

The Propaganda Model

By

Jeffery Klaehn

A thesis submitted for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

University of Strathclyde
School of Applied Social Science
Department of Sociology
September 2012

Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and they must not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author.

This thesis may be made available for consultation within
The University Library and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries
for the purposes of consultation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration of Authenticity.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Acronyms.....	vi
Abstract.....	vii
Preface	viii
I. The Propaganda Model	1
II. Applying the Propaganda Model	62
III. Canada and East Timor	79
IV. East Timor Media Coverage, 1975-1980	115
V. East Timor Media Coverage, 1981-1991	153
VI. Workplace Injury and the Ideological Formation of the Worker's Compensation Board	211
VII. Conclusion	257
Bibliography	271

Declaration of Authenticity

This thesis is the result of the author's original research. It has been composed by the author and contains material that has been previously submitted for examination leading to the award of a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Communication Science) at the University of Amsterdam in 2007.

The copyright of this thesis belongs to the author under the terms of the United Kingdom Copyright Acts as qualified by University of Strathclyde Regulation 3.50. Due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis.

Acknowledgements

With much love, for my parents, Louis and Sharyn Klaehn, who have always been unwavering in encouraging me to pursue my educational goals.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to my Supervisor, Professor David Miller, for supporting this thesis, to Professor Michael Higgins, my Internal Reader, for his support, assistance and excellent and invaluable feedback, and to Professor Justin Lewis, my External Examiner, for his advice, guidance and very helpful suggestions.

Acronyms

CBC - Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CDA - Critical Discourse Analysis

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency

ETAN - East Timor Alert Network

PM - Propaganda Model

TVO - TV Ontario, a Canadian television station

US - United States of America

WCB/WSIB - Worker's Compensation Board/Workplace Safety and Insurance Board

Abstract

Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model (PM) highlights fundamental social inequalities deriving from unequal distribution of resources and power within democratic societies and challenges commonly held notions that media within the capitalist democracies are liberal and dedicated to the public interest. This research makes important contributions to scholarly literature available on the PM, unpacking reasons why the PM represents a critical sociological approach to understanding media and society, explores the model's potential within the sociological field. The dissertation advances a contemporary discourse on the methodological techniques utilized in applying the model and proposes it be officially synthesized with Critical Discourse Analysis. The study then applies the PM to Canadian newspaper coverage of the near genocide in East Timor. Following this, the study demonstrates the ease with which traditional political-economic analysis may incorporate the PM by assessing ways in which the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (formerly the Worker's Compensation Board) operates as a power structure within Canadian society and by utilizing the PM to advance a preliminary assessment of the ideological formation of the WCB/WSIB in the Canadian news media.

Preface

The dissertation is organized into seven chapters.

Chapter one will introduce and rehearse central features of the Propaganda Model and will explore ways in which the model intersects with central theoretical concerns within the intellectual field of sociology. In conclusion, the chapter will critically engage with common criticisms of the model.

Chapter two provides a comprehensive overview of the PM's methodology and outline ways in which the model may be applied.

Chapter three, entitled "Canada and East Timor," provides historical background information on the events in East Timor following Indonesia's December 7, 1975 invasion. The chapter examines the diplomatic response of the international community and Indonesia's justifications for its actions. Following this, the chapter details ways in which Canada was connected to the East Timor near-genocide.

Chapter four of the dissertation, entitled "East Timor Media Coverage, 1975-1980," provides a summation of the quantity of the news coverage that was accorded the near-genocide in East Timor by the *Globe and Mail* throughout the invasion period, from 1975-1980. The quantity of the East Timor coverage will be explored and the shape and scope of the East Timor coverage will be qualitatively assessed on a story-by-story basis.

Chapter five, entitled “East Timor Media Coverage, 1981-1991,” provides a summation of the quantity and quality of the *Globe and Mail* news coverage of the occupation of East Timor - from 1981 through to the end of 1991.

Chapter six of the dissertation is entitled “Workplace Injury and the Ideological Formation of the Worker’s Compensation Board.” This chapter transitions to a domestic case study, exploring the experiences of injured workers in Ontario and considering how these experiences have been represented by Canadian newspapers. This research makes a valuable original contribution to the range of existent scholarly literature in terms of both the original ethnographic research presented within the chapter and the media analysis - which sets out an initial map of how workplace injury and the WCB/WSIB have been ideologically constructed. The research is pioneering in that no scholarly analysis has been undertaken on the WCB/WSIB within the Canadian context, save for research funded by the WCB/WSIB. This chapter strives to demonstrate how easily traditional political-economic analysis may incorporate the PM to enable additional explanatory power, bringing media analysis into studies centrally concerned to explore dimensions and impacts of dominant political-economic social structure(s) within contemporary society.

The PM connects communicative power with social, political and economic realities and enables sophisticated analysis of media discourses. This dissertation will demonstrate that the PM’s explanatory power is not limited by geographic borders by showing that the PM is relatable to both international and domestic news events. The dissertation will also challenge the view that

media within the capitalist democracies are dedicated to the interests of public/cultural education.

Reflexive Statement

It is a given that a PhD dissertation should represent a substantial body of work. Indeed, the whole point of the dissertation-writing process is to demonstrate that the PhD candidate is capable of undertaking independent, long-term research. The dissertation is commonly an extended research project, representing original work undertaken by the candidate. Specific requirements may vary but generally speaking the expectation for a PhD dissertation is that the body of work included within should in principle be worthy of publication in a peer-reviewed context, or deemed to have “publishable essence.” Successful PhD graduates commonly attempt to derive peer-reviewed journal articles from their dissertations after they have safely defended and officially secured their professional qualifications. In Canada, it is common for PhD graduates to publish one or two peer-reviewed journal articles from their dissertations. In rare and exceptional cases, more than two peer-reviewed journal articles derived from a dissertation would signal great success. It is exceedingly rare for a PhD candidate to publish multiple peer-reviewed journal articles from a dissertation prior to formally defending the dissertation.

It is a commonly known fact that universities, graduate programs and faculty are judged by the quality of the dissertations produced by their graduate students. This is one reason why many leading universities and departments allow PhD candidates to include peer-reviewed journal articles within their dissertations - publication in prestigious peer-reviewed journals indicates a universal standard of excellence. If a candidate has managed to successfully publish in a peer-reviewed context, this can be seen to indicate that the candidate's work represents an original contribution to knowledge and has been judged sufficiently important to warrant publication.

Materials included within this dissertation have been published in seven rigorously peer-reviewed high influence factor journals, including the *European Journal of Communication*, *Journalism Studies* and *International Communication Gazette*.

The Propaganda Model

Herman and Chomsky's PM challenges commonly held notions that media are liberal and dedicated to the public interest. As an analytical and conceptual model within the social sciences, the PM is concerned to theorize the intersection between communicative power and political economy in contemporary capitalist societies. This chapter introduces the PM, rehearses central features of the model, and explores the multiplicity of ways in which the PM intersects with central theoretical concerns within the intellectual field of sociology. In conclusion, the chapter will critically review and assess common criticisms of the PM.

I. The Propaganda Model – A General Theory of the “Free Press”

Initially referred to as a “general theory of the Free Press”, the PM in its original incarnation charged that America's elite agenda-setting media play an important role in establishing cultural hegemony, primarily by creating a general framework for news discourses that in turn is commonly adhered to by lower-tier media. Herman and Chomsky distinguished between “elite media” – referring to highly influential newspapers such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* – and the “quality press” – a term the authors deployed to refer to more populist newspapers, such as the *Boston Globe*, *Los Angeles Times* and *Philadelphia Inquirer*, among others. Chomsky (1988, p. 629) suggests that the extent to which ideological constraints relax varies according to the

geographic proximity of particular news organizations to the centers of economic and political power: “What happens in areas that are marginal with respect to the exercise of power doesn’t matter as much”. Within the nexus of corporate-state power, the PM predicts that ideological control is typically extremely tight. The PM predicts that media situated within areas that are geographically distant from political and economic power will have a greater degree of ideological freedom. “What happens in the centers of power matters a great deal,” Chomsky (1988, p. 629) notes, hence “controls are tighter to the extent that you get closer to the center[s]”.

The PM hypothesizes that elite media set the general, overall news agenda for lower-tier media, influencing the quantity and quality of news coverage that is accorded specific topics, issues and events by lower-tier media. The model also predicts that elite media routinely establish analytical frameworks that in turn influence (1) the range of debate accorded various topics and issues and (2) subsequent interpretation of news events (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 1-2). Chomsky (cited in Wintonick and Achbar, 1994, p. 55) comments that media performance is predictable given the structural and ideological contexts within which commercial media exist: “They determine, they select, they shape, they control, they restrict - in order to serve the interests of dominant, elite groups in the society”.

The PM hypothesizes that media exist within a market system and are structurally predisposed to serve “special interests that dominate the state and private activity” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. xi). Patterns of media

performance are understood as an outcome of market forces. The PM aims to study what Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xii) initially referred to as a “guided market system” – the system is shaped by a range of elements, including “the government, the leaders of the corporate community, the top media owners, and executives, and the assorted individuals and groups who are assigned or allowed to take constructive initiatives.” Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xi) write that:

Perhaps this is an obvious point, but the democratic postulate is that media are independent and committed to discovering and reporting the truth, and that they do not merely reflect the world as powerful groups wish it to be perceived. Leaders of the media claim that their news choices rest on unbiased professional and objective criteria, and they have support for this contention within the intellectual community. If, however, the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and think about, and to ‘manage’ public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how the system works is at serious odds with reality (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. xi).

II. The PM’s First-Order Predictions

The PM constitutes an institutional critique of mass media and views media performance as an outcome of market forces. The model concedes that the powerful have individual objectives but presumes that elites share common political, economic and social interests. A central hypothesis of the PM is that patterns of media behaviour will reflect these interests in such ways that are “functional” for dominant elites (Klaehn, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2005,

2006, 2010; Broudy, 2009; Mullen, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Robertson, 2011; Pedro, 2011a, 2011b).

III. Media Choices Surrounding News Selection and Presentation

The PM postulates that media routinely make selection choices that establish and define “worthy” and “unworthy” causes. It predicts there will be qualitative and quantitative differences in the treatment accorded “unworthy victims” (victims of oppression and/or state terrorism that is perpetrated by the capitalist democracies), and “worthy victims” (victims of oppression and/or state terrorism perpetrated by official enemy states). Disparities in treatment, the model predicts, will be observable in how news is presented, sourced and evaluated, such that “worthy victims” will be accorded more coverage, more prominent coverage and more humanistic treatment than unworthy victims (see Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 35).

In sum, the PM predicts that news discourses will feature the promotion of ideologically serviceable themes and system-supportive disinformation; a low volume of news coverage devoted to reporting on “unworthy victims”; dominance of official sources within media texts; and, perhaps most importantly, a very tight, controlled range of “permitted opinion” and debate.

The PM can be seen to presume various “self-interested” or ideological motives from structural patterns in news coverage. The phrase “ideologically serviceable” is defined here as the extent to which news discourses can be seen

to reflect the political, economic and ideological interests of elites, vis-à-vis media choices surrounding news selection and presentation, effective neutralization of dissent, and by allowing “the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 2).

As pointed out by Mullen (2010b, p. 209), the PM predicts that when consensus exists amongst elites, media will reflect this consensus. Herman (1996a) asserts that “where the elite are really concerned and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are not aware of their own stake in an issue or are immobilized by effective propaganda, the media will serve elite interests uncompromisingly.” Mullen (2010b, p. 209) also notes that Herman and Chomsky have stressed that the “propaganda system” does not function as efficiently where there is elite dissensus. Herman and Chomsky (1988, pp. xii-xiii) write that: “the mass media are not a solid monolith on all issues. Where the powerful are in disagreement, there will be a certain diversity of tactical judgements on how to attain generally shared aims, reflected in media debate.” Herman (1996a) acknowledges that “there are often differences within the elite which open up space for some debate and even occasional (but very rare) attacks on . . . the tactical means of achieving elite ends.” Critically, however, the PM predicts that media will typically not stray from the boundaries of “permissible debate”: Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xii) reason that “views that challenge fundamental premises or suggest that the observed modes of exercise of state power are based on systemic factors will be excluded from the

mass media even when elite controversy over tactics rages fiercely.” As observed by Klaehn and Mullen (2010, p. 12), although much broader in analytical scope, the arguments advanced by the PM are similar to those suggested by the indexing hypothesis of media/state relations put forward by Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990).

Mullen (2010b, p. 210) writes that the second hypothesis advanced by Herman and Chomsky within their model is that “where the mass media worked under corporate rather than state control, media coverage was shaped by what was, in effect, a ‘guided market system’ underpinned by five filters – the operative principles of the PM.” Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 2) suggest that:

Money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across to the public. The essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news ‘filters’, fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by governments, business and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) ‘anti-communism’ as a national religion and control mechanism. These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premise of discourse and interpretation, and the definitions of what is newsworthy in the first place.

IV. The Five Filter Elements Explained

The PM's five filter elements draw attention to the main structural constraints that impact overall patterns of media performance. Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 14) observe that most mainstream media are themselves typically large corporations, "controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by owners and other market-profit-oriented forces." The PM suggests that ownership, size and profit orientation influence media behavior and encourage bias. Advertising is the principle source of revenue for most commercial news media, and the PM predicts that media discourses will tend to reflect the interests of advertisers and the market. Taken together, the first two filters suggest that market forces and macro-level structural context influence, shape and "manufacture" media content (see Chomsky 1997a, 1997b; Herman, 1999; Klaehn, 2002a, 2005; Mullen, 2010c, Pedro, 2011a, 2011b).

V. Filter 1: Ownership, Size and Profit-Oriented

The first filter mechanism emphasizes that media are closely interlocked and share common interests with other dominant institutional sectors (such as large corporations, the state/governmental agencies, and commercial banks) (see Pedro, 2011a, pp. 11-16). Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 14) observe that "dominant media are quite large businesses; they are controlled by very wealthy

people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by owners and other market-profit-oriented forces.” As Pedro (2011a, p. 11) explains:

For political economy, the private ownership of the mass media is a crucial factor in explaining media production, since it considers that this factor sets its general orientation. The PM offers an encompassing view in which the different elements of ownership are interconnected with other social and cultural phenomena, circumscribing communication possibilities. While for the pluralist-liberal approach, private ownership and the market assure diversity and the independence of the media, the PM holds that these factors lead the media to fully integrate into the structures and logic of power.

VI. Filter 2: Dependence on Advertising Revenue and Market Forces

The second filter mechanism highlights the pervasive influence of advertising values on the news production process. To remain financially viable, most media must sell markets (readers) to buyers (advertisers). This dependency can directly impact media performance (Nelson, 1990; also see Sussman, 2011; Bagdikian, 1992; Lee and Solomon, 1990, pp. 65-72; Pedro, 2011, pp. 16-18). Chomsky (1989, p. 8) remarks that media discourses will tend to reflect “the perspectives and interests of the sellers, the buyers and the product.” Pedro (2011a, p. 16) notes that:

This second filter is closely related to the first, as the main source of financial support for most media outlets consists of the money received from sponsors for advertising. Although, for the analysis of certain individual case studies, it can be difficult to measure the specific role played by this second filter, the direct influence and the indirect influence of advertisers has been extremely well established.

VII. Filter 3: Reliance on Official Sources

The third filter mechanism highlights that dominant elites routinely facilitate the news gathering process. They do so in many ways, such as by providing media with press releases, advance copies of speeches, periodicals, photo opportunities and “ready-for-news” analysis (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 19). State and corporate sources are highly attractive to media for pragmatic and economic reasons. Such sources are favored and routinely endorsed by media because they are recognizable and viewed as *prima facie* credible (as they are seen to represent institutional authority). Information provided to media by state and corporate sources is not typically seen to warrant fact checking or potentially costly background research, and is commonly reported as accurate. Hence, this filter mechanism highlights not only the symbiotic nature of the relationship between journalists and their sources, but the reciprocity of interests involved in the relationship. Pedro (2011a, p. 20) explains that this facilitates an environment conducive to serving class-interests:

Because of the way in which the media operate, the presence of propaganda and public relations material is not an isolated phenomenon. It occurs within a general context of dependence on official sources, resulting in a natural or unplanned influence. Without the need to resort to costly influence campaigns, the corporate and political sectors have regular access to the media as an arena in which to express themselves.

Opinions and analyses expounded by state and corporate sources are commonly adapted to dominant class interests and market forces (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 23; see also Pedro, 2011a, pp. 19-23).

Because of their services, continuous contact on the beat and mutual dependency, the powerful can use personal relationships, threats, and rewards to further influence and coerce the media. The media may feel obliged to carry extremely dubious stories and mute criticism in order not to offend their sources and disturb a close relationship. It is very difficult to call authorities on whom one depends for daily news liars, even if they are whoppers. Critical sources may be avoided not only because of lesser availability and higher cost of establishing credibility, but also because the primary sources may be offended and may even threaten the media using them (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 22).

Importantly, Herman and Chomsky contend that bias is routinely structured into news discourse as a result of the dominance of official sources. Such sources may be identified as “experts” within news articles. In this way, media content is open to influence and spin - by the state and/or dominant social institutions (see Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 23) and dominant, preferred meanings can be structured into media texts.

The third filter draws attention to and highlights ways in which news discourses are socially constructed vis-à-vis sources (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, pp. 19-23). Institutionally-affiliated sources (the “primary definers” of socially constructed “reality”) typically dominate news discourses. As a result, news reflects institutional interests on a macro level. Within individual news stories, meanings may be built into media texts vis-à-vis ways in which particular texts are constructed so as to encourage specific readings.

Encoding/decoding is associated with the work of Stuart Hall (1980); although the PM does not embrace encoding/decoding, it is concerned to delineate the extent to which particular features of media texts – such as the basic constituent elements of texts – structure discourses so as to encourage intended, preferred readings.

The PM makes professionalism as ideology relevant in relation to both journalists and the institutionally-affiliated sources that typically define what comes to be identified and interpreted as “news” in the first instance. The PM stresses the symbiotic relationship between dominant social institutions and power and predicts that the preferred meanings which are structured (encoded) into news discourses will commonly be “those that are functional for elites” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 23). Although the PM in its original incarnation did not stress the importance of studying the public relations (PR) and spin strategies deployed by elites, Herman (2000) observes that:

Studies of news sources reveal that a significant proportion of news originates in public relations releases. There are, by one count, 20,000 more public relations agents working to doctor the news today than there are journalists writing it.

VIII. Filter 4: Flak

Flak, the fourth filter, draws attention to the fact that dominant social institutions typically possess the power and requisite organizational resources to apply pressure and in effect enforce conformity. Flak refers to “negative responses to a media statement or program . . . It may be organized centrally or

locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of individuals” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 26). Flak can be exerted as a simple warning and in certain cases may involve threats (of dismissal, legal action) and bullying tactics. The fourth filter element brings the concept of power directly into play when considering the PM’s theoretic foundations, stressing that dominant institutional actors often possess the requisite economic resources to subtly and/or not-so-subtly influence patterns of media performance.

Herman and Chomsky hypothesize that these first four filter elements dominate “real world” news production processes. While they operate on an individual basis, they also continuously interact with one another, and at any given point in time one filter mechanism may be most dominant in impacting news production processes. How the various constraints play out in reality will depend upon specific time/place situational contexts. Herman and Chomsky maintain that these are the most dominant elements in news production processes.

IX. Filter 5: Ideological Control Mechanisms

Since the initial publication of *Manufacturing Consent*, the demise of Communism in the former Soviet Union has brought about significant and radical changes to the world’s geo-political landscape. According to Chomsky, the final filter mechanism, “anti-communism”, still functions in the post-Cold

War world, but now in the form of a dichotomy of other-ness. Chomsky (1998, p. 41) explains:

. . . it's the idea that grave enemies are about to attack us and we need to huddle together under the protection of domestic power. You need something to frighten people with, to prevent them from paying attention to what's really happening to them. You have to somehow engender fear and hatred, to channel the kind of fear and rage, or even just discontent, that's being aroused by social and economic conditions.

This suggests that media generate fear and also suggests that media can redirect existing fear (see Chomsky, 1997a, pp. 91-92, for further discussion of the latter; see also Klaehn, 2009, p. 46; Broudy, 2009, p. 2).

In the updated edition of *Manufacturing Consent* published in 2002, Herman and Chomsky (2002, pp. xvii-xviii) conceded that the end of the Cold War effectively undermined the anti-communist ideology that had been highlighted within the model's initial incarnation:

. . . this is easily offset by the greater ideological force of the belief in the 'miracle of the market' . . . The triumph of capitalism and the increasing power of those with an interest in privatization and market rule have strengthened the grip of market ideology, at least among the elite, so that regardless of evidence, markets are assumed to be benevolent and even democratic . . . and non-market mechanisms are suspect . . . Journalism has internalized this ideology. Adding it to the residual power of anti-communism in a world in which the global power of market institutions makes non-market options seem utopian gives us an ideological package of immense strength.

To this may be added the ideological power of the “war on terror” and/or the “us versus them” dichotomy, promoted by many journalists and politicians across the political spectrum, which have helped to galvanize public support for elite interests since the Cold War ended.

Herman concedes that the fifth filter should perhaps have been originally termed “the dominant ideology,” so as to include elements of the dominant ideology that are referred to at various points throughout the version of *Manufacturing Consent* published in 1988. These elements include the merits of free enterprise, or the benevolence of one’s own government (Herman, cited in Wintonick and Achbar, 1994, p. 108). In the end, however, anti-communism was selected, primarily because the authors wished to emphasize the ideological element that had been most glaring within the Cold War context. As advanced within the original version of *Manufacturing Consent*, the description of the fifth filter mechanism is already veering toward the revised conception. For example, Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 29) originally wrote that: “This ideology helps mobilize the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism.”

Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 35) argue that the five filter mechanisms lend themselves to “a systematic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on serviceability to important domestic power interests.” The

PM predicts that this will be observable in “choices of story and in the volume and quality of coverage” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 35).

The five filter constraints narrow the range of news that passes through the gates, and even more sharply limit what can become ‘big news,’ subject to sustained news campaigns. By definition, news from primary establishment sources meets one major filter requirement and is readily accommodated by the mass media. Messages from and about dissidents and weak, unorganized individuals and groups, domestic and foreign, are at an initial disadvantage in sourcing costs and credibility, and they often do not comport with the ideology or interests of the gatekeepers and other powerful parties that influence the filtering process (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 31).

The five filter elements outlined above constitute the foundation of the PM. Herman (1996a) explains that each of the filters are “linked together, reflecting the multi-leveled capability of powerful businesses and government entities and collectives . . . to exert power over the flow of information.” Herman (1996a) highlights the central structural factors that shape media performance:

The crucial structural factors derive from the fact that the dominant media are firmly embedded in the market system. They are profit-seeking businesses owned by very wealthy people (or other companies); they are funded largely by advertisers who are also profit-seeking entities, and who want their ads to appear in a supportive selling environment. The media are also dependent on government and major business firms as information sources, and both efficiency and political considerations, and frequently overlapping interests, cause a certain degree of solidarity to prevail among the government, major media, and other corporate businesses.

The PM’s five filters provide a basis for the model’s general argument that patterns of media performance are bound to power.

X. What the PM Does Not Imply, Predict or Investigate

The fundamental argument advanced by the PM is that structural, political-economic factors elements will influence patterns of media performance.

Chomsky (1989, p. 149) writes that,

The propaganda model does not assert that the media parrot the line of the current state managers in the manner of a totalitarian regime; rather, that the media reflect the consensus of powerful elites of the state-corporate nexus generally, including those who object to some aspect of government policy, typically on tactical grounds. The model argues, from its foundations, that the media will protect the interests of the powerful, not that it will protect state managers from their criticisms; the persistent failure to see this point may reflect more general illusions about our democratic system.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a reflexive overview of the PM

Herman and Chomsky maintain that the PM does *not* represent a conspiracy theory. At the outset of *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xii) emphasize that the PM presents a “free market analysis” of mainstream media, “with the results largely the outcome of the working of market forces.” This is an important point, from a reflexive standpoint. On the one hand, the PM argues that media serve elite interests. On the other, it posits that media performance doesn’t involve conspiracy on the part of the journalists and others working within the media system to marginalize dissenting voices and thereby reproduce the status quo. Klaehn and Mullen (2010) note that while cases of direct intervention (by editors, shareholders, agents of the state, etc.) and conspiracy (recycling stories known to be false,

smears, etc.) frequently do occur, as revealed by Boyd-Barratt (2004) and Edwards and Cromwell (2009), to give just two examples, the PM provides a structural, political economy framework to account for the observed media bias in favour of corporate and political elites (also see Mullen, 2010a, 2010c).

The PM suggests that structural factors and market forces shape patterns of media behavior and encourage media to serve propaganda functions within capitalist, liberal-democratic societies. As Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 1) state:

The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, inform and inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role requires systematic propaganda.

The PM does *not* claim that media function exclusively to circulate propaganda - and this is a crucial point which will be explored and highlighted within chapters two and three of the dissertation. Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xi) stated in the Preface to *Manufacturing Consent* that: “We do not claim this is all the mass media do, but we believe the propaganda function to be a very important aspect of their overall service”.

Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 304) concede that the PM cannot account “for every detail of such a complex matter as the working of the national mass media.” The authors acknowledge that several secondary effects are left

unanalysed and cede that the PM is not concerned to analyse practical, organizational or mundane aspects of newsroom work. Concurrently, the PM makes no predications regarding audience effects – this will also be discussed further within the next two chapters of the dissertation.

XI. The PM and Intellectual Self-Defence

While emphasizing its extensive reach and resiliency, Chomsky (1987, p. 49) describes the propaganda system as “inherently unstable”, commenting that, “Any system that’s based on lying and deceit is inherently unstable.” The PM encourages intellectual and political opposition to fundamental trends that accommodate the established order and structures of ideological rule (see Chomsky, 1998, pp. 138-48). Chomsky suggests that individuals can actively combat the propaganda system and states that the first step is to develop what he refers to as a “sceptical reflex”: “It’s got to get to the point where it’s like a reflex to read the first page of the *L.A. Times* and to count the lies and distortions and to put it into some sort of rational framework” (Chomsky, 1988, p. 740). Mounting such a course of intellectual self-defence requires sufficient motivation and intellectual resources. Chomsky believes that combating propaganda requires the ability to think independently and a desire to think critically.

Adopting a program of intellectual self-defence will often also entail quite a lot of hard work. To defend against “propaganda” and gain an

understanding of many issues, Chomsky (1988, p. 717) says “you’re going to have to read exotic newspapers, and you’re going to have to compare today’s lies with yesterday’s lies and see if you can construct some rational story out of them. It’s a major effort.” To accomplish this, Chomsky (1988, p. 742) cautions: “you have to decide to become a fanatic. . . . You have to work, because nobody’s going to make it easy for you.” Beyond this, Chomsky (1979, p. 5) maintains that intellectual self-defence entails a “willingness to look at the facts with an open mind, to put simple assumptions to the test, and to pursue an argument to its conclusions.”

On what intellectual resources are required to undertake this, Chomsky states:

I frankly don’t think that anything more is required than ordinary common sense. . . . A willingness to use one’s own native intelligence and common sense to analyse and dissect and compare facts with the way in which they’re presented is really sufficient (Chomsky, cited in Rai, 1995, p. 53).

With a little industry and application, anyone who is willing to extricate [her or] himself from the system of shared ideology and propaganda will readily see through the modes of distortion developed by substantial segments of the intelligentsia. Everybody is capable of doing this (Chomsky, cited in Rai, 1995, p. 53).

In Chomsky’s view, pursuing intellectual self-defence will also need to gain access to independent media – the idea being that mainstream commercial media are not too enmeshed with power and market interests to promote

“public education” in the interests of true democracy. Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) adds that:

The mainstream media are an integral part of the power structure and in consequence consistently serve the ends of the leaders within that power structure. This means that democracy and public education are not primary aims of the mainstream mass media; the former, if fully realized, might well be damaging to the ends of the powerful; the latter also, unless properly channeled and limited, could be injurious to the powerful. These incompatibilities are likely to increase if inequality grows and if a military ethos and culture become steadily more important (as they have). The mainstream mass media will respond with attacks on and marginalization of ‘populism’ with its equalitarian tendencies, and will normalize enormous military budgets and wars.

Importantly, Chomsky stresses that non-academics do not political scientists to explain “political affairs” to them. This point speaks directly to contemporary debates surrounding public sociology:

The alleged complexity, depth, and obscurity of these questions is part of the illusion propagated by the system of ideological control, which aims to make these issues seem remote from the general population and to persuade them of their incapacity to organize their own affairs and understand the social world in which they live without the tutelage of intermediaries (Chomsky, cited in Rai, 1995, p. 53).

In the preface to the collection of his Massey Lectures, titled *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Chomsky (1989, p. vii) states that: “My personal feeling is that citizens of the democratic capitalist societies should undertake a course of intellectual self-defence to protect themselves from manipulation and mind-control.

Elsewhere, Chomsky (1982, p. 81) suggests that,

An independent mind must seek to separate itself from official doctrine, and from the criticism advanced by its alleged opponents; not just from the assertions of the propaganda system, but from its tacit presuppositions as well, expressed by critic and defender. This is a far more difficult task.

XII. The PM's Second- and Third-Order Predictions

The PM's first-order predictions are concerned entirely with observable patterns of media behaviour. The model's second- and third-order predictions are concerned with the roles played by ideological institutions in policing mainstream intellectual debates. The second-order prediction of the PM is that studies and analysis of media performance which prove that the PM is correct in its first-order predictions will be effectively excluded from debate(s) on media performance. As Chomsky (1989, p. 11) explains,

One prediction of the model is that it will be effectively excluded from discussion, for it questions the factual assumption that is most serviceable to the interests of established power: namely, that the media are cantankerous, perhaps excessively so. However well-confirmed the model may be, then, it is inadmissible, and, the model predicts, should remain outside the spectrum of debate over media. Note that the model has a rather disconcerting feature. Plainly, it is either valid or invalid. If invalid, it may be dismissed; if valid, it *will* be dismissed.

Chomsky suggests at least three reasons why the PM *should be* included in intellectual and academic debate(s) on patterns of media behaviour: (1) as stressed by Chomsky in his polemical writings, there is a tradition of advocacy

on the part of elite intellectuals for media to serve a propaganda function in society vis-a-vis the “manufacturing” or “engineering” of consent (Chomsky, 1987, p. 132); (2) autonomy of the mass media is constrained due to increasingly concentrated corporate ownership, dependence on advertising as the principal source of revenue for commercial media, and other factors, thus, on logical grounds, the PM’s first-order prediction regarding patterns of media behaviour is intuitively plausible; (3) public opinion polls indicate significant public support for the view that media play a propagandistic role within society. Chomsky (cited in Rai, 1995, p. 23) maintains that: “. . . from these three observations, elite advocacy, prior plausibility and kind of general acceptance of the view, you would draw one conclusion at least . . . You would draw the conclusion that the Propaganda Model ought to be part of the debate, part of the discussion over how the media function.”

That the PM is typically excluded from academic and intellectual debates on media and patterns of media behaviour seems to confirm the PM’s second-order prediction. Chomsky (1989, p. 151) maintains that:

It is rare to discover in the mainstream any recognition of the existence or possibility of analysis of the ideological system in terms of a propaganda model, let alone to try and confront it on rational grounds.

The PM’s third-order prediction is that intellectual and academic analyses and studies which prove that the PM’s first-order predictions are correct, however well-grounded in logical argument and supporting evidence, will be bitterly condemned. On the crucial third-order prediction, Chomsky (1989, p.

153) comments: “. . . the model predicts that such inquiry will be ignored or bitterly condemned, for it conflicts with the needs of the powerful and the privileged” (for elaboration, see Klaehn, 2002a, 2003a, 2003c, 2008, 2010; Klaehn and Mullen, 2010; Mullen 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).

XIII. The Propaganda Model and the Sociological Imagination

The discipline of sociology is non-dogmatic and multi-paradigmatic. Sociology is comprised of various and often competing perspectives that share a common aim in striving to discover knowledge/“truths” about social phenomena and the social world. Generally speaking, all sociological perspectives are inspired by the search for truths and are comprised of sets of elaborate arguments. The perceived strengths and limitations of various perspectives can in part be gleaned by the extent to which corresponding evidence suggests that the various hypotheses advanced are accurate and/or intuitively plausible and serve some utility in explaining and understanding recurring, empirically specifiable patterns.

While the PM is highly interdisciplinary, it should be recognized as a school of thought within mainstream sociology, as part of the structural-conflict perspective. Both conflict theory and the PM take as given that: power is manifest in the first instance within the economic realm; the existence of social classes is a primary feature of the structural organization of advanced capitalist societies; economic power enables social, political and ideological

power; elites are the major initiators of action within the capitalist democracies in the sense that they routinely dominate decision-making processes and are typically motivated to exercise power in a multiplicity of ways according to self-interest; the structural organization of advanced capitalist societies and the dominant economic or material relationships that characterize and define the social order directly impact the production and transmission of ideas; consciousness and the realm of ideas will correspond with dominant material relationships in ways that are both paradigmatic and hegemonic; and social control is a necessary dimension of class rule that is central to sustaining an unjust social order that in turn sustains itself by perpetuating the social inequalities upon which it is built.

In specific relation to the role and function of mainstream commercial mass media within advanced capitalist societies, both the PM and conflict theory accept as given that: power meets meaning within media discourses; social communication, popular culture, cultural politics and public pedagogy reflect dominant material relationships (i.e. existing social inequalities); political-economic elements influence overall patterns of media performance, encouraging a systematic and pervasive right-wing bias within media discourses that is consistent with the interests of power; and careful analysis of media discourses and the social, political and economic contexts in which these are produced can enable insight into the dialectic between ideology and power.

Both conflict theory and the PM emphasize the interrelations between the state, corporate capitalism and the corporate media. Chomsky (1985, p. 230)

argued that the state comprises the “actual nexus of decision-making power . . . including investment and political decisions, setting the framework within which the public policy can be discussed and is determined.” The government is composed of the more visible agents of power, “whatever groups happen to control the political system, one component of the state system, at a particular moment” (Chomsky, 1985, p. 230). Within particular time and place contexts, government is inherently transitory and is the public face of power. It may be inferred from this that power is manifest, made material, within dominant social institutions, which in turn exercise and deploy power. Ways in which power is deployed – materially, socially, politically and ideologically – vary according to specific time and place contexts. Highlighting the primacy of the state-corporate-media nexus in relation to decision-making processes, both conflict theory and the PM theorize the existence of class cohesion at the elite-level. That is, both recognize overlapping, mutual interests among elites.

As Mullen (2010a, p. 674) points out, the political economy approach to the study of the role of media in society has traditionally been concerned with issues of media ownership and control (Murdock and Golding 1977; Murdock 1982; Curran and Seaton 1991). Curran et al. (cited in Mullen, 2010a, p. 674) point out, however, that “the workings of these controls are not easy to demonstrate – or to examine empirically. The evidence is quite often is circumstantial and is derived from the ‘fit’ between the ideology implicit in the [media] message and the [economic and political] interests of those in control.”

Mullen and Klaehn (2010) point out that “this problematic has encouraged many scholars to focus upon media behaviour rather than media effects.” The PM predicts that patterns of media behavior are connected to broader institutional and market imperatives and the model advances numerous hypotheses which may be tested empirically utilizing the methodological techniques associated with the model. Toward this end, evidence supportive of the predictions advanced by the PM may be seen to lend significant legitimacy to its preferred theoretic and conceptual explanations regarding hegemonic power within society and with regard to the interrelations of state, corporate capitalism and the corporate media. If concerned simply with the scientific utility of the framework in question, the argument advanced by the PM holds together as a general framework and has much utility.

While the PM has never been officially presented as a distinctly sociological model, in terms of its basic underlying assumptions about the dialectic between ideological and communicative power and the structural organization of advanced capitalist societies, the PM unequivocally shares the general worldview associated with the structural-conflict or political economy perspective, also known as *conflict theory* within mainstream sociology. The term refers to a theoretical perspective within sociology that derives from the work of Karl Marx; class conflict, social inequality and ideological domination are central areas of concern for conflict theory (see Marx, 1956). The term also refers to the work of neo-Marxist thinkers, most notably Antonio Gramsci (1971), the Frankfurt School (commonly associated with the work of Theodor

Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Eric Fromm, Walter Benjamin and Jürgen Habermas) and Poulantzas.

As Klaehn and Mullen (2010, p. 10) have observed, radical mass media criticism has long drawn upon the critical insights provided by conflict theory (see Marx and Engels, 1970 [1845]); Theobald (2006), for example, observed that: “Of central importance within a genealogy of radical mass media criticism is [Gramsci’s] view that current bourgeois control of society, while certainly manifest in material modes of production, is culturally embedded and naturalized in the minds of the people via its hegemony over discourse.” Klaehn and Mullen (2010, p. 10) note that Europe has long been a central hub of radical mass media criticism – notable figures included Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and the Glasgow University Media Group – although resonant contributions have been made by a wide range of scholars from around the world (see Theobald (2006) and Berry (2010) for a detailed discussion of the key figures associated with radical mass media criticism). In short, conflict theory is concerned with discourse phenomena within a multiplicity of geographical and temporal contexts and, like the PM, is primarily concerned with the question of how ideological power and material power intersect and reinforce one another.

The critical-Marxist critique of political systems within capitalist liberal-democratic societies is predicated in the first instance upon the notion of the rule of the “restless many” by the few. Following directly from this is the need of the few to control the many, which may be accomplished vis-à-vis control of

access to the means of production, by ownership, force and, in some cases, fraud; control of the state, and of the law as a central mechanism of social control; influence on the media of communication within societies vis-à-vis ownership, advertising, sources of information and flak; propagandizing the political class and neutralizing resistance amongst the working class; and creating institutions designed for the purposes of social control.

Classical and modern elitism theories (Pareto, 1935; Mosca, 1939; Burnham, 1941; Michels, 1949; C. Wright Mills, 1959; Schumpeter, 1976; Domhoff, 1979) highlight the class-based nature of the state and the fact that power typically operates independently of democratic processes, impacting contemporary societies in a multiplicity of ways, such as by maintaining and exacerbating structural conditions which perpetuate class-based domination and exploitation (see Mullen, 2010a, p. 674; Mullen and Klaehn, 2010, pp. 215-217).

Herman and Chomsky's view of media as an ideological apparatus that is effectively bound to elite interests mirrors the thesis put forth by William Domhoff (1979) in his book, *The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling Class Domination in America*, which was published 9 years before *Manufacturing Consent*. On the ideological process, Domhoff (1979, p. 169) writes that:

The ideology process consists of the numerous methods through which members of the power elite attempt to shape the beliefs, attitudes and opinions of the underlying population . . . Free and open discussion are claimed to be the hallmarks of the process, but past experience shows that its leaders will utilize deceit and violence in order to

combat individuals and organizations which espouse attitudes and opinions that threaten the power and privileges of the ruling class . . . The ideology process is necessary because public opinion does not naturally and automatically agree with the opinions of the power elite.

Stressing that the ideological network is both “extremely diverse and diffuse,” Domhoff observes that media interact with other institutional sectors in circulating knowledge and shaping public opinion on a range of foreign policy and key domestic issues, including the economy and jobs. Domhoff asserts that the sum total of “special interest” is class rule, and “what is not done and not debated defines ruling class domination even if the class as a whole does not act consciously to realize its will and to subordinate other classes.”

Herman and Chomsky appropriated the phrase “manufacturing consent” from the influential American journalism, Walter Lippmann, who advocated consent engineering. In Lippmann view, the “manufacture of consent” was both necessary and desirable, predominantly because, in Lippmann’s words, “the common interests” – meaning, presumably, issues of concern to all citizens in democratic societies – “very largely elude public opinion entirely.” Lippmann postulated that “the common good” ought to be managed by a small “specialized class” (Lippmann, cited in Wintonick and Achbar, 1994, p. 40). Lippmann recommended that the role of the electorate – the “bewildered herd,” as he called them – be restricted to that of “interested spectators in the action” (Lippmann, cited in Rai, 1995, p. 23). Lippmann predicted that the “self-

conscious art of persuasion” would eventually come to preface every “political calculation” and “modify every political premise.” He stressed that consent engineering is not historically inconsistent with the overall “practice of democracy.” In his own words,

The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technique, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. As so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power (Lippmann [1922], cited in Wintonick and Achbar, 1994, p. 40).

In 1947, in an article entitled “The Engineering of Consent,” published in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Edward Bernays put forth a similar argument in support of “the manufacture of consent.” Like Lippmann, Bernays maintained that the interests of “democracy” are well-served by “the application of scientific principles and tried practices” to the “engineering of consent.” Bernays asserted that consent engineering was at the heart of democracy and characterized it as “among our most valuable contributions to the efficient functioning of society.”

The engineering of consent is the very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest. The freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly, the freedom to make the engineering of consent possible, are among the most cherished guarantees of the Constitution of the United States (Bernays [1947], cited in Wintonick and Achbar, 1994, p. 41).

Chomsky notes that the conception of democracy which underlies such doctrines is relatively consistent with the fundamental principles and ideals of America's "founding fathers." In his various political works Chomsky (1988, p. 679) frequently cites a statement made by John Jay - "Those who own the country ought to govern it" - to illustrate this particular point. John Jay was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and President of the Constitutional Committee.

Societies differ, but in ours, the major decisions over what happens in the society - decisions over investment and production and distribution and so on - are in the hands of a relatively concentrated network of major corporations and conglomerates and investment firms. They are also the ones who staff the major executive positions in the government. They're the ones who own the media and they're the ones who have to be put in a position to make the decisions. They have an overwhelmingly dominant role in the way life happens . . . Within the economic system, by law and in principle, they dominate. The control over resources and the need to satisfy their interests imposes very sharp restraints on the political system and on the ideological network (Chomsky, cited in Wintonick and Achbar, 1994, p. 51).

The PM assumes that elites are the major initiators of action in society and that elites dominate economic decision-making. Furthermore, as noted above, the PM advances the hypothesis that elite-consensus will influence patterns of media performance (Mullen, 2009, 2010a, p. 674, 2010b, p. 209, 2010c; Pedro, 2011a, pp. 10-11).

The question of media's role within society is the primary focus of the PM. While the PM originated in the US, recent scholarship suggests that the

model is gaining international resonance. Scholars from Canada, the UK and Japan have demonstrated its applicability, testing the model in terms of a wide range of domestic and international topics and issues (for a comprehensive listing of such studies, see SourceWatch, 2011).

Antonio Gramsci utilized the concept of hegemony to refer to ways in which consent of subordinate classes to capitalist consensus is achieved. As a critical concept within sociology, hegemony is first and foremost about mobilizing and securing consent and legitimation of dominant values, interests and institutions vis-à-vis intellectual and cultural leadership. Whereas some coercion is inevitable, Gramsci distinguished between hegemony and overt physical domination exercised by the state. The latter implies direct coercion whereas hegemony in its most basic sense highlights the politics and power of persuasion. The term itself is often contested within the social sciences. Many US scholars often use the terms “ideology” and “hegemony” interchangeably. Herman and Chomsky’s PM fundamentally implies a logic of mediation - or “filtering” - and the model highlights how communicative power links to social organization, cultural education and pervasive social, political and economic inequalities.

The PM suggests that mainstream commercial media are structurally predisposed to endorse, legitimize and promote the interests of power. Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) explains that the PM’s theoretical origins reside in “the economic model of industrial organization that traces back to the great British economist Alfred Marshall,” which “assumed its more modern form at

Harvard with Edward S. Mason and his student and later Berkeley academic Joe S. Bain. Our thinking was also influenced by pioneering media analysts whose ideas also flowed into our work: Warren Breed, Gaye Tuchman, Ben Bagdikian, Philip Elliott, Eric Barnouw, Peter Golding, Stuart Hall, Leon Sigal, and others.”

Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) reveals that the PM was “inspired by the failure of the mainstream mass media to serve the public interest and the unwillingness of media analysts to give adequate weight to the structural basis of that media mal-performance.”

The model actually derives from models of industrial organization, where in past years the paradigm was that structure shapes firm behavior and ultimately economic performance. Fewness of sellers means less intense competition and greater profit margins. The propaganda model similarly relates structural facts like ownership, funding sources, news sources and the relationship of these to the media, the ability to generate threatening flak, and the power to influence ideological premises, to ultimate media news and editorial performance. We hoped that this model would focus greater attention on fundamental forces affecting the media - that it would help explain their choices and frequent double standards and participation in propaganda campaigns (Herman, cited in Klaehn, 2008).

Alex Carey (1995, p. 18) pioneered the study of corporate propaganda and observed that the 20th century has “been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy.” The goal of corporate propaganda, to influence and control the “public mind,” was also identified by Marx and Engels (1970 [1845], p.64): “Each new class which puts itself in the

place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society.” Accordingly,

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time the ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it [emphasis in original] (Ibid.).

As noted by Klaehn and Mullen (2010, p. 19), the objective is ruling class hegemony, where the ideology of the capitalist class not only justifies its power but gains the active consent of the oppressed in their oppression. Gramsci defined hegemony as:

. . . an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant; in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations (cited in Williams, 1960, p. 586).

As Klaehn and Mullen (2010, p. 19) observe, elites have historically been successful in achieving such hegemony vis-à-vis advertising and the promotion of capitalist consumer culture (Packard, 1957; Baran and Sweezy, 1969; Ewen, 1976), monopolization of the mass media (Bagdikian, 1992; Herman, 1985, 1999; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Sussman, 2010, 2011; Edwards and

Cromwell, 2005, 2009; Dinan and Miller, 2007; Winter, 1992, 2002; Miller and Dinan, 2008), shaping the educational system (Miliband, 1973; Chomsky, 2000; Schmidt, 2001; Klaehn, 2006; Giroux, 2001, 2010; Jhally, 2006; Jensen, 2005, 2006) and the deployment of concerted propaganda campaigns (see Klaehn and Mullen, 2010, p. 19).

Academic discussions of the PM typically begin and end with the five filter elements. The PM's overall scope, however, is significantly more far-reaching than standard treatments suggest. The PM analytically engages with the question of how corporate and political power influence patterns of media performance, and as such is directly relevant to the question of how ideological power and discourse phenomena may be explored sociologically, particularly within the theoretical tradition associated with structural-conflict theory (see Klaehn and Mullen, 2010, p11). The PM complements other (competing) approaches and creates new opportunities for both empirical research and renewed theoretical debate concerning media and society.

The PM also connects directly with the “sociological imagination” as outlined by C. Wright Mills. Mills (1959, p. 5) proclaimed that the great promise of sociology as a critical enterprise is to inspire what he termed the sociological imagination: “a quality of mind that will help [people] to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves.” Mills argued that intellectuals should embrace critical scholarship that engages directly with power and – beyond this – he believed that intellectuals should strive for public

relevance. The PM, as a democratic and critical model that engages directly with the intersection between communicative power and economic, social, and political inequality, can be seen to represent a pathway for achieving these aims.

XIV. Critiques Associated with the PM

Generally speaking, criticisms of the PM fall into one or more of the following three categories: (1) critique motivated by political, ideological and sometimes even personal opposition to the model; (2) critique of the PM's assumptions, arguments and/or methodological approaches; and (3) critique centered around the fact that the PM is not all-encompassing and does not explain everything, in every context. Critique motivated by political, ideological and/or personal opposition to the PM may be implicit within (2) and (3). Such bias against the model may play out in different ways depending upon specific time/place contexts (see Klaehn, 2003a; Mullen, 2010a; Mullen and Klaehn, 2010; Robertson, 2011; Pedro, 2011).

XV. Generalized Misconceptions about the PM

Misconceptions about the PM continue to circulate widely: in textbooks, university departments, classrooms, and on the worldwide web. Consider, for instance, how the PM is presented in the recently published introductory text,

Popular Culture: Introductory Perspectives, by Marcel Danesi, the editor-in-chief of *Semiotica*. Introducing the PM, Danesi (2008, p. 45) writes:

One of the more interesting contemporary offshoots of culture industry theory is *propaganda theory*, associated primarily with the writings of the American linguist Noam Chomsky (b. 1928). The theory posits that those who control the funding and ownership of the media, and especially the government in power, determine how the media select and present news coverage. The media thus become nothing more than a propaganda arm of the government and put forward mainly its point of view.

Note that no reference is made or given to *Manufacturing Consent* - thereby leaving the potentially (and probably) otherwise unknowing student (presumably the “target audience” for an introductory text such as this one) with no “signposts” by which to seek evidence supportive of the PM’s arguments, which are also seriously misrepresented within the overview presented within the text. It bears noting that Edward S. Herman was the principal architect of the PM - he is not mentioned at all within Danesi’s overview. Concurrently, with regard to Danesi’s claims, the PM argues that patterns of media performance should be understood as an outcome of *market forces* and, as will be detailed in the next chapter of the dissertation, the model concerned to explore media content in relation to what’s present in media texts and also what may be absent.

Danesi asserts that the PM views media as “a propaganda arm of the government” - this fundamentally mischaracterizes the model’s central hypotheses. The PM does not suggest that media serve the “government in

power” - nor does it suggest that media function solely to circulate propaganda. Beyond this, the PM is a conceptual “model” as opposed to a “theory.” (One is left to wonder whether critics of the PM even bother to read the literature on the model before writing their articles, chapters and books aimed at marginalizing the model.) Danesi (2008, p. 45) continues,

Examples used by propaganda theorists to support their view include mainstream American television coverage of recent wars, from the Vietnam War to the War on Terror (in Afghanistan and Iraq), by which it is shown that the government in power has the ability to influence how the media present its coverage.

Like Marxist scholars, propaganda theorists see pop culture as an industry serving those in power. Although people commonly believe that the press has an obligation to be adversarial to those in power, propaganda theorists argue that the media are actually supportive of authority, for the simple reason that the press is dependent on the powerful for subsistence . . . Like the Frankfurt scholars, propaganda theorists do not seem to believe that common people can tell the difference between truth and manipulation. The solution these theorists offer is to ensure that access to public media is an open and democratic process. Such access is, in fact, becoming a reality because of the Internet, where basically anyone can post an opinion and garner an international audience for it, almost instantaneously. This very fact shows the un-tenability of propaganda theory. If consent was really manufactured in the populace as the theorists claim, why is there so much dissent against the war in Iraq online expressed by ordinary people? To my mind, individuals’ web-based political critiques are evidence of the capacity of the masses to resist indoctrination.

Thus ends Danesi’s overview of the PM. Exactly who these “propaganda theorists” are - it bears noting - is not entirely clear, as no references are included within his discussion.

XVI. Resistance and Hostility toward the PM

Herman (2000) comments that many of the initial critiques advanced against the PM “displayed a barely-concealed anger, and in most of them the propaganda model was dismissed with a few superficial clichés (conspiratorial, simplistic, etc.), without fair presentation or subjecting it to the test of evidence.” On why the anger and hostility existed, Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) explains:

The resistance and hostility to the propaganda model had several sources. One is that it is a radical critique, whose implication is that modest reforms that don't alter the structure very much aren't going to affect media performance very much. This is hard for non-radicals to swallow. Another source of resistance has been based on our relatively broad brush strokes with which we model a complex area. This makes it allegedly too mechanistic and at the same time lacking in a weighting of the elements in the model! But we don't claim that it explains everything and we are clear that elite differences and local factors (including features of individual media institutions) can influence media outcomes. We argue that the model works well in many important cases, and we await the offering of one that is superior. But we also acknowledge that there remains lots of room for media studies that do not rest on the propaganda model. This same room opens the way to criticizing the model for its failure to pursue those tracks and fill those spaces.

As Edgley (2008, p. 23) observes, Noam Chomsky's writings on US foreign policy and media power, while consistently popular with audiences outside the academy, have been largely ignored within the social sciences: “When his work *is* referred to, it is often subject to vitriolic attack. Such attacks do not come only from those on the right but also from commentators on the left” (for

details and further elaboration on Chomsky's marginalization within the social sciences, see Herring and Robinson, 2003a, 2003b). Mullen (2010a, 2010b) has documented the extent to which the PM has been excluded from and marginalized within mainstream academia. Robertson (2011) has critically engaged with central debates surrounding the PM, exploring the sociological factors that have inhibited the model's influence. The creation, diffusion and marginalization of the PM's reputation within the social sciences has been explored by Mullen and Klaehn (2010; see also Klaehn and Mullen, 2010). Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) suggests that the PM's exclusion also owes to the fact that it is a class-based and class-biased model. That the PM is interdisciplinary and oriented from the outset toward non-specialized audiences may be added to the list of possible reasons for its exclusion. The model can be seen to represent a theoretical and empirical challenge for academia, crossing boundaries between disciplines.

XVII. Exploring the "Conspiracy Theory" Criticism

The PM has been criticized for advancing a perceived conspiratorial view of media (Rai, 1995, p. 42). The term - conspiracy - implies secret controls that are divorced from normal institutional practices. At the outset of *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xiii) state that the PM constitutes a "free market analysis" of media, wherein the results "largely the outcome of the working of market forces." More recently, in an interview

undertaken by Mullen (2010c, p. 5), Herman and Chomsky have suggested that the “conspiracy theory” criticism derives from political and ideological opposition to the model:

We are very clear that the Propaganda Model does not rest on any conspiracy assumption but is rooted mainly in market-oriented processes. But many critics have not been able to see how similar results could arise without conspiracy, hence there must be an underlying conspiracy assumption. But in fact what seems to be conspiratorial behaviour is easily explained by natural market processes (e.g. use of common sources, laziness and copying others in the mainstream, common and built-in biases, fear of departure from a party line, etc.). We should note that some critics who claim that ours is a conspiratorial view do this by latching on to an occasional word or phrase we made that suggests planned action. It is true that occasionally common results arise at least in part from knowing joint action, sometimes by government request or pressure, but these are the exceptional cases. The market can do the job well, and we are very clear and explicit that this is the main mechanism through which the PM does its work.

Concurrently,

An important factor in the charge of ‘conspiracy theory’ (and general hostility to the Propaganda Model) is that many journalists find it difficult to accept the notion that institutions like those comprising the mainstream media can work to produce outcomes that run contrary to the self-understanding of the social actors who work for these institutions, and who contribute to these outcomes. Thus, harkening back to something we asserted in the first edition of our book, whereas this type of critic appears to believe that the societal purpose of the media is to enlighten the public, and to enable ‘the public to assert meaningful control over the political process by providing them with the information needed for the intelligent discharge of political responsibilities’, we believe, to the contrary, that the evidence shows that the societal purpose of the media is ‘to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic

society and the state'. This difference in view of the media's role is hard to bridge (Herman and Chomsky, cited in Mullen, 2010c, p. 5).

Thus, Herman and Chomsky reply to the "conspiracy theory" criticism by restating that the PM is a structural model that explains patterns of media behavior in terms of normal institutional imperatives (see Rai, 1995, p. 42). To those who are academically and/or politically opposed to such an analysis, which highlights the ways in which power pervades and structures various social processes, the conspiracy theory label is a convenient means by which to dismiss the PM and its explanatory logic out of hand.

XVIII. Does the PM Imply Deliberate Intent?

Some critique constitutes a hybrid of criticism and personal attack. For instance, Canadian sociologist Peter Archibald (cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 360) insists that:

. . . *manufacturing* consent and certainly *propaganda* imply not just objective irresponsibility on the part of the media [sic], but intent to ignore alternative points of view and manipulate the public. Furthermore . . . Chomsky and Herman's functionalist imagery is fraught with implications about intent. The implication is clear: the PM is often framed in conspiratorial terms. That Herman and Chomsky deny it is surprising, given that Chomsky is a linguist. It just goes to show that self-interest can warp even brilliant minds!

Herman and Chomsky cede that deliberate intent is sometimes an intervening factor that can have intended and unintended outcomes, depending upon the specific case. The preferred theoretic explanation associated with the PM doesn't assume or rely upon conspiracy. As noted, the PM assumes "self-censorship" without coercion and explains media performance in relation to structural forces. Herman (2000) comments that the PM ought to be "subjected to a test of evidence" and stresses that "intent is an un-measurable red herring" while acknowledging that many critics of the PM included "liberal and academic media analysts of the left" following the initial publication of *Manufacturing Consent*.

XIX. Analytical Emphasis and Focus

Critics of the PM have also commented upon a perceived tendency to impose meanings upon newsroom workers and editors from without, while presuming micro-processes that the model does not directly test. Similar criticism has been leveled against virtually every macro sociological theoretical perspective where the focus is on various structural elements of social organization. That is, because the PM is a structural model, it is not concerned to analyze the practical, mundane or organizational aspects of newsroom work.

Within mainstream sociology, structural models such as structural-functionalism and conflict theory have been tagged with similar criticism because these perspectives tend to focus overwhelmingly upon structural

elements as opposed to the various micro processes which in turn are the principle concern for other schools of thought within the discipline. Conflict theory is not concerned per se with the sense-making practices of actors (ethnomethodology) whereas structural-functionalism is not concerned to explicate ways in which actors recreate the social world in and through their everyday interactions (social construction). There are numerous additional examples available. Such “shortcomings,” while surely mentionable, derive from the overall theoretical framework adopted by the various models or perspectives in question, and do not lessen the utility of these models; they simply highlight that various schools of thought have divergent levels of analytical emphasis and focus.

Within the social sciences, macro structural models exist alongside models with a micro-emphasis, resulting in a non-dogmatic multi-perspective discipline with a multiplicity of focus. As noted below, however, critics of the PM, such as Canadian sociologist Peter Archibald, have nonetheless seen fit to assail the PM for not studying micro-processes. Implicit in such critique is, of course, the expectation that the PM should account for more than its formulators actually designed it to do and accomplish. Underlying such critique seems to be an expectation that social scientific models ought to explain everything – in every context. If this standard were applied universally, to every theoretic model within the social sciences, we would presumably have reason to dismiss every theoretic perspective in one fell swoop, regardless of their utility in fostering an understanding of various recurring patterns which

are empirically specifiable. For example, conflict theory could be dismissed simply because it valorizes the “bigger picture” of class antagonisms while ignoring micro-processes; social constructionism could be dismissed for focusing on micro-level social interactions while summarily ignoring macro-level structures and processes.

Critics who allege that the PM is not valid because it does not study micro-processes typically note that the model’s explanatory logic is predicated upon a preconceived notion of how power and structural elements pervade subjectivity and consciousness. How can any inferences be made relating to perceived patterns of media behavior without directly studying micro-processes, the critic might ask. Such critiques are either applying standards selectively or betraying a complete failure to understand how models actually *work* within the social sciences. Like other theoretic models, the PM begins with a set of assumptions from which various hypotheses are derived, which in turn can be tested empirically. To my mind, this is a strength of the model. The PM offers an analytical, conceptual framework, one that is concerned to theorize the operation of power in relation to dominant structural elements. The PM predicts a correlation between patterns of media behavior and broader institutional and market imperatives, and is oriented toward empirical research. It affords its own methodological techniques which may be utilized in “testing” its various substantive predictions/hypotheses vis-à-vis consideration of “boundaries of the expressible” within media discourses.

XX. The “Gatekeeper” Analogy

Other critique has likened the PM to the “gatekeeper model” of media. In scrutinizing criticisms of the PM, the question to be asked is whether this analogy is valid or flawed. The PM doesn’t assume that media personnel routinely make conscious decisions to align themselves with the interests of elites, because it is a structural model and does not theorize social psychological processes. Thus, its overarching concern with power and social class firmly distinguish it from the gatekeeper model.

Despite the gatekeeper model’s theoretic inadequacies, Hackett (1991, p. 98) states that it is an appropriate description of the work that newspaper editors actually do “with regard to news about national and international affairs: They select and disseminate, rather than generate, such news.” However, the PM does not predict that news personnel routinely plot how to cover some stories as opposed to others, and so forth, but that meanings are filtered by constraints that are essentially built into the system, such that conscious decisions are typically understood as commonsense.

At the outset of *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 2) comment that:

The elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occurs so naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret news ‘objectively’ and on the basis of professional news values.

A well-known Canadian journalist I interviewed in my research for this dissertation had this say about constraints that are in play:

A lot of journalists are genuinely clueless about the forces to which they are responding. Some are malleable, others try to act with integrity and are perpetually surprised at the blocks they encounter. Others suss out the system and either get out or act in concert with it. Those are the ones who often move up in the system. I've had journalists and editors tell me about the way things work very straightforwardly. Some combine both. There are a surprising number of higher up editors and producers who know they must accommodate the interests of ownership and other powers (in the case of public broadcasting) but within these constrictions are still committed to as much muck-raising as possible.

Another Canadian journalist I interviewed shed light upon the issue of self-censorship within the context of contemporary media:

This isn't overt censorship (as in external government censorship), but it amounts to a fairly systematic internal control of ideas. Reporters or editors who fall too far outside the mainstream on issues that are important to the corporate elite - it's okay to hold divergent views on issues like capital punishment or same-sex marriage - will be branded as 'too radical' or 'opinionated' (as opposed to the 'objective' pro-corporate positions), and will find their work marginalized and their careers going nowhere. Certainly promotions within major news organization tend to go to those who share the overall political and economic mindset of the senior editors and publisher, who in turn share that mindset with the ultimate owners. It's a fairly tight system of control, but the strings being pulled are hidden from public view. Hence it is possible to maintain the illusion that we have a 'free press', whereas in fact, we have only a partially free press. It's free, as the saying goes, to those who own it.

XXI. Audience Effects

While Herman and Chomsky have at various times both written about intervening processes (see Klaehn, 2003a, 2003c), the PM proper is firmly a structural model, and as such is concerned with the question of how structural elements influence output, and is not per se concerned with micro-scale processes. Concurrently, the PM does not theorize audience effects. It is concerned to delineate the extent to which media discourses are framed so as to produce or not “preferred” readings of media texts, which in turn can be seen to be ideologically serviceable to the interests of power.

The PM does not deny that media audiences read texts in complex ways, nor does it imply that audiences construct meanings in ways that are passive and not negotiated. The model does highlight the fact that perception, awareness and understanding are informed and constrained by the structures of the discourses in question. Some commentators would suggest otherwise. Canadian sociologist Graham Knight, for instance, argues that: “All interpretations are unavoidably selective and they are informed only to a degree by the structure of the discourse that is being interpreted” (Knight, cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 362). In my view, such theorizing can be seen to be both politically and ideologically inflected. Other scholars contend that media are highly influential in this context. One commentator, for instance, notes that:

While it is certainly the case that people are not passive receivers of media information (that they may ‘decode’ things in different ways), media texts are nonetheless encoded in very specific ways – they valorize certain voices

over others, certain sources over others, as Herman and Chomsky suggest in one of their filters (Scatamburlo-D'Annibale, cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 362).

Importantly, the PM does not set out to study audience effects, nor have its formulators ever claimed that media discourses ensure certain “effects” or outcomes. In fact, quite the opposite is actually the case.

To criticize the PM for failing to scrutinize that which it was not designed to explore, investigate or assess is perhaps analogous to condemning a book for failing to failing to provide surround sound. The PM does not set out to study effects, nor do its formulators make any claims indicating that the PM unilaterally presumes certain effects. This does not make the model *incomplete*, nor does it imply that the model presumes deliberate intent. The PM acknowledges dissent and makes no predications regarding the effectiveness of hegemonic control.

While the words “propaganda” and “manufacture” may be seen to imply conscious, deliberate intent, any serious scholar who has actually given careful consideration to the writings of Herman and Chomsky should cede that the PM does not presume or theorize effects *or* imply conspiracy. The model focuses upon how structural factors influence media discourses and as a result of its macro, structural focus, it (quite consciously and deliberately) is unconcerned with various micro-processes (such as the question of effects). This having been said, the periodic intentionality evident the language Chomsky sometimes uses - evident in the use of words such as “manufacture” and/or “control” and

in phrases such as “brainwashing [under freedom]” – affords grounds for criticism on style if not substance. Concurrently, as noted, such language implies a degree of *taken-for-granted-ness* with regard to consequent effects, which avails the model to criticism on style.

The PM does not presuppose effects, nor does it predict that audiences do not engage various forms of media in complex, non-negotiated ways. The model is concerned with the question of how the interrelations of state, corporate capitalism and the corporate media can be seen to influence media content. It is toward this end that the methodological techniques associated with the model are specifically oriented.

Any model within the social sciences can be said to have “blind spots.” The question is, to what degree do these seriously lessen the utility of the model in question? Insofar as the PM is concerned, the answer is not at all. The utility of the model stands. The matter of audience effects is not one that is within its own overall purview. As David Miller (cited in Klaehn, 2006, p. 58) correctly points out, the PM is *a model of media performance* and “it is not meant to be a theory of the wider role of the media in society, though it could be a constituent of such a theory.”

That media *do* have various effects is fairly uncontroversial. A range of scholars stress that media are both culturally and politically influential (see Clement, 1975, pp. 278-1; Cohen, 1963, p. 15; Hackett, 1991, p. 15; Hartley, 1982, p. 9; Van Dijk, 1998, p. 274; Winter, 1992; Miller, 2004; Miller and Dinan,

2008; Klaehn, 2005, 2006; Sussman, 2010, 2011). James Winter (2002, p. xxvii) writes that, “Instead of offering diverse perspectives on events and issues, the corporate media portray an increasingly myopic and orthodox picture of the world around us. The consistency with which they do this has its consequent, intended effect on public opinion and policy formation.”

Regarding Knight’s claim that the PM implies that the public are akin to “cultural dopes” and are rather easily manipulated, nothing could be further from the truth. The PM does not imply that media are monolithic, nor does it ignore dissent.

Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 306) had stressed this point in the final pages of *Manufacturing Consent*, writing that “Government and elite domination of the media have not succeeded in overcoming Vietnam syndrome and public hostility to direct US involvement in the destabilization and overthrow of other foreign governments.”

Elsewhere, in the pages of *Necessarily Illusions*, the ability of media audiences to resist and “defend” against manipulation is taken up yet again, when Chomsky (1989, p. vii) discusses “intellectual self-defense.”

Chomsky (1997) describes the propaganda system as inherently unstable and writes specifically about dissent culture in *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*. Herman (2000) has made the point that the PM describes the propaganda system in action, and makes no claim to how effective it may or may not be.

Clearly, then, the assertion that the PM takes media audiences “for granted” is problematic and, as a critique, highly dubious and less than intellectually honest. As a means of dismissing the PM from scholarly debates on media performance and/or blocking research trajectories, however, it continues to be utilized. If directing and manipulating public opinion were simply such easy affairs and closure so easily obtained, the public relations industries would not such a major part of capitalist economies worldwide.

The PM does not theorize audience effects, nor does it make predictions concerning agency and/or subjectivity. *The question of media impacts is not what the PM was designed to address.* A range of literature devoted to exploring the relation of media to public opinion exists (see Dinan and Miller, 2007; Miller and Dinan, 2008; see also, Sussman, 2010), and much of this scholarship highlights the fact that awareness, perception and understandings are typically constrained and informed by structures of discourse. This premise should be uncontroversial, especially given that the whole field of discourse analysis is centred in it. The PM may be criticized from a reception perspective, but such critique should also clearly acknowledge that the model does not theorize audience effects, nor does it make predictions regarding perception. Critique aimed at the way the public is positioned within the model’s framework seems to be motivated by the unrealistic expectation that the PM ought to explain everything, in every context, here again. One could have the same expectation of virtually every theoretic framework within mainstream sociology. Of course, again, one would presumably have reason to

dismiss all of the major paradigms and schools of thought in one fell swoop. Classical conflict theory, structural-functionalism, feminist theory, social construction, critical realism: each has its limitations.

No one perspective or optic can be seen to adequately capture and/or account for the complexity of social reality. Each optic has specific areas of focus, each is associated with certain assumptions, and each has various 'blind spots' that have been identified, discussed, utilized in furthering the existent body of theoretic literature. The various perspectives taken together form the basis of a rich body of theory distinguished by a multiplicity of emphasis and focus. Should the PM be held to what can be seen to be a higher standard than virtually every other conceptual model within the social sciences? That is, should the applications and corresponding limitations clearly set out by its formulators be taken as not enough? And, if so, on what basis, precisely? Having said this, clearly every model within the social sciences ought to be scrutinized and debated: from such debate new understandings and insights may emerge which can in turn enable greater understanding of conceptual and theoretical links and, ultimately, social processes. But the question is: should the PM be held to a higher (unobtainable?) standard?

XXII. Theorizing Power Relations

Another common criticism of the PM that has been seized upon by its critics pertains to the model's theoretic assumptions regarding the existence of a

unified ruling class. Knight (cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 363) argues that the PM “tends to take notions like ruling-class interests for granted as given and non-problematic. The only important ideological cleavage is the one between the ruling class and the people.” Knight (cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 363) comments further, stating that “This not only implies that the people are relatively easily manipulated, it also assumes that their interests are relatively homogeneous and non-problematic too.” This view can be seen to derive from a misreading of the model.

The PM doesn’t assume or imply that the public is “easily manipulated,” as Knight suggests, nor does it predict that the myriad political, economic and social interests of elites are “relatively homogeneous” to the extent that these are marked by total unification. Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 363) writes that:

. . . the PM does start from the premise that a critical political-economy will put front and center the analysis of the locus of media control and the mechanisms by which the powerful are able to dominate the flow of messages and limit the space of contesting parties. The limits on their power are certainly important, but why should they get first place, except as a means of minimizing the power of the dominant interests, inflating the elements of contestation, and pretending that the marginalized have more strength than they really possess?

It is true that the PM does not highlight instances when non-elites have influenced mainstream media, but this does not undermine the model being advanced by Herman and Chomsky. Herman (1996b, p. 15) explains that,

The market consists of numerous corporations that organize and plan to achieve their narrow goals, and which have been steadily growing in size, global reach and power. At home, they and their political allies are well funded and active; externally, institutions like the IMF, World Bank, the GATT-based World Trade Organization, [public relations firms] and the world's governments, work on their behalf. Individual powerlessness grows in the face of the globalizing market; meanwhile, labor unions and other support organizations of ordinary citizens have been under siege and have weakened . . . In this context, could anything be more perverse politically and intellectually than a retreat to micro-analysis, the celebration of minor individual triumphs, and reliance on solutions based on individual actions alone?

The PM cedes that the powerful have individual objectives and stresses that these are typically manifest in disagreements over tactics. However, the model assumes that powerful elites often do have myriad common political, economic and ideological interests.

As has been noted above, the PM's conception of the ideological process has much in common with the "class-based" model of power outlined by Domhoff (1979) in *The Powers that Be*. In translation, this view of social organization is germane to the structural-conflict perspective within mainstream sociology.

The PM highlights evident correlations between patterns of media behavior and broader institutional and market imperatives. Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2003a, p. 364) provides a succinct overview of the central "filter" elements and notes that the close inter-relationships between media and corporations and in turn polity give way to "a certain degree of solidarity":

The crucial structural factors derive from the fact that the dominant media are firmly embedded in the market system. They are profit-seeking businesses, owned by very wealthy people (or other companies); they are funded largely by advertisers who are also profit-seeking entities, and who want their ads to appear in a supportive selling environment. The media are also dependent on government and other major business firms as information sources, and both efficiency and political considerations, and frequently overlapping interests, cause a certain degree of solidarity to prevail among the government, major media, and other corporate businesses.

The PM's theoretic underpinnings can be seen to be firmly in agreement with the conception of social organization advanced by structural conflict or political-economic model within mainstream sociology, as noted. The PM assumes that elites are over-represented in government and big business sectors and are the major initiators of action in society. It presumes that elites dominate economic and governmental decision-making processes, and assumes that elite sectors share common interests that, while never unified, are largely integrated.

The PM doesn't simply take ruling class interests for granted, as Knight implies. At the outset of *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. xiii) clearly stated that:

Where the powerful are in disagreement, there will be a certain diversity in tactical judgments on how to attain shared aims, reflected in media debate. But views that challenge fundamental premises or suggest that the observed modes of exercise of state power are based on systematic factors will be excluded from the mass media even when elite controversy over tactics rages fiercely.

Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 298) suggest that a careful and thorough reading of the major mass media will bear this out and hold that the illusion of genuine debate serves to strengthen the overall “propaganda system.” Having said all this, Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) points out that some “Applications of the propaganda model do take ruling class interests as unified on some issues and as yielding consistent premises in the mainstream mass media,” such as “benevolent intent in external ventures, and the superiority of market over government interventionary solutions to economic problems.” However, Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) stresses that the PM in its original incarnation was “very clear that the ruling class may be divided on some issues, with important consequences for the media and the space within which journalists can work.”

XXIII. Critics Alleging Determinism

Another criticism that has often been leveled against the PM is that the model is highly deterministic. As noted, the PM argues that elite media interlock with other institutional sectors in ownership, management and social circles. These various interlocks, it is concluded, impact the ability of media to remain analytically detached from other dominant institutional sectors. The PM argues that this results in self-censorship without any significant coercion.

Critics alleging determinism presumably fail to subscribe to the reality of social scientific research in that virtually every model involves elements that to

various degrees one could baldly refer to as *deterministic*. Certainly the PM is not deterministic in the sense that it presupposes that media are monolithic or entirely closed to debate or period displays of critical dissent. Herman (1996) replies specifically critics who allege determinism and contends that “critics wisely stick to generalities and offer no critical detail or alternative model; when they do, the results are not impressive.”

Other scholars contend that media are far more pluralistic and far less determined. I will provide one specific example to illustrate. In their essay, “Framing the Forests: Corporations, the British Columbia Forestry Alliance, and the Media,” which appears in *Organizing Dissent*, Doyle, Elliot and Tindall (1997, p. 243) state that “media are more open, pluralistic and diverse than the more pessimistic dominant ideology thesis suggests.” The authors go on to suggest that instrumentalist analyses of patterns of media behavior are “conspiratorial” and (by virtue of default?) somehow less “sophisticated” than are more pluralistic accounts. These claim statements appear at the outset of their article. What struck me as interesting is that there was no attempt to conceal the ideologized nature of the claims. A theoretic agenda is simply advanced. An alternative model is derisively mischaracterized. The matter, apparently closed with that, is accorded no further comment. Evidence advanced by a range of scholars which reveals the extent to which media content *is* in fact severely constrained by market forces and structures of ownership is conveniently ignored.

This criticism is echoed in *News and Dissent* by Robert Hackett (1991, p. 278) who writes that “Media are not mere instruments in the hands of particular elites.” I reply to this implicit criticism of the PM by providing a quote from Conrad Black’s chief executive officer (cited in McMurtry, 1998, p. 199) in which the CEO speaks to the matter of ensuring that the editorial content of Conrad Black’s six hundred newspapers will concur with the owner’s ideological views: “If editors disagree with us, they should disagree with us when they’re no longer in our employ. The buck stops with ownership. I am responsible for meeting payroll. Therefore, I will determine what the papers say, and how they’re going to be run.” Add to this Conrad Black’s own telling remark: “If the small guy’s guardian is the media, the small guy is in bigger trouble than I thought” (cited in McMurtry, 1998, p. 199). Now, consider Doyle, Elliot and Tindall’s (1997, p. 266) conclusions regarding media constraints: “Despite the political economy of news media, they [media] are far from being simply an ideological apparatus for capital, as some prominent accounts suggest . . .”

Clearly, there is an observable dichotomy between *reality* and its *representations* as advanced by pluralistic accounts. To my mind, such accounts invariably serve an ideological function, by obfuscating reality rather than revealing.

Interestingly, Hackett (1991, p. 280) states that his own research revealed that openings and opportunities for critical discourse are created by “contradictions and leaks” within the system. Hackett (1991, p. 281) concludes

by noting that oppositional discourse and dissent are more likely to find expression in media when certain “conditions” are met:

When it speaks from within the ‘we’ group that the news addresses, when it accepts rather than challenges fundamental ideological and cultural assumptions about the values of liberalism and Western civilization, when it criticizes individual state policies or responds to previous news events rather than offers wholesale alternatives, when it speaks the language of legitimized expertise, and when it can mobilize discourses recognized as authoritative within the framework of a broadly liberal and modernist culture.

These conditions favor the explanatory logic advanced by the PM, thus giving the game away in favor of the PM. And I will dare to go further: each of these “premises” essentially recast the PM’s own general assumptions.

XXIV. Conclusion

The PM projects a view of media firmly situated within a system of social inequality. On the extent to which critical sociological perspectives conceptually confront how the interrelations of state, market and ideology constrain democracy, it is imperative to theorize the operation of power in relation to dominant structural elements. Toward this end the PM offers an attractive analytical framework, one that is oriented toward empirical research. The program of inquiry advanced by the model is designed to focus upon actual media coverage. The model’s analytical and empirical focus is squarely on structured output. It predicts a correlation between patterns of media behavior and broader institutional and market imperatives. In doing so, it

Chapter One

advances numerous hypotheses, which can be tested empirically, utilizing the methodological techniques associated with the model. These will be taken up within the next chapter of the dissertation.

Applying the Propaganda Model

While Herman and Chomsky have both written about the methodological techniques associated with the PM, they have not yet produced a single article or book chapter devoted exclusively to methodology. One would commonly be required to consult a wide range of articles, interviews and book chapters in order to delineate the full range of methodological techniques associated with the model.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the PM's methodology, outlining ways in which the model may be applied.

I. Central Methodological Techniques Associated with the PM

From reading the work of Herman and Chomsky, it is clear that the PM concerned to explore interplay between ideology, power and social inequalities. If the PM can be seen to be a “first approximation” (Herman, 2000, p. 107), a general methodological framework – derived from the body of work produced by Herman and Chomsky – should be advanced in order to provide a clear basis the empirical analysis that the model enables.

The PM may be applied in a range of different ways and affords opportunities for multiplicity of focus. Fundamentally, the model suggests that how issues and topics are treated by elite media will be bound to the interests

of power. The quantity and quality of news coverage accorded certain news stories, issues and events will differ accordingly. Herman and Chomsky maintain that observable disparities in media treatment of co-occurring historical events, or *paired examples*, can enable critical insight into patterns of media behavior.

This methodological technique may be modified so as to enable insight into how media prioritize and treat similar cases/incidents which, while perhaps not co-occurring, may share common and/or contrasting core contextual elements. A “case study approach” such as this could usefully be applied and would enable insight into how media function and socially construct news across different time/place contexts. It would enable exploration of relatively recent news events as well as historic events.

Another methodological technique associated with the PM entails analysis of how the victimized are represented within media discourses. The PM predicts that “worthy victims” (victims of state terror enacted by official enemy states) will be accorded a significant volume of coverage and will be humanized within this coverage. The model predicts that news texts relating to victims of official enemy states will be constructed in ways that will mobilize emotional response, interest and/or outrage. The model predicts that “unworthy victims” (victims of state terror undertaken by the US, its allies and/or client states) will be accorded a comparatively minimal quantity of coverage. The model predicts that the quality of the news coverage accorded unworthy victims will commonly be such that news texts will feature “only slight detail, minimal humanization,

and little context that will excite or enrage” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 35).

The model’s general argument, then, is that how victims and events are portrayed within mainstream media discourses will largely be dependent upon the interests of power within specific time/place contexts. This area of focus could also be significantly broadened and expanded to include events, issues and other groups of actors (beyond victims) (see, for example, Winter and Klaehn, 2005). The model’s focus upon how specific actors are represented within media discourses is relatable to both domestic and international events. One may go further still and suggest that the model’s analysis of victim representation should be explicitly linked to power.

Rather than presuming that news discourses somehow exist within a vacuum - apart from particular time/place contexts and various relevant dimensions of social life - the PM explores media discourses in relation to historical and contemporary political-economic contexts. The PM makes historical, political and economic dimensions directly relevant to the whole enterprise of media analysis, regardless of the specific approach one might take in relating and applying the model. The model does not examine media texts in isolation from historical facts and political-economic elements. In his voluminous writings on politics, Chomsky often moves seamlessly between discussing media coverage in unison with historical facts and various political-economic considerations.

Just as critical discourse analysis (CDA) is concerned to explore media texts in relation to the discursive practices that influence the creation and interpretation of media texts, the PM is concerned to examine media discourses in relation to historical, political and economic elements. For the PM, historical and political-economic dimensions are directly relevant to media analysis and are key areas of focus in terms of the PM's general methodological approach.

Herman and Chomsky suggest that analysis of how elite media treat some topics, issues and events, as opposed to others, may enable insight into broad patterns of media behavior. The authors maintain that observable disparities in media treatment accorded co-occurring historical events, or *paired examples*, can also enable critical insight.

The methodological technique most favoured by Chomsky in his political writings entails exploration of the "boundaries of the expressible" or range of permitted opinion on crucial topics within media discourses. This involves exploring and assessing what particular facts, details and/or arguments are present within and absent from mainstream media discourses (see Chomsky, 1989, 59). The general argument here is consistent with the PM's overall conceptualization regarding patterns of media behaviour: that which conforms to the interests of power is permissible and that which may be threatening to the interests of power will typically falls outside the range of permitted opinion.

The argument advanced by the PM is that media coverage is ideological and reflective of both power and social inequality. Herman and Chomsky provide several considerations for assessing the degree to which news coverage may be bound to these interests. These include exploring overall media choices relating to general story selection as well as quantity and quality of news coverage accorded specific events, context, and actors. Assessing the quantity of news coverage accorded a particular case, topic and/or issue is relatively straightforward. Concurrently, findings of such research easily avoid charges of being simply “impressionistic.” Investigating and assessing the extent to which the quality of news coverage accorded a specific case conforms to the “boundaries of the expressible” as predicted by the PM entails consideration of both what is present within news texts and what is absent. Sources, emphasis, placement, tone, fullness of treatment, context and range of debate are observable dimensions of news discourse that may be qualitatively assessed. The PM encourages assessment of evident omissions within media texts.

The PM assumes that news discourse is in effect bound to power and predicts that the primary sources of news will be “agents of power” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:2). According to this framework, “official sources” are those that reflect the interests of political and economic power. The PM predicts that debate will be bound to and set within parameters that will conform to these interests. Assessing the degree to which media discourses conform to the PM’s predications regarding quality of news coverage thus

entails consideration of the degree to which official sources are favored within news texts.

Applying the PM entails qualitatively examining the degree to which voices challenging the range of debate are present within and/or absent from media texts. The extent to which the boundaries of debate are defined by official sources is also central.

The PM assumes that commercial media exist within a system of power and that media are themselves fundamentally agents of social power. Evaluating data for content, omissions and style of presentation may be undertaken in order to delineate the extent to which news discourses and “boundaries of debate” are ideologically inflected. Such analysis entails assessing media choices regarding how news stories are framed and presented as texts. Applying the PM entails assessing what events, voices and/or “facts” are present within media texts and which might be absent or omitted. It also entails assessment of what voices are presented in favorable and/or unfavorable terms.

Another dimension that can be seen to be central for the PM is the inclusion or absence of photographs within news texts. Since visual imagery can powerfully impact awareness and interpretation, the PM attaches particular importance to photographs. Since visual imagery can powerfully impact awareness and interpretation, the PM attaches particular importance to photographs.

If it is discovered that important information and/or voices are missing from media texts, this can impart insight on the part of the critical analyst. Concurrently, if news reports devoted to the victims of state terror are accompanied (or not) by photographs, these texts will also enable critical insights. These presuppositions are germane to CDA and are hardly controversial.

Analysis of these elements can enable understanding on the part of the critical analyst relating to overall patterns of media behaviour. In its original incarnation, the PM stressed media choices relating to overall story selection and story treatment. Herman (cited in Klaehn, 2008) comments that:

The overlaps with critical discourse frames are numerous, but this is because the subject is immense and many tracks can be followed that are often not inconsistent with one another but stress different things. We don't stress subtle language variations and/or the nuances in effects when the elite are split and a certain amount of dissent becomes permissible. Our emphasis is on the broader routes through which power affects media choices, how this feeds into media campaigns, and how it results in dichotomization and systematic double standards. The PM focuses heavily on the institutional structure that lies behind news-making in 'a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest.' This leaves lots of room for other tracks and sub-tracks in areas we deal with.

II. Synthesizing the PM and Critical Discourse Analysis

The PM and CDA both suggest that analysis of textual prominence within media discourses can impart insight into how power and meaning intersect (see Fairclough, 1989; 1995a; 1995b; 2002; see also Giroux, 2001; Jhally, 2006; Van

Dijk, 1998). Such analysis involves careful consideration of a number of particular features of media texts. Herman and Chomsky (cited in Mullen, 2009, p. 16) have said that the PM is a form of discourse analysis – which seems an obvious point – but the model has never been seen to be part of CDA proper. It would extremely useful to synthesize the PM with CDA proper, as both models are concerned to scrutinize and explore how meanings are conveyed within media discourses. While the research within the chapters of this dissertation that follow are strictly concerned to apply only the PM proper, examination of the PM’s methodological approach affords an opportunity to explore areas of intersect between the PM and CDA.

Analysis of various dimensions of media texts may be utilized in applying the PM. Headlines are crucially important given the significant roles that they play in impacting how readers understand and subsequently interpret news events and news stories. Readers are conditioned to presume – quite correctly – that the most important or “newsworthy” information is conveyed at the outset (at the top of the “inverted pyramid”) of particular media texts. Because headlines and leads structure interpretation, they are of importance with regard to analyzing textual prominence.

Both CDA and the PM suggest that media analysis should extend beyond impressionistic readings of media texts and should include analysis of textual prominence (Fairclough, 1995a, pp. 103-104). This involves analysis of a number of particular features of media texts. Both CDA and the PM suggest that analysis of the ways in which media texts are structured or framed should

be a primary consideration. Analysis of various dimensions of media texts is required here. As noted, headlines are an important consideration because they play a significant role in impacting how readers understand and interpret the news. Given the “top-down” organization of newspaper texts, the PM suggests that it is important to assess newspaper headlines and leads.

Assessing the quantity of news coverage accorded specific news events is a primary concern for the PM.

The PM suggests that assessing how content is presented within media texts can enable critical insight into the ways in which the texts themselves may be ideologically inflected. For both CDA and the PM, fore-grounding and back-grounding are important considerations here (see Fairclough, 1995a, p. 106). What events, voices and/or facts are made explicit within media texts, and what is presented merely as incidental background fact or omitted from texts entirely? Omissions are central considerations, because if certain voices and/or facts are not even present within texts, these will have no impact on readers and will have no ideological and/or political impact. Omissions are also central to the PM’s conception of the “boundaries of debate” within media discourses. Media choices on what is accorded prominence and fore-grounded within texts influence how topics are read, understood and perceived. These choices effectively create interpretative frameworks – context is created through the presentation of media content. One can infer that the PM would hypothesize that framing, textual prominence and topic choices are in effect defined by omissions.

Both the PM and CDA identify presuppositions within media texts as centrally important (see Fairclough, 1995a, p. 107). Presuppositions relate to framing and entail assessment of the degree to which texts and particular sentences within them are structured or framed so as to present certain information, voices and/or facts as taken-for-granted or common knowledge. This may involve analysis of frames within frames. A given text may include presuppositions about previously occurring events while simultaneously ignoring or omitting various facts and/or voices. Such presuppositions may impact choices regarding emphasis and influence how topics are positioned within media texts. Both the PM and CDA also considers how events and actors are positioned within particular individual media texts and also within texts appearing over extended periods of time. As noted, the PM suggests that analysis of historical and political-economic elements should be firmly integrated into the media analysis.

The PM and the methodological techniques associated with it allow for sophisticated analysis of media discourses that extends beyond a mere “reading” of media texts. The PM is concerned to connect text analysis with political, social and economic elements.

