

UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE

DISCOURSE, POWER AND IDEOLOGY:
SOME EXPLORATIONS
IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

JOANNA THORNBORROW

Department of English Studies

Programme in Literary Linguistics

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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ABSTRACT

This thesis consists of an inquiry into the articulation between language, ideology, and power, which is approached from two different angles. Firstly, it deals with theories of ideology as *representation*, and secondly, investigates the effect of ideology and power on structures of discursive interaction.

Thompson (1984) has argued for the necessity of accounting for the relationship between meaning and power in the study of ideology, a relationship which does not seem to be adequately addressed by theories of representation on the one hand, or by theories of social interaction, on the other. The central objective of this research is then to identify possible areas of interface between the linguistic domains of semantics and pragmatics, and the social domains of background beliefs and institutional interaction, and to investigate how this interface may, in practice, construct and organise ideological meanings in discourse.

Through a series of case studies, examples of naturally-occurring discourse are analysed in order to examine specific ways in which meaning works to sustain asymmetrical relations of power, and it is argued that this relationship between meaning and power cannot be fully accounted for without integrating pragmatic theories of language in use into the analysis of social discourse.

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P A R T O N E

IDEOLOGY AS REPRESENTATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.0 General Background to the Research

The research undertaken in this thesis stems originally from an interest in the relationship between language and ideology, a belief in the validity of techniques of discourse analysis in an examination of that relationship, and from a sense that existing accounts still leave scope for further investigation into the articulation between the linguistic domains of semantics and pragmatics, and the social domains of cultural knowledge and power structures.

Work in the field of ideological and social aspects of language has tended to concentrate on either ideology as representation, or on structures of social interaction: on the one hand, neglecting social relations to focus on analyses of semantic content and sense relations which are often decontextualised; on the other hand, investigating discourse as social interaction at the expense of attending to utterance content and meaning. Theories of ideology as representation do not account for social relations and contexts in which discourses are produced and meanings negotiated, whereas practices of discourse analysis often concentrate solely on discursive structure and interpersonal interaction at the expense of attending to the function of representational aspects of the discourse.

I.1 The Role of Discourse Analysis in the Study of Ideology

The principal focus of the research has been largely oriented by Thompson (1984), and his call for an enquiry into the relationship between meaning and power:

"Ideology must be conceptualised [...] within the framework of a general social theory, one which explores the relation between action and structure and gives a central role to the concept of power. To study ideology, within such a framework, is to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination."
(1984: 146)

Thompson maintains that the role of discourse analysis is fundamental in the study of the relationship between ideology and language, but that current work in the field, while often extremely insightful, has not yet provided a systematic description of the ways in which meanings are produced within a social framework of relations of power and domination.

Commenting on three main areas of discourse analysis, the work of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) on exchange structures, the conversational analyses of Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson (1972, 1978, 1979 etc.) and the analysis of grammatical structure and ideological representation in work by Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979 etc.), Thompson claims that an adequate way of dealing with the relationship between discourse and power has not yet emerged from these studies.

The primary concern of Sinclair and Coulthard was to investigate exchange structures in discourse, but in so doing, issues of discursive content and non-linguistic organisation were often left to one side. Thompson suggests that in order to approach the issue of discursive content, it is necessary to take the role of background knowledge and topical coherence into account, while non-linguistic notions of power

and control of the discourse need to be integrated more systematically into the description (p: 107).

The conversation analysts have been concerned with the sequential organisation of discourse, describing the mechanisms of orderly turn-taking interaction between participants engaged in the activity of talk. This interaction however also lacks an attention to social context, since:

"which interpretation is to count, and which participant is to succeed in holding or usurping the right to speak depends on who the participants are and how much power they respectively have in the situation concerned."
(1984: 118)

In particular, trouble spots and repairs in the organisation of turn-taking, places where the interaction is problematic in some way (cf. Sacks et al, 1977) have to be recognised as such by participants, and this recognition depends to a large extent on relations of power and status, a social dimension where "the construction of meaning intersects with asymmetrical relations of power, which is the domain of ideology." (1984: 118).

Finally, in his discussion of the work of Fowler et al, Thompson states that while their linguistic analysis is highly developed in their studies of the link between grammatical structures and the social world, the social theory and notions of agency, domination and control remain imprecise and unrefined. (1984: 126).

Despite the criticisms, Thompson nevertheless emphasises the importance of the contribution of discourse analysis, together with a social analysis of actions and institutions, to an overall interpretative procedure which he proposes as a framework for the study of ideology.''

I.2 Developing the Role of Discourse Analysis

In taking up Thompson's argument for approaching the study of ideology in terms of the relationship between discourse and power, I suggest that in previous accounts of language and ideology, the notion of *language as action* has not been sufficiently developed. In much recent work, it is the concept of ideology as *representation* that has been the central focus of investigation, with a consequent foregrounding of the syntactic and semantic levels of language⁽²⁾. I therefore propose that if we are to account for discourse/power relations, it is within the operation of language in action that these will be displayed and thus specifically analysable. Since the principal theories which account for language as action are within the field of pragmatics, I suggest that there is scope for a discourse analysis which draws on the pragmatic level of language, a theoretical resource hitherto under-exploited in studies of language and ideology.⁽³⁾

I.2.1 Creating Space for Pragmatic Theory

Pragmatics has been described as essentially a "theory of action", in so far as language systems regulate interaction between participants in discourse, and that the categories and rules of this interaction are shaped and developed under the influence of structures of interaction in society, (cf. van Dijk, 1977: 167).

There seems then to be space for developing the role of pragmatic theory, (alongside semantic and syntactic descriptions) in an account of the operation of ideology in language in two crucial, but distinct, areas. The first, still in the domain of *ideology as representation*, is in the investigation of how background knowledge may function to produce meanings which are ideologically motivated. The second is in

the domain of discursive interaction, and consists of an attempt to integrate the notion of power, so far generally left to one side, into the analysis of talk.

I.2.2 Representation and Background Knowledge

In many of the accounts of ideology as representation⁴, the syntactic or semantic structures of language are analysed without attending to the external features of contextualisation of discourse, i.e. features such as the context of production, co-text, social relations between discourse producers and processors, and the structures of background knowledge that are mobilised in discourse through processes of inferencing. Kress has pointed out that as a result, critical linguistic theory tends to view processes from the point of view of the discourse producer at the expense of the discourse consumer, thus naturalising the view that meanings are produced and imposed: "We occupy social positions which already structure our access to texts, and structure our participation in them" (1985: 65). The participation of consumers of discourse in the construction of meanings, in terms of the background assumptions they bring to interpretation of texts, may well be an area in which pragmatic theory, the theory of the relationship between language and its users⁵ could provide some useful concepts for the analysis of meaning in context, and for the 'given', taken-for-granted aspects of commonsense background assumptions that are mobilised in processes of interpretation.

I.2.3 Discursive Interaction and Control

If the relationship between discourse and power is to be investigated further, then one of the primary sites in which language will be subject to the operations of power is in talk, and particularly talk

which takes place within an institutional framework, with unequal status or hierarchical structures overtly or covertly displayed between participants. It may be possible to account for the mechanisms of control in discourse by examining what sort of actions in the speech event can be taken by specific participants, and the ways in which discursive interaction is itself constitutive of asymmetrical power relations. In order to do this, I suggest that it is necessary to draw on techniques of conversational analysis, but to consider the aspects of power and control which may be operating internally within the discourse, rather than regarding them as external, socially determined, non-linguistic features.

I.3 Definition of Terms: Ideology - Discourse - Power

In this section a brief description is given of the key concepts around which the research has been based, in order to establish a general background for the subsequent analyses of specific data.

The relationship between the concepts of ideology, discourse and power has been explored in the pioneering work of Volosinov, who claimed that "without signs, there is no ideology." (1929, tr. 1973: 11). In his discussion of the 'multi-accentuality' of the ideological sign, he states that "The word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant" (p. 86), and that consequently there is always scope for struggle over the meaning of signs and symbols.

The work of Barthes (1957) on 'myth', and how the ruling ideas of a social formation (the bourgeoisie) come to be seen as universal, also emphasised a split in the reference of a sign, where discourse carries

out its ideological function by implicitly referring to one thing while explicitly referring to another. In his commentary on the image of a black soldier making the French military salute, Barthes illustrates the way in which a 'sign' on one level, becomes the 'signifier' on the second level of myth, where the meaning of the image carries an ideological message relating to the nature of French colonialism, the black soldier loyally saluting the French flag, showing solidarity to the French Empire, (1957: 201).

I.3.1 Defining Ideology

The term '*idéologie*' was first used, with negative connotations, in France at the beginning of the 19th century, when the '*idéologues*' were blamed by Napoleon for the failure of the French economy. The negative connotations were preserved by Marx and Engels in '*Die deutsche Ideologie*' (1846), and contemporary usage tends also to preserve this sense, in that it is often used to refer to the thought of 'the other', and that to characterise something as *ideological* is inherently to criticise it.⁶

The classic marxist use of the term *ideology* refers to a "knowledge of society" which "represent[s] as natural those social arrangements that are in fact historically contingent", or more simply, "the prevailing ways of making sense that are established throughout (bourgeois) society", (O'Sullivan et al, 1983: 108).

The marxist view of the concept has been summarised as follows:

"Ideology is the means by which ruling economic classes generalise and extend their supremacy across the whole range of social activity, and naturalise it in the process, so that their rule is accepted as natural and inevitable, and therefore legitimate and binding."
(O'Sullivan et al, 1983: 109).

Marx exempted the science of historical materialism itself from the ideological process, stating that not all knowledge is ideological, only *social* knowledge, and claimed that marxist theory should provide access to non-ideological knowledge of natural and historical laws. However, the term is also used in its negative, restricted sense, by the theorists of the 'end of ideology' debate⁷ to refer to political belief systems which advocate radical social change, thus to Marxism itself.

Williams comments on these negative aspects of the term, saying that it acquired "a sense of abstract, impractical or fanatical theory" and that it is often used "in conservative criticism of social policy derived from social theory in a conscious way." (1976: 154)

The use of the term in some areas of sociology has moved away from the notion of 'false consciousness' and closer to Althusser's definition of ideology as 'systems of representation - composed of concepts, ideas, myths or images - in which people live their imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence', (cf. Thompson, 1986: 24):

"I would want to insist that the concept "ideology" should be thought of as referring to aspects of symbol systems (or systems of representation) and not to a type of symbol system (contrasted with science or valid knowledge)." (Thompson 1986: 50).

Althusser (1971) reworked the marxist concept of ideology into a theory of the role of the state, and its operation as part of the process of reproduction through *ideological state apparatuses*. ISA's are social institutions which reproduce ideology on behalf of the state, (as opposed to *repressive state apparatuses*, i.e. penal system, army, police etc.), while appearing to be relatively autonomous from the dominant class, representing class interests as neutral and natural⁸.

Althusser's theory of ideology and the interpellation of individuals as subjects hinges on the premiss that ideology operates as a *discourse*, constructing subject positions for people within society in such a way that it becomes impossible for individuals to see themselves outside the social role imposed on them, thereby ensuring the maintenance of the rules of the established order, and the submission of the subordinate classes to it.

The concept of ideology operating as a discourse has given rise to what has been called the "social cement theories"⁹: ideology is embedded in material social practices in such a way that discourses "reproduce[d] social relations involving submission to a superior social force" (Thompson, 1986: 72), in the Althusserian sense, by interpellating individuals as subjects. However, as Thompson has pointed out:

"The concept of 'interpellation of subjects' has rather mechanical implications, suggesting that people automatically recognise themselves in terms of the categories by which they are 'hailed', and it neglects the processes by which people 'negotiate' their own identities and the variety of ways in which they are motivated to act in accordance with them."¹⁰
(Thompson 1986: 25).

The Gramscian notions of negotiation, contestation and struggle have been drawn upon in less mechanistic ways than the Althusserian 'dominant ideology' theory, by allowing for the interplay of different ideologies in society, but resulting in a consensus of shared values and norms, which creates social stability. Gramsci's concept of hegemony: "spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (1977: 12), offers a useful contrast to Althusserian notions of interpellation and submission, in so far as it

allows for a negotiation of social relations. Rather than social roles being imposed by the dominant ideology of the ruling class, society is made up of various conflicting ideologies, in constant struggle for dominance, but that dominance is gained by consent as much as by subordination. The social institutions which produce meanings, and influence ways of making sense of the world, do so in a way which renders them 'natural' or 'neutral': "Hegemony naturalises what is historically a class ideology, and renders it into the form of common sense." (O'Sullivan et al, 1983: 103).

Gramsci describes 'common sense' as "the folklore of philosophy", or:

"The conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed."
(1977: 419)

It is this concept of *common sense* which is central to a pragmatic account of the relationship between ideology and discourse, insofar as we can characterise sets of assumptions from background knowledge which are mobilised in the production and interpretation of discourse as being ideologically motivated, i.e. as forming part of 'common sense': "the incoherent set of generally held assumptions and beliefs common to any given society" (1977: 323).

The definition of ideology as natural or generally applicable knowledge, whose social origins are "suppressed, ex-nominated or deemed irrelevant" (O'Sullivan et al, 1983: 107) contrasts to a certain extent with the concept of ideology as a 'practice': "the practice of reproducing social relations of inequality within the sphere of SIGNIFICATION and DISCOURSE", and it is here that the articulation between ideology and *discourse* comes into play.

I.3.2 Defining Discourse

Discourse can be generally described here as language that is produced in its social context, that is to say as naturally occurring instances of expression, whether these take the form of conversation or of written texts. I have drawn on two different traditions of discourse analysis in this research, the mainly Anglo-saxon approach to discourse and conversation analysis, and the work of the French theorists Foucault and Pêcheux.

I.3.2.1 Discourse as Interaction

The term *discourse* as it has been understood in studies of discourse analysis (cf. Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975; Coulthard, 1977; Coulthard & Montgomery, 1981; Stubbs, 1983) essentially refers to this aspect of language; i.e. language in use, as opposed to the system of language in terms of grammatical structure, but has tended to apply specifically to spoken language rather than written.

Sinclair and Coulthard, (1975), for instance, aimed to study "the organisation of linguistic units above the rank of the clause", and by working on an analysis of classroom interaction, they attempted to describe the structure of spoken discourse, and develop a model for the way in which "language functions such as statement, question and command are realised through grammatical structure and positions in the discourse." (1975: 8).

For the conversation analysts (cf. Sacks et al, 1978), it was not the linguistic structure of discourse that was the focus of investigation, but the organisation of discursive interaction as a social process between participants according to specific rules of turn-taking. They are concerned primarily with talk, in the beginning naturally occurring

conversation, and subsequently institutional talk (cf. Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Drew, 1984).

I.3.2.2 Discourse as a 'Practice'

Both the above approaches addressed discourse as essentially spoken interaction, whereas at the opposite end of the pole of studies in discourse, is the work of the French discourse theorists Foucault and Pêcheux, who are concerned with the more general social and historical function of discourses rather than with the analysis of specific instances of naturally occurring spoken discourse.

For Foucault, discourse is made up of sets of statements which are organised into *discursive formations*, and a *discursive formation* will consist of "a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined." (1974: 117). These conditions of existence are described as *discursive practices*⁽¹⁾, which regularise the coherence of specific bodies of statements: "Regularity in the Foucauldian sense attempts to account for the ways in which statements are combined and co-exist in determinate historical conditions" (Weedon et al, 1980: 210).

Foucault however tends to avoid addressing the issue of ideology and its effects by stating that it is through discourse that "effects of truth" are created, (rather than through ideological processes):

"Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned,.... the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true."
(Foucault, 1975: 131)

His prime concern is with institutional discourses, and what it is possible to say at any given historical moment, rather than what is

actually said. As a result, the term discourse is often invoked in his writings without any direct relation to language usage, apart from one or two isolated examples. A further problem is that his theory of discursive practices and formations does not leave space for the setting up of conflicting discourses, (cf. McDonnel, 1986).

A concerted attempt to relate discourse and ideological effects directly to the processes of language is however made by Pêcheux who is directly concerned with the way in which clausal structures interrelate with 'pre-constructed' elements of *interdiscourse*, the 'complex whole' of discursive formations. For Pêcheux, discourse is a material force, setting up already available subject positions through this 'pre-constructed' knowledge, which is represented discursively in specific linguistic forms. He takes the two types of relative clause as an example of this, arguing that "the distinction between relative clauses can only be understood in terms of discursive rather than grammatical function," (cf. MacCabe, 1979: 298). This claim will be discussed in more detail in Case Study Two.

The notion of discourse as an active force in social relations, as a 'practice', has been taken up by Coward and Ellis, who see language as having a material existence, "in that it is constituted in several institutions (speech, gesture, writing) whose importance and forms differ from society to society; and that its role is determining, playing a part, [...] in the social process, in social contradictions", (1977: 80),⁽¹²⁾.

In the present study I have tended to adopt the latter sense of the term, i.e. discourse as a form of social 'practice', rather than seeing it simply as interaction. This is essentially because the notion of

discursive practices enables me to relate specific analyses of talk and text to more general claims about institutional contexts, and about the way ideological effects seem to be produced. It also allows me to make a distinction, towards the end of the thesis, (cf. Case Study Six), between discursive practices, on the one hand, and interactional procedures, on the other, when exploring possible relationships between power and language.

I.3.3 Defining Power

Power has been broadly defined as "the sources, means and relations of dominance, control and subordination", (O'Sullivan et al, 1983: 177). However, its exact characterisation and measurement remains complex and sometimes controversial. Lukes (1986) states that there is a gap between the concept of power and its operational definition, and that the different systems of quantifying power do not correlate, often because they are based on different aspects of power relations.⁽¹³⁾

In those studies of discourse which use the term, the concept is understood as "the control by one social agent of the behaviour of others" (Kress and Hodge, 1988: 39). However, the relationship between power and ideology remains problematic, since the notion of power working as the overt, one-dimensional control of one agent by another seems insufficient to account for its relationship to language, to the ideological process of 'naturalisation', and the effect of power relations on the production of meaning.

Lukes (1975) proposes an alternative, three-dimensional model for conceptualising power which arises from "shaping perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they (i.e. social agents) accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they

can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained or beneficial" (quoted in Hall, 1982: 65). This 'ideological' concept of power would therefore include 'shaping' reality, "the power to signify events in a particular way", (Hall, 1982: 69), and so has a direct relation to the way in which meaning is produced through *representation*, which Hall defines as "the active labour of making things mean", (1982: 64).

The relationship between power and discourse has also been discussed by Foucault, who again argues that it is not possible to see power as a purely one-dimensional concept:

"One should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, with 'dominators' on the one side and 'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of relations of domination."
(1975: 142)

His view is that the subject positions set up in discourse, (which include positions of power) are general functions that can be occupied by any individual taking up the role of different subjects in different series of statements, and that the exercise of power is therefore not dependent on particular individuals occupying particular subject positions: "Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (Gordon, 1980: 234). Power is an essentially productive force which operates internally within specific discursive practices:

"What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression."
(Gordon, 1980: 119)

For the purposes of this study, power will be considered as an active component of social interaction insofar as it determines relations of status between participants, and institutionally-conferred positions of authority; it can be related 'ideologically' to discourse through the process of *legitimation*: "those processes whereby the possession and exercise of power and authority are mobilised and constructed as 'right' or 'just' guaranteed by its own 'moral' superiority and 'taken for granted' inevitability." (O'Sullivan et al, 1983: 177). This legitimation concerns socially insitutionalised restrictions on who may speak, how much may be said, what may be talked about, whose assertions count as valid, etc. (cf. Therborn 1980), and forms part of the hegemonic consensus when it is naturalised as part of commonsense knowledge of what is 'right' and 'just'.

I.3.4 Discourse and Ideological Effects

One way in which discourse may function to maintain dominant ideologies seems not just on the representational level, but also on the interactional level, where interpersonal relations of power are conducted through discourse, through the activity of talk itself.

It has been seen that while the representation of events and actions may be socially and culturally determined, tending towards dominant representations at any given time in any particular culture, these representations can be challenged and re-worked to provide alternative methods of representing within the same society.

Attempts have been made to separate ideological language and non-ideological language into categories such as 'belief' versus 'knowledge', 'ideology' versus 'science', but these categories are not as easily

distinguishable as may first be thought. A Foucauldian definition of 'science', for instance, is a set of statements that can be considered as true at any historical point in time, (and thus are 'ideological'):

"Savoir' is not knowledge in the sense of a bunch of solid propositions, but [...] more like a postulated set of rules that determine what kinds of sentences are going to count as true or false in some domain Discourse is then to be analysed not in terms of who says what but in terms of the conditions under which those sentences will have a definite truth value, and hence are capable of being uttered. Such conditions will lie in the 'depth' knowledge of the time."

(Hacking, 1986: 30).

It seems more feasible to assume from the outset that all language can produce ideological meanings, depending on its social context of use, and that it is statements and utterances which produce ideologically motivated meanings, rather than sentences, in so far as these meanings create ideological effects.

However, the kind of ideological effects produced in discourse remain very much open to debate. Theories of ideological subjectivity (cf. Althusser, 1971), which state that language produces ideological effects on subjects by the process of interpellation, or the calling into position of subjects for whom that position then appears to be the only 'natural' one, have been the subject of research in work on television viewers and the construction of audience subject positions in BBC'S *NATIONWIDE* news programme, (cf. Morley, 1980), where it was found that consumers of discourse do not always take up the subject positions constructed for them by that discourse.

Although Pêcheux (1975: 158) distinguishes between three types of subject, the *identifying* subject, the *counter-identifying* subject, and the *dis-identifying* subject, and describes how discourse may set up

subject positions, he does not make it clear whether the process of dis-identification can be actively undertaken discursively, or whether it is simply a question of intellectual manoeuvring. But if, as Pêcheux claims, discourse is the 'site and means' of domination (see II.3.2.2 below), then it would seem necessary to examine not only the ideational, conceptual features of discourse in terms of systems of representation, but also its interactive organisation and its relationship to asymmetrical social structures of power.

However, even if we adopt Foucault's basic notion of power as being actively produced in discourse, we still lack an adequate description of how this process occurs. It therefore seems necessary to investigate those aspects of discourse, the actual discursive mechanisms, which are directly implicated in the production and reproduction of power, in much greater detail than has so far been the case. It also seems necessary to base this investigation on an analysis of naturally-occurring data and the processes of interaction, by looking more closely at the structures of control which operate in talk, and particularly that talk which takes place in institutionalised contexts, since it is here that the effects of power and status on talk will be most in evidence.

The second half of this thesis will therefore be concerned with an examination of the organisation and management of discursive interaction in order to define more clearly the relationship between discourse and power. In particular, I examine the ways in which the activity of talk itself sets up interactive positions for participants to speak from, positions which do not give equal rights of access to the available discursive space, and which restrict the type of actions

that can be carried out by the participants who occupy them, since this feature of talk seems to be a crucial one in establishing and maintaining control discursively in the context of interaction between participants of unequal power and status.

I.4 The Method of Analysis

The thesis takes the form of a series of case studies. In the first three studies, theories of ideology as representation are examined in relation to naturally occurring discourse, in order to explore the possibilities of accounting for ideological meaning not just through the work of representation on a semantic or syntactic level, but through the pragmatic level of inferencing processes which depend on commonsense assumptions from background knowledge in the production and interpretation of discourse. Theories of language processing, for instance frame-system theory (Minsky, 1975, 1977), and of metaphoric structuring (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), have been particularly useful in constructing an account of the role of these commonsense assumptions at work in discourse.

In the second three studies, a different aspect of pragmatic theory, concerning the structure of conversation, forms the basis for an analysis of the possible function and effects of power relations in discourse. Levinson states that pragmatic phenomena are "centrally organised around usage in conversation" which is "the prototypical kind of language usage", (1983: 284). If power is considered to be a productive element in discourse, structuring the interaction in specific ways, then it seems essential to integrate such a consideration into an analysis of the discourse produced in insitutional contexts, in order to

identify some possible effects of power and status on the organisation of the talk. Some of the findings of conversation analysis, i.e. the investigation of the organisation and management of talk, are therefore drawn upon in an examination of three specific instances of institutional discourse where the social relationships of power and status between participants are either asymmetrical, or problematic in some respect.

I.5 The Data

The analyses undertaken in this research required two main categories of data: the first category had to include discourse which exhibited specific aspects of ideological representation, and the second category had to consist of institutional interaction, particularly where asymmetrical power relations were in evidence. Most of the data are taken from media sources, for two main reasons. The first, practical, reason was for facility of access to recordings, and ease of transcription of media discourse rather than other forms of institutional interaction. The second, more theoretical, reason is that media texts not only provide prime sites for the circulation of commonsense background assumptions from shared cultural bases, but also examples of ritual (institutionalised) discourses in certain programmes, within the media (such as television interviews) or with participating media users, (such as the phone-in), in which shared cultural knowledge of interactive strategies can be observed, (cf. van Dijk, 1985).

I.5.1 Case Studies in Representation

The data selected for the first three case studies into theories of ideology as representation were all taken from the same discursive domain; that of defence discourse. Defence discourse, particularly at the time of the 1987 General Election in Britain, was the site of conflict between two opposing defence policies; the pro-nuclear policy of the Conservative party and the majority of the Alliance party, and the Labour party policy for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Data taken from a variety of different sources, from the party manifestoes to press reports and radio broadcasts, containing discussions of the defence issues which were at stake in the election campaign, form the basis for an examination of theories of representation in discourse, in relation to the pro- and anti- nuclear positions taken up by the main political parties at that time, and the ways in which these representations articulated with commonsense structures of background knowledge to produce ideological meanings.⁽¹⁵⁾

I.5.2 Case Studies in Control

For the second set of case studies, the same homogeneity of discursive domain for the data was not considered a necessary criterion, given that the focus of investigation in these three studies was not systems of representation, but the strategies of control manifested in discursive interaction. The requirement here was for a corpus of institutional talk, in order to examine how asymmetrical relations of power and status affect the interactive process in terms of management and control of the discourse. In the first study, the data consists of a radio 'phone-in' programme, where a selection of young listeners from England and Wales were invited to question Margaret Thatcher on issues

directly relating to young people in the 1987 election. In the second study, the data is taken from three television political interviews (concerning questions of defence) again from the pre-election period in 1987. The third, and final, case study involves an analysis of a police interview with a woman making a complaint of rape.¹⁶

It is moreover in this final case study that an attempt is made to bring together the discrete aspects of representation and of control discussed in the preceding analyses, in order to investigate the possibility of a more integrated account of the relationship between discourse and power; an account which attends not only to processes of representation, but also to their possible points of interface and articulation with processes of control.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY AS REPRESENTATION

II.0 The Field of Critical Linguistics

In this chapter I propose, firstly, to give a general background to the field of Critical Linguistics, which can be broadly defined as the investigation of the relationship between language and ideology, and secondly, to introduce three specific accounts of the ideological function of language which will form the starting point for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the different levels of linguistic structure (semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic) and ideological representation, in the case studies which follow in Chapters III, IV and V.

The early studies in the field of critical linguistics originate in the work of Fowler et al (1979) at the University of East Anglia, and are based on the concept that grammar is an ideological instrument for the categorisation and classification of 'the world'. The advantages and shortcomings of this body of work are discussed in paragraphs II.1 and II.2 below.

The theories which are of specific concern to the present account of ideological representation and language, and which form the basis from which I develop the argument that a pragmatic component is essential in any analysis of the relationship between language and ideology, are drawn from a wider source. They include, with regard to the syntactic and semantic levels of language respectively, Pêcheux's theory of ideology and the 'preconstructed' nature of discourse (1975), and Chilton's research into ideology and the domain of defence, (1985).

This work is introduced briefly in paragraphs II.3 - II.5 below, and the key aspects for the purposes of this study are subsequently developed in greater detail within the case studies.

Throughout this discussion of some of the main claims of critical linguistics, it is argued that ideology operates in discourse on a pragmatic level, i.e. on the level of 'language in use', and not just on the syntactic-semantic level of representation that has tended to take a central role in much of previous research into the relationship between language and ideology.

Since Thompson's claim that an adequate account of the way in which meaning is mobilised for the maintenance of relations of domination must necessarily involve an account of language in the social world, it seems that greater attention is required to the articulation between language and its contexts of use. Although pragmatic theory has in the past been seen as too 'individualistic' to be of use in a critical analysis of language and ideology, (cf. Fairclough, 1989), insofar as it conceptualises speech acts as individual strategies and goals, "understates the extent to which people are caught up in, constrained by, [...] social conventions, and gives the implausible impression that conventionalised ways of speaking or writing are 'reinvented' on each occasion of their use" (Fairclough, 1989: 9), it has nevertheless been pointed out that it is not possible to recover all meaning from syntactic and semantic levels of language alone; "we recover form, force and sense jointly, and in no way recover force and sense from form." (Pateman, 1983: 200).

It can be argued, therefore, that there has to be a place for pragmatic theory in critical discourse analysis in order to account for the role

of the contextual production of ideological meanings, and in the final section II.5 of this chapter, I sketch out some of the theories of pragmatic inferencing processes which seem to form the most useful framework for developing an account of structure of commonsense background knowledge and assumptions which are mobilised in the processing of discourse. I also discuss here some recent work by Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1989), on the ideological function of scripts in media discourse, which has begun to address the issue of how background knowledge may be at work in ideological representation.

II.1 Origins: The Determinist/Relativist Hypothesis

Much of the current work in critical linguistics acknowledges a debt to the theories of Sapir and Whorf, since the notion that language represents reality in specifically determinate ways was first expressed by Whorf in his theory of linguistic determinism. The 'Sapir/Whorf hypothesis' states that language affects thought by the ways in which it classifies reality, (although it has been difficult to substantiate this claim with regard to meaningful, cognitive units, e.g. matching grammatical form classes to conceptual correlates⁽¹⁾).

"We cut nature up, organise it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organise it in this way - an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language." (Whorf, in Carrol (ed), 1956).

Sapir and Whorf found that there were cases of differences in lexical items between languages⁽²⁾. The strong versions of the theory, that of *linguistic determinism*, (i.e. that thought is determined by language), and of *linguistic relativism*, (i.e. that no two linguistic systems have the same way of categorising the world), has now largely been

disproved, following research into linguistic universals, (e.g. conceptual systems of height, distance and time), and conceptual transfers between languages⁽³⁾, and also due to the fact that those concepts which have specific linguistic representation in some languages and not others, can still be successfully translated. However, a weaker version of the hypothesis, the basic notion that language can have an effect on the way we perceive 'reality', by the way different aspects of it are represented, is still central to many theories which aim to characterise the relationship between language and ideology.

"We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation."

(Sapir, in Mandelbaum (ed), 1949).

It is this weak version of the hypothesis, that language 'predisposes' us to interpret and represent experience in a selective way, in other words that language has the capacity to 'mediate' between its users and reality through the way it serves to organise, select and represent experiences of the world, which remains of primary concern to theories of the relationship between ideology and language.

"Language plays an active and crucial - if qualified - role in shaping (though not completely determining) the processes of representation, by 'pointing us towards different types of observation' and 'predisposing certain choices of interpretation'." (Montgomery, 1986c: 175).

These selections in the way we represent and interpret experiences of events in the world are to a large extent the product of ideologies; out of various possibilities, one particular representation is selected, and becomes 'naturalised', subsequently appearing to be the only possible representation for that particular context. To give a brief example of

this kind of selection in representation, one need only look at the kind of vocabulary used to talk about the increasingly sophisticated range of nuclear weapons that developed during the 1970's and early '80's: 'bomb' has in general been replaced by 'missile' in the nuclear context, which evokes fewer connotations of an explosion and its effects, but the term has been retained to describe the activity of terrorism or violent demonstrations: 'car-bombs', 'letter-bombs', 'petrol-bombs' etc. A further example is the type of terminology used by defence planners; in the United States the expression 'radiation enhancement weapon' was used to refer to the controversial neutron bomb designed to kill people and spare buildings. Nash (1980) argues that the use of terms such as these results in trivialising the destructive effects of these weapons, making it easier for those employed in their development to feel detached from the real nature of their work. A further effect of representing weapons in this way is to reduce the impact on the public of the reality of their destructive capability. The way in which language works to naturalise selections in representation, so that they appear not as selections at all, but as the only way of looking at and talking about a particular subject, has formed the basis of enquiry in the field of critical linguistics.

II.2 Theories of Representation: The Role of Syntax

In an extensive body of work collected in two volumes and various articles, (see Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979, Kress & Hodge, 1979, etc.), Fowler et al, originally working together at the University of East Anglia, have investigated the relationship between language and ideology by developing a theory of ideological 'transformations' via

which they aim to 'denaturalise' the way the linguistic system (or grammar) determines or 'mystifies' processes of perception and understanding. Their aim is to use linguistic analysis critically, "not only as a means of revealing ideological processes in the production of discourse, but also in pointing towards the questions that need to be asked" (Trew, 1979: 116). These questions have formed the basis of their project for critical linguistics, and are directly concerned with social relations and processes:

"Language, typically, is immersed in the ongoing life of a society, as the practical consciousness of that society. This consciousness is inevitably a partial and false consciousness. We can call it ideology, defining 'ideology' as a systematic body of ideas, organised from a particular point of view."

(Kress & Hodge, 1979: 6).

In this investigation of social relations, and the linguistic processes in which they are inscribed, one of the most productive influences has been the work of Halliday on functional grammar (cf. Halliday 1971, 1978, 1985). His elaboration of three levels of language function: ideational, interpersonal and textual, has widely informed the work of critical linguists, providing them with an analytic model that a transformational model of language (Chomsky, 1957) was less able to do, concentrating as it did on the division of language into competence and performance, and prioritising the former:

"The Chomskyan theory tells us that [...] words can only appear as the realisation of lexical items, a consequence of lexicalisation. Re-lexicalisation has no place in this theory's conception of language. On this 'Chomskyan' approach, then, choice of words is always just insertion of words, and never rewording, transformation is always production of sentences, and never transforming sentences, and discourse is a set of single, unconnected sentences."

(Trew, 1979: 113)

A functional approach, on the other hand, has provided a theoretical framework according to which language can be analysed as text, or *discourse*, rather than a set of possible sentences. Halliday's view of 'text' is all encompassing: any speech act, speech event, topic unit, exchange, episode or narrative etc. comes into this category, spoken or written. Although he is not directly concerned with the issue of an ideological function of language, he nevertheless sees society as being crucial to linguistic systems of meaning:


"The social structure is not just an ornamental background to linguistic interaction, [...], it is an essential element in the evolution of semantic systems and semantic processes."
(1978: 114.)

Halliday's focus on ideational and interpersonal levels of linguistic codes has enabled critical discourse analysts to identify corresponding levels of ideological functions of language: systems of representation (including selections in vocabulary etc.) on the ideational level, and structures of power relations (pronoun systems, selections of deixis etc.) on the interpersonal level, which underlie "the way utterance (or text) renders the world of objects, persons, events and processes on the one hand, and the way in which that same utterance sets itself into relation with a recipient (reader, viewer or hearer) on the other", (Hartley and Montgomery, 1985: 233).

II.2.1 Representation and Transformation

Taking Halliday's functional description of language as their linguistic basis, Kress and Hodge propose a set of models which represent the inter-relationships between objects and events in English:

Fig. II.1



An example of a transactive, actional, sentence would be:

The player kicked the ball.

and a non-transactive, actional sentence:

The player runs.

These are distinguished from relational models, which involve a relation between two entities, equative sentences establishing a relationship between two noun phrases, eg.:

The coach is an ex-football player.

and attributive sentences establishing relationships between nouns and 'qualities', eg:

His footwork is superb.

In English, certain transformations, as well as operations of modality, can be performed on this basic model, and every utterance has to be classified in some way. A non-transactive model allows for indeterminacy in the way events are represented, whereas a transactive model expresses more explicit causal relations, e.g.:

The player kicked the ball. (transactive)

The ball moved. (non-transactive)

Their main claim is that both in processes of classification, and in transformational operations on an utterance or a text, a particular perception of reality governs the surface form that the utterance will take, and that surface form is the direct result of the application of the particular 'ideology' of the speaker or writer.

There are several problems with this claim, some of which are recurring ones in many of the theories relating to ideology and language. Firstly, it is too reductive: if language structures express or encode one world view or ideology, then it would be impossible to account for the conflicting ideologies that exist and find expression within those same structures. Moreover, a systematic comparison of discourse from a range of different ideological sources would be necessary to substantiate fully a claim of this sort. In claiming that linguistic form encodes one ideology, or 'world view', presupposing a direct correspondence between those 'world views' and grammatical structures, i.e. that "by attending to linguistic processes one can discern [...] the underlying social reality" (Thompson, 1984: 124), Fowler et al are discounting the social nature of discourse, and the complexity of social relations which may underlie any one text in terms of who produces it, how it is interpreted, and by whom.

Any number of conflicting ideologies may be at work in a text at any time, particularly when its intended recipients are made up of disparate social groups. The syntax/ideology correlate is unable to account for any levels of meaning that fall outside its scope, and in particular pragmatic meaning which involves contextual features and inferencing in the process of interpretation.

In a more recent paper, Kress comments that the task of a text producer is "to attempt to construct a text in which discrepancies, contradictions, disjunctions are bridged, covered over, eliminated" (1985: 77), and that such a construction is not always possible to achieve. This position marks a change from the view that the linguistic processes of a text will constitute one representation of social reality, and a preliminary step towards rectifying the failure of previous work to account for the interplay of different discourses, the negotiation of meanings, and for the way in which power relations within the discursive event affect those meanings. One of the main causes of that failure has been the preoccupation with syntax at the expense of contextual and pragmatic levels of discourse analysis.

A further problem with the actional/relational language model is that while basing their approach in functional linguistic theory, Fowler et al borrow the concept of 'transformation' from generative grammar, with the result that some of the issues at stake in their arguments become blurred. Chomsky's 'deep-to-surface structure' implies a basic model upon which certain operations, or 'transformations' can take place. The notion of ideological transformations therefore tends to imply that there is a basic, non-ideological model underlying the various classified and transformed surface structure, which contradicts the claim that "there are no 'raw', uninterpreted, theory-free facts." (Trew, 1979: 95).

Pateman (1983) criticises the concept of ideological transformation as it emerges in the work of Fowler et al, by arguing that the formalism they use for their transformations is not grammatical, in the Chomskyan sense of deep to surface structure, but only 'an unrestricted

rewriting system', and he comments that "the pragmatic, extra-linguistic apparatus we require to understand utterances cannot be taken as an index of anything essentially unsatisfactory about the language in which those utterances are produced" (1983: 194). For example, in a passive sentence with agent deletion, which would be characterised as less informative, hence more 'mystificatory', the agent can be recovered in interpretation by drawing upon knowledge of the world, the context of utterance, and other non-linguistic processes. On the other hand, as Pateman again has pointed out, utterances which contain more information than is required can also be misleading in certain contexts if they violate Grice's maxim of quantity (cf. Pateman, 1983: 186).

II.2.2 Problems with the Transformational Model

One application of the 'transformational model' is an analysis by Kress & Trew (1978) of a letter sent by British Leyland to workers which was published in the *SUNDAY TIMES BUSINESS NEWS* (20.03.78). The ST claimed that the letter failed 'to get its message across' due to a low score on the 'Clarity Index' (an American-devised system of evaluating the clarity of a text by counting the number of words of more than two syllables and the number of long sentences it contains⁽⁶⁾). Kress and Trew argued that by using an objective, linguistic analysis, they could demonstrate that the ideologies embedded in the letters were ones familiar to academic industrial relations theory. They rewrote the original BL letter with the same 'clarity index' as the ST version, while also writing back in the ideology that they claimed had been written out by the ST, thereby effecting an *ideological transformation of discourse* (1978: 758).

In order to do this, they compared the linguistic changes that had taken place in the ST rewriting, e.g.:

nominalisation / denominalisation
his recent visits > *D.W. has just visited*

The results of their analysis showed, they maintain, that, for instance, in denominalisation, D.W. (Derek Whittaker, a BL director) becomes 'an agent who affects objects', with more power to act and affect others; This and other 'transformations' are found to be consistent in their ideological effects. D.W. changes his role from 'communicator' with the employees to one which is more physical and forceful, and it is suggested that "there could here be the beginning of a switch from a view of management as primarily a job of communication, to management as primarily bargaining and negotiation; a switch from a 'unitary ideology' of industrial relations to 'pluralist ideology'" (1978: 763). There are however several problems with this. Firstly, Kress and Trew state that "the original extremely complex sentence structures do represent a complex web of interrelationships in the participation and communication system in the company" (p: 768), but it seems unlikely that this system, (or *ideology*) can be derived directly from the syntactic structures of the letter alone. If this was the case, then it should be possible to derive that same system consistently from the syntax of all BL management's textual output, and there seems to be no proof that this was the case. Secondly, by taking the 'Clarity Index' reasonably seriously, they seem to put to one side the fact that short sentences and one-syllable words can often be indicative of a less 'polite' register in English. Compare, for example, the two utterances (a) and (b) below:

- a) *Can I see you now?*
- b) *I was wondering if it would be possible to see you just now?*

(a) could be described as more direct and abrasive in tone than (b), where the occurrence of a 'hedged performative' (cf. Leech, 1983: 140) results in a longer, more 'polite' form of the same request.

In attributing the 'abrasive tone' of the ST version of BL's letter only to the kind of transformations described above, Kress and Trew fail to take other levels of linguistic function, such as register, into account. Thompson has criticised this preoccupation with syntax at the expense of contextual features of discourse as the main weakness in their account, saying that it is too simplistic to claim, that 'ideology' can be 'read off' from the syntactic structure of a particular piece of discourse (1985: 125), without attending to the pragmatic level of that discourse. Indeed, research into the role of semantic and pragmatic factors in producing 'well-formed' sentences has shown that often semantic and pragmatic information is equally important as syntax in determining whether an utterance is grammatically 'well-formed' (7), and that meaning is not just a matter of syntax, but of many other factors too:

"Meaning [...] is not a fixed and invariant given, but a fluctuating phenomenon which is determined as much by the contextual conditions of its production and reception as by the syntactic features of its construction."

Thompson, 1984: 125).

II.2.3 Limitations of a Syntactic Account of Meaning

Despite these criticisms, it must be acknowledged that the work of Fowler, Kress, Hodge and Trew has made an important and substantial contribution to establishing the field of critical linguistics, and provides important insights into how some grammatical forms may be

particularly susceptible to ideological mystification in certain contexts, in particular structures which express transitivity.

Nevertheless, there is underlying the 'demystificatory' project of critical linguistics a requirement for a theory-free metalanguage in which to discuss 'objectively' the relationship between ideology and language - difficult to achieve if we must operate within a theory of reality governed by English syntax.

What Fowler et al do not seem to take into account in their theory is the way in which ideologically motivated representations in language are often imposed upon language users by cultural and social discursive environments rather than by constraints of the grammar. Instead, they see syntax as a reflection of social realities, with the implication that 'deep structure' forms represent an unmitigated, 'true' reality. As Pateman has pointed out, the grammar is not 'at fault' in giving rise to ideological representations, a claim which has been particularly relevant to the feminist debates about language, where the theory that the patriarchal syntax and semantics of English prevent women from expressing themselves fully and effectively within it, thus contributing to the maintenance of a dominant patriarchal ideology, has been vigorously contested⁽⁹⁾.

An alternative approach to the role of syntax in the production of ideological meaning can be found in the work of Michel Pêcheux (1975, trans. 1982), whose theory of *transverse discourse* deals with the linguistic processes involved in the embedding of relative clauses into main clauses to produce 'preconstructed' propositions in discourse.

This theory and some of its implications are discussed in the following section.

II.3 Theories of Social Discourse

If ideological meaning is to be seen as produced not by the system, or structure, of language, but rather through the system in operation within its social context, then it is *discourse* rather than *grammar* which becomes central to an understanding of how language functions in terms of social discursive practices. Discourse has been defined as "language as social practice determined by social structures" (Fairclough, 1989: 17), and it is through these discursive practices that meanings may come to be established and enforced.

II.3.1 Foucault and Discursive Practices

The term *discursive practice* was first used by Foucault to describe the socially-determined nature of what he terms the 'enunciative function', and taken up by Pêcheux in his account of how discourses from differing social domains intersect to produce areas of *transverse discourse*. However, a Foucauldian view of discourse is primarily linked to social institutions; discourse is what can be written or considered as true at any given moment in history:

"Discourse is [...] to be analysed not in terms of who says what but in terms of the conditions under which those sentences will have a definite truth value, and hence are capable of being uttered."
(Hacking, 1986: 30)

It is then *what can be said* that constitutes discursive practice at a given time, but it is difficult to evaluate exactly what constitutes a 'definite truth value' at any given time. Moreover, Foucault does not define discursive practices linguistically, except in isolated instances such as his discussion of 'sovereign torture' (cf. Foucault, 1975). Pêcheux, on the other hand, attempts to link this notion of discursive practices to specific discursive processes, and situates the problem of

ideological meaning in specific features of language rather than defining it in terms of social institutional practices.

II.3.2 Pêcheux: A Theory of 'Transverse Discourse'


Drawing on the Althusserian theories of interpellation and ISA's, Pêcheux attempts to link the concept of discursive practices to a linguistic base, which he terms a 'discursive process', in order to develop a theory of the articulation between different domains of discourse and language.

Pêcheux's philosophical position is firmly rooted in materialism and his arguments are based on the premiss that all discourse and meaning come about as the result of ideological struggle. Post-Marx, materialist social philosophy holds that it is the interaction produced by the relations people enter into with others, most fundamentally while engaged in the process of making what they need to subsist, that forms human nature, rather than, as in an idealist philosophy, that it is shaped by some common system of moral and social values (cf. Williams, 1976). As the primary means of social interaction is via the medium of discourse, a materialist theory of meaning holds that "meanings are to be found only in the concrete forms of differing social and institutional practices: there can be no meaning in 'language'" (McDonnell, 1986: 12). In other words, out of a range of possibilities of meanings, it is the social and institutional source of a particular discourse which will pin down and 'fix' a particular meaning within that discourse. However, the claim that there is no meaning in language could also be criticised as positing social relations as being somehow prior to language, and thus precluding any possibility of working to change discursive practices.'''

In order to examine the relationship between language and social formations, Pêcheux retraces the relationship between language and thought, and examines the linguistic mechanisms of determination and explication which have formed the backdrop for philosophical reflection on the nature of thought. These mechanisms belong to what he describes as the "zone of articulation between linguistics and the historical theory of ideological and scientific processes" (LSI: 58), and play a crucial role in determining the ideological function of discourse. It is this theory of discursive processes, i.e. how syntagmatic relations within utterances are constructed, "the system of relationships of substitution, paraphrases, synonymies etc., which operate between linguistic elements - 'signifiers' - in a given discursive formation" (LSI: 112), which have been of particular interest to some discourse analysts, (cf. Achard 1986⁽¹⁾, Torode, 1986). Pêcheux refers to this syntagmatic chain of relations between words as intradiscourse, or "the operation of discourse with respect to itself" (LSI: 116). However, along this axis of intradiscourse, another form of discourse can be interposed: discourse from other discursive formations which exist elsewhere, or pre-exist, the current discursive process, and this Pêcheux terms interdiscourse. The point of intersection, the dependence of intradiscourse on interdiscourse, is referred to as transverse discourse.

This intersection of interdiscourse and intradiscourse can be shown diagrammatically as follows:

Fig. II.11



However, although the general concepts of intra- and inter-discursive relations are frequently referred to in discussions of language and ideology, the actual mechanisms of Pêcheux's theory of transverse discourse are not often examined in depth. In the following paragraphs, I attempt to set out his theory more clearly.

II.3.2.1 Ideology and the Relative Clause: Preconstructed and Lateral Reminders

Pêcheux's main focus in exploring the articulation between interdiscourse and intradiscourse is the role of relative clauses in discursive processes. Dealing first with determinative relatives, he examines the notion of the preconstructed, or the embedding of a determinative relative clause in an utterance. He describes the 'preconstructed' elements of discourse as "the always-already there of ideological interpellation that supplies-imposes reality and its

'meaning' in the form of universality" (LSI: 115). To illustrate this notion, Pécheux uses an example from Frege⁽¹²⁾:

He who first discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets died in misery

in which the determining relative clause asserts a proposition that pre-exists what is constructed and asserted by the utterance as a whole, and as a result seems not just to add further information about the referent of *the* in the main clause, but actually determines *who* that referent is. In this way, Pécheux claims, a preconstructed element from interdiscourse, i.e.:

Someone discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets

is an assertion from scientific-historical 'reality' which becomes 'inscribed in a subject's discourse' - in this instance a biographical assertion.

If preconstructed elements from the interdiscursive realm are built into discourse through the mechanisms of determination, then lateral reminders of something which is already known from elsewhere, or what Pécheux refers to as "the return of the known in thought" (LSI: 73) intervene in the discursive process through mechanisms of explication, and produce a sustaining effect in discursive processes. Giving the example:

Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank, himself led his guards against the enemy position

Pécheux argues that the explicative clause here posits not just an additional informative assertion about Napoleon, but a causal relationship between the two, and this he calls a 'sustaining effect' of something (a proposition or assertion, a 'property') which is 'already known'. In other words,

*Napoleon himself led his guards against the enemy
because
Napoleon recognised the danger to his right flank.*

The 'already known' in this case constitutes knowledge about Napoleon, Generals, and relationships between the two in the case of dangerous battlefield situations. As Pêcheux suggests, I think rightly, the 'already known' establishes a form of *complicity* between speaker and addressee that is important to an understanding of ideological processes at work: "This complicity presupposes an *identification with the speaker*, in other words, the possibility of thinking what he is thinking in his place" (LSI: 76).

II.3.2.2 Meaning, Ideology and the Subject

The meaning that is produced by the juxtaposition of these two clauses, and the 'necessary interpretation' of a causal relationship between them, depends on the 'subject' recognising the position of the 'speaker', or 'producer', of the discourse as one he/she is or could be in. Pêcheux calls this position 'the universal subject of ideology', an identification process through which the 'hearer'/'processor' of a discourse believes that:

"If I were where you/he/x are/is, I would see and think what you/he/x see(s) and think(s)" (LSI: 87).

He argues that this identification comes about as a result of movement from 'situational properties' to 'permanent properties':

"A gradual elimination of the situational leads steadily from the concrete individual subject 'in situ' linked to his percepts and notions, to a universal subject situated everywhere and nowhere and thinking in concepts." (LSI: 86)

It is this recognition by subjects of 'evident truths' as 'permanent properties' which results in an identification with what is termed the 'universal subject':

Everybody knows that X

or

It is true/clear that X.⁽¹³⁾

The basis of the way the subject is positioned within this discursive process is founded in the work of Althusser, and his oft-quoted statement that 'ideology interpellates individuals as subjects' (1971: 162-3), "by signifying to him what he is and concealing from him that subjection" (Pêcheux 1975: 91). Althusser's theory states that ideologies are not made up of ideas, but of practices, (including discursive practices), and that these practices are inscribed in Ideological State Apparatuses. Pêcheux stresses however that the ISA's are not the expression of the domination of the ruling ideology, but form "the site and means of the realisation of that domination." (1975: 98). In other words, the area of struggle between contradictory and competing ideological formations.

Ideological formations are made up of 'subjective, evident truths' (1975: 104), which are produced within what Pêcheux terms discursive formations, determining 'what can and should be said', and implementing the ideological process of interpellation-identification. They are constituted linguistically by specific discursive processes - "the system of relationships of substitution, paraphrase, synonymies etc., which operate between linguistic elements in a given discursive formation." (LSI: 112). Subjects may react in different ways to the interpellation-identification process; they are either 'good subjects', identifying themselves with the speaking subject of ideology and thus becoming 'subjected' to the dominant ideology and its operation, or 'bad subjects', counter-identifying with it and resisting the dominant ideological and discursive formations, or they dis-identify with it,

(i.e. refuse the notion that a subject can be constructed at all), while remaining within the ISA's to construct conflicting discourses through political struggle.

Here it is important to note Pêcheux's clarification of ISA's being not the *expression*, but the *site and means* of domination, and as such, a site of conflict and struggle. However, one of the major problems with Pêcheux's theory of subjectivity is that he does not make it clear how the process of dis-identification actually occurs. If, as he suggests, all subjects are 'interpellated' by ideology at work in discursive formations, then how is it possible to escape the interpellation 'net'? And if this happens, then subjects become independent, autonomous and self-regulating, and are not interpellated by ideology at all. Again, if there are conflicting ideologies at work in any given discursive formation, Pêcheux is not clear on how conflict, or negotiation between conflicting ideologies, is manifested in discursive practices.

II.3.2.3 Problems and Applications: Accounting for Context

Apart from the inherent philosophical opacity of Pêcheux's writing, one of the main problems with his approach is that although his theory of what constitutes a discursive process is clearly staked out, he does not clearly define what a discursive formation actually is, nor how it might relate to an ideological formation (e.g. Althusser's ideological state apparatus) apart from saying that one is 'imbricated', or layered, on to the other. Neither does he give examples of where one discursive formation might end and another begin, or what happens when discursive formations are in conflict. A discursive formation is described as "that which in a given ideological formation [...] determines what can and should be said, (articulated in the form of a speech, a sermon, a

pamphlet, a report, a programme, etc.)", (LSI: 111). However, this determining principle and its relationship to a corresponding ideological formation remains a vague notion despite its crucial status in his argument.

A further problem is that although Pêcheux spells out very clearly in theory how relative clauses are linguistic mechanisms which may create ideological effects, he pays no attention to the effects of contextualisation in examples he uses, i.e. to actual discursive practices. Working from what he calls a 'logico-linguistic point', Pêcheux argues that as an articulation between two propositions in a sentence, the causal relationship between a main proposition and an explicative relative can be clearly illustrated. But when one looks for contextualised examples of explicative and determinative relative clauses, it transpires that they do not occur particularly frequently compared to other defining and explicative structures such as prepositional and adjectival phrases which act as modifiers, or appositional phrases.

Montgomery (1989) suggests that these may have a similar function to full relative clauses in producing discursive effects, and that there are other grammatical structures which may equally produce ideologically motivated discursive effects, such as processes of nominalisation discussed by Fowler et al⁽¹⁴⁾, which Pêcheux does not address in his account of the relationship between discourse and ideology.

Above all Pêcheux is mostly concerned with the syntactic and semantic level of discourse, i.e. the sentential relations of *discursive processes*, and these need to be situated in specific *discursive*

practices⁽¹⁵⁾, another term which he briefly mentions but does not really define or develop in any detail. If the term *discursive practice* is to be understood as *text* or *utterance*, then the questions of where, when, by whom and to whom texts and utterances are produced must be considered if we are to account for the ideological function of discourse.

Despite these reservations, Pêcheux's analysis of discursive processes, the articulation between main and relative clauses, and his theory of transverse discourse, are all interesting developments in a description of the relationship between language and ideology, and will be considered in more detail when related to naturally occurring data in Chapter IV, where the way in which 'preconstructed' and 'lateral reminders' may operate in practice is examined in more detail. It is also useful to bear in mind that the concept of a *universal subject position*, the 'everybody knows that...' perhaps finds a parallel in the notion of commonsense background assumptions implicit in ideological discourse, and which play an important part in producing contextual inferences.

II.4 Representation as a Product of Discourse

The ideological meanings produced by what Pêcheux terms 'the preconstructed', and by what we can here generally term *commonsense background assumptions*, have been examined on a semantic, rather than a clausal basis, by Chilton (1985), who describes the function of the verb *deter* in the specific discursive domain of defence. This account of the way in which the meaning of a term can be affected by the discursive domain in which it is used, examining the basis of the

concept of deterrence, and its relationship to other concepts in the culture, represents a significant step towards a consideration of what are essentially contextualised, pragmatic levels of meaning in discourse.

II.4.1 Changes in Semantic Meaning

In a detailed account of the semantics of the verb *deter*, Chilton claims that there have been certain broad and subtle changes in the semantic tendencies of the verb *deter*, whose adjectival and nominal forms *deterrent* and *deterrence* have taken on an increased informational load and become particularised to a specific discursive domain, i.e. that of strategic nuclear defence, becoming "objects and practices discussed and defined by experts" (p. 116). As a consequence, "the semantics of this and other terms needs to be thought of as a product, not as naturally given in a neutral language independently of social, cultural and political forces." (p. 116).

Through an unravelling of the semantics of *deter*, Chilton's aim is to elucidate "the role of language in the conceptualising of the domain of strategy" (p: 104). He first examines the lexical field of the verb *deter*, and characterises it as belonging to a set of verbs which express obligation of some sort, where "obligation is the counterpart of necessity" (p. 105). He groups these verbs as follows:

*stop, prevent, restrain, hinder, discourage, dissuade,
forbid, prohibit
cause, make, have (someone do something), force, compel
let, allow, permit.*

Further, he suggests that *deter* is an implicit negative of verbs such as *coerce* and *force*, and that it is conceptually complex in so far as it expresses linguistically encoded notions of causation which are not

philosophic or scientific in origin, but rather psychological and cultural⁽¹⁶⁾.

Chilton then looks at sentences in which *deter* can occur, e.g.

Nuclear arms deter Russia

and concludes that *deter* requires the hearer/receiver to focus on the caused event, *Russia is deterred*, without needing to specify the causing event, which in this case is taken to be *NATO's deployment of nuclear arms*.

He also states that *deter* expresses a strong causal relation between events, which renders the following sentence anomalous:

(?) *Alf deterred Bert, but Bert (still) struck him.*

This sets it apart from other verbs in the lexical field which are similar to, but not synonymous with, *deter*, such as *dissuade* or *prevent*⁽¹⁷⁾.

He states that the causing event expressed by *deter* implies some use of force on behalf of the agent, i.e. a warning or threat of something unpleasant, in contrast to *dissuade*, where the agent can use argument or promise as the causing event, comparing:

Alf dissuaded Bert from attacking Carl by:

- i. *arguing with him*
- ii. *promising to pay him off*
- iii. *warning him of the consequences*
- iv. *(?)threatening to beat him up*

and

Alf deterred Bert from attacking Carl by:

- i. *(?) arguing with him*
- ii. *(?) promising to pay him off*
- iii. *warning him of the consequences*
- iv. *threatening to beat him up*

and comments that when an instrument for *deter* is not explicitly given, a nuclear instrument is likely to be inferred "if and only if the cold-war frame is triggered" (p: 109).

He also describes how verbs in the field also specify "what is induced and the kind of agent being induced", and claims that there are certain rationality requirements on the part of the induced agent for a verb like *dissuade*, which do not hold for *deter*. The whole lexical field deals primarily with the causation of mental states, i.e. the concept that causing fear in X results in their not doing Y, and with the conceptualisation of control of others, and Chilton points out that "such conceptualisations need have no relationship to empirical reality", (p: 110).

