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Values or politics?

Explaining changing attitudes in England towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union between 1987 and 2016

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This thesis is the result of the author's original research. It has been composed by the author and has not been previously submitted for examination which has led to the award of a degree.

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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'I. L. A. B.', written in a cursive style.

Date: 16th July 2025

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Abstract

Individuals might formulate their attitudes towards key policy issues around a set of core values. Alternatively, they might utilise endorsement heuristics and calibrate their attitudes to match the position of a trusted source of information, such as their preferred political party. Meanwhile, if a party changes its stance on a policy issue, its identifiers might be expected to respond by adjusting their own views to match this new position. But are political parties able to shape the attitudes of their supporters with a change in policy position irrespective of those supporters' values?

This study merges three decades' worth of data from the British Social Attitudes survey (BSA) to test these theoretical questions, considering changing attitudes in England using a novel dataset comprised of 80,617 respondents. More specifically, it examines the role of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues in the formulation of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union between 1987 and 2016. Results demonstrate that attitudes in both areas are powerfully structured by libertarian-authoritarian or 'social' values, with authoritarianism linked to the adoption of anti-welfare and Eurosceptic attitudes. They also highlight that the views of party identifiers typically follow the policy position of their preferred party. In recent years, however, results suggest that the Labour party may have faced difficulties in carrying its supporters from across the social value spectrum with it in its chosen policy direction.

This study makes an original and substantial contribution to knowledge by extending our understanding of attitudinal structure and change, the role of parties as opinion leaders, and the drivers of ideological polarisation.

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1.

Introduction: Values or politics?

HOW DO INDIVIDUALS FORMULATE their attitudes towards complex political issues? One possible answer is that their core values shape their policy preferences. According to the literature, core values function as latent ‘belief systems’ (Surridge, 2012) consisting of a central framework of principles around which citizens construct their views towards a diverse set of policy matters (Converse, 1964). Typically conceptualised as consisting of a ‘left-right’ dimension reflecting an individual’s political and economic preferences and a ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ dimension reflecting their social or cultural inclinations (Evans and Heath, 1995; Tilley, 2005; Feldman, 2013), core values are described as helping us define “what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’ in the world” (Jacoby, 2006, p.706), as lying “at the root of behaviour” (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995, p.21), and as representing “our deeply held views of the kind of society we want to be part of” (Surridge, 2018, p.4). As a result, they can be expected to play a fundamental role in attitude formation (Rokeach, 1973).

An alternative suggestion is that an individual’s attachment to their preferred political party might shape their orientation towards key policy issues. Rather than attempting to form an opinion on each new policy dilemma they are faced with, citizens may instead look to employ ‘informational shortcuts’ (Slothuus and Bisgaard, 2021) or ‘endorsement heuristics’ (Hobolt, 2007) in the form of messages emanating from trusted sources of information. For party identifiers, defined as those who display a sense of long-term affective attachment towards a particular political party (Dalton, 2016), their party of choice may represent the paramount source of information on policy matters (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014). Consequently, these individuals might be willing to “delegate the effortful task of taking an informed position in their interest to their preferred political party” (Pannico, 2020, p.871).

Core value perspective and partisan identity, then, represent “two of the most central and enduring predispositions lying within the political belief systems of ordinary citizens” (Goren, 2005, p.881), with each holding the potential to play a key role in the formulation of individual-level attitudes. However, previous work also suggests that for party identifiers, attitudes may be subject to change based on shifting party cues (Reckhow, Grossmann and Evans, 2015). Even where individuals already hold an apparently entrenched opinion towards a policy issue, a shift in the stance of the party they support might cause them to reconsider their perspective and realign their policy preference with the new position adopted by their party (Curtice, 2010).

But in the event of a change in party cue, what happens if the new stance adopted by an individual’s party of choice clashes with their core value perspective? Is the effect of this shift weaker than it might be upon individuals whose value orientation accords with the new direction of their party, or are political parties able to carry their supporters with them on their new course regardless of their values? If so, is this ability shared across major parties within the same political system, or is one party better able to shape the views of its identifiers from across the value spectrum than another? Further, has the interplay between core values, partisan identity, and party cues played out in a consistent fashion over time, or has this picture shifted during recent decades?

While numerous studies have investigated the distinct role of values (van Oorschot, 2010; Goodwin and Heath, 2016) and partisan identity (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014; Slothuus and Bisgaard, 2021) in shaping public opinion, and while additional work has examined which factors might lead an individual to choose one decision-making path over the other (Coan *et al.*, 2008; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Pannico, 2020), to date few studies have investigated how shifting party cues affect the attitudes of individuals who hold alternative value positions. Although some researchers (for example Kam, 2005)

acknowledge that both core values and partisan identity may concurrently shape policy preferences, the extent to which changing party cues are capable of influencing the attitudes of party supporters who hold diverse value perspectives – or whether a shift in party policy in a given direction instead disproportionately impacts the views of those with a distinct set of core values – is unknown. Further, despite the existence of comparative studies examining the ability of parties operating within diverse political contexts to impact the attitudes of their supporters (for instance Samuels and Zucco, 2014; Kobayashi and Yokoyama, 2018), the question of whether major parties within a single political system are equally able to influence the views of their identifiers from across the value spectrum with a change in cue remains unanswered.

This study aims to address these gaps by utilising a novel, high-quality dataset consisting of three decades of merged British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey data to investigate how changes over time in the nature of the cues emanating from England’s two major political parties affect the policy preferences of their supporters with opposing value perspectives in two contested political spheres – the welfare state and the UK’s membership of the European Union. Its analysis is structured around the following three research questions:

-
1. How do an individual’s ‘left-right’ and ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ values shape their attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK’s membership of the European Union, and has the influence of the second of these dimensions changed over time?
 2. Have the shifting positions of England’s two major political parties towards the welfare state and the UK’s membership of the European Union over time been followed by corresponding changes in the attitudes of their identifiers?

3. To what extent have England's two major political parties been able to shape the attitudes of their identifiers with diverse value positions towards welfare and EU membership, and has their ability to do so changed over time?
-

The remainder of this chapter lays the essential foundations of this study. It positions the welfare state and Britain's EU membership as appropriate areas within which to analyse the interplay between core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues, summarises the role of each of these elements in shaping opinion in both spheres, and outlines the policy changes enacted by England's two major parties – the Conservatives and the Labour party – in each domain. It then sets out the trajectory of aggregate-level public opinion towards both welfare and Britain's relationship with Europe over recent decades, before detailing this study's analytical structure and offering a discussion of why its findings matter from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Finally, the scope and parameters of the project are delineated, with each attitudinal sphere clearly defined and its geographical and temporal coverage demarcated.

Welfare and Europe: two key sites of enquiry

Two policy spheres – the welfare state and the UK's EU membership – represent fitting areas within which to investigate the effect of changing party cues upon those who adopt different core value perspectives. Previous work suggests that opinion in each sphere may be firmly structured by both core values and party identity. Meanwhile, the stance of one or both major political parties in England towards welfare and Britain's relationship with Europe has shifted markedly during recent decades. Further, aggregate-level attitudes in each area have altered significantly over time, allowing for a comparison of the trajectory of these shifts among those holding alternative core values and opposing party ties.

Core values as structuring attitudes

The left-right value dimension might be expected to structure views towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. Representing "the principal attitudinal dimension in British politics" (Curtice, 2010, p.24), an individual's left-right value orientation reflects their beliefs about government intervention and free enterprise (Heath, Evans and Martin, 1994), economic justice (SurrIDGE, 2018), and inequality and exploitation (Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996). In short, it encapsulates their underlying political and economic preferences.

Due to the function of the welfare state in redistributing resources (Arts and Gelissen, 2001) and addressing structural inequality through state intervention (Edmiston, 2018) – issues that are central to an individual's core political and economic beliefs – those on the left may be more supportive of an expansive system of welfare provision, while those on the right may adopt a more sceptical position. This same value dimension may also be linked to attitudes towards the UK's membership of the European Union via perceptions of the institution's role in shaping levels of state welfare (Baute, Meuleman and Abts, 2019) and facilitating social democracy (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). Although for some the EU operates as a powerful force for social protection (Douglas, 2002; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015), for others membership of the bloc places restrictions upon national-level welfare systems and prioritises economic competition over social equality (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012; Walker and Corbett, 2019). Among those who see the EU as enhancing social protection, membership of the institution might be viewed in a positive light by those on the left while appearing less palatable to those on the right. In contrast, among those who view the organisation as prioritising market creation over social equality, this relationship may be reversed.

Meanwhile, the libertarian-authoritarian value dimension may also be expected to structure views in these areas. Often described as a "second dimension"

(Surridge, 2018, p.4) relative to the left-right component, an individual's libertarian-authoritarian value orientation reflects their feelings about personal freedoms (Heath, Evans and Martin, 1994), cultural heterogeneity (Curtice, 2017a), and societal order (Achterberg, van der Veen and Raven, 2014). In sum, rather than encompassing an individual's political or economic beliefs, it embodies their social and cultural preferences.

Although the impact of this value dimension is often neglected in welfare state research (Garritzmann, Busemeyer and Neimanns, 2018), libertarian-authoritarian values might be associated with welfare preferences as a result of a citizen's willingness to display trust and solidarity across ethnic or cultural lines (Ford, 2006) – particularly in heterogeneous societies (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2020). This value dimension may also shape welfare attitudes via individual-level preferences for social reciprocity and rule compliance, with authoritarians more likely than libertarians to view those who they perceive as either deviating from social and moral norms or benefitting from a system towards which they fail to contribute as unworthy of state support (Staerklé, Likki and Scheidegger, 2012). Meanwhile, those with opposing libertarian-authoritarian values might also hold different attitudes towards the merits of EU membership as a result of the institution's role in altering patterns of immigration and increasing social diversity (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017) or its embodiment of supranational structures of political power (Inglehart and Norris, 2016), with libertarian values linked to an inclusive and international outlook and authoritarian values associated with a preference for social homogeneity and national control over political and economic affairs (De Vries, 2018).

Both core value dimensions therefore have the potential to hold sway over attitudes towards the welfare state and EU membership. However, the literature suggests that the attitudinal impact of an individual's libertarian-authoritarian values may have altered over time. As western democracies have moved further

away from industrialisation (Inglehart, 1971) and cultural considerations have grown in importance when compared with economic concerns (Flanagan and Lee, 2003), post-materialist writers suggest that the libertarian-authoritarian dimension may have come to play an increasingly dominant role in the formation of attitudes towards key policy issues. As a result, we might expect an individual's views towards the welfare state and EU membership to have become increasingly linked with this component of their core values over recent decades.

Party identity as structuring attitudes

Alongside core values, partisan identity may also be of relevance to attitude formation in these two areas. Firstly, party identity has been shown to be of critical importance to the formulation of attitudes towards particularly complex issues (Coan *et al.*, 2008). Debates around EU membership and European integration are typically characterised by a high degree of complexity (Pannico, 2017), while modern European welfare states represent increasingly “complex machineries” (Marchal and Van Lancker, 2019, p.697) attempting to respond to major socioeconomic changes as part of a multi-tiered system of social protection and within the context of an intricate and dynamic ‘welfare mix’ (Taylor, 2004; Ferrera, 2005; Hendricks and Powell, 2009). Secondly, party identifiers have been shown to be particularly likely to take account of messages emanating from their party of choice when formulating their opinion towards issues perceived to be at the centre of partisan conflict (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). The appropriate role and function of the welfare state represents a traditional site of party competition (Wu and Chou, 2017), while a new cleavage centred on questions including globalisation, migration, and international political cooperation – issues that are integral to debates around EU membership – is often seen as increasingly structuring party competition in western European democracies (Grande and Kriesi, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). An individual's

perspective towards both welfare and Britain's ties with Europe may therefore be expected to reflect the stance of the party they support.

The role of changing party cues over time

Overlaying this picture, however, is the key detail that each of these areas has witnessed significant alterations in the perspectives of England's two largest political parties over time. In the case of EU membership the Conservatives, once the 'party of Europe' (May, 1998), became increasingly critical of the UK's relationship with the institution from the end of the 1980s onwards (Dorey, 2017), while the Labour party transitioned from a staunchly Eurosceptic position towards an "emphatically pro-European stance" during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Baker *et al.*, 2002, p.94) before tempering this position during the 2010s (Schnapper, 2015). Meanwhile, although the approach of the Conservative party towards welfare has remained broadly consistent throughout recent decades, from the mid 1990s onwards the Labour party shifted away from its traditional position of support for an expansive system of welfare provision and towards a more neo-liberal conception of the appropriate role and function of the welfare state (Daguerre and Etherington, 2016) before departing from this approach once more during the 2010s (O'Grady, 2022). Given the existence of prior work showing that party identifiers may adapt their issue preferences to fit the changing stance of their party of choice, we might expect the attitudes of Conservative and Labour partisans towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership to have altered in the wake of these significant undulations.

Aggregate-level changes in public opinion

While these qualities suggest that both the welfare state and the UK's role in European affairs represent fertile sites of enquiry within which to examine the role of core values, party identity, and shifting party cues in shaping public opinion, their suitability as testing grounds is further enhanced by an additional

factor: attitudes towards welfare provision and Britain's relationship with Europe have shifted markedly over time. Although historically underpinned by a relatively broad-based consensus (Pierson, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Jensen and Tyler, 2015), over recent decades societal-level changes in public opinion towards these two key institutions suggest that the merits of both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership have become increasingly contested among the electorate. Aggregate-level attitudes towards welfare experienced a marked and sustained shift away from a relatively pro-welfare position in the 1980s towards a more punitive, anti-welfare stance during the mid-to-late 1990s which persisted throughout the subsequent decade (Deeming and Johnston, 2018). Meanwhile, a gradual increase in Eurosceptic attitudes during the mid 1990s coupled with a sharp rise in core anti-European sentiment during the 2000s eventually culminated in the UK's decision to leave the EU in June 2016 (Swales, 2016)¹.

These shifts over time have been captured by BSA, which since the 1980s has tracked opinion towards both the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union². Figure I1, which displays aggregate-level scores in England on the survey's composite 'welfare' scale between 1987 and 2016³, demonstrates that attitudes towards welfare became notably harsher during the late 1990s


¹ While not to the same extent as witnessed during the lifetime of this study, evidence suggests that attitudes towards both the welfare state and Britain's role in Europe had also been subject to change prior to this point. For instance, Crewe (1988) and Hudson, Lunt and colleagues (2016a, 2016b) contend that popular attitudes towards the welfare state moved in a more sceptical direction during the mid-to-late 1970s before subsequently softening once more. Meanwhile, Anderson and Hecht (2018) argue that views towards Britain's relationship with Europe shifted in a broadly negative direction in the aftermath of the UK's decision to remain in the EEC at the 1975 referendum before undergoing something of a reversal during the mid-1980s.

² Prior to the establishment of the EU in 1993 BSA asked its respondents for their views on '*the EEC – the Common Market*' (between 1983 and 1989), '*the EC – the Common Market*' (in 1990), and '*the European Community*' (in 1991).

³ BSA's 'welfare' scale is comprised of a battery of eight statements, with participants able to select a response to each statement along a five-point scale ranging from 'Agree strongly' to 'Disagree strongly'. The composition of this scale is discussed in detail in Data and Methods. For tables displaying the data on which Figure I1 is based, see Annex I (Table IA1). For the distribution of responses to each item comprising the scale over time, see Annex I (Figure IA1, Tables IA1(a)-IA1(j)).

than had been the case previously, with this relatively anti-welfare mood remaining evident throughout the 2000s. Despite softening somewhat during the 2010s, views typically remained markedly more anti-welfare than they had been during the late 1980s (see Hudson *et al.*, 2020), having failed to pivot in the wake of the 2008-09 recession and rising levels of unemployment as they had following previous economic downturns (Taylor-Gooby, 2013; see also Clery, 2012; Baumberg, 2014).

Figure I1 Mean BSA welfare scale scores, England, 1987-2016




Note: BSA's 'welfare' scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score over time, the y-axis in Figure I1 begins at '2.4' and ends at '3.4'.

Figure I2, meanwhile, depicts changing attitudes in England towards Britain's membership of the European Union over the same period⁴. It shows a decline in the proportion of those who wished to leave the bloc between 1987 and the early-to-mid 1990s, as well as highlighting the comparative stability of membership preferences during the following decade. Finally, it illustrates a rise in the number of those who hoped for a departure from the institution during the late 2000s and

⁴ Figure I2 displays data provided by two items carried on BSA between 1987 and 2016 designed to canvass views towards the UK's relationship with Europe. Data between 1987 and 1991 are derived from a binary item on EEC/EC membership, while data between 1993 and 2016 are derived from a 5-point item on long-term EU membership preference. Further details on each of these items, together with the justification for combining them into a single time series, are provided in Data and Methods. For tables displaying the data on which Figure I2 is based, see Annex I (Table IA2). For the distribution of responses to each of the individual items comprising the time series displayed at Figure I2, see Annex I (Tables IA2(a)-IA2(b)).

early 2010s – a proportion which increased further in the 12 months leading up to the UK’s 52% vote to leave the EU in 2016. Despite the result of the referendum taking many by surprise (Menon and Salter, 2016; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2017) the broad trajectory of attitudes towards EU membership illustrated by Figure I2 suggests an electorate who, having “never taken the European project to heart” (Curtice, 2017b, p.24), had become increasingly cynical about the merits of remaining a part of the institution in the years prior to the ballot.

Figure I2 Attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership, England, 1987-2016



Investigating how core values and party preference interact within the context of two long-standing yet contested features of the British political landscape for which levels of public support have eroded in recent years therefore has the dual advantage of developing the knowledge base on the role of values, partisanship, and changing party cues in opinion formulation, while also contributing to the debate around the drivers and contours of real-world attitudinal change. Is it the case that the broad decline in support for the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership witnessed over recent decades has in part stemmed from a particular value dimension becoming more closely tied to opinion in each sphere? Or, have political parties played a key role in this development by instigating attitudinal shift among their supporters via changes in their policy positions? Meanwhile, if both values and party identity hold sway over an

individual's outlook in each area, has the ability (or otherwise) of parties to carry their supporters from across the value spectrum with them in their chosen policy direction shaped the extent of the attitudinal changes that have occurred at a societal level?

Analytical approach

Before the impact of shifting party cues upon partisans who hold alternative sets of core values can be examined, two analytical cornerstones must be established. Firstly, although both left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values might be expected to shape opinion towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, the nature of these associations requires unravelling. Secondly, while previous studies have demonstrated the potential impact of partisan identity upon attitudes towards specific areas of public policy, the degree to which party preference is linked with views towards both welfare and Europe – and the dynamics of these relationships in the wake of significant changes in the position of England's two largest political parties – must be understood.

How are core values linked with views towards the welfare state and EU membership?

As demonstrated above, both the left-right and libertarian-authoritarian aspects of an individual's core values might play a role in structuring attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. However, uncertainty surrounds the nature and extent of these ties. Meanwhile, although both value dimensions are theorised as having the potential to impact preferences towards welfare and Europe, when set against the wider context of an 'uncoupling' of issues from the traditional left-right dimension and their 'realignment' with the libertarian-authoritarian dimension (Surridge, 2012), it may be that the primacy individuals attribute to their libertarian-authoritarian values when formulating their attitudes

in each sphere has increased over time. An examination of the associations between core values and attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership forms the first of this study's three analytical chapters.

The contours of these relationships may serve to underline the importance of political parties' ability to carry supporters with opposing value perspectives with them in the wake of a change in policy direction. The left-right dimension traditionally plays a central role in determining party preference in Britain (Reinermann, 2002), with those who affiliate themselves with each of England's major parties typically adopting opposing positions on this dimension. The values of Labour supporters tend to be further to the left of this spectrum, while Conservative supporters typically fall further to the right (Bartle, 1998). The libertarian-authoritarian division, however, is traditionally less well-articulated by the system of party competition, with both Labour and Conservative identifiers occupying a range of perspectives along this continuum (Denham, 2020). In other words, while the left-right values of both sets of party supporters might be relatively homogeneous, their libertarian-authoritarian values are considerably more heterogeneous. As a result, if attitudes towards the welfare state and Britain's role in Europe are powerfully structured by libertarian-authoritarian values, the ability of parties to shape the views of their supporters from different points along that continuum is central to their prospects of success in carrying their identifiers with them *en masse* in a new policy direction.

Do party cues take effect in both areas?

Although partisans may be expected to look to the policy stance of their preferred party when formulating their attitudes towards a broad range of issues (Brader *et al.*, 2020), previous research indicates that party cues might be particularly likely to take effect where the issue at stake is highly complex (Pannico, 2017) or central to the dynamics of party competition (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). These

criteria may apply to differing degrees in each sphere, raising the question of the extent to which parties are indeed capable of shaping attitudes in both areas. Examining the role of partisan preference and shifting party cues in the formulation of attitudes towards each of these issues over time represents the focus of this study's second analytical chapter.

Although questions surrounding both EU membership and modern systems of welfare provision are complex and multifaceted, the optimal relationship between the UK and a distant, supranational political entity might be viewed as so abstract and convoluted (Janssen, 1991) as to be particularly conducive to the delegation of opinion formulation to a trusted political party (Anderson, 1998). In contrast, research suggests that welfare attitudes might be derived more intuitively from a predilection for equality versus freedom (Kumlin, 2007) or a sense of the deservingness or otherwise of welfare recipients (Gilens, 1999; van Oorschot, 2000), perhaps leaving less room for political parties to shape individual-level policy preferences.

That said, despite the salience of debates around EU membership increasing in recent decades (Hooghe and Marks, 2008), when compared with "the bread-and-butter issues of domestic politics... relatively few parties are deeply wedded, either ideologically or pragmatically, to a specific stance on integration" (Down and Wilson, 2010, p.64). The scope and nature of welfare provision represents one such 'bread-and-butter-issue' that traditionally sits at the heart of partisan conflict in western democracies (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004). Although some researchers have cast doubt upon the continued centrality of welfare to party competition in the wake of sustained welfare state retrenchment (for example Pierson, 1996), others point to a range of enduring interconnections between partisan politics and the welfare state. These include clear links between the ideological stance of a party and its willingness to expand social protection (Huber and Stephens, 2001) and the ongoing status of attitudes

towards welfare as a strong predictor of vote choice (Attewell, 2021), together with more subtle ‘systemic’ (Jakobsson and Kumlin, 2017) and ‘institutionalised’ (Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2021) party effects which shape the capacity of particular parties to pursue expansive welfare state policies.

Both policy domains therefore possess features that could lead party identifiers to mirror the position of their preferred party. Further, as party positioning in these areas has shifted over time, the attitudes of partisans might be expected to have shifted in tandem (Bergan, 2012). However, as the literature suggests that the distribution of characteristics that might encourage attitude formation based on partisan loyalty might differ in each sphere, an assessment is required of the extent to which party cues do indeed shape opinion in both areas.

Do changing party cues function across the value spectrum?

If analysis suggests that both core values and party identity play a key role in shaping attitudes towards welfare and Europe, we reach the edge of a lacuna in the knowledge base on opinion change; whether the impact of a shift in party cue is dependent upon an individual’s core value perspective, whether the ability of political parties to mould the views of their partisans from across the value spectrum is consistent across major parties within the same political system, and whether this capacity has remained stable over time. Although existing work is largely silent on the issue of the interplay between core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues in shaping individual-level attitudes, some suggestions might be offered as to the nature of the interaction between these elements.

One possibility is that party identifiers who hold a particular set of core values are more likely to respond to a party cue that accords with their value perspective. For instance, if it is the case that those with libertarian values exhibit markedly

more pro-welfare attitudes than those with authoritarian values, if a party shifts its stance towards the welfare state in a more pro-welfare direction its libertarian supporters might respond to this shift more readily than its authoritarian supporters. Adopting the language of Tetlock (1986), such a change in policy perspective may 'activate' the values of libertarian party identifiers to a greater extent than their authoritarian counterparts.

A further possibility is that the impact of changing party cues upon partisans with opposing value perspectives differs according to the political party with which they identify. For instance, although both the Conservative and Labour parties garner a considerable degree of support from across the libertarian-authoritarian spectrum (Denham, 2020), existing work indicates that a somewhat greater proportion of Conservative voters typically hold authoritarian as opposed to libertarian values while a marginally higher percentage of Labour voters adopt a libertarian rather than an authoritarian outlook (Curtice and Simpson, 2018). If analysis indicates that attitudes towards the welfare state or the UK's EU membership are powerfully structured by libertarian-authoritarian values, in line with the Conservative party's greater electoral appeal to authoritarians the party might be expected to be better able to shape the views of its identifiers with authoritarian values. Meanwhile, among Labour supporters, perhaps the opposite is the case; reflecting its greater appeal to libertarian voters, perhaps a change in policy perspective on the part of the Labour party impacts the views of its libertarian supporters more than its authoritarian supporters.

An alternative outcome is that the views of both sets of party identifiers shift to the same degree in response to a change in party cue, notwithstanding their value perspective or the party they support. If this is the case, a shift in policy position on the part of either the Conservatives or the Labour party might be expected to foreshadow a recalibration of attitudes among their partisans regardless of their core values. Employing the metaphor invoked by Curtice (2010), perhaps both

parties are equally capable of exercising a ‘weathervane’ effect across the value continuum. The extent of this ‘weathervane’ effect, and whether its strength differs among supporters of Britain’s two major political parties, forms the basis of this study’s third and final analytical chapter.

Contribution to knowledge

Addressing these gaps in the knowledge base matters. If the effect of changing party cues conforms to the outline offered by the first suggestion above – with party identifiers more responsive to a party cue that points them in the direction associated with their value orientation – this indicates that core values place an important limit upon the ability of political parties to shape the attitudes of their supporters towards contested policy issues. Rather than causing partisans to “blindly follow their party” (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014, p.60), the impact of party cues might rest upon the value perspective held by individual party identifiers, with partisans whose values pull in the opposite direction to a party cue insulated from its effects.

Meanwhile, should the results of this study conform with the second suggestion above – that the impact of changing party cues upon those with opposing value perspectives varies according to an individual’s preferred party – this may hint at key differences in the ability of England’s major parties to encourage their partisans to toe the party line. Moreover, should analysis demonstrate that libertarian-authoritarian values powerfully shape attitudes in both spheres, this could highlight important limitations in the capacity of political parties to manage value divides within their supporter base and presage how they might fare in negotiating the emergence of new issues that hold a strong association with libertarian-authoritarian values (see, for instance, Mellon, Bailey and Prosser, 2021; Smith and Hempel, 2022; O’Shaughnessy *et al.*, 2023).

In contrast, if the impact of changing party cues resembles the third suggestion above – with party identifiers responding to an alteration in the policy stance of their preferred party regardless of their value orientation – this will serve to underline the capability of parties to shape the views of their supporters across the board towards contested political issues. Rather than an individual's value perspective – and the demographic characteristics such as education (Scott, 2022), age (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), and social class (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) that contribute to its development – representing attitudinal destiny, such a finding would emphasise the vital role played by political parties in enhancing or restricting support for key political institutions notwithstanding individual-level characteristics. It may also suggest that parties perhaps have a degree of free rein to pursue a chosen policy stance without fear of alienating a portion of their supporter base whose values may be expected to lead them to resist their party's new position.

Finally, taking a step back from these possible permutations, investigating the interaction between these elements within the dual contexts of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership carries one further benefit. Despite similarities in the broad trajectory of public opinion in each of these policy domains, and suggestions that attitudes in one sphere may under certain macro-level conditions shape attitudes in the other (Beaudonnet, 2015; Baute *et al.*, 2018), in Britain there appears little evidence of a direct link between heightened scepticism towards the welfare state and increased cynicism towards the UK's membership of the EU (Cooper and Burchardt, 2022). That said, if mutual relationships exist between attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership on the one hand and core value orientation, partisan identity, and shifting party cues on the other, this might suggest that attitudinal change over time in each sphere is attributable at least in part to a common set of underlying mechanisms. Situating this study within these two spheres therefore offers an opportunity to uncover shared factors underlying changing levels of public

scepticism towards institutions that require popular support for their survival (Koster, 2010; Bauer, 2020). Further, if analysis reveals attitudinal patterns that are common to both areas, this study's findings may have applicability beyond the scope of preferences towards the welfare state and EU membership by highlighting the extent of political parties' power to stabilise or threaten other longstanding political institutions.

Defining 'the welfare state' and 'the European Union'

Attitudes towards 'the welfare state'

While the term 'welfare state' emerged as a phrase describing nations with high expenditure on health, education, and social security (Allardt, 1976), today it is more commonly used to refer to a particular section of the public sector responsible for service provision and delivery in these areas (Sandmo, 1995). The potential scope of the term is wide-ranging; Lefebvre and Pestieau (2018) suggest there are as many permutations of the 'welfare state' as there are states themselves, each with significantly different structures and ambitions (Hvinden and Schoyen, 2020) – a point emphasised by Timmins (2001) who highlights that the 'welfare state' does not exist as an entity in itself and instead represents a dynamic collection of policies which may or may not include facets as diverse as occupational welfare (Farnsworth, 2013), active labour market policies (Nordlund, 2013), and the 'tax welfare state' (Sinfield, 2013).

Notwithstanding these definitional challenges, the public provision of healthcare, education services, and a system of social security – that is, the supply of cash (and cash-like) transfer payments to individuals and families in particular circumstances (Walker, 2004) – are consistently seen as central to the concept of the modern welfare state (Sandmo, 1995; Leibfried, 2010; Nullmeier and Kaufmann, 2010; Berghman, Debels and Van Hoyweghen, 2013). Moreover,

in Britain the term ‘welfare state’ has increasingly been used to refer specifically to the latter of these elements. Thanks to its regular use by politicians and commentators in public debate on the scope and nature of the benefits system, the phrase has also come to be employed by researchers who wish to capture “popular and political understandings of social security” (Hudson, 2018, p.179).

Although in Britain the principle that the state has a responsibility to offer universal health and education services has retained extensive political and public support (Pearce and Taylor, 2013; Cream, Maguire and Robertson, 2018), the past four decades have seen intense political debate on the role of the state in safeguarding citizens’ welfare through systems of social security (Marstrand, 1996; Prideaux, 2010; Wiggan, 2012). While the Keynesian principles of demand-side management and strong welfare provision that underpinned the post-war welfare state during its ‘golden age’ are often said to have enjoyed broad cross-party support (Wincott, 2013)⁵, during the 1980s a combination of domestic economic decline coupled with increasing globalisation (Hart and Prakash, 1997), a shift towards post-Fordism and changing patterns of unemployment (Crouch, 1995), and growing concerns that the system in its contemporary guise represented a ‘moral hazard’ (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 2005) preceded the emergence of an alternative Schumpeterian vision of welfare (Jessop, 1993) characterised by supply-side intervention and a focus on training and returning the unemployed to the labour market. This vision informed the welfare policies of successive Conservative and Labour governments which sought to maximise structural competitiveness and flexibility (Deeming, 2015) and positioned ‘workfare’ as a fundamental principle of welfare reform (Peck, 2001), reducing the level of social protection offered to working-age citizens to the extent that by the mid 2010s the welfare state in Britain had “shrivelled” in comparison to its pre-

⁵ Although see Pimlott, Kavanagh and Morris (1989, p.13) who argue that, despite the idea of political consensus providing “a neat, convenient explanatory framework”, the principle that both major parties were fully aligned on welfare policy from the 1940s through to the 1970s is “an illusion that rapidly fades the closer one gets to it”.

1980s heyday (Thane, 2020, p.433). As the primary site of political and public debate over the role of the state in providing for the welfare of its citizens, it is attitudes towards this segment of the welfare state upon which this enquiry focuses.

Attitudes towards the UK's membership of 'the European Union'

Defining the European Union also presents some conceptual challenges, as encapsulated by the description of the institution offered by the former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors as an 'unidentified political object' (Delors, 1985). These challenges stem from both the inherent complexity of the EU and the continual changes to its character that have occurred during its lifetime in response to a series of internal and external developments (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2019). At the most basic level, however, the European Union may be described as a supranational union of European nations fostering political and economic integration between its member states through common policies and institutions, with the aim of creating an 'ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe' (Treaty on European Union, 1992).

While the modern-day EU possesses considerably more political and economic power than its predecessors, the principles of economic integration and international cooperation upon which it is built can be traced back to the immediate post-war period, with the pooling of national resources emanating from a desire to achieve peace and reconciliation in the wake of the Second World War (Groenendijk and Hospers, 2002; Guisan, 2011; Ciappi, 2023). Although the UK's participation in the pan-European project did not commence until its eventual accession to the then-European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, Britain would go on to remain a member of the bloc for over four decades.

Throughout this period, the institution that evolved into today's European Union experienced a series of transformative changes. Having been founded in the guise of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 – an organisation intended to integrate the coal and steel industries of six European nations – by the time of the UK's accession the institution encompassed nine states and aimed to foster significantly greater levels of economic and political integration between its members (Davis, 2017). By the late 1980s the number of member states had grown to 12, with the passing of the 1986 Single European Act signalling the intention to create a single market which would further enhance economic integration between member states and increase the political powers of the Community (Moravcsik, 1991). Economic and political integration was accelerated once more by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which established the modern-day European Union and promised “a new stage in the process of European integration” (Treaty on European Union, 1992), building provision for a single European currency and creating the concept of EU citizenship. Two subsequent waves of eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 further expanded the number of EU member states to 27 (Pollack, 2009) while the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 – which strengthened the powers of the European Parliament through a series of ‘institutional modifications’ – again altered the substantive character of the EU (Plechanovova, 2013). With the Eurozone crisis of 2008-09 and the refugee crisis of 2015-2016 further redefining the institution's “nature and objectives as well as altering its functioning and competences” (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2019, p.2), by the time of the 2016 referendum the European Union resembled a very different organisation to that which the UK had joined over four decades previously.

Parameters and scope

Geographical coverage: England

Although the welfare state and Britain's relationship with the EU represent appropriate attitudinal domains within which to examine the role of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues in shaping public opinion, perspectives in each of these spheres differ considerably across the nations that make up the United Kingdom. Deeming and Johnston (2019), for instance, highlight significant divides between the views of those in England and those in Scotland towards the appropriate level of social benefits (see also Curtice and Ormston, 2012). Meanwhile Bunyan *et al.* (2022) find distinctly positive attitudes towards the role and function of the welfare state in Northern Ireland that appear to contrast with the position in England, with Dunatchik and Smith (2018) identifying attitudinal patterns towards welfare in Wales that differ markedly over time from those observed in England.

Similarly, views towards the merits of EU membership vary significantly across each of the constituent nations of the UK. Although this variance is apparent in the differential results of the 2016 EU referendum across each territory – with a majority of voters in both England (52%) and Wales (53%) expressing a desire to leave the EU compared with just 44% of those in Northern Ireland and 38% of those in Scotland (McHarg and Mitchell, 2017) – these figures reflect long-standing differences in attitudes towards EU membership across each country. These disparities are illuminated by Ormston (2015) who demonstrates that the proportion who think Britain should leave the EU has been consistently higher in England than in Scotland since at least 1999, by Clements (2010) who observes that attitudes in Northern Ireland towards EU integration are markedly more positive on a number of key indicators than those elsewhere in the UK, and by Jeffery and colleagues (2014) who illustrate that across a range of measures the issue of Europe distinguishes public opinion in Wales from that in England.

Importantly, these differences are often attributed to the existence of distinctive political cultures across each of the UK's constituent nations. Yarde and Wishart (2020), for example, link more sympathetic attitudes towards welfare, redistribution, and social equality in Scotland to differences in partisan affiliation north and south of the border, while Curtice and Ormston (2012, p.2) highlight that as a result of the historical electoral success in Scotland of the Labour party (and, since 2007, the Scottish National Party), the "leading players" in social policy debates tend to adopt a more socially democratic perspective than is the case in England. Similarly, Ormston (2015) argues that the greater prevalence of anti-EU attitudes in England reflects the country's consistently higher level of support for Eurosceptic parties including the Conservatives and, from the late 2000s through to the 2016 referendum, UKIP. Meanwhile, looking beyond partisan preference, Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021, p.3) describe English nationalism as lying "at the heart of the decision to leave the European Union", a picture which contrasts starkly with the relationships posited between Welsh (Haesly, 2001), Scottish (Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, 2017), and Irish (Heath and Richards, 2019) national identity and support for European integration.

These differences are further compounded by links between attitudes in this area and the cross-cutting issue of constitutional preference; nationalists in Northern Ireland (Hayward, Komarova and Rosher, 2022) and Scotland (Curtice and Montagu, 2018) have been shown to adopt more positive attitudes towards the merits of EU membership than unionists, while connections between constitutional preference and EU membership have also been highlighted in Wales (Nyatanga, 2020). Moreover, national identities have been framed as representing a shared set of underlying values (Henderson and McEwen, 2005); for example, while Scottish identity is regularly portrayed as embodying a liberal, social democratic outlook typically linked by the literature to a pro-welfare, pro-European stance (see, for example, Hearn, 2000), English identity is linked by existing research with the adoption of a more socially conservative, ethnocentrist

perspective – characteristics typically associated with scepticism towards both the welfare state and EU membership (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020; Henderson and Wyn Jones, 2021).

The potential epistemological implications of these differences are summed up by Henderson and colleagues (2017, p.632), who assert that adopting a UK-wide lens when assessing the mechanisms underlying attitudinal change runs the dual risk of pushing Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales “to the analytical margins” while “veiling England”. Adopting England as a unit of analysis enables a focus on just one of these distinctive contexts, producing a picture of the interrelationships between values, political orientation, and shifting party cues that accurately represents the situation in a nation with particularly high levels of scepticism towards both the welfare state and the EU over recent decades without assuming the same story plays out in identical fashion elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

Time period: 1987-2016

Focusing on attitudes in England using data drawn from BSA also carries with it a practical advantage. The Scottish Social Attitudes survey has provided rich data on the views of the Scottish population towards both welfare and the EU since 1999 (Dean *et al.*, 2022), the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey has offered a similarly detailed account of public opinion in Northern Ireland since 1998 (NILT, 2022), and the National Survey for Wales has provided insight into the views of those living in Wales since 2012 (Welsh Government, 2021). However, high-quality data containing a large English sample in the form of BSA – which includes individual-level information on attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK’s relationship with the European Union together with data on partisan affiliation and core value perspective – stretches considerably further back in time,

allowing for a robust examination of attitudinal change commencing as early as 1987 (Butt, Clery and Curtice, 2022).

Welfare state developments

The beginning of relevant data collection on BSA coincides with a period during which major changes to the machinery of the welfare state in Britain were being implemented. The seeds of political challenge to the post-war Keynesian welfare system were sown in the late 1970s with the election of a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher who promised to promote individual responsibility and roll back the frontiers of the state (Jackson, 2014). However, many concrete changes – including the replacement of Supplementary Benefit with the less generous system of Income Support, the increased targeting of housing benefit, and the introduction of the Restart programme which introduced additional conditionality in the sphere of unemployment benefits for the first time since the 1930s (O'Grady, 2022) – took effect only during the final portion of Thatcher's period in office commencing in 1987. In other words, while an ideological attack on the welfare state aimed at "softening up the public" (Page, 2011, p.33) had begun during the earlier part of the decade, it was from this point onwards that attempts were made in earnest to radically reform the welfare state (Lowe, 1998). Meanwhile, taking this enquiry through to 2016 allows for the consideration of an extended period during which welfare state restructuring formed a defining feature of UK government policy (Beatty and Fothergill, 2018). Although a focus on reorganising the welfare system was initially adopted by the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major (Kavanagh, 2009), New Labour subsequently positioned welfare reform as an "ideological cornerstone" of its administration (Deeming and Johnston, 2018, p.398) before its pace "quickened dramatically" (Beatty and Fothergill, 2019, p.145) under the Conservative-led coalition which sought to markedly reduce welfare expenditure in line with its programme of austerity (Hobson, 2020). By the time the 2010 coalition was replaced in 2015 by a Conservative majority government pledging that "the days

of something for nothing are over” (Conservatives, 2015), the welfare state in Britain resembled a considerably more punitive and coercive system than it had done three decades previously (O'Grady, 2022).

Changes in the UK's relationship with Europe

An enquiry that begins in 1987 also enables an analysis of public attitudes towards the UK's relationship with the EU from the point at which Britain's membership of the institution looked to be politically secure. Following the election of Neil Kinnock as leader in the wake of its 1983 general election defeat, the Labour party abandoned its promise to depart from the EEC if elected in favour of a 'euro-pragmatist' approach towards membership of the bloc (Beech, 2021), vowing in its 1987 manifesto to “work constructively with our EEC partners to promote economic expansion and combat unemployment” (Labour, 1987). With the Conservatives displaying a united front in support for EEC membership during their successful 1983 election campaign (Moss and Clarke, 2021), the divisive question of Britain's contribution to the EEC budget settled (Dorey, 2017), and the public “slowly becoming accustomed to, and even perhaps comfortable with, being part of the European Community” (Evans, 2003, p.217), by the start of this study's timeline the nation looked set to remain within the institution for the foreseeable future. By the end of it, however, the UK was readying itself to detach from the bloc following a long-term rise in Eurosceptic attitudes coupled with significant changes in the stance of both major political parties towards the issue of EU membership. While Labour's shift during the mid-to-late 1980s towards an “emphatically pro-European stance” (Baker *et al.*, 2002, p.94) was solidified throughout the subsequent two decades, during the 2010s the avowedly Europhile perspective previously adopted by the party became significantly diluted (Schnapper, 2015). Meanwhile, divides between pro- and anti-Europeans within the Conservative party over the direction in which the EEC was progressing, having first been given voice in Thatcher's 1988 Bruges speech,

continued to harden throughout the 1990s and 2000s to the extent that by the time the party returned to power, Euroscepticism had become “the dominant view” among Conservatives (Smith, 2012, p.1281). With Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn adopting a position of ‘constructive ambiguity’ towards Europe (Diamond, 2019) and Conservative prime minister David Cameron engaging in a “full-throated populist embrace” of anti-European rhetoric (Vail, 2015, p.114), the calling of a referendum on the UK’s EU membership in 2016 and the subsequent vote to Leave emphasised the scale of the political and attitudinal reversal that had taken place during the previous three decades.

Structural overview

The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. First, a review of the literature provides a comprehensive picture of the concepts of core values, partisan identity, and party cues. It develops the theoretical perspectives underpinning the expectation that each of these components might play a vital role in shaping attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership, details the gaps that exist in the current literature on how each of these elements interact, and elaborates on the key research questions to be addressed by this study.

This is followed by a chapter setting out the project’s methodological approach. This positions secondary analysis of quantitative data as the optimal strategy for addressing the study’s research questions, introduces the techniques employed at the analysis stage, and provides a detailed insight into BSA – the source from which this project’s data are derived. It goes on to introduce the study’s main dependent variables representing attitudes towards the welfare state and the European Union, its key independent variables including core value orientation, partisan identity, and relevant demographic characteristics, and its temporal variables representing the shifting policy positions of England’s two major parties towards both welfare and EU membership.

Next, the first of this study's analytical chapters covers the relationship between views in England towards the welfare state and Britain's relationship with Europe and core values between 1987 and 2016. This is followed by a second analytical chapter investigating the links between opinion in each domain and party identity, before a final analysis chapter explores the impact of shifting party cues upon the attitudes of partisans with opposing sets of values.

The thesis closes with a discussion of the consequences of this study's findings. It summarises the results of analysis, before considering these results in light of the project's three research questions and drawing out a series of key theoretical and practical implications. It also considers the methodological and substantive limitations of the study, and offers suggestions for future work to further bolster understanding in this area.

2.

Literature review: Values, party identity, and shifting party cues

THIS CHAPTER CRITICALLY ASSESSES the state of the current literature on the impact of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues upon attitude formation. It sets out how prior research has typically conceptualised both core values and partisan identity, and reviews the existing evidence on the role of each of these elements in moulding public opinion. It then turns to the literature covering the potential impact of shifting party cues, discussing why we might expect the attitudes of partisans to alter over time in accordance with the position of their preferred political party before addressing in detail the major alterations that took place in the stance of England's two major parties towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership between the late 1980s and the mid 2010s. It then provides an overview of current knowledge surrounding the potential interrelationship between each of these three elements, before identifying a series of key gaps in the current understanding of their individual and cumulative impacts and drawing these together into three clearly-defined research questions.

Core values

Although elements of the association between core values and attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership remain uncertain, there exists a rich literature on the nature of core values and their function in the formulation of policy preferences. This section covers seminal work identifying values as structural forces around which individual-level attitudes are developed and considers the ways in which they are typically conceptualised, before reviewing the theoretical and empirical grounding for the expectation that core values may powerfully shape attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership.

The role of core values in attitude formulation

The concept of core values as classically expounded by Converse (1964, p.207) involves a set of opinions and preferences “bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence”, with the notion of a ‘constraint’ signifying a central framework of principles that assume “prime centrality” in an individual’s belief system and around which that individual may construct their attitudes towards new issues. It is this ‘constraint’ that enables the prediction of an individual’s attitudes towards a diverse range of issues based upon their views and opinions in other areas, and which results in the grouping together of attitudes at the individual level in “broadly predictable ways” (Heath, Evans and Martin, 1994, p.115).

Despite this theoretical assertion, early investigations into the impact of value orientation upon public opinion such as those by Campbell *et al.* (1960) in the United States and Butler and Stokes (1974) in the UK typically found an absence of such a system of core beliefs at the individual level. Rather than being motivated by a set of guiding principles or a coherent ideological framework, these studies suggested that a majority of people held opinions that were “either non-existent, randomly articulated, or supported by little information” (Pierce and Rose, 1974, p.626). In sum, the public were typically seen as displaying ‘non-attitudes’ (Converse, 1970).

A later wave of studies, however, contested these observations. In the US, Feldman and Zaller (1992, p.268) pointed to the fundamental significance of political values or ideologies in shaping public opinion, arguing that voters make use of “values and principles” in forming and justifying their policy preferences – a finding echoed by Jacoby (1994, p.338) who asserted that preferences may be seen to emanate from “an underlying trait or dimension”. In the UK, meanwhile, the methodological work of Heath, Evans, and Martin (1994; Evans and Heath, 1995; Heath and Martin, 1997) highlighted deficiencies in the techniques

employed by previous attempts to assess the role of core values in attitude formation. These efforts established that core values cannot be accurately measured in a direct manner (see also Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995). Rather, their influence can only be gauged via sophisticated indicators that successfully tap into an individual's latent beliefs (Surridge, 2012). The development of such indicators has subsequently exposed “underlying dimensions of ideology and values” (Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996, p.93) that structure public opinion in meaningful ways.

As a result, there is now a broad acceptance that core values play a key role in the development of attitudes (Park and Surridge, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2017) and can function as predictors of an individual's preferences across a wide range of policy areas. Moreover, values are seen to remain “relatively stable and enduring over time” (Heath, Evans and Martin, 1994, p.120); although individual-level attitudes and opinions towards specific issues may shift, core values are characterised as remaining comparatively consistent throughout an individual's lifetime (Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996; Sturgis, 2002; Tilley, 2005). In other words, while attitudes and issue preferences are “reactive to specific situations, contexts, and political arguments” (Surridge, 2012, p.51), core values are less amenable to such short-term influences and, consequently, less volatile.

How are values conceptualised?

Researchers have taken a diverse range of approaches to conceptualising core values. For instance, Judd (Judd and Milburn, 1980; Judd and Krosnick, 1982) utilises a single dimension of ‘political left – political right’ to encapsulate individual-level values in the American context, Jost and colleagues (2003) propose a unidimensional model focused on psychological predisposition to risk versus security, and Inglehart (1987; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) argues that the concept of ‘post-materialism’ is crucial to understanding core values in

advanced capitalist societies. Meanwhile, researchers including Lipset (1959, p.485) and Fleishman (1988, p.175) assert that a two-dimensional perspective – in the former’s case accounting for both “economic liberalism” and “non-economic liberalism” and in the latter’s case incorporating “general orientations to economic welfare on the one hand, and individual liberties on the other” – more accurately portrays the nature of core values. These perspectives can be further contrasted with those of Kerlinger (1984), Baldassarri and Goldberg (2014), and Feldman and Johnston (2014) who advocate for the consideration of multiple value dimensions to fully reflect the composition of an individual’s core beliefs.

However, there appears to be a general consensus in the UK that individual-level values as they relate to attitude formation and policy preferences can be adequately conceptualised as composed of two dimensions (Tilley, 2005; Feldman, 2013). The first of these represents the division between political and economic left and political and economic right, while the second represents the division between libertarianism and authoritarianism. The former is concerned with “collectivism and government control, as well as economic and political equality” (Evans and Heath, 1995, p.191), and embodies an individual’s underlying preferences towards matters such as economic inequality, state intervention, and private enterprise. Reflecting the conventional cleavage between political left and political right, this study refers to this dimension of an individual’s core beliefs as their ‘political values’. The latter dimension, meanwhile, concerns “freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of association, and freedom to pursue one’s own course of life” (*ibid.*) and embodies an individual’s social or cultural preferences including on law and order, civil liberties, and social diversity. Although Surridge (2018) notes that this aspect of an individual’s core beliefs is difficult to satisfactorily label, it may broadly be seen to reflect a divide between ‘social liberals’ and ‘social conservatives’ (Curtice, 2017a), or between ‘libertarians’ and ‘authoritarians’

(Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996). This study terms this dimension of an individual's core beliefs their 'social values'.

Although the first of these two dimensions represents what has traditionally been thought of as the primary value-based cleavage in Britain (Curtice, 2010), a number of authors have argued that the second dimension has perhaps come to play a more prominent role in the process of opinion formulation. Inglehart (1987, p.1292), for instance, asserts that in the context of post-industrial societies where economic inequalities have gradually reduced over time, views on what is desirable are driven less by preferences towards the redistribution of wealth and more by "the public's sense of justice, social solidarity, and other non-material motivations". While for Inglehart this has the result of shifting societal values away from 'materialism' and towards 'post-materialism', for those employing a two-dimensional conceptualisation of core values this may lead to attitudes that are traditionally structured by political values becoming increasingly aligned with social values instead (Surridge, 2012). Meanwhile, researchers such as Kriesi (Kriesi *et al.*, 2006; Kriesi and Frey, 2008) and Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2018) point to the emergence of a new political and societal divide in Western European nations focused on issues such as trade, migration, and globalisation. These issues may hold a stronger connection to the libertarian-authoritarian or 'social' dimension of an individual's core values than the left-right or 'political' dimension (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2019), and their increasing salience has the potential to sharpen the role of social values in forming electoral and policy preferences (Stenner, 2005; Stenner and Haidt, 2018) and alter the manner in which debates spanning a diverse range of policy domains are framed by political actors (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997; Brewer, Clark and Wakefield, 2002). As a result, although both core value dimensions may influence policy preferences, the literature hints that the structural power of an individual's social values may have increased over time – even in those areas traditionally seen to be strongly linked to political values.

Why might values shape views towards welfare and EU membership?

Beyond providing an extensive discussion of the role of core values in attitude formulation more generally, the literature offers a range of theoretical and empirical linkages between both political and social values and public opinion towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. This section provides an overview of these perspectives and summarises the existing evidence on the relationship between each value dimension and attitudes in both spheres.

Welfare

Political values

In deciding whether to support or oppose policy measures designed to enhance welfare, individuals might adopt a self-interested approach and prioritise the extent to which measures might improve their own position (Kangas, 1997). According to this perspective, individual-level support for specific policy interventions is primarily based on 'utility maximisation' (Wu and Chou, 2017), with citizens taking into account any personal gain they may stand to make from particular welfare measures (Peillon, 1996). We might for example expect younger people to be supportive of policies that focus on the provision of education (Fraile and Ferrer, 2005), those who are unemployed to support a system of unemployment benefit (Gelissen, 2000), or older people to support policies that ensure generous pension provision or comprehensive healthcare services (Taylor-Gooby, 2004a).

However, several researchers suggest that this perspective underplays the significance of political values in shaping support for welfare policies (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Jacoby, 1994). Edmiston (2018, p.986), for instance, submits that the weight individuals attribute to structural explanations for poverty and inequality plays a key role in both value orientation and attitudes towards the

welfare state, with those “inclined to recognise the structural determinants of poverty and affluence” more likely to hold left-wing values and support expansive welfare policies. Similarly, Fong (2001) positions belief in either ‘exogenous-determination’ or ‘self-determination’ as central to both political values and attitudes towards welfare provision, with the former typically associated with a left-of-centre set of values and support for an inclusive welfare system and the latter with a right-of-centre perspective and greater opposition to state welfare. Meanwhile, Arts and Gelissen (2001) assert that those on the left of the political spectrum hold a core preference for low levels of inequality and are therefore more likely to support measures designed to create a more equal society, while Heide-Jørgensen (2021) notes that those on the right are more likely to back policies that encourage market competition and either create or sustain inequality. Gelissen (2000) further argues that whether an individual holds the state responsible for achieving social justice and equality represents a fundamental link between value orientation and attitudes towards welfare policies, highlighting that those on the left tend to be supportive of government intervention in the form of an expansive welfare state while those on the right prefer less intervention and therefore less extensive welfare policies. At the same time, Jost and colleagues (2003; 2006) contend that specific ‘social-cognitive motives’ relate both to political value orientation and attitudes to welfare; according to this assertion, those on the left are more likely to favour social change and to view progressive welfare policies as contributing to this while those on the right are motivated by a desire for order, an aversion to uncertainty, and a fear of threat, and therefore oppose policies that may alter the status quo.

That political values might exert a powerful influence upon welfare state preferences is perhaps unsurprising; the extent to which public policy should aim to enhance welfare through the redistribution of income and the provision of state services is a central political question (Wu and Chou, 2017) and one that is fundamental to the cleavage between individuals, as well as parties, on the left

of the political spectrum and those on the right (Attewell, 2021; Heide-Jørgensen, 2021). This is emphasised by the results of numerous studies that reveal differences in enthusiasm for state welfare that cannot be explained by self-interest alone, and that highlight the contribution of political values in shaping attitudes in this area. In the US, for instance, Jacoby (1994, p.336) uses data from the 1984 National Election Study to highlight “a coherent structure” underlying attitudes towards welfare spending by political value perspective, while Groskind’s (1994) analysis of the 1986 General Social Survey finds that support for what is termed ‘economic aid to disadvantaged people’ is based largely upon political ideology rather than self-interest. In Europe, meanwhile, Sihvo and Uusitalo (1995, p.253) employ data derived from Gallup’s Finnish omnibus surveys undertaken between 1975 and 1993 to assert that attitudes towards the welfare state “are clearly a left-right issue”, a finding complemented by the results of Bean and Papadakis’s (1998) analysis of International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data addressing welfare attitudes across six western nations which concludes that groups traditionally on the left of the political spectrum tend to be more supportive of welfare provision than those on the right regardless of the welfare regime to which their nation belongs. These findings have since been confirmed by Gelissen (2000, p.298) who uses Eurobarometer data to argue that those on the left are more consistently in favour of “an extensive and intensive welfare state” than their right-wing counterparts, by Arts and Gelissen (2001, p.289) who undertake an analysis of ISSP and European Values Survey data covering 20 countries and find that “the more left-wing one’s political inclination, the more one will be solidary and in favour of the equality and need principles”, and by Jaeger (2008, p.364) who utilises European Social Survey data from three European nations to assert that left-right orientation “has a strong causal effect on support for the welfare state”. These patterns have also been observed in the UK where Clery’s (2016, p.20) examination of British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey data concludes that left-wing individuals are more supportive of policies designed to enhance welfare than those on the right,

leading to the assertion that political ideology “evidently plays an important role in shaping attitudes towards welfare”.

Social values

In addition to research linking views towards the welfare state with political values, several authors have advanced theoretical connections between welfare preferences and social values. Many of these perspectives position social diversity as central to understanding the links between social values and welfare attitudes. Writing in the US context, Quadagno (1996), Gilens (1999), and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) suggest that the ethnic diversity of American society hinders public support for strong welfare provision; according to the latter, ethnic minority citizens in the US are viewed by the white majority as being disproportionately likely to be in receipt of social assistance, and “Americans (like most people) prefer giving money to people of their own race, religion, and ethnicity” (*ibid.*, p.6). Meanwhile, Bay and Pederson (2006) point to the relative historic homogeneity of European societies as contributing to the construction and maintenance of relatively strong welfare states; in contexts where those in receipt of state support are typically perceived as being part of the same cultural or ethnic group as the majority, these authors suggest that “trust in and sympathy for welfare recipients” remains high (*ibid.*, p.421).

According to some scholars, however, changing patterns of migration in Europe may represent an obstacle to the maintenance of comprehensive welfare systems, with concerns expressed that such a development could result in a gradual erosion in support for European welfare states (Freeman, 1986; although see Taylor-Gooby, 2005 for a qualification of this argument). This point is developed by Burgoon and Rooduijn (2020), who assert that increased population heterogeneity has the potential to result in an ‘anti-solidarity effect’ which may weaken support for high levels of redistribution and welfare provision. It is also considered by Banting and Kymlicka (2006, p.3) in their discussion of a

“heterogeneity / redistribution trade-off”, a concept building upon the suggestion that welfare state support may decrease as a society becomes more diverse due to feelings of trust and solidarity failing to extend across ethnic or cultural lines.

Such an ‘anti-solidarity effect’ may be particularly prevalent among those who hold more ethnocentric, nativist attitudes towards issues such as national identity, diversity, and multiculturalism (Ford, 2006; Goodwin and Heath, 2016). While solidarity might bridge cultural and ethnic differences more easily among those who hold socially liberal values and who view multiculturalism not just as a social norm but as a virtue that requires defence on moral grounds (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020), solidarity with those who are ethnically or culturally different – and who may therefore be seen as less ‘deserving’ of welfare state protection (van Oorschot, 2006) – might be lower among those who hold more socially conservative values. If the welfare state is considered by those who adopt a more authoritarian perspective as catering increasingly for those with whom they may not feel a sense of solidarity (Crepaz, 2006), higher levels of scepticism towards welfare policies might be expected among authoritarians than among libertarians.

A related thread can be traced in Freeman’s (1986) portrayal of welfare states as necessarily resembling ‘closed’ systems. Building on the link established by Offe (2000) between the construction of modern European welfare systems and the development of nation states as self-contained units of solidarity, this perspective positions national systems of welfare provision as attempting to restrict access to ‘members’ – i.e. citizens – yet failing to do so in the context of an increasingly globalised economy and rising levels of migration. While Andersen (2003) suggests that an inability to sufficiently insulate national welfare systems from ‘non-members’ who may not have contributed to their maintenance might undermine the fiscal basis for welfare states, for those who hold a more authoritarian set of values in particular a perception that their

domestic welfare system allows migrants to contravene norms of contribution and reciprocity (Menéndez, 2007) or to ‘jump the queue’ to access welfare support (Deeming and Johnston, 2018) might also be expected to lead to lower levels of support for the welfare state.

A further theoretical perspective is offered by Staerklé and colleagues (2012, p.89), who hypothesise that authoritarian beliefs incorporating a predilection for social order may be incompatible with positive attitudes towards an expansive welfare state. As authoritarianism may be associated with a preference for “repression of deviance”, and as “deviant and nonconforming individuals” who fail to display self-reliance or offer a sufficient economic contribution may not be deemed worthy of state support, welfare-scepticism might be expected to be higher among those who adopt a more authoritarian outlook than among those with a more socially liberal set of values. This hypothesis echoes the assertions of Althammer *et al.* (2014, p.1) who argue that challenges to the legitimacy of systems of state welfare are often linked to a perception that such systems primarily support those “who do not think, behave and live as the ‘normal’ citizen does”, and is also reflected in Rossetti and colleagues’ (2021, p.351) contention that authoritarians are liable to hold negative views about welfare recipients due to a perception of this group as deviating from “the predominant norms of autonomy and self-responsibility”.

The role of social values in structuring attitudes towards welfare has been demonstrated empirically by a number of studies. As far back as the late 1980s Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989, p.1043) argued that support for state welfare appeared to be structured by elements of an individual’s core value perspective other than just the left-right dimension, with their analysis of Detroit Area Study data from 1983 suggesting that support for welfare policies is particularly marked among those who “strongly endorse a ‘liberal’ position”. These conclusions are echoed in the more recent work of Blanchet and Landry (2021, p.10), who utilise

representative data from Quebec to emphasise that the possession of authoritarian values is associated with “more negative views of welfare recipients”. Meanwhile, research undertaken by Achterberg and colleagues (2014, p.216) involving the analysis of nationally representative Dutch data reveals that the libertarian-authoritarian value dimension plays a particularly important role in shaping attitudes towards ‘commodifying’ welfare reforms – that is, those that “refer to the increased emphasis in social policy on reciprocity” and intensify punishment of recipients of state welfare “who do not comply with the rules”. This conclusion is mirrored by Garritzmann *et al.* (2018) who, through an analysis of original survey data from across eight European countries, find that authoritarianism is consistently associated with support for more punitive ‘workfare’ reforms as opposed to more expansive and egalitarian welfare policies. It is also echoed by Brazzill and colleagues (2020, p.194) who, following an exploration of nationally representative survey data in Japan, attribute higher levels of support for the concept of a ‘social investment welfare state’ among libertarians to their desire to offer “a rebuttal to the neoliberal welfare strategy of retrenchment of social transfers”. Similar observations have also been made in Britain; using BSA data Ford (2006) finds that social values exercise a powerful effect over attitudes towards the role and function of the welfare state, while Baumberg-Geiger (2017) exploits the same data source and notes that views towards benefit manipulation hold a strong association with an individual’s position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum.

Europe

Political values

Left-right values are positioned as closely intertwined with attitudes towards the domestic welfare state as a result of its function in overcoming societal inequality, its role in achieving social justice, and its embodiment of state intervention. For EU member states, however, welfare and social protection may

be viewed as multi-layered; while national welfare states function to enhance the welfare of citizens and redistribute income through the provision of public services and systems of social security, they do so within a multi-tiered system incorporating both national and supranational political structures (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995; Bruzelius, Chase and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). The impact of EU membership upon the social protections offered by member states therefore represents a potential connection between political values and attitudes towards Britain's relationship with Europe. If the EU is perceived to enhance social protection and reduce inequality, those with left-wing values might be expected to back the UK's membership of the institution while those with right-wing values might be more sceptical. Alternatively, if the EU is seen as reducing social protection and fostering inequality, we might expect this relationship to be reversed.

A number of authors posit that the EU offers a degree of social protection in addition to that provided by national welfare states through its 'social dimension', a feature that sets it apart from other global trading blocs and political unions (Walker, 2005; Hermann and Mahnkopf, 2010). Expressed through concepts such as 'social Europe' (Bailey, 2008; 2017) and the 'European social model' (Pascual and Jepsen, 2006) and comprising EU-level measures seeking to redistribute resources with the aim of enhancing equality and social justice, this social dimension has been described as "the soul of the European Union" (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015, p.3) and is positioned by a range of actors on the left as a potentially powerful check on the negative impacts of globalisation and neoliberalism (Bailey, 2005; Corbett and Walker, 2019). A number of achievements in the area of welfare and social rights attained through a combination of Treaty amendment, European Commission legislation, and European Court of Justice jurisprudence can be highlighted; workers' rights have been solidified and extended (Hermann and Mahnkopf, 2010), gender equality in pay and conditions has been enhanced (Scharpf, 2010), and access to education

has been expanded (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015). Further, EU citizens who move between member states are guaranteed individual social rights (Pennings, 2012; Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017) and are able to access welfare support in their destination state (Martinsen, Rotger and Thierry, 2019), a development viewed by Bruzelius and colleagues (2016) as significantly expanding the scope of the EU's social dimension. For those on the left who are supportive of the enhancement of welfare, then, the EU may be seen as a powerful force for social protection (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes, 2001); Douglas (2002, p.29), for example, argues that "the future for social democratic principles lies within a united Europe", while Hooghe *et al.* (2002) assert that further European integration may strengthen social democracy through the creation of powerful institutions with the ability to pursue transformative social policy. Conversely, for those on the right who may be less supportive of interventions designed to reduce inequality and increase social protection, the EU's social dimension may represent an obstacle to economic freedom through the imposition of supranational-level measures and regulations aimed at correcting inequalities caused by the market (Majone, 1994; Copeland, 2015).

However, the claim that EU membership enhances social protection is not without controversy. One counterargument comes in the form of a critique of the substance behind the EU's social dimension; despite "modest results" (Leibfried, 2015, p.266) in limited areas such as employment rights and anti-discrimination, the EU's social dimension has been described variously as representing a "failed promise" (Corbett and Walker, 2019, p.102), comprised of "cheap talk" (Scharpf, 2010, p.211), and resembling an "empty shell" (Falkner, 2003, p.196). Rather than incorporating rigorous checks on unfettered economic growth and inequality, Hermann and Mahnkopf (2010) suggest that the EU has broken with neoliberalism on a semantic level only while Walker and Corbett (2019, p.164) submit that social aims have consistently given way to "a slavish pursuit of economic competition and the vast inequalities in income, wealth, and

societal standing that result from this”. Such critics argue that the EU’s failure to prioritise social protection above economic growth was placed in particularly sharp relief by the imposition of austerity and welfare state retrenchment measures in a number of member states in response to the 2009 sovereign debt crisis (Heins and De La Porte, 2015; Theodoropoulou, 2015).

A related rebuttal of the view that the European Union represents a source of additional social protection points to a “formidable” and “increasing” set of barriers to significant policy achievements in this area at EU level (Leibfried, 2015, p.257; see also Obinger, Leibfried and Castles, 2005). Bailey (2017) groups such obstacles into three categories. The first includes ‘institutional obstacles’ such as the EU’s focus on ‘market making’ rather than ‘market correcting’ (see also Scharpf, 1998) and its use of decision-making protocols incorporating the use of supermajority rules and numerous ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Tsebelis and Yatağan, 2002) that limit the scope for accomplishing large-scale reform (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012). The second encompasses ‘political obstacles’ including perceived threats to the political power of national elites (Cederman, 2001) and the diversity of national welfare states (Corbett and Walker, 2019). Finally, the third incorporates ‘social obstacles’ including a decline in the influence of traditional social democratic forces such as trade unions and centre-left parties (Manow, Schäfer and Zorn, 2004) and a growth in the influence of business and capital markets (Leibfried, 2015). As a result of these “significant and serious” obstacles (Bailey, 2017, p.108), Falkner (2003, p.197) asserts that substantial EU-level measures aimed at enhancing welfare remain “a rather distant goal”.

