

Britain's Oldest Police?

A

Political and Social History
of Policing in Glasgow,
1779-1846

By

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Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December 2000

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Abstract

This study examines the development of policing in Glasgow from 1779 to 1846. It argues that while police reform in the city fits more closely with the revisionist view of police history than the traditionalist, neither, in terms of how they are presented in relation to England, do justice to the distinct and complex manner in which the police institution in Glasgow, or Scotland for that matter, evolved. The absence of obligatory legislative enactments and clear dividing lines between the old and the new police in Scotland, combined with the peculiar nature of the 'police' concept, resulted in a different course of development which neither model accommodates precisely.

Police development in Glasgow, the study contends, was characterised by one dominant factor – namely, the middle class seeking to control and manage more effectively their city in the face of rapid urbanisation. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this took the form of establishing a new range of public amenity provisions that were essential to health and safety. However, while this commitment to the wider aspect of policing was never entirely superseded, the control and management of people rather than the environment became of increasing importance to police commissioners as the first half of the nineteenth century progressed. Although no one incident underlay this reorientation, the traumatic events of the post-Napoleonic period proved particularly significant, as the propertied classes sought a more effective form of law enforcement to protect them from political insurrection, industrial unrest and the expanding urban masses.

The study will show that police affairs were embroiled in an ongoing struggle between different social and economic groups for control of local affairs. Throughout the period in question, issues of class, status and power were at the forefront of police management, as the local ruling elite sought to withstand the challenge to their political hegemony from, initially, the upper middle class and, latterly, the lower middle/self-employed working class.

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Abbreviations and Source References used in Endnotes

G.C.A.	Glasgow City Archives
G.U.L.	Glasgow University Library
G.P.O.D.	Glasgow Post Office Directory
P.P.	Parliamentary Papers
E1/1/1-21	Minutes of Police Commissioners
E1/2/1-4	Minutes of Police and Statute Labour Committee
E1/9/1-3	Minutes of Watching and Fire Engines
E1/34/1-2	Criminal Reports and Returns of the Chief Constable
SR22/55/1	Registers of Police
C2/4/1-3	Minutes of Magistrates
T-MH/1-3	Minutes of the Merchants' House
T-TH/1/1-11	Minutes of Trades' House
DCC 10/1/1-2	Police Rental Books
DCC 2/1	Abstract Statements, Revenue and Expenditure of the Corporation of the City of Glasgow
H-GOR/2/1-3	Minutes of Gorbals Police Commissioners
H-AND1/4	Minutes of Anderston Police Commissioners

Acknowledgments

This thesis would not have been possible but for the advice and assistance of others. Among those to whom I am principally indebted are T.M. Devine and W.H. Fraser. T.M. Devine supervised much of the thesis before departing to the University of Aberdeen, where he continued to act as supervisor in a *de facto* capacity. W.H. Fraser assumed responsibility for the supervision of the thesis following T.M. Devine's departure. Both provided invaluable advice and encouragement. To both, I am extremely grateful. C. Emsley, C.G. Brown, A. Crowther and R. Mitchison also provided helpful advice on aspects of the thesis. Naturally, none of the above are responsible for any mistakes or views contained within the thesis.

The staff at the following libraries and archives provided prompt and friendly service: Glasgow City Archives; the Mitchell Library; Glasgow University Library; Strathclyde University Library and the National Library of Scotland.

In the first year of the thesis, the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland provided invaluable financial support. Thereafter, financial assistance was provided by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Glasgow Educational and Marshall Trust. Such support would not have been possible had it not been for the willingness of the following to provide references: T.M. Devine; W.H. Fraser; T. Tomlinson; A. McArthur; D.W. Bebbington and N.L. Tranter. M. Hastie and J. Aspinwall provided secretarial assistance.

A note of thanks must also go to the historians whose work has been cited in the thesis. Their efforts made it easier to make sense of what seemed like an endless dredge through source material. I apologise if their work has in any way been misinterpreted.

Finally, and most importantly, a great deal of thanks is owed to my family for their encouragement and support.

To my Mother and in Memory of my Father

1

Introduction

I

Justification for Study

At the dawn of the nineteenth century, mainland Britain was a relatively unpoliced society of amateur justices, parish constables and night guards. Dublin and a few troubled counties of Ireland were the only parts of the then United Kingdom to have in place a professional system of police. By mid-century, professional police forces had been implanted into every area of the British Isles. In the space of a few decades, traditional forms of law enforcement had succumb to the advent of a policed society, heralding what many historians have claimed to be the birth of modern policing.¹

The wealth of writing that has analysed this development has focused predominantly on England.² London, in particular, has attracted most of the attention.³ Allied to its size and importance, the traditionally held assumption that police reform occurred first in the capital – with the Metropolitan Police Act in 1829 – has led to an unfortunate, if understandable, over-concentration on the Metropolitan Police. Only recently has police reform outside London received the attention it deserves.⁴

Unfortunately, this has not included Scotland. Despite its separate legal system and distinct tradition, police development in Scotland has been largely ignored both by Scottish and police historians.⁵ What little has been written tends to be anecdotal accounts by former officers or commemorative local histories.⁶ Serious scrutiny has been limited to the odd thesis or article, which more often than not has been concerned with the public administration rather than criminal aspect of police.⁷ Scottish historians have inexplicably preferred to focus on the forces of conflict and disorder rather than law and order. Numerous works abound on working-class militancy, radical insurrectionary movements and Chartism, yet little on the agencies that had to deal with them.⁸

Likewise, historians of the British police have at best made only fleeting reference to the Scottish experience.⁹ Normally, this occurs only when it has a direct bearing on England. Thus, a rare sentence devoted to Scotland in Stead's *The Police of Britain* is included because, in his words, it is likely that in the near future England and Wales '...will introduce...a system [of prosecution] in some respects like that of Scotland.'¹⁰ More often than not, Scotland is completely overlooked. Reith, in *British Police and the Democratic Ideal*, does not refer to Scotland; neither does Pringle in *Hue and Cry: The Birth of the British Police*; Tobias in 'Police

and the Public in the United Kingdom'; nor Jeffries in his chapter 'The British Police Tradition.'¹¹ Even historians of the English police who have shown an interest in analysing reform outside of England have failed to look to Scotland. They have instead preferred to look overseas, either for comparative histories with Ireland, Europe or America, or to the influence of the Metropolitan Police on British colonial policing.¹² Looking north has not interested them. Scots who influenced police reform in England have intrigued historians much more. Standard accounts of the historical development of policing in Britain have numerous pages or chapters devoted to Scots like Patrick Colquhoun, a London Magistrate and police reformer, but few devoted to Scotland.¹³

The nature of source material has partly contributed to this neglect. Unlike in England and Wales, those who wish to study police development in Scotland do not have a voluminous index of parliamentary papers on which to draw. The only select committee on police in Scotland in the nineteenth century was in 1852-3.¹⁴ In England, the issue of police reform was being discussed in Parliament from the late eighteenth century. Documents on which many traditional British police histories are based – parliamentary reports, committees and inquiries – were mainly concerned with England and Wales. Scotland received little Government attention. There were no ongoing parliamentary debates about the merits of police or unsuccessful attempts to introduce a reformed system. As a result, there is no easy source of reference on which to draw or stimulate interest. Any attempt to analyse police reform in Scotland requires a time-consuming investigation of local and often fragmentary police records, many of which are scattered throughout the country in local archives.

The principal reason why historians of the British police have failed to look to Scotland, however, is their complete lack of interest and awareness of policing development outwith England. Such historians have, in the words of one critic, written '...from an inward-looking, unconsciously [English] nationalistic perspective.'¹⁵ Although this by no means applies to all historians who study the English police, it is strongly evident in the older, traditional histories.¹⁶ Ironically, these tend to be ones most likely to go under the title 'British' rather than 'English' police. Such historians have either ignored Scotland completely or assumed that the origins, pattern and nature of police reform in Scotland reflected developments in England and Wales, despite the fact that Scotland has its own legal system.¹⁷ This has been conditioned, firstly, by the commonly held belief that the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 provided a model of law enforcement that was adopted throughout Britain, and secondly, by a misplaced assumption that England and Britain are synonymous. To such historians, the new police were a uniquely English institution, which less fortunate countries quickly tried to emulate. In other words, why bother to look elsewhere; England was the centre of police innovation. In taking this approach, they weaken what otherwise was extremely valuable research on English policing for which

police historians, including this one, have been, and will continue to be, indebted. The timing and nature of police reform in England understandably ascribes it to central importance in studies of the British police, but ignoring developments in other parts of Britain is myopic. Studies of policing confined to England should say precisely that; they should not go under the guise of Britain.

The failure of police historians to look north has led to an inaccurate picture of police reform both in Scotland and Britain. The claim by Jeffries that prior to the introduction of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 “...the whole idea of ‘police’ was strange and unwelcome to the British public” overlooks the fact that fourteen local police acts had been introduced in Scottish burghs before this date, not to mention that a professional policing system had been established in Ireland.¹⁸ Even police historians who have been scathing in their criticism of their English counterparts for ignoring or misinterpreting developments in neighbouring countries are guilty of doing the same when it comes to Scotland. Thus Palmer, perhaps the biggest critic of English police historians, writes: ‘during the war years, 1792-1815, there was a general lull in police reform in the British Isles.’¹⁹ Inclusion of Scotland in this assessment would have revealed that nine local police acts were introduced in Scottish burghs between these years. The failure to recognise this is perhaps understandable, given that Palmer, in his otherwise excellent study of police in England and Ireland, seems to think that ‘the story of British police and protest was, in fact, a tale of two countries.’²⁰

Yet, anyone who bothered to look would have quickly realised that police development in Scotland in the first half of the nineteenth century was distinctive from Ireland, England and Wales. Legislation on policing applying to the latter three countries did not apply to Scotland. Scotland, with its own legal system, had separate police legislation.²¹ In rural areas, commissioners of supply (landowners) were permitted to establish county forces in 1839.²² In 1857, this was made obligatory.²³ In burghs, the 1833 Burgh Police (Scotland) Act permitted all royal burghs, burghs of regality and burghs of barony to establish a system of police based on a L.10 electoral franchise.²⁴ This privilege was extended to parliamentary burghs in 1847.²⁵ Three years later, in 1850, the Police of Towns (Scotland) Act permitted any locality with a population of over 1,200 to adopt its provisions.²⁶ Many of the larger urban centres, however, preferred to ignore these national statutes in favour of their own local initiatives. As was indicated above, a significant number of such acts were introduced in the first quarter of the nineteenth century – long before the ‘police’ concept had been formally introduced in England. The most significant was the Glasgow Police Act of 1800. Its provisions, and the provisions of other future local acts, were so well thought of that Glasgow ignored all national policing legislation throughout the nineteenth century – one of the few major cities in Britain to have evolved a system of police free from central direction.

This was symbolic of a salient feature of Scottish policing – namely, that it developed through local initiative rather than central instruction. Although in provincial England the extent of central direction after police reform had been initiated was, at best, limited and, at worst, non-existent, authorities were, nonetheless, compelled to establish police forces. In Scottish towns, they were not. All national legislation relating to Scottish burgh policing was permissive. Localities adopted general legislation at their discretion, leaving out clauses that did not appeal to them. It was not until 1892 that Scottish burghs were formally compelled to establish police forces. (They were, however, assured of being policed from 1857 when the County and Burgh Police (Scotland) Act empowered county commissioners of supply to assume responsibility for policing in neighbouring burghs that had not yet introduced any constabulary provisions.)

This emphasis on local and permissive legislation was reflective of public legislation in general in this era. The first half of the nineteenth century was characterised by local initiative. The overwhelming majority of bills were local and private. This was especially so for public health matters, which, as will be shown below, were included in police legislation in Scotland. Even national legislation tended to be permissive. It was not until the third quarter of the century that general legislation became the norm and even then it was often supplemented by local acts.²⁷ Local authorities in Scotland preferred to promote their own bills that suited their own interests best rather than be instructed from an overpowering central authority.²⁸

A significant consequence of this was that police systems in Scottish burghs were introduced at different times to meet different needs. Only four of the thirty burghs that first introduced local acts between 1795 and 1850 did so in one given year. This produced a distinct pattern of uneven, fragmented development, thereby rendering it impossible to ascertain precisely when modern policing was introduced in Scotland. A study of the evolution of these systems, and the forces of economic, social and political change that brought them about, is long overdue.

II

Why Glasgow?

Few cities merit such an investigation as much as Glasgow. Given the city's prominence and reputation in the nineteenth century it is surprising that Glasgow has not formed the focus of police historians' attention. Between 1801 and 1841, the city experienced a rate of urban growth faster than any city of its size in Western Europe.²⁹ In the space of a few generations, Glasgow went from being a provincial trading town to an international industrial metropolis. The number of Glaswegians increased from 77,385 in 1801 to 274,533 a mere four decades later (suburbs

included), accounting for over half of the urban population of Scotland.³⁰ Such was the rapid and relentless speed with which the city was developing that contemporaries by 1825 were claiming that Glasgow was second only to London in size and status within the British Empire.³¹ By the end of the second half of the century, the claim was justified.

Yet, such rapid economic growth and progress came at a high human cost. Social conditions for large numbers of Glasgow's poorer classes declined markedly as more and more migrants moved to Glasgow in search of work. Social dereliction and human suffering were widespread. Few, if any, cities in Britain experienced a depth of urban crisis equal to Glasgow. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, Glasgow had the highest crude death rate in Scotland and the highest fever mortality in Britain.³² As parts of the urban environment declined markedly, the city assumed a reputation it has struggled to shake off ever since. As J.C. Symonds, Assistant Handloom Weaving Commissioner, famously stated in 1839: 'I have seen human degradation in some of its worst phases, both in England and abroad, but I can advisedly say, that I did not believe, until I visited the wynds of Glasgow, that so large amount of filth, crime misery, and disease existed on one spot in any civilized country.'³³ Glasgow, according to contemporary perception, had both the enviable and unenviable reputation of being the 'Second City of the Empire' with one of the worst criminal problems.

The history of the city's police force is equally dramatic. The Glasgow Police Force was established in 1800 – twenty-nine years before the establishment of the Metropolitan Police. It is Britain's oldest police, tracing a continuous history since its birth (although, today it goes under the banner Strathclyde Police following local government reform in 1975).³⁴ Historically, few forces in Britain were as large. In 1861, the Glasgow Police numbered 722, or 1 officer for every 558 inhabitants. Birmingham and Manchester, home to two of the largest forces outside of London, had ratios of 840 to 1 and 610 to 1 respectively by 1856.³⁵ Today, as Strathclyde Police, the force is responsible for policing almost half the population of Scotland, employing over half of all police officers in the country.³⁶ In the United Kingdom, only the Metropolitan Police and the Royal Ulster Constabulary are larger.³⁷ Moreover, the force's historical development is every bit as significant to policing in Scotland as the Metropolitan Police's development is to England. By 1861, the Glasgow Police accounted for 28% of all officers and 44% of all burgh officers in Scotland.³⁸ Furthermore, the pioneering innovations of Glasgow police commissioners were widely claimed to be instrumental in shaping similar policing initiatives in other parts of the country.³⁹ With reform in the city being characterised by local initiative rather than central instruction, its course of development provides an intriguing insight into the attitudes, aspirations and concerns of commissioners in one of Britain's major provincial towns.

III

Aims, Objectives and Sources

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the course of police development in Glasgow between 1779 and 1846. This will cover a variety of themes, all of which are essential to understanding the evolution of modern policing in the city and the economic, social and political factors that brought it about. Why did Glasgow have a system of police twenty-nine years before London? Why did it take over twenty years of political struggle for Glaswegians to introduce a police act? Did modern policing originate first in Glasgow? Why, after fighting for the establishment of a directly elected Police Commission in the late eighteenth century, were the city's large business class eager to see it disbanded a mere forty years later? Who were the police commissioners? What were their concerns and priorities? What influence were other parts of the United Kingdom on Glasgow? And how did the Glasgow experience compare with developments elsewhere? All these issues, and many more, will be examined in the forthcoming chapters.

Before embarking on these issues, it is important first to define what the term 'police' means. Part I will begin by analysing the evolution of the 'police' concept in the nineteenth century. While it will be shown that the concept was far wider in Scotland than England, embracing issues such as lighting, paving, cleansing, etc., the parameters of the study have been confined mainly to the constabulary police. Part I will then go on to review the literature on police history, outlining the main issues and how this study relates to them.

Part II of the thesis will examine the Glasgow Police Force. This will involve analysing issues familiar to the historiography, such as the origins and nature of police reform, as well as less familiar issues, such as whether or not Glasgow can lay claim to having mainland Britain's first new police. The nature of reform in the city provides a fascinating insight both into the degree of policing innovation before 1829 and the manner in which a policing system in a major British town evolved without central direction. Police historians have too often ignored the watchmen who patrolled the streets prior to 1829 in favour of the officers who did it thereafter.

Part III will analyse the Glasgow Police Commission. Particular attention will be devoted to the economic, social and political factors behind the Commission's rise in 1800 and fall in 1846. With a range of powers in advance of any other municipal authority in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century, the history of the Commission is more than worth investigating, not least as it sheds invaluable light on an hitherto neglected yet immensely important aspect of police history – police commissioners. Numerous studies are available on the social and economic profile of nineteenth-century policemen, yet surprisingly, very little on the people who controlled the police.⁴⁰ Historians of the English police have, by and large, neglected police commissioners.⁴¹ Their over-concentration on the reformed, rather than the unreformed,

police may well have conditioned this, primarily because commissioners after reform were not directly elected: metropolitan police commissioners were appointed by the Home Secretary, while watch forces after 1835 were drawn from town councillors. Yet, the history of who controlled the police, especially the unreformed borough watch forces, is an important aspect to understanding reform. As the First Report of Commissioners into the Municipal Corporations in 1835 makes abundantly clear, concern over improvement commissioners was a powerful motive for some in Parliament who sought to reform policing arrangements, a fact many historians of the English police have overlooked.⁴² This study of the Glasgow Police Commission gives a strong indication as to why the ruling elite eagerly sought to reform control of existing watching arrangements, in what is the most detailed study of any police commission hitherto carried out. (The terms ‘ruling elite’ and ‘civic elite’ will be used throughout the thesis to refer to the Lord Provost, magistrates and councillors.)

Part IV will analyse policing policy in one key area – vagrancy. Vagrants dominated the thoughts of Glasgow’s police commissioners in the first half of the nineteenth century. They are essential to any study of the concerns of commissioners. Particular attention will be devoted to the causes of vagrancy, the policies commissioners pursued in dealing with vagrants and the motivation behind their approach. In doing this, Part IV will seek to contribute to an important and yet greatly under-researched area of police history.⁴³ Too often, the vagrant has been portrayed as simply a poor law problem, with only limited attention given to the police’s role.

The final chapter will draw these four parts together by placing the study both in an historiographical and national context.

The scope of the study has been confined largely to period between 1779 – when the first policing initiative was introduced – and 1846 – when the Glasgow Police Commission was disbanded. However, select source material outwith this period has also been consulted where useful.

A variety of such material has been used. The principal ones are the minutes of police commissioners and magistrates between 1800 and 1846. Minutes of the Merchants’ House, the Trades’ House and the Town Council have also been used for various periods throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Local newspapers have been used in a similar manner. These include the *Glasgow Herald*, the *Glasgow Courier* and the *Scotch Reformers’ Gazette*. Other sources include local and national acts of Parliament; local reports, proposals, bills and manuscripts; Government reports, papers and inquiries; and contemporary and secondary literature.

As with most historical research, the reliance on source material is open to problems. A principal one is bias.⁴⁴ Many documents on police have to be viewed in terms of official policy. Those who gave evidence to Government inquiries and select committees on police were often

carefully chosen to ensure that the objectives of police reformers were met. Less favourable evidence was often put aside in favour of evidence that mirrored the sentiments of Government. Likewise, local press reports, literature and minutes often had their own objectives, which can make it extremely difficult to determine between perception and reality, especially when confronted with conflicting anecdotal evidence. That being said, so long as any problems or bias is recognised and taken account of, the value of these documents should outweigh any problems they might pose.

A second problem is the absence of important records. Many police documents for the first half of the nineteenth century have been destroyed, others simply not kept. There are no existing records of chief constables or of the social profile of officers for the police's formative years. Letter books of chief constables have been kept only from 1857, while registers of policemen have been consistently kept only from 1852.⁴⁵ Moreover, there are no detailed records on watching arrangements prior to police reform. This is disappointing, as it makes it extremely difficult to assess effectively the origins of the watch that was established in 1800. Likewise, the absence of police registers makes it extremely difficult to determine the physical profile of the force's early recruits. The absence of chief constable records can be partly off-set by the fact that, as head of the force, chief constables often attended the meetings of police commissioners and were often called upon to give information to reports and inquiries.⁴⁶

These problems aside, the historian of policing in nineteenth-century Glasgow is well served. As was indicated above, detailed records have been kept on magistrates, along with an abundance of relevant miscellaneous material and local newspapers.⁴⁷ However, the minutes of police commissioners are by far the most important source.⁴⁸ These have been well preserved, coming in twenty-two volumes for the period 1800 to 1846. Hitherto grossly under-used by historians, they provide an intriguing insight into the values, concerns and priorities of the people who controlled the police during a period of unprecedented urban growth and social crisis.⁴⁹ The principal source of reference for this study, they shed invaluable light on the manner in which Scotland's largest city dealt with rapid urbanisation and the challenges it brought.

Endnotes to Chapter 1

1. See in particular D. Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace: The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979* (London, 1979); C. Reith, *The Police Idea* (Oxford, 1938); C. Reith, *British Police and the Democratic Ideal* (Oxford, 1843); T.A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales, 900-1966* (London, 1967); P. Pringle, *Hue and Cry: The Birth of the British Police* (London, 1955); W.L. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England* (London, 1901); and L. Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3 (London, 1956).
2. For a good overview of police reform in England see C. Emsley, *The English Police: A Political and Social History*, Second Edition (London, 1996) and D. Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England: Crime, Conflict and Control* (Manchester, 1997).
3. Most general histories of police in Britain focus mainly on London. Studies specific to the Metropolitan Police include Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace* (London, 1979) and P.T. Smith, *Policing Victorian London: Political Policing, Public Order and the London Metropolitan Police* (London, 1985). For a history of policing before reform see E.A. Reynolds, *Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 1720-1830* (Stamford, 1998).
4. The best of the most recent work includes D. Philips and R.D. Storch, *Policing Provincial England, 1829-56: The Politics of Reform* (London, 1999); R.D. Storch, 'Policing Rural Southern England before the Police: Opinion and Practice, 1830-56', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989); D. Philips and R.D. Storch, 'Whigs and Coppers: The Grey Ministry's National Police Scheme, 1832', *Historical Research*, Volume LXVII (1994); and C. Steedman, *Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-80* (London, 1984). Still important works are D. Philips, 'Riots and Public Order in the Black Country, 1835-60', in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson, eds, *Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History, 1790-1920* (London, 1974); D. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country, 1835-60* (London, 1977); D.J.V. Jones, *Crime, Protest, Community and Police in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1982); D.J.V. Jones, 'The New Police, Crime and People in England and Wales, 1829-88', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Volume 33 (1983); J.M. Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police, 1835-56', *English Historical Review*, Volume LLX (1955); J.M. Hart, 'The County and Borough Police Act, 1856', *Public Administration* (1956), Volume XXXIV; R. Swift, 'Police Reform in Early Victorian York, 1835-56', *Borthwick Paper*, Number 73 (York, 1988); J. Field, 'Police, Power and Community in a Provincial English Town: Portsmouth, 1815-

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5. W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December, 1984), p.207 and K. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), p.267. Please note, the publication by Carson and Idzikowska is an abbreviated and slightly amended version of Carson's earlier publication. See also P. Gordon, *Policing Scotland* (Glasgow, 1980), introduction.

6. D. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line: The Story of the City of Glasgow Police* (London, 1973); J. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', in *Old Glasgow Club Transactions*, Volume 1, Sessions 1900-8, no author (Glasgow, 1908), pp.97-112, G.C.A., OGC I, 97; J. Ord, 'A Short History of the Glasgow Police Force with a Survey of Modern Developments' (Glasgow, 1935), pp.69-78, G.C.A., AGN, 99; A Dinsmor, 'Glasgow Police Pioneers', *Journal of the Police History Society*, Number 15 (2000); and H. Irvine, *The Diced Cap* (Aberdeen, 1972).

7. For the criminal aspect of policing see Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I'; W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part II: Policing and the Production of Social Order', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 18 (March, 1985); Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing'; and G. Gallagher, 'The First Glasgow Police'. Undergraduate Dissertation, University of Strathclyde (1986).

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8. See, for instance, W.H. Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (Edinburgh, 1988); W.H. Fraser, *Conflict and Class: Scottish Workers, 1700-1838* (Edinburgh, 1988); A. Wilson, *The Chartist Movement in Scotland* (New York, 1970); K.J. Logue, *Popular Disturbances in Scotland, 1780-1815* (Edinburgh, 1979); J.F. McCaffrey, 'Irish Immigrants and Radical Movements in the West of Scotland in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Innes Review: The Journal of the Scottish Catholic Historical Association*, Volume XXXIX, Number 1 (Spring, 1988); F. Montgomery, 'Glasgow Radicalism, 1830-48'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1974); and P.B. Ellis, and S., Mac A' Ghobhainn, *The Scottish Insurrection of 1820* (London, 1970).

9. Hart is one of the few police historians to have a chapter, albeit a brief one, on Scottish policing. J.M. Hart, *The British Police* (London, 1951), pp.168-79.

10. P.J. Stead, *The Police of Britain* (New York, 1985), pp.138-40.

11. Reith, *British Police and the Democratic Ideal*; Pringle, *Hue and Cry*; J.J. Tobias, 'Police and Public in the United Kingdom', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 7, Numbers 1-2 (1972); and C. Jeffries, *The Colonial Police* (London, 1952).

12. For comparative histories with England see C. Emsley, *Policing and its Context, 1750-1870* (London, 1983); S.H. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988); and W.R. Miller, *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in London and New York, 1830-70* (Chicago, 1977). For colonial policing see Jeffries, *The Colonial Police*; M. Brogden, 'The Emergence of Police – the Colonial Dimension', *The British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 27 (1987); and J.J. Tobias, 'The British Colonial Police: An Alternative Model', in P.J. Stead, ed., *Pioneers in Policing* (Berkshire, 1977).

13. See, for instance, Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace*, pp.2, 7, 45 and 51-6; Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, pp.38-42; and Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England*, pp.177, 181, 204 and 218-20.

14. 'Reports from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Expediency of Adopting a more Uniform System of Police in England and Wales and Scotland: Second, with proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index, 1852-3'. P.P., 1852-3 [715.], XXXVI. 161.

15. Palmer makes this point in relation to Ireland, not Scotland. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland*, p.27.

16. See, for instance, Reith, *British Police and the Democratic Ideal*; Pringle, *Hue and Cry*; Tobias, 'Police and Public in the United Kingdom'; and C. Jeffries, *The Colonial Police* (London, 1952). Reith's neglect of Scotland is surprising, given that he was the son of a Scottish banker.

17. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', p.207 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.267.

18. Jeffries, *The Colonial Police*, p.7.

19. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland*, p.31.

20. *Ibid.*, p.xvi.

21. See Prest, *Liberty and Locality*, p.188.

22. 'An act to amend the mode of assessing the rogue money in Scotland and to extend the purposes of such assessment, 2 & 3 Victoria, cap. 65, 1839'.

23. 'An Act to render more efficient the police in the counties and boroughs in Scotland, 20 & 21 Victoria, cap. 72, 1857'.

24. 'An Act to enable burghs in Scotland to establish a general system of police, 3 & 4 William IV, cap. 46, 1833'.

25. 'An Act to amend an Act to enable burghs in Scotland to establish a general system of police, and another for providing the appointment and election of magistrates and councillors for certain burghs over Scotland, 10 & 11, cap. 39, 1847'.

26. 'An Act to make more effectual provision for regulating the police of towns and populous places in Scotland, and for paving, draining, cleansing, lighting and improving the same, 13 & 14 Victoria, cap. 33, 1850'.

27. E.P. Hennock, *Fit Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth-Century Urban Government* (London, 1973), pp.4-5.

28. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland', p.64.

29. T.M. Devine, 'Introduction', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p.10.

30. *Ibid.*

31. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 27 October 1825.
32. See Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', pp.402-15.
33. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland: In consequence of an inquiry directed to be made by Poor Law Commissioners', P.P., 1842, [H.L.] XXV.III.I, p.71.
34. Ireland was the only part of the United Kingdom outside of Scotland to have introduced a system of police before Glasgow. But it has since been subject to numerous radical reforms. Earlier policing initiatives in Scotland were to be found in parts of Edinburghshire and Aberdeen but they were nowhere near as comprehensive as in Glasgow, nor did they last for very long. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland', pp.73-8 and Tyzack, "'No Mean City'?" pp.151-60.
35. V.A.C. Gatrell and T.B. Hadden, 'Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation', in E.A., Wrigley, ed., *Nineteenth-Century Society. Essays in the Use of Quantitative Methods for the Study of Social Data* (Cambridge, 1972), p.353.
36. Gordon, *Policing Scotland*, p.32.
37. Stead, *The Police of Britain*, pp.114, 140 and 142.
38. 'Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary to Home Secretary (Scotland) – Fourth', P.P., 1862, [310.], XLV. 571, pp.576 and 602.
39. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland', p.300.
40. Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England*, pp.47-77; W.J. Lowe, 'The Lancashire Constabulary, 1845-70: The Social and Occupational Function of a Victorian Police Force', *Criminal Justice History*, 4 (1983); Steedman, *Policing the Victorian Community*; and Emsley, *The English Police*, p.181.
41. The few historians who have strongly emphasised the role of those who controlled the police in the reform struggle include J. Foster, *Class Struggle in the Industrial Revolution* (London, 1974), pp.58-68 and M. Weaver, 'The New Science of Policing: Crime and the Birmingham Police Force, 1839-42', *Albion*, Volume 26 (1994), p.289.
42. 'First Report of the Commissioners appointed to Inquire into the Municipal Corporations in England and Wales'. P.P., 1835, XXIII, pp.34 and 43.
43. Jones makes the point that vagrancy has been largely neglected in English police histories. Jones, *Crime, Protest, Community and Police*, p.157.
44. Jones, 'The New Police, Crime and People in England and Wales', pp.151-2.
45. Chief constable letter books, G.C.A., E4/2 and registers of police, G.C.A., SR22/55/1.
46. See, for instance, 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland: In consequence of an inquiry directed to be made by Poor Law Commissioners', pp.72-3.

47. Minutes of magistrates, G.C.A., C2/4/1-C2/4/3.
48. Minutes of police commissioners, G.C.A., E1/1/1-E1/1/21.
49. Devine, 'Urbanisation and the Civic Response', p.184.

Part I

The 'Police' Concept and Police Historians

The 'Police' Concept in the Nineteenth Century

I

Historical Roots

The word 'police' is derived from the Greek *polis* meaning citadel or government centre of the city-state.¹ In Greek, *politeia* meant all matters concerning the welfare and survival of the state. These included 'politics', 'polity' and 'policy' – words derived from the Greek 'polis'. The Romans adopted both the word and concept. *Politia*, in Latin, was associated with state enforcement and regulation of public and private behaviour, including everyday issues such as public order, fire, health, morality and vagrancy, all of which were enforced by magistrates, patrolmen and local officials.

Emsley argues that the word and idea disappeared with the collapse of the Roman Empire but surfaced again in medieval universities to justify royal authority. Within the tradition of Roman Law, the 'police' concept gradually became associated with welfare, protection, internal administration and surveillance.² In Prussia, in 1759, for instance, police was defined:

In the widest sense of the word...[as]...all measures concerned with internal affairs of the country...in a narrower sense 'police' refers to all those things which are necessary for the maintenance of the conditions of a civil life...a still narrower meaning refers simply to the [concern with] hygiene and the supervision of food, handworkers, weights and measures.³

By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the concept had taken-on an urban connotation. Williams argues that French lexicographers by this period were defining police more specifically as a means of administering and safeguarding a city as opposed to a whole state.⁴

In England, however, the term was virtually unknown. In 1720, Edward Burt wrote to a friend in London:

Having mentioned this *French Word* more by Accident than Choice, I am tempted (by way of Chat) to make Mention likewise of a *Frenchmen*, who understood a little *English*. Soon after his Arrival in *London*, he had observed a good deal of Dirt and Disorder in the Streets, and asking about the *Police*, but finding none that understood the Term, he cried out, Good Lord!

how can one expect Order among these People, who have not such a Word as *Police* in their Language.⁵

Where there was knowledge of the concept it was treated with suspicion. An anomalous letter to the Public Advertiser in 1763 highlighted this:

The Word Police has made many bold attempts to get a footing...but as neither the Word nor the Thing itself are much understood in London, I fancy it will require a considerable Time to bring it into Fashion; perhaps from an Aversion to the French from whom this word is borrowed...English Prejudices will not soon be reconciled to it.⁶

Such hostility to police lay not so much in the name itself as in its associations. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the concept was synonymous with continental tyranny. Police smacked of absolutism. The perceived excesses and the centralised command structure of the *lieutenant general de police* in Paris and the *marche chausee* in provincial France convinced Englishmen that police and liberty were incompatible. It was deemed preferable to have no word for police in the English language than to have a police system that threatened cherished English principles of local autonomy and common law. As Lord Chesterfield wrote in 1756: 'Let us rather bear this insult than buy its remedy at too dear a rate.'⁷ Englishmen, as one French traveller, Le Blanc, put it, would rather be robbed by '...wretches of desperate fortune...' than be persecuted by an over powerful executive.⁸

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, the concept was becoming more familiar. Initially, it was used loosely to signify a variety of activities relative to civil government and policy.⁹ In 1775, for instance, Dr Johnson defined police as '...the regulation and government of a city or county, so far as regards the inhabitants.'¹⁰ The first English reference in relation to a body of men and the maintenance of order and the prevention of crime appears to be by Bow Street Magistrate, John Fielding, in his 1758 pamphlet, *An Account of the Origins and Effects of a Police Set on Foot by His Grace the Duke of Newcastle in the Year 1753*. However, it was a fleeting reference. It was not until the third quarter of the century that the word appeared more regularly in its modern form. In the 1770s and 1780s, perhaps due Fielding's example, the word appeared in a number of publications, such as the 'Westminster Police Bill', published in 1774, Hanway's *The Defects of Police*, published in 1775, and Sir William Blizard's *Desultory Reflections on Police*, published a decade later.¹¹ It even surfaced in Parliament. During a parliamentary debate on the Gordon Riots in 1780, the Earl of Shelburne referred to the police of Westminster as '...imperfect, inadequate and wretched....'¹² Police was also referred to during a debate on 'The London and Westminster Police Bill' in 1785. A year later, it made what appears to be its first statutory appearance in relation to England and Ireland

with the 1786 Dublin Police Act. Palmer argues that it was in Dublin in that year that the first popular reference to the police as a body of men was made.¹³

Perhaps of greatest significance – at least in an English context – was the celebrated *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis* in 1796 by the former Lord Provost of Glasgow Patrick Colquhoun. It was the first major work to be written on the subject of police in England and was widely received, going through seven editions. Radzinowicz and Ascoli note that although the term ‘police’ appeared in many other tracts, Colquhoun’s was the first writer on public order and criminal justice to define it as a ‘...civil force for maintaining public order, enforcing regulations for the prevention and punishment of breaches of the law, and detecting crime.’¹⁴ The precise definition of police was so important to Colquhoun that he stated it in the Preface to his treatise:

Police in this country may be considered as a new science; the properties of which consist not in the judicial Powers which lead to Punishment, and which belong to Magistrates alone; but in the Prevention and detection of crimes; and in those other functions which relate to internal regulations for the well ordering and comfort of civil society.¹⁵

II

The ‘Police’ Concept in Nineteenth-Century Scotland

In Scotland, the origin, nature and evolution of the ‘police’ concept was different from England, despite the above definition from one of its famous sons. The word ‘police’ was evident in Scotland long before her southern neighbour. According to Radzinowicz, the first time it was used in Britain in an official communication was in 1714, when Queen Anne appointed ten commissioners of police for Scotland for the general administration of the country.¹⁶ Thereafter, it appeared frequently. Lindsay, in 1733, published *The Interest of Scotland Considered with Regard to its Police in Employing of the Poor, its Agriculture, its Trade, etc.*¹⁷ Lord Kames’s *Statute Law of Scotland*, published in 1757, included the word ‘police’ as a heading.¹⁸ Erskine’s *An Institute of the Law of Scotland*, published in 1773, had a section on ‘Offences against the laws of police.’¹⁹ And, more famously, Adam Smith gave a series of lectures on *Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms* at Glasgow University in 1763.²⁰

Radzinowicz points out, however, that the concept was used inconsistently.²¹ Lindsay, for instance, notes that there was ‘...a police in employing of the poor...’ and a ‘...public police...’ that might require a highway to pass through a private estate.²² Lord Kames’s police embraced regulations for fire prevention, the sale of food and the hours of business for spirit shops.²³ And Adam Smith defined police ‘...as the second general division of

jurisprudence...which properly signified the policy of civil government, but now means the regulation of inferior parts of government, viz.: cleanliness, security, and cheapness or plenty.’²⁴

However, although the term ‘police’ was used in a very wide sense, underlying it was a concern with the common good. As Carson and Idzikowska point out:

Time and again, the notion refers to a much broader conception of policing for the public good, the public interest or public happiness, what one writer drawing upon European sources dubs *cura promovendi salutem* – concern to promote happiness or the public good – as opposed to concern to avert the ills to come or the maintenance of order (*cura advertendi mala futura*).²⁵

Erskine, in *An Institute of the Law of Scotland*, illustrates this. He argues that the principal ‘...laws of police...are calculated for the providing all the members of the community with a sufficient quantity of the necessities of life at reasonable rates, and for the prevention of dearth.’²⁶ Likewise, ‘...cheapness of plenty...’ – namely, economic and monetary policy – formed a principal basis of Adam Smith’s ‘police’.²⁷ (This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.)

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the ‘police’ concept in Scotland was synonymous with the European meaning of municipal administration for the orderly management of society. ‘Police’ was a catch-all title for most aspects of municipal provision and regulation. It embraced a wide range of issues, including the lighting, cleansing, paving and watching of the streets, the supply of water, gas and sanitation, the control of nuisances, and the inspection of common-lodging houses – issues that were often covered in public health legislation in England.²⁸ ‘Police’ was a means by which local authorities and communities could levy assessments, elect commissioners, enlarge judicial boundaries and obtain and extend powers for regulating the civil, criminal and municipal affairs of a town with the intention of promoting cleanliness, health, security and good order. To introduce a police system, as Urquhart points out, ‘...was to launch a not unambitious programme for the progress and future well-being of a town.’²⁹ Throughout the nineteenth century, policing initiatives continued to be of more importance for municipal development and local welfare than national statutes. They were so important, in fact, that one public official for Glasgow claimed in the early twentieth century that they had been a crucial factor in the construction of a formidable ‘...municipal machine...’ that came to characterise the city’s administration.³⁰

Police legislation illustrated this. As Table 2.1 shows, the first half of the nineteenth century saw a proliferation of local burgh police acts. The first was the Glasgow Police Act in 1800. Similar acts had been passed in districts in and around Edinburgh and Aberdeen in the late eighteenth century, but they did not go under the title ‘police’ *per se*, often did not include

watching provisions and were later disbanded or replaced with new local acts.³¹ Aberdeen, for instance, did not establish a watch until 1818, despite introducing an improvement act in 1795. All local policing enactments were generic in that they were as concerned, if not more so, with public amenity provision as they were with law and order. They were similar in concept to the improvement acts that were introduced in English towns in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although police acts were often more advanced in terms of provisions.³² Powers were granted for a wide range of essential services in what Tyzack, in her study of Aberdeen, has labelled the ‘...paving and lighting...’ era of policing.³³

Table 2.1: Local Police Acts introduced in Scottish Burghs, 1795-1850³⁴

Burgh	Date of Adoption	Burgh	Date of Adoption
Aberdeen**	1795	Peterhead**	1820
Glasgow	1800	Airdrie	1821
Greenock*	1801	Alloa**	1822
Port Glasgow*	1803	Bathgate	1824
Edinburgh	1805	Dingwall	1824
Leith	1806	Dundee*	1824
Paisley	1806	Dalkeith**	1825
Inverness	1808	Anderston	1826
Gorbals	1808	Banff	1840
Kilmarnock	1810	Borrowstounnes	1843
Perth	1811	Pulteneytown**	1844
Dumfries	1811	Ardrossan	1846
Kirkcaldy**	1811	Helensburgh	1846
Dunfermline**	1811	Rothesay	1846
Calton	1819	Campbeltown*	1846
Peterhead**	1820		

* Not ‘police’ acts as such although included watching provisions

** Local improvement acts not entitled ‘police’ that excluded watching provisions (although it was common for watching provisions to be later introduced)

The same principle applied to general legislation. All five national enactments relating to Scottish burgh policing incorporated provisions associated with civic and public health legislation in England. The first – the 1833 Burgh Police (Scotland) Act – was influenced by the 1828 Watching, Lighting and Cleansing of Towns Act (Ireland) and the 1830 Lighting and Watching Act for England and Wales (replaced in 1833). Its intention was to provide a general framework within which burghs could implement public amenity provision for paving, lighting, cleansing, watching and watering.³⁵ Its principal successor – The 1850 Police of Towns (Scotland) Act – is widely regarded as being a landmark in the municipal development of Scotland.³⁶ It extended the elementary and increasingly out-of-date provisions of the 1833 statute by providing a wide range of new powers and provisions to deal with civic matters such as

fires, public-bathing, common-lodging houses, the supply of water, the construction of sewers and the drainage of houses. Of the act's clauses, 196 embraced those contained in the health and municipal acts passed in England between 1847 and 1850.³⁷ Even as late as 1892, police legislation was dominated with municipal provisions. The Burgh Police (Scotland) Act in that year was primarily concerned with providing health and sanitary administration and facilitating a union between police and municipal administration.³⁸

More often than not, the stimulus to implementing a police system was shaped more by concern with public amenity provision than with law and order. As all the general enactments relating to policing in Scotland were enabling rather than obligatory, it was common for many small burghs to introduce lighting, cleansing and paving provisions while ignoring watching regulations on financial grounds. As Table 2.2 shows, of the forty-one burghs that adopted the 1833 Burgh Police (Scotland) Act between 1833 and 1849, only twelve adopted it in full, nine adopted it in part including watching, ten adopted it in part excluding watching and ten were unknown. Likewise, of the fifty-three burghs that adopted the 1850 Police of Towns (Scotland) Act between 1850 and 1862, only twenty-two adopted it in full, thirteen adopted it in part including constabulary provisions (watching no longer referred to) and eighteen adopted it in part excluding constabulary provisions (see Table 2.3). Indeed, the provisions of the 1862 General Police (Scotland) Act were constructed with the intention of allowing burghs to ignore its constabulary provisions in favour of sanitary measures to encourage wider adoption. Burghs were permitted to adopt its provisions clause by clause, rather than section by section.³⁹ This had not been permitted under the 1850 Police of Towns (Scotland) Act and was a significant reason why many burghs refused to implement it.

Table 2.2: Burghs that Adopted the 1833 Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1833-49⁴⁰

Burgh	Date of Adoption	Burgh	Date of Adoption
Montrose**	1833	Kirkintillock**	1836
Elgin***	1833	St Andrews***	1838
Inveraray***	1833	Kirkwall*	1838
Burntisland*	1833	Kelso*	1838
Maxwelltown****	1833	Fraserburgh***	1840
Lerwick***	1833	Kilsyth****	1840
Levin****	1833	Anstruther Easter*	1841
Blairgowrie**	1833	Nairn**	1841
Coldstream***	1833	Thurso*	1841
Dumfries*	1834	Pittwenween*	1842
Dingwall*	1834	Duns/Crums.*	1842
Dysart***	1834	Newmilns***	1844
Cupar***	1834	Langholm***	1845
Kinghorn*	1834	Hawick**	1845
Huntly*	1834	Castle Douglas****	1846

Alyth**	1834	Jedburgh****	1847
Kirriemuir*	1834	Kilrenny****	1848
Linktown/Abbs.****	1835	Stranraer****	1848
Arbroath**	1836	Cromarty****	1848
Forres**	1836	Musselburgh****	1849
Calrluke**	1836		

* Adopted act in full (12)

** Adopted act in part including watching (9)

*** Adopted act in part excluding watching (10)

**** Unknown (10)

Table 2.3: Burghs that Adopted the 1850 Police of Towns (Scotland) Act, 1850-62⁴¹

Burgh	Date of Adoption	Burgh	Date of Adoption
Montrose*	1850	Brechin*	1857
Ayr*	1850	Haddington**	1857
Jedburgh*	1850	Hamilton**	1857
Portobello**	1850	Maybole*	1857
Galashiels**	1850	Johnstone**	1857
Dundee**	1851	Annan**	1858
Gatehouse-of-Fleet*	1852	Newburgh**	1858
Thurso*	1852	Kirkcaldy**	1858
Lockerbie (1st)***	1852	Lochmaden***	1858
Partick*	1852	Pollokshaws***	1858
MacDuff*	1853	Turiff***	1858
Kelso*	1853	Gourock***	1858
Coupar Angus***	1853	Dalbeattie***	1858
Forres**	1854	Falkirk***	1859
Tain***	1854	Lochgilphead***	1859
Alloa*	1854	Peterhead*	1860
Maxwelltown*	1854	Old Aberdeen***	1860
Lanark*	1855	Cupar*	1861
Dingwall*	1855	North Berwick***	1861
Dumbarton*	1855	Hawick**	1861
Renfrew**	1855	Tranent***	1861
Wishaw*	1855	Newton-Stewart***	1861
Lockerbie (2 nd)*	1855	Burtisland*	1862
Stomness***	1856	Castle Douglas***	1862
Maryhill*	1856	Prestonpans***	1862
Stirling**	1857	Whitburn***	1862
Forfar*	1857		

* Adopted act in full (22)

** Adopted act in part including constabulary provisions (13)

*** Adopted act in part excluding constabulary provisions (18)

Even those areas that embraced constabulary provisions often utilised their officers more in an environmental than criminal capacity. In 1859, the Inspector of Constabulary noted of Banff: ‘...the police force is inefficient, its attention being directed more to the other duties of

cleaning and improving the streets.’⁴² This, in fact, was common in many of the smaller burgh forces. As the same source noted:

The greatest failing in inefficiency I found to be in the smaller burghs with under 5,000 inhabitants. These burghs in some cases had their town officers, lamplighters, scavengers (and, in more than one instance, the sexton), sworn in as constables, dressed up in a blue uniform and exhibited to me as their “police force”.⁴³

Indeed, the range of duties performed by burgh police forces by mid-century proved a major obstacle to amalgamation and cooperation between burgh and county forces, with the latter refusing to finance the former’s public amenity provision.⁴⁴

It seems unlikely from this that the police forces that were established in Scottish burghs, especially in the early part of the century, represented the coming of the new police (although exactly what is meant by ‘new’ police is unclear. See Chapter 4). The majority of forces were similar to the rudimentary ones that had been established under improvement acts in England. The police acts that established these represented, as Carson and Idzikowska point out, ‘...an institutional elaboration upon the old police idea.’⁴⁵ However, it is important not to underplay their significance to the evolution of the ‘police’ concept to its modern form. As Carson points out:

...this early and authoritative usage of the term “police” provided what might be called a “discursive bridge” across which development towards the modern police form might more readily travel. ...the extent to which this early police discourse facilitated subsequent developments should not be ignored. In a sense, in the beginning was indeed the word.⁴⁶

Moreover, even though the wider remit of policing was not superseded in the nineteenth century, the concept became increasingly associated with its modern form as the century progressed. Urquhart points out that the meaning of ‘police’ had become more specialised by mid-century.⁴⁷ ‘Police’ matters in the 1850 Police of Towns (Scotland) Act were largely confined to law and order and the prevention of nuisance. Paving and lighting were shown separately, while drainage, sewerage and water were included with ‘improvements’. Attitudes to police reflected this. In 1853, the Chief Constable of Glasgow referred to police as being essentially ‘...detective and preventive’, with lighting, cleansing and fire being referred to separately.⁴⁸ As Part II will show, commissioner policy mirrored this, as more and more resources were channelled into the watching aspect of police as the century progressed, much to the detriment of public health.

Moreover, as the above point suggests, it was common in many burghs – especially the larger ones – for the constabulary police (the criminal police) to become separated from the environmental police (the civil police). The watch force in Glasgow became dissociated from other aspects of police from early in the force’s history. In fact, by the late 1830s, the Lord Advocate was proposing separating the management of the criminal and civil police in the city (see Part III). The mere fact that it proved prudent in terms of legislation, management and finance to keep municipal provisions under the banner ‘police’ did not mean that watching arrangements in Scotland’s larger burghs remained stuck in the past or were inferior to other parts of the United Kingdom. The concept of ‘constabulary police’ as a specialised, separate entity was apparent in many burghs and in burgh legislation from at least the middle of the century, despite the continuation of the old ‘police’ concept.

Of course, burgh forces did not engage solely in crime-related duties. As was indicated above, many smaller forces were little more than glorified scavengers and lamplighters. Even larger burgh forces carried out environmental tasks until well into the nineteenth century. As the Chief Superintendent of the Glasgow Police informed the 1853 Select Committee on Police: ‘hitherto the time of the Glasgow police has been more taken up in keeping the city in proper order than with reference to crime or criminals.’⁴⁹ However, the bias towards environmental policing was far from universal. When the Chief Constable of Midlothian was asked by the 1853 Select Committee on Police whether or not the Edinburgh Police dealt with sanitary matters connected with the proper conducting of a large municipality, he answered: ‘I am not aware that the police perform any very onerous duties concerned with sanitary matters.’⁵⁰ He was of the opinion that by mid-century the term ‘police’ had become more firmly associated with its modern form as opposed to its old, which was a commonly held view. As a former Provost and Chief Magistrate of Paisley stated in 1853: ‘...the prevention of crime and the preservation of order [are] a great part of the duty of police.’⁵¹

Moreover, the environmental duties that were performed by burgh forces in Scotland tended to be not too dissimilar to the environmental duties that were being carried out by the new police in England. When the Chief Constable of Midlothian was asked by the Select Committee on Police in 1853 whether the police give information with respect to pavements and drains, they were told ‘...that they have a separate officer at the head of each department...’ with the ‘...same thing [being] done in the Metropolitan Police in London.’⁵² Despite the modern concept of ‘police’ emerging much earlier in England than Scotland, English police forces as the century progressed increasingly found themselves carrying out a variety of administrative tasks that were more associated with the old ‘police’ concept, such as ensuring pavements were unimpeded and licensing street sellers and cabs.⁵³ One of the great ironies of English police

history is that the period that witnessed the emergence of the 'police' concept in its modern form also saw an explosion in the range of non-crime-related duties performed by officers.

The gulf in the constabulary systems between the two countries, therefore, was nowhere near as large as the differing concepts of 'police' would suggest. This was especially so in the larger towns and cities. In fact, it is likely that many larger burgh police forces, despite being established and directed under the banner of the old 'police' concept, quickly became almost indistinguishable from their English counterparts in their day-to-day activities. As the following study will show, Glasgow provides a good illustration of the way a specialised, modern constabulary force could emerge within the wider remit of police.

Police Historiography in Britain

I

Introduction

The last twenty-five years or so have seen a dramatic change in the manner in which police history has been analysed and the scale of interest it has provoked. Once the almost exclusive preserve of former officers and civil servants, such as Reith and Critchley, the historical development of the so-called 'new' police has increasingly drawn the attention of professional historians, sociologists and criminologists. Influenced perhaps by the social and industrial tensions of the 1970s, as well as influential articles published in that decade, a more sophisticated analysis of police history, embracing a wider economic, social and political context, emerged to challenge the traditional and rather Whiggish view that had hitherto prevailed. However, this revisionist view, advanced by influential scholars like Storch and Philips, has itself come under attack in recent years, as police history continues to evolve and fascinate professional scholars.

This chapter will review the way in which such scholars have looked at the history of police in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century.¹ Key themes, issues and concepts employed in police history, along with the manner in which the historiography has evolved, will be outlined and critically analysed. This is a necessary precondition to understanding how policing in Glasgow compared and contrasted with developments in other parts of the United Kingdom and how its experience fits into the wider picture. It will also provide an analytical framework in which to analyse police reform in a country that has hitherto been largely neglected by police historians. As the literature on policing is extensive, the review has been mainly restricted to three themes that are especially relevant to this study: why the new police were introduced; what was new about them; and who controlled them. After each theme has been assessed, the theoretical position of this study will be outlined.

As in any review of literature, there is an element of oversimplification. Any attempt to synthesise the writings of a diverse group of scholars inevitably calls for some complexity and nuance to be sacrificed. However, while none of the following scholars fits the following models in every way, they do share the core assumptions outlined below.²

II

The Traditional View of Police History

Until the 1970s, the traditional account of police history, enshrined in the writings of police historians like Melville Lee, Reith and Critchley, was couched in conservative rhetoric.³ Although still evident in recent local studies, as exemplified by Ascoli, this interpretation was written mainly at the beginning of and mid-way through the twentieth century – at a time when the public's estimation of the police was at its highest.⁴ As such, police reform is viewed in a favourable, inherently progressive light, as being both sensible and inevitable.

What necessitated reform, according to this view, was an alarming increase in crime and disorder coupled with the inadequacy of existing policing arrangements. Pointing to an unprecedented increase in recorded indictments for offences against property in the first half of the nineteenth century – which increased nearly sixfold while the population increased by 80% – traditionalists claim that England was in the depths of criminality, as the twin pressures of urban growth and industrialisation created an environment in which immorality and crime could flourish. Melville Lee argues that ‘...at the dawn of the nineteenth century, England was passing through an epoch of criminality darker than any other in her annals...’, Midwinter and Reith argue that the early nineteenth century was ‘...the golden age of gangsterdom...’, and Ascoli argues that ‘poverty, hunger and unemployment had led to an ever-escalating increase in organized and casual crime....’⁵ More recent publications by Miller and Reynolds – who do not, by any means, adhere rigidly to the traditional view of police history – also emphasis the influence of crime.⁶ While accepting that other factors, such as politically motivated disorder, played a part in reform, the latter argues that

There is sufficient evidence...to privilege a growing concern about property crime as the primary motivating force behind police reform in Metropolitan London.⁷

Tobias paints the most dramatic picture, arguing of the existence of a hereditary and migratory criminal class engulfing the country in crime.

Criminals have always found it advantages to live in one area and work in another, and they would often leave the town in which they lived to steal in the surrounding country districts, or raid towns from unpoliced to policed areas.⁸

Indeed, Tobias and Melville Lee argue that such criminal migration was instrumental in the establishment of rural police forces.⁹

Influenced strongly by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century advocates of police reform, traditional policing arrangements are portrayed in this interpretation as being an ineffective safeguard of law and order. The old police, in the form of parish constables, night watchmen and amateur justices, were inefficient, amateur and open to corruption. As Critchley famously wrote, night watchmen were ‘...contemptible, dissolute and drunken buffoons who shuffled along the darkened streets after sunset with their long staves and dim lanterns, calling out the time and the state of the weather, and thus warned the criminal of their approach.’¹⁰ Moreover, the criminal justice system was not conducive to effective law enforcement. Influenced by eighteenth-century criminal reformers, this view contends that the ethos of the unreformed criminal justice system – which emphasised severity rather than certainty of punishment as a deterrent to crime – was ineffective and counter-productive. Inhumane punishment, allied to the expense, trouble and time of pursuing a case through court, made victims reluctant to prosecute and juries reluctant to convict. As Melville Lee noted, ‘...the more humane and effectual method, prevention...[was]...lost in the mistaken belief that it was possible to extirpate crime by the severity in which it was punished...’¹¹ An integral component of the criminal reformers’ argument – and of the historians who draw on it – was that it was a more effective deterrent was to have less severe penalties administered with certainty to every criminal. As Melville Lee argued: ‘...the fear of almost certain detection is a far stronger deterrent than the distant prospect of severe punishment.’¹²

Radzinowicz, Critchley and Ascoli advance the traditional perspective by emphasising the influence of politically motivated disorder and popular protest.¹³ Critchley, in particular, stresses the role of radicalism rather than crime, arguing that provincial police reform was shaped primarily by the Chartist threat.¹⁴ But, in the main, the threat from riot and organised labour is underplayed in preference to the threat posed by growing criminality and immorality, and the need for a reformed mechanism of law enforcement to reflect the changing views and needs of the English criminal justice system.

What distinguished the new police from their predecessors, according to this view of police history, were the high standards of professionalism and efficiency to which they were subject; officers after reform were carefully selected, full-time, salaried, organised and disciplined, while policing arrangements were rationalised and coordinated. In other words, there was a marked improvement on traditional practice. As Melville Lee writes:

...the year 1830 saw an almost instantaneous change in the police of London, a transformation from an inconceivably rotten and antiquated system into one which immediately became an example to the world....¹⁵

Above all else, the new police engaged in pro-active preventive policing. Rather than merely react to crimes as their predecessors had done, uniformed officers, in full public view, patrolled beats on a regular basis in the belief that their presence would deter potential criminals. This, according to police reformers like Patrick Colquhoun, was the central tenet behind the 'new science' of policing, shifting emphasis away from apprehending and severely punishing criminals once a felony had been committed, to prevent it happening in the first place.¹⁶ Links to the past were confined mainly to the police's authority and accountability, with the new police deriving their mandate from the public and retaining democratic accountability in a manner similar to the ancient system of communal self-policing. In other words, the people controlled the police. As Melville Lee notes:

Happily for English liberty there has never existed in this country any police force at the disposal of the central government, powerful enough to coerce the nation at large. Our national police has always been of the people and for the people.¹⁷

As a model of reform, the traditional view is influenced strongly by the Whig view of history. Police development is viewed as an unproblematical, progressive, linear development from the earliest police reformers, like Henry Fielding and Patrick Colquhoun, to the architect of the Metropolitan Police Act, Sir Robert Peel. Those who opposed the police's introduction – primarily on the grounds of self-interest and the threat a new police posed to cherished English liberty – are portrayed as blinkered fools who quickly realised the error of their ways once the new police took to the streets. In other words, reform was a logical solution to society's ills, designed to solve a problem that threatened every law-abiding citizen, regardless of social creed. Consensus rather than conflict was its hallmark. As one critic, Robinson, has noted, traditionalist police historians accept a '...consensual conception of government...' in which the state is neutral.¹⁸

III

The Revisionist View of Police History¹⁹

In the late 1970s and beyond, a new revisionist school of thought emerged.²⁰ Influenced by left-of-centre or Marxist thinking, revisionist police historians like Silver, Storch and Philips challenged many of the core assumptions made by traditionalists. Although similar in part, the revisionist interpretation of police history is more complex than the traditional view. The range and focus of analysis, interpretation and contribution between scholars is greater, as, inevitably,

are the nuances between them. For this reason, greater scholarly precision has been given to the revisionist interpretation than was necessary for the traditional.

What was new about the new police was not the police's enhanced efficiency, discipline and professionalism. Numerous studies have shown that inefficiency, indiscipline and corruption were rife in many reformed forces, and even today blight many police systems.²¹ Neither was it the new police's ability to prevent and detect crime that set them apart from their predecessors. Among others, Philips, Gatrell and Hadden have shown that the new police had very little impact on indictable offences in the first half of the nineteenth century, only on minor public order offences and petty crimes.²² According to the latter two scholars, the new police were '...scarcely effective on a national scale even by the 1850s...', and their performance '...scarcely influenced at all...' local rates for indictable committals.²³

What distinguished the new police from their predecessors, according to the earliest account of revisionism, was their role and function in society. In short, the new police were a new, bureaucratized form of social management designed to penetrate civil society with the values of the state through continuous surveillance of working-class society. Silver was the earliest proponent of this interpretation. In an important article published in 1967, he argues that police reform heralded the advent of a policed society, whereby

...central power exercises potentially violent supervision over the population by bureaucratic means widely diffused throughout civil society in small and discretionary operations that are capable of rapid concentration.... [This] represented the continual presence of political authority throughout daily life.²⁴

According to Storch, all facets of working-class lifestyle were to be regulated through unceasing patrol and surveillance. Policemen became 'domestic missionaries', enforcing standards of respectability, public decorum and order.²⁵

The police had a broader mission in the nineteenth century...to act as an all-purpose lever of urban discipline. The imposition of the police brought the arm of municipal and state authority directly to bear upon key institutions of daily life in working-class neighbourhoods, touching off a running battle with local custom and popular culture which lasted at least until the end of the century. Riots and strikes are by definition ephemeral episodes, but the monitoring and control of the streets, pubs, racecourses, wakes, and popular fetes was a daily function of the "new police."²⁶

Officers were empowered and instructed to clamp down on traditionally sanctioned working-class street culture and pastimes that offended Victorian respectability, provoking widespread and enduring resistance from the working class. Time-honoured practices were

criminalised, with the advent of the new police resulting in a sharp increase in the number of prosecutions for minor public order offences.²⁷

Revisionists argue that this changing role called for the police to be removed from public control. As Carson puts it, ‘...from the 1830s onwards the authorities came rapidly to realize the value of police being effectively “distanced” from the rest of the population.’²⁸ Likewise, Paley argues that one of the main innovations of the Metropolitan Police ‘...was the way in which the new institution was deliberately divorced from the local community.’²⁹ According to Silver, the middle- and ruling-class’s role as special constables and volunteers exposed the class bias of law enforcement, which, along with the former’s reluctance to act, highlighted the growing need to separate constitutional authority from economic and social dominance.³⁰ Storch and Foster, meanwhile, argue that a working-class controlled police could not be relied upon to police strikes and popular recreational pastimes.³¹

However, revisionists are not united on the precise exercise of this control. Foster and Storch imply an instrumentalist interpretation, arguing that the new police were controlled by local elites, while Spitzer and Scull, Cohen, and Brogden imply a structuralist interpretation, arguing that policing was a function of the political economy.³² What they do agree upon is that the new police were not subject to popular control.

Carson, and then later Carson and Idzikowska, develop the revisionist theme in their study of policing in Scotland.³³ They argue that in some burghs in the first few decades of the nineteenth century directly elected police commissions provided the newly emerging middle class – frustrated at their inability to penetrate the offices of self-appointed councils – with a power base to rival the old elite. However, the existence of broad electoral and commissioner franchises often had the effect of temporarily placing police control into the hands of radical sympathisers after burgh reform.

In the period after 1833, defence of some of Scotland’s old, privately instituted police systems came to represent, in effect, pockets of democratic resistance to bourgeois political hegemony.³⁴

According to Carson and Idzikowska, the ability of the working class to resist middle-class attempts to strip them of their power depended upon the financial viability and geographical entities of the commissions involved.

Philips and Storch, in a recent publication on provincial policing in England, also view police reform as being located in an elite battle for control. Policing, they argue, was intertwined with debates about the future form of local government and the role local elites were to play in local affairs, not least as reform threatened the status and power of local elites.³⁵

The policing issue was one element in a wider struggle over distribution of power within various elements of the English state. The transformation of English rural policing was drawn out and complex because it appeared to threaten a major *bouleversement* of social and power relationships both within rural society and between its rulers and the central state. In the early nineteenth century, these lines of power and authority were beginning to shift. All parties, and not least the gentry, the traditional ruling/administrator class of the counties, were asking themselves what their future place was to be in the new order of things and struggling to ensure the preservation of their status and authority.³⁶

According to Philips and Storch, the losers in this battle were the parish elites and the ratepayers, as control switched to unelected bodies.³⁷

What necessitated reform, according to the revisionist view, was not rising crime as traditionalists claim. Recorded criminal indictments may have significantly increased in the first half of the nineteenth century, but it is questionable whether or not this represented a real increase in criminal activity. As numerous studies have shown, a hardening attitude towards crime, its prosecution and punishment, combined with legal and administrative reforms that made it easier for victims to prosecute, artificially inflated recorded criminal indictments.³⁸ In other words, the first few decades of the nineteenth century saw an explosion in prosecutions, not necessarily crime. Moreover, there is scant evidence to substantiate the perception of a large, hereditary criminal class or a migratory band of thieves roaming the country from policed to unpoliced areas. Philips and Jones have shown that professional criminals accounted for a mere 10% of recorded criminal indictments, while Hart has shown that charge and conviction rates for London continued to rise after the introduction of the Metropolitan Police.³⁹ In other words, there was not a mass exodus of criminals to unpoliced areas after reform.

Nor, according to the revisionist perspective, were the new police introduced because traditional policing arrangements were corrupt and inefficient. Philips claims that parish constables in Staffordshire towns were adequate in dealing with crime.⁴⁰ Indeed, they continued until at least mid-century to play an important, albeit reduced, role in the apprehension of criminals.⁴¹ Likewise, the old system of policing in provincial rural England was, as Philips and Storch have suggested, not nearly as inefficient as police reformers portrayed; rather, it came to look inadequate, firstly, when compared to the Metropolitan model, and secondly, as metropolitan intellectuals, Government ministers and parliamentary inquiries attacked its deficiencies.⁴² Furthermore, the unreformed criminal justice system was far from being an ineffective form of law enforcement as traditionalists claim. While accepting that it was ineffective in a direct instrumental sense, Hay argues that was effective in preserving the social order precisely through a lack of technical rationality. The ruling elite valued what seemed to be

irrationalities in the criminal justice system, as it enabled them to exercise their power in a discretionary manner, free from the unwanted interference of Government. Inhumane rules and rituals, such as the 'Bloody Code' and public execution, gave people such a terror of the law that it served as an effective system for maintaining the hegemony of the ruling elite.⁴³

What encouraged the ruling elite to change this system, according to the earliest revisionist accounts, were the increased demands of property owners for more rigidly controlled urban order among the working class.⁴⁴ As Storch argues:

The implantation of a modern police in the industrial districts of Northern England resulted from a new consensus among the propertied classes that it was necessary to create a professional, bureaucratically controlled organized lever of urban discipline and permanently introduce it into the heart of working-class communities.⁴⁵

The 'demand for order in civil society', as Silver puts it, was a product not of growing criminality, but rather of class antagonisms and changing middle-class perceptions that accompanied the transition to urban, industrial society. With industrialisation entrenching class divisions and eroding traditional forms of paternal authority, the urban poor were increasingly viewed as the 'dangerous classes' whose very existence threatened the social order. Riot, which, in the view of Hobsbawm and Rude, had traditionally been accepted as being a legitimate way for the lower orders to express grievances and remind the ruling classes of their paternal responsibilities, was, by the early nineteenth century, regarded as a threat to social and political stability.⁴⁶ As the 'moral economy' gave way to a capitalist, wage-labouring economy, rioters and crowds were to be suppressed and the dangerous classes supervised by central civil authority.⁴⁷

However, these ends, according to this account of revisionism, could not be met in an unpoliced society. As Silver argues, military forces were neither capable of penetrating civil society through continual supervision nor of responding quickly enough to threats of social disorder. They were also heavy-handed. The middle class were also increasingly unwilling to discharge their police duties for fear of retribution, while the use of landowners and employers for internal peace keeping was widely believed to exacerbate problems by exposing the class bias of traditional forms of law enforcement. Furthermore, as paternal relations and social bonds, in which the effectiveness of the unreformed criminal justice system was bound-up, eroded with urbanisation, so too did the effectiveness of the machinery of law enforcement.⁴⁸ It was in this context, that

...those who sprang from the newer sources of wealth turned toward a bureaucratic police system that insulated them from popular violence, drew attack and animosity upon itself, and

seemed to separate the assertion of “constitutional” authority from that of social and economic dominance.⁴⁹

The emerging needs of capitalism combined with the growing need to control the urban poor were themes developed more fully in the context of work discipline and organised labour in the mid-to-late 1970s. Spitzer and Scull claim that capitalism called for the tighter control of hitherto loosely regulated aspects of social relations: ‘a stable public order was a precondition of rational calculation on the part of industrial capitalists.’⁵⁰ Cohen suggests that the mechanised conditions of capitalist production called for the formally free labour force to be tighter controlled: police reform was about regulating the working-class’s ‘...usage of social space and time so that it did not obstruct the traffic of industry and commerce.’⁵¹ And Philips insists that police reform in Staffordshire was the result of industrial and political unrest: ‘...it was not...[concern of]...ordinary crime, but the experience of the strikes and riots of 1842, and fear of further large-scale disorders, which led to the establishment of a county police force for Staffordshire.’⁵²

Other historians contend that the growing need to police riots and disorder, rather than the day-to-day activities of the working class, was the stimulus to reform.⁵³ Although those who adhere to this view by no means all adhere rigidly to the revisionist school of thought – Palmer’s interpretation of reform, for instance, ‘...falls somewhere between the enlightened statist and conflict schools’ – all agree that political radicalism and disorder rather than crime provided the spur for reform.⁵⁴ This view, ironically, first emerged in the writings of the traditional, and therefore ‘consensual’, police historian Radzinowicz at the turn of the twentieth century, who argued that ‘there can be no doubt that the need to control disorder during these years [1838-1842] was even more influential than the rise in ordinary crime in bringing the authorities to terms with the idea of professional police throughout the country.’⁵⁵ The first ‘conflict’ police historian – one who sees reform as being tied in with the struggle between different sections of society – to take up this theme was Hart in 1955, who took the view that Chartism was the decisive factor in the establishment of county forces.⁵⁶ Since then, the theme of crowd control has been reiterated by a series of historians. Mather claims that borough police reform was the result of the demand for *Public Order in the Age of the Chartists*.⁵⁷ Gurr, in his comparative study of London, Stockholm, Sydney and Calcutta, suggests that ‘...crises of public order...’ provided the stimulus to reform, claiming that a principal concern for the political elite was ‘...increased security against collective behavior by the lower classes.’⁵⁸ And Palmer, in his comparative study of England and Ireland, takes the view that ‘...the new police were more embroiled in politics and protest than in fighting crime.’⁵⁹

It was not until an important, yet largely neglected article on Scottish policing was published by Carson in 1984 – and then re-published in an abbreviated form by Carson and Idzikowska in 1989 – that the revisionist school first moved away from viewing police reform solely in terms of being a response to a specific problem.⁶⁰ Carson and Idzikowska locate burgh police reform in Scotland in the context of political struggle within the middle class rather than a revolutionary threat from the working class.⁶¹ Frustrated by their exclusion from local affairs – which, in the pre-reform era, were under the control of self-electing oligarchies – the creation of elected police boards had the potential to provide the emerging middle class with a voice and power base of their own. For this reason, both the new men of wealth and the established power bases eagerly sought control of police affairs, with each promoting policing enactments for this purpose:

...the issue of policing became a battleground upon which a class struggle for control of the local state was waged.... Hence, while bourgeois and professional interests might be frustrated at their inability to dislodge patrician wealth from its self-elected position of power in the magistracy, town councils, etc., they could make a bid for a power base of their own by seeking to control and sometimes to augment the powers of the police commission which a Private Act invariably established.⁶²

This struggle in Scottish towns took place not in the background of heightened anxiety of growing disorder and crime, but rather of day-to-day pressures of public amenity provision. This reflected the generic nature of the ‘police’ concept in nineteenth-century Scotland, which had as much, if not more, do with lighting, paving and cleansing than it had with law and order. Only in rural areas do Carson and Idzikowska suggest that reform was prompted by an immediate law and order problem – namely, vagrancy. Even then, they argue the problem was more financial than criminal. County police forces were introduced to keep vagrants, who otherwise could have become a burden on local poor funds, out:

...so salient was the question of vagrancy in discussions surrounding the emergence and development of the Scottish rural police, that it would be no exaggeration to conclude that these early police forces were in most instances an extension to the highly defective local machinery for handling Scotland’s wandering poor.⁶³

Carson and Idzikowska claim that fear that an influx of vagrants would lead to the introduction of compulsory poor law assessment encouraged a knock-on effect from policed to unpoliced areas.⁶⁴

McGowan, in his study of police development in Edinburghshire, also argues that vagrancy was central to police development, although he stresses more the criminal rather than financial threat vagrants posed.

Principal pressure for a new police in Edinburghshire did not stem from serious outbreaks of public disorder. On the contrary, a more subtle and new threat to public tranquility in the form of criminal vagrancy was beginning to emerge and this required a much stronger instrument of social control.⁶⁵

In recent years, eminent revisionists of policing in England have also looked beyond a simple ‘problem-response’ approach – i.e., that reform was prompted by a specific and immediate problem. Storch, in his study of rural England, argues that changing attitudes among the rural elite towards order, criminality and the role of the state were crucial in the establishment of county police forces.⁶⁶ Reform was part of an attempt to create a new level of order and decorum in response to an increasing intolerance of traditionally accepted behaviour. This reflected ‘...a slow but palpable shift in the ideology of order and order-keeping which admitted a role for the state previously denied to it.’⁶⁷ The influence of national developments – such as urban radicalism and the development of the Metropolitan Police – combined with local fears – such as rural discontent and the erosion of paternal authority – produced a heightened sensitivity to rural lawlessness, which, according to Storch, ‘...propelled an increasing number of gentlemen to “buy into” a new ideology of order created elsewhere by urban moral entrepreneurs and theorists....’⁶⁸

Philips and Storch, in a recent publication on county reform, take the view that police reform also has to be seen in the context of long-term transformations of the state and a changing social outlook and administrative philosophy of the ruling elite.⁶⁹ Influenced by an important article by Styles, Philips and Storch contend that the demand for police was the result of new expectations of law enforcement, especially the magistracy, and changing attitudes towards administration and administrators.⁷⁰ As opinion among the ruling elite towards local administration changed from individual authority to an impersonal public service model of administration, a bureaucratic system of stipendiary magistrates and paid police was necessary to meet the new expectations.

Underlying these changing attitudes was a growing critique of the unreformed criminal justice system. Philips and Storch conclude that county gentlemen had become absorbed with the values of police reformers by the 1830s. They claim that the language and principles of many of the provincial ruling elite mirrored those of metropolitan intellectuals and reformers, espousing the idea of preventive policing and its acclaimed benefits. Influenced by metropolitan currents of

thought, the provincial elite increasingly demanded a new level of performance associated with the Metropolitan Police, rendering absurd what had traditionally been acceptable procedures.⁷¹

The progressive collapse of confidence in the old constabulary among provincial gentlemen had less to do with the individual constable's own qualities and capabilities and more to do with the growth of a powerful and increasingly persuasive critique of the criminal justice system at large.⁷²

The revisionist view of police reform, therefore, encompasses a variety of themes that are constantly evolving. Although recent publications by Philips and Storch have done much to develop this view of police history, its dominant characteristic is still that the police were introduced to impose a new form of social control over lower orders in response to the erosion of traditional forms of control that accompanied industrialisation. Fighting crime was less important to police reformers than keeping the lower orders under close surveillance and discipline. Far from being a benefit to all, as traditionalists claim, the new police were a response to a problem that threatened only the upper and middle classes. As such, the policeman was essentially an instrument of working-class suppression, designed to ensure the stability of the social order and the hegemony of the ruling class in the face of working-class resistance. Conflict rather than consensus was the hallmark of reform.

IV

A Critique of Traditional and Revisionist Perspectives of Police Reform

The 'problem-response' model of police reform advanced both by traditionalists and early revisionists has been increasingly challenged in recent years. While recognising the important role that issues such as industrial unrest, Chartism and a perceived rise in crime and disorder played in many areas, historians have increasingly questioned whether reform as a whole can be explained solely in terms of problems thrown up by industrialisation and the emergence of a capitalist society.⁷³

As was indicated in the previous section, it is doubtful whether the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a real rise in crime as traditionalists claim. What seems certain is that police reformers deliberately exaggerated the extent of criminality in order to enhance the case for reform. There probably was some increase in the first couple of decades of the century, albeit not one as large as criminal statistics suggest. Palmer points out that the rise in recorded

indictments predated many of the legal and administrative reforms that did so much to artificially inflate the criminal figures, while the acute periods of economic distress that accompanied the post-Napoleonic period are likely to have forced many people to commit crimes out of necessity.⁷⁴ Gatrell and Hadden, for instance, have shown property offences, which accounted for 80% of crimes, ‘...increased in times of depression and diminished in times of prosperity....’⁷⁵

However, whether crime was increasing or not is, as Emsley points out, of less significance than the perception that it was.⁷⁶ The real issue is the extent to which society’s perception of crime influenced reform. It would be naïve to suggest that concern about a rise in crime would not have had an effect on contemporaries, especially as criminal statistics became more visible following their annual publication from 1810. Probably of greater significance, however, was the change in attitudes towards crime and what was perceived to constitute an acceptable level of crime. In many areas, the increasing threat to the social order that crime was perceived to pose is bound to have had an effect on reform.

However, it is important not to overstate this. Firstly, concerns about crime were not new. They were equally evident in the late eighteenth century, yet police reform was not perceived to be the answer. Secondly, such fears were not universally held. Numerous studies have shown that the criminal threat, in contrast to the traditional view, played little part in the process of reform. Field, for instance, has argued that heightened anxiety to either crime or disorder was absent in the debate surrounding reform in Portsmouth.⁷⁷ Thirdly, the ability of traditional forms of law enforcement and administration to deal with crime was not as hopeless and ineffective in a direct instrumental sense as traditionalists – or, indeed, the earliest accounts of revisionism – claim. Philips and Storch argue that the judicial process had a considerable capacity to cope, given the increasing determination of victims to use it, along with the increasing willingness of Government to meet the costs of prosecutors in the early nineteenth century.⁷⁸ Styles suggests that many justices could be assiduous and effective detectives.⁷⁹ And studies by Paley, Beattie, Reynolds, Emsley, Philips and Storch conclude that many watches and parish constables acquired a high degree of professionalism, organisation and discipline long before reform.⁸⁰ In other words, the new police were not simply a response to the failures of the old system.

Most damaging of all to the traditionalists’ case is their failure to take account of the diversity and legitimacy of views among those opposed and in favour of reform. Crime was only one aspect in the wider debate surrounding the need for an improved system of police. The consensual, law-abiding versus law-breaking model they advance ignores the wider economic, social and political context of reform. It also underplays the more contentious aspects of policing – such as policing strikes and maintaining order and decorum – and overstates the speed and

manner in which the new police were accepted.⁸¹ There was no unproblematical, logical progression from eighteenth-century police reformers to the Metropolitan Police, based on a growing consensus of the need for an improved form of law enforcement.⁸² Colquhoun's calls for a reformed police to prevent crime bore little resemblance to the forces that were finally introduced. Whatever motivated nineteenth-century reformers, it was not simply a knee-jerk reaction to crime.

By moving beyond the view that the police were introduced mainly in response to rising crime, revisionists provide a far more sophisticated and persuasive interpretation of reform. Their awareness of the changing economic, social and political context in which the police were introduced, combined with conflicting opinions and values of those opposed and in favour of reform, is a significant advance on the traditional view.⁸³ However, the revisionist interpretation also suffers from weaknesses.

