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TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS, LABOUR MOBILITY, AND THE EFFORT BARGAIN

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ABSTRACT

In developed and developing countries, employers' increasing demand for access to low-skilled temporary migrant labour is one of the most politically charged and complex phenomena impacting global labour markets and workplaces today. Temporary Migration Programmes, where employers control workers' labour mobility and access to permanent residency, are highly controversial yet under-researched. Regulatory controls shift power to capital away from labour and exacerbate migrant workers' vulnerability to exploitation, but critics fail to acknowledge migrant agency and motivations. The purpose of this research is to address a gap in the literature by examining the impact of regulatory controls through the lens of mobility power and the effort bargain, two terrains of struggle within the labour process. A comparative study of five case study organisations in the hospitality sector of a remote, rural tourism destination included 32 semi-structured interviews of managers, supervisors, and migrant workers.

This research offers empirical support for capital's utilisation of regulatory controls as a transnational mechanism to access, construct, and control a more vulnerable labour pool to extract surplus value. Investigation of workers' motivations addresses a gap in the literature, offering detailed empirical knowledge of migrant workers as purposeful and strategic, embedded in diverse family relationships that inform their long-term goals of permanent residency and family reunification as well as their navigation of regulatory controls in the labour market and labour process. A key contribution is empirical evidence of mobility-effort bargaining and the interplay between mobility power and effort power as resources for workers or employers, contingent on internal and external structural forces that contribute to shifting power dynamics. This research also builds on literature specific to labour market challenges of remote, rural destinations, highlighting how distance to density, density, and culture of a community influence labour recruitment, mobility, and employer bargaining power.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DW	Dishwasher
GS	Guest services
HS-TFW	Highly skilled Temporary Foreign Worker
KH	Kitchen helper
LMIA	Labour Market Impact Assessment (formerly LMO)
LMO	Labour Market Opinion (changed to LMIA)
LS-TFW	Low-skilled Temporary Foreign Worker
LS-TFWP	Low-skilled Temporary Foreign Worker Programme
MRA	Migration recruitment agent
MGR	Manager
PR	Permanent residency
PNP	Provincial Nominee Programme
RA	Room attendant
SPV	Supervisor
TFW	Temporary Foreign Worker
TFWP	Temporary Foreign Worker Programme (employer-sponsored)
WHV	Working Holiday Visa

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The growth in Temporary Migration Programmes for low-skilled workers is one of the most politically charged and complex phenomena impacting labour markets and workplaces today. The potential for Temporary Migration Programmes to balance global supply and demand for low-skilled workers, address chronic labour and skill shortages in developed countries, and alleviate underemployment and poverty in developing countries is a key theme of many international agencies and governments. The International Organization for Migration rationalises:

> A hands-on approach is needed to facilitate the mobility of labour, which until now has yet to benefit from the same level of liberalisation as capital and goods. A new approach, one which aims to facilitate the matching of labour demand and supply, should address the needs of all types of economic migrants, the skilled and less skilled, in sectors from health care to hotels, restaurants, construction, IT and education on both a temporary and permanent basis IOM (2008, p. 93).

This statement draws attention to the need to include the labour mobility of both high and low-skilled migrant labour and their role in temporary and permanent labour migration. Highly skilled workers are the subject of a global 'war for talent'. States utilise Temporary Migration Programmes as a competitive strategy in the global marketplace, enticing highly skilled workers to their country with multiple pathways towards permanent residency (PR). The plight and prospects for low-skilled migrant workers are significantly different, however, as they are a source of socio-economic and political tension. States utilise migration regulatory controls to restrict low-skilled migrant workers' labour mobility in terms of time, place, occupation, and access to permanent residency. Low-skilled, temporary foreign workers (LS-TFWs)

are a form of just-in-time labour where the emphasis is on temporariness and labour market access is restricted to those jobs native workers refuse to do (Bauder, 2006; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Foreign Worker Programmes for low-skilled workers (LS-TFWPs) are the most controversial as they interlock workers' migration status with their employment status and give employers control over both. Whilst efficient in connecting the right worker with the right job, TFWPs for low-skilled workers rely on state-sanctioned migration regulatory controls to immobilise a particular labour pool, creating what critics argue is a new class of 'unfree' workers with fewer rights than citizens and highly skilled temporary migrant workers (Fudge, 2012; Sharma, 2012; Strauss and McGrath, 2017).

In the workplace, neoliberalism has intensified existing power imbalances between capital and labour, exacerbating the vulnerability of labour and leaving workers open to high levels of risk and exploitation by employers (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012). Reports indicate that temporary migrant workers are more likely to find themselves in the lowest-paid jobs and be victims of various types of exploitation, including wage theft (Berg and Farbenblu, 2017), forced to work excessive hours without breaks, subjected to verbal and physical abuse or threats thereof, having their movements restricted (Stringer, 2016) and threatened with deportation if they complain (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014). Global imbalances in low-skilled labour and the potential for TFWPs as a response to labour shortages have sparked a resurgence in research critical of states' use of regulatory controls to constrain the mobility, rights, and temporariness of migrant labourers, focusing on the vulnerabilities and exploitation of these second-class or unfree non-citizens (Polanco, 2016; Strauss and McGrath, 2017; Stringer, 2016). This notion of migrant workers as vulnerable and passive has been challenged, with critics arguing that the construct of the vulnerable migrant worker is a generalisation that underestimates the agency of migrant workers in choosing and accepting vulnerabilities as a way to satisfy interests (Alberti, 2014; Dauvergne and Marsden, 2013; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). There is also an argument that sectors such as agriculture, hospitality, and food processing are reliant on temporary migrant labour to remain globally competitive and employer-sponsored programmes is the most efficient way

to achieve this, albeit with appropriate government oversight and well-designed programmes (Preibisch, 2010; Ruhs, 2013; Scott, 2015). These industries, however, are criticised as being low road, characterised by hard jobs and an emphasis on cost minimisation that domestic workers refuse to tolerate, hence the reliance on migrant labour (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Piore, 1979).

States' shift to 'managed migration' with an emphasis on temporary schemes that respond quickly to labour market demands signals a significant shift in power between capital, labour, and the state (Sumption, 2019). In many low-skilled schemes, employer control over workers' migration status, labour mobility, and access to PR has decidedly shifted more power to capital at the expense of labour whilst the state plays a moderating role. However, research on how this impacts employee relations, and the shop floor is limited (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Polanco, 2016; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). Whilst employers are reluctant to acknowledge how regulatory controls benefit them, there is increasing recognition of employers' preference for workers whose mobility is constrained and who are economically disadvantaged (Scott, 2013a; Sumption, 2019). Critics argue that the loss of mobility reduces workers' bargaining power and pressures them to work harder (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Polanco, 2016).

It is clear that a loss of mobility is a structural barrier to workers' agency and core to exploitation, so understanding how and why migrant workers undertake such contracts offers insight into the choices and constraints migrant workers face and what they hope to gain, as well as how their motivations inform their actions and behaviours in the labour process. Mobility power and effort power are two uncertainties in the labour process that can be a source of power for the worker or the employer in what Smith (2006) frames as mobility-effort bargaining. Investigating the impact of regulatory controls in the labour process through a mobility power and effort bargaining lens is an empirical contribution to the critical but under-researched sphere of migration regulatory controls and their impact on the labour process. Understanding both key actors' rationale for participation in LS-TFWPs is essential

as their respective motivations inform how the labour process unfolds. Moreover, it is an opportunity to consider the potential for mutual gains rather than relying on assumptions of exploitation. It is essential to recognise that regulatory controls 'frame but do not determine employee relations outcomes' (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013, p. 132).

To fully understand the impact of regulatory controls on effort and mobility power and the perspectives of employers and workers, it is essential to add a workplace context (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). Fudge and Tham (2017, p. 6) also advocate for the importance of a sectoral focus, arguing that sectors play a role in shaping not only the 'quality and conditions of work' but also the demand for low-skilled migrant workers. The hospitality sector is an exemplar of a sector with a historical reliance on low-skilled migrant workers to fill jobs that are considered physically demanding, dirty, and demeaning (Dench *et al.*, 2006). Characterised by a weak regulatory framework, low trade union representation, and generally poor employment relations (Lucas and Mansfield, 2010), the sectors' cost minimisation strategies and structural constraints, such as seasonality, have contributed to the sector's poor reputation and high levels of labour mobility (Baum, 2015). The literature review in Chapter 5 identifies ways in which a rural context can influence outcomes for migrant workers' mobility and their role in the labour process (Bauder, 2015; Preibisch, 2007; Scott, 2013a). The importance of rural economies and the scope and diversity of their socio-economic development has garnered more interest in the past several years (OECD, 2018). Recognition of rurality as a complex, under-researched phenomenon is growing (Green *et al.*, 2008), particularly in the sphere of migrant employment (Baum, 2012a; Scott, 2015).

Therefore, the empirical context for this study is the hospitality sector in remote, rural Canada. Canada is a nation built on permanent immigration, but since the 1960s, it has increasingly relied on Temporary Migration Programmes to respond to labour market demand. The LS-TFWP is a mainstay in the country's suite of programmes. Whilst policies, regulations, public pressure, and multiple controversies

have been catalysts for the evolving nature of the programme, fundamental regulations that restrict mobility and enforce the temporariness of low-skilled workers have persisted. The hospitality sector in Canada employs a much higher percentage of immigrant workers and TFWs than the 23.8 percent of immigrant workers and 1.4 percent of TFWs across the entire labour force. The accommodations sector's workforce is comprised of 31.7 percent immigrant workers and 2.7 percent non-permanent workers, whilst the food and beverage sector is comprised of 27.1 percent immigrant workers and 3.4 percent non-permanent workers (Tourism HR Canada, 2016). Significantly, the number of non-permanent migrant workers reflects, to some degree, the hospitality sector's persistence, and success in accessing Canada's LS-TFWP (Tourism HR Canada, 2016), even during economic downturns (Foster, 2012).

With respect to a rural context, Canada also has much to offer. With the second largest land mass in the world and a population of just over 40 million, Canada has decades of experience grappling with labour market dynamics associated with multiple layers of rurality. Demographic trends in rural Canada are similar to those of developed economies; however, low density and distance to density exacerbate labour market impacts (CRRF, 2015). From 2001 to 2016, growth in rural areas (5.5 percent) was much slower than urban growth (16.9 percent). It was notably concentrated in rural areas close to cities, desirable retirement locations, or Indigenous Northern communities. In contrast, during the same period, the number of potential workers in rural areas decreased by 23.3 percent (FCM, 2018). In the literature, research focused on migrant workers specific to hospitality focuses predominantly on global cities (Alberti, 2014; Markova *et al.*, 2016; McDowell, Batnitzky and Dyer, 2009) with some notable exceptions (Baum *et al.*, 2007; Thulemark, Lundmark and Heldt-Cassel, 2014; Tuulentie and Heimtun, 2014).

Although the research in this thesis was conducted in 2013, the findings and contribution continue to be both relevant and valuable as the post-covid, global demand by many economies and employers for access to LS-TFWs is on the rise

(Bauböck and Ruhs, 2022). The post-COVID-19 rise in labour shortages reflects tightening labour markets and rebounding economies but could also signal structural changes such as workers leaving the labour market permanently or no longer willing to accept the low pay and strenuous working conditions in sectors such as hospitality (Causa *et al.*, 2022).

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of migration regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs on the labour process, specifically on labour mobility power and the effort bargain. There is growing interest in the intersection between labour migration and employment (McGovern, 2007; Wright and Clibborn, 2019), and it is particularly important now given the growth of LS-TFWPs where the state has interlocked workers' migration status with their employment status (Strauss and McGrath, 2017). Despite the global imbalance between labour supply and demand and increased demand for access to low-skilled workers by developing and developed countries, research on employer-sponsored programmes and their associated regulatory controls is limited (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007; Polanco, 2016; Wright, Knox and Constantin, 2019).

The specific research questions which drive this study are:

1. To what extent does migration theory explain the motivations of temporary migrant workers and their employers for engaging in a LS-TFWP?

2. How do regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs impact labour mobility power and the effort bargain?

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Critical realism is the philosophical approach underpinning this study. It considers the objective reality of labour migration, migration programmes, regulatory controls, rural communities, and hospitality organisations, as well as the subjective nature of key actors' interpretations of their motivations, experiences, and expectations (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). Of even greater importance to this study, however, is critical realism's recognition of three domains of reality - the real, the actual, and the empirical - and its capacity to stratify these realities, identify generative mechanisms, and link them to empirical events (Danermark *et al.*, 2002; Sayer, 2000).

A critical realist methodological framework considers the research process beyond the common deductive and inductive modes of inference to include 'the abductive and retroductive logics of discovery' (Karlsson and Ackroyd, 2014, p. 3). Abduction is an opportunity to 'redescribe' or 're-contextualise' the relations between phenomena and structures to gain a better explanation or deeper knowledge (Danermark *et al.*, 2002, p. 93), whilst retroduction moves backwards from the empirical domain to the real domain to better understand transfactual conditions and uncover generative mechanisms (Easton, 2010). Identifying the motivations of key actors for engaging in a distinctive employment relationship is critical to understanding how they interpret the impact of regulatory controls in the labour process.

An intensive, comparative case study design of five different hospitality organisations in a remote, rural community offers the opportunity to identify and understand underlying generative mechanisms in the first instance and then to understand how the contexts interact with regulatory mechanisms and influence outcomes (Sayer, 2000).

1.4 OUTLINE OF THESIS

Chapter 2 contextualises the global forces underpinning global demand for access to low-skilled temporary migration labour. LS-TFWPs are highly controversial as critics argue that restricting low-skilled workers' mobility, rights, and permanent access to host countries creates a distinct category of 'unfree', more vulnerable workers (Fudge, 2012; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). Traditional economic migration theories offer some insight into drivers of labour migration but fail to recognise the complexity of temporary migration and the role that states, and migration policy play in migration management. The chapter considers the growth in temporary migration, the distinctions between worker-driven and employer-driven programmes, and key debates surrounding LS-TFWPs.

Chapter 3 considers dual labour market and segmentation theories as a lens for examining employers' historical demand for migrant labour and the increased demand to sponsor low-skilled workers. Regulatory controls restricting worker mobility and access to PR are examined thoroughly in Zou's (2015) analytical construct of hyper-dependence and hyper-precarity, offering valuable insight into how interlocking migration status with employment status provides employers with additional mechanisms to control, coerce, and discipline workers.

Chapter 4 moves the discussion to the labour process, where workers' ownership of their labour mobility power and effort power are two resources that can mediate the exploitative nature of the standard employment relationship. Smith's (2006) conceptualisation of a double indeterminacy of mobility and effort power offers the conceptual tools needed to understand the impact of the regulatory controls in the labour process. Network theory is a possible resource linking the structural demand for sponsored workers with the motivations of temporary migrant workers. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the two research questions and the importance of researching them in context.

Chapter 5 provides the rationale for choosing the hospitality sector in a remote, rural community in Canada as the empirical research context. Canada is a nation built on permanent immigration; however, TFWPs have a long history of responding to sectoral and regional labour market shortages. Economic development in rural areas is of international significance; migrant labour is crucial in responding to labour market shortages in rural contexts where labour supply challenges are exacerbated. Incorporating migrant workers into a labour force is 'spatially contingent' (Bauder, 2006); situating this study in a remote, rural context is an opportunity to examine if and how density and distance to density influence employer demand and key actors' experiences of the TFWP. The hospitality sector is characterised by low wages, hard jobs, poor career prospects, high levels of labour mobility, and structural constraints such as seasonality (Baum, 2015). Given the sector's historical reliance on migrant workers and reputation for marginalising these workers in low-skilled jobs, hospitality sector employers' persistent demand for access to LS-TFWs in Canada is not surprising, although contentious. The sector's reliance on LS-TFWs, particularly in rural areas, makes it an ideal choice for examining the impact of regulatory controls on labour mobility and effort power in the labour process.

Chapter 6 outlines the justification for a comparative case study of five case study hospitality organisations in a remote, rural community. A case study approach is useful for investigating the impact of regulatory controls on mobility power and the effort bargain and aligns with a critical realist approach that seeks to understand the generative mechanisms that drive key actors and events. A comparative case study design where criteria for inclusion include experience with LS-TFWs and TFWPs is an opportunity to distinguish the effects of context from common outcomes, thereby increasing generalisability. The case study sites are all hospitality organisations but vary in size, calibre of property, and amenities available, thereby increasing the reliability of common outcomes. Empirical data from semi-structured interviews of migrant workers, their supervisors, and managers offers rich insight into the generative mechanisms that influence key actors' participation in the TFWP,

broadening the perspective on the impacts of migration regulatory controls on mobility-effort bargaining.

Chapters 7 and 8 present the findings for the two research questions. Chapter 7 addresses the motivations of migrant workers and their employers to engage in a TFWP, whilst Chapter 8 reports the impact of regulatory controls on labour mobility and the effort bargain. The geographical and sectoral contexts are integrated throughout each chapter, offering insight into how these contextual factors influence labour supply and demand and shape employee relations.

Chapter 9 discusses the findings from Chapters 7 and 8, positioning them against the literature and the research questions. Key insights include the importance of geographical and sectoral contexts in employers' rationale for accessing LS-TFWs, the role of families in shaping migrant workers' long-term goals of PR, and how this influences workers' labour practices. Initially, regulatory controls empowered employers and workers' loss of mobility power left them vulnerable to work intensification and exploitation. However, employer control over workers' access to PR became an opportunity for mutual gain as the geographical context weakened employers' bargaining power whilst workers' effort power enhanced their bargaining position. The power dynamic shifted, and PR, family sponsorship, family reunification and mobility opportunities became the focus of mobility-effort bargaining.

Chapter 10 identifies key empirical and theoretical contributions, followed by a discussion of practical limitations to the study, and future recommendations. Migrant agency is evidenced as workers, embedded in diverse family relationships, were purposeful and strategic in building the mobility capability necessary to access transnational labour markets with the potential for permanent residency for themselves and their families. The sectoral and geographical contexts build on previous research into rural labour markets, highlighting the role of density, distance to density, and culture of communities in exacerbating recruitment and retention and

determining available labour supplies. The study contributes new insight into mobility-effort bargaining and how internal and external structural forces contribute to shifting power dynamics.

CHAPTER 2 ECONOMIC AND MIGRATION THEORY AS FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE GROWTH OF TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Chapter 2 provides a contextual framing of the global forces underpinning global labour supply and demand and how these forces contribute to the growth of TFWPs in developed countries. The chapter begins with a brief outline of the global socio-economic and political contexts in which temporary migration is situated. Next, key economic migration theories provide insight into temporary labour migration and the motivation of individual migrants to engage in temporary contracts. Then, a discussion of international labour migration offers a perspective on the size and scope of global labour mobility and the push and pull factors that contribute to the supply and demand for migrant workers. Following that is the examination of temporary labour migration, a subset of international migration which is growing in size and scope, predominantly for low-skilled workers. Key debates draw attention to states' use of migration regulatory controls to restrain LS-TFWs' mobility and access to PR in host countries, contributing to a highly contested, two-tier system (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2013).

2.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION

To understand the growth of TFWPs, it is first essential to understand the macro social-economic and political context driving global labour supply and demand. Shifts in capitalism and political ideology are transforming the global landscape as globalisation contributes to pervasive but uneven economic growth. Changes to the competitive structure of world capitalism open up extensive investment opportunities, new markets for capital exploitation, new sources of raw materials,

and access to new global pools of cheap labour (Kotz and McDonough, 2010). The intensification of capital accumulation is concurrent with advances in technologies and transportation, increased travel and communication across longer distances, and the need for liberalisation of global labour markets to resolve imbalances in labour supply and demand. Uneven economic development and demographic challenges contribute to increased demand by developed and some developing economies for access to global labour supplies, whilst under-developed and other developing economies look to outsource surplus labour supplies. This is explained in a further section, but it is essential here to highlight that despite the increased flows of capital, commodities, and ideas, the flow of labour is constrained by national borders and regulatory frameworks designed to control or impede the movement of workers, particularly the low-skilled (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020).

Immigration has always been a politically divisive issue; however, the last decade has witnessed a more overt hostility towards immigrants and migrant labour. The salience of immigration as a political issue is clear in the rise of right-wing parties in Europe, the continued support of Trump in the United States, and Brexit in the United Kingdom (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Joppke, 2020). Notwithstanding the politics of immigration, developing and developed states are confronted with 'real' high and low-skill shortages. However, the increase in demand for low-skilled workers is the most polarising factor (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). An outline of the evolution of capitalism in liberal market economies and the impact of neoliberal globalisation on labour markets and workplaces help situate the research.

2.1.1 Liberal market economies and the impact of neoliberalism on labour markets and the workplace

The core features of all capitalist economies include the persistent accumulation of capital through the production of commodities for exchange and profit, the private appropriation of production focusing on growth, and the use of profits for further

accumulation. In a capitalist economy, private organisations are considered best able to respond to market forces, with the flexibility and resources to transform products and work for organisations in new ways to pursue increased profits in a competitive market. The state's role is to secure the conditions necessary for capital accumulation, although how they do so varies according to the type and periodisation of capital (Marx, 1976).

Whilst fundamental features of capitalist economies are the same, ways and means for accumulating capital vary within and between capitalist societies. This research focuses on liberal market economies, where states rely more on macroeconomic policy and competitive markets to control wages and inflation. Fluid labour markets allow capital to hire and release labour as opportunities dictate, whilst trade unions are perceived to hinder growth and the accumulation of capital. Although some sectors can have a strong trade union presence, states rely on the market relationship between employers and individual workers (Hall, 2015). The rise in neoliberal capitalism has affected liberal market economies, although the effects vary by state.

Since the 1970s, there has been a significant shift away from the Keynesian economics and welfare state politics of the post-World War II years towards a neoliberal form of capitalism throughout many nations of the global economy. Building on Marx's thesis of capital as the organising principle of society, Harvey's (2007) definition of neoliberalism reflects the diminished role of the state as state-regulated capitalism cedes to the pressures of globalisation.

> A theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can be best advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey, 2007, p. 22).

The impact of neoliberalism has been far-reaching. Economic liberation has increased economic and social inequality and resulted in a greater concentration of capital within certain regions and groups (Harvey, 2005). Improvements in technology and communications and access to cheap labour power in developing countries meant production could occur wherever profits were maximised (Burawoy, 1983). If state regulations and costly social programmes hindered a corporation's capital accumulation, production was offshored wherever possible (Kotz and McDonough, 2010). For sectors and occupations that were geographically bound, migrant workers provided the labour market flexibility to secure capital accumulation (Sharma, 2006).

The impact of neoliberalism in the workplace has also been significant. Deregulation and the decline of trade unions shifted the balance of power away from labour towards capital, reducing opportunities for labour to share in productivity gains. Moving production or the threat of moving production offshore and outsourcing work to lower-waged economies tempered labours' response to the degradation of working conditions and employers' persistent demand for flexibilisation. The standard employment relationship, a normative model of employment characterised by full-time continuous employment and social benefits during the Keynesian Welfare State, was replaced by part-time and contingent work, the use of temporary agencies, and the growth of precarious employment (Kalleberg, 2009; Kotz and McDonough, 2010; Vosko, 2006). The demand for a flexible workforce and the resultant increase in precarious work is a worldwide phenomenon and a dominant feature in employment relations today. In their 2015 report, *World Employment and Social Outlook: The Changing Nature of Jobs,* the International Labour Organization details the global decline of full-time employment where fewer than one in four workers are employed in conditions that are representative of a standard employment relationship (ILO, 2015b). The demand for greater labour market flexibility has resulted in the segmentation of workplaces between standard and precarious contracts. The growth in zero-hour contracts in the United Kingdom is one example of the demand for flexibilisation of workers (Herod and Lambert, 2016). Precarious employment is characterised by job loss or fear of job loss, lack of alternative

employment opportunities in the labour market and/or diminished opportunities to use or enhance skills. Income precarity, unsafe work, and a lack of a collective voice are determinants or consequences of diminished opportunities and job insecurity (Standing, 1999). Employers' ability to shift risk to employees depends on workers' relative control and power (Kalleberg, 2009).

The shift to neoliberal capitalism profoundly influences employee relations and the increased precarity of employment in the secondary sector, where low-skilled labour predominates. Marxist and traditional economic theories are theoretical tools that may offer some explanatory power for temporary labour migration in the secondary sector and the motivations for those who choose to migrate.

2.2 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF MIGRATION

2.2.1 Marxist capitalist explanation for labour mobility

According to Marx (2000), production of surplus-value or profit is the 'absolute law' of the capitalist mode of production (p. 888). The means of production and labour power together contribute to both use value and surplus value of commodities; however, Marx argues:

> The development of the productivity of social labour becomes the most powerful lever of accumulation. "The same cause," says Adam Smith, "which raises the wages of labour, the increase of stock, increases its productive powers, and to make a smaller quantity of labour produce a greater quantity of work"' (Marx, 2000, p. 893).

Accessing increasing amounts of labour power is critical to the increased accumulation of capital. Growth in existing markets or the development of new

markets can intensify the accumulation of capital requiring more labour either through the extension or intensification of existing labour power or the acquisition of additional labour (Marx, 2000). If the demand for added labour results in full employment, labour is in a more favourable bargaining position, leading to a wage rise. If an increase in wages slows the accumulation of capital, capital then releases labour to be devalued; therefore, a surplus labour force, or 'reserve army, is essential to ensure the accumulation of capital continues unimpeded (Marx, 2000).

Marx conceptualised a reserve army or surplus labour population drawn from the partially employed or unemployed, a form of flexible, just-in-time labour accessed only when needed. A reserve army allows capital to control the cost of labour and expand as required. It acts as a disciplinary tactic for employed workers, highlighting their disposability, tempering demands for increased wages and better working conditions and forcing them to increase productivity (Marx, 2000). However, a domestic reserve army drawn from the partially employed and unemployed presents challenges. Augmenting production with the unemployed can reduce profits as persons in the margins may require costly social supports to function in the labour process (Castles and Kosack, 1985).

The conceptualisation of the reserve army continues to be relevant, although how it functions has developed in tandem with the evolution of various capitalist economies (Castles, 2010.) Today, migrant workers perform the same function as Marx's latent agricultural workers; however, their place in the capitalist contemporary economy is more precarious. Theoretically, a 'latent' surplus army of low-skilled migrant workers ensures that development progresses with minimal social tensions, and the temporariness of their stay relieves states from bearing the cost of their reproduction. Their willingness to take on poor pay and working conditions frees domestic workers to assume better roles, which, in turn, alters their role as members of society (Castles and Kosack, 1985). How this unfolds varies according to the political economy of migration, the associated rules and regulations of origin and receiving countries and is temporally and spatially contingent.

One of the clearest examples of an international reserve army was the free circulation of labour between Eastern European countries and the United Kingdom. Migrant workers with open work permits, PR, or rights to free circulation can fulfil a reserve army role. However, migration regulatory controls for LS-TFWPs in countries without free circulation and a potential reserve army that is not geographically proximate are much more complex. Temporary Migration Programmes, particularly those in settler countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, require low-skilled workers to have work permits, often tied to a sector or employer. Whilst Working Holiday Visa (WHV) holders and international students are a potential reserve army, employer-sponsored migrant workers are fully employed upon arrival. Hence, they are not available as part of a reserve army, at least not within the state in which they are working. Marxist accounts of capitalist economies and the role of labour and labour mobility are rooted in structural processes and uneven geographical development on a global scale (Castles and Kosack, 1985). Although considered a demand-side theory, it offers a macroeconomic view of labour mobility and a foundation for understanding two traditional economic migration theories: neoclassical economic theory and the new economics of labour migration. Both theories are supply-side theories, explaining the rationale for individuals and families to engage in labour migration. Another key foundational demand-side theory, dual and segmented labour market theory, is examined in Chapter 3.

2.2.2 Neoclassical economic theory

Neoclassical economic theory is one of the best-known migration theories, combining the macro perspective of structural determinants with the micro perspective of individual decision-making (Arango, 2000; Massey *et al.*, 1993). From a macroeconomic perspective, wage differentials represent income and welfare disparities because of the 'uneven distribution of labour and capital’ (Arango, 2000, p. 285). Where labour is scarce relative to capital, wages (the price) are higher,

attracting workers from regions or countries where labour is abundant and the price low (Arango, 2000; Massey *et al.*, 1993). Migration contributes to the spatial redistribution of the factors of production, which eliminates wage differentials and brings equilibrium to the global marketplace, after which, theoretically, there is no more need to migrate (Arango, 2000). At a micro-level, individuals are rational actors who sell their labour where they can maximise utility; individuals migrate because it is for their benefit, either in terms of income or psychic satisfaction (Borjas, 1989). Labour is conceptualised as an investment in human capital and sold where skills can be most productive, recognising that the cost of migration must be taken into account (Massey *et al.*, 1993).

However, this theory has significant shortcomings. One of the most common criticisms is what Arango (2000) calls the 'Achilles' heel of the theory. Despite high-income countries having a GDP 60 times higher than those of lower-income countries (Castles, 2007), there are very few people in real numbers who migrate, at least not internationally (McGovern, 2007; Arango, 2000). In 2020, there were 281 million international migrants, an increase of more than 40 percent since 2000, yet only representing only 3.6 percent of the world's population (IOM, 2022).

Another criticism arises from the theories' premise that those experiencing the greatest wage differentials are most likely to migrate. Castles (2000a) contests this, arguing that the poor lack the economic, cultural, and social capital needed to take advantage of opportunities elsewhere and cope in new environments and that middle-income groups are most likely to migrate. It could be argued that costs and risks associated with temporary, fixed-term contracts increase the likelihood that low-skilled migrants can fill low-skilled jobs in developed countries; however, competition for international work is intense, and wage differentials are such that even low-skilled positions can be attractive for highly skilled workers (Dench *et al.*, 2006). Neoclassical theory does not distinguish between permanent and temporary migration (Dustmann and Görlach, 2016), although it does accommodate

explanations of temporary and circulatory migration quite well (Budnik, 2011). Another criticism of neoclassical economic theory is its failure to account for the state's role in regulating labour markets (Arango, 2000; Hatton and Williamson, 2002). Labour markets induce the flow of labour, and it is by regulating labour markets, receiving and/or origin states control migration flow. Migrant workers' ability to circulate freely in a labour market and maximise utility is subject to the policies and regulations of home and host countries (Massey *et al.*, 1993). However, even in the European Union, where there is free circulation, the volume of migration is low (Arango, 2000).

Borjas's (1989) conceptualisation of an 'immigration market' where labour, like trade, is nonrandomly sorted across potential host countries addresses the policy gap in traditional economic theories. He argues that the 'notion that different agents are considering the allocation of resources among alternative uses and that a market guides this allocation basically defines economics' (p. 461). His comment captures migration's transnational pull and push as individuals 'search' for the country where they can maximise their well-being, comparing the utility of remaining in their origin country against the option of migrating. Migrant workers exercise agency in searching for and comparing offers, weighing opportunities and constraints, and maximising resources, including family and labour networks. Borjas's (1989) conceptualisation of the immigration market acknowledges the role of policy and regulatory controls used in origin and host countries to control the flow and composition of migration. Origin countries may regulate the permanent and temporary migration of their citizens through the use of fines, penalties, or exit visas, whilst host countries use policy to place different values on factors such as skills, occupation, education, or country of origin to make ‘migration offers’, competing for human and physical capital of the migrant (Borjas, 1989, p. 461). States adjust their ‘offers’ or policies according to the level of economic activity, thereby altering the size and composition of the migration flow (Borjas, 1989). LS-TFWs are valued for their ‘labour market potential’, available when needed and easily sent home when not (Castles and Kosack, 1985). In this sense, LS-TFWs become regulators of the labour market, serving as 'shock absorbers' in sectors such as hospitality and construction

that are sensitive to economic downturns (Abella, 2006). This only works if jobs are temporary and not essential to production (Castles and Kosack, 1985); many argue they are not.