II.4.2 Ideology, Frames and Metaphors

Moving from what is an essentially semantic analysis of the meaning of *deter*, Chilton turns to the discursive use of the word in its various forms, and introduces the theory of metaphoric frames to support his argument, suggesting that language works to maintain certain social and political institutions by acting as a trigger for certain conceptual frames. A frame is a structure for representing knowledge in artificial intelligence research (cf. Minsky, 1975, 1977), and will be discussed more fully in II.5 below. Chilton's use of frame system theory in his account of metaphoric transferal is one of the most interesting points raised by his enquiry with regard to the ideological function of discourse, as it is a move away from purely semantic and syntactic considerations of meaning and towards an attention to contexts of usage and inferencing systems.

Chilton describes how the term *deter* has become increasingly specialised, particularly in the adjectival and nominal forms, by giving examples of anomalous sentences progressing from the verb *deter* to *deterrent* and *deterrence*, (p: 112). He concludes that there are preferred readings for *deterrent*, in other words, that in processing this term, one contextual frame will be selected because it is more prominent than a range of other possible contextual frames. *Deterrent* is most prominently linked to criminological and cold-war frames, and *deterrence* is most likely to trigger a cold-war contextual frame.

The final part of his account of *deter* and discourse deals with the relation of the concept of *deterrence* to other concepts in the culture, in particular those related to the educational and criminological frames. Chilton argues that the way we understand concepts of cold war *deterrence* are inextricably linked to other concepts in the culture, particularly to do with education and discipline, and that this process is metaphorical. Metaphor has been defined as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 5), and Chilton examines how certain metaphors, such as the representation of the USSR as the bully in the school playground, tend to get promoted to "standard meanings" in discourse - but exactly how this may happen has not yet been the subject of any detailed investigation.

Chilton suggests that such an investigation would require an "inquiry into the role of media and education and other communicative networks" (p: 116), an inquiry that also seems crucial to an investigation into the way the concept of *deterrence* is structured, but Chilton takes it no further here. He does however give an example of how a metaphor

may be transferred between frames: in this instance from an 'education' frame, to a 'criminological' frame and then to a frame for representing international strategy, hence the currency of metaphors such as the "policing role" of the United States", and the Soviet Union being "an aggressive child in need of discipline" (p: 117). This transfer maps the teacher/pupil relationship of the 'education' frame onto the international relationship of the super powers, reproducing the same structures in the new frame, with the participant roles, and notion of who may be the legitimate agents for actions, transferred to the new situation. This results in the United States being understood as the watchful, disciplining teacher and the USSR as the disruptive, uncooperative pupil in the world 'classroom', thus creating a new metaphor based on familiar, 'known', concepts.

By his engagement with frame system theory in relation to discourse, in an attempt to characterise the forms of knowledge that are drawn upon when conceptualising and representing aspects of international relations, Chilton has widened the linguistic level of enquiry to include pragmatic theory. Much of his discussion of the discursive practices which involve concepts of deterrence appears to centre on the contextualised use of the term, and the background assumptions and inferencing processes which are triggered by its occurrence in discourse. This move away from syntactic and semantic considerations of the way in which language works to sustain certain ideological positions seems to be a crucial one, and one which leads inevitably from theoretical discussions of ideological meaning in decontextualised data, such as Pécheux's account of transverse discourse in relative

clauses, to an attention to the pragmatics of discourse, including necessarily an examination of contextualised, naturally-occurring data.

II.4.3 Inferencing Processes and the Speech Event

One study in which one aspect of these pragmatic features has been addressed is Richardson (1985), who accounts for particular differences in political speeches against the peace movement in Britain by specifying the addressees of the speeches, a heterogeneous national audience, both physically present and potentially distant (if the speech is televised), and the contextual features of the 'speech' event: the post-Falkland, pre-election period of 1983.

From her analysis of three speeches, by Margaret Thatcher, Michael Heseltine and John Nott, Richardson argues that from utterance meaning, and from the presuppositions and implicatures that are produced by the discourse, when Grice's co-operative principle is applied to the communicative event it is possible to identify the type of audience to whom these speeches are addressed, and the assumptions the speakers have about what the audience knows. This audience falls into three basic categories of the 'like-minded', the 'vulnerable' and the 'dissenters'. The views of the 'dissenters' have to be presented as unreasonable and untenable, but without giving offence to the 'vulnerable' audience (those who have not yet made up their minds), and confirm in their rightmindedness those who hold the same opinion as the speaker. This is achieved in political speeches by taking account of these heterogeneous addressees of statements, and so structuring the rhetoric that a variety of implicatures or perlocutionary effects can be produced, depending on which group of addressees the audience belongs to. Richardson concentrates her discussion on two aspects of

rhetorical structure: the rhetorical question and the denial. For example, in asking a rhetorical question relating to the morality of letting Hitler "take control of the most terrible weapons which man has ever made" Margaret Thatcher is forcing the hearer to look for an implicature, thus framing "the Nazi Germany analogy with a direct address to unilateralists" (1985: 31), and representing the unilateralist position as morally untenable.

Similarly, denials allow for opponents' propositions to be admitted into the debate, but on the level of implicature. For instance, in the following statement:

It cannot be sensible for the West to disarm and abandon this most terrible weapon to a nation whose philosophy and whose actions show their total disregard for freedom and justice.
(1985: 32)

one implicature is that *somebody holds the proposition that it can be sensible for the West to disarm* - in this case, the audience is left to make the inference that it is the unilateralists, without this being explicit in the text. The 'seriousness' of a denial, and whether it is well-judged, ill judged, or ironic, will differ for audiences with different levels of cultural knowledge and informedness, and in each case will give rise to a series of different implicatures.

Richardson found that Margaret Thatcher's speech was identified as addressing the broadest audience, trying for "different pay-offs with different parts of that audience" (p: 44), while Heseltine's addressed a slightly less heterogeneous audience, and Nott was making the 'moral case' for Trident, thus assuming his audience to be largely 'don't knows' and not addressing the 'like-minded', for whom the case would presumably not have to be made.

This study represents a serious attempt to engage with the way in which expectations relating to the background assumptions held by text recipients serve to structure and organise discourse. The meanings produced by the above speeches depended on recipients being able to make specific implicatures through pragmatic inferencing processes, and those implicatures are a result of the articulation between the discourse and the background assumptions of the audience.

The necessity of adopting a pragmatic approach to the problem of ideological representation in discourse will be argued further in Chapter III, taking as a starting point Chilton's account of the semantics of *deter*. His argument that semantic meaning is a product of discourse begins to draw on a different level of language function, and in seeking to show how current ways of representing concepts of pro-nuclear defence are motivated by frames of 'familiar' background assumptions, he paves the way for further investigation into the role of background knowledge structures in producing particular forms of discourse.

In the final section of this chapter, I set out briefly some of the theories of inferencing systems which are being drawn upon in research into the ways in which information is processed and stored. These theories have important implications for a pragmatic approach to ideological meaning which aims to include contextual features and background knowledge structures in any account of ideological representation

II.5 The Role of Pragmatics: Foregrounding Background Knowledge

Current theories in pragmatics which are concerned with the structure and organisation of background knowledge, and with processes of inferencing, have provided a basis for investigating ideological representation within a framework which allows aspects of discursive practices falling outside the domain of the grammatical 'base' of the language to be addressed in more detail. Many of these theories are concerned with the cognitive operations at work in the processing of texts, and the sets of background assumptions that processors will need to access in their interpretation of texts, and have transferred the focus of linguistic enquiry from the syntactic and semantic levels of meaning to considerations of utterances and statements in context, and to the interpretative strategies which are required in those contexts to impute meaning.

One approach to the problem of how knowledge of the world is stored in the brain has been to use psychological and computational accounts of representation in discourse analysis. These are used to account for "the type of predictable information a writer/speaker can assume his (sic) hearer/listener to have available whenever a particular situation is described" (Brown & Yule, 1983: 236). Two proposals for dealing with the way in which information is stored in memory, *frames* and *scripts*, have particularly influenced accounts of the ways in which commonsense background assumptions about the world are drawn upon in interpretative processes.

II.5.1 Commonsense Frames and Scripts

Frame System Theory (Minsky 1977) was proposed as a cognitive model for representing knowledge of the world in stereotypical structures, or

frames. Whenever a new situation is encountered, one of these frames is selected from memory and adapted to fit reality by changing the details as necessary⁽¹⁰⁾. If it is not possible to fit a particular frame to the new situation, then a replacement frame will be provided, and thus it is possible to interpret information or facts in different ways. This is particularly relevant to discussions of the function of metaphor in discourse (see II.4.2 above), where it is proposed that as metaphor provides a mechanism for representing one situation in terms of another, in the metaphorical process an unfamiliar or complex situation may come to be interpreted in the commonsense terms of a familiar, more accessible frame structure.

The main criticisms of frame system theory are that it predicts that much less discourse should occur than actually does, and that in any piece of text many frames may be called up which are not necessary to the understanding of that text, (cf. Brown & Yule, 1983: 240). Nevertheless, it remains a useful model in critical discourse analysis for conceptualising how conventional knowledge is stored.

The concept of scripts is one way of providing a more specialised version of frame theory to account for the way we fit new information in to previously organised views of the world, and the expectations set up by text:

"A single sentence and its corresponding conceptualizations set up expectations about what is to follow in the rest of a discourse or story. These expectations characterise the world knowledge that bears on a given situation, and it is these expectations that we wish to explore."
(Shank & Abelson, 1977a: 422).

Shank and Abelson describe a script as "a pre-determined, stereotyped sequence of actions that define a well-known situation", which allows

for new references to objects or actions within it just as if they had been previously mentioned. For example, in a 'restaurant' script:

John went into a restaurant. The waiter showed him to a table.

the occurrence of the definite noun phrase *the waiter* is explained by the fact that the receiver of this text has already accessed a 'restaurant' script which contains a waiter from their background knowledge.

One important aspect of script theory is that "in understanding a story that calls up a script, the script becomes part of the story even when it is not spelled out", (1977a: 425). In other words, background knowledge in the form of scripts forms an integral part of the interpretation of texts, which are understood according to conceptual dependencies. Shank and Abelson aim to find a procedure "that will let us see only the major items, yet also find, with some difficulty, the thoughts or statements that underlie them, and the ideas that underlie those, and so on", (1977a: 432).

In positing a theory of conceptual dependency, Shank and Abelson have provided a useful model for recovering those elements of background knowledge which are implicit in a discourse because they have become part of stereotyped structures of knowledge. This eliding of elements of the 'story' comes about as a result of expectations about the kind of scripts available to a discourse processor. If these scripts are not available, then a processor will not be able to successfully impute meaning to a text.

However, as with frame system theory, the main problem with the notion of scripts is finding "a principled means of limiting the number of conceptualisations required for understanding" (Brown & Yule, 1983:

244). Despite this reservation, and again similarly to frame theory, scripts have nevertheless provided a useful framework within which to analyse the ideological function of stereotypical event sequences which are mobilised in discursive practices. This is due to the need for a theory upon which to model stereotypical background knowledge. For artificial intelligence research, background knowledge is a set of 'known' facts, in the form of frames or schemata, which are mobilised in the processes of utterance comprehension. For critical discourse analysis, frames and scripts have provided a useful means of characterising that knowledge which takes the form of 'commonsense' assumptions, i.e. background knowledge which is based on social, institutional belief systems and has little to do with known 'facts'.

II.5.1.1 Ideological Function of Scripts

One of the most recent applications of the notion of scripts in the field of media studies has been undertaken by Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1988). In a paper dealing with the way in which statements enter the 'public sphere' of political debate and broadcasting, they examined the 'ideological scripts' which were evident in the forms of talk circulating during the General Election of 1987, and particularly the terms in which the issue of defence was discussed.

During this election campaign, the issue of defence became prominent after Neil Kinnock was interviewed on TV-AM (24th May), during which programme he was asked by David Frost what he would do if non-nuclear Britain was threatened by an invader possessing nuclear weapons. Kinnock's answer subsequently became the trigger for a series of comments and glosses by other politicians and news commentators which

turned out to be very damaging to the Labour party's campaign.

Kinnock's reply to David Frost's question was as follows: :

"In those circumstances, the choice is again posed - and this is the classical choice - of either exterminating everything that you stand for and, I'll use the phrase "the flower of your youth", or using resources that you've got to make any occupation totally untenable, untenable."

(quoted in Garton, Montgomery & Tolson, 1988: 6).

This statement was subsequently glossed by George Younger and John Cartwright respectively as "a policy of 'take to the hills' and "as if the Mujahideen in Penge High Street were expected to deter Soviet nuclear blackmail", glossings which were then taken up by the press headlines in the Daily Telegraph as "Guerilla war a deterrent says Kinnock" (1988: 7).

Garton, Montgomery and Tolson view this process of interrelations between the press, broadcasting institutions and political parties, as being "dominated by talk, and talk about talk on television", rather than by actual events or published policies:

"Certain assumptions are made and presuppositions are circulated in the organisation of this talk which are precisely not reducible to policy statements, but are more consistent with narrative formations in popular culture."

(1988: 7)

These narrative formations are stereotypical event sequences which represent sedimented forms of commonsense, and underly the various glossings of Kinnock's statement which are drawn from possible narrative scenarios, or scripts. Examples of these scripts include the 'Nuclear Blackmail Script', the 'Bully Script', and the 'Occupation Script', taking the form of a series of assumptions which "interlock as a chain of actions and consequences, in which hypothetical consequences are derived from possible actions in a speculative narrative of cause

and effect." (1988: 14). The effect of this interlocking was that discrete glosses of the original statement became progressively inter-related and overlapped as more of the scripts were made explicit, so that two crucial background assumptions, i.e.:

'The Soviet Union is a potential aggressor'

and

'Conventional weapons do not deter the Soviet Union'

were continually reinforced. These assumptions justified a certain level of nuclear deterrence and served to ridicule a non-nuclear defence policy.

II.5.1.2 Scripts and Metaphoric Representation

The signifiers of these narrative scenarios, drawn not only from historical precedents (e.g. the Afghan situation) but also from popular television series (e.g. 'DAD'S ARMY'), and popular press characters (e.g. 'Trades Union Bosses' and 'Labour party extremists') function as metaphors in "a highly condensed lexicon which can be transferred to various referential fields" (p: 22)⁽¹⁹⁾. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson state that these rhetorical strategies have a hegemonic purpose; "to gain consent of the voting public by operating on the terrain of commonsense", and serve to regulate the way in which discourses are framed around an established script. As a result of these dominant metaphoric processes, which extend not only to the discourse of the politicians but also to the terms in which the issues are reported (the 'campaign' was narrated as a 'pugilistic' confrontation between parties, often in terms of 'fighting' and 'landing punches'), they point out that the Labour party had a doubly difficult task, not only of confronting their political opponents, but of putting forward a non-nuclear defence

policy in terms of "a script which reduces complex political processes to dramatic confrontations, through a metaphorical rhetoric which is built around binary oppositions: friends vs enemies; strength vs weakness; taking a stand vs running away, etc." (p: 26).

This account of the circulation of scripts in certain forms of talk is particularly suggestive in the way that it points to an organisation of commonsense background knowledge which has identifiable effects on discursive practice, in this case the representation of defence issues. One aspect which still remains vaguely defined however is the relationship between an utterance or statement and the inferences which it triggers. It is usually thought that inferential processing is activated by the propositional content of a statement plus its relationship to contextual features. In the case of Kinnock's statement, the subsequent glossings seem to be triggered not by the propositional content, but by the lexical item *occupation*. This brings us back to the initial problem with scripts - i.e. how to determine which items trigger scripts and how to limit the number of scripts called up for any one statement. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson refer to the *vitality* of a script or metaphor, which requires definite characteristics. It must be consonant with a given field of reference (such as the military metaphors of the defence issue); productive of a metaphorical chain (able to be reworked in different terms in extended scripts); crystallise embedded commonsense assumptions; recruit its recipients to a clear position and have clear actantal roles for key participants (i.e. Soviet Union as *bully*); and finally, be able to organise and transfer diverse aspects of an issue from one to another.

All these factors contribute to the power of a script or metaphor to sustain a particular ideology, but another factor which seems equally important is the capacity to exclude other meanings which do not fit into the narrative scope or organisation of a given script, thus making those meanings totally incompatible with the commonsense assumptions which form the common, cultural background knowledge for that script.

II.6 Conclusions: From Code to Context

In the following chapters, the need to move from an essentially syntactic and semantic analysis of ideological meaning towards a critical pragmatic analysis of the relationship between language and ideology, is argued through a series of case studies which take up some of the main points which have been put forward here, i.e. that meaning cannot be produced by linguistic form, or code, alone, but must also depend on contextual inferences that are a result of the interaction between the discourse and available assumptions from background knowledge.

II.6.1 From Theory to Practice: Three Case Studies

The various theories of representation examined above all pose problems that an attention to the pragmatic levels of language may help to resolve, in so far as features of context, or conditions of production and reception, and above all of the background knowledge and expectations that producers and receivers of discourse bring to a text, are essentially issues that cannot be investigated on a syntactic or semantic level alone.

Similarly, theories of discourse and ideology need to be validated through an application to discourse *in practice*, particularly if the

ideological function of discourse is considered as sustaining established social relations of power, as Thompson claims.

If syntactic and semantic theories have been sometimes misleading and unproductive for the critical analysis of discourse, then pragmatics, as a theory of social features of language use, may provide a more useful way of exploring the relationship between ideology and language, although Black and Coward argue that pragmatic theory has not yet offered much to critical analyses of language, particularly from a feminist point of view, because pragmatic features such as power, higher status, and speaker 'roles' are categorised as being extra-linguistic features, subsumed into categories such as 'social assumptions' or 'encyclopaedic knowledge', and are thus displaced outside discourse as reflections of the social order, rather than playing an integral part in the production of that order. This results in the same paradox as the one they find in Spender's account of language, i.e. that : "what discourses are supposed to construct and organise turns out to be cause and origin of these discourses" (1981: 79).

However, it may well be possible to identify power and status as features of discourse, produced in and by it, and this would re-open the door for a pragmatic approach to the critical analysis of discourse. In the following chapter three case studies are undertaken in order to investigate further the aspects of the relationship between language and ideology which seem to represent the most productive way forward for critical linguistic theories of representation in discourse, and in particular the contribution that can be made by pragmatic theory

in accounting for the role of background knowledge structures in discourse processing. These studies deal respectively with:

- (1) the discursive constraints operating on the meaning of specific terms in different contexts
- (2) the inter-relation between background knowledge and Pecheux's theory of preconstructed discourse, and its embedding into discursive processes
- (3) the structuring of background knowledge into commonsense frames, scripts and schemata which organise key concepts in specific discursive domains.

The first study is an examination of the way in which the pragmatic features of contextualisation may influence the semantic level of meaning, taking as a starting point Chilton's discussion of the semantics of *deter*; the second is an application of Pécheux's theory of 'transverse discourse' to textual data in order to test the ideological function of clausal relations in discourse; and the third is an investigation of the role of commonsense frames, scripts and metaphors from background knowledge, in understanding concepts from the domain of defence discourse.

The data for all three case studies is selected from transcribed talk and texts from various sources; radio broadcasts, the press and party manifestos, which were concerned with defence policies put forward by the three major political parties during the general election campaign of 1987. The domain of defence was chosen as there were divergent, conflicting ideologies in operation at that time which had a significant effect on the way issues were presented and talked about during the campaign. This provided a wide range of data to use as a

basis for analysing how the pro- and anti- nuclear ideologies were constructed and organised discursively during a specific period of time.

P A R T T W O

CASE STUDIES IN REPRESENTATION

C H A P T E R I I I

CASE STUDY 1: A SEMANTIC AND DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF DETER

III.0 Introduction and Objectives

In the first part of this study the meaning of the verb *deter* and its nominal forms *deterrence* and *deterrent* is analysed in order to examine the claim that there has been a change in the meaning of these terms due to their increasingly specialised use in the context of defence discourse. This analysis takes the form of a theoretical discussion of the semantic properties of *deter*. In the second part of the study, data from two discursive domains (defence and law and order) are examined in order to establish whether the theoretical claims in part one are borne out when applied to talk and text 'in action'.

III.1 An Alternative Semantic Account of *Deter*

In his investigation of the semantics of *deter*, (see II.4.1 above), Chilton uses a system of entailments which does not necessarily correspond to a strict definition of the term, but has much more to do with presupposition and inference, and thus seems less semantic than pragmatic in nature. Although the claim that the verb *deter* and its derivatives are ideologically loaded terms seems valid, the method Chilton adopts does not always help to clarify exactly where that ideological load is, nor whether it is essentially semantic in nature.

As has been generally shown in the literature, it is in the interests of ideologies to present a version of events which is taken to be 'common

sense', and therefore the only viable version, or description, of a set of 'facts'. This process of 'naturalisation', the presentation of something as natural, neutral, and logical, which in fact serves the interests of a particular power structure, seems to depend on certain features of language which can be manipulated to describe particular representations of events which either do not tell the whole story, or which suppress certain forms of information, while foregrounding others.

In the first part of this study, I investigate further how this process may occur in relation to *deter*, *deterrent* and *deterrence*, and argue that it is not necessarily the inherent semantics of these terms which has changed as a result of their specific use in defence discourse, so much as the fact that they are ideologically useful precisely because they are semantically apt for the job.

III.2 A Working Definition of Entailment

While referring closely to Chilton's analysis of the verb *deter*, I propose to offer an alternative version of its semantic properties, and an alternative method of analysis. Chilton bases his examination of the semantics of *deter* on the theoretical assumptions that:

- a) "The words we are concerned with are of a semantic type such that they specify at least part of their meaning analytically; that is, the words have a number of (one-way) entailments that seem to be necessarily true."
- b) "Analyticity is inextricable from some frame of beliefs"
- c) "Since beliefs are variable, some entailments seem less necessary or sure than others."
(1985: 103).

I will take a much narrower view of entailment than that described above, and propose to use the following definition instead:

A proposition X entails a proposition Y if the truth of Y follows necessarily from the truth of X.

and by extension:

A sentence expressing proposition X entails a sentence expressing proposition Y if the truth of Y follows necessarily from the truth of X.

(Hurford and Heasley, 1983: 107).

The entailments that Chilton terms "less necessary or sure than others"

I will not consider to be entailments at all, but some form of presupposition or implicature, and I will consider analyticity not to depend on systems of belief about the world, but on linguistic notions of sense.

III.3 Some Semantic Properties of *Deter*

In the following sections, the semantic properties of *deter* are analysed according to the alternative definition of entailment described above, which enables any changes in the meaning of this term to be considered from a contextual, rather than semantic, point of view.

III.3.1 The Lexical Field of *Deter*

In Chilton's analysis, the lexical field of *deter* is set out, and other terms having the same kind of properties listed, i.e. *stop*, *prevent*, *dissuade*, *discourage*, *hinder* *restrain* etc. (1985: 106). All these verbs can be characterised as in some way causative, and *deter* takes its specific conceptual meaning in relation to, and as distinct from, other terms in the taxonomy. Chilton defines *deter* as a possible implicit negative form of a causative like *coerce* or *compel*: "A *deters* B asserts

minimally that A does something which causes B to know that B's performing some action will cause the punishment of B" (p: 105).

This firstly assumes that A and B are both [+animate], and [+rational], whereas *deter* can take [-animate], [-rational] agents, and secondly, that the affected is in some way in the wrong, or has 'bad intentions' (punishment inferring the notion of wrong-doing on the part of the affected), so is perhaps too specific a definition from which to start. However, as noted in II.4.1 above, he makes the important point that the notion of causation is a linguistically encoded one which has little to do with logical, or empirical causality. This "basic psychological category" of causation is particularly sensitive to ideological manipulation, for as Chilton rightly states: "ideologies are preoccupied with causal explanation of events" (p: 106). *Deter* is therefore conceptually complex in this respect.

III.3.2 Semantic Features of *Deter*

The basic semantic properties of *deter* can be specified as follows:

A deters B : A causes B not to do C

The same would also apply to *prevent*, except that *prevent* requires a three-place predicate including the goal of the affected agent:

A prevents B from doing C

and does not necessarily infer the notion of *fear or threat*. The degree of the predicate *deter* however seems variable, although as a transitive verb it is minimally two-place, but can be three-place if the instrument is specified:

A deters B with/by D

In other words, the participant roles of the predicate *deter* include an agent position, an affected position, and an instrument.

In addition to these three participant roles, there is also some notion of intention on the part of the affected. For the purposes of clarifying this notion, we can add a category GOAL (intended action of affected agent), which can be added to the descriptive categories, as follows:

| | | | | | | |
|-------|--------|----------|------------|---|------------|---|
| A | deters | B | from doing | C | by/with | D |
| ↓ | - | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| agent | | affected | goal | | instrument | |

Not all three places necessarily have to be filled. An example from Chilton (1985: 106) of *deter* with agent, affected and intention places made explicit is:

(1) *Alf deterred Bert from mugging him.*

In this example, the instrument category is left empty - we do not know how, or with what, Alf deterred Bert.

With all four places filled, a sentence with *deter* could look like this:

(2) The cowboy deterred the Indian from attacking him by drawing his gun.

or schematically:

A DETER B from (goal) by C.

According to the definition of entailment given in III.1.2 above, the entailments of (2) will be:

(2.1) The Indian did not attack the cowboy.

(2.11) The cowboy had a gun.

The sentence also presupposes:

(2.111) The Indian intended to attack the cowboy.

Somebody processing this statement would know that the Indian probably intended to attack the cowboy, but in fact did not do so, from their

knowledge of the analytic sense of *deter*, (cause not to do X), its entailments (i) and (ii) and its presupposition (iii) above.

Similarly,

(3) The weather deterred John from climbing the mountain.

entails:

(3.1) John did not climb the mountain.

and presupposes

(3.1i) John intended to climb the mountain.

So much can a processor deduce from the semantics of *deter*. Any further assumptions which allow the processor to understand the above statements will be outside the semantic domain. In sentence (2), for example, a processor who does not have a 'Western' information frame, (which may include such assumptions as: cowboys and Indians fight each other, cowboys have guns and Indians have arrows, cowboys are usually in a stronger position than Indians, and so on), might not process the shorter sentence:

(4) The cowboy deterred the Indian.

in the same way as a processor who does. All they would know analytically from processing this sentence out of context is:

(4.1) The Indian intended to do X

(4.1i) The Indian did not do X.

Similarly, in sentence:

(3) The weather deterred John from climbing the mountain.

the dominant inference is probably that the weather was bad, i.e. heavy rain, snow, fog etc., for a processor who holds assumptions about what meteorological conditions may deter someone from climbing a mountain.

In a more specific context, with more information available to the

processor, it may be that the weather was so hot that John decided to go swimming instead! Again, none of these assumptions can be determined from the analytic meaning of *deter*, but only from the context and the background knowledge of the processor.

Bearing these comments in mind, it can be seen that the sentence:

(5) The cowboy deterred the Indian from attacking him.

analytically tells us nothing much about the cowboy. The only way processors can supply information about the cowboy is from their own background knowledge, or 'Western' information frames.

Therefore, Chilton's claim (p. 106) that:

(1) Alf deterred Bert from mugging him

entails

(1.1) Alf was a big bloke.

seems unlikely.

According to the narrower definition of entailment, the only entailment of (1) would be:

(1.1) Bert did not mug Alf.

Anything else would be a presupposition, or some form of implicature based on the context and knowledge of Bert and Alf, and implicatures seem to be governed by something outside semantics. Alf may be a big bloke, or he may be small but wielding a pistol, or he may be a judo black belt, but sentence (1) tells us nothing about him except that he deterred Bert, and I would argue that any further information used to process this sentence must specifically come from the context, and the processor's contextual knowledge, or 'Alf' frame, rather than as Chilton claims, from "present predominant belief systems" (p: 106) which include information about specific agents for *deter*. In other words,

the 'predominant belief systems' are not triggered by the verb itself, but by its contextual environment.

To summarise the semantic properties of *deter*: it can be an up to four-place predicate, but as a transitive verb, needs only to have two of these places filled explicitly, as in:

(4) The cowboy deterred the Indian.

or:

(6) The weather deterred John.

However, despite being a transitive verb, it seems nevertheless possible to use *deter* intransitively in one particular case:

(7) ?Nuclear weapons deter.

which can be compared to:

(8) *The cowboy deterred.

(9) *The weather deterred.

or Chilton's example (p: 106):

(10) ?NATO deters.

There also seems to be a tense restriction on *deter* when it occurs with *nuclear weapons* in the agent position:

(7a) *Nuclear weapons deterred.

This is probably because a nuclear-free, or post-deterrence, world is not yet a reality, and while nuclear weapons are still deployed, the verb *deter* can only be used in the present tense (which would be an example of how such a term can become so context-sensitive, regardless of its semantics).

III.3.3 Empty Semantic Categories

In (7), and as Chilton states in relation to (10), the missing object (affected) is "supplied unambiguously from the belief system" (p. 107).

In other examples, the affected category can be filled with information

supplied not from the meaning of *deter* itself, but from sets of assumptions about the participants in a particular frame, and from a particular context.

Thus in (7), we have three empty categories, as follows:

(7) nuclear weapons deter \emptyset \emptyset \emptyset .
 (Agent) (Aff.) (Goal) (Inst.)

where the dominant assumptions used to fill the empty categories would be something like:

affected - the Soviet Union

goal - to attack Europe

instrument- (nuclear weapons - subsumed in agent)

In order to process (7) as a possible sentence by supplying the above information, a processor must be able to access sets of assumptions about nuclear bombs, the Soviet Union, and its intentions, which are called up to fill in the gaps, or empty semantic categories, of the verb *deter*. I would therefore argue that it is not the semantic properties of the verb *deter* which are in a process of change here, but that its use in the defence context activates sets of unambiguous contextual assumptions about appropriate agents and affecteds in relation to specific aspects of defence policy, which in turn limits its appropriacy for other contexts. It is these contextual assumptions which enable the statement:

(7) ?Nuclear weapons deter.

to seem more acceptable than:

(8) *The cowboy deters.

III.3.4 Possible Agents for Deter

Looking now at possible agents for *deter*, the categories Chilton gives are:

humans
 collectivities (eg. America, NATO)
 natural phenomena and obstacles

These could be generalised into the basic categories of human and non-human, abstract and concrete, etc., or [+/- human], [+/- concrete], eg:

- (1) Alf deterred Bert. [+animate, +human]
- (11) The guard dog deterred Bert. [+animate, -human]

because, given a suitable context, almost anyone or anything could deter, so contrary to Chilton's view, there does not seem to be much restriction on the agents for *deter*. In particular, human agency can be subsumed into the instrument category, when the instrument is found in the agent position, eg.:

- (12) The sharp stick deterred John.

(when the sharp stick in question is operated by somebody, and the same would apply to nuclear weapons).

Chilton's example:

- (13) ?The piano deterred John.

could be acceptable in a particular context - it could be the sound of a piano, or the piano being used as an obstacle, that deterred John from carrying out some intended action, but more information would probably be supplied regarding John's intention, and the piano, to disambiguate this and make (13) an acceptable statement.

On the other hand, the possible categories for the affected position of *deter* are much more restricted, and seem to include only [+human], and entities presumed to be composed of humans, such as the collectivities

category mentioned above. I would question Chilton's statement that animals can fill the affected position, because: *deter*, contrary to his argument that it does not require a rational induced agent, (cf. 1985: 110), does seem to have some sort of rationality requirement on the part of the affected:

(14) ?John deterred the tiger from attacking him.

seems odd, or inappropriate, compared to:

(15) John prevented the tiger from attacking him.

or

(16) ?That electric fence deters the cattle from straying into the next field.

compared to:

(17) That electric fence stops the cattle from straying into the next field.

where in (14) and (16) a different causative verb from the same semantic field, e.g. *stop* or *prevent*, seems more appropriate to the context.

III.4 Agents and Appropriacy

How does the notion of appropriate agency fit into the commonsense representation of concepts within strategic discourse? Firstly, by enabling the human agency to be concealed behind the weapons themselves, thus linguistically obscuring, and ideologically naturalising, the relationship between the missiles and those who operate them. Placing *nuclear weapons* in the agent position masks the human agency, which is left unspecified in the sentence. Secondly, through the notion of appropriateness, which is important here because although (16) is syntactically possible, intuition would probably tell a

native speaker that *deter* would not be the most appropriate choice of verb to express the relationship between the electric fence and the cattle. I would suggest that ideologies in some way play a part in determining notions of appropriateness, especially when appeals are made to 'common sense', the 'natural', and the 'possible' in a particular context.

Given that a native speaker, or efficient discourse processor, have at their disposal all this semantic information about *deter*, then in a particular context, if some of the predicate positions are left unspecified, relevant and appropriate information will be supplied from background knowledge and from the assumptions and frames relating to that context.

A second suggestion is that in practice, the discourse producer in a given communicative situation, will only leave empty predicates in a sentence with *deter* when it is assumed that the discourse receiver will be able to supply the missing information to fill them in. Defence discourse is discourse in the 'public sphere' and the occurrence of *deter* in this discursive domain will trigger certain expectations of appropriacy for agents and affected entities, compared to sentence (13), where 'piano' is only acceptable as an agent for *deter* if one has access to specific information about context.

III.5 *Deterrent and Deterrence*

I will now look at the other forms of the word *deter*, *deterrent*, (adjective and noun) and *deterrence*. Chilton gives examples of sentences which illustrate the progressively restricted sense of the above terms, and claims that:

"When the semantic make-up of the participants in a sentence involving *deterrent* is not specified (left out or left ambiguous) in discourse, then a discourse processor will supply default interpretations deriving from the criminological (or nuclear and cold-war) frame of beliefs," [...] "*deterrent* being versatile as between the legal and the nuclear frame, *deterrence* less so."
(1985: 116).

Concentrating on the nuclear and cold-war frame, and the concept of *deterrence*, it is current practice in strategic discourse to take the abstract noun denoting the concept of "preventing by fear"⁽²⁾, and use it concretely to describe a (hypothetical) state of affairs, or set of actions: the deployment of nuclear weapons. This 'concretisation' of *deterrence* seems to have resulted in its particularised meaning - it now refers to something that one is led to believe exists, or happens, in order to produce a hypothetical result, i.e. the non-invasion of Europe by the Soviet Union. The abstract concept of 'preventing by fear' has become specific, referring uniquely to a postulated state of affairs within international politics, (which, as Chilton comments, does not necessarily have any empirical reality).

Deterrent, on the other hand, is necessarily specific: something that deters. One cannot usually talk about a *deterrent* without specifying what it is, e.g.:

(18) *Long sentences are a deterrent.*
(Chilton, 1985: 113)

or:

(19) *Guard dogs are a deterrent.*

Syntactically, it must take a determiner when used in a noun phrase, (NP → Det + N), whereas *deterrence* can occur without a determiner, (NP → N).

This absence of specificity for *deterrence* probably serves the purposes of strategic discourse as it allows nuclear weapons to be referred to in discourse without actually naming them. The abstract property of the noun phrase *deterrence* also allows for ambiguity within this nuclear context: *deterrence* has in fact become a label and is thus inevitably increasingly restricted in its current usage, denoting a particular set of actions (deployment of nuclear weapons) by specific agents (NATO), in a particular context (East/West relations), while at the same time its abstract semantic properties enables this specificity to be wrapped up in an abstract package. Some change in meaning may in fact be occurring here, due to the increase in specific informational load for *deterrence*, its 'labelling' function, and the increasingly specific contextualisation in the discourse of defence.

III.5.1 *Deterrence* as a 'Commonsense' Concept

Such an increase in specificity and limited contextual usage must certainly be due in part to the role of the media in establishing a 'public sphere' of discourse, where selected issues are constantly being recycled as news topics. Any account of meaning and investigation of commonsense categories of appropriate agents for certain actions can usefully attend to the ways in which the communication of information via the media builds up 'popular' metaphors and other ways of representing concepts, which, once established within the culture, set up most of the expectations for appropriate fillers for semantic gaps of the type discussed above. In this context, it is what is assumed as 'given', i.e. the 'natural' commonsense assumptions available to consumers of media-discourse, which governs the selection of

appropriate participant roles as agent and affected when these are not specified in the discourse.

III.6 The Semantic Account: Some Conclusions

In conclusion to this section, some suggestions have been made for the reason why the terms *deter* and *deterrence* are semantically useful in the discursive domain of nuclear defence policy rather than other related terms in the lexicon. It has been shown that the semantic properties of this term lend themselves particularly well to an ideological function in this context, by naturalising appropriate selections in agent and affected positions which do not have to be explicitly stated. Further, it has been suggested that because of its frequent use by politicians and the media to denote a certain state of affairs within international relations, (which, as Chilton has pointed out, may or may not correspond to reality), and as a result of the foregrounding of these relations in the media, i.e. the prominence of the issue of arms build-up or limitation, recently 'star-wars' etc., the nominal form *deterrence* seems to have become very strongly associated with certain frames or assumptions relating to a particular state of affairs with regard to nuclear defence, and whenever it occurs tends to invoke a set of preferred assumptions in this context.

It is therefore not the inherent semantics of the term *deter* which have changed as a result of this contextual use, but rather that there has been a restriction in the range of contexts in which the nominal form *deterrence* can be used. The term has now become highly specific to the domain of defence discourse, where it refers to the development and

deployment of nuclear weapons, and this makes it less appropriate for use in other discursive domains.

In the second part of this case study, this claim will be examined further in an analysis of the discursive use of two terms from the same semantic field, (*prevent* and *deter*), during the pre-election campaign of 1987. The analysis focuses on the occurrence of the different forms of these terms in two different discursive domains, the contexts of defence and of law and order.

III.7 A Discursive Comparison of *Deter* and *Prevent*: Objectives

Having examined in the first part of this case study the semantic meanings of *deter* based on decontextualised examples, in the second part of the study the verb *deter* and its nominal forms *deterrent* and *deterrence* are examined as they occur in discourse, both spoken and written. The contexts of use are the domains of defence and of law and order, both domains in which the term is frequently used.

They are also domains in which another term from the same lexical field is used. *Prevent* and *prevention* occur in the contexts of defence and of law and order, but not, it would seem, always interchangeably with *deter* and *deterrence*.

The aim of this study is then to compare the discursive use of both terms in their verbal and nominal forms, and to examine the constraints on their use between the two contexts by testing conditions of appropriacy for possible agents, affecteds, and modifiers for these terms.

III.7.1 The Data

The spoken data used in this study are taken from radio programmes from the period May/June 1987 during which the issues of defence and law and order were discussed, in the framework of the general election of that year. The policies of the three main political parties on these issues were set out in their election manifestoes, and these are the source of the written data in the study.

The radio programmes sampled were: Radio Four: ANY QUESTIONS, (15/05/87, 22/05/87, 29/05/87); Independent Radio Phone-Ins with Margaret Thatcher, David Owen and David Steel, (May 1987).

III.7.2 Examples of *Prevent* and *Deter* in Discourse

In the data sampled from defence discourse, the verb *deter* does not occur very frequently compared to the nominal forms *deterrent* and *deterrence*. The extract below is the only example of *deter* found in the spoken data:

1.1

we can't ignore it . we have it . and we have to use it . in an intelligent sense . so we actually can do what I have thought all . what all political parties had agreed since the second world war . that is actually *deter* . *deter* aggression.

(John Moore, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87.)

In the written data, the following instance was found:

1.1i

Conventional weapons did not succeed in *deterring* war. But nuclear weapons have prevented, not only nuclear war, but conventional war in Europe as well.

(Conservative Party Manifesto, 1987, P: 71)

In the context of law and order, the data from the manifestoes included two uses of the verb form *deter*:

1.111

Our crime prevention programme will:
 help local councils to implement a safer streets policy,
 with more street-lighting, more caretakers, park-keepers and
 other public employees whose presence *deters* crime;
 lay down crime prevention standards for buildings, open
 spaces and vehicles to combat vandalism and to *deter*
 criminals.

(Labour Party Manifesto, 1987, P: 10)

The verb *prevent* occurred once in the data examined in the context of
 defence, in 1.11 above:

Nuclear weapons have *prevented* not only nuclear war but
 conventional war in Europe as well.

and not at all in the context of law and order.

III.7.3 Constraints on *Prevent* and *Deter*

In order to test for constraints on use of these two verb forms, agent
 and affected predicates can be substituted to check for grammaticality
 and appropriacy. They are very similar in meaning, insofar as they
 have the same entailments:

The weather deterred John from climbing the mountain.
 entails:
 John did not climb the mountain.

and

The weather prevented John from climbing the mountain.
 entails:
 John did not climb the mountain.

and the same presuppositions:

The weather deterred John from climbing the mountain.
 presupposes:
 John intended to climb the mountain

and

The weather prevented John from climbing the mountain.
 presupposes:
 John intended to climb the mountain.

In 1.1:

We can [.....] actually *deter* aggression

the agent of *deter* is the pronoun *we*. This is multi-referential and not made explicit in the discourse; we could include all political parties, Britain, or specifically the Conservative government. The affected position is filled by the abstract noun *aggression*, into which is subsumed the intention, or 'goal', and the affected entity and instrument positions are empty, but can be derived from the discursive co-text:

the reality of Soviet aggression
 (affected entity: The Soviets)
the nuclear deterrent we have
 (instrument: nuclear deterrent)

If all predicate places are filled with information from co-text and background assumptions, in order to spell out the propositional meaning of the sentence, it might have several possible representations:

We [*the British Gov't., the Conservative Party, the British*] *deter* the Soviets from being aggressive [*attacking? invading? fighting? declaring war on? firing nuclear weapons at?*] us by having a nuclear deterrent.

It would be equally possible to substitute the verb *prevent* in this statement without any appropriacy problems, and without any significant change in meaning:

We can [.....] actually prevent aggression

There would therefore seem to be no reason for preferring *deter* as a more appropriate term in this context.

In its discursive use here, as noted above, the term *aggression* subsumes the two categories of affected entity and goal into one:

people/nations who have aggressive intentions

just as the nominalisation *crime* subsumes the clause:

people who have criminal intentions

It is equally appropriate to have *prevent crime*, as it is to have *deter aggression*. Both verbs are able to have a [-concrete, -human] noun phrase occupying the affected position from which the categories of affected and goal are inferred from contextual and co-textual information, or knowledge that X is aggressive or that Y commits crimes.

The same occurs with *prevent* in the following statement:

Nuclear weapons have prevented conventional war in Europe.

where *conventional war in Europe* is more abstract than specifying the affected entity and goal, or intention:

Nuclear weapons have prevented European nations from fighting each other.

However, *deter* is also found with *war* as the affected entity in 1.ii:

Conventional weapons did not succeed in *deterring* war

This would again indicate that either term is substitutable for the other in the context of defence.

Turning to the context of law and order, two instances of *deter* are found in 1.iii with a [+human], and [-concrete], affected entity respectively:

...to combat vandalism and to *deter* criminals.

...with more street-lighting, more caretakers, park-keepers and other public employees whose presence *deteters* crime;

In these clauses, however, *prevent* is only substitutable if the affected entity is [-concrete]:

whose presence prevents crime

where, like *war*, the abstract noun in the affected position subsumes a [+ human] element with a goal:

whose presence prevents people committing crimes.

The phrase:

?to prevent criminals

however is grammatically odd, and begs the question: *prevent criminals doing what?* Deter, on the other hand, does allow for a [+human] affected entity without specifying any goal or intention. This property therefore facilitates its use in a statement such as the one below:

1.iv

and also we have . a very effective . crime . prevention programme . that we've just started . which means that you really should look after your own house . see that it has proper locks see the windows are locked . and do everything you can . to *deter* . the criminal.

(Margaret Thatcher, Independent Radio Phone-In, May 1987.)

So one constraint on the use of *prevent* seems to be that the goal has to be explicitly stated. *Deter* requires less specificity and thus involves more reliance on contextual assumptions which will supply possible intentions for the 'goal' category. *Deter* has however fewer constraints than *prevention* on the kind of words that can occur in the affected position, i.e. it can have a [+human] predicate with non-specified goal:

You should do everything you can to deter the criminal.

A further difference is that in 1.iv above, the agent of *deter* is you: the person listening, house-owners, who undertake specific actions (looking after your own house, putting on proper locks, locking windows etc.). These actions represent the instrument predicate, whereas in defence discourse, agent and instrument predicates are not often specified: we (various possible referents) deter aggression (Soviet aggression); how? not explicitly stated, but inferrable from background knowledge: (by deploying nuclear weapons). The meaning of *deter* is the

same in both contexts, insofar as it has the same semantic properties in each. It is the contexts and the discursive environment (of given, or inferred predicates) which determine whether the goal and instrument categories are specified or not.

III.7.4 Deterrence or Prevention?

In the data examined, particularly the spoken data, use of the verb form *deter* was much less frequent in the context of defence than the nominal forms *deterrent* and *deterrence*. From the data, the following uses of *deterrence* were found in the defence context:

1.v

Because of improvements in Soviet defences we need the greater capability of Trident to retain the necessary *deterrence* which Polaris gives. No amount of money spent on conventional defence would ever buy us the same degree of *deterrence*.

(Conservative Party Manifesto, 1987: 72)

1.vi

We believe NATO relies too heavily on nuclear weapons at all levels for *deterrence*.

NATO should adopt strategies and weapons which are more self-evidently defensive in intent and which are concerned with minimum *deterrence*.

(Alliance Party Manifesto, 1987)

III.7.5 Modification of Deterrence and Prevention

In these statements the nominal *deterrence* is used three times with a quantifying modifier, implying that *deterrence* is something that can be measured by amount or degree:

the necessary *deterrence*
 the same degree of *deterrence*
 minimum *deterrence*

Here, the term *prevention* can not be appropriately substituted:

?No amount of money spent on conventional defence would ever buy us the same degree of *prevention*.

One reason for this may be that *prevention* is not a measurable concept; either one prevents something, or one doesn't, but one cannot have a degree of prevention. Another reason in this context is that *deterrence* has in fact taken on an extra semantic load: it has come to mean *prima facie* nuclear deterrence, deploying nuclear weapons, (which of course can be measured in quantity), and thus *prevention* is not an appropriate substitution. *Deterrence* seems in this instance to be spilling over into a different, though related, semantic field: that of *protection*. *Protection* works as a more appropriate substitute for *deterrence* than *prevention* in these statements, e.g.:

The necessary protection
 The same degree of protection
 minimum protection

particularly in 1.v where the names of the nuclear missiles are given in the co-text:

1.v
 Because of improvements in Soviet defences we need the greater capability of Trident to retain the necessary *protection* which Polaris gives. No amount of money spent on conventional defence would ever buy us the same degree of *protection*.

Apart from the adjective *nuclear*, other modifiers are used with *deterrence* in the defence context to specify some form of possession, e.g.: *British deterrence*, *our deterrence*. Again, *prevention* is not appropriately substitutable in this context for the same reason identified above, i.e. the affected entity needs to be specified:

?our prevention
 ?British prevention
 ?minimum nuclear prevention

and so the nominal form *prevention* seems to retain the same properties as its verb form; the affected entity must be made explicit

in the discourse, and cannot automatically be inferred from background knowledge. The above phrases with *prevention* are referentially incomplete, whereas

our deterrence
and
British deterrence

are referentially complete without making the affected entity explicit.

In the context of law and order, the term *prevention* seems to be always preferred to *deterrence*, and the affected entity is always given in some form:

1.vii

We have . a very effective . *crime . prevention programme* .
that we've just started
(Independent Radio Phone-In to M. Thatcher, May 1987)

1.viii

Our *crime prevention programme* will:
help local councils implement a safer streets policy;
lay down *crime prevention standards* for buildings.
(Labour Party Manifesto, 1987, P: 10)

In these statements, the noun phrases *crime prevention programme*, and *crime prevention standards*, can be paraphrased as:

our programme to prevent crime

and:

our standards to prevent crime

so there is no ambiguity as to affected entities, as has been seen in III.7.3 above.

However, without being grammatically unacceptable, *deterrence* does not seem appropriately substitutable for *prevention* in these phrases:

?our very effective crime deterrence programme
?our crime deterrence standards

Furthermore, if in the following noun phrases:

our policy of nuclear deterrence
our programme of crime prevention

the nominal forms *deterrence* and *prevention* are switched to give:

?our policy of crime deterrence
 ?our programme of nuclear prevention

which can then be paraphrased as:

our policy to deter crime
 *our programme to prevent nuclear

the difference in meaning becomes clear. *Crime* is a nominal pre-modifier, and *nuclear* is adjectival. *Nuclear* specifies the type of deterrence (to be compared with *conventional deterrence*, for example), whereas *crime* specifies what is being prevented. In other words, the affected entity of the noun phrase *crime prevention* is *crime*. The affected entity of *nuclear deterrence* is inferred from something outside the noun phrase, which may or may not be made explicit.

It is perhaps possible to imagine a context within the domain of law and order where a descriptive adjective such as *nuclear* in the defence context could appropriately pre-modify *prevention*. For example, there is much talk of *neighbourhood watch schemes* being set up to prevent *crime*. A noun phrase having the same structure as *nuclear deterrence* could therefore be envisaged: *i.e. neighbourhood-watch prevention*. Here, *neighbourhood-watch* would describe the type of prevention in the same way as *nuclear* or *conventional* describes the type of deterrence.

However, this term has not become a current feature of law and order discourse in the same way as *nuclear deterrence* has become a feature of defence discourse, with the result that *neighbourhood-watch prevention* still seems somewhat inappropriate whereas there is no problem with *nuclear deterrence*.

The semantic property of *deterrence* which allows the term to be referentially complete with non-specified intention makes it more

useful than *prevention* as a conceptual representation of defence strategy. The fact that the categories of goal and affected entity can remain non-specified enables inferences to be made in order to fill these predicate positions by drawing on commonsense background assumptions about states of affairs relating to current pro-nuclear defence policies.

III.7.6 *Deterrent: Concept to Concretisation*

Unlike *prevention*, a feature of the *deter* group of terms that has been discussed above (see III.5) is that it contains two nominal forms: *deterrence* and *deterrent*, of which the former is the more conceptual, the latter more related to specific, actually occurring types of deterrence, therefore the more concrete of the two terms. One of the properties of *deterrent* is its specificity: it is used with a pre-modifying, determining phrase such as the following examples:

1.ix a

Do you honestly think Mrs Thatcher that the Russians would accept us to have our own independent nuclear . *deterrent* . if they are stripping Europe of the rest of their missiles?
(Caller, Independent Radio Phone-In, May 1987)

1.ix b

They'd get rid of an independent nuclear *deterrent*
(M. Thatcher, Independent Radio Phone-In, May 1987)

1.ix c

I think that our task . as a responsible political movement . is to see that we have . a maintained *deterrent* . until such time . as the bully that David has spoken of . is disarmed on the other side
(David Steel, Independent Radio Phone-In, May 1987)

1.ix d

NATO . has . as an inherent part of its strategy . the nuclear *deterrent*
(Roy Hattersley, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.05.87)

1.ix e

.... Denis Healey . and this is not terribly surprising . somehow imagines we could get rid of American bases . we could get rid of Britain's own weapons . and still count

upon the Americans to defend us and provide a *deterrent* in those circumstances

(Bill Rogers, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.05.87)

In the defence context, when it occurs with an indefinite determiner such as *provide a deterrent* (see example 1.ix e), the term seems to retain a more general, non-specified meaning: *the Americans will provide something that deters*. This also seems to be the case in the following example from the context of law and order:

1.ix f

now any punishment should have three elements . it should have an element of *deterrent* . certainly

(Dafyd Wigley, ANY QUESTIONS, 15.05.87)

where the type of deterrent is not made explicit.

More frequently though, it occurs with a modifying adjective phrase which particularises the type of deterrent, and which seems in most cases to have become synonymous with nuclear weapon(s). This is a possible substitute for *deterrent* in each of the noun phrases below:

a nuclear deterrent - a nuclear weapon

a maintained deterrent - a maintained nuclear weapon

an independent nuclear deterrent - an independent nuclear weapon

the British independent deterrent - the British independent nuclear weapon

This meaning is particularly clear in the following statements where a possessive modifier is used:

1.x a

... the real question which is inherent in . the original proposition . is why on earth . Great Britain should choose . to spend its money . and neglect its conventional forces . by having its own nuclear *deterrent*

(Roy Hattersley, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.05.87)

1.x b

... there is no way . that you can fire . any kind of missile from this country . unless you're going to be the aggressor . without it being obliterated first . therefore you have to put your *deterrent* into a submarine.

(Mary Goldring, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.05.87)

and the phrase *nuclear weapon* is in fact substituted for *deterrent* in the following utterance:

1.x c

there are very many good members of NATO [.....] who do not believe their involvement in NATO requires them to have an independent *nuclear weapon* of their own
(Roy Hattersley, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.05.87)

This [+concrete] feature of *deterrent* is particularly useful in the defence context as it enables nuclear weapons to be represented discursively by an alternative term, or euphemism. In a law and order context, this is does not seem to work in quite the same way:

Nuclear weapons are a deterrent - *our deterrent*
Proper locks are a deterrent - ?*our deterrent*

In the law and order context, more co-textual information would probably be required. *Our burglar alarm* could probably still not be unambiguously and appropriately referred to as *our deterrent*, and even *our burglar deterrent* seems inappropriate. However, the statements:

Burglar alarms are a deterrent
Neighbourhood watch schemes are a deterrent.

seem perfectly appropriate. It therefore seems specifically in the defence context that *deterrent* has taken on a particularised meaning synonymous with *nuclear weapon(s)*. This enables it to be used without saying what type of deterrent is being referred to, whereas in the law and order context, the type of deterrent has to be made explicit in the discourse.

Interestingly, *deterrent* is used most frequently when the talk is about the maintenance of arms levels. When the topic is arms limitation negotiations, the names and numbers of missiles are usually specified in great detail:

1.xi

you remember the history . the Soviets set up SS 20's . and we in Europe had nothing in reply . we said to them please : take them down . if you take them down we won't set up anything similar . for four years we asked them . for four years they refused . so we deployed cruise missiles . in Britain and in Germany and in Italy and also they're deploying them in . Holland and in Belgium . and the Pershing 2 . in Germany . so the intermediate ones would be . that's the SS 20's . would be taken down . and the Cruise and Pershings would be taken down . that leaves us with a problem : because the next range . the shorter range ones (etc.)

(M. Thatcher, Independent Radio Phone-In, May 1987).

In arguments of pro-nuclear defence policy, nuclear arms are represented as one single entity: *the British independent deterrent*. In discussions of arms limitations, *our deterrent* becomes a multiple collection of missiles. *Deterrent* then has a further useful feature insofar as it may represent a multiplicity and variety of weapons in one, singular lexical item. *Prevention* does not have this kind of feature, and therefore would be less useful for the context of defence.

III.8 Conclusions

The question we have been considering is whether there has been a real semantic change in the meaning of the terms *deter*, *deterrent* and *deterrence*, so that they now predominantly refer to *nuclear deterrence*, or whether their meaning is context-derived, i.e. it is only through examining the use of a term in context that what it means or infers can be determined in the final instance.

If it is the case that the semantic meaning of *deter* has changed, then as has been argued above, this would limit the use of the terms to the context of defence, and render their use in other domains anomalous. Having seen that *deter* and *deterrent* can be appropriately used in both

the contexts of law and order and of defence - and this despite the added informational load that deterrent takes on when used in a defence context - it would seem that a change in the signification of these two words has not really been marked by restriction of context. However, the form *deterrence* does seem more limited, and due to its frequent use in the context of defence to collocate with *nuclear*, it has become much more context specific. The term *deterrence* has come to infer *nuclear deterrence*, and as a result is not now equally substitutable between defence and law and order contexts.

In Law and Order contexts, although the noun phrase *prevention* is always preferred to *deterrence* in the data examined, the verb form *deter* still occurs frequently in this context. There is only one constraint on the use of *prevent*, as follows:

| | |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| deter crime | - deter aggression |
| prevent crime | - prevent aggression |
| deter criminals | - *prevent criminals |

Prevent requires a specific goal category, *deter* does not. However, *deter* does not often occur with [+human] affected in a defence context, so *prevent* can be used in the same context without a change in meaning. The semantic difference between the two terms in this case, then, does not seem significant.

The term *deter* does however have the advantage of possessing two nominal forms, which have differing abstract/concrete properties; the concept of *deterrence* as opposed to the reality of deployment of nuclear weapons, i.e. the 'hardware' as such. But this does not prevent the use of the term *deterrent* being used in law and order contexts, so its meaning does not seem restricted to refer to nuclear weapons. It

is the conceptual nominal form *deterrence* that seems more constrained, and less flexible between contexts.

Through this examination of the discursive use of *deter* and *prevent*, it has been argued that it is necessary to include a pragmatic component in an analysis of meaning, since an important part of the scope of reference of a term is determined not by its semantic properties, but by the pragmatic features of contextualised use. This has been shown in relation to the term *deterrence*, which now collocates so strongly with *nuclear* that it has become inappropriate for use in contexts such as law and order where other forms of the word are still used. The semantic properties of the term *deter*, in particular the possibility of a non-specified goal category, and of the nominal form *deterrence* which does not require a specified affected entity, allow further meanings to be supplied by drawing on commonsense background assumptions through pragmatic inferencing. It is this level of meaning that has resulted in the reduced flexibility of the term *deterrence* between contexts.

Discursive meaning is then not just a question of semantic structure, but also of pragmatic features of context and background knowledge, and if we are to consider the relationship between language and ideology in terms of representation, then the pragmatic elements involved in the production of meaning in context cannot be left aside. In particular, the ways in which background knowledge structures may function to produce ideological meanings in discourse through processes of inferencing, as has been examined in the case of the lexical items *prevent* and *deter*, are of crucial importance to ideological representation.

In the case study which follows, I move from an examination of the semantic properties of terms and their ideological function, to a discussion of the syntactic relations between clauses, with specific reference to Pécheux's theory of *transverse discourse*: the way in which preconstructed knowledge, (in many respects similar to what I have been calling 'commonsense background assumptions') is embedded into discourse by means of specific clausal relationships between propositions. It will again be argued that meaning cannot be attributed on a syntactic level alone, and that the role of pragmatic inferencing processes is crucial in any analysis of ideological representation.

CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY 2: IDEOLOGY AND THE RELATIVE CLAUSE - PECHEUX'S THEORY OF TRANSVERSE DISCOURSE

IV.0 Introduction and Objectives

Having looked at the role of lexical meaning in the discursive representation of particular concepts from the domain of defence, and claimed that pragmatic processes of inferencing are essential in the construction of those representations, here I take this claim further by examining a theory which has already been outlined in Chapter II, (cf. II.3.2 above), and which states that the clausal structure of sentences produces ideological discursive effects, and by showing that these effects seem to arise not through clausal relations, but through processes of inferencing.

The aim of this study is to investigate in detail claims made by Michel Pêcheux (1982) regarding the ideological function of relative clauses in the production of *transverse discourse*. Pêcheux states that relative clauses have a key role in producing ideological effects in discourse, through their ability to embed elements from interdiscourse, i.e. discourse or knowledge 'from elsewhere', into the intradiscursive chain of a sentence. In other words, to produce "a discursive effect linked to syntactic *embedding*", (1982: 64).

This claim is tested on a set of naturally occurring textual data in order to establish whether the relative clause structures which occur in that data can be said to have a particular ideological effect - what Pêcheux calls a *sustaining effect* in discourse - and if so, whether

this effect differs from any that are produced by other linguistic mechanisms of determination and explication.

