THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY BASED

HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN GLASGOW:

AN EXPERIMENT IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF HOUSING

Ann Rosengard

Vol III

Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Administration, University of
Strathclyde, 1984.

PART FIVE

THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION EXPERIENCE:
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND SOME CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION TO PART FIVE

Some Reflections on the Case Studies

The case studies of Reidvale and Govanhill Housing Associations involved a narrative of the development of the associations. The narrative was structured thematically in order to trace the evolution of association goals and their outcomes. Throughout the case studies, as I emphasised in the Introduction to the thesis, I have attempted to take account of the influence of, on the one hand, individuals and groups within associations and, on the other, of neighbourhood, governmental, political, economic and technological factors. Also in the Introduction to the thesis I referred to the methodological role of the case studies for the research as a whole. I suggested that the case studies can be seen as heuristic devices which have continually served to generate hypotheses relevant to associations in general. At the same time, we should recognise that the case studies have provided a testing ground for certain theories and perspectives from the literature on organisational analysis, which were discussed earlier in Chapter Nine.

Chapter Ten, prior to the case studies, focused on neighbourhood conditions and politics which provided the context to the beginnings of the two associations. That chapter also focused on the literature on public participation and community action. This literature highlighted various factors which have served to limit the potential scope and quality of resident participation in planning. I shall consider the wider implications of the CBHA experience in decentralising control and in extending resident participation in the final chapter of the thesis and at that point I shall draw further on the case studies.

In both my concluding chapters I shall refer at various points
to the case studies. At this point, however, I particularly want
to draw some conclusions about aspects of organisational development
which were highlighted in the case studies, and about which questions
were raised through the theoretical discussion in the first section
in Chapter Nine.

First, I would remind the reader that the case studies have
documented the progress of an experimental form of organisation in
Glasgow's planning scene. In short, for the first time local
residents were vested with the responsibility for handling large-
scale capital investment and for acquiring, allocating and maintaining
housing in their collective ownership. To those ends they employed
staff, they became responsible for small, complex organisations and
they were involved in industrial relations. The official structure
of CBHAs involves Committee responsibility for policy, permanent
officials in charge of administration and implementation, and external
controls and accountability. In Chapters Eight and Nine I stressed
that this official allocation of responsibilities is common to housing
associations generally, to cooperatives, to other voluntary organi-
sations and to state agencies.

In Chapter Eight and in the case studies we have seen that
associations have experienced certain similar internal tensions and
management problems. I would argue that these have resulted from
their innovative role, from the normative expectations and approaches

of their participants and of significant external agencies (the
Union, Employers and the Housing Corporation) and from their official
structure. There is no doubt that neither participants nor
significant external agencies recognised at the start the potential
management problems of CBHAs or that their participants would require
management education.

In both the Govanhill and Reidvale associations we saw how
there were difficulties experienced in realising a pragmatic balance
of responsibilities in decision making, within the staffing structure
and between Committee and staff. In both associations at certain
stages we saw a political struggle for influence and recognition
which involved emerging staff specialisms - a pattern which was
identified as common to many organisations, in Chapter Nine. In
general the case studies would confirm the arguments of those theorists
which have emphasised that there is no mileage in expectations of a
rigid compartmentalisation of member and official responsibilities
and of policy and administration.[1] In both associations there was
no persistent consensus as to the appropriate divide in official-
member responsibilities. We saw how Committee members at times
became involved in questions of detail and in implementation.

In Chapter Ten I referred to the arguments by some writers that
public participation is likely to produce greater awareness of the
constraints on goal achievement, and that participants' involvement
in the details of policy and implementation is likely to divert their

concern from the key political issues which stimulated their initial involvement.[2] I would suggest that by 1983 to 1984 in both associations participants remained largely in tune with key issues, despite their involvement in details. Further I would suggest that the various examples we saw of Committee members' intervention had differing implications and that it would therefore be difficult to make specific managerial recommendations about the appropriate scope of productive involvement for individual associations, throughout their development. For example, in both associations we saw how members' intervention in relation to the issue of housing standards served to stimulate wider policy reflection. In the sphere of housing allocation in the early stages it was inevitable that innovative, locally-based housing agencies would evolve their Allocations policies on the basis of cumulative considerations of individual cases. This pattern was most marked in the Reidvale case, whilst in Govanhill we saw a notably early attempt to develop abstract rules governing allocations. In both associations we saw, however, that pressure to regularise and depersonalise allocations came from officials rather than members and in general policies were reviewed on the basis of experience with special problems and cases. I have argued that allocations were a contentious issue in both associations and a regular focus of neighbourhood criticism. Against this background it would seem logical that CBHAs should aim at a depersonalised but sensitive approach in their role as locally-based housing agencies which control a much sought after and scarce resource

in terms of the interests of neighbourhood residents and of wider working class housing opportunities in the city. I shall return to address this point further in Chapter Fourteen.

If we consider again my review of the literature which discussed environmental influences on organisations in Chapter Nine, this led me to suggest the likelihood that CBHAs would reflect organisational features stemming from their context of state bureaucratic controls and accountability. In both associations we saw how the administrative complexity of CBHAs stemmed partly from their multiple objectives but also significantly from external bureaucratic controls with respect to the coordination of housing production, housing management and housing association finance. We also saw how in the early stages, participants frequently did not recognise the complexity of housing associations, nor the administrative tasks at hand. In particular we saw how tensions which focused on the role of Development staff stemmed from misunderstandings about the planning and administrative aspects of coordinating rehabilitation. In both associations we saw, however, that there was greater understanding of the administrative and funding complexity of associations over time and that this development partly resulted from a growing emphasis on management education and from inter-changes of experience between participants in Glasgow associations.

In Chapter Nine I drew on Child's categorisation of qualitatively different types of organisational environments.[3] I suggested on

the basis of the preceding discussion of the CBHA experience of
state funding and controls that the environment of CBHAs reflects the
three dimensions of variability (change and uncertainty), complexity
and illiberality (competition, hostility and indifference). I
would also suggest that these various features have been highlighted
further in Chapter Eight,where I focused on the various interests
affected by CBHA rehabilitation; in Chapter Ten,where I concentrated
on local influences on the development of CBHAs and the normative
expectations of early participants; and in the case studies, where
we saw the extent of local criticism and the consequences of the actions
of state agencies. Against this background, and as I suggested in
Chapter Nine, it is not surprising that we have seen bureaucratic and
centralist tendencies, as well as tendencies towards democracy and
flexibility in CBHAs.

In both associations we saw how organisational growth, the
increasing awareness of organisational complexity and participants'
experience of cumulative tensions, led CBHA Committees to favour the
establishment of a senior management role. This decision initially
produced intense reactions amongst staff, many of whom preferred
to retain maximum scope for staff participation in association
decision-making. We saw how in both associations such appointments
in the long run served to clarify role responsibilities and to
alleviate certain tensions, although clearly various aspects of the
selection process were crucial to the effectiveness of senior
appointments. Also it was evident that the outcomes of senior
appointments reflected wider and established patterns and developments

in industrial relations. I would conclude from the experience of the two associations that senior appointments and the extension of the staffing hierarchy in CBHAs do not preclude organisational flexibility, staff participation and maximum effective Committee involvement. These patterns depend on the approach ('strategic choices' in Child's terms) of Committee and key officials, on staff preferences about their involvement and on local pressures.[4]

Finally, in relation to the influences on the organisational structure of CBHAs, I would suggest that Part Three and the case studies have clearly illustrated a significant range of uncertainties and environmental changes which have affected their development. In Chapter Nine I referred to Crozier's propositions[5] about the implications of uncertainties for power struggles in organisations and I discussed a body of research which stresses that the most effective organisations operating in a context of extensive uncertainties and change are those with a flexible, organic, management structure. Similarly I discussed the research on professional organisations which emphasises the high expectations for autonomy and for discretion amongst professionals. I would conclude that my focus on the evolution of operative goals in the case study associations has served to demonstrate considerable adaptability and flexibility in both organisations. At the same time, however, we have seen that there were internal and external pressures towards centralisation and bureaucracy in both associations. On the basis of their experience

I would suggest that it may be reasonable to assume that these different patterns of organisation can coexist in CBHAs, although inevitably their coexistence will be reflected in organisational tensions.

A further pattern common to both associations was that at times cumulative organisational tensions resulted in crises involving open conflict in employer and employee relations. In discussing city-wide industrial relations developments in Chapter Eight, I suggested that the intense conflict of the early 1980s partly reflected the desire of staff for Committee recognition of their commitment and profession-alism, as dual strands of staff involvement in CBHAs. At the same time, however, staff were seeking higher material rewards from work. From the point of view of Committee members we saw that these demands served to modify initial expectations of staff commitment and re-inforced concerns stemming from staffing problems which had led to a questioning of the role of trust.

Industrial relations issues took a different form in both case study associations, reflecting cumulative and historic choices on the industrial relations front by staff and Committee. Develop-ments in industrial relations were also influenced by continuity of membership and the role of personalities. However we saw how issues about pay, comparability and professional recognition reflected more general city-wide patterns. It is perhaps not surprising that the most significant conflicts were reflected almost in parallel in both

associations and in relations between employer and employee
representative organisations.

The issue of hierarchy featured as a general focus between
1979 and 1980 and the pay structure was a key issue between 1981 and
1983, during a period of CBHA expansion and declining inflation.

We saw that out of all such instances of conflict there evolved
a new negotiated order, based on a revised, minimal though workable,
consensus. This pattern of renegotiation reflected further features
of CBHAs. First, I would suggest that the pitch of intensity which
we saw in both associations cannot be sustained over much time in
the lives of the majority of participants. People have other,
frequently more pressing concerns and interests, than simply their
paid employment or voluntary involvement in CBHAs. From the staff
point of view also, there may not be alternative or more favourable
sources of employment,and if they enjoy their work there is much to
be done. For Committee members who want to remain involved, there
are more important issues to address which relate to the main external
goals of the association, houses to be improved and decisions to
answer for within the neighbourhood. Against this background there are
certain mutual interests pursued by participants which have established
a thrust towards resolution and compromise, towards the regeneration
of trust and towards the deintensification of industrial relations
in CBHAs. I would remind the reader that in Chapter Eight I suggested
that this pattern of intensity is common to many voluntary and

professional organisations as well as to industrial situations where
the basic economic interests of workers are under threat. In the
case of voluntary and professional organisations, I suggested that
key influences are the normative work orientations and expectations
of participants and their reference points about work experience
which we have seen were frequently different for Committees and staff
in CBHAs. Whilst future developments may prove me wrong I would
suggest that both case study associations were experiencing a period
of cumulative learning and adjustment to their complex tasks, to
organisational expansion and to their complex, constraining, changing
and sometimes hostile environment. Moreover, in Chapter Eight we
saw the evolving institutionalisation of industrial relations. In
that discussion I stressed that conflict is a persistent feature of all
organisations and that conflict and tensions are therefore inevitable
in CBHAs. I would suggest, however, that certain forms of conflict
and issues of contention have been resolved through organisational
learning in the context of the increasing routinisation which has
characterised the development of Glasgow's CBHAs.

Finally in Chapter Nine, I referred to the concept of
organisational culture,[6] and to Child's emphasis on strategic
choice.[7] These concepts stress the differences between organisations
and the distinctive influence of the role of individuals and their
alignments, of participants' choices, and of specific internal and
external effects. In both associations we saw, for example, how the
dynamics of local accountability and criticism had specific outcomes

for the evolution of association policies. We saw how the experience
of different types of technological and financial problems and
uncertainties associated with rehabilitation had specific consequences
for the policies of both associations. Moreover we saw how specific
staffing problems and problems with consultants stimulated policy
revision, and that at times both associations faced uncertainties
which established scope for particular individuals or groups to gain
in their influence. A key feature of the case studies has been,
therefore, to highlight common patterns, local differences and
variations in organisational development.

In this discussion of the case studies I have made considerable
reference to the environmental influences on associations. These
have included the technological and economic uncertainties of
rehabilitation, neighbourhood influences and the context of public
accountability and state controls. In Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen
I shall now turn to focus more theoretically on environmental influences
on the development of associations. In particular I am interested in
Chapter Thirteen in exploring further the questions about control
which I raised earlier in the Introduction to the thesis and in
Chapter Nine. I shall do so in the light of theories and perspectives
in the social science literature which are relevant to the inter-
organisational, political and economic context of the development of
housing associations. We saw in Parts One and Three of the thesis
that much of the political, planning and economic context of CBHA
development has been interwoven with the experience of housing

associations generally and with the fortunes of state agencies involved in housing production. In Chapter Thirteen, therefore, I shall focus on the literature on intergovernmental relations, on central-local relations, on power and decision-making and on state intervention and control, all of which have relevance to the wider housing association experience. In Chapter Fourteen I shall focus more specifically on aspects of public participation and on the housing and planning context of CBHAs in Glasgow. Chapter Fourteen, therefore, reflects on certain questions about the context and outcomes of participation which I raised earlier in Chapter Ten and also, it will draw certain conclusions about the CBHA rehabilitation strategy in the light of studies which have focused on urban renewal and participation in other cities.

Notes and References to Introduction to Part Five

(1)   See, for example, J. Dearlove, The Reorganisation of British
        Local Government, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 213-260
        and P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, George Allen
        and Unwin, 1977, pp. 149-191.

(2)   See, for example, P. Saunders, Urban Politics, A Sociological
        Interpretation, Penguin, 1980, pp. 127-136; G. Kirk, Urban
        Planning in a Capitalist Society, Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 155-180
        and N. Boaden, et al, Public Participation in Local Services,
        Longman, 1982, pp. 1-16 and pp. 90-111.

(3)   J. Child, 'Organisation Structure Environment and Performance',
        the Role of Strategic Choice', Sociology, Volume 6, 1972, pp. 1-22.
        See also S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, Organisation, Class and
        Control, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 366-399.

(4)   See J. Child, Organisation, A Guide to Problems and Practice,
        Harper and Row, 1977, pp. 8-24 and pp. 207-235. See also
        A. Chandler, Strategy and Structure, MIT Press, 1962.

(5)   M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, London, Tavistock, 1964.

(6)   J. Child, 1977, op. cit.

(7)   J. Eldridge and A. Crombie, A Sociology of Organisations,
        London, Thomas Nelson, 1974.

HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, POWER AND CONTROL

1.a.   Introduction : the theme of control

The thesis until this point has largely been narrative, although at several points it has highlighted themes of debate and their interconnections in the social science literature. The story being narrated has been that of the development of housing associations, and in particular I have focused on the development of Glasgow's CBHAs. Of course one never just "tells a story", since our own interests and our various intellectual and ideological assumptions inevitably influence what one observes and selects as relevant to report.[1]

As we saw in the introduction I began the thesis with certain questions in mind, derived from my interest in particular fields of theory as well as in housing as an area of enquiry. Specifically I was concerned with examining the development of CBHAs through the case study method; with explaining the key influences on their development as organisations, on policy-making and its outcomes and on the dynamics of control within CBHAs. I also wanted to explore how the devolvement of control within the wider planning system, which was a key aspect of Glasgow's CBHAs, was reflected in characteristics of their development. The literature on organisations, planning and public administration posed many questions relevant to this focus - for example regarding the relations between officials

and members in decision-making; the representativeness of residents' Committees and the tensions between central control and local autonomy. I was interested in questions such as the extent to which CBHA participants are able to control outcomes in line with their objectives, and whether CBHAs can provide a means, not just of improving local housing conditions, but also of establishing new opportunities for local control and for generating local initiatives in the interest of local residents.

However, as the field research progressed, two factors influenced my approach. First, I knew of no comprehensive study of the development of the voluntary housing movement, and of Glasgow's CBHAs, and I was interested in locating their development in the context of wider political, economic, planning and cultural influences. Secondly, after I had begun the research, a Glasgow University research project began to focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of CBHAs on the area rehabilitation front.[2] I therefore became increasingly committed to exploring organisational aspects of these novel organisations in Glasgow's planning scene and especially to taking account of their planning, political, and economic context. As a result, some questions and perspectives began to seem less important, whilst others emerged with greater salience. Specifically I came to view the literature on organisational analysis as a means of providing a perspective on key aspects of the organisational development of CBHAs, rather than as posing the key questions in which I was

interested, about power and control, and about the housing and social outcomes of CBHAs. I, therefore, turned to other bodies of literature with which I had become more or less familiar in my prior academic work. This literature raised a number of questions about the contradictions between central control and local autonomy in government; about the politics of decision-making; about structured inequalities within and between organisations and in access to housing; about the limitations on effective participation in planning; and about key characteristics of the state in capitalist society - all of which I saw as relevant to the development of housing associations.

What I shall attempt to do in this and the following chapter is to relate my findings about housing associations to certain of these issues and debates in Social Science. In this chapter I shall focus more generally on housing associations, whilst Chapter Fourteen will focus more specifically on CBHAs. The particular issues and debates which I shall discuss in this chapter raise questions about the wider influences on housing associations. First I shall consider to what extent and in what ways associations are influenced by decisions taken in other organisations and in state agencies which control key resources. To explore such questions I shall examine the literature on interorganisational and intergovernmental relations. Secondly, I shall attempt to consider the question of whether it is possible to determine and fully understand the wider political influences on

housing associations simply through empirical research and in this context I shall focus on aspects of the housing association experience in the light of certain theories of power, control and decision-making. Thirdly, I am interested in the ways in which the housing association experience has been influenced by state intervention and control and I shall therefore turn to a recent development in the literature on the state and social policy, which stresses the significance of varied forms of state intervention and control. I shall suggest here that the housing association experience documented in the thesis will serve both to illustrate and to challenge certain currently influential arguments in these various fields of debate.

In Chapter Fourteen I shall focus more specifically on CBHAs and again I shall attempt to answer certain key questions posed in the social science literature which are relevant to the CBHA experience. In particular I shall explore the outcomes of CBHAs as organisations which reflect decentralisation and a means of extending public participation in the planning system. Many studies of urban politics and public participation point to contradictory outcomes of community action and exercises in public participation and thus re-affirm the emphasis on the tensions between central control and local autonomy which is to be found in the literature on public administration. A notable theme in the literature, therefore, is the argument that local attempts to generate meaningful resident participation are significantly limited by wider political and economic influences;

that residents' organisations tend to be reactive and parochial in relation to the wider planning system and that they serve to reinforce established power relations and class inequalities.[3] Finally, I want to address arguments in the planning and housing literature which question the effectiveness of the area emphasis in planning, an emphasis which has been reflected in the Glasgow rehabilitation strategy. In Chapter Fourteen, therefore, I shall consider the planning, participation and housing outcomes of Glasgow's CBHAs.

If there is one theme which runs through most of these debates and my thesis, it is the theme of control and I shall explore this theme further below. However, in the remainder of this section I shall remind the reader of the development of the thesis so far and of the key questions which have guided the research. Following sections will focus on certain theoretical perspectives on power and control which are relevant to our understanding of the housing association experience. In the second section I shall examine perspectives on interorganisational relations, and also certain theories about power to which I have only referred in passing so far; in the third section I shall apply a conceptual framework on power and decision-making to the housing association experience and, finally, in the fourth section I shall arrive at certain conclusions regarding relations between the Third Arm and the State and about questions of control.

1.b.   A multi-faceted case study

In the introduction to the thesis I suggested that central to it was a case study of the complex development of housing associations between 1974 and 1983 - a development significantly influenced by state housing policies. Apart from more detailed case studies of two community based housing associations, the thesis has largely been concerned with documenting,on the one hand, the development of central and local government housing policies and, on the other, the housing association experience and the outcomes of housing association policies. The reader by this stage might have concluded that the thesis has enabled me to luxuriate in telling "the story" of developments in housing and politics in which I am interested both as academic and as participant. It is fair comment that a central purpose of the study was to identify systematically what I saw as being key influences on the development of housing associations in general, and of CBHAs in particular.

Preceding chapters, therefore, have provided a history of the voluntary housing movement and of its changing relations with state agencies (Chapters One to Three). They have provided an account of the background, origins and development of CBHAs in Glasgow (Chapters Four and Five). They have narrated the story of the CBHAs' common experience of constraints and state controls and described the collective and political action through which Scottish associations attempted to modify these environmental constraints and ameliorate their

effects (Chapters Six and Seven). I have also attempted to illustrate the complexities and uncertainties associated with CBHA rehabilitation, and the changing relations between CBHAs and those urban groups whose interests were closely tied to the outcomes of rehabilitation and of CBHA policies (Chapter Eight).

In Chapter Nine I attempted to establish a bridge between these various themes by identifying the key questions which have guided my account and by drawing on certain perspectives in organisational analysis and in the sociology of organisations in order to highlight and explain organisational characteristics of CBHAs. In Chapter Nine I emphasised the interplay of macro- and micro-influences, of constraints and action, on the development of CBHAs - a perspective which I believed it was essential to establish prior to my account of the two case study associations in Part Four.

In Part Four, Chapter Ten set the scene by providing a picture of two neighbourhoods, Govanhill and Reidvale, and by pointing to similarities and differences between them. Also in that chapter I discussed the concepts of "community" and of "community control", which are implicit to the organisational ideology of CBHAs. That discussion largely drew on sociological analyses of community and of public participation in planning. The case studies in Part Four primarily tell the story of the development of Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations. As in other parts of the thesis, however, the case studies were structured both historically and thematically in order to pursue questions and issues which had been raised in

preceding chapters, and to enable me to illustrate the complex
dynamics of association development. The case studies have shown how
policy-making by key participants involved strategic choices which
were reflected in differences between associations. We saw how
association policies evolved in the context of changes in organi-
sational relations; in local conditions and neighbourhood interests;
in technological and financial aspects of rehabilitation; and in
wider political and economic developments which were reflected in
state controls and in the fortunes of private interests in the housing
sphere.[4]

I have emphasised that the development of CBHAs was unique
to Glasgow and that the CBHA rehabilitation strategy represented a
departure from traditional structures of planning and control over
housing, as well as from conventional housing associations.[5]
While housing associations generally, and CBHAs in particular, play
a small role in the total housing scene, their development has wider
relevance than simply to the housing stock and to those householders
directly affected by them. Just as it has been argued in the study
of social deviancy,[6] I would argue that the focus on a small, but
unique or atypical, development in housing and planning, has served
to highlight processes and issues which are relevant to organisations,
housing and planning generally, and serve to illustrate relations
between the state, the voluntary sector and various urban groups.

Dunleavy's study of the social protest over high-rise housing in the London Borough of Newham, as compared with the dominant pattern of quiescence in British cities, was based on a similar premise.[7] Dunleavy argued that: 'Precisely because it was so atypical the Beckton protest illuminates the general picture of latent conflict on mass housing issues in the 1950s and 1960s.'[8] I shall return to Dunleavy's contribution later.

At this point I want to emphasise that certain disciplines have contributed most significantly to particular themes and issues associated with the CBHA experience. For example, while I have not approached the study through the lens of a single discipline, my approach is primarily sociological and it was through the sociological analysis of organisations and of housing that I developed a perspective on social change and organisational development. This perspective emphasises the interplay of, on the one hand, structural constraints and, on the other, social and political action. It also suggests that organisations cannot be meaningfully studied without taking account of historical, political and economic influences, as well as of the role of individuals, groups and their relations in influencing outcomes.[9] It is an approach which is increasingly evident in the fields of public policy,[10] organisational analysis [11] and urban studies.[12]

In approaching the vast literature on planning, urban sociology, organisational analysis, intergovernmental relations and the state in

capitalist society I have therefore pursued questions relevant to my interests and to the CBHA experience. Specifically, I have emphasised certain questions which highlight aspects of control and their influence on the development of housing associations. [13] To what extent and in what ways do housing association participants have control as housing developers and as landlords? And in the case of CBHAs, to what extent do they have the scope to influence the rate and quality of housing provision in the interests of local residents? To what extent do CBHAs offer the potential for devolving control over housing, for meaningful decentralisation in planning? In what ways has the dependence of local, voluntary organisations on external funding been reflected in their accountability to state agencies, as well as in patterns of intervention and control by state agencies? What are the outcomes of public accountability for the organisational autonomy of CBHAs? What are the dynamics of local accountability - and to what extent do local people want control or even participation in local housing provision? Can lay participants (the policy-makers on Management Committees) retain control when we consider the complex tasks and environment of CBHAs? In my view these questions about control are equally of interest to participants as they are to academics in the fields of public policy, sociology and organisational analysis.

Some of these questions have been highlighted and addressed at various stages in the thesis, where I have pointed to relevant areas

of debate in social science. For instance, in Chapter Three I
concluded that housing associations generally have established new
opportunities for participation in planning, albeit on a small scale.
In Chapter Ten we saw that CBHAs in Glasgow extended such opportuni-
ties for the first time to working class residents in inner area
neighbourhoods affected by tenement housing obsolescence. In these
chapters I referred to questions posed by studies of public
participation and of the "community orientation" in planning. The
main points stemming from the literature on planning and public
policy were, first, that the local planning base and scope for
participation offered by CBHAs were characteristics in keeping with
more general trends in housing and planning[14] and, secondly, that
many studies of such public participation strategies have been highly
sceptical about their outcomes in terms of establishing any real shift
in control to ordinary citizens.[15] Chapters Six to Eight attempted
to illustrate the structure and operation of government controls and
to highlight the various ways in which associations are accountable
for their different activities. In doing so I drew heavily on
perspectives on interorganisational relations - perspectives which
emphasise processes of dependence and exchange in relations between
organisations. I shall discuss different approaches to the study
of interorganisational relations and their implications for
questions about control in the following section.

In order to illustrate the complex environment of CBHAs, in
Chapter Eight I focused on a variety of groups and business interests
which have been affected by the development of CBHAs. We saw, in
that chapter, that relations between CBHAs and these groups were
characterised by interdependence and conflict, and were significantly
influenced by state intervention and controls. At times we saw how
the profit orientation of business interests contradicted with the
housing objectives and approach of CBHAs. This pattern was evident
in cases of contractors' claims; of commercial owners' unwillingness
to invest in rehabilitation; and of private developers' interest in
rehabilitating with the aid of grant and in competing against CBHAs
to acquire land or buildings.

In Chapter Eight and in the case studies we have also seen how
the policies of local and central state agencies, and the goals of
housing associations, impinged on business enterprises whose interests
were tied to the fate of housing in CBHA localities. On the one hand,
these business interests were involved in the ownership and allocation
of tenement property (landlords, property factors and shopkeepers)
and, on the other, they were involved in housing production (building
contractors and professionals). There is no doubt that all these
enterprises have influenced certain aspects of the development of
CBHAs and their capacity to realise housing objectives. On the
other hand CBHAs, supported by the planning partnership, have
significantly influenced the work and financial interests of landlords,
property factors and the builders. I would conclude here that the

dynamics of control, which I documented in Part Three, have illustrated clearly how the fortunes of private housing interests have become increasingly influenced by policies of central and local state agencies and by their mediation of developments in the capitalist economy.

In Chapter Nine I pursued the theme of control at the organisational level. I first developed a perspective which would enable us to conceptualise the environment of CBHAs and I argued that the organisational environment of CBHAs is both diverse and complex. It is at the same time influenced by extensive state bureaucratic intervention and controls, significant change and uncertainty (political, economic and technological) and by contradictory aspects of support and hostility towards association objectives (for example, amongst local residents). I referred to theories which have stressed how environmental characteristics affect organisational structure and relations, and I suggested how participants' goals have interacted with the environment in producing at times competing organisational characteristics (such as tendencies to democracy, bureaucracy and centralisation). A central argument in Chapter Nine was that organisational tensions and conflicts are inevitable, and frequently stem from structural and environmental influences. However I employed Child's concept of "strategic choice" with the intention of avoiding a deterministic conception of environmental influences on organisations.(16) This framework was applied implicitly in the case studies where I attempted to illustrate the evolution of the two associations as housing producers, as local

landlords, as management (control) systems and in terms of neighbour-
hood relationships.

Having summarised the thesis and stressed its focus on issues
of control, I shall in the rest of this chapter focus on certain
theoretical perspectives which I believe deserve more systematic
exposition than I have given them so far. I shall start by discussing
the literature on interorganisational relations which has highlighted
issues of control and conflict.

We have already seen that a key aspect of the environment of
housing associations is an interorganisational network which impinges
on their activities, which straddles public and private sectors of
the economy, and which is both urban and national in dimension. There
are two main reasons for concentrating further on perspectives on
interorganisational relations. I have already argued in Chapter
Nine that research on different types of organisation should serve
to illuminate characteristics and problems of, and influences on,
housing associations. Secondly, I believe that the study of housing
associations should provide a basis for critically assessing perspectives
on interorganisational relations.

2.a.   Perspectives on interorganisational relations

Interorganisational relations have emerged as an increasingly
significant focus in research on organisations. Many studies have
attempted to map out a network of interorganisational relations for

the organisation(s) under focus and then to identify the key
characteristics of these relationships. Analytical approaches to
this endeavour reflect the multi-disciplinary influences on organi-
sational analysis generally, and some studies are a strange mixture
of abstraction and quantitative empiricism, using quantitative models
or graphs to illustrate clusters of interrelations between
organisations.[17]

I have referred earlier to certain sociological approaches
which are more relevant to this study.[18] One such approach –
the exchange perspective – stresses that organisational participants
in pursuing their objectives are dependent on resources (funding,
authority, skills, technology, cooperation and support) which are
controlled by external groups and organisations. This approach leads
to a focus on power and dependence relations, conflicts of interest,
the formation of coalitions and on processes of bargaining, transaction
and exchange between organisations. Blau states:

> Transactions among organised collectivities then, may give
> rise to social ties that unite them, just as social exchange
> among individuals tends to produce integrative bonds. These
> transactions also differentiate competing organisations and
> may result in the elimination or absorption of competitors
> and the dominance of one or a few organisations. (19)

The exchange perspective stresses that processes of control, bargaining
and cooperation are central aspects of interorganisational relations;
that organisations enter into exchanges with other organisations in
the pursuit of their goals and in seeking to reduce uncertainty and

to negotiate the environmental conditions under which they operate;[20]
that within organisations, dominant coalitions, controlling groups or
ruling elites seek continuously to establish or maintain control over
the "environment"; and finally that processes of exchange and
negotiation occur within the context of limits determined by
implicitly shared understandings or "the rules of the game".[21]
The questions about control, which I posed earlier, are consistent
with this focus on power relations between organisations, although
we shall see that there are divergent approaches to the study of
power and control. At this point, however, I shall emphasise that a
general conclusion of research is that urban interorganisational net-
works 'have become increasingly complex, interrelated and extensive',
while at the same time organisational environments are characterised
by notable change and uncertainty [22] - a perspective which is
consistent with my earlier discussion in Chapter Nine.

Turning to the theme of power and control, in Chapter Nine I
emphasised an approach which recognised a continuous dialectic of
power and conflict in organisations, but which, at the same time,
stressed structured power inequalities in organisations and denied
that groups have equivalent scope either to influence organisational
outcomes or to make themselves heard by the powerful. In parallel
with the approach of writers like Cook,[23] Benson[24] and Wassenberg[25]
to interorganisational relations, my approach to power relations
rejects certain key aspects of the "democratic-pluralist" perspective

as typified in R.A. Dahl's study of urban politics[26] and in
A. Fox's early work on industrial relations.[27] As several Marxists[28]
and radical theorists[29] have argued, I would emphasise that such an
approach underplays the significance of structured power differentials
and that, like the functionalist social systems perspective,[30]
the democratic-pluralist approach assumes that competing interest
groups implicitly support certain dominant norms and values which are
reflected in "the rules of the game" and in the negotiated order
which evolves out of conflict.[31]

Miliband has argued, however,

> what is wrong with pluralist-democratic theory is not
> its insistence on the factor of competition but its
> claim (very often its implicit assumption) that the
> major organised "interests" in these societies, and
> notably capital and labour, compete on more or less
> equal terms, and that none of them is therefore able
> to achieve a decisive and permanent advantage in the
> process of competition. [32]

In the same vein, Dunleavy has argued that social research should seek
to illuminate underlying and fundamental power relationships or
'latent issues and structures of social power, which might other-
wise remain invisible'.[33]

I shall now attempt to pursue these arguments by outlining the
main tenets of my approach to interorganisational relations. This
approach emphasises that a concern with illuminating fundamental power
inequalities is not inconsistent with recognition of divergent
(pluralist) interests. While all organisations have some capacity to

control resources sought by other organisations, we can assume that interorganisational power relations are likely to reflect structured inequalities of control and that certain agencies may control the flow of resources in the interorganisational network. We should, therefore, be seeking to determine the role of dominant agencies and patterns of structural dependence in the interorganisational context. The approach further emphasises that we should explore the institutional, political and economic factors which impinge on organisational power relations. Finally, in contrast with an eclecticism about resources, as Benson[34] and Krupp[35] have argued, I would emphasise that the significant scarce resources sought by organisational elites are financial resources and authority - a position which has been derived through theoretical rather than empirical analysis. In conclusion I would argue that approaches to the study of interorganisational relations constitute analytical models which are likely to be informed by more or less explicit theoretical and ideological standpoints.