III. Outline of Study

Two common perceptions of the PM are that it is relatable exclusively to American media, because it originated from within the US, and that the model

is centrally applicable to international as opposed to domestic issues. This research applies the PM within an exclusively Canadian context and, by taking up two case studies, demonstrates the model's usefulness and validity in a multiplicity of contexts. The topics explored within this research include Canadian newspaper coverage accorded (1) Canada's involvement in the East Timor near-genocide and (2) workplace injury and death in Ontario, Canada, and the ideological formation of the Worker's Compensation Board. A central goal of this research is to apply the PM to international and domestic news events that involve Canada and/or specifically Canadian dimensions. A secondary goal is to demonstrate a multiplicity of different approaches that may be undertaken in applying the PM in relation to particular topics, issues and events.

The dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one has provided an overview of the PM. This chapter has detailed the methodological techniques associated with the PM and will outline how the model will be applied within herein. Historical, political and economic dimensions are central to the PM's methodological approach to media analysis, so inclusion of this material within chapter three provides a basis upon which to begin exploring the Canadian newspaper coverage accorded the events in East Timor and the Canadian response to Indonesia's aggression against and "war crimes" in East Timor. Chapters four and five of the dissertation explore the quantity and quality of the news coverage that was accorded East Timor by the *Globe and Mail*. The news coverage is assessed to ascertain if quantity and quality of the

news coverage conforms to the PM's predictions. The media analysis will qualitatively explore omissions, framing, presuppositions, sources and the positioning of specific actors, events and voices, on a story-by-story basis.

Qualitative research was chosen as a means of exploring the data to enable assessment of story treatment and to allow for close textual analysis, thereby enabling insight into what Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 35) term 'modes of handling favored and inconvenient materials'. Whenever possible, the data analysis includes direct quotations from particular media texts in order to avoid charges that the analysis is simply impressionistic in nature.

The research will apply the PM to news coverage of East Timor that was published in Canada's *Globe and Mail* over a sixteen year period, from December 1975 on through to the end of 1991. The *Globe and Mail* newspaper was selected primarily because there is general consensus amongst Canadian scholars that the *Globe and Mail* constitutes Canada's key "national medium" - in addition to setting the "news agenda" for lower-tier media within Canada in much the same fashion as the *New York Times* does within the United States (US), the *Globe and Mail* also influences government decision-making processes and informs scholarly and historical accounts (see Desberats, 1990, p. 227; Hackett, 1991, p. 95; Heinricks, 1989). The timeframe of the coverage was decided upon based on the chronology of events within East Timor. Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975. Coverage of the "invasion period" - from 1975 to 1980 - and the "occupation period" - from 1981 to 1991 - will be

explored and assessed. The central aim of the study is to explore whether or not the PM is applicable within the context of Canada's print media.

The data gathering entailed two steps. Initially, the *Globe and Mail* archive office was contacted directly, and provided a clipping file that containing copies of each of the articles on East Timor that had been published in the newspaper from 1975 through to the end of 1989. Following this step, the *Canadian News Index* (CNI) was consulted to confirm the coverage. Each year of the CNI was researched - from 1975 through to the end of 1991. East Timor news articles published in the *Globe and Mail* throughout 1990 and 1991 were first located in the CNI, which lists "East Timor" as a subject heading and gives date and page information for all related articles that have been published. These articles were then manually located and printed from the microfiche copies on file at the Kitchener Public Library, where the volumes of the CNI were also consulted.

The CNI is Canada's oldest and most respected news index, and there is general consensus among Canadian media scholars that it is the most reliable and definitive news index system available within the country. Unlike several more recent news index systems that are exclusively electronic, the CNI is published on an ongoing basis as a series of bound hardcover and paperback volumes. Individual subject items are organized by corresponding dates within each volume of the CNI. Each volume features subject listings that compile news articles, dates of publication and page numbers for each article. Opinion

articles, letters to the editor and editorials are not listed in the CNI, only hard news articles.

Efforts were made to personally contact a number of individuals who were involved in the production of the East Timor coverage. Repeated attempts to locate and contact particular journalists proved unsuccessful, but contact was successfully made with several former editors who had been involved with the production of the coverage in editorial capacities throughout the sixteen year window that the study takes up. Telephone interviews were undertaken. Although none of these individuals agreed to grant permission for their names to be included within the study, data gleaned from the interviews is included within the final chapter of the dissertation, within the discussion concerning possible alternative explanations for the low volume of coverage that was accorded East Timor. While permission to include direct quotes and/or names was refused, the information provided proved to be very insightful.

To provide a point of comparison to the *Globe and Mail* coverage, an assessment of the quantity of news coverage that was accorded East Timor by other Canadian daily newspapers was also undertaken. The CNI was consulted to ascertain the coverage published in the *Calgary Herald*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Toronto Star* and *Montreal Gazette*. This enabled insight into the agenda-setting function of the *Globe and Mail* within Canada and also provided a basis for richer understanding of how East Timor and Canada's relationship to the events there were represented within the Canadian media at large.

For the purposes of this research, applying the PM entailed a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the quantity of the *Globe and Mail* news coverage, with a view toward assessing how the newspaper prioritized and covered specific issues and events as opposed to others. The PM emphasizes qualitative exploration of boundaries of debate, and this is also a central concern within this research. Sources, emphasis, placement, fullness of treatment, context, tone and evident range of debate on central issues and topics are observable dimensions of media discourses that will be qualitatively assessed in utilizing the PM to undertake detailed media analysis of the *Globe and Mail* news coverage. Several questions are of particular importance to the data analysis. During the crucial invasion period, how were central actions, actors and voices represented? How were the relevant Canadian connections represented? Did the news coverage conform to or deviate from the PM's predictions regarding the "boundaries of debate" and worthy and unworthy victims?

The dissertation then transitions to explore the experiences of Ontario injured workers and the ideological formation of the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, formerly the Workers Compensation Board (hereafter WCB/WSIB). The chapter explores and considers how the experiences of injured workers have been represented within the Canadian media. Because virtually no scholarly research on this topic exists, it was necessary to undertake extensive ethnographic research for this study. Unstructured, open-ended confidential interviews were undertaken with 47 injured workers over the course of a 14 month period. Following this, Canadian newspaper coverage

accorded the WCB/WSIB over a period of one year is explored with a focus on evident boundaries of debate, spin and legitimations. The primary contribution of research is two-fold. Given the PM's methodological approach, which makes political-economic elements directly relevant, the original ethnographic research presented within this chapter crucially provides a basis for understanding and making judgments about the quantity and quality of the news coverage accorded injured workers within Ontario by the Canadian media. The chapter also demonstrates the ease with which traditional political-economic analysis can incorporate the PM, to enable additional explanatory power, bringing media analysis into studies (such as this one) which are centrally concerned to explore dimensions of social inequality and evident impacts of dominant political-economic social structure(s) within contemporary society. In addition to providing original ethnographic research, this research aims to enable a greater understanding of the WCB/WSIB in relation to the broader overlapping nexus of ideological, economic and political power within Canadian society. It is my hope that the research will foster discussion, debate and additional research. In relation to the dissertation as a whole, the research presented within this chapter demonstrates that the PM can be usefully applied to domestic as well as international issues.

IV. Conclusion

Since the PM is a critical approach concerned with the interplay between power and ideology and how these connect to social inequality within the broader society, this study is firmly critical in terms of its overall research agenda. The PM is both an accessible and democratic model, thus a further goal was to craft a study that may be read and understood by specialized and non-specialist audiences alike. In keeping with the spirit of the PM's aims, this research was designed and structured to enable critical insight.

Canada and East Timor

This chapter provides historical background information on the events in East Timor, examines the diplomatic response of the international community, overviews Indonesia's justifications for its actions, and details the ways in which Canada was connected to the East Timor near-genocide.

I. Why East Timor?

Carey (1998/99, pp. 29-57) observes that Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was one of the most brutal in power-war history. Noam Chomsky (1992, p. 204) writes that the death toll, relative to population, was the world case of slaughter since the Holocaust. Taylor (1990, p. 178) states that Indonesia "violated almost every human rights provision in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Bill of Rights."

Indonesia's invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of East Timor constituted an act of aggression that included both "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" under international law and Canadian criminal law. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) included East Timor as case study within their book, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, on the basis of the United Nations (UN) Genocide Convention, which was signed

and ratified by Canada. The repression, state sponsored atrocities and human rights violations are well-documented and uncontroversial (see Amnesty International, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1994). Human rights violations included forced relocation causing (induced) starvation and disease, programs forced sterilization (Sissons, 1997), and psychological terror oriented toward pacification and social engineering (see Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Gunn, 1994; Scharfe, 1996, p. 55).

The case is well-suited for analysis given the extensive links shared between East Timor, Indonesia and Canada. Chomsky (cited in Briere, 1991) remarks that “Canada had enormous leverage over the slaughters in East Timor and never used it. The media were never concerned and the intellectual community was never concerned. In this respect, Canada contributed materially to the slaughters.”

II. East Timor - The Background

The island of Timor is located approximately 620 kilometers from Australia. Portuguese merchants first arrived in 1515, almost one hundred years before the Dutch Empire. Portugal colonized East Timor in 1701. In 1850, Portugal and the Dutch East Indies finalized a treaty delimiting between West Timor and East Timor, with Portugal officially claiming East Timor. West Timor was incorporated into Indonesia in 1949. Prior to Portuguese colonization, East Timor’s economy was

centrally subsistence agriculture and commodity production. East Timor is rich in natural resources, including coffee, rubber, sandalwood, peanuts, and copra. The most valuable of East Timor's natural resources, however, are its natural oil deposits, situated along its southernmost coast (see Gunn, 1994, p. 121).

In July of 1974, Portugal dissolved its overseas territories and announced plans to grant these regions the right to self-determination. Indonesia initially signaled its approval of the de-colonization plans and Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs stated that Indonesia had no territorial pretensions toward East Timor and that Indonesia would not interfere in de-colonization (Gunn, 1994, p. 85-108). On June 14, 1974 Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik (cited in Selby, 1987, p. 42) stated that: "The independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exceptions for the people of East Timor." This declaration is significant, particularly in relation to ensuing events, as will be demonstrated presently.

A civil war between three political formations - UDT, APODETI, and FRETILIN - broke out within East Timor in August 1975. The Portuguese administration withdrew from the territory after the hostilities began. Importantly, various sources confirm that the civil war had ended by November 1975 and that approximately 2000 to 3000 Timorese had died in the fighting (Scharfe, 1996, p. 45; Selby, 1987, p. 42; Jardine, 1997, pp. 15-21; Chomsky and Herman, 1979, p. 134).

Indonesian military forces began cross-border incursions from West Timor in November 1975. This same month - on November 28 - the de facto FRETILIN government declared unilateral independence for East Timor in order to defend East Timor's territorial integrity at the UN (Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, pp. 1-8). Some third States, including Mozambique, immediately recognized East Timor as an independent State (Krieger, 1997, p. xix). On December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor outright.

The invasion began shortly after midnight, with bombers attacking Dili, East Timor's capital city, from the air while paratroopers landed by the thousands on the beaches (see Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, pp. 22-27). Indonesian aerial forces pounded the city with bombs. The US had provided the majority of Indonesia's offensive weapons (Chomsky, 1987, p. 306). Later that afternoon a FRETILIN radio broadcast (cited in Budiardjo, 1991, p. 200) was picked up by reporters in Darwin, Australia: "The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately! Women and children are being shot in the streets! We are all going to be killed! This is an appeal for international help! Please do something to stop the invasion!" According to eyewitness accounts, the atrocities grew more extensive as the Indonesian invasion advanced beyond Dili and into East Timor's mountainous interior regions (see Briere, 1991, 1997). FRETILIN supporters were either immediately shot or captured and taken to camps where they were subjected to beatings and torture (Selby, 1987, p. 43).

By 1978 the East Timorese resistance was struggling to maintain control of the Matabian mountain range, where thousands of civilians had gathered, seeking safety and shelter from the ongoing Indonesian aerial assaults. Budiardjo (1991, pp. 204-205) writes that this was the most brutal year of the Indonesian aggression. With its military arsenal nearly depleted, Indonesia sought to obtain additional arms with which to “wipe out” the East Timorese resistance and crush any remaining hope for independence among the Timorese people (Chomsky, 1987, p. 306; Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, p. 27; Gunn, 1994, p. 78).

Indonesia purchased sixteen F-5 fighters from the US in February 1978 and in early April acquired eight Hawk ground-attack bombers from British Aerospace. In his chronology of the invasion and occupation, Taylor (1990, p. 17) notes that these bombers are “ideally suited for use against ground forces in difficult terrain.” Indonesia used the aircraft to implement what Budiardjo (1991, p. 205) refers to as “a strategy of encirclement and annihilation” designed to force the Timorese from their traditional mountain homes. Forced relocation entailed the peoples of East Timorese being relocated into military-controlled camps, which led to starvation and disease. It shattered a long-standing tradition of self-reliance amongst the Timorese, stripping away “a pattern of agriculture under which villages could thrive” (Selby, 1987, p. 43). It also involved gross violations of economic and social rights. The Timorese perished in great numbers as a result of malaria, which thrives in the humid

lowlands, tuberculosis and influenza (Selby, 1987, p. 43; Briere, 1991, 1997; Briere and Devaney, 1990, 1991). Forced relocation also entailed negative consequences. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990, p. 411) observe that relief workers who were admitted to East Timor in the late 1980s reported severe famine among children.

News of sterilization and forced birth control first surfaced in May 1978 (Ripley, 1990). In September 1978 Australian Liberal Minister Michael Hodgman estimated that 30,000 East Timorese had by this time already been killed by chemical defoliants (including napalm) that were used in Indonesian aerial assaults (Taylor, 1990, p. 18). One Timorese (cited in Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, p 35) said that “When they [the bombs] hit, they would cause fire and devastate the surroundings. A friend who was captured who had experience of napalm bombs in Africa where he served as a soldier said the effects of the bombs used by the Indonesians were the same.”

In September 1980, despite Indonesia’s continuing aggression, French Foreign Minister de Guiringaud visited Indonesia and agreed to terms on “the eventual establishment of a production plant to manufacture light automatic weapons” for the Indonesian military (Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, p. 30). On December 17, 1980, an official with the Central Intelligence Agency stated publicly that the US could have prevented the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor without sacrificing long-term US foreign policy objectives in

Southeast Asia (Taylor, 1990, pp. 25-26). Kay Xanana Gusmao was elected leader of the FRETILIN resistance in 1981. This same year Indonesia launched another new military offensive - "Operation Security." Selby (1987, p. 44) provides additional information on Operation Security and its impacts:

Every East Timorese male aged thirteen or above was ordered into the mountains to form a human chain. Armed with sticks and crude weapons, they were forced up into the mountains beating everything before them into a human net. Hardly any FRETILIN guerillas were caught as many of the conscripted Timorese let them slip through their legs or concealed them in their own midst. But many villagers were shot and thousands were rounded up and sent to Atauro prison island. 'Operation Security' caused further widespread devastation, in that the men were in the mountains when they should have been planting food crops in time for the rainy season. The result was a disastrous harvest in 1982 and a further wave of famine.

Shortly after Indonesia asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to leave occupied East Timor. Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces General Murdani stated that those who continued to resist Indonesian rule would be crushed "without mercy" - concurrently, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar said the East Timorese were "primitive" and of "vendetta mentality" (cited in Taylor, 1990, p. 36).

In May 1983 the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., identified the mortality rate in East Timor as the "highest death toll of the decade," second only to Cambodia under Pol Pot (Budiardjo and

Soei Liong, 1984, p. xvi; Selby, 1987, p. 44; Dunn, 1983). Amnesty International (AI) released a report in 1985 estimating that approx. 200,000 East Timorese had died as a result of the Indonesian invasion and occupation. The AI (1985) report also detailed state-sponsored summary executions, reprisal killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment, amongst other gross human rights violations.

Indonesia had increased its military presence in East Timor to 25,000 troops by 1988. In 1990 Indonesia took steps to capture Xanana Gusmao, leader of the East Timorese resistance, and launched several new military offensives within East Timor. Gunn (1994:78) reports that “By the 1990s the UK had replaced the United States as Indonesia’s biggest arms supplier with A\$220M a year in sales.”

III. Violent Repression of the East Timorese

There is general consensus that the most brutal year of the Indonesia occupation was 1978. Programs of forced relocation undertaken throughout this year resulted in induced starvation and disease (see Taylor, 1990, pp. 17-20; Taylor, 1991, p. 89; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 411). As noted, the Indonesian occupation also entailed non-consensual forced sterilization programs (see Scharfe, 1996, p. 52) and psychological programs oriented toward pacification (Gunn, 1994, p. 232).

On November 12, 1991, Indonesia soldiers armed with assault weapons opened fire on a pro-independence assembly of unarmed East Timorese civilians outside a Santa Cruz cemetery near Dili, East Timor's capital city. The assembly had consisted of mostly women (under 30 years of age) who were processing to the grave of a Timorese male (Sebastiao Gomes) who had been shot by Indonesian soldiers the previous month. Estimates of the number of East Timorese who were killed and/or "disappeared" as a result of the massacre range from 85 (Indonesia's estimate) to more than 600 (church sources and other non-governmental organizations) (Krieger, 1997, p. xx; Scharfe, 1996, p. 60).

Journalists Allan Nairn of *The New Yorker Magazine* and Amy Goodman of WBAI/Pacifica Radio witnessed the massacre firsthand and later indicated that the military action had not been provoked and was a deliberate act of state. The extracts below are from the testimony of Allan Nairn (1992) to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

What I saw was cold-blooded execution and the facts are very simple and very clear. Indonesian soldiers marched up in mass formation and opened fire in unison into a peaceful, defenseless crowd . . . Gomes' funeral was a breakthrough event because people turned out and dared to speak. As the mass broke up, people assembled onto the street. The army intelligence chief drove by. Along the route of march there were soldiers and police, who carefully eyed the passing Timorese. This time a number of people were carrying hand-lettered banners supporting the church and the cause of [East] Timorese independence . . . looking to our right we saw, coming down the road, a long, slowly marching column of uniformed troops. They were dressed in dark brown, moving in

disciplined formation, and they held M16s before them as they marched. As the column kept advancing, seemingly without end, people gasped and began to shuffle back. I went with Amy Goodman of WBAI/Pacifico radio and stood on the corner between the soldiers and the Timorese. We thought that if the Indonesian force saw that foreigners were there, they would hold back and not attack the crowd. But as we stood there watching the soldiers marched into our faces, the inconceivable thing happened. The soldiers rounded the corner, never breaking stride, raised their rifles and fired in unison into the crowd. Timorese were backpedaling, gasping, trying to flee, but in seconds they were cut down . . .

People fell, stunned and shivering, bleeding in the road, and the Indonesian soldiers kept on shooting. I saw the soldiers aiming and shooting people in the back, leaping bodies to hunt down those who were still standing. The executed school girls, young men [and] old Timorese. The street was wet with blood and the bodies were everywhere. As the soldiers were doing this they were beating me and Amy; they took our cameras and our tape recorders and grabbed Amy by the hair and punched and kicked her in the face and stomach. When I put my body over her, they focused on my head. They fractured my skull with the butts of their M16s . . . for whatever reason, the soldiers chose to let us live. We hopped a passing truck and got away. The soldiers were still firing as we left the scene, some five to ten minutes after the massacre began.

This was, purely and simply, a deliberate mass murder, a massacre of unarmed, defenseless people. There was no provocation, no stones were thrown, the crowd was quiet and shrinking back as the shooting began. There was no confrontation . . . [the] soldiers opened fire as soon as their column turned the corner and got within a dozen yards of the Timorese. After the Timorese had been gunned down the army sealed off the area. They turned away religious people who came to administer first aid. They let the Timorese bleed to death on the road.

It is clear . . . that what we witnessed [in Santa Cruz] was a deliberate act of state. The highest army officials have said as much. General Try Sutrisno, the chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, said in a speech to graduates of the National Defense Institute that Timorese like those who gathered outside the cemetery are 'people who must be crushed.' He said 'delinquents like these agitators should have to be shot and we will shoot them.' He added, 'come what may, let no one think they can ignore the ABRI - in the end they will be shot down.' General Sutrisno was simply restating the policy Jakarta has practiced in East Timor since 1975. It is the policy of President Suharto and the army command as a whole, and this massacre was simply an example of what we happened to see . . .

Indonesia responded by issuing a report saying that the shooting was a 'spontaneous reaction by soldiers . . . to protect themselves' and that it 'clearly was not ordered by or reflecting the policy of the Government of the Armed Forces.' The Indonesian report . . . is a very simple and damnable lie, and no government that praises it can be taken seriously. The only way that anyone can put any stock in this report is if they are willing to ignore the testimony of every foreign and Timorese eyewitness, as well as the policy statements of the Indonesian army chief.

Numerous reports of human rights violations in occupied East Timor continued to surface throughout 1991 and 1992. AI (1992a, 1992b) reported it was concerned about ongoing patterns of "short term detention, torture and ill treatment of alleged political opponents." Despite its own Arms Export Control Act (prohibiting commercial arms sales to countries deemed to be engaged in gross human rights

violations), the US government continued to authorize military exports to Indonesia throughout the late 1980s and 1990s

IV. East Timor at the United Nations

On December 12, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3845 (XXX) recognizing that Indonesia's invasion of East Timor had breached the principle of self-determination as laid out in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and UN Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) (Scharfe, 1996, pp. 82-83). Voting in the General Assembly on Resolution 3845 was 72 in favor, 10 against, and 43 abstentions (Budiardjo, 1991, p. 202). On December 22, 1975, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 384 which called upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor "without delay" and called upon "all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination" (Krieger, 1997, p. xxiii). On this vote, permanent members of the Security Council - Britain, France and the United States - voted in favor of the resolution (see Scharfe, 1996, p. 83).

While the majority view was that no act of self-determination had occurred, neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council strongly condemned Indonesia and its actions were not characterized as 'invasion' or blatant 'aggression.' No sanctions were suggested or imposed (Carey, 1999, p. 32; Jardine, 1995, p. 36). Most states did not go so far as to

publicly recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor as legitimate (Carey, 1998/99, p. 32). Among those nations that voted against General Assembly Resolution 3845 were Indonesia, Iran, India, Thailand and Malaysia. Many other nations abstained from the voting, including Afghanistan, Austria, Bahamas, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Norway, Morocco, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the US, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire (see Krieger, 1997, pp. 129-133).

The UN Security Council reaffirmed East Timor's right to self-determination on April 22, 1976, voting in favor of Resolution 389, which once again denounced integration. By this time approximately 60,000 Timorese had already been killed (Budiardjo, 1991, p. 199; Scharfe, 1996, p. 83). Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s the General Assembly adopted seven additional resolutions reaffirming General Assembly Resolution 3845, rejecting Indonesia's position that East Timor had been lawfully integrated into Indonesia, reaffirming East Timor's right to self-determination, and calling for an immediate Indonesian military withdrawal from East Timor. The resolutions resulted in no significant action on the part of the international community. Traditionally, Indonesia enjoyed the support of many Third World countries (Krieger,

1997, p. xxv), including countries that had experienced their own anti-colonial struggles.

V. East Timor – The Broader Context

As Chomsky (1987) observes, the history of US involvement within the Asia-Pacific region dates back to the post-World War Two era (also see Jardine, 1997, p. 18). Chomsky (1987, p. 304) points out that the direction and tone of post-war US foreign policy was set out in 1948 by George Kennan, the US State Department Director of Policy Planning – Kennan had emphasized the importance of Indonesia’s future political orientation in relation to long-term US foreign policy interests. Kennan also warned against communism and possible indigenous left-wing political movements and stated that these would deprive the US of “an area of the highest political, economic and strategic importance” (see Kennan, 1976, pp. 524-525). Post-war US foreign policy aimed to establish hegemony in the Southeast Asia region (Jardine, 1997, p. 40).

As Chomsky (1987, p. 304) observed:

Indonesia, with its wealth of natural resources, was to play a central role in the emerging global system, with Japanese and Western capitalism reconstructed within a broader framework managed by the United States and ultimately subordinated to its interests.

Anderson (1995, pp. 138-139) stresses that the immediate context was an influential element: “In almost any other period, before or after

1975, the United States would have been supportive of Portugal and its foreign policy . . . [but at that time] it was strongly felt that the counterweight of a ferociously anticommunist Indonesia was essential.” As noted, the US also had major strategic interests in the region. In cooperation with the Suharto regime, the US made use of water routes situated between the Indian and Pacific oceans to conceal nuclear submarine activity from the Soviet Union (see Anderson, 1999, p. 139).

The broader context of the US position thus includes political, economic and strategic dimensions. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US ambassador to the UN in 1975 (under the Ford administration), has stated that:

The Department of State desired the UN to prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me and I carried it out with no inconsiderable degree of success (Moynihan, cited in Chomsky, 1993, p. 60).

The US position serves as a partial explanation for how the issue of Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor was treated by the UN and the international community. The nature and scale of the atrocities, documented and condemned by major human rights organizations, resulted in no calls for military intervention or justifications for military action on the basis of protecting freedom or democracy. Throughout the 1980s Western governments continued to provide Indonesia with material, diplomatic and military support. Gunn (1994, p. 78) reports

that US military sales to Indonesia soared throughout the decade under Regan.

VI. Indonesia - The Background

As Chomsky (1987, p. 304) points out, US involvement in Indonesia can be traced back to 1958, when the US government provided financing, tactical advice and military personnel for an engagement in the Philippines that had covert CIA operatives training non-military for-hire mercenaries to overthrow the reigning Sukarno regime. The coordinated “rebellion” against Sukarno failed, but US-backed efforts to remove Sukarno and install a new military-based ruling power in Jakarta continued. Chomsky (1987, pp. 304-305) observes: “In 1965, six generals were murdered in what official doctrine (including much of scholarship) describes as a ‘communist coup,’ which miraculously spared the pro-US General Suharto while targeting elements of the military considered anti-American.” In the killings that followed, the Indonesian Community Party (PKI) was virtually eradicated. Anyone suspected of being involved with or sympathetic to its social and political agenda was detained, murdered and/or “disappeared.” Briere (1988, p. 20) reports that PKI members were often “portrayed as subhuman, as vermin to be executed, wiped out, crushed, and destroyed, to use some of the army’s language.” Civilians were recruited to play roles in the atrocities vis-à-vis “civic action”

programs funded by the Ford Foundation, the RAND Corporation and the CIA (Briere, 1988, p. 20). Ralph McGehee (cited in Briere, 1988, p. 21), a senior CIA officer at the time, writes that:

Initially the Indonesian army left the PKI alone since it had not been involved in the coup attempt. Subsequently, however, the Indonesian military leaders began a bloody extermination campaign. The killing was on such a huge scale that there were sanitation problems in East and North Sumatra. The Agency was extremely proud of its successful (one word censored [by CIA censors]) and recommended it as a model for future operations.

The PKI had been the world's fourth largest communist party prior to the campaign. Chomsky and Herman (1979, p. 206) assert that its major *fault* was simply that it opposed strong economic and political links to the US, "to which the Indonesian military was already closely tied by ideology and growing technological dependency (arms supplies and training)."

Under Suharto, atrocities continued throughout 1965/66. Briere (1988, p. 20) writes:

One of the most cold-blooded killers was Colonel Sarwo Edhie, later sent to West Papua to attack villagers resisting Indonesian occupation. He personally directed hundreds of mass slayings in Java and Bali, where resistance to the Suharto takeover was the strongest. The trucks went from village to village taking their victims away: men, women, children, grandparents. Many were forced to dig their own graves. In the words of one Muslim youth: 'There were not difficult to kill. They died like frightened birds. We killed them with knives.' Estimates of how

many people died in the orgy of killings vary from half a million to two million . . . Meanwhile, the Western press was treating the coup sympathetically. *Time* magazine reported the event as 'The West's best news in years in Asia,' while the *Toronto Globe and Mail* wrote in July, 1966, after knowledge of the killings was widespread, that 'It is both encouraging and remarkable that responsible leaders have emerged in Indonesia.'

While the Western media praised Indonesia's new political leadership, human rights violations continued - including the arrest, detainment and torture of approx. one million people in Indonesia and West Papua. Chomsky and Herman (1979, p. 215) report that the US media responded in typically "restrained" fashion: there was no public outcry nor were there calls for "justice," and the World Bank responded by making Indonesia its third largest borrower. As Chomsky (1987, p. 305) points out:

With the political opposition demolished in one of the great massacres of the modern era and 750,000 arrested, many to remain safe in jails and concentration camps for fifteen years, Indonesia was welcomed into the Free World, where it continues to serve as a loyal outpost of liberty and democracy in the approved style, including impoverishment of much of the population in a potentially rich society, terror and torture, a political system that does not merit the term 'fraudulent,' but, crucially, few barriers to foreign exploitation apart from the rapacity of the Indonesian generals and their local associates.

General Suharto and his "New Order" military regime assumed executive power in March 1966, "authorizing him to restore peace and order in

Indonesia” (Republic of Indonesia, 1993, p. 12). In March 1967, the Provincial People’s Consultative Assembly appointed Suharto acting President of Indonesia, and one year later, in March 1968, Suharto was elected President. Subsequent re-elections - in 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1993 - saw Suharto retain military power for over three decades.

Under Suharto, the Indonesian military acted as an “instrument of violent control” and played a central role in the state, “in part, though its institutional representation in parliament” (Brownstone and Demers, 1994, p. 25). Chomsky and Herman (1979, p. 205) state that routine “bloodbaths” and terror facilitated a social climate that was highly favorable to Indonesia’s client states and their economic interests in the region. The Indonesian military routinely intervened in civilian affairs, breaking up wildcat strikes, responding with force to displays of political dissent, and giving de facto sanction to torture and killing (see Amnesty International, 1985, 1994; Brownstone and Demers, 1994, p. 30).

The military also promoted the doctrine of Pancasila. Briere (1991) describes Pancasila as an “Orwellian ideology of state worship” designed to stifle dissent. Indonesian newspapers, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and unions were all compelled to swear allegiance to it. The “Coordinating Body for Assisting in the Maintenance of National Security” (also referred to as BAKORSTANAS) was established in 1988 and charged with a mandate of upholding Indonesia’s legal apparatus and implementing its anti-subversion laws (Briere, 1991). Accountable only to

President Suharto, it had the power to arrest, kill, torture and/or “disappear” anyone it liked.

In 1990 Indonesia’s Minister of Information (cited in Briere and Gage, 1993, p. 43) made a statement addressing freedom of expression within Indonesia, saying ‘We don’t need to practice censorship. We don’t need it as the press has learned to censor itself.’ Indonesian civilians were required to take Pancasila courses. Briere (1988, p. 23) characterized Indonesia under the Suharto regime as “one of the most completely militarized societies in the world”.

VII. East Timor – Indonesia’s Position

The position of the government of Indonesia is that the civil war within East Timor hadn’t ended by November 1975 and that the majority of East Timor’s population requested that the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) “intervene” in the civil war in order to provide protection against FRETILIN. Indonesia’s position is that the civil war had resulted in “the prospect of prolonged political strife, economic upheaval and foreign interference” (Krieger, 1997, p. xxi). Other sources contradict this view, indicating FRETILIN had been successful in forming an effective government which advocated control of foreign aid and investment (Dunn, 1983; Chomsky and Herman, 1979, p. 134), had initiated progressive policies (Selby, 1987, p. 42) and enjoyed popular support

among the people of East Timor (Jardine, 1997, p. 15). It is also the position of the government of Indonesia that FRETILIN would have encouraged communist expansionism within the entire Southeast Asia region (Republic of Indonesia, 1992).

According to the government of Indonesia, on May 31, 1976, a “People’s Popular Assembly” had officially requested that East Timor be incorporated into Indonesia and annexed as its twenty-seventh province, and this was made official on July 17, 1976. Indonesia’s position is that the decision to forego self-determination within East Timor had been unanimous (Krieger, 1997, p. xxi). This view is contradicted by various competing interpretations. Budiardjo and Soei Liong (1984, p. 96) state that the “People’s Popular Assembly” was “a creation of the puppet Provisional Government of East Timor [that had been] established immediately after Indonesian troops took control of Dili in December 1975.” Both Portugal and FRETILIN had rejected the government of Indonesia’s claim that the people of East Timor had invited the ABRI to intervene in any civil disorder which Indonesia claimed was happening within East Timor.

Historically, Indonesia has rebutted allegations that its incorporation of East Timor was illegal. Indonesia maintained that Portugal abandoned East Timor after the civil war, thereby relinquishing control of the territory. Portugal in turn had indicated that its withdrawal at the outset of the civil war was motivated by security

concerns. Portugal conceded that it did lose control of the territory - it attributed this to Indonesia's invasion and ensuing occupation of East Timor, and claimed it had not relinquished administering authority (Krieger, 1997, p. xxiii).

The government of Indonesia's position should be understood in terms of its own strategic political motivations and its central interest in maintaining order and stability within the region in the face of resistance and civil disorders elsewhere in the archipelago (see Anderson, 1995, pp. 139-144). Indonesia's actions and policies can also be contextualized in relation to the broader "Cold War" world context and strategic international interests. As noted, East Timor straddles strategically important waterways located between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. Following its invasion of East Timor, Indonesia negotiated a deal with the US that permitted US nuclear submarines free access to these waterways.

Broader economic elements also played into Indonesia's political motivations. Between northern Australia and East Timor there is a continental shelf divided by an area known as the Timor Trough which contains vast oil deposits. Prior to Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor, Australia had negotiated with Portugal in an attempt to delimit entitlement, but these negotiations were inconclusive due to conflicting views and disagreement over boundaries and applicable legal principles (Clark, 1995, pp. 74-75). After Indonesia invaded East Timor, Australia

reopened dialogue with Indonesia and The Timor Gap Treaty was ratified on December 11, 1989 (see Gunn, 1994, p. 121). The Treaty laid out terms for joint exploration and development of the Timor Sea oil fields. The title of the Treaty referred to the Timor Gap as “An Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia.” Although Australia had accepted and recognized Indonesian sovereignty de jure, the legality of the Treaty was challenged repeatedly on the grounds that Indonesia was not the legitimate sovereign over East Timor (Clark, 1995, p. 83; Gunn, 1994, p. 121, pp. 161-164).

VIII. Indonesia – The Political-Economic Context

The phrase “investor’s paradise” was first likened to Indonesia by Jacques Decornoy in *Le Monde* (1972), was given wider currency by Chomsky and Herman (1979, p. 205) in volume one of their *Political-Economy of Human Rights*. Under the Suharto regime, human rights within Indonesia were regarded as opposing state interests, civil liberties were subject to structurally imposed restraints, while economic and social policies were organized to accommodate foreign investment and multinational interests. Chomsky and Herman (1979, pp. 211-212) explain:

Licenses to do business, to import, to export, to exploit timber or mineral resources, government contracts, and state bank credit are all set up for sale by the military elite, or else they are reserved for

groups centered in a military office or faction. The military clique dominates by controlling access to markets and credit, serving in a manner closely analogous to ordinary gangsters who control a line of business by force and demand payoffs for entry and 'protection'. In the Indonesian case, the gangsters run an entire country and insist on payment either via 'commissions' or in joint ventures where the generals or their agents get 10-25% of the profits for a nominal investment. Besides selling licenses and other privileges, the generals and their families or clients may form their own sold agency companies, frequently using Chinese (*cukong*) managers. Thus a Suharto-associated company owns the Volkswagen agency, General Suharto owns the Mitsubishi agency and so on down the line. The Suharto interests begin with the cement, flour, mining, rubber, logging, trading, and other activities. Suharto, his wife, brother, two brothers-in-law, and other relatives and clients have shareholdings in a wide variety of foreign companies which regularly receive monopoly rights and subsidized bank credits . . . diversion of tax monies and foreign aid into privileged pockets has also attained spectacular levels under the New Order.

Jardine (1995) observes that Indonesia's open economy and repressive labor conditions transformed it into "a major center for multinational corporate activity." Extensive resource extraction and use of fossil fuels has left a lasting mark on Indonesia's environment, with water and air pollution damaging rainforests, swamps and other ecosystems. Birds, fish and other wildlife populations have suffered as a result of economic liberalization policies initiated by the Suharto regime (Briere and Gage, 1993, p. 29).

In terms of the global economic context, under Suharto Indonesia cultivated cooperative diplomatic and economic relationships with a

range of countries, including the US, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Australia, Malaysia, Germany, Singapore, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Austria, the former Soviet Union and Great Britain. Indonesia's most abundant natural resources include copra, tropical hardwoods, rubber, natural gas, coffee, oil, tropical fruits, natural gas and nickel.

IX. East Timor in Canadian Foreign Policy

Following Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor, Canada could not bring itself to support the ten UN resolutions that expressed "grave concern for the loss of life," called upon "all States to respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence," rejected "the claim that East Timor had been integrated into Indonesia," drew "the attention of the Security Council to the critical situation in East Timor," and called upon the Indonesian government to "withdraw without delay."

On the ten votes taken on the "Question of East Timor" in the UN Security Council and General Assembly from 1975 to 1982, Canada abstained on each occasion until 1980, when it began to oppose the resolutions. Canada did not vote on the two Security Council resolutions, as it was not a member of the Security Council at the time these votes took place. In later years, Canada rationalized its position, saying that

the language of the resolutions had been too “extreme.” Canada’s opposition continued throughout the 1980s and in 1987 Canada’s representative at the UN Human Rights Sub-Committee voted against putting East Timor back on the UN Human Rights Commission Agenda.

A range of secondary literature has demonstrated a multiplicity of Canadian connections to the near-genocide in East Timor. Scharfe’s invaluable analysis, *Complicity: Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy - The Case of East Timor* (Scharfe, 1996), provides a detailed overview of Canadian complicity in the East Timor near-genocide. Elaine Briere’s award-winning 1997 documentary film, *Bitter Paradise: The Sell-Out of East Timor*, assessed the extent to which Canadian economic and political self-interest can be seen to have motivated the complicity of successive Canadian governments in the East Timor near-genocide. Klaehn (2003b) has considered ways in which Canada facilitated and legitimized Indonesia’s occupation vis-à-vis diplomatic actions at the UN, pro-Indonesian foreign policy, direct investment in Indonesia, bilateral aid, and authorization of military export permits, thus in effect “aiding and abetting” the near-genocide. Eglin (1998/99, 2006) has detailed ways in which Canadian universities and academics are implicated.

Given the political-economic context of the Canada-Indonesia relationship, it is clear that Canada’s diplomatic response to the invasion and occupation of East Timor was motivated by political and economic self-interest. Canada’s diplomatic courtship of Indonesia extended

beyond its voting record at the UN. Successive Canadian governments facilitated Canadian investment in and trade with Indonesia (see Briere, 1997), and Canada has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in Overseas Development Assistance (see Eglin, 2006). Traditionally, Canada has sought to facilitate commercial interests with Indonesia, providing diplomatic support while praising the Suharto regime for establishing “order and stability” in the region (see Scharfe, 1996, pp. 137-142; Briere, 1997).

X. The Case of PT INCO in Indonesia

Since first locating in Indonesia in 1968, INCO has invested more than \$1.5 billion (Can) in its nickel-mining operations there. In the initial stages of these operations, the Crown’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC) approved two loans totalling \$57.25 million (see Scharfe, 1996, p. 169, 189). Additional funding was provided by credit agencies in the US, Japan, Norway, Britain and Australia (see Briere and Gage, 1993, p. 37; Swift, 1977, p. 81). Expansion into the Indonesian market allowed INCO to limit its reliance on a far less cost-effective Canadian workforce. Downsizing its Canadian operations resulted in a more favourable wage/benefit ratio. Indonesian mining laws allowed the state to seize large tracts of land belonging to the local peoples, who were forced to sacrifice their land, lifestyle and traditional means of

subsistence. Like the majority of its foreign aid, taxes paid by corporations such as INCO were traditionally diverted to Indonesia's military elite, in addition to invisible money involved in private security and bribes (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979, p. 212).

XI. Canadian Ambassador Glen Shortliffe's 1978 Visit to East Timor

Motivated by a desire to improve public relations, Indonesia granted an international delegation of parliamentarians and news correspondents "supervised access" to occupied East Timor in 1978. Glen Shortliffe, Canada's ambassador to Indonesia, was the first official Canadian governmental representative to visit the territory since the invasion. Ambassador Shortliffe and the Canadian media who accompanied him were able to view the starvation taking place within Indonesian military-controlled strategic hamlets where many East Timorese had been forcibly relocated. Shortliffe received a telegram from External Affairs while still in Jakarta instructing him on how to proceed. The (censored) telegram reads as follows:

We believe you should take opportunity in good company . . . to see first-hand what is happening in that territory and to take the first steps toward . . . accepting reality of East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia [censored] . . . If you are asked about the meaning of your visit you should say that you are taking advantage of an opportunity to see first-hand what is happening in East Timor. You should add that Canada accepts that East Timor had de facto been integrated into Indonesia and that it is highly unlikely

in our view that this will change [censored] . . . Canada has not . . . yet decided what position it will adopt at the UN but that visit will contribute to ongoing assessment of that position (cited in Scharfe, 1996, p. 137).

After completing his visit, Shortliffe wrote an official report for External Affairs recommending that Canada oppose self-determination for East Timor (see Scharfe, 1996, pp. 137-138). In a letter to External Affairs dated December 11, 1978, Shortliffe indicated that Canada's relationship with Indonesia had resulted in a "position where benefits to our bilateral interests . . . [could] be achieved" (Shortliffe, cited in Briere, 1991). In succeeding years, while the Indonesian occupation of East Timor advanced, successive Canadian governments would provide Indonesia with diplomatic support at the UN while praising the Suharto regime for bringing "order and stability" to the archipelago (see External Affairs and International Trade, 1992, p. 12; CIDA, 1993a, 1993b).

Foreign policy is one way that Canada was involved in the near-genocide in East Timor. Another important facet of this involvement is Canadian aid to Indonesia.

XII. Canadian Aid to Indonesia and East Timor

Canadian Overseas Development Assistance to Indonesia nearly doubled after Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 - from \$19.52 million in 1974/75 to \$36.7 million in 1975/76 (CIDA, 1975/76). As Scharfe (1996,

p. 157-158) reports, “Canada’s development relationship with Indonesia spans almost 40 uninterrupted years” and that Canada had “continually been among the top 10 [donors to Indonesia] since its 1975 invasion of East Timor.” Further, the bulk of Canada’s Overseas Development Assistance to Indonesia was bilateral, “that is government-to-government aid” which was “designed as welfare to support Canadian business (or business-like institutions like universities) by requiring the ‘aided’ country to buy the donor’s goods” (Eglin, 1998/99, p. 67; see also Eglin, 2006).

Most of our aid to Indonesia goes to Canadian multinationals, engineering and consulting firms, which help Indonesia create the infrastructure for ‘development’ of the archipelago. This so-called development helps the Indonesian military maintain power and provides markets for Canada – a cozy relationship. The trampled rights of the Indonesian people and the ongoing annihilation of the Timorese are secondary to this relationship – thus our vote at the UN (Briere and Devaney, 1990, p. 35).

CIDA documents on Canadian aid to Indonesia reveal the extent to which CIDA accepted, legitimized and endorsed Indonesia’s position on East Timor. In a 1993 report entitled “CIDA in East Timor” it is stated that East Timor had been “incorporated as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province in 1976.” The report also includes a map which represented East Timor as a province of Indonesia (CIDA, 1993a). Importantly, it corresponded with two other maps, the first of which was included in another CIDA (1993b) document, entitled “CIDA Programs in Asia,” and

the second appeared in a special issue of *The Canadian Journal of Development Studies* (1993), an academic journal. One of the editors of this journal at the time the map was published was Professor Harry Cummings, former director of the University of Guelph's Sulawesi Regional Development Project (see Eglin, 2006, for additional details).