Meanwhile, as highlighted by authors such as Saari and Kvist (2007), the scope and functionality of national welfare states is at least in part shaped by their supranational relationship with the European Union. This assertion leads to two further challenges to the principle that the EU acts as a force for welfare

enhancement. Firstly, while some argue that the EU has accomplished little in the way of social protection, others further assert that national welfare states are increasingly constrained by EU rules on economic liberalisation and competition which might preclude a wide range of traditional welfare-enhancing policy options that may otherwise be available at the national level (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995). According to Höpner and Schäfer (2012, p.431) this represents “a recipe for less social protection and redistribution” rather than more; while economic liberalisation continues apace, social protection at the EU level remains underdeveloped (Bailey, 2005; Copeland, 2015) and ‘semi-sovereign’ member states are left restricted in their capacity to address social inequality through national-level welfare measures (Scharpf, 2010; Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017). Secondly, critics argue that the ability of EU citizens to benefit from domestic welfare systems towards which they may not have directly contributed undermines both the ability of such systems to fund themselves through contributory payments (Andersen, 2003) and the legitimacy they derive from the linkage of rights and obligations (Menéndez, 2007). In the absence of the ability to limit welfare state access to domestic citizens (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014) and facing challenges to their legitimacy (Offe, 2000), critics contend that nations with more generous domestic welfare states may reduce provision as they become more economically integrated (De Beer and Koster, 2009) resulting in a process of welfare state convergence (Soroka, Banting and Johnston, 2006; Starke, Obinger and Castles, 2008) or a ‘race to the bottom’ (Kvist, 2004). If the European Union is in fact perceived as a neutral or even negative influence on levels of welfare and social protection, rather than expecting those on the left to favour EU membership we might instead anticipate ambivalence or scepticism towards the institution among this group. Conversely, if the EU is seen as prioritising market creation over social protection or as reducing the potential for expansive national-level welfare interventions, we might expect the institution to be viewed in a more positive light by those on the right who favour policies

designed to increase economic freedom over those designed to reduce inequality and enhance welfare.

A number of studies have empirically addressed the role of political values in shaping attitudes towards the EU. Employing 1996 Eurobarometer data Brinegar and Jolly (2005) submit that right-wing citizens tend to be more supportive of European integration than those on the left, while Cautrès (2012) analyses data from both the European Values Study and the European Election Study and finds that left-wing individuals evaluate the EU's impact on social security more negatively than their right-wing opponents. Further, Baute and colleagues' (2018, p.214) examination of European Values Study data across 28 European countries leads to the conclusion that those who are "strongly in favour of government intervention and income redistribution" – characteristics typically associated with those on the left of the political spectrum – "experience European integration as more threatening".

However, additional studies emphasise that the relationship between political values and views towards EU membership is context-dependent. For instance, analysis of 2009 Eurobarometer data leads Beaudonnet (2015) to conclude that in countries where state welfare systems are more inclusive those who sit on the left of the political spectrum might perceive EU membership as a threat to the status quo, while in contexts where welfare support is less comprehensive European integration may not be associated with the same set of concerns. Similarly, Garry and Tilley (2015, p.139) argue that although those on the left who live in a country with high levels of income inequality and a small public sector "will support European integration, because more integration would move public policy in a left-wing direction", those with similar political values who live in a country with lower levels of inequality and a larger public sector "are likely to be eurosceptic, as further integration would result in a more right-wing public policy".

Social values

The potential relationships between social values and attitudes towards the welfare state stem largely from issues of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity; in a heterogeneous society, the literature suggests that support for the welfare state may be lower among those with socially conservative values when compared with their counterparts who adopt a more socially liberal perspective. Issues of social diversity and changing patterns of immigration have also come to represent a key fault line in debates surrounding the UK's relationship with the EU (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014; Curtice, 2016) as a result of freedom of movement provisions which, by enabling EU citizens to move unencumbered between member states (Barnard, 2016), have contributed to increasing levels of diversity in Britain (Heath *et al.*, 2013; Thielemann and Schade, 2016). While those who hold more socially liberal values may welcome the increased cultural and ethnic diversity brought about as a result of EU membership (Ford and Goodwin, 2017), their socially conservative counterparts who may be dissatisfied with the UK's shift from a largely homogenous to a more ethnically diverse society might conversely view EU membership as an obstacle to reducing immigration (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017) and as a result hold a more negative view of the institution. The centrality of these value-based divisions became especially stark during the run-up to the UK's EU referendum, with the debate over Britain's membership of the bloc tapping into "a disagreement between social liberals and social conservatives about the relative merits of a homogeneous and a heterogeneous society" (Curtice, 2017a, p.6).

This fault line is emphasised by a number of researchers who employ a binary categorisation separating those whose socially liberal values might lead them to support the concept of EU membership from those whose socially conservative stance might result in greater scepticism towards the institution. Sobolewska and Ford (2020), for example, argue that while many of those falling into their pro-EU 'identity-liberal' group view diversity and multiculturalism as not just a social

norm but a virtue in itself that requires staunch defence on moral grounds, their 'identity-conservative' counterparts adopt a more ethnocentric, nativist view of society and are more sceptical of the merits of EU membership. This is underscored by Ford and Goodwin (2014, p.117) who submit that, in direct contrast to "the university-educated middle class", individuals belonging to demographic groups that have been 'left behind' by long-term social and economic changes in Britain – including a shift away from traditional manufacturing and towards a post-industrial economy focused on the provision of services (Becker, Fetzner and Novy, 2017) and a marked increase in the number of those accessing higher education (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003) – share a distinct set of social values placing "greater emphasis on an 'ethnic' sense of national identity, passed down through culture and ancestry" (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, p.126) and leading to a preference for "a 'drawbridge up' policy of less European integration, closed borders and fewer migrants" (Hobolt, 2016, p.1272). The divergence in attitudes towards European Union membership by social value perspective is also expressed by Goodhart (2017, p.24) who draws a distinction between 'Anywheres' – typically portrayed as liberal, professional graduates who "broadly welcome change" and see themselves as "individualists and internationalists who are not strongly attached to larger group identities, including national ones", and 'Somewheres' – who, in contrast, were not university-educated, come from "the bottom three quartiles of the income and social class spectrum", and are "nostalgic for a lost Britain". A similar division between 'cosmopolitans' and 'parochials' – terms initially introduced by Lerner (1958) and repurposed by Inglehart (1970, p.45) in hypothesising that support for European institutions may concentrate itself among those "able to relate himself to a cosmopolitan political community, rather than remaining limited to the parochial world of his immediate surroundings" – is operationalised by de Vries (2018, p.1542) to distinguish those who advocate "an inclusionary and international outlook" from those who are "increasingly wary of open borders and international influences".

Several studies have demonstrated that social values have a key role to play in structuring attitudes towards the European Union. Examining the factors underlying vote choice at the 2016 EU referendum, Hobolt (2016, p.1259), Kaufmann (2016), and Goodwin and Heath (2016) each employ BES internet panel data to assert respectively that support for the UK's departure from the EU was particularly prevalent among "those who expressed concerns about immigration and multi-culturalism", those who have a preference for 'order' as opposed to 'openness', and those who hold 'socially conservative' rather than 'socially liberal' views. Meanwhile, Swales' (2016) analysis of the same data source – this time complemented by both BSA and NatCen Panel data – leads to the finding that although just 18% of those classified as libertarian voted to leave the EU, 66% of those classified as authoritarian did so. While these studies underscore the "powerful link between social values and votes in the Referendum" (Evans and Menon, 2017, p.60), additional work emphasises the existence of social value divides in attitudes towards the UK's membership of the EU that reach further back in time. Clements (2019), for example, employs British Election Study data spanning 1983-2005 and asserts that libertarian-authoritarian values display a strong association with views towards the UK's relationship with the EU throughout this period, while Sobolewska and Ford (2020, p.224) utilise BSA data to support their assertion that authoritarianism has been "reliably associated with Euroscepticism for decades in Britain". Drawing these threads together Hobolt and colleagues (2021, p.1484) submit that the result of the referendum exposed "an underlying fault line" between social liberals and social conservatives in their views on Europe, while Curtice (2017b, p.34) contends that although those who typically adopt a socially liberal outlook on life regarded the prospect of the UK detaching itself from the EU as "an anathema", for those with a more authoritarian set of social values "a vote to Leave offered the prospect of returning to a more familiar and more stable world".

Party identity

Core values may be expected to play a vital role in the formation of public attitudes. However, if individuals are to be perceived as ‘cognitive misers’ (Kam, 2005; Nisbet, 2011), rather than “systematically process the information that they receive” when formulating their attitudes towards key policy issues they might instead use information distributed by sources they trust as a cognitive shortcut (Pannico, 2020, p.871), allowing them to “position themselves on specific issues using simple decision rules” (Torcal, Martini and Orriols, 2018, p.504). Many information sources might be available to an individual when formulating their issue preferences; Nelson and colleagues (1997), Zerback *et al.* (2015), and Copeland and Copsey (2017), for instance, position the media as a key source of opinion cues, while Dür (2019) considers the role of interest groups in shaping policy preferences and Vandeweerd (2022) examines the effect of cues from within an individual’s own social group upon attitude formulation.

While citizens may take cues from a wide range of sources, for political party supporters their party of choice may represent “an opinion-forming agency of great importance” (Campbell *et al.*, 1960, p.128) – and might even operate as the “most important” (Torcal, Martini and Orriols, 2018, p.505) source of attitudinal influence. Individuals may gravitate towards a particular party for a range of reasons including their broad political disposition (Zaller, 1992), their social or group identity (Greene, 2004), their perspective on a single issue (Zaller, 2012), or their dislike or distrust of those represented by an opposing party (Walder and Strijbis, 2022), with a sense of loyalty or attachment developing between an individual and their preferred party as a result. Party supporters may therefore be willing to leave the task of formulating a policy position in their interest to their party of choice (Pannico, 2020), using that position as a cue and replicating it when questioned about their own view (Curtice, 2010). Successful party cueing,

then, occurs when people form opinions about an issue based on the position of their preferred political party.

Whose attitudes are likely to mirror the position of their party of choice?

While the literature suggests that parties are capable of functioning as “a supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate elements of politics” (Campbell *et al.*, 1960, p.128), Slothuus and Bisgaard (2021, p.897) observe that party cues function as a heuristic shortcut among partisans primarily as a result of a “deep, emotional bond between the citizen and party”. An expressed intention to vote for a particular party at an election, therefore, might not be enough to suggest that an individual is likely to look to that party as a trusted source of information, or as a shortcut to formulating their own attitudes (Curtice, 2010). Rather, something akin to a “generalised psychological attachment” to a party (Crewe, Särilvik and Alt, 1977, p.138), a “rational habit” of supporting a particular party (Downs, 1957, p.85), or a sense of “being”, for example, ‘Conservative’ or ‘Labour’ (Bartle, 2001, p. 9) may be required before an individual is willing to base their views on the signals provided by their preferred party. Those that express such a sense of ‘affective attachment’ (Dalton, 2016) are referred to as ‘party identifiers’ (Butler and Stokes, 1974); it is these individuals in particular who might be expected to ‘toe the party line’ (Kam, 2005) and calibrate their attitudes towards a given issue to fit the perspective of the party with which they identify.

Studies across a range of policy domains and in diverse political contexts have highlighted the central role of party affiliation in attitude formation. In the US, Druckman (2001) carries out two laboratory experiments and asserts that individuals utilise information emanating from those they perceive to be “credible advice givers” when making policy decisions, while Cohen (2003, p.808) conducts four laboratory studies and concludes that social policy preferences depend “almost exclusively upon the stated position of one’s

political party”. This finding is further endorsed by Reckhow *et al.* (2015) who highlight the function of party affiliation in shaping preferences towards polarised issues in education policy, and by Barber and Pope (2019, p.52) who, following an interrogation of experimental survey data, submit that a substantial portion of the US electorate act as “partisan loyalists... motivated by their particular group affiliation”. In Europe, Slothuus (2010) finds that party identity exerts an influence upon opinion towards retirement benefits in Denmark, while in Sweden Linde (2018) argues that the attitudes of party supporters towards climate change policy are impacted by party identification and Bäck *et al.* (2022) analyse experimental survey data and observe partisan effects upon attitudes towards cannabis legalisation. The effects of party affiliation upon opinion formulation have been observed to be particularly powerful in Britain, where Brader and colleagues (2020) demonstrate that party identity affects policy preferences in areas as diverse as taxation, data security, drinking age laws, and international relations (see also Brader, Tucker and Duell, 2013). Across an extensive range of policy areas and political contexts – including in the UK – party supporters “appear willing to follow their leaders” (Broockman and Butler, 2017, p.209).

Why might party cues shape views towards welfare and EU membership?

Although existing studies highlight the effects of party affiliation upon individual-level attitudes across a wide range of policy areas, researchers have suggested several instances in which partisan preference might be particularly likely to play a role in opinion formation. Pannico (2017), for instance, suggests that party identity might be expected to shape attitudes where a policy issue is very complex or where a relative lack of information is available to citizens; in cases where voters are “unwilling or unable” to unravel complex political debates (Curtice, 2010, p.61), the position of political parties as ‘informed actors’ (Hellström, 2008) may be particularly likely to be used by party supporters as a heuristic device to overcome an ‘information shortfall’ (Hobolt, 2007) and assist

them in developing a stance on a particular issue. Meanwhile, Slothuus and de Vreese (2010, p.632) suggest that partisan preference is likely to be of importance in policy areas that sit “at the centre of conflict between political parties”; where an issue is perceived to play a key role in structuring party competition, party identifiers may place particular weight upon the position adopted by the party they support both as a result of ‘longstanding loyalties’ (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014) and to avoid having to question their own partisanship (Pannico, 2017). The literature suggests that each of this study’s key policy areas possesses a unique combination of these qualities, leading to the possibility that partisan identity might influence attitudes in both domains.

Centrality to party competition

As Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) argue, the loyalties of party identifiers may be of particular salience – and therefore particularly likely to shape attitudes – in situations where the issue at stake is central to party competition. In such highly-contested situations individuals may be more likely to think of themselves as members of a particular partisan group and orientate themselves in opposition to group outsiders (Huddy, 2001), with group differences manifesting themselves through a process of ‘partisan motivated reasoning’ whereby party supporters “interpret information through the lens of their party commitment” (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014, p.235).

Welfare represents such an issue. Debates over the form and management of the welfare state have traditionally been at the centre of the left-right cleavage that has typically structured party competition in Britain (Savage, 2020), with the merits of government intervention and an expansive welfare state cutting to the heart of the division between those on either side of the political divide (Heide-Jørgensen, 2021). Further, both major parties in England are traditionally associated with the adoption of polarised positions on welfare issues (Attewell,

2021). The political foundations of the welfare state (Timmins, 2001; McKay and Rowlingson, 2008) and its subsequent management according to Keynesian economic principles (Wincott, 2011; Crocker, 2015; Diamond, 2021), for instance, hold close historical links with the Labour party. Meanwhile, as far back as the 1950s – almost 30 years before Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election victory marked the beginning of a period of sustained upheaval in the foundations underpinning welfare provision in the UK (Pierson, 1994) – One Nation Conservatives advocated an approach towards the welfare state which would “prioritise economic stability above costly egalitarian social spending, selectivity over universality and minimal rather than optimal levels of state provision” (Page, 2011, p.26). We might, therefore, anticipate party identity to have a marked impact upon the formation of attitudes towards the welfare state among those who identify with the two major political parties in England.

Welfare policy’s status as an issue lying at the core of partisan conflict might seem to contrast with that of the UK’s EU membership – a matter on which, traditionally at least, neither major party in England has been associated with the adoption of a particular ideologically-driven stance (Down and Wilson, 2010). However, issues pertaining to European integration may be seen as increasingly influential in structuring party competition, perhaps for two interrelated reasons. The first is that the issue of Europe has, according to Hooghe and Marks (2008, p.1), been “thrust... into domestic politics”; these authors argue that while the earlier years of the European project were characterised by a ‘permissive consensus’ in which political actors were largely able to press ahead with integration free from the constrictions of public opinion, the intensification of political conflict over market integration and monetary and political union has led to the emergence of a ‘constraining dissensus’ under which the decisions of political actors on issues of European integration are subject to heightened public scrutiny. As the salience of EU membership among the public has risen (Franklin and Wlezien, 1997) and the intensity of public debate around European

integration has been amplified (Grande and Hutter, 2016), its influence upon domestic politics and the structure of party competition has increased (Oppermann and Viehrig, 2008). The second is that a broader collection of issues including international political, cultural, and economic integration has come to represent a new “critical juncture” (Kriesi *et al.*, 2006, p.921) in western European nations with major consequences for the structure of party competition at the national level (Kriesi *et al.*, 2012). The prominence of this new “transnational cleavage” (Hooghe and Marks, 2018, p.109), which itself contributes to the increased salience of debates around EU membership (Börzel and Risse, 2018), is viewed by some as so great as to be “in contention to replace the perennial left-right cleavage as the new fundamental dividing line of party systems and electoral politics” (Vössing, 2021, p.492). Historically, then, debates on EU membership might be viewed as structuring party competition in Britain to a lesser degree than debates on issues such as the role and function of the welfare state. That said, the literature provides reason to believe that their centrality to patterns of partisan conflict may have increased over past decades, leading to the expectation that attitudes in this area may also be structured by party identity.

Issue complexity

A further instance in which attitudes might be especially subject to the influence of party cues is where the issue at stake is particularly complex (Coan *et al.*, 2008). In such situations, individuals may be more likely to leave the task of disentangling this complexity to the party with which they identify (Stoeckel and Kuhn, 2018) and to rely on the position adopted by that party when formulating an opinion (Bjerke and Hansen, 2012).

As asserted by Pannico (2017), debates around EU membership and European integration are characterised by a high degree of complexity. Despite their increased salience at the national political level over time, such issues often

remain “too complex and remote from the daily lives of most citizens” (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016, p.421) to enable an independent evaluation of particular policy solutions. This is compounded by a sense that individuals often lack the required information to cut through such complexity; Hellström (2008, p.1129), for instance, portrays voters as “rather ill-informed” on European issues, while Hobolt (2007, p.151) asserts that most voters “have little detailed knowledge of European integration” – a situation exacerbated by the low availability of information on European Union politics (Pannico, 2017). The complexity of European issues, together with a lack of information among citizens, may increase the likelihood that voters will look to proxies such as a trusted political party to overcome an ‘information shortfall’ (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016), relying on the position of their preferred party to formulate their attitudes (Anderson, 1998).

This level of complexity and abstraction, on the face of things at least, might appear considerably elevated when compared with debates around welfare – an issue which might be perceived as more intuitively linked to an individual’s broader societal or economic preferences (Gilens, 1999; Kumlin, 2007) and around which attitudes may perhaps be formed more instinctively. However, Marchal and Van Lancker (2019, p.697) assert that complexity is also “inherent to welfare states”. Modern systems of welfare provision are multifaceted both in their aims and objectives and the means with which they seek to achieve specific outcomes, with welfare states balancing horizontal and vertical redistribution logics (Bussolo *et al.*, 2018), incorporating contributory and non-contributory elements (Schüring and Loewe, 2021), and often using a combination of targeted and universal benefits (Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014; Roosma and van Oorschot, 2017). Welfare states are also institutionally complex (Miettinen, Ashorn and Lehto, 2013; Yngve, 2022); thanks to a “loosening of the boundary between the public and private sectors” (Caldarice, 2018, p.64) modern systems of welfare provision are now typically composed of private, public, third-sector and ‘hybrid’

organisations (Sætre, 2023) working as part of an increasingly complex and interdependent ‘welfare mix’ (Taylor, 2004; Taylor-Gooby *et al.*, 2020). This complexity is intensified by the dynamic context in which modern European welfare states operate, with Hendricks and Powell (2009, p.9) noting that the challenges addressed by systems of welfare provision are marked by a triumvirate of “intergovernmental structures, multinational corporate influence, and population changes”. For EU member states, for instance, domestic systems of welfare provision operate within a multi-layered system of social protection comprised of both national- and supranational-level rules and regulations (Kvist, 2004; Ferrera, 2005). Meanwhile, an increasingly globalised economy has created “interlocking independencies” in national-level policy objectives reflecting “the invisible hand of market forces” (Hendricks and Powell, 2009, p.7-8), with elevated levels of immigration adding “a further layer to the complexity of market-centred ideas” (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth and Chung, 2019, p.107). Thus, although the complexity inherent in welfare debates might be less immediately striking than that which characterises debates on European integration, the literature points to a series of intricacies in this area – perhaps offering an additional reason to expect attitudes towards the welfare state to be subject to party cue effects.

Existing empirical evidence

This combination of characteristics leads to the broad expectation that party identity may play a key role in the formulation of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership. Although no existing study considers both issues in tandem, this expectation finds support in the results of existing research examining the effect of party cues in each area separately. Turning first to the link between party preference and welfare attitudes, Qiu’s (2023, p.5) analysis of US General Social Survey data highlights the “significant impact of party identification on shaping individuals’ attitudes towards social welfare”, an

observation that reinforces both the experimental findings of Cohen (2003) and the conclusions of Layman and Carsey (2002) based on an analysis of multiple waves of the US National Election Study. In Britain, meanwhile, party identity has been consistently found to shape welfare preferences. Clery's (2013, p.12) analysis of BSA data, for example, finds that an individual's attitudes towards welfare reform are determined by "the political party with which they identify", with opposition to welfare spending higher among Conservative supporters than among those who identify with the Labour party. Further, Taylor-Gooby and Taylor's (2015, p.17) exploitation of the same data source finds that Conservative and Labour identifiers differ considerably in their attitudes towards the unemployed, out-of-work benefits, and "welfare in general". Similar observations are also made by Deeming (2015, p.877) who, again using data derived from BSA, asserts that "partisanship helps to account for welfare attitudes", and by Curtice (2020, p.100) whose examination of BSA data confirms that "how parties position themselves on welfare can influence public attitudes".

Meanwhile, political parties have also been observed to represent "an important source of messages – or cues – about the EU" (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p.229). Ray (2003, p.990), for example, analyses Eurobarometer data and finds that "the position taken by a political party on the issue of European integration can act as a cue for supporters of that party", while Hooghe and Marks (2005, p.425) utilise the same data source to assert that party identifiers "will tend to follow that party's position on European integration". Hobolt's (2007, p.151) examination of the result of the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership similarly finds that citizens "rely on heuristics and cues when deciding how to vote" on issues linked to European integration, while Pannico's (2017, p.426) analysis of both experimental data collected in Spain and data from the IntUne Mass Survey conducted across 14 European countries leads to the conclusion that a top-down process by which "voters tend to assimilate their position on the EU issue to that of their party" shapes attitudes towards national relationships

with Europe. In short, the evidence suggests that citizens' opinions about EU membership may indeed be "influenced by messages received from political parties" (Pannico, 2020, p.872).

Shifting party cues

Party identification, alongside core values, may therefore play a powerful role in the formulation of attitudes – particularly in policy spheres that are central to patterns of party competition or exhibit a high degree of complexity. But in the event that a political party substantially changes its stance towards such an issue, do the attitudes of its supporters change with it? In short, even in circumstances where individuals may have developed an established perspective on a particular debate, are parties able to engender a shift in this perspective and shepherd their supporters in a given direction?

Previous research suggests that this may indeed be the case. The findings of Reckhow and colleagues (2015), for example, illustrate that attitudes among party identifiers may alter in the wake of a change in the policy position of their preferred party; even where individuals already hold an established opinion towards an issue, a shift in the stance of the party they support may lead to a corresponding change in attitudes among that party's identifiers. Researchers such as Bergan (2012) and Brader and colleagues (2020) argue that such effects may be particularly visible in cases where a political party adopts a new policy perspective that appears to be at odds with its conventional stance, with Han (2022, p.2) submitting that attitudinal change among partisans may even occur in instances where parties undertake a "deviant policy shift" by traversing an established political cleavage and introducing policies that appear entirely inconsistent with their ideological tradition. In the event of such a shift materialising, rather than reacting against the new position of their party, supporters of that party may instead exhibit a marked change in attitudes

towards the issue at stake that aligns with the party's new perspective, "pointing like a weathervane to the new direction set by the party" (Curtice, 2010, p.61).

Changes in party policy towards welfare and EU membership

That partisans might adapt their views towards specific issues in the wake of a change in the position of their preferred party may be particularly relevant to understanding the trajectory of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership in recent decades. While both of these areas are identified by previous research as spheres within which party identity may play a vital role in the formulation of individual-level attitudes, in each domain the stance of both major parties in England has shifted markedly over time.

Welfare

Late 1980s – Mid 1990s

As part of "the most significant break" in social policy tradition since 1945 (Glennister, Power and Travers, 1991, p.390) and in an effort to promote individual responsibility and roll back the frontiers of the state (Jackson, 2014), Hills (1998) submits that welfare policy under the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major between 1979 and 1997 can be characterised by four broad themes: attempts to place controls on public spending, the targeting of welfare provision to specific groups, privatisation, and increased inequality. This shift in approach away from a post-war consensus typically seen as incorporating the management of a mixed economy together with full employment and an expansive welfare state (Seldon, 1994; Powell and Hewitt, 1998) became particularly apparent during Thatcher's final term in office commencing in 1987 (Seldon and Collings, 1999). While major welfare reforms were avoided during the early years of Thatcher's tenure for fear of detracting from 'urgent' economic concerns (Page, 2015) and the "totally unfounded charge that we want to

‘dismantle the Welfare State’” had been explicitly rejected by the party in its 1983 election manifesto (Conservatives, 1983), by the end of Thatcher’s third term Conservative discourse critical of the welfare system had become more widespread (O’Grady, 2022) while programmes informed by principles of ‘workfare’ – under which welfare recipients are required to work in return for social assistance benefits (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001) – had begun to be implemented at scale (Peck, 2001; Jessop, 2003). The philosophical principles espoused during Thatcher’s final years in office were subsequently reaffirmed by the Major government (Page, 2015), with the further incorporation of workfarist principles and an increase in welfare conditionality accompanied by a notable “shift in tone” towards welfare recipients (O’Grady, 2022, p.126).

In contrast to the radical shift in approach towards welfare taken by the Conservative party during this period, throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s the maintenance of an expansive welfare state had become “increasingly central” to the Labour party’s “radical identity” (Sloman, 2019, p.181). Despite undergoing a process of structural transformation characterised as either ‘modernisation’ (Smith, 1994) or, alternatively, ‘accommodation’ (Hay, 1994) under the stewardship of Neil Kinnock, the party remained largely committed to both benefit increases and demand-side interventions aimed at reducing unemployment (O’Grady, 2022). Meanwhile, although Labour’s 1992 election manifesto referenced a pledge to “transform unemployment claimants into employed contributors” (Labour, 1992) and the Commission on Social Justice established by John Smith subsequently recommended that the welfare state should seek to promote work through education and training (Driver, 2005), workfare principles remained largely absent from Labour welfare policy and the party continued its strong opposition to Conservative cuts to the welfare budget (O’Grady, 2022).

This picture changed drastically in the mid 1990s when, following the election of Tony Blair as Labour leader, the party adopted a distinctive new ideological stance towards the welfare state (Curtice, 2010). Having undergone what Deacon (1996, p.1) terms a “revolution in thought”, the party’s approach to welfare shifted towards a focus on mutual obligations and conditionality (Whitworth and Griggs, 2013) with the unemployed reframed as ‘jobseekers’ (Deeming and Johnston, 2018) and principles of workfare positioned as central to the pursuit of the party’s ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998). By the time New Labour came to power in 1997 the party was committed to a regime based upon workfare principles and implemented “an ambitious programme for welfare reform for people of working age” (Hirsch and Millar, 2004, p.3). As a result of the party’s decision to build upon, rather than reverse, the changes made to the welfare state under the preceding Conservative governments (Fraser, 2017), a new cross-party consensus towards the role and function of the welfare state appeared to have been established that sat significantly “to the right of the old one” (Powell and Hewitt, 1998, p.2) and under which an active system of welfare provision based on responsibilities and obligations was favoured over a passive system based on rights and entitlements (Daguerre and Etherington, 2016).

While during its time in government the Labour party adopted a stance that contrasted starkly with its historic position of support for an expansive system of welfare provision (Hudson and Lunt *et al.*, 2016a), Conservative party policy during this period echoed much of what had gone before. Although under the successive leaderships of William Hague, Iain Duncan-Smith and Michael Howard a brand of ‘compassionate Conservatism’ (Hayton, 2012) was espoused which incorporated a willingness to reduce poverty and tackle social deprivation, this approach situated a raft of social issues as “exacerbated or even caused by a welfare system that did too little to encourage work” (O’Grady, 2022, p.269) and called for more “vigorous” welfare measures underpinned by conditionality and

the threat of sanctions (Page, 2015, p.120). Drawing on elements of both Blairism and Thatcherism in its desire to recognise a restructured role for public services in providing welfare support yet reduce the overall scope of the welfare state, following the election of David Cameron as Conservative leader in 2005 the party's approach found expression in proposals for a 'Big Society' (Kisby, 2010) in which a "dramatic redistribution of power from Whitehall" (Cameron, 2010) would enhance the role of the voluntary sector in providing welfare support alongside state welfare services that would adopt a distinctly neo-liberal approach to addressing poverty and 'social breakdown' (Kerr, 2007).

Early – Mid 2010s

Although the Labour party presided over a range of major welfare reforms during its period in office, the election of the Conservative-led coalition in 2010 saw the pace of reform accelerate further. A reduction in spending on welfare benefits became "central to the Government's economic strategy" (Beatty and Fothergill, 2018, p.950), forming part of a "thorough-going restructuring of the British welfare state towards a highly inegalitarian form of liberalism" (van Kersbergen, Vis and Hemerijck, 2014, p.891). Meanwhile, the "work-first logic" (Daguerre and Etherington, 2016, p.203) that had emerged during the tenure of Thatcher and Major before being consolidated by the governments of both Blair and Brown was strengthened further by David Cameron's coalition government, which expanded existing workfare programmes (Deeming and Johnston, 2018) and enhanced both welfare conditionality and the use of benefit sanctions (Sage, 2019). Alongside such "radical, far-reaching and regressive" welfare state restructuring, O'Grady (2022, p.63-64) highlights both an increased willingness to tolerate "greater poverty – even destitution – as the price of reforms" and the emergence of "more vociferous opposition to benefits claimants themselves" from within the Conservative party; in addition to being subject to a highly "unbalanced welfare contract" (Daguerre and Etherington, 2016, p.214), those in receipt of benefits

during this period also faced increased stigmatisation from the government on moral grounds.

However, while the Conservative-led coalition continued along a path of welfare reform, during the 2010s the approach of the Labour party towards the role and function of the welfare state began a gradual shift back towards its more traditional pro-welfare position. Although under the leadership of Ed Miliband many of Labour's policy proposals initially appeared relatively modest and continued to bear the hallmarks of conditionality (Sage, 2019), during this period the party began to employ moral justifications for a more expansive welfare state that distinguished their approach not just from that of the Conservatives (see, for example, Wood, 2013) but also from that of New Labour (Atkins, 2017). As the decade progressed the discourse around those in receipt of benefits emanating from the party shifted notably towards a "defence of welfare users that was last seen in the 1980s and early 1990s" (O'Grady, 2022, p.137), while following the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in 2015 the party's departure from the approach adopted under both Blair and Brown appeared particularly stark. By extricating itself from an attachment to 'workfare' (Deeming and Johnston, 2019) and aiming for "the resurrection of welfare state protections" (Schmidt, 2019, p.64), by the mid 2010s Labour's renewed approach to welfare represented "a break with a political consensus that spans a quarter of a century and which has been embraced by a variety of ideological factions within both Labour and the Conservatives" (Sage, 2019, p.101).

Welfare policy periodisation

Although the above discussion distils these undulations into three broad periods, for the purposes of analysis the identification of specific points that demarcate

the transition between them is required⁶. The literature highlights 1997 as an appropriate moment at which to distinguish between the first and second of these stages. While major changes to the Labour party's foundations – including the abandonment of Clause IV and the party's rebranding to New Labour (Kenny and Smith, 1997) – had been advocated by Tony Blair since becoming leader in 1994, it was perhaps the party's election victory in 1997 that brought home to the electorate the extent of its ideological shift. As Curtice (2010) argues, it was at the point of taking power that the party's distinctive new stance towards welfare “revealed itself in practical terms” via efforts to reduce reliance on the social security system (Hewitt, 2002) and the introduction of active labour market policies – such as the party's New Deal programmes – designed to encourage those in receipt of benefits into work (Walker and Wiseman, 2003; Etherington and Ingold, 2012). 1997 therefore represents “a sharp break with the party's past” (Curtice, 2010), with Labour's revised stance towards welfare maintained throughout the 2000s (Bara and Budge, 2001; Bara, 2006).

Meanwhile, the literature indicates 2010 as an appropriate point to distinguish between the second and third of these periods. O'Grady (2022, p.149) argues that although New Labour's neo-liberal turn brought about a degree of bipartisan agreement on welfare policy between England's two major parties during the late 1990s and 2000s, 2010 marks the start of “a rapid shift from convergence to divergence”. Analysing the discourse emerging from the Labour party over four decades, O'Grady notes a “sharp change towards negative depictions of welfare users in the 1990s and 2000s” followed by “a sharp change back again in the 2010s”, characterising the position adopted from 2010 onwards as “back to the 1980s” (*ibid.*, p.137). This argument finds further support in the work of Atkins (2017, p.96), who asserts that under Ed Miliband the party began exploring policy pathways that were considerably “less punitive” than those pursued by either the

⁶ These cut-off points form the foundation of this study's ‘welfare’ time period variable, described in Data and Methods.

incumbent coalition government or by New Labour (see also Manwaring and Smith, 2020). This reversal continued apace under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, who during his first leader's speech to the Labour party conference in 2015 emphasised the central role of "a universal welfare state" and its function as "an expression of a caring society" and underscored the damage to families and communities caused by "welfare cuts" (Corbyn, 2015) – a position which contrasted starkly with that of the Conservatives, who promised in their election manifesto of that year to "find £12 billion from welfare savings" and to focus on "stopping benefit cheats and ending welfare abuse" (Conservatives, 2015).

Europe

Late 1980s – Early 1990s

While major shifts in perspective towards the welfare state from the late 1980s onwards were in large part restricted to just one of the two major political parties in England, the policy approach of both the Labour party and the Conservatives towards the UK's EU membership altered radically between 1987 and 2016. In the case of the former, the period immediately prior to the commencement of this study's timeline had been characterised by "avid opposition" to European integration (Dimitrakopoulos, 2015), with Labour's commitment to withdrawal from the then-European Community encapsulated by its 1983 manifesto which pledged to end Britain's EC membership due to the barrier it represented to the pursuance of "radical, socialist policies for reviving the British economy" (Labour, 1983). As noted by Grahl and Teague (1988), however, this represented the high-water mark for Labour's anti-European position. Although during the mid-to-late 1980s the party's stance on the UK's membership of the EC remained far from supportive (see, for example, Kinnock, 1988), by 1987 its approach had begun to shift towards "an unenthusiastic acknowledgement that early withdrawal was not a viable policy option" (Daniels, 1998, p.74).

During the remainder of the 1980s and early 1990s, however, the party's position on European integration underwent "a dramatic volte-face" (Heffernan, 2001, p.180). Thanks in part to the Labour party's movement towards social democracy which allowed for greater tolerance of economic globalisation and an acceptance of the role of the EC in facilitating international trade (Cole, 2020; Tindale, 1992), and in part to the EC presidency of Jacques Delors – whose vision for a Social Europe was set out in an influential speech to the TUC in 1988 (Daddow, Gifford and Wellings, 2019) – the party "gradually shed its reluctance to engage with what it had perceived to be a European capitalist club" (Smith, 2012, p.1282) to the extent that by the 1992 general election Labour viewed EC membership "as an opportunity rather than as a constraint" (George and Haythorne, 1996, p.120) and adopted a position of "measured support for membership and further engagement" with the bloc (Dimitrakopoulos, 2015).

Meanwhile, in contrast to Labour's avowed Euroscepticism throughout the early-to-mid 1980s, the Conservative party had positioned themselves as broadly supportive of the UK's EC membership during this period. Indeed, despite fractious debate over the issue of Britain's contribution to the EC budget (Cooper, 2012) and the expansion of qualified majority voting (Gifford, 2008), by the point at which this investigation begins the Conservatives' pro-European stance had become "especially pronounced" as demonstrated by their successful lobbying for a reduction in barriers to European trade as part of the 1992 Programme and their support for the Single European Act (Smith, 2012, p.1281).

During the earliest years of this study's timeline, however, as the Labour party softened its stance towards European Community membership the Conservatives "began to resile from it" (Heffernan, 2001, p.180), with the re-opening of the issue of the UK's rebate in the wake of a budget crisis within the EC and the development of Delors' proposals for a Social Europe stoking tensions within the party that eventually acquired a voice in Margaret Thatcher's

1988 'Bruges speech'. Subsequently viewed as having “fundamentally altered the way the Conservative Party responded to Europe” (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2016, p.443) the Bruges speech played a significant role in legitimising Euroscepticism within Conservative ranks (Roe-Crines and Heppell, 2020), marking the cooling of the party’s earlier enthusiasm for EC membership as the scope of European integration deepened (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2019). Despite the Conservatives’ prior image as ‘the party of Europe’ (May, 1998), by the early 1990s discord over the issue of EC membership – having been compounded by negotiations over the Maastricht treaty, the fallout from Black Wednesday, and the UK’s exit from the ERM (Daniels, 1998) – had become “the most potent policy division operating within the Conservative party” (Garry, 1995, p.185).

Early 1990s – Late 2000s

This division continued to deepen during subsequent years. Gifford (2010, p.322), for instance, contrasts the attempts at a pragmatic approach towards Europe made by the party’s then-leader John Major with the increasing “virulence of Euroscepticism on the right of the Conservative Party” as embodied by the formation in 1993 of the European Research Group of Eurosceptic Conservatives, while Curtice and Evans (2015) highlight the role of the EU’s banning of British beef in 1996 in maintaining the feud between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptics within the party. This split was further reinforced by a sequence of developments including the signing of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties in 1997 and 2001, the introduction of Euro in 2002, and the EU’s eastwards expansion in 2004 and 2007 (Dorey, 2017) and shaped a series of Conservative leadership elections throughout the following decade. William Hague’s 1997 victory, for instance, was achieved with the support of prominent Eurosceptic Conservative MPs who subsequently steered the party in an increasingly anti-EU direction (Jowija, 2019), while the 2001 defeat of Ken Clarke at the hands of Iain Duncan-Smith occurred against a background of an “ABC (Anyone But Clarke) ethos among Conservative Eurosceptics” (Dorey, 2017, p.30) thanks to the perception

of the former as being too soft on the issue of EU membership. The succession of Michael Howard – a “thoroughgoing populist Eurosceptic” (Bale, 2018, p.267) – in 2003 demonstrated that Europe remained “the touchstone issue” for the Conservatives (Hayton, 2018, p.158), a situation tacitly acknowledged by his successor David Cameron who attempted to appease the Eurosceptic wing of the party during his 2005 leadership campaign by promising to remove Conservative MEPs from the centre-right European People’s Party group in the European Parliament (Rose, 2016). While subsequently imploring his party to stop ‘banging on about Europe’ (Cameron, 2006), the new Conservative leader largely adopted a “harder but quieter” stance on European integration (Bale, 2006, p.388), temporarily reducing the profile of the issue yet doing “nothing to challenge his party’s Eurosceptic orientation” (Hayton, 2018, p.158).

Conservative discord over Europe represented something of an open goal for the Labour party throughout the 1990s and 2000s, which since the 1992 election had become the more pro-European of the two largest parties in England (Heffernan, 2001). The party’s turn towards pro-Europeanism – which had begun under Neil Kinnock and continued under his successor John Smith (Dimitrakopoulos, 2015) – was solidified by the subsequent election of Tony Blair as Labour leader in 1994, with Labour’s development of “a constructive European policy which departed from that of John Major’s outgoing Conservative government” (Bulmer, 2008, p.597) clearly expressed by the party’s description of the EU within its 1997 manifesto as “an alliance of independent nations choosing to co-operate to achieve the goals they cannot achieve alone” (Labour, 1997). In the wake of New Labour’s landslide election victory the party “largely pursued the kind of pragmatic pro-Europeanism which its policy documents promised in opposition” (Baker *et al.*, 2002, p.95), with Blair’s “much vaunted pro-Europeanism” (Dimitrakopoulos, 2015) extending to promises in 2001 to further enlarge the European Union (Labour, 2001) and in 2005 to lead on European defence co-operation, to maintain a “common-sense policy” on the introduction of the Euro,

and to campaign “wholeheartedly” for a Yes vote in a prospective referendum on the ultimately unratified EU Constitutional Treaty (Labour, 2005). Despite something of a shift towards a more cautious “pro-European social democracy” during the latter years of the 2000s (Schnapper, 2015, p.157-158) New Labour largely continued its unequivocal support for the UK’s ongoing EU membership under the premiership of Gordon Brown, framing Britain’s active participation in the European project as a matter of “national interest” (Hertner and Keith, 2017, p.68) and cementing its reputation as “Britain’s most pro-European administration” (Heffernan, 2001, p.181).

Early – Mid 2010s

Following the party’s election defeat in 2010 Labour remained supportive of the UK’s continued EU membership, with new leader Ed Miliband indicating his ongoing backing for European integration (Dimitrakopoulos, 2015). However, in contrast to his predecessors Miliband placed an increased emphasis on the perceived failings of the EU and exhibited a keen preference for a ‘global’ Britain (Schnapper, 2015), advocating a “hard-headed” approach to EU reform consisting of a large-scale change in the balance of power between the UK and the EU and stating that Labour should “never shrink from being open about the problems of the European Union” (Hennessy and d’Ancona, 2012). This notable dilution of the relatively unmitigated pro-Europeanism of New Labour continued under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, whose position on the UK’s ties with Europe is described variously by Diamond (2019) as ‘Euro-cautious’ and as consisting of ‘constructive ambiguity’. Despite indicating a preference for remaining inside the EU in the run-up to the party’s 2015 leadership election Corbyn refused to definitively rule out the prospect of advocating for a Leave vote at the EU referendum as a result of David Cameron’s position of workers’ rights (Hertner and Keith, 2017), while notwithstanding its official support for Remain much of the party’s campaign in the run-up to the 2016 ballot echoed its leader’s largely “lukewarm position” on Brexit (Batrouni, 2020, p.158).

Meanwhile, despite Cameron's attempts to reduce the salience of divides among Conservative MPs over Europe the party remained "split from top to bottom" on the issue of EU membership (Holmes, 1996, p.110), with three-quarters of 2010 Conservative MPs classified by Heppell (2013) as Eurosceptic and a third of that number earmarked as 'hard' Eurosceptics in favour of the UK's departure from the EU. Against this backdrop, and in light of both external pressure applied by the rise of UKIP during the latter years of the 2000s (Usherwood, 2016) and internal pressures emanating from the Eurosceptic segment of the Conservative party (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013), Cameron adopted an increasingly "hard-line European strategy" during the early 2010s (Vail, 2015, p.109) before announcing that a referendum would take place on the UK's EU membership should the Conservatives secure victory at the 2015 election (Cameron, 2013). Despite the party leader's support for Remain, several senior Conservatives – including the then-mayor of London Boris Johnson and six Cabinet ministers – endorsed the Leave campaign (Moore, 2016), with the eventual vote to leave the EU representing the culmination of a long-standing ideological clash within the Conservative party that had "threatened its unity and plagued successive leaders" (Hayton, 2018, p.163).

Europe policy periodisation

As with changes in the position of England's two major parties towards the role and function of the welfare state, to facilitate analysis the selection of specific points that denote the passage of each of these three phases is required⁷. The literature highlights 1992 as a particularly appropriate point to distinguish between the first and second phase. Although under the leadership of Neil Kinnock the Labour party's stance towards Europe gradually shifted "from 'withdrawal' through 'withdrawal as a last resort' to a commitment to Britain's successful membership'" (Wall, 2008, p.161), as late as 1988 the party remained

⁷ These cut-off points form the foundation of this study's 'Europe' time period variable, described in Data and Methods.

sceptical of key aspects of the then-EC including the emergence of the European Single Market, the Common Agricultural Policy, and the growing influence of international businesses (Beech, 2021). By the 1992 general election, however, George and Haythorne (1996, p.120) argue that the party had begun to discuss the issue of EC membership “in terms of the type of Europe that it wanted to see rather than in terms of whether Britain ought to be a member” – a shift reinforced by the party’s commitment to opt into the new European Social Chapter in its pre-election manifesto which sealed “the transformation of both its European and economic strategies” (Cole, 2020, p.434). In contrast, the years following the Bruges speech saw Conservative division over the issue of EC membership develop to the extent that, by 1992, the relative position of both of England’s major parties towards Britain’s relationship with Europe had unambiguously switched (Heffernan, 2001).

Subsequently, 2010 represents an appropriate point at which to distinguish between the second and third of these periods. Although Labour’s newly-settled pro-European stance was maintained after the 1992 election – first under the leadership of John Smith and then under his New Labour successors Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (Stuart, 2006; Kassim, 2008) – 2010 marks something of a shift in its position, with analysis of Labour party messaging under new leader Ed Miliband emphasising the employment of an “ambivalent discourse on Europe” (Schnapper, 2015, p.170). This shift was later reinforced by Jeremy Corbyn, who exhibited his “abiding Euroscepticism” by describing his passion for staying in the EU as measuring “seven, or seven and a half out of ten” (Hertner, 2016). Meanwhile, 2010 marks a further “evolution of the debate about Europe” within the Conservative party (Schnapper, 2015, p.157). In line with the observation of Lynch and Whittaker (2013) that the profile of Conservative disputes over European integration tends to be elevated further when the party is in power, the Conservative-led coalition’s 2010 election victory resulted in “the re-emergence of European integration as a difficult and divisive issue” for the party (Lynch,

2015, p.185), with David Cameron ultimately failing in his attempts to neutralise the debate and instigating the ballot which would lead to the UK's departure from the institution (Bale, 2016).

Existing empirical evidence

The expectation that the attitudes of identifiers with each of England's major parties might have changed over time in line with the dynamic position adopted by their preferred party is broadly supported by existing research. Curtice (2010, p.71), for example, finds "a large drop in the proportion of Labour supporters believing that unemployment benefits were too low when New Labour came to power" that outweighed any similar decline among their Conservative-supporting counterparts, while Deeming and Johnston (2018) argue that the increase in sceptical attitudes towards the welfare state observed from the mid 1990s and throughout the 2000s was most notable among Labour party supporters. Clery and Dangerfield (2019, p.7), meanwhile, find "substantial evidence" of attitudes to welfare moving in line with party positioning and political discourse throughout the 2000s, with the views of supporters of different political parties "becoming much more alike, primarily because of a shift in the views of Labour Party supporters". Whether a similar shift in welfare attitudes ensued among Labour identifiers following the change in direction of the party during the 2010s, however, is perhaps less clear; although Deeming and Johnston (2019, p.167) observe "signs of a change in public mood and a shift away from workfare and the system of benefit sanctions" during more recent years, Sage (2019, p.105) states that whether such a change occurred predominantly among Labour party supporters largely "remains to be seen" while Baumberg-Geiger and colleagues (2023, p.37) suggest that, despite the Labour party becoming more pro-welfare from the 2010s onwards, further work is required in "teasing apart the exact drivers" of softening welfare attitudes during this period.

Existing evidence also broadly supports the expectation that shifts in the perspective of both of England's major parties towards the UK's EU membership may have been accompanied by corresponding attitudinal changes among their supporters. Evans and Butt's (2005, p.203) analysis of both BSA and British Election Study data, for instance, finds that while Conservative voters were particularly likely to support the UK's membership of the European Community throughout the 1980s, during the 1990s their Labour-identifying counterparts became the more pro-EU of the two sets of major party supporters – leading to the conclusion that partisans “picked up on [the] shift in elite opinion” towards European integration and calibrated their attitudes accordingly. In a similar vein Clements' (2009, p.69) examination of British Election Study panel data indicates that the perspective of Labour supporters towards EU membership shifted from one of scepticism during the 1980s to one of strong support from the mid 1990s onwards, suggesting that “Labour partisans seem to have fallen in line with the changing cues provided by their party on the European issue” while Conservative supporters “moved the other way with their party” (*ibid.*, p. 74). Endorsing this perspective further are the findings of Stevens (2013, p.554), whose exploitation of British Election Study data identifies shifts among both Labour and Conservative supporters that align with changes in party policy and leads to the assertion that partisans display “a recognition and responsiveness to the contours of party positions”.

‘Party-driven’ or ‘voter-driven’?

While evidence exists that the views of party supporters towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership shift over time to reflect the dynamic stance of their party of choice, a number of researchers sound a note of caution in definitively stating that a ‘party-driven’ model – i.e. one that points to parties as capable of shaping preferences either among their supporters (Curtice, 2010) or the electorate as a whole (Dunleavy and Ward, 1981; Dunleavy, 1991) – is more

capable of explaining the sustained association between party support and attitudinal perspective over time than a 'voter-driven model' – i.e. one that suggests either that individuals switch their party allegiances in line with their perspective on an issue (Boyd, 1986) or that parties shift their policy stance to align themselves with public opinion (Downs, 1957). For instance, Clements (2009, p.74) offers an alternative theory for the increase in pro-EU attitudes among Labour backers during the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggesting that the party's disavowal of its prior stance on Europe combined with its broader shift towards the ideological centre-ground may have allowed it "to expand its electoral base to include greater numbers of supporters with pro-European views coming into the fold". Meanwhile, in hypothesising that the ability of parties to shape the views of their supporters towards Britain's relationship with Europe may have decreased somewhat from the mid 1990s onwards as issues of European integration increased in salience, Evans and Butt (2007, p.187) posit that the question of EU membership may have begun to exert "an increasingly large effect on party support" rather than vice-versa. Similar concerns are also noted by Curtice (2010, p.28), who acknowledges the possibility that rather than reflecting a shift in perspective among a stable set of partisans, apparent changes in attitudes towards welfare among a given set of party affiliates could be "an indication that a party has managed to attract into its ranks those with a rather different set of attitudes from those upheld by its previous supporters".

However, these doubts are largely assuaged by additional evidence from both Britain and further afield. Using British Election Study panel data, Curtice and Fisher (2003, p.248) find that the impact of "desertion and recruitment" upon attitudes towards welfare and redistribution among Labour partisans during the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s is markedly smaller than the impact of changes in perspective among existing party affiliates. Meanwhile, later analysis of BSA data leads Curtice (2010, p.28) to assert that it is more plausible to view this change in perspective as the consequence of "a shift of attitudes among the

party's existing supporters" rather than a substantial change in the kind of voter that identifies with the Labour party. This assessment finds additional support in the more recent findings of Slothuus and Bisgaard (2021, p.896), who use data from five waves of a bespoke Danish internet panel survey to demonstrate that the views of party identifiers towards two major welfare issues "changed immediately and substantially when their party switched its policy position".

Similar conclusions are reached by a number of researchers in the field of attitudes towards European integration. Steenbergen and colleagues (2007), for instance, exploit Eurobarometer data to argue that, although political parties may to some degree respond to the views of voters, parties also play a key role in shaping the attitudes of their identifiers towards Europe. Meanwhile Hellström (2008), having analysed data derived from the same source, contends that the causal chain is in fact unidirectional; parties do not respond significantly to changes in voters' opinions on Europe, but are capable of influencing the attitudes of their supporters. These assertions are reflected in the conclusions of Stevens (2013, p.554) who, in arguing that the views of party identifiers in Britain are responsive to shifts in party policy, suggests that "looking for the EU as an issue capable of changing the structure of party competition via vote preferences... or focusing only on eras in which the issue was salient, is limited in a way that is harmful to inferences". Despite the suggestion that concurrent processes may be at work, there exists consistent evidence that changes in party direction are capable of instigating considerable alterations in the attitudes of party supporters towards both the welfare state and the EU over a sustained period, rather than simply encouraging those with a particular set of attitudes to switch party allegiances.

How might core values, party identity, and shifting party cues interact in decision-making on welfare and Europe?

The literature assessed above indicates that both core value perspective and party alignment may offer two potential paths to the formulation of opinion towards the welfare state and EU membership, while changes in party positioning might be expected to lead to corresponding shifts in the attitudes of party supporters in both spheres. However, when it comes to the interplay between each of these elements, the evidence base is comparatively sparse. Despite the paucity of prior work addressing this issue, there exists a series of studies that have sought to develop knowledge of whether or not core values and party identity do indeed play a dual role in shaping individual-level views towards contested policy areas and to identify the circumstances in which partisan alignment may be more or less liable to impact policy preferences than core value perspective. These studies offer a starting point in developing an understanding of the potential interrelationship between these elements, and represent a potential source of theoretical guidance for the third portion of this study which considers the impact of shifting party cues upon those who adopt different core value perspectives.

Do core values and party identity concurrently shape attitudes?

At perhaps the more extreme end of the spectrum of works touching on the simultaneous impact of value orientation and party alignment sit the conclusions of Cohen (2003). Discussed above in the context of party cue effects, Cohen argues that his findings demonstrate that partisan alignment trumps an individual's value perspective during the process of attitude formulation. In this experimental study, participants who were presented with substantive details of a policy yet denied information on the stance of their preferred party assessed the merits of the policy against their own value perspective, while participants who were given information as to the position of their party "assumed that

position as their own regardless of the content of the policy” (*ibid*, p.819). Additional investigations, including those undertaken by Ford (2006) and Torcal (2018), come to perhaps more nuanced yet similar conclusions; the former finds that partisanship exerts an influence on attitudes “over and above the effect of ideology” (Ford, 2006, p.149), while the latter indicates that the impact of party cues is typically stronger than that of an individual’s core value orientation. This perspective is concisely summed up by Barber and Pope (2019, p.38), who assert that partisan preference represents a “stronger motivator of opinion than any ideological principles”.

In contrast, however, Boudreau and MacKenzie (2014, p.49) submit that citizens in fact exhibit a willingness to detach their opinions from those of their party when available policy information “provides a compelling reason to do so”. These findings are echoed by Nordø (2021, p.45), who questions the centrality of party cues to attitude formulation and asserts that “voters’ opinion formation is less dependent on partisan elites than much of the previous work indicates”. In more moderate terms, meanwhile, Kam (2005, p.175) concludes that “on average, both matter”; rather than choosing to follow the direction suggested either by their party or their value perspective when coming to an opinion in a particular policy area, Kam asserts that individuals tend to be influenced to some degree by both concerns.

Known moderating factors

Working from this more moderate perspective, additional research has attempted to investigate the impact of specific factors – both at the micro and the macro level – that might affect the relative likelihood of either predisposition holding greater sway. However, the results of these studies, in particular those examining the effects of political sophistication, need for cognition, party age, and ideological clarity, are often inconclusive or in direct conflict with one

another, emphasising the lack of a clear understanding of the potential interplay between core values and partisan identity within the current body of literature.

Political sophistication and Need for cognition

Pannico (2020, p.869) argues that an individual's willingness to rely on party cues is moderated by "political sophistication", with less informed voters more likely to rely on partisan messaging when deciding their position on an issue. This finding echoes those of Boudreau and MacKenzie (2014) and of Kam (2005, p.164) – the latter of whom submits that "political awareness... crisply distinguishes between cue-based and value-based opinion formation" – but conflicts with the assertion of Merolla and colleagues (2016, p.21) that those with higher levels of political sophistication are in fact "most likely to use *and* most likely to over-use party cues".

The suggestion that levels of political sophistication may affect the likelihood of an individual relying on party cues when formulating policy preferences ties in with the claim of Mondak (1993, p.188), who argues that party cues are more likely to impact attitudes "when the individual's need for cognitive efficiency is most pressing". Defined by Petty and Cacioppo (1986, p.151) as the extent to which citizens "engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity", need for cognition has also been highlighted as a potential moderator of party cue effects alongside political sophistication (Bullock, 2019). However, despite some studies successfully identifying need for cognition as a factor shaping the role of party cues in attitude formation (see, for example, Bakker and Lelkes, 2018), others observe that the moderating effect of need for cognition is either weak (Holbrook, 2006) or absent (Kam, 2005).

Age of parties and Clarity of ideological position

Meanwhile, building on the work of Lupia and McCubbins (1998) who examine the effect of the trustworthiness of cue sources upon the likelihood that cues will impact opinion formation, Coan *et al.* (2008) submit that cues disseminated by older and more established political parties stand a greater chance of shaping the attitudes of party identifiers than cues from minor political parties. However, although Brader and Tucker (2012) employ this finding as a potential explanation for the apparent ability of major parties in the UK to shape the attitudes of their supporters, Conroy-Krutz and colleagues (2016) argue that political parties have the potential to shape public opinion even in relatively new democratic systems while Torcal *et al.* (2018) find no difference in the likelihood that party affiliation will trump value perspective as the preferred path to attitude formation according to the age of an individual's preferred party.

A related suggestion is that the clarity of a party's ideological position may strengthen its ability to impact the attitudes of its supporters; as hypothesised by Kobayashi and Yokoyama (2018, p.63), the clearer a party's ideological stance – which may become more defined as a party ages – “the more confident voters can be about what values and interests underpin the endorsement of a policy by a given party, leading to a larger effect of party cues on policy preferences”. Although evidence to this effect is supplied by Brader *et al.* (2013, p.1508) who submit that “the impact of party cues on partisans diminishes as the ideological clarity of the party declines”, Levendusky (2010) suggests that the impact of increased ideological clarity upon cue taking is small while Skitka and Robideau (1997, p.979) argue that only when policy positions are “completely inconsistent with their party label” do party identifiers appear unwilling to adapt their attitudes to suit the position of their party.

Strength of party attachment and Issue salience

Pannico (2020) also suggests that the strength of an individual's partisan identity impacts upon their willingness to follow cues emanating from their party of choice, with the attitudes of those who feel more closely attached to a political party more likely to be moulded by the position of that party. The same conclusion is arrived at by Clifford (2017, p.536) who attributes this effect to a heightened desire among more zealous partisans both "to uphold their own identities, but also to defend their group's reputation and interest", and by Azrout and de Vreese (2018, p.387) who likewise assert that more committed party affiliates conceive of party ties as a "social identity" and are therefore more likely to "form attitudes in line with the in-group".

In addition to strength of party attachment, however, Bullock (2019, p.133) observes that an individual's attachment to the particular issue at stake may moderate the effect of party cues; the more a citizen "cares about an issue – that is, the more that one finds it salient", the more they will think critically about cues related to that issue. This assertion echoes that of Petty and Cacioppo (1986) who find that where an issue is of particular personal relevance citizens may be more likely to engage in systematic as opposed to heuristic processing, and is reinforced by Arceneaux (2008) who submits that high levels of issue salience decrease the impact of party cue effects.

Key knowledge gaps

When considered together, the distinctive strands of literature covering core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues provide a strong framework for this investigation. Nevertheless, a series of important gaps remain in our understanding of how these elements work independently to shape public attitudes. Further, these paths to attitude formulation are often considered

separately – and while a subset of prior work has attempted to examine the interplay between them, this has typically focused on a small number of specific characteristics and has produced diverse and often conflicting results. This leaves an opportunity to fill a sequence of gaps in the knowledge base covering the role of core values, partisan identity and shifting party cues, and the joint effect of these elements upon attitude formulation.

Core values

Beginning with the existing literature on core values, prior work provides a firm theoretical understanding of why an individual's value perspective is likely to play a key role in the process of attitude formulation. This body of literature also considers the appropriate conceptualisation of core values, typically splitting them into a left-right 'political' dimension and a libertarian-authoritarian 'social' dimension and offering various perspectives on why each dimension might be expected to shape views towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership.

However, several gaps in our understanding of the role of values in the formulation of attitudes in these key areas persist. Firstly, despite indications that both the political and social dimensions of an individual's core values may shape attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, the literature covering the extent of the ties between each value dimension and views in both spheres is relatively sparse. Although the centrality of the welfare debate to the traditional left-right cleavage may lead to an expectation that attitudes in this domain might be strongly tied to political values, studies in Britain offer some – albeit limited – evidence to suggest that social values may structure views towards the scope and generosity of the welfare state even more powerfully than political values. Baumberg-Geiger (2017, p.18), for instance, finds that differences in "benefits-related morality" are greater between those at either end

of the libertarian-authoritarian scale than between those at opposite poles of the left-right spectrum, while notwithstanding restrictions in terms of sample composition Ford (2006, p.148) notes that libertarian-authoritarian values appear to have a considerably larger effect on an individual's generalised views towards welfare than left-right values despite their "less obvious connection with the welfare state". Meanwhile, although the observation that issues such as free movement and globalisation speak primarily to the libertarian-authoritarian divide might lead to the expectation of a particularly strong connection between attitudes towards the EU and social values, authors including Cautrès (2012) and Beaudonnet (2015) point to a range of possible linkages between views in this arena and political values – the direction of which are contested and the strength of which may be highly context-dependent.

Secondly, while post-materialist scholars such as Inglehart (1991; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and Flanagan (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan and Lee, 2003) postulate that the prominence of the social aspect of an individual's core values in the process of attitude formulation may have risen over time, there is little in the way of existing work that examines whether this is indeed the case in each of this study's key policy spheres. Although Sobolewska and Ford (2020, p.225) highlight that the pattern of those who hold more authoritarian social values being more likely to adopt Eurosceptic attitudes is both "strong and longstanding" little indication is offered of whether this relationship has strengthened or weakened over time, while despite Clements' (2009) adoption of a temporal perspective in examining the determinants of attitudes towards EU integration, value-based measures are relatively infrequently deployed in analysis and produce uncertain results. Meanwhile, although the work of both Baumberg-Geiger (2017) and Ford (2006) suggests that social value orientation represents a reliable predictor of attitudes to elements of welfare provision, their endeavours are rooted in a specific point in time with little complementary work

investigating whether the nature of the relationship between this value dimension and attitudes towards welfare has changed over time.

This study's first research question reflects these gaps in the current evidence base. It covers not only the nature of the relationship between each element of an individual's core value perspective and attitudes towards welfare and EU membership, but also the issue of whether social values have come to exert an increasingly powerful structural influence upon views in each area:

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1. How do an individual's 'left-right' and 'libertarian-authoritarian' values shape their attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union, and has the influence of the second of these dimensions changed over time?
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Addressing this question serves to extend the knowledge base on the role of core values in attitude formulation. Considering the complexion of the association between each value dimension and views towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership represents a contribution to the debate about the extent to which the traditional dividing line represented by the left-right dimension is now superseded by a 'new' cleavage embodied by the libertarian-authoritarian dimension (see, for example, Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Vössing, 2021). If this is indeed the case, perhaps we might expect the latter of these elements to shape attitudes in each area in a more concerted fashion than the former. Relatedly, it allows for the interrogation of claims made by post-materialist scholars such as Inglehart (1971; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) that the role of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension in shaping attitudes towards complex political issues may have increased markedly over previous decades. If this assertion is valid, perhaps this dimension has come to assume an ever-greater role in attitude formulation over time. Finally, it enables an exploration of the extent to which changes in the balance of public opinion towards the welfare state and EU

membership may be attributable to changes in the relationship between attitudes in these areas and values. If, for example, it transpires that social values represent a powerful structural force in opinion formulation in each of these spheres, perhaps changes in the strength of the association between attitudes and social values over time have resulted in alterations in the distribution of aggregate-level attitudes in each arena.

Party identity and shifting party cues

The body of prior studies on party cue effects represents a second pillar of literature supporting this investigation. Existing work provides a strong theoretical understanding of the concept of partisan identity, who might be expected to look to the policy perspective of their preferred political party when calculating their policy preferences, and the circumstances in which such effects are likely to play a role in attitude formulation. Further, key studies – such as those of Slothuus and Bisgaard (2021) in the realm of attitudes towards welfare and Hobolt (2007) in the domain of views towards European integration – indicate that partisan effects might be observable in each of this study’s areas of interest. However, while prior efforts address the role of party identity in shaping views towards the welfare state and EU integration independently, there exists no study that provides unified evidence on the impact of partisan preference upon attitudes across both domains. This is despite potential differences in the balance of characteristics across each sphere that might make attitudes particularly susceptible to the effects of party cues, and notwithstanding the speculation of Torcal and colleagues (2018) that the influence of party positioning over views towards European Union issues may be stronger than over attitudes towards domestic policy issues.

Accompanying existing work on the link between attitudes and partisan preference is a complementary channel of literature focusing upon the impacts

of changes in party stance upon the views of party supporters. Previous studies have demonstrated that the attitudes of partisans towards a given issue may shift in response to an alteration in the perspective adopted by their preferred party, with such an effect extending to cases where parties assume a new position that contrasts sharply with their historical outlook. Prior work further indicates that, at specific points during previous decades, the views of partisans seem to have altered considerably in the wake of major shifts in the position adopted by Britain's two largest parties towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. Evans and Butt (2005), for example, show that Conservative backers became more Eurosceptic following their party's shift away from a pro-European outlook in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while Stevens (2013) indicates that their Labour counterparts became more positive towards the UK's EU membership in line with changes in the policy direction of their party of choice. Meanwhile, Curtice (2010) highlights increasing levels of welfare-scepticism among Labour identifiers as the party shifted away from its traditional pro-welfare stance during the mid-to-late 1990s and 2000s.