Firstly, it is unsatisfactory to view the abandonment of the old constabulary merely as a response to the threat of riot, disorder or working-class radicalism. Like crime, there was no shortage of such problems in the past, yet police reform was not believed to be the solution.⁸⁴ Philips and Storch have shown that the Whigs were proposing a national policing scheme as early as 1832, long before the emergence of Chartist disorder.⁸⁵ Similar local initiatives were being discussed by the provincial elite from the late 1820s.⁸⁶ Harrison points out that not all crowd assembly resulted in riot, and even when it did there was no universal outcry for police reform.⁸⁷ Indeed, the same scholar argues that hostility to reform actually increased after political unrest amidst fears of further empowering incompetent and untrustworthy authorities.⁸⁸ Moreover, there does not appear to be any direct correlation between riot and the formation of the new police. As Emsley indicates, few disturbances precipitated police reform, while over half of counties did not embrace the 1839 Rural Constabulary Act despite fear of Chartism.⁸⁹ Philip and Storch, in their recent publication, support this, arguing that there was no obvious pattern – either geographically, socially or politically – distinguishing adopting from non-adopting counties.⁹⁰

Furthermore, traditional forms of riot control were not as ineffective, either technically or politically, as traditionalists and revisionists have claimed.⁹¹ Military forces and magistrates were often adept at cooling down potential disturbance, while philanthropy and poor relief were often mobilised to calm growing tensions.⁹² When disturbance did break out, the military were not nearly as heavy-handed as has often been perceived. As Emsley has pointed out, the scale of deaths from rioting in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries should not be overemphasised.⁹³ It was rare for fatalities to occur. The same scholar also points out the new police were not given any specific training for controlling crowds, were not introduced on a scale capable of dealing with riots, and did not patrol in a manner capable of doing so.⁹⁴ The

overriding majority of provincial towns and counties had such limited police resources that disorder had to be quashed by the military as late as the 1850s.⁹⁵ It was not until this period that the new police replaced the military as the first line of defence in dealing with disorder, and even then troops continued to be on standby as police until the Second World War.

Secondly, historians have also identified problems with the claim that the new police were introduced to penetrate civil society with the values of the state by constant, unceasing surveillance of working-class lifestyle and culture. Leaving aside doubt over whether the new police were capable of doing this – this will be discussed more fully in the next section – the theory runs the danger of confusing outcome with intention. As Emsley points out:

...because organisations perform certain functions it does not necessarily follow that any one function was the principal reason for their creation, nor that they embarked on this function from their inception.⁹⁶

Thirdly, as Emsley also contends, the demand for order concept is primarily based on the English experience, placing reform in the context of capitalist development in the industrial revolution. It, therefore

...ignores the fact that a bureaucratic police organisation dealing with order (as well as crime) existed in Paris a century-and-a-half before London's Metropolitan Police; similarly it ignores the public-order tasks of the *marechaussee*.⁹⁷

Fourthly, the notion of social control implies a degree of consensus among the ruling elite and middle classes that did not exist.⁹⁸ The urban bourgeoisie and provincial ruling elite were not all in favour of police reform. In some troubled towns, employers preferred to control workers through private policing initiatives and military assistance, often due to a fear of centralisation and a reluctance to finance a police force.⁹⁹

Fifthly, the need to control the urban poor focuses only on one aspect of police – namely, their coercive role. However, it is not satisfactory to view the police as simply a pressure on the working class. While working-class opposition to the new police was far more widespread and prolonged than traditionalists suggest, it was not as widespread or prolonged as revisionists have suggested. Many working-class activists welcomed the new police and the discipline they brought with them, while studies have shown that the working class were willing to utilise the police in bringing forward prosecutions.¹⁰⁰ Neglecting this not only overlooks the degree to which the police were accepted, however slowly, among certain sections of the working class, it also does not take into account the less contentious aspects of policing that had little to do with controlling the working class. According to Emsley,

...it seems more realistic to conceive of the law and the police as multi-faceted institutions used by English people of all classes to oppose, to co-operate with, and to gain concessions from, each other.¹⁰¹

Reiner is equally sceptical of portraying the police merely as an instrument of class oppression. He advocates a *neo-Reithian* framework which

...would give due weight to the success of the police reformers [in gaining increasing acceptance from substantial sections of the working class] and the tradition they created, but also recognises that policing is embedded in a social order riven by structured bases of conflict, not fundamental integration.¹⁰²

The final weakness in the view that reform was prompted by an immediate problem is its neglect of other motives. Some historians argue that reform, while often being influenced by crime and disorder, also has to be seen as product of the emerging conceptions of rationalised local government that became dominant in the 1830s. Field, Emsley and Jones argue that municipal reform was, in part, an expression of the new Whig machine committed to cheaper and more effective government.¹⁰³ A similar point had been made earlier both by Radzinowicz, who argues that reform was the tidying-up of law enforcement in the name of efficiency located in the wider process of state development, and by Critchley, who argues that the watching provisions in the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act were an attempt to rationalise and modernise local improvement acts that existed in many parts of the country.¹⁰⁴ Davey, meanwhile, has hinted that reform was part of a centralist philosophy of Whig and Benthamite reformers who wanted new, national legislation to deal with social problems.¹⁰⁵ Monkkonen links both themes of rationalised local government and the management of municipal issues in his study of police reform in urban America. He argues that police, along with other bureaucratic organisations such as fire and sanitation, was one aspect of municipal governments seeking to manage and control more effectively their towns and cities by providing a range of rationalised public services.¹⁰⁶

By locating reform in the context of state development and changing administrative philosophy, the recent publication by Philips and Storch marks a significant advance from earlier oversimplified 'problem-response' revisionism. It also illuminates the range of conflicting opinions that existed among the ruling and provincial elite. As yet, this study has not provoked a critique from English police historians. However, by reiterating the increasing need to control the lower orders following frayed paternalistic relations, the study is open to some of the criticisms of social-control revisionism outlined above.

An evaluation of Carson and Idzikowska's analysis of policing development in Scotland is difficult given the absence of any published material on the subject. This research, as parts II, III and IV will show, supports many of their main conclusions regarding burgh police reform, although whether the Glasgow experience was representative of Scotland as a whole can be answered only by further research. However, as regards county police development, the threat of compulsory assessment may well have been a powerful stimulus to reform in many areas, but it should not be overplayed. In 1818, approximately only one in six parishes were assessed, the vast majority of which were in the industrialised areas where population growth had overwhelmed the voluntary system's ability to cope.¹⁰⁷ There may well have been a knock-on effect from policed to unpoliced areas, although this theory needs greater research than Carson and Idzikowska could give it in their short study. But it is worth remembering that the influence of migratory practices on police reform in England has been increasingly challenged in recent years.

The above critique of traditionalist and revisionist accounts of police history has encouraged many historians to abandon overarching structural interpretations in favour of local variation. As Emsley argues, '...it is not possible to pin-point a particular incident or a particular individual as the prime cause for each national, let alone each local, development.'¹⁰⁸ Bailey takes it further, suggesting that '...the social reality which the historian is increasingly uncovering suggests the myopia of highlighting any one set of interests and events to explain the rise of the new police.'¹⁰⁹

Not surprisingly, revisionists have tried to refute this. In their recent publication, Philips and Storch criticise local studies for failing to '...give adequate historical context for national moves for policing reform...[and for failing]...to explain how developments in their county fit into the wider national changes in society, economy and polity of Britain.'¹¹⁰ In an earlier study, Philips criticises Bailey and 'counter-revisionists' for taking refuge in

...a detailed but sterile empiricism, as if this somehow refuted large theoretical overviews. ...Future impressive advances in this field are not going to come from people who keep their noses buried in dusty files in the Public Record Office – or County Record Offices or libraries – and lift them only to tell us that they find the detailed process of interaction between the various individuals involved too complex to yield any overall patterns. To explain events as simply the product of a series of autonomous individual actions, and as 'one damned thing after another', is unsatisfactory history at any time.¹¹¹

Certainly, the theoretical approach that seeks to explain the interaction of various factors in the process of reform is to be preferred to the local one that does not. As Taylor points out, local diversity, while providing a useful corrective to oversimplified explanations, can often

become too specific and neglect not only the wider context in which reform emerged, but also common problems found in different circumstances.¹¹² It can also overlook, as Stedman Jones points, the degree to which underlying trends may, nonetheless, have taken a similar path.¹¹³ However, theories that take little account of local circumstances – or, at least, fail to explain them – run the risk of providing an oversimplified, lop-sided view of reform. For a theory to further the historian's understanding then local variation must be explained, not overlooked or dismissed as sterile simply because it does not fit with an individual's view of the wider picture.

To date, the only attempt to formulate such a theory in a policing context has come from Carson and Idzikowska in their study of development in Scotland. Like Philips, they argue that '...there is a very real danger that infatuation with local diversity can obscure the extent to which underlying trends may none the less have followed the same direction.'¹¹⁴ However, they argue that scholars should view the existence of such diversity as a challenge to develop a model that can account for variation and unevenness, rather than simply ignoring it or viewing it as a basis for abandoning general explanation.¹¹⁵ Such a model should construct an analysis that

...instead of giving theoretical priority to either local conditions or more general developments, will take the dynamic interplay between the two as the primary locus for explanation. By this means, it is hoped, an account of Scottish policing will emerge which, far from surrendering to the temptations of descriptive empiricism implicit in the elevation of diversity to analytical pre-eminence, will offer a broader framework within which to make sense of diversity itself.¹¹⁶

According to Carson and Idzikowska, the interplay between '...macro-structural forces and more localized factors...' explains the diversity in Scottish policing.¹¹⁷ Whether it did or not remains to be seen, although it does run the risk of elevating economic factors at the expense of equally important ones, such as changing poor law ideology, demands for better public amenity provision and a growing sense of civic duty. With the historical development of Scottish policing still in its infancy, a fully informed critique of Carson and Idzikowska's interpretation is a long way off. However, there is much worth in their view that the mode of analysis they have adopted '...has more explanatory potential than either a broad, undifferentiating structural approach or its antithesis, a perspective which seeks to build knowledge incrementally through isolated and geographically specific case studies.'¹¹⁸

V

**What was New about the New Police? A Critique of
Traditional and Revisionist
Interpretations**

What was new about the new police has not captured the interest of scholars to the same extent as other policing issues. Historians, while not totally neglecting the topic, have tended to give it fleeting reference, with precedence going to issues such as police origins and impact on society.¹¹⁹ Although these lines of inquiry have in themselves shed light on this question, rarely has what was new about the new police formed the focus of detailed study. The tendency of historians to treat the unreformed and reformed police in isolation has, as Hay and Snyder point out, hindered a fuller understanding of the continuity and change between them.¹²⁰ A fuller comparative study – including traditional ‘private’ policing practices and transitional local policing experiments – is necessary before a critique of this issue can be effectively provided. Nonetheless, the limited material that exists on this topic suggests that there are weaknesses in the assumptions made by both traditionalists and revisionists.

In general, two weaknesses stand out. Firstly, both interpretations overstate the extent and manner of reform. Hart, Emsley, Philips, Field and Swift, to name but a few, argue that the transition to a disciplined, professional policing system was less dramatic and more prolonged than traditional histories have portrayed.¹²¹ Enactments such as the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act may have compelled incorporated English and Welsh boroughs to introduce policing provisions, but instruction as to how they were to be enforced was limited. In the provincial towns, no fixed guidelines were introduced other than that control of existing watch forces had to be transferred from improvement commissioners to town council watch committees. This resulted in a more gradual change in the style, personnel and manner of policing than was first thought, given the cost and reluctance of authorities to implement reform. It was common for old policing characteristics, such as high turnover rates, indiscipline and inefficiency, to linger on, with many ‘new’ forces differing little from the ones that existed before legislative instruction. As Emsley points out, ‘the shift from an old style of policing to a new one was far more gradual than much traditional police history has allowed; and many of the faults and problems attributed to the old system were to be found with the new.’¹²²

Moreover, in many areas, reform was not accompanied by a dramatic change in the intrusiveness of policing as revisionists have argued.¹²³ As Emsley points out, insufficient financial and human resources often prevented the new police from exercising close surveillance of working-class areas.¹²⁴ Very often, the watching of such areas was sacrificed to appease middle-class ratepayers, although it should be bore in mind, as Storch perceptively argues, that it

was the impression that the police were always near and likely to appear at any moment that was the principal function of surveillance.¹²⁵ Furthermore, chief constables often showed little enthusiasm to clamp down on morality crimes or recreational pastimes. Drunks and prostitutes frequently escaped prosecution, or were apprehended only during periods of heightened sensitivity. Conflicting opinion on what constituted effective policing combined with a fear of the response unpopular policing might provoke greatly restricted the police's role as moral guardians.¹²⁶ The majority of officers were incapable of acting in such a manner anyway. As Jones points out, drunkenness and indiscipline were rife among policemen, with much police time being directed at keeping officers sober and out of brothels.¹²⁷

Secondly, both interpretations fail to take sufficient account of policing developments before the advent of the new police. Recent research has shown that the basic principles of modern policing were evident before reform.¹²⁸ According to Hay and Snyder, deterrence, surveillance and apprehension – often hailed as the main innovations of the reformed police – were functions performed by salaried watchmen and parish constables, often in a manner more effective than traditional histories have claimed.¹²⁹ Reynolds, in her study of policing in London before reform, confirms this, arguing: ‘there was a significant degree of continuity between the old and the new – the ‘bobbies’ of Scotland Yard carried on what the “Charlies” of the night watch had begun.¹³⁰ Other modern principles, meanwhile, such as detection and investigation of crime, were being carried out by ‘private’ policing systems from as early as the eighteenth century, in the form of associations for the prosecution of felons, thief-takers and criminal advertising.¹³¹ The experience of such practices, combined with transitional policing innovations shortly before the advent of the new police – such as the Lighting and Watching Act of 1833 – have been credited as producing an environment in which Government legislation on policing in Southern rural England could take place.¹³²

The new police were possible because they were not new, but the product of a period of rural experimentation that has not before been adequately chronicled. Under the permissive Lighting and Watching Act of 1833, but also through a wide variety of ad hoc local expedients in the hiring of watchmen, patrols and professional Chief Constables even earlier in the century, provincial England came to know ‘police’ in its new sense. [This]... helps to make some of the links between an undoubted transformation of upper-class attitudes from resistance (in say, 1785, when Pitt was forced to withdraw the first police bill for London) to acceptance of police throughout England by the 1850s by that same class. Expedients grafted on to the old structure of parochial and county government had partially shaped a new organisational idea.¹³³

Another scholar, Styles, takes it further. He argues that continuity between the unreformed and reformed police was evident throughout the country, claiming that there was little new about the new police, other than that they were presented and perceived as new.¹³⁴

In what sense then, if any, were the “new” police new? To some extent, the fact that they were *uniformed* distinguished them visually from most pre-existing watchmen and constables, who had generally only carried staves or badges, or worn a great coat.... This emphasis on public identification is no co-incidence, because in many ways the most striking distinguishing feature of the “new” police is that they were presented and perceived as something *new*.¹³⁵

Certainly, there was little, if anything, to distinguish the new police from their predecessors once they took to streets in the 1830s. Officers did little in their day-to-day work that parish constables and night watchmen did not do before them. However, while the conclusions of the above research appear to be convincing, there is a danger that they can create a false, if perhaps, unintentional impression that nothing changed in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Continuity between the old and new police there may well have been, but there is little doubt that in many areas the late 1820s and 1830s witnessed a change in style of policing that should not be ignored over whether it emerged first with transitional policing initiatives or with the new police, or whether old constables under the guise of the new police were performing it. As Hay and Snyder point out, continuities in organisation and personnel can nonetheless be accompanied by a change in style, function and social significance of policing.¹³⁶ Police reform did indeed bring with it greater regulation of working-class pastimes and culture, just as revisionists argue. There may have been nothing new about monitoring beer houses, prostitution, recreational activities, etc., but under the new police, as Philips and Storch suggest, ‘...this occurred even more rigorously and consistently.’¹³⁷ Testimony to this was the anti-police disturbances and the rise in prosecutions for minor public order offences that accompanied police reform.¹³⁸ People, after all, would not have taken to the streets to protest about the police if there was nothing different about them. They did so precisely because there was! The fact that the rise in prosecutions for public order offences transcended dividing lines between the old and new police strongly suggests that this change in policing had less to do with who was doing the policing – the old or new police – and more to do with the type being practiced.

Of course, there was a limit to the police’s capabilities in regulating facets of working-class culture and, of course, its practice was not exactly new. But the police from the 1830s onwards were less likely to turn a blind eye to popular pastimes and rowdy behaviour as they were in the past.¹³⁹ As a Middlestown magistrate pointed out, before “the establishment of the rural police these practices [drinking and rowdyism] were winked at, but in future they would be prevented.”¹⁴⁰ As Emsley argues, police reform brought with it the potential for greater

efficiency and strictness to the management of people's daily lives, criminalising many time-honoured practices in the process.¹⁴¹

This orientation in policing was not simply directed towards the working class. Police reform and policing initiatives of the 1830s and 1840s brought with them new expectations of what policing involved. Shortly after their introduction, the new police were expected to become 'main players' in areas in which they had traditionally been subservient and had played only a minor role. In many towns, this involved performing duties such as suppressing disorder, which had previously been performed by the military, carrying out a wide range of administrative tasks, which had traditionally been the responsibility of local councils and improvement commissions, and prosecuting offences, the overwhelming majority of which had previously been carried out by victims. By mid-century, for instance, the Metropolitan Police were said to be undertaking the '...great majority...' of prosecutions in the capital, while one study puts the figure at around 30% for provincial towns.¹⁴² Of course, there were exceptions to the police's ability to perform these functions, with many, if not most, areas being slow to reform. But as Critchley points out, the links with the past should not disguise the links with the future that were being forged.¹⁴³ The transition between the old and new police may not have been one of black becoming white, as older police histories tend to suggest. But neither was it one of incessant grey!

VI

Police Control – A Critique of Traditional and Revisionist Perspectives

There is little doubt that police reform in England and Wales heralded a significant departure from popular control, as revisionists argue. As Reiner suggests, the working class, and to a lesser extent, the middle class, had far more opportunity to influence and control parish constables and watch forces than they had the new police.¹⁴⁴ In towns, the Metropolitan Police Act removed control from local watch committees and magistrates and placed it in the hands of two police commissioners, appointed by the Home Secretary, while the Municipal Corporations Act placed control in the hands of middle-class-dominated council watch committees. The property and social requirements for council office, which may often have been higher than those for locally appointed improvement and watch commissions, meant that the working class were effectively excluded from becoming commissioners of the new police until the extension of the franchise later in the century. And by that point, watch committees had ceded much of their authority to increasingly autonomous chief constables – a fact, no doubt, that was influenced by the changing balance of power within local government.¹⁴⁵ In counties, meanwhile, the gentry-dominated

magistracy controlled the police until local government reform in 1888. While chief constables up until this point had determined policy and its administration, magistrates recruited only those with similar social backgrounds to their own, ensuring, as Steedman points out, that the values of the landed gentry predominated.¹⁴⁶

In Scottish burghs (a study of Scottish counties is yet to be carried out) the situation was not as clear-cut, not least because of the legislation that compelled many local watch commissions in England to hand over power did not apply to Scottish burghs. As the previous chapter showed, the development of Scottish burgh policing was characterised by local initiative rather than central instruction, with Government not formally compelling burgh forces to establish policing systems until 1892. What is clear, however, is that many police commissions were remarkably representative for their time in history, preceding parliamentary and local government reform by a number of years. Initially, these commissions provided the discontented upper middle class with a voice and power base from which to rival self-appointed town councils. However, by the 1830s, low electoral and commissioner franchises handed power in many areas to the working class/lower middle class, with the upper middle class's ability to regain control, according to Carson and Idzikowska, depending on macro-structural factors and local circumstances.¹⁴⁷ However, while working-class control and influence clearly lasted longer in Scotland than in England – a result of the different legislation that applied to both countries – the trend remained the same. Most of Scotland's major elected police commissions by the 1860s had been incorporated into middle-class-controlled local government. In Glasgow, this, as Part III will demonstrate, was achieved in 1846 after a long and bitter struggle between the Police Commission, the Magistracy, the Town Council and Government.

It is fair to say, however, that Government was relatively relaxed about police commissioners in Scotland being directly elected, extending the provisions of the 1833 Burgh Police Act to 'populous places' places in 1847 and 1850. By contrast, in England and Wales there was a deliberate policy of removing the police from direct, popular control and management as the century progressed. The 1833 Lighting and Watching Act was the last legislative enactment relating explicitly to towns to permit the direct election of police commissioners. And even then, some police reformers opposed it as being too democratic.¹⁴⁸ The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act may have introduced an element of representative democracy into many towns, but by insisting that improvement commissions hand over authority of their watch forces to town council watch committees it significantly reduced the possibility of the working class controlling the police. Electoral and social requirements of council office aside, the policy of electing a watch force from a select number of councillors went a long in ensuring that any subversive elements in councils could be automatically filtered out by the respectable majority. Indeed, it is possible that Government would have gone further and

imposed a centralised policing structure for the whole country had it felt it would have been successful – Philips and Storch show that they were planning one for rural England in the 1830s.¹⁴⁹ But opposition from the provincial elite, on the threat such a system would pose to local autonomy, prevented such a system from being introduced.

Such hostility to the concept of the popular election of local commissioners and representatives stemmed from many reasons. In rural areas, the 1839 Report into the Rural Constabulary argued that the election of the local gentry to the magistracy was undesirable, as they ‘...are of too high a station in life to be acquainted with the necessary technicalities with thief-taking.’¹⁵⁰ In towns, meanwhile, local control to those police reformers who favoured greater centralisation smacked of corruption and inefficiency.¹⁵¹ Problems of dual administration between local improvement commissions and town councils often led to prolonged struggles for control in many towns, as the 1835 First Report into the Municipal Corporations of England and Wales illustrated.¹⁵² Above all else, however, the local election of commissioners was resented because radical sympathisers, or, at least, commissioners who did not come from the ‘right’ social background, were being elected. Perhaps the most outspoken critic was police reformer Edwin Chadwick. A staunch advocate of centralisation, Chadwick vigorously opposed attempts by radicals like Joseph Hume to open-up the governance of unincorporated towns following municipal reform.¹⁵³ The election of representatives, including councillors and magistrates, who were not deemed worthy of holding office was paramount to his concern. As he noted to the 1839 Rural Constabulary Report:

The magistrates being tradesmen and elected as members of the municipal council are placed under considerable temptations to bid for popularity to the very lowest of the voters, and, whether justly or not, the general administration of justice is suspected and mistrusted.... Protection could be obtained only by the introduction of a well-organised police or constabulary under independent control.¹⁵⁴

Lord Russell, the Whig Home Secretary, echoed this concern over the social composition of local police authorities, arguing that

...the keeping of the peace, or to use the words of the older times, “the quieting of the towns”, should be immediately under the control of the persons who are deemed proper to have government of that town.¹⁵⁵

Exactly what influence this concern had on reform remains unclear. Although revisionists suggest it was important, they have not fully explored it or given it central importance. As the previous chapter indicated, historians have tended to ignore those who

managed the old police in favour of the officers of the new police. In particular, little attention has been given to the social composition of improvement commissioners, their performance and efficiency, their priorities and concerns, and their relationship with other municipal authorities.

In rural areas, the significance such a view had on reform may have been little more than symbolic. As was indicated above, police reform did little to change the nature of control, other than by establishing a bureaucratised structure that gave the police the veneer of neutrality. In towns, however, it is likely to have been more significant. This seems especially so in provincial towns that established improvement commissions with relatively low electoral franchises. The 1835 First Report into the Municipal Corporations of England and Wales – a grossly under-used document by police historians – was laced with references to the undesirability of locally controlled and popularly elected commissioners on the grounds of their social and political persuasion:

At Coventry, serious riots and disturbances frequently occur, and the officers of police, are often active in fomenting them. In some instances, the separate and conflicting authority of Commissioners is avowedly used as a check and counterbalance to the political influence of the Commission. At Leeds, no persons are elected Commissioners of Police whose political principles are not opposed to those of the Corporation.¹⁵⁶

Allied to a perception of the need to streamline the administrative machinery and uniform local policing initiatives, this concern is likely to have been influential in shaping the watching provisions of the 1835 statute. Obviously, this is only conjecture and cannot be substantiated until further research is carried out. But, it is worth bearing in mind that the watching provisions of the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act were pretty limited: no official guidelines were given, other than that town councillors had to establish a police force and assume control of watching from improvement commissioners. As many towns, especially the larger ones, already had relatively efficient forces, the only effects of the act were to rationalise policing arrangements and switch control. In other words, reform was not simply about establishing efficient police forces to meet the emerging threat of working-class radicalism. It was also about ensuring that the people who managed the forces that already existed were prepared to use them in a way deemed appropriate by Government.

It was particularly significant that many police reformers who favoured centralisation were more relaxed about leaving the less contentious powers of improvement commissioners, such as lighting and paving, in the hands of directly elected local representatives than they were law and order. The Municipal Corporations Act compelled improvement commissions to hand-over control for watching only, not public health administration. The First Report into the Municipal Corporations gave an indication as to why:

The superintendence of paving and lighting of the various towns is in the same unsatisfactory state [as in watching], but, in this branch of police, the want of a single presiding authority leads perhaps to less evil and inconvenience.¹⁵⁷

Clearly, reform was not just about rationalisation. Government's decision to impose a centralised policing structure on Manchester, Bolton and Birmingham in 1839 illustrated that it was prepared to reform policing arrangements where concern over control existed. In Birmingham, where some members of local government had Chartist sympathies, the decision was as much about social class and political radicalism as the smooth running of local government.¹⁵⁸ Similar reasons were behind Government's refusal to listen to calls for a popularly elected police authority for London in the second half of the nineteenth century. Stanley Leighton, Conservative MP, during the parliamentary debate on the Local Government Bill in 1885, warned that:

...an elected body would not be always and altogether in favour of law and order. In certain cases an elected body would be entirely in the hands of one class of the community and that class might be opposed to the law. In the mining communities, for instance, it would be altogether in the hands of the Miners' Organisation; and the Miners' Organisation was, like every other trade organisation, not always in favour of law and order.¹⁵⁹

It would, of course, be foolish to mistake outcome with cause. Simply because reform placed control of the police in the hands of the middle and ruling classes does not necessarily mean that was a reason for reform. Equally, however, it would be naïve to suggest that this outcome – especially in the incorporated provincial towns – was purely coincidental. The Lighting and Watching Act is a good reminder of the dangers of overstating the desire to remove the police from popular control. But by the same token, the importance of police management to reform in Britain's larger towns is deserving of greater emphasis than historians have hitherto given it. Research into early nineteenth-century improvement and watch commissions may well reveal that the issue of who controlled them was every bit as important to reform as crime control and social control. It certainly was for the Glasgow Police Commission, as Part III will show.

VII

Police Reform in Glasgow within the Wider Historiography

This study will argue that while the development of policing in Glasgow in the first half of the nineteenth century fits more closely with the revisionist view of police history than the traditionalist, neither, in terms of how they are presented for England, do justice to the distinct and complex manner in which the police institution in Scotland evolved. This is hardly surprising, since both models evolved with the English experience in mind, focusing on the legislative enactments that heralded the development of the new police and the reasons behind their introduction. In Scotland, the absence of obligatory legislative enactments and clear dividing lines between the old and new police, combined with the peculiar nature of the ‘police’ concept, resulted in a different course of development, which neither model accommodates precisely. In terms of how they are presented for England, both models are far more useful to this study from a theoretical standpoint than they are for the events and factors they advance as heralding reform. It will be claimed that the disparity in events precipitating development between Scotland and England was an inevitable result of the differing concepts of ‘police’ in the two countries.

Police development in Glasgow, it will be argued, was characterised throughout the first half of the nineteenth century by one dominant factor – namely, the middle class seeking to control and manage more effectively their city in the face of rapid urbanisation. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this took the form of establishing and regulating a new range of public amenity provisions that were essential to health and safety. In this respect, police reform in 1800 mirrored more the development of English improvement commissions than the English police.

Class struggle, it will be shown, provided a crucial background to reform in Glasgow, but it did not stem initially from heightened middle-class anxiety over the need to control the lower orders. In fact, concern over the lower orders – or crime and disorder, for that fact – played only a little part in police reform in 1800, and was generally secondary to environmental concern. Rather, class struggle centred on middle-class control for the local state, as the old elite fought with an emerging new elite over who should manage the new police establishment. In this sense, the Police Commission in its formative years was an instrument of class power, as revisionists suggest, but only in the sense that it gave new men of wealth a power base in local management that hitherto they had not possessed.

However, the coercive aspect of police began to assert itself as the century progressed. While the generic nature of the ‘police’ concept was never entirely superseded, it will be

contended that the control and management of people rather than the environment became of increasing importance to commissioners, especially in the second quarter of the century. Again, crime played little part in this. Commissioners rarely mentioned it. A realisation of the need to keep the lower classes under close supervision was behind much of this changing function of policing, especially following the political and industrial insurrection that followed the post-Napoleonic period. But it would be too simplistic to say that commissioners were motivated solely by social control. As Part IV will illustrate, the rationale behind their policy regarding vagrants, for instance, was shaped more by financial rather than ideological concerns.

It will be argued that no one event or incident underlay the changing priority in policing. Different factors at different times were important, which is hardly surprising given that the process of reform was evolutionary rather than revolutionary, with no legislative dividing lines separating the old 'police' concept from the new. However, such diversity should not disguise the fact that middle-concerns and priorities were at the root of police reform and subsequent development in the city. The Police Commission, it will be shown, was essentially a middle-class institution designed to serve middle-class needs and promote middle-class values. That is not to deny that the working class benefited from certain aspects of reform – such as the lighting and paving of the streets – or that they were in favour of certain aspects of it. But the needs of the middle class came first, as will be highlighted by the selective policing of the city and the civic elite's attempt to remove the police from popular control in the 1840s once it fell into the hands of commissioners from relatively humble backgrounds.

This controversy over control in the 1840s was particularly significant as it illustrated that the political struggle that characterised reform in 1800 was not confined to the Commission's establishment. Throughout the Commission's history, the issue of management shaped policing affairs. Just as concern over the environment and, latterly, with the lower orders, was behind middle-class efforts to better manage the city, so, too, it will be claimed, was a concern with who controlled the police. Power, prestige, democracy, accountability and class were ongoing issues that were central to the Commission's rise and fall and, ultimately, to the development of policing as a whole in and around Glasgow. In this respect, the Glasgow experience concurs fully with Carson and Idzikowska's claim that policing was a battleground over which middle-class aspirations and disillusionment with local affairs were fought.

Equally, it supports their claim that '...the penetration of capitalist relations into Scotland created the conditions under which the institution of police could emerge'.¹⁶⁰ However, while the rise of the urban middle class underpinned policing development in the city by providing the economic, social and political basis and rationale for a system of police, rapid growth in population combined with evolving ideas on how to best manage city life were important too. In particular, the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment known as the civic

tradition combined with the emergence of the evangelical movement in the late eighteenth century provided ideological justification and guidance for reform. All were crucial to establishment and ongoing development of policing in Glasgow.

Endnotes to Part I

Chapter 2

1. C. Reith, *A Short History of the Police* (Oxford, 1952), p.9.
2. C. Emsley, *Policing and its Context, 1750-1870* (London, 1983), p.2.
3. Cited in *Ibid.*, p.99.
4. A. Williams, *The Police of Paris, 1718-89* (Baton Rouge, 1979), pp.8-9.
5. Cited in L. Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3 (London, 1956), p.1.
6. Cited in *Ibid.*, p.3.
7. Cited in *Ibid.*, p.2.
8. Cited in *Ibid.*
9. See *Ibid.*, p.3.
10. Cited in E.A. Reynolds, *Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 1720-1830* (Stamford, 1998), p.1.
11. See Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3, pp.4-5 and S.H. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988), p.69.
12. Cited in Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3, pp.4-5.
13. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland*, p.70.
14. Cited in Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace*, p.7. See also Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3, p.247.
15. Cited in Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3, p.247.
16. *Ibid.*, p.3.
17. P. Lindsay, *The Interest of Scotland Considered with Regard to its Police in Employing of the Poor, its Agriculture, its Trade, etc.* (Edinburgh, 1733).
18. See H.H. Kames, *Statute Law of Scotland, abridged with Historical Notes* (Edinburgh, 1757), pp.269-77.
19. J. Erskine, *An Institute of the Law of Scotland* (Edinburgh. First published in 1773, reprinted in 1828), Volume II, p.1037.

20. A. Smith, *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, delivered in the University of Glasgow by Adam Smith, Reported by a Student in 1763* (Oxford, edited by E. Cannan, 1896. First published in 1776), p.154.
21. The remainder of this paragraph is based on Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3, pp.3-4.
22. Lindsay, *The Interest of Scotland Considered with Regard to its Police in Employing of the Poor, its Agriculture, its Trade, etc.*, title page and pp.i-xxxv and 1-229.
23. Kames, *Statute Law of Scotland*, pp.269-77.
24. Smith, *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms*, p.422.
25. W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December, 1984), p.210 and k. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), pp.270-1. The European source to which they refer is P. Pasquino, 'Theatrum Politicum. The Genealogy of Capital, Police and the State of Prosperity', *Ideology and Consciousness*, Number 4 (1978).
26. Erskine, *An Institute of the Law of Scotland*, p.1037.
27. Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3, pp.420-3.
28. See R.M. Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833* (Motherwell, 1989), p.2; S. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland, 1800-50: With Special Reference to the Growth of Civic Government in Glasgow and its Suburbs'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1995); R. Tyzack, "'No Mean City"? The Growth of Civic Consciousness in Aberdeen with Particular Reference to the Work of the Police Commissioners', in T. Brotherstone and D.J. Withrington, eds, *The City and its Worlds: Aspects of Aberdeen's History since 1794* (Glasgow, 1996); R.J. Morris, 'Urbanisation in Scotland', in W.H. Fraser and R.J. Morris, eds, *People and Society in Scotland: Volume II, 1830-1914* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp.86-7; and M. Atkinson, *Local Government in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1904), pp.74-5.
29. Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833*, p.2.
30. J. Lindsay, *Review of Municipal Government in Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1909), p.31. See also W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, 'Tackling the Problems', in W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, eds, *Glasgow, Volume II: 1830 to 1912* (Manchester, 1996), p.395.
31. See J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and Systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-33'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), pp.63-78 and Tyzack, "'No Mean City"?' p.151-60.
32. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, pp.25-7.

33. Tyzack, “No Mean City”? p.151.

34. Given word length restrictions, it is not possible to state the full titles of the local acts introduced in Scottish burghs. Their legislative references are as follows: Aberdeen, (35 George III, cap, 76); Glasgow (39 & 40 George III, cap. 88); Greenock (41 George III, cap. 51); Port Glasgow (43 George III, cap. 121); Edinburgh (45 George III, cap. 21); Leith (46 George III, cap. 36); Paisley (46 George III, cap. 116); Inverness (48 George III, cap. 41); Gorbals (48 George III, cap. 42); Kilmarnock (50 George III, cap. 68); Perth (51 George III, cap. 34); Dumfries (51 George III, cap. 146); Kirkcaldy (51 George III, cap. 35); Dunfermline (51 George III, cap. 61); Calton (59 George III, cap. 3); Peterhead (1 George IV, cap. 87); Airdrie (1 & 2 George IV, cap. 60); Alloa (3 George IV, cap. 83); Bathgate (5 George IV, cap. 128); Dingwall (5 George IV, cap. 93); Dundee (5 George IV, cap. 129); Dalkeith (6 George IV, cap. 36); Anderston (7 George IV, cap. 119); Banff (3 & 4 Victoria, cap. 119); Borrowstounnes (6 & 7 Victoria, cap. 69); Pulteneytown (7 & 8 Victoria, cap. 52); Ardrossan (9 & 10 Victoria, cap. 186); Helensburgh (9 & 10 Victoria, cap. 31); Rothesay (9 and 10 Victoria, cap. 299); and Campbletown (9 & 10 Victoria, cap. 364).

35. See Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833*.

36. R.M. Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Police of Towns (Scotland) Act 1850* (Motherwell, 1989), pp.7-13 and 243 and J. Prest, *Liberty and Locality: Parliament, Permissive Legislation, and Ratepayers' Democracies in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1990), pp.188-9.

37. Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Police of Towns (Scotland) Act 1850* (Motherwell, 1989), pp.7-13.

38. ‘An Act for regulating police and sanitary administration of towns and populous places, and for facilitating the union of police and municipal administration in burghs in Scotland, 55 & 56 Victoria, cap. 55, 1892’.

39. ‘An Act to make more effectual provision for regulating the police of towns and populous places in Scotland, and for lighting, cleansing, paving, draining, supplying water, improving and promoting public health, 25 & 26 Victoria, cap. 101, 1862’.

40. Table 2.2 adapted in part from an ‘Abstract from each of the burghs in Scotland, stating whether they have or have not adopted 3 & 4 William 4, cap.46, entitled “An act to enable burghs in Scotland to establish a general system of police”, stating extent to which adopted, and the expenses attending the same’. P.P., 1847, [15.], LVII.393, p.1. See also Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833*, pp.102-6.

41. Table 2.3 adapted from Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Police of Towns (Scotland) Act 1850*, pp.246-9.

42. Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary to Home Secretary (Scotland) – First’, P.P., 1859, Session 2 [40.], XIX. 687, p.34.

43. *Ibid.*, p.4.
44. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', pp.213-14.
45. *Ibid.*, p.211 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.271.
46. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', p.210.
47. Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Police of Towns (Scotland) Act 1850*, pp.13, 29-39 and 79.
48. 'Reports from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Expediency of Adopting a more Uniform System of Police in England and Wales and Scotland: Second, with proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index, 1852-3'. P.P., 1852-3 [715.], XXXVI. 161, p.109.
49. *Ibid.*, p.112.
50. *Ibid.*, p.109.
51. *Ibid.*, p.115.
52. *Ibid.*, p.107.
53. C. Steedman, *Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-80* (London, 1984), p.16.

Chapter 3

1. For good overviews of police history in England, see C. Emsley, *The English Police: A Political and Social History*, Second Edition (London, 1996); R. Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, Second Edition (Hemel Hempstead, 1992), pp.11-56; and D. Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England: Crime, Conflict and Control* (Manchester, 1997).
2. Reiner makes this point. Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, p.13.
3. Prominent in the traditional school are W.L. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England* (London, 1901); C. Reith, *The Police Idea* (Oxford, 1938); C. Reith, *British Police and the Democratic Ideal* (Oxford, 1843); C. Reith, *A Short History of the Police* (Oxford, 1952); T.A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales, 900-1966* (London, 1967); D. Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace: The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979* (London, 1979); L. Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volumes 3 and 4 (London, 1956); J.J. Tobias, *Crime and Police in England, 1700-1900* (Dublin, 1979); J.J. Tobias, *Crime and the Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1967); P.J., Stead, 'Patrick Colquhoun: Preventive Police', in P.J. Stead, ed., *Pioneers in Policing* (Berkshire, 1977); and P.J. Stead, *The Police of Britain* (New York, 1985).
4. Taylor makes this point. Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England*, p.2. Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace*.

5. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England*, p.203; E.C. Midwinter, *Law and Order in Early Victorian Lancashire* (York, 1968), p.14; Reith, *The Police Idea*, p.177; and Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace*, p.63.
6. E.A. Reynolds, *Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 1720-1830* (Stamford, 1998), p.4 and W.R. Miller, *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in London and New York, 1830-70* (Chicago, 1977).
7. Reynolds, *Before the Bobbies*, p.4.
8. Tobias, *Crime and the Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century*, p.69.
9. *Ibid.*, pp.236-7 and Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England*, p.280.
10. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, p.30.
11. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England*, p.204.
12. *Ibid.*, p.205.
13. See Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volumes 3 and 4 and Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace*.
14. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, pp.58-62 and 76-80.
15. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England*, p.228.
16. See M. Weaver, 'The New Science of Policing: Crime and the Birmingham Police Force, 1839-42', *Albion*, Volume 26 (1994), p.295.
17. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England*, p.61.
18. C.D. Robinson, 'Ideology as History: A Look at the Way Some English Police Historians Look at the Police', *Police Studies*, II (1979), pp.45-7.
19. Please note, not all of the following scholars to whom reference has been made in this section adhere rigidly to the revisionist school of thought. Many are simply critically analysing some of the core assumptions made by traditionalists, free from an ideologically motivated agenda. Those who adhere to the revisionist school of thought have been named in the reference below.
20. Like the traditional perspective, the revisionist interpretation is a crude overview. None of the following writers fit it exactly. They include: R.D. Storch, "'The Plague of Blue Locusts': Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England, 1840-57', *International Review of Social History*, XX (1975); R.D. Storch, 'The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline and Popular Culture in Northern England, 1850-80', *Journal of Social History*, 9 (1976); R.D. Storch, 'The Problem of Working-Class Leisure: Some Roots of Middle-Class Moral Reform in the Industrial North, 1825-50', in A.P. Donajgrodzki, ed., *Social Control in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1977); R.D. Storch, 'Policing Rural Southern England before the Police: Opinion and Practice, 1830-56', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989); D. Philips and R.D. Storch, *Policing*

Provincial England, 1829-56: The Politics of Reform (London, 1999); A. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of some Themes', in D.J. Bordua, ed., *The Police: Six Sociological Essays* (New York, 1967); J. Foster, *Class Struggle in the Industrial Revolution* (London, 1974); D. Philips, 'Riots and Public Order in the Black Country, 1835-60', in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson, eds, *Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History, 1790-1920* (London, 1974); D. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country, 1835-60* (London, 1977); and D. Philips, 'A New Engine of Power and Authority: The Institutionalisation of Law Enforcement in England, 1780-1830', in V.A.C., Gatrell, B. Lenman and G. Parker, eds, *Crime and the Law. The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500* (London, 1980).

For a Scottish perspective, see W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December, 1984) and W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part II: Policing and the Production of Social Order', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 18 (March, 1985). Part I was later re-printed in a slightly altered and abbreviated form: K. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), pp.267-97.

21. J.M. Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police, 1835-56', *English Historical Review*, Volume LLX (1955), pp.415-22; Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, pp.62-8; Emsley, *The English Police*, pp.59-64; Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, pp.64-74; and R. Swift, 'Police Reform in Early Victorian York', *Borthwick Paper*, Number 73 (1988), pp.1-48.

22. V.A.C. Gatrell and T.B. Hadden, 'Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation', in E.A., Wrigley, ed., *Nineteenth Century Society. Essays in the Use of Quantitative Methods for the Study of Social Data* (Cambridge, 1972), p.353 and Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, pp.84-6. See also B.J. Davey, *Lawless and Immoral: Policing a County Town, 1838-57* (Leicester, 1983), p.182; Swift, 'Police Reform in Early Victorian York', pp.1-48; Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England*, p.97; Emsley, *Policing and its Context*, p.131; and Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, p.225.

Gatrell and Jones both argue that the new police had a significant impact on the reduction of crime in the second half of the century, pointing to improving rates of arrests, prosecutions and convictions. V.A.C. Gatrell, 'The Decline of Theft and Violence in Victorian and Edwardian England', in V.A.C., Gatrell, B. Lenman and G. Parker, eds, *Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500* (London, 1980), p.259 and D.J.V. Jones, 'The New Police, Crime and People in England and Wales, 1829-88', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Volume 33 (1983), pp.162-3.

23. Gatrell and Hadden, 'Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation', p.353.
24. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society', pp.8 and 12-13.
25. Storch, 'The Policeman as Domestic Missionary'.
26. *Ibid.*, p.481.
27. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, pp.84-6.
28. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part II', p.13.
29. R. Paley, "'An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System?'" Policing London before Peel', *Criminal Justice History*, 10 (1989), p.118.
30. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society', pp.8-15.
31. Storch, "'The Plague of Blue Locusts'", p.65 and Foster, *Class Struggle in the Industrial Revolution*, pp.56-61.
32. Storch, "'The Plague of Blue Locusts'", pp.65 and 86; Foster, *Class Struggle in the Industrial Revolution*, pp.56-61; S. Spitzer, and A. Scull, 'Social Control in Historical Perspective', in D. Greenberg, ed., *Corrections and Punishment* (Beverly Hills, 1977); P. Cohen, 'Policing the Working-Class City', in B. Fine, R. Kinsey, J. Lea, S. Piciotto and J. Young, eds, *Capitalism and the Rule of Law* (London, 1979), pp.120-1; and M. Brogden, *The Police: Anatomy and Consent* (London, 1982).
33. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', pp.207-32 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', pp.267-97.
34. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', p.222 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.286.
35. Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, pp.6-7.
36. *Ibid.*, p.7.
37. *Ibid.*, p.8.
38. For influences on criminal statistics and the problems in using them see Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, pp.47-50 and Gatrell and Hadden, 'Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation', pp.336-62.
39. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, p.287; D.V.J. Jones, *Crime, Protest, Community and Police in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1982), pp.91-2, 97 and 107-10; and Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police', pp.413-14.
40. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, p.62.
41. *Ibid.*, p.59.
42. Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, pp.6 and 45-6.
43. D. Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law', in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh and E.P. Thompson, eds, *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England* (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp.17-63.

44. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society'; Storch, "The Plague of Blue Locusts"; and Philips, 'Riots and Public Order in the Black Country'.
45. Storch, "The Plague of Blue Locusts", p.61.
46. E. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements* (Manchester, 1959), p.116 and G. Rude, *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848* (New York, 1964), pp.7-8, 47-65 and 199-204.
47. E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', *Past and Present*, Number 50 (1971), pp.76-136 and W.H. Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp.272-81.
48. Philips, 'A New Engine of Power and Authority', p.156.
49. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society', pp.11-12.
50. Spitzer and Scull, 'Social Control in Historical Perspective', p.277.
51. Cohen, 'Policing the Working-Class City', p.120.
52. Philips, 'Riots and Public Order in the Black Country', p.142.
53. For a good overview on this theme, see S.H. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988), pp.8-11.
54. *Ibid.*, p.8.
55. Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume IV, p.232.
56. Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police', pp.415 and 426-7.
57. Mather, *Public Order in the Age of the Chartists*.
58. T.R. Gurr, *Rogues, Rebels and Reformers* (Beverly Hills, 1976), pp.122-3.
59. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland*, p.9.
60. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I' and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing'.
61. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', p.208 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', pp.267-8.
62. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', p.220 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.283.
63. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', p.212 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.273.
64. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: Part I', 224-9 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', pp.291-5.

65. J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and Systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-33'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), p.92.
66. Storch, 'Policing Rural Southern England before the Police: Opinion and Practice'.
67. *Ibid.*, p.261.
68. *Ibid.*, p.263.
69. Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*.
70. *Ibid.*, pp.86-7 and 230 and J. Styles, 'The Emergence of Police: Explaining Police Reform in Eighteenth-Century and Nineteenth-Century England', *British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 27 (1987), p.21.
71. Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, pp.23 and 45-53.
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133. Passage by Hay and Snyder referring to Storch article above. Hay and Snyder, 'Using the Criminal Law', p.11.
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Part II

Britain's Oldest Police? The Early Development of the Glasgow Police Force, 1779-1846

Introduction to Part II

‘When on 29 September 1829 London’s first police officers stepped on to the streets of the Metropolis it signalled the birth of modern policing as we know it.’¹ This view of the Metropolitan Police, expressed by Sir David McNee, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, is typical of the view held by historians who adhere to the traditional school of police thought. After years of opposing a reformed system of police for being foreign, despotic and incompatible with civil liberties, London is credited with providing the world with an example of how the need for law enforcement could be reconciled with the need for liberty. Created without prior experience, the principles and practices of this unarmed and uniquely ‘English’ institution became a prototype for liberal countries throughout the world. As Ascoli, in his study of the Metropolitan Police, noted: ‘...it is an indisputable fact that for 150 years the...[Metropolitan Police]... has become the model for every other democratic society and the envy of less fortunate people.’²

However, such a view has been disputed. Some historians cite Ireland as laying the foundations for modern police reform. Palmer argues that ‘...Ireland was the theatre for police innovations in the British Isles....’³ Maitland argues that ‘a full history of the new police would probably lay its first scene in Ireland, and begin with the Dublin Police Act passed by the Irish Parliament in 1786.’⁴ And Jefferies argues that ‘it may perhaps be said, that modern police history begins not in Britain itself, but in Ireland, with Peel’s Peace Preservation Police.’⁵ Like the traditional view of police in England, there is widespread agreement that the Irish police served as a model for elsewhere. MacDonagh argues that ‘...in scale, structure and purpose...the London reform was much more a product of Irish experience than of police theorists such as Patrick Colquhoun or penal philosophers such as Bentham.’⁶ And Palmer, like many others, views Ireland and London as providing a model for British colonial authority but with the former being the most dominant.⁷

Critique of both these conventional interpretations has come mainly from a colonial perspective. Brogden challenges the notion that police modernisation occurred first in Britain. He argues that ‘salaried state appointed policing was hardly an invention of the Anglo-Saxon race.’⁸ Features of modern policing practice, according to Brogden, were evident in colonial countries before the advent of the new police in Britain.⁹ Anderson, Killingray and Hawkins, meanwhile, argue that no colonial force was quite like the Irish or Ulster constabularies.¹⁰ Ireland was heavily policed, the colonies were not, while the influence of the former in terms of training, method or development was limited. They instead emphasis the local context in which

policing evolved, arguing that colonial policing systems were too varied and complex to be portrayed as mere replicas of either model.

Recently, the critique of the conventional interpretation has gone one stage further and assumed a British dimension. Doubt has been raised as to whether police modernisation in Britain first occurred in either England or Ireland. Scotland, instead, has been credited with introducing Britain's first reformed policing system through a series of local policing initiatives. As McGowan argues:

Despite the popular myth that modern police was established by the London Metropolitan Act in 1829...salient features of the modern civil police system and system of police developed earlier in Scotland, primarily through a series of local Edinburgh Police Acts obtained in 1805, 1812 and 1822. On the premise that modern police are a full-time paid force, bureaucratically organised under an operational command structure separate from judicial direction; and subject to both the rule of law and democratic accountability, the efforts of Patrick Colquhoun as a police reformer were more tangible in early 19th century Edinburgh than London or indeed Dublin.¹¹

Dinsmor makes a similar point.

There seems to be a tendency to dismiss any policing organisation before 1829 as not being 'real' policemen, just a collection of old night watchmen or bumbling parish constables. It may, therefore, come as a surprise to those dazzled by the radiance of Peel's police reforms in London, that preventative policing was evolving successfully in the majority of the 11 Scottish cities and towns who had their own Police Acts, prior to 1829.¹²

According to the same author, it was Glasgow, and not Edinburgh or London, that was the centre of police innovation. He argues that the principles of modern policing were introduced by policing innovations in Glasgow in the late eighteenth century '...which laid down, for the first time, the foundations of a disciplined, preventative and proactive police force....'¹³ The Glasgow Magistrate Patrick Colquhoun, he contends, subsequently transported such principles to London in the 1790s, incorporating them in his acclaimed 'Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis'.¹⁴

Others claim that modern police reform occurred first with the Glasgow Police Act of 1800.¹⁵ Ord, a former chief constable of the city's force, argues the citizens of Glasgow were '...among the earliest communities to organise, for their safety and protection, a police force having some resemblance to our modern concept of a police.'¹⁶ Berry and Whyte contend that '...the Glasgow Police Act established Britain's first police brigade....'¹⁷ And Grant, in his book on the Glasgow Police, devotes a chapter to 'The Oldest Force', claiming 'there is good reason

for believing that the City of Glasgow Police Force is the oldest police force in Great Britain...preceding the London Metropolitan Police Force by twenty-nine years.'¹⁸

This part will assess whether these claims are accurate by analysing policing development in Glasgow from 1779 to 1846. It will do so by looking at the nature of the force that was established in 1800 and the reasons behind its introduction and ongoing development. This will come in four chapters. Chapter 4 will examine directly the validity of the above claims. Chapter 5 will examine the pressures behind the passing of the city's first police act. Chapter 6 will examine late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century attitudes to police and the influence that they had on reform. And Chapter 7 will assess the development of policing from 1815 to 1846 and the reasons behind it. For reasons that will become apparent, adopting such a long time-span is important to assessing effectively the above issue.

The Glasgow Police in its Formative Years

I

Problems with Definition

Any attempt to assess whether Glasgow, or any city for that fact, had mainland Britain's first modern police force is wrought with difficulty. Exactly what historians mean when they talk about the 'new' police is far from clear cut. Many historians of the English police have, by and large, simply assumed that theirs was the first professional police.¹ As a result, little effort has been made to define precisely what is meant by the 'new' police, other than that they were the forces of law and order that were established with the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act in 1829, the Municipal Corporations Act in 1835, the 1839 Rural Constabulary Act and the 1856 County and Borough Police Act.

However, this use of English police legislation to gauge modernisation in Britain is unhelpful on two accounts. Firstly, by ignoring legislation that applied to other parts of the United Kingdom, it does little to advance the historian's knowledge of whether professional policing occurred first in Scotland, Ireland, or England and Wales. It overlooks, for instance, that numerous 'police' acts had been introduced in Scotland long before England. Secondly, and more importantly, this approach does little to reveal whether the forces that were established by police legislation were actually worthy of being called police forces. As chapters 2 and 3 showed, it is highly unlikely that all the forces that were established under 'police' acts in Scotland, or for that matter in the reformed English towns after 1835, actually constituted what could be considered professional police forces. It is surely not enough to argue that a watch force established under the banner of 'police' legislation is automatically worthy of the title 'new' police, especially in Scotland where the 'police' concept was initially concerned more with public administration and amenity provision than it was with law and order. If it did, then there would be no dispute – police modernisation would have occurred first in Ireland, with the 1786 Dublin Police Act, and then in Scotland, with a series of local policing initiatives in the early nineteenth century. England, the so-called theatre of police innovation, would come a distant third.

An effective assessment of whether police modernisation occurred first in London, Dublin, Glasgow, or anywhere else, must also require that the forces of law and order meet a certain criteria associated with modern policing. However, exactly what criterion to use is in

itself problematical. Emsley argues that, in terms of accountability, control and form, three types of police developed in nineteenth-century Europe – state civilian, state military and municipal civilian.² All were evident in Britain in the form of the Metropolitan Police, the Royal Irish Constabulary and county and borough police forces. However, which one, if any, forms the best basis from to assess police reform is highly debatable. For instance, Hart, in her study of borough police reform in England, used the Metropolitan model to assess the speed of modernisation throughout the country, arguing that London was the yardstick by which to measure other forces.³ However, there is no reason why this should be the case, other than the mistaken assumption that the capital provided a model that the rest of the world sought to implement. In fact, in many ways the Metropolitan model is completely inappropriate in assessing police reform in Britain, given that its structure and organisation are unique on the mainland, forming the country's only state civilian force.

Even if historians agree on one model, its main characteristics are open to dispute on two accounts. Firstly, it is far from certain that the features associated with the 'new' police were actually new. As Chapter 3 showed, it is difficult to distinguish precisely between the 'old' and the 'new' police given the degree of continuity between them. Recent research has suggested that the dividing lines between eighteenth-century watch forces and nineteenth-century police forces were far more blurred than older accounts of police history tended to suggest.⁴ Even though the coming of the 'new' police may have heralded a change in the style and function of policing in many areas, it was not a transition that can be easily defined or characterised. Secondly, the ideological divide that splits the traditional and revisionist schools of thought has often resulted in completely different interpretations on the same subject matter. Thus, traditionalist police historians argue in favour of accountability and consent as being hallmarks of modern policing, while revisionists point to unaccountability and coercion.

In short, there is no definitive way in which to assess whether police modernisation occurred first in England, Ireland or Scotland. Conclusions drawn on this question have tended to reflect the methodological approach and ideological leanings of the historians who have addressed it. While recognising the problems involved, this chapter will, nonetheless, attempt to put forward a balanced view of Glasgow's claim to have Britain's first 'new' police by comparing it to the so-called 'new' police in England. It will do this by assessing which was stronger – the force's links with the future or the force's links with past. This may be a far from ideal approach, but it is the only feasible option available. Inevitably, however, the conclusions will be of a tentative nature, given that the lines between the old and new police were far from black and white.

II

Links with the Future

The Glasgow Police Act of 1800 forged many similarities with the reformed police of the nineteenth century. After years of relying on the primitive system of unpaid, compulsory personal service to the community and unsuccessfully experimenting with inspectors of police and town officers, the citizens of Glasgow had their first permanent body of officers for day-to-day protection. Traditional forms of watching ended as responsibility transferred to a full-time, salaried force, comprising of the Master of Police, sergeants, day-officers and watchmen. Exactly how large this force was is unclear. Old histories of the force suggest it composed of three sergeants, nine day-officers, 68 watchmen and a Master of Police. However, these figures seem too high. According to the 1801 Glasgow Post Office Directory, the force comprised of a Master of Police, two sergeants, five officers and sixty-three watchmen.⁵ With the population of the police district within the royalty being approximately 46,779, this gave Glasgow a ratio of one officer for every 659 inhabitants – one of the largest forces per head of population in Britain at any point in the nineteenth century. As late as 1846 the average ratio for English borough forces was 1 to 1,000.⁶ Indeed, such was the size of the Glasgow Police that Commissioner Aitken noted: ‘...our impression was that this force was so large and overwhelming that it would drive iniquity out of the city as though by a hurricane.’⁷

More importantly, police jurisdiction was under a single authority and extended throughout all the main parishes of the royalty. This was of immense significance as fragmented judicial authority – and its associated problems of local jealousies and insufficient cooperation – was widely condemned as the main weakness of the unreformed policing system in England.⁸ According to police reformer Patrick Colquhoun, watching in London at the turn of the nineteenth century was under the direction of around 70 trusts split between 200 parishes, each with limited judicial authority.⁹ When the police of the Metropolis was placed under one extended authority in 1829, it was hailed by Sir Robert Peel as being central to policing efficiency.

In terms of accountability, control and form, the Glasgow Police reflected what Emsley has labelled the ‘municipal’ model of provincial England and continental Europe.¹⁰ It was a civilian force, locally controlled and financed, accountable to local ratepayers of sufficient property requirement, and responsible for a wide range of municipal provisions. Overseeing police management were police commissioners, a third of whom were elected annually by proprietors of property valued at L.10 or above rental. As Part III will explore in more detail, the establishment of the Police Commission was of immense significance, as it gave ratepayers for

the first time a say in the management of local affairs and conferred upon commissioners a range of powers in advance of any other in Britain.

Like the police committees in the reformed municipal towns of England, commissioners were very much involved in the day-to-day running of police affairs, meeting at least once a week. They were responsible for all aspects of police, which included setting levels of assessment, lighting, cleansing, paving and watching the streets, recruiting chiefs of police, fixing salaries, establishing and directing day-to-day rules and regulations, and generally implementing the provisions of police acts. However, they had no authority under the early police acts to make byelaws, only administer them. Magistrates retained this right, although it was later granted to commissioners in subsequent police acts.¹¹ Nonetheless, even in its formative years, the Commission remained a fairly powerful, autonomous body, which, as Part III will show, had serious implications for its durability as the century wore on.

The structure of the force gave it the resemblance of a modern police. A central feature of the police's organisation was hierarchy of rank. This was a significant departure from the old watching arrangements in the city and remains today a salient feature of the police command structure. Under commissioners in the chain of command was the Chief of Police. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, chief officers of Glasgow went under a variety of titles: until 1825 they were known as masters of police; from 1825 to 1848 they were known as superintendents of police; from 1848 to 1862 they were known as chief superintendents; and from 1862 they were known as chief constables – James Smart being the first officer to hold this title.¹² Precisely how much autonomy chief officers enjoyed is difficult to say given the absence of chief officers' minute books in the force's formative years. The minutes of police commissioners show that commissioners often handed-down instructions on a wide range of issues, but the manner in which they were administered on a day-to-day basis was often left to the discretion of police chiefs. Moreover, police chiefs were responsible for the appointment of senior and junior officers, and had considerable input regarding any improvements that needed to be carried out. Upon his taking office in 1832, Superintendent Denovan had most of his recommendations for improving the efficiency of the force accepted by commissioners, including the establishment of more watch-houses, the abolition of the rank of head constable in favour of lieutenant and the expansion of the criminal department.¹³

Significantly, however, police chiefs until 1846 were ultimately accountable to police commissioners, both for themselves and their officers – the number of whom was determined by commissioners. Police chiefs who did not follow the wishes of commissioners were open to dismissal. In 1805, Walter Graham became the first Master of Police to be dismissed, when he refused to head the patrol at night.¹⁴ Others followed him. Furthermore, all recommendations made by police chiefs had first to be approved by commissioners. Even in areas where chiefs of

police had legal autonomy, it was known for commissioners to ride rough-shot over them. Superintendent Denovan resigned in 1832 after commissioners illegally appointed three lieutenants without consulting him.¹⁵ Ultimately, commissioners had the final say on the size, nature and purpose of the force. Indeed, as Part III will show, Government concern about the control directly elected representatives exercised over police chiefs was to prove significant both in the Commission's demise in 1846 and in a subsequent increase in the autonomy and powers of chief officers.

Next in line in the chain of command came sergeants, day officers and night watchmen – all of whom were responsible to the Chief of Police. The appointment of sergeants and officers was particularly significant as it may well have been the first time the title 'police officer' was used on mainland Britain. It also illustrated the desire among commissioners to install a degree of professionalism. Among their varied duties, sergeants were to '...to patrol the streets until between two and three in the morning, or longer if necessary; to observe if the watchmen are doing their duty....'¹⁶ They were also to take roll call half an hour before watchmen went on duty and submit daily reports of their transactions to the Master of Police – just as police forces today.

Like Metropolitan Police officers in 1829, officers were to be of certain quality to ensure efficiency. Advertisements called for them to be of 'good character' and possess 'certificates of qualification'.¹⁷ Unfortunately, it is not possible from police records to assess the character of watchmen in the first quarter of the nineteenth century or their place of origin, but contemporary reports suggests that the majority were from the West Highlands.¹⁸ Highland officers were certainly very numerous in the second quarter of the century. One study has shown that 182 watchmen between 1826 and 1851 came from the Highlands, almost 60% of whom derived from Argyle.¹⁹ Indeed, the number of migrants in the force was startling. During a five and a half-month period in 1847, 173 joined the force, of which seventy-nine were Scots, eighty-six Irish and eight English.²⁰

It is unlikely that commissioners in the force's formative years pursued a specific policy of recruiting migrants, as advertisements for recruits were placed in the Glasgow press. As will be shown below, difficulties in obtaining suitable recruits prevented commissioners being as selective as they may have wished. However, the large number of migrant officers suggests that preference may have been given to recruits from outwith Glasgow, or at least recruits not initially from there. Anecdotal evidence in the force's formative years suggests that most recruits were born outside the city, but had lived there for many years.²¹ Preference to outsiders was certainly given later in the century, with one report condemning the force's system of recruiting officers as '...faulty and objectionable, because it requires the employment of men unacquainted with the city, and ignorant of those duties of a constable which are a necessary qualification for

the due performance of their functions.’²² It went on to criticise a ‘...system of recruiting [officers] from country and Highland areas who have never being in a large city before.’²³ Significantly, recruiting officers divorced from the local community was a key feature of many police forces in the nineteenth century, particularly in Ireland and the colonies.

In such countries, the repressive, militaristic nature of policing called for police forces to be armed. In Glasgow, however, the force was a civilian one – probably the first of its kind in Britain, if not the world, to be introduced under a police act. Watchmen took to the streets armed only with four-foot long staves, lanterns and candles. Their only form of uniform was a greatcoat, on the back of which a number was painted, and badge. Officers’ clothing, on the other hand, consisted of a top-hat, blue cut-away coat, blue knee breeches, vest and greatcoat.²⁴ This emphasis on full uniformed public identification for officers was particularly significant.²⁵ A salient feature of the new police was that officers be uniformed and visible to prevent the commission of crime, rather than simply react to it. This was central to the new science of preventive policing advocated by police reformers like Patrick Colquhoun.

The earliest record of the force’s instructions illustrates that preventing crime, rather than simply responding to it, was a concern of commissioners. This was of particular significance, as traditional police histories have suggested that the concept of ‘preventive policing’ began with the Metropolitan Police Act in 1829. In Glasgow, officers and watchmen were to use ‘...the utmost vigilance, in preventing street robberies, housebreakings, assaults, breaches of the peace...and all other crimes, offences, or nuisances whatsoever....’²⁶ In doing this, they were to ‘...carefully examine all the low windows, and doors of shops and houses...and observe that they are properly secured....’²⁷ They were also assigned beats on which to patrol to ensure greater surveillance of the city. This was central to preventive policing, and took place between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. in summer months and 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. in the winter.²⁸ Furthermore, the move from an ‘unpoliced society’ – whereby police duties are carried out by citizens – to a ‘policed society’ – where they are carried out by paid officers – gave the authorities far greater scope for the regulation of day-to-day activity in the city.²⁹ Provisions in the Glasgow Police Act illustrated this.³⁰ Officers were instructed to apprehend vagrants, vagabonds and idle persons with no employment or means of subsistence. Keepers of public houses and lodging houses suspected of harbouring suspicious characters were to provide the police with names, occupations and descriptions of all persons on their premises. Mobs, riots and disorderly public houses were to be suppressed and disorderly persons picked-up. And street robbers, housebreakers and other criminals were to be apprehended or detected and brought to justice. In short, the provisions were extremely innovative.

Although difficult to assess the effectiveness of the force in preventing and tackling crime, it was believed by a former Chief Constable of Glasgow and author of the Glasgow

Police that ‘the effect of a regular police force in the city was to drive the thieves and other bad characters into the suburbs, with the result that those districts were compelled to establish police forces of their own.’³¹ Indeed, in introducing police acts in 1808 and 1826, the suburban areas of Gorbals and Anderston cited their close proximity to Glasgow as one reason for their actions.³² Significantly, the forced migration of criminals from policed to unpoliced areas was hailed by traditional police histories as being a central feature of the introduction of the new police in England.

III

Links with the Past – the Day Force and the Night Watch

As important as the above measures were in forging links with professional policing, they should not disguise the fact that there remained a considerable degree of continuity with traditional methods of law enforcement. The appointment of ‘police officers’ was clearly significant in terms of the officers’ title, but their importance to law enforcement should not be overstated. An uniformed force of two sergeants and five officers hardly constituted an effective preventive patrol. It was widely believed that the officers were ‘...invisible in the daytime...[being] chiefly engaged in the detection of grave crimes....’³³ Only one sergeant and two officers were on patrol at any given time, which, according to Commissioner Aitken, was ‘...very imperfectly done, as the men could take a rest for an hour or two in their own houses and no one be the wiser for it....’³⁴ Consequently, the city was unprotected for long periods during the day – a salient feature of traditional forms of law enforcement.

Significantly, daytime criminal police work continued to be carried out by town officers, who had performed this role for the Council in the eighteenth century (see Chapter 5 for more information). This was highlighted in 1804 when councillors and magistrates met to decide who should receive the fines levied to the police office ‘...in cases where both the town officers and police officers had been employed.’ It was decided that they should be divided equally, with rewards, too, being shared between them.³⁵

Before 1807, however, this was not too common. Most criminal business before this date seems to have been carried out by police officers, although, significantly, it does not seem to have been conducted too effectively or to any great degree. This was illustrated by the magistrates’ decision in 1807 to allocate ‘...a certain part of them [town officers] exclusively to criminal business, which is at present very ill-attended to.’³⁶ Three criminal town officers were subsequently appointed, who went on to play an important role in the criminal affairs of the city. Their existence was a reflection more of the police establishment than the police officers, the

latter of whom spent most of their time bogged down in paper work. Magistrates, with much justification, were clearly unhappy that commissioners were giving so little attention and priority to the criminal affairs of the city. Indeed, in 1811, police officers were deemed to inexperienced to deal with an inquiry relating to the robbery of L.45,000 from the Paisley Union Bank in 1811. The Procurator Fiscal had to take charge of the investigation.³⁷

An even greater degree of continuity with the past was found with the watch force. Historians of the Glasgow Police who argue that it was Britain's first modern force have tended to justify their view on the grounds that the force's watching provisions were introduced under a 'police' act – one of the first cities to do so.³⁸ But as Chapter 2 illustrated, the 'police' concept in nineteenth-century Scotland differed from its twentieth-century meaning. Policing at that point in history was generic, having more to do with environmental issues than with problems associated with law and order. Watching was simply one aspect of police along with paving, lighting and cleansing, all of which were incorporated in the provisions of 1800. As such, the majority of personnel appointed under the police act were referred to as watchmen rather than policemen. Of course, this reflected, in part, a need to distinguish the watching aspect of police from other aspects. But, more importantly, it reflected the nature of a force that was not too dissimilar to the ones that had been keeping order under improvement acts in many English towns in the eighteenth century.

The first watchmen were strongly criticised for being '...poor, frail, worn-out individuals, generally in early life connected with the West Highlands, and though ranging from sixty-five to seventy-five years of age, the greater part of which they had spent in the city, had not been able to conquer the English dialect.'³⁹ Indeed, in 1804 commissioners decided that '...no person be appointed...a watchmen who does not understand the English language....'⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, serious doubts were raised about the effectiveness of officers. One commissioner argued in 1810 that '...an examination should be made into the state of all watchmen...to determine whether they are fit for doing the duties of their office as a number of them appear old and infirm.'⁴¹ But it seemed to no avail, with commissioners measuring efficiency in terms of financial prudence rather than quality. As Mr Strang, a Glasgow City Chamberlain, pointed out: 'the watchmen were chosen, not so much on account of their fitness...as, chiefly and mainly, on the low wages at which they condescended to remain out of bed during the night and perform their supposed duties.'⁴²

Of course, there is a danger that such anecdotal evidence can convey a false impression. Watch forces and parish constables in England have been shown to be more efficient than literary evidence in Government inquiries often portrayed.⁴³ Many constables were wrongly perceived as incompetent when compared against the new standards of policing in London in the 1830s and in the face of mounting criticism from police reformers.⁴⁴ It is impossible to say

definitively whether the earliest recruits to the watch in Glasgow suffered unjustly from the same derision given the lack of detailed information. But, while it is possible that the above critique was either exaggerated or unreflective of the watch as a whole, there are grounds for believing that the force's earliest recruits lacked the professional standards associated with modern policing. Firstly, criticism was levelled against watchmen in the first decade or so of the century when there was no rival model on the British mainland against which to compare the force. Secondly, contemporaries in Glasgow had no axe to grind by portraying officers as incompetent, unlike Government inquiries, which were often trying to depict an inefficient policing system to encourage reform. Police commissioners gained nothing by criticising their own men, except the unwanted derision of ratepayers. The fact they were both vocal in their criticism of the watch and relentless in their efforts to improve it – see Chapter 7 – suggests the above views were justified.

The limited evidence that exists supports this. Advertisements may have called for recruits to be of 'good character', but, in practice, this applied only to senior officers.⁴⁵ Commissioners were forced to be less diligent in employing watchmen given the poor working conditions to which watchmen were subject. There were no physical or intellectual standards of recruitment below the rank of officer, which was in contrast to the Metropolitan Police where recruits had to be literate and able-bodied. Nor did recruits have to be under a certain age. Inevitably, standards were compromised. It was significant that commissioners did not list the former occupations of watchmen – they had done for commissioners, the Master of Police, treasurer and clerk and officers.⁴⁶ This suggests that many watchmen may well have been of retirement age, or, at least, long past their physical peak. (Unfortunately, there are no records of watchmen's ages in the force's formative years.) Moreover, those who were fit and active – clearly a number were as commissioner criticism was not aimed at the whole watch – probably left at the first available opportunity. As will be shown below, many recruits left at an early date, which suggests that police work was a temporary shelter from the vagaries of the economic cycle and the periods of unemployment it brought. This would have done little to enhance the efficiency of the force.

Moreover, indiscipline among watchmen was rife; many were dismissed for neglect of duty, the most common reasons being sleeping on duty and drunkenness.⁴⁷ Numerous petitions from ratepayers were delivered to commissioners '...complaining that the watchmen are certainly not active in the discharge of their duty.'⁴⁸ The situation became so bad that a special patrol was established to, among other things, '...see if watchmen are alert or otherwise attentive to their duty.'⁴⁹ The common occurrence of watchmen retreating to their sentry boxes made this particularly necessary.⁵⁰ As Commissioner Aitken noted: 'it was well known that many a snooze was took in these retreats while the city took care of itself.'⁵¹ Indeed, it was widely believed that

watchmen passed much of their time in these boxes, ‘...fondly hoping that the citizens were all as quiet and peacefully disposed as they were themselves.’⁵² From 1812, it was deemed necessary to instruct watchmen to enter their boxes on a rotational basis to ensure that the city was always watched; anyone found guilty of abusing the system was to be fined or dismissed.⁵³

Further attempts were made in 1816 to restrict the number of watchmen resting at any given time. Police regulations permitted only half of the watch to rest in their sentry boxes after half past eleven, while the other half constantly patrolled.⁵⁴ However, it gave criminals an idea of the position and movement of watchmen, not least as the rotation between those patrolling and those resting normally took place during the compulsory calling of the hour performed by watchmen. Contemporaries believed this to be a common problem of the watch system. As Edwin Chadwick pointed out:

...the most extensive plunder is obtained during the night; and the details of the organisation of the nightly watch are felicitously adapted to suit the convenience of the plunderers. The watchmen have mostly fixed stations (in boxes which accommodate them for repose) that it may be seen with certainty where they are, and that advantage may be taken of the opportunity significantly offered to carry on operations in security where they are not.⁵⁵

Of course, Chadwick sought police reform, so his viewpoint was undoubtedly biased. Paley has alerted the historian to the fact that many boxes were carefully and strategically placed to discourage crime.⁵⁶ Even so, night shelters for watchmen remained a salient feature of eighteenth-century forms of law enforcement. Significantly, they were removed from the metropolis following police reform in 1829.

Not surprisingly, turnover rates were high among watchmen. Although no figures are available for the early part of the century, dismissals were a common occurrence. Fifteen were dismissed in one day alone in 1819.⁵⁷ Drunkenness, neglect of duty and being ‘unfit and worn out’ were common problems. Others left through choice. Low wages, low-morale, long hours and rigorous discipline made policing an unattractive, lonely occupation.⁵⁸ At the force’s birth, night watchmen received only 10s. for a seven-day week.⁵⁹ By contrast, the average gross weekly wage for muslin weavers – the poorest paid sector of the city’s handloom weaving industry – ranged from 13s. 1d. to 15s. 2d. Cotton weavers earned between two and three times this.⁶⁰ Not surprisingly, recruits rarely stayed long. As early as 1806, commissioners were complaining of the ‘...want for watchmen to fill up the present vacant situations....’⁶¹ Policing was viewed as a stopgap occupation for migrants and elderly gentlemen who could not get work elsewhere.

The influx of migrants is unlikely to have greatly raised the physical profile of the force in its formative years, as most non-native recruits had, according to anecdotal evidence, lived in

the city for many years and were nearing or past retirement age. It would have, however, as more and more young migrant recruits flocked to the city from Ireland and the West Highlands as the first half of the century progressed. But even this would have done little to improve the force's effectiveness in preventing crime. Effective preventive policing called for both officers and watchmen to have a thorough knowledge of their beats and an awareness of suspicious characters. With many recruits using policing as a temporary occupation to offset unemployment, these attributes were lost to the police on the watchmen's departure or were never attained. Moreover, assigning watchmen and uniformed officers beats to patrol may have been a hallmark of preventive policing, but getting poorly-paid, and often aged watchmen to do it was another thing, especially in cold, wet winter nights. Significantly, only officers were uniformed, not watchmen. Preventive policing called for policemen be uniformed and highly visible to prevent crime by their presence, yet the overwhelming majority went without such attire. Most took to streets the same way as night watchmen in eighteenth-century English towns – with a greatcoat, stave and lantern.

Given such considerations, it is highly unlikely that the day patrol or the night watch encouraged criminals to migrate permanently to nearby areas, as contemporaries claimed. The nearby suburban areas may have referred to their proximity to Glasgow as being one reason for introducing police acts, but it was common for those in authority to promote the threat from a migratory criminal class.⁶² Portraying this image was a convenient way for police reformers to encourage reform. Edwin Chadwick's 1839 Commission on the Rural Constabulary was intentionally laced with references to criminals being driven from policed to unpoliced areas in the hope that it would have a 'knock-on' effect on police reform.⁶³ Whether the theory was accurate is highly contentious and difficult to prove.⁶⁴ In Glasgow, however, it is unlikely to have been true. Had the imposition of the watch in 1800 actually resulted in the forced migration of criminals to nearby suburban areas, then it would not have taken these areas a combined total of 53 years to introduce their own police acts (Gorbals, Calton and Anderston did not introduce police acts until 1808, 1819 and 1826 respectively). These acts were more concerned with the deteriorating state of urban amenity provision, such as lighting, paving and cleansing, than they were with fears of rising crime. In fact, it is likely that watchmen's most meaningful contribution to preventing crime lay, ironically, in their environmental role as inspectors of lamps rather than crime fighters. As early as 1767, Glasgow town councillors had stated that more public lighting would be beneficial to the detection and prevention of crime. Watchmen were given this role with this in mind.⁶⁵ Indeed, they spent so much time employed in this capacity that some commissioners claimed it was counterproductive, as other duties were being neglected.⁶⁶

Even if watchmen in Glasgow had been young, fit, committed and diligent, it is likely their effectiveness would have been hindered by limited jurisdiction. Although the judicial

authority of police commissioners covered the whole police district, they had no authority to police developing suburban areas.⁶⁷ The establishment of policing systems in Gorbals, Calton and Anderston meant that Glasgow was in a parliamentary constituency with five different judicial boundaries, five magistracies, four boards of police and the police of the river and harbour. Serious problems of coordination inevitably arose. It was widely believed that local jealousy and suspicion prevented these small burgh policing systems from effectively working with their larger neighbour, much to the detriment of policing efficiency. According to Frederick Hill, Inspector of Prisons, ‘...it was no uncommon thing for a criminal to escape...by merely running across a bridge’ into a different judicial area.⁶⁸ John Strang held a similar view:

...the boundaries of police jurisdiction were very much restricted, and consequently it was the easiest thing in the world to escape detection. In the east, the trickster had a city of refuge in Calton; in the south, the Gorbals offered its protection; and in the west, it was only necessary to step across St. Enoch’s burn to be safe from the watchman’s pursuit.⁶⁹

Indeed, it is likely that suburban concern over criminals fleeing Glasgow stemmed from inefficient policing arrangements providing criminals with an easy escape, rather than efficient policing forcing their permanent removal. As indicated above, contemporaries believed such uncoordinated arrangements to be a common weakness of the unreformed policing system. Petticoat Lane in London owed its notoriety as a thieves’ den before 1829 to the fact that its courts and alleys led to different administrative areas, providing criminals with an easy get-away.⁷⁰

However, Paley, in her study of London, has questioned the extent to which fragmented judicial authority was detrimental to policing efficiency:

...it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the necessary result of fragmentation was that each watch authority acted in isolation from the others. There may have been no formal coordinating machinery, but watch committees were nevertheless anxious to copy models of good practice, and they looked to each other for advice and information on the best ways to improve their service to the ratepayers.⁷¹

In Glasgow, too, commissioners took measures to improve communication and correspondence with suburban neighbours (see Chapter 7). However, it was not until 1843 that formal cooperation was finally achieved. Before then, there is strong evidence that local jealousy and petty rivalry did hinder policing efficiency. Those in authority certainly thought so. As Archibald Alison, Sheriff of Lanarkshire, noted:

It may be conceived what opportunities for the escape of criminals such a disjointed and ineffective system must have afforded. The suburban police officers, being under no common head, were jealous of each other, and united only in a common jealousy of the larger establishment of Glasgow itself. Cordial co-operation between such parties was not to be expected; and so ill did they draw together, that little communication of information went on from one to the other, and it was common practice for thieves, when they became known in one locality, to betake themselves to another, where they were enabled with comparative impunity to commence anew the gainful trade of crime.⁷²

Commissioners themselves were well aware of the problem. In 1820, they began a policy of erecting iron gates, pointing out that:

The police of the city would be rendered much more effective and beneficial if iron gates could be placed in the centre of closes leading from one street to another.... The greatest facility would be afforded to the watchmen and patrol in apprehending delinquents who resort to these thoroughfares when pursued where they find passage to a street or streets in a different or more obscure quarter of the Town and thus escape the vigilance of the most active.⁷³

That there was a direct link between this policy and criminals escaping into different judicial areas – particularly into Gorbals on the south side of the River Clyde – was illustrated in 1821 when commissioners agreed to erect

...a gate at each of the pavements leading from Clyde Street at the new and old bridges to the walk along the waterside, where it is reported thieves from the Broomielaw and other places make their escape when pursued by the police.⁷⁴

By June of 1821, commissioners had agreed to erect 175 gates at a cost of L.800.⁷⁵ As late as 1843, they were receiving petitions for more gates, which was testimony both to their deterrent in controlling crime and their perceived need.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, such a measure was a stopgap solution. Efficient and effective policing was impossible until the judicial and administrative machinery was streamlined under one authority as reform had done in the Metropolis of London in 1829 (except the city of London, which retained its own police). The Royal Commission on the Burghs of Scotland highlighted this in 1835-6, citing Glasgow as an example of the adverse effects of competing authorities.⁷⁷

IV

Links with the Past – the Social Function of Policing

Neither the day force nor the night watch force was introduced to replace the military as the first line of defence against major disorder. Unlike the Metropolitan or the Dublin Police, neither force was able to deal with such unrest. During rioting, such as the political disturbances that followed the Napoleonic Wars, the civic fathers expected to, and did, depend on military forces and special constables to maintain public order (the background to this disorder will be discussed in Chapter 6). In 1819, cavalry was stationed in the city and permanent barracks were erected.⁷⁸ At the height of political radicalism that followed in 1820, 900 special constables had to be deployed in the city along with Government troops.⁷⁹ Significantly, the police's role was to assist the civil authorities rather than the other way around.

