research…[and]…the nature of the deception is disclosed to clients at the earliest feasible opportunity'.

Sample Representativeness

A further criticism often expressed against experiments in social science is that their generalisability tends to be limited due to the nature of their samples (McDermott, 2002). The primary cause is the tendency for social scientists to, for pragmatic reasons, use 'convenience samples', such as university students (Landers and Behrend, 2015).

Students are often a relatively abundant commodity and considerably cheaper than the 'gold standard' samples i.e., population sampling (Mullinix et al., 2016). However, critics, with justification, query the external validity of results from convenience samples that typically rely upon Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic countries (WEIRD) students (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). This group has been deemed 'among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans' (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010: 61; Sears, 1986). Nonetheless, comparisons between WEIRD samples, and more representative ones, suggest that convenience sampling in political science is less problematic than it may appear (Mullinix et al., 2016). For example, Mullinix (2016) and colleagues compared 36 types of effect sizes found in convenience samples to those using population-based samples and found that 29 of the 36 were successfully replicated.

These results demonstrate that while critics are correct to caveat findings from student samples, it would be unwise to dismiss their results out of hand. As Mullinix et al., (2016: 22) conclude: 'convenience samples can lead to substantial progress in the social sciences, most acutely when researchers understand the conditions under which those samples are more or less likely to provide generalizable population inferences'. The steps taken here to bridge the gap between costly population samples, and less valid convenience samples will be discussed in the following section as it relates to the broader argument for using online, laboratory experiments.

The Case for Online Laboratory Experiments

As mentioned, there are three broad categories of experiments: field, survey, and laboratory (Hyde, 2015). All have their relative strengths and limitations, for example, field experiments typically generate greater ecological validity than laboratory studies but allow less experimental control i.e., minimisation of variables not within scope, due to the potential influence of confound variables on outcomes. The choice of which type of experiment is therefore partly dependent on the priorities of the researcher (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Hyde, 2015). As the purpose of this thesis is to address the explanatory gap within the securitisation framework by exploring several hypothesised causal relationships, the main priority is experimental control. For this reason, laboratory experiments will be used, which, to the author's knowledge, will be only

the third case of laboratory studies being conducted within Securitisation Studies and the first examining emotions and securitisation (Baele, Coan and Sterk; 2017; Vultee, 2011).

When designing laboratory experiments, there are various considerations for a researcher e.g., stimulus materials, participant recruitment methods, ecological validity etc (Druckman et al., 2011; Webster and Sell, 2014). Faced with these decisions, many researchers are now using online software to recruit participants and to administer studies (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, and Wiebe, 2011). One of the most widely used online software packages for conducting experiments is Qualtrics, a platform recently used to run fear appeal (Dillard et al., 2016) and TMT (Hirschberger et al., 2016) experiments. There are clear advantages to conducting experimental research via Qualtrics. It provides a user-friendly, dynamic tool, which, due to the partnership between various participant recruitment firms such as MTurk and Prolific enable access to a wide pool of participants, and conduct experiments for relatively low costs (Zhou and Fishback, 2016).

The fact that participants can be drawn from a large, global labour force (MTurk states that is has half a million registered workers) enables researchers to somewhat mitigate threats to representativeness associated with typical student pools (Stewart et al., 2015). Gosling et al., (2014) found that online samples are often more diverse in respect to age, ethnicity, nationality, relationship status, and income, than typical convenience samples. This finding was replicated by Berinsky et al., (2012) who examined the internal and external validity of studies conducted through MTurk (see also Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). They found that MTurk recruited samples, are typically more representative of the US population, than 'in-person convenience samples' such as students (Berinsky et al., 2012: Mullinix et al., 2016). Another, more recent comparison conducted by Peer et al. (2017), examining the relative merits of three participant recruitment firms - Prolific, CrowdFlower, and MTurk - found that whilst Prolific produced data of similar quality to MTurk participants, the sample was significantly more diverse.

Despite these advantages, concerns have been raised about various threats to the internal validity of online experiments. For example, the concern that online respondents in unsupervised environments may not be as attentive as those working in a supervised lab setting, as they may have their attention divided between ambient activities e.g., background music, or other online behaviour such as browsing social media (Hauser and Schwarz, 2015). The evidence on this topic however is mixed. Goodman et al., (2013) examined this issue using instructional manipulation checks (IMCs) and did find that MTurk respondents were somewhat less attentive than college students. On the other hand, Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, (2012), and Hauser and Schwarz, (2015) found that, compared to college samples, online participants were more diligent across a range of attentiveness tasks. Overall, therefore, evidence leans towards the suggestion that, despite the presence of possible distractions for online respondents, there is no notable difference between their levels of engagement than traditional participants.

An additional risk often highlighted is the possibility of repeated participation, which can occur if online respondents have multiple accounts which poses threats to the ability of manipulations to produce their desired effects (Cheung et al., 2017). However, the limited evidence gathered on this issue implies that repeated participation is relatively low as Berinsky et al., (2012) examined this potential threat and found that only a very small number of respondents shared an IP address (which, in itself, does not conclusively indicate that they are duplicates). For instance, two respondents using the same university network could share an IP. Overall, online software and recruitment methods, such as Qualtrics and Prolific, present an opportunity to design and run user-friendly, dynamic experiments that produce valid results, with cost-effective, reasonably representative participants. They will therefore be used to conduct all studies in this thesis.

5.4 Dependent Variables

Securitisation Attitudes

Securitisation attitudes are the primary dependent variable of concern. As described in chapter one however, securitisation itself lacks a consensually agreed upon definition within the field. This complicates operationalisation i.e., 'the translation of a theoretical variable into procedures designed to give information about its levels' (Foschi, 2014: 255). There has also been minimal research under-taken to compare various definitions to identify their commonalities, and to present a compromise ideal of successful and unsuccessful securitisation moves. One notable exception however is Floyd (2017: 12), who, inspired by the 'practice turn' in the broader IR field, has attempted to bridge the gap between the philosophical CS, and the sociological PS understandings of securitisation, by proposing that a complete securitisation occurs 'only if relevant actors act in response to the speech act'. This proposal has merit, as it is clearly less challenging to identify specific actions in comparison to proving the existence of a policy platform. However, the inherent risk of making action the defining criterion of success, is that it potentially undercuts the important intersubjective nature of the securitisation concept. For example, if a securitising actor declares an object to be a threat, then unilaterally implements a policy without the support of the relevant audience, should we consider that a successful securitisation? This would clearly risk undermining the fact that the outcome of securitisation must always be decided by the audience (Buzan et al., 1998).

To operationalise securitisation attitudes in a manner conducive to experimentation, the following is proposed: a successful securitisation requires the intended audience to demonstrate high levels of agreement that a threat exists and support for an immediate government security response (this is intentionally reminiscent of the Balzacq's (2005) definition). To be clear, government security response is not intended to mean that the audience supports a specific policy per se, simply that they expect and support the principle of security countermeasures or policy. This offers a two-dimensional, continuous understanding of securitisation, rather than a reductive binary one i.e., one that considers a securitisation move to be either a categorical success or a complete failure. By extension, securitisation attitudes themselves are therefore operationalised

as the extent to which the audience agrees that a security threat exists, and their level of support for 'immediate government action'.

This then leads to the issue of how to measure securitisation attitudes. There are various options, for example, in their recent vignette survey, Baele, Coan and Sterck (2018) use Likert scales to measure items for both threat and security response support (3 items for threat and 5 for security response support) and the results for each were then combined into simple additive indices. Employing either a five- or seven-point scale, Likert items reflect the degree to which respondents agree or disagree with a statement (Matell and Jacoby, 1971). There are advantages to Likert scales including their simplicity, standardised nature, and the ability to generate a summation value (Baker, Singleton and Velt, 2010). Nonetheless, there are also drawbacks to Likert scales, for instance, depending on how they are presented, order effects can occur whereby participants demonstrate a bias towards responses on the left of the scale (Chan, 1991). Likert scales can also lead to central tendency bias, whereby individuals seek to avoid 'extreme' answers (Sullivan and Artino, 2013). When using Likert scales, there is also the possibility of acquiescence bias which occurs when respondents seek to be agreeable in their answers. Finally, Likert scales produce ordinal data i.e., the order of rankings can be discerned (6 is greater than 5), but not the distance between them and the usefulness of ordinal data for parametric statistical analysis has been debated (Carifio and Perla, 2008).

Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) present a similarly simple, but less problematic alternative for measuring securitisation attitudes. A VAS is a relatively simple measure which presents the respondent with a line, typically 100mm long, anchored at each end by the extreme values of the variable being measured (Couper et al., 2006). The participant is then encouraged to signal where their attitude lies on this scale. There are both pragmatic and statistical advantages to VAS, including their ease of use, and the user-friendly nature of online software, which may increase respondent engagement (Stanley and Jenkins, 2007). In terms of the data quality, a VAS possesses ratio and interval properties, which make it a more appealing measure for statistical analysis (Price, Staud and Robinson, 2012). For the above reasons, to assess the extent

to which, if any, individuals consider an object to be a security threat, and their levels of support for a security response, they will be asked to complete a 0-10 VAS scale, with 0 representing no threat/support, 5 a moderate threat/support, and 10 an existential threat/completely support (see Annex B for both VAS scales).

In addition to its simplicity, a further advantage of using a sliding VAS is that it relies upon the audience's own definition of security. This embraces the intersubjective nature of securitisation more completely than a composite measure, such as the ones used by Baele, Coan and Sterck (2018) who created composite measures for both threat perception and security response support. To measure threat perceptions of Tuberculosis (TB), Baele, Coan and Sterck (2018) asked respondents to identify, using Likert scales, the 'perceived 'urgency' of the threat, the 'importance' of the issue, and whether the respondent views TB as a threat to 'society' or to them 'personally' (Baele, Coan and Sterck (2018). The issue arising from the use of composites is that it risks what Ciută (2009) terms 'definitional fiat' i.e., a situation whereby the analyst's concept of security takes precedence over audience perceptions. For that reason, to measure both securitisation attitudes, respondents will simply be asked to indicate on a slider bar the extent to which, if at all, they consider foreign corruption to be a security threat, and to indicate their level of support or opposition towards immediate US action on foreign corruption. This operationalization is intended to reflect the position, shared by the CS and Balzacq (2005: 173), that a successful securitisation does not need the audience to support a specific policy, but rather, be in favour of a general immediate security response.

Death Thought Awareness

The purpose of Study 2 will be to assess whether securitisation move content that differs in levels of the intensity of death reminders can produce varying degrees of existential angst. However, there is no direct method of measuring this form of fear. In TMT studies, levels of death thought accessibility are typically used to indirectly evidence that manipulation stimulus did elicit increased death related cognitions. As Hayes et al., (2010: 716) describe: 'an implied assumption of TMT is that in the face of mortality awareness DTA mediates, or at least partially mediates, worldview and self-esteem defensiveness'. Many TMT studies therefore measure DTA, and conduct

meditational analysis (Arrowood et al., 2017; Galliot, Sillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008; Vail III, Arndt, Motyl, & Pyszczynski, 2012). The typical measure of DTA, is a word fragment completion task (Greenberg et al., 1994). In TMT studies using this approach, respondents are presented with approximately 20-25 incomplete words fragments. These fragments include a sub-set of words that can be answered either neutrally, or in a manner which relates to death e.g., COFF_ _ [coffee or coffin], CO_ _ SE [course or corpse], and GRA _ _ [grave or grape]). This has repeatedly proved a successful means to measure whether stimulus materials do indeed increase DTA and will therefore be used in Studies 2 and 3 (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, 1999).

Worldview Defence

With securitisation attitudes operationalised, the same task must now be completed for WD, which is the dependent variable of interest in Studies 3 and 4. In TMT, this effect is defined as 'a heightened effort to adhere to culturally derived beliefs, however those beliefs are individually defined' (Juhl & Routledge, 2010: 984). The ambiguity in this definition reflects the fact that worldviews are both imprecisely bounded, and deeply personal. As such, operationalising WD is challenging (Juhl & Routledge, 2010). In TMT studies, two methods are traditionally used. The first is to measure attitudes towards a specific issue e.g., support for a particular war, and to compare means across an experimental group exposed to death reminders, and a control group (Burke et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2005; Pyszczynski et al., 2006).

The second, more straightforward method used is to assess the effects of death reminders on levels of dogmatism. This innovative method was introduced to TMT by Vail III et al., (2013) who used Altemeyer's (2002) political neutral 22-item Dogmatism (Dog) scale as a measure. The rationale for using dogmatism as an operationalisation of WD effect is clear: exposure to death reminders is purported to increase commitment to prior held beliefs. Vail III et al., (2013) therefore exposed groups to images which either evoked reminders of death or not and found that the death condition group demonstrated enhanced levels of dogmatism in line with predictions.

Both approaches have their relative merits, for instance, using dogmatism itself as a measure is a useful method in exploratory studies, to assess whether securitisation moves containing death reminders can produce WD. Conversely, using attitudes to measure WD has greater ecological validity i.e., do death reminders in securitisation moves affect securitisation attitudes? Therefore, in Study 3, which is an exploratory study testing whether MS content in securitisation moves can produce the WD effect, the dogmatism scale will therefore be used. Altemeyer's (1996: 201) scale builds on pioneering work into dogmatism by Rokeach, (1960), and operationalises the concept as 'an unchangeable and unjustified certainty in one's beliefs'. It consists of 22 statements, with the first two not included in the final summation of equally balanced positive and reserve coded items. Example items include 'It is best to be open to all possibilities and ready to reevaluate all your beliefs' and 'The people who disagree with me may well turn out to be right'. Crowson, DeBacker, and Davis (2008: 17; 23) reviewed the scales 'factorial, discriminant, convergent, and criterion related validity' and found that it performed reasonably well as a 'unidimensional and internally consistent measure'.

For Study 4, which explores whether securitisation move content affects securitisation attitudes, the measures discussed in reference to Study 1 will be used to measure WD. This is consistent with various TMT studies that have examined the effects of MS on support for specific security policies as their dependent measure (Chatard et al., 2011; Landau et al., 2004; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). The main difference between this approach and similar studies, is that the studies cited did not measure threat perception itself, instead, they assessed support for specific countermeasures against out-groups e.g., the use of pre-emptive attacks against Iran, Syria, and North Korea) (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). This raises the question of whether WD increases motivation to act, and/or also increases threat perception. The use of both measures permits exploration of this issue.

5.5 Independent Variables

Emotion

The experience, and trajectory of emotional responses to securitisation moves is posited to be a primary predictor of securitisation attitudes. However, measuring emotion(s), as outlined in chapter three, is a contentious issue (Barrett, 2014). Returning to the methods used at the beginning of the scientific study of emotion, constructivists stress that despite its own obvious limitations, self-report presents the most valid measurement approach (LeDoux and Hoffman, 2018; LeDoux and Pine, 2016). The primary advantage of self-report is that it is the only method that affords the subject with the opportunity to communicate their understanding of their own emotional states (Quigley, Lindquist and Barrett, 2014). As Cowen and Keltner (2017: 900) describe: 'People represent their transient experiences within a semantic space that includes hundreds, if not thousands, of semantic terms that refer to a rich variety of emotional states'. Self-report however is not without its own risks as the method is based upon the assumption that the individual can accurately, and honestly, identify, understand, and express a particular emotion. It also assumes that two individuals asserting that they are experiencing fear possess a shared understanding of the concept (Barrett, 2014). It is however, on balance, the most valid method available (LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018). The question now arises as to how best to conduct self-report (Harmon-Jones, Bastian, and Harmon-Jones, 2016).

One option is the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) that has been used in numerous psychological enquiries (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988). This schedule however is vulnerable to critique (Lambert et al., 2014). A particularly relevant shortcoming relates to the insensitivity of the scale regarding differentiating fear and anxiety. The fear index, for instance, within the PANAS asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they feel nervous, jittery, and shaky. These terms, problematically, are more traditionally associated with the experience of anxiety (Lambert et al., 2014). As such, by conflating the two emotions, PANAS is a poor measure of either fear or anxiety (Ebesutani et al., 2011).

An alternative approach to self-report that sidesteps the issue is to use single item measures (Ekman, Friesen, and Ancoli, 1980; Gross and Levenson, 1993). These typically take the form of a list of emotions with accompanying Likert scales. There

are however potential drawbacks to single-item measures as reliability tends to increase in proportion to survey length and single measures can also risk error variance (Crede, Harms, Niehorster, Gaye-Valentine, 2012; Harmon-Jones, Bastian, and Harmon-Jones, 2016).

There are nevertheless benefits to single measures, that make them an attractive option for the purposes of this study. Firstly, they help mitigate respondent fatigue, which is particularly important when using repeated measurements (Burisch, 1984; Harmon-Jones, Bastian, and Harmon-Jones, 2016). As previously discussed, fear appeal and TMT studies have traditionally only taken one static, post manipulation measure (Dillard et al., 2016). This, of course, makes measurement of the trajectory - which requires at least three measures - of emotion(s) impossible (Shen & Dillard, 2014). Following Dillard et al., (2016), Meczkowski, Yang, and Shen (2017), three measures of emotion will therefore be taken. To minimise the potential risk of respondent fatigue caused due to repeated measures in Study 1, a single measure will be used at each measurement point for three emotions: fear, anxiety, and happiness. Respondents will be asked variations of the question 'How do you feel at the moment? Please respond for all options' with the response scale anchored where 1 = none at all, and 7 = a great deal.

Cognitive variables

Chapter three stressed that emotions and cognitions are fundamentally entwined. Studies 1-4 therefore present an opportunity to explore potential interactions between fear, anxiety, and thoughts. This however presents an initial challenge i.e., which cognitions should be measured? An empirical and theory driven approach which draws from securitisation theory, and fear appeal models and findings, may assist in identifying potential cognitive independent variables. Firstly, it is likely that there will be a considerable, positive correlation between levels of perceived threat severity and security threat perceptions. The CS provides inspiration for operationalising perceived severity i.e., it is likely a combination of the perceived danger posed by the threat and its perceived immediacy (Buzan et al., 1998: 26-36). This, however, has yet to be experimentally tested. To that end, 7-point scales will be used in Study 1 asking

participants to ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the opinion that ‘foreign corruption is very dangerous to the US’ and ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the opinion that ‘foreign corruption poses an urgent threat to the US’. Secondly, perceived susceptibility or vulnerability is a core feature of all fear appeal models. As there has been minimal consideration of the role of perceived susceptibility in securitisation theory, two cognitive variables will be measured to enable exploratory analysis: perceived personal vulnerability and perceived national vulnerability. These will also be measured using 7-point scales asking, ‘Do you agree or disagree with the statement that ‘foreign corruption presents a threat to you or your community’ and ‘Do you agree or disagree with the opinion that the US is ‘very vulnerable to the effects of foreign corruption’.