The conceptualisation of the 'immigration market' allows for consideration of policies and regulations in migrants' decision-making and creates space to consider why migrants choose one destination over another. Research on labour migration has focused on world cities and urban areas, whilst rural areas have been neglected except for agriculture and WHVs (Green *et al.*, 2008).

2.2.3 New economics of labour migration theory

The new economics of labour migration theory builds on the neoclassical approach of rational choice; however, it posits that the decision to migrate is not the result of an individual decision but part of a family or household strategy to control risk. Families work collectively to maximise expected income and minimise risk by allocating family labour, an act of mutual interdependence ‘that views migration as a “calculated strategy” and not as an act of desperation or boundless optimism (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p. 175). In developing countries, safety nets such as private insurance markets, governmental programmes, and credit markets may be absent or inaccessible to a portion of the population, and remittances from family members abroad can mitigate capital and risk constraints at home (Bean and Brown, 2015; Massey *et al.*, 1993). However, remittances are less an act of altruism than an implied contract between family members, where sharing costs and returns represents a form of co-insurance (Stark and Bloom, 1985). Family and ethnic community networks play a significant role in facilitating transnational labour migration and navigating foreign labour markets (Smith, 2010) and is examined in more detail in Chapter 4.

New economic of labour migration theory, like neoclassical, does not explicitly distinguish between temporary and permanent migration, but the notion of target earners implies temporality (Budnik, 2011). Both neo-classical and new economics of labour migration theories help understand the initial motivation to migrate; however, the new economics of labour migration theory also emphasises the importance of continuity of employment and the dynamic of labour flows at a household level (Bean and Brown, 2015). Fixed temporary contracts can be the only gateway to labour markets in many developed countries, and a guaranteed full-time contract can be sufficient motivation.

Neoclassical economics and new economics of labour migration theories are micro-level decision models that rely on rational choice by an individual or a household. Both consider migration from the push or supply perspective (Arango, 2000). Wages are an important consideration; however, a closer examination of more general push and pull factors offers a broader explanation of the motivations for temporary labour migration.

2.3 DRIVERS OF LABOUR MIGRATION

From the preceding discussion of economic theories of motivation, it is clear that economic motives are key drivers of migration. However, they fail to capture the role of regulatory controls in migration, nor do they adequately explain motivations beyond economics. Push and pull factors are commonly used to explain why migrants feel pressure to leave their home state and might feel drawn or pulled towards a particular destination; therefore, they can illuminate potential migrant motivation beyond the economic. An outline of the size and scope of international migration provides some context, particularly geographical, for the subsequent discussion of push and pull factors.

2.3.1 Size and scope of international migration

In 2020, international migrants totalled approximately 281 million, representing 3.6 percent of the world population, or 1 in 30 persons. Europe hosted 87 million international migrants, whilst Northern America hosted 59 million. Collectively, the two regions hosted more than half of all international migrants (IOM, 2022). The International Labour Organization defines international migrant workers as 'all international migrants who are employed or unemployed and seeking employment in their present country of residence' (ILO, 2015a, p. 28). There were 169 million migrant workers globally in 2019, an increase of 3 percent from 2017 and an increase of 12.7 percent from 2013. Migrant workers are concentrated in three subregions. Northern, Southern and Western Europe hosts 24.2 percent of all international migrant workers, Northern America hosts 22.1 percent and the Arab States 14.3 percent (ILO, 2021).

Collectively, migrant workers constitute 4.9 percent of the labour force of destination countries; however, percentages differ between countries and regions. In 2019, migrant workers constituted 41.4 percent of the workforce in the Arab States, 22.1 percent in Northern America, and 18.4 percent in Northern, Southern and Western Europe (ILO, 2021), so they were clearly an integral part of the workforce in these three regions. High percentages of foreign workers in many countries reflect states' ability to access global labour supplies at all skill levels to accumulate capital. The numbers do not reflect the layers of division and how labour is segmented according to race, gender, nationality, and citizenship (Smith, 2010).

Despite the growing numbers of migrant workers, labour market participation of migrant workers as a percentage of international migrants 15 and over has steadily declined. The 169 million migrant workers in 2019 represent 69 percent of the 245 million international migrants of working age. This is a decrease from 70 percent in 2017 and 72.7 percent in 2013, a trend expected to continue until the 2030s. The

trend negatively impacts remittances for origin countries and represents a loss of macroeconomic output, growth, and contribution to social security systems in hosting countries. The decrease in migrant workers' participation in the workforce could reflect factors such as labour market and immigration policies, labour market participation in host countries, barriers to obtaining employment, non-recognition of credentials, or insufficient language skills (ILO, 2021). Low participation rates could significantly exacerbate political tensions, resulting in more reliance on temporary programmes. However, it could also reflect another demographic trend. Some developing countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America are experiencing the same demographic drop in fertility combined with the ageing population issue developed countries have experienced. This convergence of demographic trends can signal increased global competition for low-skilled workers as traditional labour export countries move to keep their workers (IOM, 2022).

2.3.2 Push and pull model

The data in the preceding discussion illustrated the high numbers of labour migrants in developed countries, where they are critical to social and economic growth. The push-pull model is a popular analytical framework because of its perceived ability to incorporate economic, environmental, and demographic factors into the decision to migrate. Factors such as lack of economic opportunity, political repression, population density, poverty, and human rights issues can 'push' individuals to seek opportunities in another country. Pull factors drawing migrants to a particular destination could include political freedom, economic opportunities, demand for specific types of labour, safety and security, or friends and family (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020).

Demographic factors are the core of much of the labour demand discussed in the preceding section. International migration can contribute to population growth in receiving countries; however, in developed countries, population growth has been

dominated by net migration since 1990-2000 (UNDESA, 2013). Canada, Europe, Japan, the United States, and other developed nations are facing the dual demographic challenge of population ageing and population decline due to declining fertility rates and increased longevity. Because of this declining population, predictions are that by 2040-2050, positive net migration will no longer offset natural increases in developed countries, and populations will decline in Europe (van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010). In Canada, immigration accounted for 80 percent of population growth in 2017-2018 and is expected to grow as the population ages. Globally, in 2019, there were 962 million people over 60, with 25 percent of that population residing in Europe (IOM, 2022).

More recent literature suggests that migrant motivation is more complex and dynamic (Alberti, 2014; Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011) than any individual migration theory allows for. Wage differentials and labour demand can be primary motivators; however, other factors, such as a desire to learn a new language, experience a new culture, gain international work experience, or join family members, are also drivers of labour migration (Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011; Wright and Pollert, 2006) although regulatory controls or individual circumstances can constrain migrant agency. Whilst the push-pull model can accommodate a laundry list of diverse motivations for migration, it is more descriptive than analytical, with no explanatory power as to how the various factors interact and facilitate or drive movement (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). For instance, migrant workers may migrate temporarily to meet their goals and return home after a fixed period, or as is very common, their intentions change over time, and they seek to stay in the new country permanently (Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011). Other migrant workers have long-term goals of a more secure future for their children and family, and a country's reputation for safety, security, or quality of life is a pull factor. They commit to a temporary contract, hoping to transition to PR (Polanco, 2016). Long-term goals draw attention to networks as a key motivator in migration. Family ties across space show the potential for future migrants and 'establish a bridgehead of migrants who represent one end of the migratory chain' (Boyd, 1989, p. 646). Wright and Pollert (2006) argue that migrant workers' motivation to stay

permanently, no matter when it happens, is often driven by push factors such as high unemployment or unfavourable conditions in their origin country. This example, as well as other motivations such as family or adventure, could be argued to represent both push and pull, something the model cannot explain or accommodate.

Push-pull is deterministic, suggesting a cause without considering the complex and dynamic set of factors that can drive migrant motivation and decision-making (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). Although unable to explain the interaction of factors contributing to migration, push-pull offers an opportunity to recognise that there are often multiple drivers of migration that can evolve over time.

2.4 THE GROWTH IN TEMPORARY MIGRATION PROGRAMMES

According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 5.1 million temporary migrant workers were entering OECD countries in 2018, a 5 percent increase from the 4.8 million temporary migrants in 2017, a growth trend expected to continue. The main categories of temporary migrants include inter-company transferees, WHV holders, seasonal workers, and 'free circulation' migrants. Poland was the top destination for migrant workers within the OECD, and the United States was second (OECD, 2020). In settler countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, temporary migration has been outpacing permanent migration (OECD, 2012), although collectively, in OECD countries in 2018, there were 5.3 million permanent residents compared to 5.1 million temporary migrants (OECD, 2020).

According to the OECD (2020), migrant workers in OECD European countries, Israel, and the United States are 'strongly over-represented' in service sectors such as domestic services and hospitality, where low-skilled work predominates. Over-representation in hospitality and support service sectors is also high in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. However, migrants in these countries also have higher

representation in high-skilled jobs such as IT and finance. The predominance in care and service sectors, such as hospitality, points towards permanent structural demand for low-skilled migrant workers; however, many LS-TFWPs restrict access to PR, a core criticism of the growth in the LS-TFWPS (Castles, 2006; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Much of this controversy is based on the long-term consequences of past Temporary Migration Programmes for low-skilled workers.

2.4.1 Lessons from the past – adverse consequences of Guest Worker Programmes

The growth in low-skilled temporary migration is hotly contested in both political and academic circles as stories of exploitation reach the public. In New Zealand, a report revealed a widespread requirement that workers pay illegal recruitment fees, reports of debt bondage and exploitation in the hospitality industry, physical, mental, and sexual abuse in the fishing industry and general exploitation and wage theft across the spectrum (Stringer, 2016). A survey in Australia reveals similar results where migrant workers accused employers of exploitation, withholding of passports, demanding payments to access jobs, demands for kickbacks, and the use of coercive threats to report workers to immigration (Berg and Farbenblu, 2017). In academic circles, key debates consider the bifurcation of programmes along the 'subjective' line of high and low skill where only the highly skilled have access to PR in the host country, the segmentation of workers into 'temporary' low-skilled jobs that are structurally permanent, the enhanced role of employers in overseeing workers' migration status, and the use of migration regulatory controls to restrict migrant workers' mobility and rights (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009).

Much of the current tension is grounded in the long-term consequences of earlier TFWPs and the desire to '*import labour but not people* [emphasis original]" (Castles, 2006, p. 942). Guest worker programmes such as the Gastarbeiter programme

(1960s) in Germany and the *Bracero* programme (1942 -1964) in the United States were heavily regulated by government, restricted worker rights, limited family reunion, and were structured with the goal of 'rotating workers' to limit their time in the country. States imposed limitations on duration to prevent acculturation and attachment to the host country and detachment from the origin country. Workers were expected to tolerate low wages, poor working conditions, and restricted rights during their contract period and then return to their homes (Castles, 2006). The lack of government safeguards in the Bracero agricultural programme resulted in the displacement of domestic workers and exploitive working conditions for migrants, however its enduring legacy is the migrant social networks that continue to provide a continuous flow of primarily undocumented workers from Mexico to the agricultural industry in the United States. This reserve army exerts downward pressure on working conditions and wages for all farm workers (Gabriel and MacDonald, 2012, p. 108).

In Germany’s Gastarbeiter programme, employers skirted policies forbidding family reunion by requesting their workers’ family members by name during the hiring process. Families became embedded in communities, and when the economy faltered and the programme closed, liberal and social democratic governments argued for the workers’ rights to PR and equal rights. Working conditions were poor; however, they were considered better than those in the host country. Critics argue the legacy of this programme is ethnic minority settlements built on a foundation of social exclusion, inferior housing, labour market segmentation, and high unemployment, all conditions that persist today (Castles, 2006).

The European and American guest worker programmes had significant unintended and long-lasting consequences, which led to their demise (Castles, 2006) however similar programmes continue in the Arab States and Asia. Critics argue that less democratic regimes can enforce strict rules regarding residency, family reunion, working conditions, and deportation, whilst more liberal democracies are challenged by migrant workers' civil and political rights (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020).

2.5 KEY DEBATES REGARDING TEMPORARY MIGRATION PROGRAMMES

Current versions of Temporary Migration Programmes are contested for reasons mirroring those of past programmes. The polarisation of low-skilled, low-wage workers into temporary 'only' programmes whilst high-skilled workers have multiple pathways to PR is a core debate. Critics argue LS-TFWPs create a distinctive category of 'unfree' workers where workers do not have the same rights and social protections afforded to other migrant and domestic workers (Bauder, 2006; Castles, 2006; Fudge, 2012). Three key debates are discussed: the state's role and regulatory controls, and bifurcation of skills, and temporariness.

2.5.1 The state and regulatory controls

The shift by states to ‘managed migration’ with an emphasis on temporary schemes that respond quickly to labour market demands signals an important shift in power between capital, labour, and the state (Sumption, 2019). Employers and other third-party actors, such as migration recruitment agents, play a more active and extensive role in a complex system of TFWPs. Employers recruit migrant workers internationally, control workers' migration status and labour mobility while they are under contract, and, in some instances, control workers' future mobility through regulatory controls such as re-hiring or access to PR. Given this significant shift in power from state to capital, and employers' control over workers' labour mobility power, growth in TFWPs is alarming (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017).

There are a myriad of Temporary Migration Programmes within and across states, each with its regulatory controls designed to adapt to evolving labour market needs.

To facilitate the ensuing discussion, categorising programmes as either worker/supply-driven or employer/demand-driven is useful in that it can encompass a wide range of different programmes yet illuminates the two key issues associated with regulatory controls: worker labour mobility and temporariness (Sumption, 2019). These categories guide the rest of the thesis.

Worker-driven permits are supply-driven, where workers are free to sell their labour power within the marketplace, albeit with whatever constraints the state imposes. Points-based systems assess highly skilled workers' education, experience, and language skills to qualify them for an open permit (Sumption, 2019). Open permits are a common form of worker-driven permit, although who can access them varies by state and changes over time. In Canada, open permits are available to highly skilled workers or their families, WHV holders, and, more recently, international students (Fudge and Tham, 2017).

WHV holders and international students are both categories of 'non-work' visas that are 'worker driven'. Individuals work at their discretion, within specific guidelines; however, there is increasing evidence of states' utilisation of these visa categories as reserve armies, particularly for low-skilled work. Critics argue student and youth mobility visas are politically 'hidden' behind public policies that position workers as sojourners and consumers, contributing to the economy whilst masking the true size and scope of the number of the international ‘non-workers’ in the labour market (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011; Robertson, 2014). Framing these labour pools as non-workers also masks labour market intentions to construct a young, mobile workforce unfettered by dependants (Robertson, 2014). Increasing the number of international students, eliminating the maximum hours students can work, extending age eligibility of WHV holders from 30 to 35, increasing WHV visas from one to two years, and removing or reducing restrictions about length of time with any one employer are all capacity building strategies states can use to augment these reserve armies. WHV holders' agency and mobility are their own (Sumption, 2019), and WHV schemes are not considered migrant worker programmes; therefore, they do

not have the same degree of regulatory oversight as Temporary Migrant Programmes, rendering WHV workers more vulnerable to exploitation (Robertson, 2014; Wright and Clibborn, 2020).

Employer-driven permits are demand-driven and intended to maximise labour market efficiency by putting the right worker with the right employer. The worker’s degree of dependence on the employer varies between programmes and states (Sumption, 2019). Canada’s LS-TFWP and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme tie migrant workers to one sponsoring employer for a specified period, and employers control visa renewals and pathways to permanency. Workers' ability to change employers in Canada is limited, and given the employers' role in future mobility, it is of little practical value. According to Sumption (2019), this sponsorship model is considered 'high dependence' with an increased risk of exploitation. A worker's ability to leave an exploitive employer and take time to find another is a critical element in mitigating worker vulnerability and keeping employers in check. In some states, workers can automatically access PR after participating in a TFWP for a specific period, whilst in other states, access to PR requires employer sponsorship. Implications for the migrant workers and the employment relationship are addressed in Chapter Three, but LS-TFWPs that constrain worker mobility and enforce temporariness are contested (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Strauss and McGrath, 2017).

Whilst there is an ethical argument that all workers have the freedom of their own labour mobility and the right to change employers (Carens, 2013), Ruhs (2013) argues that workers are choosing their vulnerabilities, deciding which terms and conditions they can live with in exchange for accessing a labour market and potentially long-term residency. Although imperfect, supporters of temporary programmes question whether it is realistic to expect employers to sponsor workers only to have workers exercise their mobility once they have accessed the labour market (Clark and Drinkwater, 2008; Ruhs, 2013; Sumption, 2019). Researchers in food production argue that they are a necessary part of the landscape if the sector is

to remain globally competitive; therefore, focusing on making them work would be more productive (Preibisch, 2007; Scott, 2015). Making them work supports the contention that TFWPs can be a triple win, providing receiving countries with the ability to address labour shortages and origin countries with the ability to address labour surpluses and generate an influx of foreign exchange through remittances into their economies. The third win is that of the migrant worker, touted as the perfect 'economic man', able to market his human capital and maximise the utility of his labour in the international marketplace (IOM, 2008). Critics argue that low-skilled workers are unable to maximise their utility and that the 'win' favours the host state. Bauböck and Ruhs (2022) argue there is a way to make them work and given the increased interest by the United States and Europe in TFWPs, a constructive approach that considers fair representation of the interests of the three actors merits exploration.

There is some agreement that TFWPs can function ethically with increased oversight and government intervention (Bauböck and Ruhs, 2022; Ruhs, 2013; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). Easing mobility restrictions for workers experiencing exploitation, allowing them a fixed period in the labour market to get a new employer, granting open visas, or offering PR after a pre-determined time with a sponsoring employer are all modifications that could reduce exploitation (Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). The argument that workers can return to their country of origin if conditions are exploitative is unrealistic. It ignores that conditions in the origin country may be worse or that workers and their families may have incurred debt to secure transnational work (Zou, 2015).

2.5.2 Low-skilled versus high-skilled, a two-tiered system

Another key debate regarding Temporary Migration Programmes is that of skill, with low-skilled workers facing different restrictions and regulations than those of high-skilled workers (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Temporary programmes designed for

high-skilled workers are more likely to reflect the competitive nature of the ‘global war for talent’ and open work permits for spouses, free public education for children, access to the national labour market, and expedited pathways to PR are competitive features. Regulatory controls over LS-TFWPs tend to be more stringent, restricting worker mobility, limiting family reunion, access to social supports, and often limiting access to PR. This bifurcation by skill creates a two-tiered system where low-skilled workers do not have the same rights as citizens and other migrant workers, and their loss of mobility renders them more vulnerable to exploitation (Strauss and McGrath, 2017).

Employer-sponsored schemes have an important advantage in that workers are hired into regions and sectors where they are most needed, and their skills are more likely to match their jobs (Castles, 2000b; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). Matching skills to jobs require some interrogation. This may apply to highly skilled workers; however, in the low-skilled arena, there is increasing evidence of over-qualified workers either being required to have more qualifications than domestic workers (Polanco, 2016) or accepting low-skilled work as the only gateway to a specific labour market (Castles, 2000b; Wills *et al.*, 2009). In the United Kingdom, when free circulation was the norm, there was ample evidence of over-qualified workers engaging in low-skilled temporary work to meet personal goals (Alberti, 2014; Dench *et al.*, 2006).

2.5.3 Temporariness as a policy category-

As shown earlier in the discussion, the International Labour Organization's definition of a migrant worker is broad and includes all workers, even those with PR. It does not capture temporary workers as a distinct category, a significant gap given the growth and role of temporary migrants in the global labour landscape. The United Nations Statistics Division’ defines temporary migrants workers:

> Foreigners admitted by the receiving state for the specific purpose of exercising an economic activity remunerated from within the receiving country. Their length of stay is usually restricted, as is the type of employment they can hold. Their dependants, if admitted, are also included in this category (Statistics UNDESA, 2017, p. 15).

The definition recognises TFWs as a distinctive group of workers who are characterised by their temporariness. As a policy category, temporariness can be understood in opposition to permanence, bounded by a specific timeframe as in the regulated temporariness common in LS-TFWPs, or flexible temporariness of HS-TFWPs and inter-company transferees, or forced temporariness as with refugees (Triandafyllidou, 2022). Temporariness is also a disciplinary practice of the state where regulatory controls filter workers according to set criteria and direct/segment workers into specific labour markets (Robertson, 2014).

The definition does not address the complexity of temporary labour migration nor the critical and ideological debate regarding whether migrant workers can or should expect permanency. Ruhs (2006) acknowledges that the core feature of the theoretical concept of temporary migrant labour programmes is that a migrant's stay and, therefore, employment is temporary; however, he argues definitions can leave the notion of permanence open to interpretation, with some assuming temporary migrants can never gain permanent residence and others seeing the temporary status as a first step towards, if not a right to permanence. Dauvergne and Marsden (2011) argue the ‘temporary’ label is ‘illusory’ given the state’s knowledge of the embedded structural demand for low-skilled migrant workers and their awareness of the motivation of many migrants to become permanent. Moreover, the focus on temporary as a form of migration status is just one dimension of what makes a sponsored migrant worker's legal status precarious. Skill, wealth, and union representation protect highly skilled temporary migrants from exploitation and abuse, advantages low-skilled workers cannot use (Fudge and Tham, 2017).

The United Nations Statistics Division's (2017) definition of temporary migrant workers does not capture the complexity of temporary migration. Dustmann and Görlach (2016) argue that re-migration plans are key, and the 'intended' duration at any point in time determines whether migration is permanent or temporary (p. 4). However, ‘intended' duration implies workers have a choice in continuing their stay, which is not true for many LS-TFWs. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) developed a classification of temporary migration that distinguishes first between permanent and temporary migration, then sub-classifies temporary migration into one of four types: return migration, contract migration, transient migration, and circulatory migration (see Figure 2.1). Underpinning the types of migration are the motives for initiating migration.



Figure 2.1. Forms of Migration (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007, P.238)

This classification is a useful starting point as the typology draws attention to the complexity of temporary labour migration, but also because it considers the

motivation underpinning all migration. Economic motivation may be a primary driver for many migrants. Still, the literature in this chapter has demonstrated multiple, diverse, and potentially overlapping motivations beyond the economic that require consideration. Motivations are dynamic, and temporality may be the ultimate goal, an initial goal that evolves, or what a worker hopes is the first step towards permanent migration (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). This uncertainty underscores the need to interrogate workers' motivations and how their choices and constraints impact their ability to meet their goals.

In Figure 2.1, return migration encompasses those workers who return to their origin country by their own choice after a period abroad, suggesting workers' ownership of their mobility. Transient migration captures workers with high levels of mobility who can move 'through' several countries before settling in a destination or returning home. Contract migration refers to situations 'where the migrant lives in the host country for a few years, and where the migration duration is exogenously determined by, for instance, a residence permit or a working contract' (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007, p. 238). Including a time period and the extent of time differentiates this definition from that of Castles (2000a, p. 95), 'temporary international movement of workers, which are organised and regulated by governments, employers, or both'. Castle's definition differs in that the duration is open-ended so that it could be five weeks or five years. This latitude may be why Castles (2000a) includes agricultural workers in his definition of contract workers, whilst in Dustmann and Weiss's typology, they are included in circulatory. Circulatory migration refers to situations where migrants move frequently to the host country for short periods but remain residents of their origin country (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007).

Dustmann and Weiss's (2007) inclusion of circulatory as a separate category recognises the complexity of the temporary/permanent binary and the role that duration of stay can play politically and publicly, an important consideration when considering LS-TFWPs. Agricultural programmes persist in most developed countries to some degree because they are circulatory or rotational, the industry is

hidden, and the 'season' is less than a year and well-defined, so temporariness can be justified (Preibisch, 2007).

This study focuses on contract migration for low-skilled workers. The typology is a useful starting point in that it recognises the complexity of temporary migration and the importance of motivation. Subdividing temporary contracts into high and low-skill categories could strengthen the typology and draw attention to the connections between skill and temporality.

2.6 CONCLUSION

From the literature reviewed in this chapter, it is evident that the re-emergence and growth of LS-TFWPs are problematic, particularly where regulatory controls restrict workers' mobility, rights, and permanent access to host labour markets (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). Data from the (OECD, 2020) suggests that global labour demand for access to low-skilled temporary migrant labour will grow and become more competitive as developing countries face demographic challenges similar to those of developed countries. Traditional economic migration theories posit that wage differentials are the motivation for individual and family decisions to engage in transnational work; however, more recent literature points to the complexity of motivations that drive migrant workers towards transnational working lives (Alberti, 2014; Arango, 2000; Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011). Moreover, traditional economic theories fail to capture how regulatory controls interact with labour markets, facilitating access for highly skilled workers whilst constraining choices for low-skilled workers (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011; Fudge, 2012). Categorising Temporary Migration Programmes as either employer-driven or worker-driven illuminates how regulatory controls associated with employer-driven programmes, such as constraints on mobility and temporariness, can exacerbate employers' power over workers, rendering them more vulnerable to exploitation (Sumption, 2019).

Motivations of both migrant workers and their employers for engaging in TFWPs cannot be assumed. The rationale and perspectives of both actors are key to understanding the persistence in demand for these programmes and how they unfold at the worksite (Anderson, 2010; Scott and Rye, 2023). Therefore, the next chapter examines employer rationale and demand for low-skilled migrant workers.

CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUALISING EMPLOYER DEMAND FOR LOW-SKILLED MIGRANT WORKERS

Chapter 2 provided insight into macroeconomic migration theories and the multiple and diverse motivations of migrant workers who engage in low-skilled labour migration, a crucial element in understanding how employee relations unfold at the worksite (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). Marxist capitalist explanation offers insight into labour demand; however, it focuses on working-class divisions (Castles and Kosack, 2010) and does not address the impact on the worksite and employee relations.

Therefore, this chapter focuses on understanding employer demand for LS-TFWs in the labour market, sectorally and occupationally. The over-representation of migrant workers marginalised in low-wage, low-skill jobs at the bottom of occupational labour markets is well-researched. Low language skills, lack of financial resources, lack of credential recognition and discrimination are some of the more common rationales for the persistence of this phenomenon (Piore, 1979; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). There is also literature suggesting that the temporary nature of work in sectors such as hospitality is mutually beneficial, as short-term work may align with the short-term plans of some temporary migrants (Baxter-Reid, 2016; Janta *et al.*, 2011) or the 'temporary' nature of the work helps migrant workers rationalise their acceptance of the work others refuse to do (Piore, 1979). According to Bauder (2006), a low-cost, unfree, disciplined, and flexible migrant workforce is an effective accumulation strategy for capital and provides a compelling explanation for the increased employer demand for access to this workforce, even during economic downturns.

The chapter begins with examining dual labour market theory, a well-established theory that provides a foundation for understanding employer demand for migrant

workers. Next, the chapter focuses on how dual labour market theory evolves into segmentation theory, expanding the potential to examine how labour markets are segmented beyond primary and secondary to include race, gender, ethnicity, and citizenship. The following section extends the discussion on segmentation to examine the two contentious migration regulatory controls identified in Chapter 2, labour mobility and temporariness. The chapter concludes by identifying three key themes from the literature review: labour mobility, effort power, and network theory.

3.1 DUAL LABOUR MARKET THEORY – RATIONALE FOR EMPLOYERS' DEMAND FOR LOW-SKILLED MIGRANT WORKERS

Dual labour market and segmentation theory offers a political economy perspective on the structural demand for migrant labour, rejecting the neoclassical economic theory's position that market mechanisms apply uniformly to all labour migration (Bauder, 2006). This theory is premised on the logic of capital accumulation but recognises that development is uneven, and it is these factors that drive employer demand for low-wage, low-skilled migrant workers (King, 2012; Piore, 1979). Individual and family migration decisions are considered a reaction to structural processes; once employer or labour market demand is known, it creates a permissive factor for migrant labour (Castles and Kosack, 1985). Although a demand-side theory, it also explains migrants' behaviour, specifically their willingness to engage in low-skilled migrant work (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). According to Piore (1979), structural demand for low-skilled migrant workers is permanent because of an inherent dualism between capital and labour, labour shortages, and occupational hierarchies. Each of these contributing factors is discussed.

3.1.1 Primary and secondary sectors – dualism between capital and labour

In his seminal book, *Birds of Passage*, Piore (1979) argues that labour migration is a demand phenomenon 'rooted in the productive system' (p. 13) and driven by capitalists' structural demand for cheap and flexible labour. Within the labour process, labour is framed as variable labour and the means of production as constant capital (Marx, 1976). Piore (1979) argues that a basic dualism between variable labour and constant capital results from the inevitable flux and uncertainty that all economies experience. Capital is a fixed factor of production in which costs must be borne by owners of capital even when production is idle. At the same time, labour is a variable factor of production, and when demand lowers, labour power is released, leaving labour to bear the cost of its unemployment (Piore, 1979, p. 36). The owners of capital control the production process and, thus, favour capital-intensive techniques over labour-intensive techniques, resulting in a stratification of labour into primary and secondary labour markets. A capital-intensive primary sector is characterised by stable, skilled jobs that employers invest in and attract domestic workers. The labour-intensive secondary industry is characterised by unstable, low-paid, low-skilled jobs with little chance of advancement and requiring little investment or cost by the employer (Doeringer and Piore, 1985). Dual labour market theory is criticised as 'too blunt' an instrument; however, it was instrumental in setting the stage for a more nuanced consideration of labour market segmentation, which is discussed in a further section (Bauder, 2006).

According to dual labour market theory, primary sector workers function as a core workforce, and migrant workers are a peripheral workforce (Piore, 1979), operating more as a reserve army responsive to economic shifts and turns (Abella, 2006). More recent research suggests migrant workers' roles in an organisation may be impacted by geography and the sector in which they are employed. In a study of A8 migrant labour, workers in urban areas were treated as peripheral, whilst in rural areas, they assumed the function of core workers (McCollum and Findlay, 2015). More controversial is the role of migrant workers as 'core' workers in LS-TFWPs in

Canada, where LS-TFWs mobility is constrained, and domestic workers are displaced (Fudge and Tham, 2017).

3.1.2 Labour shortages

Traditional labour markets in the secondary sector include women, teenagers, and immigrants; however, demographic changes, including declining birth rates, increased levels of formal education, and increased presence of women in primary and secondary sectors, have also contributed to an increased reliance on migrant workers (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Piore (1979) argues that in times of full employment, domestic workers eschew jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, choosing jobs with higher status and higher wages, which then create labour shortages in certain sectors of the economy. Employers can choose to either increase wages, shift labour to capital, or hire migrant workers (Piore, 1979). Shifting labour to capital through technology or other means may not resolve labour costs in labour-intensive sectors such as hospitality, construction, and agriculture; all labour-intensive sectors that rely heavily on migrant workers. Critics argue that these are low-road industries and that access to a cheap and disposable workforce as a factor of production facilitates the accumulation of capital and the dominance of capital over labour (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Preibisch, 2007). This accords with Castles and Kosack's (1985) argument that introducing surplus migrant workers into the production process allows capital to keep wages down. They argue that migrant workers' willingness to accept low pay combined with their willingness to maximise their utility through overtime and flexibilisation depresses wages and reduces the bargaining power of domestic workers seeking better working conditions.