Shortly after the outbreak of trouble in 1820 known as the 'Radical War', police commissioners called an '...extraordinary meeting...to get additional men employed during the disturbed state of the city for the purpose of aiding the civil authority in protecting the city and suppressing serious tumults that at present prevail.'⁸⁰ One hundred and fifty men armed with cutlasses were subsequently employed to '...be divided into small parties each headed by an officer of police for the purpose of patrolling the streets.'⁸¹ (See Chapter 6 for more information on the 'Radical War'.) Exactly what part watchmen and officers played is unclear, but their main contribution seems to have been one of arresting radical leaders and using their local knowledge and information to identify potential troublemakers rather than being at the forefront in quelling tumult.⁸² In this respect, they seem to have been extremely active. One officer was singled out for praise by magistrates, who noted:

...the valuable and important services which had been rendered by Mr Mathew Legat, senior criminal officer, during the late period of turbulence and alarm, in procuring with promptitude from time to time such correct information as enabled the magistrates by precautionary arrangements to counteract and defeat the insurrectionary designs of the disaffected....⁸³

Indeed, Berresford Ellis and MacA'Ghobhainn have claimed that Captain James Mitchell, Master of Police, was responsible for controlling the activities of Government spies in the city.⁸⁴ In 1820, Mitchell wrote to Lord Sidmouth in London suggesting that 'if the disaffected could be lured out of their layers – being made to think the day of "liberty" had come – we would catch them abroad and undefended.'⁸⁵

The police had to be used in this way as they simply were not equipped to quash disorder on their own. In 1820, the Lord Advocate criticised the Glasgow Police's organisation

and ordered Captain Brown of the Edinburgh Police and some of his officers to go to Glasgow and remedy the situation, which included significantly increasing the force's manpower.⁸⁶ Indeed, during the height of unrest fifteen coaches of Edinburgh policemen were dispatched to Glasgow.⁸⁷ A citizen, in a letter to the *Glasgow Herald* – written in response to a critique of the Glasgow Police establishment that appeared in the *Edinburgh Caledonia Mercury* – defended Glasgow's indignation on the grounds that the population of greater Glasgow exceeded that of Edinburgh by around 30,000. It also claimed that the Edinburgh rate of assessment exceeded nearly three times that of Glasgow.⁸⁸

The simple fact remained, however, that the police in Glasgow were not equipped to deal with serious disorder. Despite the efforts that were made to strengthen resources in the post-war period – it is noticeable from Table 4.1 that the ratio of police to population was strongest during this period than any other during the first half of the century – police numbers remained insufficient. Although the ratio of officers to population in the royalty of Glasgow was relatively strong in 1801 at 1 to 659 (see Table 4.1) it was small when the population of the suburbs was included at 1 to 1142. By contrast, the Metropolis of London at the turn of the century had approximately one officer for every 300 people, while Dublin had one officer for every 238 people by 1808.⁸⁹ Throughout the first half of the century, police resources remained extremely weak within the wider municipality, despite the establishment of forces in Gorbals, Calton and Anderston (see Table 4.2). This put a great strain on the ability of the police to control crowds, not least as Glasgow – and the Glasgow Green in particular – was the centre for public gatherings within the parliamentary constituency. The Lord Advocate highlighted the problem after the 'Radical War', noting that '...the state of the police of the country and city is not such as could have been desired or wished.'⁹⁰

Table 4.1: Ratio of Population to Watching/Criminal Police within the Police District of the Royalty of Glasgow, 1801-41*⁹¹

Date	Population	Police	Ratio
1801	46,779	71	659 to 1
1811	58,334	90	649 to 1
1821	72,765	161***	452 to 1
1831	101,594**	176***	577 to 1
1841	136,671**	262***	522 to 1

* Please note, the above police figures are based only on the watching/criminal police, including the police chiefs, police sergeants, police officers, patrol and watchforce. They do not include clerks of police, treasurers of police, surgeons of police or the environmental police, such as scavengers and lamplighters.

** These figures include the town of Blythswood, which was annexed in 1830 for policing purposes.

*** The police figures do not include the general commissioners, or the two resident commissioners per ward who were elected annually from 1821. If the two resident commissioners – who had the power of constable – are included, then the respective ratios for 1821, 1831 and 1841 are 348 to 1, 420 to 1 and 412 to 1 (see Figure 7.1). Furthermore, the police figure given for 1821 includes a patrol of 30 men that was later disbanded. The ratio without the patrol (excluding commissioners) is 555 to 1. The police figure given for 1841 includes supernumeraries to the number of 40. If this figure is not included, then the ratio (excluding

commissioners) is 616 to 1. Neither of the above figures includes the Police of the River Harbour, which was under the authority of the River and Harbour Trustees.

Please note, the population figures given for the police district are based on: firstly, the ancient royalty, incorporating the following parishes: West or George Parish; St Enoch Parish; South West, St Mary or Tron Parish; North West or St David Parish; East, Outer High or St Paul Parish; North, Inner High or St Paul Parish; South, Blackfriars or College Parish; St John's Parish; St Andrew's Parish; and St James's Parish; and secondly, as indicated above, the district of Blythswood and others annexed to the city in 1830 for criminal and civil jurisdiction. In 1830, the population of the district of Blythswood was 11,747; the population of the royalty was 89,847. In 1841, the population of the district of Blythswood was 17,308; the population of the royalty was 119,363.

The above parishes were all located within the police district. However, some parish boundaries to the north slightly transcended the police district. It is impossible to determine from census records how many people lived outwith police jurisdiction. It is likely the number increased as the century progressed, as more people settled in the previously unpopulated parts of the royalty. Moreover, there may well have been parts of the police district that were not included in the parish returns. This may well have increased the population of the police district by several thousand. Henry Miller, Superintendent of the Glasgow Police, estimated in 1839 that the population within police jurisdiction in Glasgow was 175,000, in contrast to the 136,671 noted above.⁹² His estimate, however, is too high. He estimates that a further 109,210 people lived in Calton, Gorbals and Anderston, making 284,210 within Glasgow and suburbs. This is just slightly more than the census remuneration of 274,324. Miller clearly overstates the number of people contained within the police district at the expense of the number of people living in nearby suburban areas. Nonetheless, his figures do show that the returns contained in the information in Table 4.1 may well be far from exact, although nowhere near as distorted as his suggest. However, these figures are as near a reflection of police strength in relation to population as can be gauged from the census material that exists.

Table 4.2: Ratio of Population to Watching/Criminal Police within Royalty of Glasgow and Suburbs, 1801-41⁹³


Date	Population	Police	Ratio
1801	81,048	71	1142 to 1
1811	108,048	100	1080 to 1
1821	147,788	192	770 to 1
1831	202,426	249	813 to 1
1841	274,324	373	735 to 1

These figures include the police of Glasgow, the suburban police of Gorbals, Calton and Anderston, established in 1808, 1819 and 1826 respectively, and the Harbour Trust/Clyde Police.

Please note, the above population figure of 81,048 for Glasgow and suburbs is around three thousand more than is often given in other studies. The above figure has been preferred as it has been calculated from the same source that was used to assess the population of the royalty.

A final link with the past concerned the role of the watch. As indicated in Chapter 3, a salient feature of the reformed police in many English towns was their intrusion into poor areas to regulate and supervise activities that offended Victorian respectability. In Glasgow, however, many poor areas went without watching provision on a number of accounts. Police provision did not extend throughout the royalty. The police district covered only around a third of the city (see Figure 4.1). Even within this district, there was no guarantee that watching and lighting provision would be given. Commissioners chose to extend such provisions only to two police boundaries contained within the royalty: the River Clyde on the south (Craignestock not included) and the royalty boundary on the west. The watching and lighting boundary to the east stopped at Graham Square and to the north at Crakenhouse Toll-bar and Mr Swanston's gate, both short of police boundaries.⁹⁴ In the outlying areas, commissioners chose not to assess poor districts, thus relieving themselves of the financial burden involved in providing suitable watching and public amenity provision. Only areas that had a sufficient number of qualified ratepayers – defined for the first in 1830 as fifty – were policed.⁹⁵ (Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal the areas to which this applied.) As Commissioner Fogo pointed out in 1830,

Figure 4.1: Police District within the Royalty of Glasgow, 1800-30



...it never has been the practice of the Board to light all...places. There are districts within the royalty which never have been either watched or lighted in respect of their inability to afford adequate revenue; the ability to afford such revenue having been generally speaking the criteria by which the Board regulates the matter.⁹⁶

The implications of this were not too serious in the early part of the century as it applied only to a small and relatively unpopulated part of the police district and royalty. The ten parishes on which the population figures in Table 4.1 are based were all within the police district. Few people lived beyond this district, or, indeed, the watching and lighting boundary within it. More damaging was commissioners' policy within the limits set for watching and lighting. Within such areas, there was no guarantee that police provision would be given, regardless of whether there were a sufficient number of qualified ratepayers. For such provision to be granted, streets, squares, lanes and passageways had to be either paved or causeyed. Moreover, foot-pavements had to be of certain size – ranging from forty foot long and six foot broad, to sixty foot and upwards long and twelve foot broad.⁹⁷ Throughout the police district, priority was given to main streets at the expense of the streets, lanes and passageways in the poorer districts. The Directors of the Glasgow University Lying-in Hospital highlighted this in 1837, complaining that '...the attention of the police...[was]...directed chiefly to the main streets of the town, neglecting the poorer parts and more obscure districts' where it was most needed.⁹⁸ As Oliver has argued, commissioners adopted the attitude that since wealthier areas raised most in assessments they were entitled to most benefits.⁹⁹ (Although it is doubtful whether they raised the most collectively.) This was a prevalent feature of improvement commissions in eighteenth-century England.¹⁰⁰

Admittedly, other parts of the city containing the working class were policed. The Glasgow Police Act of 1800 undoubtedly brought with it the potential for greater regulation and tighter control over street behaviour. Provisions regarding paving sought to restrict the use of public streets to commercial purposes. Clauses XXIII and XXVI outlined regulations on removing obstructions and nuisances from public passageways. Carrying, running, driving, drawing, sledging, carting and wheel-barrowing were all outlawed unless for commercial activity. Significantly, however, the increased regulation of street activity tended to be concerned with the environmental aspects of police, such as scavenging, inspecting lamps, removing obstructions, preventing nuisances, and enforcing byelaws.¹⁰¹ The Lord Provost highlighted this, calling in 1820 for the appointment of a Head Constable '...whose duty it should be to superintend not those minor affairs of police to which the attention of the present

police establishment of Glasgow is almost exclusively confined, but those more important matters of police which are intimately connected with the public tranquility and welfare....'¹⁰²

With the exception of vagrancy (see Part IV) and perhaps one or two other areas, close supervision of working-class pastimes in the force's formative years was mainly restricted to special occasions. Before 1815, the only recreational event that was regularly, albeit belatedly, discussed by commissioners was the policing of the annual Glasgow Fair. Up until 1810, commissioners had made little reference to it. However, in July 1810, commissioners decided that '...the watchmen [are] to be paid for extra labour during the two nights of the Fair Week....'¹⁰³ The same policy was reiterated the following year.¹⁰⁴ In July 1812, '...precautions for preventing disturbances in the Fair Week...' included requesting that special constables be more '...alert that week than usual....' Commissioners also agreed '...to draw up the best regulations possible for aiding and assisting the magistrates in preserving the peace of the city....'¹⁰⁵ By July 1815, police policy extended to appointing forty extra men on Fair Friday, as attention towards pastimes involving drunken gatherings gathered pace.¹⁰⁶

The Glasgow Fair, however, seems to have brought special police provision. In the main, there does not appear to have been any serious attempt to closely regulate the day-to-day leisure activities of the working class before the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The police minutes make little reference to other recreational pastimes. 'Immoral' popular pursuits and behaviour, such as cockfighting, prizefighting, prostitution and Sabbath profanation, do not feature in early police discussions. As Chapter 7 will show, such attention was delayed until later in the first half of the century. Only drunkenness and rowdy behaviour received any notable attention before 1815. Even then, references were fleeting and irregular, and generally did not appear until around 1810. More often than not, these references were aimed at eradicating drunkenness among police officers and watchmen rather than the general populace (see Chapter 7). Overall, the minutes suggest that there was little desire among commissioners to monitor closely drinking houses in the first decade or so of the century. Commissioners did not draw up a '...list of disorderly houses...' until 1812.¹⁰⁷

Admittedly, their authority in this area was limited: magistrates were the sole issuers of licenses. Moreover, it is possible that watchmen acted on their own initiative or under the guidance of chief constables (although the chief constables provide no evidence at the weekly meetings of commissioners to substantiate this). The introduction of a night patrol to supplement the existing watch in 1812 certainly provided the opportunity for closer regulation of working-class drinking habits. Having said that, as Chapter 7 will show, the police minutes in the post-Napoleonic period indicate a heightened concern with drunkenness that was largely absent in the Commission's formative years. Police policy in this area in the early nineteenth century seemed, at best, simply about clearing the streets of drunks and, at worst, turning a blind eye. The

Incorporation of Maltmen highlighted that not enough attention was devoted to stemming the tide of growing immorality in a policing proposal. In discussing the 1807 Glasgow Police Bill, they argued:

that a clause should be introduced into the Bill, to check the great increase of houses of bad fame in the City, and women of loose character, by whom the streets are infested; and that for this end, the law respecting them should be enforced. ...That the police officers should pay more attention to the preservation of order in the streets on the Sabbath day; and disperse all irregular and indecent meetings of persons, of which many instances are observable in the afternoons, and evenings of that day, to the disgrace of the community and subversion of good morals.¹⁰⁸

Little effort was also made to enforce the preventive or detective aspect of criminal policing. Significantly, no provisions were made for the detection of serious crime in the 1800 Glasgow Police Act. Most crime that concerned the police came under the category of nuisance, such as failing to keep closes clean, not properly paving streets, and not effectively constructing 'dungsteads'.¹⁰⁹ As late as 1817, commissioners were complaining that watchmen were ineffective in controlling crime because of the environmental duties they had to perform, which in the force's formative years ranged from scavenging and inspecting lamps, pavements and closes.¹¹⁰ This helped ensure the term 'police' retained its specialist identity as an instrument of public amenity control for much of the first half of the century – a characteristic more in tune with the unreformed than reformed police.

V

Britain's Oldest Police?

As the above research has suggested, there were two sides to the Glasgow Police. On the one hand, the force established in 1800 is worthy of being called Britain's oldest police. It was one of the first, if not the first, on mainland Britain to employ full-time, civilian, uniformed police officers under a disciplined, hierarchical command structure for the 'prevention and detection of crime.' It is not acceptable to suggest, as some historians of the English police have, that these officers were not 'real' policemen simply because they predated the Metropolitan Police.¹¹¹ To all intents and purposes, they were 'real' policemen.

Although recent research by Paley and Reynolds has shown that the degree of policing innovation in London before 1829 was far greater than traditional police histories portray, it does not appear to have been as advanced as in Glasgow.¹¹² The forces of order in the metropolis

were not called 'police', were not uniformed and were not subject to a uniform, hierarchical command structure. To ignore the developments that were taking place in Glasgow and other Scottish towns in the early nineteenth century is to overlook the fact that many of the recognisable features associated with modern policing predated the introduction of the Metropolitan Police by a considerable number of years. With recent studies of provincial policing in England making a similar point, it seems that the importance of the Metropolitan Police Act to police history has been greatly overstated by many older studies.¹¹³

On the other hand, it does not automatically follow that the Glasgow Police was Britain's first 'new' police as some authors suggest. Being Britain's oldest police and Britain's first professional police are not synonymous. The former was a legacy of two important characteristics of Scottish policing in the nineteenth century: firstly, the generic nature of the 'police' concept under which the force was established and, secondly, the absence of an obligatory, legislative dividing line 'modernising' the concept's meaning. The Glasgow Police's pioneering links with the future should not disguise its considerable links with the past. The act of 1800, in essence, established two forces – a small, primarily, day force of police officers that was supplemented by a far larger night force of watchmen. Only a handful of the force's earliest recruits were called and, perhaps more significantly, were worthy of being called 'police officers'. The rest comprised a watch force that was neither a repressive, semi-military force, like the Royal Irish Constabulary, nor a carefully selected, professional force like the Metropolitan Police. It was simply a night watch, albeit one that was well organised along hierarchical and judicial lines (although, as Chapter 7 will show, it was subsequently reformed long before 1829).

Given this, it is probably more accurate to argue that the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 formed an important bridge between the old and the new police idea. However, until the historian has a clearer understanding of what is meant by modern policing, Glasgow's claim to have Britain's first 'new' police cannot be dismissed, or substantiated, to any certain degree. The simple fact is that all attempts to argue that the 'new' police were introduced first in Ireland, Scotland or England are pointless and futile until historians define precisely what they mean by the term. And even then, a definitive resolution is unlikely given the degree of continuity between the old and new police and conflicting views on what should constitute a modern, professional police force. Until these problems are overcome, bold conclusions to the contrary will reflect more ideological prejudice and national pride than policing reality.

The Origins of the 1800 Glasgow Police Act

I

Pressures for Reform – Crime

The inclusion of officer and watching provisions in the 1800 Glasgow Police Act was, in part, a reflection of the threat from a perceived rise in crime. Like other parts of the country, the threat from lawlessness in Glasgow appeared to be great in the late eighteenth century. Numerous efforts to introduce a police act were made in this era, all claiming that crime has ‘...of late been so frequent...’¹ Police bills were promoted in 1783 and 1789 but they never reached the statute book. Citizens would not contribute to a police establishment over which they had no control; councillors, on the other hand, had neither the funds to pay for police maintenance nor the authority to levy an assessment. (The struggle over the Police Board’s introduction will be dealt with in Part III.) Nonetheless, attempts to introduce only criminal policing arrangements – as opposed to public health and amenity provisions – were successful. In 1779, an Inspector Police, along with a small number of officers, was appointed.² He was to

to enquire into and discover all encroachments which have been made or shall hereafter be made upon the public streets...and all crimes and breakers of the peace...and report any matters of consequence to the magistrates.³

However, following the Inspector’s resignation in 1781 the position was disbanded.⁴ A second, more significant policing proposal was introduced in 1788. According to one local historian, Dinsmor, it laid ‘...the foundation for the establishment of a police force with duties we could easily recognise as the basic duties of today’s police service.’⁵ The provisions enshrined in the plan established what councillors referred to as a ‘Police Institution’, employing an ‘Intendant of Police’ and a number of ‘police officers’ (not to exceed eight) under the authority of the Lord Provost, three bailies and nine commissioners, elected annually from traders and merchants. The Intendant effectively assumed the role of Chief Constable and officers were organised by rank. Officers wore a red uniform and badge on which their number and the term ‘police’ were inscribed.⁶ Dinsmor claims that this experiment was the first time the ‘preventive policing’ concept was formally written down.⁷ As the Town Council minute books reveal, the Intendant was instructed ‘...occasionally to employ his officers in the evenings and

during the night time in order to detect and prevent crimes....’⁸ How novel the concept really was at this point in history remains to be seen, but there is little doubt that the instructions given to the Intendant were extremely advanced:

...he ought to exert himself in detecting houses and shop break-ins, theft pocket pickings and other crimes of that nature which have of late been so frequent in this city for which purpose his officers ought to be employed in getting information.... The Intendant’s officers ought to be particularly attentive in apprehending and taking into custody old offenders who have been convicted of and punished for crimes for which purpose they ought to take every means of procuring information of the characters of the people who keep public houses which are haunted and frequented by persons of that description.... That he ought to pay great attention to discover and detect the resellers of stolen goods and auctioneers and pawnbrokers....⁹

Links with the past, of course, remained. The Police Intendant was responsible for a wide range of issues concerning the smooth running of the urban environment, including the regulation and removal of carriages, incumbencies and rubbish. Significantly, however, most of these duties were not devolved to officers. With the exception of attending to fires, the latter’s responsibilities were limited largely to those outlined above. The environmental responsibilities of the Police Intendant were, in the main, sub-contracted. He was, for instance, ‘...empowered to employ scavengers, horses [and] carts...’ to clean the streets and to oversee contractors for lighting – duties that watchmen of the force established in 1800 often were expected to carry out.¹⁰ In fact, in many respects, the small group of officers established in 1788 resembled more a modern police force than the watch force established in 1800. It, of course, was far smaller than the one established in 1800 – employing only officers and not watchmen – but it, nonetheless, remained a very innovative, modern form of law enforcement.

According to Eyre-Todd, the Glasgow Police modestly began with this measure.¹¹ There is a lot of truth in this. Contrary to what has often been written, the reluctance of ratepayers to finance this establishment did not lead to criminal officers being dismissed completely.¹² Rather, arrangements were re-organised. In 1792, the civic elite decided to disband the police and cut the number of town court officers from sixteen to ten. The other six effectively assumed the role of police, although they went under the title of ‘magistrates’ officers’. Significantly, they were responsible for all criminal matters, including the duties the police officers had been assigned in 1788. In 1794, however, councillors decided that the re-organisation ‘...had not answered the intended purpose....’ The practice of dividing officers into court and magistrates’ officers ended. Nonetheless, criminal policing arrangements continued, with councillors deciding ‘...that the whole sixteen officers and the chamber keeper shall perform the town’s business promiscuously....’ In other words, the duties and responsibilities of the magistrates’ officers now

extended to all sixteen officers.¹³ Thus, despite the changes that were made, it is possible to trace continuously the existence of paid, uniformed criminal officers in Glasgow to at 1788 – twelve years before the first police act had been introduced.

A former Lord Provost of Glasgow was the influential police reformer Patrick Colquhoun, although he was not one of the six magistrates who drew up the 1788 policing proposal. According to Dinsmor, Colquhoun took the concept of ‘preventive policing’ to London in 1789 and helped inspire the establishment of the Thames River Police in London in 1800 and ultimately the Metropolitan Police in 1829.¹⁴ Of course, this claim, as Chapter 3 illustrated, is open to dispute; but that there was a growing perception of the need for a more reliable form of law enforcement to deal with crime in Glasgow in the 1790s is not.

However, although significant, the influence of crime on police reform in Glasgow should not be overemphasised. All attempts to establish a police system may have perceived that crime was rising, but it certainly did not provoke any widespread hysteria, nor was it necessarily the driving force behind every proposal. Without doubt, crime had a greater influence on the introduction of criminal officers in 1779 and 1788 than it did on the attempts to introduce watching arrangements or police bills; but, as will be shown below, even then it was a distant second to more mundane concerns. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that Patrick Colquhoun influenced reform to any significant degree. His ‘Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis’, published in 1795, presented the first detailed plan for effective law enforcement and was widely acclaimed throughout the country, going through seven editions.¹⁵ But his dramatic portrayal of a society being engulfed by crime, immorality and disorder unless a centrally coordinated preventive policing system was introduced at no point gained official sanction in Glasgow. There were no calls for a policing system modelled on Colquhoun’s proposal.¹⁶ On the contrary, the law and order provisions enshrined in the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 were in stark contrast to Colquhoun’s radical policing model. Indeed, the provisions in the 1800 enactment were similar to those included in a policing proposal for the city in 1790 – five years before Colquhoun’s first publication.¹⁷

II

Pressures for Reform – Disorder

An even greater threat to law and order came from riot and political radicalism. The French Revolution in 1789 was initially widely welcomed in Scotland as means by which a foreign neighbour had been emancipated from arbitrary rule. Edmond Burke’s condemnation of the revolution and defence of the old regime in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (published

in 1790) gained little sympathy among the propertied classes in Scotland. Throughout the country, the immediate effect of the revolution was to stimulate political debate, especially among the middle class who had been seeking political reform from the 1780s.¹⁸ Middle-class reform societies spread throughout the country, stimulated further by the publication in 1791 of the first part of Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* – a robust critique of the British constitution and Burke's defence of it.

However, events in France in 1792 changed middle-class opinion. The slaughter of French nobility and clergy by extreme revolutionaries convinced the propertied classes that the revolution represented a serious threat to the social order. Anti-reform backlash was evident by the establishment of the Glasgow Constitutional Association, which aimed '...to check that unwarrantable levelling republicanism.'¹⁹ However, among the lower orders, the bloodbath of 1792 convinced many who had hitherto been politically dormant that the ruling order could be overthrown by direct action and a new democratic system established in its place.²⁰ Further encouragement was provided by Paine's *Rights of Man*, which although being widely supported initially in middle-class circles, was essentially a revolutionary document, advocating universal manhood suffrage and greater equality in society. By the end of 1793, over 200,000 copies had been sold throughout the United Kingdom. Radical reform societies, such as the Friends of the People, were established throughout the country, while sporadic political rioting occurred in a number of towns in Eastern Scotland.

In the face of such events, the propertied classes closed ranks and rallied in defence of the constitution.²¹ By 1796, the radical threat had virtually vanished. Government repression, the impact of the French Revolutionary Wars and inadequate radical leadership combined to undermine radical chances of success. Nonetheless, a further threat re-emerged in the late 1790s in the form of the radical movement known as the United Scotsmen. It was a revolutionary movement committed to annual parliaments, universal suffrage and lawful right of resistance against an arbitrary state. However, it never posed a real danger to the social order, attracting, at most, only a few thousand members. By the early nineteenth century, the movement had effectively broken-up.

Nonetheless, it was, along with the radicalism of the early 1790s, an important milestone in how many of the ruling elite began to look at the forces of order throughout the country. Military and auxiliary forces were strengthened in this decade. In 1793, fencible regiments were raised to defend the country from invasion during the French Revolutionary Wars.²² A year later, lord lieutenants were introduced to raise volunteer corps. Significantly, the corps were intended not only as a home defence against invasion, but also as a para-military police force for, in the words of Henry Dundas, Government representative in Scotland, 'the preservation of internal tranquility...' against internal disorder and insurrection.²³ The Duke of Portland highlighted this

1797, noting that 'the maintenance of the internal peace of the country and the support of the civil authority, was the leading principle of their institution, and the consideration which influenced Government to approve and countenance it.'²⁴ Permanent barracks were also erected in the major towns, including Glasgow. Perhaps most important of all, the Militia Act was introduced in Scotland in 1797. It recruited by compulsory ballot 6,000 men throughout the country. Although like the fencible regiments, the militia was primarily designed to increase national defence during the conflict with France, it was also perceived as an important tool for quashing internal disorder. It was popular with the authorities because those on standby could be put on active duty and mobilised quickly.

However, in Glasgow, the most significant factor in the realisation that a new form of riot control was needed was not this hostile political background, but rather the social and economic consequences of industrialisation. Economic growth in the second half of the eighteenth century brought changes in social relationships and work practice. To cater for a wider market, industrial productivity began to be organised more along capitalist lines, bringing increasing division of labour and new employment patterns.²⁵ Old relationships between masters and men in the traditional trades disintegrated rapidly. Employees could no longer aspire to advance from apprentices to journeymen to independent masters. The majority were destined to remain full-time wage earners at a time when, in response to the challenge of overseas competition, employers were setting wages according to commercial demands rather than traditional rates. Increasingly, there appeared to be a separation of interests between employer and employees. To defend workers' interests, journeymen's societies were established, posing new challenges to those in authority.

The Glasgow weavers' strike in 1787 illustrated clearly that old forms of social and employment relations no longer applied to the new industrial age.²⁶ Rising food prices and falling wages resulted in workers downing tools throughout the city. An unprecedented gathering of 7,000 weavers and their families agreed not to take employment at new, reduced prices being offered by employers. The standoff went on for weeks, with weavers holding out for magistrates to intervene and fix wage levels. Such a practice was not uncommon in Scotland. It was legal for tradesmen to petition either their trade incorporation or burgh magistrates to regulate wages. This was perceived to be a useful mechanism for preventing direct confrontation between employees and employers.²⁷ However, the manufacturers in Glasgow in the 1787 weavers' dispute were self-made men with no tradition of artisan culture and they were not prepared to abandon their free market principles. No legal redress was sought and the dispute became increasingly bitter. Webs were forcibly removed from looms and strikebreakers manhandled. The situation came to a head with a violent confrontation between a crowd of

weavers and burghal authorities and troops. After a period of prolonged fighting, six of the crowd were killed.

The turmoil of 1787 had a profound impact on the civic elite. As one scholar has pointed out, the outcome was regarded as a victory over violent protest, whereas in the past the resort to such forceful measures would have been perceived as being a failure by the authorities.²⁸ Underlying this reorientation in opinion was a change in the nature and structure of paternal relations in which the crowd operated. Although one scholar suggests contemporary attitudes towards disorder and paternalism had changed long before the late eighteenth century, most historians accept that riot remained as an integral part of the 'moral economy' based on common understanding for most of this century.²⁹ Popular protest was widely accepted as being a legitimate way for the lower orders to express grievances and remind the ruling classes of their paternal responsibilities. Significantly, it was not perceived as a threat to the social order. Such concessions had to be made by the authorities because of the limited forces of order that existed in the country before the 1790s.³⁰ Stability depended on mutual acceptance of each other's rights, which meant both deference and paternal responsibility.

However, by the late eighteenth century a growing acceptance of capitalist ideas challenged such paternalistic arrangements.³¹ Influenced by the free market economics of Adam Smith, landowners and employers became increasingly critical of traditional interventionist practices. The industrial street disturbances in Glasgow in 1787 were the first tangible sign that paternalistic relationships were being eroded. Although the ruling elite in Scotland were at times still prepared to intervene to relieve social distress and unrest, it was becoming less frequent and less likely.³² Wage fixing was giving way to market forces.

The events of 1787 illustrated that the 'moral economy' of the eighteenth century was being slowly surpassed by a capitalist, wage-labouring economy in which riot had no place. Disorder was now viewed as a threat to the social order and not as a legitimate expression. In conjunction with the spread of market forces, urbanisation had widened the gulf between the social classes and altered traditional forms of social management. Paternalistic social networks based on common understanding were eroded. Rioters were no longer recognisable members of the community who could be negotiated with and managed. They were distant, threatening and increasingly willing to revert to violence.³³

After 1787, riots in Glasgow were viewed, in the words of the *Glasgow Mercury*, as '...seditious insurrections and tumults...' that were to be broken-up by force.³⁴ To prevent them reoccurring, the authorities sought social control rather than negotiation. Voluntary societies were established and, significantly, calls were made for a police force.³⁵ A year later, the police institution outlined above had been established, whose officers were '...to assist in suppressing all riots, mobs and squabbles on the streets....'³⁶

There was nothing novel in this link between disorder and calls for reform. In conjunction with fears of increasing lawlessness, the issue of public disorder and its implications for private property had compelled the civic elite to reappraise their policing arrangements throughout the late eighteenth century.³⁷ As Gallacher has pointed out, the first discussion on policing in city took place in 1779 after a riot.³⁸ An anti-Catholic disturbance in 1779 protesting against the Government's Catholic Relief Bill was followed by a Council investigation and the subsequent appointment of an Inspector of Police. Moreover, as the same author also points out, a food riot in the city occurred as the 1800 Glasgow Police Act was being debated in Parliament – a fact that may well have encouraged its smooth passage.³⁹ This followed widespread rioting throughout the country in 1797 protesting against the introduction of the militia.

However, as significant as the increased threat of riot and disorder was to hardening attitudes in favour of police reform, it, too, should not be overplayed. The appointment of police officers in 1779 and 1788 may have followed riots in the city, but it is too simplistic to link the two on that ground alone. As the Council minutes illustrate, disorder was not the underlying driving force behind these experiments.⁴⁰ As will be shown below, the experiments in these years were motivated more by pragmatic concerns. Nor should this come as any great surprise. The handful of officers who were appointed in these years were not designed to control riots and were not capable of doing so. Moreover, it was not until twenty-three years after the anti-Catholic riot, and thirteen years after the weavers' strike, that Glasgow obtained its first police act. Clearly, the threat of disorder was not so great as to convince the civic elite and middle class of the need to put aside their personal differences.

To understand fully the underlying reasons behind reform in the late eighteenth century it is important to distinguish between the appointment of police officers in 1779 and 1788 and the attempts to introduce watching provisions in police bills. The motivation behind both was not the same. The threat of riot and disorder had a far greater impact on calls for a watch force than it did a handful of police officers. Even then, it would be wrong to see the introduction of watching provisions as being simply a knee-jerk response to riot. Attempts were made to introduce such provisions long before the weavers' strike of 1788. In 1783, a police bill proposed appointing between twenty-five and forty '...proper and fit persons to watch the streets in the city of Glasgow, in the night time, and to prevent irregularity, disorders and disturbances from being committed thereon, by which mode the peace and quite of the city will be established and the lives and properties of the inhabitants protected.'⁴¹ The need for a watch force reflected more a growing need to deal with everyday matters of minor disturbances and public order offences than violent unrest.

Nor should this come as a surprise. Dealing with the threat of serious disorder in the late eighteenth century was still very much associated with traditional forms of control. Although the

moral economy was slowly being eroded, many paternal practices lingered on. As was indicated above, the authorities were, in many cases, still prepared to intervene to relieve distress and possible unrest. In 1799, Lanarkshire JPs sanctioned wage increases to wrights, arguing that 'owing to the present general scarcity and extreme price of necessities of life they find it impossible with the utmost industry and economy to provide for themselves and their families.'⁴² In other words, the first line of defence against possible political or industrial unrest remained paternalism. If this failed, the next line in defence were military and volunteer forces, not the police. Of course, as Chapter 3 showed, the authorities were often reluctant to use such means on the grounds of expense, reliability and flexibility. But they were still prepared to do so, as the introduction of the militia and the strengthening of auxiliary forces in the 1790s clearly illustrated. Calls for the police to replace the military as the front-line of defence against violent disorder were still a long way off.

III

Pressures for Reform – Middle-Class Apathy and a Growing Demand for Professionalism

A growing reluctance on the part of the propertied class to voluntarily serve the community combined with a realisation that full-time, paid officials were needed to meet the demands of a rapidly expanding urban environment underlay all attempts to improve law and order arrangements in the late eighteenth century. Police officers were introduced in 1779 and 1788 precisely in response to these pressures. As councillors, in introducing the small group of officers in 1788, noted:

...having also considered vast multiplicity of business which falls under the magistrates department, occasioned by the increase of the inhabitants of this city, and that by the *close* attendance and attention which the magistrates are obliged to give in hearing and determining pleas and disputes which are daily brought before them, and in managing the revenues of the city and other matters attending the execution of their offices, it has of late years been found not only difficult to get respectable citizens to accept the office of magistracy, but also that those in that office cannot give that *close* attention to the police of the city for the detection of persons guilty of crimes and offences therein as is requisite. For remedying whereof, and to the end the magistrates may be in some measure relieved of part of the labour and toill arising from the duties of their office, the magistrates and council did and hereby do find it absolutely necessary to nominate and appoint a fit and proper person to be intendant or inspector of police of the city...⁴³

A similar rationale partly underlay the establishment of the watch force. To a large extent, the watch was little more of an enforced substitute to the growing unsuitability and inadequacies of traditional law and order arrangements. From at least 1664, Glasgow depended on her burghers to keep watch and ward along with a few town officers.⁴⁴ Each head of household was required to attend in turn, or arrange a substitute, to perform guard duty. However, the perceived increase in crime and disorder combined with population growth and a growing reluctance of the city's burghess class to perform their duty exposed this primitive system. According to contemporary reports, many householders either shirked responsibility or paid substitutes who, for whatever reason, were not deemed worthy. Although this can not be proved or disproved from the limited historical data that exists, it was widely believed this resulted in the night watch's position being occupied by men who were unsuitable for the task. As John Strang pointed out, respectable citizens in Glasgow

...either hired porters, or sent their manufacturing servants to perform the work, while occasionally a set of young madcaps ostensibly undertook the duty, but, instead of attempting to allay noise and turbulence, secretly instigated commotion for the sake of diversion. In these circumstances, it may easily be conceived that thieves, vagabonds, and blackguards had their full swing, while, beneath the safeguard of an ill-lighted and frequently a lamp-demolished town, offences of the most heinous kind were safely committed.⁴⁵

By the late eighteenth century, it was believed that law and order arrangements had fallen into disrepair. As in England, those who sought reform portrayed the increasing deployment of substitutes as evidence of an outdated, bankrupt system.⁴⁶ Whether this is true is impossible to determine from the limited records that exist. As in England, a hardening of attitudes towards crime combined with changing expectations about what existing provisions were intended to deliver may have distorted fears of growing lawlessness and the inadequacies of existing arrangements. What is clear, however, is that contemporaries in Glasgow believed there was a growing problem to be tackled. In 1790, it was decided that householders with an annual rent of L.3 or above be eligible for civic guard duty. Although records on this are far from conclusive, this may well have been the first attempt to incorporate the non-burghess into the civic guard. The numbers eligible for guard duty in 1790 (thirty) were similar to the traditional arrangements (thirty-six) according to Rait's numbers on the old civic guard in 1788, which perhaps indicates that the stimulus for the proposal was the abandonment by the burghess class of their civic duty.⁴⁷ John Strang certainly gives this impression, noting that: 'Down to the close of the last century [the eighteenth], watching and warding was, in accordance with the Burgess Oath, an obligation laid upon all who had obtained municipal privileges; but the mode practiced by the burgesses to evade the duty was, of itself, sufficient to render the whole even

worse than a farce.’⁴⁸ An advertisement in the *Glasgow Herald* outlined the new watching arrangements.

The Lord Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow, in order the more effectually to protect the persons and property of the Citizens, find it necessary and expedient to establish a NIGHT GUARD and PATROL, composed of the Citizens, in order to watch and guard the streets, and for the purpose, Do hereby ORDER and REQUIRE all male householders, Citizens and Inhabitants of Glasgow, under the age of sixty, and above eighteen, whose yearly rents are L.3 sterling or above, in rotation, to the number of thirty, every night as they shall be warned by an officer two days before mounting guard, to repair to the Laigh Council Chamber at ten o'clock at night, and to continue on guard and patrol till next morning, subject to such orders as shall be given by the Magistrates. Such as cannot, or do not chuse to attend must send to the sitting Magistrate two shillings and sixpence sterling each, the day after being warned, that the Magistrate may provide a proper substitute; and in default thereof each absentee will be fined in five shillings sterling. No substitute provided by the person warned will be accepted of.

As an institution of this kind has become necessary, from the great extent and populous of the City, it is expected by the Magistrates, that the Citizens will pay a ready obedience in discharge of a duty and service so essential and conducive to public safety.⁴⁹

This, however, seemed to have little effect. According to contemporary reports, many householders continued to shirk their responsibility. Indeed, it was widely believed ‘...that a large part of the guard very soon came to consist of these substitutes, permanently employed.’⁵⁰ What was needed was a reliable and permanent force to relieve the inhabitants of their patriarchal obligations and provide a more effective safeguard against crime and disorder. And given that this requirement was shaped more by the growing inadequacies of existing arrangements than radical thinking on policing, it was always likely to be as near to the world of the eighteenth-century watch force as the nineteenth-century police.

IV

Pressures for Reform – Urban Growth and Ideological Opinion

As significant as the above concerns were, they provided the impetus only for watching provisions. In reality, the driving force behind the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 stemmed as much, if not more, from concern about the deteriorating state of the urban environment as it did from law and order. As its provisions illustrated, a principal aim of the statute was to introduce and regulate public amenity provisions to safeguard the urban fabric. The majority of the act’s

clauses related to the environmental aspect of police, such as lighting, paving and cleansing. Watching provisions were few and far between. Indeed, it is very likely that in its formative years the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 made a greater contribution to the smooth running of the city than it did for law and order.

Under its provisions, street cleaning and the removal of filth became a statutory public duty, with both proprietors and watchmen having responsibilities concerning the cleansing of closes and streets.⁵¹ The latter were employed in this capacity twice a week, for two hours, until 1804, when a scavenging force was appointed. By 1847, the cleansing department employed 150 men at a cost of L5,600.⁵² Provisions were made for the construction of public sewers. By 1832, drainage stretched for seven miles. The act also made it obligatory for property owners to pave facing footpaths. This regulation was still in force in the early twentieth century. Furthermore, by 1807, a fire service had been set-up, which, by 1826, had five fire engines. Perhaps most important of all, the lighting of public streets became a statutory duty. It was this area that absorbed most of the energies of commissioners and, to a large extent, watchmen in the Commission's formative years. By 1805, 1,069 public lamps had been erected. By 1847, this had risen to 5,500.⁵³ Inevitably, there remained ideological and financial limitations to the Commission's achievements in municipal and sanitary reform.⁵⁴ But there is little doubt the Police Board's innovations helped create an important array of public services for the expanding urban environment.⁵⁵

Such services were increasingly needed in the face of rapid urban growth and a growing sense of civic consciousness. Before 1800, public services were at best rudimentary and at worst non-existent. There was limited lighting and paving, no effective mechanism for street cleaning, no full-time fire service and until 1790 no covered sewers. The civic elite in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had, in response to urban growth and expanding business opportunities, attempted to provide a better and safer environment. Municipal efforts aimed at promoting the 'common good' included purchasing the city's first fire engine; assuming responsibility for regulating redevelopment; controlling noxious trades such as slaughtering; building new reservoirs to ensure the supply of fresh water; and establishing a large wash house to safeguard hygiene.⁵⁶ However, these measures were overwhelmed by urban growth. From the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, Scotland went from being one of the least urbanised countries in Western Europe to one of the most. Although recent research has suggested that the rate of urbanisation in Scotland in the first half of the eighteenth century was greater and more significant than had been previously thought, it paled in comparison with 'take-off' after 1760.⁵⁷ From this date until 1830, Scotland had the fastest rate of urban growth in Western Europe. It went from seventh to second in the table of 'urbanised' societies in this region between 1750 and 1850. Whereas in the middle of the eighteenth century, less than 10%

of the country's population resided in towns of 10,000 or more inhabitants, by 1850, almost one-third did – higher than the whole of industrial mainland Europe. Only England and Wales could compare with the Scottish experience.⁵⁸

Glasgow bore a large brunt of this growth. Between 1750 and 1830, the city's society and economy were revolutionised, as Glasgow became an important centre in international trade and industry. The number of Glaswegians increased rapidly. Between 1755 and 1821, the population of the city and suburbs increased fourfold from 31,700 to 147,000. In the early nineteenth century, Glasgow's population was rising at a faster rate than any other town of its size in Western Europe as more and more migrants from the Highlands, rural lowlands and Ireland flocked to the city in search of work.⁵⁹ Urban deterioration was inevitable in the face of such rapid and relentless growth.

A central principle of the 1800 Glasgow Police Act was that citizens show a greater sense of public responsibility to prevent further urban decay.⁶⁰ Underlying such a view was the concept of 'civic duty'. The intellectual roots of this concept stemmed from the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment – a term used to describe an era of unrivalled intellectual inquiry in the fields of philosophy, history, science, law and medicine by scholars such as David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson and James Hutton. This movement affected all aspects of everyday behaviour. Enlightened thinkers emphasised reason and rationale thought rather than religious indoctrination as being the basis for advancing human understanding. In doing so, they argued that the human and the natural world could be altered for the better by the discovery of knowledge and reasoning.⁶¹

A central part of this new thinking was the ethic of rational 'improvement' – namely, the realisation that the world could be advanced by planned intervention and human effort.⁶² It was widely thought that individuals were now able to shape and manage their environment to a far greater degree than ever before. In order to do this, citizens had a civic duty to help improve the environment in which they lived. Influential enlightened figures such as Adam Ferguson were at the forefront in arguing that the active participation of all citizens in public life was essential to the betterment of both community and individual.⁶³ By the 1770s, the concept of 'civic humanism' – which stressed the responsibilities of all citizens, but essentially the elite, to create a better and more civilised society – had gained widespread currency in the circles of the propertied class.⁶⁴

These enlightened values combined with urban pressures helped fashion new ideas on how best to manage city life. From the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there emerged in Scottish burghs a growing sense of civic consciousness.⁶⁵ A growing concern with escalating social problems combined with a growing desire to install a sense of civic pride and identity helped stimulate municipal enterprises throughout the country, as the 1800 Glasgow

Police Act clearly illustrated. Indeed, by requiring householders to perform and pay for public duties, the city's first police act recognised that collective responsibility of citizens was central to the physical regeneration of the urban fabric.⁶⁶

Moreover, the emergence of evangelicalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries added a spiritual as well as an intellectual and physical dimension to calls to improve the environment. Its revival in the late eighteenth century was essentially a middle-class response to the problems posed by urban society.⁶⁷ Evangelicals sought to combat growing immorality and urban degeneration through active personal commitment. The civic elite, the majority of whom were evangelicals, applied a vigorous religious policy to urban improvement.⁶⁸ Social policy, in particular, was influenced greatly by Evangelical values of moral exhortation and spiritual welfare. Although far from being united on issues of state intervention, leading Evangelicals, such as the Reverend Stevenson MacGill, were extremely active in promoting social reform and civic improvement, with emphasis on improving both the individual and the environment. Stevenson MacGill, although often at the odds with other Evangelicals, expanded on the legacy of the Enlightenment by arguing that the environment had to be improved before the individual could flourish to the betterment of the community.⁶⁹ Health and sanitary reform was, therefore, portrayed as an essential prerequisite to the improvement of the morality of society. As one scholar has argued, it was in this way that the civic elite '...zealously embraced the Evangelical solution to society's ills....'⁷⁰

Changing Attitudes and Economic, Social and Political Pressures

I

Attitudes to Police in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries

Attitudes to police in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries went a long way in ensuring that the Glasgow watch force would take the rather rudimentary form that it did. There was little support in Glasgow for the concept of a strong, regulatory criminal police. Ratepayers simply would not finance such a system. As Part IV will show in more detail, opposition to compulsory taxation was widespread throughout Scotland in this era. Although it was most evident in the preaching of leading evangelicals such as the Reverend Thomas Chalmers on the financing of poor relief, it also permeated policing affairs, not least because of a reluctance among citizens to concede more money to an unaccountable municipal authority. Although the struggle to establish an accountable system was successful, it was, as Part III will demonstrate, on the premise that taxation would not rise above a certain level.

Moreover, there was concern that anything but a rudimentary watch force would infringe upon the liberty of Glasgow's citizens. A letter to the *Glasgow Herald* in 1805 illustrated this, referring to the '...repugnance of our free country to a rigid system of police....'¹

Such a view, however, played nowhere near as significant a part in the reform struggle in Glasgow as it did in England. In the latter, the espionage, censorship and repression associated with the police in eighteenth-century France, Spain and Italy convinced many contemporaries that an effective policing system was incompatible with freedom. Such a view hindered the establishment of a centralised policing system in London for nearly half a century. As the 1822 'Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis' pointed out:

It is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police with the perfect freedom of action and exemption from interference, which are the real privileges and blessings of society in this country; and your Committee think the forfeiture or curtailment of such advantages would be too great a sacrifice for improvement in police, or the facilities in detection of crime, however desirable in themselves if abstractedly considered.²

In Glasgow, familiarity with the 'police' concept and its meaning combined with the nature of the law and order provisions that were proposed in the 1800 Act went a long way in

reducing hostility to the idea of ‘police’ per se. One of the few times that the issue of liberty was raised at magisterial level was in response to a policing proposal, advanced by the city’s heritors and burgess in 1790, calling for a police system and the election of ward superintendents. As Part III will show, magistrates opposed the plan, arguing that granting powers of arrest to ward superintendents would be ‘...of most dangerous consequence to the liberty of citizens...[as it would create]...forty-eight new magistrates with a jurisdiction equal if not superior to the Magistrates.’³ In essence, what they were opposing was the threat that police reform on this accountable model would pose to their own liberties rather than the liberties of citizens.

Nonetheless, it is likely that citizens would have opposed the establishment of a criminal police with extensive regulatory powers had it been proposed. The appointment of a Police Intendant and a handful of officers in 1788 was condemned in an anonymous satirical poem in 1789:

A dying Goose gave me a pen,
 And bade me warn my fellow men:
 “That tho’ oppression’s always curst,
 “Still that from equals is the worst.”
 Then let us join with heart and hand,
 To drive oppressors from our land;
 Nor like the wretched simple Geese,
 Give up our freedom to Police.⁴

Particular resentment centred on the impact the police were having on the street economy:

This magazine being crowded
 Upon a market day,
 When some landwent Geese intruded
 And so produced a fray.
 The Council in a passion swore
 To the poor simple Geese
 That they must yield their hoarded store
 To a Master of Police.⁵

Even in middle-class circles throughout Britain concern was expressed about having too strong a police. Contemporary opinion in the late eighteenth century believed that an imperfect policing system that did not threaten civil liberties was to be preferred to an effective one that did. As influential eighteenth-century thinker William Blackstone noted, such imperfections are a price that ‘...all free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters.’⁶ This

liberal doctrine of state and criminal jurisprudence, as it came to be known in the writings of Blackstone, Adam Smith and William Paley, argued to great effect that the freedom of the individual outweighed any benefits that an improved police with increased powers might bring.⁷

Scepticism that benefits would actually come from such a policing system added weight to this theory. As Adam Smith, in the eighteenth century, argued: ‘in cities where there is more police and the greatest number of regulations concerning it, there is not always the greatest security.’⁸ Indeed, his contention that unpoliced-eighteenth-century London was less crime-ridden than the strongly policed Paris convinced him that ‘the more police there is the less security.’⁹ According to Smith, it was an improved economy and not police that was central to the reduction of crime:

It is not so much the police that prevents the commission of crimes as having as few persons as possible to live upon others. Nothing tends to corrupt mankind as dependency, while independency still increases the honesty of people. The establishment of commerce and manufactures, which brings about this independency, is the best police for preventing crimes. The common people have better wages in this way than in any other, and in consequence of this a general probity of manners takes place through the whole country. Nobody will be so mad as to expose himself upon the highway, when he can make better bread in an honest and industrious manner.¹⁰

Smith’s link between economic hardship and crime was rejected by most in the nineteenth century as contemporaries came to view crime as a product more of character failing. But there remained a strong belief that policing was not the best way of exercising a degree of control over the lower orders. The breakdown in traditional mechanisms of social authority that accompanied urbanisation convinced contemporaries of this. In an era of growing immorality, falling church attendance and declining paternal control, it was perceived that only a reformation in working-class morality and a reimposition of paternal supervision could safeguard the interests of the propertied class. As one writer has noted, in a world ‘...lacking in formative regulation and moral authority – a world deficient in...ideological community – only the reimposition of a system of common morality could restore [or ensure] social order.’¹¹ Few believed the police could do this. As a Police Select Committee Report in 1818 argued, the best police rested ‘above all, in the moral habits and opinions of the people.’¹² The perception that criminal activity in the first half of the nineteenth century was predominantly a product of character defect – and not as research has shown economic hardship – added substance to the view that the causes of crime could be tackled best through moral rather than police reform.¹³ Consequently, restoring close personal contact and supervision to stem the tide of irreligion, improvidence and indiscipline became the prime objective in early-nineteenth-century Glasgow,

as improving the character of the masses took on greater significance than developing the city's police.

The development of philanthropic voluntary organisations in the city illustrated this. At a time when complaints were made about the cost of police, vast resources were channelled into voluntary societies as an alternative form of supervising and controlling the lower orders.¹⁴ Influenced by a combination of humanitarian concern, heightened anxiety and similar developments in other major British towns, these organisations addressed a wide range of issues associated with the health, religious instruction and poverty of the working class. Significantly, few organisations advocated strong methods of law enforcement. As one historian stated: 'the Glasgow Temperance Movement in the years up to 1850 was essentially concerned with the desire to bring voluntary moral reform to the working classes – rather than reform through policing and more stringent licensing laws....'¹⁵

This 'diversion into moral regeneration' saw private philanthropic organisations acting as 'missionary police' in the war against vice, immorality and Sabbath profanation, in what one historian has called the '...hallowed tradition of citizen self-policing.'¹⁶ Concerns such as prostitution, delinquency and theft from the workplace were addressed by organisations like the 'Magdalene Asylum', the 'Glasgow Society for the Encouragement of Penitents' and the 'Detecting Society' as the middle class initiated and dealt with problems that were later to become the focus of extensive police campaigns. Indeed, police resources were often utilised in a mere supportive role to such organisations as social policing, expounding values of moral exhortation and self-help, was promoted in favour of more rigorous preventive policing.¹⁷ A letter to the *Glasgow Herald* in 1805 illustrated clearly the priority of the middle class:

...very often the protection of property from the depredation and suppression of immoralities, instead of being entrusted to the vigilance of the Magistracy [the legal guardians of the police], are undertaken by local voluntary associations.¹⁸

II

Economic and Social Pressures

The above attitudes to policing were increasingly challenged as the nineteenth century progressed. Slowly, but surely, there was a growing realisation among the civic elite of the need for a more effective policing system. The traumatic events of the post-Napoleonic period, in particular, were to have a significant impact on middle-class psyche and calls to reform the police. Allied to a general desire for greater professionalism, the economic, social and political tensions of these years were to prove instrumental in changing contemporary attitudes to

policing and its function. As will be shown in Chapter 7, they helped transform the relatively rudimentary force that had hitherto existed into probably the most innovative and professional law enforcement establishment on mainland Britain in the early 1820s.

The post-Napoleonic years brought with them a perceived increase in crime.¹⁹ Reference was made among police commissioners to ‘...increasing mass of vice and profligacy....’ among the urban masses.²⁰ By 1817, the Board had recommended ‘...the appointment of a specialist criminal officer who would have no other duties but the detection of crime.’²¹ By 1819, they were complaining that ‘...this city has continued to increase every year with so much rapidity and perhaps the profligacy and delinquency in a much greater proportion.’²² A year later, they noted that ‘thieves, rogues, vagabonds and depredators of every description had...[grown]...to an alarming extent.’²³

The recorded national committals for trial seemed justify this view. In Scotland in 1805, 89 criminals were committed for serious offences; by 1842, the figure had risen to 3,884. During this period the population of the country increased by 50 per cent. In other words, the recorded rate of serious crimes outstripped the rate of population growth twenty-five times over, according to figures published by Archibald Alison. (Alison does not say, but it is likely that the figures refer only to males.)²⁴ In England, the increase in serious committals for trial was not as great, although it was equally alarming. Between 1805 and 1845, the recorded rate of male committals to trial for indictable offences in England and Wales increased nearly six-fold, from 4,605 to 24,303, during a period when the population increased by only 80 per cent.²⁵

To contemporaries, this was the inevitable result of rapid urbanisation and economic growth. For some, the growing prosperity brought by industrialisation was a natural inducement to criminality. As Frederick Hill noted in 1850: ‘there cannot, of course, be an increase in wealth in the country without an increase, other things being equal, in the temptations to crime.’²⁶ For others, it was the accompanied effect of urbanisation, such as population growth, irreligion and the breakdown in traditional social relations, that was at root of the problem. Archibald Alison was one such exponent, noting in 1844 that ‘...the vast preponderance of crime is to be found in the manufacturing or densely-populated districts.’²⁷

However, whether crime really was on the increase is debatable. In Scotland, the criminal returns were grossly distorted. As Alison points out, records were not kept with any accuracy until around 1820. Prior to this, criminal returns were rarely recorded.²⁸ In England, meanwhile, it is likely that a hardening attitude towards crime, its prosecution and punishment artificially inflated the returns. As Chapter 3 showed, the growing willingness of victims to prosecute, combined with administrative and legal reforms that made it easier and cheaper for criminals to be brought to justice, narrowed the gap between unreported and reported crime.²⁹ Moreover, the annual publication of criminal statistics from 1805 onwards made crime more

visible, fuelling anxiety of growing social breakdown and encouraging further prosecutions.³⁰ As Edwin Chadwick pointed out, 'more crime is prosecuted and exposed to the public view; not more committed.'³¹

However, whether or not crime had increased was less important than the contemporary perception that it had.³² With more wealth and property, the urban middle class throughout Britain had more to lose from growing criminality than ever before, not least as 80 per cent of all recorded serious crime was against property.³³ Increasingly, crime was perceived as a threat not only to property and possessions, but also the social order. The increased expectation of security this brought may well have influenced the reform of the police in Glasgow from the 1820s.³⁴

However, there is scant evidence that it did to any great degree. The above references aside, crime rarely featured in the minutes of police commissioners. Commissioners rarely mentioned it, or, perhaps more significantly, the need for police reform to tackle it. Moreover, any at other periods, commissioners believed crime to be decreasing. As Commissioner McTyler in 1828 noted: 'It was really pleasant to see our citizens on their days of amusement walk our streets freed from the fry of pickpockets that used to infest them....'³⁵ Far more significant in changing contemporary opinion towards the police was the economic, social and political unrest of the post-war period that culminated in the 'Radical War' in 1820.

Underlying this unrest was the impact of industrialisation. Industrial and urban growth resulted in mounting economic and social problems for many workers. The transition from the moral to the market economy had forced many workers to unionise in an attempt to safeguard pay, conditions and living standards. However, wages and employment opportunities deteriorated markedly in many sectors. By the 1830s, handloom weavers were earning less than a third of what they had earned during the Napoleonic Wars.³⁶ Urban economies simply could not cope with the rapid rate of population growth. They did not have the capacity to absorb all migrants in regular work. In Glasgow, the outcome was a build up of a large labour surplus, increasing unemployment and widespread suffering.³⁷

Yet, ironically, as one scholar has pointed out, it was precisely at this time that the authorities and employers abandoned the traditional paternalistic practices that had proved so important in diffusing social disorder in the late eighteenth century.³⁸ Poor law provision, an important safety valve against unrest in the eighteenth century, became increasingly stringent. In the depression hit post-Napoleonic period, the level raised in poor rates for Glasgow fell from L.17,052 in 1815 to L.11,413 in 1822.³⁹ Influenced by the Malthus's *Essay on Population* (second edition published in 1803), compulsory poor relief was criticised for encouraging dependency and thus further poverty. The strongest advocate of this view in Glasgow was the influential evangelical preacher the Reverend Thomas Chalmers. He argued that poor relief should be based on voluntary donation and not compulsory assessment, as only by maintaining

the altruistic Christian bond between giver and receiver would social stability between the classes be preserved. However, in reality it had the reverse effect. Advocating a more stringent system of poor relief during, what was for many, a period of acute economic and social misery only added to the social tension that accompanied industrialisation.⁴⁰

This was made all the more potent by the ending of one of the most important symbols of the moral economy – wage fixing. In the late eighteenth century, local magistrates and national judges had been willing to fix wages at times of rising prices to alleviate the possibility of social disorder.⁴¹ Their power to do so under Scots Law dated from 1661. However, attempts by Lanarkshire handloom weavers to defend this principle in 1812 met with little success. Their petition to local magistrates and the Sheriff calling for wages to be increased in line with prices failed to produce an agreement. Despite a ruling by the Court of Session that JPs still had the right to regulate wages, manufacturers refused to accept the decision, and the Court was unwilling to enforce it. A prolonged and embittered strike followed with more than 30,000 looms lying idle throughout the country.

At the heart of the dispute was erosion of moral economy in favour of the new economic orthodoxy of the free market. Influenced by the eighteenth-century writings of Adam Smith, business leaders in Scotland were increasingly unwilling to uphold traditional employment patterns that conflicted with free market economics. Since at least the beginning of the nineteenth century they had been calling for an end to interventionism and the introduction of combination laws. Pressure for change was particularly strong in the industrial West of Scotland as the weavers' strike illustrated.⁴²

The dispute was finally resolved after weeks of standoff. Increasing alarm with the scale of protest convinced the sheriffs of Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire to act. The leaders of the handloom weavers' association were arrested and imprisoned for combination, despite the fact that hitherto it had not been formally outlawed. Shortly afterwards, the enactments allowing local justices to regulate wages were repealed. Only employers and the market could now decide rates of pay, significantly weakening unionism in the process.⁴³ The concept of the social economy, which related wages to living costs, had been firmly rejected in favour of the market economy.⁴⁴

This marked a watershed in industrial and paternal relations. As one scholar has pointed out, there were now no means by which the authorities could take ultimate responsibility for local needs.⁴⁵ Denied the opportunity of legal redress, and in the face of mounting economic and social pressures, many workers turned to political radicalism. A relatively peaceful era was to give way to violent protest, with significant implications for policing in the city.⁴⁶

III

Political Radicalism and Changing Attitudes, 1813-20

The revival of political radicalism between 1813 and 1820 heralded a period of embittered class conflict and social disorder. Its reawakening owed much to the deteriorating economic climate faced by many workers and the influence of two English political reformers, William Cobbett and Major John Cartwright. Although the decade from 1813 is widely believed to have led to a rise in living standards, its benefits extended only to those in employment.⁴⁷ Unemployment, however, was widespread as war demand fell off and demobilised soldiers flooded an already congested labour market. Moreover, the benefits for those in work were not shared by all. Many faced acute economic pressure following sharp increases in food prices between 1816-17.⁴⁸ One survey claims that the real wages of handloom weavers more than halved between 1815 and 1818.⁴⁹ Influenced by the weekly publication of Cobbett's the *Political Register* and Cartwright's Scottish tour in 1816, reforming ideas spread among large sections of the Scottish populace, many of whom identified their economic plight with the unreformed political system.⁵⁰

The rise of political sentiment among the masses was evident by a gathering in Glasgow in 1816 at Thrushgrove, which attracted 40,000 people. Among the politically disaffected at this time were sections of the middle class who, like the rest at the meeting, called for a reformist, moderate approach to reform. However, after this failed to make any significant impact, a new, more subversive, radicalism emerged that alienated the middle class. Secret societies were set up, many of which were suspected of holding arms. Fearing that armed force was being plotted to overthrow the Government, repressive action was taken, including the arrest and imprisonment of the radical leadership.

In the immediate years that followed, however, the radical threat exploded. In England, large-scale industrial unrest and popular disturbances at Spa Fields, Manchester and Peterloo, combined with an attempt to assassinate members of the Government in 1820, raised fears about the stability of the social order. In Scotland, industrial unrest and political agitation throughout the post-war years culminated in the notorious 'Radical War' of 1820.⁵¹ In the face of falling earnings, unstable employment, appalling social conditions, and a general deterioration in living standards, a small group of weavers attempted armed revolt against the Government in 1820. The authorities, however, had expected trouble, given the economic and political climate and intelligence passed on from *agents provocateurs*.⁵² After a violent clash with a troop of cavalry, the radical participants were arrested and radical workers excluded from employment.

Although some historians suggest the radicals did not pose a serious threat to the establishment, there is little doubt the events of 1820 had a tremendous impact on middle-class

psyche.⁵³ Almost immediately, property owners united in defence of law and order.⁵⁴ To supplement the weak policing arrangements in and around the city, middle-class volunteer regiments like the 'Glasgow Sharpshooters' were formed to protect life and property, and included volunteers like Peter Mackenzie, who a year earlier had been vociferous in campaigning for political reform.⁵⁵ At the height of unrest, a 1,000 listed as special constables. Indeed, such was the energy showing by the middle class in defending property that newspapers in the city waxed lyrical at their efforts.⁵⁶

The active participation of citizens in the nation's defence had long been perceived as being paramount to stability. But the response to the 'Radical War' illustrated that it was increasingly viewed as depending less on commerce, as advocated by the likes of Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, and more on the courage and virtue of citizens to defend themselves. A sizeable body of middle-class opinion was brought into line with eighteenth-century moderates like Adam Ferguson who argued that

...self-defence is the business of all; and we have already gone too far in the opinion that trade and manufactures are the only requisites in our country. In pursuit of such an idea, we labour to acquire wealth; but neglect the means of defending it.⁵⁷

The death of 11 civilians at Peterloo illustrated the danger of relying of volunteers or troops to do this. Both were also were inflexible and slow to mobilise. As indicated in Chapter 3, there were also doubts concerning the willingness of volunteers to suppress disorder in their own communities.⁵⁸ Moreover, the militia was unpopular. Its introduction in 1797 provoked widespread rioting.⁵⁹ The events of 1820 may have demonstrated that many citizens were prepared to participate to defend property, but the element of compulsory conscription enshrined in the Militia Act was bitterly resented as an infringement of individual liberty by despotic Government.⁶⁰ Enlightened-eighteenth-century thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Hume argued that the individual's right not to bear arms was paramount to civil society. Any attempt to force the individual to take-up arms was viewed as an unconstitutional act by a tyrannous dictator. And, as the anti-militia riots demonstrated, the right of the individual was not something that many Scottish citizens would easily sacrifice in defence of law and order. The labouring class in particular resented the fact that they were compelled to defend the property of the middle and upper classes.

With voluntary societies offering no defence once disorder had broken-out, it became clear that a new form of social management was required to fill the vacuum left by the demise of traditional paternal arrangements and the growing uncertainty over military force. Increasingly,

middle-class opinion in Glasgow, as in England, started to look to the police.⁶¹ The Lord Advocate highlighted this after the 'Radical War' in 1820, arguing that

...in maintaining the peace of the country...[the Government]...must look, in the first place, for aid from the Police of the city and county, and...less on the zealous Magistracy now in court.... I hope and trust that every description of Magistrates in this country and city...will exert themselves in the exercise of a vigorous police; or if they find the present not sufficient, they will give their cordial consent and cooperation to the establishment of a better; that they will set themselves as a wholesome example of morality and religion in their private families.⁶²

Thomas Chalmers echoed similar sentiments. Shortly after the 'Radical War' he argued that effective local government, exercised through the Magistracy as the first line of civil authority, was paramount in preventing the '...slumbering ferocities of man...[breaking]...as before, into open and declared violence'.⁶³ Increasingly, the police were viewed as an integral part in the defence of the social order. Proposals put forward in 1820 for a Head Constable illustrated this. Among his duties, he was

...to watch over the maintenance of the public peace and the designs and attempts of the turbulent and disaffected, [and] to investigate and report the particulars of the more serious depredations⁶⁴

Within a year of the 'Radical War' the civic elite's vision of a reformed, stronger policing system had been realised in the Glasgow Police Act of 1821.

Reform of the Glasgow Police, c.1815-46

I

Reform of the Glasgow Police – Preventive Policing and the ‘Police’ Concept

The 1821 Glasgow Police Act was not introduced in response to the ‘Radical War’ – the tenure of the previous enactment had expired. There is little doubt, however, that the events of the post-war period shaped many of its provisions. Enshrined in the act was the concept of ‘preventive’ policing.¹ Unlike in London, this did not involve attiring policemen in uniform; rather, it involved extending police surveillance of the community to monitor subversive and criminal activity among the working class.² In addition to the twenty-four elected general commissioners, each of the twenty-four police wards in the royalty was to elect two resident commissioners with the authority of constable (these were often referred to as superintendents). All forty-eight resident commissioners were to have a ‘...general superintendence of their respective districts [and] take all measures necessary for preserving the general peace...’³ These included apprehending and pursuing offenders, looking out of unlawful arms and implements, bringing before magistrates those who could not account for themselves, and keeping a close watch on all citizens, vagrants and public houses. To assist in this, periodical checks on the number and names of the populace were to be carried out. Whereas in the past this had been found necessary for enumeration purposes, it was now also done ‘...with a view to the preservation of the peace, the maintenance of good order within the city, and the suppression of disorderly public houses, and the prevention and detection of crimes in general...’⁴ With all previous attempts over the past thirty years to introduce ward commissioners having failed, the provision was a clear illustration that a new style of policing was required to deal with the new challenges posed by industrial society. As Gallacher, in her excellent study of policing in the city points out, the act recognised that maintaining law and order ‘...depended less on being able to mobilise large numbers of troops in time of emergency and rather more on keeping a close watch on the community.’⁵


Provisions, nonetheless, were made for times of emergency. The Police Commission was, for the first time, given additional powers to levy for a ‘...competent court of law...’ in cases of serious disorder.⁶ Henceforth, it was intended that the police no longer be mere bit part players in cases of unrest.

Such measures built on earlier attempts to improve criminal and public order provision in the city. The postwar period was accompanied by a growing realisation of the need for a more effective form of preventive policing. In 1816, police regulations stated that the Master of Police should set ‘...an example to all the servants under him, in endeavouring to prevent the commission of crimes, and in detecting those guilty thereof...’⁷ Two years earlier, recommendations were made to enhance the criminal intelligence network of the force. However, they were not implemented on financial grounds.⁸ By 1816, they had been, which was testimony to the growing anxiety that accompanied the post-war period. ‘...Trusty agents...’ were to ‘...be employed for the purpose of procuring information.’ Persons formerly associated with offenders were to be employed as ‘...a knowledge of them is necessary by the officers.’ Lists of crimes, committals and suspected persons were to be kept, with a close watch given to their residences. And stronger regulations were to be introduced regarding public houses, pawnbrokers and resellers of stolen goods (see below).⁹ This was part of a wider attempt by an increasingly evangelical Police Commission to improve the morality of the city’s urban masses.


Moreover, from 1817, two officers were to ‘...devote their time solely...’ to investigating crime for the first time in the force’s history.¹⁰ This also involved keeping a record of every crime reported in the city and a description of all those arrested.¹¹ By 1821, the Criminal Department numbered six.¹² In reality, detectives were often engaged in administrative duties rather than criminal investigations, although their presence illustrated the changing priority of police.¹³ This reorientation in policy was clearly highlighted in 1816 by the manner in which commissioners chose to finance the earlier recommendations on criminal policing – every police department was to contribute, including lighting, cleansing and fire.¹⁴ Significantly, the next few years saw a reduction both in the role and number of town officers in criminal affairs.¹⁵

Increasingly, resources were channelled into the watching police. As Figure 7.1 shows, the percentage of police expenditure on watching rose from 49% to 62% between 1810-11 and 1840-1 (see also Appendix 1). During the same period, the ratio of population to police – when resident commissioners are included – fell from 649 to 1 to 412 to 1. When resident commissioners are excluded, the ratio is 522 to 1 – still a significant reduction from 1811. (This was largely due to the employment of supernumeraries. See Figure 7.2.) This was remarkable, given that Glasgow was one of those cities that was increasing, according to one scholar, ‘...at rates that would bring cold sweat to the brows of twentieth-century housing committees.’¹⁶ The number of officers increased markedly, from seven in 1801, to fifteen in 1811, to twenty-nine in 1821, to forty-nine in 1831 and to seventy-six in 1841.¹⁷ By this last date, the day force (excluding ward commissioners) composed of forty-six officers – in stark contrast to the pair who patrolled the streets at the start of the century.

Figure 7.1 Percentage of Police Expenditure, 1810-1841



**Figure 7.2 Ratio of Population to Police including
Ward Commissioners, 1801-41**



By contrast, cutbacks were made to the environmental police as commissioners chose to pursue crime and public order at the expense and to the detriment of public health and the urban environment.¹⁸ Between 1810-11 and 1840-41, the percentage of police expenditure on lighting and cleansing fell by 15% – lighting from 30% to 21% and cleansing from 18% to 12% (see Figure 7.1). Moreover, whereas environmental misdemeanors had featured prominently in police court books in the force's formative years, by 1822 only 3.2% of police summonses concerned issues such as dirty closes and streets.¹⁹ The remainder dealt with assaults, begging, larceny, prostitution and the profanation of the Sabbath. Commissioners were particularly keen to keep the streets clear of drunks. In 1829, 80% of arrests were for drunkenness and disorderly behaviour.²⁰

In the face of a perceived growth in disorder and immorality, sanitising the moral rather than urban environment had come to assume greater importance among evangelical minded police commissioners.²¹ As one scholar has noted, 'it was not so much the physical health of the community which was seen to be in danger (except during serious epidemics) but rather its social order, hierarchy, morality and religion.'²² Slowly, but surely, the term 'police' assumed its specialist association with law and order.²³ The Chief Constable of Glasgow confirmed this at the first Government inquiry into Scottish policing in 1853 when he referred to police as being essentially '...detective and preventive...' with lighting, cleansing and fire-engines being referred to separately.²⁴ Environmental duties continued to be housed under the umbrella of the Police Commission as it was convenient for policing issues to be managed and rated by a single authority. But, significantly, these had either developed into separate entities, each with their own department distinct from the watching police, or were 'social work' duties, such as inspecting weights and measures, which were being performed by police forces throughout Britain.²⁵ No longer were watchmen employed as scavengers or lamplighters. These duties were last performed in 1804 and 1817 respectively. Law and order was now their priority.

II

Reform of the Glasgow Police – Police Policy towards Popular Culture

Law and order in the post-Napoleonic period meant more than simply preventing and detecting crime. It also included regulating a range of popular pastimes, many of which had been traditionally sanctioned or tolerated by the authorities. Commissioners in Glasgow enthusiastically embraced this role. They increasingly acted as guardians of public morality as the first half of the century progressed. The Police Commission in effect became a vehicle for

exercising moral discipline, embracing a range of issues traditionally confined to voluntary societies and public bodies.²⁶ The intention was to re-shape popular culture.²⁷

Drunkenness was of particular concern. As well as being an affront to civil society, it was widely believed to be a source of criminality. As Sheriff Alison noted: 'In Scotland it may safely be affirmed that four-fifths, probably seven-eighths, of the crimes committed originate in the effects of, or the desire for, whisky.'²⁸ Pubs were singled out as being breeding grounds of lawlessness and immorality. As Superintendent Miller noted in 1840:

The lower class of public houses are frequented by persons of the most worthless description, and in these place of scenes of brutal dissipation are constantly going on, and where schemes are matured for committing thefts and other depredations, and a connection formed between thieves and reseters.²⁹

In an attempt to tackle this, commissioners in 1819 instructed their officers and watchmen to '...endeavour to obtain a personal knowledge of the inmates of suspected public houses, or lodging houses...so as to be able to ascertain whether any suspicious characters are lurking in or about such houses by day or at night.'³⁰ However, they were continually hindered in their efforts. The sheer number of spirit houses in the royalty and suburbs – Superintendent Miller estimated that there were 2,300 of them in 1840 – allied to limited police powers made effective action extremely difficult. Commissioners had no authority to grant licenses or enter premises at will. As Superintendent Miller pointed out:

It should be a condition also that the police should at all hours, when demanded, have access to the houses. At present the keepers of public houses refuse admittance to the police, except in peculiar circumstances; and hence, offenders may assemble in their haunts unmolested, to devise schemes of villany, and how the vigilance of the police may be overcome.³¹

The limited authority of commissioners, however, did not stop them attempting to influence the issuing of licenses.³² In 1823, they requested that magistrates exercise stricter control due to the '...evil existing from persons of immoral and bad character having licenses for the sale of spirits, whose houses, cellars and taprooms are frequented by loose characters of every description.'³³ A similar request was made in 1839.³⁴ In areas where commissioners did have authority, they were relentless in their efforts to create a more orderly society. In 1820, ten additional constables were employed to arrest those who contravened licensing laws.³⁵

What underlay this policy in the post-war period was a general concern about the increasing immorality among the working class. The profanation of the Sabbath was singled out for particular attention. The failure of the Established Church to provide sufficient Church

accommodation in the face of massive population growth combined with high seat rents and expectations of respectable Sunday clothing left many of the lower orders without any form of religious or moral control.³⁶ One estimate claims that the Church of Scotland in 1815 provided just 21,690 sittings for a population of over 100,000 in and around Glasgow, with most being taken by the middle class.³⁷ This was particularly worrying as it coincided with a breakdown in traditional social relationships. Whereas in the eighteenth century, the affluent and poor had lived in close proximity to one another, the nineteenth century witnessed the increased separation between the classes following the middle-class exodus to nearby suburbs. In the face of decreasing paternal authority and increasing 'godlessness' among the lower orders, the imposition of religious instruction and moral authority was deemed paramount to the preservation of social order.

Influenced by an Evangelical revival and the sermons of the Reverend Thomas Chalmers, police commissioners in the immediate post-Napoleonic period zealously promoted a range of policies designed to uphold Sunday worship and moral authority. Their priority was preventing the sale of alcohol during the hours of divine service. In April 1817, commissioners, in one of their earliest, if not the earliest, remarks on the subject, noted '...that the practice of profaning the Sabbath, by public houses being kept open and frequented by persons for the purpose of drinking, particularly during the hours of divine service, has of late been carried to a most inexcusable length.'³⁸ In response, commissioners '...ordered that the officers of police in future take particular notice of this practice; and summon such publicans as are guilty of it before the Magistrate at the office.'³⁹ In order to ensure this,

...it was ordered, that an additional party of officers be appointed to attend to this duty...and that each officer in that day be accompanied by a substitute...[and]...make special reports of what falls under their observation....⁴⁰

Watchmen, meanwhile, were instructed '...to be more attentive in future, in reporting houses late open during the weeks and in particular such houses as are open on the Sabbath evenings....'⁴¹ The vigour with which this policy was carried out was revealed two weeks later when commissioners noted that they were '...highly satisfied with the diligence and activity of the servants of the establishment, in detecting and convening before the Magistrate at the office, persons guilty of keeping open taverns and spirit cellars upon the Sabbath....'⁴²

Further measures followed. A week later commissioners instructed their officers to '...confine themselves principally to those parts of the city where the greatest number of taverns and spirit cellars are situated.'⁴³ The following year another force was employed to restrict the sale of alcohol on Sundays.⁴⁴ The aim was to '...punish such persons as open tap rooms, shops

and other places for the sale of liquor or other articles on the Sabbath day.⁴⁵ Commissioners believed it to have been successful, reporting that they ‘... are satisfied with the officers’ activity and resolve that if they continue active in the discharge of this duty a small remuneration will be given them for their extra labour.’⁴⁶ The latter remark clearly encouraged officers. In one month alone, twenty-five cases of public houses selling alcohol on Sundays were reported.⁴⁷

Only from 1821 onwards did the attack against the drink trade decline as the tension that accompanied the post-war era withered. From this date, references in the police minutes to drinking became less frequent, at least until the emergence of the temperance movement in the mid-1830s (see Chapter 9 for more on this). Nonetheless, commissioners had shown their intent: they may not have been able to force people to go to Church, but they could, and did, encourage this by restricting the masses, or at least attempting to, from doing what they wanted.