This accounts for cognitive variables that may affect threat perception. Fear appeal models also stress the importance of cognitive antecedents to levels of perceived response efficacy, which, in the securitisation context, has clear relevance to security response support. The climate change example is illustrative of this possibility i.e., if individuals believe that there is little the government can do to address a complex problem, it is reasonable to assume that they will be less supportive of immediate action. To that end, to measure perceptions of government efficacy, participants will be asked respond to a 7-point scale question asking them to: ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the opinion that ‘the US government can help reduce corruption in other countries’.

Turning attention to negative responses to securitisation moves, as discussed in chapter four, there is also the possibility that securitisation messages will arouse defensive reactions. There are various possible measures to assess defensiveness. For the purposes of Study 1, Shen and Cole’s (2015) method of measuring perceived manipulation and message derogation - both facets of defensiveness - will be employed. To measure perceived manipulation, participants will be asked the following three questions, using a 1-5 Likert scale: ‘The article tried to make a decision for me’, ‘The article tried to manipulate me,’ and ‘The article tried to pressure me’. Answers will be combined into a composite index. To assess message derogation, a

short bipolar matrix table containing three oppositional items i.e., unconvincing-convincing, unbiased-fair, and distorted-balanced will be used, with answers also converted into an overall composite.

5.6 Conclusion

The chapter demonstrated that an experimental agenda within Securitisation Studies is required to produce insights that will improve the explanatory power of the securitisation framework. It will also provide an important counterbalance to discourse analysis and the negative consequences arising from how this technique has typically been used i.e., an emphasis on analysing positive outcomes. For the purposes of this thesis, it was argued that an online laboratory research design is the most appropriate. This is due to the various advantages associated with online software e.g., they provide user friendly environments to conduct experiments and also enable the recruitment of relatively cost-effective participants who tend to generate samples that are more representative than typical convenience samples. The specific methods, both those created for the purposes of this study e.g., the introduction of a VAS to measure securitisation, and those inspired methods in cognate fields, that will be used to measure each dependent, independent, and moderator variables were then outlined. This sets the scene for the following two chapters which outline the specific research design and results of Studies 1-4.

Chapter 6: Results Part 1 - Threat-Based Fear

6.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design, results, and analysis of Study 1, a large online experiment conducted to analyse hypotheses 1-4. Section 6.2 first describes the procedures and participants of the online vignette experiment. Section 6.3 then provides a summary of manipulation checks, descriptive and correlational results. These demonstrate that the intended manipulations were successful at producing: 1) peaks in emotional experience and 2) generating a curvilinear response in the high efficacy condition and a more linear response in the low efficacy condition. Correlation analysis also provided initial support for H1 i.e., peak fear (T2) was a more significant predictor of both threat perception levels and support for a security response than anxiety at T2. [29]

Section 6.4. presents the results of various forward multiple regression analyses conducted to further examine H1, to test H2, and to conduct exploratory analysis on possible relationships between emotions and cognitions, and their effects on securitisation attitudes. These models confirmed that when other variables are included in multiple regressions, peak fear – in both high and low efficacy conditions, exhibited the hypothesised small, linear relationship with levels of threat perception. However, no significant relationship was found between peak fear and security response support. Mixed support was therefore found for H2. The forward selection multiple regression models also enabled analysis of the relative importance of cognitive variables in shaping levels of each securitisation attitude. For threat perception, perceived security and perceived susceptibility, in addition to peak fear, were the most significant cognitive independent variables. For levels of security response support, perceived threat severity and perceptions of government efficacy were both significant predictors.

Section 6.4 also presents several mediation analyses conducted to further examine between persons relationships between these emotional and cognitive responses to

[29] In certain models in this chapter, due to character constraints in AMOS, security response support is labelled as 'Policy'.

securitisation move content, and securitisation attitudes. Fear at T2 was found to directly affect security threat perceptions, and also to exert an indirect influence by elevating severity and susceptibility cognitions. In terms of security response support levels, mediation analysis revealed that higher levels of perceived danger and threat immediacy contribute to higher levels of security response support by inflating perceptions of government efficacy.

Section 6.5 focuses on examining the within persons hypotheses i.e., H3 and H4. Using an innovative latent basis model, clear evidence was found to support H3. In brief, the curvilinear rate of emotional change over time, when modelled as the predictor of security threat perceptions, produced a good fitting model with a highly significant coefficient term. However, model fit for the more linear rate of change was unacceptable. Notably, the effect size (β =.38) of curvilinear emotional fear episodes on threat perception was also considerably larger than the coefficient found in the 'snapshot' between persons analysis of peak fear on threat perception (β =.26). Furthermore, in contrast to the results from between persons analysis, the curvilinear rate of change predicted both security threat perceptions *and* security response support.

An extended latent basis model was then used to test H4. Strong supporting evidence was again found. Curvilinear threat-based fear episodes negatively predicted both perceived manipulation and message derogation, which in turn, both negatively mediated securitisation attitudes. The linear emotional episode however did not demonstrate a negative association with either defensiveness measure. In other words, an emotional response whereby fear is aroused then decreased reduced defensive reactions to a securitisation move, whereas a linear emotional episode did not. This result is further supported by the finding that both defensiveness measures are significantly higher in the low efficacy condition than high efficacy condition. Finally, H4 was also reinforced by the striking finding that, despite being exposed to the same threat content, threat perception levels were lower in the low efficacy condition compared to the high efficacy condition. This provides further validation that the primary threat-based fear determinant of a securitisation move's relative success is the

rate of change of an emotional experience over time while processing a securitisation move.

6.2 Procedures and Participants

Following approval from the University of Strathclyde's Ethics Committee, 900 individuals were recruited via Prolific to participate in a vignette study. This large sample was selected due to the widely reported sensitivity of SEM estimates and goodness of fit measures to sample size and because the potential effect size of fear reduction on securitisation attitudes is unknown (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001; Kline 2010). Of the participants who completed Study 1, 479 were male, 417 were female and 4 preferred not to say. The median age was 34, ranging from 18-67. As the experiment was estimated to take approximately six minutes, participants who completed the experiment received £0.75 compensation, considered a 'good' level of pay according to Prolific's standards. Potential participants were presented with instructions which provided an overview of the experiment, and also informed that the purpose of the research was to develop a better understanding of the relationships between emotions, thoughts and feelings about stylized media content. They were then asked to provide consent to continue, or to exit the experiment. All consenting participants first provided basic demographic information and completed a baseline emotion measure at T0.

Following this, participants read a stylized newspaper article which presented corruption in other countries as a security threat to the US (see Annex C for full manipulation materials). As mentioned, this unfamiliar topic was selected to provide a manipulation stimulus of which the participants would likely have limited prior knowledge/attitudes. The threat component was divided into two sections, with the first intended to arouse some degree of initial negative arousal, and the latter section designed to produce peak levels of fear and/or anxiety due to its more vivid language, This second component emphasised the severity of the purported threat e.g.: 'The COVID-19 global pandemic is a powerful case study of how corruption in other countries can harm us here'.

Participants were then randomly assigned to either high efficacy or a low efficacy condition. In the high efficacy condition, two messages outlining policies that the US could advance to reduce the corruption threat were presented. These were drafted with the intention to create the impression within the audience that there is feasible action that can be taken by the US government to reduce the threat:

> Across the world, people are taking to the streets to demand an end to corrupt leaders. In the past five years alone, citizens in almost 20 countries have led popular movements to sweep away corrupt governments in favor of leaders with integrity. We cannot fight these other countries' internal battles for them, but we can tilt the scales further toward those who want to enact positive change.

In the low efficacy condition, participants read two message sections emphasising the difficulties associated with tackling corruption in other countries. These were intended to convey the difficulties of mitigating the threat, which was expected to lead to lower levels of reduction in fear and anxiety compared to the high efficacy condition. For example:

> At the moment, the US spends a tiny proportion of our overseas aid budget - 0.33% - trying to fight corruption in other countries. Is it worth spending more of our tax dollars on anticorruption efforts overseas? The weight of evidence suggests that the return on investments in anti-corruption efforts is worryingly low.

After participants read each section, a single item emotion measure was taken. This generated data on the emotional trajectory measured at five time points (T0-T4) for those in each condition. Participants then answered the dependent measures, and several independent measures of various cognitions of potential relevance e.g., the degree to which they perceived threat as imminent, and two measures of defensive reactions: perceived manipulation and message derogation. Items in the former measure include 'The article tried to pressure me', and 'This article tried to make a decision for me', and the latter asked participants to indicate their views on the article scale on a scale with three measures ranging from 1) not convincing-convincing, 2) biased-fair, and 3) distorted-balanced.

Once the study was complete, participants were sent a debrief message providing further details on the purpose of the experiment and the researcher's contact details (see Annex A).

6.3 Manipulation Checks, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Responses were first reviewed and cleansed to remove incomplete data, low effort input such as answering every measure with 0, and inconsistent responses e.g., individuals reporting maximum levels of perceived threat immediacy and severity, but minimum values for security threat perception. This left n = 416 in the high efficacy condition and n = 417 in the low efficacy conditions. Following data cleansing, an initial evaluation of the mean values for fear and anxiety at each point confirmed that the manipulations were successful, and that the intended internal emotional dynamics were produced. In the high efficacy condition, both anxiety and fear peaked at T2. This, as intended, occurred immediately following reading the second threat message section. In the high efficacy condition, fear and anxiety levels were then reduced to levels approaching or below their baseline after reading message sections 3 and 4 which outlined the proposed policy response. In the low efficacy condition, fear and anxiety levels were only reduced slightly from peak levels. Comparisons of the final emotion means confirmed that emotional experiences in each condition were significantly different. Fear at T4 (M = 1.6, SD = 1.3) in the high efficacy condition was significantly lower than fear at T4 (M = 1.9, SD = 1.5) in the low efficacy condition, $t(821) = -0.4$, $p < .001$, and anxiety at T4 (M = 2.1, SD = 1.6) in the high condition was significantly lower than its low efficacy condition equivalent (M = 2.6, SD = 1.8), $t(821) = -4.1$, $p < .001$. Means at all time points are provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Fear and Anxiety Means at All Time Points

	T0	T1	T2	T3	T4
High Efficacy Condition - Fear	1.4	1.8	2.4	1.7	1.6
Low Efficacy Condition - Fear	1.2	1.6	2.3	1.9	1.9
High Efficacy Condition - Anxiety	2.3	2.7	3	2.2	2.1

Low Efficacy Condition - Anxiety	2.2	2.5	2.9	2.5	2.6

After completing the manipulation checks, correlation analysis was conducted in both conditions to enable an initial assessment of possible relationships between all emotion time points and dependent variables (see Appendix A for high efficacy correlations correlation matrix). In the high efficacy condition, $r(416) = 0.26$, $p > .001$, and the low efficacy condition $r(415) = 0.26$, $p > .001$, peak fear at T2 had the strongest, and most significant relationship with security threat perceptions. In the low efficacy data, anxiety at T2 did demonstrate a positive, significant correlation with threat perception, $r(415) = 0.14$, $p > 0.01$, but this was considerably weaker than fear. Fear at T2 in the low efficacy condition also demonstrated the strongest correlation with security response support $r(416) = 0.11$, $p = .03$. Anxiety did not exhibit a significant correlation.

6.4 Forward Multiple Regression Models

Following this initial descriptive and correlation analysis, multiple forward selection regression analyses, a standard method for identifying best fitting predictor subsets in exploratory data with alpha to remove variables set at .1, and to include at .05 were conducted to examine possible relationships between emotions, cognitions, and their respective impacts on the two dependent variables in more detail (Neter et al., 1996). Forward selection models are a standard method. To note, due to potential multicollinearity between danger and urgency detected through initial correlation analysis $r(416) = 0.82$, $p > .001$, the two variables were excluded from the model, with the composite independent variable 'combined severity' loaded into the stepwise models analysis instead.

For the high efficacy condition data, a forward selection model with all cognitive independent variables and fear at T2 were included in the initial block, which led to three model possibilities as show in Tables 2 and 3 overleaf. Model 3, with the largest adjusted $r^2 = .41$, included fear at T2, and two cognitive variables: combined severity and combined susceptibility. A satisfactory Durbin-Watson score = 2.2 confirms that

the data met assumptions around independent errors. Further analysis was also conducted to ensure that the data meets collinearity assumptions. VIF and tolerance scores were satisfactory for all independent variables. Finally, as shown in Figure 2, a scatterplot of residuals demonstrates no evidence of homoscedasticity.

Table 2: Forward Selection Multiple Regression Model Fit on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Threat Perception in High Efficacy Condition

					Change Statistics	
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	F Change
1	.627[a]	.393	.392	1.469	.393	268.356
2	.638[b]	.408	.405	1.454	.014	9.957
3	.645[c]	.416	.412	1.445	.008	5.963

a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity
b. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Fear2
c. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Fear2, Combined susceptibility
d. Dependent Variable: Threat

Table 3: Forward Selection Multiple Regression on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Threat Perception Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.536	.383		1.400	.162
	Comsev	.577	.035	.627	16.382	.000
2	(Constant)	.429	.381		1.127	.261
	Comsev	.561	.035	.610	15.929	.000
	Fear2	.155	.049	.121	3.155	.002
3	(Constant)	.372	.379		.983	.326
	Comsev	.468	.052	.509	9.046	.000
	Fear2	.142	.049	.110	2.882	.004
	ComSus	.113	.046	.138	2.442	.015

a. Dependent Variable: Threat

Figure 2: Threat Perception and Emotional and Cognitive Variables Scatterplot



Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the same model proved to also be the best fit in the low efficacy condition. Notably, each standardized coefficient size was also somewhat larger in the low efficacy data compared to the high efficacy condition.

Table 4: Forward Selection Multiple Regression Model Fit on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Threat Perception in Low Efficacy Condition

					Change Statistics	
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	F Change
1	.771[a]	.594	.593	1.456	.594	598.065
2	.779[b]	.606	.604	1.436	.012	12.256
3	.785[c]	.616	.613	1.420	.010	10.276

a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity
b. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Fear2
c. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Fear2, Combined susceptibility
d. Dependent Variable: Threat

Table 5: Forward Selection Multiple Regression Model on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Threat Perception Coefficients in Low Efficacy Condition

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-.352	.266		-1.322	.187
	Comsev	.668	.027	.771	24.455	.000
2	(Constant)	-.510	.267		-1.914	.056
	Comsev	.646	.028	.746	23.374	.000
	Fear2	.160	.046	.112	3.501	.001
3	(Constant)	-.657	.268		-2.457	.014
	Comsev	.539	.043	.622	12.499	.000
	Fear2	.166	.045	.116	3.673	.000
	Comsus	.134	.042	.157	3.206	.001

a. Dependent Variable: Threat

To also assess predictors of security response support in both high and low efficacy conditions, similar forward selection multiple regressions were conducted, with all emotion independent variables loaded due to the mixed results in the correlation analysis. SPSS was informed to remove outliers 3 standard deviations above or below the mean.

Tables 6 and 7 outline the results in the high efficacy condition. Noticeably, in Table 6, anxiety at T0 and personal vulnerability were included as significant predictors of security response support in Model 4, with both exhibiting negative coefficient terms. This was unexpected. Further inspection of the coefficient inflation demonstrated on combined severity and government efficacy in Table 7 at the point of their inclusion from Model 3 onwards strongly suggests a suppression effect at play (Friedman and Wall, 2005). Taking the above into account, and the fact that the inclusion of baseline anxiety and personal vulnerability only adds a negligible amount (.016), to the overall R^2, it is proposed that Model 2 is the best fit to the data. The results from the forward multiple regression in the low efficacy condition, shown in Tables 8 and 9 add support to this decision. The final model explained 53.5% of the variance, with only combined severity (β = .485, p > .001), and government efficacy (β = .368, p > .001) included.

Table 6: Forward Selection Multiple Regression Model Fit on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Response Support in High Efficacy Condition

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.677[a]	.459	.457	1.502	
2	.734[b]	.538	.536	1.389	
3	.741[c]	.549	.546	1.374	
4	.746[d]	.556	.552	1.365	2.064

a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity
b. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Government efficacy
c. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Government efficacy, Anxiety0
d. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Government efficacy, Anxiety0, Personal vulnerability
e. Dependent Variable: Security Response Support

Table 7: Forward Selection Multiple Regression on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Response Support Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-.204	.410		-.498	.619
	Comsev	.691	.038	.677	18.369	.000
2	(Constant)	-1.209	.398		-3.037	.003
	Comsev	.567	.038	.555	14.935	.000
	Goveff	.458	.055	.307	8.270	.000
3	(Constant)	-.791	.416		-1.902	.058
	Comsev	.571	.038	.559	15.197	.000
	Goveff	.425	.056	.285	7.610	.000
	Anx0	-.125	.040	-.108	-3.129	.002
4	(Constant)	-.905	.416		-2.176	.030
	Comsev	.636	.046	.623	13.925	.000
	Goveff	.458	.057	.308	8.030	.000
	Anx0	-.124	.040	-.107	-3.130	.002
	Person	-.166	.067	-.113	-2.486	.013

Table 8: Forward Selection Multiple Regression Model Fit on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Response Support in Low Efficacy Condition

					Change Statistics	
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	F Change
1	.647[a]	.419	.418	1.788	.419	294.390
2	.727[b]	.528	.526	1.613	.109	94.155

a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity
b. Predictors: (Constant), Combined severity, Government efficacy
c. Dependent Variable: Security Response Support

Table 9: Forward Selection Multiple Regression on Emotional and Cognitive Variables Effects on Security Response Support Coefficients in Low Condition

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.085	.327		.260	.795
	Comsev	.575	.034	.647	17.158	.000
2	(Constant)	-.767	.308		-2.492	.013
	Comsev	.421	.034	.474	12.327	.000
	Goveff	.561	.058	.373	9.703	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Security Response Support

6.5 Mediation Analyses

As all forward regression models provided significant results with consistent combinations of independent variables across conditions, mediation analysis using Hayes Process Models in SPSS was conducted to examine possible interactions between emotion and cognitive variables and their effects on dependent variables. To test mediators of threat perception, a parallel mediation analysis was first conducted. The outcome variable for the analysis was security threat perception in the high efficacy condition, and the predictor variable was peak fear (i.e., fear at T2).

Mediator variables were set as 1) combined severity and 2) combined susceptibility. Results based on 10,000 bootstrapped samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) revealed a significant total effect ($\beta = 0.29$, $SE = .054$, $LLCI = .00$, $ULCI = .19$) and direct effect

(β = 0.13, *SE* = 0.04, *LLCI* = .005, *ULCI* = .04) of peak fear on threat perception. This was positively mediated by both combined severity (β = .1167, *SE* = .025, *LLCI* = .07, *ULCI* = .17) and combined susceptibility (β = .0319, *SE* = .015, *LLCI* = .00, *ULCI* = .07). Complete results of the mediation model (n = 416) are presented in Figure 3 with standarised units.

In summary, this model reveals that higher levels of peak fear experienced whilst reading the threatening component of a securitisation move inflates perceptions of both perceived threat severity and perceived susceptibility. Moreover, it demonstrates that higher levels of these cognitive variables are correlated with higher levels of overall security threat perception.

