The Total Neglect of Power

E.H. Carr's Classical Realism and American Power in the Northern Persian Gulf, 1943 – 2003

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This thesis is the result of the author's original research. It has been composed by the author and has not been previously submitted for examination which has led to the award of a degree.

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Abstract

In 2003 the United States, in conjunction with a coalition of the willing, invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein. This use of force to reshape order, in other words militarism, is often seen as a unique event, which was generated by the particular circumstances of 9/11, the Presidency of George W. Bush and the ideological outlook of his principal advisers. In reality, however, the use of force in Iraq is one case in a broader pattern of American militarism in the northern Gulf countries of Iraq and Iran. This research is concerned with understanding the factors that have generated American militarism in this region. The aim is to consider whether the policies of the George W. Bush administration, in particular the Iraq War, are consistent with the wider history of America's regional policy. Engaging with recent developments in the realist intellectual tradition, this thesis employs the classical realist perspective of E.H. Carr to enhance neoclassical realist explanations for America's actions. A detailed analysis of primary documents, in combination with the use of secondary sources for current eras, is employed to illustrate how episodes of nationalist, statist and Islamic revolution have contoured American foreign policy. The analysis illustrates the historical importance that the United States has attached to the balance of power in the northern Gulf. The use of force has been employed when revolutionary actors and forces, which the United States has been unable to influence through alternative means, threatened to or did disruptthe balance of power and challenge America's regional interests. From this perspective, this thesis suggests that the war in Iraq was not as unrealistic as some realists contend; rather at its core, the war was concerned with balancing against Iran. The research concludes, therefore, thatalthough the scope of Bush's militarism may have been unique, its causes seem entirely consistent with America's historic balance of power policy in the northern Gulf.

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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

9/11	Terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 11 September 2001
ACC	Arab Co-operation Council
AID	Agency for International Development
AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CENTCOM	Central Command
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CCC	Commodity Credit Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defence
DOS	Department of State
EXIM	Export-Import Bank
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GCC	Gulf Co-operation Council
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICP	Iraq Communist Party
ILA	Iraq Liberation Act
ILSA	Iran Libya Sanctions Act
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp
IPC	Iraq Petroleum Company
MAAG	Military Advisory and Assistance Group
MAP	Military Assistance Programme
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

NSA	National Security Adviser
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NSD	National Security Directive
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSDM	National Security Study Memorandum
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Co-operation
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
SAVAK	Iranian Secret Police
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
US	United States
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

1 Introduction

On 19 March 2003 American President, George W. Bush addressed the United States (US) nation and announced the commencement of the Iraq War[1]. It was the second war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Unlike the Persian Gulf War, however, which was seen as a war of necessity, the second has been characterised as a war of choice (Haass, 2006: 4 and 2009; Brzezinski, 2007; Ryan, 2009: 4). That is, the Bush administration's policy, whilst couched in the liberal internationalist tradition, reflected "a particularly [militarised] approach to democracy promotion" (Quinn, 2007: 525). Consequently, the Iraq War is argued to be symbolic of the George W. Bush administration's propensity to "use force to reshape the international order" (Bacevich, 2002). As Ikenberry (2011: 254 – 5) notes, the Bush revolution in US foreign policy resulted in the US standing "above the global order and [using] its [unrivalled] power to enforce security and order". The "invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003…was the definitive expression of this strategic orientation". This thesis investigates why the US employed militarism – the use of force to reshape political order – in Iraq when it did.

The George W. Bush administration was the third successive administration to have to respond to the Iraqi question. In 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed the strategically significant Kuwait. After a large international coalition rolled back Iraq's annexation, a wall of United Nations (UN) pressure, which included sanctions and inspections, was placed on Iraq. This pressure, for both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, was orientated towards either containing Iraq or generating the downfall of its President, Saddam Hussein. However, both were generally unwilling to employ 'boots on the ground' to achieve this.

In contrast, the George W. Bush administration, particularly after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), seemed to relish this task. Indeed, Bush argued that "After [9/11], the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water" (cited Ritchie and Rodgers, 2007: 3). Drawing on these ideas, the Bush administration released a controversial National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002. The policy statement indicated that the administration was distancing itself from the Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence. Although

[1] There have been three wars in the Persian Gulf since 1979. There is, however, no recognised naming system for the wars. To save confusion, this thesis employs the traditional 'western' naming system. The Gulf War refers to the 1980 – 1988 conflict between Iran and Iraq. The Persian Gulf War, on the other hand, refers to the 1991 conflict, whilst the Iraq War refers to the war that commenced in March 2003.

couched in realist language, the NSS, in order to respond to the post-9/11 security environment, advocated the spread of universal liberal democratic values (Quinn, 2009: 2).

Controversially, the policy statement also promoted the use of pre-emptive, preventive or anticipatory warfare to achieve this end. The NSS 2002 argued that the US "can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we [did during the Cold War]". This is because the "inability to deter a potential attack, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries, do not permit this option". Instead, the NSS insisted that the "concept of imminent threat [be adapted] to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries" (Bush, 2002a: 15).

Iraq was clearly driving the Bush administration's NSS. For instance, George W. Bush (2002c) argued that "Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies". In addition, simultaneous to the release of NSS 2002, Bush (2002d) spoke before the UN General Assembly and argued that all the security threats, which were identified in the NSS 2002, existed in "their most lethal and aggressive forms [in Iraq]". Saddam Hussein had "answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance". Implicit in Bush's speech was the argument that containment and deterrence had failed. "We have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil-for-food and the stick of coalition military strikes". However Hussein's regime, which was "a grave and growing danger", remained in power.

This 'gathering storm' speech prompted action from the US Congress, which passed a joint resolution authorising President Bush to employ, if necessary, American forces to enforce all UN resolutions in Iraq and ensure US security. At the same time, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1441, which gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with the various UN resolutions dating to the end of the Persian Gulf War. Consequently, Iraq was compelled to readmit inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who were tasked with monitoring Iraq's disarmament.

There was, however, a degree of ambiguity regarding the extent of Iraq's compliance. Whilst the IEAE reported that there was little tangible evidence to suggest that Iraq had reconstituted a weapons programme (El-Baradei, 2003), Chief of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix (2003), argued

that Iraq "appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it". The ambiguity created a struggle in the UN over the necessity of a further resolution (Malone, 2006: 192 – 201). In response the US, along with a coalition of the willing, bypassed the UN and unilaterally invaded Iraq in March 2003.

The resulting war proved hugely controversial. The justifications given for the invasion, which included Iraq's alleged links to international terrorist groups and Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction programmes, were subsequently made highly suspect. Developments after the war, in particular the costly quagmire the US found itself in (Mearsheimer, 2005b: 5) and the damage the conflict inflicted on America's soft power or public image (Nye, 2004a), entrenched the controversial nature of the Iraq War. Given that these two scenarios were predicted before the conflict, one has to wonder why the US employed military force in Iraq when it did. It is this topic that this thesis will investigate.

1.1 Research Questions

The controversies surrounding the Iraq War have resulted in the topic being extensively covered in the extant literature. The major focus has been on the exceptional nature of the war. In other words, the use of military force to overthrow Saddam Hussein was a product of the unique intersection between 9/11, the idiosyncrasies of President George W. Bush and the ideological outlooks of his chief policymakers.

In the first instance, Daalder and Lindsay's popular *America Unbound* traces American militarism to the revolutionary nature of George W. Bush. They suggest that Bush "set in motion a revolution in American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America's goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them" (Daalder and Lyndsay, 2003: 2). What made Bush revolutionary "was his willingness to use [America's military power] – even over the strenuous objections of America's friends and allies" (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 188). As a result, Bush "championed a doctrine of preemption and [de-emphasised] the reactive strategies of deterrence and containment" (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 12). From this perspective, therefore, "it can plausibly be argued that the decision to attack Saddam Hussein by invading Iraq was a decision much less likely to be taken by a different President" (Pfiffner, 2005: 233).

In the second instance, other work has attributed American militarism during the George W. Bush presidency to the impact of neoconservatism. Neoconservativism is grounded in the

belief that the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to extend the 'American peace' and, because of the 'benign nature' of America power, its military power should be used for this end. According to Halper and Clarke (2004: 4), it was the effect of neoconservatism, which "embraces risky and adventurous [policies] that [utilise] military power as the instrument of first resort", that best explains American militarism during the George W. Bush presidency. The neoconservatives, who included Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, John Bolton and Douglas Feith, all gained prominent positions in the Bush administration. After 9/11 they 'hijacked' US foreign policy and advocated the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which was a long desired goal that complemented "[Bush's] need for a powerful response [to 9/11]" (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 205). From this vantage, the "rapid lonely march into an essentially unprovoked war" would not have occurred "absent the intellectual framework provided by the neocons" (Marshall, 2003: 146).

However, there is reason to exert caution regarding the theme of uniqueness. Contrasting literature suggests that the administration of George W. Bush was not that uniquely militaristic (Bacevich, 2005) and questions whether the neoconservatives deviated significantly from traditional understandings of American power (Cox, 2004b: 591). Ultimately, however, the idea of exceptionality is contestable because the use of US military force is not unique to the post-9/11 era. Cox (2002: 264) wrote, to "make sense of US foreign policy after [9/11]…we first have to make sense of history". To make sense of US history is to recognise that the Iraq War is one instance in a broader constellation of US militarism in the northern Persian Gulf[2].

George W. Bush was the fourth successive US president to go to war with a northern Gulf country. Bill Clinton, Bush's immediate predecessor, spent the 1990s employing limited forms of warfare against Iraq. Clinton's policy followed George H.W. Bush's, who spent his final days in office ordering cruise missile attacks on Iraq after having successfully repelled the country's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. In turn, George H.W. Bush's war followed his predecessor's, Ronald Reagan, employment of American force against Iran during the Gulf War. However, if militarism – the use of force to reshape order – is more than just overt warfare, US militarism in the Gulf has an even deeper history. If a *coup d'état*, which is a form of political violence employed to reshape political order (Soderlund, 1970: 353 – 60),

[2] The northern Persian Gulf includes Iraq and Iran and is borrowed from Cordesman (1994). As this thesis progresses, it will be shown that the US has historically approached Iraq and Iran as a pair. In other words, American policy in Iraq cannot be divorced from its policy in Iran and *vice-versa*.

can be considered an instance of covert militarism, US militarism in the northern Gulf extends as far back to the early Cold War era. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration actively conspired to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, whilst the John F. Kennedy administration may have conspired to overthrow Iraqi Prime Minister, Abdul KarimQassem.

Subsequently, this thesis will investigate the following question:

What has caused US foreign policy in the northern Persian Gulf to manifest militaristically? In particular, are there any causes that are generalisable across all instances of US militarism in the northern Gulf?

This purpose of this question, which explicitly investigates the relationship between past and present US foreign policy in the northern Gulf, is to develop a broader historical picture of US policy in the region. That is, this study considers whether the policies of the George W. Bush administration, in particular the war in Iraq, can be located within the wider history of America's regional policy. If this thesis finds causes of US militarism in the northern Gulf, which seem generalisable across all instances, this would challenge the notion of uniqueness. If, however, few factors relate past and present US policy, the exceptionality thesis would be, if not confirmed, at the very least not refuted.

It is ironic that the dominant theme of exceptionality, which would suggest novelty, has arisen at a time when international relations scholarship has undertaken a historical turn (Buzan and Little, 2000; Kennedy-Pipe, 2000; Bell, 2001; Elman and Elman, 2001; Hobson and Hobden, 2002; Lawson, 2006 and 2007; Hobson and Lawson, 2008; Hobson *et al*., 2010). This theoretical development has been incorporated into the realist tradition, which has undertaken something of a renaissance of late. That is, the classical works have been revisited and revised, whilst neoclassical realism has developed as a vibrant adjunct to neorealism. Neoclassical realism, which identifies the "intervening [domestic level] variables" between international structure and foreign policy outcomes, "[imbues] realism's structural variant with a greater explanatory richness" (Kitchen, 2010: 118). As a result, neoclassical realism according to Schweller (2003: 344 – 5), is the "only game in town for the current and next generation of realists".

This thesis will consider these theoretical developments in greater detail by analysing whether the work of earlier realists can enhance our understanding of America's policy in the northern Gulf. Accordingly, this thesis will also address the following question:

To what extent are neoclassical explanations, which focus on international structural and American unit level factors, adequate for understanding US militarism in the northern Gulf? In particular, does a return to E.H. Carr's classical realism add to realist explanations for US militarism in the northern Persian Gulf?

This question is orientated towards engaging with the inter-realist debate regarding the relative explanatory utility of neoclassical and classical lenses (Taliaferro*et al*., 2009: 11 –2 and Onea, 2012: 142 – 7). Although the focus on one classical scholar could be argued to be rather restrictive, as Booth (2010: 3) explains "attempting to comprehend great minds grappling with great issues is amongst the most taxing intellectual work there is". As a result, "much can be gained by trying to understand the work of scholars who have attempted to provide an organised framework of answers of our universe of questions". At the same time, returning to the work of E.H. Carr will contribute to the growing interest in his work (Jones, 1998; Dunne *et al*., 1999; Haslam, 2000; Cox, 2001, 2004a and 2010), whilst responding to Mearsheimer's (2005a: 140) claims that British scholars today cannot, due to the intellectual 'dominance' of 'idealism', make use of Carr's arguments. At the same time, employing E.H. Carr makes perfect sense because of the historical scope of this study. As will be discussed in chapter three, Carr left his own historical methodological approach for studying world politics.

1.2 Thesis Overview

The thesis begins, following Donald Rumsfeld's infamous quote, with a review of the known and unknowns of American militarism. The first chapter, after briefly reviewing developments in the realist intellectual tradition, suggests that, due to the contribution of neoclassical realism, we know the international structural and US domestic level factors determining America's foreign policy. The chapter proceeds, channelling the ideas of Isaac Deutscher and Steven Yetiv, to suggest that there remains an unknown – the actions and reactions of foreign actors. The chapter concludes that, mimicking recent work by Tudor Onea, putting the classical back into neoclassical realism may enrich its explanatory worth. As a consequence, the third chapter discusses the classical realist theoretical framework of

E.H. Carr. Enhancing recent work, which suggests Carr's utility lays in his understanding of international liberal crisis, the chapter suggests that his approach to power, history, revolution and war and militarism also provide a useful framework for approaching America's foreign policy in the northern Gulf.

Accordingly, in chapters four through seven of this thesis, E.H. Carr's ideas are mapped onto the history of America's foreign policy in the northern Gulf. This endeavour produces a theoretically informed historical narrative through which to explore the research questions. Drawing on Carr's understanding of balance of power, the empirical chapters illustrate the historical importance the US has placed on maintaining a balance of power in the region conducive to its strategic interests. Pulling together Carr's perspectives on power and unintended effects, the empirical chapters discuss the relationship between political order and revolutionary change. In turn, influenced by Carr's discussion on revolution, the work illustrates that America's policy has been moulded by eras of nationalist, statist and Islamic revolution. In other words, US foreign policy has been influenced by the actions and reactions of regional and often revolutionary actors as much as it has by international and domestic factors. From this vantage, the argument is made that the use of militarism often correlates to these developments, which often undermine American power and influence.

This theoretically driven narrative culminates in a relatively unexplored cause of the 2003 war in Iraq – balancing against Iran. Therefore, the thesis concludes that, whilst US militarism in the Gulf during the Presidency of George W. Bush may have been more explosive in scope, its causes were consistent with the history of US policy in the Gulf. This argument, which is developed via E.H. Carr's classical realist lens, points to potential gaps inthe neoclassical realist literature and hints at possible ways to refine the scope of the theory.

2 The Knowns and Unknowns

> There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know…And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns. (Rumsfeld, 2002)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, explores the knowns and unknowns of American militarism in the Gulf. The chapter, with the research questions in mind, begins by reviewing the realist intellectual tradition, which culminates in an overview of realism's renaissance. The second section then illustrates how neoclassical realism, which is often presented as the only realist game in town, has been employed to illustrate the international structural and American unit level knowns of American militarism. The third section, using work by Steven Yetiv as a springboard, suggests that these two factors leave a third one – the actions and reactions of foreign actors – relatively unknown. The chapter concludes, following recent work highlighting the continued saliency of classical realism, that a return to the classical realism of E.H. Carr may help address this lacuna.

2.2 The Renaissance of Realism

In certain respects, there has been a renaissance of the realist intellectual tradition. After a lengthy period of neorealist hegemony, which stemmed from the publication of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* until sometime after the collapse of the Cold War bipolar international structure, realism has in many respects returned to its classical roots (Bell, 2010). This thesis is concerned with considering whether these theoretical developments can help to understand the causes of the 2003 Iraq War, which was one instance of America's use of militarism in the northern Persian Gulf. Before considering this question in greater detail, however, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the realist intellectual tradition.

According to Frankel (1996: xiii), it is the shared political and philosophical assumptions that make one a realist. These shared assumptions are often distilled to state-centrism, a focus on international anarchy and a concern with power as the fundamental currency in world politics (Keohane, 1986: 163; Walt, 1997: 932). These state-centric assumptions have, however, been rejected by some. According to Gilpin (1996: 7 - 8), Donnelly (2000: 7 - 8) and

Wohlforth(2008: 32 – 3) a broader set of assumptions characterise realist work. These include groupism, which is the belief that the group as opposed to the individual governs political life, and egoism, which is the belief that the group acts with reference to its own self-interest. As a result, politics between groups will always be conflictual (although not necessarily violent).

Realism is usually identified as a static theory (May *et al*., 2010: 6 – 7). However, the realist academic tradition has gone through at least three movements. The first movement can be termed realism's classical era. Classical realism is generally reduced to a belief that international politics is shaped by "human aggressiveness, the drive for power [and] fear" (Crawford, 2010: 159). In reality, however, the classical realists, who predominantly wrote during the inter-war and immediate post-war era, were chiefly concerned with the foreign policies of the great powers during the 20th century. As a result, they tended to challenge liberal and idealist assumptions, which transformed politics among nations, and instead advocated policies based on diplomacy and the balance of power (Carr, 1946; Morgenthau, 1993; Spykman, 2007). These ideas were carried forward into the post-war era with many classical realists critiquing the idealistic impulses underpinning America's post-war foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1952; Kennan, 1954).

The second movement, realism's structural era, was a direct response to perceived theoretical and methodological deficiencies of the classical approach. During the behavioural revolution, classical realism was subjected to repeated criticisms. As Buzan (1996: 48) comments, "it began to be argued and accepted that the methodology and the theoretical and policy agendas associated with classical realism were anachronistic". Not everyone supported these developments. Bull (1966: 362 – 4), for instance, challenged the methodological, systemic and quantitative rigour of what he termed the scientific approach. Nevertheless, his objections were overlooked, particularly in North America. As a result, the realist tradition jettisoned its traditional concerns in favour of systemic, quantitative and structural approaches. For structural or neorealists, it is the anarchical "architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power". That is, states are "trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive" (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72). These neorealist ideas were employed to explain why states balance as opposed to bandwagon (Waltz, 1979), why states balance against threats in addition to power (Walt, 1987), why hegemonic wars happen (Gilpin, 1983), why defensive concerns, such as the

security dilemma, continually occur (Jervis, 1978) and why states are likely to pursue offensive foreign policies (Mearsheimer, 2001).

The relative decline of structural realism, which was brought on by sustained intellectual critique and international developments, in particular the end of bipolarity, has resulted in what might be termed the renaissance of realism. In other words, the third realist movement has involved a return to history. This is most prominent in recent work revising the one-dimensional portrayals of the classical realist scholars (Lebow, 2003; Malloy, 2003a, 2003b and 2004; Cox, 2004a; Williams, 2005, 2007; Cozette, 2008a and 2008b; Lee, 2010).

This has been accompanied by the development of neoclassical realism, which synthesises the "[rigour] and theoretical insights of neorealism…without sacrificing the practical insights about foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in [classical realism]" (Taliaferro*et al*., 2009: 4). Neoclassical realists, according to Rose (1998: 146), recognise that a "country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system". However, this structural factor is mediated "through intervening variables at the unit level". As a result, neoclassical realism provides "greater predictive and [empirically precise]" (Deuck, 2006: 18) explanations for a country's foreign policy. As Taliaferro*et al*. (2009: 8 – 10) note, neoclassical realism has been used by a variety of scholars to illustrate the structural and domestic factors shaping alliance formations, grand strategies and relative power shifts.

Neoclassical realism, which contextually enriches structural realism, seems like a plausible route for understanding American foreign policy in the Gulf. This is because neoclassical realism historically contextualises the factors determining a country's foreign policy decision-making process (Rose, 1998: 147, fn. 6). As the next section will discuss, neoclassical realism has indeed provided richer explanations for US foreign policy during the Bush era.

2.3 The Knowns

Neoclassical realism's value added contribution, by synthesising the international structural and the unit level factors influencing a country's foreign policy, can generally be distilled to the following: structures don't make foreign policies; rather policymakers produce a country's foreign policy. These ideas have been employed to produce a number of knowns regarding the causes of US foreign policy in Iraq. Thus, whilst unipolarity, in particular the

abuse of power it engenders,is employed to explain why the US could invade Iraq (Waltz, 2004: 4, 2008: xii; Miller, 2010: 41 – 64; Monteiro, 2011: 31), neoclassical realists show why the US did employ militarism in Iraq.

2.3.1 The Impact of 9/11

According to Kitchen (2009: 270), 9/11 "had no clear effect on the structure of the international system – it did not alter the balance of power". Nonetheless, "precisely because it caused a shift in the ideas and perceptions at the unit level of the most powerful state in the system, [9/11] precipitated systemic change". Neoclassical realists, therefore, couple unipolarity with the impact of 9/11 in order to explain the decision to use force in Iraq.

According to Snyder *et al*. (2009), the impact of 9/11 intensified domestic processes in the US, particularly the politicisation of national security issues. For Snyder *et al*. this process, in combination with unipolarity, resulted in the Iraq War. They argue that unipolarity does not determine foreign policy; rather "America's prevailing strategic mindset has been a product of the interaction of its international position and its domestic politics" (Snyder *et al*., 2009: 160). Further, they argue that domestically the American political system is characterised by a high degree of party polarisation. As a result, "partisan electoral incentives can affect the motivation and ability of politicians to propound foreign policy ideologies, including doctrines justifying military intervention" (Snyder *et al*. 2009: 167). They do exhibit caution over claiming that the Bush administration instigated the war to reap political benefits at home. Nevertheless, they conclude that "party [polarisation] interacted with America's unipolar dominance and the shock of [9/11] to create a situation in which preventive war seemed an attractive option to the Bush administration, both internationally and domestically".

Rose, who argues that the decision to invade Iraq was a product of America's global primacy and the impact of 9/11, has pushed similar themes. That is, "the combination of American hegemony and the trauma of 9/11 removed any significant foreign or domestic check on the [Bush] administration's actions" (Rose, 2010: 240). In other words, the lack of constraint at the international level, which was produced by unipolarity, and at the domestic level, which was generated by the 9/11 attacks, "allowed the Bush doctrine to pass from idea into policy" (Rose, 2010: 240). The use of force in Iraq, therefore, was a product of thesedual processes.

According to Cox (2003: 3 – 4), the 9/11 attacks had a profound effect on American foreign policy. For neoclassical realists, such as Snyder *et al*.and Rose, the attacks opened a political space – or window of opportunity – for a more aggressive foreign policy. In these accounts, the international structural factor of unipolarity is complemented by the domestic impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to enrich our understanding of why the US employed force in Iraq.

2.3.2 The Role of Individuals

The "study of individuals", according to Byman and Pollack (2001: 110), "has not been attacked so much as ignored by international relations theorists". Although not explicitly neoclassical realist, the work by Byman and Pollack reminds scholars that individuals (whether alone or in small groups) have a decisive role in making a country's foreign policy. Consequently, neoclassical realist accounts of US militarism during the George W. Bush presidency have supplemented international structural accounts with individual and small group factors.

Mearsheimer and Walt, although not outwardly neoclassical realists, explain US militarism through the prism of small group dynamics. Mearsheimer and Walt (2008: 17) assert that "absent the [Jewish lobby's] influence, there almost certainly would not have been [the Iraq War]. The lobby was a necessary but not sufficient condition for [the war]". As a whole, the work is dedicated to considering why America consistently aids and supports Israel despite how this negatively impacts on American interests in the Middle East. They find their answer in the Jewish lobby – "a loose coalition of individuals and [organisations] that actively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction" (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008: 112). The activities of this interest group have pressured America into pursuing "policies in the Middle East that make little sense on either strategic or moral grounds" (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008: 11). Although international structural level variables are given implicit recognition, it is the influence of the Jewish lobby that accounts for American militarism in Iraq. In particular, how the arguments of the Jewish lobby were taken onboard by neoconservative members of the Bush administration (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008: 229 – 62).

Similar literature explores policy entrepreneurship to explain America's use of force in Iraq. In particular, work has exposed how the neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration, in particular Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence, and Under Secretaries of Defence, John Bolton and Douglas Feith, were able to exert more control over

the policymaking process after 9/11. As Taliaferro*et al*. (2009: 3) note, whilst "preponderant American power set the parameters for [the Iraq War], unit-level factors [including] policy entrepreneurship by neoconservatives within the administration…determined the character of [America's policy]". Put another way, the neoconservative 'hijack' after 9/11, was a chief factor pushing for the use of force in Iraq.

Whilst neoclassical realists contend that international polarity is a chief factor influencing a country's foreign policy, domestic factors, in particular individual and small-group factors, are part of the imperfect transmission belt shape policy outcomes. As Quinn (2011: 803 – 4) notes, individual leaders can have a decisive impact on a country's foreign policy and its position in the international system. As a result, neoclassical realists have explored how individuals and small groups, in combination with unipolarity, explain US militarism in the Gulf during the period in question.

2.3.3 The Effect of Ideas and Ideology

The constructivist turn in international relations has reminded realists that ideas, broadly defined, shape politics. In turn, neoclassical realists have incorporated ideological factors, in combination with international structural factors, to explain the use of force in Iraq.

Monten (2005), for instance, explains the militaristic foreign policy of the Bush doctrine, and by-proxy the Iraq War, through the combination of the unipolar structure and the intervening variable of a 'vindicationist' nationalist ideology. Monten (2005: 113) contends that American nationalism "has historically been defined in terms of both adherence to a set of liberal universal and political ideals and a perceived obligation to spread those norms internationally". This nationalist ideology, however, has manifested in two different ways. The exemplary tradition suggests that the US should act aloofly and promote liberal democracy through "the force of its example". The vindicationist approach, on the other hand, "argues that the United States must move beyond example and undertake active measures to spread its universal political values and institutions" (Monten, 2005: 113). From a neoclassical perspective Monten (2005: 115) argues that US policies directed towards "activist democracy promotion" are "explained by the both the expansion of material capabilities and the presence of a nationalist domestic ideology that [favours] vindicationism over exemplarism". He then applies this framework to the Bush administration's foreign policy. He argues that whilst unipolarity is a necessary condition for militarism, it is not a

sufficient one. As a result, he complements the unipolar explanation by illustrating the power of a particularly virulent vindicationist nationalist ideology, in other words neoconservatism (Monten, 2005: 143 – 54).

Kitchen and Cox (2011), although not from an explicit neoclassical framework, also explain the Iraq War through the prism of international structural changes and the prevalence of liberal internationalist ideas. The end of the Cold War meant that "liberal internationalism could not only be true to its principles, it could do so with the backing of the world's superpower, which could harness its unipolar moment to establish an enduring liberal peace" (Kitchen and Cox, 2011: 74). The liberal zeitgeist, which reached its zenith at end of the Cold War, served as the intellectual bedrock of the Iraq invasion. Liberal internationalism, based on the democratic peace theory, understood "non-democratic states as obstacles to a peaceful international system". Militarism, intervention and state-building were legitimised on the basis that sovereignty "was no longer the absolute right of a state – it would be conditional upon the political character of that state" (Kitchen and Cox, 2011: 76). As such, the Iraq War was a product of the power of these ideas coupled with America's unipolar position in the post-Cold War international system (Kitchen and Cox, 2011: 83).

Quinn (2009: 174) writes that in order to "understand US foreign policy today, it is essential to understand its deepest ideological assumptions". Neoclassical realist scholars, in recognising that international structure shapes but does not determine, have layered in ideological explanations in order to supplement structural explanations for American foreign policy. Although the international structural factor of unipolarity is considered a crucial determinant of US foreign policy, neoclassical realists offer more empirically precise explanations. This is because they illuminate the ideas and ideology that formed the bedrock of America's invasion of Iraq.

2.3.4 The Character of the American State

Neoclassical realists open the 'black box' of the state and enquire how the character of a state (its cultural, historical and institutional context) shapes the foreign policies they pursue. This awareness has resulted in the particular character of the American state, in combination with unipolarity, being forwarded as explanations for US militarism in the Gulf.

America's democratic political culture, in combination with international structural factors, has been forwarded as a chief reason for US militarism during the presidency of George W.

Bush. According to Chengqui (2011: 16), public opinion is part of the imperfect "'transmission belt'" between international structure and foreign policy outcomes. This is because in democratic country's "political leaders are elected by the public, and their policymaking is naturally affected and constrained by public opinion" (Chengqui, 2011: 16). In democratic cultures political leaders require public support. As a result, they have to adopt foreign policies that are perceived to be in the general public interest. Chengqui argues that public opinion responds to international structural change and pressures American leaders into pursuing particular foreign policies. He argues that "when US relative power within the international system was predominant, the American public was more likely to support a unilateralist approach". In contrast, as public opinion "gradually perceived a decline in US relative power…the American people progressively switched their support…to a multilateralist [foreign policy]" (Chengqui, 2011: 5). Using American National Election Studies data, he suggests that the difference between the foreign policies of George W. Bush and Barrack Obama resulted not from personal differences, but from the need to adapt to changing public opinion. US militarism in the Gulf during the George W. Bush administration, form this lens, resulted from interaction between international structural factors and America's democratic polity.

The particular character of the American state is also central to Layne's (2006) work on US foreign policy. Layne, unlike other neoclassical realists, focuses on why the US pursues grand strategies that contravene Mearsheimer's offensive realism. Layne contends that the US has consistently sought extra-regional hegemony. From a neoclassical perspective he argues that the America's pursuit of "extraregional hegemony results…from the causal linkages between the distribution of power in the international system and intervening domestic variables" (Layne, 2006: 8). Specifically, the liberal capitalist structure of the American state has resulted in economic and ideological expansionism (Layne, 2006: 7 – 10). Expansion during the Bush administration, however, became more intense because of the particular international structure. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the "only real check on US power…[and] presented the US with the opportunity to use its capabilities to exert more control over – to 'shape' – the international political system and simultaneously increase its power" (Layne, 2006: 2). From this perspective the war in Iraq was a product of the American liberal capitalist expansionary state and the international structure of unipolarity (Layne, 2009: 6 – 7).

According to Rose (1998: 147), state structures are important because they "affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy". As a result, neoclassical realist explanations for US policy have complemented international structural factors (i.e., unipolarity), by illustrating how the particular character of the American state also played a crucial role in producing the eventual policy of invading Iraq.

2.3.5 Refining Not Refuting Neorealism

According to Vazquez (1997: 900), a research tradition is degenerative if "its auxiliary propositions increasingly take on the characteristic of ad hoc explanations that do not produce any novel (theoretical) facts, as well as new empirical content". Subsequently, he indicted neoclassical realism as a degenerative project. In response, Schweller (1997) argued that neoclassical realism refined but did not refute neorealism. Neoclassical realists do not treat the international structure as a determinant of state behaviour; rather, they contend that the international structure both constrains and incentivises behaviour. In other words, neoclassical realism is a logical extension of neorealism (Rathbun, 2008: 296).

These ideas are clearly evident in current realist explanations for US militarism in the Gulf. Whilst neorealist accounts emphasise that the international structure provided opportunities for US to pursue militaristic policies, neoclassical realism brings in domestic level factors to show how these opportunities were acted upon. As a result, the impact of 9/11, the role of individuals and small groups, the effect of ideas and ideology and the character of the American state acted in combination with unipolarity to produce US militarism in the Gulf. Put another way, the knowns of the Iraq War include the international structure (unipolarity) and specific domestic factors in the US.

2.4 The Unknowns

Neoclassical realism complements neorealism because it expands on Waltz's (2000: 24) contention that "Structures shape and shove [but] they do not determine the actions of states". In doing so, however, neoclassical realism continues to work with Waltz's rather narrow understanding of what constitutes structure. This is evidenced by neoclassical explanations for American policy in Iraq, which focus solely on unipolarity. As a result, neoclassical realist accounts of the Iraq War miss, or at least leave relatively unexplored, a crucial determinant of America's foreign policy.

Waltz reduces international structure to the distribution of capabilities between the great powers, in other words the polarity of the international system. Neoclassical realists follow this approach. As Rose (1998: 146) argues, neoclassical realists "argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities". Subsequently, neoclassical realist explanations for US militarism during the George W. Bush presidency, as discussed, point to unipolarity as the chief structural factor shaping US foreign policy.

Non-Waltzian structural realists, however, argue that Waltz's distilling of structure into polarity overlooks a number of crucial factors shaping and structuring international relations. Buzan (1991: 164), for instance, argues that "polarity is merely one variable in the structure of international relations". Other factors structuring international relations include the level and density of interactions, the destructive capacity of the states in the system, the relative space for expansion, the diversity of the states in the system and the relative levels of affinity or enmity framing their relationships (Buzan, 1991: 150 – 4). These ideas formed the basis of further calls to expand the structures of international relations (Buzan*et al*., 1993). In this work it was argued that Waltzian realism overlooked how international relations, in addition to being shaped by the deep structure of polarity, were also shaped by process formations and interaction capacity. The former include the consistently re-occurring patterns through which states respond to each other, such as trade, war and balance of power, whilst the latter include technological, geographical and cultural factors (Buzan*et al*., 1993: 48 – 60). In sum, for non-Waltzian structural realists, there are factors beyond international polarity that structure international relations.

If, as Holsti (1999: 23) argues, foreign policy is ultimately relational, then the actions of others must, to some degree, structure, determine and influence a country's foreign policy. As Deutscher (1960: 40) explained, a country's foreign policy is not only the product of "internal pressures" (or unit level factors) and the "international balance of power" (polarity). He suggested that "the course of foreign policy [also] depends on the actions and reactions of other governments". In other words foreign actors, who create the strategic environment in which a country's foreign policy operates, must also be afforded causal significance. Neoclassical realist literature on US militarism, which focuses on unipolarity and

developments at the American domestic level, has left this determinant of America's foreign policy underdeveloped and unexplored.

2.4.1 The Reactive Nature of US Foreign Policy

This unknown has been broached in Yetiv's (2008) *The Absence of Grand Strategy*. Yetiv's work is implicitly neoclassical realist, as it demonstrates how foreign policy is made non-rationally (see also Yetiv, 2004), but nonetheless reveals how neoclassical realist analyses of American militarism overlook crucial policy determinants.

In the first instance Yetiv, unlike the literature reviewed above, historically broadens the subject of enquiry. His analysis of American policy in the Gulf begins in 1972, the year Britain ended its military protectorate over the region, which resulted in America assuming primary responsibility for the defence of western interests in the region. As a result, Yetiv is less focused on one event (the Iraq War) and more attune to the historical development of American policy in the region. At the same time, however, Yetiv contextually broadens the scope of enquiry. Influenced by the regional and subsystem work of Thompson, Lake and Morgan and Buzan and Wæver, Yetiv shows that the US has generally reacted to events, which have been created by actors in the Persian Gulf. This is what Yetiv terms reactive engagement. According to Yetiv reactive engagement,

> [recognises] that states formulate policies toward regions. But at its core, it posits that the foreign policies of great powers are often made in reaction to key events or are shaped by them. Reactivity is fundamentally different from grand strategy. Reactive [behaviour], by definition, is not planned but improvised. It is not governed by the motives and interests of great powers nearly as much as it is driven by events beyond their control. (Yetiv, 2008: 194)

In turn, the empirical component of Yetiv's (2008: 12 – 3)work illustrates how "unexpected, unwanted and complicated" regional developments (including Britain's withdrawal, the Iranian revolution, the Gulf War, the Persian Gulf War and Iraqi intransigence during the 1990s) shaped US policy in the Gulf. Yetiv's work illustrates, therefore, that changes in American power are not only the product of international structural and American domestic level factors. *The Absence of Grand Strategy* highlights that, regional actors who create the immediate context in which American policy operates, must also have some causal influence on American foreign policy.

Whilst Yetiv's work should be welcomed for opening this alternative avenue for thinking about the factors that influence US foreign policy, his work contains two shortcomings that question its explanatory utility. In the first instance, he explains the 2003 war in Iraq through a neoclassical lens. For Yetiv, like the neoclassical literature above, the Iraq War resulted from the combination of the unipolar structure and domestic political developments in America. As he argues:

> The end of the Cold War left the United States largely unchecked in world politics and with greater room to [manoeuvre]; the rise of American capability yielded it the potential to make war; the drama of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provided the impetus as well as increased domestic political support; and the rise of neoconservatism contributed the ideological bedrock and elite political support that helped motivate and facilitate the effort. (Yetiv, 2008: 6)

This inconsistency insinuates that the 2003 war was an exceptional event. In drawing a difference between pre-9/11 US foreign policy (shaped by regional factors) and post-9/11 US foreign policy (shaped by international structural and internal American political developments) in this way, Yetiv entrenches the idea that the 2003 war was a unique or exceptional event. It also leaves unanswered what role, if any, regional factors played in the American decision to invade Iraq.

In the second instance, Yetiv's work suffers from what Halliday referred to as the fallacy of inaction. During the 1970s a number of revolutionary events destabilised politics across the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and Southwest Asia. Halliday challenged conventional American wisdom that such movements were the products of Soviet Union machinations. Instead, he argued that any "full account of what happened in the Arc would have to give proper weight to the US role in events" (Halliday, 1982: 102).

What Halliday meant by this was that conventional accounts of the crisis, which stressed Soviet involvement, obscured the extent to which previous American interaction with the regional countries also shaped the crisis. Yetiv's*The Absence of Grand Strategy* is afflicted by this fallacy of inaction. For Yetiv (2008: 11 – 2), the US has reacted to "events beyond their control", which have increasingly got America "stuck in the tortuous politics of the region", which America "did not relish involvement in". Yet he does not consider what role, if any, previous US interaction with the Gulf shaped the events beyond America's control. For instance, his relatively sparse discussion of the Iranian revolution fails to acknowledge

what role previous US interaction played in the event (Yetiv, 2008: 34 – 7). Yetiv's work is welcomed on the basis that it, in addition to historically broadening the timeframe of analysis, opens an alternative space (the role of regional actors) for thinking about American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. However, his failure to consider the relationship between US actions and the events beyond their control, in addition to his inconsistent thesis, suggest that further work in this needs to be undertaken.

2.4.2 Refining Not Refuting Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realists, who stress that foreign policy is produced by policymakers and not by structures, downplay some classical realist insights. Specifically, whilst policy is made (within the constraints imposed by the international system) by policymakers, it is also made in response to the reactions of others. As a consequence, neoclassical realist accounts of US policy in the Gulf, which focus on the structural variable of unipolarity, overlook the actions and reactions of others as a causal variable. Putting the classical back into neoclassical realism may refine, although not necessarily refute, neoclassical accounts of the Iraq War.

In a recent survey, which posed the question "What way forward for the realist paradigm'", the authors concluded that a return to classical realism offered nothing but muddied thought (Freyberg-Inan*et al*., 2009: 3). Others, however, are far more sanguine about the continued importance classical realism. In particular, Onea has suggested that classical realist insights offer important tools for thinking about US foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Onea (2012: 146) argues that, rather than focusingspecifically on international polarity and unit level factors, a classical realist lens would show that America's foreign policy is "principally shaped by the strategic context of its interactions with other states". Accordingly, Onea suggests that US unit level factors (domestic politics and political culture) are contextually limited for understanding America's often expansionary foreign policies in the post-Cold War. This is because such analyses fail to appreciate how the US "resorted to [expansionist foreign policies] in order to safeguard its prestige as the leader of the international system, after being challenged in the successive contexts of Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and 9/11" (Onea, 2012: 152).

Although rather scant on the details of the classical realists, Onea (2012: 143) gives brief recognition to E.H. Carr as one of the chief classical realists inspiring his ideas. Chiefly, this is because Carr was primarily concerned with how foreign actors, in particular Nazi Germany

and Soviet Russia, created a new strategic environment in which the status quo powers, in Carr's case Britain, had to conduct themselves. These ideas are most prominent in one of his most overlooked works – *The Foreign Policy of Great Britain*. In this work, Carr argued that Britain's chief policy in Europe was concerned with balancing against any power that threatened Britain's strategic interests. Balancing in this sense is a "strategy or foreign policy [behaviour]", which is in contrast to balances of power, which are "outcomes at the systemic or subsytemic levels [and] conditions of power equilibrium among key states" (Paul, 2005: 2).

According to Carr, this balancing policy stemmed from Britain's desire to "not to use [power] for herself, but to prevent someone else using it". Consequently, Britain opposed "any European nation powerful and ambitious enough to establish effective dominion over the whole Continent for the simple reason that any such nation would threaten her independence" (Carr, 1939: 124). As a result, whilst Carr (1939: 22 – 32 and 148 – 77) recognised that Britain's foreign policy was shaped by international polarity and the polarisation of domestic politics, the chief factor underwriting Britain's descent into war was its strategic interaction with Germany and Soviet Russia. In particular, how successive German *coups*, which culminated in the 1939 German-Soviet defence pact, radically altered the strategic environment in which British foreign policy operated (Carr, 1939: 189 – 94). It was this pact, which symbolised the usurpation of Britain's balancing policy, which created the context for Britain's resort to war. As a result, whilst hinting that a new balance of power between Germany and Britain was a possibility, Carr (1939: 196) concluded that "Britain [fought the war]…to maintain on the Continent of Europe an orderly society of independent nations free from the brutal domination of a single overwhelming power". As a result, drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realism may enrich neoclassical accounts American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the knowns and unknowns of America's use of military power in the Persian Gulf. Working from within the realist intellectual tradition, the chapter illustrated that neoclassical realism, which is often presented as the dominant realist approach, has generated a number of knowns about American foreign policy. In particular, the use of force in Iraq was inspired by a synthesis of structural and domestic conditions. However, it was shown that this left the actions and reactions of foreign actors as a relative unknown. The

chapter concluded that a return to E.H. Carr's work, in other words putting the classical back in, may sharpen our knowledge of the factors leading to the use of force. Consequently, the next chapter will sketch Carr's classical realism.

3 E.H. Carr's Classical Realism

> 'Classics' are invariably better written than the workaday textbooks and articles that presently weigh down our desks, while attempting to comprehend great minds grappling with great issues is among the most taxing intellectual work there is…In International Politics, with its multiple schools and periodic great debates, much can be gained by trying to understand the work of scholars who have attempted to provide an organised framework of answers for our universe of questions. (Booth, 2010: 3)

3.1 Introduction

This thesis, which is influenced by Booth's sentiments above, suggests that the work of E.H. Carr may provide useful insights for thinking about the unknowns of American foreign policy in the northern Gulf. Accordingly, this chapter sketches E.H. Carr's classical realist 'framework of answers' in order to address the particular research questions of this thesis. The chapter begins by briefly introducing Carr's main literature, in particular his work on international relations and history. Although recognising the uniqueness of Carr's contribution, the second section, which follows a broad understanding of realism, suggests that Carr is a realist nonetheless. The third and final section contextually interpretshis 'framework of answers'. Whilst recent scholarship has argued that Carr's continued relevance stems from his enduring critique of liberal internationalism, this chapter contends that his understanding of power, history, revolution and war and militarism, remain salient tools for analysingpolitics between nations.

3.2 The Realist's Realist?

Miller (1991) labelled Carr the realist's realist. However, if realism is a concern with timeless wisdom and the impact of anarchy, Carr seems out of step with the realist tradition. He closed *What is History*, for instance, with the deceptively simple "And yet [history] moves" (Carr, 1964: 156). This section briefly summarises Carr's work and sketches some of the key themes and ideasanimating it.

Carr's (1931 and 1933) early work, ironically for a so called historical determinist, was biographical in nature. The time he spent in Riga working for the British Foreign Office exposed him to nineteenth century Russian literature. As he explained, he became fascinated by Russian romantic authors, in particular Fyodor Dostoevsky and Alexander Herzen(Carr,

2004a: xvi – xvii).For Carr, these authors inspired the realisation that the "liberal moralistic ideology" of the western world was not absolute; rather it was subject to "[convincing attack] by very intelligent people living outside the charmed circle, who looked at the world through very different eyes". He followed biographies of Dostoevsky and Herzen with similar works on Karl Marx (Carr, 1934) and Michael Bakunin (Carr, 1937). His chief interest lay in understanding how these characters symbolised the developing "revolt against bourgeois capitalist society" (Carr, 2004a: xviii).

The revolt, or more aptly the breakdown of the international order inspired his work on international relations. *Nationalism and After*(1945) analysed the changing balance of social forces within European states, how these transformed the role and function of the state and how, in turn, this impacted on world politics. He charted the movement from the personified monarchical state, through the bourgeoisie democratic state to the socialised nationalist state, which culminated in the two wars of the 20th century. In effect, Carr (1945: 26) related the "totalitarian symptoms" of the "two world wars, or two instalments of the same world war" to the impact of the industrial revolution on class and social relations in European states.

In the *Foreign Policy of Britain*(1939) Carr illustrated how mass politics transformed foreign policymaking. The most "revolutionary change in the conduct of foreign affairs", according to Carr (1939: 8 – 9), was the popularisation of international politics, which resulted in "issues of foreign policy [being] settled, not by governments, but by peoples". The politicisation of foreign policy, in conjunction with Britain's relative decline, resulted in a lacklustre British response to Germany's rise, at least until the 1939 German-Soviet defence treaty (Carr, 1939: 148 – 94).

In *International Relations since the Peace Treaties*, however, the descent into World War Two (WWII) was explained as an unintended effect of the post-war settlement. Carr (1941: 81 – 7, 133 – 52 and 197 – 9) demonstrated how German reparation was based on American debt financing, which in turn shaped the global economic crisis and the Nazi revolution in Germany. These events induced a return to power politics in the 1930s, the creation of two opposing blocs (the satisfied and revisionist powers) and the descent into WWII.

Equally important, E.H. Carr showed that the revolutionary forces of the late 19th and early 20th centuries undermined the political ideas held about world politics (particularly in the English speaking world). These themes are evident in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1946) and

The Conditions of Peace (1944). In the former, which has been labelled both "magnificent" (Dunne, 1998: xi) and "epoch-making" (Wilson, 2009: 8), Carr (1946: 224) charted the movement from a world dominated by utopianism to a world dominated by realism. Carr (1946: 39) was opposed to "individual stupidity" or "individual wickedness" explanations, what might be termed first image explanations for this phenomenon. Rather, he argued that the crisis resulted from the breakdown of the international political order. According to Carr (1946: 41 – 60), the post-war order was grounded in 19th century liberal ideals regarding the harmony of interests in peace and economic prosperity. Whilst these ideas reflected the conditions of the 19th century, they failed to grasp the realities of a world in transition (Carr, 1946: 60 – 2). Carr, following Mannheim, employed "realist theory as a weapon to undermine specious claims to universal truth and morality" (Dunne, 2004: 221). By illustrating the conditioned and self-interested nature of these supposed universal values, Carr (1946: 75 – 88) demonstrated how they induced a political revolt from those countries profiting least from the post-war order.