I have employed the approach outlined above, in Part Three of the thesis, in the attempt to increase our understanding of the inter-organisational context of CBHAs. My approach was to identify an interorganisational network of relations with CBHAs placed in a central position. It aimed to identify those varied resources which have been most significant to the dominant goals of CBHAs, although in two chapters I concentrated on the resources of funding and authority. Further, throughout I have been interested in the question

of whether control over these significant resources is structured
and concentrated in the interorganisational network. Finally I
have attempted to consider in what ways control patterns have
reflected important and changing aspects of the wider capitalist
system, in terms of class (structured) inequalities; the institutions
of private property and the market; dominant values of profit accumu-
lation and the state's role in reproducing the conditions of capitalist
production.

Before I conclude this discussion on the perspective of inter-
organisational relations I shall now turn to consider Rhodes'
framework for the analysis of intergovernmental relations[36] –
a framework which draws on writings on interorganisational relations
and, particularly, on Crozier's contribution.[37] In applying
Crozier's approach, Rhodes departs from the traditional approach to
the study of central-local relations and, at the same time, rejects
an approach which conceives of government as a unitary entity. I
shall outline approaches to the study of intergovernmental relations
below.

2.b.   Perspectives on inter-governmental (central-local) relations

2.b.1.   Conventional approaches

Early studies of inter-governmental relations were largely
formalistic and descriptive accounts[38] of the formal institutions
of government, their functions and their interrelations. Frequently,

such analyses were followed by prescriptions for reforms of the formal structure and functions of agencies - an approach typified in government reports. For example, the Redcliffe-Maud Commission[39] made recommendations for establishing a 'community basis' for local government and the Maud Committee Report[40] proposed changes in administrative organisation, based on managerial theories prescribing for centralised policy and resource coordination in order to minimise tendencies towards fragmentation.

Critics of the traditional approach have focused on its assumptions about the democratic character of local government; its expectations that administrative reforms should serve to increase 'democracy, efficiency, effectiveness and rationality';[41] and its emphasis on the official structure of government. In general the traditional approach regards local authorities as decentralised administrative agencies which, on the one hand, implement policies as partners or agents of central government and, on the other, are locally accountable, democratic bodies. The traditional approach, therefore, shows similarities to those schools of organisational theory which have assumed the presence of a dominant consensus over organisational goals and that organisational behaviour is significantly constrained by official rules and incentives and by the official distribution of roles and authority. We have seen earlier that, just as in the field of public administration, organisational theorists have offered prescriptions for increasing management effectiveness and efficiency.

Moreover, today there is a well established critique both of "managerialist assumptions" and of the neglect of power relations in organisations, assumptions which have characterised the work of the early organisational theorists.[42] We shall see that this pattern is also reflected in the field of public administration.

2.b.2. A shift in emphasis

The critique of the conventional approach to the study of public administration became so notably prevalent during the 1970s, that Rhodes refers to the 'conventional critique' of the 'conventional model'.[43] There are two main strands to this critique. First, it is argued that local government agencies must be treated as political entities which do not simply conform to central government policies. Secondly, in applying developments in organisational theory to the analysis of state agencies, Rhodes has emphasised the significance of political processes; the dynamics of conflict within and between government agencies; the prevalence of procedural and role ambiguities and the consequences of environmental uncertainties and change. In a later work[44] Rhodes states that the

> problem of central-local relations is not, therefore,
> one of central control, but of ambiguity, confusion
> and complexity. This state of affairs means that
> attempts at control by central departments are irritating
> and frustrating for local authorities, not because they
> are effective but because they are ad hoc even random
> measures. (45)

In keeping with Crozier's emphasis on zones of uncertainty, Rhodes further stresses that ambiguities may be advantageous to central

and local government agencies. Ambiguities permit room to manoeuvre and negotiate and Rhodes suggests that 'even the most stringent controls can be circumvented'.[46]

Rhodes' framework therefore reflects the growing influence of the focus on power and conflict in organisational theory. For example, key variables in Crozier's analysis are power relations, dependence, discretion and uncertainty - variables which are influenced by organisational contexts, organisational goals, technology and organisation structure.[47] Crozier's emphasis on uncertainty as a significant factor influencing power relations was paralleled by Thompson's emphasis on control of 'strategic communication' as a significant base of power.[48] S. Krupp, in a radical and lively critique of organisation analysis, argued for an approach which would take account of the dynamics of conflicting interests, authority, power and resource allocation.[49] Krupp suggests that

> authority, perhaps like income can be conceived as a
> property right that may be concentrated or diffused.
> It has varied sources as well as numerous rival claimants....
> Power concerns the redistribution of authority. Power
> reflects the ability to change the structure of authority....
> Power and conflict refer to change, authority to stability. [50]

In general it is these processes of power, conflict and change which have been most significantly illustrated in the case studies.

Rhodes describes his model as a 'power dependence' or exchange framework, based on the assumption that 'variations in the discretion of interacting organisations are a function of their resources, goals

and relative power potential'.[51] On the question of resources,
these range from constitutional-legal definitions of roles and of the
scope for discretion in different agencies; hierarchical resources or
formal authority; political resources, such as legitimacy derived
from the political system; information and expertise and financial
resources. On the subject of organisational goals, Rhodes argues
that the goals of government agencies will determine the resources
they seek to acquire; secondly, like Thompson and others,[52]
he stresses the role of dominant coalitions in defining goal priorities
and, thirdly, goal emphases are viewed as the outcome of an internal
and interorganisational political process, involving bargaining and
negotiation. Rhodes' model also focuses on cultural aspects of
organisations, or the 'appreciative system', which include inter-
related aspects of ideology, interests and wants. Finally he
applies the notion of 'rules of the game' to emphasise institutionali-
sed shared expectations which constrain behaviour.

There are two main points where my approach has diverged from
Rhodes' framework.[53] First, Rhodes' perspective stresses that the
interorganisational context of organisations is the most significant
aspect of their environment. He suggests that the concept of
environment is nebulous and that we should specify its relevant
aspects. In my historical approach to the study of the development
of housing associations I have focused on political, economic and
socio-cultural influences,[54] as well as on interorganisational
relations. I suspect that I have markedly diverged from the 'bare-

footed empiricism' which Rhodes disfavours in his later work[55] and, at the same time, I have found no positive indicators in Rhodes' framework as to the value of such a historical approach. Yet I would suggest that Rhodes' early discussion of his framework shows little recognition of how Crozier's classic study of power relations in two French bureaucracies made considerable reference to their wider institutional, political, cultural and economic context.[56]

Secondly, I would suggest that the pluralism of Rhodes' 1979 paper does not encourage theorising about those structured power inequalities which reflect dominant political and economic forces in capitalist society. However in his later work Rhodes argues that a pluralist approach need not imply equality and recognises that the focus on interorganisational power relations represents only one level of analysis. Rhodes states that his focus on bargaining processes

> does not necessarily mean that there is equality in the
> distribution of power. The existence of shared values
> may limit the bargaining to a narrow range of issues
> and stipulate rules of the game which favour one of
> the contending parties. (57)

In conclusion I would remind the reader of my earlier criticisms of those approaches which lay stress on shared values reflected in "rules of the game", and which may lead to a neglect of underlying conflicts. Whilst we should recognise implicit "rules of the game" I would argue that these "rules" may be as likely to reflect

subordinates' awareness of institutionalised political and economic
constraints, as they do shared values. I would suggest, further,
that in the housing association experience such "rules" and their
underlying conflicts were evident in the issues of cost limits
and rents, which were discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. Also,
in the case studies we saw how both associations at different stages
questioned the approach of government agencies to issues such as
standards and the phasing of Action Areas, yet participants clearly
recognised the power of these government agencies and accepted that
they must operate within the framework of bureaucratic regulation
and controls.

Lukes and Giddens have suggested that institutionalised political
and economic constraints represent a wider structure of control or
domination within which the dynamics of power relations takes place.[58]
In the housing context many studies have emphasised how state housing
provision, in spite of political conflicts, has served to reproduce
institutionalised class inequalities which are reflected in patterns
of access and control in the sphere of housing consumption. At the
same time, it is argued that the production of housing by state
agencies is significantly intermeshed with organisational and economic
aspects of capitalist enterprise.[59] This then is the structure of
control or domination in which intergovernmental power relations takes
place. I would emphasise, however, that this position is entirely
consistent with my earlier emphasis that organisational participants
at all levels are aware and reflexive about constraints, and have

considerable scope to make strategic choices. Giddens has argued that people are 'capable, knowledgeable agents'[60] and I would suggest that the developments which I have documented in the case studies have provided considerable support for this position. Again I would stress that in both associations participants had a considerable stock of awareness about the system of control over local housing, and that their experience of participation enlarged their understanding of the dynamics of power and control.

While I was formulating my own approach to the analysis of interorganisational relations I was critical of certain constraints and value assumptions which I saw as being intrinsic to the Rhodes' model. Clearly certain of these criticisms are still relevant, although I would suggest that his later formulation is considerably more open to a historical conception of the political and economic environment of interorganisational systems. I shall continue this theoretical discussion in the following section, after which I shall focus on aspects of power and control which have been highlighted in the housing association experience.

2.c.   Power, control and decision-making

I shall begin this section by defining power as a capacity to influence or determine outcomes. The preceding discussion has emphasised that the exercise of power in social relationships rests on the capacity to control specific resources and thus to regulate their effects. It has further stressed that power relations are

influenced by institutionalised patterns of domination, the varying
significance of resources in terms of organisational goals, and the
interplay of interests. This conception of power is entirely consis-
tent with Max Weber's influential definition,[61] 'the probability
that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out
his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this
probability rests'. Moreover, this view of power incorporates elements
of control, dependence and inequality, all of which have been
emphasised by Lukes.[62]

For the moment I shall conclude here that the perspective of
interorganisational relations has provided us with an abstract
conceptual framework for describing a complex system of relations,
interconnections and aspects of power and control. I have suggested,
however, that this perspective by itself cannot help us explain
structured power inequalities. I shall now attempt to clarify this
point further.

We have already seen that there are different approaches to the
study of power which reflect the theoretical and political stand-
points of researchers. For example, Dahl's study of politics in
New Haven[63] attempted to determine which participants most influenced
concrete decisions or 'who prevails in decision-making'.[64]
Bachrach and Baratz[65] have criticised Dahl, arguing that he employs
a restrictive view of power and that his approach reflects a
pluralistic conception of American politics - one which assumes that

all groups have the capacity to influence decisions and political outcomes relevant to their interests. Bachrach and Baratz emphasise a second face of power[66] which is represented in what they term 'non decision-making'. Non decision-making characterises situations of overt or underlying conflict; it involves decision-making which inhibits or thwarts 'a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker' and it establishes 'barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts'.[67] A key point about non decision-making is its context of conflict, and Bachrach and Baratz emphasise that where such conflict is absent we must assume value consensus amongst interest groups.

Bachrach and Baratz have identified several levels or situations of non decision-making or, in Parry and Morris's terms 'negative decision-making'. These include strategies adopted by powerful groups to evade making decisions, such as coopting dissenting interests on to positions within the power structure, or setting up commissions of enquiry. A different level of negative decision-making refers to situations where dependent groups fail to articulate grievances because of their fears and concerns about the potential reactions of the powerful. The third type of example is where dominant groups have the capacity to establish a bias in the political system, partly by influencing the values and beliefs of the less powerful and, therefore, the demands of subordinate groups.

Parry and Morris[68] and Saunders[69] have stressed the
difficulties for empirical research attempting to analyse different
types of negative decision-making, some of which may be readily
observable while others clearly are not (mobilisation of bias).
Saunders has argued: 'It is difficult enough observing decision-
making without having to consider the possibility of non decisions'[70]
Now, the key point stressed by these writers, which is consistent with
Lukes' argument which I shall consider below, is this: the main
distinction which should guide the analysis of power relations is
that between, on the one hand, observable power relations which are
reflected in practical decision-making and, on the other, the more
subtle, routine forms of control which underlie power relations, which
may be reflected in political inaction and which cannot be explained
without theorising. I would argue, following Lukes, that we should
recognise how certain forms of what Bachrach and Baratz term 'non
decision-making' (in particular, the mobilisation of bias and political
inaction) may be best conceptualised in terms of a third dimension of
power.[71]

Lukes' argument is that we must recognise a third and more
problematic dimension of power and control, and his third 'face of
power' similarly stresses ideological control and the more subtle
influences on political consciousness.[72] This third dimension

> allows for consideration of the subtler and less visible
> ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics
> through the behaviour of groups and the practices of
> institutions (which may not be analysable in terms of

individuals' decision-making and may indeed be
manifested by individuals' inaction). Moreover such
power may be exercised in the absence of observable
conflict and grievances; is it not the supreme
exercise of power to avert conflict and grievance by
influencing, shaping and determining the perceptions
and preferences of others?

Finally, Lukes stresses that this third dimension should lead
researchers to hypothesise about contradictions which exist between
the interests of those exercising power and the interests of those
who appear to implicitly accept the controls to which they are
subjected. Recognising Lukes' rider that the three dimensional model
raises complex problems for research, I would argue that we should
attempt in some way to tackle these different dimensions in our
focus on power.

Returning to Rhodes' framework I would argue that it enables
us to focus on Bachrach and Baratz's two dimensions of power although
it does not encourage us to focus on Lukes' third dimension of power.(73)
I shall now attempt to explore how these three dimensions of power
have been reflected in the housing association experience.

3.   Housing associations, interorganisational relations and control

We have seen that the goals of CBHAs relate to housing and
environmental improvements (production); housing management (allocation)
and resident involvement and local accountability.(74) Between 1974
and 1984 CBHAs evolved as small, complex administrative agencies and
local landlords. In Pahl's and Rex and Moore's terms, they have
evolved into significant 'urban managers' or 'gatekeepers' with a

major role in influencing access to their housing stock.[75] We

have seen, however, that this gatekeeping role was significantly

shaped by the policies of state agencies. If we focus on the

interorganisational context of CBHAs (see diagram) it is evident

that we must take account of interorganisational networks which high-

light interconnections between public and private institutional

sectors. In general the production and allocation operations of

CBHAs straddle public and private sectors of the economy and

associations are dependent on the state and on private sector interests.

In the following section I shall focus on issues affecting

CBHAs as producers in an attempt to highlight the processes of power

and control which were discussed theoretically in the preceding

sections.

3.a.   Production issues: power and control

Preceding chapters have pointed to underlying conflicts of

interest and contradictory frames of reference which have influenced

relations between associations and state agencies. I have argued

that the key resources controlled by state agencies have been those

of authority and funding,and in Chapters Six and Seven we saw that

disputed issues on the production front have related to intentions

about the rate and quality of area rehabilitation and its social

outcomes. For example, at times there were contradictory conceptions

of appropriate building standards pursued, on the one hand, by

Glasgow associations (CBHAs) and the Scottish Federation of Housing

CBHAs : THEIR INTER-ORGANISATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Pr.S. - Private Sector
P.S. - Public Sector

C B H A

A.   LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONS

(a)   Residents groups -   (Pr.S.)
      Community Council, etc.

(b)   Local Councillors   (P.S.)

B.   PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITIES

(a)   Interaction with other CBHAs (informal relations)

(b)   Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA)

(c)   GDC; HC; SDD: (P.S.: agencies with which CBHAs negotiate) - See C.2.

C.   TASK-BASED AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONS

Improvement Programme   Housing Management

D.   EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS (Pr.S.)

(a)   Transport and General Workers Union (Strathclyde Housing
      Association Workers Branch)

(b)   Glasgow Federation of CBHA Employers

C.1. Private Sector Agencies

a   Commercial Owners (Pr.S.)   a   District Valuers Office (Branch of
                                         Inland Revenue) assesses house
                                         values for acquisition purposes
                                         (P.S.)

b   Landlords and Factors (Pr.S.)   b   Building Firms (Pr.S.): employed to
                                         carry out maintenance work

c   Consultants (Pr.S.): Architects, c   Property Factors (Managers) (Pr.S.)
    Q.S. and Professional Bodies

d   Building Firms (Pr.S.) and respective i   Rents Registration Office (P.S.):
    bodies (Scottish National Federation   (Section of SDD)
    of Building Trades Employers; Union of
    Construction and Allied Trades)   e   Strathclyde Region (P.S.): it
                                             collects rates

                                         f   Banks (Pr.S.): rents collection
                                             service

                                         g   Local Authority: GDC Housing Depart-
                                             ment (P.S.): rehousing and
                                             nominations agreements

C.2. Funding and Approval Agencies

a   Local Authority (Private Housing Section, Housing Department at GDC) (P.S.):
    declares Action Areas for Improvement after initial survey; initial grant to
    newly-formed CBHA; loan and grant facilities to owner-occupiers; coordination
    fee.

b   Housing Corporation (Glasgow Office) (P.S.:Quago): support and advice at
    formation stage; loan funding following approval process in relation to
    individual improvement and new build schemes; monitoring.

c   Scottish Development Department (P.S.): establishes grant levels (HAG);
    cost limits; approves special projects; levels of allowance funding HA work.

d   GEAR and Scottish Development Agency (P.S.): sometime funding of
    environmental schemes (Quangos).

e   Treasury: financial control exercised through Cash Limits (P.S.).

f   Banks (Pr.S.): overdraft facility where necessary, especially in
    early years.

Associations (the SFHA) and, on the other, by the Housing Corporation
(the HC) and the Scottish Development Department (SDD). Interestingly,
private sector organisations involved in housing production – the
building professions and the builders – have pressed associations to
aim for higher standards of rehabilitation.[76]

In general, it appears that the frame of reference of the SDD
has reflected dominant intentions that rehabilitation should provide
a cheaper option than redevelopment – a policy which is clearly
consistent with the central state's policy, since the 1960s, of
reducing and controlling public expenditure. In relation to the
issue of standards, I would also suggest that the HC's frame of
reference has reflected its contradictory role in, on the one hand,
monitoring and ensuring public accountability and implementing central
government housing policies and, on the other, in promoting a movement
which has historically shown pride both in the quality of its housing
production and in meeting significant housing needs.[77] In short
the HC has operated both as an agent of the central state and as an
enabler of new initiatives. On the production front at times
associations have felt unreasonably constrained by definitions of
"reasonable" standards by HC officials; at others they have recognised
that without the support of HC officials certain practical housing
outcomes would never have been realised – for example, new build
schemes and certain instances of housing mix. Moreover, at times the
HC is recognised as having interests in common with associations.
For example, we have seen how under the cash limit system, failure

to meet the expenditure limit by the 31 March means reduction in the following year's spend. Thus the HC, the SFHA, the Glasgow Forum (and other regional forums) jointly stress the need to meet the cash limit in order to maximise potential resources for the following financial year.

In general, therefore, while spending priorities and limits have been determined within central government departments (ultimate financial control), HC officials have operated as increasingly significant 'gatekeepers', in interpreting government policies and in influencing standards and types of association provision. I would also argue that key HC officials have played an important role in mediating between the divergent interests of the central state and associations by presenting a centralised planning perspective on questions about standards and resources. The HC Board's role is to promote the policies of the government of the day through the allocation of its cash limit to associations in different regions and involved in different types of housing projects. While priorities are determined at ministerial level, clearly the HC has room to manoeuvre and to influence the SDD. This interpretative and mediating role is also evident when we explore differences in urban policy. For example we have seen that regional offices of the HC have promoted different types of associations and entered into different types of partnerships with local authorities. There is no question that the role of associations in Glasgow would have been significantly different if the partnership between the HC and the District Council

(GDC) had not resolved a strategy of promoting CBHAs as a significant vehicle for implementing improvement and neighbourhood retention.[78]

Finally, returning to the question of building standards, I shall now consider how the frame of reference of CBHA participants has been reflected in conflicts of interest with state agencies. We have seen that CBHAs in the first instance are concerned with improving housing conditions for residents of the Action Areas in which they operate. The local base of CBHAs has led, however, to further objectives of providing larger houses to enable families to live with adequate space in tenement localities and CBHA participants have also stressed that the mix of house types and sizes in improved tenements will be a crucial factor in determining the future social composition of neighbourhoods. Against this background participants have aimed to produce larger sized housing units, by means of amalgamating or integrating existing tenement houses, in order to enable growing families to live alongside the elderly, the single and the young.

In Chapters Six and Seven we saw that these social objectives were not similarly stressed by SDD and that bureaucratic devices, which were aimed at controlling capital expenditure (cost limits or levels) served to restrict the feasibility of amalgamations. We also saw, however, that such bureaucratic criteria were modified following concerted pressure by associations' representative organisations. I shall argue here that all such bureaucratic devices or controls represent strategic choices, or policy emphases, by key

decision-makers.(79) Now I have suggested that in the early stages

of the rehabilitation policy in Glasgow, certain senior central state

officials (and also, presumably politicians) did not favour the

tenement as a housing form for families. Such values may have been

reflected in the weighting of cost limits in terms of a bias towards

the production of smaller housing units.

As well as this question of housing mix, there have been other

points of issue on the "standards" front. For instance we saw that

associations and their professional consultants have increasingly

pressed for approval of higher standards, placing emphasis on "renewal"

rather than "patch and repair" of the tenement structure and on higher

amenities such as central heating. Associations have argued that the

renewal approach enables more efficient on-site production control and

should minimise future maintenance costs. Improved heating standards,

they argue further, should help to avoid the serious dampness problems

which are so common in the West of Scotland, with the rider 'provided

that tenants can bear the costs of such heating'. Finally, associations

have at times favoured minor items of expenditure - such as peepholes

in tenement doors - items which reflect the culture of the neighbour-

hoods in which associations operate. It is perhaps not surprising

that such items have generated bargaining with government agencies

whose participants are inevitably more socially distanced from the

day to day concerns of local residents.

In general, the planning concept of the "30 year life" of improved buildings has been interpreted by CBHA participants to mean that they are responsible for improving buildings which remain in reasonable condition in the 21st century.[80] In this respect there is a broad area of consensus between CBHAs and state agencies in spite of the contentious areas of interpretation and implementation which I have discussed in this section.

3.b. Aspects of negative decision-making

In Chapter Seven I argued that the approach within SDD to modifying cost limits reflected aspects of 'non' or 'negative' decision-making.[81] We saw that, during a period of rapid inflation in building costs, cost limits were held by SDD at unrealistically low levels as compared with average scheme costs. Further, I have argued that there was a bias in the cost limits system which served to emphasise the production of smaller housing units and conversely to discourage the provision of larger units through amalgamations. Now there has been modification in both these respects - associations today operate in the context of more realistic cost limits and there is greater ease in including amalgamations. In general, however, the issue of rehabilitation standards has been associated with both overt and implicit conflict between associations and central government. We have seen in the case studies and in Part Three that such conflict has focused on specific scheme submissions and on the general level of standards promoted by associations individually and collectively;

that it has stimulated participants to engage in lobbying, as well as
the campaigning efforts of the Glasgow Forum and the Scottish
Federation. The account of bureaucratic controls and collective action
in Part Three has highlighted how at times policy-making within SDD
has served to inhibit challenges to bureaucratic conceptions of
appropriate standards which emphasised low cost solutions. The
dominant frame of reference of SDD officials has stressed the role
of CBHAs in bringing about house improvements and has been less
concerned than have associations with the social implications of that
endeavour.

Also on the production front I referred to a different instance
of negative decision-making - that relating to grant and loan funding
for commercial owners in CBHA areas. In relation to this issue, we
saw that CBHAs were significantly dependent on the cooperation of
owners of commercial properties who had no access to public subsidy.[82]
Not surprisingly this cooperation was not always forthcoming as
commercial owners generally stood to gain very little from expenditure
on their share of common repairs in tenements. Whilst their invest-
ment in rehabilitation meant that they would be able to continue
trading in the longer term, in the short term commercial properties
experienced considerable disturbance. A further factor was that
small shops at times could not afford the financial and trading
consequences of rehabilitation. Improvement schemes were often
delayed by negotiations with commercial owners. As a result CBHA
participants pressed SDD to alleviate the situation by enabling some

form of grant funding, at least for small local shopkeepers. Whilst
the problem was clearly recognised within SDD, it was argued that
there could be no resolution under present legislation as the 1974
Act applied only to householders and housing.

Saunders describes this pattern of negative decision-making as
one where''dogs may bark themselves hoarse in the night but nobody
listens'.[83] On the shops question we have seen that eventually SDD
did listen to the concerted demands of participants, local
authority personnel and shopkeepers. Initial action by SDD reflected
a strategy commonly documented as a typical aspect of negative decision-
making – that of the committee of enquiry with its coopted representa-
tion of 'all interests'. (This corporatist strategy duplicated the
formation of a Cost Limit Working Party in 1979.) However as Selznick's
study showed,[84] cooptation can serve to modify the intentions of
the powerful, particularly I would suggest in relation to those issues
which by their nature are confused and uncertain, and where key
participants in powerful agencies are sympathetic. In relation to
the issue of commercial properties the Working Party found that
some level of grant funding _was_ feasible for small shopkeepers within
the framework of existing legislation. I would argue that, whilst
central government was clearly not against the principle of providing
subsidy to commercial owners or private landlords, earlier negative
decision-making reflected both the absence of political will to set
a precedent regarding non housing commercial owners and the fact of
turnover of personnel within SDD.[85]

These instances of negative decision-making have further illus-
trated the extensive powers of SDD, the body which controls key
resources of funding and authority, which are sought by associations
and which have implications for a range of groups affected by the
area rehabilitation policy. I would suggest that while certain
decisions by central government have been located within the Cabinet
and Treasury, others have been significantly influenced by senior
politicians and officials in SDD. I have emphasised that the total
housing cake is distributed at Treasury level, where decisions about
the total public expenditure on housing are taken annually. We have
seen that public housing expenditure has significantly declined since
the late 1970s and this trend looks set to continue in the mid 1980s.
Public expenditure on housing associations has been relatively less
severely curtailed. In Chapter Seven I argued that, whilst the
capital allocation to Scottish associations was insufficient to
sustain the work programmes of the growing numbers of housing
associations which were formed during the 1970s, it is significant
that the movement was allowed to expand at all.

We have seen that the housing association movement was promoted
and supported in a context of growing public expenditure restraint,
and of major political concerns about Britain's economic crisis.
Further the historical account in Part One showed how both major
parties supported the role of a Third Arm promoted through the Housing
Corporation. I have argued that central government was looking for
an alternative to local authorities as a means of tackling the

extensive problem of private sector housing obsolescence in urban areas. Also in Chapter Seven I concluded that we can only explain why the Conservative Government allowed further expansion of the voluntary sector in terms of housing association characteristics which appeal to conservative values - for example voluntarism, although I have suggested that other aspects of conservative ideology contradict with support for associations (for example privatisation and reduction in public expenditure). Against this background it is notable that there have been policy differences between Scotland and England and Wales (for example, the approach to sales, tenement cost limits). These differences are reflected in legislation and policy statements highlighting recognition of regional variations in the role and development of associations. It is at this level that senior personnel in the Scottish Office play a significant mediating or gatekeeping role in relation to the flow of resources on which associations are dependent.[86]

I shall now explore some further aspects of power and control which have been reflected in the housing association experience.

3.c.   The routinisation of power

The housing association experience can be seen as reflecting certain aspects of routinised power which have been identified in the literature. For example I have highlighted in Part Three and in the case studies how participants' intentions and collective action reflect their concerns about potentially disadvantageous reactions

by powerful agencies. For example both CBHAs accepted that certain
properties could not be saved from demolition, due to the exceptionally
high cost implications of their state of disrepair or of structural
problems. In spite of local residents' criticism of the associations'
apparent unwillingness to fight to keep local people in the neighbour-
hood, CBHAs have generally adopted a rational, instrumental stance
in these circumstances. The realities of funding controls and of
structural uncertainties have encouraged associations in these
circumstances not to automatically fight against the authorities,
knowing that the only outcomes might be to increase local support
and to alienate HC and SDD personnel. Rather the aim has been to
realise the best practical solutions, although at times this has
meant the alternative of resolving to fight to save threatened
tenements (for example when their demolition would have implications
for neighbouring buildings).

Saunders describes the case of anticipated reactions as typical
of those where 'dogs do not bark because they are muzzled or because
they believe that they are muzzled'.[87] The analogy of 'dogs' is
amusing, however it is also surprisingly behaviourist given Saunders'
position. We are talking about people who do not take political
action due to implicit, and frequently unspecific,concerns about the
assessed potential consequences of action. Implicit concerns are
that the reactions of the powerful might have more adverse outcomes
for participants' interests (or for those of the groups they serve
by virtue of their objectives) than if they were to leave the status

quo well alone. At the same time, the complexity of issues, may
mean that participants perceive no direct route by which their actions
or demands might alleviate or amend the circumstances, in spite of
their general grasp of the power structure.

Whilst funding constraints in the last resort generally
influenced possibilities of saving local houses, we have seen how
the technological complexities and uncertainties of rehabilitation, and
also local residents' preferences, established additional constraints.[88]
For example, the issue of undermining in Govanhill and its far-reaching
implications established both constraints on the improvement programme
and new opportunities for local collective action and negotiations
with state agencies, which resulted in apparently advantageous solutions.
for local residents. Further in this instance, local representatives
and state agencies were on equally "unsure ground". This example, I
would suggest, highlights that cases of anticipated reactions may be
more complex than Saunders has suggested.

Saunders refers us to a second aspect of negative decision-
making involving recognition of the routinisation of power, but this
time by the powerful who are confident that crucial issues will not
emerge as a focus of public debate. Saunders uses another metaphor
to describe such situations: 'dogs may fail to bark because they have
been doped, or at best fobbed off with a very inferior bone'.
Implicitly Saunders' metaphor here implies conscious strategies on
the part of powerful interests (a duping process).[89] This again

is too restricted an interpretation of Bachrach and Baratz's
conceptualisation of power. It does not acknowledge that while
Bachrach and Baratz may have been unclear, they did recognise the
institutionalisation of power and referred to power as much as a
capacity to influence as a pattern reflected in actual decision-
making.

> Is such bias not relevant to the study of power?
> Should not the student be continuously alert to its
> possible existence in the human institution that he
> studies, and be ever prepared to examine the forces
> which brought it into being and sustain it? (90)

Bachrach and Baratz, therefore, do not deny the significance of the
more subtle, routine forms of power and the ways in which political
ideologies and economic constraints may serve to influence the
strategies of both strategically powerful groups and agencies and
subordinate groups.

Where I would agree with Saunders is that it is enormously
difficult for researchers to discuss examples of bias and inaction
without reference to their wider context of routinised power. Moving
to my examples, I shall first consider situations where we might
conclude that key issues have not emerged as a focus of public debate.

