

**Beyond Opium: A History of Refined Drugs and Government Regulation in Modern
China, c. 1871-1945**

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Philosophy**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the history of refined drugs in China from around 1871 to 1945. It traces the process that how refined drugs including morphine and cocaine were introduced and established in China and what drove the Chinese government to regulate them. Through an analysis of a wide range of primary sources, it explores how the Chinese state sought to draw and to police a line between licit and illicit use of refined drugs. It contributes to the historiography by shifting perspective from opium to refined drugs and by making use of some archival sources which have not been consulted in connection with the history of drugs in modern China before.

This research demonstrates that the authority of deciding what were licit and illicit use of refined drugs were in different hands in different periods. Until the twentieth century, the power belonged to the medical missionaries and later the pharmaceutical companies. Between around 1900 and 1910 the Qing administration realised that it should have this power, and it drew on a regulatory model borrowed from abroad to declare that only medical and scientific use is legitimate. This then became complicated by international discussions of the same issue and a struggle in China by Chinese doctors and drug stores that used Western medicines to have themselves included in the licit/legitimate/legal category. The Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation in 1920s Shanghai and the National Narcotics Bureau established in the 1930s indicate the efforts by the Chinese state to make its control of the issue permanent, with varying degrees of success. Throughout the period which this thesis covers, the authority on refined drugs was gradually decolonised and centralised into the hand of the central government of the Chinese state. Drawing and policing a line between licit and illicit use of refined drugs was a process extending the authorities of the Chinese state over the society and the economy. It was also a process which was constitutive of state building and modernisation of China.

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List of abbreviations

CMMA China Medical Missionary Association

CMMJ *China Medical Missionary Journal*

CMA China Medical Association

CRCS China Red Cross Association

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States series

IAOA International Anti-Opium Association

TNA The National Archives at Kew

NAOA National Anti-Opium Association

NLS National Library of Scotland

OAC the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs

YMCA Young Men's Christian Association

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Beyond Opium: A History of Refined Drugs and Government Regulation in Modern China, c. 1871-1945

Introduction

On 8 March 1919, a squad of Beijing-Shenyang (then Peking-Mukden) railway policemen arrested two men and confiscated 65 bags of “lung nourishing pills” at Feng-tai station, near Beijing.¹ During the interrogations, Lu Yin-tang and Cheng Kai confessed that they knew that the pills could stop the craving of opium because they were commonly used for that purpose at their hometown. A sample of those pills was sent to the Central Hospital in Beijing for analysis and the results showed that they contained four materials: heroin, cocaine, lactose and amyloid. The instruction from the Police Office in Beijing on this case was that since the pills were used as medicine to eliminate opium craving, those men should be released. After Lu and Cheng paid the bail, the policemen let them leave after a few days of custody, and gave them back all 65 bags of pills.²

Eighteen years later, at midnight of 15 March 1937, four policemen at Beijing apprehended Zhang Kun-ding, and confiscated his six bags of red pills. He was waiting for a train back to his home in Henan after a visit to Tianjin with his uncle, where he had been given the pills and told to take them with him. Although it is unclear in the sources exactly what this batch consisted of, similar cases in the 1930s showed that such red pills were generally made of materials including morphine, cocaine, and heroin.³ No doubt aware of this, the Trail Bureau of the

¹ Fengtai was a town at that time. The Lu-gou Bridge Incident (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) happened on 7 July 1937 which marked the wider breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese War was happened in that town. Since 1952, Feng-tai has become a district of Beijing.

² “衛生處函為盧陰堂等攜帶潤肺丸內含嗎啡一類毒質請訊辦卷” (Instruction of the Health Bureau on the Case that Lu Yin-tang and His Partner Traded Pills Containing Poisons like Morphine), March 1919, Beijing Municipal Archives, J 181-018-11017.

³ See Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lar Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016, pp. 131-139.

Beijing Municipal City on Dangerous Drugs Offenders (北京市政府烈性毒品人犯審判處) sentenced Zhang Kun-ding to death and he was executed in July 1937. His uncle remained at large.⁴

There was no substantial difference between the lung nourishing pills purchased by Lu Yin-tang in 1919 and the red pills traded by Zhang Kun-ding and his uncle in 1937. The routes taken by the suspects were almost the same too, from a railway station in northern Henan province to Beijing, then on to Tianjin, before the return journey. The stories only differ significantly in their outcomes, with Lu Yin-tang free to go with his 65 bags of pills while Zhang was executed within four months of his arrest for possessing six bags. What decided their different fates was not the drugs they purchased and traded but the political, economic and social contexts in which these cases happened. It is the change in these contexts that this thesis will chart and explain.

Background and historiography

This thesis explores the history of refined drugs in China from around the 1880s to the 1940s, with a particular focus on state responses to them.⁵ The focus narrows further as the thesis proceeds, in taking a detailed look at the efforts by various regimes to draw the line between licit and illicit consumption of refined drugs in the nation, and to enforce this line in practice. The thesis shows that licit and illicit became interchanged with the terms “medical” and “non-medical” use and that the use these terms was not straightforward or self-evident. At different times and in various places, the terms “illicit” or “non-medical” use could refer to consumption

⁴ “北平市警察局外五區關於保安步警第六隊等查獲張昆定等攜帶紅丸毒品等案表呈指令” (Instruction regarding the Six Squad of the Fifth Division of the Beijing Municipal Police captured the red pill dealer Zhang Kun-ding), 1937, Beijing Municipal Archives, J184-002-14537.

⁵ According to Cambridge dictionary, a refined substance means “a substance which has been made pure by removing other substances from it”. “Refined drugs” in this thesis refer to substances such as morphine, cocaine and heroin which were processed and manufactured from raw materials including poppy and coca leaves.

for purposes of intoxication, for self-medication, to enhance sociability in groups, to provide momentary escape or oblivion from difficult circumstances, or to satisfy the cravings of a regular habit. In other words, “illicit” or “non-medical” use were complicated and shifting terms that covered a wide range of situations and contexts. One objective of this research is to trace the agendas of those whose consumption was bundled into these categories, and the reasons that the authorities used this category for them.

It considers three refined drugs, morphine, cocaine and heroin, to trace the introduction of modern pharmaceuticals into the country, pharmaceuticals which are also psychoactive and therefore particularly problematic for modern states to deal with.⁶ Morphine was used in modern China from the 1870s onwards. Cocaine arrived in the 1880s and both were regulated by 1910. The project also includes the history of heroin because from the 1910s, this drug had also found a market in China, and was included alongside the others in government anxieties about such products.

Narcotic drugs are an important theme in the history of modern China.⁷ Opium prepared for smoking dominates the literature. Until recently studies have tended to argue that the market for psychoactive substances in China from the eighteenth-century onwards was stimulated by increasing supplies. These tended to come from India, which was controlled at the time by the British who used opium exports to China in order to take control of trade with the latter. Ever-increasing supplies

⁶ Such as: Virginia Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England*, London: Free Association Books, 1999; David F. Musto, *The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Paul Gootenberg eds. *Cocaine: Global Histories*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999; Joseph F. Spillane, *Cocaine: From Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States, 1884-1920*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002; Arjo van Der Hoogte and Toine Pieters; “From Javanese Coca to Java Coca: An Exemplary Product of Dutch Colonial Agro-Industrialism, 1880-1920”, *Technology and Culture*, January 2013, vol. 54 (1), pp. 90-116.

⁷ The contemporary definition of “narcotic drugs” refers to opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin and their derivatives. This definition will be used throughout this thesis. “Refined drugs” in this thesis refers to “narcotic drugs” except opium.

resulted in the continuing growth of the market so that more and more Chinese subjects found themselves smoking opium. The Opium Wars between China and Western powers over flows of the substance, an increasingly addicted population, and a crisis in imperial finances due to the flood of silver that flowed abroad to pay for opium fatally undermined the Chinese state which entered a period of disintegration that only ended in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party took power.⁸

Research in the past two decades has challenged this argument.⁹ An early voice in the revisionist camp was Mike Jay, who asserted in 2000 that “The image at the core of this belief—that of a China reduced to chaos and misery by being flooded with opium—was one which was rarely questioned or examined, either at the time or during the decades that followed”.¹⁰ Following Mike Jay, historians such as Xavier Paulès and Julia Lovell also have questioned whether opium was a national disaster for modern China. Xavier Paulès argues that opium penetrated every aspect of the society in the first half of the nineteenth century and brought negative impacts. This was not the reason for the collapsing administration of the Qing Government but a reflection of that collapse.¹¹ Frank Dikötter and his group have argued that, “Researchers working on the history of opium in China have ... trained their gaze

⁸ These research include: 蘇智良, *中國毒品史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 2017 (1st edition, 上海人民出版社, 1997) (Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press); 邵雍, *中國近代販毒史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 2017 (1st edition 福州: 福建人民出版社, 2004) (Shao Yong, *The History of Narcotics Smuggling in Modern China*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science); 王金香, *中國禁毒史*, 上海: 上海人民出版社, 2005. (Wang Jin-xiang, *A History of Narcotics Suppression Movements in China*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press); 王宏斌, *鴉片: 日本侵華政策五十年 (1895-1945)*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 2016 (1st edition 石家莊: 河北人民出版社, 2005). (Wang Hong Bin. *Opium: Japan's Drug Policy in Occupied China Territory*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press); 齊磊, 胡金野, *中國禁毒史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 2017. (Qi Lei and Hu Jin-ye, *A History of Narcotic Drugs Control in China*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press, 2017.

⁹ For a detailed review of developments in the historiography of drugs in Asia see James Mills, “Colonialism, Consumption, and Drug Control in Asia” in Paul Gootenberg (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Drug History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. (Forthcoming).

¹⁰ Mike Jay. *Dreams of the Emperors: Drugs in the Nineteenth Century*. Sawtry: Dedalus Ltd., 2000, p. 71.

¹¹ 包利威. *鴉片在中國: 1750-1950*. 北京: 中國畫報出版社, 2017, p. 272. (Xavier Paules and Timothy Brook, *L'opium: Une passion chinoise (1750-1950)*, 2011); Julia Lovell, *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*. Picador, 2012.

exclusively on issues of supply and policy".¹² Their focus on users was a radical challenge to the historiography of the time, as they found evidence of a complex culture of consumption in the nineteenth-century and alerted historians to pay attention to this long-neglected dimension of drug history in China.

The study by Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann was also important for tracing some of the outlines of the history of morphine, cocaine, and heroin in China. It considered the history of morphine from the late nineteenth-century to the 1940s, heroin from the beginning of the 1920s onwards to the 1940s, and looked at several cases of cocaine consumption, including its early use as a local anaesthetic in the 1890s, and its use as 'coke' by some 'unfortunate women' in Shanghai in the 1920s.¹³ This thesis will build on and extend their work by exploring the history of these substances in China, particularly the responses of the state to the arrival of these products in the country, and the factors which drove policies, or which often confounded them.

Others have touched on the history of these drugs and state responses in China but without placing them at the centre of the stage. For example, James Mills traced some stories of cocaine in China in his research on that drug in India and across the British Empire in Asia. He noticed that by the 1920s the imperial authorities there increasingly blamed Chinese smugglers for routing Japanese-produced refined opiates and cocaine into British colonies. He also showed that Chinese state officials were keen to impose restrictions on the import of cocaine into their country as early as 1909, some three years before the substance featured within discussions in the emerging international drugs regulatory system at the Hague Opium Conference.¹⁴ On the whole though, his chief interest was in South Asia.

¹² Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lar Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*. p. 6.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 166.

¹⁴ James Mills, "Drugs, Consumption, and Supply in Asia: The Case of Cocaine in Colonial India, c. 1900-c. 1930", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 66, no. 2, May 2007, p. 354; James Mills, "Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium Conference, 1911-12", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, issue 42, no 3, 2014, p. 413.

Peter Thilly explores the Fujianese smuggling networks for cocaine in Southeast Asia from 1900 to 1937. He highlights the role of opportunism and entrepreneurialism within the wider history of state efforts to control trade in maritime Asia. In his perspective, “the cocaine trade is not a story of a pre-existing trade that the state made illegal. Rather, because of state initiatives to control the cocaine trade, cocaine smugglers found an opportunity to use or subvert those same state initiatives for great profit”.¹⁵ Thilly provides no explanations for the regulations though, instead focusing on the ways in which smugglers organised their network and used it to evade regulations. In highlighting the connections between the Fujianese and Southeast Asia cocaine smuggling networks he neglects domestic connections between Fujian and other regions of China. He also mentions the regulation of cocaine importation which came into force in 1910 to claim that “after which time the drug became a controlled substance and was removed from the list of legal imports”. However, this claim is inaccurate. Cocaine remained a legitimate product for import into China as long as it was for scientific and medical purposes, and this licit trade was recorded in the Maritime Customs records from 1908 until 1914 and moved to the category “medicine” after that year (along with morphine).

While James Mills and Peter Thilly have looked at some aspects of cocaine history in modern China, Steffen Rimner explores the history of morphine from the late nineteenth century to the end of the First World War in his book *Opium's Long Shadow*. His chapter on morphine history emphasises how Germany and Japan started and developed their morphine and cocaine export industries and how international activists campaigned against them. He shows how information about morphine consumption in China was collected, produced and circulated among anti-narcotic activists, journalists and diplomats. This information included topics such as morphine smuggling from western European countries like Germany and

¹⁵ Peter Thilly, “The Fujianese Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900-1937”, *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, December 2017, p. 103.

Britain to East Asia, and at the later stage, the involvement of Japanese groups in illegal commerce in cocaine and morphine, mainly in Manchuria and Fujian.¹⁶ Both Peter Thilly and Steffen Rimner are most interested in the supply of refined drugs to and within China, so regulation tends to form only a backdrop to their core research interests.

Studies in other contexts do provide important clues as to why looking at the histories of refined drugs, as opposed to raw or prepared products like opium for smoking or eating, and cannabis, is useful. Paul Gootenberg, Joseph Spillane and Stephen Karch, for example, have all looked at cocaine in various contexts.¹⁷ Between them they trace an arc from the period in the 1880s when cocaine was considered to be a wonder-drug in Western medicine, to the gathering anxieties about it in the 1890s until government intervention through state regulation became the norm by the second decade of the twentieth-century. The reasons for this trajectory varied in various countries, with racial anxieties featuring prominently in the US narrative and concerns linked to the First World War prompting action in the UK. Others have looked at it outside of these countries. Arjo van der Hoogte and Toine Pieters traced the emergence of the coca-leaf industry in the Dutch colony of Java, while Stephen Karch has detailed the emergence of Japan as a major producer of cocaine.¹⁸ Parts of China became unwilling markets for much of that product. In the Asian context Mills points out that the history of cocaine in India is important precisely because it was not opium or cannabis. Both of the latter had long histories of consumption in that country, but cocaine was an entirely novel substance when it first arrived in the 1890s, an

¹⁶ Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Controls*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018, pp. 226-278.

¹⁷ See: Paul Gootenberg, *Cocaine: Global Histories*, London; New York: Routledge, 1999; Joseph Spillane, *Cocaine: from Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States, 1884-1920*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2000; Karch, Steven Karch, *A Brief History of Cocaine*, 2nd ed. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2005.

¹⁸ A. Hoogte and T. Pieters, Toine, "From Javanese Coca to Java Coca: An Exemplary Product of Dutch Colonial Agro-Industrialism, 1880-1920", *Technology and Culture*. 54. 2013, 90-116; Steven Karch, "Japan and the Cocaine Industry of Southeast Asia, 1864-1944", in Paul Gootenberg eds. *Cocaine: Global Histories*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 146-164.

alien product which was the most modern output of the rapidly expanding pharmaceutical industries of Europe. Moreover, after the colonial authorities began to impose controls on it from 1900 onwards the market expanded, and consumers sourced the drug despite the efforts of the government there to stop them. This thesis considers some of these themes in the Chinese context.¹⁹

One of the main reasons for orientating this thesis towards regulation and government responses to refined drugs is the wealth of neglected sources available in China for such a project. Historians have tended to advise caution in approaching primary materials on the subject of drugs in Chinese history. Frank Dikotter and his team, Mike Jay, and others have argued that earlier accounts which emphasised the devastating impacts on China of opium consumption simply reproduced the perceptions of Christian missionaries because they relied upon their publications for evidence. Similarly, Zheng Yang-wen has pointed out that primary sources produced by the Chinese court or government “were prohibitionist in nature and were the products of political redefinition”.²⁰

While those revisionist drug historians are right that many primary sources are prohibitionist in nature and therefore tend to have a bias towards the negative effects of drug consumption, there is another potential bias with regard to the primary sources on drug history in modern China which is also noteworthy but has not been pointed out by historians: the anti-narcotics campaign during the Nationalist period coincides with a distinct increase in the production of primary sources. From the late 1920s onwards, when the Nationalists gained power and gradually centralised their governance, this process was accompanied by a distinct growth of relevant sources. Both the existing primary sources and the historical writing give the impression that the 1920s saw a sudden deterioration of the issue of refined drugs. However, there is little evidence to this effect. On the contrary, it

¹⁹ James Mills, “Drugs, Consumption, and Supply in Asia: The Case of Cocaine in Colonial India, c. 1900-c. 1930”, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 66, no. 2, May 2007, pp. 345-362.

²⁰ Zheng Yang wen, *The Social Life of Opium in China*, 2003, p. 5.

is beyond doubt that there was a continuity of supply, consumption, and controls of refined drugs in China from the later nineteenth century to the middle twentieth century (and onwards). What is less clear is to what extent, if at all, fewer sources mean less consumption and, by the same token, whether the increasing reports on refined drugs and their regulations reflect an actual uptake in consumption, or merely an increased awareness in society or a more stringent enforcement of existing policies. Therefore, historians need to be cautious about primary sources on the refined drugs history in modern China because it is easy to confuse an absence of evidence with evidence of absence.

Aware of these risks, this thesis draws on a wide range of primary sources, including digital and undigitized newspapers, journals and magazines; sources at national, provincial and municipal archives in China, the National Archives in Britain and the National Library of Scotland. The main digitised newspapers used in this thesis are the two most widely circulated newspapers in China from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, *Shenbao* (申報) and the *North China Herald*. Because of their large circulation and long period of publishing, historians have not only used these two newspapers as supplementary sources but have also produced monographs and theses on them.²¹ While digitised newspapers are convenient to use, historians need to avoid the “pitfalls of digital searching”.²² Adrian Bingham, for example, cautions that historians “must be aware of the way that research may be distorted by the availability of certain titles and the absence of others”, and emphasises the necessity of contextualising the newspaper sources, stating, “we cannot properly

²¹ Such as Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872-1912*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004; Weipin Tsai, *Reading Shenbao: Nationalism, Consumerism and Individuality in China, 1919-1937*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; 何塞(José Miguel Vidal Kunstmann), 報道中國: 漢學東方主義, 殖民話語以及 1850-1864 的《北華捷報》, (*Reporting China: Sinological Orientalism, Colonial Discourse and the Early Days of the North China Herald*, Master's thesis, 2012, East China Normal University). According to Weipin Tsai, “since the establishment of *Shenbao* in the late nineteenth century, its main political strategy had been ‘neutralism’; this was very obvious in its editorials”, “this attitude only started to change with the Japanese invasions, and the development of *Shenbao* after 1931” (Weipin Tsai, 2009, p.12).

²² Adrian Bingham, “The Digitization of Newspapers Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians”, *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2010, pp. 225-231.

assess the significance of newspaper content without moving beyond the texts themselves and considering the political, social and cultural contexts that the newspapers were operating in”.²³ The digital and physical sources used in this thesis not only span a wide spectrum, but also include some valuable and unused archival sources, such as records of the Foreign Mission Committee of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland at the NLS and the records of the National Narcotics Bureau at Chongqing Municipal Archives. These archival sources supplement and provide context for the newspaper material and reveal not only which regulations were adopted but also how they were or were not implemented.

Official documents and materials from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as missions and churches, are not straightforward either. While they can be used to find evidence of policies and the views of officials behind them, they are especially difficult to use for the purposes of getting beyond the thinking of government or other large organisations. However, those consuming illicit medicines and intoxicants rarely leave their own records behind, so historians are usually forced to rely on official resources in order to catch glimpses of consumers using these substances. This requires a methodology that has come to be known as “reading against the grain”, which was most clearly argued by the Subaltern Studies collective of historians in the 1980s. They stated that government records are written in what they call “the prose of counter-insurgency”, a language which empties acts of resistance, or failures of the state, of significance and meaning. By dismissing rebels as bandits, or rebellions as crimes, for example, official archives become political tools which assert the state's dominance and hegemony. “Reading against the grain” requires historians to approach these records in a new spirit, in order to reassess such acts and to dismiss the veneer given by the official voice. This thesis attempts to read beyond the language of “addicts”, “traffickers”,

²³ Ibid.

“victims”, and “evils” to seek glimpses of the agency of those consuming the substances addressed here, and those involved in supplying the market for them.²⁴

Outline of this thesis

This thesis explores the history of refined drugs in modern China with a chronological structure. Chapter 1 traces the introduction and use of morphine in China from the middle of the 1800s into the start of the twentieth century and explores the origins of the regulation on its importation which was put into force in 1909. Morphine was first introduced into China as the ingredient of anti-opium medicines by drug stores as well as medical missionaries at the beginning of the 1870s. Morphine even earned the nickname of “Jesus Opium” in Swatow (now Shantou), a southern coastal city, because of the relation between its prevalence and the activities of the missionaries. The chapter will also look at the “Masters of the needle”, local peddlers of the drug who learned the skills of injection and dosage and who located themselves in venues such as teahouses to minister to their clients. Reports on the dangers of morphine emerged in contemporary Chinese newspapers in the 1890s, especially after the country’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The substance was merged into discourses that blamed ‘narcotic drugs’ in general for weakening the Chinese nation. Around the same time, medical missionaries along with other western medical professionals, began changing their attitudes towards morphine at a time when anxieties about addiction were starting to establish themselves around the world. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), the Eight-Nation Alliance Invasion (1900), and the signing of the *Xinchou Treaty* (辛丑條約, also called *Boxer Protocol*), all stimulated the Qing Government to initiate the Late Qing Reform (1901-1911), one aspect of which was the revision of trade treaties with the Western Powers. These negotiations proved to be the ideal opportunity to raise the

²⁴ For the manifesto of the Subaltern Studies collective see R. Guha (ed.), *Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

subject of controlling morphine imports, anxieties about which had been growing among the authorities in coastal provinces. After lengthy negotiations, a notification was issued by the Imperial Maritime Customs to stipulate that, from 1 January 1909, any importation of morphine except that for use by Western doctors and medical stores in China was prohibited.

Just one year after this regulation on morphine importation, cocaine importation into China was also subjected to controls. Chapter 2 traces the introduction of cocaine into the country in the 1880s and its use there until 1910. The introduction of cocaine into China was contextualised in the rapid development of the Western pharmaceutical industry in the nineteenth century, and the increasing number of medical missionaries entering the country. Dugald Christie's reports of his operation in north-Eastern China on a case of Epithelioma using cocaine as the local anaesthetic published in the *China Medical Missionary Journal (CMMJ)* as well as *The Lancet*, was part of the global wave of enthusiasm for the drug of the mid-1880s. By the 1900s, medical use of cocaine had expanded to the hinterland and some Western physicians who were not medical missionaries also used cocaine for medical purposes. Cocaine was advertised by British and American pharmaceutical companies and traders, who were keen to markets for themselves in China. Meanwhile, non-medical use of this drug also emerged. The large amount of cocaine imported at the treaty port of Xiamen attracted the attention of local officials there and this finally prompted the negotiations between the Chinese Government and the British Government on regulating its importation. According to the regulation, any importation of cocaine other than for medical and scientific use would be prohibited after January 1910, a full four years before controls were imposed across the US and six years before the same in Britain. However, historical evidence indicates that this was a regulation which was stimulated more by the anti-narcotics campaign of the Late Qing period than the severity of the cocaine issue itself.

Of course, at much the same time as these regulations were being imposed China hosted the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission from which the international drugs regulatory system was to grow. Chapter 3 looks at the way in which the international context explains much of what happened in domestic controls on refined drugs as China entered the Republican period. One key feature of the period was the stimulus given to civil groups in China who were focused on reforming the country's drug policies. By 1924 the National Anti-Opium Association had been formed which exerted significant influence on the anti-narcotic campaigns in the ensuing years. However, the chapter also explores the constraints on the effectiveness of such campaigns and efforts by government to exert some control over flows of refined drugs in this period. It shows that the wider crisis of the state in the period, when rival factions fought for dominance, undermined the coherence of the governance of morphine, cocaine and heroin for much of the 1920s.

The final two chapters consider in detail the emergence of government units tasked with defining and policing the line between licit and illicit use of refined drugs across China from the 1920s until the end of Nationalist rule in 1949. The 1914 *Regulation for Penalties on Morphine Offences* suggests that the regime that followed the Qing administration was aware of the need to control the consumption of refined drugs for non-medical purposes. However, the chapter shows that while policies could be put in place, enforcement was more difficult. It traces one of the mechanisms devised to tackle this problem, the "Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization" that existed to deal with the legitimate demand for medical and scientific supplies of refined drugs in Shanghai between 1922 and 1925. As early as 1918, the Inspector General of the Maritime Customs, Francis Aglen, had appealed to the Revenue Council of the Beiyang Government to establish a "Poisons Inspection Bureau" specifically for the issue of refined drugs. Such a unit was finally set up by the central government in 1922 in Shanghai as an experiment which could be rolled out as a model across China if successful. It was not, and the forces against it included the local authorities, the vested interests of Chinese traders in

Western drugs, and representatives of the Treaty Powers. The illegal activities of its third and final Director were the perfect excuse for it to be abandoned in 1925.

While this Bureau failed, a National Narcotics Bureau under the administration of the Nanjing Nationalist Government was established in 1934 and operated until the end of the 1940s, when the Nationalists lost power to the Communists. Chapter 5 traces the reasons that the authorities returned to the idea of a National Narcotics Bureau and the factors that ensured it survived. At the beginning of the 1930s, establishing such a Bureau became a necessity because the narcotics suppression campaigns of the Nationalist Government rendered the medical use of refined drugs more problematic than ever. The centre-piece of these campaigns was the implementation of the Six Year Plan from 1935 onwards. During the process of establishing and operating the Bureau, the National Health Administration (to which the Bureau was affiliated) was faced with a range of problems, including the issue of cooperation with other parts of the government's drugs machinery, how to purchase refined drugs from abroad, and how to establish its authority over all legitimate transactions in refined drugs. Almost as soon as those issues were settled, the Second Sino-Japanese War started in July 1937. This conflict had a significant impact on the operation and development of the National Narcotics Bureau, as demand for painkillers grew, and the urgent need for a wider range of medicines provided the Bureau with unexpected opportunities to extend its remit.

The conclusion of this thesis will draw together the five chapters to return to the larger issue of the government of refined drugs in China, particularly when it came down to the problems of defining the line between licit and illicit use, and policing it. In approaching the history of intoxicants and psychoactive medicines in China from this new direction, the project promises fresh perspectives in a field that has been so active in the last twenty years.

Chapter One “It’s more pernicious than opium”: Morphine Consumption and Controls in China, c. 1871-1909.

Introduction

While opium-smoking has a long history in China, attitudes began to change in the nineteenth-century towards it. These attitudes have been examined by plenty of historians, including those like Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann who have traced the social, political and economic reasons for shifting positions on, and ideas about, the substance. Others, like Xavier Paulès, have pointed out that while the practice may have been viewed as increasingly undesirable in official and elite circles by the end of the century, consumption seems to have been increasing as late as the 1880s.²⁵ By 1906 the Chinese Government had decided to launch an official anti-opium-smoking movement and in 1908 restrictions were also imposed on the refined opiate morphine. This chapter will consider this substance in greater detail than previous historians who have tended to neglect it, or muddle it in with the wider story of opium in China. It argues that the introduction of controls on morphine was not merely a reaction to the increasing consumption of the substance. The decision was also entangled with the contemporary political and economic context.²⁶

“Anti-opium white powder” and the Introduction of Morphine into China

²⁵ See Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016, pp. 79-94; Xavier Paulès has pointed out that the decade from 1880 to 1890 was a period when the opium consumption spread in China. He argues that the main reason was a decrease of the price. See 包利威, *鴉片在中國: 1750-1950*, 北京: 中國畫報出版社, 2017, p. 199. (Xavier Paulès, *L’ Opium: Une passion chinoise, 1750-1950*, Paris: Payot, 2011).

²⁶ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann have explored the history of morphine from the 1870s to the 1940s in their book *Narcotic Culture*. However, their research on morphine focuses on the period of the Republican Period (1912-1949). They mention some details concerning the history of morphine during the period prior to 1912, such as its introduction into China in the 1870s. In their narrative, it is unclear how morphine became popular gradually and how the attitudes toward morphine were changing during the Late Qing period. They also provide no explanation on the reasons associated with the first morphine importation regulation. For their research on the history of morphine during the period prior to 1911, See, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, pp. 99-104, and pp. 124-129.

As a drug isolated from opium between 1803 and 1805 in Germany, morphine had been commercially produced since 1827 at the chemical laboratories of Heinrich Emanuel Merck. It first became known in Britain in the early 1820s and Macfarlan & Co. in Edinburgh began to produce it in the 1830s. By the early 1840s this drug had been accepted into medical practice in Britain.²⁷ Large amounts of morphine were distributed to Prussian and French soldiers during the war in the 1870s for pain relief and the use of the substance became more common in Europe after that.²⁸

From the 1830s onwards, Christian missionaries in China adopted an anti-opium stance. For instance, the American missionary E. C. Bridgman published an article in 1832 to condemn the opium trade.²⁹ By the 1870s missions were setting up opium refuges (detoxification centres) in China. The first one was established in Suzhou in 1871. By 1907, the China Inland Mission had built 101 opium refuges in Chengdu and 71 in Taiyuan, two places which were important mission fields of the Mission.³⁰ Medical missionaries in China started to use various kinds of morphine products in the treatment of those addicted to opium-smoking there at the beginning of the 1870s.³¹ For instance, Henry Blodget was a member of the North China Mission and arrived there with his wife in the 1860s. On 13 April 1871, in his report to the Mission, he stated that, “since the selling of pills for the cure of opium taking commenced, at the place mentioned above, that is during the last five months, six individuals are reported as having been cured of this vice. These are all heathen.

²⁷ Virginia Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England*, London: Free Association Books, 1999, pp.136-138.

²⁸ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, p.124.

²⁹ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press, 2017, p. 162.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 164.

³¹ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann have explored some early histories of those “quit opium medicines” in *Narcotic Culture*, such as, Lin Ze-xu advocated some opium substitutes during the first Opium War, which contained “a mixture of opium dross and a variety of herbs”. (Frank Dikötter et al., *Narcotic Culture*, p. 100). This story actually has been explored by some Chinese historians and they argue that Lin consulted some Chinese Traditional Medicine doctors and intended to produce a “quit opium medicine” without using the dross. (Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 75).

Two or three of them are now interested in Christian doctrine”.³² Dispensing anti-opium pills was a strategy to promote the evangelical work of the missionaries. In *Narcotic Culture*, Frank Dikötter and his co-authors describe them as “morphine Christians”.³³

These “anti-opium medicines” (戒烟藥) were willingly provided by Western companies in China. In June 1872 a British drug store Llewellyn & Company Ltd. (Chinese name “老德記藥房”) published an advertisement in *Shenbao*. The price was “sixteen wraps one yuan” and the consumption instruction was “to use one and a half wraps every day for three days then reduce to half wrap every day ... increase the amount if your craving is heavier ... swallow it with warm water or cold”. Apparently, this product had already been available on the market for some time before this advertisement, because it complained of imitators, “recently shameless persons sold fake medicine with our brand which is not only useless but harmful”.³⁴

Llewellyn & Company once again advertised its products in July 1872. The advertisement stated that “... now we have secretly purchased the best quality western anti-opium white powders which can not only cure the opium craving but also nourish your body. Once cured, no relapse. The price is sixteen wraps one yuan”.³⁵ “Secretly” here was merely a marketing rhetoric which was frequently used by contemporary drug stores, peddlers, and quacks, asserting the value of their

³² “North China Mission”, *The Missionary Herald*, vol. 7, 1869-1875, p. 272. “At the place mentioned above” refers to a place mentioned in the previous paragraph of Henry Blodget’s report. He did not name the place but stated that “There is a landlord residing in the country, seven miles from our north chapel, who has cured himself of the vice of opium-smoking by pills sold in our chapel”. According to R.G. Tiedemann, “the North China Mission was begun at Tianjin by Henry Blodget in 1860. In 1864 he opened the Beijing station.” Thus the chapel mentioned in his 1873 report was either in Tianjin or in Beijing. See R.G. Tiedemann, *Reference Guide to China Missionary Societies in China: from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 114.

³³ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, p.102.

³⁴ “包戒洋藥斷癮散”, 5 June 1872, *申報*. (“Anti-opium Medicine with Guaranteed Quality”, *Shenbao*). The “Yuan” here may refer to foreign silver coins in Shanghai. According to Zhang Ning’s research, as early as by the 1740s, “Yuan (元, or 員 and 圓, mean ‘round’)” had been used to refer to foreign silver coins which circulated in China. See 張寧, *中國近代貨幣史論*, 武漢: 湖北人民出版社, 2007, pp. 23-30. (Zhang Ning, *A History of Currencies in Modern China*, Wuhan: Hubei People’s Press).

³⁵ “外國戒烟白藥粉”, 12 July 1872, *申報*. (“Western Anti-Opium White Powder”, *Shenbao*).

medicines by creating an air of mystique about them. This kind of rhetoric also could be a camouflage for the contents of their products, which may have included morphine.

The problem with the latter idea is that it is difficult to find convincing evidence that these medicines definitely contained morphine. For example, Frank Dikötter et al argue that “medical morphine imported from Britain was advertised in *Shenbao* as early as 1874 as a miracle cure less crude than opium or dross”.³⁶ The primary source they referred to for this argument is *Shenbao* dated 17 April 1874. Chinese historian Su Zhi-liang provides more detail using the same source in his book *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, stating that the drug store “British Pharmacy” (also named Mactavish & Lehmann) advertised that it imported morphine from Britain and it could be used to cure the opium craving (The quotation is “由倫敦新到戒烟莫啡散多箱其藥醇正且有力故杜癮之效較爲捷速”).³⁷ However, after this reference was checked it seems that no such advertisement can be found in the copy of *Shenbao* published on 17 April 1874. In his book *A History of Narcotic Control in Shanghai*, Su has also stated that the drug store “British Pharmacy” advertised its imported morphine in *Shenbao* on 20 May 1872 and he provides a quote from the advertisement.³⁸ However, the quotation he uses could not be found in *Shenbao* on that date either.

Su may have drawn these references from an earlier book *A History of Pharmaceutical Industry in Modern Shanghai*. The authors of that book published the content which was quoted by Su in his two books.³⁹ They noted that the

³⁶ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, p.127.

³⁷ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, 2nd edition, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press, 2017, p. 200.

³⁸ 蘇智良, *上海禁毒史*, 上海: 上海三聯書店, 2009, p. 55. (Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotics Control in Shanghai*, Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company).

³⁹ 上海市醫藥公司, 上海市工商行政管理局, 上海社會科學院經濟研究所編, *上海近代西藥行業史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 1988, p. 33. (Shanghai Pharmaceutical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and the Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds. *A History of Pharmaceutical Industry in Modern Shanghai*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press).

quotation was from *Shenbao* dated 12 March 1874. However, the quotation could not be found in a copy of *Shenbao* from that date. There was only an advertisement for the drug store Llewellyn & Company, which was titled “包戒洋煙斷癮藥” (Anti-opium Medicine with Guaranteed Quality). It stated that “今有新到外國包戒洋煙白藥粉” (Now we have just received anti-opium foreign white powder). They do not say why they decided that this “foreign white powder” was morphine. But it seems that historians have relied on their decision to do so in order to assert that morphine was an ingredient in these powders as early as the 1870s.

Competition in the business of anti-opium medicines increased rapidly. In July 1872, a drug store named Xing Wu House marketed its anti-opium paste and pills in *Shenbao*. Like the British drug store Llewellyn & Company, Ltd., Xing Wu House advertised its anti-opium paste and pills in *Shenbao*, while also complaining of rivals faking their brand.⁴⁰ Those advertisements indicate that both real and quack anti-opium medicine had become available in Shanghai County in the mid-1870s. By the 1880s the product range had expanded. In 1884 The British Pharmacy advertised four kinds of anti-opium medicine, including “Anti-opium and stop-craving pills”, “Anti-opium medicinal liquid”, “Refined anti-opium powder” and “Renowned anti-opium white powder”.⁴¹ The expansion from “Anti-opium white powder” in the 1870s to various kinds of anti-opium medicine in the 1880s indicates that the growing of the anti-opium medicine business in Shanghai. The wider range of products may partly be explained by the ever-increasing competition in the field. Between 1843 and 1911 22 Yang-hang (洋行, foreign companies) dealt in western medicines. Of those, 18 were established from the 1860s onwards.⁴²

⁴⁰ “省吾齋戒烟膏丸”, 29 July 1872, *申報*. (“Sheng Wu House Anti-Opium Paste and Pills”, *Shenbao*).

⁴¹ “大英醫院今將各種經驗丸散藥水藥酒開列于右”, 20 May 1884, *申報*. (“A list of the experimented pills, powders, medicinal liquid and medicinal liquor of the British Pharmacy”, *Shenbao*).

⁴² Shanghai Pharmaceutical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and the Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds., *A History of Pharmaceutical Industry in Modern Shanghai*, pp. 17-21.

Medical missionaries continued to turn to these products. Dr Atwood, who was based at Tai-gu, a county in Shanxi province, recorded his experience in 1884:

Many applications have been made for the cure of the opium habit; some in a timid or half-hearted way, some by those who wished to experiment with the anti-opium medicine, as well as by some others who wanted to reform in earnest. The latter were always encouraged, and a small stock of anti-opium pills, always kept on hand, were sold at cost. Over two thousand pills were sold to about fifteen persons.⁴³

By the 1890s the morphine content of these mixtures and concoctions was explicitly acknowledged in print. During the fifth day of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China in 1890, when participants discussed the morphine issue, Dr A. Lyall talked about the situation in Swatow (now Shantou), and suggested that the substance had been included in the anti-opium remedies for some time:

In the South, we have been keeping our eyes upon it for some years, and I have no hesitation in saying that I am more afraid of the morphia habit than I am of opium-smoking ... Some years ago, when I came to Swatow, we heard very little of these anti-opium powders, but now we hear a good deal, and I see a great deal of harm resulting from them. In Amoy the state of affairs is, or was, pretty bad. The custom was introduced there by a foreign physician. He got young lads from the church, trained them in his hospital, and sent them out to sell foreign medicines, including morphia.⁴⁴

⁴³ *The Missionary Herald*, vol.9, 1884, p. 456.

⁴⁴ *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai*, p. 357.

R. A. Jamieson worked as a doctor in Shanghai after 1868 and also voluntarily gave some of his time to the St Luke's Clinic of the American Episcopal Church Mission.⁴⁵ In his testimony for the Royal Commission on Opium in 1894, he said

Within the past few years, however, the so-called 'opium habit craving powders', which are nothing but morphia, have created a taste for morphia consumption, which I learn is rapidly spreading on account of its comparative convenience and cleanliness, and also on account of the secrecy with which the habit may be indulged.⁴⁶

Journalist George Morrison recorded his experience in Chongqing in 1894, "morphia pills are sold in Chungking by the chemists to cure the opium habit. This profitable remedy was introduced by the foreign chemists of the coast ports and adopted by the Chinese".⁴⁷ This extract suggests that by this time the consumption of these substances was geographically widespread in China, and had spread from the coastal treaty ports to towns and cities in the interior.

Jamieson's comments point to some of the reasons that morphine-based products would have been attractive to consumers by the 1890s. Historians have pointed to the literati's changing attitude towards opium in that period. Xavier Paulès has shown that there were editorials that criticised opium in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁴⁸ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann have explored the discussions of the literary elites on "craving", and their condemnations of opium-smoking to satisfy this.⁴⁹ If this habit was increasingly being met with disapproval then many would have sought ways to give it up. Others would have

⁴⁵ P. French, *Through the Looking Glass: China's Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009, p. 53.

⁴⁶ Royal Commission on Opium, *Royal Commission on Opium*, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1894-1895, vol. 5, p.244.

⁴⁷ George Morrison, *An Australian in China*, London: H Cox, 1895, p. 49.

⁴⁸ Such as Xavier Paulès, see *鴉片在中國: 1750-1950*, pp. 197-198.

⁴⁹ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, pp. 88-90.

sought substances that they could substitute for their prepared opium, but which would be easier to consume discretely. The “convenience and cleanliness” of refined morphine must have been ideal.

During the 1890s Christian groups in China began to take a stand against morphine. At the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, which was held in Shanghai in 1890, medical missionary Dr John Dudgeon addressed the morphine issue within an essay on “The Evil of the Use of Opium” that he submitted to the conference. He ascribed the popularity of the white anti-opium powder to the fact that “the doses are small and effective and are easily carried on the person and partaken of”, and also to “the cunning tactics used by sellers of this medicine, such as obtaining tablets of high Chinese officials”.⁵⁰

During the discussion of this essay, the president of the China Medical Missionary Association, Dr H. W. Boone, affirmed the seriousness of the morphine problem in China and presented the resolution passed by the Association:

The China Medical Missionary Association respectfully requests this Conference to take this subject into consideration in order to see if any means can be devised to prevent the rise and spread of a new evil, viz. morphia-eating. Also the Medical Missionary Association respectfully submits a recommendation to this Conference that it pass a resolution requesting all missionaries to discourage, and, if possible, prevent the indiscriminate sale of anti-opium pills containing morphia or any other preparation of opium by native Christians or by missionaries, as it is believed that the indiscriminate sale of these pills, though originating in a good intention, is developing a tendency worse, if possible, than the one intended to be cured.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai*, pp. 327-328. For a picture of the tablet, see chapter two of this thesis.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 357.

Dr Boone endorsed the argument that there was a prevalence of morphine consumption, and agreed that the medical missionaries played a role in spreading that drug. He also stated that “I am further credibly informed that in South China morphia is being known by the name of ‘Jesus opium’ and that the Christians are considered to be spreading this habit”.⁵² However, he ascribed this phenomenon to the fact that morphine pills had been “put in the hands of people who do not know what is the proper dose of morphia”.⁵³

He was careful to point out that “when these pills are prescribed by a medical man of experience, and one who knows in what cases he is to give them and how many it is possible to use, they may do good”.⁵⁴ Here the emphasis of Dr Boone on “dose” and “experience” was designed to maintain the authority of medical professionals, and the expertise of the China Medical Missionary Association. This also explains why he blamed Chinese agents. He stated that “the native Christians and ministers, in some parts of China, have become in the habit of selling these pills, in the first place, with the desire to suppress opium smoking, but they have to found that they made money by the sale of them”.⁵⁵ The problem for the China Medical Missionary Association was not the pills but which hands distributed them. In their minds, only white, Western medical men could be relied upon to manage morphine-based anti-opium remedies. This may have had as much to do with maintaining their grip on an effective substance and the power of deciding who got access to it as it did a real concern about its habit-forming properties.

“Masters of the needle” and Consumption Patterns

In July 1875 Dr Galt reported the first year work of his opium refuge. His treatment system consisted of “... gradually diminishing doses of opium internally,

⁵² *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai*, Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890, p.357.

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 356.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*. p. 357.

accompanying by other stimulants”.⁵⁶ Where his patients were seriously ill and “the stomach refused everything that was taken” Galt was not defeated. He cheerfully told the *Church Missionary Review* that “at these times, it was marvellous to see the instantaneous effect of the hypodermic injection of a little morphia. Sometimes the needle was scarcely withdrawn before the patient declared himself better”.⁵⁷ In line with western medical knowledge at the time, Dr Galt and other medical missionaries were trying to cure the habit of smoking opium with injections of morphine. The syringe had been invented in 1853 and enabled users to inject fluids straight into the blood stream. This route of administration is the fastest way to get the desired effects since the fluid moves immediately into blood circulation and to the rest of the body. Although warning about the harmful effects of doing this had emerged as early as 1864, medical professionals in Britain continued to recommend its use into the 1870s.⁵⁸ In the United States, morphine was only prohibited in various states in the 1890s.⁵⁹

If it was medical missionaries like Galt who introduced the practice of injecting morphine to China, it was not long before local agents had adopted it. An editorial published in *Shenbao* in September 1899 stated that the “current hypodermic use of morphine for non-medical purposes could be traced back several years earlier when a rascal itinerant monk injected morphine to cure opium addicts.”⁶⁰ Another anonymous editorial published in the same year supported this theory, saying,

More than ten years ago, there was an evil monk who rented a house in Shanghai and peddled there his needle-method of curing opium addiction. Few people believed him and his needles. However, shortly after that, the

⁵⁶ Dr. Galt, “Opium Refuge. – Report of Dr. Galt”, *Church Missionary Review*, Issue 7, No.5, July 1875, p.204.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Virginia Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England*, London: Free Association Books, p. 142.

⁵⁹ David F. Musto, *The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.4.

⁶⁰ “示禁藥針”, 24 September 1899, *申報*. (“Proclaim on Regulating Morphine Injection”, *Shenbao*).

anti-opium needles were sold and some people purchased them. With satisfactory results in ceasing the craving to smoke opium, this kind of needle became popular.⁶¹

Stories about the monks in the two cases may have the same origin, or be produced from the same rumour. “A monk” might not be a monk but an individual from a marginalised group of people who were the target of anti-narcotics discourse. However, both the two stories suggest that hypodermic injection of morphine had become established in the 1890s at the coastal areas of Songjiang Prefecture, which overlaps with Shanghai city. Other reports confirmed that in the Counties of Huating, Lou, Feng-xian and Nan-hui, and several towns of Shanghai County, “Masters of the needle (針師)” injected morphine for the users in tea houses.⁶² Western observers in the 1890s noticed this too, and R.A. Jamieson, a consulting surgeon to the Imperial Maritime Customs Service and surgeon at St Luke’s hospital in 1894, stated in his testimony to the Royal Commission on Opium that, “still more recently, the hypodermic injection of morphia has been introduced, and this form of the habit is gaining ground with extraordinary rapidity.”⁶³ Dr Kerr, who was based in Guangdong, also mentioned morphine injection. He stated that “I have been told in some cases the hypodermic syringe has been used by Chinese for the substitution of opium. We should use every possible effort to counteract the evils”.⁶⁴ By 1897, an editorial in *Shenbao* stated that: “... anti-opium medicine could be found anywhere in the market. While the number of opium smokers is rising, the business of anti-opium medicine is increasingly popular.”⁶⁵ It seems that the introduction of anti-opium medicines had not helped solve the problem of opium-smoking in the closing decades of the nineteenth-century. Rather, the medical missionaries,

⁶¹ “諭示禁機針注射嗎啡過癮事”, 17 October 1899, *申報*. (“Issues Concerning the Proclaim on Regulating Morphine Injection”, *Shenbao*).

⁶² “為民除害”, 16 October 1899, *申報*. (“Eradicating the Evils for the People”, *Shenbao*).

⁶³ Royal Commission on Opium, *Royal Commission on Opium*, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1894-1895, vol. 5, p.244.

⁶⁴ *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai*, p. 360.

⁶⁵ “論烟害 接前稿”, 15 July 1899, *申報*. (“On the harm of opium smoking”, *Shenbao*).

Western companies, and local imitators who had been championing them simply succeeded in making more diverse the opiate products and modes of delivery available.

The Beginning of Morphine Control in 1899

A shift in the attitudes of medical missionaries towards morphine became noticeable in the mid-1890s in the search for ways to treat morphine consumers. In June 1895, the research of a Canadian practitioner, Dr Graham Chambers, into an antidote for morphine was published in the *CMMJ*. His method was to let the patient have potassium permanganate grain by grain to an ounce. This was an experimental approach since he was uncertain about whether potassium permanganate is of therapeutic use after morphine was absorbed into the body. So he suggested using this method while morphine was still in the stomach.⁶⁶

Other research on potassium permanganate had been carried out in America and finally circulated in China that year. Two reports on this substance had been republished in the same issue of the *CMMJ* in 1895. The first was a treatment for opium-poisoning with potassium permanganate. Dr Norton Downs from Germantown enthusiastically reported his case of curing an opium-poisoning patient, “the symptoms were of a grave character ... the permanganate almost immediately relieved a threatening coma, bringing the patient back to complete consciousness”.⁶⁷ His method was hypodermic injection. In the view of Dr Chambers, “potassium permanganate, subcutaneously, is poisonous”. The second article was by Dr George F. Suker from Toledo, Ohio. He recounted the rescue of a

⁶⁶ “Potassium Permanganate as an antidote for morphine”, *CMMJ*, vol. 9, no. 2, June 1895, p. 108. *The China Medical Missionary Journal (CMMJ)* was established by the China Medical Missionary Association in 1887 in Shanghai. Articles in this journal included reports of events related to the China Medical Missionary Association, medical cases performed by missionaries and up-to-date news about the development of medicine around the world.

⁶⁷ “Opium-poisoning Treated with Potassium Permanganate”, *CMMJ*, vol. 9, no. 4, December 1895, pp. 245-246.

thirty-five woman Miss B.E. McC, who swallowed 30 grains of sulphate of morphine on the morning of 4 May 1895.

First I injected 1/6 grain of apomorphine at 7.35 a.m., and at 7.45 a.m., 1/50 grain of nitroglycerin. The apomorphine failed to cause emesis, but the nitroglycerin acted nicely. At 7.50 a.m. I began injections of permanganate of potassium, .4 to 30 aq. dest., an average of 12 minims every ten to fifteen minutes. There was no use in trying to keep her awake or even arouse her. She lay in this condition until 11 a.m., when I was able to make her respond to her name. After the fourth injection of the permanganate she materially improved; respirations became more frequent, also very much deeper, the pulse grew stronger, and the cyanotic condition began to lessen.⁶⁸

Underneath those accounts of research on potassium permanganate was the rising idea that morphine could be dangerous as well as useful. Criticisms had also promptly moved from focusing on the anti-opium medicine which contained morphine, to the hypodermic injection of morphine at the end of the 1890s.

By now morphine was being viewed critically on the Chinese side too. The first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) stoked the rise of nationalism in China and from that time opium smoking and anti-opium medicines which contained morphine were criticized as substances which were weakening China and degenerating the Chinese nation.⁶⁹ An editorial published in 1897 in *Shenbao* argued:

It is said that recently the ingredient of most anti-opium medicine has been changed from dross to morphine, which was the essence of opium. Therefore, the addiction to opium cannot be cured unless the use of this anti-opium

⁶⁸ "Permanganate of Potassium as an Antidote to Morphine", *CMMJ*, vol. 9, no. 4, December 1895, p.247.

⁶⁹ For discussion on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the surging nationalism, see Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999, pp. 20-21.

medicine is ceased. What is worse is that one could become addicted to the anti-opium medicine when the craving of opium has stopped. Endeavouring to abstain from opium with this medicine is actually in vain and the harm of opium on Chinese people is endless.⁷⁰

This phenomenon was partly because that there was a shift of consumption method during that time. A piece of news published in March 1898 described the life of a homeless man named A Shun Tang, who indulged in opium smoking until he changed to morphine injection as it was much cheaper. After daily injections he became a morphine addict who was coated with needle holes in damaged skin which oozed malodorous substances. Feeling isolated and desperate, he ate some morphine one night and slept on the floor for a while, then walked out, took off his clothes and jumped into a river near a local market to commit suicide. Although he was pulled out of the water, the man still died. The narrator of this story in *Shenbao* commented that his demise was “an evil brought by himself”.⁷¹ Responsibility for morphine addiction was the subject of some debate though. An anonymous commentator, writing in the newspaper in August 1899, seemed to think that the government had a responsibility to step in

These people (i.e. morphine addicts) are very stupid to fall into the traps of morphine. It is the fault of nobody but their own and they have no reason to complain. However, as the authorities, you witness people experiencing the great harm brought by morphine but take no preventive measures. Where is the so-called “viewing people’s misery as your own”?⁷²

Similar appeals by the educated elites stimulated the local authorities to take action. In 1899, Xiu-cai Shen and Xu appealed to the Magistrate of the Hua-ting

⁷⁰ “論烟害 接前稿”, 15 July 1899, *申報*. (“On the harm of opium smoking”, *Shenbao*).