Figure 3: Security Threat Mediation Analysis in High Efficacy Data



*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01

The same model and procedures were used to examine the relationship between the variables of interest in the low efficacy condition. This model - Figure 4 - replicated the findings above, revealing a significant total effect (β = 0.38, *SE* = .068, *LLCI* = .00, *ULCI* = .24) and direct effect (β = 0.16, *SE* = 0.045, *LLCI* = .005, *ULCI* = .07) of peak fear on threat perception. This again was mediated by both combined severity (β = .13,

SE = .025, *LLCI* = .07, *ULCI* = .19) and combined susceptibility (*β* = .02, *SE* = .01, *LLCI* = .00, *ULCI* = .05). Figure 4 presents the full model (*n* = 417).

Figure 4: Security Threat Mediation Analysis in Low Efficacy Condition



*p< 0.05, **p < 0.01

With regard to security response support, due to forward regression models only identifying two independent variables as consistent predictors, a simple mediation analysis using Process was used to examine possible relationships. The outcome variable for the analysis was security response support, and the predictor variable was combined severity, with government efficacy cast as the mediator. Figure 5 demonstrates that this model, (*n* = 417) revealed a significant indirect effect of combined severity on security response support via government efficacy (*LL*= 0.08, *UL* = 0.18).

Figure 5: Security Response Support Mediation Analysis in High Efficacy Condition



*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$

Finally, the same simple mediation analysis examining the relationship between severity perceptions, government efficacy and support for a security response was conducted using data from the low efficacy condition. Bootstrapping analyses with 10,000 samples revealed another significant indirect effect of combined severity on government action support via government efficacy (*LL*= 0.11, *UL* = 0.21). Full model in Figure 6 ($n = 417$).

Figure 6: Security Response Support Mediation Analysis in Low Efficacy Condition



*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.001$

Between Persons Data - Overall Analysis

These results present a snapshot view of the relationship between peak fear and securitisation attitudes. H1 received strong support overall: fear is the primary emotional predictor of securitisation attitudes. H2 received mixed support. In between persons data, peak fear predicts threat perceptions directly and indirectly. Notably, mediation analysis identified that it explains fear via its effects on perceived threat severity and susceptibility.

Peak fear, however, did not predict support for a security response. Levels of security response support were best explained by two cognitive variables i.e., combined threat severity and government efficacy. These results largely confirm between persons hypotheses drawn from the fear appeal literature, and considerably advance understanding of the emotional and cognitive variables which affect securitisation attitudes. However, as outlined in chapter four, it is predicted that within persons analysis will provide significantly more explanatory value. The next stage of analysis therefore focuses on testing H3 and H4.

6.6 Emotional Episodes and Securitisation Attitudes

Testing the possible relationship between different forms of emotional episode and securitisation attitudes requires more advanced methods than regression analysis and mediation models (Shen & Dillard, 2014). To examine how rates of change affect outcomes, SEM based models are required. The next step is then to identify which form of the various SEM models is the most appropriate analytic method based on the trajectories of the emotional experiences.

Analysis of each emotional episode, represented in Figure 7, reveals that the data did not match a perfect quadratic shape in the high efficacy condition, nor a perfect linear shape in the low efficacy condition, therefore, a latent basis model was selected to conduct analysis. Latent basis models are a flexible SEM based method which estimate growth trajectories from observed, repeated within persons data (Dillard, Li and Huang, 2017; Shi & Tong, 2017). Using a latent basis model, it is therefore possible to assess whether the rate of emotional change, known as the slope, experienced in either condition predicts outcomes (Dillard, Li and Huang, 2017).

Figure 7: High Efficacy and Low Efficacy Fear Episodes Over Time



As fear demonstrated the strongest correlations with threat perception and security response support in between persons data, the relationship between internal trajectories of fear and dependent measures was assessed. AMOS 22 was used to create models with the five time points set as predictor variables, and a single outcome in each i.e., security threat perception and security response support. Models were created for both high efficacy and low efficacy conditions. As is standard, the first intercept loading was set to 0, and the final loading set to 1 (Berlin, Parra, and Williams, 2014). This enables the model to estimate remaining factor loadings for each time point. Each level lambda was set at 1, which defines the intercept as the mean of baseline fear (Dillard et al., 2017: 8). The intercept and slope were allowed to correlate, as were adjacent error terms for the predictor variables (Kline, 2011). Fit measures were good for the fear and threat model in the high efficacy condition: $\chi 2$ (11) = 25.06, p = .009, $\chi 2$/df = 2.28, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .056 (90% CI = .026/.085), and CFI = .99. The standardised regression weight β =.383 between slope and threat was highly significant (p = .002). The covariance between intercept and slope was also significant and positive (β = .05, p < .001). The full model with unstandardised coefficients, and error covariances removed for readability, is displayed in Figure 8. Standardised coefficients are found in Appendix B.

Figure 8: Latent Basis Model Fear Episode and Threat Perception in High Efficacy Condition (Unstandardised Coefficients)



The results of this model mean that an internal emotional trajectory which resembles an inverted U does indeed predict higher levels of threat perception. Analysis was then conducted to examine whether the more linear internal emotional episode exhibited in the low efficacy condition also predicts security threat perception levels. Consistent with predictions, goodness of fit measures were unacceptable for the fear and security threat perception model in the low efficacy condition, $\chi 2$ (11) = 62.01, p = .000, $\chi 2$/df = 5.65, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .106 (90% CI = .081/.132), and CFI = .97. The standardised coefficient between slope and threat was significant, and only slightly smaller than the coefficient (β =.382, p = <.001) in the curvilinear model, however, as the RMSEA was > 0.1, and $\chi 2$/df >5 - both surpassing the threshold of standard cut off levels for SEM models - there can be no confidence in the validity of this relationship (Browne and Cudeck, 1993).

Following this initial comparison of the effects of curvilinear and linear experiences of fear on security threat perceptions, the same model was used to examine the relationship between threat-based fear episodes over time, and support for a security response. The high efficacy condition was modelled first, with goodness of fit measures proving satisfactory: $\chi 2$ (11) = 34.2., p = .000, $\chi 2$/df = 3.11, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .045/.099), and CFI = .99. The standardised regression weight (β = .266) between slope and threat was highly significant (p = .006). Covariance between intercept and slope in this model was insignificant (β =.019, p = .30). The full unstandardised model is presented in Figure 9, and standardised coefficients in Appendix C.

Figure 9: Latent Basis Model Fear Episode and Security Response Support in High Efficacy Condition (Unstandardised Coefficients)



The relationship between linear experiences of fear and security response support was then modelled. Again, fit statistics for data in the low efficacy condition were unacceptable, $\chi 2$ (11) = 68, p = .000, $\chi 2$/df = 6.14, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .112 (90% CI = .09/.14), and CFI = .97. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence to support the hypothesis that fear episodes which feature emotional arousal then reduction are a better predictor of securitisation attitudes than more linear trajectories.

There are also several other noticeable findings from the data. First, the size of the standardised regression weight (β = .38) between the rate of change of fear and security threat perceptions in the high efficacy condition is larger than the standardised weight of peak fear in a simple regression analysis (β = .26). This further emphasises the contribution made by within persons analysis to elucidating these dynamics. Secondly, whilst peak fear does not significantly contribute to security response support when conducting in between persons regression analysis, there is a significant effect found in within persons data between rate of change of fear over time and support for security action (β = .27).

Defensiveness

Building on these positive results, the high efficacy model for threat perception and security response support was extended to include measures of defensiveness. The purpose of this is to test if defensiveness mediates the dependent variables, and whether, as H4 states, the curvilinear fear pattern would predict lower levels of defensive reactions. Fear and perceived manipulation were first modelled, with a direct path from slope to threat created, and an indirect path via perceived manipulation.

The model provided a good-to-satisfactory fit, $\chi 2$ (15) = 47.9, p = .000, $\chi 2$/df = 3.2, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .78 (90% CI = .05/.1), and CFI = .98. In support of H4, there was a significant (p = 0.03), negative relationship between the slope and message derogation (β = -.42, p > .001), message derogation itself was negatively associated with threat perceptions (β = -.21, p > .001), and there remained a direct, significant path between slope and threat perception (β = .29, p > .001). The full model is shown overleaf in Figure 10. Full unstandardised coefficients are also shown below in Table 10, and standardised coefficients can be found in Appendix D.

Figure 10: Latent Basis Model Fear Episode, Threat Perception and Message Derogation (Unstandardised Coefficients)



This provides evidence that defensiveness elicited by a securitisation move does, predictably, lower securitisation threat perceptions, however - critically - that levels of defensiveness itself are reduced by an internal fear experience whereby fear is aroused then reduced.

Table 10: Fear Episode Effect on Security Threat Perceptions, and Message Derogation, Unstandardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

Relationship			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Dero	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**-10.040**	**3.106**	**-3.233**	**.001**
Dero	<---	E5	-4.525	.238	-19.047	***
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000			
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	2.279	.467	4.884	***
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	5.073	1.094	4.638	***
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	1.532	.235	6.506	***
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	1.000			
Threat	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**3.309**	**1.265**	**2.616**	**.009**
Threat	<---	E6	2.113	.100	21.083	***
Threat	**<---**	**Dero**	**-.099**	**.028**	**-3.541**	***

***$p < 0.001$

When derogation and threat perception are fitted into a model using low efficacy data, the model, unsurprisingly, provides poorer fit statistics, $\chi2$ (15) = 66.7, p = .000, $\chi2$/df = 4.5, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .92 (90% CI = .08/.11), and CFI = .97. This suggests that there are no relationships between variables that can be stated with confidence. Nonetheless, it is noticeable that in the poor fitting model, the coefficient between slope and message derogation (β = -.21, p > .001) is exactly half that of the high efficacy coefficient (β = -.42, p = .001)

This approach was also used to examine the relationship between security threat perceptions and the other defensiveness measure i.e., perceived manipulation. The results provide further, albeit less robust support for H4. The model was a good fit, $\chi2$ (15) = 44.3, p = .000, $\chi2$/df = 3, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .7 (90% CI = .05/.9), and

CFI = .98. The coefficient between slope and perceived manipulation was again negative, and bordered on significance (β = -.16, p = .06). In turn, perceived manipulation negatively predicted threat perceptions (β = -.12 p = .02), whereas the direct slope path positively predicted threat perceptions (β = .36, p = .002). Table 11 presents the unstandardised coefficients (see Appendix E for the full model). In contrast, in the low efficacy model, there was an insignificant positive relationship between slope and perceived manipulation (β = .03, p = .67).

Table 11: Fear Episode Effect on Security Threat, and Perceived Manipulation, Unstandardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Data

Relationship			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Manip	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**-3.003**	**1.602**	**-1.874**	**.061**
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000			
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	2.190	.442	4.955	***
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	4.881	1.034	4.722	***
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	1.510	.227	6.656	***
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	1.000			
Threat	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**4.160**	**1.345**	**3.094**	**.002**
Threat	**<---**	**Manip**	**-.070**	**.030**	**-2.311**	**.021**

***$p < 0.001$

The relationships between emotional episodes, defensiveness and security response support were then modelled. The first model examined the relationships between slope, perceived manipulation, and security response support. This provided good fit statistics, $\chi 2$ (15) = 46, p = .000, $\chi 2$/df = 3.1, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .05/.09), and CFI = .98. All anticipated relationships were found to be significant.

Providing strong support for H4, slope negatively predicted perceived manipulation (β = -.20 p =.03), perceived manipulation demonstrated a negative relationship with security response support (β = -.23 p < .001), and slope positively predicted security response support (β = .23 p =.01).

Full unstandardised coefficients are displayed in Table 12 (see Appendix F for full model).

Table 12: Fear Episode Effect on Security Response Support, and Perceived Manipulation, Unstandardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Manip	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**-3.310**	**1.473**	**-2.247**	**.025**
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000			
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	2.033	.385	5.283	***
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	4.688	.928	5.054	***
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	1.550	.222	6.967	***
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	1.000			
Policy	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**2.684**	**1.068**	**2.513**	**.012**
Policy	**<---**	**Manip**	**-.156**	**.034**	**-4.540**	***

***$p < 0.001$

There was however an insignificant, positive relationship between slope and perceived manipulation in the poorly fitting low efficacy data ($\beta = .02$, $p = .73$). This also provides support for H5 i.e., that more linear emotional responses to securitisation moves over time will be associated with higher levels of defensiveness compared to curvilinear emotional reactions.

The final model examined the relationship between slope, message derogation and security response support. Unstandardised coefficients are presented in Table 13 overleaf (see Appendix G for full model). Fit statistics were satisfactory, $\chi 2$ (15) = 48.7 p = .000, $\chi 2/df$ = 3.24, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .74 (90% CI = .05/.1), and CFI = .98. The slope displayed a significant, negative relationship with message derogation (β = -.43, p >.001), and message derogation negatively predicted security response support by almost the same size standardised coefficient (β = -.40, p > .0001). However, surprisingly, slope and security response support displayed a positive, but insignificant relationship (β = .10, p = .22).

Table 13: Fear Episode Effect on Security Response Support, and Message Derogation, Unstandardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Data

			Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
Dero	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**-9.755**	**2.937**	**-3.322**	***
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000			
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	2.190	.434	5.051	***
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	4.953	1.032	4.801	***
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	1.544	.231	6.670	***
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	1.000			
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	1.000			
Policy	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**1.258**	**1.022**	**1.231**	**.218**
Policy	**<---**	**Dero**	**-.219**	**.030**	**-7.296**	***

***$p < 0.001$

In the poorly fitting low efficacy condition model, the coefficient size of the slope and message derogation relationship was significant, and almost exactly half the effect size of the curvilinear episode (β = -.22, p > .001). Taken together, these results present consistent evidence that emotional experiences, whereby fear is aroused then considerably reduced, are less likely to be associated with defensiveness. Moreover, defensiveness itself was found to negatively predict both threat perception and support for policy measures. This provides a convincing explanation for the between persons finding, whereby participants in the low efficacy condition demonstrated higher levels of both measures of defensiveness.

To expand, participants in the low efficacy condition demonstrated higher levels of perceived manipulation (M = 8.4, SD = 3.3), than those in the high efficacy condition (M = 7.6, SD = 3.2), t(829) = 2.81, p = .005. Participants in the low efficacy condition (M = 10.4, SD = 4), also exhibited significantly higher levels of message derogation than those in the high efficacy condition (M = 9.6, SD = 4), t(830) = 2.65, p = .008. It is proposed here that the higher levels of defensiveness experienced in the low efficacy condition explain the remarkable finding that participants in the high efficacy condition (M = 6.7, SD = 1.9) demonstrated significantly higher levels of threat perception t (802) = 5.35, p =.0001, compared to those in the low efficacy condition

(M = 5.9, SD = 2.3). This is consistent with the prediction, inspired by Shen and Coles (2015), that fear-based messaging can be counterproductive when, by failing to reduce the negative sensations aroused, it leaves the individual experiencing 'residual fear', which leads to defensiveness reactions to the securitisation move and actor to restore psychological equilibrium.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter presented the procedures, results and analysis of Study 1, the largest online experiment to date in Securitisation Studies, conducted to examine hypothesised relationships between threat-based fear, cognitions, and securitisation attitudes. Results provided mixed support for H1 and H2: peak fear and security threat perceptions demonstrated a positive, linear relationship, mediated by perceptions of threat severity and susceptibility. Security response support, however, was not predicted by peak fear, but primarily by perceived severity, positively mediated by views on government efficacy. These results implied a relatively minor role for threat-based fear vis-à-vis securitisation attitudes.

However, consistent with Balzacq's call for greater methodological sophistication within the field, advanced SEM methods were then used to test H3 and H4. H3 was strongly supported by the results of latent basis models. Consistent with predictions, a rate of emotional change over time which resembles an inverted U shape predicted both threat perceptions and security response support. Noticeably, the coefficient size for the effect of the rate of change on security threat perceptions was considerably larger than the effect of peak fear. Finally, considerable support was also found for H4 which proposed that defensiveness would be associated with more linear emotional responses to securitisation moves, and that such defensiveness aroused by a securitisation move which arouses fear but fails to assuage it, will negatively mediate securitisation attitudes. This novel finding, it was argued, is the cause of the remarkable result that security threat perception levels were significantly lower in the low efficacy condition where individuals experienced a more linear fear experience, than the high efficacy condition, despite participants being exposed to the same threat content in both conditions.

Chapter 7: Results Part 2 - Existential Fear and Securitisation Attitudes

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the procedures and results from three studies designed to explore H5-H8. Section 7.2 outlines procedures and results of Study 2, conducted to provide an initial exploration of whether death-related content within a securitisation message, such as references to terrorist acts, etc., would significantly raise Death Though Accessibility (DTA). Contrary to the predictions of H5 and H5b, Study 2 found no significant difference between levels of DTA in experimental or neutral control groups. Study 3 outlined in section 7.3 examined the hypothesised effect of existential fear rather than its purported cause. It assessed if securitisation moves can produce worldview defence (WD) - operationalised as dogmatism - and whether differences in the explicitness of death related content would produce different levels of WD. Again, no significant differences were found across means compared with a control group, and thus, no support for H6. Finally, Study 4, presented in section 7.4, directly examined the effect of death reminders on securitisation attitudes. Evidence, contrary to H7, was found. Finally, no support for found for H8 that WD would only occur if fear attributable to death reminders increased following message exposure. Overall, across the studies, there was no evidence that existential fear affects securitisation moves. The chapter concludes with possible explanations for these unexpected null results, e.g., the COVID-19 context raising baseline levels of existential fear, and recent issues over the replicability of TMT effects.

7.2 Securitisation and Death Thought Accessibility

The primary purpose of Study 2 is to assess whether death related content within a securitisation message significantly raises DTA. The secondary purpose is to examine if securitisation messages which do not contain mortality reminders, raise DTA due to the inherent connotations of national security framings or not. This enquiry was inspired by numerous previous studies that have reported significant increases in participants levels of DTA, a fundamental component of TMT's explanation for why WD occurs, following exposure to news stories about terrorism, or simple death

associated primes such as the letter WTC (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Landau, et al., 2004).

Participants and procedures

The experiment was conducted via Qualtrics, and participants (n = 300) were recruited from Prolific. The median age was 39, with participants age ranging from age 18 to 75. There were (155) male participants and (144) female, and one recipient preferring not to disclose their sex. They responded to an advertisement for participants to engage in a short study exploring reading, emotions and thought processes. Three filters were pre-applied to participants: 1) that the US is their country of residence due to the manipulation material being US focused and 2) that they are fluent in English due to the linguistically sensitive nature of previously successful TMT experiments (Pyszczynski et al, 2020) and 3) that they have a minimum 90% approval score on other Prolific studies.