Employer demand for LS-TFWs as a response to labour shortages is under increasing scrutiny. In Canada, hospitality employers' demand for access to LS-TFWs, even during economic downturns, suggested a preference for LS-TFWs (Foster, 2012). This is consistent with findings from multiple studies in the United Kingdom that

found employer demand reflected a preference for migrant workers over domestic workers (Dench *et al.*, 2006; Forde and MacKenzie, 2009; Scott, 2015), although there is disagreement as to why. The various perspectives on migrant workers as good workers are examined in a further section, but here, it is essential to reiterate the discussion in Chapter 2 of the demographic challenges faced by many developed and developing countries. Based on demographics, labour shortages are real, and it is here that Piore's (1979) dual labour market theory has explanatory power. Labour shortages are consistently concentrated in certain sectors such as hospitality, agriculture, construction, and food processing, all known for their 'hard' jobs in the secondary sector (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010), which domestic workers eschew given the opportunity (Piore, 1979). It is also important to note that, geographically, rural areas are more challenged by labour shortages than urban areas (CRRF, 2015), again as a result of demographics and rural-to-urban migration (Green *et al.*, 2008).

3.1.3 Occupational hierarchies

Occupational hierarchies reflect the social prestige and expectations of positions within the hierarchy, and it is this conceptualisation of a hierarchy that prevents employers from increasing wages (Piore, 1979). If workers at the bottom of the hierarchy experience a rise in wages, structural inflation demands that all wages within the hierarchy be proportionally increased in order to maintain social expectations and prestige (Massey *et al.*, 1993, p. 441). Piore (1979) argues that structural inflation prevents employers from raising wages to attract domestic workers during times of labour scarcity, which then creates a demand for migrant workers. Whilst domestic workers eschew bottom-end jobs, Piore (1979) argues that migrant workers are more willing to accept them because they ascribe a different meaning to their work. For migrant workers, their social identity is in their origin country, and wage differentials and associated remittances from work abroad enhance their social status at home, irrespective of the type of work. Thus, a 'dual frame of reference' along with the temporal nature of the work allows migrant workers to divorce the 'work' from the social identity of the worker (Piore, 1979;

Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). This instrumental approach to temporary work is why temporary migrant workers are the perfect 'economic man' (Piore, 1979, p. 54), although as workers become embedded in communities, their career potential, status, and ability to maximise human capital become more important (Piore, 1979).

3.2 SEGMENTATION THEORY – A MORE NUANCED APPROACH

The initial segmentation of labour markets into primary and secondary jobs was instrumental in advancing the theory of segmentation of labour markets in more nuanced directions (McCollum and Findlay, 2015). Reich, Gordon, and Edwards's (1973) study included the addition of ethnicity and gender, two segmentations which are widely used today. They propose a definition of labour market segmentation, which may be useful as this chapter explores segmentation as a lens for examining the regulatory controls associated with TFWPs. They define labour market segmentation as:

> The historical process whereby political-economic forces encourage the division of the labour market into separate submarkets, or segments, distinguished by different labour market characteristics and behavioural rules. Segmented labour markets are, thus, the outcome of a segmentation process. Segments may cut horizontally across the occupation hierarchy as well as vertically (p. 359).

This definition highlights the multi-scalar potential of segmentation theory to link neoliberal capitalism and the growth in TFWPs to a specific migrant labour pool, offering a lens to examine how regulatory controls might impact the behaviour of key actors including the migrant worker, employer, and the state. First, highlighting developments situates the research.

Migrant workers can contribute to their own segmentation through their use of kinship and ethnic community networks, where they obtain information, support, and access to foreign labour markets (Smith, 2010; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Kinship networks can perform a 'push' function as individuals and families look to transnational labour markets as a strategy to manage risk and maximise economic gain, but also a pull function as networks in the host country facilitate access to specific jobs and labour markets. Early migrants bear the most risk but establish a 'node' with an employer or destination, which then influences future migration (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). Networks reproduce themselves when current migrant workers encourage employers to hire their friends and families, assuring employers the new recruits are hard workers. Hiring within a network responds to employers' preference for managing risk and hiring, if not internally, then a known quantity and also provides employers with an additional source of control (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003).

Smith (2010, p. 276) argues that networks are critical to migrant workers' ability to navigate labour markets in host countries. More recent research highlights the role of networks in not only accessing labour markets but also in supporting migrant workers' mobility capability as they exit bad jobs or strive to meet personal, professional, or economic goals (Alberti, 2014). Understanding how kinship and ethnic community networks contribute to the mobility plans and mobility capability of migrant workers is essential to moving the conversation beyond that of the migrant worker as the 'economic man', driven only by wage differentials (Ciupijus, Forde and MacKenzie, 2020).

Labour markets and occupations are also segmented according to gender and ethnicity (Reich, Gordon and Edwards, 1973). Employers seek the most 'appropriate' workers for a particular job, and whilst skill, aptitude, and experience reflect an ability to 'do' a job, there also exist social constructions as to which gender, ethnicity, or nationality is most suited for a particular job (McDowell, Batnitsky and Dyer, 2007; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). In hotels, migrant workers from regions such as

Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are more likely to be working in back-of-the-house positions, whilst front-of-the-house positions are more likely to be filled by migrant workers from the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa (Lucas and Mansfield, 2010; Matthews and Ruhs, 2007b).

The term 'hiring queue' is used to describe the ordering or ranking of job candidates by nationality, ethnicity, gender, or race (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003, p. 8). Recent studies of hotels in London found that whilst employers and social networks favour certain groups, the volume of labour supply was so extensive and at hand that hiring queues were not evident (Markova *et al.*, 2016; Wills *et al.*, 2009), suggesting context can influence the prevalence of hiring queues. Scott (2013b) argues that employer preference can extend beyond stereotypes of gender and ethnicity to include socio-economic factors such as economic disadvantage. Employers in his horticultural study in a rural area equated economic disadvantage with workers' compliance and willingness to do more for less. Hiring queues can also be disrupted by controls over access to labour markets. Traditional gender segmentation can be challenged as more males undertake cleaning jobs when it is the only gateway to developed capitalist economies (Datta *et al.*, 2007; Wills *et al.*, 2010).

3.2.1 Segmentation and the regulatory function of migration

Significantly, Piore's (1979) linking of segmentation and migration brings into focus the regulatory function of migration. There is an expanding body of work that argues migrant labour and segmented labour markets are mutually reinforcing (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Bauder, 2006). Demand for migrant workers is rooted in employers' persistent offer of poor working conditions and low pay, which domestic workers eschew in favour of better jobs or state-sponsored social safety nets. Anderson and Ruhs (2010) argue that employer demand for migrant labour is predicated on a reserve army of migrant workers willing to accept 'bad' jobs, which, they argue, only exists because there are migrant workers willing to fill them. In this sense, what

employers want shapes the migrant supply available to them (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010). Their contention was supported by the findings in McCollum and Findlay's (2015) study of A8 migrant workers whose access to the United Kingdom labour market resulted from both market conditions and state policy decisions. Using segmentation theory as an underpinning, the authors focused on large labour supplies from A8 countries. For employers, access to large supplies of Eastern European workers who were poor in their origin country translated into a large, highly flexible, just-in-time surplus labour force in the United Kingdom. The study highlighted that the 'flexibilisation' of both the labour market and migrant workers has both a temporal and spatial quality. Domestic and migrant labour supplies were driven by economic circumstances but were also highly sensitive to changing circumstances and their own personal motivations. These findings are similar to other studies of A8 workers where migrant workers' flexibility had a temporary quality as they became habituated to their environment (Bauder, 2005; Piore, 1979) and less tolerant of poor working conditions (Alberti, 2014; Baxter-Reid, 2016; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013).

Studies focused on A8 countries reflect access to large reserve armies of workers with relatively 'free' circulation and limited oversight by the state. TFWPs are much more regulated by the state, although the degree of oversight varies between programmes. Moreover, workers are hired on a full-time basis for whatever the duration of the programme and fully employed, so not a reserve army in the usual sense. Migrants in their origin countries may be reserve armies, but for employer-sponsored programmes, the administrative challenges, timelines, and costs associated with accessing them belie the 'just-in-time' expectations of reserve armies.

3.3 SEGMENTATION BY REGULATORY CONTROLS

Segmentation theory's ability to connect political and economic forces with the creation of a distinct category of worker with specific 'labour market characteristics and behavioural rules' (Reich, Gordon and Edwards, 1973, p. 359) makes it an

appropriate lens for exploring the regulatory controls associated with TFWPs. As discussed in Chapter 2, TFWPs are highly controversial because they contravene basic tenets of a liberal democracy (Ruhs, 2006; Sharma, 2006), restrict mobility of workers, whether it is occupationally, geographically, or spatially and interlock precarious employment with precarious legal status, all of which render migrant workers more vulnerable to exploitation (Fudge, 2012; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). These particular programmes are increasingly associated with a new class of worker characterised as 'unfree' (Bauder, 2006; Rosewarne, 2010; Strauss and McGrath, 2017), as well as a 'more comprehensive process of commodification than associated with wage labour within capitalism' (Rosewarne, 2010, p. 105).

Bauder (2008) used segmentation theory as a lens for exploring citizenship as a regulatory control that segments labour markets. He is critical of the proliferation of Temporary Migration Programmes where access to citizenship is limited, arguing that states use citizenship as capital, privileging those who have it and subordinating those who do not. He argues citizenship reproduces economic privilege and segments migrant workers. It is essential to note that 'temporary only' for low-skilled workers is a common feature of both worker-driven and employer-driven programmes.

Temporary Migration Programmes benefit both the state and the employer. The state is spared the cost of the production and reproduction of labour as well as the cost of social support while workers are in the country. Employers benefit from a more flexible, disciplined, post-Fordist, and often cheaper workforce (Sharma, 2006). Understanding how regulatory controls construct a flexible, disciplined workforce is an essential component of examining the impact of regulatory controls on the shop-floor.

3.3.1 The construction of a disciplined, compliant workforce

Anderson (2010) argues that regulatory controls are used to 'produce workers with particular types of relations to employers and to labour markets' (p. 306), and that states act in concert with employers using 'migration status' to construct a disciplined and compliant workforce. Exploitation of workers in research is often focused on irregular workers who are vulnerable because there is an absence of 'migration status' (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Rodriguez, 2004); however, Anderson (2010) argues regulatory controls do not 'produce' illegality, but they do produce 'unfree' workers in particular ways. She calls for more research into how regulatory controls 'produce' status and how this produced status affects migrants' role in the labour market and at the work site. Regulatory controls can produce status in three ways: 'the creation of categories of entrant, the influencing of employment relations, and the institutionalisation of uncertainty' (p. 307).

States' role in setting conditions for entry into a country is expected and useful in filtering out undesirables whilst prioritising entrance to those who benefit the goals of the state, and important when matching skills with labour market shortages (Anderson, 2010). However, conditions for entry can be more insidious, constructing a 'migrant labour force' that goes beyond the traditional skills and experience required through regular immigration channels. TFWPs allow employers to skirt national employment laws, ordering up and 'picking' the best migrant workers according to additional criteria such as gender, nationality, family status, or any other category deemed desirable (Anderson, 2010; Preibisch, 2007). Selection criteria serve as a filter, sifting out any workers who may not be young or fit enough to conduct the hard work asked of them. WHVs are usually only available to individuals under the age of thirty, shaping a younger workforce compared to the programme being completely open. A young, skilled workforce with no dependants can be expected to be more available, more flexible, work longer hours, and contribute more without burdening the national infrastructure (Anderson, 2010; Bauder, 2006).

LS-TFWPs allow employers to condition their workforce before they arrive, using the selection process to maximise future control in the labour process. In Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme, workers' family status as married with dependants is a criterion for employment, a mechanism to ensure workers are motivated, will work hard, and will not outstay their visas (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014). Although both the state and employer are complicit in establishing criteria, their role can be masked or lost in the murkiness of a migration industry, whose role is to facilitate access to the 'best' workers at the best price. Regulatory controls and migration status can be both a tap and a mould, regulating the flow of labour and shaping a particular type of labour supply over which employers have added mechanisms of control. How migration status 'influences employee relations and the institutionalisation of uncertainty' (Anderson, 2010, p. 307) is best examined through a legal lens.

3.3.2 Hyper-dependence and hyper-precarity

Migration status as a mechanism for employer control over workers that exists outside of labour law is an important consideration when examining migrant worker vulnerabilities and the impact on employment relations (Anderson, 2010; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). Zou (2015) examines TFWPs from a legal perspective, focussing on the nexus between labour law and immigration law. A legal analytical lens is useful because it is the regulatory controls that render migrant workers most vulnerable (Anderson, 2010, p. 301).

Zou (2015) conceptualised two problems regarding how regulatory controls influence employee relations and institutionalise precarity. The first problem is the state's use of migration status to tie a worker to one employer. She uses the term 'hyper-dependence' to reflect the 'extreme dependence or subordination of the worker to the employer that goes beyond the context of the employment relationship' (p.

142). Hyper-dependence is distinctive from a standard employment relationship in that a migrant worker's legal status in the country and the workplace is tied to the employer's sponsorship (Zou, 2015). There are varying degrees of constraint on mobility associated with employer-sponsored programmes that are specified in the migration/employment contract. Workers may be tied to one employer with some job and geographical mobility available or be tied to one job, one employer, or one geographical location for a specified period. Workers may also depend on employers for their accommodation, which again exacerbates the existing power imbalance (Anderson, 2010; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). Other layers of hyper-dependence include the workers' right to exit the employment relationship and their legal status if this happens. In Australia, workers who exit an exploitive relationship are granted 90 days in which to find another employer but are not eligible for social support during this time (Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). The right to switch employers if working conditions are exploitive is argued to mitigate migrant worker vulnerability (Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017), although this is not seen as foolproof (Sumption, 2019). Finding another employer may not be realistic, particularly in rural areas (Scott, 2013a), and many migrant workers send remittances to their origin country and/or have incurred debt to secure international work, so are risk-averse (Zou, 2015).

The second problem from a legal perspective is hyper-precarity, which Zou (2015) refers to as 'the tenuous nature, in law and practice of these workers' entitlements to employment protection, social rights, and transition to more secure residence' (p. 141). Regulatory controls give employers full power over a worker's exit from the employment relationship in the form of deportation. Moreover, in many states, the extension or renewal of work permits is also under employers' control. This construction of uncertainty and insecurity undermines any access to social protections that may be available to workers in case of exploitation. Demands from the employer to take on additional duties outside the 'legal' contract puts the worker in a difficult position as they can be fired and sent back to their origin country easily by the employer. However, if they agree to operate outside the contract stipulations, they are perceived to have been complicit in violating their own legal status, a fact

the employer can use against them to subordinate them even further (Zou, 2015). TFWPs that involve both hyper-dependence and hyper-precarity render workers vulnerable to an extreme form of exploitation.

The conceptualisation of hyper-dependence and hyper-precarity is useful because it illuminates not only how the loss of mobility renders workers vulnerable to exploitation but that they are 'always' vulnerable to exploitation, even when working for the best employer. Walzer (1983), cited in Wright et al. (2017) argues workers whose mobility is constrained are under 'continuous practical threat' and oppressed by the very nature of the programme. How this unfolds on the shop floor is examined in Chapter 4.

The advantages of limiting workers' mobility from the perspective of employers have surfaced in the literature, although in a very limited way, as employers are reluctant to acknowledge or discuss how control benefits them (Scott, 2013a; Sumption, 2019). Sumption (2019) argues that employers' stated preference for employer-driven versus worker-driven permits confirms 'suspicions' that some employers prefer workers with fewer mobility rights. Employers frame themselves as 'good employers', but comments regarding hiring queues and their rationale underscore the value of immobilised workers to employers (Scott, 2013a; Sumption, 2019). Sumption references the MAC 2018 report where A8 workers, normally considered to have a strong work ethic and to be highly motivated, were viewed as 'unreliable' when compared to the United Kingdom Seasonal Agricultural Workers whose mobility was constrained. Employers in Scott's (2013) study echoed this arguing Seasonal Agricultural Workers were more committed and enthusiastic but acknowledged they 'maybe didn't have an alternative' (p. 1102).

Employer preference for migrant workers has been well documented, and the framing of migrant workers as 'good workers' dominates literature on employer demand for low-skilled or low-wage workers (Dench et al., 2006; McCollum and Findlay, 2015; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). The notion of 'good worker' or 'hard

worker' holds different meanings for different employers; therefore, it is difficult to categorise; however, employer comments that reference migrants' willingness to work longer hours, work overtime, work harder, be more productive, be flexible, be compliant, or obedient, and all without complaint and with a positive attitude relate directly to worker effort and behaviour in the labour process so is examined in Chapter 4.

Worker motivation that underpins effort is also addressed in Chapter 4, but it is essential to highlight here that the link between regulatory controls and worker effort is gaining attention (Anderson, 2010; Polanco, 2016; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). There is debate as to why migrant workers work as hard as they do with some attributing the attitude towards work to cultural differences or a positive orientation to work, others attribute migrant work ethic to a dual frame of reference where the low-skilled migrant workers is a 'transnational worker' supporting families (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Piore, 1979; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). There is also a link between the segmentation of migrant workers along gender, ethnicity, and nationality and their inability or unwillingness to access trade unions or other collective organisations; therefore, they are more vulnerable to workplace intensification and control (Rodriguez, 2004; Rogaly, 2008; Scott, 2013a).

Anderson (2010) highlighted the 'potential' for regulatory controls to influence employee relations, but there is limited empirical research that focuses on a single programme or labour supply (Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). Thompson, Newsome and Commander (2013) point out that regulatory controls 'frame but do not determine employment relations outcomes' (p. 132), highlighting the importance of context when researching these phenomena. Given the growth in TFWPs globally, more empirical research into the impact of labour mobility constraints on employee relations is crucial (Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). Anderson and Ruhs (2010) also point to the importance of a sectoral context when considering the impact of regulatory controls, arguing that it is most often

employers in low-road industries such as agriculture and hospitality who draw attention to migrants' superior work ethic.

3.3.3 Skills

Chapter 2 considered the bifurcation of Temporary Migration Programmes into low-skilled and high-skilled with different regulations and rights associated with each stream, a practice that is contested (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011). Jobs that are framed as low-skilled or low-wage work are not always a reflection of the skill level of the migrant workers (Dench *et al.*, 2006). In earlier research on low-skilled work, jobs were filled by workers with low-skill levels (Piore, 1979; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003) however, more recent studies have highlighted a skill mismatch, where migrant workers are over-qualified for the low-skilled work they are doing (Anderson *et al.*, 2006; Dench *et al.*, 2006). This may be an indicator of more complex decision-making and economic trade-offs migrant workers engage in to access the labour market in certain countries. In order to understand the choices and agency of migrant workers, one must first understand the options available to them, and how these options either constrain or facilitate choice (Dench *et al.*, 2006; Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011). This highlights the importance of understanding the complex subjective motivations of migrant workers who participate in TFWPs.

3.4 MIGRANT WORKERS AS PURPOSEFUL ACTORS

Much of the debate regarding the marginalisation of migration workers generally, and LS-TFWs specifically, positions migrant workers as vulnerable and passive, forced into contracts by economic deprivation (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014; Fudge, 2012; Polanco, 2016). Ruhs (2013) argues workers exercise agency when choosing to engage in temporary contracts, weighing options, and choosing vulnerabilities in order to meet personal goals. This argument is echoed by

Thompson, Newsome and Commander (2013,) who found evidence of mutual gain, reinforcing the importance of understanding what workers expect from the exchange bargain.

Within the labour process, employer control over workers' mobility and access to PR render workers hyper-dependent (Zou, 2015) and exercise of voice or other forms of resistance can result in deportation (Preibisch, 2010). McGrath and Strauss (2015) argue that workers *'can and do* [emphasis original] exercise agency even in the direst of circumstances' and that there are always 'spaces of negotiability' (p. 305). Labour studies focus on acts of resistance in the labour process, but McGrath and Strauss (2015) suggest that reframing workers' unfreedom as a function of workers' power relations with capital broadens the opportunities for understanding potential sources of power for workers. Power, they argue, is dynamic and new sources can be constructed. Wright (2000) argues workers have structural power if they are in a position to negatively impact capital. Workers can derive workplace power (Silver, 2003) if their role in the labour process is material to production, and its absence hinders the accumulation of capital. In times of full employment and/or labour shortages, workers have marketplace power (Wright, 2000). Wright (2000) conceptualises associational power as another form of structural power that workers can derive from their ability to organise and participate in collectives such as unions. He argues associational power can take many forms where the focus is on the potential to affect capital.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter considers dual and segmented labour market theory as a lens for examining employers' persistent demand for low-skilled migrant workers and a rationale as to why these workers are segmented into the secondary sector. Segmentation theory is an effective conceptual tool in drawing attention to migrant workers segmentation by ethnicity and gender (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003) and more recently for examining citizenship as a regulatory control (Bauder, 2008) and

A8 migrant workers as a distinctive labour pool (McCollum and Findlay, 2015). A segmentation lens is useful in the regulatory controls associated with TFWPs as it brings into sharp relief two specific controls: temporariness and mobility constraints. Zou's analytical construct of hyper-dependence and hyper-precarity captures both regulatory controls, offering valuable insight into how interlocking migrant workers' migration status with their employment status provides employers with additional mechanisms to control, coerce, and discipline workers.

The literature reviewed in this chapter revealed that much of the discussion of regulatory controls that restrict mobility speaks to the 'potential' for enhanced coercion and control, but there is limited empirical research specific to TFWPs and how it is experienced by both key actors in the employment relationship. Employers who participate in TFWPs are reluctant to discuss their enhanced power over the workers they sponsor. However, there are some studies where employers have a clear preference for TFWPs over worker-driven programmes (Scott, 2013a; Sumption, 2019). Some critics argue regulatory controls force workers to be 'good workers' as they are unable to resist work intensification and exploitation (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012), but studies linking mobility constraints and effort are limited with examples including a focus on high skills in hospitality (Wright, Knox and Constantin, 2019), Tim Horton's fast food in Canada (Polanco, 2016) and circular temporary programmes associated with Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Work Programme (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Preibisch, 2010).

Understanding the rationale and perspectives of both employers and migrant workers for engaging in TFWPs is fundamental to how they unfold in a workplace context (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). In more recent literature, critics have challenged the dominant perspective of TFWs as passive and vulnerable victims, arguing they are purposeful actors exercising agency and choosing vulnerabilities (Alberti, 2014; Ruhs, 2013; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). Motivations for engaging in temporary labour migration can be complex and multi-faceted, extending beyond the neoclassical economic rationale to include personal,

family, and professional goals (Alberti, 2014). It has been established that networks play a critical role in migrant workers accessing and navigating labour markets (Smith, 2010), but more recent literature shows networks, including kinship and ethnic communities, can play a role in shaping a migrant worker's motivation as well as provide support as they not only integrate into jobs and labour markets but explore options and build their mobility capability (Alberti, 2014; Ciupijus, Forde and MacKenzie, 2020).

Examining labour mobility and its relationship to effort in a workplace context requires the proper conceptual tools. The literature on the exploitative nature of TFWPs focuses on the enhanced power of the employer in the employment relationship and how the state provides employers with additional mechanisms of control over workers' productivity and effort. Labour process theory is grounded in the struggle between workers and employers at the point of production where capital's need to maximise the extraction of effort to maximise surplus value requires mechanisms of both control and consent over labour (Thompson and Smith, 2010). This theory offers two conceptual tools, mobility power and effort power, which may provide insight into labour mobility as a regulatory control and its relationship to the effort bargain. Both are examined in Chapter 4.

Networks have also emerged as a theme in Chapter 2 and 3. First, networks are linked to individual and family motivations for engaging in the transnational labour market, but also at the level of the worksite where employer recruitment of migrant workers' friends and families is common practice. This chapter also highlighted how networkers play a role in migrant mobility decisions and capability. Network theory, therefore, is examined in Chapter 4.

The literature in Chapter 2 provided some insight into the motivations of migrant workers for working transnationally, although no one theory captured the diverse and dynamic drivers underpinning the decision to migrate for work. New economics of labour migration theory's focus on family points to the importance of family

networks, whilst push and pull explanations include labour demand as well as family as potential drivers. In this chapter, segmentation theory drew attention to kinship and ethnic networks and their role in connecting migrant workers to specific occupations and sectors, thereby contributing to their own segmentation (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). But it also draws attention to the potential of networks to shape and support future mobility capability of migrant workers, and the need to recognise that migrant worker motivation is more complex and dynamic than wage differentials (Ciupijus, Forde and MacKenzie, 2020).

CHAPTER 4 CONCEPTUALISING LABOUR MOBILITY, EFFORT POWER AND NETWORKS

From Chapter 2, it is clear the growth in LS-TFWPs is problematic in liberal democratic societies where rights-based arguments are juxtaposed against imbalances in global supply and demand and a growing shortage of low-skilled workers in developed and developing countries (Bauböck and Ruhs, 2022; Castles, 2017; Dauvergne and Marsden, 2013; Ruhs, 2013). Chapter 3 considers how regulatory controls enshrine the hyper-dependence and hyper-precarity of migrant workers and underscores the power dynamic in the employment relationship where employers' control over migrant workers' legal status exacerbates workers' vulnerability to exploitation (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012; Zou, 2015). The literature highlights a TFWP contract's distinctiveness is grounded in its' interlocking employment and migration law. State's role is diminished, although there are expectations of increased oversight.

Within the labour process, labour mobility power and the effort bargain are promising conceptual tools for examining how TFWP regulatory controls unfold at the worksite. Smith (2010) conceptualises labour mobility as a terrain of 'strategies and tactics' (p. 269) within the labour process, where worker mobility can be a source of power for the worker or the employer, albeit contingent on context. The second tool is the effort bargain, a core element of labour process theory where the extraction of effort from the worker at the point of production is also a terrain of struggle between capital and labour. Effort is located in workers' labour power, and the amount of effort a worker expends requires the worker's consent, whether that is achieved through coercion or consent (Edwards, 1990a; Thompson and Smith, 2010). Mobility power and effort power are two uncertainties in the labour process, a terrain of struggle as capital and labour negotiate the amount of effort to be extracted and the movement of labour (Smith, 2010).

Network theory is a meso-level migration theory that brings together the macroeconomic and structural rationale of labour migration with the motivations of individuals and families (Boyd, 1989; Massey *et al.*, 1993; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Macro-economic theories were helpful but insufficient in explaining the motivations and actions of migrant workers. Dual labour and segmentation theory is a useful lens for understanding the structural demand for migrant labour; however, it provided little insight into how employers and workers connect and interact. Labour and family networks play an active role in bringing together these two key actors; therefore, network theory is an important theoretical underpinning for understanding the motivations of both parties and how they evolve throughout the employment relationship.

The chapter begins with an outline of the employment relationship where employer-sponsored temporary labour migration contracts are situated. The structure of TFWPs subordinates labour to capital to an even greater extent than standard employment relationships; therefore, this section addresses how contractual terms and roles of actors are distinctive. Next, a brief outline of labour process theory situates two key elements of interest – labour mobility and the effort bargain. Then, Smith's (2006) conceptualisation of labour mobility is examined, paying particular attention to literature where workers' labour mobility is constrained. From there, the chapter examines the effort bargain and its intersection with the rhetoric of the good worker. The last section of this chapter examines labour and family networks to understand how networks influence each actor and the labour process. The chapter concludes by identifying the research questions developed from the literature and guiding the rest of the thesis.

4.1 THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP- ACTORS, CONTRACTS

At its most fundamental, the employment relationship is a relationship between an employee and an employer, although there is broad recognition that other actors play a role in mediating it. Historically, these other actors were the state and trade unions (Edwards, 2009, p. 9); however, shifts in the political economy demand consideration of new actors and an expanded definition (Bellemare, 2000; Cooke and Wood, 2011; Heery and Frege, 2006; Michelson, Jamieson and Burgess, 2009). Under neoliberalism, both the role of the state and trade unions diminished whilst new actors such as customers, recruitment agents, and civil service organisations played an increasingly important role (Heery, Abbott and Williams, 2012). Chapter 3 highlighted the shift in power over workers' migration status from the state to employers in TFWPs.

The employment relationship is also 'continuous or open-ended' with a history and a future (Sisson, 2008, p. 15). Buyers and sellers meet in the market and enter an employment contract where the value is determined before it enters circulation; however, the use value is only realised when labour power is activated (Marx, 1976, p. 278). In TFWPs, there can be an extended period, sometimes up to a year, between signing the contract and activating labour. Although there is no economic exchange during this period, employers have invested financially in the recruitment and migration process, and workers have invested time and resources in building the mobility capability to access the TFWP as well as an opportunity cost while they wait for the process to unfold and their labour to be activated. The extent and duration of these pre-employment investments distinguish a TFWP employment relationship from a standard one. Understanding the complete history linking the employer and employee and their respective motivations can contribute to understanding the commitment of each of the actors (Bentein and Guerrero, 2008). There is also evidence of an increased role of family and labour networks in TFWP employment relationships. The enhanced role of the employer over workers'

migration status, the duration and nature of the commitment between employer and worker, and the role of networks all signal a more complex employment relationship.

The employment contract specifies the economic exchange between the employer, who offers wages in exchange for the labour power supplied by the worker for a period which may or may not be specified. In a standard employment relationship, the buyer pays the price in the form of wages, holidays, sick pay, or other benefits in exchange for the seller's labour, which, like other commodities, has a price that represents the total cost of enjoying its use (Edwards, 2009). An important trend in employment contracts is the variation in contracts that are in place for workers doing the same job (Smith, 2010). Workers are hired directly by the employer or through temporary agencies in the first instance and can be subject to different terms and conditions, including various visa types. TFWP contracts are notable in that not only does the buyer purchase the seller's labour power but also their labour mobility power for a fixed period. TFWP contracts may give employers control over future mobility as well. Critics argue this type of employment relationship is founded upon unfree employee relations (Bauder, 2006; Strauss and McGrath, 2017).

Significantly, the contract also establishes the hierarchical nature of the relationship, whereby the employee accepts the employer's authority to direct their behaviour (Simon, 1951). Unlike many oral employment contracts, a LS-TFWP employment contract is a written contract created by the state and agreed to by the worker and the employer. The state has an oversight responsibility to ensure that contract conditions are met.

4.2 CAPITALIST LABOUR PROCESS

According to Marx (1976), capital and labour meet in the market and enter employee relations as buyers and sellers of labour, and both are equal in the eyes of the law. However, labour is distinct from other commodities in that it is embodied in people,

and, therefore, within a market exchange, the buyer purchases the capacity for labour as opposed to a specific or quantifiable amount of labour. This capacity for labour, the aggregate of the mental and physical capabilities of a human being that is only activated when sold, is called labour power (Marx, 1976).

The commodity form of labour positions workers as a 'special commodity' where they are hired for both 'use (their particular skills) and exchange value (their ability to work to create surplus value and profits' (Smith, 2010, p. 269). Marx (1976) uses the term valorisation to link the labour process and the creation of surplus value, forming the capitalist form of production. The persistent goal of capital is to produce a commodity that has a use value and a surplus value, which, once created, is the legal property of the employer (Thompson, 1989). Minimising the cost of labour power or maximising production through the intensification of work or the extension of working time, the mechanisation of work, and increasing division of labour are strategies to augment surplus value (Edwards, 2009; Thompson, 1989).

Labour contributes to both use and surplus value; however, the quantity of labour or effort required by the worker is indeterminate and must be negotiated through the individual embodying the labour power. Because of this effort indeterminacy, a managerial hierarchy has the authority to ensure that employees perform the required tasks to the required standard within the required time and assign penalties if the employee fails to meet their obligation or follow the 'rules' (Edwards, 2009). Managers have the dual objective of controlling employees to maximise production whilst ensuring their cooperation, a contradictory process that sometimes requires conflicting managerial approaches. The concept of 'structured antagonism' recognises that each party has different and multiple interests and that these interests can be satisfied through the employment relationship (Edwards, 2009). Edwards (1990b) points out that whilst antagonism is inherent to the labour process and generates pressure on both workers and employers, it does not decide outcomes or the behaviour of either party on a day-to-day basis:

> Workers and employers respond to these pressures and, in doing so, develop traditions and understanding that are used to interpret their relations with each other. Their struggles stem from the exploitative character of the capital-labour relation, but they have autonomy in three distinct ways. Because their relation is contradictory and not driven by a tension between 'control' and 'resistance', it does not impose a direct logic on behaviour; instead, it generates pressures which have to be interpreted and acted on by employers and workers. Their relations are also governed by distinct principles and cannot be reduced to the outcome of influences in other parts of society. And as a given relation develops, it creates logics of its own which shape subsequent developments: workplace relations have histories (Edwards, 1990b, p. 126).