Police policy in this area, however, was not simply about bringing a reformation in working-class morality. It was as much, if not more, about repressing and removing drunks from public view. Few sights offended the middle-class more than having to pass such people and their drinking establishments on Sundays. In the words of *The Times* in 1829, respectable people wanted to go to Church without ‘...witnessing some disgusting exhibition, or having their ears offended with blasphemous and filthy expressions.’⁴⁸ In June 1819, commissioners decided that ‘...in order to suppress the profanation of the Sabbath twenty substitutes be employed...to take up disorderly and riotous persons in the streets and lanes of the city and to report houses which are kept late open on these nights or in which riotous persons may be heard.’⁴⁹ Policemen, in effect, were instructed to become a form of civic sanitation: they were to keep the streets clear of society’s human residuum. Along with vagrants, drunks were regularly picked up and removed. In 1839 alone, 3,836 persons were charged with drunkenness or being drunk and disorderly.⁵⁰ Indeed, police action in this area was so vigorous that the ‘Journal of the Society for the Preservation of Footpaths’ called for all drunks arrested on Sundays to be fined to help finance the police establishment. The creation of this ‘Sabbath Police’, it argued, would help ease the financial burden on ‘...the sober part of our citizens.’⁵¹

This proposal, however, was not implemented. Commissioners instead targeted the ‘immoral’ earnings that enabled many of the lower orders to get intoxicated in the first place. Pawnbrokers were singled out. As well as providing much needed short-term loans to the working class, pawnshops were widely perceived as being havens for stolen goods. As Superintendent Miller noted:

These small brokers, too, present great facilities for the disposal stolen property, and it is a well known fact, that the facilities thus afforded, form the strongest encouragement to the greater part of the thieves and vagrants who infest the city, to steal and commit depredations.⁵²

The first half of the nineteenth century saw a rapid growth in such outlets. Holt claims that the first regular pawnshop in Glasgow did not appear until 1813, although he points out that there were many irregular, unlicensed operators.⁵³ By the 1840s, there were thirty-three licensed pawnbrokers and around four hundred small, unlicensed brokers within the Royalty.⁵⁴ Their links with the underworld made them the increasing focus of police attention as the first half of the century progressed. In the 1821 Glasgow Police Act it was stated for the first time that ‘all brokers or dealers in second-hand goods, other than licensed pawn-brokers, resident within the City, are bound to register their names and places of residence and business, at the Town Clerk’s Chambers....’ They were also to produce on police demand any article in their possession.⁵⁵ In April 1832, commissioners noted that officers communicating with pawnbrokers over stolen items ‘...is obviously an essential part of their duty.’⁵⁶ A few months later they appointed an officer whose sole function was to do just that. He was to be ‘...exclusively employed...[in visiting]...pawnbrokers with information.’⁵⁷

However, limited police powers allied to the sheer number of brokers in the city curtailed the police’s effectiveness. Not until the 1843 Glasgow Police Act were brokers and dealers of second-hand good to be licensed. This statute significantly increased police powers over such establishments, forcing dealers to keep registered books, report stolen goods and keep reasonable hours of business.⁵⁸ Only from that year did the police and Magistracy have the required powers to tackle the most notorious trading establishments in the city.

Commissioners faced similar problems in tackling another ‘immoral’ livelihood – prostitution. They admitted this in 1844, noting that while ‘...they deplore the existence of female prostitution...[they]...regret that the duty of suppressing entirely this evil, however desirable, may be considered a hopeless task.’ Nonetheless, they resolved to

exert every power they possess to attain the end in view; and they accordingly recommend that the attention of the Superintendent should be called to clause 171 [concerning breaches of the peace and the housing persons of bad character] and that portion of clause 240 [which rendered prostitutes liable to a fine of forty shillings] of the new act, bearing on this subject; and that he should be specifically instructed to exercise the powers thereby conferred for suppressing the evil complained of with the most vigilance and activity.⁵⁹

Little concerted action had been taken before the 1843 Glasgow Police Act. The regulations issued to watchmen in 1816 instructed them to ‘...apprehend all disorderly women known to be common prostitutes, and who are in the habitual practice of walking the streets....’⁶⁰ But only on certain occasions, such as in 1831 when seventy prostitutes were detained in one night, was extensive action taken.⁶¹ More often than not, residents had to

complain before commissioners acted. Even then, satisfactory action was not guaranteed. A petition in 1842 from ratepayers in wards 9, 10, and 16, complaining about prostitutes congregating at their closes and pavements, brought a promise from the Superintendent to '...place a few active officers...' at the scene.⁶² But a month later the petitioners complained that the situation was worse than before.⁶³ It was widely believed that the presence of such women was a '...nuisance to be endured.'⁶⁴ The police seldom interfered with the city's many brothels (numbering an estimated 211 in 1849) unless investigating a crime committed by the inhabitants. They simply did not have the manpower or authority to suppress them. Not until the 1843 Glasgow Police Act were officers empowered to do this, and even this had to be amended later because of weakness in the legislation.⁶⁵

Greater action was taken regarding outdoor recreational pastimes. These had flourished in Scotland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries following the emergence of a more moderate, less puritan clergy. However, greater pressures for urban order and work discipline that accompanied industrialisation resulted in changes in attitudes and work practices that were often not conducive to recreational pastimes.⁶⁶ Whether this resulted in a decline in outdoor sporting activity has been the result of controversy. Bilsborough, in his study of Glasgow, argues that it did, while Tranter, in his study of the whole of Scotland, argues that it did not.⁶⁷ In fact, the latter argues that in terms of geographical participation, outdoor recreations were more likely to flourish in areas where the process of economic take-off and social change was at its greatest.

What is certain, however, is that the civic elite in Glasgow increasingly sought to control these pastimes from the second decade of the nineteenth century. As well as continuing to make extra provision for annual events such as the Glasgow Fair, both commissioners and councillors introduced measures to supervise day-to-day activities and the areas in which they were carried out.⁶⁸ This was part of middle-class attempts to install a greater degree of decorum and civility among the lower orders, whose rowdy, unsupervised behaviour was perceived to pose a threat to property. The Glasgow Green came in for special attention. It was home to a variety of informal and often violent games. Following attempts to improve the Green's topography, councillors in 1814 appointed a ranger to keep ball games out of the park and to disperse gatherings of noisy youths.⁶⁹ He was to patrol the Green between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. '...so as to prevent any person or persons from injuring the trees, turf, or walks'.⁷⁰ He was also to see that

...the golfers do not use the Green except at the times and in the manner prescribed by the Magistrates and the Committee on the Green, and that no games be played there except such as have their permission.⁷¹

Five years later, councillors stepped-up their attack against traditionally sanctioned pastimes. A bye-law designed to prevent sporting activity causing damage to the Green was introduced.

The Lord Provost and Magistrates do hereby strictly prohibit and discharge every person whatever from playing golf, cricket, shinty, foot ball or any other game whatever on the Green of this city [Those who do] will be prosecuted with the utmost vigour of the law.⁷²

Police commissioners provided their municipal counterparts with invaluable assistance in this area. Their officers supervised many popular pastimes from the post-Napoleonic period, especially those that involved the gathering of crowds. In 1816, commissioners resolved that on Sundays ‘...at least eight or ten men...be in the Green at once in detached parties of two each week.’⁷³ In 1820, they instructed the Chief of Police ‘...to send all the servants of the establishment who can be spared on Sunday first at three o’clock or earlier if necessary to disperse a collection of boys who assemble on the Green to fight stone battles.’⁷⁴ Similarly, in 1831, they decided to employ extra forces they ‘...deem necessary on Sabbath morning next for preventing fights in the Green.’⁷⁵ The minutes do not reveal whether these were organised prizefights or spontaneous bouts of violence. It is likely, however, to have been both. Apart from the obvious threat to public order they posed, both resulted in the assembly of potentially uncontrollable groups of men. According to one scholar, the police were so successful in expelling prizefighting from Glasgow that promoters by 1832 had to stage fights outside the city.⁷⁶ Five years later, commissioners formalised the police function, noting that ‘...any regulations necessary for games in the green...’ were to be added to the instructions of police officers.⁷⁷

Street culture also came in for attack. As Chapter 4 pointed out, the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 brought tighter control over public streets by introducing bye-laws and regulations for paving, lighting and cleansing. In the post-Napoleonic period, however, the control of human street activity became as much a concern as environmental control, as the police attempted to install a degree of order and decorum to public life. ‘Victimless offences’ were targeted. Informal crowds of people were broken-up and moved on, public gatherings were monitored, disorders were suppressed, bye-laws were enforced, and, as was indicated above, drunks and vagrants were rounded-up. The police, in short, were given a mandate to re-shape, or rather, suppress working-class culture, in the process criminalising behaviour that had traditionally been acceptable.⁷⁸

Once again, preventing crowds from gathering and removing obstructions were of particular concern. In 1820, commissioners recruited ten additional constables to monitor public

houses and ‘...give assistance in preventing boys from assembling in groups and creating noise and disturbance in the streets.’⁷⁹ It was, however, difficult to enforce successfully. In 1837, commissioners stated that preventing

...groups of persons standing on the pavements...has repeatedly been tried already but without such results as to render it expedient to establish any particular order or regulation on the subject. Indeed it was frequently found to be productive of unfortunate quarrels between the citizens and the police most desirable to be avoided. The officers have general instructions on all occasions to use every discreet means for preventing obstructions on the street.⁸⁰

Nonetheless, commissioners remained determined to enforce this policy. In the 1830s and 1840s, in particular, references to preventing obstructions to public footpaths and loitering were commonplace in the police minutes.⁸¹

This was part of a wider move towards greater surveillance of working-class lifestyle. Police powers over various aspects of working-class activities and communities increased significantly as the first half of the century progressed. Unruly public houses were watched, lists of known or suspect criminals were drawn-up and police authority over street crimes was enforced. The 1843 Glasgow Police Act, in particular, gave the police considerable powers regarding the inspection of common-lodging houses – a widely perceived den of criminals and vagrants.

Of course, there were limits to the police’s ability to carry out these duties. Unceasing surveillance of working-class lifestyle was not always possible because of insufficient financial and human resources. There may even have been, as existed in England, reluctance among officers to clamp down on all immoral behaviour for fear of the response it might provoke.⁸² There were also concerns as late as 1841 that middle-class areas were given preference when it came to watching provision. Some commissioners in that year expressed disapproval at substitutes being employed, in addition to the usual officers, in watching localities in the affluent West End of the city while the proprietors were on holiday. The *Glasgow Courier* reported that

...several members expressed themselves against imposing a heavy tax upon the poorer classes of ratepayers for the purpose of affording additional watching to the rich, who in such cases should pay the extra expenses themselves. One of the commissioners observed that should an Irishman from Bridgegate, “out at the elbows”, ask the police to watch his domicile while he went to a job of navigating or potato digging, he would be more likely to be locked up for his imprudence than get a substitute to watch his goods and chattels....⁸³

This, however, should not disguise the fact that the police were regulating facets of working-class culture on a scale hitherto unprecedented. The desire to stem the tide of

immorality and ensure social stability brought with it greater strictness to the management of people's daily lives. Policemen became 'domestic missionaries', enforcing standards of respectability, public decorum and order.⁸⁴

Not surprisingly, this clamp down on traditionally sanctioned working-class pastimes provoked resistance from many of the working class. This, however, does not appear to have been on the same scale as in England. There were no widespread riots or specific anti-police demonstrations, perhaps because of the Scots familiarity with the 'police' concept and the organic manner in which it evolved. Nonetheless, hostility was apparent. As Chapter 6 showed, policing proposals in the late eighteenth century were met by calls to '...drive oppressors from our land...' and to resist giving '...up our freedom to Police.'⁸⁵ Such sentiments endured throughout the first half of the nineteenth century among many sections of the lower orders: during the anti-bread riots in 1848, the police were met with calls of "Murder the Bastards; kill every one of them!"⁸⁶ Indeed, although the origin of this riot was economic hardship, there may well have been an anti-police undercurrent as the 1846 Municipal Police Extension Act extended police provision for the first time to many of the poorest suburban areas (see below).

Most anti-police resentment, however, took the form of peaceful protest rather violent disorder. For many, the police were unwanted also on financial grounds. Lighting, watching, cleansing and paving provisions were luxuries many of the poorer classes simply could not afford. Petitions for exemption from such provisions, and the tax involved, were nearly always rejected.⁸⁷ According to the 1834 Select Committee on Handloom Weavers, police rates were rigidly extracted.⁸⁸ Many could pay only by '...depriving their family of some of the necessities of life.'⁸⁹ Those who did not pay frequently had their possessions impounded. Avoidance was often the only option. According to Hugh MacKenzie, a Calton handloom weaver,

...as soon as a collector of police dues, water-rent or road-money is seen, an alarm is instantly given, and every door belonging to a weaver in the street is bolted, lest they should get admittance and take away any little thing they have for arrears.⁹⁰

For such people, the long arm of the law was resented more for the threat it posed to their pockets than their liberty.

III

Reform of the Glasgow Police – Crowd Control and Industrial Protest

Law and order also meant more than just tackling crime and keeping the lower orders under close surveillance. It also meant crowd control and the suppression of large-scale disorder. As the reaction that followed the ‘Radical War’ illustrated, the police were expected to become front-line players in these areas from the 1820s. Indeed, as Chapter 6 showed, it was the traumatic events of the post-war period that were the driving force behind the civic elite’s desire to reform existing policing arrangements. To a large degree, therefore, the police’s ability to deal with the large public gathering and social and industrial disorder would shape contemporary opinion as to their effectiveness.

The prevailing economic and political climate provided them with plenty such challenges. Few cities in Britain were the focal point of political radicalism and industrial action as much as Glasgow. The city, or more accurately, the Glasgow Green, was the epicentre for mass political gatherings, meetings and social protests throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. As Scotland’s largest city, and with its long-standing links with working-class political demands, Glasgow was a natural arena for public debate. Working-class leaders flocked to the city to voice economic, social and political grievances. It was common for weekly meetings of hundreds and even thousands of people to be held on the green. The largest saw 200,000 take part in a Chartist demonstration in 1838.⁹¹

Bitterness at being denied the vote when it was extended only to L.10 property holders in 1832 provided the basis for much of the discontent. What seemed to many as working-class betrayal at being excluded from the Reform Act added fuel to a long simmering political radicalism stretching back to the 1790s. But disillusionment went far deeper, incorporating what, far many, were the harsh realities of an industrial, capitalist society and economy. In many sectors, industrialisation brought with it growing uncertainty, lower wages, and declining employment opportunities and status. According to one historian, the position of the handloom weaver was transformed from ‘...craft status to the sewer of the unemployed labour’ in the space of one generation.⁹² Living standards deteriorated markedly in the face of an overheated labour market and foreign and domestic competition. Indeed, economic and social distress had reduced 20,000 weavers to assemble on Glasgow Green in 1829 to discuss their ‘...present destitute and pitiable condition.’⁹³

Other sectors were also adversely affected. In the 1820s, craft unionism throughout the country was almost wiped-out. Few trades were able to preserve controls on access or restrictions on apprenticeships due to the over-crowded labour market.⁹⁴ Simmering industrial discontent came to a head in the 1830s, most notably with the 1837 cotton spinners’ strike. The

spinners had been stirred into industrial action following plans to introduce new machinery that would, in effect, have resulted in them working to increased demands for less pay and reduced their numbers entering the trade. The bitter strike that followed was, in essence, a battle for the future structure of industry.⁹⁵ Mass picketing and violence were daily occurrences in a dispute that lasted over three months and saw one strikebreaker shot dead.⁹⁶ The Sheriff in charge of maintaining order, Archibald Alison, believed that 'Anarchy was rapidly approaching.'⁹⁷

Even more worrying to those in authority were the 'Bread Riots' of 1848.⁹⁸ Like other major cities in Europe in 1848, Glasgow was subject to widespread disorder due to lack of employment, shortage of food and acute hardship. Rioting broke out after around 10,000 who had assembled on the Glasgow Green to demand food went on the rampage. Shops were looted and property was vandalised over two days of disturbance that saw six people killed. Press reports defined the riot as the actions of '...the idle, the thoughtless and the city's thieves....'⁹⁹ The unemployed and Chartists were exonerated, although one historian has challenged the notion that the riot had no political overtones.¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, the events caused widespread anxiety. Fears were even raised in London that the rioting may spread to other major industrial centres.¹⁰¹

These events of 1848 would suggest that the Glasgow Police had advanced little in terms of its ability to deal with large-scale disorder since the 'Radical War'. For two hours the rioters went virtually unchallenged. The military had to be called in and an estimated 10,000 enrolled as special constables. The police's handling of the situation, or rather their lack of it, rightly brought widespread condemnation. The consensus, in the words of the *Glasgow Herald*, was that they were '...nowhere to be seen.'¹⁰² They seem to have been caught by surprise. According to Grant, only one officer was seen on the streets at the scene of the disturbance; the others were instructed to remain in the police building as rioters were armed.¹⁰³ Even when they did appear, they did little. *The Times* reported: 'The police, although on the spot, with the superintendent at their head, were of little or no avail, so frantic and excited were the mob, who proceeded from one excess to another.'¹⁰⁴

Clearly, the police's handling of the situation was inept. However, it does not automatically follow, as some historians have suggested, that the police were inadequately prepared to cope with urban unrest per se.¹⁰⁵ A number of mitigating circumstances has to be borne in mind. The sheer scale of the unrest, allied to the fact that some of the rioters were armed, would have overwhelmed all police forces in Britain, with perhaps the exception of the Metropolitan Police. Rioters vastly outnumbered the police. Although significant measures had been taken since the 'Radical War' to strengthen the force, they were not matched by most other authorities in the parliamentary constituency. As Part III will show in more detail, attempts by the Sheriff of Lanarkshire to introduce a police force for the whole of Lanarkshire were

constantly thwarted by landowners who did not want to meet the costs of financing industrial, urban areas. Little aid, in other words, came from surrounding districts, despite the fact that a number of protestors may have come from outwith the city bounds. Indeed, as the epicentre of public protest in the West of Scotland, Glasgow was unfairly expected to bare the cost of policing large-scale demonstrations without the assistance of most nearby authorities. And those areas that were prepared to assist, such as Calton, Anderston and Gorbals, had forces too small to make any significant impact.

Moreover, there is evidence that the chief of police, Superintendent Pearce, grossly misinterpreted the scale of the problem, from which it would be wrong to base a judgement on the force's abilities as a whole. As he informed the inquiry that followed, 'plundering, likewise, being unprecedented in this city, I did not anticipate the rush which was made, and did not provide for it....'¹⁰⁶ In the inquiry, Pearce was strongly criticised for his handling of the affair, most notably his decision not to withdraw more of his officers from their beats to deal with the situation. Only ten were removed, fifty-five continued to patrol the rest of the city as disorder raged elsewhere.¹⁰⁷ He resigned shortly after the inquiry.

Significantly, 1848 was the first time the military had to be called in since the 'Radical War', despite the often precarious economic and political climate. It was also one of the last occasions in that century. When asked in the 1853 Select Committee on Police whether he had been able on several occasions to suppress a considerable disturbance without the aid of the military, Superintendent Smart replied: 'During all my experience in Glasgow, the riots of 1848 were the only case when the military were called in.'¹⁰⁸ He had been in the force from 1832. Of course, much of this had to do with good behaviour of the crowd in general and moral-force Chartism in particular. But the police's ability to deal with major disorder was important too. As Smart informed the same committee when asked if he had any experience of riots in the city: 'Yes; I have been connected with the suppression of many riots in Glasgow...[including]...the disturbance of the cotton-spinners in 1837....'¹⁰⁹

The dispute in 1837 was a good illustration of the important role the police could play in dealing with rowdy gatherings. Even though much of the unrest took place outwith city bounds, the police were often called upon to provide assistance to strikebreakers and were instrumental in the arrest of sixteen of the cotton spinners' leaders. They were equally active in others disputes. During the trouble surrounding a miners' strike in the early 1840s, the police, according to Archibald Alison, were said to have provided 'indispensable' services.¹¹⁰ In 1842, the *Glasgow Herald* waxed lyrical about the effectiveness of the Calton Police, with the assistance of her larger neighbour, in coping with industrial disturbances involving handloom weavers. Their article illustrated the police's crucial role in bringing lawbreakers to justice, providing protection to blacklegs and generally keeping the wheels of industry ticking over.¹¹¹

Perhaps most crucially, Sheriff Alison, a critic of many police establishments at this time, described the Glasgow Police as ‘...admirable...[being]...not only efficient, but adequate to the wants of the district.’¹¹² As the authority responsible for suppressing unrest and maintaining order throughout the 1830s and 1840s, he was probably the best judge of the force’s abilities in this area, not least as he was normally on hand once disorder broke out. Indeed, as a staunch anti-trade unionist, he was a strong proponent of police reform as a barrier to ‘...the evils of combination...’ (see Part III).¹¹³ Clearly, his experience of the Glasgow Police’s handling of industrial disorder had made a favourable impression. As he informed the 1839 Select Committee on Police:

Within the city of Glasgow there is a very adequate and very admirable police force, which effectually prevents the intimidation or violence to a great extent within the bounds of the Royalty.¹¹⁴

The Glasgow Police were also active in dealing with non-industrial disorder. Shortly after the ‘Bread Riots’ in 1848 more than 400 policemen outnumbered and contained Chartists at the hustings.¹¹⁵ During riots by soldiers of the 76th Regiment in 1846, commissioners found that the conduct of officers was found to be ‘...of a highly satisfactory character.’ They went on to state that the efficiency of the force was ‘...well sustained on this occasion...in suppressing the disposition to riot and to injure the persons and property of the inhabitants...’¹¹⁶ Indeed, the ability of the Glasgow Police to deal with such situations was one reason why other areas were willing to use them at large-scale public meetings. As Superintendent Smart informed the 1853 Select Committee on Police:

Our men are sent to races, colliers’ strikes, Orange meetings, and elections of Members of Parliament all over Ayresshire, Renfrewshire and Dumbartonshire. The Glasgow Police have sent 514 men on various occasions during these two or three years.¹¹⁷

The ability to respond effectively to the outbreak of disorder, however, was only part of the police’s role. In many ways, it was subordinate, given the force’s limited resources, to their more important responsibility – making sure that unrest did not break out in the first place. Preventive policing was as much, if not more, about preventing the outbreak of tumult as it was crime.¹¹⁸ It was the police’s realisation of this, allied to factors outwith their control, that ultimately ensured that military forces would rarely be required in the city.

As was indicated above, the influence of moral-force Chartism was significant. The Chartist movement in Scotland was characterised by its rejection of physical violence.¹¹⁹ The legacy of the ‘Radical War’ allied to the influence of middle-class leadership (some of whom, as

Part III will show, were Glasgow police commissioners) gave Scottish Chartism a reformist rather than revolutionary focus. Adherents of physical force were firmly in the minority. The majority sought to advance their cause through peaceful protest and persuasion, which was in stark contrast to the industrial north of England where an aggressive, militant approach was evident. Inevitably, this significantly reduced the threat posed to the police.

However, the relative absence of violent political unrest in Glasgow in the 1830s and early 1840s also owed much to the tactics deployed by the police. This was less significant than the passive nature of the crowd and public protest, but it was influential nonetheless. A great deal of planning and organisation went into the police's handling of public gatherings. Negotiation with Chartist leaders was common, which is hardly surprising given that a number of them were on the Police Commission (see Chapter 9). Often, the police would arrange the location of rallies. Wilson points out that Captain Miller, Chief of Police, would help arrange halls for Chartists to meet under police supervision. Miller himself is said to have '...officiated at almost every large Chartist demonstration in Glasgow since 1838.'¹²⁰ Normally, he was thanked for his courtesy, illustrating the close ties that had been formed.¹²¹ Significantly, he was recalled to the Glasgow Police in 1848 after the 'Bread Riots' – he had left to join the Liverpool Police Force not long before the unrest – which suggests just how able he and his force had been in controlling crowds during his superintendence.

Great detail was given to de-fusing potential flashpoints. Policemen were generally strategically placed depending on the situation. Sometimes, a show of strength was felt necessary, but more often than not a few officers would be deployed at key points to supervise what was going on. Such an approach was perceived as a useful way to avoid confrontation while, at the same time, letting the public know that they were being watched and that they would be held to account for their actions. Crucially, however, large numbers of officers were on stand-by ready to act if necessary. In May 1845, commissioners met to prepare '...all necessary precautionary measures for preserving the peace and protecting property...' during Her Majesty's Birthday celebrations.¹²² In collaboration with Captain Miller, it was decided to assemble '...as ample and efficient a force as possible...' and close off entrance to the Green at Charlotte Street.¹²³ During a Chartist meeting on the Glasgow Green in 1839, 250 officers were detained in the police station ready, in the words of the *Glasgow Herald*, '...to turn out at a moment's notice.'¹²⁴ To ensure this was done effectively, police resources were strengthened considerably. In July 1839, the Sheriff and Magistracy decided '...that the whole police force of the city and suburban burghs should be sworn in by the Sheriff, or any of the justices of the peace of the county...as constables for the mutual protection of the city and suburbs.'¹²⁵ In the same year, commissioners agreed to establish an auxiliary force of 120 men '...from amongst the most able-bodied and efficient pensioners residing in and about the city and suburbs...' This

measure was ‘...deemed necessary for procuring the peace’ in the face of Chartism. Among the patrol’s duties was the removal of Chartist posters and placards throughout the city.¹²⁶ The police were also active in dispersing rowdy meetings between anti-corn law reformers and Chartists.¹²⁷ Such action did not necessarily hold back or suppress the Chartist threat per se, as Goodway has argued for London.¹²⁸ But it did help ensure that movement’s moral force would prevail over the physical.

Clearly, the Glasgow Police were not as inept in dealing with unrest as the events of 1848 would suggest. This was a force that was extremely committed to, and diligent in its preparations for, maintaining order. Their handling of the ‘Bread Riots’ was in many ways the exception rather than the norm. The wide public condemnation of the police that followed the two days of rioting was symbolic of this. It reflected an increased expectation in the police’s ability to deal with disorder – an expectation borne out of the police’s success in dealing with crowds for many years. In fact, in many ways, the reactions to the events of 1820 and 1848 illustrate best how far the police had come. After the ‘Radical War’ the middle class looked to the police to suppress disorder. By the time of the ‘Bread Riots’, it was expected. The events of that year aside, the police had largely fulfilled what the civic fathers in 1820 desired from them.

IV

Reform of the Glasgow Police – the Watch Force

Key to the police’s success was the reform that took place of the watch. In 1816, police commissioners noted the need ‘...to devise some means of making them [watchmen] more efficient in their duty...’ as existing regulations appear to be ‘...in many respects defective....’¹²⁹ This resulted in the implementation of the first major report on watching arrangements in the city. Although this was introduced during a period of heightened anxiety, reform was rarely the result of knee-jerk reactions. It was an on-going process throughout the century, motivated largely by a desire for professionalism, efficiency and value for money. As will be shown below, much reform had taken place before 1829, confirming the recent revisionist interpretation that many of the characteristics of the so-called new police predated the introduction of the Metropolitan Police.¹³⁰

Watching provision was expanded significantly. It is unclear exactly when this occurred, but by 1828 it no longer stopped at Graham’s Square to the east, or at Crakenhouse Toll-bar and Mr Swanston’s gate to the north – it was now conterminous with police wards. Watching spread out throughout the police district of the royalty, on beats that were measured in yards, not miles as they often were in the second half of the century.¹³¹ Most of these beats were only two or

three streets long. The officers and watchmen who patrolled them were strategically stationed – far enough apart to prevent them grouping together, but near enough for assistance. All were positioned with the intention of keeping a close surveillance over the police district and making escape extremely difficult.

However, it was difficult to meet these objectives. Commissioners were, to a certain degree, still selective in the manner in which they policed. As late as 1837, the Directors of the Glasgow University Lying-in Hospital were complaining that police provision was aimed chiefly at the main streets of the town, neglecting the poorer and more obscure districts.¹³² Although poor areas, such as between Maxwell Street and the Saltmarket to the west and east, and Trongate and Bridgeton to the north and south, were watched, provision was insufficient to effectively police the several thousand who lived there. Only the principal streets in these areas were watched, the wynds and lanes were neglected. Within the above district in 1827, only eighteen men were on patrol for an area that incorporated eighteen principal streets, dozens of wynds, lanes and alleyways, scores of drinking houses and a perceived large criminal element. Describing the above area to the 1839 Handloom Weavers' Commission, J.C. Symons reported:

I have seen human degradation in some of its worst phases, both in England and abroad, but I can advisedly say, that I did not believe until I visited the wynds of Glasgow, that so large amount of filth, crime, misery and disease existed on one spot in any civilized country.... The houses are for most part let in flats, either to the lowest class of labourers or prostitutes, or to lodging-keepers, these latter places are the grand resort and favoured abodes of all those to whom a local habitation and a name are professionally inconvenient. They are likewise the resting place of outcasts of every grade of wretchedness and destitution.¹³³

There was an inevitable demand from middle-class ratepayers that police provision be directed mainly towards their areas, but the city's overcrowded housing and the environment was at the root of the problem. The cramped, squalid conditions rendered it impossible to effectively watch the numerous dark passageways and closes. Superintendent Miller admitted as much in 1842:

The facilities for the commission of crime appear to be much greater than in London, Dublin, or Liverpool. In the latter cities nearly the whole of the houses and warehouses are self-contained; there are no common entries, no common stairs, and few, if any, sunk areas; while in Glasgow, the houses, with few exceptions, are divided into floors or smaller compartments, occupied by different tenants; there is to almost every tenement a common close or entrance, and a common stair to many of the tenements; there are sunk areas; and to nearly all there are back unprotected premises tenanted, or with a right of access, by different individuals.¹³⁴

Significantly, his remedy for tackling crime in these areas was not to station watchmen in these wynds and lanes – he knew that would be an impossible task. Rather, it was to improve the environment: ‘Much might be done to relieve the misery, and to repress the crime of this destitute population...by opening up and widening the thoroughfares, and forming new streets wherever applicable....’¹³⁵ Unfortunately, the efforts of commissioners to improve watching arrangements in the city would always be undermined by economic and social pressures over which they had no control (these pressures will be discussed in parts III and IV).

This, however, did not deter them. An on-going programme of reform was carried out throughout the first half of the century. As indicated in Chapter 4, attempts were made to ensure that watchmen entered their boxes on a rotational basis.¹³⁶ By 1828, they were prohibited from entering them – a year before a similar provision was introduced in London. Clause 5 of watchmen’s instructions noted:

Each watchmen must be constantly walking about his station, examining it particularly, to see that no depredations have been committed; and if any such have happened, he must send a report to the constable on guard immediately.¹³⁷

This was in comparison with watchmen’s regulations in 1816, which allowed half the watch to rest in these boxes rotationally. The new regulations not only meant that the principal streets within the watching bounds were being constantly patrolled – a salient feature of preventive policing – it also effectively doubled the force’s manpower, since only half had hitherto been on active duty at any given time.

Efforts were also made to improve communication and cooperation. From as early as 1810, commissioners were to undergo regular correspondence with other commissioners throughout Britain ‘...with a view if possible of giving and receiving information respecting all kinds of depredations and those found guilty of them.’¹³⁸ In 1820, commissioners agreed to light and watch the districts next to Calton that were contiguous with Glasgow on the grounds that

...it will open what the Committee think a very useful co-operation and communication between the Calton Police and that of the city, and this co-operation it is thought is of the more importance as it will often secure the apprehension of delinquents who fresh from the commission of crime and while pursued by the Calton watchmen have only to step from the South to North side of King Street to be beyond their jurisdiction and consequently to escape the punishment so justly due to them.¹³⁹

In the same year, commissioners decided that criminal officers be permitted to leave the royalty to go after criminals, provided that a warrant was provided from magistrates or the

Justice of the Peace.¹⁴⁰ Formal cooperation with suburban authorities was finally achieved by the 'cooperation clause' of 1843.¹⁴¹ Under its provisions, officers and watchmen of the different establishments were authorised to act in any area within the parliamentary constituency, with arrangements being made for each force to act in unison during emergencies. Moreover, links between the criminal departments of all four policing systems within the parliamentary constituency were established with a register of offenders for the parliamentary constituency being set-up.

Attempts were also made to improve the quality of recruits. As indicated earlier, commissioners in 1804 decided that recruits had to speak English.¹⁴² In 1811, it was decided that only able-bodied watchmen be recruited.¹⁴³ Those currently employed were to be examined to '...see if they are fit for duty.'¹⁴⁴ Those who were not were dismissed. This policy was continued throughout the first half of the century, in an often ruthless manner. In 1819, a committee appointed for the improvement of police dismissed fifteen officers in order to improve the efficiency of others.¹⁴⁵ The 1821 Police Act reiterated the desire for efficiency, introducing the first statutory requirement for watchmen: henceforth only '...fit and proper persons...' were to be employed.¹⁴⁶ In 1828, an age limit for recruits was introduced for the first time: henceforth, 'no person shall...be appointed a watchman who is above 45 years of age'.¹⁴⁷

Finally, attempts were made to improve the professionalism and discipline of the watch. In 1816, it was decided that rewards given to officers and watchmen for apprehending offenders should no longer '...depend upon the crime of which the person apprehended is convicted, or upon the punishment to which he may be sentenced....'¹⁴⁸ Commissioners felt the practice of issuing rewards upon conviction was open to abuse, as it gave officers and watchmen an incentive to secure conviction. London was cited as an example where officers procure false evidence to convict innocent people for financial reward. Instead, gratuities were to be given only '...when service has been performed beyond the ordinary line of duty, or in cases where particular activity or intelligence has been shown, or in such information procured, as has led to some important discovery.'¹⁴⁹

Indiscipline was a particular concern. Commissioners had sought to eradicate drunkenness and neglect of duty since the force's inception. The high level of complaints from ratepayers in the force's formative years, however, made it an increasing priority. Watchmen's regulations of 1816 clearly illustrated this. Every officer was '...to uniformly maintain the most exact regard to sobriety and decency in his own conduct....'¹⁵⁰ Those who ignored the Commission's wishes were to be severely dealt with: '...if any of the officers, patrol, or watchmen be found drunk, or where it is satisfactory proved that they have received intoxicating liquor from any person whatever, they [will] be instantly dismissed.'¹⁵¹ In 1817, it was decided to prosecute anyone who gave alcohol to watchmen. Commissioners were concerned that

‘...improper motives...’ often lay behind such action.¹⁵² Moreover, any watchmen found ‘...sleeping in his box...’, or caught taking bribes from disorderly houses or prostitutes...[would]...render himself liable to immediate dismissal and disgrace.’¹⁵³

These were not hollow regulations. Close supervision was introduced to ensure they were enforced. Roll-call since the force’s inception had given sergeants the opportunity to ensure watchmen were in a fit state for duty. Increasingly, however, watchmen and officers were subject to periodical checks while on the beat. In 1812, a night patrol was established to ‘...particularly see if the watchmen are alert or otherwise attentive to their duty.’¹⁵⁴ Officers were also to issue and collect tickets from watchmen at periodic intervals to ensure the latter had not left their stations.¹⁵⁵ These tickets had to be returned to the police office at the end of each shift, along with sergeants’ reports on the nightly proceedings. In addition, watchmen had to report to the station constable at the end of duty ‘...in order that the constable may see he is sober, and has not left his station before the proper time.’¹⁵⁶ Clearly, any indiscipline or neglect of duty would have been quickly detected and reported. Moreover, officers and watchmen had to leave a sum not exceeding sixpence per week of their wages with the treasurer as security for good behaviour. This was to be returned after six months if no complaint was made against them. If any complaints were made the money was forfeited.¹⁵⁷ The clerk was also to keep a record of efficiency of all officers.¹⁵⁸

Turnover in personnel, however, continued to be a problem despite the reforming zeal shown by police commissioners. As late as 1857, there were 142 resignations, 21 desertions and 100 dismissals, 61 for drunkenness and 12 for neglect of duty.¹⁵⁹ For a force of around 700, this amounted to a turnover of 37%. Policing was still a lonely, unattractive occupation that placed excessive demands on those involved. On the other hand, these figures were not too far behind the Metropolitan Police, which had a turnover rate averaging a third in its formative years.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, whereas the high level of dismissals in the Glasgow Police in the early part of the century was symptomatic of the poor quality of recruit, by the second quarter of the century it was also symptomatic of the strict discipline and high level of efficiency that commissioners sought and the closer supervision of officers. The reforms implemented by commissioners throughout the first half of the century illustrated that they were less likely to tolerate the defects that hampered the force in its formative years. Although there still remained problems, as the above figures testify, there was an undeniable improvement in the quality of officer. Testimony to this was the glowing report the force received from the Inspector of Constabulary in 1859 – the first national inspection in Scotland. Singling it out for special praise, he noted that:

The municipal authorities and members of the Police Board have spared no trouble or expense in their endeavors to make the force efficient; and their measures have been most successfully

and satisfactory carried out by the able and veteran superintendent, to whom the present high state of efficiency and discipline of the force is mainly due.... The constables have a smarter appearance on duty, and look more like their business, than those of any other city or burgh I have seen in Scotland, a proof of the good state of discipline in which they are kept by the superintendent and other officers.... They are a fine body of men, averaging 32½ years of age, and 5 feet 9½ inches in height; length of service 5½ years; and I consider are equal to any duties that they may be called on to perform, either in the city of Glasgow or elsewhere.¹⁶¹

Not surprisingly, other forces in Scotland eagerly sought Glasgow's officers. The Inspector highlighted this in his report, noting that the number of personnel recruited to high-ranking positions in other Scottish forces made the Glasgow Police '...the best "school" for police education'.¹⁶² In this respect, the Glasgow Police served as an important model for policing throughout Scotland, with former officers passing on the knowledge that made the force the most efficient in the country. Whig historians credit the Metropolitan Police with having done the same in England.¹⁶³

A remaining weakness of the Glasgow Police was the low rate of pay. By 1848, when the first national wage levels for police forces were published, constables in Glasgow were receiving between 15s. and 14s. in weekly pay, more than most, if not all, forces in Scotland. But they were receiving less than the major English forces, with constables in London earning between L.1 2s. 6d. and 17s. 6d.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, though they were earning more than the poorest paid handloom weavers by this point – whose average gross weekly income had fallen to between 5s. 6d. and 7s. 6d. – this was a consequence of the decline of the handloom weaving industry in the country.¹⁶⁵ Police work remained a poorly paid, unattractive occupation.

The Inspector of Constabulary singled this out in his first report in 1859, citing low wages as the prime reason for the force's high level of resignations.¹⁶⁶ Within the year, his recommendation for a higher rate was met, much to the benefit of policing efficiency. As Superintendent James Smart pointed out:

It has prevented to a great extent good men leaving the force, and constables now perform their duties with more spirit, and desire to give satisfaction.... I have no difficulty in getting the very best men to join the force; formerly I had difficulty in keeping up the strength with the frequently inferior material.¹⁶⁷

More still had to be done. A report in 1871 claimed that '...many of the best recruits leave the force in disgust...' because of pay and conditions.¹⁶⁸ Policing was still a long way away from being regarded as a professional career. Nevertheless, the meagre rise in pay in 1859 was a significant step in making policing for many a relatively steady occupation rather than a temporary refuge for migrants and victims of cyclical trade depression. Officers were still a long

way from being of the highest calibre (if they ever have been), but they were a marked improvement on earlier recruits.

After nearly a half century of ongoing reform, the rudimentary force that existed at the turn of the century had been transformed into one of the most professional in the country. However, it was still subject to fragmented jurisdiction within its parliamentary boundary. The establishment of closer ties with suburban authorities represented a significant advance, but the situation remained far from ideal. Various Government reports highlighted this.¹⁶⁹ What was required, as one resident wrote in 1820, was ‘...to have a strong system of police for the whole city and adjoining districts and environs.’¹⁷⁰ Until this was achieved, the Glasgow Police would fail to benefit fully from its reforming zeal, given the constraint of being bordered by three inferior policing establishments.¹⁷¹

V

The Municipal Police Extension Act, 1846

The Glasgow Municipal Police Extension Act of 1846 was a landmark in policing history. It overcame the problems of fragmented authority in the parliamentary constituency by streamlining the existing administrative and judicial machinery.¹⁷² The act merged the separate municipal and police authorities of Glasgow, Gorbals, Calton, Anderston and the Harbour Trust into one unitary body – the Police and Statute Labour Committee of the Town Council – and removed many of the problems posed by petty local jealousies and sectional administration. As Laidlaw wrote: ‘Henceforth, administration became municipal in spirit and scope rather than parochial.’¹⁷³ Resources in the municipality were pooled together, eliminating wasteful expenditure and giving the Glasgow Police one of the most efficient policing arrangements in the country. As the Chief Constable in 1853 remarked: ‘I could not wish for a better management than that which the city police is under at present.’¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, the act made provision for the Sheriff of Lanark to apply for police aid to serve the county districts, just as the Municipal Corporations Act made provision for English counties to apply to nearby towns for assistance.¹⁷⁵ By the early 1850s, up to five hundred officers were being dispatched annually from Glasgow to maintain law and order during public gatherings.¹⁷⁶ Clearly, the benefits of the act extended beyond the municipality.

Moreover, the transfer of power from the Board of Police to the Police and Statute Labour Committee of the Town Council brought Glasgow into line with reformed English borough policing systems. Although police affairs were kept administratively separate from Glasgow Town Council, with a separate police rate being levied until 1895, policing authority

was effectively placed under the Council's trusteeship. As in England, this meant that the practice of directly electing police commissioners ended permanently.

This was of particular significance as it put a stop to a decade of petty squabbling over police control. As the next part will show, policing affairs in the first half of the century were a focal point for much conflict and tension between the Police Board and the Town Council. The generic nature of policing meant that whoever controlled the Commission had access to a tremendous amount of power. As such, it was the subject of ongoing struggle for control of local affairs. This led to a great deal of energy, time and expense being misdirected towards self-preservation rather than policing efficiency. Reform ended this practice. From 1846, the prime focus of Glasgow's civic elite was winning the battle against lawlessness and urban deterioration rather than 'ideologically suspect' police commissioners. The control of the police ceased – for a little while anyway – to be the ideological football over which class and sectional interests fought.

In order to supervise more effectively the lower orders, police provision was extended to the poorest parts of the municipality, including the newly incorporated suburban areas that hitherto had no policing system. These included Bridgeton, Parkhead, Camlachie and Dennistoun, as well as the more affluent areas of Woodside and North Kelvinside. Although the Municipal Police Act of 1846 made provision for areas that were not assessed to be excluded from policing provisions, it was rarely enforced. Appeals for exemption from police costs were usually rejected, with the Police Board deciding in 1847 '...they could not exempt any class or body of men whatever from assessment.'¹⁷⁷ This was a source of much hardship and resentment for many ratepayers in Bridgeton, Parkhead and Camlachie, who unsuccessfully petitioned in 1847 and 1849 for relief from police dues.¹⁷⁸ Selective policing after municipal reform effectively came to an end, with the city being divided into six districts to ensure '...that if possible no part of the city should at any time be left without protection'.¹⁷⁹ (Central [old royalty of Glasgow], Eastern [mainly Calton], Western [mainly Anderston], Southern [mainly Gorbals], Northern, and Clyde or Harbour Dock Division [river police]).¹⁸⁰ Additional police stations were built to ensure a permanent police presence, and beats were extended, some times by two to three times. They had to be; the extended municipality now covered 5,063 acres. In 1800, it had covered only 1,864, of which only a third was policed. Significantly, the regulation of working-class activities in areas hitherto unpoliced was to become an important function of police. This was doubly important, as it was widely believed that much unpunished crime was committed in these areas. According to Chief Constable Millar, in the three months preceding 21 January 1843, ninety-one cases of theft, mainly housebreaking, had been reported at the Glasgow Police Office, committed in the neighbourhood of Glasgow, but beyond police bounds. From his

information, this figure was not a third of the crimes of that kind that had actually been committed.¹⁸¹

To penetrate the expanded city, the number of watchmen – who, significantly, were in 1846 to be called constables for the first time – was greatly increased. Between 1841 and 1861, the ratio of population to officers for the reformed municipality fell from 735 to 1 to 558 to 1.¹⁸² The ratio of population to police in the extended municipality was now close to resembling that of the royalty. The Glasgow Police still trailed the Metropolitan Police, which, with the exception of Liverpool, had the biggest force on the British mainland in terms of police to population, averaging 461 to 1 by mid-century.¹⁸³ But significantly, it was one of the largest forces in Britain both in numbers and ratio to population. Birmingham and Manchester, two of the largest forces outside London, had ratios of 840 to 1 and 610 to 1 respectively by 1856.¹⁸⁴ Indeed, the Glasgow Police Force in 1861 accounted for 28% of all officers in Scotland and 44% of all burgh officers.¹⁸⁵

There still remained a desire to improve the character of the masses and exert a degree of social policing. The importance of this was not lost on Superintendent Miller, who claimed in 1842 that ‘the principal cause of the decrease [in crime in Glasgow] is to be found in the influence exercised upon the labouring part of the people by temperance and total abstinence societies.’¹⁸⁶ Nonetheless, mid-nineteenth-century newsreaders would have been hard pushed to come across a comment such as the *Glasgow Herald's* in 1805 about the protection of property being entrusted to voluntary societies rather than police. From relatively humble beginnings, the Glasgow Police had evolved to become principal agents of urban discipline.

Conclusion to Part II

Reform in 1846 was clearly a landmark in policing history in Glasgow. It brought to the extended municipality policing provision that hitherto had been the exclusive preserve of parts of the royalty and nearby suburbs and, in doing so, removed existing problems such as fragmented judicial authority. The whole municipality could now lay claim to a policing system that rivalled any major city in Britain. The rudimentary force that existed at the turn of the century had been transformed into one of the most professional in the country – a fact clearly demonstrated by subsequent Government inspections.¹ There still remained weaknesses. Glasgow policemen may have become adapt at controlling less serious disturbances and industrial unrest in the city and neighbouring counties, but they remained vulnerable to large-scale, unexpected disorder within their own judicial bounds. Nevertheless, although far from being completely efficient, the Glasgow Police had reached a degree of professionalism unsurpassed throughout the British Isles.

The process of achieving this both confirms and refutes aspects of traditionalist and revisionist interpretations of police efficiency before 1829. In contrary to recent revisionist histories, the evidence from Glasgow suggests that the watch force was a long way from being professional in its formative years. On the other hand, the Glasgow experience strongly confirms the revisionist viewpoint that much reform was carried out before 1829. In particular, the decade or so that followed the Napoleonic Wars saw the police transformed. On the eve of the Metropolitan Police's establishment in 1829, both the day and night forces possessed many of the characteristics associated with modern policing – officers and watchmen were employed by a single police authority, were recruited on a full-time, salaried basis, were of certain age and physical condition, were subject to strict discipline and supervision, and engaged in criminal and preventive policing, which included crowd control. Such was the progress the force had made that Commissioner McTyler in 1828 could claim: '...it was universally acknowledged that it [the police establishment] was conducted on principles which at least rendered it equal to any other, if it was not the very first, in the Empire.'² This was in stark contrast to commissioners' remarks in the early part of the century.

Traditional police histories would have the historian believe that the Metropolitan model had a direct effect on reform in Glasgow after 1829. However, there is little evidence that the principles or ideas governing the capital influenced policing development in Glasgow. As Part III will show, an attempt by the Lord Advocate in the 1840s to impose a centralised policing system on the Metropolitan model illustrated this: it was strongly resisted by both the city's police commissioners and town councillors as a threat to local autonomy. Although the majority

of the civic elite were in favour of a coordinated policing system advocated by Peel, it had to be under their control, not the Home Secretary's. Municipal police extension in 1846 may have coordinated policing arrangements in the municipality, but it would be too easy to see it as being the direct result of Peel's philosophy. As the next section will show, one of the main driving forces behind reform in 1846 was concern that Government would impose an unpopular centralised policing system if the uncoordinated policing arrangements were not overcome. Any influence, therefore, was indirect rather than direct. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the civic elite showed themselves more than capable of establishing an effective policing system without looking to London or relying on Government instruction. The numerous advances made before 1829 clearly illustrate this.

Nevertheless, there were many similarities between the Glasgow Police and police in England, despite the former relying on local policing initiatives rather than Government instruction. In the latter, according to Hart, it was '...probable that the reform of the police was gradual and not spectacular....'³ This was mirrored in Glasgow. Reform in the city was a long, gradual, drawn-out transformation, stretching over a number of decades. Municipal police reform in 1846 was the culmination of a process that saw reform occur at different times, to a different extent and for different reasons.

As such, it is difficult to subscribe reform in Glasgow to a single theory or cause. It does not fit easily into the traditional Whig view of police reform based on Benthamite rational progress, whereby the old system was replaced by a consensual, centralised, efficient system solely for the prevention of crime. Far more compelling is the revisionist view, whereby the ruling elite, in response to urban society and disorder, reformed the police in order to maintain their position and discipline the urban masses. However, it, too, does not explain completely the changing nature of the force throughout the first half of the century. Although Chapter 6 argued that growing disorder between 1815 and 1820 was instrumental in changing attitudes to police and promoting the reform of the force, it was not the only reason. At different times, other less dramatic concerns were important, as other chapters will show. Police reform reflected over half a century of changing attitudes and priorities. It was too complex to be simplified and categorised into a short-term 'problem-response' view of police history.

Endnotes to Part II

Introduction

1. Quote by Sir David McNee, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner. Cited in D. Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace: The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979* (London, 1979), p.xiii.
2. *Ibid.*, p.3.
3. S.H. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988), p.29.
4. F.W. Maitland, *Justice and Police* (Cambridge, 1888), p.108.
5. C. Jeffries, *The Colonial Police* (London, 1952), p.30.
6. O. MacDonagh, *Early Victorian Government, 1830-1890* (New York, 1977), pp.169-170.
7. For a fascinating overview of the influence of police reform in Ireland, see Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland*.
8. M. Brogden, 'The Emergence of Police – the Colonial Dimension', *The British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 27 (1987), p.4.
9. Brogden attempts to turn on its head the conventional view that police models were exported from England and Ireland to the colonies. He argues that the colonial experience informed Britain, rather than the other way around. *Ibid.*, pp.4-14 and M. Brogden, 'An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and the Origins of the Professional Police', *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, Number 15 (1987), pp.179-208. For a critique, see J. Styles, 'The Emergence of Police: Explaining Police Reform in Eighteenth Century and Nineteenth Century England', *British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 27 (1987), pp.15-22.
10. D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray, 'Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940', in D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray, eds, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester, 1991), pp.3-12 and R. Hawkins, 'The 'Irish Model' and the Empire: A Case for Reassessment', in D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray, eds, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester, 1991), pp.18-24.
11. J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and Systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-1833'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), abstract.
12. A. Dinsmor, 'Glasgow Police Pioneers', *Journal of the Police History Society*, Number 15 (2000), p.9.
13. *Ibid.*, p.10.

14. *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.
15. S. Berry and H. Whyte, eds, *Glasgow Observed* (Edinburgh, 1987), p.29; D. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line: The Story of the City of Glasgow Police Force* (London, 1973), p.15; J. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', in *Old Glasgow Club Transactions*, Volume 1, Sessions 1900-1908, no author (Glasgow, 1908), pp.97-112, S.R.A., OGC I, 97; and J. Ord, 'A Short History of the Glasgow Police Force with a Survey of Modern Developments' (1935), pp.69-78, S.R.A., AGN, 99.
16. Ord, 'A Short History of the Glasgow Police Force', p.69.
17. Berry and Whyte, eds, *Glasgow Observed*, p.29.
18. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line*, p.15.

Chapter 4

1. This is certainly the assumption of the traditional histories. See, for instance, C. Reith, *British Police and the Democratic Ideal* (Oxford, 1843) and D. Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace: The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979* (London, 1979).
2. C. Emsley, 'A Typology of Nineteenth-Century Police', *Crime, History and Societies*, Volume 3 (1999), pp.29-44.
3. J.M. Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police, 1835-56', *English Historical Review*, Volume LLX (1955), pp.415-7.
4. J. Styles, 'The Emergence of Police: Explaining Police Reform in Eighteenth-Century and Nineteenth-Century England', *British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 27 (1987), pp.17-22; R. Paley, "'An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System?": Policing London before Peel', *Criminal Justice History*, 10 (1989), pp.95-130; D. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country, 1835-60* (London, 1977), pp.59-63; J.M. Beattie, *Crime and the Courts in England, 1600-1800* (Oxford, 1986), pp.71-2; and D. Philips and R.D. Storch, *Policing Provincial England, 1829-56: The Politics of Reform* (London, 1999), p.35.
5. 'G.P.O.D.', 1801, p.121.
6. See D. Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England: Crime, Conflict and Control* (Manchester, 1997), pp.34-5; and Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police, 1835-56', pp.415-25.
7. Cited in Corporation of the City of Glasgow, *Municipal Glasgow: Its Evolution and Enterprises* (Glasgow, 1914), p.287.
8. For Edwin Chadwick's views on this, see Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England*, pp.148-9.
9. S.H. Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988), p.76.

10. Emsley, 'A Typology of Nineteenth-Century Police', pp.30-44.
11. 'An act to consolidate, amend and extend the provisions of several acts for the better paving, watching, lighting and cleansing, and for regulating the police of the City of Glasgow and adjoining districts; and also for managing the statute labour of the said city; and for other purposes in relation thereto, 6 & 7 Victoria, cap. 99, 1843.' Hereafter referred to as 'Glasgow Police Act, 1843'.
12. J. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', in *Old Glasgow Club Transactions*, Volume 1, Sessions 1900-8, no author (Glasgow, 1908), G.C.A., OGC I, 97, pp.102-10.
13. D. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line: The Story of the City of Glasgow Police* (London, 1973), pp.26-7.
14. *Ibid.*, p.17.
15. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 10 January 1833.
16. 'G.P.O.D.', 1801-2, p.121.
17. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 September 1800.
18. J. Strang, *Glasgow and its Clubs* (Glasgow, 1856), p.396.
19. C. Withers, "'The Long Arm of the Law": Migration of Highland-Born Policemen to Glasgow, 1826-91', *The Local Historian*, 18, Number 3 (August, 1988), pp.129-30 and C. Withers, *Urban Highlanders: Highland-Lowland Migration and Urban Gaelic Culture, 1700-1900* (East Lothian, 1998), pp.138-40.
20. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line*, p.29.
21. See R.S. Rait, 'The Scottish Police in Early Times', *The Police Journal*, Volume III (1930), p.87.
22. 'Report to the Board of Police of Glasgow by the Committee on Watching and Lighting as to police matters' (Glasgow, 1871), G.C.A., DTC 14.2.1.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line*, p.16; and Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', p.99.
25. Styles argues that most watchmen in England were not uniformed, except for greatcoat and badge. Styles, 'The Emergence of Police', p.18.
26. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816 – Watchmen's Regulations' (Glasgow, 1816), Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room, G352.2, p.8.
27. *Ibid.*, p.7.
28. 'G.P.O.D.', 1801-2, p.121.

29. For more on the concept of policed society see A. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of some Themes', in D.J. Bordua, ed., *The Police: Six Sociological Essays* (New York, 1967).
30. 'An act for extending the Royalty of the City of Glasgow over certain adjacent lands; for paving, lighting and cleansing the streets; for regulating the police and appointing officers and watchmen, for dividing the city into wards, and appointing commissioners; and for raising funds, and giving certain powers to the Magistrates and Council, and Town and Dean of Guild Courts, for the above and other purposes, 39 & 40 George III, cap. 88, 1800'. Hereafter referred to as 'Glasgow Police Act, 1800'.
31. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', p.102.
32. 'An act for regulating the police of the barony of Gorbals, in the county of Lanark; for paving, cleansing and lighting the streets and passages thereof; erecting a bridewell or workhouse therein; and for other purposes relating thereto, 48 George III, cap. 42, 1808'; and 'An act for regulating the police of the burgh of Anderston and the lands of Lancefield and others, adjoining the said burgh, in the county of Lanark; for paving, cleansing and lighting the streets and passages of the said district, and for erecting a court-house and goal therein, George IV, cap. 119, 1826'.
33. Strang, *Glasgow and its Clubs*, p.395.
34. Cited in Corporation of the City of Glasgow, *Municipal Glasgow*, p.288.
35. R. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume IX, 1796-1808* (Glasgow, 1914), p.414. See also pp.413-15, 422 and 471-2.
36. G.C.A., C2/4/2, 19 June 1807.
37. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line*, p.19.
38. S. Berry and H. Whyte, eds, *Glasgow Observed* (Edinburgh, 1987), p.29; Grant, *The Thin Blue Line*, p.15; J. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', pp.97-112; and J. Ord, 'A Short History of the Glasgow Police Force with a Survey of Modern Developments' (1935), pp.69-78, G.C.A., AGN, 99.
39. Cited in Rait, 'The Scottish Police in Early Times', p.87. Quote from John Strang, a Glasgow City Chamberlain.
40. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 24 April 1804.
41. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 25 January 1810.
42. Cited in Rait, 'The Scottish Police in Early Times', p.87.
43. Paley, "An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System", pp.95-130; Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, pp.59-63; Beattie, *Crime and the Courts in England*, pp.71-2; and Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, p.35.
44. Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, pp.6 and 45.

45. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 September 1800.
46. For a full list of commissioners' occupations see Chapter 9. The occupations of early recruits were: Master of Police (merchant), treasurer (merchant), clerk (writer), sergeant (former sergeant) and officers (cook, weaver and two shoemakers). G.C.A., E1/1/1., 29 September 1800.
47. See G.C.A., E1/1/6, 25 January 1810; G.C.A., E1/1/8, 5 January 1815; and G.C.A., E2/1/1, 8 November 1817.
48. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 8 June 1809.
49. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 2 January 1812.
50. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 25 January 1810.
51. Cited in Berry and Whyte, eds, *Glasgow Observed*, p.31.
52. J. Bell and J. Paton, *Glasgow: Its Municipal Organisation and Administration* (Glasgow, 1896), p.116.
53. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 2 January 1812.
54. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816 – Watchmen's Regulations', pp.7-8.
55. Cited in Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England*, pp.148-9.
56. Paley, "An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System?", p.104.
57. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 9 September 1819.
58. For a good overview of the harsh nature police work, see Taylor, *The New Police in Nineteenth-Century England*, pp.47-51.
59. Bell and Paton, *Glasgow*, p.116.
60. N. Murray, *The Scottish Handloom Weavers, 1790-1850: A Social History* (Edinburgh, 1978), p.43 and pp.92-3.
61. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 4 February 1806.
62. Traditional accounts of police history also adopt this view. See W.L. Melville Lee, *A History of Police in England* (London, 1901), pp.271-2.
63. Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, p.145.
64. Initially, Hart argued that this view was inaccurate. Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police', pp.411-15. More recently, however, she has agreed with Tobias that there was a migratory class of criminals. J.M. Hart, 'Police', in W.R. Cornish, J. Hart, A.H. Manchester and J. Stevenson, *Crime and Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Dublin, 1978), p.195. J.J. Tobias, *Crime and the Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1967), pp.233-6.
65. Bell and Paton, *Glasgow*, p.157.
66. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 25 August 1817.

67. I. E. Maver, 'The Guardianship of the Community: Civic Authority Prior to 1833', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow* (Manchester, 1995), p.241.
68. F. Hill, *Crime: Its Amount, Causes and Remedies* (London, 1853), p.134.
69. Strang, *Glasgow and its Clubs*, p.400.
70. J.J. Tobias, *Crime and Police in England, 1700-1900* (Dublin, 1979), pp.11-12.
71. Paley, "An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System?", pp.105-6.
72. A. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings*, Volume I (Edinburgh, 1883), p.420.
73. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 19 January 1820. Initially, Commissioners requested that gates not be erected from the public purse. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 16 March 1820. However, they later decided to erect them where they were most needed. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 7 June 1821.
74. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 18 October 1821.
75. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 7 June 1821.
76. S. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland, 1800-50: With Special Reference to the Growth of Civic Government in Glasgow and its Suburbs'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1995), p.136.
77. 'General Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the state of Municipal Corporations in Scotland, 1835'. P.P., 1835, XXIX, p.58.
78. R. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume X, 1809-22* (Glasgow, 1915), p.523.
79. T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation and the Civic Response: Glasgow, 1800-30', in A.J.G. Cummings and T.M. Devine, eds, *Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700* (Edinburgh, 1994), p.192.
80. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 5 April 1820.
81. *Ibid.*
82. P. Berresford Ellis and S. MacA'Ghobhainn, *The Scottish Insurrection of 1820* (London, 1970), p.24.
83. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume X*, p.586.
84. Berresford Ellis and MacA'Ghobhainn, *The Scottish Insurrection of 1820*, p.140.
85. *Ibid.*, p.139. See also G. Gallacher, 'The First Glasgow Police'. Undergraduate Dissertation, University of Strathclyde (1986), pp.54-9.
86. Gallacher, 'The First Glasgow Police', pp.54-5.
87. *Ibid.*, p.56.
88. *Glasgow Herald*, 28 April 1820. See also *Ibid.*, pp.65-6.
89. Palmer claims that there were approximately 3,000 or 4,000 watchmen in London at the turn of the nineteenth century for a population of around 1,000,000. See Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland*, p.76 and p.153.

90. *Glasgow Herald*, 28 July 1820

91. For a definition of the Royalty of Glasgow, see 'Municipal Corporations (Scotland): Local Reports of the Commissioners. Part II: From Glasgow to Wigton', P.P., 1836, XXIII. Source for parishes: *Census of Great Britain, Part I, Summary, 1801-51, Volume II* (London, 1852). Sources for Blythswood Town: J. Cleland, 'Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the City of Glasgow and County of Lanark' (Glasgow, 1832), p.209 and *Glasgow Herald*, 13 August 1841. For police manpower, see 'G.P.O.D.', 1801, p.121; 'G.P.O.D.', 1811, p.164; 'G.P.O.D.', 1821, p.7; 'G.P.O.D.', 1831, p.34 and 'G.P.O.D.', 1841, p.8.

92. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland: In consequence of an inquiry directed to be made by Poor Law Commissioners', P.P., 1842, [H.L.] XXV.III.I, p.189.

93. Please note, in some years the figures for all suburban forces were not available. Where this applied, the information has been calculated using either expenditure of police or estimates of trends in manpower. See 'G.P.O.D.', 1801, p.121; 'G.P.O.D.', 1811, p.164; 'G.P.O.D.', 1821, pp.7-9; 'G.P.O.D.', 1831, pp.34-6 and 'G.P.O.D.', 1841, pp.7-10. See also H-AND/1/4, 23 October 1843; H-GOR/2/3, 13 September 1841; *Glasgow Herald*, 5 September 1831; H-GOR/2/2, 17 June 1831; and H-GOR/2/1, 7 September 1821.

Population figures for city and suburbs adapted from same sources as used for royalty, as well as C. Withers, 'The Demographic History of the City, 1831-1912', in W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, eds, *Glasgow, Volume II: 1830 to 1912* (Manchester, 1996), p.142.

94. 'Regulations of the Police, 1808' (Glasgow, 1808), Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room, C703578, p.7.

95. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 12 August 1830.

96. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 21 October 1830.

97. Persons living in streets to which this applied still were still assessed, so long as they were within the limits for watching and lighting set by Commissioners. 'Regulations of the Police, 1808', pp.5-7.

98. Cited in Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland', pp.113-14.

99. *Ibid.*

100. E.L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform, 1815-90*, Second Edition (Oxford, 1962), p.461.

101. See clause XLVIII of the 'Glasgow Police Act, 1800'.

102. Cited in Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume X*, p.586.

103. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 19 July 1810.

104. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 4 July 1811.

105. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 9 July 1812.

106. G.C.A., E1/1/8, 13 July 1815.

107. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 15 June 1812.
108. *Glasgow Herald*, 13 March 1807.
109. Gallacher, 'The First Glasgow Police', p.63.
110. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 25 August 1817.
111. A. Dinsmor, 'Glasgow Police Pioneers', *Journal of the Police History Society*, Number 15 (2000), p.9.
112. Paley, "An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System?" and E.A. Reynolds, *Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 1720-1830* (Stamford, 1998)
113. Styles, 'The Emergence of Police'; Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England*, pp.59-63; and Philips and Storch, *Policing Provincial England*, p.35.

Chapter 5

1. Extract from policing proposal, 10 December 1788. Cited in R. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VIII, 1781-95* (Glasgow, 1913), p.278.
2. G.C.A., C1/1/36, 2 March 1779.
3. R. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VII, 1760-80* (Glasgow, 1912), p.546.
4. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VIII*, pp. 5 and 338-9.
5. A. Dinsmor, 'Glasgow Police Pioneers', *Journal of the Police History Society*, Number 15 (2000), p.10.
6. *Ibid.* and G.C.A., C1/1/38, 10 December 1788.
7. Dinsmor, 'Glasgow Police Pioneers', p.10.
8. G.C.A., C1/1/38, 10 December 1788.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. G. Eyre-Todd, *History of Glasgow, Volume III: From Revolution to the Passing of the Reform Acts, 1832-3* (Glasgow, 1934), p.339.
12. D. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line: The Story of the City of Glasgow Police Force* (London, 1973); pp.1-15; J. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', in *Old Glasgow Club Transactions*, Volume 1, Sessions 1900-8, no author (Glasgow, 1908), pp.97-112, G.C.A., OGC I, 97; and J. Ord, 'A Short History of the Glasgow Police Force with a Survey of Modern Developments' (1935), pp.69-78, G.C.A., AGN, 99.

13. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VIII*, pp.492, 496-500 and 544.
14. Dinsmor, 'Glasgow Police Pioneers', p.9.
15. See P.J. Stead, 'Patrick Colquhoun: Preventive Police', in P.J. Stead, ed., *Pioneers in Policing* (Berkshire, 1977).
16. Extract from Police Bill, 10 December 1788. Cited in Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VIII*, p.278.
17. 'At a Meeting of the Committee of the Heritors and Burgesses upon the Police Bill Business, held on the 19 Day of February 1790', G.C.A., C2/1/1/174.
18. T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000* (London, 1999), pp.202-3.
19. *Glasgow Journal*, 15 January 1793. Cited in W.H. Fraser, *Scottish Popular Politics: From Radicalism to Labour* (Edinburgh, 2000), p.14.
20. Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, pp.203-7.
21. *Ibid.*, p.207 and Fraser, *Scottish Popular Politics*, pp.13-15.
22. J.R. Western, 'The Formation of the Scottish Militia of 1797', *Scottish Historical Review*, Volume 34 (1955), p.7.
23. Cited in K.J. Logue, *Popular Disturbances in Scotland, 1780-1815* (Edinburgh, 1979), p.77.
24. Cited in *Ibid.*, p.43.
25. The following paragraph is based on information contained in W.H. Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp.277-8.
26. *Ibid.*, p.278.
27. *Ibid.*, pp.279-81.
28. *Ibid.*, p.279.
29. Houston argues that there was a change in the social significance of riot by the second half of the eighteenth century. R.A. Houston, *Social Change in the Age of Enlightenment: Edinburgh, 1680-1760* (Edinburgh, 1994), pp.290-331. For an alternative view, see E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', *Past and Present*, Number 50 (1971), pp.76-136 and Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', pp.272-81.
30. Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', p.274.
31. See *Ibid.*, pp.275-82.
32. Evidence that the ruling elite were still prepared to intervene to provide relief is provided by T.M. Devine, 'The Failure of Radical Reform in Scotland in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Social and Economic Context', in T.M. Devine, ed., *Conflict and Stability in Scottish Society, 1700-1850* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp.61-2; and R. Mitchison, 'The Poor Law', in T.M. Devine and

- R. Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp.256-7.
33. Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', p.276.
34. *Glasgow Mercury*, 19 September 1787.
35. Fraser, 'Patterns of Protest', p.279.
36. G.C.A., C1/1/38, 10 December 1788.
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138. 'Regulations and Instructions for the Police Watchmen for the City of Glasgow' (Glasgow, 1828), Glasgow University Special Collections, Mu1-c.18.1, p.3.
139. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 27 December 1810.
140. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 23 March 1820.
141. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 20 July 1820.
142. *Ibid.*
143. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 24 April 1804.
144. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 24 October 1811.

145. *Ibid.*

146. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 9 September 1819.

147. Scott, *Abstract of the Police Acts of the City of Glasgow*, p.4.

148. 'Regulations and Instructions for the Police Watchmen for the City of Glasgow', p.1.

149. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816', p.5.

150. *Ibid.*

151. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816 – Watchmen's Regulations', p.14.

152. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 6 November 1817.

153. *Ibid.*

154. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816 – Watchmen's Regulations', p.14.

155. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 2 January 1812.

156. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816 – Watchmen's Regulations', p.6.

157. *Ibid.*

158. *Ibid.*, p.15.

159. 'Regulations for the Master of Police, Constables, Officers and Watchmen, Patrol, Scavengers, Superintendent of Lamps and Lamplighters, for the City of Glasgow, 1816', p.12.

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161. T.A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales, 900-1966* (London, 1967), p.153.

162. 'Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary to Home Secretary (Scotland) – First', P.P., 1859, Session 2 [40.], XIX. 687 (Hereafter cited as '1859 Inspector of Constabulary'), pp.43-6.

162. *Ibid.*, p.46.

163. See for instance, C. Reith, *The Police Idea* (Oxford, 1938); C. Reith, *British Police and the Democratic Ideal* (Oxford, 1843); C. Reith, *A Short History of the Police* (Oxford, 1952); D. Ascoli, *The Queen's Peace: The Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979* (London, 1979); and Radzinowicz, L., *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750*, Volume 3 (London, 1956).

164. Oliver provides a full-run down of wages in the main forces in Britain. Oliver, 'The Municipal Administration of Urban Society', p.184.

165. Murray, *The Scottish Handloom Weavers*, pp.90-1.
166. '1859 Inspector of Constabulary', pp.43-6.
167. *Ibid*.
168. 'Report to the Board of Police of Glasgow by the Committee on Watching and Lighting as to police matters' (Glasgow, 1871), G.C.A., DTC 14.2.1, pp.4-5.
169. 'General Report of the Commissioners appointed to Inquire into the state of Municipal Corporations in Scotland, 1835'. P.P., 1835, XXIX, p.58 and 'The First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force in the Counties of England and Wales'. P.P., 1839, XIX, p.84.
170. 'Notes upon the present system of police in Glasgow by a gentleman residing near that city' (Glasgow, 1820), p.13. Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room, C.46572.
171. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland', p.136.
172. I.E. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow, 1833-1912'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Strathclyde (1990), p.95.
173. S. Laidlaw, *Glasgow Common-Lodging Houses and the People Living in Them* (Glasgow, 1956), pp.48-9.
174. '1853 S.C.P.', p.111.
175. 'An Act to provide for the regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales, 5 & 6 William IV, cap. 76, 1835'.
176. 1853 S.C.P.', p.109.
177. Cited in Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland', p.113.
178. *Ibid*; Murray, *The Scottish Handloom Weavers*, p.109; and *Glasgow Herald*, 18 May 1849.
179. G.C.A., E1/9/2, 24 November 1846. Initially, it was proposed that the city be divided into only four districts – Central [old royalty of Glasgow], Eastern [mainly Calton], Western [mainly Anderston], Southern [mainly Gorbals].
180. 'City of Glasgow Police: Regulations, Orders and Instructions' (Glasgow, 1857), Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room, Moir Collection, G352.2 Cit., p.3.
181. A. Alison, 'The Increase of Crime', *Blackwood's Magazine* (May, 1844), p.539.
182. The figures for 1861 are calculated from information supplied by the Inspector of Constabulary in his annual report in 1862. The 1841 figures were referred to earlier. 'Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary to Home Secretary (Scotland) – Fourth', P.P., 1862, [310], XLV. 571, p.602. (Hereafter cited as '1862 Inspector of Constabulary'.)
183. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, pp.67-8.
184. V.A.C. Gatrell and T.B. Hadden, 'Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation', in E.A., Wrigley, ed., *Nineteenth-Century Society. Essays in the Use of Quantitative Methods for the Study of Social Data* (Cambridge, 1972), p.353.

185. See '1862 Inspector of Constabulary' report for Scotland', pp.576 and 602.
186. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland', pp.189-90.

Endnotes to Conclusion to Part II

1. See early Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary to Home Secretary (Scotland), Under the Provision of the Statute 20 & 21 Victoria, Cap. 72, especially 'Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary to Home Secretary (Scotland) – First', P.P., 1859, Session 2 [40.], XIX. 687, pp.43-6.
2. *Glasgow Herald*, 28 July 1828.
3. J.M. Hart, 'Reform of the Burgh Police, 1835-56', *English Historical Review*, Volume LLX (1955), p.421.

Part III

From 'Epoch-Making' Beginning to Lingering Death: The Rise and Fall of the Glasgow Police Commission, 1800-46

Introduction to Part III

Few historians would dispute the immense contribution police commissions made in nineteenth-century Scotland. In an era of rapidly deteriorating urban environments, police commissions were at the forefront in pioneering and managing public health and safety initiatives, alleviating human suffering while helping lay the foundation for the municipal revolution later in the century.¹ Moreover, the election of commissioners by local ratepayers installed in many burghs the first system of democratic accountability in a pre-reform era dominated by self-appointed councillors. As Henry Cockburn, champion of the Whig cause and Edinburgh Police Commissioner, wrote: ‘...the gradual extension of the police system over our towns trained the people to expect and to exercise elective privilege.’²

Yet, despite their historic significance, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the demise of police commissions throughout Scotland. Although often in the face of bitter opposition from commissions themselves, elected police authorities were increasingly incorporated into local government as the century progressed. By 1900, incorporation had become a statutory duty.³ All that remained of elected police commissions was their legacy.

The incorporation of the Glasgow Police Commission into the Police and Statute Labour Committee of the Town Council in 1846 was particularly surprising. Established in 1800, it was, in the words of one historian, ‘...[an] innovative body whose initiatives did much to create a new range of public services in the expanding city.’⁴ The first of its kind in any major city in Scotland, the pioneering achievements of the Glasgow Police Commission in lighting, paving, sanitation, and law and order undoubtedly served as a model for other burghs.⁵ Such was the Board’s contribution that Commissioner McTyler could remark: ‘...it was universally acknowledged that it...[was]...equal to any other, if not the very first, in the Empire.’⁶ Even Archibald Alison, Sheriff of Lanarkshire and vociferous critic of many burgh policing systems, waxed lyrical about the Commission’s achievements, noting: ‘the police force was admirable...not only efficient, but adequate to the wants of the district.’⁷

Yet, despite this, the Commission’s replacement was keenly sought in influential quarters by the 1830s, long before incorporation became obligatory and long before any other major police commission in Scotland had been disbanded. Part III will, in the following three chapters, analyse the reasons behind the Commission’s demise. Chapter 8 will analyse significance of the Commission and the economic and political background to its establishment. It will then outline the subsequent struggle to control and disband the Commission. Chapter 9 will analyse the motivation behind this struggle, and Chapter 10 will assess why those who

sought to disband the Commission were, after years of resistance, finally successful in achieving their objective.

The Struggle for Control of the Police Commission, 1789-1846

I

The Significance of the Glasgow Police Act, 1800

Described by Bell and Paton as an ‘epoch-making statute’, the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 was one of the most significant local enactments of the nineteenth century.¹ The powers it conferred upon commissioners did much to establish a new range of essential public provisions. In fact, as a specialist body charged with public services, the Commission was in advance of any other in Britain.² As well as establishing and managing a watch force, commissioners were responsible for street cleaning, the removal of filth, the cleansing of closes and streets, the paving of footpaths, the construction of sewers and the lighting of streets. Property rates were levied for the first time, the government of the city became differentiated and specialised, and innovations like recognising street cleaning as a public duty proved to be the first step towards the creation of departments like the Health and Sanitary Department of Glasgow.³ The method of replacing commissioners – a third going out annually in rotation – was later adopted by reformed town councils throughout Scotland to ensure that no representative could hold office for more than three years without submitting himself for election. Moreover, by dividing the city into twenty-four wards and creating a franchise based on assessed property rentals of L.10 and upwards, the Glasgow Police Act, in the words of one historian, ‘...became a model for the future organisation of local government in the city, and served as an important bridge between the old burgess-dominated municipality and the open system which prevailed after 1833.’⁴

The real significance of the act, however, lay in the fact that it established a degree of community control over the election of representatives.⁵ Unlike Glasgow Town Council, which remained a self-electing oligarchy until burgh reform in 1833, the Police Commission was to consist of twenty-four elected representatives, along with the Lord Provost, three bailies, the Dean of Guild and the Deacon Convenor. Commissioners were to be elected from dwelling house occupiers of L.15 or above annual rental, by occupiers of property of L.10 or above annual rental. They were to be returned from a list of all eligible householders in each ward, rather than a formal list of candidates who had put themselves forward. In other words, there was to be no formal selection process before the election; theoretically, any qualified householder could be elected whether he wanted to or not. If he did not, he could decline to qualify. A newly

enfranchised electorate and democratic authority were thereby created, thirty-two years before the first democratic parliamentary elections were held in the city.

Unfortunately, the absence of property records renders it impossible to assess the extent of enfranchisement in the Commission's formative years. It was not until the second quarter of the century that detailed information became available. In 1828-9, 7,793 properties were equal to or above the electoral rental qualification, of which 3,961 were dwelling houses and 3,832 businesses, according to figures published by local enumerator Cleland.⁶ The electorate, however, would have been considerably smaller than these figures suggest. No person was to have more than one vote upon his total possession or qualification, or vote in more than one ward, and a large number of Glasgow's enfranchised propertied class owned or occupied more than one property. Many proprietors rented both dwelling and business premises, which, regardless of whether or not they were contiguous, were listed separately in Cleland's returns. The city's Post Office Directory contained only a few thousand names, many of which had been entered twice, first as members of firms, and secondly as private residents.⁷ It is likely that the police electorate roughly mirrored that of the Council, which also had an L.10 property qualification. In 1833, 4,821 were entitled to vote in Council elections.⁸

One significant difference between the two electorates, however, was that women were not formally prohibited from voting in police elections. Although the five police acts introduced between 1800 and 1843 in Glasgow were couched in masculine gender, none openly denied women their democratic right. Not until 1843, in the Glasgow Police Act of that year, was it specifically stated that females were not entitled to vote. Prior to then, all '...occupiers of dwelling houses, shops, warehouses and other buildings...' of L.10 and upwards were enfranchised.⁹ A similar rationale governed suburban police elections. The 1843 Gorbals Police Act stated '...words importing the masculine gender shall include females', while the 1840 Calton Police Act permitted commissioners to be elected from '...people who either own property worth L.10 or more of yearly rent....'¹⁰ Indeed, female participation in police elections seems to have been not uncommon throughout the country. Other burghs where it is known that this was permitted included Forres, St. Andrews, Kilrenny and Edinburgh.¹¹

Of course, in Glasgow, female enfranchisement would not have greatly affected the size of the electorate as few women met the property requirements in the early 1800s. However, a small number did meet them. Although no electoral lists survive to quantify the female electorate, two disputed elections illustrate the point.¹² In 1825, commissioners upheld the vote of Catherine Carswell, while rejecting the vote of Anne Harper. The decisions centred on whether the women in question had stated the designation of their preferred candidate, not the elector's gender. Male votes were also validated by this criterion.¹³ In 1840 – eight years after the Reform Act had established only a male electorate – commissioners again upheld female

votes.¹⁴ This time the dispute centred on whether the designation of voters should be given. Votes by males that did not state the elector's designation were deemed illegal; similar votes by females were accepted, on the grounds that '...it was considered no proper designation could be given for female voters.'¹⁵ No reason was given as to why this was the case, but it strongly suggests that the female voters in question were housewives of L.10 male householders, rather than individual proprietors. It is not clear whether or not female householders were eligible to vote. Nonetheless, though their right to vote had still to be formally conceded in principle in the early 1800s, it had in practice – for the wives of L.10 male householders at least.