⁷¹ “柳水鳴榔”, 29 March 1898, *申報*. (“Knocking the ship board at the Mao River”, *Shenbao*).

⁷² “論貧民吸烟之害”, 30 August 1899, *申報*. (“On the harm of opium smoking for the poor”, *Shenbao*).

County of Song-jiang Prefecture to issue an official notification regulating morphine injection.⁷³ They suggested that both Chinese and Western drug stores should be prohibited from selling morphine, and that the post office and ships should be banned from delivering morphine. Local constables should assume the responsibility of expelling the “masters of the needle” from the teahouse and those who failed in this duty should be fined. They also appealed to the Shanghai Dao-tai (道臺, Circuit Intendant) to notify the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Consuls of Britain and France to add morphine to their regulations on poisons and to prohibit its sale. They also urged the Magistrate of Lou County to take similar actions.⁷⁴

Wang Xin-fu, Shanghai Dao-tai, accepted their petition and took action first. He issued an official notification on October 14th, the content of which was almost same as the suggestions given by the two Xiu-cai.⁷⁵ Encouraged by this reaction, an editorial in *Shenbao* provided some basic knowledge of morphine and described the perceived horrors of being addicted to the injection of morphine. It ended on a dramatic note “will our four hundred million Chinese people be killed by the needles?”⁷⁶ Dao-tai Wang’s initiative was followed by the Magistrate of Hua-ting County.⁷⁷ A few months later, the Subprefect of the Mixed Court of American and British Settlements in Shanghai met representatives of the Shanghai County and decided to instruct the Shanghai Municipal Council to follow the regulations, which required all drug stores in the settlements to stop selling morphine to addicts.⁷⁸ It

⁷³ “Xiu-cai (秀才)”, person who passed the imperial examination at the county level in the Ming and Qing dynasties.

⁷⁴ “示禁藥針”, 24 September 1899, *申報*. (“Proclamation on Prohibiting Morphine Injection”, *Shenbao*).

⁷⁵ “爲民除害”, 16 October 1899, *申報*. (“Eradicating Evils for the People”, *Shenbao*).

⁷⁶ “論示禁機針注射嗎啡過癮事”, 17 October 1899, *申報*. (“A Comment on the Proclaim of Prohibiting Injecting Morphine to Kill Craving”, *Shenbao*).

⁷⁷ “會禁藥針”, 29 November 1899, *申報*. (“Joint Proclaim on Prohibiting Morphine Injection”, *Shenbao*).

⁷⁸ “示禁嗎啡”, 4 March 1900, *申報*. (“Proclaim on Prohibiting Morphine Injection”, *Shenbao*. Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) was the organisation founded on 11 July 1854 by a group of Western businessmen to govern the daily operation and infrastructure of the Shanghai International Settlement. It was dissolved on 17 December 1943.

seems that the first anti-morphine campaign had achieved its objectives, and in little more than six months. Quite what this meant in practice is another matter however as the three Magistrates simply posted official notifications of the new regulations. It has not been possible to find records which suggest that efforts were made to enforce them.

Commerce, the Colonial Powers, and Controls on Morphine

The signing of the *Boxer Protocol* in 1901 is the context for understanding what happened next. After the Qing government was defeated by the Eight Power Alliance, it launched a programme of reforms that included new commercial treaties.⁷⁹ The issue of morphine imports was included in the negotiations about these treaties. The Chinese government attempted a political manoeuvre with economic thinking to tackle the issue of unregulated imports of the drug.

The Chinese state faced financial crisis from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, in part because of the payment of large indemnities to the Western powers after the Opium Wars. This situation became worse after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the *Treaty of Maguan* (馬關條約, also named *Treaty of Shimonoseki*) that followed in 1895, which included a payment of 230 million ku-ping taels in reparations and ceded Taiwan to Japan.⁸⁰ Facing this crisis, the authorities hoped to use revised

⁷⁹ David Faure, "The Mackay Treaty of 1902 and its Impact on Chinese Business", *Asia Pacific Business Review*, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2000, pp. 79-92. According to David Faure, although the treaty revision was brought about by the Boxer Rebellion and the Boxer Protocol, some commercial issues before the Boxer Rebellion had already necessitated a revision of the previous commercial treaty. One was the ambiguous characteristic of the compradors. The comprador "enters his post by putting up a substantial bond, and it is his personal credibility that guarantees the company's liabilities" (Faure, 2000, p.82). Another issue was that there was no exiting law protected the investment by Chinese persons in Western companies.

⁸⁰ Ku-ping Tael (庫平銀) was a standard unit of silver used for all taxes collected by the central government in Beijing. Other tael units connected with government taxation are Chao-ping tael for grain tribute, and Hai-guan tael emerged after the mid-19th century as a standard for customs tax payment for the Maritime Customs. See Debin Ma, "Money and Monetary System in China in the 19th-20th Century: An Overview", Working Papers No. 159/12, January 2012, p.5.

import tariffs to generate increased revenues, and this objective lay behind their negotiating position.⁸¹

Morphine had been imported into China since the 1870s but it first appeared in the Chinese government's Imperial Maritime Custom Service annual report in 1891.⁸² Before that, the inclusion of morphine in the tariff system had been advocated by missionaries. When the missionaries convened at the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China in 1890, Dr A. Lyall ascribed the popularity of morphine to the fact that there was no tariff on this drug so its price remained low, or as he put it morphine "pays no duty, and so can be sold very cheaply and at an enormous profit". To solve the problem, he suggested regulation of the trade through taxation, saying, "We feel that unless this trade is checked it will work such disastrous results as to recoil on our own heads".⁸³

At the beginning of drafting the revised Sino-British commercial treaty, Chinese representatives Lü Hai-huan, the Minister of the Board of Works (工部尚書), and Sheng Xuan-huai, the Vice Minister of the Board of Works (工部侍郎), proposed an article on regulating morphine importation for the treaty. This was rejected by the leader of the British delegation, James Mackay. After negotiations on 30 August 1902, Mackay agreed to ask for instruction from the British government about the article including four points on morphine proposed by the Chinese delegation. On receiving a reply from the British government, he consented to the inclusion of that article in the revised commercial treaty.⁸⁴ The final treaty was called the *Anglo-*

⁸¹ 李永勝, *清末中外修訂商約交涉研究*, 天津: 南開大學出版社, 2005, p. 115. (Li Yong-sheng, *A Study on the Negotiations of Revising Commercial Treaties between China and the Western Countries at the end of the Qing Dynasty*, Tianjin: Nankai University Press).

⁸² Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, p. 124.

⁸³ *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai*, Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890, p. 358.

⁸⁴ "呂海寰盛宣懷致外部嗎鴉流毒甚重請商馬使入約永禁電", 30 August 1902, 王彥威, 王亮編, *清季外交史料*, 北京: 故宮博物院, 1934. ("Telegraph from Lü Hai-huan and Sheng Xuan-huai to the Wai Wu Bu which appeals to discuss morphine issue with Mackay and include a prohibiting policy into the commercial treaty", Wang Yan-wei and Wang Liang eds., *Primary Sources on Foreign Affairs of the Late Qing*, Beijing: Summer Palace Museum)

Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902 (also known as *The Mackay Treaty*, and 中英續議通商行船條約 in Chinese), and the regulation on the importation of morphine was stipulated in Article XI. It read:

His Britannic Majesty's Government agree to the prohibition of the general importation of morphia into China, on condition, however, that the Chinese Government will allow of its importation, on payment of the Tariff import duty and under special permit, by duly qualified British medical practitioners and for the use of hospitals, or by British chemists and druggists who shall only be permitted to sell it in small quantities and on receipt of a requisition signal by a duly qualified foreign medical practitioner.

The special permits above referred to will be granted to an intending importer on his signing a bond before a British Consul guaranteeing the fulfilment of these conditions. Should an importer be found guilty before a British Consul of a breach of his bond, he will not be entitled to take out another permit. Any British subject importing morphia without a permit shall be liable to have such morphia confiscated.

This Article will come into operation on all other Treaty Powers agreeing to its conditions, but any morphia actually shipped before that date will not be affected by this prohibition.

The Chinese Government, on their side, undertake to adopt measures at once, to prevent the manufacture of morphia in China.⁸⁵

Compared with the negotiations between China and Britain, those between China and Japan regarding revision of the commercial treaty were more difficult. On 14 September 1902, Lü Hai-huan and Sheng Xuan-huai telegraphed the Chinese

⁸⁵ *Treaty between the United Kingdom and China respecting Commercial Relations, & C.*, 1902, p. 12.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the difficulties, as “discussion with the Japanese delegation has run several rounds but without any results”.⁸⁶ These difficulties reflected the tension between the two countries after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). But Japan also had a commercial interest related to the morphine trade as from the late 1890s syringes produced in Japan had been sold on the Chinese market. It was felt that their cheap price had contributed to the decrease in the cost of injecting morphine. An anonymous editorial in *Shenbao* published in October 1899 stated that,

Since the effect of morphine injection has been known in the wider population, people hurried to purchase the syringe and one pair had become as expensive as four silver coins ... A person who works at the Customs said importation of syringes had raised revenue to the value of 10, 000 taels each year. Now that Japan can imitate the syringe the price has become cheaper.⁸⁷

Following Britain, the US consented to include the prohibition of morphine importation into its revised commercial treaty with China in July 1903. During the negotiation with the US delegation to revise the commercial treaty, the Chinese representative Lü Hai-huan proposed to include syringes into the regulation on morphine importation. However, the US delegation refused this motion first because they reckoned that those syringes for injecting morphine were actually imitated by the Chinese. After viewing samples provided by the Chinese delegation and ascertained that they were indeed from Western countries, the US delegation consented to that motion.⁸⁸ In the revised commercial treaties with other Western

⁸⁶ “呂海寰盛宣懷致外部日約迄無一款就緒亟應力籌抵制電”, 15 September 1902, 王彥威, 王亮編, *清季外交史料*. (“Telegraph from Lü Hai-huan and Sheng Xuan-huai to the Wai Wu Bu about the fruitless of treaty revising negotiation with Japan and a proposal of endeavouring to resist”, Wang Yan-wei and Wang Liang eds., *Primary Sources on Foreign Affairs of the Late Qing*, Beijing: Summer Palace Museum, 1934).

⁸⁷ “諭示禁機針注射嗎啡過癮事”, *申報*, 17 October 1899. (“Issues Concerning the Proclaim on Regulating Morphine Injection”, *Shenbao*).

⁸⁸ “呂盛伍三使致外部美使允中國一律禁止莫啡鴉電”, 5 March 1903, in Wang Yan-wei and Wang Liang eds. *Primary Sources on Foreign Affairs of the Late Qing*, (Beijing: Summer Palace Museum,

countries, China also inserted the article of prohibiting morphine importation, such as the treaty with Portugal in 1904.⁸⁹

All of this diplomatic activity was met with approval in *Shenbao*. An editorial in September 1902 stated that “... morphine is something extremely harmful. Since there is a regulation policy now, doctors without certificates will not be able to purchase, profiteers will not be able to smuggle, and the sale will be decreased as well. All of these articles (i.e. the articles of the *Mackay Treaty*) will benefit the nation as well as the people”.⁹⁰

Implementation and disputes

Despite the agreements from 1902 onwards it seems that little was done by way of imposing the new regulations until 1905. In that year, a student named Jin Ying-xu at the Supreme College of Beijing (京師大學堂) wrote to Yuan Shi-kai, then Viceroy of Zhi-li province, appealing to him to prohibit the sale of morphine. The Viceroy responded positively, and instructed the Superintendent of Tianjin Maritime Customs to contact Thomas Ferguson, the Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Customs in Tianjin. He would be asked to implement the regulations, which would mean prohibiting all morphine importation except that for medical use required by western physicians. Meanwhile, Viceroy Yuan consulted the Foreign Ministry to instruct the Inspectorate General of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service to prohibit morphine importation and to record the statistics of morphine importation for medical reasons.⁹¹

1934), (“Telegraph from Lü Hai-huan, Sheng Xuan-huai and Wu Ting-fang to the Foreign Ministry about the consent of American minister to China’s prohibiting policy on morphine importation”).

⁸⁹ “續錄中葡新訂商約”, *申報*, 14 November 1904. (“Renewal of the newly signed Sino-Portuguese treaty”, *Shenbao*).

⁹⁰ “商約既成喜而敬書于後”, *申報*, 12 September 1902. (“A Comment after Delight to Hear the Signing of the Revised Commercial Treaty”, *Shenbao*).

⁹¹ “津海關道擬禁售嗎啡藥針並禁私運進口辦法”, 15 May 1905, *申報*. (“The Intendant of Tianjin Customs proposed regulations of prohibiting the selling and importation of morphine syringes”, *Shenbao*).

The new system quickly caught out importers. Three British drug stores, Llewellyn & Company Ltd., Mactavish & Company Ltd. and Watsons, imported morphine without certificates and their goods were detained by the Shanghai Maritime Customs Service in September 1905. The Shanghai Dao-tai declined to sanction their imports except under a bond guaranteeing that the morphine should only be sold in small quantities and on receipt of a requisition from a duly qualified medical practitioner. Llewellyn & Company Ltd managed to obtain permission from the Maritime Customs Service and fetched their morphine while the other two companies still waited for their goods. The Shanghai Maritime Customs Service informed the British Consul General that they had issued a notification in July 1905 about the new restrictions on morphine importation. The notification declared that free importation of morphine was prohibited and the process for importing this drug was to obtain a certificate from the Consulate. The Service also referred to the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902* as the basis for the notification they issued in July 1905.

G.D. Pitzipio, the Consul-General in Shanghai, reported this to the British Minister Ernest Satow in Beijing. Satow then argued with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese government that there was actually one condition of implementing the article concerning the regulation of morphine importation in the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902*. The condition was “this Article will come into operation on all other Treaty Powers agreeing to its conditions”.⁹² Therefore, he argued that the Shanghai Maritime Customs Service should withdraw the notification because it actually contravened the commercial treaty signed between China and Britain. After several rounds of negotiation, in October 1905, the central authorities in Beijing

⁹² “Sir E. Satow to Prince Ch’ing”, 10 October 1905, FO 228/2202, TNA. (FO refers to Foreign Office files, TNA refers to The National Archives at Kew.

instructed the Shanghai Maritime Customs Service to release the detained morphine and withdraw the notification.⁹³

One month later, in November 1905, Burroughs Wellcome & Co. wrote to the British Foreign Office that its agents in China had experienced difficulties in importing some of their goods and medicines into the country, including morphine. The firm did not accuse the Chinese government of preventing the importation of their goods, but objected to “the delay and expense involved in securing the permits provided for under the Article”.⁹⁴ Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary contacted Ernest Satow, then British Minister in Beijing, on 23 December 1905 asking, “what formalities must be observed to enable morphia to be imported into China for medicinal purposes and whether it is possible to render any assistance to Messrs. Burroughs Wellcome and Company in the matter”.⁹⁵ In a further despatch, the Foreign Office instructed the British Legation in Beijing that it would be better not to take any action on this particular case but “to assist the Chinese government in obtaining the consent of the Powers” to impose the regulations.⁹⁶

The Foreign Office also had written to the Board of Trade of the British government on 23 December 1905 and notified them that the Shanghai Maritime Customs Service had already withdrawn the notification it issued in the July of that year. Namely, there was actually no restriction on morphine importation at that time because Article XI of the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902* was inoperative unless all Treaty Powers consented to it. Both the Foreign Office and the British Legation in Beijing reckoned that it was unnecessary to provide any special help to the Burroughs Wellcome and Company on the issue of importing morphine because

⁹³ “Wai-wu Pu to Sir E. Satow”, 20 October 1905, FO 228/2202. This case was also reported in *Shenbao*. See “彙錄英使與外務部來往函件”, 23 November 1905, *申報*. (“Synopsis of the Letters between British Minister and Chinese Foreign Ministry”, *Shenbao*).

⁹⁴ Despatch from Edward Grey to Ernest Satow, 23 December 1905, FO 228/2402, TNA.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Despatch from the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty’s Minister, 27 December 1905, FO 228/2402, TNA.

the agents of the company could still import that drug into China, just at the enhanced tariff rate.

The case prompted the Foreign Office to instruct the British Legation in China to trigger a further round of negotiations on revising the commercial treaties in order to finally settle the issue of trade in morphine to China. To enter into negotiations the British government had four conditions:

- (1) That the Chinese Government should in the first place obtain the consent of all the Treaty Powers.
- (2) That they should undertake to prevent the manufacture of Morphia in China.
- (3) That sufficient notice be given before the prohibition comes into force in order that the importers of the drug may be protected from injury owing to the measure being sprung upon them.
- (4) That provision should be made for the importation into China of Morphia for medicinal purposes on condition similar to those laid down in Article XI of the Treaty of 1902.⁹⁷

Other than those conditions, the Foreign Office also instructed Mr Townley, the British Charge d’Affairs in China, “to endeavour to induce the Chinese government to permit the admission of morphia imported for duly qualified medical practitioners, chemists and druggists or for the use of hospitals under a special permit at a duty not exceeding five per cent ad valorem, subject to some such conditions as those provided for under Article 11 of the Commercial Treaty of 1902”.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Despatch from the Foreign Office to the Board of Trade, 23 December 1905, FO 228/2402, TNA.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

Other problems arose because of the new arrangements for morphine. The first was what to do with confiscated morphine. Herbert Hobson, the Commissioner of Shanghai Maritime Customs Service contacted the Inspectorate General of the Maritime Customs Service to inform them that seizures should not be sold at auction anymore, because they could simply end up back on the black-market. He suggested that they could be donated to medical missions and hospitals instead. In addition, Hobson pointed to a second problem in suggesting that the tariff on morphine should revert back from 200% to 5% as before. He thought that the heavier rate had already stimulated smuggling. In a Circular dated 12 June 1906, the Inspector-General, Robert Hart, agreed by announcing that the Maritime Customs Service would stop selling the confiscated morphine at auction. He also stated disappointedly that, "the introduction of the new high Tariff rate ... is proving ineffectual as regards the object for which it was adopted-the discouragement of Morphia importations-and only leads to evasion of the law". However, the tariff would not be changed according to instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese government.⁹⁹ The British Minister in Peking, Ernest Satow, wrote to the Ministers of other Treaty Powers in China, to ask for the standpoint of their governments on the issue of regulating morphine importation.¹⁰⁰

The Imperial Decree and the Treaty Powers

At the beginning of 1906 the Court of the Qing Dynasty had begun to address opium suppression methods. In part this was down to pressure from civil groups that had begun to form to demand progress on the issue. Lin Bing-zhang was the grandson of Lin Ze-xu, the Commissioner who burned the opium of British and Chinese merchants in 1839 in Guangzhou. In 1905 he worked with local gentry and literati to establish the Fujian Anti-Opium Society. Following this example, H. C. Dubose

⁹⁹ Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, *Documents Illustrate of the Origin, Development, and Activities of the Chinese Customs Service. Volume II: Inspector General Circulars, 1893-1910*, p. 541.

¹⁰⁰ Despatch from Ernest Satow to Foreign Representatives, 1 March 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA.

founded the Suzhou Anti-Opium Society in 1906.¹⁰¹ Other than the pressure from civil anti-opium groups, the Late Qing Reforms (1901-1912) had been ongoing for several years. It is no surprise that the Reforms also targeted morphine.

In part, this was because morphine was being smuggled. At the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 the Chinese delegation revealed the statistics of the Maritime Customs Service on morphine importation from 1898 to 1907. Those statistics showed a sharp decrease of morphine importation at all eight of the Treaty Ports from 1903 to 1904. For instance, morphine imports via the Shanghai Maritime Customs Service was 89, 118 ounces in 1903 but decreased to 26 ounces in 1904. This was mainly because the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902* and the *American-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1903* raised the duty on morphine from 5% to 200%. As the report of the Chinese delegation stated that “the high tariff duty of Hk. Tls. 3 per ounce hinders open importation, but smuggling is comparatively easy”.¹⁰² It also explained that “considerable impetus seems to have been lent to the trade in morphia by the action of the officials in carrying out the prohibitory Edicts, and by the anti-opium movement generally”.¹⁰³

According to the report, clandestine imports of morphine were mainly from Western countries such as Britain and Germany, U.S., and Japan, and the postal service was the simplest method used. In Manchuria, traffic across the extensive Korean frontier was reported to be very large. Throughout the pages of the report of the Chinese delegation regarding the issue of morphine and anti-opium remedies, was criticism of the Japanese. The report complained that both Japanese products and Japanese traders had played an important role in the formulation of an illegal morphine market, so that in parts of China “Japan is stated to be the chief source of supply, and the Japanese to be mainly responsible for its sale in

¹⁰¹ “督批蘇州拒煙會”, 14 July 1906, *申報*. (“Notification of the Viceroy to Suzhou Antiopium Society”, *Shenbao*).

¹⁰² *Report of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, China, February 1 to February 26, 1909. Vol. II. Reports of the Delegations*, Shanghai: the North-China Daily News & Herald Ltd. 1909, p. 67.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

Manchuria".¹⁰⁴ In the view of the Chinese delegation, Japanese products had a virtual monopoly there and in the lower part of the Yangtze Valley, and they had started to compete with the products of American, Britain and the continent European countries in southern China. For instance, the Commissioner of Maritime Customs at Tianjin reported that "the subcutaneous injection of morphia is not generally prevalent in the province, but that in the few cases observed by missionaries the needles were of Japanese make".¹⁰⁵

However, the report also pointed to the agency of locals in the trade of morphine and injection instruments. It suggested that the syringes used in various places in China were often from Japan but that there were also native-made ones which were cheaper in price but of a lower quality. In Jiangsu province, "there are some Chinese needles copied from a foreign model",¹⁰⁶ while in Xiamen the Commissioner of Maritime Customs reported that "the points of these local-made syringes are very crude".¹⁰⁷ In Shantou, morphine could be bought "from respectable Chinese medicine and other shops for \$6.80 an ounce, and hypodermic syringes at 90 cents to \$1 each."¹⁰⁸ The situation was similar in Guangzhou where morphine was "mainly used and sold by native shops dealing in European medicines and anti-opium remedies".¹⁰⁹

According to the report, it seems that hypodermic injection of morphine for non-medical purpose was mainly at coastal areas. In An-dong, a port city that borders Korea, there might be morphine injection because "the instruments for injection were available at Japanese druggists".¹¹⁰ In Newchwang, a treaty port in Manchuria, Japanese hawkers and druggists either openly sold morphine or disguised it in

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 67.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 67.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 68.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 68.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 69.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 69.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 67.

products with euphemistic names such as “sleep medicines” (致睡藥) or “pain killers” (止痛藥). The report gave reasons why morphine use increased in that area,

For this the anti-opium crusade is partly responsible. Many smokers honestly desirous of breaking off the habit have been deluded into believing that morphia would free them from the yoke; others, intimidated or hampered by official restrictions, have merely substituted one vice for the other; whilst many coolies resort to it on the ground of economy and convenience, \$1 worth going as far as \$3 worth of opium.¹¹¹

While morphine injection also existed at some other treaty ports, it seems that the situation varied from place to place. For instance, the report stated that in Shantou, “the subcutaneous use of morphia is not so general in Swatow, it is said, as a few years ago; it has, however, been replaced by the habit of taking morphia pills- a vicious practice, said to be increasing largely.”¹¹² However, generally, it seems that morphine pills were more popular in the hinterland, such as Henan, a province in central China. The report stated that “it would appear that very few of the people of Honan (i.e. Henan) know anything about morphia for injection purposes, though enormous quantities of the pills containing the drug are sold”.¹¹³ The report observed that “its use subcutaneously is not yet to be found everywhere, and in the more distant provinces even the name of the drug is unknown”.¹¹⁴

In this context, in September 1906 Emperor Guang-xu issued an imperial edict which stipulated a Ten Year Plan for eradicating opium and other narcotic drugs in China and the Zheng Wu Chu (政務處, Political Affairs Office) issued the *Ten Articles*

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 67.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 69.

¹¹³ Ibid. p. 69.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 67.

for Regulating Opium Suppression.¹¹⁵ The morphine issue was addressed in the sixth and the tenth items of the regulation:

Article VI. Government should produce anti-opium medicines to cure the addiction of the population. Prescriptions for eradicating opium craving are various and they need to be researched by selected doctors in provinces. The purpose of this is to sort out prescriptions which are matched to local conditions and use them to produce anti-opium medicine. The principal rule is not using dross and morphine as ingredients.

Article X. There are other substances called morphine and morphine needle which are more harmful than opium. Commissioners of Customs should refer to article eleven of the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902* and article sixteen of the *Sino-U.S. Commercial and Navigation Treaty of 1903* to instruct all the Customs to prohibit importation of morphine and morphine needles which are not for medical use. It is also forbidden for Chinese and foreigners to produce morphine and morphine needles.¹¹⁶

The Grand Council (軍機處) sent the regulations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and instructed the latter to negotiate with the British Legation in Beijing.¹¹⁷ By that time, the progress in negotiations between the two countries had already achieved some results. On 1 March 1906 Ernest Satow wrote to Prince Ch'ing and notified him of the conditions on which the British government would consent to the regulation on morphine importation. He also told Prince Ch'ing that he had

¹¹⁵ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 169.

¹¹⁶ “續政務處奏定禁烟章程”, 03 December 1906, *申報*. (“Memorial of the Political Affair Office regarding the Regulation of Opium Suppression”, *Shenbao*).

¹¹⁷ “外務部致英使禁烟節略”, 王鐵崖編, *中外舊約章匯編*, 第二卷, 上海: 上海三聯出版社, 1957, pp. 444-448. (“Note from the Foreign Ministry to the British Minister on the issue of suppressing opium”, 2 December 1906, Wang Tie-ya ed. *A Collection of Treaties and Agreements between China and Western Countries*, vol. 2, Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company).

contacted the diplomats of other treaty powers in Beijing to ask about the attitudes of their governments to the British proposal.¹¹⁸

In a reply to Satow, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that the Chinese government agreed with the British proposal, except the reduction of duty to 5%, and argued that the previous tariff (of 200%) had been approved by all the treaty powers. Meanwhile, the Ministry inquired whether the proposals included “Government-established hospitals and kindred institutions” which would like to apply for and receive permission to manufacture morphia.¹¹⁹ The Foreign Office in London instructed the British Minister in Beijing that he should tell the Chinese government that, if it insisted on the higher level of duty on morphine then it was their responsibility to persuade the treaty powers to accept it. It also clarified that the “condition as to manufacture is only for commercial manufacture” so government hospitals would be free to make their own morphine.¹²⁰ The British Minister forwarded this information to Prince Ch’ing on 30 March 1906.¹²¹ In fact, both Edward Grey and Ernest Satow thought that there would “be insuperable difficulties” to persuading the Chinese authorities to reduce the duty from 200% to 5%. The strategy proposed by Satow was to “reconsider the question of the reduction of duty” when the Chinese government had made further progress on other points.¹²²

The responses of the other Treaty Powers to Satow’s note began to reach the British Legation in the summer of 1906. On 12 June the American Legation notified him that their government had consented to the British proposal.¹²³ By May 1907, treaty powers including France, the USA, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Mexico had also agreed. Germany “prepared to make the matter a subject for negotiation in its

¹¹⁸ Note from Ernest Satow to Prince Ch’ing, 1 March 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA. Prince Ch’ing (慶親王奕劻) was the General Councillor of the Grand Council.

¹¹⁹ Note from Wai Wu Bu to Ernest Satow, 5 March 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹²⁰ Despatch from Edward Grey to H.M. Minister, 28 March 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹²¹ Note from Ernest Satow to Prince Ch’ing, 30 March 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹²² Despatch from Ernest Satow to Edward Grey, 3 April 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹²³ Despatch from W.W. Rockhill to L. Carnegie, 12 June 1906, FO 228/2402, TNA.

commercial treaty". Russia argued that "it is most improbable that Russians may indulge in its [morphine] manufacture in China" because "the importation & manufacture of opium in China is forbidden to Russians by law" and "morphia belongs to the same category".¹²⁴ Eventually, only two treaty powers, Germany and Japan had not consented to the British proposal by 15 May 1907. On 21 October 1907 the British Consul in Tokyo, Claude MacDonald, notified Jordan that the Japanese Government had already decided to consent to the British proposal but would notify them of this "later on when a proper time arrives". MacDonald realised that Japan had taken this strategy because "negotiations on many subjects between the Chinese and Japanese Government were not progressing as smoothly as could be desired, and that the Japanese were awaiting a favourable opportunity (otherwise a "quid pro quo") before they notified their consent".¹²⁵

While the Japanese Government was using the morphine issue as a bargaining counter and the negotiations reached a deadlock, the Chinese government decided to take more action on the morphine issue. This process was triggered by a memorandum submitted by the Governor of Jiangsu province, Chen Qi-tai. Sent on December 1st, it appealed to the Board of Laws to legislate on the drug, emphasising its evils and recommending a special penal law regarding the sale and non-medical use of morphine. He stated that, "the law formerly in existence against opium provided for the death penalty and as morphine is much more dangerous than opium the death penalty in accordance with the law against the manufacture of poisons would not be excessive" but acknowledged that "the object of its manufacture is not murder but gain and as, too, the victim of the craving voluntarily brings their death upon themselves the conditions are somewhat different". Among the "special enactments on the subject" that he suggested were:

¹²⁴ Despatch from W.M.R. to John Jordan, undated, FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹²⁵ Despatch from Claude MacDonald to John Jordan, 21 October 1907, FO 228/2402, TNA.

Those convicted of manufacturing instruments for the injection of morphia should be sentenced in according with the law against the manufacture of poison, the punishment being reduced from decapitation to banishment to the most remote and unhealthy regions of the Empire, those convicted of selling morphia except under a special Customs being liable to the same punishment in accordance with the law against knowingly selling poisons, and their shops will also be confiscated.

We would also pray that instructions be sent to the Customs Authorities to enforce the Treaty provisions and put a stop to smuggling so that the evil may be cut off at its root, and when definite regulations have been laid down we trust the people will reverently obey them and that the prohibition of opium may then become really effective.¹²⁶

Governor Chen's memorial was drafted by the Board of Laws after consultation with the Imperial Commissioners for Law Reform. On 16 July 1908, an Imperial Decree approved the memorial. Receiving the sanction of the Imperial Decree meant that the Board of Laws would issue necessary instructions to the Governor of Jiangsu, as well as the High Authorities of other Provinces, the Revenue Council, the High Court of Justice and the Governor of Peking.¹²⁷ John Jordan reported this action of the Chinese government to the Foreign Office on 8 September 1908.

He also described the latest negotiations regarding the morphine issue. The Chinese government had agreed to the reduction of duty and all the treaty powers had consented to the British proposal, except Japan.¹²⁸ In a later despatch to Edward Grey on 30 September 1908, Jordan informed him that that Ministry of Foreign

¹²⁶ “署江蘇巡撫陳啓泰請定販賣嗎啡及製造嗎啡針治罪專條摺”, 1 December 1907, *政治官報*, Issue 102, pp. 20-21. (“Memorial of the Governor of Jiangsu Province Regarding Suggesting to Draw Special Penal Law on Sale and Producing Morphine and the Needles”, *Politic Gazette*.) John Jordan sent an English translation of this memorial to the Foreign Office in London on 8 September 1908, see FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Despatch from John Jordan to the Foreign Office, 8 September 1908, FO 228/2402, TNA.

Affairs of China had notified him that all the treaty powers had consented to the morphine importation regulation policy. Claude MacDonald soon confirmed that Japan had indeed agreed.¹²⁹ The Chinese government intended to put into force the regulation policy from the 1 January 1909 and to reduce the duty to 5%.¹³⁰ Considering this, John Jordan proposed that the British government should issue a notification for British subjects about the new policy. Jordan's proposal was approved and a King's Regulation issued on 1 December 1908.

After two years of diplomatic negotiations, the issue of regulating morphine imports was finally coming to a conclusion by the end of 1908. In January 1909, the Inspector General of the Maritime Customs submitted the "Regulations for Prohibiting Morphine Importation", which stipulated that all the importation was prohibited except for that ordered by foreign doctors and foreign drug stores. For those who obtained permission, there were further rules. For example, foreign doctors who imported morphine and related instruments had to obtain a bond from their Consulate and provide details about the amount, the import method and a guarantee that imports were only for medical use.¹³¹ Morphine supply was now controlled.

Conclusion

From the middle of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, morphine experienced a change from an exotic miracle medicine for curing opium addiction to a pernicious regulated substance. Western medical missionaries played the principal role in establishing a market for it. They saw in its potential for curing addicts to opium-smoking a tool for their civilizing mission and more evidence of the superiority of Western medicine that they were keen to assert.

¹²⁹ Telegraph from Claude MacDonald to John Jordan, 4 October 1908. FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹³⁰ Telegraph from John Jordan to Edward Grey, 30 September 1908, FO 228/2402, TNA.

¹³¹ "總稅務司申呈禁運莫啡鴉章程", 14 January 1909, *申報*. ("Regulations of Prohibiting Morphine Importation Submitted by the Inspectorate General", *Shenbao*).

Agents for modern pharmaceutical companies readily sourced supplies for the missionaries and profited from providing morphine products. But Chinese actors were quick to adopt and adapt them. Those ‘treated’ with it noticed its potential as a replacement for the opium-smoking that was now so often presented as dirty, dangerous, and even unpatriotic. By contrast, morphine seemed to be powerful, clean and quick. Locals soon mastered the techniques of securing supplies and handling syringes, and “masters of the needle” integrated themselves into traditional non-medical contexts such as the tea house, to offer their services alongside more customary pleasures.

Chinese and Western agency and agendas were also tangled together in forming a policy response to the flow of morphine as this began to be identified as a problem. Chinese efforts to use revised commercial treaties and high tariffs to control access to morphine in the country proved ineffective. In part this was because not all government departments seemed committed to, or capable of, putting policy into action. There was also the lengthy process of securing agreements with all the treaty powers, as none would commit to morphine controls until all did. But the Qing Court kept going as morphine found itself drawn into the dynasty’s efforts to deal with the wider issue of opium consumption in China once and for all. This was a response to the activities of a new generation of anti-opium organisations in society itself. It may also have been driven by a desire of the collapsing Qing dynasty to adopt reforms to save its administration. The government succeeded in securing the necessary cooperation from the governments of the treaty powers, many of which had begun to change their own attitudes towards the issue of opium and China. The signing of the Sino-British Ten Year Agreement in 1907 was followed by a wider international effort at cooperation in suppressing narcotic drugs at the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909. However, this success counted for little as the dynasty came to an end in 1912.

A detailed understanding of morphine's introduction into China and its drugs control efforts provides fresh perspectives on a number of debates. Frank Dikötter and his group have concluded that "the transition from a tolerated opium culture to a system of prohibition produced a cure which was far worse than the disease".¹³² They argue that opium-suppression movements and policies meant that many turned away from opium-smoking to morphine injection in this period, a mode of consumption that is far more harmful to individuals and society. In fact, this chapter has argued that morphine consumption was established in China before the revival of anti-opium groups and policies of the late-Qing period which only really got going after 1905. Ironically, it was an earlier generation of anti-opium campaigners, the Western medical missionaries and pharmaceutical entrepreneurs, who were instrumental in introducing morphine consumption as a treatment for opium-smokers.

The efforts to regulate morphine also draw attention to the difficulties of the Qing state at this time. The disconnection between policy and practice is most obvious in the length of time it took the commercial agreements of 1902 on morphine to be partially implemented in 1905. Even if there was broad agreement on how to control morphine flows at the Qing Court, it is apparent that a commitment to doing this was not shared beyond its confines. This may be because of the confused motives behind this set of policies, where the attraction of raising a revenue from imports of a useful medicine using a 200% tariff may have undermined a desire to reduce a black-market for it from which non-medical consumers sourced their supplies. As the next chapter shows, disconnection between policy and practice, and a confusion of motives behind policy, was the case not only for morphine but also for cocaine, an important refined drug which was first introduced into China by the medical missionaries as a local anaesthetic.

¹³² Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, p.173.

Chapter Two “It was decided to try Cocaine”: The Introduction of Cocaine to China and its Uses, c. 1887-1910.

Introduction

Following the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, increasing numbers of Westerners settled in the so-called Treaty Ports on China’s coasts throughout the rest of the nineteenth-century. With them came their medicines and medical practitioners. This chapter will explore the arrival of cocaine in these settlements from the 1880s onwards. It argues that two groups were behind the emergence of commerce in cocaine there at that time, Christian missionaries who used modern medicines in their work as healers, and agents for the burgeoning pharmaceutical industries in Europe and the US which were keen to build new markets in Asia for their products. It also shows that those products were not simply sought for strictly therapeutic purposes in the final years of the Qing Dynasty. The chapter starts in 1887 when the first operation in China to use cocaine as an anaesthetic was reported. It ends in 1910 when the first regulations to control use of the drug were put in place there.

Western Medicines in China

The history of western medicine in China started with the Jesuit China Mission in the sixteenth century. Their activities were occasional and did not create a market for western medicine. Generally, historians view the nineteenth century as the period when modern western medicine started being introduced into China.¹³³ Some employees of the East India Company started selling western medicines in

¹³³ 李尚仁, “晚清來華的西醫”, 中央研究院生命醫療史研究室編, *中國史新論: 醫療史分冊*, 臺北: 聯經出版公司, 2015, pp. 527-571 (Li Shang-jen, “Western Medicine in China during the Late Qing Period”, in Research Group of the History of Health and Healing at the Academia Sinica eds. *New Discussions on Chinese History: The Volume on Medicine History*, Taipei: Linking Publishing Company).

China at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For instance, Dr Livingstone opened a drug store in Macau, then a Portuguese colony, in 1820. In 1827 Thomas Colledge, a British doctor working for the East India Company, cooperated with a “ship’s doctor” Alexander Pearson to open a drug store in Macau, and they then moved it to Guangzhou (Canton) the following year.¹³⁴

Increasing numbers of European and American established themselves in China as the Treaty Port system developed after 1842 and Hong Kong became a free port in 1843.¹³⁵ The treaties signed between the Chinese and British governments after the Opium Wars stipulated the rights of westerners to reside, trade and carry out missionary work at the ports. Over time these communities came to consist of merchants and traders, government employees, medical missionaries, diplomats, and travellers. With them came lifestyle and consumption habits based on what they were used to back at home, and so formulated a “culture economy”, a term coined by Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson who have pointed out that “being British has material implications”.¹³⁶ Among their demands were familiar medicines and therapies.

The doctors who met these needs were also from societies in the West, and came in three different categories; medical missionaries (mainly British and American), military doctors, and Customs doctors.¹³⁷ For medical missionaries, the Chinese people were the main consumers of their medicines. Healing the diseases and treating the ailments of the locals was intimately related to the evangelical purpose of the church doctors. Military doctors travelled with the armies and navies of the

¹³⁴ 上海市醫藥公司, 上海市工商行政管理局, 上海社會科學院經濟研究所編, *上海近代西藥行業史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 1988, p. 8. (Shanghai Pharmaceutical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and the Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds. *A History of Pharmaceutical Industry in Modern Shanghai*).

¹³⁵ Charles Elliot proclaimed Hong Kong a free port as soon as he took possession in January 1841. This was endorsed by the British Government in 1843. See Steven Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong: 1841-1997*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 21-22.

¹³⁶ Gary B. Magee and Andrew Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.6.

¹³⁷ Li Shang-jen, “Western Medicine in China during the Late Qing Period”.

foreign nations with a presence on Chinese soil. As for Customs doctors, they were appointed to the “Medical Service of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service” which was established when Robert Hart was appointed as the second General Inspector in 1863.¹³⁸ Medical missionaries were by far the most numerous of the three categories before the First World War. In Guangzhou, for example, their numbers increased from 150 in 1887 to around 300 in 1905.¹³⁹

But if doctors were a growing feature in the treaty ports societies able to offer a range of allopathic treatments, the question remains of where they obtained the medicinal substances that they required. One source was the Yang-hang (洋行), such as Jardine Matheson & Co. Ltd. Those companies imported and exported a wide range of merchandise, including medicines. The second were drug stores, such as the shop run by Mactavish & Lehmann in Shanghai (also named ‘the British Dispensary’) which was established in 1850 in Shanghai. From 1850 to 1911 a further twenty-four such foreign drug stores were opened in that city alone. At a later stage, a third type of business emerged with the opening of branch offices of the western pharmaceutical companies, such as Burroughs Wellcome & Co. in 1909.¹⁴⁰ From the 1880s onwards, Chinese-owned businesses also began to open drug stores in Shanghai which had dealings in western medicines.¹⁴¹ As trade in these products and substances grew, the structure of the business became increasingly complex.

¹³⁸ 李尚仁, “十九世紀中國通商港埠的衛生狀況: 海關醫官的觀點”, 祝平一主編, *健康與社會: 華人衛生新史*, 臺北: 聯經出版公司, 2013, pp. 69-93. (Li Shang-jen, “Hygiene Situation of the Nineteenth Century Chinese Treaty Ports: A Perspective on the Customs Doctors”, in Chu Ping-yi eds. *Health and Society: A New History of Health in China*).

¹³⁹ Harold Balme, *China and Modern Medicine: A Study in Medical Missionary Development*, London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1921, p. 55; Li Shang-jen, “Western Medicine in China during the Late Qing Period”, p. 530.

¹⁴⁰ 上海市醫藥公司, 上海工商行政管理局, 上海社會科學院經濟研究所, *上海近代西藥行業史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 1988, p. 35. (Shanghai Pharmaceutical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and The Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds. *The History of Modern Pharmaceutical Industry in Shanghai*).

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

This was something of a golden age for European and North American pharmacy as reorganisation into professional societies, innovation in techniques, and increasing access to materia medica from around the world saw it grow as both a science and a business. Morphine was isolated from opium in 1806, and this was followed by strychnine from nux vomica in 1819, caffeine from coffee in 1821, cocaine from coca leaves in 1860.¹⁴² Many more plants around the world which had medical properties were discovered and experimented with to produce drugs in the nineteenth century. The ongoing industrialization broadened the spectrum of materials used to produce medicine when it was found that some organic material derived or synthesized from coal tar contained medicinal properties.¹⁴³

Technological innovation was another important activity in the development of the pharmaceutical industry during that period. For instance, Scottish physician Alexander Wood devised the hypodermic syringe to administer drugs in solution in 1853. He used it to apply morphine.¹⁴⁴ Subsequently, its use was expanded to other drugs and medicines. Increasing technological innovations provided pharmacists and physicians with “new types of grinders and pulverisers, rotating blades for mixing dry or fluid materials, and more powerful distilling and evaporating equipment”.¹⁴⁵ The process of coating pills with sugar was perfected by William R. Warner before the American Civil War and John Wyeth and his employee patented an improved rotary tablet press in 1872.¹⁴⁶

The pharmaceutical industry grew and diversified in the nineteenth century, and although the situation in different western countries varied, broadly there was a shift in the way drugs were manufactured and sold from apothecary shops, to

¹⁴² Chauncey D. Leake, *A Historical Account of Pharmacology to the 20th Century*, Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1975, p. 140.

¹⁴³ Roy Church and E. M. Tansey, *Burroughs Wellcome & Co.: Knowledge, Trust, Profit and the Transformation of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 1880-1940*, Lancaster: Crucible Books, 2007, p. 15.

¹⁴⁴ Chauncey D. Leake, *An Historical Account of Pharmacology to the 20th Century*. p.142.

¹⁴⁵ L.G. Matthews, *History of Pharmacy in Britain*, Edinburgh: E. and S. Livingstone, 1962, pp. 319-321.

¹⁴⁶ Roy Church and E. M. Tansey, *Burroughs Wellcome & Co.: Knowledge, Trust, Profit and the Transformation of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 1880-1940*, Lancaster: Crucible Books, 2007, pp. 3-5.

family companies, and then to large corporations.¹⁴⁷ The modern pharmaceutical industry was first developed mainly in Europe, the United States and Britain, with centres such as Vienna, Philadelphia, New York and London. The German pharmaceutical industry started from a few firms such as Merck and Schering then accelerated rapidly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.¹⁴⁸ The British pharmaceutical industry began with several small firms with domestic and international business in certain markets. These included Whiffen, Morson, Allen and Hanbury, May and Baker etc.¹⁴⁹

The Philadelphian drug making business in the first half of the nineteenth century laid the foundation for the pharmaceutical industry in the United States, although firms in New York quickly followed suit. This was reinforced by the increasing establishment of medical colleges and pharmaceutical associations, and their publications, in the first half of the nineteenth century. It was consolidated from the 1870s to the 1890s, through closer relations with medical communities. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, American pharmaceutical companies changed their structures and turned towards the medical science of the period. American physicians and scientists studied in Europe and brought back laboratory-oriented medical scientific knowledge and techniques.¹⁵⁰

Western medicines first began to arrive in the holds of ships run by the foreign import/export firms, or Yang Hang, among the many other goods they were trying to sell to markets in China. Gradually, those Yang-hang established specialist departments of western medicine to handle demand.¹⁵¹ When dispensaries such as

¹⁴⁷ Jonathan Liebenau, "The Rise of the British Pharmaceutical Industry", *Pharmaceutical Industry*. Vol. 301. 1990, p. 724.

¹⁴⁸ Jonathan Liebenau, "Ethical Business: The Formation of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Britain, Germany, and the United States before 1914", *Business History*, 30, 1, 1988 p.117.

¹⁴⁹ Jonathan Liebenau, "The Rise of the British Pharmaceutical Industry", p. 725.

¹⁵⁰ Jonathan Liebenau, *Medical Science and Medical Industry: The Formation of the American Pharmaceutical Industry*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987, pp.11-56.

¹⁵¹ Shanghai Pharmaceutical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and The Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds. *The History of Modern Pharmaceutical Industry in Shanghai*, pp. 21-22.

Mactavish & Lehmann (also called the British Dispensary) established themselves, they also sold other merchandise such as perfumes and later on cameras, film, paper and other photographic accessories alongside their medical wares.¹⁵² This suggests that in the early days of such enterprises the demand for western medicine was limited and a broader range of goods was necessary to keep the company in business. It was only gradually that the drug store which solely relied on medical transactions emerged.

At first Western pharmaceutical companies used local drug stores as their agents. Advertisements for western medicines in *Shenbao* suggest that it was at the beginning of the 1870s that this practice first began in the city. On 4 March 1873 a Chinese drug store in the city named “Qing Nang House” (青囊室, blue purse house) placed the following advert in the newspaper: “This is the agent in Shanghai of a big British pharmacy called ‘Pu Kai’, which sends medicines here every month. Prices attractive, quality insurmountable...”.¹⁵³ This was not the first time Chinese drug stores advertised medicines in *Shenbao* but it is the first advertisement which stated that it was an agent of a western pharmaceutical firm.

Other than newspapers, medical journals were another field for such advertisements. On the back cover of the first issue of *CMMJ* was an advertisement for Mactavish & Lehmann Chemists, a “special agent” for four western pharmaceutical companies: Dr D. Jayne & Son, and The S.S. White Dental Manuf’G Co. in Philadelphia, Hughes & Kimber Ltd and Allen & Hanbury in London.¹⁵⁴ Allen & Hanbury was a pharmaceutical company which was founded in 1715 in London. It started advertising its supplies of cocaine and cocaine muriate on 15 January 1884 in the *Supplement to the Chemist & Druggist*, where the price of both cocaine and

¹⁵² Ibid. p. 29.

¹⁵³ “出賣外國各種藥材”, *申報*, 4 March 1873. (“Sell various kinds of western medicine”, *Shenbao* .) This house was presumably named after *Qing Nang Shu* (青囊書, *Blue Purse Book*), a missing medical classic written by Hua Tuo who was an ancient Chinese physician.

¹⁵⁴ *CMMJ*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1887, p. 52.

cocaine muriate was 1 penny for a grain.¹⁵⁵ However, it is not clear whether these products were supplied to its agents in China at this time. In an advertisement for Allen & Hanbury in the *CMMJ* in September 1889 antipyrin, phenacetin and sulphonal were listed, but there is no mention of cocaine.¹⁵⁶

As well as advertising in newspapers and medical journals, another marketing strategy was to target doctors. Advertisements of some agents were aimed at the medical missionaries. For example, when Mactavish & Lehmann published an advertisement in March 1887 in the *CMMJ* it offered discounts, saying, “medical missionaries supplied at special low rates”.¹⁵⁷ Samples of medicine were also sent to medical professionals there. For instance, an advertisement placed in the same journal by John Wyeth & Brother (Philadelphia) in March 1889 stated “we shall be glad to send samples of these Triturates to any physician who may desire to try them in his practice”.¹⁵⁸ Some agents also advertised price and stock lists through the journal, those of Ferris & Company in 1890 would be “mailed to any member of the Medical Profession free on application”.¹⁵⁹ By the end of the decade product endorsement had become a feature of articles in the *CMMJ* to endorse the products of some western pharmaceutical companies. For instance, Dr A.P. Peck was a medical missionary working at William’s Hospital in Shandong Province. In June 1889, he published an article that boldly stated that, “just at present this hospital is using a compressed powder or pill made for us by Messrs. J. Wyeth & Co., of Philadelphia, U.S.A.”.¹⁶⁰

It was this company that first advertised cocaine hydrochloride in China. In March 1889, John Wyeth & Brother Philadelphia offered “cocaine hydrochlor” at \$0.7 per bottle with 500 tablets in the *CMMJ*.¹⁶¹ Later the same year an important cocaine

¹⁵⁵ “Allen & Hanbury’s Price Current”, *Supplement to the Chemist and Druggist*, 15 January 1884, p.5.

¹⁵⁶ *CMMJ*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1889. p. 133.

¹⁵⁷ *CMMJ*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1887, p. 52.

¹⁵⁸ *CMMJ*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1889, p.47.

¹⁵⁹ *CMMJ*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1890, p.50.

¹⁶⁰ *CMMJ*. vol. 3, no. 2, 1889, p.48.

¹⁶¹ *CMMJ*, vol.3, no.1, 1889, p. 47.

manufacturer, the US company Parke Davis & Co., advertised its products in the December issue and set up Mactavish & Lehmann Ltd as its agent for the North China market and Dakin Bros. Ltd. for Hong Kong and the South China.¹⁶² There was no information in that advertisement confirming that cocaine was on the products list but the text did promise “soluble hypodermic tablets”.¹⁶³ Mactavish & Lehmann’s marketing strategy extended beyond the *CMMJ* to the newspapers too, including an advertisement in *The North-China and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, in December 1889.¹⁶⁴

Introduction of Cocaine into China and Its Medical Use

While cocaine was first isolated from coca leaves in 1860, its industrial production began in the mid-1880s, after Carl Koller discovered its anaesthetic properties in 1883 and Sigmund Freud advocated its use by publishing his paper *On Coca* in 1884.¹⁶⁵ Even in 1884, it was still “something of a chemical curiosity”.¹⁶⁶ British medical men started to recommend it at the end of 1884, one article stating that, “It is clear from the above experiments that, from the completeness of the anaesthesia produced, and the duration of its effect, we have in cocaine a very valuable addition to our local anaesthetics, and one which will be of inestimable value in many operations of minor surgery”.¹⁶⁷ When the fifty-third annual meeting of the British Medical Association was held in September 1885, there was a session that discussed the practice of anaesthesia. The chief anaesthetics discussed there were chloroform and ether. At the end of his lengthy talk, Dr Dudley W. Buxton included a few lines on cocaine: “I will only say that cocaine (sic.) has probably achieved a position from which it will be hard to oust it. It does not appear to have

¹⁶² *CMMJ*, vol. 3, no.4, 1889, p. 59.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ “Christmas Show at the Stores”, *The North-China and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, 20 December 1889.

¹⁶⁵ Steven B. Karch, *A Brief History of Cocaine*. Boca Roca: CRC Press, 2005, second edition, p. 90.

¹⁶⁶ Chauncey D. Leake, *A Historical Account of Pharmacology to the 20th Century*, Springfield: Thomas Publisher, 1975, p. 150.