The principles outlined by Edwards (1990b) are significant in acknowledging that employee relations are unique, dynamic, individual, and subjective. They also highlight the significance of history and tradition in interpreting relations between employers and workers. Edwards (1990a) argues that custom, which he describes as 'a mode of regulation which has grown up through time an unplanned manner, is how undefined aspects of a labour contract can become 'understood traditions and assumptions' (p. 45). Managers play an active role in the development of customs, but ultimately, they become a resource for either actor. The relative autonomy of employee relations suggests that workers' behaviours are influenced by their interactions with managers, but they also have the power to influence the relationship (Edwards, 1990b).

4.3 LABOUR MOBILITY WITHIN THE LABOUR PROCESS

Within labour process theory, labour mobility can be a source of power for the worker or the employer, and differentials can create a power imbalance. Workers in a capitalist economy may choose where to sell their labour power and exercise the right to exit an employment relationship, choosing another employer if available

(Smith, 2010). A worker's 'freedom to quit is a fundamental legal freedom' in capitalist societies, a mobility right central to standard employment relationships that is reinforced by trade unions, legal services, the state, and other agencies (Smith, 2006, p. 390). During conditions of full employment or when skills are scarce, workers are in a position of power and may use the threat of mobility to renegotiate the exchange bargain:

> the individual ownership of mobility power ensures any stay with a particular employer or occupation, or skill is always dependent on an exchange bargain – over work effort and mobility opportunities (that is, opportunities to increase the value of labour power, through training, development, career progress, etc.) that the exchange facilitates (Smith, 2010, p. 270).

A worker's ability to use threats of mobility to bargain over the amount of effort extracted, resist poor working conditions, effect change in the organisation of work, enhance strategic rewards, or the value of their labour power is mobility power, an internal expression of mobility-effort bargaining (Smith, 2006). Labour mobility as a source of power for workers and the potential for mobility-effort bargaining is a recent development in labour process theory (Smith, 2006; Smith, 2010). Earlier work on labour mobility, where workers' ability to quit was a source of conflict between workers and employers, focused on turnover as an external manifestation of the mobility-effort bargain without examining the effect internally on the labour process (Edwards and Scullion, 1982). This oversight is rooted in the historical supersedence of the collective over the individual, where 'quitting' was an inferior expression of discontent when compared to the voice of the collective (Smith, 2006). Smith (2006) emphasises 'the argument here is not that exit is superior to voice or vice versa' but instead signals an opportunity 'to investigate the disruptive, conflictual, and destabilising effects workers can exert by using the labour market for dispute resolution' (p. 393) and gain insight into how workers' mobility power can influence mobility-effort bargaining and facilitate change in highly competitive markets.

From an employer perspective, labour mobility can negatively affect capital accumulation, particularly when workers are material to the production process (Silver, 2003; Smith, 2006; Wright, 2000). Employers seek to control workers' labour mobility by utilising strategies such as selection, career development, pension schemes, and internal labour markets. Moreover, they may change human resource practices or the organisation of work if the cost of mobility is considered too high. Training and developing workers is also a strategy, although it is also a source of tension unless employers are sure they are the beneficiaries (Smith, 2006). A certain amount of mobility can be desirable (Smith, 2010); however, when there is abundant surplus labour and workers are substitutable, as is the case in low-skilled work in the hospitality industry, employers may see value in high levels of 'churn' (Baum, 2015). Employer practices can reinforce a 'turnover' norm, influencing workers' expectations of whether their stay in a job or industry is temporary (Iverson and Deery, 1997, p. 71). However, Smith (2006) argues that even when jobs are low-skilled and have high levels of mobility, 'the labour process has a temporality that produces the need for regulation of relations between workers and managers' (p. 394).

4.3.1 Regulating labour mobility power

In TFWPs, the loss of mobility power is a fundamental structural barrier to worker agency and core to the potential for exploitation (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012; Zou, 2015), yet there is limited empirical research examining the impact of regulatory controls on the labour process (Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007), except for the agricultural sector where there is a long history of exploitative practices and a significant body of research specific to that sector (Preibisch, 2007; Reid-Musson, 2017; Scott, 2013a). As discussed in Chapter 3, agricultural programmes fall under the category of circular migration because of the temporal nature of the work in a well-defined short period, so PR is never an option.

In places and spaces outside of agriculture, research of LS-TFWPs as a specific labour pool is more limited, often because migrant workplace studies encompass multiple migrant labour pools, and migrant workers' migration status arises from other discussions (Alberti, 2014). The impact of migration status on employee relations was one area of interest in Anderson and Ruh's (2010) study of over 1,000 migrant workers and employers who recruit migrant workers; however, the ability of most migrant workers to circulate freely within the United Kingdom, legally or illegally, and the use of temporary agencies meant employers could legitimately argue they did not know their workers' migration status. The study highlighted employers' preference for workers whose mobility was restricted, with some employers seeking out illegal and non-European Union workers because of their flexibility and willingness to tolerate poor working conditions. The authors argue that focusing on migration status and ensuring that employers in a study are aware of the workers' migration status is critical to unpacking the relationship between migration status and employment relations. Thompson, Newsome and Commander (2013) are sceptical of the impact of migration status on worker vulnerability, arguing that Anderson (2010) may exaggerate the potential for immigration controls to 'produce particular types of employment relations' (p. 141) but their study, like many others, focus on A8 workers who have relatively free mobility. Providing staff accommodation, withholding workers' passports (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007), incentivising workers with potential sponsorship towards PR (Polanco, 2016), or kinship recruitment (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003) are other strategies employers utilise to restrain workers' mobility capability.

Smith (2010) argues there is potential for mutual gains for employers and workers if the exchange bargain is fair:

> indeterminacies of effort and mobility power (finding efficient workers who will stay; finding fair employers and jobs that are regular) creates mutuality that ensures circulation of labour and free flow of labour is not continuous –

> but that organisations capture, contain, and retain for long periods, *particular* [emphasis in original] workers (p. 288).

It is clear that TFWPs tip the exchange bargain in employers' favour, and LS-TFWs' loss of mobility power for a contracted period resolves labour mobility indeterminacy in the labour process. However, Smith (2010) also raises the issue of fairness and mutuality, signalling the importance of understanding workers' motivations and how they benefit or expect to benefit from the bargains they strike. Chapter 2 highlighted that migrant workers' motivations were diverse and dynamic and extended well beyond the traditional economic gain and language acquisition (Alberti, 2014; Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011; Wright and Pollert, 2006). Workers' motivations will inform their perception of any mutual gains. It is also important not to essentialise all employers as exploitive (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013; Zou, 2015) and to recognise that regulatory controls 'frame but do not determine employee relations outcomes' (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013, p. 132).

Smith (2010) emphasises that mobility power is a resource for the worker and argues for a much broader conceptualisation of labour power than the human resource perspective of win-win, with employers having the labour they need and workers gaining access to jobs. He frames his perspective as 'flow' to capture the dynamic character of mobility and migrant workers, where migration, contracts, regulatory controls, and worker motivations are all spatially and temporally contingent. Certainly, the notion of low-skilled migrant work as temporary, a stop on the way to somewhere or something else, is a common theme in the low-skilled labour migration literature (Alberti, 2014; Wright and Pollert, 2006). Engaging in an employer-sponsored programme may be the only access to a labour market (Wills *et al.*, 2009) but also evidence of migrant workers choosing vulnerabilities as part of a long-term individual or family plan (Ruhs, 2009). The discussion thus far supports Alberti's (2014) contention that 'mobility and temporariness appear to constitute a

double terrain of control and *resistance* [emphasis in original] against the precarious conditions of life and work' (p. 14) and a new and promising avenue of inquiry.

"Fixity' is a resource for employers, but it can also be a resource for workers, even those who are geographically, occupationally, and spatially constrained by regulatory controls. Labour power can acquire 'place fixity' when workers are in one place for an extended period, allowing them to become more embedded in a community and develop networks to support their future mobility capability. 'Temporal fixity' can result from working for one employer for extended periods, a factor which can influence power dynamics between labour and capital over time (Smith, 2010). The notion of 'continuous' underpins the important role that learning, socialisation, and experience play in the employment relationship and the 'more or less constant pressures on and opportunities for the parties to seek to adjust the exchange in their favour' (Sisson, 2008, p. 15). This points to potential resources even the most vulnerable migrant workers may have at their disposal. Occupational, task, or 'skill fixity', where workers engage in one job for an extended period, can enhance the labour power capital of new migrant workers, highlighting the variability and plasticity of labour (Piore, 1979; Smith, 2010). The ability to convert labour power and transform utility repeatedly benefits employers but also builds workers' labour power capital and mobility capability. Language acquisition might be the easiest example, where enhanced skills benefit the employer and improve the labour market mobility of workers. In Alberti's (2014) study, occupational and temporal fixity were an important space for workers to occupy as they gathered financial resources, gained language and other skills, and developed and expanded their network to help them not only navigate their current situation but also to develop mobility capabilities for future moves.

4.3.2 Mobility power beyond the effort-bargain

Mobility power is a promising line of inquiry, with several studies providing insights beyond Smith's (2006) initial focus on internal mobility-effort bargaining. Migrant networks are a valuable source of recruitment; however, a study where workers within the network took responsibility for replacing each other in the production process if someone was sick highlights the potential for more nuanced notions of mobility (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007b, p. 32). In another study, local and transnational networks outside the labour process were instrumental in facilitating the mobility of workers at various stages of migrant journeys (Alberti, 2014). Vickers *et al.* (2019) argue understanding the mobility power of workers requires a more holistic approach and should encompass movement between places and jobs and within the labour process (p. 703), which aligns with Smith's (2010) concept of flow.

Alberti's (2014) study of migrant workers engaged in temporary agency work in the hospitality industry in London revealed that contrary to much of the literature, migrant workers were purposeful, exercising agency in using their transnational mobility power to exit bad jobs on their terms and in their own time. Smith (2010) identified age and life stage as factors influencing mobility decisions, but Alberti (2014) argues that mobility capacity is much more complex. High or low mobility capacity can be constrained by regulatory controls and employment status; however, it can also be influenced by a myriad of other factors, including education, gender, race, age, and finances. This accords with Anderson and Ruh's (2010) contention that migration status cannot be studied in isolation but must consider the influence of personal circumstances and characteristics. Age, gender, and education can influence decisions, but having dependants and incurring debt to migrate also can constrain options and choices (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010), suggesting that some immobilised migrant workers are more vulnerable than others, even when working under the same contract.

The discussion thus far establishes labour mobility as a promising line of inquiry. There is some evidence that regulatory controls that restrict migrant workers' mobility do influence the effort-reward bargain from the perspective of the employer (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007b; Scott, 2013a) and the worker (Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007; Polanco, 2016), but more research is needed to understand the perspectives of both key actors about how it unfolds.

4.4 EFFORT BARGAIN

The term 'effort bargain' was first used by Behrend (1957) to refer to the bargaining between an employer and workers as to what constitutes a fair day's pay. She argues that because labour power is embodied in the worker, and the amount of labour power needed to complete a task cannot be known before its completion, certain contract terms cannot be stipulated in advance. In this sense, the employment contract is similar to a blank cheque because 'certain aspects of worker behaviour are stipulated in contract terms; certain other aspects are within the authority of the employer and still other aspects are left to the worker's choice' (Simon, 1951, p. 305). This notion of workers' choice about how much effort to expend is core to labour process theory, the conceptualisation of effort indeterminacy, and the effort bargain (Smith, 2006; Thompson, 1989).

Recognising the role of choice in workers' effort, Behrend (1957) argues there are three types of workers - 'the good worker maintains a consistently high level of effort independent of earnings, the bad worker who has a low standard of effort despite incentives and the average worker who can be persuaded to increase effort and productivity through incentives' (p. 507). Whilst simplistic, this categorisation of workers, particularly that of the 'good worker', is useful in that it brings together the literature on the effort bargain with the literature on the good worker, situating both within the labour process. As discussed in Chapter 3, employer preference for migrant workers has been well documented, and the rhetoric of the 'good worker' dominates the literature on employer demand for low-skilled or low-wage workers

(Dench *et al.*, 2006; McCollum and Findlay, 2015), but there is little agreement about the qualities of a 'good worker' or why migrant workers work as hard as they do. The notion of 'good worker' holds different meanings for different employers, and whilst not all interpretations fall within the effort bargain, many aspects of employer feedback do. Examining effort and how it is measured and controlled within the labour process may provide more meaningful insight into employers' perception of migrant workers as good workers.

Baldamus's (1961) seminal book *'Efficiency and Effort'* built on Behrend's (1957) conceptualisation of the effort bargain and offers in-depth analyses of the complexities involved in management's attempts to control the quality, quantity, and distribution of workers' efforts. He proposes three distinct types of contract regulation core to understanding effort — occupational controls, effort-stability controls, and manipulating effort intensity. Whilst occupational controls are outside the labour process, analysis of stability controls and manipulation of effort intensity are located within the labour process and offer an analytical lens for understanding the effort of LS-TFWs and the notion of the 'good worker' that is so often associated with migrant workers.

Critics of TFWPs argue regulatory controls rob vulnerable migrant workers of choice about how much effort they expend (Anderson, 2010; Polanco, 2016) and render them more vulnerable to exploitation. Workers' engagement in overt and covert forms of resistance as a response to employer control is a cornerstone of labour process theory (Thompson, 1989). However, 'resistance is a tall order' when employers control workers' mobility, potential deportation, and access to renewed contracts (McGrath and Strauss, 2015, p. 306). Katz (2004) has developed a framework of resilience, reworking, and resistance that captures a broader range of overlapping social practices and responses that sustain workers and which can, separately or together, build into more formal oppositional practices. Resistance is the more overt attempt to subvert or disrupt exploitative practices, whilst reworking involves smaller acts that seek to effect some change in conditions, for example, an

improvement in staff housing. Resilience is an autonomous initiative that strengthens and rejuvenates workers, but it can also serve as the groundwork for stronger oppositional forces. Caring for one another, cultural practices, or participating in community organisations or churches are small, restorative acts that uphold dignity and affirm a person's place in society (Katz, 2004).

4.4.1 Effort stability controls and manipulation of work intensity

Individual differences in effort or output can negatively impact the productivity or profitability of an employer. Therefore, the regulation of effort stability is fundamental to an organisation's ability to standardise outputs and ensure consistency in the quality of products or services. Baldamus (1961) argues that the common function of all controls over the effort bargain is to stabilise the labour process. An organisation's ability to standardise effort builds predictability into the production process, an attempt to resolve the uncertainty of what amount of effort is reasonable or possible for the wage offered. If standards of effort become habitual, this influences wage expectations so that wage-effort becomes interlocked, providing clarity of expectations for both the employer and the worker (Baldamus, 1961).

Because effort is subjective and not quantifiable, employers look for objective and measurable indicators of changes in effort stability. Baldamus (1961) argues that:

> the employer (or supervisor), in trying to control effort, is merely guided by certain external manifestations of relative changes in effort, such as variations in output per man, quality of output, frequency of absence, level of discipline, etc.' (p. 36).

These same mechanisms that measure effort stability in the labour process are also frequently cited in the 'good worker' literature as proxies for the work ethic of

migrant workers. Absenteeism is the most obvious and common example. Organisations have responded to tight labour market and labour cost pressures with strict absence control measures, signalling the importance of absenteeism as a frontier of control (Taylor *et al.*, 2010). In the good worker literature, employers frequently cite migrant workers' low to no levels of absenteeism as an example of their strong work ethic:

> they tended to be more motivated, reliable, and committed than domestic workers. For example, migrants were said to be more likely to demonstrate lower turnover and absenteeism; be prepared to work longer and flexible hours' (Dench *et al.*, 2006, p. vi).

In a quantitative study of A8 migrant workers in the United Kingdom, migrant workers were found to have 'three times lower work absence' than their native counterparts in their first year of residency and continued to have better absenteeism rates for the first two to four years of employment (Dawson, Veliziotis and Hopkins, 2018, p. 823). Other objective measures contributing to effort stability reflected in good worker literature include consistency and high quality (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010) and reliability, commitment and flexibility (Markova *et al.*, 2016).

After stability control, the second contract regulation fundamental to the effort bargain is manipulating effort intensity. According to Baldamus (1961), effort intensity varies between the maximum effort a worker is willing to expend and the minimum effort intensity that an employer is willing to accept. He argues there are two parts to effort intensity controls. In the first instance, intensification of worker effort can manifest as higher rates of productivity or speed or through the extension of labour power and longer worker days. Some controls, such as training, discipline, and incentives, are both stability and intensity controls and can be used to stabilise output and increase speed and productivity. Many references in the literature link migrants' strong work ethic to their willingness to work longer hours and overtime (Hopkins, 2017; MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010; Thompson,

Newsome and Commander, 2013), whilst references to higher productivity seem to be more limited. Dench *et al.* (2006) reported most employers in their study linked work ethic with working longer hours, sometimes without overtime pay, whilst only a few employers in construction and agriculture specifically linked 'hard-working' to 'workers' outputs and productivity and speed' and contribution to increased business productivity (p.33). In Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme, where mobility is tightly constrained and employer control absolute, workers were pressured to work faster and harder; failure to comply or measure up could cause immediate deportation or the threat of not being 'invited' back the following year (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014).

The second part of Baldamus's (1961) argument on the manipulation of effort intensity refers to employers' deliberate manipulation of workers' motivation to maximise effort intensity. Effort is the property of the worker, and workers' ability to manipulate their effort intensity means employers require their agreement if effort intensification is to be sustainable (Behrend, 1957). Employers can use a wide range of strategies and tactics to ensure maximum effort. A common 'human relations' strategy is to try to align workers' goals with those of the organisation by manipulating workers psychologically, getting them to 'buy-in' to the company goals through team building, staff meetings and events, recognition programmes, or other types of promotions. In Polanco's (2016) study of LS-TFWs, employers used socialisation and non-monetary incentives such as holiday parties, picnics, and intra- and inter-store unit competitions with prizes to foster a team and competitive spirit. Polanco argues there are elements of both coercion and accountability in these strategies, where workers are 'instructed on how to be loyal and disciplined subjects' (p. 1335). Coercion as a strategy was much more direct in a study of temporary agricultural workers in Canada, where employers openly threatened to deport any workers who resisted work intensification. Deportation of a few workers each year had the desired effect of disciplining the remaining workers and sustaining high levels of effort intensity (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014). Migrant workers are more likely to be self-disciplined when regulatory controls constrain their mobility (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Polanco, 2016) or they are undocumented

(Rodriguez, 2004). However, there may be other, more subjective reasons that some workers are more compliant than others (Edwards and Scullion, 1984).

What motivates workers to work as hard as they do (or do not) is the subject of much debate (Baldamus, 1961; Behrend, 1957; Burawoy, 1979). Effort is subjective and, to some degree, reliant on human behaviour, particularly worker motivation, which can be unstable. According to Baldamus (1961), moral obligations towards effort and work are shaped during childhood and, if reinforced through other institutions, can develop into standards of conduct that become more engrained over time. Positive obligations towards work can strongly impact the stabilisation of effort in a workplace; however, Baldamus (1961) acknowledges the impact on effort expectations is 'remote and diffuse' (p.125). Behrend (1988) agrees that the notion of what constitutes a 'fair day's work' is subjective, and the impact of human behaviour on variations in effort and output can be significant:

> that employees' attitude with regard to output standards will be shaped by their outlook and experience. How hard they work will depend on their conception of duty. It depends on whether they conceive this in terms of fulfilment of set tasks, in terms of effort or of time. Influenced by their home expectations and their fellow employees, they acquire habitual standards of effort which they accept as 'right' and fair. These are supported by group norms which imply moral pressures that they should not put in too little effort but also that they should not put in too much (Behrend, 1988, p. 53).

Similar to Baldamus (1961), Behrend (1988) argues motivation is influenced by external socialisation; however, she places greater emphasis on the role of workplace colleagues in establishing workplace norms and what is right and fair. In the good worker literature, migrant workers are perceived to work harder than domestic workers, which has a positive influence on the work ethic of domestic workers (Dench *et al.*, 2006). In the Thompson, Newsome and Commander (2013) study, migrant workers valued their reputation as hard workers, interpreting it as a way of

separating themselves from domestic workers, a point that Hopkins and Dawson (2016) build on, arguing that migrant workers are compelled to use their hard work ethic as a demonstration to employers of their value because language deficiencies and lack of recognition of credentials mean they cannot compete in the labour market.

The influence of workplace experiences on workers' attitudes is offered as a rationale for the temporal quality of the 'good worker' rhetoric. Critics argue migrant workers are 'good when they want to be' (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013), and attitudes towards work are likely to align with those of domestic workers the longer migrant workers reside in the host country (Bauder, 2006; MacKenzie and Forde, 2009). In the Wills *et al.* (2009) study, once workers could claim benefits, particularly housing benefits, they behaved more like domestic UK citizens in low-skill jobs.

Behrend (1988) also argues that what is considered right, and fair is contextual: 'The question is one of what is fair in given circumstances for those concerned, to employees, management and society, and the answer depends on the particular situation' (p. 53). Goals and circumstances, particularly economic, are not static and can influence changes in individual, employer and societal expectations regarding right and fair (Behrend, 1988).

Burawoy (1979) is critical of Baldamus's assertion that effort and wage have a normative relationship. Moreover, he rejects his contention that the notion of a fair day's pay can be a function of an external socialisation process. He argues 'the behaviour of workers is in accordance with the organisation of the labour process and largely independent of any precapitalist consciousness they carry with them' (p. 156). Burawoy concedes that the labour process may not be completely autonomous but argues it 'may be *relatively autonomous'* (p. 151, emphasis in original) and that it is the labour process itself that determines the effect, if any, of imported consciousness of workers. Thompson (1989) rejects Burawoy's (1979) assertion that there are only

small variations in the common consciousness, arguing that we are all socialised differently, and external factors and divisions such as race, ethnicity, and gender are all reproduced in the workplace. He provides examples where class, gender, trade union affiliation, and geography impact workers' responses to control and coercion. For instance, he argues women's role in society and predominance in the secondary sector condition them to be more passive and compliant and less likely than working-class males to actively resist controls (p. 175). Thompson (1989) contends that geographical location can also shape the behaviour and attitudes of the workforce and provides an example of regional variations in attitudes towards work in the North United Kingdom as well as cultural differences internationally.

It is clear from this discussion that the indeterminacy of effort and why some workers work harder than others is complex and contested. Whilst there is some agreement that prior orientations to work and early socialisation may impact effort (Baldamus, 1961; Behrend, 1988), there is also compelling evidence that conditions within the labour process can influence migrant worker effort, at least for some time (MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; Polanco, 2016).

4.5 NETWORK THEORY

In Chapter 2, the discussion of the new economics of labour migration theory's emphasis on families and community sharing resources to balance risk and maximise utility highlights the importance of friends and family in providing support, information, and other resources to facilitate migration. Networks were also a prominent feature in the literature on segmentation in Chapter 3, where kinship, ethnic community, and labour networks played a role in migrant workers' access to and participation in transnational labour markets. The discussion in this chapter on labour mobility illuminated the contribution of networks to migrant workers' mobility capability. Network theory has the potential to provide some important insights into the motivations of migrant workers and their families to engage in

TFWPs and how their experiences and interactions with employers are influenced or mediated by networks.

Social networks are relational and constitute the crucial meso-level linking of micro-level motivations and macro-level structural formulations (Boyd and Nowak, 2012; Massey *et al.*, 1993). Network theory 'shows how individual actions are rooted in social structures', overturning the older 'individualistic' view of migration, which cast the migrant as a cost/benefit calculator (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003, p. 84). As a form of social capital, networks provide migrant workers with an opportunity to maintain or improve their position in society, and their opportunity and social gains, in turn, become a potential resource for others in their network. Network connections open the door to foreign employment, which translates into remittances for families in the origin country. New migrants with no social ties in the host destination bear the most risk and the highest costs. Each individual who follows expands the network, reducing potential risks and costs for others and increasing the likelihood of migration for others in the network (Massey *et al.*, 1993).

Labour demand is an important stimulus to migration, and the focus on supply-side actors in network theory 'camouflages the activities of many network actors, including employers, recruitment agents and other intermediaries' involved in the labour process (Krissman, 2005, p. 4). Boyd and Nowak (2012) also signal the importance of labour demand in identifying three predominant social networks in the migration process: personal (family), labour, and illegal. The first two are relevant to this research.

Before examining family and labour networks, it is important to consider the strength or density of social ties. Granovetter (1973, p. 1361) defines the strength of a tie as 'the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterise the tie'. Social ties can be 'roughly' categorised as strong, weak, or absent. Contrary to assumption, weak ties can be more effective facilitating migration than strong ties. Strong ties, such as those with family and

friends, mean sharing contact and information within the group, which can be limiting. Weak ties can expand the network by bridging information between cliques or between a small group and the larger community. Weak ties, such as those based on perceptions of shared culture, shared experiences, or even shared vulnerability, can create bonds, however fleeting, between individuals and result in access to new information and different opportunities (Granovetter, 1973).

Family and personal networks consider the 'personal relations migrants have with members of their host and home communities' (Boyd and Nowak, 2012, p. 83). In the host community, family and friend networks ease the transition for new migrant workers, supplying information, a sense of community and support, and the potential to maintain or modify their home culture. In the workplace, personal networks can provide social support to migrant workers concerned with issues of fairness and justice and enhance their willingness and ability to challenge living and working conditions in the host country (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). Family networks are strong ties (Granovetter, 1973) and carry obligations and opportunities. Members benefit from enhanced social capital, but failure to live up to the obligation of the network can cause consequences such as exclusion (Tilly, 2007).

Moreover, the influence of co-ethnic relationships extends beyond information and jobs. Community members have expectations regarding codes of conduct, and non-conformists may be sanctioned. Beyond individual motivations and structural demand, migration institutions grow and develop to support, facilitate and exploit migrant workers (Goss and Lindquist, 1995).

Labour networks are also an important source of information regarding employment opportunities and can be formal or informal. Informal labour networks, including family, friends, and acquaintances, are key sources of information, especially for those most vulnerable, including undocumented workers, those without formal credentials and youth (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). The value of labour networks is debated, however, as the impacts are not always positive. Networks can encourage

'herd behaviour' where migrants engage in work that does not match their skills and abilities, and opportunities within the network may be limited, segmenting migrants into secondary jobs and economies (Boyd and Nowak, 2012; Piore, 1979; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Formal labour networks which rely on bureaucratic mechanisms may provide a better match between employment and the migrants' skills and credentials, resulting in a higher rate of return than migrants using informal networks; however, this too is debated (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). Formal networks are also less likely to experience social closure, where one or two dominant groups capture the hiring process and can exclude non-group actors (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Not all migrants have access to formal labour networks and those who do often compete in public competition with no guaranteed labour outcome (Boyd and Nowak, 2012).

Employers' perspective on utilising networks is also the subject of debate. Networks are valuable for employers, as hiring within a network may offer additional benefits besides hiring a potentially good worker. Waldinger and Lichter (2003, p. 83) argue network hiring can be used ‘to enforce *obligations* [emphasis in original]’ so that the employer is assured that the favours he or she does for the job-seeker and his or her accomplices are repaid and that 'networks, as carriers of both information and obligations, can cement *implicit contracts* [emphasis in original] regarding the rights and responsibilities of each party to the employment exchange'. In these circumstances, migrant workers may actively participate in keeping their network 'in line'. Network hiring then becomes a self-feeding process, which employers view positively unless one or two groups capture the hiring process. Also, a workforce based on networks can become problematic if disciplinary issues arise or an employee exits the organisation and encourages his network to leave (Boyd and Nowak, 2012).

Boyd and Nowak (2012) join a chorus of others, arguing that host and origin country policies and regulations around labour migration directly influence the size and nature of migrant networks. Policies favouring PR for highly skilled workers

enhance labour networks. In contrast, temporary 'only' policies for low-skilled workers may encourage the growth of family networks if it is the only access to the labour market. Networks are also useful for providing contacts and linking migrants with particular sectors or destinations (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). Early migrants establish a 'node' in a specific destination, which can influence future migration through strong and weak ties. Increased migration in the network expands the number of destinations or nodes within that network, but the pattern of destinations is not random (Winters, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001).

4.6 FORMULATING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The literature review sought insight into LS-TFWPs and how migrant workers and employers experience regulatory controls associated with those programmes. Chapter 2 provided the contextual framing for the growth in TFWPs, drawing attention to global labour supply and demand imbalances and political tensions that gave rise to 'temporary' only programmes for low-skilled workers. Examining key debates illuminated how regulatory controls restrict low-skilled workers' mobility and access to PR, creating a distinctive category of workers without the same rights and freedoms as domestic and other migrant workers. Central to these debates is how employer controls over workers' migration and employment status renders workers more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Fudge, 2012; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). Despite the potential for coercion and exploitation, more recent research questions the characterisation of migrant workers as passive and victims, arguing migrant workers are purposeful actors, choosing vulnerabilities, being strategic in navigating labour markets, and exiting bad jobs and working conditions (Alberti, 2014; Ruhs and Martin, 2008; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). Neoclassical and new economics of labour migration theories offer some insight into the potential economic motivations and the role of families in migration decisions, but do not address temporariness specifically, nor do they capture the interaction between labour markets and regulatory controls (Arango, 2000). More recent research positions migrant motivation as diverse, dynamic, and complex but is not

specific to TFWPs (Alberti, 2014; Cook, Dwyer and Waite, 2011). Understanding the motivations of migrant workers and their employers is essential to understanding how events unfold at the worksite (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013).

Chapter 3 examined employers' perspectives on low-skilled migrant labour through the lens of dual and segmented labour market theory. Migrant labour as a response to labour shortages is a key rationale offered by employers (Piore, 1979); however, recent literature challenges the reality of labour shortages, arguing employers prefer migrant workers over domestic workers, valuing them as 'good workers' (Dench *et al*., 2006; MacKenzie and Forde, 2009) although 'good worker' holds different meanings for different employers. There is no agreement as to why employers prefer migrant workers; however, dual market and segmentation theory offers some insight into how labour markets segment workers by gender, ethnicity, and citizenship. A segmentation lens on regulatory controls illuminates how employer control over workers' mobility and access to PR could exacerbate employer power over migrant workers, resulting in workers being defined as hyper-dependent and hyper-precarious (Zou, 2015). Some critics argue these coercive controls are central to employer demand and the 'good worker' rhetoric because workers are unable to resist exploitation and work intensification (Anderson, 2010; Fudge, 2012), however, the literature revealed that much of the discussion focuses on the 'potential' for exploitation with limited empirical research specific to TFWPs (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Polanco, 2016). Regulatory controls constraining worker mobility and access to permanent residence are distinctive, and the effects are not easily captured unless migration status is a primary focus (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010); therefore, focusing on this particular labour pool is essential. No one migration theory captures both supply and demand, agency and structure; however, traditional economic theories and dual labour market and segmentation theories may offer insight into migrant worker and employer motivations. Therefore, based on the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, the first research question is 'To what extent does migration theory explain the motivations of temporary migrant workers and their employers for engaging in a LS-TFWP in the hospitality industry in rural Canada?'