3.d. Bias and inaction

3.d.1. Choice and housing strategies

Two important studies of housing policy in Birmingham have stressed that whilst the respective merits of large-scale slum clearance, phased (cellular) renewal and improvement policies had been debated in the late 1960s by central government agencies, the building professions and planning critics, in fact state improvement policies were resolved without such alternatives being opened for public debate. Indeed Paris and Blackaby[91] have argued that had Action Area residents been faced with a choice between alternatives of phased renewal or comprehensive improvement, they might have chosen the first option - and I found some evidence to support this in my interviews.[92] Just as in the Birmingham studies, the key concerns of local residents of Glasgow's inner areas were to avoid the consequences of 'deferred demolition' and to stabilise their housing futures. By the mid 1970s only a small minority of Labour councillors and local residents favoured the bulldozer, on the grounds that improvement was a second rate cheap alternative to new housing. We have seen in Chapter Two, and it is similarly argued in the Birmingham study, that the central government improvement policy was pressed on local authorities during a period of expenditure restraint. Merrett has argued, however, that central government personnel must have been aware of the potential appeal and legitimacy of the rehabilitation strategy in the context of a political climate

which was critical of large-scale slum clearance.[93]

> Perhaps the innovation was promoted in the civil
> service and the Cabinet, not because a spatially
> bounded programme was seen to be genuinely more
> cost effective but because bureaucrats and
> politicians understood that the policy redirection
> required, for ideological purposes, tangible
> symbols of the new humanism in environmental
> policy. (94)

Therefore whilst the rehabilitation strategy did not challenge the

legitimacy of the economic constraints on state expenditure,[95] it is

evident that central state planners had come to positively reject

the municipal large scale slum clearance strategy. A further significant

point is that it was central state personnel who had the capacity to

influence perceptions of possible strategies for tackling obsolescence -

both for local authorities and urban residents. It is the capacity

to influence definitions of possibilities and alternatives which is

a significant aspect of the mobilisation of bias - a process which

inhibits issues and alternatives becoming a focus of public debate or

contention amongst those most directly affected by them.

My emphasis here on the restriction of alternatives has been

highlighted in several studies of public policy and in theories about

the state. For example McKay and Cox[96] have illustrated the key

role of central state departments in influencing the shift towards

area discrimination in social policy in the mid 1960s and towards

inner city programmes in the second half of the 1960s. They argue

that the 'rediscovery of the inner city', which has increasingly been

reflected in urban policy, was promoted at central government level.

While the policy was addressed towards stimulating investment in
areas characterised by racial inequalities, multiple deprivation and
industrial decline, its public airing did not stress that this policy
represented a shift away from investment in outlying areas and New
Towns.[97]   Similarly, Hall _et al_ have emphasised that a key
characteristic of the policy process is the filtering of issues
and demands by relevant gatekeepers.[98]   On the one hand, they
argue that demands

> are subject to a fairly strict filtering process:
> They are largely absorbed within the civil service hierarchy
> and relatively few reach ministerial level. Ideally the
> hierarchical filtering process exists to select the issues
> which should be conveyed to Ministers, as well as to pre-
> vent problems rising above the level at which they can be
> resolved effectively. (99)

On the other hand, the public presentation of policy issues is similarly
affected by 'filtering' and by depoliticisation - a point aptly stated
in Crossman's Diaries.[100]

I shall consider two further examples of how dominant ideologies
and the routinisation of power are reflected in both policy-making
and political inaction. I shall focus further here on the issue of
funding and on the issue of housing association rents, which were
discussed earlier in Part Three of the thesis.

3.d.2. Funding and resource allocation

We have seen that Scottish associations experienced their first cut in the total cash limit allocated to the Housing Corporation for the year 1984 to 1985. Further, this cut took effect following the notable expansion of the Scottish movement during the second half of the 1970s - an expansion promoted by the shift in central government policy represented in the 1974 Housing Act. On the other hand, we should remember that the voluntary sector had been encouraged to expand during a period of general contraction in public housing. The Conservative Government has reduced public expenditure on housing from approximately £950 million (1979/80) to £650 million (1984/85) and proposes that this trend should continue further. At the same time unemployment in the Scottish Construction Industry has increased by 34,000.[101]

In Part Three we saw that Scottish associations and the West of Scotland Forum have campaigned increasingly on the question of resources and I have suggested that minor modifications in resource allocation are likely to have been attributable to their lobbying.[102] I shall also suggest here that certain developments on the campaigning front can be seen to reflect political aspects of resource allocation, as well as divisions within the movement and within the public housing sector as a whole. In general the voluntary sector receives a share of a total housing cake which is determined at Treasury level. The associations' cake is shared unevenly both between regions and types of housing provision according to Housing Corporation assessments, on

the one hand, of associations' capacity to produce the goods and,
on the other, of housing needs. Moreover, the housing strategies of
local authorities have influenced urban patterns of resource
allocation.

On the campaigning front, representative bodies have taken
pains not to argue the case for more resources in a way that might
suggest any desire for movement growth at the expense of other
housing sectors. Further, regional campaigns such as that generated
in the West of Scotland, 1980 to 1981, emphasised that Glasgow
associations were not pressing for a larger slice of the cake for
rehabilitation in the West at the expense of associations in the East
and special needs new build provision. In fact, the outcome of the
lobby by West of Scotland associations was an increased allocation
for special needs provision. It is likely, however, if government
funding continues to be cut, that parochial interests may become more
visible in campaigning and there are certain signs to this effect
at the time of writing.

The main point is that the divisions between housing sectors,
to which I have referred here, have served to encourage a campaigning
approach which is segmented and which until recently has been
implicitly acceptive of a fixed housing resource cake. These assumptions
and divisions have been influenced and reaffirmed by key policy-
makers at central government level in public statements about housing
need and resource allocation. The political airing of resource

questions hardly serves to encourage open acknowledgement that
political and strategic choices are regularly made within Parliament,
the Civil Service and by the Treasury about the allocation of public
funds between defence, grants to promote industrial and commercial
development, education and social policy. In general,ministerial
statements on resource issues are presented in terms which cloud
their wider political and economic context, which deny the possibility
of alternative strategies, and which discourage demands which might
severely challenge the status quo of resource allocation. Against
this background it is important to note that amongst those who wait
for decent housing the dominant pattern has been one of political
quiescence, in spite of campaigning and local publicity. In terms
of national campaigning, however, there are growing signs that
associations are interested in campaigning jointly with other agencies
involved in public housing in Scotland.[103]

The preceding discussion of the politics of resource allocation
might seem to reflect the power situation highlighted by Bachrach and
Baratz, whereby powerful interests have the scope:

> to limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial
> matters by influencing community values and political
> procedures and rituals, not withstanding that there are
> in the community serious but latent power conflicts. (104)

I have argued, however, that we cannot simply explain political
action with reference to the actions or decisions of the powerful.
Rather we have to consider how the political context of issues reflects
historical patterns of class domination and the ways in which social,

political and economic values have become embedded in institutionalised political relations and the conventions of the policy-making game.

It will be evident that my argument here has diverged considerably from Rhodes' approach which I discussed in Section Two of this chapter. In particular, in terms of my departure from focusing on participants' perceptions of power and participants' strategies, I have argued that to understand 'rules of the game' and the 'appreciative system', we must consider the relevance of subtler processes of ideological control. These processes may be reflected in institutionalised power structures; in aspects of decision-making by powerful groups, and, finally, in patterns of political action, inaction or quiescence amongst subordinate groups.

Marxists and radical political theorists have argued that ideological control by the ruling classes in capitalist societies has historically been mediated through different institutions, such as the political system, state agencies, education, the mass media, work and family socialisation. Further, they have stressed that these processes encourage passivity and acceptance and/or fear of authority, conservatism and parochialism amongst subordinate groups and that such tendencies coexist alongside more critical forms of political consciousness.[105] I would suggest that such contradictory forms of consciousness characterise the housing association movement.

On the one hand, there is a large stock of awareness about the
power structure and external dependencies; on the other hand, the
structure is routinised and largely accepted in terms of real politik -
'can we bite the hand that feeds us?' As a result, self-imposed
limitations, conventions or 'rules of the game' apply to forms of
protest and to the framing of issues. I would further suggest that
such constraints do not solely relate to fears about the anticipated
reactions of the powerful, but also to concerns about anticipated
reactions of other subordinate groups. For instance I have referred
to how participants are at times concerned that strident argument or
demonstration for more resources might be interpreted in terms of
associations wanting more of the fixed housing cake - a position that
would adversely affect the interests of other subordinate or deprived
groups, which may operate in terms of the notion of a fixed, un-
questionable total housing resource cake. We are once again back to
issues of ideology and more "nebulous" environmental influences.

Finally I want to consider the system of rent determination,
the Fair Rents System, which I discussed earlier in Chapter Seven.

3.d.3.   "Fair" rents

I would suggest that this system reflects both the institutionali-
sation of bias and a political context of such complexity that its
critics cannot meaningfully assess what realistic changes might be
sought to the advantage of association tenants. It has been argued
that the system was intended to depoliticise private sector rents

issues by establishing a system of state bureaucratic monitoring and regulation.[106] Yet we have seen that association rents have increased under the Fair Rents System to the extent that they are frequently higher than local authority rents. By 1984 Glasgow MPs were raising questions about this situation in Parliament. (During a parliamentary debate, 20 June 1984, MPs questioned rent differentials in the public sector, the appropriateness of the system of rent determination for housing associations and further, emphasised that 'about 40 per cent of registrations are currently in the housing association sector, and in Glasgow the figure is probably nearer 50 per cent'.)[107]

In general I would suggest that these trends affecting housing association rents are not at all surprising given the contradictory influences on the Fair Rents System as it applies to housing associations. On the one hand, associations are treated like private landlords. On the other hand, whilst associations, like all landlords, must realise income from rents to invest in property maintenance, central government has recognised the social or public housing objectives of associations by subsidising their administration and property maintenance costs.

This system of rent determination means that the role of associations as landlords is affected by contradictory forces which characterise the housing market and its regulation by the state. However, in Chapter Seven I suggested that there is no unanimity within the movement about the appropriateness of the Fair Rents System or

about the rent levels it has generated - although there is evidence

of cumulative dissatisfaction on both fronts. This lack of unanimity

clearly reflects the organisational and ideological diversity which

has characterised the historical development of the movement which was

described in Part One of the thesis.

One final point about the Rents Registration Service is that

in spite of its head office location within the Scottish Office,

senior officials of both the Rents Registration Service and the

Scottish Development Department continue to stress that the adminis-

trative determination of rents is not subject to political influence.[108]

Such statements may do justice to the official allocation of

responsibilities between policy and administration. As I argued in

Chapter Nine, however, in relation to housing association decision-

making, no formalistic model of decision-making functions is ever

adequate for explaining decision influences and outcomes. Therefore

whilst no evidence exists that central government politicians or

officials are consulted about rent levels by the rent officers'

hierarchy, nor that any views expressed, officially or unofficially,

by senior state personnel are adhered to within the Rents Registration

Service, this does not mean that such influence is absent. Whilst

it may be impossible to identify the dynamics of such influence,

there is considerable evidence that senior officials of the Rents

Registration Service have reported to senior SDD officials their

concerns about a particular association which appealed to reduce

rent levels on grounds of anomalies. The interest of senior SDD

officials in the approach of associations to rent levels has been clearly demonstrated in official communications with the association concerned.[109]

Finally, I would suggest that Rent Assessment Committees may have an intrinsic bias stemming from their composition which generally includes individuals with business and/or professional interests in housing. Such members may hold either an ideological or self-interested predisposition towards viewing housing as a profit-oriented financial investment rather than as provision to meet social need - although I am not arguing here that there is a necessary connection between individuals' economic and professional interests and their social values. The main point, therefore, in this discussion of the system of housing association rent determination is that the system is intrinsically biased in terms of its primary emphasis on a private housing sector which is predominantly oriented to housing as a profit making commodity, rather than decent housing as a citizen's right. In terms of the role of associations as landlord, therefore, the rules of the game stress that associations have a clearly limited administrative role to play in relation to rents. It should be noted that associations can hide behind these rules when tenants question rent increases.

Now, on this question of bias I am not suggesting that we should view the restriction of alternatives as reflecting a consciously concerted, manipulative strategy on the part of politicians and officers. Rather I would suggest that we should view policy development

as reflecting the contradictory characteristics of, and pressures
on, the state in capitalist society, which have been emphasised by
Marxists and critical social theorists.[110] For example it has
been argued that the Fair Rents System can be viewed as representing
state intervention to regulate outcomes of the conflicting economic
interests of private landlords and tenants in capitalist society.
Whilst there can be no totally objective indicators of fair treatment
(a moral concept) in the context of these conflicting interests, it
is likely that the political and economic values of key personnel
will be reflected in "fair" rent levels. Administrative discretion
may therefore mean the autonomy to implement political values in
terms of private sector rent levels.

Before moving on to the final section of this chapter, I shall
draw some conclusions about the questions which I raised earlier in
relation to control. We saw in Section Two that questions about
control have been a focus in the study of interorganisational and
intergovernmental relations, and I have argued against an approach
which ignores wider cultural, political and economic influences
on power relations. In contrast to a democratic-pluralist conception
of power I have drawn on the work of writers with a more radical and
open-ended conception of power and control and applied their more
critical perspective to the housing association experience.

In general that discussion has clearly denied the relevance of
what has been termed a "zero-sum" notion of power. Whilst I have
emphasised that state agencies have significantly determined the
scope and role of associations, we have seen that no single agency
holds all the reins, nor has the capacity fully to determine outcomes.
Moreover, associations have been shown to be active rather than
passive in relation to state policies. The main thrust of Part
Three of the thesis has highlighted the emergence of collective action
through common organisations which has served to affect state policies.
At the same time, we saw in Part Four how local circumstances and
participants' action served to influence the development of
associations. Now, while I have argued that state agencies have been
the most significant influence on the voluntary housing sector,
questions about the extent to which associations can exercise control
over their affairs have led me to emphasise the significance of other
interorganisational networks. We have seen that associations enter
into contractual relations with business and professional organisations
and these relations are characterised by changing and uneven patterns
of control and dependence.

I would remind the reader of my earlier emphasis on the concept
of uncertainty. We have seen how at times specific goals, relation-
ships and environmental conditions reflected notable uncertainty and
change. Just as Crozier suggested, power relations and struggles
frequently appeared to stem from zones or periods of uncertainty and

change. At times certain officials' influence was linked to the fact that their particular skills and tasks were relevant to pre-dominant uncertainties and problems facing their organisations. At others the technological uncertainties of rehabilitation have ensured the dependence of associations on building contractors and professional consultants. However, I have stressed that all such private sector agencies have been influenced by economic and political developments reflected in the strategies of state agencies.

In the final section of this chapter I shall consider the implications of the housing association experience for certain theories about the state in capitalist society.

4. The Third Arm and the State

In Part One of the thesis, in which I described the history of the Third Arm we saw how the "service" and "cooperative" sectors of the voluntary housing movement became almost totally dependent on state subsidy. Whereas prior to 1890, the state approached the problems of housing obsolescence and shortage by providing incentives to the private sector and by regulating standards of provision, by the early 20th century, the strategies of state agencies were notably more complex. On the one hand, the state has operated as caretaker of the housing stock by employing a dual strategy in relation to the private housing sector - a strategy which involved both incentives to provide housing (through subsidy) and control over housing production and allocation (through planning controls, legislation on standards, and

rent controls). On the other hand, the local state has increasingly operated in a more directly interventionist fashion in relation to the private sector in its slum clearance policies and in its role as developer of the public housing stock.[111] In general, state provision of housing for the working classes has reflected the bourgeois paternalist values and objectives of a historically longstanding, but relatively insignificant, provision by the voluntary sector. State housing policies have emphasised similar intentions of "filtering up", as well as assumptions about the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor which were characteristic of bourgeois philanthropic provision in the 19th century. In sum the complex web of housing policies and housing subsidies has been modified incrementally as the housing problem has changed in intensity and shape, and yet has neither met the needs of the poorest, most disadvantaged sections of urban populations, nor effectively counteracted recurrent problems and changing dimensions of housing obsolescence.[112]

The history of the Third Arm has clearly illustrated the significant growth of state intervention and control during the 20th century which has been identified in the literature on the state, social policy and housing in capitalist society. In Miliband's terms:

> More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the
> state. What they want to achieve, individually or in
> groups, now mainly depends on the state's sanction and
> support. But since that sanction and support are not
> bestowed indiscriminately, they must, ever more directly,
> seek to influence and shape the state's power and purpose,
> or try and appropriate it altogether. ... This is why as

> social beings, they are also political beings whether
> they know it or not. It is possible not to be
> interested in what the state does; but it is not
> possible to be unaffected by it. (113)

While the historical account in Parts One and Two of the thesis has

stressed the growing intervention of the state in the private housing

sector, Parts Three and Four have emphasised how interest groups

affected by state policies have continually sought to modify and

influence state policies. Hatch's study of voluntary organisations

arrives at similar conclusions to my own about the power of the state

in relation to the voluntary sector. He states:

> Thus voluntary organisations are not a challenge to the
> state in the sense of being able to supplant it or to
> carry on in parallel to it. The basic structural frame-
> work of the services, decisions about priorities in the
> allocation of resources and about levels and standards of
> provision, lie with the state. The voluntary sector does
> influence and criticise these decisions, though in the
> three towns it did seem that the statutory sector had more
> influence on the voluntary sector than vice versa. (114)

I have argued, however, that whilst state funding has been a key

factor in determining the rate and quality of housing production by

housing associations, these production outcomes have also been

significantly influenced by strategic choices and political pressure

by associations and their participants (Chapters Six and Seven). I

shall also stress here that the local base of CBHAs has been a key

factor influencing aspects of production (Chapters Ten, Eleven and

Twelve). Local pressure has influenced the approach of government

agencies to technological contingencies, such as undermining and

subsidence, and the phasing of improvements (Govanhill), and to the

role of associations in providing general family housing through new
building (Reidvale). We have also seen how, in spite of their collective
representations, associations have had to limit their production goals
in the context of public expenditure cuts and central state objectives
about building standards which have affected state housing generally.

In terms of their role in allocating housing we have seen that
associations are similarly constrained by the policies of state agencies -
by central government legislation which defines tenants' rights, by
local authority policies on nominations, and by government policies
affecting public sector rent levels. On the other hand, we saw that
associations have influenced the "nominations rights" policy of the
local authority; that representations by the SFHA, politicians and the
HC served to enable the institutionalisation of a Voluntary Sales Code
in contrast with the compulsory "right to buy" for sitting tenants
across the border. However, it must be pointed out that both of
these negotiated agreements with the local and central state may be
precarious resolutions to underlying conflicts of interest between
different state agencies and the voluntary sector, which are clearly
open to renegotiation. At the present time there is some concern
that, while certain "resolutions" are consistent with the objectives
of associations, there are those within the relevant state agencies
who may be interested in resuscitating issues and negotiating or
imposing conditions more consistent with government policies.

Now it should be clear that in discussing these issues of
control, it has often been inappropriate to speak of the state as a
whole, or as a monolithic entity. The housing association experience
has illustrated clearly the complex internal organisation of the
state, with a multiplicity of state agencies being involved in
questions of housing obsolescence and in influencing the role of
associations in meeting a variety of housing needs. The housing
association experience has also been influenced by a variety of forms
of state intervention and control.

I shall stress here that a key aspect of the research has been
that it has highlighted the complex interrelations of public and
private sectors in capitalist society, which are so significantly
reflected in housing issues and housing policy. The study has
focused on the voluntary sector generally, and on CBHAs in particular,
mainly in terms of their role in housing production.[115] In this
emphasis on housing production I have departed from a mainstream
emphasis in current theorising about the state and housing which
locates housing provision as consumption or allocation (redistri-
bution) rather than production (the basis of the economic surplus).[116]
I would argue that this difference in emphasis, and my focus on quasi-
state organisations, leads us towards a different perspective on state
intervention and control than that which has been promoted by certain
recent theories on urban politics. For example, whilst my position
is consistent with Jessop's approach, it departs considerably from
Cawson's and Saunders' analyses of state intervention, social policy
and urban conflicts.[117] Whilst all these writers agree that there

are three major forms of state intervention and control - the
market, the bureaucratic and the corporatist forms - Cawson and
Saunders stress that corporatist intervention is most likely to be
found in the sphere of capitalist production, and that market and
bureaucratic forms of intervention predominate in the housing sphere,
and in relation to social consumption provision generally. Writers
like Jessop,[118] who have pointed to the interrelationship between
the state's role in production and in consumption, lead us towards a
more complex picture of the interplay of forms of state intervention
and control - a complexity which I believe has been demonstrated in
aspects of the development of housing associations in Scotland. I
shall now clarify further some of the central arguments of this debate
and consider their relevance to the housing association experience.

First, Jessop[119] argues that the state should be viewed
initially as 'an institutional ensemble of forms of representation,
internal organisation, and intervention', and an emerging theme in
writings on the state has involved the attempt to highlight changing
patterns of representation and intervention.[120] Cawson describes
a 'market mode of intervention' by state agencies in late capitalism,
as one which is expressed in relations between a strong, increasingly
authoritarian state and a private market economy.[121] A key
feature of this market mode is that state intervention is limited to
activities which enable private markets to operate. This form of
intervention has been a dominant characteristic of the state's role
in the housing system. I would suggest that examples of market

intervention have included the promotion of owner-occupation through tax concessions on mortgages; the provision of improvement grants for private owners (a policy affected by local authority discretion), and local authority mortgages for housing in areas where building societies have refused to lend. All such policies have clearly been oriented to reviving or sustaining the housing market and one of their outcomes has clearly been to facilitate private profit. On the production side, state intervention has similarly been mainly of the market mode. I have emphasised, like Merrett and others, the economic and organisational instabilities which characterise the house construction industry. In spite of the construction industry's partnership lobby (for example, the Scottish Construction Industry Group), housing producers have generally been significantly influenced by the booms and slumps of international capitalism, which have been reflected in interest rates and also inevitably in demand.[122]

At this point I shall briefly refer to Offe's analysis of the state which has stressed that economic and political contradictions are reflected in patterns of state intervention in the housing market.[123] Offe argues that the state in capitalist society is significantly involved in maintaining capitalist accumulation and that the state therefore has a class bias. On the other hand, Offe argues that in the attempt to conceal this bias, state agencies become involved in legitimising their role by accommodating working class interests and demands. As a result the state intervenes both directly and indirectly in the marketplace (by socialising or decommodifying property

relations)- a process which at times threatens capitalist interests and the viability of the private market.[124] Offe, like O'Connor, argues that the expansion of the state's role in production establishes tendencies to a dual crisis in terms of both the legitimacy and the financial viability of state intervention - a political and economic crisis. In the context of crisis, state policies focus on resuscitating the private market by means of recommodification or reprivatisation.

I shall not discuss here Offe's arguments on the outcomes of privatisation except to say that he points to both positive and negative consequences of privatisation for the state. Offe's main point is that socialisation and privatisation are contradictory outcomes of the state's role at specific historical periods. The growing tendency of privatisation (decommodification) has been well documented since the late 1970s - a reversal of cumulative policy trends (socialisation) since the wars. In the housing field this privatisation tendency has been demonstrated in grants to private developers, in the emphasis on public sector sales and in higher subsidies to owner-occupation than to tenanted accommodation.[125] Further, it has been argued that the promotion of the voluntary housing sector as a Third Arm in housing provision was symptomatic of a political commitment to provide alternatives to municipal centralism.[126] I have suggested, however, that housing associations can be seen to represent a new form of social ownership, at least in terms of the objectives of their participants.

A second form of state intervention and control has been identi-
fied as bureaucratic control. In general centralised bureaucratic
controls and resource allocation have characterised the personal social
services which are involved in distributing welfare on the basis of
objective categorisations of need or impersonal criteria. In the
housing context, this form of allocation and control is represented
in the provision of Housing Benefit allocation and in local authority
house allocations. In general it has been argued that state
provision of social services (housing, health, etc.) reflects both
market and bureaucratic forms of intervention. Finally on the
question of bureaucratic control, while I argued in Chapter Five
that there has been a growing emphasis on corporate policy-making
by state agencies, there is no question that centralist bureaucratic
forms of control predominate - for example, the cash limit system
and the system of scheme monitoring and approval, which is based on
cost limits or levels in the housing association case.[127]

An important feature of the literature referred to in this
section, therefore, is its emphasis on the complexity of the modern
capitalist state. As well as these market and bureaucratic forms of
state intervention, resource allocation and control, many writers
have pointed to a growing pattern of corporatist intervention,
particularly in response to crises in capitalist production since
the 1960s. This argument suggests that corporatist policies have
been framed in terms of the public interest; that they have been
associated with a growing emphasis on consultation and partnership

between public and private sector agencies; that they have only indirectly been influenced by parliament and that these public-private sector partnerships have been vested with extensive discretionary powers. Corporatist intervention, therefore, has stimulated the growth of Quasi Autonomous Government Agencies (Quagos) and of Quasi Autonomous Non Governmental Agencies (Quangos) - private bodies receiving public funds, such as housing associations. Jessop argues that corporatist intervention serves to ensure central control in spite of the fragmentation of the state. At the same time, the development of corporatist policy-making may serve to segregate policy sectors and to remove policy-making from public scrutiny and accountability to parliament. Jessop concludes that the extension of corporatist intervention, the growth of state and quasi-state apparatus represents a 'massive extension of bureaucratic domination over economy and civil society'.[128] Cawson, however, stresses an analytical distinction between bureaucratic and corporatist inter-vention and, like Winckler, he argues that corporatism involves the dispersal rather than the concentration of state power.[129] I would argue, however, that Jessop's position is entirely reasonable - particularly in view of his less restrictive application of the concept and his discussion of the outcomes of corporatism.

In general these different discussions of corporatist inter-vention have been influenced by Offe's analysis of the state. Offe has argued that the growing role of the state in crisis intervention and crisis avoidance in the productive sphere has encouraged the

growth of corporatist intervention. Such intervention has tended to be indicative and enabling; to be flexible rather than bureaucratic and, therefore, more strategically effective in the context of the uncertainties of capitalist production. Moreover, corporatist intervention involves the cooptation of political and economic interests through representation - particularly in situations where cooperation is essential to the effective implementation of policies.[130]

Dunleavy and Rhodes have further extended the discussion of corporatism in their focus on aspects of control within the state.[131] They describe corporatism as a pattern which was increasingly reflected in central-local government relations under the Labour Government, 1974-79.

> By "corporatism" we mean a mode of integrating different
> sectors of society (for example public and private sectors)
> or different tiers of government (for example, central and
> local) by means of formal interest bargaining between central
> government and the outside organisations to be controlled.
> In a corporatist model we no longer have free-wheeling
> interest group activity and open access for any potential
> group to policy influence. Instead, a few powerful outside
> interests are extensively coopted into closed relations
> with central government, taking on a dual role representing
> their members to government and of controlling their
> members on behalf of government. (132)

However Dunleavy and Rhodes also stress that, since the 1979 Conservative Government came to power, we have seen a significant trend towards unilateral action by central government over local authorities, particularly with respect to financial controls. This trend reflects

the centralised, authoritarian pattern of control within the state
which has been pointed to by Ginsberg and,which I would argue,has
been evident in certain aspects of the housing association experience
of financial controls and resource allocation. In particular,it
has been reflected in those controls which focus on constraining
the rate and quality of housing production,which were documented
in Part Three and in the case studies. We saw there how individual
associations' programmes, and the rehabilitation standards of individual
schemes,were significantly shaped by bureaucratic state controls
mediated by the Housing Corporation and ultimately by the SDD.

Returning to the debate on corporatist intervention and control,
Cawson has argued that corporatism is a far less significant form of
intervention in social policy as compared with the business sector.
He does, however, point to corporatist tendencies in health provision
(for example, health policy-making has been integrated in Regional
and Area Health Authorities 'outside the control of local and arguably
central authorities'). He also suggests that corporatist modes are
most likely to develop 'where officer influences on policy are of
more significance than councillor ones, as for example in land use
planning'.[133] In referring to housing associations,Cawson argues
that voluntary groups have been effectively coopted into the system
of local government in a similar pattern to corporatism, although
he argues that this is not corporatism because associations are not
'functional groups'.[134] I do not want to embark on a methodological
discussion of Cawson's work. However, I would argue that Cawson's

approach to ideal type methodology and his concept of corporatism are
too restrictive and, further, that this is evident in his empirical
work on corporatism and its outcomes.[135] I have argued that the
development of housing associations, and in particular that of Glasgow's
CBHAs and the housing rehabilitation programme in the city, has been
intrinsically interrelated with the fortunes of private sector corporate
interests. I have also argued that this interrelationship between
public and private interests is a key feature of housing policy and
state housing provision in capitalist society. Against this background
we should not be surprised at discovering that features of corporatist
control have influenced the housing association experience.

I shall now clarify further what I consider to be the key
aspects of corporatist intervention and control, some of which have
been represented in the housing association experience. First,
corporatism is a form of state control which involves interest
representation and participation within a framework shaped by the
explicit intentions of state agencies. A second aspect of corporatism
is that whilst certain state agencies control key resources of authority
and funding in corporatist policy sectors, subordinate organisations
and interests which cooperate in the pursuit of common objectives
are frequently termed "partners" - a concept which implies a degree
of equality in responsibility and control. The notion of partnership
in corporatist policy sectors is clearly ideological - it masks
underlying conflicts of interests and the intrinsically hierarchical
character of corporatist power relations and control. It is interest-
ing that by 1984 all parties to the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy in

Glasgow - CBHAs, the SFHA, the HC, the Scottish Office - were stressing the favourable outcomes of partnerships between state agencies, and between these agencies and inner area residents.[136] Yet I would suggest that most participants clearly recognise the inequalities inherent in these partnerships.

A third key aspect of corporatist intervention is the utilisation of Quagos and Quangos in policy implementation - agencies funded by the state, but which are only indirectly subject to political control and accountability and which have been vested with a delegated remit by parliament in relation to specific policy sectors.[137] Quangos have frequently been charged with non-accountability, yet I would suggest here that their critical environment may produce a culture of defensiveness about the legitimacy of their objectives and their practices - a defensiveness which may be associated with a marked emphasis on bureaucratic criteria and political accountability. This tendency, I would further suggest, characterises both the Housing Corporation and associations. While the structural location of these quasi-state agencies enables scope for considerable autonomy and influence, they may also face significant political uncertainties. In general there are contradictory outcomes of corporatism. On the one hand, corporatist policy developments establish increased scope for influence by subordinate government agencies, voluntary groups and private sector organisations - those which are deemed "partners" in policy implementation. On the other hand, whilst corporatist partnerships may assume a flexible, exploratory approach to mutually-supported objectives, the routinisation

of policy implementation is likely to reflect intrinsic power
inequalities and to result in the extension of bureaucratic control
by the state. I would also suggest that these features of
corporatism are equally relevant to health provision, as they are to
the range of quangos/quagos operating in the housing sphere. Moreover,
I would argue that this perspective on corporatism is relevant to our
understanding of a period of expansion in the role of housing
associations, both nationally and in the Glasgow case.

We have seen that the concept of corporatism has mainly been
applied to state intervention in capitalist industry and specifically
in relation to conventional categories of producer interests. However,
I have argued that we do not have to follow suit. I have suggested
that the concept of corporatism is useful for highlighting patterns
of control within the state and, further, I would emphasise that if
we conceive of housing provision as production which is significantly
influenced by the wider economic and political system, then we are
likely to find corporatism present here too. Finally, I should add
a reminder here that in Chapter Five I suggested that corporate
management, a form of centralised, integrated policy-making, favoured
by the business sector and adopted in local authorities, has been
significantly interrelated with the development of corporatist
intervention by the local state. This pattern was notably highlighted
by Cockburn.[138] However, I would argue that in focusing on the
'local state' - the complex of state agencies operating at urban or
regional levels - and on relations between the local state and the
private sector, Cockburn's work may have unintentionally underplayed

the role of central government. I would further argue that this
emphasis also stems from the focus on housing policy in terms of
social consumption - a perspective which currently prevails in urban
sociology and social policy.[139]

The housing association experience has illustrated outcomes of
state intervention for a range of private sector producer interests.
It has demonstrated the fractional character of capitalist interests
which are tied to housing developments. Moreover, state intervention
in the private housing sector has interacted with developments in
the economy, to affect the work of building contractors and building
professionals; the role of landlords and the financial interests of
other commercial owners.