However, there exists little evidence on the real-world impact of partisan preference and shifting party cues upon attitudes towards either the welfare state or the UK's EU membership that covers the entirety of this study's timeline. In part this is due to the largely experimental nature of many studies of the effect of partisan identity and changes in party positioning. The seminal findings of Druckman (2001), for example, are derived from laboratory experiments conducted using samples of university students in the USA, a trend that continues through the 2000s and provides the basis of the conclusions of Cohen (2003), Kam (2005), and Coan *et al.* (2008). Meanwhile, the work of Reckhow and colleagues (2015) utilises experimental survey data based on more representative national samples drawn in the USA and Canada respectively, an approach also followed by Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) in Denmark, Brader and Tucker (2012) in a comparative European context, Torcal *et al.* (2018) and

Pannico (2020) in Spain, and Han (2022) in Korea. Even in the case of studies employing observational survey data, however, researchers have often limited their scope to short stretches of time. Pannico (2017), for example, supplements experimental data with cross-sectional survey data from 14 EU member states covered by the 2007 IntUne Mass Survey, while Linde (2018) examines online survey data collected by the Swedish Laboratory of Opinion Research at the University of Gothenburg between 2014 and 2015 and Slothuus (2010) employs data from the 2005 Danish National Election Survey.

Notable exceptions to this approach do exist; in terms of attitudes towards the welfare state the work of Curtice (2010) covers the period 1987-2008, while in the context of attitudes towards EU integration the endeavours of Clements (2009) span over 20 years from 1983 to 2005 and the focus of Stevens (2013) extends from 1964 to 2010. However, even in the case of these temporal studies the end-point for each enquiry is at least six years prior to the close of this project's period of interest. As a result, knowledge of the role of party cues in shaping the views of partisans towards welfare and EU membership throughout this study's timeline is incomplete, with evidence pertaining to the period between 2010 and 2016 – during which the policy positions of both major parties in England underwent significant revision – remaining particularly sparse.

This study's second research question therefore asks not just whether shifts in the attitudes of supporters of both of England's major parties towards welfare and EU membership can be detected in the wake of changes in party positioning in both areas, but whether such shifts are observable throughout this project's window of concern:

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2. Have the shifting positions of England's two major political parties towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union over time been followed by corresponding changes in the attitudes of their identifiers?
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Examining the extent to which changes in the positioning of two major parties towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership over time have reshaped the attitudes of their supporters in each of these spheres represents an important extension of current understanding of the role of partisan preference in attitude formation. Firstly, it enables an assessment of whether the findings of prior experimental studies translate to a real-world, transatlantic context. Should this be the case we might expect not just that party identifiers in England adopt different positions on marquee policy issues, but that these positions shift over time in line with alterations in the policy perspective of their party of choice (Cohen, 2003; Reckhow, Grossmann and Evans, 2015). Secondly, it allows this principle to be tested in two distinctive policy areas which may differ in their levels of complexity and centrality to the system of party competition in the UK. If party identifiers are seen to recalibrate their views towards both the merits of EU membership and the role and function of the welfare state to mirror the position of their preferred political party, this suggests that parties can operate as powerful drivers of attitudinal change across multiple policy domains with diverse characteristics. Finally, it allows for an extension of the scope of existing work in this area to cover more recent shifts in the orientation of England's two major parties towards welfare and the UK's role in Europe. Should the suggestions of Curtice (2010) and Stevens (2013) that both parties had the capacity to induce alterations in the views of their supporters in each of these areas during the 1990s and 2000s remain valid, we might expect Labour supporters to have responded to a softening of the party's stance towards welfare during the 2010s by modifying their attitudes accordingly. Meanwhile, we might

also anticipate both Conservative and Labour identifiers to have reacted to alterations in their preferred party's position towards EU integration by becoming increasingly sceptical of Britain's membership of the institution.

The interplay between core values, party identity, and shifting party cues

Addressing the first and second of these research questions represents a significant extension of the knowledge base on the role of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues in the process of attitude formulation. Equally importantly, however, the answers to these two questions serve as the key building blocks upon which this study's final analysis is founded. If both core values and partisan identity influence opinion towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, and if changes in the position of a political party can in turn lead supporters of that party to recalibrate their views in each area, we face a major gap in the literature: how do these elements work together to shape policy preferences over time, what happens in the event that an individual's preferred political party adopts a policy position that conflicts with their core value perspective, and does this story play out in the same way among supporters of two major parties within the same political system?

Perhaps the stream of literature that comes closest to addressing these questions is that which focuses on the linkage by political actors of policy questions with specific underlying values. In highlighting that "policy controversies confronting the public are... almost always phrased in terms of values", Jacoby (2006, p.716) suggests that the relative impact of value orientation or partisan identity may depend upon the extent to which individuals are 'primed' by the language employed by political parties to engage or ignore particular values they might hold – a position echoing that of Tetlock (1986, p.819), who posits that the success of partisan cues in influencing attitudes in a particular domain may depend upon "the degree that issue domain activates

conflicting values”. This argument is also reflected in the conclusions of Nelson and colleagues (1997, p.569) who find that variations in the presentation of a policy dilemma affect attitudes “by making certain considerations seem more important than others”, of Grant and Rudolph (2003, p.453) who submit that the impact of an individual’s core value perspective upon their attitudes towards contested issues “are conditioned by issue frame”, and of Malka and Lelkes (2010, p.156) who argue that individuals with opposing value perspectives more readily support policy positions that are presented by parties as “consistent with the socially prescribed meaning” of either social liberalism or social conservatism.

While this body of literature draws explicit connections between an individual’s values and their willingness to respond to party cues, it tends to do so either from a perspective of value pluralism – that is, that individuals hold disparate values within themselves that may conflict with one another and that the successful ‘activation’ of particular values by a political party is the pivot upon which the impact of a party cue rests (for example, Tetlock, 1986), or through the lens of issue framing – that is, that the projection of a political issue by a party in order to emphasise its relevance to a particular set of values is key to the success of a party cue (for example, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997). However, while the way in which policy arguments are delivered by political parties may inform an understanding of why such arguments might in specific instances appeal to those with a particular set of values, it does not tell us whether or not the power of a partisan cue is such that it enables parties to influence the attitudes of identifiers whose underlying values may lead them to oppose a new policy direction as well as those whose values may incline them to support such a shift.

Further, much of this work explores responses to newly-emerged issues or prominent contemporary events. Nelson and colleagues (1997), for instance, explore tolerance towards a racist organisation in Ohio following a high-profile

rally, while Grant and Rudolph (2003, p.454) analyse attitudes towards the “timely and controversial issue of campaign finance” in the US at the turn of the 2000s. In contrast, this study adopts as its focus two contested yet established policy domains that have generated intense and sustained political debate for decades and that existing research suggests hold long-standing structural links with both core values and partisan identity.

Stepping away from prior work on value-pluralism and issue framing, the existing body of literature also includes a relatively small number of studies that examine the extent to which parties in different circumstances and with different policy perspectives are able to influence the attitudes of their supporters. Brader and Tucker (2012), for example, investigate whether the ability of partisan cues to shape attitudes differs according to national political context – an endeavour also undertaken by Samuels and Zucco (2014) and Kobayashi and Yokoyama (2018). Meanwhile, Torcal and colleagues (2018) question whether the ability of political parties within the same system to influence the views of their supporters depends upon their approach to European integration, ultimately finding that it does not. Although these studies add considerable depth to the research on partisan cue effects that has traditionally been focused on the US context (Kobayashi and Yokoyama, 2018), and while Torcal’s (2018) consideration of two parties within the same democratic system comes closest to the approach taken by this investigation, none of these studies drill down beyond the aggregate level to assess the specific question of whether different parties are equally able to carry supporters with opposing sets of core values with them in their desired policy direction.

Reflecting these gaps, this study’s third research question asks both whether the capacity of political parties to carry their supporters with them is dependent upon an individual’s value perspective, and whether the extent of their ability to do so has remained consistent throughout previous decades:

-
3. To what extent have England's two major political parties been able to shape the attitudes of their identifiers with diverse value positions towards welfare and EU membership, and has their ability to do so changed over time?
-

Answering this research question allows for a series of unknowns about the interrelationship between core values, party identity, and shifting party cues in the process of attitude formulation to be addressed. Firstly, understanding the extent to which those with opposing sets of values adapt their views in the wake of a change in the direction of their party of choice represents a significant extension of existing knowledge surrounding the extent of parties' ability to successfully reshape the attitudes of their identifiers. As discussed in the previous chapter, this issue becomes particularly relevant if social values are observed to powerfully structure opinion towards both welfare and EU membership. Although identifiers with both of England's major political parties are relatively sharply split by political values – with Labour supporters typically markedly more left-wing than their Conservative counterparts – the relationship between party identity and social values is far less clear-cut (Denham, 2020), leading to a degree of cross-pressure between the policy direction of a political party and a considerable portion of their identifiers.

Given this cross-pressure, are parties able to act as a 'weathervane' and engender a shift in attitudes regardless of the values that their identifiers might hold, or do values insulate party supporters from the effect of a change in party cue where such a change conflicts with their deeply-held beliefs? If the former is the case, the attitudes of party supporters towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership might be expected to follow the course set out by their party of choice irrespective of the values they possess. If the latter, any attitudinal movement in the wake of a shifting party cue might be amplified among those

whose values predispose them to support the new stance of their party, and muted among those whose values indicate otherwise.

Secondly, addressing this question enables an assessment of whether the nature of this interrelationship differs among supporters of England's two major political parties. Are these parties equally able to speak effectively to members of their supporter base who hold different sets of values, or is one party more successful than another at inducing wholesale opinion change among its identifiers? For instance, should analysis demonstrate that attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership are linked to an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum, perhaps both major parties are able to reach across this value divide and influence the preferences of their libertarian and authoritarian supporters in equal measure. Or, perhaps each party experiences the 'insulating' effect of values, with both Labour and the Conservatives able to reshape the views of their identifiers whose values match the trajectory of a given change in policy yet finding resistance among those whose values might lead them to be less supportive of such a shift. Alternatively, given that a slightly higher proportion of Labour voters hold libertarian rather than authoritarian values while the reverse is the case among Conservative voters (Curtice and Simpson, 2018), perhaps these parties' greater appeal to those who adopt a particular value perspective is mirrored by a variance in their ability to successfully reshape the views of their supporters with a shift in policy stance. In other words, maybe the Labour party is more adept at 'activating' its libertarian identifiers with a change in party policy, while the Conservatives are more proficient in achieving attitudinal change among their authoritarian supporters.

Finally, attending to this question facilitates an understanding of whether the capacity of one or both of England's major parties to shape the views of their supporters with opposing value perspectives has strengthened or weakened over recent decades. Perhaps both Labour and the Conservatives have displayed an enduring ability to impact the attitudes of their supporters notwithstanding the

values they hold. In this case, among partisans of both stripes we might expect to observe parity over time in the reaction of those who hold alternative values to a shift in the perspective of their party of choice. Alternatively, if social values are observed to play an increasingly prominent role in shaping attitudes, perhaps both parties might have come to face a greater challenge in speaking to their supporters from across this value divide. A final possibility, however, is that this story differs between supporters of each major party. If this is the case, while one party might consistently exhibit an ability to carry its supporters with it *en masse* in a chosen direction, we might see a second set of partisans become increasingly less willing to respond to a party cue that conflicts with their core value perspective.

Summary

A critical examination of the existing literature addressing the role of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues in opinion formulation has identified three distinct contributions that this study seeks to make. The first of these entails an assessment of the role of core values in the formation of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's relationship with Europe, and whether the part played by social values in this process has become increasingly prominent over recent decades. The second involves an examination of the effect of partisan identity and shifting party cues in shaping views towards both welfare and EU membership over a period that has witnessed major policy alterations on the part of the two largest parties in England. Building upon this picture, the third contribution comprises an analysis of the extent to which party cues are equally heeded by partisans with opposing core values, and whether both parties display an equal and enduring ability to influence the views of their supporters who hold alternative value dispositions. The following chapter provides details of the methodological approach adopted by this project and the source from which its data are derived, before these contributions are made via three analytical chapters which address each of this study's research questions in turn.

3.

Data and methods

THIS CHAPTER SETS OUT this study's methodological approach to addressing its three research questions, which consists of a secondary analysis of merged British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey data spanning three decades. It discusses the merits and limitations associated with the secondary quantitative analysis of survey data and the methodological techniques it facilitates, before positioning data derived from BSA as particularly conducive to robust and fruitful analysis in this context. It then introduces the dependent and independent variables to be employed at the analysis stage, before offering an overview of the process of data preparation and dataset merging.

Quantitative secondary analysis of the British Social Attitudes survey

Quantitative secondary analysis involves the interrogation of data originally collected by other researchers, often for a different purpose (Dale, 2004; Curtis, 2018). The prevalence of secondary data analysis as a method of sociological enquiry has risen in tandem with both developments in computational technology and a growth in the availability of high-quality datasets through national data repositories such as the UK Data Archive based at the University of Essex, resulting in a methodological shift so marked that while many small-scale or experimental quantitative studies remain reliant upon primary data collection, the majority of large-scale quantitative analysis is now secondary in nature (MacInnes, 2020).

High-quality data

A major attraction of secondary data analysis is its ability to offer a cost-effective route to high-quality data. For little to no cost researchers can access large-scale representative data collected using complex sampling procedures, gathered by trained interviewers according to robust fieldwork requirements, and based on

questions that have been expertly designed and tested (Black, 2018). As a result, secondary analysts are able to draw generalisable conclusions based on data “that they would not dream of being able to collect themselves” (Dale, Wathan and Higgins, 2012, p.2).

In this case data are derived from BSA, a high-quality cross-sectional study conducted on an annual basis since 1983 by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen). Employing a probability-based approach, BSA presents a series of new and repeated questions covering a wide range of topic areas to a nationally representative sample of between 3,000-4,000 people each year⁸ and is widely regarded as one of the most authoritative sources of data on changing public attitudes in Britain over time (see, for example, Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson, 2011; Hudson and Lunt *et al.*, 2016a; Morris *et al.*, 2023).

Survey mode

Since 2020, BSA has collected data from its respondents via a mixed-mode push-to-web design combined with a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) element to cover the offline population (see NatCen, 2023b). However, from its inaugural year through to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, BSA utilised a blend of face-to-face and self-completion methods at the data collection stage. From 1994 onwards the face-to-face section of the survey was undertaken in its entirety with the aid of computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) technology⁹, and consisted of an interviewer reading aloud a series of questions to the respondent from a laptop screen and logging their answers using the keyboard. To keep respondent burden to a minimum this section of the interview

⁸ See Annex T (Table T1) for details of annual BSA sample sizes.

⁹ Prior to the 1993 iteration of the survey, the face-to-face interview was carried out by trained interviewers from SCPR – the forerunner to NatCen – using pen and paper survey instruments to log participants’ responses (see Witherspoon, 1985). A split-sample experiment was run in 1993 to determine the suitability of CAPI for collecting future waves of BSA data (see SCPR, n.d.-a).

typically lasted for just under an hour, while in the case of lengthier questions participants were supplied with a series of showcards displaying the answer options available to them¹⁰.

In addition to its face-to-face component, between 1983 and 2019 BSA included a self-completion section comprised of a pen-and-paper personal interview (PAPI). The self-completion section occurred subsequently to the CAPI interview, with interviewers handing a booklet containing a series of questions to the respondent who had the option of completing it in private while the interviewer remained at the address or returning it at a later date via pre-paid envelope. This section of the BSA interview was utilised to combat mode effects stemming from the presence or absence of an interviewer, typically including items of a more sensitive nature to minimise the potential for social desirability bias and to avoid placing the respondent in a position of discomfort (Nandi and Platt, 2017). Questions included within the PAPI section of the final pre-COVID survey conducted in 2019 covered issues such as mental health, prejudice towards transgender people, and sexual harassment (NatCen, 2019a).

Sampling

BSA employs a complex random probability-based sampling approach designed to maximise the representativeness of its pool of participants each year, allowing inferences to be drawn from the data it collects about the attitudes of the population as a whole and enabling the application of tests of statistical significance (Copas and Li, 1997). This probability-based approach incorporates a multi-stage sampling design¹¹ which utilises the Postcode Address File (PAF) –

¹⁰ More sensitive socio-demographic items included on the CAPI interview (such as household income) utilise a system which enables a participant to select a letter corresponding to their response from a showcard rather than stating their answer explicitly. An example can be found in Annex T (Fig T3).

¹¹ The first stage of BSA's multi-stage sampling process involves utilising the PAF to draw a randomised selection of postcode sectors from a list of all postal sectors across Britain stratified

a list of all private addresses in Britain maintained by the Post Office – as its sample frame¹².

While a sample frame that matches the target population exactly rarely exists (Valliant, Dever and Kreuter, 2013), the selection of an inclusive sample frame contributes to a reduction in coverage error – a form of non-observation bias that can occur when a sample frame does not correspond well with the population about which it is used to make inferences (Barber *et al.*, 2014). Minimising coverage error was a major motivation behind the shift in sample frame used by BSA in 1993 from the Electoral Register to the PAF (Lynn and Taylor, 1995). While prior to this shift only those at addresses registered on the electoral roll were eligible for selection, the vast majority of those over the age of 18 living in Britain now have the potential to be included within BSA's sample each year. It is important to note that the PAF does not ensure universal coverage of the population of interest, with exceptions including those who are not living in private households (for example, those residing in institutions such as hospitals or prisons) and those living in private households not listed on the PAF. However, these exceptions notwithstanding, the PAF represents a relatively expansive and well-established sample frame for high-quality household surveys (Simon, 2014).

by sub-region and population density. This is followed by a second stage, which consists of the systematic random selection of a list of addresses in each postcode sector. Prior to the 2020 wave of the survey, upon visiting each selected address and making contact with a resident a fully-trained NatCen interviewer would undertake the final step in BSA's multi-stage random-probability sampling procedure by using a computer-generated Kish grid to select at random one eligible adult living at the address to participate in the survey (see Kish, 1949). An example of a Kish grid used as part of BSA interviewer training, together with details on the selection process, is provided in Annex T (Fig T1). Following the survey's switch to a push-to-web methodology in 2020, up to two adults per household are now able to participate in BSA via two unique access codes included with each invitation letter.

¹² Due to face-to-face field resourcing constraints, between 1983 and 2019 BSA's sample frame did not include addresses north of the Caledonian Canal in Scotland. This restriction has been retained since 2020 to maintain consistency in BSA's sample coverage over time (see NatCen, 2024a). BSA's stablemate, the Scottish Social Attitudes survey, offers comprehensive coverage of Scotland including the highlands and islands from 1999 onwards, thereby providing a valuable source of attitudinal data in Scotland stretching back to the advent of Scottish devolution (see NatCen, 2024b).

Response

As with many other major surveys, particularly those undertaken face-to-face, BSA has suffered from declining response rates over time (Tourangeau, 2004; Luiten, Hox and de Leeuw, 2020)¹³. Although low response rates do not necessarily result in significant levels of survey bias (Barber *et al.*, 2014), BSA uses several techniques to maximise response rates and reduce the prospect of non-response bias (see Groves, 2006). Firstly, all addresses included within the sample drawn from the PAF are sent an advanced letter introducing the study¹⁴. Such mailings have been found to have a positive influence on response rates by emphasising the legitimacy and value of the survey for which the respondent has been selected, removing suspicion surrounding interaction with an interviewer, and introducing a sense of reciprocation and social exchange (de Leeuw *et al.*, 2007). Secondly, prospective participants are provided with a monetary incentive to take part in the survey¹⁵, a technique that has been found to increase response rates across all survey modes (Singer and Ye, 2013). Additionally, between 1983 and 2019 interviewers made multiple visits to selected addresses at different times of the day throughout a fieldwork period lasting around four months¹⁶ to increase the chances of making contact with a resident – a method found to be effective in reducing non-contact response (Goyder, 1985).

Weighting

Although probability-based sampling techniques are designed to facilitate reliable population estimates, such samples must be adjusted to account for a

¹³ See Annex T (Table T1) for details of annual BSA response rates.

¹⁴ Prior to 2020, this letter also informed the recipient that an interviewer would be calling at their address. It now provides details of how to access the survey online, together with supplementary information on how to arrange a call with one of NatCen's trained telephone interviewers.

¹⁵ Until 2019, this consisted of an unconditional £10 voucher attached to the survey's advanced letter (NatCen, 2019b). From 2020 onwards, the incentive has been conditional upon taking part in BSA (NatCen, 2020a).

¹⁶ Since the survey's shift to a push-to-web approach this fieldwork window has been reduced to around 6 weeks (see NatCen, 2021).

range of factors before they can be used to make accurate inferences about a population of interest. BSA employs a three-stage weighting procedure which accounts for unequal selection probability, corrects for known patterns of non-response, and calibrates the sample to match population-level statistics on key demographic indicators. For detailed information on the calculation of BSA's selection, non-response, and calibration weights, see NatCen (2016b).

Robust analytical techniques

A further advantage offered by the secondary analysis of high-quality representative survey data such as that collected by BSA is the ability to test hypotheses using advanced statistical techniques (Vartanian, 2010). Among the tools available to the secondary analyst of large-scale survey data sit regression techniques. Described by Kellstedt and Whitten (2018, p.188) as “the workhorses of data analysts”, regression techniques are of vital importance to social science researchers thanks to their explanatory power, their availability across a wide range of statistical software packages, and their level of methodological robustness (Aldrich and Nelson, 2011). Such analyses may serve several functions including the prediction or forecasting of new data, the adjustment of known differences between a sample and a wider group of interest, and the drawing of causal inferences through a comparison of outcomes under treatment or control (Gelman, Hill and Vehtari, 2021). Crucially for the purposes of this study, regression techniques facilitate the testing of associations and structural relationships between an outcome variable and one or more predictor variables (Gelman and Hill, 2007) and enable an assessment of the impact of a predictor variable upon a specific outcome when holding other contributing factors constant (Achen, 2011).

Although a range of regression techniques can be employed to assess the relationship between variables of interest, the applicability and appropriateness

of each method is dependent upon the characteristics of the variables being analysed (Long, 1997). Where an outcome variable is continuous, linear regression represents the most appropriate form of regression analysis (Aldrich and Nelson, 2011). Simple linear regression models the relationship between an outcome variable and a single predictor variable, with the regression equation often expressed as follows:

$$y = \alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon$$

where y represents the outcome variable, x represents the predictor variable, α represents the point at which the regression line intercepts the y -axis (indicating the value of the outcome variable when the predictor variable is 0), β represents the slope of that line (allowing for the calculation of any change in the outcome variable associated with a one-unit change in the predictor variable), and ε represents the error term (Menard, 2010). The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is commonly used to ascertain the values of α and β , a technique which involves calculating the intercept and slope of the linear model which results in the lowest possible sum of squared residuals between the values predicted by that model and the observed values upon which it is based (Zdaniuk, 2014). Meanwhile, multiple linear regression extends this approach to model the relationship between an outcome variable and two or more predictor variables, with the regression equation denoted as follows:

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_k x_k + \varepsilon$$

where y represents the outcome variable, α represents the intercept, $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k$ represent predictor variables, $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_k$ represent partial regression coefficients, and ε represents the error term (*ibid.*).

While linear regression does not place restrictions on the characteristics of predictor variables, linear models assume that the outcome variable is

continuous in nature (Aldrich and Nelson, 2011). In situations where an outcome is not continuous, this assumption is violated and the application of a linear model is inappropriate. Instead, a generalised linear model can be used to relate predictor variables and an outcome variable to each other in a nonlinear way through a 'link' function (McCullagh and Nedler, 1983). One such generalised linear model is the logistic regression model, which is applicable where an outcome variable is binary (Peng and So, 2002). By transforming a linear combination of covariate values through the logit link function (Neuhaus and McCulloch, 2011) logistic regression enables the probability of a specific categorical outcome to be calculated based on one or more predictor variables, with probabilities interpreted in terms of the odds of a particular outcome occurring.

Analysing change over time

An additional advantage associated with the secondary exploitation of high-quality survey data is the opportunity it offers to make historical comparisons and to engage in robust temporal analysis. Thanks to the high level of consistency maintained over a long period by many large-scale surveys in their questionnaire content, repeated cross-sectional data can be used to develop not just an understanding of the nature of public attitudes at a particular point, but of how attitudes may have shifted at the population level or among particular sub-groups over time (Andersen, Prause and Silver, 2011).

Such analysis is typically undertaken at the univariate or bivariate level, with a series of frequencies or crosstabulations run on specific waves of data to produce an indication of how the balance of responses to an item or series of items may have altered over a specific period (see, for example, Hudson *et al.*, 2020). More recently, however, novel approaches to using repeated cross-sectional quantitative data have been employed that enable the analysis of change over time at the multivariate level using regression techniques. Merging

individual waves of survey data together to create a single datafile, for instance, facilitates the construction of regression models that incorporate a temporal element, allowing attitudinal changes over time to be tested for statistical significance and enabling confounding factors to be accounted for. Examples of the merging of large-scale quantitative survey datasets include the work of Jennings and colleagues (2015) who draw together data from a range of long-running projects including the Crime Survey for England and Wales, the British Election Study, and BSA to examine long-term trends in crime, and the efforts of Deeming and Johnston (2018) who combine annual waves of BSA to investigate the changing distribution of attitudes towards the welfare state among those with different demographic characteristics over time.

Ethical advantages

Analysis of pre-existing data also carries with it a range of wider ethical advantages. Firstly, secondary analysis serves to promote transparency and replicability in social science research (Connelly, Gayle and Playford, 2020), with Baker (2016) highlighting its role in overcoming concerns surrounding a 'reproducibility crisis' and driving increased academic and public confidence in the results of social scientific studies. King (1995, p.444), meanwhile, points to secondary analysis as helping to foster a sense of political and social science 'community'; by encouraging researchers "to understand, evaluate, and especially build on" the work of colleagues, secondary analysis serves to underscore political and social science as a "community enterprise".

King's assertion underlines a further advantage of secondary analysis: its facilitation of "the cumulative growth of knowledge" (MacInnes, 2020, p.2). While for King this is achieved primarily through the replication and reproduction of the results of others, for Herrnson (1995, p.453) it is the use of existing data to answer novel research questions that most clearly serves this purpose. By encouraging

the secondary analyst to make the most of pre-existing data, and in many cases rely on “some portion of a dataset that the original researcher did not use”, such an approach goes beyond being “an excellent pedagogical tool” and instead becomes “a useful way to advance knowledge”. Approaches based upon the use of novel datasets generated by merging distinct survey waves into a single datafile further contribute to this cumulative growth of knowledge by enhancing the utility of existing data and creating additional tools for researchers to employ when undertaking future analyses.

Secondary analytical approaches also offer advantages from a respondent-facing perspective. The exploitation of existing datasets serves to minimise the prospect of research fatigue among potential respondents by avoiding the duplication of fieldwork (see, for example, van Mol, 2017); in the context of declining response rates, especially for those groups that are regularly the subject of sociological enquiry (Groves *et al.*, 2001), utilising existing datasets “can offer an alternative way to examine some issues while removing respondent burden” (O’Connor, 2020, p.280). Secondary analysis also carries with it a low level of respondent risk; provided that data are appropriately anonymized (Dunn *et al.*, 2015), the re-use of existing datasets to address novel questions poses “far lower risks to subjects” (Doolan and Froelicher, 2009, p.203) than alternative approaches requiring primary data collection.

Limitations of secondary quantitative analysis

While secondary analytical approaches present significant opportunities, they also carry a series of potential limitations. Perhaps the clearest of these is that data utilised for analysis were originally collected by the primary researcher and represent socially constructed artefacts shaped by the processes and people that produced them (Dale, Wathan and Higgins, 2012). This places the secondary researcher in the position of an “active interpretive agent” (Curtis, 2018, p.2); as

a result, Jennings and colleagues (2015, p.1012) observe that the secondary analyst should “be cautious about the intrinsic assumptions, values and biases involved in historical data and the knowledge that can be extracted” from such sources.

Relatedly, these authors acknowledge that secondary data may have originally been collected with a distinctive set of objectives in mind and might reflect the language, concerns, and methodological approach of an earlier generation of researchers. As such, the secondary analyst should ensure that the concepts and definitions employed by variables selected for analysis tally with their own, consider whether data should be recoded or combined to better fit with the aims of the research, and confirm that data are robust enough to allow for reliable conclusions to be drawn about the population of interest. Where this cannot be achieved, the researcher should be clear about the shortcomings of the data and be transparent about how this may affect the validity of their analysis (Dale, Wathan and Higgins, 2012).

Further, while the secondary researcher needs to appraise the data that are present within their chosen dataset, they must also consider data that might be absent from it. From a general standpoint quantitative data may lack the rich descriptive quality offered by qualitative data (see, for example, Geertz, 1973; Jarldorn and Deer, 2020). Meanwhile, at a more specific quantitative level there may be factors relevant to the understanding of a particular phenomenon for which no variables within a chosen dataset exist – or, in the case of data with a temporal element, waves in which relevant data were not collected. As a result, while the secondary quantitative analyst may be able to shed valuable light on a set of original research questions, there will inevitably be limitations to their ability to explain phenomena that are shaped by the data they choose to employ (Vartanian, 2010).

In sum, engaging in the quantitative secondary analysis of BSA data offers a range of advantages. Although the literature on secondary data analysis identifies a number of potential pitfalls, utilised effectively such an approach allows for the exploitation of rich, high-quality data produced using rigorous methodological standards without recourse to the resources required to collect primary data of equivalent quality. It also provides the potential for robust analysis over time, facilitating the testing of temporal hypotheses upon a large, nationally representative sample using advanced statistical techniques.

Key variables

BSA's utility is further advanced thanks to the survey's highly relevant questionnaire content. Throughout this study's timeline BSA has carried a series of questions designed to tap into attitudes towards both welfare and European integration. It has also included measures of party affiliation and core value perspective, together with a range of further items collecting detailed demographic information. These variables provide the tools required not just to understand views towards the welfare state and Britain's relationship with Europe at the aggregate level, but to model the changing relationship between attitudes in each area and both core value perspective and partisan identity over time while controlling for additional factors.

Dependent variables

Since its inception BSA has collected data on public attitudes towards a wide range of social and political issues. In its inaugural year, for example, the survey carried questions on topics including foreign policy, defence, and crime and policing, while at its most recent publicly-available iteration in 2022¹⁷ BSA

¹⁷ Although the BSA 2023 report is available online (Clery, Curtice and Jessop, 2024), the most recent publicly-available dataset remains BSA 2022.

covered subjects as diverse as health and social care, nuclear defence, parental responsibility, and breastfeeding (NatCen, 2023a). Each annual survey carries a range of newly-crafted questions designed either to measure public attitudes towards issues that have not been addressed by previous survey waves or to gauge opinion towards a subject in a novel manner. These new items pass through a strenuous design and testing process incorporating a systematic appraisal by NatCen's internal Questionnaire Design and Testing hub, in-depth cognitive testing, and survey piloting to minimise the possibility of measurement error (Maplethorpe, 2023). In addition, reflecting the survey's "quite atypical commitment to measuring change" (Bartle, Dellepiane and Stimson, 2010), BSA also repeats a large number of items at regular intervals. By asking respondents the same questions in the same format over time, the survey provides valuable time-series data enabling the contours of public opinion towards a variety of issues to be tracked over long periods.

Among its diverse body of questions BSA has included a series of new and repeat items designed to tap attitudes towards both Britain's role in Europe and a range of aspects of the welfare state, providing cross-sectional data on public opinion in these two areas stretching back four decades. A number of these items have been included at regular intervals on BSA since its inception, offering insight into how views in each sphere have shifted from the 1980s through to the present day.

Welfare

Since its inauguration BSA has asked its respondents at various intervals about their attitudes towards the level of unemployment benefits¹⁸, their priorities for

¹⁸ 'Opinions differ about the level of benefits for unemployed people. Which of these two statements comes closest to your own view...' (Answer options: 'benefits for unemployed people are too low and cause hardship', 'benefits for unemployed people are too high and discourage them from finding jobs').

government spending on welfare benefits targeting specific groups¹⁹, the level of public spending on ‘benefits for the poor’²⁰, and the prevalence of false benefit claims²¹. Some of these items have been carried on the survey with regularity throughout this period, while others form part of more specialised questionnaire modules included on a less frequent basis and designed to provide a snapshot of attitudes towards specific facets of the welfare system²².

These items represent valuable measures of public attitudes towards specific social benefits, and offer a useful indication of how public priorities in this area may have shifted over time (Clery, Lee and Kunz, 2013). Since 1987, however, BSA has also carried a battery of eight questions designed to gauge respondent-level attitudes to welfare in a more generalised and holistic manner (Bosanquet, 1986; Perrett, 2021). These items – which with the exception of 1990 and 1997 have appeared on the survey on an annual basis – take the form of a series of statements, with participants able to select a response option along a five-point scale ranging from ‘Agree strongly’ to ‘Disagree strongly’ that best represents their perspective towards each statement²³.

While these items can be analysed individually, they can also be combined to construct a ‘summated rating scale’ (Spector, 1992) allowing for a more accurate and nuanced assessment of respondents’ attitudes towards the welfare state

¹⁹ ‘Thinking now only of the government’s spending on **social benefits**... Which, if any, of these would be your highest priority for **extra** spending?’ (Answer options: ‘Retirement pensions’, ‘Child benefits’, ‘Benefits for the unemployed’, ‘Benefits for disabled people’, ‘Benefits for single parents’). Follow-up: ‘And which next?’.

²⁰ ‘The government should spend less on benefits for the poor’ (Answer options: ‘Agree strongly’ – ‘Disagree strongly’).

²¹ ‘Large numbers of people these days **falsely** claim benefits’ (Answer options: ‘Agree strongly’ – ‘Disagree strongly’).

²² In 2015, for example, BSA carried a module on social security and welfare comprised of questions funded by the Department for Work and Pensions and designed to elicit attitudes towards the scope and generosity of unemployment benefits, while in 2016 the same department funded questions designed to assess attitudes towards benefit fraud and manipulation.

²³ A number of these statements are inspired by those designed by Taylor-Gooby (1982, p.335) to understand attitudes towards the role of the state in providing welfare in the Medway Towns in the early 1980s (see also Taylor-Gooby, 1983a; 1983b).

(NatCen, 2020b). Such multi-item scales hold a variety of advantages over attempts to measure attitudes towards multifaceted socio-political concepts using single questions. As noted by Evans *et al.* (1996), for example, they are less likely to be impacted by an individual respondent's interpretation of the question with which they are presented and allow for greater levels of measurement discrimination. Meanwhile, as Park and Surridge (2003) submit, the ability of multi-item scales to take into account a broad range of issues pertaining to a complex attitudinal sphere – and the consequent minimisation of the effect of an individual holding an inconsistent view on a specific issue within that sphere – results in a more rounded reflection of a respondent's perspective (see also Sturgis, 2002).

The eight items currently included within BSA's 'welfare' battery are as follows:

'The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other'

'The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes'

'Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one'

'Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help'

'Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another'

'If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet'

'Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people's lives'

'The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain's proudest achievements'

Although this list reflects the current composition of the survey's welfare battery, between 2000 and 2001 its contents underwent minor revision and amendment (Park *et al.*, 2001). While the initial set of questions presented to respondents

between 1987 and 2000 included the statements ‘The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves’ and ‘People receiving social security are made to feel like second-class citizens’, these two statements were dropped in 2001 in favour of the final two statements on the current list (‘Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people’s lives’ and ‘The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest achievements’), themselves introduced for the first time in 2000²⁴.

The robustness of BSA’s welfare scale can be assessed by considering its associated Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951; Cronbach and Shavelson, 2004), a coefficient which measures the level of internal consistency of an additive scale by taking into account both the number of items comprising the scale and the magnitude of the intercorrelation between those items (Spector, 1992). Guidelines for assessing the reliability of composite scales using Cronbach’s alpha are set out by both Nunnally (1978) and DeVellis (2017). The former suggests that a scale should produce a coefficient of at least 0.7 for it to be viewed as reliable, while the latter considers a coefficient of between 0.7 and 0.8 to indicate a ‘respectable’ level of reliability and a score of between 0.8 and 0.9 to denote a ‘very good’ level of reliability.

²⁴ BSA datasets contain the variables *WelfHelp*, *MoreWelf*, *UnempJob*, *SocHelp*, *DoleFidl*, and *WelfFeet*, corresponding to each of the statements making up BSA’s welfare scale. Between 1987 and 2000 these datasets also contain the variables *WelfResp* and *WelfStig* corresponding to the two statements included as part of the scale in the survey’s earlier years, while from 2001 onwards BSA datasets include the variables *DamLives* and *ProudWlf* corresponding to the two statements which came into rotation at this point. From 1995 onwards BSA datasets also include the variable *Welfare* (updated to *Welfare2* in 2001 to reflect the scale’s change in composition), which contains individual-level welfare scale scores. These scores are calculated by summing participants’ responses to each statement and dividing this by the number of items to which a participant has provided a response (for a score to be calculated, respondents must have answered a minimum of three out of the six questions comprising the welfare scale). Prior to analysis, individual-level welfare scale scores were calculated for respondents that participated in BSA during the period 1987-1994 in a way that was consistent with how scale scores were produced post-1995. This was achieved through the use of SPSS’s ‘loop’ function, with the accuracy of the process tested against existing *Welfare* and *Welfare2* values using post-1995 waves of BSA data. For a map of the composition of BSA’s welfare scale over time, see Table T2 at Annex T.

Although BSA documentation has provided an occasional snapshot of the reliability of the survey's welfare scale, this information has not been reported on a consistent basis. To confirm the suitability of the scale for analysis throughout this study's timeline, the associated Cronbach's alpha coefficient is calculated for each annual iteration of BSA's welfare scale between 1987 and 2016²⁵. The size of these coefficients suggest that we can be confident in the ability of the welfare scale to accurately reflect a respondent's latent attitudes to the welfare state; at almost every iteration of BSA since 1987 the coefficient is measured at around 0.8 or above, thereby meeting DeVellis's (2017) criteria for a 'very good' level of reliability²⁶.

Europe

Meanwhile, over the same period BSA has carried two questions aimed at assessing public attitudes towards the UK's EU membership on a relatively consistent basis. Between 1983 and 1991 (and at irregular intervals since) the survey included the following item designed to measure public opinion towards Britain's relationship with Europe²⁷:

'Do you think Britain should continue to be a member of the European Union²⁸ or should it withdraw?'

Continue
Withdraw

²⁵ As the items comprising BSA's welfare scale are not unidirectional, before calculating Cronbach's alpha the following statements were reverse-coded: 'People receiving social security are made to feel like second class citizens'; 'The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes'; 'Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people's lives'; 'The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain's proudest achievements'.

²⁶ For a full list of the annual Cronbach's alpha coefficients associated with BSA's welfare scale, see Annex T (Table T7).

²⁷ This item corresponds to the variable *EEC* in annual BSA datasets.

²⁸ Prior to the establishment of the EU in 1993 the wording of this question referred to either '*the EEC – the Common Market*' (between 1983 and 1989), '*the EC – the Common Market*' (in 1990), and '*the European Community*' (in 1991).

Data derived from the pattern of responses to this item chart views towards the UK's role in European affairs throughout the earliest years of BSA, and represent a key source of information on the distribution of public attitudes during a decade replete with political and economic shifts. However, Curtice (2016) sounds a note of caution in recommending that attention should be paid to the way this question is formulated – particularly when using it to gauge public opinion during more recent years. Firstly, while the wording of the item reflects terminology that was widely used during the 1980s when debating the issue of the UK's relationship with Europe (the Labour Party's 1983 manifesto, for instance, argues that "British withdrawal from the Community is the right policy for Britain" (Labour, 1983), while the Conservatives' manifesto from the same year asserts that "withdrawal would be a catastrophe for this country" (Conservatives, 1983)), in subsequent years the term 'withdraw' might have been perceived as "a word with rather negative connotations" (Curtice, 2016, p.5). As a result, despite providing a reliable image of the distribution of attitudes towards the UK's role in Europe during the first decade of BSA's existence, from this point onwards responses to this item may in part be influenced by the manner in which the question is worded, casting some doubts over its utility in painting an accurate picture of public opinion beyond the mid-1990s. Secondly, although asking respondents to select from a binary set of options to indicate their attitudes towards Britain's role in European affairs provides a useful indication of the level of public support for EU membership, it leaves little room for the expression of more nuanced perspectives. As Evans and Curtice (2015) highlight, a respondent is unable to signal support for either an expansion of the role of the EU in domestic affairs, or for the UK remaining within a European framework in which the EU holds less political power – the position advocated by Prime Minister David Cameron in the years prior to the 2016 EU referendum and encapsulated by the suggestion that Britain should be "in Europe but not run by Europe" (Cameron, 2015).

As a result of these evolving concerns, from 1993 onwards BSA has asked its participants a revised question on their attitudes towards Britain's relationship with the EU²⁹. This item attempts to gauge opinion at a more granular level by allowing the expression of a more nuanced position on Britain's EU membership through a set of five response options employing language more suited to the contemporary political environment (see Curtice and Evans, 2015). The question – which aside from the year 2007 and the period between 2009 and 2011 has been carried on each annual iteration of BSA since its introduction³⁰ – reads as follows:

‘Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be...’

...to leave the European Union,
to stay in the EU and try to **reduce** the EU's powers,
to leave things as they are,
to stay in the EU and try to **increase** the EU's powers,
or, to work for the formation of a single European government?

Although when considered together responses to these items provide us with insight into attitudes towards the UK's role in Europe dating back to the 1980s, the substitution of the former variable with the latter causes a disruption in BSA's time series (see Evans and Butt, 2005; Evans and Butt, 2007). However, synthesising these variables in an appropriate manner may allow for trends on public attitudes towards Britain's relationship with Europe to be reliably discerned throughout this study's timeline.

²⁹ For a map of BSA's two repeat items on attitudes towards EU membership, see Table T3 at Annex T.

³⁰ This item corresponds to the variable *ECPolicy* on annual BSA datasets between 1993 and 2015. In 2016, with BSA fieldwork commencing in July, the wording of this question was amended to reflect the fact that the referendum on the UK's membership of the EU had taken place in June of that year. The question read as follows: 'Leaving aside the result of the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, what do you think Britain's policy should be. Should it...', with the variable labelled *ECPolic2* on the 2016 BSA dataset.

As BSA's earlier variable is comprised of binary response options, any attempt to do so necessitates recoding the survey's later item from its original five-point form into a binary variable in line with the structure of its predecessor. A number of researchers have undertaken this exercise previously, with authors largely adopting one of two strategies. Curtice (2016; Curtice and Montagu, 2019), for instance, classifies those who indicate that Britain's long-term policy should be either 'to leave the EU' or 'to stay in the EU and reduce its powers' as 'Eurosceptic' and those who select one of the three remaining options ('to stay in the EU and leave things as they are', 'to stay in the EU and increase its powers', or 'to work for the formation of a single European government') as 'Europhile'. In a similar vein, Evans and Butt (2005; 2007) combine the first two response options (those designated by Curtice as 'Eurosceptic') and label them 'reduce influence', with the three subsequent response options (those earmarked by Curtice as 'Europhile') referred to as 'increase influence'. Following a different path, however, Perrett (2021) elects to separate those respondents who demonstrate a wish 'to leave the EU' when presented with the survey's later variable from those who select any of the remaining four response options. Perrett refers to the latter group of respondents interchangeably as 'Remainers' or 'pro-European' and equates them with those who, when presented with BSA's earlier question, selected 'Continue', while the former group are categorised as 'Leavers' and equated with those who selected 'Withdraw'.

A choice is required between these two approaches, with priority given to the strategy that groups pro-European and anti-European respondents together in as consistent a way as possible over time and that minimises the number of respondents who, for example, might be grouped as being in favour of the UK's EU membership on one measure yet categorised as against it on another. Fortunately, although by 1993 the survey's earlier item had been largely replaced by its successor, the former has since made infrequent reappearances on BSA

during years in which the latter has also been included³¹. The decision on how best to unify these two distinct variables over time is therefore capable of being informed by an analysis of those occasions upon which both variables have been carried on BSA. The results of this analysis (full details of which can be found in Annex T³²) indicate that it is the second of these approaches – which funnels those who wish to depart from the institution into an ‘anti-European’ category and all other respondents into a second ‘pro-European’ category – that produces a measure of public attitudes towards Europe that is the most consistent across time. This strategy leads to a higher proportion of respondents being categorised in the same way by both measures in each of the three years in which data derived from both variables are available, while regression analysis confirms that models incorporating an independent variable based on this strategy perform best when using the survey’s later item to predict response to its earlier item and result in a higher level of model fit across all three years.

Independent variables

This study aims to assess the extent to which the ‘political’ and ‘social’ dimension of an individual’s core values shape their attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership, to determine the role of party identity in the formation of attitudes in both spheres, and to understand the impact of changing party cues upon partisans with opposing value perspectives over a period spanning almost three decades. To facilitate this, variables are required that indicate both a respondent’s core value perspective and the nature of their partisan affiliation, while a further set of markers are required to demarcate the nature of the cue emanating from their party of choice at the point of their participation in BSA.

³¹ Both variables were present on the survey in 1997, 2014, and 2015.

³² See Tables T8-T38.

Values

As argued by Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995, p.21), although core values are often considered to lie “at the root of behaviour”, a fundamental characteristic of such values is that they are non-empirical and cannot be directly observed. As a result, despite the relatively common use of core value indicators relying upon respondent self-placement (see, for example, Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson, 2011; van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015), the ‘latent’ nature of core values means they cannot be accurately gauged by simply asking a respondent where they stand on a continuum from left to right or from libertarian to authoritarian (Curtice and Bryson, 2001; Surridge, 2012).

However, it is possible to measure core values via a series of statements that tap into their various elements and deriving a summary measure that is indicative of a respondent’s overall social or political value position (Park and Surridge, 2003). The utility of such scales, and their ability to measure core values accurately, has been confirmed by several studies. Using a panel of respondents drawn from BSA 1989 participants, Heath *et al.* (1994) finds that composite scales perform well in identifying and measuring a variety of latent value positions, while Sturgis (2002) uses the British Household Panel Study to confirm the continued validity of Heath and colleagues’ scales 20 years on from their initial development. Meanwhile, Cheng *et al.*’s (2012) interrogation of a series of summary scales using the National Child Development Study and the 1970 British Cohort Study reiterates the ability of such scales to gauge respondents’ core value positions accurately and consistently.

Each year since 1986 BSA has included two series of statements designed to detect respondents’ latent political and social values. The first series – referred to as BSA’s ‘left-right’ battery (NatCen, 2016b) – allows for participants to be positioned on a scale ranging from politically left-wing to politically right-wing, while the second series – known as the survey’s ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ battery

(*ibid.*) – enables respondents to be placed on a scale ranging from social liberalism to social conservatism³³. These statements, each accompanied by five-point response options ranging from ‘Agree strongly’ to ‘Disagree strongly’, were initially developed by Evans and colleagues during the mid 1980s using a panel of respondents recruited from the 1983 iteration of the British Election Study (see Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996) and have been presented in an almost entirely consistent fashion since their introduction³⁴.

The five items used to measure a respondent’s position on the left-right spectrum are as follows³⁵:

‘Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off’

‘Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers’

‘Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’

³³ That each of these scales taps into a distinct dimension of an individual’s core values is emphasised by the low Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the two which, when taking into account all cases with a valid score on both scales between 1987-2016 ($n=63,239$), is calculated at -0.07 ($p<0.001$).

³⁴ In 1994 the statement ‘Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’ was absent from the set of statements designed to gauge respondents’ political values and was replaced by an amended version of this item with its wording reversed (this variable is not included within this study’s 1994 scale score calculations). Meanwhile, in both 1998 and 1999 the statement ‘The law should be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong’ was omitted from the set of statements designed to measure respondents’ social values. Aside from this, the content of both scales has remained consistent over time. For a map of the composition of BSA’s left-right scale between 1987 and 2016, see Table T4 at Annex T. For a map of the composition of BSA’s libertarian-authoritarian scale over the same period, see Table T5 at Annex T.

³⁵ BSA datasets contain the variables *ReDistrib*, *BigBusn*, *Wealth*, *RichLaw*, and *Indust4*, corresponding to each of the statements making up BSA’s left-right scale. From 1995 onwards BSA datasets also include the variable *LeftRigh* which contains individual-level scale scores calculated by summing each participant’s responses to the statements comprising the survey’s left-right scale items and dividing this by the number of items to which the participant has provided a response (as with the survey’s welfare scale, for a score to be calculated, respondents must have answered a minimum of three out of the six questions comprising the scale). Prior to analysis, a scale score was calculated for respondents that participated in BSA during the period 1986-1994 in a way that was consistent with how scale scores were produced post-1995. Mirroring the approach taken when producing pre-1995 welfare scale scores this was achieved through the use of SPSS’s ‘loop’ function, with the accuracy of the process tested against existing *LeftRigh* values using post-1995 waves of BSA data.

‘There is one law for the rich and one for the poor’

‘Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance’

Meanwhile, the six items used to measure a respondent’s position on the liberal-authoritarian spectrum are as follows³⁶:

‘Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values’

‘People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’

‘For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’

‘Schools should teach children to obey authority’

‘The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong’

‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’

Responses to each item are combined to produce a score ranging between ‘1’ and ‘5’. In the case of the left-right battery respondents are assigned a score of between ‘1’ (left-wing) and ‘5’ (right-wing), while in the case of the libertarian-authoritarian battery the scale runs between ‘1’ (libertarian) and ‘5’ (authoritarian).

These items have been included on BSA on an almost annual basis since the late 1980s. They did not, however, appear in 1997; instead, two ‘balanced’ series of statements designed to assess political and social values were included in their place. These ‘balanced’ batteries have been used to assess political and social value orientation as part of the British Election Study (BES) since 1992 (see

³⁶ These datasets also contain the variables *TradVals*, *StifSent*, *DeathApp*, *Obey*, *WrongLaw* and *Censor*, corresponding to each of the statements making up BSA’s libertarian-authoritarian scale. As is the case with the left-right scale, BSA datasets also include the variable *LibAuth* from 1995 onwards containing individual-level libertarian-authoritarian scale scores. Following the technique employed to backdate *Welfare* and *LeftRigh* scores to pre-1995 respondents, *LibAuth* values were calculated for 1987-1994 cases with syntax tested against existing *LibAuth* values.

Curtice and Bryson, 2001; Surridge, 2018). Their initial appearance on BSA in 1996 stemmed from the survey's role as the vehicle for the first round of the BES's 'Campaign Panel' (see SCPR, n.d.-b), while their presence on BSA the following year resulted from the inclusion of a module of BES items within 1997's stripped-down version of BSA (see NatCen, 1999).

While BSA's standard left-right and libertarian-authoritarian batteries are all worded in one direction (agreement with each statement suggests a more left-wing or libertarian standpoint, whereas disagreement indicates a more right-wing or authoritarian outlook), the alternative collection of items selected for inclusion in 1997 contains statements whose wording differs in direction with the aim of reducing the potential for acquiescence bias (see Heath and Martin, 1997). Evans and Heath (1995) however find little difference in the overall reliability associated with either 'balanced' or 'unbalanced' versions of the left-right or libertarian-authoritarian scales³⁷, arguing that any differences between the two are small enough to justify the use of either battery to assess the role of political and social values in shaping public attitudes.

Despite assurances as to the reliability of both sets of scales, the difference in their composition results in relatively large differences in the mean scores associated with each scale. In 1996, for instance, when both sets of items were included on BSA, the mean (unweighted) scale score associated with the 'balanced' left-right items is measured at 2.56, compared with a mean scale score for the standard left-right items of 2.39. Meanwhile, the survey's 1997 'balanced' mean scale score is calculated at 2.59, compared with a mean scale score of 2.48 for its standard set of items the following year. Similarly, in the case of the libertarian-authoritarian scales the mean (unweighted) scale score associated with the 'balanced' set of items in 1996 is calculated at 3.10,

³⁷ These authors in fact find that unbalanced scales perform slightly better than their balanced equivalents in terms of internal consistency and stability, although point to the presence of acquiescence effects within sets of unbalanced items as a potential cause of this.

compared with a mean scale score for the standard libertarian-authoritarian battery of 3.73. Subsequently, the 1997 ‘balanced’ mean scale score is calculated at 3.07 compared with a mean scale score of 3.84 for BSA’s standard set of items in 1998. As a result of this inconsistency, following the approach of Fisher and colleagues (2021) ‘unbalanced’ left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scale scores based on BSA 1997 are not included within this analysis.

As is the case with the survey’s welfare scale, annual BSA documentation has only occasionally included details of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient associated with its two value scales. In the absence of consistent annual reporting, this coefficient is calculated for both scales throughout the period spanning 1987-2016. At almost every iteration of BSA since 1987 the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the libertarian-authoritarian scale is measured at 0.7 or above, while the equivalent coefficient for the left-right scale is regularly measured at 0.8 or above³⁸. Bearing in mind the standards set out by both Nunnally (1978) and DeVellis (2017), these scores allow us to say with relative confidence that both scales represent reliable measures of a respondent’s underlying core values.

Indicators of an individual’s score on each of BSA’s value scales take the form of interval-level data. While this is suitable for regression modelling, in order to assist with exploratory analysis and indicative crosstabulations two categorical variables are created, each comprising three broadly evenly-sized groups³⁹. The first of these identifies those whose left-right scale score places them in the most ‘left-wing’ third of respondents, those whose score places them in the most ‘right-wing’ third, and those falling into a ‘centre’ third, while the second

³⁸ As the statements comprising each of these scales are unidirectional, no recoding is needed prior to the calculation of Cronbach’s alpha. For a full list of the annual Cronbach’s alpha coefficients associated with BSA’s left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scales, see Annex T (Table T7).

³⁹ While the number of cases in each group differs slightly, scale cut-off points are chosen to ensure the most equal possible distribution of cases across each group.

separates the most ‘libertarian’ third of respondents, the most ‘authoritarian’ third, and those whose values lead to them being classified as ‘neither’ libertarian nor authoritarian. Analysis of the distribution of scale scores across the entirety of this study’s pool of cases leads to the designation of those scoring between 1 and 2 on the survey’s left-right scale being designated as ‘left-wing’, those scoring above 3.6 as ‘right-wing’, and those falling between these two groups as ‘centrist’. Meanwhile, those scoring between 1 and 3.5 on the survey’s libertarian-authoritarian scale are earmarked as ‘libertarian’, those scoring above 4 as ‘authoritarian’, and those falling between these two groups as ‘neither’ libertarian nor authoritarian.

Partisanship

Although the latent nature of an individual’s social and political values means that their measurement requires the use of a series of indirect indicator questions, partisan identity is perhaps more straightforward to gauge using traditional survey instruments (although see Bartle, 2003 for debate surrounding the optimal strategy for doing so). That said, as discussed in the previous chapter, consideration is required of who might be considered a ‘party identifier’ for the purposes of this study. For an individual to be willing to absorb the policy perspective of their preferred party and adapt their own views in the event of a change in party cue, they might be expected to display a level of affiliation with a political party that goes beyond a willingness to offer that party electoral support and more closely resembles a degree of ‘affective attachment’ (Dalton, 2016).

Beneficially, BSA contains variables that allow for the identification of such individuals. The survey includes a series of three questions concerning a respondent’s political affiliation, asking them in the first instance:

‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?’

If a respondent answers either '*No*' or '*Don't know*', they are asked the following secondary question:

'Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others?'

If a respondent answers '*Yes*' to either of these items, they are asked to state which party it is that they support (or feel closer to). Alternatively, in the event that a respondent answers both questions by selecting either '*No*' or '*Don't know*', they are presented with the following tertiary item:

'If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?'

Those who reject the idea of being 'a supporter of any one political party' or of being 'a little closer to one party than to the others' yet respond substantively to the third of BSA's items on party preference can be considered as expressing only an intention to vote for a particular party – perhaps not enough to lead to an assimilation of that party's perspective into their own policy preferences. However, a positive response to either of the survey's first two statements provides an indication of ties to a party that resemble a longer-term sense of allegiance, something much closer to Dalton's principle of 'affective attachment'. It is this group who this study considers 'party identifiers'. Using this measure holds a further advantage: while gauging the impact of partisan identity over time using cross-sectional data has the potential to leave open questions of causality, employing a variable that incorporates the concept of long-term political allegiance goes some way to assuaging any doubts around the role of parties in shaping the attitudes of their supporters over time⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ This issue is outlined in the previous chapter, and is addressed further in Results B and Conclusions and Discussion.

While BSA allows for the identification of those who display a sense of ‘affective attachment’ to a party⁴¹, some additional work is required to create a derived variable based on this information that can be used for analysis. The first step in doing so is to identify those who give positive responses at either of the survey’s first two items and separate them from those who do not. Next, as one of the foundations of this study is that England’s two major political parties – the Conservatives and the Labour party – have significantly revised their perspective towards both welfare and EU membership over time and that their supporters may be expected to have responded by recalibrating their own attitudes in both spheres, those earmarked as party identifiers are further divided into Conservative supporters, Labour supporters, and those who do not support either of these parties.

Periodisation

BSA provides the tools to delineate respondents by both core value orientation and political identity. However, a central aspect of this study is the extent to which changing party cues affect partisans over time; when a party changes its stance, is it equally capable of taking its supporters with alternative value positions with it in its new direction? To facilitate multivariate analysis of how changes in party positioning impact the attitudes of those who identify with each party over time, and to understand the extent to which this impact varies according to party identifiers’ core values, a pair of categorical variables are

⁴¹ BSA datasets contain a range of variables based on the responses provided to each of these items. The variable *SupParty* comprises responses to the first of the survey’s three items on party affiliation, while the variable *ClosePty* consists of replies to the second of these items. Meanwhile the variable known as *PartyID1* comprises respondent’s answers to either of the three items on party identification, with *PartyID2* separating respondents whose party allegiance lies with a party other than the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat (in 1989 this code was adapted to include those identifying with ‘SDP/Liberal/Alliance’, while the same code was used to denote those with an affiliation to ‘Lib Dem/Liberal/SDP’ in 1991) or Green party (from 1993 onwards) and places them into a broad ‘Other’ category (the variable *PartyID3* was introduced in 2014 – this variable included a separate code for UKIP identifiers).

required that encapsulate the position of England's two major parties towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership at different points throughout the period spanning 1987-2016.

Welfare

The previous chapter described significant changes in the approach to welfare adopted by England's two major parties between 1987 and 2016. It demonstrated that these undulations in policy perspective can be distilled into three broad periods. Throughout the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s the Labour party's position was aligned with its traditional image as "the party of 'welfare'" (Beckett, 2016, p.13), while the Conservatives espoused a typically sceptical perspective towards the welfare state comprising a series of commitments to reduce welfare spending and the introduction of reforms based upon principles of conditionality. Although the Conservatives' approach to welfare remained largely consistent throughout the following decades, during the mid-to-late 1990s the Labour party adopted a more neo-liberal perspective towards the role and function of the welfare state that contrasted sharply with its traditional approach. Subsequently, however, under the stewardship first of Ed Miliband and then of Jeremy Corbyn, Labour's position drifted back towards its more familiar interpretation of state welfare while the perspective of the Conservative party remained consistently hard-line.

To facilitate analysis of how these changes in party positioning may have impacted the attitudes of party supporters over time, the previous chapter also identified 1997 and 2010 as appropriate cut-off points at which to distinguish between each of these periods. This study's 'welfare' time period variable therefore separates BSA respondents into three categories: those who participated in the study between 1987 and 1996, those who were interviewed between 1997 and 2009, and those whose responses were gathered between 2010 and 2016.

Europe

The previous chapter also described major shifts in the approach of England's two largest parties towards Britain's relationship with Europe between 1987 and 2016, once again condensing these shifts into three broad phases. Although the Labour party began to thaw in its approach to EC membership during the earliest portion of this study's timeline it remained the more Eurosceptic of the two major parties until the early 1990s, while despite growing division among the Conservatives during this period the party continued to adopt a broadly pro-European outlook. By the end of Neil Kinnock's tenure as party leader, however, Labour had completed its transformation into a pro-European party – a position it would continue to adopt during the remainder of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s and which contrasted sharply with the increasingly Eurosceptic stance taken by the Conservatives during this timeframe. Subsequently, the pro-European perspective adopted by the Labour party throughout much of the previous two decades became somewhat diluted during the 2010s, while the prevalence of Eurosceptic cues emanating from the Conservative party continued on an upward trajectory.

To enable analysis of how these shifts in party positioning may have shaped the views of partisans, the previous chapter identified 1992 and 2010 as appropriate partitions between each of these three phases. This study's 'Europe' time period variable therefore divides BSA respondents into three categories; those interviewed prior to 1992⁴², those who participated in the study between 1992 and 2009, and those whose responses were collected between 2010 and 2016.

⁴² As BSA did not run in 1992 (with funding diverted instead to the British Election Study), this category comprises cases from 1987 through to 1991 while the subsequent category consists of cases from 1993 through to 2009.

Demographic variables

This study focuses on the dual role of core values and partisan identity in shaping attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership over time. However, previous work has identified a range of additional individual-level characteristics as holding an association with policy preferences in each sphere, with views towards both welfare and Britain's role in Europe found to vary systematically by age, education, sex, ethnicity, geographic region, and social class. BSA provides detailed respondent-level data on each of these factors, offering the opportunity to construct regression models that measure the strength of the link between values, partisan identity, and attitudes in both spheres while controlling for the effects of relevant socio-demographic characteristics.

Age

The literature suggests that age represents a major cleavage in attitudes towards the EU, with Euroscepticism more prevalent among older voters than their younger counterparts. This demographic divide is situated as the result of a series of fundamental social and economic changes that have taken place in the UK during the past half-century (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b; Hobolt, 2016) including a shift away from traditional manufacturing and towards a post-industrial economy, the expansion of higher education, and mass migration. These changes have “transformed the typical experience of a young person growing up in Britain” (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020, p.5), placing many younger citizens in a position to benefit from increased globalisation and shaping the attitudes of younger generations towards key social and political issues (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Meanwhile, they have left many older voters “pushed to the margins” of contemporary society (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b, p.278); while those who feel comfortable with the increased levels of social and cultural diversity fostered by EU membership and those who are able to compete in the

increasingly globalised and connected environment facilitated by supranational institutions such as the EU tend to be younger, those 'left behind' by these developments are predominantly older (*ibid.*, Goodwin and Heath, 2016b). Further, while those socialised during an age of increased European integration might be more likely to see the EU's political influence as 'normal', those socialised at a time of less European cooperation may be more hostile towards perceived threats to the sovereignty of national governments (Down and Wilson, 2013; Fox and Pearce, 2018). According to this view, as the process of EU integration has intensified over time, younger 'political generations' (Mannheim, 1952) have become politically socialised against a backdrop of increased European co-operation and, as a result, are less likely to hold sceptical attitudes towards the institution than their older counterparts.

That older age groups might hold more Eurosceptic attitudes is supported by the majority of existing studies. Using Eurobarometer data from 1996, Brinegar and Jolly (2005) submit that across the EU older people are less supportive of European integration than younger people, while Ford and Goodwin's (2014b) examination of BSA data between 1993 and 2012 finds that older age groups are more likely to hold a Eurosceptic outlook than younger age groups. This pattern is mirrored by analyses of the 2016 EU referendum result. Examining aggregate-level election data, Becker *et al.* (2017) observe that local authorities with an older age profile were more likely to have voted to leave the EU – a finding bolstered by Goodwin and Heath's (2016b) analysis of individual-level data derived from Wave 8 of the British Election Study's internet panel (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a) which confirms that those in older age groups were more likely to vote Leave than those in younger age groups.

Age has also been linked with attitudes towards welfare, although its effects appear inconsistent across existing studies. For example, Deeming and Johnson's (2018) analysis of BSA data spanning 1983-2012 demonstrates that

scepticism towards particular aspects of the welfare state may be more prevalent among older citizens than their younger counterparts. This relationship may be the result of self-interest (Peillon, 1996; Wu and Chou, 2017) – a suggestion borne out by additional research suggesting that working-age citizens are more likely to support more generous in-work and unemployment benefits than older citizens (Gelissen, 2000). Alternatively this association may be related to political values, with older voters more likely to display right-of-centre political and economic attitudes than younger voters (Goerres, 2008) or to perceptions of economic risk, with those of working age more likely to be exposed to potential threats to their income than older people (Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012).

By contrast, Ford's (2006) analysis of BSA data between 2000 and 2002 finds that older people display higher levels of generalised support for welfare policies than the young. While suggesting that this may be the result of their status as beneficiaries of welfare policies such as the state pension allowance and benefits targeted at people with long-standing health conditions, Ford also indicates that this attitudinal divide may stem from older citizens' "clearer memory of the hardships endured before the introduction of the welfare state" (*ibid.*, p.147). Cooper and Burchardt (2022) – again employing BSA data, this time examining the period 1995-2018 – also submit that younger age groups hold more welfare-sceptic attitudes than their older counterparts, a conclusion echoed by Deeming (2015) who finds that the odds of a 15-24 year-old expressing the view that unemployment benefits are 'too high and discourage people from finding jobs' are more than three times that of a person aged 65 or over. Cumulatively, the results of these studies suggest that age holds a complex and multifaceted relationship with attitudes towards the welfare state, with the nature of this association contingent upon the specific aspect of welfare attitudes tapped by the dependent variable used for analysis.

As part of its extensive block of demographic questions known as the ‘household grid’ (NatCen, 2016a), BSA collects information on a respondent’s age via the following question:

‘What was your **age** last birthday?’⁴³

Mirroring the approach of numerous existing studies that employ BSA data to examine attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK’s relationship with the EU (see, for example, Pearce and Taylor, 2013; Curtice and Tipping, 2018; Cooper and Burchardt, 2022), the interval-level data provided by this item is used to create a categorical variable dividing BSA respondents into a series of age groups. Adopting the strategy of both Clery and colleagues (2013) and Ford and Goodwin (2014b), respondents are split into four age categories: those aged 18-34⁴⁴, those aged 35-49, those aged 50-64, and those aged 65 and over.

Education

Previous research also highlights the role played by education in shaping views towards Britain’s relationship with Europe, with those who hold fewer qualifications more likely to adopt a sceptical stance towards the EU than their counterparts with more qualifications. Once again, this divide is often positioned as the result of macro-level economic shifts that have driven a demand for highly-skilled graduates within Britain’s increasingly service-based and globalised economy (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a; Hobolt, 2016). Membership of the EU does not necessarily represent “a positive sum game where everyone wins”

⁴³ Prior to BSA’s shift to CAPI in 1993, interviewers manually completed the ‘Age last birthday’ section of a pen-and-paper questionnaire.