The propositional content of the relative clauses in the data is analysed in order to see which domains of interdiscourse (discourse from elsewhere) are mobilised within statements, and what ideological 'effects' (if any) are created by the relationship of these interdiscursive propositions to the propositions of main clauses.

IV.1 Some Notes on Relative Clauses

Before discussing the main claims that Pêcheux makes in more detail, a brief grammatical description of the function of relative clauses is needed as a basis for comparison with Pêcheux's description of their ideological function.

IV.1.1 Determinative, (Restrictive, or Defining) Relatives

These often occur with *that* at the head of the clause, as well as the relative pronouns *who* or *which*, and can also have [Ø] relative pronoun if the noun to which it refers is not the subject of the relative clause, eg:

The cat I saw was Harry's.
(The cat that I saw was Harry's)

or when the relative pronoun is dominated by a preposition, eg:

The table the cat is hiding under.
(The table under which the cat is hiding)

Non-finite post-modifiers of a noun phrase are equivalent in meaning to restrictive relatives, i.e. they function as a 'reduced' relative with the relative pronoun and main verb elided:

The cat hiding under the table belongs to Harry.
(The cat that is hiding under the table belongs to Harry)

Restricted relative clauses act as qualifiers in nominal or adverbial groups, and can take the form of a prepositional phrase, eg:

The boy [who is] on the bike is my brother

or a verb phrase:

The boy [who is] riding the bike is my brother

IV.1.2 Relative Clauses in Cleft Sentences

These are similar in structure to restrictive relatives, occurring with either *who*, *that* or \emptyset relative pronoun. Their function however is not to determine a subset out of a possible set of referents, thereby limiting the extension of reference, as a defining relative clause would do, eg:

The boy [who] I saw was your brother.

Nevertheless they do seem to have a certain determinative function. Halliday describes the cleft structure, or the *predicated theme* as he terms it, as contributing "to the thematic organization of the clause" (1985: 59). Any element, or unit of information within the sentence can be predicated in this way, according to what is considered as 'new' or 'given' information for the hearer. When the 'new' information is marked in a cleft sentence:

It was *the queen* who sent my uncle that hatstand.
(Halliday, 1985: 60)

this has a contrastive effect (i.e. the queen and not somebody else). Thus, in order to make explicit the 'new' value of an information unit, eg:

I saw your brother.

the predicated theme structure can be used:

It was your brother I saw.

Taking Halliday's example:

John's father wanted him to give up the violin. It was his teacher who persuaded him to continue.

the fact that John continued the violin is taken as 'given', and the 'new' element is supplied by the predicated theme 'it was his teacher'. Halliday states that this sets up a contrast between the attitude of the father and that of the teacher. If a context is supplied, a cleft structure may imply not only an explicit contrast with some other possible information (or assumption), but also a corrective function, as in the following exchange:

A: Remember when you saw Fred fall off the bike?

B: It was Harry I saw fall of the bike, not Fred.

So, the relative clause in a cleft sentence can have a determinative function when it either contrasts or corrects previous assumptions held by the hearer, but seems to represent new, rather than given, information. The actual function of the relative here then may vary according to the context in which it occurs.

IV.1.3 Explicative (non-defining, non-restrictive) Relatives

Explicative relatives are sometimes semantically indistinguishable from coordination or from adverbial subordination, eg:

The boy fell off the bike, which made him very angry.

(The boy fell off the bike, and this made him very angry).

or:

The boy fell off the bike, which was hardly moving.

(The boy fell off the bike, when it was hardly moving).

Relative pronouns in non-restrictive relative clauses are WH restricted, and the non-restrictive relative functions as a descriptive gloss to the primary clause. Halliday describes this as a relationship of '*hypotaxis + elaboration*' between clauses, where the relative clause does not have a qualifying function, whereas a restrictive relative is

embedded in the primary clause, and functions as a qualifier in a nominal or an adverbial group (1985: 167)). Another definition of the difference between the two types of clauses is that a non-restrictive relative clause is not a modifier, whereas a restrictive relative is. In other words, there is no syntactic relation between the non-restrictive relative and its antecedent, the WH relative pronoun being the only indication of the relationship between the non-restrictive relative clause and its 'host' (cf. Fabb, 1990: 57).

If a non-restrictive secondary clause is finite, it has the same form as a defining relative, but does not define subsets:

The man, who was riding a bicycle, turned left.

The WH pronoun of non-restrictive relative clauses can refer to a nominal group or a larger segment of the primary clause:

Unfortunately the man fell off, which made him very angry.
(Falling off made him very angry)

Determinative and explicative relative clauses are also differentiated by intonation - a determinative relative forms a single tone group, while an explicative relative clause forms a separate tone group from the main clause - and also by punctuation - explicative relatives are often separated from the main clause by a comma.

IV.1.4 Grammatical Form and Function

From these brief notes on the structure and function of relative clauses, it can be seen that different grammatical forms can have the same defining *function* as a determinative relative clause, (eg. a prepositional phrase), whereas others may have the same *form*, (e.g. a relative clause in a cleft sentence), without having the same function.

Also, an explicative relative may sometimes function as a coordinator, or as an adverbial subordinator, as well as providing further information about the primary clause. These and any other grammatical forms of explication and determination which are present in the data will be compared to the explicative and determinative relative clauses found, in order to examine any differences that may result in terms of ideological effect.

IV.1.5 Pêcheux's Account of the Discursive Function of Relative Clauses

As has been already discussed in Chapter II above, Pêcheux's main concern is with the syntagmatic relations within utterances or statements, i.e. with *intradiscourse*, and with the way in which elements from *interdiscourse* (or discourses from elsewhere), become embedded in the intradiscursive chain as *transverse discourse*. He claims that the primary structure which allows for this embedding is the relative clause, in both its determinative form and its explicative form.

According to Pêcheux, the determinative relative clause allows for *preconstructed elements*, or evident truths¹¹ to form part of the syntagmatic chain of a statement, constituting a meaning which is, in his terms, 'always-already there' within that statement. The explicative relative clause on the other hand enables a *lateral reminder* to be inserted into the intradiscursive chain, which, behind its contingent nature as an additional, informative proposition, in fact serves to posit a causal relationship between the proposition of the

cause/effect relationship between the clauses, but also creates a form of 'identification' between the speaker, or producer, of an utterance, and its processor, via *transverse discourse*:

"This [...] double form of ideological subjection [...] enables us to understand why the *preconstructed* as I have defined it involves simultaneously 'what everyone knows', i.e. the thought contents of the 'universal subject', support of identification, and what everyone, in a given 'situation', can see and hear, in the form of the evident facts of the 'situational context'."

(1982: 121).

In other words, the ideological 'effects' of an utterance result from a set of 'given' assumptions presumed to be held by the speaker and the hearer, creating an identification through meanings that are 'common' to both: "the possibility of thinking what he (sic) is thinking in his place" (1982: 76) These claims have wide implications for the role of the relative clause within a sentence, according to it a discursive function which at times seems to be in contradiction with what has generally been seen as its primary grammatical functions of modification and determination for restrictive relatives, and of descriptive gloss or coordination for non-restrictive relatives, as has been discussed above.

In the data, specific instances of determinative and explicative relative clauses are identified and examined, in order to analyse their discursive function and ideological effects in the light of Pêcheux's theory of evident truths and lateral reminders in discourse. These will be compared to other instances of determination and explication which may give rise to discursive effects which are equally ideological in nature as those discussed by Pêcheux in his account of relative clauses.⁽⁴⁾

IV.2 THE DATA

The texts which are examined in this study are articles taken from British newspapers dated 9th June 1987, two days before the general election of that year. All of them are concerned with the campaign 'issue' of that day, which was a rumour that military chiefs of staff would resign if a Labour government was elected.

IV.2.1 Sources and Descriptions

The eight newspapers sampled were:

| | |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| The Independent | The Daily Express |
| The Guardian | The Daily Mail |
| The Times | Today |
| The Sun | The Daily Mirror |

Out of these, seven contained coverage of the 'Chiefs of staff to resign' issue, the only one having no coverage of it was the Daily Mirror. The length of the articles varied from a maximum total of 35 sentences (Daily Express) down to 5 sentences (Today). These totals do not include headline text, and apply only to sentences directly relating to the target issue in articles where more than one issue is reported. The Daily Express article differed from the others in so far as it did not appear as a front page lead, but as a comment article. It has been included in the data as it essentially deals with the same topic as the other front page leads, but from an overtly partisan point of view, rather than as a report of the election campaign.

The table in Fig. IV.1 below shows the different papers sampled, the headline accompanying the text, the total number of sentences dealing with the target issue, and the total number of sentences containing a relative clause structure in those sentences.

Fig. IV.1

| Paper | Headline | Number of sentences | Number of relative clauses |
|-------------|--|---------------------|----------------------------|
| INDEPENDENT | Thatcher 'trembles' at Labour defence plan | 19 | 1 |
| GUARDIAN | Thatcher inflames defence debate | 10 | 0 |
| TIMES | Non-nuclear policy 'would hurt nation' | 19 | 2 |
| TODAY | I know what I'd do if Labour win, Maggie tells the top brass LAY DOWN YOUR ARMS | 5 | 0 |
| EXPRESS | Will you gamble with your family's safety? | 35 | 7 |
| SUN | General Maggie: I'd quit under Labour Ban bomb blast at Kinnock | 8 | 0 |
| MAIL | How could they work with Kinnock? | 16 | 1 |
| MIRROR | ----- | --- | --- |
| Total | | 112 | 11 |

IV.2.2 Sentences Containing Relative Clauses

The sentences from the data containing some form of relative clause are listed below:

IV.2.3 Instances of Determinative Relative Clauses

The Times

She said that if she were in their shoes she would resign rather than carry out orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and liberty.

However, it is understood that they are unanimous about the military advice they would give to an incoming Labour government

Daily Express

On Thursday therefore, we must not take the appalling risk of returning to power a Party which will not guarantee our national security.

Furthermore, there are at least six other countries which might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century - not all of them friendly towards us.

The Independent

Mr Kinnock retorted "Address that question to the 150 countries of the world who do not have, have never possessed and most of them will not accommodate nuclear weapons."

IV.2.4 Instances of Explicative Relative Clauses

Daily Express

So far, much of the defence debate has been conducted on a yah-boo level, which is an insult to the intelligence of the electorate.

Finally, Doctor Owen, who articulates the defence policy of the SDP-Liberal Alliance, is not some dithering amateur looking desperately for a policy.

The main danger of Labour's proposal is that it will gravely weaken the NATO alliance, without which we cannot hope to defend ourselves

However firm the SDP may be in its commitment to NATO and the British deterrent, the Liberal Party has a strong unilateralist, anti-American element, which has already committed a Party Congress to the abandonment of Polaris.

It is likely that there will be, before the end of the year, an agreement to remove Russian SS20 missiles and American Cruise and Pershing 2 from Europe (an agreement which has been made possible by the West's refusal to remove Cruise and Pershing unilaterally).

Daily Mail

The biggest dilemma of all if Labour wins would face the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse, who masterminded the Falklands campaign.

IV.2.5 Other Examples of Determination

All the sentences listed below can be paraphrased as determinative relative clauses:

The Independent

"It would be for the Chiefs of Staff to decide whether in their view - it would certainly be mine - that the damage done to NATO, to liberty - because Britain has always stood for liberty - the damage done to Britain's defences would be so deep, so fundamental that they could no longer be responsible for carrying the burden of defence or be in charge of our armed forces without a nuclear weapon of any kind when those armed forces faced an adversary who had." (quote from Margaret Thatcher).

"I could not be responsible for the men under me in those circumstances."

The Sun

... a nation stripped of defences by a labour government

... a ban-the-bomb labour government

Daily Express

Mr Kinnock is not a Soviet agent plotting the downfall of Britain

Today

It came in an interview on BBC's Panorama programme when Sir Robin Day asked what the armed forces chief should do - resign or obey a democratically elected government committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament

IV.2.6 Other Examples of Explication

All the sentences below could be paraphrased in such a way that they would contain an explicative relative clause:

The Independent

There was also a report last night that the chiefs of staff gave an assurance to George Younger, the Secretary of State for Defence, that they would not enter into the political debate over defence during the election campaign.

Neil Kinnock, the Labour leader, answered criticism over defence from a studio audience last night on the Granada 500 programme.

Interviewed on the BBC TV Panorama programme, Mrs Thatcher said:

...

Asked how conventional weapons could become a deterrent to nuclear weapons, Mr Kinnock retorted:

Daily Express

Furthermore, there are at least six other countries which might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century - not all of them friendly towards us.

The Guardian

Her comments - touching on the sensitive position of serving officers - are certain to inflame the already bitter defence controversy.

Daily Mail

If they went, then it is difficult to see how the top defence civil servant, Sir Clive Whitmore - a former Thatcher aide - could stay too.

IV.3 Data Analysis

The aim of this analysis is to examine any ideological effects produced by relative clauses in the texts, and to compare these with other possible sources of ideological effects in statements where there is no relative clause structure.

IV.3.1 Total Number of Relative Clauses

As can be seen from Figure IV.1, the papers with the least number of relative clause structures are The Sun and The Guardian, which out of a total of 11 and 9 sentences respectively, contained 0 relative clause

structures. The Daily Express article contained 7 sentences with a relative clause structure out of a total of 35. The Mirror did not cover the story at all. Out of a total of 115 sentences, then, 12 contained a relative clause structure - slightly less than 10% of the total number of sentences dealing with this story in the data examined. These figures give rise to certain questions about Pêcheux's claims regarding the function of the relative clause in discourse:

1. If The Sun and The Guardian contain 0 relative clauses, does this mean that they have no 'ideological effect' on the reader?
2. If The Daily Express contains proportionally the most relatives, does it then produce the most ideological effects?
3. If the proportion of sentences containing relative clauses represents less than 10% of the total, are the remaining 90% to be considered as producing no ideological effects?

The relative clause does not appear to be a major feature of the texts examined, so Pêcheux's theory that transverse discourse is the site within discourse where ideological effects are produced, leaves a problem for the analysis of texts where there is none, (e.g. articles from The Guardian and The Sun), as well as for the co-textual sentences constituting the major body of the data. The theory of the preconstructed and lateral reminders which are created in transverse discourse, while appearing enlightened and useful in many ways, nevertheless seems to be highly dependent on the role of the relative clause. This dependency, bearing in mind the three questions outlined above, would result in it being inadequate as an overall theory of the relationship between discourse and ideology due to the vast amount of data it cannot deal with. In the following section, the discursive

function of relative clauses as they appear in the data is analysed in order to see whether Pêcheux's claims with regard to their role are indeed justified.

IV.3.2 The Relative Clause in a Cleft Sentence

'Preconstructed' and 'lateral reminders' are not only embedded in determinative and explicative relative clauses, but are also present in other grammatical structures, for example the relative clause in a cleft sentence. The relative clause in a cleft-structure sentence has the same form as a determinative relative clause, but not the same determinative, or defining, function (see IV.1.2 above).

Pêcheux has stated that the proposition in a determinative relative clause expresses something that is 'always-already there' in the world,

i.e.:

*He who discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets died
in misery
(1982: 61)*

presupposes the 'evident truth' that:

Someone discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets.

Accordingly, it could be said that the sentence:

- (1) She said that she would resign rather than carry out orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and liberty

presupposes the 'evident truth' that:

[Some?/Any?] orders would deal a fundamental blow to NATO.

However, if the clause in a cleft structure sentence has the same *grammatical form* as a determinative relative clause, is it then the case that it contains a 'preconstructed proposition', even though it does not have a determining function?

An example of a cleft sentence structure occurs in the following extract from the data:

- (2) Britain is not just another country. We have never been just another country. It was Britain who stood when everybody else surrendered.
(from THE TIMES, report of a statement by Thatcher)

The relative clause contains the proposition:

Britain stood

This could be regarded as an 'evident truth' from, for example, the discursive domain of 'World War II history', in just the same way that Pêcheux's example above:

Someone discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets

is an evident truth from the domain of scientific history. We therefore have a preconstructed proposition in a non-determinative relative clause. However, given its co-text, this sentence seems also to derive its ideological motivation from its *contrastive* function as a cleft structure. In other words, to state that:

It was Britain who stood

implies that other countries who did not 'stand' are in some way less important or special, thus putting Britain into a more favourable light, as being better than the others. This information is not 'new' for readers of Times in the sense that it forms part of World War II history, but the contrast between Britain (who stood) and the others (who didn't) is foregrounded for the purposes of Thatcher's argument.

In addition to the contrastive function established by its internal cleft structure, the statement acts as a 'justificatory gloss' to the other two statements in (2) quoted above, reinforcing the comparison between Britain and 'just another country':

Britain is not just another country.
We have never been just another country.
It was Britain who stood when everybody else surrendered.

This comparison is reinforced by the highly patterned structure of this unit, i.e. the lexical and pronominal coreference of *Britain/we/Britain*, and by the collocation of *just another country/everybody else*.

The ideological effects of this sentence therefore seem to depend not only on the propositions contained within its clausal structure, but also on its intra-textual relationship to other sentences in the discourse, as well as on the implicatures it produces.

Through its relationship to co-text, can this 'evident truth' be said to have a different ideological effect from that of one contained in a determinative relative clause?

There are other sentences in the data which can be considered as containing a 'preconstructed' proposition, but which are not determinative relatives (although some can be paraphrased as such):

- (3) Mr Kinnock is not a Soviet agent plotting the downfall of Britain
 (Mr Kinnock is not a Soviet agent who is plotting the downfall of Britain)

presupposes:

Soviet agents plot the downfall of Britain

There are other discursive structures, such as headline texts, whose possible ideological effects cannot be accounted for if the theory of the ideological function of discourse is limited to inter-sentential relations between propositions of primary and relative clauses. This would be the case for the following headline text, which is from The Daily Express:

- (4) Will you gamble with your family's safety?

Here, no relative clause paraphrase is possible, but the statement nevertheless has the implicature:

Your family is safe.

which can also be considered as a 'preconstructed proposition' functioning as an 'evident truth' in this discourse.

It would therefore seem necessary to enlarge the field of what kind of sentences can be considered as productive of ideological effects, to include those other than relative clauses.

IV.3.3 - Causal Relationships Between Clauses

From evidence in the data, it also seems possible that determinative relatives, as well as explicatives, can produce a motivated cause/effect relationship between propositions.

IV.3.4 Cause and Effect in Explicative Relatives

Pêcheux states that a cause/effect relationship exists between propositions contained in a primary and explicative relative clause, using the example:

Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank, himself led his guards against the enemy position.

which he paraphrases as:

Napoleon himself led his guards against the enemy position because he recognised the danger to his right flank.

An explicative relative can, however, in Halliday's terms, also function as a descriptive gloss, or elaboration, on a nominal group in a main clause. An example of a sentence containing an explicative relative from the data is:

- (5) The biggest dilemma of all if Labour wins would face the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse, who masterminded the Falklands campaign.

Pêcheux's use of *because* in a paraphrase to show a cause/effect relationship is not obviously applicable to this sentence:

(?) The biggest dilemma will face Sir John Fieldhouse because he masterminded the Falklands campaign

It is not clear that the relationship between 'facing the dilemma' and 'masterminding the Falklands campaign' can be expressed in terms of cause and effect. This may have something to do with the fact that the subject of the main clause and the relative clause is not coreferential as in the Napoleon example, i.e.:

The biggest dilemma faces Sir John Fieldhouse.
Sir John Fieldhouse masterminded the Falklands campaign.

as opposed to:

Napoleon led his guards against the enemy position.
Napoleon recognised the danger to his right flank.

The function of the explicative relative here is more to provide a descriptive gloss on the role of Sir John Fieldhouse, than an expression of a causal relationship between two clauses in the sentence. The reference to the Falklands campaign is in itself a highly ideological element, but the effects of the sentence as a whole seem more to do with the background assumptions that are related to the Falklands campaign, and possible inferences that might be triggered by its occurrence in the sentence, and its relation to contextual elements, than an effect of 'transverse discourse' in an explicative relative clause.

The ideological effects of this sentence may then arise not from the occurrence of a relative clause, but from the presence of a descriptive gloss of Sir John Fieldhouse. In this sentence, the nominal group 'the Chief of the Defence Staff' is also qualified by two other appositional nominal groups, producing an extended nominal grouping:

the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir
John Fieldhouse

It could be argued that the 'lateral reminder' effect of the explicative relative would equally hold if the explicative relative was rewritten as another nominal group in apposition, i.e.:

The biggest dilemma of all if Labour wins would face the the Chief of the Defence Staff, masterminder of the Falklands campaign Sir John Fieldhouse.

The ideological effect would in this case not be produced by the 'lateral reminder' of a relative clause:

Sir John Fieldhouse, who masterminded the Falklands campaign but on the qualifier:

masterminder of the Falklands campaign.

How can the ideological 'effect' of this sentence be described, then, if it is not a product of transverse discourse? It seems that in either form, nominal group or relative clause, the effect of additionally glossing Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse as masterminder of the Falklands campaign is to lend weight to the importance and credibility of his role as Chief of Defence Staff. The effect of the meaning of this sentence in context depends on accessing further assumptions about Sir John Fieldhouse, which produce the implicature that he supports a *pro-nuclear* policy:

The biggest dilemma of all if Labour wins will face Sir John Fieldhouse.

If Labour wins, Labour will disarm unilaterally.

If Labour disarms unilaterally, SJF will face a dilemma

If SJF faces a dilemma, that is because he does not agree with Labour policy

SJF does not agree with unilateral disarmament

implicature:

SJF supports pro-nuclear defence policy.

Sir John Fieldhouse faces a dilemma therefore not because he is Admiral of the Fleet, and Chief of Defence Staff, and he masterminded the

Falklands campaign, but because he is against unilateral nuclear disarmament. It is through this implicature that the sentence can be considered to have an ideological 'effect', not through the explicative relative clause.

IV.3.5 Cause and Effect in a Determinative Relative Clause

A cause/effect relationship can sometimes exist (explicitly or implicitly) between the two propositions of a determinative relative and the primary clause, as in (6) and (7) below:

- (6) She said that if she were in their shoes she would resign rather than carry out orders which would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and liberty.

where the causal relationship can be paraphrased as:

She would resign *because* she had been ordered to deal a fundamental blow to NATO (et al).

or in:

- (7) We must not take the appalling risk of returning to power a party which will not guarantee our national security

where the causal relationship can be expressed as:

If we take risk X (cause), then we do not guarantee Y (effect)

Another example of a determinative relative clause in which a causal relationship is implied is:

- (8) "Address that question to the 150 countries of the world who do not have, have never possessed, and most of them will not accommodate nuclear weapons."

In (8), which is reported as direct speech, a causal relationship could arguably be said to exist between the imperative of the main clause:

Address that question to the 150 countries [...]

and the proposition of the relative:

because they don't have nuclear weapons

Here, the explicative relative clause could also be paraphrased to contain a pre-head modifier:

the other non-nuclear countries of the world

and the implicit causal relationship still holds, due to contextual and co-textual information about the nature of 'that question' and what the 150 countries might reply to it.

There are also examples of explicative relatives in the data in which ideologically motivated causality is more difficult to establish, eg:

- (9) Dr Owen, who articulates the defence policy of the SDP-Liberal Alliance, is not some dithering amateur looking desperately for a policy.

where processing the explicative relative as being in a causal relation to the primary clause would depend on whether one considered that being the articulator of the SDP-Liberal Alliance was sufficient condition not to be a dithering amateur!

or:

- (10) The main danger of Labour's proposal is that it will weaken the NATO alliance without which we cannot hope to defend ourselves.

In (10), the explicative relative pronoun has the same function as a coordinator and when this is the case, the cause/effect relation disappears:

The main danger of Labour's proposal is that it will weaken the NATO alliance, and we cannot hope to defend ourselves without it.

In:

- (11) The Liberal party has a strong unilateralist element, which has already committed a Party congress to the abandonment of Polaris

the causal relation is inversed. The primary clause contains the causal element, and the explicative relative contains the effect, i.e:

A Party congress has been committed to the abandonment of Polaris because the Liberal party has a strong unilateralist element.

and in:

(12) So far, much of the defence debate has been conducted on a yah-boo level, which is an insult to the intelligence of the electorate

it is again not clear that a causal relationship exists. The relative pronoun *which* refers to the segment:

conducting the campaign on a yah-boo level

and has a coordinative function, enabling the statement to be paraphrased as:

Much of the defence debate has been conducted on a yah-boo level, *and* this is an insult to the electorate.

Finally, a motivated cause/effect relationship also holds within other structures than the explicative relative, such as the parenthetical, non-finite clauses in (13), where for example:

(13) Her comments - touching on the sensitive position of serving officers - are certain to inflame the already bitter defence controversy

can be processed as:

Her comments will inflame the defence controversy *because* they touch on the sensitive position of serving officers

and in the parenthetical noun phrase below:

(14) If they went, then it is difficult to see how the top defence civil servant, Sir Clive Whitmore - a former Thatcher aide - could stay too.

In conclusion to this section, three main points seem to emerge from the analysis so far. These are as follows:

1. Although Pêcheux's claim that explicative relative clauses have an implicit, ideologically motivated cause/effect relationship with primary

clauses, is in some cases borne out, this is not necessarily due to the explicative relative clause structure itself.

2. Determinative relatives may also have either an implicit or explicit causal relationship with a main clause

3. Explicative relatives may have none at all, specifically when the relative pronoun acts as a coordinator.

Therefore, an ideologically motivated, implicit causal relationship can be expressed by other structures in a clause, as has been demonstrated above, such as pre-head modifiers, and verb and noun phrases contained in a parenthetical structure.

IV.4 Assigning Discursive Domains to Propositions

One key feature of Pêcheux's theory of transverse discourse is that in relative clauses, discourses from other discursive domains are able to intersect with the discursive domain of the intra-discourse, or the syntagmatic chain of the utterance, to produce ideological effects through preconstructed propositions and lateral reminders.

In statements from the data, this attribution of a discursive domain to propositions in empirical data is more problematic than in Pêcheux's example:

He who first discovered the elliptical orbit of the planets died in misery.

where he can state fairly unequivocally that the main-clause proposition concerns 'the domain of biographical detail', and the proposition expressed by the relative clause originates in 'the domain of scientific history'. The issue is not so clear-cut in the data being examined in this study, as it is not always possible to show that a

distinct discursive domain 'x' intersects with discursive domain 'y' to produce transverse discourse.

In:

- (15) She said that if she were in their shoes she would resign rather than carry out orders which would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, to Britain's defences and liberty

the propositions expressed in the sentence are quite complex. Broken down into its constituent parts, the sentence can be represented as:

- P₁ She said P₁₁
 P₁₁ If she was in their shoes, she would resign rather than carry out orders
 P₁₁₁ That would deal a fundamental blow to NATO et al.

There are two problems here. Firstly, do the different elements of this sentence all belong to different discursive domains, or are they part of the same one? Secondly, assigning a discursive domain is further complicated by the fact that we are dealing with reported speech:

She said that (P₁₁)

and with a hypothetical state of affairs:

If she were in their shoes she would resign

In attempting to assign a discursive domain to the propositions of this clause complex, the following possibilities could be considered:

- Personal assertion (She said that [...])
 Personal choice (do X rather than Y)
 Military ethics (resign or carry out orders)
 Advice (if she were in their shoes)

There may be others, but I would argue that there is no single category that this sentence can be slotted into as is the case for Pécheux's example concerning Kepler:

Someone died in misery

Similarly, for the 'preconstructed' proposition of the determinative relative clause:

[some] orders would deal a blow to NATO etc.

the discursive domain could possibly be attributed to the discourse of:

defence
 Historical possibility
 Possible dangers to NATO et al
 International military alliance

or to something else entirely. In this sentence, then, it seems no longer possible to claim as Pêcheux does, that a distinct discursive domain 'x' intersects with discursive domain 'y' from interdiscourse via the embedding of a relative clause into the main proposition of a sentence.

The same problem arises with:

(16) However, it is understood that they are unanimous about the military advice they would give to an incoming Labour government.

as specifying a discursive domain for the propositions contained in this sentence would again be an arbitrary matter. Furthermore, in (16), the domain of discourse of the 'preconstructed' interdiscursive proposition does not seem to differ in any significant way from the domain of the intradiscursive proposition except than to specify the recipient of the advice, as follows:

The heads of the three armed forces are unanimous about the military advice.

presupposes:

Heads of armed forces advise X.

and the relative clause:

They would give [military advice] to an incoming Labour government.

presupposes:

Heads of armed forces advise (Labour?) governments.

Although it could be argued here that as the proposition of the relative clause presupposes an 'evident truth', it can be categorised as a 'preconstructed' proposition, it is more difficult to argue that it originates in a different discursive domain from that of the main clause.

As I hope to have demonstrated in these examples, it seems that Pêcheux's neat categories of 'biographical detail' and 'scientific history' for his de-contextualised example prove difficult to duplicate or extend when dealing with empirical text. This implies that his theory that transverse discourse, or discourse from elsewhere, serves to produce ideological effects by embedding preconstructed propositions into sentences, is not necessarily borne out when the function of relative clauses in discourse is examined closely.

I would argue that in attempting to define the discursive cause of ideological effects, the assignment of a specific discursive domain to a proposition may in fact be less useful than attending to the function of that proposition within the sentence, in relation to the co-text, and in terms of the inferences it produces. When these levels of meaning are taken into account, the ideological effects of a sentence, in terms of what sort of background assumptions are accessed, and what sort of implicatures are derived through processing, can be described more explicitly. This claim will be developed more fully in section IV.7 below.

IV.5 Problems of Tense and Modality

Related to this issue, and possibly the root of the problem, is the issue of tense and modality. Pécheux's examples are all in the past tense. Once conditional tenses, reported speech, and various other discursive devices which occur in the data are taken into consideration, assigning a discursive domain to a proposition becomes more problematic. So does working out which 'preconstructed' propositions may be present in a sentence. Pécheux's examples are sentences about past events in the world. In the data examined here, we are dealing with the realm of hypothesis and possibility, which is represented by the use of conditional and modal structures in the text. In (15), if a past tense is substituted for the modal *would*, and the conditional clause omitted, it is then easier to specify a discursive domain for the propositions in the statement:

- i. She resigned rather than carry out orders.
- ii The orders dealt a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain and liberty.

The discursive domain of (i) could be attributed to biographical detail, and (ii) perhaps to international military history. As it stands in the data, however, (15) is the report of a statement that Thatcher made concerning three hypothetical states of affairs:

- a. Thatcher being a military chief of staff
- b. Thatcher being given orders to disarm unilaterally
- c. Disarming unilaterally dealing a fundamental blow to NATO etc.

Rather than attempting to assign a discursive domain of 'possibility' to these propositions, it may be more fruitful to examine how these possibilities are encoded in the sentence. The first two are explicitly marked in the discourse by the conditional clause with *if*:

She said that *if she were in their shoes* she would resign rather than carry out orders

The third however is not marked as hypothetical, the verb phrase *would deal* is marked for certainty rather than possibility (substituting an epistemic modal *might* or *could* produces a different meaning). As a result, a hypothetical proposition is embedded into the discourse as a certainty - or, what we know about the world:

[Some] orders would deal a fundamental blow to NATO etc.

IV.6 Determining 'Preconstructed' Propositions in Relative Clauses

In the above example, the 'evident truth' contained in the determinative relative clause is fairly easy to pin down. This is not always the case, as will be seen in the data below.

Taking the statement:

(16) It is understood that they are unanimous about the military advice they would give to an incoming Labour government

the propositional content of the relative clause is conditional and can be represented as:

If : a Labour government was elected
Then: the Chiefs of Staff would give it X advice.

Because of the conditional nature of this sentence, can it be said to represent something that is 'always-already there' in the form of a preconstructed proposition? And if so, what form would it take? This sentence has several presuppositions, but it is possible to attribute a preconstructed status to any one of them:

- i Someone advises an incoming Labour government
- ii Chiefs of Staff advise Labour governments
- iii Governments receive military advice

- iv Labour governments receive military advice
- v A particular government receives military advice

None of these would account for an important element in the processing of this sentence, i.e. the *nature* of the advice they would give. In (16), it is the fact that *they are unanimous about the advice* that is foregrounded in the statement:

It is understood that X

and not what the advice actually is. The fact that 'the advice' occurs as a definite noun phrase also tends to designate that advice as 'given information'⁴ to the processor (cf. Brown & Yule, 1983: 168). I would argue that the 'evident truth' or 'common sense assumption' that is accessed in processing (16), which is taken as 'given', is the assumption that:

Military Chiefs of Staff would advise an incoming labour government not to disarm unilaterally

and the statement that they are *unanimous* about this implies that:

All Chiefs of Staff are pro-nuclear defence.

Thus, when the nature of the advice is spelled out in the following statement in the text, it is nevertheless not the *theme*, i.e. the new information of that statement, but 'given' information: what the processor already knows. The new information is that they will *exercise their right to see Mr Kinnock*:

(17) Senior Whitehall sources said that they would exercise their right to see Mr Kinnock, if he was Prime Minister, to inform him of their reservations about the adoption of a non-nuclear defence strategy.

There is another statement which poses a problem for assigning a 'preconstructed' proposition to the relative clause. In:

(18) Furthermore, there are at least six other countries which might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century - not all of them friendly towards us.

the information contained in the determinative relative is presented as 'new' information (signalled by the discourse marker furthermore, rather than information that is given, i.e. 'always-already there'). The statement could be paraphrased as:

At least six other countries might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century

and still have exactly the same propositional content, and therefore the same presuppositions, as (18), i.e.:

There are six other countries (six other countries exist?)
Six other countries might have nuclear weapons before the end of the century.

Any ideological effect that is derived from this sentence seems not to be produced by the proposition of the relative clause, but by its relationship to the following parenthetical clause:

not all of them friendly towards us

The juxtaposition of these two clauses mobilises a set of inter-related assumptions which lead to the implicature:

We need nuclear weapons.

These assumptions are:

Countries that are unfriendly towards us might attack us.
Countries that attack us might use nuclear weapons.
We have no nuclear weapons
We are unable to defend ourselves.
We are invaded/conquered/ruled by our enemies.
If we don't want to be invaded, we need nuclear weapons

In statement (19), there is a contrasting position:

(19) There are 150 countries of the world who do not have, have never possessed and most of them will not accommodate nuclear weapons.

Here, an alternative set of assumptions is mobilised, which is in contrast to the set suggested above:

150 countries don't have nuclear weapons
These countries are still able to defend themselves
These countries are not invaded by their enemies
We do not need nuclear weapons

Although these statements are closely related in terms of their propositional content, i.e.:

X number of countries do not have nuclear weapons
X number of countries might have nuclear weapons before long

they give rise to conflicting sets of implicatures. These implicatures can only be derived if the statement is processed in relation to the rest of the text, i.e: (a) the relationship of the proposition to others in the sentence; and (b) the relationship of the sentence to other sentences in the text.

These inter-textual relationships between sentences seem to be equally significant to the ideological functioning of discourse as the intra-sentential relationships between propositions. The context and co-text of a sentence such as (18) above, affect the way it will be processed, and contribute to the ideological effect produced by that sentence.

If we consider ideological effects to be the range of specific inferences made in the process of interpretation that rely on accessing commonsense background assumptions, then the relationship of a statement to its co-text and context seems equally crucial to the production of ideological meaning as the 'evident truths' that Pêcheux claims are represented by the preconstructed propositions in determinative relative clauses.

IV.7 Co-text and Extra-Clausal Reference.

In Pêcheux's discussion of the relationship between language and ideology, the examples he uses are frequently decontextualised, and as has been suggested above, his theories concerning the 'discursive process' are limited to the way that propositions are embedded in sentences, rather than examining the extended inter-sentential relationships that exist within texts.

These relationships are often signalled by extra-clausal reference - propositions within clauses are often referentially incomplete and the attribution of 'meaning' depends on co-textual and contextual elements. This extra-clausal reference can depend not only, and most obviously, on pronominal and lexical co-reference within a text, but also on sets of assumptions that have to be accessed in order to process a text fully. These assumptions may form part of a processor's 'background knowledge', or may be derived from other sentences in the text, i.e. they depend on co-textual and contextual relations, rather than just intra-clausal relations within a sentence.

If we observe Pêcheux's terminology, the sentence:

- (18) She said that if she were in their shoes she would resign rather than carry out orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and liberty

can be divided into two different types of proposition: intra-discursive and interdiscursive. An intradiscursive proposition is that contained in the main clause of an utterance, and in (18) this takes the form of a conditional, introduced by a marker for reported speech:

- P1 [She said that] if she were in their shoes she would resign rather than carry out orders.

The interdiscursive, or 'preconstructed' proposition will be that contained in the relative clause, here: :

P11 Orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO,
Britain's defences and liberty

If the function of a determinative relative clause is taken to be one of qualification, (see the definition in IV.1.1 above), then it can be predicted that (P11) will supply qualifying information about the noun phrase it 'determines', i.e. it will answer the question 'which orders?'

This seems partly to be the case:

Orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO et al

However, in this statement, *orders* has no determiner, and it does not necessarily refer outside the clause to any specific orders. This lack of determiner for *orders* in (18) leads to a problem for processing the proposition in (P11), because it is not made explicit in the text exactly which orders are being referred to. There may be a whole range of orders that would 'deal a fundamental blow to NATO et al'. In order to get to the 'evident truth' contained in the interdiscursive proposition (P11), more work still has to be done through pragmatic inferencing. There is much missing semantically in assignment of meaning to *orders*, due, as is suggested above, to the lack of determination, which creates a 'gap' in meaning to be filled by the text processor, who has to decide which 'orders' are meant here. There are two main possibilities:

Any (all) orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and liberty.

or:

Some (specific) orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and liberty.

In the latter case, further information about what these orders actually are can only be inferred from the co-text and context of the sentence, and not from its constituent propositions. The preceding sentence in the data is:

(20) The Prime Minister last night entered the controversy over how the Chiefs of Staff at the Ministry of Defence should respond to an incoming Labour government committed to a unilateralist defence policy.

A series of background 'bridging' assumptions are necessary in order to answer the question 'which orders?', which could include:

- A Labour government committed to a unilateralist defence policy will remove nuclear weapons from Britain.
- The military are responsible for the logistics of installing and removing nuclear weapons
- To remove nuclear weapons, an incoming Labour government would order the Military Chiefs of Staff to dismantle them.

From this it can be inferred that 'orders' in (18) refers to orders to remove nuclear weapons.

It thus seems possible to make three claims regarding this data:

1. That the 'evident truth' in this determinative relative clause is not to be found in the proposition:

[Some/all] orders would deal a fundamental blow to NATO et al.

which still leaves *orders* to a large extent unspecified.

2. That an 'evident truth' can be found in the inferred proposition:

Orders to remove nuclear weapons from Britain would deal a fundamental blow to NATO et al.

3. That this can only be derived from access to the co-text and context, not from the propositional content of the clause itself.

It could be argued further that one ideological 'effect' of this statement is a result of the way in which it implicates, through its

co-textual relations, or poses as 'given' without overtly asserting it, the assumption that:

A Labour government would deal a fundamental blow to NATO, to Britain's defences, and liberty.

These relations are made explicit in figure IV.11 below, which shows the parallel structuring of the two statements through pronominal and phrasal coreference:

Fig. IV.11

- | | | | |
|------|--|--|--------------|
| i) | The Prime Minister last night entered the controversy | She | said that |
| ii) | over how the Chiefs of Staff at the MoD should respond | if she were in their shoes she | would resign |
| iii) | to an incoming Labour government committed to | rather than carry out orders that would deal | |
| iv) | a unilateral nuclear defence policy | a fundamental blow to NATO, Britain's defences and | liberty |

Here, 'she' in (19) refers anaphorically to 'the Prime Minister' in (20), and 'their' refers anaphorically to 'the Chiefs of Staff'. There is phrasal coreference between 'entered the controversy' and 'said that', and between 'respond' and 'resign'. This parallelism in the form of the ordering of co-referential elements in the clauses creates an implicit parallel between the last two elements of the sentence, i.e.:

an incoming Labour government committed to a unilateralist defence policy

and

orders that would deal a fundamental blow to NATO Britain's defences and liberty

It could be argued that these inter-textual relations between sentences function to produce ideological effects in processing this discourse, just as much as the embedding of a 'preconstructed' proposition into the syntagmatic chain of relations within a sentence.

IV.8 Conclusions

From this exploration of the 'preconstructed' nature of the proposition contained in a determinative relative clause, two main observations can be made regarding Pécheux's claims about the discursive function of this structure.

Firstly, although it does seem to be the case that the 'defining', or qualifying function of a relative clause can in some cases lead to the embedding of 'evident truths', (what Pécheux refers to as 'knowledge from elsewhere', or the 'always-already there'), into the discursive process, these 'evident truths' are not encoded semantically in the propositional content of the clause, but have to be worked out through inferencing processes which depend on access to co-text, context and background assumptions for any given sentence.

Secondly, it seems that a determinative relative clause can act as a form of trigger for certain inferences, which are produced by accessing assumptions already available from the co-text and/or from background knowledge as the text is processed and interpreted. If these background assumptions and co-text are not available, a different interpretation of any statement taken in isolation may ensue. In other words, in the case of the particular example discussed above, without access to the co-text and the relations of parallelism between two statements, to the referents of 'she' and 'their', and to background knowledge from which bridging assumptions can be made, the interpretative process for statement (19) would not necessarily take place.

More generally, the implications arising from Pécheux's claim about the role of relative clauses in producing ideological effects in discourse,

do not seem to hold in the light of an analysis of naturally occurring data. If it is the case that transverse discourse, or the embedding of preconstructed propositions into sentences or utterances, is created only through the mechanism of relative clause structures, then there is a great deal of discourse which would have to be considered as non-productive of ideological effects. However, as has been argued in this study, ideological discursive effects do seem to be produced by sentences other than those containing a relative clause, and therefore I would suggest that the notion of transverse discourse is better approached through a different level of language, i.e. that of pragmatic inferencing in interpretative processes, rather than through syntactic relations between clauses, as Pécheux has proposed. The preconstructed knowledge that Pécheux sees as 'embedded' in transverse discourse may well be available in basic forms of commonsense background knowledge, which are mobilised as discourse is processed on a pragmatic, rather than a syntactic, level of meaning.

In the following case study, the nature of this commonsense background knowledge is examined more closely, again with specific reference to the domain of defence discourse. Different forms of background knowledge structures are discussed in the light of current theories of pragmatic inferencing processes, and an attempt is made to clarify their role, which I have not yet explicitly defined, in the production of ideological meanings in discourse.

C H A P T E R V

CASE STUDY 3: STRUCTURES OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE - : IDEOLOGICAL REPRESENTATION AND METAPHOR

V.0 Introduction and Objectives

In the first two studies, it has been argued that a full account of meaning in discourse, including ideological meaning, can not be given without considering the role of contextual features and of background knowledge in communication. The aim of this case study is to investigate further the claim that ideological effects in discourse are created pragmatically by the way sentences or utterances relate to the context in which they are produced, and specifically, by the way sentences or utterances interact with assumptions from background knowledge to produce ideological meanings through processes of inferencing.

This approach enables us to move from syntactic or semantic accounts of ideology as representation, such as those that have been discussed in the preceding studies of semantic structure and clausal relations, towards a more pragmatic analysis of naturally occurring discourse and the ideological meanings it produces on an inferential level of interpretation. In this way, accounts of ideological effects in discourse can be extended to include consideration of contextualised use of language, rather than being limited to just syntax, as in Pêcheux's theory of the role of the relative clause, or semantic structure, as in Chilton's account of the role of *deter*.

This study focuses on one particular form of ideological inferencing: the way in which the use of metaphor in discourse functions as a

trigger mechanism for mobilising commonsense background knowledge in interpretative processes.

V.1 Inferencing Processes, Frames and Scripts

The importance of metaphor in discursive representation has already been discussed by Chilton, 1985, and Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1988.

Chilton (1985) has outlined a basic theory of the function of frames⁶ in producing metaphoric representations in the context of the abstract notion of deterrence, and relates the concept of metaphorical structuring to a theory of frames, suggesting that in the metaphoric process "institutionalised frames of belief are triggered which are then matched", (1985: 118). In the context of defence, this is translated by the 'playground' metaphor which is frequently used to talk about international cold war relations. One of the aims of the present study will be to examine further the systems of background knowledge which are drawn upon in the specific domain of defence discourse.

Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1988) extend this theory to include the notion of scripts⁷, or 'stereotypical event sequences', and claim that the 'vitality' of certain metaphors and scripts in media discourse depend upon their being consonant with a particular field of reference, yet able to produce a 'metaphorical chain', i.e. able to be reworked in different terms in different scripts, and on their being capable of "maximally organising diverse aspects of the issue and be transferable from one aspect to another", (1988: 23).

The notion that text and talk are processed by drawing on 'frames' and 'scripts' stored in background knowledge provides a useful basis for an

account of the ideological meanings produced in discourse for two main reasons.

Firstly, because frames and scripts provide a framework for organising background knowledge, of which commonsense assumptions form a part, a framework which enables commonsense background assumptions to be integrated into the inferencing systems which underlie the processing of text and talk⁽¹⁾. Secondly, as a result of this organisational framework, theories of inferencing systems enable us to deal with aspects of language processing through the networks of assumptions that hearers and readers bring to texts in the interpretative process, rather than concentrating on the purely representational aspects of language, such as have been examined above in the discussion of Pêcheux's theory of transverse discourse and ideological 'effects', which is concerned with the structural and semantic level of discourse production.

The importance of the role of 'mutual knowledge' has been discussed briefly by Downes (1984: 299), with particular reference to investigations by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities in 1956. Basing his discussion on Minsky's theory of frames, (cf. Minsky 1975), Downes shows how background knowledge forms an inferential network, according to which statements take on meanings which are consistent with a 'web of belief' or 'theory' about the 'cold war' made up of axiomatic, self-evidently true propositions; in this case that the US is at war with Moscow, that communists must obey Moscow, and that American communists are therefore traitors.

V.2 Metaphor and Background Knowledge Frames

Evidence of the way in which scripts are mobilised in discourse is the glossing which occurs when a statement is relayed through talk and text in television and press reports (cf. Garton, Montgomery & Tolson, 1988), with regard to the statement made by Neil Kinnock that:

In those circumstances, the choice is again posed - and this is the classical choice - of either exterminating everything that you stand for and, I'll use the phrase "the flower of your youth", or using resources that you've got to make any occupation totally untenable, untenable."

One problem which arises from their account is determining how exactly the scripts are linked to the inferencing processes which result in a particular statement being glossed in a form that was probably very different from the original speaker's intended meaning. Garton, Montgomery & Tolson propose several scripts which, they suggest, form part of background knowledge 'frames', and which were characterised in the subsequent glossings of the original statement relayed in press and television news reports (cf. II.5.1.1 above). However, it is still not clear whether these scripts just represent certain kinds of background knowledge structures, or whether they do in fact form a regulatory mechanism for the production of meanings in defence discourse.

To investigate this hypothesis further, it would be necessary to examine how scripts may be mobilised in processing statements, whether they are triggered by a lexical 'prompt', or by the propositional content of a statement. If lexical items call up associated scripts from memory in the form of "sedimented forms of 'commonsense'" (Garton, Montgomery & Tolson, 1988: 16), then the propositional content of a statement would not appear to be particularly relevant to the way that

statement is processed, still less a clausal inter-relationship such as that of 'transverse discourse' proposed by Pêcheux.

Further, if it is the case that scripts are triggered by lexical items, then we must also examine why one particular item gains prominence over others in the same statement, which seems to be the case in the data examined by Garton Montgomery & Tolson.

One possible approach to this problem is to introduce the theory of *relevance*, (Sperber and Wilson, 1986a, 1986b), in order to examine how the structures which organise commonsense assumptions in background knowledge are made contextually relevant through the discursive use of metaphor. In the following section, a brief outline of the principle of relevance is given, and of the claims it makes which are of interest for the purposes of this study.

V.3 Inferencing and 'Contextual Assumptions': a Role for Relevance Theory?

Relevance theory has its origins in the work of Grice on hypothesis confirmation, the co-operative principle and maxims of conversation (Grice: 1975), but states that the principle that lies behind human communication and cognition is the principle of *relevance*, (Sperber & Wilson, 1986b: 9). The interpretation of utterances is highly context dependent, and communication is achieved not by coding and decoding messages, but by making inferences about the communicator's intentions (1986b: 6). Information is relevant to a processor if it interacts with what he/she already assumes about the world to produce certain contextual effects. These contextual effects are produced by the new information provided by the communicator combining with the context to

give contextual implications. These in turn either strengthen existing assumptions held by the processor about the world, or contradict and eliminate them.

In order to process an utterance, hearers need access to sets of contextual assumptions which speakers 'expect' them to use while processing the explicit propositional content of an utterance. (These 'expectations' may well prove to be the site of possible ideological interference in the way utterances are processed, but for the purposes of relevance theory they are 'given variables' in an interpretative process).

Contextual assumptions are derived either from memory or from the environment in which the utterance is produced. The contextual implications that hearers are expected to recover in processing the explicit propositional content of the utterance are derived by deductive inference from the propositional content and from the context, and the more salient the implicature, the stronger it is (1986b: 27).

When communication is successful:

"the audience interprets the evidence [provided by the communicator] on the intended lines. Failures in communication result from misinterpretation of the evidence provided. Indeterminacy results from the fact that a single utterance may provide evidence for a range of related hypotheses, all similar enough to the thoughts the communicator wanted to convey" (1986a: 6).

There is then, a certain amount of risk involved in interpretation. Evidence can be misinterpreted, even when all the 'right' inferencing procedures are applied. When this happens, the hearer can deduce a 'best' hypothesis, but it may not be the one intended by the communicator. As with the 'expectations' noted above, I would suggest

that notions of 'right' inferencing procedures and 'best' hypotheses are open to ideological motivation.

V.3.1 Problems for the data: the 'Unco-operative Principle'

One problem with relevance as a theory of communication is that when it is applied to a wide range of communicative activities, such as the talk produced in the data examined here, the underlying 'intuitive' notion of the 'co-operative principle' in talk is open to question. For the purpose of this study, relevance theory presents similar disadvantages to other theories of communication in that it does not deal with naturally occurring spoken data but with constructed examples, albeit contextually constructed, of instances of one-to-one communication. In talk, particularly in conflictual discussion and exchanges, there does not seem to be the same type of communicative and informative intentions that Sperber & Wilson say characterise any act of ostensive-inferential communication i.e. "the realisation that a trustworthy communicator intends to make you believe something is an excellent reason for believing it." (1986: 163). The context in which Kinnock's utterance above was produced, and the ways in which it was interpreted, was not necessarily one in which 'co-operation' between participants, i.e. where speakers and hearers are aiming for maximum relevance *in good faith*, is a salient feature.

In much of the talk and text that is produced in a media context, particularly during election campaigns, this underlying cooperation is not foregrounded as the communicative event tends to be confrontational. It may be the case that this difference between underlying principles of one-to-one 'conversation' and those of the data used for this study would also be evident in other forms of

confrontational communication (courtroom disputes, disruptive classroom communication, police interrogation, etc.) where the communicative aim is not to derive the maximum contextual effects from a minimal processing effort, but rather to concentrate on deriving contextual implicatures from utterances which are not necessarily linked to what the communicator intended to convey. If a speaker's 'aim' is to "make the contextual effects of their utterances easy to recover" (1986a: 12), then in some forms of talk it would seem that a hearer's 'aim' is specifically not to recover these 'easily recovered' contextual effects, but other contextual effects of a statement that may be outside the speaker's control. If certain words can be selected in processing because they match a generalised concept stored in memory, (cf. Schank & Burstein, 1985), then this explains how the Conservative Central Office Monitoring Unit was able to pick up on Kinnock's utterance (see II.5.1.1 above) and through contrived inferencing processes accessing the 'occupation' script, arrive at an interpretation that was probably not intended at the time the utterance was made.

V.3.2 Relevance Theory and Metaphor

Despite these reservations about the claims of relevance theory in relation to the type of talk event from which the data to be analysed is taken⁽¹⁰⁾, it nevertheless seems justifiable to ask whether there is any way that one aspect of the theory can help to account for the way in which Kinnock's utterance was processed and subsequently glossed, by providing a framework for explicating the inferencing processes involved. Relevance may provide a way of accounting for a mechanism whereby certain more prominent scripts may be triggered in the

interpretative process, and also for a possible theory of constraints according to which particular frames or scripts are accessed.

This mechanism seems to be strongly linked to the function of metaphor in discourse; indeed, the role of metaphor seems to be a fundamental one in the way we structure and conceptualise experience in general. Lakoff and Johnson state that metaphors "allow us [...] to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another" (1980: 61), and that these concepts are often culturally specific. In a discussion of the metaphor 'time is money', they note that:

"In our culture time is money in many ways: telephone message units, hourly wages, hotel room rates, yearly budgets, interest on loans, and paying your debt to society by 'serving time'. These practices are relatively new in the history of the human race, and by no means do they exist in all cultures."

Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 8).

This metaphorical concept of 'time as money' structures the way we think and talk about time as 'a valuable commodity': to be saved, given, wasted etc., and as a limited resource: to be used, run out of, have enough of etc. Thus, "metaphorical entailments can characterise a coherent system of metaphorical concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical expressions for those concepts" (1980: 9).

Chilton relates this notion of metaphorical structuring to a theory of 'frames', suggesting that in the metaphoric process "institutionalised frames of belief are triggered which are then matched" (1995: 118). In the context of defence, this is translated by the 'playground' metaphor which is frequently used to talk about international cold war relations. Most interestingly for the purposes of this analysis, metaphorical structuring of concepts are not static, but give rise to inferences, in other words they have:

"the ability [...] to induce inferences in one domain on the basis of more complete or more familiar knowledge or belief in a more basic domain."
(Chilton: 1985: 122)

Sperber & Wilson state that metaphoric representations in utterances give rise to a substantial element of indeterminacy in the process of interpretation, i.e. they produce "indefinite arrays of weak implicatures". (1986b: 27). One way of determining these 'weak implicatures' may well be to relate them to different 'frames' or 'scripts' etc. of background knowledge structures. Thus when Kinnock uses the phrase:

exterminating the flower of your youth

a particular 'frame' or 'script', or in relevance terms, a set of 'contextual assumptions', are made available to the processor. More explicitly, in triggering a 'conventional war frame' by the use of the '*flower of your youth*' metaphor, the most relevant of possible representations of the phrase relates to the frame of conventional war, of World War I, where young men die in battle fields.

Given the fact that the search for relevance is to a large extent governed by the contextual assumptions held by a processor about the world, and that processors aim for maximum contextual effects/minimal effort, then it could be claimed that the use of this phrase gives rise to a series of inferences that the speaker did not necessarily intend to produce, but were alternative possible interpretations triggered by the metaphor (not by the totality of the propositions contained in the utterance).

The risk involved in confrontational talk of non-intended interpretations of the evidence supplied is predictably very much

higher than in other forms of talk. It seems likely that the speaker's intention was to invoke the consequences of a 'nuclear' war by a comparison of the effects of nuclear and conventional war:

either you *exterminate* everything you stand for (nuclear frame)
or you use *all the resources you have* to make any occupation untenable (conventional frame)

Instead, the references to conventional war, either from World War I, ('the flower of your youth'), or from World War II (the 'occupation' script), enabled other contexts for interpretation to be accessed, such as the 'Dad's Army' characters, resistance movements, the Mujahedin, and so on, in the 'uncooperative' processing of this statement by the Conservative Media Monitoring Unit⁽¹¹⁾.

However, Sperber & Wilson argue that metaphors tend to give rise to a series of weak implicatures, not strong ones, whereas the inferential process described above relies on the prominence of a metaphor and the very strong 'relevant' implicatures that are derived from it, given a certain context and talk environment. Nevertheless, the risk involved in confrontational talk of non-intended interpretations of the evidence supplied is predictably very much higher than in other forms of talk. I would claim therefore that in specific contexts, particularly where commonsense background assumptions are at stake in processing talk and text, metaphoric representation can, on the contrary, involve the accessing of existing commonsense assumptions about the world which override utterance meaning in terms of propositional content, which as a result becomes less prominent in the interpretative process. In the case of Kinnock's utterance, his use of a metaphoric representation may have acted as a trigger for accessing commonsense assumptions

which are closely associated with particular discursive fields (in this instance, conventional war) and which was picked up on in an uncooperative processing of the statement.

V.3.3 Contexts for Processing: Metaphoric currency

As noted above, limitations on the number of frames and scripts, or 'encyclopaedic extensions', that are mobilised by any given statement have to occur during the interpretative process, otherwise the search for meaning would become totally unrestrained and probably inconclusive:

"The assumption that [...] encyclopaedic extensions are automatically made for every concept and in every case leads to absurdities - context is not uniquely determined knowledge" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 141)

Sperber and Wilson state that a context that is used for processing new assumptions expressed by a statement consists of a subset of the individual hearer's old assumptions, with which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects, and that "context formation is open to choices and revisions throughout the comprehension process" (1986: 137). The selection of a particular context is governed by the search for relevance, and the less accessible a context, the greater the effort involved in accessing it. Conversely, the more accessible a context, the less effort will be involved in accessing it and the more relevant it will be. (1986: 142). These claims concerning the selection of contexts, and the accessibility of the background assumptions which determine their relevance, seem to support the argument that particular metaphoric representations trigger a network of related assumptions which are easily accessible from commonsense background knowledge. These

metaphors then become established as the acceptable way of talking about issues in defence discourse, and become correspondingly more 'relevant' than other contextual assumptions that might be accessed in processing statements made within those domains.

In more concrete terms, the 'World War I' script and the 'Occupation' script spelled out by Garton, Montgomery and Tolson are more accessible than an 'extermination' script, possibly because the first two form part of historical experience, whereas the 'nuclear extermination' script still contains an element of science fiction - the imaginable but not the historically experienced.

V.3.4 Ideological Function of Metaphor in Discourse

In the discussion above I have argued that Relevance theory provides a possible explication of the way that structures of background knowledge, (i.e. frames, scripts etc.) are triggered by metaphors and become preferred contexts for processing and interpreting discourse.

In cases such as the one discussed by Garton, Montgomery & Tolson, these contexts do not necessarily correspond to the expectations of the speaker, and the range of interpretations of a statement seems to depend on the assumptions a processor chooses to access rather than those the speaker expects him/her to access.

One of Kinnock's main problems may have been that for this particular problem of defence policy, the relevant contextual assumptions for the speaker were less easily accessible than those stereotypical event sequences which were circulated in the subsequent glossings of his statement. The appeal to the past, here in the form of the 'flower of your youth' metaphor, which is frequently made in political discourse worked against him on this occasion. Anti-technology scripts'' and

traditional value scripts which are often present in education and economic discourses do not appear to work for anti-nuclear discourse.

To conclude this section, the main points raised in this discussion can be summarised as follows. It has been suggested that:

1. metaphors in discourse function as a trigger mechanism for accessing sets of stored assumptions from background knowledge structures;
2. these background knowledge structures take the form of frames, scripts (stereotypical event sequences), or schemata;
3. these frames etc. contain commonsense assumptions that are mobilised to produce ideological meanings in talk.