¹⁶⁷ “Correspondence, cocaine as a local anaesthetic”, *British Medical Journal*, 6 December 1884.

answered in every case, and its range of usefulness must, of necessity, be restricted within narrow limits.”¹⁶⁸ Numerous reports on its medical use were published from 1885 onwards.¹⁶⁹ British medical men used this drug as local anaesthesia and to cure morphine addiction.¹⁷⁰ However, after a short period of optimism, the medical use of cocaine in Britain began to wane in the 1890s as concerns grew about its side-effects.¹⁷¹

At much the same time as cocaine was enjoying a peak of popularity in medical circles in the UK, news of it was spreading in expatriate circles. In the first issue of the *CMMJ*, published in September 1887, an article with the title “Cocaine in Cholera Infantum” was republished from another journal, *The Therapeutic Gazette*, which was published in Detroit in the USA. This short article reads as follows:

Dr. Herr, of Ottawa, after a thorough discussion of the essential nature of Cholera Infantum, recommends Hydrochloride of Cocaine in doses of one-sixth ($\frac{1}{6}$) of a grain, given every two hours. He believes we have in Cocaine a stimulant to the ganglionic centres and a sedative to the sensitive gastrointestinal mucus membrane.¹⁷²

Not that this is the first evidence of an interest in cocaine among doctors working in China. Earlier that year, in the 30 April 1887 issue of the *Lancet*, Dr Dugald Christie published an article:

The following case is of interest as illustrating the value of Cocaine as a local anaesthetic in minor surgery.

¹⁶⁸ “British Medical Association Fifty-third Annual Meeting, proceedings of sections, the practice of artificial anaesthesia, local and general”, *British Medical Journal*, 19 September 1885, p. 534.

¹⁶⁹ Virginia Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century*, London: Free Association Books, 1999, p. 220.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 220-222.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 222.

¹⁷² “Cocaine in Cholera Infantum”, *CMMJ*, Vol.1 No. 3, 1887. p. 125.

The patient, a merchant in this city, suffered from Epithelioma of the penis. For two years he had been doing the rounds of the native practitioners, and came to us as a last resource, weak, emaciated, and the nervous system, from prolonged pain and sleeplessness, in a state of extreme irritability. As the only hope of saving life lay in amputation, he readily submitted to the operation. Chloroform was carefully administered, but after a few inhalations, proving a bad subject for a general anaesthetic, it was decided to try Cocaine. Twenty minims of a five-per cent solution of the Hydrochlorate were injected in five-minim doses, at short intervals, round the seat of incision; and a quarter of an hour after the first injection the operation was performed without the patient experiencing the slightest pain. Another point of interest is that, except from the larger blood-vessels, there was hardly any haemorrhage, doubtless due to the constricting effect of the drug on the capillaries. No bad effects followed. The anaesthetic produced lasted over a day; indeed, the patient complained of no pain after the operation. He recovered without a bad symptom, and now enjoys excellent health. I constantly use cocaine in eye operations, cataracts, iridectomy, pterygium, and also in cases of fistula in ano, abscesses, &c., with most satisfactory results.¹⁷³

Christie had successfully applied to The Foreign Mission Committee of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland for appointment as a medical missionary to Manchuria in July 1881.¹⁷⁴ The location had been chosen by the Church as its base in China, and he had established a hospital there by 1885.¹⁷⁵ His exploits while doing this were the subject of two articles in successive editions of the *CMMJ* in

¹⁷³ Dugald Christie, "Amputation of penis: cocaine as a local anaesthetic", *The Lancet*. 30 April 1887, p. 875.

¹⁷⁴ Letter from James Buchanan to Dugald Christie, 27 July 1881, National Library of Scotland, MSS 7567.

¹⁷⁵ "Our China Mission to be Concentrated in Manchuria", *United Presbyterian Missionary Record*, 2 Feb 1885, p.44; The Foreign Mission Committee first sent to Dugald Christie £ 400, then remitted £ 232 for him for establishing the hospital. See letters from James Buchanan to Dugald Christie, dated 31 May 1883 and 4 October 1883, National Library of Scotland, MSS 7567.

1887 and the article above was reprinted there, except for a deletion of three words (“in minor surgery” in the first line), in June 1888.¹⁷⁶ But in an earlier article in the journal he alluded to a postscript to the story:

I have just sent an account of another case to the *Lancet*. This man came to us in a dying condition. An operation was followed with very satisfactory results, and he now enjoys good health. As a thank-offering for his recovery he subscribed ten taels, and put up a tablet to the hospital.¹⁷⁷

Ten taels was not a small amount of money in 1880s Manchuria and not every patient of Dugald Christie’s hospital could make such a contribution like the merchant whose operation had been completed with cocaine.¹⁷⁸

It is noteworthy that in his report to the Church, Christie also mentioned that the patient donated a tablet to his hospital.¹⁷⁹ Giving doctors tablets after they cured diseases was a long tradition in China. Generally, there were several Chinese characters written on those wood-made tablets and those characters were a quotation from some classical text with the meaning of praising the doctors’ outstanding skills and excellent moral. While the ten taels had financial importance for Dugald Christie’s hospital, getting tablets from patients and hanging them in the hospital would demonstrate that he had earned social capital in the local community. Tablets were visual certificates of the recognition of local people on Christie’s hospital. This evidence of a successful operation would have been useful

¹⁷⁶ “Amputation of Penis”, *CMMJ*, Vol.2 No.2, 1888, p. 86. Before this reprint of his experiment on cocaine in the *CMMJ*, two extracts of the letters of Dugald Christie to the China Medical Missionary Association had been published in that journal. See “Moukden: “Items and Notes”, *CMMJ*, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 136; “Dr Christie’s Work”, *CMMJ*, vol. 1, no. 4, 1887, p. 168.

¹⁷⁷ “Mukden: Dr Christie’s Work”, *CMMJ*, December 1887, p. 168.

¹⁷⁸ Ten taels in 1887 Manchuria equalled to 2 dollars and 10 cents. In the spring 1887, Dr Christie performed an operation and the patient contributed 10 taels, he recorded this with “he presented the hospital with ten taels (about £ 2 10/)”. See Dugald Christie, *Ten Years in Manchuria: A Story of Medical Work in Moukden: 1883-1893*, Edinburgh: The Religious Tract and Book Society of Scotland, London: Houlston and Sons, 1894, pp.34-36.

¹⁷⁹ “Amputation of Penis”, *CMMJ*, Vol.2 No.2, 1888, p. 86.

in building trust. Cocaine was central to this moment of medical evangelism and imperialism. It seems that from the perspective of the missionaries, Western and Christian medicine had triumphed over Chinese alternatives, and been gratefully received by the locals.



Figure 1. Hospital Assistant, Evangelist, and Medical Students, of Dugald Christie’s Hospital in Shenyang (Mukden). Above the main gate of the hospital was a tablet paid for by a satisfied patient, with four Chinese characters on it (博施濟衆) meaning “Bestow liberally to relieve the masses”, which was a quotation from the classic *The Analects of Confucius*). Source: International Mission Photography Archive of USC Digital Library. This photo was also used by Dugald Christie at the front page of his book *Ten Years in Manchuria: A Story of Medical Mission Work in Manchuria, 1883-1893*.

It is important to note that in the operation Dugald Christie administered chloroform first. He shifted to cocaine when the anaesthesia result was not ideal under chloroform. This is no surprise as in 1880s Britain chloroform was still widely used for anaesthesia. British surgeons preferred chloroform to ether which was usually the choice of their American counterparts.¹⁸⁰ The failure in this instance may corroborate the observation made by Frank Dikötter and his group that the warm weather in southern China made chloroform evaporate more swiftly.¹⁸¹ Pain relief was so important to missionaries as historians have argued that it was one of those areas of medicine in which nineteenth-century developments in the West gave clear advantages over what was available in Chinese systems.¹⁸² In this it could serve as a 'tool of empire', in that it was one example that demonstrated what Europeans believed was the utter superiority of their ideas and beliefs over those of other societies, a belief that justified colonialism in general.¹⁸³ Not that those medical missionaries were afraid to check out the opposition. In the September issue of the *CMMJ* of the same year in which Christie published his article on cocaine, Dr J.W. Lambuth, a medical missionary working at Suzhou Hospital, reported his experiences of a local product recommended for its anaesthetic properties:

A substance resembling wax, but harder and semi-transparent, in the form of a tablet, was cut into small pieces and digested in water for twenty-four hours, together with a small, white, woody excrescence. The liquid was then found by Dr. Lambuth to possess well-marked anaesthetic properties. It was found that a numbness of the lips and tongue was produced, and that the finger immersed in the solution for some minutes could then be pricked with a needle without any pain being felt. The tablet was described as being the juice of the eyes of a frog. It was probably the substance obtained by the

¹⁸⁰ Stephanie Snow, *Operations without Pain: The Practice and Science of Anaesthesia in Victorian Britain*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 152-182.

¹⁸¹ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016, p.166.

¹⁸² Esme Cleall, *Missionary Discourses of Difference: Negotiating Otherness in the British Empire, 1840-1900*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 77.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* pp. 79-97.

Chinese by placing a frog in a jar containing flour, and irritating the animal, when it exudes a liquid which forms a paste with the flour. This is then dried and made into cakes bearing some resemblance to button lac. If the anaesthetic property be due to the frog's excretion, and not to the white, woody excrescence above mentioned, the fact suggests the possibility of the animal using the secretion to deaden the pain to which it might be subjected by its enemies.¹⁸⁴

Others, such as John Dudgeon, similarly researched Chinese materia medica because of curiosity about, or admiration for, Chinese medicine.¹⁸⁵

The question of how Christie sourced his cocaine for the operation remains unanswered, but other evidence from his correspondence does show that medical missions secured supplies in a number of ways. Before sending him to China, the Secretary of the Foreign Mission Committee, James Buchanan, asked Christie to meet a Dr Craig to discuss the list of medicine.¹⁸⁶ Just one day before writing the letter to Christie, Buchanan said in his letter to Dr Craig, "the enclosed is an order for drugs by Dr. Christie who is about to proceed to Manchuria. The Dispensary is to be began there: hence he must have a complete stock".¹⁸⁷ In the following years of working in Manchuria, Dugald Christie regularly wrote (sometimes by telegram) to the Foreign Mission Society to ask for drugs. Generally, the Foreign Mission Committee placed its orders in Britain and sent them to China via a shipping company such as Butterfield & Swire.¹⁸⁸ Since this process took a long time, medical missionaries in Manchuria also purchased supplies from the agents of western

¹⁸⁴ "A Chinese Anaesthetic", *CMMJ*, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1887, p.125.

¹⁸⁵ 高晞, *德貞傳: 一個英國醫療傳教士與晚清醫學近代化*, 上海: 復旦大學出版社, 2009. (Gao Xi, *Biography of John Dudgeon: A British Medical Missionary and the Modernisation of Medicine in Late Qing Period*, Shanghai: Fudan University Press).

¹⁸⁶ Letter from James Buchanan to Dugald Christie, 8 July 1882, National Library of Scotland, MSS 7567.

¹⁸⁷ Letter from James Buchanan to Dr Criag, 7 July 1882, National Library of Scotland, MSS 7567.

¹⁸⁸ Letter from James Buchanan to McKillop Yong, 4 August 1904, National Library of Scotland, MSS 7567.

pharmaceutical companies in China when the situation was urgent, although this was more expensive.¹⁸⁹ An additional method of getting drugs was to send them when newly appointed medical missionaries departed from Britain or when medical missionaries returned to China after their furlough. While Christie's successful operation shows that cocaine was being used in China by 1887, it is not clear that he was using cocaine purchased there at the time.

Cocaine and missionary medicine in China

William. W. Shrubshall published his paper on the use of cocaine in an operation in the *CMMJ* in 1890. He noted the earlier paper of his predecessor, without indicating if it had inspired his own efforts "the following case (almost identical with that given by Dugald Christie in a recent Number) is confirmatory of the effect of Cocaine in such circumstances".¹⁹⁰ But the procedure seemed very similar.

Lu Chang Chiu, at 51 when admitted, had been suffering from epithelioma of penis for more than two years. Fetid discharge abundant. The man is weak, emaciated and irritable.

On two separate occasions chloroform was administered; each time proved the patient to be an unsuitable subject. I then injected in the line of intended incision thirty minims of a five-per-cent solution of Cocaine Hydrochlorate, in five-minim doses. In ten minutes after the first injection all parts of the penis anterior to the tourniquet were perfectly anaesthetised. The amputation completed, while I was trying the arteries, patient inquired "Is it cut yet?"- sufficient evidence of the painlessness of the operation. Anaesthesia lasted for about 18 hours. His recovery was complete without a bad symptom.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ Letter from James Buchanan to Dugald Christie, 4 August 1904, National Library of Scotland, MSS 7567.

¹⁹⁰ "Cocaine as an anaesthesia", *CMMJ*, vol. 4, no.4, 1890, pp. 259-260.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

This account shows that cocaine was still being used for medical purposes in China into the 1890s. However, it is worth pausing here to point out that he tried chloroform twice before turning to cocaine. It is clear that the latter had not replaced the former in medical mission surgery. The point made above about British surgical traditions and the preference for chloroform may partly explain this. It could also be put down to a risk-aversion among medical missionaries. Harold Balme, who served in the role in China early in the twentieth-century, pointed out that: "In such places (i.e. remote portions of China), the pioneer had to proceed with great caution, carefully picking his cases, and avoiding, as far as was possible, all risk of failure".¹⁹² It may be that Shrubshall was avoiding the possible risks of using an unfamiliar substance since it might ruin the trust of local people.

Dr Edward G. Horder went to Pakhoi (now Beihai) in 1886 and began a hospital for men there in 1887.¹⁹³ On 23 April 1888 a seventy-one year old man applied for the removal of a painful tumour situated over the lower end of the breast-bone. Horder reported that "after painting with cocaine the tumour was excised." Following this brief description of the operation Dr Horder gave a longer account of the evangelistic outcome of this medical work:

Immediately the tumour was removed he expressed his gratitude in no measured terms, and said, "I will be a Christian." This man lives at Cheong-Lok, about forty-five miles from Pakhoi, and for many years has traded in cinnamon, & c., visiting Canton, Hong Kong, Swatow, and other places for business. He had very often heard the Gospel, and told us he knew a great deal of the "doctrine", but not till he came to the hospital was he "asked to

¹⁹² Harold Balme, *China and Modern Medicine: A Study in Medical Missionary Development*, London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1921, p.64.

¹⁹³ Pakhoi (Beihai), was a port city of Guangdong province and now a city of Guangxi Province.

become a Christian.” When asked why he trusted the foreigners at hospital taught the religion of Jesus, I knew I was safe.” He remained in the hospital some weeks, and on May 3rd was baptised.¹⁹⁴

The limited medical information in this account, when compared with those of Christie and Shrubshall, draws attention to the place of publication. The medical journals were used for sharing medical information so detailed descriptions of operations was necessary and included scientific terms which would be understood by specialist readers. This article appeared in *The Church Mission Intelligencer and Record*, a monthly journal published by the Church Missionary Society in London as a survey and record of Protestant mission work around the world. Most readers would have been committed Christians, and would have included many of the missionaries themselves. Horder’s article is therefore less interested in the details of the procedure itself, and more concerned with the meaning of the operation itself for spreading the gospel and securing conversions.

Not that this type of article was strictly limited to the more general type of journal. In an 1894 edition of *Medical Mission Quarterly*, Dr Herbert Hickin at Tai-chow reported his used cocaine to remove an arrow which stuck into the socket of a boy’s eye.

A little boy playing at bow and arrows with his mates was accidentally struck by the full force of the arrow at a distance of five to six yards. The arrow head was so firmly embedded in the socket of the eyes that the father told me he could scarcely extract it. The arrow head was large, rusty, dirty and very blunt. All hope of saving the sight was impossible, but by means of the compresses of cocaine and belladonna the pain was subdued and the wound healed. The father was a man of means, a relative of Mr. Tsang-loh-t’ien, through whose instrumentality the Gospel was first spread here; so doubtless the father was

¹⁹⁴ “Pakhoi Mission, South China”, *The Church Mission Intelligencer and Record*, vol. 14, Sep 1889. p. 548.

familiar with Christian truth, but he was an opium smoker and possibly on this account had never shown any apparent interest in Christianity, but when he heard that his boy's life would be saved, he involuntarily exclaimed in tones of the deepest conviction, "*thanks be to God.*" I have not seen a man more deeply moved and so full of deep thankfulness as he was. Tears of joy silently trickled down his cheeks.

This anecdote may serve to show how the Gospel may be exercising an influence in the heart for a long while without any apparent manifestation of it.¹⁹⁵

Dr G. Whitfield Guinness provided his account of cocaine use in surgery in the periodical *China's Millions*, the periodical of the China Inland Mission (CIM), a British interdenominational organisation. It shows that even those missionaries who had worked their way into China's interior had access to cocaine. He arrived in Kaifeng, the capital of Henan province, in June 1902 and reported as follows: "we have ventured to do a little surgical work, such as removal of tumours, &c. A large lipoma, which owing to past needling by a Chinese doctor had become inflamed and very adherent, was removed without an anaesthetic other than cocaine".¹⁹⁶ Whether he had arrived with his own supply, or had managed to secure it so far inland, remains open to question.

Cocaine and the Wider Western Medical Community

Medical missionaries were not the only group of people who used cocaine for operations. Private surgeons, doctors and dentists became increasingly numerous in treaty ports such as Shanghai in the second half of the nineteenth century, and can be traced through advertisements for their services in newspapers and medical

¹⁹⁵ *Medical Mission Quarterly*, issue 10, April 1895, p.36.

¹⁹⁶ "What Others are Doing", *Mercy and Truth*, issue 86, vol. 8, Feb 1904, p.55.

journals.¹⁹⁷ Unless they were particularly interested in publishing accounts of their practices though, it can be difficult to find out how what they were using. A Customs record dated 1910 indicates that by that time cocaine was being sold in the dispensaries of Shantou (then Swatow). On 18 March 1910, the Maritime Customs of Shantou confiscated 42,440 small bottles of cocaine on a British ship and each bottle contained around 1 gram of cocaine. At first the Customs staff were not sure what the substance was, so they consulted a western physician who worked at the Swatow Christian Hospital. The doctor told them that this drug was cocaine and was used at hospitals. He also told the authorities that people who were not familiar with it call it “Gao Jia Yin Na” (高加印那) while people who know it name it “Kou Ka Yin Na” (寇卡印那). Moreover, he said dispensaries in Shantou marketed it as “Ge Gong” (哥宮). He also emphasised that the drug (i.e. cocaine) was mainly used in hospitals but in very small amounts.¹⁹⁸

Many Chinese public hospitals had organised a “Western Medicine Department” by the turn of the twentieth century. For example, in 1905 the “Capital Official Hospital” or “Official Hospital” was set up by the government as a public institution in Beijing, the country’s capital, with such a Department. In December 1906, the institution’s management submitted an application to the Ministry of Civil Affairs to purchase medical instruments and medicine:

Since the medicine purchased and stored at the western medicine department of the Governmental Hospital is not enough while there are increasing number of patients recently, more purchase of medicine is reckoned necessary. After a thorough survey, we found that a wide range of medicine is needed. Therefore an application is being submitted here to apply for some appropriation for this purpose. Please send someone to inspect

¹⁹⁷ “H.M. Winn, Doctor of Dentist Surgery”, *CMMJ*, vol.3, no. 1, 1889, p. 44.

¹⁹⁸ “查禁販運鴉片莫非等毒品入口” (Inspecting and prohibiting the smuggling of morphine and other narcotic drugs), 1909-1911, Guangdong Provincial Archives, 95-1-526.

those medicines as soon as they have been purchased and brought here. In addition, more medical instruments need to be purchased from London and Tokyo since instruments sold there are cheaper and higher quality. Delivery of those medical instruments may take some days. While for the medicine, it is better to purchase from a nearer place for an urgent need thus we decide to obtain them from Liangji Pharmacy in Tianjin city.¹⁹⁹

The enclosed list of required products included “two taels (around 74.6 grams) of cocaine hydrochloride”. As a public hospital, this institution provided free medical services to the local Chinese population (although meals had to be paid for). It relied on the funding of the Ministry of Civil Affairs but also raised resources from the patients. When a patient registered at this hospital, he or she had a range of donation options. If the donation was under 300 yin yuan (silver coins),²⁰⁰ the patient’s name would be put on the public monthly list posted in the hospital. If it was between 300 and 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affairs would issue a tablet with four Chinese character “ji gong hao yi” (means “public spirited”) to the patient. If over 2000, the donation would be reported to the Court of the Dynasty.²⁰¹ Military officials, government administrators and local merchants were among the clientele so presumably the donation system was designed to encourage them to pay for service in return for enhancing their reputations and prestige.²⁰²

What is clear is that, when stocking up a hospital on Western lines for local residents and officials, the Chinese authorities considered cocaine to be among the

¹⁹⁹ Translated from the original context “竊查西醫處原購藥料本屬無多兼之近來就診之人日多一日是以所存藥料逐見減消自應續行購辦俾資接濟茲經詳細檢查藥品不敷應用者甚多除分別繕列清摺外理合申請核發銀兩以便購辦一俟購運來京即請派員驗收再續購器具應向倫敦東京訂購緣器美價廉惟運到稍需時日至藥料一項若購之外洋殊形緩不濟急擬就近仍在天津良濟藥房置辦”，“官醫院西醫處為申請撥發銀兩添購藥料器具並送清折由” (Appropriation application of purchasing medical instruments and medicine by the Western Medicine Department of the Official Hospital), 24 December 1906, First Historical Archives of China, 21-297-018.

²⁰⁰ Mexico silver coins.

²⁰¹ 王玉辛, “清末的中央衛生行政機構與京城官醫院”, *中國科技史料*, vol.15, issue.3, 1994, pp. 31-32. (“Central Administration System of Health in Late Qing and the Capital Official Hospital”, *China Historical Material of Science and Technology*).

²⁰² Ibid.

supplies necessary for its new institution. In the space of three decades the product had gone from its first introduction to the country to the point where it was considered to be essential for the practice of modern medicine there. Significantly, the number of patients admitted to the Chinese Medicine Department and Western Medicine Department of that hospital was changing at this time. When the hospital was founded in 1905, more patients registered at the former. By June 1907, there were 6, 851 admissions at the Chinese Medicine Department while 7, 499 attended the Western Medicine Department.²⁰³

Non-medical Use Prior to 1910

Although medical use of cocaine was the main feature of the consumption of this drug prior to 1910, there is some evidence that Chinese people had started using it for non-medical purposes too. Records produced by the American Philippine Commission provide glimpses of this situation. After defeating Spain in the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines, the United States appointed a Commission to exercise legislative and limited executive powers there in 1902. A committee was affiliated to the Philippine Commission to investigate opium consumption there and across Asia. The committee investigated “Shanghai, Hong Kong and other places in China”. In its report published in 1905, it asserted that the “Chinese are said to be victims of the opium habit, of the morphia, the cocaine, and even the cigarette habit”.²⁰⁴ Part of this report had also been published in an

²⁰³ 朱光華, “清末的京城官醫院”, *中華醫史雜誌*, issue 1, 1985, pp. 31-32. (Zhu Guang-hua, “Capital Official Hospital in the Late Qing”, *Chinese Journal of Medical History*). While here the Chinese Medicine Department and the Western Medicine Department were distinctly separated, the dichotomy of ‘Chinese medicine’ and ‘Western medicine’ throughout this thesis does not mean to emphasize the differences between them. As argued by Emily Baum, “neither Chinese nor Western medicine are monolithic entities, but rather continuously evolving systems composed of a series of interlocking (and sometimes self-contradictory) parts”. These two terms in this thesis refer to “any practices, ideologies, and institutions attributed to such terms in the historical moment under consideration”. See Emily Baum, “Medicine and Public health in Twentieth-century China: Histories of Modernization and Change”, *History Compass*, vol. 18, no. 7, July 2020, pp. 1-11.

²⁰⁴ “Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein and the Rules, Ordinances and Laws Regulating such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hongkong, Saigon, Singapore, Burmah, Java and the Philippine Islands”, Bureau of Insular Affairs War Department, 1905, p.22.

English newspaper in Shanghai on 21 April 1905.²⁰⁵ It is not clear what evidence the Committee used to arrive at the conclusion that Chinese people used cocaine at that time. The report also concluded that the drug was being used for intoxication and for non-medical purposes elsewhere in Asia, such as Burma and India. It seemed to be convinced that China was not alone in having acquired the cocaine habit.

Evidence in China itself of cocaine consumption is difficult to come by, but there are some hints that use for purposes that were not seen by the authorities as strictly medical was slowly being recognised as a problem. In 1909 the *Bulletin of the Chong Qing Commerce Chamber* reported that:

Recently some Chinese people consumed cocaine with the same method of using morphine to comfort their bodies. While after prolonged use, fatigue of limbs will emerge. It is therefore more pernicious than morphine. The Viceroy of Fujian and Zhejiang provinces has appealed to the central government to issue regulations on this drug like that on morphine to terminate its harm in China.²⁰⁶

This brief report was a reference to what seems to have been the sudden decision of the Chinese authorities to act on cocaine. Mills traced the story as follows:

The Chinese viceroy of Fukien and Chekiang had become concerned about the consumption of cocaine among the local population. After asking the commissioner of customs for information the viceroy had arrived at the opinion that cocaine was 'more pernicious in its effects than morphia' and a

²⁰⁵ "Opium in the Orient: Report of the Philippine Commission", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, 21 April 1905.

²⁰⁶ Translated from Chinese: 惟近日中國多有人照用嗎啡之法以貪身體舒服者用之既久則四肢無力尤覺軟弱難堪故比嗎啡之禍更烈現由閩督咨請政府比照嗎啡進口辦法一律議禁以除毒害, "禁止高根", *重慶商會公報*, issue 163, 1909, unpagged. ("Prohibiting Cocaine", *Bulletin of Chong Qing Commerce Chamber*, 1909.).

‘worse evil than morphia’. As the Chinese government had recently adopted measures to prevent the import of morphine into the country it proposed to do the same with regard to cocaine.²⁰⁷

The Viceroy of Fujian and Zhejiang reported this issue to the central government in Beijing. On 10 December 1909, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Government (Wai Wu Bu) wrote to the British Minister at Beijing and stated that “it is obvious that to eradicate the evil its import should be prohibited under the same rules which applying to the prohibition of the import of Morphia into China”. It also requested the Minister to “instruct British merchants to comply with this Regulation (i.e. the regulation on morphine importation)”.²⁰⁸ After consulting the Foreign Office in London, W. G. Max Muller, the Chargé d'affaires, at Peking replied to Prince Ch’ing on 13 October 1910, saying, “I have now the honour to inform Your Highness that, all the Treaty Powers having consented to the prohibition of cocaine on the same term as the prohibition applying to morphia, I have issued on the 8th instant a King’s Regulation making the prohibition binding on British subjects from December 1st”.²⁰⁹ It has not been possible to find traces of the evidence or reasoning behind these decisions by the viceroy or the imperial court in Chinese archives. A clue comes, however, in British correspondence. A letter to Müller on 30 June 1910, from the British Consulate at Xiamen, reported that “cocaine ... has become ... a favourite commodity among the southern Chinese. Large quantities are brought into this port (i.e. Xiamen), to be smuggled to the Straits and Burmah for the use of the Chinese in those places”.²¹⁰ This suggests that the drug was not simply finding a market in China itself, but in the Chinese diaspora across South-East Asia.

²⁰⁷ James H. Mills, Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium Conference, 1911–12, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 42, 3, 2014, 414.

²⁰⁸ “Wai Wu Pu to H.M. Minister”, 10 December 1910, FO 228/2202, TNA. This reference is to Foreign Office (FO) materials. The Foreign Ministry was Prince Ch’ing (慶親王) and the H.M. Minister was John Jordan.

²⁰⁹ “W.G. Max Muller to Prince Ch’ing”, FO 228/2202, TNA.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Peter Thilly's article analysing the Asian cocaine trade of the early twentieth century has pointed to the position of Fujian province as important for the development of a clandestine cocaine trade in the first decades of the twentieth-century. From 1908 to 1910, cocaine importation at Xiamen jumped from 1, 970 ounces, to 11, 927 ounces and then 27, 578 ounces, "after which time (i.e. 1910) the drug became a controlled substance and was removed from the list of legal imports".²¹¹ The source Thilly used to reach this conclusion is the *Decennial Report for Amoy, 1902-1911* which was edited by the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. However, in fact, cocaine importation was recorded by the Imperial Maritime Custom System until 1915 in the *Trade Returns* of the Maritime Customs Service. Those statistics on cocaine importation indicate some changing patterns from 1910 to 1915. An important change was that the location of imports shifted from southern to eastern and northern China.²¹² This certainly suggests that the enthusiasm for action on cocaine by the Viceroy of Fujian was matched only gradually elsewhere. It might also mean that as the location of commerce in cocaine moved northwards between 1910 and 1915, markets for the drug sprang up at the new sites.

Officials suspected that the non-medical use of cocaine had begun to grow as the authorities across Asia had been attempting to tighten control on the smoking of opium. The British Consul in Xiamen informed Müller on 30 June 1910 that cocaine consumption by Chinese users in southern China, the Straits and Burma was related to the regulation on opium, saying, "cocaine has become-and especially since opium has been made a luxury difficult of access-a favourite commodity among the southern Chinese".²¹³ Chinese sources also indicate that the appearance of cocaine consumption in 1909 was related to the suppression on other intoxicants and psychoactive substances.

²¹¹ See Peter Thilly, "The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900-1937", *East Asian History and Culture Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2018, p. 90.

²¹² A detailed discussion on those changes is at chapter four of this thesis.

²¹³ "B. G. Tours to W. G. Max Muller", 30 June 1910, FO 228/2202, TNA.

'Gao gen' (i.e. cocaine) is also named as 'Kao ken' or 'Ku geng'. Recently, it has been used to substitute morphine in the anti-opium pills ... It is doubtful that the newly produced various kinds of tonics did not contain cocaine. Our people are obsessed with tonics, a custom which has existed for a long time.²¹⁴

If this report was right, then it seems that people had turned to cocaine in a context where China's citizens were being encouraged to give up opium-smoking, even if this meant that they turned to other substances either as substitutes for the habit or to ease the pains of withdrawal. There is also the suggestion that cocaine was being drawn into the practices of Chinese medicine and the ingredients of those making the "tonics" to satisfy local demand. As Peter Thilly has argued, as the market grew, there were plenty of opportunists and entrepreneurs prepared to evade state control and to smuggle in supplies.²¹⁵ Whether they had to try too hard is doubtful because the inspection of the Maritime Customs was ineffective. Just around one year after starting to enforce the cocaine importation regulation, the Qing Dynasty came to its end. The turmoil resulted from the revolution in 1911-12 worsened the refined drugs situation further.

Conclusion

Cocaine's arrival in China was entirely down to the various Westerners who saw in it a way of pursuing their agendas there. The evidence suggests that medical missionaries were the first to use cocaine at the hospitals they established as part of their efforts to convert the local population to Christianity. Dr Edward Horder's case shows that they considered it a success in this regard, as surgery completed

²¹⁴ "禁運高根藉防流毒", *農工雜誌*, 1909, Issue 4, pp. 110-111. ("Prohibiting the Transportation of Cocaine and Stopping Its Baneful Influence", *Agriculture and Industry Magazine*).

²¹⁵ Peter Thilly, "The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900-1937".

when using it as a local anaesthetic seemed to draw patients to the religion of the surgeons. It was an ideal item with which to assert the superiority of western medicine. In his article, Dr Whitfield Guinness made of point of criticising the effects of needles used by Chinese doctors on the lipoma that he dealt with while the patient was numbed with cocaine. In this regard the substance served as a tool of the form of cultural imperialism that they were pursuing.

The substance also began to feature in the range of products offered by Western pharmaceutical companies and their agents in China. Their enlarging business was intimately related to the expansion of western empires through the treaty port system, so pharmaceutical capitalism and colonialism went hand in hand.²¹⁶ While the interests of the medical missionaries were evangelical and those of the companies and their agents were commercial, they were not entirely unrelated. The latter recognised as early as the 1880s that the Christian doctors were on the front line of establishing modern medicine in China. For this reason they were targeted with offers of discounts and advertisements for the range of drugs that were for sale among which, by 1889, was cocaine.

It is important to balance this picture of cocaine's arrival with the Westerners of the later nineteenth-century in China with an account of the ways in which local groups adopted and adapted it. While evidence of this is sketchier, it is certainly interesting. When setting up a Western-style medical department in Beijing, the authorities were careful to include cocaine in the list of supplies they ordered for it. Clearly observers of the new science had identified it as an important element in its practices. There are also hints that cocaine began to be added to the "tonics" prepared by local, traditional producers of therapeutic substances and treatments

²¹⁶ Jean-Paul Gaudillière, "Professional or Industrial Order? Patients, Biological Drugs, and Pharmaceutical Capitalism in Early Twentieth Century Germany", *History and Technology*, vol. 24, no. 2, 2008, pp. 107-133; Laurence Monnais, *The Colonial Life of Pharmaceuticals: Medicines and Modernity in Vietnam*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

for their clients.²¹⁷ Perhaps most important of all, reports from within China and by foreign officials agreed that a market for non-medical use, where consumers bought cocaine for its intoxicating and psychoactive properties, were stimulated by the anti-opium politics and policies of the government there. Measures taken there as part of the anti-opium campaigns of the period seem to have forced customers to look elsewhere to satisfy their cravings, and both Mills and Thilly have shown that there were plenty of willing suppliers who were quick to source alternatives like cocaine for this new market. Of course, this became easier towards the end of this period as the Qing Dynasty began to collapse and government controls unravelled before the end of the regime in 1911. The consequences of this for the history of cocaine, and of other refined drugs there, is the subject of the next chapters.

²¹⁷ James H. Mills, "Drugs, Consumption and Supply in Asia: the Case of Cocaine in Colonial India", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 66, 2, 2007, pp. 345-362.

Chapter Three “The Conference being held will perhaps serve to her endeavours”: Refined Drugs, the Evolving International Drugs Regulatory System, and China’s Drug Policy, c. 1909-1925.

Introduction

From the turn of the twentieth century the issue of psychoactive substances became the subject of regular diplomatic attention and was increasingly identified as a problem requiring international coordination.²¹⁸ China and the U.K. put the opium issue on the negotiating table in the first decade of the twentieth-century with the 1906 agreement on Indian opium, and this process gained more momentum during the interwar period under the auspices of the League of Nations for which the drug became a permanent feature of their operations. China’s domestic drug policy and the international drug regulatory system interacted and shaped the contours of the drugs issue in China. This interaction has been explored by some historians, but their research mainly focuses on the place in it of opium for smoking.²¹⁹

This interaction started with the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission. Although the key issue discussed at this Commission was opium in Asia, morphine was also

²¹⁸ William B. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 9-39.

²¹⁹ Zhang Li and Tang Qi-hua have already explored China’s participation in the sessions of the OAC (Opium Advisory Committee) and international opium conferences held by the League of Nations. While have mentioned some information on the issue of refined drugs, both of their books focus on the opium issue. See 張力, *國際合在中國: 國際聯盟角色的考察, 1919-1946 (International Cooperation in China: A Perspective of the Role of the League of Nations, 1919-1946)*, 臺北: 中央研究院近代史所, 2012 (2nd edition), pp. 195-270; 唐啓華, *北京政府與國際聯盟: 1919-1928 (Beijing Government and the League of Nations, 1919-1928)*, 臺北: 東大圖書公司, 1998, pp. 285-321. A recent research on the relation between China’s drug policy and the international drugs regulatory system is Alan Baumler’s article, “Citizenship, the Nation and the Race: China and the International Opium System, 1912-1931”, *Frontiers of History in China*, 2018, 13(3), pp. 330-354. Similar as Zhang Li and Tang Qi-hua, Baumler’s analysis is centred at the opium issue. Steffen Rimner’s recent book explores the origins of the international drugs control system, and adds to the literature with an analysis of the role of the international activists, but his analysis stops at the end of First World War. See Steffen Rimner, *Opium’s Long Shadow: from Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018.

included in the final resolutions. Cocaine was added in the Hague Opium Convention of 1912. The 1924-25 Geneva Opium Conferences integrated coca leaves into the system and introduced the import certificate system. Debates about the issue of refined drugs will be examined between 1909 when the Shanghai Opium Commission was convened to 1925 when the Geneva Opium Conferences were closed.²²⁰ This will provide a fresh account of the influence of the international context on China's experience of governing refined drugs, and the impacts of those experiences on its international positions.

The Morphine Issue at the Shanghai Opium Commission

As chapter one shows, before the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909, the Chinese government endeavoured to get the consent of the British government on the regulation of morphine importation, but failed initially. When the Maritime Customs of Shanghai issued the notification of new regulations regarding morphine importation, and detained the morphine imported by several British companies in 1905, the British government argued that the articles regarding morphine importation stipulated in the commercial treaty could only be put into force when all the Treaty Powers consented. Ensuing disputes regarding the morphine importation triggered further negotiations between the two countries to revise Article XI of the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902*.

China proposed the same policy to the U.S. shortly after the Grand Secretariat of the Chinese government enacted an imperial opium suppression edict in September 1906. Prince Ch'ing, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contacted W.W. Rockhill, then American Minister at Beijing, asking for the assistance of the American government to implement the opium suppression regulations. In his note, Prince Ch'ing argued that morphine and the syringes for its injection were more

²²⁰ This chapter pays particular attention to the discussions on the refined drugs, not opium, at the international opium conferences is mainly because this is a research gap. Previous research has explored the aspect of the opium issue.

injurious than opium. It was therefore necessary to prohibit the importation of morphine and syringes for everything except for medical purposes. He asked the American government to enforce Article XVI of the *Chinese American Commercial Treaty of 1903* to achieve this.²²¹ Rockhill transmitted Prince Ch'ing's note to the Secretary of the State of the U.S. on 4 January 1907. In the view of Rockhill, they should not provide that assistance because the U.S. already helped the Chinese government to eradicate the opium evil. However, the result was unsatisfactory.²²² In addition, after further communications with Prince Ch'ing, Rockhill realised that the Chinese government actually had not framed any regulations to effectively restrict the use of morphine to medical purposes, nor had it adopted measures to prevent the manufacture of morphine and injection instruments in China. He replied to the Prince Ch'ing that when the Chinese government took those measures, he would submit this request to the U.S. government for consideration.²²³

Since both the U.S. and Britain rejected the request to regulate morphine trading with China, the Chinese government issued another edict which stated that "the restriction of the importation of morphia and hypodermic needles must wait all the treaty powers consent thereto"²²⁴ and started negotiations with the Treaty Powers

²²¹ "The Prince Ch'ing to Minister Rockhill", 17 December 1906, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Hereafter *FRUS*), file No. 774/23-27.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p1/d116> (Access date 16/06/2020)

²²² After receiving the note, Rockhill called on the Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs and saw Tang Shao-yi, a high diplomat at that department. In his report to the Secretary of State of the US, Rockhill stated that "I reviewed the past action of the United States in helping China to eradicate the opium evil, the provisions of our treaty of 1844 (Article XXXIII), and that of 1880 (Article II), and the act of Congress of February 23, 1887, and assured him that China could confidently count on our hearty assistance in the present fight its Government is making to free the country of this curse. I expressed, however, the fear that, as the action of the United States in the past had not had the desired effect of restricting in the least the spread of opium smoking, so with the present case, if we agreed to the immediate enforcement of the provisions of Article XVI of our treaty of 1903 without similar action being agreed to by all treaty powers, the result would be the same". See "Minister Rockhill to the Secretary of State", 4 January 1907, *FRUS*, file No. 774/23-27.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p1/d116> (Access date 16/06/2020)

²²³ "Minister Rockhill to the Secretary of State", 4 January 1907, *FRUS*, file No. 774/23-27.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p1/d116> (Access date 16/06/2020)

²²⁴ "Chargé Fletcher to the Secretary of State", 25 March 1908, *FRUS*, file No. 774/190-193.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1908/d69> (Access date 16/06/2020)

to enforce Article XI of the *Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902* and Article XVI of the *American Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1903*, both of which concerned the regulation of morphine importation. As chapter one shows, after around two years of negotiations, all the Treaty Powers consented to the British proposal to regulate imports of morphine and syringes, and to reduce the Customs duty to 5%. These regulations were designed to come into force on 1 January 1909.

When the negotiations between China and the Treaty Powers were still in progress, another process added an incentive to tackle the morphine issue for the Chinese government. That was the start of preparations for convening the Shanghai Opium Commission. Historians have pointed out that this was not a Chinese initiative, but one prompted by the Americans. They may have had humanitarian ideas in mind, particularly after establishing control over the Philippines and encountering opium-smoking there. However, they could also see the advantages of interceding on China's behalf on an issue where the British could be embarrassed.²²⁵

When the American government first proposed a conference to tackle the opium issue in Asia, morphine was not mentioned. On 8 May 1908, the American ambassador to London, Whitelaw Reid, notified the British Foreign Office that all the governments concerned had agreed to an investigation of the opium trade in China by a joint commission. Reid also transmitted the expectation of the U.S. government that "each commission should proceed independently and immediately with the investigation of the opium question", and to devise means to limit the use, and to suppress the traffic, of opium in their possessions in China.²²⁶ Shortly after that, the American government thought that the morphine issue should also be considered at the Shanghai Opium Commission. This change was because the American government investigated its domestic drugs situation as a preparation for participating in the Commission. On 11 July 1908, Alvey A. Adee, then U.S. Acting

²²⁵ William McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, p. 27.

²²⁶ "Ambassador Reid to the Minister for Foreign Affairs", 8 May 1908, *FRUS*. Filed No. 774/310-313. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1908/d85> (Accessed 16/06/2020)

Secretary of State, instructed Whitelaw Reid, then American ambassador to London, to notify the British Foreign Office that the subject was being considered for forthcoming Shanghai Opium Commission. The subject included the “manufacture of morphia and other derivatives” and the “use of morphia and other derivatives”. The U.S. Government also sent the telegraph to the American ambassadors to France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and China.²²⁷ The British government consented to the proposal to include morphine but requested some modifications. The main suggestion was that the American government should ask the participating countries to investigate their domestic drugs situation as a preparation for the Shanghai Opium Commission.²²⁸ This addition was later agreed by the U.S. as well as other participating countries. Thus, when the delegations of thirteen countries convened in Shanghai, they already had some information on the morphine issue and would discuss it at the Commission.

Those delegations submitted to the Commission the reports of investigations into drugs issue by their respective governments. The fifth section of the report of the Chinese delegation to the Commission addressed the morphine issue.²²⁹ During the sessions of the Shanghai Opium Commission, the morphine issue was first raised by the Chinese delegate Tang Guo-an at the fourth session on 8 February 1909. He emphasised that there were enormous quantities of morphine imported clandestinely into China. Meanwhile, he appealed for “immediate action to curtail the spread of so-called anti-opium remedies among the people, as most of these nostrums contained opium in some form or other”.²³⁰ To deal with this issue, he moved a resolution at the eighth session, “that a Committee of five Delegates be appointed to consider and report on the medical aspects of the opium question,

²²⁷ “The Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador Reid”, 11 July 1908, *FRUS*. Filed No. 774/245B. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1908/d76> (Accessed 16/06/2020).

²²⁸ “Ambassador Reid to the Secretary of State”, 25 August 1908, *FRUS*, Field No. 774/310-313. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1908/d85> (Accessed 16/06/2020).

²²⁹ An analysis on the report of the Chinese delegation on the morphine issue, see chapter 1 of this thesis.

²³⁰ *Report of the International Opium Commission*, Vol. I. Report of the Proceedings, Shanghai: the North-China Daily News & Herald Ltd. 1909, p. 21.

including the best methods of curing the opium habit without recourse to the drug or any of its derivatives”.²³¹

Discussion of this resolution continued in the ninth session. Cecil Clementi Smith, the British delegate, opposed it. He stated that his opposition was “based solely on the fact that he did not consider that the Commission included a sufficient number of men competent to deal with the question”.²³² He emphasised that the proposed Committee should be appointed with a scientific basis while there were only two medical experts in the delegations, the American Dr Hamilton Wright and a Japanese delegate.²³³ Clementi Smith agreed that the anti-opium remedies were a problem and thought that some steps should be taken. He used the result of the anti-narcotic movements of the Chinese Government to support his argument. He stated that “although the Chinese government had issued regulations in which it was distinctly laid down that anti-opium pills should not consist of opium or morphia, it was well known that the pills containing a large proportion of the forbidden drugs were being sold in China”.²³⁴ He therefore proposed an amendment of Tang’s resolution:

That, having regard to the constitution of this Commission, which has not among its Members a sufficient number to form a Committee for the investigation from the scientific point of view of anti-opium remedies and of the properties and effects of opium and its products, the Commission desires

²³¹ Ibid. p. 36.

²³² Ibid. p. 37.

²³³ Hamilton Wright did not name the Japanese delegate here. He mistakenly stated that there was one medical specialist in the Japanese delegation. There were actually two, Dr Y. Tahara, the Director of the Imperial Hygienic Laboratory, and Dr T. Takaki, the Director of the Medical School and Chief of the Sanitary Bureau of the Government of Formosa. It seems that Hamilton Wright realised this fact later because he stated at the eleventh session that “we have two eminent scientists on the Japanese Delegation who are concerned with the opium problem” (*Report of the International Opium Commission*, Vol. I. Report of the Proceedings, p. 59).

²³⁴ *Report of the International Opium Commission*, Vol. I. Report of the Proceedings, Shanghai: the North-China Daily News & Herald Ltd. 1909, Ibid. p. 37.

that each Delegation shall recommend these branches of the subject to its own Government for such action as that Government may think necessary.²³⁵

After the British delegate explained his opposition to Tang's resolution and proposed the above amendment, the American delegate Hamilton Wright pointed out that there was actually another medical expert at the Commission. That was a Chinese delegate who was educated in the West.²³⁶ Hamilton Wright argued with Cecil Clementi Smith that "if one was enough for the Royal Commission, three should be sufficient for the International Commission".²³⁷ Following Hamilton Wright, Tang Guo-an also remarked on the words of the British delegate. Tang emphasised two points. Firstly, the Chinese Government had been taking steps to tackle the issue of anti-opium remedies for two years. Secondly, those anti-opium remedies were manufactured in and found their way into the hinterland from the Treaty Ports. Without the cooperation of the Treaty Powers, it was impossible for the Chinese Government to prevent its spread. Tang's remark was supported by the German delegate Walther Rössler. He argued that "according to the correspondence exchanged between the Governments of the United States of America and the powers interested in the opium question, this Commission is expected to make a general and impartial investigation of the scientific and material conditions of the opium trade and the opium habit". He also pointed out that the Report of the Ceylon Commission on Opium, of the Straits Commission on Opium, and of the Royal Commission on Opium in India, all contained information on the medical side of opium. Following the statement of the German delegate, Cecil Clementi Smith moved to vote on his amendment and it was passed by 7 votes to 6.²³⁸

²³⁵ Ibid. p. 37.

²³⁶ Hamilton Wright did not name the Chinese delegate here. It should be Dr Hsu Hua-Ching, who was the President of the Army Medical College and Expectant Taotai of Chili.

²³⁷ *Report of the International Opium Commission*, Vol. I. Report of the Proceedings, Shanghai: the North-China Daily News & Herald Ltd. 1909, Ibid. p. 38. The "Royal Commission" here refers to the Royal Commission on Opium which was appointed by the British Government in 1893 and it released a report in 1895.

²³⁸ Ibid. p. 38.

The morphine issue was brought up again at the eleventh to thirteenth sessions and it provoked heated discussion. At the eleventh session, delegates of the Commission discussed the resolutions of the delegate of the U.S., Hamilton Wright. His fifth resolution was:

That, whereas, the reports submitted to the International Opium Commission by the Delegations present, indicate that the use of morphia, its salts and derivatives, is indissolubly bound up with the abuse of opium itself, and that their use accompanies, or sooner or later, supervenes, on the use of opium itself:

Be it Resolved (Sic.), therefore, that: in the judgement of the International Opium Commission, strict International Agreements are needed to control the trade in, and the present or possible future abuse of, morphia and its salts and derivatives, by the people of the Governments represented in the International Opium Commission.²³⁹

The chair pointed out to the Commission that a similar resolution had been drawn up by the British delegation. During the discussion, the British delegate preferred a modification of the wording of his previous resolution (with an omission of the words "to China" and "other") to the American resolution. The modified resolution read:

That the Commission finds that the unrestricted manufacture, sale and distribution of morphine already constitute a grave danger [to China], and that the morphine habit is already known, and shows signs of spreading, among [other] peoples in the East and elsewhere: the Commission therefore desires to urge strongly on all Governments in its own territories and

²³⁹ Ibid. p. 47.

possessions to control the manufacture, sale and distribution of this drug, and also of such other derivatives of opium as may appear on scientific enquiry to be liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill effects.²⁴⁰

Hamilton Wright accepted the resolution of the British delegate. After some minor amendments, the resolution of the British delegate was adopted unanimously by the Commission and became the fifth point of the final resolutions of the Shanghai Opium Commission.²⁴¹

The Chinese government welcomed this broadening of the agenda for the 1909 meeting to include the morphine issue. Emphasising the issue of morphine and anti-opium remedies could reduce the pressure of the Chinese delegation at the Shanghai Opium Commission. While the Treaty Powers criticised China's opium situation, the Chinese delegation could argue that all the morphine consumed in China was from abroad. However, the inclusion of morphine produced various difficulties at the Commission. This was first because the manufacturing countries such as Britain were opposed to a regulation on morphine being inserted into the final resolutions of the Commission. In addition, although it was the U.S. government which proposed the inclusion of the morphine issue at the Shanghai Opium Commission, and it was the Chinese representative Tang Guo-an first raised this issue during the discussions, neither of these two countries actually had any domestic controls on the substance at the time. At the Shanghai Opium Commission, the information for the report of the Chinese delegation was from the Maritime Customs Service and the missionaries. Relying on that information pointed uncomfortably to the shortcomings of the Qing Government and its semi-colonial reliance on foreign organisations for information about its own country.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 52.

²⁴¹ Ibid. p. 52.

China's Participation in the Hague Opium Conferences and the Issue of Refined Drugs

In the wake of the Shanghai meeting the Government of the U.S. contacted those who had been there once again in September 1909. Their intention was to organise another conference to make binding the recommendations agreed at the Shanghai Opium Commission.²⁴² On 6 November 1909 the Government of the U.S. asked the opinion of the Chinese government about proposing another international opium conference. Two months later, Prince Ch'ing notified the U.S. Chargé d'affaires Henry Fletcher that China accepted the proposal to convene an opium conference with a few reservations.²⁴³ In its note on 9 March 1910, the U.S. Secretary of State instructed Fletcher to notify the Chinese government that the idea of opening another opium conference had been accepted by the governments of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Russia, and it would be held at The Hague.²⁴⁴ On 18 September 1910, the British Foreign Office notified the U.S. Ambassador in London Whitelaw Reid that Britain would also participate in the conference.²⁴⁵

The forthcoming international conference spurred the Chinese government to investigate its domestic drugs situation. When the U.S. government asked Chinese colleagues whether they could attend the opium conference in September 1910, the reply was that the earliest possible date was November.²⁴⁶ What the Chinese government needed to prepare was evidence to prove that its anti-opium movement had made significant progress.²⁴⁷ Shortly after that communication with

²⁴² William B. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, pp. 29-30.

²⁴³ The Prince of Ch'ing to Chargé Fletcher, 3 January 1910, *FRUS*, File No. 774/699. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1910/d268> (Accessed 16/06/2020)

²⁴⁴ The Secretary of State to Chargé Fletcher, 9 March, 1910. *FRUS*, File No. 774/699. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1910/d281> (Accessed 16/06/2020)

²⁴⁵ The Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador Reid, 19 September 1910, File No. 511.4A/794. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1910/d300> (Accessed 16/06/2020)

²⁴⁶ “美國議開禁烟會草案”, 7 August 1910, *申報*. (Proposal of the US Government about the Opium Conference, *Shenbao*).