Similar themes were present in *The Conditions of Peace* where Carr argued that political leadership was being transferred from the satisfied to the dissatisfied powers. This occurred because the satisfied powers "continued to draw their inspiration from the conditions of the period which had witnessed their rise to power", whilst the "dissatisfied Powers were in the position of revolutionaries renouncing and challenging the past in the name of new ideologies" (Carr, 1944: x – xi). As a result, the revolutionary powers were better adept at harnessing the changing military, political and economic forces of the early 19th century for (Carr, 1944: xi – xxiv). This was because there was a general inability, amongst the *status quo* powers at least, to appreciate "the revolution which began in the last war [and which had] been the driving-force of every significant political movement of the [20th century]" (Carr, 1944: 10). It was the transformative events of the 20th century (mass politics, collectivisation, industrialisation, nationalism and internationalism) that became "final proof of [the] bankruptcy" of the moral ideas of 19th century liberalism. Yet, political leaders in the western world continued to think about world politics through dated ideas about liberal democracy, *laissez faire* and self-determination (Carr, 1944: 14 – 125).

After WWII Carr's scholarly work focused more specifically on revolution and history. The "historical turning-point" (Carr, 2004a: xx) that was the Russian revolution in 1917 generated an interest, which would consume the remainder of his career. Initially, he produced a brief

book charting the impact of the Russian revolution on the western world (Carr, 1947). This was complemented with a 14 volume history of the revolution and its aftermath, which was condensed into a single volume (Carr, 2004b). In between, Carr wrote two books on the nature of history and historical change. The first, *The New Society* (Carr, 1951), outlined his progressive historical approach, which stressed that, despite the significant changes brought on by the move from individual to mass society, the "impending dissolution" (Carr, 1951: 100) of the western world was exaggerated. The second, *What is History* (Carr, 1964), which remains a classic in History discipline, made similar claims whilst outlining a causal determinist approach to the study of history.

E.H. Carr, particularly amongst international relations scholars, is often reduced to a leading figure in the 'first debate' between realists and utopians. A great deal of work has been undertaken to question the idea of a 'first debate' (Wilson, 1999 and 2004) and question this rather narrow understanding of E.H. Carr (Dunne *et al*., 1999; Jones, 1998; Haslam, 2000; Cox, 2001 and 2004a). Indeed, this brief summary of his work suggests that it was the vicissitudes of international relations, which influenced the scholarly work he produced.

3.3 Will the Real E.H. Carr Please Stand Up?

The secondary literature on E.H. Carr, perhaps rather fittingly for an acerbic scholar, is characterised by polemic. On the one hand, Carr is celebrated as a conservative realist who exposed the paucity of inter-war utopian thought (Mearsheimer, 2005a: 140 – 3). On the other, he is considered a radical Marxist who critically revealed the power relations lying behind liberal appeals to universalism (Cox, 2000: 885). Perhaps Cox (1999) was perhaps correct to ask 'will the real E.H. Carr please stand up?'This section sketches a traditional reading of E.H. Carr as a classical realist, albeit a unique one.

First, however, it is important to note that Carr's most celebrated realist work, *The Twenty Years' Crisi*s, which is mythologised as an attack on utopianism or idealism, also contains a significant critique of realism. *The Twenty Years' Crisis* begins by noting how World War I (WWI) produced a "demand for the popularisation of international politics and heralded the birth of a new science" (Carr, 1946: 2). This new science, like any other, was predominantly utopian in nature. According to Carr (1946: 5), "when the human mind begins to exercise itself in some fresh field, an initial stage occurs in which the element of purpose is overwhelmingly strong". The limitations of utopianism, however, stem from its aspirational

as opposed to rigorous outlook. Realist thought, what Carr (1946: 9) identified as "hard and ruthless analysis (Carr, 1946: 9), is the necessary and inevitable correction. However, realism is equally problematic. As Carr argued:

> Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial stage, realism is liable to assume a critical and somewhat cynical aspect. In the field of thought, it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or alter. In the field of action, realism tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting and adapting oneself to, these forces and these tendencies. Such an attitude, though advocated in the name of 'objective' thought, may no doubt be carried to a point where it results in the sterilisation of thought and the negation of action. (Carr, 1946: 10)

It is important to note, therefore, that Carr's realism and utopianism were not necessarily theories of international relations. They were intellectual positions with regards the relationship between thought and action. Nor, as some have suggested (Cox, 2001: xxiii), were utopianism and realism two sides of the same coin. The analogy that Carr (1946: 11) employs is that of a pendulum. The relationship between utopianism and realism involved a "balance always swinging towards and away from equilibrium and never completely attaining it".

It is this pendulum-like swing that characterised the inter-war crisis for Carr. As he argued, the "characteristic feature of the crisis of the twenty years between 1919 and 1939 was the abrupt descent from the visionary hopes of the [1920s] to the grim despair of the [1930s]". It was, for Carr (1946: 224), a movement from a "utopia which took little account of reality to a reality from which every element of utopia was rigorously excluded". Whilst *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is celebrated as a critique of utopianism, most overlooked is the fact that is was also highly critical of realism, which as above, was defined as passivity to irresistible or inevitable forces. It was from this aversion to passivity, in other words historical determinism that Carr, by advocating a policy of appeasement, which appeared most prominently in the first edition (Cox, 2001: lxxii – lxxxii), critiqued the realist or pessimistic idea that WWII was an inevitable clash.

Passivity to historical forces is certainly evident among current realist scholars and it manifests chiefly in a cyclical or repetitive philosophy of history. Mearsheimer (2001: 2) argues that world politics "have always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way". Similarly Gilpin (1983: 7) argues that the "fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia". This pessimism, however, is not evident in the work of Carr. His work contained many progressive ideas including re-democratising Britain in the face of structural inequalities (Carr, 1944: 117 – 25); re-democratising western politics in the face of alternative models of socio-political and economic life (Carr, 1947); searching for forms of post-national identity (Carr, 1945: 38 – 70); and searching for the means and methods of peaceful international change (Carr, 1946: 208 – 23). In fact, Carr (1951: 5 – 6) viewed history as a "a procession of events about which almost the only thing that can be said with certainty is that is moves constantly on and never returns to the same place".

As a result, many question Carr's association with the realist tradition. Some, for instance, argue that Carr is best thought of as a Marxist. The characterisation stems from the influence of Mannheim on his work. The idea of conditioned thought permeates *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, whilst the historical significance of class struggle is also a prominent feature (Carr, 1946: 66 – 78). Carr was certainly keen to stress such associations. He noted that *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, whilst not Marxist, was "'strongly impregnated with Marxist ways of thinking'" (cited Cox, 2001a: lxvi). These elements in his work have been taken by some as evidence of his Marxism (Brown, 2001: 28 – 30; Goldfischer, 2002).

Others prefer to characterise Carr as an idealist. Such literature emphasises the ethical visions contained in Carr's interregnum work. Booth (1991: 531) argues that Carr's utopianism has generally been "ignored by realists [because it] was inconvenient that one of realism's chief gurus had some decidedly utopian leanings". Similarly, Howe (1994: 277) argues that *The Twenty Years' Crisis* involves "healthy measures of utopianism", particularly in how it focuses on bringing about "a more peaceful and just international order".

These overlooked elements in Carr's work have led some to characterise him as a critical theorist. Robert Cox (1981: 128 and 1996: 27), whose observation on the pragmatic nature of knowledge echoed Carr's (1964: 27), lists Carr as being heavily influential on his own work. Cox (2000: 885) argues that a "retrieval of [Carr's] historical mode of thinking would be invaluable in unmasking the prevalent ideological cover of the power positions in

contemporary world politics and clearing the ground for an alternative vision of the future". Similarly Falk (1997) details the presence of a critical realist tradition in IR, which focuses on the realities of power and the dynamism of political and institutional arrangements, whilst pointing to possible imminent world orders. Falk (1997: 40) suggests that Carr falls into this category and, as a result, he was a "critical realist of the early, non self-conscious variety".

There are elements of truth regarding these classifications of E.H. Carr. Nevertheless, it is still possible to characterise Carr as a realist, if a "hedged" (Donnelly, 2000: 12), "different sort" (Cox, 2001: xl) or peculiar realist (Wilson, 2001). Booth (2010: 2) critiques the practice of labelling to explain, which is the labelling or pigeon holing scholars in order to explain their work. Accordingly, if one is to label Carr a realist, one needs to explain the label.

To recall from chapter two, realists, in the broadest sense, work from three general assumptions about the nature of politics. Specifically, realists view political life as being governed by the group as opposed to the individual. In addition, realists believe that self-interest motivates the group's actions. As a result, politics will generally produce conflictual, although not necessarily violent, relationships. Carr, like many of his classical contemporaries, held what is now commonly referred to as an agonistic view of politics. That is, conflict is an endemic feature of politics.

The first assumption – groupism – is clearly identifiable in his work. In *What is History* he argues that the idea of the individual apart from society is a fallacy. "Every human being", Carr (1964: 31) argues, "at every stage of history or pre-history is born into a society and from his earliest years is moulded by that society". This social process, which makes the idea of an abstracted and isolated individual a myth, permeates the nature of Carr's politics. Quoting Aristotle's maxim that man is a political animal, Carr finds the nature of politics to result from the human predisposition to live in communal groups. Carr (1946: 95) argues that "men have always from the most primitive times formed semi-permanent groups larger than the single family, and one of the functions of such a group has been to regulate relations between its members". It is the regulation and reproduction of these political groups that makes politics.

Carr also adheres to the assumption that interest motivates action. His realist critique of 19th century liberalism is based on the view that, rather than being universal in nature, it was an "unconscious [reflection] of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national

interest at a particular time" (Carr, 1946: 87). In perhaps his most realist work – *The Foreign Policy of Britain* – he recognises the complexity of national policy, the symbiotic as opposed to subaltern relationship between ends and means and the subjectivity of national interest. Yet, with regards to foreign policy he still concludes that "the traditions of the nation should be respected, its commitments honoured and its interests maintained" (1939: 2 – 3).

These two assumptions result in politics, for Carr, being driven by conflict. "Politics are", Carr (1946: 102) argues, "in one sense always power politics". He does recognise that international relations cannot be reduced to power and conflict. Nevertheless, Carr contends (1946: 102) that as "soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power of one state in relation to another, the matter at once becomes 'political'". For Carr (1946: 168), conflicting interests and political conflict are the fundamental feature of political life and have to be managed through prudent "give-and-take" and "self-sacrifice". In many ways, his aversion to 19th century liberalism was based on the notion that power and conflict had been eliminated from politics. Although power relations had been relatively concealed and operated subtly through the 1920s, power was pervasive nonetheless (Carr, 1946: 102). For Carr, what "was commonly called the 'return of power politics' in 1931 was, in fact, the termination of the monopoly of power enjoyed by the *status quo* Powers" (Carr, 1946: 103).

E.H. Carr may have had a unique perspective but this is hardly unique to E.H. Carr. There are, as with any intellectual grouping in International Relations, often as many realists as there are realisms. Carr did, however, subscribe to three broad realist assumptions about the political. He saw the group and not the individual as the fundamental feature of political life, he saw self-interest as motivating the group and he contended that, as a result, conflict was an endemic feature of political life. Carr was also a classical realist. This does not mean that he saw political conflict as being driven by a caricatured version of Hobbes' human nature, how some still characterise classical realism (Nuruzzaman, 2006: 241). Rather, Carr belonged to a group of "classical scholars" who wrote during a period, which included the "evolution to mass societies, the industrial revolution, the rise of nationalism and self-determination [that] redefined politics and concomitantly diplomacy and international affairs" (Guzzini, 2001: 121).

3.4 E.H. Carr's Classical Realist 'Framework of Answers'

Having 'explained the label' of classical realism as applied to E.H. Carr, this section will provide a contextual interpretation of the 'framework of answers' Carr's classical realist perspective offers. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to broach two issues regarding the use of 'classic' literature.

First, the last section concluded that E.H. Carr's work was a product of its time. If correct, one would assume this would question the relevance of his 'framework of answers' for studying the contemporary issue of US militarism in the Persian Gulf. Carr was aware of this problem. In the 1960s he wrote that he hoped he was "sufficiently up-to-date to recognise that anything written in the 1890s must be nonsense" (Carr, 1964: 8). In fact, the entirety of his international relations work can be viewed as a critique of employing the ideas of one century as means to make sense of the radically different conditions of another century (Evans, 1975). As a result, whilst many authors question his methodology (Smith, 1986: 68 – 98), his theoretical sophistication (Mearsheimer, 2001: 18), his critical insights (Rosenberg, 1994: 10 – 4), his politics (Pryce-Jones, 1999), his relativism (Morgenthau, 1948: 134; Bull, 1969: 628; Thompson, 1980: 77) and his historical determinism (Berlin, 1969: 81 – 7; Wilson 2000: 8), the most persistent criticism of Carr is his irrelevance. In other words, in "arguably" a condition of "postmodernity" (Jenkins, 1997: 3), Carr's 'modern' views appear antiquated.

Hirst (1999: 138 – 48), influenced by Parsons and Foucault, argues that political developments, in particular globalisation, have undermined Carr's statist assumptions regarding the locus of military, economic and political power. In addition, Jenkins (1995: 43 – 63 and 2004), influenced by Lyotard and Barthes, suggests that intellectual developments, in particular the problem of causality, have surpassed E.H. Carr's work. That is, because Carr's old-fashioned 'modern' ideas about objectivity mean that is "so unhelpful [and] out of date" (Jenkins, 2004: 319).

In contrast, however, others are more sanguine about the continued relevance of E.H. Carr. Cox (2010), for instance, suggests that Carr's work is perhaps ever more relevant now than at any time since its publication.

> The reason I think should be obvious. The liberal world that announced itself with such fanfare after the Cold War – in much the same way it announced itself after World War I – is clearly suffering from acute stress in the early part of the twenty-

> first century as a result of the 'war on terror' that seems to have no end, alterations in the structure of the world that are working to weaken the United States, and finally the global economic crisis. Taken separately neither factor alone would do a great deal of damage to the liberal project taken together they do, and hence compel us back to revisit one of the theorists of another, much earlier liberal crisis. Indeed, we could do a lot worse now than to turn back to Carr to see if he has anything useful to say about the sources of the current malaise. (Cox, 2010: 3)

Cox's (2010: 3) thesis, which is admittedly non-fleshed out, is chiefly concerned with Carr's critique of liberal internationalism and his understanding of international liberal crises and how this may illuminate on the current crisis. This, however, is only a partial explanation for E.H. Carr's continued relevance. The interpretation of E.H. Carr's work, which is offered in this work, suggests that his 'framework of answers', in particular his theories of power, history, revolution and war and militarism, can help understand the determinants of US militarism in the Gulf. In other words, Carr's work remains valid for thinking about traditional realist concerns such as the foreign policies of the great powers.

Second, as this endeavour is concerned with interpreting E.H. Carr's 'framework of answers', it is necessary to discuss a number of caveats regarding the contested practice of interpretation. If interpretation is the "act of 'extracting meaning' from a text", there is little agreement whether one can do so objectively, whether interpretation will always be subjective and therefore whether meaning is indeterminate (Welch, 2003: 309). What follows in this discussion is what Brown (2010: 143 – 4) refers to as a contextual rather than a symptomatic interpretation. The former is concerned with interpreting and reconstructing what the original text and author is doing, whilst the latter is concerned with deconstructionism through exposing the exclusions of the original work. The contextual method is employed here not because contextual readings are inherently superior. Instead, it is the nature of the research being undertaken that has informed this choice.

It is not only the practice of interpretation that is contested. Interpretations themselves are contested. As a result, multiple and often contradictory views of Carr exist in the extant literature. These include Carr the liberal (Duke, 1993); Carr the hard-headed realist (Mearsheimer, 2005); Carr the appeaser (Fox, 1985: 7 – 8); Carr the totalitarian (Pryce-Jones, 1999); and Carr the radical (Cox, 2000: 885). The interpretation offered in this thesis does not dispute these alternatives outright or claim a monopoly of interpretation. Rather,

thisinterpretation of Carr is grounded in his own methodological stance towards the relationship between theory and data (or interpretation and fact). Carr adopts an iterative strategy whereby theory and data work in tandem throughout the research process, mutually shaping, reshaping and refining each other (Carr, 1964: 28 – 30). The reading of Carr, in this thesis, has been shaped as much by the reading of American foreign policy in the northern Gulf and *vice-versa*. As Carr (1964: 30) noted, "history is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past". This may seem intuitively odd. However, as Halliday (2004: 258) humorously contended "one cannot step into the same Carr twice". In other words, interpreting the classics, like interpreting history, will always be contextualised by the present.

Interpretation, however, is not only coloured by present concerns. That which has intervened between the text and the present also shapes interpretation. As Brown (2010: 144) notes, interpretation involves an "an attempt to recreate as far as possible the context within which the author wrote". However, such recreations are necessarily contextualised. Through a musical analogy Brown (2010: 144) argues one cannot hope to recreate "Beethoven's symphonies the way Beethoven's audiences would have heard them" because "we cannot wipe out the auditory experiences of two hundred years by an act of will". The interpretation of Carr is coloured by not only the authors that followed him but also by the developments that have taken place in the discipline since he published his work. With these caveats in mind, the remainder of this section will outline Carr's classical realist 'framework of answers', which will be subsequently mapped onto the history of US foreign policy in the northern Persian Gulf.

3.4.1 Power

Power is perhaps the fundamental concept of political studies. Yet, power is a slippery and elusive concept (Baldwin, 2002; Berenskoetter, 2007). The aim here is not to add substantively to the literature on power. Rather the aim is to provide a contextual interpretation that detailshow Carr approached power, which will provide one element of his 'framework of answers'. In other words, because this thesis is chiefly concerned with American power and whether Carr's classical realism can enhance our understanding of it, it is necessary to outline his theory of power. Carr is often unjustly depicted as being atheoreticalregarding power (Mearsheimer, 2001: 18. This criticism is rather banal. Carr, as a functionalist, saw power's purpose as to produce and reproduce political order.

E.H. Carr, as discussed earlier, held anti-individualist assumptions about the nature of politics. He framed his understanding of politics in opposition to the individualistic ideas underpinning 19th century liberalism. Carr critiques the 19th century liberal ideal of an individual separate from society. He related the dominance of such ideas to the historical development of the capitalist system, which emphasised the importance of individual initiative. In doing so, he challenged the view that there is a dichotomy between the individual and society. Instead, he argued that this struggle between "liberty" and "social justice" reflected a struggle "between groups of individuals in society, each group striving to promote social policies favourable to it and to frustrate social policies inimical to it" (Carr, 1964: 34).

This groupism permeates Carr's understanding of politics. According to Carr (1946: 95) "Man has always lived in groups". He made this assumption because of his belief that it is impossible to become human without the socialisation processes of wider society (Carr, 1964: 31 – 2). As humans are moulded from an early age by the group and society into which they are born, "the individual apart from society would be both speechless and mindless" (1964: 31). That is not to suggest that Carr ascribed to methodological holism. In arguing that the "development of society and the development of the individual go hand in hand" (Carr, 1964: 32), he demonstrated an embryonic critical realist approach to the structure and agency question.

The stress Carr placed on the social aspect of humanity led him to conclude that power is necessary for any political order. Unlike some of his classical contemporaries, Carr was a dualist. "Sometimes [humans display] egoism", whilst at other times "[they display] sociability" (Carr, 1946: 95). As a result, some basis for concord is required. As he contends, "in every society some sanction is required to produce the measure of solidarity requisite for its maintenance" (Carr, 1946: 95). It is the powerful that are responsible for employing these sanctions. As a result, "Power", that is material capability, is a "necessary ingredient of every political order" (Carr, 1946: 232). In other words, Carr's anti-individualism leads him to a functional view of power.

Power's purpose, for E.H. Carr and his classical realist contemporaries (Rynning and Ringsmose, 2008: 23), isto produce and reproduce political order. However, Carr was not a simple 'might is right' realist. He saw both material capabilities *and* legitimate authority as being crucial to political order. As he argued, "Just as within the state every government,

though it needs power as a basis of its authority, also needs the moral basis of the consent of the governed, so an international order cannot be based on power alone" (Carr, 1946: 235). Thus, political order, according to Carr, is built on a blend of material capabilities and common appeals to legitimate authority.

International political orders are grounded in the material capability of a state to influence the military, economic and ideological spheres of activity. As Carr (1946: 232) argues, the post-WWI British political order was grounded in British military influence, which proved capable of "[guaranteeing] immunity from major wars" and "offered equal security to all". This was complemented by British economic influence, which "established a single currency" and "widespread acceptance of the principle of free trade". In addition, British ideological influence was maintained via linguistic dominance as English was the "*lingua franca* of four continents". This balance of power, which was "created by a superior power", produced "the illusion – and to some extent the reality" of a particular political order "possessing interests and sympathies in common" (Carr, 1946: 232).

This focus on material influence, however, is complemented by a stress on the importance of legitimacy. The stability of a political order rests on the ability to blend both power and moral appeals. "International politics", according to Carr (1946: 145), "are always power politics; for it is impossible to eliminate power from them. But that is only part of the story". Power, that is material influence, needs to be grounded in authority that is made morally legitimate. As a result, Carr (1946: 145) argues that there exists "an international stock of common ideas, however limited and however weakly held, to which appeal can be made, and of a belief that these common ideas stand somehow in the scale of values above national interests". These moral appeals "like the supremacy of a ruling class within the state" must be judiciously managed and made "tolerable" to all that exist within the political order (Carr, 1946: 168 – 9). As he argues, "It is a basic fact about human nature that human beings do in the long run reject the doctrine that might makes right" (1946: 145). This is because "mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power" (Carr, 1946: 235 – 6). Accordingly, material power needs to be made palatable through appeals to common or shared ideas.

Carr's principal rationale, particularly in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, was to "[counteract] the glaring and dangerous defect of nearly all thinking [during the interregnum] – the almost total neglect of the factor of power" (Carr, 1946: vii). This statement is usually deployed to suggest that Carr was opposed to the utopian thought, which ignored power (Mearsheimer,

2005a: 140 – 3). In reality, however, Carr was stressing that the effects of power, in particular the common appeals underpinning it, had been neglected. In other words, the common appeals or moral basis underpinning power, which lacked an adequate grounding in reality, helped inspire a revolt. He writes, for instance, that:

> just as the threat of class-war by the proletarian is a 'natural cynical reaction to the sentimental and dishonest efforts of the privileged classes to obscure the conflict of interest between classes by a constant emphasis on the minimum interests which they have in common', so the war-mongering of the dissatisfied Powers was the 'natural cynical reaction' to the sentimental and dishonest platitudinising of the satisfied Powers on the common interest in peace. (Carr, 1946: 84)

In other words, Carr was not simply suggesting that power had been neglected. Rather, and perhaps more importantly, he was arguing that the effects of power had been neglected.

Mearsheimer suggested that Carr was theoretically unaware with regards power. This section has illustrated Mearsheimer's misunderstanding. Carr saw power as functional. In other words, power's purpose was to produce and reproduce political order. He was also broadly materialist. Carr saw political order as being sustained through military, economic and ideological influence. Additionally, however, he was acutely aware that power needed to be moralised and legitimised. Equally important, however, Carr was keen to map the effects of power and to stress how power, which is not imbued with moral legitimacy, tends to generate revolt. This element of Carr's 'framework of answers' will be considered in greater detail in the empirical component of this thesis.

3.4.2 History

E.H. Carr's "brand of realism", according to Germain (2004: 322), "[was] powerfully influenced by his view of history". His philosophy of history is perhaps adequately captured by the following statement. According to Carr (1947: vii), "[unless] we are content to believe that history has no meaning, we are bound to treat it as a coherent sequence in which one set of events or ideas leads on to another set of events or ideas and helps to influence them and determine them". Given that the empirical focus of this thesis is historical, it is necessary to detail Carr's 'framework of answers' regarding history. As will be discussed, Carr was a realist and a materialist. Thus, he was chiefly concerned with tracing the causal effects of particular material conditions, in particular the effects of particular political orders.

E.H. Carr suggested that history should be studied through a nascent critical realist philosophy. For some, critical realist philosophy is seen as a panacea for the post-positivist study of international relations.Others, however, are more cautious. Brown (2007: 416), whilst welcoming it as a platform for materialist analyses of world politics, worried that it could "revitalise debates over epistemology and ontology [and do international relations] no good". This is likely the position E.H. Carr would have taken. In her memoir of Carr, Deutscher (1983: 84) commented that Carr "barred all 'fundamental' philosophical discussions". This was because "Any kind of philosophical terminology jarred on him". As a result, "he would quickly put away in the farthest corner of the room any book which smacked to him of such jargon".

Nevertheless, it is possible to characterise Carr as a philosophical, if simplistic, critical realist. According to Benton and Craib (2001: 120), critical realists are "committed to the existence of a real world, which exists and acts independently of our knowledge or beliefs about it". In addition, critical realists "hold that this external world is in principle knowable, and to some (discoverable) extent open to being changed on the basis of such knowledge as we are able to achieve". This (unusually) straightforward account of critical realism dovetails with Carr's philosophical position. For instance, he argued that "human actions have causes which are in principle knowable". As a result, he argued that "History, like everyday life would be impossible", if this was not the case (Carr, 1964: 93 – 4). He was also critical in the sense that he believed that the knowable world was open to change, which is illustrated by the frequent policy interventions found in his inter-war academic work (Carr, 1944: 129 – 275, 1945: 38 – 70 and 1946: 208 – 39) and his journalist writings (Jones, 1998: 72 – 112).

As a philosophical realist, he was committed to causal determinism. That is, Carr was committed to the view that the causes of human actions and social are discoverable. According to Carr (1964: 87) the great thinker "is the man who asks the question 'Why?'". This commitment to causality is grounded in the "axiom that everything has a cause [and that this] is a condition of our capacity to understand what is going on around us" (Carr, 1964: 93 – 4). He recognised, perhaps too fleetingly, that causes have to be interpreted, they are often multiple and often complex. Nevertheless, he argued that causes, in the final resort, have to be subordinated and "order and unity [brought] into the chaos of happenings" (Carr, 1964: 91).

This preference for hierarchy or closure is one reason why post-modernists are opposed to Carr. The various post-modern movements, which eschew causal determinism, are grounded in the principle that, as interpretation is subjective, all knowledge is indeterminate. This results in the problem of history. According to Vaughan-Williams (2005: 117), this is the "impossibility of getting historical interpretation one hundred percent right". In *What is History*, Carr outlined a defence against this reasoning. He argued that "It does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different shapes from different angles of vision, it has objectively either no shape at all or an infinity of shapes". In other words, just "because interpretation plays a necessary part in establishing the facts of history, and because no existing interpretation is wholly objective", this does not mean that history is "in principle not amenable to objective interpretation" (Carr, 1964: 26 – 7). To clarify, the problem with postmodern objections to causality is that they result from illogical reasoning. The objection to interpreting causal determinism is grounded in the principle that all knowledge claims are indeterminate. Yet, if all knowledge claims are indeterminate, this includes the claim 'that all knowledge claims are indeterminate'. If this is correct, then there is little reason to eschew causal analysis.

Although a causal determinist, Carr was not a historical determinist. Historical determinism is a belief in "the impotence of deliberate action, whether individual or concerted, to alter the course of human history, since historical changes are allegedly the products of deep-lying forces which conform to fixed, though perhaps not always known, patterns of development" (Nagel, 1960: 291). In contrast, whilst accepting that historical forces were indeed powerful, E.H. Carr was starkly opposed to the irresistibility of existing forces. Accordingly, like many critical realists, Carr viewed the causes of the social (and natural) world as being tendential. As he argues:

> The so-called laws of sciences which affect our ordinary life are in fact statements of tendency, statements of what will happen other things being equal…They do not claim to predict what will happen in concrete cases. The law of gravity does not prove that [a] particular apple will fall to the ground: somebody may catch it in a basket. The law of optics that light travels in a straight line does not prove that a particular ray of light may not be refracted or scattered by some intervening object. (Carr, 1964: 68)

However, this does not mean that understanding the causes of events in the social world have no utility beyond the specifics of a particular event. Rather, Carr argues that when tendential causes are applied to the social world they can "serve as a guide to action and a key to our understanding of how things happen". Although one cannot predict a unique event such as a revolution, he argues that one can suggest that a "revolution is likely to occur in the near future if somebody touches it off, or unless somebody on the government side does something to stop it" (Carr, 1964: 69). Thus, for Carr the causes of human action and social events are, in principle, open to being determined.

Carr also advocated a broadly materialist approach to history. Marx's historical materialism is predicated on the basis that material conditions, which specifically for Marx meant the mode of economic production, generate social forces that ultimately result in transformation and historical development (McLellan, 2000: 141 – 236). This materialist outlook is present in Carr's historical approach. As he notes in *The New Society*, the forces of the French, American and industrial revolutions generated the political conditions of the mid-20th century (Carr, 1951: 2). In other words Carr is keen to stress how material conditions, which for E.H. Carr meant the structural conditions of a political order, create unintended effects. Carr, like other classical realists, contended that whilst power was a crucial ingredient of political order, power has a tendency to create revolt. As he noted, "power, always tends to reach a point where it defeats its own end by inciting the mind to revolt" (Carr, 1946: 145). As a result, history is driven by the "social forces", often unintended, which are generated by the particular material conditions of particular political orders. These forces generate "results often at variance with, and sometimes opposite to, the results which they themselves intended" (Carr, 1964: 52).

Carr's philosophy of history is, therefore, conterminous to historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalist insights have increasingly been brought into International Relations (Ikenberry, 1998a, 1999b and 2001; Dannreuther, 2011 and Mabee, 2011). In particular, the concept of path dependency is used to illustrate the relative stability of specific political, social and institutional settlements. In other words, particular paths or branches, which are selected at critical junctures, often generate self-reinforcing mechanisms that institutionalise and reinforce earlier policy decisions. In contrast, Mahoney sketches a form of path dependency, which is generated by reactive sequencing. According to Mahoney (2000: 526, emphasis in the original), "reactive sequences are marked by backlash processes that

transform or perhaps *reverse* early events". They are chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events" (Mahoney, 2000: 509) and "each event in the sequence is both a reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events" (Mahoney, 2000: 526). This dovetails neatly with Carr's concern with tracing cause and effect sequences. As he notes, political orders often "produce results, utterly remote from the conscious purposes of those who set them in motion" (Carr, 1944: 6).

Carr's (1951: 1) historical approach was grounded in the principle that in order to understand the present one first has to understand the past. In particular, Carr was keen to trace the origins and subsequent developments of particular material conditions. Generally, the neoclassical realist accounts of American foreign policy in the Gulf have focused on one event – the Iraq War. The historical element of Carr's 'framework of answers', as will be discussed throughout the empirical sections of this thesis, should help enhance this lack of historical context.

3.4.3 Revolution

Halliday (2004: 258), who was certainly no realist but was nevertheless hugely influenced by E.H. Carr, wrote that there is "no concept more central to the extended *oeuvre* of Carr than that of revolution". As a result, the proceeding discussion illustratesthat revolution was central to the 'framework of answers' of E.H. Carr's classical realism. The aim of which is to stress that for Carr, revolutionary actors and their actions and reactions contour the foreign policies of the status quo powers. This idea will be employed in the subsequent empirical chapters in order to enhance realist understandings of American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.

Although Carr has been critiqued for failing to adequately define revolutions (Halliday, 2004: 259), he argued that they are symbolic of the "[breaking] up and [sweeping] away the half-rotted structure of an old social and political order, and lay the foundations of new". Unlike many others, however, Carr does not limit revolutions to the political sphere. In fact, he saw revolutionary change as operating in the industrial (Carr, 1939: 27 – 32 and 1951: 1), the military (Carr, 1944: xi – xiv), the economic (1951: 19 – 60) and the psychological spheres (Carr, 1964: 134 – 50) of human activity. Thus, unlike the majority of the realist literature (although see Walt, 1992), Carr is focused on how revolution and revolutions alter international relations. As Wilson (2000: 10) argues, "the French revolution, the 'great social

revolution', and the Bolshevik revolution, are much more important in Carr's [classical realism] than the 'condition of anarchy'". In particular, Carr recognised that revolution was an important factor in international relations because it generated new ideas about political authority and tended to alter a country's foreign policies.

In *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*, Carr discussed how new ideas, which were in part generated by the Soviet revolution, altered politics in the western powers. The Soviet revolution, according to Carr (1947: 1 – 19), produced particular internationalist ideas that challenged the supremacy of the liberal individualist tradition. Similarly, Carr argued that the Soviet revolution generated new ideas about economic practice, which affected the *laissez faire* western capitalist states. In fact, he saw the development of economic planning and the move towards collectivist social policies, as being "largely the result, conscious or unconscious, of the impact of Soviet practice and achievement" (Carr, 1947: 20). The Soviet revolution also produced new forms of political consciousness and a new political "creed capable of generating…devotion and enthusiasm" (Carr, 1947: 85).

E.H. Carr also stressed how a revolution invariably generated a change in a country's foreign policy (see also Halliday, 1999: 133 – 57 and 2002). He argued that the Soviet revolution signalled "the emergence of a Russian national political consciousness…and this betokened the beginnings of a reaction against European penetration and resentment of European influence and European airs of superiority" (1947: 104 – 5). Accordingly, the Soviet state worked to increase its security by expanding its influence in Eastern Europe (Carr, 1947: 108 – 9). Accordingly, in his voluminous work on the Russian revolution Carr charted the changes it produced in Russia's foreign policy (Carr, 2004b: 9 – 19; 84 – 105 and 173 – 84). These transformations included withdrawing from WWI, establishing the Communist International to export revolution, creating new alliances with Germany and generally becoming alienated from the western powers.

To quote Wilson (2000: 4), Carr is not the "realist's realist"; rather he is the revolutionist's realist. That is, Carr was keen to stress how revolutionary actors and forces altered politics between nations. In other words, Carr's utility extends beyond helping us to understand the current malaise of liberal internationalism. As the empirical chapters of this thesis will show, incorporating revolution into Carr's 'framework of answers' can address the unknown of American militarism, which was identified in chapter two.

3.4.5 War and Militarism

The core question of this research is concerned with understanding the causes of American militarism in the Gulf and by-proxy the 2003 Iraq War. Accordingly, this subsection charts Carr's 'framework of answers' with regards war and militarism. It points to Carr's conservative understanding of war, which he traced to political breakdown, and his classical sociologist understanding of why power manifests coercively.

According to Nelson and Olin, the causes of war literature can usefully be distilled into three ideological categories: the conservative, the radical and the liberal. The liberal tradition emphasises that regime type is crucial to war. That is, authoritarian regimes are more prone to war than democratic regimes. Liberal perspectives on war also stress the psychological and individual biases created by crisis moments, which often generate war (Nelson and Olin, 1979: 39 – 43). Radical lenses of war, on the other hand, often stress capitalist motives for war (Nelson and Olin, 1979: 75 – 91). Conservative explanations for war, in contrast, offer two chief factors generating violent conflict. The biological approach traces war to the flawed nature of man. It is based on a caricatured Hobbesian view of human nature. In contrast, the structural approach relates war to the breakdown of political authority and hierarchy (Nelson and Olin, 1979: 16). This explanation is found in Gilpin's (1983) *War and Change in World Politics*, where he traces hegemonic wars to disequilibrium or disruptions in the balance of power, which are created by rising or declining powers. Gilpin (1984: 291) lists Carr as one of the chief influences on his work. Therefore, it is no surprise that Carr shares this conservative understanding of war.

This conservative outlook is clearly evident in Carr's work on the two world wars. For instance, he argued that "When the passions of war are aroused, it becomes almost fatally easy to attribute the catastrophe solely to the ambitions of and the arrogance of a small group of men". Critiquing this perspective, Carr (1946: ix) favoured analysing the "underlying and significant, rather than the immediate and personal" causes of war. Subsequently, he related the interregnum crisis to the breakdown of international hierarchy and political order. For Carr (1964: 46), the two wars of the 20th century were not a product of the "individual wickedness of Wilhelm II and Hitler"; rather, they were produced by a "deep-seated breakdown in the system of international relations". In fact, he concluded that the descent into war symbolised "final and irrevocable breakdown of the conditions which made the

nineteenth-century order possible" (Carr, 1946: 236 – 7). In other words, as discussed above, there had been a total neglect of power.

This conservative vantage led Carr to offer tentative suggestions for why power manifests in militarised forms. Often overlooked in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is an attempt (buried and perhaps implicit) to explore the conditions whereby the instruments of power transform into coercive forms. Carr's (1946: 108, fn.3) overt influence is Bertrand Russell. According to Russell (2004: 5), "power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from any of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations". Like Russell, Carr seemed concerned with this aim.

Carr (1946: 132) saw power as chiefly manifesting in either "'civilised'" (meaning economic or political) or "hazardous" (meaning military) forms. It is possible to describe these as soft and hard forms of power. Nye (2004b: 120), who developed these terms, has recognised the influence of E.H. Carr on his own work. However, Nye and Carr are not synonymous. For Nye (2004b: 5), hard power rests on "inducements ('carrots') or threats ('sticks')", whilst soft power "rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others". As a result, Nye clearly distinguishes between the two. That is, for Nye, "soft power is the power of attraction, the influence of example – as opposed to the influence and power derived from military force, economic sanctions and even economic aid" (Parmar and Cox, 2010: 1). Carr (1946: 132), on the other hand, takes a less dichotomous approach. As he argues, "Power, which is an element of all political action, is one and indivisible. It uses military and economic weapons for the same end". In other words, whilst Nye stresses the differences between the coercive and attractive forms of power, Carr challenges this dichotomy.

In addition, Carr and Nye diverge, because the former is more concerned with understanding the potential conditions when hazardous military forms of power are likely to prevail over softer 'civilised' forms of power. For Carr (1946: 109), military power is a "weapon which it may require in the last resort to use". This 'last resort' implies that when softer forms of power fail to achieve the desired effect, harder forms of power will be employed. "The substitution", Carr informs us "of the economic weapon for the military weapon – what Marx calls the replacement of cannons by capital – is a symptom not so much of superior morality as of superior strength" (1946: 129). This thesis is reiterated a number of pages later. "The strong", according to Carr (1946: 132), "will tend to prefer the minor and more 'civilised' weapon, because it will generally suffice to achieve his purposes; and as long as it will

suffice, he is under no temptation to resort to the more hazardous military weapon". In other words, militarism – the use of force – is employed when the strong are unable or unwilling to influence the situation through alternative means.

These four elements – power, history, revolution and war and militarism – form a coherent 'framework of answers'. In the subsequent empirical chapters, this framework of answers will be applied to the history of American policy in the Gulf. The resulting theoretically driven narrative will consider the broader causes of American militarism in the Gulf, but also whether Carr can enhance neoclassical accounts. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to discuss the methodology employed in this thesis.

3.4.6 Methodology

As this thesis is researching the history of US foreign policy in the northern Persian Gulf through the theoretical lens of E.H. Carr, it makes sense to employ his methodological approach. Carr followed what has been termed historiography, which is "the writing of history based on a selective, critical reading of sources that [synthesise] particular bits of information into a narrative description or analysis" (Thies, 2002: 351). It is akin to what is commonly referred to as process tracing. Process tracing, according to Bennett (2010: 208), is "analogous to a detective attempting to solve a crime by looking at clues and suspects and piecing together a convincing explanation".

This has been achieved through documentary analysis. This method utilises official records and personal or biographic writings as the means through which to collect a "rich source of data" (Punch, 2005: 184). Carr (1964: 16), as a traditionalist historian concerned with high politics, was primarily concerned with documents of the state. *The Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) is the primary source for historic American foreign policy. This official series publishes reports, briefings, memoranda of conversations, minutes of meetings and personal correspondence from the principal agencies of American foreign policy. These include the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defence (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Data collected from the FRUS was complemented with archival work at the Presidential Libraries network and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland. The empirical research focused principally on the NSC and the DOS bureau in charge of Near Eastern

Affairs (NEA)[3] as the primary institutions concerned with developing and implementing security and diplomatic policy. Archival research was undertaken in response to claims that over reliance on secondary sources often engenders the risk of replicating unacknowledged biases (Larson, 2001). However, where primary resources remain closed, in particular for the latter periods of this study, the thesis has had to rely on secondary sources, specifically media reports and official pronouncements.

Documentary analysis does engender methodological problems. As George and Bennett (2004: 100 – 4) argue, there is an inherent danger documentary analysis will replicate unacknowledged errors or politicised statements as Objective truth. Jackson (2008: 7), however, has questioned this naive characterisation of documentary research. He argues that archival researchers generally adopt a sceptical stance towards historical records. E.H. Carr (1964: 8 – 30), who questioned the idea that facts speak for themselves, clearly took this sceptical position. The problem with such a perspective is that it fails to acknowledge how documents are subjective. Historical documents can only tell us "what the author of the document thought – what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he though, or even only what he himself thought he thought" (Carr, 1964: 16).

In order to minimise the effect of subjectivity bias this thesis, where appropriate, has followed Thies' (2002: 365 – 6) recommendations. Thies argues that it is impossible to eradicate the subjective nature of historical documents. However, Thies suggests that, by consulting an extensive array of sources and practising triage (revealing disputes and debates found in the documents), subjectivity bias can, if not be eradicated, be minimised.

This thesis has consulted a range of primary and secondary sources. Qualitative interviews were considered as a potential means to increase the extensiveness of sources used in this project, however, they were rejected on the basis that similar works were refused interview access (Almutairi, 2009: 139). Where different documents offer competing perspectives or viewpoints these have also been made explicit in the text. However, such differences or disputes should not be considered the main focus of this thesis.

[3] This institution has repeatedly changed its name during the timeframe covered in this thesis. To save confusion, the work will refer to the Bureau by its traditional NEA abbreviation.

Documentary analysis also entails selectivity bias. Historical facts, for Carr (1964: 23), are "like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean". As a result, "what the historian catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use". In other words, any historical analysis will necessarily include and exclude certain documents from the finished work. Carr offers no systematic approach for this. Rather he outlines an abstracted approach in terms of historical significance. Historical facts – or data – are the raw material of the historian. Yet, they have to be brought to life through interpretation. The facts of history "speak only when the historian calls on them. It is he who decides which facts to give to the floor and in what order or context" (Carr, 1964: 11). This process of inclusion and exclusion is desirable in order to "'sew together a logical and rational quilt of "knowledge"'" (Carr, 1964: 104).

This begs the question what is logical and Carr finds the answer in terms of historical significance. Significance, however, is not an absolute value. Rather, it is "something still incomplete and in the process of becoming" (Carr, 1964: 121) and is revealed through the research process. As a result, Carr advocates what is commonly referred to as an iterative research strategy (Bryman, 2004: 10). This is the process whereby theory and data work in tandem, mutually shaping and reshaping each other throughout the research process. As Carr noted,

> as soon as I have got going on a few of what I take to be capital sources, the itch becomes too strong and I begin to write – not necessarily at the beginning, but somewhere, anywhere. Thereafter, reading and writing go simultaneously. The writing is added to, subtracted from, reshaped, cancelled, as I go on reading. The reading is guided and directed and made fruitful by the writing: the more I write, the more I know what I am looking for, the better I understand the significance and relevance of what I find…I am convinced that, for any historian worth the name, the two processes of what economists call 'input' and 'output' go on simultaneously and are, in practice, parts of a single process. (1964: 28)

In the end, however, it is impossible to remove any form of subjectivity or selectivity bias from historical study. As the "element of interpretation enters into every fact of history" (Carr, 1964: 13), historiography becomes the "'hard core of interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts'" (Carr, 1964: 23). This however does not equate to interpretative anarchy. For Carr, whilst "objectivity of fact" is unobtainable, objectivity of the "relation between fact and interpretation, between past [and] present". However, this is something

"incomplete and in the process of becoming". In other words, objective interpretation is nothing the researcher themselves can claim. As Gaddis (2001: 322) comments, one cannot eradicate the problems of writing history. One can only be aware of the problem and "then get on with doing history as best we can, leaving it to our readers to determine which of our interpretations comes closest to the truth". With this caveat in mind, the remainder of this thesis will thread E.H. Carr's classical realist ideas through a conceptually driven historical narrative of US foreign policy in the northern Gulf.

3.5 Conclusion

E.H. Carr occupies a strange place in the discipline of international relations. Traditionalist readings paint him as the archetypal realist who crusaded against idealistic thought. Revisionist readings, on the other hand, tend to characterise him as a forerunner of critical theoretical approaches. As a result, he is held aloft as someone who could help understand the contemporary problems befalling the American led liberal order. The reading of Carr offered here, on the other hand, takes a bit from both. Employing Carr's own iterative approach, the interpretation of Carr (the theory) has been influenced as much by the interpretation of the case being researched (the historical 'fact'). In turn, four particular elements of Carr's work, specifically his discussions of power, history, revolution and war and militarism, have been synthesised into a 'framework of answers'. The remainder of this thesis will now draw on this 'framework of answers' in order to map past and present (meaning up until 2003) American foreign policy in the Gulf. The purpose of which is to consider whether the George W. Bush administration's approach to the Persian Gulf can be located within the wider history of America's regional policy. In addition, the empirical study will consider whether putting Carr's classical realism back into neoclassical realism can enhance and expand the formers accounts of American foreign policy.

4 Countering the Revolution

> The Soviet Union was the big bear to the north [of the Persian Gulf]…It was close at hand. It wasn't far away. So there was a lot of concern about that and, not least, the concern, in the largest strategic sense, of Soviet access to the warm waters of the Gulf to the south and control over the oil of that region. (Laingen, 1992)

4.1 Introduction

Bruce Laingen, a member of staff in the Iranian embassy in the early 1950s, neatly summarised the chief concerns motivating American policy in the Persian Gulf. In other words, preventing the expansion of Soviet influence (whether real or exaggerated) was the chief idea guiding American policymakers in the Gulf. Drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realist description of Britain's balance of power policy in Europe, this chapter illustrates the creation of a similar American policy in the Gulf. America's strategic interests in the southern Gulf, particularly in Saudi Arabia, resulted in attempts to employ the northern Gulf as a 'strategic buffer' or 'northern tier' between the Gulf and the Soviet Union. Utilising Carr's discussion of political order and unintended effects, the chapter illustrates the revolutionary forces that this political order engendered, how they challenged America's strategic interests and in doing so ultimately reshaped the trajectory of American foreign policy. In sum, the chapter discusses the balancing strategies the US employed to counter the nationalist revolutions in Iran and in Iraq.

4.2 The Origins of US Policy in the Northern Persian Gulf

E.H. Carr's (1951: 1) historical approach was grounded in the principle that in order to understand the present one first has to understand the past. Accordingly, this section traces the origins of American foreign policy in the Gulf. This section illustrates how developments in WWII radically altered America's interest in the Gulf. In particular, it resulted in the development of a balancing strategy, which was rather similar to Carr's (1939: 124 – 5) description of Britain's approach to Europe.