Having discussed theoretically the general implications of the role of metaphor in structuring forms of background knowledge, and of its role in triggering sets of contextual assumptions in interpretation, in the following study a particular set of metaphors are examined, where their function as a mode of structuring concepts will be set out more clearly.

V.4 Metaphoric Transfers in Talk about Defence

The domain of defence, and of international relations, is highly complex. Talk about defence, and in particular the representation of cold-war relations, is a discursive domain which draws very strongly on familiar, commonsense concepts in order to put forward pro-nuclear policies to a non-specialist public; policies which have been widely endorsed until the recent events in Eastern Europe significantly changed the prevailing attitudes to east-west relations.

There was a range of metaphors current in talk about international relations and NATO, which structured the concepts that were used in interpreting and understanding the complexities of defence policies, in what seems to be a coherent and consistent manner.

In the analysis that follows, I examine some of the key metaphors that were in circulation and discuss their effect on the meanings produced in defence discourse. Particular forms of 'commonsense' background knowledge relating to strength and 'fairplay' seem to play a central role in structuring pro-nuclear arguments, and are often represented in discourse via metaphors of familiar institutions and actions. These representational systems then actively shape the way in which the concepts involved in defence policy and nuclear deterrence are understood by the non-specialist, voting public. The anti-nuclear arguments however did not seem to be able to draw on a similar set of metaphors and commonsense background assumptions, which resulted in the anti-nuclear position being represented as weak and ineffective.

In the analysis that follows, the categories of frames, scenarios, and scripts, taken from theories of inferencing processes, are used to provide a framework for the examination of how relationships and events are conceptualised through the metaphoric process, and the consequent importance of metaphor in producing ideological representations.

V.4.1 Data - The Talk Event

The data to be analysed below are taken from radio broadcasts which were produced during May and June 1987, when the issue of defence was a frequent topic of discussion. These broadcasts were either 'phone-ins' on Independent Radio, or the Radio 4 ANY QUESTIONS series. The

talk that occurs in radio programmes such as phone-ins or ANY QUESTIONS is, in general, divided between three categories of participants: the programme presenter, the people who ask the questions, and the programme guest(s) who answer them. The answer turns are usually much longer than question turns, and there is subsequently little or no exchange between the people who ask the questions and the guest speakers, which means that the person providing the answer turn does not often have to respond to interruptions or challenges to his/her statements from the floor. This results in participants being able to occupy extended turns to present their arguments for or against unilateral nuclear disarmament. All the data examined are concerned with talk about defence.

V.4.2 NATO as a 'Club': Rules for Membership

A metaphor which occurs in various forms in the data examined is NATO IS A CLUB. The 'schemata' that are associated with clubs include information about the rules, conditions of membership, responsibilities etc. The 'club' metaphor is particularly prominent in (1):

(1)

he says we're only concerned with this country see . well of course they are . but what that means is that we're gonna be members of a club but not accept the rules . or the bit of the rules that we don't want to accept . er somebody else can have nuclear weapons that's members of NATO . we're not saying don't have nuclear weapons in NATO . we'll just say that if there are any . we're not having them on our soil . I think that's an immoral stand apart from anything else . I think it's a stupid stand to take as far as the defence of this country is concerned....

(Cyril Smith, (All.), ANY QUESTIONS, 22/5/87).

Here, the membership 'rules' are explicitly spelled out, they have to be accepted and adhered to, at the risk of losing one's right to be a

respected member of the club. The metaphorical structuring can be expressed as follows:

Clubs have rules
 Members of a club must abide by the rules
 NATO is like a club
 Members of NATO must accept the rules of NATO

A further aspect of the 'club' metaphor is the 'moral code of behaviour' required of its members; i.e. what counts as an acceptable code of conduct within the 'club'. This can be paralleled by other requirements, such as dress, for instance the obligation, for men to wear a tie in certain places, or Boy Scouts to wear uniforms, etc.. In (1) above, the obligation concerns 'morality'; i.e. the notion of 'right and proper behaviour'. This can be expressed as:

A club has a moral code of behaviour
 NATO is a club
 In NATO, it is against the moral code to benefit from nuclear weapons without taking responsibility for them.
 Britain is a member of NATO.
 Britain must take responsibility for nuclear weapons.

In this way, it is possible to represent the Labour party's decision to disarm uni-laterally as an 'immoral' decision, which goes against the code of conduct expected of members of the NATO 'club'.

The structuring of the relations between the constituent countries of NATO in terms of the 'club' metaphor allows for an extension into various associated aspects of the metaphor according to background knowledge about clubs in the form of a 'schema', with information about club rules and codes of behaviour. This schema is probably highly culturally determined⁽¹³⁾, and draws on commonsense assumptions about what counts as 'right and proper' behaviour within a particular group.

The NATO as a 'club' metaphor also underlies the argument structure of the data in (2). Here, the argument for keeping nuclear weapons in

Britain is built up through a series of hypothetical actions and events that would occur if the code of 'right and proper' behaviour towards other members in the club is not observed:

(2)

but you know the Labour party's received many many warnings not to be so anti-American and anti-nuclear . and the one I liked very much was Michael Stewart who, Lord Stewart now in the house of Lords . in a recent defence debate in their lordships house on 25th February saying . if we hope to have any influence on the nuclear field . it's no good beginning by telling the United States . to take all its nuclear weapons out of this country . and not to expect any cooperation from us on nuclear matters in the future . we can say that if we like . but we can't expect after that to have any effect at all on United States policy

(Independent Radio Phone-in to Margaret Thatcher, May 1987)

Here, again the argument depends on concepts relating to background assumptions about codes of behaviour within a club and relationships between members. The principal assumption underlying the propositions in (2) can be expressed as a club 'rule', e.g.:

Rule: Accepting X on your territory means having say in how X is used.

so:

Britain accepts US nuclear weapons on its territory
 Britain has a say in (an effect on) US policy
 Britain refuses US nuclear weapons on its territory
 Britain has no say in US policy

In (3), the argument develops further along the lines of the club code of behaviour, and mobilises more assumptions about what constitutes acceptable behaviour between members of the club:

(3)

Now . the freedom of Europe depends in considerable measure . not only on the way in which we deploy our troops in Europe . and the weapons we have . it also depends upon our alliance with the United States . and NATO is a nuclear alliance . we have been foremost as one of the nuclear powers . and you really cannot expect to go on hitting out at the United States . saying as the Labour party does . that their bases would go . they'd get rid of an independent nuclear deterrent . and to command any respect at all . and

the real difficult thing is . and one has warned about it again and again . if you really irritate and upset the United States . by being anti-American . then you will come to a time . when they'll say . all right if that's what you think . maybe we'll consider taking out the 330,000 American troops . that they have right on the front line in Europe ...
(Independent Radio Phone-In to Margaret Thatcher, May 1987)

Again, it is the code of behaviour between members of the club that is the structuring concept behind the argument. The two key assumptions

here are that:-

Members of a club do not attack each other.
If one member attacks, the other will retaliate.

Thus the argument develops according to the assumption that if the Labour Party irritates and upsets the US, then the US will retaliate by taking troops out of Europe.

There is a slight flaw in the extension of the club metaphor here, which demonstrates that metaphoric transfers can in fact only partially structure one concept in terms of another, especially when the 'complex' concept is as intricate as defence policy. In taking 330,000 troops out of Europe the US would not only be showing its disapproval of policies of the Labour party in Britain, but through its actions generally destabilising the entire NATO alliance, so any sanctions against Britain would affect not just the Labour party but other countries in the 'club' too. This may however be consistent with a prevalent view that the only two members of NATO whose interests count are Britain and the US. In (4), the interests of Europe as a whole are not referred to:

(4)

Now . I hope that day will never never come . because it is vital that they stay there . and I have always said . that it's in the interests of the United States . to have their troops in Europe as well as in Britain's interest
(M. Thatcher, INDEPENDENT RADIO PHONE-IN, May 1987).

The same assumptions accessed in (3), relating to rules of behaviour between members of the club and member 'rights', are made explicit in the structure of the argument in (5):

(5)

If I as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom found very very anti-British things . being said against us by the United States er . and we are contributing a great deal to the defence . then it may well be that I should react . *if you are an alliance you negotiate with an alliance . you do not hit out . you negotiate with an alliance . and you recognise that if you don't . then the same right that you have to attack them . is the same right as they have . to say what they wish to say about you . freedom is indivisible.*

(Thatcher, INDEPENDENT RADIO PHONE-IN, May 1987).

Again, the assumption that members of a club do not attack each other is prominent. So is the injured party's right to retaliate according to the rule:

If one member attacks, the other will retaliate.

In the examples above, the club metaphor is a key element, as it enables the arguments for nuclear deterrence to be organised according to a framework of background assumptions of commonsense knowledge schemata. These schemata mobilise assumptions which are coherent with the base metaphor of the club, as has been shown by the evocation of rules, rights and moral obligations that exist between members of that club. As a result, Labour's defence policy is characterised as an 'attack' on other club members, and as unacceptable, irresponsible behaviour.

V.4.3 Extension: From 'Club' to 'Street'

From the commonsense notions related to concepts of 'right and proper behaviour' (morality) and 'the right to retaliate' (tit-for-tat) in a specific environment (a club), another metaphoric environment is also

transferred onto concepts of international relations: the 'street'. By the use of the metaphor: BRITAIN IS A HOUSE WITH A BACKYARD, in (6), a similar set of inferences to those arising from the 'club' metaphor are triggered via the familiar domestic 'frame' of the street:

(6)

Well I must say that when I listen to Peter Snape . and I listen to the Labour party proposals on nuclear disarmament . what strikes me is that what they're really saying is . *we're all in favour of them being in somebody else's back yard but not ours* . now I find that quite immoral . I mean if they said we want all nuclear weapons banned from the NATO alliance zone . and we will fight to do that . there is some moral justification . but if you listen carefully to what he said . he said oh we're not saying there shouldn't be nuclear weapons in NATO . no no
(Cyril Smith, (All.), ANY QUESTIONS, 22.05.87)

The 'backyard' metaphor that is used here gives rise to another set of background assumptions relating to a domestic frame which is explicitly triggered by the term 'backyard', i.e.:

NATO is like a street
A street is made up of houses
Houses have backyards, front doors, side gates, etc.
Members of NATO live in houses.
Britain is a member of NATO.
Britain has a back yard

The Labour party, living in the British 'house', is behaving in an 'unneighbourly' fashion by refusing to store nuclear weapons in its back yard while expecting other inhabitants of the street to do so. In a similar way to the 'club' metaphor, this is again qualified as 'immoral' behaviour, i.e. unacceptable conduct for members of the socially defined group; for the inhabitants of the 'street'.

The metaphoric representations described above in pro-nuclear arguments about defence policy draw heavily on commonsense assumptions relating to codes of behaviour within a group (street, club, alliance), which form part of common cultural background knowledge schemata. The

Labour party's arguments did not seem to be able to match these metaphoric transfers with any correspondingly strong appeal to commonsense in defence of its own non-nuclear policies, despite attempts to modify the conceptualisation of the club rules. All counter-arguments are expressed in what are basically the same terms as the pro-nuclear arguments, and as Hall has pointed out in relation to the immigration issue of the late '70's, "to enter the debate on these terms as tantamount to giving credibility to the dominant problematic"⁽¹⁴⁾ (1982: 8).

V.4.4 What are the rules anyway?

One attempt to refocus the terms of the debate can be seen in (7) below, where the 'club' metaphor is retained, but the rules are changed:

(7)

The Labour party's proposals . if that is what the questioner is referring to . is that nuclear weapons should be removed from this country . *nothing particularly revolutionary in that* although you won't believe so when you hear Ken Clarke in a moment or two . after all . there are 5 other countries who are members of NATO who don't have nuclear weapons themselves . and who don't allow them on their soil . so *I don't think that the NATO alliance would be fragmented or destroyed if this country behaved as any member of NATO can behave* . and say a . we don't want Trident because it's too dear and b . after negotiation we would like you . as friends and allies . that is the Americans . to remove your weapons from our soil . I do not believe the consequences of such a request would be for the Americans to remove their troops from Europe . they are after all in Europe not just to defend us but to defend their homeland too . so I don't think that this country . as a member of NATO making those decisions . would have any great impact on the stationing of American troops in Europe . although as I say I'll be very interested to hear Ken Clarke in a moment or two because he will tell you it is the nearest thing to the red hordes at the gate . it ain't and we're gonna do it

(Peter Snape, (Lab.), ANY QUESTIONS, 22.5.87)

In this extract, Snape tends to rely on negative qualifications in his representations of the issues at stake, by referring to metaphors which

are often used to characterise what are seen as extreme forms of left-wing policy, e.g.:

nothing particularly revolutionary in that . although you won't believe so when you hear Ken Clarke in a moment or two

he will tell you it is the nearest thing to the red hordes at the gate. it ain't and we're gonna do it

The references to 'revolutionary' and 'red hordes at the gate' are 'stock', commonsense representations of the Labour party and its policies, and do not provide any contrasting positive metaphor that would stand in opposition to the pro-nuclear metaphoric currency of groups, clubs, and moral fairplay. He does however base his main argument on a new version of the NATO IS A CLUB metaphor, by drawing on a different aspect of the 'club' schemata, thus extending the assumptions in a different direction to those in examples (1) - (6) above.

The main assumption behind Snape's argument is that:

The rules of a club apply equally to all members.

He therefore structures his argument accordingly:

NATO is a club
 Clubs have rules.
 Rule: Members of NATO do not have to have nuclear weapons
 Britain is a member of NATO
 Britain does not have to have nuclear weapons.

Here, then, the conceptualisation still relies on the 'club' metaphor to represent international relations, but instead of drawing on one part of a background knowledge 'club' schema that contains commonsense information about rules for codes of behaviour, and in particular, making statements about what counts as 'moral' and 'immoral' conduct between members, Snape makes use of a different part of the schema to

structure his argument for a non-nuclear defence policy, by saying that there are no rules about requirements to have nuclear weapons in order to be a member of the NATO club.

V.4.5 Further Extensions of the Metaphor: Responsibility, Morality and the Role of Britain

The use of the metaphor **NATO IS A CLUB** in defence discourse enables other aspects present in the structure of club schemata, particularly assumptions relating to morality and codes of behaviour, to be brought into the argument for pro-nuclear defence policy. In (8) and (9) below, the issues of morality and responsibility are still represented in a way which is coherent with the 'club' metaphor.

(8)

... the most irresponsible course for Britain would be to say for example that we shall remain members of NATO and have the advantages of the American umbrella . at the same time neither provide American bases on one hand . nor provide weapons of our own on the other . *that is a very immoral approach to this problem* . and I'd be very interested to see that Denis Healey . and this is not terribly surprising . somehow imagines we could get rid of American bases . we could get rid of Britain's own weapons . and still count upon the Americans to defend us and provide a deterrent in those circumstances . that I think is nonsense and we must provide for our own nuclear defence . painful and sad though it is in a nuclear armed world.
(Bill Rogers, (All.), ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87.)

(9)

... the astonishing naivety of Roy Hattersley in the face of the reality of Soviet aggression and Soviet threat is quite bewildering to most of the people of this country . *and the lack . as Bill Rogers said . of morality* in assuming for some reason that it's alright to be defended by somebody else's nuclear weaponry . but somehow not right to assume *the uncomfortable awful and difficult responsibility* ourself at the end of the day.
(John Moore, (Con.), ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87).

In these two examples, the same assumptions about what counts as 'right and proper' behaviour within a particular group that were identified in (1) - (6) above, structure the discourse. According to the code in

operation here, 'expecting something for nothing', or 'refusing responsibility for X while at the same time expecting to benefit from X', counts as unacceptable behaviour within the 'club'. This can be expressed as another rule:

Members who want X must assume responsibility for X.

and any member who breaks this rule is accused of 'immorality'. The club metaphor seems also to enable the argument not only to be structured according to sets of rules, but also to impute a moral value to some of them, and thus establishing the possession of nuclear weapons as moral and responsible behaviour.

The argument can be schematised as follows:

Evading responsibility is immoral.

If Britain doesn't want responsibility for nuclear weapons, but Britain wants the protection of nuclear weapons, then Britain is immoral.

There is a close relationship between the way expectations of British responsibility and morality are represented in these examples from the data, and assumptions about Britain's status within the group (or 'place in the world'). Arguments concerning status within the group often appeal to ranks of responsibility and prestige, and the amount of responsibility is represented as variable between members of NATO, those having higher status also have greater responsibility. This is explicit in (10) and (11) below, where the background assumptions:

All members of a club are not equal

All members of a club do not have equal responsibility

underlie the argument structure.

(10)

Roy Hattersley does seem to assume as does most of his opposition colleagues now . officially . that Britain does not have the kind of role that we expect it to have . and

the kind of action we expect it to take with the responsibility of the nuclear deterrent we have
(John Moore, (Con.), ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87)

(11)

I am an ordinary voter . I am not a politician . I do worry about this country's place in the world and I do not want to be counted with Denmark . I reckon that we have a little more to contribute to the world than that.

(Mary Goldring, ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87)

The arguments in these two examples draw on assumptions relating to rank and responsibility within the club hierarchy, this time extending the metaphor to include all the countries of the world, and implying that all members of this 'world' group are not of equal status. It is this aspect of the argument that is highlighted in (12):

(12)

Mr Moore's comment about what I had to say had nothing to do with strategy . it had to do with views of Britain's place in the world . he says he's got a different view about Britain in the world.

(Roy Hattersley, (Lab.), ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87)

An alternative view of the NATO group could however be one of equal status between members, and it is this assumption (all members of a club are equal) that structures the argument in (13):

(13)

... there are very many good members of NATO . the Germans being the obvious example . the Danes . Holland . Belgium . who do not believe their involvement in NATO requires them to have an independent nuclear weapon of their own.

(Roy Hattersley, (Lab.), ANY QUESTIONS, 29.5.87)

The key assumptions organising the argument in examples (10) and (11), relating to the different status of countries in the world, can be expressed as follows:

Countries have different ranks in the world
Countries with nuclear weapons have higher rank than countries without nuclear weapons
Denmark does not have nuclear weapons
Britain does have nuclear weapons
Britain has a higher rank than Denmark

In the particular schema drawn on here, the criteria for high status and high responsibility within the group depend on the possession of nuclear weapons, i.e. they are criteria of power. Other criteria, mentioned by Hattersley in relation to Denmark, such as economic prosperity, do not seem to rank as highly as that of fire power. Elsewhere in the programme, for instance, one participant said "I do not want to be a pig farmer", inferring that all Danes are pig farmers and being a pig farmer has a low status within the group.

The above representations of responsibility, morality and status all seem to rely on particular assumptions coming from background knowledge schemata, about conditions for high status and level of responsibility within a 'club' or group, (NATO or 'the world'). The concept of the group is also present in a different metaphor frequently used in the domain of defence discourse, which is THE WORLD IS A PLAYGROUND.

V.4.6 The Playground Scenario and 'Bully' Script

The 'playground' metaphor has high currency 'value' in defence discourse, and an explicit representation of this occurs in the example in (14) below. The focus of this metaphor is not intra-club relations and codes of behaviour, but international cold-war relations. The data was taken from an independent radio phone-in to David Owen & David Steel, and was the response to a question relating to the Alliance party's support of an independent nuclear deterrent for Britain.

(14)

The only way to describe nuclear deterrence is to take it out of its emotion and think of it in terms of what is deterrence in normal life . if you're in a playground and there is a bully and he keeps focusing on a small boy and a bigger boy gets up and says to that bully . look if you hit that small boy again I'm going to hit you . in fact what often happens is the bully is afraid and the man with the

strength that doesn't ever have to use it he simply says . if you do that I will hit you . now that is what deterrence is in nuclear terms as well . you've got to be ready to say that you will use it . if you don't say that you will use it . then of course it can never be a deterrent.

(David Owen, (All.), INDEPENDENT RADIO PHONE-IN, May 1987).

Chilton (1985, 1988) has examined in detail the function of the metaphor THE SOVIET UNION IS A BULLY as it appeared in a Ministry of Defence leaflet entitled:

How to deal with a bully

Peace through deterrence - the only answer to a bully's threat.

He suggests that in the metaphoric process, the familiar institutional 'playground' frame is mapped onto a less familiar, and much more complex, 'cold war relations' frame, the latter thus being understood in terms of the former. Chilton gives a set of what he terms 'entailments', (but as I have argued in Case Study 1 these seem to be not entailments but implicatures), arising from the playground frame (again, schema or scenario is possibly a more suitable term here) which are often expressed in pro-nuclear discourse, "not of course AS entailments of a belief system, but as if they were empirically valid descriptions of the real world." (1985: 119). They represent a series of 'stereotypical truth-judgements' relating to concepts of bullies, weakness, strength, fear, etc. which fit into a playground schema and are transferred onto the concepts of defence, in the same way as background assumptions contained in a 'club' schema are transferred onto conceptualisations of NATO in the data examined above.

In (14), a stereotypical event sequence (or script) that takes place within the playground 'schema', is explicitly worked through in the discourse. As Chilton has stated with regard to the MoD leaflet, the 'script' mobilises background assumptions and gives rise to inferences

which may hold for a playground but are questionable in terms of descriptions of world relations, but which are nevertheless built into the structure of the argument.

A problem for the overall coherence of the 'playground' metaphor arises through Owen's use of the word 'emotion':

The only way to describe nuclear deterrence is to take it out of its emotion and think of it in terms of what is deterrence in normal life.

as one of the implicatures of this statement is that:

Normal life is not emotional

which seems odd. Presumably, the adjective 'emotive' (i.e. deterrence is an *emotive* issue) is what he meant. If the implicatures of this statement are taken to be:

There is deterrence in normal life.

Deterrence in normal life is not emotional (i.e. non-emotive).

this provides a context for the 'bully' script to be processed according to assumptions relating to the 'non-emotive' scenario of the 'normal life' playground. I would question whether in fact what happens between children is classified as 'non-emotive' in commonsense assumptions about playgrounds, but the playground metaphor and bully script have become so deeply embedded in representations of cold-war relations in defence discourse that this does not seem to matter.

V.4.7 Nuclear Weapons mean Peace

In a less explicit form, commonsense assumptions about what counts as 'normal life' are also the basis of another crucial aspect of pro-nuclear discourse: the assumption that nuclear weapons are the key to peace. This can be illustrated in (15) and (16) below:

(15)

I believe frankly that the presence of nuclear weapons has defended the peace of Europe for the last 40 years.

(Cyril Smith, (All.), ANY QUESTIONS, 22.5.87)

(16)

... but actually the peace of Europe since the war has been based on collective security and nuclear deterrence . the idea that we do have a strong alliance and we have to rely on nuclear deterrence to avoid conventional war . conventional war rages throughout the rest of the world . Europe's been the cockpit of war . there are still deep political divisions across it . the reason there hasn't been a war is that war is not an option to people on either side of the iron curtain as long as we have nuclear deterrence . and here is Britain . an ally in the middle of that . suddenly saying we're going non-nuclear . and I think the Labour party is saying . we're going to spend the money on tanks and planes . and match the Red Army . it's a very dangerous proposition and it's time we actually stuck to where we are . I'd like to see the level go down . as the level goes down the British independent nuclear deterrent becomes that much more important I think . to make sure that Europe remains safe .

(Kenneth Clarke, (Con.), ANY QUESTIONS, 22.05.87)

The argument in (16) is based on the assumption that war is a 'normal' state of affairs in the world:

conventional war rages throughout the rest of the world

and that Europe too would be at war if it wasn't for nuclear weapons.

The argument that war has been avoided due to the deployment of nuclear weapons seems to have an effect on the way in which arms limitation negotiations are represented, paradoxically, as confrontation, as war, giving rise to statements such as:

"the latest peace offensive by the Soviet Block"
(BBC Radio 4 TODAY PROGRAMME, 24.01.89).

where negotiations to reduce the number of nuclear weapons are metaphorically structured as represented as war between NATO and the Soviet Block.

V.4.8 Coherence between Metaphors and Background Knowledge Schemata: a View of Normality.

The various forms of metaphor in circulation in defence discourse, and the related institutional systems of belief underlying them which have been analysed here, are recurring features of the way states of affairs and events are represented within pro-nuclear arguments relating to complex issues of international power relations. These issues are represented discursively in terms of the familiar frames and schemata which organize our background knowledge and commonsense assumptions about the world, assumptions which are structured by available experience of what counts as 'normal'. Available schemata from 'normal life' in Britain could consist of clubs, school playgrounds and backyards, but the codes of behaviour which are associated with them are repeatedly given universal status by the application of these culturally specific criteria to issues of a much wider, and much more complex nature.

I would suggest that the concept of rank within the world, or within NATO, also stems from assumptions relating to an institutional 'group' frame which is present in the 'club', 'street' and 'school yard' metaphors. In the school yard, it is the 'bigger' boy who protects the small one, who supplies the strength for 'deterrence'. Within a club, some members may be more prestigious than others, have more authority and more responsibility. The metaphorically derived inferences about countries and their relationships then become embedded into background assumptions as stereotypical truth-values, which then circulate in discursive form in talk about defence. Thus Denmark can be represented as of minor status compared to Britain, and qualities of strength and

courage which are represented as quintessentially British are attributed greater value than the ability to produce good bacon which is the prominent 'quality' attributed to the Danes.

V.5 Conclusions

In the preceding analysis, two principal functions of metaphor in the processing of discourse have been examined with regard to the specific domain of defence. These functions have been characterised as the ability of metaphoric representations to:

a) access stored sets of commonsense assumptions from background knowledge which provide maximally relevant contextual assumptions in the processing of discourse;

and

b) transfer sets of commonsense assumptions from background knowledge onto representations of more complex concepts, which then serve to organise and structure arguments.

Through the analysis of metaphoric representation in talk about defence, it has been argued that the use of metaphor acts as a trigger mechanism for particular inferences that are coherent with commonsense frames, scripts or schemata from background knowledge. In the data examined, the metaphor of NATO as a distinct social entity - a group or club - was seen to be the structuring concept underlying pro-nuclear arguments during the general election campaign period in 1987. Consequently, metaphors are claimed to be a fertile site of interaction between discourse and contextual background knowledge for the production of ideological meanings.

It seems therefore that if the relationship between language and ideology is to be accounted for in terms of how representations become naturalised, commonsense ways of talking about states of affairs, then the metaphoric process plays an important role in determining how particular ideological representations can become dominant, established and acceptable ways of talking about the concepts at stake in a given domain, through being grounded in assumptions relating to stereotypical and culturally-specific knowledge structures within a given country.

V.6 General Conclusions to Case Studies in Representation

In the analysis of different types of meaning undertaken in these three case studies, it has been argued that it is not possible to consider that ideological meanings are produced only on a semantic or syntactic level in discourse. The semantic structure of a lexical item such as *deter* was shown to be only partially productive of its meaning, with contextual features and assumptions from background knowledge playing a crucial role in establishing its contextual, discursive meaning. Similarly, in the analysis of the discursive effects produced by relative clauses, it was shown that although the embedding of a relative structure may in some cases lead to an ideological 'preconstructed' element being represented in an utterance, this seemed due more to pragmatic processes of inferencing rather than specific clausal relations between main clauses and relatives, since other grammatical structures in the discourse also served to produce similar types of ideological effects.

In the third study, the role of pragmatic inferencing in producing ideological meanings has been developed with regard to one specific

aspect of the interpretative process; the structuring of concepts through metaphoric representation and transfer. Representing a complex state of affairs metaphorically makes available commonsense background assumptions which, as they are consonant with the particular metaphor in use, are extended to the more complex concept. Thus, by organising information about complex relations or events through more familiar metaphoric structures, the complex concepts are expressed in simplified, often culturally-specific, naturalised terms which come to preclude any other forms of representation as being either inappropriate or invalid.

The overall claim that has been developed here, then, is that an understanding of the relationship between language, meaning and ideology necessarily depends on a pragmatic analysis of discourse in context, rather than an account of meaning which relies only on semantic or syntactic levels of language. The contextualised features of language use, and the inferencing processes that are used in interpretation, have a central function in determining the meaning, and by extension, the ideological effects of discourse. Without a context of production and processing, entailing access to background knowledge and commonsense assumptions, a sentence cannot be considered to produce ideological meanings. It is statements or utterances in context that produce ideological effects, and pragmatic theory is therefore essential in any analysis of ideologically-motivated meanings in discourse.

In this account of ideological representation in discourse, however, there has been little scope for introducing the notion of power, and in particular, the interface between social relations of power, and forms of ideological representation. The ways in which power structures are reproduced in and through discourse have in general been much less

clearly defined than the relationship between discourse and ideology, and in order to explore further the ways in which language sustains relations of domination, it will be necessary to consider more fully the relationship between discourse and power.

In the following chapters, the central focus of discussion is this area of interface between power and discourse, in which I draw on a different field of pragmatic theory, dealing essentially with language as *interaction*. In particular, I examine the mechanisms of control at work in talk, and specifically, in talk that takes place within an institutional context where there are unequal relations of power between the participants. Through these analyses, I aim to examine ways in which discourse is implicated in the maintenance of asymmetrical power relations, and again, will argue that pragmatic theory, through its account of conversational structure and organisation, can provide the means to develop a critical analysis of the relationship between discourse and power.

P A R T T H R E E

FROM REPRESENTATION TO CONTROL

C H A P T E R V I

REVIEW OF THEORIES OF DISCURSIVE INTERACTION

VI.0 Discourse: A Site for the Production of Power Relations

Thompson claims that ideologies operate as 'discursive practices' inscribed in everyday life which maintain relations of domination (1984: 63). If this claim is to be justified, then it is necessary to make the social organisation of discourse also the object of investigation, and not just the representational aspects of language as has so often been the case. Thompson has also tended to focus on the relationship between ideology and language on the representational level rather than on how social relations of power are manifested in discourse, and his suggestion that discursive genres such as anecdote and narrative should form the basic data for a discursive analysis of the relationship between meaning and power tends to deflect attention from the interactive structuring of discourse and the ways in which power can be actively negotiated, legitimised or reinforced through *interactive discursive practices*.

It has been pointed out that language itself can be a form of power, since it sets up dominant and subordinate positions for participants to speak from, (cf. Montgomery, 1986b: 62). However, the relationship between power and discourse does not seem to be simply a matter of occupying dominant or subordinate subject positions, since 'subjects' do not necessarily always take up the positions inscribed for them in a text, but often resist this kind of pre-inscribed positioning, (cf.

Morley, 1980b). Furthermore, the implications of Pêcheux's notion of *disidentification* (see II.3.2.2 above) are that interpellation into specific subject positions can be resisted, and so discursive power must be to a certain extent negotiable, or at least limited in some way. Another view of power is that it is synonymous with discourse. According to Foucault, "Discourse [...] is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized", (1970: 110), which seems to be echoed in Hall's description of power in discourse (1982), as the power to signify events in a particular way, the power to 'make things mean'.

In order to explore the complex relationship between discourse and power more fully, I suggest that a shift of focus is necessary, moving from a concern with the representational aspects of discourse, towards an attention to the interactive structures which are involved in its production. In this way, it may be possible to identify specific discursive actions and positions, in which asymmetrical relations of power between participants are constructed actively through the discursive process. I therefore propose to look carefully at how talk is organised by participants, and rather than focusing on the inscribed subject positions they occupy, to analyse the interaction in terms of what can be done within this organisation, i.e. what kind of actions it is possible to take, whether all participants are able to take them equally, and if not, how the restrictions to discursive actions and access to discursive space may be operating.

It is then this interactional aspect of discourse that is the focus of the three case studies to follow, in which the interactive organisation of social discursive practices is the primary object of study.

VI.1 Selection of Data: Talk 'Events'

The kind of interaction in which relationships of power and control are more overtly at stake, and may be produced and negotiated through or within discursive practices, is in spoken rather than written texts. This is not to say that written texts are not discursive sites in which power relations are at work. Kress has suggested that:

"power seems to lie with the producers of texts: the power to marshal discourses into certain configurations, to act on the pre-existent subject positions of readers, [...] to construct reading positions, to select genres and to control possibilities of reading."
(1985a: 84)

However, he argues that the interaction between text and reader does not always have to be on the terms of the text producers, and that it is possible to resist the inscribed subject positions in a text by exposing them, by approaching any text with certain questions about its motivation and function: why texts are produced, who reads them, and the effect this has on their construction.

In talk, this kind of 'resistant' interpretation would result in a great deal of unco-operative discourse, which, in institutional contexts, would involve challenges to the asymmetrical structures of power and hierarchy. Although this kind of unco-operative interaction does take place, it has been suggested that the talk 'event' is constructed jointly and simultaneously by participants, according to a certain consensus between its participants, (cf. Fairclough 1985). Fairclough refers to this consensus as 'orderly talk', (1985: 739), which results in the subject positions within the talk rarely being overtly called into question by participants. One reason for this may be that 'resistant talking', including challenges to propositions, requires more

interactional work on behalf of participants than compliances (cf. Coulthard, 1981), since a challenge is usually followed by an explanation or justification, whereas compliances require no further explanation. It is this problem of 'orderly' versus 'unco-operative' discourse which will be a central focus of analysis in the case studies in this section, particularly in Chapter IX.

VI.2 Discourse and Social Institutions

The role of social institutions in shaping and determining discourse practices has been discussed in detail by Fairclough (1985, 1989), who stresses that all discourse is determined by sets of conventions which are associated with social institutions, and that these conventions are shaped by power relations in society as a whole (1989: 17). All talk, be it mundane chat, doctor/patient interviews or media discourse, takes place within a social structure and according to conventions of social practice, and is not simply "an accomplishment of the social actors who produce it" (1989: 12). This position, which Fairclough ascribes to much of conversation analysis, tends to naturalise the 'commonsense' view that talk just 'happens', when in fact all interaction is subject to specific social and institutional constraints that lead to the reproduction of existing positions of power and status.

However, it could be argued that the techniques of conversation analysis may nevertheless enable the organisation and management of interactive talk to be examined in terms of participant rights and obligations, if we consider that access to certain types of turns is not always available to all participants equally. The aim of the three case studies in this section is to examine how the structure of talk,

as described by conversation analysts, may be subject to institutional constraints in terms of power relations between participants, and in this way, to explore the relationship between discourse and power more fully than has so far been done.

VI.3 Institutional Talk: Alternative Methods of Analysis

There have been two main trends in the development of discourse analysis, one associated with the work undertaken in Birmingham (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975, Coulthard and Montgomery, 1981, etc.) on the structure of discourse beyond sentence level, and the other originating in ethnomethodological work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, (1978); Schegloff, (1972, 1979); etc. In the sections that follow, a brief account is given of these approaches to the analysis of talk, in order to evaluate their respective advantages and disadvantages for an analysis of discursive mechanisms of control.

VI.3.1 Sinclair & Coulthard: Teacher/Pupil Interaction

The approach to discourse analysis that was developed in Birmingham by Sinclair and Coulthard was ostensibly concerned with investigating verbal interaction to establish units of linguistic structure beyond the clause, and involved the study of speech exchanges as units of jointly constructed discourse through an analysis of recordings of teacher/pupil interaction in the classroom.

They defined the minimal unit of conversational interaction as an *exchange*, with a maximally three-place structure of Initiation-Response-Feedback, or IRF. This structure predicts that in an exchange, an *initiation* produces a following *response*, and that a *response* will

follow a preceding *initiation*. Initiations and responses are therefore symmetrically related, and a *feedback* functions to close an exchange.

A typical teacher/pupil exchange would run as follows:

I T: What's the capital of France
 R P: Is it Paris?
 F T: That's right.
 I T: and Germany?
 R P: Bonn
 F T: Good

(Quoted in Stubbs, 1983: 29)

Different kinds of initiation make different predictions about what will follow, eg. an initiation which is a request for information not known to the questioner will predict a different response than if the initiation is a request for information already known, as is the case in many teacher/pupil exchanges. For example:

I A: Have you got the time?
 R B: It's a quarter past ten
 F A: Thanks

Here, B's response would be unlikely to take the form of a question as in the previous example:

I A: Have you got the time?
 R B: (?)Is it a quarter past ten?

Although the IRF structure was primarily developed in an analysis of classroom discourse, Sinclair and Coulthard claimed that it formed a minimal basic unit for interaction, and therefore would be a primary structure for interactive discourse in general.

However, although the Birmingham approach was based on the assumption that structure in conversation is not found on the level of linguistic form but on the level of speech acts or interactional moves made by particular utterances, Levinson (1983: 228) points to several drawbacks with this account. Firstly, the fact that single sentence utterances

can perform more than one speech act at a time; secondly that there are no identifiable utterance units onto which speech acts or moves can be mapped; thirdly, that context plays a crucial part in the assignment of utterance function, and that utterances which appear ill-formed when taken out of context may turn out to be perfectly coherent when a context is supplied.

A further problem for the purposes of the present analysis is that the Birmingham work does not allow for the notions of power and domination to be treated as resulting from discursive practices, in the sense of being actively produced within the activity of talk itself. The question of control of the discourse, and responsibility for the direction of the discourse, is ascribed naturally to the teacher, (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975: 4,6). As Montgomery has pointed out, this model of exchange structure tends to collapse the notion of 'domination' into the notion of 'control of the discourse', "by detaching too completely the processes of power and domination from their non-discursive material bases" (1986b: 50). In the following case studies I propose to examine further the discursive mechanisms through which control of the talk is established and maintained, particularly in relation to instances of institutional discourse.

VI.3.2 Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

The ethnomethodological approach developed in the work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson does not have very much to say either about power and control, but does consider verbal interaction as indicative of social organisation and order, and proposes an analysis for the ways in which conversation displays that order. Conversation analysis deals with small scale, local features of verbal interaction, without any

preconceived hypotheses regarding the nature of that interaction. Hence, if power structures do have a key function in the way talk is organised, then the ways in which that is so should emerge from the analysis, rather than be assumed as 'given' from the outset, (cf. Montgomery, 1986b).

However, the findings of conversation analysis seem potentially the more useful for the purposes of an examination of power and control in discourse insofar as they are more flexible than the Birmingham model, which seems limited to a particular form of teacher/pupil interaction and has not been widely developed as a discourse model in other domains. Despite Fairclough's claim that conversation analysis naturalises the concept that talk 'just happens' (cf. VI.2 above), the rules of turn-taking in conversation may well enable features of power and control to be considered, in terms of how the talk is organised and managed, if the social and institutional constraints on participants are also taken into account. In particular, it may be possible to examine how the activity of talk itself may reproduce and reinforce existing relations of power, rather than assuming that these relations are external, 'given' features of the discursive context, and thus not produced within the talk itself.

In order to do this, it is first necessary to outline the features of 'conversation' which have been described as 'rule-governed', and to identify those aspects of the system which act as constraints on discursive interaction, and which are therefore potentially useful as mechanisms of control in the management of talk.

VI.3.2.1 The 'Technology' of Conversation

The techniques of conversation analysis were first developed by Sacks⁽¹⁾ to study talk, which he saw as a strongly organised form of social interaction. Ethnomethodology treats interactive talk as its central resource, and develops an analysis out of that resource:

"When we start out with a piece of data, the question of what we are going to end up with, what kind of findings it will give, should not be a consideration. We sit down with a piece of data, make a bunch of observations, and see where they will go."

(Sacks, (ed. Jefferson) 1984: 23)

The aim of the analysis is to examine the interaction which is accomplished by participants in talk, seeking to explicate "methods by which such orderliness can be displayed, managed and recognised by members" (Heritage and Watson, 1979: 124).

The ethnomethodologists' aim was to find a model of organisation that would be at the same time context-free, and thus applicable to all instances of conversational activity, and capable of context sensitivity, to be able to take into account variable features of the interaction (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1978: 9). They found that turn-taking was the basic form of organisation of conversation, and that it followed a system which involved two components and a set of rules. The two components are the *turn-constructional component*, (a unit type e.g. a greeting, or a Transition Relevance Place), and the *turn-allocational component* (current speaker to new, or self-selection).

The length of a conversation is governed by some other organisation than the turn-taking one, as turn-taking only governs the sequencing of talk:

"turn-taking organisation for conversation makes no provision for the content of any turn, nor does it constrain what is (to be) done in any turn."

(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1978: 21).

What is actually accomplished in any given turn is constrained by other systems external to the rules for turn-taking:

"That the conversational turn-taking system does not constrain what occupies its turns, frees the turns for use by other systems, those systems' components then being subject to the organisational contingencies of the turns they occupy."

(1978: 21).

One of these 'other systems' is the adjacency pair format, in which a greeting is followed by a greeting, a question by an answer, etc. These systems in turn may however be subject to further constraints, which are not addressed by conversation analysts, and which seem to be highly dependent on institutional features, such as who has the right to withhold answers, and who is under obligation to reply. The turn-taking system in itself, then, organises only the transition between one speaker and the next, not what is said, nor what can be *accomplished* in a turn.

The following features of the turn-taking system, i.e. pre-allocation of turns, adjacency pair formats, and formulations, seem to constitute potential areas of activity within which control of the discourse can be established and maintained.

VI.3.2.2 Pre-Allocation of Turns

Conversation represents one 'pole' of the speech exchange system, where turns are not pre-allocated and speaker selection is accomplished locally. With increasing degrees of pre-allocation of turns, the length of turns also increases, and speech events such as debate and some forms of ceremony would represent the opposite pole of the system.

However, it is claimed that conversation should nevertheless be regarded as the basic system of interaction, with other systems representing a variety of transformations on the basic type:

"Debate or ceremony would not be an independent polar type, but rather the most extreme transformation of conversation, most extreme in fully fixing the most important, and perhaps nearly all, of the parameters that conversation allows to vary."

(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1978: 47).

This claim seems reasonable, but it must again be pointed out that although conversation may be the basic form of social interaction, it still occurs within a social context, perhaps rather less structured than an institutional context such as classroom or courtroom, but subject nevertheless to organisational constraints.

In forms of institutionalised discourse, then, a certain amount of turn pre-allocation is to be predicted according to the nature of the organisation of the institution in question. For example, in court proceedings, (cf. Atkinson and Drew, 1979), the speech exchange system has a high degree of pre-allocation of turns, whereas in job interviews, there is a lesser degree of pre-allocation, but still comparatively more than in conversation. In terms of relations of power and status between participants, where turns are pre-allocated, not all participants have access to the same type of turns, and therefore are restricted in the type of actions they can take in those turns. In their analysis of courtroom examinations, Atkinson & Drew point out that the question turns are allocated to the examiner, who can make accusations, challenge, impute blame, etc., within those turns, whereas defendants and witnesses are in the position of having to supply answers, in which they can make denials, justifications, etc. (1979: 62).

The power to accuse or impute blame therefore is accessible to the examiner, but not to the examinee, who is restricted to the position of answerer. It seems then that there are some types of turns which put participants in a potentially more powerful discursive position than others, and correspondingly, some turns which put participants in a less powerful position.

VI.3.2.3 Structural Location of Utterances: Adjacency Pairs

A further conversational structure which sets up constraints on participants in talk is the adjacency pair, and its preferred and dispreferred responses.

Schegloff (cf. Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) claims that it is the structural location of a given utterance with regard to others that is indicative of the activity that utterance is accomplishing in the conversation, and not its linguistic form. Apart from initial utterances, an utterance appears after a sequence of other utterances, and has to deal with them in a relevant way. Any utterance, including initial utterances, "may occur in a structurally defined place in conversation, in which case its structural location can have attached to its slot a set of features that may overwhelm its syntactic or prosodic structure in primacy." (Schegloff, 1984: 34).

The main structure governing the location of utterances in a conversation is the adjacency pair, which is a minimal dialogic unit, comprising a first pair part and a second pair part. The first pair part establishes 'conditional relevance' upon anything that occurs in the slot that follows. That is to say, that what follows a question turn will be considered as an answer, a greeting turn is followed by a greeting, an invitation by an acceptance/refusal, etc. Even if a first

pair part is followed by silence in the second pair part slot, that silence will be construed as relevant in some way by the participants in the talk.

Silence in a second pair part slot is however often a *dispreferred* response, as there are fairly strong constraints on what Pomerantz (1984) terms *preference organisation* in adjacency pairs. Preference organisation concerns the type of response which is considered apt or suitable, the 'unmarked' response, after a first pair part of an adjacency pair. For example, the preferred response to a request is the granting of that request, whereas a refusal is a dispreferred response. One difference marking dispreferred responses is the slight delay that precedes their delivery. Dispreferred responses are also often marked by tokens such as *uh*, *well*, qualifiers or hesitations, an account or explanation, or some form of mitigation of the dispreferred act, (cf. Levinson 1983: 334). Silence seems to be the ultimate dispreferred conversational act, as the sequencing rules of turn-taking and adjacency pairing put strong constraints on participants to respond to an utterance in some way.

VI.3.2.4 Formulations

Another feature of talk which is used to organise and manage discursive interaction is the *formulation*, a type of repair mechanism for the breakdown in sequence organisation which re-establishes 'gist', or "the for-all-practical-purposes definiteness of sense", (Heritage and Watson, 1979: 137). During stretches of conversation, multiple glosses may occur to provide for the possibility of "multiple or multi-implicative gists or upshots", (Heritage and Watson, 1979: 137). This mechanism

allows for decisions to be made about interpretations of utterances which are then confirmed, or disconfirmed, by participants:

"The primary business of formulations is to demonstrate understanding and presumptively, to have that understanding attended to, and as a first preference, endorsed."
(Heritage and Watson, 1979: 138).

Formulations constitute a first pair part of an adjacency pair insofar as they give rise to *receptions: confirmations* (the preferred response) or *disconfirmations*, which are generally described as decisions about sense by the participants in the talk, thus enabling them to establish 'gist' as they go along. The orderliness and sense of the talk is, then, subject to routine display and checks through formulations, which can then be treated as a basis for subsequent talk (cf. Heritage and Watson, 1979: 144). This function of establishing direction and sense in talk, particularly as the preferred response to a formulation is a confirmation, may be open to exploitation in forms of institutional discourse where there may be disagreement about issues of 'sense'. This issue will be discussed in more length in VI.4.2 below.

VI.4 Applications of Conversation Analysis to Institutional Discourse

The analysis of talk that takes place within an institutional setting, using techniques of conversation analysis, has previously been justified by two general observations about the nature of institutional discourse. Firstly, it was found that institutional interaction "involves the selective reduction of the full range of conversational practices available for use in mundane interaction", (although as has already been noted in VI.2 above, mundane conversation itself seems to be a form of institutionalised social interaction with its own 'specialised use' of

interactive procedures, and is not an activity that is completely free of institutional constraints); and secondly, that it "involves a degree of concentration on, and specialisation of, particular procedures which have their 'home' or base environment in ordinary talk", (Heritage, 1984: 240). Courtroom interaction, for instance, involves a high concentration of consecutive question/answer sequences, and a feature of television interviews is specialised use of formulations.

These findings supported the view that "comparative analysis with mundane interaction is essential if the 'special features' of interaction in particular institutional contexts are to receive adequate specification and understanding" (Heritage, 1984: 240). Institutional discourse thus became the focus of ethnomethodological work to investigate the specific features of mundane interaction selected in varying institutional contexts, and to examine the effect of these on the turn-taking system of exchanges in those contexts.

Two instances of this application are found in the work of Atkinson and Drew (1979) on courtroom interaction, and of Heritage (1985) on analysing news interviews. In a further study, Harris (1984), analyses the function of questions in magistrates' courts from a broader perspective, drawing on both work in conversation analysis and the work of Sinclair and Coulthard et al. The findings of these studies, and their implications for the role of power in discourse, are discussed briefly below.

VI.4.1 Courtroom Examinations

In relation to turn-taking organisation, and the allocation of speakers for next turns, Atkinson and Drew observe that transition from one

speaker to another is not necessarily unproblematic, but involves the acquisition of the 'right to speak':

"The motivation to self-select by starting as early as possible at a completion point also has something to do with securing rights to the turn by starting before other intending speakers."
(1979: 39)

Further, the allocation of the next turn by a current speaker also involves more than just an indication of who should speak next, as there are strong constraints on the interaction due to the nature of adjacency pairs, where a first pair part requires a specific second pair part, and thus may put a participant in the position of having to supply that second pair part.

Atkinson and Drew found the principal difference between courtroom interaction and mundane conversation is that, in the former, turn order is fixed and the type of turn is fixed, the minimal unit of interaction being the question/answer pair. The pre-allocation of the turns also involves turn-type allocation: in an A - B - A - B ordering, where the examiner has the question turn, the examined party's turns have to be answers (1979: 62).

The turn-taking system of courtroom discourse allocates turns mostly between two parties: the examiner and the examinee. Any turns taken by other parties are thus classed as interruptions, either non-violative (e.g. by non-examining counsel), or violative (e.g. by a member of the public), although the examiner's turn can be taken by a 'chairman', (e.g. a judge), without affecting the turn organisation. The turn taking is therefore for the most part not locally managed, as in courtroom examinations the possibility of speaker self-selection (apart from the judge) is not admitted by the institutional proceedings.

Certain aspects of the interaction are locally managed, however, such as the turn size, the timing and the sequence type of turn, as follows:

1. Turns are often longer than in conversation, as due to their pre-allocation, there is no competition to self select for the next one⁽²⁾.
2. Overlap between turns exists and is remedied in the same way as for conversational interaction, but pauses often occur after the completion of a pair. Pauses are used as an interactional strategy by counsel to imply disbelief, scepticism, validity or significance of an examinee's answer, and are directed at the jury, rather than at the examinee. They are therefore *counsel turns*, and function as a comment on the prior turn, (cf. Atkinson & Drew. 1979: 68).
3. Different types of turn sequence can be packed into the question/answer format to effect different actions, e.g. accusations, challenges, justifications, denials, rebuttals, etc.,

These actions that can be taken in courtroom examinations "have important consequences for the interactional techniques employed by both parties [...] and for the ways in which sequences develop" (1979: 81). However, not all actions are permissible, as the question/answer sequences can be formulated in such a way as to imply a judgement about an action or description given by an examinee, and the permissible/non-permissible nature of actions (e.g. an accusation) in the question turns is also locally managed, usually by an interruption from non-examining counsel.

VI.4.1.1 Questioning as a mechanism of control

These aspects of the organisation of courtroom interaction therefore result in the 'right to talk' being restricted among participants, and strongly regulated by institutional procedure. The constraints of

adjacency question/answer pairs on the interaction also reinforce an asymmetrical relationship between questioner and answerer: the person doing the answering being under some form of obligation to provide specific second-pair parts to questions.

Thus the role of the courtroom examiner as questioner not only puts them in a more powerful interactional position, but also allows them control over what counts as acceptable information. As Harris has pointed out:

"that information from witnesses and defendants is transferred in court by means of questioning sequences rather than, say, lengthy accounts enables the questioner [...] to control what counts as information in a case" (1984: 7).

In an analysis of the questioning procedures in magistrates' courts, Harris examines the various syntactic forms of questions and their function in the courtroom situation in terms of the types of response they elicit. She finds that polar questions and WH questions such as *what*, *how much*, *how many*, require either yes/no, disjunctive, or minimal responses, and that only in questions with *how* and *why* forms is more than a minimal response demanded.

Of all the questions in the data base, Harris found that *why* and *how* questions represented under 6% of the total of questions asked, whereas yes/no and disjunctive questions made up over 62% of the total. Requests for naming amounts⁽⁹⁾ represented just over 20%, and restrictive response questions just over 11%. She concluded that the propositional content, syntactic form and context all contribute to the relationship of questions to specific functions, but that it is difficult to directly relate form to function. However, highly conducive question forms were prevalent, and were employed by the

examiner to obtain information and to accuse, these being the principal functions of the questioning. Examples of this type of question are declaratives with tags, declaratives asking for information, or disjunctives, which generally give rise either to a minimal answer ('yes/no') confirming the proposition of the question, or in a disjunctive question, a minimal choice ('married/single'):

Everybody else seems to have done something but you, don't they?

You'd better not argue with any foreman in future, had you?

You're unemployed.

Are you married or single?

(Harris, 1984: 10,11).

As such, Harris points out that they provide a powerful means of control over the discourse, since the fact that they contain completed propositions makes it difficult for defendants to introduce a topic or have any influence over what is discussed, and thus conducive questions reinforce what is seen as the greater power and higher social status of the questioner (in this case, the magistrate) in relation to the answerer.

VI.4.2 TV News Interviews

A further application of techniques of conversation analysis has been in the study of the use of *formulations* in television news interviews (Heritage, 1985). It was found that question-answer sequences which elicit 'news' reports in natural conversation are often followed by third-turn 'receipts'. A third-turn receipt can take the form of an 'assessment' of the news, or a 'newsmark', e.g. 'how nice!' or 'oh really!', (cf. Jefferson 1981), or a 'continuer' e.g. 'hm mm', (cf. Jefferson 1983), which serve to "align the questioner to the answerer as a recipient of reported information" (Heritage 1985: 98).

In news reports, (and in courtroom interaction), third-turn receipts, or 'objects of reciprocity and affiliation' are absent from the interaction, which is conducted via question-answer chains. There are several reasons for this:

1. The roles of reporter and news recipient are institutionally pre-established, rather than being ad hoc roles within natural conversation:

"A news interviewee is given access to media time by virtue of an antecedent decision that he or she has some personal experience, activity or opinion that is newsworthy" (Heritage 1985: 99).

2. Third-turn receipts propose some form of commitment to the truth or adequacy of the received report, whereas the interviewer's task is not to judge or assess, but to elicit information: "The avoidance of routine conversational receipt objects may be managed so as to achieve a posture of formal or official neutrality with respect to the testimony of witnesses or interviewees", (Heritage 1985: 99).

3. The talk is produced for overhearers, i.e. the news audience, rather than for the interviewers, who are likely to know in advance what the interviewee is going to report. The interviewer is therefore not the primary addressee of the talk he or she elicits from the interviewee: "Through the avoidance of third-turn receipt objects characteristic of question-answer sequences in natural conversation, questioners decline the role of report recipient while maintaining the role of report elicitor", (Heritage 1985: 100).

Third-turn receipts of 'news' are often replaced in interviews by 'formulations', (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, Heritage and Watson, 1980): summaries or glosses which develop the gist of an informant's previous statements (see VI.3.2.4 above). Formulations are frequent in

institutional interaction that is audience-directed, as they are addressed more to an overhearing audience than are the question-answer sequences in an interview, and they have various functions in the talk.

Formulations can:

- (a) serve to emphasise or maintain a topic of a previous turn rather than direct the report onto a different subject;
- (b) provide a representation of knowledge or experience which was primarily 'owned' by the interviewee, and act as an invitation for that representation to be confirmed or denied (again, see VI.3.2.4 above);
- (c) elicit further information on that topic as the focus for the next turn.

Formulations are intended to preserve neutrality, contrary to third-turn receipts, insofar as they do not manifest empathy or affiliation with the interviewee. However they are also selective, in that they preserve some elements of the report while discarding others, and they make explicit what is often left implicit in a report, e.g. causality: "The interviewer's formulation is inferentially elaborative in that it picks out certain elements of the prior report, re-references them, and explicitly depicts their relatedness to one another", (Heritage 1985: 103).

The main role of formulations in television news interviews is then to develop and advance a report by emphasising one aspect of it which is maintained as the topical focus for the next turn, while the news audience is kept on an 'institutionally appropriate footing'⁽⁴⁾. This is achieved by means of three main actions: *prompts*, *co-operative recycles*, and *inferentially elaborate probes*.

A *prompt* is used to invite the interviewee to reconfirm or elaborate on prior remarks; a *co-operative recycle* is an "accurate and agreeable" restatement of the interviewee's position, often* accompanied by a disclaimer of interviewer responsibility, (e.g. 'so you're suggesting there that...'); and an *inferentially elaborate probe* is used to test or probe some aspect of the interviewee's acts, intentions or attitudes, in other words "to restate the interviewee's position by making overt reference to what might be treated as implicated or presupposed by that position" ((Heritage 1985: 110). This type of formulation is essentially unco-operative, as the interviewee is obliged to provide a stronger, possibly more news-worthy statement of his/her position.

VI.4.2.1 Formulation as a mechanism of control

The formulation has thus become a controlling mechanism for interviewers, by which they are able to clarify, underline significance, challenge or probe prior talk, while at the same time being 'covered' by the warrant of neutrality - of making something 'clear' for the news audience. This neutrality of formulations is, however, suspect, as by their nature they are selective, focusing on particular aspects of a report while underplaying others, and doing a lot of inferential work via presuppositions and background assumptions to make certain implicit propositions of the talk explicit, and thus highlighted.

In the process of glossing statements, an interpretation of speaker meaning is given by the interviewer for the purpose of clarification to the news audience, but the new representation functions to orient the talk in one way rather than another, preserving a "tacit orientation" of the talk for the overhearing audience, and constraining the interviewee

to focus on particular aspects of the report. Formulating, then, appears to be a useful mechanism for determining topic, direction and even re-representation of a story, which implies that the control of the talk in this type of institutional exchange lies with the the participant doing the formulations.

VI.5 Conclusions

Although these analyses of aspects of institutional discourse have produced valuable results in terms of explicating the processes according to which talk is produced in institutional contexts compared to the organisation of talk in natural conversation, with the exception of Harris (1984), their accent has been on local situational features of interaction, with less attention paid to social factors such as status and power relationships between participants in the talk.

Fairclough has commented that:

"Although 'locally' explanatory descriptive work may seek to identify at least local determinants of features of particular discourses, descriptive work generally has been little concerned with the effects of discourse. [...] For critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, the question of how discourse cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro-structures is at the heart of the explanatory endeavour" (1985: 753).

Discursive interaction does not take place in a social vacuum, and all talk, whether it be natural conversation or institutional ceremony, operates according to constraints that are produced by the social environment in which it occurs, and is not just organised co-operatively between the participants involved.

However, as the ethnomethodologists have shown, there are strong rules for organising turn-taking speech exchanges on every level, whether the

exchange is locally managed, or organised according to institutionally pre-allocated turn positions. One way of investigating the ways in which power structures are actively reproduced in discourse may therefore be to examine samples of talk which take place in a context of asymmetrical power relations, and to analyse the organisation and management of the interaction in terms of the effect of those power relations on the kind of actions participants are able to take in the discourse, and in terms of the kinds of restrictions that are placed on access to more or less powerful turn positions.

Fairclough has also commented that "the absence of a serious concern with explaining norms (of interaction) results in a neglect of power; [...] furthermore, there has been such an emphasis on co-operative conversation between equals that even matters of status have been relatively neglected", (1985: 756). Without equal status, participants in talk cannot contribute equally to "a maximally effective exchange of information" (cf. Grice, 1975), on co-operative terms, according to the maxims of conversation, since a pre-condition of the co-operative principle is that participants have the same rights and obligations in the discourse, rights to turn-taking, to performing certain illocutionary acts (such as requesting, ordering, etc.) and the obligation to respond to them. On the other hand, the notion of felicity conditions (cf. Austin, 1962) for performative utterances has tended to naturalise relationships of hierarchy and status, by considering the power to undertake certain speech acts to be a pre-determined 'given', rather than as a relationship which can be actively constructed on a discursive level.