⁴⁴ Although BSA stipulates that its sampling frame consists only of those aged 18 and over, nine respondents under the age of 18 are included within BSA datasets between 1987 and 2016 (this may be the result of erroneous information provided to the interviewer either by a respondent or another member of the respondent’s household as part of the doorstep selection process). Rather than losing these cases by setting them as missing values, they are included within the youngest age group.

(Anderson and Reichert, 1995, p.233). Rather, as Gabel and Palmer (1995, p.7) put it, those with higher levels of education “are better prepared to apply their talents in diverse international settings”, while their counterparts with fewer qualifications are “more expendable in times of economic downturn”. Consequently, while those with more marketable qualifications might view the EU as further broadening the scope of commercial opportunity due to its facilitation of economic openness (Ford and Heath, 2014), those with fewer qualifications might be both less able to take advantage of the economic opportunities offered by EU membership and wary of increased competition for a decreasing number of low-skilled jobs via the EU’s freedom of movement provisions (Longhi and Rokicka, 2012; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017).

Alternative explanations for the impact of education upon attitudes towards the European Union suggest that those who spend a larger proportion of their lives in educational settings are more likely to hold a pro-European outlook due to being socialised for longer in an environment that promotes more ‘cosmopolitan values’ (Kunst, Kuhn and van de Werfhorst, 2020). While negative attitudes towards the EU may in part stem from the perceived cultural threat posed by those from different backgrounds (McLaren, 2002), spending more time in education may reduce this sense of perceived threat by both increasing individuals’ knowledge of other cultures (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006) and imbuing a more liberal and accepting social outlook (Hagendoorn and Nekuee, 1999; Van de Werfhorst and de Graaf, 2004). Meanwhile, those who spend longer in education may also be more likely to acquire a set of cognitive skills and abilities that foster a greater understanding of the role of more complex and remote political entities such as the EU (Inglehart, 1970). The literature therefore positions those with higher levels of education as not only more likely to be positive about both the economic and cultural consequences of EU membership, but also more likely to be able to interpret and accept the role of the EU as a supranational political institution.

Numerous studies confirm the role of education in structuring attitudes towards the European Union. Using Eurobarometer data from 2000 covering multiple EU member states Hooghe and Marks (2005) find that those with higher levels of education are less likely to exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes than those with lower levels of education, while Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) – also employing Eurobarometer data, this time spanning the years 1994-2004 – observe differences in Euroscepticism by education that are particularly pronounced in several countries including Britain. Again utilising Eurobarometer data between 1973 and 2010, Hakhverdian *et al.* (2013) find not only that education impacts upon levels of Euroscepticism but that this effect may have increased over time in multiple member states – once more, including Britain. Meanwhile, focusing exclusively on British data, Curtice’s (2015) analysis of both BSA 2014 and Wave 6 of the 2015 British Election Study internet panel highlights a notable gap in preferences towards the UK’s EU membership between those with a degree-level qualification and those without, while several analyses of the result of the 2016 EU referendum at both the aggregate level (Goodwin and Heath, 2016b; Johnston *et al.*, 2018) and the individual level (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a; Hobolt, 2016; Curtice, 2017; Simon, 2022) illuminate the higher propensity of those with fewer qualifications to have voted in favour of Britain’s departure from the EU. The strength of the relationship between education and support for Leave is firmly underscored by Zhang (2018, p.304) who – in arguing that “higher education is the predominant factor dividing the nation” – submits that “an increase of about 3% in the proportion of British adults accessing higher education in England and Wales could have reversed the referendum result in the UK”.

As with attitudes towards EU membership, views towards the welfare state may be structured by levels of educational attainment. Unlike perspectives on Britain’s relationship with Europe, however, education might be theorised to shape attitudes to welfare in two opposing directions. On the one hand those with higher levels of education might be less supportive of state welfare provisions

due to their relative economic security (Kapstein, 2000); as Attewell (2022, p.1081) argues, education may provide an “insurance function” which reduces individual-level support for an expansive system of welfare. On the other hand, however, Gelepithis and Giani (2022, p.46) assert that the role of education in offering heightened economic security “is only half the story”, arguing that welfare state support might be greater among those with more qualifications due to the role of higher education in promoting progressive and egalitarian economic perspectives (Dee, 2004).

The available evidence appears to suggest that the second of these theoretical approaches better reflects the relationship between education and attitudes towards welfare. Utilising BSA data, Ford (2006) asserts that higher levels of educational attainment are linked with increased support for the welfare state – a finding replicated by Deeming (2015) who submits that those without a university degree are over 80% more likely to feel benefit levels are too generous than those with a degree-level qualification or above. Meanwhile, although Attewell’s (2022) analysis of ESS data provides a more mixed picture – with those holding higher educational qualifications more likely to view welfare recipients as deserving yet exhibiting greater opposition to the suggestion that the state is responsible for maintaining living standards – Cooper and Burchardt’s (2022, p.7) results based on an exploration of BSA data lead them to conclude that “on the whole, having lower levels of educational qualifications is associated with stronger anti-welfare attitudes”.

Since 1985, BSA has collected data on respondents’ educational attainment by presenting them with a showcard (evolving in later years into a series of showcards to reflect the expanded set of qualifications a participant may possess) containing a list of possible qualifications and asking them to indicate

which of those on the list, if any, they hold⁴⁵. Following the strategy employed by Deeming (2015; Deeming and Johnston, 2018) and Langsæther and Evans (2020), the available data on respondent-level educational attainment are compressed into a categorical variable placing respondents into one of three consistent categories over time: those with at least a degree-level qualification, those with an ‘intermediate’ qualification (incorporating those whose highest level of educational attainment takes the form of a GCSE- or A-level-equivalent qualification), and those who hold no formal educational qualifications⁴⁶.

Sex

Although studies examining the role of age and education in structuring attitudes towards Britain’s relationship with the EU are relatively numerous, the question of whether Euroscepticism may be gendered has garnered comparatively little attention. This relative lack of academic consideration mirrors the “invisibility of gender issues” (MacLeavy, 2018, p.207) during the lead-up to the 2016 EU referendum and the marginalisation of women’s rights and equality issues as constituent parts of the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership (Guerrina and Murphy, 2016). This marginalisation may have resulted from the under-representation of women on both sides of the argument both pre- and post-referendum (Shorrocks and Fowler, 2019), or from the

⁴⁵ For a copy of the showcards used as part of BSA 2016, see Annex T (Fig T3). While the list of potential answers is extensive, BSA datasets routinely include derived variables that condense responses into broader categories. The variable *HEdQual* separates respondents with a degree-level qualification, those with a higher educational qualification below degree-level, those with A-levels or equivalent, those with O-levels or equivalent, those with CSE-level qualifications or equivalent, those with qualifications from outside the UK or other qualifications that do not fit within the rest of the schema, and those with no qualifications. *HEdQual2* (included in annual BSA datasets from 2004 onwards) employs a similar structure but distinguishes those with a postgraduate degree from those with a first degree. *HEdQual3*, meanwhile, groups respondents into four discrete categories: those with a degree, those with A-level qualifications or equivalent (including those with higher educational qualifications below degree-level), those with O-level qualifications or equivalent, and those with no formal educational qualifications.

⁴⁶ This is achieved by first deriving a variable from *HEdQual2* (carried on the survey between 2004 and 2011) and *HEdQual* (included between 1985 and 2003) that mirrors the coding schema employed by *HEdQual3*, before combining those cases sitting within the resultant ‘GCSE or equivalent’ and ‘A-level or equivalent’ groups into one ‘Intermediate’ category.

disproportionate presence of “discourses surrounding the institutionalisation of a dominant masculinity” (Achilleos-Sarll and Martill, 2019, p.15) including those focusing on ‘deal-making’ and ‘militarism’.

However, a potential link between attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership and sex can be derived from the theory that those ‘left behind’ by long-term social and economic shifts are more likely to hold sceptical attitudes towards the EU. As a result of societal structures having left women less likely to hold more advanced educational qualifications, less likely to be in a higher social or occupational class, and less able to respond to macroeconomic shifts than their male counterparts (Fowler, 2022), women may be more likely to form part of this group than men (Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, 2017). Meanwhile, due to the likelihood that women will shoulder more caring responsibilities and receive a lower income than men (Warren, Pascall and Fox, 2010), women may be considered as among those “most vulnerable to poverty” (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a, see also Cain, 2016) – further increasing the likelihood that women may be disproportionately represented among the ‘losers of globalisation’ that voted heavily for Leave in 2016 (Hobolt, 2016).

What research does exist remains divided on the role of gender in structuring attitudes towards the EU. Several studies have failed to find evidence of a relationship, with Ashcroft (2016), Goodwin and Heath (2016a), Clarke *et al.* (2017), and Shorrocks and Fowler (2019) observing parity in EU referendum voting patterns between men and women. Such findings reflect the results of pre-referendum research by Curtice (2015) who, utilising a combination of polling data, the post-2015 General Election wave of the British Election Study’s internet panel, and the 2014 BSA, finds a lack of any consistent gender gap in attitudes towards Europe in the years immediately prior to the referendum.

That said, despite varying somewhat in the strength of their findings, additional studies do uncover differences in levels of Euroscepticism between men and women. Although according to Clements (2009) these differences are small and inconsistent, Stockemer *et al.* (2020) observe that some models of attitudes towards European integration indicate that views in this area may be gendered (see also Nielsen, 2016). Nelsen and Guth (2000, p.267), meanwhile, cautiously note that “a modest gender gap” exists in attitudes towards European integration with women tending to be more sceptical than men, while Liebert (1999, p.231) uses Eurobarometer data from the 1980s and 1990s to more confidently assert that women are less supportive than men of EU membership “in practically all member states” including the UK – a finding replicated by Lubbers and Scheepers (2010).

Meanwhile, a range of mechanisms might be expected to underpin the potential existence of a “modern gender gap” in attitudes towards the welfare state in advanced capitalist economies (Goossen, 2020, p.452). As is the case with the relationship between welfare state preferences and age, views towards welfare may be associated with gender as a result of self-interest. For example, women and men may have different preferences towards the provision of welfare because of “situational factors” that position women as more likely to benefit from specific welfare policies such as those targeted at widows and single parents (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003, p.417), while the gendered division of labour and the persistence of economic inequalities between men and women may place women in a position of enhanced social risk (Bonoli, 2005; Shorrocks and Grasso, 2020). Further, as the rolling back of modern welfare states might be more likely to impact women as a result of the gendered division of caregiving responsibilities (Daly, 2011; Campbell, 2012), women may have a greater interest in the preservation of more comprehensive welfare policies due to having more to lose in the event of welfare state retrenchment (Goossen, 2020).

Women might also differ from men in their attitudes towards the provision of welfare as a result of gendered differences in ideological orientation. These differences may themselves be shaped by residual variances in the norms, expectations, and life experiences of women and men (Wood and Eagly, 2012); while women's heightened exposure to economic precarity and disproportionate caregiving responsibilities might drive pro-welfare preferences as a result of risk calculations, these experiences may also play a role in the formulation of more compassionate and collectivist views including positive attitudes towards the welfare state (Gilligan, 1982; Howell and Day, 2000). Alternatively, these differences may be caused by the decline of traditional familial structures and increased levels of access to education and the labour market, leading to a shift over time in the position of women from the political right to the political left (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Moreover, as such a shift might lead women to exhibit greater support for left-of-centre political parties (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Abendschön and Steinmetz, 2014), the typically pro-welfare messaging emanating from these parties might further bolster a gendered divide in attitudes towards welfare.

As with the comparatively inconsistent picture that emerges from the literature on gendered views towards the EU, the empirical evidence for the presence of gendered differences in welfare state attitudes is mixed. Shorrocks and Grasso (2020) find greater support for redistribution and social spending among women than among men in Britain, while Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) utilise data from the International Social Survey Programme covering the period 1995-1997 to illustrate that women hold more positive attitudes towards the welfare state than men in 23 countries including Britain. Similarly, Goossen's (2020) analysis of data from round 4 of the European Social Survey from 2008-09 illustrates that women are more supportive of 'an encompassing welfare state' than men in 21 European countries – once again including Britain. Meanwhile, outside of the UK, Habibov (2013) observes greater backing for redistribution among women in

post-Soviet nations and Howell and Day (2000) find higher levels of support for social welfare policies among women in the USA.

In contrast, however, a number of studies have found either no relationship between welfare attitudes and gender or have found evidence of a mixed or counterintuitive picture. Utilising BSA data from 2000-2002, Ford (2006) finds that gender holds no statistically significant relationship with attitudes to welfare. Meanwhile, Bradshaw and Mayhew (2004) uncover inconsistent evidence of variance by gender across different welfare indicators, observing that although women are slightly less likely than men to believe that the welfare state ‘encourages people to stop helping each other’, women are also slightly less likely to support the redistribution of income from the better-off to those who are less well off. Similarly, using BSA data spanning the period 1983-2012, Deeming and Johnston (2018) find that while women are less likely than men to feel that a reduction in welfare benefits would encourage people to stand on their own two feet, they are more likely to think that the level of welfare benefits is too high – a finding which replicates earlier work by Deeming (2015).

Prior to 2020, BSA interviewers coded the sex of respondents as either male or female when completing the survey’s ‘household grid’ section, resulting in an analysis-ready binary variable. Coding was undertaken on the basis of the interviewer’s own observations⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ The variable *R*Sex comprises data on respondent sex. It is important to note that the utility of binary measures in explaining the role of sex and gender in structuring social and political attitudes when compared with more nuanced questions designed to assess respondent gender identity has been questioned in the literature (see, for example, Westbrook and Saperstein, 2015; Smyth and Olson, 2020). Consequently, while BSA’s binary sex variable provides useful insight into the role of sex and gender in shaping attitudes, there may be facets of these relationships that BSA’s binary variable is unable to reveal.

Ethnicity

An often-emphasised characteristic of the ‘left-behind’ group of voters that previous work suggests formed the basis of support for Leave is their ethnicity. Ford and Goodwin (2014a, p.277), for instance, refer to macroeconomic shifts as leaving “older white working-class voters behind”, while Sobolewska and Ford (2020, p.50) place “white school leavers” within a broader ethnocentrist group of ‘identity-conservatives’ among whom Euroscepticism is particularly prevalent. Although Burrell and Hopkins (2019, p.5) assert that Euroscepticism “presents a more complicated racial stratification than is sometimes acknowledged”, existing research suggests that a relationship may indeed exist between anti-EU sentiment and ethnicity. This is implied by Goodwin and Heath (2016b, p.325) who, in an examination of aggregate-level data in the wake of the 2016 EU referendum, suggest that a characteristic of those areas where Leave won its strongest support was that “the local population is heavily white”. Subsequent individual-level analysis by these authors (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a) further finds that support for Leave was around 18 percentage points higher among people from white British backgrounds than it was among people from black and minority ethnic backgrounds.

Ethnicity is also linked by the literature with attitudes towards the welfare state, with white citizens exhibiting less support for welfare and redistribution than ethnic minority citizens. This effect – which is particularly pronounced among those who hold negative views towards those from BAME backgrounds (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2016; Ford and Kootstra, 2017) – might be expected to be more marked in diverse populations such as that of England (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Bay and Pedersen, 2006); in a more heterogeneous society, the salience of ethnic and cultural differences among potential welfare recipients may be increased (Balch and Balabanova, 2017; Sobolewska and Ford, 2020), and evaluations of the ‘deservingness’ of those who are perceived to benefit from

state welfare policies may play a more prominent role in shaping welfare preferences (van Oorschot, 2006).

Since its inception BSA has adapted its method for collecting information on a respondent's ethnicity on several occasions. Early datasets spanning the period 1983-1987 contain data on a respondent's ethnic origin as coded by the interviewer and based on their own observations of the physical characteristics of the participant⁴⁸. Without consultation, interviewers grouped respondents into one of the following four categories: 'Indian (inc E. African), Pakistani, Bangladeshi', 'Black, African, W.Indian', 'White/European', and 'Other non-white' (Witherspoon, 1985). This early approach to collecting respondent-level data on ethnicity may be subject to a number of criticisms; aside from interviewer observations being prone to error (Sinibaldi, Durrant and Kreuter, 2013; West and Kreuter, 2015), basing ethnic belonging upon an interviewer's observation of physical characteristics neglects the importance of shared beliefs and values in shaping ethnic identity and marginalises a respondent's sense of *belonging* to an ethnicity (Morning, 2008).

The 1989 iteration of the survey, however, trialled a different approach. While interviewers continued to code respondents' ethnic origin according to their own observations, the questionnaire also carried the following item⁴⁹:

'To which of these groups do you consider you belong?'

Black, of African, Caribbean or other origin

Asian, of Indian origin
of Pakistani origin

⁴⁸ This data is contained within the variable *EthnicGp*.

⁴⁹ This data is contained within the variable *RaceOrig*. In light of BSA's change in approach, the interviewer documentation accompanying the 1989 survey notes that the response provided by the participant to this question may differ from the code selected by the interviewer based on a respondent's physical characteristics. In such circumstances, interviewers were instructed to "never query the answer the respondent gives at this question" (SCPR, 1989, p.27).

of Chinese origin
of other origin⁵⁰
White, of British origin
of Irish origin
of other origin

From 1990 onwards BSA dispensed with the practice of requiring interviewers to code ethnicity based on their own observations, with each survey since this point instead asking the respondent to state which ethnic group they belong to. The available responses to this question have altered somewhat over time. From 1996 onwards, for example, respondents have been able to distinguish between 'Black, of African origin', 'Black, of Caribbean origin', and 'Black, of other origin'; to select 'Mixed origin'; or to select 'Other'. Meanwhile, the options 'White, of British origin' and 'White, of Irish origin' were replaced in 1996 by 'White, of any European origin', which itself was combined with the 'White, of other origin' option in 2010 to form a new 'White, of any origin' category⁵¹.

Later iterations of BSA's ethnic origin variable enable the measurement of a respondent's ethnicity at a more nuanced and granular level. However, to allow for consistent analysis over time, this study first condenses the data provided by later waves of the survey to form four groups that are comparable with data collected by interviewers in the earliest years of BSA: 'Black', 'Asian', 'Mixed or other', and 'White'. Following this recoding process, early exploratory analysis reveals the presence of categories with small base sizes which represent an obstacle to robust regression analysis⁵². In order to remedy this, the former three

⁵⁰ Where 'Asian, of other origin' or 'White, of other origin' was selected by a respondent, interviewers were instructed to ask 'which?' and to write the respondent's description of their ethnic origin word-for-word (SCPR, 1989).

⁵¹ Reflecting the changes in available answer options, the variable *RaceOrig* became known as *RaceOri2* in 1996, switching its name once more to *RaceOri3* from 2010 onwards.

⁵² The first derived ethnicity variable categorises 94% of cases as 'white', while just 2% of cases are coded as 'Black', 3% as 'Asian', and 1% as 'Mixed or other'.

categories are combined to form a binary variable separating respondents coded as ‘Not White’ and respondents coded as ‘White’⁵³.

Region

A further characteristic associated with attitudes towards EU membership is the region within which an individual resides. This relationship may stem primarily from spatial economic differences; Goodwin and Heath (2016b, p.325), for example, include within their definition of Leave-supporting areas at the 2016 referendum “communities that tend to be more economically disadvantaged than average”, while Becker *et al.* (2017, p.32) note that support for Leave was particularly marked “in areas with a strong tradition of manufacturing employment... and those areas with relatively low pay and high unemployment”. This “revolt of the rustbelt” (Boyle, Paddison and Shirlow, 2018, p.101) may on the face of it seem epiphenomenal in that it simply reflects the geographic spread of individual-level demographic factors such as age and educational attainment. However, Goodwin and Heath (2016a) identify a significant interaction between these factors and the character of the area in which an individual lives, arguing that ‘left behind’ voters in ‘left behind’ areas in Britain face the “double whammy” of being marginalised both due to a lack of skills and because of a shortfall in opportunities “to get ahead within their local communities”. Others meanwhile suggest that the source of these differences may be primarily cultural; Applebaum (2017), for instance, points to a divide in attitudes towards Europe between those living in English regions outside of London and a supposed liberal ‘metropolitan elite’ residing in the capital, while Beech (2021, p.165) points to increased levels of Euroscepticism among those “outside of the great metropolitan centres” who adopt a more socially conservative outlook on life.

⁵³ This strategy reflects the approach adopted by both Deeming (2015; Deeming and Johnston, 2018) when examining BSA data on ethnicity and Fox (Fox and Pearce, 2017; Kolpinskaya and Fox, 2019) when analysing similarly-distributed BES data.

Regional differences in attitudes towards the UK's EU membership are evident in Swales' (2016) analysis of the geographical distribution of the result of the 2016 EU referendum. However, as far back as the early 1990s authors such as Bulpitt (1992, p.271) observed the potential for regional divergence in attitudes towards Europe should British politics become "dominated by Euro-cosmopolitans – people who know more about airports and restaurants in Brussels or Strasbourg than the problems of, say, Middlesbrough and Walsall". Henderson and colleagues' (2016) analysis of BSA data supports the suggestion that regional divides in views towards Europe have a long history, highlighting that variance in levels of Euroscepticism by region can be traced back at least three decades. According to these findings, anti-European sentiment has typically been lowest in London, higher in the north, and highest across the south and midlands.

A geographical divide has also been observed in attitudes towards the welfare state. Deeming and Johnston (2018), for instance, use BSA data to demonstrate that those in England's northern regions are less likely to exhibit anti-welfare sentiment than those elsewhere, arguing that the pattern of attitudes towards welfare maps neatly onto England's long-standing north-south divide. Meanwhile, Ford (2006) implicitly links the distribution of party-political support to the finding that those in the north of England typically hold more pro-welfare attitudes than their compatriots elsewhere. Butt (2022), however, finds that although views towards the welfare state are more sympathetic in the north than in either the midlands or the south, they are most positive in London. This leads the author to make the linked observation that, as the prevalence of left-wing and libertarian values is highest in the capital, regional differences in attitudes towards the welfare state may to some extent reflect the geographical distribution of political and social beliefs.

Each annual BSA dataset contains information on the region in which a respondent resides, with the survey's method of categorising a respondent's

region changing on three occasions over this study's timeline. Between its inception in 1983 through to the end of the 1990s BSA categorised a participant's region into one of 11 groups⁵⁴, while between 2000 and 2002 the survey used a 12-category schema based upon Government Office Region (ONS, 2023a)⁵⁵ before revising these categories once more in 2003⁵⁶. To allow for consistent analysis over time, this study first creates a derived variable by recoding data on respondent region into 11 categories consistent with the earliest schema employed by BSA⁵⁷. To avoid categories with low base sizes and to conform with the principle of parsimonious data modelling (Seasholtz and Kowalski, 1993), this variable is then condensed into five groups. Taking into account the conclusions of both Henderson and colleagues (2016) and Butt (2022) that attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership may be distinguishable in London from those outside the capital, and that views in the north may differ from those elsewhere, a final derived variable separates respondents into three categories: those living in London, those living in the south and midlands, and those living in the north of England.

Social class

An additional facet of the 'left-behind' group of voters seen by many to have driven support for Britain's departure from the EU is social class, with those in traditional working-class occupations more likely to hold Eurosceptic attitudes than their middle-class counterparts. The theoretical association between social class and attitudes to Europe rests partially on the differential opportunities available to those at either end of the class spectrum in an increasingly connected economy, with those in lower-skilled jobs positioned by Hobolt (2016, p.1265) as the "losers of globalisation" of the kind fostered by EU membership in

⁵⁴ This data is contained within the variable *STRegion*.

⁵⁵ This data is contained within the variable *GOR*.

⁵⁶ This data is contained within the variable *GOR2*.

⁵⁷ For details of how this variable recodes each of BSA's 'region' variables over time, see Annex T (Table T39).

contrast to those who possess “higher levels of human capital (education and occupational skills) and income”. This relationship may also occur as a result of differences in social and cultural outlook between social classes; while the values of younger, more highly-skilled, middle-class sections of society are increasingly shaped by the UK’s growing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity (Ford and Goodwin, 2014a), the values of predominantly older, working-class voters remain underpinned by a more traditional authoritarian outlook and have thus become “increasingly at odds with the mainstream liberal consensus” (Ford and Goodwin, 2017, p.20).

There may also be a political capital aspect to this linkage; while ‘left behind’ voters previously played a pivotal role in deciding the outcome of elections, Ford and Goodwin (2014a, p.117) assert that their decline as a proportion of the electorate has since positioned them as “spectators in electoral battles for the educated middle-class vote”. To maximise political efficacy, these authors point to the shifting strategies of the two major UK political parties as “increasingly jettisoning appeals to the left-behind groups in favour of a more economically centrist and socially liberal policy targeted at the professional and middle-class voters that both parties regard as electorally essential” (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b, p.281).

That class is associated with attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership has been demonstrated by several researchers. Goodwin and Heath (2016a), for instance, observe that support for Leave at the 2016 referendum was lowest among “the more secure middle- and upper-classes”, and Swales (2016) finds that those who perceive themselves as working class were among those most likely to opt to leave the EU. Meanwhile, both Curtice’s (2015) and Ormston’s (2015) pre-referendum analyses of BSA data together with BES and publicly-available polling data suggest that class-based differences in opinion towards Britain’s role in Europe were present in the years prior to the ballot.

Attitudinal differences by class have also been demonstrated in the welfare sphere. As Esping-Andersen (1999, p.30) argues, issues such as poverty, economic security, and unemployment are “traditional working-class risks”, with the role of state welfare provision in mitigating against these risks leading to Svallfors’ (2008, p.381) suggestion that the welfare state itself exists as a “class compromise” between those at either end of the class system. As a result of the greater economic precarity experienced by working-class individuals and the welfare state’s function as a safety net, those whose occupational status places them within the working class are often perceived as “traditional welfare state supporters” (Sachweh, 2018, p.149).

These theoretical suggestions are confirmed by the results of a series of studies. Svallfors (2004), for instance, utilises data from the International Social Survey Programme’s Role of Government module to demonstrate class-based differences in attitudes to welfare across a range of measures in four countries including Britain – a finding replicated by Deeming and Johnston’s (2018) examination of BSA data spanning the period 1983-2011. Meanwhile, undertaking a more detailed class-based analysis of attitudes towards the welfare state, Deeming (2015, p.876) asserts that class represents an “important contributory factor” in attitudes to welfare, observing that those in higher occupational classes are more likely than their opposite numbers to believe that welfare benefits are too generous and that conditionality within the social security system is too weak (see also McAndrew, 2020).

At irregular intervals throughout its lifespan, BSA has asked its respondents to state which social class they feel they belong to⁵⁸. However, in addition to these

⁵⁸ At its first wave in 1983, BSA presented its respondents with the following question: ‘Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular social class. Please look at this card and tell me which social class you would say you belong to?’ Answer options: ‘Upper middle’, ‘Middle’, ‘Upper working’, ‘Working’, ‘Poor’. More recently, in 2005 and 2012, respondents were asked the following question: ‘Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to any particular class? Which class is that?’ Answer options: ‘Middle class’, ‘Working class’.

comparatively infrequent and subjective indicators (see Heath, Savage and Senior, 2013), BSA datasets provide several more robust measures of class on an annual basis. These are derived from a classification of respondents' jobs according to a set coding schema⁵⁹, with respondents asked to provide details of their occupation (including their job title, the nature of the work involved, whether they are an employee or self-employed, the training and qualifications required to perform their role, and the number of people they are responsible for supervising) before these responses are collated and coded according to a lookup table based upon a standard classification provided by the Office for National Statistics⁶⁰. With consideration given to the concepts of 'skill level' and 'skill specialisation' associated with each occupation (ONS, 2023b), respondents are then grouped into categories based on the nature and characteristics of their job.

Since 2010, for cross-sectional analysis by social class the BSA research team have recommended using a variable employing the SOC2010 coding schema and comprising seven socio-economic groups based on the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) (NatCen, 2016b)⁶¹. When analysing the

⁵⁹ Respondents are classified according to their own occupation, as opposed to that of a 'head of household'. Respondents not in employment at the time of their participation in the survey are asked about their last job, while those waiting to take up paid employment are asked about their impending job. As a result, all respondents aside from those who have never worked receive an occupational code (see NatCen, 2016b).

⁶⁰ Between 1983 and 1990, BSA utilised the Classification of Occupations 1980 (C080) as the basis for its occupational coding (see SCPR, 1991). In 1991 the survey switched to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC90), introduced by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) for the 1991 Census, as the basis for its occupation coding. SOC90 was later superseded by SOC2000 ahead of the 2001 Census and adopted by BSA as the basis for its occupational coding from 2001 onwards. From 2011 through to its final pre-COVID wave in 2019, BSA coded occupation according to the Standard Occupational Classification 2010 (SOC 2010) (see NatCen, 2016b). Subsequently, respondents have been asked to self-classify their current or last job into one of eight possible categories, with this data used in combination with information on a respondent's employment status to derive their socio-economic class (see Clery *et al.*, 2021).

⁶¹ This variable is labelled *RClass*. To maintain consistent time series, BSA datasets also include variables such as *RNSocCL* (comprising six 'Registrar General's Social Class' groupings) and *RNSEGGrp* (composed of 18 'Socio-Economic Groupings' condensed into six categories) based upon previous coding schemas.

relationship between attitudes and social class over time, however, the team recommend the construction of a variable based upon the Goldthorpe-Heath social classification schema, which allows for “a comparable measure of social class across the lifetime of the survey” (*ibid.*, p.19)⁶². Following these guidelines, and mirroring the approach adopted by Clery *et al.* (2013), a variable is created consisting of the following five categories: ‘Salaried (Higher & Lower)’, ‘Clerical (Junior non-manual)’, ‘Petty bourgeois’, ‘Foreman / Technicians’, and ‘Working class’⁶³. Subsequently, emulating the strategy adopted Surridge (2012), Mountford-Zimdars and colleagues (2013), and Devine and Sensier (2017), those in each of the three middle categories are combined into one ‘intermediate’ group. The resultant variable partitions respondents into one of three categories: those belonging to the ‘salaried’, those belonging to an ‘intermediate’ class, and those whose occupation places them within the ‘working’ class.

Data preparation

BSA represents a source of rich, high-quality information on public attitudes. However, as a large-scale project spanning almost four decades, the data it produces are by their nature wide-ranging and complex. As a result, before BSA data can be effectively utilised, it must be managed and prepared for analysis.

⁶² The Goldthorpe-Heath schema comprises eleven categories and was first introduced to BSA in 1987 with the aim of classifying occupations “by their ‘general comparability’, considering such factors as sources and levels of Income, economic security, promotion prospects, and level of job autonomy and authority” (see SCPR, 1988). It is recognised by Evans and De Graaf (2013, p.13) as “the only systematically validated measure of class position” available for use on large-scale surveys.

⁶³ While the BSA research team acknowledge that there is “no perfect solution” to tackling the issue of analysing social class consistently over time (NatCen, 2016b, p.19), the team note that “at the 5-class level these two schemas are conceptually based on more or less the same principles”, and that this strategy thereby offers the optimal route to understanding the changing association between public attitudes and social class. Clery and colleagues (2013) derive the data for this variable from *RNSEG* between 2001 and 2016, and from *RGHClass* between 1987 and 2000.

Accessing British Social Attitudes survey data

BSA datasets are deposited annually with the UK Data Archive and are available for users to download in a variety of formats together with supporting files including user guides and questionnaire documentation. Each annual dataset is downloaded together with its accompanying files, with key methodological information traced and recorded⁶⁴.

Mapping key variables

Following a comprehensive review of its accompanying documentation, each annual dataset is systematically searched for the presence or absence of each of this study's central dependent variables. Additional searches are conducted for those variables measuring respondent-level core social and political values and partisan identity, and for variables containing key respondent-level socio-demographic information. Methodological variables necessary for analysis such as those pertaining to survey weight, plus administrative variables such as respondent serial number and survey version, are also sought. The presence or absence of each variable is logged, together with its associated question wording and answer options as listed in the questionnaire documentation accompanying each dataset. In the case of variables such as composite scale scores derived from multiple individual questions, the items upon which a variable is based are also charted, with any changes to these characteristics noted accordingly⁶⁵.

Dataset merging

Earlier in this chapter, the ability to undertake analysis of change over time was identified as a key advantage of secondary quantitative analysis. Specifically, the

⁶⁴ See Annex T (Table T1) for details of annual BSA sample sizes, fieldwork dates, and response rates between 1987 and 2016.

⁶⁵ See Annex T (Tables T2-T6) for a map of the presence and composition of this study's key dependent and independent variables on each wave of BSA between 1987 and 2016.

work of researchers such as Jennings *et al.* (2015) and Deeming and Johnston (2018) was highlighted as carving out an innovative path towards the use of repeat cross-sectional survey data for robust multivariate temporal analysis. By merging multiple individual survey waves into a single datafile spanning a defined period, this approach allows for the construction of temporal regression models and the application of statistical tests to changes observed over time. In the context of this study, it also offers the opportunity to extend a corpus of work that has previously been undertaken in a largely experimental context (see, for example, Cohen, 2003; Reckhow, Grossmann and Evans, 2015; Han, 2022) via an examination of the interrelationship between core values and party preference – and the impact of a change in party cue upon the attitudes of those with alternative value perspectives – in the real world using large-scale population-level data.

This novel technique is employed here. While BSA data are collected on a yearly basis and are available as a series of annual datasets, prior to the analysis stage a single merged datafile is created spanning the period 1987 to 2016 and containing each variable required for analysis. To facilitate successful data merging, annual unweighted frequencies for each required variable are produced and reviewed. Inconsistencies across annual datasets in variable coding, variable labels, and value labels over time are then identified and addressed, with any changes made to the coding of these variables checked against the original data via crosstabulation. A new, cleaned dataset is then produced for each annual wave of BSA by dropping extraneous variables and retaining only those to be utilised in analysis. All cases in each new annual dataset are assigned an identifier code to signify the year from which that case originates. Once all cases are assigned an identifier code, a new dataset is created by merging annual cleaned BSA datasets from 1987 through to 2016 using SPSS's 'ADD FILES' command. Subsequently, the contents of this dataset are checked against original annual BSA datasets via a systematic comparison of frequencies and

crosstabulations to ensure that each case, and each variable, has been successfully incorporated within the merged dataset. Finally, as this enquiry focuses on attitudinal change over time in England, cases pertaining to respondents in Scotland and Wales are identified and dropped for analysis, leaving a merged dataset containing 80,617 cases.

Summary

This chapter sets out a methodological strategy tailored to investigating the impacts of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues upon attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership over time. It details the benefits of secondary quantitative analysis of existing survey data and the analytical techniques it facilitates, before situating data gathered by BSA as particularly suitable for this study's purposes. It goes on to specify a series of key variables capable of being utilised for analysis, before considering the advantages and practicalities of merging BSA data to allow for robust temporal analysis.

The following chapters exploit an original merged dataset covering three decades of attitudinal development to address each of this study's research questions in turn. However, this dataset also holds significant potential for re-analysis and further extension – either widthways to incorporate additional variables, or lengthways to encompass an expanded timeframe⁶⁶. To facilitate such future work, upon completion of this study the dataset created for analysis will be provided to NatCen and lodged with the UK Data Archive for researchers to access openly.

⁶⁶ For example, this study's dataset has been extended lengthways to include BSA data from 2017-2022 and used to analyse the relationship between age, values, and attitudes over time (Curtice *et al.*, 2023).

4.

Results A: Core values

-
1. How do an individual's 'left-right' and 'libertarian-authoritarian' values shape their attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union, and has the influence of the second of these dimensions changed over time?
-

IN ADDRESSING THE FIRST of this study's three research questions, this chapter demonstrates that attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union are powerfully structured by social value orientation. More specifically, it indicates that although the left-right, or 'political', dimension of an individual's core value perspective holds an association with views in each arena, it is the libertarian-authoritarian, or 'social', dimension of an individual's core values that is more strongly tied to attitudes in both policy areas. Moreover, in each sphere it is authoritarianism that is typically linked with the adoption of sceptical attitudes; the possession of a more liberal set of social values is associated with the espousal of both a pro-welfare and pro-European perspective, while holding a more socially conservative outlook is linked to the adoption of a negative position towards both the welfare state and Britain's ties with Europe.

This chapter also finds that despite changes in the aggregate level of scepticism in each sphere, the strength of the relationship between social values and attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership has remained relatively stable over recent decades. Although social values were somewhat more loosely associated with Euroscepticism during the late 1980s and early 1990s than was the case from the mid 1990s onwards, the strength of this link subsequently remained constant as attitudes towards Britain's EU membership became more negative across the social value spectrum. Meanwhile, despite the association between social values and attitudes towards welfare weakening somewhat

during the late 1990s and 2000s, any indications of a change in this relationship during the 2010s as aggregate-level attitudes towards welfare softened once more are observed to be statistically insignificant.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the links between each element of an individual's core values and attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership are investigated at a bivariate level. This establishes the direction of the relationships between opinion in both spheres and each value dimension and enables an assessment of the relative strength of these associations. The potential interaction between left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values in shaping attitudes towards welfare and EU membership is then explored, with the dynamics of these links tested further via multivariate regression analysis.

Having identified the libertarian-authoritarian value dimension as a powerful predictor of attitudes in both spheres, temporal elements are introduced to allow for an assessment of the extent to which this value dimension may have come to exert more or less influence over preferences towards welfare and EU membership over time. After mapping the bivariate relationships between an individual's score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale and their views towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership between 1987 and 2016, initial regression models are extended to incorporate terms representing the interaction between social value orientation and time period.

Political values or social values?

To begin building an image of the relationship between each core value dimension and attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, initial bivariate analysis is undertaken to establish the extent to which political and social values as measured by BSA's left-right and libertarian-authoritarian

scales are associated with opinion in both spheres across the period spanning 1987-2016 as a whole. This analysis also provides an indication of the direction in which these associations run.

Welfare

First, the mean score on BSA's welfare scale is calculated among those whose position on the survey's left-right scale places them in the most left-wing third of respondents, those whose score places them in the central third, and those who fall within the most right-wing third of respondents⁶⁷. As described in Data and Methods, a lower score on the survey's welfare scale – which runs from 1 to 5 – is indicative of a more pro-welfare perspective, while a higher score suggests a more anti-welfare stance.

The results of this exercise highlight an association between attitudes towards the welfare state and political values. Between 1987 and 2016 the mean welfare scale score among those on the left stands at 2.83, while the equivalent figure is calculated at 3.01 among those in the centre and 3.15 among those on the right. Pro-welfare attitudes appear most prevalent among those with left-wing values, while welfare-scepticism appears most common among those whose values place them further to the right.


This analysis is repeated, this time replacing this study's categorical indicator of left-right values with the equivalent variable denoting libertarian-authoritarian values. Results indicate that a link also exists between attitudes towards the welfare state and social value orientation. Between 1987 and 2016 the mean welfare scale score is gauged at 2.73 among those whose social values place them in the most socially liberal third of respondents, at 3.08 among those who

⁶⁷ See Data and Methods for details on the construction of categorical variables based on left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scale score.

fall within the survey’s central third, and at 3.30 among its most authoritarian third of respondents. Pro-welfare sentiment appears most common among those with libertarian values, while welfare-scepticism appears most common among those whose values are more authoritarian.

Initial bivariate analysis indicates that both value dimensions may be associated with views towards the welfare state. In displaying the mean scale score linked with each group side by side, however, Figure A3 suggests that the relationship between views towards welfare and social values may be particularly strong; while the difference in mean welfare scale score between those on the left and those on the right stands at 0.32, the equivalent distance between libertarians and authoritarians is calculated at 0.57⁶⁸.

Figure A3 Mean welfare scale scores among core value groups, 1987-2016 combined



Note: BSA’s ‘welfare’ scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of differences in the mean scale score between those with opposing social values over time, the x-axis in Figure A3 begins at ‘2.4’ and ends at ‘3.4’.

⁶⁸ For tables displaying the data on which Figure A3 is based, see Annex A (Table AA3).

Although Figure A3 offers a useful first impression of the association between attitudes and core values, utilising BSA's original ratio-level scale scores allows for a more nuanced understanding of this relationship. Table A1 displays the results of a simple linear regression model employing an individual's score on BSA's welfare scale as its outcome variable and utilising both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and left-right scale score as predictors⁶⁹. As with BSA's welfare scale, the survey's left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scales run from 1 to 5. A lower score on each scale is associated with a more left-wing or libertarian set of values, while a higher score is suggestive of a more right-wing or authoritarian outlook.

Table A1 Core values and Attitudes to welfare, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.784		0.018	0	0.749	0.818
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.214	0.247	0.003	0	0.208	0.221
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.452	0.451	0.004	0	0.445	0.46

n = 49,111

Table A1 indicates a statistically significant relationship between political values and attitudes towards the welfare state during the period spanning 1987 and 2016. The more right-wing a respondent the more likely that respondent is to register a higher, more sceptical score on BSA's welfare scale, with an increase of '1' in a respondent's left-right scale score associated with a rise in welfare scale score of 0.214. However, once again the social dimension of an individual's core value perspective appears to hold a particularly powerful relationship with attitudes to welfare. Table A1 suggests that authoritarian respondents are

⁶⁹ Unless stated, all linear models of attitudes towards welfare throughout this analysis are nested within this study's final model (displayed at Table C29 in Results C) and fitted to an identical group of cases to allow for comparison between models.

markedly more likely than their more libertarian counterparts to hold anti-welfare views, with an increase of ‘1’ in a respondent’s libertarian-authoritarian scale score tied to a rise in welfare scale score of 0.452.

Assessing the extent to which simple linear models incorporating each of these predictors fit the data further sharpens this picture. While a regression equation including only respondent-level left-right scale score as a predictor variable produces an R^2 figure of 0.047, replacing this with libertarian-authoritarian scale score produces a notably higher R^2 of 0.189⁷⁰. A respondent’s social value orientation therefore appears capable of explaining more of the variation in attitudes towards the welfare state than a respondent’s political value orientation.

Europe

Table A2 displays the results of a crosstabulation between EU membership preference and this study’s categorical measure of left-right values. While fewer than two in 10 (17%) of those classed as holding the most right-of-centre political values and a slightly higher proportion (20%) of those with centrist political values exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes, among those with the most left-of-centre values this figure is gauged at over one quarter (26%).

Table A2 Attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership by political value group, 1987-2016 combined

	Left	Centre	Right
Not Leave	68%	73%	78%
Leave	26%	20%	17%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>8781</i>	<i>11689</i>	<i>9117</i>

Note: Those who answer ‘Don’t Know’ or ‘Refused’ are included in the denominator on which the percentages in these tables are based but are not shown.

⁷⁰ For full regression tables, see Annex A (Tables AX1-AX2).

Table A2 thus begins to clarify the nature of the relationship between left-right values and opinion towards European integration; between 1987 and 2016, Euroscepticism appears more prevalent among those on the left than among those in the centre or those on the right⁷¹.

Table A3 Attitudes towards the UK's EU membership by social value group, 1987-2016 combined

	Libertarian	Neither	Authoritarian
Not Leave	82%	72%	64%
Leave	13%	22%	30%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>10119</i>	<i>9405</i>	<i>7984</i>

Note: Those who answer 'Don't Know' or 'Refused' are included in the denominator on which the percentages in these tables are based but are not shown.


Table A3 repeats this analysis, this time substituting this study's categorical indicator of left-right values with its categorical marker of libertarian-authoritarian values. Among libertarians just 13% adopt an anti-European stance, while among those classified as neither libertarian nor authoritarian this figure stands at just over two in 10 (22%). Among authoritarians, however, three in 10 (30%) exhibited a desire to leave the EU between 1987 and 2016. Across this

⁷¹ Two factors might lead to the expectation that the nature of the link between political values and attitudes towards the UK's EU membership may have shifted in recent decades, and that focusing on the position between 1987-2016 as a whole may obscure these fluctuations and underplay the true extent of the relationship. Firstly, where the inclusivity of a national-level welfare system reduces over time, those on the left may come to see the EU as less of a threat to the maintenance of a powerful domestic welfare state (Evans and Butt, 2007). This assertion is supported by Van Elsas and Van der Brug (2015), whose analysis suggests that as the British welfare state has decreased in size Euroscepticism has become less prevalent among those on the left of the political spectrum compared with those on the right. Secondly, as both Labour and Conservative supporters are largely sorted by political values (Reinermann, 2002), major changes in policy perspective undertaken by both of England's two largest parties may be expected to have led to changes over time in the association between attitudes towards the EU and left-right orientation. Analysis of this link in each of this study's 'Europe' time periods suggest that while the extent of the relationship has varied somewhat over time, those on the left have been consistently more likely to exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes than their counterparts on the right. Moreover, even at its largest (between 1987 and 1991), the attitudinal gap between those on the left and those on the right has never exceeded the equivalent gap between libertarians and authoritarians (for crosstabulations of the relationship between political values, social values, and EU membership preference over time, see Annex A (Tables AX3(a)-AX3(b))).

study's period of interest, Euroscepticism appears more prevalent among authoritarians than among libertarians.

As with attitudes towards the welfare state, initial bivariate analysis suggests that both political and social values may be linked with views towards the UK's role in Europe. However, in displaying side by side the proportion of those within each core value category exhibiting Eurosceptic attitudes, Figure A4⁷² once again hints that the association between EU membership preference and social values may be the stronger of the two. Although the difference between the proportion of those on the left and those on the right adopting a Eurosceptic position stands at around nine percentage points, the equivalent distance between social liberals and social conservatives stands at a more marked 17 points.

Figure A4 Euroscepticism among core value groups, 1987-2016 combined



This picture is further emphasised by Table A4, which contains the results of a simple logistic regression model employing both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and left-right scale score as predictor variables and EU membership

⁷² For tables displaying the data on which Figure A4 is based, see Annex A (Table AA4).

preference as its outcome variable⁷³. In concert with the findings derived from earlier analysis the more right-wing a respondent the less likely that respondent is to adopt an anti-European perspective, with an increase of ‘1’ in left-right scale score linked with a statistically significant increase in the odds of holding Eurosceptic attitudes by a factor of around 0.8 (translating to a real-terms decrease in the likelihood of displaying anti-European sentiment). Once more, however, Table A4 indicates that social values appear to hold a particularly powerful association with EU membership preference, with an increase of ‘1’ in a respondent’s libertarian-authoritarian scale score associated with an increase in the odds of that respondent adopting a Eurosceptic perspective by a factor of 2.172.

Table A4 Core values and EU membership preference, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.666	0.026	0.12	<.001		
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.224	0.799	0.02	<.001	0.768	0.832
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.776	2.172	0.027	<.001	2.062	2.289

n = 24,186

Again, an assessment of the degree to which simple logistic models incorporating each of these predictors fit the data – this time expressed by Nagelkerke’s pseudo- R^2 value (Nagelkerke, 1991) – further supports the suggestion that social values exercise a particularly powerful influence over views towards European integration. While a model incorporating only respondent-level left-right scale score produces a Nagelkerke R^2 value of 0.012, an equivalent model including only a respondent’s libertarian-authoritarian scale

⁷³ Unless stated, all logistic models of attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership throughout this analysis are nested within this study’s final model (displayed at Table C30 in Results C) and fitted to an identical group of cases to allow for comparison between models.

produces a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.063⁷⁴. As is the case with attitudes towards the welfare state, a respondent's social value orientation appears capable of explaining more of the variation in attitudes towards the UK's membership of the EU than a respondent's political value orientation.

Although early analysis indicates that the relationships between attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership and social values may be markedly stronger than their links with political values, Fieldhouse *et al.* (2019, p.175) note that a "variable race" between indicators of different dimensions of a respondent's value perspective should be approached with caution. This warning is offered in the context of an assessment of the effect of alternative value dimensions upon vote choice at successive elections using British Election Study data. However, their observation that the link between an individual's score on separate scales and a given outcome may depend on a range of factors – including the relative accuracy with which each scale taps into its target value dimension – is equally relevant here. That said, Fieldhouse and colleagues contend that the differences in pseudo- R^2 observed between their models of the link between respondents' score on each of their composite scales and vote choice are "sufficiently large" to enable them to draw robust conclusions about their comparative impact. For those authors, that the pseudo- R^2 associated with one model is around three times larger than that linked with a second model is sufficient for such conclusions to be drawn. In the context of this study, a linear model of attitudes towards the welfare state containing only libertarian-authoritarian scale score produces an R^2 figure over four times larger than an equivalent model containing only left-right scale score, while a logistic model of EU membership preference using only libertarian-authoritarian scale score as a predictor holds a pseudo- R^2 value over five times larger than a model engaging only left-right scale score as a predictor. Employing the language utilised by Fieldhouse *et al.* (*ibid.*), these differences are 'sufficiently large' to

⁷⁴ For full regression tables, see Annex A (Tables AX5-AX6).

support the conclusion that social values shape attitudes in both domains to a greater degree than political values.

A libertarian-authoritarian / left-right interaction?

So far, initial analysis suggests that while both sets of values can to some extent act as predictors of attitudes towards welfare and EU membership, social values represent a particularly powerful indicator of views in each sphere. Further, the direction of this relationship is the same in both domains, with those who hold more socially conservative values tending to adopt more sceptical views towards both the welfare state and Britain's relationship with the EU. That said, as argued by Surridge (2018) both aspects of an individual's core value perspective may moderate one another to some degree; even in the context of two domains that appear largely structured by libertarian-authoritarian value orientation, considering the broader 'value space' in which an individual sits, and the extent to which the libertarian-authoritarian dimension matters for attitude formation among both those on the left and those on the right, may provide a more accurate insight into the combined role of political and social values in shaping attitudes in both areas.

To address this issue, an interaction term is added to the regression models displayed in Table A1 and Table A4 to represent the multiplicative effect of an individual's score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale on the one hand and their score on the survey's left-right scale on the other. To avoid excessive multicollinearity between the main effect of each scale score and their interaction, variables denoting left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scale scores are mean-centred prior to the calculation of the interaction term. Table A5 displays the results of an updated linear model of attitudes towards the welfare state incorporating this interaction, while Table A6 contains the results of an enhanced logistic model of EU membership preference.

Table A5 indicates the presence of a small yet statistically significant interaction between both sets of values in shaping views towards the welfare state. Although of the two value-based dimensions social values appear to provide the more powerful driving force behind attitudes in this area, the *degree* to which one dimension shapes an individual's welfare preferences depends – to some extent at least – on the other. More specifically, as an individual's score on one scale increases, the relationship between attitudes towards welfare and their score on the second scale becomes slightly less pronounced. For example, in the case of a particularly right-wing respondent, the predictive value of their score on the survey's libertarian-authoritarian scale is slightly reduced. By comparison, in the case of a particularly left-wing respondent, the predictive value of their score on the survey's libertarian-authoritarian scale is slightly larger.

Table A5 Core values and Attitudes to welfare including value interaction, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.802		0.018	0	0.768	0.837
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.215	0.247	0.003	0	0.208	0.222
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.447	0.445	0.004	0	0.439	0.454
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.037	-0.032	0.005	<.001	-0.046	-0.028

n = 49,111

Similarly, Table A6 suggests that a small yet statistically significant interaction between both social and political values plays a role in the formation of views towards the UK's membership of the EU. As with attitudes towards the welfare state, the degree to which each of these dimensions shapes an individual's attitudes towards Britain's role in Europe depends to some extent on the other. This time, however, as an individual's score on one scale increases, the link between attitudes towards Britain's role in Europe and their score on the second

Table A6 Core values and EU membership preference including value interaction, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.676	0.025	0.119	<.001		
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.245	0.782	0.022	<.001	0.75	0.817
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.793	2.209	0.027	<.001	2.094	2.331
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.084	1.087	0.032	0.008	1.022	1.157

n = 24,186

scale becomes slightly more pronounced. For instance, in the case of a particularly right-wing respondent, the predictive value of their score on the survey's libertarian-authoritarian scale is slightly enhanced. In contrast, in the case of a particularly left-wing respondent, the predictive value of their score on the survey's libertarian-authoritarian scale is slightly smaller.

Both Table A5 and Table A6 add a degree of nuance to our understanding of how each value dimension impacts upon the formation of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. An individual's social value perspective continues to represent a powerful predictor of opinion in both domains. However, the coefficients linked with both respondent-level left-right scale score and its interaction with libertarian-authoritarian scale score suggest that, albeit to a lesser degree, political values impact views in each sphere at the main effect level and via a small yet significant interplay with social values.

Preliminary conclusions I

Stepping back, these initial results yield three sets of conclusions. The first surrounds the direction of the relationships between both sets of core values and attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. Analysis

suggests that an individual's political value perspective holds an association with attitudes towards welfare, with those on the left of the spectrum typically holding more positive attitudes towards welfare provision and those on the right exhibiting more sceptical attitudes. Analysis also indicates that political values are linked to views towards Britain's place in Europe, but that the direction of this association is reversed; those on the left tend to express more sceptical attitudes towards the UK's EU membership, while those on the right are typically more supportive. In contrast, the direction of the association between an individual's social value perspective and their attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's membership of the EU appears consistent across each sphere. Those with a more libertarian set of social values appear to hold more positive attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's ties with Europe, while those whose values are more authoritarian display more sceptical attitudes in both areas.

The second set of conclusions centre around the relative strength of the links between each value dimension and attitudes towards welfare and EU membership. While relationships are apparent between views in both spheres and political values, in each policy domain it appears that social values exercise the more powerful structural influence. This is suggested both by a comparison of the mean welfare scale score achieved by those holding different sets of political and social values, and by a crosstabulation of EU membership preference with categorical variables representing political and social value perspective. The relative power of each value dimension in structuring attitudes in each arena is further underlined by the results of initial regression analysis. Models of the relationship between views in each sphere and both sets of core values produce coefficients that are markedly higher for respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score than for respondent-level left-right scale score, while models utilising the former as their sole predictor produce a considerably larger R^2 figure than models utilising only the latter.

While social values appear central to the formulation of attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership, the third finding to be drawn from results so far is that an individual's political values may amplify or attenuate the association between their position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum and their preferences in each area. While those who hold authoritarian social values are markedly more likely to adopt a sceptical position towards both the welfare state and EU membership than their libertarian counterparts, the link between authoritarianism and welfare-scepticism is slightly muted for those on the right of the political spectrum while the association between authoritarianism and Euroscepticism is slightly enhanced among those with right-wing political values. Thus, while social values operate as a key foundation around which attitudes in each sphere are constructed, political values continue to impact opinion formation – if only to a more minor degree – both at the main effect level and through a small yet statistically significant interaction with an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum.

Introducing demographics

Analysis thus far supports the suggestion that core values – and social values in particular – play a fundamental role in the formation of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. However, this study's Data and Methods chapter highlighted the existence of connections between opinion in each sphere and a range of demographic characteristics which may also be linked to an individual's core value perspective. To control for the effect of these characteristics, a further series of multivariate regression models are constructed. These models incorporate the suite of relevant demographic variables carried on BSA and specified in Data and Methods, in addition to individual-level scores on the survey's left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scales.

Welfare

The first stage in this exercise involves the specification of a stepped linear regression model utilising a respondent's position on BSA's welfare scale as its outcome variable. Step one, displayed in Table A7, employs indicators of respondent-level age group, sex, ethnicity, education, region, and social class as predictors. Its results allow for an assessment of the effect of each of these demographic characteristics upon welfare preferences. Step two, displayed in Table A8, then incorporates left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scale score, together with an interaction term representing the multiplicative effect of an individual's social and political value perspective. Via a comparison with the data displayed in Table A5 above, its results demonstrate the impact of taking known demographic variance into account upon the strength of the relationship between core values and views towards welfare.

Table A7 Demographic characteristics and Attitudes to welfare, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.802		0.018	0	0.768	0.837
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.074	-0.051	0.008	<.001	-0.09	-0.059
50-64	-0.11	-0.07	0.009	<.001	-0.126	-0.093
65+	-0.003	-0.002	0.01	0.787	-0.022	0.016
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.009	-0.007	0.006	0.141	-0.02	0.003
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.06	-0.023	0.012	<.001	-0.084	-0.036
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.016	-0.012	0.008	0.048	-0.032	0
Degree	-0.253	-0.145	0.011	<.001	-0.275	-0.231
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.099	0.073	0.007	<.001	0.085	0.112
London	0	0	0.01	0.986	-0.02	0.021
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.028	0.02	0.007	<.001	0.013	0.042
Working	-0.063	-0.04	0.009	<.001	-0.08	-0.046

n = 49,111

Data displayed in Table A7 suggest that the relationships between attitudes towards the welfare state and key demographic characteristics reflect in large part the expectations derived from the literature. The statistically significant negative coefficient associated with the dummy ‘working class’ variable, for example, indicates that working-class individuals are less likely than those in both the salariat and those in intermediate categories to hold welfare-sceptic beliefs, while respondents in the north and in London typically exhibit more favourable attitudes towards the welfare state than their compatriots in the south and midlands. Table A7 also hints that those in BAME groups may be marginally more welfare-sceptic than those who are white, although at 0.06 the difference in welfare scale score between the two groups appears marginal.

These results also highlight variance in attitudes towards welfare by age, however this relationship does not appear to be linear. While dummy variables representing those aged 35-49 and 50-64 produce statistically significant negative coefficients indicative of more positive views towards welfare, attitudes among those aged 65 and over do not appear to differ significantly from those aged under 35. Meanwhile, the statistically significant negative coefficients associated with the dummy ‘intermediate’ and ‘degree’ variables indicate that the possession of higher educational qualifications is associated with the adoption of a more pro-welfare position – a suggestion that perhaps contravenes the expectation drawn from self-interest theory that those with higher levels of formal education may exhibit lower levels of support for the welfare state due to their relative economic security. Finally, despite the literature suggesting that attitudes towards welfare may vary by sex, the data displayed in Table A7 do not provide any evidence in support of this proposition⁷⁵.

⁷⁵ Although see Shorrocks and Grasso (2020) for a discussion of why relationships between gender and attitudes towards welfare provision may not be obvious at the main effect level.

The primary conclusion to be drawn from this exercise, however, is derived from Table A8: despite variance in attitudes towards the welfare state by a series of demographic factors, taking these factors into account has little impact upon the strength of the relationship between views on welfare and core value perspective. While the model displayed in Table A5 above calculates the statistically significant coefficient associated with respondent-level left-right scale score at 0.215, the updated model displayed in Table A8 places this figure at 0.209 when controlling for key demographic characteristics. Meanwhile, in the case of

Table A8 Core values and Attitudes to welfare controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.849		0.024	<.001	0.803	0.896
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.209	0.24	0.003	0	0.202	0.216
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.452	0.451	0.004	0	0.444	0.46
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.04	-0.035	0.005	<.001	-0.049	-0.031
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.106	-0.072	0.007	<.001	-0.12	-0.093
50-64	-0.156	-0.099	0.008	<.001	-0.171	-0.141
65+	-0.103	-0.061	0.009	<.001	-0.12	-0.087
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.023	-0.017	0.005	<.001	-0.033	-0.013
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.019	-0.007	0.011	0.082	-0.039	0.002
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	0.02	0.015	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.034
Degree	-0.03	-0.017	0.01	0.003	-0.05	-0.01
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.091	0.067	0.006	<.001	0.079	0.102
London	0.057	0.028	0.009	<.001	0.039	0.075
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.016	0.011	0.006	0.015	0.003	0.028
Working	-0.029	-0.018	0.008	<.001	-0.044	-0.014

n = 49,111

libertarian-authoritarian scale score, the statistically significant coefficient stands at 0.452 according to Table A8 as opposed to 0.447 according to Table A5. The interaction between these two value dimensions also remains significant following the incorporation of demographic control variables, with the coefficient measured at -0.04 – almost identical to the figure of -0.037 displayed in Table A5. This position is further underlined by a comparison of the indicators of model fit associated with each model step. Accounting for only demographic variables, as per step one, produces an R^2 statistic of 0.031; incorporating core value position, however, increases this figure more than eight-fold to 0.264. An individual's core value perspective therefore explains a considerably greater proportion of individual-level variance in attitudes towards the welfare state than demographic markers alone.

These results confirm that the relationships between each core value dimension and attitudes towards welfare suggested by earlier analysis – and the relative strength of these relationships – are not simply the product of the associations that exist between welfare state preferences and demographic characteristics. Rather, incorporating indicators of additional factors suspected of holding a connection with views on welfare strengthens this chapter's preliminary conclusions that core values shape opinion towards the welfare state, and that social values in particular play a central role in the formation of attitudes towards welfare.

The central aim of this analysis is to control for the effects of demographic characteristics when assessing the association between an individual's core values and their attitudes towards the role and function of the welfare state. That said, a subsidiary conclusion to be drawn from Table A8 is that taking core values into account has subtle implications for the relationship between views on welfare and a number of demographic markers. For instance, accounting for core value perspective results in the marginal association between ethnicity and

attitudes to welfare observed within Table A7 becoming insignificant, while women appear fractionally less welfare-sceptic than men once core value orientation is considered. Meanwhile, those aged 65 and over are observed to hold more positive attitudes towards the welfare state than those aged 18-34, and those living in London join those in the South and Midlands in holding more sceptical views on welfare than those in the North of England. Further, although those with a degree remain less likely to exhibit anti-welfare beliefs than those with fewer formal qualifications, the coefficients associated with each education category are considerably reduced once core values are accounted for, suggesting that the link between respondent-level welfare scale score and education is at least partially explained by the relationship between views towards welfare and core values. Introducing core value perspective also impacts the coefficients linked to social class in a similar manner; while working-class individuals remain less likely to hold anti-welfare views than members of the salariat or members of intermediate classes, the coefficients associated with each group are reduced. Taken as a whole, these observations suggest not just that the connections between a respondent's core value orientation and their attitudes towards the welfare state survive once key demographic characteristics are controlled for, but that these values in fact shape the nature and extent of the associations observed in the literature between demography and welfare preferences.

Europe

A similar story emerges from the results of stepped logistic regression analysis employing binary EU membership preference as the outcome variable and indicators of age, sex, ethnicity, education, region, and social class as predictors at the first step, and left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scale score together with an interaction term representing the multiplicative effect of social and political values at the second step.

Once more, Table A9 indicates that the links between the majority of these demographic markers and EU membership preference reflect those outlined by the literature. The statistically significant positive coefficients linked with each age group, for example, confirm that the likelihood of a respondent holding Eurosceptic attitudes is lowest among those aged 18-34, while the progressive increase in the size of the associated exponents suggests that this likelihood broadly increases through the age groups. Similarly, the significant positive coefficients associated with each social class category indicate that members of members of both ‘intermediate’ and ‘working-class’ groups are more likely to feel anti-European than members of the ‘salarial’, while the significant negative coefficients accompanying each education category highlight that the likelihood

Table A9 Demographic characteristics and EU membership preference, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.737	0.176	0.102	<.001		
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>				<.001		
35-49	0.28	1.323	0.046	<.001	1.208	1.447
50-64	0.472	1.603	0.047	<.001	1.461	1.759
65+	0.558	1.747	0.052	<.001	1.579	1.933
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.033	0.967	0.032	0.295	0.908	1.03
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.195	1.215	0.078	0.013	1.042	1.416
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.334	0.716	0.039	<.001	0.663	0.774
Degree	-1.036	0.355	0.068	<.001	0.311	0.405
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>				0.015		
South and Midlands	0.092	1.096	0.036	0.01	1.022	1.176
London	-0.01	0.991	0.059	0.871	0.883	1.112
<i>Social class Comparator: Salarial</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	0.341	1.407	0.041	<.001	1.299	1.523
Working	0.434	1.544	0.047	<.001	1.408	1.692

n = 24,186

of holding Eurosceptic attitudes is highest among those with no formal qualifications and lowest among those with a degree-level qualification or above. Table A9 also indicates the presence of a relationship between views towards Europe and ethnicity, with white respondents more likely to be Eurosceptic than those in BAME groups by a factor of 1.215. Finally, a small but statistically significant association between attitudes towards the UK's EU membership and region also appears present, with those in the South and Midlands marginally more likely to hold anti-European views than those living in the North of England.

Table A10 Core values and EU membership preference controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	3.782	0.023	0.161	<.001		
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.185	0.831	0.023	<.001	0.795	0.869
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.63	1.877	0.029	<.001	1.774	1.987
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.097	1.102	0.032	0.002	1.035	1.174
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>				<.001		
35-49	0.248	1.282	0.046	<.001	1.17	1.404
50-64	0.388	1.474	0.048	<.001	1.341	1.619
65+	0.425	1.529	0.053	<.001	1.379	1.695
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.002	0.998	0.032	0.946	0.936	1.063
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.265	1.303	0.079	<.001	1.116	1.522
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.214	0.807	0.04	<.001	0.746	0.874
Degree	-0.671	0.511	0.07	<.001	0.445	0.587
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>				0.001		
South and Midlands	0.129	1.138	0.036	<.001	1.06	1.222
London	0.053	1.055	0.06	0.373	0.938	1.186
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	0.264	1.301	0.041	<.001	1.2	1.411
Working	0.332	1.394	0.048	<.001	1.268	1.531

n = 24,186

Crucially, however, Table A10 demonstrates that the role of core values in structuring attitudes towards the UK's EU membership remains clear and consistent once these demographic relationships are accounted for. True, at 0.801 the decrease in the odds of a respondent expressing anti-European sentiment when their left-right scale score increases by '1' is marginally smaller than that suggested by Table A6 (0.782), while the 1.877 rise in the odds of a respondent exhibiting Eurosceptic attitudes associated with an increase of '1' in their libertarian-authoritarian scale score also falls slightly short of the figure displayed in Table A6 (2.209). That said, much of the explanatory power of core values remains once demographic characteristics are controlled for. Further, as is the case with attitudes towards the welfare state, the relative strength of the relationship between views on the UK's EU membership and each dimension of an individual's core value perspective is largely unchanged once demographic variance is considered. While left-right positioning exerts an influence upon views towards Britain's role in Europe at the main-effect level and through a statistically significant interaction with social values, the impact of an individual's location on the libertarian-authoritarian spectrum remains a notably stronger predictor of attitudes in this sphere.