²⁴⁷ “電飭各省查報禁烟情形”, 26 August 1910, *申報*. (Instructing the Governors to Investigate the Situation of Anti-opium Movement, *Shenbao*).

the U.S. government, the Chinese central government instructed provincial governors to report the achievements of their anti-opium campaigns in recent years. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised that “the Powers have decided to convene another international opium conference in September at The Hague and the Chinese government has been notified to send a delegation. The conference is related to the anti-opium movement in China”. In addition, the central government notified the Viceroy that the conference would be held in September while it had told the U.S. government the earliest possible date was November. It seems that they were aiming to push the Viceroy to carry out their investigations and to submit their reports.²⁴⁸

The search for information on domestic drugs issues was further prompted by the pre-conference negotiations as the British delegation set a condition for their participation in the Hague opium conference. They requested that participating countries should carry out surveys of their domestic morphine and cocaine markets.²⁴⁹ For the United States, this work had already been completed by Hamilton Wright during 1908 and 1909 in preparing for the Shanghai Opium Commission.²⁵⁰ For China, no evidence can be found to confirm that the Chinese Government carried out these investigations into morphine and cocaine. The information which Wu Lien-teh, the Chinese representative, presented at The Hague might have been collected from western missionaries in China, since at that time Wu was a prominent medical professional in China and had connections with the China Medical Missionary Association. Wherever he got his information, Wu

²⁴⁸ Ibid. “Viceroy” (總督), literally means “general supervisor”. Viceroy governed one territory or more provinces of China during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasties (1644-1911).

²⁴⁹ James Mills has argued that it was problems with cocaine in its Asian colonies that drove the British government to endeavour to include this drug in the negotiations at The Hague. See James Mills, Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium Conference, 1911-12, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 42, 3, 2014, pp. 400-419.

²⁵⁰ Joseph F. Spillane, *Cocaine: From Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States, 1884-1920*, John Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 114.

Lien-teh certainly “gave a vivid picture of the harm done by morphine and cocaine in China” at The Hague meeting.²⁵¹

As chapter one shows, the discussions on the morphine issue in China since the 1880s mainly emphasised that the drug was from abroad. It is no surprise then that China supported the request of the British Government to include cocaine and morphine in the agenda of The Hague opium conference. Wu Lien-teh “vigorously supported” the British representative, Cecil Clementi Smith, when the latter spoke in the seventh to ninth sessions on the issues of morphine and cocaine.²⁵² At the eleventh session of the conference on 19 December 1911, the French delegation brought up a resolution to tackle anti-opium remedies because most of them contained opium, morphine or cocaine. During the discussion, Wu Lien-teh supported the French delegation by claiming that “nearly all of them (i.e. the anti-opium remedies) contained opium or morphine”.²⁵³

When the Hague Opium Conference was in progress, the Xin Hai Revolution broke out on 11 November 1911 and ended the administration of the Qing Dynasty within a few months. Emperor Puyi officially announced his abdication on 12 February 1912 and the Republic of China replaced it. The Revolution impeded China’s negotiations with the western countries at The Hague. As Hamilton Wright recalled after the conference, the western powers thought that uncertainties at home were a hindrance to the Chinese delegation at The Hague.²⁵⁴ In addition, western newspaper reports about the worsening situation regarding drugs brought about by the political upheaval put pressure on the delegation. For instance, a report on *The Times* stated that “one incident of the revolutionary movement had been a revival

²⁵¹ Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference held at The Hague, December 1911-January 1912, London: HMSO, 1912, p. 8.

²⁵² Ibid. p. 8.

²⁵³ Ibid. p. 12.

²⁵⁴ Hamilton Wright, “The International Opium Conference”, *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 7, no. 1, January, 1913, p. 138.

of opium cultivation in Yünnan and Szechuan (i.e. Yunnan and Sichuan)".²⁵⁵ The Chinese representative Tang Guo-an was forced to admit that if this was the case then "it was only a regrettable incident of the present situation and that when order was re-established, the Chinese Government would pursue its anti-opium measures with still greater energy than before".²⁵⁶

Despite the difficult situation and the criticism, the Chinese delegation brought forward five resolutions "having special reference to China, and to the Powers having special treaties with the Chinese Government" at the eleventh session of the Hague conference. According to the report of the British delegation sent back to London, before proposing the five resolutions, the Chinese delegation had discussed with them and worded the resolutions in accordance with suggestions they had made. The first, second and fifth resolutions were related to the issue of refined drugs. The first two resolutions passed without amendments and the fifth was agreed by other representatives after some alteration of the original wording. Those resolutions read:

The participating Governments agree to co-operate with the Chinese Government in the prevention of the smuggling of opium, morphine, cocaine, & c., from their colonies in the Far East, or from their leased territories in China into Chinese territory, while the Chinese Government will similarly co-operate towards, the prevention of such smuggling from China into the colonies and territories in question.

With a view to giving practical effect to the principle embodied in resolution No. 9 of the Shanghai commission, the Chinese Government will enact pharmaceutical laws for its subjects, regulating the sale and distribution of morphine, cocaine, & c., and will communicate these laws to the treaty

²⁵⁵ *Report of the British Delegates to the International Opium Conference held at The Hague, December 1911-January 1912*, p. 6.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Powers represented at the conference. These Powers will, if they find the said laws acceptable, take the necessary steps for applying them to their own nationals in China.

...

The participating Governments possessing post offices of their own in China undertake to adopt stringent measures to prevent the illegal importation into China, as well as the transmission from one part of China to another through the agency of their aforesaid post office, of opium, whether raw or prepared, of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, and of the other substances dealt with in the convention.²⁵⁷

Discussions of the proposed resolutions of the Chinese delegation impacted on Chapter IV of the final convention, which stipulated the responsibility of both western powers and the Chinese government to tackle this issue.²⁵⁸ Meanwhile, discussions on cocaine, morphine, and the “anti-opium remedies” at the Hague Opium Conference also influenced the policies on refined drugs in China. The final Article IX of the Convention produced at the Hague required the contracting countries to enact pharmacy laws or regulations on morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts. After the Hague Opium Conferences, the newly established Republican China initiated legislations on refined drugs and referred to the Convention produced at the Hague to endorse their actions.

The Beiyang Government’s Policies on Refined Drugs and the Geneva Opium Conferences

Regulating refined drugs in the Republic

²⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 12.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. pp. 12-13.

Shortly after the Beiyang Government was established, officials appealed to the administration to tackle the drugs issue. As early as May 1912, Zhou Yu, along with twelve other Senate members, proposed that the government issue regulations on opium.²⁵⁹ At a meeting on 18 October 1912, a Senator proposed a prohibition on the use of morphine. He stated

Morphine is more pernicious than opium as its users first intended to eradicate the opium craving with this drug. However, the situation became worse while the opium addiction was still there. The bodies of the addicts gradually rotted and collapsed until they dead, so it seems better not to suppress the opium craving. It is necessary to prohibit this harmful drug.²⁶⁰

He argued that morphine offences in the future should be subject to the stipulations on opium consumption in the newly drafted provisional *Criminal Law* but the penalty should be one level heavier. Based on the newly issued provisional *Criminal Law*, this Senator drafted a ten clause morphine regulation because he thought that “without prohibiting its use and issuing a specific regulation (i.e. on morphine), how could [the government] eradicate this severe and lingering illness and protect people’s lives?”²⁶¹ Meanwhile, he thought that the import of morphine by foreigners was related to foreign affairs. However, the newly formulated *Hague Opium Convention* had stipulated that the Chinese Government would take measures to prohibit the smuggling of raw and prepared opium, morphine, and cocaine. Thus, he proposed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should refer to the *Hague Opium Convention* to formulate some measures to deal with this issue. This Senator’s resolutions were passed at the meeting.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ 于恩德, *中國禁烟法令變遷史*, 上海: 中華書局, 1934, pp. 156-157. (Yu En-de, *A History of Legislations for Opium Suppression in China*, Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company, 1934).

²⁶⁰ “十八日參議院紀事”, 25 October 1912, *申報*. (“Synopsis of the Meeting of the Congress on October 18th”, *Shenbao*). The report did not include the name of the Senator.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.* This sentence is translated from the original text “是非嚴重取締訂立專條何以力祛沉痾保存生命”.

²⁶² *Ibid.*

It is unclear how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to proposal of this Senator, but in 1914, the Beiyang Government issued a twelve points *Regulations for Punishing Morphine Offences* (嗎啡治罪條例), just months before China ratified the *International Opium Convention of 1912*.²⁶³ The Regulation stipulated penalties for offenders who produced morphine and syringes for morphine injection, or who injected or helped others to inject morphine. Maritime Customs Service staff or police officers who imported morphine and syringes, who connived with the person who imported morphine or syringes, or other offenders, were also to be punished. It imposed heavier penalties on all public officials who were caught in contravention of these regulations.²⁶⁴ These *Regulations for Punishing Morphine Offences* had some similarities with the anti-narcotic policies issued by the Late Qing Government. The *Ten Points Regulation for Opium Suppression* (禁烟章程十條) issued in 1906 stipulated that anti-opium medicines could not contain morphine.²⁶⁵ Following this was the regulation on morphine importation which came into force in 1909 and the similar regulation on cocaine in 1910, as previous two chapters have explored. These similarities suggest the continuity of the policies on refined drugs between the Qing and the Beiyang administrations.

Although this *Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences* specifically focused on morphine, it also included one clause dealing with cocaine. The eleventh clause of the regulation is that “Before a pharmacy law is issued, all of the offences concerning cocaine and heroin and their derivatives are subject to this regulation”.²⁶⁶ It suggests the influence of the *Hague Opium Convention* because Article IX of that agreement stipulated that “the contracting Powers shall enact pharmacy laws or regulations to confine to medical and legitimate purposes the

²⁶³ China representative signed the *Hague Opium Convention* in February 1915, see Zhang Li, *International Cooperation in China: An Exploration with the Perspective of the League of Nations*, p. 198.

²⁶⁴ “Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences”, in Ma Mo-zhen et al eds. *Primary Sources on the History of Suppressing Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 626.

²⁶⁵ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 169.

²⁶⁶ 嗎啡治罪條例 (*Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences*), in Ma Mo-zhen et al eds. *Primary Sources on the History of Suppressing Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 626.

manufactures, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts unless laws or regulations on the subject are ready in existence".²⁶⁷ The clause also included an explanation on the chemistry formulas of cocaine and heroin. It might be because that those two drugs were still novelties for the contemporary general public so a brief explanation was necessary.²⁶⁸

By 1914 opium, morphine, cocaine and heroin had been included in the control policies of the Beiyang Government, although the regulations on their medical use came later. Thus, a lot of progress was made at the start of its administration. In order to enforce the new regulations, the Suzhou municipal government appointed anti-opium inspectors in 1915. In September of that year Chief Li of the police fired one inspector who was absent without leave and issued a twelve clause *Rules of Work for Anti-Opium Inspectors*. The *Rules* read as follows:

One. Anti-Opium inspectors are selected by this Department from the people who are kind, honest, fair-minded, diligent, assiduous and enthusiastic about the anti-opium movement.

Two. There is no limitation of the number of the inspectors at present. The number is open to the changing opium suppression workload.

Three. No salaries are provided for the anti-opium inspectors. The payment is from the award of the confiscation cases every month.

Four. Responsibilities of inspectors are limited to inspecting opium, morphine, cocaine, and heroin, and no other business should be involved.

Five. Inspectors should ascertain the name and address of the offenders who illegally trade and sell [opium] and [morphine] injection. After applying for the warrant, the inspectors should search the place in the company of the policemen.

²⁶⁷ *International Opium Convention* signed at Hague, 23 January, 1912, *League of Nations Documents, 1919-1946*, O.C. 1. (1). p. 28.

²⁶⁸ A literal translation of the *Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences* see Appendix 1.

Six. Policemen of the branch offices of this Police Department have the authority to search suspicious places without notifying the anti-opium inspectors.

Seven. The anti-opium inspectors should show the warrant when they ask for the assistance of the police or when required by the people whom they inspect.

Eight. Inspectors who inspect houses without authorization will be punished heavily.

Nine. Without thorough investigation, inspectors should not apply for the warrants hastily.

Ten. Each warrant matches each search case. After the search and reporting the case, the warrant should be submitted.

Eleven. Inspectors who accepted bribes, or administered false accusations are subject to double punishment.

Twelve. This regulation shall come into force on the day of promulgation.²⁶⁹

Su Zhi-liang views the corruption of officials as one of the weaknesses of the late Qing anti-opium movement.²⁷⁰ As the above situation in Suzhou shows, enforcing drugs policies at a time of social and political unrest remained complex. The potential for corruption in the enforcement of drugs laws, and the anxiety to do something about it, continued into the period of the administration of the Beiyang Government.

According to the *Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences*, cocaine and heroin offences were subject to the penalty for morphine offences because there was not yet a pharmacy law in 1914. The situation soon changed. The Ministry of the Interior issued a *Regulation on Chemists and Druggists* (管理藥商章程) in

²⁶⁹ “蘇州”, 20 September 1915, 申報. (“Suzhou”, *Shenbao*).

²⁷⁰ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotics in China*, pp. 181-182.

December 1915.²⁷¹ In that regulation, six of the thirty clauses were pertaining to “poisons” (“毒劇藥” in the text, literally means “extremely poisonous medicines”). Those clauses detailed the rules that drug stores should follow when they sold such products. They were required to check and follow the instructions issued by western pharmacies where those poisons were imported from; purchasers had to provide a prescription with a signature and the seal of a doctor; if the purchase was for medical use and without the prescription of a doctor, or if customers were too young (although no age restriction was stipulated), the keepers of drug stores were obliged to record the details of sellers and buyers along with the information of the poison for the inspection of authorities. This regulation did not name opium, morphine, cocaine, and heroin, but it laid the foundation for controls on production of, trading in and consuming those substances for medical purposes.

Simultaneously, the Beiyang Government also issued the *Regulations for the Sale of Medicinal Opium and Morphine*. Its first clause was that the “Sale of medicinal opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin and their derivatives should comply with the *Regulation on Chemists and Druggists* and this regulation.”²⁷² The regulation contained twelve clauses and stipulated the laid out the process by which drug stores could import and distribute medicinal opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin, and also syringes. To import those products, drug stores had to obtain certificates from the local police office and to provide the latter with invoices. To sell them, drug stores had to comply with the *Regulation on Chemists and Druggists*. If drug stores intended to make compounds such as pills containing those drugs, they were required to strictly follow the western formulas. If they used Chinese formulas, they had to send those formulas to the authorities to check. Officers in charge of health issues at local police offices were authorised to inspect drug stores.²⁷³ This regulation indicates that there were tensions between the authorities relating to

²⁷¹ “內務部訂定管理藥商章程”, 4 December 1915, *申報*. (*Ministry of the Interior Stipulated Regulations on the Chemists and Druggists*, *Shenbao*).

²⁷² “又限制藥用鴉片嗎啡等品營業章程”, 4 December 1915, *申報*. (“Regulation on Selling Medical Use Opium and Morphine”, *Shenbao*).

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

the issue of refined drugs. The Chinese authorities, such as the local police intended to obtain more power over the issue of refined drugs. However, by that time, that power was more in the hands of western medical professionals and the Maritime Customs Service.

In February 1915 Chinese medical professionals established the Chinese Medical Association. This was designed to organise and represent Chinese doctors who had received western medical training and it deepened the tension between them and western medical professionals in China.²⁷⁴ Cocaine featured in this power struggle. Wu Lien-Teh published an editorial in the newly established *National Medical Journal* to complain about the situation where western physicians could import drugs such as morphine and cocaine while their Chinese counterparts could not. In the opinion of Wu, the inequality was one of “the disabilities imposed upon the Chinese qualified medical profession”.²⁷⁵ Two years later, at the biannual meeting of the China Medical Missionary Association in Guangzhou, Wu emphasised this situation again in his address

The Customs laws regarding the importation of morphine and hypodermic needles into China are somewhat crude, and inflict much hardship upon qualified medical men and apothecaries. One meets with such a phrase as “qualified foreign medical practitioner”, which if taken literally will exclude Chinese medical men qualified in Europe or America from importing or using this drug for the most humane purposes. Again, by existing laws a hypodermic syringe is at present regarded as an instrument solely for injecting morphine and cocaine, and a Chinese medical man is unable to obtain it for the injection of emetin, pituitrin or any of the important new drugs. As matters remain at

²⁷⁴ Tao Fei-ya, and Wang Hao. “Evolution of the Modern Medicine Community: from the China Medical Missionary Association (CMMA) to Chinese Medical Association (CMA).” *Historical Research*, no. 5 (2014): 79-95. (陶飛亞, 王皓. “近代醫學共同體的嬗變: 從博醫會到中華醫學會.” *歷史研究*, 2014 年第 5 期, 79-95).

²⁷⁵ “Regulations for the Medical Use of Morphia and Cocaine”, *The National Medical Journal*, vol. 2, issue 3, 1916, pp. 14-17.

present, the real culprits escape, whilst every difficulty is placed before *bona fide* practitioners and properly accredited apothecaries for the importation and use of these drug syringes.²⁷⁶

Modern pharmaceutical substances, and the instruments required for their administration, had become part of the struggle of doctors of Chinese origin trained in Western medicine for professional and legal recognition. Their language also reflected the nationalism of the period.

Two years after the *Regulations for Sale of Medicinal Opium and Morphine*, the Beiyang Government drew up a ten clause *Regulation for Controlling the Importation of Morphine and Cocaine* (限制輸入嗎啡高根章程) in March 1917. Before drafting the regulation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed with the Revenue Council Article XII of the *Hague Opium Convention* which required that “the contracting Powers shall use their best endeavours to restrict to authorised persons the import of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts”. Then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the western diplomats in Beijing that the Chinese government was drafting a regulation to implement the Article. However, with the exception of the French Minister, they all replied that it was inconvenient for them to consent or that they needed to get the permission of their respective governments first.²⁷⁷ The logic of this regulation was, in order to solve the opium and morphine problem, they needed simply to control imports and to inspect the sale of those drugs. Therefore, the *Regulation for Controlling the Morphine and Cocaine Importation* principally focused on three issues: importation by doctors, importation by drug stores, and the rule that the Maritime Customs Service should confirm cases of importation and smuggling.²⁷⁸ At that time, the Maritime Customs Service was affiliated to the Revenue Council. Thus, this regulation put almost all of

²⁷⁶ “In the Field of Business and Finance: The Menace of Morphine”, *Millard’s Review of the Far East*, 18 August 1917.

²⁷⁷ “限制輸入嗎啡高根章程”, 26 March 1917, *申報*. (Regulation for Controlling the Morphine and Cocaine Importation, *Shenbao*).

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

the responsibility of controlling the importation and inspecting the sale at the port cities onto the shoulder of the Maritime Customs Service. They even had the power to inspect drug shops there.

China's participation in the OAC sessions and the Geneva Opium Conferences

From the foundation of the League of Nations onwards China actively participated in its activities. The country was one of the first eight member nations of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (Abbreviated as the Opium Advisory Committee, OAC). In 1922, the OAC passed a five point resolution on cocaine regulation which was accepted by the Council of the League of Nations. The resolution was:

- (a) that the information with regard to the manufacture of cocaine should be completed as soon as possible;
- (b) that the Council of the League should invite the government to furnish the Secretariat with as close an estimate as possible of the annual requirement of cocaine in their respective countries;
- (c) that the governments should arrange for the mutual exchange of full information concerning all seizures made by their respective Customs and Police authorities;
- (d) that the governments should consider the advisability of undertaking educational work as to the dangers of indulgence in the drugs;
- (e) that, as experience shows that, in consequence of the enormous profits realised by the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs, pecuniary penalties are no longer a sufficient deterrent, the governments should consider the question of providing for a substantial sentence of imprisonment as an alternative penalty.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ A. 13. 1922. (C. 223(1). 1922. XI.), *League of Nations Documents 1919-1946*.

The Chinese Representative Office at Geneva received a letter from the Secretary General on those resolutions on June 20th. After receiving the letter on July 28th, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Ministry of the Interior and asked the latter to consider and to implement those requirements of the OAC. In the view of the Ministry of the Interior, the Chinese government had already implemented the fifth resolution because the *Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences of 1914*, which covered cocaine too, stipulated heavier penalties on drug offenders compared with previous regulations. In regard to the first and second resolutions, the Ministry of the Interior needed further consideration. It stated that the third and fourth resolutions should be carried out immediately. Then the Ministry of the Interior asked the Ministry of Transportation to also implement the regulations.²⁸⁰ The Ministry of Transportation promptly instructed its subordinate institutions to submit information about cocaine confiscations every three months.²⁸¹ The position of the Chinese authorities on cocaine in this period had been directly shaped by OAC actions.

The OAC again put the cocaine issue on its agenda for the fifth session in 1923. In advance of the meeting, the Secretary General of the League of Nations had required members of the OAC to prepare information about cocaine manufacture to send to the Secretariat.²⁸² The eleventh meeting of the OAC, which was held on 31 May 1923, discussed the “limitation of the manufacture of morphia, other opium derivatives and cocaine”. The Japanese representative Senichi Uchino reported on the situation in Japan. He admitted that “a considerable amount of morphine and other drugs was imported and manufactured in Japan” and ascribed the situation to

²⁸⁰ “內務部咨交通部外交部函送行政院關於高根之議案除咨復應通行外抄咨請查照辦理文”，19 September 1922, *交通公報*. (Notification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transportation about the Resolutions on Cocaine by the Council of the League of Nations, *Transport Gazette*).

²⁸¹ “部令：交通部訓令”，19 September 1922, *交通公報*. (Instruction of the Ministry of Transportation, *Transportation Gazette*).

²⁸² Circular letters, 27 April 1923, *League of Nations Documents 1919-1946*.

the scarcity of those drugs during the war. In regard to cocaine, Uchino stated that it was difficult to ascertain the amount of cocaine imported before 1921 but the imports of the year 1921 was a large amount despite provisions regarding its import being inserted into the newly issued regulations. The imports for 1922 were smaller but there was increased manufacture in that year. As for the reason, Uchino explained, saying, “the reason why the manufacture of cocaine during the previous year (i.e. 1922) had been larger than in the year 1921 was that the manufacture had increased as a result of the new Regulations restricting import”.²⁸³ After Uchino’s address, the representative of the government of India, John Campbell, reminded the other representatives that the previous Japanese representative, Ariyoshi Akira, reported that there were 500, 000 ounces of morphia and 150, 000 of cocaine in Japan in 1921. Since there were no figures showing those drugs had been exported, Campbell asked the Japanese representative “Where, then, were these drugs to be found?”²⁸⁴ John Jordan, an assessor for the OAC, agreed with Campbell. He pointed out that Formosa and Macao were two black spots in the East regarding the traffic in drugs. Then he connected the situation to China and stated that:

At the last session M. Ariyoshi had said that he did not know what had become of the morphia in Japan. It was useless to maintain that only three kilogrammes had been exported from that country in 1921. Everyone knew that the exports to China were enormous. All northern China was deluged with morphia. It had been found impossible to keep morphia out of the province of Shansi, although that province was under an excellent Governor who had done all he could to suppress that traffic. Until this question was

²⁸³ Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, *League of Nations Documents 1919-1946*, C. 418. M. 184. 1923. XI. p. 73. Japan ratified the Hague Convention in 1921 and this obliged Japan to take action to bring the KLT (Kwantung Leased Territory) drug regulation policy into compliance with international law. See Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013, p. 107.

²⁸⁴ Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, *League of Nations Documents 1919-1946*, C. 418. M. 184. 1923. XI. p. 73.

settled, no progress could be made, and it was absolutely necessary for the Committee to obtain the necessary figures.²⁸⁵

Following John Jordan, the Chinese representative Zhu Zhao-xin also emphasised the situation that large amounts of morphine were imported into China. He also condemned the manufacture of refined drugs and the role played by smugglers. He listed the amount of morphine produced by Germany, Britain, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S. in 1921, then stated that “countries thus turned out morphia by the ton, which was purchased by the smugglers by the ton”.²⁸⁶ At the end of his remarks, he “earnestly appealed, therefore, to the Committee to take steps to prevent the world from being poisoned by the great superfluity of morphine, not only for the sake of the present generation, but also for the sake of the future. If the traffic were allowed to continue, the dangers to which it gave rise would be more serious than those inflicted by the war”.²⁸⁷ Discussions on the issue of manufacture and imports of refined drugs of Japan continued at the next meeting. The Chinese representative was clearly comfortable on the issue of morphine, as the blame for its circulation in his country seemed to lay squarely with producers elsewhere.

At the twelfth meeting of the session, the Japanese representative Uchino answered the questions of Campbell and John Jordan. He was unable to provide the numbers they asked for because “it was difficult to know the quantity consumed there, and there were no figures of the quantity actually kept in stock out of the quantity of morphia imported”.²⁸⁸ He also argued that the other representatives should not just look at the statistics of 1921 but that they should compare it with the numbers of 1922. Then they could see the great decrease of both the importation and manufacture. He took morphine as an example, “the quantity of morphine imported had been 2,066 kilos in 1922, while it had been 5,043 kilos in

²⁸⁵ Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, *League of Nations Documents 1919-1946*, C. 418. M. 184. 1923. XI. p. 73.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 73.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 74.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 74.

1921, and the manufacture had been 308 kilos in 1922, and 5, 926 kilos in 1921".²⁸⁹ Facing the response of the Japanese representative, John Jordan provided the evidence from the Maritime Customs Service in China, which showed that nearly all the smuggled morphine was carried in Japanese ships.²⁹⁰ The British representative Malcolm Delevingne also joined the discussion. He asked Uchino what the regulations of the Japanese government were for refined drugs since there was a considerable amount of manufacture and importation. Moreover, Delevingne asked Uchino whether he could return to the point about the Japanese pharmaceutical company Messrs Hoshi, since the previous Japanese representative Yokoyama Masayuki had mentioned it.²⁹¹ After Delevingne's questions, John Jordan emphasised again the question of smuggling with the list he just obtained from the Secretary. That document, published by the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, indicated that from May 26th to June 19th in 1922, practically all the morphine seized had been either in the possession of Japanese or Russian nationals.²⁹² In his replies to the questions of Delevingne and John Jordan, Uchino said "he did not deny that there was smuggling from Japan, and he deeply regretted it".²⁹³ Following this admission, Uchino "gave a summary of the Ordinances relating to the control of morphine, cocaine and their respective salts" and "a summary of the Regulations for the sale and the control of medicine".²⁹⁴ He managed to understate the severity of the trade and smuggling of refined drugs by Japanese, and without mentioning the pharmaceutical company Hoshi, a question which had been specifically pointed out by Malcolm Delevingne.²⁹⁵

The Chinese representative Zhu Zhao-xin attended the twelfth meeting but did not remark on the above discussion about the role of Japan in the Asian trade in refined drugs, neither did he speak a word when other representatives discussed the

²⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 74.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 74.

²⁹¹ Ibid. p. 75.

²⁹² Ibid. p. 75.

²⁹³ Ibid. p. 75.

²⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 75.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. pp. 75-76.

manufacture of refined drugs by Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands. In light of his address at the eleventh meeting, a presumable explanation is that he did not want to directly criticise certain countries. When Delevingne and Jordan repeatedly questioned the Japanese representative concerning the issue of morphine and cocaine at the eleventh meeting, he ascribed the worsening refined drugs situation to the smugglers and pharmaceutical companies. He emphasised that “It was clear that many Governments were not making money out of the traffic and the only ones to benefit were a few profiteers and others, who were thus enabled to ship drugs to foreign countries in order to reap a large profit”.²⁹⁶ This standpoint of the Chinese representatives at Geneva might be related to the political situation in China. During the first years of the 1920s, the central government was in the hands of several warlords in turn. Since different warlords had the support of different western powers and the regimes changed very fast in those years, it might have been wise for the Chinese representatives at Geneva to keep quiet.²⁹⁷ Moreover, the Chinese representative could not provide the consumption statistics of refined drugs in China when the OAC asked the representatives to provide this information. Zhu Zhao-xin confessed that this was because there was no government department in charge of the issue at the time. A summary of the letter which the Chinese government submitted to the OAC reads:

Until a central organ for the manufacture of drugs has been established and control centralised, it is impossible to give the statistics of annual

²⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 74.

²⁹⁷ This situation was probably also related to the relationship between China and the League of Nations. China was a non-permanent member of the Council from 1921 to 1923. However, from September 1923 to September 1925, China lost its Council seat for the fourth, fifth and sixth Assemblies of the League of Nations. This was a disadvantage for the Chinese delegation at the Geneva opium conference. When Chinese representative Wellington Koo was the vice-president of the Council in 1922, he had spoken for the Chinese delegation concerning the drugs issue on various occasions. Another factor that impacted on the Chinese delegation was the membership fees due to the League of Nations. In 1924, China was still struggling to pay the membership fees for the year 1922, let alone the fees for the years 1923 and 1924. In 1925, China did not pay any membership fees. The disturbed political situation and financial crisis in China rendered the government unable to pay. Even the salaries of Chinese diplomats were not paid. See Tang Qi-hua, *Beijing Government and the League of Nations: 1919-1928*, pp. 121-150.

consumption. For these purposes, the Chinese Government is planning to establish a Bureau to keep a close watch on all illicit drugs and also a factory for manufacturing drugs for legitimate use. As soon as these two institutions are in existence, the Chinese Government will give accurate statistics.²⁹⁸

While the Chinese delegation was happy to see others squirm on the issue of refined drugs, they were significantly less comfortable when the issue of opium for smoking was brought up. The main work of the fifth session of the OAC was discussions of the resolutions of the representative of the U.S. that the Council of the League of Nations should invite countries to convene another international opium conference. It was the British representative, Malcolm Delevingne, who insisted that “the Committee should recommend that one item on the agenda of the proposed conference should be the means which should be taken to bring about the suppression of the illegal production and use of opium in China”.²⁹⁹ For this suggestion, the Chinese representative Zhu Zhao-xin “desired most strongly to express, on behalf of his Government, the opinion that there must be no outside interference whatever with the internal affairs of China in connection with the question”.³⁰⁰ After several rounds of debates, an amendment proposed by Zhu Zhao-xin was finally accepted by the Committee. It constituted the final resolutions of the fifth session of the OAC regarding the purpose of the forthcoming two conferences. It read:

(b) As to a reduction of the amount of raw opium to be imported for the purpose of smoking in those territories where it is temporarily continued, and as to the measures which should be taken by the Government of the Republic

²⁹⁸ Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, *League of Nations Documents 1919-1946*, C. 418. M. 184. 1923. XI. p. 128.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 117.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.* p. 117.

of China to bring about a suppression of the illegal production and use of opium in China.³⁰¹

What Zhu Zhao-xin pursued here was a policy the Chinese delegation had followed throughout the first six sessions of the OAC. As Zhang Li has pointed out in his study of relations between China and the League of Nations, this was to oppose any proposals that enabled other countries to investigate the opium situation in China.³⁰² He also argues that another principle of the Chinese delegation at the first six sessions was to appeal for international cooperation to tackle drugs issues.³⁰³ James Mills has also argued in his study of the drug politics at the League of Nations that China's support for the Egyptian delegation's proposal on cannabis was because it was "eager for the opportunity to focus attention away from their own positions on opium."³⁰⁴ Given the confused and complex politics of opium for smoking back in China, the Chinese delegation did what they could to deflect international attention away from it.

The Chinese representative took the same strategy at the sixth session of the OAC. The agenda was focused on "Control by the Chinese authorities of opium and its derivatives supplied by the drug stores in China and owned by Chinese as well as by foreigners". At the fifth meeting of that session on 7 August 1924, representatives and assessors of the OAC discussed the *Provisional Regulations for the Registration of Chinese and Foreign Pharmacies* (中西藥店管理暫行章程) submitted by the Chinese representative Zhu Zhao-xin to the OAC. He explained why he brought this matter to the Committee:

³⁰¹ Ibid. p. 203.

³⁰² Zhang Li, *International Cooperation in China: An Exploration from the Perspective of the League of Nations*, pp. 205-215.

³⁰³ Ibid. pp. 216-225.

³⁰⁴ James Mills, *Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade and Prohibition, 1800-1928*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 177.

Many foreigners in China enjoyed extra-territorial rights, and, in order that China might give effect to the measures for suppressing the traffic in opium within her frontiers, the Chinese Government must be given full power to enforce the laws of the country. The Government hoped, with the help of the Committee, to obtain the support of the Powers concerned in achieving that object.³⁰⁵

It is unclear why the Chinese representative only mentioned opium. It might be because he was too eager to emphasise the issue of the extraterritoriality. The reason why this point is noteworthy is because he actually submitted to the OAC two documents on this issue to the OAC. The second one was *Provisional Regulations for the Issue of Special Licenses to Deal in Narcotics* and it suggests that the issue proposed by Zhu Zhao-xin was not limited to opium. For instance, its first article reads:

All pharmacies importing and offering for sale narcotics (morphine, cocaine, heroin, etc.) must apply to the Narcotics Department for authorisation; applications will be forwarded by the Narcotics Department to the Ministry of the Interior, which, after investigating the case, will issue a special license.³⁰⁶

After Zhu Zhao-xin gave the explanation why he brought that regulation to the Committee, representatives and assessors of the OAC discussed the *Provisional Regulations for the Registration of Chinese and Foreign Pharmacies*. The main dispute was that whether this was in the competence of the OAC. For instance, Delevingne “considered that it was useless for the Committee to deal with the subject at all in the existing situation”.³⁰⁷ However, things changed that when one of the assessors, Brenier, suddenly pointed out that “the Chinese Government’s

³⁰⁵ Minutes of the Sixth Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs, C. 397. M. 146. 1924. XI. p. 20.

³⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 78.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 20.

proposal concerned drugs and this question was entirely different from that of opium”.³⁰⁸ Then the meeting quickly ended with a resolution that the chairman would submit the following proposal:

The Advisory Committee recommends that Powers having extra-territorial rights in China should, if they have not already done so, make regulations, the breach of which shall be punishable by the adequate penalties, to control the carrying on by their nationals in China of any trade in the drugs to which Chapter III of the Hague Convention applies. The Advisory Committee further recommends that copies of such regulations should be sent to the Secretariat of the League.³⁰⁹

The first Geneva opium conference was designed to consider measures for suppressing opium use in the Far East and suggestions for improving opium controls in China.³¹⁰ The Chinese representatives at the conference continued emphasising the refined drugs issue to distract attention away from the opium situation in China. When the opium issue in China was first discussed at the sixth meeting of the conference, the Chinese delegate, Shi Zhao-ji, stood up and gave a lengthy address. The main point of his address was that opium was first introduced into China by foreigners, and foreign countries played an important role in causing the current situation in China. The disturbed political conditions in China was an obstacle for suppressing opium but the cooperation of western governments was imperative. While his address focused on the opium issue, which was also the theme of the first Geneva opium conference, Shi Zhao-ji also emphasised that the anti-opium movement in China was hampered by “narcotics drugs which are illegally introduced into and sold in China”. He stated that:

³⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 22.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ William McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, p. 67.

This situation of affairs, with reference to the smuggling of narcotic drugs, is mentioned in this first Conference only because its effect is greatly to increase the difficulty of the task of the Chinese Government in its efforts to enforce its laws which prohibit absolutely the production or the smoking of prepared opium. Reports have come from provincial authorities that, almost in proportion as they succeed in stamping out the smoking of opium, there is recourse, especially by the poorer classes, to these smuggled-in narcotic drugs. Thus, in a recent letter to the International Anti-Opium Association at Peking, His Excellency Wang Cheng-Pin, Civil Governor of the Metropolitan province of Chihli, says: "There are signs, I believe, if I am not too optimistic, that the greater the success of the opium suppression in Chihli, the more prevailing is the narcotic problem. This traffic in morphia, Chintan (note, literally means "golden elixir") or white pills is more pernicious than opium to our Chihli people. China does not manufacture narcotics. The morphine, cocaine, heroin all come from abroad."³¹¹

The Chinese delegation at Geneva not only emphasised that refined drugs were from abroad but also stressed that the extraterritoriality stipulated in the treaties with the Powers hindered the Chinese government in tackling the refined drugs issue. At the beginning of his address at the six meeting of the first Geneva opium conference, Shi Zhao-ji stated that "Even more than other nations, China has suffered, and still is suffering, from the acts of individuals over whom she has not had, and does have, effective control by reason of the obligation that has been imposed upon her to concede extra-territorial rights to the nationals of certain of the Powers with which she has treaty relations".³¹² If there was any doubt about his message, he made it clear; "This debauching traffic is for the most part carried on by nationals of foreign Powers".³¹³ The Chinese delegate once again used the issue

³¹¹ *First Opium Conference, Geneva, November 3rd, 1924 – February 11th, 1925, Minutes and Annexes*, p. 28.

³¹² *First Opium Conference, Geneva, November 3rd, 1924 – February 11th, 1925, Minutes and Annexes*, p. 27.

³¹³ *Ibid.* p. 28.

of refined drugs to distract from the issue of opium-smoking, and to point the finger of blame at others outside of China. While emphasising the refined drugs issue and the extraterritoriality could be helpful for the Chinese delegation to argue with the criticisms, the disturbed political situation and the recrudescence of opium cultivation were the facts which incurred harsh condemnation at the conference. Moreover, because of the design of Malcom Delevingne, the U.S. was excluded from the first conference so China lost an important ally during the debates.

The second Geneva opium conference focused on the production of raw materials as well as the manufacture of refined drugs. Its agenda reads:

Considering of the measures which can be taken to carry out the Opium Convention of 1912 with regard to: (1) a limitation of the amounts of morphine, heroin or cocaine and their respective salts to be manufactured; (2) a limitation of the amounts of raw opium and the coca leaf to be imported for that purpose and for other material and scientific purposes; (3) a limitation of the production of raw opium and the coca leaf for export to the amount required for such medicinal and scientific purposes.³¹⁴

The first address of the Chinese representative Shi Zhao-ji was at the fifth meeting, the meeting of which he was the president. In that address, after regretting the disturbed political situation and emphasising the continued will of the Chinese Government and people to tackle drugs issue, he stated that

When, happily, the Government at Peking is again able to exert full executive and administrative authority, it will, as one of its first activities, take steps to the full extent of its powers, to free the country once more from the misuse of opium, of its derivatives and of other narcotic drugs—drugs which, it may be

³¹⁴ *Records of the Second Opium Conference, vol. 1, Plenary Meetings Text of the Debates*, C. 760. M. 260. 1924. XI. p. 15.

said, are not manufactured in China and which may not be legally introduced into the country save for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes.³¹⁵

He emphasised the support of the people on this issue, and stated in his address that, “there is a rapidly rising flood of public opinion, far surpassing what has ever before existed, which demands that the present production and consumption of opium within China, which is illegal under the Chinese law, shall cease”.³¹⁶ Then he moved to his appeal to other representatives

My present purpose in stating these facts regarding China is solely in order to show the approval with which the views of Bishop Brent will be received by the Chinese Government and by the Chinese people. So far as they are concerned, the Conference may count upon their full co-operation in any action that may be taken by the Powers in general to lessen and, if possible, to bring to a complete end the evils now affecting mankind by reason of the misuse of opium, of its derivatives, and of other narcotics drugs.³¹⁷

The speech of Shi Zhao-ji at this meeting could be viewed as a summary of the main argument of the Chinese delegation at Geneva. They repeated this discourse at the following meetings. The problem was that others were not easily distracted so that the prepared opium for smoking issue became the deadlock of the negotiations at Geneva conferences. However, before that deadlock and the withdrawal of the US and the Chinese representatives, the second Geneva opium conference made obvious progress on the refined drugs issue. The Geneva opium conferences created the *International Opium Convention of 1925*. Its main fruits, as summarised by William B. McAllister, were “(1) the creation of the Permanent Central Opium Board, (2) a system of import certificates and export authorizations (3) various provisions for the enhancement of domestic control measures, (4) restrictions on

³¹⁵ Ibid. p. 39.

³¹⁶ Ibid. p. 39.

³¹⁷ Ibid. p. 39.

the trade in coca leaves and marijuana, (5) controls on processed drugs such as crude cocaine and ecgonine, and (6) procedures to add new drugs to the list of controlled substances.”³¹⁸

Although China withdrew from the Geneva opium conference before it closed, participating in the conferences prompted the establishment and the development of anti-opium organizations in China, particularly the National Anti-Opium Association. The campaigns it initiated in the second half of the 1920s exerted significant influence on the anti-narcotics movements in China.³¹⁹ Participating in the opium conferences and the discussions at Geneva also impacted on the drug policy of China, so that it came to include more substances into regulation policy and to introduce the importation certificate system. The negotiations and resolutions of the participating countries about drug policy at Geneva was a driver for the Chinese government to revisit and reflect on its own strategies. For instance, although coca leaves were not either produced in or imported into China, the Chinese government decided to prohibit it in 1931.³²⁰

Conclusion

The crusade on refined drugs in China from the 1910s to the 1920s was a process of interaction between China’s domestic drug policy and the evolving international drugs regulatory system. On the one hand, the participation of China prompted the discussion on the refined drugs issue at the sessions of the OAC as well as at the

³¹⁸ William B. McAllister’s *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 76.

³¹⁹ The relation between the establishment of National Anti-Opium Association and the convening of the Geneva Opium Conferences, and the activities of this Association, See Edward R. Slack Jr. “The National Anti-Opium Association and the Guomindang State, 1924-1927”, in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi eds. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839-1952*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 248-269.

³²⁰ “禁烟委員會公函”, 11 August 1931, *禁烟委員會公報* (“Official Letter from the National Opium Suppression Commission to the Foreign Ministry”, *Gazette of the National Opium Suppression Commission*); “禁烟會請禁古柯葉入口”, 27 August 1931, *申報* (“The National Opium Suppression Commission Appealed to Prohibit the Importation of Coca Leaves”, *Shenbao*).

Geneva Opium Conferences. The Chinese representatives provided statistics about the confiscations by the Maritime Customs Service, reported on refined drugs offences cases, and submitted its provisional regulation on pharmacy. Other than providing this information on refined drugs, the Chinese representatives at Geneva continued emphasising their harm. Within the context that there was increasing nationalism in China, the Chinese representatives as well as the representative of the civil groups (the National Anti-Opium Association) also combined the refined drugs problem with the extraterritoriality issue and the role of the foreigners and used it to condemn the governance of the western powers in the concessions and leased territories in China. In turn, this condemnation was one of forces which pushed western powers to agree to take more action to tackle the refined drugs issue in China.

On the other hand, the evolving international drugs regulatory system not only endorsed the actions of the Chinese government to deal with the refined drugs issue, but also propelled the Chinese government to carry out the obligations stipulated in the *Hague Opium Convention* and those required by the OAC and by the other entities of the League of Nations relating to the drugs matter. Moreover, if this was the direct influence of the international drugs control system on China's drug policy and the discourse of suppressing the refined drugs, it also had indirect impact. This indirect impact was to stimulate discussion and debate about drugs in China, which eventually resulted in new organizations such as the National Anti-Opium Association.

Within those interactions between China's drug policy and the international drugs regulatory system, the refined drugs situation in China seems to have become worse from the 1900s to the 1920s although, as the above discussion shows, even the Chinese delegation at Geneva struggled to provide accurate information on precisely what this meant. The Chinese representative Zhu Zhao-xin, admitted that this was the case and had explained that there was no governmental department in

charge of the consumption of the refined drugs issue. If there was a rise in the use of refined drugs in China by the 1920s, this would have been a contributory factor, i.e. that in these turbulent years in Chinese government there was little effective enforcement of regulations and policies. This problem prompted the Beiyang Government to establish an experimental government agency, the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation, in December 1924 in Shanghai. The next chapter will discuss the rise and fall of this unit.

Chapter Four “It Is Necessary to Check the Rapid-growth of the Evil”: The Rise and Fall of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization in Shanghai, 1922-1925

Introduction

The preceding chapter explores the interaction between the international drugs regulatory system and China’s domestic drug policies to the mid-1920s as they related to refined drugs. After the refined drugs suppression policies in China of the 1910s proved ineffective, a bureau inspecting the use of refined drugs in Shanghai was finally established in 1922. However, this only operated for two and half years. While it was the first governmental institution specifically formed to deal with refined drugs, and a precursor to the National Narcotic Bureau established in China during the 1930s, the Shanghai unit has been largely neglected by historians. Using the rise and fall of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization in the 1920s as a case study, this chapter will explore the forces behind the establishment of the unit, and what its demise reveals about the place of refined drugs in China at the time.

Refined Drugs in China in the 1910s

A few studies have explored the history of refined drugs in China in the 1910s. Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann have analysed the formation of a market for refined drugs from the 1890s to the Republican period. From their perspective, the principal reason behind the growing consumption of refined drugs was the opium suppression policy initiated in the last several years of the Qing Dynasty and which continued in subsequent decades. They also consider some cultural reasons such as the “needle lore” in the spread of morphine injection and a pill culture which could be traced to ancient China.³²¹ While this group focus on consumers to explain the

³²¹ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016. Frank Dikötter and his co-authors have argued that “While technological innovations help to explain the success of the hypodermic in China, a long-standing needle lore must

growing market for refined substances, Steffen Rimner relies on an international history approach. His political economy of morphine from the 1890s to the 1910s looks at global sources of supplies of the morphine consumed in China at the beginning of the twentieth century.³²² For the history of cocaine in Asia Peter Thilly explores the role of Fujianese societies in the Asian cocaine market in the early twentieth century and emphasises their agency in connecting consumers to foreign producer.³²³

While those studies are valuable, some aspects of the refined drugs market in 1910s China still need more research. The existing literature neglects the medical use of refined drugs after they came to be viewed as “poisons” and the ongoing use of these substances in medicine and medical institutions. Also, research on refined drugs tends to jump quickly from the last couple of years of the Qing dynasty, to the mid-1920s, leaving a gap of roughly a decade. This is unfortunate given that this was an important period when the amount of refined drugs in China seems to have significantly increased. This phenomenon is mainly the result of historians relying on anti-narcotic sources, which focus on drugs suppression campaigns in modern China. Such sources also neglect the fact that those drugs were still used for medical purposes. Moreover, many valuable sources have not yet been used for the discussion, such as Chinese local archives, Maritime Customs documents, and contemporary journalistic reports.

Consumption and demand

also be taken into account. The Curative power of the injection captured the imagination of different constituencies in China, many being already accustomed to the use of needles in local medical practices involving acupuncture.” (*Narcotic Culture*, p. 147).

³²² Steffen Rimner, *Opium’s Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018.

³²³ Peter Thilly, “The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900-1937”, *Cross-Currents: Asian History and Culture Review*, No. 25, December 2017, pp. 84-106.

The regulations on morphine that came into force in 1909 and on cocaine in 1910 permitted importation for medical purposes. The evidence suggests that these refined substances continued to be used in this way. For example, Dr Duncan Main was a medical missionary in China and in charge of a medical college in Hangzhou. In May 1910 he gave a speech at the annual meeting of the Medical Mission Auxiliary in the Queen's Hall.³²⁴ While the speech focused on the anti-opium campaign in China and the perils of the rise of morphine consumption, he made a point of acknowledging the medical use of the latter at his hospital. He also noted the curious relationship between legitimate and illegitimate use of the drug, adding that

Although there is a heavy duty upon morphia, and it can only be brought into the country for medical purposes, it is being smuggled in, and for the last eighteen months we have not had to buy an ounce of morphia because the Commissioner of Customs in Shanghai supplied it to us free, as having been smuggled in as bi-carbonate of soda and such like, it was confiscated by Government orders.³²⁵

The need for morphine in medical treatment was often linked to the uncertainties of the period. For example a newspaper report stated that a Chinese laundryman was admitted to the Red Cross General Hospital in Shanghai in 1917 with a bullet wound. Despite the administration of morphine he died of his injury soon after.³²⁶

³²⁴ Dr Duncan Main did not mention which "Queen's Hall", but the first sentence of his report reads "Crossing London Bridge the other day, I noticed the words 'Cold Storage Union'". Thus the meeting shall be convened in London. "China's Need of Medical Missions", *Mercy and Truth*, issue 153, vol. 13, September 1909, p. 296.

³²⁵ "China's Need of Medical Missions", *Mercy and Truth*, issue 153, vol. 13, September 1909, p. 298. It is worth noting that the duty of morphine had actually decreased from 200% to 5% since January 1909 when the regulation on its importation came into force. The process of the formulation of this regulation has been discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis.

³²⁶ "Tragedy at a Police Station: A Chinese Laundryman Fatally Wounded", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, April 14th, 1917.

As with the previous two decades, the medical use of those drugs was principally in the hands of medical missionaries and other western medical professionals. This was not simply because they had a training in western medicine, but because this training gave western medical men easier access to those drugs in the regulations. As has been discussed in chapter three, regulations on morphine and cocaine issued by the Maritime Customs Service provided privileges for the western medical professionals and the regulation incurred the criticism of their Chinese counterparts.

Another factor which affected the extent of the medical use of these drugs was the different financial situation of hospitals. Some hospitals could afford to purchase morphine while others could not. As chapter two shows, the Inner-City Governmental Hospital in Beijing submitted an application to the Ministry of the Interior for purchasing western medicines including cocaine. While the Inner-City Governmental Hospital mainly admitted officials and well-off patients in Beijing, the Outer City Governmental Hospital was open to the general public and received decidedly fewer financial donations from patients. It had to rely on supplies of seized morphine from the authorities. For example, in August 1919 the Outer City Governmental Hospital sent an application to the Health Bureau of the Capital Police for four taels (roughly 200g) of confiscated morphine for medical use. The office in charge of such questions, the Judicial Bureau of the Capital Police, approved the application and supplied the hospital with the amount requested.³²⁷

Non-medical use of morphine also continued in the 1910s despite the regulations designed to eradicate supplies. In the early 1910s, it seems that cocaine was still a novel drug which was mainly used by westerners in some coastal cities for non-medical purposes. In November 1914, an American, Edward C. le Clair, together with another westerner, robbed a shop on Wusong Road in Shanghai. Before

³²⁷ "Permission of the Health Bureau of the Capital Police for Distributing Morphine to the Outer City Governmental Hospital", (京師警察廳衛生處關於外城官醫院需用嗎啡請予酌發的公函), August 1919, Beijing Municipal Archives, J181-018-11008-001.

committing the crime, the former 'took injection of cocaine four different times amounting in quantity to about a half tea-spoonful' and 'drank a considerable quantity of intoxicating liquors'. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment and indicted to pay the costs of the prosecution.³²⁸ Gradually, a sub-culture of non-medical using refined drugs developed in the city. A newspaper report in Shanghai in 1916 commented that:

It is probable that very few people who live south of the Soochow Creek have any idea, whatever, of the conditions prevalent on the other side of that waterway. The seamy side of life is there to be found in all its hideousness from the illicit sale of drink, some of which consists of the worst kinds of spirits, to the administration of doses of drugs with the hypodermic syringe for small considerations, and covering every form of viciousness. Morphine, cocaine and opium are to be obtained in a large number of the irregular establishments found in the district bounded by North Soochow Road, North Szechuen (Sic.) Road, Ward Road and the Huangpu River.

It is not easy for the ordinary resident in Shanghai to obtain these things. Possibly he would not use the correct slang which would establish him as a person in the know and to be trusted. But a man who bore all the marks of a seafaring man with a little money to spend would be readily understood if he made a quiet demand to be supplied with "coke" or "snow". The mention of these two terms and the production of a dollar would ensure the meeting of his requirement.³²⁹

³²⁸ "U.S. Court for China", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, November 7th, 1914.

³²⁹ "The Seamy Side of Shanghai: Morphine and Cocaine", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, August 19th, 1916.

The term 'seafaring man' in this report may indicate that sailors and others involved in maritime trading constituted a regular clientele for refined drugs in coastal cities in this period.

Compared with cocaine, morphine injection for non-medical purpose was a much wider phenomenon in 1910s China. As chapter one shows, morphine injection for pleasure had emerged in the late 1880s and the beginning of the 1890s in Shanghai. It continued into the 1910s, and by that time had spread widely in China, mainly in four regions besides Shanghai; Manchuria, Zhili, Shandong and Fujian provinces. All those four regions were coastal places and had one port city which was opened in 1842 after the First Opium War. Those were the places first reached by western medicine and morphine was one of those medicines. More importantly, the Japanese had extensive activities in those places. Manchuria borders Korea, which became a colony of Japan since 1910. Tianjin, in Zhili province and the commercial centre of northern China, had a Japanese concession. Qingdao, the most important port city of Shandong province, was occupied by Japan from 1914 to 1922, while Fujian was the nearest mainland province to Taiwan, a colony of Japan which was ceded from China in 1895. In addition, Japan along with eight western countries started to manage the International Settlement on Gulangyu in 1895. Gulangyu was a small island which was part of Xiamen. It was at Xiamen, a port city of Fujian province, where the cocaine problem was first noticed by Chinese authorities in 1909, as chapter two has explored.