In this review of theories of discursive interaction, I have claimed that it is possible to examine the effect of power relationships on discourse through an analysis of rights and restrictions which are set up within the interactive structure of talk. I have also suggested that gaining access to particular turn positions may play a crucial role in the way that talk is managed and controlled.

In the case studies which follow, I propose to use some of the findings of conversation analysis which have been described above, in order to explore in more detail the possible interface between particular discursive features and social relations of power, since there seem to be certain types of turn which are potentially more powerful than others in terms of securing control of the interaction.

As has been discussed in VI.4.1 above, question turns are potentially more powerful than answer turns, since an asymmetrical relation is set up between the participant occupying the question turn, and the participant occupying the answer turn, who is under some sort of obligation to respond. This relationship has been examined in terms of courtroom proceedings, both in magistrates courts and judicial enquiries, but may well apply in other types of interaction as a mechanism for establishing discursive control. This claim will be examined further in an analysis of a radio phone-in broadcast in Chapter VII, and also in relation to a police investigation in Chapter IX.

In some institutional contexts, such as the examples of courtroom interaction discussed in VI.4.1 above, the high degree of pre-allocation of turns results in certain turn types being reserved for some participants and refused to others. Consequently, the power to

control the discourse, in terms of both topic management and of constraints on certain actions, seems to be unequally distributed between the participants, and to reinforce existing social relations of power. Another conversational mechanism which also seems to be potentially powerful in terms of topic control is the formulation, the nature and use of which have been outlined in the context of television interviews in VI.4.2 above. It has been suggested that the participant occupying the formulating turn is in a stronger position from which to control the direction of the talk, than the participant who is in the position of having to supply confirmation or disconfirmation of the formulated proposition. In this way, formulating activity appears to be another potential mechanism for gaining control of the interaction, and creating an asymmetrical relationship discursively between participants.

VI.5.1 Towards an Analysis of Mechanisms of Discursive Control: Three Case Studies

The primary objectives of the three case studies which follow are therefore:

1. To examine the management of talk in terms of the organisation and control of discursive space, i.e. the access to particular turn positions from which certain actions can be taken, and the function of particular types of turn (e.g. formulations and questions) in establishing that control;

and

2. To investigate the rights and obligations in talk between participants of unequal status, by comparing possible actions that can

be taken with those that would normally occur in 'natural' conversation.

In undertaking these case studies, the intention is to explore further the hypothesis that asymmetrical social relations of power are actively produced and reinforced through the systems of structuring and management of talk. In the following chapters, I am particularly concerned with the mechanisms of control which may be in operation in talk that is produced in institutional contexts, between participants of unequal status in terms of social power.

If it is the case that power is reinforced and reproduced through discourse, as Fairclough has claimed, then it is necessary to analyse specific examples of institutional discourse, in order to establish which strategies and actions enable some participants to establish and maintain control of the interaction, at the same time restricting the actions of other participants in the talk.

It is then samples of talk from institutional contexts which forms the body of data for the following three studies, talk that takes place within institutionally-determined norms of interaction which are characterised by asymmetrical power relations in terms of hierarchy and social status. However, I would again stress that everyday conversational events should be considered as taking place according to institutionally-determined norms, but in selecting data from specific institutions, it can be predicted that the asymmetrical relations of power will be more prominent, and thus more overtly accessible for the purposes of critical discursive analysis than naturally-occurring conversation.

Of the available transcribed and recorded data, two specific instances of institutional talk were selected for their inherent features of asymmetrical power relations, although the two talk 'events' take place in very different institutional environments. One is a transcript of a police interview with a woman making a complaint of rape⁽⁵⁾, and the other is a Radio One 'Phone-In' programme to Margaret Thatcher. The third set of data is taken from talk between participants in television political interviews, where the relations of power and status are more ambiguous and thus a possible 'problem area' for controlling the discursive interaction. The main objectives of the analysis will be to focus on how the asymmetrical power relations at work in these talk events are made explicit, established or challenged in terms of the management of the discursive interaction itself.

CHAPTER VII

CASE STUDY 4: MECHANISMS OF CONTROL OF TALK - TURN STRUCTURE IN A RADIO PHONE-IN

"As long as one is in the position of doing the questions, then in part one has control of the conversation." (Harvey Sacks, Unpublished Lecture, 1964).

"Anyone in the position of answering is restricted to dealing with just what's in the prior question." (Paul Drew, 1984).

VII.0 Introduction and Objectives.

In this study, the turn structure of talk in a RADIO ONE 'Phone-In' programme is analysed in order to examine whether specific turn positions can function to control the interaction, and if so, how this affects the discursive organisation in terms of 'who can do what' in this type of talk event.

A Radio 'Phone-In' typically consists of the following participants: a D.J., a 'guest personality' and listeners who participate in the broadcast by telephoning in to talk directly to the 'guest personality'. The generic nature of this type of programme sets up some expectations about the kind of interaction that will take place, specifically, some form of direct discursive interaction between the listeners who 'phone in', and question the 'guest personality' on specific issues. These expectations are to a certain extent mitigated by institutional constraints on the talk, and this results in the control of the talk, which in other institutional settings such as courtrooms etc. resides with the 'questioner', being as it were 'displaced' onto another participant, not the one 'doing the questions'.

The first part of the analysis deals with the openings of calls in the phone-in, in order to establish what the sequencing rules are which

govern the interaction prior to the question turn, and what kind of participant positions are set up in these opening exchanges. The second part deals with specific question/answer pairs to examine whether the talk follows the 'rules' for adjacency pairing of utterances in conversational interaction, and if not, what new set of rules may emerge from the data. Any 'breaches' of the rules which occur, and their effect on the talk are also examined. The third part of the analysis looks at the closings of calls, in order to establish what constitutes a sufficient answer to a question, and which participants may decide when to terminate a call.

In conclusion, it is claimed that control of the talk depends on certain participants occupying particular turn positions and turn types, in terms of what can actually be done within those turns, and that this control is asymmetrical, i.e. not all participants in the talk have the same 'rights', in the management of the talk.

VII.1 Programme Details

The talk to be examined in this paper is taken from data recorded during the period May/June 1987, just prior to the general election of that year. This particular phone-in was broadcast on BBC Radio One, on 3rd June, and the participants in the programme are the disc jockey Simon Bates, Margaret Thatcher, and a series of about 20 callers from throughout England and Wales. In the analysis, callers will be referred to by their first names, the D.J. as SB, and Margaret Thatcher as MT.

VII.1.1 Generic Features

The characteristic generic feature of a phone-in is the fact that it involves a form of direct contact between participating listeners and

one or more 'guest personalities', (from political or other public spheres); i.e it is a "communicative event by the media, with media-users as participants", (van Dijk, 1985: 8) . This contact is to some extent mediated by the D.J., who introduces callers and intervenes in exchanges between the callers and the guest personality. These exchanges usually take the form of a question/answer sequence.

VII.1.2 Participation Frameworks

As well as specifying the participants in the talk event, it is also necessary to distinguish between PRODUCERS and PROCESSORS of talk in relation to this particular form of discursive situation, and to bear in mind that those who are actively engaged in producing the talk are not the only processors of it. As for all radio talk, the processors of the talk are not only the interactants themselves, but anyone who is listening to the programme. Listeners have a 'non-productive' role, but nevertheless seem to represent an important element in the organisation of the talk and may well play an important role in accounting for certain of its surface features, (cf. Montgomery. 1986a).

Goffman describes this relationship between speakers and hearers of talk in terms of participation frameworks: "When a word is spoken, all those who happen to be in perceptual range of the event will have some sort of participation status relative to it" (1981: 3). A participation status is "the relation of any one such member to this utterance", (or indeed to all the activity in the situation). A hearer may have an official status as a ratified participant in an encounter, but other hearers also exist: bystanders or eavesdroppers for example, whose participation status is not that of ratified participant.

In the context of an informal conversation, any such non-productive processors of the talk will not necessarily be accounted for in the structure of that conversation. In the context of a radio broadcast where listeners are excluded from the talk due to generic and technical features of the medium, they nevertheless retain an official status in the talk 'event'. As Goffman states: "an utterance does not carve up the world beyond the speaker into precisely two parts, recipients and non-recipients, but rather opens up an array of structurally differentiated possibilities, establishing the participation framework in which the speaker will be guiding his delivery" (p: 137).

In the case of radio talk, certain features of its discursive organisation may be accounted for by this participation framework of 'active' and 'passive' ratified participants, e.g. the fact that the DJ manages the interaction and the length of calls, mediating between the active participants in the talk to ensure that it remains accessible to the listeners, who are also ratified participants. In the phone-in, these features seem to have the function of containing the talk within a certain institutionalised format which does not exclude listeners from the talk event, to a certain extent preventing it from becoming one-to-one interaction.

VII.1.3 Institutional Constraints

As well as the generic and discursive features mentioned above, it must be noted that there are certain institutional and technical constraints operating on the talk in this type of programme. Firstly, the D.J. has a pre-allocated role as the presenter of the programme, which can be defined informally as being nominally in control of the proceedings, introducing callers, and organising the transfer from one caller to

another. Secondly, the callers have been pre-selected, and the order of their questions pre-established, as well as the topic, or theme, of their questions. Evidence for this occurs in utterances such as:

(1) - (Call 8)

SB: We may come back to that later on

or

(2) - (Call 14)

SB: Well hold on a second . Jasbinda because I'd like to bring back . if someone else from Cardiff in Wales on that

Thirdly, the opening sequences of the telephone calls from listeners to the programme take place 'off the air', and the openings of the calls as they are broadcast differ significantly from those of 'normal' telephone calls, as will be seen later in the analysis.

The ensuing account of the data is based on the assumption that these generic, discursive and institutional features will have some effect on the interaction taking place in the phone-in, differentiating it from other forms of discursive interaction. The way in which the organisation and control of the talk is managed by the participants within this framework, compared to management of other forms of conversational activity, is therefore the main focus of this analysis.

The use of techniques of conversation analysis in the description of other forms of institutional data, (cf. the discussion in Chapter VI above), has been based on an observation that conversation is the basic system of interaction, with a high degree of variable parameters, and that institutional or ceremonial discourse fixes, in various ways, those variable parameters (cf. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978). As has already been pointed out, this has motivated a comparative analysis with mundane interaction, which is "essential if the 'special features'

of interaction in particular institutional contexts are to receive adequate specification and understanding." Of particular relevance to this study is the analysis of interactive structure of telephone calls, (cf. Schegloff 1972, 1979), specifically the way call openings and closings are managed by participants, which forms a basis for comparison with the institutionalised talk of a radio phone-in.

VII.2 Features of Conversational Interaction in the Phone-In.

While remaining relatively informal compared, for instance, to the interaction in courtroom cross-examinations, which has a high proportion of pre-allocated turns and turn-types, the interaction in the radio phone-in examined here seems nevertheless to exhibit definite structural regularities in the organisation of the turn-taking system.

This type of programme does set up expectations of some kind of conversational activity; dialogue between programme participants and some form of minimal question-answer sequencing. It therefore seems valid, at least as a starting point for the analysis, to examine the data in terms of conversational structure, in order to establish how and when the rules governing the organisation of this type of radio talk differ from those governing the organisation of informal conversation.

VII.2.1 Local Management and Turn-Taking

The phone-in data can in many respects be regarded as 'conversational', in that it exhibits features of conversational activity, such as turn-taking. Turn taking, as the conversation analysts have observed, is a basic feature of conversation between two participants, insofar as one person starts, talks and stops, then the second person starts, talks

and stops, with very little overlap, and with very short gaps between participant turns (see VI.3.2.1 above). The mechanism which governs this activity must also operate when there are more than two participants in the talk:

"If there are more than two parties then provision is made for all parties to speak without there being any specified order or 'queue' of speakers. In addition the same system seems to operate equally well both in face-to-face interaction and in the absence of visual monitoring,, as on the telephone" (Levinson, 1983: 297).

Local Management is the system proposed by Sacks, Shegloff and Jefferson (1978), to account for the mechanism of turn-taking, and functions according to 'a set of rules' operating on a turn-by-turn basis. The system operates as a device for allocating 'control of the floor' to participants in the conversation and requires 'minimal units', i.e. turn construction components, and turn-allocational components, for the selection of next speakers, (1978: 9). These are formed by syntactic elements, (sentences, clauses etc.) and a speaker is initially assigned one of these units, which can then be expanded, to construct a turn. At the end of a unit there is a point where another turn may begin, called a transition relevance place, or TRP. A crucial feature of these units is the predictability of the end of a unit which accounts for split-second speaker transition between turns.

Of course, speaker selection is less problematic when there are only two participants in the talk. As there are three participants in the phone-in model, one area for close investigation is how speakers are selected and turns allocated in the data, and it is predicted that the system of local management will in some way be influenced by the

institutional nature of the talk, differentiating it from more 'informal' conversational activity.

Although there may be good arguments for considering all conversational interaction as occurring on some form of institutional basis, only on a more or less formal scale, (having a chat over the garden fence may be subject to certain organisational rules just as teacher-pupil talk is, only less formally), for the purposes of this analysis it is nevertheless considered that the talk in this data is a special, institutional, form of conversational activity, which will have certain features in common with informal conversation, but which will be subject to institutional constraints.

VII.3 Data Analysis

This analysis is divided into three main parts, each dealing with a specific aspect of the interactive 'unit' of the phone-in: the call. A call has three broadly distinct steps, or actions, within it: the opening sequence, the question/answer sequence, and the closing sequence.

VII.3.1 Patterns of Opening Sequences in a Telephone Conversation

Since the data we are dealing with here is talk which takes place through the medium of the telephone, it may be interesting to compare the opening sequences of the talk with those of a 'normal' telephone conversation, which is organised according to fairly strong constraints based on sets of adjacency pairs. Schegloff (1972), defines the opening sequences of a telephone call as follows:

Caller : summons (phone rings)
 Receiver: response
 Caller: greetings 1 (+identification)
 Receiver: greetings 2
 Caller: first topic slot

In practice, this would produce:

Caller : phone rings (summons)
 Receiver: hello (response)
 Caller: hello, it's Sue here (greetings 1)
 Receiver: hello Sue (greetings 2)
 Caller: - (first topic slot)

The *summons* functions as a first pair part of an adjacency pair *summons/response*, i.e. the telephone ringing produces a response from the receiver, who answers it. In the phone-in, this opening sequence does not form part of the broadcast phone call, (although this exchange must have taken place off the air, previous to the sequence occurring in the data, with a different receiver), and the principal difference with a normal phone call is then that the D.J. knows in advance who is calling, so there is no caller identification slot.

In the phone-in, the conversation begins with the receiver, in this case the D.J., nominating the caller (out of a series of possible callers), and greeting him or her. This is the reversal of a 'normal' call opening, where it is the caller who identifies him or herself (if necessary) to the receiver. The callers in the phone-in do however often confirm their identification, as well as responding to the greeting, by saying *hello, yes*, as in the following call:

(3) - (Call 1)
 SB: Kevin M from Barnstaple in North Devon . good evening
 Kevin: Hello yes

Once the opening sequence has been completed, however, callers have the first topic slot position to ask a question, and the following turn is

taken by M.T. providing the second pair part (i.e. the answer) of a question/answer adjacency pair sequence. It can be noted here that this is the only place in a call where there is direct interaction between the caller and M.T. apart from one particular case which I shall be discussing in detail below.

Although the rules governing opening sequences in the phone-in are necessarily different from those of the telephone conversation, because of the call being broadcast without its opening sequences for technical, organisational reasons, there is nevertheless a definite sequence established for the 'on the air' openings. This can be represented as:

| | | |
|----|--------|--|
| T1 | SB | (Nomination/greetings 1/'on-line' signal |
| T2 | | (Greetings 2 |
| T3 | | (Greetings 3 (not always provided) |
| T4 | Caller | (Question |
| T5 | MT | (Response |

The three components (nomination, greetings and 'on-line signal') of the first turn do not always occur in this order, and the greetings component is sometimes omitted from this turn, as will be seen in the following section. In turns 2 and 3, the greetings slot can be taken up by either of the other two participants, and the Caller always occupies the question turn.

It should also be noted that the allocation of the identifying turns are different in the phone-in from those of a phone-call: whereas in a telephone call opening, it is the caller who identifies him/herself, in the phone-in they are identified by the receiver, i.e. the D.J., who is selecting callers. In telephone conversation openings, there are rules of summons/answering sequences which result in the receiver having to listen to the caller. These rules are that:

- summons/answer sequences are non-terminal (something must follow)
 - " " " are non-repeatable
 - the summoner is obligated to talk again
 - the answerer is obligated to listen
- (Shegloff, 1972).

Thus, any obligation on the part of the receiver to listen to unselected participants is removed, as the opening sequences are bypassed in the live broadcast, these sequences taking place off the air.

What appears to be happening in the opening exchanges of the phone-in, is that the adjacency pair rules operate *within* a framework of a regular sequence of 'moves', (cf. Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975). Callers selected from a range of possible participants have to be brought into the interaction by the D.J.. To do this, the D.J. uses a system similar to that of nomination, a term which has been used by Sinclair and Coulthard to refer to the act of naming members of a class, either by calling them by name, or using a proform *you, anybody*, in order to "call on or give permission to a pupil to contribute to the discourse" (1975: 42). In the phone-in, the act of nomination indicates to callers when it is their turn in a sequence of calls.

VII.3.2 Patterns of Opening Sequences in the Phone-In

The opening sequence of the calls follows a pattern which is typically made up of 3 or 4 turns, and in which all three participants have at least one turn position. An example of this pattern is seen in the call openings below:

- (4) - (Call 5)
- | | | |
|----|--------|--|
| T1 | SB: | It's 01580 4411 you're on line to the Prime Minister and we'll go to David J in Portsmouth in Hampshire . hello David (G1) |
| T2 | David: | Hello (G2) |
| T3 | MT: | Hello David(G1) |
| T4 | David: | Hello . does the Prime Minister think that [....] (G2 + Question) |

(5) - (Call 4)

T1 SB: Ned G in York you're on line to Mrs
Thatcher . hi (G1)
T2 Ned: Hello Mrs Thatcher (G1)
T3 MT: Hello Ned (G2)

(6) - (Call 9)

T1 SB: Chris J in Coventry in the West Midlands
you're on line to the Prime Minister
T2 MT: Hello Chris (G1)
T3 Chris: Hello Mrs Thatcher . um first of all I'd
like to [...] (G2 + Question)

In the opening sequence, SB always takes the first turn, which is made up of a maximum of three components: a *nomination* of the caller, a *greetings* token, and an 'on-line' signal. The 'on-line' signal refers to the action of setting up the direct communication between caller and MT, in other words, organising the transition from interaction between SB and caller to MT and caller.

The nomination is always present and usually occurs at the beginning of the turn, whereas the greetings token and 'on-line' positions can be interchanged, in mid-turn or turn-final position, or absent from the turn altogether. In (4), the 'on-line' signal occurs at the beginning of the turn, but the DJ precedes this signal with the telephone number for the programme, which appears to be addressed to all 'ratified listeners' to the phone-in, rather than specifically to the caller David. Breaking down the turn into its separate components gives us, in Call 4:

Nomination: Ned G in York
On-line signal: You're on line to Mrs Thatcher
Greetings: Hi

The position of the greetings token and 'on-line' signal influences what happens in the next utterance, and who takes the next turn position. For example, when the greetings token occurs as the final component of the turn, it is nearly always followed by a greeting response from the caller, producing a regular greetings adjacency pair:

(7) - (Call 12)

SB: Sarah H in Cheltenham in Gloucester *hello*
 Sarah: *Hello*

The only exception to this rule is in Call 4, where the caller takes turn 2, but instead of supplying the second part greeting of the adjacency pair, supplies another first part greeting to MT:

(5) - (Call 4)

SB: Ned G in York you're on line to Mrs Thatcher . *hi*
 Ned: - *Hello Mrs Thatcher*
 MT: *Hello Ned*

One explanation for this may have something to do with the fact that the *you're on the line to Mrs Thatcher* component occurring in mid-turn position is processed by the caller as a form of introduction to the Prime Minister, which overrides the greeting component, i.e. it carries more weight in governing what happens in the response. The only other call where this occurs is Call 11, where the addressee of the greeting in turn 2 is not specified, and a first-pair greeting part is not supplied by SB:

(8) - (Call 11)

SB: Elliott L you're on line to Mrs Thatcher
 Elliott: *Good evening*
 MT: *Hello Elliott good evening*

In this opening, the greetings token directed to the caller is absent from the first turn, and the caller supplies the first part of a greetings adjacency pair, MT the second part.

When the greetings token occurs as the second component in the turn, MT takes over turn 2:

(9) - (Call 2)

SB: Sarah P in Sudbury in Suffolk good evening .
 you're on line to the Prime Minister
 MT: Good evening

When the greetings token is absent from the D.J. turn, either the caller initiates a greetings sequence with MT, as in (10), or MT takes over turn 2, as in (11):

(10) - (Call 6)
 SB: Paul F in Runcorn in Cheshire . you're on line to
 the Prime Minister
 Paul: Hello Mrs Thatcher

(11) - (Call 9)
 SB: Chris J in Coventry in the West Midlands you're
 on line to the Prime Minister
 MT: Hello Chris

The implication of these turn patterns is that the force of a greeting is strongest, i.e. produces a response from the addressee in the following turn, only when the greeting token occurs as the final component in the turn. In other words, what occurs in turn-final position tends to carry most weight, and the nature of the second-pair part of an adjacency pair will depend upon what comes in turn-final position of the previous first-pair part.

Also, if the greeting token appears in mid-turn position, or is absent altogether, then turn 2 can be occupied by a participant other than the participant nominated in turn 1.

Finally, if the 'on-line' signal is absent from the first turn, the caller does not ask their question directly, but only after it has been supplied by SB, as in (12), or by MT, as in (13):

(12) - (Call 12)
 SB: Sarah H in Cheltenham in Gloucester hello
 Sarah: Hello
 MT: Hello Sarah
 SB: You're on line to the Prime Minister
 Sarah: I'd just like to ask you [....]

and

(13) - (Call 19)

SB: Sophie L in Hackney in London . hello Sophie
 Sophie: Hello
 MT: Sophie
 Sophie: Hello
 MT: Hello dear go ahead

To conclude this section, I would suggest that the supplying of the 'on-line' signal, setting up the possibility of direct interaction with MT, acts as a form of authorisation to take a turn, in particular the caller question turn. In other words, the caller does not have the 'right' to ask a question until either SB or MT authorises them to do so.

The turn-constructional components identified so far in the opening sequences of the phone-in are as follows:

NOMINATIONS

GREETINGS (usually in 2 part adjacency pairs)

'ON-LINE' SIGNALS (authorising a caller question turn)

As has been noted, the nomination always occurs first, and the greetings and 'on-line' signals are interchangeable in mid-turn and turn-final positions. These turn-construction components can all occur within in the same turn, or be spread over a series of turns, but are always occupied by the D.J. The Caller then responds to the nomination and greeting, but waits for the authorisation provided by an 'on-line' signal before asking a question. This pattern thus sets up an interactive sequence which reverses that of the normal phone call, i.e. the receiver is under no obligation to the caller to respond, and it is the caller who is in the position of having to respond to the D.J, as a result placing the D.J. in a stronger position of control from the outset. This position is strengthened by the 'on-line' signal component, which reinforces the asymmetrical relationship between

participants, since the 'right of access' to the caller's question turn has to be authorised by the DJ or MT. The notion of participant's 'rights' in the talk can be developed further if we look at the specific actions taken by the participants in the phone-in.

VII.3.3 Allocation of Turn-Types in Openings: Who Does What

Having established these turn-components, we can now look at which participants can occupy particular types of turns, and see whether there are any restrictions on who can take up the different turn positions in the talk. The following observations can be made:

1. SB is always in first turn position of a call, and therefore always occupies the nominating turn. He can also occupy greeting and 'authorising' turns when these components occur as separate turns.
2. Margaret Thatcher can occupy greeting turns and 'authorising' turns.
3. The caller can occupy greeting and question turns, but the latter only after an authorisation has been supplied.

It would seem that the interaction in these opening sequences is operating according to fairly regular rules of adjacency pairing, in so far as greeting pairs, for instance, are respected by the participants, (apart from the one exception noted above). However, there is an asymmetrical allocation of turn types as the callers do not always occupy the same turn types as SB or MT. They never give 'on-line' signals, i.e. they cannot authorise turns. Moreover, they cannot initiate a question turn without the authorisation being supplied by SB or MT.

VII.3.4 Implications: Notion of 'Authorisation'

In view of the two observations quoted at the beginning of this paper, it would appear that the organisation of the turn structure in the openings of phone-in calls provides a setting for establishing the control of the talk, which, as has been noted above, according to conversational norms usually lies with the person asking the questions. In the phone-in, despite the fact that the caller occupies the crucial question turn, the talk is managed in such a way that the caller does not have the same possibilities as the other two participants, and has to be given authorisation to take up a question turn position. When this authorisation is absent, or delayed, the caller does not initiate the question turn but waits for it to be supplied before proceeding with a question.

There is therefore an asymmetrical structure of control which is contrary to other forms of institutional discursive events in which the person asking the questions is in the 'controlling' position, eg: the classroom, courtroom, police investigation, etc. In the phone-in, the 'power' of the questioner is limited by the organisational structure of the interaction, which restricts the access of the caller to particular turn-types. The interactive power of the other two participants is on the other hand increased, since they can take up turn positions that are not accessible to the caller, and do not have to wait for authorisation to speak. Thus, the more powerful conversational role of 'questioner' is mitigated in the phone-in by the opening sequence of the calls, which sets up a less powerful position role for the caller to question from.

VII.4 Question/Answer Pairs: Adjacency Pairs in Conversation.

An adjacency pair, of which the greetings pairs in the opening sequences examined above are an example, is typically composed of two adjacent utterances, "produced by different speakers, ordered as a first part and a second part, and typed, such that a particular first part requires a particular second part" (eg. a question requires an answer), and a rule which governs their use is: "having produced a first part of some pair, the current speaker must stop speaking and next speaker must produce at that point a second part to the same pair" (Levinson, 1983: 303). In the data examined here, this rule does not always seem to hold, as a first pair part (eg. a greeting token) can be turn-initial or turn-medial, without the current speaker stopping speaking. However, this rule can be modified by the occurrence of 'insertion sequences', where, for example, one question-answer pair can be embedded in another, as in the following example :

A: May I have a bottle of Mich? Q1
 B: Are you 21? Q2
 A: No A1
 B: No A2
 (Levinson: 304)

There can be any number of utterances inserted into an adjacency pair, resulting in a question and its answer being several utterances apart, but the first part of an adjacency pair guarantees that either a relevant second pair part will occur at some point, or that its absence will be accounted for in some way. In this particular set of data, it seems that other tokens can be inserted within the turn before the second pair part is supplied by the next speaker.

The main problem with adjacency pairs is that the examples quoted in the literature often only have two participants in the conversation,

therefore it will be necessary to examine how they function in conversational activity involving more than two participants.

VII4.1 Adjacency Pairs in the Phone-In

Regular adjacency question/answer pairs do form part of the organising discursive format of the phone-in, as each call sequence contains at least one specific question, to which an answer is supplied by the designated next speaker, in exchanges such as:

(14) - (Call 1)

Kevin: My question to the Prime Minister is on health .
I'm a nurse in a London teaching hospital and my
question is this . if the Prime Minister is so
committed to the health service why is it that
she did not have the confidence to use the NHS
herself recently

MT: It's not a question of confidence . I have to have
anything I need doing on a certain day . at a
certain time . and I confess I prefer to choose
my own particular doctor . and for that . I'm
prepared to insure

(15) - (Call 2)

Sarah: What are you going to do about people like my
dad . who when they go after jobs . are told that
they are too old at forty

MT: We have a special scheme . it's called I'm afraid
restart . there's a lot of jargon in this . they
are called in every six months if they haven't
got a job [....]

These exchanges are examples of a regular question/answer pair in which the participants are the caller and MT. However, the adjacency pair rules do not tell us anything about what happens next in the exchange, nor who speaks next.

If we turn to the 'IRF' model (cf. VI.3.1 above) of the structure of a two-participant conversation, the next turn would probably be a response, or follow-up turn by Participant 1, who took the question turn, to indicate satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the answer supplied by Participant 2. For instance, in a teacher/pupil exchange:

- (I) Teacher Can you tell me why you eat all that food?
Yes
- (R) Pupil To keep you strong.
- (F) Teacher To keep you strong. Yes.

In the phone-in, this does not happen. After a question/answer exchange, it is SB who takes the next turn:

(16) - (Call 3)

Sharon: Mrs Thatcher . I'd like to know if you come to power again . what you're going to do about the schools [....]

SB: Sharon thank you very much for your question . it's a very bad line but I think I heard [....]

MT: Er Sharon I thought I heard that .

SB: mm well that answers that question . Ned G in York you're on line to Mrs Thatcher

The structure which emerges here is a four-part exchange made up of the caller's question turn, a D.J. turn (to rectify the technical problem of the bad line), an answer turn, and a then a follow-up turn, which is taken by the D.J., not the caller. In the follow-up turn, it is possible either to terminate the call and introduce the next one, or to open up space for further questions, or 'supplementaries'. The ability to terminate a call in this turn in effect also implies the ability to judge whether a sufficient answer has been supplied. This is made particularly explicit in (16) above by SB's comment *well that answers that question*. In the data, these turn positions are always occupied by the same participants:

1. Question turn: Caller
2. Answer turn: MT
3. Follow-up turn: SB

In the phone-in therefore it is not the callers who decide whether their question has been answered satisfactorily, but SB, and this again undermines the conversational 'power' of the questioner, by restricting

their access to a follow-up turn, and consequently their right to determine whether their question has been given an adequate answer.

VII.4.2 Supplementary Questions: Who Asks Them

As described above, there is often only one question-answer adjacency pair between the caller and MT in each call to the phone-in, which limits the direct interaction between two of the participants in the talk. Any further questions, referred to as 'supplementaries' in the data, are either asked directly by SB, or are elicited from (or refused to) the caller by him, as in the examples in (17) below:

(17)

(Call 2)

SB: Sarah you're a 12 year-old . are you happy with the Prime Minister's answer?

(Call 6)

SB: Paul does that answer your question?

(Call 6) (to MT)

SB: Do you recognise the north/south divide?

(Call 8)

SB: Would you like to come back Ian?

(Call 1)

SB: Kevin I'm not going to let you come back with a supplementary . I want to get as many calls in as possible

When a caller tries to take up a 'supplementary' question or follow-up turn without SB providing one of the turn-types above, he is prevented from doing so by SB, as in the example below:

(18) - (Call 5)

David: What ... (inaudible)

MT: and sometimes it's thought that they would need more

SB: Hang on one second David

MT: it's a top-up loan and not a substitute for a grant

SB: Would you like to come back now

David: Yes the point I'm trying to make is that [....]

This seems to indicate that any question initiation turn from the caller has to be preceded by a D.J. 'authorisation' turn, in which channels are reopened between a caller and MT as in the opening sequences when the component *you're on line to the Prime Minister* has to be supplied before the caller asks their question. In the above extract, the caller's attempt to initiate a turn is disallowed by SB, and the Prime Minister goes on talking without repeating any part of her utterance, i.e. without acknowledging that an interruption has occurred. It should be noted here that where overlap or interruption occur in informal conversation, this is typically repaired by one speaker dropping out, and the other recycling that part of the turn obscured by the overlap, (cf. Levinson, 1983: 300). In this extract, MT continues without recycling: no part of the utterance is repeated. The caller, behaving in an orderly fashion, forgoes his turn until selected to take a turn by SB's 'on-line' signal.

Turn sequences of the following type also need to be accounted for in some way, as they appear to be breaching speaker selection rules altogether. In his question turn, SB has designated Sarah as the next speaker, but it is MT who takes the next 'response' turn, before Sarah gives her answer in turn 3:

(19) - (Call 2)

- (1) SB: *Sarah* does your f... . does your dad perhaps
feel that he's too old for a job
- (2) MT: *Oh no*
- (3) Sarah: Well he's on a government scheme at the
moment . but he finishes in August so then
he'll be out of work again
- (4) SB: uhuh

and the same happens in (20), where MT again takes up the second turn before Paul provides the answer to SB's question:

(20) - (Call 6)

- (1) SB: *Paul does that answer your question*
 (2) MT: *er Paul will know all this . working for a
 building society*
 (3) Paul: *Yes . um . to a certain extent yes [....]*

In these extracts we find the second turn position occupied by a non-designated speaker, i.e. a participant who is not the addressee of the question turn. In (19), the second turn position supplies the second pair part of the adjacency pair, and the third turn position also does so, giving the sequence:

- T1 question + designation of next speaker
 T2 answer 1a (non-designated speaker)
 T3 answer 1b (designated speaker)

It would seem that there is some breach, or variation, of the adjacency pair sequencing rules occurring here, because a participant self-selects despite the next speaker having already been designated.

In (20), the second turn position is not the second part of an adjacency pair, but a comment, or continuation of a previous turn from the non-designated speaker, and the second-pair part is supplied in turn 3 by the designated speaker:

- T1 question + designation of next speaker
 T2 comment (non-designated speaker)
 T3 answer (designated speaker)

It seems possible then for a participant to take non-designated turns, and override the selector of the question, but when this occurs, it is always MT who takes the non-designated second turn position. The authorisation to take a turn then seems only to be applied to the caller, whereas MT needs no authorisation to speak.

This would imply that what has so far been considered as an organisational feature constraining the management of talk in a phone-in, does not in fact apply to all participants, and that the

restrictions that apply to callers do not apply equally to MT. In other words, the institutional constraints of organisation, which produce an asymmetrical relation of power between participants, can be breached by MT, who has access to many more actions in the talk than the caller does. The right to self-select for a turn, without having to wait for D.J. authorisation to speak, seems to involve wider issues of power being reproduced in the interaction, rather than simply the organisational constraints of this particular type of broadcast.

VII.4.3 Breaches: Where the Structure Breaks Down

There are occasions, although they are rare, when a caller does not behave in an 'orderly' fashion (as in most of the extracts above), and breaks out of the established structure of the talk. The following call is an example of this kind of breach:

(21) - (Call 7)

- | | | |
|----|-------|---|
| 1 | SB: | Mark C from Ilfracombe in Devon . welcome |
| 2 | Mark: | Hello |
| 3 | MT: | Hello |
| 4 | SB: | What's your question please |
| 5 | Mark: | [....] does this not show that your government does not care about the young |
| 6 | MT: | No I don't think it does at all [...] if you were an employer you couldn't afford to take young people on at four fifths of the adult wage |
| 7 | Mark: | Yes but |
| 8 | MT: | if it was a skilled job . and so in our way we shall get many more people employed |
| 9 | Mark: | You've had 8 years to have your say . could I have a little more say please |
| 10 | MT: | Yes of course |
| 11 | Mark: | When an employer takes on young people [....] but at least they had some protection . you have removed that Mrs Thatcher |
| 12 | SB: | Mark hang on a second I'm going to get the Prime Minister to answer your question |
| 13 | MT: | No . no I don't accept that because [...] |
| 14 | SB: | We may come back to that later on . thank you for your call Mark . Ian W you're on line to the Prime Minister in Aylesbury Bucks. |

The first three turns of this call follow an orderly greetings structure of the opening sequence seen in previous calls, followed by an 'on-line' signal:

| | | |
|----|-------|------------------|
| T1 | SB: | greetings |
| T2 | Mark: | greetings |
| T3 | MT: | greetings |
| T4 | SB: | 'on-line' signal |

The next two turns constitute the question/answer adjacency pair, then the caller tries to obtain a next turn by interrupting at turn 7. MT uses the same strategy as in Call 5, (continuing without acknowledging the interruption), but this time the caller manages to take the next turn (turn 9) - a position which is occupied by SB in all the other calls. By doing this, he manages to interact directly with MT, and initiate another question/answer adjacency pair:

| | |
|-------|---|
| Mark: | You've had 8 years to have your say . could I have a little more say please |
| MT: | Yes of course |

thus opening up space for himself to take the following turn, turn 11, coming after MT's answer in turns 6 and 8.

By securing a further turn, Mark has broken the pattern established in all the other calls for this particular sequence, and engaged in non-mediated interaction which is governed by adjacency pair rules. In other words, instead of the positions:

| | | |
|-----|---------|-----------|
| (1) | Caller: | Question |
| (2) | MT: | Answer |
| (3) | SB: | Follow-up |

we find Mark taking the follow-up turn usually occupied by the D.J.:

| | | |
|----|-------|--------------------------------|
| 5. | Mark: | Question (first pair part) |
| 6. | MT: | Answer (second pair part) |
| 7. | Mark: | (Interruption) |
| 8. | MT: | Continues answer from turn (6) |

-
9. Mark: Question (first pair part)
 10. MT: Answer (second pair part)
 11. Mark: Follow-up : : :
 12. SB: (Interruption) :
 13. MT: Response to follow-up at turn 11)

From this sequence, it would appear that once the third turn after a question/answer adjacency pair has been secured by a participant, they are guaranteed a response from their addressee. SB's intervention at turn 12 is not acknowledged by either of the other participants, and in turn 13 MT is responding to Mark's follow-up at turn 11, not to his original question as prompted by SB at turn 12:

- SB: Mark hang on a second I'm going to get the prime minister to answer your question
 MT: No . no I don't accept that because [....]

This breach in the turn sequencing established in the other calls effectively allows for interaction between Mark and the Prime Minister which is not managed by SB.

VII.4.4 Implications: Notion of 'Mediation'

As I have attempted to demonstrate in the above analysis, the talk in the phone-in follows very specific patterns of turn-taking, which, when they are broken, considerably alter the organisation of the talk. The direct interaction between callers and MT occurs only in the central question/answer adjacency pair, and only after that question has been initiated by SB's 'on-line' signal in the opening sequence, eg: *you're on line to the Prime Minister*. Any other 'supplementary' question or follow-up can only be initiated by the D.J., not by the caller, and when callers try to initiate a turn without the D.J. first giving the 'on-line' signal, this is disallowed by the D.J.. I would suggest then that the callers are usually allocated one *authorised* question turn, which serves to limit their direct interaction with MT, and that any

subsequent interaction is *mediated* by SB. Whenever a caller attempts to take an unauthorised question or follow-up turn, and interact directly with MT without mediation, this is subject to SB's intervention to re-establish the 'normal' sequence, and the caller's role as a questioner is consequently very limited.

VII.5 Call Closings: Telephone Conversations Compared to Phone-In

The sequencing rules for telephone call closings, as well as their openings, are also subject to constraints, (cf. Sacks & Schegloff, 1973). A typical closing sequence involves four turns, which are governed by the rule that a pre-closing sequence is necessary to allow both participants space for 'deferred mentionables', (cf. Levinson, 1983: 325). This pre-closing sequence is then followed by the closing sequence, giving a structure such as:

A : okay
 B : okay
 A : bye
 B : bye

The rules governing the organisation of 'normal' telephone conversation closings are quite subtle:

"Closings are a delicate matter both technically, in the sense that they must be so placed that no party is forced to exit while still having compelling things to say, and socially in the sense that both over-hasty and over-slow terminations can carry unwelcome inferences about the social relationships between the participants."
 (Levinson: 316).

In the data, the technical rule is flouted insofar as the caller is given no chance to bring up 'deferred mentionables', i.e. what they might still have left to say, and the social rule insofar as the closing turn is often hasty in the extreme! A typical closing sequence is made up of only one turn, occupied by the DJ:

(22) - (Call 11)

SB: Thank you Elliot / Sarah Henry in Cheltenham in Gloucester . hello

This turn position usually occurs after a turn occupied by MT, and the transition to the next caller often occurs within that same turn, as in the extract above.

Other examples of terminations are given below:

(23)

(Call 1)

SB: Kevin I'm not going to let you come back with a supplementary . I want to get in as many calls as possible / Sarah P in Sudbury in Suffolk . good evening

(Call 3)

SB: mm well that answers that question / Ned G in York you're on line to the Prime Minister

Some closing sequences are comprised of more than one turn, as in (24):

(24) - (Call 9)

SB: Chris thank you very much for your question

MT: Thank you Chris /

SB: Michael P in Clifton in Bristol hello

Towards the end of the broadcast, presumably when time is running short, sometimes there is no closing sequence at all, and the call terminates directly after an MT turn by SB introducing the next caller. Another closing mechanism is the programme 'jingle'. This is heard three times in the phone-in, twice preceded by an SB turn, eg:

(25) - (Call 12)

SB: The Prime Minister

Jingle: Radio One . Election '87

The longest closing sequence occurs at the beginning of the programme in (26)

(26) - (Call 2):

MT: Sarah would like her father to have a job .
wouldn't you dear

Sarah: Yeah

MT: Yes of course you would . we'll try

SB: Thank you very much indeed for your call Sarah
/Sharon H [...]

The first three turns of this closing sequence, occupied by MT and Sarah in a question/answer/follow-up sequence, do not really constitute a closing in the same way as (24) or (25) above, but nevertheless do contain elements indicating a probable point of closure: the rhetorical question and repetition of Sarah's answer in the follow-up turn (taken by MT), intonational features (two falling tones on *of course you would* and *we'll try*).

VII.5.1 Who Can Terminate Calls

Many of the features identified in the above analysis are the result of practical problems of management of the talk which are specific to this type of programme in radio broadcasting. However, the result of these institutional constraints nevertheless is to put the D.J. in a more powerful position than the caller, in terms of interactive control of the talk. In all the extracts quoted above, it has been observed that the final turn in a call is always taken by SB. Occasionally, MT duplicates SB's closing turn by adding a *thank you* in the following turn. In no call does the caller have a turn position in the closing sequence, except minimally in (27), (Call 5), below.

It may be the case that, as in the opening sequences, the real end of the call takes place 'off the air' for technical and organisational reasons. We do not know if the caller is transferred to another receiver off the air, with whom a closing sequence of the type described by Schegloff takes place, or whether the caller considers that the D.J.'s final turn signals the end of the call and hangs up immediately after it. Both actions may in fact happen.

When there is no closing turn from SB, the call sequence ends with an MT turn. The caller is never in the final turn position, and the only example of a caller participating in a closing sequence occurs in (27):

(27) - (Call 5)

SB: David come back if you want to one more time
 David: Well, thank you for clarifying that issue Prime
 Minister
 SB: Thank you very much indeed
 MT: Thank you very much

Apart from this example, the caller never occupies a turn position in closing sequences, and therefore seems not to be involved in the management of closings. MT does not initiate closings either, consequently, the decision of whether to terminate a call or ask a 'supplementary' appears to rest entirely with SB.

VII.5.2 Link Between End of Calls and Satisfactory Answers

If the D.J. is the participant in the talk whose role is to determine when the end of a call should occur, and the caller is not authorised to interact directly with the Prime Minister, except when given authorisation to do so, then it also appears to be the DJ who determines whether or not a question has been satisfactorily answered or not. This is made explicit in Call 3:

(28) - (Call 3)

SB: mm well that answers that question . Ned G in
 York [....]

and in Calls 6 and 10, when MT's answer is apparently deemed insufficient:

(29)

(Call 10)

SB: Can I just take Michael's point
 MT: uh mm
 SB: I think Michael is on about the regulations
 primarily and the difficulties that some young
 people have [....]

(Call 6):

- SB: Paul . does that answer your question
 MT: er Paul will know all this . working for a building society
 Paul: Yes um . to a certain extent yes but do you recognise that the great north/south divide is a big major problem [....]
 MT: Well you can't direct people to start up in the north [....]
 SB: Do you recognise the north/south divide

Possible points of closure in the talk are therefore managed by SB, who opts either to terminate a call after the second pair part has been supplied to a caller's question by MT, or to prolong a call by opening up further exchanges with a series of 'supplementary' questions. The caller is rarely in a position to be able to take up a turn in which he or she can express satisfaction or otherwise with an answer, and never without authorisation to do so. There are very few calls which terminate after a caller response turn. An example of this is in (30):

(30) - (Call 8)

- SB: Would you like to come back Ian
 Ian: Yes well I'm very satisfied about that . I'd like to see tax coming down because it's alright for Mr Kinnock to keep saying that [....]
 SB: Well thank you very much indeed and thank you for your comments
 MT: Thank you Ian . thank you very much Ian . I agree
 SB: I'm going to keep the Prime Minister on right . thank you . Chris J in Coventry [...]

Once again, it would appear that the authorisation to end turns lies with SB, and that the caller is only authorised to initiate a closing sequence, and to say whether he or she is satisfied with an answer, through a DJ authorising turn. This effectively allows no space for 'deferred mentionables' to be initiated by the caller, and it is therefore quite possible that they have to exit from the exchange while still having "compelling things to say".

VII.6 Conclusions

From this analysis of a radio phone-in I have attempted to demonstrate that the organisational rules governing the talk in this type of broadcast, while having certain features in common, nevertheless differ on several important counts from those governing ordinary conversational activity, and also from those which specifically govern telephone call conversational activity.

VII.6.1 Organisation of Talk: Distribution of Turn Types

This difference is apparent in the ordering of turns in the talk, insofar as there is a regular pattern of interaction, with a specified order in which participants take particular turns. This is different from the turn-taking structure quoted in VII.2.1 that "provision is made for all parties to speak *without* there being any specified order or 'queue' of speakers" (my italics), (Levinson, 1983: 297). In the phone-in, the basic pattern, or 'order' of speakers, (although there may be variations on this, as has been shown) is as follows:

| | |
|--------|---|
| SB: | Nomination, 'on-line' signal, greetings |
| Caller | Greetings |
| MT | Greetings |
| Caller | Greetings / Question |
| MT: | Answer |
| SB: | Follow-up |

Having established this order of participation, it has been seen that there are different turn types within the interaction, from within which different kinds of actions can be taken by participants. These are not always occupied indiscriminately by any one of the participant, as the caller is allocated one initial authorised question turn, and any subsequent turns, either in the form of 'supplementaries' or further comment, have to be authorised by the D.J. This implies that the caller

does not have the 'right' to 'self-select' for a turn position, but has to wait for authorisation by the D.J. to take a turn. The result of this allocation of turn-types is that there is *mediation* between the caller and MT, which limits the amount of direct interaction between these two participants in the talk. Although this organisation may well be the result of institutional and technical constraints on the talk, it serves to set up the framework for establishing control of the talk and the distribution of power positions within it.

VII.6.2 Controlling the Talk.

The control of the talk does not however depend entirely on the mediating role of the DJ, but on who can occupy particular turn positions in the talk. Specifically, the third turn-position coming after MT's second pair part answer turn to a caller's authorised question, is crucial for gaining control of the talk, and in the data this turn is almost always, with one exception, occupied by SB, who can then either terminate the call or initiate supplementary questions or comments, i.e. make decisions about managing the direction of the talk. However, when a caller occupies this turn position, as was seen in the 'breach' of the organisation in (21) - (Call 7), then they are in a much more powerful interactive position, as the addressee is constrained to provide an answer, or response, to that turn. It would appear that there is some form of rule based on adjacency pairing in operation here, i.e. that when a first part is supplied, then a second part is required, which overrides the DJ's turn. This would account for the fact that whenever a caller attempts to self-select to occupy that third position (there is space for self-selection due to there being no direct addressee, or designated speaker to take a follow-up turn, thus

continuing the exchange), SB intervenes to regain that turn position, and thus the control of the talk.

VII.6.3 Participant Roles and Power

As a consequence of the above allocation of turn-types, the caller's status as a questioner is in fact very limited, insofar as he or she is usually only allowed to take up one authorised question turn. This attribution of turn positions results in a discursive organisation in which control of the talk is to a large extent determined by the moves which various participants are authorised to make, and results in a reversal of the usual power positions between questioners and answerers. In other institutional settings, such as the courtroom or some classroom situations, control of the talk lies with the questioner, not with the person being questioned, and there is an unequal distribution of power in favour of the questioner.

In the context of this radio broadcast, the ratio of power is reversed as a result of the organisation of the discursive interaction, and this organisation seems to depend on specific participants occupying particular turn positions within the talk in order for it to be sustained. If this pattern is broken, then the interaction becomes much more open to local management of transition between the caller and MT, and therefore much more conversational in nature, because it is no longer mediated by SB. The D.J.'s role therefore seems to be to ensure that the talk stays as far as possible within its regular structure and that unauthorised interaction is prevented wherever possible.

From this analysis, then, two broad claims can be made with regard to the reinforcement and reproduction of asymmetrical power relations in

discourse. Firstly, that in institutional talk, asymmetrical relations of power are produced discursively in terms of which participants have 'right of access' to certain turn positions, and by extension, the possibility of taking certain actions from those positions. Since those turn positions from which key controlling actions can be taken are reserved, in general terms, for the institutional 'manager' of the talk, the D.J., the participants in the phone-in did not all have equal access to the same type of turns. Furthermore, certain potentially 'powerful' positions in talk can be effectively undermined by these institutional constraints which restrict access to turns. Secondly, it would seem that what have been regarded as interactive 'rules' for conversation, such as those governing the adjacency pairing of utterances and speaker selection, can in fact be over-ruled by participants with a greater degree of social power and status, as was seen by the actions of MT in this particular data.

In the following case study, the function of another potentially powerful discursive mechanism for establishing control in talk, i.e. the *formulation*, will be examined in the context of political television interviews, where the questioner is not a member of the listening or viewing public, but a television interviewer, and where, as a result, the power relations between questioner and answerer will predictably be more ambiguous than in the radio phone-in to Margaret Thatcher. The second claim made here, that social relations of power and status can undermine the obligations that would normally hold in conversational interaction, will be developed further in the final case study.

C H A P T E R V I I I

CASE STUDY 5: FORMULATING IN TELEVISION POLITICAL INTERVIEWS

VIII.0 Case Study Objectives

In the previous study, I have suggested that the relationship between discourse and power can be examined in terms of access in talk to particular turn types, and thus to particular discursive actions, and by the restriction of the right of access to some participants and not others. In the phone-in, where the talk is managed by the DJ, control is achieved by a structure of turn-taking which mediates the direct interaction between two of the participants, thus reducing the potential conversational power of a 'questioner'. It was also suggested that there was evidence here that the greater the social power and status of participants, the wider the range of discursive actions accessible to them.

In the following analysis, another type of discursive activity is examined for its potential controlling function in talk. As has been discussed in VI.3.3 above, *formulating* in conversation is a particular type of third-turn 'receipt' of new information, which in the institutional context of television news reports seems to have a key function in the management of talk to establishing 'gist'. It is suggested that the formulation may well be a key discursive mechanism for gaining control of talk, and that participants who occupy formulating turns are in a more powerful interactive position than other participants who do not have access to this type of turn.

The central focus of this study, then, is the role of formulations as controlling mechanisms of the talk in television political interviews,

paying particular attention to the interactive function of the different types of formulation present in the data, and of their effect on the organisation and management of the talk. Through this analysis, the aim is to explore further the more general issue of how discourse may be implicated in producing asymmetrical relations of power.

VIII.1 Description and Role of Formulating in Institutional Talk

It has been found that a feature of question-answer sequences in conversation between two participants is the third turn receipt of 'news', the information that is solicited by a question (cf. Jefferson 1981, Schegloff 1982, Heritage 1985). In the three-turn sequences (1) to (3) below, the third turns constitute different types of third turn receipt 'objects': assessment, newsmark, and 'oh' receipt:

- (1) C: How's yer foot
 A: Oh it's healing beautifully
 → C: Good
- (2) M: How many cigarettes yih had
 E: None
 → M: Oh really
 E: No
 M: Very good
- (3) S: Who w'you talking to
 G: I wasn't talking to anybody. Both Martin 'n I
 slept until about noon
 → S: Oh
 G: and when I woke up, I wanted to call my mother.
 S: Mm hm
 G: an' I picked up the phone. an' I couldn't dial
 out'n I thought our phone was out'v order'n
 → S: oh yeh
- (quoted in Heritage, 1985: 98(')).

These third turn receipt objects function to "align the questioner to the answerer as a recipient of reported information" (Heritage, 1985: 98), and generally indicate some form of commitment on behalf of

the news recipient to the truth or adequacy of the information received.

In the three examples above, the third turn in (1) is an assessment of the news received, in (2) there is a 'newsmark' (cf. Jefferson 1981) *oh* really preceding the assessment, and in (3) the '*oh*' receipts confirm the information in the previous turn as news to the report recipient.

In institutional question-answer sequences however, such as television news interviews and courtroom interaction, which involve an 'overhearing' audience (judge, jury, or television viewers), third turn receipts of this kind are rare, as the interviewer declines the role of 'report recipient', while maintaining the role of 'report elicitor' (Heritage 1985: 100). The questioner does however engage in third turn 'formulating': glossing, summarising and developing the gist of an informant's earlier statements, but these formulating utterances are addressed more to the overhearing audience than to the interviewee, thus altering the alignment of the interactive relationship between the questioner and answerer, and positioning the audience in the role of report recipient (Heritage 1985: 100).

In television news interviews, formulations function as prompts to clarify, refocus and/or redirect interviewee reports, according to criteria of the 'newsworthiness' of certain aspects of those reports:

"Interviewers' formulations both advance the prior report and propose a direction for interviewees' subsequent reporting activities. Formulations advance the prior report by finding a point in the prior utterance and thus shifting its focus, redeveloping its gist, making something explicit that was previously implicit in the prior utterance, or by making inferences about its presuppositions or implications."
(Heritage, 1985: 104).

Formulating in television news interviews is thus used to carry out a variety of activities: "to draw points from the talk that was unfocused or differently focused, to underline the significance of a prior response, or to probe or challenge earlier stated positions," (Heritage, 1985: 114).

As has been discussed in VI.2.2.4 above, the action of formulating can have an effect on the orientation of the talk as the questioners are able to refocus and paraphrase the information provided by answerers, and by making explicit implicit propositions in an utterance, (e.g. making inferences from relations of causality otherwise left implicit in the talk, cf. Heritage, 1985: 103), and by selecting certain elements of an interviewee's talk while discarding others, thus orienting the discourse in a particular way.

VIII.1.1 Interactive Role of the Formulator

In news interviews, formulating is described as a "weapon in the news interviewer's armoury" (Heritage, 1985: 114), implying that the act of formulating, or 'attempting to clarify for the audience', provides the interviewer with the means of maintaining a certain amount of discursive power. It seems possible to characterise this power along two main axes:

- 1) control over the orientation of the talk, achieved by allowing the interviewer to collaborate with, resist or challenge interviewees' statements, while at the same time preserving the cover of 'neutrality' required by broadcasting organisations;
- 2) creation of an asymmetrical interactive relationship in the talk by placing the interviewer in a position of power in relation to the interviewee, insofar as the latter seems under obligation to receive and

react to a formulation.

The first axis could be defined as being concerned with problems of discursive representation, and the second with problems of discursive management.

A central area for analysis in this study will therefore be the types of formulating acts carried out by interviewers and the reception given to them by interviewees, in order to examine whether in fact formulations are used as a controlling mechanism in the data.

VIII.1.2 Power Relations in Political Interviews

In political interviews on television, the relationship between interviewer and interviewee in terms of socially-determined power structures is less overtly manifest than in was the case in the data analysed in Case Study 4, between BBC Radio 1 listeners and Margaret Thatcher. In this set of data, the power relationships seem to be ambivalent between members of two different types of institution: the television broadcasting system and the party-political system of government. Inside the studio, the TV interviewers are ostensibly the institutional managers of the talk event, insofar as they direct and control the question sequences and the time allocated to each interviewee, but outside the studio, the politicians could arguably be said to be in a more powerful position in the overall social hierarchy insofar as they are involved in the process of government. The relations of power and status between politicians and journalists are not as clear-cut as those in other types of institutional talk events, and may therefore be more problematic for the interactive organisation of the talk⁽²⁾.

It is suggested that the television political interview can in some ways be seen as a point of interface between two social institutions, each with their own internal hierarchies and power structures, and it is predicted that the discursive interaction will manifest any tension produced by that interface in some way. Particular attention will be paid to the interviewer's use of formulations as a potential mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of interactive control.

VIII.2 Data Analysis

The data to be analysed in this study are taken from three television political interviews during the general election campaign of 1987. All the interviews deal with the subject of the defence policy, and focus on issues raised by the Labour party's policy of unilateral disarmament.

The programmes are:

A WEEK IN POLITICS, 29.05.87, (Channel 4)

Interviewer: Nick Ross

Interviewees: Denzil Davies (Labour)
John Cartwright (Alliance)
John Stanley (Conservative)

THIS WEEK, NEXT WEEK, 24.05.87, (BBC 1)

Interviewer: Vivian White

Interviewee: Norman Tebbit

FIRST TUESDAY, 2.06.87, (ITV Regions, Granada, Tyne Tees)

Interviewer: Olivia O'Leary

Interviewees: Richard Perle (US, Rep.)
Dennis Healey (Labour)
Alan Beith (Alliance)
Geoffrey Howe (Conservative)
George McGovern (US, Dem.)

The participants will be henceforth referred to only by their initials in the data extracts.

VIII.2.1 Structure and Management of Interviews

The general structure of the discursive interaction is similar in all three programmes, with variations according to the number of interviewees taking part. The turn-taking structure is pre-determined according to institutional norms and procedures for this type of political interview format: i.e. equal allocation of speaking time to each of the participants, and no direct interaction between interviewees (when there is more than one). The interviewer is the nominal institutional manager of the speech event, and has the institutionally-determined right to ask the questions⁽³⁾. The interviewees are in the interactive position of 'answerers' only.

VIII.2.2 Turn-Taking Organisation and Speaker Selection

The allocation of turns is pre-determined: A - B - A - B - A - C, and so on, (where A is the interviewer and B, C, the interviewees), and the turn types are also pre-determined, A always taking the question turn, and B, C etc. the response turn. Speaker selection is also to a great extent pre-determined, and is carried out by the interviewer, who signals the end of an interviewee turn and nominates the speaker to take the next turn:

(1)

O'L: Right . to go quickly to Dennis Healey

O'L: Right . well we have the . we do have Richard Perle
back . so if we can just finish what we were talking
about

There is a certain amount of ad hoc management to deal with problems, as for example when a satellite link is lost with Richard Perle in the U.S.:

(2)

O'L: Right . well we seem to have just temporarily lost our link there . but Dennis Healey . do you think you have anything to worry about there .

Interviewees do not normally self-select, but if they do, this is viewed as an 'unauthorised' interruption, and is either ignored by the interviewer, as in (3) below, or 'postponed', the interrupting participant then being selected as next speaker for the next interviewee turn, as in (4):

(3)

DH: (...) I think this change in the world situation

O'L: Right

DH requires a change in policy . and I'm tragically disappointed that unlike the American government the British government will not change as the world changes

GH: But that's

O'L: Right . and we're going to have to leave this particular section there (...)

(4)

GH: (...) I think if he has any sense of shame now left at all . he ought now to stand down from his present position

DH: Can I answer that

GH: He is seeking to defend a programme of . it's a matter of the utmost importance to the British people . it's for this reason that people of integrity like David Owen . left the Labour party . and other members of the Labour shadow cabinet . are reluctant to back this policy . the nation is entitled to know . why he's still there . defending this policy

O'L: Right . well you . you . Dennis Healey . you've heard the cry . resign resign . what's your answer

DJ: Well I've had that all through my life but (...)