However, such concessions did not extend to all occupiers. Rating and representation did not go hand in hand, as has been claimed elsewhere.¹⁶ On the contrary, many ratepayers remained disenfranchised due to an injustice in the rating qualification, which set the rating and electoral levels at L.4 and L.10 respectively. Of the 15,637 properties valued at L.4 and above in Glasgow in the rental year 1828-9, 7,844 were under L.10, accounting for just over 50 per cent.¹⁷ It was a similar picture across the country. An article in *The Scotsman* in 1822 estimated that more than a quarter of police ratepayers in Edinburgh did not have a say in the election of commissioners.¹⁸

Moreover, those who held the vote tended to be small business owners, paying high rentals on their business premises, rather than the populace at large. The above 1828-9 figures show that only 20 per cent of small businesses were under L.10 rental (971 out of 4,803), compared to 63 per cent of dwelling houses (6,873 out of 10,834).¹⁹ The middle class, particularly self-employed burgh members, almost exclusively, therefore, formed the electorate, despite the financial contribution made by others. The voting qualification ensured it, with working-class house rentals as late as 1832 rarely rising above L.7.10.²⁰ Apparently, this class of ratepayers' money was valued more than its judgement. Those who belonged to it paid less in assessments, which were graded on a sliding scale, ranging from 4d. for the lowest rated properties (properties between L.4 and L.6 annual rental) to 1s. for the highest (properties over L.15 annual rental). But this was little compensation for being denied a voice in local affairs, despite the civic elite's claim to the contrary.²¹

Thus, though the Glasgow Police Act of 1800 deserves its title 'epoch-making statute' for the landmark local precedents that it set, it was not without limitations.²² For all the visionary zeal shown by its framers, the act remained in essence a conservative measure. A new wave of first-time voters may have been created overnight, but the vast majority of citizens, many of them ratepayers, remained disenfranchised. Elective privilege was vested only in a small number, comprising of the leading sections of Glasgow society.

II

The Struggle for the Establishment of the Glasgow Police Commission, 1789-1800

The above conclusion should come as no surprise, given the background to the Board's establishment. It was never the intention of the act's promoters or framers to introduce a revolutionary measure that was based on popular suffrage. Those demanding an elected Police Commission – primarily the Trades' House and middle class – were doing so to empower the politically impotent burgess class, not the working class. The principle of no money without representation on which the financing of the Commission was fought was intended to extend only to the middle class. Working-class political concerns played little part in the struggle for the Commission's establishment, other than the assurance given to appease the middle class that working-class house rentals would not be included in the franchise. Although this issue had caused concern in a 1792 policing proposal, for fear of the quality of police commissioners elected, it was always secondary to the real issue at hand, which was who was to control policing affairs: the old elite or the emerging classes of economic substance.²³

As Chapter 3 showed, the struggle for control of policing affairs was a salient feature of police development throughout Britain. Carson and Idzikowska argue that policing in Scottish burghs was a battleground upon which middle-class disillusionment with local government was fought.²⁴ Moreover, Philips and Storch argue that policing in provincial England was intertwined with debates about the future form of local government and the role local elites were to play in local affairs.²⁵ The issue of control was also a feature of police development in urban America. As Monkkonen has shown, reform in America's larger cities was often characterised by political struggle between urban elites.²⁶

The Glasgow experience was no different to these examples. Policing in the city in the 1790s was, among other things, one way in which middle-class disillusionment with the existing political and financial arrangements was expressed. In a city that was in the early stages of becoming manufacturing rather than mercantile by the end of the eighteenth century,²⁷ the concentration of Town Council control in the hands of a small, unaccountable, self-perpetuating oligarchy of colonial traders was increasingly resented, especially by new men of wealth. Members of both the city's constitutional electing bodies – the Trades' House, representing the incorporated trades, and the Merchants' House, representing mercantile interests – had vented their anger at the situation. But frustration was most strongly expressed in the Trades' House, primarily because of the Council set, which ensured that craftsmen were outnumbered by merchants, and could not hold the principal office.²⁸ The most obvious way discontent was seen was in the movement for burgh reform, but it also permeated policing issues, as Carson and

Idzikowska have pointed out.²⁹ Frustrated by elitist, mercantile control of local affairs, the creation of an elected Police Board had the potential to provide the emerging middle class with a voice and power base of their own; and, given that policing was wide in conception in this period, embracing a variety of administrative affairs, it was one that could rival the existing administration.³⁰

For this reason, both the civic elite and heritors and burgesses of the city eagerly sought control of policing affairs, both promoting their own policing proposals while bitterly opposing other plans. Attempts by the Town Council to introduce a policing system directly under its authority throughout the 1780s and 1790s were consistently matched by middle-class attempts to initiate an elected Commission. Such an approach, in fact, was common throughout the country. As Carson and Idzikowska point out, similar policing suggestions by discontented bourgeoisie in other burghs usually led to councils either instigating police reform to ensure it remained under their control, or staunchly opposing middle-class proposals for an elected commission in an attempt to preserve their own position.³¹

In Glasgow, councillors promoted police bills in 1783 and 1789.³² Both proposed placing police control firmly in the hands of councillors and magistrates, and rejected the principle of electing police commissioners from local ratepayers. They planned to levy a tax, not exceeding 2½ per cent, on all rents of houses, shops and warehouses with annual rentals not under but above L.2. Despite being accepted by the Merchants' House, both bills failed after widespread opposition, most notably from the Trades' House. This institutional body had no authority on its own to block the bills – under the city's constitution, the support of two of the city's three constitutional bodies was all that was required introduce a bill for tax raising purposes into Parliament.³³ However, the strength of public opposition led councillors to suspend the 1783 bill. The 1789 bill failed to get through Parliament, again in the face of widespread opposition.

It has been claimed that ratepayers had neither the desire to pay for a policing system, nor the foresight to see its benefits.³⁴ There is an element of truth in the first claim. In the late eighteenth century, resistance to compulsory taxation was strong. Every attempt to establish a police system brought dissenting voices over the costs involved. Even the 1800 Police Act had its opponents. As Mr Clydesdale, at a meeting of the Incorporation of Wrights, remarked: '...an additional tax to be levied from the inhabitants for such purposes is unnecessary....'³⁵

For many of the middle class, however, the issue of finance was secondary to control. Many were prepared to finance a policing system – the successful 1800 bill had been introduced '...at the request of a great number of respectable inhabitants of the city...' and was widely accepted.³⁶ But arrangements had to be on ratepayers' terms, not the Council's. Ratepayers were not prepared to concede further financial control and responsibility to an unpopular and

accountable municipal authority as the Council's bills proposed, especially in the hostile political climate. They had become increasingly disillusioned with Council control being vested in a self-appointed group of colonial traders and a perceived abuse of local finances.³⁷ The movement for burgh reform clearly highlighted this. Although this movement failed in the 1790s, the issue of policing provided the middle class with an alternative route to express their grievances and promote their aspirations. As such, only an elected authority, subject to sufficient control over expenditure, and in receipt of an annual financial contribution from councillors, would get the financial backing of the burgess class needed for a successful policing system. On the eve of reform in 1800, the Incorporation of Wrights captured the opinion of most craftsmen by resolving of the

...necessity of a well regulated police, for so large and populous a city as Glasgow [based on the] ...principle that the inhabitants taxed should annually elect their own Commissioners, who should be vested with power...of fixing the rate of tax, not exceeding a certain sum on rents.³⁸

That establishing a degree of local control was the main issue for the middle class was clearly illustrated in 1800, when the incorporated trades unanimously accepted an amended police bill that conceded this principle. Only months earlier, thirteen out of the fourteen trade incorporations rejected a proposal that did not concede this.³⁹ The Merchant House's continued support for Council bills was testimony to the dominant position of merchants on the Council. But even in this institution, a substantial body favoured an accountable policing system. Of the 288 merchants who voted on the Council's 1789 bill, only 133 voted in favour, 115 against.⁴⁰ This was a clear indication of discontent at the uneven distribution of power within merchant ranks, where power was concentrated in the hands of a small clique.

A number of such men, along with many of the non-merchant middle class, had sought to introduce an accountable policing system in 1790 and 1792. The 1790 plan by the city's heritors and burgesses proposed dividing the city into twenty-four wards, each with two elected superintendents controlled by a board of commissioners, which would include the Lord Provost, three bailies and eighteen elected commissioners chosen from householders of property valued at L.15 per annum. Councillors were to be prohibited from acting as commissioners, a clear indication of disillusionment with the Town Council. Superintendents were to be authorised to arrest and confine disorderly persons until they could be brought before a magistrate and were to ensure that the cleansing, lighting and watching of wards was properly carried out. The assessment to be paid was 7d. per annum.⁴¹ The 1792 plan proposed by the city's 'respectable inhabitants' was very similar to the 1790 proposal, although it recommended widening the franchise to L.4 rental per annum and altering the assessment to be levied (which was now to

levied on a sliding scale). This was in response to criticisms of the 1790 proposal that the electorate was too exclusive and the rate of assessment too high to be acceptable to the populace. Commissioners were to be elected from annual rentals of L.15 and above.⁴²

The 1792 proposal brought little documented response, other than criticism of the low electoral franchise, which it was claimed would lead to ideologically suspect commissioners being elected. Although Parliament was petitioned, the proposal came to nothing, largely due to Council apathy. The response of the civic elite to the 1790 proposal indicates why they were so unenthusiastic. Magistrates strongly opposed the proposal for a number of reasons, but they centred mainly on the threat a rival authority would pose to the Council. They argued that electing commissioners and superintendents from householders of property valued at L.15 rental per annum would lead to a tiny clique of wealthy property owners becoming representatives of the city's ratepayers. They also claimed that the role of commissioners and superintendents would undermine magisterial authority. Moreover, granting powers of arrest to ward superintendents would threaten the liberty of citizens by creating forty-eight new magistrates with jurisdiction equal if not superior to magistrates. For this reason, the idea of electing superintendents was firmly opposed, with magistrates arguing that they '...must undoubtedly be chosen by the Magistrates and Council....'⁴³ The bill was not sent to Parliament.

However, after nearly two decades, the stalemate was finally resolved, with compromise on both sides. Councillors had insufficient funds to finance a policing system. Royal Burghs in Scotland were limited as to how to impose taxation, and the five ways in which Glasgow could do this were outdated and raised insufficient funds for everyday requirements.⁴⁴ Therefore, having failed to get their own bills through Parliament in the face of widespread opposition, councillors and magistrates were forced to agree to an elected police authority in 1800 in the wake of a rapidly deteriorating urban environment, a perceived rise in crime and disorder and a growing realisation that traditional arrangements were not suited to the needs of a rapidly expanding population. They also agreed to contribute L.800 annually to policing costs in response to ratepayer demands. Moreover, assurances were given that annual assessments would not rise above certain levels for the first few years, ranging from four pence in the pound for the lowest to one shilling in the pound for the highest. The act stipulated that any surplus police revenue was to be reinvested '...so that the aforesaid assessments shall be proportionally diminished.'⁴⁵ Furthermore, commissioners were to publish annual financial statements. This was in response to demands that the Commission be transparent, unlike the Council, the latter of which repeatedly refused to let the Trades' House examine its accounts in the late eighteenth century.⁴⁶

To appease the civic elite, executive policing authority was vested in the Magistracy, as the legally designated guardians of the peace. In other words, commissioners were to be

responsible only for administration. Places on the Commission were reserved for the Lord Provost, three bailies, the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convenor. There were no legal provisions prohibiting councillors from acting as commissioners, and there were no elected superintendents in each ward. Moreover, the electorate was relatively exclusive, being restricted to L10 property holders, as councillors and magistrates had demanded.

Despite these concessions, many in local government resented the establishment of the elected police authority. As far as Glasgow's civic elite was concerned, an unpopular authority that had the potential to undermine merchant domination of public life had been created. This was inevitably going to create tension as the century progressed.

III

The Struggle for Control of the Glasgow Police Commission, 1800-46 – a Narrative of Events

The civic elite's frustration at the Board's establishment manifested itself in two ways. In the first quarter of the century, it took the form of trying to control the Commission. During the framing of the 1807 Glasgow Police Act (the 1800 act expired after seven years), the civic elite became embroiled in a bitter struggle over the eligibility of commissioners and the manner in which they were elected. Councillors and magistrates argued that the annual rental qualification for commissioners be raised from L.15 to L.30 and the number of bailies on the Commission increased from three to five. They also argued that in each ward there be at least fifteen householders eligible for election, elected by a minimum number of votes. Wards that did not meet these requirements would have their representatives appointed by the Commission.⁴⁷ Previously, there had to be less than ten qualified householders for this to happen, and no obligatory minimum number of votes was required. Essentially, the civic elite were attempting to increase magisterial authority of the Commission, render the Commission more exclusive to attract more socially acceptable commissioners, and disenfranchise a substantial number of voters, particularly those in less affluent wards with fewer qualified householders.

Not surprisingly, all the proposals were bitterly opposed by police commissioners, ratepayers and trade incorporations.⁴⁸ A meeting of local inhabitants argued that raising the commissioner qualification would be '...a marked reflection upon the present and former commissioners, who have so satisfactory to the public, and honourably to themselves, discharged their duty....'⁴⁹ The Incorporation of Masons, meanwhile, captured the opinion of the trade incorporations by opposing the attempt to increase the magisterial presence on the

Commission, ‘...so to prevent the Magistracy from obtaining any superiority or advantage over Commissioners.’⁵⁰ Each body put forward motions designed to weaken the influence of the civic elite and empower commissioners. The latter argued that if the magisterial presence on the Commission is to be increased, then ‘...there seems an evident propriety in providing that no member of the Town Council can act as a commissioner, and that a commissioner by becoming a councillor does *ipso facto* vacate the seat.’⁵¹ The Incorporation of Cordiners added to this by arguing that the number of commissioners elected should increase in proportion to bailies. Calls were also made for commissioners to appoint ward constables and make bye-laws and regulations, and councillors were asked to contribute more to police costs.⁵² Clearly, the hostility towards councillors transcended the Commission’s establishment.

However, unlike during the struggle for the Commission in 1800, there was a less effective opposition to magisterial proposals. Parliament’s dissolution in that year did much to weaken the resolve of ratepayers, largely because the expense of opposing the bill in Parliament would have to be borne again. Pleas for more money were made from those mobilising opinion against the bill, so as to ‘...not allow the advantages which have seemingly with reluctance been made by the Council, to be all lost for want of funds....’⁵³ But they had little effect. Magistrates got their bill through Parliament with few amendments. The commissioner qualification rate was increased from L.15 to L.30, unless there were less than fifteen electors in each ward, whereby it would be reduced to L.25, or L.20, etc., until there were enough qualified. Furthermore, the bailie presence was increased to five. None of the proposals advanced by commissioners and the trade incorporations was accepted, although they successfully opposed the attempt to introduce a minimum number of votes to elect commissioners.

The civic elite made similar attempts to control the Commission in the second quarter of the century. In 1843, Henry Home Drummond, MP for Perthshire, attempted to ban publicans and pawnbrokers from acting as commissioners by amending the 1843 Glasgow Police Bill. Commissioners opposed the proposal, on the grounds that they ‘...unanimously and strongly disapprove of said proposal and of all interference with the rights of the electors to chose their representatives...from whatever classes they shall consider best qualified....’⁵⁴ The bill was modified, to the effect that only small spirit dealers were prohibited. Wholesale dealers were eligible, so long as their dwelling houses were valued at L.20 or over rental. Pawnbrokers were not prohibited, though, for the first time, they were required to be licensed.⁵⁵ In the same year, an attempt was made to increase the commissioner qualification rate to L.20, after it had been lowered to L.10 in 1837. However, commissioners successfully opposed it, arguing that it would be unfair if the qualification rate for the Commission was higher than that of either Council or Parliament. They also argued that it would deprive several poor wards of having representatives on the Commission.⁵⁶

By the 1830s, however, such attempts to control the Commission became increasingly of secondary importance. Instead, they were replaced with a stronger desire to see the Commission disbanded. Unlike in England and Wales, this did not emanate directly from central government in the form of obligatory instruction. The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act – which incorporated improvement and watch commissions in England and Wales – did not apply to Scotland. The Scottish equivalent – the 1833 Burgh Reform Act – was an enabling enactment, which permitted but did not compel burghs in Scotland to establish or incorporate policing systems. Nonetheless, Government influence was still exercised. The Lord Advocate – Government’s chief legal representative in Scotland – led the calls for the Commission’s disbandment, along with magistrates, Conservative councillors and the Lord Provost.

Numerous proposals and bills were put forward proposing the abolition of the Police Commission, heralding a contentious and prolonged conflict.⁵⁷ Attempts by the civic elite in 1837 and 1840 to extend criminal policing arrangements over the wider municipality under the control of local magistrates and justices were followed by a Government attempt in 1843 to create an extended, centralised criminal policing structure. All failed in the face of widespread opposition, most notably from commissioners and Liberal councillors, the latter of whom regarded centralisation as a threat to local autonomy. For Liberals, however, this did not amount to unconditional support for the Commission *per se*. By the mid-1840s, they themselves advocated the Commission’s disbandment, albeit with its responsibilities transferred to local rather than central government.

The 1835-6 Report into the Municipal Corporations first raised the issue of disbanding the Police Commission. It argued that all police commissions in Scotland should be incorporated into local government following burgh reform in 1833.⁵⁸ Commissioners in Glasgow staunchly refuted the recommendation, arguing that assuming responsibility for police would place too much of a burden on overworked councillors, who had neither the time nor specialist local knowledge to deal with police affairs. They argued that a separation in management between Council and police was essential to ensure that neither was neglected.⁵⁹ Commissioners throughout the 1830s and 1840s used this to justify the need for a second elected municipal authority. No immediate steps were taken to implement the report’s recommendation.

Within a year, however, the first proposal was put forward to reform policing arrangements. In 1837-8, the Lord Provost suggested establishing a criminal police district and board for the parliamentary burgh under the authority of the magistrates of Glasgow, Gorbals, Calton and Anderston, the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, county justices and three police commissioners. Existing police boards were to be abolished and replaced by elected local boards of civil police covering the extended police area. In other words, the criminal and civil police were to be separated, the former under the control of the Magistracy and county justices and the

latter elected representatives. The elected representatives of the civil police were to be responsible only for environmental issues such as lighting, cleansing and paving, not law and order.⁶⁰

However, it was not until two years later that an attempt was made to implement such a system. In 1840, a Conservative dominated Town Council signified its intention of petitioning Parliament to introduce a police bill based on similar principles, although no place on the Board of Criminal Police was to be reserved for police commissioners. The latter's places were to be taken by Glasgow's Dean of Guild and Deacon Convenor. Commissioners, in opposing the bill, drew upon substantial public support, particularly from pawnbrokers and the Glasgow Spirit Dealers' Association who feared greater police surveillance and increased taxation under the new regime. Liberals in the Town Council also opposed the bill, instead favouring municipal expansion as a solution to the city's policing problems. They exploited concern at what an extended police system would cost in order to make political gain at the expense of their Conservative counterparts.⁶¹ They, along with commissioners, also argued that police affairs would be managed more economically and efficiently if the civil and criminal police were kept under one body.

A bitter struggle ensued over the next two years. Each promoted bills in Parliament – commissioners in defence of existing arrangements – while claiming the right to originate and finance police enactments. Accusations emanated from the civic elite that commissioners were using police funds illegally to safeguard their own position, a claim commissioners strongly denied. Indeed, magistrates even attempted to prohibit commissioners from using police funds to promote police acts, though, hypocritically, they were using Council funds for the same purpose.⁶² After two years of hostility, the bills finally appeared in Parliament in 1842, each being vigorously contested by a host of witnesses. However, the House of Commons Committee, exasperated by the seemingly endless petty squabbling, recommended that both parties withdraw their bills, and enter into some arrangement for an amicable solution. Local police acts, subject to periodic renewal, were not regarded as being the most effective solution to Glasgow's policing problems.⁶³ As Pagan has pointed out, this recommendation was tantamount to a command, and effectively ended one of the most contentious disputes seen in the city.⁶⁴

Conservative failure in the municipal elections in November 1842 brought with it a reversal in the civic elite's policing policy.⁶⁵ Liberals used their ascendancy to empower commissioners to draft a police bill, while reserving the right to initiate a general policing measure in future to magistrates. With all civic opposition withdrawn, commissioners promoted a bill proposing to renew their former powers. However, its progress was interrupted. In March 1843, Government declared its intention of introducing a general criminal police bill for the parliamentary constituency, which it had done for Manchester.⁶⁶ This proposed centralising the

criminal police under the authority of two or three commissioners appointed by the Lord Advocate. The Liberal Council approved of an extended policing system, but under only magisterial, not central government, control, and only on the basis that unity was maintained between the civil and criminal police.⁶⁷ The Government's attempt to centralise control of the criminal police was strongly opposed as a threat to local autonomy.⁶⁸

Councillors, along with police commissioners, drew on substantial public support, including a petition of over 16,000 signatures opposing the bill.⁶⁹ Such opposition led to the bill being abandoned in favour of the commissioners' bill, which received royal assent in 1843. It renewed previous police acts and powers for twenty-one years.⁷⁰

However, for many Liberal councillors, the 1843 Glasgow Police Act was a short-term solution. Policing problems, they argued, would be overcome only through municipal restructuring. Shortly after the 1843 act was introduced, they resolved that '...every exertion...' should be used to bring about amalgamation, although no recommendations were made as to the structure of the enlarged municipality.⁷¹ They were prompted into action by a bill by the magistrates of Anderston in 1844 proposing to extend their jurisdiction over Woodside and adjacent lands, which were affluent areas to the west of Glasgow. As these areas were also desirable for tax purposes, commissioners, with magisterial and Council support, opposed the bill, and drafted one of their own to incorporate these lands into Glasgow. While this was going on, the authorities of the populous village of Bridgeton to the east were drawing up a bill to erect it into a police burgh, while the authorities of Calton and Mile-end proposed a bill to extend their boundaries over Bridgeton. Yet another procession of representatives and petitions were sent to Parliament to promote these bills, much to Parliament's exasperation. Growing weary of the endless sectional squabbling, Parliament threw-out all bills, and made clear that only a general system of police for the parliamentary constituency would be acceptable.⁷²

Such intimation gave the Lord Advocate, the Lord Provost, magistrates and the Liberal dominated Council the impetus to formulate their previous flirtation with the concept of extending the wider municipality. The Lord Advocate again stated his view that the police should extend throughout the parliamentary constituency under the control of two or three commissioners not subject to popular appointment.⁷³ The civic elite, preferring instead to maintain police control in the city, advocated incorporating the Glasgow Police Commission into the Town Council and extending magisterial jurisdiction over the parliamentary constituency. In 1845, magistrates and councillors drew up a bill proposing this. Police affairs were to be placed in the hands of the Police and Statute Labour Committee of the Town Council, which would be administratively independent of the Council, but appointed exclusively from councillors and magistrates, along with the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convenor. To appease the Lord Advocate, and in accordance with Government demands, the Chief Superintendent was to be

appointed by the Lord Provost, magistrates and Sheriff of Lanarkshire, and not, as it stood, by police commissioners.⁷⁴

Not surprisingly, Glasgow police commissioners and their suburban counterparts opposed the bill. Although not opposing the proposal to extend the municipal boundaries, they argued that ‘...if the present police establishments of the city and suburbs were to be disturbed, and the whole united under one general establishment, it was expedient...that the affairs of this large establishment should be managed by a board of commissioners, specially elected for the purpose....’⁷⁵ Their opposition, however, was ineffective. The 1846 Police Act passed the legislature on 27 July 1846, forty-six years after the historic Police Commission had been established. The next two chapters will analyse why the Commission’s disbandment was keenly sought and why, after nearly ten years of resistance, it was finally achieved.

**Pressures for Reform – The Motivation
behind the Police Commission’s
Incorporation**

I

**Pressures for Reform – Uncoordinated
Policing Arrangements**

The immediate concern in promoting the 1846 Police and Statute Labour Act appeared to have more to do with the wider municipality than the Police Commission. Reform was sought to co-ordinate and extend policing arrangements under the one Magistracy and make Glasgow’s civic entity coterminous with the wider parliamentary constituency.¹ This was seen as being essential to improving the efficiency of criminal policing arrangements in the wider municipality, which housed five different police authorities. As the Lord Provost argued, ‘...an extended and general system of police, extending over the parliamentary boundary, was the only measure which could properly secure the effectiveness which was absolutely necessary in such a large city...’² Every attempt at reform made by the civic and ruling elite from the late 1830s had this as a concern. In supporting the 1846 Police Act, the Lord Advocate argued that the ‘...extension and union of the criminal police over the parliamentary burgh was the only thing he cared about.’³

As Chapter 4 showed, this was a reflection of the fragmented nature of policing arrangements in the parliamentary constituency, which housed five judicial boundaries, five magistracies and five policing authorities. Serious problems of coordination inevitably arose and brought widespread criticism from influential figures like Sheriff Archibald Alison.⁴ Although condemnation of existing arrangements had long been prevalent amongst those who desired a more coordinated policing system, it took on greater significance in the late 1830-40s. In Conservative circles, in particular, it was a reflection of growing concern about the inefficiency of policing arrangements in coping with industrial disorder. As Chapter 7 pointed out, the 1830s were volatile times in industrial relations in and around Glasgow. Technological innovations and a deepening commercial crisis led to growing unemployment, falling wages and deteriorating employment opportunities for many industrial sectors. Working-class militancy and industrial unrest were widespread. The summer of 1837 was a particularly troubled period with iron miners, iron moulders, coal miners, sawyers and cotton spinners in Lanarkshire all on strike attempting to safeguard jobs, pay and conditions. Violence and intimidation against strikebreakers and employers were commonplace. The cotton spinners’ dispute in Glasgow was

particularly bitter. One strikebreaker was shot dead, leading to the transportation of five committee members of the Cotton Spinners' Association.⁵ Amidst this background, the political movement of Chartism was emerging to articulate working-class grievances.

As industrial disorder intensified, it became more difficult to maintain order and protect the safety of strikebreakers. The only adequate police force in the parliamentary constituency was in Glasgow, numbering 224; and it had no jurisdiction outwith the city boundary where much industrial unrest occurred. The suburban forces in Gorbals, Calton and Anderston, where many mills were located, had around only fifteen-to-twenty officers each for around 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants. The authority responsible for maintaining public order, the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, Archibald Alison, lamented at this situation, arguing that these forces were '...inadequate in ordinary times...[and]...wholly unfit to meet the exigencies of disturbed periods when general distress prevailed, or formidable strikes had reduced half the working classes to compulsory destitution.'⁶ He was especially critical of suburban police commissioners and the democratic control to which they were subject, claiming that because they were elected '...by what amounted almost to household suffrage...' they were reluctant to set the adequate assessment necessary for effective policing.⁷ Suspicion and jealousy exacerbated the problem as it prevented each area working together. As Alison noted:

...in the suburbs, which contained 100,000 souls, and where the principal manufactories were situated, there was either no police at all, or a very inefficient one, so broken down into minute subdivisions and separate jurisdictions that no respectable force for any common object could be collected.⁸

Other parts of the parliamentary constituency had no police at all. There was no county police, leaving rural areas and many manufacturing districts without protection. When being besieged by masters and employers claiming intimidation and violence by striking workers, Alison had '...not a single policeman...' to help them.⁹ During such times of crisis, he had to rely on special constables and military forces to maintain order, but they were often unreliable. When he called for volunteers to meet him to protect strikebreakers at a cotton mill in Oakbank in 1837, "Only one appeared!"¹⁰ Landowners were equally apathetic. During a disturbance in the Lanarkshire town of Airdrie in 1842, few responded to Alison's call '...raise the *posse comitatus*, or constabulary force.' Apart from a group of constables '...armed with billhooks and batons, not one of the landed proprietors did anything, either for their own or the public defence.' He added sardonically, '...they nearly all disappeared: it was surprising how many wives and daughters were suddenly found to require sea-bathing at Ardrossan, the waters of Harrogate, or the prescriptions of Dr Jephson at Leamington.'¹¹ For Alison, these examples were

‘...a demonstration [of] how dangerous it is to suppress even the most outrageous violence in one part of the population by the aid of another part.’¹²

This convinced him that it was unwise to use civilians to control other civilians. This, he believed, would be best achieved by strengthening the state’s coercive apparatus. Yet, he was frustrated in his attempts to effect police reform in Lanarkshire.¹³ He proposed establishing a police force centred in Glasgow but covering all outlying areas within twenty miles to protect ‘...the whole manufacturing districts of the west of Scotland.’¹⁴ But he faced ‘...obstinate resistance...’ from the country gentlemen of Lanarkshire who were unwilling to finance such a system.¹⁵ Landowners resented an inequitable system of assessment, in which rogue money was taxed on the value of land rent rather than property, as a burden on proprietors rather than tenants. (Rogue money was a tax to pay for the arrest, detention and prosecution of criminals.) Tenants, in other words, paid nothing. Not surprisingly, landowners were in no hurry to add further to their burden. Moreover, landowners of the sparsely populated and tranquil rural areas in the upper ward of the county were not prepared to finance the policing of industrial areas in the middle and lower wards.¹⁶ In their view, they would be paying to police the problems of coal and iron masters. According to A.J. List, senior police officer, the landowners’ argument was that ‘...we do not require so many policeman as you do in the lower and middle wards, where you have coal-works and iron-works, and [yet] we shall be assessed to supply your wants.’¹⁷ As Carson and Idzikowska point out, industrialists, even if they were proprietors, would pay only a fraction of the cost appropriate to their needs.¹⁸ Referring to policing proposal for the county, a landowner put a figure on the discrepancy:

... the proposed plan of a police for the county of Lanark was 40 police for the lower ward, 20 for the middle ward, and 7 for the upper ward.... I have here a return of the whole property in those wards: in the upper ward the value of the property is L.135,649, in the middle ward, L.450,915 and in the lower ward L.157,438, so that in fact, the upper ward, with its seven policemen, would pay as much as the lower ward, with its 40 policemen.¹⁹

In the face of such resistance, industrial Lanarkshire towns like Airdrie and Coatbridge established their own separate police forces. In the case of Coatbridge, this came about after the ironmasters had requested that the mining commissioner use his influence to bring about police reform.²⁰ A county police force was not introduced until 1857 when it became obligatory for every county to establish one. According to Alison’s reflections on this, once recalcitrant landowners, such as the Duke of Hamilton, ‘...had become the greatest owners of coal and iron mines in the county...and...began to see what it was to have several thousand colliers and ironminers out on strike...without any civil force to coerce them...’, they no longer opposed the establishment of a county force.²¹ In other words, once the threat from disorder outweighed

concerns about cost, the concept of police became more acceptable. This was also a common feature of English county policing.²²

In and around Glasgow, however, the need for an extended policing system was realised from the late 1830s after the industrial unrest. Conservatives, in particular, attached great ideological significance to the need for such a system. Influenced by Sir Robert Peel, architect of the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act, a coordinated policing system was perceived as being a control mechanism that was central to the stability of the social order.²³ In particular, it was perceived as being an essential check to working-class militancy. This was highlighted in the 1839 County Constabulary Report, which cited Glasgow as an example of the urgent necessity of more coordinated policing in the face of militant trade unionism.²⁴ As one of its contributors, Archibald Alison, noted:

I think the extension of a regular police would have a very great effect; more effect than anything else possibly could have in checking the evils of combination; because I think that if any combination could only be severed from its accompanying intimidation and violence, it would cease to be an evil at all.²⁵

Liberals, meanwhile, had their own ideological motives for reform. Firstly, a coordinated policing system was necessary for practical reasons of financial stringency and municipal efficiency – it would streamline the administrative structure and pool resources.²⁶ This was a product of the Whig philosophy of the need for financial efficiency and rationalisation in urban administration, which gained widespread currency in the mid-1830s and 1840s.²⁷ With councils being democratically elected from 1832, it was regarded as an extravagant waste of resources to have five elected police authorities in one parliamentary constituency. The 1835-6 Report into the Municipal Corporations in Scotland argued that all police commissions in Scotland should be incorporated into local government following the democratisation of town councils in 1833, citing Glasgow as an example of the adverse effects of competing local authorities.²⁸

Secondly, Liberals feared that failure to solve the city's policing problems would lead to an unpopular system, free from local control, being forced upon the municipality from London.²⁹ This was instrumental in their decision to withdraw support for the Commission in 1843. The Government's attempt to centralise police control in 1843 seemed to confirm contemporary fears. As Councillor Dunlop remarked:

Government finds a great community like this that cannot agree upon the fitting measure for the lives and properties of the inhabitants, not only in the city itself, but in the extensive suburbs around it – a community so vast that any serious disturbance in it must be felt over the

nation at large. And if they themselves could not agree on a proper measure for the protection of the peace, it became the duty of the Government to interfere and provide one.³⁰

All councillors, admittedly, did not hold this view. Some argued that Government would not have proposed introducing a centralised policing system had it not been for the promptings of the Lord Provost. Councillor Lumsden claimed of the 1843 Government proposal ‘...that the Government never would have interfered but for the great anxiety displayed by his Lordship, and the influence he had made use of to get them to take this measure in hand.’³¹ However, although it was widely held that the Lord Provost had instigated the Government’s proposal in 1843 – an act for which he was censored by councillors – the popular consensus was that Government would impose an extended policing system if the civic elite did not. As the *Glasgow Herald* argued in 1843, the Town Council ‘...will not succeed in preventing Government interference otherwise than by uniting their fellow citizens in approval of a practicable general measure of police....’³² Even the Lord Provost stated this in defence of his actions.³³

Councillors and magistrates were perfectly aware that policing arrangements in and around Glasgow were increasingly frustrating Parliament. Apart from the problems referred to above, many extensive areas in and around the municipality had no policing system in place at all. Some were affluent areas in the west of the city, but the majority were ‘...inhabited by the humbler classes to east...’ such as Bridgeton, Camlachie and Parkhead, where policing was very much needed.³⁴ Councillors frequently pointed out that Government would not tolerate Britain’s second most populous city being so inadequately policed for much longer, especially in areas where society’s ‘dangerous classes’ were perceived to inhabit.³⁵ Government had shown a willingness to intervene where necessary in matters of law and order, temporarily imposing Metropolitan-style policing systems on Bolton, Birmingham and Manchester between 1839 and 1842. There was also the problem of parliamentary time being overwhelmed by local policing bills which councils and policing authorities throughout the country were increasingly promoting. Between 1837 and 1846, seven were promoted in Glasgow alone, of which only two were successful. Many more were promoted for suburban areas. Such petty sectional squabbling was much to Parliament’s distaste, and greatly hastened the likelihood of Government intervention.

Only a general policing measure for the whole municipality would solve this problem and appease Government. This was clearly highlighted in 1843 when Parliament superseded all local police bills before it that related to Glasgow and its neighbours, and called instead for a general union. Government intervention to effect this would have been bitterly resented by councillors, partly on the ground that the outcome could be insensitive to Glasgow’s needs, but

essentially on the threat it would have posed to local autonomy. A Town Council memorial on a proposed Government Police Bill in 1843 underlined this:

In the resolutions of the constituted authorities and public boards, it is decidedly in favour of local enactments emanating directly from the people to be affected, as the best judges of their own requirements: in other words, in favour of the principles of self-government and regulation, and popular representation, and opposed to the interference of the Government in local affairs...[such]...interference of Government, in the present instance, trenches on the principles of representation and responsibility, which the Council conceive to be a fundamental one of the British constitution.³⁶

By this date, the desire to effect a uniform policing system was stimulated as much by fear from Government interference as social unrest.

The controversy surrounding reform, therefore, became irretrievably intertwined in the debate about who controlled municipal affairs. And it was not just between local and central government. It was to prove equally pertinent in relations between the two rival administrative bodies in Glasgow – the Town Council and Police Commission – with a significant outcome for the latter’s durability. For though municipal reform was intended to extend the municipality of Glasgow and coordinate policing arrangements, it was also used as a tool to disband the Police Commission. The expansion of Glasgow’s boundary and the elimination of all existing police commissions in the parliamentary constituency did not necessarily go hand in hand. Claims by councillors that ‘...there was a need to eliminate existing separate and independent burghs and jurisdictions within the parliamentary boundary...’ explained only the rationale behind amalgamation, not the demise of the elected police authority.³⁷ Reform could have been effected while preserving one elected Police Commission for the parliamentary constituency, as commissioners argued. That the civic elite opposed such a measure, and indeed actively sought to replace the Commission, holds the key to why the city’s first elected authority was disbanded forty-six years after its historic birth.

II

Pressures for Reform – Prestige

A powerful motive for the civic elite was the boost they themselves would get from incorporation. Contemporary reports claimed that the prestige of Council had declined since the Commission’s establishment. The House of Commons Select Committee on the 1846 Municipal Police and Statute Labour Bill was crammed with references to the declining status of town

councillors.³⁸ Particular concern centred on the growing lack of interest in Council elections, which, in the words of Bailie Anderson, had been ‘...considerably diminished....’³⁹

Although such claims were deliberately exaggerated to enhance the case for incorporation, there is little doubt that many in Council circles were envious of their municipal counterparts. Councillors had neither the revenue nor range of responsibilities conferred upon commissioners. On the eve of reform in 1845, the former had an annual expenditure of L.15,716; the latter had L.24,592.⁴⁰ The Council’s financial limitations were brought home to councillors in the 1840s following numerous government reports that portrayed Glasgow as one of the dirtiest and unhealthiest cities in Britain. Such public condemnations convinced the civic elite of the need for a more interventionist, regulatory approach to urban management. A wide range of initiatives that would improve the city’s public health and flagging image was sought. The City Improvement Trust initiative of the 1860s – which aimed to clear city centre slums – had its genesis in the 1840s when the civic fathers realised the need for promoting a positive image of the city.⁴¹ However, councillors before incorporation did not have enough resources with which to embark on reform. Unlike police commissioners, they had no authority to levy rates for policing purposes. The Council’s revenue raising powers were restricted to five forms of assessment, each of which was outdated and yielded insufficient funds. A more effective and uniform system of direct taxation was needed.⁴² Incorporation would provide this by conferring upon councillors rating powers hitherto held by commissioners. As commissioner Moir argued in 1846, ‘...the Corporation was in an exceedingly shaky condition – the money bags were exceedingly empty – and the Town Council wanted to get their hands into the pockets of the inhabitants by hook or by crook.’⁴³

Moreover, incorporation would greatly enhance the position of councillor as sole administrator of municipal authority, which is what many councillors had long sought. As Bailie Anderson remarked ‘...we are more desirous now to render the office of councillor still more important than it is. And...by attaching to it the police affairs, I think you will render it an object of greater ambition.’⁴⁴

For some, therefore, 1846 was simply the culmination of what their forefathers had fought for in the reform struggle at the turn century – the elimination of a rival body with the power to undermine Town Council authority. As the Lord Provost – commenting on the proposed incorporation of the Commission – noted in 1846: ‘...I am certain that we will never have a more favourable opportunity of obtaining what this Council have long desired to see accomplished.’⁴⁵

Such sentiments, however, were by no means universally held. Self-interest was not an issue for all councillors. Many had opposed attempts to disband the Police Commission

throughout the late 1830s and early 1840s. Councillor Turner of Thrusgrove even chaired a public meeting that overwhelmingly resolved to campaign against the 1846 bill.⁴⁶ Moreover, self-interest does not explain the timing behind the Commission's demise. Why its incorporation was actively sought four decades after its establishment can be fully explained only by developments that took place in the 1830s and 1840s.

III

Pressures for Reform – Corruption, Nepotism and Inefficiency?

By the 1830s, concerns were voiced over perceived commissioner inefficiency and corruption. It was widely reported that ratepayers' money was being squandered with each passing year. Peter Mackenzie's *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* was the most vocal on this point, claiming in 1846 that '...during the last six years, more money has been squandered away by this Board and some of its adjuncts, or quondam friends, than had been done for six and thirty years preceding!'⁴⁷ Particular resentment was directed towards what appeared to be lavish spending on numerous aborted police bills. Sir George Strickland, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on the 1846 Municipal Police Bill, estimated that L.3,000 had been spent annually between 1836 and 1846 in either promoting or opposing them.⁴⁸ Moreover, it was portrayed that commissioners were all too willing to exploit police bills. Press reports lamented at the numerous trips by commissioners to Parliament to oppose and promote these bills, portraying them as little more than an annual outing at ratepayers' expense. As Peter Mackenzie argued:

Sweep away, then, this board, and...there will be no more bungled bills in Parliament at the commencement of every session, and fewer "deputations" at so much per head, entailing, in the shape of assessments, a grievous burden on the community...[For we will be]...much mistaken if the citizens of Glasgow will not be astonished and indignant to learn...how they have been deceived, and pillaged, and plundered, to an enormous extent, in the name of Police Acts, by the worshipful Board.⁴⁹

This was one of many claims made by Mackenzie of personal corruption among commissioners. He made numerous accusations of '...how much have some of them [police commissioners] pocketed.'⁵⁰ He actively advanced the perception that commissioners were hiding police accounts from the public so as not to reveal '...wasteful, and unwarranted, and prodigal expenditure of the public money entrusted in them....'⁵¹ Moreover, numerous reports lamented at perceived nepotism, cronyism and electoral corruption, amidst claims of commissioners and their associates being elected and appointed '...illegally and unjustly....'⁵²

There were instances to support some of these claims. Commissioners and their associates were appointed to salaried positions of importance in controversial circumstances. The appointment of Superintendent Denovan's in 1832, and his subsequent resignation a year later, is a good case in point. It was evident that a section of the Police Commission sought Commissioner Watson's election to this post rather than Denovan's, despite the fact that the latter was an experienced, well-qualified candidate, who had previously held the position of Superintendent of Leith Police. On the way to the ballot, Watson's supporters subjected Denovan's to aggressively hostile treatment. Describing his entrance to the hall where the vote was to be made, Commissioner Mackenzie, remarked that he had

...just been way-laid and insulted by Mr Watson's party, in order to prevent him coming forward; and when they found their efforts unavailing, he has been hissed and hooted along the passage by the liberal gentlemen.⁵³

Within the year, Denovan had resigned, citing many 'grievances', though the arbitrary way in which commissioners illegally appointed officers that Denovan did not deem worthy was at the root of it. As he stated:

The Commissioners having in contravention of the provisions of the 37th section of the Police Act, and in violation of the functions conferred upon me by that Statute appointed three parties to act as Lieutenants of Police who, in my humble opinion are utterly incapable of exercising certain important duties which is proposed that those officers shall perform.⁵⁴

The legal responsibility for appointing senior officers lay in the hands of the Superintendent. Denovan's replacement was none other than Commissioner Watson, who, within the year, had a 25% pay increase sanctioned by his former associates in the Commission. (After protests from ratepayers, the increase in pay was withdrawn.⁵⁵) Other valid accusations centred on the appointment of less senior officials and officers. In 1842, the Clerk of Police for eighteen years, James Inglis, was unfairly dismissed amidst claims of neglect of duty and incompetence. A small majority of commissioners found him guilty of keeping money for the sale of goods for five months, interfering in the election of commissioners, and altering minutes and documents of the Board.⁵⁶ However, a sizeable minority of commissioners argued that the allegations were unfounded, and publicly condemned the decision. Contemporary reports claimed Inglis had been unfairly dismissed to make way for a political placeman in the form of James Burnet – a police commissioner and influential lawyer.⁵⁷ It was stated that Burnet had been appointed to get legal influence on the Board's side for its ongoing dispute with magistrates. Burnet had initially supported the magistrates' 1842 bill, but his appointment to the

position of Clerk of Police brought an immediate change in his allegiance. After his appointment, any future clerk had to be a member of the Faculty of Advocates. It was little surprise that Mr Inglis's removal was deemed to have been '...brought about for the cruel consummation of a dirty job.'⁵⁸

Equally, it appeared that commissioners were, at times, guilty of electoral nepotism. From the late 1820s, barely an election went by without electors, magistrates and commissioners protesting that some commissioners had been appointed '...illegally and unjustly...'⁵⁹ The continued refusal of commissioners to re-appoint Commissioner Alexander Glen is a case in point. Despite being continuously elected by his ward, and despite numerous petitions from ratepayers protesting at the Board's actions, commissioners refused to sanction his re-election, on ground that he did not meet the property requirement. This, despite the fact that his L.8 dwelling house was situated directly above his tavern, rated at L.30 per annum. Only when Mr Glen took legal action did the Board agree to his re-election.⁶⁰ On another occasion, the Board refused to accept the ratepayers' choice James Wilson on the grounds of a rule not used before, nor conveyed to the electorate.⁶¹ This merely created the impression that commissioners were picking and choosing their associates. The minutes are full of other examples.

However, in most cases the reality was that electoral protests had more to do with electoral teething problems than corruption. As the city's first democratic institution, commissioners had to confront a wide array of difficult questions. Controversy centred on a wide range of issues, ranging from the legality of the surveyor's rental list, the legality of votes cast and the legality of company votes, all of which led to confusion, disruption and resentment amongst commissioners, the Magistracy and the electorate.⁶² Commissioners for much of the time from the late 1820s simply could not agree on an efficient, consistent electoral procedure. Indeed, this seems to have been not uncommon. McGowan found a similar situation in the Edinburgh Police Commission.⁶³ Commissioner Watson highlighted the confusion in Glasgow in 1832, remarking:

...much uncertainty prevails as to sundry points of practice connected with the election of Commissioners, owing to differences of opinion such as obtain relative to the finality of the surveyors lists at any given period, the legality of making alterations therein and relative to the form of voters tickets, and the validity of recall votes with other matters. And it is most desirable that all dubiety should be removed from such points to prevent in future disappointment to electors, and questions productive of frequent division at the Board.⁶⁴

As Commissioner Watson's last point indicates, many of the problems stemmed from the fact that the Police Commission was, at times, incapable of acting as a united body. As with all public bodies, local politics played its part. The democratic principles on which the

Commission was founded brought with it a wide array of gentlemen from different social backgrounds, each with their own views and values (see next section). Political and personal squabbling was inevitable. As one reporter, after being asked by commissioners to portray them in a more favourable light, remarked: ‘...it would be easier to make a silk purse out of sow’s ear.’⁶⁵ It seemed to contemporaries that commissioners were being continuously bogged down in personal disputes and accompanying red tape. Barely a year went by without some appeal being made to the Court of Justiciary, over some hotly disputed election or another, which, significantly, did much to undermine the Commission’s reputation as an effective forum for urban management. As Peter Mackenzie, commenting on the conduct of the Commission, noted:

[it was like]...a den of brawlers, who, in nine meetings out of ten, are constantly snarling at each other, and attends, little, if at all, to the real out-works of police⁶⁶

The last point, however, was inaccurate. At no point did commissioners let their differences paralyse or interfere with the management of police affairs. Such differences were normally resolved at lengthy meetings held outwith the normal hours of police business – a testament to the dedication and commitment of most commissioners. Disputed elections aside, commissioners showed themselves more than capable of conducting police business in an efficient manner.⁶⁷ Their numerous achievements in water, lighting, gas, public health and watching illustrated this. The Commission showed itself to be an innovative authority. As early as 1830 it called for the need to extend policing to the wider parliamentary constituency, long before similar sentiments were being voiced seriously in elite circles:

...to secure the efficiency in any system of police at a moderate expense, the territory under its population must either be compact and pretty densely inhabited, or when a city is the scene of its operation it ought to comprehend the whole outskirts and suburbs, these being generally inhabited by a lower class of the population among whom delinquents are created and find refuge. The present police of Glasgow which is admitted to be very efficient, affords a proof of the accuracy of this statement.... The only departure from this system of police which would preserve its efficiency...[is] a Police which would comprehend the city and all the suburbs.⁶⁸

In fact, much of the criticism levelled against the Police Commission had more to do with uncoordinated policing arrangements within the parliamentary constituency than it had with commissioner inefficiency. A controversy surrounding the use of fire engines outwith city bounds in the early 1840s clearly illustrated this. After two major fires destroyed parts of the Lancefield Cotton Mills in Anderston and the Spinning Mill in Bridgeton in 1841 the Lord Provost bitterly attacked the Police Commission for ‘...refusing to lend an ear to the cry of

suffering and distress...[and for not]...preventing the destruction of lives and property....⁶⁹ Police commissioners, however, were in the unenviable position of being able to do little, being involved at the time in a dispute over insurance payments for sanctioning the use of fire engines outwith city bounds.⁷⁰ As Sweeney points out, the problem for police authorities in and around the city was not so much that each had its shortcomings; it was that they would be more effective working together.⁷¹

The majority of the accusations that emanated from the civic elite and the press were little more than flagrant lies designed to discredit the Police Commission in the eyes of ratepayers. By the late 1830s, many in influential circles were conducting a propaganda war against commissioners. The Lord Provost and the maverick Peter Mackenzie were behind most of the libelous claims. Police commissioners were aware of it, noting:

There can be no doubt that for a long time past certain newspapers have been in the practice of publishing garbled and unfair reports, suppressing often nearly all the important business transacted, and misrepresenting the words and sentiments of members on matters of completely trivial importance, thereby giving to the public the most erroneous ideas of the conduct of the members, the nature and extent of the business done, and the manner in which it was conducted.⁷²

Indeed, commissioner concern at what was perceived to be unfair reporting became so great that calls were made to allow public access to weekly meetings.⁷³

Protestations over the cost of police bills illustrate their concern. The *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* claimed in 1845 that L.5,140 had been spent on abortive police bills in late session of Parliament. In fact, this expense had been incurred in the sessions 1842-3 in obtaining the 1843 Police Act, and included the sum of L.2,235 paid to the Town Council.⁷⁴ The opinions emanating from the 1846 House of Commons Select Committee were equally distorted. Commissioners spent c.L.13,000 on bills between 1836-45, water and statute labour included, considerably less than the L.3,000 a year on police bills that was claimed.⁷⁵ There was no excuse for these claims, as commissioners published their accounts annually, in contrary to the claims made by Peter Mackenzie. Of course, the expense incurred by commissioners was still considerable, and doubt was raised as to the legality of using public funds for this purpose.⁷⁶ But the civic elite were equally responsible, given that the local bills put forward by commissioners were usually introduced in response to Council bills that sought to disband the Commission. Moreover, councillors were also guilty of using the public purse to further their own ends. They spent L.4,625 promoting their police bills and opposing the police bills of the police commissioners of Glasgow and Gorbals in 1842 alone.⁷⁷ Furthermore, although there were instances of disputed appointments, they were the exception rather than the rule. The

overwhelming majority of appointments were legal and just. Accusations to the contrary were generally untrue.

One area where commissioners should shoulder some responsibility, however, is in their management of Glasgow's spiralling social problems. The state of the urban environment left much to be desired. Social dereliction and human degradation were widespread, with conditions for the poorer classes deteriorating markedly in the post-Napoleonic years. Public health suffered greatly. Crude death rates were exceptionally high and rising: in 1821, the mortality of the population per 1,000 was 24.8; by 1841, it was 31.5. Corresponding figures for Aberdeen, Dundee and Edinburgh in 1841 were 16.0, 22.1 and 25.4 respectively.⁷⁸ During the same period, life expectancy for male Glaswegians who lived beyond the age of ten fell by five years, from 42 to 37.⁷⁹ Infant mortality was equally alarming. In 1850, one in two children born in Glasgow died before their fifth birthday; the corresponding figure for Paris, which was portrayed as having a poor record in public health, was one in three.⁸⁰ Infectious diseases were rife. Poor areas were devastated by recurring outbreaks of cholera and typhoid. Between 1830-5, around half of patients admitted to the Royal Infirmary were diagnosed as suffering from typhus. Indeed, in 1837, an estimated 20 per cent of deaths were caused by typhus; in London, it was just 8 per cent.⁸¹

It was widely recognised that the squalid urban environment lay behind many of these figures. Yet, ironically, the Police Commission – the main authority of public health and sanitation – was not widely criticised by those who sought to disband the Commission. It was left to social investigators and observers to portray Glasgow as one of the dirtiest cities in Britain. Edwin Chadwick in 1842 described Glasgow as '...possibly the filthiest and unhealthiest of all the British towns of this period.'⁸² Superintendent Miller claimed that 'in the very centre of the city there is an accumulated mass of squalid wretchedness, which is probably unequalled in any other town in the British dominions'.⁸³ And Dr Cowan, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence and Police at the University of Glasgow, argued

In all the districts of the burgh, and in the suburbs, there is a want of sewerage and drainage, and the deficiency is in the necessity for it. The streets, or rather lanes and alleys, in which the poor live, are filthy beyond measure; excrementitious matter, and filth of every description is allowed to lie upon the lanes, or, if collected, it remains accumulating for months, until the landlord, whose property it is, is pleased to remove it.⁸⁴

Although there is no evidence to confirm this, it is possible that the city's civic elite recognised that these appalling conditions were mostly predetermined by factors outwith police control. Demographic and economic pressures put an exceptional strain on the urban infrastructure.⁸⁵ Glasgow's population between 1801 and 1841 increased at a rapid and relentless

pace. The number of Glaswegians rose from 77,385 in 1801 to 274,533 in 1841 (suburbs included) – a rate faster than any British city of its size. As Devine has argued, many of Glasgow's social problems stemmed primarily from the fact that it was growing faster than towns of a similar size.⁸⁶ Migrants flocked in search of work, commonly from poor areas, such as the Western Highlands and Ireland. Usually, they brought disease and poverty with them. Significantly, they continued to migrate even when economic conditions in the city were depressed, largely because of economic and social pressures at home. Inevitably, there emerged a gross structural imbalance between the demand and supply of labour, resulting in unemployment and poverty. Housing conditions exacerbated the problem. The rate of formation of new houses did not keep pace with population growth. Between 1831 and 1841, the population in and around the city increased by 33,000; inhabited dwelling houses rose by just 3,551.⁸⁷ Moreover, low wages, irregular employment and high rents left Glaswegians with little alternative but to inhabit high-rise, multi-occupancy tenements. Invariably, these were overcrowded, squalid and devoid of adequate public amenity provision. Amidst such rapid urban growth, deterioration in urban infrastructure and public health was inevitable.

Moreover, commissioners simply did not have sufficient power to deal with the city's most pressing social problems. As the Report into the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Poor in 1842 noted, commissioners had no authority – or insufficient authority – over a range of issues that were central to public health.⁸⁸ They had no power to see that housing for the poor was properly constructed, to close or pull-down derelict property, to regulate dunghills, to remove filth on a daily basis, to open ill-ventilated closes, to properly pave closes, to regulate lodging-houses, and to limit the number of people per property. The typhus epidemic of 1817-18 provides a good case in point. After consulting the medical profession, commissioners were informed that typhus was primarily caused by '...the unclean state of the closes and by the lanes in different parts of the town and stagnate water contained in the dunghills in these closes and lanes'. Yet, commissioners concluded that they '...cannot compel the proprietors of closes to remove these nuisances.'⁸⁹ They simply had no legal right to interfere with private property. Greater powers were clearly needed to deal with the spiralling social crisis, for which the above report repeatedly called.

That being said, commissioners were not totally blameless for the appalling state of the urban environment. Often, they chose not to exercise the powers they did hold. As Devine has argued, energetic efforts to remove filth took place only once in the first thirty years of the Commission – during the typhus epidemic noted above.⁹⁰ At other periods, it was unusual for proprietors to be summoned for not keeping closes or streets clean. In September 1819, only two people were summoned to the police court for dirty closes or not emptying dungsteads; by contrast, the respective figures for begging and Sabbath profanation were 67 and 24.⁹¹ Amidst

fears of growing crime and disorder, commissioners chose to give greater priority to law and order rather than public health.⁹² As Figure 7.1 showed, the percentage of police expenditure on watching rose by 13% between 1810-1 and 1840-1. By contrast, the percentage of police expenditure on lighting and cleansing fell by 15%. As one scholar has argued, sanitising the morals of the working classes was simply given more importance than the urban environment, much to the detriment of the latter.⁹³

There were a few enlightened souls, like the Reverend Stevenson MacGill, who argued that the environment had to be improved before the individual could flourish, but the consensus among commissioners was that personal morality had to be improved first for there to be any urban regeneration. Such commitment to tackling the spiritual failings of the community was not conducive to intervention, regulation and high taxation. Rather than raise taxes and take strong direct action to alleviate Glasgow's social problems, commissioners chose instead to keep costs to a minimum for fear of sapping the moral fibre of the working classes. Influenced by Thomas Chalmers's preaching on compulsory assessment and its detrimental effect on character, commissioners kept the level of assessment relatively static throughout the first half of the century. In 1800, it ranged from four pence for the lowest rated property, to one shilling for the highest; by 1840, the corresponding figures were just four and a half, and one shilling and one.⁹⁴

Many commissioners even by the latter date had still to accept fully that an adequate levy was necessary and desirable. The response of commissioners to a Council proposal for improving the wynds, lanes and closes in 1842 illustrated this clearly.⁹⁵ The proposal was opposed, along with clauses for constituting a Board of Health and raising funds by assessment '...for defraying the expense of erecting buildings as hospitals, dispensaries...and for appointing medical officers, district surgeons, apothecaries, inspectors, etc.' Commissioners argued ratepayers should not be compelled to meet these costs, as the '...preservation of public health...' could not be guaranteed by '...compulsory assessment.'⁹⁶ Such ideological reluctance to tackle the city's spiralling problems through intervention, regulation and taxation undoubtedly added to the social misery many Glaswegians faced.⁹⁷

This was exacerbated by the policy of selective policing commissioners adopted. As Chapter 4 showed, commissioners chose not to assess poor districts, thus relieving themselves of the financial burden involved in providing policing provision. Only areas that had a sufficient number of qualified ratepayers were part of the police district.⁹⁸ And even this did not guarantee policing provision. For this to be given, streets, squares, lanes and passageways had to be either paved or causeyed and foot-pavements had to be of certain size.⁹⁹ Throughout the police district, priority was given to main streets at the expense of the streets, lanes and passageways in the poorer districts. In other words, the areas where public amenity provision was most needed were usually neglected. Commissioners adopted the attitude that since wealthier areas raised most in

assessments they were entitled to most benefits.¹⁰⁰ Oliver has argued that commissioners in Edinburgh adopted a similar policy.¹⁰¹ Not surprisingly, this resulted in two conflicting images of Glasgow – of the picturesque environs to the west and the squalid declining centre. As Councillor Mitchell noted in 1846, it is ‘...now so distinctly proved that Glasgow, generally speaking, instead of being that unhealthy town which it was formerly supposed to be; was perhaps one of the most healthy towns in Great Britain for those in wealthy and comfortable circumstances.’¹⁰² Commissioner policy played a small, though nonetheless significant, part in ensuring that the same could not be said about the poor.

Although easy to be wise in hindsight, commissioners could have done more to alleviate the city’s spiralling social problems. The ideological climate may not have been conducive to direct action, but the depths of human misery experienced by the poorer classes called for a stronger response than commissioners were prepared to give. Like other public bodies throughout Britain at the time, the Police Commission’s adherence to the contemporary philosophy did little to alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable. The pioneering achievements of commissioners in public health were mainly to the benefit of the middle class. Not enough was done to ease the plight of the poorer classes.

Not that this alarmed those who sought to incorporate the Police Commission. The criticism of police commissioners by the likes of Peter Mackenzie was restricted mainly to middle-class concerns: namely, the cost and control of policing affairs. Working-class grievances did not interest them. Claims of inefficiency and corruption were used to disband the Commission because they struck a chord with the middle classes: they were a convenient way in which to discredit commissioners in the eyes of the electorate. The fact commissioners were mostly innocent of the charges they faced was irrelevant.

Such perceived inefficiency, however, does not explain fully the motivation behind the Commission’s demise. After all, town councillors were equally open to the charges commissioners faced, not least for being politically divisive and spending large amounts of the public purse on personally motivated police bills. In many respects, the campaign against the Police Commission was symptomatic of a far greater concern to many of Glasgow’s civic elite – namely, the changing social standing of police commissioners. To contemporaries, the ability to perform efficiently and effectively in public office was largely measured, not on the performance of public bodies, but on the character, quality and social standing of their personnel. It was in the way these features differed from the Police Commission to the Town Council in the second quarter of the century that more than anything brought claims of inefficiency from Glasgow’s elite.

IV


Pressures for Reform – the Social Composition of the Police Commission

Expectations of public office were great in nineteenth-century society. As Hennock has argued, councillors were expected to be of station or respectability, intelligent or educated, and possessors of substance, property or wealth.¹⁰³ In other words, being above the ordinary was a prime requirement of office.¹⁰⁴ Police commissioners were expected to be no different. Like councillors, they were to be drawn from the most successful elements of middle-class society. As guardians of public morality, they had to provide moral leadership; and, as instruments of social control, they were expected to preserve and advance middle-class values by their behaviour and actions.¹⁰⁵ Being morally fit for office, therefore, was an essential prerequisite. Above all else, however, they were to have a business background; it was from here their respectability and social standing would be derived. Put simply, they were to comprise of merchants and manufacturers – the leading lights of Glasgow society.

Police commissioners met these requirements in the Commission's formative years. As Figure 9.1 shows, commissioners classified as merchant or manufacturer accounted for 62% between 1800 and 1805. The percentage of commissioners classified as professional or commercial, on the other hand, accounted for 4%, petty bourgeoisie 22% and artisan/others 12%, the latter of whom were all self-employed in small workshops. (All of the above and subsequent statistics relating to the social composition of police commissioners have been based on annual average percentages. A full run down of these figures, and the methodology employed, is given in Appendix 2. The methodology employed in their occupational classification and analysis, along with the names of the commissioners to whom they apply are given in appendices 3 and 4 respectively.)

The commissioner qualification rate had been set at a level that would ensure a merchant/manufacturing dominated social composition. Until 1807, only occupiers of dwelling rented at L.15 per annum were eligible as commissioners. Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate from existing sources the number to which this applied, but it was extremely small. In 1802, only twenty out of one hundred and forty eight rate-paying properties were subject to rentals of L.15 and above in ward twenty-three.¹⁰⁶ In addition, it is unlikely all of these properties were dwelling houses; many may have been small businesses, which were not eligible for the office of commissioner, regardless of their rental. Evidence from the first annual election in 1800 suggests this is likely. In that year, 8.3% of wards did not have the requisite ten households eligible to meet the commissioner qualification.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, eligibility for office became even more exclusive after the Glasgow Police Act of 1807, which raised the

Figure 9.1 Occupational Trends of Police Commissioners, 1800-46



commissioner qualification to L.30 and above annual rental, so long as there were at least ten qualified candidates (if not, the qualification would drop by L.5 until there were). By 1828-9 – the first year detailed information is available – only 20% of dwelling houses valued at or above the electoral level, and only 5% valued at or above the rate-paying level, were rated at the highest commissioner qualification.¹⁰⁸ Clearly, only the affluent were eligible.

Although the struggle to establish an elected Police Commission in 1800 had been won against a merchant and manufacturer controlled Council, it was always intended that gentlemen from similar occupational backgrounds would dominate it. The struggle, essentially, was a reaction against the uneven distribution of political power in the ranks of the upper middle class, where power was concentrated in the hands of an exclusive group of colonial traders, despite their waning economic influence. As such, it was about enfranchising the middle class and empowering new men of economic status – the self-made merchants and manufacturers who were unable to penetrate the small, elitist ranks of the Town Council.¹⁰⁹ Attempts by the trade incorporations and police commissioners to prohibit councillors from acting as commissioners clearly illustrated this. Although councillors successfully defeated these attempts – both before the Commission's establishment and again during the drafting of the 1807 Glasgow Police Act – it made little difference to the overall social composition of the Commission.¹¹⁰ In its formative years, the Commission represented the changing economic balance in the city, comprising of new men of wealth who had hitherto been excluded from municipal authority. Between 1800 and 1805, fifty-seven commissioners served on the Commission, of which only nine served on the Magistracy, Council or Dean of Guild Court, while an additional nine were representatives of either the Merchants' or Trades' Houses (two served in the Merchants' House and seven in the Trades' House).¹¹¹ In other words, two-thirds of commissioners between 1800 and 1805 were not committee members of any of the city's institutional bodies. Of those who were, only three served simultaneously on the Magistracy, six on the Council and two on the Dean of Guild Court.¹¹² Thus, though the old guard were represented, the Police Commission was largely the domain of the economic rather than political elite, forming a powerful body of some of the city's wealthiest and most respected men who hitherto had been excluded from or were on the fringes of municipal affairs.

However, by the 1830s this had changed. From 1810, the number of merchants and manufacturers on the Police Commission declined quite steadily (see Figure 9.1). In that year, their annual average percentage for the preceding five years peaked at 64%. Thereafter it fell, in five-year intervals, to 57%, 45%, 45% and 32.5%. The turning point, however, was between 1830 and 1835. For the first time, they were superseded as the largest grouping, falling to 24%. By the final few years of the Commission, they were its smallest grouping, numbering just 15.5% - a decline of over 400% since the Commission's birth.

It is possible, of course, that the extent of merchant and manufacturer decline was distorted by the changing use in terminology in this period, especially the label 'merchant'. As Nenadic has pointed out, there was considerable prestige attached to the title 'merchant' in the early part of the nineteenth century, which meant it was prone to overuse as a 'catch-all' title for those desiring its accompanied status.¹¹³ By the 1830s, however, greater precision was being applied to occupational classifications, with merchant being used to refer more to major overseas and domestic traders.

It is unlikely, however, that this development affected the occupational trend of the Commission to any great extent. As Appendix 3 shows, the greater precision given to occupational classifications did not result in the abandonment of the title 'merchant' amongst smaller traders in the minutes, just a clearer definition of their area of involvement. Furthermore, such small-scale merchants, such as wine and cheese merchants, were the norm amongst their occupational grouping by the late 1830s. It was the large-scale, high status merchants that had dominated the Commission in its formative years that were no longer identified with the city's first elected body.

This contradicts Morris's assertion that police commissions shared the same personnel in their latter years as town councils.¹¹⁴ In terms of both personnel and occupational classification, they could not have been more different. As Sweeney has shown, the social and economic profile of the city's town councillors did not change in the years immediately after 1833, despite the concession made to democracy.¹¹⁵ The Council continued to be dominated by the merchant and manufacturing elite, largely because councillors were subject to a burgess qualification and selection procedure. The Police Commission, on the other hand, corresponded more closely with the pattern of occupational distribution in the city by the late 1830s, being dominated by shopkeepers and tradesmen.¹¹⁶ As Figure 9.1 shows, the annual average percentage of commissioners classified as artisan/others between 1841 and 1846 was 34.5%, petty bourgeoisie 33% and commercial or professional 17%. The democratic representation of the Commission provided the emerging lower middle class with their first entry into municipal affairs.

This change in social composition was largely the result of a merchant/manufacturer switch to artisan/others. The annual average percentage of merchant and manufacturer commissioners declined from 62% between 1800 and 1805, to 15.5% between 1841 and 1846; for artisan/others, it increased from 12% to 34.5%. By contrast, the percentage of petty bourgeoisie and professional or commercial commissioners increased by only 11% and 13% respectively for the same period.

However, this switch did not necessarily mean that the Police Commission had become infiltrated with the wage-earning working class. Although artisan/others were employed in what

could be labelled occupations of the skilled working class, such as engraver or printer, they were themselves small working employers. The evidence contained in the Glasgow Police Office Directory shows that the overwhelming majority of commissioners listed artisan/others in 1846 were proprietors of small workshops and places of business, probably employing at least one tradesman. Nor should this be surprising. The nature of serving on the Commission limited it predominantly to the self-employed. Commissioners were not paid and were required, though not compelled, to attend weekly meetings during working hours. Few of even the most civic-minded employers would have granted an employee paid time-off to act as commissioner.¹¹⁷ Besides, the possibility of this occurring was not likely to arise. Few, if any, of even the skilled working class would have been paying rentals sufficient to qualify them as commissioners unless they were running small businesses. The majority of the working class were paying house rents below L.7.10 a year in 1841, which ensured that the franchise and the Commission were almost entirely restricted to those with middle-class incomes.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, to Glasgow's respectable society, the presence of a large number of commissioners from humble backgrounds was alarming, regardless of how many they employed or how much they earned. Local press reports clearly highlighted this.¹¹⁹ To contemporaries, a man's occupation was far more important in designating his status than his income, and artisans – and it may be added the petty bourgeoisie – were not deemed worthy of holding public positions. Frequent aspersions were cast concerning commissioners' character, intelligence and conduct from the early 1830s, but they centred essentially on the fact that fewer came from a merchant or manufacturing background. The *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* clearly highlighted this in 1846, stating:

It is no longer the Board it once was. It is destitute of the talent and commanding influence which it possessed prior to the Municipal Reform Bill...[and it]...has greatly deteriorated in character within these last few years. Every succeeding year, in fact, seems only to make it worse and worse.¹²⁰

Such a view was common throughout the country.¹²¹ Graham Spiers, Sheriff of Edinburgh, argued that police commissioners were

persons generally possessing, I think, less property themselves, and not representing so adequately, as the Town Council does, the feelings of property in the community.¹²²

An anonymous writer to *Blackwood's Magazine* in 1831 went further, arguing


...there is not a more ignorant, profligate, self-sufficient class than a large proportion of its shopkeepers, and manufacturing operatives.¹²³

Increasingly, fears were raised that police commissioners in Glasgow – as it seemed elsewhere – were of suspect moral character. As Maver has pointed out, '...from the 1830s alarm bells had been ringing among the elites in Glasgow about the penchant of the electorate to return representatives who seemed to be ideologically suspect.'¹²⁴ Spirit traders and pawnbrokers, in particular, were being returned in increasing numbers. This was especially so for commissioners with spirit licenses, who in 1843 peaked at a staggering 21% of the commission's social composition – forming its largest occupational grouping. Only after Henry Home Drummond's amendment prohibiting spirit dealers with property under L.20 becoming commissioners was introduced in 1843 did their presence significantly decline, falling to just 2.5% for the subsequent two years.

Such representatives were not a novel addition to the Police Commission: spirit traders in particular had been increasingly elected from the 1820s (See Figure 9.2). Moreover, although Figure 9.2 does not show this, others had been elected in the Commission's formative years, although they were listed as merchants rather than spirit traders in the police minutes. However, their increasing presence on the Commission in the second quarter of the century caused alarm among councillors for two reasons. Firstly, the social standing of these commissioners differed from their predecessors. By the 1830s, commissioners with spirit licenses were more likely to be small-scale traders or publicans than large-scale merchants. Probably, around three-quarters fitted this description, as was illustrated by the impact Henry Home Drummond's amendment had on the number of spirit dealers on the Commission after 1843. Such men were not deemed worthy of holding public office.

Secondly, the election of spirit traders to the public office coincided with the rise of the temperance movement, which came to prominence in Glasgow in the 1830s with the establishment of the Radical Temperance Society in 1836.¹²⁵ Although by no means were all councillors in favour of total abstinence, there was widespread concern about the effect drink was having on society. Indeed, in 1838, councillors established an ad-hoc Committee on Intemperance and Sabbath Profanation in the first step towards tightening licensing laws.¹²⁶ Drunkenness was increasingly seen as a root cause of social evils and not, as before, an essential ingredient of social gatherings. Poverty, social dereliction and moral decay were now viewed as being symptomatic of alcohol abuse, as the corrupting influence of drink became a scapegoat for the problems posed by urbanisation. Only by regulating or prohibiting the sale of spirits would society be saved from a spiritual abyss.

Figure 9.2 Percentage of Commissioners who were Spirit Traders or Pawnbrokers, 1800-46



However, to contemporaries, the small-scale spirit traders who served on the Commission could not be relied upon to take effective regulatory action in areas in which they had a personal interest. The same applied to pawnbrokers. A letter sent to the Commission in 1844 ‘...complaining of a pawnshop being kept open on Sundays’ highlighted this concern.¹²⁷ Such fears were commonplace throughout Britain. As Hart has shown for English towns, the reluctance of watch committees with interests in the drink trade to take strong action over licensing laws was particularly concerning, especially in areas like Devonport where complaints about licensed premises had to be submitted to the watch commissioners.¹²⁸ Like Glasgow, anxiety became so great throughout the country that attempts were made to exclude such people from sitting on police watch committees.

Whether such anxiety in Glasgow was justified is difficult to assess. It seemed, on first appearance, that police commissioners were, indeed, lax in their attitude towards drinking. Glasgow had an exceptionally high number of licensed spirit dealers – probably more in terms of ratio to population than anywhere in Britain. Archibald Alison – never one to underplay a case – estimated in the late 1830s that the proportion of public houses to other houses was 1 to 10 for Glasgow, compared to 1 to 56 for London.¹²⁹ He also claimed ‘...that the proportion of whiskey drunk in Glasgow is twice or thrice as much as in any similar population upon the face of the globe.’¹³⁰ Although both these claims were probably exaggerated, alcohol consumption and drunkenness were serious problems.¹³¹ By the 1830s, there were more licensed premises than food sellers in the city.¹³² Dr Dunlop, a campaigner for teetotalism, estimated that over L.450,000 was spent annually on drink in the early 1830s.¹³³ Such consumption often led to police involvement. Of the 7,687 individuals brought before the police courts in 1839, 1,013 were charged with being ‘drunk and disorderly’, and 1,959 for ‘being drunk on the streets.’¹³⁴ Some of those were themselves commissioners. James Smart, Superintendent of Calton, argued that the police commissioners of Calton had ‘...been taken up on one or two occasions and fined for being drunk and disorderly...[and]...and breakers of the peace.’¹³⁵ Their Glasgow counterparts too, liked to indulge themselves, spending forty pounds of public money on wine celebrating the Queen’s birthday in 1845, despite opposition from a fellow commissioner.¹³⁶ Moreover, their opposition to the attempt to ban spirit dealers and pawnbrokers from the Commission added to the perception that they were doing little to regulate the city’s thriving spirit trade.

In fairness, there was little commissioners could have done. Police control in this area was limited until the introduction of the Forbes Mackenzie Act in 1853 and stronger local licensing laws in the same decade, which between them prohibited Sunday opening, regulated opening hours and the issuing of licenses, and increased police powers on infringements. Prior to then, the city’s licensing laws were governed by the Home Drummond Act of 1828, which

established the first formal restrictions on the opening hours of spirit houses. However, the conditions attached the issuing of licenses were vague, specifying that public houses do not open at 'unreasonable hours'. Exactly what constituted 'unreasonable hours' was open to interpretation and difficult to enforce. Moreover, licenses were issued very easily – to anyone who could produce a character reference from their minister or other respectable citizen. This encouraged the rapid growth in the number of spirit houses, which made it impossible for the police to supervise them effectively, given their limited resources.¹³⁷

Commissioners had no authority to introduce new licensing laws. All they could do was enforce existing ones to the best of their ability. Although concern over drinking did not dominate commissioner policy like vagrancy (see Part IV), the evidence suggests they did not shirk their responsibility. As was indicated above, those brought before the police courts were commonly for drink related offences. More than 25,000 of the 30,000 cases of imprisonment in Glasgow in 1844 were on the charge of being drunk and disorderly.¹³⁸ After a letter by inhabitants in 1843 complaining about the goings-on in a nearby tavern, '...several of the parties complained against...[were]...reported and summoned before the magistrates under the Home Drummond Act', leading to the landlord's removal.¹³⁹ Indeed, such was the activity of police action in this area that a petition, signed by 300 publicans and spirit dealers, was presented to commissioners, '...complaining that the inferior officers of police were in the habit of entering and searching their houses on the Sundays', often without warrants.¹⁴⁰ Significantly, this occurred in 1840, before the number of spirit traders on the Commission had been reduced by Home Drummond's amendment.

An even stronger resolve applied to pawnbrokers. Commissioners were responsible for framing the provisions in the 1843 Glasgow Police Act on pawnbroking. These included that brokers and dealers in second-hand goods '...not be kept open at unreasonable hours...', keep registered books, report stolen goods and, for the first time, be licensed.¹⁴¹ Their diligence ensured these were enforced. In 1844, twelve criminal officers were appointed to visit pawnbrokers '...to facilitate the means of detecting crime and recovering property', in what amounted to one of the strongest regulatory campaigns ever launched.¹⁴² The seriousness of the initiative, and the commissioners' commitment to it, was underlined four months later when two officers who failed to detect stolen goods in two licensed pawnbrokers were suspended.¹⁴³ Nor should this be surprising. At best, pawnbrokers accounted for a mere 3% of the Commission's occupational grouping, nowhere near enough to effectively influence proceedings. A motion by commissioner Pattison against the clause in the 1843 Glasgow Police Act restricting the hours of brokers and dealers illustrated this. It was defeated by twelve votes to nine.¹⁴⁴

Although it appeared that commissioners were willing to take a stronger line over pawnbroking than spirit licensing, to contemporaries, pledging and drunkenness were

inextricably linked. The Secretary of the Glasgow City Mission pointed this out.¹⁴⁵ An attack on one, therefore, was perceived as an attack on the other, and there was little doubt that pawnbroking came under increasing scrutiny in the 1840s. What contemporaries deemed to be morally suspect police commissioners may have been a feature of the Police Commission from the 1830s, but they were not in the majority, nor able to orchestrate proceedings to any significant degree. Nevertheless, their presence was widely believed to undermine one of the key functions of police – to act as guardians of public morality. As an instrument of social authority, commissioners were expected to advance middle-class values, and publicans and small spirit dealers sent out the wrong singles.

The most alarming consequence of the changing social composition of the Police Commission, however, was the changing political outlook of commissioners. From at least the early 1830s, political reformers and radicals were being returned in increasing numbers. The Police Commission in effect became a forum from which to oppose the Town Council. Commissioners were vociferous advocates of many issues that conflicted with the Council, most notably reform of the Corn Laws and burghs. Numerous references in the pre-reform era to ‘...despotic misrule...[from]...an arrogant and self-willed authority’ highlighted clearly the opinions that were emanating from commissioner circles towards their municipal counterparts.¹⁴⁶ Naturally, such comments made for strained relations between the two bodies, with councillors, with much justification, bitterly resenting commissioner interference in areas that did not concern them. The differing social compositions of the two bodies made conflict inevitable.