Participants were first issued with instructions informing them that the study would entail reading a short, stylized newspaper article, completing memory, attention, demographic questions, and finally to undertake a word fragment exercise. Those who provided consent were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a high death reminder securitisation condition, a non-existential securitisation condition and a neutral condition (see Annex D for all manipulation materials). In each condition, the participant was asked to read a short vignette. In the high death reminder condition, participants read a short article entitled 'Deadly Heat' which made repeated references to casualties from climate change exacerbated weather events across the US, the non-existential securitisation condition read titled 'The True Cost of Climate Change' which focused on damage to property and national prosperity. In both conditions, climate change was framed as a security threat. In the neutral condition, participants read a matter-of-fact text largely adopted from the Wikipedia entry which described and defined politics and Political Science. There was no emotional language in the text, and no implicit or explicit references to death.

On completion of reading the assigned text, in line with standard practice in TMT studies, participants completed an emotion measure (the same as used in Study 1) and

were issued with several distraction tasks. As discussed in the methodology chapter, TMT advises that experimenters should create a delay between exposure to mortality reminders and the measurement of dependent variables, and also seek to distract participants to minimise the probability of thoughts of death being addressed through proximate psychological defences such as denial. Therefore, participants were asked to complete a spot the difference exercise, a short survey on social media usage, and a demographics questionnaire before completing the dependent measure, a 17-word fragment exercise.

Results and Analysis

To examine H5, means were compared across all groups, and it was evident that there were no significant differences: high death securitisation condition (M = 1.56, SD = 0.92), non-existential condition (M = 1.57, SD = 0.94) and neutral condition (M = 1.54, SD = 0.93). To statistically confirm that there were no meaningful differences, a T-test was conducted comparing the high death reminder to the neutral condition, $t(197)$ = 0.22, p = 0.83. This confirmed that the manipulations produced no significant differences across conditions.

When considering this null result, it is important to note the context in which these studies were conducted: they were conducted with US participants during the COVID-19 pandemic. It may be possible therefore that this context may have led to naturally inflated levels of DTA amongst participants and thus, created somewhat of a ceiling effect which undermined the sensitivity of the manipulations (Chew & Yap, 2021).

Unlike DTA, emotional responses between conditions for self-reported fear were significantly higher in the high death reminder condition compared to fear in the neutral condition. An ANOVA found that highest levels of fear in the existential condition (M = 3.0, SD = 2.5), the second highest level in the non-existential condition (M = 2.8, SD = 2.6), these differed significantly from the fear level in the neutral group (M =1.1, SD = 1.7), (F (2, 300) = 21.9, p < .001.

This increase in self-reported fear is unsurprising, given the threatening nature of the two experimental conditions when compared to the unthreatening content in the neutral control condition. Nonetheless, without evidence of increased DTA – contrary

to the predictions of H5, it is impossible to conclude whether these negative emotions should be categorised as threat-based fear, or a combination of that emotions and fear's existential variant, or to test H8.

7.3 Securitisation and Dogmatism

Study 3 examined the hypothesised attitudinal effect of existential fear in the securitisation context i.e., WD. As outlined previously, prior studies have found consistent evidence that death reminders produce a large effect (r = .5) on political attitudes (Burke et al., 2013). To that end, a short, online vignette experiment was designed to assess H6.

Participants and procedures

A small N pilot study (N = 154) was first conducted to test whether the high death 'Deadly Heat' vignette could produce differences in WD, operationalised as dogmatism, when compared to the neutral text. This results of this pilot study approached significance (M = 79, SD = 22), neutral text (M = 72, SD = 23), (t (154 = 1.84, p = .068). It was therefore concluded that in a larger sample approaching 100 participants per condition, the standard recommended sample size for between groups comparisons, that this effect would likely achieve statistical significance (Brysbaert, 2019).

To that end, 300 participants, all US nationals, were therefore recruited via Prolific (151 male, 149 female). The median age was 35, with a range from 18-64. It was estimated that the study would take approximately 7 minutes to complete, and individuals received £0.88 for completed participation. The same filters as Study 2 were applied, and participants who had completed Studies 1 and 2 were ineligible for this experiment. Participants were initially informed that the experiment would comprise of reading a short text; completing a few memory, attention, and demographic questions; and, filling out a personality questionnaire. Individuals who did not provide consent at this point were redirected to a page which thanked them for their interest in the experiment and terminated their involvement in the process.

Participants provided an initial baseline level of emotion using the method employed in previous studies and were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions where

they read one of the vignettes used in Study 2. Following completion of a post manipulation emotion measure, participants completed the same distraction tasks used in Study 2. Finally, to measure the dependent variable, they were asked to complete Altemeyer's (2002) dogmatism scale.

Results and Analysis

Descriptive statistics revealed that the anticipated WD effect was not found: existential securitisation condition (M = 77, SD = 21), non-existential condition (M = 77, SD = 20) and neutral condition (M = 79, SD = 21). Indeed, when comparing the means across groups, participants in the neutral condition demonstrated insignificantly higher levels of dogmatism than the existential condition (t (198) = 0.77, p = .44). Therefore, no support was provided for H6.

There are various possible explanations for the failure to find the expected effect in the full study. Again, the COVID-19 context, by acting as a constant death reminder, may produce higher state levels of WD, which, in this study, manifested as higher dogmatism levels. Future research could seek to examine whether countries such as the US with particularly high death counts, do exhibit higher levels of DTA and dogmatism compared to less badly affected countries. The second possibility is that the manipulation materials were ineffective as death reminders. This, however, would be inconsistent with previous experiments which found that both subtle and more explicit reminders of death in vignettes reliably produce WD. The third possible explanation is that dogmatism may not be an ideologically neutral measure of WD. There is a large body of literature which presents dogmatism as being more strongly affiliated with right wing, or conservative political outlooks (Duckitt, 2019). As such, it is possible that individuals who hold prior right wing/conservative political beliefs may be more likely to exhibit WD via dogmatism - and conversely, more liberal individuals may be less inclined to demonstrate increased dogmatism.

To test this possibility, a median split was conducted on political ideology which was measured on a 0-10 scale (very liberal to very conservative) as one of the filler demographic questions, and dogmatism scores compared between liberals in the high death reminder condition, and the neutral. This comparison was also conducted for

self-reported conservatives. No significant effects were found suggesting, that dogmatism did in fact act as an ideologically neutral measure as intended. Finally, it is possible that the delay intentionally created between exposure to the securitisation message and the measurement of dogmatism may have lessened the effect. Most TMT studies include a delay for both theoretical and empirically driven reasons, and it continues to be advocated as standard experimental practice by leading TMT theorists (Chatard, Hirschberger, & Pyszczynski, 2020). However, a small body of evidence contradicts this finding (Trafimow and Hughes, 2012). Accordingly, to account for the possibility that delay was the cause of the negative results in Studies 2 and 3, Study 4 removed the delay used in previous experiments between exposure to manipulations and measurement of the dependent variable.

7.4 Securitisation and Worldview Defence

Study 4 examined whether explicit death reminders would affect securitisation attitudes per se (H7). Prior to exposure to a vignette that presented climate change as a security threat to the US, participants were randomly assigned to either a death reminder condition or an aversive condition. It was hypothesised that individuals in the death reminder condition would manifest WD operationalised as lower levels of threat perception and support for security countermeasures compared to the respondents in the aversive condition.

Participants and procedures

200 participants, all US nationals, were recruited via Prolific. There were 111 female participants, and 89 males. In addition to the filters used previously and updated to exclude those who had engaged with the prior study, only participants who had self-identified as climate change sceptics were eligible. The median age was 43, ranging from 19 to 75. As it was estimated that the study would take approximately 4 minutes to complete, individuals received £0.50 for completed participation.

The instructions issued in Study 3 were again presented, with participants informed that their views on a newspaper article would also be sought at the end of the experiments. They were then asked provide consent to indicate willingness to participate in the experiment. Those who proceeded to the experiment, then first completed a baseline measure for fear, anxiety and happiness, and a basic demographic

questionnaire. They were then randomly assigned to either a death reminder condition, or a public shame condition. The later was intended to evoke negative emotions, but not fear of death.

The death reminder manipulation was consistent with the method used in the vast majority of TMT studies whereby participants were asked to: 'Please describe - in a few sentences - the emotions that the thought of your own death arouse in you?' (Landau, Solomon & Greenberg, 2004). In the aversive condition, they were asked: 'Please describe - in a few sentences - the emotions that the thought of being shamed in public arouse in you'?

All participants then read a stylised newspaper article attempting to securitise climate change. This was the same vignette used as an intended non-existential reminder manipulation in Study 3. There was no methodological reason to amend the manipulation stimulus used in prior studies, as it was designed not to evoke death thoughts or mortality salience but to serve as non-existential securitisation move. The dependent measures were the standard questions used to assess securitisation attitudes in Study 1. As mentioned, to reduce the possibility that a delay between the manipulation and measurement affected results, for Study 4, no delay was incorporated into this research design.

Results and analysis

Contrary to expectations, threat perceptions in the high death reminder condition were significantly higher ($M = 2.9$, $SD = 2.8$) than those in the aversive condition ($M = 2.1$, $SD = 2.4$), $t\ (196) = 2.16$, $p = .032$. However, there were no significant differences between conditions on support for security measures, $t\ (197) = 1.45$, $p = .15$.

The purpose of this study was to examine whether WD, triggered by existential fear, would affect securitisation attitudes. As WD is defined as increased belief in prior-held beliefs when reminded of death, it was hypothesised that participants in the death reminder condition would demonstrate lower levels of securitisation attitudes, compared to the aversive condition. Results, for threat perception, were contrary to expectations. There is little guidance within TMT literature to explain why a death

reminder would lead to heightened threat perception on an issue which runs contrary to a group's beliefs.

Based on the weight of evidence produced in this chapter, and whilst conscious of the methodological difficulties of conducting such research into sensitive psychological processes during a pandemic, no evidence was generated to suggest that existential fear produces any particularly unique psychological effects on securitisation attitudes. These findings should also be considered in the context of two recent meta-analysis that bring the robustness and replicability of TMT's main hypotheses firmly into question in the concluding section (Klein, 2019).

As part of their impactful project to replicate well-known findings in psychology, Many Labs attempted to replicate the WD effect with a large sample ($N = 2{,}200$) across 21 labs. In line with the general 'replicability crisis' in social psychology, their meta-analysis found no support for the mortality salience hypothesis. This was the case found in both a condition where the researchers were advised by TMT's main authors, and in another where they sought to independently recreate experimental procedures described in highly cited TMT papers. A Bayesian reanalysis of Many Labs 4 data by Haaf et al. (2020) using advanced methods including hierarchical modelling approaches and model comparison with Bayes factors, and taking account of the critiques by Pyszczynski et al. (2020) found either no, or minimal evidence supporting the proposed MS effect. Indeed, in 29 of 33 Bayes factors, no support at all was found for the effect.

Pyszczynski et al. (2020) have challenged these findings, contending that the techniques used in replications deviated from best methodological practice, and that sample sizes were underpowered. These present studies however followed purported best practice and also failed to replicate the purported WD effect. One possible explanation for both the replicability crisis in general and the specific issues relating to TMT is publication bias (Schäfer, 2019). The inevitable effect of this is vastly inflated reported effect sizes. These studies covered in this chapter may therefore provide a modest contribution to the literature by reporting their negative effects transparently, and, add further evidence against the existence of the proposed WD effect.

7.5 Conclusion

Chapter four outlined the significant body of empirical findings validating TMT's central hypotheses. It argued that based on prior findings, the concept of WD is likely to have clear relevance to this project, one designed to create a fear-based model of securitisation attitudes. Indeed, the reported effect size of WD on political attitudes (r = .5) is considerably larger than the standard effect size of threat-based fear in the fear appeal literature (d = 0.29). Studies 2-4 were therefore designed to assess different aspects of the purported relationship between existential fear and its effects on attitudes. Study 2 examined whether typical securitisation moves would raise DTA, a psychological precursor to WD, and a means to identify the arousal of existential fear. No evidence was found. Study 3 sought to examine a different component of TMT's model: whether death reminders in securitisation content would produce WD operationalised as dogmatism. This, again, found no support despite a promising pilot study, and positive results in similar studies using the same dependent measure (Vail III et al., 2013).

A final study sought to examine whether prior held beliefs would affect securitisation moves, following a death reminder, in a manner consistent with TMT. Evidence, to the contrary of expectations was found. Participants in the condition reminded of death prior to exposure to a non-existential securitisation move exhibited significantly higher levels of threat perception compared to a non-death related aversive comparator, whilst there was no difference across groups on support for climate policies. One methodological limitation was raised i.e., the COVID-19 context may have produced ambiently inflated levels of existential angst. This is certainly a possibility. However, two recent meta-analyses were discussed which shed considerable doubt on the robustness and replicability of the WD effect, the conceptual centrepiece of TMT. Overall, the studies produced no evidence to support the inclusion of existential fear as a component of a psychological model of securitisation attitudes.

Chapter 8: General Discussion

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to enhance Securitisation Studies by developing an emotion centred psychological theory of securitisation attitudes. To that end, section 8.2 draws on the various social psychology derived hypotheses elaborated in chapter four, and the empirical findings of the two previous chapters, to present and explain the unique conceptual and theoretical contribution made here, formalised into two psychological models of securitisation attitudes. Building upon existing components of the securitisation framework to ensure theoretical continuity, with the addition of threat-based fear and related cognitions, the first model presents the optimum, interconnected configuration of securitisation message content, threat-based fear emotional dynamics, and cognitive responses which predict high levels of securitisation attitudes following a securitisation move. The second model outlines the sub-optimum configurations of the prior mentioned variables which predict comparatively lower levels of securitisation move acceptance. The conditions for a failed securitisation move are also considered before the section concludes with a discussion of the practical and ethical ramifications of these models for securitisation theory, and for wider Political Science.

Section 8.3 then examines the limitations of the present work, including the inherently limited ecological validity of an online laboratory experiment exploring complex, often vigorously contested social phenomena, and the lack of disaggregated findings. It also acknowledges that the focus of the experimental approach was to assess the variables which affect the relative effectiveness of securitisation moves i.e., the method employed here did not seek to intentionally produce 'failed' securitisation outcomes per se. The emotional and cognitive dynamics which are proposed to contribute to negative securitisation move outcomes are deduced from the data associated with relatively successful securitisations. Confirmation of these assertions requires further research. The section also explores ethical considerations associated with this enquiry and puts forth the concept of a 'civic fear-based just securitisation move' and various criteria to assess the ethical value of a securitisation move intending to elicit fear.

Finally, section 8.4 expands upon select areas for future research, with a focus on identifying pathways for further theoretical advances. The central argument advanced is that the theoretical contribution made by this thesis, should disarm any residual reluctance within Securitisation Studies to proactively engage with relevant aspects of social and political psychology to address existing shortcomings within the field, and, to now open new, hitherto unmined interdisciplinary research avenues. The approach taken i.e., incorporating threat-based fear into the existing securitisation framework, provides a platform on which to cumulatively develop this opportunity laden psychological school of securitisation theory. Accordingly, literature with likely relevance for further illuminating under-theorised components of the securitisation framework is therefore identified.

In addition to research avenues which offer to enhance the explanatory and predictive value of existing components of the securitisation framework, section 8.5 also contends that a transformational theoretical step within Securitisation Studies, building upon the models proposed here, is the incorporation of systematic individual variance. Study 1 categorically demonstrated that within person emotional dynamics significantly affect securitisation outcomes. However, excluding the unsuccessful exploration of the effects of group level political ideologies in the context of death reminders, this thesis did not seek to identify individual level psychological or demographic traits which consistently affect securitisation attitudes either directly, or indirectly through their effects on emotional and cognitive responses. This leaves the field lagging, in both the study and practice political communications, in the era of digital psychological profiling and micro-targeting (Zarouali et al., 2020). To set the scene for this theoretical advance, opportunities for future research with promise for exploring how biological, socialised, and psychological traits may affect securitisation attitudes are identified.

8.2 A Psychological Theory and Models of Securitisation Attitudes

The development of a psychological theory of securitisation attitudes - centred on emotions - is a foray into overwhelmingly unchartered theoretical territory. Conceptual clarity, which has evaded the field to-date in the various tentative explorations of the role of emotions in influencing the securitisation process, is required from the outset to orient this expedition. To that end, the studies presented in previous chapters provide

an important initial conceptual contribution by charting this unfamiliar terrain. First, contrary to expectations, existential fear appears to have no significant, theoretically consistent effect on securitisation attitudes. This was a surprising finding given the plethora of TMT research which has reported medium to large effects on political and security attitudes (Burke et al., 2013). It was also unexpected, considering the long lineage of theoretical contemplation given to the attitudinal effects of existential angst in political science, most strikingly encapsulated in Hobbes's (2005 [1651]: 96) identification of existential dread as the defining feature of his imagined state of nature: 'No arts; no letters; no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death'.

It is possible, as discussed, that this result may merely represent a methodological quirk caused by the pandemic context in which the experiments were conducted, which results in elevated levels of mortality salience and DTA in control groups. However, these findings, in combination with two contemporaneous pre pandemic meta-analyses, also found no evidence of the WD effect occurring in response to death reminders across a very large-*N* study conducted across various labs. This suggests that there may be limited value in further exploration of the potential role played by the existential variety of fear within securitisation theory in the present context.

The experiments also demonstrated that anxiety, whilst unsurprisingly elicited by the vivid securitisation message content presented to recipients, did not have a particularly noticeable attitudinal effect. Conversely, consistent with expectations, results revealed that it is threat-elicited fear which is central to the internal psychological dynamics which influence securitisation attitudinal outcomes i.e., when data was analysed from either a between persons or within persons perspective, threat-based fear was the primary emotional independent variable in all conditions. This finding provides considerable conceptual clarity regarding which form of significant emotional response, a standard securitisation message proposing an immediate threat will arouse, which is particularly relevant given that threat-based fear and anxiety are distinct emotions, and as such, are considered to produce different psychological effects on both message processing and attitudes (Albertson et al., 2020).

In addition to providing conceptual precision, Study 1 also generates a wealth of empirical evidence with which to enhance the explanatory power of a refined securitisation framework. In line with recent developments in the fear appeal field, one notable result with major relevance for theory building, is clear evidence of the necessity to precisely specify the unit of analysis under discussion when considering the relationship between emotions and securitisation attitudes. In this case, a focus on peak fear, and its associated snapshot analytical approach i.e., peak fear scores regressed against dependent variables, reveals a small, linear, direct effect played by peak fear in the generation of security threat perceptions. This effect size was considerably smaller than the effect of combined threat severity, conceptualised as the combination of two cognitive variables: perceived danger and threat imminence, and slightly larger than combined susceptibility i.e., perceived national and personal vulnerability to the threat.

These initial findings were complemented by mediation analysis which enabled a more nuanced understanding how these emotional and cognitive variables interact to affect threat perception. The analysis revealed that positive, linear increases in peak fear amplify cognitions of threat severity and susceptibility, which, in turn, both inflate overall security threat perceptions. The size of the total effect of peak fear on security threat perception, directly, and indirectly, via its effects on these two mediators, was also more than double its direct effect alone. This result provides considerable validation for the decision to adopt a constructivist understanding of emotion, whereby emotions and cognitions were anticipated to produce entwined, reciprocal effects.