The centrality of core values in shaping attitudes towards the UK's EU membership is further bolstered by assessing the extent to which each model step fits the data. Accounting for only demographic variables, as per step one, produces a Nagelkerke R^2 statistic of 0.064, a figure which increases to 0.099 once indicators of core value orientation are incorporated at step two. A model accounting for core value perspective once again explains a greater proportion of the variance in individual-level attitudes towards the UK's EU membership than a model including demographic characteristics alone.

Although the key objective of this analysis is to assess the extent to which the relationships between core values and views towards European integration survive once demography is controlled for, Table A9 and Table A10 also shed light

on the extent to which core values underpin the links between EU membership preference and a range of demographic characteristics hinted at by previous work. For some demographic markers the impact of considering core values is minimal. For instance, little difference is observed between Table A9 and Table A10 in the nature of the links between attitudes towards Europe and both sex and region, while the coefficient associated with ethnicity is very slightly elevated at Table A10 when compared with Table A9. However, in the case of age, education, and social class – three characteristics previously observed to hold particularly marked associations with EU membership preference – the coefficient associated with each category is reduced following the incorporation of indicators of an individual's core value perspective. As is the case with attitudes towards the welfare state, core values appear to at least partially explain the links that exist between views on European integration and a number of key demographic markers.

Preliminary conclusions II

The results of this additional set of multivariate regression models support the findings of earlier analysis. Chiefly, while demographic indicators are linked with attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, core value perspective continues to exercise a concerted influence in both spheres once these links have been accounted for. Further, the relationship between core value orientation and views in both areas appears capable of explaining at least a portion of the association between demography and opinion.

Meanwhile, models controlling for the effects of key demographic characteristics reinforce the conclusion that the social dimension of an individual's core value orientation plays a powerful role in structuring preferences in both areas. Although the influence of political values remains statistically significant both at the main-effect level and through its interaction with social values, whether an

individual adopts a socially libertarian or socially authoritarian perspective remains the more influential factor of the two once additional variables are considered.

Temporal analysis

This chapter identifies social values as the principal value dimension around which attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership are structured. However, this study's first research question asks not only about the nature of the relationship between core values and attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's role in Europe, but also whether the influence of social values over views in each area has changed over time. The answer to this might shed light on the validity of the prediction of post-materialist scholars that the role of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension in shaping attitudes towards complex political issues may have increased during previous decades. Further, it might help us to understand why attitudes towards both welfare and European integration have shifted so markedly throughout this study's timeline. If libertarian-authoritarian values have become more strongly tied to views in each sphere over time, perhaps the aggregate-level changes in opinion towards welfare and EU membership discussed in this study's introductory chapter might be driven by attitudinal transformation occurring at a disproportionate rate among those with a distinctive set of social values. To address this issue, the remainder of this chapter adopts a temporal approach and assesses the nature of the relationship over time between libertarian-authoritarian values and attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership between 1987 and 2016.


Aggregate-level distribution of social values

Before considering the extent to which the dynamics of societal-level attitudes towards welfare and European integration over time might be accounted for by changes in the strength of their association with social values, a more straightforward possibility is considered. Perhaps, rather than being attributable to alterations in the *power* of the link between attitudes and social values, aggregate-level shifts in public opinion simply reflect changes in the *prevalence* of the social value perspective associated with scepticism in each sphere. As the above analysis links both anti-welfare and anti-European sentiment with authoritarianism, could it simply be the case that the proportion of people exhibiting scepticism towards both welfare and EU membership has shifted in tandem with changes in the proportion of authoritarians in society?

Examining the distribution of social values across the population throughout this period allows the validity of this proposition to be assessed. Figure A5 displays the mean score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale in each year that the items comprising the scale have been carried on the survey⁷⁶. It demonstrates that, while this figure fluctuated somewhat during the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the 2000s the balance of social values in society remained relatively stable; having oscillated between a low of 3.51 and a high of 3.84 before the turn of the decade, the mean score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale was consistently measured at between 3.67 and 3.77 throughout the following 10 years. During the 2010s, however, the balance tipped distinctly in the direction of libertarianism; having been gauged at 3.75 in 2011 the mean scale score dropped steadily during the period that followed, falling to 3.52 in 2016.

⁷⁶ For tables displaying the data on which Figure A5 is based, see Annex A (Table AA5).

Figure A5 Mean libertarian-authoritarian scale scores, England, 1987-2016



Note: BSA's 'libertarian-authoritarian' scale runs from 1 (libertarian) to 5 (authoritarian). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score over time, the y-axis in Figure A5 begins at '3' and ends at '4.4'.

At first glance, Figure A5 suggests that at specific junctures the direction of travel of societal-level social values may roughly resemble the shift in aggregate-level opinion towards the welfare state displayed in Figure I1. Setting aside some fluctuation between 1991 and 1993 the overall stability observed at Figure A5 throughout the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s broadly reflects the stasis in attitudes towards welfare during this period, while during the 2010s aggregate-level authoritarianism decreased as views towards the welfare state became more positive. That said, throughout the 2000s – a period during which welfare-scepticism was consistently elevated – scores on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale were regularly measured at a slightly lower level than had been the case previously. Welfare-scepticism had risen in prominence, yet the prevalence of authoritarianism had dipped.

Meanwhile, evidence is thinner still of a connection between shifting aggregate-level attitudes towards Britain's relationship with Europe and changes in the overall prevalence of authoritarian social values. While Figure I2 demonstrates that cynicism towards the EU fell away drastically during the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s, the balance of social values at a societal level remained broadly constant. Moreover, the subsequent increase in the proportion of those

exhibiting a desire to leave the EU during the 2010s directly contradicts the trajectory of social values, which continued to move in a more libertarian direction. Between 1987 and 2016, there appears to be relatively little evidence linking changing levels of scepticism towards either the welfare state or the UK's EU membership with aggregate-level shifts in the balance of social values.

Social values and attitudes over time

This section now turns to the question of whether changes in the distribution of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership might instead be explained at least in part by changes in the strength of their relationship with social values over time. To begin to form an impression of how the link between opinion in each sphere and an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum might have altered throughout this study's timeline, the distribution of views towards both welfare and European integration is calculated on an annual basis among those who hold opposing sets of social values.


Welfare

Figure A6 displays the annual mean score on BSA's welfare scale among both its most libertarian third and its most authoritarian third of respondents⁷⁷. Earlier analysis suggested that, considering this study's timeline as a whole, welfare-scepticism appeared more prevalent among those with more authoritarian social values. The first message emanating from Figure A6 is that this was the case in each year throughout the period spanning 1987-2016, with the annual mean score on BSA's welfare scale consistently measured at a higher level among authoritarians than among libertarians. The scale of the attitudinal distance between the two groups is emphasised by the observation that the mean welfare

⁷⁷ For tables displaying the data on which Figure A6 is based, see Annex A (Table AA6).

scale score among libertarians did not exceed 2.9 at any point during this period, while the equivalent figure among authoritarians did not fall below this figure.

Figure A6 Mean welfare scale scores among social value groups, 1987-2016



Note: BSA's 'welfare' scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score associated with each group over time, the y-axis in Figure A6 begins at '2.2' and ends at '3.6'.

The second insight offered by Figure A6 is that the extent to which those with opposing social values differed in their views towards the welfare state may have been marginally greater during the earlier portion of this study's timeline. While BSA's 1987 reading registered a difference in mean scale score between its most libertarian third of respondents and its most authoritarian third of almost 0.8, aside from some fluctuation between 1993 and 1994 the distance between the two groups was regularly measured at between 0.63 and 0.73 throughout the remainder of the 1980s and during the first half of the 1990s. However, by 1998 – largely thanks to a gradual rise in scepticism towards welfare among those with a more libertarian disposition that outpaced that among authoritarians – the magnitude of this difference had slipped to 0.56. Notwithstanding a brief resurgence in 2003 the size of this attitudinal gap remained relatively stable between 2001 and 2007, before decreasing further to lows of 0.44 in 2008 and 0.48 in 2010. Once again, this slight decline in the distance between the two groups towards the end of the 2000s appears to be the consequence of rising

libertarian welfare-scepticism, with the mean welfare scale score reaching highs of 2.87 and 2.89 among libertarians during this period. Meanwhile, despite showing some signs of widening once more in subsequent years, Figure A6 suggests the gap in mean welfare scale score between libertarians and authoritarians remained slightly narrower during the 2010s than was the case throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

Figure A6 provides a useful first impression of the dynamics of the link between social values and attitudes towards welfare over time. However, as an illustration of the bivariate relationship between social values and views towards the welfare state, the results displayed in Figure A6 do not take into account the links between welfare preferences and demographic markers illuminated by Table A8 above. Further, annual fluctuations apparent within this analysis have the potential to obscure longer-term change or consistency in opinion among both groups. To address these shortcomings, the linear model of attitudes towards the welfare state displayed in Table A8 is expanded to incorporate the interaction between respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score and each of the three periods comprising this study's 'welfare' time period variable⁷⁸. These results are displayed in Table A11.

The statistically significant negative coefficients displayed alongside each time period interaction term indicate a relationship between social values and attitudes towards welfare that is slightly looser from the mid-to-late 1990s onwards than was the case previously. More specifically, an increase of '1' in a respondent's libertarian-authoritarian scale score between 1997 and 2009 is associated with an increase in welfare scale score that is 0.05 less than is the case between 1987 and 1996, while between 2010 and 2016 this increase is measured at 0.036 less than the equivalent increase between 1987 and 1996. Meanwhile, switching the reference category from the first to the second of these

⁷⁸ See Data and Methods for details of this variable's construction.

Table A11 Core values and Attitudes to welfare controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.63		0.035	<.001	0.562	0.698
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.484	0.483	0.008	0	0.469	0.5
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.145	0.109	0.006	<.001	0.133	0.158
10-16	0.17	0.115	0.007	<.001	0.156	0.184
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
LA*97-09	-0.05	-0.033	0.01	<.001	-0.069	-0.031
LA*10-16	-0.036	-0.02	0.011	<.001	-0.057	-0.016
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.204	0.235	0.003	0	0.197	0.211
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.034	-0.029	0.005	<.001	-0.042	-0.025
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.113	-0.077	0.007	<.001	-0.127	-0.1
50-64	-0.173	-0.11	0.007	<.001	-0.188	-0.158
65+	-0.128	-0.075	0.009	<.001	-0.145	-0.111
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.025	-0.018	0.005	<.001	-0.035	-0.015
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.006	0.002	0.011	0.596	-0.015	0.027
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.001	-0.001	0.007	0.909	-0.015	0.013
Degree	-0.069	-0.04	0.01	<.001	-0.089	-0.049
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.092	0.068	0.006	<.001	0.081	0.104
London	0.065	0.032	0.009	<.001	0.047	0.083
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.019	0.013	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.032
Working	-0.022	-0.014	0.008	0.004	-0.037	-0.007

n = 49,111

time periods demonstrates that the power of the link between attitudes towards the welfare state and social value perspective remains relatively stable across

periods two and three; as per Table A12⁷⁹, despite a small positive coefficient of 0.014 the association between social values and welfare scale score between 2010 and 2016 carries a *p*-value of 0.121. Table A11 therefore confirms that the effect of social value perspective upon views towards welfare weakens slightly between periods one and two, while Table A12 indicates that no further significant change is detectable in the strength of this relationship between periods two and three.

Table A12 Core values and Attitudes to welfare controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised (with alternative reference category)

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.962		0.029	<.001	0.905	1.018
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.434	0.433	0.006	0	0.422	0.446
<i>Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
87-96	-0.145	-0.095	0.006	<.001	-0.158	-0.133
10-16	0.025	0.017	0.006	<.001	0.013	0.037
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
Lib-Auth*87-96	0.05	0.025	0.01	<.001	0.031	0.069
Lib-Auth*10-16	0.014	0.008	0.009	0.121	-0.004	0.032

n = 49,111

Europe

Figure A7 meanwhile displays the proportion of Eurosceptics among BSA's most libertarian and authoritarian respondents between 1987 and 2016⁸⁰. As with the relationship between attitudes towards the welfare state and social value perspective, Figure A7 shows that in each year throughout this study's timeline

⁷⁹ Table A12 displays the impact of a change in the 'time period' reference category from 1987-1996 to 1997-2009 upon the coefficients for 'respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score' and 'time period', plus their interaction. The coefficients for the remaining predictors are identical to those displayed in Table A11.

⁸⁰ For tables displaying the data on which Figure A7 is based, see Annex A (Table AA7).

Euroscepticism has been more prevalent among those with authoritarian social values than among those with libertarian social values.

Figure A7 Euroscepticism among social value groups, 1987-2016




Figure A7 perhaps provides an initial suggestion that the strength of the link between views towards Britain's relationship with Europe and social values may have altered somewhat over time. Both datapoints from the late 1980s gauge the attitudinal gap between the most libertarian respondents and their more authoritarian counterparts at 17 percentage points, a distance that by the turn of the 1990s had reduced to 13 points and by the mid-1990s had shrunk further still thanks largely to a drop in Euroscepticism that was more pronounced among authoritarians than among libertarians. Although throughout the remainder of the 1990s and into the early 2000s the gap between these two groups was typically measured at around 10 points, by the mid-2000s this distance is registered at closer to 20 points – largely due to an increase in anti-European sentiment among those with more authoritarian social values. Subsequently during the early-to-mid 2010s a gap of around 30 percentage points is visible between those with contrasting social value perspectives, which despite a short-term reduction in 2015 had extended to 37 percentage points by 2016.

Table A13 Core values and EU membership preference controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised (with alternative reference category)

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.098	0.045	0.259	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.449	1.567	0.06	<.001	1.392	1.763
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	-0.411	0.663	0.044	<.001	0.608	0.723
10-16	0.68	1.975	0.052	<.001	1.783	2.187
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
LA*93-09	0.273	1.314	0.07	<.001	1.145	1.508
LA*10-16	0.347	1.415	0.081	<.001	1.207	1.658
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.176	0.839	0.023	<.001	0.802	0.878
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.09	1.094	0.033	0.006	1.027	1.166
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>				<.001		
35-49	0.252	1.287	0.047	<.001	1.173	1.412
50-64	0.363	1.438	0.049	<.001	1.306	1.584
65+	0.346	1.413	0.054	<.001	1.271	1.57
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.002	0.998	0.033	0.958	0.936	1.065
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.405	1.499	0.082	<.001	1.278	1.759
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.291	0.747	0.041	<.001	0.689	0.811
Degree	-0.844	0.43	0.073	<.001	0.373	0.496
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>				<.001		
South and Midlands	0.145	1.156	0.037	<.001	1.076	1.243
London	0.075	1.077	0.061	0.219	0.957	1.213
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	0.278	1.32	0.042	<.001	1.216	1.434
Working	0.324	1.382	0.049	<.001	1.256	1.521

n = 24,186

However, the results of regression analysis add a considerable degree of nuance to these tentative findings. Table A13 presents an expanded version of the logistic

model of EU membership preference displayed at Table A10, this time encompassing the interaction between respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score and each of the three periods comprising this study's 'Europe' time period variable⁸¹. These results suggests that the relationship between an individual's social value orientation and their views towards Britain's membership of the EU strengthens somewhat between the first and second of these periods. More specifically, between 1993 and 2009 the associated odds ratio of 1.314 indicates that an increase of '1' in a respondent's score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale results in an increase in the odds of that respondent being Eurosceptic that is significantly larger than that between 1987 and 1991.

Table A14 Core values and EU membership preference controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-4.523	0.011	0.197	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.722	2.059	0.04	<.001	1.905	2.225
Time period <i>Comparator: 93-09</i>				<.001		
87-91	0.411	1.508	0.044	<.001	1.384	1.643
10-16	1.091	2.978	0.043	<.001	2.738	3.239
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator: 93-09</i>				<.001		
LA*87-91	-0.273	0.761	0.07	<.001	0.663	0.873
LA*10-16	0.074	1.077	0.067	0.272	0.944	1.228

n = 24,186

Meanwhile, although Table A13 suggests that the interaction coefficient associated with libertarian-authoritarian scale score and period three is marginally higher than that associated with period two, a switch in the reference category from 1987-1991 to 1993-2009 demonstrates that this difference is not statistically significant. As per Table A14, despite producing a small positive

⁸¹ See Data and Methods for details of this variable's construction.

exponent the p -value associated with the relationship between social values and EU membership preference during 2010-2016 falls considerably short of 0.05, indicating no significant change in the strength of the ties between social value perspective and attitudes towards the UK's EU membership between periods two and three⁸².

In sum, initial bivariate analysis hinted that the relationship between social values and views towards the UK's EU membership may have shifted over time. Regression analysis confirms that this relationship was somewhat tighter between 1993 and 2009 than was the case previously, with authoritarians becoming more sharply distinguished from libertarians in their scepticism towards the UK's EU membership. However, despite annual crosstabulations suggesting that the link between social value orientation and views towards Britain's ties with Europe may have tightened further in subsequent years, regression analysis suggest that any strengthening of this association between 1993-2009 and 2010-2016 is statistically insignificant.

The difference in the results produced by each technique is not simply accounted for by the capacity of regression analysis to account for other factors that may motivate attitudes towards the UK's EU membership. Although Table A13 and Table A14 display the results of a model that controls for known variance in EU membership preference across other key characteristics, running this model with fewer (or no) additional controls produces coefficients that tell a broadly similar story⁸³. Instead, this discrepancy is likely to be a result of how BSA data on respondent-level social value perspective is deployed. While Figure A6 is based upon a categorisation of respondents into three equally-sized groups

⁸² Table A14 displays the impact of a change in the 'time period' reference category from 1987-1991 to 1993-2009 upon the coefficients for 'respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score' and 'time period', plus their interaction. The coefficients for the remaining predictors are identical to those displayed in Table A13.

⁸³ Models of the relationship between respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score and EU membership preference with no additional control variables are included within Annex A (Tables AX6(a)-AX6(b)).

according to their position on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale, by utilising the survey's original ratio-level variable the regression analysis that forms the basis of Table A13 and Table A14 retains all of the nuance that this measure has to offer. In short, while crosstabulations based upon a derived categorical indicator of social value orientation provide a useful overview of the difference in outlook between those who sit at either end of the social values continuum, the additional detail supplied by the survey's original variable results in a more precise impression of the dynamics of the relationship between attitudes and social values over time.

Conclusions

This study's first research question addresses the relationship between core value perspective and attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's membership of the EU. It asks how an individual's political and social values shape their views in each sphere, and whether the influence of the second of these value dimensions has changed over time.

Analysis demonstrates that social values exercise a particularly powerful impact upon individual-level attitudes in each sphere. Although political values are linked with opinion both at the main effect level and through a small yet statistically significant interaction with social values, an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum represents the primary value-based factor shaping their views towards both welfare and EU membership. Further, it is the possession of authoritarian values that is associated with scepticism in both spheres.

Subsequently, analysis illustrates that the link between attitudes in each domain and libertarian-authoritarian value orientation does not strengthen consistently over time. Although social values are observed to be slightly more tightly bound

up with views toward the UK's EU membership during the late 1990s and 2000s than was the case previously, logistic regression analysis does not detect any statistically significant signs of change in this relationship during subsequent years. Meanwhile, although social values are shown to be slightly less tightly bound up with opinion towards the welfare state during the mid-to-late 1990s and 2000s than they previously were, linear regression analysis finds no statistically significant change in the strength of this association during the latter part of this study's timeline.

These findings provide an answer to this study's first research question: the social dimension of an individual's core values plays a central role in shaping attitudes towards welfare and EU membership, while in both spheres the extent of its influence has remained broadly stable for the majority of this study's timeline. That this relative consistency is observed against a backdrop of marked attitudinal shifts at the aggregate level leads to a further conclusion: although social values appear capable of explaining the *structure* of public attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, values alone do not explain attitudinal *change* in these areas. Doing so perhaps requires taking an additional element into consideration – an issue to which this study's second analysis chapter now turns.

5.

Results B: Party identity and shifting party cues

-
2. Have the shifting positions of England's two major political parties towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union over time been followed by corresponding changes in the attitudes of their identifiers?
-

THIS CHAPTER CONFIRMS THAT attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's membership of the European Union are structured by partisan identity, with the views of supporters of the two largest parties in England – the Conservatives and the Labour party – following divergent trajectories throughout this study's timeline. This chapter further illustrates that these trajectories mirror the dynamic policy stance of both parties towards the role and function of the welfare state and the appropriate relationship between Britain and the European Union, with partisans regularly recalibrating their views to fit with the changing policy perspective advocated by their party of choice.

Although Labour identifiers consistently exhibit more positive attitudes towards the welfare state than Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 2016, changes during the mid-1990s in the nature of the cues emanating from the Labour party preceded a realignment of attitudes among its supporters to match their party's more anti-welfare position. Similarly, the subsequent reversion in the stance of the Labour party towards its more traditional perspective on welfare during the 2010s was reflected in a pro-welfare shift in the views of its supporters. In contrast, the comparative stability of attitudes towards welfare among Conservative identifiers observed across this period mirrors the consistency of the cues disseminated by the party with which they affiliate themselves.

Meanwhile, the attitudes of both Labour and Conservative sympathisers towards the UK's membership of the EU altered radically between 1987 and 2016 in the wake of shifting party cues. Although during the late-1980s supporters of the Labour party were the more Eurosceptic of these two sets of partisans, the marked shift in the perspective of their party of choice towards pro-Europeanism – which occurred in tandem with an increase in anti-European sentiment on the part of the Conservative party – resulted in a switch in the relative stance of both groups of party identifiers. Subsequently, the Labour party's drift away from its avowedly positive stance on EU membership, together with the increasingly Eurosceptic nature of the cues emanating from the Conservative party, led to a rise in anti-European sentiment among both sets of partisans during the 2010s.

This chapter further demonstrates that party identity continues to exert an influence upon views towards both welfare and EU membership once social values – shown in the previous chapter to be central to the formulation of attitudes in both spheres – are taken into consideration. Although the impact of party ties in shaping opinion towards the welfare state is marginally reduced when accounting for an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum, its effect over time remains clear-cut. Meanwhile, accounting for social values sharpens the role of partisan affiliation in shaping attitudes towards Britain's place in Europe during the 2010s while leaving the extent of its influence throughout the remainder of this study's timeline largely unchanged.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the changing relationships over time between party identity and attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership are explored at a bivariate level. This establishes how the views of Labour and Conservative supporters towards the welfare state and Britain's place in Europe shifted between 1987 and 2016, allowing for an assessment of the extent to which these changes map on to shifts in the direction of the cues emanating from both major parties. Second, multivariate regression models are specified to test

the extent to which attitudinal changes observed among supporters of England's two major parties over time are indeed explained by partisan identity, as opposed to confounding characteristics known to hold an association with both political affiliation and views in both spheres. These models are then extended to embrace the structural role of core value orientation identified in the previous chapter.


Party identity and attitudes over time

Although this study's literature review identified that views towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership are likely to differ among those with opposing party affiliations, it also set an expectation that the nature of this relationship may change markedly over time in accordance with the shifting policy positions of each major party. This chapter therefore adopts an entirely temporal approach, beginning with a calculation of the distribution of views towards both welfare and EU membership among those who display a sense of affective attachment to the Labour party and those whose affiliations lie with the Conservative party in each year throughout this study's timeline.

Welfare

First, the annual mean score on BSA's welfare scale between 1987 and 2016 is gauged among both Conservative identifiers and their Labour-supporting counterparts. The first point of note emerging from the results of this exercise, displayed in Figure B8, is that the mean welfare scale score among Conservative identifiers is consistently higher than that among Labour identifiers. While the score associated with the former group has never fallen below 3, among the latter group the score has never been registered at above this level. Throughout this study's timeline, attitudes towards the welfare state have been unswervingly

Figure B8 Mean welfare scale scores among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016



Note: BSA's 'welfare' scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score associated with each group over time, the y-axis in Figure B8 begins at '2' and ends at '3.8'.

more sceptical among Conservative party affiliates than among those aligned with the Labour party.

Secondly, Figure B8 indicates that any change in the attitudes of Conservative supporters over time is considerably less marked than that observed among Labour supporters. During the 1980s and early 1990s the typical welfare scale score associated with Conservative identifiers was gauged at between 3.06 and 3.24, before increasing somewhat to 3.36 by 1996 and remaining relatively stable throughout the remainder of the decade. Despite some fluctuation at the turn of the millennium this stability rolled over into the 2000s, with the typical score among Conservatives on BSA's welfare scale remaining within the bounds of 3.22 and 3.36 between 2001 and 2015 before slipping to 3.11 during the final year of this study's timeline.

This picture is distinct from that observed among Labour supporters. During the 1980s and early 1990s views among those who identified with the Labour party appeared relatively consistent, remaining at between 2.42 and 2.47 before

increasing modestly to between 2.54 and 2.65 during the mid-1990s. By 1998, however, the mean score among Labour identifiers had risen to almost 2.90, with anti-welfare sentiment among this group persisting at a similarly elevated level for the remainder of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s. Subsequently, during the 2010s a sustained fall in welfare-scepticism among Labour supporters saw their typical welfare scale score drop to just 2.59 by 2016 – a figure which contrasts sharply with the position among this group just over a decade previously and which more closely resembles the position of Labour identifiers during the mid 1990s.


These shifts resulted in the difference in mean welfare scale score between the two sets of party supporters altering notably throughout this study's timeline. According to Figure B8, during the earliest years of this enquiry the magnitude of this variance was typically gauged at between 0.6 and 0.8. By the 2000s, however, in the wake of an increase in welfare scale score among Labour identifiers the distance between the two groups was frequently measured at around 0.4. Subsequently, following a fall in the typical score associated with this group, this difference expanded once more to around 0.5 during the late 2000s and early-to-mid 2010s.

Marked increases in the mean welfare scale score associated with Labour identifiers during the latter part of the 1990s provide initial support for the suggestion that the views of Labour supporters became more anti-welfare as the perspective of their party of choice towards the role and function of the welfare state shifted in a more neo-liberal, anti-welfare direction. Likewise, the subsequent movement among this group which becomes apparent during the early 2010s tessellates with the proposition that as the Labour party began to transition back towards its traditional stance towards welfare, the views of its supporters softened in response. Meanwhile, the lack of an equivalent change in the mean welfare scale score associated with Conservative supporters indicates

that views among this group remained comparatively stable across this study’s timeline in concert with the relatively consistent nature of the cues emanating from the party with which they identify.

That attitudinal shifts among supporters of England’s two major parties differed in their trajectory throughout this study’s timeline is perhaps even more clearly demonstrated by Figure B9⁸⁴, which depicts the mean position on BSA’s welfare scale among both partisan groups within each of the three periods specified by this study’s ‘welfare’ time period variable⁸⁵. Figure B9 indicates once again that the average stance of a Conservative identifier remained comparatively consistent across these three periods. Between 1987 and 1996 the typical welfare scale score associated with this group stood at 3.2, a figure which subsequently rose by less than 0.1 to 3.29 between 1998 and 2009 before remaining at the almost identical level of 3.27 between 2010 and 2016. In contrast, although between 1987 and 1996 the typical welfare scale score

Figure B9 Mean welfare scale scores among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 periodised



Note: BSA’s ‘welfare’ scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score associated with each group over time, the y-axis in Figure B9 begins at ‘2.2’ and ends at ‘3.6’.

⁸⁴ For tables displaying the data on which Figure B9 is based, see Annex B (Table BA9).

⁸⁵ See Data and Methods for details of this variable’s construction.

associated with Labour identifiers measured 2.53, between 1998 and 2009 this figure stood at a considerably elevated 2.86. Meanwhile, the figure of 2.74 linked with this group of partisans between 2010 and 2016 – although not quite as low as was the case between 1987 and 1996 – is notably reduced when compared with the period spanning 1997-2009. Once again, Figure B9 appears to support the proposition that Labour supporters recalibrated their attitudes towards the appropriate role and function of the welfare state in the wake of changes in the nature of the cues emanating from their party of choice.

This picture of variance over time in the pattern of attitudes towards the welfare state by party identity is reinforced by the results of initial regression analysis. Table B15 displays the results of a linear regression model employing an individual's welfare scale score as its outcome variable and incorporating both party identity and time period as predictors at the main effect level, plus their higher-order interaction. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers who responded to BSA between 1987 and 1996.

The interpretation of linear models representing change over time in this chapter is perhaps more complex than that applied in the previous chapter. The temporal linear models contained within Results A reflect the interaction between respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score (a continuous variable) and time period (a categorical variable) in predicting respondent-level welfare scale score. As a result, the interaction coefficients produced by the regression equation can be taken to represent the impact of an increase of '1' in libertarian-authoritarian scale score upon predicted welfare scale score in different time periods. In contrast, the linear models contained within this chapter reflect the interaction between partisan identity and time period – both of which are categorical variables. In such cases the interaction coefficients represent the difference in predicted outcome for each non-reference category of a given variable (in this case, party identity) depending on the value of a second variable (in this case, time period).

Table B15 Party identity and Attitudes to welfare, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	3.097		0.009	0	3.08	3.114
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	-0.554	-0.374	0.013	0	-0.58	-0.527
None	-0.143	-0.102	0.014	<.001	-0.171	-0.115
O/DK/R	0.015	0.004	0.019	0.441	-0.023	0.053
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.193	0.144	0.012	<.001	0.169	0.217
10-16	0.18	0.121	0.014	<.001	0.153	0.207
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>						
<i>Comparator: Conservative 87-96</i>						
Lab*97-09	0.124	0.064	0.018	<.001	0.089	0.158
Lab*10-16	0.006	0.002	0.02	0.782	-0.034	0.045
None*97-09	-0.016	-0.009	0.018	0.381	-0.051	0.019
None*10-16	-0.031	-0.014	0.02	0.118	-0.069	0.008
O/DK/R*97-09	-0.411	-0.132	0.016	<.001	-0.443	-0.379
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.41	-0.108	0.021	<.001	-0.452	-0.369

n = 49,111

Table B15a Calculated interactions derived from Table B15

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	0.193	0.18
Labour	-0.554	-0.237	-0.368

Guidance for interpreting the results of such models is provided by Haile (2017). According to this approach, the main effect coefficients can be taken to reflect the position among those at each non-reference level of a predictor variable, relative to the model's reference category. At Table B15, for example, the reference category consists of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996. The main effect coefficient associated with Labour identifiers therefore reflects their relative position in 1987-1996 when compared with Conservative identifiers during the same period. Similarly, the main effect coefficient associated with the period 1997-2009 reflects the relative position of Conservative identifiers during this timeframe when compared with Conservative identifiers during 1987-1996.

Meanwhile, the interaction coefficients reflect the difference in predicted outcome for each possible non-reference combination of the two categorical variables comprising the interaction. To aid the interpretation of these figures, Haile recommends adding together the interaction coefficient and the main effect coefficient for each of the dummy variables representing its component parts. For example, to understand the estimated welfare scale score of Labour supporters in 1997-2009 relative to the position of members of the model's reference category (comprised of Conservative identifiers in 1987-1996), the main effect coefficient linked with Labour supporters (-0.554) and the main effect coefficient linked with the time period 1997-2009 (0.193) are added to the interaction coefficient linked with Labour supporters in 1997-2009 (0.124). The resultant figure of -0.237 indicates that the typical welfare scale score among Labour supporters in 1997-2009 was 0.237 lower than that among Conservative identifiers in 1987-1996. To assist the reader, a full set of these calculations accompanies each linear model contained within this chapter.

In line with the findings of earlier analysis, the results displayed within Table B15 and Table B15a suggest that any change in welfare scale score over time among Conservatives is considerably less marked than that observed among Labour supporters. Between 1997 and 2009 identifying with the Conservative party was associated with a welfare scale score of 0.193 higher than that linked with Conservative affiliates between 1987 and 1996. Similarly, between 2010 and 2016, the typical welfare scale score attached to Conservative supporters stood at 0.18 higher than was the case among this group between 1987 and 1996.

In contrast, Table B15 and Table B15a indicate that the views of Labour supporters shifted considerably over time. Between 1987 and 1996 the welfare scale score among Labour identifiers stood at 0.554 lower than that among Conservative identifiers. However, between 1997 and 2009 identifying with the Labour party was associated with a welfare scale score of just 0.237 lower than

that associated with Conservatives between 1987 and 1996. Views among Labour supporters were therefore markedly more anti-welfare during the late-1990s and 2000s than they were previously, with the increase in welfare-scepticism among this group considerably larger between periods one and two than that observed among Conservatives across the same timeframe.

Table B15 and Table B15a meanwhile illustrate that attitudes among Labour supporters subsequently softened once more. The extent of this development is clarified by switching the model's reference category from Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996 to Labour identifiers during the same timeframe. Doing so produces a statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.128 for Labour supporters between 2010 and 2016, confirming that the welfare scale score among Labour identifiers during this period was significantly lower than that registered between 1997 and 2009 yet remained significantly higher than was the case between 1987 and 1996⁸⁶.


Reinforcing the suggestion of Figure B9 above, initial regression analysis confirms that attitudes towards welfare among Conservative supporters remained relatively consistent throughout this study's timeline when compared with those of Labour supporters. Just as the cues emanating from the Conservative party altered little, the attitudes of its identifiers appear to have remained broadly stable. In contrast, anti-welfare sentiment increased notably among Labour backers during the late 1990s and 2000s before softening once more during the 2010s – a trajectory which maps neatly onto the direction of the cues disseminated by the party throughout this study's timeline.

⁸⁶ For full regression results based on a model designating Labour identifiers as its reference category, see Annex B (Tables BX1(a)-BX1(b)).

Europe

Turning to attitudes towards the UK's relationship with Europe, Figure B10 displays the annual proportion of supporters of each of England's two largest parties who wished to leave the EU between 1987 and 2016⁸⁷.

Figure B10 Euroscepticism among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016



As with attitudes towards the welfare state, Figure B10 indicates that the dynamics of the association between EU membership preference and party affiliation appear to have shifted markedly over time. Moreover, Figure B10 neatly illustrates that the relative position of Conservative and Labour supporters towards the UK's role in European affairs reversed during the early years of this study's timeline. Although in 1987 the proportion of Labour identifiers exhibiting Eurosceptic attitudes was measured at 25 points higher than that among their Conservative counterparts, the decline in the proportion of Labour supporters backing the UK's withdrawal from the institution during the years that followed outpaced the equivalent fall among Conservative sympathisers so rapidly that by the early 1990s views towards the UK's relationship with Europe had reached

⁸⁷ For tables displaying the data on which Figure B10 is based, see Annex B (Tables BA10(a)-BA10(b)).

parity among both groups. While this alignment in attitudes continued throughout the first half of the 1990s, during the latter part of the decade a degree of distance once more became observable between supporters of both parties. In a reversal of the pattern observed in earlier years, however, in both 1997 and 1998 levels of Euroscepticism among Conservative identifiers were measured at 6-8 points higher than among Labour identifiers. Following a brief convergence this pattern continued into the 2000s, with an increase in the proportion of Conservative backers demonstrating a desire to leave the EU driving a widening of the gap between supporters of the two parties to almost 20 points by 2006.

BSA's readings throughout the first half of the 2010s suggest that around three in 10 Conservative identifiers adopted negative views towards Europe during this period – a proportion greater than that gauged throughout the majority of the 2000s. Similarly, despite some oscillation, levels of Euroscepticism also sat at a consistently elevated level among Labour supporters when compared with the previous decade. In the final year of this study's timeline anti-European sentiment is seen to increase further among both groups; for Labour supporters the proportion of those exhibiting Eurosceptic attitudes rose from 16% to 31% between 2015 and 2016, while among Conservative supporters the equivalent figure jumped from 28% to 51%.

The differential movement between Labour identifiers and their Conservative counterparts displayed by Figure B10 provides initial support for the suggestion that, throughout this study's timeline, partisan identifiers amended their attitudes towards the UK's EU membership to fit with the stance of their party of choice. Labour supporters appear to have become less Eurosceptic as the perspective of their preferred party shifted in a more pro-European direction from the early 1990s onwards, before becoming more Eurosceptic once more during the 2010s as the party's pro-Europeanism became less pronounced. In contrast, Conservative backers became more Eurosceptic throughout the 1990s and

2000s as the stance of their party of choice moved in an anti-European direction, with attitudes among this group hardening further during the 2010s as the Eurosceptic cues emanating from their preferred party became more prominent still.

That attitudes among both sets of party identifiers towards EU membership follow different courses over time is once again emphasised by Figure B11⁸⁸. This figure illustrates the proportion of Labour and Conservative identifiers who hold a Eurosceptic outlook during each of the three periods distinguished by this study's 'Europe' time period variable, constructed to represent the shifting positions of both major parties towards Britain's EU membership⁸⁹.

Figure B11 Euroscepticism among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 periodised




Figure B11 underlines the reversal in the relative positions of both sets of party supporters towards Europe between periods one and two. Although Euroscepticism appears typically less prevalent among Conservative identifiers than among Labour partisans between 1987 and 1991, average figures for the period spanning 1993-2009 indicate a marginal rise in Euroscepticism among

⁸⁸ For tables displaying the data on which Figure B11 is based, see Annex B (Tables BA11(a)-BA11(b)).

⁸⁹ See Data and Methods for details of this variable's construction.

Conservative supporters that contrasts with the sharp fall in the prevalence of anti-EU sentiment observed among Labour supporters. Meanwhile, anti-European attitudes are subsequently more common among both sets of party identifiers during the 2010s than was the case between 1993 and 2009.

These conclusions find further support in the results of initial regression analysis. Table B16 contains the results of a logistic regression model utilising EU membership preference as the outcome variable and incorporating both party identity and time period as predictors at the main effect level, plus their higher-order interaction. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers who responded to BSA between 1987 and 1991.

The challenges discussed above in interpreting the interaction between two categorical variables within linear regression models also apply to logistic models. The temporal logistic models contained within Results A reflect the interaction between respondent-level libertarian-authoritarian scale score (a continuous variable) and time period (a categorical variable) in predicting Euroscepticism. As a result, the exponents associated with each interaction term can be taken to represent the impact of an increase of '1' in libertarian-authoritarian scale score upon the odds of respondents holding Eurosceptic attitudes in different time periods relative to the reference category. However, the logistic models contained within this chapter reflect the interaction between two categorical variables – partisan identity and time period. In such cases, the exponents associated with each interaction term represent the difference in the odds of holding Eurosceptic attitudes for each non-reference level of a given variable (in this case, party identity) depending on the value of a second variable (in this case, time period), relative to the reference category.

Table B16 Party identity and EU membership preference, 1986-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.372	0.253	0.06	<.001		
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>				<.001		
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	0.506	1.658	0.085	<.001	1.403	1.959
None	0.49	1.632	0.089	<.001	1.37	1.944
O/DK/R	0.243	1.275	0.118	0.04	1.011	1.608
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	0.136	1.146	0.071	0.055	0.997	1.317
10-16	0.82	2.27	0.084	<.001	1.924	2.679
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>				<.001		
<i>Comparator: Conservative 87-91</i>						
Lab*93-09	-1.244	0.288	0.104	<.001	0.235	0.353
Lab*10-16	-1.131	0.323	0.126	<.001	0.252	0.413
None*93-09	-0.67	0.512	0.104	<.001	0.418	0.627
None*10-16	-0.515	0.597	0.12	<.001	0.472	0.756
O/DK/R*93-09	-0.681	0.506	0.142	<.001	0.384	0.668
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.343	0.71	0.162	0.035	0.516	0.976

n = 24,186

Table B16a Calculated odds ratios derived from Table B16

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	1.146	2.27
Labour	1.658	0.547	1.216

Guidance for interpreting the results of such models is once again provided by Haile (2017). According to this approach, the main effect exponents can be taken to reflect the odds of a given outcome occurring among those at each non-reference level of a predictor variable, relative to the model's reference category. At Table B16, the reference category comprises Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1991. The main effect exponent associated with Labour identifiers therefore reflects the odds of this group holding Eurosceptic views relative to the odds among Conservative identifiers during the same period. Similarly, the main effect coefficient associated with the period 1993-2009 reflects the odds of

Conservative identifiers during this timeframe adopting a Eurosceptic standpoint relative to the odds among Conservative identifiers during 1987-1991.

Meanwhile, the exponents linked with each interaction term reflect the difference in the odds ratio associated with each possible non-reference combination of the two categorical variables comprising the interaction. To assist in the interpretation of these odds ratios, Haile advises multiplying the interaction exponent and the main effect exponent for each of the dummy variables representing its component parts. For example, to understand the odds of Labour supporters in 1993-2009 holding Eurosceptic attitudes relative to the odds of members of the model's reference category (comprised of Conservative identifiers in 1987-1991), the main effect exponent linked with Labour supporters (1.658), the main effect exponent linked with the time period 1993-2009 (1.146), and the exponent linked with Labour supporters in 1993-2009 (0.288) are multiplied. The resultant figure of 0.547 indicates that Labour supporters between 1993-2009 were 0.547 times as likely to hold Eurosceptic attitudes when compared with Conservative identifiers between 1987-1991. As is the case with each linear model contained within this chapter, a full set of these calculations accompanies each logistic model.

As per earlier analysis, the results displayed in Table B16 and Table B16a indicate that attitudes towards Britain's relationship with Europe have shifted in different directions among supporters of both major parties in England over time. True, according to Table B16 the increase in the odds of a Conservative supporter adopting an anti-European stance between 1987-1991 and 1993-2009 appears just short of statistical significance, preventing us from confidently asserting that the attitudes of this group of partisans altered notably between periods one and two. During period three, however, the relative odds of a Conservative supporter holding Eurosceptic views increased significantly to 2.27. The results displayed in Table B16 and Table B16a therefore suggest that Conservatives were more than

twice as likely to adopt a Eurosceptic standpoint between 2010 and 2016 than they were between 1987 and 1991.

Meanwhile, Table B16a indicates that between 1987 and 1991 the relative odds of a Labour identifier exhibiting Eurosceptic tendencies stood at 1.658. During this period, Labour supporters were therefore significantly more likely than their Conservative counterparts to hold Eurosceptic attitudes. Between 1993 and 2009, however, the relative odds of a Labour identifier displaying anti-European sentiment had fallen to 0.547 – a marked drop that contrasts sharply with the relative stability among Conservative supporters across the same timeframe. Subsequently, Table B16a suggests that between 2010 and 2016 the relative odds of a Labour identifier exhibiting Eurosceptic attitudes increased to 1.216 – a figure which, while not as high as between 1987 and 1991, nonetheless remains considerably elevated when compared with the position between 1993 and 2009.

Echoing the impression offered by Figure B11 above, initial regression analysis suggests that attitudes among Conservative identifiers appeared significantly more anti-European by the final stages of this study's timeline than they were at its outset. This shift reflects the increasingly Eurosceptic nature of the cues emanating from their party of choice. In contrast, the views of Labour identifiers towards the UK's EU membership appear more positive during the 1990s and 2000s than was the case previously before shifting in a more sceptical direction during the 2010s – a pattern that also mirrors the dynamic position of their preferred party.

Preliminary conclusions I

Analysis thus far suggests that, in both spheres, the attitudes of those who identify with each of England's two major parties appear to follow the direction set out by their party of choice. Among Labour supporters, substantially elevated

levels of anti-welfare sentiment are observed during the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s when compared with previous years. During the 2010s, however, views towards the welfare state among this group of partisans – although not as sympathetic as during the late 1980s and early 1990s – appear significantly softer than was the case throughout the previous decade. In contrast, welfare preferences among Conservative supporters remain comparatively stable throughout this study's timeline. Meanwhile, anti-European sentiment among Labour identifiers is gauged at considerably lower levels during the mid-to-late 1990s and 2000s than was the case during previous years, before increasing somewhat during the 2010s. This trajectory once again differs markedly from that among Conservative identifiers, who were significantly more likely to hold Eurosceptic views by the end of this study's timeline than they were at the beginning. This picture of attitudinal shift neatly maps onto the changing nature of the cues emanating from each party towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, supporting the suggestion that partisans recalibrated their attitudes in both spheres over time to fit with the position of their preferred party.

Introducing demographics

The results of early regression analysis support the proposition that partisan identity plays a key role in the formulation of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's ties with Europe. However, previous work highlights that the demographic factors observed in the previous chapter to hold an association with attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership also differ in their distribution across both sets of party identifiers. To assess the robustness of the proposition that party identity itself exerts a powerful influence over attitudes in both arenas – rather than simply reflecting the uneven dispersal of demographic characteristics among both sets of partisans – these results are further tested via models that incorporate additional demographic predictors.

Welfare

Table B17 contains the results of an extended iteration of the linear regression model displayed in Table B15 above. Utilising respondent-level welfare scale score as its outcome variable and incorporating both party identity and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction, this extended model also employs respondent-level age group, sex, ethnicity, education, region, and social class as additional independent variables. Once more, the model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996.

Table B17 Party identity and Attitudes to welfare controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	3.3		0.019	0	3.263	3.337
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	-0.562	-0.379	0.013	0	-0.588	-0.535
None	-0.175	-0.124	0.014	<.001	-0.202	-0.147
O/DK/R	-0.003	-0.001	0.019	0.88	-0.04	0.034
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.212	0.158	0.012	<.001	0.188	0.235
10-16	0.225	0.152	0.014	<.001	0.198	0.252
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>						
<i>Comparator: Conservative 87-96</i>						
Lab*97-09	0.132	0.068	0.017	<.001	0.098	0.166
Lab*10-16	0.014	0.005	0.02	0.486	-0.025	0.053
None*97-09	-0.01	-0.006	0.018	0.554	-0.045	0.024
None*10-16	-0.034	-0.016	0.019	0.083	-0.072	0.004
O/DK/R*97-09	-0.379	-0.122	0.016	<.001	-0.41	-0.347
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.384	-0.101	0.021	<.001	-0.425	-0.343
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.084	-0.057	0.008	<.001	-0.099	-0.069
50-64	-0.144	-0.091	0.008	<.001	-0.16	-0.127
65+	-0.06	-0.035	0.01	<.001	-0.078	-0.041

Table B17 cont'd

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
Sex Comparator: Male						
Female	-0.018	-0.014	0.006	0.001	-0.029	-0.007
Ethnicity Comparator: BAME						
White	-0.091	-0.035	0.012	<.001	-0.114	-0.068
Education Comparator: No quals						
Intermediate	-0.073	-0.054	0.008	<.001	-0.088	-0.058
Degree	-0.282	-0.162	0.011	<.001	-0.303	-0.261
Region Comparator: North						
South and Midlands	0.045	0.033	0.006	<.001	0.033	0.058
London	-0.016	-0.008	0.01	0.104	-0.036	0.003
Social class Comparator:						
Salariat						
Intermediate	0.04	0.029	0.007	<.001	0.026	0.054
Working	0.002	0.001	0.008	0.807	-0.014	0.018

n = 49,111

Table B17a Calculated interaction coefficients derived from Table B17

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	0.212	0.225
Labour	-0.562	-0.218	-0.323

Accounting for the potentially confounding effect of demographics produces a more accurate picture of the effect of partisan identity upon views towards the welfare state over time. When compared with the results contained within Table B15 and Table B15a, the figure representing the estimated welfare scale score among Conservatives in period two relative to period one marginally increases. When no additional factors were considered, this group of partisans were typically seen to register scores of 0.193 higher on BSA's welfare scale score between 1997 and 2009 than was the case between 1987 and 1996. Incorporating demographic controls leads to this figure being placed at 0.212.

Nonetheless, the estimated increase in welfare scale score associated with Conservative identifiers between periods one and two, at just over 0.2, remains


considerably less marked than that observed among Labour supporters. While Table B15a suggested that between 1987 and 1996 Labour identifiers typically achieved a score of 0.554 lower than their Conservative counterparts before this gap narrowed to 0.237 during period two, taking demographics into account produces equivalent numbers of -0.562 and -0.218. These updated figures indicate that the estimated change in attitudes among Labour supporters between periods one and two appears slightly larger once demographics are considered; while calculations based upon Table B15a suggest an increase in welfare scale score among Labour supporters of 0.317 between periods one and two, updated figures derived from Table B17a place this increase at 0.344. The rise in welfare-sceptic attitudes among Labour supporters between 1987-1996 and 1997-2009 thus remains notably larger than that witnessed among Conservatives over the same timeframe.

Meanwhile, coefficients of 0.212 and 0.225 reiterate that there appears to be little difference between the estimated welfare scale score achieved by Conservatives during periods two and three. In contrast, Table B15 and Table B15a indicate that anti-welfare sentiment among Labour supporters was less prevalent between 2010 and 2016 than was the case between 1997 and 2009. Once again, the extent of this development is clarified by switching the model's reference category from Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996 to Labour supporters during the same timeframe. This produces a statistically significant positive coefficient (of 0.175) for Labour backers during period three, confirming that the estimated welfare scale score among this group between 2010 and 2016 remains significantly lower than that registered between 1997 and 2009 yet significantly higher than between 1987 and 1996 once demographic variance is taken into account⁹⁰.

⁹⁰ For full regression results based on a model designating Labour identifiers as its reference category, see Annex B (Tables BX2(a)-BX2(b)).

Despite small changes in the size of the coefficients linked with each partisan group over time, the overall pattern of attitudinal movement suggested by Table B17 and Table B17a broadly matches that derived from Table B15 and Table B15a. This pattern is depicted by Figure B12. Using Table B17a as its foundation, Figure B12 plots the estimated position on BSA’s welfare scale associated with both sets of partisans in each time period. It demonstrates that although the typical welfare scale score obtained by Conservative identifiers increased slightly between periods one and two, this is far outstripped by the rise in welfare scale score associated with Labour supporters across the same timeframe. Subsequently, while the estimated position of Conservatives remained largely stable between periods two and three, the typical welfare scale score obtained among Labour backers – although not on a par with that observed during period one – was notably lower in period three than in period two.

Figure B12 Party identity and Attitudes to welfare controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised: plotted interactions



Europe

A similar picture emerges from Table B18, which contains the results of an extension of the logistic regression model displayed in Table B16 above. Employing EU membership preference as its outcome variable and incorporating

both party identity and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction, this extended model also utilises respondent-level age group, sex, ethnicity, education, region, and social class as additional independent variables. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative supporters between 1987 and 1991.

Table B18 Party identity and EU membership preference controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.882	0.152	0.121	<.001		
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>				<.001		
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	0.423	1.526	0.088	<.001	1.284	1.814
None	0.439	1.551	0.092	<.001	1.296	1.857
O/DK/R	0.298	1.347	0.121	0.014	1.063	1.709
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>				<.001		
97-09	0.228	1.256	0.073	0.002	1.089	1.449
10-16	1.082	2.95	0.088	<.001	2.482	3.508
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>				<.001		
<i>Comparator: Conservative 87-96</i>						
Lab*97-09	-1.192	0.304	0.106	<.001	0.247	0.374
Lab*10-16	-1.017	0.362	0.131	<.001	0.28	0.467
None*97-09	-0.587	0.556	0.106	<.001	0.452	0.684
None*10-16	-0.461	0.631	0.123	<.001	0.495	0.803
O/DK/R*97-09	-0.641	0.527	0.145	<.001	0.397	0.7
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.307	0.736	0.168	0.067	0.53	1.022
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>				<.001		
35-49	0.308	1.36	0.047	<.001	1.24	1.492
50-64	0.465	1.592	0.049	<.001	1.445	1.753
65+	0.508	1.662	0.054	<.001	1.495	1.849
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.043	0.957	0.033	0.183	0.898	1.021
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.226	1.254	0.081	0.005	1.07	1.469
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.432	0.649	0.041	<.001	0.599	0.704
Degree	-1.221	0.295	0.071	<.001	0.257	0.339

Table B18 cont'd

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
Region Comparator: North				0.164		
South and Midlands	0.051	1.053	0.037	0.164	0.979	1.132
London	-0.036	0.964	0.06	0.544	0.857	1.085
Social class Comparator: Salariat				<.001		
Intermediate	0.373	1.452	0.042	<.001	1.338	1.575
Working	0.452	1.571	0.048	<.001	1.428	1.727

n = 24,186

Table B18a Calculated odds ratios derived from Table B18


	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	1.256	2.95
Labour	1.526	0.583	1.63

Taking into account demographic characteristics has the effect of enhancing the majority of the odds ratios associated with each party identity group over time. When compared with the results contained in Table B16 and Table B16a, the estimated odds of a Conservative supporter holding Eurosceptic attitudes during period two relative to period one transform from a statistically insignificant 1.146 to a significant 1.256 according to Table B18 and Table B18a. Similarly, during period three the equivalent figure shifts from 2.27 according to earlier calculations to 2.95 in this more refined model. Meanwhile, although the relative odds of a Labour supporter adopting Eurosceptic views between 1987-1996 and 1997-2009 are slightly lower than those estimated by Table B16a, the odds ratio associated with Labour identifiers during period three now stands at 1.63 according to Table B18a – a marked increase on the earlier figure of 1.216.

Despite some alterations in the size of the coefficients, the overall pattern of attitudinal change associated with each partisan group once demographic variance is accounted for is broadly consistent with earlier estimates. Perhaps the one notable amendment to the picture provided by Table B16 and Table B16a

is that, according to Table B18, the odds ratio associated with Conservative identifiers during period two is statistically significant. Controlling for demographics, Conservatives between 1993 and 2009 were more likely to hold Eurosceptic attitudes than their predecessors – a movement which sharply contrasts with that observed among Labour supporters who shifted in the opposite direction across the same timeframe.

Figure B13 Party identity and EU membership preference controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised: plotted interactions



These changes over time are illustrated clearly by Figure B13. Using the figures displayed in Table B18a, Figure B13 plots the estimated relative odds of holding Eurosceptic attitudes associated with both sets of partisans in each time period. It shows that the odds of a Conservative identifier possessing a Eurosceptic outlook during period one were higher than the equivalent odds among Labour supporters, before attitudes among each group moved in opposite directions to such an extent that by period two this position had reversed. Subsequently, although views towards Europe hardened among both sets of identifiers, Figure B13 suggests that this development was more notable among Conservatives, with the attitudinal gap between the two groups expanding during period three.

Preliminary conclusions II

Even when taking into account additional demographic factors, the effect of party identity upon attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership over time remains clear. In both spheres, the views of supporters of England's two largest parties are seen to follow divergent trajectories across the lifetime of this study, with these trajectories mapping onto the shifting dynamics of the cues emanating from both parties over time. Among Labour supporters, attitudes towards welfare were markedly more negative between 1997 and 2009 than between 1987 and 1996 before reverting to a position that, while less anti-welfare in nature than during the late 1990s and 2000s, remained significantly more sceptical than was the case during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast, despite the views of Conservative supporters towards welfare being marginally more sceptical between 1997 and 2009 than they were between 1987 and 1996, the broad picture among this group is one of comparative stability over time. Meanwhile, although between 1987 and 1991 the views of Labour partisans are considerably more Eurosceptic than those of Conservative supporters, between 1993 and 2009 this picture is turned on its head. Subsequently views among both groups are seen to shift in a Eurosceptic direction, although this development appears more concerted among Conservative identifiers than among Labour identifiers.

Moreover, rather than attenuating the attitudinal impact of party identity, introducing demographic control variables more often than not has the effect of amplifying differences in the trajectories of each group over time. For example, the magnitude of the movement of Labour supporters in an anti-welfare direction between periods one and two when compared with the equivalent movement among Conservatives is increased once taking demographic characteristics into account. Meanwhile, the contrast in the trajectory of attitudes towards Europe between these two groups of partisans over time is also heightened once demographic factors are considered. These results support the contention that

partisan affiliation shapes opinion in both spheres, with views among Conservative and Labour supporters shifting markedly following modifications in the stance of their preferred party.

Reintroducing values

Party identity matters. However, the previous chapter demonstrates that an individual's core values also exert a structural influence over attitudes towards the role and function of the welfare state and Britain's place in Europe. More specifically, although left-right or 'political' values are associated with views towards both welfare and EU membership, libertarian-authoritarian or 'social' values play a key role in attitude formulation in both areas. Those who adopt a libertarian outlook on life are typically more likely to exhibit positive views in each sphere, with those who hold more authoritarian beliefs typically more likely to display sceptical attitudes.

With the veracity of these two paths to attitude formulation independently established, attention now turns to the question of whether value perspective and party preference each continue to exert an influence upon attitudes towards the welfare state and Britain's EU membership once the other is accounted for. This represents a key step in this study's line of enquiry; before engaging in an analysis of whether England's major parties are equally able to carry both their libertarian and authoritarian supporters with them in a given direction, the attitudinal impacts of both core value orientation and party identity must be shown to coexist. To address this issue, the regression models displayed in Table B17 and Table B18 are extended to embrace a respondent's left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scale scores, plus the interaction between these two factors.

Welfare

According to Table B19 and Table B19a, considering both core value perspective and partisan identity has the effect of mildly tempering the coefficients representing both the main effect of libertarian-authoritarian scale score and the effect of partisan identity over time upon an individual's score on BSA's welfare scale. Controlling for partisan identity, for instance, slightly lowers the estimate of the main effect of libertarian-authoritarian scale score from 0.452 as shown by Table A8 in the previous chapter to 0.42. Meanwhile, in the majority of cases the effect of political party support – and the extent to which the attitudes of partisans change over time – is slightly reduced among both Conservative and Labour identifiers once values are taken into account. For example, while Table B17a estimates that the welfare scale score among Conservatives was 0.212 higher between 1997 and 2009 than between 1987 and 1996, Table B19a places this figure at 0.145. Similarly, while the difference in the estimated change in attitudes among Labour partisans between periods one and two is calculated at 0.344 according to Table B17a, calculations based upon Table B19a suggest that this difference stands at 0.245 once values are accounted for.

Table B19 Party identity and Attitudes to welfare incorporating core values and controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.149		0.027	0	1.097	1.201
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	-0.331	-0.223	0.012	<.001	-0.355	-0.306
None	-0.069	-0.049	0.013	<.001	-0.094	-0.044
O/DK/R	0.018	0.005	0.017	0.305	-0.016	0.051
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.145	0.108	0.011	<.001	0.123	0.166
10-16	0.184	0.124	0.012	<.001	0.16	0.208

Table B19 cont'd

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I.for B	
					Lower	Upper
Party ID * Time period						
Comparator: Conservative 87-96						
Lab*97-09	0.1	0.052	0.016	<.001	0.069	0.131
Lab*10-16	0.028	0.011	0.018	0.115	-0.007	0.064
None*97-09	-0.002	-0.001	0.016	0.893	-0.033	0.029
None*10-16	-0.035	-0.016	0.017	0.047	-0.069	0
O/DK/R*97-09	-0.175	-0.056	0.015	<.001	-0.204	-0.146
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.165	-0.044	0.019	<.001	-0.202	-0.128
Libertarian-Authoritarian						
1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.42	0.418	0.004	0	0.411	0.428
Left-Right						
1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.161	0.185	0.004	0	0.154	0.168
Libertarian-authoritarian scale						
score (centred) * Left-right scale	-0.036	-0.031	0.004	<.001	-0.045	-0.027
score (centred)						
Age Comparator: 18-34						
35-49	-0.109	-0.075	0.007	<.001	-0.122	-0.096
50-64	-0.174	-0.11	0.007	<.001	-0.189	-0.159
65+	-0.131	-0.077	0.009	<.001	-0.148	-0.114
Sex Comparator: Male						
Female	-0.026	-0.02	0.005	<.001	-0.036	-0.016
Ethnicity Comparator: BAME						
White	-0.025	-0.01	0.011	0.017	-0.046	-0.005
Education Comparator: No quals						
Intermediate	-0.015	-0.011	0.007	0.031	-0.029	-0.001
Degree	-0.07	-0.04	0.01	<.001	-0.09	-0.05
Region Comparator: North						
South and Midlands	0.064	0.047	0.006	<.001	0.052	0.075
London	0.046	0.023	0.009	<.001	0.029	0.064
Social class Comparator:						
Salariat						
Intermediate	0.019	0.014	0.006	0.003	0.007	0.031
Working	-0.005	-0.003	0.008	0.55	-0.019	0.01

n = 49,111

Table B19a Calculated interaction coefficients derived from Table B19

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	0.145	0.184
Labour	-0.331	-0.086	-0.119

That said, the main effect of social values remains clear following the introduction of party identity. Further, although left-right orientation continues to be associated with attitudes towards welfare both at the main effect level and through a small yet statistically significant interaction with social values, a respondent's position on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale clearly remains the more powerful value dimension in shaping opinion towards the welfare state. At the same time, the dynamics of the effect of partisan alignment over time survive the inclusion of measures denoting a respondent's core value perspective⁹¹. According to Table B19, both social values and party identity have a dual role to play in shaping attitudes towards the welfare state.

Europe

Meanwhile, at 1.944 Table B20 shows that considering both an individual's core value perspective and their partisan identity does little to modify the estimated main effect of libertarian-authoritarian scale score upon that individual's chances of holding Eurosceptic attitudes (estimated at 1.877 at Table A10 in the previous chapter). Table B20 and Table B20a also suggest that taking values into account leaves the relative odds of both sets of party identifiers holding Eurosceptic views in periods one and two largely unchanged, while producing slightly elevated odds for both groups during period three. Among Conservatives, for example, the odds of holding Eurosceptic views during period three when compared with period one increase from 2.95 as displayed in Table B18a to 3.24

⁹¹ This conclusion extends to the position of Labour identifiers in period three. As is the case in Table B15 and Table B17 above, the coefficient representing this group in Table B19 is insignificant. Switching the model's reference category from Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996 to Labour identifiers between 1987 and 1996 produces a statistically significant positive coefficient for Labour identifiers in period three of 0.168. This indicates that the estimated welfare scale score among Labour supporters between 2010 and 2016 remains significantly lower than that registered between 1997 and 2009 yet significantly higher than between 1987 and 1996 once core values are accounted for. For full regression results based on a model designating Labour identifiers between 1987 and 1996 as its reference category, see Annex B (Tables BX3(a)-BX3(b)).

Table B20 Party identity and EU membership preference incorporating core values and controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.985	0.019	0.191	<.001		
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>				<.001		
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	0.439	1.551	0.093	<.001	1.292	1.862
None	0.448	1.565	0.095	<.001	1.3	1.884
O/DK/R	0.345	1.412	0.124	0.006	1.107	1.801
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>				<.001		
97-09	0.218	1.244	0.074	0.003	1.076	1.437
10-16	1.176	3.24	0.09	<.001	2.716	3.865
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>				<.001		
<i>Comparator: Conservative 87-96</i>						
Lab*97-09	-1.219	0.296	0.108	<.001	0.239	0.365
Lab*10-16	-1.036	0.355	0.133	<.001	0.273	0.461
None*97-09	-0.614	0.541	0.107	<.001	0.439	0.668
None*10-16	-0.555	0.574	0.126	<.001	0.449	0.735
O/DK/R*97-09	-0.636	0.53	0.147	<.001	0.397	0.707
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.301	0.74	0.172	0.079	0.528	1.035
<i>Libertarian-Authoritarian</i>						
1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.665	1.944	0.03	<.001	1.832	2.063
<i>Left-Right</i>						
1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.224	0.8	0.025	<.001	0.761	0.839
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale</i>						
score (centred) * Left-right scale	0.1	1.106	0.033	0.002	1.036	1.179
score (centred)						
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>				<.001		
35-49	0.269	1.309	0.048	<.001	1.192	1.437
50-64	0.367	1.444	0.05	<.001	1.309	1.593
65+	0.356	1.427	0.055	<.001	1.28	1.591
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.009	0.991	0.033	0.782	0.928	1.057
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.318	1.374	0.082	<.001	1.17	1.613
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.308	0.735	0.042	<.001	0.677	0.798
Degree	-0.856	0.425	0.073	<.001	0.368	0.49
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>				0.043		
South and Midlands	0.092	1.097	0.037	0.014	1.019	1.18
London	0.037	1.038	0.061	0.546	0.921	1.169

Table B20 Cont'd

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)		
					Lower	Upper	
Social class <i>Comparator:</i>				<.001			
<i>Salariat</i>							
Intermediate	0.292	1.339	0.042		<.001	1.232	1.454
Working	0.337	1.401	0.049	<.001	1.271	1.544	

n = 24,186

Table B20a Calculated odds ratios derived from Table B20

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	1.244	3.24
Labour	1.551	0.571	1.784

according to Table B20a, while among Labour supporters the equivalent figure rises from 1.63 to 1.784.

Table B20 and Table B20a indicate once again that the independent main effect of social value perspective and the dynamics of the effect of partisan alignment over time each survive the inclusion of measures denoting both characteristics within a single model. Indeed, where the inclusion of both measures leads to changes in the coefficients, these changes accentuate the impact of social values and the difference in the trajectory of attitudes among each set of party supporters. The results contained within Table B20 and Table B20a therefore confirm that both social value perspective and party identity have a concurrent role to play in shaping attitudes towards the UK's relationship with Europe.

Stability in partisanship over time

The above analysis identifies partisan identity as a key factor in shaping individual-level opinion towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, and positions shifting party cues as an important driver of attitudinal change in both spheres. As noted in this study's Data and Methods


chapter, however, despite possessing a range of unparalleled advantages the cross-sectional nature of BSA data requires the exercise of caution in ascribing political parties with the ability to mould the attitudes of their supporters. Rather than party identifiers realigning their attitudes with the position of their preferred party in the event of a shift in party policy, an alternative possibility is that a change in the nature of the cues emanating from a political party instead induces individuals with attitudes that align with that party's new position to begin to support that party – and for those who oppose the party's new stance to distance themselves from their former party of choice.

As discussed in Data and Methods, this consideration is a key motivator for utilising 'party identity' as an indicator of an individual's partisan affiliation as opposed to, for example, vote intention. As this measure is designed to pick up on those who express a degree of long-term affective attachment to a party, the proportion of Labour and Conservative identifiers over time might be expected to remain relatively stable, reducing the prospect of compositional churn.