The chronology of major events in East Timor laid out in the document entitled "CIDA in Asia" (1993b) stated that "conflict" (a neutral term) between Indonesia and FRETILIN followed East Timor's "incorporation" and "severely disrupted life in the region for the next half decade." Addressing reports of atrocities and gross human rights violations, the report simply stated that "the international community tolerated these with unease." Canada's foreign policy decisions toward East Timor are not commented upon. Like Canadian foreign policy statements (see Scharfe, 1996; Briere, 1997), Canadian governmental reports and documents relating to developmental aid to Indonesia emphasized the economic importance of Indonesia first and foremost, and served to promote official discourse.

Ripley (1990) argues that Canada's statements have been "at the behest of the corporate sector," sanitized and "smoothed over . . . often virtually lifted off the page of Indonesian propaganda booklets." Canadian-based multinationals profited enormously from the Canada-Indonesia relationship (Briere, 1997), particularly vis-à-vis direct investment and by exploiting Indonesia's natural resources and

abundance of cheap labor – mostly women. CIDA (1992, p. 8) declared that Canadian development aid to Indonesia was geared toward the “environment,” “human resource development” and “women in development.”

Prior to 1995 the government of Canada and the Department of External Affairs and International Trade had highlighted concern for human rights as a central feature of Canada’s foreign policy (Scharfe, 1996, p. 5). External Affairs publicly announced in 1995 that Canadian foreign policy was no longer officially linked to human rights considerations at all.

XIII. Canadian Military Exports to Indonesia

Although Indonesia was able to acquire the majority of its military arsenal from other countries, predominantly the US, successive Canadian governments authorized military export permits allowing Canadian arms manufacturers to export dual-type (civilian and military) goods to Indonesia. Canada’s willingness to authorize export permits stood in opposition to its own Import/Export Act, which prohibited the sale of Canadian-made military goods to “countries engaged in hostilities” and/or to “countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of human rights” (see Scharfe, 1996, pp. 197-204). There is a burden of proof indicating that Indonesia met both these

criteria. Scharfe (1996, p. 201) points out that Foreign Affairs did not trace the use or end user of Canadian military export goods. The goods and component parts were frequently sold indirectly, rerouted through third parties, in turn re-exported to target countries. Similarly, Canada did not regularly screen indirect military exports. Military goods leaving Canada were often classified as civilian, only to be used in the production of military equipment elsewhere, prior to being shipped to the recipient countries (see McLeod, 1991).

External Affairs and International Trade Canada hosted an arms bazaar in 1984 at the Mandarin Hotel in Jakarta - in attendance were members of the Indonesian military and domestic business class, senior Canadian government officials, and ten Canadian arms manufacturers (Briere and Gage, 1993, p. 37). Also in 1984, while on a state visit to Jakarta, then Minister of External Affairs and International Trade, future Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien asked Indonesian President Suharto to explain reports of atrocities and killings in East Timor, saying "I don't intend to criticize you; I just want to know the facts" (ETAN, 1989). In February 1986 External Affairs announced the sale of 100 Pratt and Whitney engines to Indonesia (for use in Bell helicopters). In June 1986, approximately two years after Jean Chretien's visit to Jakarta, the government of Canada accepted an invitation to participate in an Indonesian air show, with several Canadian aerospace firms (ETAN, 1989). Just three months before the Santa Cruz massacre, Canada invited

Indonesia to another military goods junket, the August 1991 international arms bazaar at the Abbotsford Airshow.

A two-page document -- entitled "Backgrounder on Canada and Human Rights in Indonesia" -- was sent to me in 1993, in reply to a letter I wrote to Foreign Affairs asking for an explanation of Canadian policy toward East Timor. Here External Affairs devoted a grand total of four lines -- at the bottom of the second page -- to mention of Canadian military exports to Indonesia. The document stated that Canadian military exports "are restricted to items where there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population."

The spring 1995 East Timor Alert Network Newsletter reported that the Chretien government had authorized a total of \$5,763,000 in military export permits to Indonesia since coming to power in late 1993 (ETAN, 1995). In February 1995 the Department of Foreign Affairs released a document, entitled "Canada's Export Strategy: The International Trade Business Plan 1995/1996 - Defense Products," which identified Indonesia as "a priority country and a growth market for Canadian arms exports" (ibid).

XIV. Conclusion

Given that Canada was involved in the East Timor near-genocide in numerous ways -- by virtue of its pro-Indonesian voting record on East

Timor resolutions at the UN, aid and foreign policy decisions, direct investment, trade relations and military support – the “story” was not quite so remote as Canada’s geographic proximity to East Timor might commonsensically suggest. This chapter has explored the international response to the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. It has provided details on the political-economic context of the Canada-Indonesia relationship and explored the multiplicity of ways in which Canada was connected to the events in East Timor. The chapter has assessed the extent to which Canadian economic and political self-interest can be seen to have motivated the complicity of successive Canadian governments in the East Timor near-genocide perpetrated by the government of Indonesia.

The chapter has also considered ways in which successive Canadian governments facilitated and legitimized Indonesia’s illegal occupation of East Timor vis-à-vis diplomatic actions at the UN, pro-Indonesian foreign policy, direct investment in Indonesia, material support in the form of bilateral aid, indirect arms sales and the authorization of military export permits, thus in effect “aiding and abetting” the near-genocide. The research presented within this chapter has intended to provide a historical framework to contextualize the media analysis presented within the next two chapters of the dissertation, while also encouraging debate concerning the relationship between the political and economic policies of Western nations and the

state of human rights elsewhere in the world. In line with the PM's methodological approach, the chapter has also aimed to establish the political-economic context of the Canada-Indonesia relationship in relation to East Timor.

The next chapter explores how Canada's self-declared "national newspaper" covered the unfolding news story of the invasion and occupation of East Timor.

East Timor Media Coverage, 1975-1980

This chapter begins by providing a summation of the quantity of the news coverage that was accorded the near-genocide in East Timor by the *Globe and Mail* throughout the crucial invasion period, from 1975-1980. Following this, the shape and scope of the East Timor coverage are assessed.

I. Covering the Invasion: The Distribution of the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor Coverage, 1975 -1980

Table One provides a summation of the quantity and distribution of the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor coverage from 1975 to December 31, 1991. Included is a breakdown of the number of articles, editorials and letters to the editor published each year throughout this period.

The data indicate that the *Globe and Mail* East Timor coverage reduced significantly after the December 7, 1975 invasion, then dropped to virtually nil as the atrocities reached their peak in 1978. The quantity and distribution of the news coverage throughout this period both conform to the predictions advanced by the PM.

It was during this period that the international community could have done the most to prevent the atrocities in East Timor.

TABLE ONE
SEARCH OF GLOBE AND MAIL ARTICLES RELATING TO EAST TIMOR
DECEMBER 7, 1975 - DECEMBER 31, 1991

Year	Total Articles	East Timor mentioned in passing	Articles about East Timor	Editorials	Letters to Editor re: East Timor
1975	36				
Feb.	1		1		
Aug-Sept	22	1	21		
Oct-Dec.6	6	1	5		
Dec.7-31	7		7		
1976	6	1	7		
1977	1		1		
1978	1		1		
1979	3		3		
1980	5	1	3		1
1981	5	3	3		
1982	9	5	3		1
1983	10	5	5		
1984	18	7	1		10
1985	7	3	2		2
1986	4	3	1		
1987	13	3	1	1	8
1988	9	4	2		3
1989	19	2	8		9
1990	12	4	3		5
1991	28	12	12		4

Source: (Scharfe, 1996, p. 117).

The media silence on East Timor during the invasion period served to conceal the invasion and also kept Canada's diplomatic and material contributions from entering the realm of public discussion.

Chomsky notes that the *New York Times* coverage of East Timor had also significantly dropped following the invasion and ultimately "reduced to zero as the atrocities reached their peak" (Chomsky, 1989, p. 81; also see Chomsky, 1989, pp. 155-158).

The importance of this suppression cannot be too strongly stressed. Because of it, too few knew what was happening, or paid sufficient attention to the little that did seep through. As should be obvious, this is a criticism of great severity (Chomsky, 1989, p. 156).

The shape and scope of the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor coverage will now be assessed on an article by article basis.

II. Analysis of Article #1 - December 8, 1975

The *Globe and Mail* carried its first report on Indonesia's invasion of East Timor from the Associated Press and *New York Times* on December 8, 1975. By-lined from Jakarta, the article is headlined "Indonesian troops invade East Timor" and it is accompanied by a very small map that represents Timor, Australia and the Philippines. The article's lead, structured around official Indonesian sources, conveys the impression that Indonesia did not invade East Timor so much as intervene in internal conflict: "Sea-borne Indonesian troops landed

yesterday in the capital of Portuguese Timor, reinforcing partisans who captured the city from rival guerrillas, Indonesian officials say.”

The paragraphs immediately following this are framed to converge on statements advanced by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and do not feature content that offers a variety of perspectives or prominently highlight the victims of the Indonesian invasion.

Statements attributed to Foreign Minister Malik at the outset of the article articulate the official Indonesian position. Paragraphs two through four of the article read as follows:

Foreign Minister Adam Malik said the pro-Indonesian Apodeti Party had declared the colony part of Indonesia and sent a cable asking that Indonesian troops be sent to the capital of Dili to prevent more bloodshed.

Mr. Malik said the rival Revolutionary Front for Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) offered no resistance and that about 300 FRETILIN soldiers had surrendered to Apodeti troops.

He denied FRETILIN radio reports, monitored in Australia, that Indonesian warships had shelled the town and that Indonesian troops had landed by parachute, but he did not rule out the possibility that Apodeti troops had been dropped by planes.

The Indonesian invasion is cast here as an internal conflict. Various sources confirm that the civil war in East Timor had ended the month before, in November 1975 (see Sharfe, 1996, p. 45; Selby, 1987, p. 42; Jardine, 1997, pp. 15-21; Chomsky and Herman, 1979, p. 134).

Three paragraphs of the article (ten through twelve) are devoted to the diplomatic context of the invasion. The third (paragraph twelve) can be seen to be critical of Indonesia and to condemn its invasion of East Timor. Paragraphs ten through twelve read as follows:

Portugal last night broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia, accusing Jakarta of military aggression in Timor and calling on the United Nations Security Council to end the invasion of its last colony. Portuguese troops on the island retreated to warships anchored in Dili.

In Sydney, Australian dock-workers banned the loading of all cargo for Indonesia to protest against the intervention in Portuguese Timor.

The Peking Government condemned the attack on Dili as a 'flagrant' invasion.

The single line paragraph twelve (cited directly above) is obviously firmly critical, because it conveys that the Peking government had condemned Indonesia's aggression and also because the aggression is referred to here as a "flagrant' invasion." This is the only line within the article that reads as a condemnation of the Indonesian invasion. Immediately following this, the article once again returns to Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik, who is summarized (as opposed to quoted directly) in such a way that he appears to be replying to the Peking government's explicit condemnation.

That the article is structured to downplay the seriousness of the invasion is clearly evident. Paragraph thirteen of the article reads as follows: "Mr. Malik said Indonesian troops will remain in Dili only a short time, until the people of the colony can carry out 'an act of free choice' to decide whether they want

independence, union with Indonesia or continued association with Portugal. He said a meeting of all sides - including FRETILIN if it wishes - will be held to plan the method of choosing.”

A more or less coherent picture of the major events is thus established. The article is structured to converge upon official discourse. Indonesia’s invasion, according to the interpretative framework established, was not to be recognized as an act of aggression. A bare minimum of information is presented within the article that challenges the official discourse.

Perhaps the most significant line within the entire article is the second last paragraph, which is presented as neutral and not deriving from any one particular source. This line reads as follow: “The invasion and capture of the capital by Indonesia seems to mark at least the beginning of the end of the Portuguese colony that will be integrated with Indonesia.” The significance of this line within *this* article cannot be overstated. In effect, it predicts the eventual annexation of East Timor. The line appears as a self-contained paragraph and is not identified with any source(s). Since this article was by-lined to the Associated Press and the *New York Times*, as opposed to a particular correspondent or writer, the author is unknown.

Earlier in the article Indonesian Foreign Minister had been cited as stating that “an act of free choice” would be undertaken to determine East Timor’s future. Here, however, the writer of the article is effectively predicting the future, forecasting Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. That such a

declaration was made by the Associated Press, *New York Times* and *Globe and Mail*, and was published a mere one day after the invasion is arresting in terms of the range of inferences and conclusions which may now be reasonably drawn.

The article conforms to the PM on all fronts, in relation to “boundaries of debate,” placement, representation of worthy/unworthy victims, sources, context and fullness of treatment.

III. Analysis of Article #2 - December 9, 1975

On December 9, 1975, the *Globe and Mail* carried a Reuters report by-lined out of Jakarta, headlined: “Reports conflict on Timor.” The article is comprised of eleven paragraphs, most of which are one sentence in total length.

The article’s lead provides details on the conflicting “reports” - made directly relevant by the article’s headline - and the article’s second paragraph is entirely devoted to Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik’s account of what was happening in the territory. The article’s lead and first full paragraph read as follows:

The Indonesian Government yesterday reported calm in Dili, the capital of East Timor, while opposing forces said at least 500 people, most of them women and children, had been killed.

In Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said pro-Indonesian parties had set up a provisional administration after fighting on Sunday and the city was under control.

The official version of events is given priority within the article. Indonesia's invasion is characterized as "fighting" - the preferred meaning encoded into the text is that hostilities have ended and East Timor is now "under control."

Although no direct quotations are included, the article's next four paragraphs cite Jose Ramos Horta, leader of the FRETILIN party. The article conveys Ramos Horta's position on the immediate aftermath of the invasion.

Ramos Horta would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (with Bishop Belo) in 1996 for his unwavering efforts to secure independence for East Timor. The article's author states that "FRETILIN would welcome UN help but opposed any military intervention by the international body. The independence movement needed neither food nor arms from abroad, but hoped for diplomatic help."

This statement represents a significant feature of the data. It is difficult to fathom why, one day after the invasion, FRETILIN would be issuing a statement indicating that it opposed military intervention.

It is also difficult to believe that FRETILIN would have said only that it would "welcome UN help" - how this is conveyed by the article suggests no real sense of urgency or desperation. Contrast this with a FRETILIN radio broadcast that had been picked up by reporters in Darwin, Australia, only two days earlier, on the day of the invasion. Here FRETILIN had been desperately

pleading for help from the international community. The radio broadcast (cited in Selby, 1987, p. 42 and Budiardjo, 1991, p. 200) was as follows: “The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately! Women and children are being shot in the streets! We are all going to be killed! This is an appeal for international help! Please do something to stop the invasion!”

How FRETILIN’s position is represented within the article clearly differs (radically) from the urgency conveyed by this radio report.

The article’s fourth paragraph of the December 8 article was devoted to Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik’s denying this same radio report. It is not mentioned here, within the December 9 article, and the FRETILIN position appears here to be significantly revised.

The December 9 article mentions “radio reports” but the reference is vague, and the radio report from the day of the invasion (cited above) isn’t directly quoted within the article. If the radio broadcast had been quoted directly, it may have had a powerful emotional impact upon readers, especially the last two sentences, which plead for international assistance.

The article concludes with a direct quote from Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik, which reads as follow: “We cannot reject it if we are asked to help restore peace in East Timor. Moreover, we know well that the situation there is endangering our security.” This line is significant because it once again advances the official chronology: that Indonesia had intervened in the civil war in East Timor at the request of the East Timorese themselves, rather than

invaded. The article ends with this quote, with no further qualification added by the author.

The article's author might have noted that at the time of the invasion the civil war in East Timor had already ended. Following from this, it would have been impossible for Indonesia to "intervene" in the civil war, as Foreign Minister Malik claimed to be the case. The omission of this glaring contradiction is significant.

IV. Analysis of Article #3 - December 10, 1975

On December 10, 1975, the *Globe and Mail* carried an article from Reuters and the *New York Times*, by-lined out of Jakarta and headlined: "Timor radio says more centres taken by pro-Indonesian forces." The headline, conforming to the PM, indicates that "pro-Indonesian forces" as opposed to "Indonesian forces" were in East Timor. Like the articles devoted to East Timor of December 8 and 9, this article was very short in terms of overall length (twelve paragraphs) and, as predicted by the PM, is accompanied by no photos which may have organised reader attention or elicited emotional response.

The article's lead is consistent with its headline in not drawing attention to the fact that Indonesia had invaded East Timor three days earlier. Significantly, here the invasion is not even mentioned. Instead, the unfolding news story becomes again one in which the central actors are pro-Indonesian forces comprised of East Timorese citizens. The article conveys the impression

that life “in Dili had returned to normal” and once again Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik is cited, as are unnamed Indonesian “diplomatic sources.”

The lead cites a “Radio Dili report” and the first full paragraph reports that the radio station itself had been “captured” by pro-Indonesian forces. It is an interesting feature of the data that the radio report is identified as the most crucial information available – communicated within both the headline and lead. The second half of the article cites official Indonesian sources and while acknowledging that FRETILIN sources exist, the article explicitly conveys the impression that they are unavailable. In order to illustrate how these elements are conveyed within the article, and to provide the reader with a sense of precisely how brief the article is in terms of its overall length, the entire text is reproduced here:

Pro-Indonesian forces have captured several towns west of the East Timor capital of Dili in ‘mopping up’ operations, according to a Radio Dili broadcast yesterday.

The radio itself was captured on Sunday by pro-Indonesian forces – of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and Apodeti, Ota and Trabalista parties – which with the backing of Indonesian units took over the capital during the weekend and forced the left-wing FRETILIN forces to flee to the surrounding hills.

Yesterday’s broadcast said many of the citizens of Dili who fled to the jungle during the fighting had returned to the capital and hoisted the red and white national flag of neighbouring Indonesia.

It added that life in Dili had returned to normal.

Among the towns said to have been captured was the coastal city of Maubara 22 miles west of the capital.

Radio Dili quoted a leader of the joint forces, Guilberme Concalves, as appealing to supporters of FRETILIN - which 10 days ago declared East Timor a republic independent of Portugal - to surrender.

Meanwhile Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said more volunteers were needed for the mopping up operations.

He told a youth delegation that peace and order in East Timor should be restored immediately.

Diplomatic sources in Jakarta said it was difficult to assess the size of the remaining FRETILIN forces, although they were known to be well-armed with Portuguese weapons.

Other leaders of FRETILIN - the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor - were last reported in Australia on their way to New York to seek support for their cause at the United Nations.

In Lisbon, Portuguese Foreign Minister Ernesto Melo Antunes said Lisbon was still responsible for the sovereignty of East Timor and condemned Indonesia for armed aggression.

The Portuguese have evacuated Atauro island, 20 miles off East Timor, where they had set up administrative headquarters after the outbreak of civil war on the main island last August. However a Portuguese vessel with a contingent of troops remains anchored off Atauro as 'a symbol of Portuguese sovereignty,' the minister said.

Significantly, apart from one line noting that the Portuguese Foreign Minister had condemned the Indonesian action as armed aggression, no content presented within the article indicates that Indonesian forces had invaded East Timor, that countless civilians had died as a result of the initial aggression, or that the killing was continuing, still underway, at the time this article was published. Instead, the article conveys the impression that life in East Timor has returned to normal, that more civilian volunteers are needed to "mop up,"

and that civilians in East Timor's capital city of Dili were raising Indonesian flags.

V. Analysis of Article #4 - December 15, 1975

On December 15, the *Globe and Mail* published a report by-lined from Jakarta, headlined "Portuguese enclave will join Indonesia." The article consisted of six brief paragraphs, eight sentences in total length.

The article itself converges tightly upon official sources. This is clearly illustrated by its lead and first paragraph. The second paragraph of the article reports that "the Indonesia government declared that the United Nations should pay more attention to the call for independence in Portuguese Timor rather than making accusations of Indonesian military intervention." It is striking that no elaboration is provided on this sentence/paragraph since the *Globe and Mail* coverage up to this point had given no indication whatsoever that the UN had made any statement on East Timor. Here only the Indonesian statement is given, which indicates that Indonesia disagrees with the (unreported) UN position.

The article makes specific reference to East Timor only in its last paragraph, which reads as follows: "Indonesian troops landed in Dili last week to help pro-Indonesian parties drive back the leftist forces of FRETILIN - the Revolutionary Front for Independent of East Timor. The leftists and pro-

Indonesians have been fighting since last April for control of the Portuguese colony.” In relation to the PM, this paragraph is significant for several reasons.

The paragraph reports the official Indonesian position and presents this as fact. No details or analysis which would have called the Indonesian position into question are included. FRETILIN - referred to as “guerrillas” within the headline of the December 8 article - are referred to as “leftists” here. The paragraph recasts the Indonesian invasion in a thoroughly neutral manner, stating that “Indonesian troops landed in Dili.” And this paragraph also rewrites history, and in doing so endorses official revisionism, reporting (again) as fact that the civil war in East Timor was still underway at the time of the Indonesian invasion, which it was not. Indonesia, the invader, is cast as liberator - entering East Timor, the article suggests, “to help” - and the article’s headline again suggests that annexation is a foregone conclusion. The article conforms to the PM’s substantive predictions regarding the “boundaries of debate,” worthy/unworthy victims, sources, context and fullness of treatment.

In 1977, former Australian diplomat James Dunn met and spoke with a number of East Timorese refugees who had survived the invasion and fled to Lisbon. The extracts below are taken from Dunn’s book, *Timor, A People Betrayed*, and tell of the calculated and horrific nature of the initial Indonesian assault:

The attack on the Timorese capital, much of which was uncontested, turned out to be one of the most brutal operations of its kind in modern state warfare. Hundreds of Timorese and Chinese were gunned down at random in the

streets of Dili. In one such incident, a large number of APODETI supporters who had just been released from internment by FRETILIN went out to greet their liberators, to be gunned down on the streets for their trouble. A number of executions were carried out by Indonesian troops, with some of the condemned being selected at random and others with the help of their collaborators. One of the most bizarre and gruesome of these atrocities occurred within 24 hours of the invasion and involved the killing of 150 people.

This shocking spectacle began with the execution of more than 20 women who, from various accounts, were selected at random. Some had young children who wept in distress as the soldiers tore them from the arms of their terrified mothers. The women were led to the edge of the jetty and shot one at a time, with the crowd of onlookers being forced at gunpoint to count aloud as each execution took place . . .

There were killings of Timorese and Chinese in the streets and in houses. Apparently faced with the orgy of indiscriminate killing, many of the residents of the capital retreated into their homes but this too offered little protection. Indonesian soldiers broke into the houses, especially those displaying FRETILIN and even UDT flags or symbols, and in some cases shot whole families. In the suburbs near the airport, soldiers resorted to hurling grenades through the doors or windows of houses crowded with frightened people, causing heavy loss of life (Dunn, 1983, pp. 283-284).

VI. Analysis of Article #5 - December 23, 1975

On December 23, 1975, the *Globe and Mail* at last published a report indicating the UN position on East Timor. The article is carried from Reuters and by-lined from the UN. The headline reads "Remove Timor troops, UN asks Indonesians" and above the main headline is a smaller headline reading "Assessment sought."

That the invading Indonesian military is characterized as “Timor troops” is crucially important and can be seen as an endorsement of the official Indonesian discourse. As will be noted within the next chapter, the *Globe and Mail* would still be referring to the Indonesian occupying forces as “Timor troops” sixteen years later - in an article published in 1991. It is striking that the practice began here, within weeks of the invasion.

Like all of the East Timor coverage published to date, this article is extremely brief in terms of overall length, which conforms to the predictions of the PM, and is comprised of eight paragraphs, nine sentences in total. The article’s lead reads as follows: “The UN Security Council voted unanimously yesterday to call on the Indonesian Government to withdraw ‘without delay’ from Portuguese Timor.”

The first full paragraph provides additional details, by way of elaboration: “The 15-nation council also requested Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to send a special representative to the territory to make an on-the-spot assessment and establish contact with all the parties and states concerned to ensure implementation of the resolution.”

No further details are provided. No information is presented regarding what proscriptions of the UN Charter were violated by Indonesia. No quotes from governments condemning the invasion are presented within the article. No historical context is present. No details, information or analysis regarding Canada’s position on the invasion is presented. Canada had abstained from

voting on Resolution 384, which had called upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor “without delay” and called upon “all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination” (Krieger, 1997, p. xxiii).

It is striking, given that the article is reporting on UN action in reply to an invasion of territory, that the words “invaded” and “invasion” are not used once anywhere within the article. The absence of these words is even more significant given that the article’s final two paragraphs are entirely devoted to the official Indonesian position. These paragraphs – comprising a total of four lines – read as follows: “In Jakarta, a spokesman for the Indonesian Foreign Office denied any direct military intervention. ‘Like we have been saying all along, those people in Portuguese Timor are volunteers and we have no control over them,’ Nana Satresma said. ‘Who do they want us to withdraw? We have repeatedly said we have no troops in the area.’” The preferred reading encoded within these paragraphs is that not only hadn’t Indonesia invaded East Timor, it also had no troops in East Timor, because according to the source cited, its military had no direct involvement.

That this was reported as such, presented as fact without further comment, warrants no elaboration. What bears noting is that even here, in the first article devoted to the UN position, official sources are front and center in defining how the invasion and occupation of East Timor are to be understood. This article is reporting on a UN Resolution that called for an immediate Indonesian military withdraw from East Timor, yet it suggests that an invasion

never actually took place. Official sources are prominently highlighted and no opposing information or voices are present.

The *Globe and Mail* carried an extremely brief (five paragraphs in total length) report from Reuters on December 30 that gave information on the selection of the UN Secretary General's representative chosen to visit East Timor. By-lined from the UN and headlined "Italian picked for UN mission in East Timor," the article featured no information about East Timor. No additional coverage would be given to the unfolding events in East Timor for over two weeks.

VII. Analysis of Article #6 – January 16, 1976

As noted, the majority of articles within the catalogue of *Globe and Mail* East Timor news coverage are brief in terms of overall length. An article reporting on a UN special envoy visit to East Timor and published in the *Globe and Mail* on January 16, 1976, is illustrative. Carried from the Associated Press and by-lined from Jakarta, the article is four sentences in total length and reads as follows: "UN special envoy Vittorio Guiciardi arrived yesterday to begin a study of the East Timor situation. UN resolutions call for an immediate withdraw of Indonesian troops from the former Portuguese colony. Indonesia says it only has volunteers in Timor. Mr. Guiciardi said he conferred in New York with Ramos Horta, a leader of the anti-Indonesian leftist Revolutionary Front for Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN)."

The “investigatory zeal in the search for . . . villainy and the responsibility of high officials” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 35) that might characterize coverage of “worthy victims” is clearly not present here. There would not be another article on East Timor published for another four and a half months.

VIII. Analysis of Article #7 – June 1, 1976

Of the six articles published in the *Globe and Mail* throughout 1976, four originated from Jakarta, with headings such as “East Timor Becomes part of Indonesia” (June 1, 1976) and “East Timor Merger Approved” (June 30, 1976). Both of these articles report on the government of Indonesia’s staged and illegal annexation of East Timor.

The first article is three lines in total length and its headline reads: “East Timor becomes part of Indonesia.” The headline presents the annexation of East Timor in a closed fashion and communicates one preferred interpretation, which converges upon official Indonesian accounts.

The article states that Indonesian troops “landed on” East Timor – the word “invaded” is not used. The rich history of independence amongst the peoples of East Timor is written out in favor of the official Indonesian position.

There is no mention within the article of the UN’s position on East Timor. That the UN had called for an immediate withdrawal of all Indonesian troops is not reported. Instead, the article reports the diplomatic context, not attributed to any source, in flat, matter-of-fact fashion: “The action came six months after

Indonesian troops landed on the eastern half of the island Dec. 7, overcoming the forces of the leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, known as FRETILIN.”

The article’s characterization of the Indonesian invasion as simply “Indonesian troops landed on the eastern half of the island” is significant for its level of omission and detachment. The brief detail accorded the invasion and annexation of East Timor is characterized by its avoidance of vivid and/or specific details and personal testimonies. In terms of critical reporting, the article fails to mention that the “People’s Popular Assembly” was a puppet government that had been established after Indonesia invaded (see Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, p. 96; Briere and Devaney, 1990; Briere, 1997).

That the annexation of East Timor had been predicted by the *Globe and Mail* six months earlier - on the day after the Indonesian invasion - is another significant feature of the data.

IX. Analysis of Article #8 - June 30, 1976

The second *Globe and Mail* article reporting on Indonesia’s (staged) annexation was accompanied by the headline “East Timor merger approved” (Reuters, June 30, 1976). The article consists of seven paragraphs and is by-lined out of Jakarta. It identifies no sources, but it is clear that its headline and first three paragraphs are principally informed by official Indonesian accounts, which the article converges upon and endorses. Its lead reports: “The Indonesian

government formally approved the integration of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor into Indonesia.” Immediately following this, “A Cabinet meeting accepted a position from the hastily convened Popular Assembly in East Timor asking Indonesia to take control of the disputed island territory north of Australia.”

This account of the annexation, characterized as “a foregone conclusion,” is structured around official accounts and encoded to produce one preferred meaning. Like the article published on June 1st, the text is closed off to a range of possible readings. These articles are conduits for official discourse, representing central events/actions in a neutral manner as fact to be taken for granted. They are structured to exclude alternative representations and to converge on official discourse.

The government of Indonesia reportedly controlled less than twenty percent of East Timor at the time the annexation took place. Neither article acknowledges that the “People’s Popular Assembly” was created by the Indonesian government. Omissions, distortions and misinformation are clearly evident and the interpretive frameworks established by these articles indicate a pervasive propaganda effort.

In late August 1976, Allen J. MacEachen, then Secretary of State for External Affairs and International Trade Canada, gave a speech in Jakarta and spoke at length about Indonesia’s natural resources, large population and strategic importance. MacEachen (1976a) stressed these placed Indonesia “in a

key position to play a role in international affairs” and highlighted a “reorientation of Canada’s foreign policy,” saying that Canada had been “impressed by Indonesia’s pragmatic leadership . . . which has resulted in steady economic progress.”

Such an endorsement is noteworthy because Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor had only taken place ten months before this speech was made. The fact that MacEachen was in Jakarta a mere ten months after the invasion, promoting Canada and its relationship with Indonesia, despite the invasion and then-ongoing military occupation, nicely illustrates Canada’s foreign policy position on East Timor.

The next week MacEachen delivered a speech to the Australian National Press Club and spoke about the “healthy and trouble-free relations” shared between Canada and Australia. Both countries, he declared, deserved praise for having taken action to “preserve and continue traditions that are dedicated to freedom and human dignity.” Discussing the Asia-Pacific region, MacEachen said that “even old and trusted partners [Canada and Australia] should be alert to new opportunities” (MacEachen, 1976b). The content of these two speeches clearly indicates that Canada had political-economic interests in Indonesia. Canada’s voting record on East Timor resolutions at the UN can be seen to be reflective of these interests. As noted, Canadian Overseas Development Assistance to Indonesia nearly doubled after Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 - from \$19.52 million in 1974/75 to \$36.7 million in 1975/76 (CIDA, 1975/76).

The *Globe and Mail* would not publish another article on East Timor for over two months.

X. Analysis of Article #9 – September 11, 1976

On September 11, 1976, the *Globe and Mail* published a report by David Jenkins, headlined “Wooing Timor,” carried from the *Far East Economic Review*. The report is noteworthy for the detached way in which it discusses the central events on which it reports, which relate to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. The article conforms to the predictions of the PM in every possible way – it presents Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor as an objective fact, features no mention of the atrocities undertaken in the territory, and treats the “new reality” as innocuous.

Six weeks after its formal takeover of East Timor, Jakarta is taking steps to bring the territory into line with the other 26 Indonesian provinces. The people will be permitted to retain their culture and traditions, but the administration and system of government is undergoing a thorough overhaul.

Critics charge that this is proof that the former Portuguese territory has fallen prey to Javanese imperialists and that Indonesia is digesting East Timor as rapidly as possible. This distresses Indonesians, who say that Timor Timur (East Timor) or Tim-Tim as they prefer to call it, chose to be part of Indonesia and that it would be dishonorable to ignore the needs of the country’s most underdeveloped province. Jakarta’s intentions have been outlined in the past six weeks in a series of announcements by Government departments.

This article suggests that life in “Tim-Tim” was calm, orderly and proceeding along under the auspices of annexation. As Briere (1997) notes, Canadian investment in and economic ties with Indonesia throughout this time period was significant.

The *Globe and Mail* coverage of East Timor dropped to virtually nil for the next two-and-a-half years (from March, 1977 through to September 1979), a particularly striking feature of the data that strongly confirms the PM. Only one article on East Timor appeared in the *Globe and Mail* during each of the 1977 and 1978 calendar years.

XI. Analysis of Article #10 – March 1, 1977

The quantity and distribution of the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor news coverage throughout this time period conforms to the predictions advanced by the PM. In 1977, the only article on East Timor published in the *Globe and Mail* consisted of two sentences, five short lines of column space within the newspaper, and this article is headlined “Australians charge over 100,000 killings” (March 1, 1977). By-lined out of Canberra, the article reads as follows: “Six Labor Party Members of the Australian Parliament charged yesterday that the Indonesian armed forces have killed up to 100,000 people in East Timor. Indonesia annexed the eastern half of Timor island, which is in the Indonesian archipelago, last July after a civil war.” That the charges advanced by the Australian diplomats did not warrant additional news coverage conforms to the

PM's predictions regarding boundaries of debate and worthy/unworthy victims. That the second sentence of the article makes no mention of an invasion and clear violation of the UN Charter ever having transpired also conforms to the PM's predictions. These two lines represent the extent of the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor coverage throughout the timeframe when the Indonesian occupation was advancing, and when the atrocities were reaching their peak. The *Globe and Mail's* coverage of East Timor throughout the entire year consisted of two sentences. It was this same year that Indonesia commenced its "encirclement and annihilation" campaign, and the atrocities in East Timor would reach their peak.

XII. Analysis of Article #11 - October 9, 1978

The single article on East Timor that was published by the *Globe and Mail* in 1978 (October 9, A4) was written by Mick Lowe and is a factually correct historical piece that details the events leading up to the 1975 invasion. The article's headline - "60,000 have died in unseen war, Indonesia fears communism on eastern flank" - is significant, however, precisely because it accepts, endorses and promotes the official Indonesian chronology and history of events. The headline establishes context within which Indonesia's illegal invasion is represented as *intervention* and *war* as opposed to invasion and aggression. The task of writing newspaper headlines is an editorial responsibility.

Rather than reproducing the official (dominant) discourse reflected within the headline, the body of the article features critical content. By-lined out of Lisbon, the article highlights two crucial points that call official representations into question: crucially, it stresses that there was no evidence proving that FRETILIN was pro-communist, as Indonesia had always claimed, and it reports that the civil war in East Timor had ended by September 1975. Lowe notes that FRETILIN had successfully secured control over East Timor after winning the civil war. He states that “Most described the country as peaceful, and spoke highly of the new government’s efficiency in distributing foodstuffs in a time of shortage.” Immediately after this, Lowe writes of the Indonesian invasion: “On November 28, 1975, FRETILIN declared East Timor’s independence, a state that was to prove short-lived. On the morning of December 7, 1975, thousands of Indonesian paratroopers and marines, backed by elements of Indonesian Navy and Air Forces, invaded the country.” This clearly deviates from the official chronology.

The presence of critical discourse – and, in this case, of factually correct reporting – does not prove a case against the PM. Indeed, from the outset the PM clearly stated that media are not entirely closed and argued that the appearance of openness and neutrality are of fundamental importance. Hence, the model predicts that patterns of media behaviour will be aligned with the interests of power, but this does not suggest that media are monolithic or that critical news reports will not be published as a matter of course. The focus for the PM is the extent to which media serve a propaganda function.

As noted, the *Globe and Mail* published only this one article on East Timor throughout the entire year of 1978. The absolute low volume of coverage during this time period is important because there is general consensus that 1978 was the most brutal year of Indonesia's invasion and occupation. It was during this same year that Canadian ambassador to Indonesia Glen Shortliffe visited East Timor and saw the conditions there first-hand. Although Canadian journalists had accompanied him, no coverage was published in the *Globe and Mail*. The absence of coverage and editorial comment during this and the previous year conforms to the PM in absolute terms.

Indonesia's "encirclement and annihilation" campaign was ongoing throughout 1978. Forced relocation, resulting in induced starvation and disease, was also ongoing (see Taylor, 1990, pp. 17-20; Taylor, 1991, p. 89; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 411). Indonesia's occupation also entailed non-consensual forced sterilization programs (Scharfe, 1996, p. 52) and psychological terror oriented toward pacification of the East Timorese (Gunn, 1994, p. 232). The *Globe and Mail* would not publish another article on East Timor for almost an entire year.

XIII. Analysis of Article #12 – September 4, 1979

On September 4, 1979, the *Globe and Mail* published a special report by Jill Jolliffe by-lined out of Lisbon, headlined "East Timor guerillas defy starvation

and Jakarta's bombs" (A12). The reference to "guerillas" in the headline is as the PM would predict, but significant critical content is present within the article itself. The first paragraph after the article's lead reads as follows: "East Timor was invaded by Indonesia in December, 1975, after the Portuguese colonial administration withdrew during a civil war. The island territory has been blockaded by Indonesia ever since, and human rights organizations have accused the Jakarta Government of mass slaughter of the population. The United Nations has condemned the invasion and called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops."

The critical content presented here contrasts with the articles covering the initial invasion, published in 1975 on December 8, 9 and 10. The inclusion of criticism from human rights organizations was not present within the articles published in 1976 on June 1 and 30 or September 11. This article is one of three articles in total that the *Globe and Mail* published throughout the entire calendar year of 1979.

Jolliffe proceeds to tell the story of a Portuguese priest who is said to have "described the widespread death by starvation in the mountainous interior" of East Timor. Significantly, Jolliffe incorporates the priest's views on FRETILIN, which contradict and call into question the official Indonesian version of events. Paragraphs ten and eleven of the article read as follows: "A shy, slightly-built man, Father De Rego is anti-Communist. Some youths from Dili might have been influenced by communism, he says, but the main leaders of FRETILIN were never Communist, let alone their followers. During his three

years in the mountains, he said mass regularly behind FRETILIN lines. To talk of recognizing Indonesian rule in East Timor is quite unjust, he says. Indonesia invaded East Timor, and the country is under military occupation exactly as some European countries were occupied by Nazi Germany, and as East Timor was occupied by Japan during the Second World War.”

It bears noting in translation that this is the first time that such historical comparison has been made within the *Globe and Mail* coverage. As noted, most of the articles on East Timor were written and structured in ways that suggested that an invasion had never actually occurred.

XIV. Analysis of Article #13 – October 30, 1979

The *Globe and Mail* published a short article (nine paragraphs in total length) reporting on relief efforts in East Timor on October 30, 1979. The by-line of the (Reuters) article combines the East Timorese place-name with Indonesia as a country (*Dili, Indonesia*), thereby endorsing Indonesia’s annexation of the territory. The article’s content converges upon the official Indonesian statements, and evident omissions are noteworthy. The article attributes the induced starvation and disease within the occupied territory to the civil war in East Timor – as opposed to the invasion and subsequent actions of the Indonesian military – thereby endorsing misinformation promoted by the official Indonesian chronology of events. The article’s headline, encoded to legitimize the official discourse, reads: “Timorese face starvation as aftermath

of war.” The lead, further solidifying the preferred chronology, reads as follows: “The famine is attributed largely to the 1975-1976 civil war, when agricultural production was badly disrupted as tens of thousands of East Timorese fled to the mountains.”

The article cites only two sources throughout. The first is Indonesia’s Catholic Relief Service chief. The second source, not identified directly, is mentioned in the article’s second last paragraph, which reads as follows: “Resident neutral observers say there is absolutely nothing to support claims published that half the population was exterminated as a deliberate act of genocide by the Indonesian army.”

Who these “resident neutral observers” actually were is never revealed – they are not identified within the article, nor is it stated whether they might be Indonesian military officials residing in the occupied territory. It seems unlikely the reporter was drawing upon testimony provided by starving East Timorese who were at this point in time languishing in Indonesian-run strategic hamlets situated in the humid lowland regions of East Timor as a result of forced relocation.

XV. Analysis of Article #14 – January 30, 1980

Three months later, on January 30, 1980, the *Globe and Mail* carried another story from the *New York Times* Service reporting on the famine situation in East Timor. The article, written by Henry Kamm, reported that the situation in East

Timor had improved. Located on A3, the article is 19 paragraphs, and, in terms of its length, is more substantial than the vast majority of the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor coverage. Its by-line again combines the East Timorese place-name with Indonesia as a country. Its headline - "War, famine move away from ravaged East Timor" - is noteworthy because it does nothing to suggest that East Timor had been illegally invaded and occupied by Indonesia, thus stripping all meaningful significance (and context) away from the issue of "famine" (induced starvation). The inclusion of the word "war" again repeats and endorses the official chronology. Not accompanied by any photographs that might humanize the victims of Indonesia's invasion and occupation, the article is structured entirely around official sources. Core assumptions are not debated or scrutinized. The thematic content of the lead is consistent with the headline: "Slowly and painfully, the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, annexed by Indonesia in 1976, is heading from war and famine toward a state of marginal survival that was its lot through four centuries of colonial rule." A long and rich history of self-reliance amongst the East Timorese is - here again - written out of history and official discourse is repeated.

Consistent with the interpretive framework established by the article's lead, its second paragraph, as if copied from an officially sanctioned document, dutifully attributes the strife in East Timor to the civil war. The US is mentioned for its humanitarian efforts in East Timor - omitted from this discussion is the fact that, as noted, the US was Indonesia's central supplier of weapons used throughout the invasion. The one-line paragraph reads as

follows: “The resettlement areas, in which 300,000 Timorese displaced by persistent civil war and struggle against invaders are gathered, are crowded with malnourished and sick people surviving on relief supplies provided mainly by the United States.” Here “civil war” and “resettlement” are muddled with “struggle against invaders” with no further clarification or comment.

Elements of the next three paragraphs are blatantly propagandistic. Kamm writes that he “saw no sign of the widespread starvation that was prevalent until food and medical relief began arriving last September.” He then states that, “victims of marasmus, the murderous disease in which the body begins to consume itself for lack of other proteins, are no longer apparent.”

As the PM predicts, the peoples of East Timor are not humanized by this account. Graphic detail or descriptions of suffering that might prompt emotional connection or sympathetic reaction are not included. Induced starvation and disease, the article suggests, were no longer endemic.

Prior to Indonesia’s invasion the Timorese had been self-reliant and lived in villages. Selby (1987, p. 43) describes the strategic hamlets that the Timorese were forced to move to in highly negative terms, adding that a history of “self-reliance was shattered” as a result of forced relocation. Glaringly absent from Kamm’s overview is that the starvation and disease were *induced* and that these problems continued to persist at the time this article was published. That which is present within Kamm’s article also strongly confirms the PM. The

totality of human suffering is not characterized in terms of invasion, occupation and years of bombing and destruction.

In the second last line of the article Kamm states that he had waited two and a half years to enter the occupied territory. Quoting directly, he states that he “was allowed only limited freedom to travel to the interior” and was accompanied at all times by Major Benny Mandalika of the Indonesian military. Kamm reports that an Indonesian military official was present during all the interviews he undertook. The last paragraph of the article consists of a quote from Indonesian Major Mandalika: “I must stay with you so you get the right information. My boss told me to go with you wherever you go. If you interview the man on the street, you might get the wrong information.”

This statement was not questioned, qualified, criticized or elaborated upon by Kamm - it wasn't even commented upon. This is in many ways very indicative of the entire catalogue of *Globe and Mail* East Timor news coverage published throughout the invasion period. The coverage featured no editorials, no investigative reporting apart from the Mick Lowe and Jill Jolliffe articles, no condemnation of Indonesia's actions (apart from passing mentions), and no reporting on the multiplicity of ways in which Canada was part of the story.