As early as the turn of the twentieth century, non-medical use of cocaine and morphine had emerged in Manchuria, especially in Jilin (then romanisation of it was 'Kirin') province, which bordered Korea. In the *Decennial Report* which was compiled by the Maritime Customs Service in 1913, there are some descriptions about the economy situation of Longjing, a county that bordered Korea.

The soil and climate of this district are well adapted to the cultivation of the poppy, and from early times it was one of the chief crops. For many years before its cultivation was prohibited, in 1908, it is estimated that 20 per cent. of the land under cultivation was devoted to it, and the opium produced is said to have found a ready market and was mostly sold in East Siberia. On account of the small population of the district, the prohibition was easily enforced, the cultivation at once ceasing, and the fields which were formerly a blaze of colour when the poppy was in bloom soon took on the more subdued hues of the millet, kaoliang, and other grain. Very little opium has been imported into the district since that time, no movements whatever appearing in the Customs returns during the past two years.

Unfortunately, with the increasing scarcity of opium, the use of morphia and cocaine, more pernicious drugs, has rapidly increased. Although strict watch is kept to prevent their importation, yet, on account of the extent of the frontier and the small size of the packages, it seems to be of little avail, and it is said that the victims of the habit have little difficulty in obtaining them.³³⁰

The border line between Jilin province and Korea was long and a large part of it was formed by a river, making the detection of drugs smuggling difficult. According to an editorial in 1915

The Japanese population in Kirin city (note, a city in Jilin province) itself is insignificant not exceeding 300 in all; for all present Kirin is the terminus of the railway system, and as the neighbouring districts are but scantily populated, no great attractions are offered to the Japanese trader, except the patent medicine vendor (engaged in the morphia and cocaine traffic) to push his way into the interior districts from the northwesterly point, it being more to

³³⁰ *Decennial Reports, 1902-1911*, vol. I, Northern and Yangtze Ports, Shanghai: Statistical Department, Inspectorate General of Customs, 1913, p. 78.

his advantage to enter Chinese territory from Korea, the South Eastern portion of the province being more cultivated and more convenient.³³¹

West of Jilin was Liaoning province, where morphine injections had been noticed by the provincial authorities in 1912. The provincial authorities there contacted the Board of Laws about the issue that year as they were uncertain about what punishment should be imposed on morphine users. The reply was that as the Republic of China had just been established there was not yet any relevant legislation on this issue.³³²

It seems that the hypodermic injection of morphine and cocaine for non-medical purposes in the 1910s was a phenomenon mainly in the coastal regions and big cities, while eating pills containing refined drugs was more common in inland China. Those pills were transported from coastal cities to the interior areas. For instance, when opium suppression was in progress in Guizhou province in 1917 and some poppy plants were uprooted, merchants in Guangdong, a coastal province which borders Guizhou, took advantage of the situation and sold morphine pills there.³³³ A correspondent of *The North China Herald* noted a similar situation in contemporary eastern China as, in Jiangsu (then romanization of it was 'Kiangsu') Province, 'morphine pills are thought to come into this section in large quantities from Shanghai'.³³⁴

New marketing strategies for selling morphine pills also emerged in the 1910s. As chapter two shows, some medical missionaries as well as other medical

³³¹ "The Unnoticed Activities of the Japanese in Kirin Province: Part I", *Peking Gazette*, September 10th, 1915.

³³² "Inquiries of the High Prosecutor's Office of Mukden Province to the Board of Law Regarding whether Morphine Injection are Subjected to Punishment" (奉天高等檢察廳為電請司法部施打嗎啡應否科罰事), June 1912, Liaoning Provincial Archives, JC017-01-000594.

³³³ "Kueichow-Yunnan Border Life: Our Own Correspondence", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, March 31st, 1917.

³³⁴ "Drugs in Kiangsu: Our Own Correspondent", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, March 1st, 1919.

professionals began to criticise their use as early as the 1890s. Together with the government's prohibition of the production of morphine pills, this criticism led to a change in advertisements for those pills. Rather than promoting them as anti-opium substances, they were now sold as various kinds of medicine or tonic containing morphine as well as other refined drugs. For instance, at the first annual meeting of the China Medical Association in 1916, the Health Officer of the Shanghai Municipal Council announced that many of the advertised medicines curing coughs 'contained morphine and might do serious damage'.³³⁵ This was a period when the western medicine business obtained a chance to accumulate capital and develop. During the First World War, the import of western medicine from Europe and America decreased but the Japanese export to China increased. Meanwhile, because of the shortage of western medicines in China, the price of existing supplies soared, with some increasing 20-30 times by the end of the conflict. Chinese drug stores earned a lot profits during that period. Moreover, some Chinese-run drug stores which had business in western medicine manufactured their own patent medicines.³³⁶

Generally, those pills were made of mixed materials and their formulas changed from time to time. An important change was that heroin became an ingredient for those pills towards the end of the decade when it was introduced into China for non-medical use. In the 'lung nourishing pills' case which has been discussed in the introduction chapter, the two passengers, Lu Yin-tang and Cheng Kai, took a train to Tianjian and purchased the pills there at a price of 20 yuan a bag. The pills were seized on their way back to Henan province because the railway policemen suspected that they might contain opium. During their interrogation, the detained men claimed that the pills contained no opium and that they only knew that the pills could kill the craving for opium because it was quite commonly used for that

³³⁵ "National Medical Association: the Opening Meeting", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, February 12th, 1916.

³³⁶ 上海市醫藥公司, 上海市工商行政管理局, 上海社會科學院經濟研究所編, 上海近代西藥行業史, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 1988, pp. 55-59. (Shanghai Pharmaceutical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and the Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds. *A History of Western Medicine Business in Modern Shanghai*).

purpose in Henan province. However, they had no idea that those pills were prohibited drugs. A sample of those pills was sent to the Central Hospital in Beijing for analysis. They turned out to contain mainly four materials: heroin (6%), cocaine (2%), lactose (75%) and amyloid (7%). The samples varied in percentages of heroin and cocaine and were different weights, suggesting that they were handmade. The instruction from the Health Bureau of the Capital Police in this case was that, since the pills were used as medicines to eliminate the opium craving, the men could be released. After Lu Yin-tang and his partner paid the bail, the police let them leave after a few days of custody, and also gave back their 65 bags of pills.³³⁷

Heroin in 1919 in China was not only used for making drugs pills but also for hypodermic injection. Lewis R. Jordan appeared at the U.S. Court in Shanghai on a charge of vagrancy in August 1919. He had been found under the influence of drugs in several alleyways in Shanghai and a Japanese pharmacy confirmed that Jordan's 'daily allowance' was '15 grains of cocaine and 6 of heroin'. He was found to be carrying drug-taking kit which included syringes and needles when he was arrested by the police.³³⁸ This was unusual, since eating pills containing refined drugs was the dominant method of consumption in late 1910s China.

In Lu Yin-tang's case, although the Health Bureau of the Capital Police ordered that he should be released because those pills were used for curing the opium craving, this should not have been a reason to set them free. As chapter three showed, as early as 1915, the Beiyang government had issued the *Regulations for Punishing Morphine Offences*. It stipulated that before the issuance of pharmacy laws, offences related to cocaine and heroin were subject to the same punishment as for morphine offences. This stipulation is obscure because it did not answer some important questions, such as, which kind of manufacture or use or trade of cocaine

³³⁷ "Instruction of the Health Bureau on the Case that Lu Yin-tang and His Partner Traded Pills Containing Poisons like Morphine" (衛生處函為盧陰堂等攜帶潤肺丸內含嗎啡一類毒質請訊辦卷), March 1919, Beijing Municipal Archives, J 181-018-11017.

³³⁸ "Local and General", *The Shanghai Times (1914-1921)*, 27 Aug 1919.

and heroin would be punished? Undoubtedly this blur produced difficulties when dealing with the cocaine or heroin offences. At least two kinds of problems would appear. The first one is what punishment should be given to the offenders. Another problem was that of how much reward should be given to the officers (such as the policemen) who confiscated cocaine or heroin.

The Maritime Customs Service raised the second problem, namely, the reward for cocaine and heroin confiscations, to the Revenue Council, the government department which it was affiliated to. Eventually, the issue ended up with the Ministry of the Interior which responded as follows to the Chief Police Officer in Beijing

I am sending you the following instruction. We have received a note from the Ministry of Finance to ask our opinion on the issue of cocaine and heroin offences. The Revenue Council has suggested the Ministry of Finance that the award for the confiscations of cocaine and heroin should be the same as that for morphine. The offences involving cocaine and heroin injection instruments as well as 'cocaine and heroin medicines' should be handled accordance with the regulations for offences involving morphine injection instruments and 'morphine medicines'. The Ministry of Finance has consented to this suggestion and replied to the Revenue Council. Meanwhile, it asked the opinion of our department on this issue and suggested that our department should instruct provincial governments to implement this policy. Other than instructing the provincial governors, I am sending your bureau this note we received from the Ministry of Finance to instruct your bureau to conform to this policy.³³⁹

³³⁹“內務部關於拿獲高根安落因兩種禁物者均應給賞給警察總監的飭 (Instruction from the Ministry of the Interior to the Chief Police Officer regarding the issue that Cocaine and Heroin Confiscations should also be Awarded)”, 1915, Beijing Municipal Archives, J181-018-05393. This paragraph is translated by the author from the original text: 為飭知事准財政部咨稱准稅務處咨拿獲高根安落因兩種禁物者均應照拿獲嗎啡給賞拿獲施打高根安落因器具及摻和高根安落因藥品

After receiving the instruction of the Ministry of the Interior, the Capital Police ordered its branch offices 'to strictly investigate and prosecute' when they suspected that offences were being committed.³⁴⁰ This source indicates that regulations on refined drugs had included more substances by 1915. Not just offences on morphine, cocaine, heroin and their derivatives would be punished, medicines containing those refined drugs were also prohibited. Therefore, the order of the Capital Police on Lu Yin-tang's case actually did not conform to the regulations as they stood. They may have been bribed to free him and his accomplice. However, the amount of departments and agencies that became involved in the correspondence above, suggests that confusion about the rules and how to enforce them is just as likely an explanation.

Lu Yin-tang's smuggling of narcotic pills with the camouflage of 'medicine' is not a novel method as pills were the main consumption pattern when non-medical use of morphine first emerged in China in the nineteenth century. However, some aspects of this case were indeed new phenomena, and it signifies some important reasons why there was a rising market for these types of refined drugs in the 1910s. In their confession, Lu and his partner stated that many grocery stores in Henan province sold that kind of 'lung nourishing pills'. Having worked in several shops, Lu was aware of the profit of that business and decided to source his own supplies directly from Tianjin to sell them in Henan province. They confessed that for each bag they could earn 4-5 yuan, which might have been an underestimate given that they were talking to the police.³⁴¹ Generous profits, and the relative safety of this business—using 'medicine' as the camouflage, must have lured many people like Lu and his partner to step into this business and work as the middlemen keen to build a market for their new products.

者均應照拿獲施打嗎啡器具和嗎啡藥品之辦法辦理等語本部意見相同除咨覆稅務處外咨請通行各省官廳遵照辦理等因到部除通行各省巡按使查照外合即鈔錄原咨飭知該廳遵照可也此飭。

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

Another new and noticeable aspect of this case is that Lu Yin-tang and his partner took advantage of the improved transportation system. The growing railway network, since the late Qing Dynasty, benefited drug smugglers in the 1910s. When Lu Yin-tang and his partner adventured to purchase narcotic pills, they headed to the capital Beijing first, then changed to Tianjin, which was their destination and the contemporary business centre of northern China. It was also a production centre of pills containing refined drugs. At that moment, the railway from Tianjin to the centre of Manchuria, Shenyang, had also been built. By 1919, Manchuria had become an important centre for both illicit supply and consumption of morphine, especially Jilin province with its long border to Korea. The increasing railway system and the developed postal system provided unprecedented connectedness across China, and beyond.³⁴²

Regarding the reasons for consuming refined drugs in 1910s China, a frequently told story is that the opium suppression policy prompted opium users to shift to refined drugs such as morphine. This may be true, but it seems to be only part of the explanation. The price was certainly the main driving force which prompted opium users to shift to inject morphine or eat morphine pills. In 1916 an editorial in the *Peking Daily News* about the growing morphine market listed the reasons why the 'morphine habit obtained such a hold in Manchuria'; firstly the price was low, from 2 to 5 cents; secondly, 'many moderate opium-smokers of the poorer classes can no longer afford to buy opium'; thirdly, drug 'fiends' asserted that they could give opium smokers as much as pleasure by injecting morphine.³⁴³ At the Joint Medical Conference held in 1917, Dr Wu Lien-teh, president of the China National Medical

³⁴² See Weipin Tsai, "The Qing Empire's Last Flowering: The expansion of China's Post Office at the turn of the twentieth century", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2015, pp. 895-930; Lane J Harris, "Stumbling towards Empire: The Shanghai Local Post Office, the Transnational British Community and Informal Empire in China, 1863-97", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2018, pp. 418-445; Elisabeth Köll, *Railroads and the Transformation of China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019.

³⁴³ "Morphia in Manchuria: Growing Use of the Drug", *Peking Daily News (1914-1917)*, 28 January 1916.

Association, emphasised again that “for at the cost of 4 to 5 cents a coolie could satisfy his cravings and obtain immediate satisfaction”.³⁴⁴ In 1919, an editorial stated that “Opium, to a great extent, is not now obtainable by the masses in China, but a hypodermic syringe and morphine can be got for a few cents.”³⁴⁵

However, not all of the refined drug users consumed opium before changing to morphine or other refined drugs. Even for those opium users who changed to use morphine later, it was not merely because of the rising price of opium. A frequently underestimated role is that played by the middlemen. Chapter one identified the “masters of the needle”, who as early as the 1880s were introducing consumers to morphine injection. When the Governor of the Three Eastern Provinces consulted the Board of Laws in 1911 about how to punish morphine users, he used a different name for these suppliers.

Morphine is most harmful. The Board of Laws has issued regulations before concerning the manufacture, injecting, and trade of morphine. We have instructed the affiliated departments to implement those regulations. However, those regulations include no contents about whether the “injected person” (i.e. the consumers) are also offenders. Almost all of the person who are injected morphine are silly country men. They are enticed [by the injectors], ignorant that morphine was a poison and tried it. Since they are actually victims of this poison, it is improper to punish them heavily. However, recently frequent captured “morphine needle offenders” (i.e. the injectors) have confessed names of the injected person. We should not set those injected person free. Is it proper to refer to “the crime of violating the constitution” to give them the tenth level of punishment?³⁴⁶

³⁴⁴ Wu Lien-teh, “The Menace of Morphine”, *Peking Gazette (1915-1917)*, 27 February 1917.

³⁴⁵ “The Outside of the Platter”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, 25 January 1919.

³⁴⁶ “兩江督院張札禁煙公所准法部咨議復東三省被打嗎啡人犯治罪一案文”, *南洋官報*, 第 144 期, 1911, 第 22 頁”. (“Governor Zhang of Liangjiang Provinces Sent the Opium Suppression Bureau the Instruction from the Board of Laws on the Case about Morphine Injection in the Northern-east Three Provinces”, *Gazette of Southern Coastal China*, issue 144, 1911, p. 22.). This is translated by the author

The Board of Laws agreed to the suggestion of the Governor to give the “injected person” the tenth level of punishment.³⁴⁷ While it is unclear whether those enticed “countrymen” were already opium-smokers, this case suggests that suppliers continued to do more than simply sell the drug. They were actively involved in persuading potential consumers, in handling the technology for them, and of administering the substance to them.

Some historians also argue that consumers shifted from opium smoking to morphine injection because morphine injection was viewed as a symbol of social status. In this sense, Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann suggest that “the use of morphine, besides being cheap and effective, was also seen as a ‘modern’ statement: like opium in the late eighteenth century, its foreign origin conferred status, respect and prestige”, without, however, providing evidence.³⁴⁸ The theory is supported by the fact that most morphine users were lower classes. Morphine was much cheaper than opium from the 1880s to the 1910s. In addition, its use did not require complicated equipment and lengthy rituals, which were often involved in smoking. Maybe, rather than providing elevated social status, morphine simply gave the users faster and cheaper satisfaction, and easier availability.

In summary, the consumption of refined drugs was certainly well-established in China by the end of the 1910s. Both morphine and cocaine were still used for medical reasons, mainly by Western doctors. But the emergence of the “lung nourishing pills” market shows that there was a quasi-medical demand developing in China for products that included the modern industrial pharmaceuticals. Non-medical use was actively promoted by “injectors” who seem to have been similar to

from the original text: 查嗎啡為害最烈前奉法部奏定製造施打及販賣專條當經通飭各屬一體遵行在案細譯通行于被施打之人並未議及有罪誠以被施打者盡屬鄉愚多被誘惑因不覺其為毒而始行嘗試即不能因其受毒而重以罪名可知惟近來拿獲嗎啡針犯極多其供出被打之人勢不能遽予釋放應否酌照違制律處十等罰。

³⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 23.

³⁴⁸ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, p. 128.

the “masters of the needle” of the 1880s. They introduced consumers to morphine injection, but did not necessarily dominate this market. Pills and patent medicines containing these refined drugs seem to have been more common in this period, perhaps because it was more difficult for the authorities to check their content, and perhaps because consumers found them more convenient modes of delivery.

Supply

A few historians have sketched the supply of refined drugs in the 1910s. Dikötter, Zhou, and Laamann have argued that Germany and Britain were the two prime manufacturers of morphine before the First World War. Then production in Britain drastically increased after 1915 because of wartime demand. The main importer of British morphine was Japan, from where it was re-exported and smuggled it into China.³⁴⁹ They base their conclusions mainly on Wu Lien-teh’s editorials, published in contemporary medical journals, newspapers, and his autobiography. There are more reliable historical sources. Morphine importation into China from 1893 until 1915, and cocaine importation from 1908 to 1915, were recorded in the *Trade Returns* of the Customs.

Frank Dikötter and his co-authors indicate that cocaine consumed in China was from Japan and that it was refined from coca leaves grown in Taiwan.³⁵⁰ Once this supply line was established it grew. Steven Karch has pointed out that Japan started to refine cocaine from the coca leaves produced in Dutch Java after the turn of the twentieth century. This business was encouraged by the Japanese government during the First World War. An experiment of cultivating coca plants in Jiayi failed in 1916 but was successful in 1918.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 125.

³⁵⁰ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, and Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016. pp. 165-166.

³⁵¹ Steven Karch, *A Brief History of Cocaine*, Baton Rouge: Taylor & Francis, 2005, p. 97.

The supply of refined drugs consumed in 1910s China was much more complicated than has been previously established, not least of all as it changed frequently. The *Returns of Trade* first recorded cocaine importation in 1908. In that year, cocaine was imported from Hong Kong and Germany, with net imports of 870 ounces and 100 ounces respectively. Cocaine distribution was through two Customs districts in that year, Shanghai (100 ounces) and Xiamen (1,970 ounces). The country or region from which cocaine was imported and the Customs district through which the cocaine was distributed were the same in 1909. The import was 12, 037 ounces from Hong Kong and 100 ounces from Germany. The net import of cocaine through Shanghai Customs was 100 ounces and 11, 727 ounces through Xiamen Customs. In 1911, one export country or region was added to the statistics of the *Returns of Trade*. That was Belgium. The imports from Hong Kong, Germany, Belgium were 29, 378 ounces, 124 ounces, and 175 ounces respectively. The number of Customs districts for net cocaine import also increased from two to three. The new one was Shantou. The import statistics were 299 ounces at Shanghai, 27, 578 ounces at Xiamen and 568 ounces at Shantou. In 1911, cocaine was imported from five countries or regions but the number had decreased sharply, 6 ounces from Hong Kong, 44 ounces from Great Britain, 28 ounces from Germany, 2 ounces from Japan (including Formosa), and 2 ounces from U.S.A. (including Hawaii). Cocaine was imported via six Customs, Tianjin, Jiujiang, Shanghai, Suzhou, Xiamen and Shantou, with statistics 27, 1, 48, 3, 1, 2 ounces respectively.³⁵²In 1912, cocaine was imported still from five countries or regions but with the disappearance of the U.S.A and added Switzerland. The import statistics were 10, 71, 239, 16, 373 ounces separately. The import Customs were Dalian, Tianjin, Jiaozhou, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Xiamen, with respective statistics 372, 35, 4, 287, 1, and 10 ounces. In 1913, cocaine was imported from Hong Kong, Great Britain, Germany, Russia and Siberia by land frontier, Russia pacific ports, and Japan (including Formosa), with 11, 92, 110, 321, 70 and 23 ounces separately. Net import of cocaine into five Customs

³⁵² *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports 1911, Part III. Analysis of Foreign Trade*, Shanghai: Statistic Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1912, p. 171.

Districts Manzhouli, Suifenhe, Hangzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, with respective 321, 70, 2, 13, and 11 ounces. Countries or regions from which cocaine was imported increased to seven in 1914 but the amounts decreased. The importation from Hong Kong, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and Siberia by land frontier, Japan (including Formosa), and the U.S.A. (including Hawaii) were 5, 20, 12, 50, 15, 8, and 4 ounces respectively.³⁵³

Those statistics indicate that cocaine imported into China was mainly from Germany and Britain in the year 1911. Then the Japanese colony in Taiwan and Russia joined the list of exporters of cocaine to China in 1912 and 1913.³⁵⁴ Cocaine imported from Taiwan were 2 ounces, 373 ounces, and 23 ounces in the years 1911, 1912 and 1913 respectively. A sudden increase in 1912 might be related to the 1911 revolution which ended the Qing Dynasty. The violence brought by the revolution meant there would have been an increased medical demand for those injured in disturbances, and the instability and anxiety could have fuelled a market for non-medical use. In 1913 Russia started to export cocaine to China from both its land frontier and its pacific ports. For the former, it was 321 ounces and for the latter 70 ounces in 1913. This made Russia the biggest cocaine exporter into China in that year, mainly through its border with Manchuria at Man-zhou-li, the first stop for the train entering China from Russia.³⁵⁵

After 1910 there seems to have been significant changes in the ports through which refined drugs were imported. Xiamen declined in significance and new points of import emerged in eastern and northern China. This change was because of new regulations on cocaine importation issued by the Customs in 1910, and also due to a possible better implementation of the regulations in southern coastal cities. A

³⁵³ *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports 1914, Part III. Analysis of Foreign Trade*, Shanghai: Statistic Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1915, p. 286. For tables of these statistics please see Appendix 2.

³⁵⁴ *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1912*, Shanghai: the Statistic Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1913, p.262.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

better implementation of the regulation policy could make the importation process more complicated. In addition, the places where cocaine was imported from also changed. In the years 1908, 1909 and 1910, colonial Hong Kong was the principal exporter of cocaine into China, accounting for 89.7%, 99% and 99% of the importation.³⁵⁶ As Britain had agreed to the cocaine importation regulations issued by the Chinese government, cocaine exports from Hong Kong to China decreased sharply after 1910, from 29, 378 ounces in 1910 to 6 ounces in 1911.³⁵⁷ The situation also changed dramatically from 1911 to 1913. The countries which exported most cocaine to China were Britain in 1911, Germany in 1912, and “Russia and Siberia by land frontier” in 1913.³⁵⁸ It is safe to assume that while importation from Hong Kong decreased sharply after 1910, British-sources of cocaine just sought different ports to enter China. So Britain was still the largest exporter of cocaine into China in 1910 and 1911, although it was much less than that of the years prior to 1910. Then the largest portion of cocaine exportation shifted to Germany and Russia in 1912 and 1913, respectively, suggesting intense competition in the global cocaine business.

In 1914 most annual importation was from the Netherlands, with a total of 50 ounces or roughly 44% of the total. The situation changed dramatically in 1915 when cocaine imported from Japan soared to 11,077 ounces, 97.4% of China’s total.³⁵⁹ Since the First World War had already started, the supply of cocaine from Europe directly to China was disrupted. A possible explanation for the sudden and huge increase of cocaine importation from Japan is that its domestic production

³⁵⁶ Those percentages are calculated by the author, for the statistics of cocaine importation, see *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1911*, Shanghai: the Statistic Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1912. It is necessary to point out that in the years 1909 and 1910, some cocaine imported from Hong Kong was then re-exported. In 1909, the re-exportation was 410 ounces, occupied 0.03 % of the total importation. In 1910, the numbers were 1,800 ounces and 0.06%.

³⁵⁷ *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1912*, Shanghai: the Statistic Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1913. p. 262. Cocaine importation from Hong Kong into China were 10 ounces in 1912 and 11 ounces in 1913.

³⁵⁸ *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1912*, Shanghai: the Statistic Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1913. p.262.

³⁵⁹ *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1915*, Shanghai: the Statistic Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1916. p. 267.

suddenly increased after 1914 with coca leaves from other countries. Since the outbreak of the First World War, the Tokio Hygienic Laboratory had “engaged in assiduous manufacture of numerous medicine and chemicals for which supply Japan depended upon Germany and some other countries”. The morphine production at that laboratory had increased “to some fifty kilogrammes and will be soon, it is understood, sold by auction”.³⁶⁰ Other than this official producer in Japan, the Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company played a more important role in the morphine market after 1913 using opium from the Ottoman and Persian empires.³⁶¹ While Japan increased its domestic production, importing morphine from other countries still continued. A newspaper report stated that in the year 1916, the United States exported £385,000 morphine to Japan.³⁶²

Undoubtedly, the whole picture of the supply of refined drugs must be more complicated than those reflected in the statistics of *Returns of Trade* because there was smuggling besides the legitimate transactions. From the beginning of the 1910s when regulations on both morphine and cocaine were put into place, the confiscations of refined drugs began. In May 1912, to show its appreciation, the Red Cross Society of China listed contributions it received from government agencies between October 1911 to April 1912 in the newspaper *The North China Herald*. Among those donations, 4 pounds of cocaine was from the Customs.³⁶³

It seems that the trade routes for licit imports were also used by drug smugglers as importation ports were also the places where large amount of cocaine and morphine were confiscated. While the importation of cocaine from Hong Kong to mainland China dropped sharply after 1910, as abovementioned, many journalistic reports indicate that it was still a nexus of cocaine smuggling in 1910s. In February

³⁶⁰ “Local and General News”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 28 August 1915.

³⁶¹ Steffen Rimner, *Opium’s Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control*, p. 233.

³⁶² “Statistics on Principal Articles Imported into Japan”, *Millard’s Review of the Far East*, 20 October 1917.

³⁶³ “Miscellaneous Articles Received in Aid of Fund”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 11 May 1912.

1913, the Superintendent of Imports and Exports R.O. Hutchison made an application at the Hong Kong Magistracy for the forfeiture of fifty cases of cocaine seized by the police at Holt's Wharf.³⁶⁴ At a later time of that year, George L. Duncan, a managing partner of the firm Messrs. McEwen Frickel & Co., was fined \$ 4,000 for possessing 519 ounces of cocaine and 188 lb. of morphine. The police followed two cases coming out of the office of this firm and seized them when they were transported to a boarding house. Further search in that office found some sardine tins which contained cocaine, while some of them really contained sardine.³⁶⁵ In northern China, the previous importation route from Russia to China had also become a smuggling line.³⁶⁶

Imports of cocaine and of morphine were lumped together in the "medicine" category in the *Returns of Trade* after 1915 so no details are available after that, but other sources and anecdotal evidence provide clues about developments after that. An editorial published in *The China Medical Journal* in 1915 pointed out that Japan imported 6.25 tons of morphine from Germany and Britain. One British manufacturing chemist in London provided 2.5 tons, two firms in Glasgow and Edinburgh supplied 2 tons, and German firms contributed 1.75 tons.³⁶⁷ At the Joint Medical Conference held in 1917, Wu Lien-teh warned about the serious situation of morphine consumption in China.³⁶⁸ He sketched the supply of morphine consumed in China by 1914, "the supply of morphine comes mainly from two firms in Edinburgh and one firm in London", and the statistics of morphine exportation from Britain were 5.5, 7.5, 11.5 and 14 tons from 1911 to 1914 separately. He also

³⁶⁴ "Local and General News", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 22 February 1913.

³⁶⁵ "The Hong Kong Drug Case Conviction of Foreign Merchant", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 20 September 1913.

³⁶⁶ "Government's Opium Scheme: Uproar in the Senate", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, 28 September 1918.

³⁶⁷ "The Morphine Evil in China", *The China Medical Journal*, vol. 29, No 6, November 1915, pp. 401-402. (Name of *The China Medical Missionary Journal* was changed to *The China Medical Journal* in 1907).

³⁶⁸ Held by the China National Medical Association and the China Medical Missionary Associations.

estimated that the amount in 1915 and 1916 could be 16 tons.³⁶⁹ He also described how morphine reached the hands of Chinese consumers

Once arrived in Japan, the morphine is usually made up into small packets or placed into small bottles, labelled in different ways, e.g. morphine, white powder, soothing stuff, dreamland elixir, etc., and exported openly or smuggled secretly into China by way of Dalny, Antung and Formosa. Almost every Japanese drug dealer or pedlar in Manchuria sells it in some form or another, and does so with impunity, because no Japanese can be arrested without complaint being first lodged at the consulate. From the Japanese agents and sub-agents the drug may be passed on to disputable Chinese who frequent the coolie depot and inject a solution, usually very dirty, with a hypodermic syringe which may be made with glass, metal or even bamboo. Rigorous imprisonment for two years is a common sentence for Chinese found with morphine in their possession, but the principal culprits often escape punishment.³⁷⁰

From 1915 newspapers in China increasingly pointed the finger at Japanese smugglers. This does not mean that Japanese smuggling started in that year. As Steffen Rimner has argued, the emergence of those reports was the result of the changing global political economy of drugs.³⁷¹ Indeed, the activities of Japanese smugglers in shifting morphine and cocaine in Asia had been revealed at the Hague international opium conference of 1911/12, because the British government required participating countries to investigate the situation of morphine and cocaine in their territories.³⁷² By 1914, the illegal sale of morphine and cocaine by Japanese smugglers was brought up by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

³⁶⁹ Wu Lien-teh, "The Menace of Morphine", *Peking Gazette (1915-1917)*, 27 February 1917.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Control*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 239.

³⁷² James Mills, Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium Conference, 1911-12, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 42, 3, 2014, pp. 400-419.

discussions with the Japanese Minister. As a result, it was agreed that illegal sellers caught by the Chinese authorities would be sent to Japanese Consulates and then deported or duly punished.³⁷³ However, this was more lip-service than a real regulation, as the following sections indicate.

Changing Controls and Regulation

The late Qing opium suppression movement was followed by the anti-narcotic policies of the newly established Republican China. As chapter three showed, a range of regulations on opium and refined drugs were issued from 1909 to 1914 and a specific regulation on morphine was enacted in 1914, the *Regulations for Punishing Morphine Offences*. Its last clause stipulated that before a pharmacy law was issued, all cocaine, heroin and their derivatives offenses were liable to the regulation.³⁷⁴ After that, a pharmacy law on medical use of those refined drugs was issued in 1915. This set of controls was focused on defining legitimate and illegitimate uses of these products, and setting out punishments for those consumers seeking them for non-medical purposes. When it came to supply of these refined drugs, the Republican government continued to use the Maritime Customs System to control importation. Strategies included import restrictions, the confiscation of smuggled goods, and increased rewards for Customs staff who seized contraband, with the purpose of encouraging them to action while making them less likely to be bribed by smugglers.³⁷⁵ However, the implementation of those regulations was confronted by difficulties. Smugglers invented increasingly sophisticated methods to evade the inspection of Customs officers. For instance, at the end of 1913 the Maritime Customs confiscated a private letter sent from Gustav

³⁷³ "Secret Sale of Morphine and Cocaine", *Peking Daily News (1914-1917)*, 23 April 1914.

³⁷⁴ For a literal translation of this regulation, see chapter 3 of this thesis.

³⁷⁵ Inspector General's Circulars: "Morphia, cocaine, etc.: regulations for punishment of people guilty of dealing in, etc.: instructions" issued on 24 April 1914; "Cocaine and heroin : seizures of, to be treated like morphia seizures" issued on 13 May 1915; "Seizure rewards for ship's officers handing over opium, morphia, cocaine, heroin, and poppy seed : new scale introduced ;instructions" on 26 October 1917; "Seizure rewards for opium, morphia, cocaine, heroin, poppy seed, etc.: revised scale and method of payment; instructions" on 14 March 1918.

Hoffmann in Frankfurt to someone in China which showed how the smugglers endeavoured to evade detection:

I am quite aware of the fact that this particular business is connected with a certain amount of risk, but, on the other hand, I know quite well by practical experience how to minimise this risk by using all precautions in getting up shipments.

In the first line it is of highest necessity to ensure a full success to attach the greatest importance to careful and skilful packing, and as this point is a speciality of mine I can give my friends every guarantee in this respect.

.....

I know quite well that Customs people on your side have become rather sharp of late, and altho' (sic.) some of my friends continue to have their orders shipped without taking the precaution of having the C. or M. concealed in any way and apparently can manage to get their shipments through the Customs without the slightest trouble, I cannot really recommend this system. My recommendation goes to the effect to have the C. or M. concealed within some other packages containing harmless goods, packing the same in such a way that even on opening a package there will be nothing to arouse the Customs people's suspicious.³⁷⁶

In order to give the potential clients in China more confidence, Hoffmann then provided details about what goods and devices morphine and cocaine could be concealed in and how to pack them. He also told the potential buyer the price of these two drugs and how to send the order and remittance. If the buyer would like

³⁷⁶ "Morphia and Cocaine: Copy of letter showing methods employed to evade Customs detection circulated for Commissioners' information", *Inspector General's Semi-official Circulars, 1911-1933*, p. 12-15.

to know the updated price, Hoffmann suggested to cable him and to use code words, “Cheese for Cocaine and Margarine for Morphia”, in the telegraph.³⁷⁷

The political situation in the 1910s also impeded an effective implementation of anti-narcotic policies. While the revolution terminated the administration of Qing Dynasty and established a Republican China in 1912, the central government had only a weak control of limited areas. The situation became even worse when the President Yuan Shi-kai died in the June of 1916 and the country began to splinter into a number of competing regions run by a variety of leaders who came to be known as warlords.³⁷⁸

The semi-colonial conditions of extraterritoriality also impeded the implementation of coherent drugs prohibition policies across China. The authorities certainly felt that Japanese smugglers used extraterritoriality to shield their illegal business. One *Decennial Report* edited by the Maritime Customs reported on Antung (now Andong), a city on the border with Korea:

As a matter of fact, the secret trade in these poisons, as well as in opium itself, appeared to be carried on to a far greater extent in the Japanese Settlement than in the Chinese town, for, in 99 out of every 100 opium or morphia cases brought to the local Chinese Law Court for investigation, the offender’s answer to the question ‘where is the stuff from?’ has been always ‘Chitaokow’, which is an abbreviation used by the local Chinese to indicate the Japanese Settlement. Throughout the past 10 years opium and its derivatives, including morphia, etc., were constantly smuggled by railway from Korea.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Peter Zarrow, *China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949*, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 83.

³⁷⁹ *Decennial Reports, 1912-1921*, vol. I, Northern and Yangtze Ports, Shanghai: Statistical Department, Inspectorate General of Customs, 1924, p. 62.

Because of extraterritoriality, Japanese offenders would be sent to the nearest Japanese Consulate. However, in practice, this kind of case was difficult because it was related to foreign relations. In the December of 1917 the Magistrate of Zunhua, a county of what was Zhi-li Province, arrested a Japanese shop-keeper named Itagaki, who was caught illegally trading in morphine. The Magistrate instructed the Police Officer of that county to notify the Commissioner of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to send Itagaki to the Japanese Consulate in Tianjin.³⁸⁰ In the meantime, the Police Office confiscated the mail of another two Japanese merchants to prevent news of the arrest from spreading. However, the Post Officer viewed this as an improper action and reported the police action to the General Post Office and then to the Ministry of Communication. Because there was no regulation about whether Chinese officials could confiscate the letters of foreigners, the Ministry of Communication consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about how to deal with this case.

The Ministry decided that it was right for Itagaki to be detained but it was improper to interfere with the mail of other Japanese merchants. It suggested that the Ministry of Communication should instruct the Post Office to send the letters. However, those letters had already been opened and the Police had discovered that the merchants had written for to the Japanese Consul in Tianjin and a merchant in Tangshan appealing for the help of the Japanese military. The Magistrate's decision was to arrange for the Police Officer to bring the letters along with the offender Itagaki to Tianjin.³⁸¹ Although there are no historical sources to show what happened next, this story shows the complexities of dealing with cases of Japanese smugglers.

³⁸⁰ From the beginning of the Republican China, the Foreign Ministry had set "Office of the Commissioner" at some border regions and cities where resided large amount of westerners. Those offices were withdrawn gradually in the 1940s.

³⁸¹ "日人販賣嗎啡被扣郵件事" (Japanese Merchants' Mail were Detained because Selling Morphine), 1917-1918, Archives of the Institute of Modern History of Academic Sinica, 03-02-052-02.

Even when Japanese offenders were caught by Chinese authorities and sent to the Consulates, they could still elude punishment. The third quarterly report of the Tianjin Anti-Narcotic Society in 1919, stated that four raids upon opium and morphine dens were carried out in August of that year. A newspaper report reviewed that “the most significant case found in this report is that of the Japanese morphine dealers in Chang-li”.³⁸² The review also quoted one paragraph from the report:

Two Japanese, (whose names were given in Chinese equivalents), alleged to be morphine dealers were taken to the Magistrate’s Yamen with the cooperation of the police. On their premises, eight Chinese were found, being there to obtain morphine injections. They were also taken to the Yamen as well as a quantity of morphine and a needle. Two small packets of the drug were previously bought by the society detective from that store.³⁸³

This extract was followed with a summary of the reviewer on the consequence of this case, and that of similar cases.

After passing through the series of legal procedures, the case turned out to be such that the two Japanese were released by the Japanese Consul on the ground that the charge was “without evidence”. The case itself has been referred to the International Anti-Opium Association in Peking for further action.

Two similar cases also happened in Chien An-hsien and Lu Lung-hsien respectively. The Japanese offenders in those districts were ordered to leave after they had confessed.³⁸⁴

³⁸² Chang-li is a coastal county in Hebei Province, which was about 200 km east of Tianjin.

³⁸³ “New Books and Publications: The Anti-Narcotic Society”, *Millard’s Review of the Far East (1919-1921)*, 13 December 1919.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

The Tianjin Anti-Narcotic Society's report did not provide information about whether the eight Chinese men were using morphine there or worked as agents for the Japanese shop keepers. However, other evidence suggests that even for Chinese offenders, the regulations were not always well implemented. For instance, Wu Lien-teh complained in an address in 1917 that "rigorous imprisonment for two years is a common sentence for Chinese found with morphine in their possession", although "the principal culprits often escape punishment".³⁸⁵ Though Wu's argument is only partly reliable as he was an ardent prohibitionist and might have exaggerated the situation, the abovementioned case in 1919 involving Li Yin-tang suggests that Chinese offenders did not end up being punished even when caught red-handed.

The drive against the non-medical use of the refined substances was not confined to government. Civil bodies became increasingly significant in anti-narcotics politics in the Republican period. As chapter three showed, regional anti-opium bodies established in the 1900s grew to become wider organizations such as the China National Anti-Opium Association established in 1910 and the International Anti-Opium Association in 1918. While the China National Anti-Opium Association faded after a short period, the IAOA worked into the 1920s, when the National Anti-Opium Association took over its role in 1924.³⁸⁶ By 1920 the IAOA had about two hundred sub-branches across China.³⁸⁷ They enabled the Association to collect information on the drugs issue from around the country. Moreover, this Association had connections with medical professionals, merchants, the educated elites,

³⁸⁵ Wu Lien-teh, "The Menace of Morphine", *Peking Gazette (1915-1917)*, 27 February 1917.

³⁸⁶ Edward R. Slack Jr. "The National Anti-Opium Association and the Guimindang State, 1924-1927", in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi eds. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839-1952*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 248-269.

³⁸⁷ Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018. p. 268.

journalists, politicians, and diplomats.³⁸⁸ The IAOA also paid attention to the issue of refined drugs. For instance, at a meeting held on 20 June 1919 in Beijing, A.E. Blanco described the danger to China of the morphine trade. “Members and friends of the International Anti-Opium Association” attended the meeting and *The Shanghai Times* published a summary of his speech

Mr. Blanco said that with opium at the present high price only the vicious rich seem to be able to indulge in the drug, but the coolie can and does pay a few coppers for an injection of morphia which makes him forget the toil, the hardships, the monotony of his life. This horrible, sordid trade was increasingly daily, and in the farthest corners of Mongolia the victims of morphia can be counted by the thousand. Mr. Blanco exhibited a morphia syringe of native construction that had been sent him by one of the Belgian Missionaries who laid the entire blame for the present traffic in morphia at the door of Japan. Mr. Blanco then pointed out that as in recent years a considerable amount of morphia had been exported from Great Britain and from Japan transhipped to China, and while it was inconceivable that the British Government would continue to be an accessory to such a traffic, this was an international question and the main work of this Association is to assist in erecting an international system whereby the illicit traffic in the above mentioned drugs shall be entirely suppressed.³⁸⁹

These organisations can, in part, be seen as a civil response to the loss of central government power over drugs issues after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. They can also be accounted for by rising nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century.³⁹⁰ When Republican China was established in 1912, many people expected

³⁸⁸ An analysis on how this Association along with other contemporary anti-narcotic activists pursued international drugs regulatory cooperation, see Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018. pp. 267-278.

³⁸⁹ “Meeting of the International Anti-Opium Association, Speaker Condemns the ‘Horrible, Sordid Trade’ in Morphia”, *The Shanghai Times (1914-1921)*, 28 June 1919.

³⁹⁰ Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, pp. 32-37.

the new government to initiate a new era. When those anti-opium associations appealed to the central government to terminate the Ten-Year Agreement with Britain, one main argument was that China should retrieve its 'sovereign rights' over the suppression of opium.³⁹¹ The anti-opium movement was thus connected with the contemporary discourse of getting rid of all forms of colonial government on Chinese soil by foreign nations. It was under the pressure of public opinion, for example, that President Xu Shi-chang purchased the last legally imported Indian opium from Shanghai merchants and burned it at the Bund in 1919.³⁹² Action on morphine, heroin and cocaine quickly became integrated into their agendas.

The Rise and Fall of the Bureau

As in 1909, when Customs officials had taken the initiative in calling for the inclusion of cocaine in the morphine regulations, it was officers from that department who lay behind the early moves towards the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization in Shanghai. In March 1918 Francis Aglen, the Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, appealed to the Revenue Council to establish a 'Poisons Inspection Bureau' to 'control and guard against the smuggling and illicit sale of narcotic drugs'. After discussion, a meeting of the Cabinet (國務會議) of the Beiyang Government decided that the Epidemic Prevention Office of the Ministry of the Interior would establish that Bureau. Circumstances seemed to be against it and *The North-China Herald* reported that "On account of political disturbance, however, its establishment was indefinitely postponed".³⁹³ A report published in *Shenbao* asserted that the postponement was

³⁹¹ 丁義華, "論鴉片廢約之迫不及待", *申報*, 21 November 1910. (Edward Waite Thwing, "On the Urgency of Abolishing the Opium Agreement", *Shenbao*); "中國爭廢鴉片條約大會紀事", 22 November 1910, *申報*. (Anonymity, Notes of the Meeting for Appealing to Abolish the Opium Agreement, *Shenbao*).

³⁹² Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 41.

³⁹³ "Drug Inspection Bureau: Chinese Government Office for Shanghai", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 16 December 1922. In the English primary sources such as newspaper reports, the name of the proposed bureau was "Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation". In the Chinese primary sources, it was called "毒藥管理局" (literally means

because it was hard to raise the funding.³⁹⁴ Both reasons were probably part of the decision. A year later the Inspector General appealed again for such a Bureau and it was finally founded in 1922 in Shanghai.

A report in *Shenbao* argued that in order to control expenses, central government had decided to set up an experimental Bureau in Shanghai which, if successful, could be replicated elsewhere.³⁹⁵ Other newspapers reported that the central government planned to establish six bureaus in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Fengtian and two places in Sichuan province. The first was to be established in Shanghai because, as one article explained, “Shanghai, besides other places, is a hotbed of such drugs”.³⁹⁶ The city was also the biggest treaty port in China and important for the economy of the Republican government.

It was noteworthy that the Bureau was established as the “Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization” when initially it was conceived as the “Poisons Regulation Bureau”.³⁹⁷ This suggests that officials of the central government at the beginning of the Republican China adopted some ideas of the Qing government towards narcotic drugs such as morphine and cocaine. As chapter two shows, when the Governor of Jiangsu province Chen Qi-tai appealed to the central government to issue a regulation on morphine, he stated that the officials in Jiangsu province first intended to put the drug under the article about Wu Gu (巫蛊, witchcraft and poison made of poisonous insects) of the *Great Qing Legal Code*, but decided

“Bureau of Regulating Poisons”) before its establishment, then changed to “違禁藥品管理局” (literally means “Bureau of Regulating Illegal Drugs”). This chapter uses the contemporary translation, i.e. “Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation” to refer to this Bureau, rather than a literal translation of its Chinese name.

³⁹⁴ “開辦違禁藥品管理局”, 24 December 1922, *申報*, (“Establishing the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization, *Shenbao*).

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ “違禁藥品管理局之內容”, *申報*, 3 February 1923, (Declaration and Tentative Prospectus of the Bureau, *Shenbao*); “Drug Inspection Bureau: Chinese Government Office for Shanghai”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 16 December 1922.

³⁹⁷ “毒藥管理局不日成立”, *申報*, 2 December 1922. (“A Poison Regulation Bureau will be Established Soon”, *Shenbao*).

against it. So they appealed the central government to issue a special regulation on that drug.

An editorial mentioned that the IAOA praised this decision of the Chinese government and commented that the provisional articles were the same as the regulations issued in Britain.³⁹⁸ The name of the Bureau was then changed to the “Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”.³⁹⁹ This change was suggested by Dr Wu Lien-teh, the Cambridge graduate and the man who had established his reputation in leading the successful campaign to tackle the 1910-1911 plague in Manchuria.⁴⁰⁰ The decision to change the name of the Bureau to follow his suggestion seems significant. It shows that Wu Lien-teh was able to exert more influence on policies on public health, based on a growing respect in government circles for those practicing western medicine.⁴⁰¹

When the Bureau was finally established in 1922, the person picked by the central government to direct the Bureau was Li Ying-mi. Li passed the selection examination organised by the Qing government in 1906 then studied medicine at St Louis University in Missouri with a state scholarship. Students who passed the same examination and went to the USA including W.W. Yen and Alfred Sao-ke Sze, both of whom had become famous diplomats during the late Qing and Republican China.⁴⁰² After studying in the USA, both Yen and Sze worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Government, while Li was appointed to the Ministry of

³⁹⁸ “違禁藥品管理局之內容”, *申報*, 3 February 1923. (“Declaration and Tentative Prospectus of the Bureau”, *Shenbao*). The source did not mention which was the British regulation. It should be the 1920 Dangerous Drugs Act.

³⁹⁹ Literal translation of the Chinese name of this Bureau is “Bureau of Prohibited Drugs Inspection”.

⁴⁰⁰ Wu Lien Teh pioneered the use of gauze face masks during the Manchurian plague of 1910-11. See Christos Lynteris, “Plague Masks: The Visual Emergence of Anti-Epidemic Protection Equipment”, *Medical Anthropology*, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2018, pp. 442-257.

⁴⁰¹ “開辦違禁藥品管理局”, *申報*, 24 December 1922. (“Establishment of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Shenbao*).


⁴⁰² “考試留學生等第名單”, *申報*, 24 October 1906. (“Score ranking of the students who are going to studying abroad”, *Shenbao*).

the Army in 1908 on his return to China.⁴⁰³ It is unclear how his career progressed but on December 13th 1922 he became the first Director of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization, which was situated at No.55 Boulevard des Deux Republiques, a street on the border between Shanghai County and the French Concession (Figure 2.).

His first work was to draft regulations and after just eleven days in post he sent to the Ministry of the Interior the *Provisional Articles of Association for the Bureau*, the *Articles of Association about Registration for Chinese and Western Drug Stores*, and the *Provisional Articles of Association for Issuing Special Licenses*. After making some revisions, the Ministry of the Interior sent them to the Jiangsu provincial government and instructed the latter to assist the Bureau by putting those regulations into force.⁴⁰⁴ According to those regulations, all drug stores needed to register at the Ministry of the Interior. Prices of licenses varied and were based on the amount of the registered capital of the drug stores. For instance, drug stores with a registered capital of 100,000 yuan needed a license with a price of 400 yuan. If the drug store increased its registered capital or changed its name, it had to register again. Other than this “basic” license, if the drug store wanted to sell morphine, cocaine, and heroin, it needed a special license issued by the Ministry of Interior. Three kinds of special license were sold at the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation. The first one was an “Annual special license” which permitted the drug stores to keep a small amount of refined drugs for medical use. The second kind of license called a “Provisional special license” which permitted pharmacies to temporarily keep some refined drugs, for emergencies such as a plague outbreak. The third kind of license was a “wholesale license” which permitted the pharmacies

⁴⁰³ “京師近事”, *申報*, 15 June 1908. (News in the capital, *Shenbao*). Yen was the first Vice Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1912, then Premier and President in 1920s. Sze was the Minister to the United States in and representative to a few of international conferences in 1920s, including the Geneva Opium Conferences in 1924-25.

⁴⁰⁴ “開辦違禁藥品管理局”, 24 December 1922, *申報*. (“Establishment of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Shenbao*).



Map 1. A map of Shanghai in 1923. Source:

https://www.virtualshanghai.net/Asset/Preview/vcMap_ID-1884_No-01.jpeg

to run a wholesale business. Except the provisional one, the other two kinds of special licenses needed to be renewed every year, with fees.⁴⁰⁵

Although the establishment of the Bureau was hailed by the General Secretary of the International Anti-Opium Association as “a very laudable effort on the part of the Chinese Government”,⁴⁰⁶ when Li Ying-mi intended to implement those regulations, he confronted various difficulties. The first difficulty was the intense resistance of drug stores, since they needed to pay fees to register and to pay more annual fees if their business involved morphine, cocaine and heroin. Moreover, since it was an experimental regulation in Shanghai only, drug stores in other cities did not find themselves facing similar regulations and expenses. By February 1923, the Medicine Research Society of Northern Shanghai had convened more than ten times to discuss the regulations of the Bureau. It also submitted documents to the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Jiangsu provincial government to complain of the difficult situation that had been created for drug stores in Shanghai. The document submitted to the Jiangsu provincial government was through the Office of the Wusong and Shanghai Guardian. The Guardian acknowledged the difficulties faced by the drug stores and hinted that he had been thinking of abolishing the Bureau. The meeting of the Medicine Research Society of Northern Shanghai on February 20th threatened action; “if the Bureau sends someone to inspect our stores, or the Bureau takes some other actions, we will not cooperate in any case, to show our determined objection.”⁴⁰⁷

Chinese drug stores were particularly resistant. They argued that the name of the department was the “Bureau of Regulating Illicit Drugs” (i.e. the “Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation”. This is a literal translation of its Chinese name 違

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ “Control of Narcotics by Chinese”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, 3 February 1923.

⁴⁰⁷ “反對違禁藥品管理局”, 20 February 1923, *時報*. (“Resist the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Shi Bao*).