Wider economic developments and state intervention have been
the key factors influencing these business interests. The housing
association experience has reflected the influence of a variety of
forms of state intervention and control, as well as changes in the
pattern of controls over time. Against a background of political and
economic constraints of national significance,and a major housing
problem of private sector housing obsolescence, we have seen that a
corporatist partnership developed in Glasgow between local and
central state agencies. Since the development of Glasgow's housing
associations, corporatist intervention and mediation has been reflected
in the cooptation of voluntary bodies in implementing state policies.
At the same time,the fortunes of some building contractors and

professional firms became closely tied to the local authority's rehabilitation strategy and a significant proportion of the work of such firms seemed to be commissioned by CBHAs.

The corporatist pattern has been reflected further in these aspects of policy in Glasgow: the District Council/Housing Corporation Working Party (1974 onwards); negotiations between the local authority and Glasgow associations on "nomination rights" (allocations) in 1979; negotiations between the local authority and individual associations on planning for new building; and between the Housing Corporation and individual associations on annual programming. Also the corporatist partnership of the HC and the GDC was perhaps most clearly in evidence in its role of promoting local associations and of providing support to local residents participating in the formative stage of associations. Further, we have seen several examples of corporatist policy involving central state agencies and the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA) – for example, in relation to cost limits and the "shops question". In general, the corporatist pattern has been most significantly related to the role of associations in producing housing and to the wider context of production uncertainties.

This pattern has been reflected both in temporary instances of joint negotiations and working parties, and in the more routinised relationship between the Housing Corporation and the Glasgow District Council, which has been a key aspect of the planning context of CBHAs.

Finally, I should mention that the SFHA faces the contradiction of wanting to operate autonomously whilst seeking routine official consultation with the Housing Corporation, and for its representation to be heard on questions of resource allocation. On the question of associations' allocative role as landlords, I would suggest that corporatist strategies may be particularly relevant to the planning context of Glasgow's CBHAs, with their clearly defined area remit and their devolved control over improved tenement housing in the inner areas. Improved housing is clearly a desirable and scarce resource from the point of view of the local authority, as well as existing and prospective tenants. Against this background we may see an extension of the corporatist pattern in future relations between the local authority, the Housing Corporation and associations, and particularly at any stage where the local authority strategy aims to achieve uniform modifications in the role of associations. Such a pattern would once again diverge from the Cawson-Saunders predictors about control.[140]

Finally, we have seen how the central state's dual-pronged strategy of promoting a Third Arm during the 1970s, and of channeling its efforts towards the rehabilitation of sub-tolerable privately owned housing, have reflected a more general pattern of increasing state intervention. As Dunleavy stated:

> Setting up national or regional quasi-governmental
> agencies (QGAs) removes key production issues from
> direct political control, makes these issues difficult
> for the public to organise around, and allows business (and
> less often the trade unions) to be integrated into a close

> pattern of corporatist relations. QGAs plus corporatist
> policy making are able to generate initiatives and under-
> take planning that the conventional civil service (or
> any other line bureaucracy) would find very difficult
> to cope with. (141)

Dunleavy further emphasises that key outcomes of the corporatist pattern

are the political incorporation or integration of pressure groups,and

the distancing of representative organisations from their grass roots

membership or from the wider interests they represent. We have seen

some of these patterns in the housing association experience - for

example in underlying tensions between regional and national

representation (Chapter Seven) and between associations and local

residents (case studies). I shall explore these further in

Chapter Fourteen.

As well as these corporatist aspects of policy, the housing

association experience has reflected tensions between different types

of state intervention and control. For example,on the production

front, housing standards have been constrained by cost limits, and the

pace of association production has been constrained by cash limits or

cash targeting. These are crude, centralist, bureaucratic forms of

expenditure control mediated by central state agencies, which have

at times significantly conflicted with associations' housing objectives

and inhibited associations from resolving production uncertainties

and, most signficantly, the housing problems of local people. It is

interesting that both instances of cooptation, a corporatist pattern,

to which I referred earlier,followed cumulative dissatisfaction

amongst associations, and tensions between associations and the

Housing Corporation. They also stemmed from pressure by business
and professional interests, as well as by politicians.

In terms of market intervention, it is important to note that
Glasgow's CBHAs have represented a key aspect of the city's inner
area rehabilitation strategy - a strategy which was corporatist,
but which evolved in parallel with market forms of intervention in
housing (improvement grants, enabling legislation). Moreover, since
1979, there has been an increasing pattern of centralised authoritarian
control (cash limits).paralleled by attempts to stimulate the housing
market and to minimise or to recoup public housing subsidies. In
Chapter Two I argued that the Third Arm since the 1960s has increasingly
been approached by the central state as a means of implementing its
housing policies - cost rent provision and coownership (1960s);
fair rents provision and the rehabilitation strategy (1970s). I
suggested that against this background we should not be too surprised
if the voluntary sector in the 1980s is being approached, on the one
hand, as a means of extending home ownership and, on the other, as
an agency enabling the long term reduction of public subsidy via
increased rents and reduced standards of provision. I would suggest
here that the Conservative Government's sales policy is intrinsically
interwoven with such a policy on rents. If our housing association
tenants were at the present time less vulnerable in terms of their
employment stability, owner-occupation would soon become a highly
attractive option to the rapidly increasing rent levels which they
face on an ongoing basis, and which can only be borne with extensive

personal housing subsidies. It is interesting that to date the sales

issue has illustrated the corporatist tendency, with the Scottish

Federation promoting its Voluntary Sales policy to associations. Yet

Scottish associations would not be too surprised to see the

authoritarian imposition of sales by the present government, as has

been experienced by their English counterparts and by local authorities.

This policy issue highlights the fact that a key factor influencing

corporatist representation is the fear of weaker parties that non

participation may hasten authoritarian solutions, and conversely that

participation may serve to protect or advance their collective interests.

As Cawson has argued, 'corporatism is intrinsically hierarchical'.[142]

Whilst Cawson is referring to the power of those interests represented

in policy-making, as against those which are excluded from direct

representation, like Dunleavy,[143] I have argued that we should expect

to find structured power inequalities - a fundamental power relationship -

in all partnerships of planning and policy-making. Further, I have

argued that control rests significantly in the hands of those agencies

which ultimately control the resources of funding and authority. In

the case of housing associations, in the last resort this fundamental

power rests with the central state. I have argued that local

authorities and central state agencies operating at local level act

as significant gatekeepers, or mediators of central state policies.

I have also emphasised that their capacity to influence outcomes is

dependent on a favourable economic environment and on assessments by

key central state personnel of the capacity of subordinate agencies

to mobilise opposition or to effectively question their legitimacy -

for example by local authorities collectively, by the media or by the
wider population. Against this background,it is not at all surprising
that campaigning has become an increasing priority amongst associations,
both nationally and locally. Whilst the development of corporatism
might imply the incorporation of housing associations, we have seen
that these bodies possess considerable autonomy. Cawson comments
on the difference between Quangos (quasi non governmental organisations)
and Quagos (quasi governmental organisations).[144] 'The difference
is then, one of relative autonomy from state interference: the
quango can bark; the quago usually purrs.' Associations do and can
bark.

It is also important to recognise that this relative autonomy
means that housing associations exercise control over key resources
sought by groups with significant housing needs. In Chapter Fourteen
I shall argue that their proximity to local production uncertainties
and their control over allocations means that participants do have
some scope to influence housing access, the development programme
and the long term role of their association.

I would argue that their economic, political and planning
context has placed housing associations more firmly in the public sector,
and we have seen that in Glasgow groups of local residents have
actually participated in the state rehabilitation strategy of the
1970s. In this chapter we have seen how the state's strategy towards
housing obsolescence and the role of the voluntary sector has reflected

826.

a mixture of bureaucratic, market and corporatist forms of intervention
and control. At the same time, the experience of resident partici-
pation in housing associations has been influenced by association
choices, as well as by political and economic developments. These
wider developments have been reflected in changes in housing policies
and government controls and in the dynamics of relations, on the one
hand, with state agencies and, on the other, with the local residents
affected by housing associations. I shall consider further planning,
housing and participation outcomes of CBHAs in the concluding chapter,
which my reader will be delighted to learn will be a shorter one!

827.

Notes and References to Chapter Thirteen

(1)   See P. Saunders, <u>Social Theory and the Urban Question</u>,
        Hutchinson & Co., 1981, p. 27.   This methodological position
        has also been argued by C.W. Mills, <u>The Sociological Imagination</u>,
        Pelican Books, 1970; G. Stedman Jones, 'History:. The Poverty
        of Empiricism' in <u>Ideology in Social Science, Readings in
        Critical Social Theory</u>, edited by R. Blackburn, Fontana/Collins,
        1975, pp. 96-118;   A. Giddens, <u>New Rules of Sociological Method</u>,
        Hutchinson, 1976 and B. Fay, <u>Social Theory and Political Practice</u>,
        George Allen and Unwin, 1975.

(2)   See D. Maclennan, M. Brailey and N. Lawrie, <u>The Rehabilitation
        Activities and Effectiveness of Housing Associations in Scotland</u>,
        A Report prepared for the Scottish Development Department,
        April 1983.

(3)   See Chapter Ten.

(4)   See Chapters Eleven and Twelve.

(5)   See Chapters One and Five.

(6)   See, for example, L. Taylor, <u>Deviance and Society</u>, Thomas Nelson
        and Sons, 1971, p. 19.

(7)   P. Dunleavy, 'Protest and Quiescence in Urban Politics: a
        Critique of Pluralist and Structuralist Marxist Views' in
        A. Blowers, C. Brook, P. Dunleavy and L. McDowell, (eds.),
        <u>Urban Change and Conflict, an Interdisciplinary Reader</u>,
        Harper and Row, in association with The Open University, 1981,
        pp. 190-197.

(8)   <u>Ibid</u>, p. 197.

(9)   See Chapter Nine for a fuller exposition of this approach which
        emphasises the dynamic interaction between structure and action.

(10)   See for example, the work of J. Dearlove, <u>The reorganisation of
        British Local Government, Old Orthodoxies and a Political
        Perspective</u>, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 164-184 and
        pp. 213-256; and D. McKay and A. Cox, 'Confusion and Reality
        in Public Policy:the Case of the British Urban Programme',
        in <u>Public Policy in Theory and Practice</u>, edited by C. Pollitt,
        L. Lewis, J. Negro and J. Patten, Hodder and Stoughton in
        association with The Open University Press, 1979, pp. 80-93.

(11)   See Chapter Nine.

(12) See, for example, P. Saunders, <u>Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation</u>, Penguin Books, 1980; J. Lambert, C. Paris, B. Blackaby, <u>Housing Policy and the State, Allocation, Access and Control</u>, Macmillan Press, 1978; and A. Blowers, <u>et al</u>, (editors), <u>Urban Change and Conflict, An Interdisciplinary Reader</u>, Harper and Row, 1982, <u>op. cit.</u>

(13) See A. Dawe,'The Two Sociologies', <u>British Journal of Sociology</u>, 1970, 21, pp. 207-218. Dawe emphasises how questions about control have been a central problematic for the major schools of sociology.

(14) See Chapter Three.

(15) See Chapter Ten.

(16) J. Child, 'Organisation Structure, Environment and Performance: the Role of Strategic Choice', <u>Sociology</u>, 6 (1), 1972, pp. 1-22.

(17) See G.B. Baty, W.M. Evan and T.W. Rothermal, 'Personnel Flows in Interorganisational Relations' in <u>Interorganisational Relations</u>, edited by W.M. Evan, Penguin Books, 1976, pp. 122-142.

(18) See Introduction to Part Three of the thesis.

(19) P.M. Blau, 'Social Change among Collectivities!, in W.M. Evan, (ed.), <u>Interorganisational Relations</u>, 1976, op. cit., pp. 56-68.

(20) This perspective has characterised the work of J.D. Thompson, <u>Organisations in Action</u>, New York, McGraw Hill, 1967. See also, J.D. Thompson and W.J. McEwen, 'Organisational Goals and Environment', in A. Etzioni, (ed.), <u>A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations,</u> Second Edition, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, pp. 187-196.

(21) The games approach has been developed by M. Crozier, 'Comparing Structures and Comparing Games' in G. Hofstede and M.S. Kassem (eds.), <u>European Contributions to Organisation Theory</u>, Asson, Van Gorcum, 1976, pp. 193-207.

(22) See K.S. Cook, 'Exchange and Power in Networks of Inter-organisational Relations', <u>Sociological Quarterly</u>, 18, 1977, pp. 62-82; H. Turk, 'Interorganisational Networks in Urban Society', in <u>Interorganisational</u> Relations, edited by W.M. Evan, 1976, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 62-82.

(23) K.S. Cook, <u>Sociological Quarterly</u>, 1977, op. cit., pp. 62-82.

(24) J.K. Benson, 'The Interorganisational Network as a Political Economy', in L. Karpik (ed.), <u>Organisation and Environment</u>, London, Sage, 1978, pp. 69-102.

(25) A. Wassenberg, 'The Powerlessness of Organisation Theory', in S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley (eds.), <u>Critical Issues in Organisations</u>, 1977, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 86-98.

(26) See R.A. Dahl, <u>Who Governs?</u>, Yale University Press, 1961; R.A. Dahl, 'A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model', in J. Urry and J. Wakeford, (eds.), <u>Power in Britain, Sociological Readings</u>, Heinemann Educational Books, 1973, pp. 273-281.

(27) A. Fox, <u>Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations</u>, Research Paper No. 3, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, London, HMSO, 1966.

(28) See, for example, R. Miliband, <u>The State in Capitalist Society</u>, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969; R. Hyman and I. Brough, <u>Social Values and Industrial Relations</u>, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, Social Science Research Council, 1975, pp. 150-183. Also I. Gough, distinguishes between the action-oriented, liberalism of pluralism, and the objectivism and structural determinism of functionalism. I. Gough, <u>The Political Economy of the Welfare State. Critical Texts in Social Work and the Welfare State</u>, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, pp. 1-16.

(29) Amonst the radical critics of consensual pluralism and functionalism I would include A. Fox's later work, 'Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology' in J. Child,(ed.), <u>Man and Organisation</u>, London, Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp. 185-233; A.W. Gouldner, <u>The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology</u>, London, Heinemann, 1970; P. Dunleavy, 'Protest and Quiescence in Urban Politics: A Critique of Marxist and Structuralist Views' in <u>Urban Change and Conflict</u> edited by A. Blowers, <u>et al</u>, Harper and Row, 1981, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 190-197; C.W. Mills, <u>The Power Elite</u>, Oxford University Press, 1959.

(30) The functionalist approach is typified in the work of T. Parsons, <u>Structure and Process in Modern Societies</u>, New York, Free Press, 1960, in E. Durkheim's <u>The Division of Labour in Society</u>, New York, Free Press, 1964 and in A. Etzioni's <u>The Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations</u>, New York, Free Press, 1961.

(31) These assumptions are evident in the influential work of M. Crozier, <u>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</u>, Tavistock, 1964 and J. D. Thompson, <u>Organisations in Action</u>, 1967, op. cit.

(32) R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, 1969, op. cit.,
      p. 146.

(33) P. Dunleavy, 'Protest and Quiescence in Urban Politics' in
      Urban Change and Conflict, Harper and Row, 1981, op. cit.,
      p. 192.

(34) J.K. Benson, 'Innovation and Crisis in Organisational Analysis',
      Sociological Quarterly, 1977, 18, pp. 3-16; see also L. Karpik,
      (ed.), Organisation and Environment, London, Sage, 1978, pp.
      69-102, op. cit.

(35) S. Krupp, Pattern in Organisation Analysis: A Critical
      Examination, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1961.

(36) See, Committee of Enquiry into Local Government Finance,
      The Relationship between Central and Local Government, Appendix 6,
      Cmnd. 6453, London, HMSO, 1976; R.A.W. Rhodes, Future Research
      into Central-Local Relations: A Framework for Analysis, London,
      Social Science Research Council, 1979; and R.A.W. Rhodes,
      Control and Power in Central-Local Relations, Gower Press,
      SSRC, 1981.

(37) M. Crozier, 'The Relationship between Micro- and Macro-
      sociology, a Study of Organisational Systems as an Empirical
      Approach to Problems of Macro-sociology', Human Relations,
      1972, 25, pp. 239-51; M. Crozier, 'Comparing Structures and
      Comparing Games''in G. Hofstede and M.S. Kassem,(eds.),
      European Contributions to Organisation Theory, Assen, Van Gorcum,
      1976, pp. 193-207.

(38) See J. Dearlove, The Reorganisation of British Local Government,
      Old Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective, Cambridge University
      Press, 1979, pp. 118-163 and C. Cockburn, The Local State,
      Management of Cities and of People, Pluto Press, 1977, pp. 5-40.

(39) Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Report,
      (Redcliffe-Maud), Cmnd. 4040, HMSO, 1969.

(40) Committee on the Management of Local Government, Management of
      Local Government, (Maud Report), HMSO, 1967.

(41) J. Dearlove describes these assumptions as part of an orthodoxy
      or traditional wisdom about local government. See The Re-
      organisation of British Local Government, 1979, op. cit., p. 3.

(42) See Chapter Nine.

(43) R.A.W. Rhodes, 1979, op. cit., p. 3.

(44) R.A.W. Rhodes, Control and Power in Central-Local Relations: A Framework for Analysis, 1981, op. cit. In this later work Rhodes appears to adopt a more comprehensive approach towards the organisational environment and to be more critical of the democratic, egalitarian and consensual assumptions associated with pluralist theory.

(45) R.A.W. Rhodes, 1981, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

(46) Ibid, p. 34.

(47) M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, London, Tavistock, 1964, pp. 145-7 and 162-174.

(48) J.D. Thompson, Organisations in Action, 1967, op. cit.

(49) S. Krupp, Pattern in Organisation Analysis, a Critical Examination, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1961, pp. 168-185.

(50) Ibid, p. 174.

(51) R.A.W. Rhodes, 1979, op. cit., p. 34.

(52) J.D. Thompson, Organisations in Action, 1967, op. cit.; C. Perrow, 'The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations', American Sociological Review, 26, pp. 854-866, 1961; P. Georgiou, 'The Goal Paradigm and Notes Towards a Counter-Paradigm', Administrative Science Quarterly, 18, pp. 291-310, 1973.

(53) R.A.W. Rhodes, 1979, op. cit.

(54) See Parts One and Two of the thesis.

(55) R.A.W. Rhodes, Control and Power in Central-Local Relations, 1981, op. cit, p. 129.

(56) M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, London Tavistock, 1964, especially Part Four, pp. 213-312.

(57) R.A.W. Rhodes, 1981, op. cit., p. 57.

(58) See A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 88-101 and pp. 145-150. Also S. Lukes, 'Power and Authority', in T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, (eds.), A History of Sociological Analysis, Heinemann Basic Books, 1978.

(59) This position has been clearly argued, on the one hand, by
      critical theorists like S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain,
      Routledge and Kegan Paul; J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby,
      Housing Policy and the State, 1978; A. Murie, Housing Inequality
      and Deprivation, Heinemann, 1983; J.R. Mellor, Urban Sociology
      in an Urbanised Society, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977
      and, on the other, by influential Marxists writing on housing
      issues. For example, F. Engels, The Housing Question, Progress
      Publishers, Moscow, 1975; D. Harvey, Social Justice and the
      City, London, Edward Arnold, 1973; and 'Government Policies,
      Financial Institutions and Neighbourhood Change in United
      States Cities' in M. Harloe,(ed.), Captive Cities, London,
      John Wiley, 1977, pp. 123-140; and M. Castells, The Urban
      Question, Edward Arnold, 1977.

(60) See A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, 1979, op. cit.,
      p. 254.

(61) M. Weber,'Economy and Society', C. Roth and C. Wittich, (eds.),
      New York, Bedminster, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 53.

(62) S. Lukes, 'Power and Authority', 1978, op. cit., p. 638.

(63) R. Dahl, Who Governs, Yale University Press, 1961.

(64) See N.W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, New Haven
      Yale University Press, 1963.S. Lukes argues that these writers
      present a 'one dimensional view' of power, 'Power and Authority',
      1978, op. cit., p. 668.

(65) See P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power',
      American Political Science Review, 1962, Vol. 56, pp. 947-952.
      Reprinted in Decisions, Organisations and Society,
      F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray, D.C. Potter and C.J. Pollitt,(eds.),
      Penguin, 1978 edition, pp. 392-404.

(66) P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz in Decisions, Organisations and
      Society, 1978, op. cit., pp. 396-403.

(67) P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, Power and Poverty in Theory and
      Practice, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 7-8 and
      p. 49.

(68) G. Parry and P. Morriss, 'When is a decision not a decision?',
      in I. Crewe, British Political Sociology Yearbook, Volume 1:
      Elites in Western Democracy, Croom Helm, 1974.

(69) P. Saunders, Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation,
      1979, op. cit.

(70) *Ibid*, p. 31.

(71) S. Lukes, 'Power and Authority' in <u>A History of Sociological Analysis</u>, 1978, op. cit., pp. 669-671.

(72) *Ibid*, p. 669. See also M. Mann, <u>Consciousness and Action in the Western Working Class</u>, Macmillan, 1973, op. cit.; J. Westergaard and H. Resler, <u>Class in a Capitalist Society</u>, Heinemann, 1975, for a similar view.

(73) See R.A.W. Rhodes, <u>Control and Power in Central-Local Relations</u>, 1981, op. cit., p. 57.

(74) In Chapter Nine I classified the goals of CBHAs and pointed to these structural tensions.

(75) See R. Pahl, <u>Whose City</u>, 2nd Edition, Penguin, 1975, pp. 187-194 and 265-287; J. Rex and R. Moore, <u>Race, Community and Conflict</u>, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 19-41.

(76) See Chapter Eight.

(77) See Chapter Three.

(78) See Chapters Two and Five.

(79) See Chapter Nine and the Introduction to this chapter for a discussion of the concept of 'strategic choice'.

(80) See <u>Miles Better, Miles to Go</u>, Housetalk Publication, 1984.

(81) See P. Saunders, <u>Urban Politics</u>, Penguin, 1979, op. cit., pp. 21-32.

(82) See Chapter Eight.

(83) P. Saunders, 1979, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 29.

(84) P. Selznick, <u>TVA and the Grass Roots</u>, Berkeley, University of California, 1966.

(85) See Chapters Seven and Eight.

(86) See M. Keating and A. Midwinter, <u>The Government of Scotland</u>, Mainstream Publishing, 1983, pp. 157-188. The writers argue that in spite of a tradition of Scottish control over the administrative process and of considerable scope for influence on key aspects of housing policy, a trend of centralisation is evident in Scottish housing policy.

(87) P. Saunders, 1979, op. cit., p. 30. See also P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power' in F.G. Castles, et al, (eds.), Decisions, Organisations and Society, Penguin, 1978.

(88) See Chapters Eleven and Twelve.

(89) P. Saunders, 1979, op. cit., p. 31.

(90) P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 1978, op. cit., p. 396.

(91) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham, Heinemann, London, 1979, p. 76.

(92) See also Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve of the thesis.

(93) S. Merrett, Owner Occupation in Britain, 1982, op. cit., pp. 203-206.

(94) Ibid, p. 203.

(95) C. Paris and B. Blackaby emphasise that prior to the shift in policy it was never fully resolved that rehabilitation would prove to be a cheaper option than redevelopment, although it was generally assumed that this would be the case. Not Much Improvement, 1979, op. cit., pp. 21-26.

(96) D.H. McKay and A.W. Cox, The Politics of Urban Change, Croom Helm, London, 1979.

(97) Ibid, p. 251.

(98) P. Hall, H. Land, R. Parker, A. Webb, Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy, Heinemann, London, 1978, pp. 65-66.

(99) Ibid, p. 64.

(100) R. Crossman, The Crossman Diaries, Selections from the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, 1964-1970, edited by A. Howard, (Condensed Version), Methuen, 1981, pp. 109-117.

(101) Scottish Office, Abstract of Scottish Statistics, HMSO, 1983, p. 55. See also, White Paper, Public Expenditure White Paper, Cmnd. 8789-11, February 1983, p. 76.

(102) See Chapter Seven.

(103)   See Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, <u>Manifesto</u>
        <u>for 1984 District Council Elections</u>, SFHA, 1984; this
        pattern was also evident at the SFHA Annual Conference,
        2-4 June 1984, Aviemore.

(104)   P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 1978, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 396.

(105)   See <u>Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social</u>
        Philosophy, edited by T. Bottomore and M. Rubel, London,
        Watts & Co., 1956, pp. 70-71; K. Marx and F. Engels, <u>The</u>
        <u>German Ideology</u>, edited by C.J. Arthur, Lawrence and Wishart,
        1970, pp. 64-68; G. Lukacs, 'Towards a Methodology of the
        Problem of Organisation' in <u>History and Class Consciousness</u>,
        Merlin Press, 1968; A. Gramsci, <u>Selections from the Prison</u>
        <u>Notebooks</u>, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell,
        London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971; M. Mann, 1973, <u>op. cit.</u>;
        J. Habermas, <u>Legitimation Crisis</u>, London, Heinemann, 1976 and
        C. Offe, 'Political Authority and Class Structure: An Analysis
        of Late Capitalist Societies', <u>International Journal of</u>
        <u>Sociology</u>, 11.1, 1972, pp. 73-105.

(106)   N. Ginsberg, <u>Class, Capital and Social Policy</u>, Macmillan,
        1979, pp. 121-126; J.B. Cullingworth, <u>Essays on Housing</u>
        <u>Policy, The British Scene</u>, George Allen and Unwin, 1979, pp.
        65-71; M.H. Cooper and D.C. Stafford, 'The Economic Implications
        of Fair Rents', in <u>Health, Wealth and Housing,</u> edited by
        R.A.B. Leaper, Basil Blackwell, 1980, pp. 95-116.

(107)   See H.C. Debs. Fourth Standing Committee on Statutory
        Instruments, etc., <u>Increase of Rent Restriction (Housing</u>
        <u>Association) (Scotland) Amendment Order, 1984</u>, Wednesday
        20 June 1984, London HMSO, p. 4.

(108)   Reaffirmed by senior civil servant at SFHA Conference, Aviemore,
        2-4 June, 1984.

(109)   For example, Rutherglen HA, 1983.

(110)   See, for example, R. Miliband, <u>The State in Capitalist Society</u>,
        Quartet Books Ltd., 1974, pp. 51-62; R. Miliband, <u>Marxism and</u>
        <u>Politics</u>, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 72-90; C. Offe,
        <u>Structural Problems of the Capitalist State</u>, London, Macmillan
        1982; B. Jessop, <u>The Capitalist State</u>, Martin Robertson and Co.,
        1983. There is clearly a rapidly expanding body of theory
        about the state in capitalist society and I should emphasise
        here that my discussion in Chapter Thirteen only refers to
        certain of the key areas of debate.

(111)   See Chapters Two and Four.

(112)   See S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, Routledge and Kegan
        Paul, 1979; J. Burnett, A Social History of Housing, 1815-1970,
        Methuen, 1980, for a similar analysis.

(113)   R. Miliband, 1973, op. cit., p. 3.

(114)   S. Hatch, Outside the State, Voluntary Organisations in Three
        English Towns, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 148.

(115)   A similar argument is to be found in T.A. Broadbent,
        Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, Methuen and Co.,
        1977 and by H. Stretton, Urban Planning in Rich and Poor
        Countries, Oxford University Press, 1978. See also
        S. Merrett, 1979, op. cit. The complex interrelations between
        production and consumption were also emphasised by K. Marx.
        See K. Marx, The Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of
        Political Economy, Translation and forward by M. Nicolaus,
        Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1974,
        pp. 88-100.

(116)   See M. Castells, 'Theoretical Propositions for an Experimental
        Study of Urban Social Movements', Urban Sociology, Critical
        Essays, edited by C.G. Pickvance, Tavistock Publications,
        1976, pp. 147-173; C.G. Pickvance,'On the study of urban
        social movements', in Urban Sociology, Critical Essays, 1976,
        op. cit., pp. 198-218.

(117)   See P. Saunders, Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation,
        Penguin, 1980, op. cit., pp. 103-136 and A. Cawson, Corporatism
        and Welfare, Social Policy and State Intervention in Britain,
        Heinemann, 1982.

(118)   B. Jessop, The Capitalist State, 1983, op. cit.

(119)   Ibid, p. 228.

(120)   A. Cawson, 1982, op. cit., pp. 65-73. Also P. Saunders,
        Social Theory and the Urban Question, Hutchinson & Co., 1981.

(121)   A. Cawson, 1982, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

(122)   See S. Merrett with F. Gray, Owner Occupation in Britain,
        Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, op. cit., pp. 159-188.

(123)   C. Offe, 'The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation' in L. Lindberg, <u>et al</u>, (eds.), <u>Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism</u>, London, Lexington Books, 1975 and C. Offe, <u>Structural Problems of the Capitalist State</u>, London, Macmillan, 1982.

(124)   <u>Ibid</u>.

(125)   See H. Drucker, P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, G. Peele, (eds.), <u>Developments in British Politics</u>, Macmillan Press, 1983, pp. 112-113 and pp. 153-4; S. Merrett, 1982, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 125-135; P. Saunders, <u>Urban Politics</u>, 1979, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 76-92.

(126)   N. Ginsberg, <u>Class, Capital and Social Policy</u>, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 124-126.

(127)   See Chapter Seven and the case studies. See also, A. Gamble, 'Economic Policy', pp. 134-152 in H. Drucker <u>et al</u>, (eds.), <u>Developments in British Politics</u>, 1983, <u>op. cit.</u>, especially pp. 150-152; M. Keating and A. Midwinter, <u>The Government of Scotland</u>, Mainstream Publishing, 1983, pp. 187-190.

(128)   B. Jessop, 'The Transformation of the State in Post War Britain', in R. Scase, (ed.), <u>The State in Western Europe</u>, London, Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 56-61 and pp. 233-235.

(129)   See A. Cawson, <u>Corporatism and Welfare</u>, Heinemann, 1982, p. 52. See also J.T. Winkler, 'The Corporate Economy: Theory and Administration' in R. Scase, (ed.), <u>Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control</u>, London, Allen and Unwin, 1977, pp. 43-58.

(130)   C. Offe, 'The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation' in L. Lindberg, <u>et al</u>, (eds.), <u>Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism</u>, Lexington, 1975, <u>op. cit.</u>

(131)   P. Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Beyond Whitehall', in P. Drucker, <u>et al</u>, (eds.), <u>Developments in British Politics</u>, Macmillan, 1983, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 106-133.

(132)   <u>Ibid</u>, p. 124.

(133)   A. Cawson, <u>Corporatism and Welfare</u>, 1982, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 79.

(134)   <u>Ibid</u>, p. 100.

(135)   <u>Ibid</u>, pp. 87-104.

(136)   As did the Scottish Secretary of State, Alan Stewart, speaking at the 10000 House Celebration in Glasgow, Mitchell Theatre, 27 August 1984.

(137)   A. Cawson, 1982, op. cit., pp. 41-2 and pp. 90-93.

(138)   C. Cockburn, The Local State, London, Pluto Press, 1977.

(139)   See C.G. Pickvance, Urban Sociology: Critical Essays, Tavistock, 1976 and P. Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban Question, Hutchinson and Co., 1981, op. cit., pp. 200-218.   See M. Ball, 'British Housing Policy and the House Building Industry', Capital and Class, No. 4, pp. 78-79, for a corrective emphasis.