It was noticeable however, that peak fear produced no significant effect on security response attitudes. In fact, mediation models suggest that security countermeasures support is driven by solely cognitive factors: threat perceptions, and perceptions of government efficacy to address proposed threats. Collectively, these results, produced using the near hegemonic methodological approach within social psychology, would suggest a relatively modest role for fear in the production of securitisation attitudes whereby a fear-based communication campaign contributes to initial security threat perceptions but has limited value for building support for a security response to a threat.

When the unit of analysis is expanded beyond peak emotional moments to focus on the full emotional episode influenced by a securitisation move, it is clear however that the summation above only presents a fragment of the overall relationship between threat-based fear and securitisation attitudes. Indeed, within person analysis provides a considerably richer understanding of the relationships between content, emotion and cognitive responses, leading to conclusions which explicitly contradict certain folk psychology assumptions, which, as Williams (2011) identified, are often implied within Securitisation Studies when emotions are tentatively considered e.g., that higher levels of fear will inevitably lead to higher levels of securitisation attitudes in all conditions.

In a significant theoretical contribution to both Securitisation Studies, and Political Science, when analysing the overall emotional episode and its effects on securitisation attitudes, it is evident that it is not only the level of fear arousal which influences security threat perceptions, but, critically, also *the extent to which fear is reduced*. Unlike peak fear, this evoke and decrease emotional dynamic - which can be simplistically represented as an inverted U shape over time - significantly predicts levels of both threat perception *and* support for a security response. To formally model this relationship between fear episodes and securitisation attitudes, drawing on Neo-Drive fear appeal theories, the constructivist theory of emotion, and the results of the between person mediation analysis, it is proposed here that an initial elevation of fear-based arousal is conducive to persuasion in the context of securitisation due to its cognitive and physiological associations with threat perception. As discussed, in chapter three, emotions, whilst not determinative of attitudinal outcomes, emotional experiences function as cognitive and behavioural guides.

In this case, the combination of external securitisation content emphasising the immediacy and severity of danger, and associated onset of internal fear sensations, steer individuals towards heightened security threat conceptualisations. However, as an involuntary state of fear is not a pleasant psychological condition to be sustained in, individuals experiencing such threat-induced negative affect are also momentarily biased to react positively towards content which provides a relatively convincing means of reducing fear and restoring psychological equilibrium (Woody and

Szechtman, 2013). It is at this point in psychological processing of a securitisation move that the proposed policy response is typically considered. If the policy response message is evaluated as satisfactorily convincing - such as the policy proposals in the high efficacy condition message - individuals will accept the proposal for which they have been somewhat predisposed by their emotional experience to evaluate positively. Indeed, the soothing nature of the convincing security policy response in Study 1 is reflected by the comparatively lower levels of fear at the point of the final emotion measurement for those in the high efficacy condition.

Not only does the innate desire to restore psychological equilibrium help explain successful cases of securitisation, but also offers a convincing explanation for threat-based fear's role in influencing sub-optimum securitisation moves. As mentioned, a state of prolonged involuntary peak fear is not a pleasant or adaptive condition, and individuals are psychologically and biologically motivated to end it (Woody and Szechtman, 2011). This, however, is challenging to achieve when presented with a securitisation message which denotes a highly threatening situation which the recipient, or others acting on the individual's behalf, have minimal capacity to mitigate or neutralise. In such a situation, where fear is aroused but not assuaged by convincing policy proposals, it is proposed that message recipients intuitively seek to reduce the sensation of negative affect via alternative means (Shen, 2015). Evidence accrued from Study 1 elucidates the dynamics of this psychological phenomenon. Despite the low efficacy message being more nuanced than the high efficacy condition, individuals in the former demonstrated higher levels of defensiveness on two separate measures i.e., they were more likely consider the message as intending to manipulate them, and also, to derogate the author and content as biased. Moreover, not only was defensiveness higher in the low efficacy condition, but threat perception levels were also significantly lower than in the high efficacy condition.

To emphasise, there was no difference in threat component content of the messages which individuals read across conditions, only the relative strength of the proposed policy response. Collectively, these findings strongly suggest that when fear is elicited by a threatening message but not reduced, individuals are more likely to reject the message in order to restore reduced negative affect and restore psychological balance.

This conclusion is also supported by results of the analysis which extended the latent basis models for both security threat and countermeasures and found that curvilinear fear episodes were associated with lower levels of defensiveness compared to linear emotional episodes. Therefore, it appears that an initial threat experience occurs when presented with a strong threat component, however, final threat perception is dependent on the trajectory of the overall emotional episode, which itself is heavily contingent on the perceived convincingness of the proposed policy response component of the securitisation move.

These results have significant ramifications for securitisation theory, and the formal modelling of fear, cognition, and securitisation attitudes into the securitisation framework. The first contribution made to addressing present shortcomings within securitisation theory is the addition of a clear causal mechanism within the framework, i.e., the threat-based fear emotional dynamic over time. In essence, it is proposed here that securitisation moves which arouse and reduce fear over the duration of an emotional episode - due to the optimal configuration of message content - will produce higher levels of securitisation attitudes than more linear threat-based fear episodes. Conversely, it is argued that messages which fail to arouse initial levels of fear will be ineffective. In addition to providing an empirically robust means for including emotional dynamics into the securitisation framework, this also draws out the role of the audience, and its agency during the process, a widely acknowledged under-theorised component of the framework (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau, 2011; McDonald, 2008). Indeed, by locating the primary outcome of securitisation move success at the level of an audience's emotional and cognitive reactions to securitisation move content, this presents the most comprehensive effort within the field to date to address this existing limitation.

This dynamic also emphasizes the necessity to significantly raise the profile of the policy component of securitisation moves when conceptualising, theorising and analysing cases of attempted securitisation. Traditionally, the emphasis in securitisation theory and case studies has largely been on the proposed threat. Indeed, there is a long-standing debate over whether a successful securitisation should be defined as requiring consent for, or implementation of specific countermeasures, or

simply creating a more loosely defined policy platform for potential future action (Floyd, 2016). The findings of Study 1 demonstrate that the perceived strength of the policy component, or lack thereof, of a securitisation move is not a product of a successful securitisation, but rather, it is a critical determinant of overall message persuasiveness. This underscores the need for the policy component to receive the same ontological and theoretical prioritisation as threat construction in case studies.

Finally, expanding on the largely unexamined issue of how and why variance in message content affects outcomes, the mediation analyses conducted elucidates the main message level features that securitisation moves should emphasise to increase their effectiveness. The innovative experimental approach here revealed that to enhance persuasiveness, the threat component should stress the danger and the immediacy of the threat, in addition to message recipients' collective and personal vulnerability. In terms of the policy component, in addition to presenting a comprehensive policy, securitisation actors will increase their persuasiveness if they emphasise their capability to implement the proposed security response. Mediation analysis also revealed an interesting relationship between threat cognitions and support for security action: perceived threat severity, but not susceptibility perceptions increased overall support for a government security response.

The proposed relationships between message content configurations, emotional episodes, defensiveness, and securitisation attitudes are formalised in two flow diagrams in Figure 11 and Figure 12 which represent the optimum and sub-optimum models respectively.

Figure 11: Optimum Model



Figure 12: Sub-Optimum Model



By providing a blueprint with which to assess the roles played by emotional dynamics and securitisation move content when studying securitisation cases, these models address a gap in Securitisation Studies between the CS's exceptionalism and the PS's desire for a more practical iteration of securitisation theory. The models main value lies in the provision of a clear structure, consistent with the securitisation framework, onto which securitisation political speeches, images, media content etc., can be organised and analysed. The experimentally driven approach adopted also provides an important counterbalance within securitisation theory against the tendency to seek to explain and describe only positive outcomes. This methodological choice led to the identification of not only when fear is conducive to persuasion, but when and why fear can inhibit successful persuasion. The proposed linear emotional episode associated with less effective outcomes, provides a mechanism to support analysis of inconclusive cases of securitisation which feature highly dangerous threat content, but less convincing policy proposals. Moreover, the identification of the linear, positive relationship between peak fear and security threat perceptions, strongly suggests that moves which fail to initially arouse sufficient levels of threat-based fear are unlikely to be successful. Taken together, this should contribute to rebalancing the positive case study bias within empirical securitisation literature, by equipping researchers to explore and explain the relative effectiveness of different securitisation moves.

In addition to the theoretical implications for Securitisation Studies outlined beforehand, these models have numerous real-world implications for securitisation practitioners. The most obvious implication is the overall value of arousing fear. In both the high and low efficacy conditions, peak fear, directly and indirectly led to increased security threat perceptions. It is worth highlighting that whilst the securitisation attempt in the high efficacy condition was more effective in terms of both securitisation attitudes, the low efficacy condition still produced a relatively effective overall securitisation. In short, fear, in line with predictions, is positively correlated with threat perception. The conclusion from the within persons analysis however renders it clear that to deliver intended results, securitisation 'managers of unease' have a further task: they should aim to arouse and to then reduce an audience's fear levels via their communications. This dynamic raises interesting questions around the phasing and timing of securitisation moves. The models developed here would

suggest that to increase the probability of mass support for complete securitisations, securitisation actors would benefit from delaying seeking public support for a proposed securitisation move until clear, convincing, feasible countermeasures have been well developed. This however immediately raises ethical issues around the possible trade-off between securitisation move effectiveness, and transparency.

It also leads to discussion of *how* to deliver securitisation moves most effectively. There is a burgeoning literature outlining the rise of social media as a means of elite political communications (Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Nulty et al., 2016). The space constrained nature of platforms such as Twitter however has also been attributed to a rise in political and media sensationalism (Otto, Glogger & Boukes, 2017). In the case of securitisation, these trends may lead to a disproportionate emphasis on the attention-grabbing threat component of securitisation moves, at the expense of less click worthy policy proposals. It is possible therefore that the current media environment is not particularly conducive to optimum configurations of securitisation move content required to produce a curvilinear fear episode. Indeed, this may be one explanation for the COVID-19 era return of lengthy elite televised press conferences, now used widely as a standard method of presenting fluctuations in the magnitude of the COVID-19 threat and to comprehensively explain the rationale for emergency measures.

It would be remiss not to expand on the issue of ethics at this point, as there are multifaceted ethical dimensions to both securitisation theory, and this thesis per se. The CS have stressed from the earliest formulations of their theory that securitisation, as a practice, is not politically or ethically neutral. It can be a profoundly powerful governmental instrument used to redirect resources, create and solidify social identities, stifle democratic debate and transparency, and, of course, legitimise wars and conflict. To that end, the CS have been explicit, that from their perspective, 'security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics' (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Wæver (1999: 335, 2002: 49) has therefore expressed a clear preference for desecuritisation where possible.

This, however, has not prevented normative criticisms being targeted at the CS, and securitisation theory in general (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 1999). As Taureck (2006) demonstrates, much of this criticism conflates the purpose of securitisation theory per

se as a concept and a framework, and the normative aspects of broader Securitisation Studies. The purpose of securitisation theory is 'simply' to enhance analysis of the construction, effects, and the dissolution of security threats and emergency measures. Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis has been, in the first instance, to enhance scholars' ability to conduct such analysis by augmenting the securitisation framework to include emotions.

However, by identifying causal mechanisms, and incorporating them into an intentionally (albeit not entirely) constitutive model, a new ethical issue arises which Securitisation Studies has not previously considered: this thesis, to an extent, has increased the applied utility of the securitisation framework. In other words, in addition to enhancing Securitisation Studies' explanatory and predictive power, it has steered securitisation from an overwhelmingly descriptive framework, towards, at least in regard to threat-based fear, becoming more of a guide for applied practice. This prompts discussion of at least two significant issues: 1) was this enquiry ethically appropriate and 2) are fear-based securitisation moves ethical?

With regard to the former issue, I would argue that the practice of fear-based political and security messaging is so deeply established in contemporary political life, that the risk of a research project further incentivising actors to attempt to mobilise threat-based fear for strategic purposes is negligible. Moreover, improving understanding of the dynamics of fear-based securitisation for the purposes of enhancing securitisation theory, also better equips those engaged in Securitisation Studies, or the broader political domain, to contest moves which they consider to be ethically dubious. To expand, identification of the cognitive and emotional variables which combine to produce high levels of securitisation attitudes proposes a blueprint for reverse engineering fear-based securitisation i.e., desecuritisation.

On the latter issue, I adopt a consequentialist and case dependent position. Discussion of the ethics of using fear as a tool to facilitate fear has a long philosophical legacy (Pfau, 2007). Plato concluded that appeals to emotion debase the audience and the speaker by corrupting reason and logic (ibid). Aristotle however was less critical, acknowledging that fear-based rhetoric is sometimes required to stir a complacent audience to acknowledge and react to both immediate threats, and those which flicker

on the horizon for which humans appear poorly furnished to tackle (ibid). Modern manifestations of this debate widely feature in the fear appeal literature, and wider Political Science (Gourevitch 2010; McQueen, 2018; Pfau, 2007; Scheller, 2019).

Drawing on McQueen (2018), Pfau (2007) and Floyd (2011), I advance the concept of the 'civic fear-based just securitisation move' for guiding ethical deliberation. To provide a framework within Securitisation Studies for analysis of the 'moral rightness' of specific securitisation moves, Floyd (2011: 436) advances three criteria: 1) that an objective existential threat exists; (2) that the referent object of security is 'morally legitimate'; and (3) that the proposed countermeasure is appropriate. Whilst I would contend that the first criteria may set the bar excessively high in some cases, these three criteria are a helpful guide with which to evaluate the relative ethical merits of a securitisation move. To account for the additional issue of whether intentionally using fear is appropriate, I propose to add one additional criterion: (4) that the securitiser elicits fear concomitant to the objective risk and seeks to extinguish it as soon as possible through their actions and discourse. Fear, of a genuine, objective threat is not irrational. On the contrary, in the Aristotelian tradition, it is often a necessary condition for both persuasion and civic collective action. Seeking to arouse fear in an audience to persuade them of the existence of a genuine threat is therefore not immoral, provided that it 'elicits rather than extinguishes our sense of agency, and invites rather than forecloses deliberation' (McQueen, 2018: 14). In McQueen's (2018: 5) felicitous phrase, there is clear civic value in 'fearing well'. For both practical and civic reasons however, a securitiser should seek to reduce fear levels associated with a specific threat when appropriate. If they do so, and meet the three conditions outlined by Floyd, I contend that this will represent a 'civic fear-based just securitisation move'.

Finally, this leads to discussion of the broader relevance of this thesis, and application of the proposed models beyond Securitisation Studies. Outside of the standard boundaries of Security Studies, there is a sizeable literature in political science and sociology which discusses the role of emotions - typically fear - in political persuasion and mobilisation (Altheide, 2006; Furedi, 2007; Gardner, 2009; Robin, 2004). The starting point for many contributions, as summarised by Shirlow & Pain (2003: 15), is that: '[F]ear, whether it is quelled and or stimulated, provides the capacity to both

control and manipulate a variety of social and political discourses'. However, the vast majority of this research is theoretical, and lacks clear models. The contribution of this thesis to the literature is the provision of an experimentally acquired understanding of when and why the experience of threat-based fear aroused in political communities, facilitates or impedes political persuasion. Given that the elicit-reduce threat-base fear dynamic has been found to be effective in fear-based messaging across health communications and security policy contexts, it is reasonable to assume that the models proposed here will also help analysis of emotion-based communications in non-security case studies exploring political rhetoric relating to other emotive issues such as migration, abortion rights, and criminal justice issues.

8.3 Limitations

As Williams (2003) emphasised, incorporating fear into securitisation theory is a significant theoretical and methodological challenge. This initial foray has demonstrated the clear value of incorporating select cutting edge findings and methods from the affective science and fear appeal fields into the securitisation framework, however, it is not without its limitations. Considering methodological shortcomings first, as acknowledged from the outset, securitisation, in the real world, does not take place in a lab where individuals read carefully crafted manipulation stimuli. Actual cases of securitisation occur via our saturated, contested mediascape, which, in the digital era, often means that individuals are simultaneously processing information streams from different sources e.g., scanning Twitter while watching a TV news segment. This leads to the first, clear, limitation of this thesis: debatable ecological validity (see Holleman et al., 2020 for a comprehensive discussion of the literature on laboratory experiments and ecological validity).

There are numerous aspects of the methodological approach which contribute to sub-optimum ecological validity. First of all, due to ethical considerations, participants - who completed the experiments for financial reward - were explicitly informed from the outset that they were reading a stylised message constructed for the purposes of an experiment. Whilst it is encouraging that this method produced considerable variation in emotional and cognitive responses, the price for such internal validity is somewhat reduced external validity. Building upon results here, further work - which must also navigate complicated ethical waters - is required to examine how individuals respond

to securitisation moves in more natural contexts. One possible way forward in this regard could be online survey measures following real world political events e.g., political speeches, or news segments portraying a new security threat etc.

One other related limitation was that the message was one sided. The degree of contestation around securitisation moves varies per case, however, in deliberate democracies there is often various oppositional narratives (Paterson and Karyotis, 2020). In the introduction to this thesis, the example of then President Trump attempting to securitise migration and seek support for the 'border wall', was referenced. This case was a clear example of a contested move as the Democratic Party representatives immediately accused the President of 'fear mongering' and sought to reframe the issue with slogans such as 'build bridges not walls' (US shutdown: Border politicians oppose Trump's wall, 2019). Further work is therefore required to examine the effects of contested and supporting narratives on psychological processing to generate a more holistic model.

The absence of political contestation within the scope of this methodological approach also connects to a shortcoming around the negation of demographic variance. Given the exploratory nature of this research, an epistemological decision was made to anchor analysis to generalisable population-level dynamics. This was motivated by a desire to focus on generating proof of concept to other scholars within Securitisation Studies, who view the process as a profoundly collective level phenomenon, and are also presently doubtful of the value of a psychological approach to securitisation. The trade-off with this decision is the neglect of possible demographic variance, which leaves considerable room for future analysis examining whether, for example, sex and age, differences affect how fear, or the various related cognitions, are experienced following exposure to a securitisation message.

A further limitation which needs to be addressed via additional research to increase confidence in the generalisability of the proposed model is its debatable case-specificity. In other words, does the model proposed here describe the dynamics which led to increased or decreased securitisation attitudes only in relation to this particular issue i.e., foreign corruption, or are the same combinations of emotional and cognitive variables likely to produce the same effects regardless of the subject matter. This

challenge is valid, however, given that the initial hypotheses guiding the enquiry were drawn on a well-developed theoretical and empirical body of work i.e., fear appeals, this should attenuate concerns over generalisability and transferability. However, this can only be confirmed by replication of the proposed interactions e.g., that fear inflates severity and susceptibility perceptions using other forms of manipulation stimuli on different topics. The generalisability of the findings would also have been enhanced had a truly representative sample been used. Unfortunately, the cost of the large sample size required to conduct the within persons analysis prohibited this option due to resource constraints. Instead, a convenience sample drawn from Prolific participants, was used, which, as discussed, is typically more representative than student samples, however, a fully representative sample remains the gold standard.