The discussion in Chapter 4 considers the employment relationship, emphasising the distinctive nature of a TFWP employment relationship. Empirical studies investigating the interaction between constraints on workers' mobility and workers' effort power are limited, highlighting the impact of regulatory controls on the labour process as a gap in research. Constraints are coercive by nature; however, migrant worker agency and motivations cannot be underestimated. Therefore, the second research question is 'How do regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs impact labour mobility power and the effort bargain?

4.7 CONCLUSION

Chapter 4 considered labour mobility and the effort bargain as two conceptual tools appropriate for examining the impact of migration regulatory controls on the labour process. Effort power and labour mobility power are two uncertainties in the labour process, where capital and labour negotiate the effort to be extracted and the movement of labour. Regulatory controls constraining worker mobility are a structural barrier to worker agency and their ability to exit bad employment relationships; however, workers' resources must not be underestimated, underscoring the need to investigate the impact of these controls on mobility-effort bargaining.

Investigating the impact of regulatory controls on effort and mobility power and the perspectives of employers and workers requires a workplace context (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). Fudge and Tham (2017, p. 6) also advocate for the importance of a sectoral focus, arguing that sectors play a role in shaping not only the 'quality and conditions of work' but also the demand for low-skilled migrant workers. The literature review identified the hospitality sector as a low-road industry with a historical reliance on and marginalisation of migrant workers, so Chapter 5 considers the hospitality industry as a sectoral context. The literature review also signalled that a geographical context, specifically a rural one, may influence how

regulatory controls and the labour process are experienced. Therefore, Chapter 5 also examines the hospitality sector in rural Canada as the empirical context for this study.

CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH CONTEXT

The empirical context of this study is the hospitality sector in rural Canada. Canada offers two key strengths as an exemplar for studying the impact of LS-TFWP regulatory controls in the workplace. First, Canada's history as a nation of immigrants and decades of experience with permanent and temporary migration make it an ideal choice for studying migration regulatory controls. Second, Canada has the second largest land mass in the world with a population of just over 40 million, so it has experienced the labour market dynamics of multiple layers of rurality.

Temporary migrant workers as a response to labour market supply challenges in rural areas are of international significance, even though regulatory frameworks may vary from state to state (Green *et al.*, 2008; Rye, 2018; Rye and Scott, 2018). In Canada, TFWPs respond to labour shortages and are intended to be sensitive to economic downturns. However, rural communities are highlighted as one area where employers are more likely to access this alternative workforce, even in a recession (CTRI and CBC, 2012). Recognising that incorporating migrant workers into a labour market is 'spatially contingent' (Bauder, 2006, p. 17), situating this research in a remote, rural context can contribute new knowledge regarding temporary migrant labour as a response to labour market challenges in rural communities.

The first section of this chapter offers a rationale for a rural context and Canada as an exemplar. The second section rationalises hospitality as a sectoral context, highlighting the sector's historical relationship with low-skilled migrant labour. The section draws attention to the hospitality sector's culture of mobility and more recent extensive research on potential drivers of that mobility. Following that is a discussion of Canada's Temporary Migration Programmes, their evolution, and how they function.

5.1 RATIONALE FOR CANADA AS A CASE STUDY CONTEXT

Canada's managed migration system is one of the OECD's oldest and most respected migration management systems. Despite being one of the largest migration systems in the OECD, in terms of absolute numbers and relative to its population, its infrastructure is considered innovative and nimble. Policies and programmes are structured and monitored so they respond and adapt quickly to new evidence, challenges that may arise, and fluctuations in the labour market (OECD, 2016; OECD, 2019). Rapid and ongoing changes can be challenging for users of the system; however, from a national perspective, it means that politically sensitive issues that arise disappear from the public eye quickly. Frequently extolled as a role model by the OECD, Canada has one of the most competitive selection systems for skilled migration. Over one in five people in Canada are foreign-born, one of the highest shares in the OECD. Of the foreign-born population, 60 percent is highly educated, the highest share of highly educated within the OECD (OECD, 2019). Reports from the OECD are more muted for low-skilled temporary labour migration, which is addressed in a further section. Overall, immigration is a cornerstone of Canada's development and is generally accepted and supported, resulting in integration outcomes well above most other OECD countries.

Whilst permanent migration increased by more than 50 percent between 2005 and 2015, it was outpaced by rapid growth in Temporary Labour Migration. Before 2002, the average number of TFWs in Canada each year ranged from 80,000 to 100,000. In 2002, responding to pressure from employers, the Canadian government launched a pilot project that allowed a wide range of sectors and employers to sponsor TFWs, even for low-skilled work. By 2013, there were 386,406 TFWs employed in Canada, representing 2 percent of the working population (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014, p. 4). The increase represents a significant policy shift away from Canada's long-standing commitment to permanent immigration towards a focus on temporary labour migration. The temporary migration system in Canada is complex and somewhat fluid; however, regulatory controls that restrict low-skilled

migrant workers' mobility and access to PR remain a stable feature of LS-TFWPs. Canada's history with migration generally, and temporary labour migration specifically, make it an excellent exemplar for a case study of migration regulatory controls.

5.2 RURAL CONTEXT

The literature review drew attention to the importance of geographical context when examining low-skilled labour migration. Within the labour process, TFWs in rural contexts assumed the role of 'core' workers, whilst TFWs in urban locations were more likely to be considered 'peripheral' (McCollum and Findlay, 2015; Preibisch, 2007); however, implications for the organisation of the workforce were not addressed. In TFWPs, where migrant labour mobility is constrained, some states allow workers who are exploited to switch employers. However, this is considered unrealistic in rural locations where distance, transportation, and access to opportunities are deterrents (Sumption, 2019). These implications become significant given the heightened labour force challenges rural areas experience, which include low population density, transitions from resource-based to service economies, and tendencies towards a low-skills equilibrium (Green *et al*., 2008). Until recently, research and debates on low-skilled labour migration have focused on world cities and urban areas, whilst, apart from agriculture, food processing, and WHVs, rural areas have been neglected (Green *et al.*, 2008; Scott, 2015; Ward, 2006).

Internationally, rural economies' importance and unique development trajectories have gained more traction in the past several years. In a significant shift from practice, the (OECD, 2018) *Rural Policy 3.0 – Implementing a New Rural Paradigm* not only recognises the scope and diversity of socio-economic rural development but also, for the first time, acknowledges that not all rural regions are alike. In a shift away from rurality as a 'metro' and 'non-metro' binary, the OECD's proposed new paradigm recognises 'three types of rural: 1) within a functional urban area, ii) close to a functional urban area, and iii) far from a functional urban area' (p. 1). This

typology reflects rural as a complex phenomenon, and 'the degree of physical distance between rural and urban places and the degree of linkages' (p. 2) signals the importance of distance to density when assessing rurality.

Canada has much to offer as a rural context for this study. It has the second-largest land mass in the world and has been grappling with defining rurality and ensuring equity in meeting the needs of multiple layers of rurality for decades. Similar to the OECD definition, Canada recognises 'the distance to density' as a key dimension when considering the rurality of a place but, importantly, distinguishes between communities with low density but nearby major commuter routes and urban centres and those communities with low density on the geographical and economic periphery. In this way, the density of the community is a second key factor in assessing the degree of rurality (CRRF, 2015). Characteristics of a place: people, enterprises and institutions do not define rurality, but each influence and is influenced by the density of the locale itself (Bollman and Reimer, 2018). Amenities available in and transportation to a community of 2,000 differs from those in a community of 15,000, although both might be 500 kilometres from the nearest urban location. Therefore, two key dimensions in Canada are critical to assessing rurality: density and distance-to-density (CRRF, 2015). These are measured on a continuum and become significant in 'rural proofing' or ensuring a rural lens applies to new policy (Bollman and Reimer, 2018, p. 3).

Demographic trends in rural Canada are similar to those of developed economies; however, density and distance to density exacerbate labour market impacts. Rural populations are ageing, and whilst immigration has contributed to population growth in some regions, it is inconsistent. Rural Canada experiences labour market and skill shortages more acutely (CTRI and CBC, 2012) and human capital challenges pose a major barrier to rural economic development. In 2009, the demographic replacement of the non-metro workforce in Canada fell below 100, whilst the demographic replacement of the metro workforce fell below 100 percent in 2013 (CRRF, 2015).

Demographic challenges intensify competition for workers and are expected to continue until 2029.

Moreover, rural communities have higher high school dropout rates (16.4 percent) than urban communities (9.2 percent). Less than 50 percent of the rural population has post-secondary education; among the 34 OECD countries, Canada has the largest rural-urban gap regarding levels of education in the workforce. These labour supply challenges are exacerbated by the exodus of youth from rural communities who seek better educational or employment opportunities in urban centres (CRRF, 2015).

In Canada, communities with low density and a long distance from urban centres are referred to as 'remote rural' (CRRF, 2015). Structural constraints may be more pronounced in remote rural destinations, impacting labour demand and supply. Weak transportation and service infrastructure, localised skills mismatches, and an over-reliance on low-skilled, casual, and often seasonal workers are additional challenges for remote rural communities (Baum, 2012a; Lindsay, McCracken and McQuaid, 2003). For sectors such as hospitality, access to the community, poor communication systems, seasonality, a predominance of small, independent businesses, and only marginal representation of major brands can impact the competitiveness of businesses and the quality and continuity of a workforce. The inability to attract quality workers or high labour turnover negatively affects the product or service quality, reducing competitiveness. Moreover, workers may need to migrate between jobs, regions, or countries to sustain year-round employment (Baum, 2012a).

5.3 HOSPITALITY – A SECTORAL FOCUS

Fudge and Tham (2017, p. 6) highlight the value of a sectoral focus, arguing that, in keeping with industrial relations literature, the sector plays a role in shaping the 'quality and conditions of work' as well as creating the sector-specific demand for low-skilled migrant labour. The tourism and hospitality industry is a global service

sector that relies heavily on human capital and has a long history of employing migrant labour to respond to significant challenges in meeting labour market demand (Baum, 2012b; Zampoukos and Ioannides, 2011). Before the COVID pandemic, the global tourism industry represented 9.9 percent of global employment or 1 in 10 workers and, in the past decade, 1 in 5 of all new jobs. Moreover, in 2017, the 4.6 percent increase in tourism GDP outpaced that of the global economy (World Tourism & Travel Council, 2018). This growth trajectory is mirrored in Canada, where tourism was 6.5 percent of GDP in 2017. Direct and indirect tourism employment accounted for 1.59 million jobs, representing 8.6 percent of total employment (World Tourism & Travel Council, 2018). According to the United Nations World Tourism Organisation, international arrival numbers between January 2023 and July 2023 reached 84 percent of pre-pandemic numbers, putting the sector on track for a full recovery (UNWTO, 2023). The post-COVID-19 rise in labour shortages could be a function of tightening labour markets and rebounding economies; however, it could also signal structural changes such as workers leaving the labour market permanently or workers no longer willing to accept the low pay and strenuous working conditions in sectors such as hospitality (Causa *et al.*, 2022).

This study focuses on one aspect of the tourism industry: the hospitality sector. The hospitality industry 'comprises all businesses whose primary purpose is to offer food, beverage, and accommodation for sale commercially' (Lucas, 2004, p. 3); however, Baum (2006) notes there is considerable vertical and horizontal diversity within the sector, an important factor in this study. Baum argues that 'size, location and ownership of hospitality businesses' influence the organisation of work, and that job titles may mask the actual roles, responsibilities and skills required' (p. 346). Horizontal diversity is significant, ranging from concession stands to Michelin restaurants in the food and beverage sector and campgrounds to 5-star luxury hotels in the accommodation sectors, each offering different levels of services and amenities, which also impact the organisation of work (Baum, 2006). The sector has a weak regulatory framework, low trade union representation, and poor employment relations (Lucas and Mansfield, 2010). Several features distinguish the hospitality sector from other sectors that have a direct impact on employment:

> an unpredictable and ad hoc demand for services; a high level of customer contact; low levels of labour productivity; low wages across a range of occupations; high rates of labour turnover, and high levels of hard-to-fill vacancies (Lucas and Mansfield, 2010, p. 4).

Grappling with the unpredictability of consumer demand, particularly when it involves seasonality, whilst minimising costs, demands flexibility from the workforce (Lai, Soltani and Baum, 2008). The simultaneous production and consumption of the product or service and the triadic role of the guest, employer, and worker in that interaction create additional pressure on workers and contribute to stressful working conditions. Low-skilled work predominates in the hospitality sector, much of which is often framed as dirty and demeaning. Dishwashing and room attendants are the least skilled jobs but some of the most physically demanding; hence, they are also the most challenging to fill (Dench *et al*., 2006). Moreover, the sector is characterised by high levels of labour turnover. The average hospitality industry turnover rate in Canada is 25.9 percent, a full 6 percent higher than any other industry (Bares, 2016). Seasonal hospitality employees are 'more than twice as likely to quit before the end of the season than full-time employees', and the voluntary turnover rate across the industry is 24 percent in contrast to 8.6 percent for other sectors (go2HR, 2017).

5.3.1 Labour mobility in the hospitality sector

Whilst there is agreement that the hospitality sector experiences higher levels of labour mobility than other sectors (Lundmark, 2020), there is no consensus on why. Higher levels of turnover can be attributed to low wages and poor working conditions, as well as the perception of a weak internal labour market, low commitment to training, and poor career prospects (Riley, Ladkin and Szivas, 2002). However, employers' low commitment to training can be attributed, in some part, to both the high turnover and the expectation that jobs are temporary (Devine *et al.*,

2007). The expectation of work as temporary is an important consideration. A study by Iverson and Deery (1997) found that 'the hospitality industry has created and reinforced a turnover culture', which they characterise as 'the acceptance of turnover as part of the work-group norm' (p. 80). Employees enter the industry knowing it is temporary and, therefore, view quitting as appropriate (p. 71). Lundmark (2020) argues that whilst poor working conditions and human resource practices can contribute to high levels of labour mobility within the workforce, they are only part of the picture. His analysis of Swedish longitudinal geo-referenced microdata for 1993 – 2011 supports Iverson and Deery's (1997) notion of a 'culture of mobility' and, he argues, indicates the need for a large-scale study. Norms regarding mobility in a workplace develop over time and can have a 'contagion' effect on the attitudes and behaviours of other workers. When the norm is cohesion among workers, turnover diminishes (Hinkin, Holtom and Liu, 2012).

Lundmark's (2020) survey analysis identified work-life variables that can influence labour mobility decisions for hospitality workers. For example, the smaller the organisation and the longer the distance from home are both variables that could positively influence a worker's decision to change jobs. However, labour market density within 50 kilometres would be a mitigating factor. Higher levels of education and being of a younger age positively influence mobility, whilst family status or dependants have a negative impact. Significantly, tenure is a 'powerful predictor of workplace mobility' (p. 296) in that the longer a person is in an organisation, the less likely they are to leave. Lundmark (2020) argues that whilst age may be a factor, the cost of giving up the level of social capital and trust built up over time may outweigh the perceived benefits associated with mobility and encourage risk-averse behaviours. Lundmark's survey of mobility data in Sweden offers insight into potential trends or patterns in behaviour that are particular to hospitality workers but doesn't allow for insight into specific labour pools, the agency of individual workers, or how worker motivations intersect with workers' migration status, employment status, age, family status, or other factors that influence mobility decisions.

Temporary and part-time contracts (less than 20 hours per week) were two objective factors that significantly increased labour mobility (Lundmark, 2020, p. 285). Stochastic demand, whether by hour, day, or season, requires more flexibility and may partially explain the sectors' traditional labour pools of students, women, and migrant labour (Baum, 2007; Lai and Baum, 2005). Seasonality, in particular, is a temporal demand that would provoke labour mobility (Lundmark, 2020). Numerical flexibility allows employers to expand or contract their workforce according to variations in demand (Zampoukos and Ioannides, 2011). It is foundational to the reputation of migrant workers as a 'just-in-time' response to labour market demand (Lai and Baum, 2005), who operate as a reserve army in the secondary sector (Piore, 1979).

The temporal nature of hospitality work is associated with periods of unemployment unless employees can 'dovetail' periods of work in different regions or industries; however, (Ball, 1988, p. 507) argues temporality may be attractive to certain populations. Students, parents with school-age children, those looking to augment income in addition to a primary job and young people new to the labour force seeking experience may value the easy access and temporal nature of hospitality work. Adler and Adler (2004) developed a typology of hospitality workers in a resort destination based on their perceived mobility capability. Locals and new immigrants were two categories framed as trapped workers, characterised by low education, limited opportunities, and lower mobility capability. Their typology doesn't include temporary migrant workers who are often well educated, nor does it include low-skilled sponsored workers who could be framed as 'trapped' but much more coercively than new immigrants and with much lower mobility capability. The other categories, seekers and managers, had high mobility capability. Seekers, in particular, were considered highly transient and characterised by their experiential and leisure orientation rather than a work or material orientation. Duncan, Scott and Baum (2013) argue that high levels of mobility, including inter-sectoral, intra-sectoral and geographical, can be desirable for lifestyle workers or seekers or working tourists, where the lines between tourist and worker are blurred and geographical mobility is the goal.

For others, particularly domestic workers, the asocial hours, poor working conditions, and precarious nature of the work may be a deterrent, leading to the perception of hospitality as a temporary step on the route to a 'real' job (Baum, 2007; Szivas, Riley and Airey, 2003). Adler and Adler (2004) argue that the industry's temporal nature makes it difficult to retain quality workers, who are more likely to seek stability and long-term employment. Moreover, full-time employees are critical to the success of hospitality operations, providing stability and ensuring the continuity of service and quality standards. However, structural constraints such as seasonality and the size and calibre of the organisation contribute to who is willing and able to invest the necessary resources to ensure workforce stability (Baum, 2012a). Larger operations, including luxury properties and chain hotels, recognise the impact of high levels of labour mobility on their ability to compete internationally and invest more in improved working conditions, access to training and benefits, the creation of strong internal labour markets, and opportunities for growth and development (Baum, 2015; Christensen Hughes, 2018). However, small to medium-sized operations predominate in the hospitality sector, and these operations are less willing or able to move away from their low-cost management strategies, refusing to invest in training development and the long-term potential of their employees (Baum, 2007). The historical role of migrant workers as a reserve army contributes to the sector's ability to function as a low-road industry. Some argue that the downskilling trend particular to the hospitality sector is not related to the demands of the work nor expectations of the consumer but linked to how the sector relies on and shapes a highly mobile labour force and what employers believe they can expect from that workforce (Wood 1997 cited in Baum 2007). For migrant workers, entry-level positions in hospitality are often the only gateway to a regional or national labour market, particularly if language is an issue or credentials are not recognised (Baum, 2007; Dench *et al.,* 2006).

5.3.2 Migrant workers and the hospitality sector

In Canada, the hospitality sector's historical reliance on migrant workers has increased since COVID-19. As of May 2022, the tourism immigration labour force reached 99.5% of its 2019 size, whilst the tourism labour force of workers born in Canada reached at 85.6% of its 2019 levels (Tourism HR Canada, 2024). Immigrants comprised 26% of the total tourism workforce in 2016 (Tourism HR Canada, 2016); however, this number increased to 30% by May 2022 (Tourism HR Canada, 2024). These numbers do not include non-permanent tourism workers.

Post-COVID-19 data by industry group has yet to be available; however, Table 1 offers insight into the distribution of immigrant workers by industry group.

Table 1. Immigrants/non-permanent residents as a percentage of the labour force, by industry group

	Non-Immigrants	Immigrants	Non-Permanent
Cdn Labour Force	74.8%	23.8%	1.4%
Tourism Sector	71.5%	26.0%	2.6%
Accommodations	65.6%	31.7%	2.7%
Food and Beverage	69.5%	27.1%	3.4%
Recreation and Ent	82.0%	16.2%	1.8%
Transportation	68.2%	31.1%	0.6%
Travel Services	62.4%	35.3%	2.3%

(Source: Tourism HR Canada – Profile of immigrants in Canada's tourism sector, 2016)

In 2016, immigrant and non-permanent workers comprised 26 percent and 2.6 percent of the tourism labour force; however, Table 1 demonstrates that the accommodations, food and beverage, travel and transportation industry groups have higher proportions of foreign-born workers. Within each industry group, foreign-born workers predominate in certain occupations. Foreign-born workers comprise 69.9 percent of taxi and limousine drivers, 51.6 percent of chefs and in

accommodation, and 42.5 percent of light-duty cleaners or room attendants (Tourism HR Canada, 2016).

Chapter 2 highlighted the growing role of WHV holders and international students as labour pools filling low-skilled jobs. In Canada, there were 807,750 international students at the end of 2022, an increase of 170 percent over the previous decade and 31 percent from 2021 to 2022 (CBIE, 2023). These two labour pools have become an important reserve army for the hospitality sector, as their goals align with the temporal flexibility demands of the sector.

Employers contend temporary migrant workers are necessary because of labour shortages; however, critics are they work harder, are more agreeable to poorer working conditions, and bring a higher level of education to low-skilled jobs (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010). For these labour pools, the hospitality sector is attractive because of easy access and the temporal nature of the work, a 'means to an end' to subsidise travel and lifestyle choices and studies (Robertson, 2014).

5.3.3 Hospitality sector in a rural context

The discussion thus far has considered the impact of temporal demand, poor working conditions, and high levels of labour mobility on the hospitality sector. Baum (2012a) argues that the challenges hospitality operators in peripheral destinations face are different in both kind and extent, highlighting the importance of context when examining the labour mobility of migrant workers. Geographic isolation, access to the destination, population density, proximity to density, and seasonality all present additional challenges in delivering products and services in a highly competitive, international marketplace. Service quality, particularly in luxury operations, is both a competitive and strategic issue and relies on a competent workforce to achieve the level of competitiveness necessary to compete globally

(Baum and Hagen, 1999; Baum and Lundtorp, 2001). The remoteness of the destination does not alter consumer expectations about quality and service; workers' skill sets are expected to be on par with their urban counterparts.

Seasonality directly impacts the quality and sustainability of employment and access to and availability of skills (Baum and Lundtorp, 2001). A remote rural location can be an additional barrier to accessing specific or alternative labour markets (Baum and Hagen, 1999). A rural community's dependence on external labour is a function of the density of the community, the size and structure of the locally based hospitality organisations, seasonality, and the maturity of the tourism product (Baum, 2012a). What distinguishes remote rural communities from other destinations is their high reliance on seasonal workers, who often must travel significant distances to access work. Reserve armies of seekers and students are temporal, and if labour mobility is high during peak season, there may not be a reserve army available, which compromises the service and product quality and strains the existing workforce. In Canada, accessing qualified workers is an issue for hospitality operators across the country; however, hospitality operators in rural regions may not receive any applications, skilled or otherwise (CTRI and CBC, 2012).

Migrant labour is increasingly important in addressing labour shortages and skill deficiencies in rural economies; however, one of the key supplies is WHV participants, who, like their domestic seeker counterparts, are highly mobile. Employers appreciate that migrant labour tends to be younger, better educated, and willing to accept lower wages; however, critics argue that migrant labour contributes to a low-skill equilibrium and is a short-term solution which can displace local, vulnerable workers and prevent employers from engaging in long-term training and investment strategies (Green *et al*., 2008). Moreover, there is an assumption in developed economies such as Canada's that in seasonal operations, LS-TFWs are the first to lose their jobs; however, as stated in an earlier section, WHV holders and international students are not regulated in the same way as 'migrant workers’, so data is not available.

A remote rural location and hospitality context may add complexity to the employment relationship of LS-TFWs. Organisations with high levels of mobility prioritise activities and staffing that support continual rebuilding and require different managerial regimes than those where conditions are stable, and managers and workers have worked together for extended periods. Tenure and proximity can influence employee relations, and special provisions, such as staff accommodation and transportation, broaden the points of contact between the key actors (Dunlop, 1958). Moreover, employers in smaller hospitality organisations, which are the norm in remote rural locations, tend to be more caring and supportive of migrant workers; a personalised relation that is not a characteristic of larger, urban properties (Baum, 2012b). However, employers' control over employment and accommodation can result in paternalism and higher levels of dependency. In LS-TFWPs, workers are hyper-dependent on their employers. They may feel unable to challenge employers about working conditions or refuse additional work if their accommodation and job are at risk, particularly if children are involved and local housing is expensive or in short supply (Zou, 2015; Anderson, 2010).

In peripheral regions, organisations are micro to small-sized and usually owner-operated or family businesses, which may limit opportunities for career progression and constrain potential labour supplies. Employers of small and medium businesses usually only invest in training and development if forced by a legal imperative or market pressures (Baum, 2012a). However, Piore (1979) argues that operations in isolated or rural areas may be the exception to this norm. There may not be the critical mass necessary to offer a full range of pre-entry or in-service educational opportunities, and relocating to access training may not be feasible for more mature residents or career changers. Employers who require training employees to compete internationally, such as luxury resorts, are forced to invest in training and development (Baum, 2012a).

This section has examined some key factors contributing to the hospitality sector's poor reputation for marginalising migrant workers in lower-skilled jobs in the secondary sector and how a remote, rural destination can pose additional challenges. Before discussing Canada's migration history and policies, it is essential to situate the empirical fieldwork for this study. As discussed earlier, ongoing and rapid reform of temporary migration policy is a strategic approach of the Canadian government; therefore, it is essential to clarify the period of this study. Empirical fieldwork was conducted in 2013, with limited follow-up in 2015 and 2018. Thus, the time frame of the empirical fieldwork, 2013, is used in future sections when discussing the regulatory framework that shaped the study.

5.4 CANADIAN CONTEXT – MIGRATION HISTORY AND POLICY

As a nation built on immigration, migration is part of Canada's national heritage and receives broad public support (OECD, 2019). Historically, permanent migration, with an emphasis on family reunification, has been the cornerstone of Canadian immigration policy (Valiani, 2013). In the late 19th and early 20th century, economic growth and social development were key priorities; policies focused on numbers of immigrants without emphasising skill. Post-war labour shortages in the 40s and 50s resulted in a wave of immigration, primarily from Europe, which gave way to labour surpluses in the 60s and 70s created by the 'baby boom' generation's entry into the labour market. Immigration policy focused on general merit and humanitarian considerations; however, a new points-based application process supported those with a high ability to contribute socially and economically or a support network of close relatives (Watt, Krywulak and Kitagawa, 2008). By the 1960s, the number of Europeans looking to emigrate was declining, whilst at the same time, the racialised nature of Canada's immigration policies came under international scrutiny. The points-based system was created in Canada in 1967 as a more transparent mechanism for assessing entry criteria and, for the first time, valued skills as opposed to ethnicity (Valiani, 2013).

5.4.1 Evolution of Canada's Temporary Migration Programmes

Early sectoral labour shortages were addressed through occupation-specific temporary programmes, two of which continue today and are considered cornerstones of Canada's Temporary Migration Programmes. The first is the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme, Canada's oldest and 'best-known' TFWP. Touted as a model of success by the (OECD, 2016), the programme is circular; low-skilled migrant workers from the Caribbean and Mexico are hired on a 'temporary only' basis for up to 8 months of the year through bilateral agreements with their respective governments. The programme is employer-driven and highly regulated by both states. Workers' mobility is strictly controlled, from when they leave the airport in their origin country until they return home (Tomic and Trumper, 2012). Although there is significant evidence of exploitation, the restructuring of capital-labour relations through temporary migration policy is argued to be essential for Canada to maintain its position in a globalised economy (Preibisch, 2010). According to Employment and Social Development Canada (2014), the programme works because the shortages are 'real' and acute, with ample evidence Canadians are unwilling to do the jobs, but importantly, because the maximum duration is 8 months, it is clearly temporary. This notion of temporary is contested as workers who return each season for decades are 'permanently temporary (Nakache and Dixon-Perera, 2015). Seasonal Agricultural Workers are explicitly forbidden from accessing PR through the Provincial Nominee Programme (PNP); only 3 percent of agricultural workers transition to PR but do so through other routes, such as economic immigration channels (Elgersma, 2014).

The second sectoral employer-sponsored programme is the Caregiver programme, which began in the 1960s as a live-in caregiver programme where 'nannies' lived with families for two years, after which they could apply for PR independently of the family. The 'live-in' requirement was dropped when complaints of excessive mobility constraints surfaced, and more recently, the programme was broadened to include elder care. The transition rate from temporary to permanent for caregivers is 97

percent (Elgersma, 2014). A recent evaluation of the programme by the OECD (2019) is critical of the 'automatic' granting of PR after two years, arguing that a high percentage of workers enter the country as caretakers of their relatives, leave caretaking within 5 years, and therefore are not solving the labour shortage.

The Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Programme launched in 1973 was Canada's first formalised, 'generalised' LS-TFWP, where regulatory controls restricted migrant workers' mobility and rights, creating a new category of 'unfree' temporary workers (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Sharma, 2006). The Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Programme signalled a policy shift from Canada's historical reliance on immigration for settlement to meet labour market demand to a reliance on TFWs as a just-in-time, reserve labour force to meet sectoral and regional labour shortages. Until the 1990s, the generalised programme focused on high-skilled occupations despite persistent demand by employers for access to low-skilled migrant workers. The 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, enacted in 2002, created the regulations needed to support the controversial two-tier migration system that persists today. The Act formalised mechanisms that facilitated the expansion of categories of workers, each with their own set of regulations as to when, how, under what conditions, and for how long migrant workers can access the Canadian labour market, as well as facilitate or block their access to PR. The regulations utilise the National Occupational Classification (NOC) to categorise the skill levels of workers needed, and the skill level determines workers' mobility capability in the Canadian labour market. In 2021, the NOC system was overhauled, moving away from categorising occupations by skill to categorisation by education and training required.

Table 2 outlines NOC classifications and the skills or qualifications necessary in that category.

Table 2. Canada's National Occupational Classifications

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">NOC before 2021</th><th colspan="2">NOC from 2021</th><th>Examples</th></tr>
<tr><th colspan="2">Occupation usually requires</th><th colspan="2">Occupation usually requires</th><th></th></tr>
<tr><td>NOC O</td><td>Management</td><td>Teer 0</td><td>Management</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>NOC A Professional</td><td>University education</td><td>Teer 1</td><td>University degree</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">NOC B
Technical and skilled trades</td><td rowspan="2">College education
Specialised training
Apprenticeship training</td><td>Teer 2</td><td>College diploma or apprenticeship training of 2 or more years.
Supervisory occupations</td><td>Chef</td></tr>
<tr><td>Teer 3</td><td>College Diploma.
Apprenticeship of less than two years.
More than 6 months on the job training.</td><td>Cooks</td></tr>
<tr><td>NOC C
Intermediate skill</td><td>Secondary school and/or occupation specific training</td><td>Teer 4</td><td>High school diploma
Several weeks on the job training</td><td>Receptionist
Front Desk
Guest Services
Bartender</td></tr>
<tr><td>NOC D
Elementary skill</td><td>On the job training is usually provided</td><td>Teer 5</td><td>Short term work demonstration and no formal education</td><td>Room Attendant
Kitchen helper
Dishwasher
*food and beverage server</td></tr>
</table>

(Table 2: Adapted from Employment and Social Development Canada website)

During the period of this study, temporary migration streams were tailored to occupations according to their skill level. Citizenship and Immigration Canada categorised NOC 'O', 'A', and 'B' as highly skilled and NOC 'C' and 'D' categorised as low-skilled (see Table 2). Most entry-level positions in the hospitality industry in NOC 'C' and 'D' are now in Teer 1 and Teer 2, respectively, except for food and

beverage services, previously classified as NOC 'C' or intermediate skill has been 'downgraded' to Teer 5. Although the TFWP has shifted from a low-skill and high-skill programme to a low-wage, high-wage programme, NOCs continue to play a key role in workers' ability to access PR; NOC 'D' and Teer 5 experience the most barriers to permanent residency.