(140)   See, for example, P. Saunders, 'The Three Elements of the Urban Question', Social Theory and the Urban Question, 1981, op. cit., p. 261.

(141)   P. Dunleavy, 'Analysing British Politics', pp. 253-299, in H. Drucker, et al, Developments in British Politics, 1983, op. cit., p. 279.

(142)   A. Cawson, 1982, op. cit., pp. 51-52 and p. 127.

(143)   P. Dunleavy, Urban Change and Conflict, Harper and Row, 1981, op. cit., pp. 190-197.

(144)   A. Cawson, Corporatism and Welfare, 1982, op. cit., p. 127.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CBHAs AND THEIR PLANNING, PARTICIPATION
AND HOUSING OUTCOMES

In this final chapter I shall draw some conclusions about
Glasgow's housing associations in terms of their role in the urban
planning system; their consequences for local resident participation
and their impact on local housing. Whilst the thesis has focused
more generally on the development of housing associations, in this
chapter I shall focus specifically on Glasgow's CBHAs.

Before turning to the themes which I have chosen to explore
I shall remind the reader that whilst the research has documented the
development of two CBHAs in particular (Chapters Eleven and Twelve),
I also collated information in relation to five other associations.
Moreover, interviews were held with key participants in these
associations, in representative bodies and in government agencies.
Between 1979 and 1981 I monitored developments in the wider planning
system by drawing on all possible sources of information. I attended
meetings and conferences, analysed reports, newspaper articles, and
accumulated what seemed like a multitude of diaries and files and,
wherever possible, I updated this information in 1983.

I have explained in the Introduction to the thesis that I
have also been actively involved with CBHAs and their representative
bodies in a number of capacities. My participation predated the
research to 1977, when I was an official in Reidvale HA. It was
revived in 1979 when I joined a local Action Group which aimed to

promote a CBHA to coordinate tenement rehabilitation in Rutherglen.
It has continued throughout the period during which I have been
writing up my research. Until this point I have seldom knowingly
drawn on my general experience as a participant, for reasons which
I explained in the Introduction. However in this final chapter,
in which I am drawing some general conclusions about CBHAs, I shall
at several points draw on that experience. In the following
section I shall consider how the development of CBHAs has reflected
certain significant changes in Glasgow's planning system.

1.   CBHAs and the urban planning system

        I have argued that the development of CBHAs in Glasgow during
the 1970s represented a deviation from long established forms of
planning intervention in the city. Since the 19th century, local
authority planning intervention focused on the extensive problems of
housing obsolescence and shortage. These problems had restricted most
significantly the housing opportunities of working class people in the
West of Scotland and, at the same time, were a key focus of their
political representatives. Also, until the 1970s, the local authority's
strategies for tackling housing obsolescence and urban renewal were
notably bureaucratic, authoritarian and centrally coordinated and
involved large scale implementation of central government enabling
legislation. The "community based" strategy therefore represented
an atypical development in Glasgow's planning scene.

        I have argued that local authority support for the role of
neighbourhood based associations in Glasgow, emerged out of a crisis
of legitimacy and funding, during a period of recognition that positive

action was essential to alleviate the massive problem of sub-tolerable housing.[1] We saw how there was growing questioning of the legitimacy of the local authority's strategy of slum clearance, in terms of the chronic disruption it caused to people and to neighbourhoods. A climate of criticism had developed amongst local residents, the media and a minority of building professionals and this stimulated the search for a new approach within the local authority. At the same time there was a growing economic crisis which was reflected in central state attempts to curb public expenditure; in a changing conception of the role of the local state in housing provision and in the policy shift from new building to rehabilitation.[2] I have emphasised further that area rehabilitation is an inherently uncertain planning and building process, which requires flexible and sensitive coordination and an approach which is adaptive to local circumstances. The rehabilitation policy therefore generated new organisational challenges and problems for the local authority and this pattern has been identified in other studies.[3] As Paris and Blackaby concluded from their study of Improvement Policy in Birmingham:

> the problems of management are more difficult for
> improvement policies than for slum clearance. The
> reason for this is that so much of the implementation
> is mediated by private individuals and agencies which
> are outside direct public control. (4)

This then was the context in which 27 neighbourhood based housing associations (CBHAs) were promoted during the 1970s and early 1980s, by a partnership of local and central state agencies. The

CBHA rehabilitation policy in Glasgow also had the support of local residents. We have seen how CBHAs deviated from the mainstream of the housing association movement, in terms of their local base, their area remit and their involvement of local residents on Management Committees. By the mid 1970s, however, the planning innovation of CBHAs had begun to show signs of routinisation. What began as a planning experiment was supported and extended via the systematic allocation of roles and functions between those government agencies which have significantly influenced the role of associations. However we saw in the case studies how local policy-making by CBHA participants in Reidvale and Govanhill influenced their membership constituency, their zone of operation and local housing outcomes.

I have stressed that CBHAs were a notable innovation in Glasgow's planning system. However, we saw in Chapter Five and in the case studies that by the late 1970s there were significant changes in the local authority's approach to housing issues. In general these changes were influenced by political and economic developments subsequent to the formation of CBHAs. In particular the economic crisis in Britain has interacted with government policies of privatisation and expenditure control to restrict the role of the local state in the housing sphere. In this context Glasgow District Council (GDC) was increasingly to assume the role of "caretaker" in relation to the city's housing stock. It became more extensively involved in liaising with private sector interests in the pursuit of its policy of inner area housing renewal. In implementing this policy it involved

residents' associations in Repairs schemes, housing associations and also private developers. At the same time, in response to central government encouragement of public participation, GDC has increasingly promoted and liaised with tenants' associations, residents' associations and tenant management and ownership cooperatives in the public sector. The District Council was demonstrating the twin strands of corporate management and public participation which were so aptly emphasised as key characteristics of the local state in Cockburn's study.[5] Against this background we can view CBHAs as an atypical planning development which has highlighted the emergence of a new style of relationship between the local authority and its urban environment.

I have emphasised throughout, that the planning context of CBHAs is not specifically "urban". We have seen that GDC worked in partnership with the Housing Corporation (HC) and that since 1978 associations sought collectively to influence the policies of central state agencies. I shall now turn to consider some further important ways in which the development of CBHAs, as well as similarities and differences between them, have been influenced by their wider environment.

The thesis has illustrated the complexity of CBHA policies and of the planning system and it has emphasised the uncertainties which are intrinsic to rehabilitation. These complexities and uncertainties have interacted to shape CBHAs as small, but specialised

organisations in which officials inevitably influence relations with
government agencies, the progress of rehabilitation and the evolution
of association policies.[6] The case studies have illustrated that
the key role of officials is an unavoidable consequence of the
organisational and funding complexity of CBHAs. The influence of
officials also reflects participants' dependence on professional
expertise and the "part time" involvement of lay Committee members.
Moreover, official influence is reinforced by the established patterns
of communication and decision-making which characterise government
bodies. These include issue based meetings, working parties and
conferences and also the inevitable 'phone calls and unofficial and
informal contacts, which all participants recognise as a major source
of influence on policy-making.

We have seen that patterns of Committee involvement vary
between associations and in the same association over time. In some
associations Committee members have taken an active role in represent-
ing their association to government agencies, both in an·official
capacity and at a more informal level. At the same time officials
from state agencies have had to develop new skills to cope with
questioning by local representatives and with being called to account
at public meetings. Therefore a key feature of CBHAs is that they
have involved decentralisation or devolution in the urban planning
system. Yet we have seen that CBHAs, as private bodies funded by
public monies, are subject to extensive controls and constraints on
their operations. In sum the CBHA rehabilitation programme has taken
place, as Cockburn emphasised in relation to local authority

participation schemes, on ground prepared by the state.[7] I have

stressed, however, that the texture and boundaries of this "ground"

have been incrementally modified by the demands and strategies of

associations.

In Glasgow we have seen how the local authority has been

notably supportive of local associations, which from the start it

regarded as preferable to private landlords. We must remember,

however, that housing associations are not in themselves a financial

drain on the local authority. Like the SSHA they have provided a

channel for bringing central government funding into the city's

inner areas to alleviate major housing problems. At the same time

different departments in the local authority - Planning, Private

Sector (Clearance and Improvement Section) and Housing Management -

have developed more flexible ways of working with housing associations.

There are of course the inevitable confusions and communication gaps

which characterise all large bureaucratic organisations but on the

whole the Council has been constructive in its support. The GDC

has approached CBHAs as an intrinsic aspect of housing provision in

the city. Moreover, certain influential local politicians have up-

held CBHAs as a policy achievement which has influenced the Council's

approach to other issues, such as repair schemes in the private and

public sector.[8] We must remember, however, that since 1981, the

area renewal objectives of CBHAs have been significantly restrained,

not only by shortages of funding, but also by competition for land

and buildings with private developers. Different areas like Reidvale

and Govanhill have been affected by the District Council's "alternative strategy" of promoting public-private partnerships and building for sale in the inner areas. On the other hand we must also remember that until recently this pattern has been less marked in Glasgow, than in other cities like Edinburgh and Dundee.

I have stressed the extent of local authority support for CBHAs in the 1970s. However, I do not want to imply here that the notable qualitative shift in relations between inner area residents who became involved in housing associations and the Council was necessarily reflected in the experience of council tenants. For the majority of council tenants in Glasgow's large peripheral estates, the Council controls access to decent housing more directly than is the case for residents of improvement areas. In fact the twin pronged strategy of local authority planning intervention in the form of Action Area declaration and the promotion of locally controlled associations in areas with sub-tolerable housing, has served to expand the range of realistic housing opportunities and choice for residents. In Govanhill and Reidvale we saw that the first year or so of CBHA development involved mainly a phase of "gearing up" and of local planning and consultation. The regularity of delays resulted in growing criticism of associations which local residents blamed for prolonging their waiting in houses without baths and WCs, which were often in chronic disrepair. In both neighbourhoods the CBHAs were at times identified as part of "the Council" by local people. On the other hand, once their houses had been programmed for improvement, residents

gained access to the possibilities of either an improved house in the
area (their existing house or one which was more suited to their
family size and circumstances) or to increasing their chances of a
council house. Such opportunities were always limited by the
practicalities of what was on offer from the CBHA or the Council.
In general, however, the range of housing choices is greater for tenants
and owner-occupiers in improvement areas than is the case either for
residents of demolition areas or for District Council tenants in parts
of the peripheral schemes, where housing and its environment are
seriously in disrepair.

Therefore local residents have gained access to new opportunities
as area improvement schemes have progressed. On the other hand, there
was no uniformity in the progession of CBHA programmes or in the
opportunities brought by them. For instance certain neighbourhoods
had a special planning status which enabled them to attract additional
funds, beyond that routinely provided for "back court" environmental
improvements (for example from the SDA in GEAR and the Maryhill
Corridor); some areas fell within the planners' definition of Areas
of Priority Treatment which provided access to Urban Aid funding for
neighbourhood projects; some areas faced delays caused by problems
of undermining and some faced delays and problems in coordinating
improvement schemes due to the extent of commercial properties. Also,
within each locality, the level of grants for backcourt schemes changed
over time and in certain areas tenement blocks affected by structural
instability became demolition areas, thus destroying residents' hopes
for remaining in their neighbourhoods. Moreover, the case studies

have illustrated how in some neighbourhoods CBHA participation has
generated partnerships between associations, neighbourhood groups and
local authorities. Outcomes have included initiatives, such as
Reidvale's neighbourhood centre and Govanhill's church, as well as
more locally responsive planning, such as in Govanhill.

On the building front we have seen that standards of housing
provision increased, on the one hand, due to the cumulative rehabili-
tation experience of CBHAs, builders and building professionals and,
on the other, as the result of these groups' pressure on government
agencies to adopt a more flexible approach to standards of tenement
rehabilitation.[9] In general, therefore, the progression of CBHA
rehabilitation programmes has effected incremental improvements in
local housing opportunities for Action Area residents. At the same
time, however, we have seen that there are differences between CBHA
neighbourhoods which have reflected the influence of contingencies
such as subsidence and structural problems.

Housing market factors and housing tenure patterns have also
influenced neighbourhood differences. For example, we saw in the case
studies how associations' area renewal objectives by the 1980s were
restricted by the growing interest of private developers in producing
or rehabilitating housing for profit in the inner areas. This
development in itself has demonstrated the "pump priming" effects of
state investment and CBHA rehabilitation. Such patterns have varied,
however, with established perceptions of neighbourhoods as zones
favourable to private investment, and with the flow of funding to

CBHAs. For example, there is no doubt that public sector funding restraint has led some associations, like Shettleston and Queens Cross, to take on board privatisation initiatives. Moreover we saw how, in Reidvale, the association's planned new build development was threatened by commercial developers' proposals and, in Govanhill, a private developer purchased housing which the association had long planned to rehabilitate. It is interesting that by mid 1984 residents were protesting about the circumstances they later experienced during and after the renovation of their housing. Also by 1984 in Govanhill the local association's plans for new building on land cleared by demolition were dependent on local authority planning decisions in the light of a private developer's interest in the site.

Govanhill, I have suggested, has been an area more attractive to owner-occupation than Reidvale, and I have emphasised more generally the significant housing market differences within and between CBHA localities. In areas like Govanhill, the vibrancy of the housing market meant that owner-occupiers who sold their houses after rehabilitation, just like private developers, were able to profit considerably from state subsidy. This pattern persisted in spite of the local problems associated with undermining in areas like Govanhill and Partick. On the other hand, I have emphasised that there were social status differences within Govanhill which were reflected in aspects of the housing market. In general, however, we have seen that owner-occupiers whose families were overcrowded were mainly unable at the same time to retain their housing ownership and to alleviate their overcrowding.

850.

In general there was greater predictability about the phasing
of Action Area declaration as the improvement programme progressed
in both neighbourhoods. However, in Govanhill, a much larger area
than Reidvale, residents of certain blocks faced ma or uncertainties
which were related both to the issue of subsidence and to state fund-
ing. Therefore whilst in all localities the establishment of CBHA
programmes has served to generate new expectations about housing
amongst local residents, there has been no evenness to the realisation
of such expectations. As Mellor argues, however, we must remember
that low income inner area neighbourhoods have always been characterised
by social divisions and housing inequalities.[10] The key point is
that area renewal has served to highlight the varied influences on
inequalities of access to decent housing.

Returning to the similarities between CBHA neighbourhoods,
a general pattern has been that over time CBHAs have come to be seen
as a key agency controlling housing opportunities for local residents.
We saw in the case studies how frustration and aggression are fre-
quently focused on CBHA participants, rather than on the state agencies
which provide access to funding and their authority to develop their
programmes. The focus of local criticism would clearly have been
different if the local authority in the early 1970s had resolved
either to sustain the slum clearance programme which was planned for
sub-tolerable inner area housing, or to implement the rehabilitation
strategy itself, by devolving into area offices. Moreover, relations
between the local authority and residents' groups clearly differ   in
cases of GDC coordinated repair schemes and those of CBHA rehabilitation.

I have stressed in this section that the origins and development of CBHAs have reflected certain key changes in the role and the approach of the local authority to the issue of housing obsolescence in the inner areas. In particular the development of CBHAs established new opportunities for the involvement of local residents. I would suggest further that CBHAs represent a locally based organisational resource which has the capacity to generate new forms of enterprise involving, on the one hand, public bodies and, on the other, voluntary and neighbourhood groups. Such partnerships are able to ensure that new initiatives in housing and social provision are locally oriented and responsive. However, as I argued in Chapter Thirteen, we should remember that such partnerships are likely to involve power inequalities between participating agencies.

At the time of writing the 'partnership' pattern is increasingly in evidence. We have seen how CBHAs have provided purpose built houses for the elderly and disabled in their neighbourhoods and sometimes they have done so in partnership with national specialist associations, like Key and Bield, which produce houses for the mentally handicapped and elderly respectively. Also various non-housing initiatives have come to fruition, such as Elderpark's Day Centre for the Elderly, funded jointly by Elderpart HA, the Community Services Agency, the Social Work Department and the Manpower Services Commission. Other initiatives include a multi-purpose resource centre (Yoker) and a development of small workshops (Queens Cross) to encourage local employment opportunities.[11] The case studies have also highlighted

the ongoing tensions between neighbourhood groups (tenants associations, residents groups and CBHAs). However, in spite of such tensions, local groups have jointly influenced the planners' intentions regarding significant local problems. We saw this pattern in Reidvale in the case of environmental improvements and in Govanhill in relation to new building and the undermining issue.

All these developments reflect some reshaping of the urban planning system. Whilst the corporate planning approach prevails, I would argue that at the present time there is more scope for local initiatives on the housing front in CBHA localities. Moreover, we have seen that the organisational resources housed in CBHAs have been increasingly valued by government agencies. In 1974 when the local authority and the Housing Corporation resolved to promote Glasgow's CBHAs they placed their confidence in significantly unprofessionalised, local bodies. Today, the coordination role of CBHAs in local planning initiatives is recognised by the Scottish Development Agency and also the Strathclyde Region. At the same time we have seen in the case studies that new forms of professionalism have been evolving in CBHAs.

There are, therefore, three main strands of the shift in the role of the local authority, which have been represented in the development of CBHAs. These are corporate management; partnerships between public, private and voluntary agencies and, finally, increased scope for local participation and locally oriented initiatives. That these developments have taken place during a period of economic crisis and public sector funding restraint is perhaps not surprising. I have

argued, however, that they were also stimulated by changes in planning and in managerial ideologies within the state.

A key feature of CBHAs which has been stressed in the thesis has been their role in involving area residents in responsibility for local improvement programmes and for managing the housing which is owned by associations. In the following section I shall attempt to draw some further conclusions about the characteristics and outcomes of this participation and its meaning to those who assumed new responsibilities within the urban planning system.

2.   CBHAs and participation

I have discussed earlier some of the main themes in the litera-ture on public participation and community action.[12] We saw that studies of neighbourhood based participation exercises have focused on different aspects of participation. They have emphasised differences in the organisational characteristics, and in the scope and intensity of participation.[13] Further, there have been competing explanations of increasing demands for citizen participation. Paris and Blackaby have described two main approaches here:

> One argues that public participation is the spontaneous
> product of growing public disenchantment with government
> ... The other interpretation sees public participation,
> not as a consequence of public dissatisfaction, but as a
> device initiated and sustained by government to provide
> legitimation for actions that it already intends to take,
> particularly when that action may otherwise meet public
> opposition. (14)

Paris and Blackaby suggest that such debates cannot be settled in the abstract and that both versions of the influences on participation may be relevant. In the rest of this section I shall consider some further aspects of the CBHA case of public participation. In doing so I shall take account of two important studies of housing policy and participation in Birmingham[15] - a city in which planning has shown certain striking similarities to Glasgow.

2.a.   <u>A Tale of Two Cities</u>?

Paris and Blackaby have concluded from their study of Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham that both theories of participation are relevant to Birmingham's urban renewal strategy. This policy emerged during the 1970s, following a Conference on Urban Renewal in 1972. The local authority's programme in Birmingham involved two levels of participation: first, at a local level in renewal areas and, secondly, through a city-wide forum. Local participation was mediated through public meetings, and communications were channelled through locally based project teams and residents' associations promoted by the local authority. City-wide participation was focused through a federation of residents' associations. In practice there were marked local variations in the intensity of participation. Its "scope" was notably limited to consultations about environmental improvement and its out-comes were marginal in terms of the effects of consultation on local authority policy.[16]

Now, just as I have argued that the resident involvement
dimension of the CBHA-inner area renewal strategy was unique to
Glasgow, Paris and Blackaby emphasise the uniqueness of the Birmingham
developments which they have documented. I would suggest that both
the Glasgow and Birmingham developments have illustrated how extensive-
ly central government policies of public participation, community
development and area rehabilitation were corporately implemented by
two of Britain's largest local authorities. However, the institutional
arrangements were significantly different producing certain dissimilar
outcomes. In particular, the focus of resident dissent and criticism
in Birmingham was the local authority, whereas in the Glasgow case
it was CBHAs and central government agencies. There were also notable
similarities in the participation strategy and its outcomes in the
two cities.

In the Birmingham case the writers conclude that there was a
notable consensus between the local authority and local residents about
the mutual advantages of the urban renewal-participation strategy.
This consensus prevailed although the strategy had been a local
authority initiative and despite the fact that control rested mainly
with the authority.[17] I have emphasised similar contradictory
aspects of the Glasgow pattern, although we have seen that in the
case of CBHAs control rests significantly with a complex of central
and local state agencies. A further key similarity is that the
experience of participation in Birmingham is described as having led
to a greater awareness amongst local residents of the structure and

dynamics of power within the local authority.

In the same vein we have seen that participation produced a
growing awareness amongst CBHA participants of the politics of decision-
making and control within the state. Further similarities between
the two cities were as follows: first, there were marked variations
in the social composition and representativeness of residents' groups;
secondly, there was the supportive role played by some professionals
in relation to some local committees, and finally, there was a general
emphasis by participants that their participation was issue focused,
constructive and "non-political".[18] I have argued, however, that
whilst participation may take place outside institutionalised party
politics, it is clearly political with a small "p" in the sense of
generating interest and action which is focused on influencing state
policies.

Now turning to differences between the Birmingham study and my
observations upon Glasgow's CBHAs, I would argue that the level and
scope of participation has been considerably greater in the Glasgow
case. In terms of Arnstein's levels of participation (Manipulation,
Therapy, Information, Consultation, Placation, Partnership, Delegated
Power and Citizen Control), I would suggest that CBHAs involve a
considerable degree of 'delegated power' in the coordination and
implementation of area renewal.[19] To be more specific, CBHAs have
delegated power to the extent that following Action Area declaration
they determine the phasing of improvement work; they employ pro-
fessionals and contractors and monitor their work; they have the

capacity to influence housing standards; they decide at what stages
in the improvement programme to consult tenants, owner-occupiers
and commercial properties. Moreover, they involve aspects of
citizen control in their role as local landlords, in particular in
the sphere of allocations. We have seen, however, that they have
had virtually no influence on the determination of rent levels. The
delegated powers and aspects of local control which are characteristic
of CBHAs are therefore highly circumscribed by the wider planning
context.

I have argued, however, that the scope and degree of delegated
power and local control are considerably greater in the case of
Glasgow's CBHAs than in the Birmingham study of residents' involve-
ment in planning. I shall now stress certain further important
similarities in approach, and differences in empirical focus, of
the two studies. In general my earlier discussion of public
participation in Chapter Ten is consistent with Paris and Blackaby's
position on the dynamics of power and control and resident participation.
It is especially consistent with their view that resident participation
establishes tendencies both to incorporation and to protest.[20]
They describe incorporation:

> as a process whereby the potential anger and frustration
> of communities affected by planning is diffused, so that
> concerted action to challenge the existing order of things
> is diverted into "useful" and "constructive" discussions
> with each other and with representatives of the (local)
> authority concerned. (21)

At the same time the incorporation thesis stresses that the influence of residents' associations on state policies is minimal.

Paris and Blackaby suggest that the incorporation tendency is not inevitable and that participation in Birmingham did not serve to quell protest and opposition. They refer to the fact that prior to the renewal strategy quiescence and resignation were the norm in the inner areas and they highlight examples of how at times local residents entered into open conflict with the authorities. Yet they conclude like many writers that public participation has had a very limited effect on policy outcomes. For example, Dennis and Cockburn have argued that whilst participation may be characterised by incipient protest and radicalism, it also serves to extend social control by state agencies.[22] Dennis stresses that public participation schemes enable local authorities to educate participants about what is technically and economically practicable. He suggests that such schemes serve to limit participants' demands and further, to induce "trust" by local residents, both in the personnel of state agencies and in the policy-making system. Moreover, participation schemes provide a means by which state agencies can gauge and monitor reactions to their policies. Such a process requires effective rather than token participation and may have outcomes which contradict state policies.

I would argue that the scope and degree of participation which we have seen in the case studies means that CBHAs offer the scope for

effective rather than token participation. We have seen how CBHA
policies, and campaigning by participants on wider fronts, have had
cumulative and sometimes significant outcomes for both state agencies
and local housing opportunities. I would suggest that this pattern
reflects a more extensive devolvement of control in the case of
Glasgow's CBHAs as compared with the extent and scope of participation
described in the British literature. Yet at the same time the experi-
ence of Glasgow's CBHAs clearly does reflect the same tendencies to
incorporation which have been identified in the literature. I
disagree. however, with the emphasis in Dennis et al's conclusions,
that participation serves mainly to generate trust in the policy
makers and in the planning system. I would argue that for most
participants in CBHAs, their participation has led to a pragmatic
awareness of the locations of power and of its dynamics within the
state. Such awareness is not consistent with a simplistic or naive
trust in the decision takers and the planning system. We should
therefore distinguish between, on the one hand, a simplistic trust
and, on the other, participants' awareness that most policy makers
are reasonable people who operate according to their own values and
objectives and within the confines of their position within a planning
system which is influenced by political and economic developments.
Moreover, CBHA participants are aware that the realisation of local
objectives will be advantaged if they can sustain cooperative and
constructive working relations between CBHAs and state agencies.
Finally I would suggest that participation and local representation
may encourage for some people a growing sense of self importance, as

a result of the opportunities generated for liaising with powerful representatives of government agencies. The phenomenon of "expanding egos" is, however, a source of bemusement to the majority of participants. On the other hand, participants also recognise that such liaisons are essential to ensure that the economic and centrally rationalist objectives pursued by state agencies are countered by the continuous presentation of arguments in support of local people and special interest groups.

Whilst the studies which I have discussed in this section have focused on the outcomes of participation, my study has concentrated on an experiment in planning decentralisation and local control. I shall now explore further the relations between centralised planning and neighbourhood control.

2.b.   Control and accountability

In the pursuit of different types of organisational goals CBHAs have varying amounts of influence and exercise different forms of control. We have seen that in their role in housing production and in coordinating area improvement programmes, associations have influenced changes in standards of house improvement and in government policies about the role of associations in area renewal. There have also been differences in the pace and shape of local programmes. Such differences have reflected local contingencies as well as the outcomes of strategic bargaining between associations and state agencies. I have stressed that key aspects of area renewal

programmes have been influenced most significantly by government policies and funding constraints. I have argued, however, that the resident involvement and local accountability characteristics of CBHAs have been reflected in new opportunities for local influence. Local residents participating in CBHAs have been able to press home local problems to state agencies, as well as to builders and building professionals. In emphasising these opportunities of influence my conclusions differ from those stressed by other writers in relation to housing associations.[23]

We have also seen how in the attempt to influence the pace, quality and other dimensions of local area renewal programmes, associations engage in bargaining with powerful agencies, as well as consultation and bargaining with tenants, owner-occupiers, landlords and owners of commercial properties. This pattern of bargaining and compromise stems from goals of accommodating local residents' preferences, and from the recognition that support and cooperation by the varied interests related to local housing are essential to the progress of area renewal. In their production role, therefore, CBHAs cannot operate autonomously, either locally or in relation to government agencies. Parts Three and Four of the thesis have illustrated the complex dynamics of accountability and control both in relation to government agencies and to local residents.

I shall now turn to focus on the role of CBHAs as local land-lords. I have argued that, on the one hand, CBHAs have had considerable autonomy in the sphere of allocating housing, in terms of both policy development and its implementation. On the other hand, I have suggested that they have had virtually no influence to date in the sphere of rent determination, other than perhaps encouraging increased administrative rationality and control within the Rents Registration Service.

In the sphere of allocations I have stressed that CBHA participants, just like government agencies, control access to the scarce resource of decent housing for local residents and for those who want to live in the inner areas. In their allocations policies they define rules of access to the housing in CBHA ownership. Further, CBHA officials and Housing Management sub committees resolve particular outcomes for "special cases". These powers are routinised but they are not unchecked. As we have seen, CBHAs are legally obliged to publish allocations policies,[24] they are required under standing agreements, to take up nominations from local authority waiting lists and, like all associations, they are monitored by the Housing Corporation which is empowered to intervene in association affairs.[25]

Within this framework of controls and accountability, I would argue that as collective landlords CBHA participants have a considerable capacity to generate bias or to unofficially operational-ise their own prejudices. Just as I have argued that state policies

may reflect a conservative bias,[26] I shall suggest here that
CBHA participants have the scope to operate as progressive or as
reactionary landlords. Two arguments which I discussed earlier in
Chapter Nine have relevance to this point. First, I suggested that
CBHAs, as neighbourhood based and resident controlled housing
agencies, are likely to reflect the social, political and economic
circumstances of their participants. Secondly, I drew on a body of
theory which stresses the key role of powerful groups in influencing
the development of organisational goals and strategies.[27]
Regarding these points, we saw in earlier chapters how the deterioration
of the inner areas since 1945 resulted from the decline of industry
and from decreasing investment in property maintenance by commercial
landlords. The slum clearance strategy also cumulatively served to
reduce the confidence of private investors and to establish an
environment of major uncertainties for local residents. These
different developments interacted, therefore, to effect economic,
physical and social blight of the inner areas. In Chapter Ten and
in the case studies we also saw how they influenced the social
composition of neighbourhoods and the orientations of CBHA Committees.

On the social composition of CBHA Committees, a 1979 survey of
housing association committee membership highlighted certain notable
differences between Edinburgh and Glasgow associations.[28] The
Report argued that:

> Reflecting the social and economic structure of the areas=
> being rehabilitated, and the Glasgow penchant for resident
> based management, a high proportion of members in Glasgow
> were not in employment. In Glasgow this proportion was
> 57% and it reflects not only participation by retired
> households and married women, but it also mirrors high
> local unemployment rates. In Edinburgh, roughly a third
> of members had a managerial, professional background -
> (31.2% as compared with approximately 17.7% in Glasgow). (29)

We should also remember that the working class residents of Glasgow's

inner areas have traditionally had minimal access to influence. I

have suggested that the experience of control by working people in

the West of Scotland has generally been characterised by authoritarian-

ism and non-participation in the spheres of work, education and

housing. This pattern has clearly differed from that of certain

other political cultures. For example, as Greve stated in 1971:

> Attitudes to housing are part of prevailing social values,
> and in societies like those in Scandinavia which have under-
> gone and are undergoing rapid social and economic change,
> housing values are also changing. These changes are
> reflected in a variety of ways including rising standards
> of space, equipment and design for the immediate dwelling;
> growing attention to the quality of the environment, and
> to the relationship between the dwelling and the environ-
> ment, and hence between the household and its neighbours.
> At the same time, there is continual discussion about the
> nature, functions and effectiveness of the agencies and
> institutions involved in the provision and management. (30)

I would argue that a similar pattern of changing values and expectat-

ions has become apparent in Glasgow since the early 1970s.

I now want to return to our focus on CBHAs as local landlords,

and to consider further this aspect of CBHAs in the light of the

preceding discussion of political and cultural influences. I am

suggesting here that we can expect CBHAs to reflect certain
authoritarian and parochial tendencies, alongside more open-minded
and progressive ones. Such contradictory tendencies have been clearly
identified in relation to local authorities,[31] and the growing
recognition of reactionary tendencies in housing authorities has
stimulated an emerging drive towards professionalisation.[32]
Also in the case studies we have seen that there is a continual process
of reflection about, and modification of, allocations policies in
CBHAs. We saw too, that there is a growing emphasis on systematising
property maintenance within the Housing Management sections of CBHAs.

What then might be the main influences on the traditionalism
and parochialism to which I have referred? I would suggest first
that in CBHAs reactionary tendencies may stem from elitism and from
traditionalist values and assumptions relating to the landlord-
tenant relationship. Such values may be reflected in the conditions
applied to tenancies (Tenants Handbooks and Allocations Policies) and
in control strategies focused on problems with tenants. For example,
I would suggest that a "traditionalist" control strategy might reflect
participants' assumptions that the association cannot afford to be
recognised by local residents as taking a "soft" approach to problems
with tenants, such as the long term non-payment of rent and "anti-
social" behaviour. The belief that a firm line is required in such
instances is likely to be associated with more pragmatic concerns
that if the association is perceived as a soft option, then there may
be a "multiplier" effect. The parallels with assumptions about child
rearing are striking.