During the early 20th century America acted aloofly towards the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. As one Department of State (1971a: 513) paper put it, there was little interest in anything "more than extending protection to American philanthropic and missionary activities and the assurance of equality of opportunity for nominal exchange". As a result,

American interactions with the Gulf were chiefly non-governmental, what Carr would have labelled *laissez faire*. Chief activities included proselytising missions that were funded by the Presbyterian Church (Zirinsky, 1993;Ghaneabassiri, 2002), and commercial interests in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and the Arab American Oil Company.

The economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s, as Carr (1944: 71) argued, produced reform of the *laissez faire* tradition in the US, particularly during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Developments in WWII also altered America's isolationism regarding the Gulf. Germany's 1942 invasion of Russia resulted in an Anglo-Russian alliance which, in turn, resulted in a joint invasion of Iran. The Japanese attacks at Pearl Harbour in late 1941 dragged America (officially) into the conflict. Subsequently, the Persian Gulf became the principal route to provide lend-lease material to the Soviet Union, who the US were now allied with (Motter, 1951: 3 – 26). As a result, the three ports at the head of the Gulf were transformed into modern supply lines (Macris, 2010: 43 – 7). In other words, the Persian Gulf became a crucial geo-strategic point in America's international relations.

It was Saudi Arabia, in particular, which most interested US policymakers. In 1933 Standard Oil of California successfully won an oil concession in Saudi Arabia meaning an American firm owned a monopoly over the concession area (Yergin, 2009: 272 – 5). Saudi Arabian oil production, by the time of America's entry into WWII, was nearing 20,000 barrels of oil per day. At the same time, the technological aspects of WWII underscored the significance of oil supplies for national security (Painter, 1992: 190 – 2). Accordingly, the US, as E.H. Carr's classical realist lens would suggest, became concerned with obtaining and maintaining material influence in the strategically important country. For James Byrnes, Roosevelt's Secretary of War Mobilisation, Saudi Arabia's importance lay in its "'strategic location…the important oil resources of that country and the prestige of King Ibn Saud throughout the Arab world'" (cited Bronson, 2006: 24). Accordingly President Roosevelt, as his successors have done (see Cordesman, 1987; Miller, 1991; Hart, 1998; Bronson, 2006), saw US national security as being dependent on the stability of the US-Saudi relationship. In fact, President Roosevelt, in extending aid to the country, went as far as to say that the "'[defence] of Saudi Arabia is vital to the [defence] of the United States'" (cited Stork and Wenger, 1991: 22).

Consequently, America's strategic interest in Saudi Arabia led rather naturally to a balancing strategy for the northern Gulf. As discussed, E.H. Carr (1939: 124) suggested that Britain's principal European policy was to balance against power that would challenge its interests. A

similar strategy, which was produced by America's strategic interest in Saudi Arabia, was the initial factor shaping America's approach to the northern Persian Gulf countries.

This is illustrated by exploring America's policy in Iran at this juncture. There was a general concern that the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran could result in either country obtaining preponderance in the region. As a result, John Jernegan (1943), a member of staff in the US embassy, argued that the US should send advisory missions to Iran to remove "any excuse for post-war occupation, partition or tutelage [by Britain or Russia]". Dean Acheson (1943), Under Secretary of State, opposed the policy. He argued that such a move was tantamount to "imperialist penetration". Nevertheless, President Roosevelt (1944) considered Iran a good testing ground for illustrating "what [America] could do [with] an unselfish policy". Subsequently, three advisory missions were deployed to Iran to support what Patrick Hurley (1943), President Roosevelt's special assistant, called "nation-building".

Ostensibly, the advisory missions in reflected America's concern with ensuring that the country was capable of supporting the Persian Gulf supply route. However, the policy also reflected a concern with balancing against opposing power in the northern Gulf. As Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, argued:

> it is to the advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran's integrity and independence are maintained and that she becomes prosperous and stable. Likewise, from a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia. (Hull, 1964: 378)

This policy, as will be shown throughout this thesis, has continually been invoked by American policymakers. However, it has often been altered to reflect particular conditions. This is illustrated by looking at US foreign policy after the war. A joint treaty, which gave a deadline of six months after the cessation of WWII for allied forces to withdraw, accompanied the Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran. In the build-up to the March 1946 deadline, the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions of Iran, which were both located in the Soviet occupied zone, declared their independence from the central Iranian state (Blake, 2009: 28 – 34). American policymakers voiced concern, particularly when intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet Union were not withdrawing their forces, that the Soviet Union was seeking to expand its influence in Iran in order to demand oil concessions and communication and transit rights (Lenczowski, 1990: 9 – 10).

In response, America sought to secure Russian withdrawal through the recently established UN (Fawcett, 1992: 122 – 31), whilst tacit evidence suggests that President Harry S. Truman made a *démarche* to the Soviet Union. In his memoirs Truman (cited Lenczowski, 1990: 13) indicated that he personally assured Russia that their continued presence in Iran would be met with American force. The Soviet forces did withdraw from Iran after negotiating a possible oil concession with Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam (Hasanli, 2006: 216 – 7 and 240 – 1). Any Soviet gains in Iran, however, were subsequently lost. In December 1946, backed by a $10 million US military grant and an implied security guarantee, Qavam deployed the Iranian military to retake the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions (Pach, 1991: 104), whilst the promised Soviet oil concession was rejected by the Iranian *Majlis* (parliament) (Bill, 1988: 37 – 8).

It was in this context that the Cold War, what Deutscher (1960) referred to as the Great Clash, was born. The clash was accompanied by a perceptible shift in American rhetoric and action. George Kennan (1947), a political officer in the Moscow embassy, wrote an infamous 'long telegram' in which he argued that co-habitation with Russia was impossible. As such, America should actively seek to contain Soviet influence. Not everyone agreed with Kennan's analysis. Charles Bohlen, also a political officer in the Moscow embassy, suggested that a more co-operative balance should be pursued (Pach, 1991: 21). Nevertheless, containment would subsequently form the bedrock of American post-war foreign policy. It produced the Truman doctrine and the US national security state. It also provided the cement, what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) would have referred to as common appeals, for the post-war Persian Gulf political order.

In the first instance, America's nascent Cold War strategy dovetailed with the concerns of political elites in the two northern Gulf countries. For The Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the actions of the Soviet Union in the north of the country led him to reverse Iran's traditional policy of equilibrium between the major powers. A positive alignment with America offered an implicit security guarantee against any future Soviet intervention. It was also believed that it would strengthen the Pahlavistate against *Tudeh* (Iran's communist party) inspired unrest in the country (Chubin and Zabih, 1974: 4 – 5). Similarly, Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Said, was concerned about Egypt's growing regional influence and nationalist opposition to his ruling regime. Strengthening ties to the powerful western countries was a means to counter these perceived challenges (Williamson, 2004: 89 – 90).

In the second instance, American strategy also concerted with British policy. Tension and mutual suspicion often characterised Anglo-American relations in the Middle East after WWII. For instance, many American policymakers were critical of Britain's imperial past. However, on the whole America "never doubted the conjunction of British and American strategic interests…[and] were wary of undermining British security interests in vital areas like…the Middle East" (Leffler, 1992: 2). In October 1947 representatives of Britain and America met in Washington to discuss the Middle East. Although the talks produced no formal agreement or treaty, they concluded in the establishment of a tacit Anglo-American political order for the northern Gulf.

From the American perspective the Middle East was crucial to the developing world order. Militarily, there was an interest in the region because of its strategic location and its "tremendous value…as a highway but sea, land and between East and West". Economically, the importance of the region stemmed from its "possession of great mineral wealth". Ideologically, there was a concern that the "rising nationalism of the peoples of the Middle East [could] harden in a mould of hostility to the West". In essence, American strategy towards the region was grounded in the belief that "Soviet aspirations in the Middle East which, if fulfilled, would have a disastrous effect not only on American interest in the area but on our general position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union". As a result, it was considered "essential that Soviet expansion in that area be contained" (Department of State, 1971a: 513 – 4).

However, American commitments in Europe and the Pacific meant that they required a continued British military guarantee over the region. The British, on the other hand, required economic concessions from the Americans, particularly with regards Sterling trading areas and quasi-imperialist oil concessions (Department of State, 1971a: 514 – 6). Both Iraq and Iran were considered vital to this nascent order. For instance, "the preservation of the political independence and the territorial integrity of Iran was essential to the maintenance of the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East" (Department of State, 1971b: 593). In addition, Iraq, which was home to major military installations crucial for British force projection, was "regarded as possibly the key Middle Eastern country" (Department of State, 1971c: 594). In other words, the balancing strategy was refashioned to accommodate an alliance between the US, Britain and the two northern Gulf countries, which had the

explicit aim of countering Soviet influence in the region and domestic unrest or instability in the two northern Gulf countries.

As E.H. Carr's classical realist lens would suggest, material influence in the economic, military and ideological spheres of human activity, was a crucial ingredient of this order. For instance, Iraq was made eligible for Point IV[4] assistance. A mission was sent to Iraq to train technicians, support Iraq's economic development and organise exchange programmes (Wiens, 1959: 142). Economic aid purchased influence in Iraq, particularly in the country's development board, which was tasked with governing Iraq's post-war economic reconstruction. As Ambassador Ryan Crocker (1982: 556) noted, America had a seat on this board that allowed the US to exert subtle ideological and economic influence in Iraq. Additionally, Iraq was made eligible for the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) and received a $10 million MAP grant (Stassen, 1986: 2367 – 8). As per the terms of the MAP, a Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) was attached to the Iraqi military. The MAAG functioned to oversee the MAP, but also provided American with access to Iraq's armed forces personnel (Barrow, 1986: 2358).

Similar programmes were started in Iran. A Point IV programme was established in 1951. According to William Warne (1999: 18), who headed the programme, American technicians oversaw agricultural, health and educational improvement programmes in Iran. The Point IV programme shaped the political opinion of the Iranian populace. As Warne (1999: 81) noted, on one particular trip to a village he was greeted with chants of *zendeh-bad dowletAmreka* (long live the government of America). Iran was also made eligible for a MAP. As a result, the military mission in Iran, which had been established by President Roosevelt, was complemented with an Iranian MAAG. The MAAG was primarily responsible for the "training of Iranian military students in US military schools and indoctrination of very important military personnel in conducted tours of US military establishments and civilian [defence] industries" (Martz, 1953).

This section has traced the origins of US interest in the Persian Gulf. In doing so, it has shown that America's strategic interest in Saudi Arabia resulted in the formation of a balancing strategy for the northern Gulf. As international relations moved from the WWII to the Cold War era, this balancing strategy resulted in the creation of an Anglo-American

[4] The Point IV programme, whose name stemmed from President Harry S. Truman's inaugural speech, provided technical assistance to developing countries as a means to win 'hearts and minds' during the early Cold War.

political order, which was directed against the Soviet Union. Drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realism, the next two sections will discusseffects of this political order.

4.3 The Nationalist Revolution in Iran

According to the 1949 NSC policy statement on Iran, the "primary objective of [US] foreign policy [was] to prevent the domination of [Iran] by the [Soviet Union] and to strengthen Iran's orientation toward the west". This was because the US considered that "if Iran should come under Soviet domination, the independence of all other countries of the Middle East would be directly threatened" (Lay, 1949: 1 – 2). In other words, Iran was part of the important 'strategic buffer' between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. As a result, the country was crucial to America's balance of power policy. Consequently, the US undertook policies to wed Iran to a nascent Anglo-American political order. However, as this section will discuss, this generated revolutionary effects, which ultimately undermined western influence and threatened America's strategic interests.

4.3.1 Background

In 1951 Mohammad Mosaddeq became Iranian Prime Minister. Protracted negotiations between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) over the distribution of profits from Iran's oil industry provided the immediate context of Mosaddeq's ascension to the office of Prime Minister. In broader terms, however, Mosaddeq's rise to power represented a nationalist revolution in Iran. Director of Policy Planning in the Department of State, Paul Nitze, explained that there was "a real revolution that took place in Iraq…after [Mosaddeq] came in". "[The Iranians] were going to get rid of British influence; they were going to get all these vast resources which came with oil; it was going to be a new life" (Acheson, 1954: reel 2, track 2, page 1). Similarly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1954: reel 2, track 2, page 11) suggested that Mosaddeq "was not a chance agitator"; rather he represented "a very deep revolution, nationalist in character, which was sweeping not only Iran but the whole Middle East". The nationalist revolution, just two years later, ended rather ignominiously when Mosaddeq was overthrown by a *coup d'état*. The CIA, in particular Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt (1979; see also Kinzer, 2008), in combination with British intelligence services and a variety of Iranian actors overthrew the elected Prime Minister of Iran.

This instance of covert militarism has been debated extensively in the literature on US foreign policy in Iran. Explanations tend to emphasise either international structural level or American domestic level factors. Gavin (1999: 5) relates America's role in the *coup d'état* to international "shifts in the balance of power and the perceived threat from the [Soviet Union that] allowed for more aggressive measures to guarantee that Iran remained out of the Soviet orbit". In contrast, other literature focuses on political developments in the US. In particular, the election of the aggressively anti-Communist Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, which replaced the more liberal Harry S. Truman administration, is argued to be a crucial determinant of the use of force at this juncture (Rubin, 1981: 55 and Gasiorowski, 2004: 229 – 33).

These international structural and US unit level factors are obviously important. However, E.H. Carr's classical realism stresses that revolutionary forces and actors are often chief sources of change in world politics. In other words, foreign actors must also be accorded a causal role in any analysis of US foreign policy because they create the strategic context in which US foreign policy operates. As a result, it is necessary to discuss how the nationalist revolution shaped the political context in Iran.

The nationalist revolution was inspired by 19th century reformist ideas, which sought to limit the role of the monarchy and limit foreign influence in Iran (Keddie, 2006: 58 – 72). These ideas informed the politics of the *Jebh-e Melli* (the National Front), whom Mohammad Mosaddeq led. These ideas, as E.H. Carr's understanding of revolution would suggest, produced a new political environment in Iran.

The National Front was an amalgam of the liberal intelligentsia (represented by Mosaddeq), the *ulama* (represented by Ayatollah Abol-GhasemKashani, speaker of the *Majlis*) and the *bazaar* (represented by MuzzafarBaqai, *Majlis* deputy). Although the loose coalition diverged over the question of secular reform, shared antipathy towards the AIOC, particularly its unequal distribution of profits, provided a sense of cohesion. Initially, this shared interest resulted in direct conflict between the National Front and the Shah. Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the AIOC and the Iranian Majlis renegotiated a new agreement, which would permit the continuation of the company's oil concession. Under the urging of the British government, the Shah installed General Ali Razmara as Prime Minister, in order to push through the renegotiated oil concession (Kinzer, 2008: 72 – 4). In March 1951 a member of a radical Isalmist group assassinated Razmara after Kashani had denounced

Razmara for his capitulation to western oil interests (Abrahamian, 2008: 116). The reworked agreement stalled in the *Majlis*, which instead opted to nationalise Iran's oil industry and elect Mohammad Mosaddeq to replace Razmara.

Mosaddeq's tenure as Prime Minister also created conflict between Iran and the western powers. Whilst expressing sympathy with nationalist causes, American policymakers were concerned that any nationalisation in Iran would create 'leapfrogging' in other countries. As Paul Nitze (1975) explained, if "[Mosaddeq] succeeded in the [nationalisation] of the British petroleum properties without paying any compensation, this, then would be an example for others thereafter to [nationalise]". As a result, the Truman administration mediated negotiations between the British and the Iranians. However, these negotiations revealed the divergence between American and Iranian ideas about the most suitable resolution to the crisis. Whilst Mosaddeq favoured nationalising the AIOC with respect to Iranian law, the American (and British) position was that any nationalisation had to respect the sanctity of commercial contracts. In particular, that compensation should be paid for any property (including the oil still in the ground) dispossessed (McGhee, 1975: 50 – 2 and Harriman, 1989: 111 – 2).

As the international dimensions of the crisis escalated through 1951 and 1952 (Iran expelled British workers from the country and Britain embargoed Iranian crude), the conflict between the Shah and Mosaddeq also heightened. In July 1952 Mosaddeq resigned as Prime Minister. Some suggest that the Shah, acting under Anglo-American advisement, forcefully removed the Iranian Prime Minister (Cottam, 1988: 100; Keddie, 2006: 126). However, others contend that he voluntarily resigned to pre-empt his dismissal (Azimi, 2004: 52;Katouzian, 2004: 10). The Shah replaced Mosaddeq with a 'strong-man' to end the protracted oil negotiations. However, Mosaddeq's supporters took to the streets in opposition and the military was deployed to crush the nascent rebellion. Ayatollah Kashani, speaker of the *Majlis*, issued a *fatwa* (religious ruling) ordering the military not to engage. After five tense, days the Shah acquiesced and reinstated Mosaddeq.

Upon returning to office, Mosaddeq successfully petitioned the *Majlis* for emergency powers. As a result, he extended his constitutional role *vis-à-vis* the Shah (Abrahamian, 1982: 272 – 80). These powers were extended once more in January 1953. However both Kashani and Baqai, amongst others, were opposed to the extension the powers. Consequently, the National Front began to splinter. In February, as the Shah and his wife were leaving the country for

medical treatment in Europe, rumours began to circulate that Mosaddeq was forcing the Shah's abdication. Kashani remarked "'if the Shah goes, everything we have will go with him'" (cited Katouzian, 2004: 14 – 5). In response, Kashani attempted to remove Mosaddeq from power by organising a violent demonstration outside Mosaddeq's house. Six months later, Mosaddeq was overthrown by a conspiracy involving the CIA, the British intelligence services, pro-monarchy supporters, the Iranian court and factions of the Iranian military.

The Mosaddeq revolution in Iran opened a political space for new political ideas to come to the fore, which generated new forms of political conflict. These factors, in addition to international polarity and domestic developments in the US, shaped US foreign policy at this juncture. Most importantly for this thesis, the revolution undermined the post-war political order.

4.3.2 The Anglo-American Political Order

America's policy in Iran was grounded in a wider balancing strategy to counter any power which, to paraphrase Carr (1939: 124), would threaten their interests in the Gulf. As a 1949 NSC policy statement contended, "If Iran should come under Soviet domination, the independence of all other countries of the Middle East would be directly threatened". Accordingly, the "primary objective of our policy is to prevent the domination of [Iran] by the [Soviet Union] and to strengthen Iran's orientation toward the west" (Lay, 1949: 1 – 2). As a result, the US contributed to a post-war political order based on a general Anglo-American division of labour. However, following E.H. Carr's classical realism, this subsection demonstrates that this political order generated, in part, unintended and revolutionary effects.

Political order, according to E.H. Carr's classical realism, is grounded in material influence. Accordingly, policymakers viewed America's national interest in Iran in terms of obtaining and maintaining influence. Economically, it was Iran's oil resources that were of chief interest to the US. A NSC policy statement, which was released just after Mosaddeq took power, concluded that the "Loss of Iranian oil production…would seriously affect Western economic and military interests" (Lay, 1951: 5). As a result, it was deemed an imperative that the US maintained influence in the country's oil industry. This was because it was believed that western assistance and expertise were crucial to the ability of Iran (and other oil producing countries) to maintain the necessary production levels to meet growing demand

(Gleason, 1989c: 640). Ideologically, the US was also concerned in maintaining influence with the Shah, in particular supporting his continuing pro-western outlook. As the NSC 1951 policy paper contended, "The only source of [leadership in Iran] appears to be the Shah [and] he can only succeed with strong support from the United States and [Britain]" (Lay, 1951: 10). In addition, the US was also concerned with influencing the military and security institutions of the country, which would "[increase] respect for Iranian sovereignty and [avoid] a pretext for Soviet intervention, as well as making indirect Soviet aggression more difficult" (Lay, 1949: 2).

These general interests were often questioned. Whilst NSC policy statements spoke in general terms about America's military commitment to Iran, the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned America's capability to undertake this task (Gold, 1988: 17). Others also questioned the principle that the west was dependent on Iranian oil (Acheson, 1989h: 278 – 81). In addition, other voices were sceptical about the Shah as a figure of political stability. A Department of State (1949: 8) paper, for instance, argued that the Shah's "indecisiveness, his failure to understand the problems to be tackled [and] the poor advice of his official and unofficial entourage", meant that he "frequently seems to have very little conception of how to put [his good intentions] into action". However, Iran, according to John Stutesman (1988), a political officer in the embassy, was seen as a 'strategic buffer' between the Soviet Union and the Gulf. The concern with maintaining this buffer overrode these concerns.

As discussed in chapter three, E.H. Carr's classical realist lens suggests that political orders have the potential to generate revolutionary forces. This seems like a cogent way for thinking about the effects of the Anglo-American political order. The post-war order was built upon a division of labour. American influence was complemented by an explicit British security guarantee over Iran (and the wider Middle East). The AIOC, particularly the lucrative financial gains it provided to the British government, was crucial to Britain's ability to finance its part of the bargain (Marsh, 1998: 536 – 7). However, the continued quasi-imperial British presence in Iran interacted with latent political conflicts. It provided the cohesion that bound various actors in the National Front together, whilst the lengthy negotiations between the company and the Iranian government created the political space for the nationalists to take power. The AIOC was not only a pivot of the post-war order; it was central to its breakdown.

The resulting nationalist revolution threatened America's key interests and threatened the stability of the post-war order. Unlike the Shah, Mohammad Mosaddeq was opposed to western alignment. As Abrahamian(1982: 189)notes, Mosaddeq rejected the traditionalist Iranian policy of balancing between the major powers. This was because it "whetted the appetites of the foreign powers…[turning] Iran into a free-for-all", instead he favoured the termination of "granting major concessions" and making sure that "Iran would pursue a strictly nonaligned course". As a result, throughout the nationalist revolution, Mosaddeq threatened to end American military assistance programmes in Iran. For Dean Acheson (1989f: 50), Secretary of State, such policies would make the "US [programme] in Iran difficult or impossible". Mosaddeq's nationalist revolution also had the potential to undermine America's economic influence in Iran and throughout the region. If Mosaddeq successfully nationalised the AIOC, the belief was that this would generate 'leapfrogging' by other states, in particular Saudi Arabia. Thus, America insisted that any nationalisation must be accompanied with due compensation. Assistant Secretary of State NEA, Henry Byroade (1988) recalled that America accepted nationalisation with "compensation, provided there was continued access to oil". A similar sentiment was expressed by Dean Acheson who commented that whilst in "general US does not favour nationalisation", the US recognised the "right of sovereign states to [nationalise] provided prompt payment [and] just compensation made" (Acheson, 1989g: 25). Finally, there was also a concern that the revolution could create a political space for Soviet exploitation. As an NSC report concluded,

> Present trends in Iran are [unfavourable] to the maintenance of control by a non-communist regime for an extended period of time. In wrestling the political initiative from the Shah, the landlords, and other traditional holders of power, the National Front politicians now in power have at least temporarily eliminated every alternative to their own rule expect the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintain control of the situation indefinitely is uncertain…
>
> Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that the communists might be enabled to gain the ascendancy as a result of such possible developments as a struggle for power with the National Front…If present trends continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to the free world. (Lay, 1952: 2)

The post-war political order was a crucial determinant of the nationalist revolution in Iran. For the US, as the revolution developed it began to threaten not only the stability of the post-

war order, but also America's strategic interests across the region. In response, as the next subsection will discuss, the US employed various instruments to restore political order.

4.3.3 The Nature of American Power

The nationalist revolution in Iran, like E.H. Carr's classical realist perspective would suggest, was a central force driving American foreign policy at this juncture. The nationalist ideas it promulgated undermined the Anglo-American balance of power, threatened America's strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and threatened the 'strategic buffer' image of Iran held by American policymakers. According to E.H. Carr (1946: 102), "as soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power of one state in relation to another, the mater at once becomes "'political'". Consequently, the US employed various instruments to restore political order. This subsection traces the development of American power during the era of nationalist revolution in Iran.

4.3.3.1 Soft Power

The US employed forms of soft power to persuade Mohammad Mosaddeq to either accept a resolution to the protracted negotiations between the AIOC and the Iranian government, which was deemed acceptable to western interests, or to create the conditions of his downfall. Initially the US employed economic sanctions, what E.H. Carr (1946: 131) would have referred to as dollar bullets, to influence the political situation in Iran. Prior to Mosaddeq's ascension to Iranian Prime Minister, Henry Grady, America's Ambassador in Iran, successfully obtained a $25 million Export Import (EXIM) Bank loan for generating economic development in the country. The loan, however, was not ratified by the Iranian *Majlis* and after Razmara's assassination was held in abeyance. Grady, after the collapse of initial negotiations between the AIOC and the Iranian government, wrote to the DOS suggesting that the $25 million dollar loan should now proceed. According to Grady (1989: 149 – 50), the loan would provide much needed economic assistance.

The DOS, however, vetoed Grady's suggestion. Neil Webb (1989a: 160), Acting Secretary of State, informed Grady that if the loan proceeded, it would likely result in Mosaddeq using the "action is evidence [of US] support [for his] position". As a result, it would "[encourage him] to continue [his] present intransigence". Thus, the EXIM loan was withheld on the basis that it "might tend to bring about a more reasonable attitude and possibly a change of [policy] if not of [government]" (Webb, 1989a: 160).

Economic sanctions, however, did not have the desired effect. Mosaddeq remained adamant in his negotiating position (nationalising with reference to Iranian law), whilst his popularity amongst the Iranian populace grew. This occurred despite a boycott of Iranian crude. As Heiss (2004: 181 – 2) argues, the British believed that the Iranian government had no legal right to cancel the AIOC concession. Accordingly Britain, with support from the other western members of the international petroleum industry, employed the "boycott as a tool of economic warfare that could be used to preserve its traditional control over Iranian oil". The boycott created intense economic pressure in the country. In response, Mohammad Mosaddeq asked Loy Henderson, who had replaced Grady as America's Ambassador, for emergency financial aid. Whilst voicing scepticism about financial assistance, Henderson (1989a: 324) concluded that, if attached with conditions, financial aid may end the deadlock between the company and the government of Iran. An analysis provided by the, however, rebuked with this suggestion. It concluded that:

> It is unlikely that receipt of US emergency aid would induce [Mosaddeq] to co-operate with other US measures for strengthening Iran economically or militarily. Moreover, such US aid to [Mosaddeq] would not only tend to alienate the British but might discourage the Shah and the more conservative opposition, thereby reducing the chances for a more amenable government coming to power. (Borel, 1989: 330)

The report includes hand-written comments by Harry S. Truman indicating that he was in agreement with its conclusions. As a result, Ambassador Henderson (1989b: 342) conveyed to Mosaddeq that "US funds appropriated for the purpose of extending [military] and [economic] aid [should] not be used to replace revenue which [should] and [could] be obtained from oil". America's interest in forcing a change in Iranian policy was deemed more important than alleviating the deteriorating economic situation in the country.

The US also used diplomacy, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) referred to as the "art of persuasion", to pressure the Shah to remove Mosaddeq from power. Not everyone agreed with this practice. Henry Grady (1989: 149) contended that such policies were not needed because there was "a fair chance of [the US] getting [Mosaddeq] to come to terms with [Britain's] position". Grady, however, was in the minority. Others routinely pressured the Shah to remove Mosaddeq from power. Avrell Harriman, then Ambassador at large, noted that he "told [the Shah] that I thought we would never make a settlement with [Mosaddeq] and that he would have to use his constitutional authority at some stage of the game"

(Acheson, 1954: reel 2, track 2, p. 2). As a result, Harriman imparted on the Shah "the desirability of his taking his constitutional prerogatives and dismissing [Mosaddeq]…it seemed as if he was almost to the point of doing it but the next day he said he wouldn't" (Acheson, 1954: reel 3, track 2, p. 10).

In one of his first meetings with the Shah, Loy Henderson also employed diplomatic persuasion. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, instructed Henderson to advise the Shah of the following:

> That while you are convinced [British] sincerely desire [an] amicable solution to oil controversy proposals thus far put forward by [Iranian government] [would] not provide reasonable basis for resumption of [negotiations], and there is serious doubt that successful [negotiations] with [Mosaddeq] are possible. It is most important, however, that [Mosaddeq] not take any action which [would] render it impossible for Iran and Great Britain to find solution through some successor [government] if this in fact proves impossible with [Mosaddeq]. While decision as to whether [Mosaddeqshould] be replaced at this time is entirely up to the Shah to make, he [should] be strongly encouraged if he feels he is in a position to bring this about. (Acheson, 1989a: 170)

Henderson (1973: 198) has dismissed suggestions that the US sought to pressure the Shah to remove Mosaddeq from power. Acheson's telegram to Henderson would suggest otherwise. As too, does a 1952 paper prepared for an Anglo-American summit, which clearly indicates that diplomatic pressure took place. The paper noted that "the talks which…our representatives in Tehran have had with the Shah concerning the possible replacement of Mosaddeq have had no effect, and the position of the latter seems now to be as firm as ever" (Gilman, 1952).

The US also combined economic incentives and diplomacy to pressure the Shah to act. In May 1952, Ambassador Henderson communicated to Washington that he had met with a close confidant of the Shah who had asked for advice on removing Mosaddeq from power. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, replied with the following:

> that [should Mosaddeq] be replaced by [a government] with strength of purpose to defend itself against external communist aggression or internal subversion and [be] willing and able [to] realistically [negotiate] for oil settlement with [Britain], US [should] do utmost [to] assist such [government] in installing stability and developing

> economy as to reduce [the] danger [of a] loss of Iran through internal communist subversion. (Acheson, 1989b: 387)

Acheson did note that it was not America's prerogative to select Iran's political leaders. However, he stressed that "regardless rights or wrongs of matter, it is clear there can be no solution [to] Iran's most pressing problems in absence [of an] oil settlement and it appears there can be no settlement with [Mosaddeq]" (1989b: 389). Acheson closed the communication by suggesting to Henderson that Iran would receive a $145 million of aid if the Shah could resolve the AIOC crisis. Shortly after,Mosaddeq did leave office. Although he did return a number of days later, the US was clearly siding with the Shah in his constitutional and political conflict with his revolutionary Prime Minister.

After Mosaddeq returned to office in July 1952, the US resorted to incentivising Mosaddeq'sbehaviour. According to E.H. Carr (1946: 124), economic power is crucial to purchasing influence. Following this idea, the US offered financial assistance to Mosaddeq, which had the aim of pressuring him into accepting a resolution to the oil negotiations deemed acceptable to western interests. After Mosaddeq's return to office, Dean Acheson (1989c: 415 – 6) informed Loy Henderson that Mosaddeq's "stronger position vis-à-vis the Shah" necessitates negotiating with him. Accordingly the US, with Britain's blessing, offered a $10 million grant to the Iranian government in order to persuade Mosaddeq to accept international arbitration on the AIOC crisis. Not all concurred with this economic lever. Paul Lovett, Secretary of Defence, found the proposal rather puzzling, particularly the suggestion that Iran would be free to sell its oil even to eastern bloc countries (NSC, 1989a: 431). Loy Henderson (1989c: 432 – 3), on the other hand, suggested that a higher figure might have more chance of purchasing Mosaddeq's acquiescence. Nevertheless, Acheson (1989d: 429) continued with the proposal on the basis that Iran's economic deterioration required US assistance, but that such "support must be in a manner which will not relinquish [Britain's] claims to compensation for [the nationalisation of the] AIOC".

The proposal, however, failed to purchase Mosaddeq's acquiescence (Henderson, 1989d: 464 – 9). In response, a further financial package was offered to Iran, which included a $100 million advance for sales of Iranian oil. Questions were raised over the legality of the proposal. Nevertheless, it went ahead with the express purpose of "[securing] agreement [regarding] compensation to the AIOC and in a form desired by [Britain]" (Acheson, 1989e:

589). In other words, the US was seeking to economically pressure Mosaddeq into accepting a resolution deemed acceptable to western interests.

Although the proposal was eventually rejected by Mosaddeq on the basis that it was inconsistent with Iranian law, it was complemented by a propaganda campaign to weaken Mosaddeq's power base. The campaign, a form of what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) called the "art of persuasion", had the explicit aim of exploiting divisions in the National Front, particularly between Mosaddeq and Ayatollah Kashani, speaker of the Iranian parliament. The declassified release of NSC 136/1 outlines a policy of "continuing special political measures" designed to direct the nationalist movement along "constructive channels" (Lay, 1952: 3). Gavin (1999: 78) has previously noted this. However what he does not appreciate is that such measures were called for as early as March 1951. The declassified release of NSC 107 indicates the following policy in the event of a neutral Iran:

> Current United States measures in Iran are designed to prevent this…If nevertheless the contingency did occur, the United States could, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and with little risk in proportion to the possible gain, take positive steps, including covert measures, to support pro-Western elements and effect Iran's alignment with the free world. (Lay, 1951: 9 – 10)

The word 'continue' in the November 1952 NSC paper indicates that at some juncture between March 1951 and November 1952 a propaganda campaign was begun. The NSC 136/1 progress report indicates that a psychological and propaganda strategy for the Middle East to counter communist influence (Iran included) was approved in January 1953 (Smith, 1953). Such a start date however, is inconsistent with NSC 136/1. Gasiorowski (1987), based on interviews with CIA officers, has shown that a US propaganda campaign began in the summer of 1952. This campaign started as a direct response to Mosaddeq's return to office in July. Utilising the BEDAM network, an official anti-*Tudeh* (Iran's communist party) campaign that was begun in 1948 the programme effectively transformed into an anti-Mosaddeq campaign. Its purpose was to demonise Mosaddeq and create a wedge between him and other members of the National Front coalition.

The propaganda campaign appeared to have the desired effect. As discussed previously, Kashani disassociated himself from Mosaddeq and led a failed putsch to overthrow his erstwhile coalition partner. This, however, cannot solely be attributed to US efforts. After all, as discussed previously, the National Front was never a homogenous entity. At the very least,

however, America's attempts to exploit divisions amongst its leading members played some part in the divisions that emerged between Kashani and Mosaddeq during 1953.

Throughout the nationalist revolution in Iran, the US employed softer forms of power to either force Mosaddeq's acquiescence to the western position or condition his political downfall. The economic incentives offered to Mosaddeq in the winter of 1952 and 1953 failed to purchase his agreement, whilst the political instability generated by the split amongst the members of the National Front increasingly concerned members of the Eisenhower administration, which had replaced the Truman administration in January 1953. New Secretary of State, John Dulles (1989a: 703), contended that the "situation [in Iran was] so dangerous and unpredictable [that it] might be necessary [to] act promptly and [that] the US [would] have to have [a] considerable measure [of] discretion as to what it did". As will be discussed below, this 'considerable measure of discretion' involved employing a covert form of militarism to instigate regime change in Iran.

4.3.3.2 Hard Power

E.H. Carr's classical realism suggests that one of the chief forces in international relations is revolution. This is because it generates new political ideas and alters politics amongst nations. The nationalist revolution in Iran seems like a useful way for making this aspect of Carr's work effulgent. In other words, the nationalist revolution in Iran and its consequences generated a change in America's foreign policy.

In the first instance, the revolution, which was a product of nationalist and anti-colonialist ideas, underscored Britain's decline in Iran and the Middle East more broadly. As a result, the US became the chief western power. This transformation was noted by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson (1989f: 512), who contended that "if Iran is to be saved the initiative and…the responsibility would have to come from [the US] rather than from the British". Consequently, the nationalist revolution meant that the US, as opposed to Britain, was increasingly becoming the primary western power in the region.

This is perhaps best illustrated by the policies outlined in the November 1952 NSC policy statement. Whereas its predecessor had spoken of minimising America's military commitments in the region, NSC 136/1 was more willing to advocate a militarised stance. The report contended that if "an attempted or an actual Communist seizure of power [occurs in] Iran…the [US] should support a non-communist Iranian Government, including

participation in the military support of such a government if necessary and useful" (Lay, 1952: 3 – 4). In addition, NSC 136/1 concluded that in "the event of a Soviet attack by [organised Soviet Union] military forces against Iran, the [US]…would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent". The shift occurred despite DOD objections, which argued that they "would be extremely difficult to implement and would require the transfer of American forces from other areas where the [US] had commitments, or else an increase in the level of forces now in being or planned" (NSC, 1989b: 526). The strategic interest in bulwarking the northern Gulf against any form of Soviet penetration, which was a product of America's strategic interest in the southern Gulf, overrode these concerns. Although US policymakers were opposed to the use of overt force to depose Mosaddeq (Acheson, 1954: reel 2, track 1, page 4 – 5), after the revolution they were more willing to accept the role of military guarantor for the region.

In the second instance, the nationalist revolution created actors that the US was increasingly unable to influence through 'civilised' means. This is evidenced by the repeated failure to pressure Mosaddeq into accepting terms deemed acceptable to western interests or generating his downfall. For instance, on 10 February John Dulles (1989b: 663), Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, wrote to Loy Henderson, Ambassador in Iran, and informed him that the winter 1952 financial incentives were unlikely to be successful. At the same time, Washington was "unable to devise any new formulae likely to be agreed [to] by both [Mosaddeq] and [the] British". Equally troublesome for Dulles, however, was the suggestion that Mosaddeq was planning on breaking the embargo on Iranian oil by selling oil at a 50 percent discount. At the same time, the growing opposition to Mosaddeq, symbolised by Kashani's putsch, increasingly concerned US policymakers. A CIA (1989: 690) report concluded that the "Communist Tudeh Party may be expected to [capitalise] on, and increase, the [Mosaddeq-Kashani conflict] in every possible way".

These two developments resulted in the US pursuing a militarised, if covert, policy in Iran. E.H. Carr (1946: 132) wrote that the "strong will tend to prefer the minor and more 'civilised' weapon, because it will generally suffice to achieve his purposes; and as long as it will suffice, he is under no temptation to resort to the more hazardous military weapon". This seems like a cogent way of thinking about US policy at this juncture. Softer forms of power proved insufficient. As a result, from this position of declining influence, the US employed more coercive forms of power.

The question of Iranian policy was raised at a NSC meeting on 4 March. John Dulles, Secretary of State, argued that current developments in the country were likely to result in Mosaddeq taking dictatorial powers. As long as Mosaddeq remained in power, according to Dulles, "there was but little danger". If, on the other hand, "he [was] to be assassinated or otherwise to disappear from power, a political vacuum would occur in Iran and the Communists might easily take over". The concern was that such a development would impact on America's strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. If "Iran succumbed to the Communists there was little doubt that in short order the other areas of the Middle East, with some [sixty] percent of the world's oil reserves, would fall into Communist control" (Gleason, 1989a: 693).

Accordingly, Dulles outlined three policy options. The first, which remains partially classified, included recalling the Ambassador from Iran. The second option involved the US unilaterally negotiating with the Iranian government, whilst the third involved supporting Iran's oil industry with financial and technical assistance. In other words, the latter two options advocated dividing the US from Britain. Dulles "expressed doubts" over the latter two options because "the losses we might anticipate in other parts of the world were likely to overweigh any gain". President Dwight Eisenhower agreed and stressed the importance of not "[breaking] with the British". On the other hand, Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's National Security Adviser (NSA), "pleaded the wisdom of [pursuing a policy] independent of the British" (Gleason, 1989a: 695 – 6).

A subsequent NSC meeting a week later indicates that Cutler's objections were ignored. At this meeting it was agreed that the US would not purchase Iranian crude, would continue to discourage US commercial activities in the Iranian oil industry and would not extend large-scale financial assistance to the Iranian government (Gleason, 1989b: 711 – 14). In between the two NSC meetings Dulles, Eisenhower and Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, met with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. De MoraesRuehsen (1993: 474, emphasis in the original), quoting British Foreign Office records, suggests that Eisenhower "appealed to [Dulles and Eden]…to find some new and imaginative approach to the Persian oil problem, *which kept Persia in the Western orbit*". As a result, according to De MoraesRuehsen, Eisenhower provided a "'green light'" for engaging in covert militarism. That is, the US was now prepared to associate itself with long-standing British attempts to overthrow Mosaddeq.

At the same time, the official CIA history of the August 1953 *coup d'état* indicates that American Ambassador, Loy Henderson, was approached by an Iranian General, whose name remains classified. As the official history notes:

> In March 1953 a telegram was received from the [CIA station in Iran] which stated that General [one word of classified text] had contacted the assistant military attaché and had requested Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or not the US Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian military effort to oust [Mosaddeq]…
>
> …On the basis of the [one word of classified text] overture and other clear signs that determined opposition to [Mosaddeq] was taking shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reckless attitude of the government of [Mosaddeq], General Walter Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of State, determined that the US Government could no longer approve of the [Mosaddeq] government and would prefer a successor government in which there would be no National Frontists. (Wilber, 1959: 2)

Henderson's telegrams to Washington at this juncture reveal that he was also in contact with HosseinAla, the Shah's Minister of Court. Ala had suggested that General FazlollahZahedi, an erstwhile ally of Mosaddeq who had become opposed to Mosaddeq's policies, could be a possible replacement for Mosaddeq. In April 1953 Henderson (1989e: 721) had contended that "Zahedi…might be no improvement [over Mosaddeq]". However, in his final meeting with the Shah before being recalled to Washington, Henderson (1989f: 731) records that he informed the Shah that the "US [would welcome Zahedi] provided [that the] Shah would give Zahedi full and sustained support". Accordingly the US, in addition to supporting Britain, was also now willing to support Iranian opposition, principally from the court and military, which was also planning to overthrow Mosaddeq.

Not everyone was satisfied with these developments. Roger Gorian, the CIA's Chief of Station in Tehran, was opposed to overthrowing Mosaddeq. According to Louis (2004: 161), Gorian "believed that intervention would not only be disastrous in the long run but would also create the short-term impression that the United States supported 'Anglo-French colonialism'". In response, Allan Dulles, Director of the CIA, removed Gorian from his post (Kinzer, 2008: 164). The concern over the regional impact of Iran's revolution and the need to counter Mosaddeq's revolution overrode these concerns.

The actual operation, which was code-named TPAJAX, was planned for August. An early planning paper suggested that "a Shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing [Mosaddeq]" (Wilber, 1959: 3). CIA and British secret service agents met in Nicosia, Cyprus in May where it was agreed that a quasi-legal approach was necessary, that pro-Mosaddeq elements in the military would need to be neutralised and that an active propaganda campaign against Mosaddeq would need to be undertaken. The plan received approval in early July (Wilber, 1959: 8 – 18). The *coup d'état* was planned for the 15 August but the *firman* (royal decree) removing Mosaddeq from power was not delivered. Mosaddeqbecame aware of the action and pre-empted it by arresting the Iranian general tasked with delivering them. Consequently, for a number of days Iran convulsed as two centres of power claimed political authority. On the evening of the 18 August Tehran was shaken by spontaneous and organised protest and violence. The following day the popular press declared the legitimacy of Zahedi's government (Gasiorowski, 2004: 251 – 6).

There are of course different interpretations of this event. Orthodox accounts stress the role of the CIA, in particular Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt (Roosevelt, 1979; Kinzer, 2008), whilst revisionists stress the role of Iranian actors (Mokhtari, 2008; Bayandor, 2010). The main axis of debate within this literature centres on whether Roosevelt was responsible for managing the operation after its apparent failure, or whether it was Iranian actors who took the initiative between the 15 and 18 of August. What is perhaps not debatable, however, is how the *coup d'état*countered a revolutionary actor through force that the US was unable or unwilling to influence through softer or 'civilised' means.

With Zahedi in power the Mosaddeq revolution in Iran was over. Mosaddeq was sentenced to death (later reduced to solitary confinement and then house arrest), whilst many of his nationalist followers were harassed, imprisoned, tortured or executed. The Shah reclaimed his constitutional powers, whilst the pliant Zahedi provided assurances of Iran's western alignment. After lengthy negotiations, the dispute between the AIOC and the Iranian government was resolved. The National Iranian Oil Company was established. However, western interests balanced the nationalisation of the AIOC. An international consortium (including the former AIOC, the five American major oil corporations and a French firm) was created to manage Iran's oil industry, whilst the AIOC received a generous compensation package (Yergin, 2009: 452 – 60). Accordingly, as E.H. Carr's classical realism would

suggest, the US returned to softer forms of power to influence Iran. In 1953 an emergency grant worth $45 million was furnished to the Iranian government, whilst Point IV aid, worth $23.4 million, was renewed for another year (Henderson, 1989g: 776, fn. 4).

4.3.4 Balancing Against Mosaddeq

The Mosaddeq revolution, which was a product of the Anglo-American political order, generated nationalist ideologies that advocated distancing Iran from the western powers. As a result, the Iranian nationalist revolution threatened America's strategic interest in the southern Gulf. It was believed that a unilateral (without compensation) nationalisation of the AIOC could generate similar developments across the region. It was also believed that the revolution, the protracted oil crisis and resulting political instability could open a space for increased Soviet penetration in the country.

Consequently, this section has sketched the strategies that, drawing on E.H. Carr's description of Britain's European balance of power policy, the US employed to balance against Mosaddeq and the threat he represented to America's strategic interests. These included balancing with Britain (by implicitly supporting the oil embargo), balancing with the Shah (by pressurising him into forcing Mosaddeq's resignation) and balancing against Mosaddeq (by engaging in negative propaganda against him). These softer strategies, however, failed to have the desired effect. Accordingly, particularly after repeated failures to ensure Mosaddeq's acquiescence, the US employed harder forms of power. In particular, the US balanced with Britain and pro-monarchy actors in Iran to overthrow Mosaddeq. Put another way, the US was clearly engaging in balance of power politics to counter the nationalist revolution. The use of harder forms of power to achieve this was produced by the failure of the US to influence Mosaddeq through other means. That is, it was symbolic of America's declining influence in Iran.

4.4 The Nationalist Revolution in Iraq

In July 1958, capitalising on the zeitgeist of Arab nationalism, a group of Iraqi military officers overthrew the monarchy, executed leading politicians and established the Republic of Iraq. The revolution, according to Hurst (2009: 17), did not cause "Washington any great alarm". This analysis is inaccurate. Alan Dulles, Director of the CIA, labelled the situation in Iraq "'the most dangerous in the world'" (cited Osgood, 2009: 18). David Fritzlan (1990), a member of staff in the embassy, argued that America's interests "were to keep Iraq in the

[anti-Soviet] Baghdad Pact [and] help Iraq strengthen its [defence] forces". In other words, Iraq was part of the 'strategic buffer' between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. The revolution, however, challenged this. For instance, Morris Draper (1991), who worked in the US embassy, noted that "the Soviets hitched their wagon to [the forces of nationalism]". As a result, the fear was that Iraq's tilt towards the Soviet Union, "could have [become] a battleground for a Soviet-US confrontation", which would invariably threaten US interests in the southern Gulf. This section, drawing on Carr's classical realism, sketches American foreign policy in Iraq at this juncture.