禁藥品管理局), and because they merely sold traditional Chinese medicine rather than “illicit drugs”, it was unnecessary for them to register. The drug stores which should register at the Bureau were those “Chinese-Western drug stores”.⁴⁰⁸ According to the research of Huang Ko-wu, at the beginning of the Republican period, there were many more Chinese medicine stores than western medicine stores in Shanghai, although the latter placed many more advertisements in the newspapers.⁴⁰⁹ This situation changed during the First World War when western owned drug stores developed more slowly while Chinese-owned ‘western medicine drug stores’ had the opportunity to expand with supplies from Japan. Those Chinese operated drug stores, which sold western medicine or both western and Chinese medicine, gradually became rivals to the Chinese Traditional Medicine drug shops. After the First World War, the competition became much harsher because the businesses of Westerners in China gradually recovered, as medicine was again imported from Europe after 1918.⁴¹⁰

In addition to the resistance of drug stores, Li Ying-bi’s Bureau also came into conflict with the local authorities in Shanghai. The first to object was the Wusong and Shanghai Guardian, which was the base of the military Guardian and the real seat of power in Shanghai after 1916.⁴¹¹ At the beginning of 1923, when the

⁴⁰⁸ “滬北醫藥會呈內務部文反對違禁藥品注冊新章”, *申報*, 4 September 1923. (“The Medicine Society of Northern Shanghai Submitted a Document to the Ministry of the Interior to Object the New Registration Policy”, *Shenbao*).

⁴⁰⁹ 黃克武, “從申報醫藥廣告看民初上海的醫療文化與社會生活, 1912-1926”, *中央研究院近代史研究所集刊*, 1988 年第 17 期下, 第 141-194 頁. (Huang Ko-wu, “An Analysis of the Medical Culture and Social Life in Early Republican China with the Medicine Advertisements on *Shenbao*, 1912-1926”, *Journal of the Institution of Modern History of Academia Sinica*, issue 17 B, 1988, pp. 141-194.); Max K.W. Huang, “Medical Advertisement and cultural Translation: the Case of *Shenbao* in Early Twentieth-Century China”, in Pei-yin Lin and Weipin Tsai eds. *Print, Profit, and Perception: Ideas, Information and Knowledge in Chinese Societies, 1895-1949*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004, pp. 114-147.

⁴¹⁰ Shanghai Medical Company, Shanghai Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and The Institute of Economy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science eds. *Development of the Western Medicine Industry in Modern Shanghai (上海近代西藥行業史)*, 1988, Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press, pp. 54-120. Regarding how Chinese entrepreneurs gradually established their medicine business network in China and Southeast Asia by marketing and cultivating consumer culture, see Sherman Cochran, *Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.

⁴¹¹ Guardians were part of a tentative military system by the Beiyang Government which was initiated by the *Provisional Regulations on Guardians* issued in 1913. When Yuan Shi-kai planned to declare

Minister of Portugal in Beijing complained that the Ministry of the Interior had established this Bureau in Shanghai without getting the consent of western powers, it was to the *Wusong* and *Shanghai Guardian* that they turned. The *Wusong* and *Shanghai Guardian* stated that it did not get any notification from the Bureau or the Ministry of the Interior before the Bureau was established.⁴¹² In 1923, the *Wusong* and *Shanghai Guardian* reported to the Ministry of the Interior that the Bureau was coming into conflict with the drug stores in Shanghai. In November 1923, the Ministry of the Interior instructed the Bureau to ignore the resistance of the Chinese drug stores and to notify the Chamber of Commerce that the registration system would continue.⁴¹³

Another authority was the Shanghai Municipal Council, which governed the International Settlement and the French Concession and which represented the Western communities in the city. On 24 January 1923 the Council discussed the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization. News about the establishment was published on January 7th in the *Shanghai Sunday Times*. In the view of the Council, that news report was misleading since it suggested that the Bureau might be endeavouring to get chemists and druggists in the Settlement to take out licenses and that the Council should publish a notice in its Gazette to notify the chemists and druggists that the Bureau did not have the power to operate in the jurisdiction of the Council. After some discussion, the Council concluded that it should not take any action before consulting with the Senior Consul.⁴¹⁴ The Bureau found itself attracting unwanted attention from the foreign powers in Shanghai.

himself as the Emperor in 1916, he appointed his follower Zheng Ru-cheng as the Guardian of Shanghai and promoted this position to a level which was affiliated to the Beiyang Government not Jiangsu province. The purpose of this action was to contain the power of the warlord Feng Guo-zhang who was governing Jiangsu province. When Zheng was assassinated in 1915, Yuan appointed Yang Shan-de as the Guardian. Yang was later promoted as the Military Governor of Zhejiang province and Lu Yong-xiang succeed the position. Then he appointed his follower He Feng-lin as the Guardian.

⁴¹² “護軍使飭查違禁藥品管理局”, 4 February 1923, *申報*. (“The Guardian Ordered to Investigate the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Shenbao*).

⁴¹³ “違禁藥品管理局仍須進行”, 4 November 1923, *申報*. (“The Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation should Continue Its Work”, *Shenbao*).

⁴¹⁴ *The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council*, volume XXII, 1922-1924, pp. 268-269.

In response to this opposition, the Bureau published a lengthy declaration in *Shenbao* on 3 February 1923 justifying its existence, and laying out its remit. It is worth quoting in full as it also includes the regulations for the registration of the drug stores.

This Bureau is established under the ordinance of the central government. It aims to suppress all kinds of narcotic drugs and to manage the registration issue of both Chinese and Western medicine men. The relative regulations issued by the Ministry of the Interior are on the record (i.e. The establishment of the Bureau was really under the ordinance of the Ministry of the Interior and this could be checked). Since China initiated the opium suppression movement, morphine, cocaine and heroin as well as other narcotic drugs have been imported and the amount has increased day after day, month after month. However, there is no record of the distribution of those refined drugs, neither inspection on how they were used to manufacture drugs. Thus the refined drugs have flooded in the stores of the cities and have poisoned the whole society. Not only Chinese people worry about this situation, but also many foreigners are sorry for it. The Article XIII of the *Hague Opium Convention* stipulates that the contracting countries could only export morphine, cocaine and their derivatives from their countries to other countries when they have received a licence issued in accordance with the laws of the importing country authorising them to export the drugs. Article XIV stipulates that the contracting countries shall apply the laws and regulations respecting the manufacture, import, sale, or export of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts. Article XV stipulates that the contracting countries having treaties with China shall, in conjunction with the Chinese Government, take the necessary measures to prevent the smuggling into Chinese territory, as well as into their Far-Eastern Colonies and into the leased territories which they occupy in China, of raw and prepared opium, morphine,

cocaine, and their respective salts, as also of the substances referred to in Article XIV of the present Convention. Article XVI stipulates that the Chinese government shall promulgate pharmacy laws to suppress [the illegal use]. It also stipulates that the contracting countries having treaties with China shall examine these laws, if they find them acceptable, and apply them to their nationals residing in China. In 1919, based on those stipulations of the *Convention*, the Inspectorate General of the Maritime Customs drafted and submitted a nine point appeal. He appealed the central government to establish a “Bureau for Regulating Poisons” and to enact regulations for issuing licenses [to the drug stores]. After considering the appeal, the Ministry of the Interior submitted it to the Cabinet. The Cabinet discussed this issue and passed the proposal. However, as the central government has been busy on other more important issues, establishing this Bureau was postponed. Recently, the League of Nations and the International Anti-Opium Association have repeatedly asked the Chinese government about the regulations it has for tackling the issues of cocaine and morphine. The central government has been worrying about the worsening situation of the drugs. Meanwhile, it has been facing the international pressure. Therefore, the central government has referred to the “regulations on medicine men” of other countries and formulated its own. It has decided to establish a Bureau in Shanghai and all the Chinese and Western medicine men shall register with it. The Bureau will issue license to them. It will also issue special licenses at certain occasions in order to make sure the supply for legitimate use of refined drugs. These policies would benefit the inspections and this is the first step to prevent the illegal trade and sale of the refined drugs. Thus, this Bureau will definitely confirm to the ordinance of the Ministry of the Interior. It will also view suppressing those poisons as its duty. All the medicine men shall understand the will of the Chinese government to establish its credit in China as well as in abroad, and the will of the Chinese government to protect the legitimate drug

business. The medicine men shall thus confirm to the laws and regulations without any postponement.⁴¹⁵

Following this action, the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization finally started inspections in June 1923, when it had already been in existence for half a year.⁴¹⁶ The Shanghai Daotai, the Director of the Police Agency in Shanghai, and Li Ying-mi co-issued a notification asking the pharmacies to register at the Bureau.⁴¹⁷ The problem was that the *Provisional Articles of Association of Issuing Special Licenses* of December 1922 were vague on enforcement. They stipulated that “the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization will send inspectors to drug stores to check whether the amount of narcotic drugs matched the number stipulated on their licenses. If not, they would be sent to “accountable department” to accept punishment”.⁴¹⁸ However, there was no detail about which department was in charge of these inspections.⁴¹⁹ Moreover, to implement its regulations, the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization needed the assistance of the Police Agency in Shanghai. However, this Bureau was affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior of the central government in Beijing. Not surprisingly, the Police Agency would not cooperate with the Bureau because it was the central government which could collect the revenues of the registration fees and licenses fees paid by drug stores in Shanghai.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁵ “違禁藥品管理局之內容”, *申報*, 3 February, 1923. (“Declaration and Tentative Prospectus of the Bureau”, *Shenbao*). It is worth to note that while the declaration of the Bureau referred four Articles of the *Hague Opium Convention*, it actually summarised the content of the articles not directly quoted them. It also omitted some content, such as the second sentence of the Article XV of the *Convention*, “The Chinese Government shall, on their part, take similar measures for the suppression of the smuggling of opium and of other substances above referred to from China to the foreign colonies and leased territories”.

⁴¹⁶ “違禁品管理局實行稽查”, 10 June 1923, *申報*. (“The Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization initiated the inspection”, *Shenbao*).

⁴¹⁷ “藥商均應注冊之會銜布告”, 15 June 1923, *申報*. (“Joint-issued notification about pharmacies should register”, *Shenbao*).

⁴¹⁸ This is translated from the original text “違禁藥品管理局得隨時派員密查各藥店所出售藥品數量是否與執照所載相符如有不正當情形應交由該管官廳依法懲辦”. See “違禁藥品管理局之內容”, *申報*, 3 February, 1923. (“Declaration and Tentative Prospectus of the Bureau”, *Shenbao*).

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁰ Before the establishment of the Bureau, the drug stores registered with the Police Office. Unsurprisingly, the establishment and operation of the Bureau created tension with the police office.

The position of the Bureau gradually became more complex still. The Wusong and Shanghai Guardian established its own bureau for inspecting the business of refined drugs in 1923, to compete with the Bureau directed by Li Ying-mi. In addition, the Shanghai Municipal Council established a committee to investigate the issue in the Foreign Settlement. The Committee's report was published in the *Municipal Gazette* in November 1923.⁴²¹ It recommended establishing a board to deal with the issue of refined drugs in Shanghai, "consisting of one representative from each Consular Group, the Municipal Council, the French Concession, the Chinese Bureau, with two physicians, two chemists, a veterinary surgeon and a dentist".⁴²²

Despite the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation's struggles to assert itself in Shanghai, a similar institution had been established in Jiangxi province by the provincial authorities in 1924. As in Shanghai, the Bureau in Jiangxi provoked resistance. Representatives of the Jiangxi gentries demonstrated before the Presidential Palace and the Cabinet Office in Beijing to protest about the Bureau and they appealed to the central government to abolish it. It is very possible that those gentries were also merchants or had connections with merchants. At that time, merchants from different provinces had their representatives in the capital. Finally, the Cabinet sent a telegram to the governor of Jiangxi province, Cai Cheng-

The Bureau obtained some help from the Jiangsu provincial government (of which Shanghai was a county). On 21 June 1923, the Jiangsu provincial government instructed the Wusong and Shanghai Police Department, the Suzhou Police Department, and the Dao-yin (administration officer in charge of several counties), to assist the inspection of the Bureau. See "江蘇省長公署訓令第五四二〇號", 21 June 1923, *江蘇公報*. ("Instruction of the Jiangsu Provincial Governor Office, No. 5420", *Jiangsu Gazette*). This instruction quoted the regulation issued by the Ministry of the Interior concerning the registration issue, which stated that "Drug stores should register with the Bureau. The drug stores which previously registered with the police and the county magistrate office now also should register with the Bureau".

⁴²¹ "News from the Municipal Gazette", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, December 1st, 1923.

⁴²² "Sale of Dangerous Drugs", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, December 8th, 1923.

xun, and instructed him to abolish the Bureau since it was not only a harm to the residents in Jiangxi but also might provoke the protests of western countries.⁴²³

Li Ying-bi fought back in Shanghai and wrote a report directly linking the reluctant drug stores of the city to illegal activities:

Morphine, cocaine, heroin and other refined drugs came from abroad while Shanghai was a centre for selling various pills and liquid medicines produced with those materials. Most drug stores in Shanghai produced and advertised those drugs under camouflage of medicine, such as recent popular white pills, red pills, purple pills and golden grains. They were sold in many cities and towns, especially the areas along the railway from Shanghai to Nanjing. For the corners of inland areas especially those along Changjiang (i.e. Yangtze River), shipping was the method. Many of those drugs were advertised openly as tonic while all of the samples I tested contain heroin, strychnine, caffeine etc.⁴²⁴

He sent this report to the Jiangsu provincial government and asked for their help when the Bureau sent staff to investigate the drug issues there. What he expected was that when investigators found that drug stores sold products containing refined substances, the local authorities in Jiangsu province would arrest the shop keepers involved.⁴²⁵ Since Li was an official of the central government in Beijing which was controlled by Zhi warlords, and Jiangsu province was under the power of the Wan warlords, Li's strategy seemed optimistic. In fact the Jiangsu authorities responded with objections to the Bureau's registration policy. In support of the Chinese drug

⁴²³ "Anti-Poison Bureau in Kiangsi: Indignation of the Gentry and Petition for Suppression", April 26th, 1924, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*.

⁴²⁴ "違禁藥品局請協助調查", 12 May 1924, *新聞報*. ("The Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization Asked Assistance for its Investigation", *Xin Wen Bao*).

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*

stores that had already resisted that policy, the Jiangsu provincial government pressed the Bureau for revisions.⁴²⁶

The Bureau changed the registration policy. The revised registration policy stipulated that drug stores which merely sold Chinese medicine could register at the Bureau with no need to pay the registration fees. Chinese drug stores which sold pills and patent medicines still needed to register at the Bureau with 10% of the previous stipulated registration fees. In addition, they were required to send samples of the pills and patent medicines to the Bureau for examination.⁴²⁷

However, this condition was also resisted by the Chinese drugs stores. In the note sent from their association to the Bureau, they applauded Jiangsu provincial government and argued with the Bureau that the registration violated long traditions in China. In addition, they protested that their drug stores had already paid tax to the government so should not be burdened with further charges.⁴²⁸

Another editorial penned by this association was explicitly given the title *Responsibility*. That editorial argued that since the unit's name was the 'Bureau of Regulating Illicit Drugs' and the Chinese drug stores did not use illicit drugs, it was not its responsibility to require them to register and send samples to test.⁴²⁹

Despite these setbacks, the Bureau opened branches in Suzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, Xuzhou and another one in Shanghai which was responsible for the western Huangpu River areas.⁴³⁰ This was achieved by the new director Gu Cheng,

⁴²⁶ “本會致違禁藥品管理局公函”，*神州醫學雜誌*，1925。（“A Letter from this Association to the Bureau of Drugs Inspection and Standardization”，*Shen Zhou Medical Journal*）.

⁴²⁷ “違禁藥品管理局之佈告”，5 March 1925。（“Notification of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”，*Xin Wen Bao*）.

⁴²⁸ “本會致違禁藥品管理局公函”，*神州醫學雜誌*，1925。（“A Note from this Association to the Bureau of Drugs Inspection and Standardization”，*Shen Zhou Medical Journal*）.

⁴²⁹ “責任”，*神州醫學雜誌*，1925。（“Responsibility”，*Shen Zhou Medical Journal*）.

⁴³⁰ “設立違禁藥品分局”，25 August 1924，*新聞報*。（“The Bureau of Drugs Inspection and Standardization will Establish Branches”，*Xin Wen Bao*）；“組設違禁藥品管理分局”，10 March 1925。（“The Bureau of Drugs Inspection and Standardization has Established Branches”，*Xin Wen Bao*）；“浦西違禁藥品管理局佈告”，24 March 1925，*新聞報*。（“Notification of the Western Huangpu River Office of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”，*Xin Wen Bao*）.

who succeed Li Ying-bi in the middle of 1924.⁴³¹ However, it did not mean that he was more powerful than Li. In fact, this was an outcome of the “Jiangzhe War”, a serial of battles between various warlords in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces from September 1924 to January 1925. Shanghai and other parts of Jiangsu province were seized by Feng Warlords who also had a grip on the central government in Beijing. The Bureau seized this opportunity and expanded during the first months of their control. However, this success did not last too long. The Bureau’s expansion was resisted in certain areas. In February 1925, the Jiangsu provincial government instructed the local authorities to end branches established in Nantong and Rugao counties because “they were illegal and disturbed the populace there”.⁴³²

However, the final blow came about under its third director, Shi Feng-xiang. Shi succeeded Gu Cheng at the beginning of 1925. During the first two months in that position, Shi abused his power for personal gains and thus angered some citizens in Shanghai. On 28 April 1925, Chen Zhen-chao and several other Shanghai citizens sent a joint-report to the National Anti-Opium Association. They appealed to the Association to join in opposition to the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation and to telegraph the central government to investigate the Bureau and to punish its directors. The report reads

In consideration of the unrestricted importation of the refined drugs and their harm to the people, the central government established the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation in Shanghai. The purpose was to limit the refined drugs to the legitimate use and to eliminate their damage to the

⁴³¹ A journalistic report published on *Shenbao* on 8 August 1926 stated that the Li Ying-bi was resigned from the director in the May of 1923 and the third director Shi Feng-xiang started his work at the spring of 1924. Both of those dates were not true. For this journalistic report, see “恢復違禁藥品管理局之呈請” (Appeal of Recovering the Operation of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization), August 8th, 1926, *Shenbao* .

⁴³² “假名設立違禁藥品局之查禁”, 28 February 1925, *新聞報*. (“Ban the Fake Branches of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Xin Wen Bao*). “Fake” here means someone assumed the name of the Bureau and pretended to be staff of its branches offices. In that way, they could extort drug stores.

people. However, its previous director Gu Cheng did not follow this. He breached his duty and took this as a chance to gain money. Without the permission of the Ministry [of the Interior], he established branch offices, hired staff, and asked them to inspect and investigate [the drugs issue]. He also sold the positions of the Bureau: officer for the Suzhou branch office was priced at 600 yuan, officer for Zhabei branch office 1,000 yuan, inspector 300 yuan and investigator 200 yuan. Moreover, he recruited scoundrels to seize opium and to issue excessive fines in the name of inspecting illicit drugs. The police has interfered with them repeatedly. Thus there are records on those issues and it is easy [for you] to check. Part of the seized opium is retained for his own use and the rest has been re-sold to opium dealers. The fines are put into their own purses and never have been submitted to the government. Thus they have been using the government agency which was established for regulating refined drugs to seize and trade opium. Suppressing opium is related to the international treaties and Shanghai is a place where many foreigners reside who could see and hear this case. This is an embarrassment for China. It seems that the Ministry [of the Interior] also heard about this; thus it moved Gu Cheng from that position and appointed Shi Feng-xiang as the new director, Fan Da-yuan as the vice-director. [The central government] expected them to be able to reform and clean the previous malpractices. However, they have greatly disappointed the people. Their abuse has gone even further than that of the previous director and produced more harms. As soon as they were appointed, they notified the staff of the Bureau to pay the bribes as usual, otherwise they would be removed from the positions. The official notes issued by the Bureau could prove this. Recently, [the director of] this Bureau set up a branch office in Gaochun without the approval of the central government. The provincial governor noticed this and abolished the branch office there. (Partial content of the report omitted here [sic.]). We consider the aim of the central government in establishing this Bureau is to repress the vapour of the poisons (i.e. opium and refined drugs), but it has

been used to swindle money from the people. If this will not be punished, where is the position for the laws? Other than submitting an appeal to the Ministry of the Interior and the Jiangsu provincial governor, we are reporting to your Association. We hope your Association could view the people and nation's warfare as your vocation and join us to condemn [the Bureau], to telegraph the central government to abolish [it], and to punish [the officials of the Bureau]. This will be a very hopeful and joyful thing for our country.⁴³³

It is unclear whether the National Anti-Opium Association joined the group of citizens to appeal to the central and regional authorities to abolish the Bureau and to punish the directors. As the above report suggests, the several Shanghai citizens also sent an appeal to the Ministry of the Interior and the Governor of Jiangsu province.⁴³⁴ After receiving the appeal, the Ministry of the Interior, Gong Xin-zhan, sent an official, Dong Jia-hui, to investigate the case and report to the Ministry. Shortly after that, on 29 May 1925, the Ministry of the Interior sent another official, the Officer of General Service of the Ministry of the Interior, Zhou Jia-yan "to cooperate with Dong Jia-hui to take over the files etc. of the Bureau and investigate and prosecute severely".⁴³⁵ While sending those two officials to Shanghai to investigate and take over the Bureau, the Ministry of the Interior also sent a note to the Governor of Jiangsu province, Zheng Qian, to notifying him of those actions of the Ministry. It is noteworthy that in that note, the Ministry did not state that he would punish the directors of the Bureau. He only told the Governor that he

⁴³³ "滬公民責難違禁藥品管理局", 29 April 1925, *申報*. ("Shanghai Citizens Condemn the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation", *Shenbao*).

⁴³⁴ "內部查辦違禁藥品管理局", 1 June 1925, *申報*. ("The Ministry of the Interior Investigates and Prosecutes the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation", *Shenbao*). This source indicates that the Ministry of the Interior received their appeal. In its instruction to Dong Jia-hui (the first official sent to investigate the case), the Ministry of the Interior mentioned one name of the several Shanghai citizens, saying, "Chen Zhen-chao et al have appealed to punish the Director Shi Feng-xiang and Vice-Director Fan Da-yuan of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation".

⁴³⁵ "部令查辦違禁藥品局", 30 May 1925, *時報*. ("Ordinance of the Ministry of Interior to Investigate and Prosecute the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization", *Shi Bao*); "內部查辦違禁藥品管理局", 1 June 1925, *申報*. ("The Ministry of the Interior Investigates and Prosecutes the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation", *Shenbao*).

instructed the directors to stop the operation of the Bureau and let the officials he sent to Shanghai to tackle the case.⁴³⁶

However, things changed quickly. In a later note to the Su-Wan (abbreviation for Jiangsu and Anhui provinces) Pacification Commissioner (宣撫使) Lu Yong-xiang and the Governor of Jiangsu province Zheng Qian, the Ministry stated that

In the past few days, newspapers in Beijing have reported that some opium sold in Shanghai was pasted with revenue stamps of the Bureau of the Drug Inspection and Standardisation, namely, the 卍 pattern stamps. We are very shocked to read those news. In the first two months of being the Director, Shi Feng-xiang have applied to this Ministry about establishing branch offices at the transportation hubs in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces to inspect the drugs issue. We instructed him to postpone this action. Meanwhile, he enquired about the stipulations about the authority of the Bureau and names of the drugs the Bureau could inspect. We ordered him to wait for the issuance of a new regulation. We telegraphed him to stop enforcing the previous regulation for drug stores to register with the Bureau. We also notified him that once we issue a new regulation, we would notify him to enforce it. Thus, we never tolerate his requests. Moreover, the authority of the Bureau is just to inspect the drugs issue and to superintend drug stores. It was never approved to issue revenue stamps on drugs, let alone opium revenue stamps. If what the newspaper reported is truth, [the Director] is definitely undaunted and reckless. Unless we investigate the case and punish him strictly, we could completely eradicate the malpractice [of the Bureau] and implement the law and discipline. Other than instructing Dong Jia-hui to investigate and submit a reliable reply, we are asking your Commissioner and your Governor to instruct the Song-Hu (i.e. Wusong and Shanghai) police office to survey and watch

⁴³⁶ “部令查辦違禁藥品局”, 30 May 1925, *時報*. (“Ordinance of the Ministry of Interior to Investigate and Prosecute the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Shi Bao*).

over Shi Feng-xiang, with a view to punishing him. We appreciate your cooperation on this case.⁴³⁷

The above stories indicate some features of the contemporary political and economic situation which were related to the fate of the Bureau. The most important one might be the relationship between the central government and regional authorities. In the first note to the Governor of Jiangsu province, the Ministry of the Interior did not tell the Governor that he would punish the director of the Bureau probably because he had not received the report from the two officials he sent to Shanghai. It is also worthwhile to consider whether the two officials could carry out their investigation and prosecute the director of the Bureau. This was reflected by the fact that the Ministry of the Interior sent a lower-ranking official first, then sent another one who had a much higher rank. In his second note to the Governor of Jiangsu province (which was also sent to the Su-Wan Pacification Commissioner), although he asked the Commissioner and the Governor to investigate and detain the director, the Ministry did not mention that he had received the report from the officials he sent to Shanghai to investigate the case.

Another possible explanation is that the Ministry wanted to solve the problem with his authority and with a lower profile. Probably he did not intend to punish the director at first. It was the Ministry who established the Bureau in Shanghai. If something went wrong, he might prefer to send his personnel from Beijing to Shanghai to tackle the issue, not the local authorities. It was embarrassing for the

⁴³⁷ “内部查辦違禁藥品管理局”, 1 June 1925, *申報*. (“The Ministry of the Interior Investigates and Prosecutes the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation”, *Shenbao*). It is unclear why there was 卍 (萬字符) pattern stamp on the package of the opium but presumably because 卍 has the meaning of “auspicious” in Buddhism. This was similar to the situation during the Qing Dynasty when the opium package was sometimes printed with Chinese characters such as “福” “祿” “壽” (“blessing”, “prosperity” and “happiness” respectively). It seems that this packaging culture continued from opium to refined drugs. White cranes were printed on the “Fujitsuru and (false) Boehringer cocaine labels” of the confiscated cocaine in Hong Kong in 1925-26. This bird represents health, happiness and longevity in Chinese culture. For that white crane label, See Peter Thilly, “The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900-1937”, *Cross-Currents: Eastern Asian History and Culture Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017, p. 99.

Ministry that there was a scandal regarding the Bureau established by his department and situated in the judiciary of the Su-Wan Pacification Commissioner and the Governor of Jiangsu province. His first plan to solve the problem might be to abolish the Bureau to appease the anger of the Shanghai citizens. Although the scandal was an embarrassment for the Ministry, it was the reports in some Beijing newspapers that impelled him to take a stand to punish the director. This was different because the appeal submitted by the Shanghai citizens was a private communication. The newspaper reports in Beijing, then the capital, would be known by the officials of the central government there.

When the Ministry decided to punish the director Shi Feng-xiang, he obtained the help of the local authorities to investigate and detain the director. This could have been a strategy to show his stance on this scandal. It was also for practical reasons. In that situation, if he wanted to capture the director (and probably other involved officials), he needed the help of the Su-Wan Pacification Commissioner who was the military power in the two provinces, and the Governor of Jiangsu province, who was chief administrator in that region.

After receiving the note of the Ministry of the Interior, the Su-Wan Pacification Commissioner and the Governor of Jiangsu province consented to the decision of the Ministry of the Interior and instructed the Wusong and Shanghai Guardian to carry out the instruction.⁴³⁸ There is no further newspaper report on the result of the investigation, but sources in 1926 indicated that his action signalled the end of the Bureau.⁴³⁹

Conclusion

⁴³⁸ “部令查辦違禁藥品局”, 30 May 1925, *時報*. (“Ordinance of the Ministry of the Interior to Investigate and Prosecute the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization”, *Shi Bao*).

⁴³⁹ “呈請設局取締違禁藥品”, 8 August 1926, *新聞報*. (“Appeal to Establish a Bureau to Suppress the Illicit Drugs”, *Xin Wen Bao*).

Establishing a governmental bureau specifically dedicated to refined drugs at the beginning of the 1920s first resulted from the deteriorating drug situation in 1910s China. A larger consumption market in that decade was in part a result of the anti-opium campaigns initiated in the late Qing period, which produced a group of consumers who needed alternatives to opium for smoking to meet their cravings. Continuing medical education and practice also required refined drugs for medical use. In addition, 1910s was also a period when larger quantities of these substances became available on the global market. When European supply was interrupted during that period, Japan promptly filled the gap. Between those sources of supply and their consumers, were countless middle-men of a wide variety of nationalities eager to profit from running the gauntlet of the authorities. This “motley gaggle of small-time and uncoordinated entrepreneurs”,⁴⁴⁰ played an important role of growing the market for refined drugs in China in this period.

The timing and nature of the government response to this was not simply dictated by anxieties about consumers. The Inspector General of Maritime Customs Service asked for a specialist bureau to enforce regulations on licit and illicit supplies of refined drugs in 1918 but it only came about in 1922. The Chinese government faced difficulties in setting up the office in the first place because its ability to assert itself in Shanghai was often limited due to the unstable political situation in the period. Once established this instability continued to affect the Bureau. It also faced local opposition. This was partly economic as a well-organised body of drug store owners fought off efforts to impose greater regulation of their businesses and to impose levies on their profits. It was also partly political, as the local authorities resisted interference from central government in Beijing, and those in charge of the foreign settlements in the city ensured that it did not claim jurisdiction over transactions in refined drugs in their parts of town. The apparently opportunistic effort by its final director to line his own pockets was just the pretext to close it

⁴⁴⁰ Jim Mills, “Drugs, Consumption, and Supply in Asia: The Case of Cocaine in Colonial India, c.1900-c.1930”, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol 66, no 2, May 2007, p. 359.

down. Although there were sporadic appeals to re-establish a drugs inspection bureau after its demise,⁴⁴¹ it would be until the 1930 that central government would once again return to the idea. The next chapter looks at what happens when it did, and the argument that what eventually followed the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization in Shanghai enjoyed rather more success.

⁴⁴¹ “恢復違禁藥品管理局之呈請”, 8 August 1926. (“Appeal of Re-establishing the Bureau of Drugs Inspection and Standardization”, *Shenbao*).

Chapter Five “Such Bureau so as to Facilitate the Gigantic Task of Drug Eradication”: The Establishing the National Narcotics Bureau, and the Consumption of Refined Drugs in China, c. 1925-1945

Introduction

The preceding chapter explores the factors associated with the rise and fall of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation in 1920s Shanghai. The year following the closure of the Bureau Li Ying-mi, its first director, petitioned the Wusong and Shanghai Commerce Inspection Administration (淞滬商埠督辦公署) in August 1926 to re-establish the Bureau.⁴⁴² His request was not granted. It was seven years after the establishment of the Nanjing Nationalist Government in 1928 that a narcotics bureau on a national basis was finally established and it operated successfully until the end of the administration of the Nationalists in mainland China. This chapter will explore the history of this National Narcotics Bureau, focusing on the factors associated with its establishment and the impact of its operation on refined drugs markets in China. It will start in 1925 when the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation was shut down and will stop in 1945 when the Second World War came to an end.

The Last Years of the Beiyang Government (1925-1928)

⁴⁴² “恢復違禁藥品管理局之呈請”, *申報*, 8 August 1926. (“Appeal of Re-establishing the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation”, *Shenbao*). The Wusong and Shanghai Commerce Inspection Administration was the actual administration power of the Shanghai County from June 1925 to 29 March 1927, until the Shanghai Special Municipality was established by the Nanjing Nationalist Government in 1927. See 吳健熙, “丁文江和淞滬商埠督辦公署”, *史林*, issue 1, 1992, pp. 55-62, (Wu Jian-xi, “Ding Wen-jiang and the Wusong and Shanghai Commerce Inspection Bureau”, *Historical Review*); 呂俊偉, 王德剛, 孫傳芳, 濟南: 山東大學出版社, 1996, pp. 75-80, (Lü Jun-wei and Wang De-gang, *A Biography of Sun Chuan-fang*); 何漢威, “一九二六年淞滬商埠督辦公署總辦任內的丁文江”, *中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊*, 81(1), 2000, pp. 37-150, (Hon Wai-ho, “Ding Wen-jiang during His Term as Director-General of the WuSong and Shanghai Commerce Inspection Administration in 1926”).

In the last years of the Beiyang Government, the disturbed political situation became more and more unstable. Other than the continued conflict among the warlords, a Guangzhou Nationalist Government was also established in 1925. There were now two governments in China. Historian Su Zhi-liang has termed the year 1925 as “the year of opium wars”, in part because political rivals fought over control of trade in the drug in mainland China, and in part because all the upheaval resulted in a demand for temporary comfort or oblivion in local populations that endured the fighting. In turn, this stimulated suppliers to action.⁴⁴³

Contemporary newspaper reports provide a glimpse of the continuation of refined drugs consumption during this period. For instance, in June 1926 a correspondent of the *North-China Herald* reported from Manchuria. He stated that “another drug extensively handled is cocaine and this now comes mostly from Germany. There is always a good demand for this among the underworld of Harbin where some of the confirmed addicts are people in their teens”.⁴⁴⁴ Doctors continued to advertise their services to those who consumed these substances, although they remained opaque about just that their remedies consisted of. An advertisement in *The China Press* stated that Dr Maxmillian Langsner had just returned from his trip in north-China to Shanghai, and “has engaged an apartment at 151 Ave. Haig Phone West 6304 where he will be pleased if his former patients will call on him. The Dr will receive new patients by appointment ... for the treatment of ... opium, cocaine, liquor and drug addicts”.⁴⁴⁵

Refined drugs consumed in this period were mainly from Europe and Japan. In June 1926, K.T Chung, the General Secretary of the National Anti-Opium Association was quoted in *The China Press* as stating that, in the first three months of 1926, “the Customs seizures in China of morphine, heroin and cocaine from foreign sources

⁴⁴³ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, pp. 210-220.

⁴⁴⁴ “Smuggling in Manchuria: Opium to China, ‘Luxuries’ to Russia and Human Beings from Siberia”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 2 October 1926.

⁴⁴⁵ “Business and Official Notices”, *The China Press (1925-1938)*, 19 December 1926.

(Japan and Europe) have amounted to 8, 536 ounces. This amount is more than two-thirds of the total customs seizures of these drugs for the whole year 1925".⁴⁴⁶ The Chinese Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) held a National Convention in Jinan in August 1926. The Association stated that their study had shown that "Japanese morphia, heroin and cocaine are doing a tremendous amount of harm to the province (i.e. Shandong province). It is alleged that over \$ 5,000,000 worth of these drugs are consumed in Shantung per year".⁴⁴⁷ Those two claims could be supported by newspaper reports from Europe. On 14 January 1927, *The China Press* reprinted a news from Reuters that the Berlin police rounded up an international gang which was "ostensibly dealing in shaving-soap, boot polish, et cetera" but under which they were in fact smuggling narcotics. Twelve leaders of the gang were arrested, including three Russians, and the report asserted that "The gang mostly smuggled cocaine to China and Japan. This brought the dealers a profit of £50 a lb."⁴⁴⁸

Chinese nationals were certainly involved in the international smuggling of refined drugs at that time. In July 1926 Canadian Customs Officers and Royal Canadian Mounted Police pursued a car with three Chinese people in it. During the chase, one of them was seen to throw a parcel out of the window. The parcel was recovered and was found to contain morphine and cocaine to the wholesale value of \$ 2,000. Lim Fong-duck alias Gordon Lim, Wong Wing and Chang Shik were arrested and the latter was found to be a member of the crew of the *Empress of Asia*.⁴⁴⁹ Since the police was still investigating the case, the newspaper report did not reveal anything about the source of the confiscated morphine and cocaine, but an earlier report

⁴⁴⁶ K.T. Chung, "Correspondence: The Narcotic Problems of China", *The China Press (1925-1938)*, 10 June 1926. Chung referred the same statistics in his correspondence to another newspaper two days later. See K.T. Chung, "China's Narcotic Problem: Indigenous or International", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 12 June 1926.

⁴⁴⁷ "The Anti-Opium Movement: Week's Demonstration Organized by Chinese Y.M.C.A. for October", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 21 August 1926.

⁴⁴⁸ "Berlin Police Capture Opium Smuggling Gang", *The China Press (1925-1938)*, 14 January 1927.

⁴⁴⁹ "Our Canadian Letter", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 21 August 1926.

from Vancouver suggested that there had already been narcotic drugs trafficking via the steamers from China and Japan that year. The Canadian police and Customs officers had even dropped the prosecution of some drug runners in a bid to “discover and seize the ‘higher-ups’ in the illicit narcotic traffic”.⁴⁵⁰ Xiamen, the port city where large amounts of cocaine had been reported in the first decade of the twentieth-century, continued its role as a refined drugs smuggling hub in the mid-1920s. For example, in 1926 the s.s. Kutsang arrived in Shanghai from Amoy.

A large quantity of prepared opium and cocaine was discovered ingeniously hidden in the panelling of the smoking room on board the s.s. “Kutsang” which arrived from Amoy on Sunday. It was reported to Captain V. Mc C. Liddlell that a screw needed replacing in the panelling. Signs of tampering with being noticeable, the master ordered a stretch of the panelling to be removed and found the drugs hidden in the cavity. Revenue officers were called in later and made a further search of the vessel without result. Inquiries are being made, but so far no arrests have been made. The opium weighed 2,300 taels and the cocaine amounted to 25 pounds.⁴⁵¹

Although the political situation was disturbed, the Beiyang Government did try from time to time to tackle the illicit flows of refined drugs in the last years of its administration. On the application of the Special Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Commissioner of Foreign Affairs” in the source), the police of the Shanghai Municipal Council raided No 584 Guangzhou Road on 22 April 1925. The police “seized a quantity of strychnine, morphine and cocaine, together with a quantity of pills”. Judgement which was delivered on May 30 to two Italians, Messrs. Ramondino and Zau reads:

⁴⁵⁰ “Our British Columbia Letter”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 22 May 1926.

⁴⁵¹ “News Brevities”, *The China Press (1925-1938)*, 14 July 1926.

The charge is based on the special law for Morphia issued by the Presidential (sic.) Order of December 31, 1920, which prohibits and punishes dealings in narcotics and other drugs: prohibition which, however, must be construed to concern dealings carried on without the necessary permit. It has been conclusively shown in this case that the goods (other than the pills) that form the subject matter of this charge have been duly passed through the Customs, which, being a branch of the Chinese Government, the same has to be held as having granted the necessary permit. The goods therefore are not contraband goods, but have been legally imported. The charge therefore fails on this ground.

With reference to the pills, the charge must also fail, as it has been shown the quantity of the habit-forming drugs contained in these pills does not exceed the prescribed limit.

The charge is therefore dismissed and the goods are ordered to be returned to defendants.⁴⁵²

This judgement suggests some factors which deterred the enforcement of regulation on refined drugs. The first one was the importation policy. Some legally imported refined drugs could be used for other purposes, such as making narcotic pills in this case. As the judge stated, the seized refined drugs were not contraband and the charge thus failed. Secondly, there was tension between the central government and foreign settlements authorities. It is noteworthy that the raid was carried out because the application of the Special Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁵³ Since the Beiyang Government had no administrative power in

⁴⁵² "Municipal Gazette News", *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 22 August 1925.

⁴⁵³ The Beiyang Government set up a "Special Commissioner Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Shanghai (外交部駐滬特派員公署)" in 1916, to deal with foreign affairs there. It was abolished in 1929. The precursor of this Office was the "Commissioner Office of Trade in Shanghai" (駐滬通商交涉司) which was established in 1911.

the Settlements, the Police of the Shanghai Municipal Council might be reluctant to cooperate in carrying out the raid. The judgement stated that since the goods had passed through Maritime Customs, “a branch of the Chinese Government”, the charge should fail. This decision seems to be problematic if it is compared with some other cases in that year. Just a few months before this case, the Mix Court in Shanghai tried two opium and drugs related cases.

The wholesale trade in opium and drugs was very clearly proved in two cases concluded during the month. At 51 Canton Road 385 lb. of opium were seized, together with various documents, which showed the magnitude of the dealing carried on in various parts of the world. All seven accused were found guilty and sentences were imposed ranging from two months’ imprisonment and a fine of \$ 500 to 18 months’ imprisonment and a fine of \$ 500. One of the accused was also ordered to be expelled. In the other case the Police seized at 562 Foochow Road 96 bottles of strychnine hydrochloride, as well as a tin of morphia tablets and various pills and necessaries for their production. The Court sentenced two of the accused to 3 years’ imprisonment and a fine of \$ 500, while the third was awarded 6 months’ imprisonment.⁴⁵⁴

While the second case abovementioned also suggests that the Shanghai Municipal Council could enforce the regulations on refined drugs sometimes, it seems that in the areas under the administration of the Beiyang Government the implementation of policies could be worse, as signified by the discussions in chapter four regarding the rise and fall of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization in 1925.

The Policies of the Nanjing Nationalist Government

⁴⁵⁴ “Municipal Gazette News: Volunteers Corps Mixed Court Report for February”, *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941)*, 11 April 1925.

The Nanjing Nationalist Government adopted a range of methods to tackle the refined drugs issue from the outset of its administration. It started to tackle the issue of opium and refined drugs at the 105th session of the meeting of the Central Political Council (中政會) of the Nationalist Party. It was decided that the national administration based in Nanjing would eradicate the consumption of narcotic drugs within three years. To this end it was decided to instruct the Ministry of Finance to establish an “Opium Suppression Administration” (禁烟處), to instruct counties to establish “Opium Suppression Bureaus” (禁烟局) or “Anti-Opium Medicine Sales Offices” (戒烟藥品專賣處).⁴⁵⁵ In September 1927, the Ministry of Finance enacted a *Provisional Regulation for Opium Suppression* (禁烟暫行章程). Although it was a regulation on opium suppression, it also involved refined drugs as it also stipulated that the import of white and red pills, morphine, cocaine and heroin other than those for medicinal and scientific use should be prohibited.⁴⁵⁶ The next step was the establishment of the National Opium Suppression Commission in 1928.⁴⁵⁷ In September of that year, the Commission issued the *Regulation for Implementing the Anti-Opium Law* (禁烟法施行條例). This regulation mainly stipulated the structure of the new opium suppression government agencies. It also clarified the anti-opium measures which local authorities should take. For instance, the National Opium Suppression Commission and local authorities should send staff to transportation hubs to cooperate with the Customs to detect smuggling. Magistrates and mayors were also expected to organise random inspections of refined drugs flows in their

⁴⁵⁵ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 235.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid. Su does not mention cocaine in his narrative. The drug was actually listed in the Regulation. Fourth point of the Regulation reads: “Importation of all kinds of red pills, white pills, opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin etc. should be prohibited except for medicinal purpose”. See 中華民國國民政府浙江省政府令民字第一三八〇四號, *浙江省政府公報*, 27 October, 1927, p. 8. (“Instruction of the Zhejiang Provincial Government of the Republic of China”, no. 13804, *Gazette of Zhejiang Provincial Government*).

⁴⁵⁷ For the process of the establishment of this Commission and valuations on its function, see Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, pp. 236-237; Alan Baumler, *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse than Floods and Wild Beasts*, pp. 140-142. Historians have emphasised the work of this Commission on opium issues but neglected that on the issue of refined drugs.

administrative regions.⁴⁵⁸ However, this kind of regulation was just something on paper at that time, because of the relatively weak grip of the central government on many regions. As Alan Baumler has argued, “from 1929 to 1935, opium policy was made in the provinces”.⁴⁵⁹

The National Opium Suppression Commission also engaged in the work of sorting out the refined drugs situation.⁴⁶⁰ It repeatedly appealed to other governmental departments to cooperate in dealing with the issue of defining and monitoring the licit, medicinal and scientific, use of refined drugs. At the eleventh session of the Commission held in January 1929, it proposed to distribute licences for selling refined drugs to legitimate stores. The meeting resolved that the Commission would cooperate with the Ministries of the Interior and of Health to establish a bureau to regulate the medical and scientific use of these drugs.⁴⁶¹ On 20 April 1929, the Commission discussed a draft *Regulation on Medical Use of Narcotic Drugs* (麻醉藥品管理條例) and passed a revised version,⁴⁶² which paved the way for dealing with the issue of the medicinal and scientific use of narcotic drugs.

⁴⁵⁸ 齊磊, 胡金野, *中國禁毒史*, 上海: 上海社會科學院出版社, 2017. p. 205. (Qi Lei and Hu Jin-ye, *A History of Suppressing Narcotic Drugs in China*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press).

⁴⁵⁹ Alan Baumler, *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic*, p. 142.

⁴⁶⁰ Alan Baumler argues that the Commission was a “failure” but he draws this conclusion from the operation of this Commission on the opium issue. See Alan Baumler, *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic*, pp. 140-142.

⁴⁶¹ “The Importation of Narcotic Drugs: Proposal to Establish a Bureau for Control of Drugs”, *The North-China Herald*, 12 January 1929.

⁴⁶² “首都紀聞”, *申報*, 21 April 1929. (“News in the Capital”, *Shenbao*). Narcotic drugs (麻醉藥品, literally means “anaesthetic medicine”) here mainly refer to opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin and their derivatives. “麻醉藥品” was the phrase used to translate “narcotic drugs” at that time. Thus this chapter follows that way and uses “narcotic drugs”, although “麻醉藥品” more means to a nowadays phrase “psychoactive medicine”. It seems that medical use of narcotic drugs had raised discussions in the newspapers and journals since 1924, before the 1924-25 Geneva Opium Conferences was convened. The discussion at Geneva stimulated discussions in Chinese newspapers and magazines and the phrase “麻醉藥品” first emerged, such as “本省警務實錄: 部令調查麻醉藥品”, *甘肅警務周刊*, 1924, p. 18, (“Police News in this Province: the Ministry of the Interior Ordered to Investigate the Narcotic Drugs Issue”, *Police News Weekly of Gansu Province*); “國家專利之麻醉藥品”, *化學藥業雜誌*, 1924, pp. 20-21, (“Government Monopolised Narcotic Drugs”, *Journal of Chemical Medicine Industry*).

At this stage, however, the Nanjing Nationalist government was yet to assert control over the country. It was also yet to abandon the sale of opium as a source of revenue. At the beginning of the administration of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, the Ministry of Finance established an Opium Suppression Administration in the capital, Nanjing, and Opium Suppression Bureaus in the provinces. The Ministry of Finance abolished the Hubei Provincial Anti-Opium Bureau (湖北禁烟局) and established the Hubei and Hunan Special Tax Bureau (兩湖特稅處) in January 1929, because Hankou, the capital of Hubei province, was a hub for opium smuggling. The Hubei and Hunan Special Tax Bureau was a temporary governmental organization which was set to operate for only six months. However, it continued for five years (1929-1934) because its purpose was to collect large amounts of opium revenue.⁴⁶³

In April 1934, Chiang Kai-shek changed the Hubei and Hunan Special Tax Bureau to the “Opium Suppression Inspectorate” (禁烟督察處) and affiliated it to the Military Affairs Committee with himself as General. The jurisdiction of the Inspectorate also expanded from two provinces (Hubei and Hunan) to ten provinces (Henan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui, Fujian, Hunan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanxi and Gansu). Chiang’s power over narcotic drugs issue was expanded further when the National Opium Suppression Commission appealed to the Executive Council in June 1934 to hand its authority on the narcotic drugs issue in those ten provinces to the Military Affairs Committee.⁴⁶⁴ This application was quickly passed by the Executive Council. Therefore, by July 1934, Chiang had control of the narcotic drugs issue in ten provinces, although polices in those ten provinces varied and the provincial government still issued regulations in their jurisdictions.⁴⁶⁵ His next move was to initiate a Six Year Plan to launch a nationwide approach that would eradicate these

⁴⁶³ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, p. 240.

⁴⁶⁴ 賴淑卿, *國民政府六年禁烟計劃及其成效*, 臺北: 國史館, 1986, pp. 57-58. (Lai Shu-qing, *The Six-Year Plan of the Nanjing Nationalist Government and Its Achievement*).

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 59-60.

regional difference, and centralise power over, and income from, opium in China under his command.⁴⁶⁶

The Six Year Plan

The *Implementation Methods for Opium Prohibition* (禁烟實施辦法) and the *Implementation Methods for Dangerous Drugs Prohibition* (禁毒實施辦法), in April 1935, marked the initiation of the Six-Year Plan.⁴⁶⁷ According to the plan, 1935 to 1936 would be focused on eradicating refined drugs consumption in China while the six years from 1935 to 1940 was for suppressing opium. Thus the plan was also called “Two Years Suppressing Dangerous Drugs and Six Years Suppressing Opium” (二年禁毒六年禁烟). However, in fact, the campaigns to suppress refined drugs continued through the whole six year period as well.

Regulations on refined drugs during the process of the implementation of the Six-Year Plan mainly drew on the *Provisional Regulations for Prohibiting Dangerous Drugs* (嚴禁烈性毒品暫行條例) which was issued in May 1934 and the abovementioned *Implementation Methods for Dangerous Drugs Prohibition*. The *Provisional Regulations for Prohibiting Dangerous Drugs* established basic rules for tackling dangerous drugs offences while the *Implementation Methods for Dangerous Drugs Prohibition* detailed those rules and provided a timetable. According to the *Implementation Methods for Dangerous Drugs Prohibition*, people who consumed dangerous drugs or injected morphine must send themselves to detoxification centres to withdraw from consumption by 1935. In 1936 consumers

⁴⁶⁶ Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusade in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 79-80.

⁴⁶⁷ This *Dangerous Drugs Suppression Plan* did not stipulate what were the “dangerous drugs” but a previous regulation *The Provisional Regulation of Suppression Dangerous Drugs* issued in April 1934 stipulated that “Morphine, cocaine, heroin, their derivatives, red and white as well as other colour pills with those ingredients are all dangerous drugs”. See “嚴禁烈性毒品暫行條例”, *河南省政府公報*, Issue 1043, p.1. (“The Provisional Regulation of Suppression Dangerous Drugs”, *Gazette of Henan Provincial Government*). So it seems that the meaning of “dangerous drugs” equals that of “narcotic drugs” but excluded opium at that time.

who did not surrender themselves to detoxification centres would be pursued, sent to detoxification centres and also receive five years of imprisonment. From 1937 onwards, anyone caught using refined drugs would be executed or sentenced to life imprisonment. Relapsed dangerous drugs users were subject to the death penalty before 1935, but the penalty could be reduced to five years imprisonment if they voluntarily surrendered themselves. Dangerous drugs manufacturers, smugglers, and sellers faced the death penalty in all cases. Accessories to the processes of manufacturing, transporting or selling dangerous drugs would face five to twelve years of imprisonment. Civil servants and government officials who assisted the manufacture, transportation, or sale of the controlled substances would be executed.⁴⁶⁸

As the dangerous drugs suppression campaign would produce many offenders, the second article of the *Implementation Methods for Dangerous Drugs Prohibition* stipulated that

The provinces, cities and counties with high number of dangerous drugs users or morphine injectors should establish detoxification centres. Provincial, municipal and county governments should complete establishing the detoxification centres or enlarging the existing ones in three months from this April. For the places where the number of dangerous drugs users or morphine injectors is not high, some high-grade hospitals could be used as detoxification centres.⁴⁶⁹

The *Implementation Methods for Dangerous Drugs Prohibition* also required the local authorities to publicise the regulations to the general public with posters. Considering the fact that many Chinese people were illiterate or quasi-literate, the regulation even stipulated that the local authorities should use simple and easy-

⁴⁶⁸ “禁毒實施辦法”, 河南省政府公報, issue 1316, 1935, pp. 5-6. (“Implementation Methods of Dangerous Drugs Prohibition”, *Gazette of Henan Provincial Government*).

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

remembered words to make the populace learn the dangerous drugs suppression policies.⁴⁷⁰ This was actually a method frequently used by the National Anti-Opium Association during its anti-narcotics campaigns in the 1920s. Vivid cartoons with captions during the campaigns articulated the drug policies to the local communities and alerted them to the harsh regulations (See figure 2.). The regulation also stipulated how the local authorities could mobilise the populace and publicise the simplified version of the policies to them. It required municipal and county authorities to instruct the police officers, directors of districts, and leaders of autonomous communities to conduct propaganda in their administration regions. For the institutions such as Party branch offices, governmental departments, and schools, the person in charge of the institution shouldered the responsibility of publicising the policy to its personnel.⁴⁷¹

Opium suppression campaigns were also initiated at the same time with the dangerous drugs suppression campaign. The Six-Year Plan divided the opium issue into four categories: cultivation, transportation, sale and consumption. It was an opium monopoly system with a deadline. When the Plan was initiated, the governmental organisations in charge of the opium issue were the National Opium Suppression Commission and the Opium Suppression Inspectorate. According to the Plan, the National Opium Suppression Commission which was affiliated to the Military Committee was in charge of issues of 'cultivation' and 'consumption' of opium. The Opium Suppression Inspectorate dealt with the issues of "transportation" and "sale". The plan divided the administration regions under the governance of the Nationalists into two categories: regions which should adopt a prohibition policy and regions which should take a gradual suppression policy. The latter was categorised again into two types: regions which should prohibit the cultivation but take a gradual suppression policy on transportation, sale and consumption; and regions which were expected to take a gradual suppression policy

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.