Regarding the question of parochialism, I would suggest that parochialism may stem from the dominant goals of CBHA participants which emphasise that local associations should serve to halt the trend of social decline which has affected their neighbourhoods. Such goals may be reflected in participants' emphasis on "local connection" and on catering for the needs of existing local residents, as well as in goals relating to the longer term social composition of their neighbourhoods which are reflected in CBHA allocations policies.

Having recognised these potential tendencies, I also want to acknowledge here the possibility of a power group developing within a CBHA Committee which is so reactionary and so locally oriented that the CBHA develops into a local housing agency controlled by an authoritarian local elite, which is unaccessible to local influence. In my study I came across no such cases, although as a participant I have been aware of criticisms to that effect which have been focused on CBHAs. If such a pattern were to develop I would argue that the Housing Corporation clearly has a role to play in exercising its monitoring responsibilities, as also have local councillors. Moreover, I would suggest that residents' groups might take up either or both of these channels of complaint which are accessible in the dual system of public accountability.

I have now pointed to certain possible outcomes of authoritarian or parochial values which, I have suggested, may at times characterise CBHAs and, further, I have discussed some implications of the external

monitoring of associations. In doing so I have highlighted certain
criticisms of CBHAs as local landlords. I would suggest, however,
that such a critical perspective is equally relevant to all housing
agencies. Against this background I now want to remind the reader
of some of the key features of CBHAs which were identified in the case
studies. Certain characteristics of CBHAs, to which I shall refer
below, are features which would seem to positively counteract
reactionary tendencies by generating progressiveness, self-monitoring
and policy reflection within CBHAs.

For example in both case studies at certain stages we saw
tendencies towards parochialism and traditionalism. Parochialism
was reflected in relation to the Committees' responsibilities as
landlords, whilst I would suggest that we saw evidence of
authoritarianism and traditionalism mainly in relation to the role
of Committees as employers. These patterns were, however, significant
only at certain stages of CBHA development and we should remember
that a key aspect of the case studies has been to highlight the local
specificity of many of the major influences on patterns of association
development. There were further patterns which were commonly in
evidence in both associations. First we saw that in both neighbour-
hoods there was regular open criticism of CBHAs which was focused
either on particular issues and participants or on general conceptions
of the style of their management. There is no question that
participants came to expect such criticism as a normal feature of
participation. However, at the same time, we saw that participants

are sensitive to local criticism and that it frequently generated
reflection on policies and administrative decision-making. This was
evident in the Govanhill case in respect of the issues of allocations,
the phasing of blocks for improvement and standards of rehabilitation.
In the Reidvale case, we saw the outcomes of local criticism for
the association's approach to housing standards, to owner-occupier
improvements and to allocations. On the other hand, we saw how local
criticism was frequently misplaced or was at times based only on a
partial understanding of the influences on association policies and
practices. Also at times local criticism emphasised assumptions
that associations would cater primarily for local people, thus
reinforcing parochial tendencies in CBHAs.

Continuing with the theme of the influence of external criticism
and accountability, we have seen how associations generally have
been influenced also by advice and criticism coming from the Housing
Corporation and the District Council. Moreover, we have seen that
participants have regularly been concerned by political uncertainties
pertaining to their role, both in the sphere of neighbourhood pro-
vision and in terms of state planning. I would argue that participants
generally accept the validity of routinised public accountability,
which is such a significant aspect of the context of housing
associations. However, we have seen in the case studies and in
Part Three of the thesis how CBHA participants have been critical of
certain key aspects of the implementation of controls and
accountability by state agencies.

A second type of influence and one which I would suggest is associated with progressiveness in CBHAs, stems from their connections with the voluntary housing sector. Whilst I have pointed to the paternalism of early charitable provision, we must remember that progressiveness and flexibility are much noted characteristics of the long established voluntary housing movement and, particularly so, on the housing management front.[33] It was these characteristics which attracted many participants to become involved in CBHAs, which were viewed as a challenging and meaningful alternative to established housing agencies operating in Glasgow. To many new participants, CBHAs represented a medium for enabling local resident involvement in improving local housing conditions and opportunities. They were seen to provide opportunities to establish increased local accessibility and accountability on the local housing front. Moreover, they were seen to offer the scope for more flexible and innovative approaches to local, social problems.

A different "progressive" influence which has been illustrated in the case studies has been that of increasing professionalisation. In Chapters Eight and Nine I have illustrated the growing support for educational and training provision amongst Glasgow associations[34] and in the case study associations we saw how there were notable influences towards increasing professionalisation. Against this background I would suggest that today most of the residents on CBHA Committees recognise that to be authoritarian landlords would not solve local social problems, although it might "displace" some of them (for example, by evictions). They also

recognise that for CBHAs to operate as enlightened local landlords requires education, in the wider sense of challenging their own established values, as well as in the narrower sense of learning progressive housing management techniques.

Finally, a fourth and important influence on increasing progressiveness relates to the practical achievements by associations in alleviating local housing conditions. We saw in both Reidvale and Govanhill how the progress of area rehabilitation schemes served to reduce the most chronic housing conditions and established greater scope for flexibility in allocations. Such progress, I would suggest, establishes an environment which is conducive to more open mindedness and to new initiatives on the housing management front.

At the present time I would suggest that most of Glasgow's CBHAs have reached such a stage in their development programmes – a stage which is conducive to increased reflection on their role as local landlords. Their growing emphasis on developing effective systems of planned maintenance, and on providing housing for "special needs" groups which are not catered for within the wider housing system, is clearly illustrative of this pattern.

I would suggest further that in the next few years we are likely to see more experimentation on the participation front by those CBHAs with advanced development programmes. At the present time participants are aware of a range of strategies which could serve to generate increased tenant participation. Such initiatives could take the form

of tenant cooperatives and management or consultative committees based in the tenement "close" or "block". Implementation of such options will depend,however, on policy decisions, staffing resources and on local interest.

Just as we saw in the case studies I would argue that policy and practices in the sphere of allocations are significantly contentious for any housing authority. This is a policy area in which the social values of members and officials notably affect housing opportunities of the poorest, disadvantaged and minority groups. As recognised in recent legislation[35] it is a policy area where existing and prospective tenants should know their rights. Moreover, we have seen that housing management in general is a continual focus of local monitoring and that proximity to local criticism has influenced CBHA participants to continually modify their allocations and property management systems.

Finally in this discussion on participation I shall consider to what extent CBHA Committees are representative and locally accountable.

2.c.   Representation and local accountability

Studies of residents' participation in planning have emphasised the unrepresentative character of residents' associations in relation to area populations.[36] For example Paris and Blackaby's study of participation in Birmingham Action Areas concludes that:

> Few would claim that most residents' associations were
> representative of their area populations, however that
> term is defined. Whilst there were notable exceptions,
> it was the experience of most team leaders and
> community workers that most associations consisted of
> disproportionate numbers of owner-occupiers rather
> than tenants, white residents rather than black,
> and the elderly rather than the young. The characteristics
> of the leadership exhibited an even more marked tendency in
> these directions. (37)

Now in the case studies we saw that one association's Committee

(Reidvale's) has predominantly involved young to middle aged

tenants rather than owner-occupiers, and that it has involved mainly

men rather than women. The other association's Committee (Govanhill's)

shifted in composition from one which was dominated by women rather

than men and by owner-occupiers rather than tenants, to one which

involved more men and more tenants.

I have argued on the basis of the literature which I discussed

in Chapter Nine that dominant groups are inevitable in organisational

life and that such groups represent a key influence on decision-

making. We saw these patterns in evidence in the case studies. I

would suggest, however, from my observation of CBHAs that their

formal constitution, their local base and the dynamics of local

politics are likely to interact to influence the composition of

Committees towards increased representativeness of local memberships.

On the other hand, we must remember that CBHA participants have the

capacity to encourage or discourage access to membership by defining

the criteria of access to shareholding and by resolving whether or

not to extend membership and to encourage participation. We saw

that both case study associations did attempt to extend
opportunities for participation. We also saw how these efforts
were constrained, on the one hand, by local apathy and criticism
and, on the other, by pressures to produce results on the housing
front. We saw how in parallel there were changes in Committee
composition which stemmed from cumulative organisational tensions
and from the dynamics of local politics and accountability.[38]

My focus on the dynamics of participation and on its wider
structural context has led me towards certain conclusions which
differ from those emphasised in Maclennan et al's study of housing
associations. It is perhaps not surprising that Maclennan et al's
focus on rehabilitation effectiveness led to little consideration of
the wider political and economic influences on aspects of participation.
However the study appears to have misunderstood certain practical
features of CBHA participation. For example it appears to confuse
those local residents who have paid their one pound share and become
members, with residents of Action Areas who have not joined their
associations.[39]

Maclennan et al quite rightly question the assumptions which
are implicit in the concepts of "community base" and "community control",
just as I have done in Chapter Ten. In that chapter I have argued
that if we are to use the term community at all, then we can
meaningfully describe CBHAs as community based. In particular this
concept is relevant if we want to highlight certain distinguishing

aspects of CBHAs at a general level. While I might have preferred
the term "neighbourhood" housing association I would suggest here that
the term "community based housing association", highlights the role
of these organisations within the urban planning system, their
organisational goals, ideology and structure, their neighbourhood
orientation and location and their conditions of access to membership.
Maclennan et al argue that:

> Although, as is later indicated, tenants unanimously
> agreed that Housing Associations had become a major
> source of improvement in their housing and neighbour-
> hood conditions, it is arguable that this stems from the
> level of local investment rather than from the manage-
> ment structure adopted for shaping investment decisions.
> For it would be a crude and incorrect generalisation to
> claim that associations were primarily "community based". (40)

In this study we have seen variations in associations' definitions
of "the neighbourhood" or "community" and, therefore, of the CBHA
membership constituency. This pattern is not surprising in the light
of my earlier discussion of the concept of community in Chapter Ten.
Moreover, the concept of "community base" represents different
meanings in different associations. In some it implies "tenant
control" whilst in others it connotes the involvement of local
residents within a wider constituency which has been defined as
"the neighbourhood". In Chapter Ten and in the case studies we have
seen that participants make strategic choices about whether and how
to encourage more local participation in their affairs. I would
conclude, however, from the accounts of association development
in the two case studies that the local base and control characteristics
of CBHAs are more conducive to the generation of local participation,

and to the neighbourhood orientation of association policies than
other existing forms of organising housing provision.

Maclennan et al prefer the term "locally oriented" to
"community based" because of the terminological and practical
confusions associated with the concept of community. I would suggest,
however, that their terminology underplays the intensity of involve-
ment and purpose that we have seen to characterise many CBHAs. I
shall further suggest that "locally committed" might have been a
more appropriate term for highlighting differences in approach and
involvement between CBHAs and other decentralised bureaucratic
organisations in the urban planning scene.

Turning to the question of tenant participation in design, I
would suggest that CBHAs offer the scope for tenants to influence
aspects of their improved houses as far as is practicable given the
constraints of funding and of the tenement structure. I have
suggested that the emphasis on maximising speed in housing production
conflicts with intentions of maximising participation and choice.
Moreover, in some instances choice in design is significantly
limited for all parties concerned (associations, architects and
residents). For example, we have seen that frequently design choice
is primarily focused on specific features of back courts, house
decoration and kitchen layout. Yet, on the other hand, we have seen
that local residents find their associations generally accessible.[41]

We have seen that there have been differences in participation between associations and in the same association over time, and I have argued that such variations reflect the interplay of strategic policy choices, local circumstances, and wider political and economic conditions. I do not accept Maclennan et al's conclusion that any locally based housing agency (say for example, a local housing office of the District or of SSHA) might have produced similar outcomes in terms of the potential for participation. Turning to the studies which I discussed in Chapter Ten, these studies highlighted the limited scope for participation which has been enabled by attempts to decentralise urban renewal planning and implementation in British cities. They have shown a "tokenism" in the implementation of participation by local authorities and that neighbourhood based officials faced enormous difficulties due to the structural and attitudinal gap between planning centre and periphery. There have been certain notable attempts at decentralising urban renewal abroad. For example in Rotterdam a 'Mid-Seventies Reassessment' led to the establishment of 11 urban renewal Project Groups which were area based and had considerable devolved powers.[42] Now we saw in Chapter Five that certain Assist architects had considered pressing the local authority in such a direction, prior to clarity about the option of housing associations. I am doubtful, however, that an authority as traditionalist, as large and as centralised as Glasgow District was in the early 1970s could have positively tackled

the implementation of any such devolution. We have seen also how
pressures to produce and to alleviate local housing conditions have
diverted associations from their participation objectives. Such
pressures would have been even greater for Glasgow District
officials with their historically accumulated credibility gap.

It is relevant to ask, what then have been the key outcomes
of CBHA participation to date. There are two main channels of
participation to consider in the CBHA case. First I shall focus on
the meaning and outcomes of participation for those active as
collective managers on CBHA Committees. Secondly I shall draw
some conclusions about wider aspects of neighbourhood participation
in CBHAs.

In terms of the first channel there is no doubt that CBHAs
have enabled local people to become involved in improving local
housing opportunities. We have seen how this endeavour has been
associated with extensive controls, delays, organisational tensions
and uncertainties. Moreover as the improvement programme has pro-
gressed, the role of local residents has been focused on the complex
tasks of, on the one hand, the development and monitoring of policy
and, on the other, representation of local interests and account-
ability to local people and state agencies. Role ambiguities, delays,
tension and frustration are therefore the costs of participation. I
would argue, however, that the "rewards" or benefits of participation
can be summarised in terms of a challenging, responsible and

cooperative productive enterprise which also offers scope for initiative. I would suggest further that it is these enabling characteristics of CBHAs which have served to sustain and regenerate active resident involvement.

We have seen certain notable outcomes of CBHA participation and in particular we saw how various forms of neighbourhood based social provision can be facilitated by CBHAs. Such provision frequently resulted from CBHA members lobbying in partnership with other neighbourhood groups to attract public funds from a variety of sources. We have also seen the accumulation of management experience and political awareness amongst CBHA members and I would suggest that participants can readily transfer such experience in other directions. Further, there have been the recent collective attempts to disseminate information to tenants and to promote awareness about the role of associations in the city - a notable development of the early 1980s.

Moreover, I would argue that in spite of continuing divisions within the Glasgow movement, a notable unifying force amongst participants is their belief in the uniqueness of CBHAs, in their achievements and in their capacity to contribute to housing provision in the city. [43] We have seen that local activists have become increasingly involved in the national housing association movement. There are, however, current signs that some CBHA participants believe that they have as much common ground with local authority tenants and, particularly, with neighbourhood cooperatives as they do with other

sections of the voluntary movement. We can therefore expect to see
new linkages and developments during the 1980s which will highlight
the uniqueness of Glasgow's CBHAs.

Finally I shall draw some conclusions about wider aspects of
neighbourhood participation in the context of arguments raised by
Dunleavy's study of the residents of Beckton, in the London Borough
of Newham.[44] The Beckton residents were affected by the local
authority's plans to rehouse them from the Beckton clearance area
into a high-rise scheme under construction. The first phase of this
scheme achieved fame through the Ronan Point collapse. The residents
lobbied and protested against rehousing plans but gained no access to
consultation or negotiation about their housing futures. Dunleavy
documents how following strident protest and considerable publicity
the Beckton residents' campaign wavered in the face of the local
authority's doggedness of intent and denial of their right to be
heard. Some three years after the start of the Beckton campaign
most residents had accepted rehousing offers and the Beckton
Committee folded. This outcome was similar to that highlighted by
other studies of neighbourhood protest over clearance and rehousing
plans in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in cities like Glasgow,[45]
Newcastle[46] and Birmingham.[47]

Dunleavy's conclusions, however, have relevance to our focus
on participation. He states:

> Precisely because it was so atypical the Beckton
> protest illuminates the general picture of latent conflict
> on mass housing issues in the 1950s and the 1960s. It
> provides objective evidence that in the absence of the
> normal coercive power relationships between the public
> housing apparatus and "slum" residents, the latter would
> have chosen a different housing future, most basically
> one controlled by them. (48)

I would argue that the story of Glasgow's CBHAs provides considerable

support for Dunleavy's conclusion here. Certainly by the mid 1970s

there had been a shift from a coercive power relationship between

the local authority and inner area "slum" residents towards a

"partnership" relationship between local authorities and local

associations. Against this background we have seen how groups of

local residents came to recognise the various potentials of local

control. Yet at the same time I have argued that, despite this

shift, control over key resources still rests with state agencies.

Moreover, we have seen that ten years on the majority of

Action Area residents have remained uninvolved. They have not

recognised the potentials of local involvement; they have not under-

stood the complex structure and operation of controls; they have been

cynical of, critical about and distant from their local association.

This non-participation is notably apparent, although to varying

degrees between localities and, over time, within them. It is a

phenomenon which associations have attempted to change, at times

individually and more recently collectively.

On the other hand we have seen that "non participation" is
not understood by many local activists and, at the same time, it
serves to reproduce the power relations between CBHAs and local
residents. I have argued that non participation reflects various
influences. It stems from the longstanding experience of powerless-
ness by working class residents in relation to the state. It
reflects the normality of uncertainties surrounding their housing
circumstances. It is influenced by the complexities of the funding
and administration of public housing. Finally, it reflects the
fact that not everyone wants, or is able, to become involved.
Against this background it is not surprising that those who learn
from their participation in an enormously complex planning system
are sometimes socially distanced from those who are apathetic, other-
wise occupied or confused.

I shall now attempt to answer the question of whether
participation in the planning system has served to incorporate activists,
to quell protest and to encourage their political quiescence.[49]
I have suggested earlier that prior to CBHA formation local people's
opposition to clearance and redevelopment was generally focused on
the local authority in an undirected and reactive fashion.[50]
I have emphasised that in Glasgow during the late 1960s and early
1970s there was no concerted social movement of opposition or intent.
Where protest was coordinated this was significantly due to the
influence of urban professionals who were critical of the established
planning system. In the context of this apolitical and non

participatory background it is reasonable to argue that participation has established new opportunities for local residents to learn about the power structure and about the politics of resource allocation. I have also argued that any increased political awareness gained through participation will not necessarily be reflected in increased political action. I have suggested that inaction largely stems from participants' recognition of the extensive powers of government agencies and of the complexity of the issues affecting them.[51] I have also suggested that participants' generalised fears about the potential reactions of state agencies may result in negative decision-making by associations - for example, when associations choose not to provide information which might stimulate local scares and jeopardise ongoing negotiations. On the other hand, we have seen that many associations have openly criticised government policies. They have encouraged local residents to join in their campaigns and these patterns reflect similar contradictions to those identified elsewhere in the literature on participation.

Over the first decade of the CBHA planning experiment, therefore, there have been contradictory outcomes on the participation front. In some neighbourhoods CBHAs have become an integral part of a complex system of neighbourhood based activities and provision, which is influenced by the dynamics of neighbourhood politics.[52] At certain stages in the career of CBHAs we have seen that they may become a focus of local criticism. They may be perceived as being distant from those local people whose interests they represent. I

have argued that both reactionary and progressive tendencies are inherent in CBHAs and at different stages they may be dominated by one or other such tendency, depending on the influence of personalities, alignments, the dynamics of internal politics and   external influences.

I have stressed that CBHAs are youthful organisations in Glasgow's planning scene. I have emphasised that they are continually evolving in terms of their role within their neighbourhoods, their relations with the voluntary housing movement and with government agencies, and their approaches to campaigning. Their participants are continually learning management skills and developing strategies which are more appropriate to their objectives, problems and circumstances. As organisations many CBHAs are characterised by entrepreneurialism and a vibrancy of activity and purpose. I have also argued that as organisational systems they reflect the coexistence of different forms of control. We have seen in the case studies where I described developments in organisational relations that, at times, the experience of contradictory features of CBHAs makes life difficult for their participants.[53]   To some extent, staff and Committee relations may be characterised as a partnership of intent which is based on mutual trust. In this context professionals approach lay Committees as continual sounding boards. They apply their professionalism in aiding Committees to develop tools for monitoring their associations' affairs. They play a crucial advisory, initiating and supportive role in relation to the Committees' responsibilities

for developing their associations' policies. Moreover, this role of officials in policy development in turn establishes constraints and guidelines which influence the ways in which officials represent the Committee to outside agencies. There is therefore a complexity and circularity to the phenomenon of official influences.

We have seen in the case studies how new participants have experienced problems in coming to terms with the complexity of CBHA policy-making and with the key role of officials. Moreover, we have seen how personalities and events have at certain times served to render trust shaky. In Chapter Nine I pointed to the inevitability of hierarchy in CBHAs. In the case studies we saw that the role of Committees in monitoring association officials and in respect of industrial relations issues, is implicitly hierarchical. We saw how hierarchical control tendencies have also stemmed from external influences. For example, Committees may feel that they know better than their staff how to act in terms of the neighbourhood interests they represent. Alternatively, they may feel pressured to implement certain recommendations by government agencies. However, I would argue that whilst hierarchy may be inevitable, authoritarianism is certainly not.

In terms of their organisational characteristics, therefore, I have stressed in Chapters Eight and Nine that CBHAs are not at all unique. I have argued that constructive working relations in small, innovative organisations like CBHAs are dependent on a number of

influences. I have suggested that goal chievement in such
organisations depends on extensive staff commitment and professional-
ism in the face of delegated responsibilities, complex tasks and
environmental uncertainties. Moreover I have argued that such
commitment cannot be sustained without a highly consultative and open
style of management. I have suggested that CBHAs could learn from
the management problems of other organisations. It seems reasonable
to conclude that organisations like cooperatives might also learn
from the management experiences of CBHAs which have been documented
and analysed in the thesis. I have now explored several different
aspects of participation, politics and control which have been associ-
ated with the CBHA experience to date. In the final section of this
chapter I shall now turn to consider further some important impli-
cations of the development of CBHAs for local housing and for the
future role of neighbourhood associations in Glasgow.

3.   Housing outcomes: No mean improvement

Merrett reminds us that housing obsolescence is a state of
affairs and not a process.[54] He defines obsolescence in terms of
a gap 'at a particular point in time between the existing physical
standard of a house and some perceived alternative'. He argues that:

> To understand obsolescence it follows that ideally
> one should explain both the material conditions of
> the accommodation and the subjective wishes of the
> household or (in the context of government policy)
> the expressed intentions of the planners. (55)

Clearly both slum clearance and housing improvement are strategies for tackling housing obsolescence, and we have seen that the improvement policy gained favour during the second half of the 1960s in Britain.

We have seen that the rehabilitation strategy of the 1970s was promoted by central government; that it has had the support of the major political parties and that its implementation took a particular shape in Glasgow. To date few studies have focused on the outcomes of the rehabilitation strategy. However certain implications of the rehabilitation-area renewal policy have been addressed by Duncan,[56] Paris and Blackaby[57] and Merrett.[58] All these writers have criticised the piecemeal and limited outcomes of the area approach which have been emphasised by the planners since the 1960s. As Merrett argues:

> The crucial weakness of the area approach, as Duncan and Paris and Blackaby have ably demonstrated, is that a vast amount of limited staff resources of housing, planning and other departments is channelled into a very limited number of streets in a district, often to no real effect. [59]

Paris and Blackaby suggest that the trend towards improvement has gone too far in Britain to enable adequate levels of housing replacement - a position also adopted by the Environmental Health Officers' Association in 1977.[60] Moreover they stress that implementation of the area rehabilitation policy has to date been far from effective. Just as I have suggested in Chapter Thirteen they argue that:

> The central contradiction of improvement policy is
> that it is a market-oriented form of intervention,
> specifically seeking to stimulate market processes,
> yet at the same time not controlling crucial market
> relations which are precisely the cause of housing
> decay. (61)

On the basis of the CBHA experience I would endorse several of

their conclusions. They suggest that where private owners do not

cooperate voluntarily with improvement schemes, compulsory powers

should be accessible to the authorities. We have seen that such

powers are accessible to Glasgow's CBHAs. Secondly, they suggest

that the current commitment to retaining owner-occupation demands

more adequate levels of improvement grants and a more flexible

approach to their allocation. Finally, they stress that

rehabilitation involves a more exacting, more flexible work

technology than new building and that:

> Improvement policy requires new entrepreneurial
> forms of intervention, persuading and cajoling
> owners of old houses to spend their money, plus
> variable grant assistance to bring that housing
> up to a better standard. (62)

Merrett has argued likewise. (63) Yet, on the other hand, Paris and

Blackaby point to the inadequate performance of the multiplicity of

of small building firms in Birmingham and they bemoan the lack of a

pool of labour which is specialised in the skills of house renovation.

To resolve these administrative problems they recommend the expansion

of direct labour operation by the local authority.

At this point I shall diverge from Paris and Blackaby's conclu-
sions, as a result of differences in the policy, process and outcomes
of the rehabilitation strategy in Glasgow. Before I turn to these
points of disagreement I shall attempt to highlight where these may
stem from disjunctures in the periods focused on in the Glasgow
and Birmingham cases of rehabilitation. Two time factors are
important here. First, my study focuses on rehabilitation over a
ten year period whereas the Birmingham study stops in 1978.[64]
It is therefore possible that rehabilitation progress in Birmingham
has expanded rapidly since that date. Secondly, just as occurred
in Glasgow, it is likely that since 1979 in Birmingham housing
expenditure cuts have led to a virtual halt in public sector new build-
ing and that larger building firms have gathered expertise in
rehabilitation.

Whereas the Birmingham study is titled 'Not Much Improvement',
I want to emphasise that there has been no mean improvement in the
Glasgow case. After a shaky, even feeble, start to rehabilitation
in Glasgow between 1974 and 1978, the programme gathered notable
momentum between 1978 and 1984. By 1978, several large building
firms had accumulated expertise in handling local authority and
housing association contracts, as had numerous firms of architects
and quantity surveyors. A further point is that Glasgow's CBHAs
have occupied a central role in implementing the programme of area
renewal. Therefore, returning to address Paris and Blackaby's
suggestion about Direct Works, I would argue that it is unlikely that

an efficient Direct Works Section could have handled the scale of the
Glasgow programme. Such a development might certainly have avoided
some of the worst delays and conflicts of financial interest between
associations and contractors which were highlighted in Chapter Eight
of the thesis. Most significantly, however, I would suggest that it
would have served to channel profit in a different direction.

Turning to consider the development of the Glasgow programme
by 1978, 7,000 houses had been acquired in Action Areas for
Improvement of which only 1,000 had been improved. By 1984, 12,000
unimproved houses have been improved to provide 10,000 houses after
amalgamations, whilst associations had also coordinated 822 owner-occupied
house improvements. CBHAs have further provided 293 houses through
new building, whilst national and regional associations have developed
new build schemes including 1,043 houses mainly providing for special
housing needs.[65] These efforts, together with Council repair
schemes, new building by the Wimpeys and the Barratts, SDA advance
factory building and environmental schemes, have effectively served
to transform parts of Glasgow which in the late 1960s and early
1970s had appeared to be forgotten places. Scottish Office ministers
and local authority politicians have acclaimed the role of private
developers in the regeneration process. Yet the former fail to
publicly admit the relatively poor space standards which have
characterised some of these private developments and which are almost
certain to ensure a new form of housing trap for lower income owner-
occupiers in the inner areas.

Whilst building regulations define minimal standards, such standards are generally superceded by most agencies involved in producing housing. In the case of CBHAs we have seen that standards of housing provision have been restricted in the early stages of local programmes by associations' objectives of catering for existing residents. However more significantly, housing association standards of provision through both tenement rehabilitation and new building, just like that of local authorities, have mainly reflected the constraints of central state funding and of cash expenditure controls. We have seen that participants were frequently dissatisfied with standards of provision and with the distribution of house sizes which they achieved in the early stages of local rehabilitation programmes. Against this background we have seen how participants became involved in an evolving network of contacts which enabled the sharing of local experiences and problems and which stimulated the development of commonly pursued objectives in the city. As a result, associations today generally emphasise their achievements in improving housing standards produced through rehabilitation. At the same time they are seeking funding and controls which will enable better standards of heating and energy conservation, higher levels of replacement rather than repair, and more scope for house amalgamations.[66] There is no doubt that the visual impact of the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy is remarkable. The effects of local programmes cannot fail to strike visitors who return to areas like Govanhill and Govan, with its three local associations to the South of the city. The same improvements in housing and environment

characterise areas like Queens Cross, Maryhill and Springburn to the North, the GEAR area to the East which includes five associations and also Partick, Whiteinch and Scotstoun to the West of Glasgow. This pattern contrasts sharply with my own recent experience of returning to Bootle, North Liverpool, an area which appears to be persistently characterised by housing obsolescence.

In general, the signs are that, provided funding is forthcoming, the Glasgow programme of area renewal will continue to build on its current momentum. I would suggest also that the CBHA/ rehabilitation strategy has proved to be more effective than the housing renewal policies implemented in many other British cities during the 1970s. Why then is the improvement strategy working in Glasgow? I would suggest these reasons. The policy was shaped by a partnership of intent which was supported by central and local government agencies and major political parties. It established a planning framework for CBHAs which did not quell entrepreneurialism and local initiative. Further, a notable outcome of the development of a multiplicity of CBHAs has been its association with a pattern of friendly competitiveness about their local achievements. I would suggest, however, that perhaps the key outcome of the CBHA/ rehabilitation strategy is that it has generated an urban planning network which is conducive to mutual exchanges about participants' local experiences and problems. This network has enabled the development of cumulative expertise in the coordination of rehabilitation.

The local base and membership of CBHAs have also been conducive
to flexibility and persuasiveness in negotiations with private owners
in areas characterised by such extensive decay that most people have
recognised that some planning treatment is essential. Powers of
persuasion have also been buttressed by grant aid and at times by
the compulsory powers of the local authority. Moreover, the local
authority has been flexible in its approach. In spite of this
support, however, we have seen that associations still face major
problems in gaining cooperation from private owners.

In general I would suggest that a significant advantage of the
Glasgow strategy has been that associations have been able to acquire
properties from owners who do not wish, or are unable, to improve
with the aid of grant. They have provided a form of social ownership
or of neighbourhood based collective ownership and management which
represents an alternative both to mainstream public sector provision
and to housing controlled by private landlords. CBHAs therefore pro-
vide a means for retaining a stock of housing for rent in the inner
cities. A key outcome of this social ownership may be to prevent the
trend to gentrification which has been notable in certain other
British cities and which has served to displace the existing working
class populations of neighbourhoods.[67] We should remember, however,
that if rent levels increase at the current pace then clearly owner-
occupation may prove more attractive than the social ownership of
CBHAs. Such a development would have obvious consequences for further
decline in the inner area rental stock.

The studies of planning, to which I have referred in this chapter, would suggest that obsolescence is a recurrent phenomenon and a problem which affects the interests of both residents and planners. In this context we should recognise that CBHAs as locally controlled planning agencies will regularly confront problems of local housing obsolescence. We have seen how since the origins of the programme in Glasgow, improvement standards have continually increased as a result of critical reflection by participants and local residents and their pressure on state agencies. Efforts to improve standards also stemmed from certain more technical concerns of CBHA participants about post improvement maintenance problems. Against this background, Glasgow's CBHAs currently emphasise that they are producing homes 'fit for the 21st century'.[68]

In the thesis I have stressed the numerous uncertainties which are intrinsic to the process of rehabilitation. We must remember, however, the post 1945 evidence that new buildings and old buildings alike are subject to ground instabilities and to the uncertainties which are inherent in fast changing aspects of construction technology. Also, the history of housing and planning has shown that social values and expectations relating to standards of housing provision are continuously changing. Against this background we can assume that there will be a longer term role for CBHAs in rehabilitation and in post improvement repair and renewal. With this knowledge a few CBHAs have developed small "direct works" sections and there is some current interest in exploring the scope for joint initiatives in this direction.