4.4.1 Background

The literature on US-Iraqi relations at this juncture is relatively sparse. Existing accounts tend to emphasis the international structural and American unit domestic factors shaping policy outcomes. James Akins (2000), a political officer in the Iraq embassy, argued that US policy was predominantly influenced by international factors. "Iraq [after the revolution] clearly was very strongly under the influence of the Soviets, and we decided that something should be done". Aburish (1997: 81 – 2), on the other hand, suggests it was corporate interests that was predominantly shaping America's approach to Iraq, particularly after the country helped establish the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In contrast, alternative literature, which charts the Eisenhower administration's response to the revolution, stresses how the innate conservatism of the President was the fundamental reason why America, despite pressure from allies, refrained from reversing the Iraqi revolution through force (Barrett, 2008; Osgood, 2009).

International structural and US domestic level factors are obviously crucial determinants of American foreign policy. However, E.H. Carr's classical realism, which was outlined in chapter three, suggests that foreign actors and how they interact with the US should also be accredited some causal influence. In particular, the Iraqi revolution and its subsequent development was a decisive element shaping American policy at this point. The chief result of the revolution was inter-revolutionary conflict. The revolutionary government, whilst "generally moderate and nationalist" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 49 – 50), was far from homogenous. In particular, a fracture quickly developed between two of the principal leaders of the revolution. Abdul KarimQassem, who took the post of Prime Minister, and Abdul Salem Aref, who became Minister of the Interior, quickly diverged over the identity of Iraq. It was a rivalry, which was "not simply personal", but reflected "the long-unanswered

question of the identity of Iraq, as a potential nation-state, or as an administrative part of a larger Arab nation" (Tripp, 2008: 147). As a result, the political environment after the revolution quickly developed into a power struggle between these two ideals – the "'left wing' (Iraqi nationalist and communist) and 'right wing' (Arab nationalist) attitudes" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 51).

This struggle for power centred on Iraq's relations with the United Arab Republic (UAR) (a political union between Egypt and Syria established in 1958). Aref favoured a union, whilst Qassem favoured a federation. Unity talks with UAR President, Gamal Abdul Nasser, stalled (Kerr, 1971) and Qassem increasingly emerged as the "sole leader" of the revolution (Dann, 1969: 358). To increase his power base Qassem depended on the networks of political associations maintained by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 53 – 5). This move, however, brought Qassem into conflict with both Nasser and America as both, for different reasons, were opposed to communist influence in Iraq and the wider Arab world.

This Iraq-UAR cold war (Kerr, 1971: 17) created intense political division in Iraq. There were abortive *coups* in December 1958 and March 1959 and a botched assassination attempt in the autumn of 1959, which were allegedly supported by Nasser (Aburish, 2005: 178 – 85). In response, Qassem became even more dependent on the ICP to maintain his grasp on political power. This paved the way for improved Iraqi-Soviet Union relations. Qassem withdrew Iraq from the pro-western Baghdad Pact (see next section) and signed military and economic agreements with the Soviet Union (Smolansky and Smolansky, 1991: 16). Nationalist opposition to these developments continued throughout his rule, whilst an insurgency erupted in the Kurdish region, which would last a further 15 years, after Qassem failed to grant the region autonomy (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 80 – 1). His rule was increasingly untenable as continued instability in the country alienated large swathes of public opinion (Dann, 1969: 358).

One of the more visible effects of revolution, as E.H. Carr's classical realism reminds us, is the transformations itgenerates in a country's foreign policy. The Iraq revolution and the nationalist ideas it espoused were no exception. In addition to effectively realigning with the Soviet bloc, Iraq pursued policies that worried the western powers. This included dispossessing the IPC of 95 percent of its oil concession area. Although the IPC continued to exploit the Iraqi oil fields, Iraq's demands for equitable profits resulted in protracted

negotiations between the IPC and the Iraqi government, which would last a further decade (Penrose and Penrose, 1978: 381 – 420). Qassem's relationships with his Gulf neighbours also deteriorated. Tensions with Iran developed after the two countries clashed over the Shatt-al Arab waterway, which served as the border between the two countries (Tripp, 2008: 158 – 9). Qassem also made a territorial claim to Kuwait, which was met with a British show of military force (Petersen, 2006: 28 –9). In other words, the Iraqi revolution threatened many of America's strategic interests in the Gulf. As Robert Komer (1961b), a member of staff in the NSC commented, "If [Qassem] can add Kuwait production…to that of the IPC, he'll have a stranglehold on [Middle East] oil". In addition, the "[Soviet Union] would have much to gain if [Qassem] took over Kuwait".

In sum, the Iraqi revolution radically altered Iraq's relationships with western powers. Most prominently Iraq under Qassem withdrew Iraq from the western bloc and increasingly tilted towards the Soviet bloc. As such, the Iraq revolution undermined the Anglo-American political order in the northern Gulf.

4.4.2 The Baghdad Pact Political Order

America's interest in Iraq was a product of its wider interest in preventing the establishment of any power in the northern Gulf, which would challenge America's strategic interests. This subsection sketches how this aim was managed through the Baghdad Pact political order and, guided by Carr's classical realism, illustrates the revolutionary effects it engendered.

America's chief interests in Iraq, as E.H. Carr's classical realism would suggest, lay in material influence. For instance, Director for Mutual Security, Avrell Harriman (1986: 2339), argued that "Iraq's ability to defend itself and to participate in the [defence] of the area of which it is a part of, is important to the security of the United States". The MAP was a crucial method of maintaining US influence. The main economic interest in Iraq was its oil. "The strategic resources", of Iraq and the Near East more broadly, "are of such importance to the Free World, particularly Western Europe, that it is in the security interest of the United States to make sure that these resources will be used for strengthening the Free World" (Lay, 1993c: 19). There was also a general belief that Iraq's regional position and its pro-western orientation was an advantage, particularly as Arab nationalist opinion was turning increasingly hostile to the west (Lay, 1993c: 18 – 24). Maintaining influence in and

"[supporting] the present regime in Iraq", was argued to be a progressive way of exercising both Iraqi and American "constructive leadership within the Arab world" (Lay, 1993c: 30).

At the same time, Americanpower was grounded in what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) referred to as common appeals. In 1955 after lengthy negotiations a regional security organisation, which was named the Baghdad Pact, was established. Britain, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan joined the pact, whilst the US was accorded observer status. However, according to David Fritzlan, Counsellor in the US embassy, this did not reduce America's influence. As he noted:

> As observers though, we were as active, and influential, as if we'd been full members. We put in a lot of money, we had a technical staff and donated administrative staff to the Baghdad [organisation]. We took part in all the military exercises involved, and we concluded various agreements on communications and such technical matters. So that as far as the efficiency of the Pact was concerned it was not in any way diminished by our non-membership. (Fritzlan, 1990)

The Baghdad Pact realised Secretary of State John Dulles' conception of the northern tier, which was a ring of pro-western states buffering the Soviet Union (Barrett, 2007: 10 – 19). The pact, however, also appealed to the regional states. As Halliday (1996: 8) contended, the pact, which offered access to US financial, technical and economic aid, "also reflected the shared interests which the monarchs of Iran and Iraq had in facing a rising nationalist tide in the region".

Not everyone was satisfied with this policy. Public affairs officer in the Baghdad embassy, David Newsom (1991), recalled that there "were many signs suggesting that the concept was not acceptable to the Iraqi population". Nicholas Thacher, also a member of staff in the embassy, argued that there were "reservations regarding Iraq's participation [in the Baghdad Pact]". This was because "Iraq would be seen as moving directly contrary to the nationalist and pan-Arab ideals of its neighbours and against the strong views of politically conscious elements within Iraq" (1991: 67). The desire to promote the 'northern tier' as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Gulf, however, overrode these concerns.

Drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realist perspective, however, it is possible to show that the Baghdad Pact generated unintended and revolutionary forces. Iraq's military installations, particularly after the nationalist revolution in Egypt, were pivotal to western conceptions of regional defence and were therefore critical for the continued Anglo-American division of

labour. However, the continued quasi-colonial British presence and influence was increasingly unwelcome in Iraq. As a result, popular opposition to British influence in Iraq became increasingly violent during the 1950s (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991: 127 – 31). At the same time, Egyptian President Nasser, who after Suez had become the leading symbol of Arab nationalism (Choueiri, 2000: 183), launched vituperative attacks on the Baghdad Pact, in particular how it represented backdoor colonialism (Aburish, 2005: 75 – 81). In part, therefore, Iraq's inclusion in the Baghdad Pact, which isolated it from wider popular sentiment in the Arab world, generated a revolution. This was certainly the opinion of some American policymakers. For example, Hermann Eilts (1988), a political officer in the embassy, argued that "Iraq had isolated itself". As a consequence, "the Iraqi membership in the Baghdad Pact was a factor [leading] to the [revolution]. It wasn't the only factor, but it was a factor".

The foreign policies that post-revolutionary Iraq pursued put the new republic on a collision course with US interests. Under Qassem, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which was later renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Furthermore, Iraq signed military and defence agreements with the Soviet Union (Smolansky and Smolansky, 1991: 16), increasing the Soviet Union's influence in the strategically significant northern Gulf. Qassem also nationalised the IPC oil concession, which undermined America's economic influence in the country. As the Department of State's (1962) policy paper on Iraq concluded, "we have little means for…ensuring the flow of Iraqi petroleum to the west, or for assisting in the development of a more balanced economy". Political relations also reached a nadir. After America welcomed Kuwait's first ambassador into the US, Iraq recalled its Ambassador, which further limited "channels of communication" between the two countries (Ball, 1962).

In other words, the Iraqi revolution, which in part was generated by the effects of the post-war political order, starkly undermined American power. The US was unable to materially influence post-revolutionary Iraq or even construct common appeals between the two countries. Accordingly, as the next section will discuss, the US employed a variety of means to restore political order.

4.4.3 The Nature of American Power

US-Iraqi relations at this juncture were what E.H. Carr (1946: 102) termed political. That is, they involved questions of power. According to Hume Horan (2000), who was a member of

staff in the US embassy, "American interests were…substantial in Iraq. It was a kind of communist stalking horse right between Iran and Saudi Arabia…countries that were close to us and important". Influenced by E.H. Carr's classical realism, this subsection charts American power at this juncture.

4.4.3.1 Hard Power

Seemingly in contrast to E.H. Carr's last resort thesis, the US initially employed forms of hard power to counter the Iraqi revolution and to contain its potential regional spread. Although the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration seemed averse to reversing the revolution through force, military forms of power were employed to counter its regional spread. In January 1957 President Eisenhower successfully received congressional approval for the Eisenhower Doctrine. That is, the US would henceforth employ its armed forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism" (Eisenhower, D., 1957). The Lebanese government which, during a period of terse civil war (Fisk, 2001: 69 – 72), considered itself potentially subject to interference from the UAR, was one of the first countries to request assistance. Both President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, whilst recognising that intervention was possibly needed, were reticent about its likely effects (Kunz, 2002: 88).

The revolution in Iraq reversed this hesitancy. One day after the revolution the US deployed 14,000 US Marines to Beirut "amid friendly crowds of late afternoon beach-goers and throngs of peddlers hawking everything from hummus to Coca Cola" (Little, 1996: 27). British forces complemented the intervention by landing military forces in Jordan (Tal, 1995; Ashton, 1997). Whilst Britain considered the interventions as a first step to reversing the Iraqi revolution through force (Blackwell, 1999; Worrall, 2007), the Eisenhower administration was chiefly concerned with containing its impact.

There was a general consensus that Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of the UAR, was complicit in the overthrow of the pro-Western Iraqi government, which was part of a wider strategy to destabilise the pro-western Middle East nations. CIA Director, Allen Dulles (1993: 312), suggested that the "Nasser sponsored coup" would "set up a chain reaction which will doom the pro-West governments of Lebanon and Jordan…and raise grave problems for Turkey and Iran". As a result, the intervention in Lebanon had the implicit

purpose of containing the spread of revolutionary nationalism. As Vice President, Richard Nixon, argued, "Lebanon is not too important"; rather "Iraq is the big thing" (Dulles, J.F., 1993b: 321). It was also a view shared by President Eisenhower who argued that the joint military actions were undertaken to "bolster" the pro-western states and to ensure that the "'Persian Gulf area stays within the Western orbit'" (cited Gendzier, 2002: 108). In other words, the US employed military force in order to contain the Iraqi revolution.

Similar aims motivated America's policy in Iran at this juncture. In response to the Iraqi revolution, the US increased military assistance to Iran and signed a bilateral defence agreement. In the words of E.H. Carr (1946: 109), the US provided Iran with a "weapon which it may require in the last resort to use". Before the Iraqi revolution the Joint Chiefs of Staff had deemed the Iranian MAP efficient. In fact, they suggested that "it is not feasible to build up Iranian forces so they can resist successfully large scale Soviet aggression". This was because "incursions [into Iran from other nations] are either improbable or possible only on a small scale" (Twining, 1993: 557).

The revolution in Iraq reversed this policy. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to the Shah of Iran just a number of days after the revolution stressed his "belief that [Iran's] armed forces as now supported should be brought up to agreed operational strength" (Dulles, J.F., 1993a). As a result, the US military missions in Iran devised 'Plan Counterbalance'. The plan increased the size of the Iranian army by 30,000 personnel, improved training and logistics and increased the efficiency of the military assistance funds. This was in order that Iran's military forces could develop into a "well-trained and equipped mobile force of sufficient strength", which was capable of "[maintaining] Iran's internal security, [resisting] external aggression and [making] maximum contribution to the northern tier [defence] within the Baghdad Pact" (ARMISH-MAAG, 1959).

As noted by John Holmes (1996), a member of staff in the US embassy in Iran, "relations with Iraq, both between Iran and Iraq and the United States and Iraq, were extremely bad [after the revolution]". As a result, the US MAP in Iran was increased substantially(Herter, 1993: 650). At the same time, the US concluded bilateral defence agreements with Iran (in addition to Pakistan and Turkey) designed to strengthen the remaining northern tier countries. As a result, the US "had become a member of [CENTO] in all but name" (Yeşilbursa, 2005: 215). Not all were satisfied with these developments. Maurice Williams (1996), a member of staff in the US Agency for International Development (AID), argued that he "was fairly

critical of [US foreign policy in Iran] for being so militarily orientated". For Williams, American policy in Iran "required a more economic development focus and less on supporting the Shah's military aspirations". Nevertheless, the need to further militarise Iran and the other northern tier countries was a direct response to Iraq's revolution and its regional impact.

Similar to the nationalist revolution in Iran, the Iraqi revolution, which further eroded British power, altered America's military stance in the region. In fact, NSC 6011 released in July 1960 argued that, whilst welcoming co-operative foreign policies with other western powers, the US should now held the "major responsibility for providing Free World leadership toward the area as a whole" (Lay, 1993a: 269). The dual challenge of revolutionary nationalism and Soviet Communism meant the Eisenhower administration was willing to accept this role. As NSC 6011 recorded, "The most dangerous challenge to long-range Western interests in the Near East arises not from Arab nationalism per se, but from the short-term coincidences of many of those objectives with those of the [Soviet Union]" (Lay, 1993a: 264). In other words, the Soviets were better equipped to exploit the era of Arab nationalism, which "would be a major setback for US interests" (Lay, 1993a: 265).

Accordingly, whilst earlier NSC statements had advocated the use of military force as a last resort to ensure oil supplies from the region, NSC 6011 expanded America's military commitment. It advocated the "use of force in the Near East region should it appear that peaceful countermeasures [would] no longer suffice to prevent Soviet dominance in the area" (Lay, 1993a: 270). There is little evidence to suggest that principal policymakers were opposed to this development. However, Robert Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, and Christian Herter, Secretary of State, did disagree over whether the US would intervene unilaterally if needed (Johnson, 1993: 261). The point, however, is that the Iraqi revolution radically altered the Persian Gulf and Middle East strategic context. In doing so, the revolution once again influenced the trajectory of US foreign policy.

E.H. Carr (1946: 109) wrote that war was a weapon of last resort. The US, seemingly acting in contrast to this thesis, immediately employed military power to counter the Iraqi revolution. The revolution in Iraq, however, was the zenith of revolutionary Arab nationalism, which had begun with the Egyptian revolution in 1952. It was, in the words of Louis (2002: 13), "one of those rare times when it became apparent to the world at large that [Arab nationalism]…clashed dramatically with British and American efforts to preserve their

own influence". E.H. Carr's approach to militarism, which was sketched in chapter three, suggests that it is a weapon of last resort and is generally produced by declining influence. This still seems like a useful way of thinking about America's militaristic response to the 1958 revolution in Iraq, which ultimately threatened the Anglo-American power and America's strategic interests in the southern Gulf.

4.4.3.2 Soft Power

Beyond employing force to contain the revolution, the US also employed softer, or what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) referred to as "'civilised'" weapons, to effect change in Iraq. Specifically, as the conflict between Iraq and the UAR over leadership of the Arab nationalist movement became a *de-facto* cold war (Kerr, 1971: 17 and Hourani, 1991: viii), the US tilted – that is diplomatically sided – towards the UAR.

Not all policymakers supported this policy. President Eisenhower, in an 18 December NSC meeting, favoured "co-operating with Nasser if we think he is restive at the prospect of [Soviet] domination" (Boggs, 1993: 364). However, Bill Rountree (1993: 371), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, favoured "[reserving] for the present any recommendations on whether action by Nasser or in concert with him should be encouraged". Nasser's terse relations with virtually all of America's chief allies (Iran, Turkey, Britain, Israel and Saudi Arabia) made such a move problematic. Thus, debate in the NSC continued. At the 15 January meeting Secretary of State, John Dulles, argued that America was "not sufficiently sophisticated to mix into the complicated situation [in Iraq]" because, since the revolution, America had "relatively few remaining assets" in the country. Whilst Eisenhower welcomed ideas on how to "support Nasser vis-à-vis developments in Iraq", Dulles argued that "at the moment there was nothing much [America] could do but that we must carefully avoid appearing to meddle in the situation in Iraq" (Gleason, 1993a: 376 – 7).

Dulles' objections, however, were seemingly already overruled. In an off-the-record meeting on 23 December President Eisenhower met with Christian Herter, Acting Secretary of State, Bill Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, and Richard Nixon, Vice President. Rountree admitted to "[withholding] some of the details [of his discussions with Nasser]" from the NSC. As a result, he advocated a pro-Nasser stance in the Arab Cold War. Rountree advised Eisenhower that "Nasser desires to work with us on Iraq" and "we can work with Nasser on the Iraqi situation". In turn, Eisenhower appeared pleased at doing "business with

Nasser" because he had more popular appeal and could therefore oppose communism in Iraq more effectively (Eisenhower, J., 1992: 509 – 11). As a result, the US restarted its Public Law 480, or the 'food for peace programme', which offered the UAR subsidised food. In the words of E.H. Carr (1946: 124), the US was employing forms of economic power to "acquire power and influence" in the UAR.

Despite objections from the Department of State, therefore, the US took a partisan position in the Arab Cold War. Even NEA staff supported this position. In fact, William Lakeland (1959), officer in charge of Iraqi affairs in the NEA, advocated a strategy of being "willing to be of what assistance we can in [the Arab Cold War] which is of common interest to the UAR and the US". The hope was that, in supporting the UAR, the US could circumscribe Communist influence in Iraq, which would ultimately challenge America's traditional conception of the northern Gulf as a 'strategic buffer'.

What actual assistance, beyond restarting the food for peace programme, the US provided to the UAR is an open question. Robert Anderson (1959), Secretary of the Treasury, did write a briefing paper to Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt, who had 'left' the CIA and was now employed as a chief executive for Gulf Oil. In the paper, Anderson noted that "[Nasser's] outright hostility toward Iraq has come about without any substantial evidence available to him that the US or Britain are prepared to accept anything like the 'terms' we said would be necessary to enlist him in all-out battle against Communism". At the same time, Anderson admitted "We have had several lengthy discussions with [Nasser] on the question of Iraq, and many more with principal Egyptian [military] officers concerned with the problem presented by that country". Clearly, America's alignment, whilst limited, was concerned with countering communist influence in Iraq.

As these discussions were occurring the UAR was allegedly conducting covert warfare in Iraq. In March 1959 an Iraqi military officer, who had alleged links to the UAR, incited a rebellion against Qassem's regime (Aburish, 2005: 178 – 85). After a number of days of violence the rebellion was crushed. There is little to suggest that the US actively participated in these actions, but the US did have advance knowledge (CIA, 1993: 385, fn.1), which likely stemmed from the discussions with Nasser. Importantly for US foreign policy, however, the nationalist rebellion would have a decisive impact on the strategies Abdul Karim Qassem, Prime Minister of Iraq, employed to maintain power. As Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett (1990: 68 – 9) contend, after the rebellion, Qassem moved further to the ICP by purging nationalists

from his government. Additionally, he withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and accepted military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union (Smolansky and Smolansky, 1990: 68 – 9). In response to these developments John Jernegan (1993: 397 – 8), US Ambassador in Iraq, concluded that the "Iron Curtain [was] descending". As a result, "it looks as if 1959 will be the year of the bear in Iraq".

In response, the US pursued softer forms of power, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) termed the "art of persuasion", as a means to impose on Qassem the dangers of increasing communist influence in Iraq. Not everyone agreed with this policy. In fact, there were terse debates between chief policymakers, which reflected the traditional 'hawk' and 'dove' bureaucratic divide (see Smith, 1984: 13). This divide was most apparent during the 2 April NSC meeting. C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State, commented that if America started "something in Iraq, knowledge of our activities would presently be widespread in the Middle East and we would simply be accused of colonialism and imperialism" (Gleason, 1993b: 403 – 4). In contrast, Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's NSA, advocated intervention. Gray argued that if "Iraq is going to end up Communist anyhow, it would be worthwhile to take the risk of [intervention] since it might possibly result in saving Iraq" (Gleason, 1993b: 405). The divide led to the creation of an interdepartmental group, which was established under NSC action 2068, for the "purpose of determining what the US government either alone or in concert with others can do [one line of classified text] to avoid a Communist takeover in Iraq" (Gray, 1959).

The NSC 2068 group, however, failed to overcome the bureaucratic impasse. Phillip Halla (1959a), who was a member of staff in the NSC, records that in the first meeting "[the Department of] State urged the desirability of a hands-off policy by both the US and Nasser", whilst DOD and CIA "share[d] the view that time is of the essence and that we had about reached the point of 'now or never'". Accordingly, US policy at this stage was rather inconsistent. Halla (1959b) revealed in one meeting that "limited activities in intelligence and psychological warfare [in support of Nasser had] just been authorised", whilst in another he noted that a NEA representative had met with Turkish and Iranian officials who had agreed to hold in "reserve" the Kurds (Halla, 1959c). However, the only actual policy output from the NSC 2068 group was a draft policy paper that declared a policy of non-intervention (NSC, 1959).

In response, Ambassador Jernegan returned to Washington in May and reported to the NSC. Jernegan recognised the increased Communist influence in Iraq, but argued that this resulted from a "widespread fear" amongst Qassem's regime that it "would be brought down by Nasser". Accordingly, Jernegan advocated a 'hands off' policy. This was because he feared that overt American hostility would "drive [Qassem] more completely into the hands of the Soviets" (Gleason, 1993c: 447). Under Jernegan's leadership, the NSC 2068 group was suspended. In its place, Jernegan advocated the use of softer forms of power to gain influence over Iraq. These included diplomacy to end Iraq's regional isolation, the establishment of a technical assistance programme to train Iraqi nationals in the US and the creation of a cultural agreement between the US and Iraq to engender mutual exchanges between the two countries. Therefore, the US was following a policy based on what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) called the "art of persuasion", to "reassure [Qassem] and to support his regime" (Gleason, 1993c: 448), which had the purpose of minimising communist influence in the country.

These policies, however, failed to have the desired effect and political developments in Iraq meant that the NSC 2068 group was reconvened. These developments included a nascent civil war between communists and nationalists, increased political executions in Iraq, purges of nationalists from government and territorial tensions between Iraq and Iran. In response, the US pursued a policy that seemed to have the purpose of fomenting internal opposition to Qassem. The NSC 2068 group reconvened in January 1960. G. Lewis Jones, who had replaced Bill Rountree as Assistant Secretary of State for the NEA and convenor of the group, indicated that the "situation in Iraq is now such, that while there were risks involved, the possibilities of developments adverse to US interests are such as to justify a more [one word of classified text] [programme] within Iraq". Large portions of this meeting remain security classified, even after a mandatory review in 2011. What is declassified, however, includes a presentation to the group by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Raymond Hare. His presentation, which followed a meeting with UAR President Nasser, indicates that "Nasser's resources inside Iraq [have] been cut down". As a result, Hare believed that "an Iraqi solution to the Iraq problem" was required. This is followed by a comment from a representative from the DOD who "stressed the view, which he said was backed by [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the [DOD], that we need a great deal more information in order to appraise the various Iraqi groups and our chances of success in working through them" (Halla, 1960). In other words the US, as it did during the Iranian revolution, appears to have been seeking to co-ordinate opposition to Qassem's regime. This

seems plausible considering the policy guidance included in NSC 6011 of July 1960. It noted that the US should "Discreetly encourage tendencies in Iraq which may in time lead to a further lessening of Soviet Bloc and Communist influence and to a continued improvement in Iraq's relations with the Free World" (Lay, 1993a: 272). Put another way, the US was seeking to induce a change in the actual government of Iraq.

Similar policies were followed by the John F. Kennedy administration. Although Qassem continually challenged western interests in the region, in particular by nationalising the IPC and threatening to annex Kuwait, the DOS continued to favour softer forms of power. Philips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, contended:

> [that the US] must resist firmly all efforts to force us to undertake intervention of any type in the internal affairs of Iraq unless and until it is clear the domestic Communists stand to gain control of Iraq in absence of such intervention. In the present circumstances, for the US and/or its friends to place severe pressure on Iraq or to intervene ineffectively in Iraq would only serve to increase the likelihood of a situation we do not want: a communist takeover…Our objective is to the best of our ability to avoid pushing Iraq further along its present path and to endeavour to persuade certain allies and friends to pursue a similar course. (Talbot, 1961a)

Similar policies were set out in Department of State (1962) guidelines. The guidelines stated that US policy should "work towards diminishing [Qassem's suspicion of the US]…by careful diplomacy". At the same time, the US should "gradually [broaden] our contact, mainly in cultural and educational fields", whilst being ready to respond to requests for "economic or other forms of assistance". At the same time, the policy statement indicated a continuation of Eisenhower era policy.

> In striving to reduce Soviet influence in Iraq, and to increase our own, the [US] can continue to make discreet use of their enlarged area of contact to persuade influential Iraqis of the existence of common interests between Iraq and the [US] and of the dangers of association with the Soviet Bloc. (Department of State, 1962)

In other words, the US continued with softer, or what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) labelled "'civilised'" forms of power, to influence political developments in Iraq. Not everyone agreed with this policy. Robert Armor (1961), who was an analyst in the CIA, favoured more forceful activity to circumscribe communist influence in Iraq. Similarly, Robert Komer (1962a), a member of staff in the NSC, advocated a more interventionist policy in Iraq. He

advised McGeorge Bundy, his superior and President Kennedy's NSA, that he had been "prodding" the Department of State to take more action. However, Komer was dissatisfied with the Department of State's continual objections. Komer, in concluding his memorandum, urged "[the Department of] State/CIA to look at (on a no holds barred basis)" the likelihood "of a coup in Iraq, possibilities of US/[Britain] influencing it [and] pros and cons of doing so". In effect, Komer was calling for the establishment of a NSC Special Group (a group within the NSC tasked with overseeing covert operations).

There is little evidence to suggest that the Kennedy administration established such a group. However, there is tacit evidence to suggest that the US, like it did during the Iranian nationalist revolution, engaged in propaganda, or the "art of persuasion" (Carr, 1946: 132) as a means to generate opposition to Qassem. For example, James Akins, a political officer in the US embassy in Baghdad, wrote to NEA staff in October thanking them for 'articles' on the Kurds. He noted:

> they have had considerable effect here. The government says they are 'proof' of American involvement in the revolt, the Kurds are encouraged by them and the Communist demand that the [Kurdish Democratic Party] denounce the articles as fabrications. Too bad the Kurdish issue is complicated by the Kurds in Turkey and Iran. If all Kurds were in Iraq it would be easier for us. I see no reason to continue being gentle with this regime and hope that the department will authorise us to tell [Qassem] we have had enough of this nonsense. I would like to be able to add that if he persists in his accusation of American aid to the Kurds, in spite of clear indication that the Soviet Bloc is favouring them, perhaps we will be forced to examine our policy of 'hands off' Iraq and the Kurds. (Akins, 1962)

Akins, who has alleged CIA involvement in the February 1963 *coup d'état* (Little, 2003), is now deceased and so cannot comment on this. However, from the description, and with NEA complicity, Akins appears to have been engaging in propaganda operations in Iraq, which had the apparent aim of creating the impression that America was supporting and intervening in the Kurdish rebellion. One may only theorise on the purpose of this. It may have served to induce a reaction from Qassem and thus act as a pretext for a more aggressive policy. It was possibly hoped that such propaganda would prolong the Kurdish rebellion, ultimately weaken Iraq and therefore limit its impact on regional politics. It may have also been directed towards creating a wedge between the Kurdish factions and the ICP and Soviets, in order to ensure the Kurdish factions moved towards the *Ba'ath* (renaissance) and nationalist grand coalition,

which according to Sluglett and Sluglett (1990: 81 – 2)was already in the process of occurring. Interestingly enough, Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for the NEA, which seemed complicit in Akins actions, wrote to the *charged'affaires* in Iraq, Roy Melbourne, castigating Qassem. Talbot wrote that "[Qassem] feels the need for a foreign devil to blame for the army's miserable showing. We seem to be among his candidates for the position" (Talbot, 1962a). Embassy staff seemed to have been conspiring to cultivate this thought.

In February 1963 a coalition of *Ba'ath*, Iraqi nationalists and Kurdish opposition did overthrow Qassem. He was summarily executed and communists were subjected to violent repression, whilst Qassem's erstwhile revolutionary, Abdul Salam Aref, returned as Iraqi President. A memorandum from Robert Komer, member of staff in the NSC, lends credence to the idea that the US participated in these developments. Komer noted that:

> While it [is] still early, Iraqi revolution seems to have succeeded. It is almost certainly a net gain for our side…the regime will be preferable to [Qassem's]…We will make informal friendly noises as soon as we can find out whom to talk with, and ought to [recognise] as soon as we're sure these guys are firmly in the saddle. CIA had excellent reports on the plotting, but I doubt either they or [Britain] should claim much credit for it. (Komer, 1963)

Komer's memorandum to John F. Kennedy, however, does not necessarily mean that the US instigated the February *coup*, as some have suggested (Zeman, 2006: 52 – 3). The 'doubting' in his memorandum suggests that Komer may have been considering associating the US with the *coup* in order to create a sense of American omnipotence. As he is now deceased it is impossible to obtain comment. At the very least, however, the scattered evidence suggests that the US was actively associating itself with the various actors and groups opposed to Qassem's regime.

As the new government took power in Baghdad, the US sought, as E.H. Carr's classical realism would suggest, methods to acquire power and influence in the country. After the fall of Qassem Roy Melbourne (1963), America's Iraqi *charge d'affaires*, wrote to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State. He argued that Iraq's "non-aligned" foreign policy "combined with its clearly anti-communist position [warrants] appropriate [US] help at opportune times". Rusk (1963), however, was more cautious. He wrote to President Kennedy and argued that "we seek friendship with Iraq", whilst "avoiding efforts to press [favours] on the new regime but

standing ready to be helpful where we can without materially increasing the current aid level". Nevertheless, through 1963 Iraq was made eligible for the 'food for peace' subsidy programme (Davies, 1963) and made eligible for military sales (Harriman, 1963). However, US-Iraqi relations remained tentative. Iraq remained subject to political turmoil. The uneasy balance between the pro-UAR Aref and the *Ba'ath* leader, Hassan al-Bakr, collapsed in November. As a result, the *Ba'ath*were purged from government. At the same time, America's relationships with Iran and Israel, which were chief contributors to the continued rebellion in Iraq's Kurdish region, overshadowed US-Iraqi relations. As Walter McClelland (1995), an economic officer in the US embassy, noted, the US was "really trying to [normalise] our relations with Iraq, build up trade, promote mutual understanding". However, "we were not sure we were making much headway…The Iraqi government was taking more and more an anti-Western position".

4.4.4 Balancing Against Communism in Iraq

The first section of this chapter suggested that, drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realist balance of power concept, balancing against power that would threaten US interests has guided American policy in the Gulf. The Iraqi revolution, which was in part generated by the post-war political order, radically threatened America's chief interests. Many American policymakers believed that Qassem's policies and his supporters would lead to increased Soviet influence in the country. They did not believe Qassem was a communist. Nevertheless, as one embassy official put it, if "[Qassem] had to choose between, 'Heads it is America, tails it is the Russians', it would often come up 'Tails'" (Horan, 1996). As a result, the general feeling was that developments after Iraq's revolution challenged the northern tier concept. That is, the Iraqi revolution threatened the 'strategic buffer' between Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf.

As a result, the preceding subsection illustrated the balancing strategies the US employed to counter Iraq's revolution. These included militarily balancing with pro-western states (by intervening in Lebanon and increasing military assistance to Iran), balancing with the UAR in the Arab cold war (by diplomatically tilting with the Arab republic) and balancing against Qassem (by embarking on propaganda to weaken his regime). Because of the shrouded mystery (Little, 2004: 694) of American policy in Iraq at this juncture, it is extremely difficult to assert that the US employed militarism to overthrow Qassem. Nevertheless, the reduction in American influence produced by the revolution generated increasing calls,

particularly from policymakers in the NSC, the CIA and the DOD, to employ force to effect change in Iraq. These calls seemed to be tempered by concerns, which were voiced by representatives from the DOS, that any intervention would be counterproductive. Nevertheless, the revolution, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, radically reshaped America's traditional conception of the northern Gulf and created the conditions for an intense tilt towards Iran.

4.5 Conclusion

Neoclassical realism is based on the idea that a country's foreign policy is shaped by international structural and unit level factors. Whilst not denying the importance of these determinants of American foreign policy, this chapter, by engaging with E.H. Carr's classical realist ideas, has stressed that America's foreign policy at this juncture was also shaped by the nationalist revolutions in Iraq and in Iran. The chapter began by discussing the origins of American interest in the Gulf – its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. The two northern Gulf countries were viewed as a 'strategic buffer' or 'northern tier' protecting this interest. At the same time, however, the nascent post-war order generated, in part, nationalist revolutions in both countries, which ultimately threatened this strategic interest.

The chapter, in making these connections, discussed the balancing strategies the US employed in both Iran and Iraq to counter the nationalist revolutions. In the former, when the US was unable or unwilling to influence Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, by more 'civilised' or softer means, it resorted to the use of militarism, albeit of a covert nature, to overthrow him. In the latter, whilst there is no clear evidence to suggest that America participated in the eventual downfall of Iraqi Prime Minister, Abdul Karim Qassem, his tenure in charge of Iraq certainly generated increasing calls for a more interventionist stance. Perhaps most importantly, however, the two nationalist revolutions, which underwrote Britain's decline, shaped American policy by moving it into the position of chief western power. E.H. Carr was attune to the effects of revolution on international politics and this overarching idea helps bring into focus one of the principal determinants of American foreign policy at this juncture. In fact, as the next chapter will discuss, the effects of the era of nationalist revolution would continually shape America's policy options.

5 Controlling the Revolution

> The Shah was…building up his forces – on paper at least, the Iranians were stronger than the Iraqis and we were content to let it be that way because, even then, the Gulf states, including Saudi, were nervous about Iraq and had every right to be. (Draper, 1991)

5.1 Introduction

The era of nationalist revolution, the revolution in Iraq in particular, fundamentally altered the strategic environment of the northern Gulf. In fact, according to Halliday (1996: 9), if there was "one event that served to break the mould of previous Gulf politics…it was the Iraqi revolution of 1958". This was because it resulted in Britain's regional decline, Iran's regional rise and subsequent terse relations between the two northern Gulf neighbours. At the same time, as the illustrative quote from Morris Draper, a member of staff in the NEA, alludes to, the US continued to attach a high level of importance to the regional balance of power. In fact, as the 60s moved into the 70s Iran was increasingly seen less as a 'strategic buffer' and more as an 'island of stability'. This chapter, which employs E.H. Carr's classical realist 'framework of answers', explores the rise and then fall of the US-Iranian political order.

5.2 The Statist Revolution in Iran

The John F. Kennedy administration took office promising a 'new frontier' in both domestic and foreign policy. These themes certainly influenced American policy in Iran. At the same time, however, America's overarching concern with a stable political order in the Gulf tempered these ideals. According to William Miller (2003), who was a political officer in the embassy, there "was a policy battle [in the US] between the supporters of the Shah's absolute rule and those who wanted Iran to have a constitutional democratic monarchy". As Miller noted, it was the former that won out and "so the shah became the 'linchpin of stability' at that point". The principal concern remained reproducing Iran's role asa 'strategic buffer'. "Iran", according to Harold Saunders (1993), an analyst for the CIA, "was central to our concerns because the Persian Gulf was central to our economic well-being". Accordingly, Iran was seen as "a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Gulf oil fields". This section, which employs E.H. Carr's classical realist lens as a theoretical guide, charts the nature of American foreign policy in Iran.

5.2.1 Background

US-Iranian relations, or more fittingly US-Shah relations, intensified after the zenith of revolutionary Arab nationalism. The last Iranian policy paper produced by the Eisenhower administration, whilst noting the internal instability created by the almost dictatorial nature of the Shah, concluded that he was "the best hope of furthering US interests in Iran" (Lay, 1993b: 683 – 4).

Existing literature tends to emphasise the international structural or American domestic influences shaping US foreign policy at this juncture. Cottam (1970: 6) stresses how American policy was orientated towards the strengthening of a "non-communist, stable [regime] capable of resisting Soviet subversion". In contrast, alternative literature places less emphasis on the Cold War bipolar structure and instead points to the domestic determinants of US foreign policy. Summitt (2004), for instance, shows that American policy was influenced, particularly during the John F. Kennedy presidency, by bureaucratic struggles. Conflict between traditionalists, such as Ambassador Julian Holmes, and new frontiersman, such as NSC staff member Robert Komer, often hindered the policy process. It was the former that proved successful and, according to Goode (1991), this resulted in acquiescence to the Shah's relatively superficial political reform programme. Similarly, Johns (2007) demonstrates how US-Iranian relations during the Lyndon B. Johnson presidency were affected by the domestic impact of the Vietnam War. The pressing concern of the conflict in Southeast Asia meant less time was devoted to other areas. In turn, short-term considerations, meaning that the US often pandered to the Shah's desires, won out over long-term policy planning.

E.H. Carr's classical realism, however, reminds us that the foreign policies of the *status quo* powers (in this case the US) are not only produced by second (unit level) and third image (international structural) factors. For Carr, the actions and reactions of foreign actors, by shaping the political environment of the *status quo* powers, also influence the foreign policies of the *status quo* countries. As a result, it is necessary to chart the forces shaping American policy at this point. In the early 1960s Iran remained a politically divisive country. In fact, a NSC policy statement concluded that, lacking any reform, "the monarchy is likely to be overthrown" (Lay, 1993b: 683). Public dissatisfaction with declining wages, rampant inflation and political corruption produced anti-government protests in May 1961 (Abrahamian, 1982: 421 – 3). In response, the Shah appointed Ali Amini as Prime Minister.

Amini was a vocal advocate of political reform (Bill, 1988: 143). However, his appointment created tensions amongst American policymakers. A special taskforce was established to consider America's best interests in Iran. The first report concluded that America was committed to a pro-western Iran. At the same time, however, the taskforce agreed that the Shah was one of the chief causes of political unrest in the country. As a consequence, the taskforce concluded that the US "should actively encourage the Shah to move toward a constitutional role", whilst encouraging more broad based political participation (Talbot, 1961b: 3 – 4). This policy was influenced by ideas held by some policymakers that claimed that modernising Iran would engender more political stability. For instance, Robert Komer (1961a), a member of staff in the NSC, was in favour of creating a "'controlled revolution'" in Iran by "backing [Amini] to the hilt". The alternative, or more appropriately fear, was that Iran would be enveloped by a "mass revolution", which would create a "volatile Iran" that "would become prey to the Tudeh Party and the [Soviet Union]" (Komer, 1987: 15). Others disagreed with this analysis. For instance, Julius Holmes (1961), who was America's Ambassador in Iran, argued that America should continue with its pro-Shah policy as the "Shah continues to be the repository of power [in Iran]".

It was the latter voice that informed the taskforce's second appraisal of US foreign policy in Iran. The 1962 report concluded that, whilst Amini had averted economic ruin, Iran remained "politically sick and economically [disorganised]". The real policy dilemma, however, was the relative lack of "middle ground" between the Shah and the "largely destructive and unrealistic" opposition. As a result, the US could either support the revolutionary nationalists, with the corollary that this would result in a neutral Iran, or "continue to support governments acceptable to the Shah". It was the former that the taskforce concluded was necessary if the US was to "avoid a major political defeat" (Talbot, 1962b: 1 – 2). Robert Komer (1962b) continued to criticise this policy. He argued that the US was "going to hell in a hack in Iran". Komer argued that the US should "back a moderately progressive government in an attempt to take the wind out of the [National Front's] sails, risking the Shah's displeasure if necessary". However, his objections were ignored on the basis that a more democratic Iran would, by its very nature, be a neutral Iran. In turn, a more neutral Iran would weaken, if not end, Iran's role as the traditional strategic buffer.

The Shah, having secured American support, removed Amini from power in order to "pave the way for the appointment of a less independent, more loyal, political lieutenant" (Bill,

1988: 147). As a result, Even Komer (1995) argued that there was "no presently foreseeable alternative [in Iran] than some combination of the Shah and a reformist cabinet". The political divisions in Iran, however, resulted in the Shah pursuing strategies to pacify opposition in the country. Specifically, the Shah's white revolution programme was established as a means to legitimise the Pahlavi state. As Gheissari and Nasr note (2006: 68), the white revolution was aimed at "[upstaging] the left". It was hoped that it would "institutionalise [Pahlavi] hold over the middle class and over those social groups that might serve as the basis of support for an effective [opposition] movement". The white revolution promised land reform, nationalisation of the forests, labour equity, industrial reform and female enfranchisement. The programme, as Ansari (2003: 158) notes, was one of "'Bonapartism'". In effect, it was a political strategy with the explicit aim of drawing the "peasants and the petit-bourgeoisie…into a social and political alliance with their enlightened despot".

This statist revolution, which heralded the consolidation of the Pahlavi state (Halliday, 1979a: 27 – 8 and Keddie, 2006: 140 – 69), created the strategic context in which US foreign policy had to operate. Iran's economy was transformed into a heavy industry based economy, which was accompanied by exponential growth in gross domestic product and gross national product (Gheissari and Nasr, 2006: 60 – 1). As a result, Iranian military spending rose from $64 million at the start of the 1960s to $844 million by the end of the decade. In terms of internal security, the Pahlavi state focused on crushing domestic opposition. In 1957 the *Sazman-e Etelaat va Amjniat-e* (Iranian secret police, henceforth SAVAK) was formed. SAVAK was principally responsible for the "destruction of those who in any way oppose the Shah's rule" (Halliday, 1979a: 81). In addition the state extended its ideological reach by embarking on an educational reform programme that exponentially increased the government's involvement in the education of its populace (Abrahamian, 2008: 134). Iran's growing strength, coupled with the decline of the traditional Middle Easter power – Britain – provided the context for the increasing diplomatic tilt towards Iran. For all intents and purposes the Shah's white revolution, or perhaps more appropriately the profits from Iran's oil industry, was transforming Iran into a regional power and one that was crucial to American conceptions of regional political order. As Robert Komer (1987: 32 – 3) noted, America's "interest in Iran was the oil, and the access which Iran would give to the Arab states…at this point we were just interested in keeping the Soviets out of *any* country around the Soviet periphery".

5.2.2 The US-Iranian Political Order

Political orders are, according to E.H. Carr's classical realism, built on material influence. Accordingly, the US understood that its chief interests in Iran lay in maintaining influence in the country. NSC 6010 of July 1960 argued that, since Mosaddeq's overthrow in August 1953, "Iran has been regarded in the area as a symbol of US influence". As a result, Iran's "reversion to neutralism or its subjection to Soviet control would represent major psychological setbacks…for US prestige throughout the Middle East" (Lay, 1993b: 681). American programmes, particularly economic aid and military assistance, were seen as vital forms of leverage. As a result, NSC 6010 concluded that US programmes "are the determining factor in the Shah's orientation toward the West" and are "important, if not essential, pillars supporting the Shah in his present…position" (Lay, 1993b: 687).

In addition, for E.H. Carr (1946: 145), political order was also grounded in what he termed common appeals. This seems like a useful way for explaining US-Iranian relations at this juncture. For instance, Deputy Chief of the US embassy, Stuart Rockwell (1988), argued that "Iran seemed to be an important Middle Eastern country which was not involved in the Palestinian crisis, and which seemed to have interests which paralleled ours". This is best illustrated by looking at the shared policies the two countries followed.

As the John F. Kennedy administration took office, there was a general consensus that international communism was better equipped to exploit the conditions of the underdeveloped and developing world. A Department of Army (1960) paper argued that the Iron and Bamboo curtains had achieved success by exploiting the "people's war" in former colonial areas. Richard Hilsman (1961), an intelligence analyst in the Department of State, concurred with this analysis and suggested that the US should pursue a policy of reform and modernisation to immunise these societies against communist penetration. Similar arguments were made by members of staff in the NSC (Komer, 1961c).

These ideas developed into America's counterinsurgency grand strategy. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 124 created a NSC Special Group to co-ordinate interdepartmental activities to respond to the threat of insurgencies (Bundy, 1962a). The NSC (1962: 2 – 3) defined an insurgency as a "condition resulting from revolt or insurrection against a constituted government". It was argued that the specific political conditions of the developing regions (Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East) made countries in

these regions most susceptible to insurgency and rebellion. These conditions included unstable state-society relations, lack of governmental legitimacy and unbalanced and unequal economies (NSC, 1962: 5 – 6). Accordingly, the counterinsurgency strategy called for the US to use a variety of tools to immunise 'at risk' nations against any form of political insurgency. These modernisation ideas dovetailed rather neatly with the Shah's own conception of state-building at this juncture, which was symbolised by his white revolution.

Whilst the counterinsurgency strategy was predominantly focused on the conflicts in Southeast Asia, Iran was included in the Special Group's remit as a country subjected to political insurrection (Bundy, 1962b). As a result, Iran was offered US military assistance. In April and May 1963 American Special Forces rotated into Iran "for the purpose of converting the Iranian airborne battalion into a Special Forces group". The principal concern was that the land reform programme, which was part of the white revolution, was creating "tribal unrest". Of equal concern was the Iranian response, which involved "jet-strafing and napalm attacks", that was assumed to be counterproductive. In particular, there was a general belief that the Shah's aggressive response could create a violent insurgency and a subsequent political vacuum, which the UAR and Soviet Russia "would be happy to fill" (Moses, 1964). Richard Secordof the US Air Force (who later served as Chief of the MAAG) participated in the special operations. In his memoirs he called it "winning the war nobody heard of" (Secord, 1992: 44). Secord suggests that by 1963 a full scale war had developed in which was supported by both Iraq and the Soviet Union (Secord, 1992: 47). Working in conjunction with the MAAG staff, American Special Forces provided training and assistance to aid the Iranian Armed Forces in defeating the Kurdish rebellion (Secord, 1992: 48 – 50).