Analysis of the proportion of BSA respondents in England classified as either Labour or Conservative identifiers throughout this study's timeline, however, suggests that this is not infallibly the case. Figure B14⁹² illustrates that having fluctuated between 1987 and 1991, the proportion of Labour identifiers subsequently rose steadily by around seven percentage points through to 1995. After remaining relatively consistent throughout the remainder of the decade, this figure then almost halved between 2001 and 2009 before increasing by around five percentage points between 2009 and 2012. The number of Conservative identifiers meanwhile declined relatively steadily between 1987 and the turn of the 2000s, before stabilising through to 2007. This proportion then fluctuated somewhat during the late-2000s and early 2010s before increasing by around six points between 2014 and 2015.

⁹² For tables displaying the data on which Figure B14 is based, see Annex B (Table BA14).

Figure B14 Conservative and Labour party identification, England, 1987-2016



That these figures shift throughout this study's timeline poses a question for the interpretation of this chapter's findings. If the proportion of, say, Labour identifiers has increased at points in time at which attitudinal change appears to have occurred among this group, perhaps these results are detecting not a change in the views of existing Labour partisans but a change in the type of individual that identifies with the Labour party. In other words, rather than the attitudes of Labour supporters shifting in the wake of party cues, perhaps these results simply reflect a shift in the composition of this group over time.

However, a comparison of the timing of changes in the proportion of those identifying with each party with the timing of the attitudinal shifts observed among each group of partisans provides support for the argument that parties exercise a powerful influence over the views of their identifiers, and that it is this – rather than compositional churn – that is driving the trends that this chapter uncovers. Taking first the pattern of identification with the Labour party over time, Figure B14 indicates that the proportion of Labour partisans increased during the first half of the 1990s. Rather than occurring in tandem with the marked rise in anti-welfare sentiment observed among this group during the late 1990s⁹³, this

⁹³ See Figure B8.

jump in Labour identification occurred a number of years before this development. Meanwhile, although by the early-to-mid 1990s the attitudes of Labour supporters had become considerably more pro-European than was the case previously, the majority of this shift predates the increase in Labour affiliation rather than occurring in unison⁹⁴. In similar fashion, the increase in Labour party identification observed between 2009 and 2012 occurs for the most part prior to the substantial decline in anti-welfare attitudes among this group witnessed in earnest between 2011 and 2016. Further, although data availability prevents the precise annual distribution of attitudes towards Europe across this timeframe from being charted, a considerable amount of attitudinal change among this group occurs during the mid 2010s – a number of years after the proportion of Labour identifiers increased.

In additional support of this conclusion, the literature provides little to indicate that the high-profile acquisition of new members by the party during the 2010s (Seyd, 2020) – and particularly during the penultimate and final years of this study’s timeline (Finn, 2019) – substantially shifted the overall profile of Labour identifiers relative to their Conservative counterparts. True, between 2011 and 2016 the typical score of a Labour identifier on BSA’s libertarian-authoritarian scale – the value dimension which the previous chapter demonstrates is particularly closely associated with attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership – fell by around 0.34, suggesting that Labour supporters as a whole became somewhat more liberal over this period⁹⁵. That said, across the same timeframe the mean libertarian-authoritarian scale score associated with Conservative supporters also fell by 0.28. This indicates that there is little in the way of distinctiveness associated with the increased levels of libertarianism observed among Labour identifiers that might lead us to suspect a disproportionate influx of libertarian backers as driving an increase in pro-welfare

⁹⁴ See Figure B10.

⁹⁵ See Figure C17 in Results C, and Table CA17 at Annex C.

attitudes among this group. Moreover, Whiteley *et al.* (2019, p.81) contend that in contrast to the popular portrayal of new Labour members as “one homogeneous, predominantly youthful mass” this group were instead comprised of both new and returning members from across the demographic spectrum, while Poletti and colleagues (2016) find that despite new Labour members holding more socially liberal values than existing members according to some measures, on a range of other indicators the perspectives of both groups appear remarkably similar. Perhaps even more crucially, any marked increase in the number of Labour *members* during this period is not reflected in a large shift in the proportion of Labour *identifiers*, which instead remained relatively stable from 2012 onwards.

Meanwhile, despite an increase in the proportion asserting ties with the Conservative party during the 2010s this study observes little shift in the views of this group towards welfare, assuaging any potential concern around a link between compositional churn within Conservative ranks and the dynamics of Conservative attitudes towards the welfare state. This increase in Conservative identifiers may – on the face of it at least – pose a greater issue for this chapter’s interpretation of changes in this group’s attitudes towards Europe. While this study’s central argument posits that party identifiers respond to the position of their party, the Conservatives’ increasingly anti-European stance during the 2010s may itself have been driven by factors such as the external threat of UKIP (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009) and designed with the goal of attracting Eurosceptic voters who may otherwise have chosen to cast their ballot elsewhere (Evans, de Geus and Green, 2021). However, analysis of the annual distribution of attitudes to Europe by partisan identity suggests that the six-point increase in identification with the Conservative party between 2014 and 2015 occurs alongside relative stability in the prevalence of Conservative anti-European sentiment. Instead, the bulk of the shift in attitudes towards Europe among Conservatives during this period occurs between 2015 and 2016 – years

in which the proportion of Conservative identifiers remains steady. Taken together, then, an examination of attitudinal trends among partisans of both stripes and a comparison of these trends with the dynamics of party identification over time provide assurances that this analysis is indeed picking up genuine shifts in the views of party identifiers, as opposed to simply gauging the attitudes of a largely different type of party supporter at specific points.

Conclusions

This study's second research question focuses on the role of party identity and shifting party cues in shaping views towards both the welfare state and the UK's relationship with Europe over time. It asks whether changes in the position of both major parties in England towards welfare and EU membership have been followed by corresponding changes in the attitudes of those who identify with each party.

This chapter's first set of findings demonstrate that the dynamics of the cues emanating from both parties between 1987 and 2016 were mirrored by changes in the attitudes of their supporters towards the welfare state and Britain's place in Europe. Analysis shows that in each sphere the views of Conservative and Labour identifiers follow divergent courses, with attitudes among each group reflecting the changing policy position of their party of choice. The broadly neo-liberal, anti-welfare shift in the Labour party's stance during the mid-1990s was mirrored in an increase in welfare-scepticism among its identifiers, while the party's subsequent return to its more traditional position on welfare during the 2010s was echoed by its supporters in the form of an uptick in pro-welfare attitudes. In contrast, the relative stability of the nature of the cues on welfare emanating from the Conservative party tessellates with the comparatively high level of consistency observed in attitudes towards the welfare state among its identifiers. Meanwhile, the Labour party's about-turn in its perspective on

European integration during the earliest part of this study's timeline preceded a marked fall in Euroscepticism among its backers, before the muting of the party's pro-European stance during the 2010s heralded a rise in anti-European sentiment among its supporters. This differs markedly from the picture among Conservative affiliates, whose attitudes throughout this study's timeline mirrored the increasingly Eurosceptic character of the cues disseminated by their party of choice.

This chapter also confirms that both political party support and social values – the strand of an individual's core value perspective positioned by the previous chapter as key to shaping views in both domains – exert an independent influence upon individual-level attitudes towards both welfare and EU membership. Although accounting for core value perspective marginally reduces the magnitude of the impact of changing party cues upon the attitudes of partisans towards the welfare state over time, the role of party identity remains clearly observable. Meanwhile, considering core values alongside partisan preference appears to sharpen further the distinctiveness of patterns of attitudinal change among both sets of party supporters towards EU membership.

These findings provide an answer to this study's second research question: the shifting position of political parties towards the welfare state and the UK's membership of the EU have indeed been followed by corresponding changes in the attitudes of party identifiers. Moreover, while the findings of the previous chapter indicate that social values offer valuable insight into the *structure* of attitudes in both spheres, this chapter establishes partisan identity – and the impact of changing party cues – as a necessary ingredient if we are to understand attitudinal *change* throughout this study's timeline.

When considered together, the results of these two chapters underscore the existence of two paths to attitude formation that endure alongside one another.

Social values have a powerful impact on views towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, yet for partisans the dynamic cues emanating from their party of choice represent a second factor shaping policy preferences. But what happens when these two paths appear to lead in opposite directions? True, the results contained within this chapter indicate that parties appear capable of operating as powerful drivers of attitudinal change, with the views of their supporters shifting in line with changes in the policy direction of their preferred party. But does the ability of a change in party cue to reshape the attitudes of a party supporter depend on that supporter's social value perspective? Do individual-level social values limit or enhance the capacity of parties to instigate opinion reformulation, or are parties able to influence the views of their supporters irrespective of their core beliefs? Furthermore, does the interaction between party preference and social values look similar for supporters of the two major parties in England, or is one party more capable than the other of persuading its supporters from across the social value continuum of the merits of a given policy direction? These issues are addressed by this study's final analysis chapter.

6.

Results C: Party cues across the social value spectrum

-
3. To what extent have England's two major political parties been able to shape the attitudes of their identifiers with diverse value positions towards welfare and EU membership, and has their ability to do so changed over time?
-

RESULTS A ILLUSTRATED THAT individuals may formulate their attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership around their core value perspective. Specifically, it demonstrated that social values powerfully structure opinion in both spheres; the more authoritarian an individual, the more likely they are to hold sceptical attitudes towards both welfare and Britain's ties with Europe. Results B meanwhile highlighted that individuals may also derive their views in both policy areas from the perspective of the party they support. As the positions of both major parties in England towards the role and function of the welfare state and the appropriate relationship between Britain and the EU have changed over time, party identifiers have recalibrated their attitudes in both spheres to match the stance of their party of choice. Results B also observed that when considered together, both an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum *and* their partisan identity matter independently in the formation of attitudes towards welfare and EU membership. Regardless of party alignment, authoritarians are more likely to exhibit sceptical views in both policy areas. Meanwhile, the dynamics over time of the relationship between party identity and opinion in each sphere continue to be observable when controlling for an individual's social value perspective.

This chapter builds on these findings to address this study's third research question: the extent to which England's two major parties have been able to

shape the attitudes of their supporters with diverse value positions towards both welfare and EU membership, and whether their ability to do so has altered over time. By examining the strength of the relationship between social value orientation and opinion in both policy spheres among partisans of different stripes between 1987 and 2016, it investigates the extent to which individuals with opposing social value perspectives are willing to recalibrate their attitudes to align with the position of their party of choice – and whether this willingness depends on the party they support.

Findings show that, throughout the bulk of this study's timeline, the views of both Conservative and Labour identifiers from across the social value spectrum shifted in a similar fashion in the wake of a change in the stance of the party they support. From the late 1980s through to the end of the 2000s, cues emanating from both parties appear to have impacted the attitudes of both libertarian and authoritarian partisans in equal measure. During the 2010s, however, while this pattern continued among Conservative supporters, signs emerge that changes in the position of the Labour party may have had a differential impact upon its supporters with opposing social values. Although not unanimous in their results, a range of models of the relationship between attitudes and social values among Labour identifiers support the proposition that the party's adoption of a more pro-welfare perspective during the 2010s was followed by a pro-welfare attitudinal shift that was more marked among its libertarian backers than among its authoritarian backers. Similarly, the results of a number of models suggest that the party's mitigation of its avowedly pro-European stance during this period foreshadowed an increase in Euroscepticism that was sharper among Labour authoritarians than among Labour libertarians.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, analysis of the distribution of social values among both Conservative and Labour identifiers highlights the extent to which each group comprises individuals adopting diverse positions along the

libertarian-authoritarian continuum. The trajectory of the relationship between social values and views towards both the welfare state and Britain's EU membership over time is then explored at a bivariate level among both sets of partisans, providing an early indication of whether attitudinal change may have occurred at a similar rate among libertarian party supporters and their authoritarian counterparts. Results are then tested using regression analysis, with multivariate models constructed to represent the dynamics over time of the association between social value perspective and attitudes towards both welfare and European integration among supporters of each major party. Models are initially fitted separately to Conservative supporters on the one hand and Labour partisans on the other, before being extended to encompass those with diverse party identities.


Social values among Conservative and Labour identifiers

Before turning to the ability of political parties to shape the views of their supporters with different sets of social values, this chapter first considers whether supporters of both major parties in England do in fact adopt a range of perspectives from across the libertarian-authoritarian continuum. Understanding this is crucial to the theoretical and methodological validity of the analysis which follows. Firstly, if a party's supporter base is made up of individuals holding a largely homogeneous set of social values, for the most part that party need only concern itself with its ability to shape the attitudes of those who adopt that perspective. For instance, if Conservative identifiers are overwhelmingly authoritarian, any difficulties that party may face in shaping the views of the small minority of its identifiers with libertarian values is unlikely to prevent it from taking the bulk of its supporters with it in the wake of a change in party cue. However, if each party's supporter base comprises individuals who hold a variety of social value perspectives, the ability of both parties to shape the views of their supporters from different points along that continuum becomes

vital to their prospects of success in carrying their identifiers with them *en masse* in a new policy direction. Secondly, if partisans are sorted in large part by social value perspective, identifying any interaction that might exist between value orientation and party preference becomes challenging. If analysis aims to understand whether, for example, authoritarian Labour supporters respond in the same way to party cues as libertarian Labour supporters, low numbers of authoritarian Labour identifiers within the data provided by BSA could prevent the production of statistically significant results.

To begin to understand the distribution of social values among Conservative and Labour identifiers, this study’s measure of party identity is crosstabulated with its categorical indicator of social value perspective. The results of this exercise, which are displayed in Figure C15, demonstrate the proportion of each group of party supporters across the period spanning 1987-2016 who fall within BSA’s most libertarian third of respondents, its central third, and its most authoritarian third⁹⁶.

Figure C15 Social values among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 combined




⁹⁶ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C15 is based, see Annex C (Table CA15).

As Figure C15 indicates, among Conservative identifiers just under one in three (28%) hold social values that place them within the survey’s most libertarian group, while just over one third (35%) fall within its most authoritarian category and the remainder (37%) adopt a social value perspective that situates them neither at the libertarian nor authoritarian end of the spectrum. Meanwhile, although among Labour supporters a plurality (44%) are defined as adopting a libertarian outlook, a quarter (25%) fall within BSA’s most authoritarian third of respondents while over three in 10 (31%) sit within its central category.

While some differences in the social value composition of each partisan group are apparent from Figure C15, both groups contain a broad mix of individuals holding a variety of social value perspectives. This is emphasised further by Figure C16, which depicts the mean score on BSA’s libertarian-authoritarian scale associated with each group of party supporters⁹⁷. At 3.88 Conservative identifiers’ position on this scale is typically further towards its authoritarian end, while among Labour supporters the mean scale score of 3.60 falls closer to its libertarian end. However, at just 0.28 the difference in mean score between the

Figure C16 Mean libertarian-authoritarian scale scores among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 combined




⁹⁷ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C16 is based, see Annex C (Table CA16).

two groups is relatively small. Once again, Figure C16 underlines that when it comes to the value dimension that is central to the formulation of attitudes towards both welfare and European integration, both of England's major parties represent broad churches and draw on the support of individuals from across the social value spectrum.

Further, in displaying the annual mean score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale for each partisan group between 1987 and 2016, Figure C17 demonstrates that this was the case in each year throughout this study's timeline⁹⁸. Although the mean libertarian-authoritarian scale score associated with Labour identifiers is consistently lower than that linked with their Conservative counterparts, the pattern of change among both sets of party supporters is largely similar. Each group appears to have become more libertarian between the late 1980s and early

Figure C17 Mean libertarian-authoritarian scale scores among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016



Note: BSA's 'libertarian-authoritarian' scale runs from 1 (libertarian) to 5 (authoritarian). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score associated with each partisan group over time, the y-axis in Figure C17 begins at '2.8' and ends at '4.4'.

⁹⁸ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C17 is based, see Annex C (Table CA17).

1990s before a broad reversal of this development throughout the remainder of the decade, while during the 2000s the social value perspective of both groups remained relatively consistent before becoming more libertarian once more during the 2010s. Additionally, the degree of distance between the social values of Conservative supporters and their Labour counterparts as measured by their mean positions on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale has never exceeded half a point, with a maximum difference between supporters of the two major political parties gauged at 0.47 in 1987.

Preliminary conclusions I

The above analysis demonstrates that although the values of Labour identifiers are typically somewhat more libertarian than those of Conservatives, supporters of both major parties adopt a range of social value perspectives. This diversity in social value orientation is present throughout the lifetime of this study. Meanwhile, although the typical value perspective of both sets of partisans has shifted over time, these shifts have occurred in the same direction and at a broadly similar rate. These results suggest not only that an analysis of the interaction between partisan identity and social value perspective in shaping attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership is practicable, but that the ability of both parties to shape the views of their supporters from across the social value spectrum matters if they are to successfully carry their identifiers with them in a new policy direction.

Bivariate analysis among party groups


Having demonstrated the dispersal of social value perspectives among both Labour and Conservative identifiers, this chapter turns to charting attitudes over time towards both welfare and European integration among those who share a partisan identity, yet whose social values contrast.

Conservatives

Welfare

Figure C18⁹⁹ displays the mean score achieved on BSA's welfare scale in each of this study's three 'welfare' time periods among Conservative identifiers whose social values place them within the survey's most libertarian third of respondents, and among their fellow Conservatives who fall within its most authoritarian third.

Figure C18 Mean welfare scale scores among Conservative identifiers by social value group, 1987-2016 periodised



Note: BSA's 'welfare' scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score associated with Conservative libertarians and Conservative authoritarians over time, the y-axis in Figure C18 begins at '2.6' and ends at '3.8'.

The previous chapter demonstrated that the typical welfare scale score achieved by Conservative supporters throughout this study's timeline remained relatively stable when compared with the picture among Labour identifiers¹⁰⁰, a finding

⁹⁹ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C18 is based, see Annex C (Table CA18).

¹⁰⁰ To remind the reader of the trajectory of attitudes towards the welfare state over time among Conservative identifiers as a whole, Figure C18 also shows the typical welfare scale score achieved in each period by all Conservative identifiers regardless of their social values as first illustrated by Figure B9.

anticipated due to the relative consistency of the cues offered by the Conservative party in this area between 1987 and 2016. Figure C18 further suggests that, in broad terms at least, this stability can be observed not just among Conservative supporters as a whole, but among Conservative identifiers who adopt opposing social value perspectives. While both sets of Conservative sympathisers moved in a slightly more anti-welfare direction between 1987-1996 and 1997-2009 the change in welfare scale score across these periods measured just 0.15 among Conservative libertarians and an even lower 0.07 among Conservative authoritarians, with views among both groups remaining broadly consistent between 1997-2009 and 2010-2016. In the absence of a notable alteration in the nature of the cue emanating from their party of choice, the attitudes of both Conservative libertarians and Conservative authoritarians appear to have remained largely stable throughout this study's timeline.

Europe

Meanwhile, Figure C19¹⁰¹ illustrates the proportion of both libertarian and authoritarian Conservatives who expressed a desire to leave the EU in each of this study's three 'Europe' time periods. Once again, the previous chapter offers a picture of how attitudes in this arena shifted over time among Conservatives as a whole; during the earliest part of this study's timeline the proportion of Conservative identifiers exhibiting Eurosceptic attitudes was registered at around one in five, rising modestly during period two before increasing markedly to over one-third during period three¹⁰².

¹⁰¹ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C19 is based, see Annex C (Tables CA19(a)-CA19(c)).

¹⁰² To remind the reader of the trajectory of attitudes towards the UK's EU membership over time among Conservative identifiers as a whole, Figure C19 also shows the prevalence of Euroscepticism in each period among all Conservative identifiers regardless of their social values as first illustrated by Figure B11.

Figure C19 Euroscepticism among Conservative identifiers by social value group, 1987-2016 periodised




Figure C19 suggests that between 1987-1991 and 1993-2009, the attitudes of the most libertarian Conservative identifiers followed the same trajectory as their more authoritarian fellow partisans. Just as the prevalence of Euroscepticism among Conservative libertarians increased slightly from 14% during period one to 16% during period two, so too did its prevalence among Conservative authoritarians – from 27% to 29% across the same window.

Between 1993-2009 and 2010-2016, Figure C19 indicates that attitudes towards the UK's place in Europe also moved in the same direction among Conservative libertarians and Conservative authoritarians, with the prevalence of Euroscepticism rising among both groups. Notably, however, Figure C19 offers a suggestion that this increase may have been slightly more marked among authoritarian Conservative identifiers than among libertarian Conservative identifiers. While the proportion of Conservative libertarians exhibiting anti-European sentiment increased by eight percentage points between periods two and three, among Conservative authoritarians this proportion rose by 17 points across the same timeframe. This divergence resulted in the attitudinal gap between the two groups – which measured just 12 points in both periods one and

two – reaching 22 points during period three. Figure C19 thus hints that during the latter stages of this study’s timeline, the response of Conservative authoritarians to a policy shift in an ‘authoritarian’ direction may have been somewhat more marked than that of Conservative libertarians.

Labour


Welfare

Figure C20¹⁰³ displays the results of a similar exercise to that charted by Figure C18, this time taking Labour supporters as the basis for analysis. The previous chapter shows that this group of partisans became notably more sceptical towards the welfare state during the mid-to-late 1990s, as indicated by a marked increase in the mean score on BSA’s welfare scale achieved by Labour identifiers during this period¹⁰⁴. Figure C20 suggests that this shift in perspective is visible among both libertarian and authoritarian Labour backers in relatively equal measure; among the former group the mean score on BSA’s welfare scale increased from 2.27 to 2.60 between 1987-1996 and 1997-2009, while among the latter group the typical score rose from 2.86 to 3.14. While the distance between the most libertarian and authoritarian Labour backers narrowed slightly between periods one and two, the extent of this narrowing is measured at just 0.05 points on BSA’s welfare scale. In the wake of a change in the nature of the cue offered by the Labour party in a more anti-welfare, ‘authoritarian’ direction, Labour supporters with a libertarian outlook on life appeared to respond to this shift almost as readily as their authoritarian fellow partisans.

¹⁰³ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C20 is based, see Annex C (Table CA20).

¹⁰⁴ To remind the reader of the trajectory of attitudes towards the welfare state over time among Labour identifiers as a whole, Figure C20 also shows the typical welfare scale score achieved in each period by all Labour identifiers regardless of their social values as first illustrated by Figure B9.

Figure C20 Mean welfare scale scores among Labour identifiers by social value group, 1987-2016 periodised



Note: BSA's 'welfare' scale runs from 1 (pro-welfare) to 5 (anti-welfare). To facilitate a clearer portrayal of changes in the mean scale score associated with Labour libertarians and Labour authoritarians over time, the y-axis in Figure C20 begins at '2' and ends at '3.4'.

The previous chapter also finds that views among Labour supporters subsequently shifted in a more pro-welfare direction, as evidenced by a fall in the typical welfare scale score associated with Labour identifiers during the 2010s. Figure C20 shows that this recalibration is evident among Labour libertarians, whose typical welfare scale score fell from 2.60 during 1997-2009 to 2.46 during 2010-2016 – a drop of 0.14 points. However, an equivalent attitudinal modification is not visible among Labour authoritarians, for whom the mean score on BSA's welfare scale remained at a similar level across both periods. As a result, the distance between the two groups in mean scale score expanded from 0.54 during period two to 0.68 during period three. Following a reorientation of the party's stance towards the welfare state in a more pro-welfare, 'libertarian' direction, Figure C20 offers a suggestion that although Labour libertarians became more pro-welfare in their outlook, their more authoritarian fellow partisans may have been more reluctant to follow suit.

Europe

Finally, Figure C21¹⁰⁵ displays the proportion of both libertarian and authoritarian Labour identifiers who wished to leave the EU in each of this study's three 'Europe' time periods. Once again, the previous chapter details the attitudinal trends in this sphere among Labour identifiers as a whole; having been the more Eurosceptic of the two sets of major party supporters during the earliest years of this study's timeline, the prevalence of Euroscepticism among Labour identifiers subsequently fell away markedly before rising during the 2010s¹⁰⁶.

Figure C21 Euroscepticism among Conservative identifiers by social value group, 1987-2016 periodised




Figure C21 shows that between 1987-1991 and 1993-2009 the attitudes of both libertarian and authoritarian Labour supporters became notably more pro-European. However, this shift appears starker among authoritarian Labour backers than among their libertarian counterparts. While the proportion of

¹⁰⁵ For tables displaying the data on which Figure C21 is based, see Annex C (Tables CA21(a)-CA21(c)).

¹⁰⁶ To remind the reader of the trajectory of attitudes towards the UK's EU membership over time among Labour identifiers as a whole, Figure C21 also shows the prevalence of Euroscepticism in each period among all Labour identifiers regardless of their social values as first illustrated by Figure B11.

libertarian Labour supporters displaying Eurosceptic views fell by 12 points from 18% during period one to just 6% during period two, among authoritarian Labour supporters the prevalence of Euroscepticism fell by 25 points from 43% to 21% across the same timeframe. Similarly, Figure C21 suggests that despite both libertarian and authoritarian Labour supporters becoming more Eurosceptic between 1993-2009 and 2010-2016, this change may also have been more pronounced among authoritarian Labour identifiers. Although among Labour-supporting libertarians the proportion of those professing a Eurosceptic outlook increased by 7 points from 6% during period two to 13% during period three, among Labour-supporting authoritarians the equivalent rise – from 21% to 42% – measured 21 points.

The early indication offered by Figure C21 is that the attitudes of Labour authoritarians may have become disproportionately *less* Eurosceptic between periods one and two, before becoming disproportionately *more* Eurosceptic between periods two and three. This latter shift suggests that Labour's muting of its pro-European outlook during the 2010s may have been responded to by its authoritarian identifiers to a greater extent than its libertarian supporters – a development in keeping with the proposition that a change in cue in a more 'authoritarian' direction may impact views among authoritarian party supporters more powerfully than among libertarian party supporters¹⁰⁷.

That said, Figure C21's suggestion that Labour-supporting authoritarians may have become disproportionately more pro-European between periods one and two when compared with Labour libertarians does not fit with this proposition – if a change in cue 'activates' those whose social values suggest they may be supportive of a party's new issue stance, the Labour party's move in a pro-European direction between periods one and two might instead have been

¹⁰⁷ See this study's Introduction and Literature Review chapters for a discussion of why this might be expected to occur.

expected to impact its libertarian identifiers to a greater extent than its authoritarian backers. Nor does it tally with the alternative proposition that parties are capable of taking their supporters from across the value spectrum with them in the wake of a change in cue; instead, the suggestion offered by Figure C21 is that those whose values might be expected to oppose the Labour party's revised position on Europe responded in greatest measure to this policy shift. However, this apparently counterintuitive development may be explained by 'floor effect'; having dropped to just 6% between 1993 and 2009, perhaps a lower limit or 'floor' in the prevalence of Euroscepticism among Labour libertarians had been reached beyond which further detectable attrition is unlikely from both a theoretical (Hickson and Miles, 2018) and methodological (Carlsson et al., 2021) perspective. The decrease in anti-European sentiment among Labour-supporting libertarians between periods one and two may therefore appear minor when compared to the change in attitudes among authoritarians not because the latter group were more willing to recalibrate their views to fit with their party's new position, but instead due to Euroscepticism among the former group having reached its measurable lower limit.

Preliminary conclusions II

Cumulatively, Figure C18-Figure C21 hint at a number of tentative conclusions. For the most part, England's two major parties appear to be able to shape the attitudes of both their libertarian and their authoritarian supporters with a change in cue to at least some degree. This ability appears particularly evident during the earlier part of this study's timeline. For example, the above analysis suggests that both libertarian and authoritarian Conservatives responded in almost identical fashion to a change in their preferred party's stance on Europe between periods one and two, while the same can be said of libertarian and authoritarian Labour backers in the wake of their party's change in direction on welfare. Meanwhile, although Labour authoritarians at first glance appear to have responded more

markedly than their libertarian counterparts to the party's pivot on EU membership between periods one and two, this may be explained by the prevalence of Euroscepticism among Labour libertarians having reached a realistic lower limit during the mid-to-late 1990s and 2000s.

During the latter stages of this study's timeline, however, this analysis perhaps offers an early hint that the capacity of parties to carry their supporters with them in a new direction irrespective of their social values may have waned. Moreover, there appears to be more tentative evidence of this development in the case of Labour than there is in the case of the Conservatives. While the uptick in Euroscepticism between periods two and three in response to the ever-more Eurosceptic cues emerging from their party of choice appears marginally more pronounced among authoritarian Conservatives than among their libertarian counterparts, the views of authoritarian Labour identifiers appear to have diverged from those of libertarian Labour identifiers more sharply across the same period. Meanwhile, although Labour libertarians recalibrated their attitudes in the wake of their party's shift towards a more pro-welfare position during the 2010s, analysis thus far suggests that authoritarian Labour partisans may have been less willing to do so.

Is it really the case that the ability of England's major parties to shape the views of their supporters from across the social value spectrum via a change in party cue deteriorated during the latter part of this study's timeline? To investigate whether this suggestion is supported by more complex analysis, a series of regression models are specified to test the significance of the apparent changes observed above in the strength of the relationship between social values and attitudes towards both welfare and European integration among each set of partisans.

Within-party regression analysis

Conservatives

Table C21 displays the results of a linear regression model fitted to Conservative identifiers¹⁰⁸. This model employs an individual's score on BSA's welfare scale as its outcome variable, and incorporates both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers who responded to BSA between 1987 and 1996.

Table C21 Core values and Attitudes to welfare among Conservative identifiers, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.643		0.063	<.001	1.519	1.766
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.404	0.39	0.016	<.001	0.372	0.435
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.082	0.07	0.012	<.001	0.058	0.106
10-16	0.106	0.082	0.013	<.001	0.08	0.132
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
LA*97-09	-0.051	-0.032	0.021	0.015	-0.092	-0.01
LA*10-16	-0.05	-0.027	0.022	0.023	-0.094	-0.007

n = 13,170

Table C21 demonstrates that the main effect of social values is significant for Conservative identifiers, with a higher score on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale associated with a higher score on the survey's welfare scale. This reinforces Results A's conclusion that those with more authoritarian social values are more likely than those with more libertarian social values to be sceptical of the aims and objectives of the welfare state. Additionally, the significant positive

¹⁰⁸ This model is nested within that displayed in Table C25.

coefficients linked with the main effect of time period suggest that among Conservatives, attitudes to welfare were marginally tougher between 1997 and 2009 and between 2010 and 2016 than was the case between 1987 and 1996. This echoes Results B's finding that the views of Conservatives in this sphere hardened slightly between periods one and two before remaining relatively consistent for the remainder of this study's timeline.

Further, the small yet significant negative interaction coefficient linked with the effect of libertarian-authoritarian scale score during 1997-2009 suggests that the relationship between attitudes towards welfare and social values may have loosened slightly among Conservatives between periods one and two. Meanwhile, the almost identical coefficient linked with the effect of social values during 2010-2016 indicates that the strength of this relationship subsequently remained stable between periods two and three. This development, hinted at by Figure C18 above, mirrors almost exactly that which Results A suggests occurred across society as a whole. As Table A11 demonstrates, the link between social values and views towards welfare was slightly weaker in period two than was the case in period one before remaining unchanged between periods two and three. Further, the coefficient representing the extent of this population-level tightening was calculated by Table A11 at -0.05 – a figure almost identical to that of -0.051 calculated by Table C21 as having occurred among Conservatives. In short, in the absence of any notable shift in the character of the cue emanating from the Conservative party on welfare throughout this study's timeline, the nature of the link between attitudes towards the welfare state and social values among Conservative identifiers appears to have followed the same course as that observed across society as a whole.

Table C22 meanwhile displays the results of a logistic regression model also fitted to Conservative identifiers¹⁰⁹. This model employs binary EU membership

¹⁰⁹ This model is nested within that displayed in Table C26.

preference as its outcome variable, and includes both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1991.

Table C22 Core values and EU membership preference among Conservative identifiers, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-4.091	0.017	0.483	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.682	1.978	0.119	<.001	1.568	2.496
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	0.156	1.169	0.084	0.064	0.991	1.379
10-16	0.954	2.597	0.095	<.001	2.155	3.128
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				0.361		
Lib-Auth*93-09	0.007	1.007	0.14	0.958	0.766	1.325
Lib-Auth*10-16	0.184	1.203	0.161	0.252	0.877	1.649

n = 6,966

Once again Table C22 indicates that the main effect of an individual's position on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale is significant, with a higher score associated with a higher likelihood of holding Eurosceptic attitudes. This echoes Results A's conclusion that those who adopt a more authoritarian outlook are more likely than those adopt a more libertarian outlook to oppose the UK's EU membership. The coefficients linked with the main effect of time period also broadly reflect Results B's conclusion that the views of Conservative identifiers became more Eurosceptic over time; although according to Table C22 the shift in attitudes between periods one and two is just short of statistical significance, the marked increase in anti-EU sentiment among Conservative identifiers between periods two and three is significant.

Meanwhile, Table C22 counters any suggestion that the Conservative party have struggled to carry their libertarian and authoritarian supporters with them in equal measure in more recent years. The exponent representing the relative strength of the relationship between attitudes towards the UK's EU membership and social values in period two when compared with period one stands at a statistically insignificant 1.007, while although the equivalent figure for period three is gauged at a slightly higher 1.203 this is also statistically insignificant. Although Figure C19 perhaps hinted at something of a strengthening in the association between views on Britain's relationship with Europe and social values among Conservatives during 2010-2016, this is not supported by the results in Table C22.

Labour

Table C23 contains the results of an equivalent model to that displayed in Table C21, this time fitted to Labour supporters¹¹⁰. The model uses welfare scale score as its outcome variable, and includes both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction. Its reference category is comprised of Labour identifiers between 1987 and 1996.

As is the case at Table C21, the main effect of an individual's position on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale is once again significant. Meanwhile the statistically significant positive coefficients linked with the main effect of time period suggest that among Labour supporters, attitudes to welfare were markedly tougher during 1997-2009 and 2010-2016 than was the case during 1987-1996. Moreover, at 0.283 the coefficient representing the change in attitudes among Labour supporters during period two is considerably larger than

¹¹⁰ This model is nested within that displayed in Table C27.

Table C23 Core values and Attitudes to welfare among Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.05		0.047	<.001	0.958	1.142
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.417	0.447	0.013	<.001	0.392	0.442
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.283	0.205	0.012	<.001	0.259	0.307
10-16	0.236	0.146	0.015	<.001	0.207	0.264
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
LA*97-09	-0.01	-0.007	0.016	0.525	-0.043	0.022
LA*10-16	0.047	0.027	0.019	0.011	0.011	0.084

n = 13,985

the 0.082 representing the equivalent shift among Conservatives during the same period at Table C21. This echoes Results B's finding that the views of Labour supporters in particular were notably harsher during period two than they were previously; in response to a shift in cue in an anti-welfare direction, the attitudes of Labour identifiers appear to have become distinctively more welfare-sceptic. Further, switching the model's reference category from Labour supporters during 1987-1996 to Labour supporters during 1997-2009 produces statistically significant negative coefficients of -0.283 for period one and -0.047 for period three. This reinforces Results B's conclusion that the views of Labour supporters towards welfare subsequently softened during the 2010s, though not to the levels witnessed during the late-1980s and early-to-mid 1990s¹¹¹.

Most importantly, however, Table C23 adds further support to the notion that the views of libertarian Labour supporters during period three may have moved in a pro-welfare direction more markedly than the views of authoritarian Labour supporters. The statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.01 representing the

¹¹¹ For full regression results based on a model designating Labour identifiers between 1997 and 2009 as its reference category, see Annex C (Table CX1).

relationship between views on welfare and social values among Labour supporters in period two suggests that the attitudes of both Labour libertarians and Labour authoritarians towards welfare hardened in equal measure during 1997-2009. However, the statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.047 representing this association during period three indicates that the relationship between welfare preference and social values among Labour identifiers may have sharpened somewhat during the 2010s. This fits with the suggestion derived from Figure C20 that although the views of Labour libertarians appeared to move in a pro-welfare direction during the latter stages of this study's timeline, the views of Labour authoritarians did not. Table C23 therefore adds further weight to the proposition that while the Labour party were able to carry its libertarian supporters with it in a pro-welfare direction during the 2010s, it faced more resistance among its authoritarian backers.

Table C24 meanwhile fits the model displayed in Table C22 to Labour supporters¹¹². The model utilises binary EU membership preference as its outcome variable, and includes both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction. The model's reference category is comprised of Labour identifiers between 1987 and 1991.

Table C24 indicates once more that the main effect of libertarian-authoritarian scale score is significant. It also shows that the odds of a Labour supporter holding Eurosceptic views in period two are significantly lower than in period one, before increasing once more in period three. This underscores Results B's finding that Labour backers became markedly more pro-European following their preferred party's policy reversal on Europe, before becoming more Eurosceptic once more in the wake of the party's softening of its pro-European stance during the 2010s.

¹¹² This model is nested within that displayed in Table C28.

Table C24 Core values and EU membership preference among Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.836	0.022	0.362	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.807	2.242	0.095	<.001	1.862	2.699
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	-1.235	0.291	0.08	<.001	0.249	0.34
10-16	-0.184	0.832	0.098	0.062	0.686	1.009
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				0.133		
Lib-Auth*93-09	0.178	1.195	0.121	0.14	0.943	1.513
Lib-Auth*10-16	0.284	1.329	0.148	0.055	0.994	1.776

n = 7,042

Meanwhile, the statistically insignificant exponent of 1.195 representing the link between views on EU membership and social values among Labour identifiers during period two indicates that both libertarian and authoritarian Labour supporters recalibrated their views in broadly equal measure in the wake of their party's pro-EU turn. This result reinforces the conclusion that the apparently less-marked attitudinal shift among Labour libertarians during this period visible at Figure C21 may be the product of floor effect; when undertaking more sophisticated analysis employing a scale variable capable of more sensitive measurement, this inconsistent finding is not replicated. However, Table C24 is less conclusive on whether the party's subsequent muting of its position during the 2010s was followed by an attitudinal shift among both its libertarian and authoritarian backers, or whether a readjustment in EU membership preference took place primarily among its authoritarian supporters. At 1.329, the exponent representing the association between views on EU membership and social values among Labour identifiers during period three hints once more at the possibility that this association may have sharpened somewhat during the 2010s. This tallies with the suggestion derived from Figure C21 that Labour authoritarians appeared to move in a Eurosceptic direction during the latter

stages of this study's timeline more notably than Labour libertarians. However, the associated p -value of 0.055 is marginally outside the bounds of statistical significance, preventing us from confidently asserting that the Labour party was less successful in shaping the preferences of its libertarian supporters towards Europe during the 2010s than its authoritarian supporters.

Preliminary conclusions III

This set of regression models largely supports the conclusions drawn from early bivariate analysis. There appears to have been minimal change in the strength of the association between social values and attitudes towards the welfare state among Conservative identifiers throughout this study's timeline, while any apparent shift in the nature of the link between social values and views on EU membership among this group during the 2010s is statistically insignificant. However, among Labour supporters the relationship between attitudes towards welfare and social values was significantly stronger during 2010-2016 than it had been previously. Meanwhile, although just beyond the bounds of statistical significance, a similar development is hinted at in the realm of EU membership preference. These results add to the suggestion that the Labour party may have faced difficulties in more recent years in carrying its supporters from across the social value spectrum with it following a change in cue.

Reintroducing controls

To further test the veracity of these findings, these models are extended and refined. As discussed in Results A, a series of demographic factors are associated with views towards both welfare and European integration. In addition, although less concerted than their position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum, an individual's position on the left-right scale also exercises an influence over their attitudes in both areas. The regression models

displayed in Table C21-Table C24 are therefore expanded to take these additional factors into account and control for their effects, producing a more accurate picture of the role of social value orientation in shaping attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership among each group over time.

Further, as discussed in Results B, these additional factors may also be unequally dispersed among those who hold alternative party identities. As a result, although modelling the relationship between attitudes and values among one set of partisans in isolation offers an impression of the trajectory of the link between social values and opinion among a given set of party supporters, it does not allow for the direct comparison of results between those with different party ties. To account for this, a second set of regression models is fitted to all cases contained within this project's dataset. Cumulatively, the results of these models enable a final assessment of the extent to which the strength of the association between social values and attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership differs between supporters of each of England's major parties over time.

Welfare

Table C25 contains the results of an expanded version of the model displayed at Table C21. It utilises an individual's score on BSA's welfare scale as its outcome variable, and employs both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction. In addition, this extended model also includes the full range of demographic characteristics identified by previous chapters as having the potential to hold an association with attitudes towards welfare, plus those additional value-based characteristics observed within Results A to impact welfare preferences. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996.

Table C25 Core values and Attitudes to welfare among Conservative identifiers controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.365		0.079	<.001	1.211	1.52
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.43	0.416	0.016	<.001	0.398	0.436
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.092	0.078	0.012	<.001	0.068	0.115
10-16	0.124	0.096	0.013	<.001	0.098	0.15
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
LA*97-09	-0.051	-0.032	0.021	0.014	-0.091	-0.01
LA*10-16	-0.05	-0.027	0.022	0.022	-0.093	-0.007
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.068	-0.052	0.014	<.001	-0.097	-0.04
50-64	-0.118	-0.092	0.015	<.001	-0.147	-0.09
65+	-0.124	-0.094	0.016	<.001	-0.154	-0.093
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.045	-0.038	0.01	<.001	-0.063	-0.026
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.059	-0.016	0.03	0.048	-0.118	0
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.029	-0.025	0.013	0.026	-0.055	-0.004
Degree	-0.021	-0.013	0.019	0.261	-0.058	0.016
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.044	0.035	0.012	<.001	0.021	0.066
London	0.017	0.009	0.018	0.345	-0.018	0.051
<i>Social class Comparator: Salarial</i>						
Intermediate	0.039	0.033	0.011	<.001	0.018	0.061
Working	-0.009	-0.005	0.016	0.566	-0.04	0.022
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.103	0.135	0.007	<.001	0.089	0.116
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.002	0.001	0.01	0.882	-0.018	0.022

n = 13,170

Incorporating these factors has little effect on the relationship between social values and welfare preferences among Conservative supporters, or its dynamics over time. Even once additional variables are introduced, the more authoritarian

a Conservative supporter's values the more likely they are to hold negative views towards welfare. Meanwhile, Conservative identifiers remain marginally more sceptical about the role and function of the welfare state during 1997-2009 and 2010-2016 than was the case during 1987-1996 when also accounting for additional factors. Moreover, Table C25 once again indicates that the association between views on welfare and social values among Conservatives loosened slightly between periods one and two before remaining stable between periods two and three. Table C25 further supports the conclusion that without any marked change in party cue, the relationship between attitudes towards the welfare state and social values among Conservative identifiers followed the same pattern as that observed across society as a whole.

Similarly, Table C26 contains the results of an extended iteration of the model displayed at Table C22. This model employs binary EU membership preference as its outcome variable, and includes both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction. It also contains those additional demographic and value-based characteristics incorporated at Table C25 above. The model's reference category is comprised of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1991.

Once again, accounting for additional demographic and value-based relationships does not result in any major changes in the nature of the association between social values and views towards European integration among Conservative supporters; even once other variables are considered, the more authoritarian a Conservative supporter's values the more likely they are to hold Eurosceptic attitudes. Meanwhile, the introduction of additional factors appears to sharpen slightly the difference in levels of Euroscepticism among Conservatives between periods one and two; although Table C22 demonstrated that Euroscepticism was more common among Conservatives at the conclusion

Table C26 Core values and EU membership preference among Conservative identifiers controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-2.934	0.053	0.586	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.492	1.636	0.126	<.001	1.277	2.095
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	0.213	1.238	0.088	0.015	1.042	1.47
10-16	1.07	2.917	0.102	<.001	2.39	3.56
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				0.506		
Lib-Auth*93-09	-0.031	0.969	0.144	0.827	0.731	1.284
Lib-Auth*10-16	0.125	1.133	0.166	0.451	0.818	1.569
Age <i>Comparator: 18-34</i>				<.001		
35-49	0.087	1.091	0.097	0.373	0.901	1.32
50-64	0.278	1.32	0.095	0.003	1.096	1.59
65+	0.342	1.408	0.1	<.001	1.158	1.712
Sex <i>Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	0.066	1.068	0.059	0.267	0.951	1.2
Ethnicity <i>Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.095	1.1	0.206	0.645	0.734	1.648
Education <i>Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.296	0.744	0.075	<.001	0.642	0.862
Degree	-0.612	0.543	0.121	<.001	0.428	0.688
Region <i>Comparator: North</i>				0.85		
South and Midlands	-0.035	0.965	0.07	0.615	0.841	1.108
London	0	1	0.111	0.998	0.805	1.243
Social class <i>Comparator: Salariat</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	0.211	1.235	0.069	0.002	1.08	1.413
Working	0.329	1.389	0.093	<.001	1.158	1.667
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.22	0.802	0.045	<.001	0.734	0.877
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.135	1.144	0.066	0.043	1.004	1.303

n = 6,966

of this study's timeline than at its outset, the statistically significant coefficients linked with each time period at the main effect level within Table C26 suggest that

the prevalence of Euroscepticism among Conservatives is higher in each successive period. Finally, the coefficients linked with the interaction between social values and each time period continue to be statistically insignificant once additional variables are accounted for, indicating that the link between social values and opinion towards the UK's EU membership among Conservative partisans remained stable over time. Table C26 reinforces the conclusion that libertarian and authoritarian Conservatives appear to have been equally willing to follow the increasingly Eurosceptic course charted by their party of choice.

Labour

Meanwhile, Table C27 fits the model displayed at Table C25 to Labour identifiers. This model employs an individual's score on BSA's welfare scale as its outcome variable and both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction, alongside additional demographic and value-based control variables. Its reference category is comprised of Labour identifiers between 1987 and 1996.

Table C27 replicates many of the results displayed at Table C23, which displays the relationship between social values and views towards welfare among Labour supporters prior to the introduction of additional control variables. The main effect of an individual's position on BSA's libertarian-authoritarian scale remains significant among Labour supporters, while the attitudes of Labour identifiers towards the welfare state were considerably tougher during 1997-2009 than was the case during 1987-1996. Switching the model's reference category from Labour backers between 1987 and 1996 to Labour supporters between 1997 and 2009, however, produces a main-effect coefficient for the period spanning 2010-2016 of -0.022 that is outside the bounds of statistical significance ($p=0.085$); although analysis thus far has suggested that the views of Labour supporters towards the role and function of the welfare state softened during the 2010s, this

Table C27 Core values and Attitudes to welfare among Labour identifiers controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.783		0.063	<.001	0.66	0.906
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.419	0.449	0.014	<.001	0.392	0.447
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.248	0.18	0.012	<.001	0.224	0.272
10-16	0.226	0.14	0.015	<.001	0.197	0.255
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
LA*97-09	-0.014	-0.01	0.016	0.369	-0.046	0.017
LA*10-16	0.013	0.007	0.018	0.483	-0.023	0.048
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.156	1.391	0.013	<.001	-0.181	-0.13
50-64	-0.225	1.306	0.015	<.001	-0.253	-0.196
65+	-0.167	1.187	0.017	<.001	-0.2	-0.134
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.02	0.98	0.01	0.04	-0.039	-0.001
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.047	1.145	0.018	0.008	-0.082	-0.012
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.048	0.7	0.014	<.001	-0.074	-0.021
Degree	-0.141	0.371	0.02	<.001	-0.179	-0.103
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.083	1.167	0.011	<.001	0.062	0.104
London	0.098	0.997	0.016	<.001	0.067	0.13
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.019	1.627	0.013	0.141	-0.006	0.044
Working	0.033	1.74	0.014	0.023	0.005	0.061
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.198	0.882	0.008	<.001	0.183	0.213
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.03	1.039	0.009	<.001	-0.048	-0.012

n = 13,985

model reflects this development less clearly¹¹³. The suggestion derived from Table C23 that the link between social values and welfare preferences may have strengthened among Labour supporters during period three is also less conclusive according to Table C27. Although the coefficient representing the interaction between attitudes towards welfare and social values among Labour identifiers during 2010-2016 remains positive, at 0.013 its size is considerably reduced when compared with the coefficient of 0.047 displayed within Table C23 while its associated *p*-value of 0.483 shows it is statistically insignificant. Table C27 therefore does little to advance the proposition that the Labour party was less able to carry its authoritarian supporters than its libertarian supporters with it in a pro-welfare direction during the 2010s.

Table C28, however, echoes more clearly the suggestion that the Labour party may have struggled to impact the views of its supporters from across the social value spectrum during the 2010s. Fitting the model displayed at Table C26 to Labour identifiers, the model contained within Table C28 employs binary EU membership preference as its outcome variable and includes both libertarian-authoritarian scale score and time period as predictors at the main effect level plus their higher-order interaction, together with additional demographic and value-based controls. Its reference category is comprised of Labour identifiers between 1987 and 1991.

Table C28 demonstrates that the main effect of a Labour supporter's social values upon their EU membership preference remains significant once additional variables are accounted for. It also shows that the odds of a Labour supporter holding Eurosceptic views remain significantly lower in period two than in period one, before increasing once more in period three. Meanwhile, the exponent representing the association between views on EU membership and social

¹¹³ For full regression results based on a model designating Labour identifiers between 1997 and 2009 as its reference category, see Annex C (Table CX2).

Table C28 Core values and EU membership preference among Labour identifiers controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.313	0.036	0.49	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.565	1.759	0.116	<.001	1.401	2.208
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	-1.022	0.36	0.086	<.001	0.304	0.426
10-16	0.179	1.196	0.108	0.099	0.967	1.479
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				0.093		
Lib-Auth*93-09	0.177	1.194	0.126	0.16	0.932	1.529
Lib-Auth*10-16	0.333	1.395	0.155	0.032	1.03	1.89
Age <i>Comparator: 18-34</i>				0.008		
35-49	0.33	1.391	0.1	<.001	1.143	1.693
50-64	0.264	1.302	0.107	0.014	1.055	1.607
65+	0.174	1.19	0.116	0.133	0.948	1.493
Sex <i>Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.018	0.983	0.068	0.798	0.86	1.123
Ethnicity <i>Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	0.131	1.14	0.14	0.35	0.866	1.499
Education <i>Comparator: No quals</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.356	0.701	0.084	<.001	0.594	0.827
Degree	-0.993	0.371	0.163	<.001	0.269	0.51
Region <i>Comparator: North</i>				0.08		
South and Midlands	0.152	1.165	0.073	0.036	1.01	1.343
London	-0.001	0.999	0.122	0.991	0.786	1.269
Social class <i>Comparator: Salariat</i>				<.001		
Intermediate	0.487	1.627	0.1	<.001	1.338	1.979
Working	0.551	1.734	0.106	<.001	1.408	2.136
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.123	0.885	0.054	0.024	0.796	0.984
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.055	1.056	0.075	0.465	0.912	1.224

n = 7,042

values among Labour identifiers during period two remains insignificant following the incorporation of additional controls; in the wake of their party's change in

position on European integration, Table C28 shows that the views of libertarian and authoritarian Labour supporters became less Eurosceptic in broadly equal measure.

However, Table C28 indicates that once additional variables are accounted for, the link between social values and views towards Britain's relationship with Europe was stronger among Labour supporters between 2010 and 2016 than it had been previously. Table C24 suggested that the exponent of 1.329 representing the association between views on EU membership and social values among Labour identifiers during period three was marginally beyond the bounds of statistical significance. Table C28 however calculates this exponent at the slightly higher figure of 1.395, and places its associated *p*-value at a statistically significant 0.032. As a result, Table C28 adds further support to the suggestion that the Labour party may have been less successful in shaping the preferences of its libertarian supporters towards Europe during the 2010s than its authoritarian supporters.

Cross-party regression analysis

The above analysis provides further insight into the dynamics of the relationship between attitudes and social values among both Conservative and Labour identifiers over time. Table C21-Table C24 begin to examine the strength of this association in two policy domains and across three time periods among each group, with Table C25-Table C28 controlling for variance by key demographic characteristics and accounting for the links between views in each area and left-right or 'political' values. The final step in this analysis is to construct two regression models encompassing all available cases within this study's dataset. The first of these, displayed in Table C29, utilises an individual's score on BSA's welfare scale as its outcome variable. The second, displayed in Table C30, engages binary EU membership preference as its outcome variable. Both employ

libertarian-authoritarian scale score, time period, and party identity as their key main-effect predictors, plus the two-way interaction between each of these predictors in turn¹¹⁴. In addition, Table C29 and Table C30 display the three-way interaction between each of these variables. Finally, they incorporate the additional demographic and value-based indicators present at Table C25-Table C28. The reference category for the model contained within Table C29 is comprised of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1996, while the reference category for the model contained within Table C30 consists of Conservative identifiers between 1987 and 1991.

Table C29 Core values and Attitudes to welfare by Party identity controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.107		0.068	<.001	0.973	1.24
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.451	0.45	0.017	<.001	0.419	0.484
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.094	0.07	0.013	<.001	0.069	0.118
10-16	0.13	0.088	0.014	<.001	0.103	0.156
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	-0.393	-0.266	0.014	<.001	-0.42	-0.366
None	-0.129	-0.092	0.014	<.001	-0.157	-0.102
O/DK/R	-0.213	-0.1	0.018	<.001	-0.248	-0.179
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Lib-Auth*Labour	-0.029	-0.017	0.021	0.172	-0.07	0.012
Lib-Auth*None	-0.032	-0.017	0.024	0.185	-0.079	0.015
Lib-Auth*O/DK/R	0.012	0.004	0.027	0.662	-0.041	0.064

¹¹⁴ Figures representing the categorical two-way interaction between party identity and time period among both Conservative and Labour identifiers, calculated using the technique set out by Haile (2017) and described in the previous chapter, can be found in Annex C (for figures based on Table C29 see Table CX3, and for figures based on Table C30 see Table CX5).

Table C29 Cont'd

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
Party ID * Time period						
Comparator: Conservative 87-96						
Lab*97-09	0.153	0.079	0.017	<.001	0.119	0.186
Lab*10-16	0.089	0.034	0.019	<.001	0.051	0.127
None*97-09	0.053	0.03	0.017	0.002	0.02	0.087
None*10-16	0.021	0.01	0.018	0.251	-0.015	0.057
O/DK/R*97-09	0.043	0.014	0.023	0.058	-0.001	0.088
O/DK/R*10-16	0.067	0.018	0.025	0.007	0.018	0.116
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period						
Comparator: 87-96						
LA*97-09	-0.053	-0.035	0.021	0.014	-0.095	-0.011
LA*10-16	-0.048	-0.027	0.023	0.034	-0.093	-0.004
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Party ID * Time period						
Comparator: Conservative 87-96						
LA*Lab*97-09	0.043	0.017	0.026	0.107	-0.009	0.094
LA*Lab*10-16	0.071	0.022	0.029	0.014	0.014	0.127
LA*None*97-09	0.01	0.004	0.029	0.732	-0.047	0.067
LA*None*10-16	0.001	0	0.031	0.984	-0.06	0.061
LA*O/DK/R*97-09	0.053	0.013	0.034	0.118	-0.013	0.119
LA*O/DK/R*10-16	0.061	0.014	0.036	0.086	-0.009	0.131
Age Comparator: 18-34						
35-49	-0.108	-0.074	0.007	<.001	-0.122	-0.095
50-64	-0.174	-0.111	0.007	<.001	-0.189	-0.16
65+	-0.133	-0.078	0.009	<.001	-0.149	-0.116
Sex Comparator: Male						
Female	-0.025	-0.019	0.005	<.001	-0.035	-0.015
Ethnicity Comparator: BAME						
White	-0.023	-0.009	0.011	0.027	-0.044	-0.003
Education Comparator: No quals						
Intermediate	-0.014	-0.01	0.007	0.045	-0.028	0
Degree	-0.066	-0.038	0.01	<.001	-0.085	-0.046
Region Comparator: North						
South and Midlands	0.064	0.047	0.006	<.001	0.052	0.075
London	0.046	0.023	0.009	<.001	0.029	0.064
Social class Comparator: Salariat						
Intermediate	0.018	0.013	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.031
Working	-0.004	-0.002	0.008	0.607	-0.019	0.011

Table C29 Cont'd

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.152	0.175	0.004	0	0.145	0.16
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.034	-0.03	0.005	<.001	-0.044	-0.025

n = 49,111

The image of the relationship between social values and attitudes towards welfare among Conservative identifiers portrayed by Table C21 and Table C25 is mirrored by Table C29. The statistically significant coefficient of 0.094 linked with Conservatives during period two confirms that this group were slightly more sceptical of the welfare state during 1997-2009 than was the case previously, while the similarly-sized coefficient of 0.13 linked with Conservative identifiers during period three suggests that views towards welfare among this group subsequently remained broadly stable. Meanwhile, the statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.053 linked with the relationship between social values and views towards welfare among Conservative identifiers during period two indicates that this association was somewhat weaker during 1997-2009 than was the case previously, while the similarly-sized coefficient of -0.048 linked with the relationship between social values and views towards welfare among Conservative identifiers during period three suggests that the strength of this association subsequently remained consistent. In concert with the results contained within Table C21 and Table C25, Table C29 demonstrates that in the absence of any marked shift in party cue, the relationship between social values and attitudes towards welfare followed a similar trajectory among Conservative backers as it did among society as a whole.

Further, Table C29 demonstrates that the picture among Labour identifiers is markedly different from that among Conservatives. The significant positive coefficient of 0.153 linked with Labour supporters during period two confirms

that attitudes towards welfare among this group were considerably more negative during 1997-2009 than they were previously. Meanwhile, switching the model's reference category from 1987-1996 to 1997-2009 produces statistically significant negative coefficients of -0.153 for Labour supporters during period one and -0.064 for Labour supporters during period three¹¹⁵. Rebutting the suggestion offered by the results contained within Table C27, Table C29 highlights that Labour identifiers during the 2010s became more positive towards the welfare state once more – although not to the extent witnessed prior to 1997.

Crucially, Table C29 also adds further weight to the suggestion that while the relationship between social values and attitudes towards welfare among Labour supporters remained consistent across periods one and two, this link may have strengthened during period three. Although the coefficient representing the power of this association during 1997-2009 relative to 1987-1996 is insignificant, the coefficient of 0.071 representing the connection between views on welfare and social values among Labour identifiers during 2010-2016 holds a *p*-value of 0.014. In suggesting that this association was significantly more powerful among Labour supporters during period three, Table C29 supports the proposition that the Labour party's movement in a pro-welfare direction during the 2010s may have had a greater impact upon the views of its libertarian supporters than its authoritarian supporters.

Table C30 also echoes the results of earlier analysis of the dynamics of the relationship between social values and attitudes towards EU membership among Conservative identifiers. The statistically significant coefficient of 1.257 linked with Conservatives during period two confirms that this group were somewhat more sceptical towards Britain's ties with Europe during 1993-2009 than was the case previously, while the coefficient of 3.093 indicates that Euroscepticism among this group was even more pronounced during 2010-2016.

¹¹⁵ For full regression results based on a model designating Conservative identifiers between 1997 and 2009 as its reference category, see Annex C (Tables CX4(a)-CX4(b)).

Table C30 Core values and EU membership preference by Party identity controlling for demographic characteristics, 1987-2016 periodised

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.242	0.039	0.521	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.487	1.627	0.124	<.001	1.277	2.073
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	0.228	1.257	0.087	0.008	1.06	1.489
10-16	1.129	3.093	0.099	<.001	2.549	3.754
Party ID <i>Comparator:</i> <i>Conservative</i>				<.001		
Labour	0.377	1.457	0.101	<.001	1.196	1.776
None	0.421	1.524	0.103	<.001	1.246	1.863
O/DK/R	0.304	1.356	0.129	0.019	1.052	1.747
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Party ID <i>Comparator:</i> <i>Conservative</i>				0.488		
Lib-Auth*Labour	0.151	1.163	0.162	0.35	0.847	1.597
Lib-Auth*None	-0.057	0.945	0.179	0.75	0.665	1.342
Lib-Auth*O/DK/R	-0.075	0.928	0.213	0.726	0.612	1.408
Party ID * Time period <i>Comparator: Conservative 87-91</i>				<.001		
Lab*93-09	-1.251	0.286	0.119	<.001	0.227	0.361
Lab*10-16	-0.984	0.374	0.14	<.001	0.284	0.492
None*93-09	-0.647	0.524	0.118	<.001	0.416	0.66
None*10-16	-0.528	0.59	0.132	<.001	0.455	0.764
O/DK/R*93-09	-0.756	0.469	0.157	<.001	0.345	0.638
O/DK/R*10-16	-0.176	0.839	0.181	0.333	0.588	1.197
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator:</i> <i>87-91</i>				0.651		
LA*93-09	-0.045	0.956	0.144	0.754	0.721	1.267
LA*10-16	0.08	1.084	0.166	0.629	0.782	1.501
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Party ID * Time period <i>Comparator: Conservative 87-91</i>				0.009		
LA*Lab*93-09	0.186	1.205	0.189	0.323	0.832	1.744
LA*Lab*10-16	0.27	1.311	0.224	0.227	0.845	2.032
LA*None*93-09	0.257	1.293	0.203	0.207	0.868	1.925
LA*None*10-16	0.025	1.025	0.229	0.913	0.655	1.605
LA*O/DK/R*93-09	0.838	2.312	0.256	0.001	1.4	3.817
LA*O/DK/R*10-16	0.895	2.447	0.292	0.002	1.379	4.341

Table C30 Cont'd

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
Age Comparator: 18-34				<.001		
35-49	0.271	1.311	0.048	<.001	1.194	1.44
50-64	0.376	1.456	0.05	<.001	1.319	1.607
65+	0.366	1.442	0.056	<.001	1.293	1.608
Sex Comparator: Male						
Female	-0.006	0.994	0.033	0.858	0.931	1.061
Ethnicity Comparator: BAME						
White	0.335	1.397	0.082	<.001	1.189	1.642
Education Comparator: No quals				<.001		
Intermediate	-0.308	0.735	0.042	<.001	0.677	0.798
Degree	-0.826	0.438	0.073	<.001	0.379	0.505
Region Comparator: North				0.048		
South and Midlands	0.092	1.096	0.037	0.014	1.019	1.18
London	0.047	1.048	0.061	0.446	0.929	1.181
Social class Comparator: Salariat				<.001		
Intermediate	0.284	1.329	0.042	<.001	1.223	1.444
Working	0.334	1.397	0.05	<.001	1.268	1.54
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	-0.242	0.785	0.025	<.001	0.747	0.825
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	0.156	1.169	0.037	<.001	1.087	1.257

n = 24,186

Meanwhile, the insignificant coefficients linked with the relationship between social values and attitudes towards Europe among Conservative identifiers during periods two and three indicate that the strength of this association remained consistent over time. As is the case with Table C24 and Table C28, Table C30 highlights that in the wake of the increasingly Eurosceptic messaging emanating from their party of choice, libertarian and authoritarian Conservatives appear to have shifted their views in equal measure.

Table C30 also illustrates that the trajectory of attitudes towards Europe among Labour identifiers differs from that among Conservatives, with the odds of a

Labour supporter holding Eurosceptic views significantly lower in period two than in period one before increasing once more in period three. Meanwhile, as at Table C24 and Table C28, the exponent representing the relationship between views on EU membership and social values among Labour supporters during period two is insignificant; following the Labour party's policy reversal on European integration, Table C30 shows that the views of both libertarian and authoritarian Labour identifiers became more pro-European in tandem.

Finally, the exponent contained within Table C30 representing the link between views on Britain's ties with Europe and libertarian-authoritarian scale score among Labour supporters during period three stands at 1.311. Although this figure offers a hint that the relationship between EU membership preference and social values may have been stronger among Labour identifiers during 2010-2016 than had been the case previously, its associated *p*-value of 0.227 prevents us from stating with confidence that this is the case. While the slightly higher – and statistically significant – coefficient of 1.395 displayed at Table C28 firmly supported the proposition that the Labour party was less successful in shaping the views of its libertarian identifiers than its authoritarian identifiers during the 2010s, Table C30 does not offer the same degree of backing.

Preliminary conclusions IV

A number of consistent findings can be drawn from the above analysis. Firstly, among Conservative identifiers each regression model paints the same picture of the relationship between social values and attitudes over time. Aside from a subtle loosening of the link between views towards welfare and social values among this group during the late-1990s and 2000s that mirrors the pattern across society as a whole, this relationship remains consistent throughout this study's timeline. In combination with the results discussed in the previous chapter, this enables us to assert not just that Conservative supporters respond to the cues emanating from their party of choice, but that both libertarian and authoritarian

Conservative backers appear to recalibrate their preferences in equal measure following a change in party cue. These models are also united in suggesting that throughout the majority of this study's timeline, this pattern is also visible among Labour supporters. While the previous chapter indicated that Labour partisans adjust their attitudes in the wake of a change in the policy direction of their party of choice, the above analysis suggests that through to the late 2000s both libertarian and authoritarian Labour partisans were equally willing to realign their preferences with those of their preferred party following a change in its stance.

Where these results are less consistent, however, is on the issue of whether this pattern was sustained among Labour identifiers during the 2010s. Modelling the link between social values and attitudes towards welfare among Labour supporters without accounting for additional factors offers an early indication that libertarian Labour backers may have responded more readily than authoritarian Labour backers to the party's move away from its neo-liberal position on welfare. The introduction of demographic and value-based controls initially results in this finding becoming statistically insignificant, however extending the model beyond just Labour identifiers and instead fitting it to this study's entire sample suggests that the relationship between social values and views on welfare among Labour supporters during the 2010s was significantly stronger than it had been previously. Meanwhile, early modelling of the link between social values and attitudes towards EU membership among Labour identifiers hints that authoritarian Labour supporters may have shifted their views more markedly than libertarian Labour supporters following the party's muting of its pro-European stance. Although this finding is just short of statistical significance, the introduction of controls results in a coefficient representing the relationship between social values and EU membership preference during the 2010s that is significant. That said, the extension of this model to cover this study's entire sample produces a figure with an associated *p*-value that is beyond the bounds of statistical significance, reducing the confidence with which we can

state that the relationship between social values and views on Europe among Labour supporters during the 2010s was stronger than it had been previously.

Conclusions

The findings of Results A and Results B illustrate that both social values and partisan identity powerfully shape attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. Building from these foundations, this study's third research question asks whether England's two major parties are able to shape the attitudes of their supporters from across the value spectrum, and whether their ability to do so has strengthened or weakened over time.