Some overlap between turns occurs, as turn transitions are locally managed by the participants, and can be problematic. Either the current speaker stops talking, or the interviewer takes the next turn at a transition relevance place, with varying amounts of success, as in (5) below where it takes O'Leary four interviewer turns to stop McGovern:

(5)

O'L: Right

GM: Let me just underscore something that I don't think has been brought out here tonight as much as it should have . and that . and that is the purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use them . if they're ever used on a major scale . all of the major countries are going to largely disappear

O'L: Right

GM: There won't be any Britain if there is a nuclear exchange involving Britain and the Soviet Union . there won't be any Soviet Union either because it will mean that we're going to be involved in a major nuclear war that may spell the end of all of us

O'L: Right . Senator

GM: So the important thing is to pursue policies that will avoid that and it's in that area where economics and arms control and diplomacy and politics become more important than the exact size of the nuclear force

O'L: Senator McGovern . just to put some of the points to our panel here (...)

In (6), the interviewee acknowledges the interviewer question turn, but does not respond to it, continuing his response to the previous question, and thus presenting a challenge to the 'managing' role of the interviewer:

(6)

NT: (...) there's a very common expression which they use . the government doesn't care . (we've heard that .

VW: (that hurts does it

NT: no . no let me go on . we've heard that said time and time again (...)

Most answer turns are relatively long compared to those in conversational data, and the question turns, also long, frequently consist of a series of related questions within the same turn, with the result that answerers can select a particular point on which to focus in their response, as in:

(7)

NR: Well you won't surprise any of the electorate I don't think by telling them that you don't think Labour's views are sensible . but I wonder . and I put my question again . whether yours aren't also dangerous in electoral terms . whether people don't perceive that the Tory party doesn't really have its heart in

disarmament at all . that you really want to keep the
bomb . the fact is that you do . don't you
JS: I'd like to answer that particular point first of all
(...)

Here, out of four possible questions, Stanley explicitly selects the last one in the series:

NR: the fact is that you do (really want to keep the bomb) don't
you?
JS: I'd like to answer that particular point

As will be discussed in more detail below; despite this specific selection of one aspect of the question, Stanley's response is nevertheless not treated as an adequate one by Ross, and the subsequent interaction displays a struggle between interviewer and interviewee over what counts as an appropriate response to the question.

VIII.2.3 Topic Management

One feature of political interviews in general is that interviewees tend to give fairly wide-ranging answers to questions, and within their answer turns sometimes depart from what may be considered as the main focus of the interviewer's question. Although the topic of the question is selected by the interviewer, and a change of topic within question/answer sequences is usually instigated by him/her, the interviewees do have a certain amount of leeway to shift the focus of their answer, but in general, whatever is in the response turn counts as an adequate 'answer'. However, when there is a wide departure from the topic in an interviewee response, this can be subject to interviewer intervention, as in the extract below:

(8)
NR: (Can I
JS: (and the proof . and the proof is in the pudding
NR: Can can I ask you to (answer my question
JS: (right now . I'm answering right
now . the proof is in the pudding . the fact is . that
in 1987 . there is at the present time the most far-

- reaching arms control negotiations . the most serious arms control negotiations taking place . that have been taking place at any time since the Second World War , in conventional forces . in chemical forces . in the whole range of nuclear weapons
- NR: Is this because the Conservatives have ordered Trident . is this why Mr Gorbachev has decided
- JS: (it is because . not just this present government . the United Kingdom government . though we've played our role . it is essentially because the NATO alliance has adhered to its policy of maintaining its defences . modernising its defences . not going down the route of one-sided disarmament
- NR: (OK let me put my question
- JS: (so the Soviets have come to the conclusion
- NR: (my question to you again because
- JS: (the Soviets
- NR: in truth you know you're not (tackling my question
- JS: (the soviets have made it quite clear that for them now at last it is worth their while to come back to the negotiating table
- NR: Look . I want to give you the opportunity to answer that question because I think it's in your own interests to do so (...)

Here, it takes Ross seven turns to get Stanley to stop talking so that he can restate his initial question. To achieve this, he has to work through a series of interviewer turns which increase in length as they remain unacknowledged by the interviewee, (as do those of O'Leary when trying to take the next turn from McGovern):

- (1) *Can I*
- (2) *Can I ask you to answer my question*
- (3) *Ok let me put my question to you again*
- (4) *In truth you know you're not answering my question*
- (5) *Look, I want to give you the opportunity to answer my question*

Look in the last turn constitutes a direct signal for attention that was not achieved by the previous interviewer turns.

The above extracts from the data illustrate some of the management strategies used in the interaction by the interviewer to maintain overall control of the turn sequences and of the topic focus. As these

turn sequences show, topic maintenance, as well as turn transition, can be subject to interviewer intervention. Overt challenges to interviewer control from another participant, particularly at turn transition points where there is overlap in the talk, can constitute a struggle for the interviewee's right to continue a turn and the interviewer's right to start the next one.

VIII.3 The Nature of Formulating Activity

In the data above, we have been concentrating on aspects of interaction which involve meta-linguistic elements in the talk⁴, operating on the organisational level for the management of turn length, turn transition, speaker selection and topic maintenance. Further examples of these organisational elements are signals by the interviewer for the end of turns and interviewee transition such as:

Right
To turn to you
Let me bring in
Let me put my question again
I'll start with ... etc.

Formulations do not function as mechanisms of discourse management and control in the same way as the metalinguistic strategies above, as they do not organise speaker selection and topic control in the talk, but rather the interpretation and orientation of what conversation analysts term 'gist', and what, for the purposes of this analysis, may more usefully be called *implicative meaning*. I shall use this term to refer to the interpretations and glosses made by the interviewer in the act of formulating, and which are based on inferences that can be made from an interviewee's response to a question.

As has been discussed in VI.2.2.4 above, various things can happen in a formulation. The interviewer can prompt the interviewee to confirm or elaborate parts of their response that may not be clear for an overhearing audience, as for example in:

(9)

JC: I think we see the NATO tasks that Britain has as being the most important . if one is looking for potential savings . I think the first area one examines are the outer area commitments . the commitments beyond the European theatre

NR: *The Falklands . Belize . places like that*

JC: Exactly (...)

where 'outer area commitments' are glossed by the interviewer for purposes of clarification to the television audience. The above example is, however, the only one of this kind of formulation in the data examined. Much more frequent are what Heritage terms *inferentially elaborative probes*, which make explicit implicit propositions in the previous turn, and *recycles*, which paraphrase or gloss propositions made in the previous turn. These last two types of formulation can be either co-operative or unco-operative⁽⁵⁾, and in the latter case, often represent challenges to an interviewee's response.

VIII.4 Instances of Formulations in the Data

In the following section, the different types of formulating activity that take place during the interviews are examined, and the effects of this activity on the organisation and management of the interaction are discussed in relation to issues of discursive power.

VIII.4.1 FIRST TUESDAY, (2.06.87, ITV Regions).

In FIRST TUESDAY, there are only two formulating turns out of a total of 27 interviewer turns, the first containing two formulations, both of which are inferentially elaborative:

(10)

RP: Well I very much believe that the North Atlantic alliance must stand together . because divided across the Atlantic . Europe by itself will be unable to resist Soviet pressure . Soviet blackmail . Soviet blandishments . so I'm very much in favour of a cohesive Atlantic alliance . but it will be difficult politically to maintain the cohesion that is essential to the alliance . if America's closest ally turns its back on what has been a very special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom . and in effect expels the nuclear forces of the United States from British territory . it will be awfully difficult to explain that to Americans who are otherwise being asked to bear enormous risks . even though it may be in our interests to bear those risks.

O'L: *But but you still can't say that what the Labour party is telling the electorate is wrong . basically . the Labour party is telling the electorate that yes . they would pursue a unilateralist policy here . but there will still be the United States nuclear umbrella there to fend off any threat . any blackmail . from the Soviet Union . and you're really not suggesting that he's wrong*

RP: No I am saying that the first statement is the only one that the Labour party is in a position to make (...)

In (10), the formulations are headed by the adverbs:

*but you still can't say that
and you're really not suggesting that*

and the effect of these is an implicature that Perle was in fact trying to suggest that the Labour party was wrong. Here, O'Leary has interpreted the response unco-operatively, as implying that the Labour party is in fact safe in assuming that they can rely on American support even if they implement a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, and Perle responds with a disconfirmation, followed by a restatement of his point of view.

The second formulation is a co-operative recycle, where O'Leary glosses the propositions in McGovern's talk, and has that gloss confirmed:

(11)

GM: Well I can't interpret what the reason is for that but I want to make very clear that the American

Many of the question/answer pairs in this interview tend to be limited to one pair per participant, i.e. the turn structure is [A - B] - [A - C] - [A - D], only occasionally does an exchange between interviewer and interviewee spread over more than two turns. One instance of this happening is when there is a turn transition problem, as with McGovern in (5) above, while in the other cases, in a four-turn exchange the third (interviewer) turn does not consist of a formulation, but of another question, either WH:

(14)

AB: [...] he cannot then contend that Britain should rely on an American nuclear umbrella . still less suppose that you would have any influence at all on the way that was {disposed

O'L: {why . why can't he

or a negative interrogative, as in:

(15)

O'L: Does this not throw into some doubt your insistence . the Alliance insistence . on the retaining of an independent nuclear deterrent [...]

In both these examples the four turn exchange takes place between O'Leary and Beith. The longest exchange (5 turns) is at the beginning of the interview between O'Leary and Perle. All the other exchange sequences consist of one interviewer speaker selection and question turn, followed by one interviewee response turn:

(16)

O'L: Right Dennis Healey . and I will come to Sir Geoffrey Howe in a minute . Dennis Healey . the point that [...]

DH: No . well there are two things there . [...]

O'L: Right . let me bring in Sir Geoffrey Howe [...]

GH: Well I don't know quite what more evidence you want than what you've heard from Richard Perle [...]

In this particular interview then, formulating activity does not take up a large proportion of the interviewer turns, since third-turn interviewer responses in the exchanges are either absent or take the

form of further question turns, rather than formulations. This seems to have two main consequences, as follows:

1) That the participants in the interview do not often have to respond to implicative meanings inferred by the interviewer from their talk, and so they are less subject to unco-operative interactive strategies on the part of the interviewer than in interviews where formulating is more frequent.

2) That due to the absence of third turn interviewer responses of this kind, these implicative meanings are not made explicit for the television audience, who presumably have to do more inferential interpreting work without interviewer orientation of the talk.

VIII.4.2 A WEEK IN POLITICS, (29.05.87, Channel 4).

In this programme, the length of the exchanges between the interviewer and one particular interviewee, in terms of the number of turns per sequence, is significantly greater than in FIRST TUESDAY. A single exchange sequence can consist of up to 26 turns. In the first exchange sequence between Ross and Davies, out of 12 interviewer turns, 6 include formulating activity of some kind.

(17)

- NR: [...] Denzil Davies you've had a pretty busy week haven't you . you have been doing your best to make it clear that Labour is not soft on defence . now why . because up to a couple of years ago and more recently Labour has been busy saying we spend too much on defence on munitions of destruction . that we ought to be diverting money towards health . towards schools
- DD: Well I think most people . not just in the Labour party . would prefer in an ideal world to spend less money on armaments and more money on other things . that is not the world we are living in and I think Mr Healey's interview on this programme said it quite clearly . in the last election we were talking about reductions in conventional forces as well as in nuclear weapons . that frankly didn't make any sense . now we are saying quite clearly . yes let's move away from nuclear weapons . but the corollary to that must

be , and this is what's happening in Europe today .
 the corollary must be an increase in conventional
 deterrence to allay the fears and to enable Europe to
 become nuclear free . so we feel our policy really is
 looking forward . is in tune with the movements taking
 place in Europe . and indeed with the views of Mr
 Gorbachev and president Reagan

NR: *So at least in part what we are seeing with Labour is
 what the Conservatives would regard as a conversion
 on the road to Jerusalem . you're saying we were
 wrong in '83 . we must spend more on arms*

DD: Well it's not a conversion . if you go back the Labour
 government of which I was a member in 1975 to 1979
 actually agreed to commit us to a 3%%.increase in real
 terms , which NATO wished . and it was our (decision

NR: (You
 agree that you were wrong in '83

DD: The policy in 1983 had the wrong balance and now we
 think we've got the balance right . and we think that
 the whole movement in Europe in fact vindicates what
 we are trying to say

NR: *Now you say it's to allay fears in Europe . now Mr
 Kinnock has been busily telling us that there are no
 grounds for fears . that the Soviets have no intention
 . and indeed no capacity to dominate us*

DD: Well I don't think the Soviets . and General Rogers has
 said this and other NATO commanders . do intend to
 send their troops across the river Elbe tomorrow . but
 on the other hand

In (17) above there are two interviewer turns in which there are three
 formulations, the first formulation is inferentially elaborative, and the
 second two recycle talk from the previous turn. All are unco-operative:

- i) So at least in part what we are seeing with Labour is
 what the Conservatives would regard as a conversion
 on the road to Jerusalem
- ii) you're saying we were wrong in '83 . we must spend
 more on arms
- iii) Now you say it's to allay fears in Europe

The first two formulations highlight particular aspects of Davies's
 response to the first interviewer question - the fact that the Labour
 party has changed its policy. They are received by the interviewee as
 unco-operative insofar as he disconfirms them in his response, and

restates his position differently, (the disconfirmation is signalled by the marker *well* and a negative declarative). There does not appear to be any constraint on which formulation is disconfirmed⁶ in this case, as Davies responds to the first formulation in the turn rather than the second:

NR: So at least in part what we are seeing with Labour is what the Conservatives would regard as a conversion on the road to Jerusalem . you're saying we were wrong in '83 . we must spend more on arms .

DD: well it's not a conversion . if you go back to the Labour government [...]

In the third formulating turn in (17) Ross compares Davies's proposition with one of Kinnock's previous statements during the campaign, putting Davies into the position of having made a contradictory statement with regard to Labour party policy:

NR: Now you say it's to allay fears in Europe . now Mr Kinnock has been busily telling us that there are no grounds for fears . that the Soviets have no intention . and indeed no capacity to dominate us

DD: Well I don't think the Soviets . and General Rogers has said this and other NATO commanders . do intend to send their troops across the river Elbe tomorrow . but on the other hand

Davies's response here is not to the unco-operative recycle of his talk, but to the final part of the turn concerning his position in relation to Kinnock's statement, and it therefore appears to be a justification of this position rather than a disconfirmation of:

you say it's to allay fears in Europe

It would seem then that when a formulation is followed by a further utterance in the interviewee turn that is not a formulation, it is the final part of the turn that is responded to, not the formulation.

In the remainder of this exchange, there are four formulations which are contained in a series of five challenging turns, and the turn size

gets shorter as the interaction between Ross and Davies becomes more confrontational:

(18)

NR: Now this is fascinating . *you're saying that you're trying to allay groundless fears* . all this taxpayer's money . which we could spend on other things . you're going to put into conventional armaments . to allay groundless fears

DD: *No . it's not the case of the fears being groundless* . the fears are (still there

NR: (I'm sorry but that was your phrase

DD: The fears are still there . the fears perhaps less in Britain that they are in central Europe . certainly when I go to Germany . I talk to members of both (parties

NR: *(So we're doing it for the Germans*

DD: *No we are not* . we are doing it to get rid of nuclear weapons because they are dangerous and they would destroy Europe if they were used

NR: *Ah so it's the price* . (the price

DD: (to some extent yes . the price to be paid for getting rid of nuclear weapons is to increase in conventional forces

NR: The electoral price . *in other words the voters couldn't stomach reducing conventional forces (and*

DD: (it's *not a question of voting* . it is a proper price to pay to get rid of more dangerous weapons because we need to increase our conventional forces . [...]

These formulations start with a recycle:

1) NR: you're saying that you're trying to allay groundless fears

which is then disconfirmed in the next turn by Davies:

DD: no it's not a case of the fears being groundless . the fears are still there

and the following three are inferentially elaborative:

ii) NR: so we're doing it for the Germans

iii) NR: Ah so it's the price

iv) NR: the electoral price . in other words the voters couldn't stomach reducing conventional forces and [.]

Davies disconfirms (ii), and confirms (iii):

NR: Ah so it's the price . the price
 DD: to some extent yes

before Ross specifies 'the electoral price' in (iv), which is then disconfirmed by Davies:

DD: it's not a question of voting

Out of the 24 turns in this exchange sequence then, 6 interviewer turns are unco-operative formulations, giving rise to disconfirming responses. From this data, it can be noted that the interviewee is in a position of having to respond to every formulation made by the interviewer, except when a formulation is followed by a different type of utterance in the same turn. Furthermore, due to their unco-operative nature, i.e. the fact that they give rise to disconfirmations such as:

No, it's not a case of the fears being groundless
 No we are not
 It's not a question of voting

the formulations in this exchange sequence can be seen to function as challenges in interviewer turns insofar as they produce a series of implicative meanings which are disconfirmed by Davies, and thus have a direct bearing on the orientation and content of the interviewee talk.

In the next 8-turn exchange sequence with a new interviewee, there are three formulations, the first taking the form of a clarifying prompt (see (9) above), the second an inferentially elaborative probe, and the third a recycle of propositions in the previous turn. The latter two formulations lead to confirmations and thus seem more co-operative in nature than those described above:

(19)

JC: [...] I think the first area one examines are the outer area commitments . the commitments beyond the European theatre

NR: *The Falklands . Belize . places like that*

JC: *Exactly* . but one shouldn't run away with the idea that there's vast sums to be saved in eliminating

those commitments . they don't actually cost vast sums of money

NR: *But that's something Alliance would be prepared to do*

JC: I think that if one . we are committed to a total re-examination of the defence budget to make sure that the commitments marry up with the resources available . and the first things one has to look at is the outer area activities . but as I say I don't think you're going to save vast sums of money in looking at those

NR: So Alliance commitment . if you think of Britain as a . as a world policeman . Alliance would presumably like to see Britain upholding the weak against bullies all around the world . *you're saying well . we're not going to*

JC: *I think that our role as an independent world policeman was completed a long time ago .* and I think that if we are to play a part in sorting out problems in various parts of the world it's certainly not on a national basis . it is through the United Nations . and it may well be that we can continue to do some quite useful jobs for the United Nations in that area . but the idea that we are going to be able to send a gunboat to sort out some problems in some far-flung part of the world . I think that is now living in cloud cuckoo land.

The responses given to the second and third formulations in (19) are not disconfirmations, nor are they explicit confirmations as in (9):

JC: exactly

but they nevertheless seem to generally confirm the propositions of the inferentially elaborative formulations:

JC: the first area one examines are the outer area commitments [....]

NR: *But that's something Alliance would be prepared to do*

JC: I think that if one . [....] . *and the first things one has to look at is the outer area activities .*

NR: So Alliance commitment . if you think of Britain as a . as a world policeman . *Alliance would presumably like to see Britain upholding the weak against bullies all around the world . you're saying well . we're not going to*

JC: *I think that our role as an independent world policeman was completed a long time ago.*

In a subsequent exchange between Ross and Cartwright, there are two further examples of inferentially elaborative formulations. The first

is again neither explicitly confirmed nor disconfirmed, but is rather a re-alignment of interviewee position in relation to the formulating proposition:

(20)

NR: *So you say that definitely . whatever happens . Trident will not be necessary . you won't buy it*

JC: *We say at the moment that it is not good value for money if one is trying to provide a minimal deterrent which will inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union*

NR: *(You're still hedging your bets . you're still leaving it open*

JC: *No what I'm saying is at this point in time . at this point in time if we are asked this question [...]*

The second interviewer formulating turn in this sequence seems to be also inferentially elaborative, inferring from Cartwright's statements that Alliance policy is not firmly committed to cancelling Trident, and this receives an explicit disconfirmation.

The last instance of a formulating turn in this interview occurs in an exchange between Ross and Davies:

(21)

DD: *[...] but the Americans do not want . frankly . to fight the kind of limited nuclear war in Europe . which would destroy 250.000 American troops . that is one of the reasons why the Americans are now pushing to get rid of (nuclear weapons*

NR: *(you make it sound as if the Americans support Labour policy . but they don't*

DD: *Well you see they do to a considerable extent . now that comes as a great surprise to you . but in fact if the debate in this country was really serious [...]*

In (21), the formulation is inferentially elaborative, and co-operative insofar as it receives a confirmation, but the final proposition in the interviewer turn contradicts the formulation:

NR: *but they don't*

It is therefore not totally clear in this instance whether the response is a confirmation of the formulation, or a disagreement with the statement *but they don't*, or both. However, it may again be the case that the occurrence of another declarative in the turn after the formulation enables the interviewee to respond to the final element in the turn, and not the preceding formulation.

In these exchanges then, the interactive structure seems to demonstrate an obligation on behalf of the interviewee to respond to formulating activity in turns, except when the formulation is followed in the same turn by a different type of utterance. Interviewees never take a formulating turn, which puts the interviewer in the relatively stronger interactive position of being able to establish the direction of the talk through the production of implicative meanings. From this programme data it can be seen that out of the 12 formulating turns, 8 give rise to disconfirmations of inferential elaborations or unco-operative recycles, (7 of which involve the same interviewee), while the five remaining formulations are received by confirmations.

There is in this programme a long exchange sequence (26 turns in all) between Ross and Stanley which does not involve any formulating activity at all, but is more directly taken up with the struggle to establish what counts as a proper answer to the question, as has been examined in (8) above, and it is perhaps worth noting that while Stanley and Ross are engaged in a struggle over what is or is not an appropriate answer to a question, no formulating takes place, therefore Ross does not challenge Stanley's talk in the same way as he does with the other two participants, particularly Davies's talk, which is subject to most of the unco-operative formulations, whereas Cartwright's talk

is dealt with more co-operatively. Stanley on the other hand poses a problem for Ross's position as manager of the talk.

The main contrasts between this interview and FIRST TUESDAY do then seem to be characterised by differences in the organisation of the interaction in terms of exchange sequences and length of turns between interviewer and interviewee, as well as in the amount of formulating that takes place. The interviewer tends to rely on question turns, and overt talk management strategies to maintain control of the direction of the talk, rather than on formulating activity.

VIII.4.3 THIS WEEK NEXT WEEK, (24.05.87, BBC 1).

The third programme to be sampled was THIS WEEK NEXT WEEK, 24.05.87, part of which contained an interview with Norman Tebbit relating to Conservative election campaign tactics and the issue of defence. There is one clear instance of formulation in this extract, and two other interviewer question turns that seem to have a similar function to formulations, insofar as they are unco-operative and inferentially elaborative in relation to the interviewee talk. The clear example of formulating activity is in (22) below, where the formulation in the interviewer turn is followed by two declaratives:

(22)

VW: In 1983 Mr Tebbit your party protested during the campaign that you would not play the Falklands factor . *you're telling me now that the Tories won the Falklands war* . it wasn't a party issue . it was a British victory

NT: Of course it was . but what we say is also absolutely true . that if you consider the possibility of a government which didn't have a majority . for example . I think it would have been very difficult to carry through an operation of that kind . any of us who have had experience in government . particularly in the cabinet . know that it is not always easy to get full agreement on an issue . even amongst people of the same party

NT's response turn here is to those declarative statements, rather than confirming or disconfirming the formulation:

VW: *You're telling me now that the Tories won the Falklands war*

As was suggested in relation to (21) above, it seems possible to leave a formulation without a reception when it does not occur in turn-final position. NT's response here is a direct agreement with the interviewer's statement:

VW: *It wasn't a party issue it was a British victory*

NT: *Of course it was*

and the formulation is left without interviewee confirmation or disconfirmation.

The following two extracts contain instances of what look like formulations, as they draw inferentially on interviewee talk in the previous turn, but they are framed as questions.

(23)

VW: In your election PPB you are accused by the other parties of wrapping yourselves in the Union Jack . can I quote you from your own manifesto Mr Tebbit . let us not forget the challenge of the Falklands War . how many of the alternative governments on offer would have stood firm . overcome or even survived such difficulties . what did that mean

NT: I think it points up to the fact that . let's start from the extreme . of a government without a majority . of a shifting coalition perhaps relying on the votes of splinter parties . that's not a very good position in which to be to conduct an operation of that kind . there were a number of people who got rather nervous about it at times . there were a number of people who wanted us to compromise . (now I think

VW: *(Are you suggesting that the Labour party under the leadership of Mr Kinnock or the SDP Liberal Alliance under the leadership of David Owen or David Steel . are not patriotic*

NT: *No of course not [...]*

(24)

VW: *But are you telling me that it's in the patriotic national interest that the Tories should have a large majority*

NT: I think . my own view is that it is in the national interest that the Tories should have a large majority but I don't claim that it's a matter of patriotism over that . of course not . [...]

From these two examples, there appears to be no difference between the reception of a formulation, and the type of interviewee response given to these questions. The propositions in both questions are disconfirmed by NT:

VW Are you suggesting that [.....]

NT Of course not

VW Are you telling me that [....]

NT [....] Of course not

It would therefore seem that formulations which are framed as questions can still have the same function, i.e. as inferentially elaborative interpretations of what has been said in the previous interviewee turn. These questions remain 'unco-operative', i.e. they produce a disconfirming response from NT: *of course not*, and enable the interviewer to remain in control as far as the interpretation of interviewee talk is concerned.

VIII.5 Conclusions

From this analysis of formulating turns in television political interviews, several observations can be made. Firstly, that formulating actions always elicit a confirming or disconfirming response from interviewees, except when another type of activity follows the formulation in turn final position (in general terms, whatever occurs in turn-final position tends to carry the most weight in terms of determining what sort of response will be elicited).

Secondly, that where there is a large proportion of unco-operative formulating action in an exchange sequence, the interaction becomes more confrontational (i.e. there is disagreement between interviewer and interviewee), and transitions between turns are more subject to local management by the participants, than when the turn types are limited to pre-allocated question/answer sequences.

Thirdly, that where there is a high proportion of unco-operative formulating in an exchange sequence, the primary function of the formulation as described by Heritage (1985: 114), - the clarification of issues for an overhearing audience - tends to be displaced by a more directly confrontational function between participants, where the interviewer recuperates the role of report recipient. This role may also be signalled by the occurrence of 'assessments' (see (21) above), in interviewer turns, e.g.:

now this is fascinating....
that sounds pretty vague to me.....
(NR, A WEEK IN POLITICS)

In this case, the confrontational nature of formulations becomes more explicit as a mechanism of control than when there is less formulating activity on the part of the interviewer.

To return to the central objective of the analysis, i.e. to examine whether there is a problematic power relationship in this type of interview, and how it is resolved by the interviewer in terms of remaining in control of the talk, two further observations can be made.

1) The institutional role of 'talk manager' conferred on the interviewer is sometimes challenged by interviewees within the framework of the interactive structure. In the data, these challenges are signalled by the following actions on the part of the interviewees:

-
- i) Non-acknowledgment of interviewer signals to end a turn
 - ii) Overlap between turns
 - iii) Struggles for maintenance of topic between interviewer and interviewee
 - iv) Switching of topic in a response turn

all of which problematise the controlling role of the interviewer.

2) On the other hand, a third-turn interviewer formulating receipt of a response is always followed by an interviewee confirmation or disconfirmation, provided that it occurs in turn final position. A formulation is therefore not usually left unacknowledged as interviewer management turns can sometimes be.

This would imply that strategies of control that relate to issues of meaning and representation, i.e. the interviewer inferential interpretations of interviewee talk, are possibly a stronger means of discursive control in this context than more overt talk-management strategies that can be challenged by interviewees.

The pre-determined institutional discourse framework in this type of talk event usually ensures that in general terms, the overall programme structure is adhered to by the all the participants. However, this pre-determined nature of the turn-taking organisation and the turn-types does not preclude a certain amount of struggle between participants in specific areas: e.g. establishing what counts as a relevant answer, or when to end a turn. When this kind of struggle arises, the interviewer, as 'manager' of the talk, has to use overt talk management strategies to resolve it. In formulating activity, however, the interviewer has access to a discursive mechanism which requires a response from the

interviewee, and which ensures that the person doing the formulating remains in control of the direction, or 'gist' of the talk.

The formulation, then, does seem to operate as a means of covert discursive control, and in the context of political interviews, where the social power and relative status of the participants can be seen as institutionally ambivalent, this is particularly useful as it allows the interviewer to remain in control without overtly appearing to do so.

In contrast to the turn structure of the phone-in, where the powerful discursive position of the questioners was shown to be effectively restricted by limiting their access to follow-up, 'receipt of information' third-turn positions, the structure of this type of television interview gives the questioner access to formulating turn positions, thus putting him/her in a stronger position of control in relation to the interviewee since formulations require responses and produce implicative meanings that have to be attended to by the person doing the answers.

So far then, the main conclusion emerging from these two case studies in control is that certain turn positions are potentially more powerful discursively than others, insofar as they require specific responses, and thus the participants who occupy those turns are in a relatively stronger position from which to control the interaction than those who are under some obligation to provide the responses. However, these discursively powerful positions can be limited and mitigated in the structure of institutional talk, by restricting some participants' right of access to those turns. As was seen in the phone-in, this resulted in limiting the power of the questioner, and reproducing discursively the asymmetrical social relations of power between callers and Margaret

Thatcher. In the television interviews, on the other hand, the interviewers' powerful role as questioners is reinforced by their right to occupy formulating turns, and thus strengthening their position of control without it being explicit interactively.

In the next, and final study, the interactive structure of talk that takes place within the institutional context of a police investigation is the main focus of analysis. Here, however, the questioners are in the more powerful position institutionally as well as discursively, but as the interaction does not take place within a highly structured media framework, access to turn positions is not so strongly regulated as in the first two sets of data. The main focus of this analysis is then how the participants are able to establish and maintain their position of power in the talk through the range of discursive actions that are available to them, and the effect of their relative positions of institutional power on their right of access to those actions.

CHAPTER IX

CASE STUDY 6: ORDERLY DISCOURSE AND BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE

IX.0 Introduction and Objectives

In this final case study into the relationship between discourse and power, I propose to address some wider issues of power in talk, rather than concentrating on specific mechanisms of control such as the formulating turns discussed in the preceding analysis. In particular, I wish to return to the ideological function of discourse, and to examine critically the notion that 'orderly talk' is produced by commonsense background assumptions that are shared between participants.

The role of ideological representation in discourse, and the role of pragmatic inferencing processes in the production of meaning, which was the focus of the analyses of *deter*, the function of the relative clause in ideological meaning, and the structures of background knowledge examined in the first three case studies, has not so far been brought into an account of what is essentially an interpersonal level of language use, although it was suggested in the study of formulating in television interviews that formulating activity could constitute a means of controlling representation on an ideational level, and of controlling talk on an interpersonal level. A more concerted attempt is made in this analysis to explore possible areas of interface between ideological representations, on the one hand, and interpersonal power relations, on the other, since discursive power in some instances seems to depend not only on the occupation of particular turn positions in talk, but also on the ability of some participants to establish control of the discursive practices of representation.

In contrast to the two previous studies, the data for this analysis, in as much as it is drawn from a police investigation of a rape complaint, consists of a talk event in which greater institutional power clearly lies with the questioner. In this study, I aim to examine the ways in which this asymmetrical power relationship is reproduced and maintained discursively by the participants with the greater power. The central concern is with the dominant and subordinate positions that are set up interactively in the talk, and how access to these positions is achieved or restricted by participants.

In this analysis, I will also attempt to relate the notions of discursive control which have been briefly discussed in the preceding studies, and which involve interactive strategies for establishing the control of meaning, such as formulating activity, to a critical account of Fairclough's concept of 'orderly talk', (cf. Fairclough, 1985).

IX.1 'Orderly Talk' and 'Ideological Discourse Formations'

In a recent attempt to integrate the concept of power into a critical account of ideological discourse, Fairclough, (1985, 1989a, 1989b), argues the need for a critical linguistics which would examine "how discourse cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro structures" (1985: 753).; in other words, the role of micro-discursive practices in maintaining broader social, institutional practices. He states that any account of discursive interaction cannot be complete without attending to the distribution and exercise of power within that interactive situation, and this can only be achieved through reference to the social formation in which the exchange takes place.

By conflating Althusser's concept of ideological formations and Pêcheux's concept of discursive formations, (see I.3.1 and I.3.2 above), in order to provide a 'handle' for dealing with ideological pluralism in institutions, Fairclough develops the notion of an *ideological discourse formation* (or IDF), and claims that one of any number of conflicting IDF's will be dominant in any given institutional structure. It is through power relations that this dominance is maintained. The discursive practices related to the dominant IDF then become naturalised and taken as neutral within that institution.

The four functions of Fairclough's ideological discursive formations are:

- a) to define ideological norms
- b) to define discursive norms
- c) to construct institutional subject positions
- d) to naturalise the ideologies expressed

and the goal of a critical analysis is to denaturalise these IDF's in order to show how social structures determine the properties of discourse, and how discourse then determines social structures in a dialectical process.

IX.1.1 Language and Social Structures

In spite of many discussions of the ideological function of discourse, there nevertheless still remains a problem in the definition of the role of language as either being productive of social structures, or instrumental in the control and maintenance of those structures. Fairclough claims that there is a two-way relationship between social institutions and IDF's; one at the same time determining and being reproduced in the other, and his aim in developing a concept of ideological discursive formations is to characterise this two-way

relationship by regrouping four different types of ideological effects in discourse under one term, which can be attributed to 'norms' of ideological (or commonsense) background knowledge.

However, the relationship still does not seem to be entirely clarified by this concept, which seems to be too monolithic a structure, with the implication that there is a one-to-one correspondence between an IDF and a social institution, without leaving room for the concept of an interplay of conflicting ideologies within institutional discursive practices .

IX.1.2 Establishing Norms of Orderly Interaction

One of the claims Fairclough makes about the norms of interaction is that the 'orderliness' of talk depends on shared background knowledge which is ideologically motivated, but which often appears as 'naturalised', or as 'common sense' to the participants in the discourse. This claim can be briefly summarised as follows:

- 1). Orderliness of discourse depends on the mutual recognition by the participants of background knowledge which is ideologically represented, or 'naturalised', (i.e. which has become ideologically unmarked).
- 2). Orderliness is the 'sense' of the participants that 'things are as they should be' (evident from coherence of interaction, meaningful turns, appropriate and expected discursive behaviour from the participants' perspective).

Background knowledge can either be on an ideational level (knowledge of the 'world'), or on an interpersonal, or pragmatic level (knowledge of interactive 'norms').

This definition of 'orderliness' in discourse as "the sense of the participants in it (which may be more or less successfully elicited, or inferred from their interactive behaviour), that things are as they should be; i.e. as one would normally expect them to be", (Fairclough, 1985: 740), remains a rather vague criterion for the evaluation of 'orderliness'. How is it possible to judge the participants' sense that 'things are as they should be'?

Fairclough claims that this judgement can be derived from pre-established norms of interactive behaviour, which would presuppose some kind of normative structure against which micro-discursive interactions could be matched and evaluated by the discourse analyst. However, this is problematic. As Stubbs has pointed out:

"relationships between linguistic forms and actions [....] are unlikely to be entirely definable. The interpretation of such acts will often depend on idiosyncratic or social knowledge and cannot therefore be formalised" (1983: 175).

so the definition of a normative model of interactive behaviour which would cover all instances of discursive interaction seems, at the very least, a difficult task, and one that has not as yet been satisfactorily undertaken. Sinclair and Coulthard's model for discourse analysis (1975) was set up as an attempt to define this type of structure, but as it describes a specific type of classroom interaction, it is too restricted in scope to be applied to all instances of discursive interaction. Similarly, the conversational model of turn-taking has been used to analyse micro-situations, but has tended to emphasise the 'local management' of interaction by individual participants. rather than considering talk as an activity which takes place within a framework of ideologically determined norms.⁷ The setting up of a

normative model of orderly interaction against which 'disorder' can be measured therefore seems problematic.

Fairclough suggests that 'orderliness' may be judged from the coherence of interaction between participants, from their use of expected markers of deference, (presumably by one towards the other in an asymmetrical power structure), and by the use of an appropriate lexicon by both. From this it may be inferred that 'dis-orderly' discourse would presumably involve incoherence of interaction, i.e. constant interruptions and the non-fitting together of meaningful turns, non-use of deference markers, (probably resulting in 'rudeness' or some similar concept, eg. insolence), and the use of an inappropriate lexicon, and register in general.

However, in the analysis that follows, I argue that discourse may still be 'orderly' under these conditions, in the sense that participants are still acting within a framework of turns and exchanges. Whether these conditions result in, for example, the absurdity of a Rosencrantz and Guildenstern-type exchange, in which normal expectations of meaning are disrupted, and communication breaks down in dramatic fashion, or a straightforward argument, the orderliness of the discourse structure is not affected. Disagreements, even misunderstandings, are still accomplished jointly within an interactive framework, and the participants in discursive interaction need not necessarily have to share the same 'naturalised' background knowledge in order to produce a recognisable coherent pattern of verbal exchange.

How then can the norms and conventions of the 'orderly' discursive behaviour described by Fairclough be determined? Presumably by the norms of the institutions in which the discourse occurs, ideologically

motivated but naturalised, and in which specific subject positions are assigned to and recognised by the participants; as in, for example, the teacher/pupil exchanges described by Sinclair and Coulthard. However, if one participant does not accept these conventions, this is not necessarily a sign that something is wrong with their discursive ability to participate 'normally' in discursive interaction, but a sign that they refuse to operate within the institutional framework. (For example, children who rebel against the teacher/pupil power structure and discursive 'norms' are labelled as socially 'disruptive' rather than somehow discursively 'deficient').

Bearing the above comments in mind, I would suggest that interaction can still be 'orderly' even when ideological background knowledge is not shared by all the participants in the interaction, or is disputed in some way by one of them. On the other hand, I would agree with Fairclough that the discourse of any one participant in communicative interaction is essentially determined by sets of assumptions in background knowledge (ideological or otherwise). I would however prefer to use the term *ideological coherence* to designate unifying background assumptions which may underly the discourse of a particular participant in verbal interaction, and *orderliness* to refer to norms of interaction, i.e. turn-taking, adjacency pairs, and conversational exchanges. In this way it is possible to isolate the representational aspects in the discourse, which may be adopted by some but not necessarily all the participants, from the activity of talk itself, i.e. the organisation of the talk as it is constructed between participants.

In the analysis I attempt to demonstrate that the interaction is orderly in terms of structure, despite the non-sharing of background assumptions, and that orderliness in discourse does not therefore necessarily depend upon shared assumptions from background knowledge in this case. I then suggest that the ideological coherence of the discourse and the asymmetrical nature of the interaction (in terms of social and institutional status) can be analysed differently to produce an account of how the talk is organised, without recourse to a one-to-one 'IDF/institution' relationship such as that proposed by Fairclough, which does not allow for the different, conflicting ideologies that may be in operation within discourse at any given time.

IX.2 Data Analysis

Part of the data to be analysed here has already been discussed by Fairclough (cf. 1985 and briefly in 1989a)⁽¹⁾. It consists of talk that takes place between a woman (A) who has come to a police station to make a complaint of rape, and two male police officers (B and C). The talk is asymmetrical in terms of turn sequencing as there are three participants: out of the total number of 20 turns in extract (1) below, (which corresponds to the section of data analysed by Fairclough), A occupies 7 positions, and B and C occupy the rest between them (9 for C and 4 for B).

(1)

- | | | |
|----|---|--|
| 1 | C | you do realise that when we have you medically examined... |
| 2. | B | they'll come up with nothing |
| 3 | C | the swabs are taken.. it'll show.. if you've had sexual intercourse with three men this afternoon.. it'll show |
| 4 | A | it'll show each one.. |
| 5 | C | it'll show each one .. |
| | B | hmm |

- 6 A yeah I know
7 C alright .. so ..
8 A so it would show (indist.)
9 C or not with three men alright .. so we can confirm it's happened .. that you've had sex with three men .. if it does confirm it .. then I would go so far as to say .. that you went to that house willingly .. there's no struggle .. you could have run away quite easily .. when you got out of the car .. to go to the house .. you could have got away quite easily .. you're well known .. in Reading to the uniformed lads for being a nuisance in the streets shouting and bawling .. couple of times you've been arrested for under the Mental Health Act .. for shouting and bawling in the street .. haven't you ..
- 10 A when I was ill yeah
11 C yeah .. right .. so .. what's to stop you .. shouting and screaming in the street .. when you think you're going to get raped .. you're not frightened at all .. you walk in there .. quite blasé you're not frightened at all ..
- 12 A I was frightened
13 C you weren't .. you're showing no signs of emotion every now and again you have a little tear ..
- 14 B (indist.) if you were frightened .. and you came at me I think I would dive .. I wouldn't take you on you frighten me
- 15 C (indist.)
16 A why would I frighten you (indist.) only a little
17 B you you just
it doesn't matter .. you're female and you've probably got a hell of a temper .. if you were to go
- 18 A I haven't got a temper (indist.) a hell of a temper
19 C oh I don't know..
20 B I think if things if if things were up against a wall .. I think you'd fight and fight very hard

In his analysis of this data, Fairclough claimed that "the most striking instance of ideologically based coherence in this text is 'You're female and you've probably got a hell of a temper'" (1985: 741). But in focusing on this particular utterance, he seems to have ignored A's contribution to the interaction and concentrated only on B and C's discourse in his analysis of orderliness. The interaction can be considered as 'orderly' according to Fairclough's criterion of shared

background knowledge only with regard to B and C's talk, but not with regard to A's.

I propose therefore to give a different account of the talk in (1), in which both orderliness of interaction and coherence of ideological representation are examined, but not in terms of the latter being productive of the former.

IX.2.1 Orderliness in Exchange Sequences

The talk in (1) above can be schematically represented, in terms of the speech acts of each participant within a turn, as follows:

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| 1 | C | Question (in form of declarative: <i>you do realise..</i>) |
| 2 | B | Assertion |
| 3 | C | Assertion |
| 4 | A | Assertion (response to 3.) |
| 5 | C | Assertion (confirmation of 4.) |
| 6 | A | Assertion (response to 1.) |
| 7 | C | Acknowledgment of 6 (+ unfinished utterance) |
| 8 | A | Assertion (response to 7, continues C's utterance) |
| 9 | C | Extended turn, 8 assertions followed by rhetorical question: <i>you've been arrested before, haven't you?</i>) |
| 10 | A | Assertion (response to last question in 9) |
| 11 | C | Acknowledgment + rhetorical question <i>what's to stop you... + 3 assertions</i> |
| 12 | A | Contradiction of final assertion in 11 |
| 13 | C | Contradiction of 12 + 2 assertions |
| 14 | B | Extended turn, 3 assertions |
| 15 | C | (Indistinct) |
| 16 | A | Question (response to final assertion in 14) |
| 17 | B | 2 assertions (response to 16.) |
| 18 | A | Contradiction of 2nd assertion in 17 |
| 19 | C | Assertion (response to 18) |
| 20 | B | Assertion |

Despite the asymmetrical nature of the discourse, it can be seen to fit into an 'orderly' interactive turn-taking sequence. In the first 6 turns, for example, the first pair part of the question in turn 1, continued in turn 3, is answered in turn 6, with an inserted adjacency pair at turns 4/5:

-
- 1 C you do realise that when we have you medically
examined...
- 2 B they'll come up with nothing
- 3 C the swabs are taken.. it'll show.. if you've had
sexual intercourse with three men this afternoon..
it'll show
- 4 A it'll show each one..
- 5 C it'll show each one..
- 6 A yeah I know

There is nothing disruptive of orderly turn-taking activity in the following four sets of turn sequences, sets 1 and 2 showing agreement, and 3 and 4 disagreement, in A's responses:

Set 1

- 1 C You do realise that when we have you medically
examined
- 2 B they'll come up with nothing
- 3 C the swabs are taken.. it'll show.. if you've had
sexual intercourse with three men this afternoon..
it'll show
- 4 A it'll show each one..
- 5 C it'll show each one..
- 6 A yeah I know

Set 2

- 9 C You've been arrested before.. haven't you
- 10 A When I was ill, yes
- 11 C Yeah right so

Set 3

- 11 C You're not irrightened at all
- 12 A I was frightened
- 13 C You weren't

Set 4

- 14 B You frighten me
- 15 C (indistinct)
- 16 A Why would I irrighten you
- 17 B You you just .. it doesn't matter .. you're female
and you've probably got a hell of a temper.. if
you were to go ..
- 18 A I haven't got a temper

Although they are 'orderly', it does not seem obvious from these sequences that A shares the same background knowledge as B and C as far as the underlying assumptions of the discourse are concerned, but

rather the contrary. In Set 2, A's utterance in turn 10 is a qualifying assertion in response to C's question in turn 9, with the implicature *I'm not ill now*. In Set 3, A denies C's assertion in turn 11, and in Set 4, A asks for an explanation of B's assertion in turn 14, then refutes that explanation. In Sets 2, 3 and 4 then, A, B and C do not appear to share the same 'given' background assumptions relating to the topic of their talk. It is only in Set 1 that A's utterances can be said to show some agreement with C's assertion in turn 5, but this does not necessarily indicate shared assumptions between participants:

| | | |
|---|---|---------------------|
| 4 | A | It'll show each one |
| 5 | C | It'll show each one |
| 6 | A | Yes I know |

Some of the background assumptions which are made explicit in the above data through B and C's utterances can be expressed as follows:

- i A frequently shouts and bawls in the street and gets arrested
- ii A is not frightened
- iii A is frightening
- iv A has a temper

while the background assumptions which are made explicit in the data through A's utterances can be expressed as:

- i A was arrested when she was ill
- ii A was frightened
- iii A is not frightening
- iv A hasn't got a temper

These all seem to be specific assumptions in relation to a specific individual, and are not necessarily ideological in themselves. However, although there are further assumptions recoverable from the discourse which, to some degree, can be said to account for the coherence of B and C's utterances, and which do seem to be ideologically motivated,

(for instance Fairclough's example *all women have tempers*, there is no evidence from the talk that A shares these assumptions.)

A does in fact openly challenge some of the background assumptions which are both implicit and explicit in B and C's utterances. In Set 4, the two propositions:

You're female
You've probably got a hell of a temper

can only be related in terms of the second being a direct result of the first, if it is taken as given that:

All females have a temper

If this is the premiss from which B's assertion in turn 17 is derived, a commonsense background assumption relating to women, A does not necessarily share it. A's turn 16 is a question in response to B's assertion at turn 15:

15 B You frighten me
 16 A Why would I frighten you?

and this is the only WH information-seeking question in the extract. On the other hand, B and C's questions are conducive 'tag' questions, or declaratives, eg.:

B couple of times you've been arrested for.. under the Mental Health Act.. for shouting and bawling in the street .. haven't you?
 B What's to stop you.. shouting and screaming in the street .. when you think you're going to get raped..

These questions seem to function in two ways. Firstly, they are requests for confirmation of what Labov and Fanshel have termed 'A and B - events': "If A makes a statement about B events, then it is heard as a request for confirmation", (1977: 100). Secondly, these questions are not only conducive insofar as the preferred response is a

confirmation of the propositions they contain, but they also function as *accusations* by referring to A's past behaviour in relation to her present complaint of rape. This accusatory nature of B and C's discourse is dealt with in more detail in IX.3.1 below.

IX.2.2 Coherence in Commonsense Background Assumptions

There seem to be several 'naturalised' background assumptions present in B and C's discourse, which are not shared by A. By this I do not mean to imply that A is necessarily aware of these commonsense assumptions, as her challenges are to surface utterances, not to the assumptions that generate them, and I would argue that the ideologically based coherence in B and C's discourse seems evident at the very beginning of the data examined here; for example, the assertion in turns 1 and 2 that:

- | | | |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | C | When we have you medically examined |
| 2 | B | They'll come up with nothing |

In making the above assertion, B and C are implying that medical evidence of rape will not be found. However, their being able to make this assertion at all depends on their institutional status as 'police' men and their social status as police 'men', rather than their knowledge of medical examinations. The coherence across two participant turns, i.e. C starting the utterance and B finishing it, seems to indicate that they are drawing on the same background assumptions, which may also be linked to contextual information they have about A, as the whole interview is conducted according to the assumption that A has not been raped. What may well be happening here is an enactment of a hostile cross-examination of the type that A would encounter in a courtroom situation, where B and C take up the position of a defence counsel in a

rape trial, and in their questioning attempt to impute blame to A's actions. In cases of alleged rape, this type of questioning is common:

"The questioning to the 'victim' can be designed to impugn her action by attempting to show that it was partly or wholly responsible for the defendant's action."

(Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 105).

In the data, the series of assertions made by B and C regarding A's actions seem to be 'blame implicative' in this way, i.e. they imply that whatever happened to her was her fault as she could have done something about it:

C if it does confirm it .. then I would go so far as at say.. that you went to that house willingly there's no struggle.. you could have run away quite easily

The assumptions displayed in B and C's discourse are in conflict with A's, since an implicature of A's utterances seems to be that the medical examination will provide scientific evidence that she has been raped by three men; whereas the implicature of B and C's utterances is that it will provide scientific evidence for sexual intercourse with three men (but not rape). The background assumptions underlying the discourse of the three participants therefore seem to differ to a large extent.

IX.2.3 Coherence within Participant Turns

In turn 9 there is a conflation of two forms of ideological discourse, one based on male value judgements about women, and the other based on constructing legal evidence. The commonsense assumptions of the first are used to build up the legal evidence that will disprove A's rape claim. The series of assertions in turn 9 can only be coherent if ideologically-based background assumptions are taken into account. The assertions are:

It'll confirm that you've had sex or not with three men
So we can confirm it's happened
that you've had sex with three men

if it does confirm it then you went to that house willingly
there's no struggle

In order to process these utterances as discursively coherent, I would suggest that some form of script may be in operation which provides the underlying coherence between the propositions in this turn. This coherence could be expressed in terms of a 'stereotypical event sequence' or 'boring little story' (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977a: 422), as follows:

A woman gets into a car with three men and they drive to a house. The woman does not struggle or show any signs of fear. Sexual intercourse takes place between the woman and the three men. Afterwards the woman claims she has been raped, but really it is her own fault.

The kind of script mobilised here draws on available commonsense assumptions about typical behaviour patterns, for instance:

- i People who are frightened struggle.
(A did not struggle, therefore A was not frightened).
- ii People who shout and bawl in the street are frightening
(A often shouts and bawls in the street, therefore A is frightening).
- iii People who are frightening are strong.
(A is frightening, therefore A is strong and can defend herself).

Since A is frightening and A is strong, A could have got away from someone who attacked her if she had wanted to. As a result, confirmation that intercourse has taken place is, for B and C, is only confirmation that A has had sexual intercourse with three men, and not proof of rape.

From the analysis so far it can be observed that:

- 1) the exchange sequences are orderly insofar as they exhibit meaningful turn sequences and question/response pairs;

2) there is ideological coherence between A and C's discourse, but not between the discourse of A, B and C.

Therefore, mutual recognition of ideologically represented background knowledge does not seem to be a pre-condition of 'orderliness' in this particular data.

IX.2.4 Conflicting Discursive Practices

An additional feature of the institutional context of the talk in (1) is particularly striking, in that two sets of discursive 'practices' are mobilised in the talk. These practices are conflicting in the sense that one involves commonsense assumptions about the police and the law, while the other involves commonsense assumptions about women from a sexist ideology. By examining some of these assumptions underlying the two formations, it can be demonstrated how they are contradictory, and how the second discursive practice achieves dominance in this particular case.

Firstly, the commonsense assumptions about representation and function of the law hold that:

- i The law exists to protect citizens against crime.
- ii Policemen are agents of the law
- iii Policemen protect citizens against crime.

Secondly, commonsense assumptions about women who have been raped hold that:

- i Women who put themselves in a situation where sexual intercourse is likely to occur preclude the possibility of rape
- ii A was in a situation where intercourse was likely to occur.
- iii A was probably a willing partner.

From A's perspective, the assumptions about the law seem to be dominant:

-
- i Rape is a crime.
 - ii Crimes are reported to the police.
 - iii A has been raped, so A reports it to the police.

From B and C's perspective, the sexist aspect is dominant:

- i A is a woman.
- ii A was in a situation where intercourse was likely to occur
- iii A was probably a willing partner.
- iv A was not raped.

The dominant discursive practice in this case seems to be the second one. In this context, by discursive practice I am referring to the terms on which the talk is conducted, and the expectations according to which the interaction proceeds. In this case, expectations about reporting a crime to the police⁽⁹⁾ are not met. Instead of asking for information, B and C make their own assertions about the circumstances, to which A responds. The result of the dominance of a sexist ideological discursive practice is that the talk is conducted according to the assumption that A has not really been the victim of rape, therefore no crime has been committed and A does not get her 'protection' as a citizen. What happens in this interview is that a woman coming to the police to make a complaint about a rape attack (rather than another type of crime such as a robbery or mugging) finds herself being accused instead of having her complaint treated as legitimate. In reporting a crime of rape, A is herself subjected to accusations and becomes the 'guilty' party, as a result of the sexist discursive practice that in some way is dominant in the interaction. This particular interview is also affected by B and C's prior knowledge of A's history of mental instability, but in general it is often the case that to report a rape will lead to an enquiry into the innocence

of the the victim rather than the guilt of the attacker, (cf. Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 105).

IX.2.5 Conflicting Background Assumptions in the Talk

Standard procedure for how to report an assault - go to police station - answer police questions - make statement etc. are actions that are known to A, B and C, and would usually provide the institutional framework within which the interaction would proceed. However, as has been argued above, background knowledge of institutional interactive procedure, and commonsense assumptions explicitly or implicitly expressed in the talk, do not necessarily create coherent ideological discourse. To disrupt discursive procedures, (i.e. the organisation of turn-taking etc.) the institutional interaction must be challenged in some way, whereas non-sharing of certain commonsense assumptions does not necessarily lead to disorder in discursive procedure.

In the data, B and C respond to A's utterances according to sets of ideological assumptions about women, rape and A's particular 'case'. It seems clear from the data that A's utterances are not processed as she intends them to be, (i.e. they are not taken at their face value), but are turned into contradictory meanings by the interpretation brought to them by the policemen B and C. As noted above, the interview is based on the assumption developed in the talk by B and C, that A has not been raped. In processing her utterances, they appear to be making interpretations which depend mostly on available pre-existing assumptions, both about A's 'micro' situation, and more generally about women. The series of assumptions relating to women, to rape, to 'normal' female behaviour and to A personally which have a cohesive role in the discourse are that:

-
- i. Women tend to have bad tempers
 - ii People in a bad temper are frightening.
 - iii People who are frightened struggle.
 - iv People who have once behaved in a certain way are likely to do so again irrespective of a change in circumstances.
 - v Being in a situation where sexual intercourse is likely to occur is tantamount to being a willing partner and rules out rape.

(all 'implicit propositions' identified by Fairclough, 1985: 742)

To this list could also be added:

- vi Women who are raped are behaving in a way that provokes, or invites, attack.
- vii Rape is in some way women's fault - they are guilty until proved innocent rather than the other way round.
- viii Women who frequently have sexual intercourse with different men are morally inferior to those that don't
- ix People who do not struggle do not want to escape.
etc....

All these assumptions, and possibly others, seem to form part of the ideological coherence underlying B & C's discourse, rather than just the one suggested by Fairclough as the most obvious, cohesive ideological proposition:

All women have bad tempers.

IX.2.6 Effect of Institutional Status on Discursive Practices

B and C's discourse is produced within an institutional framework which enables them, as policemen with higher status than A, to change the terms of the interaction from an information seeking, interrogative mode or practice in crime reports, to an accusatory one. This framework positions them in the authoritative, social role of representatives of the law and 'protectors' of citizens, and it would seem to be this socially-inscribed dominant position which gives them ultimate control over the interaction, despite challenges by A. The talk they produce from this position displays sexist commonsense background assumptions, and their utterances consist of propositions

which are, to a great extent, determined by elements that are taken as 'given' prior to the interaction, rather than interpretations which develop as a result of new information provided by A.

To draw some preliminary conclusions from the discussion of the above data so far, while agreeing that background knowledge to a certain extent "subsumes 'naturalised' ideological relations" (Fairclough 1985: 739), all participants sharing the same ideologically-based background knowledge in order to produce 'orderly' discourse does not seem to be a necessary condition for orderliness in discursive interaction. As I hope to have shown in the above analysis, an exchange or sequence of exchanges in discourse can be 'orderly' in terms of the interactive turn-taking structure, without displaying ideological coherence across different participant utterances, and participants may either share or not share ideological background assumptions without this affecting the orderliness of the talk.

IX.3 From 'Orderliness' to 'Control' in the Discourse.

Having discussed the issues of order, background assumptions and conflict in discursive practices with regard to the data in (1), I now move to a wider examination of features of control in further extracts from the same data source. Following the distinctions outlined above, in order to distinguish between the different levels of discursive activity in operation, I will use the term *discursive practice* to refer to selections in representational surface forms of the talk, i.e. terms of reference, lexicalisation, metaphor, simile etc.; *ideological coherence* to refer to those commonsense assumptions which form the ideological 'background knowledge' base which underlies the propositions of any one

participant in the talk; and *discursive structure* to refer to the way the talk proceeds interactively in terms of 'orderly' norms of turn-taking, question/answer pairs, etc. These three levels of activity within talk may be linked, but at this stage it has not been demonstrated how one level may affect the others, nor what effect they may have on control of the discourse in terms of maintaining asymmetrical relations of power.

IX.3.1 Control of the Speech Event

In the type of unequal status encounter found in the data, participants in the discourse do not all have the same interactive rights or obligations, which produces the particular turn-taking structure and organisation of the talk event.

In the data, B and C are in the institutionally dominant positions, and remain in those positions despite challenges from A⁽¹⁰⁾ which do not undermine their dominant status. As noted in IX.2.5 above, the discursive practices involved in reporting a crime to the police usually involve reporting the crime, answering questions, making a statement, etc. In this case however, the interaction does not proceed along these lines, and A is not in a position to insist on a return to procedural 'norms' of reporting a crime.

Instead, the mode of questioning is very much accusatory rather than information seeking, resulting in A being challenged or accused as she gives her version of events. The type of turns taken by B and C largely consist of declarative statements about the events A reports, or tag questions which in many cases can be seen as pre-sequences to blame attribution (cf. Atkinson and Drew, 1979). In courtroom cross-examinations, "action sequences associated with such tasks as

challenging or blaming are managed through questions and answers"

(Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 105). An example of this from the data is:

- 9 C: couple of times you've been arrested for under
the Mental Health Act .. for shouting and bawling
in the street .. haven't you
- 10 A: When I was ill yeah
- 11 C: yeah .. right .. so what's to stop you .. shouting
and screaming in the street .. when you think
you're going to get raped .. you're not frightened
at all

where C's first turn is a pre-blame sequence to the explicit accusation in his second turn.

The use of tag questions in particular has been described as a marker for control and power in unequal encounters, i.e. "speech situations where one participant is institutionally invested with rights and obligations to control talk" (Cameron & Coates, 1989: 87), consisting of an interactional resource for powerful participants. This is particularly the case when they function as conducive question types (cf. Harris 1984), leading to a confirmation rather than negation, and as such function as "a strategy to control the ongoing talk" (Cameron & Coates, 1989: 89).