Following changes to regulations in the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the 'Pilot Project for Occupations Requiring Lower Levels of Formal Training' was launched in 2002, a response to employers' demand for access to low-skilled workers in NOC 'C' and 'D' categories (see Table 2). The number of TFWs grew significantly in the first several years across a wide range of sectors and increased again in 2006 when the government expedited access, reduced wait times, and prioritised regional occupations under pressure (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Employer pressure persisted, and the Expedited Labour Market Opinion pilot project was launched in 2006, initially addressing 12 occupations, then expanded to include 38 occupations in 2008 (Gross, 2014) . By 2010, 31.1 percent of TFWs were highly skilled, compared to 32.7 percent of low-skilled; the percentage of LS-TFWs had grown by 70 percent. The hospitality sector was central to the increased demand for access to LS-TFWs. In 2010, four of the top six occupational groupings accessing the programme were hospitality-related: food counter attendants and kitchen helpers (NOC D), cooks (NOC B), light-duty cleaners (NOC D), and food and beverage servers (NOC C) (Foster, 2012, p. 28).

The hospitality sector's demand for access and high utilisation rates of the LS-TFWP came under scrutiny in 2009 during a downturn in the economy. Whilst construction was sensitive to economic shifts, applications from accommodation and food service employers rebounded quickly, suggesting a growing reliance on LS-TFWs. The 'relief valve' intention of the LS-TFWP was less elastic than anticipated, implying that employers were using these programmes to address core labour supply issues (Foster, 2012). Following several public cases alleging the displacement of Canadian workers, including one involving McDonald's fast-food restaurant, an investigation

uncovered exploitative working conditions in the fast-food sector and a negative impact on Canadian workers. Subsequently, applications from NOC 'C' accommodation, food service and retail, and all of NOC 'D' were no longer accepted (Elgersma, 2014).

From 2002 to 2013, the number of TFWs present on December 1st had increased by approximately 13 percent per year or from 101,259 to 386,406 (Foster, 2012. These numbers reflect all temporary programmes, Canada's commitment to temporary labour migration, and a two-step approach (Nakache and Dixon-Perera, 2015). Since then, several HS-TFWP streams have transitioned into International Mobility Programmes that use open permit visas with varying restrictions. WHV holders, high-skilled workers, international students, spouses of high-skilled workers, and workers deemed to provide a social, cultural, or economic benefit to Canada access open permits. In 2008, Canada launched the Canadian Experience Programme, where migrant workers with two years of Canadian work experience can apply for PR independent of an employer. LS-TFWs and seasonal agricultural workers are the only two labour pools ineligible for this programme.

Hospitality employers are once again eligible to apply to the LS-TFWP, although there a range of mechanisms that come and go, including caps on the number of low-skilled workers in a worksite, by job, and by percentage, increasing fees for accessing low-skilled workers, allowing 'preferred' employers easier access to low-skilled temporary workers, and the inclusion of a seasonal programme for shortages of less than 120 days, which subsequently expanded to 270 days, reflecting the temporal intent of the programme. State oversight was strengthened by giving Employment and Social Development Canada the authority to inspect workplaces, request documentation, engage in random checks for compliance, and respond to complaints or tips from the public. Non-compliant employers are fined, named on a public website, and can be suspended from the programme (Gross, 2017). Whilst programme conditions for the low-skilled (low-wage) programme change frequently, employer control over workers' mobility and access to PR persists.

5.4.2 Fundamentals of the LS-TFWP

The TFWP is managed federally by three departments. Citizenship and Immigration Canada assesses visa applications of foreign workers, focusing on workers' health and the accuracy of the information provided. In addition to overseeing Canada's NOC system, Employment and Social Development Canada ensures that identified labour shortages are genuine and that LS-TFWs do not displace domestic workers. Employers must complete and pass a Labour Market Information Assessment (LMIA), previously known as a Labour Market Opinion (LMO), to access the TFWP. The LMIA requires employers to demonstrate specific efforts to recruit and train domestic workers and prove they adhere to prevailing wage rates for the occupation and the region. The Canadian Border Services Agency processes TFW applications at the border and assesses whether workers' intent is temporary (Elgersma, 2014).

Regulations are complex and ever-changing; however, during this study, employers were responsible for providing full-time work (35-40 hours), reasonable accommodation, airfare and transportation costs, health care, and workers' compensation insurance. The contract was specific regarding the position and general job description, and any subsequent changes required approval from Employment and Social Development Canada. Lateral transfers and promotions were strictly forbidden unless the employer applied for an LMIA for the new position, proving no Canadians were available. Workers pay into Canada Pension and Employment Insurance; however, they are not eligible to access either of these social supports. Either party can terminate the employment contract, wherein the migrant worker must return to his country of origin. If terminated, the employer is responsible for the worker's transportation costs.

LS-TFWPs are designed to be temporary. Access to PR is very limited, and then only through the PNP, where workers are reliant on their employer agreeing there is a full-time job available for an indefinite period and that the nominee will fill that position. The PNP is a provincial programme, so criteria and regulations vary by province and are generally attuned to regional and occupational labour market needs. Restrictions for access change frequently and may be occupational, geographical or because of quotas imposed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Depending on the province, LS-TFWs can apply to the PNP after being with an employer for 6 -9 months.

Whilst LS-TFWs can change jobs, the paperwork is complex and requires the new employer to go through the LMIA process, and the outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Immigration consultations can navigate the system on behalf of a worker but at a considerable financial cost to the worker. During this study, visas were for two years, with the potential for one renewal. LS-TFWs were allowed a maximum stay of 4 years, after which they would have to wait another year in their origin country before applying again, a risk for workers wanting to change employers (Nakache and Dixon-Perera, 2015).

Workers who secure their employers' nomination are responsible for completing the application to the PNP, paying an application fee, passing a language test, and providing proof they meet a minimum income threshold based on family status. PNP offices forward approved applications to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, who determine if the applicant is awarded PR. At the time of this research, the entire process, including provincial nomination and PR, could take anywhere from 1 to 3 years, depending on the complexity of the file, including family status and backlogs. The PNP nomination by the employer is the only possible route to PR for most low-skilled workers, a contentious practice that has been the subject of intense debate and criticism (Bauder, 2006; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009).

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has established the rationale for choosing the hospitality sector in rural Canada as the empirical context for investigating regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs. Canada is a nation built on permanent immigration, although, since the 1960s, it has increasingly relied on temporary labour migration to meet its labour market needs. Geographically, the only land access to Canada is through the United States, and there is no migrant 'reserve army' that is proximate and can move freely within the country. Tourists cannot switch to a working visa, so access to the Canadian labour market requires intentionality and planning. TFWPs have been an important element in managing migration in Canada, and whilst policies and regulations have adapted to new information, political pressure, and labour market demand, employer control over low-skilled workers' mobility and access to PR have persisted.

This chapter also sought to highlight the importance of geographical context. Chapters three and four identified the potential impacts of a rural context on outcomes for migrant worker mobility and their role in the labour process (Bauder, 2015; Scott, 2013a; Sumption, 2019). The OECD (2018) *Rural Policy 3.0 – Implementing a New Rural Paradigm* recognises rural economies' socio-economic scope and diversity and signals the international importance of rurality in economic development. Canada is experienced in defining and assessing varieties of rurality and is aware of the impact of rurality on labour markets. Density and distance to density are useful tools for evaluating labour market dynamics, access to labour supplies, labour shortages, and the 'need' for access to LS-TFWs. Rural contexts are under-represented in the research of migrant workers and employment relations; therefore, this research has the potential to contribute new knowledge about the impact of TFWPs on the employment relationship and the long-term viability of TFWPs as a solution to chronic labour shortages in peripheral areas.

The section on the hospitality sector highlights the sector's well-established, poor reputation as an employer but also draws attention to the structural constraints that characterise the industry and its' historical reliance on migrant labour. Despite the size and scope of the sector, research that is specific to the workplace and work is fairly limited (Baum, 2012b; Dench *et al*., 2006; Lucas and Mansfield, 2010) although more recent research has focused on labour (McDowell, Batnitsky and Dyer, 2007), labour market segmentation and exploitation (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003), recruitment (Markova *et al.*, 2016) and mobility power to exit bad jobs (Alberti, 2014). Within the sector, high levels of labour mobility are a cultural norm (Iverson and Deery, 1997), which is no longer tenable in states where chronic labour shortages persist. Research on migrant workers specific to hospitality has predominantly focused on global cities (Alberti, 2014; Markova *et al*., 2016; Polanco, 2016), with some notable exceptions (Devine *et al*., 2007). Baum *et al.* (2016), in their review of tourism and hospitality research specific to the workforce, highlight the need for more research that recognises hospitality's role in the global economy. They argue that future research must recognise interdependencies across macro, micro, and mesa levels, be situated in and acknowledge the broader geopolitical, social, and economic forces and their impact on the workforce (p. 13). Moreover, given the high levels of mobility that characterise the sector, more research investigating mobility is necessary (Baum *et al.*, 2016; Zampoukos and Ioannides, 2011).

CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The empirical study addressing the research questions was based on a comparative analysis of five case study resorts in a remote, rural tourism destination. Single case studies focus on identifying mechanisms that shape outcomes, whilst a comparative case approach offers a unique opportunity to extend that knowledge and distinguish the effects of the geographical and sectoral contexts from the 'character of the process' (Ackroyd, 2008, p. 534). A critical realist approach was adopted. This presents a distinct advantage over either a positivist or social constructionism approach because of its ability to consider the empirical domain where the investigation takes place and the 'real' domain, where the generative mechanisms that propel decision-making about migration take place.

This chapter begins with a discussion of critical realism and the ontological underpinnings that make critical realism an ideal choice for this research. Next, the chapter details the rationale for choosing a comparative case study research design. The literature review and a preliminary survey point to the potential influence of sectoral and geographical contexts in shaping how regulatory controls are experienced, and a comparative design can identify generative mechanisms and offer insight into how they interact with context and influence outcomes. The following section justifies semi-structured interviews of managers, supervisors, and migrant workers as an appropriate method for answering the research questions and highlights the process, including challenges and opportunities. Finally, the chapter outlines the strengths and limitations of the study, how data was analysed, and ethical considerations.

6.1 PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

The philosophical approach adopted for this study is critical realism, a scientific alternative developed in opposition to the empirical, positivist philosophy that predominates in the natural sciences and a relativist/nominalist approach that is strongly linked to the social sciences. Often associated with Bhaskar (2013), critical realism offers a third way, not a compromise or conflation of two ends of the philosophical spectrum, but a novel approach that captures key elements of both approaches (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). It accepts the positivist approach where '… an (objective) world exists independently of people's perceptions, language, or imagination…' (p. 3) but '… also recognises that part of that world consists of subjective interpretations which influence the ways in which it is perceived and experienced…' which is foundational to a constructionist approach (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014, p. 3). Before justifying the decision to adopt a critical realist methodology, it is important to situate a critical realist approach regarding this study's key disciplines.

The field of management and organisation is not associated with a particular paradigm but is considered fragmented, with sub-disciplines favouring different approaches (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000). However, within the realm of employment generally, and labour process analysis specifically, critical realism has been an implicit paradigm for some time (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Edwards, 2005). Thompson and Vincent (2010) argue grounding labour process analysis within a critical realist ontology offers greater explanatory power in connecting the labour process to the wider political economy and enhances opportunities to hone research contributions. Within the discipline of tourism and hospitality, a positivist paradigm predominates, and despite a wide range of interests, research approaches persistently seek to 'measure, describe, predict, and generalise' (Morgan *et al.*, 2018, p. 184). This criticism aligns with that of Baum *et al.* (2016), whose review of extant literature with a focus on the tourism and hospitality workforce found there were few qualitative studies and, more generally, a lack of originality, sophistication, and

innovation in methodological approaches which undermines it potential for theoretical contributions. Critical scholarship that embeds research in the larger socio-economic and political contexts and draws on tourism's interdisciplinary strengths can enhance the discipline's ability to assert itself in the more mainstream social sciences (Baum *et al.*, 2016; Morgan *et al.*, 2018). Grounding this study in a critical realist framework is consistent with labour process and employment research and has the potential to strengthen the theoretical contribution to the field of tourism and hospitality.

6.1.1 Principles of critical realism

The previous discussion highlighted the distinctiveness of critical realism regarding its ontological stance vis-à-vis positivism and nominalism/constructionism; however, the relations between ontology and epistemology are another important element (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). Ontology is concerned with the question of reality or 'what is' and generally falls between a realist perspective, where reality exists external to the individual, and a nominalist perspective, where reality is a product of one's mind (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 'Epistemology explores the theory of knowledge, and its essential concerns are the meaning of the term 'knowledge', the limits and scope of knowledge and what constitutes a valid claim to know something' (Tribe, 2004, p. 46). Fletcher (2017) argues both positivist and constructivist approaches have the effect of conflating ontology and epistemology 'reducing reality to what is known whether that acts as a lens or a container' (p. 182).

In critical realism, ontology is not reducible to epistemology; however, the relation between reality and what can be known encompasses three distinct domains – the real, the actual, and the empirical (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). The 'real' domain is where whatever is real exists, independent of our understanding and whether it is an empirical object of inquiry. Importantly, it is at this level that objects or structures act

as causal forces or mechanisms to produce events. The 'actual' domain is where causal powers and mechanisms are activated and produce events, whether we are there to experience or observe them or not (Sayer, 2000). Even if someone were present to observe an event 'what happens is not the same as what is observed to happen', and some events 'may be too small/large/fast/slow to be perceived'. The perceived absence of an event in the 'actual domain' does not mean no mechanisms are at work in the 'real domain'. 'Underlying tendencies towards change' can be present in the real domain long before a change in the form of an 'event' in the actual domain occurs (Outhwaite, 1983, p. 322). The empirical domain is the transitive level of reality, where events are experienced but mediated through human interpretation (Danermark *et al.*, 2002; Sayer, 2000).

Moving from an epistemological to an ontological stance and expanding the focus from the empirical event to examining the mechanisms that generate the event is at the core of critical realism (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). In open systems, events occur as part of larger systems, such as organisations or societies where objects or entities with causal powers and liabilities may or may not generate an event (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). Entities 'provide the basic theoretical building blocks for critical realist explanation and can be such things as organisations, people, relationships, attitudes, resources… They can be human, social or material, complex or simple, structured or unstructured' (Easton, 2011, p. 120). Entities exist in the empirical, actual, and real domains. Danermark *et al.* (2002) argues reality is stratified across multiple layers that are hierarchically organised, with each layer or strata having its own mechanism:

> When moving 'upwards' through these strata, we find that each new stratum is formed by powers and mechanisms of the underlying strata. At the same time, this new stratum represents something entirely new, unique, and qualitatively different, which cannot be reduced to underlying strata. When the properties of the underlying strata have been combined, qualitatively new

> objects have come into existence, each with its own specific structures, forces, power, and mechanisms. The start of this new and unique occurrence is called emergence [original emphasis], and it is thus possible to say that an object has 'emergent powers' (p. 59-60).

The explanatory power of critical realism is understanding how the different layers of entities relate as part of the greater whole and the emergent power of the new entity (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). In this research, one entity of interest is the employment relationship between LS-TFWs and the employers who sponsor them. The literature review highlighted the greater causal powers afforded to employers by state-imposed regulatory controls and argues that these same regulatory controls render migrant workers more vulnerable to exploitation (Anderson, 2010). And this may, in fact, be true. However, a critical realist perspective demands that the underlying or generative mechanisms across different strata are crucial elements in understanding the 'how' and 'why' of the new entity. Migrant workers and their employers are shaped by the causal powers and liabilities of their own social systems, so outcomes cannot be assumed. To understand causation is 'to question what causes something is to 'ask what 'makes it happen', what 'produces', what 'generates, 'creates' or 'determines' it or more weakly, what 'enables' or 'leads to it'' (Sayer, 1992, p. 104). Adopting a realist approach in this study creates the space to investigate how the regulatory controls impact the mobility and effort bargains, but also the opportunity to look beyond the employment relationship to understand how the motivations of both the migrant workers and their employers are shaped by their realities and to gain insight into the underlying mechanisms that shape that reality. Critical realism recognises that the new entity that is formed by this specific employment relationship has emergent powers, so is not reducible to its constituent parts (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). Instead, this new entity has new causal powers and liabilities that require investigation.

Relationships between entities can be 'necessary' or 'contingent'. Necessary relations derive from the nature of the bodies involved, which are those where one object cannot exist without the other. Employers and employees are necessary relations if considering the employment relationship, although the fact that relations are necessary may or may not be important to the objective of the research. Internal relations may be asymmetric (Easton, 2010). Employers continue to exist as part of an employment relationship without the participation of LS-TFWs; however, LS-TFWs can only exist in the employment relationship with the sponsorship of the employer. Entities have multiple relations, some necessary and others contingent. Changes 'will' impact bodies in necessary relations, whilst in the case of contingent relations, bodies 'may' be affected. According to Sayer (1992): 'A contingent relation occurs when "it is neither necessary nor impossible that they stand in any particular relation"' (p. 89). The concept of contingency is particularly important in this research, where a spatial and sectoral context is among the objects of research. (Easton, 2010) is critical of 'context', arguing that it is 'too general' and that it is just a 'simpler, less well-articulated' version of contingency, offering little relevant information about the 'possible' relationship between the focal entities and the environment. He argues critical realism is much more direct in establishing the form of the causal relationship: 'In what ways may the external contingency affect the events that have occurred?' (p. 121). Whether relations between objects of study are contingent or necessary is essential in determining whether concrete phenomena are generalisable (Sayer, 2000).

6.1.2 Methodological implications

This research aligns ontologically with a critical realist approach. Labour migration, policies, programmes, rural communities, and hospitality organisations are all objective, independent realities that exist independently of our knowledge of them. The emphasis on necessity and contingency can aid in understanding differences in outcomes based on spatial or sectoral context, as well as in identifying causal powers

and mechanisms that can operate and interact to produce specific events (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 2000). A contextual element is also important in allowing individuals' experiences to be interpreted and understood (Sayer, 2000).

Adopting critical realism as a methodology requires broadening the researcher's conceptualisation of the research process beyond the common deductive and inductive modes of inference to consider abduction and retroduction. Whilst it can be argued that these modes of inference are complementary, they are each a 'different thought operation, a different way of moving from one thing to something else' (Danermark *et al.*, 2002, p. 79). Induction moves from the particular to the general, whilst deduction moves from the general to the particular; however, thought operations for both are focused on movement or events in the empirical domain (Easton, 2010, p. 123). In abduction, inference is:

> A creative reasoning process enabling the researcher to discern relations and connections not evident or obvious – to formulate innovative ideas about the interconnection of phenomena to think about something in a different context, an ability to 'see something as something else' (Danermark *et al.*, 2002, p. 93).

The relations between phenomena and structures can be 'redescribed' or 're-contextualised' with the goal of gaining a better explanation or deeper knowledge but with no expectation of absolute truth (Danermark *et al.*, 2002, p. 91). Retroduction is similar to induction, deduction, and abduction in that it moves from one thing to something else but differs in that it 'moves backward' from the empirical domain to the real, seeking the transfactual conditions that made the event at the empirical level possible (Easton, 2010). In this study, retroduction offers an opportunity to uncover and understand the causal powers that drive employers and migrant workers to engage in a LS-TFWP. These motivations are carried forward into the employment

relationship and labour process, helping to shape the actions and behaviours of each of the actors. Knowledge can be improved or constructed by locating new generative mechanisms in a broader socio-economic and political context (Ackroyd, 2004). Because of their ability to sort through the interplay between phenomena and context, comparative case studies provide a strong empirical foundation for retroduction(Karlsson and Ackroyd, 2014). The rationale for adopting a comparative case design is explained in a further section.

6.2 RESEARCH DESIGN IN CRITICAL REALISM

A research design is 'the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions, and, ultimately, to its conclusions' (Yin, 2009, p. 26). All research designs have strengths and limitations; therefore, it is incumbent upon the researcher to choose a design that best answers the research questions (Merriam, 2009). Critical realism is not associated with any particular method, instead advocating that the choice of method is guided by the research questions, the object of study, what one wants to learn about it, and how this aligns with what can be learned from a particular method (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). Karlsson and Ackroyd (2014) agree that realists can adopt whatever methods have the best chance to connect concepts to available data and potential generative mechanisms; however, they argue all realist research designs should have 'the abductive and retroductive logics of discovery' (p. 3), a caveat that prioritises some research designs over others.

Moreover, critical realism shies away from the traditional 'either/or' approach often associated with a qualitative or quantitative methodology, instead adopting a pluralist approach that recognises the value of each in achieving certain outcomes. Research designs in critical realism utilise extensive research to identify common patterns or tendencies in phenomena but rely on intensive research methods to investigate the underlying generative mechanisms to understand better the 'how' and 'why' of that phenomenon (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). Extensive research can point to 'demi-

regularities', which are tendencies or patterns that reproduce over extended periods of time and space to such a degree that they become 'generalities' but without an explanation as to the underlying mechanisms (Lawson, 1997).

In this study, the literature review established the growth in temporary labour migration, and in TFWPs specifically, as demi-regularities with long and complex histories. Migration status was a key focus of a large-scale, mixed-methodology study of low-skilled migrant workers in the United Kingdom after the E.U. enlargement (Anderson *et al.*, 2006). Their findings highlighted constraints on labour mobility as a potential issue meriting further investigation; however, they emphasised the importance of targeting workers according to their migration status to understand the underlying mechanisms. This recommendation was echoed by Wright, Knox and Constantin (2019).

This study and the literature review established that growth in TFWPs is a demi-regularity meriting intensive investigation. Employer-sponsored programmes are designed to be sensitive to labour markets, and the 2008 downturn in the Canadian economy impacted employers' access to LS-TFWs. Consequently, before engaging in the intensive phase of research, it was necessary to identify employers who accessed international workers through federal programmes and determine if and where LS-TFWs were most likely to be in demand.

6.2.1 Preliminary Survey

In 2010, an online survey, *Recruitment and Labour Shortages*, was distributed to human resource managers or general managers of more than 200 lodging operations in a Canadian province/territory where employers had a history of accessing international workers through federal programmes. The purpose of the survey was to

gather information about where LS-TFWs were employed (size and calibre of property, community), under which programme they had been hired, and in what capacity (department and positions). An ideal outcome would be the identification of employers who were actively engaged in the LS-TFWP and who would be willing to participate in future research. The provincial and national Tourism Human Resource Associations, as well as the provincial Accommodation Association, were supportive and provided feedback and information. The hotel properties on the provincial Accommodation Association's membership list formed the core database for the survey and were cross-referenced with local and regional tourism databases, where possible. Based on informal discussions and literature, it was decided to target hotels that were three stars or higher with a minimum of 40 rooms. The Expedia website was used to identify the star rating of each property, and when unavailable through Expedia, Canada Select star rating system was used. Survey responses are strengthened by directly targeting the 'right' person (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009). Because of the complexity of sponsoring LS-TFWs, it was assumed that either a human resource manager or general manager would be directly involved in the decision-making and recruitment process, and an online survey sent directly to their email would have the best chance of a response. The Accommodation Association's database provided only telephone numbers, so properties were contacted directly to access email addresses. During this process, a number of properties either clarified they did not employ LS-TFWs or declined to participate. The employers who received the survey represented a broad cross-section of hotels and resorts across the province and within the parameters of 3 stars or higher and over 40 rooms.

Survey Gizmo was used to develop the questionnaire, which was first piloted by several people known to the researcher, and questions were tweaked as needed. The Canadian Tourism Human Resource Council provided a prize of training certification as an incentive to complete the questionnaire. An introductory email was sent with the initial distribution of the survey, and over the next six to eight weeks, follow-up emails were sent to encourage participation. An offer to send a

summary of findings when the survey was complete was also made available to participants as a further incentive.

There were 69 completed questionnaires, a 28 percent response rate and data were analysed using SPSS. Labour shortages were a concern for 49.3 percent of respondents for the year 2011 but rose to 78.3 percent when considering the next five years. Housekeeping and food and beverage departments were expected to experience the highest level of shortages, a finding consistent with the literature. Whilst the sample size of this survey was too small to make any significant contribution, it was useful to illuminate any leanings or trends that merited further research. Key areas of interest were whether concern for labour shortages was impacted by geographic location (rural/urban), hotel rating, or the number of rooms.

Canada Census defines urban as a city with a population of over 50,000. Of the completed surveys, 55.1 percent of the respondents were classified as urban and 44.9 percent as rural. In terms of star rating, 37.7 percent of respondents represented properties of 4 to 5 stars, whilst 62.3 percent represented properties of 3 to 3.5 stars. In terms of the number of rooms, 49.3 percent of properties had over 100 rooms, whilst 50.7 percent had 100 rooms or fewer. Star rating had no measurable impact when considering urban and rural properties.

The urban and rural variables were impacted by the number of rooms. Of the urban hotels expressing concern about shortages (56 percent of total respondents), 73 percent of these properties had 100 or fewer rooms. Of the rural hotels expressing concern (44 percent of total properties), 67 percent were larger properties. Large, urban properties are more likely to be unionised and, as a respondent commented, have a large pool of landed immigrants and international students to draw from, so they are less likely to need access to LS-TFWs. Larger properties outside of urban centres had less access to landed immigrants; hence, labour supply and quality of

workers were more likely to be a concern given the more constrained labour pool. Follow-up conversations with managers at a higher-end hotel chain confirmed that proximity to urban areas was a significant factor in their ability to attract international students and WHV holders. They reported that, in most years, their properties close to major urban centres did not sponsor low-skilled workers, whilst their more remote properties were more reliant on access to this labour pool.

In terms of star rating, 57 percent of employers represented 3– 3.5-star properties, and 43 percent represented 4-to-5-star properties. Of the 4-to-5-star properties, 78 percent had 100 or fewer rooms, and 22 percent were larger properties. Of the 3-to-3.5-star properties, 62 percent of those concerned about labour shortages had over 100 rooms. Several employers did not respond to questions about the number of international workers in their workforce and the role that they played, if any. Whilst the number of respondents was small, the results suggested that size, the calibre of property, and geographic location could impact employers' access to sufficient, quality labour supply. These tendencies were considered when moving to the next stage of designing the research.

The survey findings pointed towards the potential of either a specific geographic location or a multi-unit chain across both rural and urban locales as potential research sites. Both options were explored further, utilising the researcher's personal and professional network and connections provided by the PhD supervisor. Discussions with managers at two different hotel chains supported the earlier findings that urban and rural close to urban properties were more likely to staff their properties through WHV and international student programmes and, because of the downturn in the economy, could staff fully without engaging in LS-TFWPs, but that remote, rural resort destinations were more problematic. This finding aligns with another study that identified labour and skill shortages as more acute in rural areas to the degree that some organisations in rural areas may not receive any applications at all (CTRI and CBC, 2012). This suggests that employers were more likely to have access to

LS-TFWs even in a recession. The *Recruitment and Labour Shortage* survey identified several communities suitable for the research, and several employers indicated their willingness to participate in further research.

An informal interview with an international recruitment agent confirmed labour market challenges were exacerbated in rural communities where operators were smaller and lacked the resources needed to access international labour pools. The agent identified several communities where organisations were actively sponsoring LS-TFWs despite downturns in the economy. Consideration was given to utilising a multi-unit hotel chain, which would require an interprovincial research design and involve communities of varied sizes, or alternatively, a remote, rural destination as the research context. The literature review in Chapters 3 and 4 identified potential impacts of a rural context on outcomes for migrant worker mobility and their role in the labour process (Bauder, 2015; Scott, 2013a). Chapter 5 detailed the increasing importance of rurality in global economic development (OECD, 2018) and the more specific labour market challenges experienced by remote, rural destinations. Based on the outcome of the extensive research phase, it was decided to situate the intensive research phase in a remote, rural destination.

6.2.2 Research context: Beachside – a remote, rural community

Choosing where to situate research involves establishing criteria to be used in the decision-making and then assessing potential sites against the criteria (Merriam, 2009). For this research, criteria included whether the community was remote rural or remote proximate to urban, whether there were employers actively engaged in the LS-TFWP, the potential for a minimum of twenty-five interviews, the willingness of both potential employers and workers to participate, and accessibility to the community and employers over an extended period. The community of Beachside best met the established criteria. The recruitment agent had confirmed the names of

several properties actively sponsoring LS-TFWs and offered to facilitate introductions if required. Moreover, one of the larger employers in Beachside participated in the preliminary survey and indicated a willingness to participate in further research.

Beachside, located in a remote area of Canada, was an international tourism destination with upwards of 1 million visitors per year. Regional and international visitors were attracted by the unique natural setting, spectacular views, a wide range of ecotourism, adventure, and other outdoor activities, as well as high-quality amenities. Tourism was a major contributor to the community's economy, generating millions per year in direct income. Tourism was highly seasonal, with upwards of 6,000 visitors arriving daily during peak season, although marketing initiatives promoting the community as a year-round destination were successful in growing both shoulder and low seasons.

Investment in community infrastructure was low; however, there had been significant tourism suprastructure development focused on high-quality amenities to meet international visitor demands. The average room rate in July and August was approximately $450.00 at the time of this research. There had also been an influx of secondary home development, leading to skyrocketing property values and increased housing density. Most of the tourist accommodation was along a stretch of beach beside the highway leading into the downtown core and consisted of beachfront hotels, motels, resorts, cabins, and campsites, many of which were of international calibre. The downtown core consisted of smaller lodging operations and numerous restaurants, boutique shops, activity operators, and other tourism services.

Access to Beachside was limited to a small commuter airport or one road, which could prove challenging in some weather. Most visitors arrived by car, travelling more than 5 hours from the nearest large city and international airport. Public

transportation within Beachside was limited to peak season and one bus, which facilitated movement between the outlying resorts and the downtown core. Amenities were limited to a small grocery store, a gas station, and a small bank. Community members considered community facilities such as schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities to be inadequate. A high degree of seasonality and the transient nature of tourism workers were key issues that had negative impacts on the community.

The small permanent population of Beachside increased by 4,000 to 5,000 seasonal workers each summer, exacerbating existing issues of affordable housing, high living costs, and inadequate infrastructure. Seasonal workers were traditionally youth and seekers drawn to the natural attractions and lifestyle; however, low wages, lack of housing and the prohibitive cost of living contributed to increased mobility of these labour pools. Peak season extended into October; therefore, secondary and post-secondary students, a traditional labour pool, were not the best fit.

6.2.3 Case study method

The literature review and extensive research phase identified the need for intensive research to investigate the growth in LS-TFWPs, how regulatory controls unfolded at the worksite and on the shop floor, and why key actors engage in the programme. The literature review and preliminary field investigation infer that the rural and sectoral contexts may influence the outcomes, but not more than that. Ackroyd (2008) argues that 'the interests of realists in intensive studies are because the organisation under study is a place where the effects of wider economic and social connections have effects' (p. 536), an important element in this research where demographic challenges and economic inequality drive labour migration.

According to Yin (2009) 'a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear' (p.18). Yin's (2009) recognition of the importance of contextual conditions and the role they play in shaping outcomes distinguishes case studies from other methods, such as experiments, where contextual conditions must be controlled and defined in advance of the study. Case studies are optimised when the focus is on contemporary events and does not rely on the researcher's 'control over and access to actual behavioural events' (Yin, 2009, p. 11), important considerations in critical realism where events occur in the real, actual, and empirical domains (Danermark *et al.*, 2002).

Case studies are valued as a method because of their flexibility and ability to meet a range of goals. They can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. Research questions that focus on 'how' and 'why' are more explanatory and align themselves well with a case study. Yin (2009, p. 9) argues that 'how' and 'why' questions 'deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence'. This aligns well with critical realism, where the focus is stratification over time and understanding mechanisms. The ability of a case study to offer a situation where mechanisms are isolated is a key element supporting abductive logic (Karlsson and Ackroyd, 2014).