Unlike the Town Council, which did not return its first Catholic councillor until 1893, the Police Commission had at least one recognised Catholic member by 1842, when John O’Neil was elected commissioner for ward seventeen. His Irish origins and religion were inevitably going to concern the Protestant-controlled Council who, at a time when religious tensions were running high, feared that the Police Commission could become ‘...a focal point for Catholic aspirations.’¹⁴⁷ As McCaffrey has argued, Irish immigrants to the West of Scotland in the first half of the nineteenth century were more radical and politically organised than historians have traditionally portrayed, as was illustrated by their role in strikes, the 1848 riots, O’Connellite politics, temperance and Chartism.¹⁴⁸

It is extremely difficult to determine the political allegiances of commissioners, though the fact Liberal councillors in the 1830s opposed attempts to disband the Commission suggests the majority may have been middle-class liberal reformers. By the late 1830s/early 1840s, however, there was an increasing tendency for Chartists to be elected. The following Chartists served on the Commission: George Ross (1838-46), William Pattison (1844-6), James Moir (1845-6), William Thomson (1829-37) and John Birkmyre (1835-7). These are the only recognised ones, although others may have been Chartist sympathisers. All were leading

members of the Chartist Universal Suffrage Central Committee for Scotland. George Ross – the longest serving Chartist commissioner by far – was a substantial financial contributor to the Chartist press. All had turned their attention away from overtly political issues to the wider sphere of public activity following the movement's decline in 1842.¹⁴⁹ Concerns were widespread that such men could gain a stranglehold on the Commission. The *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* highlighted this anxiety. In 1846 it lamented at the fact that '...a notorious Chartist Commissioner' had effectively been left in charge, following the removal of a delegation of magistrates, commissioners and the Superintendent to London on police bill business.¹⁵⁰

This, it seemed, was not misplaced paranoia. George Ross, along with Commissioner Aitken and the Senior Lieutenant, had been placed in charge of the force for a short period in 1845. He and his two counterparts effectively assumed the role of Chief of Police in the absence of the Superintendent of Police.¹⁵¹ Moreover, those with Chartist leanings were extremely active in the day-to-day running of police affairs. George Ross in particular was responsible for orchestrating much of policing debate, holding the Chair on numerous occasions from 1843.¹⁵² The most important committees were rarely without a Chartist member: in 1846, the committees on finance, officers and watching all had at least one recognised Chartist present. And Ross and his counterparts were more than willing to use their positions to advance their political views. In 1845, Ross called for all ratepayers to be enfranchised.¹⁵³ A year later, William Pattison called for the public to be admitted to public meetings.¹⁵⁴ Both formed an alliance in 1845 to protest against a clause in the 1843 Glasgow Police Act restricting brokers' hours of business.¹⁵⁵ Their reason was not given, but it is likely to have been viewed as an attack upon the working class, who were often dependent upon pawnshops for short-term loans. One commissioner in 1841 even questioned the commitment of George Ross to public order, noting '...his economy in voting for an additional force to protect the peace during the "sacred month" of the Chartist....'¹⁵⁶ Ross had been critical of the Chief Superintendent for employing substitutes without first consulting the Commission. Moreover, a change in electoral suffrage in 1837 seemed to illustrate clearly Chartist influence: all of the electorate was, for the first time, eligible to serve as commissioners.

Contemporary middle-class opinion was convinced that Chartist commissioners were a dangerous and disproportionate influence on the Commission. This raised fears that radical sympathisers could be appointed to positions of importance. Such a controversy arose in 1844, when commissioners appointed Archibald Wilson, of Anderston Police, Superintendent of Glasgow. Magistrates had sought William MacKinnon's appointment, believing he to be a more suitable candidate.¹⁵⁷ It was also believed that Chartist commissioners were the driving forces behind opposition to the Police Commission's incorporation, with the *Glasgow Herald* arguing that '...all the orators [at a public meeting against incorporation] were of the Chartist school.'¹⁵⁸

Events elsewhere may have alerted contemporaries to the dangers a radical Police Commission could pose. Foster has shown how the town's industrial working class gained control of the police in 1812-20 and 1831 after a prolonged battle with the employing class.¹⁵⁹ Working-class radicals attempted to use the police to their advantage, dismissing the watch force in 1831. Newspapers lamented at the situation, with one correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* noting in 1834 that Oldham is '...sadly deficient in its police force; they had no military at hand in case of disturbance; and the town was completely in the hands of the destructives.'¹⁶⁰ The situation was finally resolved in 1849 with the town's incorporation, after long and bitter working-class opposition. In Manchester, Bolton and Birmingham, meanwhile, concern over police control led to the Government imposing Metropolitan-style policing structures in 1839. Particular concern centred on Birmingham, where some members of local government had Chartist sympathies.¹⁶¹

In Glasgow, however, the situation was different, particularly from Oldham. Although, like Oldham, the civic elite's attempt to incorporate the Police Commission led to a prolonged struggle for police control, it was not polarised along strict class lines to anywhere near the same degree. The struggle in Glasgow over the Commission's incorporation in 1846 was essentially a struggle for the trappings of office between the emerging lower middle class/skilled, self-employed working class and the established middle class. In other words, it was a struggle between small-scale businessmen and their larger counterparts, both of whom were respectable and propertied. It was not a labouring-class middle-class issue based on either anti or pro-police sentiment. Policing ideology played little part. The majority of reformers on the Glasgow Police Commission were middle-class reformers, not working-class. Even Ross was middle class. Adopting militant tactics was never an issue. Police commissioners showed themselves more than willing and able to take strong action against public disorder aimed at furthering working-class political demands. As Chapter 7 showed, commissioners in 1839 set-up a paid auxiliary force of 120 men to remove '...inflammatory [political] placards posted on the walls of the city and suburbs', enlisted extra substitutes to supervise Chartist meetings, and instructed their officers to protect strikebreakers.¹⁶² All were, in the words of commissioners, '...measures necessary for procuring the peace....'¹⁶³

Even the chance of seditious activity from the few Chartist police commissioners was remote. As was indicated in Chapter 7, Scottish Chartism was collaborative and based on legal and constitutional tactics; it was never confrontational.¹⁶⁴ Respectability had long been its key feature. Ross may have attempted to extend the franchise to all ratepayers and make the Commission more democratic, but it was done legally, with each motion being put before fellow commissioners. Like other commissioners, Chartist commissioners were prepared to take strong action in the defence of law and order. Ross was a member of the Select Committee in 1839 that

recommended the establishment of an auxiliary force to deal with inflammatory Chartist literature and the swearing-in of extra special constables. Although the voting pattern of commissioners on this issue was not revealed, no opposition from Ross or any of the others was recorded. This suggests the motion was unanimously supported (it was common for dissent to be recorded). During his short spell in charge of the police in the absence of the Chief Superintendent, Ross showed himself a trustworthy, law-abiding citizen, gaining a vote of thanks from his fellow commissioners on his performance.¹⁶⁵ The mere fact he was deemed worthy to be placed in such a position of responsibility illustrated clearly that he was not seen as a threat. Moreover, his amendment that the Chief Superintendent in future apply to the Commission for substitutes was designed to raise the efficiency of the force by improving the performance of officers, not weaken it. He argued that fewer substitutes would be needed if officers performed better. Significantly, he was widely supported by other commissioners.¹⁶⁶ The likelihood of he and his sympathisers appointing radicals to positions of importance in the police was remote. In the controversy surrounding the election of Superintendent Wilson in 1844, Ross voted with the magistrates for an alternative candidate.¹⁶⁷

Even if Ross and his counterparts had sought a militant approach, it would have had little effect. Chartist commissioners were firmly in the minority. There were only five recognised Chartists between 1837 and 1846, and not more than three in a given year. Chartist views gained little support. Ross's call for all ratepayers to be enfranchised clearly illustrated this – it failed to be seconded.¹⁶⁸ Though all those enfranchised were, for the first time, eligible to stand as commissioners in 1837, it was more a reflection of Parliament's decision that all occupiers of dwelling houses of L.10 rental be eligible for burgh administration than any radical measure on the part of police commissioners. The 1837 Glasgow Police Act provided the first opportunity for this to be implemented. The reaction to George Ross's claim that 'I am not one of her Majesty's servants, but I am one of her most loyal subjects' summed-up the general feeling of commissioners towards their Chartist counterparts: it was met with laughter!¹⁶⁹ Chartist calls for cooperative societies and teetotalism would have done little to endear Ross and his fellow sympathisers to a Police Commission dominated by shopkeepers and spirit dealers. In fact, it was Ross who clashed with commissioners for spending forty pounds of public money on wine celebrating the Queen's birthday, tearing-up the invoice in question – an act for which he was censored.¹⁷⁰

The threat of militant radicalism within the Police Commission was, therefore, never as serious in Glasgow as in Oldham. There was never the likelihood of the police being disbanded or used to further militant working-class political objectives in the first half of the century. Much of the concern surrounding radicalism stemmed not from working-class militancy, but what was perceived to be politically subversive at the time.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, to many in respectable circles

there was always the danger that control of the police could fall into the wrong hands, especially given the speed with which the social profile of the Commission was changing. The possibility of working-class radicals being elected increased every year, with fewer and fewer gentlemen from respectable backgrounds being returned. With the police in the 1830s and 1840s assuming more and more responsibility regarding sensitive issues, such as policing strikes, working-class rallies, public order, etc., it was, in Government circles, deemed paramount to remove commissioners, and the criminal police in particular, from direct, public control. This was central to the Lord Advocate's attempts to centralise control of the criminal police under his authority. As he argued: '...control of a properly constituted criminal police, particularly the appointment of the Chief Officer, or Superintendent, should not be vested in a large popularly elected body....'¹⁷² Instead, it should '...be managed by two, or, at most, three Commissioners [under his authority], who shall not be subject to popular appointment or control.'¹⁷³ Significantly, he did not share the same resolve for the civil police.

Although unsuccessful in centralising control, the Commission's incorporation in 1846 effectively removed any possibility of radicals gaining control of the criminal police. With commissioners now being nominated from among councillors, the respectable majority could automatically filter out subversive elements.¹⁷⁴ A respectable majority would be ensured by the fact that councillors had to be paid-up burgess members, which in effect installed a class as well as financial qualification for the office of commissioner. To the civic elite, community control of the police was still acceptable, so long as it was in the hands of the respectable public.

Moreover, with the power to appoint the Chief Superintendent being placed in the hands of the Lord Provost, magistrates and Sheriff of Lanarkshire in accordance with Government demands, the remote possibility that radicals could be appointed to positions of importance was removed.¹⁷⁵ Significantly, this appears to have coincided with an increase in autonomy of the Chief Superintendent. Although no formal increase in his powers was stated in the 1846 Police Act, it is clear from contemporary reports that chief superintendents had a fair degree of autonomy after 1846. Police minutes in 1846 note that the Chief Superintendent '...is to have charge of the whole affairs of this establishment.'¹⁷⁶ When asked by the 1853 Select Committee on Police if he is subject to any unwanted interference from the Police and State Labour Committee, Chief Superintendent Smart replied: 'I have never once been interfered with by any one party. ...I am held responsible for everything that is done.'¹⁷⁷ Significantly, when asked under whose orders he acts, he replied: 'under the orders of the magistrates and of the sheriff, to a certain extent.'¹⁷⁸ The popular management of the criminal police was rapidly becoming a thing of the past.

V


**Pressures for Reform – the Residential Qualification and
Social and Electoral Change**

The factors that heralded the transformation in the Commission's social profile were a cause of much resentment to many of the civic elite. Merchants and manufacturers were, in effect, unfairly excluded in their efforts to become commissioners from early in the Commission's history. Unlike councillors, commissioners were subject to a residential qualification – they had to live in the ward in which they represented. Such a provision had been enshrined in the 1800 Police Act to ensure that commissioners would have a close understanding of the requirements of their own ward. This seems to have been a feature of local policing and improvement initiatives. Davey has shown that commissioners in Horncastle also had to be resident.¹⁷⁹ In Glasgow, however, such a provision did not take account of economic and social change. Whereas at the turn of the nineteenth century the working class and 'respectable' middle class had lived nearby within city bounds, the rapidly deteriorating environment soon witnessed a massive middle-class exodus to more salubrious suburbs.¹⁸⁰ As Checkland has pointed out, 'by the 1820s every man of substance had moved to the new areas to the west and north west of the centre, upwind from the smoke of the new engines, and in the opposite side of the town from the masses of Calton and Bridgeton, and north of Anderston.'¹⁸¹ Inevitably, Glasgow's most respected members of the middle class found themselves either forced off the Commission, or excluded from it altogether, in consequence of having removed outwith police jurisdiction.

As Figure 9.3 shows, removal from ward accounted for 82.5% of resignations in the Commission's first ten years. Thereafter, it accounted for at least 50% of resignations until 1830 to 1835, with the exception of 1811 to 1815, when it accounted for 45%, and this figure is likely to be distorted by missing minutes between February 1813 and November 1814. Only in the Commission's last ten years was the effect of the residential qualification on resignations significantly reduced, falling to just 35.5%. This was a result of a change in policy. Burgh reform in 1833, allied to concern at the effect the residential qualification was having on the social composition of the Police Commission, led to it being partially withdrawn in the 1837 Glasgow Police Act.¹⁸² Under that statute, all electors could represent a ward in which they did not reside, so long as their dwelling houses were within the extended police district. The 1843 Glasgow Police Act restored a ward qualification, although it extended to all properties, not just dwelling houses.¹⁸³ In other words, businessmen living outwith the police district could represent a ward in which they occupied business premises of sufficient annual rental.

Surprisingly, merchants and manufacturers do not appear to have been disproportionately affected by the residential qualification in relation to their percentage of the


Figure 9.3 Percentage of Resignations caused by Residential Qualification, 1800-1846 (Based on Annual Average Percentages)



Commission, which may have been expected given the extent of their decline. As Figure 9.4 shows, the percentage of such men who were forced to resign because they had removed from ward was roughly balanced with their numbers on the Commission as a whole. The residential qualification affected commissioners from every background because of the high level of residential mobility within the city. As Fraser and Maver have pointed out, in Glasgow it was common for people to move up and down the housing scale, within a relatively short distance.¹⁸⁴ Significantly, however, the artisan and bourgeois commissioners who had moved from their original wards were more likely than their merchant or manufacturer counterparts to be eligible to represent other wards, as they tended to remain within the police district. Merchants and manufacturers, by contrast, were more likely to migrate to the affluent suburbs outwith police jurisdiction. According to the *Glasgow Herald* in 1833, the overwhelming majority of the 800 merchants who were burgess members were non-resident in the city; by contrast, nearly all of the 3,500 craft members were resident.¹⁸⁵ It is likely, therefore, that the residential qualification affected the city's merchant and manufacturing class more in an indirect manner – by rendering many ineligible for the Commission in the first place – than a direct manner, by forcing them to give up positions for which they had been elected.

Although the Glasgow Police Act of 1837 permitted those merchants and manufacturers still residing in the police district to represent wards in which they did not live, it was very uncommon. Commissioners after this date were predominantly returned in wards in which they resided. Of the twenty commissioners, whose addresses are known, who were elected at annual general elections between 1842 and 1844, only one did not reside in the ward in which he was elected – he lived in the next one.¹⁸⁶ Voters continued to look for local representatives with whom they were familiar. This put radicals and others from similar backgrounds at an advantage as it became easier to be elected in areas most respectable middle-class inhabitants had long since abandoned. Chartist leaders like James Moir and William Pattison were able to build a popular base in the declining East End of Glasgow and get themselves elected to the Commission.¹⁸⁷ Although no formal system of electioneering was in place in police elections, informally, the likes of Ross were able to canvas the support of large numbers in their respective districts. More often than not, the ward electorate would unanimously elect them: Ross was elected in 1844 with all 104 votes cast in his favour.¹⁸⁸ Police elections, theoretically, may have been open to anyone who met the electoral requirement, but in reality, the outcome was usually decided between one or two candidates. Of the fourteen ward elections that took place in 1845, six wards voted for one candidate, six for two, one for four and one failed to vote.¹⁸⁹ In most cases, one candidate had the overwhelming majority of votes. The subsequent removal of powerful and influential merchants and manufacturers from many wards, therefore, effectively meant that working-class leaders could be returned unchallenged.

Figure 9.4 Merch/Manf. Resignations caused by Residential Qualification, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages)



As a result, some poorer wards became almost the exclusive preserve of the petty bourgeoisie and artisan class. Of the eleven commissioners returned in wards 26 and 33 between 1829 and 1846, only two did not belong to either grouping, one of which was appointed by the Board. It was particularly difficult for merchants and manufacturers to be elected by voters in the original twenty-four wards. After 1833, only thirteen of the twenty-four wards returned such men, of which nine were returned just once. Merchant and manufacturer electoral success was increasingly restricted to the Blythswood, a wealthy area, which was incorporated in 1830 for policing purposes. In the seven original Blythswood wards between 1830 and 1846, all returned more merchant, manufacturer, professional or commercial commissioners than petty bourgeoisie or artisan, at a time when respectable middle-class ratepayers were finding it difficult to be returned in the original twenty-four wards. Some newly incorporated wards were almost the exclusive preserve of the respectable middle class. The Blythswood wards of 28, 30 and 36 returned sixteen commissioners from 1830, of which only two were petty bourgeoisie or artisan. (Please note, new wards were added in the following years: 25 and 26 in 1829, and 27 to 35 in 1830, excluding 32 and 33, which were later annexed in 1839. Wards 25 and 26 were created from part of wards 1 and 24, the latter two of which had seen rapid increases in population.¹⁹⁰ Wards 25 and 26 were relatively poor. Wards 27 to 35, excluding 32 and 33, were part of Blythswood, which was incorporated in 1830 for policing purposes. Wards 32 and 33 were less affluent areas, or, at least, did not have many affluent ratepayers, having taken nine years to have a sufficient number of qualified ratepayers for policing purposes. Ward 36 – a wealth area – was later added. As it was extremely difficult to determine the affluent from the poor wards in the original police district, preference for ward variation has been based on the incorporated wards of 25 to 36 where there is some knowledge of relative prosperity.)

Such ward variation was an inevitable, though unintended, consequence of residential segregation. Some areas had large numbers of ratepayers' enfranchised and eligible to act as commissioners; others had few. In the affluent wards of Blythswood in 1830-1, 59% of dwelling houses were valued at L.10 and above and 31% at L.30 and above. In the twenty-six police wards of Glasgow a year earlier, the corresponding figures were 37% and 7%.¹⁹¹ Commissioners argued that this variation was essential if the less affluent, as well as affluent, areas were to be effectively represented. Indeed, in 1833 they unsuccessfully called for the introduction of a residential qualification for Council elections:

Such an interest in the ward [either as resident, occupant or proprietor] should in the opinion of your Committee be an essential qualification of a Councillor, else the Council might possibly consist of persons who had a peculiar local interest elsewhere opposed to the general interest, or at least some important local interests might be deprived of that due care and protection which can only be secured by a direct identity of interest in the constituency and

representative. The superficial objection and oligarchial conversion to a possible want of what is vulgarly called respectability, or more plainly speaking wealth, in the representatives of a less affluent neighbourhood, so far from being an objection, is the true recommendation of a local representation identified in condition, feelings and interest with every class of the constituency and every quarter of the city.¹⁹²

Not surprisingly, the civic elite emphatically rejected this. The presence of such an electoral requirement in police elections, however, proved significant for even the upper middle class that remained in less fashionable wards in the city: they were now a minority grouping, denied of enough electoral support to maintain their dominance of the Commission.

This was symptomatic of a wider, greater problem for elites in the city – their engulfment by the petty bourgeoisie and artisan class. In terms of ratio to population, small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and artisans were rising at a substantially faster rate than other social groups in the first half of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the century, the middle class were relatively small in relation to population. As Nenadic has shown, they accounted for little more 15% of the city's population in 1800.¹⁹³ By 1861, however, the corresponding figure had risen to 26%, of which the small business class formed a significant part.¹⁹⁴ Population and economic growth provided the environment in which the shopkeeper and self-employed tradesman could flourish. A whole range of tertiary services was required to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding consumer society.¹⁹⁵ Significantly, an estimated 75% of the middle class in 1861 were small business owners and occupiers of dwelling houses of an annual rental value of around L.26.¹⁹⁶ In other words, a substantial number have been eligible to vote and act as commissioners. MacLaren found similar structural change crucial in determining the social compositions of kirk sessions in Aberdeen during the Disruption years.¹⁹⁷

In Glasgow, the number eligible for election would have increased substantially after 1837 when every elector with dwelling houses valued at L.10 and upwards became eligible for election to the Commission. Prior to this date, Glasgow had the highest commissioner and electoral qualifications in the parliamentary constituency at L.30 and L.10 respectively. The police acts in Gorbals and Calton in 1808 and 1819 set commissioner and electoral qualifications at L.10 and L.5 respectively; Anderston's were slightly higher at L.20 and L.10.¹⁹⁸ (Gorbals later raised its electoral requirement to L.10.) Such low qualifications had caused alarm. As was indicated earlier, Archibald Alison was a vociferous critic:

The suburban Police Commissioners, being chosen by what amounted almost to household suffrage, had such a terror of their constituents, that they could not be induced to take powers for an adequate assessment; and the police force which they provided – sixteen or eighteen men among 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants – inadequate even in ordinary times, was wholly unfit to meet the exigencies of disturbed periods when general distress prevailed....¹⁹⁹

After 1837, such concern centred on Glasgow, as the office of commissioner became less exclusive. Approximately five times as many dwelling houses were now valued at the commissioner qualification rate.²⁰⁰ A wide array of new proprietors – many of them landlords and publicans – was now eligible to hold office. Small-scale spirit traders benefited more than most from the reduced commissioner rate for two reasons. Firstly, Glasgow had an exceptionally high number of pubs and beerhouses. According to an anonymous letter protesting against the Parliamentary Reform Bill in *Blackwood's Magazine* in 1831, 4,275 out of 8,000 properties rated at L.10 or above in and around the city were pubs or brothels.²⁰¹ In other words, publicans and brothel keepers would form the bulk of the new electorate. Although these figures were deliberately exaggerated to whip-up opposition, the number of such establishments was considerable (see above). Secondly, many licensed premises were contiguous with the licensee's dwelling house. In such circumstances, the proprietor was eligible, so long as one half of the aggregate total was house and the other business. Commissioners in 1832 had decided that publicans and tavern keepers living in their properties were eligible to act as commissioners upon full rent.²⁰²

Naturally, such electoral and structural change was crucial in determining the social composition of the Commission in the second quarter of the century. The merchant and manufacturing class was no longer numerically superior in terms of eligibility for the Commission. Economic, social and electoral change had altered the balance of power in favour of a petty bourgeoisie and self-employed artisan class that increasingly possessed the economic requirements of public office. Only the existence of burgess' membership as eligibility for councillors prevented a similar development in the city's other municipal authority after 1833.²⁰³

This was not lost on the civic elite. The merchant-and manufacturer-dominated Council had long been aware of the threat the rising middle class posed to their municipal hegemony. As was indicated in Chapter 8, numerous attempts to ensure that the Commission remained an exclusive preserve of men of substance and respectability were made by councillors throughout the period. That they were ultimately unsuccessful in achieving their objective proved to be the underlying reason why many, in Conservative circles in particular, sought the Commission's incorporation. All the other criticisms of the Commission were merely symptoms of what was essentially a motivation based on social class.

Why Reform was Successful

I

Government Support

The changing social composition of the Police Commission may explain why influential sections of the civic and ruling elite sought to disband the Commission, but it does not explain the more pertinent question of why they were successful in achieving their objective. After all, many of the civic elite had sought the Commission's incorporation from at least the late 1830s, proposing its abolition on numerous occasions. The Police Commission had consistently opposed such attempts by their municipal counterpart, often drawing on public support. And they did so again in 1846. A petition of over twenty thousand was submitted to Parliament protesting about the Municipal Police Bill, while institutional opposition came from commissioners themselves, their suburban counterparts, the Trades' House and the Barony Statute Labour Trustees.¹

However, unlike previous attempts at reform, the 1846 bill was strongly supported by the both local and central government. Past attempts had failed because of opposition from one or the other. Councillors – Liberals in particular – opposed Government attempts at centralisation as a threat to local autonomy, while Parliament opposed Council bills for being sectional. The 1846 bill succeeded because it was neither of these. On the one hand, the bill appeased Parliament's desire to see an extended policing system throughout the municipality. Central government, and the Lord Advocate in particular, had long sought a suitable solution to the city's policing problem. As indicated earlier, they had become increasingly frustrated by numerous local police enactments for Glasgow and its suburbs overwhelming parliamentary time. By throwing out sectional police bills in 1843, they had made it clear that only a general system of police would be acceptable. The Municipal Police Bill was never likely to be opposed by Parliament. As the *Glasgow Herald* pointed out, on commenting on the police commissioners attempt to oppose the bill in the Lords:

...[it]...will have no more effect in retarding...the General Bill, than the firing of 500 blank cartridges would have had in battering down the fortress of St. Jean d'Aire.²

On the other hand, the bill kept police control firmly in local hands, which had always been a necessary precondition to reform for many councillors. This was especially so for Liberal councillors, who were more strongly opposed to the concept of centralisation than some of their Conservative counterparts, the latter of whom saw ideological advantages of a centralised

policing system. Such Conservative aspirations, allied to the fact that Conservatives were opposed to the restructuring of the municipality – as it would undermine traditional burgess trading rights – had traditionally frustrated Liberal aspirations to coordinate policing arrangements under a local authority. However, Conservative decline in the 1843 Council elections, allied to the abolition of exclusive trading privileges in all Scottish burghs in 1846, removed these obstacles. With Conservative opposition ineffectual, and the issue of mercantile protectionism redundant, the way was now relatively clear politically for amalgamation to go ahead.³

Moreover, suburban councillors and magistrates, who had blown hot and cold over amalgamation, were generally in favour of it by the mid-1840s.⁴ The removal of exclusive trading privileges removed a barrier to amalgamation. Suburban authorities now saw advantages with amalgamating with their larger, wealthier neighbour. Lacking the finance or assets of Glasgow, and the legal means of raising revenue outwith police boards, joining with Glasgow made financial sense, especially once fears about increased taxation were allayed. The financial advantages for the suburban areas had been made clear in the 1835-6 Report on Scottish Municipal Corporations, which called for amalgamation between the different areas within the parliamentary constituency.⁵ This was a scenario repeated throughout the country. As Carson and Idzikowska have pointed out, small burghs and police commissions often found themselves under intense pressure to amalgamate or incorporate with larger local authorities on financial grounds. Indeed, their ability to remain independent often depended solely on money.⁶

II

Upper-middle-class Disillusionment

However, as important as such backing was, the success of the bill ran far deeper than mere government backing. The Police Commission throughout its history had always relied on institutional and upper-middle-class support to thwart Town Council encroachment. Attempts by the Council to raise the commissioner qualification, circumscribe the Commission's membership, or even disband it completely, had always provoked a backlash from the upper-middle-class electorate. By 1846, however, there was no such response.

Such fight was restricted primarily to the less affluent sections of society – namely, the lower middle class and the skilled working class. Those mobilising opinion against the 1846 bill – the police commissioners, Chartists and members of the craft institutions – came from humble backgrounds, as did those who supported them. As the *Glasgow Herald*, noted: ‘...the petitions for and against this bill do not differ more in regard to the numbers than the characters of those

by whom they are signed.’⁷ The twenty thousand signatories opposing reform were deemed unrepresentative of the respectable propertied classes. As the *Glasgow Herald* pointed out:

...we deny, and have always denied, that petitions which are laid down at the corners of the street, and which every school or passerby who can scowl his name is invited to sign, are exponents of the feelings of a community.⁸

With approximately only five to six thousand proprietors of L.10 dwelling houses in the city by 1846, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of petitioners were from the lower echelons of society. The fact petitioners could sign their names suggests it came from the skilled working class/lower middle class, rather than unskilled working class.

Exactly how widespread was this support for the Commission among artisans and small traders is impossible to calculate. Local press reports created the impression that it was not widespread. The *Glasgow Herald* referred to a poor turnout at a meeting opposing the bill, which had been organised by commissioners:

...the meeting was exceedingly thin, and at no time was the large hall crowded. About half a dozen persons were seated in the west gallery; and the east gallery was empty. The platform was filled by the Glasgow Police Commissioners, and some of their suburban brethren.⁹

Certainly, it is true, that many ratepayers may have been ambivalent to the Commission’s survival. Burgh reform in 1833 may have stifled the resolve of many ratepayers to fight for the Commission. However, the 20,000 who petitioned Parliament suggests it commanded more support among the lower echelons of society than contemporary reports portrayed.

Nor should this be a surprise. As the lower middle class and skilled working class formed the lion’s share of the Commission, they stood to lose most from its demise, especially as only burgess members could be councillors. This was especially so for artisans/others, who had risen from being the Commission’s smallest social grouping in the late 1820s to its largest by the mid-1840s. As will be shown below, the skilled craftsmen’s commitment to the Commission by the 1830s was stronger than any other social grouping; it had, in effect, become a focal point of artisan activity, not least as it provided them with a forum from which to manage municipal affairs. In police elections, the residential qualification allied to the absence of both a selection procedure for candidates and burgess qualification – both of which applied in Town Council elections – had made it easier for artisans to be elected to the Police Commission than the Council. And not surprisingly, many artisans were reluctant to hand control of the police to a merchant and manufacturing dominated Council that provided craftsmen with little opportunity

to manage municipal affairs. Similar views to those of the artisans are likely to have been held by many small traders, as they formed the Commission's second largest social grouping, although there is evidence that their attachment to the Commission was not quite as strong (see below).


Moreover, in Calton, where the electoral qualification was lower than in the Glasgow, working-class ratepayers who did not want to be disenfranchised opposed the 1846 bill. As Pattison pointed out:

Whatever might be said to the contrary, he found that Calton people, paying rents from L.2 to L.5, were generally opposed to the measure, because it would have the effect of disenfranchising them; and he believed not one of them would sacrifice his vote for the sake of the small sum he had to pay [in police assessment].... The large mass of working men were willing to pay their share in the management of these rates; but the Town Council, instead of going onward...were retrograding, because the measure they proposed to throw not only the constituencies of the suburban districts overboard, but to deprive likewise from three to four thousand of the present Police electors in the city of their suffrages....¹⁰

That being said, there is no doubting that upper-middle-class opinion – the only opinion that mattered in terms of the Board's durability – was strongly in favour of incorporation. For all its attempts to deliberately exaggerate public opinion, the *Herald's* claim that '...nine-tenths of all the better classes in the community are in its [the bill's] favour' it is unlikely to have been too far off the mark.¹¹ A petition '...signed by a large number of highly respectable and influential parties...' in support of the bill highlighted clearly where middle-class support lay.¹² One magistrate – Robert Walker of Gorbals – even went so as far to claim that '...I have not met with one ratepayer in Gorbals or in the city who is opposed to this measure.'¹³

The reluctance of men of social standing to serve on the Commission supports these views. Gentlemen declining to act as commissioners had always been a feature of police elections, largely due to electoral procedure. As commissioners were elected from all householders eligible to act as commissioners, rather than a list of candidates who put themselves forward, it was possible for those who did not want to serve on the Commission to be elected. In such circumstances, they could decline to serve. This became more common among the respectable classes as time went on. As Bailie Glassford Bell pointed out to the House of Commons Committee on the 1846 Municipal Police Bill: '...there is often great difficulty in getting [respectable] gentlemen to come forward to be members at all.'¹⁴ As Figure 10.1 shows, the number of men who declined to act as commissioners increased considerably from 1811. In the Commission's first ten years, the position of commissioner was extremely prestigious and much sought after. The annual average percentage of those who declined to act

Figure 10.1 Percentage that Declined to Act as Police Commissioners, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Averages)



as commissioner never rose above 1.5%. Thereafter, however, it fell below 6.5% on only one occasion, between 1836 and 1840 when it accounted for 4%.


Furthermore, though Figure 10.1 indicates a very slight fall in the number of declines in the last twenty years or so of the Commission, it was not representative of an increasing prestige among Glasgow's respectable society. Rather, it was representative, firstly, of a change in electoral procedure in 1831, whereby those who declined to act had, for the first time, to forfeit a sum equal to double of their annual assessment. This had been in place since 1821, but commissioners only started implementing it in 1831, after yet another commissioner had declined to accept office.¹⁵ This may have helped reduce the number of declines from 10.5% between 1816-20 to 4% between 1836-40, before they rose again to 9% between 1841-6.

Secondly, and more importantly, the fall was representative of the fact that less merchants and manufacturers were serving on the Commission. As Figure 10.2 shows, this grouping was far and away the most likely to decline to act as commissioners in the Commission's closing years, greatly outstripping their ratio to the Commission's social composition. Of the nineteen gentlemen, whose occupations are known, who declined to act between 1830 and 1846, ten were merchants and manufacturers, two were professionals and seven were small traders. In other words, merchants and manufacturers accounted for over a half of declines during a period when they were increasingly less likely to be elected in the first place. Significantly, not one artisan declined to act during the same period, despite the fact that they were more likely to be elected, as their rise from the Commission's smallest social grouping in the late 1820s to its largest by the mid-1840s illustrated.

Class variation was equally apparent in terms of regional variation. In general, inhabitants of affluent areas were less likely than inhabitants of poorer areas to serve on the Commission. Of the twenty-three commissioners who declined to act between 1830 and 1846, twelve were in the seven affluent wards of Blythswood, eleven in the other twenty-nine. In other words, 52% of all declines occurred in Blythswood, which accounted for just one-fifth of police wards. In poorer wards and wards with fewer affluent ratepayers there were fewer declines – in wards 32 and 33 there were none.

Of course, it is likely that this class variation was conditioned partly by electoral procedure, as those from less affluent backgrounds may not have had the financial means to decline. It is noticeable that the lower middle class/skilled working class were less likely to decline after 1831 when fines were first introduced. However, it is important not to overemphasise the significance of the financial penalty of not accepting office. As was indicated above, it was not always enforced. Even after 1831, it was rarely referred to in the minutes. Besides, a commissioner accepting office and then resigning shortly afterwards could legally overcome any forfeit. Significantly, there is no evidence that artisans/others did this. Between

Figure 10.2 Merch/Manu. who Declined to Act as Police Commissioners, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages)



1830 and 1846, they accounted for just six of the twenty-seven resignations that were made for made for personal reasons (rather than having been caused by a breach of electoral requirement); merchants and manufacturers accounted for six, professionals six and the petty bourgeoisie nine. Moreover, the six artisans had all been long servants of the Commission. Even accounting for financial pressures, it would be fair to say that upper-middle-class alienation from the Commission by the late 1830s surpassed that of the lower middle class, particularly the self-employed artisan class.

Many of the upper middle class, and, indeed petty bourgeoisie, were declining to act as commissioners because of the time involved. Commissioners met at least once a week, which was both burdensome and time consuming. This became increasingly so as the Commission's range of responsibilities and workload increased as the first half of the century progressed. Long, frequent and often highly charged meetings became increasingly common. A high level of commitment was needed, which many businessmen were simply not prepared to give. Even the most civic minded of citizens often had little alternative but to decline, with the overwhelming majority of meetings being held during working hours. In such circumstances, civic duty gave way to financial reality.

However, why the upper middle class from the 1830s should have been at least twice as likely as the lower middle class and skilled working class to decline cannot be explained by business pressures: lower-middle-class commissioners were themselves businessmen and were subject to similar demands. Underpinning upper-middle-class apathy was a growing sense of disillusionment with the Commission. Many merchants and manufacturers were simply unwilling to serve in a Commission dominated by artisans and shopkeepers. This was a scenario repeated throughout the country. As one anonymous writer, protesting against the proposal to lower the electoral franchise in parliamentary elections to L.10, wrote of police elections in *Blackwood's Magazine* in 1831:

The experiment *has been tried* in all the principal towns of Scotland, of police commissioners chosen by the suffrage of all the L.10 householders; and it is well known both who constitute the immense majority at such elections, and what is the description of candidates who are returned. The elections are so completely overpowered by the low householders, that few respectable citizens think of using their suffrage; and the commissioners chosen in this manner, are of such a character, that, with the exception of a few patriotic individuals, who, for the public good, undertake the duty, it is a matter of extreme difficulty to get any gentlemen to belong to the establishment. Ask any householder of Edinburgh or Glasgow, and he will give this account of police elections in these cities; and it is a matter of perfect horror to its respectable inhabitants, to have the elections of Parliament placed on the same footing.¹⁶

The changing social composition of the Commission and in the adversarial manner in which it conducted its affairs had alienated the city's large business class. The prestige of office had declined as more and more artisans and traders were returned. Upper-middle-class opinion from around the late 1820-30s no longer perceived the Commission to be a respectable forum of municipal government to which they aspired – it was a dissenting, anachronistic institution to be avoided. Deacon Convenor McLellan first highlighted this concern in 1832, bitterly criticising the Commission for being used as a forum for political sentiment in issues outwith the policing domain.

...Gentlemen of high respectability, and whose services had they accepted office would have eminently conduced to the efficiency of the Board have declined when elected to become Commissioners because they had observed the Board to have more the appearance of an arena upon which municipal and national politics were discussed, than that of a quiet and orderly assembly...for the discharge of specific local duties.¹⁷

The *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* went further. Commenting on the Commission, it pointed out:

It is shunned by our best merchants and manufacturers, and we question whether any banker would take his place at it for any consideration. Why is this? Because babblers, hollow-hearted politicians and selfish men got amongst it.¹⁸

Regional studies have shown that the influx of the lower middle class into town councils in the second half of the nineteenth century had a similar, though less dramatic, effect, as the respectable classes increasingly shunned municipal affairs rather than share power with those from humbler backgrounds.¹⁹ It was yet another example of the Police Commission setting the trend for municipal affairs.

It is important to stress that this particular precedent did not represent upper-middle-class disillusionment with the police. Upper-middle-class desire to manage police affairs was still strong – as the civic elite's attempts to incorporate the Commission illustrated. But they, and not the lower middle class, had to be in control. Once this control started to wane, and their efforts to restrict access to the Commission had failed, they increasingly wanted nothing to do with the Commission. By the 1830s, the upper middle class's aspirations of being elected to the Commission had simply been replaced with a desire to see it disbanded, so that police control would once again lie in their hands.

III Burgh Reform

The change in the upper-middle-class's attitude towards the Commission, however, went far deeper than a mere sense of alienation about its social composition and conduct. Many merchants and manufacturers would not have been so vociferous in their support for the Commission's incorporation if they did not have an alternative forum from which to influence and manage municipal affairs. Neither, for that matter, would other ratepayers have been ambivalent about the Commission's survival. The first tangible evidence of upper-middle-class disillusionment may have preceded 1833 by a few years, but there is no doubting that the subsequent years significantly accelerated this trend. One overriding issue was central to the Commission's incorporation: the democratisation of the Council in 1833.

After burgh reform, there was a marked decline in interest in policing issues, coupled with a substantial increase in Council proceedings, among the upper middle class. As the *Glasgow Herald* observed in 1840:

...between resignations, failure to elect, and refusals to accept, it would appear, as we hinted some time since, that this important body has, ever since the reformation of the burgh election system – in consequence of which it has been proposed to dispense with the Board – been gradually abolishing itself. Men of business talents and respectability, who can spare time to devote to public affairs, seem now to regard the Councillor's seat as the only one worthy of ambition, while the membership of the Police Board is held at a discount.²⁰

Shortly after the Commission's incorporation one contemporary poignantly wrote:

Many of the most distinguished of the citizens had been members of this board, and even those opposed to it could scarcely deny that it discharged the duties consigned to it with zeal and fidelity. The opening up of the town council, however, to popular election, vastly lessened the importance with which the police board used to be regarded; and in later years it ceased to be an object with the higher class of citizens to be connected with it. Indeed, they generally refused to serve when returned; and thus the members of the boards, both of the city and suburbs, degenerated in status and in estimation of the public, though not generally speaking, in respectability or upright intention.²¹

In municipal affairs, the position of councillor had always been the most prestigious, conferring authority, power and status. The city's merchant and manufacturing class had always actively sought membership of the Council. This did not change after 1833, primarily because Burgess qualification and selection procedure ensured that the reformed and unreformed Council


had the same social composition of merchants and manufacturers.²² The Police Commission after 1833, however, was not held in the same regard among such gentlemen. Although, social, economic and electoral change played a significant part in its changing make-up, there is no doubting the influence of burgh reform. It was no coincidence that the number of merchants and manufacturers who acted as commissioners declined significantly after 1833, as Figure 9.1 showed.

Declining interest was also apparent in terms of the number of commissioners who had to be appointed by the Commission after no votes, or an insufficient number, had been cast in their wards. (From 1821, at least ten votes were required to elect a commissioner.) Electoral apathy had always been a feature of police elections, especially for resident commissioners who exercised the power of constable in each ward.²³ At no time since their introduction in 1821 were more than 10% elected by the electorate.²⁴ The much more important function of electing general commissioners, however, had always stimulated greater interest. In the Commission's formative years, elections were well turned out. Between 1806 and 1810 the annual average percentage of commissioners who had to be appointed after no votes had been cast was just 4%; in the previous five years all wards voted (see Figure 10.3).

After burgh reform, however, there was a marked change in electoral practice. Between 1830 and 1840, 16% of commissioners were elected without electoral approval, before falling slightly to 11.5% in the last six years of the Commission (figures again based on annual averages). In other words, the last sixteen years saw 14.3% of the Commission's representatives elected without any votes, or a sufficient number, having been cast by the electorate; the corresponding figure for the first sixteen years was just 4.5%. Although at least ten votes were required to elect a commissioner from 1821, it is unlikely to artificially inflated these figures: the overwhelming majority of appointed commissioners were done so after no votes had been cast rather than just an insufficient number. The increase in apathy was real.

This, however, was not solely linked to developments after 1833. As Figure 10.3 shows, declining interest in police elections started from as early as 1810, as the novelty of voting wore off. In fact, the number of commissioners who had to be appointed after no votes, or an insufficient number had been cast, peaked at 20.5% between 1821 and 1825. What was particularly significant about voting patterns after 1833 was the degree of class variation. Once again, electoral apathy was most evident in the affluent area of Blythswood. On the twenty-two occasions that wards did not vote for a commissioner from 1830, twelve occurred in Blythswood, despite the fact that they accounted for just one-fifth of wards. On the other occasions that wards failed to elect a commissioner, only seven occurred in the original twenty-four wards of the royalty, despite the fact that many were in decline both economically and socially. Poorer wards and wards with less affluent ratepayers were, in general, more likely to

Figure 10.3 Percentage of Commissioners who had to be Appointed after no Votes, or an Insufficient Number, had been Cast, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages)



vote than their more illustrious counterparts. On only one occasion did the less affluent wards 32 and 33 fail to elect a police commissioner. In fact, there is evidence of growing interest in police elections in the less affluent wards as the presence on the Commission of the skilled working class/lower middle class increased. Between 1815 and 1830, the original twenty-four wards of the police district failed to elect a commissioner on twenty occasions, in contrast to the mere seven times in the subsequent fifteen years. The slight rise in the number of no votes cast after 1830 was largely the result of the incorporation of middle-class wards in that year.

This is further evident by electoral statistics for the annual general elections that took place in 1844 and 1845 – the only years after 1833 for which complete records exist. In the original police district, elections took place in seventeen wards in 1844 and eight in 1845, occurring in some wards on more than one occasion because of resignations. In only seven out of the twenty-six wards of this district were no elections held. In other words, the electoral statistics for these years provide a good overview of the extent of voting in the royalty as a whole. Of the twenty-five elections that took place in this district between 1844-5, 3,149 votes were cast, averaging 126 per ward.²⁵ This amounted to at least one out of every two who were eligible to vote doing so – hardly evidence of electoral apathy. (Approximately 5,500 were eligible to vote in these elections.)²⁶ In the 1826 annual election – the only year where evidence is recorded before 1833 – 1,427 votes were cast in eleven ward elections, averaging 130 per ward.²⁷ In other words, there is no evidence of growing disinterest in police elections in the original police district in the 1830s and 1840s.

In Blythswood, however, it was a different story. Of the seven ward elections that took place between 1844 and 1845, 314 votes were cast, averaging just 45 per ward – nearly three times less than the rest of the police district. The majority of these Blythswood votes – 147 and 94 in the electoral year 1844 – were cast in wards 27 and 28.²⁸ The other Blythswood wards recorded fewer votes than any other any ward in the police district. And these figures must be regarded as being high for Blythswood, given the tendency of many of its wards not to vote at all. Admittedly, Blythswood had a much smaller population than the royalty of Glasgow, numbering over 20,000 in 1844 compared to over 115,000 for her larger neighbour. However, this discrepancy is partly offset by the fact that the overwhelming majority of Blythswood's inhabitants were enfranchised, which was in stark contrast to the rest of the police district. The upper middle class were simply less likely than the lower middle class to vote in police elections by the 1840s. McGowan made a similar point in his study of the police in Edinburgh.²⁹

In Glasgow, the democratisation of the Council after 1833 had much to do with this. There was little doubt that aspirations of Council coupled with the accompanied elections captured the upper-middle-class's interest at the expense of the Commission. Bailie Anderson clearly highlighted this, stating: '...the inhabitants take a great interest in the election of

councillors and very little in the election of Commissioners'.³⁰ And he was not alone in holding this view. After three wards out of fourteen had failed to cast a single vote in an 1845 police election, the *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* noted: 'nothing can prove it better...how very little interest the public take in police matters...[given commissioners frequent need]...to elect themselves.'³¹

Burgh reform had, among the upper middle class, effectively rendered the Police Commission bankrupt in terms of its popular appeal – that of local accountability. It was no longer the sole bastion of local democracy. With the Town Council now a popularly elected authority, there was simply no need to have another one. As Henry Cockburn succinctly noted, allowing people to choose their police commissioners was '...a precedent always appealed to, till the Reform Act superseded the necessity of using it.'³²

Conclusion to Part III

There was no uniform motivation behind the Commission's incorporation. Different men of different political persuasions had different motives. For some, fear of militant trade unionism and centralisation were high on the agenda. For others, it was the need to streamline the administrative machinery and enhance the office of councillor. Among those who were most active in seeking to disband the Commission, however, the changing social composition of the Commission was paramount. It was simply inconceivable for the Lord Advocate to allow artisans and small traders to manage the criminal police in a city that was on the verge of becoming the 'Second city of the Empire', especially as policing increasingly became politicised. Like other major towns in Britain, it was deemed essential to remove the police from popular control.

Popular representation had simply gone too far.¹ Among other issues, the Commission had intended to give a say in the running of municipal affairs to those merchants, manufacturers and burgh members who were unable to penetrate the Town Council. It had not intended to empower the petty bourgeoisie and artisan class. Glasgow's first democratic municipal authority simply paid the ultimate price for being ahead of its time. The emergence of popularly appointed and accountable representatives and a middle-class power base that reflected the occupational distribution in society as a whole were features of municipal politics that were to emerge as the century progressed. Many of Glasgow's civic elite were simply not ready for them when it came to control of the criminal police.

Neither were many of the upper middle class ready for these developments. It was their alienation from the Commission that ultimately ensured the demise of the city's first democratic institution. With burgh reform went one of the central appeals of Commission – that of democratic accountability. In this regard, the demise of the Commission was, ironically, rooted in struggle behind its inception.² The calls for local accountability that had heralded the Commission's birth in the late eighteenth century were ultimately to ensure its demise in the nineteenth.

Endnotes to Part III

Introduction

1. S. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland, 1800-50: With special reference to the Growth of Civic Government in Glasgow and its Suburbs'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1995), p.214.
2. H. Cockburn, *Memoirs of His Time* (Edinburgh, 1856), p.170.
3. J. Hart, *The British Police* (London, 1961), p.172.
4. T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation and the Civic Response: Glasgow, 1800-30', in A.J.G. Cummings and T.M. Devine, eds, *Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700* (Edinburgh, 1994), p.186.
5. Eight southern districts outside the royalty of Edinburgh, along with Leith and Canongate, introduced improvement acts in 1771, 1771 and 1772 respectively. However, their police provisions were nowhere near as comprehensive as Glasgow's. J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-33'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), pp.63-78.
6. W. McTyer, quoted in the *Glasgow Herald*, 28 July 1828.
7. A. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings: An Autobiography*, Volume I, (Edinburgh, 1883), pp.419-20.

Chapter 8

1. J. Bell and J. Paton, *Glasgow: Its Municipal Organisation and Administration* (Glasgow, 1896), p.113.
2. T.M. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p.414.
3. Bell and Paton, *Municipal Organisation*, p.113.
4. I.E. Maver, 'The Guardianship of the Community: Civic Authority Prior to 1833', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow* (Manchester, 1995), p.251.
5. Bell and Paton, *Municipal Organisation*, p.113.
6. J. Cleland, *Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the City of Glasgow and County of Lanark* (Glasgow, 1832), p.162.

7. D.A. Teviotdale, 'The Glasgow Parliamentary Constituency, 1832-46'. B.Litt. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1962), p.39.
8. Bell and Paton, *Municipal Organisation*, p.63.
9. 'An act for extending the Royalty of the City of Glasgow over certain adjacent lands; for paving, lighting and cleansing the streets; for regulating the police and appointing officers and watchmen, for dividing the city into wards, and appointing commissioners; and for raising funds, and giving certain powers to the Magistrates and Council, and Town and Dean of Guild Courts, for the above and other purposes, 39 & 40 George III, cap. 88, 1800.' (Hereafter referred to as 'Glasgow Police Act, 1800'.)
10. S. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland, 1800-50: With special reference to the Growth of Civic Government in Glasgow and its Suburbs'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1995), pp.32-3.
11. R.M. Urquhart, *The Burghs of Scotland and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833* (Motherwell, 1989), p.13.
12. See Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland', pp.97-8.
13. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 27 August 1825.
14. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 29 October 1840.
15. In the election in question, there were 85 tickets for Mr Lennie and 36 for Mr Anderson. However, around 50 of Mr Anderson's tickets were objected to as not stating the designation of voters. The objection was sustained, except in the case of female voters, where it was resolved that no designation could be given. Mr Lennie was elected by 40 votes to 36. A protest was lodged by Commissioner Forrester. *Glasgow Herald* 30 October 1840.
 Later, on the Sheriff's decree, Mr Anderson was duly elected. It is not clear whether the validity of female votes had anything to do with this, as no reason was given for the Sheriff's decision. However, the next police act, for the first time, formally stated that only male householders were eligible to vote. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 24 December 1840.
16. Bell and Paton, *Municipal Organisation*, p.113.
17. Figures adapted from Cleland, *Enumeration of the Inhabitants, 1832*, p.162.
18. J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-33'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), p.227.
19. Cleland, *Enumeration of the Inhabitants, 1832*, p.162.
20. R.J. Baird, 'Report on the General and Sanitary Conditions of the Working Classes and Poor in the City of Glasgow' (Glasgow, 1841), p.7

21. Even as late as 1843 similar statements were being echoed. As the *Glasgow Herald* stated: '...those who occupy houses under the L.10 mark will be compensated by the reduction in the assessment, or by being exempted from it altogether'. *Glasgow Herald*, 9 March 1846.
22. Bell and Paton, *Municipal Organisation*, p.113.
23. 'Scheme for Regulating the Police of the City of Glasgow: Suggested by the general sense of citizens that some such regulations are absolutely necessary; and which, it is hoped, may form the groundwork of a plan of Police, as agreeable to the views of all parties, as the nature of that necessary establishment will permit' (Glasgow, 1792), G.U.L., Mu24-y.1, p.4.
24. W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December 1984), p.208 and K. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), p.267-8.
25. D. Philips and R.D. Storch, *Policing Provincial England, 1829-56: The Politics of Reform* (London, 1999), pp.6-7.
26. E.H. Monkkenon, *Police in Urban America, 1860-1920* (Cambridge, 1981), pp.42-4.
27. T.M. Devine, *The Tobacco Lords* (Edinburgh, 1975), p.166.
28. Maver, 'Guardianship of the Community', p.257.
29. Carson and Idzikowska make this point for burghs in Scotland, not just Glasgow. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', p.220 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.283.
30. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', p.220 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.283.
31. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', pp.220-1 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.283.
32. See R. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VIII, 1781-95* (Glasgow, 1913), pp.93, 97, 288, 333, 341, 342, 348, 349, 355, 356, 447, 450 and 458.
33. G.C.A., T-MH/1/3, 11 February 1790.
34. J. Ord, 'Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force', in *Old Glasgow Club Transactions*, Volume 1, Sessions 1900-8, no author (Glasgow, 1908), pp.97-112, G.C.A., OGC I, 97, p.99; J. Ord, 'A Short History of the Glasgow Police Force with a Survey of Modern Developments' (Glasgow, 1935), pp.69-78, G.C.A., AGN, 99, p.69; and D. Grant, *The Thin Blue Line: The Story of the City of Glasgow Police* (London, 1973), p.15.
35. *Glasgow Herald*, 14 March 1800.
36. *Ibid.*
37. See H.W. Meikle, *Scotland and the French Revolution*, Second Edition (London, 1969), p.19.

38. The resolutions of the Incorporation of Wrights are adapted from the *Glasgow Herald*, 14 March 1800.
39. See *Ibid.* and R. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume IX, 1796-1808* (Glasgow, 1914), p.188.
40. G.C.A., T-MH/1/3, 11 February 1790.
41. 'At a Meeting of the Committee of the Heritors and Burgesses upon the Police Bill Business, held on the 19 Day of February 1790', G.C.A., C2/1/1/174.
42. 'Scheme for Regulating the Police of the City of Glasgow'.
43. 'Answers from the Magistrates and Town Council to the Proposals of the Committee of Heritors and Burgess, dated 19 February 1790, for making certain alterations on the Police Bill', G.C.A., C2/1/1/181, pp.185-6.
44. For more on this, see Maver, 'Guardianship of the Community', p.246.
45. 'Glasgow Police Act, 1800'.
46. Renwick, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, Volume VIII*, pp.217-19.
47. *Glasgow Herald*, 27 January 1807.
48. See *Ibid.*, 20 February 1807, 9 March 1807, 13 March 1807, 16 March 1807, 20 March 1807 and 23 March 1807.
49. *Ibid.*, 20 February 1807.
50. *Ibid.*, 20 March 1807.
51. *Ibid.*, 27 January 1807.
52. See *Ibid.*, 20 February 1807, 9 March 1807, 13 March 1807, 16 March 1807, 20 March 1807, 23 March 1807 and 6 April 1807.
53. *Ibid.*, 10 July 1807.
54. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 29 May 1833.
55. I.E. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow, 1833-1912: Public Service and the Scottish Civil Identity'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Strathclyde (1990), p.118 and G.C.A., E1/1/21, 21 September 1843.
56. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 17 July 1843.
57. For a good overview of the struggle, see J. Pagan, *Sketch of the History of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1847), pp.150-4 and Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.92-122.
58. 'General Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the state of Municipal Corporations in Scotland, 1835'. P.P., 1835, XXIX, p.58.
59. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 22 January 1836, 5 February 1836 and 15 April 1836.
60. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 8 February 1838.
61. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.99-102.

62. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 8 April 1842.
63. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.101-2.
64. Pagan, *Sketch of the History of Glasgow*, p.151.
65. The remainder of this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, is based on *Ibid.*, pp.151-2 and Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.102-4.
66. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 9 March 1843.
67. *Glasgow Herald*, 17 March 1843.
68. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1843.
69. For the opposition of commissioners to the bill, see G.C.A., E1/1/20, 13 March 1843.
70. Pagan, *Sketch of the History of Glasgow*, p.152.
71. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.103.
72. Pagan, *Sketch of the History of Glasgow*, pp.152-3.
73. *Glasgow Herald*, 12 and 16 January 1846.
74. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.122.
75. *Glasgow Herald*, 23 January 1846.

Chapter 9

1. I.E. Maver, 'Politics and Power in the Scottish City: Glasgow's Town Council in the Nineteenth Century', in T.M. Devine, ed., *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), p.110.
2. *Glasgow Herald*, 3 April 1843.
3. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 22 January 1846.
4. A. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings*, Volume I (Edinburgh, 1883), p.420.
5. See W.H. Fraser, 'The Glasgow Cotton Spinners, 1837', in J. Butt and J.T. Ward, eds, *Scottish Themes: Essays in Honour of Professor S.G.E., Lythe* (Edinburgh, 1976), pp.80-97 and W.H. Fraser, *Conflict and Class: Scottish Workers, 1700-1838* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp.152-4.
6. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings*: Volume I, pp.420-1. For a good overview of Alison's views on Lanarkshire's policing problems, see M. Michie, *An Enlightened Tory in Victorian Scotland: The Career of Sir Archibald Alison* (East Lothian, 1997), pp.64-91.
7. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings*: Volume I, pp.420-1.
8. *Ibid.*, p.372.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p.376.
11. *Ibid.*, p.488.
12. *Ibid.*, pp.360-1.

13. See Michie, *An Enlightened Tory in Victorian Scotland*, pp.77-9; W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: the Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December, 1984), pp.228-30; and K. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), pp.295-7.
14. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings: Volume I*, pp.422-4.
15. *Ibid.*, p.351.
16. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', pp.229-30 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', pp.296-7.
17. 'Reports from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Expediency of Adopting a more Uniform System of Police in England and Wales and Scotland: Second, with proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index, 1852-3'. P.P., 1852-3 [715.], XXXVI. 161, p.103 (hereafter cited as '1853 S.C.P.').
18. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', pp.229-30 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', pp.296-7.
19. '1853 S.C.P.', p.116.
20. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery', p.229 and Carson and Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing', p.296.
21. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings: Volume I*, p.419.
22. D. Philips, *Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country, 1835-60* (London, 1977), p.57.
23. I.E. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow, 1833-1912'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Strathclyde (1990), pp.97-8.
24. 'The First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force in the Counties of England and Wales', P.P., 1839, XIX, p.84.
25. *Ibid.* p.84.
26. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.95.
27. For the impact of this philosophy on English provincial police reform, see C. Emsley, *Policing and its Context, 1750-1870* (London, 1983), pp.78-81; D.J.V. Jones, 'The New Police, Crime and People in England and Wales, 1829-88', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Volume 33 (1983), pp.157-9; and J. Field, 'Police, Power and Community in a Provincial English Town: Portsmouth, 1815-75', in V. Bailey, ed., *Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (New Jersey, 1981), pp.42-8.
28. 'General Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the state of Municipal Corporations in Scotland, 1835'. P.P., 1835, XXIX, p.58.

29. See *Glasgow Herald*, 20 March 1843 and 12 January 1846.
30. *Ibid.*, 17 March 1843.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1843.
33. *Ibid.*, 17 March 1843.
34. *Ibid.*, 9 March 1846.
35. See *Ibid.*, 17 March 1843 for Town Council discussion on Government concern at Glasgow's adjoining areas going unpoliced.
36. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1843.
37. *Ibid.*, 17 March 1843.
38. *Ibid.*, 24 August 1846.
39. *Ibid.*
40. 'Abstract Statements, Revenue and Expenditure of the Corporation of the City of Glasgow, 1818 to 1859'. G.C.A., DCC/2/1 and E1/1/22, 31 July 1845.
41. I.E. Maver 'Glasgow's Civic Government', in W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, eds, *Glasgow, Volume II: 1830 to 1912* (Manchester, 1996), pp.454 and 460-1.
42. I.E. Maver, 'The Guardianship of the Community: Civic Authority before 1833', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p.246.
43. *Glasgow Herald*, 6 March 1846.
44. *Ibid.*, 24 August 1846.
45. *Ibid.*, 6 March 1846.
46. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.112.
47. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 25 April 1846.
48. *Glasgow Herald*, 6 March 1846.
49. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 30 August 1845.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, 8 November 1845.
52. This reference was by Commissioner McArthur, protesting at the election of Commissioner Abbey. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 28 April 1825.
53. *Glasgow Herald*, 30 March 1832.
54. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 10 January 1833.
55. See G.C.A., E1/1/18, 1 May 1834 to 22 May 1834.
56. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 12 May 1842.
57. 'Case of Mr Inglis: Late Clerk of Police' (Glasgow, 1847), G.U.L., Special Collections, Mu.22-a.15, pp.1-11.
58. *Ibid.*, p.2.

59. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 28 April 1825.
60. For a fuller account of the on-going dispute surrounding his appointment, see G.C.A., E1/1/17, 29 July 1833 to 12 September 1833.
61. According to Commissioner McArthur, 'the Board illegally and unjustly rejected 125 votes in favour of Mr James Wilson, principally on the ground that the voters had not specified their trade or occupation, such specification neither being requested by the act nor being specified as necessary in the advertisement of the election to the public.' G.C.A., E1/1/14, 28 April 1825.
62. For the long-going dispute between police commissioners and the Magistracy over whether companies should have the vote see G.C.A., E1/1/14, 25 April 1825 to 1 February 1827. It was finally resolved that company votes were legal.
63. J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and Systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-33'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), p.166.
64. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 2 November 1832.
65. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 6 September 1845.
66. *Ibid.*, 21 March 1846.
67. Maver makes the same point. Maver, 'Glasgow's Civic Government', p.453.
68. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 22 April 1830.
69. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 25 November 1841.
70. See Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.197-8.
71. *Ibid.*, p.116.
72. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 4 September 1845.
73. A motion was put forward on this subject by Commissioner Pattison – it was never resolved. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 16 April 1846.
74. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 25 August 1845.
75. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 18 August 1836; E1/1/18, 28 August 1837; E1/1/19 27 August 1838; E1/1/19, 22 August 1839; E1/1/19, 9 July 1840; E1/1/20, 22 July 1841; E1/1/20, 21 July 1842; E1/1/21, 27 July 1843; E1/1/21, 25 July 1844; and E1/1/22, 31 July 1845.
76. In 1842, a bill of suspension and interdict was served to the Board by magistrates, on the resolution of commissioners to set aside L.1,000 towards proposed Police Bill. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 24 March 1842.
77. *Glasgow Herald*, 1 August 1842.
78. T.M. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', in T.M Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p.404.
79. W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, 'The Social Problems of the City', in W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, eds, *Glasgow, Volume II: 1830 to 1912* (Manchester, 1996), p.352.

80. D. Daiches, *Scotland and the Union* (London, 1977), p.128.
81. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', p.404.
82. Cited in M.W., Flinn, ed., *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain* by Edwin Chadwick (Edinburgh, 1965), p.99.
83. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland: in consequence of an inquiry directed to be made by Poor Law Commissioners', P.P., 1842, [H.L.] XXV.III.I, p.72.
84. *Ibid.*
85. The remainder of this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, is based on Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', pp.406-12.
86. T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation', in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp.48-9.
87. Fraser and Maver, 'The Social Problems of the City', p.364.
88. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland', pp.70-3.
89. Cited in T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation and the Civic Response: Glasgow, 1800-30', in A.J.G Cummings and T.M Devine, eds, *Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700* (Edinburgh, 1994), p.189.
90. *Ibid.*, pp.189-90.
91. *Ibid.*, p.190.
92. *Ibid.*, pp.190-4.
93. *Ibid.*, p.191.
94. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 September 1800 and E1/1/19, 31 August 1840.
95. See Devine, 'Urbanisation and the Civic Response', p.191.
96. 'Notes explanatory of the heads of new police bill for Glasgow, 1842' (Glasgow, 1842), pp.14-15. Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room, Moir Collection, 62632.55.
97. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', p.415.
98. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 12 August 1830.
99. Persons living in streets to which this applied were still assessed, so long as they were within the limits for watching and lighting set by commissioners. 'Regulations of the Police, 1808' (Glasgow, 1808), pp.5-7. Mitchell Library, Glasgow Room, C703578.
100. S. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland, 1800-50: With Special Reference to the Growth of Civic Government in Glasgow and its Suburbs'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1995), pp.113-14.
101. *Ibid.*, p.211.
102. *Glasgow Herald*, 20 March 1846.

103. E.P. Hennock, *Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth-Century Urban Government* (London, 1973), pp.308-12.
104. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.687.
105. MacLaren makes the same point for Kirk session elders in Aberdeen. A. MacLaren, 'Class Formation and Class Fractions: the Aberdeen Bourgeoisie, 1836-50', in G. Gordon and B. Dicks, *Scottish Urban History* (Aberdeen, 1983), p.112.
106. G.C.A., D-CC 10/1/1.
107. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 9 August 1800.
108. Figures adapted from Cleland, J., *Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the City of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1832), p.162.
109. For a background on the concentration of merchant power, see Maver, 'Politics and Power in the Scottish City', p.101.
110. *Glasgow Herald*, 27 January 1807, 16 March 1807 and 20 March 1807.
111. The nine who served on the Commission who also served on either the Magistracy, Council or Dean of Guild Court were Peter Bald, William Muir, David Scott, John Hamilton, Gilbert Hamilton, James Robertson, William Cuthbertson, William Telfer and Andrew McFarlane. The additional nine who were representatives of either the Merchants' or Trades' Houses were Alex Oswald, Andrew Reid (both Merchants' House), John Graham, William Mitchell, James Bryce, David McMillan, George Smith, James Watson and John Craig (all Trades' House). See Appendix 4 for social composition of police commissioners. For membership of public bodies, see *Glasgow Herald*, 10 and 13 October 1800; *Glasgow Herald*, 19 October 1801; *Glasgow Courier*, 14 and 16 October 1802; *Glasgow Herald*, 14 October 1803; *Glasgow Herald*, 12 October 1804; and *Glasgow Herald*, 11 October 1805.
112. The three commissioners who served simultaneously on the Magistracy were John Hamilton, William Cuthbertson and William Muir. The six who served simultaneously on the Council were Peter Bald, William Muir, William Cuthbertson, David Scott, Gilbert Hamilton and John Hamilton. The two who served simultaneously on the Dean of Guild Court were Peter Bald and Andrew McFarlane. *Ibid.*
113. S.S. Nenadic, 'The Structure, Values and Influence of the Scottish Urban Middle Class: Glasgow, 1800-70'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1986), p.57.
114. R.J. Morris, 'Urbanisation in Scotland', in W.H. Fraser and R.J. Morris, eds, *People and Society in Scotland: Volume II, 1830-1914* (Edinburgh, 1990), p.86.
115. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.36-8.
116. For background on the occupational distribution of the middle class, see Nenadic, 'The Structure, Values and Influence of the Scottish Urban Middle Class', pp.52-72.

117. Hennock found a similar situation in English councils in the first half of the nineteenth century. Hennock, *Fit and Proper Persons*, p.10.

118. C.R. Baird, *Report on the General Sanitary Condition of the Working Classes and Poor in the City of Glasgow* (London, 1842), p.7.

According to Teviotdale, there were 7,024 registered to vote for the parliamentary elections in 1832, almost of all whom were burgh members. He claims there was not any significant change in the subsequent fourteen years. D.A. Teviotdale, 'The Glasgow Parliamentary Constituency, 1832-46'. B.Litt. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1962), pp.38-42. According to Sweeney, however, the extent of burghs' enfranchisement was likely to be lower. See Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.46.

119. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 25 April 1846.

120. *Ibid.*

121. See evidence given to House of Commons Committee on 1846 Glasgow Police and Statute Labour Bill. *Glasgow Herald*, 3 August 1846 to September 1846.

122. *Ibid.*, 31 August 1846.

123. Anon., 'On Parliamentary Reform and the French Revolution', *Blackwood's Magazine* (June, 1831), p.926.

124. Maver, 'Politics and Power in the Scottish City', p.110.

125. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.588.

126. *Ibid.*, p.591.

127. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 27 June 1844.

128. J.M. Hart, 'The County and Borough Police Act, 1856', *Public Administration* (1956), Volume XXXIV.

129. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland', p.191.

130. Cited in *Ibid.*

131. C.R. Baird, in his investigation of the sanitary condition of the lower classes in Glasgow, estimated that within the ten parishes of the city there were 1,393 licensed spirit retailers and 19,467 families, or one licensed person or public house for every fourteen families. Chief Superintendent Miller put the figure a little higher for Glasgow and suburbs at one public house for every twenty-five families. *Ibid.*

132. D. Paton, 'Drink and the Temperance Movement in Scotland in the Nineteenth Century'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh (1976), pp.133-5.

133. Daiches, *Scotland and the Union*, p.129.

134. 'Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland', p.190.

135. *Glasgow Herald*, 3 August 1846.

136. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 30 August.

137. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.591-602.
138. J.E. Handley, *The Irish in Scotland, 1798-1845*, Second Edition (Cork, 1945), p.260.
139. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 12 January 1843.
140. *Glasgow Herald*, 9 October 1840.
141. *Ibid.*, 24 February 1843.
142. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 19 September 1844.
143. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 23 January 1845.
144. G.C.A., 24 February 1845.
145. M. Tebbutt, *Making Ends Meet: Pawnbroking and Working-Class Credit* (Leicester, 1983), pp.112-13.
146. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 27 October 1825.
147. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.792-3.
148. J.F. McCaffrey, 'Irish Immigrants and Radical Movements in the West of Scotland in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Innes Review: The Journal of the Scottish Catholic Historical Association*, Number 1, Volume XXXIX (Spring, 1988), pp.46-60.
149. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.116.
150. The reference was to an earlier incident. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 25 April 1846.
151. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 17 April 1845.
152. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 24 August 1843
153. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 21 February 1845.
154. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 16 April 1846.
155. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 24 February 1845.
156. *Glasgow Herald*, 3 September 1841.
157. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 25 April 1844.
158. *Glasgow Herald*, 9 March 1846.
159. J. Foster, *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns* (London, 1971), pp.58-68, 150 and 159-60.
160. Cited in *Ibid.*, p.59.
161. M. Weaver, 'The New Science of Policing: Crime and the Birmingham Police Force, 1839-42', *Albion*, Volume 26 (1994), p.289; T.A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales, 900-1966* (London, 1967), pp.83-4; and C. Emsley, *The English Police: A Political and Social History*, Second Edition (London, 1996), pp.41-2.
162. G.C.A., E1/119, 1 August 1839 and 2 August 1839.
163. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 1 August 1839.

164. W.H. Fraser, 'The Scottish Context of Chartism', in T. Brotherstone, ed., *Covenant, Charter and Party: Traditions of Popular Revolt in Scottish History* (Aberdeen, 1989), p.70 and T.C. Smout, *A Century of the Scottish People, 1830-1914* (London, 1986), p.27.
165. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 8 May 1845.
166. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 28 July 1842.
167. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 25 April 1844.
168. G.C.A., E1/1/21, February 1845.
169. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 10 January 1846.
170. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 30 August.
171. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.116.
172. *Glasgow Herald*, 16 January 1846.
173. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 15 May 1845.
174. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', p.110 and p.119.
175. *Ibid.*, pp.121-2.
176. G.C.A., E1/9/2, 10 December 1846.
177. '1853 S.C.P.', pp.110-1.
178. *Ibid.*, p.109.
179. B.J. Davey, *Lawless and Immoral: Policing a County Town, 1838-57* (Leicester, 1983), p.49.
180. For background to residential segregation, see M. Simpson, 'Middle-Class Housing and the Growth of Suburban Communities in the West End of Glasgow, 1830-1914'. B.Litt. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1970).
181. S.G. Checkland, 'The British Industrial City in History: The Glasgow Case', *Urban Studies*, 1 (1964), p.43.
182. 'An act to continue for a limited term of years the acts relating to the police of the City of Glasgow, to vest the management of the statute labour conversion money in the said city in the Board of Police thereof; and for other purposes therein mentioned, 7 William IV, cap. 48, 1837.'
183. 'An act to consolidate, amend and extend the provisions of several acts for the better paving, watching, lighting and cleansing, and for regulating the police of the City of Glasgow and adjoining districts; and also for managing the statute labour of the said city; and for other purposes in relation thereto, 6 & 7 Victoria, cap. 99, 1843.'
184. Fraser and Maver, 'The Social Problems of the City', pp.373-4.
185. *Glasgow Herald*, 12 April 1833.
186. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 25 July 1842, E1/1/20, 25 May 1843 and E1/1/21, 29 July 1844.
187. W.H. Fraser, 'The Working Class', in W.H. Fraser and I.E. Maver, eds, *Glasgow*, pp.315-16.

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189. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 28 July 1845.
190. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 23 July 1829.
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192. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 18 April 1833.
193. S.S. Nenadic, 'The Middle Ranks and Modernisation', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p.279.
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197. A. MacLaren, *Religion and Social Class: The Disruption Years in Aberdeen* (London, 1974), pp.208-11 and MacLaren, 'Class Formation and Class Fractions', pp.112-29.
198. 'An act for regulating the police of the barony of Gorbals, in the county of Lanark; for paving, cleansing and lighting the streets and passages thereof; erecting a bridewell or workhouse therein; and for other purposes relating thereto, 48 George III, cap. 42, 1808.' G.U.L., Special Collections, Mu.22-y.1; 'An act for regulating the police of the burgh of Calton and the village of Mile-end in the County of Lanark; for paving, cleansing and lighting the streets and passages of said district; and for erecting a court-house, goal and bridewell or workhouse therein, 59 George III, cap. 3, 1819.' G.U.L., Special Collections, Mu.22-y.1; and 'An act for regulating the police of the burgh of Anderston and the lands of Lancefield and others, adjoining the said burgh, in the county of Lanark; for paving, cleansing and lighting the streets and passages of the said district, and for erecting a court-house and goal therein, George IV, cap. 119, 1826'. G.U.L., Special Collections, Mu.22-y.1.
199. Alison, *Some Account of My Life and Writings: Volume I*, pp.420-1.
200. Estimate based on rental year 1828-9. Cleland, *Enumeration of the Inhabitants, 1832*, p.162.
201. Anon., 'On Parliamentary Reform and the French Revolution', p.925.
202. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 30 July 1832.
203. As Maver has pointed out, councillors, even after 1833, had to meet a range of qualifications based on their wealth and social standing. They all had to be of burgh membership, which greatly restricted the occupational categories eligible for election and guaranteed representatives of affluence. Maver, 'Glasgow's Civic Government', p.444.

Chapter 10

1. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 30 April 1846; G.C.A., E1/1/22, 4 June 1846 and T-TH/1/1/11, 13 March 1846.
2. *Glasgow Herald*, 15 June 1846.
3. I.E. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow, 1833-1912'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Strathclyde (1990), pp.106 and 112.
4. *Glasgow Herald*, 16 January 1846.
5. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.94-5 and 104-5.
6. W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: the Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December, 1984), pp.222-3 and K. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), pp.287-8.
7. *Glasgow Herald*, 20 April 1846.
8. *Ibid.*, 20 April 1846.
9. *Ibid.*, 6 March 1846.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, 20 April 1846.
12. *Ibid.*, 27 March 1846.
13. *Ibid.*, 14 September 1846.
14. *Ibid.*, 27 July 1846.
15. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 18 August 1831.
16. Anon., 'On Parliamentary Reform and the French Revolution', *Blackwood's Magazine* (June, 1831), p.926.
17. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 17 May 1832.
18. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 25 April 1846.
19. E.P. Hennock, *Fit Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth-Century Urban Government* (London, 1973), pp.313-16 and S.S. Nenadic, 'The Structure, Values and Influence of the Scottish Urban Middle Class: Glasgow, 1800-70'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1986), pp.306 and 313.
20. *Glasgow Herald*, 25 December 1840.
21. J. Pagan, *Sketch of the History of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1847), p.154.
22. Sweeney, 'The Municipal Administration of Glasgow', pp.36-8.
23. In 1821, two resident commissioners were appointed to each ward. They were responsible for exercising constabulary powers and superintending their respective wards. They did not, however, constitute part of the Commission, and had no say in the management of police affairs.

24. The annual average percentages of resident commissioners elected where no votes, or an insufficient number, were cast were as follows: between 1821 and 1825, 91%; between 1826 and 1830, 96%; between 1831 and 1835, 96%; between 1836 and 1840, 90% and between 1841 and 1846, 94%. See G.C.A., E1/1/12, 9 July 1821; E1/1/12, 12 August 1822; E1/1/13, 11 August 1823; E1/1/13, 9 August 1824; E1/1/14, 8 September 1825; E1/1/15, 14 August 1826; E1/1/15, 13 August 1827; E1/1/16, 11 August 1828; E1/1/16, 10 August 1829; E1/1/16, 9 August 1830; E1/1/17, 8 August 1831; E1/1/17, 13 August 1832; E1/1/17, 12 August 1833; E1/1/18, 11 August 1834; E1/1/18, 10 August 1835; E1/1/18, 8 August 1836; E1/1/18, 14 August 1837; E1/1/19, 13 August 1838; E1/1/19, 12 August 1839; E1/1/19, 10 August 1840; E1/1/20, 9 August 1841; E1/1/20, 9 August 1842; E1/1/21, 14 August 1843; E1/1/21, 12 August 1844; E1/1/22, 11 August 1845; E1/1/22, 13 August 1846.

25. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 29 July 1844 and G.C.A. E1/1/22, 28 July 1845.

26. Corporation of the City of Glasgow, *Municipal Glasgow: Its Evolution and Enterprises* (Glasgow, 1914), p.320.

27. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 31 July 1826.

28. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 29 July 1844 and G.C.A., E1/1/22, 28 July 1845.

29. J. McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland: A Case Study of the Police and systems of Police in Edinburghshire, 1800-33'. Ph.D. Thesis, Open University (1997), pp.165-6.

30. *Glasgow Herald*, 24 August 1846.

31. *Scotch Reformers' Gazette*, 2 August 1845.

32. Adapted from McGowan, 'The Emergence of Modern Civil Police in Scotland', pp.238-9.

Conclusion

1. Carson and Idzikowska also make this point for other burghs. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900, Part I', p.222 and K. Carson and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), p.286.

2. MacLaren makes a similar point in his study of the Disruption in the Free Church in Aberdeen. A. MacLaren, *Religion and Social Class: The Disruption Years in Aberdeen* (London, 1974), pp.208-11.

Part IV

**Poor Law or Criminal Law Guardians?
Policing Vagrancy in Glasgow,
1800-46 – A Case Study of
Police Policy and
Priority**

Introduction to Part IV

Vagrants fascinated commentators in nineteenth-century Britain. They were the focal point of numerous reports, parliamentary inquiries and legislative enactments throughout the period. Official inquiries, such as in 1821, 1847-8 and 1866, addressed them directly, while others, such as the 1839 Royal Commission on the Rural Constabulary, were crammed with references to their perceived evils.¹ Interest was so great that few official reports neglected to refer to them. Even literary figures and social investigators, such as Mayhew and Stallard, wrote extensively on the problems that they posed.² All portrayed a dramatic, if at times somewhat contrasting picture. Images of vagrants as loathsome social parasites that ‘...infest the country...’ were often coupled with attractive portrayals of vagrant lifestyle, free from the restraints of settled residence.³ As an official at a Yorkshire Poor Law Conference remarked, vagrancy is ‘...a more pleasant and congenial mode of life’.⁴

Intriguing as such paradoxical images of vagrancy were, it was its perceived increase brought the problem into the public eye. Although impossible to quantify precisely – it was believed that only a small proportion of vagrants sought official assistance – contemporaries were of little doubt the problem was becoming more extensive.⁵ One estimate made at a poor law conference in 1910 claimed that vagrancy to population in England had risen more than ten-fold from the second half of the nineteenth century.⁶

In Scotland, the problem was probably greater. Unlike the English system of poor provision, the Scottish system provided little safety valve against periods of economic hardship. Although relief was sometimes administered in such times, the able-bodied Scot had no legal right to it, which left those who had fallen on hard times often with little alternative but to beg or adopt the nomadic lifestyle. Few doubted the scale of the problem. The Inspector of Constabulary in 1867 remarked: ‘the evil of vagrancy is loudly complained of from one end of Scotland to the other.’⁷ Estimates of its extent varied considerably. According to the Inspector of Constabulary, 53,534 were reported in Scotland in 1861, while the Inspector of Poor for Rutherglen claimed in 1887 that 138,748 such persons roamed the country.⁸ Most agreed with their southern counterparts that the problem was becoming more extensive as the above figures suggest. As Sheriff William Watson of Aberdeenshire, in his investigation into the causes and cure of mendicancy in Scotland, noted in 1880: ‘...vagrancy has increased, and is increasing....’⁹

Few areas of the country appeared to be as affected as Glasgow. As early as 1811, the police minutes were reporting that ‘...the public streets, roads and lanes of the city and suburbs are much infested by public and common beggars....’¹⁰ It was a problem that appeared to be

unrelenting, with frequent claims that ‘...rogues, vagabonds and depredators of every description had...[grown]...to an alarming extent’.¹¹ As with other parts of the country, a hardening of attitudes towards vagrancy may have partially distorted contemporary opinions and figures concerning the scale of the problem and its perceived increase. But they are unlikely to have been without foundation given the massive influx of migrants into the city in the first half of the century and the volatile economic conditions they faced. (These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.) In August 1819, the police apprehended 355 beggars within city bounds, only five months after ‘...upwards of two hundred pounds...’ had been set aside to deal with the problem.¹² Indeed, such was the time, effort and expense directed by commissioners towards tackling vagrancy that it would be fair to say that few other concerns dominated more their thoughts between 1800 and 1846.