The data below is a further extract from the same interview between the policemen B and C, and the woman A, and precedes extract (1). It is necessary to situate the data in (2) within its co-text and context in order to clarify the content of the exchanges. B and C are commenting on A's account of what happened to her, and are trying to construct an alternative version of the events, according to which she has had sexual intercourse with three men, but has not been raped. This part of the interview can be separated into five discrete units, as follows (the full transcript can be found in Appendix 1):

-
- 1 A's account of what happened after the rape
 - 2 B's qualification of A's account as a "fairytale" and "a lot of bollocks"
 - 3 C's alternative account, supported with 'evidence' from landlord of pub etc.
 - 4 B's topic shift: tries to show that A isn't upset, comparison with other rape victims
 - 5 B's topic shift: "fairytale".

Again, much of the interaction exhibits features of courtroom examination, particularly in the descriptions given by B and C of events A has reported. It has been noted that descriptions can also have an accusatory purpose:

"description is not merely an appendage to other interactional work; rather it is often through constructing descriptions that certain interactional tasks may be accomplished." (Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 107)

Thus, describing a reported action often implies that a 'paired action' might have been taken on the witness's (or defendant's) part, i.e. actions they might have been expected to take, and if those actions were not taken, then witnesses can anticipate that the questioning will lead to an attribution of blame (cf. Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 153). An explicit example of this from the data is:

What's to stop you shouting and screaming in the street when you think you're going to be raped?

I first deal with the exchanges in Unit 4 above, as they present a problem for B in managing the interaction due to a conflict in background assumptions, and illustrate how this problem is dealt with by B, who from his more powerful interactive position in the talk, manages to repair the 'error' in his interrogation tactics.

(2)

- 1 B You've told me that you wouldn't be here
- 2 A That's right yeah
- 3 B Why not
- 4 A Because it's a lot of fuss and a lot of aggro for
n...
- 5 B For what

-
- 6 A Something you can get over that you can accept
 7 B Well you're a lot stronger than some women I've met I'm glad to say ... I've met some that've been raped and all sorts of things have happened to them and they think their life is crumbling down around their ankles like a pair of knickers with the elastic gone
 8 A Well that's why I've been in _____ isn't it
 9 B I don't know
 10 A It's exactly why I've been in _____
 11 A [Why do you think I've been in _____
 12 B [It doesn't hold water this does it

In this unit, the basic discursive structures, in terms of turn-taking norms, are regularly adhered to, but there is a problem at turns 11 and 12, which overlap. Having been momentarily put in the position of answerer at turn 8, it is at this point that B manages to regain control of the interaction by responding to turn 11 with a shift in topic and another question.

IX.3.2 Withholding Response and Topic Shifts

The sequence of utterances 1 - 6 follow a regular pattern of assertion/confirmation, question/answer, question/answer. Turn 7 is a form of follow-up, containing a commentary on A's utterances in turns 4 and 6, but also the first part of the exchanges in turns 7, 8 and 9, where A is able to ask a question in turn 8. This question is possible because the implicature of the last assertion in turn 7, i.e.:

A's life is not crumbling down around her ankles

is challenged by A. We may assume that A holds the assumption that she has been in a mental hospital precisely because her life is 'crumbling down around her ankles', and that this conflicts with the implicature of assertions in turn 7.

Turn 8 being the first part of a question/answer pair, B provides the second part in turn 9:

- 8 A Well that's why I've been in _____ isn't it?
 9 B I don't know

with A occupying a follow-up turn in 10:

- 10 A That's exactly why I've been in _____

This sequence theoretically moves A into a stronger position of control in the interaction⁽¹¹⁾, which she attempts to reinforce by a repetition of the question in turn 11:

- 11 A Why do you think I've been in _____.

Instead of providing an answer to this first pair part of a question/answer pair, however, B's next turn in 12 is a topic shift in a further declarative tag question:

- 12 B It doesn't hold water this does it

The scope of reference of *it* and *this* in this utterance is everything that A has been describing, her 'story', rather than specifically her assertion in turn 9 and question in turn 11.

B thus regains the temporary loss of control by shifting the focus of the talk back to previous assertions, the non-provision of a second pair part to A's question in 11 implicating, it seems, that B is unwilling to pursue that topic (A having been in a mental hospital) because it is a risk to his control of the talk, as well as being unproductive as regards the 'goal' or 'point' of the exchange. The assertions in turn 7 do not seem to have achieved the speaker 'goal', which was to provide further evidence that A has not been raped, because they have in fact 'backfired', therefore B uses turn 12 to return to his former assertion that A is making most of her story up; *this* is a 'fairytale', 'a lot of bollocks', and it 'doesn't hold water'.

To summarise, B implicates in turn 7 that in spite of what has happened to her, A's life is *not* crumbling around her ankles, therefore she is stronger than other women, (and this somehow provides evidence that she has not been raped), whereas A implicates in turn 8 that her life is 'crumbling around her ankles', which is why she has been in a mental hospital. B's response to the question in turn 8 is a second pair part answer *I don't know*, but as this puts him in a weaker position from which to pursue his argument, being no longer in the 'questioner' position, but the 'answerer', he then shifts the topic to regain control of the talk and put himself back in the dominant position.

B has taken for granted that A's assumptions will be the same as his in making the assertions in turn 7:

- i Women break down when they have been raped
- ii A has not broken down
- iii A is strong
- iv (A has not been raped)

when in fact this is not the case; A does not seem to share assumptions ii or iii. This is new information to B, who repairs his error by changing the topic and thus re-establishing his position of power.

The same pattern can be seen in the following extract from (1):

- 14 B I wouldn't take you on .. you frighten me
- 15 C (indist.)
- 16 A why would I frighten you
- 17 B you you just .. it doesn't matter ..

Again, B is put into the position of answerer by A's turn 16, but as this problematises his status as *police-man* in possession of the 'correct' version of events, he uses a topic shift to avoid responding to A's question.

This strategy appears to flout the rules governing adjacency pairs which state that a question requires an answer. However, the absence of a response is nevertheless taken as a response of some kind - from which inferences can be made (see Schegloff, 1984); in this case possibly indicating that B and C are under no obligation to respond to A's questions, reinforcing the unequal power/status relationship which gives certain participants the right not to respond while others are under obligation to do so. If there is 'dis-orderly' interaction here then, it seems to originate in B and C's breaking the rules of adjacency pair utterances rather than in non-shared background assumptions. This implies that the actions which can be taken in particular turns by participants are directly governed by their status in relation to the other participants involved in the talk, and that within the interactive structure the same rights and obligations are not evenly distributed between participants.

IX.3.3 Managing Challenges

The following exchanges show points in the interaction where B and C's assertions or implicatures are challenged or contradicted by A. A challenge in talk has been defined as "any speech action that makes problematical the status of the listener" (Labov & Fanshell, 1977: 124). B and C's responses to these challenges are examined in order to establish how they secure their control of the discourse and consequently reinforce their dominant status.

(3)

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | B | Now stop mucking us all about |
| 2 | A | I'm not mucking you about |
| 3 | B | I'm not saying to you as you're lying .. get rid of the fruitiness get rid of all the beauty about it and let's get down to facts and figures |
| 4 | A | it's not beautiful at all is it |

5 B Well some of it is all this crap about bus stops
and .. numbers and blue and white tea towels to
wipe myself down with

(4)

1 C The story you've told us .. is .. like my colleague
said like a fairy tale.. honestly

2 A Well it happened I ..

3 B Yeah well we're not saying it didn't happen .. I'm
talking about the embroidery that goes on ..
around it -

(5)

1 C He knows you .. she left here quite willingly with
three lads

2 A Three lads I didn't go with three lads

3 C Well you left the pub with them

4 A They might have followed me out or - or
something I don't know

(6)

1 B I've met some that've been raped and all sorts of
things have happened to them and they think
their life is crumbling down around their ankles
like a pair of knickers with the elastic gone ..

2 A Well that's why I've been in ____ isn't it

3 B I don't know

4 A Why do you think I've been in ____

(7)

1 B All we've got is your side of the story and
you're still making a fairy tale out of it

2 A I'm not making a fairy tale out of it

3 B Think you are

The challenge in (6) has already been discussed above, and is the only instance where B has a temporary loss of control of the interaction. In the other exchanges, B and C deal with the challenges either by a reformulation of A's utterances, or in (7), by repeating the assertion in turn 1.

The discourse is organised around two conflicting versions of events, the woman's and the policemen's, and it is the latter which is dominant. This dominance seems to be a result of two main factors: firstly, the descriptions which work as accusations in the interaction, as in (5):

(5)

- 1 C He knows you .. she left here quite willingly with three lads
- 2 A Three lads I didn't go with three lads
- 3 C Well you left the pub with them
- 4 A They might have followed me out or - or something I don't know

and secondly, B and C's control of the categorising process, in other words the terms in which the events are represented and discussed. These categories are selected from two oppositional axes: the 'fairytale' and the 'facts and figures'. Under the *fairytale* category can be listed the following phrases:

a load of bollocks, crap, the fruitiness of it, the beauty of it, embroidery

against which the other version, B and C's *facts and figures* is contrasted and set up as the 'real' version of the events.

A can only deny these categories either by negation or by challenging B and C's assertions, but does not construct any alternative categories or metaphors in her report of events. In other words, A has to operate within the discursive practices established by B and C.

That these practices are rather incoherent does not make any difference, as the incoherence goes unchallenged, as in the following utterances:

- B ... let's get down to facts and figures
- B ... all this crap about bus stops and .. numbers and blue and white tea towels

where the *facts and figures* in A's version are re-categorised as *crap about bus stops*.

A's challenges to the policemen's alternative representation of events take the form of negations, e.g.:

- i I'm not mucking you about
- ii It's not beautiful at all is it

- iii Three lads I didn't go with three lads
- iv I'm not making a fairytale out of it

or a challenging assertion, e.g.:

- v well it happened
- vi well that's why I've been in _____ isn't it

and in (5), a reformulation of C's assertion:

- C well you left the pub with them
- A they might have followed me out or .. or something

However, the reformulations are a recurring feature of B and C's discourse rather than A's in most of the other challenging exchanges.

This can be seen from the three-part turn sequences below, e.g.:

Set 5

- 1 B Now stop mucking us all about
- 2 A I'm not mucking you about
- 3 B I'm not saying to you as you're lying ...

Set 6

- 1 B ...get rid of all the beauty about it and let's get down to facts and figures
- 2 A it's not beautiful at all is it
- 3 B well some of it is

Set 7

- 1 C The story you've told us .. is .. like my colleague said like a fairy tale.. honestly
- 2. A Well it happened I ..
- 3 C Yeah well we're not saying it didn't happen ..

Set 8

- 1 C She left here quite willingly with three lads
- 2 A Three lads I didn't go with three lads
- 3 3 Well you left the pub with them

B and C's third turn positions in these exchange units are introduced by discourse markers such as *I'm not saying*, *well*, *well we're not saying*, or *yeah well*. The function of the discourse marker *well* has been described as to "refer backwards to some topic that is shared knowledge, marking the utterance as relevant to what has preceded, but admitting a shift in topic" (Stubbs, 1983: 172). In the above sets of

utterances, these markers seem to indicate that the assertion to follow will contain a challenge to the assertion in the preceding turn, rather than a topic shift. A uses them on two occasions to challenge assertions or inferences in B or C's utterances. In (4), A challenges the inference made by B that she is not telling the truth starting her turn with the marker *well*:

B .. like my colleague said .. like a fairytale .. honestly
 A Well it happened

and also as discussed above in relation to (6):

A Well that's why I've been in ____ isn't it

IX.4 Conclusions

In the analysis of the above data, it has been suggested that institutional power operates within the discourse on two different levels, the first in terms of what it is possible to do in the interactive management of the structural discursive procedures in the talk, and the second in terms of the ability to control the selections in discursive practices, or representations.

IX.4.1 Power and Discursive Procedures

It would appear that the third turn position in an exchange unit is crucial for the mechanism of controlling the direction of the talk, whether the exchange unit is made up of question/answer/follow-up turns or assertion/contradiction/assertion turns. The only instance in the data of temporary loss of control being in extract (6) where A transforms a challenge into a question turn, thus putting B in the weaker position of having to provide an answer in the next turn, which gives A access to a follow-up third turn.

However, the question of control of the discursive procedure does not seem to be uniquely a matter of occupying certain turn positions, although this is an important micro-structure of the way control is acquired in three-turn exchange units. The interaction is managed by B and C, not by A, as is shown by the fact that B is able to change topics when challenged by a question that puts him in a weaker position discursively. This would indicate that B and C reserve the right to occupy the position of questioner, and refuse to occupy that of answerer. In other words, when A is in the position of questioner, there is no obligation on B and C's part to provide an answer.

IX.4.2 Power and Discursive Practices

There are other discursive features in this data which add to the asymmetrical nature of the control, e.g. who can establish the terms of the discourse, the discursive practices according to which the talk is conducted. In the data being examined, this is particularly evident in the metaphoric categorisation in B and C's discourse. As stated above, the events are essentially recast by B and C in their terms, which A can only negate, rather than produce an alternative practice of representation. Examples from the data of this type of categorisation practice are:

- B the biggest load of bollocks I've ever heard
- B better fairytales than bloody Gretel can do
- B life is crumbling down around their ankles like a pair of knickers with the elastic gone

all of which are used to describe the events of A's story. Control, then, would seem to reside not only in the management of discursive procedure, but also in the right to enforce particular terms of representation, i.e. of discursive practice. In this case, regardless of

the 'true facts' of the story, the result of these practices is a trivialisation of rape and of womens' reactions to it by a process of insult and of ridicule - particularly the offensive yet trenchant image of the last simile.

IX.4.3 Social Power in Unequal Status Interaction

The fact that B and C are able to control the discourse in this way is a direct result of ideological positioning and social roles which are already in existence as a framework for the talk examined here. Stubbs (1983) states that 'discourse rules' are 'socio-linguistic' in nature, i.e. "they involve not only speech acts but refer to status of hearer and speaker and therefore to the social structure of power and authority relationships" (p: 173). These 'discourse rules' then seem to override the 'conversational rules' of turn-taking and adjacency pairs, as was seen in case study 4, with regard to the actions taken by Margaret Thatcher, and again here with regard to the actions of the policemen.

As has been noted above, as policemen, B and C are socially and ideologically in a more powerful position than A, as a woman reporting a rape attack, for three main reasons: firstly because of their institutional position of authority as policemen compared to A's status as a citizen; secondly, because they are male (and there are two of them); and thirdly, because of their assumed normal mental health compared to A's record of mental health problems and previous arrest, which makes her version less reliable than theirs.

This socially determined position of power is expressed in the discourse through the interpersonal structure of the talk in terms of the actions carried out by B and C, who have the right to command and

accuse, as well as not being under obligation to answer. This puts A in the weaker discursive position, without the same rights as B and C, but under obligation to answer, confirm or disconfirm, which reinforces the dominant/subordinate relationship between the participants. The felicity conditions for the speech acts in the following exchange depend on B being in the dominant power position in the context of the talk event:

(8)

- 1 B Listen to me .. I've been sitting here twenty minutes half an hour listening to you .. some of it's the biggest lot of bollocks I've ever heard .. I can get very annoyed very shortly .. one minute you're saying it's Coley next minute you're saying it's the Meadway
- 2 A We passed Coley Park
- 3 B What happened .. I'm sick and tired of the ups and downs and the ins and outs .. some of this is better fairy tales than bloody .. Gretel can do - now stop mucking us all about

In B's turns 1 and 3, the imperatives *listen to me* and *now stop mucking us all about*, and the threat *I can get annoyed very shortly*, owe their effective force to institutionally-determined felicity conditions, in other words the institutional status of B compared to that of A results in B having a wider range of interactive resources than A in terms of what he can do in the talk. B is in a position to threaten, to accuse, etc., whereas A is in the position of having to receive and deal with threats and accusations.

One of the principal criteria for exercising discursive power then seems to be the institutionally attributed rights to take certain actions, such as to accuse or threaten another participant in the talk event. In unequal status interaction, those rights are not held equally by all participants. If a participant to whom those rights were not

attributed (for instance A in this set of data) took the same actions, they would not have the same perlocutionary effect⁽¹²⁾ as when a participant with those rights (i.e. in this data B or C) takes them.

In this study of discursive procedures and practices within unequal-status interaction, I have attempted to show on the one hand, that orderly discourse, in terms of interactive 'norms' of conversation, is not necessarily a product of shared or naturalised commonsense assumptions in background knowledge. On the other hand, I have tried to demonstrate how institutionally-determined asymmetrical relations of power and status can affect the actions that can be taken in the talk; e.g. the management of local discursive procedures, the right to shift topic and reformulate assertions, as well as access to positions from which particular power-invested speech acts can be effected, such as the power to order, and the power to insult and intimidate.

Lastly, I have claimed that institutional power also enables participants to select and enforce the discursive practices which determine the way events, actions and concepts are represented in the talk, according to internally coherent sets of commonsense background assumptions. These commonsense background assumptions, probably taking the form of scripts, or other types of knowledge structures that have been described in Chapter V above, function to secure the intelligibility of a participant's utterances within and across turns, but not necessarily intelligibility throughout the discourse of all the participants in the talk.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

X.1 Pragmatic Theory in Discourse Analysis

The central concern of this thesis has been to explore the role of pragmatic theory in investigating the relationship between discourse, ideology and power. This investigation has focused on two main aspects of pragmatic meaning in discourse: firstly by examining the ways in which structures of commonsense background knowledge give rise to inferencing processes which may in some ways be ideological; and secondly, by examining ways in which the notion of power may be integrated into the analysis of talk which is produced in the context of social institutions.

It has been claimed that the pragmatic level of language plays a crucial role in the relationship between discourse, ideology and power, both in terms of the production of contextualised meaning, which depends on access to structures of background knowledge, as well as in terms of accounting for interactive structures which reproduce and reinforce social relations of power and status discursively.

In the first three case studies, it was argued that ideological meaning is not necessarily fixed at the level of syntactic or semantic linguistic code, but is highly dependent on pragmatic features of language use in context, features such as inferencing processes which draw on commonsense background assumptions to construct meaning. In the second three case studies, it was argued that the organisation of talk, what has been identified by conversation analysts as sequencing in co-operative discursive interaction, is itself subject to social and

institutional constraints which lead to the reproduction of unequal positions of power and status in that interaction. These constraints affect participant rights within talk, giving some participants greater access to certain interactive positions, and the possibility to perform a greater range of discursive actions, which at the same time restricts the access and actions of other participants within that discursive space.

X.2 Summary of Results of Case Studies in Representation

Through these three studies it was suggested that whereas representation on syntactic and semantic levels of language has been the central focus of previous critical analysis of the production of ideological meaning in discourse, it is essential to consider the role of pragmatic features of language use, such as presupposition and inferencing, and it was argued that the relationship between ideology and discourse cannot be fully described until these kind of features have been taken into account.

X.2.1 Case Study One: A Semantic and Discursive Analysis of *Deter*

In the examination of the semantics of *deter* and its occurrence in the context of defence discourse, it was demonstrated that a pragmatic component is needed in the analysis of the ideological mobilisation of this term and its nominal forms, rather than just a semantic account of its meaning. It was suggested that although the semantic features of *deter* are more useful than those of other terms from the same semantic field in the representation of pro-nuclear defence concepts, its meaning within this context does not only depend upon these semantic features, but also on contextualised pragmatic features relating to commonsense

assumptions about international relations at the time that discourse was produced.

In the data examined, it was seen that *prevent* and *deter* are substitutable between different contexts, but that the nominal forms of these terms, *prevention* and *deterrence*, are not. This seems to indicate that the verb form *deter* has not taken on a specialised meaning, restricted to the context of defence, but that the nominal form *deterrence* has. It was argued that instead of an overall change in the semantic features of all the lexical forms of the term, the abstract nominal form *deterrence* now triggers specific inferences related to the concept of pro-nuclear defence, due to its selective, specialised use in this context, which as a result limits its appropriacy for use in other contexts.

The ideological meaning produced by the term *deterrence* seems therefore to depend not only on the semantic features which have made it ideologically useful in this context, but equally on the pragmatic inferences it gives rise to as a result of this specialised use. In other words, it has taken on extra ideological meaning in terms of the background knowledge structures, or commonsense assumptions, associated with it, rather than in terms of a set of new and different semantic features.

X.2.2 Case Study Two: Ideology and the Relative Clause

In the second case study, Pécheux's theory of transverse discourse was examined, specifically in relation to his claims about the function of relative clauses in discourse. Here it was argued that if transverse discourse, i.e. discourse originating in the 'preconstructed', or 'knowledge from elsewhere', (more banally, perhaps, sets of commonsense

background assumptions), is embedded into intra-discursive statements, this is not, as Pécheux proposes, via the mechanism of relative clause structures, but rather as a result of inferencing processes, and of the construction of meaning from co-textual statements in the discourse.

It was suggested that ideological representation is not a result of syntactic features of sentence structure, in terms of relative clauses, but that it is specifically linked to inter-textual relations of co-text and to contextual inferences. The 'evident truths' that Pécheux refers to can therefore be more usefully considered as operating on the pragmatic, rather than syntactic, level of language, as they are not necessarily encoded syntactically in the discourse, but are inferrable from the statements of the discourse in context.

It was therefore concluded that while Pécheux's notion of transverse discourse, in terms of its account of the ways in which 'knowledge from elsewhere' becomes embedded in discourse through relative clause structures, was not a valid one, the concept of transverse discourse can nevertheless be retained if we consider that ideological meanings are more likely to be produced by accessing assumptions from commonsense background knowledge through pragmatic inferencing processes, rather than through the syntactic embedding of relative clause structures into statements.

X.2.3 Case Study Three: Structures of Background Knowledge

In the third case study, there was a move away from the consideration of semantic and syntactic levels of representation, and the ways in which pragmatic aspects of language use affect those levels, towards a more detailed examination of some specific pragmatic processes which may produce ideological meanings. Still in relation to the selected

context of defence, the focus of discussion here was how meanings may be produced by accessing available sets of background assumptions and knowledge structures, in the form of scripts or metaphors.

It was argued that inferencing processes which rely on access to these culturally specific knowledge structures, result in the production of ideological meaning. Ways of conceptualising complex relationships in terms of more familiar ones, either by accessing scripts embedded in memory or by mapping one metaphorical structure onto another, give rise to inferences that are based on the more familiar structure or set of assumptions, but which are held to be universally valid for the more complex concept or set of relations.

A major part of the way ideological meaning is constructed in discourse can therefore be seen to depend upon pragmatic processes rather than on semantic or syntactic forms.

X.2.4 Representation and Context: General Conclusions

From these three case studies it can be concluded that while aspects of the linguistic code, i.e. syntactic and semantic representation, do have an ideological function in discourse, the role of pragmatic meaning, i.e. contextually-produced inferences, must also be taken into account in an analysis of how ideological meanings may be produced in discourse. The range of inferences that may be triggered by a statement depends on available commonsense background assumptions that may be accessed as that statement is processed, and meaning is not just determined by selections in semantic or syntactic form.

VI.3 Summary of Results of Case Studies in Control

Having argued the case for the role of pragmatic theory in terms of the production of meaning through inferencing processes, in the second part of the thesis, the focus of investigation is specific instances of institutional discursive interaction, and the effect of relations of power and status on that interaction. It is suggested that if ideological discourse is to be seen as discourse which reinforces asymmetrical relations of domination, then those relations will be analysable discursively on the pragmatic rather than the semantic or syntactic level, through, for instance, an account of the interactive structure and management of particular forms of talk.

The relationship between social conditions of power and status and the organisation of discursive interaction, was examined in an attempt to account for ways in which asymmetrical power relations may be constituted in discourse, which in turn reproduces and reinforces those relations.

It was argued that in the organisation and management of institutional discourse, the right to perform particular actions, and to take up certain positions in the talk, is not equally accessible to all the participants in the talk event, and that access to discursive space is restricted in systematic, analysable ways. It was claimed that the components of discursive interaction do not seem to constitute an autonomous system of turn-taking sequences, or conversational moves, but are subject to the constraints of social systems of hierarchy and status, which determine and regulate the type of actions that can be taken in a given talk event, and by whom.

X.3.1 Case Study Four: Mechanisms of Control in Talk

In Case Study 4 the institutional framework for managing talk in a radio phone-in programme was analysed, and it was seen that the operational constraints of the programme resulted in an unequal distribution of power between participants in the talk event. It was demonstrated that the occupation of certain turn positions was a key mechanism for the management of the interaction, but that these positions were not accessible to all participants in the talk. As a result, the right to take up certain turn positions, and to carry out the specific actions that these positions enabled, was restricted to some participants and not others. The management of the talk in this way resulted in the interaction always being controlled by the same participants, in this case the institutionally more powerful DJ and the Prime Minister, who occupied the key turn positions which gave access to control of the discourse.

The way in which the operational management of the interaction was established and maintained, which resulted in restriction of access to some turn positions, and of unequal rights to take certain actions, also produced an undermining of what is often posited as a conventional conversational 'norm': i.e. the tendency of a questioner to be in a more powerful interactive position than an answerer. Therefore, although being nominally in the position of answerer, the Prime Minister nevertheless retained a more powerful position within the talk event than the various people who were questioning her.

X.3.2 Case Study Five: Formulating in Television Political Interviews

The issue of control in talk was also the focus of Case Study 5, where some specific conversational actions were examined for their effect on the overall control of talk produced in the context of political television interviews. The action of formulating, while not an overt talk management strategy on the part of the interviewer, nevertheless seems to be an important discursive mechanism for gaining control of the interaction in this kind of interview, without overtly appearing to do so. Formulating takes place only in interviewer turns and requires some sort of response from the interviewee to whom it is addressed, i.e. it puts the interviewee under an obligation to respond. As well as being a mechanism for controlling the interaction on a sequential level, formulating also operates to control the direction of 'gist' in the talk, in other words it has a direct effect on meaning, as selected inferences can be drawn and particular interpretations made from the content of interviewee turns. In political interviews where a great deal of formulating goes on, this enables the interviewer to occupy a strong interactive position in relation to the other participants, without having to use more overt management strategies which can be more problematic interactively, e.g. when they are challenged or ignored by interviewees.

X.3.3 Case Study Six: Orderly Discourse and Background Knowledge

In Case Study 6 it was again argued that control of talk is linked to the occupation of particular turn positions, and there is further evidence of the third turn, in a three-turn exchange sequence, being a key position for gaining control of the interaction. However, here

again, interactive constraints that are claimed to operate in co-operative conversation, (e.g. a question will give rise to an answer), seem to be over-ruled by institutional features of power and status, e.g. institutionally more powerful participants can in effect refuse to take up the position of answerer, while reserving the position of questioner. Also, the right to perform certain actions in the talk, such as shifting topic, withholding a response or ignoring a challenge, is restricted to those participants with institutionally more power and status. Therefore, it is claimed that whereas discursive interaction creates an orderly structure of turn positions from which different actions can be taken, these actions do not all have equal discursive 'power' potential for controlling the talk. The structure is subject to institutional constraints which determine not only who has access to the more powerful positions, and who does not, but also who can refuse to take up the weaker positions inscribed in the talk. As a result, asymmetrical social relations of power are actively reproduced in discursive interaction, where not all participants have equal rights to take certain actions, or equal access to key positions of control in the talk.

X.3.4 Meaning and Power: General Conclusions

In addition to claiming that the activity of talk itself sets up more or less powerful positions through its organisational structure, which are then occupied by certain participants rather than others, it is also suggested here that a possible link between power and meaning may exist. In case study 5, the act of formulating as a controlling interpretative mechanism was examined, and in the data for Case Study 6 this control takes the form of the ability to select and impose

particular terms, or discursive practices, as well as to reformulate meanings from third turn positions. The problem of ideological representation and how it functions actively to reproduce social relations of power may therefore have a base in structures of interaction, i.e. those participants having access to key positions of control in talk, access which is institutionally determined by generic structures, in the case of the media data, or by social status, in the case of the rape investigation, may also be able to control representation from those positions, and to be in control of ideological categorisation is to be in a strong position to reinforce asymmetrical relations of social power.

X.4 Some Remaining Problems

Finally, there are two issues which this thesis has not been able to address adequately, and which will no doubt require much further consideration. One relates to the language/power/ideology debate, and the other relates to implications for pragmatic theory itself.

The principal remaining question regarding the relationship between language, ideology and power is whether there is any articulation between ideology (in terms of discursive representation), and power (here as it can be observed in the process of interactive control), or whether discourse functions on two separate levels to sustain relations of domination, levels which could be seen as corresponding to the Hallidayan theory of ideational and interpersonal functions of language. In this thesis a possible area of interface between the two levels began to emerge from the case studies, particularly the final one, relating to the control of meaning and discursive practice. This

interface is between the inferencing processes at work in formulating activity, or in third-turn receipt of information in institutional discourse, where the formulator seems to occupy a stronger interactive position than the other participants in talk. In general, there appears to be a significant relationship between what can be done interactively from third turn positions in exchanges, (e.g. types of reception of information, formulations etc.) and the glossing and interpretation of statements, based on inferencing processes, which produce contextualised meaning.

In equal status encounters, interpretations can be confirmed or disconfirmed, while in unequal status encounters, such as those taking place in an institutional context, features of participant power and status tend to invalidate disconfirmations, or make attempts to challenge interpretations ineffective.

Therefore, it has been suggested that a participant who occupies certain key turn positions in an interactive sequence may potentially have more control over meaning, or selections in representation, than a participant whose access to those positions is in some way restricted.

The second issue is a problem for pragmatic theory as it has been applied in the investigation of the ideological function of contextualised meaning. Much of pragmatic theory, based on a Gricean approach to the maxims of conversation, whether it concerns theories such as Leech's 'politeness principle', or Sperber and Wilson's theory of relevance, takes as axiomatic the basic principle of co-operative interaction between individuals. As has been shown through the data used in the case studies for this thesis, a lot of talk, particularly that produced in an institutional context, does not seem to operate

according to the co-operative principle at all, and tends to work against the maxims of conversation as described by mainstream pragmatic theory. A similar problem exists for the interactive organisation of talk, since although turn-taking rules can be seen to operate on one level, for instance that of adjacency pairing of question/answer sequences, there seem to be definite contextual constraints on what sort of answers are considered adequate, and on which participants in any given talk event can decide what counts as an appropriate answer.

The implication of this seems to be that pragmatic theory will have to start to deal with features of non-co-operative discourse, rather than taking as given that co-operation is a normative goal for all conversational interaction, otherwise it will only be able to deal with a limited amount of communication, and cannot claim to provide a theory which will account for all meaning in all contexts, as Relevance theory, for instance, has tended to do. The critical analysis of discourse, and the availability of institutional talk as data, may allow for the development of pragmatic theory in this direction.

X.5 Overall Conclusions and Possible Areas for Further Research.

To return to Thompson's call for an enquiry into the ways in which language sustains asymmetrical relations of domination, how far have the case studies in this research been able to begin to provide some answers to this central question?

Firstly, by claiming that in order to account for ideological meaning, it is not possible to consider aspects of language as representation without also considering aspects of language as action. This means

that pragmatic theory, an account of the relationship between language structure and language use, needs to be integrated into the critical description of the relationship between discourse and ideology. It has been argued throughout the thesis that ideological meanings and effects are produced by statements in context, rather than by isolated sentences. In other words, it could be predicted that the same sentence form produced in two different contexts would have different ideological effects, conditional on the contextualised meanings that could be inferred in each case.

These contextualised meanings seem, to a greater or lesser extent, to depend upon various forms of available commonsense structures of background knowledge which are accessed as discourse is processed, thereby reinforcing certain dominant representations, while making any others seem incompatible with, or invalid for, that particular context.

There seems then to be a constant articulation between language as code, i.e. in terms of syntactic and semantic representations, and the production of those representations in context, i.e. pragmatic aspects of meaning. As a result of this articulation, certain discursive practices, rather than others, become established as legitimate and acceptable ways of talking about particular issues or events.

However, the problem of how this process occurs, i.e. of how some representations come to be accepted as valid, legitimate ways of talking about concepts, issues and events in the world, still needs further analysis.

It has been suggested here that the power of some metaphoric representations depends upon the kind of available, familiar concepts onto which more complex ones can readily be mapped, and that these

representations then become more difficult to challenge or re-represent in alternative ways, using less salient metaphoric structures. The alternative ways of talking about concepts related to the pro- and anti-nuclear debate during the last election provided useful data for the examination of how certain representations worked particularly powerfully for pro-nuclear policies; it would perhaps be necessary to extend this investigation further into other domains of public discourse in order to examine whether the same claims can be made about dominant representations there.

Another area in which these claims can be developed further is the changing relations between east and west in the light of recent developments in Europe, and the general thaw in 'cold-war' politics, which makes obsolete much of the discourse of deterrence, and the pro-nuclear arguments examined here. There will no doubt be new and different metaphors which will be drawn upon to express the equally complex relationships between east and west in the emerging period of late capitalism/ex-communism, and the talk about issues relating to this domain should provide a vital source of information about how this experience is being conceptualised, particularly by the media.

Secondly, it has been claimed that a further aspect of pragmatic theory, relating to the analysis of conversational interaction, can be drawn upon in the investigation of mechanisms of control in talk. It was shown that structures of discursive interaction operate according to social constraints, which depend on features of power and status. Some participants in institutional discourse, due to their higher social status, or generically-determined role, are able to select which interactive positions to occupy, (e.g. questioner or answerer) by

refusing to take up positions which would put them in a discursively subordinate relationship to other participants, whereas others are unable to do so, which consequently places them in a less powerful position interactively. Discourse can therefore be regarded as reproductive of social power, which determines rights to perform certain actions, and restricts access to key turn positions, which are inscribed in the activity of talk itself.

However, although the analysis of management and control of discursive interaction does not often take into account problems of *meaning* (in terms of representational content of the discourse), it was suggested that there may be some scope within the interactive 'rules' for managing meaning as well as just the sequential, turn-taking aspects of talk. This scope would include, for instance, formulating activity, which involves inferencing processes in the interpretation of utterances; control of the selection of discursive practices of representation in specific domains; and the performance of certain illocutionary acts which depend upon occupying certain discursive positions related to social power and status of the participants. (e.g. the felicity conditions for ordering, requesting, insulting etc.).

Discourse can then be seen to sustain relations of domination in two ways:

- 1) By selecting, and establishing as natural, particular discursive practices of ideological representation, including metaphoric representation, which relate to sets of commonsense background assumptions and give rise to preferred inferences on the pragmatic level of meaning;

2) Through social discursive interaction, examined specifically here in the context of institutional speech events, which reinforces and reproduces relations of power and status within discourse, thus affecting the occupation of key interactive positions, and resulting in restricted access to those positions for participants with less power and/or lower status.

Whether it be in the field of discursive representation, or in the field of discursive interaction, I have argued here that pragmatic theory has a central role to play in the critical analysis of discourse and the exploration of how ideological meanings are produced in language. Although I have dealt with only two aspects of pragmatic theory, those dealing with particular forms of inferencing processes and those dealing with conversational interaction, there may well be further areas in which pragmatics can be integrated into future analyses of discourse, power and ideology, particularly on the level of interpersonal interaction. For instance, in any analysis of negotiating procedures, of arbitration or of legal representation, an understanding of the pragmatic features of discourse will be essential if the long-term goals for critical language study set out by Fairclough are to be attained, i.e. a greater understanding of how language inter-relates with power, and thus the promotion of greater equality in social patterns of communication.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

- (1) Thompson develops a method of studying ideology that he calls 'depth hermeneutics', which involves in the first phase a social analysis on the levels of action, institutions and the 'structuring' elements of institutions; in the second phase a discursive analysis of narrative, argument structure, and syntactic structure; and in the third phase an interpretative strategy to explicate the referential function of discourse, reconnecting it to relations of domination. This last phase corresponds to some extent with the aims of critical discourse analysis, but Thompson's call for the analysis of narrative and argument again seems to marginalise the crucial relationship between language and power in interactive discourse and to focus on representation alone.
- (2) The predominant view of ideology as representation is expressed in the following definition:
"Ideology is a system of coding reality and not a determined set of coded messages [...] in this way, ideology becomes autonomous in relation to the consciousness or intention of its agents; these may be conscious of their points of view about social forms but not of the semantic conditions (rules and categories or codification) which make possible these points of view [...] an 'ideology' may be defined as a system of semantic rules to generate messages." (Veron, 1971: 68).
- (3) Hitherto studies of the relationship between ideology and language have tended to be suspicious of the field of pragmatics, arguing that the concept of speech acts has been too individualistic to be of use in an account of the socially determined nature of discourse (cf. Fairclough 1989), and that social factors are lumped together under a term such as 'background knowledge', which is reduced to a reflection of reality, exterior to discourse, rather than productive of social relations within discourse, (cf. Coward & Black, 1981). Pécheux refers to speech act theory and performative utterances as "the struggle to the death of speaking subjects" (1975: 182).
- (4) The main part of these investigations into the relationship between the grammar of a language and ideological representations has been carried out by Fowler et al, (1979), and will be discussed in more depth in Chapter II.
- (5) This is a very general definition of pragmatics. Levinson (1983) discusses the various aspects covered by pragmatic theory as ranging from the study of relations between language and context that are grammaticalised (including deixis, honorifics, presupposition etc.) to the study of implicature and inferencing systems (cf. Grice, 1957, on speaker vs. sentence meaning), and including also discourse and conversation analysis.
- (6) Thompson points out that ideology is not a neutral term, and that the negative sense is tenacious despite its integration into the

disciplines of social science: "to characterise a view as 'ideological' is already to criticise it" (1984: 1).

- (7) In 'The end of ideology' debate (cf. Waxman, 1968) of the late 1950's, the term ideology was used in a restricted sense to refer to political belief systems.
- (8) Examples of ISA's are institutions such as the education system, religious groups, the family, the legal system, the party-political system, etc.
- (9) These theories are developed essentially in Durkheimian sociology and in Althusserian Marxism, cf. discussion in Thompson, (1986).
- (10) This problem of the mechanical nature of interpellation has been taken up by Morley (1980) where, in a study of reactions of the 'Nationwide' television audience to news items, it was found that preferred 'readings' of news stories, and subject positions constructed by them, are not always taken up by viewers. Morley claims that to see ideology only as representation, with meanings and subject positions being constructed entirely by the 'text', is too reductionist, taking the text to be "the total site of the production of meaning rather than working within the field of pre-existing social representations." In an ideological account of meaning, it is therefore equally important to consider 'what gets said' and 'what identifications get made by whom' in terms of the social construction of the subject *outside* the text, (Morley, 1980: 151).
- (11) A detailed discussion of Foucault's understanding of statement, discursive formation and discursive practice can be found in Foucault (1972). Pêcheux also uses the concept of discursive formation but relates it to generic form: what can and should be said in a report, speech, programme etc. This does not, however, refer to genre as such, but to some form of 'regulatory principle' underlying the text itself (cf. Montgomery 1990), which approaches the Foucauldian notion of discursive practice. The term *discursive practice* in Pêcheux's work seems to refer more to what is actually enunciated in discourse than to a regulatory system.
- (12) It is this view of discourse that has generally been taken up in the field of discourse and communication studies, where the text is considered as "an active element within social relations" and "an element in the currency of hegemony" (cf. Cicourel and Mills, 1985: 41).
- (13) For theories of power and measurement of power, cf. Parsons, Arendt and Dahl, in Lukes (ed), 1986.
- (14) Marxist theory separates 'social knowledge' (belief systems) from 'scientific knowledge'. For a discussion of ideology as 'belief systems', cf. Seliger, 1976; Giddens, (1979), treats ideology as "ideological aspects of social systems", not as a type of symbol

system contrasting with science or 'knowledge', cf. Thompson, 1986: 24).

- (15) Van Dijk has argued the need for micro-studies of media processes in order to analyse "their strategies, routine acts, commonsense categories, or other principles of understanding", (1985: 6).
- (16) An extract from this interview has already been analysed by Fairclough (cf. Fairclough 1985, 1989), with whose permission further extracts are reproduced here.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

- (1) The effects of the lexicon on cognition have been tested (cf. Berlin and Kay, 1969), using colour terms, and the results tended to contradict the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis, as it was found that when groups of speakers of two different natural languages were asked to trace the boundaries of the colour terms in their language, and to choose the best example of each basic term, there was variation between boundaries, even between same-language speakers, but mainly agreement as to the best example of basic colours from speakers of both languages. It was concluded that the cross-cultural differences noted had resulted from looking at boundaries of colour names rather than 'focal points' of colours (Rosch, 1977: 511).
- (2) The most often quoted being the different words for varieties of snow used by Eskimos, the same word used in Hopi for everything that flies except birds, and the different words for types of hole in Pintupi, an Australian aboriginal language. Concise descriptions of these differences can be found in Crystal, 1987.
- (3) The results of the tests for differences in colour perception and memorising showed that basic colour terminology appears to be universal, and that perceptually salient colours form natural prototypes for development of colour terms, in other words that the colour space seems to be a prime example of "the influence of underlying perceptual cognitive factors on linguistic categories" (Rosch, 1977: 516), and any cultural differences that occur are found "on the level of categorisation rather than perception of colour" (Rosch, 1977: 509).
- (4) Marx's concept of 'mystification' has been defined by Laing (1964) as meaning "a plausible misrepresentation of what was going on (process) or what is being done (praxis) in the service of the interests of one socio-economic class over or against another class" Laing himself uses it to elucidate ways of handling conflicts within the family, describing the mystified state as a "failure to see what is 'really' being experienced, or being done, or going on". Critical linguistics uses the term to describe the way in which language contributes to this misrepresentation of the world and events.

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- (5) The 'Fog' (renamed 'Clarity') Index' - it is surprising that this is taken as a serious gauge as there is no proof that short sentences are always clearer than long ones - depending on the context and goal of the utterance or statement.
- (6) Kress & Trew take their industrial relations theory from Wood & Elliott: 'A critical Evaluation of Fox's radicalisation of Industrial Relations Theory', *SOCIOLOGY*, Vol. 11, No. 1 1978.
- (7) Lakoff argues the case for considering aspects of 'performance' as just as much part of 'competence' as passive rules or relativisation ((1975: 336).
- (8) Cf. Spender, 1980, and Black & Coward, 1981. In Spender's account of the masculine bias of syntax, she cites certain prescriptive grammatical 'rules', one example of which is that the male term be placed before the female term in co-ordinate structures such as *men and women*, and *husband and wife*. This in fact has little to do with a 'rule' of syntax but much to do with ideology and social usage, as it does not express a syntactic property of coordinate structures. Black & Coward point out that *women and men* is as syntactically well-formed as *a biscuit and a cake* or *a cake and a biscuit*, (1981: 74). The issue at stake here is not the male properties of syntax but of one particular 'prescriptive' view of co-ordinate structures, and the question that needs to be asked is not how men made syntax, but "why are idioms often a central component of ideological discourses where they function as if they were required by the structure of language, the organisation of society or 'human nature'?" (1981: 74).
- (9) Foucault's notion of discursive practice is taken up by Coward and Ellis (1977), who attempt to give it some substance by defining the process of language as a specific *signifying practice*, (independent from economic, political and ideological practices.
- (10) This position can be contrasted with that taken by Volosinov, (1929, tr. 1973), who takes issue with the Saussurian notion of signs having stable values, and argues that meaning can never really be fixed at all, as it is a product of a unique contextual use of a sign in a unique social situation. Meaning is thus a dynamic and variable process, inextricably linked to ideology, and produced by the material social processes of interaction between individuals.
- (11) Achard (1986) states that one objective of critical discourse analysis is "to characterise those paraphrastic operations which allow an utterance to remain in the discursive register, and those which make it leave that register." (p: 30,). (my translation). Although his theoretical approach differs, in his discussion of the French verb *divorcer* Achard seems to be dealing with the same type of operation as that discussed by Chilton (1985) regarding the effect of ideological discourse on the semantics of *deter*.

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- (12) Pécheux takes this example from Frege, 1892: 'On Sense and Reference', transl. 1952, Black M., in Geach & Black, (eds), TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF GOTTLLOB FREGE, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- (13) For this formula Pécheux draws on the work of FUCHS, 1970, 'Contribution à la construction d'une grammaire de reconnaissance du français', Thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Paris VII.
- (14) *Nominalisation* is the creation of a noun phrase from an active verb, e.g. *picketing* from *X pickets*, or *coal deliveries* from *X delivers coal*. This 'transformation' involves the deletion of an agent, with the result that the description of an action is transformed into an abstract entity with no 'actor', thus imposing a more abstract world on the material world of physical events, (cf. Kress & Hodge, 1979: 23).
- (15) It is Foucault's definition of discursive practices (1972) that has more generally been drawn upon, rather than Pécheux's, in most of the developments in theories of discourse.
- (16) Chilton bases his account of causality, in relation to beliefs about possible and impossible states of affairs on Miller and Johnson Laird (1976), who define necessary and sufficient causes for actions related to causal verbs. While the latter claim that English causative verbs express merely sufficient cause, Chilton suggests that *deter* and *prevent* are ambiguous with respect to sufficient causes, which leads to an interpretation that "deployment of nuclear weapons is also a necessary preventive measure" (p: 111).
- (17) Other European cultures have in fact selected different verbs from the same field, e.g. *dissuasion* in French. It would be interesting as an exercise in cross-cultural pragmatics to compare the entailments and implicatures of *dissuader* and *deter*.
- (18) These details are the *fillers* that fit into the labelled *slots* of the frame structure. For example, a house will have a number of slots for rooms, and the features of one particular 'house situation' encountered in the world will provide the *fillers* for that frame.
- (19) This role of figures from popular culture in metaphoric representation of issues of defence has also been noted by Moss (1985), who cites the use of characters from *Star Wars* in an article from a military magazine presenting new laser weapons to troops:

"The picture sequence [of characters from *Star Wars*] is a good example of the way mass media blur the distinctions between fact and fiction, using familiar fiction as a means of grasping the unfamiliar fact. In this case, fantasy is presented as more dangerous.

Indeed reality is presented as play: the training beams are only harmless gadgetry." (Moss, 1985: 53).

- (20) The effects of ideological subject positioning seem to be central to the issue of power relations within discourse, yet these effects are still not fully understood. Although it has been shown that texts 'construct' subject positions for their recipients, it is argued that this positioning can be resisted, depending on the subject's relation to other texts and contexts:

"It does not follow that because the reader has 'taken the position' most fully inscribed in the text, sufficient for the text to be intelligible, he/she will, for that reason alone, subscribe to the ideological problematic of that text." (Morley, 1980a: 167).

NOTES TO CASE STUDIES IN REPRESENTATION (CHAPTERS III, IV & V)

- (1) Cf. Habermas, J., 1972; Garnham, N., 1986, and Garton, Tolson and Montgomery, 1988.
- (2) This definition of *deterrence* is given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1978 Revised Edition, Oxford University Press.
- (3) Pêcheux draws on work by Henry (1977) for his definition of preconstructed propositions.
- (4) Montgomery (1989) has pointed out the similarity of function between relative clauses and other kinds of structures in a study of sentences taken from The Sunday Times.
- (5) The concept of 'givenness' in discourse has been defined in various ways, ranging from a narrow definition of the concept, to a wider, cognitive view. Halliday (1967) sees 'givenness' as what is treated by the speaker as recoverable anaphorically or situationally; Clark & Clark (1977) refer to it as what the listener is expected to know already; and Sanford & Garrod (1981) describe it as a status within a *scenario* which language evokes, (cf. Brown & Yule, 1983: 179).
- (6) *Frame system theory* (cf. Minsky 1974, 1975, 1977), is a method of representing background knowledge used in the production and processing of discourse. A frame can be described as "a fixed representation of knowledge about the world" (Brown & Yule, 1983: 238).
- (7) A *script* (cf. Schank & Abelson 1977a, 1977b, and Schank & Burstein, 1985) is linked to frame system theory but deals with organising event sequences rather than a fixed situation. The term *scenario* is sometimes used to determine extended domains of reference (cf. Sanford & Garrod, 1981), and *schemata* to refer to "high-level complex (and even conventional or habitual) knowledge structures" (cf. van Dijk, 1981: 141).

- An example of a script, (e.g. the 'origins of World War II') is given in Garton, Montgomery & Tolson, (1988: 14).
*In the search for peace European nations disarm.
 Germany covertly rearms.
 By this means Germany gains a military ascendancy over other European nations.
 Germany uses its superior power to threaten weaker nations.
 The weaker nations are unable to resist Germany.
 Germany occupies the territory of weaker nations by force.*
- (8) Schank & Burstein (1985) describe programmes that were developed to process news stories according to the principle that people do not read every word when processing texts, but often rely on strong contextual predictions about meanings. They claim that a news story is processed by accessing knowledge structures in memory that best match or explain it, but that subsequent stories are interpreted in terms of the generalisations that provide "the most specific plausible inferences that can be made from what is known", (p: 159).
- (9) For a thorough critique of Relevance theory, see Levinson (1989) who argues that the theory is circular and therefore self-perpetuating
- (10) Sperber & Wilson would probably argue that relevance theory accounts for all communication equally.
- (11) During the television interview in which Neil Kinnock made this statement, the interviewer David Frost did not pick up on this interpretation.
- (12) Cyril Smith uses the appeal to the past with reference to the '3 R's' and bank clerks who can't count, (ANY QUESTIONS, 22.05.87), as does Margaret Thatcher in appeals to Victorian family values and 'housewifely thrift'.
- (13) Schemata are, very probably, culturally determined, as expectations or predictions in the interpretation of discourse may vary according to different cultural groups, or even different sub-groups within a culture (cf. Brown & Yule, 1983: 248).
- (14) Hall refers to this struggle over the 'terms of an argument', in relation to the immigration debate in Britain, which is defined as a problem of 'numbers', and points out that to use the same terms in a counter-argument is "tantamount to giving credibility to the dominant problematic":
 "The terms define the 'rationality' of the argument, and constrain how the discourse will 'freely' develop. A counter argument - that the numbers are *not* too high - makes an opposite case: but inevitably, it also reproduces the terms of the argument. [...] Arguments which seek to change the terms of reference are read as 'straying from the point'. So part of the struggle

is over the way the problem is formulated: the terms of the debate, and the 'logic' it entails."
(Hall, 1982: 81)

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

- (1) In a series of unpublished lectures, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, transcribed and edited by Jefferson, 1984, in Heritage, (ed): *Studies in Social Action*.
- (2) Harris, however, notes that shorter responses are supplied after questions in magistrates courts than would be the case in conversation: "in a context where the questions are nearly all posed by the participant with higher status and authority, such questions which allow a minimal response are more likely to receive it than in ordinary conversation between people of more or less equal status" (1984: 13).
- (3) The data base for Harris's analysis is questioning in Magistrates' Arrears and Maintenance Courts, therefore many of the questions are related to amounts of money.
- (4) Cf. Goffmann, 1981.
- (5) This data was supplied by Fairclough, who originally used part of it for his paper "Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 1985.

NOTES TO CASE STUDIES IN CONTROL (CHAPTERS VII, VIII & IX)

- (1) The transcriptions have been simplified from the original data in Heritage 1985. Transcription conventions adopted in this study show pauses: (.) but not timed, and overlap is indicated by curved brackets: (. [...]) indicates that part of the talk has been omitted for purposes of clarity and brevity.
- (2) Other forms of institutional speech events have more clear cut 'power' roles for the participants, e.g. in a courtroom (Drew 1984), a police investigation (see Case Study 6 below), a classroom (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975).
- (3) This can be compared to the phone-in, for example, where more than one participant can take the 'role' of questioner, (see Case Study 4 above).
- (4) Leech defines metalinguistic terms as 'the way conversation is managed and structured by its participants' (1983: 139), i.e. reference to the speech acts in which interlocutors are engaged, in order to request a reply, etc. I use it therefore to refer to the activity of managing the speech event.

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- (5) Heritage states that unco-operative formulations do not necessarily disadvantage the interviewee, they only give rise to disconfirmations: "The unco-operative character of these sequences arises from the fact that, whether inadvertently or by design, the interviewer formulates a version of the interviewee's position that the latter might be expected to deny (...) just as a co-operative formulation may occur as a component in a sequence that is ultimately damaging to an interviewee's position, so an interviewee may benefit from the opportunity to reject a particular version of his position" (Heritage 1985: 112).
- (6) In other multi-component turns (see phone-in for example) it seems to be the the final component that is responded to in the next turn, i.e. what comes at the end of the turn carries most weight for the interlocutor. This would be in concordance with the principle of end focus in utterances (cf Leech 1983: 65).
- (7) Although work on institutional interaction has been undertaken by Atkinson & Drew, 1979; and Drew, 1984; on courtroom examinations, the problem of power relations is still left to one side. Harris, however, 1984, attempts to integrate the notion of control into her account of magistrate court proceedings.
- (8) The data here has been reproduced by permission of Norman Fairclough, who first used an extract from the interview to illustrate 'ideologically based coherence' of the proposition: *you're female and you've probably got a hell of a temper* (1985: 4).
- (9) See for instance Fairclough, (1989: 18) for details of police procedure for eliciting information from a witness to a crime.
- (10) Labov & Fanshell (1977) describe a challenge to status as any action which puts the status of the listener into doubt.
- (11) The importance of third-turn positions for interactive control has been discussed in Case Study 4.
- (12) Austin describes as a perlocutionary act, saying something which produces "certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons", (1962: 101).

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A P P E N D I X

Much of the discourse which has been analysed in this thesis forms part of a larger body of data, consisting of radio and television broadcasts in which one of the topics of discussion was defence policy. These broadcasts were recorded during the general election period of 1987, and then transcribed for the purpose of researching this thesis. Where extracts from these sources have been quoted extensively in the case studies, the full transcripts have not been included in the Appendix.

However, I have included here the original articles which formed the data base for Case Study Two, (Chapter IV), on representation and the relative clause, as well as the full transcript of the Radio One Phone-In to Margaret Thatcher which is analysed in Case Study Four, (Chapter VII), and the extended transcript of the police examination of the rape case in Case Study Six, (Chapter IX).

I would again like to acknowledge my debt to Greg Garton, Queen Margarets College, Edinburgh, for his help in collating the recorded data, and also to Norman Fairclough, University of Lancaster, for his permission to use the extract from the police examination.

Why the defence issue must be of paramount concern to the voters

WITH the most important General Election since the Second World War only 48 hours away, I would like to explain why the defence of this country is still the decisive issue.

The principal duty of a democratically-elected Government is to ensure that its people and their institutions are kept safe from external threats. There can be a serious argument about how much the Government should be involved in the health, education and general welfare of the community; but our military defences cannot be a matter of self-help or individual effort.

INSULT
On Thursday, therefore, we must not take the appalling risk of returning to power a Party which will not guarantee our national security.

So far, much of the defence debate has been conducted on a yab-boo level, which is an insult to the intelligence of the Electorate. It is time to look seriously at the policies of each Party and tune out some of the distracting background noise.

Will you gamble with your family's safety?



BY LORD CHALFONT

1 First, Mr Kinnock is not a Soviet agent plotting the downfall of Britain. Nor is he a Party leader forced into rash policies by pressures from his unilateralist wing. Mr Kinnock is the unilateralist wing.

2 He genuinely believes that the safety of this country can be assured by one-sided nuclear disarmament, the removal of American nuclear bases and a "non-nuclear" defence policy.

3 Second, Mrs Thatcher is not a Right-wing fanatic obsessed by nuclear weapons. She genuinely believes that national security is best assured by the possession of a nuclear striking force as a deterrent of last resort.

4 Furthermore, she believes

5 that in order to maintain the effectiveness of that deterrent, it is necessary to replace the obsolescent Polaris submarine missile system with the more powerful Trident.

6 Finally, Dr Owen, who articulates the defence policy of the SDP-Liberal Alliance, is not some dithering amateur looking desperately for a policy. He has thought about these things deeply and he has concluded that although Britain should keep an independent deterrent, it should be something less powerful and expensive than Trident.

7 All these policies deserve to be taken seriously. The main danger of Labour's proposals that it will gravely weaken the NATO Alliance, without

8 which we cannot hope to defend ourselves.

9 Mr Kinnock's claim that he will use the money saved by cancelling Trident to strengthen our conventional forces, therefore, makes no sense.

10 A totally non-nuclear defence of western Europe would cost far more than the present system of defence combined with nuclear deterrence; and for Britain it would inevitably mean the re-introduction of national service.

DANGER

11 The danger of Dr Owen's policy is less acute, but still serious. In the first place, no alternative to Trident is likely to be as effective against the Soviet defences of the future. And, if it were, it would be at least as expensive; and there is another problem.

12 However firm the SDP may be in its commitment to

13 NATO and the British deterrent, the Liberal Party has a strong unilateralist, anti-American element, which has already committed a Party Congress to the abandonment of Polaris. It would be rash to place any decision about Britain's defence policy in the hands of so uncertain a coalition.

14 One of the arguments frequently advanced against Mrs Thatcher's defence policy is that it is committing Britain to continued reliance on nuclear weapons at a time when the superpowers are moving into an era of nuclear disarmament. If this were true, it would be a powerful argument; but it is not.

15 It is likely that there will be, before the end of the year, an agreement to remove Russian SS20 missiles and American Cruise and Pershing 2 from Europe (an agreement which has been made possible by the West's refusal to remove Cruise and Pershing unilateralily). There may even be an

16 agreement on shorter-range missiles.

17 There will, however, still be nuclear systems in Europe; and there will, of course, still be powerful nuclear arsenals in the United States, the Soviet Union, France and China. Furthermore, there are at least six other countries which might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century—not all of them friendly towards us.

18 The truth is that the next 10-15 years are likely to be difficult, complicated and dangerous. There may be far-reaching measures of nuclear disarmament, in the negotiation for which the British independent deterrent would play an important part.

UNCERTAIN

19 On the other hand, if Mr Gorbachev's policies should fail, we would return to a precarious nuclear confrontation. In this case we would almost certainly find ourselves in a world of many nuclear powers.

20 In this uncertain and menacing world, Mrs Thatcher's policies alone provide an insurance against disaster; some might say an over-insurance, but that is no bad thing in military strategy. The other two parties are prepared, for the first time, to gamble irresponsibly with our national security.

TODAY



I know what I'd do if Labour win, Maggie tells the top brass

LAY DOWN YOUR ARMS

MRS THATCHER last night virtually advised Britain's military chiefs to quit the defence of the country if Labour wins the election.

by CHRIS BUCKLAND, Political Editor

the damage done to Nato, the damage done to liberty, the damage done to Britain's defences, be so deep, so fundamental that they could no longer be responsible for carrying that burden of defence or being in charge of our armed forces without a nuclear weapon of any kind when those armed forces faced an adversary that had them."

② The Prime Minister's amazing outburst is certain to fuel a furious row in the run-up to Polling Day.

⑥ Last night, Mrs Thatcher began a flying visit to the economic summit in Venice.