However, the counterinsurgency order was not only based on military training. NSAM 119 advocated the use of the military civic action programmes in countries subjected to popular resistance. Foreign military forces were encouraged and supported to engage in state-building "projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation and other [areas] helpful to economic development" (NSC, 1961). As a result, US AIDprovided financial support to the Iranian armed forces to participate in programmes including infrastructure development, literacy programmes and health programmes (see Halliday, 1979a: 73). Put another way, the US-Iranian political order was grounded in a shared interest in helping the Iranian monarchy immunise itself against internal and external opposition. The principal rationale was Iran's

role as the strategic buffer. As member of staff in the NEA, George Bennsky (1993) argued, "Iran was so key to our whole Soviet containment policy". As a result, there was little questioning of the idea that "we needed Iran and the Shah was our person". Iran and its role in CENTO let the US "sit there underneath the Soviets soft belly and keep it from doing anything". At the same time, as will be discussed in the following subsection, there was also a concern with helping Iran balance against its more radical neighbours, in particular Iraq.

In the early 1960s it was common for some US policymakers to ridicule Iran. Robert Komer (1961a), member of staff in the NSC, once labelled Iran a "gimcrack country". By the end of the decade, however, it was far more common for US policymakers to stress the importance of the US-Iranian relationship. For instance, a joint statement that followed the Shah's visit to the US, noted that the "[Shah] reaffirmed Iran's determination to sustain an adequate modern [defence] force to ensure Iran's national security, [whilst President Johnson] expressed the desire of the [US] to continue cooperating with Iran to this end" (Johnson, 1968). The following subsection will discuss the means through which the US supported this.

5.1.3 The Nature of American Power

The Shah's white revolution, which stood in contrast to the black or red revolutions of the mosque or the intelligentsia, was the principal force driving Iranian politics. Subsequently, it was one of the principal factors shaping America's policies in Iran at this juncture. Although policymakers often voiced scepticism about the white revolution, there was a general agreement that America's strategic interests in the Gulf necessitated full support of the Shah. As the Department of State's (1965) policy paper on Iran concluded, "until another potentially viable power source appears…support for the Shah and his reformist [programmes] will form the basic condition of [US foreign policy in Iran]". This section, drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realist lens, charts the instruments the US employed to support the Shah.

5.1.3.1 Soft Power

Economic power, according to E.H. Carr (1946: 124 – 5), is an important tool of foreign policy. This is because by exporting capital and controlling foreign markets great powers, such as the United States, can purchase influence abroad. Accordingly, the US employed economic power to purchase influence in Iran in order to direct its social, political and economic development.

American financial assistance to Iran began with the Point IV technical assistance programme in 1951. Financial assistance between 1951 and 1967 totalled $712 million. Initial projects focused chiefly on developmental concerns, such as improving agriculture, health, education and sanitation. According to Murat Williams (1990), a member of staff in the NEA, the policies were aimed at "[strengthening] Iran financially [and] economically". This was because the US "felt that Iran was a bastion of support for us", whilst Iran's "long border with the Soviet Union and with its influence in the Persian Gulf states" was crucial to the containment of the Soviet Union. The financial assistance also had the objective of increasing the Shah's power base *vis-à-vis* domestic opposition. Maurice Williams (1996), a member of staff in the AID, argued that the chief "[objective] was to bolster the Shah's weak political support". In other words, the US employed economic instruments to strengthen the Shah's Iran *vis-à-vis* both internal and external opposition.

US financial aid was also concerned with expanding US influence in and through Iranian society. John Howison (1965), member of staff in the NEA, commented that economic assistance "on a large scale contributed to the forward movement experienced [in Iran] during the past decade and secured [American] entrée into key administrative, economic and military avenues". According to Howison, this resulted in "considerable acceptance among the present ruling society of the value of Iran's ties with the west", whilst also persuading Iranian leaders of the value in "the stress with which we have placed on orderly modernisation and socio-economic development".

The projects which were supported by the US reflected this concern. A US AID (1965) report indicated that during the 1960s assistance projects began concentrating on governmental administration. The aim was to strengthen "private business and [the] industrial sector, particularly through encouraging private US investment". As American global economic aid was declining (assistance to Iran was terminated in 1967), promoting American private investment in Iran was considered crucial to the continuation of US influence in the country. The Department of State (1965) Iranian policy paper, which stressed that American commercial investment was the foremost "means of preserving American presence and influence in key undertakings in the Iranian economy", made this aim perfectly clear.

As a result, by 1967 American private investment in Iran had reached $300 million (Rockwell, 1967). US firms invested in Iranian public works, such as National Organic Corporation's contract for waste disposal in Iran and Weather Engineering Corporation's

contract for cloud seeding with Tehran water authorities (Harlan, 1967). Other major American investments were made in the Iranian petrochemical industry, including joint investments between Allied Chemical, Standard Oil and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran (Rockwell, 1967). Other major commercial activities included BF Goodrich, General Tires, Foremost Dairy, Proctor and Gamble and Camay Soap (Harlan, 1968), which were involved in a variety of industries including "tire factories, pharmaceutical and synthetic detergent plants, the processing of dairy products and the manufacture of pumps and irrigation equipment" (Rockwell, 1967). Such economic influence was a crucial means to sanitise Iran, as per the counterinsurgency doctrine, against internal opposition.

There were occasional disagreements about the US-Iranian economic relationship. According to Robert Harlan (1968), an economic officer in the American embassy, American companies often voiced displeasure at the "arbitrary and uneconomic" practices of the Iranian government. Iranian officials also voiced disquiet over the interest equalisation tax (a programme designed to curtail American investment abroad as a means to reduce capital flight from America) and its possible negative impact on investment in Iran (Rockwell, 1967). Nevertheless, economic influence through credit and capital proved largely successful in purchasing US influence in Iran.

Economic instruments were complemented by the employment of ideological tools, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) labelled "power over opinion", to support the Shah's white revolution and influence Iran's general political, economic and social development. Increasing state involvement in education, which had the purpose of institutionalising Pahlavi rule in Iran, was one of the chief concerns of the Shah's white revolution. The US supported this by financing a project that sent academics and advisers from the University of Pennsylvania State sent Iran to support the modernisation of Shiraz University (Garlitz, 2008: 176 – 210). Embassy documents also reveal a concern with shaping the opinion of the youth in Iran. This policy was reflected in the creation of a joint embassy-AID 'Country Youth Team'. The team had the explicit task of addressing the "problem of developing a responsible middle class" by "affecting of the minds especially of the volatile student milieu in Tehran" (NEA, 1964a). In other words, America employed ideological instruments, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) labelled the "art of persuasion", to effect a pro-Pahlavi outlook amongst the general Iranian populace.

The US also undertook positive propagandising programmes to portray a benign picture of America amongst the Iranian public. According to the Department of State (1964) Iran policy

paper, American ideological power was directed towards developing a "favourable US image as an effective guarantor of Iranian security and as a friendly power interested in Iranian independence and progress". This was achieved through the actions of the American Ambassador in Iran. The Ambassador was responsible for cultivating close contacts with a range of leading Iranian figures including government officials, professional leaders, intellectuals, university students, military officers and media officials.

In addition the US Information Agency, which was America's primary public diplomacy institution, oversaw a comprehensive public relations exercise. It included selecting and placing positive US news programmes in the Iranian media in addition to arranging for the import of US films and television programmes to Iran. A good example of the type of image America sought to construct is found in a film demonstrating the role and history of American diplomats' abroad. The transcription of the film, which was broadcast nationally in Iran circa 1965, illustrates the values US diplomats carry with them. The transcription alludes to understanding, empathy, learning and patience. "The American foreign service officer…in the best tradition of American diplomacy…is always conscious of the feelings and traditions of the people of the country he is dealing with" (US Information Agency, 1965).

The US also granted over 1,200 Iranian citizens training in America or other pro-western countries. Many of the exchange participants took high political offices on their return to Iran. For instance, by 1964 participants in the exchange programme included: 10 percent of *Majlis* members; the deputy Prime Minister; the Director General of Land Reform; the Governor General of Khorasan; Iran's permanent representative in CENTO; the Chief of National Police; the Chief of Khuzestan Water and Electricity Authority; the Director of General Standards; four diplomatic ministers; five directors of Iranian general ministries; nine chiefs of ministry departments; seven deputy chiefs of ministry departments and two mayors (NEA, 1964b). As such US ideological power, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) referred to as "power over opinion", was concerned with inducing a pro-American outlook amongst the Iranian populace.

Not everyone supported America's ideological policies in Iran. William Miller (1965), a political officer in the embassy, contended that the "'New Men'" in Iran (various nationalists across the political spectrum particularly from the post-Mosaddeq National Front) were increasingly opposed to US influence in Iran, in particular America's pro-Shah policy. According to Miller, "the dominance of American influence in Iran, particularly military

strategic considerations, has created in the eyes of Iranian youth a new danger". These "'New Men'" subscribe to the belief that, if "Iran is to be anything more than a western satellite which would be cast aside if oil or strategic interests change, Iran must have her own independent 'power'". Miller argued that unless US policy changed the "'New Men'" will "become increasingly xenophobic and particularly anti-American". This is because they viewed "unqualified support of the Shah" as inhabiting "Iran from achieving maximum economic, political and sociological development". Consequently, Miller suggested that the US should work towards the creation of a "strong Prime Minister and cabinet, a responsible and representative parliament and a stress on civil liberties".

Miller's prescient arguments were largely ignored. Despite violent opposition in Iran, which included the 1965 assassination of Prime Minister Ali-Hassan Mansur by Islamic extremists and the non-fatal shooting of the Shah by similar groups, the US attributed this to "isolated extremist groups" (Jernegan, 1965). The need for political stability in Iran overruled any idealism in US foreign policy. As the Department of State policy paper on Iran put it:

> Support of the Shah's regime is the best way to sustain our own major interest in Iran, promote stability, and foster political and economic growth….There is no begging the fact that political institutions are inadequate in Iran and that operation of the government is very much the work of one man whose removal from the scene would have most serious consequences. The alternative strategy of promoting a nationalist-type government, however, would probably lead to an atmosphere of increasingly unmanageable and irresponsible nationalist fervour and neutralism. (Department of State, 1965)

Robert Komer (1961a), a member of staff in the NSC, called for a "'controlled revolution'" in Iran. Of course, Komer was vocal in his antipathy towards the Shah. Nevertheless, the US throughout the 1960s utilised soft forms of power to influence the statist revolution in Iran. Economic influence and power over opinion, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) saw as "'civilised'" powers, were employed to buttress the Shah's government and to support its continued development as the 'strategic buffer'.

5.2.3.2 Hard Power

Throughout the era of statist revolution in Iran, America also utilised harder forms of military power. As E.H. Carr (1946: 132) suggested, "Power…is one and indivisible. It uses military

and economic weapons for the same end". Principally, this involved large-scale funding of Iran's military modernisation programme. The financing of Iran's military served the immediate purpose of militarising the Iranian state in a strategically volatile region. In particular, militarising Iran had the immediate rationale of contributing to its role as the 'strategic buffer' between the Soviet Union and the Gulf. For example, Richard Kennedy (1995), an adviser in the Iranian MAAG, argued that America was concerned with "[positioning] the Iranian Army in ways to prevent a major Russian – Soviet push to the warm water ports [of] the Persian Gulf". At the same time, militarising Iran also served the purpose of balancing Iran against its radical neighbours, which included the UAR and Iraq. Equally important, however, the wider rationale for the military assistance programme was political influence. As E.H. Carr (1946: 109) contended, "military strength [is] a recognised standard of political values". Accordingly, the US employed its military power as a means to influence the increasingly strategically important Iranian state.

In late 1958 President Eisenhower ordered a review of all America's military assistance programmes. As a result, the US embassy in Iran drew up a five year commitment for military assistance in Iran. The five year MAP was never approved. Nevertheless, the Shah continued to petition the US for a multiyear financial assistance programme for military modernisation. In fact, in the first months of the John F. Kennedy administration he sent Teymur Bakhtiar, Chief of SAVAK, to visit with Kennedy. The President informed Bakhtiar that military assistance was pending and was once again being reviewed (Department of State, 1995). The review culminated in a decision to induce a reduction in Iran's armed forces and force political and economic modernisation in Iran by offering a five year MAP as a 'carrot' (Komer, 1987: 13 – 4). There were disagreements amongst principal policymakers over the plans. Ambassador Julius Holmes (1995), for instance, feared that forcing a reduction in Iran's armed forces without a suitable carrot would be counterproductive. NSC representatives, such as Harold Saunders (1961), in contrast, were more inclined to see the reduction in Iran's armed forces as being beneficial. Nevertheless, a five year MAP was approved in April 1962 extending $330 million to finance Iran's military modernisation (Rusk, 1995).

In the summer of 1964 the US increased the MAP and provided Iran with a further $50 million grant and $200 million credit. The Shah wrote to President Lyndon B. Johnson and argued that regional developments necessitated that Iran increase its military capabilities. In

particular, the November 1963 bloodless *coup d'état* in Iraq, which had purged the *Ba'ath* from government, that resulted in a pro-Nasser Iraq. As a result, the Shah was concerned about increasing pressure from radical Arab states (Pahlavi, 1999a).

Chief policymakers disagreed over whether to increase the Iranian MAP. Julius Holmes (1999a), US Ambassador in Iran, communicated to President Johnson that he thought "the threat to Iranian security is now less, not more, than at time [the MAP was] signed". Therefore, for Holmes, the existing MAP "adequately [provided] for the [defence] of Iran". In contrast Harold Saunders (1999), who was a member of staff in the NSC, argued that, whilst the Shah's fears may be unfounded, increasing the MAP was a useful means of diplomatic leverage. President Johnson (1999) favoured Holmes' position and informed the Shah that there would be no increase in the MAP.

In May, however, the UAR and Iraq signed a military and economic treaty. As a result, Ambassador Holmes (1999b) reversed his position and argued that the US should be more receptive to the Shah's demands. The underlying theme of the MAP increase in July was militarising Iran against potential threats from its radical neighbours, in particular Iraq and the UAR. The pretext, however, was that the MAP was a crucial means of US influence in Iran. Robert Komer (1999), a member of staff in the NSC, argued that the 1964 increase was a lever through which America could "limit the Shah's overall military outlays". This was because the increase was accompanied by an implicit "promise that Iran will restrict its own military outlays as to what we think reasonable so that [Iran's economic development programme] is not short-changed". The increase in the Iranian MAP also afforded intimate access to Iranian military institutions. The text of the 1964 agreement shows that the American Chief of the MAAG became (in conjunction with representatives of the Iranian armed forces) responsible for developing "detailed plans and arrangements for all matters pertaining to the United States-Iran military modernisation equipment program". In addition, the Chief of the MAAG assumed responsibility for the development of "force objectives and [determining] valid military equipment and training requirements…deemed attainable in future time periods" (Rusk, 1999a).

The MAP was increased again just two years later. For the Shah, regional developments, in particular the Indian-Pakistan conflict, illustrated the ineffectiveness of CENTO as a regional defence organisation. As a result, the Shah demanded a further $200 million of finance from the US, which he had already obtained *Majlis* approval for (Meyer, 1999a). There was

significant opposition to yet another increase in the Iranian MAP. Intelligence reports suggested that the Shah's fears regarding the radical Arab threat were misplaced (CIA, 1999). Representatives from the DOD concurred with this analysis and concluded that the Shah should be "[discouraged in] his purchase of highly sophisticated weaponry" (McNaughton, 1999). AID staff also raised concerns about further military outlays and how they may potentially hinder Iran's economic development (Macomber, 1999). Walt Rostow (1999a), President Johnson's NSA, agreed with these opinions. Nevertheless, he wrote to Johnson and argued that since the Shah will "buy arms somewhere, the best we can do is lean on the brakes".

As a result, Johnson furnished Iran with a further $200 million credit for making military purchases in the US. Again, whilst balancing Iran against its radical neighbours was the rationale articulated, the subtler justification for bending to the Shah's desires was that the MAP in Iran was the chief means of US influence. As Armin Meyer (1999b) argued, if America failed to extend MAP it "would [result in the US losing] our influence on [the] Shah in [the] military field and other fields as well". On the other hand, increasing the MAP will allow the US to "retain considerable leverage in his military planning [and] use citizens like General Khatemi [Commander of Iran's Air Force] to curb some of [the] Shah's extreme desires". Equally important for Ambassador Meyer, however, was that "by maintaining dialogue with Shah [regarding] things military we can influence [Iran] in whole spectrum of our relations".

In the final years of the Johnson administration the MAP in Iran was extended once more. The original MAP had provided a five year commitment between 1962 and 1967. However, the Shah of Iran wrote to President Johnson in late 1967 and informed him that the "modern, and sometimes very sophisticated weapons, pouring into some of [our neighbouring] countries…compels us to take appropriate military preparedness measures" (Pahlavi, 1999b). As a result, the Shah and his military advisers had devised a further five year military modernisation programme for Iran, which required further financial assistance.

With the Vietnam War raging Congress was extending its foreign policy remit. The Foreign Military Sales Act 1968, for instance, limited credit sales to underdeveloped or developing countries. Some members of the administration opposed a further multiyear commitment (Rusk, 1999b), whilst representatives of AID also raised concerns about the economic effect

of Iran's military expansion (Sober, 1999). Nevertheless, an interdepartmental review concluded that:

> we have an overriding political interest in offering to the Shah an arms supply proposal that would be adequate to bolster the Shah's confidence in our desire to retain our intimate military relationship with Iran; to keep him from feeling that he had no choice but to turn to the Soviets for sophisticated arms; and to support continuance of our present close and constructive over ties with Iran. (Sober, 1999)

Acting on this guidance, President Johnson approved a one year extension of the MAP and furnished Iran with a further $100 million credit for military purchases in 1968. The one-year extension of the MAP was accompanied without an explicit long-term agreement but an implicit guarantee that the US "would do what we can to help" (Rostow, 1999b). Whilst helping Iran to balance against its radical neighbours, in particular Iraq, was a definite rationale for the extension of MAP, equally important was maintaining US influence in the country. As a Department of State (1999) paper argued, the "virtually exclusive military advisory relationship provided through [MAAG] should ensure our remaining the primary foreign military influence in Iran". As the political order in the Persian Gulf was transforming, this leverage over Iran was deemed increasingly important. As Armin Meyer (1999c) contended, the military relationship will allow for American leverage over the "key role which [Iran] will inevitably play in [the] Gulf".

5.2.4 Balancing with the Shah's Iran

According to Archie Bolster (1992), who held multiple foreign service posts in Iran, the "traditional [US] line" was that the "Shah was the lynch pin of our interests in Iran and without him the whole thing would fall apart…as much as we wanted democracy and other people to be part of the power structure, we were in the end dependent on the Shah". With the decline of Britain and the radicalisation of Iraq, Iran's role as the 'strategic buffer' grew in importance. In other words, America remained committed to its traditional policy of preventing the rise of any power on the northern Gulf that could threaten its interests. Put another way, the US at this juncture engaged in balance of power politics. This included the use of softer forms of power, in particular economic aid and positive propagandising, which helped the Shah balance against domestic opposition in the country. In addition, whilst military aid underwrote continued US influence in the country, it also had an explicit aim of balancing with the Shah against his neighbouring radical states, in particular the Soviet

Union, the UAR and Iraq. As the next section will discuss, this relationship, which was a product of the Shah's own statist revolution, would be enhanced even further as the Persian Gulf moved into the post-colonial age.

5.3 The Post-colonial Revolution in the Gulf

Richard Nixon, US President, and the Shah of Iran met in Tehran in May 1972. The meeting occurred shortly after the Soviet Union had signed bilateral treaties with Iraq and Egypt. Nixon, in agreeing to supply Iran with hi-tech weaponry, turned to the Shah and said "'Protect me'" (The White House, 2006). With Britain withdrawing its military and political protectorate over the Gulf, allying with and therefore balancing with the Shah's Iran was a logical choice for the Nixon administration. This section charts US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf as revolutionary forces were once more altering its political landscape.

5.3.1 Background

To say that the Nixon administration admired the Shah's Iran is an understatement. The Shah made a state visit to the US in October 1969 and Nixon's toast was glowing. Nixon (1969b), during a meal in honour of the Shah, addressed the dignitaries and stated that "when we say 'His Majesty', we [realise] we are drinking to a man who has demonstrated majesty…in his leadership, majesty in his reverence for the past [and majesty] in his vision for the future". Literature on US-Iranian relations during this period mostly focuses on the second and third image variables shaping America's foreign policy. Yetiv (2008: 49) stresses how the Nixon doctrine (see next section), as applied to Iran, served the purpose of balancing against Soviet power internationally. Similarly, Kiely (2009: 36) argues that America's policy in Iran during this era was grounded in the desire to build up Iran "as an anti-Soviet bulwark in the Persian Gulf". The Nixon doctrine itself, as Cox (1985: 48) argues, was produced by the "alteration in the balance of global forces", which was created by the quagmire in Vietnam, US-Soviet nuclear parity and America's relative economic decline. Other literature, in contrast, suggests that it was domestic factors that had the most influence at this juncture. Alvandi (2012), for instance, contends that it was Nixon's admiration of the Shah that led the administration to entangle itself even further with Pahlavi Iran. In other words, "Nixon brought new ideas to the White House about the Pahlavi monarch and his ambitions for Iran, which stood in stark contrast [with the Johnson administration]". The change in administrations "provided fertile

ground for the shah's relentless efforts to secure Washington's backing for Iranian regional primacy" (Alvandi, 2012: 338).

This thesis, whilst recognising the importance of international structural and American domestic factors, suggests that American foreign policy is also shaped by the actions and reactions of foreign actors. Consequently, it is necessary to briefly sketch the principal foreign influences that were determining the course of US foreign policy at this juncture. The chief forces producing change in the Persian Gulf during the 1970s were regional in character. At this point, the Persian Gulf was moving into a post-colonial era (Halliday, 1977: 26 – 30). In January 1968, in the midst of a burgeoning financial crisis, the British government took the decision to cease its political protectorate over Bahrain, Qatar and the seven Trucial sheikhdoms in the southern Gulf. After a lengthy period of negotiations, set against a backdrop of terse territorial disputes, the seven sheikhdoms formed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in December 1971, whilst Bahrain and Qatar opted for political independence. Britain also ended its military protectorate over the Gulf, withdrew its navy and repatriated the Juffair naval base back to the Bahraini government. Although British power in the Middle East had gradually declined throughout the post-war era, these policy decisions created a literal scramble for the Gulf. As a *New York Times* journalist reflected, with the southern Gulf nations being oil-rich but under-populated, they are "a ripe target for outside influences". In this context, the question remained: just who "will succeed Britain" (Howe, 1972).

Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf was accompanied by seismic shifts in relationship between the oil-producing and oil-consuming nations. The Libyan nationalist revolution resulted in the country's foreign oil concessions being renegotiated. The result was a 55/45 profit sharing split in favour of the Libyan government. As Yergin (2009: 562) notes, this "decisively changed the balance of power between the governments of the producing companies and the oil companies". In other words, the much feared 'leapfrogging' had begun. As a result, foreign oil concessions were reworked across the region. The two northern Gulf countries benefited handsomely. Iran's oil income between 1972 and 1973 totalled $2.25 billion. Between 1975 and 1976 the figure reached a mammoth $19.1 billion (Halliday, 1979a: 160). In Iraq the *Ba'ath* government, after a decade of negotiations, successfully nationalised the IPC concession area (Penrose and Penrose, 1978: 381 – 420). As a result, Iraq's yearly oil income increased from $512 million to $26.1 billion during the

1970s (Alnasrawi, 2001). The exponential growth in capital fed state consolidation in both countries. This was predominantly felt in the military sphere. Iranian expenditures increased from $2 billion to $10.5 billion during the decade, whilst Iraqi spending grew between $800 million to $2.1 billion in the same period (Palmer, 1992: 89).

These factors, along with ideological discord, produced an increasingly conflictual Iraqi-Iranian relationship. As Halliday (2005: 351) briefly notes, the two countries engaged in a low intensity conflict. In April 1969 Iran, by sending an Iranian naval vessel down the Shatt al-Arab without Iraqi escort, violated the 1937 border treaty between the two countries. As a consequence, the two countries deployed military troops to border areas and engaged in a fierce war of words. Iraqi President Hasan al-Bakr denounced Iran's "illegal ambitions on Iraqi territory and the Arab Gulf", whilst Iranian officials singled out Iraq as a sponsor of radical movements across the region (Schmidt, 1969). The tension escalated a number of months later with military skirmishes being reported along the Iraq-Iran border (*The New York Times*, 1969). It was flamed by rhetoric in both countries. Hasan al-Bakr called for an Arab alliance in the Gulf (*The New York Times*, 1970), whilst Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Foreign Minister, spoke of Iran's historical leadership role and Iran's desire for "'honesty and…peace in the Persian Gulf'" (cited Lee, 1970). The terse relations erupted into explicit violent conflict in 1972. After the formation of the UAE and Bahrain's independence was secured, Iran occupied three strategic islands in the Gulf. In response, Iraq broke diplomatic relations and began expelling ethnic Persians (*The New York Times*, 1972a). Armed conflict erupted in April 1972 as military forces clashed along the border for a number of days (*The New York Times*, 1972b).

The increasingly hostile relationship threatened to drag in the superpowers. Although both the US (see below) and the Soviet Union (Smolansky and Smolansky, 1991: 143 – 87) were actively seeking to expand political influence in both Gulf countries, the ideological outlooks of all four led to rather natural alliances. Iran continued with its traditional pro-American stance, whilst Iraq secured a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, which provided the country with military, technical and economic assistance. The Iraq-Iran conflict, which included interference in each other's internal affairs, lasted until 1975 when the two countries reached a peace settlement (Halliday, 1996: 12). Nevertheless the transformations in the Iraqi-Iranian relationship, which were produced by British withdrawal, increasing oil income,

increasing militarisation and ideological division, provided the immediate background to America's foreign policy at this juncture.

5.3.2 The US-Iranian Political Order

Although there had been significant political transformations in the Persian Gulf region, one staple remained the US-Iranian partnership. It was common place for American policymakers to characterise Iran as an 'island of stability'. Henry Kissinger (1970b), NSA to President Nixon, suggested that the "Shah's Iran is an island of stability in an otherwise unstable region". President Jimmy Carter (1977a) echoed this sentiment when he stated that Iran was "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world". Underpinning this relationship, at least from the US perspective, was the view that the Shah's Iranwould prevent any challenge to America's interests. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1983: 354), NSA to President Carter, argued that Iran was of "central importance…to the safeguarding of the American, and more generally, Western interest in the oil region of the Persian Gulf". Similarly Secretary of State during the Carter administration, Cyrus Vance (1983: 314), contended that Iran was "the major force for stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf" and that Iran's "military strength ensured Western access to gulf oil and served as a barrier to Soviet expansionism". This subsection, following E.H. Carr's classical realism, maps the US-Iranian political order as it developed through the 1970s.

According to E.H. Carr's classical realism, political orders are grounded in material interest. As a result, America viewed its interests in the Gulf in terms of maintaining influence. According to Peter Rodman (1969), Henry Kissinger's assistant on the NSC, "US interest [in the Persian Gulf] is in access and influence". The region has important "military interests, including communications and intelligence facilities in Iran [and] overflight privileges across Iran and Saudi Arabia". In addition, the region's oil resources, which provided the US with a balance of payments surplus, are "crucial to West Europe, Japan, and US forces in [Southeast] Asia". Accordingly, America's general interest lay in promoting stability and "[minimising] radical or Soviet gains".

At the same time, however, the US-Iranian political order was built on what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) referred to as common appeals. In 1969, in an impromptu press conference in Guam, President Richard Nixon (1969a) stated that "we must avoid [the] kind of policy that will make countries so dependent on us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we

have in Vietnam". As a consequence, the Nixon doctrine stated that local powers should take the principal role in providing regional security frameworks (Nixon, 1967: 114). The policy, according to Litwak (1984: 124 – 6), generated significant opposition. This was because some believed it "was a dangerously flawed policy which failed to provide either a vision or a coherent framework for the conduct of American foreign policy". Nevertheless, the Nixon doctrine coupled with *détente* (Cox, 1990: 31 – 3) became America's chief grand strategy at this juncture. This strategy dovetailed rather neatly with the Shah's foreign policy at this point. Henry Kissinger (1972), for instance, contended that the Shah is committed to "the [principles] of the Nixon Doctrine…that will permit countries like Iran…to develop the capacity to do what the US can no longer do around the world in providing the principal ingredients of regional security and stability". In other words, the Shah was dedicated to developing Iran as "a major power in her own right [and] a force for stability and prosperity in the region as a whole" (Spanier, 1972).

The shared US-Iranian interest in building up Iran as a major regional power resulted in a relatively coherent political order. In July 1969, in response to Britain's announced withdrawal from the Gulf, President Nixon approved National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 66. The study called for an analysis of US options in response to the "problems created by the withdrawal from the Gulf of the British presence in its present form" (Kissinger, 1969). National Security Directive Memorandum (NSDM) 92, after a year of study, was the end product. NSDM 92 suggested that America's "near term" strategy would be directed towards fostering "co-operation between Iran and Saudi Arabia" as the means to ensure regional security and stability. This was accompanied by the retention of the small American regional naval presence and the establishment of diplomatic, technical and cultural relations with the newly independent southern Gulf countries. In reality, however, the strategy was heavily dependent on Iran's growing regional power. As NSDM 92 noted, fostering Saudi-Iranian co-operation was circumscribed by the recognition of the "preponderance of Iranian power" (Kissinger, 1970a). Iran's far larger population and army *vis-à-vis* its southern neighbour (Halliday, 1977: 29) distinguished the country as the dominant one in the region. In many respects, therefore, the Anglo-American political order, which had operated in the immediate post-war era, was replaced by an American-Iranian political order.

There were voices of opposition to this development. Chester Crocker (1970), who was a member of staff in the NSC, argued that the idea of a "'self-regulating security system'" in the region was a "somewhat rosy view of [the security] prospects in the Gulf". In fact, he contended that the policy might create "radical Arab pressures and/or possible heavy-handed Iranian assertions of local hegemony" putting "Gulf stability [in jeopardy]". Despite his opposition, however, Crocker conceded that he could offer no alternatives.

Thus, by the time that Gerald Ford replaced the disgraced Nixon, the Nixon doctrine was firmly established. The Ford administration undertook a review of US policy in the Gulf. Yet, the review offered "no specific recommendations". In fact, the final paper produced by NSSM 238 concluded that "we should bear in mind the general approach which has been responsible for the policy successes achieved to date" (NSC, 1977). Many members of the Carter administration, which had campaigned on a platform of human rights, were ideologically opposed to the monarchical and quasi-authoritarian regime in Iran (Seliktar, 2000: 53 – 7). Nevertheless, in his first year in office Jimmy Carter (1977b) stated that American policy would balance "together with our allies and friend [against] Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East and East Asia". Thus, there was little outward change in America's policy in Iran. Henry Precht (2000), a member of staff in the NEA, contended that "when the Carter administration replaced the Ford administration, there were surface changes but not anything basic in terms of [Iranian] policy shifts". The rationale for this policy, as Gary Sick (2001: 28), member of staff in the NSC, explained, stemmed from the need to "ensure that the cooperative relationship that had been developed…would be preserved and that Iran would remain a strong, reliable and friendly ally in the vital region of the Persian Gulf".

Iran's increasing strength, which had been underwritten by successive American administrations, meant that it became the counter revolutionary force in the region (Halliday, 1977: 27 – 29). Whilst Iran was no American stooge, the relationship, which had been cultivated since the 1953 *coup d'état*, meant that the US maintained strong leverage over the Shah's domestic and foreign policies. As a result, the US could often appear distant from the peripheral but potentially escalatory conflicts taking place in Iran's near neighbourhood. It is what E.H. Carr (1946: 102 – 3) would have referred to as subtle but concealed power. Having sketched the contours of this order, the following section will discuss the means through which the US supported it.

5.3.3 The Nature of American Power

E.H. Carr's classical realist lens, which differs from other forms of realism that focus on the international structural and unit level factors shaping a country's foreign policy, suggests that revolutionary actors and forces have a decisive impact on international relations. The Persian Gulf, as discussed above, was certainly subject to revolutionary forces at this juncture. The chief US concern, according to Henry Kissinger (1970c), was in "[dealing] with [the] readjustment of the balance in the area". This subsection discusses the tools employed by the US to readjust to this new era.

5.3.3.1 Soft Power

Principally, the US responded by employing forms of economic power to adjust to the new political environment. In the words of E.H. Carr (1946: 124), the US worked to "acquire power and influence" in the Persian Gulf countries. The radical alterations in the relationship between the oil-producing and oil-consuming nations, coupled with increasing US dependence on energy imports, resulted in NSSM 174. The directive called for a study to "define and discuss the national security aspects of the projected situation and propose alternative policies to deal with problems that are identified" (Kissinger, 1973). The output of NSSM 174 was an August 1973 report, which outlined various strategies for contending with the new relationship between oil-producing and oil-consuming nations. One important aspect was that the oil-producing nations would have increased financial capabilities. As the August report noted, "Increased oil earnings will give the producer countries funds that could be directly invested in other national economies or spent to import goods into the producing countries" (NSC, 1973: 11).

Consequently, the report concluded that the need to "prevent Saudi Arabia from becoming [radicalised]" meant that the US needed to actively "increase Saudi Arabia's vested interest in maintaining oil production at an adequate rate". As a result, the US should actively facilitate "Saudi Arabian investment of excess revenues at home, in the US and elsewhere" (NSC, 1973: 54). Not everyone favoured this policy. Others were chiefly concerned with reducing America's dependence on foreign imports (Akins, 1973: 487 – 90). Nevertheless the desire to bind Saudi Arabia, in other words to make it as dependent on the stability of the American and western economies as they were on Saudi Arabian oil, resulted in this being the rather logical policy choice.

Consequently, particularly after the 1973 Arab-Israel October War and the Arab oil embargo, the US and Saudi Arabia established a Joint Commission on Economic Co-operation. According to a report by the US Government Accountability Office, the commission:

> was established on the heels of the Arab oil embargo and [oil] price increases. The embargo [emphasised] that closer US-Arab ties were needed. The oil prices increases gave Saudi Arabia a substantial amount of petrodollars which could be used for development purposes.
>
> The Commission was perceived as an important mechanism for (1) fostering closer political ties between the two countries through economic cooperation, (2) assisting Saudi [industrialisation] and development while recycling petrodollars, and (3) facilitating the flow to Saudi Arabia of American goods, services, and technology. (Staats, 1979: 2)

A similar commission was established in Iran. According to Henry Kissinger the US-Iranian Commission was orientated towards:

> developing mechanisms to expand the existing close and mutually beneficial ties between the United States and Iran in the political, economic, cultural, [defence], scientific and technological fields…
>
> …The principal task of the Commission will be to identify [programmes] that will contribute to the earliest possible achievement of Iran's dynamic [programmes] of social and economic development…Building on the existing strong ties between American and Iranian business firms and other institutions, the Commission will investigate means to encourage a freer flow of trade and investment, cooperation in finance and further development of joint business ventures. (Kissinger, 1974)

However, according to William Lehfeldt (1987), an economic officer in the US embassy in Iran, the Commission had the ulterior motive of ensuring US access to Iran's growing market. As he noted, "that was our aim, of course. To make sure that the American share of the market was either constant or increased…and help the Iranians export things other than oil to the [US]". Subsequently, the Shah agreed to invest $15 billion in the US economy, which was considered an "economic bonanza" (Sulzberger, 1975a).

Not everyone was satisfied with these developments. Some argued that instead of accommodating the Shah's increased wealth, the US should actively limit it. Specifically,

during the Presidency of Gerald Ford, increasing concern was raised over the Shah's hawkish position on OPEC pricing. Whilst William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, favoured curtailing OPEC price rises as a means to prevent economic collapse in the industrialised countries, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, favoured continued support of the Shah regardless of the cost. As Cooper (2008: 584 – 91) shows, it was the former position that the US followed by supporting Saudi Arabian supported price cuts in late 1976.

Although the US-Iranian relationship undeniably suffered tension during this period of change, by the time the Jimmy Carter administration took office the US-Iranian relationship appeared, economically at least, to be on firm ground. As Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, concluded:

> Our exports of civilian goods to Iran are now running over two billion dollars per year; direct US investment in Iran is over one-half billion dollars, with the possibility of significant increases in the next few years; over 150 of the largest US firms and banks are active in the country and over 30,000 Americans live in Iran…Over 50 American universities have links with Iranian governmental institutions and the Iranian student population is now approximately 30,000, the largest single contingent from any foreign country. (Vance, 1977)

Put another way, despite tensions, the US readjusted to Iran's new found power and wealth, which was a product of Iran's increasing oil income, by seeking to control its economic market. As E.H. Carr's (1946: 124) classical realism argued, the control of foreign markets is one of the principal means to "acquire power and influence abroad". This was now increasingly important in the post-colonial Persian Gulf because the Shah was "[willing] to project his power and influence in the region in ways generally useful to [the US]" (Vance, 1977).

Political developments in the Persian Gulf also led the US to expand its economic influence in Iraq. After a five year break in diplomatic relations, the US opened an interests section in the Belgium embassy in Baghdad in May 1972. Mutual interests between Iraqi and the US led America to acquire more influence in the country. As Saddam Hussein, Secretary General of the *Ba'ath* party, noted, Iraq does not "'drink oil, we sell it, and we know our major markets are in the West and Japan'" (cited De Onis, 1973). Accordingly, US policymakers saw economic influence as a means to moderate Iraq's regional behaviour and dampen Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union.

Representatives from the NEA, particularly during the Johnson administration, preached caution regarding improved relations between the US and Iraq (Seelye, 1968). During the Nixon administration, however, there was a different atmosphere. The political changes in the Gulf led intelligence reports to conclude that Iraq had the "opportunity to expand its present role in Gulf politics" (Lilley, 2006). In response, America established a US interests section in the Belgian embassy in Iraq. According to Thomas Scotes (2006), a member of staff in the NEA, this decision was made on the basis of "[America's] commercial interest in Iraq", whilst the US presence would also provide "more regular and analytic political and economic reporting from Iraq".

Arthur Lowrie, a career diplomat, was appointed as *charge d'affaires* in the US interests section in August 1972. America's chief interest at this juncture, according to Lowrie (1972), was "orderly development and stability over the next twenty years in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia to ensure western access to oil". As a result of Iraq's "geographical location, its role as a major oil producer and its political vulnerability [the country is] of considerable interest". It was hoped that the new relationship, which also included expanded commercial ties (De Onis, 1975), would move Iraq closer to the west and moderate the country's behaviour, particularly with regards the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Marshal Wiley, principal officer in the US interests section, explained:

> [America did not have] any particular policy designs about Iraq, other than to gradually improve relations to the extent that the Iraqis were willing to do so, but we weren't going to force the issue…
>
> …We, again, were concerned about Iraq's rather militant anti-Israel posture and we had hoped to moderate that, of course. (Wiley, 1989)

The extent to which either aim succeeded is debatable. According to Morris Draper (1991), Country Director for the Arab states in the NEA, whilst Iraq was never a Soviet satellite it was nevertheless "very dependent on the Soviets for military assistance". Similarly David Mack (1995), a counsellor in the US interests section, contended that Iraq was never "going to compromise their principles. They always talked about the Palestine issue as if it was [an] issue of destiny". Nevertheless, the US was able to increase its share of the burgeoning Iraqi market.

According to E.H. Carr's (1946: 124) classical realism, economic power is one of the chief means for purchasing influence in a foreign country. This seems like an erudite way for thinking about US foreign policy in the Gulf at this juncture. The radical transformations generated by the change in the balance of power between the oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, in addition to Britain's withdrawal, radically altered the political environment in the Gulf. The US, in response to these developments, utilised softer forms of economic power to maintain its influence.

5.3.3.2 Hard Power

"Power", according to E.H. Carr (1946: 132), "which is an element of all political action, is one and indivisible. It uses military and economic weapons for the same end". American policymakers at this juncture seemed guided by this idea. As will be discussed below, softer forms of economic power were complemented by the employment of harder forms of power.

In the first instance the changes in Iraq, which were brought on by its increasing oil revenue and its relationship with the Soviet Union, concerned American policymakers. In response, the US engaged in covert militarism to weaken central government rule in Iraq and counter Soviet penetration of the country. In May 1972, as the Department of State was preparing to re-establish low-level diplomatic relations with Iraq, Harold Saunders (2006), a member of staff in the NSC, communicated to Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger's assistant, that the Iranian SAVAK had asked for US assistance to the Kurdish rebels. It was hoped that the continuation of the rebellion would disrupt the consolidation of *Ba'ath* rule in Iraq and the "reduce the chances of Soviet entrenchment [in the country]". Saunders indicated that neither the CIA nor the Department of State favoured US involvement in the plan. He also argued that "any assistance that may be needed by [Mustaffa Barzani, leader of the Kurdish rebellion] is fully within the capability of Iran or Israel to provide". In addition, according to Saunders, "the odds are against the Kurds succeeding". As a result, he concluded that the US should "remain out of this as we have in the past". Kissinger was in agreement.

Geopolitical developments, however, soon forced Kissinger to reverse this position. In April, Iraq and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship, which provided Iraq with Soviet military, technical and economic aid. At the signing ceremony, Iraqi President, Hasan al-Bakr, argued that it illustrated that the Soviet Union was a "'true friend of the Arabs'". He also emphasised article 4 of the treaty, which declared that the two nations "'will continue

their determined struggle against imperialism and Zionism'" (cited *The New York Times*, 1972c). Theodore Eliot (2006), Executive Secretary in the Department of State, in analysing the treaty concluded that it "[symbolised] recent Soviet advances in the area and [reflected] considerable and increasing Soviet presence in Iraq".

Not everyone concurred with this analysis. Rodger Davies (2006), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, suggested that the "treaty may in some way reflect Soviet-Iraqi desire to gain influence in the Persian Gulf [but doubted whether] Iraq in present state of political stability provides sufficient base for such an undertaking". Similarly a CIA (2006) intelligence report suggested that, whilst "greater Soviet involvement in the Gulf area is virtually a foregone conclusion, there are limits on Moscow's freedom to [manoeuvre]". In particular, the Soviet's desire to increase influence in Iran will probably retard any Soviet penetration in Iraq. However, Henry Kissinger shared Eliot's unease. According to Kissinger (2000: 1263), the Iraq-Soviet Union treaty, which mirrored Soviet treaties with Egypt and India, was indicative of a concerted Soviet attempt to encircle America's chief allies in the region, in particular Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Accordingly, with America's chief interests threatened, the US decided to support the rebellion. In late June, Richard Helms, Director of the CIA, and Richard Kennedy, a member of staff in the NSC, met with representatives of Mustaffa Barzani, the traditional leader of the Kurdish resistance. Helms was in favour of supporting the Kurdish rebellion. Chiefly, he saw the rebellion as a means to weaken *Ba'ath power* and weaken Soviet penetration in the country. His 18 July memorandum argued that:

> It is clearly in the interest of the [United States government] and its friends and allies in the area that the present Iraqi regime be kept off balance, or even overthrown if that can be done without escalating hostilities on the international level. The most effective and secure means to achieve this end will be to furnish Barzani and the Kurds to enable them to maintain their resistance to the regime. The regime, despotic internally, is aggressively hostile in its intentions toward Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the [UAE]. The danger Iraqi hostility poses has become an increasingly significant factor in the area because of the [Soviet-Iraq treaty of friendship]…Both the Iraqi regime and the Soviets appreciate that if the Iraqi army must be [mobilised] and redeployed for a renewed campaign against the Kurds, it is likely to become less subject to regime control, and the regime's capabilities for action against its [neighbours] will be reduced…

> …it is clear that unless the [United States government] and other interested nations provide increased support for Barzani, he will have no reasonable alternative to reaching an early accommodation with the Iraqi regime – an accommodation which would serve Soviet aims and enhance Iraq's capabilities for disruption of stability among other nations in the area. (Helms, 2006)

As a result, both Henry Kissinger and President Nixon made the decision to materially aid the Kurdish fighters, which had the express purpose of weakening the rule of the central government in Iraq (Kissinger, 2006a). Thus, by October the US had supplied Barzani's rebels with an undisclosed sum of money, large quantities of Soviet made machine guns and had made plans for further shipment of armaments from Iran and another undisclosed country (Kissinger, 2006b).

There is little evidence to suggest that anyone questioned the policy. This likely resulted from the high-level of secrecy surrounding it. According to Arthur Lowrie (1989), who was America's *charge d'affaires* in Iraq, neither he nor Roy Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, were aware of the financial assistance being provided to the Kurdish rebels. In fact, the congressional Pike report on CIA covert activities concluded that Kissinger circumvented statutory rules regarding covert action.

> There was no formal Committee meeting at which a formal proposal paper containing both pros and cons could be discussed and voted on. Instead, members were simply directed to acknowledge receipt of the operation. In a setting of almost unprecedented secrecy within the US government, John B. Connally, the former Treasury Secretary…personally advised [the Shah] the US would co-operate. (Pike, 1977: 196)

American and Iranian support for the rebellion would last a further three years during which the conflict threatened to intensify into an Iraq-Iran war. The joint policy ended in 1975 when the Shah, having secured Iraqi concessions on a reworked border treaty, agreed to withdraw his material support of the Kurdish rebellion (Sulzberger, 1975b). The US followed suit and the rebellion quickly ended. In this instance, the use of force was undertaken to maintain the balance of power between Iraq and Iran. For example, John Evans, a member of staff in the Iran embassy, concluded:

> [Iran] was a 'pillar of stability'…the idea was that Iran was going to be a bastion of stability…

> …let's remember that Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State at the time. Kissinger understood the dynamics of the region extremely well and so did [Ambassador Richard] Helms…who were in very close contact with each other…if there was an instability or a hint of an imbalance in the area…they were particularly good about balancing Iraq and Iran. And the Kurdish question was there too and there were various levers that they were able to use to keep the Gulf area [stabilised] and moving in the right direction. (Evans, 2009)

This was complemented by the continued militarisation of Iran. The Nixon administration continued and expanded the Iranian MAP in an effort to balance the Shah against his radical neighbours.At the same time, however, the arms transfers served the additional purpose of, to paraphrase E.H. Carr (1946: 124), purchasing influence over the Shah's Iran. In the late 1960s the Shah once again embarked on a military modernising programme and was seeking further US assistance. In response, America's Ambassador in Iran, Douglas MacArthur (1970), argued that the MAP should be extended for a number of years. This was because Iran was "key to whether [the] Gulf remains in friendly hands". William Rodgers (1970), Secretary of State, concurred with this analysis and argued that America's "political and security interests in Iran require that we be as responsive as possible with the Shah".