As noted, the PM hypothesizes that “modes of handling favoured and inconvenient materials (placement, tone, context, fullness of treatment)” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 35) will support elite interests. The reporting examined here conforms to the predictions advanced by the PM and strongly

indicates media self-censorship. Propagandistic elements are observable in both individual story headlines and story content.

XVI. Analysis of Article #15 – May 5, 1980

On May 5, 1980, a brief article – three sentences in total length – reporting on AI’s concerns in East Timor was published. Carried from Reuters, the article is headlined: “Amnesty group says Timor leaders may have been slain” (A2). The article provides information on victims but is too brief to humanize the victims or place their plight within any meaningful context:

Amnesty International expressed fears yesterday that 22 former members of an East Timor independence movement had been executed after surrendering under an amnesty offered by the Indonesian authorities.

The London-based human rights organization said a number of them disappeared in the former Portuguese colony after being re-arrested by Indonesian troops last year, in addition to others missing since they surrendered.

Amnesty International said several hundred prisoners, some of them held since the Indonesian invasion of the island territory in December 1975, were underfed and detained in harsh and dangerous conditions.

XVII. Analysis of Article #16 – September 23, 1980

The only other article published in 1980 on East Timor was published on September 23. Written by Jill Jolliffe, the article is headlined “Indonesia rejects terms for talks on East Timor,” and reports on Indonesia’s rejection of a

diplomatic proposal for talks on East Timor that had been advanced by Portugal. Again, this is an extremely brief article, comprised of eight paragraphs – eleven sentences – in total length.

XVIII. Coverage of the East Timor Story in Other Canadian Daily Newspapers

The *Canadian News Index* lists a total of zero (0) news articles published on East Timor throughout the entire invasion period (1975-1980) published by the *Calgary Herald*, *Montreal Gazette* and/or the *Winnipeg Free Press*. There was only one article on East Timor published in the *Toronto Star* throughout the entire period. The *Toronto Star* article was published one day after the invasion, on December 8, 1975.

By-lined out of Jakarta, the (Reuters-UPI) article shares commonality with the *Globe and Mail* report. The second paragraph of the *Toronto Star* article is devoted to affording space to Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik who, not surprisingly, is quoted as saying “that the Indonesian troops [had] stormed the capital of Dili at the invitation of pro-Indonesian elements” within East Timor.

The article’s one-line fifth paragraph notes that China had called Indonesia’s takeover a “flagrant invasion.” This was not present within the *Globe and Mail* coverage. The article’s sixth paragraph again cites Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik on the official Indonesian chronology: “Malik claimed Indonesia, which immediately declared Dili part of its territory, acted to ‘prevent bloodshed’ in a civil war which had broken out between the pro-

Indonesian forces, members of the People's Democratic Association of Timor (Apodeti), and the leftist forces belonging to the Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN).”

According to the *Canadian News Index*, the *Toronto Star* did not publish another news article on East Timor for the next fourteen years.

The absolute low volume of coverage of the invasion, occupation and near-genocide can be seen to support the PM's predictions regarding observable patterns of media behavior. It can also be seen to lend support to the assumption that the *Globe and Mail* serves an agenda-setting function within Canada, setting the news agenda for the country's other print media, particularly with regard to foreign affairs.

XIX. Conclusion

The data analysis presented above has been concerned to delineate the extent to which the *Globe and Mail's* treatment of the East Timor story can be seen to have conformed to or deviated from the PM's substantive predictions regarding overall patterns of media performance. The chapter provided a story-by-story summation of the *Globe and Mail's* news coverage published throughout the crucial invasion period of 1975-1980.

The findings indicate that the *Globe and Mail* diverted public attention away from two important considerations throughout the invasion period: (1) the *international* nature of the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East

Timor and (2) Canada's own diplomatic and material contributions to the slaughters. Two levels of omission are evident in the *G&M's* East Timor coverage during the crucial invasion period. At the referential level, omission is evidenced by the absence of context, criticism and humanization from the whole process of representation, save for the October 9, 1978 article by Mick Lowe. At the signifiatory level, omission is evidenced by the absence of alternative ways of signifying actors, action and events, which are framed in particular ways. The sources cited in the *Globe and Mail's* East Timor coverage published throughout the invasion period were predominantly official sources, which again confirms the PM's substantive hypotheses. Official Indonesian representations of major events, actors and substantive issues were presented not as claims but rather as *facts*, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, as demonstrated most clearly within the article by Henry Kamm published on January 30, 1980.

Following its 1975 invasion, Indonesia consistently claimed that it hadn't *invaded* East Timor but rather had *intervened* in the civil war in East Timor. This representation created a contextual framework within which Indonesia's actions in East Timor could be characterized as "intervention" as opposed to "invasion," "illegal aggression" and "occupation." As highlighted in the previous chapter, various scholarly sources indicate that the brief civil war within East Timor had ended by November 1975, and that between 2000 and 3000 Timorese had died in the fighting (see Scharfe, 1996, p. 45; Selby, 1987, p. 42). Indonesia commenced cross-border armed incursions from West Timor in

November 1975 and on 28 November 1975 the de facto FRETILIN government had declared unilateral independence for East Timor in order to defend its territorial integrity at the UN (see Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, p. 1-8). Indonesia then invaded outright, on 7 December. The *Globe and Mail's* chronology exactly mirrored the government of Indonesia's official chronology both in terms of both what it declared to be fact and what excluded. As demonstrated by the analysis presented within this chapter, the *Globe and Mail* news coverage established context within which Indonesia's 1975 *invasion* of East Timor was not an act of *aggression* but rather "intervention" and later "war" with FRETILIN. Within this contextual framework, ensuing events could be explained away, justified, and *blamed upon* the resistance movement (FRETILIN) within East Timor. By promoting this representation, the *Globe and Mail* can be seen to have facilitated Canada's (geo)political-economic interests.

East Timor Media Coverage, 1981-1991

This chapter provides a summation of the quantity and quality of the *Globe and Mail* news coverage of the occupation of East Timor - from 1981 through to the end of 1991.

The distribution of the *Globe and Mail* coverage is presented within Table Two.

TABLE TWO
CANADIAN NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF EAST TIMOR
1981 - 1991

YEAR	Articles in the <i>Globe and Mail</i> about East Timor	Articles in other Canadian Daily Newspapers about East Timor
1981	2	0
1982	3	0
1983	5	6
1984	1	0
1985	2	0
1986	1	0
1987	1	2
1988	2	2
1989	8	6
1990	3	2
1991	12	32
TOTAL	40	

I. Analysis of Article #1 - December 10, 1981

On December 10, 1981, the *Globe and Mail* published a short article by Jill Jolliffe, headlined: “Row hits Portugal over Timor” (A2). The article is by-lined from Lisbon and reports on the controversy surrounding a television news program that had aired in which two journalists, Artur Albarran and Barata Feyo, claimed that East Timor had requested integration with Indonesia.

The article begins by summarizing the controversy and the human rights situation within East Timor. The lead and second and third paragraphs read as follows:

A political row has erupted here over a television program which accused left-wing political leaders of encouraging the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

Portugal’s former colony in Asia has been the scene of guerilla fighting since then and human rights organizations have said that more than a third of the Timorese population of 650,000 has died as a result of the invasion.

Recent refugee reports say a large-scale Indonesian invasion is underway, with the civilian population being conscripted from the nationalist movement Fretilin.

It is important to highlight that within the second paragraph of the article (quoted directly above), the invasion itself is characterized as “guerilla fighting” and no actual information pertaining to the central actors, dynamics or events in play here is provided beyond this.

The next paragraph of the article briefly summarizes the “controversy” surrounding claims that had been made by the two journalists, supportive of

the Indonesian view, that East Timorese representatives had actually requested integration prior to the December 7, 1975, invasion of the territory:

The accusations were made last week by journalists Artur Albarran and Barata Feyo, who alleged that in 1974 and 1975 Portugal's left-wing leaders, including Socialist Mario Soares, had met Indonesian security chief Ali Murtopo secretly in Lisbon and London and had made concessions to Indonesia's ambition to annex East Timor.

Significantly, the article provides no information on the UN resolutions calling upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor "without delay." While paragraphs two and three of the article (quoted above) make mention of the invasion and human rights situation in East Timor, the article does not humanize the victims of the Indonesian invasion. Concerns over human rights are limited to paragraph two of the article and are given no further comment. Nor does the article feature any information solicited from non-official sources - such as East Timorese refugees residing in Lisbon - which may have offered competing viewpoints and information. The claims made by the journalists, however, are granted further support. Paragraph nine of the article reads as follows: "The two journalists say that they hold irrefutable proof of their accusations. They also say they invited three of the key figures in the Timor case to appear [on the television program] but only one, Admiral Jose Azevedd Pinheiro, the last premier of the revolution period, had accepted."

The final paragraph of the article once again endorses the claims made by the two journalists: "The allegations made by the journalists are supported by other sources - notably, the Australian defense and foreign policy

documents published in Australia last year revealing cables sent between Canberra and Jakarta about East Timor, and documents released since the invasion by the Indonesian security organization Opsus.”

This entire paragraph is structured around official accounts and informed by official sources. Given the historical facts, it is not entirely surprising that the government of Australia and the Indonesian Security forces would support the journalists' allegations.

Omitted from this news story is any mention of the fact that the government of Indonesia had publicly indicated prior to its invasion of East Timor that it had no territorial pretensions toward East Timor subsequent to Portugal's announcing plans for de-colonization of the territory. Also absent from the discourse is any mention of the Timor Gap oil treaty between the government of Indonesia and the government of Australia.

Perhaps most significantly, while the article's headline alludes to the fact that there was perhaps debate over the journalists' claims, yet the article itself offers no competing viewpoints or interpretations beyond the official sources noted above. Coupled with the absence of historical and political-economic context, the boundaries of debate can be seen to strongly conform to the predictions of the PM.

II. Analysis of Article #2 – February 6, 1982

On February 6, 1982, the *Globe and Mail* published a report by Jill Jolliffe, headlined: “Indonesia moves over East Timor spark row in Lisbon” (A15). By-lined out of Lisbon, the article reports on the (then) new military offensive launched by the Indonesian military, and on the diplomatic campaign underway to win international recognition for Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.

The article is a total of twenty paragraphs in length and is accompanied by a photograph of an East Timorese woman and child. The photo caption reads: “East Timorese refugees – victims of Indonesian offensive.” Significantly, both the woman and child appear relatively happy within the photo. The woman is holding the child, who appears to be healthy, and both are looking toward the camera, as if posing for the shot. Although they are referred to as “victims of Indonesian offensive” [sic] by the photo caption, the woman and child do not look like victims in the actual photo.

The article features critical dimensions and highlights relevant political context. Paragraph six of the article reads as follows: “Since the 1975 invasion of the Southeast Asia territory, the United Nations has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, but the demands have been ignored by the Indonesian government.”

Paragraph eight provides information relating to the voting on the UN resolution that had taken place the previous year, noting that “the resolution supporting East Timorese self-determination was supported by only 12 votes at

last year's General Assembly meeting, and Indonesia has now launched a campaign to turn the tide by winning the votes of African states." Significantly, no information pertaining to Canada's pro-Indonesian voting record at the UN on this or on previous East Timor resolutions at the UN is provided within this context. Nor does the article provide any details on the US diplomatic, material and military involvement.

The article does include information relating to the human rights situation in East Timor. Paragraphs thirteen through fifteen of the article read as follows:

East Timorese refugees arriving in Lisbon claim mass executions and indiscriminate brutality is continuing in their homeland six years after the invasion.

Two deputies from the regional assembly of East Timor were arrested recently after they complained in their annual report to President Suharto about the behavior of occupying troops. They documented cases of 'torture, maltreatment, murders . . .' and said the East Timorese population was living in an atmosphere of fear.

The report was signed by Joao Pedro Soares and Isaac Leandro and was forwarded to President Suharto in June. In September it was leaked to the foreign press, and in November the two men were arrested. They were released only after an outcry in the Australian newspapers.

Additional critical information is presented at the bottom of the inverted pyramid, within the final five paragraphs of the article, which are excerpted here:

In recent months, the territory has been the scene of a new military offensive by the Indonesian army. Operation security was an attempt to sweep the country with a dragnet

made up of Indonesian army regulars and the conscripted local populations.

The result, according to a Catholic Church source (one of the few reliable information channels from East Timor since 1975) was the execution of around 500 civilians last year, although the operation failed to capture more than a handful of Fretilin guerrillas.

A letter smuggled to Lisbon from Timor late last year described the operation: 'In the mountains all the schools are shut and the students are obliged to go to school in the bush and fight against the guerrillas. Only invalids and women are excused. Since they invaded East Timor the Indonesians have killed thousands and thousands, and people are still dying.'

'If they continued to make martyrs of us, the war in Timor will never end, because the guerrillas will fight with whatever they have (swords, sticks, spears, etc.) because God is just and on the sides of those who fight for truth . . .'

Timorese refugees in Portugal say their pleas, which have been constant since they arrived here in 1976, are lost on the world. They say the United Nations vote [of the previous year] showed that the big powers can afford to ignore a tiny country with no important resources or strategic influence. Canada voted last year in support of the Indonesian position.

In comparison with the entire catalogue of the *Globe and Mail* East Timor news coverage, this article is among the longest and most extensive ever to be published, even though it is only four columns in total length. One might read this article and conclude that it does not conform to the predictions of the PM because it features information on the human rights situation in East Timor. There are several compelling reasons why such a conclusion would be problematic, however.

As noted, the article's headline is completely neutral and does not organize reader attention toward the victimization of the East Timorese, nor can it be seen to generate reader sympathy or interest in East Timor as an unfolding news story. The photograph accompanying the article is also neutral, and not reflective of the claims of human suffering made relevant within the actual article. The diplomatic/political context is addressed within paragraph six of the article (quoted above) but the article provides no information on why Western governments did not enforce the UN resolutions. The article features no information pertaining to Western investment within Indonesia, no information on long-term US foreign policy aims in the region, no information on Western aid or military exports to Indonesia. Anyone reading this article who was unfamiliar with the central actors and dynamics in play would have no reason to infer that extensive economic and diplomatic ties between Canada and Indonesia existed at the time of the invasion, nor would readers necessarily deduce that the Canadian government had targeted Indonesia as a key market. The article provides no relevant information and makes no connections between the events in East Timor and the Canada-Indonesia relationship. Its headline implies that the article is fundamentally about the diplomatic context as this relates to the Indonesia invasion of East Timor. Canada's voting record at the UN would seem to be immediately relevant, as would relevant Canadian connections to East Timor and Indonesia.

Significantly, within the final paragraphs of the article (quoted in full above) it is stated that the Catholic Church in East Timor is "one of the few

reliable information channels from East Timor” since the invasion. The article then quotes a letter smuggled out of East Timor in order to provide readers with impressions from the perspective of the East Timorese victims. Immediately after this, the article makes reference to East Timorese refugees in Portugal. If first-hand testimonies pertaining to the human rights violations within East Timor were available from refugees, it begs the question: why were no direct quotes provided from these refugees? Were they not considered a “reliable information channel”? Was a letter perhaps better suited for the article, as opposed to eyewitness accounts of survivors? Given that refugees had escaped and were in fact residing in Lisbon, one would assume they could have been reached. Jolliffe does not state how the letter quoted within the article was actually obtained, and readers are given no insight into how many refugees were residing in Portugal at this time. The previous *Globe and Mail* coverage of East Timor (dating back to the outset of the invasion period) endorsed official Indonesian sources as the sole channel of reliable information on East Timor.

Noteworthy about the last paragraph of the article is the context. The UN voting record of the previous year is discussed here as if the total of nine previous resolutions that had been passed by the UN supportive of East Timor’s self-determination did not exist. These resolutions are not mentioned. Instead, the paragraph mentions only the most recent resolution, and in doing so it emphasizes that the resolution passed only by a relatively slight margin. This context suggests no clear consensus on whether the Indonesian invasion had

violated international law, with regard to East Timorese self-determination and right to territory. Concurrently, the events in East Timor are addressed here as if they had existed within a vacuum, isolated and apart from any broader (geo)political-economic context(s). Given the article's length, that Canada's voting record on East Timor resolutions at the UN is accorded no mention outside of the last line of the article is another striking feature of this article that can be seen to conform to the predictions of the PM. Even when Canada's diplomatic actions are discussed, only a bare minimum of information is provided, summarized here in a mere ten words, in the last line of article. The structure of newspaper articles is such that what the editors deem to be the most important or crucial information is presented at the outset of news articles, encapsulated by the headline and lead. Relative importance of subsequent information is generally presumed to follow hierarchically from the top-down, as is commonly known.

III. Analysis of Article #3 - January 10, 1983

On January 10, 1983, the *Globe and Mail* published an article by Bruce McDougall, headlined "Timor conflict clouds PM's visit" (A10). Bruce McDougall was not a *Globe and Mail* staff writer - he was a financial writer living in Toronto who had a special interest in East Timor. This information is given at the end of his article, which reports on Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's visit to Indonesia, which was to take place on January 11, 1983. The

article is significant and features extremely critical content as well as information devoted to Canada's voting record on East Timor at the UN. Paragraph five of the article reads as follows: "The Centre for Defense Information in Washington has cited the East Timor conflict as one of the three most violent in the world, after Cambodia and Afghanistan. Since 1975, when Indonesia invaded the territory 560 kilometers (350 miles) northwest of Australia, as many as 200,000 East Timorese - almost one-third of the population - have died."

The article then addresses Canada's position on East Timor at the UN, and quotes an unnamed source from the Department of External Affairs addressing Canada's view of the Indonesian invasion:

Since 1980, Canada has voted against UN resolutions supporting East Timor's right to self-determination. In previous years, it abstained from the voting.

Canadian officials argue that international attention should focus on humanitarian and developmental aspects of the situation, rather than on the political issues. 'We don't have a view on whether the Indonesian invasion was a good or bad thing,' the External Affairs official said. 'But signs indicate that Indonesia is coming to grips with East Timor's development needs.'

Immediately following this McDougall offers a competing interpretation, one that challenges the official discourse, and subsequent to this he proceeds to provide additional critical information:

Recent reports from East Timor indicate that malnutrition and starvation remain serious problems and that until East

Timor's political status is resolved, these problems will continue.

Rod Nordland, a reporter for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, said last week that he saw signs of widespread hunger and famine, even in the capital city of Dili, when he visited East Timor last year.

Mr. Norland, the first US journalist allowed into the area by the Indonesians in two years, said Indonesian forces had removed thousands of East Timorese from their homes and herded them into resettlement areas to prevent them from supporting the East Timorese resistance movement, FRETILIN - the Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor. As a result, Mr. Norland said, "fields are lying fallow. There's no farming."

In a resettlement camp near Dili, Mr. Norland said he took measurements of 22 children under the age of 12. By international health standards, 18 of the children were chronically malnourished. (Officials say an incidence of chronic malnutrition of more than 1 percent is "alarming.")

'The Indonesians are showing the East Timorese that they'll take any steps necessary to crush FRETILIN,' Mr. Norland said. 'If that means starving people to death, they'll starve them to death.'

The presence of critical content within this article regarding the forced resettlement of East Timorese can be seen to mobilize reader attention and emotion. The paragraphs quoted above highlight the historical facts and squarely place blame for the human suffering and death toll. The information present within the article, rather than being structured around official sources, avails readers with a range of issues that one would assume, based on past coverage, fall outside the "boundaries of the expressible."

McDougall once again returns to Canada and its official position on East Timor, in the final paragraphs of the article's second column, and once again presents alternative discourse, writing that:

Canadian officials regard East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province, under the political administration of the Indonesian government.

This view is opposed by the East Timorese themselves, according to observers. 'There's continued need for relief aid,' said Mike Chamberlain of the East Timor Human Rights Committee in Syracuse, N.Y. 'But it's important to talk about the political issues. They're at the root of the trouble. Political reasons alone prevent access to Timor.'

Mr. Norland talked to 'dozens' of East Timorese during his visit last year, he said. 'All the Timorese I talked to said they hated the Indonesians. They're a different culture, a different type of people. For them, the Indonesian occupation is their worst nightmare come true.'

In the final paragraphs of the article McDougall addresses the issue of Canadian aid to East Timor and Indonesia, and makes the relevant Canadian connections explicit:

Although Canada has undertaken one of its largest bilateral aid programs in Indonesia, spending more than \$180 million on aid and development in the past 10 years, there is little interest in East Timor among Canadian academics.

In the past six years, only one question has been raised in the House of Commons questioning Canada's tacit support of Indonesia's military aggression in the area.

This article is the first in the entire catalogue of *Globe and Mail* coverage since the invasion that so clearly details Canada's position on East Timor. It is also the first (and last) article to mention that Canadian academics had largely ignored East Timor.

McDougall devotes the final paragraph of the article to reporting on the US military support for Indonesia and on the resistance to the government's actions within the US Congress: "In the United States, political interest is growing, particularly after Mr. Suharto visited Washington last fall. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, 84 congressmen called for a full inquiry into events in East Timor, including the provision of weapons by the United States to Indonesia for use in East Timor in violation of a moratorium on arms sales to that country in 1976. US military aid to Indonesia for 1983 is projected to be \$52.6 million, up 67 percent over 1981."

As noted above, the presence of critical content does not disprove the PM, but, clearly, this article features a range of critical information that is foregrounded and presented as explicit, rather than being left implicit. It is a highly critical, honest report that makes connections between various dimensions of the East Timor story, including ways in which Canada may be seen to be linked to East Timor.

Absent dimensions that can be seen to be directly relevant are Canadian direct investment in Indonesia, and the degree to which political-economic considerations might be seen to have impacted diplomacy, US hegemony in the region, as well as the Timor Trough and the issue of oil.

IV. Analysis of Article #4 – January 12, 1983

Two days later, on January 12, 1983, a report written by Bryan Johnson was published (A12). Headlined “ET’s no stranger on streets of Indonesia,” the report contrasts sharply with the much more critical McDougall article of January 10. Johnson’s article does address the human rights situation within East Timor but the article is structured around official sources and calls competing views into question. “The number of Timorese killed or imprisoned since Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1976, ostensibly to keep it from ‘turning into another Cuba,’ is lost in a jumble of charges and counter charges,” Johnson writes. He includes an estimate from unnamed “Australian journalists” that only 10,000 Timorese had been killed, and notes “other estimates range as high as 200,000.” The fact that no sources are identified to validate the higher estimate is as the PM model would predict.

Johnson provides details on an AI report relating to events that took place two years earlier, in 1981. Immediately following this is a quote from an unnamed “Canadian Embassy official” that calls AI’s estimate into question:

Amnesty International says that in September, 1981, 300 people were slaughtered in a religious shrine called the Rock of St. Anthony, where they had taken refuge from Indonesian soldiers.

‘The Indonesians deny that the number was anything near that large,’ a spokesman for the Canadian Embassy told a press briefing here yesterday. ‘They say the Amnesty report is very much exaggerated. But they really won’t way what happened. They admit there was an incident and that a number of people have died. But that’s all the details we have.’

This statement is accorded no comment by Johnson and it is not followed-up by information from additional sources.

The material presented above encapsulates the extent to which the article addresses the atrocities in East Timor. The article contains no information relating to Canada beyond the last paragraph, which reads as follows:

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau will talk to General Suharto on his current trip, but he has said he doesn't 'visit other countries with the intention of telling them how to run their own affairs.' He did say, however, that he might suggest that a country improve its human rights record 'strictly on humanitarian grounds . . . because their reputation in the democratic world would be improved if they did.'

In stark contrast to the way in which McDougall's article was structured, Johnson accords this statement no comment and no other sources are cited which may have taken up the ethical dimensions of Canada's position. Bryan Johnson was a *Globe and Mail* staff reporter at the time this and other article he would write about East Timor were published but he would subsequently leave the newspaper in later years to run a brothel with teenage prostitutes in the Philippines!

V. Analysis of Article #5 - June 28, 1983

On June 28, 1983, the *Globe and Mail* published another story by Jill Jolliffe, headlined: "East Timor cease fire reported" (A16). By-lined from Lisbon, the article cites unnamed East Timorese sources as saying that a cease-fire had

been negotiated between FRETILIN and Indonesian military forces. The article's headline captures the central dimensions of the story and reads as follows: "Refugees in Lisbon say that Indonesian authorities have negotiated a cease-fire with guerrilla fighters in Portugal's former colony of East Timor, although Indonesia has denied the reports."

The article is relatively short, only ten paragraphs in total length. Information relevant to the political-economic context and human rights situation within East Timor is contained within and limited to the article's third paragraph, which reads as follows:

Since 1975 when Indonesia invaded after a civil war during which Portugal abandoned the territory, the Jakarta government has rejected claims by the East Timorese liberation movement FRETILIN that its forces are still fighting against the occupation troops. Reports of atrocities by Indonesian soldiers have been persistently raised in the United Nations and by rights organizations such as Amnesty International.

There is no mention within the article of the East Timor resolutions at the UN or of Canada's voting record at the UN, nor is there mention of the death toll within occupied East Timor. As noted above, human rights groups, such as Amnesty International (1985), estimated the death toll to be approx. 200,000 people out of a pre-invasion of approximately 650,000. There is no mention within the article on induced starvation and disease, forced sterilization, mass killings and other specific human rights violations that occurred within East Timor, apart from the article's vague reference to "atrocities." The absence of historical and political-economic context conforms to the predictions of the PM.

That the victims are not humanized is exactly as the PM would predict as well. The story itself is significant because it strongly implies that the conflict, characterized as Indonesian military “authorities” versus “guerilla fighters,” had either ended or was presumably about to conclude. Clearly this was not the case, as the historical facts bear out.

VI. Analysis of Article #6 – September 3, 1983

On September 3, 1983, the *Globe and Mail* published a very small article relating to the human rights situation in East Timor. Five one-line paragraphs in total length, the article is carried from Reuters and by-lined from the UN. Its headline reads: “UN told of torture, killing in Timor”. The contents of the article provide information that is critical yet problematic, for reasons that will be explored below. The article’s lead reads as follows: “Amnesty International charged yesterday that Indonesian forces have summarily killed and tortured hundreds of thousands of people in East Timor since taking over the former Portuguese territory in 1975.” While this line does indicate critical content, it also endorses Indonesia’s illegal annexation of East Timor and fails to alert readers to the fact that Indonesia had invaded East Timor. The next paragraph reads: “Appearing before the United Nations De-colonization Committee, Amnesty representative Margo Picken said reports available to her organization ‘have long suggested a clear and consistent pattern of human rights violations.’” Following this, the article states that: “Indonesia has been battling

FRETILIN, a local independence movement, which opposes its rule over the territory.”

As the PM would predict, no specific details on these human rights violations - which might mobilize reader emotion - are included within the text. The next line of the article reads as follows: “Miss Picken told the committee: ‘Amnesty International now has lists of hundreds of people who were reportedly killed outside combat or ‘disappeared’ between December 1975 and the end of 1982.’” It is entirely unclear how exactly it is that the estimate of those killed moves from “hundreds of thousands of people” within the article’s first line to “hundreds of people” here in its third line. One possible explanation would be a typographical error was made, as one might intuitively reason that “hundreds of thousands of people” should have appeared within the third line - but it didn’t. As the article was published, it reports that AI “has lists of hundreds of people who were reportedly killed outside combat or ‘disappeared’ between December 1975 and the end of 1982.” Another possible explanation would be that the article was purposefully written and structured in this manner so information relating to the death toll estimate would not be conveyed clearly. The article concludes with this line: “She gave details on two interrogation centers said to be in current use in Dili, the East Timor capital, where detainees were subjected to torture and ill treatment.”

Clearly this article features critical content relating to the human rights situation within East Timor. However, there are several ways in which the article conforms to the predictions of the PM. As noted, the Indonesian

invasion of East Timor is cast simply as Indonesia having taken over “the former Portuguese territory.” No additional information is provided, such as General Assembly Resolution 3845 or Security Council Resolution 389. Indonesia’s illegal occupation of East Timor is described simply as its “rule over the territory.”

Herman and Chomsky (1988:35) hypothesize that unworthy victims will be accorded “slight detail, minimal humanization, and little context that will excite or enrage.” The article’s concluding paragraph illustrates this - “She gave details on two interrogation centers said to be in current use in Dili, the East Timor capital, where detainees were subjected to torture and ill treatment.” It can be safely reasoned that the AI representative conveyed additional details, given that AI’s reports on the atrocities in occupied East Timor have routinely included much by way of graphic detail (see Amnesty International, 1980, 1985, 1987, 1988).

Knowing then that detailed information on the nature and extent of the human rights violations in East Timor was available at the time this article was published - and is precisely what the article itself is reporting on - one can infer that this information was being ignored or suppressed. The mention of two “interrogation centers” does not evoke reader interest or sympathetic emotion, nor does it come close to conveying the extent of AI’s concerns at this time regarding the human rights situation in occupied East Timor.

VII. Analysis of Article #7 - February 10, 1984

Throughout 1984 the *Globe and Mail* published only one article about East Timor, published on February 10, 1984, and carrying the headline: "Shadow battle hobbles army in Indonesia" (A1). The article, another piece written by *Globe and Mail* staffer Bryan Johnson, is by-lined from Jakarta. The article begins on the front page of newspaper but only six short paragraphs are included there, with the rest of the article appearing on page fourteen. The article's headline is sufficiently vague that in reading it one would not necessarily even presume that the article itself is actually about East Timor. The information presented within the lead and first two full paragraphs of the article, however, are significant and read as follows:

There are perhaps no more than 200 hardcore guerrillas being chased around East Timor by 10,000 to 15,000 Indonesian troops. But you can't kill what you can't find. Or as one top Government advisor puts it: 'Our army is shooting at shadows.'

So the sad saga drags on, nine years after the former Portuguese colony became one of the world's worst horror stories.

'It's a running sore,' says a Western military attaché who has visited Indonesia's newest province. 'They have tried the hearts-and-minds approach and it didn't wash. Now they have gone back to the big-stick policy and it doesn't seem to be working much better. This thing is going to go on and on until we all get old.'

Note the story presented within the article's lead. By this point in time various sources indicate that as many as a third of the East Timor's population had been killed as a direct result of Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East

Timor (Budiardjo, 1991, p. 200; Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, p. 27; Briere, 1991, 1997; Selby, 1987; Chomsky, 1987, p. 306; Taylor, 1990; Gunn, 1994, p. 78). The lead takes gross economies with truth and caricatures the victims of the Indonesian aggression. As the PM predicts, sources are limited to an unnamed “government” representative, whom one might assume is affiliated with the Indonesian government, and an unnamed Westerner “who has visited Indonesia’s newest province.”

Here history is effectively being rewritten. The UN never recognized Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor and no less than ten UN resolutions had called upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor “without delay” (Scharfe, 1996, pp. 82-83; Budiardjo, 1991, p. 202; Krieger, 1997, p. xxiii). Note the way in which the occupation is characterized within the first and second full paragraphs of the article. No outrage is expressed, no blame is placed; according to the lead, there are only shadows, and “you can’t kill what you can’t find.”

The ensuing text, appearing on page fourteen of the newspaper, also has several significant features. Deep into the article, in the third and last column, is mention of Indonesia’s relationship with the US:

The Indonesians are aware that East Timor has given them an international black eye . . . Most foreign observers agree, however, that the United States and neighboring Asian countries quietly acquiesced in the Indonesian takeover - on the grounds that East Timor might become ‘an Asian Cuba.’

‘You have to remember that 1975 was the year the Americans were beaten in Vietnam and the Australians were

pulling their horns,' a Jakarta-based diplomat says. 'It is widely believed that (former United States Secretary of State Henry) Kissinger told the Indonesians: do it if you have to, but make it quick and don't kill a lot of people.'

Nine years later, the diplomat smiles at the grim irony of Mr. Kissinger's instructions.

This is the first time in the entire catalogue of the *Globe and Mail* East Timor coverage that it is noted that the US played a direct role in the invasion - almost ten years after the invasion occurred. It is significant, in relation to the PM, that no comment is made on Canada's own diplomatic, material and militaristic contributions, particularly so given that this article was written by a *Globe and Mail* reporter.

The article cites an Indonesian source that simultaneously grossly underestimates the number of East Timorese killed and diverts blame for the death toll away from the Indonesian government:

'It is certain that thousands of them died,' cedes Mr. Wanandi of the CSIS. 'But most of them were not killed by the military . . . They died from starvation or disease. I was there in 1979 when 120,000 people came down from the hills and, my God, you just wouldn't believe the shape they were in. Children with distended stomachs, everyone with skin diseases.'

The International Red Cross saved at least 70,000 lives with an emergency treatment program.

Yet Mr. Wanandi argues that Indonesia cannot be held responsible for the tragedy. The Portuguese simply pulled the rug out from under East Timor with their precipitous departure, he says, and FRETILIN members were murderous, butchers who plunged the country into immediate civil war.

‘The simple fact is,’ the Indonesian analyst says, ‘that we had no interest in East Timor at all. There were no emotional ties, because it had never been part of the Dutch Empire. We didn’t consider it part of Indonesia but we woke up one day and realized what a mess we had right on our doorstep. The Portuguese had left a complete vacuum . . . the place was in chaos. I think we were more or less forced to do what we did.’

The source indicates that the East Timorese suffered from starvation and disease. But “blame” is diverted away. The source’s characterization obscures the fact that starvation and disease were induced, part of a brutal occupation. This is accorded no comment from Johnson. Instead, Johnson’s mention of the Red Cross in the paragraph immediately following the quote from the “Indonesian analyst” source simply reinforces the official interpretive framework – that induced starvation and disease were not part of what in reality was a nearly decade-long ongoing military assault of near-genocidal proportions.

Subsequent to Portugal signaling plans to de-colonize its overseas colonies, FRETILIN had declared East Timor’s unilateral independence. The source’s claim “a complete vacuum” existed can be read as a fabrication. It corresponds with the source’s concluding statement, that Indonesia was “forced to do what we did.” The Indonesian military had begun cross-border incursions from West Timor in November 1975. Later this same month the de facto FRETILIN government had declared unilateral independence for East Timor, in order to defend East Timor’s territorial integrity at the UN (Budiardjo and Soei Liong, 1984, pp. 1-8).

In sum, the article is structured around and endorses the official discourse. Contesting interpretations, viewpoints and information are not included within the text. Information regarding the Canada-Indonesia relationship is not present within the article. Here again, the Canadian news coverage is presenting the story of East Timor as if Canada has no connections to it whatsoever – such that Canada is not even mentioned.

VIII. Analysis of Article #8 – Friday, December 21, 1985

On December 21, 1985, the *Globe and Mail* carried a story from the *New York Times* Service, written by Barbara Crossette, by-lined out of Jakarta, and headlined: “Indonesians ‘defusing separatist time bombs’” (A9). The story treats the events in East Timor in a detached manner throughout. Minimal humanization and lack of content that might organize reader interest, outrage or sympathetic emotion is reflected by the lead and first two full paragraphs of the article. These read as follows:

Forty years after their country declared its independence from the Dutch, Indonesians say they are making progress in defusing two ‘time bombs’ left behind by colonial powers.

One of the trouble spots is the former Dutch territory of West Irian, which shares the island of New Guinea with the independent nation of Papua New Guinea, and which has been the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya since 1983. The other is East Timor, a former Portuguese territory invaded and incorporated by Indonesia in 1975-1976.

In both provinces, separatist movements have been holding out against rule by Jakarta, attracting sympathy and support abroad that has embarrassed Indonesia.

The article features no information on the catalogue of human rights violations that had taken place and were continuing to take place within East Timor. Treatment accorded the victims of the invasion and occupation within the article conforms to the predictions of the PM. The article converges upon official sources throughout, offers no competing viewpoints and/or interpretations, and Canada again receives no mention.

IX. Analysis of Article #9 - December 7, 1985

On December 7, 1985, the *Globe and Mail* published a story by Derek Rasmussen, headlined: "East Timor, A tragedy ignored" (A9). Rasmussen was *not* a *Globe and Mail* staff reporter - he was (and still is) a peace activist, and in the early 1980s he co-founded the Canadian Indonesia-East Timor project. Present within this article are a wide range of information and sources that highlight Canada's relationship to the events in East Timor. A photograph of three East Timorese villagers and a map indicating East Timor in relation to Indonesia accompany the article. Among the sources cited within the article are the East Timor Catholic Church and Amnesty International. The article is framed in such a way so that official accounts are called into question, as illustrated by this excerpt from the article's second column:

Canadian businesses have invested more than \$1 billion in Indonesia.

Canada has also been promoting the sale of Canadian arms to the Indonesian military . . .

Roger Chan, deputy director for External Affairs, confirms that his department is promoting military sales to Indonesia. Defense links between Canada and Indonesia are improving dramatically, he said, citing External Affairs' sponsorship of Canada's first arms show in Indonesia (in November 1984) as an example.

Questioned about Indonesian human rights violations at the time of the arms show, Gardiner Wilson, then deputy director of External Affairs' Southeast Asian relations, said "these things happen upwards of five, six, seven, eight years ago. The situation is quite different than it was then."

'I am astonished that External Affairs said that,' responded Brian Cameron, Amnesty International's spokesman [sic] in Ottawa. 'For the past six years we've been providing information that shows a systematic pattern of human rights violations (in East Timor).'

But Indonesia's ambassador to Canada, Dr. Hasjim Djalal, maintains that 'East Timor is a non-issue. Practically everybody in East Timor supports integration (with Indonesia).'

This article deviates from the previous coverage, which omitted Canada's role in relation to the East Timor near-genocide. Official sources are represented within the article, but a range of other voices and viewpoints are also given expression, challenging the boundaries of debate as these had been established within the *Globe and Mail* coverage to date.

X. Analysis of Article #10 – November 10, 1986

On November 10, 1986, the *Globe and Mail* carried an article headlined: "11-year East Timor war escalating, reports from resistance leaders say." By-lined out of Lisbon, the report is written by Jill Jolliffe. Whereas the headline

conforms to official discourse in characterizing resistance to Indonesia's occupation as "war," elements of the report can be read as critical. For instance, the report notes that "Indonesia invaded" East Timor, points out that a "new Indonesian military offensive" had been launched, and mentions a culture a fear amongst East Timorese refugees living in Lisbon. But the report does not accord significant detail to the victims of the Indonesian invasion and occupation, nor does it humanize the victims in significant, observable ways. The last line of the article reads: "Refugees arriving in Portugal from Timor have also said that war has deteriorated in recent months, though they were afraid to give details." It cannot be easily known if Jolliffe was able to obtain actual quotes from these refugees, but presumably this information was derived from legitimate Timorese sources. No direct quotes are provided from victims, who are identified within the article as "unnamed sources," as official sources commonly are within the *Globe's* East Timor coverage.

XI. Analysis of Article #11 (Editorial) - January 9, 1987

On January 9, 1987, the *Globe and Mail* published its first (and only) editorial on East Timor dating back to the time of the December 7, 1975 Indonesian invasion. Newspaper editorials, as opposed to hard news articles, reflect the perspectives of newspapers themselves, and editorials are meant to have public and political influence.

That the *Globe and Mail* waited over a decade to publish an editorial on East Timor is a significant feature of the data, one that very strongly supports the PM.

Information relating to the death toll in East Timor is present within the editorial, as is general historical and political context:

The United Nations has repeatedly opposed Indonesia's takeover and demanded East Timorese self-determination. But the UN's last resolution was in 1982. Indonesia has effectively defied its will - and not for the first time. In 1969 it annexed West Irian after holding a sham vote among the local Papuans. (The UN had required that they be consulted in the future.)

Even more deplorable than the denial of self-determination in East Timor has been the brutal violation of human rights which has accompanied that denial. Amnesty International in 1985 published a report that documented 'cases of extrajudicial executions, "disappearances," torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and unfair trials which had taken place in the territory since the Indonesian invasion.'

An estimated 250,000 of the island's 650,000 people have been killed in the Indonesian army's no-holds-barred campaign to quash FRETILIN . . .

The final two paragraphs of the editorial establish connections between Canada's diplomatic record on East Timor and its economic relationship to Indonesia, noting that:

Ottawa has been reluctant to rock the Indonesian boat because of its economic ties with this potential Pacific power. Canada is the third largest foreign investor in Indonesia, and has lavished more development aid on it than on any other non-Commonwealth country. Canada even holds trade fairs to promote military exports to Indonesia.

For four decades, Ottawa has been refused to recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. Yet, after only a few years, Canada considers East Timor's takeover a fait accompli and its torment small cause for complaint. Thus does principle bow to expediency.

In sum, the editorial features information that is critical and touches upon (albeit briefly) political and economic linkages between Canada and Indonesia. It does not, however, express or mobilize outrage, nor does it condemn the successive Canadian governments for their complicity in the East Timor near-genocide.

The *Globe and Mail* editorial begs the question: if the near-genocide East Timor and Canada's connections to events there were deemed significant enough to warrant a strong editorial position, why did the *Globe and Mail* publish only one article about East Timor throughout the entire calendar year that this editorial was published? And why had it published only a handful of articles about East Timor over the course of the previous four years?

XII. Analysis of Article #12 – March 9, 1988

On March 9, 1988, the *Globe and Mail* published a “special report” written by Jill Jolliffe, headlined as follows: “Witnesses tell of East Timor torture” (A13). The article is firmly critical and structured around accounts provided East Timorese refugees residing in Lisbon. The headline and lead can be seen to mobilize reader attention and highlight the victims of the near-genocide. The

article's lead reads as follows: "Refugees in Lisbon say that Indonesian authorities in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor have systematically tortured prisoners and that the practice is continuing." In relation to the substantive predictions advanced by the PM, it is significant article focuses on "tortured prisoners" as opposed to "near-genocide."

The next two paragraphs of the article, which read as follows, are structured around the official discourse:

The tiny southeast Asian colony was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and has been the scene of a resistance war ever since. The United Nations does not recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, although leading Western powers, including Canada, do.

Poedji Koenterso, Indonesian ambassador to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, said in a telephone interview that such allegations are not new but are 'part of a general campaign against Indonesia.'

Context is established within which ensuing information relating to the human rights situation within in East Timor is called into doubt. An impression is conveyed that the ensuing details may or may not be true: as the official sources indicate that the "allegations" are merely "part of a general campaign against Indonesia," and are presumably not to be taken seriously. Such context conforms to the predications of the PM.

The next three paragraphs of the article (paragraphs four through six) are also significant, and read as follows:

As early as 1976 refugees in Lisbon said Indonesian authorities systematically tortured nationalists fighting Indonesian control over East Timor.

At the time, it was hearsay, but now details of the torture are provided by eyewitnesses and by the victims, who have waited years to escape the territory.

Because Indonesia has sealed the half-island territory off from the world, the time-lag in documenting claims means it may be another decade before today's allegations are documented fully.

The claims made here are important for several reasons. Information pertaining to the near-genocide had been available from both refugees and eyewitnesses long before “now” - the time this article was published. AI's reports on East Timor are not mentioned here. This is significant. AI's major report, “East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, Extra-judicial Executions, ‘Disappearances’, Torture and Political Imprisonment,” is not mentioned, even though the report was published in 1985, three year before this article was written and published in the *Globe and Mail*.

In April 1987 AI had issued another report on East Timor, entitled “Indonesia/East Timor: Summary of Amnesty International Concerns in Indonesia and East Timor.” This report is not mentioned. Instead, readers are told that “it may be another decade” before today's “claims” and/or “allegations” (or “hearsay”) are “documented fully.”

Information relating to Indonesia's forced relocation of the East Timorese was also available at this time, but this is similarly not mentioned within the article. Induced starvation and disease, and forced sterilization, are also not

issues that are present within the article. The article strongly conveys the impression that the central dimension of importance to the victims is torture. Systematic killing and near-genocide, invasion and aggressive occupation are left unexamined. The article makes no significant connection between these elements and the cases of torture within East Timor that it reports upon.