③ It came in an interview on BBC's Panorama programme when Sir Robin Day asked what the armed forces chief should do — resign or obey a democratically elected government committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament.

⑦ Meanwhile opinion polls gave Tories a fresh boost with the latest survey in today's Guardian showing Mrs Thatcher heading for a 132 majority. The Marplan poll, taken yesterday, gives the Conservatives 45 percent of the vote (one more than last week), Labour 32 (down two) and the Alliance 21 (up one).

④ *Bristling with anger she replied: "I know what I would do. I just could not be responsible for the men under me in those circumstances."*

⑧ Labour and Alliance leaders took comfort from regional polls which showed them closing the gap in vital seats in London and the South.

⑤ She said they would have to decide "whether in their view and it would certainly be mine — that

Thatcher inflames defence debate

By James Naughtie
and David Gow

The Prime Minister last night fanned the election defence row when she made clear that she thought the chiefs of the defence staff would be justified in resigning if a Labour government came to power committed to a non-nuclear strategy.

Mrs Thatcher said that if she were in the position of a chief of staff she would have no doubts about what she would do. Speaking on Panorama on BBC Television, she made it obvious that she meant resignation.

Although she added that it was entirely a matter for the chiefs themselves, her comments — touching on the sensitive position of serving officers — are certain to inflame the already bitter defence controversy.

If she found herself leading a minority government, she said she would not resign. "If I was the largest party and I don't see why I should resign."

The Tory programme would be put to parliament, which could deliver its judgment. There would be no "argy-bargy" with minority parties. But she was confident that it would not be necessary. "I hope and believe that we shall win with a reasonable majority. I tremble to think what would happen to Britain if we do not."

She presented a determined and combative personality in the interview with Sir Robin Day but denied that she ran her government arrogantly. It was insulting to members of her Cabinet who were invited "from time to time" to give their views, she said.

Mrs Thatcher was speaking against the background of fierce attacks on her style of government by Labour leaders and Dr David Owen, the SDP leader. They focused on the practice of Thatcherism — which the Prime Minister described as "sound common sense" — as the main theme of the closing stages of the campaign.

Mr Bryan Gould, Labour's campaign co-ordinator, accused her of being a Prime Minister who always looked backwards and was surrounded by a Cabinet of "tired grey men." Dr Owen said: "She will not admit one failure. She will not concede one fault. She will not allow that anything in Britain is amiss."

Mr Thatcher was in imperious mood in her interview, declaring that it was "Thatcherism" which had put an end to the division caused by trade union action under the last Labour Government.

She refused to predict the level of inflation, unemployment or the basic rate of income tax after another term, but insisted that the essence of Thatcherism was "sound finance" and good economic management. "It is sound common sense," she said.

It was insulting to her Minister to suggest that the Cabinet consisted of "Yes" men, she said. Similarly, the attacks on her as hard and uncaring were cruel, and intended to be. "It is a ruse to take away attention from their record in government, which was a dis-

Turn to back page col. 5.

STATE OF THE POLLS



| Con | Lab | All |
|-----|-----|-----|
| 44 | 33 | 21 |

Average of last five polls

Election news, pages 6 and 8; Leader comment and letters, page 16; How Neil Kinnock is passing the tests and Now the secret is out, page 21; Inflation boost for Tories, page 23; Tax plans under wraps, back page.

Mrs Thatcher said: "The chiefs of staff have to make up their own mind — each person is responsible for what he decides. I know what I would do. I could not be responsible for the men under me in these circumstances. It would not be fair to put them in the field if we did not have nuclear weapons — I know what I would do. But they are free to make their decision."

She also revealed that she is keeping open the possibility of resignation in mid-term if she is re-elected on Thursday, despite her earlier insistence that she would serve out a third term.

"I have not made up my mind," she said. Although she would like to go through to a fourth term she did not know what would happen to her. "Eventually, someone will want to come up exactly as I did."

Thatcher 'trembles' at Labour's defence plan

1. MARGARET THATCHER last night said she "trembled to think" what would happen to Britain if the Tories lost the election. She made clear that, if she was one of the Chiefs of Defence Staff, she would resign rather than carry out the policy of a Labour Government to abandon nuclear weapons.

3 Although she emphasised that she was not giving advice to the Chiefs of Staff, the message was clear. Interviewed on the BBC TV *Panorama* programme, Mrs Thatcher said: "The Chiefs of Staff have to make up their own minds. Each person is responsible for what he decides.

5 "It would be for the Chiefs of Staff to decide whether in their view — it would certainly be mine — that the damage done to Nato, to liberty — because Britain has always stood for liberty — the damage done to Britain's defences would be so deep, so fundamental that they could no longer be responsible for carrying the burden of defence or be in charge of our armed forces without a nuclear weapon of any kind when those armed forces faced an adversary who had.

6 "I know what I would do. I just could not be responsible for the men under me in those circumstances. It would not be fair to put them in the field if the others had nuclear weapons. I know what I would do, but they are free to make their decision. That is a fundamental part of what I believe."

12 Mrs Thatcher's remarks are certain to heighten the controversy over Labour's non-nuclear defence policy.

13 Today's *Guardian* Marplan poll suggests that the Tories have gained since Mrs Thatcher's gaffe over private health and this may be attributed to their counter-attack on Labour over defence.

By Colin Brown
Political Correspondent

There was also a report last night that the Chiefs of Staff gave an assurance to George Younger, the Secretary of State for Defence, that they would not enter into the political debate over defence during the election campaign. But this was dismissed by the Ministry of Defence as "a total fabrication".

Neil Kinnock, the Labour leader, answered criticism over defence from a studio audience last night on the Granada 500 programme. He said the choice was between buying a new £10-11bn system of nuclear weapons and running down the conventional forces, or investing that money in a 50-ship surface fleet, proper provision for the RAF and the British Army of the Rhine.

Asked how conventional weapons could become a deterrent to nuclear weapons, Mr Kinnock retorted: "Address that question to the 150 countries of the world who do not have, have never possessed and most of them will not accommodate nuclear weapons."

However, Mrs Thatcher said: "It is my hope and belief we will win a very reasonable majority. I tremble to think what will happen if we don't."

She reaffirmed her determination to continue in office in a hung parliament if the Conservatives had the largest number of seats. Although she refused to rule out the possibility of negotiations with other parties, including the Alliance she underlined her distaste for the "argy bargy" required in coalitions.

Mrs Thatcher said: "I would rather take my programme, as the largest minority party, before Parliament and say, 'Deliver your opinion on it.'"

GENERAL MARGARET QUIT UNDER LABOUR!

Ban-bomb blast at Kinnock

By CHRISTOPHER POTTER

PREMIER Margaret Thatcher said last night she would quit if she were an Army general serving under Neil Kinnock.

She claimed it would be impossible to carry on in a nation stripped of defences by a Labour Government.

Mrs Thatcher told BBC Panorama viewers: "I know what I would do. I would say, I could no longer be in command."

She added: "The chiefs of staff have

to make up their own minds. It will be up to them to form their own view, and decide whether it would be in the interests of the nation to damage NATO and Britain and our European allies."

But she pointed out: "If Britain pulls out of its commitment to NATO, it is as if one of the pillars of the temple has collapsed."

The Sun predicted last week that military top brass are prepared to resign if a ban-the-bomb Labour Government is elected.

The Panorama programme was recorded before Mrs Thatcher flew out to the seven-nation economic summit in Venice yesterday.

Mr Kinnock claimed the summit was just an expensive election stunt. By last night, Mrs Thatcher had virtually taken over.

Launch

In just a few hours, she had helped U.S. President Reagan and the other leaders launch a new crackdown on drugs, terrorism and AIDS.

Frogmen scoured the canals of Venice to prevent the threat of an IRA attack on Mrs Thatcher.

In a programme screened on Channel Four last night, the Prime Minister admitted her decisions have not ALWAYS been right.

"I am just as human as anyone else," she said. "I too make mistakes."



It's Venice to meet you. Mrs Thatcher and President Reagan last night

THE SUN,
9.06.87.

Labour chiefs clash on nukes

By TREVOR KAVANAGH Political Editor

LABOUR leader Neil Kinnock and his Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey clashed head-on yesterday over the party's disastrous "no nukes" defence policy.

Mr Healey said on Jimmy Young's radio programme that he would expect America to come to the aid of a non-nuclear Britain under threat from Russia.

Asked if he thought the US would help if we were threatened with nuclear blackmail, Mr Healey replied: "Certainly."

He said America's nuclear umbrella had been used once before to save Britain—during the Suez crisis in 1956.

But minutes earlier in Birmingham Mr Kinnock said NOTHING could justify the use of nukes—even self-defence.

He said there would be no point in anyone trying to blackmail us with nuclear threats.

He added: "The use of those weapons would make whatever conquests they were seeking completely uninhabitable."

Pounced

Mr Kinnock told last year's Labour conference there was "no such thing" as a nuclear umbrella.

He also said he would never press the nuclear trigger—or expect another country to do it for him.

The clash between Mr Kinnock and Mr Healey revealed the scale of division between the two.

And top Tories were quick to pounce on the split.

Defence Secretary George Younger said Mr Healey was saying to the Americans:

"Get out of the way—we don't want to spend any money on nuclear weapons but we expect you to bail us out."

The Sun Sun Page 4

By POLITICAL EDITOR

1) MRS THATCHER suggested last night that if Britain's defence chiefs share her views they will walk out if Labour wins on Thursday.

2) Thrusting the defence issue back to the heart of the election, she insisted that Mr Kinnock's ban-the-bomb policy would wreck the Western Alliance.

3) In one of the most dramatic declarations any Prime Minister has made about the loyalty and

THERE is good poll news for Mrs Thatcher this morning with Marplan forecasting a landslide Tory victory with a 13 point lead over Labour. And SDP leader David Owen astonished journalists last night by suggesting that Mrs Thatcher looks invincible.

Polls apart — Page TWO

judgement of the Armed Forces, she said: 'I know what I would do. I could just not be responsible for the men in those circumstances.'

4) Mrs Thatcher said she was hoping for a 'reasonable majority' in the poll but added: 'I tremble what will happen to Britain if we don't'.

5) It was not the only sensation in one of the most extraordinary television examples the country is ever likely to see of the Thatcher personality in action.

6) Questioned by Sir Robin Day on BBC TV's Panorama, the Premier was touched on the raw by accusations of a hard and uncaring style.

7) But it was her belief about the implications of Mr Kinnock's first order of the

Turn to Page 2, Col 6

INSIDE: Weather 2, World Wide 1

Daily Mail, Tuesday, June 9, 1987

Defence dilemma

Continued from Page One

day, in recalling the Polaris nuclear submarines, that have left defence chiefs in a spot.

8) Mrs Thatcher said that if the order were given 'they will have to make up their own minds'.

9) She went on: 'It would be for them to decide whether in their view — it would certainly be in mine — that the damage done to Nato and to liberty — because Britain has always stood for liberty — the damage done to Britain's defences would be so deep, so fundamental that they can no longer be responsible for bearing the burden of defence, for being in charge of our armed forces with no nuclear weapons of any kind facing adversaries that had them.'

10) The biggest dilemma of all if Labour wins would face the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse, who masterminded the Falklands campaign.

11) But behind him, wrestling with their consciences, would be the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir William Staveley, the Army chief, General Sir Nigel Bagnall and Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir David Craig.

Anger

12) If they went, then it is difficult to see how the top defence civil servant, Sir Clive Whitmore — a former Thatcher aide — could stay too. What Mrs Thatcher has pinpointed is nothing less than the biggest peacetime crisis at the top of the armed forces that Britain may ever face.

Non-nuclear policy 'would hurt nation'

By Michael Evans and Nicholas Wood

The Prime Minister last night entered the controversy over how the Chiefs of Staff at the Ministry of Defence should respond to an incoming Labour government committed to a unilateralist defence policy. they will not become involved in any way in the election debate over Labour's plans to scrap the independent nuclear deterrent and close American nuclear bases.

2) She said that if she were in their shoes she would resign rather than carry out orders that would deal a fundamental blow to Nato, Britain's defences and liberty.

1) Mr George Younger, Secretary of State for Defence, has asked for and received pledges from the present Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse, and the heads of the three Armed Forces that they would not make their views known about the implications of Labour's policy.

3) For Britain to abandon nuclear weapons would be as if "one of the pillars of the temple had collapsed". Mrs Margaret Thatcher declared in a *Panorama* interview with Sir Robin Day.

4) However, it is understood that they are unanimous about

4) However, she insisted that the decision had to rest with the service chiefs themselves making up their own minds.

Chase Manhattan Securities, the British subsidiary of US bankers Chase Manhattan, has forecast a collapse of the gilt-edged market and double-figures interest rates if the Labour Party gains an overall majority on Thursday. Page 29

5) "I know what I would do. I just could not be responsible for the men under me in those circumstances."

7) "It would do untold damage. Britain is not just another country. We have never been just another country: It was Britain who stood when every one else surrendered. And if Britain puts out of that commitment, it's as if one of the pillars of the temple has collapsed because we are one of the pillars of freedom."

8) the military advice they would give to an incoming Labour government.

11) It was disclosed that the Chiefs of Staff have assured the Government that

9) Senior Whitehall sources said that they would exercise their right to see Mr Neil Kinnock, if he was Prime Minister, to inform him of their reservations about the adoption of a non-nuclear defence strategy.

10) Some former Chiefs of the
Continued on page 28, col 7

Chiefs pledge silence

Continued from page 1

Defence Staff have indicated their opposition to Labour's non-nuclear strategy, outlined in its manifesto.

from patrol, he would have resigned.

17) Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff from 1979 to 1982 and principal military adviser to the Prime Minister during the Falklands conflict, has said that, had he been faced with a Labour government determined to withdraw Polaris

16) Despite Lord Lewin's commitment Whitehall sources indicated that resignation of defence chiefs was unlikely.

18) Mr Denzil Davies, Labour defence spokesman, said yesterday: "I have no doubt that the military would carry out the democratic wishes of the British people and that they would do so constitutionally."

RADIO ONE PHONE-IN - MRS THATCHER
3/6/87

DJ Ok last night the leader of the labour party Neil Kinnock was with us/ tomorrow David Steel for the Alliance will be here/but tonight I'm joined by the Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher, good evening.

MT Good evening.

DJ Thank you for coming now lets get straight to the calls, Kevin McEllan from Barnstaple in North Devon, good evening.

Caller Hello yes, my question to the Prime minister is on health. I'm a nurse in a London theaching hospital and my question is this: if the Prime Minister is so committed to the health service why is it that she did not have the confidence to use the NHS herself? recently?

MT It's not a question of confidence, I have to have anything I need doing on a certain day, at a certain time, and I confess I prefer to choose my own particular doctor, and for that, I'm prepared to insure.

DJ Kevin I'm not going to let you come back with a supplementary(. I want to get as many calls in as possible. Sarah Powell, in Sudbury in Suffolk good evening, you're on line to the prime minister.

MT Hello Sarah

Caller what are you going to do if you get voted in again about people like my dad, when they go after jobs, are told that they are too old at forty?

MT We have a special scheme, it's called I'm afraid restart, there's a lot of jargon in this, they are called in every six months if they havn't got a job, now we counsel them, we try to see what jobs are available which people can't fill because they haven't got the skills, and we try to match the person, the training of the person, to the skill that is required, and if not, then we ask them if they'd like to go on what is called a community programme Those are jobs which as you can imagine, are, it may be doing up a village hall. It may be helping with something in the public sector, if they would like to go on that particular scheme, as a job for six months or a year.

DJ Sarah does your f... your dad perhaps feel he's too old for a job?

MT Oh no

Caller Well he's on a government scheme at the moment, but he finishes in August so then he'll be out of work again.

DJ Uhhu

MT It is not easy in your particular area is it because the work is very seasonal in any event you're in Barnstaple North Devon, it is farming it is tourism and so there's always been quite a lot of seasonal work and it's a question of getting as much light industry as we can there. We'll try to help your father dear as much as we can by counselling him and by training him for the jobs that are available:

DJ Long term are you optimistic about unemployment when people are older?

MT Long term yes I am optimistic about unemployment, first because all the new technological advances in history have had the immediate effect of putting people out of work but the longer term effect of creating all sorts of new jobs that no one ever thought of before, so in the end I think more jobs will come on, but there's a second reason. At the moment the population of working age is getting larger, more people between age 16 and 65. That's because there have been more school leavers for a period of 10 years than there have people retiring. In the early 1990's that changes.

DJ Mm

MT far fewer school leavers and more people retiring, so there will be an improvement in the job prospects for that alone, but there are new companies coming, there are... I went to open one the other day, the other Saturday morning, it came on in 1981, it employs a thousand people, it's a courier service, it sends, it sends, process documents, process parcels all over the world. It couldn't come into existence until we'd broken the post office monopoly on that, so there are 1000 jobs, which are new jobs, and there quite a number of other kinds of work like that.

DJ Sarah you're a 12 year old, are you happy with the prime minister's answer?

Caller Well

MT Sarah would like her father to have a job dear, wouldn't you?

Caller Yeah

MT Yes of course you would. We'll try.

DJ Thank you very much indeed for your call Sarah, Sharon Holden from Hailsham in Essex, in Sussex I beg your pardon, Sharon hi.

Caller Hello

DJ You're on line to the Prime minister.

MT Hello Sharon.

Caller Mrs Thatcher, I'd like to know if you come to power again, what you're going to do about the state of the schools. The classroom are drastically overcrowded, there's not enough textbooks between pupils and other equipment is very short.

DJ Sharon thank you very much for your question, it's a very bad line but I think I heard, let me just repeat it for the prime minister, you're asking about resources for schools, and you're saying that in your area, there isn't enough money for textbooks.

MT Er Sharon, I thought I heard that. Look, what government does is to allocate a certain amount of money for each pupil, whether it's a primary school pupil, less than a secondary school pupil, and if you're in a sixth form it's obviously more than from ages 12 to 16, now within the amount that's allocated, the local, your local education authority decides how much shall go to staff, how much shall go to books, how much shall go to equipment and so on, and what we have done is a number of things. First, there's far more per pupil than there used to be, and that's so even after inflation has been taken into account, it's about 17% more so there is really more. Secondly we have provided more teachers in proportion to pupils, and thirdly, better trained teachers. Now how that's allocated between the various parts of education is up to your locality, and possibly up to your governors or your head teacher.

DJ Mm, well that answers that question. Ned Gardhouse in York you're on line to Mrs Thatcher, hi.

Caller Hello Mrs Thatcher.

MT Hello Ned.

Caller That's right. Well it's a bit of a light weight question, this, I just wondered, Mr Kinnock has recorded a video, with Tracy Allman, David Steel has ..

DJ (laughs)

Caller appeared in one as well, I wondered if you'd a chance to let down your hair, whether or not you would appear in a video?

MT I don't somehow think you'd like the result, and I don't therefore think I should inflict it upon you.

Caller I could give you a good contract.

MT (laughs)

DJ Ned you sound like a good con man to me, thank you very much for your call.

MT Thank you very much.

DJ It's 01 580 4411 you're on line to the prime minister and we'll go to David Jury in Portsmouth in Hampshire hello David.

Caller Hello

MT Hello David.

Caller Hello. Does the prime minister think that in the current employment situation, where a university degree is no longer a guarantee of a job, that the conservative's intended student loan scheme is justified?

MT First, a university degree has never been a guarantee of a job. University degrees are really, if you want to go to read a particular subject, it might be a vocational subject, that is to say you might want to be a doctor, you might want to be an engineer, so you take a medical degree, or a chemical engineering degree, but there are many other degrees you may take in the arts, English, History, or Social Sciences, and it's never been a guarantee that there will be a job for a person with a university degree. As a matter of fact at the moment most people who come out of universities with degrees are getting a job for the simple reason that it really is a kind of mind-training and therefore there are many many jobs available which the employer wants a mind-training. Now loans we are having a look at top-up loans, not as a substitute for the grant but as a top up. As you know sometimes parents don't meet their contribution under the grant scheme for their children...

Caller What (inaudible)

MT and and sometimes it's thought that they would need more

DJ Hang on one second David

MT It's a top-up loan and not a substitute for a grant.

DJ Would you like to come back now?

Caller Yes, the point I'm trying to make is that there may be some people who may be locked out of education because their parents can't afford the contribution and if they can't get a job when they come out of university with their degree or they're a doctor or engineer, then the loan is going to fall on them, and if they haven't got a job, it's going to fall on their parents and what if their parents can't afford it?

MT If they haven't got a job then obviously the repayment of any loan would not be demanded immediately, one has to be reasonable about these things

Caller Such a loan will stay until they get a job?

MT The loan would stay until one gets a job, and when you do get a job you would expect with a university degree that you'd have a very much better paid job

MT but let me make it clear. The loan is not a substitute for the grant, the grant continues. It's a top-up. Now I don't know about you but many of the young people that I know take jobs in the vacation and they help therefore to make some money to meet their own expenses, it just depends where in the country you are, but a lot of young people do that.

DJ David come back if you want to one more time

Caller Well, thank you for clarifying that issue prime minister.

DJ Thank you very much indeed.

MT Thank you very much.

DJ Ok Paul Fuller in Runcorn in Cheshire, you're on line to the Prime minister.

Caller Hello Mrs Thatcher.

MT Hello, that was Paul, was it?

DJ Paul yes.

Caller It is yes. I work for a local building society, and in order to get promotion I need to move down south. Now my concern is the differing in house prices up here, down there, er, I understand, and agree, at the moment, with London weighting, but I don't see why somebody should get a London weighting for just working and living in London. I don't think it should be necessary.

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MT Well it has been for years and years. I can remember when I was very young hearing that someone from our small town was going to London, and the salary seemed enormous to us until they told us just exactly what the housing prices were. So it has been that a capital city tends to act as a magnet. Now I don't know whether you're, you're, you're married or want a house or a flat, but when we went to work on our first job or second job, we went to live in digs with a landlady. I'm afraid there aren't quite as many as there used to be, and one of the things we are trying to do is to bring back rather more resident landlord lettings so that there are facilities for people like you. Also, as you will know, and perhaps have seen from the manifesto, we're trying to encourage people like building societies, and various financial institutions to build more flats and houses to let, and for that they'll either have to have a proper assured tenancy, or something called shorthold, and I'm sure you know about both of those.

DJ It does take time though, doesn't it Mrs Thatcher.

MT Oh it does take time. I agree, but you know there are a lot of properties that are empty, er, we released the law to enable for example, er people in council

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flats to take in lodgers if they wished to do so, but I find far fewer lodgings than there used to be in my time as a young person, which I think is a pity, and we'll try to get more. I know what it is. Many widows who would otherwise have made their livelihood by taking in people, are a little bit fearful if they get someone whom they really just can't abide in the house.

DJ Mm

MT It's difficult to get rid of them, and they have to, would have to go to court, er and um it would take quite a time to get rid of them, and we're having a look at that.

DJ We're talking about a specific difficulty with Paul though, who obviously cannot afford to move south to get the job, it's the 'on your bike' principle.

MT Well he could afford to move south if he could get er housing at a reasonable price. Of course one does have housing benefit as you know, so that people can take a rented room, and if it is too much for them to afford, then they do get help with the housing benefit.

DJ Paul, does that answer your question?

MT Er Paul will know all this, working for a building society.

Caller Yes, um, to a certain extent yes but do you recognise that the great north-south divide is a big major problem. None of the parties seem to have recognised this and seem to have policies to alter this fact.

MT Well you can't direct people to start up in the north. I've just come down from the north today to this programme. I went to the best shopping centre in UK I think, one at Gateshead, absolutely magnificent. Then I went over to a superb firm called Black and Becker where everything is going well, they're taking on extra people, then I heard of Glaxo is starting up there, but you can't direct people where they should go. Now we used to try to do that, and what happened, if you sent them where it was not economic to go, eventually they closed down, and they were not then able to start up where they had wanted, so you've just got to recognise that if people are to start up a business, they've got to start it up in a place where they can keep their costs down, from which they can sell their goods, and from which they can get the kind of labour they want to employ.

DJ Do you recognise the north south divide?

MT I think that is much too simplistic, much too simplistic a description. I know of places in the south which have a particular problem, some of them in the coastal towns, thanet is one particular one, or some of them

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where a particular firm has closed down, which also have high rates of unemployment. I do know that in the north they have marvellous communications, they have excellent universities and also they're very fortunate in that salary for salary they can get very much better housing, as we've just been told, and it doesn't cost them anything like so much to go to work, so if you do it the other way, if you go for promotion to the north, then you sell your house in the south, then you've got a bit of capital, and you're living costs are less, so just look at it that way.

DJ Radio I, on line to the prime minister,
JINGLE-Election '87.... On line....Radio I.

DJ Mark Campbell from Ilfracombe in Devon welcome.

Caller Hello

MT Hello

DJ What's your question please?

Caller Prime Minister

MT Mark

Caller Over the election period prime minister you have been accused of not caring - something which you denied, but how can you claim to care especially when the young are concerned, when your government has abolished wages councils for under 21s, meaning employers can pay under 21s as little as they wish. Younger people under your government were already low paid, and abolishing wages councils can only make things worse. Does this not show that your government does not care about the young?

MT No I don't think it does at all. I think caring is not how much you talk about it it's what you do. You've challenged me about wages councils, you know full well that sometimes where young people had to be paid something like 4/5 of the wages of adults then employers could not take them on.. You will find that where young people get far more jobs for example in Germany they are paid a much much smaller proportion of the adult wage and so you'll find that the number of apprenticeships is very much bigger. Indeed if I might point out the elec, the electrical union has in fact come to that scheme and has got a much smaller wage to young people. That way they will get jobs. Just look at it, if you were an employer you couldn't afford to take young people on at 4/5 of the adult wage

Caller Yes but

MT if it was a skilled job, and so in our way we shall get many more people employed

Caller You've had a question to have your say, could I have
a little more say please?

MT Yes of course.

Caller When an employer takes young people on I've seen it here in Ilfracombe in the summer, they take on adults before the high season gets going. Once the high season comes they sack the adults and take on children, so it fuels unemployment and employers just have cheaper labour. You've talked about students getting wages in jobs in the summer, most are under 21 they have no protection so what do they do? They are forced to take a very very low wages, forced by yourself. Before the wages, menial wages weren't all that high, but at least they had some protection, you have removed that Mrs Thatcher

DJ Mark hang on a second I'm going to get the prime minister to answer your question.

MT No, no I don't accept that because at that particular time there is a fantastic demand as you know for people to work in hotels. All of a sudden everyone wants them and they just cannot get them if they pay very very low wages. They have in fact to pay what it is necessary for them to run the hotel. They of course have to gear their prices if they put their prices up they're not going to get people coming to stay at their hotel, or stay, or to work or to come to shop at their local retail trade. You must always remember, and if an employer prices himself out of the market there isn't a job. In those seaside towns for years it's always been a problem about seasonal, seasonal jobs, because those people in the hotels and often in the shops have to make enough to live on for a year, and yes therefore some of the prices are high, but if they put them up too much they'll just not get the custom. That's the problem.

DJ We may come back to that later on. Thank you for your call Mark, Ian West you're on line to the Prime Minister in Aylesbury in Bucks.

Caller Hello Mrs Thatcher

MT Hello Ian.

Caller Yeah, I come from a one parent family, a difficulty my mother has found in finding work is the poverty trap, where the initial tax paid is too high and it's just you know, not worth paying all the transport costs etc. I'm just wondering what measures the next conservative government will do, will take, to alleviate this common problem.

MT Well this is a problem I know quite a number of people say to me look it's not worth while my going to out to work I could get as much on supplementary benefit and when I think that I've got to have better clothes

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and pay the transport costs then it's not worth it. It bothers us a great deal. Whether what we're going to do as far as people in that position is concerned under the new system we're going to let them have as much when they're on comparatively low wages in work for their children as they get when they're out of work. That will help very much indeed. Secondly, yes we have tried to lift the threshold at which you pay tax in other words we have tried to increase the amount of tax-free personal allowance. We've done it several times but I agree with you the gap is still not big enough but that does mean further reductions in taxation over and above those which we've been able to make at the moment.

DJ Will you in the future make a reduction in taxation?

MT We want you need to do two things first you have to increase the personal allowances with inflation index them so that they're they don't lose their value and secondly you try actually to increase them but then I'm very conscious that even 27 pence in the £ for income tax is a very high rate to start in we want to get it down to 25 pence but even that is quite a high rate you know for your first £

DJ Will you do it?

MT Well that just depends how the economy goes. We're never rash in our promises we have in fact run the economy well and soundly and I think steadily and surely is far better than making grandiose promises and not being able to fulfill them.

DJ Would you like to come back Ian?

Caller Yes well I'm very satisfied about that I'd like to see tax coming down because it's alright for Mr Kinnoch to keep saying that he'd rather spend it on different things but when it comes down to it, when it comes down to ordinary people how much they're going to spend on different things when they want a better standard of living, different things like this, and when it's worth while to take a job you know because of these different / the poverty trap problem

DJ Well thank you very much indeed and thank you for your comments

MT Thank you Ian / thank you very much Ian / I agree
DJ I'm going to keep the prime minister on right / thank you / Chris Jackson in Coventry in the West Midlands you're on line to the prime minister

MT Hello Chris

Caller Hello Mrs Thatcher. / Um first of all I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to start in business via the government's enterprise scheme

MT Is this the enterprise allowance?

Caller The enterprise allowance scheme

MT Good I'm glad you've found it helpful

Caller Thank you / um first of all I'd really like to ask about the small businesses

MT Yes

Caller a slight concern that / If you could clarify that the majority of small businesses due to the investment problems that the small person has tend to be in the service sector non-manufacturing sector of the economy / how do you see / and in fact do you see the manufacturing sector of the economy as being important in view of the recent trade figures?

MT

The manufacturing sector is very important but for years and years now we've been able to produce more goods in the manufacturing sector by employing fewer people and that's because of the advance of technology and we can't fight change we have to work with it because if these factories didn't use the latest technology they'd go out of business / now later this technology will make possible all kinds of new products which we can't think of at the moment and when I first knew about computers it would take a whole room to have in quite a quite a small computer / now you can get a tiny one on your desk / all kinds of things therefore become possible but er I think the second point I just wanted to say

Caller Mm

MT I think sometimes people make too sharp a distinction between manufacturing and services / you say services / a hotel is service / look it has to buy carpets it has to buy furniture it has to buy glasses it has to buy knives and forks it has to buy a whole load of manufacturing things / you might think computers are in the service sector / yes they are but first someone has to make them and really they're very very much more tangled up together than most people think and I would not sharply divide them for one depends upon the other we need both.

DJ Chris thank you very much for your question

MT Thank you Chris

DJ Michael Parker in Clifton in Bristol hello

Caller Hello good evening Mrs Thatcher

MT Hello Michael

Caller um if (you) were to be returned to a third term in office what would be the home / what would the homeless have to look forward to / any / can I continue sorry

DJ Continue

Caller Any reply to the parliamentary / a parliamentary

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question (a ...) admitted it cost twice as much to keep a household in bed and breakfast as to provide decent permanent housing / would she make any change to the policy that forces over 100,000 homeless into bed and breakfast and a lot more mostly young people to live without the basic right of a secure roof over them?

MT Look / at the moment there are about 119,000 council flats and houses empty and what we're trying to do is to get them speed up the time between someone going out of that house or flat and someone coming in / some of them have been empty for over a year and that just doesn't make sense and secondly there are about in the private sector there are about 500,000 er properties which could be let er often with residential landlords or a flat in the same house which are not let at the moment and we are directing all our housing policy to this to bring those back onto the market but again I say to you I spent my early years in digs - and really if we can get more residential landlords to let some rooms it would both help them with income and it would help the people who are seeking somewhere decent to live

DJ Can I just take Michael's point

MT Uh mm

DJ I think Michael is on about the regulations primarily and the difficulty that some young people have if they lose their benefits if they don't move on from board and lodgings where they're provided with a meal / is that the point you're trying to make Michael?

caller Actually it's not just that it's the fact that er the present conservative government is prepared to throw er I'm not quite sure of the figure / thousands pounds millions of pounds at the symptoms of homelessness but is not prepared to spend money on a building programme which would do (...) you know

DJ Alright let me just :

MT The housing programme for the next 3 years is 3 1/2 billion pounds a year / that's a great deal of money 3 1/2 billion pounds a year / what we're concentrating on is housing for special groups of people for example the elderly because frequently they want to move out of a big house into a small one if only the small one or the sheltered housing is available / so as far as building houses is concerned that's what we're concentrating on / also we are very much aware that a number of local council houses and flats are really in quite a bad state of repair and we think that the best thing we can do is to try to bring those houses and flats up to a decent standard of living and therefore we are increasing the amount which goes to those / that will get better housing faster that spending the same amount of money on building fewer extra flats or houses

DJ Have you any plans assuming that you become the next government have you any plans specifically to increase housing in that sense?

MT Er I think that our main increase in housing will come as it is coming now through the private sector and wherever you travel almost there's a boom in construction it's quite remarkable / a fantastic number of houses going up a lot of young people want to buy can't afford in this area to buy a whole house so they can buy a half a house and then pay the rent for the other half / and quite a number of them try to buy a first house which is just very small / but on a plot of land which will allow them to build on eventually to expand / so the main increase is coming in the private sector I think quite right because all the polls say all the surveys say that young people certainly between the age of 20 and 24 their great objective is to get their first / their foot on the first rung of the housing ladder and that if they do that it will be very very much better for them and if we can therefore then release some of the other houses and flats in the in the council sector for these young people and get more residential landlords to let

DJ Can you do that?

MT Well we / look we've got a whole programme to do it / you can put the ball at someone's feet / whether they will kick it or not we don't know but we'll just have to see.

DJ The prime minister
JINGIEE Radio-one, election '87.

DJ Elliot Lewis you're on line to Mrs Thatcher

Caller Good evening

MT hello Elliot good evening

Caller Your famous quote from St Francis of Assisi in 1979 talks of your premiership bringing harmony truth faith and hope / do you consider you've achieved this?

MT I think that we have brought harmony into industrial relations by our reform of trade union law / a great deal of harmony / wherever I go in manufacturing industry people say to me look we couldn't have done what we're doing now with our exports with our production with our competitiveness unless you Mrs Thatcher had reformed trade union law / no longer is it conflict and adversarial situations we get much more cooperation and we get much more team work and secondly / we have tried to look at people and try to give them more opportunity for example we were very anxious to have more people able to own their own houses / therefore it's part of our policy to extend private ownership / home ownership much more widely / we're doing it / it's part of our policy to save out of

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their earnings / to build up a little bit of money of their own therefore we're reducing tax and therefore we're trying to keep inflation down so that their savings are worth something / and thirdly / when we have privatised companies and even when other companies want to give shares to their employees we have made it easier for them to do so / all this is bringing much more harmony to the whole of manufacturing industry and it's because of that that it's a great success / no class strife for us we don't look at people in that way they're not blocks of people to use / they are individuals

DJ How about truth?

MT Well I hope that I hope that I answer accurately truthfully / I take a tremendous amount of time in trying to to keep abreast of the facts and answer as candidly as I can

DJ Elliot would you like to come back?

Caller Um I'd just like to point out that there didn't seem to be much harmony on the picket lines during the miner's dispute / there didn't seem to be much truth surrounding the Westland affair and I would seriously doubt the faith and hope in this government of the 3 million plus unemployed people.

MT ~~Firstly~~ ~~the~~ ~~lines~~ / the miner's strike started ~~before~~ ~~the~~ ~~Fast~~ of our trade union reforms had come into effect / had it come into effect they would have had to have had a secret ballot or could have been taken to court and I do not myself think that that strike would then ever have started / so it would in fact be different now / on the Westland affair I made more detailed statements and went to er and went to extreme lengths to check every single fact before I gave those statements and what was the third / unemployed look no no um government in a free society can guarantee everyone a job / yes if you're prepared to have an unfree society like the soviet society so that you have total direction of labour / you have to be told what job you can do and you have to stay in it and can't go and find another one / you have to be told where you can go / told where you can live / told how much you can earn / then you can have full employment but it's not the sort of society you would like / no freedom / no human rights / not for Britain.

DJ Thank you Elliot / Sarah Henry in Cheltenham in Gloucester hello

Caller Hello

MT Hello Sarah

DJ You're on line to the prime minister

Caller I'd just like to ask you why your government is so

keen on bringing in tax cuts which are only going to benefit people in no need of extra help when instead the money could be used in areas where it would benefit everybody / such as in education or health or creating jobs

MT But (...) tax cuts / actually go to benefit everyone / when you go to put up the tax free allowance that benefits everyone / when you actually cut the standard rate of tax / that benefits every single person who pays tax and that's the overwhelming majority / now I don't find / that young couples with families are overflush with money / I find them struggling to pay a mortgage / I find them knowing that children will come up to their school term needing extra shoes / I find them wanting enough money to help to run the car and possibly to save enough to go on holiday / I don't find them overflush with money and I do say sometimes to my fellow members of parliament / what are you going to do when you go and say to your constituents I've spent your tax relief / I thought I could spend it better than you / so you'll not

be able to go on holiday this year / you will not be able to have some little luxury that you had / the most important thing you can do in life / is to give your children a better start than you had / and it's no part of my belief or my philosophy / to deprive people of that fundamental right / by their own effort / to earn more and to keep more of their earnings to do better for their children / and if everyone did it / we'd have a very much better society.

DJ Thank you very much Sarah / er Jasminnda Dujvah

MT Oh my goodness

DJ Jasbinda from Birmingham

MT How do we pronounce you Jas...

Caller It's Jasbinda

MT Right we've got it.

Caller OK / I've just been looking through your manifesto / and I've found that you've mentioned a lot about putting people on training schemes / like the YTS

MT I'm so sorry / I didn't quite hear that / found that we've mentioned what was it?

Caller You've mentioned about putting people on training schemes such as YTS

DJ Training schemes

MT Training schemes yes

Caller And they're all short term / and I want to know what real long term jobs you would create for the people / and how.

MT But the training schemes aren't all short term / the youth training scheme now can be as much as two years / I was looking at an excellent one run by

GEC yesterday in Scotland
Caller Yes

MT and they were being taught all kinds of electronic work / er / and also being taught how to present themselves / er also business courses / and it wasn't short term at all / they could get from that training / they could get a qualification / they could then add to that qualification and go on to further training / it was really long term stuff / and that's as it should be / um and the other training scheme we've just started / er a job training scheme we started up in April / it's specially designed for slightly people older / than 18 / it's designed to look around the area / and see / where there are jobs / but there're not enough people with the requisite skills to fill those jobs / and so we try to match the training / to jobs that are vacant / and of course we do it in conjunction with industry / that's long term / training is going to be a fundamental part of industrial life.

DJ Jasbinda would you like to come back?

Caller Well I don't see how you're going to create um jobs for the people who don't want to go on training schemes / and just want to use education to get a job straight away / like

DJ Well hold on a second

MT Look
DH ~~Jasbinda~~ because I'd like to bring back / if someone else from Cardiff in Wales on that / Steven Jones actually prime minister I think / has a complementary question about unemployment / ~~Steven~~ could you ask your question to the prime minister please

Caller Um well it's not that complimentary actually / I voted conservative in the last election

DJ I didn't mean complimentary in that sense
MT (laughs)

Caller OK I voted conservative in the last election / and I would do so again bar from the unemployment problem / so my question is / would you be prepared to resign control of the government / if you didn't reduce unemployment as outlined in the manifesto?

MT No / I have not / given any guarantee / of reduction of unemployment in the manifesto / this time last election 1983 / I was not prepared to give any forecast about unemployment / nevertheless since then we have actually / er under during those 4 years I million jobs have been created / er not by government but by business / because business under this government is flourishing / and therefore they have created / 1 million more jobs / and in the last 10 months / unemployment now is also falling / but I wanted

to come back / to the other question / there are you're quite right / there are going to be fewer jobs / fewer unskilled jobs / that's because so much technology requires extra skills these days / and no there's no way / in which one can guarantee everyone to have a job / if they won't take a training / nor I think should one be prepared to refuse a training / if you really want a job / I think you should be prepared to take a training / governments cannot guarantee jobs in a free society / jobs come from prosperous business / what governments try to do / is to run the country in such a way / that more businesses are started and created / and under this government new businesses are started up / and registered at the rate of about 500 a week / so it is coming / it is happening / but don't think a government can wave a wand / and create jobs / we can er / er help small businesses to start / and we can help and do help young people / to get a training / so their chances of getting a job are very much better / or we can help them to start up on their own / as the young person came in a few moments ago / gets an enterprise allowance / while he's starting up his own business / and he gets paid £40 a week for a year

DJ Prime minister some people think that you show lack of sympathy for those who are unemployed / particularly young people / er you sometimes give to some people (s) impression the idea that they should get up and get a job / and if they don't then it's their fault / is that true?

MT No / I think everyone should make strenuous efforts to get a job / of course / and I think they should make as many efforts as possible to present themselves nicely / and I think they should be taught how to do that at school / and employers tell me if more people did that / and turned up to interviews / then more people would be placed in a job because you know / in the south ^{you} do get stories / and they are fully documented / of people / who will say well I look / we were going to get 7 or 8 people going to come for a job but only 2 turned up / or they didn't
Nill
turn up on time / so yes / I think if you want a job / and most young people do / you do make great efforts to go out and try to find one yourself / and if you can't find one then you go and ask for help / in training / and that's what the help is for

DJ But do / are you sympathetic with unemployed people?

MT Of course I'm sympathetic / look I don't know what I would do / if I didn't work / I mean all my life I've worked / I'm a natural worker / I like working hard / I don't know what I'd do without it / I never had any money except what I earned / and I don't know what I would do

DJ ...let's go back to the phones / ...

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Maldstone in Kent hello / you're on line to the prime minister

Caller Hello
MT Hello / Sandra was it?
Caller Yes
MT Yes

Caller I would like to ask the prime minister / on the question of first time voters apparently we will be totalling about 4 million / um many young people appear to be apathetic towards politics and don't appear to know / the different ideologies of the parties / um would it be feasible to implement some form of politics / um as part of the curriculum in the later stages of secondary education?
so that young people could be more socially aware?
or politically aware?

MT Well I don't know what happens at your school / and when I was / er at school years ago we used to have something called civics / and we used to be taught / and also in history / we used to be taught / and in our own particular system had developed / and in civics we learned about current events / er that certainly was in the 6th form / because I think if you teach it before then / it's not easy / and of course you just have to be -ware of political indoctrination / but I am certain that some schools do that alternatively / you know again / we used to belong to a debating society / er which started at twenty to four / after school had finished / and we would debate the great issues of the day / and our history teacher would come along and give us a great deal of advice / I learned a lot that way / a great deal / and I also used to go to the library every Saturday / and get out for my father who was very keen on talking to us and discussing things with us / one of the great books of the week it might have been about / a biography of a famous politician / it might have been about a particular period of history / but you can learn an awful lot that way

Jingle Radio One Election '87

DJ Mark Brown of Newport in Shropshire hello you're on line to the prime minister

MT Hello / It was Mark was it

DJ We have a lot of Mark and a lot of (...) Michaels today Mark

Caller (...) In view of yesterday's party election broadcast / I would ask you / if you think the manner in which they pushed you to the forefront / rather than your policies / leaves you open to personal attack?

MT In view of yesterday's / party election
Caller party election broadcast
MT Party political / does it leave you open to personal

17.

/ look / I go down to the house of commons / as prime minister / twice a week / every Tuesday / and every Thursday / and I stand up there / every Tuesday and every / and I'm attacked / I'm attacked from the opposition / and I just get used to it / because I reckon if you put yourself in the front line in politics / you must expect to be shot at / not of course literally but verbally

DJ (laughs) / Our election call

MT So you just don't squeal about it / it just / I don't like it / er I don't like it if it gets personal because if anyone starts to attack you personally / the short answer is well you haven't got any policies then have you

DJ Let me be personal and ask you / you've been accused of this in the papers / are elections in this country becoming more presidential

MT No I don't think they are / er I think I think that charge was made right back in 1945 / er when after all Winston was / um / up for election / it is a charge which is made almost / um every election / in a way I think that the party leaders are highlighted more / since we had television / and radio / even more since we had television / but you know / we are a team / and you'll see all of my team appearing / on television / and hear them on radio / and a very good team they are if I may say so / excellent / not belterred anywhere.

DJ (laughs) Sue Aden from Newham in London hello

Caller Yes hello

MT Hello Sue
Caller hello / I'd like to ask um / if there's someone who is unemployed / and under 25 / who refuses to go on a job training scheme that you're proposing in your manifesto / so they can continue looking for work / do the conservatives plan / at any time in the future / to reduce or take away their social security money / as they've proposed with 16 - 18 year olds / who refuse a place on YTS?

MT

On 16 - 18 year olds / er you can either / stay at school or go on to a technical college / or get a job / if there's one available / or go on to YTS training / there's absolutely no need for any young person / to be / unemployed . and we think it is much better for them / to take one of those courses of action / if they chose not to / they're perfectly free to choose not to / but they cannot then expect / to be kept by the taxpayer when they've exercised their choice not to take / any of those things / now / we have not got any guarantee for people above the age of 18 you see you get a guaranteed place on YTS / and if for a time you hadn't got one then of course / you would still get the social security / but if you positively refuse to do any of those

18.

things / then we do think that er / that er should not in fact be entitled / to be kept by the taxpayer / if you wish not to work and your parents will keep you that's different / but you couldn't at the moment do it for 18 - 25 / because there's no guarantee of a place on JTS / what / in order ~~to~~ be able to get any unemployment benefit / or supplementary benefit / you know you have to be / available for work

Caller Yeah

MT That is the test / and it's been the test for a very very long time now / so you ought not just to be able to sit back / er and er / do nothing about it / you are supposed to be available for work and trying to get a job / and I think that's right.

DJ Sue would you like to come back on a supplementary

Caller Yes I would yes because / you haven't really answered the question as to / if you guarantee a place for all 18 - 25 year olds on the Job training scheme / whether um / then / they will be not able to benefit like / the 16 - 18 year olds and also / er as far as YTS is concerned / er only 1/3 of the people who complete YTS / actually get a job at the end of it / and only 12% / of those people / are with the same company that they've been with on the YTS scheme / and I think that taking away / er young people's benefit / is little more than conscription onto a cheap labour scheme / you just

MT

It's not conscription at all dear / it's not conscription at all / no one's forcing you to stay at school / no one's forcing you to go to college / no one is forcing you to go into a job / no one is forcing you to go onto YTS / what we're saying is if you do none of those things when there is a guarantee that you'll get a training job / you're not entitled to expect the tax payer to keep you / that's what we're saying

DJ Sue thank you

MT but there's no g / at the moment / the job training scheme only started the 1st April this year / so it's comparatively new / that's the one after the youth training scheme / comparatively new / and there can be no question at the moment of guaranteeing / er a place / on the job training scheme until it's working much much / well until we've seen how it works

DJ Thanks very much Sue for your call / Paul Duffey in Kingswood in Bristol hello you're on line to the prime minister

MT Hello Paul

Caller Hello / um my question is um would you agree with this description of the conservative policy on privatisation of nationalised industries / i.e. that it's as Harold Macmillan said a policy of selling off / the family silver / and further is it in fact selling

19.

it back to the family in question / i.e. is it selling the public something that it already owns?

MT

No / I take a view / I don't think government should allocate unto itself too many powers / governments aren't good at running business / they're not businessmen / it's not for them to run these businesses / and therefore I think it's far better / for them to be privatised / those that have been privatised have been far more successful / they've done extremely well / done very well for their employees / and many of them taken on more jobs / and many of the employees have become shareholders / yes so I do describe it / as selling the family silver back to the family / and the money which they pay comes straight into the treasury / and of course can in fact be used for other schemes or other capital / er capital development / or for other health schemes education or any of the things on which government spends money

DJ

And more privatisation in the next conservative government

MT

More privatisation yes / I say / governments are not good at running business and I think people who can / who think they can / are a little bit arrogant

DJ

Sophie Linden in Hackney in London / hello Sophie

Caller Hello

MT Sophie

Caller Hello

MT Hello dear go ahead

Caller

I'd just like to ask you how can you joke about the labour party's plans for ministry of women / aren't you aware of the problems and disadvantages / women face in this country?

MT

No I think that women have far many more opportunities now than they used to have / they've far many more opportunities for jobs / I was looking at the million of jobs that have been created since 1983 well over half a million / were for women / our problem is to get women to take up some of the opportunities that are available / look women have been able to come into parliament for years / but we've no more now than we had in the 1930's / more women are getting to the top in banking / in the city / in business / not quite so much in the media yet but I hope that will come / listen if they don't get the top job / so I don't think it is a question of law it is a question of getting them to take advantage of the many opportunities and recognising / that many of them with young children would not wish to be away from their young children while / until they go until they're off / until they leave school

DJ Sophie very quickly come back

Caller But you've cut the social services so women who have to take on the extra burden of looking after elderly relatives / and you have no plans for extra child

20.

care / so women can't actually take the opportunities / if there are actually any more

MT Well yes quite a number of women do take the opportunity / it just depends how far you live in a family / er with other members of the family with you as we did when I was young / or how far mother has to stay at home / in which case sometimes she can do some work at home / or sometimes she can take a child out with her / but I'm not very keen / on trying to to to to force mothers out in any way / to go out to work when they prefer to stay home to look after their children / they must be free to do so

DJ Let me get one more call if I can Mrs Thatcher / Peter Davis in Bristol hello very quickly your question please

Caller Um why have you and your government been so secretive and authoritarian / and why won't you allow there to be a freedom of information bill as in America? / allow there to be an all party parliamentary committee overlooking the role of MI5 / and why

DJ Peter thank you very much I know the tenor of your question lets have the answer

MT Ah this is the this is / er a bill that we brought in in 1980 / there was a bill on the official secrets act to amend it / it was the result of a very long enquiry by Oliver Franks and he made certain proposals to amend it / those proposals had been accepted by the labour party when they were government but they went out / and we also thought they found favour with us we brought it in in 1980 / it did not in fact get through their lordships house / and we are considering whether to bring it in again / or whether to to to have an other changes / it's a very difficult measure everyone agrees / that the law wants changing / it's much more difficult to get them to agree / on precisely how / it should be changed

DJ Can I ask you a one word answer / is secrecy a good thing?

MT You have to have secrecy in some things in order to have security / that has always been understood / by all parts of the house

DJ And a final question / earlier in the election campaign you said that you'd like to go on and on and on / can you specifically tell the radio 1 audience now how long you would like to be prime minister?

MT No / er that I can't / er because every time every year one comes up for re-election / and that is one submits oneself to the judgement of the people / but also it isn't wholly up to me apart from that / because every year / in the conservative party / the leader of the conservative party has to submit / to an election process the er / among our MP's

and our 1922 committee / and it's done every october november / so it is not wholly up to me / I would like to win this election / I would like to be returned for a third term / and I'll I'll work just as hard in that third term as I have in the first two and yes I believe we have transformed the face of Britain / and Britain's reputation / rides high / in the world / I want to keep it that way but beyond that let's have a look / let's have a look at the fence when it comes to it / things may be different you don't know

DJ Mrs Thatcher won't give me a reply as opposed to the leader of the conservative party?

MT Er Mrs Thatcher / Mrs Thatcher loves the work loves the work she's doing / but recognises very much that just as as she / if I might refer to myself in that way / just as I had opportunities / so other other people will be looking for opportunities for themselves and that's the way life goes on

DJ Thank you for joining us on radio I Mrs Thatcher very much indeed / tomorrow night David Steel for the alliance will be here we'll give you the number during the day on Radio 1

End

(exhilarated)
?

D. _____
C. _____

A. left I think .. and eventually got to Main Road where the buses came .. the

B. _____
(exhilarated)
?

C. _____

A. bus went .. straight .. they .. went off .. to the left .. and down a road

B. _____

C. _____

A. I saw them go ..
um .. and [let me out

B. _____

C. _____
what did .. they stopped did they
where was

A. _____
umm .. no .. th they s they waz

B. _____

C. that on the main road or at the junction ..

A. turned left .. then stopped .. th there's a bus stop up there if you catch

B. _____

B. _____

C. _____

A. on the bus .. I haven't got no money .. they said oh bloody hell bloody women
I haven't got no money
I forgot no money ..

B. _____

C. _____

A. got no money they've only got money (indist.) they said oh that's too bad

B. _____

C. _____

A. the .. the blond bloke said .. so em .. th the guy with ^{the} brown hair says well

B. _____

C. _____

A. I've got to see my missus so I better hurry up .. so I said well .. (indist.)

B. _____

C. _____

A. he says oh come on then girl here you are here's sixteen pence .. he seemed

B. _____

20

B. _____

C. sixty or sixteen

is

A. yeah .. and that was sixteen pence (indist.) centre ..

B. _____

C. that how much it is ..

A. well I don't know exactly it was .. I thin I think it was the

B. _____

C. from where ..

ω

A. Meadway Road .. is there a Meadway Road is there such a road as that

B. _____

yeah ..

C. _____

A. _____

B. listen to me .. I've been sitting here twenty minutes half an hour listening to

C. _____

A. _____

B. you .. some of it's the biggest lot of bollocks I've ever heard .. I can set

B. very annoyed very shortly .. one minute you're saying it's Coley next minute

C. _____

A. we passed Coley Park ..

B. you're saying it's the Meadway

what happened .. I'm

(Brian)

A. _____

B. sick and tired of the ups and downs and the ins and outs .. some of this is

C. _____

A. _____

B. better fairy tales than bloody .. Grettel can do - (exhales) now stop mucking

C. _____

A. I'm not mucking you about

B. us all about (indist.) I'm not saying to you as you're

C. _____

A. _____

B. lying .. get rid of the fruitiness get rid of all the beauty about it and let's

it's not beautiful at all is it

A. ... well some of it is all this crap

B. get down to facts and figures

C. ...

A. ...

B. about bus stops and .. numbers and blue and white tea towels to wipe myself

C. ...

A. ...

B. down with .. what the hell's gone on .. if nothing's gone on let's all pack

C. ...

A. ...

B. it off and go home... if something's gone on and you think well .. that's an

C. ...

A. ...

B. experience that's life alright ..

C. ...

A. ... that's what I do think

B. ... this is the biggest

C. ...

A. ...

A. ...

B. ...

C. a*ternorn .. and it's not with your boyfriend .. but .. I would go as far as

A. ...

B. ...

C. to say .. I think .. you've been a willing party to it .. no seriously .. you're

A. ...

B. ...

C. not upset by it .. you haven't taken a blind bit of notice of anything that's

A. ...

B. ...

C. gone on .. the story you've told us .. is .. like my colleague said a fairy

A. ...

B. ...

C. ... well it happened I (indist.)

A. ...

B. ... yeah well we're not saying it didn't

C. tale .. honestly

A. ...

A. ...

A.

B.

C. know .. we know what's happened to you right .. you've had a hard time your

A.

B.

C. husband beat you up .. you've had a mental breakdown .. you've had .. a long ..

A.

B.

C. long time .. being treated for depression .. haven't you and .. you went to

W
S
W

A.

B.

C. a pub .. you meet a couple of fellows .. and they say let's go back for a cup

A.

B.

C. of coffee .. and you go back .. and it goes a bit too far .. and they have

A.

) I haven't even .. known them before ..

A.

B.

C. well you got in the car with them .. you got in the car with them

you haven't come

A.

B. here because you want to have you ..

C.

you made no effort at all to get away from

A.

B.

C. them .. I've checked with the (name deleted) (indist.) you got out .. and you

A.

B.

C. walked down .. with them .. first thing I did .. you know when we left you .. at

A.

B.

C. the house .. we went ntraight down (name deleted) .. and spoke to the landlord

A.

B.

A.
B.
C. oh yes I can remember her .. she's the one that's a little bit funny .. alright ..

A.
(Indist.) three

B.

C. he knows you .. she left here quite willingly with three lads ..

A. lads I didn't go with three lads ..
they

B.

C.
well you left the pub with them ..

A. might have followed me out or .. or something I don't know

B.
you've told me .. that

C.

A.
that's right yeah because it's a lot of f rags.

B. you wouldn't be here why not .. hm!

C.

A. accept
B. well you're a lot stronger than some women I've met I'm glad to say ..
C.

A.

B. I've met some that've been raped and all sorts of things have happened to them

C.

A.
364

B. and they think their life is crumbling down around their ankles like a pair of

C.

A.
well that's why I've been in (name deleted)

B. knickers with the elastic gone ..

C.

A. isn't it ..
it's exactly why I've been in (name deleted)

B. I don't know - it

C.

A. why do you think I've been in (name deleted)

A.

B. is .. there's a lot more to this .. unfortunately we will never know the other

C.

A.

B.

C. it'll show .. if you've had sexual intercourse with three men this afternoon ..

A.

B. side of the story because we w don't know the other three blokes .. two one or

C.

A. [it'll show each one] Yeah I know so it

B. humm

C. it'll show .. [it'll show each one ..] alright .. so ..

A.

B. none whatever the case may be I don't know .. all we've got is your side of the

C.

A. would show (indist.) Yeah

B. humm

C. [it'll confirm that you've had sex .. or not with three men] 36 59

A. I'm not making a fairy

B. story and you're still making a fairy tale out of it ..

C.

A.

B.

C. alright .. so we can confirm it's happened .. that you've had sex with three

A. tale out of it ..

B. think you are -

C. you do realise that when we have you

A.

B.

C. men .. if it does confirm it .. then I would go so far as to say .. that you

A.

B. they'll come up with nothing

C. medically examined .. and she swabs are are taken

A.

B.

113

- A.
- B.
- C. quite easily .. when you got out of the car .. t go to the house .. you could

- A.
- B.
- C. have got away quite easily .. you're well known .. in Reading .. to the

- A.
- B.
- C. uniformed .. lads .. for being a nuisance in the streets shouting and bawling ..

UN 66

- A.
- B.
- C. couple of times you've been arrested .. fo under the Mental Health Act ..

- A. when I was ill
- B.
- C. for shouting and screaming in the street .. haven't you ..

- A. yeah
- B.
- C. yeah .. right .. so .. what's to stop you .. shouting and screaming ..

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- A.
- B.
- C. in the street .. when you think you're going to get raped .. you're not

- A.
- B.
- C. frightened at all .. You walk in there .. quite blase you're not frightened at

- A. I was frightened
- B.
- C. all .. you weren't .. you're showing no signs of emotion

- A.
- B. (indist. chair noise) you were
- C. every now and again you have a little tear ..

- A.
- B. frightened .. and you came at me I think I would dive .. I wouldn't take you
- C.

- A. why would I frighten you (indist) only a little
- B. on - you frighten me
- C. you just

A. half

B. It doesn't matter .. you're female and you've probably got a hell of a

C.

A. I haven't got a temper (Indist.)

B. temper .. If you were to go

C. oh I don't know ..

A.

B. I think if things if if things were up against a wall .. I think you'd fight

C.

A.

B. and you'd fight very hard ..

C. I spoke to your boyfriend .. he says the same that

A.

B,

A.

B.

C. half an hour and spoke to him about you .. that's how I know all about your

A. I was alright

B.

C. periods and .. things like this and when you last had sex .. alright

A. over the weekend wans't I ..

B.

C. ~~nothing~~ night