Not everyone concurred with this policy. County Director for the Gulf Arab countries in the NEA, William Brewer (2006), argued that the "future threat to the Arab states of the Gulf is subversive rather than military [therefore] substantial Iranian forces are likely to prove not only unnecessary but may be positively harmful". Representatives from the DOD also voiced apprehension. Deputy Secretary of Defence, David Packard (2006), argued that increasing military assistance to Iran, whilst the NSC had not yet approved a regional policy, was imprudent. Even Henry Kissinger (1970b), Richard Nixon's NSA, doubted whether the "direct military threat to Iran from the Persian Gulf is as great as the Shah fears". Nevertheless, Kissinger concluded that "The Shah's foreign policy, while increasingly flexible, is openly based on a special relationship with the US". As a result, "there seems little reason not to give the Shah whatever he wants".

Accordingly, further yearly credits worth over $100 million were approved and financed through the EXIM bank, despite this institution not generally being used for military sales. The policy had two purposes. According to Douglas MacArthur (1970), US Ambassador, Iran was the "only element of real stability and progress" in the "volatile and turbulent

region". Accordingly, the "US should do all we can to help Iran increase its strength so it can defend our and other free world interest in Gulf without [the US] having to get involved". At the same time, however, the military relationship was seen as a tool of influence. As Secretary of State, William Rodgers (1969), noted, America's military relationship with Iran provides "ready means for influencing Iran on international matters".

The combination of the oil boom, Britain's withdrawal and the Soviet treaties with Iraq and Egypt led the Nixon administration to increase exponentially military sales to Iran. Kissinger's (2006c) memorandum of the meeting indicates that "in general, decisions on the acquisition of military equipment should be left primarily to the government of Iran." In addition, "If the government of Iran has to buy certain equipment, the purchase of US equipment should be encouraged tactfully". As Gary Sick (2001: 17), who served in the NSC during the Carter administration argued, Kissinger decided that the US "will [henceforth] accede to any of the Shah's requests for arms purchases from [the US]". Although Kissinger (2000: 1263) has disputed this as hyperbole, the figures speak for themselves. Through the mid-1970s Iranian spending on US military equipment soared. In 1973 purchases equalled $2.2 billion, in 1974 $4.1 billion, in 1975 $2.5 billion, in 1976 $1.8 billion and in 1977 $5 billion (CIA, 1978). These mammoth sales occurred despite repeated resistance from the Department of Defence. For instance, James Schlesinger (1986: 15 – 19), Secretary of Defence, opposed the sale of hi-tech weaponry to Iran on the basis that it was excessive and could quite possible induce regional arms races.

There was also significant opposition to the arms sales to Iran from Congress, particularly from Edward 'Ted' Kennedy, Democratic Senator for Massachusetts. In 1975 he introduced a bill to impose a moratorium on arms sales to the Gulf and a year later he wrote an article in Foreign Affairs defending this decision. Kennedy (1976: 22 – 6) argued that the arms sales could create domestic instability, exacerbate local tensions and instigate a regional arms race. The Jimmy Carter administration seemed to share some of the concerns. In fact, during his first year in office Carter (1977c) released Presidential Directive 13. The directive outlined a "policy of restraint" with regards arms transfers, increased Executive and Congressional controls on arms sales and characterised arms sales as "an exceptional foreign policy implement". At the same time, however, Presidential Directive 13 maintained that the "United States will continue to utilise arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our allies and close friends". It was in Iran where this ambiguity was most obvious.

On the one hand, the Carter administration cancelled a sale of sophisticated aircraft worth $4 in the summer of 1977 (Weinraub, 1977). Yet on the other, President Carter (1982: 434 – 5) personally saw to it that Congress approved the sale to Iran of the technologically advanced Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS). In fact, a 1978 Presidential Review Committee concluded that the US should not only continue with arms sales in Iran but also increase them. There was "mounting concern in some parts of the [Carter administration] and in [Congress] over the problems that Iran faces in absorbing arms" (Burt, 1978). Nevertheless, the 1978 review concluded that the US "should provide Iran with additional military capability for force projection". It even suggested that the Carter administration should circumvent some of the controls, which were outlined in Presidential Directive 13, by not "[turning] down Iranian requests simply because the requested system would allow Iran to project force beyond its borders" (Dodson, 1978).

The overriding concern was to buttress Iran as the traditional buffer against the Soviet Union. As one *New York Times* journalist argued, "Iran plays a vital role in American security, both as a major oil producer and a bulwark against the extension of Soviet power in the Persian Gulf" (Burt, 1978). In addition, the US continually viewed the arms sales as means to, to paraphrase E.H. Carr, acquire power and influence in Iran. A CIA paper, which was prepared in response to a proposed four year $12 billion arms sale package, argued the following:

> While the opportunities for coercive influence are small, arms sales provide the US with some potential to exert a subtler and longer-term type of influence on Iran by providing direct entry into its military establishment. Close and amicable working relationships with US personnel have left many Iranian officers with a [favourable] image of the US. These same relationships constitute a channel through which American values and perceptions…can be quietly transmitted…In the event that radical forces opposed to both the Shah and the military someday come to power in Tehran, the memory of Washington's ties with the former regime might increase the new governments dislike for the US. It is far more likely, however, that the military itself will be the principal pillar of a successor regime. The attitude nurtured now through the arms sales relationship make it more probable that such a regime will remain friendly to the US. (CIA, 1978)

The tone, which reflected the revolutionary conditions in Iran (see next section), may have been different, however, the message was the same: arms sales – a form of military power –

were not only central to balancing Iran against its radical neighbours, in particular Iraq. They were also crucial means of acquiring influence and leverage in Iran.

5.3.4 Balancing with the Shah's Iran

US-Iranian relations during this period of change were often strained. The Shah would often critique America's policy on often limiting arms transfers. At the same time, particularly during the Ford administration, American policymakers often balked at the Shah's hard-line stance towards OPEC pricing. The election of Jimmy Carter, who was a liberal reformer, also strained US-Iranian relations. Nevertheless, whilst not necessarily offering *carte blanche* to the Shah, Carter, like Nixon and Kissinger, saw Iran as an 'island of stability'. As a result, the US-Iranian relationship continued to form the central piece in America's regional policy. As Richard Helms, America's Ambassador in Iran, explained:

> There was no one else to turn to in the Persian Gulf area. After all, Iran has the largest population in that region. It has a border that stretches for miles along the Persian Gulf. It has control of one side of the Strait of Hormuz through which all the oil tankers have to pass entering and leaving the Persian Gulf…[The Shah] could maintain some stability and some – what shall we say – pro-American [course]. (Helms, 1985: 59)

In other words, the US continued to follow a balancing policy. Balancing with the Shah was carried out in both soft ways (binding Iran's economy to the west) and hard ways (militarising Iran and providing covert assistance to Iran's chief threat Iraq). The aim, however, followed America's traditional strategic interest of preventing the rise of a great power that, in the words of E.H. Carr, would threaten its independence. As the next section will discuss, however, this order, which had been cultivated since the fall of Mosaddeq, was about to become undone.

5.4 The Islamic Revolution

E.H. Carr's classical realism reminds us that whilst power is central to order, power generates unintended and often revolutionary effects. As he noted, power "tends to reach a point where it defeats its own end by inciting the mind to revolt against power" (Carr, 1946: 145). This chapter has reviewed US foreign policy in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s and has illustrated the strategic importance of Iran to America's balance of power strategy in the Gulf. By the 1970s, this developed into a consensus view that the Shah's Iran was an 'island of stability'.

In fact, the CIA produced an intelligence analysis in August 1978 that stated Iran is "'not in a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situation'" (cited Bowden, 2006: 4). Just six months later the Pahlavi state fell. This section outlines a classical realist explanation, which is guided by E.H. Carr's classical realist writings, for the revolution and US policy during the collapse of its most important strategic ally.

It is first necessary to provide some background to one of the chief actors in the Iranian revolution: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini, a leading *marja* (source of inspiration) in the Shia faith, had been exiled from Iran in the 1960s for political opposition to the Shah's white revolution, in particular its secularist trends. Exiled in Turkey and then Iraq, Khomeini's agenda – the *Velayet-e Faqeh* (guardianship of the jurists) – continued to penetrate Iran through smuggled audiocassettes (Abrahamian, 1993: 11). In late 1977 Mostafa Khomeini, the Ayatollah's eldest son, was found dead in mysterious circumstances. Mostafa's death was widely attributed to SAVAK (Sick, 2001: 40). This was followed by an article, which according to Manouchehr Ganji (2002: 19), who was the Shah's Minister of Education, was purposefully placed in the Iranian press. The article questioned Khomeini's theological credentials and caricatured him as agent of British imperialism. In response, members of the Shia faith protested in the holy city of Qom and the Iranian government responded with deadly measures. The deaths, following religious tradition, were mourned 40 days later in a public outpouring of grief. The Iranian government responded once more with deadly force.

The "forty-forty" (Sick, 2001: 40) – protest followed by deadly crackdown followed by more protest – quickly gained momentum. A variety of actors and groups including the *bazaar*, the industrial labour classes, the *Tudeh*, the secular intelligentsia, student groups, the mosque and militant Islamic groups soon formed an overpowering coalition standing in opposition to the Shah's rule (Parsa, 1989: 87 – 219). The popular opposition movement culminated in a particularly violent government crackdown in September 1978 and the imposition of martial law in the country. The 'island of stability' was looking decidedly unstable. A number of months later, the Shah fled the country and the Pahlavi dynasty collapsed.

According to Abrahamian, the "fall of the Shah will go down in history as perhaps the most dramatic revolution of modern times" (1980: 21). As a result, the causes of the Iranian revolution have been extensively explored in the literature. Competing explanations tend to focus on political factors (the Shah's nascent attempts at liberalisation), religious factors

(how the revolutionaries employed the mosque network), cultural factors (the norms and ideas of the Shia faith), economic factors (Iran's boom and bust in the late 1970s) and security factors (the breakdown of Iran's security forces) (Kurzman, 2004: 12 – 124). The classical realist lens of E.H. Carr, however, reminds us that political orders generate productive forces. As Halliday (1979b: 15) argued, the "factors leading to the revolution in Iran…are…rooted in the last half century of Iranian history and in the particular model of development that the Shah pursued", whilst also being "crucially influenced by the pattern of the country's relations with the US". In other words the Shah's white revolution, which was underwritten by successive American administrations, generated social forces that would ultimately bring down the political order.

In particular, the white revolution failed to make Iran industrially competitive *vis-à-vis* the global market. As a result the lower, middle and professional classes saw an increasing squeeze in their living standards. The land reform programmes did not succeed in making Iran agriculturally self-reliant, whilst the programme created a wave of urban migration that Iranian cities were unprepared for. At the same time economic inequalities continued, whilst the benefits of the oil-boom either fed Iranian militarisation or moved upwards and outwards. These factors were compounded by an economic collapse in 1976, which was created by a slowdown in global demand for oil and a subsequent reduction in oil income. Political instability, which was illustrated by rapid and successive changes in government between 1976 and 1978, followed economic instability. In this context the *ulama* – who had "resented their loss of social position" created by the white revolution – were, "[absent] any other form of evident organised opposition", able to "mobilise people in the streets" against the Pahlavi state (Halliday, 1979b: 8 – 10).

As E.H. Carr's classical realist perspective would suggest, US policy during these developments, whilst often overshadowed by bureaucratic tension between chief policymakers, was aimed at maintaining material influence in the key military and political institutions of Iran. As Iran lurched into revolutionary chaos the Carter administration was preoccupied with other pressing foreign policy concerns, in particular the Arab-Israeli peace talks and strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. According to Gary Sick (2001: 50 – 1), a Persian Gulf specialist in the NSC, during the summer of 1978 "for the first time in many years" there was "concern about long-term Iranian stability". Nevertheless, it was not until November that the NSC officially met to discuss the situation in Iran. After a meeting

with the Shah, William Sullivan (1978), America's Ambassador in Iran, communicated to Washington that the Shah believed his remaining options were to either "abdicate and turn the country over to the military or impose military government under his continuing rule".

Although chief policymakers agreed about the strategic importance of Iran (Brzezinski, 1983: 354 and Vance, 1983: 314), there were disputes about how best to influence the situation. This is perhaps best illustrated by the nature of discussions during the 2 November NSC meeting, which was in direct response to Sullivan's telegram. Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State, argued against any military rule. Christopher argued that a "military government is likely to be very short-lived unless people can see something else coming along which will resolve some of the fundamental issues". In contrast Harold Brown, Secretary of Defence, argued that a "military government with the Shah is obviously better than one without the Shah" (NSC, 1978). It was the former advice that was heard the loudest and the following day a message of unqualified support was passed to the Shah via Brzezinski (1983: 365).

Shortly afterwardsthe Shah formed a military government and made a national broadcast appealing for calm (Afkhami, 2009: 489). Unrest, however, continued and the military government appeared unable to restore order. The NSC met again in December to appraise the situation. George Ball, a veteran diplomat, was drafted in as a support Secretary of State. He immediately concluded that the Pahlavi dynasty was "'on the verge of collapse'" and therefore the "'only chance [for the Shah] to save his dynasty…and retain [American] support is for him to transfer his power to a government responsive to the people'" (Ball, 1982: 458 – 9). Ball favoured a council of notables to immediately oversee a transfer to civilian rule. Others, particularly Brzezinski (1983: 373 – 5),preferred the continuation of the military government, which overtime would evolve into a form of civilian rule. It was this position that was favoured by President Carter and continued expressions of support were sent to the Shah. In the meantime, however, the Shah successfully persuaded Shahpour Bakhtiar, the leader of the largest faction in the National Front, to form a government, on the proviso that the Shah would take a constitutional role (Ansari, 2003: 211).

These developments led the Carter administration to pursue a policy designed to maintain the primacy of the Iranian armed forces in Iranian politics should the Shah abdicate. In other words, the material influence the US had in the Iranian military was too important to lose. Accordingly, General Robert 'Dutch' Huyser, second in command to Supreme Allied

Commander Alexander Haig, was sent to Iran. Ostensibly, Huyser was to meet with the Iranian armed forces during this tense period and to solve some of the military supply problems that had been created by revolutionary chaos. In reality, however, his mission was to ensure continued American influence in Iran, in particular in its armed forces. As Bruce Riedel (2009), an analyst with the CIA explained, "[Huyser's] mission was to go out and see if the Iranian military had the stomach to attempt a coup to suppress the revolution".

Not everyone supported this policy. Huyser's superior, Alexander Haig, opposed the policy on the basis that its motives appeared "ambiguous and because it was a pre-eminently political task" (Huyser, 1986: vii). Ambassador William Sullivan also questioned the policy. Whilst not "vehemently opposed to it", Sullivan (1981: 228 – 9) "doubted the propriety" of Huyser's mission and whether it could accomplish anything. Nevertheless, according to President Carter (1982: 444 – 5), it was paramount to "retain [America's] relationship with the Shah and the military – our only two routes to future good relations with Iran". This was because "we didn't know the form of government [Iran] might take if the military was eliminated as a major factor". E.H. Carr's classical realism, as discussed in chapter three, stressed the importance of material influence. This was the overriding concern in Washington during the final days of the Pahlavi state.

Huyser was instructed to leave Iran in mid-January as there was increasing hostility to his presence. Before leaving, however, he advised Washington that the Iranian military "now had the capability to [stage a takeover], and if ordered by Bakhtiar they would do it" (Huyser, 1986: 259). Yet, the military intervention failed to materialise. On 1 February 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to a wave of adulation and pronounced that he would "'strike with my fists at the mouths of [the Bakhtiar] government. From now on it is I who will name the government'" (cited British Broadcasting Corporation, N.D.). For a number of days Iran convulsed as two centres of power – Bakhtiar and Khomeini – claimed legitimacy. Iran's military, which was demoralised after a year of employing martial force in Iran (Brzezinski, 1983: 395), quickly melted and Bakhtiar's government collapsed. The revolution – the sweeping "away [of] the half-rotted structure of an old social and political order" (Carr, 1944: 3) – had succeeded.

The revolution, as Carr's classical realist perspective would suggest, was a transformative point in America's foreign policy in the Gulf. Not only did it remove America's chief ally, it turned decisively anti-American. As the revolution progressed, an obvious split developed

between Khomeini and Mehdi Bazargan, a secular reformer and interim Iranian Prime Minister. Early drafts of the proposed constitution balanced the secular and republican elements these characters symbolised. However, as revolutionary uncertainty remained it "[became] increasingly apparent that a more rigorous interpretation of Islam was coming to the fore" (Ansari, 2003: 224). At the same time, Jimmy Carter reversed an earlier decision and allowed the Shah entry to the US for medical treatment, despite protestations from the DOS (Vance, 1983: 370). Concomitantly, Zbigniew Brzezinski met with Ibrahim Yazdi, Iranian Foreign Minister, and Mehdi Bazargan in Algiers. According to Brzezinski (1983: 476), the meeting discussed the "basic community of interests" between Iran and the US and the possibility of developing a new post-revolutionary "security, economic, political and intelligence [relationship]".

The effect of these events, particularly the latter, was seismic. According to Abrahamian (2008: 168), Khomeini supporters saw this as evidence of Bazargan and American "'plotting'". In turn, the following day a number of Iranian students seized the American embassy. Whilst Khomeini had initially been critical of the embassy seizure, he quickly realised that he could deploy the rising anti-Americanism to his advantage. Accordingly, he announced to the Iranian nation that "'the centre of corruption [the US embassy] has now been captured…and the [US] cannot do a 'bloody' thing about it'" (cited British Broadcasting Corporation, 1979a). In other words, the embassy seizure was the second movement in the Iranian revolution (Ansari, 2009: 11). Its chief ideology, however, was no longer *Marg Bar Shah* (death to the Shah); rather it was *Marg Bar Amreka* (death to America). As Victor Tomseth, a political officer in the Iranian embassy, explained:

> what really prompted this student group to move when it did was that photograph [of Brzezinski and Bazargan shaking hands] that appeared in the Saturday paper. This was a group that did not want to see our policy succeed. It did not want to see us be able to have a significant relationship with the new authorities in Iran. Their objective was to try and break that nexus. When they saw [Bazargan] shaking hands with Brzezinski, they saw that as evidence that, in fact, we were succeeding and that they needed to do something quickly to check that process. (Tomseth, 1999)

The embassy seizure lasted a further 444 days. Throughout the crisis the US employed a wall of pressure to secure the release of the hostages, which included diplomacy and economic sanctions, what E.H. Carr would have referred to as the art of persuasion and dollar bullets, to

secure the release of the diplomatic staff held hostage (Sick, 1980). The US even undertook a risky military rescue operation code-named Eagle Claw, which ended in disaster and the death of eight American servicemen.

Equally important, however, the Iranian revolution provided the context for a reorientation of American foreign policy. That is, in undermining American power it provided the context for a more militarised US foreign policy. A Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established. It was based on the need to project military power into the region now that the Shah had fallen. In turn, the RDF renewed military relationships with chief regional allies, in particular Egypt and the southern Gulf states (Stork, 1980: 3 – 13).

To recall from the last chapter, the nationalist revolutions in the northern Gulf, which undermined British power, resulted in a more militaristic American stance. The Islamic revolution, which was compounded by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, had the same effect. In other words, it directly threatened America's traditional strategic interests. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's NSA, explained:

> the crisis in Iran heightened our sense of vulnerability…After all, Iran was one of the two pillars on which both stability and our political preeminence in the Persian Gulf rested. Once the Iranian pillar had collapsed, we were faced with the possibility that one way or another, before too long, we may have either a hostile Iran on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf facing us, or we might even have the Soviets there; and that possibility arose very sharply when the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. If they succeed in occupying it, Iran would be even more vulnerable to the Soviet Union, and in any case, the Persian Gulf would be accessible even to Soviet tactical air force from bases in Afghanistan…
>
> …This was a major setback for the United States…the collapse of the regime in Iran meant that the position of the United States north of the Persian Gulf was disintegrating. (Brzezinski, 1997)

In turn, the US was more willing to employ force to reshape order. This is perhaps best illustrated by Carter's (1980) State of the Union address, which effectively re-invoked America's traditional policy for a new era. The address, otherwise known as the Carter doctrine, stated that "[any] attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the [US], and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force".

According to E.H. Carr revolutions, rather than international anarchy or human nature, are the principal forces shaping world politics. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was no exception. The Shah's 'island of stability' was gone. Instead, Iran had developed into a state deeply antagonistic to the US. Khomeini, in an address to the Iranian nation on the day the US embassy was seized, proclaimed that:

> The clamour being raised by the great Satan [meaning the US]…is because its hand has been cut off from our resources; it is afraid lest this amputation becomes permanent…
>
> …Today we simply cannot remain idle and watch things; today we are facing underground treasons', treasons' devised…mainly by the great Satan, America. They must bear in mind that Iran is still in a state of revolution…They must be put in their place. (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1979b)

These revolutionary ideas, as the next chapter will discuss, would have severe repercussions for American power in the northern Persian Gulf.

5.5 Conclusion

In the early 1960s American policymakers spoke of a "'controlled revolution'" (Komer, 1961a) in Iran; by the end of the 1970s the revolution was more or less controlling them. In between, the US animated by its continued interest in Iranian "real estate", which acted as "kind of band, presumably keeping the Soviet's from penetrating southward to reach [the] oil resources [of the Persian Gulf]" (Schlesinger, 1986: 8), formed a relatively coherent US-Iranian order built on material influence and shared interests.

In other words, this chapter explored how the US balanced with the Shah's Iran in order to protect its interests in the southern Gulf. Balancing strategies included sanitising the Pahlavi state against domestic opposition and militarising Iran in the face of its radical neighbours, which, particularly after the withdrawal of Britain, focused more specifically on Iraq. All the while, American policymakers worked insidiously to obtain and maintain influence in the strategically important country (Komer, 1987: 32 – 3). In turn, US power operated more subtly and was able to appear distant from the peripheral but potentially escalatory conflicts taking place in the Gulf.

Whilst recognising that America's policy is shaped by international structural and unit level factors, this thesis has worked with the ideas of E.H. Carr to explore how American policy has also been shaped by the actions and reactions of foreign and often revolutionary actors. As mentioned, the era of 'controlled revolution' ended in a revolution that was far from controlled. As the next chapter will elaborate, the Iranian revolution and its effects fundamentally – perhaps even irrevocably – altered the geopolitics of the Gulf.

6 Containing the Revolution

> Our bosses couldn't cope with the idea of an 80 year old Ayatollah, which they didn't even know what an Ayatollah was, who lived on garlic and onions and yoghurt, directing a revolution that was about to topple America's most important ally. (Riedel, 2009)

6.1 Introduction

Bruce Riedel, an analyst for the CIA, was obviously talking about the Iranian revolution toppling the Shah. As the revolution progressed, however, US policymakers voiced similar concerns about the potential spread of the revolution throughout the Gulf. In other words, although the Gulf may have been radically transformed by the revolution, America's principal strategic interest remained relatively consistent. With the Shah and his 'island of stability' gone, however, US foreign policy had to adapt. E.H. Carr (1944: once wrote that, "War is produced by the conditions which have made revolution necessary". It is no surprise, therefore, that in the two decades after the revolution, war in the northern Gulf remained permanently on the horizon. As this chapter will discuss, to adapt to the Iranian revolution and its aftermath the US increasingly employed militarism.

6.2 The Gulf War

President Ronald Reagan (1981), during a press conference announcing the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, announced that the US "will not permit [Saudi Arabia] to be an Iran". "There is no way", Reagan continued, "as long as Saudi Arabia and the OPEC nations…provide the energy that is needed to turn the wheels of industry in the Western world…that we could stand by and see that taken over by anyone". The Iranian revolution and its aftermath, which included a prolonged and violent war between Iraq and Iran, induced Reagan to re-invoke America's historic policy in the Gulf. When asked for specifics on how he would prevent the loss of Saudi Arabia, Reagan offered none. As this section will show, however, the Reagan administration pursued policies that had the explicit aim of containing the Iran.

6.2.1 Background

A combination of international structural and American unit level factors are often presented as the chief sources of American foreign policy at this juncture. In particular, shifts in the

balance of power or correlation of forces that favoured the Soviet Union (Thompson, 1982: 157 – 9) and the aggressive ideological underpinnings of the Reagan administration (Drumbell, 1997: 53 – 78), are seen as chief guides of US foreign policy. Whilst these factors are obviously important, this thesis, drawing inspiration from E.H. Carr, suggests that America's foreign policy is often shaped by actors and events in the Persian Gulf region itself. At this juncture, it was the Iranian revolution and its subsequent effects, which were the chief sources contouring American policy. The early years of the Islamic republic were characterised by increasing acrimony between secular and non-secular groups vying for power (Abrahamian, 2008: 169). Abulhassan Banisadr, the Islamic republic's first president, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the charismatic leader of the revolution, increasingly clashed over the nature of the post-revolutionary state. It was Khomeini that proved successful when he forced the *Majlis* to impeach Banisadr, who subsequently fled the country (Banisadr, 2005: 6 – 12).

Consequently, Iranian politics and society became increasingly subject to clerical rule. The *Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelabi* (Army of Revolutionary Guards, herewith the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC) and *Basej-e Mostazafen* (Mobilisation of the Oppressed, henceforth *Basej*) increasingly took power away from the traditional military institutions of Pahlavi Iran (Ward, 2009: 225 – 30). Charitable foundations, known as *bonyads*, took possession of a range of industries and businesses absconded or abandoned during the revolution. This process resulted in clerical penetration of the Iranian economy under the guise of collectivisation and mobilisation (Nomani and Behdad, 2006: 37 – 6). In addition, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance reversed many of the secular trends of the Pahlavi state by promulgating a cultural revolution. A concerted propaganda campaign through press and through education was conducted in order to discredit opposition to clerical rule (Abrahamian, 2008: 177 – 8).

In the Middle East more broadly, the Iranian revolution was a "turning point" for political Islam, particularly for the Shia (Baabood, 2010: 151). The most visible effect was Iran's support of the Lebanese *Hezbollah* during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. This meant that Iran and the US increasingly clashed, particularly as the IRGC was alleged to have participated in the truck-bombings of the American embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut(Baer, 2008: 57 – 76).

The rhetoric emanating from Iran also created intense unease amongst the Persian Gulf monarchies (Nonneman, 2004: 167 – 8). As Baabood (2010: 151) notes, the Iranian revolution "introduced an entirely new lexicon based on the use of religion as a political tool and inspired more populist movements throughout the region". In turn, the Iranian revolution "gave the Shia an ally and supporter, and Shia uprisings began to gather momentum". In response, the Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE formed the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). As Ramazani (1988: 6) notes, "the Iranian revolution helped to coalesce the security concerns of Saudi Arabia and the other monarchies in the Gulf region". The chief concern was that the Iranian revolution would inspire similar movements, which appeared to have some basis in reality. In late 1979 the Grand Mosque at Mecca was seized by a small group of militants opposing monarchical rule in Saudi Arabia. This was followed by Shia protests and similar unrest in Bahrain and Kuwait, which extended to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Nasr, 2007: 138 – 9). These events convinced the monarchical states that "the time for a united front had come if they wanted to ensure their survival" (Ramazani, 1988: 8).

Beyond this Islamic cold war (McLean, 2001: 15 – 22), the Iranian revolution drastically altered relations between the two northern Gulf countries. Like the other Gulf Arab states, Iraq had a significant Shia population, which were routinely marginalised from political participation. An assassination attempt was made on Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. In response, the Iraqi government executed leading Shia clerics (Hooglund, 2002: 160 – 1). In addition, Iraq allegedly supported dissident Iranian groups, by offering sanctuary and material aid (Hiro, 2001: 13 – 7). In September 1980, after repeated military clashes along the border, Iraq launched a full-scale invasion into Iran and claimed territory in the Khuzestan region. The resulting conflict would last a further eight years. In terms of blood and treasure it cost over a million casualties and over $190 billion (Hiro, 1989: 9). It also became the chief factor animating US policymakers at the time. The real concern was that the war would escalate into a wider regional conflagration, particularly between Iran and the southern Gulf countries. As a result, the US was chiefly concerned about the impact of the revolution on the strategically significant southern Gulf. For instance, Nicholas Veliotes (1982), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, remarked that "[the Gulf War] serves no US national interest, nor that of our allies…we have a real concern that this conflict could spill over to threaten [neighbouring] friendly states".

As chapter three of this thesis argued, E.H. Carr was chiefly concerned with illustrating how revolutions, broadly defined, shaped world politics. The most important effect of the revolution for this study was how it impacted on US interests in the Gulf. In many ways, as the last chapter suggested, *Marg Bar Amreka* had replaced *Marg Bar Shah* as the chief slogan of Iran's revolution. The 'island of stability' had passed. In its place was a more politically unstable region. Consequently, the US took active steps to construct a new post-Iranian political order.

6.2.2 The US-Arab Political Order

As discussed, the Iranian revolution radically transformed the international relations of the Persian Gulf. Henry Kissinger, for instance, commented that it was the "'biggest foreign policy debacle of the US in a generation'". This was because the fall of the Shah "'shifted the balance of power in the Middle East to radical forces'" (cited *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 1979). Accordingly, whilst the US continued to view the region through its traditional lens, which was symbolised by Reagan's (1990: 411) assertion to not lose Saudi Arabia too, a new political order had to be established. This section sketches the political order that developed.

According to E.H. Carr's classical realist perspective, political order is grounded in material influence. The US seemed guided by this idea and approached its interest in the Persian Gulf in terms of influence. America's principal interest lay in the continuation of a pro-western Saudi Arabia. "Especially since the events in Iran", Secretary of State, Alexander Haig (1984: 169), recalled, "We wanted to open a strategic dialogue with the moderate Arab states, among which Saudi Arabia was the most influential". America's chief economic interest remained the region's oil resources. As NSDD 114 made clear, "a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf" would have a "real and psychological impact" on the "international economic system". Accordingly, the US was committed to "undertake whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping" (Reagan, 1983). Finally, the Reagan administration had a keen interest in influencing the course of the Gulf War, in particular determining that it did not escalate regionally or even globally (Reagan, 1984).

E.H. Carr also suggested that common ideas were crucial to the formation of any political order. The ideas underpinning America's grand strategy at this juncture were grounded in the belief that US power needed to be revitalised. According to Cox (1990: 34), the Reagan

government based its global strategy on the assumption that "only when the United States was strong could there be order in the world". American global strategy was based on the principal that containment and détente had failed. In other words, American power had been weakened by *détente* and the "'decade of neglect'" (Drumbell, 1997: 55). There was certainly a "cleavage" between "'true believers'" like Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, and the more pragmatic George Schultz, Secretary of State (Drumbell, 1997: 58 – 9). Nevertheless, there was a "nearly uniform ideological viewpoint" amongst principal policymakers that "Soviet influence (and momentum) was increasing and US influence was diminishing, and that the United States needed to halt this trend" (Scott, 1996: 16).

These ideas resulted in the creation of NSDD 32, which codified America's grand strategy at this juncture. Major objectives identified in NSDD 32 included the continuation of nuclear deterrence, the reversal of Soviet expansionism, the limitation of Soviet political and military capabilities and continued American access to foreign markets. However, there was a primary concern with strengthening "the influence of the US throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations [and] by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to US interests" (Reagan, 1982: 1 – 2). This strategy coalesced with many of the strategic concerns of the Arab countries in the Gulf. In particular, as the last section discussed, the Arab monarchies in the Gulf formed the GCC, which had the explicit purpose of countering the destabilising effects of the Iranian revolution. That is, the US and the monarchical Gulf Arab countries held a shared antipathy towards Iran under Khomeinism. This was because the latter believed that there was no place for monarchy in Islam (Cole, N.D.). As a result, what developed throughout the 1980s was a post-revolutionary political order based on US-Arab strategic alliances.

Of course, many opposed these developments. Some voiced concern about the nature of governance in the Arab states and their "unwillingness" to buy into American conceptions of regional security, which stemmed from their "bedrock belief that Israel [not Iran or the Soviets] was the principal enemy" (Tiecher and Tiecher, 1993: 127). Many were also opposed to the arming of the Gulf Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia. The proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of the AWACS generated heated congressional opposition. Congress, which was influenced by Israel's concern that the increasing militarisation of Saudi Arabia would threaten Israeli security, opposed the sale (Lanham, 2004: 1 – 3). Nevertheless, the sale of the AWACS, and subsequently the US-Saudi relationship, was pushed through despite

opposition. According to Alexander Haig (1984: 169), US Secretary of State, this was because a "substantial gesture" was required to reverse the opinion of "the moderate Arab states [that] had questioned the purposes and the resolve of the United States [after the fall of the Shah]".

To support this political order, the Reagan administration expanded Carter's RDF concept. The Reagan administration established US Central Command (CENTCOM), which had primary responsibility for providing security in Southwest Asia. America was able to expand its military presence because the Gulf states, which normally demanded that the US stay "'over the horizon'", were keen to have the "horizon come close to their shores" (Gold, 1988: 70). Accordingly, the US acted as a "[defence] coordinator, adviser, principal arms' supplier and strategic deterrent" (Kostiner, 1988: 55). The next section will discuss the instruments of power the US employed at this juncture to support this political order.

6.2.3 The Nature of American Power

Revolution, drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realism,is one of the chief drivers of international relations. This is certainly the case with the 1979 Iranian revolution, which radically transformed the international relations of the Persian Gulf. America's chief concern was preventing the spread of the revolution. In order to contain revolutionary Iran, the US employed various forms of power, or what E.H. Carr (1946: 95) termed sanctions. This section interrogates the nature of US power at this juncture.

6.2.3.1 Soft Power

Initially, US power was deployed to curtail Iran's access to military equipment. In the words of E.H. Carr (1946: 132), the US employed the "art of persuasion" to entice others to cease transferring arms to Iran. After the bombings of the American embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon, the US, in a more proactive stance towards Iran, launched Operation Staunch. According to Secretary of State, George Schultz (1993: 237), America's main interest lay in bringing an end to the war. However, the US lacked diplomatic relations with both countries. As such, it was believed an arms embargo would "disrupt the arms trade, cause difficulties and delays in access to spare parts, and make the weaponry more expensive to the warring countries". However, the memorandum launching Operation Staunch reveals a more nuanced embargo. Schultz (1995b) noted that America's interest lay in "reducing [Iran's] ability to use violence in support of its foreign political objectives" and in "[encouraging] Iraq and other

producers to improve the security of crude oil supply". As such, Schultz called for the "US and like-minded states to take steps designed to cut off western arms sales to Iran and encourage Iraq to avoid expansionary steps in the Gulf". On the whole, Operation Staunch was chiefly concerned with limiting Iran's ability to conduct warfare.

There was little suggestion (at least not at this point) that anyone seriously disputed the policy. Howard Tiecher, who was a member of staff in the NSC, did articulate a different rationale for the initiative. He argued that, rather than staunch Iran, the main purpose was to "dissipate lingering suspicions in the Arab world, particularly in Baghdad, that the US wanted Iraq and Iran to maintain their death grip rather than see either party emerge victorious from the war" (Tiecher and Tiecher, 1993: 296).

Whether Operation Staunch achieved its desired effects is an open question. Richard Fairbanks, Special envoy in charge of the diplomatic initiative, argued that whilst it "'might not have been a 100 per cent success…we definitely managed to stop most major weapons from reaching Iran from US allies'" (cited Pythian, 1997: 35). Operation Staunch even appeared to bridge the Cold War bipolar international structure. One *New York Times* article noted that Soviet diplomats were "believed to be putting pressure on [their] allies, primarily North Korea, to cut back arms sales to Iran" (Kifner, 1984). On the other hand, a Congressional report on the Iran-contra affair indicated that "Iran's military potential clearly grew [despite Operation Staunch]" (Hamilton and Inouye, 1987: 159). This was clearly illustrated by the military gains Iran was able to achieve from 1982 onwards, which included reversing Iraq's territorial gains in the north and south of the country and launching its own offensives into Iraqi territory (Karsh, 2002: 36 – 51).

This shift in the balance of power resulted in America diplomatically tilting to Iraq. A NEA 1983 position paper argued that the "Iranian strategy of bringing about the Iraqi regimes political collapse through military attrition coupled with [the] financial strangulation [of Iraq] seems to be slowly having an effect". In "this context [a] possible 'tilt' towards Iraq should be considered". The paper urged caution by noting that any new relationship with Iraq would undermine "the possibility of developing a future relationship with Iran". However, it concluded that economic support to Iraq could possibly ensure the country's survival (Veliotes and Howe, 1995).

The paper, however, was predated by a number of US-Iraqi diplomatic exchanges at senior levels. Officials from both Iraq and America recognised that their aversion to Khomeini's Iran created a set of shared interests, what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) termed common appeals. According to James Placke (2001), a member of staff in the NEA, "we had a parallel set of interests with Iraq in the region". This was because "they were the military barrier to expansion of Iranian revolutionary ideology…The Iraqis being a secular society were opposed to it and also because it would cost them their country". As a result, Morris Draper, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, visited Iraq in April of 1981 and met with Iraq's Foreign Minister, Saadoun Hammadi. According to William Eagleton (1995a), from the US interests section in Baghdad, the meeting occurred at a time when the US has "a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the [1958] revolution". After the meeting Draper concluded that whilst Iraq was unwilling at this point to resume full diplomatic relations the *Ba'ath* government would "resume and encourage a more systematic and intimate dialogue at senior level" (Eagleton, 1995b). The relationship, for Draper, was clearly built on balance of power politics. As he recalled, "During those days, we kept thinking of balance of power politics. We viewed Iraq as a bulwark against revolutionary Iran" (Draper, 1991).

Subsequently, at the UN General Assembly in October 1982 Secretary of State, George Schultz, met with his Iraqi counterpart Saadoun Hammadi. Hammadi voiced concern that Iran was seeking "'power and domination'" over the Gulf and was attempting to "'export its revolution'" (cited Nossiter, 1982). Although what transpired at this meeting remains unknown (Schultz does not mention it in his memoirs), Hammadi and Schultz met again in February 1983. Schultz's (1995a) memorandum of this meeting indicates that the Iraqi Foreign Minister had requested America to "urge [its] friends to limit their arms supply and trade with Iran [and police] the black market in arms more effectively". Given that Operation Staunch followed a number of months later, Hammadi's appeals were obviously heard loudly in Washington.

Not everyone was satisfied with these developments. Howard Tiecher, a member of staff in the NSC, was strongly opposed to the relationship on the basis that Iraq "remained irreconcilably opposed to a political settlement with Israel, had not renounced its long-standing claims to Kuwait and continued to [harbour] international terrorists" (Tiecher and Tiecher, 1993: 59 – 71).

Nevertheless, the desire to contain revolutionary Iran weakened the efficacy of this opposition. In late 1983 Donald Rumsfeld, President Reagan's Middle East Special Envoy, toured the region and met with both Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein, Iraqi President. Reports of the meeting imply a great deal of cordiality. According to Rumsfeld the meeting with Hussein removed "whatever obstacles remained in the way of resuming diplomatic relations". In addition, it "marked a positive milestone in the development of US-Iraqi relations and will prove to be a wider benefit to US posture in the region" (Price, 1995). As Rumsfeld (2011: 4) noted in his memoirs, Iraq was the "'less bad'" option in Gulf. "Whatever misgivings we had about reaching out to Saddam Hussein, the alternative of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East was decidedly worse". Put another way, the Iraqi tilt was precipitated by the Iranian revolution and its regional effects.

E.H. Carr's (1946: 125 – 6) classical realist lens reminds us that economic power, particularly the use of loans and credit, is a chief means of purchasing influence abroad. Consequently, the US-Iraqi tilt was grounded in US economic aid to Iraq. In May 1982 NEA staff communicated to Secretary of State Schultz that Iraq's military defeats "have weakened Saddam Hussein, who now appears more vulnerable to a Ba'ath party coup". If Saddam Hussein fell it would likely increase Iran's "capabilities [to destabilise] the region" (Howe and Veliotes, 1995). As a result, the US made Iraq eligible for foreign agricultural credits, which had the implicit purpose of maintaining the country as the bulwark against Iran. The US Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program guaranteed payments for American agricultural exports to foreign countries (Mendolwitz, 1990: 2 – 3). In December 1982 Iraq was approved for a CCC guarantee worth $210 million. According to Secretary of State, George Schultz:

> our support for Iraq increased in rough proportion to Iran's military successes: plain and simple, the United States was engaged in a limited form of balance-of-power policy. The United States could not stand idle and watch the Khomeini revolution sweep forwards. Beginning in December 1982, prodded by US agricultural interests, we provided Iraq with $210 million in credits to purchase American wheat, rice, and feed grains, as well as access to EXIM Bank credits and continuing financing of agricultural sales by the CCC. (Schultz, 1993: 227)

Despite concern from the Department of the Treasury's (1995a and 1995b) that the CCC programme was overburdening Iraq with debt, the programme provided Iraq with $5 billion

of agricultural credits (Mendolwitz, 1990: 2). The credits offered Iraq a "significant benefit for a country that experienced growing financial difficulties throughout the 1980s" (Battle, 1995: 19). Other economic initiatives included the removal of Iraq from the list of nations supporting international terrorism in February 1982. As a result, Congressional oversight of dual use sales, material which could be used for both civilian and military purposes, to Iraq was removed. This occurred despite congressional opposition suggesting that such a move "'was inappropriate and may be a major mistake'" (cited Gwertzman, 1982). Throughout the conflict, the sale to Iraq of dual use items such as heavy trucks (Howe, 1995) and helicopters (Newton, 1995a) continued despite accusations that such equipment was intended for military purposes (Berman, 1995). The strategic interest in maintaining Iraq as the chief bulwark against Iran overrode these concerns.

Forms of soft power, which is what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) termed "'civilised'" weapons, were employed by the US to tilt towards Iraq during the Gulf War. Although diplomatic persuasion and economic influence managed to maintain Iraq as the bulwark against Khomeinism, the Gulf War continued without an end insight. The continuation of hostilities was a deep concern for American policymakers. Just one year into the conflict Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State, remarked:

> There is a great risk that the [Gulf War] may spill over into [neighbouring] states, and it has already aggravated inter-Arab relations. It may lead to unforeseen and far-reaching changes in the regional balance of power, offering the Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge its influence in the process. (Haig, 1982)

Unable to influence events through softer forms of power, as the next subsection will discuss, the US turned towards militarism.

6.2.3.2 Hard Power

In the first instance, the US employed forms of military power in an effort to re-establish influence in Iran. During the summer of 1985 there were calls amongst some American policymakers for an Iranian *rapprochement*. A draft NSDD argued that as Khomeini was reaching the end of his life there was likely to be a secessionist struggle for power. As such, the draft directive called for an "active and sustained [programme] to build [American] leverage and understanding of the internal situation [in Iran] as to enable us to exhort a greater and more constructive influence over Iranian politics". In terms of policy, the

directive advanced a number of options to "enhance leverage" in Iran, which included the "provision of selected military equipment on a case by case basis" (Fortier and Tiecher, 1995).

Many policymakers ridiculed the idea. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, suggested that it was "almost too absurd to comment on", likening it to "asking [Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi] to Washington for a cosy chat" (Powell, 1995). Similarly George Schultz, Secretary of State, contended that the directive was unrealistic, that arms to Iran would not buy the US "the kind of influence we want" and that America's "moderate Arab friends…will be badly shaken if they ever find out" (Schultz, 1995c). Nonetheless, on 17 January President Reagan authorised a covert action to sell, through various Iranian and Israeli intermediaries, 4000 anti-tank missiles to Iran. The initiative, which is now known as the Iran-contra affair, had the immediate aim of purchasing Iranian government pressure on *Hezbollah* to release hostages held in Lebanon. According to the presidential finding that authorised the action, however, the hostage release was a "by-product" of a "larger effort to develop ties to potentially moderate forces in Iran" (Poindexter, 1995a). In other words, the US seemed to be following E.H. Carr's classical realist idea that political order is built on material influence.

The arms transfers were also accompanied by intelligence exchanges. In January 1986 William Casey, Director of the CIA, agreed to supply Iran with Iraq's order of battle despite being advised that this could "cause the Iranians to have a successful offensive against the Iraqi's with cataclysmic results" (McMahon, 1995). Further intelligence was passed to Iran in October 1986, which provided information on Iraq's supply routes, military positions and areas where they expected Iran to attack (North, 1995). John Poindexter, Reagan's NSA, seemed blasé with the ethics of this double dealing, only asking Oliver North, his assistant in the NSC, for a "thoughtful piece that lays out a rational scheme [for] providing [intelligence] to both sides" (Poindexter, 1995b).

The initiative resulted in the release of some hostages from Lebanon and the visit of NSC staff to Iran in February 1986. Yet, any improvement in US-Iranian relations was tempered by mutual mistrust (North, 1991: 47 – 63). In late 1986 a Lebanese newspaper exposed the Iran-contra initiative. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the *Majlis* and who America believed they were indirectly negotiating with, confirmed the story, although allegedly embellishing details (Poindexter, 1995c). The purpose of Rafsanjani's exposition remains an

open question. Some contend that the Syrian government leaked the story to undermine the potential US-Iranian *rapprochement* (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997: 91). Others contend that Rafsanjani's political opponents leaked the story in order to undermine him (Reagan, 1990: 529 and Parsi, 2007: 124).

Overlooked, however, is that Rafsanjani's leak may have been a strategic move. Iran, recognising that Arab and US support of Iraq was the principal blocking point to an Iranian victory, sought means to break this coalition, which included a diplomatic offensive throughout 1985. This culminated in Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, in a first since the 1979 revolution, visiting Iran and meeting with Hussein Musavi, Iranian Prime Minister, and Ali Khamenei, Iranian President. During the meeting, according to Iran's state news agency, Faisal had spoken of a "willingness" to improve Iranian-Saudi relations, whilst articulating his "respect" for the "Islamic movement in Iran". Khamenei, on the other hand, stressed his rejection of "superpower domination" of the Gulf (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1985). Rafsanjani's exposition may have been a complementary attempt to weaken US prestige in the Arab world and therefore undermine American power in the region.

Without access to official Iranian documents this is perhaps indiscernible. At the very least, however, it was certainly the effect of Rafsanjani's leak. Domestically, the Iran-contra affair caused political outrage. In the Persian Gulf, however, it undermined American prestige. As Hunter (1991: 152) comments, judging by the "public statements of Gulf and Arab officials, US credibility [had] reached its lowest level since the fall of the Shah in 1979". Furthermore, the initiative quite possibly played a role in further Iranian strategic gains. In early 1986 Iran launched an offensive into Iraqi territory and seized the strategically significant Faw peninsula (Hiro, 1989: 167 – 80). The surprise attack occurred shortly after the CIA had authorised intelligence sharing with Iran. Iran's capture of the Faw peninsula threatened both "the main highway to Kuwait [and Iraq's second city] Basra" (Fisk, 1986). In turn, Iran appeared "in a much stronger position to exert pressure on the Gulf states to cease their support for Iraq" (Hirst, 1986). Put simply, Iran had managed to transform the balance of power.