Thus, it may be concluded that even though the article features critical content and is largely structured around accounts from victims, central dimensions of the article conform to the predictions of the PM.

The body of the article primarily focuses upon one torture victim, Maria Gorete Josquim. A small photo of Ms. Josquim accompanies the article. The photo is a head shot of her face and contrasts sharply with imagery conveyed within the text of the article. In the photo, the victim appears healthy and happy, whereas the text provides details on how she had been tortured.

Paragraph fourteen is illustrative: “Maria . . . had cigarette burns on her arms and chest and had had electric shocks applied to her neck, ear and arms. We embraced and cried on that night we shared a cell, sleeping on the same bed.”

The final four paragraphs of the article feature cursory details on two other torture victims, and the article concludes by placing these accounts within official context. The final four paragraphs read as follows:

Another torture victim, a 51-year old man who asked that his name not be published because he still has family in East Timor, arrived in Lisbon in 1986.

He said he was strung up from a crossbeam in the San Tai Ho prison in July 1977 and beaten by an Indonesian intelligence agent and his assistant, who carved patterns on his back with a knife.

Still another victim, Jose Guterres, 24, who arrived in Lisbon last year, was arrested in July 1986, as a FRETILIN fighter. He claims he was beaten at an army post in Dili and was then stripped, had his arms and feet tied, and was underwater in a tank for long intervals.

Mr. Koentarso, the Indonesian ambassador to the UNHCR [UN Human Rights Commission], said that Mr. Guterres's testimony before the commission last year was not credible.

In sum, then, the article features themes, content and sources that can be seen to mobilize reader attention toward the human suffering of "prisoners" within East Timor. It begins and ends with official accounts, which cast doubt upon these themes, content and sources. The photo that accompanies the article, rather than conveying a merely neutral impression, seems incongruent with the accounts featured within the article. Concurrently, the article provides details relating to only three individuals, and does not connect these cases, the stories of the "tortured prisoners," to the larger story of invasion, occupation and near-genocide.

XIII. Analysis of Article #13 – December 6, 1988

On December 6, 1988, on the thirteenth anniversary of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the *Globe and Mail* published a report written by Elaine Briere. At the time this article was published Briere was coordinator of the East Timor Alert Network, funded by the Canadian Council of Churches. Briere had been in

East Timor prior to the Indonesian invasion, working on a photo-documentary of village life within the territory. The article is headlined: “Tribulations of a tiny nation, Why does Canada condone the subjugation of East Timor?” (A7). It is accompanied by a photo of a Timorese villager, and the photo caption reads: “Youthful member of a Timorese hill tribe: a peaceful nation whose 700,000 people were reduced by one-third.” The first third of the article accurately overviews the historical facts of the Indonesian invasion.

Briere provides details on the death toll within East Timor, and explicitly links the death toll to induced starvation. Concurrently, she notes that FRETILIN was not a “communist” party, which contradicts official representations. This information is presented within paragraphs five through seven of the article, which read as follows:

The Catholic Church and human rights groups estimate that 200,000 people have died in East Timor since 1975 as a result of massacres, famine and confinement in military-controlled ‘strategic’ hamlets. Before the invasion, the entire population numbered just under 700,000.

Indonesia claims it invaded East Timor because FRETILIN was Communist, but FRETILIN was really a populist Roman Catholic nationalist movement. Its leaders first focused their appeals for support not on the Communist bloc, but on countries such as Australia and on the United Nations – in both cases, to no avail.

In June 1976, with less than 20 percent of the country under its control, Indonesia unveiled its true intentions by convening a ‘People’s Assembly’ to agree to the annexation of East Timor. This act was witnessed by a handful of diplomats and journalists taking part in the first of Indonesia’s carefully stage-managed visits to the area.

Despite the question posed in the article's headline, on why Canada has acted as it had with regard to East Timor, only two lines of the article (which make up paragraph nine) are actually devoted to addressing this question. Paragraph nine reads as follows:

Western countries have been slow to criticize Indonesia because of close business ties. Canada and the United States - among the larger investors - have never rebuked Indonesia for its attack even though it was committed in direct violation of the UN's two most basic tenants: integrity of territory and the right to self-determination.

No additional information on the Canada-Indonesia relationship is provided within the article. The PM predicts that such connections would not be made. The article's headline also conforms to the predictions of the PM, by characterizing the near-genocide in East Timor as the "tribulations of a tiny nation."

Two months earlier, in November 1988, Elaine Briere had published an article in *Briarpatch*, a Canadian alternative media publication, which had been accompanied by a headline that was much more forceful and suggestive: "East Timor: Genocide continues."

XIV. Analysis of Article #14 - September 25, 1989

On September 25, 1989, the *Globe and Mail* published an article by correspondent Edith Terry, headlined "East Timor problems haunt Indonesia, blight international image" (A10). The article is by-lined out of Laspalos,

Indonesia, which is significant because it endorses Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, conveying the preferred reading that East Timor is legally a province of Indonesia. The report does feature critical historical context, but does not humanize the East Timorese in such a way so as to inspire reader sympathy, outrage or emotional connection. Conforming to the predictions of the PM, the article's first lead and first four full paragraphs actually do just the opposite, conveying the impression that all is "normal" in East Timor. Terry implies that the East Timorese are apparently so happy that they are dancing and partying long into the night. The article begins with a description of the conditions Terry observes within the "oasis"— one of the words Terry uses in describing East Timor. The lead and ensuing paragraphs read as follows:

Deep into the night, raucous yells split the air. A community dance has become an excuse for an all-night party.

At dawn the next morning, two Timorese sisters, Carla and Indrawarti, lead a visitor to the Lospalos market.

They wave at friends, play with a tethered fawn and chatter in Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesian, even a little English. One is named after her father, the other is named after an Indonesian folk heroine.

The children and the town of Lospalos are an oasis of normalcy in a beleaguered land.

Nearly 14 years after its invasion by Indonesia, East Timor remains a territory under the heavy hand of military occupation. It has become a problem that will not go away, blighting Indonesia's international image and confounding efforts to correct it.

The article's lead and first three paragraphs paint East Timor as an "oasis of normalcy." Terry gives the impression that the parents of normal East Timorese are likely to name their children after Indonesian folklore heroines, as the parents of the young girl noted here had done. Obviously the transition from the idyllic scenario constructed within the first several paragraphs to mentioning of the invasion is jarring. Terry provides no relevant details here on the historical or diplomatic context, aside from pointing out that East Timor "has become a problem."

Later in the article Terry addresses the invasion and annexation in greater detail and acknowledges that most outside observers view Indonesian's annexation of East Timor as staged and fraudulent. Paragraphs thirteen through fifteen of the article read as follows:

Old wounds linger on the island. In December 1975, Indonesia quelled an indigenous independent movement led by the socialist FRETILIN party, landing tens of thousands of troops on the island.

Seven months later, the government proclaimed East Timor as the 27th Indonesian province after conducting an unmonitored referendum that most observers dismiss as polite fiction.

Throughout the late 1970s, East Timor was a battle zone. The Indonesian military used starvation as well as firepower to suppress FRETILIN. According to government statistics, the population fell to 555,000 in 1980 from 627,000 in 1973.

AI's estimate of the death toll (approx. 200,000) is not cited within the article (Amnesty International, 1985). The only death toll estimate given is the

Indonesian number - 72,000. By invading East Timor, Indonesia had violated the UN Charter, and was thus in violation of international law. This basic fact is also not present within the article. Nor are any details on the Canada-Indonesia relationship included within the article. Again Canada is not linked to the events in East Timor in any way.

It is interesting that here Terry acknowledges that Indonesia's annexation of East Timor has been dismissed by most "as polite fiction" - interesting because within the articles that followed this piece, Terry refers to the annexation as if it is merely an objective historical fact to be taken for granted.

XV. Analysis of Article #15 - September 26, 1989

On September 26, 1989, the *Globe and Mail* published another article by correspondent Edith Terry reporting on the upcoming papal visit, scheduled for October 12, 1989. The central focus of the article is an interview with Bishop Belo of East Timor but Terry provides only four excerpts from the interview and only two lines of the article even mention human rights violations in East Timor. The article is headlined "East Timor tense on eve of visit by Pope" (A12) and is accompanied by a photo of Bishop Belo. In the photo, Bishop Belo is smiling and appears happy. This is significant and, again, conforms to the predictions of the PM.

Also significant is the fact that the article is by-lined from "Dili, Indonesia." By representing East Timor's capital city as a province of Indonesia

within the by-line, the *Globe and Mail* is effectively endorsing Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor and rewriting history in the process. As noted above, however, this is consistent with the official discourse and with the *Globe and Mail's* catalogue of East Timor coverage.

The article's second paragraph provides a quote from Bishop Belo, but Terry adds that Bishop Belo is "reluctant to talk" about East Timor, presumably explaining why the article conveys virtually no information whatsoever relating to the human rights situation in East Timor. Immediately after this, Terry writes that Bishop Belo talked "for an hour" about East Timor. No account is given on what was actually said beyond this. From the lead down, the first paragraphs of the article read as follows:

Settling into a rattan chair that has seen better days, Carlos Felipes Ximenes Belo, Bishop of East Timor, chooses his words carefully.

'Our situation is very delicate here. I don't want to have more troubles,' he says, explaining why he is reluctant to talk.

The bishop agrees to the interview, but his conversation is broken by long pauses and he responds warily. His eyes say more.

Still, the bishop is among the most talkative Timorese encountered in about a week of travel in the former Portuguese colony.

For an hour, Bishop Belo spoke about the mood as the province awaits a papal visit on October 12.

It is significant that Terry opted to include only one quote from Bishop Belo in the article's opening paragraphs, one that effectively says nothing.

Concurrently, Terry refers to East Timor as “the province” without any qualification. The significance of referring to East Timor as a province of Indonesia here is that it is presuppositional. Noting this is both useful and crucially important toward providing a linguistic understanding of the common-sense reading of such texts. There is no mention of the ten UN resolutions calling upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. There is no mention of the fact that Indonesia was, according to the most basic precepts of international law, illegally occupying the territory even as this interview was taking place.

In the next paragraphs, Terry actually states that East Timor is a province of Indonesia. Continuing from the above extract, the article reads as follows:

The event has explosive potential.

East Timor is the Indonesian province where Catholicism is the dominant religion.

The Indonesian government hopes that the Pope’s visit will show the world that its 14-year rule has been a success.

Terry does not explain what is to be inferred from “explosive potential” as no additional explanation is provided on this. With reference to the PM, there is perhaps little that needs to be said here.

Terry repeatedly states that East Timor is a province of Indonesia, even though the article itself is written in such a way to imply that it is structured around Terry’s interview with Bishop Belo.

Bishop Belo, one of the most outspoken critics of Indonesia and long-time supporter of East Timor's right to self-determination, would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for his tireless efforts to help free East Timor.

Of all the historical elements that could have been incorporated within the lead paragraphs, Terry chose to mention only religious orientation. Not present here, even though it can be seen to be directly relevant, is the fact that the Pope himself had agreed to visit Indonesia only on the condition that he be permitted to give a mass in East Timor. As noted, Terry neglects to mention that the UN had never recognized Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. Terry also leaves out the fact that the Pope himself also did not recognize East Timor's incorporation.

The absence and misrepresentation of historical and political facts are striking, as is Terry's characterization of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, which is simply referred to as its "14-year rule." A clearer example of propaganda it would be difficult to find.

XVI. Analysis of Article #16 – September 28, 1989

Two days later, on September 28, 1989, the *Globe and Mail* published another article by Edith Terry, by-lined out of Baucau, Indonesia, headlined: "Military in East Timor seeks human face for harsh presence" (A13). This article is not about East Timor per se, but I have included it within the sample for three reasons: (1) Baucau is about 120 KM east of Dili, and this article's by-line misrepresented East Timor as a province of Indonesia, thereby endorsing

Indonesia's illegal occupation of the territory; (2) "East Timor" is mentioned within the article's headline; and (3) five paragraphs of the article are specifically devoted to East Timor. The article is primarily about Indonesian troops and does not address the human rights situation within East Timor, but it does include information relating to FRETILIN.

The article's lead and first three full paragraphs illustrate the absence of historical context and read as follows:

Caught by surprise, the *bupati* of Baucau comes to the door, in an old T-shirt and shorts.

Herman Seryono changes swiftly into a uniform more befitting his status as the highest government official in Baucau, East Timor's fourth-largest district.

As the decade-long battle against the Timorese independence movement winds down, the army had adopted public relations to put a human face on martial law.

Mr. Soryono, a Japanese who was nominally elected to his job last March, has been busy since then coming up with ways to revive tourism, expand agriculture, and develop a handicrafts industry.

These paragraphs are significant for several reasons. They conform to the predictions advanced by the PM regarding the boundaries of debate and worthy and unworthy victims. No information relating to Indonesia's occupation of East Timor is included. Terry states that resistance to Indonesia's take-over, ongoing since the 1975 invasion, was at this time diminishing. Terry does not indicate the sources for this information. Bishop Belo would certainly not have said that resistance to Indonesian-rule was diminishing. As noted, Terry had spoken to Bishop Belo only days before this article was written. It is also

significant that Terry indicates that the “independence movement” had been underway for a “decade” – presumably meaning only since 1979. This, again, is simply incorrect – not true.

East Timor is mentioned within paragraphs nine through thirteen of the article, which read as follows:

For 14 years, Indonesia has justified its military presence in East Timor by pointing to continued resistance by fragments of the socialist FRETILIN party, which now styles itself the “nationalist army”.

With numbers estimated at a few hundred, the FRETILIN threat is so diminished that the army is reorganizing the special commando unit based in East Timor.

But the Indonesian armed forces are having a hard time letting go.

Sources say that East Timor has become too valuable for the military to abandon. The rugged terrain is ideal for training exercises. Commercially, the martial law regime has been lucrative.

The military is said to control PT Denok Hernandez International, the largest company in East Timor, which has a monopoly of all shipping trade in East Timor. Local stores in Dili are filled with Gucci and Rolex watches and electric equipment from Singapore, prices few can afford.

The absence of historical context and incorrect information advanced within this article conform to the predictions of the PM.

XVII. Analysis of Article #17 – September 30, 1989

On September 30, 1989, the *Globe and Mail* published another article by Edith Terry, headlined: “Military in East Timor pays little attention to top-ranking civilian” (A9). Here again, the article is by-lined out of Dili, Indonesia. This is a significant recurring dimension of the data. Representing East Timor as a province of Indonesia effectively signaled endorsement and thereby can be seen to have legitimized Indonesia’s occupation. As should now be clear, this is a reoccurring feature of the news discourse.

This article again features no information on the victims of Indonesia’s assault on East Timor, nor does it include any information relating to the UN resolutions on East Timor. Connections to Canada are again also not present in any way. The article can be seen to carry forward themes Terry set out to establish in her earlier articles, namely that life within East Timor was now very “normal.” The article’s lead and first full paragraph read as follows:

In the Governor’s office, the curtains are drawn against the afternoon sunlight. Aides have been sent away. When he speaks to the foreign press, Governor Mario Viegas Carrascalao insists on privacy.

The highest-ranking civilian official in East Timor has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the transition back to normalcy after 14 years of rule by the Indonesian armed forces.

In terms of providing information on the economic context, paragraphs twelve through fourteen of the article are significant. Although economic linkages to Canada and the US are not present in the article, information on the domestic economic context is present. Terry writes that,

Although East Timor is one of Indonesia's poorest provinces, with an average annual income of \$152, it has become a lucrative fiefdom for the military. For one thing, East Timor receives the highest per capita financing of any Indonesian province. In an average year, direct government subsidies amount to \$32 million.

Besides the stream of government cash, the military has established lucrative freeholds in coffee and timber. It also monopolizes the import and export business . . . The official monopoly, controlled by the military, rakes in huge profits by importing duty-free goods from Singapore and selling them at large mark-ups.

The presence of this information within the article is noteworthy, as the domestic economic context has not been a significant feature within the *Globe and Mail* catalogue of East Timor news coverage. Again, Terry's reference to East Timor as a province of Indonesia can be seen to endorse Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor. This is a glaring feature of the data that may be viewed as propagandistic, conforming to the predictions of the PM.

XVIII. Analysis of Article #18 – October 25, 1989

On October 25, 1989, the *Globe and Mail* published an extremely small article reporting on former Australian diplomat James Dunn's visit to Canada. The article, authored by *Globe and Mail* staff reporter Charlotte Montgomery, is headlined: "Canada ignoring occupation of East Timor, author says" (A4). This is the first article that the newspaper had published since the Elaine Briere article of one year earlier that features information on Canada's complicity in the East Timor near-genocide.

Given the minimal coverage that was accorded East Timor within the Canadian media and the virtually non-existent coverage of Canada's relationship to the events there, it is easy to understand why East Timor was "forgotten" or "hidden."

In order to fully convey just how brief this article is, I include the entire text here:

Canada and other Commonwealth countries are risking hypocrisy when they denounce South Africa over apartheid but ignore Indonesia and East Timor, a former Australian diplomat says.

East Timor, a tiny former Portuguese territory that was invaded in 1975 by neighboring Indonesia and annexed the following year, has been largely forgotten, in part because other countries do not want to upset the pro-Western Indonesian government, said James Dunn, a former Australian consul to East Timor.

'Nobody has anything like the loss of life there was in Timor,' Mr. Dunn said. 'It was blatant, so brutal. Those people who did all the bloodshed are still running things . . . Let's call a brutal rape a brutal rape and not say, "Well, things are better now . . ."'

Estimates of the number of Timorese killed in the war that followed Indonesia's invasion range as high as 250,000. The United Nations repeatedly has endorsed East Timor's right to self-determination and has called for a withdrawal of Indonesian troops.

Canada, which essentially has ignored the issue, has significant trade, investment and aid with Indonesia.

Jose Guterres, an East Timorese resident from Portugal and a supporter of FRETILIN, the Front for an Independent East Timor, said in an interview the organization wants a referendum to determine East Timor's fate.

'I can bet my life that people would not want to be part of Indonesia,' Mr. Guterres said.

Mr. Dunn, an author who now works with the non-governmental Human Rights Council of Australia, and Mr. Guterres were in Canada for a series of public meetings intended to raise awareness of the issue of East Timor.

Several elements of this article can be seen to conform to predictions advanced by the PM. First, the article is extremely brief, as the PM would predict, given that the article relates to "Canada ignoring [the] occupation of East Timor," which the article's headline makes explicit. Second, only one line within the article actually reports on how Canada is linked to East Timor and Indonesia - only cursory facts are provided here, no details or elaboration. Third, the article gives the death toll estimate, but does not include any additional content relating to the victims.

XIX. Analysis of Article #19 - November 12, 1991

The Santa Cruz (or Dili) massacre took place on November 12, 1991, when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on a memorial procession outside a Santa Cruz cemetery. Initial estimates of the number of civilian deaths ranged varied, ranging from 115 (Legal Aid Foundation, Indonesia) to 40 (official Indonesian estimate). The *Globe and Mail's* first news report on the massacre was carried from the Associated Press on November 13 and was headlined "East Timor troops fire on demonstrators, Dozens reported killed in protest against Indonesia's 15-year rule" (A13).

It is important to note that the task of writing newspaper headlines is an editorial responsibility. The troops referred to in the headline were Indonesian troops within East Timor, rather than “East Timor troops.” Given the work that newspaper headlines do in terms of influencing how readers come to view and understand the news (see Lee and Solomon, 1990, p. 35), this distinction is crucial. There were never any “East Timor troops.” The headline fundamentally mischaracterizes the central actors involved in the action that the headline itself addresses.

The article itself is predominantly structured around official Indonesian sources. Its lead is consistent with the headline, and reads as follows: “Soldiers in East Timor fired yesterday on pro-independence demonstrators wielding sticks, stones and knives, killing dozens of people protesting against Indonesia’s 15-year rule, officials said.” That it was actually Indonesian troops who fired on East Timorese civilians is never plainly stated. Context is created within which the massacre was not cold-blooded murder of innocent, unarmed civilians. The action is recast here within an interpretive framework that defines the military response as “self-defense.”

The article does not humanize the victims nor does it provide details of the violence. Names and ages of those killed are not reported within the article, although these details may have been not yet available at the time the article went to press. The article utilizes the words “fighting” and “clashes” to summarize the central action. Historical context is limited to paragraph eleven, in the article’s second column, where it is stated that Indonesia “sent troops to

intervene in the civil war [in East Timor] and then annexed the territory.” The article then states, “After the Indonesian invasion, farming came to a standstill, leading to widespread starvation.” Indonesia’s many military actions, such as its 1978 strategy of “encirclement and annihilation” (see Budiardjo, 1991:200), are not reported on, even though these can be seen to be directly relevant to the violence the article is reporting upon.

XX. Analysis of Article #20 – November 15, 1991

On November 15, 1991, the *Globe and Mail* published a highly critical background piece, written by Linda Hossie, headlined “Independence bid drenched in blood” (A13). The article highlights the death toll in East Timor and can be seen to humanize the victims of the Indonesian invasion and occupation.

The article notes that “birth control is imposed on Timorese women” and reports that the Indonesian invasion “violated two most basic United Nations principles: the right to self-determination and the integrity of territory.” Significantly, Western complicity is also addressed. Hossie writes, “UN resolutions condemning the invasion have consistently been resisted” by the US and “several of its allies, including Canada.”

The final two paragraphs of the article consider the diplomatic context in relation to political-economic dimensions. Hossie writes,

The explanation for this is widely thought to lie in Indonesia's strategic importance - its islands span seaways that link Japan and Middle Eastern oil fields - and the West's well-developed trade ties to the country.

Indonesia is the second largest recipient of bilateral Canadian foreign aid. Canada also has extensive business ties with Indonesia, including arms sales.

Themes of vested political-economic interests and political alliances are clearly present within this article.

The *Globe and Mail* published a second report by Linda Hossie the following day, on November 16, 1991. This article was headlined: "Condemn Indonesian action, Canada urged" (A13). Like the November 15 article, this piece was also critical and largely structured around accounts from FRETILIN founder Jose Luis Gutterres. The article's third paragraph quotes Gutterres as asking "Why doesn't Canada join the civilized world in denouncing the brutality in East Timor?"

XXI. Analysis of Dili Massacre Coverage in Other Canadian Dailies

On November 13, 1991, the *Montreal Gazette* carried a Reuters News Service report that can be seen to contrast sharply with the Associated Press report that was published by the *Globe and Mail*. The *Montreal Gazette* article was headlined "Soldiers open fire on Timorese protesters" (A16) and is by-lined out of Jakarta, but is structured around accounts from Portugal's President, Mario Soares, and a spokesperson for FRETILIN in Portugal. The article's lead reports on the massacre and does not favor official accounts. It reads as follows:

“Indonesian soldiers opened fire yesterday on a funeral procession of youths protesting against Jakarta’s rule over East Timor.” Present within the next paragraph is Soares’ condemnation of the attack.

On November 25 the *Toronto Star* published an investigative article by David Webster, headlined: “Ottawa reluctant to condemn killing in East Timor” (A17). When this article was published David Webster was a human rights researcher, activist and member of the East Timor Alert Network. Central to the article was the Canada-Indonesia relationship and its political-economic context. This article was followed by a letter of rebuttal by Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall, which was published on December 4 (A26).

The *Winnipeg Free Press* published a Canadian Press story on December 12 that reviewed the massacre from the perspective of Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman. Headlined “Eyewitnesses recall ‘unmitigated evil’ of East Timor killings,” the article is firmly critical and structured around quotes from the two eyewitness sources. Goodman is quoted in paragraph ten of the article as follows:

These were not a couple of renegade soldiers or hotheads who got carried away . . . They were extremely disciplined. They marched in formation, never skipping a beat. They spread out across the front of the demonstrators and started firing in cold blood.

Themes of atrocities, victimization and gross human rights violations are clearly evident in the Dili massacre coverage.

XXII. Conclusion

The data analysis presented above has been concerned to delineate the extent to which the *Globe and Mail's* treatment of the East Timor story can be seen to conform to or deviate from the PM's substantive predictions regarding patterns of media performance. The chapter has provided a story-by-story summation of the quantity and quality of the news coverage accorded East Timor by the *Globe and Mail* throughout the occupation period.

As noted within chapter two, the PM hypothesizes that how specific issues, events and actors are portrayed within media discourses will largely depend upon the interests of power within specific time/place contexts. The model hypothesizes that particular facts, details and/or arguments will fall outside the "boundaries of the expressible" and that there will be a very tight, controlled range of "permitted opinion" and debate within media discourses. Investigating omissions entails consideration of what is present within and absent from texts. The PM's methodological framework suggests key features of media texts that should be assessed: sources, emphasis, placement, tone, fullness of treatment, context, range of debate and evident omissions are all observable dimensions that have been qualitatively assessed within this chapter. As indicated above, articles were published throughout the decade marking the occupation period which did not clearly conform to the PM's substantive predictions. What conclusions may therefore be drawn from the data?

The PM predicts that coverage of unworthy victims will feature “only slight detail, minimal humanization, and little context that will excite or enrage” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 35), as noted within chapter two of the dissertation and restated above. The analysis set out within this chapter has been concerned to explore the data in relation to this prediction. It was discovered that a number of articles and headlines were published throughout the occupation period did humanize and/or provide context relating to the victims of the Indonesian invasion and occupation, such as the December 7, 1985 article by Derek Rasmussen, which carried the headline “East Timor, A tragedy ignored,” and also the September 3, 1983 headline: “UN told of torture, killing in East Timor.”

Headlines are crucially important, as noted above, again within chapter two of the dissertation, given the significant roles that headlines play in generating and organizing reader attention as well as in shaping reader understanding and interpretation of news events/stories. Thus, it seems important to acknowledge the additional headlines that drew attention to the atrocities and extensive human rights violations that were being perpetrated within the illegally occupied territory, most notably “Witnesses tell of East Timor torture” (March 9, 1988) and “Independence bid drenched in blood” (Nov 15, 1991).

Other articles did not clearly conform to the predictions of the PM in terms of overall story content, such as those articles which included information on Canada’s multi-faceted involvement in the unfolding news

story. Bruce McDougall's January 10, 1983 article, headlined "Timor conflict clouds PM's visit," was the first article in the entire catalogue of *Globe and Mail* coverage since the invasion had taken place that centrally focused upon Canada's foreign policy position on East Timor. It was also the first (and last) article to mention that Canadian academics had largely ignored East Timor. The two Linda Hossie articles published in November 1991 also included information on Canada and the diplomatic context in relation to political-economic dimensions.

In other ways, however, the coverage published throughout the occupation period almost entirely conformed to the PM's substantive predictions. The systematic killing that accompanied the invasion and occupation of East Timor was left almost entirely unexamined (see particularly the articles published on March 9, 1988 and September 30, 1989). As noted within chapter two, the PM attaches particular importance to photographs and the inclusion and/or absence of photographs within news texts, as visual imagery can powerfully organize reader attention, awareness and interpretation of news events. The photo included within the February 6, 1982 article is therefore especially noteworthy for two reasons: because the photograph caption indicated that the woman in child captured within the photo were "victims" and because appeared healthy and also relatively happy within this photograph. In terms of the PM's substantive predictions, the low volume of coverage accorded East Timor throughout this decade is an important feature of the data.

Official discourse continued to constitute the majority of the “news” on East Timor presented within the *Globe and Mail*. With rare exception, the range of coverage conformed to the PM’s substantive predictions regarding the “boundaries of debate” and unworthy victims. Absence of context, criticism and humanization were clear features of articles that conformed to the PM. Edith Terry’s September 25, 1989 article is nicely illustrative: it actually described occupied East Timor as an “oasis.”

Most of the headlines published throughout the occupation period were entirely neutral and did not include language that humanized the victims of the Indonesian occupation. One headline (November 15, 1991) officially endorsed the Indonesian annexation of East Timor in reporting on the Dili massacre, referring to Indonesian soldiers as “East Timor troops.” East Timor was referred to as “Indonesia’s newest province” in 1984, within the Bryan Johnson article. Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor was further endorsed several years later, in Edith Terry’s September 25, 1989 article. This was a reoccurring feature of the data, also evidenced vis-à-vis by-lines included within articles published on September 26, 28 and 30, 1989 that listed East Timor as a province of Indonesia – representing East Timor as, for instance, “Dili, Indonesia” – combining the illegally occupied territory place name with the illegal occupier in such a way so as to communicate in presuppositional terms that an annexation had previously lawfully occurred, while Indonesia was illegally occupying East Timor.

While several articles were published that did discuss Canada within the context of the invasion and occupation, the vast majority of articles included no relevant information on Canada's complicity in the near-genocide and/or made no connections between the events in East Timor and the Canada-Indonesia relationship (as noted, for example, within the articles published on December 10, 1981; February 6, 1982; January 28, 1983; February 10, 1984; December 21, 1985). Other articles were structured almost entirely around official accounts (such as the January 12, 1983 and February 10, 1984 articles by *Globe and Mail* staff reporter Bryan Johnson, and the September 26, 1989 article by correspondent Edith Terry). Most of the articles that did not clearly conform to the PM's predictions were not written by *Globe and Mail* staff reporters, suggesting that focusing upon who writes particular news articles is crucially important when undertaking news analysis.

The December 6, 1988 article by Elaine Briere, headlined "Tribulations of a tiny nation, Why does Canada condone the subjugation of East Timor?" provided additional information on East Timor and the Canada-Indonesia relationship. Despite the article's headline, only two lines of the article were devoted to discussing how Canada was involved in the story. The article's headline conforms to PM's predictions regarding unworthy victims vis-à-vis its characterization of the near-genocide in East Timor as simply the "tribulations of a tiny nation." As noted, Briere had published an article in *Briarpatch*, a Canadian alternative media publication, two months earlier which had been

accompanied by a headline that had been far more suggestive: “East Timor: Genocide continues.”

Globe and Mail staff reporter Charlotte Montgomery’s article published on October 25, 1989, headlined “Canada ignoring occupation of East Timor, author says,” is noteworthy because, despite the headline, only a single line within the article actually reported upon how Canada was involved with the story of East Timor and Indonesia. As noted above, only cursory facts were provided within this article, no details or elaboration, and the article also conformed to the PM’s predictions regarding unworthy victims.

The *Globe and Mail* editorial of January 9, 1987 also discussed Canada’s position on East Timor. That this was the first editorial the newspaper had devoted to East Timor, despite Canada’s voting record on East Timor resolutions at the UN and the extensive ties shared between Canada and Indonesia detailed within chapter three of the dissertation, supports the PM, particularly given that it was published over a decade after the invasion had taken place.

As noted throughout both this and the previous chapter, the vast majority of the articles within the catalogue of *Globe and Mail* coverage presented the story of East Timor as if Canada had no real connections to it whatsoever – such that Canada was for the most part not even mentioned.

Workplace Injury and the Ideological Formation of the Worker's Compensation Board¹

This chapter is concerned to assess ways in which the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, formerly the Workers Compensation Board (hereafter WCB/WSIB), operates as a power structure. The chapter demonstrates the ease with which traditional political-economic analysis may incorporate the PM, enabling additional explanatory power, bringing media analysis into studies that are centrally concerned to explore dimensions and impacts of dominant political-economic social structure(s) within contemporary society. The research presented within this chapter aims to demonstrate that the PM's utility, illustrating how the model may be usefully applied to domestic as opposed to international issues. The research explores the experiences and perceptions of injured workers in Canada with reference to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, formerly known as the Workers Compensation Board (hereafter referred to as WSIB). Following this, the chapter advances a preliminary assessment of the ideological formation of the WSIB in the Canadian news media.

¹ This chapter was originally published as "(Ghost in the Machine) An Assessment of the Physical, Emotional and Economic Impact(s) of Workplace Injury in Canada and Analysis of the Ideological Formation of the Ontario Workers Compensation Board" in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), *Bound by Power: Intended Consequences* (Montreal: Black Rose, 2006) and was co-authored with Jean and Teresa Chen. I was the principle author of the study and conceived of the idea for the research. I undertook (with Jean Chen) the ethnographic research for the study. Online references are cited with footnotes within this chapter.

In applying the PM, the primary goal is to delineate the extent to which workers' experiences were reflected in the newspaper coverage of the WCB/WSIB. The chapter considers the quantity of news coverage as well as thematic content and overall story treatment, providing a preliminary benchmark by which to assess the news coverage in relation to the economic, emotional and social impacts of workplace injury in Ontario, which the majority of the chapter is concerned to overview.

1. Historical Overview

For well over a century, workers have continuously fought for workplace health and safety. The Factory Act of 1804 was a vague system, one that favored the interests of employers, and only loosely regulated and enforced health and safety standards in factories. The Workmen's Compensation Board (WCB) in Ontario emerged in 1915 and was based upon a no fault system. Under this schema, workers were denied the right to sue their employers for workplace damages and injuries regardless of fault, in exchange for guaranteed 'compensation'.²

In theory, workers were to be *protected* against wage loss as they were to be *compensated* for lost (work) time, unusual medical expenses, and rehabilitation costs for the duration of their injuries, and compensation was to

² Workplace Safety & Insurance Board, 'Quick Guide,' 2005, <http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/Public/ReferenceQuickGuide> (Accessed: June 2005)

be scaled according to pre-injury income. But as many injured workers have experienced, the “system in action” has been anything but fair or straightforward with respect to its impact(s) on Ontario injured workers. It has, however, worked as intended, that is, quite wonderfully, for Ontario employers. Employers viewed WCB premiums as a fair trade-off for legal protection against possible litigation and liability incurred as the result of workplace injuries and wrongful deaths.

Consider how the system was described in the 1915 Ontario Workmen’s Compensation Board annual report:

Claims are expeditiously and inexpensively disposed of. Employers are immune from the expense and annoyance of litigation.³

Since the Board’s inception, there have been three name changes: from Workmen’s Compensation Board to Workers’ Compensation (WCB) to Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB).⁴ The first change was to reflect the increasing number of women in the workforce. The later change came into effect in 1998 due to the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act (Bill 99). Underlying Bill 99 was a mandate to prevent workplace injury and disease, assist in early and safe return to work for injured workers and to promotion of workplace safety education and training. This change constituted Ontario to be

³ Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, “Annual Report 2001,” [http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/LookupFiles/DownloadableFile2001AnnualReport/\\$File/AR2001e.pdf](http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/LookupFiles/DownloadableFile2001AnnualReport/$File/AR2001e.pdf) (Accessed: June 2005)

⁴ Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, “Quick Guide,” 2005.

the first province to drop “workers” and “compensation” from the name.⁵ By including the term “insurance,” there were clear implications of no fault and third party accountability.

The Ontario Ministry of Labor defines the WCB/WSIB as a public sector (statutory) organization that administers the *Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997* and the *Workers’ Compensation Act*.⁶ The WCB/WSIB has been and continued to be solely funded by employer premiums.⁷ Employers pay premium rates according to their industrial risks; compensation to injured workers is paid from this ‘common pool’. Although the WCB/WSIB is a corporation of the Province of Ontario, it is administered by an independent board of directors who advise on financial practices, health and safety polices, human resource functions, governance and policy matters, and investment policies.⁸

2. Bill 99 – The Workplace Safety and Insurance Act

January 1, 1998 marked a major setback in workers’ compensation rights. The Mike Harris government in Ontario passed Bill 99, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, a new statute that significantly impacted injured workers, and

⁵ Injured Workers Online, “POLITICS/Bill 99,” 1998, <http://www.injuredworkersonline.org/Politics/bill99.htm> (Accessed: June 2005)

⁶ Ontario Ministry of Labour, “The Ministry of Labour and Its Role,” 2005, http://www.gov.on.ca/LAB/english/hs/faq/faq_6.html (Access: May 2005)

⁷ Workplace Safety & Insurance Board, “Quick Guide.”

⁸ Workplace Safety & Insurance Board, “2004 Annual Report,” April 2005, p. 7, [http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/LookupFiles/DownloadableFile2004AnnualReport/\\$File/AnnualReport04.pdf](http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/LookupFiles/DownloadableFile2004AnnualReport/$File/AnnualReport04.pdf)

were inconsistent with the fundamental philosophical principles of the workers' compensation system as originally outlined by Sir William Meredith in 1913:

A just compensation law...ought to provide that the compensation should continue to be paid as long as the disability caused by the accident lasts, and the amount of compensation should have relation to the earning power of the injured workman.⁹

The Bill 99 legislation attacked workers' compensation from all angles - eligibility/qualification, privacy, benefit levels, appeal process, labour market re-entry and so forth. A six month time limit to file an application for benefits and appeal any decision made by the WSIB was introduced. Moreover, the legislation included a blanket rule that any decision made by the WSIB since 1914 would have to be appealed by June 30, 1998.¹⁰ Thereafter, all claim appeals would be considered inactive, and archived. The WCB/WSIB essentially wiped their hands clean of any responsibility to previous actions or decisions. Currently, if a claim is not filed within six months of the date of injury, workers are ineligible for any benefits whatsoever.

As of January 1, 1997, employers were saving 5% on their premiums, which accounted for approximately \$100 million every year.¹¹ These savings were not reinvested into workplace health and safety or into compensation benefits but rather employers' direct profit from every penny not paid into

⁹ Injured Workers Online, "POLITICS/Bill 99," 1998, <http://www.injuredworkersonline.org/Politics/bill99.htm>

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

workers' compensation. In fact, workers' compensation benefits have been reduced to 85% of net wages from the up to 90% currently paid.¹² Elizabeth Witmer, the Minister of Labour at the time, perhaps not surprisingly, saw fit to praise this (then) new system, stating that "the new Workplace Safety and Insurance Board will offer more competitive rates and *will better meet the needs of employers and injured workers*" (my emphasis).¹³

Bill 99 refused to recognize or compensate for chronic stress and also restricted entitlement for chronic pain disabilities.¹⁴ Although chronic stresses have increasingly become a workplace issue, they have been classified as not falling within the purview of workplace injury. It is questionable how WSIB can easily determine and consequently discount certain injuries as not constituting legitimate workplace injuries. Consistent with the historical record, Bill 99 continued to undercut workers and their injuries.

Interestingly, part of the WCB/WSIB's new mandate was to accelerate workers' return to work. Businesses unwilling to cooperate with this consequentially faced significant fines from the WCB/WSIB. Employers more so than ever exerted their power over workers, urging them to return back to work as quickly as possible, in order to save money on their WSIB assessments.

¹² Canadian Auto Workers Union, "Workers' Compensation in Canada. The New Millennium: Looking Backward, Looking Forward," <http://www.caw.ca/whatwedo/health&safety/newmillenium.asp>

¹³ Injured Workers Online, "POLITICS/Bill 99," 1998, <http://www.injuredworkersonline.org/Politics/bill99.htm>

¹⁴ Ibid.

Under Bill 99, workers were expected to return to work if “suitable employment was provided for them.”¹⁵ This provision was even applicable if a worker was not fully recovered from an injury/illness. Such policies presumably fail to acknowledge that if injured workers are unable to recuperate completely, their injuries may subsist and perhaps even worsen. Workers continued to be disadvantaged in returning to work, especially if placed in unsuitable work.

With Bill 99, injured workers are forced to forgo their privacy rights relating to some of their medical records.¹⁶ That injured workers’ medical records are no longer be private can be seen to be dehumanizing. The WCB/WSIB has gained the power to reserve the right to cut all benefits if an injured worker does not follow its plan for medical treatment.

From a broader prospective, statistically the actual number of injured workers is skewed and does not reflect the realities of the workplace. Although it is illegal for employers to stop claims for workplace injuries, this does not prohibit such actions from occurring. Employers now have extraordinary powers over workers. Doctors of their choice are selected to examine and assess injured workers. If workers object to this, employers may within four days request the assistance of WCB/WSIB, and order the worker to attend examination.¹⁷ Ultimately, refusal to cooperate prohibits benefit claims.

¹⁵ Canadian Auto Workers Union, “Claim Your Right. Workers’ Compensation in Ontario,” <http://www.caw.ca/whatwedo/health&safety/pdf/claimyourright.pdf>

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

The WCB/WSIB has implemented the New Experimental Experience Rating Plan (NEER) and CAD-7 so companies with a good accident record relative to the industry average receive rebates, and those with records below the average pay additional surcharges.¹⁸ Employers are not investing these rebates into prevention activities but instead focusing their efforts and resources into *claims control*. Similar to insurance schemes, employers now have incentive to take advantage of this reward system through deterrence or prevention of employees from reporting claims for workers' compensation benefits. Employers *today* often give employees "light duty work" and continue to pay full wages/salaries. *Now*, there is an *economic incentive* to do so.

Even when a claim has been filed, some employers have resorted to persuading doctors and the WCB/WSIB's appeals board to deny benefits and/or overturn decisions. In brief, the lower the workplace accident rate, the larger the premium rebate logic has consequentially lead to increased unreported claims, early but unsafe return to work, and greater imbalances within the system as a whole. Bill 99 dramatically eroded the workers' rights, and should be viewed as contributing toward the further deterioration of workplace health and safety in Canada. In unison, it increased the profits of corporations.

Following Bill 99, Bill C-45, an act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of organizations) came into effect on March 31, 2004.¹⁹ The legislative

¹⁸ Canadian Auto Workers Union, "Workers' Compensation in Canada . . ."

¹⁹ Department of JusticeCanada, "Section II: Changing the Law under Bill C-45," 2003, <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/c45/section02.html>

change has broadened the scope of entities and persons who are legally accountable if they fail to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of workers and the public. It is an extension criminal law duty in addition to all existing Occupational Health and Safety legislations in attempt to reflect the increasing complexity of current business structures.

Taking a step back, from a corporate standpoint, it was advantageous to commit workplace offences. First, employer fines for workplace-related offences, including workers' death due to negligence, were tax deductible.²⁰ Second, the fundamentals of the WCB/WSIB were based on "no fault" workplace insurance.²¹ As noted above, workers were prohibited from suing their employer for injuries and were limited by government policies and legislation. In contrast, employers strive to maximize their experience rating through appeals and manipulations. At the same time, as noted, they are spared "*the expense and annoyance of litigation.*"²² Lastly, prior to Bill C-45, criminal prosecution and conviction for workplace offences were inconceivable as employers were not personally accountable to their workers.²³

²⁰ Canadian Council for the Rights of Injured Workers, "National Campaign to Amend Canada's Criminal Code," 2001, <http://www.ccriw.com/english.html>

²¹ Ibid.

²² Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, "Annual Report 2001."

²³ Canadian Council for the Rights of Injured Workers, "National Campaign to Amend Canada's Criminal Code," 2001, <http://www.ccriw.com/english.html>

3. Original Ethnographic Research

Data for this research was drawn from a series of in-depth, unstructured, open-ended interviews. A total of 47 men/women who were injured and applied for compensation or were spouses of injured workers were interviewed. A higher percentage of males were interviewed than females. The research was undertaken over a 14-month timeframe. Demographics varied. Participants varied widely in terms of age and occupation. Participants were given details on the nature of the study and each gave their consent to be interviewed for this research. The interviews were conducted in various locations: from the homes of the participants to local coffee shops. Interviews were recorded and later transcribed, and then kept in a secure environment. All identifying names have been removed, in order to ensure the anonymity of participants. All details on how injuries occurred were also removed. Absolute confidentiality was guaranteed to those interviewed and all identifying information has been excised.

A principle aim of this research is to give voice to Ontario injured workers themselves - many have experienced what we term a “culture of fear” - which has gained wide currency in Ontario. Many, many injured workers are afraid to talk openly about their (forced) interactions with the WCB/WSIB; they fear possible consequences. Their stories are told here, whenever possible, in their own words.

4. Workplace Safety in Ontario – minimizing the costs of injured workers' claims and maximizing corporate profits

Workplace injury is pervasive across Canada. In the province of Ontario, Canada, it is estimated that 'one person dies every day . . . as a result of work-related injury, and there are three accidents per working day that result in amputation.'²⁴

The research indicates that many injured workers are made to feel at fault for their injuries. Many experienced varying degrees of hostility from their employers subsequent to their injuries.