This chapter finds that for the bulk of this study's timeline, an individual's social value perspective made little difference to their willingness to respond to a change in cue emanating from their party of choice. Ripples of the Labour party's shift in a more anti-welfare direction during the mid-1990s are observable in equal measure among both Labour authoritarians who might be expected to respond more readily to a change in policy stance that accords with their values, and among Labour libertarians who might be expected to be more resistant to such a cue. Meanwhile, the change in perspective of both major parties towards EU integration during the early 1990s is seen to have impacted the views of partisans with contrasting value predilections; Labour authoritarians are observed to have shifted in a pro-European direction to the same extent as Labour libertarians, while Euroscepticism is seen to have increased in equal measure among Conservative identifiers from across the social value continuum. This observation provides an answer to the first portion of this study's third research question: in large part, England's two major parties appear able to shape the attitudes of their supporters with diverse value positions towards both welfare and EU membership.

However, during the final portion of this study's timeline, indications emerge that – for one party at least – the ability to carry its supporters from across the social values continuum with it in the wake of a change in policy stance may have weakened somewhat. Results of regression analysis are united in confirming that partisan cues continued to shape the views of both libertarian and authoritarian Conservative supporters to the same degree during the 2010s. However, some (though not all) models of the relationship between attitudes and social values among Labour identifiers indicate that during this period the Labour party struggled to unanimously persuade its supporters from across the value spectrum of the merits of a new policy stance. More specifically, signs emerge that Labour identifiers whose social values might be expected to conflict with their preferred party's new position did not recalibrate their views to the same extent as Labour identifiers whose social values were in accord with this new stance. For instance, the results of a number of the models contained within this chapter suggest that following the Labour party's revision of its neo-liberal stance towards the welfare state, the resultant pro-welfare shift in attitudes was more marked among libertarian Labour supporters than among their authoritarian fellow partisans. Similarly, a number of this chapter's models of the relationship between attitudes towards the UK's EU membership and social values among Labour identifiers suggest that the party's mitigation of its avowedly pro-European position may have resulted in an increase in Euroscepticism among its authoritarian backers of a greater magnitude than that observed among Labour-supporting libertarians.

These results represent a response to the second portion of this study's third research question. Between 1987 and 2016, individuals who identified with the Conservatives were equally as likely to absorb the cues disseminated by their party of choice regardless of their social value perspective. The same pattern is also visible among Labour backers throughout the majority of this study's timeline. However, during the 2010s the Labour party's pro-welfare cues may just have been responded to with greater gusto by its libertarian supporters whose

values accorded with this change in position, while the party's turn away from avowed pro-Europeanism might perhaps have been more clearly reflected in the attitudes of its authoritarian supporters whose values concurred with such a shift.

7.

Conclusions and discussion

THIS STUDY BEGAN BY posing three original research questions addressing the role of core values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues in the formulation of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership over time. The results of analysis based upon high-quality survey data spanning three decades provide answers to these questions, plugging several gaps in the knowledge base and advancing current understanding of the interplay between each of these elements in shaping views towards two contested political issues.

This chapter collates these results before considering their wider implications. First, a summary of key findings is provided, with gaps in the current evidence base reappraised in light of the evidence provided by this study. The broader theoretical implications of these findings for how we understand attitudinal change over time are then considered, before their practical consequences for the future policy avenues open to each of England's major parties are addressed. Finally, a discussion of the limitations of this study is offered together with a series of suggestions for future research.

Summary of results

Values

This study's first research question addressed the role of core values in the formulation of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership. It asked about the extent to which an individual's political and social values shape their views in each sphere, and whether the influence of the latter of these dimensions has strengthened or weakened over time. Analysis contained within Results A emphasises the central role of social values in shaping contemporary public opinion in England. It demonstrates that although political values are linked with attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's

EU membership at the main effect level and via a small yet statistically significant interaction with social values, it is the latter value dimension which powerfully structures opinion in both areas. Meanwhile, the possession of authoritarian social values is associated with scepticism in both spheres, with authoritarians more likely than libertarians to hold welfare-sceptic and Eurosceptic attitudes.

The observation that social values strongly influence attitudes towards EU membership supports the findings of a number of existing studies (see, for example, Swales, 2016; Evans and Menon, 2017; Hobolt, Leeper and Tilley, 2021). It also reinforces the various dichotomous distinctions offered by the literature between ‘identity-liberals’ and ‘identity-conservatives’ (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020), ‘Anywheres’ and ‘Somewheres’ (Goodhart, 2017), and ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘parochials’ (De Vries, 2018), each of whom are positioned as adopting opposing perspectives towards European integration as a result of their social outlook. However, the finding that social values play a fundamental role in shaping preferences towards the welfare state is perhaps more surprising; even in a sphere typically viewed as structured primarily by left-right or ‘political’ values, an individual’s position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum exerts a powerful influence over individual-level attitudes. These results support the theoretical work of researchers such as van Oorschot (2006), Crepaz (2006), and Staerklé *et al.* (2012) who identify a series of potential linkages between attitudes towards welfare and social values. Meanwhile, by demonstrating that the libertarian-authoritarian dimension is strongly associated with more generalised welfare preferences, these results build on the work of Baumberg-Geiger (2017) and Garritzmann *et al.* (2018) who observe a link between social values and specific aspects of welfare provision such as ‘benefits-related morality’ and ‘workfare’ reforms. The centrality of social values – a dimension less well-articulated by the traditional system of party competition in Britain than political values – in structuring public opinion across both spheres also offers support to the assertions of scholars such as Hooghe and Marks (2018) and Vössing (2021)

who argue that the cleavage between more socially progressive libertarians and more socially conservative authoritarians represents “the new fundamental dividing line” in modern western democracies (*ibid.*, p.492).

How ‘new’ this cleavage really is, however, is doubtful. Analysis suggests that social values exert a powerful influence over attitudes towards both the welfare state and European integration throughout this study’s timeline. This finding develops prior analysis of the drivers of welfare preferences (for example, Ford, 2006) and views towards EU membership (for instance, Clements, 2009) by demonstrating that an individual’s position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum is powerfully associated with their attitudes in both spheres over a period spanning almost three decades. Meanwhile, the broad temporal stability of these associations perhaps contradicts expectations derived from the work of post-materialist scholars such as Inglehart (1991) and Flanagan (2003) that social values may have become more closely intertwined with attitudes towards welfare and European integration over time. Libertarian-authoritarian values appear vital for understanding the distribution of attitudes in both spheres, and according to the results of this study this has been the case since at least the late-1980s.

Party identity and shifting party cues

This study’s second research question addressed the role of partisanship and shifting party cues in shaping attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership. It asked whether changes in the policy position of England’s two major parties towards both welfare and European integration from the late-1980s through to the mid-2010s were reflected in the views of those who identify with each party. The results contained within Results B illustrate that in both spheres, attitudinal change among Labour and Conservative identifiers maps neatly onto the dynamic policy positions of both parties over time. These findings build upon

the experimental work of Cohen (2003), Coan *et al.* (2008), and Pannico (2020) by demonstrating the real-world impact of shifting party cues upon attitudes towards two contested policy issues; in both areas, parties exert a powerful ‘weathervane’ effect whereby a change in policy direction on the part of a political party precedes a recalibration of attitudes among its identifiers.

Analysis demonstrates that party cue effects are observable throughout this study’s timeline. Shifts in the perspective of England’s two major parties towards Britain’s relationship with Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s appear to have shaped the attitudes of those who identify with each party, as did the signals sent out by both parties during the 2010s. Meanwhile, Labour’s change in perspective on welfare during the mid-to-late 1990s was mirrored in the preferences of its identifiers, just as the party’s revision of its stance during the 2010s appears to have led to a further recalibration of attitudes among its supporters. These observations extend the findings of the small number of existing studies focusing on the impact of party cues over a sustained period (for example, Curtice, 2010; Stevens, 2013) by demonstrating that changes in party positioning during the first half of the 2010s – a particularly febrile period in British politics – had a powerful impact upon the attitudes of partisans in both policy areas, just as they had done previously.

Meanwhile, these findings offer little backing for the proposition that party cue effects may be considerably more marked in one sphere than the other. Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) suggest that welfare preferences may be particularly susceptible to party cue effects due to the centrality of welfare to the traditional pattern of party competition, while Torcal *et al.* (2018) speculate that views on European integration may be especially amenable to the influence of party cues due to the complexity of debates around EU membership. However, in echoing the findings of previous work undertaken in each sphere separately (for example, Hobolt, 2007; Slothuus and Bisgaard, 2021), these results indicate that party

cues are capable of exercising a powerful influence over the attitudes of partisans in both domains despite differences in their inherent characteristics.

Finally, analysis demonstrates that both social values and party identity appear to exert an independent influence over attitudes towards welfare and EU membership. Differences in the views of libertarians and authoritarians in both spheres remain clear irrespective of party ties. At the same time, a change in party positioning is seen to precede a recalibration of attitudes among partisans even when social values are accounted for. Reinforcing the assertion of Kam (2005), these results suggest that both core values and party identity offer a path to attitude formulation; parties have the capacity to act as ‘weathervanes’ and shape the views of their supporters, but they do so against an attitudinal backdrop that is powerfully structured by social values. Consequently, political parties might be expected to face the prospect of a values-based ‘dividing line’ when adjusting their policy stance in these areas. As supporters of each of England’s major parties adopt a variety of positions along the libertarian-authoritarian continuum, the values of a considerable chunk of partisans – irrespective of party stripes – might be expected to lead them to resist the direction set out by their party of choice towards the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership.

The cross-value functionality of party cues

Building from these foundations, this study’s third research question addresses the interplay between values and party cues in shaping attitudes towards the welfare state and Britain’s EU membership. It asks whether England’s two major parties have the capacity to shape the views of their supporters who adopt opposing value perspectives in equal measure, and whether their ability to do so has changed over time. Analysis contained within Results C demonstrates that although partisans with opposing social values typically adopt contrasting sets

of attitudes in both spheres, for a sustained period the ability of parties to instigate a change in these attitudes with a shift in policy perspective did not vary according to the social values held by individual party supporters. While it was suggested at the outset of this study that a policy shift in a direction associated with social liberalism or social conservatism might 'activate' partisans with either libertarian or authoritarian social values to a greater extent than their fellow partisans with opposing social values, between the late 1980s and the end of the 2000s these results provide little supportive evidence for this proposition. Instead, policy shifts were typically followed by attitudinal change among both authoritarian and libertarian party identifiers in broadly equal measure.

These results also indicate that for a sustained period, the ability to act as a 'weathervane' irrespective of the structural role of social values was shared by both the Conservatives and the Labour party. Earlier in this investigation, a suggestion was offered that the slightly greater numbers of libertarians backing Labour and the slightly higher proportion of authoritarians supporting the Conservatives might presage differences in the ability of each party to affect the attitudes of identifiers from across the social value continuum with a change in party cue. Counter to these expectations, from the late-1980s through to the end of the 2000s a shift in policy position on the part of either party was followed by a recalibration of attitudes among that party's supporters regardless of their position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum.

Results C's findings further demonstrate that the Conservative party appears to have retained the ability to speak effectively to its supporters with diverse social values into the 2010s. However, they offer an indication that between 2010 and 2016 the Labour party may have struggled to carry its supporters from across the social value spectrum with it following a shift in policy position as successfully as it had done before. Although not united in their results, a range of regression models contained within Results C suggest that during the first half of the 2010s

Labour libertarians were more likely to respond to a cue in a pro-welfare direction than their authoritarian counterparts, while Labour authoritarians were more willing to respond to a Eurosceptic policy shift than Labour libertarians. These findings offer a hint that for the Labour party, the powerful link between social values and attitudes towards welfare and EU membership may have come to represent an obstacle to its capacity to induce wholesale attitudinal change among its supporter base in these areas.

Discussion

These findings offer significant insight into the role of core value orientation, party identity, and shifting party cues in the formation of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership over time in the real world. They also hold a series of wider theoretical and practical implications that expand our understanding of the mechanisms underpinning attitudinal change towards contested political issues, and provide a platform for making assertions about the likely role of each of these elements in shaping both public opinion – and the policy options available to England's major political parties – in future decades.

Structure and change

As detailed in this study's introductory chapter, aggregate-level views towards both the welfare state and the UK's relationship with Europe shifted considerably between 1987 and 2016. Anti-welfare sentiment appeared to increase markedly during the late-1990s and 2000s before falling away somewhat during the first half of the following decade, while scepticism towards Britain's EU membership rose steadily from the early 1990s onwards before undergoing a sharp increase during the 2010s. Meanwhile, Results A demonstrated that views in both spheres are closely tied to social values, with scepticism towards the aims and objectives of the welfare state and the merits of the UK's relationship with Europe strongly

associated with the adoption of a more socially conservative, authoritarian outlook.

However, analysis shows that this relationship alone appears incapable of explaining the significant attitudinal changes observed at the aggregate level in both areas. Results A examined the proposition that these alterations could be attributable to a shift in the prevalence of one social value perspective over another; if the proportion of those in society adopting an authoritarian outlook has increased over time, for example, the level of scepticism towards both the welfare state and Britain's role in Europe might be expected to have risen in tandem. However, results demonstrate that shifts in the distribution of social values do not tessellate neatly with long-term changes in opinion towards either welfare or Europe. Although the hike in welfare-scepticism during the late 1990s coincides with a point at which authoritarian values appear slightly more prevalent, the same cannot be said about the consistently higher levels of welfare-scepticism observed throughout the 2000s. Meanwhile, major increases in societal-level Euroscepticism during the 2010s occurred against a backdrop of authoritarian values becoming less – rather than more – widespread.

Given the lack of support for this proposition, Results A further considered the possibility that aggregate-level shifts in each domain could instead be symptomatic of a modification in the underlying relationship between attitudes in each sphere and the values that underpin them. Rather than being driven by changes in the overall prevalence of contrasting social values, perhaps societal-level movements in opinion were instead the product of attitudinal transformation occurring at a disproportionate rate among those with a distinctive set of social values. However, analysis indicates that the link between libertarian-authoritarian value perspective and attitudes in both spheres remained broadly stable throughout this study's lifetime; despite some prior undulation in the power of the association between social values and views on

welfare and Europe, results indicate that during the mid 1990s this link stabilised and remained consistent throughout the decades that followed.

Thanks to their key role in structuring opinion in both domains, social values might be expected to be central to the processes underlying attitudinal change. However, neither the movement of society in a generally more libertarian direction nor changes in the nature of the latent relationship between social values and attitudinal perspective over time provide a satisfactory explanation for shifts in the levels of scepticism towards both institutions observed over a period spanning three decades. This suggests that considering values alone does not appear to advance our understanding of how and why such change occurs. Instead, the findings of this study highlight partisan cues – and their capacity to transcend the values divide – as crucial in driving attitudinal change. As both of England's major parties acquire their support from across the social value spectrum, their ability to induce a wholesale shift in the views of their supporters throughout the majority of this study's timeline following a change in policy stance helps us to understand how attitudinal change can occur in the context of two policy areas in which views are powerfully linked with libertarian-authoritarian value perspective. In short, while social values help us to understand the *structure* of public attitudes, considering partisan identity – and alterations in the stance of England's major political parties over time – is crucial if we are to understand attitudinal *change*.

While this conclusion offers novel insight in the context of the ability of party cues to operate across the social value spectrum, in a broader sense it echoes the position advocated by Heath, Curtice, and Jowell (1985) as far back as the mid-1980s. In the wake of changes in the political behaviour of working-class voters observed following the 1983 general election, these authors argued that shifts in opinion or electoral preference cannot simply be put down to demographic change or attitudinal dealignment. Rather, to be fully understood, such shifts

must be viewed against the backdrop of “changes which have nothing at all to do” with the underlying configuration of public opinion (*ibid.*, p.38). Although these authors focused on the relationship between attitudes, vote choice, and socioeconomic class while this study addresses the link between attitudes, party identity, and social values, both share a fundamental conclusion; attitudes are formulated within a context, and political parties play a central role in shaping and altering that context over time.

Parties as opinion leaders

Relatedly, these findings reinforce the key link between the positions that major political parties choose to adopt and the views of their supporters. From the 1980s through to the mid-2010s the results of this study position political parties as key drivers of attitudes among their identifiers and demonstrate that, despite some qualification latterly, parties possess the ability to shift opinion among their supporters towards contested political issues no matter what social values those supporters hold close to them.

Undoubtedly parties are operating within a complex and multifaceted attitudinal environment, and a range of competing explanations have been put forward for the trajectory of attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK’s EU membership. Turning first to the former, both Taylor-Gooby (2004) and Clery (2012) highlight a potential link between public opinion and economic conditions during the 1980s and early 1990s, with attitudes moving in a pro-welfare direction in the wake of economic stagnation due either to perceptions of rising social need or economic self-interest (Baumberg, 2014). Economic shifts combined with perceptions of increasing levels of poverty may also offer a contributory rationale for the softening of attitudes during the 2010s, with views towards welfare changing as claimants were considered to be more in need (Baumberg Geiger et al., 2023). Further, changing attitudes towards welfare at specific points

in time fit the thermostatic model of public opinion first expounded by Wlezien (1995; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). In accordance with the assertion that the electorate send signals to policymakers to adjust the status quo when the ‘temperature’ differs from that which they desire (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson, 2010), views on welfare appeared to soften both under the relatively punitive administrations of Thatcher and Major and alongside significant cuts in welfare spending during the 2010s.

Meanwhile, a range of competing explanations have also been offered for changes in public opinion towards Britain’s relationship with Europe. That attitudes turned in a notably more Eurosceptic direction during the mid-1990s, for instance, coincides with the EU’s decision to ban British beef exports in the wake of the BSE crisis (Evans, 1998; Curtice and Evans, 2015), while the increased politicisation of issues surrounding monetary union throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s may have driven a rise in anti-European sentiment during this period among groups in society with higher levels of opposition to the Euro (Evans, 2000; 2003). The enlargement of the EU to encompass ten new member states in 2004 and its subsequent expansion in 2007 to include Romania and Bulgaria has also been linked with increased levels of Euroscepticism (see, for example, Longhi and Rokicka, 2012; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), while the increase in the proportion of those expressing a wish to leave the EU during the 2010s further coincides with UKIP’s rise to prominence during the life of the 2010-2015 parliament – a party with the express aim of ending Britain’s membership of the EU (Usherwood, 2016).

These perspectives enrich our understanding of attitudinal shifts at specific junctures. However, many alternative accounts of opinion change in the sphere of EU membership focus on key events, limiting their utility over a longer period. Meanwhile, In the case of attitudes towards welfare, theories that fit the trajectory of opinion during the earlier and (to a slightly lesser degree) later stages

of this study's timeline marry up less well with the pattern of public opinion during its midsection. Data covering the period following the 2008-09 recession, for example, suggest that welfare-scepticism failed to wane as it had done in the wake of previous economic downturns (Pearce and Taylor, 2013). Meanwhile thermostatic theory fails to explain the dynamics of attitudes to welfare during the 2000s, a period during which the shift towards more punitive 'workfare' principles was not accompanied by a softening of public opinion (Deeming and Johnston, 2018).

In contrast, the principle that changing party cues have the potential to transform public attitudes offers an explanation that consistently fits the data, with the pattern of attitudes in each area over time following markedly different trajectories among supporters of each major party. Although operating within a whirlwind of parallel processes – and alongside other heuristic sources including interest groups (Arceneaux and Kolodny, 2009), subject 'experts' (Wang, 2021), and media outlets of both the traditional (Entman, 1989) and social (Porten-Cheé and Eilders, 2020) – these findings suggest that political parties have the power to fortify support for long-standing political institutions via their impact upon the attitudes of their identifiers or to contribute to their erosion and collapse, even those that appear to have a bedrock of backing among individuals with a particular social value perspective.

That this is true in two very different attitudinal contexts suggests that this effect may occur in other policy spheres in which views are strongly linked to social values. Existing research suggests that libertarians and authoritarians typically adopt contrasting positions on a diverse range of issues including the environment (Johnston and Deeming, 2016), same-sex relationships (Park and Rhead, 2013), and immigration (Ford, Humphrey and Wilson, 2024), yet in each of these areas the cues emanating from political parties have also been shown to shape opinion among their supporters (see Clements, 2014; Hartevelt,

Kokkonen and Dahlberg, 2017; Linde, 2020). In light of this, the observation that party cues have the ability to overcome value-based differences and drive attitudinal change even among those who might be expected to oppose a particular policy position suggests that parties bear significant responsibility for the direction of public opinion in such spheres. Meanwhile, that these mechanisms have been detected across a sustained period indicates that parties have the capacity to mould views towards key emerging issues upon which libertarians and authoritarians may be expected to adopt different positions, including technological development (Peng, 2023), large-scale public health interventions (Mellon, Bailey and Prosser, 2021), and those seeking refuge and asylum (Torres, 2019).

This observation perhaps has further significance. Although the attitudes of those who hold authoritarian values may differ from those who adopt a more libertarian outlook, and although social value orientation is strongly linked to socio-demographic characteristics such as age, education, and social class, stubborn support for or opposition to political institutions at the individual level is not simply written in the stars. As Sobolewska and Ford (2020, p.280) suggest, “demography is not destiny”. Instead, parties have the ability to author – or at least extensively edit – the story of an individual’s attitudinal perspective, notwithstanding their social values or the socio-demographic attributes that may contribute to these.

Party cues and polarisation

These results also have implications for theories of political polarisation. Differences in issue preferences are an essential part of a functioning democracy (Lipset, 1959). However, the health of a democracy is threatened when these differences solidify and divide society into opposing groups (Hobolt, Leeper and Tilley, 2021). This crystallisation of conflicts may lead to ideological polarisation, with individuals becoming more likely to adopt an “extremity of political views”

around a particular set of underlying values (*ibid.*, p.1477). Increased polarisation can result in societies becoming “split into mutually distrustful ‘Us vs Them’ camps” (McCoy and Somer, 2019, p.234; see also McCoy, Rahman and Somer, 2018), removing the common ground required for democracy to function effectively and making it difficult for citizens to coexist peacefully (Stavrakakis, 2018).

The question of whether polarisation has deepened in Britain in recent decades, and whether the UK represents an increasingly divided kingdom, has generated significant debate (Duffy *et al.*, 2019; Juan-Torres, Dixon and Kimaram, 2020; Grechyna, 2023). This discussion intensified further in the years following the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, with differences in policy preferences seen to crystallise into new political identities based around Remain and Leave (see, for example, Curtice and Montagu, 2019; Evans and Schaffner, 2019; Tilley and Hobolt, 2023). However, in spite of these developments Perrett (2021) utilises BSA data spanning 1986-2018 to show that ideological polarisation along libertarian-authoritarian lines remained largely stable in Britain for over three decades. Although Brexit may represent one of “a small set of takeoff issues” where individuals adopt opposing and entrenched positions (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007, p.784), Perrett argues that the majority of attitudinal trends broadly support the existence of ‘parallel publics’; those with opposing social values may hold different issue preferences, but these preferences move in similar directions over time while the attitudinal difference between each group remains relatively stable.

The results of this study fit with Perrett’s findings, and illustrate how party cues can instigate attitudinal change without significantly increasing levels of ideological polarisation. Analysis demonstrates that attitudes towards two key policy issues – the welfare state and the UK’s relationship with Europe – are closely tied to social values. As both major parties in England draw on the support of individuals from across the social value spectrum, and as analysis further

indicates that both parties are for the most part able to take their supporters with them in a new direction irrespective of the social values they hold, a change in party cue is generally unlikely to expand the attitudinal distance between libertarians and authoritarians. Instead, party supporters from across the libertarian-authoritarian continuum may be expected to respond to such a shift by recalibrating their views to fit with their preferred party's new stance, leaving the gap between social liberals and social conservatives at a societal level largely unchanged. This assertion supports the contention of Baldassarri and Bearman (2007, p.784) that "attitudes rarely polarise, even though people believe polarisation to be common".

Moreover, if enhanced ideological polarisation is considered deleterious for democracy, the observation that party cues in large part operate successfully across the social values spectrum can perhaps be seen as good news for the health of Britain's political system. Indeed, a shift in party positioning that results in divergence between England's two largest parties may help to sustain democracy by offering voters genuine choice between two distinctive approaches, without resulting in the 'toxic' effects of ideological division which can include a weakening of respect for democratic norms, a deepening of intolerance and discrimination, and a decline in societal trust (Milačić, 2021; Talisse, 2021). As noted by Diamond (1990, p.40), "democracy requires conflict – but not too much"; that individuals from across the social value spectrum tend to readjust their attitudes in light of a change in party cue might therefore be seen as helping to maintain the balance between conflict and consensus that enables democracy to function effectively.

A deviation among Labour identifiers?

These findings demonstrate that party cues can – and generally do – operate successfully across the social value spectrum. From the late-1980s through to the end of the 2000s, a shift in the position of either of England's two major parties

towards the welfare state or the UK's EU membership was followed by a readjustment of issue preferences among both its libertarian and authoritarian supporters in broadly equal measure. More recently, however, the results of this study hint at something of a deviation from this general principle. Between 2010 and 2016 analysis indicates that authoritarian Labour supporters may have been more resistant to the party's shift in a pro-welfare direction, while libertarian Labour identifiers may have been less willing to reflect the party's altered stance on Europe via a shift in their own attitudes. A range of possible explanations for this development might be derived from the literature, allowing us to speculate on the reasons why the Labour party could have encountered difficulties in carrying its supporters from across the social values spectrum with it during the 2010s and how it may overcome this issue.

Nature of cues

One possible explanation could be drawn from the nature of the cues offered by the Labour party on welfare and Europe during the early part of the 2010s. This study's literature review identified that the impact of a party cue may be moderated by the level of clarity it offers to party supporters. It noted previous research suggesting that the clearer a party's stance on an issue, the larger the effect of its cues upon the policy preferences of its identifiers (Kobayashi and Yokoyama, 2018, p.63). It also highlighted existing work demonstrating that as the clarity of party messaging declines, "the impact of party cues on partisans diminishes" (Brader, Tucker and Duell, 2013, p.1508).

With this in mind, perhaps the cues emerging from the Labour party on welfare and Europe during the 2010s lacked the clarity or conviction required to persuade its supporters from opposite sides of the social values divide to toe the party line. Although under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership from 2015 onwards the party's cues on welfare looked markedly different to those distributed during the late 1990s

and 2000s, Sage (2019, p.101) argues that Labour's messaging under Ed Miliband during the first half of the 2010s was relatively cautious by comparison due to a fear of "apparently tough public attitudes on benefit recipients". Meanwhile, Hertner and Keith (2017, p.82) suggest that under Miliband the profile of the party's messaging on Europe was deliberately reduced in an attempt to "depoliticise or defuse EU issues for fear of losing votes", with Corbyn's subsequent comment that he stood at "seven, or seven and a half out of ten" on Britain's EU membership doing little to illuminate the party's position any further (Hertner, 2016). Although this approach might have formed part of a strategic attempt to avoid losing the support of either its libertarian or authoritarian backers, perhaps it instead had the effect of leaving the door open for those whose values conflicted with the party's stance to choose not to follow its lead.

The potential impact of this lack of clarity may have been exacerbated further by the salience of issues connected with both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership during the 2010s. This study's literature review referenced research suggesting that high levels of issue salience may decrease the impact of party cues (Arceneaux, 2008), with additional work indicating that the more an individual cares about an issue, the more critical they may be of the cues emanating from their party of choice (Bullock, 2019). While the salience of both welfare and EU integration peaked at specific points during the first half of the 2010s (Sage, 2019; Milazzo, Trumm and Townsley, 2020), throughout this period considerable political and media attention was also devoted to two related areas in which attitudes are heavily linked with social values: the 'deservingness' of welfare recipients (Baumberg, 2016) and EU immigration (Diffley, 2015). In such a high-salience climate, perhaps the absence of clear messaging from their preferred party was even more likely to lead to Labour supporters looking to their own social values rather than to the position of their party of choice when formulating their attitudes.

Supporter composition

A second possible explanation, however, might lie in the composition of the party's supporter base. This study's literature review noted several authors who attribute the result of the 2016 EU referendum to a schism between the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation (Hobolt, 2016; Curtice, 2017), or between a 'university-educated middle class' and the 'left behind' (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Heath, 2016a). Although Brexit represented a large-scale electoral exposure of these splits, Evans and Tilley (2017, p.201) state that "it would be wrong to believe that these divisions are in any sense new, even if they have not been so effectively expressed for many years". This dovetails with the arguments presented by Ford and Goodwin (2014, p.137) that traditional working-class groups who felt "alienated, left behind and angry" by long-term political and social changes contributed to the rise of UKIP from the mid-2000s onwards, and by Sobolewska and Ford (2020, p.3) that such changes have mobilised "demographic divides into political competition" over a period spanning several decades. It also links to the broader suggestion that many Western democracies, including the UK, are suffering what Waylen (2015, p.495) describes as "a serious crisis of representation, participation and legitimacy", which in Britain is characterised by falling turnout at general elections (Uberoi, 2023), decreasing trust in institutions (Seyd, 2024; Valgarosson et al., 2025), and scepticism of the motives and abilities of political leaders (Hall et al. 2022). These developments are particularly noted among those who fall into Ford and Goodwin's 'left-behind' category, including working-class voters (Uberoi and Johnston, 2022) and those struggling financially (Curtice, Montagu and Sivathanan, 2024).

Of England's two major parties, it is perhaps Labour that suffered the most from this schism. Goodwin and Heath (2016b, p.323), for example, suggest that the 2016 EU referendum worked to "crystallise and exacerbate" ideological differences between educated middle-class Labour backers who hold more liberal social values and their 'left-behind' counterparts who are typically more

socially conservative, while Ford and Goodwin (2017, p.18) submit that in the years preceding the ballot the latter group had “gradually lost faith in Labour as a party that represented them and responded to their concerns”. These suggestions appear to have been borne out by the results of subsequent UK general elections, with the party going on to lose a considerable proportion of its vote share between 2017 and 2019 in traditionally Labour-held seats in the north of England characterised as ‘left behind’ (Ford *et al.*, 2021; Hooper, 2023). Viewed in this light, perhaps the results of this study reveal a divide between the party’s more socially liberal identifiers and its more authoritarian ‘left behind’ supporters that, despite coming to a head in 2016, had been bubbling under the surface during the first half of the 2010s, with both groups increasingly unwilling to take heed of a party cue that went against the grain of their social values.

Meanwhile, this growing divide may have been further intensified by the increasing discrepancy between the class composition of Labour’s traditional supporter base and the pool from which its politicians are drawn. Evans and Tilley (2017, p.126) note that “signals can be sent by the things politicians and parties say and do, but they can also be sent by the background of politicians themselves”. As university-educated professionals have come to dominate mainstream politics, Ford and Goodwin (2017, p.19) argue that ‘left behind’ voters have become increasingly “cut adrift” not just in terms of the policy priorities of a more dominant socially liberal elite, but also in terms of their representation within the ranks of England’s major parties. Once again it is the Labour party that has suffered the most from this development, with the presence of fewer working-class Labour MPs in recent decades resulting in a growing perception among its supporters that the party with which they identify has become “less responsive to the concerns of the working class” (Heath, 2018, p.1056). Perhaps, then, the cues offered by the Labour party during the 2010s failed to convince its more socially conservative supporters to readjust their attitudes due to a belief that the party no longer has their interests at heart, while

its more socially liberal supporters were unwilling to respond to a party cue that rubbed against their social value perspective after becoming increasingly used to having things their own way.

Longevity and impact

Should the nature of the cues distributed by Labour during the first half of the 2010s represent the main source of its apparent difficulty in speaking as effectively to its supporters with opposing social values as it had done before, there is little to suggest that this pattern need necessarily continue. This study finds that parties are for the most part capable of carrying their identifiers with them with a change in party cue irrespective of their social values. As a result, rather than attempting to “ride both horses at once” (Curtice, 2021a, p.423) on contested policy issues such as welfare and Europe, the distribution of a clearer, more convincing set of cues that leave little room for doubt about its stance might go some way to returning the party to a position where it is able to shape the views of both its libertarian and authoritarian backers in equal measure.

In contrast, should divides within the Labour party’s supporter base be pinpointed as the key source of its apparent difficulty in carrying its identifiers with opposing social values with it during the first part of the 2010s, addressing this issue is likely to be more complex than simply enhancing the clarity of party messaging. Although the profile of specific issues capable of bringing the division between social liberals and social conservatives to a head may rise and fall over time (see, for example, Surridge, 2023), the results of this study support existing work demonstrating that the underlying cleavage between those with opposing social values represents a key attitudinal dividing line across multiple policy areas – and one that is likely to remain in situ for the foreseeable future (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Stenner and Haidt, 2018). As a result, for as long as division within its supporter base endures, the challenge that the Labour party appears to

face in speaking to its supporters from across the libertarian-authoritarian continuum is liable to continue.

This may carry practical consequences for the range of policy options available to the party in future. Researchers have long pointed to an increase in the prevalence of libertarian values in western democratic societies (see, for example, Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) – observations that have been replicated in the British context by both Tilley (2005) and, more recently, Duffy *et al.* (2023). Such a trajectory is confirmed by the findings of this study, both at a societal level¹¹⁶ and among supporters of both major political parties in England¹¹⁷; not only have the values of the electorate as a whole become more libertarian, but so have the values of both Conservative and Labour supporters. On the face of it, this development might be expected to disincentivise both parties from pursuing policy approaches that resonate with those who hold more socially conservative values. However, if parties are able to effectively carry both their libertarian and authoritarian supporters with them following a change in party cue, even in an environment where the proportion of authoritarians appears to be diminishing their ability to journey down more socially conservative policy paths may remain alive and well.

For Labour in more recent years, however, this does not seem to have been the case. Instead, between 2010 and 2016 its more authoritarian cues seem to have held less sway over the attitudes of its socially liberal supporters, while its more socially liberal party cues appear to have had less impact upon the attitudes of its authoritarian backers. This places the party in something of a bind. For as long as the party continues to face difficulties in speaking effectively to its supporters from both sides of the social values divide, it may become increasingly incentivised to follow more socially liberal policy pathways as a way of keeping a

¹¹⁶ See Figure A5 in Results A.

¹¹⁷ See Figure C17 in Results C.

growing majority of its supporter base satisfied. In contrast, any gains to be made from the pursuance of more socially conservative policy approaches may shrink over time as the proportion of authoritarians both at a societal level – and within its supporter base – continues to decrease. Nevertheless, although it might appear politically expedient for the party to play increasingly to the interests of the somewhat larger socially liberal portion of its identifiers, doing so risks further intensifying a feeling among the still-sizeable section of the party's affiliates who hold more authoritarian social values that their party of choice is failing to offer them a political voice.

With the potential risks for the party's prospects of keeping together its coalition of voters from across the social values continuum associated with the adoption of a stance towards the welfare state or the UK's relationship with Europe that is either avowedly socially liberal or conspicuously socially conservative, perhaps these findings might be interpreted as encouraging an approach that attempts to appease those at both ends of the spectrum. This, indeed, appears to be reflected in the party's present-day tactics in both arenas. In line with Sir Keir Starmer's claim during his 2022 party conference speech that Labour represents "the party of the centre-ground" (Starmer, 2022) the party advocates a welfare system which seeks to achieve 'more fair and more just' provision yet describes welfare reform as a 'moral imperative' (Starmer, 2025), and regularly expresses a desire to foster close links with the European Union (Lawless, 2023) while at the same time emphasising that "there's no case for going back to the EU" (Quinn, 2023). Such an approach, however, carries its own jeopardy. As discussed above, should the party's stance appear unclear or muddled as a result of its attempt to straddle the values divide, its difficulties in holding its supporter base together may continue. Meanwhile, now that the party finds itself in government, occupying ambiguous or inconsistent policy positions may leave it vulnerable to being out-manoeuvred by opposition parties with a stronger appeal to those at either end of the liberal-authoritarian spectrum (Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2019)

and struggling to set out “a strong image of its own identity and its location within the major political debates of our age” (McDaniel, 2023) while also facing a fight to keep its own MPs united (Mason and Stacey, 2025).

Instead, if divides among its supporter base do indeed represent the primary cause of Labour’s apparent inability to speak effectively to its supporters from across the social value spectrum during the early part of the 2010s, perhaps the true long-term solution is likely to lie in attempting to address the roots of these divides. At a minimum, this might require convincing the party’s ‘left-behind’ supporters that it remains capable of addressing their interests via a focus on the reduction of the economic inequalities between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation (Rodríguez-Pose, Terrero-Dávila and Lee, 2023). Just as importantly, however, it may also require a demonstration that the voices of both sets of supporters are capable of influencing mainstream political discourse, and that the concerns of both groups will be treated with equal levels of respect and concern (Gidron and Hall, 2017).

Limitations and avenues for future research

Substantive limitations and suggestions

The results of this study enable impactful conclusions to be drawn about the ability of party cues to shape the attitudes of partisans from across the social value spectrum. However, these findings carry with them a number of substantive limitations which leave open a series of avenues for future research.

Timespan

The first of these limitations is represented by the window of time this study covers. Although its results provide novel insight into the interaction between

core values and partisan identity throughout a particularly tumultuous period in British politics, they do not allow assertions to be made about how these processes operate either before this window opens or after it shuts. This leads to the first recommendation for additional research in this area: to extend the timeframe covered by this study by delving further into the past or reaching beyond the mid 2010s.

Options for exploring the state of play prior to 1987 are limited by data availability. Although Tilley's (2005) use of British Election Study data to examine social value change in Britain back to 1974 suggests that such an endeavour is possible, this approach requires the creation of alternative and relatively untested indicators of social value perspective which utilise items not designed to form a composite scale to plug the gaps between the early 1970s and the introduction of BES's conventional libertarian-authoritarian scale in 1992. Extending this enquiry beyond 2016, however, is considerably more feasible. Since the UK's vote to leave the EU, each annual wave of BSA has included the question that from 1993 onwards comprises this study's dependent variable on attitudes towards Britain's role in Europe (albeit with slight amendments to both the question stem and the answer options available to respondents¹¹⁸). Meanwhile, BSA's battery of items on attitudes towards the welfare state has remained unchanged, as have the questions comprising the survey's core value scales and those gathering individual-level information on partisan identity.

In addition to being methodologically achievable, taking this analysis beyond 2016 is substantially desirable. This period has seen a significant realignment of libertarian and authoritarian voters with both of England's major political parties between 2017 and 2019 (Ford *et al.*, 2021) together with the emergence of new

¹¹⁸ This item now reads as follows: 'Leaving aside the result of the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, what do you think Britain's policy should be? Should it be to... Be outside the European Union, Be part of the EU but try to **reduce** the EU's powers, Be part of the EU and try to keep the EU's powers as they are, Be part of the EU and try to **increase** the EU's powers, Work for the formation of a single European government'.

political identities based around support for, or opposition to, the UK leaving the EU (Curtice, 2018; Evans and Schaffner, 2019; Tilley and Hobolt, 2023). Taken together, these developments suggest not just that the balance of libertarians and authoritarians within the supporter base of each party may have shifted in recent years, but also that there may exist alternative, cross-cutting, and issue-specific identities that sit alongside traditional conceptions of partisanship. Meanwhile, since the conclusion of this study further notable shifts have taken place in the Labour party's perspective towards both the welfare state and the UK's relationship with Europe under the leadership of both Jeremy Corbyn (Manwaring and Smith, 2020) and Keir Starmer (Crerar and Butler, 2023). In light of the suggestion that the Labour party might have struggled to speak with conviction to its supporters with contrasting social values in each of these spheres during the 2010s, undertaking research into how these more recent shifts in policy perspective were received by Labour identifiers from across the social value spectrum represents an opportunity to examine whether these signs have since intensified or faded.

Breadth of policy areas

Attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's EU membership were selected as testing grounds for this study due to their status as exemplars of politically contested policy domains in which attitudes were likely to be structured by core value perspective, and towards which the stances of England's major parties have shifted over time. The processes uncovered by this project might therefore be expected to underpin attitudinal change in other areas with similar characteristics. However, as this study's focus on the interaction between social values and partisan identity over time is novel, there is currently no empirical evidence of how this interaction functions outside of these areas.

BSA data offers numerous possibilities for future research into the impact of social values, party identity, and shifting party cues in other contested policy areas with close ties to an individual's position on the libertarian-authoritarian continuum. One such domain is the environment. Aggregate-level attitudes towards the environment and climate issues have shifted markedly over time (Hinchliffe, 2022), while studies indicate that views in this area are likely to be strongly linked to both social value orientation (Johnston and Deeming, 2016; Smith and Hempel, 2022) and party support (Fisher, Fitzgerald and Poortinga, 2018). Meanwhile, the cues offered by England's major political parties on the environment and climate change have shifted in notably different directions during recent decades. Although Godfrey (2012) highlights early instances of cross-party consensus on the environment, Carter (2006, p.764) finds that the messages emanating from the Labour party during the 1990s and early 2000s were "consistently 'greener'" than those distributed by the Conservatives before David Cameron's identification of environmental protection as a priority following his election as party leader in 2005. Despite both parties adopting a broadly pro-environmental position in the years that followed (see, for example, Jowit, 2010), scepticism towards policies designed to tackle climate change subsequently increased among a vocal minority of Conservative MPs during the 2010s and early 2020s (Carter and Clements, 2015; Paterson, Wilshire and Tobin, 2024). This shift in stance was reflected in then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak's promise immediately before the 2024 UK General Election to prioritise "energy security and your family finances over environmental dogma" (Sunak, 2024) – a statement which contrasted markedly with the guarantee offered by Labour leader Sir Kier Starmer to accelerate the UK's progress to net zero and "make Britain a clean energy superpower" (Labour, 2024).

BSA carries a range of questions on attitudes towards environmental issues that have been asked on a regular basis over recent decades, offering the potential for a fruitful extension of this seam of work beyond the attitudinal contexts explored

here¹¹⁹. A further recommendation for future research in this area is therefore to utilise the rich data provided by BSA to expand this study's interrogation of the interaction between social values and partisan identity over time into additional policy spheres.

Geographical coverage

A third substantive limitation can be derived from this project's geographical focus. As discussed in this study's introduction, England – rather than Britain or the UK as a whole – was selected as the unit of analysis due to differences in the distribution of attitudes towards both welfare and Europe, patterns of partisanship, and the balance of core values between it and its immediate neighbours. As a result of England's distinctiveness, the insight offered by the findings of this study might not directly translate to other spatial contexts either within the UK or further afield.

An additional recommendation for further research in this area is therefore to investigate the interplay between core values, party identity, and shifting party cues in other nations. While the availability of rich data on English attitudes towards contested political issues such as the welfare state and the UK's EU membership stretching back over a sustained period facilitated the rooting of this enquiry in England, opportunities to undertake similar analysis elsewhere are plentiful. For instance, although BSA's relatively small sample size and less-than-universal coverage in Scotland means that utilising BSA data to study attitudes north of the border beyond the aggregate level carries with it significant methodological caveats (see, for example, NatCen, 2016, p.7), since its inception in 1999 BSA's stablemate – the Scottish Social Attitudes survey – has included

¹¹⁹ For example, since 2011 BSA has asked its respondents whether or not they believe that climate change is taking place, between 1990 and 2017 BSA asked a suite of questions about the environmental impacts of car and plane travel, and at irregular intervals since 1993 BSA has asked about the relationship between climate change and economic growth.

each of the items comprising this study's independent variables together with a suite of questions on attitudes towards both the welfare state and the UK's relationship with Europe on a regular basis¹²⁰.

Further afield, much of the previous research on party cue effects has been undertaken in the USA. Examining the role of social values, party affiliation, and party cues in attitude formulation represents an opportunity to further develop this body of work. Since 1972, The National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey (GSS) has carried questions on a diverse range of contested policy issues including state welfare (Smith and Son, 2019) and the United States' role in global affairs (NORC, 2023a; NORC, 2023b), in addition to civil liberties (Smith, Son and Schapiro, 2015), gun control (Smith and Son, 2015), reproductive rights (Smith and Son, 2013), and immigration (Pryce, 2018). Meanwhile, the survey also includes items on party affiliation (Levy and Razin, 2020) and core values (Linneman, 2012). GSS data therefore offer a potentially productive route to examining the interplay between social values, partisan preference, and shifting party cues over an extended timeframe in a context within which much of the existing knowledge of party cue effects is rooted.

Methodological limitations and suggestions

Cross-sectional versus longitudinal data

In addition to these substantive limits, the nature of the data employed by this study also bounds the scope of its conclusions. The project's key data source, the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey, represents "a paragon of quality in survey research" (Bartle, Dellepiane and Stimson, 2010, p.217). The breadth of issues covered by the survey and the rich socio-demographic, political, and

¹²⁰ For example, each year since 1999 SSA has asked its respondents about the level of benefits for unemployed people, while on a more irregular basis the survey has also carried the question comprising the second portion of this study's dependent variable measuring attitudes towards EU membership.

value-based information collected from its respondents offer unparalleled opportunities to examine the role of values, party preference, and shifting party cues in the formulation of attitudes. Meanwhile its commitment to the repeated assessment of attitudes across sustained periods using consistent measures allows for an accurate understanding to be garnered of attitudinal change over time. However, BSA's repeated cross-sectional design – which involves interviews with a fresh sample of respondents at each wave – represents something of a limitation in the specific context of this project.

This limitation does not apply to all elements of this enquiry. Data gleaned from repeated cross-sectional surveys such as BSA are regularly used to produce a detailed picture of attitudinal change both at the aggregate level (see, for example, Hills, 2002; Hudson *et al.*, 2020; Montagu and Maplethorpe, 2024) and among specific sub-groups (see, for instance, Rothon and Heath, 2003; Curtice, 2010). Meanwhile, as core values are typically conceptualised as developing in early adulthood (Schwartz, 2014; Kiley and Vaisey, 2020) and as remaining stable and consistent throughout an individual's life course (Surridge, 2012), cross-sectional data also suits an analysis of the links between core values and policy preferences over time at both the societal level (see, for example, Park and Surridge, 2003; Tilley, 2005) and the individual level (Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996; Sturgis, 2002). However, greater caution is needed when analysing party effects over time using cross-sectional data.

While this study positions parties as powerful agents of attitudinal change, an alternative proposition – as discussed in Results B – is that individuals instead switch party allegiance in the event that a party's revised stance no longer fits their issue preferences (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 2001; Evans, 2002). Guarding against this possibility, the measure of party affiliation employed by this study goes beyond electoral history or current vote intention and instead utilises the concept of 'affective attachment'; an individual is classed as a 'party identifier'

only if they display a deeper sense of underlying loyalty to a particular party. This measure ascribes a degree of stability to an individual's partisan alignment, with those who report 'belonging' to one party or another likely to retain this sentiment over time rather than switching their allegiance following a change in policy stance on the part of their preferred party (Dalton, 2016). Meanwhile, analysis contained within Results B indicates that changes over time in the proportion who identify with each of England's major parties do not explain the dynamics of the association between social values, partisan preference, and shifting party cues observed throughout this study's timeline. However, as Curtice (2010) asserts, this point can only be settled if the same participants are interviewed on multiple occasions over an extended period of time. In short, while BSA data offers unparalleled advantages for the purposes of this study, only panel data offers the opportunity to unequivocally demonstrate causality.

Thanks to their repeated questioning of the same individuals over time, longitudinal surveys are "well-suited to the statistical analysis of both social change and dynamic behaviour" (Ruspini, 2002, p.27). That said, the lack of suitable data may hamper any attempt to undertake retrospective analysis of the interplay between social values, partisan identity, and shifting party cues using existing panel datasets¹²¹. However, future work in this area may involve the collection of novel longitudinal data designed to facilitate such analysis, with potential vehicles for this including the British Election Study's Internet Panel (BES, 2023) and the NatCen Panel (NatCen, 2024c). This leads to an additional recommendation for further research: the testing of how these dynamics play out in future years using longitudinal survey data collected specifically for the purpose of examining the role of core values, party identity, and shifting party cues in attitude formulation.

¹²¹ For example, although Understanding Society has incorporated a range of attitudinal variables since its inception in 1991 as the British Household Panel Survey (Understanding Society, 2023), these fall far short of the breadth of public opinion data offered by BSA.

Measurement consistency

An additional limitation to this study is represented by inconsistency over time in the composition of its dependent variables. As discussed in Data and Methods, this study's measure of an individual's generalised attitudes to welfare is the product of the amalgamation of a series of questions compiled almost four decades ago by primary BSA researchers to form a composite scale. However, the questions included within this scale were altered by the research team during the early part of the 2000s in an attempt to tap more accurately into contemporary views on welfare (Park *et al.*, 2001). Meanwhile, this study's measure of attitudes towards Europe is comprised of two questions, the earliest of which – despite making infrequent reappearances in later years – was largely replaced in 1993 with a more nuanced item employing updated terminology and designed to gather more granular attitudes towards the UK's EU membership via a wider range of answer options (Curtice and Evans, 2015).

That these items were revised and updated by the primary research team has the major benefit of ensuring that the concepts and language they utilise remain contemporary and relevant, allowing for an accurate assessment of where the public stand in two highly contested policy arenas. However, it also opens up the possibility that an individual registering a specific welfare scale score or being identified as Eurosceptic during the early years of this study may have registered a different welfare scale score or been labelled as Europhile had they participated in BSA later on in this project's timeline – not through a change in attitudes, but because of alterations in the instruments used to gauge these attitudes.

Although short-lived, Figure I1 does in fact show a dip of around 0.2 in the annual mean welfare scale score achieved by BSA respondents between 2000 and 2001 which may be attributable to a change in the composition of the welfare scale across these years. This fluctuation however appears to have evened out by the

following year, while the Cronbach's alpha score associated with the survey's welfare scale is gauged at over 0.9 between 2000 and 2002 – indicative of a high degree of consistency over time in the latent attitude being tapped into by the scale despite a change in its composite variables¹²². Meanwhile, as demonstrated by Figure I2 the decline in the proportion of individuals classified as Eurosceptic between 1991 (the final year in which this figure is calculated using BSA's initial item on attitudes towards Britain's place in Europe) and 1993 (the inaugural appearance of BSA's updated variable) is broadly in line with the downturn in anti-European sentiment exhibited during previous years. Further, the reappearance of the survey's earlier variable in select years during the 1990s and 2010s allows for the undertaking of regression analysis that suggests a high level of overlap between the sentiments gathered by each item¹²³. While it is important to acknowledge such inconsistencies where they occur, analysis suggests that we can nonetheless be confident about the veracity of this study's findings.

Conversely, rigidity in the composition of one this study's key independent variables may be pointed to by some as an additional limitation. BSA has measured social values in a consistent fashion since the introduction of its libertarian-authoritarian scale in 1986, a feature which offers significant methodological advantages. However, the items which comprise the scale focus on issues that reflected the underlying value schism between libertarians and authoritarians at the time of its development during the 1980s (see Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996) including the legitimacy of the death penalty, the teaching of obedience in schools, and censorship in literature and the arts. This opens the scale up to the criticism that it fails to consider more contemporary debates upon which social liberals and social conservatives may be divided. In short, as social value measures are “products of their day and age” (Everett, 2013, p.2), that

¹²² See Annex T (Table T7).

¹²³ See Annex T (Tables T8-T38).

deployed by BSA may be viewed by some as past its 'use-by' date (Henningham, 1996). By way of comparison, a series of more modern touchstone issues are referenced by alternative scales designed to measure social value orientation; the British Election Study's 'balanced' libertarian-authoritarian scale, for example, incorporates questions addressing the right to protest and attitudes towards same-sex relationships, while scales utilised by researchers such as Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Enggist and colleagues (2025) contain items on immigration, international political integration, and views towards the right of same-sex couples to adopt children.

That said, BSA's social value scale encapsulates several debates that remain central to the modern libertarian-authoritarian divide, including the importance of 'traditional British values' (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020), preferences for criminal sentencing (Loader, 2020), and law and order (Caluori, 2024). Moreover, despite the appeal of instruments which reference highly salient areas of contention Everett (2013) argues that "it is preferable that one has a validated scale"; the ability of BSA's battery of items to tap successfully into social values has been demonstrated repeatedly over successive decades (see, for example, Heath et al., 1994; Evans and Butt, 2007), with significant work in this area undertaken by NatCen as recently as 2024 (Moller Vallgarda and Steen, 2024). In sum, while future research may seek to triangulate the link between attitudes, social values, and party preference using an alternative libertarian-authoritarian measure, existing research suggests that we can be confident in the ongoing ability of BSA's scale to reveal the divide between social liberals and social conservatives while its consistency over time offers a persuasive counterpoint to any remaining concerns over its contemporary reliability.

Missing data

The presence of missing datapoints during this study's timeline forms a further methodological limitation. Firstly, both 1988 and 1992 represent fallow years for

BSA when financial resources were instead diverted to the undertaking of the 1987 and 1992 post-election waves of the British Election Study (SCPR, n.d.-b). The absence of data in these years – the first of which coincides with the point at which the Conservative government replaced Supplementary Benefit with the less generous Income Support and increased the age at which young people were able to access income assistance from 16 to 18 (Harris, 1988) while the second of which corresponds to the year in which the Treaty of the European Union was signed at Maastricht (Berrington and Hague, 1998) – restricts this study’s ability to shed light on the precise distribution of attitudes at these junctures.

In addition, although BSA has run in every year since its pause in 1992, the survey has not carried the questions that comprise its welfare scale on each of its annual iterations without fail. In 1990 and 1997 it omitted these items, resulting in two further gaps in this time series – the second of which coincides with New Labour’s 1997 general election victory and comes at the point at which the attitudes of Labour supporters in particular appeared to be shifting in an anti-welfare direction. Meanwhile, in 2007 and between 2009-2011 BSA did not include its regular item on attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership, leading to gaps in this time series towards the end of the 2000s – a period which immediately follows the strengthening of the political powers of the EU through the ratification of the Lisbon treaty (Piris, 2010, esp. p.325) and encompasses both a ramping up of Conservative Euroscepticism and the beginnings of a dilution in the formerly avowedly pro-EU stance of the Labour party.

A further point to note is the absence of usable data on core value perspective in select years. This occurs in 1997 – a year in which the bulk of BSA funding was once again assigned to the British Election Study, resulting in a “scaled-down” iteration of BSA on which BES’s alternative ‘balanced’ value scale items were

carried in place of the survey's standard value scale batteries¹²⁴. Meanwhile, in both 1991 and 1993 BSA's value scale items appeared on a different version of the survey to that containing its question on the UK's role in Europe. As a result, no participant responded to both the survey's questions on core values and its item on EU membership preference, precluding any analysis of the relationship between the two.

Two features of this study's analytical strategy mitigate the impact of missing data in individual years. Firstly, the partitioning of time series data into three segments covering extended stretches of time reduces the impact of discrete missing datapoints, focusing on public opinion during longer periods as opposed to individual annual readings. Secondly, this periodisation is structured by changes in the policy stance of both major parties toward both the welfare state and the UK's EU membership, rather than by the precise distribution of each dependent variable at specific points. That said, it cannot be guaranteed that were data available at these points, the state of attitudes in each period – or the relationship between views in each arena and this study's independent variables – would not be gauged slightly differently.

A further suggestion for future research is therefore the replication of these findings using an alternative data source, with a potential candidate for this role being the British Election Study. As with BSA, BES data possesses its own limitations. Due to its primary function as an election study BES data is only collected in the wake of a UK general election¹²⁵, limiting the scope for analysis incorporating shorter time periods. BES also contains less in the way of consistent measures of attitudes towards the welfare state and the UK's relationship with the EU, while attempts to explore the interplay between social

¹²⁴ See Data and Methods for more details on the discrepancy between BSA and BES value scales.

¹²⁵ Although since 2014 surveys using the British Election Study's Internet Panel have been carried out between elections, the cross-sectional random probability BES continues to run only in the wake of a UK general election (see Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2021).

values, party cues, and attitudes prior to the introduction of its value scales in 1992 may prove challenging (although, as demonstrated by Tilley (2005), not impossible). Despite these obstacles, ratification of the results of this study via a second high-quality data source would reinforce the conclusion that its findings reflect reality rather than representing artefacts of the data chosen for analysis.

Quantitative methodology

A final methodological constraint stems from this study's broader quantitative approach. Overarching methodological decisions "are always theoretically loaded" (Silverman, 2010, p.117), and choices should be derived from a project's research questions and the theoretical assumptions that underpin them rather than any perception of a single approach as "in principle 'better' or 'more virtuous'" than another (Bechhofer, 1996, p.584). This study set out to test a series of hypotheses around the role of core values and partisan identity in the formulation of public opinion, understand the interplay between measurable characteristics, and extrapolate the results of its analysis to a wider population. These objectives are well-suited to a methodology involving the analysis of high-quality quantitative data – an approach which allows for the construction of complex yet generalisable models of the social world (Polit and Beck, 2010) and the application of tests of statistical significance (Lewis-Back, Bryman and Liao, 2011).

That said, although quantitative methods enable the creation of a robust picture of attitudinal change over time there remains considerable space for complementary research making use of the rich descriptive quality offered by qualitative techniques (see, for example, Curtice, 2021b; Taylor-Gooby, Leruth and Chung, 2019). While the findings of this study draw conclusions from a quantification of the interaction over time between core values and partisan identity, elements of this interaction perhaps represent a Latourian 'black box' with its inputs and outputs known but a significant amount of unexplained

internal complexity remaining (Latour, 1999). Supplementary qualitative work might allow us to break open this black box and look more deeply at the interplay between these elements, shedding light on the cognitive processes individuals engage in when their core value orientation conflicts with the new stance adopted by their party of choice (an issue arising from the work of Kam, 2005) and the extent to which the framing of cues shapes their appeal to partisans with conflicting value perspectives (a question raised by Slothuus and Bisgaard, 2021). Such an approach may also facilitate an understanding of the processes lying behind any changes in the nature of the interaction between core values and party preference among groups of partisans at specific points. For example, although the models constructed as part of this study identify a potential shift in how the interrelationship between these two predilections operates among Labour supporters, data gathered through in-depth interviews or focus groups with Labour identifiers in possession of a range of social values may shed light on why it is that more liberally-inclined Labour supporters have apparently come to feel less willing to follow the lead of their party on Europe and why more socially conservative Labour backers appear more disinclined to absorb their party's position on welfare.

An additional recommendation for further research in this domain is therefore to develop a richer understanding of the processes underlying the interaction between core values and party identity through the application of qualitative methods. Most obviously this may involve the collection of primary qualitative data designed to elicit an in-depth contemporary understanding of the complex interrelationship between these factors. Alternatively, future qualitative research may attempt to incorporate a more temporal element. Although attitudinal data cannot accurately be collected retrospectively (Dale, 2004) the identification and exploration of relevant archived qualitative data may enable a qualitative understanding of the evolution of attitudes over time (see, for example, Kern and Mustasilta, 2023), while researchers might also look to employ a qualitative

longitudinal approach to explore the mechanisms through which these dynamic processes unfold going forward (Neale, 2016).

Conclusion

This study set out to address the role of core values and partisan preference in the process of attitude formulation, and to understand the extent to which England's major parties are able to influence the views of their supporters with a change in party cue regardless of the values they hold. Its findings demonstrate that social values are central to understanding the structure of public attitudes towards two contested political issues – the welfare state and the UK's relationship with Europe. However, it is the role of parties in shaping the attitudes of their supporters via the cues they distribute, and the capacity of these cues to reach across the social values divide, that is key to understanding how and why public opinion in these areas has shifted so markedly over time.

These findings enhance existing knowledge of how change can occur in attitudinal spheres with powerful links to social values. They also have implications for our understanding of whether a change in the cues emanating from major political parties who draw on the support of those from across the social value spectrum is likely to result in increased levels of ideological polarisation. Further, they emphasise the vital role that parties play as opinion leaders, as well as highlighting the dynamic and malleable nature of partisanship. Notwithstanding the enduring perception of Labour as the 'party of welfare', it was the party's transition towards a more neo-liberal conception of the role and function of the welfare state during the mid-1990s which facilitated a long-term shift in attitudes towards welfare provision that, two decades on, was yet to be fully reversed. Meanwhile, although at the start of this study's timeline it was the Conservatives who positioned themselves as the 'party of Europe', the increasingly Eurosceptic stance adopted by the party throughout subsequent

decades played a fundamental role in undermining support for the UK's membership of the EU.

Despite the general principle that parties can shape the views of their identifiers from across the social value spectrum, this study also uncovers subtle signs that – for one party at least – the ability to carry its supporters with opposing social values with it in the wake of a change in policy position might have weakened during the first half of the 2010s. This development may have stemmed from the nature of the cues distributed by the Labour party during this period. Should this be the case, strategic changes to the clarity of party messaging could go some way to restoring the party's ability to speak effectively to its identifiers from across the libertarian-authoritarian continuum. Alternatively, however, this development might be a consequence of long-standing divisions within the party's supporter base rising to the surface. Should this be the case, a more long-term set of solutions focused on addressing the root causes of these divisions might be required before the party is once more able to convince its supporters *en masse* of the merits of a chosen policy direction. Meanwhile, in the short-term at least, the ability of the Labour party to pursue an unbridled range of policy pathways safe in the knowledge that it can take its identifiers with it might – perhaps for the first time in decades – be constrained.

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Collated annexes

Annex I

Introduction:
Values or politics?

Supplementary tables and figures

Table IA1 Welfare scale mean scores, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Mean scale score	2.91		2.88		2.78		2.78
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Mean scale score	2.85	2.93	2.95		3.10	3.09	3.12
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Mean scale score	2.92	3.01	3.02	3.07	3.07	3.03	3.09
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Mean scale score	3.11	3.08	3.10	3.10	3.04	3.02	3.03
	2015	2016					
Mean scale score	3.00	2.90					

Figure IA1 Composite of items comprising BSA’s ‘welfare’ scale. 1987-2016




Table IA1(a) 'The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other', 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	8%		4%		5%		4%
Agree	33%		28%		23%		28%
Neither agree nor disagree	24%		26%		29%		30%
Disagree	31%		36%		37%		33%
Disagree strongly	4%		5%		5%		4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	3%	5%	5%		5%	4%	4%
Agree	29%	31%	27%		30%	28%	31%
Neither agree nor disagree	30%	27%	34%		33%	35%	32%
Disagree	33%	33%	30%		29%	30%	29%
Disagree strongly	3%	2%	3%		1%	2%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Agree strongly	4%	4%	6%	3%	5%	4%	4%
Agree	24%	27%	30%	21%	27%	26%	26%
Neither agree nor disagree	35%	36%	34%	40%	37%	40%	36%
Disagree	33%	28%	26%	31%	27%	27%	29%
Disagree strongly	3%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>	<i>2290</i>
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Agree strongly	5%	4%	6%	5%	6%	5%	4%
Agree	27%	31%	34%	28%	28%	32%	23%
Neither agree nor disagree	38%	39%	33%	38%	36%	36%	41%
Disagree	25%	23%	23%	25%	23%	22%	26%
Disagree strongly	3%	1%	2%	2%	4%	3%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1997</i>

Table IA1(a) cont'd

	2015	2016
Agree strongly	4%	3%
Agree	25%	21%
Neither agree nor disagree	40%	41%
Disagree	26%	29%
Disagree strongly	3%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>

Note: Those who answer 'Don't Know' or 'Refused' are included in the denominator on which the percentages in these tables are based, but are not shown.