Finally, sample size demands also prohibited the addition of low threat and no efficacy conditions to Study 1. Such a low threat vs. high threat comparison would have provided a direct test of whether the more vivid content in the high threat condition leads to elevated initial fear levels and associated cognitive responses as anticipated. This, again, based on the large body of fear appeal evidence - which demonstrates that vivid descriptions of possible harm do typically arouse higher levels of fear - appears to be a reasonable assumption, however it was not directly tested here. Relatedly, there was no direct evidence of a failed securitisation attempt per se. Instead, based on various fear appeal meta-analysis, and the findings of regressions examining peak fear and securitisation attitudes, it is inferred that securitisation moves which elicit negligible levels of fear will be unsuccessful. Validation of this inference, however, requires further experimentation. Similarly, incorporating a no efficacy condition into Study 1 would have enabled analysis of whether the complete absence of a policy proposal is associated with even higher levels of defensiveness compared to low efficacy statements.

8.4 Areas for Future Research

The models proposed here, despite the limitations outlined above, provide a clear foundation on which to build a cumulative, experimentally driven research agenda exploring the psychology of securitisation. Encouragingly, due to the dearth of cross-fertilisation between psychology and securitisation theory to date, there are numerous exciting new areas for psychologically focused research at each stage of the

securitisation process. This section first identifies new research opportunities, inspired by theory and empirical data in various psychological fields, which represent the next steps in the development of the proposed refined securitisation framework. It is then argued that the next significant step to advance this nascent psychology of securitisation is to go beyond the meso, group level of analysis adopted in this thesis, and embrace the challenge of identifying the categories of individual level variance which are likely to systematically affect securitisation attitudes. To that end, several promising areas for future research are now identified.

Securitisation actors

There is minimal research exploring the issue of who can securitise effectively. However, there is considerable literature exploring similar issues across fields including fear appeals, communications research, and political psychology. The starting point for Securitisation Studies could be the effects of source credibility. It is a well replicated finding in social psychology that high-credibility sources are more effective at attitude change (Druckman, 2001). Additional factors examined in other contexts include likability and perceived objectivity (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). In the alleged post truth political and media environment, which of these source variables is most relevant to a securitisation move's success remains to be explored.

Experimental methods such as those used in this thesis would be well suited to the study of whether these factors influence securitisation attitudes. There is also the interesting sub-question of when source ambiguity can facilitate persuasion. For example, Weber et al., (2012) found that campaign ads sponsored by unknown actors were considered more persuasive by audiences than better known interest groups. This echoes with the successful securitisation attempt in Study 1, which was intentionally ambiguous over its source to minimise the risk of potential partisan responses. It also strikes a chord with criticisms that securitisation theory has been overly focussed on elite actors at the expense of marginalised and oppressed groups (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019; Wilkinson, 2007). Further research should therefore examine how the identity – or lack thereof – of the securitisation actor affects securitisation attitudes.

Securitisation moves

This thesis makes a significant contribution to securitisation theory by furthering understanding of how the threat and policy components of an idealised securitisation move interact to influence outcomes. It also identified critical aspects of message content e.g., the importance of emphasising the actor's capability to implement the proposed policy. Nevertheless, much remains to be known about how variance in securitisation message strategies and content affects attitudes. For example, does message repetition increase the likelihood of persuasion? There is emerging evidence which suggests that this could be a promising line of future enquiry. Shi and Smith (2016) found that repeated fear appeals led to enhanced levels of threat perception. This raises the connected issue of message fatigue (So, 2017). Research should be considered which examines the effects of repeated securitisation messages and whether, after a certain point, they become counterproductive.

Future research on the nature of the proposed policy response could also be illuminating. Tannenbaum et al., (2015) conclude that messages which contain one off proposals/responses are typically more persuasive. There would therefore be clear merit in examining whether this effect is replicated with security policy proposals e.g., it is easier to establish support for a one-off targeted strike, than a more comprehensive, ongoing strategy? If so, this could potentially assist in further elucidating and explaining what determines high efficacy perceptions amongst recipients, an essential feature of a successful securitisation move.

The role of prior subjective knowledge or attitudes towards proposed threats and policies within a securitisation move presents another promising research avenue. This thesis deliberately chose a topic for which it was expected that few members of the public would consider to be a security issue, to minimise the risk of prior held beliefs desensitising the manipulation. Real world examples of securitisation however are likely to often build on existing attitudes e.g., strategic campaigns to present migrants as a security threat, such as those during the 'Mediterranean Migrant/Refugee Crisis' or the UK's Brexit Campaign did not occur in a social vacuum. They drew on embedded narratives and shared sentiments and attitudes among some constituencies about specific ethnic and religious groups. Exactly how such prior beliefs or subjective

knowledge affects the processing of securitisation messages remains to be seen. Interestingly however, Averbeck, Jones and Robertson (2011) found that fear appeals which reference topics known to the recipient tend to produce lower levels of emotional arousal and higher levels of systematic processing. Future research could explore this issue of whether it is easier to securitise an audience on new or unfamiliar issues compared to those which they consider themselves more informed.

Finally, as discussed in the methodology section, this thesis relied on stylized newspaper vignettes to manipulate fear levels in the audience. This, for practical reasons i.e., the proven track record of vignettes acting as reliable stimuli, led to a clear methodological bias towards verbal securitisation in comparison to the non-discursive means which the PS rightly highlight are also used to insecuritise issues. More exploratory designs could seek to explore the emotional effects elicited when audiences witness security policies and practices, and how non-verbally aroused emotions affect securitisation attitudes.

Other emotions

As the first experimental attempt at incorporating emotions into securitisation theory, this thesis focused on the emotions with the most immediate relevance to threat perception and persuasion i.e., threat-based fear, existential fear, and anxiety. It has long been accepted however that messages which intend to arouse fear often elicit other emotions (Leshner et al., 2009). Given the nature of security issues, it is also likely that securitisation moves also produce emotional responses beyond those examined here. For instance, there is strong evidence that the immediate prevailing emotional response to the 9/11 attacks was national anger (Back et al., 2010). Does anger produce the same psychological effects as fear? Or is the experience of anger counterproductive to persuasion? These questions, amongst others, remain to be explored, and there is a burgeoning literature exploring how combinations of emotions affect persuasion on which future research can draw (Alam and So, 2020; Albertson et al., 2020; Nabi and Green; 2015).

Incorporating personality

As discussed in chapter five, the constructivist theory of emotion emphasises that how emotions are experienced, and the effects they produce, are somewhat heterogeneous (LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018). This means that to further the psychology of securitisation, there will likely be merit in seeking to identify which differences at the individual level i.e., personality traits, affect securitisation attitudes through their direct effects and their relationship with fear and cognitive responses to securitisation moves. Indeed, Aristotle (2006: 1382a, 129) reflected on this over two millennia ago:

> Those experiencing, and thinking they experience, great good fortune do not think they might suffer. Therefore they are insolent and belittlers and rash (wealth, strength and an abundance of friends makes them so); nor are those afraid who think they have already suffered all dreadful things possible and have become coldly indifferent to the future, like those actually being done to death.

The individual however, for the reasons outlined in chapter two, does not feature within securitisation theory. This creates a tension between the field and applied political communications, which is witnessing a seminal shift from the traditional practice of mass marketing i.e., the development of one message for one audience, for example, the 'Daisy' ad run by Lyndon B. Johnson's campaign that implied that Barry Goldwater's approach to politics would lead to nuclear annihilation, to micro or nano-targeted messages aimed at specific sub-groups or individuals (Endres & Kelly, 2018; Semetko & Tworzecki, 2017). This practice differs considerably from mass marketing by drawing on personal characteristics identified from 'big data' e.g., Facebook activity, to target messages towards particular individuals (González, 2017).

One form of micro-targeting enabled by big data is 'psychological persuasion' i.e., communications 'tailored to people's unique psychological characteristics and motivations' (Matz, Kosinski, Nave and Stillwell, 2017: 12715). This is the form of mass communications that was controversially provided by Cambridge Analytica to government and private clients. The firm generated personality profiles from online behaviour and predicted individuals' characteristics based on the widely used Five Factor Model (FFM), 'big five' personality traits, i.e., openness, conscientiousness,

extroversion, agreeableness, neuroticism (González, 2017). These were then supplemented with information drawn from available data e.g., geographical location, and online habits and whilst much of the civil and academic discussion about the effectiveness and ethics of micro-targeting focuses on its uses in electoral campaigns, there is clear evidence that government departments are testing how to employ these tactics on security issues e.g., the use of 'computational propaganda' (Woolley & Howard, 2017).

There is emerging evidence that such a person-centric communications approach does increase the effectiveness of persuasion attempts (Matz et al., 2017). Matz et al. (2017) conducted a range of innovative field experiments comparing the effectiveness of personality tailored advertisements for products and standard promotions as an ethically sound means of testing the impact of psychological persuasion. They first generated psychological profiles of Facebook users on two constructs i.e., levels of extraversion and openness by analysing Facebook 'like' activity and based on these profiles, then exposed individuals to tailored advertisements for products that are intended to appeal to their traits. An illustrative example is that individuals scoring high on extraversion would receive adverts for products containing images of people dancing and vibrant colours, whereas adverts for introverts were more sedate and featured slogans designed to be relatable e.g., 'beauty doesn't have to shout'. Compared to the control group of standard adverts, on every metric, psychologically tailored ads on only two personality traits were more effective e.g., generating up to 40% more clicks and 50% more purchases of the products than personality incongruent or standard content (Matz et al., 2017).

Whilst the evidence base on the effectiveness of person centric persuasion is nascent at this point for various reasons such as the relative novelty of the method, the absence of publicly available data, and wider ethical concerns around experimentation, there are reasons to assume that psychological persuasion will increase the impact of securitisation moves. For example, Sumner and Shearing's research (2017) tailored pro and anti-internet surveillance messages to individuals based on their levels of self-reported authoritarianism. In the high authoritarian, anti-surveillance image, the content featured a background of the D-Day landings, and the slogan 'They fought for

your freedom, don't give it away!'. The authors then tested their effectiveness on Facebook measured by likes and shares by unique users. Consistent with expectations, tailored ads were significantly more effective in all conditions (Sumner and Shearing, 2017).

Therefore, based on emerging evidence across several cognate fields, it appears reasonable to assume that content tailored to psychological traits will be, on average, more persuasive than generalised mass communications. The following section therefore maps out selected areas for further research to examine how traits interact with emotions to affect securitisation attitudes.

The foundational level of political psychology is biological differences, which have been found to be important determinants of a wide range political attitudes and behaviours (Hatemi and McDermott 2012a; Orey and Park 2012; Smith et al., 2012). As Hatemi and McDermott (2018: 5), in a relatively recent appeal to those working in international security to incorporate interdisciplinary insights, describe:

> It is now established that individual differences in our DNA and neurological functions are reflected in all those cognitive and emotional traits that guide complex decisions including those in International Relations involving decisions to go war, who to fight against, when to aggress and when to withdraw, how to lead, and when not to intervene.

There appears to be no reason to believe that responses to securitisation attitudes are somehow immune to these biological influences. It is proposed here that revised-Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST), offers a well-developed starting point for further exploration of this issue due to its relevance to the experience of fear and threat cognitions, and the survival circuits which often underpin them.

At its theoretical core, revised-Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST) proposes that there are three brain-behavioural systems which underpin threat related emotional and motivational behaviour, and that individual level variance in these systems is an important determinant of broader behavioural and personality differences (Pickering and Corr, 2008). Two of these systems, the Fight, Flight and Freeze System (FFFS), and the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS), are often considered as the biological, survival circuit inputs of fear and anxiety respectively (McNaughton and Corr, 2018).

However, until recently, there was a problematic tendency within r-RST to effectively equate activation of these systems with the direct experience of these emotions (LeDoux, 2012). This was clearly inconsistent with the constructivist understanding of emotions applied in this thesis whereby conceptual knowledge is required to generate an emotional experience (Barrett, 2018). Notably however, McNaughton and Corr (2018) have recently recast these two systems, following LeDoux's terminology, as survival circuits. This is a considerable theoretical step which permits the integration of both theories i.e., the constructivist theory of emotions provides an overarching framework outlining the key components of an emotional experience, and r-RST clarifies the role of biological systems associated with fear. These inputs, or survival circuits, which evolved to maximise fitness in a landscape scattered with threats (predators, other humans, etc.), it is argued here, will likely affect various aspects of the processing of securitisation moves, and ultimately influence their attitudinal outcomes (LeDoux, 2012). To that end, three areas for specific future research are proposed.

Moderating Emotional Responses

The initial contribution that the concept of FFFS can therefore offer securitisation is that the variance in the sensitivity of this system may account for differences in how fear is experienced following securitisation moves. As discussed, drawing on neo-drive fear appeal theories, the central mechanism in both psychological models of securitisation attitudes presented in this thesis is the trajectory of emotional reactions over time in response to securitisation moves. And whilst differences in FFFS sensitivity cannot be expected to explain all of the variance in how individuals respond emotionally to securitisation content, it should, *ceteris paribus*, likely exert influences on the magnitude of their onset and overall trajectory (Davidson, 1993; Gray, 1990). Future research should consider exploring the tentative hypothesis advanced here that individuals with high FFFS and BIS sensitivity will experience higher levels of peak fear and anxiety in response to message content. This is consistent with Heponiemi, Keltikangas-Järvinen, Puttonen & Ravaja (2003) who found that high BIS and BAS predispositions magnified emotional response to stimuli.

Threat Perceptions

In addition to their direct effects upon emotional responses to external stimuli, survival circuit variance also exerts cognitive effects (De Dreu, Nijstad & Baas, 2010; Noguchi, Gohm & Dalsky, 2006; Perkins et al., 2010). For example, in further findings with clear relevance to securitisation, Perkins et al. (2010) found that individuals with sensitive BIS dispositions are more likely to perceive threats as closer and more severe. Conversely, individuals with low trait anxiety perceive threats to be less proximate and less significant (McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Perkins et al, 2010).

Drawing on these findings, it is proposed that individual differences in the two RST-3 systems which mediate threat behaviour i.e., the FFFS, and the BIS, will likely affect cognitive appraisals of the severity and proximity of proposed threats. Specifically, future research should explore whether FFFS sensitivity positively correlates with magnified threat perceptions. The converse can also be inferred from existing studies i.e., individuals who score lower on FFFS will have lower threat perceptions. How BIS affects threat perceptions is more challenging to predict. Many of the studies conducted exploring BIS and threat perception were conducted during earlier iterations of RST when FFFS and BIS were a unitary construct. Nevertheless, based on the findings of these studies, it is reasonable to assume that higher BIS sensitivity will also be correlated with higher threat perceptions (Meyer et al., 2015).

Support for Countermeasures

In addition to threat perceptions, there are theoretical and experimental reasons to propose that RST-3 sensitivity will also influence cognitive appraisals of policy proposals. However, rather than BIS, and FFFS, it is argued that BAS sensitivity will exert the strongest effects on levels of support for security countermeasures. This is due to the BAS being the biological foundation of approach related motivational tendencies (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). As such, individuals who exhibit high trait BAS dispositions are typically more sensitive to reward, and display personality traits such as extraversion, risk-taking behaviour, and impulsivity (Gable, 2012; Zisserson,

2007). High BAS sensitivity is also associated with a bias towards positively framed content and arguments (Shen and Dillard, 2009; Yan, Dillard and Shen, 2012).

Socialisation

Unlike the role of biology, the role of socialisation on political psychology and behaviour is a long-standing area of research (Adorno et al., 1950; Freud, 1930; Hyman, 1959; Marcuse, 1952). In the early years of Political Science, socialisation theories exploring how differences in early experiences may affect later political behaviour, were largely rooted in the psychoanalytical tradition and advanced mainly unfalsifiable propositions centring on child-parent interactions. With the positivist turn in social science, a new, experimentally driven theory emerged, which, whilst still inspired by certain concepts from the psychoanalytical tradition, has generated a rich, empirically grounded theory with clear relevance to Security Studies (Huddy, Feldman, & Webber, 2007; Weise, Pyszczynski, & Cox, 2008; Weber & Federico, 2007).

One such theory is attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969; 1973, 1980). Attachment theory, initially proposed by Bowlby (1969; 1973, 1980), proposes that infants possess an 'innate psychobiological system' that motives them to gravitate towards caregivers when distressed or under threat (Ein-Dor, 2014). This tendency acquired during evolution confers adaptive advantages e.g., it helps protect the young from predation (Mikulincer et al., 2000; Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002). However, caregivers are not always available when a child is distressed, and when they are present, there is significant variation in how adults respond to distressed children with some being overly protective, whilst others can be dismissive or cruel (Newton, 2008). Attachment theory proposes that over time, these interactions become solidified into attachment styles, which produce profound differences in 'affective, behavioural and cognitive responses in social contexts across the individual's lifetime' (Chui and Leung 2016: 55). Bowlby (1969), and Ainsworth et al., (1978) categorised these styles: 1) secure, 2) avoidant and 3) resistant attachment styles.

There is a considerable body of research demonstrating the applicability of attachment theory to security matters. Huddy et al. (2007), for example, found that individuals

who felt secure following 9/11 expressed lower levels of support for stronger security policies e.g., curtailed civil liberties and the invasion of Afghanistan, than insecure people. Mikulincer et al., (2001) and Mikulincer & Shaver, (2001) also found that individuals primed with attachment security were less likely to derogate out-groups. Ein-Dor, Mikulincer, Doron, & Shaver (2010) have built upon these, and other's findings, to propose Social Defense Theory (SDT) i.e., a theory exploring how differences in attachment styles affects group behaviour. SDT starts from the premise that, if attachment security appears to be adaptive e.g., secure individuals experience better mental health, are more adept in leadership positions, and tend to have more long-lasting, meaningful relationships, why, across different samples and cultures, is there a significant section of society who are insecurely attached (Ein-Dor, 2014)?

SDT argues that, whilst insecurity may not be advantageous in certain situations, group heterogeneity is advantageous over the long term. Based on the attachment categories of secure, anxious, and avoidant, and the results of a number of studies, SDT proposes that in societies there exist: 1) secure individuals who, whilst acting as effective leaders, are slower than others at detecting and responding to threats, 2) insecure 'sentinels' who frequently engage in risk assessment and are more sensitive to threats providing early warnings to the group and 3) independent avoidant individuals who are less likely to take decisive action to the benefit of their own, and the group's evolutionary fitness (Ein-Dor, 2014; Ein-Dor, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2011b).