Figure 2. “一個吸食毒品的終局”，黃縣民友，1934 年第二卷第 23 期，9-10 頁. (“The Outcome of A Narcotics User”, *Huang Xian Min You (People and Friend in Huang County)*, vol. 2, no. 23, pp. 9-10).

on cultivation, transportation, sale and consumption.⁴⁷² These categories partly reflected the uneven picture across China. The anti-opium movement had achieved relatively satisfying results in some places such as Qinghai province. Meanwhile, some places were categorised as “prohibition regions” just because the Nanjing Nationalist Government intended to use them as models, such as the capital city Nanjing. The categories were sometimes switched because of the changing political and social situation. For instance, when Nanjing was occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army in 1937, the Nationalist Government set Chongqing as the wartime period capital and categorised it as a “prohibition region” in 1939.⁴⁷³

However, the implementation of the regulations for suppressing dangerous drugs and opium was faced with many difficulties. For the opium suppression plan, as Zhou Yong-ming has pointed out, “the main obstacle was that the government found it impossible to purchase all crude opium held by the public”.⁴⁷⁴ Regarding the refined drugs prohibition plan, a big problem was how to rehabilitate addicts. There were not sufficient detoxification centres or prisons available to accommodate all the users who came forward in compliance with the new regulations. The central and local authorities could not establish enough detoxification centres for use in just three months, as the *Implementation Methods of Dangerous Drugs Prohibition* proposed. Meanwhile, the campaigns moved forward very fast, which made the situation worse. Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann have revealed in their research that even before the Six-Year Plan was started, some prisons were overcrowded with opium offenders because of the opium suppression campaigns of the late 1920s.⁴⁷⁵ The situation became worse after the initiation of the Six-Year Plan. Opium and dangerous drugs suppression campaigns produced many in need of treatment who died in prisons rather than

⁴⁷² Lai Shu-qing, *The Six-Year Plan of Nanjing Nationalist Government and its Achievements*, pp. 65-74.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 68.

⁴⁷⁴ Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building*, p. 83.

⁴⁷⁵ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lar Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, pp. 105-121.

found themselves allocated to detoxification centres. Even for the addicts who were treated at these centres, many were killed by poisonous detoxification medicines the effectiveness of which had not been certified.⁴⁷⁶

Even so, the implementation of the Six-Year Plan shaped the narcotic drugs context in China in the 1930s and early 1940s. The most influential aspect of this process was that the Nanjing Nationalist Government gradually asserted its control over drugs policy around the country. An unprecedented national system of inspecting narcotic drugs was established. However, while the Nanjing Nationalist Government focused on the illegal use of narcotic drugs, another problem began to emerge for their control regime. The legitimate use of refined substances for medical reasons was almost entirely forgotten in the early rush to deal with illegitimate activities. The debates about, and the eventual establishment of, the National Narcotics Bureau show that this only gradually dawned on the regime.

Establishing the National Narcotics Bureau

Re-establishing a government body in charge of the issue of medicinal and scientific use of refined drugs was discussed shortly after the abolition of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization in Shanghai in 1925. Li Ying-mi, the first director of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization, petitioned the Shanghai Commerce Inspection Administration in August 1926 to re-establish a bureau in charge of the refined drugs issue. This was rejected. Shortly after the establishment of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, the previous director of the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardization, Chen Yi-hong, appealed to the Nationalist Government to establish a bureau to inspect refined drugs in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces in September 1928.⁴⁷⁷ This was mainly because by 1928 the non-medical use of refined drugs had become rampant there. In July 1928, the National Anti-

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ “禁烟委員會開會”, *申報*, 16 September 1928. (“Meeting of the National Opium-Suppression Committee”, *Shenbao*).

Opium Association used a whole issue of its journal to publish its investigation into the narcotic drugs situation in various provinces. It indicated that refined drugs were used at the east of Huangpu river area of Jiangsu province. As for Zhejiang province, the report argued that one of the factors which resulted in the failure of the narcotics suppression campaign was that red pills were very popular in the eastern part of that province. In other parts of Zhejiang province, people also consumed red pills. The Anti-Narcotic Bureau of Zhejiang stated that about 2/3 of the opium users in that province also used the red pills.⁴⁷⁸

While re-establishing a narcotic bureau had been discussed shortly after the Nanjing Nationalist Government came to power, it had been postponed. This was firstly because the Nanjing Nationalist Government had other priorities, as by 1930 it only controlled 8% of the area and 20% of the population within China's borders.⁴⁷⁹ Resistance from pharmaceutical entrepreneurs, Nationalist Party branch offices, and civil bodies also impeded the process of its establishment. An article in a 1929 edition of the Chinese-language journal *Medicine and Drug Review*, for example, voiced the view of many as it stated that the recently established Central Health Laboratory could shoulder the responsibility for analysing medicines and the Public

⁴⁷⁸ 戴秉衡, 周楚材, “兩年來全國煙禍概況”, *拒毒月刊*, issue 23, July 1928, pp. 35-39 and pp. 43-44. (Dai Bing-heng and Zhou Chu-cai, “The Situation of Narcotic Drugs in Past Two Years”, *Opium: A National Issue*).

⁴⁷⁹ Jack Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.238.

Security Bureau (the police office) could cope with the cases of illicit use.⁴⁸⁰

Therefore plans to establish a narcotic bureau were redundant.⁴⁸¹

Some local authorities could be bitterly opposed to plans for a national unit. For example, a branch office of the Nationalist Party in Shanghai worried that a nationwide office would establish a monopoly system over refined drugs, just as the Nanjing Nationalist Government was trying to do over the supply of opium for smoking.⁴⁸² The announcement of the branch office published in *Shenbao* reads

The Opium Suppression Bureau was a disguised form of opium monopoly agency. Facing opposition from different levels in the Party (i.e. the Nationalist Party) organisation throughout the country and civil groups of all sectors of the community, the central government ordered its abolishment.

⁴⁸⁰ During the period of the Beiyang Government (1912-1927), a "Health Laboratory" (衛生試驗所) was established in Beijing in 1919. Its main responsibility was to inspect public health issues such as food quality, medicine, etc. A local "Health Laboratory" was also established in Shanghai in 1926. When the Shanghai Special Municipality was established in 1927 and later a Health Bureau was erected, this Health Laboratory was affiliated to the Health Bureau of the Shanghai Special Municipality. The Health Laboratory of the Ministry of the Interior actually assumed some responsibility of inspecting medicines and drugs. For instance, in February 1927, before importing Parke & Davis & Company's Syrup of Cocillana, Messrs. Anderson, Meyer & Company submitted samples of this medicine to the Ministry of the Interior for analysis. The Health Laboratory's chemical analysis showed that narcotic drugs contained in the medicine Syrup of Cocillana were within the limitations (contains no more than 0.2 per cent of morphia or no more than 0.1 per cent of cocaine or heroin). With this certification, the Inspectorate General instructed the Commissioners of Customs to permit this company's importation of the Syrup of Cocillana. The Health Laboratory of the Ministry of the Interior was changed to "the Central Health Laboratory" (中央衛生試驗所) in 1929 and the unit also shouldered some responsibilities of inspecting narcotic drugs. See "內務部厘訂衛生試驗所規程", *浙江警務雜誌*, vol. 25, 1919, pp. 4-6. ("The Ministry of the Interior has Determined the Bylaw of the Health Laboratory", Magazine of Zhejiang Police Affairs); "一件上海市公所衛生試驗所案", *上海市公報*, vol. 17, pp. 32-37, 1926. ("An Issue regarding the Health Laboratory of Shanghai City", Gazette of Shanghai City); "Medicine Containing Prohibited Drugs: Syrup of Cocillana May be Imported without Restriction", *Inspectorate General's Circulars No. 3752*, 28 February 1927. For the history of the evaluation of medicine in terms of testing for efficacy in the European countries, see Christoph Gradmann and Jonathan Simon eds. *Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 1890-1950*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

⁴⁸¹ "和中央衛生試驗所的藥學同志商榷一下", *醫藥評論*, vol 6, 1929, pp. 10-11. ("A Review of the Arguments of the Pharmacists at the National Hygiene Laboratory", *Medicine and Drug Review*).

⁴⁸² The Nanjing National Government opened "the Shanghai Opium Suppression Bureau" on 21 August 1927, an action which stimulated wide resistance and the central government finally shut it down again in July 1928. See Frederick Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai: 1927-1937*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 128; "Shanghai Protests Against Proposed Opium Bureau", *The China Weekly Review*, 27 June 1931.

People around the country rejoiced over this. However, the proponents of the opium monopoly policy have been taking clandestine actions vigorously because their desire has not yet been met. It is heard that someone has suggested the central government establish a National Narcotic Bureau and this proposal has been accepted. The Director of the Bureau will be the Doctor (note, PhD) who just returned from abroad and he is one of the most vigorous advocators of opium monopoly policy. This has been reported in many newspapers and is not just hearsay ... What was worse, [the Nanjing Nationalist Government] intends to establish a National Narcotic Bureau although there is already a National Opium Suppression Commission. The overlap of different government agencies makes them unable to implement policies ... In this way, despite the fact that there is suppression on opium and other narcotic drugs (note, “poison” in the source), the situation has been worsening. Although the rumours stated above are not definite facts, we shall take some precautions. In order to suppress opium and other narcotic drugs (note, “poison” in the source), to energise our Chinese nation, and to conform to the “Anti-Narcotics Will”, the eighth propaganda meeting of this branch office has decided: if the central government establishes an agency for opium monopoly, we will lead all the Party members in this district and the general publics to pledge our lives to oppose it.⁴⁸³

Given the strength of such opposition, and the evident confusion about what purposes the various agencies involved in the suppression of narcotics consumption actually did, the National Health Administration in Nanjing was forced to issue a statement pointing out that the proposed bureau “was nothing to do with opium monopoly system.”⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸³ “反對設置全國麻醉藥品管理處”, *申報*, 3 August, 1931. (“Opposition to the Establishment of a National Narcotics Bureau”, *Shenbao*).

⁴⁸⁴ “麻醉品設專管機關”, *申報*, 17 August 1931. (“A Bureau will be Established Specifically on Narcotic Drugs”, *Shenbao*).

The National Anti-Opium Association also opposed the establishment of a national bureau for dealing with issues related to the control of supplies of refined drugs. August 5 1931 was the seven year anniversary of the Association's foundation. In a declaration to mark the occasion published that day in *Republican China Daily*, it criticised the proposal for establishing the national bureau, viewing it as an effort by central government to monopolise the trade in refined drugs. The Association also specifically pointed a finger at Wu Lien-teh, who openly supported the opium monopoly policy, although the declaration did not mention his name but used "the Doctor" instead.⁴⁸⁵ The National Anti-Opium Association assumed that Wu Lien-teh's return from Europe was because the Nanjing Nationalist Government would appoint him as the director of the proposed Narcotics Bureau.⁴⁸⁶ Moreover, the Association sent a letter to the Executive Council of the Nanjing Nationalist Government two months later which read

According to the newspapers reports, the State Council held a meeting on October 13th. The second motion at the meeting was from the National Opium Suppression Commission. It appealed the central government to instruct the Ministry of the Interior to establish central and regional narcotic bureaus because the *Regulation on Medical Use of Narcotic Drugs* has been issued for a while but there is still no government body in charge of this issue. This motion was discussed and passed at the meeting. Etc. etc. We are quite confused about this decision. Some supporters of the opium monopoly policy have advocated a regulation on the medical use of narcotic drugs. Their proposal is not different from establishing a monopoly system of opium and all the other narcotic drugs (note, "poison" in the source). This has violated the "Anti-narcotics Will of the Prime Minister" (note, Sun Yet-san) as well as the pure and wise programme of the National Party. People around the country have objected to this proposal and the Legislative Council of the

⁴⁸⁵ Wu obtained a doctoral degree in medicine from the University of Cambridge.

⁴⁸⁶ "拒毒會七周年紀念宣言", *民國日報*, 5 August 1931. ("Seven Years Anniversary Declaration of the National Anti-Opium Association", *Republican China Daily*).

Nanjing Nationalist Government has vetoed it. Then this kind of proposal disappeared for a while. Is the resolution passed at the October 13th meeting regarding establishing central and regional narcotic bureaus the same as the previous proposal [for establishing a monopoly system]? When the National Opium Suppression Commission submitted that proposal, it did not clarify the detailed method [of establishing the bureaus]. Thus the people cannot have no suspicion on this issue and link it with what happened before. We are facing national calamity and our country is being disintegrated. We should work with determination and strengthen the spirit to make our country prosperous, and should not obey the will of the people and walk into the path of self-destruction. We are sincerely asking your Council to follow the public sentiment and to explain clearly about the detailed methods of establishing the central and regional bureaus and what exactly the bureaus are, and to publish this to let the general public know. Then the confusion will be solved and the rumours will be cleared up.⁴⁸⁷

In order to neutralize the critics of the proposal, the Nanjing Nationalist Government offered explanations. As one report in *Shenbao* states

The organization of the [proposed] Narcotics Bureau will be simple. Regarding its work, it will be to estimate the amount of required narcotic drugs based on the population. It will also issue licenses and will inspect whether there is smuggling [of narcotics]. The policy of issuing licenses will be changed. Under the new policy, the Maritime Customs will not be able to issue licenses at its discretion. Otherwise, it is impossible to know the amount of the imports.⁴⁸⁸

This brief explanation did not satisfy opponents such as the National Anti-Opium Association. It was not a detailed explanation as the Association expected.

⁴⁸⁷ “拒毒會反對麻醉藥品機關”, *申報*, October 15th, 1931. (“The National Anti-Opium Association Opposes to Establish a Narcotic Bureau”, *Shenbao*).

⁴⁸⁸ “麻醉品管理處工作”, *申報*, 25 October 1931. (“Work of the Narcotic Bureau”, *Shenbao*).

Moreover, the issue of establishing a narcotic bureau was entangled with that of the Nationalist Government's opium monopoly, so it is little wonder that suspicions lingered about precisely what the new bureau that they had proposed was for. Indeed, when the proposal for an Opium Suppression Bureau appeared again in 1931, which would have tightened the Nationalist government's grip on raw opium revenues, it stimulated strong protests once more.⁴⁸⁹

The drug policy of the National Opium Suppression Commission also attracted the opposition of the Control Council of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, although the latter did not specifically object to the proposal for establishing the bureau for refined drugs.⁴⁹⁰ On 28 April 1932, Gao You-tang, a member of the Control Council, submitted a proposal to impeach Liu Rui-heng, the head of the National Opium Suppression Committee and the director of the National Health Administration. In his appeal, Gao You-tang argued that "compared with the policy during the administration of his predecessor, Zhang Zhi-jiang, the drug policy under the administration of Liu was a retrogression." In the view of Gao, Liu's role in establishing the Opium Suppression Bureau was evidence enough of this retrogression, but he also asserted that Liu took "the cultivation, transportation and sale of opium as a chance to accumulate his own fortune", and his drug policy was "wrecking the country and bringing ruin to the Chinese people". As such, he stood accused of contravening Articles 16 and 18 of the *Anti-Opium Law*.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁹ "Shanghai Protests Against Proposed Opium Bureau", *The China Weekly Review*, 27 June 1931.

⁴⁹⁰ Control Yuan (監察院), or Control Council, a governmental department which was in charge of supervising the conduct of officials and had power to impeach.

⁴⁹¹ "彈劾劉瑞恆", *申報*, 4 May 1932. ("Impeach Liu Rui-heng", *Shenbao*). Although it was published in the newspapers in May 1932, the impeachment actually happened in the autumn of 1931. (See "高友唐覆拒毒會函", *申報*, 18 May 1932. ("Gao You-tang's Reply Letter to the National Anti-Opium Association", *Shenbao*)). At that time, Liu Rui-heng was recently appointed as head of the National Opium Suppression Commission. John R. Watt argues that this appointment was because the Health Ministry (of which Liu was the head) was demoted and put back under the Ministry the Interior. To avoid the embarrassment and to keep his rank, Liu was appointed as the head of the National Opium Suppression Commission thus he could continue attend the cabinet meetings. However, this entangled him in the Nationalist Government's opium policy. See John R. Watt, *Saving Lives in Wartime China: How Medical Reformers Built Modern Healthcare System Amid War and Epidemics, 1928-1945*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, pp. 44-45.

Gao You-tang's appeal was strongly supported by the National Anti-Opium Association.⁴⁹² More than eighty civil societies in Shanghai also supported impeachment,⁴⁹³ partly because the Association campaigned vigorously to encourage them to join in.⁴⁹⁴ The National Anti-Opium Association also contacted Gao You-tang and received his reply on 17 May 1932. He explained that the case was before the Nationalist government's recently established Discipline Committee (懲戒委員會).⁴⁹⁵ Gao did not seem optimistic, stating that "It is hard to predict whether the government will deal with it in accordance with the law. My main purpose was to alert the others".⁴⁹⁶ Besides, Gao was busy with other matters, having also appealed for the impeachment of Wang Zhao-ming, the head of the Executive Council. Wang signed the *Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement* (淞滬停戰協定) on 5 May 1932 without asking the permission of the Legislative Council (立法院).⁴⁹⁷ Some contemporaries hailed these activities of Gao, and someone called Tao Zai-dong even published a poem in newspaper to praise him.⁴⁹⁸ However, many others regarded him as a trouble-maker and even his own boss, Yu You-ren, the head of the Control Council, complained about his big-mouth.⁴⁹⁹ Gao's efforts to force the impeachment of Liu Rui-heng failed, so may therefore be put down in part to other distractions. However, Liu Rui-heng had powerful allies. He was a classmate of T.V. Song, the Minister of Finance of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, when they studied at Harvard. Song was the brother-in-law of the

⁴⁹² "拒毒會響應高友唐彈劾劉瑞恆案", *申報*, 6 May 1932. ("The National Anti-Opium Association Supported the Case that Gao You-tang Impeached Liu Rui-heng", *Shenbao*).

⁴⁹³ "八十餘團體響應彈劾劉瑞恆案", *申報*, 15 May 1932. ("More than Eighty Societies Supported the Case that Liu Rui-heng is Impeached", *Shenbao*).

⁴⁹⁴ "鴉片公賣中拒毒會痛哭陳辭函全國各團體速起抗爭", *申報*, 12 May 1932. ("Among the Discussions on the Opium Monopoly, the National Anti-Opium Association Sent an Emotional Letter to other Societies to Appeal them to Oppose the Policy").

⁴⁹⁵ "高友唐覆拒毒會函", *申報*, 18 May 1932. ("Gao You-tang's Reply Letter to the National Anti-Opium Association", *Shenbao*).

⁴⁹⁶ "高友唐覆拒毒會函", *申報*, 18 May 1932. ("Gao You-tang's Reply Letter to the National Anti-Opium Association", *Shenbao*).

⁴⁹⁷ "對劾汪案聲辯", *申報*, 23 May 1932. ("The defence of impeaching Wang Zhao-ming", *Shenbao*).

⁴⁹⁸ "故人高友唐任監察敢言有台諫生風之感概而賦贈", *申報*, 23 May 1932. ("I wrote this poem to my friend Councillor Gao You-tang for his outspoken and admonishment", *Shenbao*).

⁴⁹⁹ "于右任電高友唐質問高覆稱報載有誤", *申報*, 15 July 1932. ("Yu You-ren queried Gao in his telegraph and Gao replied that the report in newspaper is misinformation", *Shenbao*).

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.⁵⁰⁰ Moreover, Liu Rui-heng was simply doing the government's bidding as the National Opium Suppression Committee was designed to concentrate nationwide revenues from raw opium in the hands of the Nationalist government.

In this context the Nanjing Nationalist Government explained again that the proposed Narcotics Bureau would have nothing to do with the opium monopoly system.⁵⁰¹ It seems that the initial plan was to let an existing government body shoulder the responsibility for the medical use of refined drugs, rather than establish a new one. On 24 August 1932, a meeting of the Executive Council decided that the Central Hospital in Nanjing would be the organization in charge of the issue.⁵⁰² However, this proposal was resisted by the Central Hospital. An instruction from the Ministry of the Interior to the Shanghai Municipal Government contains a summary of this story

In accordance with the third point of the *Revised Regulation on Medical Use of Narcotic Drugs*, this Ministry proposed to the Executive Council to arrange for the Central Hospital as the central agency in charge of the issue of medical use of narcotic drugs. The Executive Council permitted this proposal and instructed the Central Hospital to shoulder that responsibility. However, the Central Hospital stated that it was impossible to ascertain whether the refined drugs are pure or not without analysis. However, the Central Hospital is a

⁵⁰⁰ John R. Watt, *Saving Lives in Wartime China: How Medical Reformers Built Modern Healthcare System amid War and Epidemics, 1928-1945*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, p. 36.

⁵⁰¹ This was partially prompted by the continued appeal of the National Opium Suppression Commission. Replying to the appeal from the National Opium Suppression Commission about establishing a narcotic bureau, the Executive Council issued an instruction on 16 October 1931, asking the Ministry of the Interior to establish a narcotic bureau quickly. See “呈請轉飭內政部依照麻醉藥品管理條例趕速成立麻醉藥品總分經理機關請鑒核由”, *行政院公牘*, 1931, (“Petition that Asking the Executive Council to Instruct the Ministry of the Interior to Establish a Narcotic Bureau Quickly according to the Regulation on Narcotic Drugs”, *Official Files of the Executive Council*); “呈為請轉飭內政部依照條例趕速成立麻醉藥品總分經理機關由”, *行政院公報*, 1931, (“Petition that Asking the Executive Council to Instruct the Ministry of the Interior to Establish a Narcotic Bureau Quickly according to the Regulation on Narcotic Drugs”, *Gazette of the Executive Council*).

⁵⁰² “行政院決議案”, *申報*, 24 August 1932. (“Resolutions of the Executive Council”, *Shenbao*).

health service institution and does not have the equipment to analyse drugs. Moreover, it argued that regulating the issue of refined drugs is intricate work. It quite easily breeds corrupt practices when there is even slight negligence. Therefore, [to establish an agency in charge of the issue of medical use of narcotic drugs] has been delayed for a long time.⁵⁰³

The lack of a Central Bureau with expertise in both the refined substances and their regulation meant that practical problems quickly arose. In March 1931, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau (police office) investigated the New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd. (新亞化學製藥廠).⁵⁰⁴ The Shanghai Special Municipality reported to the National Opium Suppression Commission about this investigation and stated that the company was not involved in the illegal trade in refined drugs. However, after reading the submitted files about this case, the National Opium Suppression Commission asked the Shanghai Special Municipality to carry out more thorough investigations because there were some questionable points, such as, why there were cocaine hydrochloride, heroin hydrochloride on its sales lists while the marketing manager of the company stated that they merely sold morphine. In the view of the National Opium Suppression Commission, it was necessary to clarify where and how those narcotic drugs on the sales lists were imported and whether the amounts sold to physicians and pharmacists complied with the standards set by the Nanjing Nationalist Government.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰³ Translated from the original text: 案查本部前經依照修正麻醉藥品管理條例第三條之規定呈准行政院指定中央醫院為麻醉藥品總經理機關並經轉飭中央醫院遵照辦理嗣後該醫院以醫藥用麻醉藥品是否純良非經詳細化驗不足以資辨別中央醫院為一醫事機關對於化驗藥品設備未能十分完善且經理此事極為繁瑣考察稍疏易滋流弊是以遲遲未克成立。See “上海市政府訓令第一四七八號”，*上海市政府公報*, 1935. (“Instruction of the Special Municipality of Shanghai”, *Gazette of Shanghai Municipal Government*).

⁵⁰⁴ The New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd. was a Chinese pharmaceutical company established in 1926 in Shanghai, producing medicine, medical instruments, and cosmetic products. See “新亞化學製藥廠”，*中國國貨工廠史略*, (國貨事業出版社: 1935), p. 125. (“New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd.”, in *A History of Domestic Products Factories*).

⁵⁰⁵ “禁烟委員會咨第五七八號”，*禁烟委員會公報*, vol 3, 1931, pp. 40-41. (“Note from the National Opium Suppression Committee to the Shanghai Municipal City Council”, *Gazette of the National Opium Suppression Committee*).

In light of cases like this where legitimate companies found themselves under investigation, pharmaceutical suppliers and drug stores united and appealed to the Nanjing Nationalist Government. As a member of the Shanghai New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association (上海新藥業公會), the New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd. asked it for help.⁵⁰⁶ The Association presented a petition to the National Health Administration in 1932, appealing to it to ask the central government to issue regulations on the trade of refined drugs for medical and scientific use. In that petition, the New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association stated that harsh regulations which could be traced back to the Late Qing period and which were revised in the early Republican were not adapted to the current situation because increasing numbers of modern medical professionals, new hospitals, and the growth of the drug store sector, meant that demand for refined drugs for medicinal and scientific use had expanded. While Chinese drug stores and Chinese medical professionals were confronting difficulties in obtaining narcotic drugs, their western counterparts could easily access these materials through the support of their Consulates. The petition also stated that the National Health Administration did not need to worry that businessmen would import too much narcotic drugs and earn illicit profits. The newly established Health Bureaus in many big cities could shoulder the responsibility of inspecting the importation of, and the trade in, refined drugs, with the cooperation of the Maritime Customs. Aiming to strength the petition, the New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association also contacted the National Association of Physicians and asked the latter to join the petition.⁵⁰⁷

Despite the urgency voiced by the industry, the central government reacted slowly. Meanwhile, it did not permit local authorities to establish narcotic bureaus. A 'Narcotics Inspecting and Arresting Bureau' was established by Jiangsu provincial

⁵⁰⁶ The Shanghai New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association was established by more than thirty companies of new pharmaceutical business in 1927.

⁵⁰⁷ “致各委員請參考新藥業公會呈衛生署速訂麻醉藥品賣買辦法文”, *醫事彙刊*, 1932. (“A Letter to Our Members concerning the New Pharmaceutical Industry’s Petition to the National Health Administration to Quickly Enact a Regulation on the Trade of Narcotic Drugs”, *Journal of Medical News*).

government in February 1933. However, shortly after this, the Executive Council of the Nanjing National Government instructed the Jiangsu authorities to abolish it. This decision was recommended by the National Opium Suppression Commission, after “an investigation into the nature of the work conducted by the Narcotic Inspecting and Arresting Bureau”.⁵⁰⁸ However, the instructions of the Executive Council were not enforced by the Jiangsu provincial government immediately. In August of that year the Executive Council issued a similar instruction again. A contemporary newspaper report revealed that the central government decided to ban the Bureau in Jiangsu province because it “conducted the sale of opium in several Kiangsu districts”.⁵⁰⁹ This situation reflects the conflicts of interests between the central government and the provincial authorities over controlling opium and refined drugs. It also means that by 1933, the establishment of a governmental organization in charge of the refined drugs issue around the country was more urgent than ever.

Just after the ‘Narcotic Inspecting and Arresting Bureau’ case in Jiangsu province in February 1933, pharmacies and physicians in Tianjin city raised the question in March of the medicinal use of refined drugs with the Municipal authorities there. Since there was still no specific government body in charge of this issue, the Tianjin Special Municipality consulted the Ministry of the Interior in Nanjing. After receiving a reply from the Ministry of the Interior, the Hebei Provincial Government instructed the Tianjin Special Municipality to inform the pharmacists and physicians who needed refined drugs that they had to purchase them from the National Health Administration. The process was: the National Health Administration would submit applications to the Ministry of the Interior then the Ministry of the Interior would communicate with the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance would instruct the Maritime Customs to permit the importation requirements of the physicians

⁵⁰⁸ “Executive Yuan Bans Kiangsu Drug Bureaus”, *The China Press (1925-1938)*, 23 February 1933.

⁵⁰⁹ “Kiangsu Drug Bureau Abolished by Nanjing”, *The China Press (1925-1938)*, 16 August 1933.

and pharmacists.⁵¹⁰ By July 1934 the Central Health Laboratory of the National Health Administration had been identified as the specific unit tasked with handling the orders of pharmacists and physicians.⁵¹¹

In the meantime though, the *Temporary Regulation for Suppressing Dangerous Drugs* issued by the Military Affairs Committee in May 1934 stipulated that:

“First. Morphine, cocaine, heroin, their derivatives, red and white as well as other colour pills with those ingredients are all dangerous drugs.

Second. Producers or transporters of dangerous drugs are subject to the death penalty.

Third. Sellers or intended sellers of dangerous drugs are subject to the death penalty or life imprisonment.....”⁵¹²

In response to this the Shanghai New Pharmaceutical Industry Association convened a meeting on 30 May 1934. The regulation did not make any clear reference to medical use or to those who dealt in legitimate supplies, so members were alarmed that they were at risk of severe punishment just for going about their business. The Association decided to appeal urgently to the central government to issue regulations specifically on the medicinal and scientific use of narcotic drugs.⁵¹³

⁵¹⁰ “河北省政府訓令第一六零五號”, *河北省政府公報*, 1933. (“Instructions of the Hebei Provincial Government No.1605”, *Gazette of Hebei Provincial Government*).

⁵¹¹ “上海市政府訓令第一四七八四號”, *上海市政府公報*, 1935. (“Instructions of the Shanghai Special Municipality, No. 14784”, *Gazette of the Shanghai Special Municipality*).

⁵¹² “市府佈告嚴禁烈性毒品”, *中央日報*, 20 May 1934. (Shanghai Municipal City Proclaims to Strictly Prohibit Dangerous Drugs, *Central Daily*).

⁵¹³ “新藥業公會請另頒販賣醫用麻醉藥品條例”, *申報*, 30 May 1934. (“The New Pharmaceutical Industry Asked the Nanjing Nationalist Government to Issue Regulations on the Medical Use of Narcotic Drugs”); “販賣醫藥用麻醉藥品新藥業請另頒條例”, *神州國醫學報*, Vol 2, Issue 10, 1934, pp. 39-41. (“New Pharmaceutical Industry which Sells Narcotic Drugs Appeal to Issue another Regulation”, *Journal of China National Medicine*).

The Shanghai New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association had several allies on this issue. On 5 August 1934, five associations (The Medical Federation of China (全國醫師聯合會 literally means 'National Physicians Association'), Shanghai Physician Association, Shanghai Pharmacist Association, Pharmaceutical Industry Association and New Pharmaceutical Industry Association) convened a joint meeting at the office of the New Pharmaceutical Industry Association to discuss actions they should take because the government would soon implement the *Revised Regulations on Narcotic Drugs*. Below is a summary of the meeting which has been recorded in the archive

Chairman [of the meeting]: The purpose of the meeting today is known to everyone here thus it will be superfluous to explain it. Now it is time for each of you to report the opinion of your association on this case. (Reports of the representatives are not recorded and the following are resolutions). 1. This meeting discussed how to react to the forthcoming implementation of the *Revised Regulations on Narcotic Drugs* by the central government. Resolution: the five associations will continue to convene joint meetings until this issue is decided. 2. How to convene the joint meetings? Resolution: the five associations will be the convenor in turn and the communication office for this will be set in the [headquarters of] the New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association. 3. This meeting discussed that since we want to attend the discussions of the central government on the provisional measures of regulating the medical use of narcotic drugs, whether should we send a representative to petition for this? Resolutions: (1). Each association recommends a representative to meet on August 8th to present a petition to the Wusong and Shanghai Garrison Commissioner's Headquarters (淞滬警備

司令部) and the Shanghai Special Municipality; (2) These representatives will send a paper petition to the National Health Administration in Nanjing.⁵¹⁴

It was not so easy to formulate a united front. The Medical Federation of China was one of the five associations at the meeting on August 5th and its representative, Jiang Zhen-xun, even chaired the meeting. However, after receiving the resolutions of the meeting, the Medical Federation of China sent a note to the other associations on August 7th, saying, “The resolutions of the joint meeting of the five associations convened a few days ago is received. However, after discussion of the executive committee of our association, we have decided that it is difficult for us to join you to present petitions to the Shanghai Garrison Commissioner’s Headquarters and the National Health Administration. We beg your pardon on this”.⁵¹⁵

While those Associations opposed the newly issued narcotic drugs prohibition policy, the authorities fought back. On 16 August 1934, the Public Security Bureau of Shanghai Special Municipality raided the factories of the New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd. Company. After seizing 200 taels of morphine in the storage room, the Police prosecuted the New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd. in Shanghai No.1 Special District Court. However, allies rallied around and the Shanghai Physicians Association, the Association of the Shanghai New Pharmaceutical Industry, and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce appealed to the Court and guaranteed the innocence of the Company. Their petition to the Court stated that the New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd. Company had registered at the Ministry of Commerce and the

⁵¹⁴ “有閔當局管理麻醉藥品的條例規定及上海市新藥商業同業公會向衛生署全國新藥業公會聯合會等主管機關反映要求請釋問題的來往文書” (Files Regarding Regulations on Narcotic Drugs and Shanghai New Pharmaceutical Industry Association’s Inquiry to the Health Administration and the National New Pharmaceutical Industry Association), Shanghai Municipal Archives, S 284-1-86, 1931-1948.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

Health Bureau of the Shanghai Special Municipality. They also argued that the morphine was merely for manufacturing medicine such as anaesthetics.⁵¹⁶

Meanwhile, the five associations presented their petitions to the authorities in Shanghai as well as the Nationalist Government in Nanjing. The central government obviously realised that they had a case, as it instructed the Shanghai Special Municipality to find an interim solution to the problem.⁵¹⁷ With the endorsement of the central government, the Woosung and Shanghai Garrison Commissioner's Headquarters along with the Shanghai Special Municipality issued a notification which stated that a "Provisional Shanghai Narcotic Bureau" would be established. Before that, the pharmaceutical industries in Shanghai should report to the Health Bureau of the Shanghai Special Municipality in a week stating how much of these substances they currently stored. They also had to report the statistics of their sales every ten days to the Health Bureau.⁵¹⁸ This could be viewed as a concession of the central government to the Shanghai merchants since the Health Bureau of the Municipality actually just worked as an inspection agency which did not have real control of the narcotic drugs trade. However, this situation did not last very long because in December of that year a National Narcotics Bureau was established. The above stories indicate that in the process of its establishment, the medical professionals and pharmaceutical industry played an important role. However, the newly established Bureau still needed some time to begin its operation.

The Work of the National Narcotics Bureau

⁵¹⁶ "藥用麻醉品被訴經過", *申報*, 27 August 1933. ("Pharma Stored Medical Use Narcotic was Sued", *Shenbao*).

⁵¹⁷ "麻醉藥品管理條例即將實施", *申報*, 24 August 1934. ("Regulations on Narcotic Drugs will be Implemented").

⁵¹⁸ "本市將設麻醉藥品臨時管理處", *申報*, 2 October 1934. ("This Municipal City will Establish A Provisional Narcotic Bureau", *Shenbao*). "徐曉初談設立麻醉品經理處原因", *申報*, 30 July 1935. ("Xu Xiao-chu Addressed Reasons of Establishing the Narcotic Bureau", *Shenbao*).

While contemporary governmental records state that the Bureau was established in December 1934, it was not until December 1935 that its establishment was announced in newspapers.⁵¹⁹ Before that date, the National Health Administration to which the new Narcotics Bureau was affiliated needed to solve a range of issues. One of those issues was how the new body should cooperate with the Opium Suppression Inspectorate. In November 1934, the National Health Administration wrote to the Opium Suppression Inspectorate to borrow 50,000 yuan as the start-up funding for the Narcotics Bureau.⁵²⁰ The Director of the Opium Suppression Inspectorate, Li Ji-hong, then contacted the Generalissimo of the Military Affairs Committee, Chiang Kai-shek, and received an instruction from the latter that the National Health Administration should clarify the measures for the cooperation between the two agencies first before agreeing to the loan. Those two government agencies then discussed and drafted a plan, which was submitted to the Field Headquarters of the Generalissimo in Nanchang. It was not satisfactory in the view of the Generalissimo and revised measures were submitted to the Field Headquarters for his consideration on 15 March 1935. In June 1935, Hu Shi-ze, the Chinese representative to the League of Nations, presented his suggestions on revising the measures. This is an important reminder of the international context in which the Bureau emerged. The certificate system agreed at the Geneva Opium

⁵¹⁹ For instance, an instruction of the Zhejiang provincial government on 16 July 1935 referred a document of the Ministry of the Interior which stated that “Last July, this Ministry applied to the Executive Council to establish a narcotic bureau. The Executive Council permitted that the Central Hygiene Laboratory will be the government agency to manage the issue of medical use of narcotic drugs. Then this Ministry instructed the Central Hygiene Laboratory to follow this instruction. The Laboratory reported later that the Bureau has been established in last December”. See 浙江省政府訓令民字第二三〇七號 (Instructions of the Zhejiang Provincial Government, Civil Affairs, No. 2307), *浙江省政府公報訓令第一千三百八十期* (*Zhejiang Provincial Government Gazette, Instructions, Issue 1380*), 1935, p. 1. Shen Huang-zhong and Li Fu-sheng argue that a preparation committee of establishing the National Narcotic Bureau was set up in 8 December 1934 and the Bureau was established on 1 July 1935, see “A Time-honoured Enterprise: The History of the No. 1 Pharmaceutical Factory of Nanjing”, *Yu Hua Literature and History*, issue 6, 1992, p. 109. Articles on this magazine provide no references.

⁵²⁰ The 459th Central Political Meeting of the National Party held on 29 May 1935 passed resolutions which including to abolish the Opium Suppression Committee and to establish new institutions on drug issues. Head of the new system was Supreme Opium Suppression Inspector, Chiang Kai-shek, who led the Opium Suppression Inspectorate and a new Opium Suppression Committee (the previous one was established in 1928). See Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Drugs in China*, pp.274-275; and Alan Baumler, *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic*, pp. 179-181.

Conferences in 1924-25 required governments to act to monitor and control flows of substances such as morphine, cocaine and heroin. Compliance with this international system, and the 1931 League of Nations conference on the limitation of manufacturing these drugs, meant that the Nanjing Nationalist Government needed a unit capable of producing reliable statistics for reporting purposes and other data for policy. Once Hu Shi-ze had configured the Bureau to meet these needs, a final version was figured out and agreed by the Military Commission later that month.⁵²¹

Among the issues regarding the cooperation between the two government agencies, an important one was the proceeds of the sale of the confiscated drugs. It was proposed that the Opium Suppression Inspectorate would send the confiscated refined drugs to the National Narcotics Bureau, which would sell it on to those who supplied legitimate markets. The Inspectorate wanted the latter to share the dividends of those transactions. In June 1935, Liu Rui-heng, head of the National Health Administration, sent the Opium Suppression Inspectorate a note.⁵²² Liu stated that:

According to the resolution of the 189th meeting of the Executive Council, the National Narcotic Bureau provisionally manages ten kinds of narcotic drugs for medicinal and scientific use, including opium, morphine, codeine, ethylmorphine (dionine), apomorphine hydrochloride, extract cannabis (soft), cocaine, strychnine, dihydro-oxy cedeinone (Eukodal) and pantopon. Any purchase by the hospitals, physicians and druggists is subject to strict regulations. It is estimated that the annual need of morphine is less than 400 kg. The morphine for medical use must be pure and has high quality.

However, more than half of the confiscated morphine is adulterated. Even

⁵²¹ “軍委會委員長行營軍法處陳請檢送麻醉藥品管理條例等項法規公函及有關文書” (Various Files regarding the Judge Advocate of the Field Headquarters of the Military Commission Presented Regulations on Narcotic Drugs), 1934-1937, Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, 12-1020.

⁵²² The Central Health Laboratory was the governing body of the National Narcotic Bureau. The National Health Administration governed the Central Health Laboratory.

after the process of purification, the materials which have been used to adulterate the morphine cannot be cleaned out thoroughly and used for medical injection and scientific research. Thus other than purifying the crude morphine supplied by your Inspectorate (i.e. the Opium Suppression Inspectorate), this Laboratory (i.e. the Central Hygiene Laboratory) still needs to purchase narcotic drugs from foreign pharmaceutical companies. The narcotic drugs this Bureau manages is not just morphine. The morphine provided by your Inspectorate must be purified, then manufactured to sell. Now we have received the instruction to share the proceeds of the sale of the narcotic drugs. The proceeds for morphine should be that purified.⁵²³

After discussion with Hu Jie, the secretary of the Opium Suppression Inspectorate, the National Health Administration drafted a five-point regulation concerning the proceeds of the sale of the confiscated drugs. Both of the institutions shared 50% of the incomes of selling the drugs such as morphine (after further purification). In regard to drugs such as cocaine where no further refinement was needed, both of them also shared 50% of the proceeds. With drugs which needed further processing to refine, such as heroin, the Bureau would pay 7/24 of the income to the Opium Suppression Inspectorate.⁵²⁴

The National Narcotics Bureau also needed to wait for the refined drugs it purchased from abroad before beginning its operation, namely, selling them to the institutions and individuals who needed morphine, cocaine, heroin etc for medical and scientific use. After the establishment of a National Narcotics Bureau was permitted by the Executive Council, the Health Administration ordered ten kinds of narcotic drugs from abroad. Regarding the amount of the order, the Bureau “referred to the estimation of the specialists of the League of Nations and

⁵²³ “擬訂禁烟督察處嗎啡及其他麻醉藥品銷售後撥接獎金盈利辦法”, *國民政府禁烟史料*, volume 2, p. 299. (“Draft Measures regarding Dividends of Selling the Confiscated Morphine and other Narcotic Drugs”, *Compiled Primary sources concerning the Opium Suppression of the Nationalist Government*).

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 298-302.

considered China's domestic situation".⁵²⁵ In a memorial submitted to the Executive Council, the Health Administration stated that the order would arrive in China in October 1935.⁵²⁶

When the issues regarding cooperation with the Opium Suppression Inspectorate and the sources of the narcotic drugs solved in mid-1935, the central government adopted a range of other measures to prepare the Bureau for operation. As early as 21 November 1934, the Ministry of the Interior submitted to the Executive Council a proposed constitution for the unit.⁵²⁷ A revised version of the constitution was passed at a meeting of the Executive Council on 18 June 1935.⁵²⁸ Also in June 1935, the Nanjing Nationalist Government decided to halt the implementation of the *Revised Regulation on Narcotic Drugs* (修正麻醉藥品管理條例) which was issued in 1931. This was because according to that regulation, it was the responsibility of local governments to arrange drug stores for the distribution of narcotic drugs for medicinal and scientific use. The central government changed this policy and instructed provincial and municipal authorities to 'temporarily slow down' (暫緩) the speed of arranging institutions for distributing narcotic drugs.⁵²⁹ This decision of the Executive Council was the consequence of the appeal of the Ministry of the Interior. In the view of the Ministry of the Interior, the previous policy was problematic because few local drug stores could meet the required criteria. Moreover, the regulations of local authorities on those drug stores were not satisfactory. This situation might stimulate the illegal use of narcotic drugs, impede the progress of the anti-narcotic campaign, and provide opportunities for other countries to criticise the drug policy of the Chinese government. Therefore, the

⁵²⁵ 江西省政府訓令民三字第一六二二三號, *江西省政府公報*, 1935. ("Instruction of the Jiangxi Provincial Government", *Jiangxi Provincial Government Gazette*).

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁷ *申報*, 21 November 1934. (*Shenbao*).

⁵²⁸ *申報*, 19 June, 1935. (*Shenbao*).

⁵²⁹ For instance, the Shanghai Special Municipality instructed the Health Bureau and Public Security Bureau in that city to follow the order of the Executive Council that required provincial and municipal authorities to slow down the speed of arranging drug stores to distribute narcotic drugs. See "上海市政府訓令第一四七八號", *上海市政府公報*, 1935. ("Instructions of the Shanghai Special Municipality No. 1478", *Gazette of Shanghai Municipal Government*).

local authorities should abandon putting the refined drugs issue in the hands of drug stores. Anyone who needed them from now on had to order them from the National Narcotics Bureau in the future.⁵³⁰

In order to establish a national distribution network, the Nanjing Nationalist Government issued the *Provisional Regulation for Purchasing Narcotic Drugs* (暫行購用麻醉藥品辦法). The *Regulation* drafted by the National Narcotics Bureau was passed by the Executive Council on 13 August 1935. In September 1935, the Military Affairs Committee ordered the provincial and municipal governments to circulate the *Regulation* to their affiliated governmental organizations.⁵³¹ According to the *Regulation*, hospitals, doctors, and pharmacists who wanted to purchase refined drugs must be registered at the Ministry of the Interior. Dispensaries which would like to purchase refined drugs must be registered at the Health Bureau of the local authorities. Academic research institutions such as medical schools which needed to purchase refined drugs for scientific use must be registered with the central government. All those individuals and institutions which were in need of these substances were required to make their purchases from the Narcotics Bureau by post. Meanwhile, the regulation stipulated which kinds of narcotic drugs the Bureau could sell. Those drugs including: opium, morphine, codeine, ethylmorphine hydrochloride (dionine), apomorphine hydrochloride, extract cannabis (soft), cocaine, strychnine, dihydro-oxy cedeinone (Eukodal) and pantopon.⁵³²

The National Narcotics Bureau also took advantage of the growing national public health system. For instance, the Health Office of the Nanjing Municipal Government investigated all of the drug stores in that city in 1935 and found that generally the drug stores had no prescriptions from the physicians. This was because the

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ Such as “中央文件法規：購用麻醉藥品暫行辦法”，*浙江省政府公報*, Issue 2433, 1935, pp. 4-5, (“Provisional Regulation of Purchasing Narcotic Drugs”, *Gazette of Zhejiang Provincial Government*); “中央文件法規：購用麻醉藥品暫行辦法”，*湖北省政府公報*, Issue 135, 1935, pp. 29-30, (“Provisional Regulation of Purchasing Narcotic Drugs”, *Gazette of Hubei Provincial Government*).

⁵³² Ibid.

physicians required patients to bring prescriptions back to subsequent visits. After taking a prescription and purchasing some medicines or drugs from a drug store, the patient would keep the prescription. The Health Office viewed this as an obstacle for inspecting the use of refined substances like morphine, cocaine and heroin because it could not know what physicians had prescribed. To solve this problem, it instructed all the physicians in that city to leave prescriptions at the drug stores and not to give them to the patients. If the patients really needed to take away the prescriptions, the physicians must write two prescriptions every time, one for the patient and one left in the drug stores for the inspection of the Health Office.⁵³³

To make way for the new Bureau, it was also necessary to loosen the grip of the authority of the Maritime Customs Service over narcotic drugs importation. This was done by 9 December 1935, as the Maritime Custom in Shanghai posted a notification which listed the revised clauses of the *Regulations on Medical Use of Narcotic Drugs*. The regulations read:

“First. From now on, licenses for importing narcotic drugs from Germany and Switzerland will not be issued by the Maritime Customs.

Second. Shanghai will be the only port for importing narcotic drugs and strychnine.

Third. The National Hygiene Laboratory will be in charge of the issues of importing and distributing narcotic drugs and strychnine. Licenses issued by the Ministry of the Interior are necessary for importing those drugs and

⁵³³ “衛生事務所嚴密取締麻醉藥品”, *廣濟醫刊*, vol. 12, no. 3, 1935. pp. 5-6. (“The Health Office Strictly Prohibited Narcotic Drugs”, *Guang Ji Medical Journal*).

licenses issued by the National Hygiene Laboratory for distributing narcotic drugs in China.”⁵³⁴

After taking the above measures, the Bureau published a daily announcement that it was now ready for business in *Shenbao* from December 20th to 25th, 1935.⁵³⁵ By that time, the Executive Council had passed the bylaws of the National Narcotic Bureau on 18 June 1935.⁵³⁶ The central government in Nanjing had already sent the provincial and municipal governments, and local authorities the revised bylaws of the National Narcotics Bureau.⁵³⁷ The contrast with the 1920s could not have been more obvious. Now, a centralised government could force the local authorities to recognise the newly established National Narcotics Bureau.

The ‘narcotics phobia’, of the Nationalist Government in this period described by Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun and Lars Laamann, and the Six Year Plan that was the government’s response to it meant there was by now a nationwide hierarchy on drugs issues, that included the National Opium Suppression Committee in Nanjing, its branch offices in the provinces, municipalities, and counties, the Opium Suppression Inspectorate and now the National Narcotics Bureau of the Central Health Laboratory.⁵³⁸ The regulations were also revised to ensure that the place of the Bureau in the institutional framework was clear. The first action was to stop the *Revised Regulation on Narcotic Drugs* issued in 1931 which stipulated that it was the provincial or municipal government’s responsibility to arrange drug stores in charge

⁵³⁴ “江海關改正報運麻醉藥品進口辦法”, *新醫藥*, vol 3, issue 4, 1935, p. 1084. (“Shanghai Maritime Customs Revised the Policy of Importing Narcotic Drugs”, *New Medicine*). The National Narcotic Bureau was affiliated to the National Hygiene Laboratory.

⁵³⁵ “中央衛生試驗所經理麻醉藥品通告”, *申報*, 20 December 1935. (“Announcement regarding the Central Health Laboratory is Now Managing the Narcotic Drugs Issue”, *Shenbao*). News about the establishment of the Bureau finally appeared in newspapers in November 1935. See “行政院之工作報告”, *申報*, 12 November 1935. (“Report of the Executive Council”, *Shenbao*).

⁵³⁶ *申報*, June 19th, 1935. (*Shenbao*).

⁵³⁷ Such as: “浙江省政府訓令民字第三五〇三號”, *浙江省政府公報*, 1934, (“Instructions of the Zhejiang Provincial Government No. 3503”, *Gazette of Zhejiang Provincial Government*); “修正中央衛生試驗所麻醉藥品經理處組織章程”, *北平市市政府公報*, 1935, (“Revised Bylaw of the National Narcotic Bureau of the Central Health Laboratory”, *Gazette of Peiping Special Municipality*).

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

of the distribution of narcotic drugs for medicinal and scientific use. From now on, anyone who needed narcotic drugs had to order from the National Narcotics Bureau.⁵³⁹

Even so, the newly established National Narcotics Bureau still faced problems. One of those concerned omissions from the *Provisional Regulation for Purchasing Narcotic Drugs* which was issued in August 1935. It merely listed ten refined drugs which institutions and individuals could purchase for medicinal and scientific use. However, drug stores sold more than ten kinds of refined drugs with psychoactive properties. Moreover, the regulation only stipulated that hospitals, drug stores, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, and academic institutions could order narcotic drugs from the Bureau so did not mention the pharmaceutical industry itself. This was raised by some members of the New Pharmaceutical Industry Trade Association in Shanghai. It asked the National Health Administration to make further explanations on the *Provisional Regulation for Purchasing Narcotic Drugs*. After receiving the explanation of the Health Administration, the Association reported to its members on 9 January 1936.