All [the] company said when I got injured was it wasn't their fault and 'he' meaning me must have done something wrong.

One respondent recalled being injured so seriously that he was brought to the hospital via ambulance. His employer did not contact his partner to alert her of his injuries:

I was taken by ambulance to the hospital and no one even called my wife to tell her I was hurt. I was laying there in the hospital bed and I didn't know if I would be able to walk again.

Another reflected upon the events that immediately followed his accident. He stated that his employer appeared to be more concerned with liability than his physical and emotional recovery.

After my injury they went around to co-workers and got statements of what they witnessed. Then everything was documented. My foreman didn't even bother to call me to see how I was doing. I was in bed for six weeks . . . they

²⁴ Robin Kalbfleisch, "Staking a claim on safety," <http://www.benefitscanada.com/content/legacy/Content/1998/07-98/ben292.html>

want to get everything they can, anything they can try to use against you . . .

Other respondents reported coercion and intimidation, designed to force them back to work early. Various methods were utilized to legitimately terminate injured workers subsequent to their injuries. More than one respondent reported on attempts to sabotage; injured workers were assigned jobs that they were physically incapable of performing due to their injuries.

My former supervisor from [place of employment] came up to years after I stopped working, at a coffee shop. He told me that management had instructed him to give me a job on the line that they knew I couldn't handle because of my injury. They did it so it would look like I wasn't doing my job. He actually told me that they had set me up. It was all planned. Even though they could have given me light duty. They wanted to push me out. He apologized to me, said it had always bothered him.

Strategic termination was not an uncommon theme uncovered throughout the course of this research.

When my husband came back from assessment at [deleted] hospital, he was deemed fit for light duty work. For a period of a few months he was put to work on a machine that he had to use his injured leg, which of course he couldn't do. The company knew this. After being employed there for 26 years, they tried to terminate him. Instead, the union took action, and he had to apply for disability pension. However, this pension of \$460.08 a month is never indexed. They could have given him light duty work for four years and he could have retired with full pension and all benefits. By doing what they did if he were to pass away, I lose all my health benefits . . . for drugs, eye glasses, and all extended benefits. If they had simply let him retire with the 30 year early retirement, I would have been entitled to full benefits for life, unless I remarried. So where does that leave me, if I become ill later? It's so unfair, and I worry about it because my husband is extremely ill and has been for some time.

Respondents felt abandoned by their employers, when they were at their most vulnerable moments. For some, this was (initially) unexpected. A number of injured workers said they had not expected their employers to utilize underhanded tactics designed to terminate them, because they had been loyal employees prior to their injuries. Injured workers were given minimal support at the time of their injuries and throughout the recovery phases.

5. Physical Impacts of Workplace Injury

Respondents indicated that their injuries had caused permanent disability and lasting physical pain.

My baby girl was born shortly after. She was so little, but I had trouble even sitting up in bed. I couldn't hold her. All I could do was lie there. It was so hard.

As one injured worker said, "I still can't turn my head, 23 year later." Physical pain was a pervasive element, repeatedly touched upon.

My head was off to the side for 15 years after the injury. I couldn't turn forward, I couldn't straighten my neck. I felt depressed, because I was in constant pain. I started taking a lot of heavy medications, pain killers. They didn't help. Well, they dulled the pain for a while. But nothing numbed it. It's still there . . .

Many of the injured workers interviewed reported that they have taken or are currently taking a litany of medications, prescribed to help alleviate pain caused by their injuries. Some indicated dependence on prescription pain-killer drugs; the result of long-term use. This was a recurrent theme.

I have to take at least fifteen to twenty pills a day to reduce the pain. It hurts so much. Some days I can't get up to even go down the stairs.

The spouse of one injured worker we interviewed told us that the surgery required to treat her husband's injuries entailed severe risk, which could have compounded his situation, rendering him paralyzed.

He had a 50/50 chance of being in a wheelchair after. In the back of my mind I was worried. He could have been paralyzed. It could also have affected his prostate, urinary tract, and even caused possible brain damage.

Another respondent conveyed similar fears about corrective surgery: "I was scared about being paralyzed during surgery for my back. One day I was healthy and walking fine. The next thing I knew, they were telling me that I could be in a wheelchair for the rest of my life." Yet another respondent indicated that the surgical procedures advised and undertaken in response to his initial injury caused additional physical damage:

I had a spinal infusion to stop the pain. It was more of a detriment, because my nerve was pinched. Now I'm in more pain. It's constant.

It was clear and evident in speaking with the injured workers that many are forced to live with ongoing pain and continue to experience it on a daily basis. Even more daunting for some was contending with the limited options presented to them on how to medically correct their injuries. In some cases, when respondents were faced with decisions on whether to undergo invasive medical procedures, they chose not to, wanting to avoid the risk of physically debilitating themselves further.

6. The Political-Economic Context

Since injured workers in Ontario cannot litigate against their employers for physical injuries sustained on the job, they are compelled to seek compensation from the WCB/WSIB. A very prominent theme in the injured workers' stories told to us focused upon the degradation and frustration that virtually all respondents associated with the WCB/WSIB. This followed from their highly negative experiences with the WCB/WSIB during their assessments and rehabilitation. A common concern was the invasion of personal privacy. One injured worker stated that the claims process was so dehumanizing and degrading that he was made to feel as if he was "this big" – the respondent gestured with his index finger and thumb to visually mark how emotionally demeaning he felt the process to be. Feedback indicated that this experience was common. Numerous respondents felt persecuted.

No one wants to deal with them [the WCB/WSIB] unless you have to. I had no choice but to apply for compensation.

One injured worker stated: "[The claim process] was the worst, humiliating experience that a man could go through . . . the most humiliating experience a man could go through. [All of it was] just so degrading." Another conveyed: "You don't want to be disabled – no one wants to be disabled."

Another respondent discovered shortly after making his initial WCB/WSIB claim that the process was much more involved and exasperating than he had initially anticipated. He had no choice but to make a claim for compensation. Reflecting upon his involvement with the WCB/WSIB thus far, he stated:

Initially I went into it, I thought it wouldn't be like it was. I thought, because I was truly hurt, compensation would help. That they were there to help. But that's not the way the process works. I learned the hard way. I have to watch what I say because it's frustrating. They tried every which way to discredit me and to discount my injury. I often said things in frustration when I was dealing with those people. Finally, after one specialist said, you are really hurt, they laid off. Then they were satisfied. But before that, it was every day, you wake up and deal with it again.

This respondent believed that after he was legitimately injured at his workplace and unable to return to work he would be able to access adequate compensation for his injury. However he soon discovered that getting fair compensation for his (life-long) injuries was not an easily accomplished feat.

Other respondents echoed the same level of frustration with the system of compensation stating that the process was demeaning in that representatives from the WCB/WSIB treated the injured workers as though they were deviants making fraudulent claims. Respondents encountered condescending case-workers who treated them as if they were submitting false claims to obtain illegitimate monies from the WCB/WSIB. One respondent stated:

They beat you down, and take away everything. They treat you like nothing is wrong with you even when there is. [They] treat you like you're okay. Even a criminal isn't guilty until he's proven guilty. When you're on compensation, you're not innocent. They make you feel guilty, as if you're doing something wrong. That's the way they make you feel, like a crook.

Another injured worker added:

You're treated like a second class citizen trying to commit a crime - fraud.

This was a common, pervasive theme:

They're not going to just give you money. You have to fight with them all the time. Those people are so arrogant. They're getting their paychecks and don't give a shit about you. It's like a group mind, I swear to God. They're just part of the WCB machine. They're like robots . . .

Another likened the WCB/WSIB to a “bully” – virtually every injured worker interviewed cited personal experiences with intimidation and scare tactics as mechanisms of control and coercion.

In school there's always a kid who's a bully around the schoolyard that everyone's scared of and no one wants to anger. WCB is just as bad as that bully. They try to scare you and intimidate you, to tell them what they want to hear. They want you to tell them that you're faking your injury, and that you can go back to work, even when you can't. The whole system is that bully from the schoolyard.

Many respondents resented the fact that they were assumed to be guilty of fraud when in fact they were truly in pain. Many felt the assessment process intrusive.

Several indicated that the WCB/WSIB had hired private investigators to park in front of their homes, to watch them interacting with their families. The injured workers were infuriated with the intrusive measures taken by the WCB/WSIB. They felt this violated their privacy and human rights.

They [the WCB/WSIB] treated me like a criminal who broke the law . . . like I was trying to commit fraud and also when I was back home they put private investigators in front of my home to watch me.

Injured workers widely reported being made to feel immoral and fraudulent. They conveyed great levels of frustration, especially those who felt violated twice-over, by both case-workers *and* private investigators hired to spy on them.

One investigator came to my house and said he was from head office of WCB who was here to help us with my claim. He came over to our house and interrogated me and my wife about what we were going to do about the claim and how I was doing. He was watching everything I was doing when he was at the house. We ran into him a year and a half later at a meeting for injured workers and he was not the man he said he was. It came out that he was an investigator who worked at the local office and he was not sent to my house to help me with my claim but to see if I was doing something I wasn't supposed to be doing.

Another respondent stated:

I was sitting in my kitchen and noticed someone was fixing the telephone pole in front of my house. I thought nothing of it, just thought it was some city worker. Well, as I'm drinking my coffee I see him taking pictures of me. I called the police and they said that the guy was a hired investigator.

A majority of the respondents also candidly recalled the way in which the health care professionals had treated them - very callous, prejudicial and dismissive upon first meeting. The process of simply being assessed for injury was highly degrading for many.

As one respondent recollected:

Doctors at the WCB assess you like you're really not even a human-being with feelings and rights. They don't really even talk to you like a person. You're just something they need to do to get through their day. They don't care about you. They said to me, 'Your neck is worth a certain

percentage and your legs are worth another percentage . . . ' They break your body into pieces and give some limbs more money than others . . . not even like you're a whole person, they just care about parts of you.

Another interviewee echoed similar sentiments:

They degrade your body like a piece of meat. You feel that, the way they pick apart your body, that you're at the butcher's. And depending on which part they see as more valuable, you get more money for this, even though the pain is everywhere, all the time . . . everything in chronic pain, they don't care, and they can't ever give you enough money to cover the pain you have . . .

A majority of the respondents reported that health care professionals were unprofessional and treated the injured workers as if they were "second-class citizens." One respondent articulated her thoughts on how she was treated during her assessment:

They're not by any means compassionate. They don't care, the pain they cause. They want to see you cringe, to see if your injury really bugged you up.

Another stated:

The way he talked to me was unreal . . . the doctor said to me... 'You know what people think of people who are on compensation? People don't have a really high view of people on compensation.'

Several respondents described the health care professionals who conducted their assessments as biased. Many workers stated that the medical assessors minimized the workers' injuries in favor of the WCB/WSIB.

I had to go see the WCB doctor . . . it's up to them how much [money] you get, up to their discretion how much pension you'll get. If you get a nasty doctor that thinks you're faking your injury, they will assess such low rate, and if you want

more you have to fight so hard to get more . . . [this involves] appeals [and] long drawn out court processes . . . adjudicators . . . and [further] appeals . . . and I didn't have any money. What could I do?

Many respondents reported being forced to physically exert themselves even though they were not physically capable of performing such exercises and routines during the assessments. One respondent said that during her assessment she was repeatedly asked to perform tasks that were incredibly painful. When she refused, the doctor was unsympathetic.

He forced me to do things that I just couldn't physically do. I remember, I was peddling on a bike. You know, one of those exercise bikes. And my legs were so injured that I couldn't peddle forward. All I could do was peddle backward. The doctor kept on telling me peddle forward. I told him I couldn't. He kept on saying try it forward, do it forward. But I couldn't. Do it, he insisted.

Another injured worker stated that she was in so much pain during one of the examinations with a health care specialist that she was almost in tears:

He pressed my back so goddamn hard I was screaming. He put me on a table, where my head went down into a recessed hole. Then he came right down on top of me and pushed with his thumbs all the way down my neck and back. I screamed . . . I couldn't help it. I can't describe how much it hurt.

Graphic accounts of pain were common throughout the interview process.

The nurse put me through exercises. She kept on pushing on it [leg] She kept pushing, and pulling. I told her to stop but she wouldn't. The doctor finally said to stop, and she finally did. I had tears in my eyes because of the pain.

An overwhelmingly number of injured workers interviewed indicated that the claims process was physically laborious and emotionally trying, not

just for the individual making the claim but for their whole family. One injured worker told us that it was “extremely emotional, dealing with all the reassessments. It definitely effects your mental health. It affects your family.”

Injured workers who attended the WCB/WSIB Rehabilitation Hospital reported extremely caustic experiences throughout the rehabilitation phases of their treatment.

When I came home from the [rehabilitation] hospital I was in so much pain and was so infuriated by the doctors at that place. They were drilling me about how I was injured and what was injured. I came home and collapsed. My wife found me at the bottom of the stairs. I couldn't move. I had a heart condition. They didn't care.

Numerous injured workers stated that they were watched constantly by staff and health care professionals at the WCB/WSIB rehabilitation hospital:

They watch every move you make. If you bend over the wrong way, too much or too fast, they say you're faking the injury.

One injured worker felt like he couldn't trust anyone at the compensation hospital:

I felt like I couldn't trust anyone there [at the rehabilitation hospital]...I made one friend who I could trust in there . . . you really have to watch who you talk to.

A respondent recalled a WCB/WSIB staff member posing as a patient, to gain information on what the workers were doing outside of their rehabilitation program and in their “private time.”

They even had guys who were not injured workers at the wards, talking, sleeping, eating with you, and finding out what you're talking about in private. Eight guys slept in a

ward, and you could have guys from compensation watching, listening, right there, and not know it. How fast you get out of bed, if you laugh too much and act like you're not in pain when the staff isn't around. I went to a meeting with a case-worker shortly after and she said, you have no trouble making your bed, how is that possible if your back is so injured?

Respondents stated that the health care professionals at the rehabilitation hospital would push the workers to physical and emotional exhaustion. One clearly remembered a phrase that was repeated again and again as he was obligated to perform specific exercises:

Her favorite saying was 'no pain, no gain'. She said it during my exercise sessions. Always saying it, no matter how much pain I was in. I was in tears because I couldn't do anymore, I was in so much pain. She [the WCB/WSIB health care professional] didn't care. She just laughed and said 'you're a big boy, it's not that bad'. Once I got home, I didn't even want to talk about it with my wife because I was so embarrassed about what happened that day, but, you know, looking back now, it isn't me that should be embarrassed.

It is not possible to communicate the anger and frustration expressed by many of the interviewees when speaking about WCB/WSIB assessment and rehabilitation.

During this process they threw everything at me. Honestly, they tried to break me. They didn't care how much they humiliated me or how much they hurt or aggravated me. They call themselves doctors, but they're not doctors . . .

Those interviewed who have had extensive interaction with the WCB/WSIB felt that the process of filing for a claim was extremely invasive: many characterized their assessment and "rehabilitation" experiences as

inhumane and intolerable. First, these individuals were physically injured while at their places of employment, then they applied for compensation. What followed, for many, was nightmarish.

One worker likened applying for compensation to “signing a contract with the devil.” WCB/WSIB caseworkers and health care physicians, for most respondents, could not be trusted. One’s home life is suddenly no longer personal or private. And there is absolutely no recourse; this is the system. Every injured worker interviewed recounted feeling of powerless at various points. Unable to return to work and therefore unable to remain financially viable, due to their injuries, many felt that the “care” deployed by the WCB/WSIB health care professionals exacerbated pre-existing feelings of anomie and powerlessness.

One participant said that injured workers should “never go to an assessment alone, always stake someone with you, because ninety percent of the time all you say will be on record, everything, and they will twist your words if they can, to use them against you later. Take a witness, always.” The participant described a medical appointment with one of the WCB/WSIB specialists. S/he stated that at the end of their appointment the doctor had casually asked if s/he needed help putting their socks on. The participant responded with no, saying s/he could do it. Later, s/he discovered this exchange had been recorded, in legal documents, on which the doctor himself had written: “the patient can’t be too bad if . . . [s/he] can put on their socks.” The participant was shocked and dismayed at the fact that every appointment

s/he had, and any interaction with WCB/WSIB specialists and case-workers was documented in this fashion. The interviewee was later made to undergo an “educational assessment.” In the interviewee’s own words, “I went in for a reevaluation. They tested me, to see how far I could go in school, see how far I could go up. The man who was doing the assessment was so obnoxious and demeaning toward me. I then realized the type of people I was dealing with here.”

7. Culture of Fear – ‘You’re always looking over your shoulder . . .’

Overwhelmingly, the injured workers we spoke to expressed fear with regard to speaking negatively about the WCB/WSIB and their own personal claims process and/or rehabilitation experience. Overall, participants did not want to be in any way personally linked to their stories. They were extremely apprehensive about being “cut-off” from their compensation funds, which they were dependent upon in order to pay rent, buy food, and manage other basic necessities of life. “If they want to create a reason, they will,” one injured worker reflected.

Many interviewees feared having their identities revealed and did not wish to provide specific details about their personal injuries. Others were understandably reluctant to give any identifying information regarding their place of employment and/or the dates of their claims to the WCB/WSIB. Even

injured workers who have been accessing compensation for more than ten-years were hesitant to give identifying details.

One respondent agreed to be interviewed and once the actual interview date approached called and stated that their claim was currently in the process of being appealed and that they couldn't risk saying anything that would put their appeal process in jeopardy. S/he explained that they have four children and although their spouse is employed full-time, they couldn't afford to "create any trouble" with the WCB/WSIB. The fear felt by this respondent was not uncommon. In many ways, it was shared amongst all the injured workers interviewed for this research.

The theme of being afraid of the WCB/WSIB and those who represent its Board is overwhelmingly pervasive. This cannot be emphasized strongly enough. While undertaking this research, discernible oppression was impossible not to notice. Many injured workers, regardless of the length of time that had passed since their initial compensation claims with the WCB/WSIB, expressed great apprehension in telling their stories. Respondents repeatedly spoke of the "threat" of the WCB/WSIB causing difficulties or revoking their compensation if they were seen to be "rocking the boat" – such as by speaking out against the WCB/WSIB within critical scholarly research.

You have to do what they tell you to do. If you don't do exactly what they tell you to do you cut off instantly . . .

Participants conveyed lack of trust toward health care providers:

You're always looking over your shoulder. You never know who's watching you. Even when I went to assessments, I

had to watch what I said to the doctors. They wrote everything I said down. But they would twist things around, too. Then the case worker called me and said that I needed to have my claim re-assessed because of something I'd said to the doctor earlier that month. That's how it is . . .

Another injured worker stated that:

The doctors ask you so many questions. They tried to manipulate what I said about the injury. When I was talking about the pain in my neck the doctor asked me which way it was shooting. I said the pain was shooting up my neck. Then he asked if the pain was shooting down my back and I said yes. Then he said, I thought you said it was shooting up . . .

Workers spoke about having their lives invaded by the fear of being “caught” participating in activities that would jeopardize their compensation:

It sounds crazy but I felt like I couldn't even step out of my house. Otherwise I'd be watched. I'm not even doing anything wrong. But they make you feel like you are. I feel like a prisoner in my own home.

Participants reported taking extraordinary precautions within their daily activities to ensure that they would take no actions that could possibly lead to the WCB/WSIB accusing them of lying about the severity of their injuries. The fear was instilled in them by virtue of their forced interactions with the WCB/WSIB. The control and power exercised by the WCB/WSIB prompted the vast majority of injured workers interviewed to excessively monitor their own actions, regardless of whether or not their injuries were inhibiting those actions.

I was afraid to water my plants in the garden ... I heard stories of people having their compensation taken away when investigators saw them working in the garden. I can't have my compensation taken away. It's all I have. I can't

work anymore, so I have to be extra careful in what I do. They could say that if I'm watering my plants, I could be working, and cut me off.

Respondents spoke of apprehension about going to the park with their children, attending school activities and social events, due to their fears of investigators and/or WCB/WSIB representatives seeing and/or watching them. Respondents felt they were unable to participate in these events due to the threat of presence of WCB/WSIB investigators.

Even though the respondents had legitimate workplace injuries, they were fearful about having their compensation revoked and/or their claims denied. One participant stated that the compensation system is designed in such a manner to “break your spirit, cripple you mentally in order to control what you do and say . . . they do it too.”

Virtually all the injured workers spoken to articulated a sense of dread when recalling their experiences with the WCB/WSIB. Many recounted having their personal freedoms stripped away from them - not from their physical injuries per se but as a direct result of the mental and emotional energy consumed by applying for and proving the validity of their injuries to the WCB/WSIB.

8. Multiple Points of Economic Impact

Injured workers and their families often go into debt and are sometimes even in jeopardy of bankruptcy due to the economic impacts of not being able to return

to work and having to depend on the compensation issued by the WCB/WSIB. A majority of respondents indicated that the economic impact was one of the foremost causes of stress and anxiety. Several said that they received inconsistent amounts of compensation per pay period and were not receiving the compensation on a consistent monthly basis. One injured worker's spouse stated that:

We would call, they [the WCB/WSIB] said it's mailed out . . . weeks passed and nothing came . . . We waited for the cheque to come, and watched for the mailman every day, but nothing came. We called the WCB and they said the cheque was in the mail. They said wait. We waited and the next couple days the cheque didn't come yet.

When it finally did come we had to pay all the money we owed, so we were left with nothing again . . .

Injured workers are often left powerless during the claims process. One respondent told us that, following excessively long assessment phases, a report of the injury is submitted to an "expert" chosen by the WCB/WSIB, for final approval. This process, the respondent said, takes from six to eighteen months. Several respondents indicated that they had undergone and/or are currently experiencing severe financial strife due to the extensive processing periods. Others commented on caseworkers at the WCB/WSIB office not giving straightforward answers to them regarding financial aspects of their cases.

Respondents reported having to borrow money from extended family and friends. Many stated they were unable to remain economically viable due to the insufficient monthly payments issued by the WCB/WSIB. "We were so broke and had so many bills accumulating, but no way to pay them."

Another respondent remarked:

Being injured and not having any money coming in, well, it was hell. My family couldn't afford anything. My child couldn't go on any school trips or have any toys at Christmas. We had trouble putting food on the table. It drained the bank account, all the money we saved was all of a sudden all gone, but still bills kept coming and they had to be paid . . .

Themes of severe economic hardship and frustration at having to suddenly undergo major changes in lifestyle were common throughout numerous interviews:

We had to go to a food bank for groceries, and get bag of potatoes and bread and cans of soup. I'd never in my life up until this point had to rely on a food bank. To me, I felt degraded. I felt like a beggar. Until . . . was injured at work we didn't have to depend on compensation, or the food bank . . . but when he was hurt he couldn't work, he was in and out of surgery and comp [workers compensation] did not give us enough to live . . .

The wife of one respondent recalled having to telephone her local Member of Parliament because their WCB/WSIB payment was so late. "I had to phone the MP, and in days she was on it. Then all of a sudden we got our first pay-cheque." Subsequent to this, later on in the process, the respondent received a letter stating that his compensation had been cut off because he had not returned a form to the WCB/WSIB by the due date they had requested. He phoned and told the WCB/WSIB that he had never received the form. He was later told that there had been a mistake, and that the form had never been mailed to him. "By then we were already a month behind on all our bills . . . the mortgage payment was due, but there was no money left in the account."

In discussing the overall impact of injuries, the economic impacts cannot be ignored. Constant struggle was a pervasive theme evidenced in the vast majority of respondents' stories. Those we interviewed did not have any choice in becoming economically dependent on the WCB/WSIB. In fact, every respondent stated that they would have preferred to return to work, as opposed to remaining on compensation.

9. Familial Impact – “It kills me to see her in so much pain . . .”

There is no doubt that the families of injured workers are impacted both financially and emotionally by the fact that their spouse or parent is injured. Emotionally, the family must come to terms with the physical impact of the injury itself. Participants indicated that physical impairments restricted ability to undertake basic household tasks and to interact with their child(ren) as they had before their injuries. Not being able to maintain economically viable as a result of the inconsistent and unreliable nature of compensation from the WCB/WSIB put added pressure on families. Spouses of injured workers often emotionally support and even care for the injured workers' physical needs, and compensate for reduced income coming to the household. Child(ren) of an injured parent often times experience conflicting emotions: confusion, feelings of anger and/or sadness.

The family as a whole must re-conceptualize the way in which they function. Following an injury at the workplace, workers may experience

depression and isolate themselves from their families and friends, disengaging from family and once routine daily activities. A spouse of an injured worker recalled telling her son that: “Dad isn’t upset at you – he’s just having a bad day.” The same respondent stated that her son often tried to brighten his father’s spirit by drawing him pictures and telling jokes. Her husband, however, was experiencing bouts of severe depression due to the fact that he was physically unable to return to work. At the time, he was also in the midst the WCB/WSIB claims process. As a result, he was laden with induced anxiety.

Another respondent recalled:

The kids didn’t want to be home because he [her husband] was so miserable. They knew, if they came home and he was in pain, he would be easily upset. It wasn’t fair for the children, but he [her husband] couldn’t help that he was in so much pain.

Her spouse, who was present and interviewed at the same time, commented:

I went to the bedroom because of the children, to get away, that’s just the way it was. I honestly couldn’t carry on sometimes because of the pain, it was bad enough to drive you around the bend . . . really it [the injury] affected my whole family. My whole life . . .

Young children often cannot comprehend the adversarial nature of the compensation process and are thus left with many unanswered questions. As one child stated:

Mommy’s sad a lot because she has to go to so many doctors’ appointments for her back and the doctors ask her so many questions. Mommy hates going to so many doctors.

Although children are often unable to understand the tedious nature of the WCB/WSIB claims process, they are able to discern levels of depression and angst experienced by their parents during the assessment periods. Even when attempts were made to shelter children from the harsh realities of fear, anger, anxiety and depression, the children were still impacted by disruptions felt within the family units.

My son was good when I was at home. He didn't understand why I was home all the time but he tried to cheer me up. He was too young to know what was going on but knew something was wrong. He just didn't know what.

Workers who were married at the time of their injury experienced high degrees of stress and friction within their marriages as a result of their injuries and their forced interactions with the WCB/WSIB.

It killed me to see her in so much pain and having to deal with people at the WSIB office. They treated her like dirt. After she got some bad news about her compensation or had to go see another doctor, we usually argued. She was under incredible stress, and so was I. It was very hard . . .

Another worker recounted:

I was depressed, anxious and it caused arguments in the home, and of course my whole demeanor changed. I wasn't happy and any little thing that happened, I was jumping on it.

Spouses were impacted in a variety of ways:

My husband was always at home. It was hard, stressful for all, try to be strong for him. It was really hard because I was so stressed myself, with the whole situation, but I couldn't show that. I needed to be strong for him, and be there to support him, and the children needed me too.

The vast majority of respondents indicated experiencing severe personal anxiety and stress due to new financial pressures. Most respondents with children articulated concerns about whether or not they would be able to provide food, clothing and shelter for their families. One respondent was forced to sell his house and relocate his family into an apartment because he was unable to pay his mortgage after his injury, due to the drop in pay. He spoke about his wife being increasingly worried as a result of having to obtain part-time jobs in an attempt to recoup the lost income. Another spoke about the pressure placed on the shoulders of his wife when he was injured and unable to receive full compensation. He remembered, "Me and my wife never saw each other. She was always working, and when she came home, she was so exhausted." Another communicated anger and frustration with the WCB/WSIB and his former employer: "They didn't care about me, my family, my life, or us having no money to feed our children." A spouse of an injured worker recalled taking on the responsibilities of childcare and all the household tasks while her husband was at the WCB/WSIB rehabilitation hospital:

When he was gone so many weeks at a time to these assessments I had to do everything. No neighbors helped shovel the snow. Then when he came home, he was so angry. The experience harmed the whole family. It hurt everyone, because it's so frustrating [the system]. Because I was so frustrated, I took it out on everyone, the kids. A lot of time I couldn't deal with all of it. It just became too much a lot of the time . . . it was a true nightmare in every sense of the word.

Several respondents indicated that their marriages had deteriorated as a result of their injuries and the strenuous WCB/WSIB claims process. Three

injured workers' spouses in the sample had filed for legal separation. In general, injured workers reported that the experience of being physically injured and then having to justify their claims to the WCB/WSIB was traumatic. They reported difficulties coping with their changing self-concepts.

Virtually everyone interviewed indicated in no uncertain terms that they had considered themselves to be very happy and very productive prior to their injuries. Subsequent to their injuries, they were compelled to seek compensation, and many told us that it was at this time that they felt most physically and emotionally vulnerable. The majority reported experiencing extreme difficulties. Most were no longer able to interact with their families in the same manner as they had in the past. They felt that their lives had suddenly and forever changed. Many stories indicated that economic stresses had compounded already acute anxieties, which in turn impacted the family in a multiplicity of ways. Strained interactions with family members should in part be seen to represent outward expressions of anger and frustration. Some injured workers reacted to the induced stresses by turning within themselves, and detaching from their families.

10. Social and Emotional Points of Impact

Injured workers experience feelings of loss, followed by grieving. Loss was described in terms of reduced physical capabilities, and the sudden absence of gainful employment and income.

I felt like I couldn't look after my family anymore. We went for groceries every Friday and we couldn't do that anymore. My sense of self was shattered after the injury. I was used to feeling productive. I was already down, and then I was beaten down again, by the WSIB.

Anger and frustration were commonly reported. Some respondents indicated that they experienced excessive guilt as a result of not being able to aid their spouses with household responsibilities. One respondent, for example, stated that:

When I couldn't do housework . . . and . . . it made me mad. I'd think, I should do it, but I couldn't. Before, I'd done so much. So it fell back on my wife again. God . . . I wanted to do it [vacuuming, mowing the lawns in the summer, and shoveling snow in the winter] but I couldn't anymore, and it hurt me so much to see her hurt by all of it too . . .

Others felt as if their lives had forever changed, which was reinforced by stigmatization. Respondents stated that people generally did not comprehend the amount of physical and emotional pain that was experienced as a result of their workplace injuries. One respondent vividly remembered having to live through "taunting" from her husband's family after she was injured and had applied for compensation: they implied that she was "lazy" and "weak" for not being able to cope with the pain of her injury. Others had similar experiences with family and friends.

I remember when we [his spouse's family] used to get together. Her family would say sarcastic things like, 'oh it must be nice to stay at home and not work and get free money.' I told them I'd rather be working. It was frustrating. You have to be careful what you say, because they're family. I honestly felt like telling them to . . .

One respondent stated that “people don’t understand how much you have to give up when you’re on compensation. Your whole life changes, and it’s not for the good, believe me. I would give anything to go back to that day I was hurt, and change it. I would do anything for the chance to go back.” Respondents commonly reported feeling marginalized. The majority indicated that they had no supports within their communities, no venues where they might have been able to openly speak about these issues. They experienced frustration with the lack of understanding on the part of family and friends who did not understand what it was like to be in constant pain and were unable to empathize with their struggles and experiences within the context of the WCB/WSIB “machine.”

Many experienced emotional strains and feelings of depression. In some cases, this resulted in dependency on anti-depressants and/or alcohol, as a coping mechanism. Vulnerable, in physical pain, and having to endure the emotional stresses of the WCB/WSIB claims process, many injured workers indicated that they had been desperate to escape, because they experienced feelings of acute powerless to do anything to change their situations.

You know I was by myself when I was injured. No one was there to help me through the constant pain I was feeling. Afterwards, I found that drinking helped me dealing with it. I was permanently crippled. I couldn’t work. None of our friends were around for us.

Another respondent spoke about other injured workers he knows who use alcohol to assist in overcoming the emotional and physical pain of their injuries:

When you drink you don't have to think about what's going on with your life. Some of them guys would be bombed at 10 o'clock in the morning. They turned to alcohol, a lot of the hard stuff.

Several respondents mentioned that the WCB/WSIB provided individual counseling. However, one participant spoke about the lack of trust she had with the psychologist that was appointed to work with her. This worker explained that the assigned counselor "basically was WCB/WSIB . . . they were paying her" and therefore she did not feel safe in divulging any personal details, fearful that any information told to the counselor could and likely would be reported back "to their investigators, and their lawyers." She stated that she could not fully engage in a healthy therapeutic relationship with the psychologist because she could not trust her. This particular respondent still suffers from depression and is finding it difficult to process the effects of the injury without professional help. Currently she is on anti-depressants prescribed by her family physician, but is unable to financially support the professional help that she needs to meet her mental health needs. Other respondents reported having symptoms of depression as well:

I was so miserable. All I wanted to do was stay in my bedroom. I didn't want to go play with my kids or even talk some days. It got pretty bad some days. I didn't even want to get out of bed. I was taking anti-depressants and they helped in the beginning, but then I just didn't feel like they were doing anything . . .

Injured workers reported that families were their main support systems. Some respondents stated that they had turned to others who were injured as a means of support.

Not one of the injured workers interviewed felt that the WCB/WSIB had adequately compensated them for their pain and suffering, or their lost wages. “You could be half dead and all you would ever get is 50% of what you were making before your injury. That’s the maximum allowance. You could be 99% dead. You would only get 50%,” one respondent said. Another respondent remembered:

The money that they end up giving you still doesn’t take away the injury for the rest of my life. It doesn’t take away the pain I have to wake up with every morning . . . If I wasn’t injured I would have earned so much more money, for the rest of my life. Now I’m crippled and permanently dependent on compensation. I’ve lost so much money, in terms of lost wages.

A spouse of an injured worker stated that:

It’s a full-time job, trying to get any money out of them [the WCB/WSIB], you phone them to ask where the cheques are and they don’t care. My life was on hold and it changed forever. It’s still on hold. They [the WCB/WSIB] did all of that to try to break us, to the point that you just want to give up because you’re sick of fighting with them. It took my husband and I ten years to get the maximum amount. Ten years! It’s insane . . . [and] shouldn’t be allowed to happen.

Other injured workers spoke with sadness and frustration about the fact that they could never return to work – in any capacity – due to their injuries:

No one will hire you because you’re considered a ‘high risk’ person now. The liability is too high. So I couldn’t get another job. It’s not like I can work anyway. I have trouble moving around the house . . . and you can’t start your own business, because the compensation will get cut off immediately if you try to do that. And the bank won’t give you a loan because you’re on compensation.

The accounts reflected the painful circumstances of the real life struggles that the injured workers we spoke to endure:

I will never be the same . . . I have to walk with a cane now, and I still can't lift my kids up without feeling a shooting pain up my back . . . and those bastards . . . five years, and I'm still struggling with them [the WCB/WSIB] . . .

Workers recounted having their independence and self-sufficiency stripped away. Those interviewed stated that they were also greatly impacted by the ways in which they were treated by the WCB/WSIB. The dehumanizing effects of their interactions contributed to the stress felt by the injured workers and their families.

Workers were asked to describe their lasting impressions of the WCB/WSIB. I feel it important to convey that the vast majority of injured workers interviewed shared common shared feelings and experiences. In their own words, their lasting impressions of the WCB/WSIB: “frustrating,” “you have to fight them tooth and nail,” “anger,” “tiring,” “degrading,” “shameful,” “they generalize all injuries,” “it’s so stressful,” “no one wants to deal with them, but you have no choice, you have to do it,” “you don’t have any power . . . it’s their game and they make their own rules, as it suits them,” “brutal,” “disgusting,” “not worth it,” “bureaucratic,” “they make you feel less than human,” “I don’t want anyone to feel sorry for me,” “inaccessible,” “a lot of people out there are going through the same thing right now,” “I turned to the children for support,” “until I went through it myself, I didn’t really understand what kind of hell it is to go on compensation,” “by the end, you start to hate yourself . . . that’s what

it does to you . . . they [mess] you right up” “it’s a sick little system, and it’s all legal . . . it shouldn’t be allowed, people shouldn’t be treated like this . . .”

One participant stated that:

I don’t want people to feel sorry for me; I want everyone who reads about me to learn from my experience and to know they aren’t the only one . . . it’s a right to be compensated if you get hurt from work . . . no one should be stripped of that right. From day one, there should be education for workers. This would reduce the risk of workplace injury so much. The government has to do more, much more, here. Young guys, they think they’re invincible, and the companies love to get them. They will work on contract, work odd hours. ‘No problem.’ They’re cheap labor, and they’re willing to do anything. They’re afraid of getting fired. That can seriously hurt you. You can’t go back from a serious injury. Once it happens, it’s too late. And you don’t want to have to deal with comp. Trust me . . .

Another had this to say:

We just had to move on with our lives. We decided, we’re not doing it anymore. It consumes your life, fighting with them all the time. That’s what your life then becomes. It makes you so angry. We came to a point where we had no more strength to fight anymore. They’ve got all kinds of money, and all kinds of lawyers. If they wanted to prove that up was down and down was up, they could do it. It kills you mentally, physically. We couldn’t take the stress anymore. So we decided to rebuild our life as best we could. We couldn’t change the fact that he [her spouse] was injured, but we could change how we were as people, and move on with our dignity and pride intact.

11. The Ideological Formation of the WCB/WSIB – Applying the PM

In 2001, Canada, along with Italy, had the highest job fatality rates among the 16 member-countries of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). Canada's rate was seven out of 100,000 workers. By comparison, the US rate was four and Germany's three. Over the past two decades, Canada has reduced its workplace mortality rate by only 6.6 per cent – the lowest of any industrialized country. In 2001, Canada's rate of workplace injuries (3,145 out of 100,000 workers) was the fourth highest among the 16 OECD countries . . . 280,729 claims were accepted by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board for injuries, illness and fatalities in 2002 . . . An average of 42 young Ontario workers (14-24) are injured, made ill or killed on the job each day. An average of 270 workers of all ages are injured, made ill or killed in Ontario daily . . . Approximately 15,000 young workers under the age of 25 are injured in Ontario every year . . . Over two-thirds of young workers have never received a safety training manual for their job. Over half of young workers have received no training for new jobs.²⁵

A central concern of the PM is the dialectic between communicative power and social inequality within contemporary society. To provide a preliminary assessment of the ideological formation of the Ontario WCB/WSIB in the Canadian media, it was necessary to undertake the extensive ethnographic research that enabled this research, presented above, precisely because Canadian academics have **completely ignored** the WCB/WSIB.²⁶

²⁵ “Workplace injury statistics paint a painful picture: Canada's workplace injury, illness, fatality rate among worst in 2001,” *The Post* (Burlington, Ontario, Canada), April 23, 2004, p. 42.

²⁶ Exceptions include Smith (2000); Shainblum, Sullivan and Frank (2000); Beardwood, Kirsh and Clark (2005). Notably, the Beardwood *et al* research was “supported by the Research Advisory Council of the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board.” One will be hard pressed to find any mention of the WCB/WSIB in university textbooks commonly used for Social Inequality and/or Human Rights classes in Canada; the omission is glaring and noteworthy if the PM is applied to the realm of scholarly debate. The PM may also be usefully applied to scholarly discourses.

The intent here, in utilizing the PM to assess the media coverage, is simply to delineate the extent to which injured workers' experiences – such as those set out above – have been reflected in Canadian newspaper coverage of the WCB/WSIB. The quantity and quality of the news coverage is assessed, as well as thematic content and choices regarding overall story treatment. Given that 1998 was the year in which Bill 99 was enacted, coverage accorded the WCB/WSIB from January 1, 1998 through to December 31, 1998 in the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* was assessed. The *Toronto Star* was selected because it is Canada's most widely read daily newspaper and there is a perception that it is also a more *liberal* newspaper than the *Globe and Mail*. The *Globe and Mail* was selected (again) because it is Canada's key national newspaper. As Hackett (1991:227) observes, it is “disproportionately read by the affluent and powerful: *Globe* reports often fuel debate in the House of Commons, and at all three levels of government, politicians and officials . . . read it.”

The CNI was utilized to search for the news coverage and both the “subject index” and “corporate name index” were consulted under the topic headings: “Worker's compensation” and “Worker's compensation – Ontario” (subject index), and “Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board” (corporate name index). The quantity of the coverage accorded the WCB/WSIB throughout the 12 month period was as follows: a total of nine (9) articles in the *Globe and Mail* and six (6) articles in the *Toronto Star*. The low volume of coverage and comment reveals the extent to which the experiences, economic hardships and

personal challenges faced by Ontario injured workers - in unison with their interactions with the WCB/WSIB - can be seen to have been ideological non-issues in Canada. This is in keeping with the PM's substantive predictions.

The experiences, economic hardships and multiplicity of challenges faced by Ontario's injured workers - which, as detailed above, are typically exacerbated by their forced interactions with WCB/WSIB personnel - received no news coverage. The treatment accorded injured workers by the WCB/WSIB and frequent delays and extensive waiting periods germane to the processing of case files were accorded no news coverage.

Historically, Canadian newspaper coverage has highlighted "fraud" as a major element in the WCB/WSIB as an unfolding news story, causing the issue to gain wide currency as a central element in the ideological formation of the WCB/WSIB in Canada.

Consider the following headlines - listed in the CNI and Canadian Newsstand and published in various Ontario media over the course of the past decade - and the extent to which they direct public attention toward fraud as an issue of central importance in relation to the WCB/WSIB:

- 1m WCB fraud under investigation (*Hamilton Spectator*, Apr 10, 1992, A12)
- Ontario WCB defrauded of about \$150 million a year (*Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, Aug 6, 1993, A2)
- Tax-weary Canadians more likely to snitch: spying neighbors are threat to social bonds, prof warns (*Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, Aug 30, 1993, D1)
- 24 charged in fraud crackdown at WCB (*Hamilton Spectator*, July 16, 1994, A7)

- Five charged with bilking WCB, insurers (*Toronto Star*, Oct 7, 1994, A11)
- Fraud squad: estimates of WCB fraud in Canada as high as \$900M per year (*Occupational Health and Safety*, Jan/Feb 1998)
- WCB gets teeth to bite cheaters: Abusers face jail terms or stiff fines under new rules (*Hamilton Spectator*, Nov 2, 1995, B5)

The meanings encoded within and conveyed by these headlines, and the conclusions that may be quickly and reasonably drawn, at a glance, are self-evident.

A two-column Canadian Press article published on page A2 of the July 14, 1998 edition of the *Globe and Mail*, by Tom Blackwell, is illustrative. The article's headline reads as follows: "Compensation abuse gets special attention, Fraud squad lays more than 150 charges." As noted, there is a general consensus amongst media scholars that newspaper headlines are instrumental in framing how readers perceive news stories. The article's lead paragraph is consistent with the interpretive framework established by the headline and reads as follows: "It's becoming harder to cheat Ontario's workers-compensation system and get away with it." There are two reasons why I felt this article particularly noteworthy. First, the headline and lead are (deliberately?) vague, such that one could infer from them any number of reasonable conclusions. Second, the article actually makes the point - in its final four paragraphs, at the bottom of its second column - that *employers* were found to have committed the majority of the "fraud" made relevant and

newsworthy by its headline and lead. The *second last* paragraph of the article reads as follows: “Employers accounted for 87 of this year’s charges and workers 16. Two board employees charged with accepting bribes and the people charged with bribing them make up another 46.” That employers had enacted “abuse” of the system is accorded no further comment. Blackwell’s article was picked up and published in the *Kitchener-Waterloo Record* on the same day it appeared in the *Globe and Mail*, with a slightly modified headline: “Tories pounce on cheaters who bilk workers compensation, charges soar” (*Waterloo Regional Record*, Kitchener, Ontario, July 14, 1998, A4). One can only speculate on the positive changes that might become enabled in Ontario, and Canada, if only “worker’s rights” ranked as highly as “fraud” on Canada’s political and media agenda.