Case studies are often criticised for their lack of generalisability because of the small sample size; however, Yin (2009) argues for the importance of distinguishing between empirical generalisability and analytical generalisability. This distinction is important in single case studies that use a critical realist methodology. New generative mechanisms that are conceptualised or reconceptualised are theoretically guided, but the new knowledge is reliant on and reinforced by empirical corroboration. It may be generalisable if it can be replicated in other organisations, but even without generalisability, it offers epistemological gains through new

contributions to knowledge. Comparative case studies have the potential to extend the potential impact of case study research (Karlsson and Ackroyd, 2014).

6.2.4 The case for a comparative case design

For the critical realist, comparative case studies offer a unique opportunity to understand how context interacts with generative mechanisms to shape outcomes. Single case studies primarily focus on identifying underlying mechanisms; however, it requires the comparison of multiple cases to extend that knowledge and be able to distinguish the effects of the context from the 'character of the process' (Ackroyd, 2008, p. 534). Danermark *et al.* (2002) emphasise the importance of comparative case studies in providing an empirical foundation for retroduction where the researcher can move from observation of empirical events to a conceptualisation of the transfactual conditions that informed the event. Sorting out contingent differences is a crucial step in isolating common outcomes. In this research, the literature and preliminary empirical fieldwork drew attention to geographical and sectoral contexts as contingencies that can or may impact outcomes without illuminating the how and why. Investigating multiple sites in the same geographical location isolates some contingencies; however, it is not known if a rural, remote locale affects all organisations in the same way, and if not, why not.

Similarly, variations in the size and calibre of hospitality operations can influence labour supplies and labour processes, but the how and why are unknown. Sayer (2000) argues that assessing actors' actions and strategies and whether they were successful or not is intrinsically linked to context. Success or failure may be more a result of the context, as opposed to the actors' own actions or intentions. Adopting a comparative case study design is an opportunity to identify and understand underlying generative mechanisms in the first instance and then to understand how context interacts with these mechanisms and how this influences outcomes. In this

research, a comparative case study design is appropriate to answer the research questions identified earlier in the chapter.

6.3 SELECTING CASE STUDY SITES

In any research, access to sufficient data is an important consideration in designing research (Yin, 2009); therefore, ensuring there are enough interviewees who meet the criteria for the study and who participate is an important consideration when choosing case study sites. Criterion sampling provides a measure of quality assurance by ensuring that all participants meet some criteria (Creswell, 2013), which in this research included employers with experience sponsoring LS-TFWs. Preference was given to employers with an active Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) contract where regulatory controls were well defined. Access to hiring managers, supervisors, and LS-TFWs at each case study site was also a key criterion.

Of course, selecting cases that are most likely to answer the research questions is an important consideration in building a research plan (Yin, 2009). In a positivist research design, comparative cases would be identical, except for one key variable, which deductive logic would then identify as the causal factor. In comparative case studies, variations in context or variations in the mechanism that is being studied are also an important consideration. For single case studies, generative mechanisms are the focus and assumed to have the greatest influence on outcomes, whilst in comparative cases, the interaction between mechanisms and context is unknown, and understanding how each contributes to outcomes is central to the inquiry. A strong research design can increase the precision of this outcome. In realist comparative case studies: 'there is a generative mechanism at work that has distinctive properties, working itself out circumstances' quasi-identical cases are not necessary and perhaps not wanted (Karlsson and Ackroyd, 2014, p. 5).

In an intensive research design utilising a comparative case method, there are two levels of sampling which take place, the first being each 'case' to be studied and then the sampling within the case. Probability and non-probability sampling are the two basic types of sampling used in research. Probability sampling allows for the generalisability of results and, therefore, has more in common with quantitative research; non-probability sampling is more utilised in intensive research (Merriam, 2009). Non-probability refers to sampling in a non-random method where some units of the population may be more likely to be chosen than others (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009). The concept of purposeful or purposive sampling (non-probability) allows the researcher to select individuals and sites because they can purposely inform the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2013). In this research, the preliminary survey identified Royal as a potential participant who met the criteria for the study and expressed a willingness to participate in future research. An informal conversation with a recruitment agent for LS-TFWs in Beachside identified other case study sites where employers were actively sponsoring LS-TFWs.

Several types of purposive sampling are available to researchers, and more than one sampling strategy within a project can be used. The researcher should plan ahead but should also be flexible and responsive to the situation (Creswell, 2013). Snowball or network sampling is one of the most common strategies and involves locating a few key participants who then suggest other potential participants (Merriam, 2009). An advantage of snowball or chain sampling is the likelihood that the initial participants can identify cases that are information-rich (Creswell, 2013), which was the case in this research. Edgewater was recommended by Royal. Opportunistic sampling, where a researcher takes advantage of a new lead or an unexpected opportunity (Creswell, 2013), occurred during the study, which allowed for the inclusion of a property with experience hiring foreign workers but whose most recent application to the TFWP was unsuccessful.

The five case study sites offered variety in terms of sectoral context, either in terms of the number of rooms, calibre of the operation, or amenities offered. Four organisations actively employed LS-TFWs under LMIA; the fifth resort, Wildwood, had sponsored LS-TFWs in the past; however, a recent application was rejected. All five case study sites had experience with WHV holders and international students.

Royal

Royal was one of the larger luxury resorts in Beachside. It was independently owned and situated across several acres of beachfront on the outskirts of the town. The resort was upscale, emanated luxury, and offered a full range of amenities, including food and beverage, retail, and activities, to an international clientele. High levels of customer service were a key focus and source of pride for the more than 100 employees.

Edgewater

Edgewater was a smaller, more rustic beachfront resort on the outskirts of Beachside. The resort was independently owned, and accommodation units, including cabins and campsites, were situated across several acres, including the waterfront. Units varied in size; however, all had kitchen facilities, and guests were expected to be self-sufficient. The resort reflected the natural environment with a relaxed atmosphere and catered to families, couples, and their pets.

Wildwood

Wildwood was independently owned and offered a range of rooms, cabins, and camping spread across a number of acres. The majority of units were beachfront, were above average in quality and comfort, and décor reflected the natural setting. Many units were fully equipped with kitchens; however, some food and beverage service was available to guests.

Oasis

Oasis was an independently owned, upscale resort situated on the outskirts of Beachside. The resort was beachfront across several acres and comprised cabins and rooms as well as a full range of amenities, including food and beverage, retail, and activities.

Shoreline

Shoreline was a mid-range resort on the outskirts of Beachside. Accommodation units varied in size, but all included fully equipped kitchens, and guests were expected to be self-sufficient. The resort was popular with families and young professionals interested in outdoor adventure. Amenities were limited to a small retail area at the front desk.

6.4 INTERVIEWS

Methods to gather information in a case study include direct observation, surveys, interviews, archival records, participant observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2009). Creswell (2013) suggests that whilst new and creative forms of data may appear, data can be grouped into four categories: observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual material. Interviews, however, are one of the most common sources of information in social research (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009; Smith and Elger, 2014) and are the cornerstone of this study. The opportunity to interact with an interviewee, gain access to their perspective and attitude, and account for their experiences is a key reason for the popularity of interviews as a form of research inquiry (Smith and Elger, 2014).

Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) define a research interview as 'a purposeful conversation between two or more people, requiring the interviewer to establish rapport, to ask concise and unambiguous questions, to which the interviewee is willing to respond, and to listen attentively' (p.372). This definition is vague, however, in that it does not address the form and structure of interviews nor how decisions as to form and structure can shape or undermine outcomes. A formal structured interview where questions are closed, and all respondents reply to the same question in the same order is useful and necessary in a positivist paradigm where the goal is data collection with the expectation that the results are statistically representative of a certain population and therefore generalisable (Seale, 2004). Alternatively, the same definition could apply to a constructionist or interpretive approach where the interview is an opportunity to access participants' 'subjective understanding of events, social relations and social contexts'; however, this approach is often criticised for its lack of generalisability because it 'cannot be assessed against an external or objective social reality that is independent of the interpretation of the individual' (Smith and Elger, 2014, p. 8). Interviews in the critical realist tradition are designed to access not only participants' attitudes, values, and subjective accounts of their experiences and contexts but also to understand the causal mechanisms that shape their multi-layered social reality (Smith and Elger, 2014).

The first research question in this study focused on understanding the generative mechanisms that propel migrant workers and their employers into a LS-TFWP. Decisions as to how to structure interviews are determined by the overall aim of the research, the research questions, and the overall research strategy (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). In this research, semi-structured interviews offered an opportunity to respect and appreciate participants' interpretation of their experiences and gain an understanding of the transfactual conditions that may have influenced their accounts. Semi-structured interviews follow a pre-determined set of questions or topics that are framed as open questions and serve as guides for a conversation between the interviewee and the interviewer, thereby providing an opportunity to explore the views of the interviewee in more detail (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill,

2012; Seale, 2004). Berg (2007) argues that in semi-structured interviews, interviewers 'are permitted (in fact, expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared standardised questions' (p. 95). In this study, the literature reviews provided direction for some probes; however, the ability to include 'unscheduled probes' and follow-up questions, clarifying understanding, and pursuing new lines of inquiry provided a much richer and more detailed understanding of the interviewees' experiences. Open-ended and flexible questions are much more likely to provide access to an individual's attitudes and values, motivations, understanding and interpretation of events, and how they have ascribed meaning (Seale, 2004). Research on the impact of stringent regulatory controls from the perspective of both LS-TFWs and employers is limited, as is knowledge of how geographical and sectoral contexts influence outcomes. In this study, semi-structured interviews offered the opportunity to investigate fully 'why' key actors had engaged in a TFWP and 'how' it unfolded in the workplace, as well as the role of the rural and hospitality contexts in shaping their collective experiences.

6.4.1 Identifying interview participants

According to Creswell (2013), when undertaking purposeful sampling as part of qualitative research, researchers must consider who to select as a participant in a study, the size of the sample, and the sampling strategy used. It is important to choose participants with the best perspective on your research questions, thereby ensuring you have accessed the most valuable information.

In this study, potential participants targeted included managers who recruited TFWs, supervisors who worked with LS-TFWs daily, and TFWs. Each group offered a distinct perspective in addressing the research questions. Senior managers, whether a general manager or human resource manager, played a key role in the decision to recruit LS-TFWs so they could speak to the rationale for participation in the

programme, offer their insight into the process, the selection criteria used, and potentially the impact of regulatory controls on the shop floor. 'Potentially' is an important caveat as it cannot be assumed that managers as 'practitioners' are the most knowledgeable or able to offer a non-biased account as their experience is embedded in specific contexts, and their insight may be quite narrow (Smith and Elger, 2014). Supervisors and line managers provide insight into the labour process and the role that LS-TFWs play in that process; however, it cannot be assumed they know the specific regulations of each programme or, indeed, the migration status of any worker at any given moment. The participation of LS-TFWs was critical to gaining a fuller picture of how regulatory controls and constraints on mobility and temporariness unfolded on the shop floor and how workers' motivations for participation in the programme informed their actions and behaviours.

Acquiring access to potential case study sites and potential participants can be considered a political process that is often mediated by gatekeepers who carefully consider the benefits and potential drawbacks of participation and the motives of the researcher (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009, p. 16). This was an important dynamic as Canada's LS-TFWP was a controversial public issue, and the federal government and employers were increasingly scrutinised for adherence. The preliminary field survey, with its focus on labour shortages, had established a 'non-threatening' approach to Royal, one of the larger hospitality employers in Beachside. The concerns they expressed about chronic labour shortages and frustration with the TFWP were echoed by each of the subsequent employers who were approached. Royal expressed willingness to take part; however, they requested to see the Participant Information sheets and interview schedules for all participants in advance before giving final approval. Overall, employers seemed comfortable with the intent of the research and the questions. The approach to Royal set the tone for the approach to the other employers.

Permission to access the case study site and interview participants was organised in advance with a senior manager at each property. At Royal, a senior manager agreed to promote the opportunity to be interviewed to managers and supervisors at a subsequent department meeting and to post information about the opportunity in the staff room for entry-level employees. A schedule over three days was posted, and employees signed up voluntarily. Smaller employers were less formal, and whilst senior managers organised the timing of the interviews and agreed to ensure information sheets were posted where employees could read them, how this unfolded was unclear. At Edgewater and Oasis, a senior manager identified the workers and the timing of the interviews. At Shoreline, a senior manager expressed a desire to participate and agreed to speak with employees but also insisted they be present at any interview, and timing was problematic. Eventually, another manager became involved, organised a time and space, and identified four workers who were finishing a shift at that time. At Oasis and Edgewater, interviewees were drawn from workers on shift at the time. The role of managers in choosing interviewees and how this might influence results is addressed in a further section.

At each case study site, interviews were sought with managers, supervisors, and entry-level international workers. Table 3 profiles participants according to the case study site, role in the organisation, migration status at the time of the study, and migration status learned during follow-up conversations between 2015 and 2018. The names of interviewees have been anonymised with gender-neutral names, and management titles and departments of managers have not been included, again in the interests of anonymity.

Table 3. Profile of participants

	Participant	Role	Resort	Migration Status (Initial Interview)	Migration Status 2018
1	Bailey	Manager	Edgewater	Canadian	
2	Riley	Manager	Royal	Canadian	
3	Blake	Manager	Royal	Canadian	
4	Kennedy	Manager	Royal	Canadian	
5	Camille	Manager	Royal	PR (formerly HS-TFW)	
6	Addison	Manager	Royal	Canadian	
7	Taylor	Manager	Wildwood	Canadian	
8	Corey	Manager	Shoreline	Canadian	
9	Morgan	Manager	Shoreline	Canadian	
10	Brook	Manager	Oasis	Canadian	
11	Ginez	Manager	Oasis	PR – former refugee	
12	Quinn	Supervisor	Edgewater	Canadian	
13	Ariel	Supervisor	Royal	PR – Former LS-TFW	
14	Jules	Supervisor	Oasis	PR – Former LS-TFW	
15	Dani	Supervisor	Oasis	LS-TFW (former RA)	PR
16	Marion	RA	Edgewater	PR – Former LS-TFW	
17	Jesse	RA	Edgewater	PR – Former LS-TFW	
18	Dayan	Cook	Royal	HS-TFW	
19	Cameron	Cook	Royal	HS-TFW	
20	Danso	Dish/KH	Royal	LS-TFW	PNP rejected
21	Azul	Guest Services	Royal	LS-TFW	PNP rejected
22	Maya	Guest Services	Royal	LS-TFW	PR received
23	Jayme	Room Attendant	Royal	LS-TFW	PR received
24	Rivera	Room Attendant	Royal	LS-TFW	PNP rejected
25	Baden	Room Attendant	Wildwood	Working Holiday Visa	
26	Bodie	Room Attendant	Wildwood	Working Holiday Visa	
27	Edel	Room Attendant	Wildwood	Working Holiday Visa	
28	Avery	Room Attendant	Shoreline	LS-TFW	PR received
29	Fran	Room Attendant	Shoreline	LS-TFW	PR received
30	Gabi	Room Attendant	Shoreline	LS-TFW	PR received
31	Angel	Room Attendant	Shoreline	LS-TFW	PR received
32	Lyn	Room Attendant	Oasis	LS-TFW	PR received

In total, 32 interviews were conducted, a number that falls within the broad norm of 15 to 60 participants found in work and organisation studies (Saunders and Townsend, 2016). The composition of interviews within each case study site is representative of the target population. The number of representative interviews in the study, combined with the high quality of the responses, offered a rich account of key actors' experiences and was sufficient in answering the research questions. The number of interviews at each case study site is representative of the size of the property, the number of employees overall, and the number of LS-TFWs employed. Royal, with more than 100 employees, represented the largest number of interviews (13) and included LS-TFWs across multiple departments. The preponderance of LS-TFWs interviewed were room attendants, which is reflective of chronic labour shortages in housekeeping departments in Beachside and across Canada but more broadly reflects the role of room attendants at the bottom of labour markets across North America and Europe (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010).

6.4.2 Interview schedule

An interview schedule was developed for each group of participants being interviewed, reflecting their role in the organisation. Managers and supervisors were included as one group, reflecting the vertical diversity common to the hospitality sector, where job titles and responsibilities can vary depending on the size, geographical location, and ownership of the organisation (Baum, 2006). All international entry-level workers interviewed were included in a second group. In semi-structured interviews, questions are developed to 'guide' the conversation and are designed to be flexible, allowing the interviewer to probe further into responses or to explore new lines of inquiry, where appropriate (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009). Interview questions were shaped by the analytical framework outlined in the literature review as well as data from the preliminary empirical fieldwork.

In this study, the questions can be divided into three rough sections, with the first section focused on the first research question, identifying the motivations and rationale for participating in the TFWP. For workers, questions were designed to understand the key drivers for participating in the programme, whether intentions were permanent or temporary, how the process evolved for them, and the role of sectoral and geographical context, if any, in their decision-making. For employers, the questions were designed to ascertain their familiarity with the TFWP, their rationale for participating, and their perception of the advantages of this programme. Questions in the second section were developed in response to the literature where migrant workers were identified as 'better' workers and preferred by employers, although studies, where workers' perceptions are considered, are very limited. The second research question focused on the impact of regulatory controls, specifically constrained mobility and restrictions on access to permanence. The second section of the interview schedule assessed the experience of each party in the labour process and is most direct with respect to the implications of temporariness on the labour process. The initial focus on temporariness reflected the literature and the temporal intentions of the programme, and the results were unexpected. Questions on each actor's perception of workers' skills and abilities, qualifications, and how they are experienced and valued in the labour process were a neutral segue way into the impact of restricted mobility. The third section focused on each actor's perception of the impact of temporariness and the rural context on employee relations.

The interview schedule for entry-level workers (see Appendix 1) was preceded by a small questionnaire asking the participants about their work and educational history, migration status, family status, and length of time with the sponsoring organisation. This questionnaire served a dual purpose in that it reminded the participants about their lives and experiences before emigrating and was useful during the interview to shape questions and probe more deeply when discussing their histories, qualifications, and skills. Questions on motivations for coming to a remote, rural community and the hospitality industry helped build rapport as participants were willing to discuss their homes, families, and aspirations.

The interview guide for supervisors and managers (see Appendix 2) began with a focus on their experience with programmes for international workers, prompting discussion of programmes, how they worked, and participants' perception of their' effectiveness. This proved to be a good warm-up conversation as labour shortages and labour supply challenges were 'hot button' issues that each manager was eager to discuss.

6.4.3 Interview procedure and challenges

Interviews occurred over six months, from July until December. Interviews were organised in tandem with resort occupancy, so July and August were challenging months in which to access interviewees and book space to meet. Several times, interviews were cancelled in full, or there were fewer participants than expected. Later in the fall, when occupancy was lower, fewer workers were available as many were said to be on vacation. Managers organised the timing and location of the interviews with mixed success. For entry-level workers, interviews at the two larger properties were organised before or after their shifts, as workers' accommodation could be offsite, and transportation was challenging. At the smaller resorts, workers participated during their shifts. All management and supervisors participated during their shifts, and housekeeping supervisors and managers were frequently interrupted by radio communications. Interviews were scheduled in meeting rooms at two of the sites and in the property restaurants whilst they were closed at two others. The interviews with two entry-level workers at one resort were the only two interviews that were awkward in terms of setting. Poor weather resulted in interviews taking place in the corner of a busy lobby area, so it was sometimes difficult to hear and understand interviewee responses. In addition, interviewees became emotional when speaking about their sacrifices which caused some consternation for the manager when he passed.

Semi-structured interviews are useful in their flexibility in terms of sequencing the questions and creating space for conversations to flow in a way that is meaningful to the interviewee. There is also the ability to change the wording, expand on questions, or provide examples to accommodate language levels, such as English as a second language, cultural differences, or questions that become irrelevant to the research (Berg, 2007). This was an important feature as it became clear quickly that initial assumptions regarding the temporariness of the employment relationship reflected the intentions of the government and programme; however, it did not represent the motivations of the key actors, nor did it reflect reality. Also, language levels of the entry-level workers varied significantly, so questions, particularly about workplace experience, required different approaches and reframing. Interviews ranged in duration from 30 to 60 minutes for entry-level workers and supervisors and from 45 minutes to 2 hours for managers.

Each of the interview sessions began with a brief explanation of the research project and the researcher as a PhD student, followed by an explanation of how the session would unfold. Before asking participants to sign a consent form, great care was taken to explain the participant's role, how the information would be used, their right to disengage if they felt uncomfortable, that their participation was completely confidential, and data would be anonymised. Participants were asked if the session could be recorded, and all agreed. As detailed above, initial questions focused on the participants' own experiences; therefore, they were useful in putting participants at ease and building rapport.

Whilst they offer rich data and a more complete picture of complex issues, qualitative interviews have challenges and limitations. They are more time-consuming, which translates into a higher cost, which in turn may limit geographic coverage and the size of the sample (Seale, 2004). In this research, the case study site

required travel and staying multiple nights at participant resorts, which was an additional opportunity to observe the operation and get a sense of the culture.

6.4.4 Documentation

Documents are relevant to any case study and can take numerous forms; therefore, researchers need a specific data collection plan. Not only can they corroborate other evidence, but documents can also be used to make inferences, which can then be validated in other ways (Yin, 2009). In this study, data from the preliminary field investigation about geographical and sectoral context was further validated by participants during interviews. Questionnaires completed by entry-level workers at the beginning of their interview provided insight into their migration status and degree of transnational experience, as well as pointed to gaps between credentials and their entry-level employment. It is important when reviewing documentary evidence to remember that documents represent "a communication among other parties attempting to achieve some other objectives" (Yin, 2009, p. 105) and that the researcher's role is one of observer. The regulatory controls associated with the employer-sponsored TFWP are available as public documents on the Canadian government website. Also available is the contract between workers and their employers which specifies minimum guaranteed hours, expectations regarding housing and transportation costs, and consequences for operating outside of the agreed-upon contract. These documents are available publicly to support or contest employers' accounts of how the programme unfolds at their worksite.

Each interview was recorded and then transcribed, providing written documentation of each interview. Because multiple workers and managers were interviewed at each site, conflicting accounts between these sources were easily identified from the transcripts.

6.5 DATA ANALYSIS

In this study, all interviews were transcribed verbatim, the first few by the researcher, and then a professional transcribing company was employed to complete the remainder. Whilst the company was helpful, many interviewees were English as a second language; because the professional transcriber was not familiar with the subject, the transcripts required careful checking and editing. This follow-up process was helpful in that it ensured that the researcher listened to each audiotape to ensure accuracy and created the space to make notes about initial impressions, emotions, and context (Saldaña, 2016).

There is no established or recommended process for coding and data analysis in critical realism (Fletcher, 2017) except for the inclusion of abductive and retroductive modes of inference (Danermark *et al.*, 2002). For critical realists, the goal of the analysis process is 'to find the best explanation of reality through engagement with existing (fallible) theories about that reality' suggesting theory provides a loose framework without forcing any preconceptions as to what is actually happening (Fletcher, 2017, p. 186). In the first cycle of coding, a deductive approach was used for the initial line-by-line coding process; parent codes such as motivations for migration, labour shortages, temporariness, effort, and work ethic were drawn from the literature and theoretical framework, whilst other parent codes represented the context (rural, hospitality) or topic bins such as migration process. NVIVO 12 was used to organise the volume of data and the high number of codes generated. The line-by-line coding exercise required decision-making and flexibility about how and where 'chunks' of information fit or did not and to inductively identify new codes that were recurring but not part of the initial literature review (Miles and Huberman, 1994). (Saldaña, 2016) emphasises the importance of remaining flexible during the coding process, adding, deleting, and modifying codes as needed. In the first coding cycle, data from management and workers were coded and categorised separately, and the geographic and hospitality contexts were considered across all categories (see Appendix 3). The initial deductive, inductive exercise was useful in identifying

demi-regularities or patterns, which in critical realism 'represent the beginning of abduction and retroduction' (Fletcher, 2017, p. 185). Employers' focus on stability, employers' and workers' shared focus on permanence as opposed to temporariness, and the significant role of nuclear and work families were demi-regularities identified across the five case study sites during the initial coding process. NVIVO was helpful in the early stages for organising the data, identifying empirical demi-regularities, and accommodating cross-case analysis; however, as Yin (2009) argues, software is a tool to assist; it cannot replace the thinking and analysis required of the researcher. In this instance, reducing the volume of data across five case study organisations to extracts created a distance from the text and important contextual information was either lost or muted.

In critical realism, abduction is a mode of inference where redescription or recontextualization of phenomena or concrete events can lead to a new and potentially deeper conceptualisation. Abductive reasoning requires 'creativity and the ability to form associations' and creates the space 'to formulate new ideas about the interconnection of phenomena' (Danermark *et al.*, 2002, p. 93). In this study, recontextualising the concepts of temporariness and permanence as mobility and immobility shifted the focus of analysis from the structural constraints of migration regulatory controls to include a broader consideration and understanding of worker agency and mobility in the internal and external labour process. A mobility/immobility lens was used in the subsequent reading and rereading of transcripts, and when revisiting and broadening the scope of the literature review (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009). Identification of patterns continued as evidence was combined and recombined in different ways to make sense of the data (Yin, 2009).

Retroduction is the thought operation of moving from 'knowledge of one thing to knowledge of something else' achieved by moving backwards from the empirical event to an understanding of the transfactual conditions and causal mechanisms that

made the event possible (Danermark *et al.*, 2002, p. 96). The role of families in LS-TFWs' decisions to migrate was a dominant pattern across the case study sites. Using the question of Danermark *et al.* (2002) 'What properties must exist for X to exist and be what X is?' (p. 97) as a guide for the analysis, illuminated families' goals of family reunification as a causal mechanism in migration decisions and the likelihood of achieving it as a necessary condition for at least some workers to engage in TFWP in Beachside. Using a chronological lens (Yin, 2009) to map workers' mobility/immobility patterns provided deeper insight into workers' long-term geographical and occupational mobility strategies and how families' long-term goals informed workers' actions and behaviour in the labour process. These findings support the contention that grounding labour process analysis in a critical realist ontology offers greater explanatory power in connecting the labour process to the wider political economy and enhancing opportunities to hone research contributions (Thompson and Vincent, 2010).

6.6 LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS OF THE STUDY

Culture and power are two key dynamics that can influence the quality and veracity of the research results, and LS-TFWs are vulnerable; therefore, less likely to engage in a process about their work without their employers' permission. It is understood that employers' involvement in the recruitment and potentially the selection of participants is a limitation of this study; however, given the remote, rural context, the lack of an organisation such as a union as an alternative access point, and a research design that relies on access to managers and supervisors as well as migrant workers, employer involvement in the recruitment of participants was unavoidable.

However, it is argued that the comparative case study design may mitigate any limitations. The 5 case study sites vary considerably in terms of size, number of employees, and organisational structure, as well as in terms of how workers were approached to participate and by whom. Within each case study site, the inclusion of

migrant workers, supervisors, and managers could also mitigate any potential limitations. Workers who were in the early stages of the LMIA contract could be considered most vulnerable to pressures from employers; however, the inclusion of migrant workers at various stages of the PR process, including those who had achieved full mobility capability, could mitigate that concern and strengthen the validity of common outcomes identified (Bryman, Teevan and Bell, 2009).

6.7 ETHICAL ISSUES

Ethics are a critical part of the research process, and special consideration must be given to how participants may be impacted by a person's agreement to take part in the research. Specific issues include informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, and data protection (Seale, 2004). In this research, a participant information sheet was provided to managers at each case study site to disseminate to potential participants. When meeting each of the participants for the first time, the researcher used the same participant information sheet to discuss the research objectives, explain that participation was voluntary and that they had the right, without explanation, to withdraw from the process at any time and have their interview data removed from the study and destroyed. Contact information was provided, and participants were invited to contact the researcher at any time to discuss, change, or remove any information they had provided. They were informed that audiotaping the conversation was a choice and that the researcher was happy to take notes if they were uncomfortable. Lastly, participants were assured that their participation was confidential, and all identifiers would be removed from the final product. Participants were then asked to sign a consent form confirming they understood all the above.

6.8 AUTHOR POSITIONALITY

Before discussing the findings in Chapter Seven, I want to acknowledge my positionality concerning the research subject, context, and participants. My early career was in hospitality, specifically food and beverage and housekeeping, and subsequently as a post-secondary educator in hospitality and tourism. I understood the challenges of chronic labour shortages for organisations and the historical role of migrant workers in addressing these shortages; however, LS-TFWPs were new and controversial, and the implications of the regulatory controls on key actors' experiences and the labour process were unknown. My 'lived experience' in the industry not only helped me understand and empathise with managers and workers as they grappled with the structural constraints of the industry, but it also facilitated more probing questions in areas of interest. I was not an 'insider', but my background and role as a PhD student lent credibility to my research focus on temporary migrant workers, and this role seemed to have the most impact on communication with employer participants, contributing to more open discussions and the richness of the data. Managers were frustrated and stressed by labour market challenges and the TFWP; therefore, they were willing to share their experiences, perspectives, and hopes for a better solution. Migrant workers placed a high value on education; some wished to pursue further studies once they received permanent residency, whilst others undertook a LS-TFWP contract so their children could have access to a better education in the future. Education was a shared value, and several workers expressed support for my goal of a PhD, indicating they were happy to help me in my journey. The subject matter was also important to workers, and some saw the interview as an opportunity to ask questions about the programme or reinforce the importance of permanent residency for workers.

As a white, fourth-generation Canadian woman, I am acutely aware of my outsider status in the temporary migrant worker experience, particularly one where freedom and mobility are constrained. The privilege afforded by my social location as a Canadian citizen felt most tangible when some workers described their fears of

deportation and how this impacted their effort power; however, my privilege was present throughout the interviews, impacting responses in different ways. For instance, when discussing future career goals, hospitality professionals spoke positively about the potential for promotion and accessing other hotel departments in Beachside or elsewhere. Career converters under LMIA seemed uncertain about the next steps, and a couple of workers' stated desire for a long-term career in hospitality felt like they were telling me what they thought I wanted to hear. One interviewee, who had sacrificed a professional career in another industry, seemed irritated by the question. His response, 'whoever pays the most,' highlighted the privilege inherent in the question for workers whose mobility and choices were constrained. It is important, however, to recognise that outsider status is not a static position; 'as situations involving different values arise, different statuses are activated, and the lines of separation shift' (Holmes, 2020). This fluidity was most evident in discussions of motivations to migrate. For instance, my age and role as a mother provided a point of connection with several workers who had children as they shared their aspirations for their children's future. Gender may have been another point of connection, although not consistently. Interviews with women and Canadian and European men were longer and seemed more open and personal than those with some of the male LS-TFWs, who were more reserved in their responses. Outsider status may have limited my full understanding of and access to temporary migrant workers' experiences; however, it allowed me to respect and amplify the voices of an important but under-researched labour pool in my research.

6.9 CONCLUSION

In this study, the critical realist approach adopted recognises not only the multiple realities involved in migration management, a rural context, and the labour process in hospitality organisations but also recognises that how key actors perceive and interpret their experiences and those realities are subjective. The conceptualisation of three distinct domains – the real, the actual, and the empirical - is especially useful in this research as it creates an opportunity to understand the generative mechanisms

that drive migrant workers and their employers into a TFWP and how their motivations inform their actions and behaviours in the labour process.

Regulatory mechanisms that give employers control over low-skilled migrant workers' mobility and access to PR create unique labour pools, sometimes characterised as unfree (Strauss and McGrath, 2017). The ability to isolate and then gain access to this unique labour pool, as well as their managers, was a crucial step in the design and implementation of the research plan and, subsequently, in answering the research questions. The need to involve the employers in facilitating access to workers and in the scheduling of the interviews is recognised as a limitation of the study; however, the comparative case design, as well as the heterogeneous sampling within each case study site, can mitigate these limitations.