Given this context, a study of vagrancy is crucial to understanding policing in the city. The following chapter will analyse why vagrancy was such a visible problem of nineteenth-century society and of Glasgow in particular. It will then assess the police response. Chapter 12 will analyse the rationale behind commissioner policy, while the conclusion to Part IV will assess the implications this policy had for policing as a whole. In doing this, the study seeks to contribute to an important and yet under-researched area of police history.¹³ Too often the vagrant has been portrayed as simply a poor law problem, with only limited attention given to the police’s role.¹⁴ Historians have tended to divide themselves into traditionalist and revisionist camps, with the former merely assuming that vagrancy’s association with crime was the rationale for policing policy, and the latter arguing that it was social control. Rarely, however, has a detailed study of policing policy in this area been carried out.

Vagrancy and the Police Response

I

The Causes of Vagrancy

In England, the legal definition of the term 'vagrant' or 'casual' in the nineteenth century was a destitute person without permanent residence or settlement who sought temporary workhouse relief.¹ In Scotland, no such legal definition was given.² No specific legislative provision for vagrancy in Scotland was made in the first half of the century. The main statute relating to vagrancy in this period – the 1824 Vagrancy Act – applied only to England and Wales. Broadly speaking, however, the term applied to tinkers, gypsies, unlicensed hawkers and all persons who lived by begging with no apparent means of supporting themselves.³ More often than not, the terms 'vagrant' and 'beggar' were used interchangeably.

Few contemporaries doubted what caused such people to pursue the vagrant lifestyle. The overwhelming majority were convinced that vagrancy was the self-inflicted product of character defect; a moral failing on the part of the individual caused by idleness, indiscipline and intemperance. As Sheriff Watson of Aberdeen noted: 'Its numbers are made up of persons who have an inherent dislike to work.'⁴ Randle Jackson, a Surrey magistrate, even went so far as to claim in 1828 that vagrants were a sub-criminal class who roamed the country in pursuit of dishonest means.⁵ According to one historian, such professional beggars and villains accounted for half of all vagrants in Elizabethan England.⁶ (No similar study for Scotland has been carried out.)

Character failing and moral delinquency, however, were only part of the explanation. Both were frequently portrayed as being symptomatic of two wider problems, which according to contemporaries greatly encouraged mendicancy. The first concerned poor law provision. A few enlightened individuals, such as W.P. Alison, Professor of Medicine, Edinburgh University, argued that the '...inadequacy of legal allowances...results in a dependence upon common begging'.⁷ However, they were firmly in the minority. The majority took the opposite view. Influenced by Malthus's economic theory, the common belief was that parish aid sapped moral fibre, encouraging a culture of idleness and dependency. As the Town's Hospital – Glasgow's poor law authority – claimed in 1818:

It has been invariably found that the number of the poor increases with the established means of their support, and that the measures of charity ought as much as possible remain invisible till the moment of their distribution.⁸

The second concern was indiscriminate almsgiving. In the 1840s, the Parochial Board of Glasgow repeatedly claimed that unregulated assistance was encouraging pauperism.⁹ So, too, did the local press. The *Glasgow Examiner* claimed that such was the misapplication of charity in the city that ‘Glasgow will become one vast mass of beggars and imbeciles.’¹⁰ The public was frequently singled out for providing the relief upon which vagrants thrived. As Mr Lambert, in a lecture delivered on the vagrancy laws in England in 1868, noted:

I cannot too emphatically enforce my conviction that as long as the public persist in bestowing alms upon valiant beggars and sturdy vagabonds, every attempt on the part of those who make or administer the laws for the suppression of vagrancy and mendicancy will most assuredly prove unavailing.¹¹

It was widely believed that the profits gained from such almsgiving greatly outstripped the earnings of an honest labourer thereby encouraging the vagrant lifestyle.¹² As George Brine, a self-confessed professional vagrant, pointed out: ‘I soon discovered that more money could be got without work than with it.’¹³ Sheriff Watson agreed, claiming that

Vagrancy must be a profitable trade to those who pursue it. ...it is well known that those people live far better than not only paupers supported by the enforced charity of the poor laws, but also better than many of our honest and industrial classes.¹⁴

The financial rewards of begging were commonly believed to have contaminated or seduced into the mendicant lifestyle those who were poor through no fault of their own.¹⁵ Claims were widespread in London in the 1880s that indiscriminate charity was pauperising many of the ‘respectable’ lower orders, which raised fears of an insurrectionary alliance between the casual ‘residuum’ and the working class.¹⁶ Indeed, such concerns were instrumental in the establishment of mendicant societies that sought to better administer private philanthropy.¹⁷

Unfortunately, there was little understanding of perhaps the greatest cause of vagrancy – unemployment and economic hardship. A few contemporaries, like Reverend Clark, Minister of the Old Church, Edinburgh, recognised the link between poverty and vagrancy, pointing out that ‘a great deal of the destitution is caused by the want of employment.’¹⁸ But they were few and far between. By preferring to see poverty in moral rather than economic terms, most mid-Victorian thinkers failed to relate the vagaries of the economic cycle with the problem of society’s wandering poor.

Research, however, has shown that there was a tangible link. Statistical analysis by Crowther indicates that fluctuations in pauperism and vagrancy followed similar fluctuations in the number of unemployed between 1880 and 1930.¹⁹ Moreover, Sidney and Beatrice Webb calculated that the number of vagrants in England at the turn of the twentieth century varied from thirty or forty thousand in years of prosperous trade to seventy or eighty in times of depression. They estimated that at least one-third of all vagrants in prosperous times, and nearly two-thirds in bad times, were wandering in search of work.²⁰ Furthermore, though the Glasgow police minutes for the first half of the nineteenth century portray a vagrancy problem throughout the period, in good times and bad, there is evidence of heightened police concern in times of economic depression.²¹ In 1818, when unemployment was high, 300 beggars were regularly picked-up by police each month, with more police energy being channelled into mendicancy at that point than any other policing sphere – a clear illustration of what appeared to police commissioners to be an escalating problem.²²

That such an economic dimension to vagrancy existed should not be particularly surprising given the nature of the nineteenth-century economy. As Stedman Jones and Treble have demonstrated, the urban labour market was one dominated by casual, seasonal and irregular employment.²³ Industries such as building and docking had come to rely on such labour, which even in non-depressed times brought periods of irregular employment. But unfortunately, these industries tended to be susceptible to cyclical depression, which frequently resulted in a large underemployed labour surplus, given the propensity for bad trading periods in the nineteenth century.²⁴

Contemporaries blinded themselves to the effects of this by arguing that the able-bodied unemployed should, through the exercise of foresight and prudence, provide for periods of unemployment.²⁵ Such an assumption, however, was based upon the belief that the majority of the lower orders had incomes sufficient to provide security for times of hardship. They did not. Incomes in many sectors were chronically low and falling, largely due to labour surplus. Murray, for instance, has shown that real wages for Glasgow's handloom weavers fell dramatically between 1810 and 1831.²⁶

Moreover, the Scottish poor law did little to alleviate the suffering or ease the problem of those forced to take to the nomadic lifestyle in search of work. In fact, in many cases it is likely to have exacerbated the situation. Unlike the English poor law, the Scottish one provided little safety valve against periods of economic hardship. In England, the able-bodied were given a legal right to relief. Moreover, the 'Speenhamland' system – whereby wages of local labourers were subsidised by local magistrates – helped keep low incomes above subsistence level. In Scotland, neither applied. The able-bodied had no legal right to relief or support in times of hardship, although it was often administered. Unlike the English system, which helped contain

the population, the Scottish system seemed to encourage migration, while, perversely, maintaining that each area should support its own poor. Scots who had fallen on hard times often had little alternative but to beg or adopt the nomadic lifestyle.

This underlying structural cause of vagrancy explains why it was such a pressing concern for Glasgow's police commissioners; for though every major urban centre in Britain could point to low wages, fluctuations in trade and irregularity of employment, few areas were as severely affected as Glasgow. The Glasgow economy was heavily dependent upon cotton textiles in the early part of the nineteenth century, accounting for 40 per cent of the occupied labour force.²⁷ After 1815, however, the cotton industry – with the exception of 1825 – never regained its former prosperity. It was an industry largely reliant on markets overseas, which rendered it susceptible to cyclical trade depressions and strong international competition. Serious recessions, like those in 1816-17, 1819-20, 1826-7 and 1836-7, were not uncommon, resulting in long periods of unemployment and economic hardship.

Conditions were not much better for many of those in employment. The economy was one of low wages and temporary and seasonal employment. James Cleland estimated that almost one quarter of Glasgow's labour force in 1831 were casual workers, employed in occupations most likely to be affected by irregularity of work and low pay.²⁸ Many of these people could depend upon employment only on an hourly, half-day or daily basis.²⁹ They were, therefore, notoriously vulnerable to temporary periods of unemployment, persistent underemployment and long periods of idleness during less prosperous times. As Treble has pointed out:

In Glasgow, masons and builders' labourers in the mid-1840s, were frequently thrown idle in the winter season, [and] are in some instances exposed to great privations, and have no means of obtaining relief except by public begging....³⁰

What made these economic problems so pressing was a gross structural imbalance between the demand and supply of labour.³¹ Few labour markets were as congested and volatile as Glasgow's, largely because of the rapid demographic increase that affected the city. Between 1801 and 1841, the number of inhabitants in and around Glasgow rose from 77,385 to 274,533, which even for Scotland – which had the fastest rate of urban growth in Western Europe in this period – was exceptional.³² A massive and unparalleled rate of inward migration, both temporary and permanent, was largely responsible for such an increase. By 1851, the census noted that a staggering 56 per cent of the city's population and 72.4 per cent of the adult population had been born outside its boundaries.³³ The greatest proportion of migrants came from other parts of lowland Scotland – particularly from adjacent lowland counties – which accounted for 24.2 per

cent of the city's population. Irish migrants accounted for slightly less, with Highland migrants forming the smallest migrant grouping at 5 per cent.³⁴

Economic and demographic pressures in these areas were in some cases so acute as to compel movement. In the lowlands, agricultural improvement from the late eighteenth century brought with it consolidation of farm units at the expense of the sub-tenantry. For cottagers and sub-tenants, this meant displacement from land and household, as employment was tied in with accommodation. Only the population essential for proper cultivation was retained, often on a servant and wage labouring, as opposed to landholding, basis. This, combined with population growth and stagnant employment opportunities, created a large surplus of landless labourers, which greatly encouraged migration to towns.³⁵

Although most Highland migrants came from the more prosperous areas of the region, economic pressures were still at work.³⁶ (Those who moved from poorer Highland areas tended to go overseas.) The Highland economy was largely dependent upon temporary migration to lowland areas as it provided seasonal income and acted as a safety valve against overpopulation. By the 1840s, this had become even more important. The decline of the kelp industry, linen manufacture, whisky distilling, commercial fishing and cattle farming in the face of competition created a vast pool of underemployed labour.³⁷ This, combined with bad harvests, accumulating rent arrears, evictions and landlord bankruptcies, made migration to lowland areas in some cases a necessity to stave off economic crisis. In Ireland, meanwhile, economic and demographic pressures were at their most acute, especially in the famine stricken 1840s. By this point, 25,000 were arriving annually, which was in contrast to two decades earlier when 8,000 or so made the annual crossing to take advantage of seasonal employment.³⁸

What made Glasgow the prime magnet for these migrants was the 'pull' of the urban environment. Urbanisation brought more jobs, greater range of employment opportunities and, in some cases, higher wages. Significantly, however, the rate of inward migration did not relent when the economic situation became less prosperous. Even after 1815, when labour demand slackened and clear signs of a labour surplus emerged, the city still retained its allure, largely because employment opportunities were better than the migrants' place of origin. Between 1811 and 1821, which included the recession hit years of 1816-17, the population increased by 46 per cent.³⁹ The inevitable outcome was an enormous surplus of unemployed, underemployed, poorly paid migrants who were exceedingly vulnerable to the vagaries of the trade cycle.

II

Police Policy

The policy of Glasgow's police commissioners in tackling vagrancy was clear: the police were '...to take-up all persons found begging in the streets, lanes and passages of the city and bring them into the [police] office...' until such a time as they could be brought before a magistrate.⁴⁰ This was consistency emphasised by police commissioners throughout the period and their subordinates administered it on a daily basis.⁴¹ Officers were essentially human garbage men instructed to keep the streets clean from society's refuse.⁴² Little attempt was made to distinguish between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor or vagrants and beggars, despite claims to the contrary by police commissioners in 1811. More often than not, those suspected were dealt with indiscriminately with the overriding intention being the eradication of vagrancy from city bounds.

Police commissioners introduced numerous measures to achieve this. In 1811, all public begging was formally prohibited. Officers were instructed to arrest any person who was found begging after this date. Those with a legal right to relief were to be provided for, but those who did not were

...to be ordered from the city and repair to the parish in which they have a legal claim for support. Those who are able to labour for their subsistence but refuse to work may be committed to Bridewell and detained therein at hard labour for such period as may be found just and proper.⁴³

A patrol was established in the force's formative years to assist officers in this capacity (the exact date of the establishment is unknown).⁴⁴ Both the patrol and the force were aided from 1818 by a group of police substitutes.⁴⁵ Three years later a vagrancy officer was appointed.⁴⁶ He was '...to devote his whole attention to...vagrancy..., examine such lodgings as harbour vagrants...', take charge of all applications for passes, and keep a register of all paupers and beggars.⁴⁷ All those who could show no evidence of self-sufficiency were to be removed. The position of vagrancy officer was later expanded into the Vagrancy Department, which had an annual expenditure of L.145.15 as early as 1829.⁴⁸

Moreover, from 1815, officers who were effective in taking-up beggars were to be rewarded with an undisclosed sum.⁴⁹ By 1818, '...a premium of two shillings and sixpence...' was being offered each day '...to the party who [had] apprehended the greatest number.'⁵⁰ Such was the eagerness of officers to receive the financial incentive that it was claimed that they neglected their other duties.⁵¹ A police register was also kept from as early as 1811 so that '...the

Commissioners may see...what officers have been most vigilant.'⁵² Those who were not vigilant were dismissed.⁵³ Vagrant haunts, meanwhile, such as parks, fairs, and bridge-ways were actively policed, while, from 1821, anyone found guilty of harbouring vagrants was to be punished.⁵⁴

Public and private bodies were also utilised in the fight against mendicancy. Police commissioners and poor law guardians met on a regular basis to discuss how to deal with what appeared to be a spiralling problem. They first joined forces in 1809 and continued to work together until 1841, when the jointly funded position of vagrancy officer ended.⁵⁵ After this date, the Town's Hospital continued to finance the post while the police commission entrusted the vagrancy officer's duties to ordinary officers.⁵⁶ Voluntary associations, meanwhile, such as the Glasgow Night Asylum for the Homeless, were often subject to police supervision. The asylum was established in 1838 and was said to be popular with the police as it offered them a place in which to direct wandering strangers.⁵⁷

Of course, there was nothing new in this policy of repressing begging. From as early as the fifteenth century, the Scottish Parliament had introduced statutes for this purpose. The first, in 1424, provided for the arrest and punishment of vagrants unless it was otherwise seen that they could not earn their living, in which case they were to be issued with a badge that allowed them to beg.⁵⁸ Other enactments followed in 1425, 1427, 1449, 1455, 1457, 1478, 1617, 1661, 1663 and 1672, all of which dealt severely with beggars.⁵⁹ Moreover, poor law statutes were as concerned with vagrancy as they were with the provision of relief. The foundation of the Scottish Poor Law, the act of 1579, included in its provisions the punishment of strange and idle beggars, authorising the scourging and burning of all those between fourteen and seventy years of age who went about the country without lawful employment. Underlying this was the principle that each area should support its own poor.⁶⁰

Commissioner policy was far from unique. English policing authorities were equally active in tackling vagrancy, although it took a different form from the approach of Glasgow. Whereas in the latter, the police were primarily concerned with the rounding-up and removal of beggars from city bounds, in the former they adopted a much more 'hands-on' administrative approach (although removing vagrants was high on their list of priorities).⁶¹ By the mid-1860s, policemen were employed as poor relieving officers in around half of England's poor law unions.⁶² Way-tickets were also administered as attempts were made to increase police supervision of vagrants, both en route and in parishes. Moreover, vagrant places of destination, such as casual wards, night asylums, and common lodging houses, were often under the control, or at least close supervision, of a police officer.⁶³ Although the police in Glasgow also supervised such places, there was not the same degree of formal regulation of vagrants as there was in England. Police commissioners in the city were more concerned about exclusion rather

than regulation, whereas in England the control and supervision of vagrants' movement throughout the country was an important aspect of police.

In England, destitute vagrants and the able-bodied had to be relieved by poor law authorities. Destitute wayfarers had to be provided with temporary food and shelter as a safeguard against criminality, mendicancy and starvation, irrespective of settlement.⁶⁴ Naturally, this, combined with expensive system of 'passing' vagrants, called for administration and regulation. The police, along with the poor law guardians, were a natural choice to oversee this, given the perceived evils of vagrancy (see next chapter).⁶⁵

In Scotland, however, the principles of the poor law were different. Unlike England, vagrants and the able-bodied were not to be relieved. As vagrancy was not something to be administered, regulated or relieved through the poor law, there seemed less need on the part of the police to become involved. Vagrancy may have been one of Glasgow's most salient features in the first half of the nineteenth century, but why it should have been a police concern in an era when private philanthropic organisations undertook much of the responsibility for society's ills needs to be examined.

The Rationale behind Police Policy

I

Crime Control or Social Control

Vagrants have long had an association with crime. Chambliss has argued that vagrancy statutes in England underwent a shift in concern from 1530 onwards.¹ The earliest statutes were introduced following the decimation of the labour force by 'Black Death' in the fourteenth century and were designed to combat labour mobility, lessen the bargaining power of labourers and ensure that feudal landowners had an adequate supply of cheap labour.² By the sixteenth century, however, vagrancy enactments were designed more to deal with criminals, with those suspected of vagrancy having to show how they lawfully earned a living. Those who could not were punished or labelled as 'felons'. Although no similar study has been conducted for Scotland, it is clear that the link between vagrancy and crime was well entrenched. Early Scottish vagrancy acts stated that vagrants were to be summarily put to death as thieves.³

With no visible means of support, it was easy to see why vagrants were linked with crime. By the nineteenth century, few contemporaries doubted that most vagrants were criminal or, at least, potentially criminal.⁴ As one poor law officer in 1848 remarked: 'they are, for the most part, if not criminals, at least on the verge of crime'.⁵ Henry Mayhew even argued that vagrancy was 'the nursery of crime...' with vagrants forming '...one of the most restless, discontented, vicious and dangerous elements of society'.⁶ The perceived criminality of the mendicant poor was a central theme of Edwin Chadwick's 1839 Report on the Rural Constabulary, which argued that the establishment of a national police force was essential to counter the migration of professional criminals from policed to unpoliced areas.⁷ Traditional police historians draw heavily on this assumption.⁸

However, there is little evidence to support it. As Jones points out, most vagrants did not belong to a hardened, professional, criminal class, while, as Chapter 3 showed, it is questionable whether there really was an exodus from policed to unpoliced areas.⁹ Nonetheless, in the eyes of contemporaries, vagrants were part of a sub-criminal culture, which made them an obvious target for police action. In England, such action was extensive. The 1824 Vagrancy Act rationalised the criminal law in an attempt to suppress the criminal tendencies of vagrants.¹⁰ The use of policemen as poor relieving officers was, in part, designed to ensure greater supervision of criminals.¹¹ Moreover, stern action was taken against Irish migrants, who contemporaries believed to be a fruitful source of crime and vagrancy. Studies in the mid-nineteenth century

show a disproportionately high number of Irishmen figuring in the criminal returns along with their victimisation by police officers.¹²

In Scotland, too, police action against vagrancy was often tied-up with crime, as Carson and Idzikowska have shown. Surprisingly, however, police commissioners in Glasgow rarely mentioned the link between the two. There were, of course, occasional references, both from them and their officers. Superintendent Miller, when asked if the habits of begging commonly led to petty offences, replied, 'I have no doubt of it.'¹³ But such reference appeared sparingly in police minutes. Commissioners launched no specific policies linking vagrancy with crime. Admittedly, the fact that vagrants were apprehended and removed from city bounds would have curtailed their criminality within police jurisdiction, which may explain why no specific policies were devised. The commissioners' policy was, after all, more about deterring than controlling. But the fact remained that vagrants were banished from city bounds essentially for reasons other than their criminal tendencies. Although crime may have been a concern for police commissioners, it was a long way from being their priority.

Similar conclusions for other studies have led revisionists to argue that policing vagrancy had more to do with preserving the social order than preventing and detecting crime. The strongest advocate of this is Levett, who argues that the police in urban America were introduced primarily to control and supervise the poor and immigrant population – America's 'dangerous classes'.¹⁴ However, such a view is also evident in most revisionist and histories. In such accounts, the collapse of traditional forms of social control that accompanied industrialisation is said to have led to a new view of the migrant poor.¹⁵ They were distant, threatening and free from the structured discipline and supervision of the workplace. They were also a glaring affront to Victorian self-help, respectability and industry, pursuing a lifestyle that was the antithesis to capitalist means of production and a hierarchical social order. As Foucault on the relationship between vagrancy and order wrote:

"One sleeps at home, said the judge, because in fact for him everything must have a home, some dwelling however magnificent or mean; his task is not to provide one, but to force every individual to live in one." Moreover, one must have a station in life, a recognizable identity, an individuality fixed once and for all: "What is your station? This question is the simplest expression of the established order of society; such vagabondage is repugnant to it, disturbs it; one must have a stable, continuous long-term station, thoughts of the future, of a future secure, in order to reassure it against all attacks." In short, one should have a master, be caught up and situated in a hierarchy; one exists only when fixed in definite relations of domination: Who do you work with? That is to say since you are not a master you must be servant, whatever your station; it is not a question of your satisfactoriness as an individual; it is a question of order to be maintained." Confronted with discipline on the face of the law, there is illegality which

puts itself forward as a right; it is indiscipline, rather than the criminal offence that causes the rupture.¹⁶

In Glasgow, however, there is little recorded evidence to suggest that the rationale behind commissioner policy was social order or the obstructive implications for capitalist relations and development. No reference was made to either in the police minutes. While the policies certainly conferred upon officers a wide range of powers for the control and surveillance of the poor, the motivation behind them had little to do with the need for a disciplined workforce or heightened anxiety over the threat they posed to social relations. Indeed, such concerns seem to have played little part in the desire to suppress vagrancy throughout Scotland – Carson and Idzikowska and McGowan make a similar point in their respective studies of police reform in Scottish counties and Edinburghshire.¹⁷ Nor should this come as a surprise. Concern with vagrancy had been evident from at least the fifteenth century – it was not simply a symptom of the transition to a class-based capitalist society. It was the long-standing concerns over vagrancy, rather than new ones that accompanied industrialisation, that more than anything shaped commissioner policy.

II Public Health

Of great concern was the health threat vagrants posed. Contemporaries commonly believed that vagrants were one of the most dangerous carriers of disease.¹⁸ Frequent claims were made by Glasgow police commissioners concerning ‘...the notoriety of persistent begging as being a means of spreading the [cholera] disease.’¹⁹ Such an opinion seemed justified. W.P. Alison, in his poor law inquiry, pointed out that 1/6th of those brought to the Edinburgh Infirmary with cholera in the first three months of its outbreak in 1843 were wandering strangers, ‘almost all of them in a state of destitution’.²⁰

The lifestyle of vagrants made them particularly vulnerable to infection and its spread. Vagrants’ continued movement from area to area was an ideal way of catching and transmitting disease. Moreover, the squalid, overcrowded conditions in which vagrants lived were a breeding ground for infection. In Glasgow, this was particularly acute. The thousands of migrants that flocked to the city created a demand for housing that outstripped supply. Between 1831 and 1841, the number of houses available increased by just 3,551 despite the population rising by 33,031.²¹ For those migrants that found rented accommodation, it was invariably cheap, multi-occupancy, tenement dwellings, lacking sufficient sanitary conditions.²² For others, the lack of

insufficient housing left them little alternative but to seek temporary shelter in the notorious common lodging-houses. In 1843, there were an estimated 524 registered low-class lodging-houses in the centre of the city, accommodating between 5,000 and 10,000 persons per night.²³

The cheapness of such houses made them popular with vagrants.²⁴ But they were often lacking in hygiene and sanitation. As a report by District Surgeons in 1843 pointed out when referring to a Glasgow common lodging-house,

64 Havannah Street is not surpassed by any close in the city for filth, misery, crime and disease; it contains 59 houses, all inhabited by a most wretched class of individuals...every inhabitant of these dens has fever; it literally swarms with prostitutes of the lowest class.²⁵

Indeed, such was the extent of overcrowding, squalor and pollution in these lodgings that infection from disease seemed almost inevitable. As Dr Cowan, a city District Police Surgeon, noted, 'the lodging-houses are the media through which the newly arrived migrants find their way to the fever hospital....'²⁶

Not surprisingly, much of the police's efforts in tackling disease linked with vagrancy concerned common lodging-houses. For the early part of the century this was done informally, with police commissioners instructing their officers 'to examine such lodgings as harbour vagrants....'²⁷ However, by the 1830s, it was conducted on a much more formal basis. During the cholera epidemic in 1832, police commissioners responded to the Board of Health's advice '...to engage medical inspectors to visit and report upon the sanitary state of health of all lodging houses kept for the reception of vagrants.'²⁸ A few years later, a Committee on Health and Vagrancy was established by police commissioners for, among other things, the '...the purpose of visiting several tenements...[and]...occupied lodging houses....'²⁹ In 1843, under the Glasgow Police Act of that year, specific legislation to regulate conditions in common lodging-houses was introduced for the first time.³⁰ Under this statute, power was given to police commissioners to license lodging-houses, prevent overcrowding and squalor and ensure that cases of fever were reported. Moreover, all lodging-houses were to be inspected and approved by the Superintendent of Police, or an authorised member of his staff, before lodgers could be accommodated. Officers were also given power to instruct vagrants to wash their clothes to prevent '...danger of contagion and infection....'³¹

Outwith the control of lodging-houses, the standard policy throughout the period was, as police commissioners pointed out in 1843, '...the prompt removal of pauper fever patients found on the streets or brought to the police office....'³² Although this applied to all vagrants, Irish migrants were singled out for special attention. The contemporary perception was that they carried fever. Certainly, they were well represented among fever victims. In 1832, Irish-born

admissions to the fever hospital accounted for 33 per cent, in 1835-6 30 per cent and in 1842 41 per cent.³³ But whether or not they transported fever from Ireland was not as important as the perception that they did.³⁴ It was this, after all, that shaped policy. Glasgow police commissioners, like other civic authorities, were convinced of the connection, stressing in 1832 that every effort should be made to deport vagrants, ‘...by steam boats or otherwise....’³⁵ Indeed, such was the police commissioners’ concern about the influx of infected Irish migrants that they requested that ‘masters and managers of steam vessels...ought to refuse to import vagrants and beggars to the Forth of the Clyde....’³⁶ In cases where the ships’ authorities did not, provision was made in the form of a medical officer, who was instructed to inspect every steamer arriving on the River Clyde for fever cases.³⁷

Such anxiety with the health threat vagrants posed had much to do with recurring epidemics that afflicted Glasgow. The city’s deplorable housing conditions created an environment conducive to the rapid spread of disease. In the first half of the century, there were four epidemics of typhus fever, three of cholera and one of relapsing fever.³⁸ The outbreak of typhus in 1818 inflicted 32,000 people, 3,500 fatally. Cholera in 1832, meanwhile, infected 6,208, killing 3,166 – a rate twice as bad as any comparable city and a tenth of all deaths from cholera in Britain.³⁹ Under such conditions, evangelical preaching that ‘cleanliness is next to godliness’, by the likes of the Reverend Stevenson MacGill, gained widespread currency in the circles of the middle classes.⁴⁰ Beggars, with their association with squalor, were the natural targets for such sentiments.

Significantly, however, the danger vagrants posed to health surfaced only during times of heightened hysteria concerning the spread of disease. From the references made above, it is clear that this threat emerged in the early 1830s following the outbreak of cholera and surfaced again in the early 1840s. In between such periods, and indeed before, the link between vagrancy and disease was rarely mentioned. Indeed, it was not until the outbreak of cholera in 1832 that commissioners first mentioned the seriousness of the threat to public health posed by begging.⁴¹ And on this occasion, it took a letter from the civic fathers of Haddington to inform them of the association following its outbreak there.

Before this date, there was little mention of the health risk posed by beggars. Commissioners were aware of it, noting in 1818 that officers were ‘...exposed to infection by attending at the guardhouse to enroll the beggars’.⁴² But they rarely portrayed vagrancy as a threat to the public health, despite the epidemics of typhus and fever that affected the city in 1817-19 and 1826. The 1843 Glasgow Police Act was the first police act to state that vagrants should be apprehended and removed on medical grounds. The previous five police acts made no reference to this. The detrimental effect of common lodging-houses on the city’s health was one area where the problem had been long identified, but still it took forty-three years before police

commissioners assumed statutory responsibility for their licensing, cleanliness and general health. Even then, the regulations of the statute were never properly enforced due to lack of sufficient manpower and the other extensive duties the police had to perform. As the Superintendent of Police was reported to have claimed in 1847, the strict enforcement of the regulations would have meant 6,000 persons being turned nightly to the streets, which was not a practical solution to the vagrancy problem.⁴³

Why commissioners in the first three decades of the century were lax in their approach is not easy to answer. Whether it was caused by a failure of commissioners to grasp fully the seriousness of the link between disease and mendicancy is difficult to determine and is outwith the scope of this study. But it is likely to have played a significant part. Until the 1830s, disease, like poverty, was often seen as a product of individual weakness. People caught disease because of their own failures and lack of cleanliness. In the 1830s, however, influential doctors, such as W.P. Alison, argued that disease and poverty were closely related. Increasingly, conventional views of the causes of poverty and disease were challenged, as calls were made for a new approach to deal with problems of the poor. Alison, in particular, was a vociferous critic of the old poor law and its detrimental effect on public health.⁴⁴ Indeed, concern over the high level of disease among the urban poor was a significant factor in calls to reform the old poor law.

Probably of greater significance in explaining commissioner laxity in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, however, were contemporary attitudes to disease and the purpose of police. There was a false sense of security among the middle classes towards infection in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. While the medical link between poverty and disease had yet to be formally established, it was widely believed that certain types of disease, especially typhus and cholera, affected only poor areas and poor people.⁴⁵ For typhus, it was mainly accurate; in the few epidemics that affected the city before the 1830s, the overwhelming majority of cases were confined to poverty-stricken areas.⁴⁶ For cholera, however, it was not. One study of sampled English towns estimates that 10 per cent of cholera victims in the 1832 epidemic were from the middle class.⁴⁷ In Glasgow too, the epidemic spread from poor areas of the city to parts normally safe from typhus, including ‘...many among the wealthier citizens.’⁴⁸

It was this realisation in the 1830s that the poverty and disease of one section of the community had serious implications for the rest that more than anything brought a growing concern with the health threat of vagrancy. Whether the attitudes that prevailed in the early part of the century transferred into apathy among police commissioners cannot be conclusively proved. But given that commissioners were essentially policing in the interests of the middle classes in the Commission’s formative years, frequently neglecting the poorer parts of the city, it is highly possible that they were lax in their approach because infection was not perceived to be

a middle-class concern. (See Chapter 4 for background to the poorer parts of the city not being policed.) It is unlikely to be mere coincidence that police attention towards vagrancy started to become concerned with public health around the same time as the middle class began to realise that cholera posed a threat to them – in the 1830s. Before then, when typhus was ravaging the working class, vagrancy's association with infection did not seem to greatly interest commissioners. Indeed, as Devine has shown, there was actually a swing from the environmental to criminal aspect of policing from the early in the 1820s, much to the detriment of the latter.⁴⁹ (See Chapter 6 for more information on this.)

III Money

The police commissioners' obsession with vagrancy throughout the first half of the century stemmed primarily from a middle-class concern other than disease. What alarmed them most was the threat vagrants posed to the public purse rather than public order. Throughout the period in question, commissioners' overriding priority was the financial implications of mendicancy. It was widely believed that native Glaswegians were being burdened with relieving not only their own poor but also the poor of other areas. Commissioners frequently complained that the city was being overwhelmed by beggars who '...have no claim whatever to support from the parishes of Glasgow.'⁵⁰ Country and Irish migrants were singled out, with the later coming under the most scrutiny.⁵¹ Commissioners claimed that Irish authorities were paying the fares of beggars to come to Glasgow, subjecting '...the citizens of Glasgow...[to a]...great and growing burden....'⁵² As evidence, they pointed to the Barony Parish on the outskirts of the city, with its large Irish population, where it was claimed the poor rate rose from L.2,800 in 1825 to L.8,000 in 1833.⁵³ A leader in one Glasgow newspaper even went so far as to claim that two-thirds of public aid was distributed to Irish migrants.⁵⁴

However, there is no evidence that migrants were a disproportionate burden on the charitable public purse. Handley has shown that the proportion of Irish on the poor list was not large enough to justify the indignation they faced.⁵⁵ Claims to the contrary often reflected sectarian prejudice and hysteria that Irish immigration posed a threat to native employment prospects, wage levels and spiritual welfare.⁵⁶ In fact, Handley has shown that the Irish were unfairly discriminated against when it came to public provision:

The distributors of the fund...preferred to husband it for the benefit of the members of their own persuasion, and in consequence strangers, and in particular Irish Catholics, met with discouragement and even rebuff when they were legally entitled to financial help.⁵⁷

Moreover, the number of ‘...strangers or in-comers...’ that appeared on the parochial lists under ‘...occasional funds...’ was not extensive.⁵⁸ Parochial boards preferred to ‘move-on’ pauper strangers rather than relieve them, even though the old poor law made no provision for their removal.⁵⁹ In fact, the extent of relief administered through poor rates was often diminishing, especially during periods of high unemployment when commissioners’ concerns of vagrancy were at their greatest. In the depression hit years following the Napoleonic Wars, the level raised in poor rates for the city proper fell in a downward trend from L.17,052 in 1815 to L.11,413 in 1822 as more money was channelled into private philanthropy.⁶⁰

Nonetheless, the contemporary perception was that destitute migrants were a drain on local funds. Such a sentiment, in fact, was echoed throughout Britain. In England, poor law authorities frequently complained about the rising cost of relieving vagrants, especially Irish migrants.⁶¹ They were, of course, compelled to relieve destitute wandering strangers and the able-bodied unemployed by law. Scots authorities were not. But the financial costs of having a large number of able-bodied migrant strangers in the city still alarmed commissioners in Glasgow for a number of reasons.

Firstly, it was not uncommon for the able-bodied or the wandering stranger to be given temporary relief by Scottish poor law authorities when in distress. As regards the former, assistance was often administered from the voluntary source of public funds during periods of high unemployment. The Directors of the Town’s Hospital in Glasgow stated in 1841 that the able-bodied had a right to expect this.⁶² Such relief was viewed as a useful mechanism for preventing the destitute becoming a permanent burden so long as it was not financed through compulsory assessment. Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that it was often easier and cheaper to provide vagrants with temporary aid to help them on their way rather than go through the expensive and time consuming practice of trying to establish settlement.⁶³ As an official of the Canongate Poorhouse in Edinburgh, when asked in 1869 how he dealt with Irish paupers without settlement, pointed out: ‘[I] give them casual relief and get rid of them as rapidly as possible.’⁶⁴ Indeed such a practice, according to some sources, was common throughout the country, with the Poor Law Board of Supervision complaining that poor relieving officers ‘...give relief to vagrants much too easily.’⁶⁵ (Poor law officials after 1845 were compelled to relieve deserving strangers unable to earn a living until their parish of settlement was ascertained.)

Secondly, fears were raised about the impact of paupers on private charity administered outwith the poor law. The relief administered through such charity outweighed public provision. Cleland estimated that in Glasgow in 1815-16 public relief expenditure amounted to just L.13,388; by contrast, the amount supplied through organised charities and unorganised sources was L.19,654 and L.67,667 respectively.⁶⁶ Private charity was regarded as the best form of charity as, in the words of Robert Hamilton at a poor law address, ‘...it cultivates, while it gratifies, benevolence on the part of the giver, and induces gratitude on the part of the receiver.’⁶⁷ However, it was commonly believed that a disproportionate amount of it went to migrant beggars. This seems unlikely given contemporary attitudes, but police commissioners, poor law officials and poor law inspectors were convinced of it. Even one of the more enlightened contemporaries, W.P. Alison, claimed this in his poor law investigation in 1844, remarking that vagrants were maintained ‘...chiefly at the expense of charitable individuals....’⁶⁸ According to the same author, country migrants in particular were an excessive burden on private charity.⁶⁹ Glasgow’s civic elite echoed this, and called on the ‘...inhabitants neither to give alms...nor allow their servants to do so...[as it encourages]...crowds of stranger vagrant beggars to resort to the city.’⁷⁰

Thirdly, and most importantly, fears were widespread among commissioners that migrant paupers would gain legal settlement. Preventing this was without doubt their overriding concern in tackling vagrancy throughout the period. As early as 1800, in the first police act, it was stated that resident commissioners in each ward had the power ‘...to take the legal steps for preventing poor persons and beggars from gaining legal settlements in the city, so as to entitle them to charity....’⁷¹ Thereafter, it was consistently reiterated. Although commissioners pursued a policy of targeting all mendicants found on the city streets, it was clear from the policies pursued that the migrant rather than the native beggar alarmed them most.

As early as 1801, commissioners established a census to ascertain how long people had lived in the city.⁷² Its intention was to inform commissioners of all persons...who have not resided three years in town and who are likely to become a burden upon the city funds....⁷³ Those who were likely, such as Michael Donarchy, a labourer, with a wife and six children, who had been resident for 2½ years without burdening the poor fund, were ‘...ordered to warned away....’⁷⁴ Although there was no legal provision for the removal of destitute paupers on the ground that a person was likely to become chargeable, there were no legal restrictions.⁷⁵ As such, it was a common practice for authorities to do this, fearing poor residents would overburden them.⁷⁶ In Glasgow, police commissioners actually employed beables and vagrant officers to oversee the removal of such people.⁷⁷ They also put vagrant haunts under close surveillance to ascertain those most likely to become chargeable.⁷⁸ Moreover, ‘...printed certificates warning away poor persons not having acquired a right to the charity of the city...’

were distributed by commissioners from as early as 1810, ‘...so as to prevent them obtaining such....’⁷⁹ To help further achieve this, close links were formed between commissioners and the Town’s Hospital. From 1833, they jointly financed new police officers, whose role was to ‘...furnish with passes...those taken-up who are found to belong to distant parts.’⁸⁰ Furthermore, registers were to be kept of every vagrant or beggar apprehended, showing his legal domicile, place of arrest, lodging quarters and number of times arrested.⁸¹

Numerous efforts were made to prevent Irish immigrants gaining settlement, some of which have been referred to. In 1833, a petition from police commissioners was sent to Parliament for the ‘...necessity and expediency of protecting the citizens of Glasgow from the great and growing burden resulting from an influx of Irish paupers....’⁸² It called for the introduction of ‘...a proper legal provision for the poverty in Ireland out of...the large revenue of the Irish Church...’ and an end to the practice of Irish authorities subsidising the travel of paupers to Scottish ports.⁸³ Irish beggars found loitering in the streets, meanwhile, were, like other beggars, rounded-up and transported back to their native country. Of the 783 vagrants apprehended in the first few weeks of 1847, 593 were Irish, 130 of who were deported.⁸⁴ To the frustration of commissioners, however, many such paupers prior to this date would simply have been shipped back to Scotland, given that the old poor law made no provision for the detention of Irish and English paupers in their native parishes.

The manner in which vagrants were dealt with, however, more than anything underlined where the concern lay of Glasgow’s civic elite. Magistrates, the legal guardians of the police, were more concerned with banishing vagrants than punishing them, largely because it was cheaper. Admittedly, their options in terms of punishing vagrants were limited either to the expensive practice of imprisoning them – for up to sixty days – or imposing a financial penalty that few, if any, could afford to pay.⁸⁵ The draconian practices of nailing vagrants’ ears to trees, placing them in stocks and whipping or hanging them had long since ended.⁸⁶ But the scale of the Magistracy’s preference for banishment was striking. Of the 170 vagrants taken into custody by the Glasgow Police in 1857 – the first year where records were kept – 129 were discharged and only 41 sent to prison.⁸⁷ Thereafter, very few were imprisoned, with the overwhelming majority being admonished and sent on their way.⁸⁸ Although such a policy was consistent throughout the country – Hart argues that magistrates in London in the 1830s were doing the same – it was bitterly resented by the Directors’ of the Town’s Hospital and a section of the Police Commission.⁸⁹ In 1837, the Vagrancy Committee of the Commission criticised ‘...the leniency with which beggars...are dealt with by the Magistrates.’⁹⁰ Some commissioners even complained that some beggars appeared before magistrates between 40 and 50 times.⁹¹ In choosing to ignore these complaints in favour of moving on potential criminals and carriers of disease, magistrates highlighted clearly where their priorities lay – with the purse strings of

Glasgow's rate-paying citizens. The moral, criminal and health issues of vagrancy were simply of less importance than the financial.

Conclusion to Part IV

Why the financial concerns of vagrancy should have dominated the thoughts of Scottish authorities when the criminal and social concerns seem to have been more evident in other countries had much to do with a hardening attitude towards poor law provision.¹ Contemporaries in early-nineteenth-century Scotland were increasingly alarmed about the growing burden and manner of financing pauperism. What made Scotland different from many other countries – where there was also concern about spiralling costs – was, firstly, the scale of the vagrancy problem and, secondly, the absence of legal provision for assessment – a compulsory tax for poor provision. Authorities in Scotland preferred to support their poor by voluntary means. Assessment, it was believed, led to more pauperism by weakening personal responsibility, moral restraint and industry. However, assessment was spreading. In the 1790s, ninety-two parishes were assessed; by 1820, a Church of Scotland report, which did not include every parish, noted one hundred and ninety-eight.² By 1845, there were 230, while 640, mainly rural parishes, continued to depend upon voluntary contributions.³ Such concern with the spread of assessment was at the heart of Carson and Idzikowska's claim that county police force's in Scotland were concerned primarily with keeping vagrants out.⁴ This created hostility towards the migrant poor even in areas that were already being assessed, not least as poor relief cost appeared to spiral at the same time. In Glasgow, the level of assessment in 1790 was L.1,420; by 1814, it had risen to L.10,707.⁵

In reality, however, there was little evidence to justify the concern: poor relief expenditure rose in real terms by just 15% between 1790 and 1814 in sampled parishes throughout the country.⁶ Both this and the growth in assessment were more a consequence of the collapse in the traditional form of public provision – Church of Scotland collections – than any increasing burden. The failure of church accommodation to keep pace with population growth, its declining attendances, the growth in dissenting congregations and a substantial increase in absentee landlords created a situation where assessment was necessary to overcome declining church collections.

But to contemporaries, the perceived increase in poor provision was proof that assessment encouraged pauperism. As the Report of General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1818 noted, assessment ‘...multiplies the number of paupers, by debasing and corrupting one class of population, and leading to an extravagant expenditure in supporting them, it unjustly and unnecessarily oppresses the other’.⁷ No one was more vociferous in echoing this than the influential evangelical preacher Thomas Chalmers.⁸ Influenced by Malthusian economic theory, Chalmers argued that assessed poor relief enhanced the poverty it

was intended to relieve by sapping personal responsibility and encouraging dependency.⁹ As such, the poor law should be reformed along stringent lines in favour of a relief system based on a voluntary personal relationship between donator and receiver.¹⁰ Only this system of parochial poor relief would, along with church extension and evangelical teaching, save industrial society from moral disaster.

Clearly, it was a concept based on the assumptions of a pre-industrial era, which ignored the economic and social effects of industrialisation. Nevertheless, Chalmers's ideas gained widespread currency among Glasgow's civic elite in the first half of the nineteenth century.¹¹ Cage has demonstrated how town councillors enthusiastically embraced his ideas, especially regarding poor law reform.¹² Police commissioners did likewise. The mounting relief being channelled into private philanthropy was of little concern to them, so long as it was not administered indiscriminately. This was consistent with Chalmers's relationship between giver and receiver. Public provision, however, was of concern. As they argued in 1832:

...every public charity necessarily creates more poverty than it provides for because the lower orders uniformly overrate its powers, and the relaxation of the habits of industry which it induces goes much beyond the capability of the fund.¹³

This rigorous defence of the old poor law was significant as it symbolised commissioner attitude towards vagrancy. In essence, the policies they pursued were little more than mechanisms for upholding the principles of the old poor law at a time when they were coming under threat from rapid economic and social change. Keeping costs down, ensuring that each area looked after its own poor, punishing idle beggars and, in the case of rural forces, preventing the introduction of compulsory assessment, were all underlying features of the old Scottish poor law. In rigorously pursuing these objectives at the expense of other associated evils of vagrancy, the police in this period were guardians more of the poor law than the criminal law.

Endnotes to Part IV

Introduction

1. 'Report from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider Existing Laws Relating to Vagrants, 1821', P.P. [543.] IV.121; 'Reports and Communications on Vagrancy, 1847-8', P.P. [987.] LIII, 235; 'Reports on Vagrancy to President of Poor Law Board by Poor Law Inspectors, 1866', P.P. [3698.] XXXV.631; and 'The Royal Commission on Establishing Efficient Constabulary Force in the Counties of England and Wales, 1839', P.P. [169.], XIX. Numerous reports on the poor law, homelessness, the Irish poor, and settlement and removal laws also refer to vagrancy. For background on this see D.J.V. Jones, *Crime, Protest, Community and Police in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1982), pp.178-80.
2. H. Mayhew, *London Labour and the London Poor*, 4 Volumes (London, 1861-62) and J.H. Stallard, *The Female Casual and Her Lodging* (London, 1866). Other nineteenth-century literature includes: A. Brown, *On the Suppression of Vagrancy and Indiscriminate Almsgiving* (London, 1872); P.J. Balfour, 'On Beggars' Badges, with Notes on the Licensed Mendicants of Scotland', *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, Volume IX (1886-1887) New Series; J. Cruickshank, *Observations on the Scotch System of Poor Laws: Together with the Explanation of a Plan for the Suppression of Vagrants, Street Beggars and Imposters* (Aberdeen, 1813); J. Lambert, *Vagrancy Laws and Vagrants* (London, 1869); C.J. Ribton-Turner, *A History of Vagrants and Vagrancy and Beggars and Begging* (London, 1887); and W. Watson, *Vagrancy in Scotland: Its Causes and Cure* (Edinburgh, 1880).
3. Ribton-Turner, *A History of Vagrants and Vagrancy*, p.367.
4. Cited in R. Vorspan, 'Vagrancy and the New Poor Law in Late-Victorian and Edwardian England', *English Historical Review*, Volume XCII (1977), p.73.
5. *Ibid.*, p.63 and Watson, *Vagrancy in Scotland*, p.11.
6. Vorspan, 'Vagrancy and the New Poor Law in Late-Victorian and Edwardian England', p.59.
7. Cited in Watson, *Vagrancy in Scotland*, p.10.
8. Inspector of Constabulary figure adapted from *Ibid.*, p.9. Inspector of Poor figure adapted from R.P. Lamond, *The Scottish Poor Laws: Their History, Policy and Operation* (Glasgow, 1892), p.73.
9. Cited in Watson, *Vagrancy in Scotland*, p.4.
10. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 5 April 1811.
11. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 3 February 1820.
12. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 5 August 1819 and G.C.A., E1/1/10, 29 April 1819.

13. Jones makes the point that vagrancy has been largely neglected in English police histories. Jones, *Crime, Protest, Community and Police*, p.157.

14. See, for instance, W.G. Carson, 'Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing, 1795-1800, Part I', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 17 (December, 1984), pp.224-8 and K. Carson, and H. Idzikowska, 'The Social Production of Scottish Policing, 1795-1900', in D. Hay and F. Snyder, eds, *Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1989), pp.291-5.

Chapter 11

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3. W. Watson, *Vagrancy in Scotland: Its Causes and Cure* (Edinburgh, 1880), p.10-11 and R.P. Lamond, *The Scottish Poor Laws: Their History, Policy and Operation* (Glasgow, 1892), p.122.

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5. Cited in L. Rose, *Rogues and Vagabonds: The Vagrant Underworld in Britain, 1815-1985* (London, 1985), p.2.

6. Pound argues that for every vagrant in Elizabethan England prepared to work there was another prepared to live by dishonest means. J.F. Pound, 'Vagrants and the Social Order in Elizabethan England', *Past and Present*, Number 71 (May 1976), pp.126-9.

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11. Cited in A. Brown, *On the Suppression of Vagrancy and Indiscriminate Almsgiving* (London, 1872), p.7.

12. Watson, *Vagrancy in Scotland*, p.11.

13. Cited in Brown, A., *On the Suppression of Vagrancy and Indiscriminate Almsgiving* (London, 1872), pp.11-12.

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16. G. Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between the Classes in Victorian Society* (London, 1984), pp.244-61. Bailey challenges this. V. Bailey, ed., *Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1991), pp.94-125.
17. See Rose, *Rogues and Vagabonds*, p.18.
18. Cited in Alison, *Remarks on the Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Poor Laws of Scotland*, p.177. For the opinions of others on the same issue, see pp.177-85.
19. M.A. Crowther, *The Workhouse System, 1834-1929. The History of an English Social Institution* (Cambridge, 1981), pp.252-4.
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21. Economic depressions caused high unemployment in Glasgow in the following years: 1818-19, 1825-6, 1829, 1832, 1837 and 1840-3. R.A. Cage, *The Scottish Poor Law, 1745-1845* (Edinburgh, 1981), pi. The years following the Napoleonic Wars were particularly depressed and were accompanied by heightened police interest in vagrancy. See reference 41 for evidence of the extent of this interest.
22. T.M., Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', in T.M. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p.408.
23. See Stedman Jones, *Outcast London*, p.52 and J.H. Treble, *Urban Poverty in Britain, 1830-1914* (London, 1979), p.8.
24. Stedman Jones, *Outcast London* p.52.
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26. N. Murray, *The Scottish Handloom Weavers: A Social History* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp.46-7.
27. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', p.410. The rest of this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, is based on this, pp.407-8.
28. J. Cleland, *Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the City of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1832), p.231.
29. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', p.408.
30. Treble, *Urban Poverty in Britain*, p.72.
31. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', p.407.
32. T.M. Devine, 'Introduction', in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (Edinburgh, 1988), p.4. Of the ten principal towns in Scotland in 1851, only 47 per cent of their inhabitants had been born in them. T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation', in Devine and Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland*, p.41.
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34. *Ibid.*, pp.11-12.

35. See T.M. Devine, 'Social Stability and Agrarian Change in Eastern Lowlands of Scotland, 1810-40', *Social History*, Number 3 (1978), pp.342-4; Devine, 'Urbanisation', pp.41-7; M. Gray, 'Scottish Emigration: the Social Impact of Agrarian Change in the Rural Lowlands, 1775-1875', *Perspectives in American History*, Volume VII (1973), pp.95-174; and M. Gray, 'The Social Impact of Agrarian Change in the Rural Lowlands', in Devine and Mitchison, eds, *People and Society in Scotland*, pp.57-60.

36. T.M. Devine, 'Highland Migration to Lowland Scotland, 1760-1860', *Scottish Historical Review*, 62 (1983), p.139.

37. T.M. Devine, *The Great Highland Famine. Hunger Emigration and the Scottish Highlands in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1988), p.155.

38. J.E. Handley, *The Irish in Scotland, 1798-1845*, Second Edition (Cork, 1945), p.38.

39. Devine, 'The Urban Crisis', p.407.

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- 8 July 1841; G.C.A., E1/1/20, 31 March 1842; G.C.A., E1/1/20, 29 December 1842; G.C.A., E1/1/20, 5 January 1843 and G.C.A., E1/1/20, 29 June 1843.
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43. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 15 April 1811.
44. The patrol was disbanded in 1815, although it was later re-established on a number of occasions. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 27 February 1815.
45. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 20 November 1818.
46. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 20 December 1821.
47. *Ibid.*
48. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 9 July 1829.
49. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 27 February 1815.
50. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 23 April 1818.
51. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 20 November 1818.
52. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 25 July 1811.
53. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 17 February 1820.
54. S. Oliver, 'The Administration of Urban Society in Scotland, 1800-50: With Special Reference to the Growth of Civic Government in Glasgow and its Suburbs'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow (1995), p.57.
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62. D.J.V. Jones, *Crime, Protest, Community and Police in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London, 1982), p.190.
63. Rose, *Rogues and Vagabonds*, pp.193-4.
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Chapter 12

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81. *Ibid.*
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*
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88. *Ibid.*
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90. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 11 May 1837.
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Conclusion

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Conclusion

Police development in Glasgow, or other large burghs of Scotland for that matter, does not fit easily into the established models of police history. It was not prompted simply by widespread concern about increasing crime, growing disorder or inadequate methods of law enforcement, as traditionalist police historians argue. Neither, as revisionists suggest, was it prompted by riot, labour disputes or an increased need to control the 'dangerous classes'. Rather, police development was the result of the middle class seeking to control and manage more effectively their city in the face of rapid urbanisation, which, in the early nineteenth century, took the form of establishing and regulating a new range of public amenity provisions that were essential to the comfort and well being of citizens. Admittedly, anxiety with crime, disorder and traditional forms of watching and warding helped shaped the watching provisions of the 1800 statute, but these were just one aspect of a number of concerns, the majority of which had more to do with public order than law and order. In this respect, police reform mirrored more the development of English improvement commissions than the English police. In fact, the emergence of the institution of police in Scotland was closer to continental Europe and urban America than it was England, in that it was concerned initially with providing a range of public services.

What made Glasgow and other Scottish burghs distinctive from other parts of the United Kingdom was the nature of the 'police' concept. In Scotland, 'police' was a means by which local communities could levy assessments, elect commissioners, enlarge judicial boundaries, and obtain and extend powers for regulating the civil, criminal and municipal affairs of a town. Throughout Scotland, local burgh communities in the first half of the nineteenth century saw an increasing need to introduce 'police' acts following rapid and often relentless population growth, inadequate local amenity provision, increasing social dereliction and changing economic and social structures. Burgh police development, in other words, was a national phenomenon that appears to have been brought about by changes in Scottish society, economy and politics. Only further research on other burgh forces will confirm or deny this, but it does not appear to have been simply a knee-jerk reaction to periods of heightened tension. To view reform, in Scotland's largest city at least, as being simply a response to a specific local problem such as crime or disorder would be to overlook the more important structural, political and ideological dimensions.

Underpinning structural change was the rise of the urban middle class. From its inception, policing was caught up in middle-class conflict over the control of local affairs. Changing economic and social structures combined with issues of power, accountability and

class were central to the history of the Glasgow Police Commission and, ultimately, to the development of policing as a whole in and around Glasgow. In the late eighteenth century, this took the form of an increasingly politically conscious economic elite battling to establish an accountable authority in a pre-reform era dominated by self-appointed town councillors. However, it permeated policing affairs more potently in the 1840s following the rise and transfer of police control to the petty bourgeoisie and artisan class. As Part III showed, this switch in the balance of power in favour of the lower middle class/skilled working class proved crucial to the demise of the city's first representative authority.

Evolving ideas on how best to manage city life added to the economic, social and political pressure for reform in the late eighteenth century. The long-term legacy of the Enlightenment combined with the emergence of the evangelical movement in the late eighteenth century provided ideological justification and guidance for reform. Underlying all police acts in Scotland was the realisation that both the individual and the community could be improved by rational thought, planned action and the active participation of citizens in public life. When fused urban pressures and economic and social change, it explained why the institution of police emerged in Scotland.

On its establishment, the Glasgow Police Establishment was anything but a form of social control. Environmental control rather than social control characterised the Glasgow Police in early nineteenth century. Class struggle played an important part in the development of policing, but it centred mainly on middle-class control for the local state, not heightened anxiety over the lower orders. As was indicated above, the Police Commission in its formative years was an instrument of class power only in the sense that it gave new men of wealth a power base in local management that hitherto they had not possessed.

However, the coercive aspect of police began to assert itself as the century progressed. While the generic nature of the 'police' concept was never entirely superseded, the control and management of people rather than the environment became of increasing importance to commissioners as the first half of the century progressed. Keeping the streets clean and clear of society's residuum remained a priority of commissioners, but it increasingly switched to human rather than environmental residuum. As Part II showed, more and more financial resources were channelled into the watching rather than environmental aspect of policing in the second quarter of the century. Officers were, in effect, instructed to become human garbage men, cleansing society of vagrants, drunks and rowdy individuals.¹ At the same time, they were removed of many of their generic policing responsibilities, such as sweeping the streets, in favour of matters concerned more with law and order.

The rationale behind this reorientation in policing had little to do with crime. Commissioners rarely mentioned it. The threat from disorder, radical unrest and society's

'dangerous classes' was far more important. It is noticeable from Table 4.1 that the strength of the city's force was at its strongest during the industrial and political troubles between 1811 to 1821. As Part III showed, the threat from industrial unrest and the labouring poor was also important factors in calls to extend the municipal boundaries in the late 1830s and early 1840s.

However, it is important not to overstate these concerns in explaining the force's ongoing development. In general, they emerged only during times of heightened tension. Other factors were equally important, not least the financial concerns of vagrancy, a desire for greater professionalism and the changing balance of political power in the city. Although the Police Commission was essentially a middle-class institution serving middle-class needs and promoting middle-class values, no one event or incident underlay police reform. Different factors at different times were important.

Nor should this be surprising given the distinctive manner in which the police institution was introduced in Scotland. With no legislative dividing line separating the old 'police' concept from the new, reform was always going to evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Endnotes to Conclusion

1. Brogden also argues that the police were human garbage men in his study of policing in Liverpool. M. Brogden, *On the Mersey Beat: Policing Liverpool between the Wars* (Oxford, 1991), p.1.

**Appendix 1: Percentage of Police Expenditure,
1810-11 to 1840-1**

	1810-11	1820-1	1830-1	1840-1
Watching	49	56	55	62
Lighting	30	32	31	21
Cleansing	18	10	12	12
Fire	3	2	2	5

Please note, the information is based only on the expenditure of the above four departments, not complete police expenditure or funds. These four areas make up around 80% of police outlay. Expenditure on other areas, such as wages of superior officers (superintendent, clerk, treasurer, etc.) and miscellaneous costs (law expenses, clothes, etc.), have been excluded. The expenses of the superintendent, clerk, etc., have been excluded as their responsibility covered all aspects of police. Furthermore, costs such as law expenses varied each year and would have distorted overall trends. So too would the fact that not all police funds were spent in certain years (often due to unsold dung, assessment arrears, cash to be collected, etc.)

Watching includes officers, watchmen, criminal officers and vagrant officers; lighting includes the lighting department; cleansing includes scavenging, dung removal and the watering of the streets; and fire includes the fire department.

Police expenditure for 1801 has been excluded because the fire department had not been established and watchmen acted as scavengers.

Sources: *Glasgow Courier*, 15 August 1811; G.C.A., E1/1/12, 21 June 1821; G.C.A., E1/1/17, 18 August 1831; E1/1/20, 22 July 1841.

Appendix 2: Occupational and Electoral Trends of the Glasgow Police Commission, 1800-46

The methodologies adopted for the following occupational and electoral trends of the Glasgow Police Commission between 1800 and 1846 are, for the most part, self-explanatory by the nature of the issues posed. However, to ensure clarity they are outlined below.

- The occupational profile of police commissioners has been gauged using only the percentage of commissioners whose details are known. Where a police commissioner's occupation is not known, he has been omitted from analysis.
- The percentage of police commissioners who resigned due to the residential qualification or other reasons has been calculated from every resignation listed in the appendix. The percentage of commissioners who resigned due to the residential qualification who were classified as merchant or manufacturer has been calculated from only those commissioners whose occupations are known.
- The percentage of elected commissioners who declined to act has been gauged from those elected either by the electorate or appointed by the Board. The percentage of those who were classified as merchant or manufacturer who declined to act has been calculated only from those commissioners whose occupations are known.
- The percentage of commissioners who had to be appointed after no votes, or insufficient number of votes, had been cast has been calculated only from those wards that held elections. Commissioners elected simply by Board appointment without an election having been held have been excluded from the overall total.
- All findings in a given year have been calculated by including commissioners elected at by-elections, as well as annual elections.
- All findings have been rounded to the nearest half per cent to make them easier to apply to graphs.
- The statistics used in figures 9.1 to 10.3 have been based on average annual percentages over five-year periods, and are reflected in the tables below. Adopting this broad time span provides a more accurate picture of general occupational and electoral trends than could have been provided by annual statistics. Annual statistics often varied considerably, or were incomplete because of gaps in police minutes. Nonetheless, annual returns are listed below also, as it makes it easier to determine how the statistics given in figures 9.1 to 10.3 to were arrived at. These yearly returns, with the exception to the ones relating to spirit traders and pawnbrokers, were not given in the main text.

Occupational Trends of Police Commissioners, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages over Five-Year Periods)

	1800- 1805	1806- 1810	1811- 1815	1816- 1820	1821- 1825	1826- 1830	1831- 1835	1836- 1840	1841- 1846
Merch/Man.	62	64	57	45	45	32.5	24	22	15.5
Prof/Comm.	4	2.5	3	4	14	15.5	16	14	17
Petty Bourg.	22	20.5	30	41	30	31	31.5	33.5	33
Artis/Other	12	13	10	10	11	21	28.5	30.5	34.5
Spirit Trader	1	2	0	0	6.5	5	8.5	9	11
Pawnbroker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	2.5

Please note, spirit traders and pawnbrokers were listed among the petty bourgeoisie category.

Commissioner Resignations, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages over Five-Year Periods)

	1800- 1805	1806- 1810	1811- 1815	1816- 1820	1821- 1825	1826- 1830	1831- 1835	1836- 1840	1841- 1846
1	85	80	45	54	64	85	56	36	35
2	15	20	55	46	36	15	44	64	65
3	66	30	50	50	62.5	20	16.5	37.5	30

Key:

1. Percentage of Commissioner resignations caused by the residential qualification.
2. Percentage of Commissioner resignations not caused by the residential qualification.
3. Percentage of Commissioners who resigned due to residential qualification who were classified as merchant or manufacturer.

Commissioner Declines, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages over Five-Year Periods)

	1800- 1805	1806- 1810	1811- 1815	1816- 1820	1821- 1825	1826- 1830	1831- 1835	1836- 1840	1841- 1846
1	1.5	1.5	11.5	10.5	9	6.5	8.5	4	9
2	0	0	75	91.5	33	33	44	75	46

Key:

1. Percentage of Commissioners elected, either by voters or Board appointment, who declined to act.
2. Percentage of Commissioners who declined to act who were classified as either merchant or manufacturer.

Commissioners who were Appointed after No Votes or an Insufficient Number had been Cast, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Average Percentages over Five-Year Periods)

1800- 1805	1806- 1810	1811- 1815	1816- 1820	1821- 1825	1826- 1830	1831- 1835	1836- 1840	1841- 1846
0	4	13.5	9.5	20.5	5.5	16	15.5	11.5

Occupational Trends of Police Commissioners, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Percentages)

	1800	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809
Merch/Man.	82	73	64	50	48	58	67	69	56	65
Prof/Comm.	0	7.5	4	8	5	0	0	0	12.5	0
Petty Bourg.	11	12	24	31	21	31.5	28	25	12.5	12
Artis/Other	7	7.5	8	11	26	10.5	5	6	19	23
Spirit Trad.	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	6	0	0
Pawnbroker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1810	1811	1812	1813	1814	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819
Merch/Man.	65	63	56	44	64	55	59	46	44	33.5
Prof/Comm.	0	5	6	6	0	0	0	7	6	0
Petty Bourg.	20	21	19	31	36	45	41	40	37.5	50
Artis/Other	15	11	19	19	0	0	0	7	12.5	16.5
Spirit Trad.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pawnbroker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1820	1821	1822	1823	1824	1825	1826	1827	1828	1829
Merch/Man.	44	*	57	50	40	33	37	35	26	26
Prof/Comm.	6	*	7	11	20	17	25	20	11	16
Petty Bourg.	37.5	*	22	33	33	33	19	30	37	37
Artis/Other	12.5	*	14	6	7	17	19	15	26	21
Spirit Trad.	0	*	0	11	7	8	0	5	5	10.5
Pawnbroker	0	*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Please note, there was no election in 1821 due to the Glasgow Police Act in that year.

	1830	1831	1832	1833	1834	1835	1836	1837	1838	1839
Merch/Man.	38	30	19	20	23	27	24	24	24	21
Prof/Comm.	5	10	19	20	19	12	17	14	12	15
Petty Bourg.	33	30	22	33	35	38	38	41	30.5	23
Artis/Other	24	30	40	27	23	23	21	21	33.5	41
Spirit Trad.	5	5	7	10	9	11.5	13	10	3	10
Pawnbroker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2.5

	1840	1841	1842	1843	1844	1845	1846
Merch/Man.	21	16	11	10.5	14	19	23
Prof/Comm.	15	19	14	16	20	14	20
Petty Bourg.	23	27	39	42	33	33.5	23
Artis/Other	41	38	36	31.5	33	33.5	34
Spirit Trad.	10	13.5	19.5	21	2.5	2.5	5.5
Pawnbroker	2.5	3	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3

Please note, spirit traders and pawnbrokers were listed among the petty bourgeois category.

Commissioner Resignations, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Percentages)

	1800	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809
1	75	75	100	100	75	0	100	50	50	100
2	25	25	0	0	25	0	0	50	50	0
3	66	66	100	50	50	0	100	0	0	0

	1810	1811	1812	1813	1814	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819
1	100	50	0	75	100	0	0	66.5	50	75
2	0	50	100	25	0	100	0	33.5	50	25
3	50	100	0	0	?	0	0	100	50	0

	1820	1821	1822	1823	1824	1825	1826	1827	1828	1829
1	25	*	80	60	50	66.5	100	50	100	100
2	75	*	20	40	50	33.5	0	50	0	0
3	?	*	50	100	100	0	33	0	0	0

Please note, there was no election in 1821 due to the Glasgow Police Act in that year.

	1830	1831	1832	1833	1834	1835	1836	1837	1838	1839
1	75	50	50	17	64	100	66.5	0	40	50
2	25	50	50	83	36	0	33.5	100	60	50
3	66	0	50	0	33	0	0	0	0	100

	1840	1841	1842	1843	1844	1845	1846
1	25	33.5	33.5	8.5	33.5	66.5	**
2	75	66.5	66.5	91.5	66.5	33.5	**
3	50	50	100	0	0	0	**

** Please note, there were no resignations as the Commission was disbanded in that year.

Key:

1. Percentage of Commissioner resignations caused by the residential qualification.
2. Percentage of Commissioner resignations not caused by residential qualification.

3. Percentage of Commissioners who resigned due to residential qualification who were classified as merchant or manufacturer.

Commissioner Declines, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Percentages)

	1800	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809
1	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	8	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1810	1811	1812	1813	1814	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819
1	0	20	0	26.5	0	11	9	0	26.5	0
2	0	50	0	100	0	?	100	0	75	0

	1820	1821	1822	1823	1824	1825	1826	1827	1828	1829
1	17.5	*	15	20	0	0	8	0	25	0
2	100	*	?	33	0	0	0	0	66	0

* Please note, there was no election in 1821 due to the Glasgow Police Act in that year.

	1830	1831	1832	1833	1834	1835	1836	1837	1838	1839
1	0	13	5.5	23	0	0	11	0	0	0
2	0	0	100	33	0	0	50	0	0	0

	1840	1841	1842	1843	1844	1845	1846
1	9	10.5	0	13.5	13	6.5	**
2	100	0	0	33	50	100	**

** Please note, there were no declines in 1846 as the Commission was disbanded in that year.

Key:

1. Percentage of Commissioners elected, either by voters or Board appointment, who declined to act.
2. Percentage of Commissioners who declined to act who were classified as either merchant or manufacturer.

Commissioners who were Appointed after No Votes or an Insufficient Number had been Cast, 1800-46 (Based on Annual Percentages)

1800	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0

1810	1811	1812	1813	1814	1815	1816	1817	1818	1819
12.5	0	0	13	0	55	27	0	21.5	0

1820	1821	1822	1823	1824	1825	1826	1827	1828	1829
0	*	18	50	14	0	8	0	0	14

* Please note, there was no election in 1821 due to the Glasgow Police Act in that year.

1830	1831	1832	1833	1834	1835	1836	1837	1838	1839
5	21	5.5	11.5	27	14	35	16	6	10

1840	1841	1842	1843	1844	1845	1846
9.5	17.5	29.5	0	0	15	7

Appendix 3: Status Classification of Police Commissioners' Occupational Profile

Any attempt to construct an historical status classification from occupational profile is wrought with difficulties. Deciding which status groupings to use is in itself contentious, without the added problem of ascribing occupations to them. Variations between the employed, self-employed, affluent, and less affluent within certain occupational categories make it impossible to construct a definitive social classification. Nevertheless, while recognising the difficulties involved, an attempt has been made below to create a general, if somewhat rough, classification from all the occupations listed in the police minutes. It is important to point out, however, that the following groupings are mere functional distinctions; they are not intended to represent influence or economic standing. All the occupations listed below at some point appeared in the police minutes.

1. **Merchant/Manufacturer group.** This includes large suppliers and producers of consumer and capital goods, which the minutes classified as specifically merchant or manufacturer. They have been grouped together in this form for two reasons. Firstly, because in Glasgow they were the most prestigious and powerful social grouping, with the composition of the Town Council, and many other public and charitable bodies, being drawn solely from people from such backgrounds. Secondly, because they were closely linked, with many manufacturers having mercantile interests, and vice-versa. Furthermore, it was often impossible to establish whether a commissioner was a merchant or manufacturer, given the tendency of the police minutes to list someone as a merchant one year and a manufacturer another.
2. **Professional/Commercial group.** This includes writers (legal term for lawyers in nineteenth-century Scotland), surgeons, doctors, druggists, clerks, accountants, drawing teachers, engineers, commission agents, house factors, portioners, auctioneers, publishers, measurers (surveyors) and collectors. This group is worthy of being distinguished from other middle-class occupations as they consist of educated and 'respectable' men. As a result, their presence at Police Board meetings was not likely to alarm elite opinion.
3. **Petty bourgeois group.** This includes small retailers, such as grocers, bakers, fleshers, ham curers, confectioners, tobacconists, ironmongers, drysalts, spirit dealers (including vintners, victuallers and innkeepers), clothiers, drapers, hosiers, booksellers, stationers,

jewellers, perfumers, warehousemen, and pawn brokers. It also includes, stable and coach proprietors and lodging occupiers.

4. **Artisan/Others group.** This includes craftsmen (the overwhelming majority of whom were self-employed small businessmen), such as wrights, coopers, watchmakers, shoemakers, engravers, masons, printers, tailors, hatters, candlemakers, umbrella makers, skimmers, reelmakers, tallow-chandlers, calenderers, carvers and guilders, tinsplate workers, smiths, builders, glaziers, fish hook makers, painters, tanners, slaters, plasterers, ironfounders and tile makers. It also includes one singer. They have been classified as artisan/others because they evolve from the lower echelons of society, probably having served an apprenticeship, despite the fact that the majority were self-employed and perhaps worthy in terms of income of being classified as petty bourgeois.

Appendix 4: The Social Composition of the Glasgow Police Commission, 1800-46

The following social composition of Glasgow police commissioners has been obtained primarily from the city's police commissioners' minute books. This source was preferred to local newspapers and Post Office Directory for the following reasons. Firstly, the minute books consistently record membership of the Police Board. Neither of the other sources do this. The Post Office Directory ignored the city's commissioners of police until 1826, while press attention throughout the period was at best sporadic. Secondly, the minute books are the only source that consistently record resignations and by-elections. The other two sources were concerned only with annual elections, which do not give a full insight into social or electoral trends. Thirdly, the minute books often state the occupational profile of commissioners. The Post Office Directory neglected to do this, while the local press took much of its information secondhand anyway from the Police Office.

The reliance on police commissioners' minutes is, admittedly, open to weaknesses. Two in particular stand out. Firstly, they give a rather vague insight into the social background of commissioners. All that is revealed is a commissioner's general occupational profile, with little precise detail supplied. Such detail could have been uncovered in the Post Office Directory – the most detailed source of occupational reference for this period – if the addresses of the police commissioners had been supplied in the minutes. And this would have been the preferred option if it had been feasible. However, unfortunately it was not. Addresses were rarely given in the minutes, thus rendering it impossible to determine from the Directory the identity and occupational profile of a police commissioner who shared his name with other Glasgow citizens. Although this did not apply to all commissioners listed in the Directory, the number it did apply to was too large to justify using it as the main source of occupational reference, despite the greater insights it offered.

The second main weakness in using the Police Commission minutes is, like most historical sources, the gaps and inconsistencies that appear in them. Of the twenty-two volumes of minute books that cover the period 1800 to 1846, one is missing (E1/1/5, covering from 24 March 1807 to 16 February 1809), while another excludes a considerable period of time (E1/1/7 ends 4 February 1813, with E1/1/8 not beginning until 10 November 1814). Furthermore, though the minutes that do exist consistently list the names of commissioners, they are not as consistent in listing their occupations. On certain occasions, names were listed without occupational profile. However, it is important to stress that this was the exception rather than the norm, and was not so frequent as to render this source untenable as a guide to social profile. The minutes of

the Police Commission still provide the most consistent and reliable insight in this area of all the potential sources, for reasons outlined above.

It is important to point out that no attempt has been made to fill in occupational gaps by looking to the local press and Post Office Directory, even where information was available. (The exception to this is the missing volume and dates outlined above, whereby *The Glasgow Herald* was used to determine commissioners of police.) Some historians may frown on such an approach, but it has been done to ensure consistency. Relying on a variety of sources would have distorted the overall trend, given the frequent tendency for police commissioners to be given a different occupational profile from one source to another. For instance, in 1813, *The Glasgow Herald* listed three commissioners as having different occupations from the information given in the police minutes. Occupational disparity between source minutes and Post Office Directory was even greater, given the precise occupational listings the later tended to ascribe. Relying solely on source minutes was, for all its flaws, the only way a degree of continuity could be guaranteed. Though it was achieved at the expense of completeness – which could not be ensured by using the local press and directory, anyway, for reasons outlined above – overall trends can still be gauged from the percentage of commissioners whose occupations were stated. The historian can take comfort from the fact that such commissioners accounted for at least three-quarters of all those listed in the minutes.

As a guide to the following listing of commissioners, please note the following. Firstly, after the initial election in 1800, elections were held on an annual basis, with a third of the senior commissioners going out on rotation. The wards involved have been indented. Although the minutes only record the results of the wards that were balloted, the full list of commissioners has been stated below for easy reference. Secondly, the occupations of commissioners were normally stated only after their initial election, and rarely after they were re-elected. Where this applies, the initial listing will be continued unless otherwise changed in the minutes. Thirdly, resignations that were caused by removal from ward were always stated, either in the minutes or the press. Where no reason was given, it has been assumed that it was for personal reasons and not a breach of the residential qualification. Fourthly, results have been calculated, as indicated earlier, by using the percentage of commissioners whose details are known (see Appendix Two). All findings in a given year have been calculated by including those commissioners elected at by-elections, rather than simply annual general elections. Finally, a note on the magnitude of the appendix. It is necessary to have such a voluminous appendix in order to exemplify the findings given in relation to the social composition of Glasgow Police Commission and the electoral trends of the electors. Everything stated regarding these issues can be gauged from this and the previous two appendices.

1800 General Election:

- 1/ Dundas Paterson (merchant); 2/ David Scott (wright); 3/ John Sorley (merchant); 4/ William Cuthbertson (merchant); 5/ David Todd (merchant); 6/ David Crawford (merchant); 7/ Henry Riddel (merchant); 8/ Gilbert Hamilton (merchant); 9/ John Hamilton (grocer); 10/ John Shaw (bookseller); 11/ Matthew Robertson (stationer); 12/ Thomas Buchanan (merchant); 13/ William Urie (cooper); 14/ William Aitken (merchant); 15/ Alexander Oswald (merchant); 16/ William Falconer (merchant); 17/ James Robertson (merchant); 18/ James Guthrie (merchant); 19/ James Whyte (merchant); 20/ William Muir (merchant); 21/ John Goudie (merchant); 22/ John Stenhouse (merchant); 23/ John Harper (merchant); 24/ Peter McAdam (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 September 1800.
- Please note, G.C.A., E1/1/1, 4 August 1800 lists the following gentlemen for wards 2, 10, 11, 21 and 24 respectively: John Thomson (reel maker); Robert Miller (copper smith); John Downie (merchant); Archibald Broadley (tailor); and John Anderson (bricklayer). However, they were not qualified to hold their positions. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 6 August 1800. The commissioners listed above replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 9 August 1800.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1800 to 1801:

- John Stenhouse (merchant), Commissioner for ward 22, resigns to become Master of Police. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 29 September 1800. Cornelius Todd (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 December 1800.
- Matthew Robertson (stationer), Commissioner for ward 11; William Falconer (merchant), Commissioner for ward 16; and James Whyte (merchant), Commissioner for ward 19, all resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. E1/1/1, 1 June 1801. James Bryce (merchant), William Kelly (merchant) and James Peat (merchant) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 15 June 1801.