E.H. Carr's classical realism reminds us that militarism, the use of force to reshape order, is often the product of declining influence, which is symbolised by the failure of softer or more 'civilised' means of influence. This seems like a useful way for approaching America's

response to developments in the Gulf War. Following from the disastrous Iranian initiative, the US deployed military force to counter Iran. In February 1987 President Reagan (1987) announced that America remains "strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz", which was followed with the launch of Operation Earnest Will (Wise, 2007: 52 – 73). Kuwaiti tankers were re-flagged, that is re-registered as US national vessels, and provided with a US naval escort through the Gulf. According to Gary Sick, who was a member of the NSC staff during the Carter administration, the policy was shaped by the desire to contain Iran and respond to America's declining prestige. Sick noted that:

> The underlying basis for the [re-flagging] policy, however, was the embarrassment of the Iran-contra affair, which punctured American credibility with the Arab states of the gulf and created the impression that Washington had shifted its support to Iran in the gulf war. To compensate for that bungled policy, America tilted sharply toward Iraq and tried to reassure its Arab allies by providing a more active security umbrella in the gulf.
>
> At the time this policy was initiated, the great fear was that Iran would win the war, thereby upsetting the political balance in the Middle East. The United States presence was designed to counter and deter Iranian attacks on neutral shipping in the gulf and to pressure Iran to accept a cease-fire. (Sick, 1988)

The prospect of US military involvement in a war-zone generated significant Congressional opposition. Congressman Tom Lantos, House of Representatives, argued that the military presence in the Gulf required Congressional oversight because the US was "taking a position which clearly puts us on the side of one of the belligerents" (US Congress, 1987: 18). In response Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, argued that America's military involvement was not an act of war; rather it was an act of deterrence against Iran (US Congress, 1987: 2 – 3).

Despite Murphy's suggestions, however, there was something inevitable about a military clash between the US and Iran. In October, an Iranian Silkworm missile struck and sank the *Sea Isle City*, a Kuwaiti tanker re-flagged by America. In response, America launched Operation Nimble Archer attacking Iranian oil platforms home to Iranian radar and gunboats (Roberts, 1987). Although there was a debate about the correct response, with some favouring a hawkish strike and others preaching caution (Cushman, 1987), there was no real question over the necessity of a military response. After the attacks Weinberger failed to rule

out further military operations against Iran, whilst an Iranian official remarked that America had "'entered a swamp from which it can in no way get out'" (cited Tyler, 1987).

The clash was repeated a number of months later. In April 1988 an American frigate sank after striking an Iranian mine (Cushman, 1988a). In a one day battle, which was code-named Operation Praying Mantis (Wise, 2007: 188 – 218), the American navy virtually destroyed Iran's navy (Cushman, 1988b). Some officials did raise questions over the military clashes. Thomas Downey, Congressman in the House of Representatives, warned against the "'shooting war under way [which] won't take much effort to see it escalate'" (cited Johnson, 1988).

Operation Praying Mantis occurred at the very same time that Iraq launched a counter-offensive, which retook the Faw peninsula. In the aftermath of the joint onslaught on Iran, the American Ambassador in Iraq, David Newton, sent a memorandum to Washington. He claimed that "because of the sensitivity of Iranian charges of US-Iraqi collusion, fighting between Iran and the US…has hardly been in the press". Nevertheless, he noted that "Iraqi officials are delighted at the bloody nose we [have] given the Iranians" (Newton, 1995b). American officials pleaded that the simultaneous attacks were coincidental (Cushman, 1988b). However, given that Iraqi-American intelligence exchanges through the conduits of Saudi Arabia and Jordan had been commonplace throughout the 1980s (Tiecher, 2009), this claim is somewhat dubious. For all intents and purposes America was now a belligerent in the conflict and using military power as a means to bring an end to the Gulf War. As Carr's (1946: 111) classical realism would suggest, war is often the product of a desire to prevent another from getting any stronger. This was clearly at work in US policy towards Iran at this juncture.

The Gulf War came to an official close in August 1988 after Khomeini accepted the terms of UN Security Council resolution 598. By April both the Iranian armed forces and the populace in general had become demoralised over the lengthy and brutal war. At the same time, the joint military operations illustrated to Iran that it was now fighting on two fronts. Tehran radio, after the joint April attacks, reported that "the US forces' aggressive actions in the Persian Gulf confirm that the reason for their presence there is not to bring about the just termination of the imposed war. By violating neutrality in the imposed war, they have taken steps to expand the war" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1988). America's complicity in Iraq's recapture of the Faw peninsula, which included the deployment of chemical warfare,

also aggrieved the Iranians. As Rafsanjani (2009) commented, "The West allowed Iraq to break international law". This was compounded in June when the *USS Vincennes*, which was patrolling the Gulf, mistakenly shot down an Iran Air 655, a civilian Iranian aircraft. The official investigation into the incident concluded that it was an accident created by the *Vincennes's* technical equipment mistakenly identifying the aircraft as a fighter-jet (Department of Defence, 1988). For the Iranian government, however, the attack was purposeful (Strauss, 1988) and, coupled with twin attacks in April, highlighted the futility of continuing with the war. Subsequently, the Iranians accepted the cease-fire. As Mohsen Rafiqdoost (2009), Minister of the IRGC noted, "[Iran's] military commanders and politicians saw no way to win this war. So it was time to accept a cease-fire".

E.H. Carr's (1946: 109) classical realism suggests that war is often a policy of last resort. This seems true with regards US militarism in the Persian Gulf at this juncture. Softer forms of power failed to have the desired effect. Accordingly, particular after the Iran-contra affair had undermined US prestige amongst the Arab Gulf states, the US resorted to force to contain Iran and, in the words of former NSC member of staff, Gary Sick (1988), "[pressurise] Iran to accept a cease-fire".

6.2.4 Balancing Against Iran

This thesis works from the assumption that America's foreign policy in the northern Gulf has generally followed a balance of power policy in the northern Gulf, which roughly equates with E.H. Carr's (1939: 124) characterisation of Britain's European policy. Whilst in the wake of the Iraqi revolution in 1958 this was concerned with balancing with the Shah's Iran, after the 1979 revolution, this resulted in balancing with Iraq. There was a general belief that the Iranian revolution, in particular its antipathy towards monarchical rule and American influence in the Persian Gulf, would clash with American interests. To paraphrase US President, Ronald Reagan (1990: 411), the US would not lose Saudi Arabia like it had just lost Iran.

As a result, at this juncture the US balanced against Iran by providing economic assistance to Iraq, employing diplomatic pressure to cease Iran's access to military equipment and eventually joining the war, if in practice but not in name. As Morris Draper (1991), Deputy Secretary of State NEA, commented, "[during the Gulf War] we kept thinking of balance-of-power politics. We viewed Iraq as a bulwark against revolutionary Iran".

6.3 The Persian Gulf War

E.H. Carr's classical realist standpoint suggests that particular political orders generate unintended effects. As this section will show, these ideas provide a practical way for thinking about political developments in the Persian Gulf. Initially, the administration of George H.W. Bush hoped that the relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq would continue after the Gulf War. However, the effects of American policy during the Gulf War generated consequences that would rule this out.

As the Gulf War was drawing to a close and the shared antagonism to the Khomeini threat dissipated, there was a sense that the US-Iraqi relationship was transforming. In fact, Gary Sick, who was a Persian Gulf specialist in the NSC during the Carter administration, argued that,

> as [the US] military presence has increased our diplomatic influence has declined. As Iraq sensed victory, it began to back away from us. In the past several weeks, Iraq has snubbed the United States' chief delegate to the United Nations, Vernon Walters; has initiated a well-coordinated series of public attacks on United States Middle East policy, and then abruptly [cancelled] a meeting of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, with Secretary of State George P. [Schultz], supposedly because a mid-level State Department official met with a Kurdish leader. Our military policy was never blended into a broader diplomatic strategy. As a result, the prospects for a peace settlement have faded, we have actually lost influence with the party we chose to support and we find ourselves at the mercy of events in the war with no ability to shape the course of events. (Sick, 1988)

Iraq, which now found itself free from its traditional regional counterweight (Iran), also began pursuing a more aggressive policy. Chemical and biological weapons had allegedly been used when Iraq regained the Faw peninsula in April 1988 (Newton, 1995b; Hiro, 2002). The same non-conventional weapons were used during the genocidal *al-Anfal* (the spoils) campaign to reassert central authority in Iraqi Kurdistan (Karsh, 2002: 77 – 8). Previous use of chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf War had received a relatively muted response from the US. As George Schultz (2009), Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State, explained: "[It was] a very hard balance. [Iraq was] using chemical weapons, so [we wanted] them to stop using the chemical weapons. At the same time, [we didn't] want to see Iran win

the war". The chemical attacks in August 1988, however, received a staunch *démarche* from the US (Glaspie, 1995; Murphy, 1995; Schultz, 1995d).

Nevertheless, when George H.W. Bush became America's 41st President in January 1989, his administration seemed determined, at least initially, to continue with the US-Iraq political order. The chief rationale remained balancing against Iran. After the Gulf War, a comprehensive review of American policy in the Gulf was called for. The output was National Security Directive (NSD) 26 (Bush, 1989). According to Jentelson (1994: 94, emphasis in original), NSD 26 reflected "a belief in both the value of and possibilities for moving beyond [America's] war time alliance [with Iraq] to a more enduring *accommodation* between the US and Iraq". Some did question the general assumptions of NSD 26. Zalmay Khalilzad, a member of staff in the Policy Planning office in the Department of State, argued that the Gulf War had rewritten the balance of power in the region. That is, Iran's defeat had emboldened Iraq and, as such, the US should actively seek to counter Iraq's regional power (Olsen, 2003: 22).

Nevertheless, NSD 26 became official policy and implied US-Iranian hostility was the chief reason. In other words, balance of power politics continued to shape US foreign policy in the Gulf. That is, to paraphrase E.H. Carr, Iran was viewed as a country that threatened America's strategic interests in the region. NSD 26 outlined US interest in the Persian Gulf in traditional economic, military and ideological terms. However, the threat to the Gulf was understood in a new light. The US would "defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own" (Bush, 1989). Although not made explicit, the regional power was clearly Iran. As Richard Haass (N.D.: 3), Middle East director in the NSC noted, "Tehran's commitment to exporting its revolution throughout the region…remained an ongoing and serious threat to regional stability". As a result, NSD 26 "reaffirmed the view that Iran, and not Iraq, posed the greater threat to US interests in the region". As such, the Bush administration "supported a policy, which was consistent with what he inherited from President Reagan, of trying to build a political and commercial relationship with Iraq in the hopes of moderating its [behaviour] and offsetting Iranian power".

This political order, following E.H. Carr's classical realist lens, was imbuedwith US material influence. NSD 26 recognised that Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons posed a

serious problem. However, it concluded that a normal relationship "between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and Middle East". As a result, the USwould "propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its [behaviour] and to increase [American] influence with Iraq" (Bush, 1989).

In practical terms this meant that the CCC programme was continued as an "economic incentive [and a] good faith effort toward better relations [with Iraq]" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 306). As a result, in November 1989 a further $1 billion of CCC credit was approved (Raul, 1995). Representatives from the Department of Treasury (Barreda, 1995; McCamey, 1995) did suggest that Iraq's unmanageable debt and allegations of Iraqi corruption of the programme provided justification for suspending the programme. However, James Baker, Secretary of State, applied pressure and the $1 billion programme, which was to be delivered in two separate tranches, was approved (McCormack, 1995). This was because, as Brent Scowcroft, Bush's NSA, noted, the loss "of the CCC [programme] would have nearly erased what little leverage we had with Iraq" (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 306).

Material influence, however, was not complemented with what Carr (1946: 145) referred to as common appeals. In fact, as the second tranche of CCC credit was to be delivered to Iraq, what little leverage the US had with the country was apparent. Saddam Hussein appeared determined to continue the Cold War in the Middle East. In early 1990 Iraq, along with Egypt, Yemen and Jordan, formed the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC). As Pelletiere (1996: 17) notes the four states in the ACC "physically wrapped themselves around [Saudi Arabia]". The ACC "was meant to challenge the GCC" and "resurrect the cause of Arab nationalism". In February 1990 Saddam Hussein spoke before the first ACC congregation. Hussein argued that, whilst Cold War had balanced between the two sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the decline of Soviet power meant that the situation had changed. Given the "erosion" of the Soviets as the "key champion of the Arabs" and given the "influence of the Zionist lobby" on America, Hussein feared "new stupidities" from Israel. At the same time, he also voiced apprehension that an unbalanced US, which was a "superpower without an equal", would result in the "Arab Gulf region [being] governed by US will" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1990).

At the same time, a number of allegations resulted in increasing opposition to the US-Iraqi relationship. These included Iraq's alleged corruption of the CCC programme (Richard, 1995; Rukstele, 1995), repeated allegations that Iraq was importing dual use items that could

be used to constitute a nuclear weapons programme (Catto, 1995; Cohen 1995; McGhee, 1995) and Saddam Hussein's inflammatory speeches against Israel (Tyler, 1990). As a result Howard Berman, Congressman in the House of Representatives, raised a bill to impose economic sanctions on Iraq, which included the cessation of US economic aid (Sinai, 1990). Members of the Department of State opposed this action. John Kelly (1990), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, argued that any sanctions would "hurt US exporters and worsen our trade deficit…[and] would [worsen] our ability to exercise a restraining influence on Iraq". Nevertheless, at a deputies NSC meeting in May the Department of State agreed to suspend economic aid to Iraq in order to prevent any further Congressional action (Kelly, 1995).

At the same time, Iraq's relations with the southern Gulf were deteriorating. Iraq's financial outlays during the Gulf War had resulted in the country being overburdened with debt. Yet, the Shatt al-Arab – Iraq's principal route to the Gulf – remained blocked, whilst OPEC members, in particular Kuwait, had deflated the price of oil by producing above OPEC quotas (Hiro, 1992: 83 – 9). Hussein, clearly saw this as part of a concerted US-Arab economic war. "'The policies of some Arab rulers are American…They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security'". Chillingly, he stated, "'Iraqis will not forget the saying that cutting necks is better than cutting the means of living'" (cited Ibrahim, 1990). Weeks laterhe invaded and annexed Kuwait.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which has been labelled "one of the major international postwar crises" (Halliday, 1991: 223), has been explored extensively in the literature. Many explain the invasion in terms of Iraqi political culture, in particular Hussein's dictatorial nature and his propensity to engage in strategic gambles, which are inevitably followed by tragic results (Cockburn and Cockburn, 2002: 6 – 7). Additional literature stresses the role of geography, in particular Iraq's limited littoral space (Schofield, 1997: 132 – 4), whilst others point to America's unintentional "green light" for the invasion (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 54). Other factors include traditional radical and conservative tensions, ethnic tensions between southern and northern Arabs, Hussein's pan-Arab vision and the end of bipolarity (Matthews, 1993: 39 – 54). Although these explanations have certain utility, the causes of Iraq's invasion need to recognise that the post-Gulf War environment influenced Hussein's decision. In particular, the defeat of Iran, which was produced by American military power, destabilised the balance of power between the two northern Gulf countries. At the same time, the Gulf War generated untold Iraqi economic debt to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Gause, 2002: 53 – 9).

In other words, following Carr's classical realism, the post-Iranian political order generated unintended consequences, which in part, generated Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

As Saddam Hussein was sabre-rattling, Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defence, re-invoked America's traditional interest. "'[America's] commitments haven't changed'", Cheney argued, "'[and] obviously we take very seriously any threat that would put at risk US interests or US friends in the region'" (cited Murphy, 1990). In response to the actual invasion, the Bush administration released NSD 45. It argued that Iraq's invasion had placed "vital US interests at risk" (Bush, 1990). Accordingly, the US employed various instruments to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Initially, these included freezing Iraqi assets, supporting the international embargo of Iraq, which was UN mandated and establishing an international diplomatic consensus that opposed Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. In other words, America employed softer, or what Carr (1946: 132) referred to as "'civilised'", forms of power to impel Iraq's retreat.

Iraq, however, maintained its position despite the UN speaking with relative unanimity. UN Security Council resolution 678 imposed a 15 January deadline for Iraq's withdrawal before force would be employed. Last minute diplomatic talks failed (Baker, 1995: 345 – 65) and as a result, the Bush administration sought congressional approval for employing force. During Congressional debates, some, such as Thomas Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, argued for continued "'reliance on sanctions and [for Congress] not [to] support force now'". Others, such as Stephen Solarz, Congressman in the House of Representatives, argued that force was necessary to prevent "'a brutal dictator from getting his hands on the economic jugular of the world'" (cited Clymer, 1991). It was the latter voice which was heard the loudest and the resolution authorising force was passed 52 to 47 and 250 to 183 in the Senate and House respectively. Having successfully obtained congressional authorisation President Bush issued NSD 54, which argued that economic instruments of power "have not accomplished the intended objective of ending Iraq's occupation of Kuwait [and there] is no persuasive evidence that they will do so in a timely manner". As such, American and coalition military power needed to be deployed to "effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait" (Bush, 1991a). To paraphrase E.H. Carr, militarism was employed as a last resort when softer forms of power had failed to produce the intended effect.

The resulting Persian Gulf War was relatively short affair. The aerial bombardment of Iraq dropped more conventional bombs on the country than had been used in the entirety of WWII (Hiro, 1992: 4). After which a short ground campaign lasting just 100 hours forced the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. President Bush (1991c), after the cessation of hostilities, declared that "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met". At the same time however, he pointed to the "difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace".

There was, however, a general feeling that Saddam Hussein would not, could not and should not survive. In other words, the Bush administration wished for a post-Saddam Iraq. The general assumption was that this would be generated by non-military means. As Dick Cheney (2011: 224), Secretary of Defence commented, "We hoped that Saddam's military…might turn against him after the humiliating defeat we had just delivered them". It was also believed that the economic sanctions, which were implicitly tied to Hussein's downfall, would force his removal from power. President Bush (1991d) remarked that there "will not be normalised relations with the United States…until Saddam Hussein is out of there". This view was shared by Robert Gates, Director of the CIA, who argued that an "'easing of sanctions will be considered only when there is a new government'" (cited Byman, 2001: 151).

Subsequently, the US employed sanctions, or what E.H. Carr (1946: 129) would have termed dollar bullets, to induce a change in Iraq's government. As Gunter (1999: 150 – 1) argues, the Bush administration hoped that the "economic sanctions [would] create a crisis atmosphere…that might lead a lone Iraqi security official or family member to assassinate [Saddam Hussein]". In addition to, the US also employed the "art of persuasion" (Carr, 1946: 132) to foment opposition to Hussein's rule. In May 1991 President George H.W. Bush signed a presidential finding to support internal opposition in Iraq to take power (Smith and Ottaway, 1996). CIA funds were diverted to a Saudi Arabian based opposition group, which was formed form former *Ba'ath* military officers, in order to help them broadcast anti-Hussein propaganda in Iraq (Cordesman, 1999a: 27).

Continuing to shape policy in Iraq, however, was the spectre of Iran. As Brent Scowcroft (2001a) contended, "one of our objectives [after the Persian Gulf War] was not to have Iraq split up into constituent parts". This was because "it's a fundamental interest of the United States to keep a balance in that area, in Iraq and in Iran". This was a view that was also shared by Secretary of State, James Baker, who argued that,

> as much as Saddam Hussein's [neighbours] wanted to see him gone, they feared that Iraq might fragment in unpredictable ways that would play into the hands of the mullahs in Iran, who could export their brand of Islamic fundamentalism with the help of Iraq's Shiites and quickly transform themselves into the dominant regional power. This was also a genuine concern of the Bush administration and many of our allies as well. Just as fears of Iranian expansionism helped shape US [policy before the Persian Gulf War], this same phobia was a significant factor in our [post-war] decision making. (Baker, 1995: 437 – 8)

In other words, America's 'phobia' of Iran, which was a product of the Iranian revolution and its subsequent developments, provided the immediate backdrop to US policy in Iraq. As the next section will discuss, this resulted in the formation of a unilateral balancing strategy aimed at both Iran and Iraq.

6.4 The Non War

One of the first duties for new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher was to tour the Middle East. In addition to re-energising the Middle East peace process, Christopher met with representatives of the Saudi Arabian government. The joint statement, which was released after the meeting, suggests that America's traditional aim in the Gulf continued to animate US foreign policy at this juncture. "President Clinton's commitment", according to Christopher (1993b), "to the security of friends in the Gulf, like that of every President since Franklin Roosevelt, is firm and constant". In other words, as Edward Djerejian (1993a), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, noted, America remains committed to "[providing] for the [defence] of the Gulf states [who] remain vulnerable to aggression from an unrepentant Iraq or a rearmed and ideologically assertive Iran". As this section will show, the US undertook a policy to balance unilaterally against both Iraq and Iraq. However, in this "netherworld between war and peace" (Gordon, 1994a) the US increasingly resorted to 'non war'. That is, a war in everything but name, which was aimed at moving Iraq into a post-Saddam era.

6.4.1 Background

As discussed above, the Clinton administration generally followed America's traditional conceptions of national interest in the Persian Gulf. In fact, Assistant Secretary of State for the NEA, Edward Djerejian (1993b), stated that US regional policy is aimed at "[reducing] the chances that another aggressor will emerge to seek control over the area, threaten the

independence of existing states, and dictate policy in the region". The factors shaping this policy are generally reduced to international structural or US domestic level factors. Clinton's policy, which outwardly favoured non-intervention in Iraq, was for some produced by the post-Cold War international structure. According to Pauly (2005: 67), the relative lack of a clear coherent international structure meant that the Clinton administration was generally unwilling to "bear substantial economic, military and political costs in order to achieve grand strategic objectives". In contrast, alternative literature stresses the domestic influences shaping US foreign policy at this juncture. According to Burgos (2008: 214 – 8), it was the 'Republican revolution' in the mid-1990s, which gave the Republican Party control of Congress, that influenced a more interventionist policy in Iraq. A similar point is made by Murray (2010: 114 – 5), who argues that Clinton's often fluctuating policy in Iran was produced by conflicts between the US Executive and US Congress over control of the foreign policy process.

These factors are obviously important. However, E.H. Carr's classical realism, as discussed in chapter three, suggests that the actions and reactions of foreign actors also shape American policy. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss how Iraq and Iran created the environment in which US policy operated. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in July 1989 led some to suggest that Iran's revolutionary zeal would pass. President George H.W. Bush, for instance, remarked that "'with [Khomeini's] passing we hope Iran will now move toward assuming a responsible role in the international community'" (cited Thurgood, 1989). However, as Arjomand (2009: 4) explains, the death of Khomeini "did not mean the end of the revolution, but only the beginning of a prolonged struggle among the children of the revolution".

Although the relatively hard-line Ali Khamenei replaced Khomeini as Supreme Leader, the more 'pragmatic' Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani replaced Khamenei as Iranian President. Rafsanjani, following a policy of economic reconstruction, expanded commercial and diplomatic ties with Russia, China, India and western Europe (Estelami, 1999: 55 – 7). Nevertheless, the mercantile bourgeoisie republic continued to generate significant economic inequalities and political dissatisfaction (Ansari, 2006: 52 – 81). As Gerges argued, by the mid-1990s "'the economic situation [had] deteriorated under the clergy regime in Iran'" (cited Greene, 1997). Economic and political dissatisfaction, which was combined with demographic pressures for change (the emergence and politicisation of an age cohort removed from the revolutionary zeal of the 1980s), created a political space for reform

minded politicians. Consequently, in 1997 Mohammad Khatami won the presidential election by campaigning on a broad platform of political and economic reform (Ansari, 2006: 168 – 75).

The election of Khatami was revolutionary in the sense that it "came as a radical break with the totalitarian ideology of the Islamic revolution" (Arjomand, 2009: 92). This revolutionary transformation, as E.H. Carr's classical realist perspective would suggest, had a subsequent impact on Iran's foreign policy. As Hiro (2001: 293 – 4) comments, Khatami's election bridged the divide between the republican Iran and the monarchical Saudi Arabia. As a result, it paved the way for the close of the Islamic cold war, which had hindered relations between the two Persian Gulf countries during the 1980s, and paved the way for a Saudi-Iranian *détente* (McLean, 2001: 29 – 64).

The election of Khatami also led the Clinton administration to consider the possibility of an American-Iranian *rapprochement* (Katzman, 2000: 20). However, many Iranian policymakers remained committed, rhetorically at least, to reducing America's influence in the Gulf. For instance Kamal Kharrazi, Iranian Foreign Minister, declared that Iran was opposed to US unipolarity and that the US "should be taught a lesson that it cannot impose its policies on others" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998a). Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, also declared that "America is the Great Satan…[America is] a mischief against nations…we are against America's presence in the Gulf" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998c).

The *Ba'ath* leaders in Iraq shared these views. Nevertheless, whilst Iran was able to successfully reintegrate itself into regional politics, Iraq remained to all intents and purposes a regional pariah. In other words, the balance between Iraq and Iran had once more shifted to the Persians. The legacy of the Persian Gulf War also meant that Iraq was ostracised from its monarchical neighbours and the Arab world more broadly. As a result Iraq, which was effectively divided by the western sponsored no fly zones, was subjected to increasing internal and external pressures for change.

A range of opposition groups sought to overthrow President Saddam Hussein. These included the Iraqi National Accord, which was supported by Saudi Arabia, and the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution, which was supported by Iran (Katzman, 2009: 4 – 5). An umbrella group, the Iraqi National Congress, which saw itself as a government in exile, was

established to "'[wrestle] the power from the [*Ba'ath*] regime'" (Gunter, 1999: 149). In addition, Kurdish factions, co-ordinated by the CIA (Baer, 2002: 171 – 213), openly opposed the Sunni Arab dominated *Ba'ath* party. According to Katzman (2009: 3 – 6), a Middle East analyst in the US Congressional Research Service, these groups received financial support and non-lethal training from the US. Katzman (1998a: 1) suggested that the Iraqi "opposition has been generally ineffective in shaking [Saddam Hussein's] grip on power, in part because of differences within and between the different dissident groups and with the regional backers of these groups". However, as Hitchen's (2003: 18) argued, there was something of a 'when' and not an 'if' about the fall of the Iraqi President. As he noted, "Saddam Hussein is not going to survive. His regime is on the verge of implosion [and it] has long passed the point of diminishing returns".

After the Cold War ended, US interests in the Persian Gulf remained relatively stable (Cox, 1995: 110). At the same time, however, the US, after the effects of the Iranian revolution, the Gulf War and the Persian Gulf, was estranged from the northern Gulf. In this context, as the next section will discuss, the US established and managed a unilateral political order, which was based on America's capability to balance against both Iraq and Iran.

6.4.2 The US Unilateral Political Order

Power, according to E.H. Carr, is based on material influence. Consequently, the US understood its national interest in the Persian Gulf in terms of maintaining military, economic and political influence. Martin Indyk (1993), a Middle East expert in the NSC, gave a speech in 1993 that clearly illustrated this relationship. America, according to Indyk, had a strong interest in influencing the "free-flow of Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices". Additionally, the US was concerned with influencing the "promotion of a just, lasting, comprehensive and real settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict", whilst remaining committed to a "foreign policy that would stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction to this volatile region". Finally, the US was concerned with courting the "friendship of those in the Arab world who seek good relations with the US", whilst opposing the "violent movements cloaked in religious garb that have begun to challenge governments across the Arab world".

These interests reflected America's wider grand strategy at this juncture. Clinton's relative inexperience in foreign policy often led to his administration being accused of pursuing "Band-Aid diplomacy". In other words, the Clinton administration improvised "policy at

each flash point, [proposed] half-remedies to intractable situations and [used] non-action as a form of action" (Brinkley, 1997: 113). In reality, however, as Walt argues (2000: 62 – 6), the Clinton administration, like those that preceded it, followed four critical tenets of American foreign policy: US global leadership, engagement, expansion and containment.

President Clinton (1995c: 1) argued that the end of the Cold War, which was a period of "great promise and also great uncertainty", meant that US "leadership in the world has never been more important". According to Secretary of State, Warren Christopher (1993a), this was because America was an exceptional nation. America's exceptionality resulted from the fact that no "other nation possesses our military might, economic strength or moral authority". America's exceptionality in turn required engagement. As a result, the "neo-know nothings", who advocated an isolationist policy, were muddleheaded. America's national interests could only be served by engaging economically and politically and by maintaining a credible military deterrent (Lake, 1993). This concern with engagement was complemented with a desire to expand and enlarge the international (or more appropriately liberal capitalist) order. Channelling America's liberal internationalist tradition, Clinton (1993a) argued that his foreign policy would be concerned with expanding the "world's community of market based economies [and] the circle of nations that live under [liberal democracy]". This was because America's "dream is of a…world of thriving democracies that co-operate with each other and live in peace". However, this liberal idealism was accompanied by a hard-nosed realism concerning 'backlash states' or 'rogue regimes' (Litwak, 2000: 24 – 5). According to Anthony Lake (1993), Clinton's NSA, whilst the democratic world was expanding, there remained a number of "dictator[s], theocrat[s], kleptocrat[s] [and] central planner[s]". These backlash states, which stood outside the "circle of democracy", were considered to have a destabilising effect. They were insular and oppressive and, as they rotted from within, they had a tendency to become "more desperate and dangerous". As a result, the US would "isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically, and technologically".

Both Iraq and Iran were indicted as the chief rogue regimes. As a result, there was little if any of what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) referred to as common appeals between the US and the northern Gulf countries. Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, just prior to the Persian Gulf War, received a telegram from his chief of intelligence that promised to "declare an all-out and unrelenting confrontation with [America]. We will chase them to every corner at all times. No high tower or house of steel will protect them against the fire of truth" (British

Broadcasting Corporation, 1991). Similar themes were promoted by Iranian President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who stated that it "is not hard to kill Americans [or westerners]…there are so many…everywhere in the world" (cited Morris, 1989).

In turn, the US considered both Iraq and Iran as threatening to American power and interests. Both countries were a seabed of anti-Americanism, chief sponsors of terrorism, principal promoters of destabilising military programmes and, sitting atop the Persian Gulf, they threatened at any time to disrupt the world's oil supply (Lake, 1994: 45 – 7). However, it was not just the northern Gulf where American power and prestige seemed to be retreating. Even American influence over Saudi Arabia, its chief Gulf ally, appeared on the decline. As Bronson (2006: 231) notes, over "the course of the 1990s Saudi leaders lost confidence in America's regional policies, and close US-Saudi relations became increasingly unpopular inside the Kingdom".

The US, to bring some order to this region in flux, announced a policy of dual containment. According to Indyk dual containment was predicated on the idea that the "old balance of power game" had been discredited. Balancing had failed because it produced negative results (Iraq's invasion of Kuwait). It was also impractical because both Iran and Iraq were deeply antagonistic. In addition, balance of power was considered irrelevant because America's position as the regions "unchallenged dominant power" meant that it did not "need to rely on [either Iraq or Iran] to balance the other" (Indyk, 1993). Although both Indyk and his superior, Anthony Lake, recognised the difference between Iraq and Iran, both were seen as hostile to the continued reproduction of American power. As such, the US would isolate the two countries from the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East region. America, to paraphrase Indyk, would act to make sure the backlash east (Iran and Iraq) could not interfere with the moderate west (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel).

That is not to say everyone concurred with the policy. Edward Djerejian (1993c), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, seemed to suggest that a relationship with Iran was a possibility. He concluded that, "[the Clinton administration's] policy does not exclude dialogue with Iran…Our dialogue with [authorised] Iranian representative's remains valid". General Joseph Hoar, Commander of CENTCOM, on the other hand, seemed to rule out such a dialogue when he suggested that Iran was a "'long-term political threat to [regional] peace and security'" (cited Borowiec, 1994). The policy of dual containment also raised serious objections from independent analysts. Graham Fuller, an analyst for the Research and

Development Corporation, argued that "in the post-Cold War era [the US needs] to think in new categories about how we can create Gulf-wide security groups…that will allow the Gulf very slowly and gradually to begin to cope with its own security problems" (Middle East Policy Council, 1994). Anthony Cordesman, a professor at Georgetown University, whilst welcoming dual containment, suggested that the Clinton administration were idealistic regarding the necessary power required to achieve dual containment. America's declining defence budget meant that, "while we may have the right strategy, it is far from clear that we are willing to pay for it" (Middle East Policy Council, 1994). Nevertheless, the Clinton administration overruled these objections. As Middle East expert in the NSC, Martin Indyk concluded, America's "basic purpose…is to maintain a [favourable] balance in the region – [favourable] to our interests, [favourable] to the interests of our regional friends in the Gulf and beyond in the Middle East. And…we can do that without depending on either Iraq or Iran" (Middle East Policy Council, 1994).

The dual containment political order very much reflected America's traditional balancing policy in the Gulf. As Kenneth Katzman (1998b: 6), a Middle East expert for the Congressional Research Service, noted that0 dual containment was designed to "reduce the threat from [Iran and Iraq] by seeking to keep both of them weak". Rather than balancing "Iran against Iraq, and vice versa" dual containment was grounded in the belief that, unilaterally, America could "obstruct the ambitions of either regional power". The following subsection will discuss the tools the US employed to support this political order.

6.4.3 The Nature of American Power

As the Clinton administration was taking office, the US was raining missiles down on Iraq. Ostensibly, the military strikes during early 1993 were in response to Iraqi actions that appeared to violate the terms of the Persian Gulf War armistice. These included deploying surface to air missiles in the no fly zones, entering Kuwaiti territory to recover lost military equipment and obstructing access to UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors (Schmitt, 1993). For the outgoing president, US military actions were designed to force Iraq's adherence to the various UN resolutions (Bush, 1993). For incoming Vice President, Al Gore on the other hand, forcing Iraq's compliance would "'increase the odds that eventually [Saddam Hussein] will be replaced'" (cited Ifill, 1993). For the Clinton administration, however, it was both Iraq and Iran that were classified as the region's chief

rogue states. Drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realism, which was discussed in chapter three, this subsection charts the evolution of US power at this juncture.

6.4.3.1 Soft Power

Economic sanctions, what E.H. Carr (1946: 129) would have referred to as dollar bullets, were one of the chief implements employed by the US to isolate Iraq. UN Security Council resolution 661 of August 1990 outlawed all international trade and commercial activity in Iraq. At the close of the Persian Gulf War UN Security Council resolution 687 was adopted, which tied the continuation of the embargo to Iraq's disarmament and its acceptance of international inspections and monitoring. The US, along with Britain, was the chief advocate for maintaining the sanctions throughout the 1990s (Malone, 2006: 114 – 51).

Chief policymakers within the Clinton administration, however, disagreed over the intended effects of the sanctions. In an interview just prior to taking office American President, Bill Clinton, argued that, whilst "'the people of Iraq would be better off if they had a different ruler'", he still believed in "'death-bed conversions'". As a result, Clinton contended that the sanctions were designed to influence a change in the behaviour of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. If Hussein "'wants a different relationship with the US and the UN'", Clinton argued, "'all he has to do is change his [behaviour]'" (cited Friedman, 1993a).

In contrast, others in the Clinton administration saw the sanctions as means to promote regime change in Iraq. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, reasoned that he "'did not find it conceivable that [Saddam Hussein] could obey [the UN resolutions] and stay in power, so I hope that by forcing – pressing those resolutions, we will insure [sic] his departure from power'" (cited Sciolino, 1993a). There was, however, little disagreement that the sanctions were a necessary method of circumscribing Iraq's war machine. In its accomplishment statement, the NSC (N.D.) noted that the Clinton administration "Kept in place the most stringent multilateral sanctions regime the world has ever seen, to prevent Saddam Hussein from rebuilding Iraq's [pre-Persian] Gulf War military machine".

In terms of circumscribing Iraq's war machine, the sanctions regime ultimately proved successful. As Lopez and Cortright (2004: 97) note, the "sanctions undermined Iraqi military capabilities and prevented rearmament by keeping Iraq's oil wealth and imports…out of the hands of Saddam Hussein". At the same time, however, the embargo on Iraq proved counterproductive. Rather than weakening *Ba'ath* rule in Iraq, the UN embargo actually

entrenched it by making the populace even more dependent on the state for basic welfare (Hurst, 2009: 137 – 9; Dodge, 2010). The impact of the embargo also generated a shift in international opinion. Non-governmental organisations frequently noted how the sanctions reduced the nutritional intake of the Iraqi population, weakened public health across the country and increased child mortality rates. An oil-for-food programme, after much vacillation by the Iraqi government, was established to address these concerns (Katzman, 2002b: 1 – 8). However, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein proved adept at manipulating international opinion (Deulfer, 2004: 35), particularly after UN staff in charge of the humanitarian effort resigned in protest at the UN's policies (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1998b, 2000). As a result, according to Charles Deulfer (2004: transmittal message, 11 – 12), the Special Adviser to the Deputy Chief of Intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, "By 2000, the erosion of [the] sanctions [regime had] accelerated". From Iraq's perspective, "the long struggle to outlast the containment policy of the United States imposed through the UN seemed [tantalisingly] close". Iraq had managed to obtain "firm allies" such as Russia and Syria "who had developed economic and political stakes in the success of [Saddam Hussein's] regime". As a result, by the end of the 1990s the "collapse or removal of sanctions was foreseeable". In other words, the economic sanctions were neither containing Saddam Hussein adequately nor generating his downfall.

Economic sanctions were also the chief instrument the US employed to isolate Iran. The sanctioning of Iran however, unlike the Iraqi embargo, was chiefly unilateral. As a result, the US employed what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) referred to as the "art of persuasion" to convince others to also isolate Iran. This followed Secretary of State, Warren Christopher's (1998: 201), characterisation of Iran as the "most significant state sponsor of terrorism and the most ardent opponent of the Middle East peace process". Accordingly, limiting military "sales and preferential economic treatment" would significantly decrease the scope for Iran to "divert resources to terrorism". As a result, the US actively petitioned Russia and China to cease military and nuclear trade with Iran (Smith, 1993) and pressured the European Union countries to suspend commercial trade with Iran (Sciolino, 1993b).

This policy, however, produced insubstantial results. The European states, particularly France and Germany, remained committed to engaging with Iran both economically and diplomatically (Rudolf, 1999: 85 – 88). At the same time, throughout the 1990s both China

and Russia continued to cultivate close ties with Iran, particularly in the field of military sales and nuclear transfers, despite repeated US pressure (Byman, et al. 2001: 59 – 65).

This, in combination with Iran's ardent and allegedly violent opposition to the Middle East peace process, resulted in further US sanctions. To paraphrase E.H. Carr (1946: 129), the US continued to employ dollar bullets in order to isolate Iran. In March 1995 Clinton released Executive Orders 12957 and 12959. The former prohibited American-owned companies from participating in the development of the Iranian oil industry (Clinton, 1995a). The later, because of the "extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States" (Clinton, 1995b), prohibited Iranian imports, circumscribed American exports and barred American investment in Iran. Not everyone favoured America's unilateral embargo of Iran. Representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy and Commerce argued that "curbing American trade would have little effect on Iran and could hurt American companies instead" (Sciolino, 1995). This opposition, however, was overridden by Warren Christopher's (1995) desire to "contain Iran and to pressure it to cease its unacceptable actions". In other words, the necessity of isolating Iran economically, politically and military overrode these objections.

The intensified sanctioning of Iran did result in one US oil firm having to withdraw its investment in Iran's oil industry (Jehl, 1995). However, other non-US firms quickly filled the void. An October review concluded that, "for the most part [Iran] found new buyers for the oil previously purchase by US firms" (Katzman, 2000: 12). Additionally, the sanctions appeared to have a counterproductive effect. Rather than promoting a change in Iran's behaviour, the sanctions seemed to be increasing Iran's desire for anti-US activities. In June 1996 the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed American military personnel, was struck by a truck bomb, which killed 19 American's and one Saudi national. Although the bombing was attributed to Saudi *Hezbollah*, many assert that the IRGC participated in the attack. As Sandy Berger, Clinton's NSA, contended "We know it was done by the Saudi [Hezbollah] [but we also] know they were trained by the Iranians…there was Iranian involvement" (cited Sick, 2003: 88). According to Kenneth Katzman (1998b: 9), a researcher with the US Congressional Research Service, Iran's foreign policy at this juncture was aimed at "[intimidating] the GCC states and [separating] them from their protector, the United States". If Iran's alleged involvement in the Khobar bombing is correct, it was likely a part of this process. In other words, the bombing, which inspired

domestic unrest in Saudi Arabia over its close relationship with the US, would hopefully impel the Saudi government to reconsider its close relationship with the US.

Two months after the Khobar bombing the Clinton administration acquiesced to Congressional pressure and intensified the Iranian sanctions. In other words, the US continued with dollar bullets to influence Iran. In August 1996 Public Law 104-172, otherwise known as the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), was signed into force. The ILSA imposed American sanctions on any firm investing in the two chief sponsors of state terrorism (Clinton, 1996). The ILSA put extra-territorial muscle on America's unilateral sanctions. It gave substantial authority to the American president to deny access to American capital, finance, imports and exports any firm or government investing in Iran. There was literally months of bureaucratic debate over the wording and powers of the ILSA. However, there was a general consensus that "in order to reduce Iran's long term potential to fund terrorism and acquire weapons and technology, the United States should act to prevent foreign investment in Iran's crucial energy sector" (Katzman, 2000: 12).

The ILSA was not popularly received. The extra-territorial nature of the sanctions upset many of America's allies. As Kenneth Katzman (2006: 3), a researcher of the US Congress, contended, "the European Union states opposed [the] ILSA as an extraterritorial application of US law". Representatives from US private industries also raised objections about the potential losses created by America's unilateral sanctions (Uchitelle, 1996).

At the same time, many commentators began to voice serious concern over America's wider policy in the region. Thomas Friedman (1996), of *The New York Times*, argued that, instead of sanctioning Iran, America should "strengthen the pragmatists" to help "tip the balance to those [favouring] a more a normal relationship with the US". Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former NSA to President Carter, also opposed the ILSA. "'I do not see any reason'", Brzezinski noted, "'why we should be pursuing a policy of isolating Iran, because Iran, if we pursue hostility towards it, makes it more difficult to isolate Iraq'". Instead Brzezinski argued that in order to "'maintain stability in the Persian Gulf [and] access to central Asia…where there are enormous deposits of energy'" the US requires a "'good strategic relationship with Iran'" (cited Sciolino, 1996). In other words, there was an increasing call for America to tilt back to Iran. Nevertheless, Madeline Albright, who replaced Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, repeated her predecessor's view that the US should continue to economically, politically and militarily isolate Iran (Sieff, 1997).

Khatami's election in Iran and the increasing failure of America's policy in Iraq, however, led the Clinton administration to pursue an Iranian *rapprochement*. That is, there were increasing calls to balance once more with America's erstwhile ally. According to Kenneth Katzman (2000: 21), a researcher for the US Congress, the election of Khatami led some to "believe that better US relations with Iran could help contain Iraq".

Not everybody welcomed this development. For instance, George Tenet, Director of the CIA, labelled Iran the greatest challenge to American interests (Gertz, 1998). Nevertheless, even Secretary of State, Madeline Albright (1998), seemed to reverse the Department of State's position regarding Iran. In a speech to the Asia Society in June she argued that Iran "would be welcome [in the international community] if it is willing to make a constructive contribution". Albright argued that, whilst "the gap between [Iran and the US] remains wide", now is the "time to test the possibilities for bridging this gap".

In turn, the US employed softer forms of power, which included positive propagandising in Iran, cultural exchanges and streamlining visits for Iranian citizens, to create the conditions for a better relationship (Sciolino, 1998). The Iranian response, however, was relatively muted. Kamal Kharazzi, Iranian Foreign Minister, critiqued America's policy in Iran and called for the lifting of economic sanctions (Jenson, 1998). The Clinton administration did relax some of the economic sanctions. For instance, the French oil giant was granted a waiver from the ILSA, despite ardent opposition from Congress (Jehl, 1998). There was, however, little appetite for suspending the ILSA indefinitely. Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, argued that "this is a situation where the strategic interests of the United States are so great that they outweigh temporary advantages of American companies" (Perlez and LeVine, 2001). Accordingly, the US-Iranian *rapprochement* was left incomplete.

The Clinton administration undertook a further attempt at an Iranian *rapprochement*, particularly after Khatami and the reform movement were successful in the 2000 *Majlis* elections (Albright, 2003: 323). Speaking at the American-Iranian Council, Secretary of State, Madeline Albright (2000), announced an easing of America's trade embargo on Iranian carpets, fruit and pistachio nuts. Albright also used the speech to call for a spring peace of mutual trust, which would replace the cold war of mutual mistrust. She also stressed the interests that Iran and the US had "in the future stability and peace in the Gulf". Nevertheless, domestic opposition in both countries tempered any new relationship. As Perlez and Risen (2001) noted, the Clinton "administration [faced] strong anti-Iranian sentiment in Congress

and remains highly concerned about Iranian support of terrorism and the possibility that Tehran may seek to undermine Middle East peace talks". In Iran, the "US still [represented] a deeply emotional issue for the country's supreme leader….and other conservative clerics who hold decisive power in the country". In turn, the US-Iranian *rapprochement* remained incomplete. As a result, with 'civilised' forms of power not having their desired effect, the US increasingly resorted to harder forms of power in the Gulf

6.4.3.2 Hard Power

E.H. Carr (1946: 132) stated that the strong will tend to utilise softer forms of power until they no longer suffice. As will be discussed below, this seems like an entirely plausible way for thinking about American militarism in Iraq at this juncture. Throughout the 1990s the US employed limited war, which as this subsection will show increased in scale and purpose, in order to weaken Iraq's war machine and its capability generating regional instability.

Just a number of months into the Clinton administration Iraq appeared to take some actions contravening the armistice of the Persian Gulf War. These included hatching a plot to assassinate President George H. W. Bush (Jehl, 1993a), refusing the installation of video-cameras at sights suspected of weapons proliferation (*The Guardian*, 1993) and bolstering military positions in the Kurdish region (Kinsley, 1993). In response, President Bill Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack on Iraq's intelligence headquarters. The intention was, according to Clinton (1993b), to "target Iraq's capacity to support violence against the [US] and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw [behaviour] in the future". As a result, the use of military force was to compel Hussein's acquiescence. According to Les Aspin, US Secretary of Defence, "'Getting rid of Saddam Hussein does not automatically solve the problem'". Rather, what the US is "'looking at is the [behaviour], and that's the main test" (cited Friedman, 1993b).

The threat of military force was employed only a year later. As part of an effort to shake the sanctions regime Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Foreign Minister, addressed the UN in October and condemned the continued embargo (Black, 1994). At the same, Iraq amassed military forces near the Kuwait border. According to some US officials, "the troop deployments, the most threatening moves Iraq has taken since the [Persian Gulf War], were probably a bluff intended to encourage the [UN] to lift [the] economic sanctions" (Gordon, 1994b). In response, the Clinton administration deployed a taskforce to the Gulf. Again, the use of force

was to compel Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions. According to President Clinton (1994), "We will not allow Iraq to threaten its [neighbours] or to intimidate the [UN]…the sanctions will be maintained until Iraq complies with all relevant UN resolutions".