On the question of whether the rehabilitation policy has gone too far, I would argue that this is not the case in Glasgow. There is no doubt that rehabilitation has been a less costly, rather than a cheap option in the Glasgow case. At the same time CBHAs are seeking some scope for new building and have made certain inroads in this direction. The key constraints on both new building and the rehabilitation effort is funding. At the present time there is more "green space" in Glasgow than any other city, and gap sites due to prospective demolition vary between neighbourhoods. There is therefore no reason why a gradual, phased programme of renewal should not be feasible in the long term in many CBHA localities.

I would also stress, however, that there has been insufficient allocation of monies to new building and to rehabilitation, taking the housing sector as a whole. As I argued in Chapter Thirteen, it is only because insufficient resources are being allocated to housing production generally that we find that different branches of housing provision, all of which are relevant to the resolution of different housing problems, are regarded as mutually exclusive. It is this pattern of insufficient funding which I would suggest has been a key factor influencing swings in housing provision. Returning to the Glasgow case of area rehabilitation, in spite of associations' achievements in most CBHA localities, ten years on there remains extensive work to be done. There are current concerns amongst CBHA participants that there might be a swing away from the planning emphasis on inner area renewal, or that the funding allocated to associations

might be further reduced with severe consequences for local
programmes. The experience of the earlier "moratorium" and of current
levels of resource allocation would suggest that such developments
would exacerbate local delays and uncertainties and they would
jeopardise in some localities, the viability of local programmes.
Moreover, I would suggest that the relevance of the CBHA/rehabilitation
strategy would then be brought into question.

Finally I disagree with those who have criticised the viability
of the area approach.[69] If the zoning of problems, strategies and
investment is centrally coordinated; if it involves a multiplicity
of agencies and approaches, if it is flexible and is characterised
by continuous reflection and reassessment of relative needs and
priorities, then this appears to me to be an entirely reasonable
approach to planning. If, however, the area emphasis simply reflects
planning fashions and swings with political and economic opportunities,
then it will always be easy to be critical of the outcomes of planning.
I would suggest that the CBHA/area rehabilitation strategy in Glasgow
has reflected both rational planning and opportunism and overall it
has been working well. I would suggest, however, that current housing
policies of funding restraint and of privatisation are likely to
encourage, on the one hand, more planning opportunism and, on the
other, increased state subsidy towards the private sector. The out-
come is likely to promote private profit rather than to ensure housing
provision for those in need. At the same time we may see signs of
competition between different sectors of housing provision such as

state and voluntary agencies, and between agencies focusing on

different housing needs, such as those of the elderly, the handi-

capped, working class residents in the inner areas and in the

peripheral schemes. In terms of relative housing needs there remain

outstanding problems in CBHA neighbourhoods where many families

are overcrowded and still live in intolerable conditions without

baths and WCs or in properties in chronic disrepair.[70] At the

same time, as housing and environmental improvements have progressed

in these neighbourhoods, unemployment, crime, and drug taking have

steadily increased. As a result there are some local residents who

would question the extent of neighbourhood improvement for local

people and others who have begun to focus on addressing these problems.

In these respects, however, it is questionable whether CBHA neigh-

bourhoods, in spite of intolerable housing conditions, fare any worse

than those living in the vast peripheral schemes, where social and

economic problems are so markedly reflected in the poor state of

parts of the housing stock. Under the present system of resource

allocation, therefore, the amelioration of the circumstances of

working class people facing different degrees and forms of housing

obsolescence in the public and private housing sectors, is dependent

on a competition for resources allocated to housing by the state.

The existing criteria applied by planners in defining housing

obsolescence include houses which lack basic amenities, such as WCs

and bathrooms and certain items of structural disrepair. We have

seen how the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy has served to significantly

improve the condition of Glasgow's non-council housing stock.

Whereas in 1971, 41% of households in the private sector lacked the

use of a bath, by 1981 the equivalent proportion of such households

was 9%.[71] If, however, we go beyond the official definitions of

obsolescence and sub-tolerability and include in our assessment the

intolerable housing conditions experienced in relation to extensive

damp and disrepair in the council sector, then we have surely to

conclude that housing policies of the 1970s and 1980s have made

only limited inroads into housing obsolescence as a current state

of affairs in Glasgow and nationally. Against this background it is

not surprising that all housing agencies operating in the public

sector are pressing for more resources to be allocated to housing

production.

In the thesis I have documented the CBHA experiment of resident

involvement in the management of area renewal in Glasgow. We have

seen how CBHAs have sustained and regenerated the involvement of local

residents in spite of planning uncertainties and delays, external

bureaucratic controls and organisational problems. The CBHA

experiment ironically has taken place during a period of increasing

unemployment and social problems. Yet we have seen that local resi-

dents have positively assumed responsibility for major aspects of

area renewal in their neighbourhoods and I have argued that this

responsibility has been carried out on behalf of the state. Against

this background it is surely not surprising that participants remain

expectant that the relevant state agencies will sustain the flow of

resources to enable CBHAs to complete their area rehabilitation
programmes, to establish new initiatives and to ameliorate local
housing opportunities.[72] The whole area of housing obsolescence
and planning intervention is clearly worthy of further research.
However I shall conclude by outlining certain questions which I
would like to see pursued in relation to the CBHA experience.

Many questions remain as to the future of CBHAs and their
participation outcomes. By 1984, will CBHAs have been further
incorporated within the housing and planning system or will their
representative bodies continue to operate as a critical, challenging
and independent force? How will collective representation be mediated
- by a strong Glasgow body which operates in tandem with a strong
Scottish Federation, or will Glasgow's CBHAs forego their regional
distinctiveness and campaign solely through national representation?
I would also be interested to see whether Glasgow associations will
develop links with local authority neighbourhood co-ops which face
similar housing problems despite their different funding circumstances.

On the housing front, in 1994, what will we have learnt about
housing standards and about the effectiveness and efficiency of CBHA
rehabilitation? I would argue that the technical viability and social
outcomes of the CBHA rehabilitation strategy require assessment over
a time scale which illustrates changes in neighbourhood social
patterns, in housing choices and opportunities and which provides
evidence of the technical and economic implications of the

rehabilitation strategy.

And on the participation front, will CBHAs have managed to
generate more active forms of resident participation in their affairs?
Or will local apathy, disinterest and cynicism predominate in shaping
their role, thus reflecting a pattern which characterised relations
between inner area residents and the local authority in the late
1960s and early 1970s, prior to CBHA formation? I have suggested
that the answers to many of these questions will depend on strategic
choices by CBHA participants as well as on developments in the wider
planning context of CBHAs.

I would argue that whilst CBHAs are funded to alleviate local
housing conditions, they will never solely be evaluated in terms of
their effectiveness in providing housing. Like all housing
associations they will be assessed in terms of their innovativeness
as producers and in terms of their flexibility and sensitivity as
landlords. Moreover, as neighbourhood agencies, which place an
ideological emphasis on community control, they will also be assessed
in terms of the extent to which they have generated local participation
and are seen to be locally accountable.[73] Yet we have seen that
CBHA members experience difficulties in generating local interest
and at times are disillusioned about local apathy. I would argue
that participants must continually reflect on the reasons why local
people do not become involved. They must remember that for many
local residents initial participation was generated by accidental

factors, and that for all participants it takes a long time to learn the ropes.

Turning now to reflect on the case studies and on aspects of the wider planning system, we cannot fail to note that CBHAs are organisations with a distinctive style and mode of operation. We have seen their special qualities as innovative and locally committed housing agencies and how the persistence of these organisational characteristics depends on the continual regeneration of flexibility and trust between staff and committee members, in the face of the particular tensions and contradictions which influence them. Finally we have seen that, on the one hand, associations reflect common characteristics which stem from their wider political, economic and planning environment. On the other hand, the influence of personalities, management choices, organisational and neighbourhood politics and local contingencies means that there will always be as many variations, on the themes covered in this thesis, as there are community based housing associations. Each association, therefore, has a distinctive background, history, organisational culture and pattern of development which is worthy of a study in its own right. I am fully aware that whilst I may have highlighted their diversity, my thesis has not done justice to illustrating the variety of Glasgow's CBHAs.

Finally the last chapter emphasised the interrelations between public and private housing sectors which were reflected in the housing association experience. Moreover, it stressed the influence of state agencies on the goals and achievements of housing associations. How will these influences affect the longer term role of CBHAs as landlords and producers? I have argued that current state housing policies are likely to significantly limit the role of CBHAs as local housing producers. Against this background it is inevitable that CBHA participants will require continually to reflect on their objectives and to negotiate with the state agencies which control the key resources of authority and funding on which their housing goals are dependent. In the words of the Committee member quoted in Chapter Eleven, it is likely that associations will continue to negotiate their way 'through a sea of uncertainty'.

Notes and References to Chapter Fourteen

(1)   See Chapter Five.

(2)   See Chapter Two.

(3)   See S. Merrett with Fred Gray, Owner Occupation in Britain,
        Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 197-202. J. Lambert,
        C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State:
        Allocation, Access and Control, Macmillan Press, 1978, pp.
        92-146 and C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement:
        Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham, Heinemann, London, 1979.

(4)   C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, op. cit., p. 179.

(5)   C. Cockburn, The Local State, London Pluto Press, 1977.

(6)   See Chapter Nine and the case studies.

(7)   C. Cockburn, 1977, op. cit., p. 158.

(8)   See Chapter Five and also City of Glasgow District Council,
        Housing Plan 7, 1983, Chapter 7, pp. 59-68.

(9)   See Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.

(10)   See J.R. Mellor, Urban Sociology in an Urbanised Society,
        Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 73-87.

(11)   See Miles Better, Miles to Go: The Story of Glasgow's
        Housing Associations, Part Three, Housetalk, August 1984.

(12)   See Chapters Three and Ten.

(13)   See, for example, N. Boaden, M. Goldsmith, W. Hampton and
        P. Stringer, Public Participation in Local Services, Longman,
        1982, pp. 1-69, pp. 90-111 and pp. 167-180; G. Kirk, Urban
        Planning in a Capitalist Society, Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 155-180
        and S.R. Arnstein, 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation',
        Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 1969, Vol. 30,
        No. 4, pp. 216-224.

(14)   C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, 1979, op. cit.,
        p.129.

(15)   Ibid and J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy
        and the State, 1978, op. cit.

(16) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, 1979, op. cit.,
      pp. 183-184. See N. Boaden et al, Public Participation in Local
      Services, 1982, op. cit., pp. 90-111 for a similar argument
      about the limitations on the scope of resident participation
      in Britain.

(17) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

(18) Ibid, pp. 145-156.

(19) S.R. Arnstein, 1969, op. cit.

(20) For a similar argument see also G. Kirk, Urban Planning in a
      Capitalist Society, 1980, op. cit., pp. 156-180; J. Dearlove,
      The Politics of Policy in Local Government: The Making and
      Maintenance of Public Policy in the Royal Borough of Kensington,
      London, Cambridge University Press, 1973; P. Saunders,
      Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation, Penguin, 1980,
      pp. 273-290; N. Dennis, 'In Dispraise of Political Trust',
      in W. Sewell and J. Coppock, Public Participation in Planning,
      Wiley, 1977.

(21) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, op. cit., p. 132.

(22) N. Dennis, 1977, op. cit., and C. Cockburn, The Local State,
      1977, op. cit.

(23) For example, J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1978, op. cit.,
      pp. 59-61; N. Ginsberg, Class Capital and Social Policy,
      Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 124-126. These writers have focused
      on mainstream housing associations and have shown little
      awareness of the "community based" variety.

(24) See Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act, 1980, Chapter 52,
      Part II, Section 16 and Part III, Sections 26 and 27, London,
      HMSO, 1980.

(25) See Chapters Three, Five and Nine.

(26) See Chapter Thirteen.

(27) See Chapter Nine.

(28) D. Maclennan, M. Brailey and N. Lawrie, The Rehabilitation
      Activities and Effectiveness of Housing Associations in Scotland,
      A Report prepared for the Scottish Development Department,
      Scottish Office, Central Research Unit Papers, April 1983,
      pp. 40-41.

(29) *Ibid*, p. 41.

(30) See J. Greve, <u>Voluntary Housing in Scandinavia: A Study of</u>
<u>Denmark, Norway and Sweden</u>, Occasional Paper No. 21, Centre
for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham, 1971,
p. 1.

(31) See N. Ginsberg, <u>Class, Capital and Social Policy</u>, 1979, <u>op. cit.</u>,
pp. 156-168 and J. Darke and R. Darke, <u>Who Needs Housing</u>,
Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 42-49.

(32) *Ibid*, pp. 120-133.

(33) See N. Ginsberg, 1979, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 126.

(34) See Chapter Nine.

(35) Tenants' Rights Etc. (Scotland) Act, 1980, <u>op. cit.</u>

(36) J. Lambert <u>et al</u>, 1978, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 126-127 and C. Paris
and B. Blackaby, 1979, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 138-139; J. Gower Davies,
<u>The Evangelistic Bureaucrat</u>, Tavistock Publications, 1974,
pp. 157-169; N. Dennis, 'Community Action, Quasi-Community
Action and Anti-Community Action', in P. Leonard, (ed.),
<u>The Sociology of Community Action</u>, The Sociological Review,
Monograph No. 21, November 1975, pp. 143-164.

(37) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, <u>Not Much Improvement</u>, 1979, <u>op. cit.</u>,
p. 138.

(38) See Chapter Nine and the case studies.

(39) D. Maclennan <u>et al</u>, 1983, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 43-44.

(40) *Ibid*, p. 43. See also pp. 56-57 on the consultation process
and residents' attitudes to it.

(41) *Ibid*, pp. 56-57.

(42) <u>Urban Renewal in Europe</u>, published by The Glasgow in Europe
Group, for Annual Conference of SFHA, June 1983.

(43) *Ibid*, 'We'll do it our way'. See also <u>Miles Better, Miles to</u>
<u>Go</u>, Housetalk, August 1984, Section 4.

(44) P. Dunleavy, 'Protest and Quiescence in Urban Politics: A
Critique of Pluralist and Structuralist Marxist Views', in
A. Blowers, <u>et al</u>, <u>Urban Change and Conflict: An Interdisciplin-</u>
<u>ary Reader</u>, Harper and Row, The Open University, 1981, pp.
190-197.

(45) S. Jacobs, 'Community Action in a Glasgow Clearance Area: Consensus or Conflict?', in P. Leonard, (ed.), The Sociology of Community Action, 1975, op. cit., pp. 165-184.

(46) Ibid, pp. 143-164.

(47) J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1978, op. cit.

(48) P. Dunleavy, 1981, op. cit., p. 197.

(49) A question posed by Dunleavy and by the other studies of participation to which I have referred above.

(50) See Chapter Five and Introduction to Part Three.

(51) See Chapter Thirteen.

(52) See Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve.

(53) See Chapter Nine and the case studies.

(54) S. Merrett with F. Gray, Owner Occupation in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 189.

(55) Ibid.

(56) T.L.C. Duncan, assisted by J. Curry, Housing Improvement Policies in England and Wales, Centre of Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham, 1974.

(57) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, op. cit.

(58) S. Merrett, 1982, op. cit.

(59) Ibid, p. 204.

(60) C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, op. cit., p. 189.

(61) Ibid, pp. 185-186.

(62) Ibid, p. 179.

(63) S. Merrett, 1982, op. cit., pp. 197-202.

(64) Paris and Blackaby, 1979, op. cit., pp. 196-198, Appendix 2.

(65) Housing Associations and Glasgow, Neighbourhood Renewal and Specialist Housing, The Housing Corporation, August 1984. See also Housing Plan 7, Glasgow District Council, Chapter 3, pp. 29-31.

(66)   See Chapter Seven and the case studies, Chapters Eleven and Twelve.

(67)   See S. Merrett, <u>Owner Occupation in Britain</u>, 1982, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 145-146 and pp. 220-222. Merrett defines gentrification as a process involving 'the displacement of the existing low-income groups of households and their replacement with higher-income groups', p. 145.

(68)   See <u>Miles Better, Miles to Go</u>, Housetalk, August 1984, especially Part 4.

(69)   For example, S. Merrett, 1982, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 202-205.

(70)   <u>Miles Better, Miles to Go</u>, Housetalk, 1984, <u>op. cit.</u>, Part 4.

(71)   <u>Ibid</u>. See also Glasgow District Council Housing Department, <u>Annual Housing Review</u>, 1983, p. 186 and GDC, <u>Housing Plan 7</u>, Chapter 2, p. 22.

(72)   <u>Miles Better, Miles to Go</u>, Housetalk, 1984, <u>op. cit.</u>, Part 4.

(73)   See D. Maclellan <u>et al</u>, Central Research Unit Papers, April 1983, <u>op. cit.</u>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books, Articles and Reports

M. Albrow, 1970, Bureaucracy, London, Pall Mall.

G. Armstrong and M. Wilson, 1971, 'Social Problems, Social Control
and the Case of Easterhouse', Paper presented to British Sociological
Association Conference, 1971.

G. Armstrong and M. Wilson, 1973, 'City Politics and Deviancy Amplifi-
cation', pp. 61-89 in I. Taylor and L. Taylor (eds.), Politics and
Deviance, Penguin, 1973.

S.R. Arnstein, 1969, 'A ladder of citizen participation', Journal of
the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 216-224.

P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 1962, 'Two faces of Power', American
Political Science Review, Vol. 56, pp. 947-952. Reprinted in
F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray, D.C. Potter and C.J. Pollitt (eds.),
Decisions Organisations and Society, Penguin, 1978, pp. 392-404.

P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 1970, Power and Poverty in Theory and
Practice, New York, Oxford University Press.

J. Baird, 1922, Dennistoun: Past and Present, with a foreword by
J. Barrie, The Dennistoun Press, Duke Street.

M. Ball, 1978, 'British housing policy and the house building industry',
Capital and Class, No. 4, pp. 78-99.

J.A. Banks, 1974, Trade Unionism, Collier-Macmillan.

R. Barcroft, 1979, 'Out of the Public Eye', Architects' Journal, No. 10,
Vol. 169, 7 March 1979, pp. 471-487.

F. Bechhofer, 1974, 'Current approaches to empirical research: some
central ideas', pp. 70-91 in J. Rex (ed.), Approaches to Sociology,
Routledge and Kegan Paul.

C. Bell and H. Newby, 1971, Community Studies: An Introduction to the
Sociology of the Local Community, George Allen and Unwin.

R. Bendix, 1970, 'The Impact of Ideas on Organisational Structure'
in O. Grusky and G.A. Miller (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations,
Basic Studies, New York, The Free Press, pp. 529-536.

J.K. Benson, 1977, 'Innovation and Crisis in Organisational Analysis',
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1977, pp. 3-16.

J.K. Benson, 1978, 'The Interorganisational Network as a Political Economy' in L. Karpik (ed.), Organisation and Environment, London, Sage, pp. 69-102.

J.K. Benson, 1981, 'Organisations: A Dialectical View' in O. Grusky and G. Miller (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations: Basic Studies, 2nd Edition, New York, The Free Press, pp. 201-227.

B.M. Berger, 1968, Working Class Suburb, A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia, University of California Press.

J. Black and H. White, 1973, Dennistoun, A Brief History, Glasgow Room, Mitchell Library.

R. Blackburn, 1975, (ed.), Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory, Fontana/Collins.

P. Blau, 1963, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, University of Chicago Press.

P. Blau and W. Scott, 1963, Formal Organisations, A Comparative Approach, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

P.M. Blau, 1976, 'Social Change among Collectivities' in W.M. Evan (ed.), Interorganisational Relations, Penguin, pp. 56-68.

M. Blaxter, 1979, (ed.), 'Symposium on the Handling of Qualitative Data', Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 649-825.

A. Blowers, C. Brook, P. Dunleavy and L. McDowell, 1982, (eds.), Urban Change and Conflict: An Interdisciplinary Reader, Harper and Row.

P. Blumberg, 1968, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation, Constable and Co.

N. Boaden, M. Goldsmith, W. Hampton and P. Stringer, 1982, Public Participation in Local Services, Longman Group Ltd.

S.A. Booth, D.C. Pitt and W.J. Money, 1982, 'Organisational Redundancy? A Critical Appraisal of the GEAR Project', Public Administration, Vol. 60, No. 1, Spring 1982.

T.B. Bottomore, 1975, Sociology as Social Criticism, London, George Allen and Unwin.

T. Bottomore, 1979, Political Sociology, Hutchinson & Co.

T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, 1978, (eds.), A History of Sociological Analysis, Basic Books.

T. Bottomore and M. Rubel, 1956, (eds.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, London, Watts & Co.

M. Bowley, 1945, Housing and the State, Allen and Unwin.

M. Brailey, 1981, 'Associations' Allocations', Roof, November/ December 1981.

T.A. Broadbent, 1977, Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, Methuen & Co. Ltd.

G. Brown, 1975, (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland, EUSPB.

M. Bulmer, 1982, The Uses of Social Research: Social Investigation in Public Policy Making, Contemporary Social Research, No. 3, London, George Allen and Unwin.

J. Burnett, 1980, A Social History of Housing, 1815-1970, Methuen & Co.

T. Burns and G.M. Stalker, 1961, The Management of Innovation, Tavistock.

G. Burrell and G. Morgan, 1979, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, Heinemann, London.

J. Butt, 1971, 'Working Class Housing in Glasgow, 1851-1914' in S.D. Chapman (ed.), The History of Working Class Housing - A Symposium, David and Charles, pp. 55-92.

V. Cable, 1974, 'Glasgow's Motorways and Technocratic Blight', New Society, 5 September 1974.

V. Cable, 1975, 'Glasgow, Area of Need' in G. Brown (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland, 1975, op. cit.

A.K. Cairncross, 1954, (ed.), The Scottish Economy, Cambridge University Press.

T. Campbell, 1980, Seven Theories of Human Society, Clarendon, Oxford University Press.

M. Castells, 1976, 'Theoretical propositions for an experimental study of urban social movements' in C.G. Pickvance (ed.), Urban Sociology, Critical Essays, pp. 147-173.

M. Castells, 1977, The Urban Question, Edward Arnold.

F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray, D.C. Potter and C.J. Pollitt, 1978, (eds.), Decisions, Organisations and Society, Penguin, 4th Edition.

A. Cawson, 1982, Corporatism and Welfare, Social Policy and State Intervention in Britain, Heinemann.

A. Chandler, 1962, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

S. Chapman, 1971, (ed.), The History of Working Class Housing – A Symposium, David and Charles.

S. Checkland, 1977, The Upas Tree, Glasgow 1875-1975, University of Glasgow Press.

J. Child, 1973, (ed.), Man and Organisation, London, Allen and Unwin.

J. Child, 1973, 'Organisation Structure, Environment and Performance, the role of strategic choice' in G. Salaman and K. Thompson (eds.), People and Organisations, London, Longman, pp. 91-107. Reprinted from Sociology, 1972, 6(1), pp. 1-22.

J. Child, 1977, Organisations: A Guide to Problems and Practice, Harper and Row, 1977.

D.B. Clark, 1973, 'The Concept of Community: a Re-examination', Sociological Review, Vol. 21, 1973, pp. 402-414.

T. Clarke and L. Clements, 1978, (eds.), Trade Unions under Capitalism, Fontana.

S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, 1977, (eds.), Critical Issues in Organisations, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, 1980, Organisation, Class and Control, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

K. Coates, 1976, (ed.), The New Worker Co-operatives, Spokesman Books.

K. Coates and R. Silburn, 1970, Poverty, The Forgotten Englishmen, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

C. Cockburn, 1977, The Local State, Management of Cities and People, Pluto Press.

P.S. Cohen, 1968, Modern Social Theory, London, Heinemann.

L. Colletti, 1974, Introduction to Karl Marx. Early Writings, Penguin, New Left Review.

Community Projects Foundation, 1979, Information Sheet No. 1, A Guide to Housing Action Areas for Demolition, September 1979.

K.S. Cook, 1977, 'Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganisational Relations', Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1977, pp. 62-82.

E.W. Cooney, 1974, 'High Flats in Local Authority Housing in England and Wales since 1945' in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), Multi-Storey Living, The British Working Class Experience, Croom Helm, London.

M.H. Cooper and D.C. Stafford, 1980, 'The Economic Implications of Fair Rents' in R.A.B. Leaper (ed.), Health, Wealth and Housing, Basil Blackwell, pp. 95-116.

L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg, 1967, (eds.), Sociological Theory, Collier-Macmillan, Second Edition.

R. Cowan, 1978, Viewpoint 2: 'Strong hand, heavy hand', Journal of Town and Country Planning, November 1978, pp. 490-492.

R. Crossman, 1981, The Crossman Diaries: Selections from the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, 1964-1970, (condensed version edited by A. Howard), Methuen & Co. Ltd.

M. Crozier, 1964, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, London, Tavistock.

M. Crozier, 1972, 'The Relationship between Micro- and Macro-sociology: a study of organisational systems as an empirical approach to problems of macrosociology', Human Relations, Vol. 25, pp. 239-251.

M. Crozier, 1976, 'Comparing Structures and Comparing Games' in G. Hofstede and M.S. Kassem (eds.), European Contributions to Organisation Theory, Assen, Van Gorcum, pp. 193-207.

J.B. Cullingworth, 1976, Town and Country Planning in Britain, London, George Allen and Unwin, 6th Edition.

J.B. Cullingworth, 1979, Essays on Housing Policy: The British Scene, George Allen and Unwin.

J.B. Cullingworth and C.J. Watson, 1970, Housing in Clydeside, Scottish Development Department, HMSO.

R.A. Dahl, 1961, Who Governs?, Yale University Press.

R.A. Dahl, 1973, 'A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model' in J. Urry and J. Wakeford (eds.), Power in Britain: Sociological Readings, Heinemann Educational Books.

M. Dalton, 1959, Men Who Manage, New York, Wiley.

S. Damer, 1974, 'Wine Alley: the sociology of a dreadful enclosure', Sociological Review, Vol. 22, pp. 221-248.

J. Darke and R. Darke, 1979, Who Needs Housing, Macmillan Press.

R. Darke and R. Walker, 1977, Local Government and the Public, Leonard Hill.

J.G. Davies, 1972, The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, Tavistock.

A. Dawe, 1970, 'The Two Sociologies', British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 21, pp. 207-218.

A. Dawe, 1978, 'Theories of Social Action', pp. 362-417 in T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet (eds.), A History of Sociological Analysis, Heinemann.

J. Dearlove, 1973, The Politics of Policy in Local Government: The Making and Maintenance of Public Policy in the Royal Borough of Kensington, London, Cambridge University Press.

J. Dearlove, 1979, The Reorganisation of British Local Government, Old Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press.

N. Dennis, 1972, Public Participation and Planners Blight, Faber and Faber.

N. Dennis, 1975, 'Community Action, Quasi-Community Action and Anti-Community Action' in P. Leonard (ed.), The Sociology of Community Action, The Sociological Review, Monograph No. 21, pp. 143-164.

N. Dennis, 1977, 'In dispraise of political trust' in W. Sewell and J. Coppock (eds.), Public Participation in Planning, Wiley.

N. Dennis, 1978, 'The Popularity of the Neighbourhood Community Idea' in R.E. Pahl (ed.), Readings in Urban Sociology, Pergamon Press, pp. 74-94.

D. Donnison, 1975, Social Policy and Administration Revisited, Allen and Unwin.

D. Donnison, 1980, 'Urban Development and Social Policies' pp.51-70 in R. and B. Leaper (eds.), Health, Wealth and Housing, Basil Blackwell.

H. Drucker, P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, G. Peele, 1983, (eds.), Developments in British Politics, Macmillan Press.

T.L.C. Duncan, 'Housing Action Areas in Scotland', Housing Review, January-February 1977.

T.L.C. Duncan assisted by J. Curry, 1974, Housing Improvement Policies in England and Wales, Centre of Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham.

T.L.C. Duncan and R.H. Cowan, 1976, Housing Action Areas in Scotland, The Planning Exchange, Glasgow.

P. Dunleavy, 1976, 'An issue centred approach to the study of power', Political Studies, Voo. 24, No. 4, pp. 423-434.

P. Dunleavy, 1982, 'Protest and quiescence in urban politics: a critique of some pluralist and structuralist myths', pp. 190-197 in A. Blowers, C. Brook, P. Dunleavy and L. McDowell (eds.), Urban Change and Conflict: An interdisciplinary reader, Harper and Row. Reprinted from International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1977, pp. 193-218.

P. Dunleavy, 1983, 'Analysing British Politics' in H. Drucker, et al, (eds.), Developments in British Politics, Macmillan Press, pp. 253-299.

P. Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, 1983, 'Beyond Whitehall' in H. Drucker, et al, (eds.), Developments in British Politics, Macmillan Press, pp. 106-133.

E. Durkheim, 1964, The Division of Labour in Society, New York, Free Press.

I. Dyer, 1982, 'Housing Associations in Glasgow' in Making the City Work, Glasgow District Council for the Turin Conference.

J. Edwards and R. Batley, 1978, The Politics of Positive Discrimination: An Evaluation of the Urban Programme, 1976-1977, Tavistock.

S.N. Eisenstadt, 1970, 'Bureaucracy Bureaucratisation and De-bureaucratisation' in A. Etzioni (ed.), A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, 2nd Edition, Holt Reinhart and Winston.

J.E.T. Eldridge, 1971, Sociology and Industrial Life, Nelson.

J.E.T. Eldridge, 1977, 'Trade Unions and Bureaucratic Control' in T. Clarke and L. Clements (eds.), Trade Unions Under Capitalism, Fontana, pp. 175-183.

J.E.T. Eldridge and A.D. Crombie, 1974, A Sociology of Organisations, George Allen and Unwin, 1974.

P. Elliott, 1972, The Sociology of the Professions, Macmillan.

J. Elster, 1976, Contradictions and Possible Worlds, J. Wiley & Sons.

F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, 1965, 'The Causal Texture of Organisational Environments', Human Relations, 1965, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 21-31.

F. Engels, 1975, The Housing Question, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

J. English, R. Madigan and P. Norman, 1976, Slum Clearance: The Social and Administrative Context in England and Wales, Croom Helm.

A. Etzioni, 1961, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, The Free Press.

A. Etzioni, 1964, Modern Organisations, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall.

A. Etzioni, 1970, (ed.), A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 2nd Edition.

W.M. Evan, 1976, (ed.), Interorganisational Relations, Penguin.

B. Farmer and R. Smith, 1975, 'Overspill Theory: A Metropolitan Case Study', Urban Studies, Vol. 12, 1975, pp. 151-168.

B. Fay, 1975, Social Theory and Political Practice, George Allen and Unwin.

H. Fayol, 1949, General and Industrial Management, London, Pitman.

J. Firn, 1975, 'External Control and Regional Policy', in G. Brown (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland, EUSPB, pp. 153-169.

D. Flanagan, 1969, A Centenary Story of the Co-operative Union of Great Britain and Ireland, 1869-1969, Co-operative Union Ltd., Holyoake House.

A. Flanders, 1968, 'Bargaining Theory: The Classical Model Reconsidered' in B.C. Roberts (ed.), Industrial Relations: Contemporary Issues, Macmillan.

A. Fox, 1971, A Sociology of Work in Industry, Collier-Macmillan.

A. Fox, 1973, 'Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology' in J. Child (ed.), Man and Organisation, London, Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp. 185-233.

A. Fox, 1974, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations, London, Faber and Faber.

A. Fox, 1974, Man Mismanagement, Hutchinson & Co.

J. Freund, 1970, The Sociology of Max Weber, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.

H. Gans, 1962, The Urban Villagers, Free Press.

P. Gardiner, 1968, The Nature of Historical Explanation, Third Edition, Oxford University Press.

E. Gauldie, 1974, 'The Middle Class and Working Class Housing in the 19th Century' in A.A. MacLaren (ed.), Social Class in Scotland, John Donald Ltd.