These three styles are likely to represent important categories of individual variance affecting how securitisation move content i.e., levels of threat and policy efficacy is perceived. In terms of threat perception, securely attached individuals (i.e., those low in anxiety and low in avoidance), and avoidant individuals, are likely to perceive lower levels of threat compared to anxious individuals. Likewise, in terms of perceptions of the policy recommendation component of securitisation messages, securely attached people may be less supportive due to their feeling of felt security. Anxious people, however, have been repeatedly found to act swiftly in the face of perceived threats, and as such they may be more receptive to proposed security policy responses (Ein-Dor and Orgad, 2012). It is somewhat more of a challenge to predict how avoidant personalities will influence perceptions of policy efficacy. Ein-Dor (2014: 4) defines

avoidant individuals as possessing more decisive tendencies than secure or anxiously attached people. This may suggest that their perceptions will be more exaggerated i.e., significantly greater, or lower support for policy proposals than the other attachment styles. All of the above can be assessed using standard measures, and the portfolio of securitisation specific methods developed here.

Political Ideology

Finally, as securitisation attitudes are deeply political, it is reasonable to predict that, in addition to these biological and socialised building blocks of political psychology, trait variance in political ideology itself will also be a critical personality level influence on securitisation attitudes. There are however, (in)famously many ways to categorise political worldviews. It is proposed here that of these various measures, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt and Sibley, 2010; Sidanius and Pratto, 2011) hold particular relevance for furthering understanding of how differences in political opinions may affect securitisation attitudes. Both concepts are now briefly introduced with speculative hypotheses offered for the purposes of future research on how they may affect securitisation outcomes.

Following the furore caused by the post-World War Two publication of the Authoritarian Personality, the study of political psychology fell out of favour with behaviouralist and rational choice theories beginning to dominate Political Science (Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013; Roiser and Willig, 2002). The introduction of Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996) theory of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) however helped to somewhat buck this trend. Whilst clearly influenced by Adorno et al., (1950), Altemeyer was acutely aware of the limitations of psychoanalytically rooted theories, and therefore sought to develop a more robust theory and more precise measures of political ideology. Altemeyer, eschewing psychoanalytical explanations for personality differences, drew on Bandura's (1977) social learning theory. In this account, authoritarian tendencies are acquired through socialisation processes i.e., the nature of an individual's interactions with parents, teachers, etc., which, over time, inform an individual's views on authority. Therefore, unlike Adorno et al., Altemeyer

(1999) explained authoritarian outlooks not as the manifestation of permanent personality traits, but as reflective of the broader context and social attitudes which can change over time. Altemeyer (1999: 8), through factor analysis, reduced these original nine components down to a triad attitudinal cluster: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. These traits are posited to compose RWA, a concept which has made a considerable impact on political psychology and has proven to predict a range of political behaviour e.g., higher RWA scores predict prejudice, ethnocentrism, and hostility towards 'deviant' groups (Altemeyer, 1999).

Coinciding with Altemeyer's revival of work examining predictors of authoritarianism, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) introduced Social Dominance Theory (SDT), a theory exploring how social hierarchies are established and maintained; and proposed the concept of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) as its central measure. SDO represents 'the extent to which one desires that one's in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups' (Pratto et al., 1994: 742). High scores on the SDO scale correlate strongly with conservative views, and opposition to policies that would reduce group inequities (Pratto et al., 1997; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). There is a degree of theoretical overlap between the attitudes measured by the RWA and SDO scales, however, covariation is small ($r = 0.18$) (Pratto et al., 1994).

Both have clear relevance for the development of a psychology of securitisation. The starting point is their effects on threat perception and pro-security policies. Numerous studies have found RWA to have a magnifying effect on threat perception and positively correlated with increased support for pro-security policies (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert, & Duckitt, 2009; Sales & Friend, 1973). Illustratively, McFarland (2005) found that individuals higher in RWA perceived higher levels of threat posed by Iraq to the US and were more likely to support a pre-emptive attack. This is consistent with Lavine et al. (1999) who, in a finding with clear relevance to fear appeals, found that high authoritarians are particularly receptive to threat-based persuasion attempts (see also Lavine, Lodge and Freitas, 2005).

SDO has also been found to affect security policy attitudes. Its effects, however, differ from those of RWA, due to the different motivational drivers behind these two dimensions of political ideology. SDO, rather than contribute to threat magnification,

and a desire to neutralise dangers, can increase support for security policies through a desire to maintain order and hierarchies (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010). Crowson et al. (2005), for example, found that SDO was predictive of support for restrictions on human rights in a US sample, and Cohrs et al. (2005) discovered similar results in Germany with higher SDO correlating with support for post 9/11 restrictions on internet freedom. Therefore, whilst high SDO is unlikely to result in increased threat perception, it does suggest a unique, attitudinal path to increased support for countermeasures to regulate the social position of outgroups and minorities. Taken together, the concepts of RWA and SDO therefore offer a solid, empirically robust entry point for future research into how differences in political ideology affect securitisation attitudes.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter summarised the overall theoretical contribution to the field made by this thesis. Section 8.2, drawing on the findings of the most ambitious experiment conducted with Securitisation Studies to-date, presented the first psychological models of securitisation attitudes. These conclusively demonstrate the considerable value accrued by incorporating emotion into securitisation theory. By locating the trajectory of a threat-based fear episode as a central causal mechanism in the securitisation process, these models address a range of existing shortcomings e.g., the lack of causal mechanisms, minimal focus on the audience, and negligible explanatory power of securitisation theory, whilst providing the first experimentally driven refinements to the existing securitisation framework.

The optimum model identifies the interactions between message content, cognitions, and emotional trajectories most likely to lead to high level of securitisation attitudes. It emphasised the necessity for a securitisation actor to raise but also reduce fear through convincing policy proposals. This curvilinear form of emotional response predicts both higher levels of threat perception and support for a security response, and is also associated with lower levels of defensiveness, an important negative mediator of securitisation attitudes. Conversely, the sub-optimum model outlines when and why messages which fail to reduce fear are less effective.

Section 8.3 then outlined several limitations of this project, including the limited ecological validity associated with online laboratory experiments, and the need for further replications to assess the generalisability of the models proposed here. It also emphasised that these models should not be considered as a substitute for detailed, contextually informed case studies, but a tool to enhance explanation and prediction of specific dynamics. It concluded with a discussion of ethical considerations associated with this project, and proposed criteria for evaluating the ethics of a fear-based securitisation move. Section 8.4 concluded the chapter by building on this theoretical contribution to propose the next steps in the development of a fully-fledged psychological theory of securitisation. To that end, it presented numerous areas for future research to expand and enhance the current models, and also to take theoretical step by examining personality traits that, based upon existing evidence and theory, are likely to contribute to illuminating how individual variance affects securitisation attitudes. This, it was argued, will ensure that securitisation theory remains aligned with how securitisation moves, and political communications are conducted in the digital age.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Securitisation theory, inspired by a wide range of linguistic and sociological fields outside the traditional theoretical core of IR, has made a significant contribution to Security Studies. As discussed in chapter two, by injecting constructivism into a traditionally rationalist field, the concept of securitisation expanded the field's epistemological and ontological horizons and has since generated a vibrant research agenda centred on the issue of how security threats and policies come into being, a process with profound social and political consequences. To date, however, Securitisation Studies, has failed to build on this interdisciplinary breakthrough to reach its full potential.

Although they illuminate important aspects of the securitisation landscape, neither the speech act orientated, nor the sociological approach to securitisation, meaningfully account for the role of emotions in the securitisation process. Chapter two also identified related limitations hindering Securitisation Studies' capacity to comprehensively answer its primary research questions i.e., 'What makes something a security issue? What kind of responses does this call for? What are the specific consequences of agreeing that something is a threat?' (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016). These include the failure to identify causal relationships within the securitisation process, the ontological deprioritisation of the audience's role, and limited theorisation regarding how variance in securitisation move content affects outcomes.

This thesis argued that Securitisation Studies can holistically address these interconnected issues by rediscovering its interdisciplinary spirit and embracing social and political psychology. To assuage those concerned that a psychological turn in securitisation theory risks splintering the research agenda into analysis of micro relationships and undermining its applied value as a framework for analysis of empirical cases, it contended that this first step towards the establishment of a psychological school of securitisation theory should seek to incorporate emotions into a refined securitisation framework to explain how emotional responses to securitisation moves affect securitisation attitudes at the group level. Accordingly, this

project should not be considered as a replacement to CS or PS, but as a theoretical complement, positioned between the semi constitutive discourse focused linguistic approach, and the more explanatory, practice orientated sociological branch.

This, however, presented both a broad and daunting task for a field that has exhibited negligible engagement with social psychology or affective science thus far in its development. Chapter three therefore laid the theoretical groundwork by demonstrating that the adoption of a constructivist understanding of emotions enables a precise conceptualisation of emotions in general, and fear and anxiety specifically – two emotions that those in both affective science, and tangential social science fields, have grappled with but failed to comprehensively conceptualise. This ensured a strong conceptual and theoretical foundation from which to hypothesize how fear(s) will affect securitisation attitudes, and, accordingly, the implications for Securitisation Studies of adopting a constructivist theory of emotions were outlined.

At the broadest level, it was argued that emotions - contrary to a tendency displayed within the field - should not be considered as deterministic predictors of outcomes e.g., when experiencing fear, individuals will not automatically be persuaded by an argument. Instead, a more nuanced interplay of cognitions and emotions should be expected, albeit with a degree of regularity. The need for conceptual precision when studying and predicting the effects of a particular type of emotion was emphasised, something which the securitisation field, in its rare considerations of emotion's relationship with securitisation outcomes, often fails to provide. Finally, the mutually constitutive nature of emotions and cognition was emphasised, and a decision to incorporate this insight into this thesis's methodological strategy was explained. Chapter three concluded by hypothesising that a standard securitisation communication is likely to elicit both fear and anxiety (with the former being the strongest predictor of attitude change), and that depending on the nature of the message, both threat-based and existential fear may be aroused simultaneously – with these two hues of the same emotion likely to guide unique attitudinal responses.

Chapter four built on these foundations and introduced literature selected from two fields of social psychology to propose possible regularities between threat-based and existential fear, and securitisation attitudes. It first introduced the fear appeal literature,

and, drawing on cutting edge findings, argued that how threat-based fear is understood to affect securitisation attitudes depends on the specific unit of analysis in question. Peak levels of fear were proposed to likely exhibit a relatively small, linear, positive relationship with securitisation attitudes. This would suggest that a securitisation actor's primary objective should be maximising the intensity of fear experienced by message recipients. However, inspired by the re-emergence of drive theory within the fear appeal field, it was also posited that the most robust emotional predictor of security threat perception and support for a security response would be an overall fear episode that, when mapped, demonstrates a curvilinear internal trajectory within individuals. This hypothesis has significantly different implications for securitisation actors and implies that not only is it important that an actor arouses fear via the threat component of their messaging, but that they also seek to reduce it to near baseline levels through a convincing, soothing policy proposal.

It was also argued that a focus on threat-based fear emotional dynamics over time would help illuminate the underexamined issue of sub-optimum securitisation moves. It was theorised that securitisation messages which arouse but fail to significantly reduce fear would lead to higher levels of defensiveness, whereby individuals, in an attempt to establish psychological equilibrium, reject the source of their discomfort i.e., the securitisation actor or the message itself, which then leads to lower levels of securitisation attitudes compared to a curvilinear emotional dynamic.

Chapter four then turned to theorising on the possible role of existential fear within the securitisation framework. Given that securitisation moves frequently contain reminders of mortality, it drew on TMT to propose that, in addition to threat-based fear, existential fear may affect securitisation attitudes via the WD effect. This, it was argued, implied two, possibly interacting fear-based pathways towards successful and unsuccessful securitisation moves. Moreover, the fact that the direction of WD is purportedly predicated on prior held beliefs, suggested a group level, fear related psychological mechanism to account for the role of worldviews at a collective level, thus maintaining alignment with the level of analysis of the CS's securitisation framework.

Chapter five outlined the innovative methodological approach taken to test the hypotheses outlined during the prior theory building process. The case for an experimental approach was advanced i.e., that experiments will complement the overreliance on discourse analysis within the field and enable overdue identification of causal relationships. Ethical issues and mitigation strategies relating to analysing securitisation in the lab were then outlined, with the chapter concluding with a discussion covering the relative merits of online laboratory experiments, the nature and recruitment of participants, and specific measures for each variable of interest.

The results and analysis presented in chapters six and seven tested these various hypotheses. They therefore provide a robust data driven bedrock on which to build the first psychological model(s) of securitisation attitudes. Validating this methodological strategy, the experiments produced several important findings, which were formalised into models presented in chapter eight, a chapter which summarises the significant conceptual and theoretical contribution made to Securitisation Studies, and broader Political Science by this thesis. Since Aristotle, appealing to emotions has been considered an effective mode of persuasion (Brinton, 1988). Neither Security Studies, nor the broader field of Political Science, however, has successfully identified the precise dynamics of pathos. By reigniting Securitisation Studies' interdisciplinary theoretical spark, and using innovative, advanced statistical methods, this gap in the literature has now been addressed. In the process, the conditions for a new, exciting research agenda have been established - the psychology of securitisation.

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Annexes

Annex A: Debrief Messages

Study 1

Thank you for your participation in this study.

Now that you have completed it, I would like to share some more information about the experiment.

The purpose of the study was to explore how emotions, specifically fear and anxiety, experienced when reading typical media content on security issues affects threat perceptions and support for government policy.

The stylized newspaper article that you read was created by the author, and all participants were randomly assigned to read a version that either emphasized how feasible it is to address foreign corruption, or how difficult it is. The content within the articles was drawn from real articles in the international press.

The content was designed to create one group where, in general, fear and anxiety would be increased from a baseline and then be significantly reduced. In the other group, it is expected that fear and anxiety will increase then only somewhat reduce.

Analysis will be conducted to see if there is a difference in the relationship between these two different types of emotional experience and views.

Thank you again for your participation.

If you would like to contact the Principal Investigator of the study to discuss this research, please e-mail Brendan McGillen (brendan.mcgillen@strath.ac.uk).

Study 2

Thank you for your participation in this study.

Now that you have completed it, I would like to share some more information about the experiment.

The purpose of the study was to explore whether reading newspaper content that contains references to mortality increases the amount of death thoughts that individuals have after reading.

To examine this, participants were randomly assigned to read a stylized newspaper article, written by the researcher, which either contained death reminders or did not.

Analysis will be conducted to see if there is a difference between the groups in the extent to which people think about death.

This is the first stage in a research project which is examining whether thinking about death affect people's political views.

Thank you again for your participation.

If you would like to contact the Principal Investigator of the study to discuss this research, please e-mail Brendan McGillen (brendan.mcgillen@strath.ac.uk).

Study 3
Thank you for your participation in this study.

Now that you have completed it, I would like to share some more information about the experiment.

The purpose of the study was to explore whether newspaper content that reminds people of death is associated with higher levels of dogmatism.

To examine this, all participants have been randomly assigned to one of three conditions 1) one article with clear reminders of death 2) one with subtle reminders and 3) a neutral condition with no reminders.

Everyone then completed a measure of dogmatism.

Analysis will be conducted to see if there is a difference in the relationship between these three different conditions and levels of dogmatism.

Thank you again for your participation.

If you would like to contact the Principal Investigator of the study to discuss this research, please e-mail Brendan McGillen (brendan.mcgillen@strath.ac.uk).

Study 4
Thank you for your participation in this study.

Now that you have completed it, I would like to share some more information about the experiment.

The purpose of the study was to explore whether thinking about your own death affects political opinions.

To examine this, participants were randomly assigned to either write about how their own death makes them feel, or about how being publicly shamed would make them feel.

Everyone then read the same stylized article, written by the researcher, which drew from real newspaper articles. It presented climate change as a security threat.

Analysis will be conducted to see if there is a difference in the extent to which people think that it is a security threat and if they support security response support, depending on whether they were thinking about death or not.

Thank you again for your participation.

If you would like to contact the Principal Investigator of the study to discuss this research, please e-mail Brendan McGillen (brendan.mcgillen@strath.ac.uk)

Annex B: VAS Scales

Dependent Measures



Annex C: Study 1 Manipulation Stimuli

Part 1

Foreign corruption: an unrecognized threat to our national security

When it comes to politics and social issues, it often feels like there's more that divides Americans than unites us. However, there is one thing that binds the vast majority of US citizens together: a fundamental aversion to government corruption. This seems to be hardwired into our national consciousness from the moment the Pilgrims left Europe due partly to disdain for the moral and financial corruption of their rulers. This fear is still felt strongly today. According to Chapman University's annual 'Survey of Fears', anxiety about government corruption worried more Americans - regardless of political identity — than climate change, cyber terrorism and personal bankruptcy.

Part 2

National security experts say we should also be worried about corruption beyond our borders. The Covid-19 global pandemic is a powerful case study of how corruption in other countries can harm us here.

Pandemics, such as Ebola and Covid-19 create ample opportunities for the corrupt to exploit the sick and desperate. In many countries, extortionate bribes are demanded for access to basic health care. Those who cannot pay, are left out in the cold. Even worse, in some cases, medical assistance simply doesn't even exist for entire communities because government officials have siphoned off emergency funds into their own bank accounts.

This is more than a moral issue. This corruption leaves infected and untreated people free to circulate within the broader population, unaware that they are spreading the virus to others. And in our era of mass global transportation, with hundreds of thousands of people flying across continents every day, these unknowing virus carriers can quickly infect people in other regions.

Low Efficacy Condition Part 3

This all leads to the question: what can we do about it?

At the moment, the US spends a tiny proportion of our overseas aid budget - 0.33% - trying to fight corruption in other countries. Is it worth spending more of our tax dollars on anticorruption efforts overseas? The weight of evidence suggests that the return on investments in anti-corruption efforts is worryingly low.

Other rich countries, and multinational organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, have spent decades trying to reduce corruption in poorer countries. Anti-corruption initiatives are usually launched with high hopes, considerable fanfare and, occasionally, genuine political backing from top-level leadership in the country

in question. But the record shows that success has been rare, with very few good-news stories to report. Why is that the case?

Low Efficacy Condition Part 4

First of all, talk is cheap. Every aspiring politician claims that they want to reduce corruption. It is one of the easiest ways to win votes and tarnish your opponent. Unfortunately however, there are very few cases of politicians who actually put their rhetoric into practice once in office.

Second, rich countries trying to solve corruption in other nations often lack legitimacy in the eyes of the people they claim to be helping. It is difficult to tell people to make reforms when they can point out many of your own corruption problems at home.

Third, corruption is almost always conducted in secret, behind closed doors, with those involved going to great lengths not to be discovered. Not only does this mean that it's hard to detect and prosecute, it's also near-impossible to work out whether progress is actually being made in stamping it out.

Overall, anyone who thinks that fixing corruption in other countries is straightforward is mistaken. There are simply no easy answers. There are also many other issues dominating the government's agenda at this time - problems which can be more easily solved.