Table IA1(b) 'Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help', 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	7%		6%		5%		6%
Agree	24%		22%		21%		19%
Neither agree nor disagree	24%		27%		26%		26%
Disagree	33%		34%		36%		36%
Disagree strongly	11%		9%		10%		12%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	4%	6%	6%		5%	5%	5%
Agree	23%	24%	24%		27%	22%	26%
Neither agree nor disagree	25%	25%	29%		30%	32%	31%
Disagree	39%	36%	32%		32%	35%	33%
Disagree strongly	8%	7%	9%		4%	4%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Agree strongly	5%	8%	9%	8%	9%	4%	8%
Agree	26%	29%	29%	31%	30%	25%	27%
Neither agree nor disagree	31%	31%	30%	33%	34%	38%	35%
Disagree	31%	27%	25%	23%	23%	29%	24%
Disagree strongly	4%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>	<i>2290</i>

Table IA1(b) cont'd

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Agree strongly	8%	6%	7%	8%	8%	7%	7%
Agree	29%	27%	29%	28%	27%	26%	25%
Neither agree nor disagree	35%	34%	34%	35%	36%	36%	36%
Disagree	23%	29%	24%	25%	22%	24%	25%
Disagree strongly	3%	3%	4%	3%	5%	4%	6%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1997</i>

	2015	2016
Agree strongly	6%	4%
Agree	23%	17%
Neither agree nor disagree	38%	39%
Disagree	27%	32%
Disagree strongly	5%	6%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>

Table IA1(c) 'Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one', 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	8%		13%		8%		6%
Agree	36%		43%		32%		22%
Neither agree nor disagree	16%		18%		19%		21%
Disagree	29%		20%		32%		38%
Disagree strongly	10%		5%		8%		12%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	5%	8%	9%		12%	13%	14%
Agree	28%	31%	32%		43%	46%	49%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	22%	22%		22%	22%	19%
Disagree	34%	30%	30%		18%	16%	16%
Disagree strongly	9%	6%	6%		2%	2%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>

Table IA1(c) cont'd

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Agree strongly	17%	16%	18%	17%	17%	14%	16%
Agree	48%	50%	50%	53%	53%	54%	51%
Neither agree nor disagree	19%	18%	16%	19%	19%	20%	19%
Disagree	13%	13%	12%	8%	9%	10%	10%
Disagree strongly	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>	<i>2290</i>
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Agree strongly	18%	11%	12%	15%	15%	13%	15%
Agree	51%	44%	43%	41%	40%	42%	45%
Neither agree nor disagree	19%	25%	24%	23%	22%	23%	19%
Disagree	9%	17%	17%	16%	18%	17%	17%
Disagree strongly	1%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1997</i>
	2015	2016					
Agree strongly	14%	14%					
Agree	48%	43%					
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	25%					
Disagree	12%	15%					
Disagree strongly	2%	2%					
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>					

Table IA1(d) 'If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet', 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	8%		8%		7%		6%
Agree	26%		23%		20%		21%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%		24%		24%		23%
Disagree	31%		33%		36%		35%
Disagree strongly	13%		11%		13%		15%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>

Table IA1(d) cont'd

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	6%	8%	9%		10%	8%	7%
Agree	22%	25%	26%		31%	32%	31%
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	21%	24%		27%	27%	26%
Disagree	36%	33%	28%		27%	28%	30%
Disagree strongly	11%	10%	12%		4%	5%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Agree strongly	9%	10%	12%	12%	13%	9%	13%
Agree	31%	35%	31%	35%	37%	38%	39%
Neither agree nor disagree	24%	24%	27%	27%	24%	26%	22%
Disagree	30%	25%	24%	20%	21%	23%	19%
Disagree strongly	5%	5%	3%	4%	3%	2%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>	<i>2290</i>
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Agree strongly	13%	11%	13%	15%	14%	15%	14%
Agree	41%	40%	44%	39%	39%	39%	40%
Neither agree nor disagree	24%	25%	22%	23%	23%	22%	23%
Disagree	17%	19%	15%	18%	17%	18%	17%
Disagree strongly	3%	3%	4%	3%	2%	4%	5%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1997</i>
	2015	2016					
Agree strongly	12%	10%					
Agree	41%	34%					
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	26%					
Disagree	18%	23%					
Disagree strongly	4%	5%					
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>					

Table IA1(e) 'The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes', 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	16%		16%		15%		13%
Agree	37%		43%		42%		38%
Neither agree nor disagree	24%		24%		23%		26%
Disagree	19%		15%		17%		18%
Disagree strongly	3%		2%		2%		3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	9%	10%	10%		7%	6%	7%
Agree	39%	39%	32%		36%	33%	31%
Neither agree nor disagree	27%	26%	29%		29%	31%	31%
Disagree	21%	21%	24%		23%	26%	27%
Disagree strongly	2%	2%	4%		3%	4%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Agree strongly	7%	7%	6%	4%	4%	4%	4%
Agree	36%	36%	36%	31%	31%	30%	27%
Neither agree nor disagree	30%	27%	29%	30%	31%	35%	33%
Disagree	24%	24%	25%	28%	28%	27%	29%
Disagree strongly	3%	3%	2%	4%	4%	3%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>	<i>2290</i>
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Agree strongly	5%	3%	4%	4%	6%	5%	4%
Agree	29%	23%	24%	23%	28%	30%	24%
Neither agree nor disagree	28%	29%	31%	32%	32%	30%	30%
Disagree	30%	38%	33%	34%	27%	27%	33%
Disagree strongly	6%	5%	6%	6%	5%	6%	7%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1997</i>

Table IA1(e) cont'd

	2015	2016
Agree strongly	6%	5%
Agree	31%	29%
Neither agree nor disagree	29%	34%
Disagree	28%	27%
Disagree strongly	4%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>

Table IA1(f) 'Most people on the dole are fiddling one way or another', 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	7%		7%		6%		8%
Agree	26%		25%		22%		24%
Neither agree nor disagree	28%		32%		31%		31%
Disagree	31%		29%		31%		28%
Disagree strongly	8%		7%		8%		9%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	7%	8%	9%		10%	8%	8%
Agree	27%	25%	26%		29%	29%	32%
Neither agree nor disagree	29%	28%	33%		32%	35%	31%
Disagree	28%	30%	24%		23%	24%	25%
Disagree strongly	7%	7%	6%		4%	3%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Agree strongly	8%	9%	10%	10%	10%	7%	9%
Agree	26%	30%	29%	31%	28%	26%	30%
Neither agree nor disagree	30%	31%	33%	33%	32%	37%	32%
Disagree	29%	25%	22%	21%	24%	26%	23%
Disagree strongly	5%	3%	4%	2%	3%	2%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>	<i>2290</i>

Table IA1(f) cont'd

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Agree strongly	8%	9%	8%	9%	9%	7%	8%
Agree	28%	23%	28%	27%	27%	25%	26%
Neither agree nor disagree	37%	38%	34%	34%	31%	35%	34%
Disagree	21%	25%	24%	25%	24%	25%	24%
Disagree strongly	4%	3%	4%	3%	6%	6%	6%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>	<i>1997</i>

	2015	2016
Agree strongly	7%	5%
Agree	22%	18%
Neither agree nor disagree	36%	37%
Disagree	26%	32%
Disagree strongly	6%	7%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>

Table IA1(g) 'The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain's proudest achievements', 2000-2016

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Agree strongly	18%	19%	16%	17%	15%	17%	13%
Agree	38%	38%	37%	41%	36%	36%	35%
Neither agree nor disagree	30%	30%	31%	29%	34%	32%	36%
Disagree	11%	10%	12%	8%	11%	10%	12%
Disagree strongly	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2515</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Agree strongly	15%	15%	12%	15%	16%	18%	18%
Agree	38%	35%	36%	36%	34%	36%	38%
Neither agree nor disagree	31%	33%	34%	31%	34%	30%	30%
Disagree	12%	11%	12%	12%	12%	10%	9%
Disagree strongly	3%	3%	4%	4%	3%	4%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2290</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>

Table IA1(g) cont'd

	2014	2015	2016
Agree strongly	19%	19%	20%
Agree	34%	36%	37%
Neither agree nor disagree	31%	31%	30%
Disagree	12%	10%	8%
Disagree strongly	3%	3%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>

Table IA1(h) 'Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people's lives', 2000-2016

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Agree strongly	10%	11%	9%	8%	7%	8%	6%
Agree	48%	47%	44%	45%	41%	40%	40%
Neither agree nor disagree	25%	26%	27%	27%	32%	33%	35%
Disagree	14%	13%	16%	17%	16%	17%	16%
Disagree strongly	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2515</i>	<i>2341</i>	<i>2419</i>	<i>719</i>	<i>2185</i>	<i>2274</i>	<i>2409</i>

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Agree strongly	6%	7%	6%	8%	7%	10%	10%
Agree	37%	37%	39%	33%	34%	36%	36%
Neither agree nor disagree	32%	33%	30%	31%	33%	30%	30%
Disagree	20%	18%	20%	22%	22%	19%	20%
Disagree strongly	2%	2%	3%	4%	2%	2%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2290</i>	<i>2585</i>	<i>814</i>	<i>2360</i>	<i>2436</i>	<i>2448</i>	<i>2423</i>

	2014	2015	2016
Agree strongly	10%	10%	11%
Agree	36%	34%	38%
Neither agree nor disagree	32%	34%	33%
Disagree	18%	19%	15%
Disagree strongly	2%	2%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>2432</i>	<i>2090</i>

Table IA1(i) 'The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves', 1987-2000

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	12%		9%		7%		9%
Agree	41%		31%		26%		32%
Neither agree nor disagree	19%		23%		27%		25%
Disagree	23%		32%		32%		28%
Disagree strongly	4%		6%		7%		5%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	10%	12%	12%		10%	10%	9%
Agree	35%	35%	34%		39%	37%	42%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	21%	25%		24%	27%	24%
Disagree	28%	26%	24%		23%	22%	23%
Disagree strongly	4%	3%	5%		2%	2%	1%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>

Table IA1(j) 'People receiving social security are made to feel like second-class citizens', 1987-2000

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agree strongly	15%		14%		12%		12%
Agree	33%		39%		40%		41%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%		23%		23%		23%
Disagree	26%		22%		22%		21%
Disagree strongly	3%		2%		2%		2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1087</i>		<i>1117</i>		<i>2120</i>		<i>2187</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agree strongly	9%	8%	11%		6%	6%	6%
Agree	41%	39%	37%		39%	36%	36%
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	23%	26%		26%	28%	26%
Disagree	23%	26%	22%		26%	27%	29%
Disagree strongly	2%	2%	2%		1%	2%	2%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2522</i>	<i>2655</i>	<i>2620</i>		<i>2159</i>	<i>2111</i>	<i>2515</i>

Table IA2 Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Not Leave	63%		68%	63%	77%		63%
Leave	31%		26%	19%	17%		11%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2402</i>		<i>2571</i>	<i>2395</i>	<i>1233</i>		<i>1243</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Not Leave	77%	80%	71%	69%	75%	80%	75%
Leave	12%	14%	21%	18%	15%	14%	18%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>995</i>	<i>1041</i>	<i>1004</i>	<i>1153</i>	<i>886</i>	<i>902</i>	<i>1928</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Not Leave	76%	76%	76%	74%	74%	75%	
Leave	15%	16%	16%	19%	17%	16%	
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>924</i>	<i>2897</i>	<i>1917</i>	<i>2684</i>	<i>3643</i>	<i>928</i>	
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Not Leave	72%				64%	66%	69%
Leave	21%				31%	26%	26%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>982</i>				<i>939</i>	<i>1854</i>	<i>827</i>
	2015	2016					
Not Leave	72%	54%					
Leave	22%	42%					
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>960</i>	<i>1687</i>					

Table IA2(a) Attitudes towards whether Britain should continue to be a member of the EEC/EC or withdraw, 1987-1991

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Continue	63%		68%	76%	77%
Withdraw	31%		26%	19%	17%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2402</i>		<i>2571</i>	<i>2395</i>	<i>1233</i>

Table IA2(b) Attitudes towards Britain's long-term EU policy, 1993-2016

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Leave the EU	11%	12%	14%	21%	18%	15%	14%
Stay, reduce powers	29%	27%	24%	40%	30%	37%	45%
Stay, maintain powers	22%	19%	20%	18%	18%	23%	20%
Stay, increase powers	21%	27%	28%	8%	15%	7%	9%
Single European govt	8%	9%	8%	6%	6%	8%	6%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1243</i>	<i>995</i>	<i>1041</i>	<i>1004</i>	<i>1153</i>	<i>886</i>	<i>902</i>
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Leave the EU	18%	15%	16%	16%	19%	17%	16%
Stay, reduce powers	40%	39%	36%	33%	39%	36%	37%
Stay, maintain powers	18%	20%	22%	27%	23%	24%	26%
Stay, increase powers	10%	11%	11%	11%	7%	10%	8%
Single European govt	7%	6%	7%	6%	5%	4%	4%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>1928</i>	<i>924</i>	<i>2897</i>	<i>1917</i>	<i>2684</i>	<i>3643</i>	<i>928</i>
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Leave the EU		21%				31%	26%
Stay, reduce powers		36%				37%	40%
Stay, maintain powers		24%				16%	18%
Stay, increase powers		9%				9%	6%
Single European govt		3%				3%	3%
<i>Unweighted base</i>		<i>982</i>				<i>939</i>	<i>1854</i>
	2014	2015	2016				
Leave the EU	26%	22%	42%				
Stay, reduce powers	39%	44%	34%				
Stay, maintain powers	16%	17%	15%				
Stay, increase powers	10%	7%	4%				
Single European govt	4%	3%	2%				
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>827</i>	<i>960</i>	<i>1687</i>				

Annex A

Results A:
Core values

Supplementary tables

Table AA3 Welfare scale mean scores among core value groups, 1987-2016 combined

	Left	Centre	Right
Mean scale score	2.83	3.01	3.15

	Libertarian	Neither	Authoritarian
Mean scale score	2.73	3.08	3.30

Table AA4 Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among core value groups, 1987-2016 combined

	Left	Centre	Right
Not Leave	68%	74%	78%
Leave	26%	20%	17%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>8731</i>	<i>11658</i>	<i>9169</i>

	Libertarian	Neither	Authoritarian
Not Leave	82%	72%	64%
Leave	13%	22%	30%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>10377</i>	<i>9336</i>	<i>7812</i>

Note: Those who answer 'Don't Know' or 'Refused' are included in the denominator on which the percentages in these tables are based, but are not shown.

Table AA5 Libertarian-Authoritarian scale mean scores, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Mean scale score	3.80		3.77	3.70	3.51		3.84

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Mean scale score	3.69	3.74	3.72		3.84	3.84	3.72

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Mean scale score	3.67	3.70	3.71	3.73	3.77	3.73	3.75

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Mean scale score	3.73	3.74	3.69	3.75	3.71	3.70	3.61

	2015	2016
Mean scale score	3.58	3.52

Table AA6 Welfare scale mean scores among social value groups, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Libertarian	2.46		2.54		2.52		2.48
Neither	3.02		2.94		2.91		2.86
Authoritarian	3.24		3.17		3.19		2.94
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Libertarian	2.56	2.58	2.64		2.79	2.82	2.88
Neither	2.91	2.97	3.03		3.11	3.10	3.16
Authoritarian	3.17	3.31	3.27		3.34	3.32	3.39
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Libertarian	2.65	2.74	2.73	2.80	2.81	2.78	2.80
Neither	3.03	3.07	3.04	3.14	3.11	3.09	3.16
Authoritarian	3.21	3.30	3.41	3.34	3.33	3.31	3.40
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Libertarian	2.89	2.82	2.87	2.79	2.74	2.76	2.76
Neither	3.16	3.12	3.19	3.16	3.09	3.09	3.15
Authoritarian	3.34	3.35	3.35	3.38	3.35	3.32	3.38
	2015	2016					
Libertarian	2.75	2.65					
Neither	3.14	3.07					
Authoritarian	3.31	3.26					

Table AA7 Proportion who wish to leave the EEC/EC/EU among social value groups, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Libertarian	23%		18%	13%			
Neither	30%		28%	19%			
Authoritarian	39%		34%	25%			
<i>Unweighted bases</i>							
<i>Libertarian</i>	333		743	766			
<i>Neither</i>	388		756	781			
<i>Authoritarian</i>	362		704	537			
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Libertarian	7%	8%	15%		10%	7%	13%
Neither	14%	16%	17%		12%	13%	18%
Authoritarian	15%	20%	33%		20%	17%	24%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>							
<i>Libertarian</i>	300	326	309		182	196	591
<i>Neither</i>	269	279	278		266	246	589
<i>Authoritarian</i>	260	276	235		272	218	497
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Libertarian	6%	10%	10%	10%	8%	7%	
Neither	17%	16%	16%	21%	17%	17%	
Authoritarian	21%	25%	25%	28%	28%	25%	
<i>Unweighted bases</i>							
<i>Libertarian</i>	302	889	560	807	1018	289	
<i>Neither</i>	256	815	546	710	995	282	
<i>Authoritarian</i>	202	662	405	632	951	213	
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Libertarian	9%				21%	14%	12%
Neither	24%				35%	32%	31%
Authoritarian	36%				42%	41%	43%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>							
<i>Libertarian</i>	331				284	573	289
<i>Neither</i>	287				299	547	200
<i>Authoritarian</i>	237				199	438	167

Table AA7 cont'd

	2015	2016
Libertarian	13%	31%
Neither	25%	52%
Authoritarian	34%	67%
<i>Unweighted bases</i>		
<i>Libertarian</i>	358	673
<i>Neither</i>	250	366
<i>Authoritarian</i>	214	303

Table AX1 Political values *and* Attitudes to welfare, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	2.527		0.010	<.001	2.507	2.547
Left-Right 1 (left) - 5 (right)	0.189	0.218	0.004	<.001	0.182	0.197
R Squared	0.047					

Table AX2 Social values *and* Attitudes to welfare, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.389		0.010	<.001	1.359	1.419
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.437	0.435	0.004	<.001	0.429	0.445
R Squared	0.189					

Table AX3(a) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among political value groups, 1987-2016 periodised

	Left	Centre	Right
1987-1991			
Not Leave	62%	73%	79%
Leave	32%	22%	17%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	2624	2695	2235
1993-2009			
Not Leave	74%	77%	80%
Leave	20%	16%	14%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	4699	6948	5252
2010-2016			
Not Leave	60%	63%	69%
Leave	37%	31%	26%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1458	2046	1630

Table AX3(b) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among social value groups, 1987-2016 periodised

	Libertarian	Neither	Authoritarian
1987-1991			
Not Leave	78%	71%	63%
Leave	17%	25%	32%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	1842	1925	1603
1993-2009			
Not Leave	84%	76%	69%
Leave	9%	17%	25%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	6100	5818	5060
2010-2016			
Not Leave	76%	60%	49%
Leave	20%	35%	46%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	2177	1662	1321

Table AX4 Political values *and* EU membership preference, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-0.591	0.554	0.052	<.001		
Left-Right 1 (left) - 5 (right)	-0.273	0.761	0.020	<.001	0.732	0.792
Nagelkerke R Squared		0.012				

Table AX5 Social values *and* EU membership preference, 1987-2016 combined

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-4.345	0.013	0.105	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.806	2.238	0.027	<.001	2.124	2.359
Nagelkerke R Squared	0.063					

Table AX6(a) Alternative regression model to Table A13, Time period reference category: 87-91, excluding sociodemographic controls

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-3.41	0.033	0.227	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.612	1.843	0.058	<.001	1.645	2.065
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	-0.531	0.588	0.043	<.001	0.541	0.639
10-16	0.453	1.573	0.049	<.001	1.429	1.731
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator:</i> <i>87-91</i>				<.001		
LA*93-09	0.308	1.36	0.069	<.001	1.188	1.558
LA*10-16	0.344	1.41	0.079	<.001	1.208	1.647

Table AX6(b) Alternative regression model to Table A14, Time period reference category: 93-03, excluding sociodemographic controls

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-5.084	0.006	0.151	<.001		
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.919	2.507	0.038	<.001	2.329	2.7
Time period <i>Comparator: 87-91</i>				<.001		
93-09	0.531	1.701	0.043	<.001	1.565	1.849
10-16	0.984	2.675	0.041	<.001	2.467	2.901
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period <i>Comparator:</i> <i>87-91</i>				<.001		
LA*93-09	-0.308	0.735	0.069	<.001	0.642	0.842
LA*10-16	0.036	1.037	0.066	0.583	0.911	1.179

Annex B

Results B:
Partisan identity and
shifting party cues

Supplementary tables

Table BA8 Welfare scale mean scores among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Conservative	3.24		3.17		3.09		3.06
Labour	2.42		2.46		2.42		2.47
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Conservative	3.21	3.27	3.36		3.38	3.32	3.37
Labour	2.54	2.65	2.60		2.89	2.96	2.92
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Conservative	3.14	3.22	3.24	3.29	3.30	3.23	3.31
Labour	2.77	2.82	2.85	2.79	2.89	2.85	2.88
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Conservative	3.32	3.29	3.36	3.36	3.30	3.28	3.28
Labour	2.82	2.81	2.82	2.88	2.76	2.72	2.73
	2015	2016					
Conservative	3.23	3.11					
Labour	2.64	2.59					

Table BA9 Welfare scale mean scores among Conservative and Labour identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	3.20	3.29	3.27
Labour	2.53	2.86	2.74

Table BA10(a) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among Conservative identifiers, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Not Leave	74%		74%	83%	81%		84%
Leave	22%		22%	14%	15%		10%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	901		960	798	432		409
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Not Leave	84%	84%	73%	70%	74%	83%	73%
Leave	11%	15%	22%	22%	18%	15%	24%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	300	258	271	298	222	219	442

Table BA10(a) cont'd

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Not Leave	79%	71%	70%	72%	71%	70%	
Leave	19%	25%	27%	24%	26%	25%	
<i>Unweighted base</i>	197	654	431	619	823	209	
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Not Leave	67%				65%	65%	68%
Leave	30%				35%	33%	30%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	256				225	418	208
	2015	2016					
Not Leave	72%	47%					
Leave	28%	52%					
<i>Unweighted base</i>	290	496					

Note: Those who answer 'Don't Know' or 'Refused' are included in the denominator on which the percentages in these tables are based, but are not shown.

Table BA10(b) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among Labour identifiers, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Not Leave	48%		64%	74%	75%		79%
Leave	45%		30%	22%	18%		10%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	570		697	766	330		374
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Not Leave	83%	82%	74%	73%	77%	79%	81%
Leave	10%	11%	18%	16%	11%	17%	12%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	310	324	335	395	310	286	609
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Not Leave	81%	83%	81%	81%	78%	83%	
Leave	10%	10%	11%	13%	12%	9%	
<i>Unweighted base</i>	331	898	572	695	1159	240	
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Not Leave	79%				70%	74%	75%
Leave	15%				27%	19%	20%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	208				248	453	182
	2015	2016					
Not Leave	77%	64%					
Leave	15%	35%					
<i>Unweighted base</i>	228	421					

Table BA11(a) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among Conservative identifiers by Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	77%	75%	63%
Leave	19%	21%	36%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>3091</i>	<i>5608</i>	<i>1637</i>

Table BA11(b) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among Labour identifiers by Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	71%	81%	73%
Leave	23%	12%	22%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2363</i>	<i>7064</i>	<i>1532</i>

Table BA14 Partisan identity, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Conservative	37%		38%	33%	34%		31%
Labour	24%		27%	32%	28%		30%
Lib Dem	12%		8%	6%	10%		10%
None	25%		24%	25%	26%		26%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2402</i>		<i>2571</i>	<i>2395</i>	<i>2490</i>		<i>2503</i>
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Conservative	28%	25%	27%	26%	23%	23%	23%
Labour	33%	35%	33%	34%	36%	32%	32%
Lib Dem	10%	9%	8%	6%	7%	7%	6%
None	27%	29%	30%	31%	32%	36%	38%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2959</i>	<i>3100</i>	<i>3072</i>	<i>1153</i>	<i>2695</i>	<i>2718</i>	<i>2887</i>
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Conservative	21%	22%	23%	23%	22%	22%	21%
Labour	37%	31%	30%	25%	31%	26%	27%
Lib Dem	9%	8%	7%	8%	9%	8%	7%
None	31%	37%	38%	41%	36%	41%	42%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2761</i>	<i>2897</i>	<i>3709</i>	<i>2684</i>	<i>3643</i>	<i>3666</i>	<i>3517</i>
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Conservative	25%	22%	25%	24%	22%	21%	22%
Labour	21%	20%	22%	24%	25%	24%	23%
Lib Dem	6%	7%	9%	6%	5%	5%	4%
None	45%	46%	41%	43%	45%	44%	43%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>3880</i>	<i>2917</i>	<i>2795</i>	<i>2859</i>	<i>2793</i>	<i>2799</i>	<i>2449</i>

Table BA14 cont'd

	2015	2016
Conservative	28%	28%
Labour	24%	24%
Lib Dem	3%	5%
None	37%	36%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	3778	2525

Table BX1(a) Alternative regression model to Table B15, Party ID reference category: *Labour*

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	2.6		0.009	0	2.583	2.617
<i>Party ID Comparator: Labour</i>						
Conservative	0.62	0.409	0.013	0	0.594	0.647
None	0.353	0.251	0.014	<.001	0.326	0.381
O/DK/R	0.139	0.037	0.019	<.001	0.101	0.176
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.259	0.194	0.012	<.001	0.236	0.282
10-16	0.128	0.086	0.014	<.001	0.101	0.155
<i>Party ID * Time period Comparator: Labour 87-96</i>						
Con*97-09	-0.19	-0.089	0.018	<.001	-0.225	-0.156
Con*10-16	-0.072	-0.028	0.02	<.001	-0.112	-0.033
None*97-09	-0.082	-0.046	0.017	<.001	-0.116	-0.048
None*10-16	0.021	0.01	0.02	0.291	-0.018	0.06
O/DK/R*97-09	-0.01	-0.003	0.016	0.517	-0.041	0.021
O/DK/R*10-16	0.078	0.021	0.021	<.001	0.036	0.12

Table BX1(b) Calculated interactions based on alternative regression model to Table B15, Party ID reference category: *Labour*

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Labour	REF	0.259	0.128
Conservative	0.62	0.689	0.676

Table BX2(a) Alternative regression model to Table B17, Party ID reference category: *Labour*

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	2.789		0.018	0	2.753	2.825
<i>Party ID Comparator: Labour</i>						
Conservative	0.616	0.406	0.013	0	0.59	0.642
None	0.324	0.23	0.014	<.001	0.296	0.351
O/DK/R	0.122	0.032	0.019	<.001	0.085	0.159
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.28	0.209	0.011	<.001	0.257	0.302
10-16	0.175	0.118	0.014	<.001	0.147	0.202
<i>Party ID * Time period Comparator: Labour 87-96</i>						
Con*97-09	-0.187	-0.088	0.017	<.001	-0.222	-0.153
Con*10-16	-0.07	-0.027	0.02	<.001	-0.109	-0.031
None*97-09	-0.079	-0.045	0.017	<.001	-0.113	-0.046
None*10-16	0.015	0.007	0.02	0.43	-0.023	0.054
O/DK/R*97-09	0.019	0.006	0.016	0.214	-0.011	0.05
O/DK/R*10-16	0.101	0.027	0.021	<.001	0.06	0.143
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.081	-0.055	0.008	<.001	-0.096	-0.067
50-64	-0.141	-0.09	0.008	<.001	-0.157	-0.125
65+	-0.058	-0.034	0.009	<.001	-0.077	-0.039
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.014	-0.01	0.006	0.016	-0.025	-0.003
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.087	-0.033	0.012	<.001	-0.11	-0.065
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.068	-0.05	0.008	<.001	-0.083	-0.053
Degree	-0.272	-0.156	0.011	<.001	-0.293	-0.251
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.05	0.037	0.006	<.001	0.038	0.063
London	-0.015	-0.007	0.01	0.14	-0.034	0.005
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.039	0.028	0.007	<.001	0.025	0.052
Working	0.001	0.001	0.008	0.872	-0.015	0.018

Table BX2(b) Calculated interactions based on alternative regression model to Table B17, Party ID reference category: *Labour*

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Labour	REF	0.28	0.175
Conservative	0.616	0.709	0.721

Table BX3(a) Alternative regression model to Table B19, Party ID reference category: *Labour*

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	0.878		0.025	<.001	0.83	0.926
<i>Party ID Comparator: Labour</i>						
Conservative	0.353	0.232	0.012	<.001	0.328	0.377
None	0.22	0.156	0.013	<.001	0.195	0.244
O/DK/R	0.09	0.024	0.017	<.001	0.057	0.124
<i>Time period Comparator: 87-96</i>						
97-09	0.202	0.151	0.01	<.001	0.181	0.222
10-16	0.168	0.113	0.013	<.001	0.144	0.193
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>						
<i>Comparator: Labour 87-96</i>						
Con*97-09	-0.119	-0.056	0.016	<.001	-0.15	-0.088
Con*10-16	-0.048	-0.019	0.018	0.008	-0.083	-0.013
None*97-09	-0.059	-0.033	0.016	<.001	-0.089	-0.028
None*10-16	-0.02	-0.009	0.018	0.268	-0.054	0.015
O/DK/R*97-09	0.038	0.012	0.014	0.007	0.01	0.065
O/DK/R*10-16	0.101	0.027	0.019	<.001	0.064	0.139
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.415	0.414	0.004	0	0.407	0.424
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.156	0.18	0.004	0	0.149	0.164
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.039	-0.034	0.004	<.001	-0.048	-0.031
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.107	-0.073	0.007	<.001	-0.121	-0.094
50-64	-0.172	-0.109	0.007	<.001	-0.187	-0.158
65+	-0.129	-0.076	0.009	<.001	-0.146	-0.112
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.023	-0.017	0.005	<.001	-0.033	-0.013
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.023	-0.009	0.011	0.026	-0.044	-0.003

Table BX3(a) cont'd

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
Education <i>Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.012	-0.009	0.007	0.093	-0.026	0.002
Degree	-0.065	-0.037	0.01	<.001	-0.085	-0.045
Region <i>Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.067	0.049	0.006	<.001	0.055	0.078
London	0.047	0.023	0.009	<.001	0.029	0.064
Social class <i>Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.018	0.013	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.031
Working	-0.006	-0.004	0.008	0.396	-0.021	0.008

Table BX3(b) Calculated interactions based on alternative regression model to Table B19, Party ID reference category: *Labour*

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Labour	REF	0.202	0.168
Conservative	0.353	0.436	0.473

Annex C

Results C:

The interaction between
core values and party identity

Supplementary tables

Table CA15 Social values (grouped) among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 combined

	Conservative	Labour
Libertarian	28%	44%
Neither	37%	31%
Authoritarian	35%	25%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>16797</i>	<i>17862</i>

Note: Those who answer 'Don't Know' or 'Refused' are included in the denominator on which the percentages in these tables are based, but are not shown.

Table CA16 Libertarian-Authoritarian scale means among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016 combined

	Conservative	Labour
Mean scale score	3.88	3.60

Table CA17 Libertarian-Authoritarian scale means among Conservative and Labour identifiers, 1987-2016

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Conservative	4.00		3.93	3.90	3.72		4.01
Labour	3.53		3.63	3.53	3.34		3.68
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Conservative	3.90	3.91	3.91		3.99	4.00	3.89
Labour	3.54	3.60	3.59		3.76	3.79	3.62
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Conservative	3.87	3.88	3.92	3.86	3.93	3.89	3.89
Labour	3.62	3.62	3.67	3.61	3.70	3.66	3.65
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Conservative	3.85	3.88	3.83	3.95	3.87	3.86	3.73
Labour	3.62	3.62	3.58	3.61	3.57	3.54	3.46
	2015	2016					
Conservative	3.69	3.68					
Labour	3.41	3.27					

Table CA18 Welfare scale means by social value group among Conservative identifiers by Time period

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
All Conservatives	3.20	3.29	3.27
Libertarian Conservatives	2.91	3.06	3.05
Authoritarian Conservatives	3.44	3.51	3.51

Table CA19(a) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among Conservative identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	77%	75%	63%
Leave	19%	21%	36%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>3091</i>	<i>5608</i>	<i>1637</i>

Table CA19(b) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among libertarian Conservative identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	84%	82%	76%
Leave	14%	15%	24%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>474</i>	<i>1078</i>	<i>517</i>

Table CA19(c) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among authoritarian Conservative identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	70%	69%	54%
Leave	26%	28%	45%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>764</i>	<i>1534</i>	<i>396</i>

Table CA20 Welfare scale means by social value group among Labour identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
All Labour	2.27	2.60	2.46
Libertarian Labour	2.53	2.86	2.74
Authoritarian Labour	2.86	3.14	3.13

Table CA21(a) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among Labour identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	71%	81%	73%
Leave	23%	12%	22%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>2363</i>	<i>7064</i>	<i>1532</i>

Table CA21(b) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among libertarian Labour identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	78%	90%	84%
Leave	18%	6%	13%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>643</i>	<i>2137</i>	<i>659</i>

Table CA21(c) Attitudes towards Britain's EEC/EC/EU membership among authoritarian Labour identifiers *by* Time period

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Not Leave	54%	75%	55%
Leave	41%	19%	40%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>372</i>	<i>1417</i>	<i>275</i>

Table CX1 Alternative regression model to Table C23, Time period reference category: 97-09

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.372		0.038	<.001	1.297	1.447
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.407	0.436	0.01	<.001	0.387	0.427
<i>Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
87-96	-0.283	-0.183	0.012	<.001	-0.307	-0.259
10-16	-0.047	-0.029	0.013	<.001	-0.073	-0.022
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
LA*87-96	0.01	0.006	0.016	0.525	-0.022	0.043
LA*10-16	0.058	0.033	0.017	<.001	0.025	0.091

Table CX2 Alternative regression model to Table C27, Time period reference category: 97-09

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.085		0.056	<.001	0.976	1.193
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.405	0.434	0.011	<.001	0.383	0.426
<i>Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
87-96	-0.248	-0.161	0.012	<.001	-0.272	-0.224
10-16	-0.022	-0.014	0.013	0.085	-0.047	0.003
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
LA*87-96	0.014	0.008	0.016	0.369	-0.017	0.046
LA*10-16	0.027	0.015	0.016	0.096	-0.005	0.059
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.156	-0.104	0.013	<.001	-0.181	-0.13
50-64	-0.225	-0.139	0.015	<.001	-0.253	-0.196
65+	-0.167	-0.096	0.017	<.001	-0.2	-0.134
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.02	-0.015	0.01	0.04	-0.039	-0.001
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.047	-0.02	0.018	0.008	-0.082	-0.012
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.048	-0.035	0.014	<.001	-0.074	-0.021
Degree	-0.141	-0.081	0.02	<.001	-0.179	-0.103
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.083	0.06	0.011	<.001	0.062	0.104
London	0.098	0.05	0.016	<.001	0.067	0.13
<i>Social class Comparator: Salariat</i>						
Intermediate	0.019	0.013	0.013	0.141	-0.006	0.044
Working	0.033	0.022	0.014	0.023	0.005	0.061
<i>Left-Right</i>						
1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.198	0.197	0.008	<.001	0.183	0.213
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)</i>						
	-0.03	-0.029	0.009	<.001	-0.048	-0.012

Table CX3 Calculated two-way categorical interaction between partisan identity and time period based on Table C29

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	0.094	0.13
Labour	-0.393	-0.146	-0.174

Table CX4(a) Alternative regression model to Table C29, Time period reference category: 97-09

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for B	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	1.396		0.059	<.001	1.28	1.511
Libertarian-Authoritarian 1 (libertarian) - 5 (authoritarian)	0.399	0.398	0.014	<.001	0.371	0.426
<i>Time period Comparator: 97-09</i>						
87-96	-0.094	-0.061	0.013	<.001	-0.118	-0.069
10-16	0.036	0.024	0.012	0.004	0.012	0.06
<i>Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Labour	-0.24	-0.162	0.011	<.001	-0.262	-0.219
None	-0.076	-0.054	0.01	<.001	-0.097	-0.056
O/DK/R	-0.17	-0.08	0.015	<.001	-0.199	-0.142
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Party ID Comparator:</i>						
<i>Conservative</i>						
Lib-Auth*Labour	0.014	0.008	0.017	0.417	-0.02	0.048
Lib-Auth*None	-0.022	-0.012	0.017	0.21	-0.056	0.012
Lib-Auth*O/DK/R	0.065	0.025	0.021	0.002	0.023	0.106
<i>Party ID * Time period</i>						
<i>Comparator: Conservative 97-09</i>						
Lab*87-96	-0.153	-0.061	0.017	<.001	-0.186	-0.119
Lab*10-16	-0.064	-0.024	0.017	<.001	-0.098	-0.03
None*87-96	-0.053	-0.02	0.017	0.002	-0.087	-0.02
None*10-16	-0.032	-0.015	0.016	0.043	-0.063	-0.001
O/DK/R*87-96	-0.043	-0.011	0.023	0.058	-0.088	0.001
O/DK/R*10-16	0.024	0.006	0.023	0.289	-0.021	0.069
<i>Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Time period</i>						
<i>Comparator: 97-09</i>						
LA*87-96	0.053	0.026	0.021	0.014	0.011	0.095
LA*10-16	0.004	0.002	0.021	0.837	-0.037	0.046

Table CX4(a) cont'd

Category	B	Strd B	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I.for B	
					Lower	Upper
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score * Party ID * Time period <i>Comparator: Conservative 97-09</i>						
LA*Lab*87-96	-0.043	-0.014	0.026	0.107	-0.094	0.009
LA*Lab*10-16	0.028	0.009	0.026	0.286	-0.023	0.08
LA*None*87-96	-0.01	-0.002	0.029	0.732	-0.067	0.047
LA*None*10-16	-0.009	-0.003	0.026	0.721	-0.061	0.042
LA*O/DK/R*87-96	-0.053	-0.01	0.034	0.118	-0.119	0.013
LA*O/DK/R*10-16	0.008	0.002	0.032	0.791	-0.054	0.071
<i>Age Comparator: 18-34</i>						
35-49	-0.108	-0.074	0.007	<.001	-0.122	-0.095
50-64	-0.174	-0.111	0.007	<.001	-0.189	-0.16
65+	-0.133	-0.078	0.009	<.001	-0.149	-0.116
<i>Sex Comparator: Male</i>						
Female	-0.025	-0.019	0.005	<.001	-0.035	-0.015
<i>Ethnicity Comparator: BAME</i>						
White	-0.023	-0.009	0.011	0.027	-0.044	-0.003
<i>Education Comparator: No quals</i>						
Intermediate	-0.014	-0.01	0.007	0.045	-0.028	0
Degree	-0.066	-0.038	0.01	<.001	-0.085	-0.046
<i>Region Comparator: North</i>						
South and Midlands	0.064	0.047	0.006	<.001	0.052	0.075
London	0.046	0.023	0.009	<.001	0.029	0.064
<i>Social class Comparator: Salaried</i>						
Intermediate	0.018	0.013	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.031
Working	-0.004	-0.002	0.008	0.607	-0.019	0.011
Left-Right 1 (left-wing) - 5 (right-wing)	0.152	0.175	0.004	<.001	0.145	0.16
Libertarian-authoritarian scale score (centred) * Left-right scale score (centred)	-0.034	-0.03	0.005	<.001	-0.044	-0.025

Table CX4(b) Calculated two-way categorical interaction between partisan identity and time period based on alternative regression model to Table C29, Time period reference category: 97-09

	1987-1996	1997-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	-0.094	REF	0.036
Labour	-0.487	-0.24	-0.268

Table CX5 Calculated two-way categorical interaction between partisan identity and time period based on Table C30

	1987-1991	1993-2009	2010-2016
Conservative	REF	1.257	3.093
Labour	1.457	0.542	1.685

Annex T

Technical appendix

BSA fieldwork details

Table T1 Annual British Social Attitudes fieldwork details, 1987-2016

Year	Mainstage		Re-issue / mop-up		Sample size	Response rate
	From	To	From	To		
2016	Jul	Oct	Nov	Nov	2942	46%
2015	Jul	Oct	Nov	Nov	4328	51%
2014	Jul	Sep	Oct	Nov	2878	47%
2013	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3244	54%
2012	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3428	54%
2011	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3311	55%
2010	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3297	54%
2009	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3421	56%
2008	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	4486	56%
2007	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	4124	53%
2006	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	4291	54%
2005	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	4269	55%
2004	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3199	57%
2003	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	4432	59%
2002	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3435	61%
2001	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3287	59%
2000	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3426	62%
1999	Jun	Sep	Oct	Nov	3143	58%
1998	Apr	Jul	Aug	Sep	3146	59%
1997	Jan	Mar	Apr	May	1355	62%
1996	Apr	Jun	Jul	Aug	3662	68%
1995	Apr	Jun	Jul	Aug	3633	69%
1994	May	Jul	Aug	Oct	3469	65%
1993	Apr	Jun	'later'	'later'	2945	68%
1992						
1991	Mar	May	'later'	'later'	2918	67%
1990	Mar	May	'later'	'later'	2797	64%
1989	Mar	May	'later'	'later'	3029	69%
1988						
1987	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	2847	67%

Source: Annual BSA documentation, available through the UK Data Service

Note: From 2007, the response rate is based on upper limit response rate calculations. The BSA research team describe these calculations as follows (see NatCen, 2016, p.9):

“Response is calculated as a range from a lower limit where all unknown eligibility cases (for example, address inaccessible, or unknown whether address is residential) are assumed to be eligible and therefore included in the unproductive outcomes, to an upper limit where all these cases are assumed to be ineligible and therefore excluded from the response calculation”.

Fig T1 – Example Kish grid

SN: XXXXXXXX	PT: XXX
PERSON/DU: 2	3 4 5 6
SELECT: 2	1 3 5 5
PERSON/DU: 7 8 9	10 11 12
SELECT: 6 5 3	8 2 12
Fieldwork end: XX/XX/XX	

Source: BSA field interviewer training documentation, provided by NatCen

Note: In instances where a BSA interviewer encountered an address containing more than one dwelling unit, or an address with more than one resident, a computer-generated Kish grid was used to randomly select either a dwelling unit to make contact with or an individual to interview.

To make a dwelling unit selection, the interviewer listed all dwelling units contained within an address in alphanumeric order. The interviewer then located the figure at the 'PERSON/DU' row which reflected the total number of dwelling units within an address, noting the figure directly below at the 'SELECT' row. They then selected the dwelling unit corresponding to this number within the alphanumeric list. For example, if an address contained ten dwelling units numbered '1' to '10', the interviewer would select the third address (as indicated by the superimposed rectangle).

To make a respondent selection, the interviewer listed the names of all eligible individuals living at an address in alphabetical order. The interviewer then located the figure at the 'PERSON/DU' row which reflected the total number of eligible individuals living at an address, noting the figure directly below at the 'SELECT' row. They then selected the individual corresponding to this number within the alphabetical list. For example, if three eligible individuals named 'Alan', 'Beryl', and 'Claire' lived at an address, the interviewer would select 'Alan' (as indicated by the superimposed oval).

Composition of dependent variables

Table T2 Items comprising BSA's 'Welfare' scale, 1987-2016

Year	WelfHelp	MoreWelf	UnempJob	SocHelp	DoleFidl	WelfFeet
1987	X	X	X	X	X	X
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989	X	X	X	X	X	X
1990						
1991	X	X	X	X	X	X
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993	X	X	X	X	X	X
1994	X	X	X	X	X	X
1995	X	X	X	X	X	X
1996	X	X	X	X	X	X
1997						
1998	X	X	X	X	X	X
1999	X	X	X	X	X	X
2000	X	X	X	X	X	X
2001	X	X	X	X	X	X
2002	X	X	X	X	X	X
2003	X	X	X	X	X	X
2004	X	X	X	X	X	X
2005	X	X	X	X	X	X
2006	X	X	X	X	X	X
2007	X	X	X	X	X	X
2008	X	X	X	X	X	X
2009	X	X	X	X	X	X
2010	X	X	X	X	X	X
2011	X	X	X	X	X	X
2012	X	X	X	X	X	X
2013	X	X	X	X	X	X
2014	X	X	X	X	X	X
2015	X	X	X	X	X	X
2016	X	X	X	X	X	X

Table T2 cont'd

Year	DamLives	ProudWlf	WelfResp	WelfStig
1987			X	X
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989			X	X
1990				
1991			Y	Y
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993			X	X
1994			X	X
1995			X	X
1996			X	X
1997				
1998			X	X
1999			X	X
2000	X	X	X	X
2001	X	X		
2002	X	X		
2003	X	X		
2004	X	X		
2005	X	X		
2006	X	X		
2007	X	X		
2008	X	X		
2009	X	X		
2010	X	X		
2011	X	X		
2012	X	X		
2013	X	X		
2014	X	X		
2015	X	X		
2016	X	X		

Question wording

WelfHelp: 'The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other'

MoreWelf: 'The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes'

UnempJob: 'Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one'

SocHelp: ‘Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help’

DoleFidl: ‘Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’

WelfFeet: ‘If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet’

DamLives: ‘Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people’s lives’

ProudWlf: ‘The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest achievements’

WelfResp: ‘The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves’

WelfStig: ‘People receiving social security are made to feel like second-class citizens’

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Table T3 Composition of derived ‘EU membership preference’ variable, 1987-2016

Year	EEC	ECPolicy	ECPolicy2
1987	X		
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989	X		
1990	X		
1991	X		
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993		X	
1994		X	
1995		X	
1996		X	
1997	(X)	X	
1998		X	
1999		X	
2000		X	
2001		X	
2002		X	
2003		X	
2004		X	

Table T3 cont'd

Year	EEC	ECPolicy	ECPolicy2
2005		X	
2006		X	
2007			
2008		X	
2009			
2010			
2011			
2012		X	
2013		X	
2014	(X)	X	
2015	(X)	X	
2016			X

Note: In years where multiple items on attitudes towards EU membership are available, items marked in **bold** are used to form this study's EU membership preference variable.

Question wording

EEC: Do you think Britain should continue to be a member of the European Union¹²⁶ or should it withdraw?

Continue
Withdraw

ECPolicy: Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be...

...to leave the European Union,
to stay in the EU and try to **reduce** the EU's powers,
to leave things as they are,
to stay in the EU and try to **increase** the EU's powers,
or, to work for the formation of a single European government?

ECPolicy2: Leaving aside the result of the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, what do you think Britain's policy should be. Should it...

... leave the European Union,
stay in the EU and try to **reduce** the EU's powers,
leave things as they are,
stay in the EU and try to **increase** the EU's powers,
or, to work for the formation of a single European government?

¹²⁶ Between 1987 and 1989 this question referred to 'the EEC – the Common Market', in 1990 the question referred to 'the EC – the Common Market', in 1991 it referred to 'the European Community', and in 1997, 2014, and 2015 it referred to 'the European Union'.

Composition of key independent variables

Table T4 Composition of BSA's 'Left-Right' scale, 1987-2016

Year	Redistrb	BigBusnn	Wealth	RichLaw	Indust4
1987	X	X	X	X	X
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989	X	X	X	X	X
1990	X	X	X	X	X
1991	X	X	X	X	X
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993	X	X	X	X	X
1994	X	X		X	X
1995	X	X	X	X	X
1996	X	X	X	X	X
1997					
1998	X	X	X	X	X
1999	X	X	X	X	X
2000	X	X	X	X	X
2001	X	X	X	X	X
2002	X	X	X	X	X
2003	X	X	X	X	X
2004	X	X	X	X	X
2005	X	X	X	X	X
2006	X	X	X	X	X
2007	X	X	X	X	X
2008	X	X	X	X	X
2009	X	X	X	X	X
2010	X	X	X	X	X
2011	X	X	X	X	X
2012	X	X	X	X	X
2013	X	X	X	X	X
2014	X	X	X	X	X
2015	X	X	X	X	X
2016	X	X	X	X	X

Question wording

Redistrb: 'Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off'

BigBusnn: 'Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers'

Wealth: 'Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth'

RichLaw: 'There is one law for the rich and one for the poor'

Indust4: 'Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance'

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Table T5 Composition of BSA's 'Libertarian-Authoritarian' scale, 1987-2016

Year	TradVals	StifSent	DeathApp	Obey	WrongLaw	Censor
1987	X	X	X	X	X	X
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989	X	X	X	X	X	X
1990	X	X	X	X	X	X
1991	X	X	X	X	X	X
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993	X	X	X	X	X	X
1994	X	X	X	X	X	X
1995	X	X	X	X	X	X
1996	X	X	X	X	X	X
1997						
1998	X	X	X	X		X
1999	X	X	X	X		X
2000	X	X	X	X	X	X
2001	X	X	X	X	X	X
2002	X	X	X	X	X	X
2003	X	X	X	X	X	X
2004	X	X	X	X	X	X
2005	X	X	X	X	X	X
2006	X	X	X	X	X	X
2007	X	X	X	X	X	X
2008	X	X	X	X	X	X
2009	X	X	X	X	X	X
2010	X	X	X	X	X	X
2011	X	X	X	X	X	X
2012	X	X	X	X	X	X
2013	X	X	X	X	X	X
2014	X	X	X	X	X	X
2015	X	X	X	X	X	X
2016	X	X	X	X	X	X

Question wording

TradVals: ‘Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values’

StifSent: ‘People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’

DeathApp: ‘For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’

Obey: ‘Schools should teach children to obey authority’

WrongLaw: ‘The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong’

Censor: ‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Table T6 Availability of items measuring respondent-level partisan identity, 1987-2016

Year	SupParty	ClosePty	Partyid1
1987	X	X	X
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989	X	X	X
1990	X	X	X
1991	X	X	X
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993	X	X	X
1994	X	X	X
1995	X	X	X
1996	X	X	X
1997	X	X	X
1998	X	X	X
1999	X	X	X
2000	X	X	X
2001	X	X	X
2002	X	X	X
2003	X	X	X
2004	X	X	X
2005	X	X	X
2006	X	X	X

Table T6 cont'd

Year	SupParty	ClosePty	Partyid1
2007	X	X	X
2008	X	X	X
2009	X	X	X
2010	X	X	X
2011	X	X	X
2012	X	X	X
2013	X	X	X
2014	X	X	X
2015	X	X	X
2016	X	X	X

Question wording

SupParty: 'Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?'

ClosePty: 'Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others?'

Partyid1: 'Which one?'¹²⁷

Conservative¹²⁸

Labour

Liberal Democrats

Scottish National Party

Plaid Cymru

Green Party

UK Independence Party (UKIP)

British National Party (BNP) / National Front

Trade Union and Socialist Coalition (TUSC) / RESPECT / Other socialist party

Other party (WRITE IN)

Other answer (WRITE IN)

None

Refused to say

(Don't know)

(Refusal)

¹²⁷ Respondents who answer 'No' at either SupParty or ClosePty are asked 'If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?' at Partyid1. These respondents are not classed as party identifiers for the purposes of this study.

¹²⁸ Interviewers were asked not to prompt respondents at this question, and instead to code their answer according to a pre-set schema. This schema was amended over time to reflect the contemporary pattern of party politics. The codes provided here are taken from BSA 2016 documentation.

Reliability and internal consistency of BSA scales

Table T7 Annual Cronbach's alpha coefficient for BSA's 'Welfare', 'Left-Right', and 'Libertarian-Authoritarian' scales, 1987-2016

Year	Welfare	Left-Right	Libertarian-Authoritarian
1987	0.81	0.87	0.72
1988	N/A	N/A	N/A
1989	0.82	0.85	0.72
1990		0.85	0.69
1991	0.81	0.78	0.69
1992	N/A	N/A	N/A
1993	0.83	0.84	0.73
1994	0.83	0.77	0.72
1995	0.84	0.84	0.74
1996	0.84	0.81	0.71
1997			
1998	0.81	0.81	0.72
1999	0.78	0.82	0.69
2000	0.79	0.82	0.72
2001	0.80	0.81	0.73
2002	0.80	0.83	0.73
2003	0.83	0.81	0.72
2004	0.82	0.82	0.70
2005	0.80	0.79	0.73
2006	0.79	0.81	0.71
2007	0.81	0.79	0.73
2008	0.82	0.82	0.71
2009	0.82	0.81	0.73
2010	0.82	0.81	0.72
2011	0.81	0.80	0.74
2012	0.80	0.82	0.74
2013	0.82	0.82	0.76
2014	0.82	0.82	0.74
2015	0.81	0.82	0.76
2016	0.81	0.82	0.77

Note: Figures based on weighted BSA data and unstandardised item scores.

Computation of EU membership preference variable

Between 1983 and 1991 BSA presented its respondents with the following item, labelled *EEC* in annual BSA datasets:

‘Do you think Britain should continue to be a member of the European Union or should it withdraw?’

Continue
Withdraw

From 1993 onwards the survey asked its respondents the following question, labelled *ECPolicy*¹²⁹ in annual BSA datasets:

‘Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be...’

...to leave the European Union,
to stay in the EU and try to **reduce** the EU’s powers,
to leave things as they are,
to stay in the EU and try to **increase** the EU’s powers,
or, to work for the formation of a single European government?

When creating a time series comprised of data derived from both items, one of two strategies may be adopted for recoding *ECPolicy* into a binary variable in line with *EEC*. These alternative strategies are set out in Table T7 below.

Table T8 Alternative strategies

Strategy A ‘Euro sceptic’ – ‘Europhile’		Strategy B ‘Leave’ – ‘Not Leave’	
<i>ECPolicy</i>	<i>EEC</i>	<i>ECPolicy</i>	<i>EEC</i>
Leave the EU	Withdraw	Leave the EU	Withdraw
Stay and reduce powers		Stay and reduce powers	Continue
Stay and keep powers as they are	Continue	Stay and keep powers as they are	
Stay and increase powers		Stay and increase powers	
Work for single European gov		Work for single European gov	

¹²⁹ An amended version of this question to account for the occurrence of the EU Referendum prior to BSA 2016 fieldwork is labelled *ECPolicy2* in the BSA 2016 dataset.

Despite *EEC* being largely replaced by *ECPolicy* from 1993 onwards, both items were subsequently included on BSA in 1997, 2014, and 2015. As a result, the decision as to which strategy to employ was capable of being informed by an analysis of data across each of these three years. This analysis aimed to determine which strategy resulted in the highest level of consistency in how cases are coded across each variable.

This section of the technical appendix proceeds as follows. For each of the three years in which both *EEC* and *ECPolicy* appear on BSA, a series of illustrative crosstabulations is followed by an analysis of the proportion of cases that are coded consistently across both variables using each strategy. For Strategy A, a case is deemed as coded consistently if it meets the following criteria:

- ◇ An individual selects '*Withdraw*' at *EEC* and either '*Leave the EU*' or '*Stay in the EU and reduce its powers*' at *ECPolicy*
- ◇ An individual selects '*Continue*' at *EEC* and one of the three remaining answer options at *ECPolicy*
- ◇ An individual selects '*Don't know*' or refuses to respond at both *EEC* and *ECPolicy*

For Strategy B, a case is deemed as coded consistently if it meets the following criteria:

- ◇ An individual selects '*Withdraw*' at *EEC* and '*Leave the EU*' at *ECPolicy*
- ◇ An individual selects '*Continue*' at *EEC* and one of the four remaining answer options at *ECPolicy*
- ◇ An individual selects '*Don't know*' or refuses to respond at both *EEC* and *ECPolicy*

This analysis is followed by two simple logistic regression models constructed to produce a Nagelkerke R squared measure of model fit. The first of these employs a recoded version of *ECPolicy* which follows Strategy A to predict the value of *EEC*, while the second utilises a recoded version of *ECPolicy* which follows Strategy B to predict the value of *EEC*.

Measures of consistency and model fit in 1997, 2014, and 2015 are then collated and summarised. This allows for a comparison of the performance of both strategies across each year, leading to the identification of Strategy B as the preferred technique for synthesising both variables over time.

1997

Crosstabulations

Table T9 *ECPolicy* by *EEC*, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave the EU	1%	60%	3%
Stay and reduce	38%	23%	18%
Stay and keep as they are	23%	9%	18%
Stay and increase	23%	5%	9%
Work for single European gov	11%	1%	1%
DK/Ref	5%	3%	51%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>596</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>212</i>

Table T10 *ECPolicy* (Strategy A recode) by *EEC*, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	39%	83%	21%
Europhile	56%	14%	28%
DK/Ref	5%	3%	51%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>596</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>212</i>

Table T11 *ECPolicy* (Strategy B recode) by *EEC*, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	1%	59%	3%
Not Leave	94%	38%	46%
DK/Ref	5%	3%	51%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>596</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>212</i>

Strategy A: Consistency analysis

Table T12 Unweighted consistency calculations, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	230	281	47
Europhile	339	53	55
DK/Ref	27	11	110
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>596</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>212</i>

Consistent cases	63%

Table T13 Weighted consistency calculations, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	238	275	42
Europhile	344	48	58
DK/Ref	28	10	104
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>610</i>	<i>333</i>	<i>204</i>
Consistent cases	63%		

Strategy B: Consistency analysis**Table T14** Unweighted consistency calculations, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	6	203	7
Not Leave	563	131	95
DK/Ref	27	11	110
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>596</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>212</i>
Consistent cases	76%		

Table T15 Weighted consistency calculations, 1997

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	7	198	7
Not Leave	575	126	94
DK/Ref	28	10	104
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>610</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>205</i>
Consistent cases	70%		

Strategy A: Model fit

Table T16 Simple logistic regression, 1997

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.962	0.141	0.154	<.001		
Eurosceptic	2.109	8.24	0.177	<.001	5.822	11.663

Predictor: *ECPolicy* Strategy A (0 = 'Europhile', 1 = 'Eurosceptic')
Outcome: *EEC* (0 = 'Continue', 1 = 'Withdraw')

Nagelkerke R Squared	0.246

Strategy B: Model fit

Table T17 Simple logistic regression, 1997

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.52	0.219	0.098	<.001		
Leave	4.931	138.525	0.41	<.001	62.039	309.311

Predictor: *ECPolicy* Strategy B (0 = 'Not Leave', 1 = 'Leave')
Outcome: *EEC* (0 = 'Continue', 1 = 'Withdraw')

Nagelkerke R Squared	0.549

2014

Crosstabulations

Table T18 *ECPolicy* by *EEC*, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave the EU	1%	67%	12%
Stay and reduce	52%	23%	22%
Stay and keep as they are	24%	5%	14%
Stay and increase	16%	1%	5%
Work for single European gov	5%	5%	2%
DK/Ref	2%	*	46%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	430	334	63

Table T19 *ECPolicy* (Strategy A recode) by *EEC*, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	53%	89%	33%
Europhile	45%	10%	20%
DK/Ref	2%	*	47%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>430</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>63</i>

Table T20 *ECPolicy* (Strategy B recode) by *EEC*, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	1%	66%	13%
Not Leave	97%	33%	41%
DK/Ref	2%	*	47%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>430</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>63</i>

Strategy A: Consistency analysis**Table T21** Unweighted consistency calculations, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	232	304	22
Europhile	187	27	13
DK/Ref	11	3	28
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>430</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>63</i>
Consistent cases	63%		

Table T22 Weighted consistency calculations, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	246	277	21
Europhile	211	32	13
DK/Ref	11	1	30
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>468</i>	<i>310</i>	<i>64</i>
Consistent cases	62%		

Strategy B: Consistency analysis

Table T23 Unweighted consistency calculations, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	4	219	7
Not Leave	415	112	28
DK/Ref	11	3	28
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>430</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>63</i>
Consistent cases	80%		

Table T24 Weighted consistency calculations, 2014

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	3	206	8
Not Leave	454	103	26
DK/Ref	11	1	30
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>468</i>	<i>310</i>	<i>64</i>
Consistent cases	82%		

Strategy A: Model fit

Table T25 Simple logistic regression, 2014

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.885	0.152	0.19	<.001		
Eurosceptic	2.002	7.403	0.209	<.001	4.917	11.147
Predictor: <i>ECPolicy</i> Strategy A (0 = 'Europhile', 1 = 'Eurosceptic')						
Outcome: <i>EEC</i> (0 = 'Continue', 1 = 'Withdraw')						
Nagelkerke R Squared	0.196					

Strategy B: Model fit

Table T26 Simple logistic regression, 2014

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.488	0.226	0.109	<.001		
Leave	5.682	293.524	0.582	<.001	93.827	917.805

Predictor: *ECPolicy* Strategy B (0 = 'Not Leave', 1 = 'Leave')
Outcome: *EEC* (0 = 'Continue', 1 = 'Withdraw')

Nagelkerke R Squared	0.618

2015

Table T27 *ECPolicy* by *EEC*, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave the EU	2%	67%	3%
Stay and reduce	55%	23%	50%
Stay and keep as they are	26%	5%	10%
Stay and increase	11%	1%	4%
Work for single European gov	5%	1%	-
DK/Ref	2%	3%	33%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>532</i>	<i>313</i>	<i>115</i>

Table T28 *ECPolicy* (Strategy A recode) by *EEC*, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	56%	90%	52%
Europhile	42%	6%	14%
DK/Ref	2%	3%	34%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>532</i>	<i>313</i>	<i>115</i>

Table T29 *ECPolicy* (Strategy B recode) by *EEC*, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	2%	67%	3%
Not Leave	96%	29%	64%
DK/Ref	2%	3%	33%
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>532</i>	<i>313</i>	<i>115</i>

Strategy A: Consistency analysis

Table T30 Unweighted consistency calculations, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	299	286	57
Europhile	221	19	15
DK/Ref	12	8	43
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>532</i>	<i>313</i>	<i>115</i>
Consistent cases	57%		

Table T31 Weighted consistency calculations, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Eurosceptic	306	266	53
Europhile	226	19	14
DK/Ref	12	9	34
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>544</i>	<i>294</i>	<i>101</i>
Consistent cases	56%		

Strategy B: Consistency analysis

Table T32 Unweighted consistency calculations, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	7	213	4
Not Leave	513	92	68
DK/Ref	12	8	43
<i>Unweighted base</i>	<i>532</i>	<i>313</i>	<i>115</i>
Consistent cases	80%		

Table T33 Weighted consistency calculations, 2015

	Continue	Withdraw	DK/Ref
Leave	9	199	3
Not Leave	523	87	65
DK/Ref	12	9	34
<i>Weighted base</i>	<i>544</i>	<i>295</i>	<i>102</i>
Consistent cases	80%		

Strategy A: Model fit

Table T34 Simple logistic regression, 2015

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-2.46	0.085	0.237	<.001		
Eurosceptic	2.319	10.614	0.252	<.001	6.208	16.641
Predictor: <i>ECPolicy</i> Strategy A (0 = 'Europhile', 1 = 'Eurosceptic')						
Outcome: <i>EEC</i> (0 = 'Continue', 1 = 'Withdraw')						
Nagelkerke R Squared		0.205				

Strategy B: Model fit

Table T35 Simple logistic regression, 2015

Category	B	Exp(B)	S.E.	Sig.	95% C.I. for Exp(B)	
					Lower	Upper
<i>Constant</i>	-1.795	0.166	0.116	<.001		
Leave	4.836	126.001	0.352	<.001	63.206	251.184
Predictor: <i>ECPolicy</i> Strategy B (0 = 'Not Leave', 1 = 'Leave')						
Outcome: <i>EEC</i> (0 = 'Continue', 1 = 'Withdraw')						
Nagelkerke R Squared		0.613				

Summary

In each year for which data is available, a higher proportion of respondents are coded consistently at *EEC* and *ECPolicy* using Strategy B rather than Strategy A.

Table T36 Comparative consistency calculations (unweighted data)

	Strategy A	Strategy B
1997	63%	76%
2014	63%	80%
2015	57%	80%

Table T37 Comparative consistency calculations (weighted data)

	Strategy A	Strategy B
1997	63%	70%
2014	62%	82%
2015	56%	80%

In each year for which data is available, the Nagelkerke R Square figure is higher for Strategy B than Strategy A, indicating a better model fit.

Table T38 Comparative model fit (Nagelkerke R Square)

	Strategy A	Strategy B
1997	0.246	0.549
2014	0.196	0.618
2015	0.205	0.613

Supplementary material on sociodemographic variables

Table T39 – ‘Region’ on the British Social Attitudes survey, 1987-2016

STRegion 1987-1999	GOR 2000-2002	GOR2 2003-2016	Unified region over time	Region variable for analysis
North of England	North East	North East	North East	North
North West	North West	North West	North West	
Yorks and Humberside	Merseyside	Yorkshire and the Humber	Yorkshire & Humberside	
West Midlands	Yorkshire & Humber	East Midlands	West Midlands	Midlands and South
East Midlands	East Midlands	West Midlands	East Midlands	
East Anglia	West Midlands	South West	East Anglia	
South West	South West	East of England	South West	
South East (excl. G London)	East of England	South East	South East	
Greater London	South East	Inner London	London	London
Scotland	London	Outer London	Scotland	Scotland and Wales
Wales	Scotland	Scotland	Wales	
	Wales	Wales		

**Fig T2 – British Social Attitudes survey ‘Educational qualifications obtained’
showcards, 2016**

CARD R8	
SECTION 1: GCSE Grades D-G Short course GCSE Vocational GCSE CSE Grades 2-5 GCE O-level grades D-E or 7-9 Scottish SCE Ordinary Bands D-E Scottish Standard Grades 4-7 SCOTVEC/SQA National Certificate modules Scottish School Leaving Certificate – no grade Scottish Access 1-3 Scottish Intermediate 1 at grades B-D	SECTION 2: GCSE Grades A*-C CSE Grade 1 GCE O-level Grades A-C or 1-6 School Certificate or Matriculation Scottish SCE Ordinary Bands A-C or Pass Scottish Standard Grades 1-3 or Pass Scottish School Leaving Certificate Lower Grade SUPE Ordinary Northern Ireland Junior Certificate SQA Intermediate 1 at Grade A SQA Intermediate 2 (any grade) SQA National 4
SECTION 3: GCE A-level, S-level, A2-level, AS-level International Baccalaureate Vocational A-level (AVCE) Scottish Higher SQA National 5 Scottish SCE/SLC/SUPE at Higher Grade Scottish Higher School Certificate Certificate of Sixth Year Studies/ Advanced Higher Grades Northern Ireland Senior Certificate Welsh Baccalaureate	SECTION 4: Overseas school leaving exam or certificate

CARD R9	
University or CNAA first degree, e.g. BA, BSc University or CNAA diploma or Foundation Degree Postgraduate degree, e.g. MA, MSc, MPhil, DPhil, PhD Teacher Training qualification Nursing qualification	
Foundation/Advanced (modern) apprenticeship completed Other recognised trade apprenticeship completed	
OCR/RSA (PLEASE GIVE LEVEL) Other clerical or commercial qualification	
City and Guilds Certificate (PLEASE GIVE LEVEL)	
BEC/TEC BTEC/ Edexcel	} First Certificate/ First or General Diploma (General/ Ordinary) National Certificate (ONC) or Diploma (OND) Higher National Certificate (HNC) or Diploma (HND)
NVQ/SVQ/GNVQ/GSVQ (PLEASE GIVE LEVEL)	
Other recognised academic or vocational qualifications (PLEASE SAY WHAT)	

Fig T3 – British Social Attitudes survey ‘Household income’ showcard, 2016

CARD R16					
WEEKLY income BEFORE tax		MONTHLY income BEFORE tax		ANNUAL income BEFORE tax	
Less than £140	Q	Less than £590	Q	Less than £7,100	
£141 - 180	T	£591 - 770	T	£7,101 - 9,300	
£181 - 210	O	£771 - 910	O	£9,301 - 10,900	
£211 - 240	K	£911 - 1,000	K	£10,901 - 12,600	
£241 - 270	L	£1,001 - 1,200	L	£12,601 - 14,300	
£271 - 310	B	£1,201 - 1,300	B	£14,301 - 16,200	
£311 - 350	Z	£1,301 - 1,500	Z	£16,201 - 18,300	
£351 - 400	M	£1,501 - 1,700	M	£18,301 - 20,600	
£401 - 440	F	£1,701 - 1,900	F	£20,601 - 23,000	
£441 - 500	J	£1,901 - 2,200	J	£23,001 - 26,000	
£501 - 560	D	£2,201 - 2,400	D	£26,001 - 29,000	
£561 - 620	H	£2,401 - 2,700	H	£29,001 - 32,100	
£621 - 680	A	£2,701 - 3,000	A	£32,101 - 35,700	
£681 - 760	W	£3,001 - 3,300	W	£35,701 - 39,600	
£761 - 850	G	£3,301 - 3,700	G	£39,601 - 44,200	
£851 - 960	N	£3,701 - 4,200	N	£44,201 - 49,900	
£961 - 1,100	X	£4,201 - 4,800	X	£49,901 - 57,200	
£1,101 - 1,300	C	£4,801 - 5,600	C	£57,201 - 67,200	
£1,301 - 1,700	P	£5,601 - 7,200	P	£67,201 - 86,600	
£1,701 or more	E	£7,201 or more	E	£86,601 or more	

‘Whew! I don’t have to run anymore.’

- Haruki Murakami