1801 General Election:

- 1/ *Alex McGregor (writer)*; 2/ David Scott (wright); 3/ *John Sorley (merchant, re-elected)*; 4/ William Cuthbertson (merchant); 5/ *George Thomson (merchant)*; 6/ David Crawford (merchant); 7/ *Dougald Bannatyne (merchant)*; 8/ Gilbert Hamilton (merchant); 9/ *Matthew Robertson (stationer)*; 10/ John Shaw (bookseller); 11/ *John Downie (not stated)*; 12/ Thomas Buchanan (merchant); 13/ William Ure (cooper); 14/ William Aitken (merchant); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ William Kelly (merchant); 17/ *Andrew Reid (manufacturer)*; 18/ James Guthrie (merchant); 19/ Jason Peat (merchant); 20/ William Muir

(merchant); 21/ John Goudie (merchant); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ John Harper (merchant); 24/ *William Leckie (hosier)*. G.C.A., E1/1/2, 6 November 1801.

- Please note, the above minute lists James Bryce (merchant) as being re-elected for ward 11. However, a new election was held after protest from the electors regarding the validity of certain ballots. G.C.A., E1/1/2, 13 November 1801. Mr Downie (not stated) was subsequently elected. G.C.A., E1/1/2, 26 November 1801.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1801 to 1802:

- Thomas Buchanan (merchant), Commissioner for ward 12, deceased. James Guthrie (merchant), Commissioner for ward 18; James Goudie (merchant), Commissioner for ward 21; and Alex McGregor (writer), Commissioner for ward 1, all resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. G.C.A., E1/1/3, 20 May 1802. William Marshall (writer); James Rodger (manufacturer); George Smith (not stated); and John Bell (merchant) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 7 June 1802.
- William Kelly (merchant), Commissioner for ward 16, resigns, claiming to be too busy to attend. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/3, 19 October 1802.

1802 General Election:

- 1/ John Bell (merchant); 2/ *Nathan Stevenson (merchant)*; 3/ John Sorley (merchant); 4/ William Cuthbertson (merchant); 5/ George Thomson (merchant); 6/ *William Telfer (shoemaker)*; 7/ Dougald Bannatyne (merchant); 8/ Gilbert Hamilton (merchant); 9/ Matthew Robertson (bookseller); 10/ *John Shaw (bookseller, re-elected)*; 11/ John Downie (not stated); 12/ *William Marshall (writer, re-elected)*; 13/ *John Hamilton (grocer, later referred to as either James or Jason in minutes)*; 14/ *William Aitken (merchant, re-elected)*; 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ *Peter Bald (drysalter)*; 17/ Andrew Reid (manufacturer); 18/ James Rodger (manufacturer); 19/ James Peat (merchant); 20/ William Muir (merchant); 21/ *George Smith (shoemaker)*; 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ John Harper (manufacturer); 24/ William Leckie (hosier). G.C.A., E1/1/3, 2 November 1802.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1802 to 1803:

- John Downie (not stated), Commissioner for ward 11, and James Rodger (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 18, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. G.C.A., E1/1/3, 24 May 1803. James Watson (flesher) and James Paterson (manufacturer) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 6 June 1803.

1803 General Election:

- 1/ John Bell (merchant); 2/ Nathan Stevenson (merchant); 3/ John Sorley (merchant); 4/ *John Graham (baker)*; 5/ George Thomson (merchant); 6/ William Telfer (shoemaker); 7/ Dougald Bannatyne (merchant); 8/ *Gilbert Hamilton (merchant, re-elected)*; 9/ Matthew Robertson (bookseller); 10/ John Shaw (bookseller); 11/ James Watson (flesher); 12/ William Marshall (writer); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ William Aitken (merchant); 15/ *Alexander Oswald (merchant, re-elected)*; 16/ Peter Bald (drysalter); 17/ Andrew Reid (manufacturer); 18/ *William Meikle (baker)*; 19/ *James Peat (merchant, re-elected)*; 20/ *William Muir (merchant, re-elected)*; 21/ George Smith (shoemaker); 22/ *Cornelius Todd (merchant, re-elected)*; 23/ *John Harper (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 24/ William Leckie (hosier). G.C.A., E1/1/3, 8 November 1803.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1803 to 1804:

- William Marshall (writer), Commissioner for ward 12, and James Peat (merchant), Commissioner for ward 19, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 29 May 1804. Daniel McMillan (shoemaker), and Alex McGregor (writer), replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 12 June 1804.
- John Shaw (bookseller), Commissioner for ward 10, deceased. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 23 October 1804.

1804 General Election:

- 1/ *Joseph Bain (not stated)*; 2/ Nathan Stevenson (merchant); 3/ *Andrew McFarlane (not stated)*; 4/ John Graham (baker); 5/ *Joshua Heywood (not stated)*; 6/ William Telfer (shoemaker); 7/ *Dougald Bannatyne (merchant, re-elected)*; 8/ Gilbert Hamilton (merchant); 9/ *Matthew Robertson (bookseller, re-elected)*; 10/ *Thomas Neilson (not stated)*; 11/ *John Reid (not stated)*; 12/ Daniel McMillan (shoemaker); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ William Aitken (merchant); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ Peter Bald (drysalter); 17/ *John Thorn (not stated)*; 18/ William Meikle (baker); 19/ Alex McGregor (writer); 20/ William Muir (merchant); 21/ George Smith (shoemaker); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ John Harper (manufacturer); 24/ *William Leckie (hosier, re-elected)*. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 6 November 1804.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1804 to 1805:

- John Reid (not stated), Commissioner for ward 11, and George Smith (shoemaker), Commissioner for ward 21, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. G.C.A.,

E1/1/4, 25 June 1805. John Craig (leather merchant) and James Johnston (not clearly stated) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 9 July 1805.

- Alex McGregor (writer), Commissioner for ward 19, declines to accept post. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 2 July 1805. Although elected over a year ago, and listed as commissioner for that ward, he never attended weekly meetings and was never formally qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 25 June 1805. William Mitchell (watchmaker) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 9 July 1805.
- Dougald Bannatyne (merchant), Commissioner for ward 7, resigns, citing removal from ward as reason. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 10 September 1805. Robert McLehose (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 17 September 1805.
- John Graham (baker), Commissioner for ward 4, resigns - no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 22 October 1805.

1805 General Election:

- 1/ Joseph Bain (not stated); 2/ *Nathan Stevenson (merchant, re-elected)*; 3/ Andrew McFarlane (not stated); 4/ *William Cuthbertson (merchant)*; 5/ John Heywood (not stated); 6/ *Henry Mandrop (merchant)*; 7/ Robert McLehose (not stated); 8/ Gilbert Hamilton (merchant); 9/ Matthew Robertson (bookseller); 10/ *Thomas Neilson (not stated)*; 11/ John Craig (leather merchant); 12/ *James Grop (spirit dealer)*; 13/ *James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected)*; 14/ *William Aitken (merchant, re-elected)*; 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ *James Peat (merchant)*; 17/ John Thorn (not stated); 18/ William Meikle (baker); 19/ William Mitchell (watchmaker); 20/ William Muir (merchant); 21/ *John Jenkine (shoemaker)*; 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ John Harper (manufacturer); 24/ William Leckie (hosier). G.C.A., E1/1/4, 5 November 1805.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1805 to 1806:

- William Mitchell, Commissioner for ward 19, disqualified by non-residence. William Scott (tobacconist) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/4, 17 June 1806.

1806 General Election:

- 1/ Joseph Bain (not stated); 2/ Nathan Stephenson (merchant); 3/ Andrew McFarlane (not stated); 4/ *William Cuthbertson (merchant, re-elected)*; 5/ Joshua Heywood (not stated); 6/ Henry Mandrop (merchant); 7/ Robert McLehose (not stated); 8/ *Gilbert Hamilton (merchant, re-elected)*; 9/ Matthew Robertson (bookseller); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ John Craig (leather merchant); 12/ Jason Grop (spirit dealer); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ William Aitken (merchant); 15/ *Alex Oswald (merchant, re-elected)*; 16/ James

Peat (merchant); 17/ James Thorn (not stated); 18/ *James Paterson (merchant)*; 19/ *William Scott (tobacconist, re-elected)*; 20/ *John Russel (merchant)*; 21/ John Jenkine (shoemaker); 22/ *Cornelius Todd (merchant, re-elected)*; 23/ *Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer)*; 24/ William Leckie (hosier). G.C.A., E1/1/4, 4 November 1806.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1806 to 1807:

- John Russel (merchant), Commissioner for ward 20, resigns, citing removal from Royalty as reason. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 June 1807. David Turnbull (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 August 1807. (Please note, the result of election was not given because of missing volume of weekly minutes. The date of David Turnbull's appointment has been determined by his first appearance on the quarterly Board.)

1807 General Election:

- 1/ *John Bain (not stated, re-elected)*; 2/ Nathan Stevenson (merchant); 3/ *Robert Kennedy (not stated)*; 4/ William Cuthbertson (merchant); 5/ *Joshua Heywood (not stated, re-elected)*; 6/ Henry Mandrop (merchant); 7/ *Alex Hunter (not stated)*; 8/ Gilbert Hamilton (merchant); 9/ *Alex McLeod (not stated)*; 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ *John Craig (leather merchant, re-elected)*; 12/ John Grop (spirit dealer); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ William Aitken (merchant); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ James Peat (merchant); 17/ *John Thorn (not stated, re-elected)*; 18/ James Paterson (merchant); 19/ William Scott (tobacconist); 20/ David Turnbull (not stated); 21/ John Jenkine (shoemaker); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ *William Leckie (hosier, re-elected)*. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 13 November 1807 and G.C.A., E1/1/1, 29 February 1808. (The above was compiled using those commissioners who attended quarterly meetings. This was rendered necessary by a missing minute book.)

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1807 to 1808:

- Gilbert Hamilton (merchant), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns - no reason given. William Leckie (hosier), Commissioner for ward 24, resigns, citing removal from ward as reason. Both by-elections to take place with annual general election. *Glasgow Herald*, 22 July 1808.

1808 General Election:

- 1/ Joseph Bain (not stated); 2/ *Nathan Stevenson (merchant, re-elected)*; 3/ Robert Kennedy (not stated); 4/ William Cuthbertson (merchant); 5/ Joshua Heywood (not stated); 6/ *Alex Carrick (writer)*; 7/ Alex Hunter (not stated); 8/ *William Dunlop (surgeon)*; 9/ Alex McLeod (not stated); 10/ *Mr Shearer (not stated)*; 11/ John Craig (leather merchant); 12/ Robert

Pirrie (cooper. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected); 14/ William Leckie (cooper); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ James Peat (merchant, re-elected); 17/ John Thorn (not stated); 18/ James Paterson (merchant); 19/ William Scott (tobacconist); 20/ David Turnbull (not stated); 21/ John Jenkine (shoemaker, re-elected); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ Robert Strang (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/1, 26 July 1808.

- Please note, the above minute lists J. Jamieson (surgeon) elected for ward 10, and Charles Walker (not stated) elected for ward 16. However, they did not take-up their positions. John Jamieson declined to accept. *Glasgow Herald*, 5 August 1808. The missing volume makes it difficult to determine exactly why Charles Walker was not appointed. However, as there is no record of a by-election in the press for ward 16 it is unlikely that Charles Walker declined to accept. As James Peat, in the above minute, protested against the validity of Charles Walker's appointment, it is likely that his protest was successful.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1808 to 1809:

- By 28 November 1808 Joshua Heywood (not stated), Commissioner for ward 5, had been appointed to the Magistracy. The quarterly Board minutes show D. Crawford (not stated) as the new commissioner. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 28 November 1808.
- Alex Carrick (writer), Commissioner for ward 6, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to be held with annual general election. *Glasgow Herald*, 21 July 1809.

1809 General Election:

- 1/ Joseph Bain (not stated); 2/ Nathan Stephenson (merchant); 3/ Robert Kennedy (not stated); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ David Crawford (not stated); 6/ James Coats (merchant); 7/ Alex Hunter (not stated); 8/ William Muir (merchant); 9/ Alex McLeod (not stated); 10/ John Shearer (not stated); 11/ John Craig (leather merchant); 12/ Robert Pirrie (cooper); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ William Leckie (cooper); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant, re-elected); 16/ James Peat (merchant); 17/ John Thorn (not stated); 18/ Gilbert Auchinvole (merchant); 19/ William Scott (tobacconist, re-elected); 20/ David Turnbull (not stated, re-elected); 21/ John Jenkine (shoemaker); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant, re-elected); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer, re-elected); 24/ Robert Strang (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 August 1809 and G.C.A., E1/1/6, 10 August 1809.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1809 to 1810:

- David Turnbull (not stated), Commissioner for ward 20, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 22 February 1810. George Lyon (ironsmith) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 8 March 1810.

- David Crawford (not stated), Commissioner for ward 5, resigns, citing removal from Royalty as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 14 June 1810. Basil Ronald (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 28 June 1810.

1810 General Election:

- 1/ John Dobbin (merchant. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 2/ Matthew Stevenson (merchant); 3/ William Stenhouse (merchant); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ Joshua Heywood (not stated); 6/ James Coats (merchant); 7/ James Paterson (manufacturer); 8/ William Muir (merchant); 9/ Alex McLeod (not stated, re-elected); 10/ John Shearer (not stated); 11/ Archie Gillies (grocer); 12/ Robert Pirrie (cooper); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ William Leckie (cooper); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ John Peat (merchant); 17/ John Thorn (not stated, re-elected); 18/ Gilbert Auchinvole (merchant); 19/ William Scott (tobacconist); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ John Jenkine (shoemaker); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ Robert Strang (merchant, re-elected). G.C.A., E1/1/6, 30 July 1810.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1810 to 1811:

- By-elections to be held in wards 7, 9 and 19, following the removal of commissioners Jason Paterson (manufacturer), Alex McLeod (not stated) and William Scott (tobacconist) from their wards. They are to be held with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/6, 25 July 1811.

1811 General Election:

- 1/ John Dobbin (merchant); 2/ Nathan Stevenson (merchant, re-elected). 3/ William Stenhouse (merchant); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ John Heywood (not stated); 6/ Alex Campbell (writer); 7/ Stewart Smith (not stated); 8/ William Muir (merchant); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ John Shearer (not stated, re-elected); 11/ Archie Gillies (grocer); 12/ Robert Pirrie (cooper, re-elected); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected); 14/ James Lumsden (engraver); 15/ Alex Oswald (merchant); 16/ Michael Miller (baker); 17/ John Thorn (not stated); 18/ Gilbert Auchinvole (merchant); 19/ Robert Kennedy (merchant); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ John Alexander (not stated); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ Robert Strang (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/6, 6 August 1811.
- Please note, the above minute lists Thomas Arthur (not stated) Commissioner for ward 7, James Miller (merchant) Commissioner for ward 14 and William Scott (tobacconist) Commissioner for ward 21. However, all three declined to accept. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 22

August 1811. The commissioners listed above on 19 September 1811 replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 19 September 1811.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1811 to 1812:

- Joshua Heywood (not stated), Commissioner for ward 5, elected to the Magistracy. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 10 October 1811. George Buchanan (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 17 October 1811.
- By-election to be held in ward 3 at the annual election following the removal of William Stenhouse (merchant) from his ward. G.C.A., E1/1/7, 9 July 1812.

1812 General Election:

- 1/ John Dobbin (merchant); 2/ Nathan Stevenson (merchant); 3/ *Hugh Miller (not stated)*; 4/ *John Ure (merchant, re-elected)*; 5/ George Buchanan (not stated); 6/ Alex Campbell (writer); 7/ Stewart Smith (not stated); 8/ *John Jamieson (not stated)*; 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ John Shearer (not stated); 11/ Archie Gillies (grocer); 12/ Robert Pirrie (cooper); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ James Lumsden (engraver); 15/ *James Laird (merchant)*; 16/ Michael Miller (baker); 17/ John Thorn (not stated); 18/ *Gilbert Auchinvole (merchant, re-elected)*; 19/ *John Young (not stated)*; 20/ *George Lyon (ironsmith, re-elected)*; 21/ John Alexander (not stated); 22/ *Cornelius Todd (merchant, re-elected)*; 23/ *Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 24/ Robert Strang (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/7, 6 August 1812.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1812 to 1813:

- John Jamieson (not stated), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns - no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. *Glasgow Herald*, 16 July 1813.
- Gilbert Auchinvole (merchant), Commissioner for ward 18, resigns - no reason given. By-election to be held after annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 26 July 1813.

1813 General Election:

- 1/ *Robert Lochore (shoemaker. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 2/ Nathan Stevenson (merchant); 3/ *Matthew Flemming (not stated in this minute, although later referred to as merchant)*; 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ *George Buchanan (not stated, re-elected)*; 6/ Alex Campbell (writer); 7/ *John MacKintosh (not stated. No votes cast - appointed by Board)*; 8/ *William Muir (not stated)*; 9/ *Hugh Love (merchant, re-elected)*; 10/ John Shearer, (not stated); 11/ *Archie Gillies (grocer, re-elected)*; 12/ Robert Pirrie (cooper);

13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ James Lumsden (engraver); 15/ James Laird (merchant); 16/ Michael Miller (baker); 17/ *Alex Stewart (not stated)*; 18/ *William Currie (not stated)*; 19/ John Young (not stated); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ John Alexander (not stated); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ *Robert Paterson (not stated)*. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 26 July 1813.

- Please note, the above minute lists Andrew Rankine (merchant) Commissioner for ward 7 and Andrew Buchanan (not stated) Commissioner for ward 17. However, both declined to be qualified, as did the Commissioner elected for the eighteenth ward (name and occupation not given). *Glasgow Herald*, 6 August 1813. After the subsequent by-election in ward 18, Andrew White (not stated) was elected Commissioner for that ward. However, he too declined to be qualified. *Glasgow Herald*, 16 August 1813. It is difficult to determine exactly when John Mackintosh, Alex Stewart and William Currie were elected due to the gap in the minutes covering this period. However, all three first appeared in the minutes of the quarterly meeting on 30 August 1813. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 30 August 1813.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1813 to 1814:

- John Young (not stated), Commissioner for ward 19, resigns, citing removal from city as his reason. *Glasgow Herald*, 16 May 1814. James Dawson (not stated in this minute, but later listed as ironsmith) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 30 May 1814. Please note, this was Mr Dawson's first appearance at the quarterly meeting. A gap in the minutes covering this period makes it impossible to say precisely when he was elected.
- Robert Lochore (shoemaker), Commissioner for ward 1 and John McIntosh (accountant), Commissioner for ward 7, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. Robert Paterson (merchant), Commissioner for ward 24 resigns - no reason given. By-elections to take place with annual general election. *Glasgow Herald*, 15 July 1814.

1814 General Election:

- 1/ *John Sinclair (not stated)*; 2/ *William Blackburn (not stated)*; 3/ Matthew Flemming (merchant); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ George Buchanan (not stated); 6/ *George Brown (not stated)*; 7/ *Robert Smith (not stated)*; 8/ William Muir (not stated); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ *Thomas Neilson (not stated)*; 11/ Archie Gillies (grocer); 12/ *Duncan McDougal (not stated)*; 13/ James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected); 14/ *Ronald McNicoll (not stated)*; 15/ James Laird (merchant); 16/ *Thomas Gemmill (not stated)*; 17/ Alex Stewart (not stated); 18/ William Currie (not stated); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ *Robert McDonald (not stated)*; 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/

Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ *John Barclay (not stated)*. G.C.A., E1/1/8, 5 January 1815.

- Please note, this information was derived from a committee of commissioners and was not the result of the annual election. This was necessary because of a gap in the minutes.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1814 to 1815:

- Alex Stewart (not stated), Commissioner for ward 17, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/8, 26 January 1815. Robert Walker (manufacturer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/8, 2 February 1815.
- George Buchanan (not stated), Commissioner for ward 5, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/8, 20 July 1815.

1815 General Election:

- 1/ John Sinclair (not stated); 2/ William Blackburn (not stated); 3/ Matthew Flemming (merchant); 4/ *John Ure (merchant, re-elected. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 5/ *Thomas Meek (not stated)*; 6/ George Brown (not stated); 7/ Robert Smith (not stated); 8/ *William McGavin (not stated in this minute, although later referred to as lodging)*; 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ Archie Gillies (grocer); 12/ Duncan McDougal (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ Ronald McNicol (not stated); 15/ *Samuel Hunter (not stated. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 16/ Thomas Gemmill (not stated); 17/ Robert Walker (manufacturer); 18/ *James Coats (not stated. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 19/ *James Dawson (ironsmith,, re-elected)*; 20/ *George Lyon (ironsmith, re-elected)*; 21/ Robert McDonald (not stated); 22/ *Cornelius Todd (merchant, re-elected. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 23/ *Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer, re-elected. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 24/ John Barclay (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/8, 31 July 1815.
- Please note, the above minute lists William Currie (not stated) as being Commissioner for ward 18, having been re-appointed. However, he declined to be qualified. The Board appointed James Coats. No election was held. G.C.A., E1/1/8, 10 August 1815.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1815 to 1816:

- Robert Smith (not stated), Commissioner for ward 7, resigns - no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 23 May 1816.

1816 General Election:

- 1/ *George Duncan (not stated. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*; 2/ William Blackburn (not stated); 3/ *John Nyld (not stated)*; 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ *Thomas Meek (not stated, re-elected)*; 6/ George Brown (not stated); 7/ *James Provan (not stated)*; 8/ William McGavin (lodging); 9/ *Hugh Love (merchant, re-elected)*; 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ *John Hamilton (grocer, re-elected)*; 12/ Duncan McDougal (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ Ronald McNicol (not stated); 15/ Samuel Hunter (not stated); 16/ Thomas Gemmill (not stated); 17/ *Robert Walker (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 18/ James Coats (not stated); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ Robert McDonald (not stated); 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ *Moses McCulloch (not stated. No votes cast - appointed by the Board)*. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 29 July 1816.
- Please note, the above minute lists Robert Aitken (not stated) Commissioner for ward 7. However, he was deemed ineligible. James Provan (not stated) replaced him on 8 August 1816. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 8 August 1816.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1816 to 1817:

- John Nyld (not stated), Commissioner for ward 3, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 25 November 1816. Matthew Flemming (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 3 December 1816.
- Thomas Meek (not stated), Commissioner for ward 5, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 15 March 1817. John Crighton (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 1 April 1817. However, he declined to be qualified. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 17 July 1817.

1817 General Election:

- 1/ George Duncan (not stated); 2/ *William Blackburn (not stated, re-elected)*; 3/ Matthew Flemming (merchant); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ *David Syme (grocer)*; 6/ *Robert Marshall (writer)*; 7/ James Provan (not stated); 8/ William McGavin (lodging); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ *Thomas Neilson (not stated, re-elected)*; 11/ John Hamilton (grocer); 12/ *Douglas McDougal (not stated, re-elected)*; 13/ *James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected)*; 14/ *James Lumsden senior (engraver)*; 15/ Samuel Hunter (not stated); 16/ *Alexander Stewart (merchant)*; 17/ Robert Walker (manufacturer); 18/ James Coats (not stated); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ *Ronald McDonald (not stated, re-elected)*; 22/ Cornelius Todd (merchant); 23/ Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer); 24/ Moses McCulloch (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/9, 28 July 1817.

- Please note, the above minutes lists Ronald McNicol Commissioner for ward 14. However, he was not eligible, having removed from ward. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 7 August 1817. James Lumsden (engraver) replaced him on 12 August 1817. G.C.A., E1/1/9, 12 August 1817.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1817 to 1818:

- Cornelius Todd (merchant), Commissioner for ward 22, deceased. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 25 June 1818.
- James Lumsden (engraver), Commissioner for ward 14, resigns due to ill health. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 2 July 1818.
- Jason Provan (not stated), Commissioner for ward 7, and Alexander Stewart (merchant), Commissioner for ward 16, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 16 July 1818.

1818 General Election:

- 1/ George Duncan (not stated); 2/ William Blackburn (not stated); 3/ Matthew Flemming (merchant); 4/ *John Ure (merchant, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 5/ David Syme (grocer); 6/ Robert Marshall (writer); 7/ *David Laird (merchant. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 8/ *William McGavin (lodging, re-elected)*; 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ John Hamilton (grocer); 12/ Douglas McDougal (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ *Mr Pearce (not stated. He was appointed by the Board following the refusal of two elected men to qualify)*; 15/ *Andrew Brocket (mason)*; 16/ *William Ure (tea merchant)*; 17/ Robert Walker (manufacturer); 18/ *James Coats (not stated, re-elected)*; 19/ *James Dawson (ironsmith, re-elected)*; 20/ *George Lyon (ironsmith, re-elected)*; 21/ Ronald McDonald (not stated); 22/ *James Scott (hatter)*; 23/ *Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 24/ Moses McCulloch (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/10, 27 July 1818.
- Please note, the above minute lists James Allan (grain merchant) Commissioner for ward 14, Robert Shirra (merchant) Commissioner for ward 16 and Andrew White (manufacturer) Commissioner for ward 18. However, all three declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 6 August 1818. Robert Shirra and Andrew White were replaced in their respective wards by the Commissioners listed above, while James Lang (victualler) was initially elected to ward 14. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 20 August 1818. However, he, too, declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 26 August 1818. Mr Pearce (not stated) replaced him on 10 September 1818. (This reference is taken from Mr Pearce's first appearance on the weekly Board rather than his

electoral result. A gap in the minutes rendered this necessary.) G.C.A., E1/1/10, 10 September 1818.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1818 to 1819:

- Robert Marshall (writer), Commissioner for wards 6, and Andrew Stephenson (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 23, both resign, citing removal from Royalty as their reason. Both by-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/10, 15 July 1819.

1819 General Election:

- 1/ John Galbraith junior (not stated); 2/ William Blackburn (not stated); 3/ Matthew Flemming (merchant, re-elected); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ David Sim (grocer, re-elected); 6/ Jason Davie (not stated); 7/ John Hutchison (not stated); 8/ William McGavin (lodging); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant, re-elected); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ John Hamilton (grocer, re-elected); 12/ Douglas McDougal (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ Mr Pearce (not stated); 15/ Andrew Brocket (mason); 16/ William Ure (tea merchant); 17/ Walter Graham (not stated); 18/ James Coats (not stated); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ Ronald McDonald (not stated); 22/ James Scott (hatter); 23/ Michael Gilfillan (not stated); 24/ Moses McCulloch (not stated, re-elected). G.C.A., E1/1/10, 26 July 1819.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1819 to 1820:

- John Galbraith junior (not stated), Commissioner for ward 1, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 13 July 1820.
- Andrew Brocket (mason), Commissioner for ward 15, James Coats (not stated), Commissioner for ward 18, and James Scott (hatter), Commissioner for ward 22, all resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 27 July 1820.

1820 General Election:

- 1/ George Sim (candlemaker); 2/ Robert Miller (wright); 3/ Matthew Flemming (merchant); 4/ John Ure (merchant); 5/ David Sim (grocer); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ John Hutchison (not stated); 8/ William McGavin (lodging); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated, re-elected); 11/ John Hamilton (grocer); 12/ Duncan McDougal (not stated, re-elected); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected); 14/ Dr Perry (doctor); 15/ Peter Paterson (not stated); 16/ William Ure (tea merchant, re-elected); 17/ Walter Graham (not stated); 18/ James Davidson (not stated); 19/ James Dawson

(ironsmith); 20/ George Lyon (ironsmith); 21/ *John Alexander junior (not stated)*; 22/ *John Robertson (manufacturer)*; 23/ Michael Gilfillan (not stated); 24/ Moses McCulloch (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/11, 31 July 1820.

- Please note, the above minute lists Mr Alston (not stated) Commissioner for ward 15. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 10 August 1820. Peter Paterson (not stated) replaced him on 17 August 1820. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 17 August 1820.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1820 to 1822 (no election in 1821 due to passing of new Police Act):

- James Davidson (not stated), Commissioner for ward 18, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 8 February 1821. William Gilmour (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/11, 13 February 1821.
- John Hutchison (not stated), Commissioner for ward 7, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 9 July 1821. Samuel Low (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 13 November 1821. Before Samuel Low's appointment, however, Thomas Arthur (merchant) and Charles Hutchison (not stated) both declined to be qualified for this position, despite being elected by voters. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 26 July 1821 and G.C.A., E1/1/12, 2 November 1821.
- John Alexander (not stated), Commissioner for ward 21, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 4 July 1822.
- Matthew Flemming (merchant), Commissioner for ward 3, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 18 July 1822.

1822 General Election:

- 1/ George Sim (candlemaker); 2/ Robert Miller (wright); 3/ *Andrew Dow (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 4/ Samuel Coleman (merchant); 5/ David Sim (grocer); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ Samuel Low (merchant); 8/ *Robert Paterson (merchant. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ John Hamilton (grocer); 12/ Duncan McDougal (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (not stated); 14/ Dr Perry (doctor); 15/ *Robert Walker (not stated)*; 16/ William Ure (tea merchant); 17/ Walter Graham (not stated); 18/ *William Gilmour (merchant, re-elected)*; 19/ *James Dawson (ironsmith, re-elected)*; 20/ *Robert Aitken (not stated)*; 21/ *William Peddie (not stated)*; 22/ *John Robertson (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 23/ *Michael Gilfillan (not stated, re-elected)*; 24/ Moses McCulloch (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/12, 29 July 1822.

- Please note, the above minute lists Samuel Hunter (not stated) Commissioner for ward 3. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 1 August 1822. Andrew Dow replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 3 October 1822. Before Mr Dow's appointment, however, James Miller (not stated) declined to be qualified for this position, despite being appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 8 August 1822.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1822 to 1823:

- Samuel Low (merchant), Commissioner for ward 7, resigns – no reason given. John Duncan (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/12, 12 August 1822.
- Doctor Perry (doctor), Commissioner for ward 14, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 5 June 1823.
- Moses McCulloch (not stated), Commissioner for ward 24, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 12 June 1823.
- John Duncan (merchant), Commissioner for ward 7, and Andrew Dow (not stated), Commissioner for ward 3, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 18 June 1823.

1823 General Election:

- *1/ George Hendrie (surgeon); 2/ Robert Miller (wright); 3/ John McArthur (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by Board); 4/ Samuel Coleman (merchant); 5/ Dr John Baird (doctor); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ David Pattison (merchant. No votes cast – appointed by Board); 8/ Robert Patterson (merchant); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by Board); 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ Thomas Johnston (grocer. No votes cast – appointed by Board); 12/ Duncan McDougal (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ Robert Stewart (spirit dealer, appointed by Board after refusal); 15/ Robert Walker (not stated); 16/ William Ure (tea merchant); 17/ Robert Ure (manufacturer. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by Board); 18/ William Gilmour (merchant); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ Robert Aitken (not stated); 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ John Robertson (manufacturer); 23/ William Gilfillan (not stated); 24/ Robert Tannahill (not stated. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by Board).* G.C.A., E1/1/13, 28 July 1823.
- Please note, the above minute lists Matthew Flemming (merchant), Commissioner for ward 3, John Hamilton (grocer), Commissioner for ward 11, and William Mitchell (jeweller), Commissioner for ward 14. However, all three declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 31 July 1823 and G.C.A., E1/1/13, 21 August 1823. The Commissioners listed above who

replaced them in their respective wards were also appointed on these dates – no elections were held.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1823 to 1824:

- Robert Patterson (merchant), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns – no reason given. William Ure (tea merchant), Commissioner for ward 16, and John Robertson (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 22, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. *Glasgow Herald*, 15 December 1823. They were replaced in their respective wards by John Smith (stationer), William Yuile (spirit dealer) and Allan Clarke (yarn merchant) respectively. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 22 December 1823.
- David Pattison (merchant), Commissioner for ward 7, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 17 June 1824.
- Robert Tannahill (not stated), Commissioner for ward 24, resigns, citing pressure of work as his resign. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 14 July 1824.

1824 General Election:

- 1/ George Hendrie (surgeon); 2/ *Robert Miller (wright, re-elected)*; 3/ John McArthur (not stated); 4/ Samuel Coleman (merchant); 5/ Dr John Baird (doctor); 6/ *James Lumsden junior (not stated, re-elected)*; 7/ *Mr Walker (not stated)*; 8/ John Smith (stationer); 9/ Hugh Love (merchant); 10/ *Thomas Neilson (not stated, re-elected)*; 11/ Thomas Johnston (grocer); 12/ *Joseph Nixon (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 13/ *James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected)*; 14/ *Robert Stewart (spirit dealer, re-elected - appointed by Board after successful candidate deemed ineligible)*; 15/ Robert Walker (not stated); 16/ *Peter Neilson (not stated)*; 17/ Peter Ure (manufacturer); 18/ William Gilmour (merchant); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ Robert Aitken (not stated); 21/ *William Peddie (not stated, re-elected)*; 22/ Allan Clarke (yarn merchant); 23/ Michael Gilfillan (not stated); 24/ *Hugh Robertson (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 26 July 1824.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1824 to 1825:

- Robert Ure (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 17, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 12 August 1824. Walter Graham (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/13, 26 August 1824.

- Thomas Johnston (grocer), Commissioner for ward 11, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 30 December 1824. Hamilton Miller (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 19 January 1825.
- Dr John Baird (doctor), Commissioner for ward 5, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 14 April 1825. Robert Abbey (druggist) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 27 April, 1825.
- Hugh Love (merchant), Commissioner for ward 9, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 2 June 1825.
- Robert Walker (not stated), Commissioner for ward 15, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 9 June 1825. Gavin Steel (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/14, 15 June 1825.

1825 General Election:

- 1/ George Hendrie (surgeon); 2/ Robert Miller (wright); 3/ John McArthur (not stated); 4/ *Samuel Coleman (merchant, re-elected)*; 5/ Robert Abbey (druggist); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ Gavin Steel (merchant); 8/ *John Smith (stationer, re-elected)*; 9/ *Graham Hogg (tailor)*; 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ Hamilton Miller (not stated); 12/ Joseph Nixon (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ Robert Stewart (spirit dealer); 15/ *James Christie (not stated)*; 16/ Peter Neilson (not stated); 17/ Walter Graham (not stated); 18/ *William Gilmour (merchant, re-elected)*; 19/ *James Dawson (ironsmith, re-elected)*; 20/ *Robert Aitken (not stated, re-elected)*; 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ *Allan Clarke (yarn merchant, re-elected)*; 23/ *Michael Gilfillan (not stated, re-elected)*; 24/ Hugh Robertson (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/14, 26 August 1825 and 27 August 1825.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1825 to 1826:

- Robert Miller (wright), Commissioner for ward 2, resigns – no reason given. Robert Stewart (spirit dealer), Commissioner for ward 14, and Michael Gilfillan (not stated), Commissioner for ward 23, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 6 July 1826.

1826 General Election:

- 1/ *George Hendrie (surgeon, re-elected)*; 2/ *John Thomson (reelmaker)*; 3/ *Walter McNee (manufacturer)*; 4/ Samuel Coleman (merchant); 5/ *Robert Abbey (druggist, re-elected)*; 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ *Dr Miller (doctor)*; 8/ John Smith (stationer); 9/ *Graham Hogg (tailor, re-elected)*; 10/ Thomas Neilson (not stated); 11/ *Hamilton Miller (not stated, re-elected)*; 12/ Joseph Nixon (not stated); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/

Hugh Wilson (engraver. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Peter Neilson (not stated); 17/ Archibald Whitelaw (manufacturer); 18/ William Gilmour (merchant); 19/ James Dawson (ironsmith); 20/ Robert Aitken (not stated); 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ Allan Clarke (yarn merchant); 23/ Duncan Turner (writer); 24/ William Craig (manufacturer). G.C.A., E1/1/15, 31 July 1826.

- Please note, the above minute lists Thomas Anderson (spirit dealer) Commissioner for ward 14. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 3 August 1826. Hugh Wilson replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 21 August 1826.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1826 to 1827:

- George Hendrie (surgeon), Commissioner for ward 1, and William Craig (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 24, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general elections. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 19 July 1827.
- James Dawson (ironsmith), Commissioner for ward 19, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place after annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 26 July 1827.

1827 General Election:

- *1/ William Forrest (grocer); 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler); 3/ Walter McNee (manufacturer); 4/ Samuel Coleman (merchant); 5/ Robert Abbey (druggist); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated, re-elected); 7/ Dr Miller (doctor); 8/ John Smith (stationer); 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ Alexander Miller (inkeeper); 11/ Alexander Miller (not stated); 12/ Robert Paterson (baker); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer, re-elected); 14/ Hugh Wilson (engraver, re-elected); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Peter Neilson (not stated, re-elected); 17/ Archibald Whitelaw (manufacturer); 18/ Walter Gilmour (merchant); 19/ Alexander Drysdale (grocer); 20/ Robert Aitken (not stated); 21/ William Peddie (not stated, re-elected); 22/ Allan Clarke (yarn merchant); 23/ Duncan Turner (writer); 24/ James Black (manufacturer). G.C.A., E1/1/15, 30 July 1827.*
- Please note, Alexander Drysdale, Commissioner for ward 19, was elected after the general election. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 13 August 1827.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1827 to 1828:

- John Smith (stationer), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns – elected to the Magistracy. Robert Aitken (not stated), Commissioner for ward 20, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 11

October 1827. William McTyer (leather merchant) and William Davidson (surgeon) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 22 October 1827.

- Robert Abbey (druggist), Commissioner for ward 5, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 17 July 1828.

1828 General Election:

- 1/ William Forrest (grocer); 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler); 3/ Walter McNee (manufacturer); 4/ *John Watson junior (manufacturer)*; 5/ *Robert Hood (cooper)*; 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ Doctor Miller (doctor); 8/ *John Smith youngest (bookseller)*; 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ Alexander Miller (innkeeper); 11/ Hamilton Miller (not stated); 12/ Robert Paterson (baker); 13/ James Hamilton (grocer); 14/ Hugh Wilson (engraver); 15/ *James Christie (not stated, re-elected)*; 16/ Peter Neilson (not stated); 17/ Archibald Whitelaw (manufacturer); 18/ *John Hart (grocer)*; 19/ *James Drysdale (grocer, re-elected)*; 20/ *William Davidson (surgeon, re-elected)*; 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ *William Lang (printer)*; 23/ *Patrick Lethem (manufacturer)*; 24/ James Black (manufacturer). G.C.A., E1/1/15, 28 July 1828.
- Please note, the above minute lists William McTyer (leather merchant) Commissioner for ward 8 and William Gilmour (merchant) Commissioner for ward 18. However, both declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 14 August 1828 and 11 September 1828. They were replaced in their respective wards on 20 October 1828 and 22 September 1828. G.C.A., E1/1/15, 20 October 1828 and 22 September 1828. Before John Smith's appointment, however, John Robertson (reel cabinetmaker) declined to be qualified for this post, despite being elected by the voters. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 9 October 1828.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1828 to 1829:

- James Hamilton (grocer), Commissioner for ward 13, Hugh Wilson (engraver), Commissioner for ward 14, and John Hart (grocer), Commissioner for ward 18, all resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 16 July 1829.

1829 General Election:

- 1/ *William Thomson (flesher)*; 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler); 3/ *Walter McNee (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 4/ John Watson junior (manufacturer); 5/ *Robert Hood (cooper, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ *Graham Hutchison (manufacturer)*; 8/ John Smith youngest (bookseller); 9/

Graham Hogg (tailor, re-elected); 10/ Alexander Miller (innkeeper); 11/ Hamilton Miller (not stated, re-elected); 12/ Robert Paterson (baker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ Robert Stewart (spirit merchant); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Peter Neilson (not stated); 17/ James Lockhart (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 18/ David Mathie (writer, changes his name to Fogo); 19/ James Drysdale (grocer); 20/ William Davidson (surgeon); 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Patrick Lethem (manufacturer); 24/ Patrick Black (manufacturer, re-elected); 25/ Captain Charles McArthur (not stated); 26/ James Hamilton (grocer). G.C.A., E1/1/16, 27 July 1829.

- Please note, the above minute does not list the commissioners for wards 25 and 26. They were appointed on 10 August 1829. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 10 August 1829.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1829 to 1830:

- Hamilton Miller (not stated), Commissioner for ward 11, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 4 March 1830. William Menzies (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 10 March 1830.
- James Lockhart (not stated), Commissioner for ward 17, and William Davidson (surgeon), Commissioner for ward 20, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 15 July 1830.

1830 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher); 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler, re-elected); 3/ Walter McNee (manufacturer); 4/ John Watson junior (manufacturer); 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated, re-elected); 7/ Graham Hutchison (manufacturer); 8/ John Smith youngest (bookseller); 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ William Duncan (innkeeper); 11/ William Menzies (not stated); 12/ Robert Paterson (baker, re-elected); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engraver, re-elected); 14/ Archibald Fullerton (bookseller); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Peter Neilson (not stated, re-elected); 17/ Alexander Allan (merchant, re-elected); 18/ David Fogo (writer); 19/ James Drysdale (grocer); 20/ James Moffat (merchant. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board); 21/ William Peddie (not stated, re-elected); 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Patrick Lethem (manufacturer); 24/ James Black (manufacturer); 25/ Captain Charles McArthur (not stated); 26/ James Hamilton (grocer); 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ William Provan (not stated); 29/ Benjamin Greig (not stated); 30/ John Douglas (not stated); 31/ William Craig (not stated); 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed 34/ Alexander Morris (not stated); 35/ Thomas Bain (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/16, 26 July 1830.
- Please note, the above minute does not lists the commissioners for wards 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 34. They were appointed on 27 August 1830. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 27 August 1830.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1830 to 1831:

- John Smith youngest (bookseller), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns – elected to the Magistracy. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 21 October 1830. Dougald McFee (merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/16, 25 October 1830.
- Peter Neilson (not stated), Commissioner for ward 16, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 10 March 1831. Mr Morgan (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 16 March 1831.
- Dougald McFee (merchant), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 5 May 1831.
- James Hamilton (grocer), Commissioner for ward 26, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 12 May 1831.
- Walter McNee (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 3, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 14 July 1831.

1831 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher); 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler); 3/ *Alexander Dewar (grocer)*; 4/ *Johnathan Watson junior (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ Graham Hutchison (manufacturer); 8/ *James McArthur (accountant)*; 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ William Duncan (innkeeper); 11/ William Menzies (not stated); 12/ Robert Paterson (baker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engraver); 14/ Archibald Fullerton (bookseller); 15/ *James Christie (not stated, re-elected)*; 16/ Mr Morgan (not stated); 17/ Alexander Allan (merchant); 18/ *David Fogo (writer, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 19/ *James Drysdale (grocer, re-elected)*; 20/ *James Moffat (merchant, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast, appointed by the Board)*; 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ *William Lang (printer, re-elected)*; 23/ *William Bankier (calender)*; 24/ James Black (manufacturer); 25/ Captain Charles McArthur (not stated); 26/ *Donald Rose (iron founder. No votes cast, appointed by the Board)*; 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ William Provan (not stated); 29/ Benjamin Greig (not stated); 30/ *John Douglas (not stated, re-elected)*; 31/ William Craig (not stated); 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Alexander Morris (not stated); 35/ *Thomas Bain (not stated, re-elected)*. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 25 July 1831.

- Please note, the above minute lists William Gray (jeweller) Commissioner for ward 26. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 28 July 1831. Donald rose replaced him on 5 September 1831. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 5 September 1831. Before Mr Rose's appointment, however, John Fulton (not stated) declined to be qualified for this post, despite being appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 11 August 1831.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1831 to 1832:

- Benjamin Craig (not stated), Commissioner for ward 29, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 24 November 1831. Lawrence Mackenzie (manufacturer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 6 December 1831.
- William Duncan (innkeeper), Commissioner for ward 10, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 28 May 1832.
- James Drysdale (grocer), Commissioner for ward 19, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 12 July.
- Mr Morgan (not stated), Commissioner for ward 16, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 12 July 1832.

1832 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher, re-elected); 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler); 3/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 4/ John Watson junior (manufacturer); 5/ Robert Hood (cooper, re-elected); 6/ James Lumsden junior (not stated); 7/ William Warren (teacher of drawing. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 8/ John McArthur (accountant); 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor, re-elected); 10/ Alexander Glen (vintner); 11/ William Menzies (not stated, re-elected); 12/ Robert Paterson (baker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engraver); 14/ Archibald Fullerton (bookseller); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Robert Flemming (spirit dealer); 17/ Robert Allan (merchant, re-elected); 18/ David Fogo (writer); 19/ John Spence (candlemaker); 20/ James Moffat (merchant); 21/ William Peddie (not stated); 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ William Bankier (calender); 24/ John Blackie (publisher); 25/ James Scott (manufacturer); 26/ David Rose (iron founder); 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ William Provan (not stated); 29/ Lawrence MacKenzie (manufacturer, re-elected); 30/ James Douglas (not stated); 31/ William Craig (not stated); 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Thomas Rennie (not stated); 35/ Thomas Bain (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/17, 30 July 1832.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1832 to 1833:

- David Fogo (writer), Commissioner for ward 18, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 2 August 1832. David Taylor (surgeon) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 3 September 1832. Before Mr Taylor's appointment, however, John King (manufacturer) declined to be qualified for this post, despite having being elected by voters. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 16 August 1832.
- William Peddie (not stated), Commissioner for ward 21, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 16 August 1832. James Anderson (baker) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 27 August 1832.
- John Watson junior (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 4, resigns to become Superintendent. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 24 January 1833. James Wallace (tea merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 5 February 1833.
- Alexander Allan (merchant), Commissioner for ward 17, and Donald Rose (iron founder), Commissioner for ward 26, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 18 July 1833.

1833 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher); 2/ *John Freeland (tallow chandler, re-elected)*; 3/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 4/ James Wallace (tea merchant); 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ *James Lumsden (not stated, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 7/ William Warren (teacher of drawing); 8/ John McArthur (accountant); 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ *Alexander Glen (vintner, re-elected)*; 11/ William Menzies (not stated); 12/ *Robert Paterson (baker, re-elected)*; 13/ *Hugh Wilson (engineer, re-elected)*; 14/ *Stephen Cotton (commercial lodgings keeper)*; 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ *Robert Flemming (spirit dealer, re-elected)*; 17/ *Peter Ingles (not stated)*; 18/ David Taylor (surgeon); 19/ John Spence (candlemaker); 20/ James Moffat (merchant); 21/ *James Anderson (baker, re-elected)*; 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ William Bankier (calender); 24/ John Blackie (publisher); 25/ James Scott (manufacturer); 26/ *William Bain (baker. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 27/ *John Watson (not stated, re-elected)*; 28/ *John Henry Morgan (commission merchant)*; 29/ Lawrence MacKenzie (manufacturer); 30/ James Douglas (not stated); 31/ *William Craig (not stated, re-elected)*; 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Thomas Rennie (not stated); 35/ Thomas Bain (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/17, 29 July 1833.
- Please note, the above minute lists James Steel (not stated) Commissioner for ward 10, William Lyon (coach proprietor) Commissioner for ward 14, William Gemmill (merchant)

Commissioner for ward 26 and William Provan (not stated) Commissioner for ward 28. However, all four declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/1, 1 August 1833 and 8 August 1833. The Commissioners listed above on 12 August 1833 and 23 September 1833 replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 12 August 1833 and 23 September 1833.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1833 to 1834:

- Resignation of William Menzies (not stated), Commissioner for ward 11 – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 15 August 1833. David Kelly (victualler) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 26 August 1833.
- Thomas Rennie (not stated), Commissioner for ward 34 and Thomas Bain (not stated), Commissioner for ward 35, both deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 3 October 1833. Alex Morrison (writer) and William Milroy (merchant) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 14 October 1833.
- Robert Paterson (baker), Commissioner for ward 12, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 14 November 1833. James Middleton (jeweller. No votes cast – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 25 November 1833.
- James Lumsden (not stated), Commissioner for ward 6, William Bankier (calender), Commissioner for ward 23 and William Craig (not stated), Commissioner for ward 31, all resign, having been elected to the Town Council. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 14 November 1833. Alexander Duncanson (baker), Thomas Samuel (merchant) and John Galbraith (not stated) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/17, 25 November 1833. Before Alexander Duncanson's appointment, however, two declined to be qualified despite being elected by the voters: Archibald McLellan (not stated) and John Sharp (accountant). G.C.A., E1/1/17, 12 December 1833 and 26 December 1833. The exact date of Mr Duncanson's appointment is unknown.
- John McArthur (accountant), Commissioner for ward 8, moves from ward. He is to resign at annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 5 June 1834. Lawrence Mackenzie (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 29, deceased. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 17 July 1834.

1834 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher); 2/ John Freeland (tallow chandler); 3/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 4/ *James Wallace (tea merchant, re-elected)*; 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ Alexander Duncanson (baker); 7/ William Warren (teacher of drawing); 8/ *John Marks (hatter)*; 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ Alexander Glen (vintner); 11/ David Kelly

(victualler); 12/ James Middleton (jeweller); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ Stephen Cotton (commercial lodgings keeper); 15/ *James Christie (not stated, re-elected)*; 16/ Robert Flemming (spirit dealer); 17/ Peter Ingles (not stated); 18/ *David Taylor (not stated, re-elected)*; 19/ *John Spence (candlemaker, re-elected)*; 20/ *James Moffat (merchant. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 21/ James Anderson (baker); 22/ *Robert Brown (grocer)*; 23/ *Henry Taylor (grain merchant)*; 24/ John Blackie (publisher); 25/ James Scott (manufacturer); 26/ *William Bain (baker, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ John Henry Morgan (commission merchant); 29/ *John McArthur (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 30/ *James Douglas (not stated, re-elected)*; 31/ John Galbraith (not stated); 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Alex Morrison (writer); 35/ *William Milroy (merchant, re-elected)*. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 28 July 1834.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1834 to 1835:

- Alexander Duncanson (baker), Commissioner for ward 6, resigns, citing change in his qualifications as his reason. John Henry Morgan (commission merchant), Commissioner for ward 28, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 31 July 1834. John Henry Morgan (commission merchant) and John Boyle Gray (writer. No votes cast – appointed by the Board) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 11 August 1834.
- James Scott (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 25, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 9 October 1834. Archibald McCallum (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 27 October 1834.
- James Wallace (tea merchant), Commissioner for ward 4, resigns, having been elected to the Town Council. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 6 November 1834. John Burnet (writer) replaced him. Mr Burnet appointed by the Board, following claim that he should have been appointed at last election due to validity of Mr Wallace's votes (no election was held). G.C.A., E1/1/18, 3 April 1835.
- John Freeland (tallow chandler), Commissioner for ward 2, deceased. John Henry Morgan (commission merchant), Commissioner for ward 6, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. John Spence (candlemaker), Commissioner for ward 19, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 16 January 1835. William Cochran (calenderer), Edward White (not stated. No votes cast, appointed by Board) and Peter McAra (grocer) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 26 January 1835 and 30 January 1835.
- Thomas Crawford (calenderer), Commissioner for ward 3, John Marks (hatter), Commissioner for ward 8, David Kelly (victualler), Commissioner for ward 11, James

Middleton (jeweller), Commissioner for ward 12 and Peter Ingles (not stated), Commissioner for ward 17, all resign, citing removal from ward as their reason (Marks and Ingles having moved to the country). By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 5 June 1835.

1835 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher, re-elected); 2/ William Cochran (calanderer); 3/ William McAdam (merchant); 4/ John Burnet (writer); 5/ Robert Hood (cooper, re-elected); 6/ Edward White (not stated); 7/ John Birkmyre (manufacturer); 8/ Robert Weir (stationer); 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor, re-elected); 10/ Alexander Glen (vintner); 11/ Robert Fulton (vitualler); 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ Stephen Cotton (commercial lodgings keeper); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Robert Flemming (spirit dealer); 17/ Charles Bryson (hardware merchant); 18/ David Taylor (not stated); 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ James Moffat (merchant); 21/ James Anderson (baker); 22/ Robert Brown (grocer); 23/ Henry Tailor (grain merchant); 24/ William Strang (manufacturer); 25/ Captain Charles McArthur (not stated); 26/ William Bain (baker); 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ John Boyle Gray (writer); 29/ John McArthur (not stated, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 30/ James Douglas (not stated); 31/ John Galbraith (not stated); 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 35/ William Milroy (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/18, 27 July 1835.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1835 to 1836:

- Robert Brown (grocer), Commissioner for ward 22, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 31 July 1835. William Lang (printer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 10 August 1835.

1836 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher); 2/ William Cochran (calanderer, re-elected); 3/ William McAdam (merchant); 4/ John Burnet (writer); 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ Edward White (not stated, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 7/ John Birkmyre (manufacturer); 8/ Robert Weir (stationer); 9/ Graham Hogg (tailor); 10/ Alexander Glen (vintner, re-elected); 11/ Robert Fulton (vitualler); 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer, re-elected); 14/ Stephen Cotton (commercial lodgings keeper, re-elected); 15/ James Christie (not stated); 16/ Robert Flemming (spirit dealer, re-elected); 17/ Charles Bryson (hardware

merchant); 18/ David Taylor (not stated); 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ James Moffat (merchant); 21/ *James Anderson (baker, re-elected)*; 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Henry Tailor (grain merchant); 24/ William Strang (manufacturer); 25/ Captain Charles McArthur (not stated); 26/ William Bain (baker); 27/ *John Watson (not stated, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 28/ *John Aitken (surgeon)*; 29/ John McArthur (not stated); 30/ James Douglas (not stated); 31/ *James McArthur (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 35/ William Milroy (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/18, 25 July 1836.

- Please note, the above minute lists James Brash (bookseller) Commissioner for ward 28. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 29 July 1836. Mr Aitken replaced him on 19 September 1836. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 19 September 1836. Before Mr Aitken's appointment, however, Andrew Monarch (cotton yarn merchant) declined to be qualified, despite being appointed by the Board as Commissioner, following a by-election where no votes were cast. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 11 August 1836.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1836 to 1837:

- Robert Flemming (spirit dealer), Commissioner for ward 16, and Captain Charles McArthur (not stated), Commissioner for ward 25, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 15 September 1836. William Lyon (surgeon) and Archibald McCallum (bookseller) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 21 November 1836 and 30 May 1837. (The appointment of a new Commissioner for ward 25 was delayed pending confirmation from Captain McArthur that he had removed from ward. As it turned out, he had moved to Limerick.)
- James Christie (not stated), Commissioner for ward 15, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 22 December 1836. James Bryce (agent. No votes cast – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 5 January 1837.
- Graham Hogg (tailor), Commissioner for ward 9, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 18 May 1837. John Lemmon (Three Lun Tavern) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 30 May 1837.

1837 General Election:

- 1/ William Thomson (flesher); 2/ William Cochran (calenderer); 3/ William McAdam (merchant); 4/ *Allan Clarke (cotton yarn merchant)*; 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ Edward White (not stated); 7/ John Birkmyre (manufacturer); 8/ *John Forrester (baker)*; 9/ John Lemmon (Three Lun Tavern); 10/ Alexander Glen (vintner); 11/ Robert Fulton (victualler); 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ Stephen Cotton (commercial lodgings keeper); 15/ *Robert Scott (baker)*; 16/ William Lyon (surgeon); 17/

Charles Bryson (hardware merchant); 18/ *David Taylor (not stated, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 19/ *Peter McAra (grocer, re-elected)*; 20/ *John McGrigor (tobacconist)*; 21/ James Anderson (baker); 22/ *William Lang (printer, re-elected)*; 23/ *Robert Goodwin (house factor)*; 24/ William Strang (manufacturer); 25/ Archibald McCallum (bookseller); 26/ *James Jackson (tinplate worker)*; 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ John Aitken (surgeon); 29/ John McArthur (not stated); 30/ *Thomas Waddell (manufacturer. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 31/ James McArthur (not stated); 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 35/ *William Milroy (merchant, re-elected)*. G.C.A., E1/1/18, 31 July 1837.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1837 to 1838:

- James Anderson (baker), Commissioner for ward 21, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 5 October 1837. William Wotherspoon (baker) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 16 October 1837.
- William Thomson (flesher), Commissioner for ward 1, and James McArthur (not stated), Commissioner for ward 31, both resign – no reason given. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 19 April 1838.
- Edward White (not stated), Commissioner for ward 6, and William Lyon (surgeon), Commissioner for ward 16, both resign – no reason given. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 19 July 1838.

1838 General Election:

- 1/ *James Beith (umbrella maker)*; 2/ William Cochran (calenderer); 3/ *James Anderson junior (baker)*; 4/ Allan Clarke (cotton yarn merchant); 5/ *Robert Hood (cooper, re-elected)*; 6/ *Robert Taylor (builder)*; 7/ *David Chisolm (carver and gilder)*; 8/ John Forrester (baker); 9/ *George Ross (shoemaker)*; 10/ Alexander Glen (vintner); 11/ *Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker)*; 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ Stephen Cotton (commercial lodgings keeper); 15/ Robert Scott (baker); 16/ *James Cairns (tailor)*; 17/ *Alexander Kellar (silk merchant)*; 18/ *James Alexander (irongmonger)*; 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ John McGrigor (tobacconist); 21/ William Wotherspoon (baker); 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Robert Goodwin (house factor); 24/ *William Strang (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 25/ *George Grant junior (merchant)*; 26/ James Jackson (tinplate worker); 27/ John Watson (not stated); 28/ John Aitken (surgeon); 29/ *John McArthur (not stated, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 30/ Thomas Waddell (manufacturer); 31/ *Peter Cumming (woolen linen merchant)*; 32/ not assessed; 33/ not assessed; 34/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 35/ William Milroy (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/19, 30 July 1838.

- Please note, the above minute lists no Commissioner for ward 29. The Board appointed Mr McArthur. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 2 August 1838.

Resignation and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1838 to 1839:

- John McArthur (not stated), Commissioner for ward 29, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason (likely to be royalty). Peter Cumming (woolen linen merchant), Commissioner for ward 31, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 20 December 1838. Thomas Leadbetter (tea merchant) and George Green (druggist) replaced them in their respective wards. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 31 December 1838.
- Thomas Crawford (calenderer), Commissioner for ward 34, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 17 January 1839.
- William Wotherspoon (baker), Commissioner for ward 21, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 2 May 1839. By-election to take place with annual general election.
- William Cochran (calenderer), Commissioner for ward 2, Robert Goodwin (house factor), Commissioner for ward 23, and James Jackson (tinplate worker), Commissioner for ward 26, all removed from ward. They are to continue as Commissioners until annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 6 June 1839.
- William Strang (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 24, and John McGrigor (tobacconist), Commissioner for ward 20, both resign – no reason given. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 11 July 1839.
- Allan Clarke (cotton yarn merchant), Commissioner for ward 4, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 18 July 1839.

1839 General Election:

- 1/ James Beith (umbrella maker); 2/ *John McKenzie (confectioner)*; 3/ James Anderson junior (baker); 4/ *John Burnet (writer)*; 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ *Robert Taylor (not stated, re-elected)*; 7/ David Chisolm (carver and gilder); 8/ John Forrester (baker); 9/ George Ross (shoemaker); 10/ *Patrick Black (not stated in this minute, but later classified as spirit dealer)*; 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker); 12/ *Thomas Beggs (watchmaker, re-elected)*; 13/ *Hugh Wilson (engineer, re-elected)*; 14/ *Thomas McGuffrie (builder)*; 15/ Robert Scott (baker); 16/ *James Cairns (tailor, re-elected)*; 17/ Alexander Kellar (silk merchant); 18/ James Alexander (ironmonger); 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ *William Stewart (not stated in this minute, but later classified as cloth merchant)*; 21/ *David Mickel (tavern. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Robert Gutt (draper); 24/ *John Rennie (glazier)*; 25/ George Grant junior (merchant); 26/ *John*

Stewart (innkeeper); 27/ George Cairns (grain merchant); 28/ David Miller (wright) 29/ Thomas Leadbetter (tea merchant); 30/ Thomas Waddell (manufacturer); 31/ George Green (druggist, re-elected); 32/ Andrew Grop (writer); 33/ George Sim (candlemaker. No votes cast – appointed by the Board); 34/ James Dick (builder); 35/ William Milroy (merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/19, 29 July 1839.

- Please note, the above minute lists Alexander Gemmill (writer) Commissioner for ward 4. However, John Burnet (writer) replaced him on appeal. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 22 August 1839.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1839 to 1840:

- Andrew Grop (writer), Commissioner for ward 32, resigns, after being appointed Sheriff substitute of Perthshire, where he is to reside. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 10 October 1839. Robert Lindsay (not stated in this minute, but later given as builder) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 21 October 1839.
- Thomas Leadbetter (tea merchant), Commissioner for ward 29, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason (to continue until annual general election, having stayed within the Royalty). By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 25 June 1840.

1840 General Election:

- 1/ James Beith (umbrella maker); 2/ John McKenzie (confectioner); 3/ James Anderson junior (baker); 4/ *John Burnet (writer, re-elected)*; 5/ Robert Hood (cooper); 6/ Robert Taylor (not stated); 7/ David Chisolm (carver and gilder); 8/ *John Forrester (baker, re-elected)*; 9/ George Ross (shoemaker); 10/ Patrick Black (spirit dealer); 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker); 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ Thomas McGuffrie (builder); 15/ *Robert Scott (baker, re-elected)*; 16/ James Cairns (tailor); 17/ Alexander Kellar (silk merchant); 18/ *John Dougal (fish hook maker)*; 19/ *Peter McAra (grocer, re-elected)*; 20/ *William Stewart (cloth merchant, re-elected)*; 21/ David Mickel (tavern); 22/ *William Lang (printer, re-elected)*; 23/ *Robert Gutt (silk merchant, re-elected)*; 24/ John Rennie (glazier); 25/ George Grant junior (merchant); 26/ *John Stewart (innkeeper, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 27/ George Cairns (grain merchant); 28/ David Miller (wright); 29/ *William Auchineloss (surgeon)*; 30/ *Thomas Leadbetter (merchant)*; 31/ George Green (druggist); 32/ Robert Lindsay (builder); 33/ George Sim (candlemaker); 34/ James Dick (builder); 35/ *David Latta (not stated. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 27 July 1840.

- Please note, the above minute lists John Risk (manufacturer) Commissioner for ward 35. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 30 July 1840. Mr Latta replaced him on 10 August 1840. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 10 August 1840.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1840 to 1841:

- Robert Taylor (not stated), Commissioner for ward 6, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 17 September 1840. William Yuile (wine merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 15 October 1840.
- James Dick (builder), Commissioner for ward 34, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 24 September 1840. Robert Gutt, former Commissioner for ward 23, (silk merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 15 October 1840.
- Robert Gutt (silk merchant), Commissioner for ward 23, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 15 October 1840. William Anderson (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 24 December 1840. Please note, the minute of 29 October 1840 listed Moses Lennie (not stated) as Commissioner. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 29 October 1840. However, Mr Anderson was elected following an appeal to the Sheriff.
- Thomas Leadbetter (merchant), Commissioner for ward 30, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 19 November 1840. Robert Muir (writer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 4 January 1841. Before Mr Muir's appointment, however, William McLean junior (manufacturer) declined to be qualified for this position, despite being appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 24 December 1840.
- Thomas McGuffrie (builder), Commissioner for ward 14, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 10 December 1840. James Smellie (chemist and druggist) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 23 December 1840.
- John Dougal (fish hook maker), Commissioner for ward 18, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 24 December 1840. John Craig (slater) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 4 January 1841.
- George Grant junior (merchant), Commissioner for ward 25, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 21 January 1841. Charles McArthur (not stated) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/19, 1 February 1841.
- William Anderson (not stated), Commissioner for ward 23, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 29 April 1841. Charles Johnston (plasterer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 12 May 1841.
- George Green (druggist), Commissioner for ward 31, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 8 July 1841.

1841 General Election:

- 1/ *William Watson (rag and paper merchant)*; 2/ John McKenzie (confectioner); 3/ *James Anderson junior (baker, re-elected)*; 4/ John Burnet (writer); 5/ *James Beith (umbrella maker)*; 6/ William Yuile (wine merchant); 7/ *Mr Clarke (surgeon)*; 8/ John Forrester (baker); 9/ *George Ross (shoemaker, re-elected)*; 10/ Patrick Black (spirit dealer); 11/ *Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker, re-elected)*; 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ James Smellie (chemist and druggist); 15/ Robert Scott (baker); 16/ James Cairns (tailor); 17/ *Alexander Kellar (silk merchant, re-elected)*; 18/ John Craig (slater); 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ William Stewart (cloth merchant); 21/ David Mickel (tavern); 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Charles Johnston (plasterer); 24/ *John Rennie (glazier, re-elected)*; 25/ *John Coulter (not stated)*; 26/ John Stewart (innkeeper); 27/ George Cairns (grain merchant); 28/ David Miller (wright); 29/ *Andrew Paton (drysalter. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 30/ Robert Muir (writer); 31/ *James Monteith (writer)*; 32/ Robert Lindsay (builder); 33/ George Sim (candlemaker); 34/ *Donald McIntyre (measurer. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 35/ David Latta (not stated). G.C.A., E1/1/20, 26 July 1841.
- Please note, the above minute lists Alexander Allan (ham curer) Commissioner for ward 31. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 29 July 1841. Mr Monteith (writer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 9 August 1841.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1841 to 1842:

- James Smellie (chemist and druggist), Commissioner for ward 14, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 22 October 1841. William Bain (spirit merchant) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 1 November 1841.
- David Latta (not stated), Commissioner for ward 35, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 27 January 1842. Thomas Russell (smith) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 21 March 1842. Before Mr Russell's appointment, however, the Board appointed John Brownlie (shoemaker) after the electorate had failed to cast any votes. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 21 February 1842. However, he was later deemed ineligible, as he did not live in the ward. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 24 March 1842.
- James Monteith (writer), Commissioner for ward 31, resigns, 'disapproving...of the proceedings of the Commissioners of Police regarding the Police Bill proposed to be brought into Parliament'. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 21 February 1842. Matthew Dick (candlemaker) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 25 April 1842. Before Mr Dick's appointment, however, James

Lumsden senior (stationer) was appointed by the Board, but declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 31 March 1842.

- Donald McIntyre (measurer), Commissioner for ward 34, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 24 March 1842. Thomas Crawford (calenderer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 25 April 1842.
- John Burnet (writer), Commissioner for ward 4, resigns to become principal clerk. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 16 June 1842.
- Alexander Kellar (silk merchant), Commissioner for 17, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 14 July 1842.

1842 General Election:

- 1/ William Watson (rag and paper merchant); 2/ *John McKenzie (confectioner, re-elected)*; 3/ James Anderson junior (baker); 4/ *John Tait (baker)*; 5/ James Beith (umbrella maker); 6/ *William Yuile (wine merchant, re-elected)*; 7/ Mr Clarke (surgeon); 8/ John Forrester (baker); 9/ George Ross (shoemaker); 10/ *Patrick Black (spirit dealer, re-elected)*; 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker); 12/ *Thomas Beggs (watchmaker. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 13/ *Hugh Wilson (engineer, re-elected)*; 14/ *William Bain (spirit merchant, re-elected)*; 15/ Robert Scott (baker); 16/ *James Cairns (tailor, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 17/ *John O'Neil (tailor)*; 18/ *David Mickel (tanner)*; 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ William Stewart (cloth merchant); 21/ David Mickel (tavern); 22/ William Lang (printer); 23/ Charles Johnston (plasterer); 24/ John Rennie (glazier); 25/ John Coulter (not stated); 26/ John Stewart (innkeeper); 27/ *Alexander McDougal (spirit dealer)*; 28/ *John Aitken (surgeon. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 29/ Andrew Paton (drysalter); 30/ Robert Muir (writer); 31/ *Matthew Dick (candlemaker, re-elected)*; 32/ *Robert Lindsay (builder, re-elected)*; 33/ *John Craig (victualler. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 34/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 35/ Thomas Russell (smith); G.C.A., E1/1/20, 25 July 1842.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1842 to 1843:

- Robert Muir (writer), Commissioner for ward 30, deceased. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 10 November 1842. John Douglas (writer) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 29 November 1842.
- Matthew Dick (candlemaker), Commissioner for ward 31, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 24 November 1842. John Hamilton (tobacconist. No votes cast – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/20, 19 December 1842.

- David Mickel (tavern), Commissioner for ward 21, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A. E1/1/20, 25 May 1843.
- William Stewart (cloth merchant), Commissioner for ward 20, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason (to continue until annual general election). G.C.A., E1/1/20, 8 June 1843.

1843 General Election:

- 1/ William Watson (rag and paper merchant); 2/ John McKenzie (confectioner); 3/ James Anderson junior (baker); 4/ *John Tait (baker, re-elected)*; 5/ James Beith (umbrella maker); 6/ William Yuile (wine merchant); 7/ Mr Clarke (surgeon); 8/ *John Forrester (baker, re-elected)*; 9/ George Ross (shoemaker); 10/ Patrick Black (spirit dealer); 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker); 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Hugh Wilson (engineer); 14/ William Bain (spirit merchant); 15/ *James Minto (builder)*; 16/ James Cairns (tailor); 17/ John O'Neil (tailor); 18/ *John Craig (stables)*; 19/ *Peter McAra (grocer, re-elected)*; 20/ *David Gilmour (baker)*; 21/ *Robert McFarlane (iron monger)*; 22/ *David McMichael senior (manufacturer)*; 23/ *Charles Johnston (plasterer, re-elected)*; 24/ John Rennie (glazier); 25/ John Coulter (not stated); 26/ *John Stewart (vintner, re-elected)*; 27/ Alexander McDougal (spirit dealer); 28/ John Aitken (surgeon); 29/ Andrew Paton (drysalter); 30/ *William Ross (spirit dealer)*; 31/ *James Wilson (surgeon)*; 32/ Robert Lindsay (builder); 33/ John Craig (victualler); 34/ Thomas Crawford (calenderer); 35/ *Thomas Russell (smith, re-elected)*. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 31 July 1843.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1843 to 1844:

- William Yuile (wine merchant), Commissioner for ward 6, resigns due to 35th section of 1843 Glasgow Police Act, which forbid the election of retailers of spirits and beers, unless they were licensed wholesaler dealers with a house valued at L.20 or upwards rental. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 21 September 1843. David Yuile (wine and spirit merchant. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 19 October 1843.
- John Stewart (vintner), Commissioner for ward 26, resigns due to 35th section of the 1843 Glasgow Police Act. John Robertson (toy merchant. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 9 November 1843.
- Thomas Crawford (calanderer), Commissioner for 34, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 9 November 1843. Donald McIntyre (measurer. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 27 November 1843. Before Mr McIntyre's appointment, however, both John Burnet (clerk to Commissioners of Police) and Robert

Bryson (cotton broker) declined to be qualified, despite being appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 23 November 1843 and 27 November 1843.

- John Forrester (baker), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns due to 35th section of the Glasgow Police Act. He possessed a spirit and beer retailer's licence when elected, although not any more. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 16 November 1843. The Board re-appoint him on 23 November 1843. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 23 November 1843.
- Alexander McDougal (spirit dealer), Commissioner for ward 27, resigns due to 35th section of the 1843 Glasgow Police Act. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 16 November 1843. Board re-appoint him until annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 23 November 1843.
- John Craig (victualler), Commissioner for ward 33, resigns due to 35th clause of the 1843 Glasgow Police Act. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 23 November 1843. Kenny Bruce (house factor. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 22 December 1843.
- Patrick Black (spirit dealer), Commissioner for ward 10, and William Bain (spirit merchant), Commissioner for ward 14, both resign due to 35th section of the 1843 Glasgow Police Act. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 27 November 1843. Both were re-appointed by the Board until annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 27 November 1843.
- John Forrester (baker), Commissioner for ward 8, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 14 December 1843. Angus McDonald (not stated. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 28 December 1843. Before Mr Donald's appointment, however, Walter McNee (manufacturer) declined to be qualified, despite being appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 21 December 1843.
- Robert McFarlane (ironmonger), Commissioner for ward 21, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 16 May 1841. David Meikle (skinner. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 23 May 1844.
- John McKenzie (confectioner), Commissioner for ward 2, resigns, citing removal from ward as his reason. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 4 July 1844.
- John Coulter (not stated), Commissioner for ward 25, resigns to retire. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 4 July 1844.

1844 General Election:

- *1/ William Pattison (bookseller); 2/ William Duncan (cheese merchant); 3/ James Anderson junior (baker, re-elected); 4/ John Tait (baker); 5/ William Cochran (calanderer); 6/ David Yuile (commissioner agent, re-elected); 7/ William Anderson (accountant); 8/ John Forrester (baker, re-elected); 9/ George Ross (shoemaker, re-elected); 10/ Stewart Mitchell*

(tobacconist); 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker, re-elected); 12/ Thomas Beggs (watchmaker); 13/ Robert McTear (auctioneer); 14/ John Robertson (merchant); 15/ James Minto (builder); 16/ James Cairns (tailor); 17/ John O'Neil (tailor, re-elected); 18/ John Craig (stables); 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ David Gilmour (baker); 21/ Porteous Sutherland (singer); 22/ David McMichael senior (manufacturer); 23/ Charles Johnston (plasterer); 24/ Robert Miller (clothier); 25/ John Rennie (glazier); 26/ John Coulter (tile maker); 27/ Alexander McDougal (portioner, re-elected); 28/ John Aitken (surgeon); 29/ Andrew Paton (drysalter, re-elected); 30/ William Ross (spirit dealer); 31/ James Wilson (surgeon); 32/ Robert Lindsay (builder); 33/ Kenny Bruce (house factor); 34/ Donald McIntyre (not stated); 35/ Thomas Russell (smith); 36/ James Fraser Galbraith (writer). G.C.A., E1/1/21, 29 July 1844.

- Please note, the above minute lists William York (builder) Commissioner for ward 34. However, after protest about Mr York's election, Mr McIntyre was appointed in his place. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 5 September 1844.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1844 to 1845:

- William Ross (spirit dealer), Commissioner for ward 30, disqualified. G.C.A., E1/1/21, 17 February 1845. Hugh McPherson (merchant and clothier) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 10 March 1845.
- James Wilson (surgeon), Commissioner for ward 31, deceased. Donald McIntyre (not stated), Commissioner for ward 34 and James Fraser Galbraith (writer), Commissioner for ward 36, both resign – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 6 March 1845. Robert Rankin (flesher), William York (builder) and William Martin (manufacturer) replaced them in their respective wards. No elections held – Board appointed them. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 10 March 1845, 27 March 1845 and 17 April 1845. Before Robert Rankin's election, however, both James Rankin (flesher) and Cornelius Brown (manufacturer) declined to be qualified, despite having been appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 20 March 1845 and 4 April 1845. Before William York's election, William McLeod (manufacturer) declined to be qualified, despite having been appointed by the Board. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 20 March 1845.
- Robert Miller (clothier), Commissioner for ward 24, resigns, citing removal to the country from ward. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 8 May 1845. By-election to take place with annual general election, but only after John Blane (warehouseman) declined to be qualified despite being elected by the voters. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 22 May 1845.
- Alexander McDougal (portioner), Commissioner for ward 27, resigns – no reason given. By-election to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 12 June 1845.

- William York (builder), Commissioner for ward 34, and William Martin (manufacturer), Commissioner for ward 36, both resign (reason unclear; but both resignation and removal mentioned, as well as disqualification). By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 3 July 1845.

1845 General Election:

- 1/ William Pattison (bookseller); 2/ *William Duncan (cheese merchant, re-elected)*; 3/ James Anderson junior (baker); 4/ John Tait (baker); 5/ William Cochran (calanderer); 6/ *David Yuile (commissioner agent, re-elected)*; 7/ William Anderson (accountant); 8/ John Forrester (baker); 9/ George Ross (shoemaker); 10/ *Stewart Mitchell (tobacconist, re-elected)*; 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker); 12/ *Hugh Wilson (engraver)*; 13/ *Robert McTear (auctioneer, re-elected)*; 14/ John Robertson (merchant); 15/ James Minto (builder); 16/ *Alexander Kellar (portioner)*; 17/ John O'Neil (tailor); 18/ John Craig (stables); 19/ Peter McAra (grocer); 20/ David Gilmour (baker); 21/ *Porteous Sutherland (singer, re-elected)*; 22/ David McMichael senior (manufacturer); 23/ Charles Johnston (plasterer); 24/ *James Wilson (joiner)*; 25/ John Rennie (glazier); 26/ John Coulter (tile maker); 27/ *David Penman (marble cutter. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 28/ *Captain James McArthur (not stated)*; 29/ Andrew Paton (drysalter); 30/ Hugh McPherson (merchant and clothier); 31/ *Robert Rankine (flesher, re-elected. No votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 32/ *Donald Rose (merchant)*; 33/ Kenny Bruce (house factor); 34/ *William York (builder, re-elected)*; 35/ Thomas Russell (smith); 36/ *James Steel (wine and spirit merchant. No election held – appointed by the Board)*. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 28 July 1845.
- Please note, the above minute lists William Martin (manufacturer) Commissioner for ward 36. However, he declined to be qualified. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 31 July 1845. James Steel replaced him on 7 August 1845. No election held – appointed by Board. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 7 August 1845.

Resignations and By-elections between Annual General Elections, 1845 to 1846:

- John Craig (stables), Commissioner for ward 18, resigns – no reason given. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 29 January 1846. James Moir (tea dealer; will be classified as merchant. No election held – appointed by the Board) replaced him. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 5 February 1846.
- Captain James McArthur (not stated), Commissioner for ward 28, and Andrew Paton (drysalter), Commissioner for ward 29, both resign, citing removal from ward as their reason. By-elections to take place with annual general election. G.C.A., E1/1/22, 27 July 1846.

1846 Annual General Election:

- 1/ William Pattison (bookseller); 2/ William Duncan (cheese merchant); 3/ James Anderson junior (baker); 4/ *Andrew Paton (merchant)*; 5/ William Cochran (calanderer); 6/ David Yuile (commissioner agent); 7/ William Anderson (accountant); 8/ *John Forrester (baker, re-elected)*; 9/ George Ross (shoemaker); 10/ Stewart Mitchell (tobacconist); 11/ Patrick Scanlin (pawnbroker); 12/ Hugh Wilson (engraver); 13/ Robert McTear (auctioneer); 14/ *Captain Charles McArthur (not stated)*; 15/ *William Bain (spirit merchant)*; 16/ Alexander Kellar (portioner); 17/ John O'Neil (tailor); 18/ *James Moir (tea dealer, re-elected)*; 19/ *Peter McAra (grocer, re-elected)*; 20/ *David Gilmour (portioner, re-elected)*; 21/ Porteous Sutherland (singer); 22/ *David McMichael senior (manufacturer, re-elected)*; 23/ *Patrick Rattray (builder)*; 24/ James Wilson (joiner); 25/ John Rennie (glazier); 26/ John Coulter (tile maker); 27/ David Penman (marble cutter); 28/ *Dr John Aitken (doctor)*; 29/ *James Gardner (perfumer)*; 30/ *Hugh McPherson (merchant and clothier, re-elected. Not sufficient votes cast – appointed by the Board)*; 31/ Robert Rankine (flesher); 32/ Donald Rose (merchant); 33/ *Thomas McIntosh (painter)*; 34/ William York (builder); 35/ *Hugh Blyth (collector)*; 36/ James Steel (wine and spirit merchant). G.C.A., E1/1/22, 27 July 1846.

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'An act for amending, remaking more effectual, and continuing parts of an act of the thirty-ninth and fortieth years of His present Majesty, for extending the Royalty of the City of Glasgow over certain adjacent lands, for paving, lighting and cleansing the streets, and other purposes in the said act mentioned, 47 George III, cap. 29, 1807.' G.U.L., Special Collections, Mu.2-g.44.

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