12. Conclusion

There are some courageous doctors in Canada who have seen the abuses within the WCBs and have come forward with their complaints. One brave doctor, Doctor Maida Follini, testified before a 1998 committee on Nova Scotia’s WCB Act. ‘I experienced some pressure from the WCB in relation to one of my cases. After submitting my report, I received a letter from Dr. Kevin A. Bourke, Medical Advisor, Central North Shore, informing me that he would not process the invoice for my fee unless I edited my report to conform to his desires. Fortunately, unbeknownst to him, I had already received my fee. I, of course, did not edit my report. But I did inform him of the rationale for the recommendations that I had made. I must say that I was somewhat affronted that a WCB staff member would request that an independent professional change her report to conform to the board’s wishes and in particular, threaten

to withhold payment.’ Needless to say, Doctor Follini didn’t see many more WCB patients.²⁷

In addition to providing original ethnographic research, this research has enabled a better understanding of the WCB/WSIB in relation to the broader overlapping nexus of ideological, economic and political power within Canadian society. It is my hope that the research will inspire discussion, debate and additional research. In relation to the dissertation as a whole, the research presented within this chapter demonstrates that the PM may be usefully applied to domestic (as opposed to international) issues. And, as noted within the introduction, an additional goal of this research is to demonstrate that the PM may be usefully applied within the Canadian context. The chapter’s primary contribution resides both in the original ethnographic research presented within the study and in the media analysis undertaken to accompany this research. Given that the PM’s methodological approach, which makes political-economic elements directly relevant to the study of communicative and ideological power, the original ethnographic research is crucial in terms of providing a basis for making judgments about the quantity and quality of the news coverage accorded injured workers’ in Ontario by the Canadian newspapers. As noted at the outset of this chapter, demonstrating the ease with which traditional political-economic analysis may incorporate the PM, to enable additional explanatory power, has been a central aim of including this chapter within the dissertation.

²⁷ D.M. Boyle, “WCBs failing injured workers,” <http://www.wcbcanada.com/html/index.php>

Conclusion

The research presented within chapters three, four and five of the dissertation focused upon testing the PM and asked whether the *Globe and Mail* news coverage of the historical events in East Timor over a sixteen year period could be seen to conform to the PM's substantive predictions regarding patterns of media behaviour. That is, did the news coverage provide a political and historical benchmark by which to inform the public (or not) and influence (or not) Canadian governmental policy on Indonesia and East Timor. The question is a crucial one given that the government of Canada was in a position to wield significant diplomatic influence over the "Question of East Timor" at the UN during the period of 1975 through until 1991. The question of how Canada's news agenda-setter and self-declared "national newspaper" prioritized and covered the unfolding news story of Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor was therefore an important one. The data analysis presented within chapters four and five also explored the extent to which the news coverage served a public education function in relation to covering Canada's unique connections to and participation within the broader narrative. The coverage was scrutinized in order to ascertain the extent to which the *Globe and Mail* played an ideological role, oriented toward the political accommodation of Canada's own (geo)political-economic interests?

Prior to the December 7, 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the *Globe and Mail* had published 29 articles on East Timor up to and including December 6, 1975. After Indonesia invaded East Timor, the *Globe and Mail* coverage declined quickly and significantly. This is evidenced by the distribution of its coverage of the invasion during the month of December 1975. The distribution is as follows: one article was published on the day after the invasion (December 8), one article was published on each of December 9th and December 10th, and one article was published on each of December 15th, 20th, 23rd and 30th. The *Globe and Mail* coverage of the ensuing illegal occupation of East Timor throughout 1976 consisted of seven articles. One article on East Timor was published in 1977, a single paragraph article on March 1, headlined "Australians charge 100,000 killings." Throughout the next sixteen months, there was no additional coverage of East Timor. On October 9, 1978, an investigative article by Mick Lowe was published, headlined "60,000 have died in unseen war." Throughout 1979 the *Globe and Mail* published a total of three articles on East Timor. This was the extent of the *Globe and Mail* coverage of East Timor throughout the crucial invasion period.

There were no editorials published during the invasion period, which is another significant feature of the data. The coverage included no discussions of Canada's diplomatic response to the invasion at the UN, nor did it provide any information on the Canada-Indonesia relationship in relation to the unfolding story of East Timor. What conclusions might therefore be reached based upon these findings? At this stage, Canada was effectively omitted from

the unfolding news story of Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor. The quantity and quality of the coverage published throughout the invasion period strongly conform to the predictions of the PM.

Throughout the occupation period, dating from 1981-1991, official discourse continued to constitute the overwhelming majority of the news on East Timor that was presented within the *Globe and Mail*. The low volume of coverage accorded East Timor throughout the decade is another significant feature of the data, one which also supports PM.

There are several possible alternative explanations for the initial poor coverage accorded the East Timor story throughout the invasion period. Indonesia imposed tight information controls that prevented journalists from entering the territory after the invasion. Lack of access to the territory is on fairly logical grounds a reasonable explanation for the low volume of coverage. Moreover, the *Globe and Mail* had only three full-time staff foreign correspondents (based in Beijing, London and Washington) at the time of the invasion and relied upon the wire services (principally Reuters and AP), travelling Canadian-based staff correspondents, and freelance writers. The *Toronto Star* only had two foreign bureaus (in London and Washington) and a limited commitment to Asia at the time of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. If one were looking for reasons to explain the low volume of news coverage, then, lack of resources is another argument that could be put forth. Lack of interest among the Canadian public could be offered as a third possible

explanation. Each of these possible alternative explanations can be seen to be problematic.

Carey (1998/99, p. 46) states that “A form of collusion existed between Western governments, international corporations and the Indonesian Government to keep East Timor off the agenda given the very lucrative business contracts which existed with Jakarta at this time.” Noam Chomsky argues that the elite American media ignored and suppressed the East Timor story precisely because doing so served broader US political-economic interests. Chomsky (1982, pp. 337-348) recalls that the *Columbia Journalism Review* had asked him to contribute a piece in 1978. Chomsky then suggested an essay discussing the lack of coverage accorded to the unfolding events in East Timor by the American media. His proposal was rejected on the grounds that the topic of East Timor was said to be “too remote.” Chomsky remarks, “the circle is complete,” when “first, the media suppress a major story, then a journal dedicated to the performance of the media is unwilling to investigate the suppression because it has been so effective” (Ibid.).

As noted in chapter three, eight months after the invasion Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs and International Trade Allan J. MacEachen delivered a speech in Jakarta. MacEachen spoke at length about Indonesia’s natural resources, large population and strategic importance, all of which, he stressed, had placed Indonesia “in a key position to play a role in international affairs.” MacEachen had noted a “reorientation of Canada’s foreign policy” toward increased economic development, shared objectives and

co-operation between Canada and Indonesia. He declared that Canada had been “impressed by Indonesia’s pragmatic leadership . . . which has resulted in steady economic progress” (MacEachen, 1976a). Two years later, in 1978, Canada’s ambassador to Indonesia Glen Shortliffe had visited illegally occupied East Timor as part of the international delegation of parliamentarians and news correspondents granted supervised access to the territory. The delegation witnessed the conditions of the starving, diseased Timorese residing in the military-controlled strategic hamlets. Canadian news journalists undeniably had direct (albeit supervised) access to the territory during this diplomatic visit. It may be concluded, based upon these facts, that there is reason to seriously question the argument that lack of access fully explains the low volume of coverage accorded the events in East Timor throughout the crucial invasion period and Canada’s role in “aiding and abetting” the near-genocide.

The argument that the low volume of coverage accorded East Timor throughout this time period could be explained by lack of access to the illegally occupied territory is extremely problematic for several additional reasons. That information was available on what was taking place in East Timor at the time is undeniable. Chomsky and Herman, for instance, devoted an entire section of their book *The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. One: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* to the near-genocide in East Timor. This book was published in 1979. Beyond this, however, East Timor was accorded coverage in a range of alternative media throughout the invasion period. At least 22 articles on East Timor were published in alternative media in 1978

alone (at least 16 articles in 1979, and at least 19 articles in 1980). Data on alternative media coverage of East Timor would be more meaningful if it could be assessed whether this volume of coverage was high as a percentage of overall alternative media content, however Canadian alternative media from this time period is not indexed nor is it archived, making undertaking this analysis virtually impossible. The alternative media coverage of East Timor that I was able to successfully obtain during my dissertation research came by way of contacts with authors and East Timor activists, some of whom had kept alternative media clipping files.

If lack of access is in fact a credible explanation for the low volume of coverage by Canada's self-declared "national newspaper," one might well ask how alternative media, with far fewer resources available to them, could possibly generate so many more news stories devoted to what was happening in East Timor during this time period? The second possible explanation is also seriously compromised given that, by definition, alternative media are availed of far fewer resources than are corporate, mainstream print media, like the *Globe and Mail*.

The last possible explanation for the absolute low volume of coverage accorded the story of East Timor is lack of interest among (1) the *Globe and Mail's* readership and (2) amongst the Canadian public generally. This explanation is problematic for the simple reason that the East Timor story can be seen to have been both sensationalistic and dramatic. As an unfolding news story, its dimensions entailed invasion, bombing and systematic gross human

rights violations. As noted in chapter three, the East Timor story included other dramatic elements: forced relocation, induced starvation and disease, pacification, sterilization, (Western-backed) near-genocide. There were myriad ways in which Canada was directly connected to the actions and events that were occurring there at the time. Finally, if one takes the suggestion that interest in the story simply was not there, then it begs the question, why not? On logical grounds, the quantity, distribution and quality of the news coverage can be seen to have been ideologically motivated.

As noted, a central methodological technique associated with the PM is to explore the range of permitted opinion or “boundaries of debate” on crucial topics. Two levels of omission are evident in the *Globe and Mail*'s East Timor coverage. Omission is evidenced by the absence of context, criticism and humanization, from the whole process of representation, particularly throughout the invasion period. Omission is also evidenced by the absence of alternative ways of signifying actors, actions and events. The sources cited within the *Globe and Mail* coverage were predominantly official sources. Indonesian representations of actions and events were typically presented as fact, despite contradictory evidence. The thematic content of the coverage demonstrates the extent which the newspaper accepted, endorsed, legitimized and promoted Indonesia's position. Indonesia claimed that it had intervened in the civil war in East Timor - in an attempt to restore peace within the territory - rather than invaded. This created an interpretive framework within which Indonesia's “invasion” of East Timor could be characterized as “war” with

FRETILIN - the official chronology advanced by Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs (1992) and repeatedly endorsed by the Canadian government. The chronology advanced by the *Globe and Mail* coverage throughout the invasion period reproduced the official chronology in terms of both what it declared to be fact and what it excluded from the "boundaries of debate."

The *Globe and Mail's* endorsement of the official chronology can indeed be traced back to the pre-invasion period. On November 11, 1975, the *Globe and Mail* had published a report headlined "Civil Wars that bleed the Third World" which stated that the civil war in East Timor had yet to end at this time. A smaller article - headlined "East Timor official seeks help" - published on November 26, 1975, reported (again) that the civil war in East Timor was still underway at this time. As noted within chapter three, the civil war in East Timor had in reality ended prior to Indonesia's invasion. The induced starvation and disease that ravaged East Timor in the years immediately after the invasion are omitted from the official chronology and were largely absent from the entire catalogue of news coverage, as were state-sponsored terrorism, human rights violations and atrocities. Canadian diplomatic, material and military support for Indonesia was edited out of the unfolding news story entirely during the invasion period.

In assessing the extent to which the *Globe and Mail* coverage of East Timor conforms with the hypotheses advanced by the PM, this research suggests that the *Globe and Mail* affirmed rather than challenged Canada's diplomatic aims and actions during the period in which the coverage appeared.

The promotion of ideologically serviceable disinformation is systematic in the *Globe and Mail* East Timor news coverage, and is observable in terms of both individual story headlines and story content.

What conclusions might therefore be reasonably and clearly drawn from these findings? First, the *Globe and Mail* failed in its public responsibility to provide adequate news coverage, first of the major events, actions and actors involved in the unfolding story of East Timor and, second, of the myriad relevant Canadian connections. More extensive coverage can be seen to have been warranted given the horrific and sensational nature of the East Timor near-genocide, and the involvement of the international community, Canada in particular. The vital role of Canada's key national medium is of particular importance given that its news coverage throughout the late 1970s and 1980s can be seen (1) to have served as a conduit for official, established truths and (2) to have facilitated Canadian's pro-business foreign policy towards Indonesia. Second, the *Globe and Mail* can be seen to have performed a significant hegemonic function, oriented toward legitimization and political accommodation. The significance of political legitimacy in this particular case should be seen to be marginal given that assent was achieved simply by ensuring that the Canadian public would remain relatively uninformed about the near-genocide. However, as demonstrated, the data indicates that legitimacy was virtually ensured, vis-à-vis suppression of dissenting voices coupled with promotion of ideologically serviceable themes, disinformation and political propaganda proper. Throughout this time period, the government of Canada's

diplomatic actions and policies towards Indonesia and East Timor were oriented squarely towards accommodation of Canada's own corporate (geo)political-economic interests. The absolute low volume of news coverage virtually ensured that decision-making would be unchallenged. It may therefore be concluded that the interrelations of state and corporate capitalism and the corporate media effectively circumvented fundamental democratic processes.

While undertaking my research I was alerted to other cases relating to East Timor and other media. Elaine Briere, photo-journalist and long-time East Timor activist, explained to me that her award-winning documentary film, *Bitter Paradise: The Sell-Out of East Timor*, which includes extensive details on Canada's material ties to and diplomatic support of Indonesia in relation to East Timor, has been suppressed by the CBC:

. . . my film *Bitter Paradise* was lawyered by CBC and never shown, then TVO took it and aired it only once or twice before their largest corporate donor, INCO, threatened to sue them if they aired it again. However, it is still used by a lot of universities to illustrate the reality gap between the fact and fiction of the Canadian identity overseas.¹

Interestingly, in terms of how communicative power and social, political and economic realities play out in broader media, I discovered that DC Comics (which is owned by Time Warner) nixed a planned Batman story that had a plotline involving US arms sales to Indonesia. As conveyed to me directly by acclaimed Batman artist Norm Breyfogle:

¹ Email correspondence, March 29, 2009.

I first drew five issues [of *Anarky*]; #4 and #5 became the unpublished issues. Joe Rubenstein, the inker on the series, must have been an issue or two behind me in the inking, which helps to explain why the unpublished issues weren't ever inked. Then DC decided they wanted a new first story arc, so they had Alan Grant and I do a new #1, #2, and #3, which automatically renumbered our original #1, #2, #3, #4, and #5 as #4, #5, #6, #7, and #8. But then DC wanted a *Haunted Tank* cross-over, so that became the new #7.

Then we got word of cancellation, so instead of publishing the first part of an intended three-part story arc (our original #4 and #5 and intended #6, now the unpublished #9 and #10), we did a one-issue closing story in which the Joker is revealed to be Anarky's father — my idea, by the way — which became #8. So the two issues that were originally to be #4 and #5 — now the unpublished #9 and #10 — never got inked or published.

It's always seemed to me that DC pulled all these shenanigans to prevent our original #4 and #5 — and the intended but never written or penciled #6 — from being published because that three-part story was about a touchy political issue: the USA's arms sales to Indonesia's repressive government.²

There has never been a sociological assessment of the near-genocide in East Timor within the context of the Canada-Indonesia relationship - a fact which is perplexing given the extensive links between Canada, Indonesia and East Timor. The historical research presented within chapter three of the dissertation drew upon a wide range of divergent materials. Historical facts were explored in unison with political-economic and ideological dimensions. The research thus provides a valuable historical and sociological account of

² Email interview, June 24, 2010.

Canada's relationship to the East Timor near-genocide and of the Canadian newspaper coverage that was accorded the near-genocide.

The chapter devoted to the experiences of injured workers in Ontario considered how these experiences were represented within Canadian newspapers. This research aimed to make a valuable original contribution to the range of existent scholarly literature in terms of both the original ethnographic research that was presented within the chapter and the media analysis, which set out an initial map of how workplace injury and the WCB/WSIB have been ideologically constructed within Canadian print media. This research is pioneering given that no scholarly analysis whatsoever has been undertaken on the WCB/WSIB within the Canadian context, save for research that was funded by the WCB/WSIB itself. This chapter of the dissertation aimed to demonstrate how easily traditional political-economic analysis may incorporate the PM in order to enable additional explanatory power, bringing media analysis into studies that are centrally concerned to explore dimensions and impacts of dominant political-economic social structure(s) within contemporary society.

In conclusion, based upon this research, what conclusions might be drawn about the PM? The PM highlights fundamental social inequalities deriving from the unequal distribution of resources and power within democratic societies and hypothesizes that media are in effects agents of power. In testing the model, this research has aimed to make important contributions to scholarly literature available on the PM and to demonstrate

that the PM may be usefully applied to both international and domestic news stories. The research has also aimed to demonstrate that the PM may be applied in a diverse range of ways, involving varying timeframes and degrees of focus.

The PM is oriented toward empirical research. That the PM is adaptable and flexible enough to allow scholars to utilize and apply it creatively in studying the relationship between texts and power is one of the model's great strengths. The analysis of the media coverage accorded the East Timor near-genocide and the Canada-Indonesia relationship, set out in chapters three and four of the dissertation, presented a very detailed (story by story) analysis of the relevant historical facts and political-economic context, and this material is presented very distinctly, as opposed to the research presented within chapter six of the dissertation, which utilizes a different approach in adopting the PM. The dissertation has aimed to demonstrate that the PM may be utilized in various ways, affording research opportunities to meet the multiplicity of contexts which contemporary sociologists might study aspects of the social world, and to which the PM may be usefully applied.

In relation to the question of how ideological power and discursive phenomena may be explored sociologically, particularly within the theoretical tradition associated with structural-conflict theory, the model has great utility. Boyd-Barrett (2007: 7) writes that:

The PM is a well-crafted synthesis of the work produced by media sociologists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s,

particularly British research. It drew upon political economy work (Peter Golding, Graham Murdock), the sociology of organisations (Jeremy Tunstall) and cultural studies (Stuart Hall).

As previously discussed and set out by Klaehn and Mullen (2010) and Pedro (2011a, 2011b), the PM complements other (competing) approaches and creates new opportunities for both empirical research and renewed theoretical debate concerning the role of media and society. The model readily enables critical, empirical research into media performance and is well-suited to a multiplicity of domestic and international issues: the internment of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War, globalization and the political-economy of the sex trade, workers and unions within the broader context of social class and human rights issues, public relations (PR) and corporate spin, environmental issues, terrorism, war, domestic state/police violence, instances of institutional victimization, domestic poverty, political inequalities and much else.

In my view, the range of topics the PM can theoretically be applied to is limited only by the creativity and imagination of the researcher, and existent scholarly work on the PM has only scratched the surface of the potential the model affords in enabling new original, empirical research, which will in turn further understanding of how ideological power and meaning intersect with political economy.

Bibliography

Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (1972) *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Herder and Herder.

Alford, Matthew (2009) "A Propaganda Model for Hollywood," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 6(2), pp. 144-156.

Alford, Matthew (2010) *Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy*. London: Pluto.

Alford, Matthew (2010) *Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy*. London: Pluto Press.

Altheide, David (2006) *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*. Lanham, Massachusetts: AltaMira Press.

Althusser, Louis (1969) *For Marx*. London: Allen Lane.

Althusser, Louis (1971) "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Althusser, L. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. London: New Left Books.

Amnesty International (1980) *East Timor: Statement of Amnesty International Concerns in East Timor*. London: Amnesty International, 29 April.

Amnesty International (1985) *East Timor: Violations of Human Rights, Extra-judicial Executions, "Disappearances", Torture and Political Imprisonment*. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (1987) *Indonesia/East Timor: Summary of Amnesty International Concerns in Indonesia and East Timor*. London: Amnesty International, April 1987.

Amnesty International (1988) *Indonesia/East Timor: Summary of Amnesty International Concerns in Indonesia and East Timor*. London: Amnesty International, May 1988.

Amnesty International (1990) *Indonesia/East Timor: A Summary of AI's Concerns*. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (1991) *East Timor: The Santa Cruz Massacre*. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International (1994) *Indonesia and East Timor: Power and Impunity, Human Rights under the New Order*. London: Amnesty International.

Andersen, Robin (2006) *A Century of Media, A Century of War*. New York: Peter Lang.

Anderson, B. (1995) "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications" in P. Carey and G. Bentley (eds) *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Aronson, James (1990) *The Press and the Cold War*, Revised Edition. New York: Monthly Review Press.

- Babe, Robert (2005) "Newspaper Discourses on Environment" in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.) *Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model*, London: Black Rose.
- Bagdikian, Ben (1992) *The New Media Monopoly*, Fourth Edition. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. (1969) "Theses on Advertising" in Baran, P. (ed.) *The Longer View*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Barker, Michael J. (2009) "Blame the Media," *Swans Commentary*.
Online: <http://www.swans.com/library/art15/barker16.html> [accessed October 15, 2011]
- Barsky, Robert (2006) "Anarchism, the Chomsky Effect and the Descent from the Ivory Tower," *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 23(5), pp. 446-452.
- Bennett, Lance 1990. "Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." *Journal of Communication*, 40(2): 103-25.
- Bennett, Lance (1990) "Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States", *Journal of Communication*, 40(2), pp. 103-25.
- Berry, David (2010) "Radical Mass Media Criticism, History and Theory," in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), *The Political Economy of Media and Power*, New York: Peter Lang, pp. 319-36.
- Berry, David and John Theobald (eds.) (2006) *Radical Mass Media Criticism*. London: Black Rose.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1996) *Sur la télévision*, Paris, Liber-Raisons d'Agir. Translation (1998) *On Television and Journalism*. London, Pluto.
- Boyd-Barrett, Oliver (2004) "Judith Miller, the *New York Times* and the Propaganda Model," *Journalism Studies*, 5(4), pp. 435-449.
- Briere, Elaine (1988) "Feeding the Cyclops," *Briarpatch*, October, p. 35.
- Briere, Elaine (1991) "A country now forgotten," *This Magazine*, 25(1), June/July, pp. 22-24.
- Briere, Elaine (1997) *Bitter Paradise: The Sell Out of East Timor* [video documentary]. Mission, British Columbia: Snapshot Productions.
- Briere, Elaine and Dan Devaney (1990) "East Timor: The slaughter of a tribal nation," *Canadian Dimension*, 24(7), October, pp. 31-35.
- Briere, Elaine and Dan Devaney (1991) "Development and Death in East Timor," *Briarpatch* (March), pp. 42-45.
- Briere, Elaine and S. Gage (1993) *The Indonesian Kit*. Second edition. Vancouver, British Columbia: East Timor Alert Network.
- Broudy, Daniel (2009) "The Propaganda of Patriotism and Color," *Synaesthesia* 1(1), pp. 1-9.
- Brownstone, M. and C. Demers (1994) *External Review of the University of Guelph's Involvement in the Sulawesi Regional Development Project*. Guelph, Ontario: University of Guelph.

- Budiardjo, C. (1991) "Indonesia: mass extermination and the consolidation of authoritarian power" in *Western State Terrorism*. New York: Routledge.
- Budiardjo, C. and L. Soei Liong (1984) *The War Against East Timor*. London: Zed.
- Carey, Alex (1995) *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*. Sydney NSW, Australia: University of New South Wales Press.
- Carey, W. (1998/99) "East Timor: The Making of an International Issue, 1974-1979," *Brock Review*, 7 (1/2).
- Carruthers, Susan (1995a) *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Counterinsurgency, 1944-1960*. London: Leicester University Press.
- Carruthers, Susan (1995b) "A Red Under Every Bed? Anti-Communist Propaganda and Britain's Response to Colonial Insurgency", *Contemporary Record*, 9(2), pp. 294-318.
- Chalk, F. and K. Jonassohn (1990) *The History and Sociology of Genocide*. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press (in cooperation with the Montreal Institute for Genocide Studies).
- Chomsky, Noam (1973) *For Reasons of State*. London: Collins.
- Chomsky, Noam (1979) *Language and Responsibility*. Hassocks: Harvester Press.
- Chomsky, Noam (1985) *Turning the Tide: US Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*. London: Pluto.
- Chomsky, Noam (1987) *The Chomsky Reader*, ed. James Peck. New York: Pantheon.
- Chomsky, Noam (1988) *Language and Politics*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Chomsky, Noam (1989) *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*. Toronto, Ontario: CBC Enterprises.
- Chomsky, Noam (1991) "International Terrorism: Image and Reality" in George, A. (ed.) *Western State Terrorism*. London: Polity.
- Chomsky, Noam (1992) *Deterring Democracy* (New York: Hill and Wang).
- Chomsky, Noam (1997a) *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Chomsky, Noam (1997b) "What Makes Mainstream Media Mainstream," *Z Magazine*, reprinted online at: <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199710-.htm> [accessed September 20, 2010]
- Chomsky, Noam (1998) *The Common Good*. Interviews with David Barsamian. Berkeley, CA: Odonian.
- Chomsky, Noam (2000) *Chomsky on Mis-Education*. Boston: Rowman and Littlefield.
- CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1975/1976) *Canada and Development Cooperation Annual Review*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency.

CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1976) *Annual Report*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency.

CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1992) *CIDA Programs in Asia: Indonesia*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency.

CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1993a) *CIDA Programs in Asia*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency.

CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) (1993b) *CIDA in East Timor*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency.

Clark, R.S. (1995). "Timor Gap: The Legality of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia", in *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of A Nation*. P. Carey and G.Carter Bentley (eds). London: Casell and SSRC: London, 73-94.

Clement, W. (1975) *Canadian Corporate Elite: Analysis of Economic Power*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Cohen, B. (1963) *The Press and Foreign Policy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Corner, John (2003) "Debate: The Model in Question - A Response to Klaehn on Herman and Chomsky," *European Journal of Communication*, 18(3), pp. 367-375.

Cromwell, David (2006) "Absurd Silence and Misplaced Pragmatism: how dissent is kept to manageable levels" in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), *Bound by Power: Intended Consequences*. Montreal: Black Rose, pp. 90-104.

Cromwell, David (2012) *Why Are We the Good Guys? Reclaiming Your Mind From the Delusions of Propaganda*. London: Zero Books.

Curran, James and Jean Seaton 1991. *Power and Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, Fourth edition. London: Routledge.

Curran, James, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott 1982. "The Study of the Media: Theoretical Approaches" in *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by Michael Gurevitch et al. London: Routledge, pp. 11-29.

Curtis, Liz (1984) *Ireland and the Propaganda War: The British Media and the "Battle for Hearts and Minds."* London: Pluto.

Danesi, Marcel (2008) *Popular Culture: Introductory Perspectives*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Desberats, P. (1990) *Guide to Canadian News Media*. Toronto: Between the Lines.

Dinan, William and David Miller (eds.) (2007) *Thinker Faker Spinner Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on Democracy*. London: Pluto.

Domhoff, William G. (1979) *The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling-Class Domination in America*. New York: Viking.

- Doyle, A., B. Elliot and D. Tindall (1997) "Framing the Forests: Corporations, the B.C. Forest Alliance, and the Media" in *Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice*. Toronto: Garamond.
- Dunn, James (1983) *Timor: A People Betrayed*. Milton, Qld: Jacaranda Press.
- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1989) "Canada and Canadian Investment in Indonesia". Vancouver: ETAN.
- ETAN (East Timor Alert Network) (1995) ETAN News Bulletin. Toronto: ETAN.
- Edgley, Alison (2009) "Manufacturing Consistency: Social Science, Rhetoric and Chomsky's Critique," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, (6)2, pp. 23-42.
- Edwards, David and David Cromwell (2005) *Guardians of Power: The Myth of the Liberal Media*. London: Pluto Press, 2005.
- Edwards, David and David Cromwell (2009) *Newspeak in the 21st Century*, London: Pluto.
- Eglin, Peter (1998/99) "Partnership in an Evil Action: Canadian Universities, Indonesia and Genocide in East Timor," *Brock Review* (7)1/2, pp. 58-100.
- Eglin, Peter (2006) "Partnership in an Evil Action: Canadian Universities, Indonesia, East Timor and the Question of Intellectual Responsibility Again" in *Bound by Power: Intended Consequences*, Jeffery Klaehn (ed). Montreal: Black Rose, pp. 217-258.
- Eldridge, John (ed.) (1993) *Getting the Message*. New York: Routledge.
- Entman, Robert (1991) "Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Disasters", *Journal of Communication*, 41(4), pp. 6-27.
- Entman, Robert (2004) *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ewen, S. (1996) *PR! A Social History of Spin*, New York: Basic Books.
- Everton, Robert (2005) "Israel Asper and Israeli Propaganda" in *Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model*, Jeffery Klaehn (ed). Montreal: Black Rose, pp. 63-94.
- External Affairs and International Trade Canada (1992) *Survey of Bilateral Economic Relations Between Canada and Indonesia*. Ottawa: External Affairs.
- Fairclough, Norman (1989) *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, Norman (1995a) *Media Discourse*. New York: Edward Arnold.
- Fairclough, Norman (1995b) *Critical Discourse Analysis*. Boston: Addison Wesley.
- Fairclough, Norman (2002) "Language in New Capitalism," *Discourse & Society*, 13(2), pp. 163-166.
- Fishman, Mark (1980) *Manufacturing the News*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.

- Flacks, David (1991) "Making History and Making Theory: Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevance" in *Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing World*. Sage: Newbury Park, pp. 3-18.
- Foreign Affairs Canada (1999) "Fact sheet - Indonesia, April 1999." Ottawa: Foreign Affairs, no pages numbers.
- Gans, H. (1979) *Deciding What's News*. New York: Pantheon.
- Ginsberg, Benjamin (1986) *The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power*, New York: Basic Books.
- Giroux, Henry (2001) *The Mouse That Roared: Disney and the End of Innocence*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Giroux, Henry (2010) "Public Pedagogy, Cultural Politics and the Biopolitics of Militarization" in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), *The Political Economy of Media and Power*, New York: Peter Lang, pp. 181-204.
- Glasgow University Media Group (1985) *War and Peace News*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Golding, Peter and Graham Murdock (1991) "Culture, Communications and Political Economy" in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (eds.), *Mass Media and Society*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Goodwin, Jeff (1994) "What's right (and wrong) about left media criticism? Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, *Sociological Forum*, 9(1), pp. 101-11.
- Gramsci, Antonio (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Greenberg, Josh and Elliott Charlene (2009) "A Cold-cut crisis: Food-borne illness, legitimization problems and *Communication*, 34(2), pp. 189-204.
- Greenberg, Josh and Graham Knight (2009) "Rethinking Public Relations," *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 34(2), pp. 183-7.
- Greenslade, Roy (2003) *Press Gang: How Newspapers Make Profit from Propaganda*, London: Pan Books.
- Golding, Peter and Graham Murdock (1991) "Culture, Communications and Political Economy" in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds.), *Mass Media and Society*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Gunn, Geoffrey (1994) *A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor*. Sydney: Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.
- Hackett, R. (1991) *News and Dissent: The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada*. New Jersey: Ablex.
- Haley, Michael C. and Ronald F. Lunsford (1994) *Noam Chomsky*. New York: Twayne Publishers.
- Hall, Stuart (1980) "Encoding/Decoding" in Hall, S. et al (Eds.) *Culture, Media, Language*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hallin, Daniel C. (1986) *The Uncensored War*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Hartley, J. (1982) *Understanding News*. New York: Metheun.
- Heinricks, G. (1989) "Whose news? Business circles the globe." *This Magazine*, (23)3 Sept., pp. 14-21.
- Herman, Edward S. (1985) "Diversity of News: 'Marginalizing' the Opposition," *Journal of Communication*, 35 (summer), pp. 135-46.
- Herman, Edward S. (1996a) "The Propaganda Model Revisited" in the *Monthly Review* (July). Reprinted online: <http://musictravel.free.fr/political/political7.htm> (accessed on October 21, 2009).
- Herman, Edward S. (1996b) "Postmodernism triumphs" in *Z Magazine* (Jan), pp. 15-17.
- Herman, Edward S. (1992) *Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda*. Boston: South End Press.
- Herman, Edward S. (1999) *The Myth of the Liberal Media*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Herman, Edward S. (2000) "The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective," *Journalism Studies*, 1(1), pp. 101-112. Reprinted online at: <http://www.human-nature.com/reason/01/herman.html> [accessed April 10, 2009]
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (2002) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, Second edition. New York: Pantheon.
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (2004a) "Reply to Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang," *Political Communication*, 21, pp. 103-7.
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (2004b) "Further Reply to the Langs," *Political Communication*, 21, pp. 113-6.
- Herman, Edward S. and Gerry O'Sullivan (1991) "'Terrorism' as Ideology and Cultural Industry" in George, A. (ed.) *Western State Terrorism*. London: Polity Press.
- Herring, Eric and Piers Robinson (2003a) "Forum on Chomsky: Introduction," *Review of International Studies*, 29, pp.551-2.
- Herring, Eric and Piers Robinson (2003b) "Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chomsky on the Study of the News Media and US Foreign Policy," *Review of International Studies* 29, pp. 553-68.
- Hollingsworth, Mark (1986) *The Press and Political Dissent: A Question of Censorship*. London: Pluto.
- Jensen, Robert (2005) "Dan Rather and the Problem with Patriotism" in *Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model*, Jeffery Klaehn (ed). Montreal: Black Rose, pp. 120-137.

- Jensen, Robert (2006) "The Myth of the Neutral Professional" in *Bound by Power: Intended Consequences*, Jeffery Klaehn (ed.). Montreal: Black Rose, pp. 64-71.
- Jhally, Sut 2006 *Spectacle of Accumulation: Essays in Culture, Media and Politics*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Kennan, G.F. (1976) "Review of Current Trends, U.S. Foreign Policy," PPS/23, Top Secret, included in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume 1, Part 2*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 509-529.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2002a) "A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model," *European Journal of Communication* Vol. 17(2), pp.147-182.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2002b) "Corporate Hegemony: A Critical Assessment of the *Globe and Mail's* News Coverage of Near-Genocide in Occupied East Timor, 1975-1980,' *International Communication Gazette*, 2002, Vol. 64(4), pp. 301-321.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2003a) "Behind the Invisible Curtain of Scholarly Criticism: Revisiting the Propaganda Model," *Journalism Studies* (4)3, pp. 359-369.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2003b) "Canadian Complicity in the East Timor Near-Genocide: A Case Study in the Sociology of Human Rights," *Portuguese Studies Review* 11(1), pp. 49-66.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2003c) "Model Construction: Various Other Epistemological Concerns - A Reply to John Corner's Commentary on the Propaganda Model," *European Journal of Communication* Vol. 18(3), pp. 377-383.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (ed.) (2005) *Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (ed.) (2006) *Bound by Power: Intended Consequences*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2008) "Media, Power and the Origins of the Propaganda Model: An Interview with Edward S. Herman," *Fifth Estate Online: The International Journal of Radical Mass Media Criticism*.
Online at: <http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/?p=140> [accessed November 3, 2011]
- Klaehn, Jeffery (2009) "The Propaganda Model: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* Vol. 6(2), pp. 43-58.
- Klaehn, Jeffery (ed.) (2010) *The Political Economy of Media and Power*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Klaehn, Jeffery and Andrew Mullen (2010) "The Propaganda Model and Sociology: Understanding the Media and Society," *Synaesthesia: Communication Across Cultures* Vol. 1(1), pp. 10-23.
- Krieger, J. (1997) *East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, M. and N. Solomon (1990) *Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in the News Media*. New York: Carol.

- Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang (2004a) "Noam Chomsky and the Manufacture of Consent for American Foreign Policy." *Political Communication*, (21), pp.93-101.
- MacEachen, A. (1976a) "Canada and Indonesia - the dialogue has begun well." Speech delivered to Jakarta Press Club, August 25, 1976.
- MacEachen, A. (1976b) "Canada and Australia expand their untroubled relationship." Speech to Australian National Press Club, September 3, 1976.
- Marx, Karl (1956) *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*. T. Bottomore and M. Rubel (eds.). London: Watts.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich 1970 [1845] *The German Ideology*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology News Office 1992 "Chomsky is Citation Champ", 15 April.
Online: <http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/1992/citation0415.html> (accessed Oct 15, 2010).
- Masse, B. (1992) "Why won't Canada follow its own human rights rules?" *Peace Magazine* (May/June), 12-13.7
- McChesney, Robert 1999 *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- McChesney, Robert (2008) *The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- McMurtry, J. (1998) *Unequal Freedoms: The Global Market as an Ethical System*. Toronto: Garamond.
- Mermin, John (1999) *Debating War and Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Michels, Robert (1949) *Political Parties*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
- Miliband, R. (1969) *The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Miller, David (2004) *Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq*, David Miller (ed.). London: Pluto.
- Miller, David (2007) "Spinning Farmed Salmon" in *Thinker Faker Spinner Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on Democracy*, William Dinan and David Miller (eds.). London: Pluto.
- Miller, David (2009) "Going in for the kill: the "kettling" role of PR in science and research," Spinwatch, July 17, 2009.
Online at: <http://www.spinwatch.org/blogs-mainMenu-29/david-miller-unspun-mainmenu-31/5307-go-in-for-the-kill-the-role-of-pr-in-science-and-research> (accessed November 19, 2010)
- Miller, David and William Dinan (2007) "Public Relations and the Subversion of Democracy" in *Thinker Faker Spinner Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on Democracy*, William Dinan and David Miller (eds.). London: Pluto.

- Miller, David and William Dinan (2008) *A Century of Spin: How Public Relations Became the Cutting Edge of Corporate Power*. London: Pluto.
- Mills, C. Wright (1959) *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moody, R. (1992) *The Gulliver File, Mines, People and Land: A Global Background*. Toronto: Garamond.
- Mosca, Gaetano (1939) *The Ruling Class*. Translated and edited by A. Livingstone. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Mullen, Andrew (2009) "The Propaganda Model After 20 Years: An Interview with Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, Vol. 6(2), pp. 12-22.
- Mullen, Andrew (2010a) "Twenty Years On: The Second-Order Prediction of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model," *Media, Culture and Society* Vol. 32(4), pp. 672-690.
- Mullen, Andrew (2010b) "Bringing Power Back In: The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model, 1988-2008" in *The Political Economy of the Media and Power*, edited by Jeffery Klaehn. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 207-234.
- Mullen, Andrew (2010c) "The Propaganda Model After 20 Years: Interview with Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky," Fifth Estate Online, Feb 2010, pp. 1-10.
Online at: http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/comment/Mullen_paper_FEO.pdf (accessed July 20, 2012)
- Mullen, Andrew and Jeffery Klaehn (2010) "The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to Analyzing Mass Media Behaviour," *Sociology Compass*, 4(4), pp. 215-229.
- Murdock, Graham (1982) "Large Corporations and the Control of the Communications Industries" in *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran and J. Woolacott. London: Routledge, pp. 118-150.
- Murdock, Graham and Peter Golding (1977) "Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations" in *Mass Communication and Society*, edited by J. Curran, M. Gurevitch and J. Woolacott. London: Edward Arnold, pp. 12-43.
- Nairn, A. (1992) "Testimony of Allan Nairn before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Crisis in East Timor and US Foreign Policy toward Indonesia," Feb 17.
- Nelson, J. (1989) *Sultans of Sleaze: Public Relations and the Mass Media*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Nelson, Richard Alan (1990) "Bias versus fairness: The social utility of issues management." *Public Relations Review* 16 (spring), pp. 25-32.
- Packard, Vance (1957) *The Hidden Persuaders*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Parenti, Michael (1986) *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media*. New York: St Martins.
- Pareto, Vilfredo (1935) *The Mind and Society*. Translated by A. Livingstone and A. Bongiaro. New York: Harcourt-Brace.

Pedro, Joan (2011a) "The Propaganda Model in the Early 21st Century - Part 1,' *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011), 1865-1905.

Pedro, Joan (2011b) ""The Propaganda Model in the Early 21st Century - Part 2,' *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011), 1906-1926.

Phillips, Peter (2007) "Left Progressive Media Inside the Propaganda Model" [Available at www.projectcensored.org (accessed on 1 December 2008)].

Philo, Greg and Greg McLaughlin (1993) *The British Media and the Gulf War*. Glasgow: Glasgow University Media Group.

Pilger, John (1998) *Hidden Agendas*. London: Vintage.

Poulantzas, Nicos (1975) *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.

Rai, Milan (1995) *Chomsky's Politics*. New York: Verso.

Republic of Indonesia (1992) *Indonesian Sourcebook*. Indonesia: Republic of Indonesia.

Ripley, B. (1990) "Deserves scrutiny," Letter to the editor, *Globe and Mail*, September 4.

Robertson, John (2011) "The Propaganda Model in 2011: Stronger Yet Still Neglected in UK Higher Education," *Synaesthesia*, Vol. 1(1): pp. 24-33.

Salmon, Charles (1989) "Review of Manufacturing Consent by Herman and Chomsky." *Journalism Quarterly* 66 (Summer), pp. 494-5.

Scharfe, Sharon (1996) *Complicity: Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy - The Case of East Timor*. Montreal: Black Rose.

Schlesinger, Philip (1989) "From Production to Propaganda", *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol. 11, pp. 283-306.

Schlesinger, Philip (1992) "From production to propaganda" in *Media, Culture and Society: A Reader*. London: Sage.

Schmidt, Jeff (2001) *Disciplined Minds: A critical look at salaried professionals and the soul-battering system that shapes their lives*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Schudson, Michael (1989) "The Sociology of News Production." *Media, Culture and Society* 11(3), pp. 263-82.

Schumpeter, Joseph (1976) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Sissons, M. (1997) *From One Day to Another: Violations of Women's Reproductive and Sexual Rights in East Timor*. Victoria: East Timor Human Rights Center.

SourceWatch 2011 "Propaganda Model" web-page, online at: http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Propaganda_Model [accessed September 21, 2011]

Sparks, Colin 2005 "Extending and Refining the Propaganda Model", *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, 4(2), pp. 68-84.

- Sussman, Gerald (2010) "The Systematic Bases of Promotional Political Culture" in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), *The Political Economy of Media and Power*. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 113-140.
- Sussman, Gerald (ed.) (2011) *The Propaganda Society*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Swift, J. (1977) *The Big Nickel: INCO at Home and Abroad*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Taylor, J. (1990) *The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1974-1979: A Chronology*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.
- Taylor, J. (1991) *Indonesia's Forgotten War - The Hidden History of East Timor*. London: Zed.
- Theobald, John (2006) "The Intellectual Tradition of Radical Mass Media Criticism: A Framework," *Fifth-Estate-Online: The International Journal of Radical Mass Media Criticism*. Online at: <http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/criticism/TheobaldFifthEstate.pdf> (accessed Sept 22, 2011)
- Tuchman, G. (1978) *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- United States Dept. of State (1948) "Bureau of Foreign Affairs: Military Assistance on Reimbursable Basis, Map Country Indonesia." Southeast Asia series, University Publications of America.
- Van Dijk, T. (1983) "Discourse Analysis: Its Development and Application to the Structure of News," *Journal of Communication* (2), pp. 11-32.
- Van Dijk, T. (1988) *News Analysis: Case Studies of International News in the Press*. New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Van Dijk, T. (1998) *Ideology: a multi-disciplinary approach*. London: Sage.
- Williams, G. A. (1960) "The concept of 'Egemonia' in the thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some notes on interpretation," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21 (4): 586-99.
- White, D. (1964) "The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News," *People, Society and Mass Communication*, LA. Dexter and D.M. White (eds). New York: Free Press.
- Winter, James (1992) *Common Cents*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Winter, James (1998) *Democracy's Oxygen: How the Corporations Control the News*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Winter, James (2002) *MediaThink*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Winter, James (2007) *Lies Media Tell Us*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Winter, J. and B. Everton (2006) "How Jimmy Carter Spent His Cuba Vacation: Media Coverage and Ideological Bias" in *Bound by Power: Intended Consequences*, Jeffery Klaehn (ed). Montreal: Black Rose, pp. 150-187.
- Wintonick, Peter and Mark Achbar (1994) *Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media*. Montreal: Black Rose.