E. Gauldie, 1974, Cruel Habitations: A History of Working Class Housing, 1780-1918, London, Allen and Unwin.

V. George and P. Wilding, 1976, Ideology and the Welfare State, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

P. Georgiou, 1973, 'The Goal Paradigm and Notes Towards a Counter-Paradigm', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 291-310.

H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, 1946, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press.

A. Giddens, 1973, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, Hutchinson.

A. Giddens, 1976, New Rules of Sociological Method, Hutchinson.

A. Giddens 1979, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Macmillan Press.

A. Giddens, 1983, Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction, Macmillan Press.

N. Ginsberg, 1979, Class, Capital and Social Policy, Macmillan Press.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1978, 'Collective statement presented by delegation from 19 Glasgow associations involved in rehabilitation to Members of Parliament at the House of Commons', 18 April 1978.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1979, 'As seen from the Sharp End: a Critique of the HC Scottish Practice Note 2/1978', Paper by J. Johnson, Director of Assist, presented to SFHA Conference on Rehabilitation Standards, March 1979.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1980, Paper on 'Non-residential properties in Action Areas', presented to Development Staff Forum by David Black, August 1980.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1981, 'Paper on rent anomalies for Information, Consideration and Reaction', presented by Housing Management Forum to the SDD and the SFHA.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1983, Urban Renewal in Europe, Pamphlet published by Glasgow in Europe Group for SFHA Annual Conference, June 1983.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1983-84, Housetalk: The Newspaper for Tenants of Housing Associations, Issues Nos. 1-3.

Glasgow Housing Associations, 1984, Miles Better - Miles to Go: The Story of Glasgow's Housing Associations, Housetalk, August 1984.

R. Glass, 1978, 'Urban Sociology in Great Britain' in R.E. Pahl (ed.), Readings in Urban Sociology, Pergamon, pp. 47-73.

R.L. Gold, 1958, 'Roles in sociological field observation', Social Forces, Vol. 36, pp. 217-223.

J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, 1969, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press.

J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, 1969, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Vol. 3, Cambridge University Press.

J.H. Goldthorpe, 1978, 'Industrial Relations in Great Britain' in T. Clarke and L. Clements (eds.), Trade Unions under Capitalism, Fontana, pp. 184-224.

P. and P. Goodman, 1960, Communitas, Vintage Books.

R. Goodman, 1972, After the Planners, Pelican Books.

I. Gough, 1980, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, Macmillan.

A.W. Gouldner, 1954, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, The Free Press, New York.

A.W. Gouldner, 1964, 'Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy' in L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg (eds.), Sociological Theory, Macmillan Press, pp. 500-509.

A. Gouldner, 1965, Wildcat Strike, New York, Free Press.

A.W. Gouldner, 1970, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, London, Heinemann.

Govanhill Community Plan Working Party, 1977, 'Submission to Hugh Brown, Member of Parliament'.

Govanhill: Crossroads Project Community Newspaper, The View, 1977-1982.

Govanhill Housing Association Ltd. (GHA), Annual Reports, 1976 to 1984.

Govanhill Housing Association Ltd. (GHA), Govanhill Research Project II, S. Mason, October 1976.

J. Gower Davies, 1974, The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, Tavistock Publications.

A. Gramsci, 1971, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell, London, Lawrence and Wishart.

J. Greve, 1971, Voluntary Housing in Scandinavia: A Study of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper No. 21.

O. Grusky and G.A. Miller, 1970, (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations, Basic Studies, New York, The Free Press, 2nd Edition, 1981.

R. Guest, 1962, Organisational Change, Homewood Ill., The Dorsey Press.

R. Guest and C.R. Walker, 1952, The Man on the Assembly Line, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press.

L.A. Gunn, 1978, 'Why is Implementation so Difficult?', Management Services in Government, November 1978.

L.A. Gunn, 1979, 'The Policy Making Process', unpublished paper, presented to Society for Social Medicine, July 1979.

L.A. Gunn and B.W. Hogwood, 1984, 'Models of Policy Making', Policy Analysis Teaching Package 20, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.

J. Gyford, 1976, Local Politics in Britain, Croom Helm.

J. Habermas, 1976, Legitimation Crisis, London, Heinemann.

P. Hall, 1973, 'Professionalisation and Bureaucratisation' in G. Salaman and K. Thompson (eds.), People and Organisations, Longman, pp. 120-133.

P. Hall, H. Land, R. Parker and A. Webb, 1978, Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy, Heinemann.

R.H. Hall, 1977, <u>Organisations: Structure and Process</u>, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 2nd Edition.

R.H. Hall, J. Clark, P. Giordano, P. Johnson and M. Van Roekel, 1981, 'Patterns of Interorganisational Relationships' in O. Grusky and G.A. Miller (eds.), <u>The Sociology of Organisations</u>, Macmillan, The Free Press, pp. 477-494.

J. Hands, 1975, <u>Housing Co-operatives</u>, Society for Co-operative Dwellings.

M. Harloe, 1978, (ed.), <u>Captive Cities</u>, J. Wiley and Sons.

M. Harloe, R. Issacharoff and R. Minns, 1974, <u>The Organisation of Housing: Public and Private Enterprise in London</u>, Heinemann.

D. Harvey, 1973, <u>Social Justice and the City</u>, London, Edward Arnold.

D. Harvey, 1977, 'Government Policies, financial institutions and neighbourhood change in United States cities' in M. Harloe, (ed.), <u>Captive Cities</u>, London, John Wiley, pp. 123-140.

S. Hatch, 1980, <u>Outside the State: Voluntary Organisations in Three English Towns</u>, Croom Helm.

D.R. Hay and J. McLaughlin, 1974, 'The UCS work-in : an interim catalogue', <u>Scottish Labour History Bulletin</u>, No. 8, 1974.

H.H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky, <u>The Private Government of Public Money</u>, Macmillan, 1974.

A. Henderson, 1974, 'Industrial Overspill from Glasgow, 1958-1968', <u>Urban Studies</u>, Vol. 11, 1974, pp. 61-79.

B.J. Heraud, 1975, 'The New Towns: A Philosophy of Community' in P. Leonard (ed.), <u>The Sociology of Community Action</u>, Sociological Review, Monograph No. 21, pp. 39-55.

S. Hilditch, 1981, 'Build Homes, Build Hope', <u>Roof</u>, November/December 1981.

G.A. Hillery, 1955, 'Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement', <u>Rural Sociology</u>, Vol. 20, 1955.

B. Hogwood, 1976, <u>An Analysis of GEAR</u>, Unpublished paper, Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde.

R. Hyman, 1972, <u>Strikes</u>, London, Fontana.

R. Hyman and I. Brough, 1975, <u>Social Values and Industrial Relations</u>, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, Social Science Research Council.

J.A. Jackson, 1970, <u>Professions and Professionalisation</u>, Cambridge University Press.

M. Jacobs, 1975, <u>The Reidvale Papers</u> 1 to 3, Mile End Project, Young Volunteer Force.

S. Jacobs, 1975, 'Community Action in a Glasgow Clearance Area: Consensus or Conflict' in P. Leonard (ed.), <u>The Sociology of Community Action</u>, Sociological Review Monograph No. 21, University of Keele, pp. 165-184.

C.S. Jencks, 1971, <u>Modern Movements in Architecture</u>, Pelican.

B. Jessop, 1979, 'Corporatism, Parliamentarism and Social Democracy' in P.C. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds.), <u>Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation</u>, Beverly Hills and London, Sage.

B. Jessop, 1980, 'The Transformation of the State in post-war Britain' in R. Scase (ed.), <u>The State in Western Europe</u>, London, Croom Helm.

B. Jessop, 1983, <u>The Capitalist State</u>, Martin Robertson & Co.

T.J. Johnson, 1972, <u>Professions and Power</u>, Macmillan Press.

L. Karpik, 1978, (ed.), <u>Organisation and Environment</u>, London, Sage.

M. Keating, 1981, 'Area, Power and Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom: Some Problems of Analysis', unpublished paper, University of Strathclyde, March.

M. Keating and A. Midwinter, 1983, <u>The Government of Scotland</u>, Mainstream Publishing.

J. Kernaghan, 1981, 'Harnessing the Resources of the Private Sector' in <u>Making the City Work, Enterprise and Democracy in Urban Europe</u>, Glasgow District Council for Project Turin International, pp. 119-122.

G. Kirk, 1980, <u>Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society</u>, Croom Helm.

S. Krupp, 1961, <u>Pattern in Organisational Analysis, A Critical Examination</u>, Holt, Reinhart and Winston.

J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1978, <u>Housing Policy and the State, Allocation, Access and Control</u>, Macmillan Press.

H.A. Landsberger, 1970, (ed.), <u>Comparative Perspectives on Formal Organisations</u>, Little, Brown and Company.

R.A.B. Leaper, 1980, (ed.), <u>Health, Wealth and Housing</u>, Basil Blackwell.

V. Lenin, 1932, The State and Revolution, New York, International Publishers.

P. Leonard, 1975, (ed.), The Sociology of Community Action, Sociological Review Monograph No. 21, November.

L. Lindberg, R. Alford, C. Crouch and C. Offe, 1975, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, Lexington Books.

C.E. Lindblom, 1959, 'The Science of Muddling Through', Public Administration Review, Spring.

S.M. Lipset, M. Trow and J.S. Coleman, 1956, Union Democracy, Glencoe Illinois, Free Press.

G. Lukacs, 1968, 'Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organisation' in History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press.

S. Lukes, 1978, 'Power and Authority' in T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, (eds.), A History of Sociological Analysis, Heinemann, pp. 633-676.

R. Lumley, 1973, White Collar Unionism in Britain, Methuen & Co.

A.A. MacLaren, 1974, (ed.), Social Class in Scotland, John Donald Ltd.

A.A. MacLaren, 1974, Religion and Social Class, The Disruption Years in Aberdeen, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

D. MacLennan, M. Brailey and N. Lawrie, 1983, The Rehabilitation Activities and Effectiveness of Housing Associations in Scotland: A Report prepared for the Scottish Development Department, Scottish Office, Central Research Unit.

J.G. McCall and J.L. Simmons, 1969, (eds.), Issues in Participant Observation, Addison-Wesley.

R. McKay and B. Barr, 1976, The Scottish Daily News, Canongate, Edinburgh.

D.H. McKay and A.W. Cox, 1979, The Politics of Urban Change, Croom Helm.

D.H. McKay and A.W. Cox, 1979, 'Confusion and reality in public policy: the case of the British urban programme' in C. Pollitt, L. Lewis, J. Negro and J. Patten (eds.), Public Policy in Theory and Practice, Hodder and Stoughton, 1979, pp. 80-94.

H. McShane, 1978, No Mean Fighter, (written by Joan Smith), Pluto Press.

M. Mann, 1973, Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class, Macmillan.

K. Marx, 1957, Capital, Allen and Unwin.

K. Marx and F. Engels, 1970, The German Ideology, edited by
C.J. Arthur, Lawrence and Wishart.

K. Marx, 1974, The Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political
Economy, Translation and Foreword by M. Nicolaus, Penguin Books
in association with New Left Review.

T. Mason, 1977, 'Intention and Implementation in Housing Policy,
A Study of Recent Developments in Urban Renewal', Journal of Social
Policy, Vol. 6, Part 1, January, pp. 17-33.

M. Matheson, 1976, 'Housing Associations in Glasgow', Discussion
Paper No. 8, Discussion Papers in Planning, University of Glasgow.

J. Melling, 1980, (ed.), Housing, Social Policy and the State, Croom
Helm.

J. Melling, 1983, Rent Strikes: People's Struggle for Housing in West
Scotland, 1890-1916, Polygon Books.

J.R. Mellor, 1977, Urban Sociology in an Urbanised Society,
Routledge and Kegan Paul.

S. Merrett, 1979, State Housing in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

S. Merrett with F. Gray, 1982, Owner Occupation in Britain, Routledge
and Kegan Paul.

R.K. Merton, 1963, (ed.), Reader on Bureaucracy, Glencoe.

R. Michels, 1949, Political Parties, Glencoe Illinois, Free Press.

R.K. Middlemas, 1965, The Clydesiders, Hutcheson & Co.

R. Miliband, 1969, The State in Capitalist Society, Quartet Books,
1974.

R. Miliband, 1977, Marxism and Politics, Oxford University Press.

C.W. Mills, 1959, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press.

C.W. Mills, 1964, White Collar: The American Middle Class, Oxford
University Press, 12th Edition.

C.W. Mills, 1970, The Sociological Imagination, Pelican Books.

R. Mishra, 1981, Society and Social Policy, Theories and Practice of
Welfare, Macmillan Press, 2nd Edition.

L.B. Mohr, 1973, 'The Concept of Organisational Goal',
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, pp. 470-481.

N.P. Mouzelis, 1967, Organisation and Bureaucracy, Routledge and
Kegan Paul.

A. Murie, 1983, Housing Inequality and Deprivation, Heinemann
Educational Books.

National Federation of Housing Associations, (NFHA), Voluntary Housing
1977 to 1983.

National Federation of Housing Associations, 1978,
Special Projects Through Housing Associations: an NFHA Guide, by
R. Wurtzburg, Revised Edition.

National Federation of Housing Associations, 1978, Growing Pains:
Coping with the Problems of Growth in Housing Associations.

National Federation of Housing Associations, 1978, Housing Associations,
A Guide to Housing Associations, December.

National Federation of Housing Associations, 1979, Housing Associations,
A Committee Member's Handbook .

National Federation of Housing Associations, 1980, The Housing Act,
1980. A Guide for Housing Associations, November.

L. Needleman, 1965, The Economics of Housing, London, Staples Press.

L. Needleman, 1969, 'The Comparative Economics of Improvement and
New Building', Urban Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 196-209.

S. Nelson, 1980, Participating in GEAR, Strathclyde Area Survey,
University of Strathclyde.

T. Nichols, 1969, Ownership, Control and Ideology, George Allen and
Unwin.

R.E. Nicoll, 1972, 'The Glasgow Region', Official Architecture and
Planning, Vol. 35, pp. 25-28.

P. Norman, 1972, 'A Derelict Policy', Official Architecture and
Planning, Vol. 35, pp. 29-32.

P. Norman, 1975, 'Managerialism: a review of recent work' in
Proceedings of the Conference on Urban Change and Conflict,
Centre for Environmental Studies, London.

P. Norman, R. Madigan and J. English, 1976, Slum Clearance, Croom Helm.

C.A. Oakley, 1946, The Second City, Blackie and Sons, London.

J. O'Connor, 1973, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St Martins Press, New York.

C. Offe, 1972, 'Political Authority and Class Structures: An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies', International Journal of Sociology, Vol. 11, 1, pp. 73-105.

C. Offe, 1975, 'The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy-Formation' in L. Lindberg et al, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, Lexington Books.

C. Offe, 1982, Structural Problems of the Capitalist State, Macmillan.

M. Pacione, 1979, 'Housing Policies in Glasgow since 1880', The Geographical Review, Vol. 69, pp. 395-412.

D. Page, 1971, (ed.), Housing Associations - Three Surveys, Research Memorandum No. 7, University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies.

R.E. Pahl, 1970, Patterns of Urban Life, London, Longman.

R.E. Pahl, 1978, (ed.), Readings in Urban Sociology, Pergamon Press.

R.E. Pahl and J.T. Winckler, 1975, 'The Coming Corporatism', Challenge, March-April, pp. 28-35.

R.E. Pahl, 1975, Whose City?, Penguin Books, 2nd Edition.

R.E. Pahl, 1977, 'Managers, Technical Experts and the State' in M. Harloe (ed.), Captive Cities, John Wiley.

J.A. Palmer, 1972, 'Introduction to the British Edition' of R. Goodman's, After the Planners, Penguin Books, pp. 9-50.

C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, Not Much Improvement: Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham, Heinemann, London.

S. Parker, R. Brown, J. Child and M. Smith, 1972, The Sociology of Industry, George Allen and Unwin.

G. Parry and P. Morriss, 1974, 'When is a decision not a decision?' in I. Crewe, (ed.), British Political Sociology Year Book, Vol. 1 : Elites in Western Democracy, Croom Helm.

T. Parsons, 1956, 'Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organisations', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1, pp. 63-85 and pp. 225-239.

T. Parsons, 1960, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, New York, Free Press.

P.L. Payne, 1967, (ed.), Studies in Scottish Business History, Cass.

C. Perrow, 1961, 'The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations', American Sociological Review, Vol. 26, pp. 854-866.

C. Perrow, 1970, Organisational Analysis: A Sociological Review, Belmont, California.

C. Perrow, 1972, Complex Organisations, A Critical Essay, Scott Foresman & Co.

C.G. Pickvance, 1976, 'On the study of urban social movements' in C.G. Pickvance (ed.), Urban Sociology, Critical Essays, Tavistock, pp. 198-218.

C.G. Pickvance, 1976, (ed.), Urban Sociology, Critical Essays, Tavistock.

R. Plant, H. Lesser and P. Taylor-Gooby, 1980, Political Philosophy and Social Welfare: Essays on the Normative Basis of Welfare Provision, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

C. Pollitt, L. Lewis, J. Negro and J. Patten 1979, (eds.), Public Policy in Theory and Practice, Hodder and Stoughton in Association with the Open University Press.

N.W. Polsby, 1963, Community Power and Political Theory, New Haven, Yale University Press.

D.E. Poplin, 1979, Communities: A Survey of Theories and Methods of Research, Macmillan Press.

D.S. Pugh and D.J. Hickson, 1976, Organisational Structure in its Context: the Aston Programme, London, Saxon House.

P. Raggatt and M. Evans, 1977, (eds.), Urban Education: The Political Context, Ward Lock Educational and Open University Press.

J. Raynor and J. Harden, 1973, (eds.), Cities, Communities and the Young, Readings in Urban Education, Volume 1, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Reidvale Housing Association Ltd. (RHA), Annual Reports, 1977 to 1984.

J. Rex, 1974, Approaches to Sociology: An introduction to major trends in British Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

J. Rex and R. Moore, 1967, Race, Community and Conflict, A Study of Sparkbrook, Oxford University Press.

R.A.W. Rhodes, 1973, 'The politics of policy', Local Government Chronicle, 28 September 1973, pp. 1026-1027.

R.A.W. Rhodes, 1975, 'The lost world of British local politics', Local Government Studies, Vol.1, pp. 39-59.

R.A.W. Rhodes, 1979, Future Research into Central-Local Relations: A Framework for Analysis, London, Social Science Research Council.

R.A.W. Rhodes, 1981, Control and Power in Central-Local Relations, Gower Press, Social Science Research Council.

A.K. Rice, 1963, The Enterprise and its Environment, London, Tavistock.

J. Richardson, 1982, 'The Concept of Policy Style', pp. 1-16 in J. Richardson, (ed.), Policy Styles in Western Europe, George Allen and Unwin.

H. Rose, 1968, The Housing Problem, Heinemann, London.

P. Sager, 1980, Scotland-History and Literature; Architecture and Countryside, British Tourist Association.

G. Salaman and K. Thompson, 1980, (eds.), Control and Ideology in Organisations, Open University Press.

P. Saunders, 1980, Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, Penguin Books.

P. Saunders, 1981, Social Theory and the Urban Question, Hutchinson & Co.

R. Scase, 1980, (ed.), The State in Western Europe, London, Croom Helm.

D. Schon, 1971, Beyond the Stable State, Temple Smith.

J. Scott and M. Hughes, 1975, 'Finance Capital and the Upper Classes' in G. Brown (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland, op. cit., pp. 170-186.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1976, Report, 'The urgency of rationalising Factoring', December.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1978, Rehabilitation Committee Report, 'Delays in Approval for Community-Based Housing Association Projects'.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1980, Report, 'Structure of the System of Cost Limits', D. Clark, SFHA Research Officer, January.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1980, Report,
'The Training Requirements of Community-Based Housing Associations
in Glasgow', B. Murphy.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1981, Review Body Report.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1981, 'Background Paper
on Cost Limits Restructuring', Research Officer.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1981, 'Who Cares: A
Report on Scotland's Neglected Housing Problems', D. Clark, Research
Officer.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1982, 'A Housing
Association Programme for the 1980s, Proposals for a Five-Year
Framework for Development for the Association Movement in Scotland'.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1983, Advice Note,
'Housing Associations Sales Policies'.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1983, 'Home Ownership
Initiatives and Sales of Association Houses', D. Clark, Research
Officer.

Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1984, 'Manifesto for 1984
District Council Elections'.

P. Self, 1977, Administrative Theories and Politics, George Allen and
Unwin, Second Edition.

P. Selznick, 1949, TVA and the Grass Roots, University of California
Press.

P. Selznick, 1970, 'Rejoinder to Wolin' in A. Etzioni (ed.),
A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, Holt Reinhart and
Winston, 2nd Edition, pp. 149-154.

W. Sewell and J. Coppock, 1977, (eds.), Public Participation in Planning,
Wiley.

Shelter's Housing Magazine, 1981, 'Disastrous Warning on Sales', Roof,
September/October 1981.

Shelter's Housing Magazine, 1981, 'Improvement Grants for Profit',
Roof, November/December 1981.

Shelter's Housing Magazine, 1982, 'Association Tendering Grinds to a
Halt', Roof, November/December 1982.

Shelter, 1981, Report, 'Housing Finance in Scotland'.

J.R. Short, 1982, Housing in Britain: The Post-War Experience, Methuen & Co.

D.L. Sills, 1957, The Volunteers: Means and Ends in a National Organisation, Chicago, Free Press.

D. Silverman, 1974, The Theory of Organisations, Heinemann.

H.A. Simon, 1964, 'On the Concept of Organisational Goal', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 9(1), pp. 1-22.

A. Slaven, 1967, 'The Dixon Enterprises' in P.L. Payne, (ed.), Studies in Scottish Business History, Cass.

R. Smith, 1974, 'Multi-dwelling building in Scotland, 1750-1970; A study based on housing in the Clyde Valley' in A. Sutcliffe, (ed.), Multi-Storey Living, The British Working Class Experience, Croom Helm.

M. Stacey, 1960, Tradition and Change, Oxford University Press.

M. Stacey, 1969, 'The Myth of Community Studies', British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, pp. 134-145.

G. Stedman Jones, 1975, 'History: The Poverty of Empiricism' in R. Blackburn, (ed.), Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory, Fontana/Collins, pp. 96-118.

M. Stein and A. Vidich, 1963, (eds.), Sociology on Trial, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.

Strathclyde University, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Govanhill Study, 1976.

H. Stretton, 1978, Urban Planning in Rich and Poor Countries, Oxford University Press.

A. Sutcliffe, 1974, (ed.), Multi-Storey Living, The British Working Class Experience, Croom Helm.

J.N. Tarn, 1973, Five Per Cent Philanthropy, An Account of Housing in Urban Areas, between 1840 and 1914, Cambridge University Press.

L. Taylor, 1971, Deviance and Society, Thomas Nelson and Sons.

J.D. Thompson, 1967, Organisations in Action, New York, McGraw Hill.

J.D. Thompson and W. McEwan, 1970, 'Organisational Goals and Environment' in A. Etzioni (ed.), A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, Holt Reinhart and Winston, 2nd Edition, pp. 187-196.

M. Thornley, 'Housing Rehabilitation - Assist', Architects' Journal, 10 November 1976, 8 December 1976 and 9 February 1977.

H. Turk, 1976, 'Interorganisational Networks in Urban Society' in W.M. Evans (ed.), Interorganisational Relations, Penguin Books, pp. 239-255.

B.A. Turner, 1971, Exploring the Industrial Subculture, Macmillan.

J.C. Turner and F. Fichter, 1972, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, New York, Macmillan.

J. Urry and J. Wakeford, 1973, (eds.), Power in Britain: Sociological Readings, Heinemann Educational Books.

T. Veblen, 1904, The Theory of Business Enterprise, Scribner.

T. Veblen, 1941, The Instinct of Workmanship, Norton.

C. Ward, 1973, Anarchy in Action, London, George Allen and Unwin.

C. Ward, 1974, Tenants Take Over, The Architectural Press, London.

A. Wassenberg, 1977, 'The Powerlessness of Organisation Theory' in S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, Critical Issues in Organisations, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 86-98.

M. Weber, 1968, Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and G. Wittich, Bedminster Press.

M. Weber, 1975, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, edited by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, Macmillan Press.

M. Weber, 1974, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Unwin University Books.

J. Westergaard and H. Resler, 1982, Class In A Capitalist Society: A Study of Contemporary Britain, Pelican Books, 5th Edition.

H.L. Wilensky, 1964, 'The Professionalisation of Everyone?', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70, pp. 137-158.

G.A. Williams, 1975, Proletarian Order, Pluto Press.

P. Winch, 1958, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

J.T. Winkler, 1977, 'The corporate economy: theory and administration' in R. Scase (ed.), Industrial Society: Class Cleavage and Control, London, Allen and Unwin, pp. 43-58.

F. Worsdall, 1979, The Tenement, A Way of Life. A Social, Historical and Architectural Study of Housing in Glasgow, W. and R. Chambers Ltd.

M. Young and P. Willmott, 1962, Family and Kinship in East London, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Publications by State Agencies

Central Housing Advisory Committee, Our Older Homes: A Call for Action, (Denington Report), HMSO, 1966.

Central Housing Advisory Committee, Housing Associations: A Working Paper of the Central Housing Advisory Committee, HMSO, 1971.

Commissioners of Police of the Burgh of Govanhill, Burgh of Govanhill, Lanarkshire: Historical Statement by Commissioners, 1891, Glasgow Room, Mitchell Library.

Committee on Housing in Greater London, Report, (Millner-Holland Report), Cmnd. 2605, HMSO, 1965.

Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance, The Relationship Between Central and Local Government, Appendix 6, Cmnd. 6453, HMSO, 1976.

Committee on the Management of Local Government, Report, (Maud Report), HMSO, 1967.

Committee on Public Participation in Planning, People and Planning, (Skeffington Report), HMSO, 1969.

Corporation of Glasgow and the Scottish Development Department, Report of the Glasgow Housing Programme Working Party, 1970.

Corporation of Glasgow, Second Review of the Development Plan, Areas of Need in Glasgow, June 1972.

Department of the Environment, Policy for the Inner Cities, White Paper, Cmnd. 6845, June 1977.

Department of the Environment, 1981 Census (Small Area Statistics), O PCS, 1982.

Glasgow District Council Housing Department, Housing Plans, 1977-1983.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Govanhill: Report and First Stage Recommendations for Planning Action and Local Consultation in the Govanhill Community, Report by the Director of Planning, January 1974.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Dennistoun Local Plan, Report of Survey, 1976.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Planning Policy Report, 1978.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Camlachie Local Plan Survey Report, 1978.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Glasgow, Implications of Population Changes to 1983, 1978.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Govanhill Local Plan, Survey Report, May 1979.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Dennistoun Local Plan, June 1980.

Glasgow District Council Planning Department, Govanhill Local Plan, June 1980.

Glasgow District Council, Making the City Work, Enterprise and Democracy in Urban Europe, published by GDC for Project Turin International, 1981.

House of Commons Debates, Vol. 873, May 6-17 1974, pp. 42-167, HMSO.

House of Commons Debates, House of Commons Adjournment Debate, 12 November 1982, HMSO.

House of Commons Debates, Fourth Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, etc., Increase of Rent Restriction (Housing Association) (Scotland) Amendment Order 1984, Wednesday, 20 June 1984, HMSO.

Housing Corporation, The Policy Programme of the Housing Corporation, Glasgow Office, 1974.

Housing Corporation, Practice Notes for Housing Associations, Revised Edition, 1976.

Housing Corporation, Guidance Circular for Registered Housing Associations, In the Public Eye, 1977.

Housing Corporation, Annual Reports, 1977 to 1984.

Housing Corporation in Scotland, Scottish News, 1979 to 1983.

Housing Corporation in Scotland, Rehabilitation Projects. Procedures for obtaining HC loan finance for work to existing buildings, Circular No. 7, 1980.

Housing Corporation in Scotland, Voluntary Sales by Housing Associations, Circular No. 14, 1980.

Housing Corporation, The Directory of Housing Co-operatives, 1981.

Housing Corporation, The Housing Corporation in Scotland, Information Note No. 5, 10.12.82.

Housing Corporation in Scotland, Housing Corporation Registration and Supervision Responsibilities, Scottish Guidance Note No. 16, October 1983.

Housing Corporation, Housing Associations and Glasgow. Neighbourhood Renewal and Specialist Housing, Brochure, August 1984.

Housing Corporation, Housing Associations in Grampian, Tayside and North Fife: Neighbourhood Renewal and Specialist Housing, 1984.

Ministry of Housing and Local Government, The Deeplish Study: Improvement Possibilities in a District of Rochdale, HMSO, 1966.

National Building Agency, New Approaches to Urban Renewal, Report for the Department of the Environment, May 1981.

Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Report, (Redcliffe-Maud Report), Cmnd. 4040, HMSO, 1969.

Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, Research Paper No. 3 by A. Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations, HMSO, 1966.

Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal, The Future for GEAR, Key Issues and Possible Courses of Action, July 1978.

Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal, Report on Household Survey, 1978.

Scottish Development Department, Housing Act 1974, Housing Corporation, Housing Associations and Housing Authorities in Scotland, Circular No. 10, 1975.

Scottish Development Department, <u>Scottish Housing: A Consultative Docu-</u> <u>ment</u>, Cmnd. 6852, 1977.

Scottish Development Department, 'Comments on SFHA Submission of September 1980', October 1980.

Scottish Development Department, <u>First Report on Housing Action Areas</u>, HMSO, 1980.

Scottish Development Department, <u>The Housing Act 1974: Housing</u> <u>Association Grant, Delegated Cost Levels for Improvement Projects</u>, Circular No. 11, 1981.

Scottish Development Department, <u>Abstract of Scottish Statistics</u>, HMSO, 1983.

Scottish Housing Advisory Committee, <u>Report</u>, 'Scotland's Older Houses', HMSO, 1967.

Social Science Research Council, <u>Future Research into Central-Local</u> <u>Relations: A framework for analysis</u>, Social Science Research Council, 1979.

Strathclyde Regional Council, Department of Physical Planning, <u>Strathclyde Structure Plan 1977, A Consultative Draft</u>, 1977.

White Paper, <u>Old Houses into New Homes</u>, Cmnd. 3602, 1968.

White Paper, <u>Better Homes, the Next Priorities</u>, Cmnd. 5339, 1973.

White Paper, <u>Towards Better Housing: Proposals for Dealing with</u> <u>Scotland's Older Housing</u>, Cmnd. 5338, 1973.

White Paper, <u>Widening the Choice: The Next Steps in Housing</u>, Cmnd. 5280, 1973.

White Paper, <u>Policy for the Inner Cities</u>, Cmnd. 6845, 1977.

White Paper, <u>Public Expenditure White Paper</u>, Cmnd. 8789-11, 1983.

Journals and Periodicals

Journals and Series consulted in the research:

Administrative Science Quarterly

American Journal of Sociology

American Political Science Review

American Sociological Review

Architects' Journal

British Journal of Sociology

Capital and Class

Glasgow Herald

Glasgow News, 'Alternative Newspaper', 1972 to 1975.

Housing Review

Human Relations

International Journal of Sociology

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research

Journal of Social Policy

Journal of Town and Country Planning

Local Government Chronicle

Local Government Studies

Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Housing and Construction Statistics

Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Housing Statistics

New Society

Newsletter for Tenants, Govanhill Housing Association and Reidvale Housing Association, 1978 to 1983.

Official Architecture and Planning

Political Studies

Reidvale Residents' Association Gazette, Published by Reidvale
  Residents' Association, 1974 to 1976.

Roof, 1977-1984.

The Scotsman

Scottish Development Department, Scottish Housing Statistics, No.1 - 19,
  1978 to 1982.

Scottish Federation News, Journal of the Scottish Federation of Housing
  Associations.

Sociological Quarterly

Sociological Review

Sociology

The View, Community Newspaper, Govanhill, produced with support of
  Crossroads, Community Work Agency.

Urban Studies

Voluntary Housing, Journal of the National Federation of Housing
  Associations.