High Efficacy Condition - Part 3

Historically, under both political parties, the United States has been highly influential on the world stage at reducing global corruption. We were the first country in the world to pass legislation banning our companies from bribing officials in foreign countries to gain contracts. This set the bar for many other countries who quickly followed. As a result, international business is now a lot cleaner and delivers better results for customers through genuine competition.

And since 2010, an ongoing US anticorruption initiative led by the Department of Justice has identified and frozen more than $3.2 billion of US based assets owned by corrupt foreign leaders, with much of it returned to where it was stolen from. This is a strong foundation on which to significantly ramp up US global anticorruption efforts to help tackle this issue.

High Efficacy Condition – Part 4

In further positive news, now is the perfect time to act. Across the world, people are taking to the streets to demand an end to corrupt leaders. In the past five years alone, citizens in almost 20 countries have led popular movements to sweep away corrupt

governments in favor of leaders with integrity. We cannot fight these other countries' internal battles for them, but we can tilt the scales further toward those who want to enact positive change.

One clear way to do this is to maximize the use of US visa restrictions and asset freezes as a powerful means of punishing and deterring corruption by foreign elites. No-one involved in foreign corruption should be allowed into the US, or to profit from our attractive financial markets. We have a good record in this area, but we can make even more of a difference through the investment of greater government focus and resources. This will send a strong signal that the US stands firm with those seeking to improve their countries, which, in addition to projecting our democratic values, can only help also make us all more secure by reducing this serious threat.

Annex D: Study 2 Manipulation Stimuli

Death Reminder Condition

Deadly Heat

NASA data confirms that 19 of the last 20 years are now the warmest ever on record. The consequences of this level of global warming can be fatal.

In short, the warming planet makes extreme weather events more frequent and more deadly.

For example, the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season was the most active in recorded history. It killed 431 people - US citizens from Louisiana to New York - and over $50 billion worth of damage.

And on the Pacific coast, California has seen 6 of the 20 largest ever wildfires in California all occur in 2020. By the end of the year, 9,639 fires claimed 31 lives and destroyed thousands of homes.

Our national security experts are increasingly concerned about the effects of such extreme weather on our military capabilities.

According to the Department of Defense, 79 military and naval bases that are currently threatened by increased flooding, drought and wildfires, etc.

In 2018, Hurricane Michael alone caused $5 billion worth of destruction to Tyndall Air Force Base, damaging every single building and leaving several in complete ruin. This put 40% of our F-22 fighter jets out of commission, leaving serious weaknesses in our military capabilities.

There is also a tragic human cost for our military. In recent years, 17 of our soldiers have died - not at the hands of enemy combatants - but due to heat exposure while on training exercises in the US.

In brief, climate change is much more than simply an environmental issue. It is a clear threat to the very lives of our citizens and our national security.

Economic Threat Condition

The True Cost of Climate Change

Our economic security is increasingly threatened by the effects of climate change.

For example, the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season was the most active ever recorded, with 13 hurricanes inflicting over $50 billion worth of damage to businesses, residences and our national infrastructure.

These economically harmful weather events will become more frequent and more intense as the climate continues to change.

A recent, comprehensive analysis published in the renowned Nature journal explored how climate change is likely to harm 22 different sectors of the US economy including agriculture and retail.

The ‘best case’ scenario forecasts the damage to add up to approximately $300 billion a year by 2100. In the worst case scenario, the effects of climate change are estimated to cost a staggering $520 billion per year.

To put these figures in context, the combined budgets of our army and navy is $376 billion.

This level of defense spending is not sustainable without underlying economic growth. Moreover, in the coming years, the government will have to substantially redirect its limited resources towards mitigation activities e.g. building dams to stop rising tides from encroaching on towns and cities.

Worryingly, all of this will occur during an era of increased global competition for dwindling natural resources. For that reason, national security experts unanimously predict greater risks of international conflict.

Climate change is therefore much more than an environmental issue. By harming our prosperity, and draining government resources, it increasingly threatens the very foundations of our national security.

Neutral Condition

Politics (from Greek: 'affairs of the cities') is the set of activities that are associated with making decisions in groups, or other forms of power relations between individuals, such as the distribution of resources or status.

A variety of methods are deployed in politics, which include promoting one's own political views among people, negotiation with other political subjects, making laws, and exercising force.

In modern nation states, people often form political parties to represent their ideas. Members of a party often agree to take the same position on many issues and agree to support the same changes to law and the same leaders. An election is usually a competition between different parties.

Forms of government can be classified by several ways. In terms of the structure of power, there are monarchies (including absolute and constitutional monarchies) and republics (usually presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary). In absolute monarchies, the monarch (e.g. the king or queen) holds supreme autocratic authority, and are rarely restricted by written laws, legislature, or customs.

Within countries, a common method of describing political differences is the left-right spectrum. This classification dates from the French Revolution where political representatives who supported a democratic republic rather than a monarchy, and believed that politics should be secular rather than religious sat on the left of the National Assembly, and their opponents who supported the aristocracy and Church sat on the right.

The study of politics is called political science, or politology. It comprises numerous subfields, including comparative politics, political economy, and public administration.

Appendices

Appendix A: Study 1 High Efficacy Condition Full Correlation Matrix

	Fear0			Anx0		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	1		415	.638**	.000	415
Anx0	.638**	.000	415	1		415
Fear1	.627**	.000	415	.467**	.000	415
Anx1	.474**	.000	415	.729**	.000	415
Fear2	.570**	.000	415	.413**	.000	415
Anx2	.450**	.000	415	.660**	.000	415
Fear3	.543**	.000	415	.441**	.000	415
Anx3	.447**	.000	415	.675**	.000	415
Fear4	.612**	.000	415	.496**	.000	415
Anx4	.460**	.000	415	.693**	.000	415
Dero	.034	.484	415	.168**	.001	415
Manip	.086	.081	415	.206**	.000	415
Threat	.128**	.009	415	.017	.728	415
Policy	-.095	.053	415	-.200**	.000	415
Comsev	.032	.514	415	-.052	.294	415
Danger	.009	.849	415	-.044	.376	415
Urgency	.047	.337	415	-.052	.286	415
ComSus	.092	.060	415	-.002	.968	415
USvul	.032	.519	415	.056	.257	415
Person	.122*	.013	415	-.055	.262	415
GovEff	-.057	.250	415	-.206**	.000	415

Correlations

	Fear1			Anx1		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.627**	.000	415	.474**	.000	415
Anx0	.467**	.000	415	.729**	.000	415
Fear1	1		415	.641**	.000	415
Anx1	.641**	.000	415	1		415
Fear2	.780**	.000	415	.591**	.000	415
Anx2	.591**	.000	415	.835**	.000	415
Fear3	.707**	.000	415	.566**	.000	415
Anx3	.534**	.000	415	.790**	.000	415
Fear4	.713**	.000	415	.548**	.000	415
Anx4	.506**	.000	415	.766**	.000	415
Dero	-.088	.072	415	.050	.313	415
Manip	.037	.456	415	.123*	.012	415
Threat	.198**	.000	415	.104*	.035	415
Policy	.006	.909	415	-.082	.096	415
Comsev	.134**	.006	415	.087	.078	415
Danger	.124*	.011	415	.086	.082	415
Urgency	.127**	.010	415	.078	.114	415
ComSus	.172**	.000	415	.100*	.043	415
USvul	.101*	.040	415	.121*	.014	415
Person	.188**	.000	415	.051	.299	415
GovEff	-.015	.764	415	-.087	.076	415

Correlations

	Fear2			Anx2		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.570**	.000	415	.450**	.000	415
Anx0	.413**	.000	415	.660**	.000	415
Fear1	.780**	.000	415	.591**	.000	415
Anx1	.591**	.000	415	.835**	.000	415
Fear2	1		415	.716**	.000	415
Anx2	.716**	.000	415	1		415
Fear3	.696**	.000	415	.568**	.000	415
Anx3	.485**	.000	415	.720**	.000	415
Fear4	.667**	.000	415	.546**	.000	415
Anx4	.446**	.000	415	.668**	.000	415
Dero	-.192**	.000	415	-.040	.420	415
Manip	-.040	.416	415	.063	.204	415
Threat	.251**	.000	415	.143**	.003	415
Policy	.109*	.027	415	-.013	.795	415
Comsev	.229**	.000	415	.152**	.002	415
Danger	.223**	.000	415	.166**	.001	415
Urgency	.209**	.000	415	.124*	.011	415
ComSus	.212**	.000	415	.138**	.005	415
USvul	.135**	.006	415	.112*	.023	415
Person	.222**	.000	415	.122*	.013	415
GovEff	.081	.097	415	-.024	.626	415

Correlations

	Fear3			Anx3		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.543**	.000	415	.447**	.000	415
Anx0	.441**	.000	415	.675**	.000	415
Fear1	.707**	.000	415	.534**	.000	415
Anx1	.566**	.000	415	.790**	.000	415
Fear2	.696**	.000	415	.485**	.000	415
Anx2	.568**	.000	415	.720**	.000	415
Fear3	1		415	.732**	.000	415
Anx3	.732**	.000	415	1		415
Fear4	.838**	.000	415	.635**	.000	415
Anx4	.645**	.000	415	.878**	.000	415
Dero	.014	.770	415	.118*	.017	415
Manip	.083	.091	415	.138**	.005	415
Threat	.141**	.004	415	.039	.432	415
Policy	-.023	.641	415	-.113*	.021	415
Comsev	.098*	.045	415	.010	.833	415
Danger	.102*	.037	415	.015	.763	415
Urgency	.084	.087	415	.006	.910	415
ComSus	.124*	.011	415	.063	.204	415
USvul	.067	.176	415	.071	.148	415
Person	.142**	.004	415	.036	.460	415
GovEff	-.103*	.037	415	-.155**	.002	415

Correlations

	Fear4			Anx4		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.612**	.000	415	.460**	.000	415
Anx0	.496**	.000	415	.693**	.000	415
Fear1	.713**	.000	415	.506**	.000	415
Anx1	.548**	.000	415	.766**	.000	415
Fear2	.667**	.000	415	.446**	.000	415
Anx2	.546**	.000	415	.668**	.000	415
Fear3	.838**	.000	415	.645**	.000	415
Anx3	.635**	.000	415	.878**	.000	415
Fear4	1		415	.691**	.000	415
Anx4	.691**	.000	415	1		415
Dero	.060	.220	415	.160**	.001	415
Manip	.131**	.008	415	.197**	.000	415
Threat	.122*	.013	415	.031	.533	415
Policy	-.090	.066	415	-.161**	.001	415
Comsev	.056	.258	415	-.003	.959	415
Danger	.051	.302	415	-.007	.891	415
Urgency	.053	.277	415	.001	.980	415
ComSus	.104*	.034	415	.046	.346	415
USvul	.029	.557	415	.053	.283	415
Person	.144**	.003	415	.027	.585	415
GovEff	-.147**	.003	415	-.212**	.000	415

Correlations

	Dero			Manip		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.034	.484	415	.086	.081	415
Anx0	.168**	.001	415	.206**	.000	415
Fear1	-.088	.072	415	.037	.456	415
Anx1	.050	.313	415	.123*	.012	415
Fear2	-.192**	.000	415	-.040	.416	415
Anx2	-.040	.420	415	.063	.204	415
Fear3	.014	.770	415	.083	.091	415
Anx3	.118*	.017	415	.138**	.005	415
Fear4	.060	.220	415	.131**	.008	415
Anx4	.160**	.001	415	.197**	.000	415
Dero	1		415	.531**	.000	415
Manip	.531**	.000	415	1		415
Threat	-.325**	.000	415	-.169**	.001	415
Policy	-.463**	.000	415	-.285**	.000	415
Comsev	-.436**	.000	415	-.238**	.000	415
Danger	-.405**	.000	415	-.222**	.000	415
Urgency	-.414**	.000	415	-.224**	.000	415
ComSus	-.353**	.000	415	-.179**	.000	415
USvul	-.244**	.000	415	-.104*	.034	415
Person	-.352**	.000	415	-.197**	.000	415
GovEff	-.500**	.000	415	-.296**	.000	415

Correlations

	Threat			Policy		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.128**	.009	415	-.095	.053	415
Anx0	.017	.728	415	-.200**	.000	415
Fear1	.198**	.000	415	.006	.909	415
Anx1	.104*	.035	415	-.082	.096	415
Fear2	.251**	.000	415	.109*	.027	415
Anx2	.143**	.003	415	-.013	.795	415
Fear3	.141**	.004	415	-.023	.641	415
Anx3	.039	.432	415	-.113*	.021	415
Fear4	.122*	.013	415	-.090	.066	415
Anx4	.031	.533	415	-.161**	.001	415
Dero	-.325**	.000	415	-.463**	.000	415
Manip	-.169**	.001	415	-.285**	.000	415
Threat	1		415	.458**	.000	415
Policy	.458**	.000	415	1		415
Comsev	.625**	.000	415	.601**	.000	415
Danger	.621**	.000	415	.568**	.000	415
Urgency	.559**	.000	415	.562**	.000	415
ComSus	.533**	.000	415	.400**	.000	415
USvul	.420**	.000	415	.335**	.000	415
Person	.483**	.000	415	.345**	.000	415
GovEff	.276**	.000	415	.509**	.000	415

Correlations

	Comsev			Danger		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.032	.514	415	.009	.849	415
Anx0	-.052	.294	415	-.044	.376	415
Fear1	.134**	.006	415	.124*	.011	415
Anx1	.087	.078	415	.086	.082	415
Fear2	.229**	.000	415	.223**	.000	415
Anx2	.152**	.002	415	.166**	.001	415
Fear3	.098*	.045	415	.102*	.037	415
Anx3	.010	.833	415	.015	.763	415
Fear4	.056	.258	415	.051	.302	415
Anx4	-.003	.959	415	-.007	.891	415
Dero	-.436**	.000	415	-.405**	.000	415
Manip	-.238**	.000	415	-.222**	.000	415
Threat	.625**	.000	415	.621**	.000	415
Policy	.601**	.000	415	.568**	.000	415
Comsev	1		415	.926**	.000	415
Danger	.926**	.000	415	1		415
Urgency	.951**	.000	415	.763**	.000	415
ComSus	.741**	.000	415	.702**	.000	415
USvul	.599**	.000	415	.574**	.000	415
Person	.658**	.000	415	.617**	.000	415
GovEff	.411**	.000	415	.393**	.000	415

Correlations

	Urgency			ComSus		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.047	.337	415	.092	.060	415
Anx0	-.052	.286	415	-.002	.968	415
Fear1	.127**	.010	415	.172**	.000	415
Anx1	.078	.114	415	.100*	.043	415
Fear2	.209**	.000	415	.212**	.000	415
Anx2	.124*	.011	415	.138**	.005	415
Fear3	.084	.087	415	.124*	.011	415
Anx3	.006	.910	415	.063	.204	415
Fear4	.053	.277	415	.104*	.034	415
Anx4	.001	.980	415	.046	.346	415
Dero	-.414**	.000	415	-.353**	.000	415
Manip	-.224**	.000	415	-.179**	.000	415
Threat	.559**	.000	415	.533**	.000	415
Policy	.562**	.000	415	.400**	.000	415
Comsev	.951**	.000	415	.741**	.000	415
Danger	.763**	.000	415	.702**	.000	415
Urgency	1		415	.692**	.000	415
ComSus	.692**	.000	415	1		415
USvul	.554**	.000	415	.837**	.000	415
Person	.618**	.000	415	.861**	.000	415
GovEff	.380**	.000	415	.360**	.000	415

Correlations

	USvul			Person		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	.032	.519	415	.122*	.013	415
Anx0	.056	.257	415	-.055	.262	415
Fear1	.101*	.040	415	.188**	.000	415
Anx1	.121*	.014	415	.051	.299	415
Fear2	.135**	.006	415	.222**	.000	415
Anx2	.112*	.023	415	.122*	.013	415
Fear3	.067	.176	415	.142**	.004	415
Anx3	.071	.148	415	.036	.460	415
Fear4	.029	.557	415	.144**	.003	415
Anx4	.053	.283	415	.027	.585	415
Dero	-.244**	.000	415	-.352**	.000	415
Manip	-.104*	.034	415	-.197**	.000	415
Threat	.420**	.000	415	.483**	.000	415
Policy	.335**	.000	415	.345**	.000	415
Comsev	.599**	.000	415	.658**	.000	415
Danger	.574**	.000	415	.617**	.000	415
Urgency	.554**	.000	415	.618**	.000	415
ComSus	.837**	.000	415	.861**	.000	415
USvul	1		415	.443**	.000	415
Person	.443**	.000	415	1		415
GovEff	.190**	.000	415	.413**	.000	415

Correlations

	GovEff		
	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	N
Fear0	-.057	.250	415
Anx0	-.206**	.000	415
Fear1	-.015	.764	415
Anx1	-.087	.076	415
Fear2	.081	.097	415
Anx2	-.024	.626	415
Fear3	-.103*	.037	415
Anx3	-.155**	.002	415
Fear4	-.147**	.003	415
Anx4	-.212**	.000	415
Dero	-.500**	.000	415
Manip	-.296**	.000	415
Threat	.276**	.000	415
Policy	.509**	.000	415
Comsev	.411**	.000	415
Danger	.393**	.000	415
Urgency	.380**	.000	415
ComSus	.360**	.000	415
USvul	.190**	.000	415
Person	.413**	.000	415
GovEff	1		415

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix B: Fear Episode Effect on Security Threat Perception, Standardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

Relationship			**Estimate**
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	.782
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	.717
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	.244
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	.615
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	.465
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	.741
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	.173
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	.756
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	.118
Threat	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**.383***

*$p < 0.05$

Appendix C: Fear Episode Effect on Security Response Support, Standardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

Relationship			**Estimate**
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	.799
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	.755
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	.265
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	.650
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	.524
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	.770
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	.207
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	.783
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	.137
Policy	**<---**	**SLOPE**	**.266***

*$p < 0.05$

Appendix D: Fear Episode Effect on Security Threat Perception, and Message Derogation, Standardised Coefficients in High Efficacy Condition

Relationship			**Estimate**
Dero	<---	SLOPE	-.412
Fear0	<---	ICEPT	.795
Fear0	<---	SLOPE	.000
Fear1	<---	ICEPT	.743
Fear1	<---	SLOPE	.263
Fear2	<---	ICEPT	.640
Fear2	<---	SLOPE	.505
Fear3	<---	ICEPT	.765
Fear3	<---	SLOPE	.182
Fear4	<---	ICEPT	.778
Fear4	<---	SLOPE	.121
Threat	<---	SLOPE	.290
Threat	**<---**	**Dero**	**-.210*** **

***$p < 0.001$

Appendix E: Latent Basis Model Fear Episode, Threat Perception and Perceived Manipulation (Unstandardised)



Appendix F: Latent Basis Model Fear Episode, Security Response Support and Perceived Manipulation (Unstandardised)



Appendix G: Latent Basis Model Fear Episode, Security Response Support and Message Derogation (Unstandardised)