The drama was repeated in the autumn of 1996 when Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, moved his military into the Kurdistan region in response to internecine fighting between two Kurdish factions. In response, the US rather puzzlingly extended the no fly zone in the south of the country and launched a number of cruise missile strikes against Iraq. Whilst for William Perry, Secretary of Defence, the attacks were not a prelude to removing Hussein from power, others including Director of the CIA, John Deutch, stated that the Clinton administration stood for regime change (Sciolino, 1996). These voices were having more of an impact on the Clinton administration's policy. Earlier in the year, Bill Clinton allegedly authorised a clandestine CIA operation to support a *coup d'état* from the Kurdish region; Hussein's attack disrupted this network (Weiner, 1996a and 1996b). More problematic, however, there was increasing dissatisfaction in the Arab world regarding America's policy in Iraq, particularly from Saudi Arabia (MacFarquhar, 1996).

Emboldened, Saddam Hussein challenged more forthrightly America's wall of pressure. The terse battle reached its apex in November 1997 when Iraq expelled UNSCOM weapons inspectors, accusing them of spying for the US (Borger *et al*., 1997). As a result, a consensus "emerged in the [Clinton administration] that Iraq would never comply with [UNSCOM] and that smart bombs and cruise missiles may be needed" (Weiner, 1998). The Clinton administration, however, proved unable to garner either domestic or international support for a concerted military effort in Iraq. Consequently, whilst some such as William Cohen, Secretary of Defence, and Bill Richardson, UN Ambassador, favoured military action (Gordon and Sciolino, 1998), the administration as a whole supported UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's diplomatic efforts. Again, however, a certain degree of ambiguity surrounded the Clinton administration's policy. Whilst, Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, stressed that the wall of pressure would remain until Hussein had fallen from power, Sandy Berger, Clinton's NSA, argued that the sanctions and inspections would be lifted when Saddam Hussein complied with all UN Security Council resolutions (Sciolino, 1997).

Annan managed to obtain a diplomatic resolution, which provided ample concessions to maintain the international monitoring of Iraq's weapons programmes. However, it lasted only until November 1998 when UNSCOM inspectors were repeatedly refused access. In

response, America launched Operation Desert Fox and bombed Iraq for four days. There was a certain degree of ambiguity over the aims of the military strikes. President Clinton contended that Hussein "could avert a barrage of punitive air and missile strikes only by agreeing immediately and unconditionally to resume international inspections" (Broder, 1998). In contrast, others, including Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, were much more vocal about promoting regime change (Crossette, 1998). Regime change had certainly become an aim for the Clinton administration. In October Clinton himself signed into force Public Law-105-338, which is alternatively known as the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) 1998. According to Clinton (1998), the act had the purpose of supporting "opposition groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community that could lead to a popularly supported government". In turn, this would "permit [the US and Iraq] to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life".

In turn, the US pursued a more aggressivecovert programme to foment opposition to *Ba'ath* rule in Iraq. According to Kenneth Katzman (2009: 3), a Middle East analysis for the US Congressional Research Service, the ILA authorised "up to $97 million worth of [defence] articles and services to designated opposition groups". As Sandy Berger (1998), Clinton's NSA, made clear in a December speech, change "will come to Iraq at a time and manner that we can influence but not predict". Therefore, the US is doing "all we can to strengthen the Iraqi opposition so that it can seek change inside Iraq". As a result, career diplomat Frank Ricciardone was appointed to "oversee the implementation of the [ILA] and help coordinate efforts by Iraqi opposition groups to overthrow [Saddam Hussein]" (Gause, 1999: 54).

Not everyone agreed with the policy. General Anthony Zinni, Commander of CENTCOM, argued that such a strategy "'could be very dangerous'" because the opposition has "'little if any viability'" (cited Scarborough, 1999). This opposition, however, was drowned out on the basis that containment had failed. As Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, explained:

> In the case of Iraq, the policy became more aggressive over time…Over time the nature of the threats changed. The Iraqis became more of a problem, more difficult to contain…we reached the point where we changed our policy to containment plus regime change and declared that our objective is not only to contain Saddam as long as he was around, but also help the Iraqi people remove him and set up a different kind of government. (Indyk, 1999)

The US employed forms of militarism to support this. In other words, the Clinton administration engaged in what might be termed a 'non-war'. That is, a war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq in everything but name. By March of 1999 America had bombed Iraq one day out of two since the cessation of Desert Fox (Myers and Weiner, 1999), whilst by August America had dropped 1,100 missiles on 359 separate Iraqi targets (Myers, 1999). According to Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defence, this non-war was designed "'to help create the political and military conditions that will permit a successful change of the regime'" (cited Myers and Weiner, 1999). Sandy Berger, in his December speech outlining the administration's policy, argued that this option *vis-à-vis* a full-scale military operation was the lesser of two evils. According to Berger:

> The only sure way for us to effect [Saddam Hussein's] departure now would be tocommit hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight on the ground inside Iraq. I do not believe that the costs of such a campaign would be sustainable at home or abroad. And the reward of success would be an American military occupation of Iraq that could last years. (Berger, 1998)

What Berger failed to indicate, however, was that the US was employing military force from afar to create the conditions for a successful change of theIraqi regime. In the words of Kenneth Katzman (2002a: 5), a specialist in Middle East affairs for the Congressional Research Service, the Clinton administration was "[promoting] an insurgency [in Iraq] by using US airpower to protect opposition-controlled enclaves".

E.H. Carr (1946: 132) wrote that the "strong will tend to prefer the minor and more 'civilised' weapon because it will generally suffice to achieve his purposes; and as long as it will suffice, he is under no temptation to resort to the more hazardous military weapon". This seems like a suitable explanation for US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf at this juncture. The US was clearly unable to influence change in Iraq through softer means, whilst they were clearly unable to recreate a new relationship with Iran. Accordingly the Clinton administration resorted to a war in everything but name, in order to support opposition groups to overthrow Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. Walt argued that the:

> main architects [of the Iraq War] were a group of well-connected neoconservatives, who began openly lobbying for war during the Clinton administration. They failed to persuade President Bill Clinton, and they were unable to convince [President George

> W.] Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to opt for war until after 9/11. (Walt, 2012a)

Given the analysis presented here, in particular that the US was effectively at war with Iraq by early 1999, Walt's comments seem wide of the mark.

6.4.4 Balancing Against Iraq and Iran

E.H. Carr's (1939: 124) classical realist treatise on British foreign policy in continental Europe argued that Britain traditionally followed a policy of countering any power that would "menace her own independence". In the northern Persian Gulf the US has employed a similar balancing strategy. At first glance, the Clinton administration appeared to reject balance of power politics. Martin Indyk (1993), Middle East expert in the NSC, during his speech announcing dual containment forwarded such a position. In reality, however, as Indyk himself would later state,the "Clinton administration's approach to Iraq and Iran does not ignore the balance of power". Rather, the administration's approach is designed to "maintain a [favourable] balance in the region – [favourable] to our interests, [favourable] to the interests of our regional friends in the Gulf and beyond in the Middle East". It was the general belief, however, that the "circumstances are such that we can [maintain this balance] without depending on either Iraq or Iran".

As a result, the US employed economic sanctions and the art of persuasion to isolate both countries from the wider region. As the 1990s progressed, however, it became increasingly apparent that this was a rather idealistic assumption. Even the Clinton administration, which committed itself to regime change in Iraq, which even included the use of force, and seeking a *rapprochement* with Iran, seemed aware of this. Nevertheless, dual containment continued. As the next chapter will show, however, the forces it generated would further alter America's foreign policy in the northern Gulf.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter, which has drawn on E.H. Carr's classical realist ideas, has illustrated how the Iranian revolution and its regional effects subsequently altered American foreign policy in the Gulf. Even as world politics moved from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, America's interest in the Gulf remained relatively stable – prevent any power in the north from challenging America's interests in the south. During the 1980s the obvious challenge came

from Iran. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, however, both Iran and Iraq were viewed as 'rogue states'.

In other words, the Iranian revolution and its regional effects radically transformed the politics of the Gulf. In turn, the US balanced with Iraq as the bulwark against Iran. However, the Gulf War continued with no end in sight and, particularly after the disastrous Iran-contra initiative that eroded American influence, the US employed militarism against Iran. A short while later, unable to expel Saddam Hussein's Iraq from Kuwait by other means, the US deployed force once more. Carr's discussions of militarism, therefore, serve as cogent reminders that it is not only international structural and American unit level factors shaping the trajectory of America's foreign policy. Rather, the actions and reactions of foreign actors also shape and shove America's policy options.

The Clinton administration's answer to the Gulf was to isolate, or more appropriately balance, both Iraq and Iran. By the middle of his second term, however, this policy altered course, in practice if not necessarily in name. The result was an incomplete *rapprochement* with Iran, which was stalled by mutual mistrust in both countries, and a 'non war' in Iraq, which had the explicit aim of removing Hussein from power. Neither was particularly effective and would prove rather counterproductive. In early 1998 one commentator argued that, whilst "US influence will remain strong [in the region]", the "failure to bring down Saddam Hussein, isolate Iran or oversee a peace between Israel and the Palestinians means that the total dominance of [the] US in the region is coming to an end" (Cockburn, 1998). As will be discussed below, this was a rather perceptive argument.

7 The Continuation of Containment by Other Means

> Well, I will make those points to [the Arab world], that [America's policy in Iraq] does exist to protect them. One of the reasons for our presence in the region, and one of the reasons we fought the Gulf War, was not just to kick the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, but to bring a new sense of security to the region. And for the past ten years they have enjoyed that security. (Powell, 2001)

7.1 Introduction

Colin Powell, when asked about Arab distaste of America's policy in Iraq, re-articulated relatively constant themes about America's role as the security guarantor of the Gulf. His tone, however, was less than conciliatory, which perhaps reflected his increasing exasperation with America's quasi-war with Saddam Hussein. At the same time, Powell was receiving briefings from Edward Walker, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, which noted the failure of the Clinton administration's *rapprochement* with Iran and the unsustainability of America's policy in Iraq (De Young, 2006: 313). In other words, there was an implicit recognition that America's unilateral political order was failing. This section, using E.H. Carr's classical realist theory as a springboard, illustrates the effects of dual containment, how it precipitated a change in the regional balance of power favouringIran and threatened America's traditional interest and how, in turn, the US responded by tilting once more with Iraq. In other words, whilst the Bush administration's foreign policy in the Gulf may have been more explosive, it followed a relatively consistent concern with the balance of power in the northern Gulf.

7.2 The Effects of Dual Containment

Dual containment of Iraq and Iran, as the last chapter illustrated, was the chief means through which the US sought to reproduce political order in the Persian Gulf. This unilateral political order, whilst creating little dispute amongst principal policymakers in the Clinton administration, generated significant scholarly unease (Conry, 1994; Brzezinski*et al*., 1997; Fuller and Lesser, 1997;Sick, 1998). In particular, Gause (1994: 56) argued that "dual containment contained many "logical flaws…and is based on faulty geopolitical premises". The policy was ignorant of the geopolitical realities of the Persian Gulf and ignorant of the fact that an increase in America's military presence would act as "a lightning rod for domestic discontent [in the GCC countries]" (Gause, 1994: 60 – 2). In sum, Gause (1994: 57) argued that "[dual containment] could end up encouraging the very results – regional conflict

and increased Iranian power – that the United States seeks to prevent". Gause's arguments, as this section will show, were rather portentous. Employing E.H. Carr's classical realist lens, in particular his discussion of the relationship between political order and unintended effects, this section will sketch the effects of dual containment.

E.H. Carr's classical realism was predicated on the belief that political orders generate productive and often revolutionary forces. This seems like a cogent way for thinking about dual containment. Dual containment's chief effect was to underwrite Iran's regional integration, which occurred simultaneous to a decline in US influence across the Middle East. As the US-Iraq conflict was reaching its zenith in late 1997, the US was sponsoring the fourth Middle East and North Africa Economic summit scheduled for November. However, despite repeated diplomatic pressure, what E.H. Carr (1946: 132) referred to as the "art of persuasion", many of America's Arab allies boycotted the event (Evans, 1997a; Fisk, 1997; Lancaster, 1997a). Whilst the boycott reflected the Arab world's anger regarding America's policy in Israel, particularly as the peace process was faltering, it also reflected "a generally sour mood in US-Arab relations at a time when Washington is trying to build regional support for a strong stand against Iraq" (Lancaster, 1997b). As one Egyptian analyst argued, the "'consensus within the Arab world now is that American policy toward Iraq has been overkill and that the Iraqi people have suffered needlessly'" (cited Jehl, 1997a).

Just one month later the leaders of Muslim countries, including those that had boycotted America's November conference, attended the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) annual conference, which was symbolically held in Tehran. Previously staunch American allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, attended the conference and exchanged pleasantries with the one-time regional pariah Iran. The Saudi Arabian government even gifted the Iranian government the religiously symbolic *kiswah* (the drape covering the Kabba at Mecca) for the event. As a result, the "conference [had] great religious significance, narrowing the centuries-old divisions between Shia Muslim Iran and the larger Sunni Muslim community (Evans, 1997b). For the Muslim leaders in attendance, the conference "provided a platform…to express their dissatisfaction with US policy towards Iraq and Israel" (Lancaster, 1997c). For Iran, on the other hand, the conference represented "a chance to repair its tarnished international image and advance its goal to be the regional powerbroker" (Theodoulou, 1997). Accordingly, at the end of the OIC, both Saudi Arabian and Egyptian officials expressed the hope that relations with Iran would improve further (Jehl, 1997b). As a

consequence, for Iran at least, the conference marked the beginning of America's decline in the Gulf. For instance, Iran's national radio station declared that:

> The disappointment of the [US] about the Tehran summit means another strategic defeat for the US policies in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East region; a defeat that can turn into a strategic failure of Washington in the region, should the regional countries maintain a [sic] steady cooperation for the security of the region. (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1997)

Unfortunately for the US this is precisely what happened. According to Martin Indyk (1997), Assistant Secretary of State NEA, Iran began "offering itself up to the states of both the Middle East and Central Asia as an island of stability in an otherwise troubled region". At the same time, America's influence amongst the Arab world was at its nadir. At this juncture, according to Richard Murphy, former Assistant Secretary of State NEA, "Arab criticism of our Iraq policy has grown…open agreement, open cooperation [with] the [US] against [Iraq] is today more embarrassing for [the Arab world]" (US Congress, 1998b: 23 – 4). In other words, the US was increasingly unable to create what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) termed common appeals with its Arab allies. Buoyed by America's failing policies in Iraq and the failing peace process, which would turn even more violent as the 1990s drew to a close, Iran was increasingly able to undermine America's material influence in the Gulf.

In the first instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran were able to reach an agreement in March to reduce oil production. The agreement, according to Richard (1999: 18), "made a significant decision by cutting 2.1 million barrels per day from production [which had the aim of rising] prices by restricting production". As a consequence, between the March 1999 agreement and February 2000 the price of oil trebled from $11 to $30 a barrel (Hamilton, 2000). The soaring oil prices threatened to have a decisive impact on the American economy and on the economies of its allies. Alan Greenspan, Chief of the US Federal Reserve, noted that "'I have been through too many oil shocks to them unseriously [*sic*]…If the price changes, it has a major impact on the economy'" (cited Kahn, 2000). Accordingly Bill Richardson, US Secretary of Energy, toured the OPEC countries with the aim of persuading them to reduce the cost of oil. As he argued, "'My message is going to be that there should be increased production – that it's important that there be stability in the markets'" (cited Bryant, 2000). In response, the OPEC countries did agree to increase oil production by 1.45 million barrels per day but this was far less than the Clinton administration had wanted. In fact, one energy

analyst commented that "'I don't think [the increase in production] will have a big effect. I think what it will probably do is prevent prices from going up again'" (cited Stanley, 2000). Accordingly, oil prices remained high throughout 2000, which was compounded by a further cut in oil production in early 2001. This was despite pressure being applied once again by Bill Richardson (Drozdiak, 2001). In other words, the US at this juncture, to paraphrase E.H. Carr (1946: 124), had little power and influence in the chief economic structures of the Persian Gulf.

Similar developments occurred in the ideological sphere. Throughout the 1990s the US castigated Iran as the world's chief sponsor of terrorism. Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, argued that, even after the election of Mohammad Khatami, "Iranian support for terrorism remains in place" (US Congress, 1998a: 22). The improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, however, meant that the US was unable to persuade the Saudi Arabian government of this. The Saudi Arabian-Iranian *détente*, for the Saudi Arabian government at least, pacified Shia unrest and radical opposition in the country (Cordesman, 1999b: 26). As a result, whilst the US investigation into the Khobar Towers bombing indicated Saudi *Hezbollah* with the support of Iran (Johnson, 2001), there was little acceptance of this in Saudi Arabia. Equally important, however, the US seemed increasingly unable to persuade the Saudi Arabian government of the necessity of its policy in Iraq. In February 1998 for instance, during the lengthy crisis in Iraq, Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, and William Cohen, Secretary of Defence, were unable to convince Saudi Arabia that military action in Iraq was a necessity. According to Teitelbaum (1998: 24), Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to accommodate America's policies stemmed from the need to respond to the increasing domestic unrest, which was, in part, inspired by America's policy in Iraq. As a result, the Saudi Arabian government, after one particular lethal US missile strike in February 2001, declared that it was henceforth unwilling to co-operate with future US "offensive operations [in Iraq]" (Pollack, 2002: 86). Ideological power, for E.H. Carr (1946: 132), involved the "art of persuasion". The US at this juncture had clearly lost the ability to influence key actors in the region, in particular Saudi Arabia.

In addition, American attempts to circumscribe Iranian militarily power failed. Although some suggested that Iran's military forces were under-equipped and ill-trained (Byman and Wise, 2002: 19 – 26), others pointed out that Iran's 325,000 man standing army stood in stark contrast to the combined 187,000 man army of the GCC countries (Cordesman, 1999b: 32).

In addition, Iran's paramilitary forces, its developing naval capabilities, its use of terror and subversion and its increasing strategic missile capability marked it out as the primary regional military power (Eisenstadt, 1999: 19 – 25). Thus, Iran's increased capabilities saw the country extend its foreign policy remit. Iranian support of the Lebanese *Hezbollah* seemed complicit in the eventual Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (Baer, 2008: 51 – 94). Iran also deployed its forces to the Afghanistan border and threatened to intervene in the continuing civil war in the country, which followed the *Taleban's* (students) murder of nine Iranian diplomats (Nikou, N.D.). In addition, by 2001 Iran was even striking at Iraq by launching rocket attacks against Iranian opposition groups given sanctuary by Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. In fact, after a spate of lethal rocket attacks in April 2001 some commentators argued that a second war between the two countries was a distinct possibility (Tarzi and Parliament, 2001: 131).

Perhaps most significantly, however, the Saudi Arabian-Iranian *détente*, which steadily developed through the late-1990s, culminated in an April 2001 joint security pact between the two countries. According to Potter and Sick (2002: 4), the "unprecedented security pact…signalled greater Arab trust of Iran and could prove to be a harbinger of improved relations". They contend that, despite internal political conflict within Iran, the pact signified the development of a new consensus embracing the "idea of [Iran's] reconciliation in the Gulf", which could precipitate a move beyond the "confrontational and interventionist mode of the immediate post-revolutionary period". Accordingly, "it is likely that [Saudi Arabia and Iran] will increasingly take charge of their own destiny". Consequently, the 2001 security pact was a historic, perhaps even revolutionary moment in Saudi Arabian-Iranian relations. Not even during the 1970s, when both were locked into America's twin-pillar structure, could respective officials overcome the territorial, political and cultural disputes between the two countries.

The security pact, as Saudi Arabian officials keenly stressed, included no military dimension. Rather, it was chiefly concerned with co-ordinating joint approaches to regional issues, such as immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering. The Iranians, however, clearly represented the 2001 security pact as symbolising a post-American regional balance of power. The Voice of the Islamic Republic radio service, for instance, suggested that the "US attempts at creating discord between Iran and the Muslim states of the region indicates the fact that the US administration does not seek peace and stability in the region". However,

the "development of ties between Iran and other states, including Saudi Arabia, is a sign of the failure of the US policies in the face [*sic*] of Iran" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001a). Similarly, the Islamic Republic News Agency recorded that the pact indicated that the "Arab governments in southern Persian Gulf region have [realised] well that [the] aliens who are stationed in the region [meaning the US] are only after [the] preservation of their own periodical and long-term interests". The establishment of the Saudi Arabian-Iranian pact, which is "based on [the] preservation of regional interests, embodies the entire region and, therefore, countries in the Persian Gulf region should adopt new policies within the same framework and place their relations on the same basis". This was because "the only way to establish stability, sustainability…and security in the region is through defined and balanced relations among the [regional countries]" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001b). Chairman of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, went as far as to suggest that the pact represented a "united Islamic front", which would "help resolve the regional crisis, including that of Iraq and Afghanistan" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001d).

Saudi officials, whilst less explicitly anti-American, took the establishment of the pact to implicitly signal to the US that the balance of power, qualitatively if not quantitatively, had indeed changed. According to the Saudi Arabian Press Agency, Saudi's Interior Minister, Prince Nayef Bin Abdul Aziz, contended that "'Our relations with Iran are distinguished and governed by factors of neighbourhood, interests and Islamic brotherhood. Others [meaning the US] can not be allowed to identify our interests because we know them better'" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001c). Aziz also stressed that "Iran and Saudi Arabia [would] undertake more responsibilities for resolving regional issues [and] called on both countries to pool their capabilities to preserve the rights of the regional countries" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001d). Perhaps most importantly, however, Aziz declared that "'We have decided to take a big step towards security between our two countries. We consider Saudi Arabia's security as Iran's security, and Iran's security as our security'" (cited Associated Press, 2001).

Drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realism, this thesis has shown the continued US attachment to and invocation that no power challenge or threaten America's strategic interests in the southern Gulf. Iran for all intents and purposes had, by exploiting the deep unease in the Arab world over America's policy in Iraq and Israel, usurped this policy.In other words, to paraphrase E.H. Carr (1946: vii), there had been a neglect of American power. American

power, in the obvious sense, had been neglected because Iran had managed to challenge America's traditional interest and qualitatively change the regional balance of power. However, to recall the discussion in chapter three, Carr's neglect thesis suggested that it was the effects of power which had been neglected. This seems to be true here too. America's Iraqi policy, which was coupled with growing displeasure about US policy regarding Israel, was one of the fundamental levers driving the Iranian-Saudi Arabian *détente*.

There has been a consistent, perhaps even institutionalisedAmerican approach to the northern Gulf – counter any power that would or could threaten US interests in the southern Gulf. The unilateral dual containment order was a present-day manifestation of this policy. However, using Carr's classical realist lens, this section has illustrated the effects and eventual collapse of dual containment. Whilst the wall of pressure on Iraq may have ostracised and isolated Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it provided the opportunity for Iran to once again present itself as an 'island of stability'. This process culminated in the April 2001 Saudi Arabian-Iranian security pact, which symbolised a qualitative change in the regional balance of power. In effect, paraphrasing E.H. Carr, there had been a total neglect of American power.

7.3 Balancing with a post-Saddam Iraq

It is not clear whether principal American policymakers were aware of this shift in the balance of power. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld (2001), in the summer of 2001 did issue a policy memorandum calling for a new approach to the Gulf. However, his ideas do not appear to have been pursued with any vigour. Naturally, the 9/11 attacks changed this drift in US foreign policy (Rumsfeld, 2011: 421). Often represented as the chief factor, which generated the rise of neoconservative ideas and the subsequent unrealistic war in Iraq (Yetiv, 2008: 6), the 9/11 attacks, in reality, prompted the US to pursue a foreign policy in the Gulf relatively consistent with past foreign policy. Shortly after 9/11 Cox, channelling E.H. Carr, arguedthat to "make sense of US foreign policy after [9/11]…we first have to make sense of history". History tells us that since the fall of the Shah, the US has endeavoured (although at times inconsistently) to contain and balance Iran. As the following discussion will show, policy after 9/11 continued this approach, albeit by other means.

Initially, the George W. Bush administration continued with the inherited policies of dual containment. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, took the lead on Iraq. In testimony to theCongressional Committee on International Relations,Powell outlined a three pronged

approach to Iraq, which was entirely consistent with the policies pursued by the Bill Clinton administration. This included the continued support of sanctions, continued pressure on Iraq to readmit the inspections teams and support of the ILA, which was to be achieved through supplying financial assistance to Iraqi opposition groups (US Congress, 2001a: 18 – 20). In other words, the George W. Bush administration continued the wall of pressure, which included a mixture of instruments short of actual overt warfare, to generate the downfall of Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.

Not everyone was satisfied with this policy. Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defence Advisory board, argued that:

> I [have] come to the conclusion…that we do not have an effective [Iraq] policy now. The changes that are being talked about will be no more effective that we have had in the past, that we will not be safe from the eventual development of the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction against us, against our friends and allies in the region, against our troops in the field, as long as Saddam Hussein is in power…Therefore, it seems to me worth concentrating our efforts on the one policy that could actually work, and that is the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. (US Congress, 2001b: 31)

However, it was the former voice that appealed most to President George W. Bush (2010: 228) as the best means to keep "Saddam in his box". There was, however, international opposition to the continuation of the sanctions regime. Although Secretary of State, Colin Powell, successfully obtained French and Chinese acquiescence, the Russian's threatened to veto the proposed resolution and the plan for renewed inspection was held in abeyance (Crossette, 2001). In response, the George W. Bush administration continued with the Clinton-esque policy of bombing Iraq from afar (*The New York Times*, 2001a, 2001b and2001c).

The administration also continued with the inherited policy of employing sanctions, what E.H. Carr (1946: 131) would have referred to as the employment of dollar bullets, to contain and isolate Iran. In August 2001 the ILSA was renewed for a further five years (Bush, 2001a). There was strong Congressional support for the continuation of the ILSA. Henry Hyde, Congressman in the US House of Representatives, argued that "Iran has recently stepped up its support to Islamic radical movements…and has made every effort to disrupt the peace process in the Middle East…Iran [is] the most active state sponsor of terrorism"

(US Congress, 2001c: 5). This view was shared by Tom Lantos, Congressman in the US House of Representatives, who argued that the "Initial reasons…for applying sanctions on Iran are as compelling today as when ILSA was enacted 5 years ago". In particular, Iran "continues to support terrorism…continues to develop weapons of mass destruction…and it fanatically opposes not only the peace process in the Middle East, but the very existence of our allies as well" (US Congress, 2001c: 6).

Not everyone concurred with this policy. Lee Hamilton, former Congressman, and James Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy during the Carter administration, argued that the sanctions "have scant international support and have made it more difficult to advance our interests in the region" (Hamilton and Schlesinger, 2001). Similarly Brent Scowcroft (2001b), who was NSA for George H.W. Bush, argued that the embargo was ineffective. Scowcroft pointed out that, if removed, it could provide a "signal from the US showing the desire for a better bilateral relationship", which may "provide encouragement and impetus to reformers and the people who eagerly seek change". Some in the George W. Bush administration were also sceptical about the use of unilateral sanctions in Iran. Vice President, Dick Cheney, who was heading a taskforce on America's deepening energy crisis, suggested that unilaterally sanctioning Iran was hurting America's commercial interests (Sipress and Behr, 2001). The characterisation of Iran as a threat to political order in the Gulf, however, overrode these concerns. As William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State NEA, concluded, "I think it's very important to be very clear eyed about a number of Iranian [behaviours] which threaten our interests very directly…which we have long viewed as being very dangerous and [destabilising]" (US Congress, 2001d).

At least some in the administration, however, recognised that something had gone wrong with the balance of power. During an after dinner speech on 8 September Donald Rumsfeld asked "'How did it happen that we are on the opposite side of both Iran and Iraq…it makes no sense'" (cited Sciolino and Lewis, 2001). As a result, during the summer of 2001 he suggested that the NSC meet to discuss possible policy options to restore the balance. These included retreating from containment, a more serious regime change policy with Arab support or re-establishing contact with Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein (Rumsfeld, 2011: 419 – 21). Interestingly, Rumsfeld did not even consider an Iranian *rapprochement*. His policy memorandum indicates why. It notes:

> There ought to be a way for the US to not be at loggerheads with both of the two most powerful nations in the Gulf – Iran and Iraq – when the two of them do not like each other, are firing at each other and have groups in their respective countries that are hostile to the other side. The particular unfortunate circumstances of Iraq being governed by Saddam and Iran being governed by the clerics have suspended the standard rule that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. If Saddam's regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region and elsewhere. (Rumsfeld, 2001)

In other words, Rumsfeld, guided by the history of America's interactions with the northern Persian Gulf countries, saw the removal of Saddam Hussein from power as the means to balance against and contain Iran.

There is little to suggest that Rumsfeld's ideas were pursued with any vigour. That is, until the 9/11 terrorist attacks. America's immediate response to the attacks was to invoke article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which legitimised a military attack in Afghanistan, where members of al-Qaeda, including Osama Bin Laden, received sanctuary. For all intents and purposes, the US now occupied Iran's 936-kilometer eastern front. The war with the *Taleban*, who were long-time antagonists of Iran, did, however, open a space for what E.H. Carr (1946: 145) termed common appeals with Iran. A brief "diplomatic ballet", which included Iran's agreement to provide safe-haven to US troops if needed and America's assurances that Iran's territorial integrity would be maintained, was begun (Sciolino and Lewis, 2001). However, opposition to this *rapprochement* was continually voiced. Before America's invasion of Afghanistan, the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had seemingly ruled out any rapprochement. He labelled America a "'terrorist state'", which "'divides terrorism into good and bad'". Invoking the Iran Air 665 incident, Khamenei proclaimed that "Everybody should know that Iran, the Islamic Iran, will not participate in any movement that is led by America" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001e). There was also opposition from some within the Bush administration. Richard Perle (2001), Chairman of the Advisory Committee, argued that "no one should confuse [possible] Iranian support for [the war on terror] with an Iranian commitment to oppose terrorism. It is unthinkable that we could admit them into the coalition".

At the same time, a number of news stories in the US conveniently surfaced thathighlighted Iran's associations with international terrorist groups. These included alleged links between

Iran's Revolutionary Guard and *al-Qaeda* (Risen, 2001), Iranian support for the Lebanese *Hezbollah* (Risen, 2002a and 2002b), Iran's alleged assistance to *Taleban* and *al-Qaeda* fighters resisting America's occupation of Afghanistan (Schmitt, 2002a; 2002b and Smith, 2002) and Iran's alleged shipping of arms to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Bennet and Greenberg, 2002). In response, American President, George W. Bush (2002e), repeated his mantra that you are "'Either with us, or against us', and any nation that thwarts our ability to rout terror out where it exists will be held to account one way or another". Whilst welcoming "positive signals" from Iran, he warned that if "they are trying – if they in any way, shape, or form try to [destabilise Afghanistan], the coalition will be – we'll deal with them". His warning was repeated a number of days later in his State of the Union address, which labelled Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as an "axis of evil" (Bush, 2002b).

As a result, the attacks of 9/11 were employed to legitimise the construction of a new balance of power for the Gulf. As a *New York Times* article reflected, there was a "growing consensus in the [Bush administration] that the Clinton administration policy of 'dual containment', which isolated and punished both Iran and Iraq, was unwise and that the US could no longer have both as enemies" (Sciolino and Lewis, 2001). With an American-Iranian relationship ruled out by mutual mistrust, the only other remaining option was Iraq. To refer back to Rumsfeld's (2001) policy suggestions in the summer of 2001, "If Saddam's regime were ousted, we would have a much-improved position in the region". Yet, Hussein remained in place despite a decade long attempt to remove him from power by other means. Carr's (1946: 132) classical realist thesis of militarism is predicated on the idea that when all else fails, the strong will employ "hazardous" power. This is a plausible way for thinking about America's employment of force in Iraq. As Condoleezza Rice (2011: 187), Bush's NSA, argued, "The fact is we invaded Iraq because we believed we had run out of other options. The sanctions were not working, the inspections were unsatisfactory, and we could not get Saddam to leave by other means".

The resulting Iraq War was certainly sold in terms that fused liberal internationalist and neoconservative ideas about the universal applicability of liberal democracy. For classical realists, however, ideas and ideology are a subterfuge for national interests. As Morgenthau (1993: 83) argued, "The actors on the international scene rarely present the foreign policy they are pursuing for what it is". Rather, the "true nature of the policies pursued disappears behind a veil of ideological disguises". This was a view which was shared by E.H. Carr

(1946: 87), who argued that "supposedly absolute and universal principles [are] not principles at all, but the unconscious [reflections] of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time". The interest, in this case, was balancing against and containing Iran.

This, at the very least, was how many hard-liners in the George W. Bush administration saw it. John Bolton (2007: 139), who was Under Secretary of State in the DOD, argued that Iran was "'the big enchilada in the war on terror'". This was also a view shared by Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence. After 9/11 he produced a policy paper, which remains classified, that stated that the attacks meant America was engaged in a lengthy struggle with radical Islam. Whilst Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran posed particular problems, Iraq was weak and therefore more possible (Woodward, 2006: 83 – 5). Overthrowing Saddam Hussein would send a message to the rest of the region, in particular Iran. As President Bush explained, "Changes in Iraq will result in a change…not only in Iraq but [also] in Iran" (Woodward, 2004: 231). Condoleezza Rice, in her memoirs, implied a similar rationale for the war. She noted:

> [Iran] was the poster child for state sponsorship of terrorism in the Middle East and made persistent attempts to shift the balance of power in the region…
>
> …many of our Sunni allies in the Middle East feared Iran's penetration into the region. Iran, [America's regional allies] believed, wanted to establish a 'Shia crescent', uniting those populations across national borders and destroying the integrity of the Sunni-governed states. The 'Persian' challenge, as our Sunni friends called it, had to be counterbalanced since it could not be destroyed. Iraq historically served as this buffer. (Rice, 2011: 164)

If, as argued, the Iraq War did serve the purpose of balancing against and containing Iran, this makes spurious some claims by the George W. Bush administration. President Bush, in a 2003 interview, suggested that "After [9/11], the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water" (cited Ritchie and Rodgers, 2007: 3). However, the war in Iraq, which complemented the war in Afghanistan, placed a military cordon around Iran. The dual invasions meant that American not only occupied Iran's 936-kilometer eastern front, but also its 1,448-kilometer western front. The two countries both had strong cultural and ethnic links with Iran, whilst Iran had been engaged in low-level conflict with both. When the 2001 pact with Saudi Arabia was signed, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's former President, stated

that this "united Islamic front" would "help resolve the regional crisis, including that of Iraq and Afghanistan" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001d). It is interesting to remember that America's post-war containment policy, particularly as it applied to the northern Gulf, was grounded in supporting pro-western states in the Soviet Union's near periphery. It is not too hard to draw very strong parallels with US policy towards Iran. In other words, E.H. Carr (1946: 111) asserted that war is often fought to prevent another from becoming any stronger. The Iraq War seems to fit this mould; only the target was not necessarily Iraq.

The War in Iraq was not the end of containment; rather it was more the continuation of the containment by other means. The military encirclement of Iran complemented America's economic and political efforts at containing Iran, which have been pursued relatively consistently since the 1979 revolution. In other words, American militarism during the George W. Bush administration reflected its historical usage. That is, to balance against revolutionary states and forces in the northern Gulf, which it is unable or unwilling to influence through 'civilised' means. If correct, the Bush administration followed a balance of power policy which, as this thesis has shown, has historically guided American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter specifically looked at the George W. Bush administration's policy in the Gulf. As a whole, this thesis has been concerned with questioning whether Bush's war in Iraq and its causes can be placed within the wider history of American policy in the region. The standard characterisation is that the Bush administration, particularly after 9/11, employed militarism in an egregious and entirely unrealistic fashion, which stood in contrast to its predecessors.

This chapter challenges this characterisation. Employing E.H. Carr's theoretical 'framework of answers' the thesis has stressed the relative importance the US has attached to preventing the rise of a power in the north that would threaten its interests in the south. The use of force has been considered and employed when foreign actors that the US has been unable or unwilling to influence through softer actions, have challenged America's perennial interest. This chapter, following E.H. Carr's classical realist perspectives, has stressed that the dual containment unilateral order generated unintended effects. That is, Iran was able to capitalise on dissatisfaction amongst America's Arab allies to effectively usurp America's traditional

policy. The war to tilt back with a post-Saddam Iraq, whilst never inevitable, was entirely consistent with America's balance of power policy in the northern Gulf.

At the very least, this is how James Jeffrey's, America's Ambassador in Iraq, understands current US-Iraqi relations. Jeffrey's argues that "Iraq represents the frontier between the Arab and Persian worlds". As a result, "[Iraq] will play a critical role in achieving US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East for the foreseeable future". Accordingly, America must remain committed to helping Iraq "emerge as a strategic partner and a force for stability and moderation in a troubled region" (US Congress, 2011). One does not have to listen very hard to hear the historically consistent themes of the 'strategic buffer' and the 'island of stability'. Although the scope of Bush's militarism in Iraq may have been quite unique, its causes appear rather consistent with history of American policy in the Gulf. That is, balancing against power that threatens America's interests. Since the 1979 revolution, it has been Iran that has been the principal target.

8 Conclusion

In March 2003 America, supported by a coalition of the willing, invaded Iraq and deposed Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration's employment of militarism is often treated as an exceptional event, which was borne from the particular circumstances of 9/11 and the George W. Bush presidency. In this thesis, however, the Iraq War is treated as one instance in a broader pattern of American militarism in the northern Gulf. This thesis, in drawing such links, started withthree coreobjectives. First, the research has aimed at a broader understanding of the underlying causes of American militarism in the northern Gulf. Second, in doing so, the research has consideredwhether the Bush administration's strategy could be located within the wider history of America'spolicy in the northern Persian Gulf region. Third, drawing on recent developments in the realist literature, the thesis has considered whether E.H. Carr's classical realism could enhance neoclassical realist explanations for US foreign policy. This concluding chapter reviews the principal findings, reflects on the resulting implications and closes by considering the avenues of further research which this thesis engenders.

8.1 Findings

Drawing on E.H. Carr's classical realist lens, in particular his characterisation of Britain's balance of power policy in Europe, this thesis finds that the US has attached extreme importance to the balance of power in the northern Persian Gulf. As was discussed in chapter three, America's strategic interest in Saudi Arabia led American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to tie America's security to that of Saudi Arabia. To paraphrase Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, the US would counteract – that is balance – any power in the northern Gulf opposed to American interests. In other words, America's policy in Iraq cannot be divorced from its policy in Iran and *vice-versa*.Thishistorical concern with the balance of power, as the preceding discussion has shown, has reverberated throughout the course of America's interaction with the northern Persian Gulf states.

Accordingly, the US has actively co-ordinated particular political orders as a means to produce and reproduce order in the northern Gulf. This thesis, influenced by E.H. Carr's classical realist ideathat political orders generate productive forces, has mapped the effects of these political orders. The Anglo-American post-war order generated nationalist revolutions in both Iran and Iraq. In turn, the resulting US-Iranian political order inspired revolution in

Iran. Following this, the post-Iranian political order generated Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, whilst the US unilateral political order underwrote America's subsequent decline and Iran's regional rise.

This historical approach has allowed this thesis to sketch the underlying causes of American militarism in the northern Persian Gulf. The thesis finds that America has employed the use of force to reshape order when it has been unable or unwilling to influence regional actors through softer – or more 'civilised' – means. In other words, American militarism in the Gulf is a last resort, which tends to correlate with a period of declining influence, and is orientated towards reshaping political order and restoring a balance of power.

From this argument, it is possible to locate the policies of the George W. Bush administration, in particular the Iraq War, within the wider history of America's interaction with the northern Persian Gulf countries. The preceding discussion illustrated that the US has balanced against Mosaddeq, balanced against Communism in Iraq, balanced with the Shah, balanced against Khomeinism and then unilaterally balanced against the two 'rogue regimes'. The war in Iraq continued this trend by balancing against Iran's growing regional power, in particular how it threatened America's strategic interests.

In order to make these claims, this thesis drew on recent developments in the realist intellectual tradition. As discussed previously, realism has undertaken a renaissance of late. There has been a growing interest in the classical works. In particular, neoclassical realism, which explains a country's foreign policy by synthesising international structural and unit level policy determinants, has refined but not refuted Waltzian realism. Although often presented as representing the pinnacle of the realist tradition, this work, which employed E.H. Carr's classical realism, illustrates that neoclassical realism can itself be refined by giving more prominence to the concerns of the classical realists. Taking E.H. Carr's ideas, in particular his concern with revolution, this thesis fleshed out this argument. In doing so, it illustrated that America's policy in the Gulf is not only produced by international polarity and domestic developments, in other words structure and agency. US foreign policy is also made in response to the actions and reactions of others, in other words contingency. In developing these ideas, this thesis has exposed a salient but relatively unexplored facet of America's war in Iraq: the qualitative, although not quantitative, shift in the balance of regional power in the spring of 2001.

8.2 Implications

Beyond illustrating the continued saliency of E.H. Carr for the realist tradition, the findings of this thesis have important implications for realist thought on the Iraq War. Prior to the war, realist critique focused on the Bush administration's claims that containment had failed. Realists argued that the war was not in America's national interest. Instead, they advocated continued "vigilant containment of Iraq" (Art *et al*., 2002). This was followed by work by Mearsheimer and Walt (2002), which suggested that "the historical record shows that the US can contain Iraq effectively…just as it contained the Soviet Union during the Iraq War" (see also Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). Betts (2003), Jervis (2003) and Waltz (2003) all made similar arguments. In other words, the realist opposition to the Iraq War, which tapped into the rich realist tradition of critiquing the idealistic underpinnings of American foreign policy, suggested that the Bush administration's foreign policy– its rejection of containment and balance – was a decidedly unrealistic foreign policy. In fact, Mearsheimer (2002: 16), ignoring the history of US-Iranian relations, idealistically asserted that the US "should rely on the states in the region to balance each other. Specifically, [the US] should seek to improve relations with Iran, not Iraq, and rely heavily on Iran to contain Iraq". These ideas continue to populate the literature on American foreign policy. Recently, Rosato and Schuessler (2011: 804) argued that a more realistic foreign policy would involve "the United States [balancing] against other great powers and also against other minor powers that inhabit strategically important regions of the world". They contend that had America pursued a more prudent realism, instead of being intoxicated by liberal and neoconservative ideas, the strategic blunder of the Iraq War would have certainly been avoided (Rosato and Schuessler, 2011: 811 – 12).

These arguments, if this thesis is correct, are mistaken. This work has shown that the US has historically balanced against any state or force that would threaten its strategic interest in Saudi Arabia. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran (although applied inconsistently at times) has been the chief target of this policy. The tilt to Iraq in the 1980s and the subsequent Persian Gulf War were the products of this policy. And it was Iran which, throughout the late 1990s, increasingly usurped America's traditional interests. In other words, it was not the containment of Iraq which failed throughout the 1990s; rather it was the containment of Iran. Consequently, the military ring around Iran, which was generated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, was the continuation of containment, albeit by other means.If scholarly realists wish

to engage in real time policy debate, they had better come equipped with a more detailed understanding of the often mercurial regions where America's foreign policy operates.

8.3 Areas for Further Research

The findings of this thesis call for further investigation, which may only be made possible when official documents are made open for release. At its core, the argument presented here suggests the war in Iraq served the purpose of balancing against Iran. History informs us that, since the 1979 revolution, America has sought to contain and isolate revolutionary Iran. The war, which completed the encirclement of Iran and developed into an Iraqi state with normalised US relations, continued this process.

However, there has been little official acknowledgement of this. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence, did indicate that he saw a post-Saddam Iraq as the chief means to improve America's position. John Bolton, Under Secretary of State in the DOD, on the other hand, suggested that the war on terror was a *de-facto* war on Iran. Further research has to be undertaken to question whether there was a conscious decision to re-tilt with a post-Hussein Iraq, what official documents may attest to this, who advocated such a move and what dissenting voices were raised.

This leads to further questions about how and why Iran was put on and then rapidly off the agenda. In January 2002 President Bush labelled the country a member of the axis of evil. Yet, by the release of the NSS in September 2002 Iran was strangely absent from the section on rogue states. The answer to why this occurred may only be possible when official documents become available for research and principal policymakers become more amenable to interview.

E.H. Carr (1964: 42) advocated that "When you take up a historical work, it is not enough to look for the author's name on the title page; look also for the date of publication or writing – it is sometimes more revealing". What he meant by this, was that historical writing, or indeed any social political writing, is conditioned by the context in which it is written. In other words, the "historian belongs not the past but to the present". Accordingly, developments in the US-Iranian relationship contextualised this thesis.

As a result, this thesis generates questions about current US-Iranian relations. In particular, Carr's classical realism is predicated on the relationship between political orders and

productive forces. Is it possible to suggest that developments in US-Iranian relations, in particular Iran's third revolution, which was symbolised by the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Ansari, 2009: 11), were a direct product of Iran's military encirclement? The thesis also raises questions about the character of the US-Iranian conflict. Is it a 'Cold War too', as some have suggested (Wright, 2007)? Or do the suggestions that the America has actively supported Sunni resistance fighters in Iranian Baluchistan (Hersh, 2008), whilst Iran has supported Shia resistance fighters in Iraq (Beehner and Bruno, 2008), suggest that it is more of a hot war.

The continuing mutually hostile relationship between the US and Iran also creates a space for thinking more clearly about Carr's classical realism, in particular The *Twenty Years'* Crisis. In other words, rereading Carr through the US-Iranian conflict may illuminate some of the overlooked aspects in his work. In fact, Carr's chief aim in The *Twenty Years'Crisis* appeared to be a consideration of whether Germany's Nazi revolution and the subsequent rise of the country made war inevitable. His conclusion, which included an advocacy of 'appeasement', suggests that his answer was no. Applying Carr's classical realism to the "inevitable" (Goldberg, 2012) war with Iran, whilst drawing similarities with current realist writings (Walt, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a and 2012b), would challenge certain characterisations of Carr as a determinist.

The core theoretical argument presented in this thesis is that America's foreign policy in the Gulf, in addition to being shaped by domestic level and international structural level factors, is also influenced by the actions and reactions of foreign, and often revolutionary, states and forces. This opens a space for thinking about how such processes also impact on America's domestic politics. The literature on US-Iranian relations is populated with how America's actions, in particular the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953, negatively impacted on Iran's political development (Rubin, 1981; Bill, 1988; Kinzer, 2008). Perhaps more attention could be paid to how events in Iran, in particular the 1979 revolution and subsequent hostage crisis and the Iran-contra and October surprise scandals, shaped the outcomes of American presidential elections in 1980 and 1992. This is particularly important, as the question of Iran's alleged weapons proliferation programme may be one of the key foreign policy factors shaping the outcome of the 2012 presidential election.

Questioning whether Jimmy Carter, without the Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage crisis, would have won the 1980 election or whether George H.W. Bush, without the Iran-

contra and October surprise scandals, would have won the 1992 election are examples of what E.H. Carr (1964: 97) termed “parlour games”. That is, they are historical ‘might-have-beens’, which Carr, as an empiricist historian, was naturally opposed to. At the same time, however, Carr, unlike the majority of his realist cohorts, was sensitive to the impact of revolution on international relations. As a result, he viewed the Russian revolution as “one of the turning points of history” because it challenged western conceptions of political order (Carr, 1978: 35). The same could be said of the 1979 revolution in Iran. The state and forces it unleashed generated a number of events that have increasingly destabilised American power and influence in the whole Middle East. Indeed, if the US-Iranian relationship had survived, the world today may have been a very different place.

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