After receiving the request of our member associations around the country, we submitted documents to the National Health Administration twice to ask it explain the *Provisional Regulation for Purchasing Narcotic Drugs*. The instruction of the National Health Administration numbered 'medical issues no. 2639' stated that: the two documents of your Association are received. The following are instructions to your questions: 1. to meet the legitimate use, the pharmaceutical industry could purchase narcotic drugs from the Bureau complying with the *Regulation*; 2. Narcotic drugs weighed less than 5 grams could be resold but need to include a label of the drug store which resells it. Moreover, the resale is limited in the locality; 3. Narcotic drugs which have been listed in the fifth point of the *Regulation* could be

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

manufactured by your pharmaceutical industry but statistics need to be reported to this Administration at the end of each month; 4. Strychnine refers to pure strychnine and its derivatives; 5. All drug stores should report to this Administration their storage of narcotic drugs and the medicines made from them before 31 December 1935. From the date when drug stores receive this instruction, all of them need to start purchasing from the National Narcotics Bureau if they need narcotic drugs; 5. Statistics of sales from 31 December 1935 to the date when they received the narcotic drugs from the National Narcotic Bureau should be submitted to the National Health Administration. The latest date for starting to purchase narcotic drugs from the Bureau is 1 March 1936; 6. Other narcotic drugs and their derivatives besides the ten listed in the *Regulations* are prohibited to sell because the Executive Council had not checked them. If there is medicinal and scientific need of those drugs in the future, this Administration will check them first then apply for the permission of the Executive Council.⁵⁴⁰

The New Pharmaceutical Industry Association remained unhappy about the last issue of how drug stores should deal with the narcotic drugs in their hands but not listed in the *Regulation*. Obviously, they had only two choices: to sell them out by the deadline, or to face the penalty. Probably because there were only three months left before the deadline and it was impossible for them to sell all the relevant substances, the New Pharmaceutical Industry Association wrote to the National Health Administration again specifically on this issue. The instruction of the Health Administration was that the New Pharmaceutical Industry Association should ask its members to submit detailed information about what and how much of the narcotic drugs they had (besides the ten kinds), so the National Health

⁵⁴⁰ “上海市製藥業工業同業公會關於有關機關頒佈的購用麻醉藥品暫行辦理以及關於呈請修改解釋條文和具體手續的批復文書” (Files regarding the Shanghai Pharmaceutical Industry Association asked for explanation on the Provisional Regulation of Purchasing Narcotic Drugs), 1935-1936, Shanghai Municipal Archives, S 65-1-51.

Administration could send information to the Executive Council to decide how to proceed.⁵⁴¹

By the beginning of 1936 the National Narcotics Bureau was still facing other problems. On 27 February 1936, it reported to the National Health Administration that although the Bureau had started to sell narcotic drugs on 12 December 1935, and had announced this in both English and Chinese newspapers, there had not been many customers in the previous two months. The National Narcotics Bureau ascribed this situation to the existence of alternative methods of getting narcotic drugs. So it asked the National Health Administration to communicate with provincial and municipal governments, and health institutions, to ask them to strictly inspect the use of narcotic drugs by hospitals, physicians, and drug stores in their respective administrative regions. The National Narcotics Bureau pointed out that these agencies could not openly reject the request as inspecting the use of narcotic drugs could be presented as part of the wider narcotic drugs suppression campaign. Considering the fact that in 1936 the Six-Year Plan had been in place for a year no government bodies dared to get a reputation for non-cooperation with the campaign. This proved to be the case, and in May 1936 Hunan Provincial Government, for example, sent an instruction to the Public Security Bureaus at the capital (Changsha) and those in the Counties of that province to strictly inspect the illicit trade in refined drugs.⁵⁴² 'Illicit' meant all purchases from sources other than the National Narcotics Bureau, even where their purpose was medical and scientific use.

As the agency that oversaw the Bureau, the Central Health Laboratory reported the situation to the National Health Administration. The National Health Administration duly sent a note to the Opium Suppression Commission of the Military Affairs Committee. Eventually Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Military Affairs

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² “湖南省政府訓令衛字第三五號”，*湖南省政府公報*, May 1936, (“Instruction of Hunan Provincial Government, Health Issue, No. 35”, *Gazette of Hunan Provincial Government*).

Committee got involved to personally endorse the campaign of inspections to identify the illicit trading in refined drugs. In a message to government bodies around the country early in 1936, he stated that

Since the establishment of the Narcotic Bureau, some western medicine dispensaries, hospitals, physicians and medical schools had purchased narcotic drugs from the Bureau. However, most of them have not yet. Undoubtedly, they have other methods to obtain narcotic drugs. This situation also indicates that the illegal trade in narcotic drugs exists everywhere. Without strictly differentiating [the legitimate and illegitimate trade and sale], and strict investigation and seizures, how can we punish the offenders and eradicate the narcotic drugs?⁵⁴³

After reviewing the process of the establishment of the National Narcotics Bureau and describing the current problem, he stated

I have had a look at the certificate issued by the National Narcotics Bureau of the Central Health Laboratory and checked the package policy of the Bureau. The refined drugs sold by the Bureau are contained in glass bottles and sealed with sealing wax. The glass bottles are packaged with wood boxes, then sent to the post office to deliver. [All of these are completed with] a standard process. Thus it is not difficult for local authorities to inspect and seize. Refined drugs packed in a different way, or without the certificate issued by the Bureau, or not the abovementioned ten kinds of drugs, should be seized. Moreover, there are regulations for inspecting the method of using parcels to smuggle refined drugs. Every anti-opium and anti-narcotics (note, 'poison' in

⁵⁴³ “軍委會委員長行營軍法處陳請檢送麻醉藥品管理條例等項法規公函及有關文書” (Files regarding the Judge Advocate of the Field Headquarters of the Military Committee submitted Regulations on Narcotic Drugs, Official Letters, etc.), 1934-1937, Second Historical Archives of China, 12-1020.

the text) governmental organisations of local authorities should refer to the regulations and carry out inspections.⁵⁴⁴

While the Military Affairs Committee praised the system for purchasing narcotic drugs from the National Narcotics Bureau, however, it was not so popular with buyers. In November 1936, the New Pharmaceutical Industry Association appealed to the National Health Administration of the Executive Council to set up a branch office of the National Narcotics Bureau in Shanghai.⁵⁴⁵ They made this appeal because many dispensaries which were members of the Association complained that it was inconvenient to purchase refined drugs from the Bureau in Nanjing. In addition, delivering the drugs by post also added costs to the price of the drugs and slowed down treatment times, which might endanger the lives of their patients.⁵⁴⁶ Although the National Narcotics Bureau did not open a branch office in Shanghai as the Association suggested, it eventually asked the Health Laboratory of the Shanghai Municipal City to work as its sale agent in October 1937. The reason for this was the wider breakout the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and the National Narcotics Bureau

After this firm intervention by the Nanjing Nationalist Government, the National Narcotics Bureau finally began to operate effectively. The statistics it submitted in subsequent reports suggest that in the years 1936 and 1937 customers increased significantly so that the Bureau made a profit from the sale of narcotic drugs after an initial loss in 1935.⁵⁴⁷ Routine correspondence showed that customers soon

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ The Health Administration which was affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior had been affiliated to the Executive Yuan since June 1935.

⁵⁴⁶ “麻醉藥品運銷執照”，*申報*，23 November 1936. (“Licenses for Distributing Narcotic Drugs”，*Shenbao*).

⁵⁴⁷ “國民政府訓令重字第一二三號”，*國民政府公報*，17 March 1939. (“Instructions of the Nationalist Government, Chongqing, No 123”，*Gazette of National Government*). According to this source, the incomes and expenses in those three years were, 100, 133.31 / 126, 898.45 in 1935, 303, 292.17 / 252, 469.26 in 1936, and 275, 789.55 / 234, 371.57 in 1937. The currency was Chinese yuan.

settled into the new system of making purchases from the Bureau for all sorts of routine medical procedures. When the clinic of the Judicial Council (司法院) ordered 20 grams of cocaine from the Narcotics Bureau in March 1942, it reported that from 29 November 1940 to 16 January 1941 it used cocaine four times, or 10 grams cocaine in total. It was used to prepare solution for eye surgery and nasal drops.⁵⁴⁸ More intriguingly, Zhang Zi-jian, a pharmacist and also the Manager of Xinhua Drug Store, sent an order to the National Narcotics Bureau to buy 10 grams of morphine hydrochloride. From 27 May 1938 to 4 June 1938, his drug store used approximate 0.25 grams of this drug every day. The purpose was 'to withdraw opium craving'.⁵⁴⁹

However, by 1937 Chiang Kai-shek had more urgent problems to deal with than monitoring the operations of the Bureau. The Lu-gou Bridge (also named as Marco Polo Bridge) Incident which happened on 7 July marked the wider outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In November the Nanjing Nationalist Government moved to Chongqing, a mountainous city in south-eastern China, and set it up as the provisional capital. It remained so until the end of the Second World War. The escalation of the conflict did not simply change the location of the Bureau's headquarters however. It also impacted upon the progress of the government's Six-Year Plan for narcotics, and on the way that the National Narcotics Bureau functioned.

Shortly after the wider Sino-Japanese War broke out, the Bureau moved to the hinterland follow the instructions of the National Health Administration. It moved its manufacturing unit to Changsha and the other parts to Hankou. The manufacturing department had all arrived in Changsha by October 1937 but then

⁵⁴⁸ “司法院診療室麻醉藥品訂購用途報告表訂購單” (An Order of Narcotic Drugs and A Report about the Purpose of the Narcotic Drugs which has been Used by the Clinic of the Judicial Council), 1942, Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0030-0001-00008-00000-01000.

⁵⁴⁹ “麻醉藥品訂購單麻醉藥品用途報告表”, (An Order of Narcotic Drugs and A Report about the Purpose of the Narcotic Drugs which has been Used), 1937-1938, Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0030-0001-00037-00000-86000.

was forced to move again to Chongqing in January 1938 because of continued bombing there by the Japanese. The other department also moved from Hankou to Chongqing in the first half of 1938 because of battles in that city.⁵⁵⁰ As the Bureau moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, it also set up a branch office in Shanghai. In October 1937 the Secretariat of the Shanghai Municipal City wrote to the Municipal Board of Directors of the French Concession (Conseil D' Administration Municipal de la Concession Française de Shanghai) and notified the latter that the Health Laboratory of the Shanghai Municipal City would be the branch office of the National Narcotics Bureau. This was the instruction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Health Administration.⁵⁵¹ After the Nationalist Army lost battles in Shanghai and the city was occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army, the headquarters of the China Medical Association in Shanghai worked as a Sale Agent for the National Narcotics Bureau.⁵⁵² In March 1938, the National Narcotics Bureau also set up a branch office in Hankou, one of the economic centres of inland China.⁵⁵³ In April 1938, the Central Hygiene Laboratory of the National Health Administration was abolished and the National Narcotics Bureau was affiliated to the Hygiene Laboratory Department of the National Health Administration.⁵⁵⁴

The escalation of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 also changed the features of the anti-narcotics campaign in China. The war made Chiang Kai-shek shift his attention away from the narcotics issue to focus on military affairs. On 1 March 1938, he

⁵⁵⁰ Shen Huang-zhong and Li Fu-sheng, "A Time-honoured Enterprise: The History of the No. 1 Pharmaceutical Factory of Nanjing", *Yu Hua Literature and History*, Issue 6, 1992, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁵¹ "上海法租界公董局卫生处关于上海市卫生试验所代售麻醉药品事" (Notifying the Health Department of the Municipal Board of Directors of the French Concession in Shanghai that the Health Department of Shanghai Municipal City will be the sale agent for the National Narcotic Bureau), 1937-1938, Shanghai Municipal Archives, U385-1-257. The Nationalist Army retreated from Shanghai on 11 November 1937, see 楊國強, 張培德, *上海通史第七卷民國政治*, 上海: 上海人民出版社, 1999, p. 336, (Yang Guo-qiang and Zhang Pei-de eds. *History of Shanghai, vol. VII, Politics of the Republican China*).

⁵⁵² "關於魯姆向麻醉藥品經理處訂購麻醉藥品的函件", (Letters regarding Ruhm's Ordering Narcotic Drugs from the National Narcotic Bureau), 1938-1939, Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0030-0001-00017-0000-34000.

⁵⁵³ "赴各縣工作", *申報*, 1 March 1938. ("Work in Various Counties", *Shenbao*).

⁵⁵⁴ "交通部公報總衛字第七九九號", *交通公報*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1938. ("Instructions of the Ministry of Communication, Health Affairs, No. 799". *Communication Gazette*).

resigned from his post overseeing China's drugs policies as head of the Opium Suppression Commission. Zhou Yong-ming has argued that this was a key moment in the Six-Year Plan because Chiang played an important role in coordinating policy implementation when the drug issue was under his direct authority.⁵⁵⁵ After his resignation, "the campaign witnessed overlapping opium-suppression organs set up by different ministries and with a lesser degree of coordination".⁵⁵⁶ Chiang Kai-shek's Opium Suppression Commission lost its independent status and was quietly subsumed into the Ministry of the Interior following his resignation. The difference was obvious. In 1937 the Inspectorate General of the Maritime Customs instructed the Commissioners of Customs that their seizure reports should be sent directly to Chiang Kai-shek himself.⁵⁵⁷ In September 1938, the Inspectorate General instructed the Commissioners of Maritime Customs to simply send the reports to the Opium Suppression Commission of the Ministry of the Interior.⁵⁵⁸

The Second Sino-Japanese War produced a large number of casualties who needed medical care and refined drugs to treat pain. This was reflected by the sudden influx of orders by military units to the National Narcotics Bureau for refined drugs. For instance, in January 1938, the Medical Officer of the 51st Division of the Army, Tang

⁵⁵⁵ The Nanjing Nationalist Government established a National Opium Suppression Commission in 1928, as has discussed at the beginning of this chapter. This Commission was like an independent government body with many high officials as its members. It operated until 1935. On 5 June 1935, Chiang Kai-shek abolished this Commission. Shortly after that, he established a new Opium Suppression Commission (禁烟委員會總會, literally means "Opium Suppression General-Commission") on 15 June 1935 and the Military Affairs Committee was its governing body. When Chiang Kai-shek resigned from this commission on 1 March 1938, the Opium Suppression Commission was affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior. See Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, pp. 274-276; Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, p. 83; Alan Baumler, *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse than Floods and Wild Beasts*, New York: State University of New York Press, 2007, p. 178.

⁵⁵⁶ Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, pp. 83-84.

⁵⁵⁷ "Narcotics: opium and/or habit-forming drugs: foreign, seized on importation from abroad: attested copies of Seizure Reports relating to, to be prepared in quadruplicate, two copies being forwarded to Non-Resident Secretary and two to the General Superintendent of the Anti-Opium Commission direct; instructions", *Inspectorate General's Circulars*, No. 5534, 17 June 1937.

⁵⁵⁸ "Narcotics: opium and/or habit-forming drugs seized on importation from abroad: attested copies of Seizures Reports relating to, formerly sent direct to General Superintendent of the Anti-Opium Commission, Nanking, to be sent to Anti-Opium Commission of the Nei-cheng Pu, Chungking; instructions", *Inspectorate General's Circulars*, No. 5718, 7 September 1938.

Wen-jue, submitted an application to the Narcotics Bureau to purchase six kinds of refined drugs including 6 wa (瓦, 1 wa equals 0.5 g) cocaine, one box of opium laudanum and one box of morphine ampoules for medical use.⁵⁵⁹ At that time, the National Narcotics Bureau had a branch office in Wuhan and the 51st Division of the Army also had an office in that city. That might be the reason why it purchased narcotic drugs from that branch office of the Bureau rather than from headquarters in Chongqing. In March 1938, the Medical Office of the 48th Division of the Army sent an application to the National Narcotics Bureau to purchase “30g codeine phosphate, 10 g cocaine hydrochloride, 10 boxes of morphine ample, and 15 g of morphine hydrochloride”. Meanwhile, it submitted a report of the use of the narcotic drugs last time, “distributed to the troops and the medical units for medical use”.⁵⁶⁰

It was not just the military which found itself increasingly reliant on the Bureau for supplies to deal with the conflict. This was signified by the case that a branch office of the China Red Cross Association ordered narcotic drugs from the Bureau. After the Lugou Bridge Incident in July 1937 the Luoyang branch office of the China Red Cross Association promptly trained 190 nursing personnel and organised them into three squadrons and nine units. It then sent out several units to the northern Henan province and southern Shanxi province where lots of wounded soldiers and refugees were congested. However, the Luoyang branch office of the Association soon found that they were short of refined drugs. Therefore the Luoyang branch office sent a delegate to Hankou to purchase narcotic drugs. When the person arrived at the branch office of the Narcotics Bureau in Hankou to fetch the narcotic drugs, s/he submitted another order to the National Narcotic Bureau, along with a

⁵⁵⁹ “關於擬請售給陸軍第 51 師武漢辦事處嗎啡陸瓦可加因十瓦磷古等致軍政部衛生署麻醉藥品經理處的公函” (Letters from the Wuhan Office of the 51st Division of the Army to the Narcotic Bureau of the Health Administration of the Military-Political Ministry to purchase morphine, cocaine etc), Chongqing Municipal Archives, 1938, 0030-0001-00221-00000-17000.

⁵⁶⁰ “Letters from the 48th Division of the Army to the Narcotic Bureau”, Chongqing Municipal Archives, 1938, 0030-0001-00216-00001-94000.

letter of the General Secretary of the China Red Cross Association, to purchase more narcotic drugs for future use.⁵⁶¹

The War also seems to have impacted on the effectiveness of the importation and distribution system of the National Narcotics Bureau. Since June 1938, the port which was used for importing refined drugs for medicinal and scientific use had been changed from Shanghai to Guangzhou, a port city in southern China, because the conflict made Shanghai unviable.⁵⁶² The disturbance produced by the hostilities also meant that buyers sometimes received broken parcels damaged goods. For example, in December 1937 the physician Lei Ao sent back the morphine and injecting syringes that he bought along with a letter to the National Narcotics Bureau, informing them that most of the items were broken when he received them.⁵⁶³ Orders were lost too. Dr W. Rohm was a physician working for the Allianz China Mission in Nancheng, a county in southern Jiangxi province, in the late 1930s. He sent a registered letter along with a cheque to the Hankou branch office of the National Narcotic Bureau on 1 August 1938 to order “10 gram Morphine hydrochloride and 5 gram Codeine phosphate”. Since he received no parcel or any information from the branch office in Hankou, Dr Rohm sent a letter again on October 18th. When Dr Rohm mailed the first letter, the Battle of Wuhan (Hankou was part of what is now Wuhan) had been raging for two months and lasted until the end of October of 1938. Although he did not get any information about his first letter, his second letter reached Chongqing, the place where the National Narcotics Bureau was headquartered from 1938. In its reply to Dr Rohm, the official at the

⁵⁶¹ “關於洛陽紅十字會向衛生署麻醉藥品經理處購買麻醉藥品致衛生署麻醉藥品經理處的函” (A Letter from the Luoyang Branch Office of the China Red Cross to the Narcotic Bureau of Health Administration concerning Purchasing Narcotic Drugs), 1938, Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0030-0001-00226-00000-05000.

⁵⁶² “Narcotics: revised regulations governing importation of, from abroad and subsequent movement within China: importation henceforth only allowed at Canton instead of Shanghai, notifying”, *Inspectorate General's Circulars*, No. 5687, 23 June 1938.

⁵⁶³ “關於中央衛生試驗所麻醉藥品經理處所寄藥品多有破損請予以補換致中央衛生試驗所麻醉藥品經理處的函” (A letter to the National Narcotic Bureau of the Central Health Laboratory concerning most the purchased medicines have were broken), December 1937, Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0030-0001-00037-00000-21000.

National Narcotics Bureau stated that “your letter of October 18th addressed to the Central Hygiene Laboratory, Division of Narcotic, Hankow (i.e. Hankou), reached us via Hengyang, Hunan, yesterday, as if by miracle.” Considering the situation, the National Narcotic Bureau made an exception for Dr Rohm and sent him the drugs first, asking him to pay later. Those drugs and a bill for 23.72 yuan contained in an express letter arrived in the hands of Dr Rohm in January 1939. He then sent out 23.72 Yuan postal money order and the certificates for purchasing refined drugs and they safely arrived in Chongqing in February 1939. Meanwhile, the National Narcotic Bureau suggested Dr Rohm to purchase narcotic drugs from its sale agent in Shanghai next time, because it was nearer to Jiangxi province.⁵⁶⁴

The narcotic drugs sold by the National Narcotics Bureau were mainly imported from western countries, especially at the beginning of its operation. Purchasing refined drugs from abroad did not work well sometimes. At the end of 1935, the National Narcotics Bureau purchased two batches of goods, including 50 kg morphine hydrochloride and 10 kg dionine (ethylmorphine hydrochloride), from C. Melchers GmbH & Co. However, those goods were not exported from the foreign country (note, no information about which country) when they were supposed to have been, in January and April of 1936 respectively. The suspicion was that the company had been prevented from sending the goods by their national government who were suspicious of a consignment of refined drugs for China. The agent for C. Melchers GmbH & Co. suggested that the Narcotics Bureau notify the National Health Administration, its governing body. The National Health Administration then issued the National Narcotics Bureau with two special importation certificates and notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask it to contact the relative foreign government and ask it to permit delivery.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁴ “關於魯姆向麻醉藥品經理處訂購麻醉藥品的函件” (Letters regarding Ruhm’s purchasing narcotic drugs from the National Narcotic Bureau), Chongqing Municipal Archives, 0030-0001-00017-00000-34000, 1938-1939.

⁵⁶⁵ 衛生署咨外交部 (Official Communication from the Health Administration to the Foreign Ministry), 9 July 1936, 衛生署醫藥證照公告月刊 (*Announcement Health Administration*), Issue 7, 1936, pp. 8-9.

However, in time the Bureau began to generate its own supplies by taking materials seized by the Opium Suppression Inspectorate to refine into morphine. For example, when the Central Hygiene Laboratory was preparing to establish the Narcotics Bureau, it wrote to the Opium Suppression Inspectorate to purchase 10,000 taels of Gansu opium (because the Bureau found that opium produced in that province was of a higher quality). It also asked the Opium Suppression Inspectorate to waive the 'special tax' on those opium.⁵⁶⁶ Since this was a large amount of opium, the Opium Suppression Inspectorate asked the Central Hygiene Laboratory to explain themselves. The reply from the Laboratory was that it was for producing tincture and powder of opium. Meanwhile, the Inspectorate also wrote to the Military Affairs Committee to ask for its view on this transaction. The Military Affairs Committee advised that the Inspectorate could provide the opium but the 'special taxes' could not be waived.⁵⁶⁷ Shortly after the Bureau was established, it wrote again to the Opium Suppression Inspectorate in September 1935 and asked the latter to sell it 2, 000 taels of Gansu opium and 4, 000 taels of crude morphine.⁵⁶⁸

Once established, the Narcotics Bureau also produced its own refined drugs. In January 1936, the Bureau started to use some basic instruments to manufacture morphine hydrochloride and codeine hydrochloride with imported materials and confiscated opium and crude morphine.⁵⁶⁹ Products of the National Narcotics

⁵⁶⁶ At that time, opium was also called “特貨” (special goods) in some official files, and the tax was called “特稅” (special tax).

⁵⁶⁷ “軍委會委員長行營軍法處陳請檢送麻醉藥品管理條例等項法規公函及有關文書” (Various Files regarding the Judge Advocate of Field Headquarters of the Military Commission Submitted the Regulations on Narcotic Drugs, Official Letters, etc), 1934-1937, Second Historical Archives of China, 12-1020.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ 沈黃忠, 李福生, “一個老字號企業的歷程: 南京第一製藥廠的歷史沿革”, *雨花文史*, Issue 6, 1992, p. 110. (Shen Huang-zhong and Li Fu-sheng, “A Time-honoured Enterprise: The History of the No. 1 Pharmaceutical Factory of Nanjing”, *Yu Hua Literature and History*). *Yu Hua Literature and History* is a local magazine and the articles in it have no references.

Bureau were exempted from inter-port duty after June 1938.⁵⁷⁰ This was designed to reduce the expenses of the Bureau and to enable it to generate some income. In September 1944, the Bureau even advertised its own tincture of opium in *Shenbao*.⁵⁷¹

Other than controlled refined drugs, the Bureau also started to produce non-narcotic medicines in 1940 and in that year it received an extra 40,000 Yuan appropriation for that purpose.⁵⁷² However, the Bureau realised that such was the demand for these medicines that the appropriation could not meet the costs, so it made an application to the Executive Council for more funding.⁵⁷³ After evaluation by the Special Committee of the Financial Ministry, the Nationalist government agreed to the proposal, but only by shifting funding it had provided for the production of the controlled refined drugs to this new purpose.⁵⁷⁴ It seems that under the pressure of wartime conditions, the remit of the Bureau was starting to shift and become less well-defined. Indeed, in 1944 the Health Administration established the No. 1 Pharmaceutical Factory with the Narcotics Bureau as its governing body. After the Second Sino-Japanese War came to an end in 1945, the Narcotics Bureau moved back to Nanjing from Chongqing and continued to operate there until the end of the administration of the Nationalists in mainland China in 1949.⁵⁷⁵ Despite its contested beginnings, and the disruption of the war, the

⁵⁷⁰ "Duty exemption: narcotics produced by Narcotic Agency of Health Laboratory Department of National Health Administration to be exempted from interport duty; instructions", *Inspectorate General's Circulars*, No. 5686, 22 June 1938.

⁵⁷¹ "食米特種配給辦法", *申報*, 16 September 1944. ("Regulations on Special Ration of Rice", *Shenbao*).

⁵⁷² By 1941, the non-narcotic medicines it produced including sublimation sulphur, silver nitrate, and compound rhrbarb. See: Shen Huang-zhong and Li Fu-sheng, "A Time-honoured Enterprise: The History of the No. 1 Pharmaceutical Factory of Nanjing", *Yu Hua Literature and History*, Issue 6, 1992, p. 111.

⁵⁷³ The Narcotic Bureau was affiliated to the Health Administration all the time. The Health Administration was changed to be affiliated to the Executive Council in April 1940 thus here the Narcotic Bureau's application was submitted to the Executive Council.

⁵⁷⁴ 國民政府訓令渝文字第六六九號 (Instruction of the Nationalist Government, Chongqing, Civil Service Department, No. 669), 30 July 1940, *國民政府公報訓令渝字第二八零號* (*Gazette of the Nationalist Government, Instructions, Chongqing*, No. 280), p. 6.

⁵⁷⁵ Shen Huang-zhong and Li Fu-sheng, "A Time-honoured Enterprise: The History of the No. 1 Pharmaceutical Factory of Nanjing", pp. 111-112.

Bureau had become firmly established in the structures of the Nationalist government's approach to refined, "narcotic", drugs.

Conclusion

The Nationalist government's approach towards psychoactive substances has often been dismissed by historians, Alan Baumler going as far as to call the National Opium Suppression Commission a "failure".⁵⁷⁶ But this chapter has shown that this may be too much of a generalisation, and one that can only be reached by focusing solely on Chiang Kai-shek's de facto opium monopoly in the 1930s. Instead, by looking at other parts of the Chinese government's approach to the issue of psychoactive substances in the period a more rounded picture emerges.

In the first place, the contrast between the fate of the experimental local narcotic bureau established by the Beiyang government in 1920s Shanghai and that of the National Narcotics Bureau in the 1930s is important. While the former struggled to survive for less than three years, the latter became a permanent fixture of the Nationalist government's drugs bureaucracy. In part this reflects the different natures of the regimes in which they were established, as the Beiyang government proved to be splintered and short-lived, while the Nationalists achieved a far greater degree of control over most of China and the machinery of government. However, tracing the story by which the National Narcotics Bureau was established is important, as it shows how the administration picked its way through the difficulties of defining where the line lay between illicit and licit use of powerful substances like morphine, cocaine and heroin, rather than giving up on the task. Time and time again, resistance, opposition and problems arose, and on each occasion the authorities came up with a workable solution. The most eye-catching of these interventions came when Chiang Kai-shek himself took charge of the

⁵⁷⁶ Alan Baumler, *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse than Floods and Wild Beasts*, New York: State University of New York Press, 2007, pp. 140-142.

campaign to establish the Bureau as the sole source of these refined drugs in the country, a measure that certainly seemed to work in establishing the Bureau as the point of contact for legitimate customers. In short, the Nationalist administration was successful in bringing the issue of the legitimate medical and scientific uses of these refined, psychoactive substances, into the orbit of government in China. Whether this had any impact on illegitimate markets is another question altogether not considered here.⁵⁷⁷

The story also draws attention to the complexities of addressing issues related to psychoactive substances in this period in China. Multiple agencies, a range of government departments, and tensions between central and local government all had to be negotiated in setting up the Bureau and ensuring that it became a permanent fixture in the system. This was also the case when it came to interest groups outside of the authorities, as medical associations, pharmaceutical companies and others all pursued their own agendas. It is striking that it was only when commercial groups suddenly found themselves on the wrong side of the law in 1934 that they began to see the value of such a Bureau rather than campaign against it. The change of heart by this group also draws attention to the power of economic interests to shape the government's policies on refined drugs.

There are wider contexts still for understanding the emergence and longevity of the Bureau under the Nationalist regime. One is the gradual establishment of public health as a government concern in China during the period of Chiang Kai-shek's administration. The Bureau's destiny had been combined with that of the National Health Administration from the 1920s onwards, and a broader move to insert the authorities into the activities of doctors, hospitals and health more widely. The Bureau, as part of the National Health Administration, was one feature in a web of

⁵⁷⁷ Su Zhi-liang has argued that the dislocation caused by the conflicts of the period ensured that consumption of refined substances like morphine, heroin and cocaine, as well as the traditional use of opium for smoking, remained serious problems in a disrupted and demoralised population at the end of the war with Japan in 1945; *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, pp. 343-353.

agencies that were designed to draw the medical world under the control of the political one. The new regulations on refined drugs of the 1930s insisted on systems of registration and surveillance which mean that doctors, drug stores and pharmaceutical companies were subjected to more government scrutiny than ever before.

Finally, the chapter showed that the wider international context was also a factor in the story of the Bureau. While the story in China has been the main focus here, Hu Shi-ze's inclusion in the process of scoping out the Bureau's remit and functions is a reminder that the international drugs regulatory system under the League of Nations was a presence in government decisions from the 1920s onwards. While much of this chapter has been about the place of refined drugs in a time when China was struggling for independence from foreign interference and invasion, the broader framework of this system shows that the domestic story remained tangled up with the wider one of the global governance of psychoactive drugs that was becoming established in this period.

Conclusion

The findings of this thesis offer conclusions in two distinct though interrelated areas. One pertains to debates about the consumption of refined drugs such as morphine, cocaine and heroin in China and the emergence of a corresponding market. A second set of conclusions relates to the formulation of policies on refined drugs in the half century after these substances first began appearing in China, and to what this reveals about the nature of the Chinese state in a period of transition.

Supply, Consumption and Markets

In his neat summary of existing positions in historiography regarding the formation of markets for psychoactive substances in the modern period, Bill McAllister argued that there were two core theories. On the one hand there is what he called the “supply-control mentality”, which argues that the emergence of a group of consumers follows an increase in supply, i.e. the arrival of larger amounts of a drug product stimulates a market for it. This theory rapidly became the ‘dominant’ explanation among policy makers from the early twentieth-century onwards, so that the subsequent international drugs regulatory system became focused on cutting off supply. The other core approach highlights the role of consumers. The argument here is that the arrival of a new substance lead the affected society to experiment with and to assess it. If members of that society decide it is useful and find ways to integrate it into their existing understandings of intoxicants, medicines, and health, they begin to adopt and adapt it to their needs, in the

process stimulating a demand for more of it. The agency here is not with suppliers, but with consumers.⁵⁷⁸

Obviously, it is difficult to track in precise detail the growth markets for substances that quickly become illegal, as illicit consumers and suppliers do not usually keep good records, and even when they do these are not often handed over to the authorities for the benefit of historians. It is also important to approach the available evidence with caution, as exaggeration and moral panic about the volume of drugs flows were often political tools that hid from view what was really happening. However, it is possible to trace the overall outlines of the story of how a market emerged for morphine, cocaine, and heroin in China, thereby providing insights into the relative strength of the supply- and the demand-side driven theory. The period from the 1870s to the 1880s was the time when morphine was mainly used for medical purposes, usually as a painkiller. It was introduced to China by medical missionaries who saw it as a tool of their evangelical mission. The ability to cure, or at least to treat effectively and painlessly, gave them prestige among local Chinese communities which they hoped would draw locals to their messages about the benefits of Christianity in general. Western pharmaceutical companies and their agents, eager to enter a potentially huge market, were quick to ensure that medical missionaries and their non-religious successors could access ready supplies. These two groups, medical missionaries and Western pharmaceutical interests, established morphine in China.

What followed was equally important as local groups began to adopt and adapt the substance. Observers like the journalist George Morrison noticed in the 1890s that

⁵⁷⁸ William B. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 5.

opium pills had been adopted by the Chinese, while other modes of delivery also seem to have found a place. The “Masters of the Needle” story suggests that morphine was quickly on offer in non-medical settings such as the tea-house, and that it was being administered by Chinese experts who had established suitable dosages and consumption technologies like the hypodermic syringe. Exactly why consumers bought their services is not clear, and many commentators seemed to agree that morphine was being used by those who were seeking to overcome the aches of weaning themselves from opium-smoking. The tea-house context, and the elaborate title of “Masters of the Needle” suggest, however, that morphine had a mystique about it and that some consumers were seeking it for pleasure rather than pain relief. By the end of the nineteenth-century, a range of both Western and Chinese agents were engaged in the business of deciding what morphine was to be used for, and where and when it should be available to consumers.

Heroin and cocaine made the picture more complex still. The former appeared in the late 1910s and continued thereafter. Cocaine’s sudden appearance as a “wonder drug” in Europe and the USA in the 1880s saw it arrive in China by the end of the decade for reasons familiar from the morphine story, as medical missionaries used it as a highly effective anaesthetic in delicate surgery which, as they were delighted to see, impressed locals to the extent that they were drawn to the wider messages about Christianity. Once again, pharmaceutical companies and their agents were quick to ensure that evangelical doctors could rely on them for supplies. Adoption and adaptation by local societies followed quickly, and there is evidence that traditional Chinese medicine practitioners began to incorporate it into tonics which customers sought to ease the discomforts of giving up opium-smoking in the early twentieth-century. The power to decide who should have cocaine and why, therefore, remained dispersed across various groups in these early stages of its establishment in China.

Easy generalisations about the markets for these substances should be avoided, however. For instance, there seem to have been important geographical variations to the story. From the 1870s when morphine was introduced into China to the end of the First World War, consumption spread to many places but seems to have been most often reported in a handful of regions including Manchuria, Hebei, Shandong, Shanghai and Fujian, all of which contained treaty ports. This is readily explained, as these were the places in China in which Western medicine first established itself, and they were busy harbours where the nation connected with the rest of the world. By the same token, they were also places where high volumes of maritime traffic meant that smuggling was possible, and sometimes tolerated, and consumption more easily concealed in large populations living in dense neighbourhoods. Besides the treaty ports consumption of, and trade in, refined drugs seem to have been more common at hubs of transportation into the hinterland, such as railway stations or river harbours. Modes of delivery also seem to have varied, so that hypodermic needles were reported less often away from coastal cities and transport hubs, with pills remaining the preferred option in more out of the way areas. Adding to the complexity of the picture, in the mid-1930s a new procedure of mixing refined drugs and cigarettes to smoke appeared in Shanghai.⁵⁷⁹

The consumption of refined drugs in modern China was highly gendered. From the earliest reports of morphine onwards, patients or consumers were overwhelmingly men, be it those whose tumours were removed or medical operations completed painlessly, or those caught giving in to their own opium-cravings or seeking new pleasures. There were some notable exceptions, as the 1920s newspapers briefly reproduced stories about female Russian refugees in Manchuria who committed suicide by swallowing refined drugs to escape the “white slave traffic” that followed the Russian Revolution from 1917 to 1923 in which they were often groomed by

⁵⁷⁹ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016, pp. 136-137.

criminal gangs for prostitution. The stories echo those explored in much the same period by Marek Kohn concerning the “cocaine girls” in London during and after the First World War.⁵⁸⁰ They reflect national anxieties about threats to gender norms in a period of political uncertainty rather than provide evidence of significant new markets for refined drugs.

The thesis has also shown that the reasons for consumers to experience these refined substances also varied dramatically. Throughout the period examined here, many encountered them for strictly medical reasons, such as anaesthesia in painful operations. Cocaine, for example, was still in use as a local anaesthetic in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War long after it ceased to be used for this purpose in Western medical contexts. It is clear that many sought these substances for what could be seen as quasi-medical purposes, linked to withdrawal from other substances and practices such as opium-smoking. These refined drugs were provided in pills, in locally prepared tonics, and unadulterated through needles into the 1940s.

Teasing out the instances where consumers turned to such drugs for non-medical purposes is difficult for the reasons outlined above, that is consumers of psychoactive medicines not seeking medication rarely leave evidence behind where they explain their actions. But there certainly seems to be evidence to support the theory of Dikötter et al. that as Chinese consumers were increasingly denied the pleasures of opium-smoking because of the anti-opium campaigns in China of the 1890s onwards, they turned to other substances that could offer alternatives.⁵⁸¹ What officials were describing when they said that the local population was “using

⁵⁸⁰ Marek Kohn, “Cocaine girls: sex, drugs, and modernity in London during and after the First World War”, in Paul Gootenberg ed. *Cocaine: Global Histories*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 105-122.

⁵⁸¹ Frank Dikötter, Zhou Xun, Lars Laamann, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016, pp. 123-154.

morphine to comfort their bodies” or that “cocaine ... has become ... a favourite commodity among the southern Chinese” is opaque because of the language used. But such sentences certainly suggest that by the first decade of the twentieth-century local consumers had turned to these substances for the pleasures and psychoactive effects that they promised.

If there are no simple generalizations to be made about consumers then the question remains of what can be said of the suppliers of morphine, cocaine and heroin in the period considered. Clearly, in different historical periods a variety of actors played important roles in producing and trafficking refined drugs. The introduction and early distribution of morphine and cocaine was down to medical missionaries (who often took their own supplies to China) and the Western pharmaceutical companies and their agents there. They marketed their products in newspapers and magazines, sent samples to medical professionals and offered discounts to encourage interest in their goods. When the importation of morphine and cocaine was subjected to regulation after 1909/10, supplies for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes continued to come from these sources. Smuggling for the illegal market remained easy while cocaine remained unregulated in Europe, where few countries applied controls on refined drugs flows until the end of the First World War. Peter Thilly has argued that well-organised Chinese maritime trading groups sourced and distributed supplies, but there is also plenty of evidence that smaller-scale operators made more modest profits by concealing limited batches on ships and in cargoes which were part of routine and legitimate transactions. The First World War started to alter this pattern of supply from Europe, as Japanese pharmaceutical companies took advantage of an interruption of supplies from there during the conflict to produce and export their own goods for the Chinese market. The picture became more complex still when the Chinese themselves began to produce and supply these refined substances. By the end of the 1920s, morphine production had emerged in Chongqing, which borders Sichuan province, an opium producing region. The Yangtze River was the route by which refined substances

could be transported to Shanghai and other urban centres. At the beginning of the 1930s, the illegitimate manufacture of heroin also emerged in China.

In short, this picture suggests that the story of how the market grew for morphine, cocaine and heroin in China in this period is not easily explained either by focusing on suppliers or consumers. Given the change over time, the gender differences, the regional variations, and the emergence of both licit and illicit markets, it is probably better to think in terms of what Pierre Arnaud-Chouvy and Joël Meissonnier have called “a clearer picture of the push and pull factors that are so characteristic of an illegal economy”.⁵⁸² Only the details can provide an explanation of why Chinese people bought these substances at any particular time and place, and efforts to generalize only suit those who prefer simpler explanations.

Refined drugs and the Chinese state

The story of consumption and supply is not complete without looking at state actions. This thesis has examined a story previously neglected by historians, in which the Chinese state inserted itself into the market for morphine, cocaine and heroin by claiming to itself the exclusive power to dictate where the line could be drawn between licit/illicit or legitimate/illegitimate uses of those substances. It was argued above that when these products first began arriving in China it was suppliers and consumers who decided who could, and who could not, have access to them. By the 1940s the National Narcotics Bureau, an arm of the Nationalist government, was the agency that did so. The government finally had a grip on the power to decide who could handle these substances without fear of punishment, and the purposes for which they could use them.

⁵⁸² Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy and Joel Meissonnier, *Yaa Baa: Production, Traffic and Consumption of Methamphetamines in Mainland Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004, p. xix.

There were many steps on the way. The larger context involves moves to discourage the consumption of opium prepared for smoking that grew over the course of the nineteenth-century as imports foisted on China from abroad threatened imperial finances and brought the country into conflict with western nations. By the end of the century anti-opium campaigns in the country presented the smoking habit in nationalist tones and as a threat to the existence of China itself. When observers and critics began to notice that opium-smokers were turning to morphine injections, the substance was framed in a similar way. “Will our four hundred million Chinese people be killed by the needles?” exclaimed one newspaper in 1899. This prompted calls for controls among the educated elites and some government officials, and finally the Qing administration took advantage of negotiations over trade with Western countries to act on morphine (and subsequently cocaine). By 1902, imports of these substances into China were banned other than for those who were qualified to use them for medical purposes or to stock them in drugs stores. The importance of the international context is demonstrated by the fact it was the British delegation to negotiate the Mackey Treaty who first suggested that imports for medical use (by British doctors) be deemed legitimate and licit, while all other uses and users be condemned as the opposite. In the following years Chinese initiatives continued to be prompted as much by foreigners as by Chinese nationals; the 1906 opium edict, which included controls on morphine, was partly the outcome of the petition of Hampden Coit Dubose, the founder of the Anti-Opium League in China, and the country’s delegation at the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission relied on information gathered by Western missionaries.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸³ Su Zhi-liang, *A History of Narcotic Drugs in China*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press, 2017, p. 166. Regarding the Chinese delegation at the Shanghai Opium Commission relied on the information collected by the missionaries to discuss the morphine issue, see chapter 3 of this thesis.

Those from outside China remained a presence in the ways that the Chinese government approached the question of the line between licit/illicit use of refined substances into the 1920s. It was Francis Aglen, the Inspector General of the Maritime Customs from 1910 to 1927, who first appealed to the Beiyang Government to establish a bureau to deal with the issue of refined drugs in 1918, which finally resulted in the Bureau of Drug Inspection and Standardisation in Shanghai between 1922 and 1925. The latter failed, showing that the central government's effort to assert its control over the issue of who got to decide when those substances could be used was not a straightforward one of success. It failed because it was not strong enough to seize that power at the time, and its limits were exposed by rival factions, internal division among branches of government, foreign interference, and economic interest groups such as the owners of Chinese drugs stores.

This situation had changed by the time that the Nationalist administration under Chiang Kai-shek was in charge early in the 1930s. The Six-Year Plan was a comprehensive effort to ensure that the Chinese state took firm charge over the issue of psychoactive substances within its borders. It was aimed at both opium smoking and refined drugs, and threatened harsh punishments to all involved, from consumers to suppliers, including corrupt officials. While it had been careful to align itself with League of Nations agreements, the authors of the Plan had not relied on foreign pressure or advice, and the League itself voiced its admiration for the bullish approach of the Chinese government.⁵⁸⁴ The moment when the administration finally took charge of defining and policing the line between licit/illicit use came as a result of the Plan.

⁵⁸⁴ Zhang Li, *International Cooperation in China: A Study of the Role of the League of Nations, 1919-1946*, Taipei: Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica, Monograph Series No. 83, pp. 240-250. William B. McAllister has pointed out that this also had much to do with the decreasing authority of the League of Nations in the 1930s. See William B. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 106.

Its sweeping nature meant that details were missed. Among them, was the question of who could hold supplies of these refined substances without fear of punishment, and who could use them. In the 1920s Chinese drug stores had found themselves able to resist the Shanghai Bureau by challenging definitions and appealing to rival authorities. But the context shifted under Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Raids like the one on the New Asiatic Chemical Works Ltd in 1932 suggested that the authorities were increasingly serious about the surveillance of producers and suppliers of refined substances, and when the 1934 Temporary Regulation made no mention at all of licit or legal uses of these substances, members of the National Physicians Association, the Shanghai Physician Association, the Shanghai Pharmacist Association, and the Pharmaceutical Industry Association suddenly found themselves facing the death penalty because of stocks they had in warehouses and medicine cabinets. When the authorities once again launched a raid on the New Asiatic Chemical Works, those dealing in supplies for medical and scientific purposes found themselves in a corner. When a government-run National Narcotics Bureau to deal with the issue of licit, legitimate and legal uses of morphine, cocaine and heroin was mooted, it must have seemed a lesser evil than the death penalty.

The reason that the Bureau survived thereafter was because Chiang Kai-shek lent his personal authority to seeing that it had time to get up and running, and because for a while his administration was stable and powerful.⁵⁸⁵ Other factors worked in its favour, as the war with Japan ensured that its services in providing supplies of powerful painkillers were soon in high demand, and the wider demand for therapeutics in a period of conflict saw it take on new functions in producing some of China's medicines. The Chinese state had encroached onto the domestic market

⁵⁸⁵ Felix Boecking, *No Great Wall: Trade, Tariffs, and Nationalism in Republican China, 1927-1945*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017, p. 16, p. 14.

for refined drugs, to the point where it had taken control from producers, suppliers, doctors, consumers and foreigners of defining and policing the line between what could be considered the legitimate use of powerful, refined drugs and what would be deemed illicit, and therefore illegal, consumption. This thesis has shown that this was a faltering process, tangled up in and shaped by the nation's wider and turbulent history of the period.

Over the last twenty years or so researchers have started to challenge an older picture of a Chinese state that collapsed in the nineteenth-century because of illicit trading in psychoactive substances, and which struggled to recover until the Communist Party came to power in 1949. David Bello, in studying the role of Central Asian states in supplying opium to Chinese consumers in the nineteenth-century, concluded that rather than undermining the imperial system, such a trade simply exposed its existing limitations.⁵⁸⁶ Zhou Yong-ming's work argues that narcotic drugs were central to the processes of establishing a new Chinese state in the wake of the downfall of the Qing dynasty. He has shown that government anti-opium campaigns before 1949 were exercises in state-building where the authorities set about extending their authority over the lives and habits of the population in new ways.⁵⁸⁷ This dissertation has shown that this was the case in the story of refined drugs too. Efforts to draw and police the line between licit and illicit uses of morphine, cocaine and heroin were about extending the state's control over pharmaceutical companies, drug stores and doctors. They were also about taking back power from foreigners determined to dictate which substances should be sold in China and the reasons that they should be available. At the same time, they were equally to do with that process of extending the state's authority over the lives and habits of the population. The National Narcotics Bureau is the right place to end the

⁵⁸⁶ David Anthony Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire: Drug Prohibition in the Chinese Interior, 1729-1850*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

⁵⁸⁷ Zhou Yong-ming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.

story of this dissertation, as its name emphasises that the “national” was as important as the “narcotic” in its history.

Appendix 1. *Regulation for Punishing Morphine Offences* in 1914 (translated from Chinese by the author of this thesis)

One. People who manufacture or sale of morphine, store or smuggle morphine from abroad with the intention for sale is subject to level three to five imprisonment plus a fine of 500 Yuan.

Two. People who manufacture the instruments for morphine injection, store or smuggle those instruments from abroad with the intention for sale are subject to lower than level four imprisonment or subject to a detention.

Three. Customs officials and their assistants who smuggle morphine or injection instruments from abroad or connive with others to smuggle morphine or injection instruments are subject to level two to three imprisonment plus a fine of 1,000 Yuan.

Four. People who inject morphine are subject to lower than level four imprisonment plus a fine of less than 300 Yuan or a detention plus a fine less than 300 Yuan.

Five. People who ask someone else to injection morphine for them are subject to lower than level five imprisonment or less than a fine of 1,000 Yuan.

Six. Policemen and their assistants who meet these above cases but do not punish them are subject to the respective punishment.

Seven. People who store injection instruments are subject to a fine of less than 100 Yuan.

Eight. People who have the intention of committing the offences in abovementioned situation of points one to five are also subject to a punishment.

Nine. Offenders in the abovementioned situation of points one to six will be deprived of public rights. If they are officials, they will be removed from their posts.

Ten. The morphine offence cases which have been charged before the enactment of this regulation but have not been brought to trial are also subject to this regulation.

Eleven. Before a pharmacy law is issued, all of the offences concerning cocaine (cocaine is made from coca leaves and its formula is $C_{17}H_{21}NO_4$) and heroin (Heroin is diamorphine and its formula is $C_{21}H_{23}NO_5$) and their derivatives are subject to this regulation.

Twelve. This regulation shall come into force on the day of promulgation.

Appendix 2. Cocaine importation in the *Trade Returns* of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service

A.

CHINA.—TRADE RETURNS

高根
COCAINE.

262

民國二年貿易冊
貨品號數 } 168.
Article No. }

來自何處	COUNTRY FROM WHICH IMPORTED.	年分 1910.		年分 1911.		年分 1912.		年分 1913.	
		貨數	價值	貨數	價值	貨數	價值	貨數	價值
		Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.
		英兩	兩	英兩	兩	英兩	兩	英兩	兩
		Ounces.	Hk. Tls.	Ounces.	Hk. Tls.	Ounces.	Hk. Tls.	Ounces.	Hk. Tls.
香港	Hongkong	29,378	100,919	6	79	10	32	11	35
英國	Great Britain	44	185	71	262	92	317
德國	Germany	124	390	28	79	239	651	110	351
比國	Belgium	175	455
瑞士	Switzerland	16	32
俄國由陸路	Russia and Siberia by land frontier	321	621
俄國太平洋各口	" Pacific Ports	70	98
日本	Japan (including Formosa)	2	10	373	746	23	58
美國及檀香山	U.S. of America (including Hawaii)	2	9
由外洋進口總數	GROSS IMPORT from Foreign Countries	29,677	100,864	82	362	709	1,723	627	1,215
復往外洋	RE-EXPORTED to Foreign Countries	1,800	6,610	13	53	642	1,251
由外洋進口淨數	NET IMPORT from Foreign Countries direct	27,877	94,254	69	309	709	1,723
各關進口淨數	NET IMPORT INTO EACH CUSTOMS DISTRICT.								
滿洲里	Manchouli	321	621
綏芬河	Suifenho	70	98
大連	Dairen	372	743
天津	Tientsin	27	133	35	107
膠州	Kiaochow	1	5	4	41
九江	Kiukiang
上海	Shanghai	299	845	48	204	287	797
蘇州	Soochow	3	13	1	3	2	25
杭州	Hangchow	11	30
廈門	Amoy	27,578	93,409	1	4	10	32
汕頭	Swatow	568	1,136	2	3
由外洋及通商口岸進口淨數	NET IMPORT from Foreign Countries and Chinese Ports	28,445	95,390	82	362	709	1,723	417	795

民國三年貿易冊

貨品號數 } 184.
Article No. }

高根
COCAINE.

來自何處	COUNTRY FROM WHICH IMPORTED.	民國元年 1912.		民國二年 1913.		民國三年 1914.	
		貨數 Quantity.	價值 Value.	貨數 Quantity.	價值 Value.	貨數 Quantity.	價值 Value.
		英兩 Ounces.	兩 Hk. Tls.	英兩 Ounces.	兩 Hk. Tls.	英兩 Ounces.	兩 Hk. Tls.
香港 ...	Hongkong ...	10	32	11	30	5	12
英國 ...	Great Britain ...	71	262	92	213	20	53
德國 ...	Germany ...	239	651	110	187	12	33
荷蘭 ...	Netherlands	50	119
瑞士 ...	Switzerland ...	16	32
由陸路... 俄國... 日本... 美國... 及檀香山	Russia and Siberia by land frontier " Pacific Ports Japan (including Formosa) U.S. of America (including Hawaii)	321	642	15	32
由外洋進口總數	GROSS IMPORT from Foreign Countries ...	709	1,723	627	1,216	114	306
復往外洋...	RE-EXPORTED to Foreign Countries	642	1,281	101	303
由外洋進口淨數	NET IMPORT from Foreign Countries direct ...	709	1,723	13	3
各關進口淨數	NET IMPORT INTO EACH CUSTOMS DISTRICT.						
滿洲里	Manchouli	321	642	15	32
綏芬河	Suifenho	70	92
大連	Dairen ...	372	743
天津	Tientsin ...	35	107	8	14
長沙	Kluochow ...	4	41
上海	Changsha
蘇州	Shanghai ...	287	797	4	8
杭州	Soochow ...	1	3	75	192
廈門	Hangchow	2	5	7	18
汕頭	Amoy ...	10	32	13	26
應除復出口多於進口之數	Less Excess of Re-exports over Imports	11	30	3	8
由外洋及通商口岸進口淨數	NET IMPORT from Foreign Countries and Chinese Ports ...	709	1,723	417	795	13	3

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J-181 Department of the Capital Police of Beiyang Government

Liaoning Provincial Archives

JC-017 High Prosecutor's Office of Liaoning Province

Guangdong Provincial Archives

95 Maritime Customs of Jiu-long (then Kowloon)

Chongqing Municipal Archives

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