A comparative case study design that includes a shared geographic context as well as five hospitality case study sites that vary in terms of size, calibre, and amenities is a key strength of the study. The design offers a strong empirical foundation for understanding the generative mechanisms particular to TFWPs and regulatory controls in the first instance and then the ability to extend knowledge further to understand how these mechanisms interact with the remote, rural and hospitality contexts and how this influences outcomes. Determining whether the contexts are necessary or contingent on the outcomes is essential to determining generalisability.

Semi-structured interviews of migrant workers, supervisors, and managers at 5 case study sites provided a rich set of data that spoke directly to the two research questions in this study. Knowledge can be improved by locating new generative mechanisms in the broader socio-economic and political contexts (Ackroyd, 2004), and in this study, a critical realist approach created an opportunity for retroduction, connecting the transfactual conditions of both key actors to the labour process in Beachside. Understanding the underlying mechanisms that motivated each actor was

essential to understanding how and why regulatory controls impacted the mobility power and effort bargains in the way that they did.

The next chapter reports the findings of the first research question, focusing on the motivations of key actors for participating in a TFWP.

CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH FINDINGS -MOTIVATIONS OF KEY ACTORS

This chapter reports the research findings from 32 individual interviews representing managers, supervisors, and temporary migrant workers from five case study organisations: Shoreline, Royal, Oasis, Wildwood, and Edgewater. In Chapter 6, consideration was given to the two research questions and how best to analyse and present the data. The discussion emphasised the importance of identifying mechanisms that motivate migrant workers and their employers to engage in a LS-TFWP as a crucial first step in understanding how migration regulatory controls shape a distinctive employment relationship and impact labour mobility and the effort bargain. The hospitality sector and the remote rural community are contextual factors that may inform the motivations of each key actor and shape how they experience the regulatory controls and are integrated throughout both analysis chapters. This chapter considers Research Question 1.

> To what extent does migration theory explain the motivation of temporary migrant workers and their employers for engaging in a LS-TFWP?

Migration is a complex global phenomenon studied from a range of perspectives, disciplines, and levels of analysis and is too diverse to be captured in a single theory (Arango, 2000). Therefore, this chapter draws on economic migration theories as foundational explanations for individual and family decisions to migrate and the concept of a migration market to examine migrant agency as they weigh choices and constraints. Dual and segmented theory is the lens used to consider the structural factors contributing to employer demand. Network theory provides the crucial link between structure and agency, offering insight into how migration is facilitated and perpetuated to a remote, rural destination such as Beachside (Faist, 2010).

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses employer rationale for sponsoring LS-TFWs through a dual labour theory lens. Ongoing labour shortages in the hospitality sector are exacerbated by the density and distance to the density of Beachside, as well as the community's unique culture. Labour shortages and issues with the quality of workers are complex; geographical context intersects with structural constraints such as seasonality and temporal rhythms of housekeeping departments. The size, calibre, and amenities offered at each case study site influence the organisation's ability to tolerate high levels of labour mobility and the limited, low-quality reserve army.

The second section examines the motivations of three types of temporary international workers, demonstrating how distinctive each is. LS-TFWs are deeply embedded in diverse family relationships, and long-term family goals and obligations inform migration decisions and shape migration trajectories. Economic drivers are critical to low-skilled migrants' decisions to initiate and perpetuate their transnational journeys; however, the potential for PR for themselves and their families is a crucial factor in workers' decisions to undertake a TFWP contract in the hospitality sector in Beachside. Workers' agency is evident in the long-term planning and evaluation of migration opportunities and risks and, for many, achieving their goals. LS-TFWs' mobility capability is varied and intersects with transnational and hospitality industry experience, age, and family status. Family and labour networks are important resources for workers and employers in establishing Beachside as a destination node.

The last section uses a segmentation theory lens to highlight how regulatory controls allow employers to use nationality, education, experience, gender, family status, and workers' motivation for PR to shape a more committed, compliant, and vulnerable workforce.

7.1 EMPLOYER RATIONALE FOR SPONSORING TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS

In Chapter 3, consideration was given to labour migration as a demand phenomenon driven by uneven global economic development and capitalists' demand for cheap and flexible labour. As variable labour, low-skilled migrant workers are characterised as a reserve army segmented into the secondary market, where domestic workers eschew jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy (Piore, 1979). Current research (Dench et al., 2006; Foster, 2012) challenges employers' assertions that labour shortages are real, arguing that labour shortages are a proxy for issues related to the skill or quality of workforce available (Dench et al., 2006) and that migrant workers are valued because they are vulnerable and easily exploited (Anderson, 2010; Bauder, 2006). In Canada, hospitality employers' demand to sponsor LS-TFWs is contentious and under increased scrutiny for these same reasons (Foster, 2012); however, consideration must be given to remote, rural communities where structural constraints may be more pronounced and negatively impact supply and demand (Baum, 2012a). In this section, the examination of commonalities and differences between case study sites offers insight into the 'reality' of labour shortages, their contribution to employers' persistent demand for access to the LS-TFWP, and how labour demand intersects with the spatial and sectoral contexts.

7.1.1 Labour shortages and geographical implications

It was evident that there were broad similarities across the case studies when examining employers' rationale for sponsoring LS-TFWs. Labour shortages were a 'hot' topic with managers at each case study site, and senior managers were adamant that their applications to and participation in the LS-TFWP were due to the remote, rural locale of Beachside and its small population. Beachside's year-round population was numerically too small to support the tourism sector during high season when the population increased to over 6,000 per day; consequently, employers at each resort

relied on an influx of seasonal workers to staff their resorts. Recruitment and retention were identified by each employer as critical issues, although how critical and in which department was influenced by the size, calibre, and amenities available at each resort. Chronic shortages in housekeeping were common across all case study sites: 'We have the summer where we had only eight staff in our housekeeping department for August and it was like "are you kidding me?", like it was rotating. Everyone was a housekeeper that summer' (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Access to Beachside, lack of amenities, and local community transportation were key challenges identified by managers. The community was two hours on a long road from the nearest 'bigger' community and five hours from a larger centre and airport. The remote locale was a key selling feature for tourists; however, it could be a barrier for workers. Winter weather events added to accessibility challenges: 'Just getting to Beachside is a bit of a struggle (Addison, Mgr, Royal). The remote locale and the low population density limited the amenities available, which was a deterrent for seasonal workers and those interested in building a career and family in Beachside. There were a myriad of restaurants, hotels, resorts, and retail shops that catered to a high-end clientele, but amenities needed by residents were much more limited: 'So getting around without any vehicle is hard. Well then, if you have any special wishes like I feel I want to buy certain things, there's one grocery store and one hardware store, and that's it' (Edel, RA, Wildwood). As an internationally renowned tourism destination, food and housing costs were high, and public transportation was limited to high season, posing significant challenges to in-migrants. The lack of amenities and public transportation contributed to high levels of labour mobility and clearly challenged employers:

> I can't tell you how much we talk about that [remoteness] because we have gone through employee after employee that has gotten to Beachside and said, 'Oh, this wasn't what I thought it was going to be, and I didn't know it rained here and it's like, really? No McDonald's in Beachside? What? And there's no bus transportation. I can't live here, and they're on the next bus out. And

> we've invested all this time and effort into getting them here and securing staff accommodation for them, and then they get here, and they're like, 'yeah, see you later'' (Addison, Mgr, Royal).

Employers also identified the community's unique culture as a contributing factor to higher levels of labour mobility than urban hotels might experience. Beachside's international reputation as a 'must see' destination, as well as its natural environment and beach activities, were attractive to tourists and to seekers who wanted to experience Beachside's lifestyle. Seekers were a reserve army, but in Beachside, they were highly transient and not considered a quality labour pool: 'It's unfortunate. I think Beachside still draws a certain group of people. The hippies or the wannabees or whatever, they will come, and they'll float around, and they'll work for you for a couple of months and then they'll leave' (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline). Similar to other tourism destinations, Beachside experienced critical housing shortages, and the little housing available was expensive. Most resorts offered staff accommodation for new employees, at least for high season, but this could be a double-edged sword. Some seekers would accept an entry-level position in hospitality to access free or low-cost accommodation and subsequently call in sick and leave without notice when they had experienced enough of Beachside.

Employers were unanimous in their frustration with government agencies' lack of recognition of the unique challenges posed by their remote, rural location:

> I've always been shocked that they've never had kind of like a remote category, like it doesn't seem like when they're asking me reasons why I'm not hiring ... or why am I having trouble finding a Canadian. I'm like well, it's mainly due to the remoteness, and [that] doesn't seem to trigger anything ... like they don't recognise that as a problem of certain communities (Taylor, Mgr, Wildwood).

Wildwood had experience with the LS-TFW; however, a recent application was rejected, whilst Shoreline received its first rejection after years of ongoing participation in the TFWP. The stress level of both managers was palpable as they discussed their rejections and the effects of the remote, rural locale:

> They didn't think we needed workers and something about that we have a decline in our off-season and that we couldn't offer them full time … A lot of the people don't realise where Beachside is and how hard it is … Most people don't know where Beachside is, and the lifestyle, and coming out here, and they won't come, right … And a lot of the people that we do have apply, [they] don't realise where Beachside is (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Corey's comments captured the interplay between the geographical and sectoral contexts. Labour market challenges posed by the community's remote, rural locale and culture were exacerbated by the high level of seasonality in an internationally renowned resort destination.

7.1.2 Labour shortages and sectoral implications

Beachside's low population density meant in-migration was always necessary, highlighting the importance of the hospitality sector's ability to attract and retain the small local labour supply. Low-skilled workers could sell their labour power externally: 'If you don't have skills, and you're looking for a job, you can hop on [transportation] and be making $100,000 a year or more in the oil and gas industry' (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater). Competition for the few local workers and seekers was intense within the community. Hospitality operators positioned themselves against the rest of the hospitality organisations as well as other sectors: 'It's challenging because, you know, you're all going after that same body in the spring and it's who's going to offer the best role for that person' (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater).

There was consensus among managers that domestic workers did not view the hospitality industry as a viable career option. Oasis and Royal were larger operations with internal labour markets; however, managers complained the expectations of the traditional youth market were unrealistic: 'They're coming out of high school never having worked a day, not even at McDonald's or babysitting or anything, and they want to be managers, but they've never managed anything (Riley, Mgr., Royal). In addition to unrealistic job expectations and lack of preparedness for work generally, managers felt young workers were also unprepared for living away from home, with parents expecting managers to take on a caretaking role:

> I'm just surprised at some of the skills that they are arriving with. It is beyond work ... and the perception that some parents have of this job, you know, because for most people, this is their first time away from home, for a bunch of them anyways, and I've had parents sort of show up to drop off their kids for work and hand me a Ziploc bag with prescriptions in it like I was a camp counsellor (Taylor, Mgr, Wildwood).

Consistent with the literature, entry-level positions in housekeeping and the kitchen were two areas where jobs were considered 'hard', and as a result, recruitment and retention were ongoing issues, particularly for domestic workers. A manager at Royal reported that Canadian workers had a low tolerance for working conditions in the kitchen and often complained: 'I've never worked so hard for so little money' (Kennedy, Mgr, Royal). Retention of quality workers reflected the quality of the job but was also linked to the size, calibre, and amenities of an operation as well as the remote, rural locale:

> The biggest issue has always been retention … getting someone that's actually interested in staying for a while and challenging them once you do get that … making sure they are happy in Beachside .… a struggle in every dept. and at random times … lots of people coming in the summer but the

> quality isn't there … no control over leaving and you are scrambling (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

Oasis and Royal were larger properties with restaurants, rooms, and activity centres. Internal labour markets offered some opportunities to retain workers, which is discussed in a further section; however, high levels of labour mobility impacted their ability to provide quality service and managers across the case study sites were unanimous in their assertion that recruitment of LS-TFWs was critical to mitigate the uncertainties of a highly mobile labour market. When discussing LS-TFWs as a distinctive labour pool, employers were reluctant to speak about workers' mobility constraints; instead, each employer spoke about the stabilising effect of LS-TFWs on the workplace and the labour process:

> What we were looking for … we don't want the whole work staff to be Filipino … it's nice to hire locally but it's nice just to have just a base sort of some long term … so the housekeeping manager doesn't go crazy with people constantly leaving that she's going to have four to six people that you can count on all the time (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

7.1.3 Recruitment

Recruitment strategies varied according to the size, calibre, and number of employees at each resort. Domestic labour supplies included locals, seekers, and students, and key strategies such as advertising varied according to the resort's size. Edgewater was the smallest and most casual of the resorts, with fewer than 30 workers in high season and only a difference of six to eight workers between low and high season. They relied on seasonal workers, domestic or international, and local word of mouth and their reputation: 'We are known as a kind of an employer of choice' (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater). Shoreline required between 50 and 100 staff when

operating at full capacity and offered accommodation but no other amenities. They advertised locally and regionally but also relied on seasonal workers. Both Wildwood and Royal invested resources in national domestic recruitment, but labour markets were highly competitive, and there were no guarantees new hires would follow through. A group of students hired from [province] fell through at the last minute when American resorts lured them away. Blake (Mgr, Royal) emphasised employers' vulnerability when heavily reliant on external recruitment: 'We were waiting for these people, and I didn't hire because we knew we had all these people, and then it just didn't work out'. Employers' only recourse was to hire locally or operate short-staffed, which some did. Immigrants and students were a 'reserve army' in urban locations; however, the population and remoteness of Beachside were such that a reserve army of domestic or immigrant workers was limited, although, in high season, there were a larger number of unemployed or semi-employed seekers. International students, WHV holders, HS-TFWs, and LS-TFWs were important international labour supplies, although the degree of utilisation of each labour pool varied by size, calibre, department, and number of employees at each resort. WHV holders from Europe, Australia, and the United Kingdom were considered international seekers interested in the culture and adventure of Beachside but were also highly transient. Shoreline, Edgewater, Wildwood, and Oasis worked with agencies such as the German Association or waited for seekers to apply, externally or after they arrived in Beachside: 'I hired three Australians. They came. They stayed. They left in a noticeably short period. Lovely people while they were with us but ... they fed me a line, and then about one and half months later they went, "Okay, we are going now. We've got a ticket for Europe"' (Morgan, Mgr., Shoreline). The uncertainty of when WHV holders would exit increased employer vulnerability in high season.

Royal adopted a more formal, bureaucratic approach to international recruitment, attending job fairs in Europe and the Philippines, and was strategic in its approach to controlling the transience of international seekers. At job fairs in Europe, they targeted potential workers interested in Beachside's natural environment and culture and relied on their expertise in the migration process to help potential 'working

tourists/migrant workers' navigate the WHV and TFWP visa schemes. The high level of service required to meet international standards required longer orientation and training, and Royal was more sensitive to high levels of labour mobility:

> People that are coming here on a foreign worker programme or coming here to work from different countries they are wanting to come on a more long-term basis as well, whereas domestically, you might have someone come for a year and this area, I mean Beachside is not a place that people settle in. It's very transient, and so it's challenging when you have people coming through on a yearly basis and in guest services, you can expect to not ... to be able to become comfortable in your job maybe after six months if you have never been in a hotel before, a year even (Addison, Mgr, Royal).

Recruitment of LS-TFWs required more lead time and a high degree of intentionality as the timelines of the process could be unpredictable. The paperwork process was complex, and international recruitment required different resources, so each resort utilised an MRA to recruit on their behalf at one time or another. Employers who utilised an MRA expressed high trust and confidence in that person: 'They know [Oasis] really well. They've been out here … It's just worked out really nicely. They're picking their top candidates for whatever reason' (Brook, Mgr, Oasis). Edgewood and Wildwood both indicated they would use an MRA in future recruitment. The agent put together recommendations for workers and organised interviews through Skype.

Oasis, Edgewood, and Shoreline each relied on family network recruitment, although there was some variation in approach. Each of these employers referenced stacks of resumes on their desk 'just waiting for the call' (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater). Oasis was newer to the TFWP, and most LS-TFWs were single or at least without dependants:

> Her sister will be joining us in the New Year …. I really like it that … the [resort] is a family. So, to be able to create that family around the family. We've got a bunch of staff related to the housekeeper, that's her brother, a husband, and different things. So, you know a little bit more about them because it's hard doing interviews. I don't like doing interviews over the phone or on Skype. Then, when you know a little bit more about them, it's nice (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

The sense of expanding the nuclear and workplace family was a theme that emerged at Oasis, Edgewood, and Shoreline. Bailey (Mgr, Edgewater) agreed that hiring family reduced the risks involved in the 'unknown' of international recruitment, a consideration given the programme's high cost and the small team: 'Is that person going to fit in your team? Is that person going to, you know, especially with the small team that we have here … this is like a family'. Another benefit of family recruitment was the expectation that LS-TFWs would share or take responsibility for the productivity of their family members, relieving managers of that role:

> The good side about knowing these employees and having the employees recommend [new recruits] is that they're recommending people that they're putting their reputation on, so you know that the people that they're bringing forward are going to be hard-working or going to be like the people we currently have and sit well into the family [work] (Baily, Mgr, Edgewater).

Edgewater was committed to family network recruitment, notably for workers with dependants. They offered private family housing and reunited two of the interviewees' families by hiring the spouse of the bridgehead worker. Shoreline also engaged in family with dependant recruitment, although their strategy seemed less defined. Family recruitment extended the employment relationship of the LS-TFWs, a strategy for employers that is examined in a further section.

Royal did not use an MRA; it focused on acquiring in-house expertise on migration processes and visas. They participated in job fairs in the Philippines and specifically targeted workers with transnational hospitality experience interested in a long-term career in hospitality and tried to balance that with the realities of life in Beachside:

> You're in a gym. There's like 600 people. They're all queued up staring at you, and you've got one in front of you, and you've got about seven to ten minutes to interview them, and the first thing out of their mouths is, "I want to move to Canada. I want to bring my family … so you have to be brutally honest with the situation …. You can't really raise a family in Beachside. Hospitality is challenging for families. There is shift work … the type of younger people [in Beachside], there's lots of drugs, alcohol, people tend to be partyers and lots of marriages break up …. You can't find a babysitter here …. maybe that's an opportunity to come and just send money home (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Riley was clear that PR was not discussed during interviews, although at least one worker refuted this. They targeted workers with the potential to move into supervisory and management positions, and there was evidence of limited family network recruitment for workers with management potential.

Service quality

Service quality was a critical competitive factor for Beachside, where guest expectations were influenced by the international reputation of the destination and the high cost of accommodation: 'The guests, they are more demanding. Our villas ... they're $800 a night ... if I was paying $800 a night, I would want service' (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline). All resorts were more casual than urban properties, aiming for an ambience that aligned with the natural beach and forest environment but also conscious of the expectations of a high-end international clientele. Edgewater was the smallest and most casual of the properties, with fewer than thirty employees at

full capacity, whilst the larger properties each had more than 100 employees during high season. High levels of customer service and professionalism were a norm, but workers were also expected to have 'warmth and genuineness' and to develop a rapport with the guests. At Royal, understanding nuances in guest service was critical, and investment in orientation and training was significant, even for positions with lower levels of guest contact. It was clear the remoteness of the destination did not alter guest expectations about quality and service, and managers were under pressure to maintain standards:

> That's why I said it's frustrating we have people that leave after a year because you're just developing them, and not only that, I mean in the service that's provided as well, and it's very noticeable by our guests when we have a lot of new people that start on the team because we get a lot of feedback from them saying, they're not up to the level of service of property such as yours, or they're very new, there's a lot of new people on the team or that kind of thing, we get a lot of that kind of feedback (Addison, Mgr, Royal).

Addison's comments reflect how a resort's calibre influences its ability to tolerate high levels of labour mobility and low-quality workers.

7.1.4 Labour shortages or quality of workers available?

In this section, it is necessary to interrogate employers' assertions that demand for access to LS-TFWs was predicated on labour shortages and how their accounts intersect with perceived skill or quality of worker shortages, as well as structural constraints such as seasonality and the temporal rhythms of different departments. Occupancy during high season, which was May to October, was over 80 percent, peaking in July and August at close to 100 percent. During low season, occupancy was as low as 40 percent and primarily on weekends, which posed additional staffing

challenges, particularly in housekeeping, where shortages were most critical. Jobs such as room attendant required more staff and shorter shifts to accommodate intense periods of 'turning over' rooms between 11 a.m. check-out and 4 p.m. check-in.

TFWP contract conditions restricted employers from relying on traditional strategies of numerical and functional flexibility to manage stochastic demand, stipulating that LS-TFWs were entitled to full-time work, 35–40 hours per week, 52 weeks of the year, in the same job, for the duration of the contract. The underlying expectation was that workers were not expected to bear the cost of idle time. In high season, at Royal, guest services and the kitchen were scheduled in eight-hour shifts so easily accommodated contract conditions, and at all the resorts, the tight turn-around time for flipping rooms in housekeeping suggested that six-hour shifts were the norm. A shorter workday was an attractive feature for seekers where beach activities and cultural experiences were prioritised: 'some people are not as hard-working or just take six-hour shifts – like a lot of people just take six-hour shifts' (Bodie, RA, Wildwood). LS-TFWs, though, wanted 'their' hours. Morgan (Mgr, Shoreline) struggled with the shift in employer obligations to provide full-time work for LS-TFWs given the historical structural constraints in housekeeping departments and the industry's culture of mobility:

> [In the past] … I just employed people like crazy, but we still never worked eight-hour days, but I had a lot of people a month …. then what a lot of people did was they went and got second jobs in the restaurants and things, and now I'm stuck because these [LS-TFWs] cannot work anywhere else … at the same time I don't have the hours.

Employers' responsibility to provide full-time work and ensure workers do not bear the cost of idle time was a significant shift from industry practice and a shift from current neoliberal trends. The obligation was a struggle for each employer, although to what degree was contingent on their resort's size, amenities, and calibre. During high season, Oasis, Royal, and Shoreline indicated they 'could' provide sponsored

room attendants with seven to eight hours per day because there were always things to do, such as laundry, extra cleaning tasks, public areas, and others. At Oasis and Shoreline, the potential for eight hours was framed as 'if the employee wanted it', and there was a sense that workers at these two resorts would have to push to get their full hours.

It was evident that, despite the structural constraints in housekeeping, employers continued to experience labour shortages during high season, either because newly recruited workers failed to show or because of high levels of labour mobility. Oasis, Shoreline and Edgewater were adamant they sponsored low-skilled workers because of labour shortages; however, each indicated if the LS-TFWs did not arrive before high season, they hired locally, suggesting the issue was quality, not just quantity:

> The timeline has been the hardest thing for us ... could it happen we don't get them [LMIA workers] before the summer? ... quite possibly and ... you definitely do have to have a backup plan yeah; we'll have to hire locally if it doesn't work out … it just won't be the quality and as long-term as we want them (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

Royal reported deciding to operate short-staffed rather than turn to locals or seekers at the last minute. The quality of workers available was a common theme across each case study site. Employers frequently equated quality with reliability, including absenteeism and labour mobility and, as such, locals and seekers were considered low-quality workers. WHV workers were framed as 'hard' workers, good quality but highly transient, therefore unreliable. LS-TFWs were perceived as high-quality and dedicated workers:

> The programme has definitely changed the face of the way that we work and the quality of our output; now we have people here that care about their jobs and care about the work that they're putting out, whereas unfortunately, with

> a lot of – I still find it now that young Canadians just don't have the dedication they don't have the drive, they're here to [play] and have a good time and they don't want to take their job seriously. In contrast, the international workers are all about the job, because they have goals (Blake, Mgr, Royal).

Managers linking workers' efforts with their goals was a common finding across the resorts. Managers, as well as LS-TFWs, commented on seekers' short-term holiday focus and the longer-term, more serious goals of LS-TFWs. Chapter 8 examines these perceptions in more detail.

Employers continued to grapple with labour shortages in low season. Structural constraints in housekeeping were exacerbated by low occupancy, primarily on weekends, making it more difficult to meet contract conditions. Some managers were vague about the number of hours required by the contract. Corey (Mgr, Shoreline) pulled a copy of the contract from her desk and acknowledged that the contract stipulated 35–40 hours per week, whilst Morgan (Mgr, Shoreline) had a different understanding:

> We have to give them so many hours a day. It is like minimum hours. Actually, the minimum is five, I think, actually. For the most part, in the summer, it's not a problem, but now it is. It is a problem because if it's not busy, I can't give you six hours a day … and really, in the grand scheme of things, I can't produce hours out of my hat. I just can't. If there's ten rooms occupied, that's what it is … Yes, I can create other stuff, but it's not going to be an eight-hour day and a 40-hour a week. It's just not.

A 'one-size fits all' TFWP contract did not align with the structural constraints of the hospitality industry. Shoreline, Oasis, and Edgewater were challenged to meet the contract hours in the winter months, although the degree of discrepancy between the

contracted hours and what workers received is unknown. Workers at Royal indicated they received their requisite hours, although that sometimes involved training or cross-training inter-or intra-departmentally. The gap between demand for sponsored workers and actual labour shortages in low season was most apparent at Shoreline, where the lack of amenities and an internal labour market limited the employer's ability to even bend the rules. The manager at Shoreline was the most vocal about the challenges of seasonality and meeting the requisite guaranteed hours:

> I have a hard time offering the staff year-round employment ... if I say I need six people, I don't necessarily need six people year-round or can't give them the hours that I want to be able to give them ... I really want to start getting people on work permits so I could just do contracts ... so I could start laying them off and they can go (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Despite little available work, employers still experienced labour shortages in housekeeping: 'I might struggle a little bit for Christmas because I've had an ad in the paper for a month. I haven't had an application yet' (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline). Locals and some seekers were a potential labour supply, but their availability reflected the culture of the community. Both labour supplies mirrored the laid-back, beach-type lifestyle that Beachside was famous for and low season demand for workers primarily on weekends and holidays did not necessarily align with the 'work only enough to live' culture. In an interview in November, Brook (Mgr, Oasis) confirmed locals and seekers were already 'on a break' from the labour market:

> Right now, [Nov], if we needed to hire someone pretty much, they're not available until January 2nd because they're going to take Christmas and the New Year off. If they don't have a job, they don't care. I started at the [Oasis] [years ago] on January 2nd. Yeah, I'm one of those.

It was evident that labour shortages were real sometimes, even though the availability of full-time hours was a struggle in the smaller resorts. The culture of the community and seekers that it attracted resulted in a lower-quality, unreliable labour supply that challenged employers' ability to meet quality service standards, yet structural constraints challenged their ability to meet the wage-hours bargain of the LS-TFWP. A guaranteed workforce alleviated some pressure on employers, but before interrogating this, understanding the financial cost to employers offers additional insight into employers' persistent demand for LS-TFWs.

7.1.5 Cost of sponsoring workers

Migrant labour as a 'cheap' and 'disposable' workforce (Piore, 1979) was rejected by employers in this study. The cost of sponsoring workers was higher than recruitment from other labour pools, although a reduction in the cost of labour mobility mitigated those costs:

> The whole misconception that employers choose international workers because they're cheaper is completely false. You, as an employer, pay often just to get them into the country, not only, you know, flights, recruitment service fees, medical. I don't have to fly someone from [another province]. I don't pay the medical. I don't need to do any of that or pay for the privilege of getting them there, and then, the prevailing wage that the government makes you pay to receive the Labour Market Opinion [LMIA] is often higher (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

The average prevailing wage in Canada at the time of this study was at least $2.00 to $3.00 more per hour than the average Canadian minimum wage of $10.00 per hour. WHV holders at Wildwood earned minimum wage, whilst at Royal, wages for all room attendants were increased to the prevailing wage: 'It's higher than some of our

positions so we then have to raise our… our room attendants now get [prevailing wage] an hour … so everyone benefitted from that' (Riley, Mgr., Royal). At Oasis, the manager reported the wage differential was smaller, and non-TFWs would receive that increase eventually, so LS-TFWs at Oasis earned more than domestic and other migrant workers, at least for the first months of their contract.

Royal paid agencies in the Philippines recruitment fees of $2,000 - $3,000 per hire, whilst Shoreline and Oasis hired through a Canadian migration agent and paid between $5,000-$6,000 per worker. Employers were required to pay an application fee to the Canadian government, travel and health care costs for the workers, and offer subsidised housing. The types of accommodation and the cost to workers and employers varied by property, but they ranged from free to $600 per month. At Edgewater, staff accommodation was free:

> So, it's not a revenue-generating space, so when you take that, you know, [prevailing wage] an hour, and you add rent equivalent to what you have to pay in Beachside for one-bedroom unit or what have you or even the trailer, I mean you're adding probably $5 to $6 an hour more to their wage So, it does become attractive for the right people You know, there is that benefit (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater).

It was evident that direct costs of hiring LS-TFWs were considerably more than that of any other labour pool; however, factoring in the cost of labour mobility broadened the perspective:

> We looked at it financially, too, with the company. You do invest a little bit of money to bring them over, but we worked it out, and even if they do only stay the two years, it costs us only a dollar a day extra and the amount of money that we save on training to not have to train that person four times

> within the two years - it totally works out ... and they're just harder workers (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

LS-TFWs resolved, in part, two key issues for employers: the quality of workers and labour mobility. It is essential to emphasise here that employers considered other international labour pools 'good workers' as well. Royal actively targeted WHV holders as potential long-term migrant workers and noted they did not pay the extra costs associated with LS-TFWs: 'We don't have to pay for flights ... we can hire immediately ... And now we do a combination of both of these [TFWP and WHV] (Riley, Mgr, Royal). They continued to pay the extra costs for the same quality of workers, suggesting that control over workers' mobility was the priority. There was consensus amongst employers that a high-quality workforce whose mobility was constrained was worth the extra cost, frustration with timelines, and stresses associated with meeting the contractual conditions (or not) of the TFWP:

> I think with them [LS-TFWs] right now is that you have a stable workforce for two years. The hope is that they will lend that stability, especially to Beachside in an area like this and learn what they need to do … it affords you that stability, and so, you're stuck with them, and they are stuck with you (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline).

The impact of employers' control over workers' labour mobility is examined in Chapter 8, but it is essential to note here that employers were unanimous in their insistence they 'needed' LS-TFWs to offset the high levels of labour mobility endemic to Beachside. This section has drawn attention to the value of a high-quality, immobilised workforce for employers in a remote, rural community without a reliable, quality reserve army. Seasonality and the calibre of the resort destination are additional layers of complexity in assessing the veracity of labour shortages as a rationale for participation in the TFWP. Before examining the motivations of temporary migrant workers, it is essential to investigate the second regulatory control, temporariness.

7.1.6 Nominating all LS-TFWs to the PNP

A striking observation from the empirical data comparison of the four case study properties was employers' history of nominating all workers who requested it to the PNP as long as they passed their probationary period. For a LS-TFW, the PNP nomination was the first step towards PR. For the employer, nominating an employee was a formal commitment that they had full-time work available on an indefinite basis. This finding was unexpected given the literature and the temporal intentions of the TFWP, but also because of the impact of seasonality on the availability of full-time work. Each employer indicated they had no issue with having their nominations accepted: 'I don't meet any resistance getting [nominating workers] PNP' (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline), and the majority of nominees received PR.

LS-TFWs were responsible for the PNP process, which included completing the application, passing an English language test, paying a processing fee, proving they met minimum income thresholds based on family size, and securing their employers' nominations. They had to be employed for six to nine months [varies by province] before they could be nominated:

> For those positions that are entry-level positions, they work for the property for [six to nine] months, so it gives us, as an employer, opportunity to really sess them out and make sure they're worth it, and there's no cost involved to us ... we nominate them and ask them for an additional one-year commitment on top of what their current commitment is .... we've only had it once or twice where people have not been working out in their roles and wanted it [PR] ... luckily it's [PNP nomination] [six to nine] months so we usually have those situations dealt with [by then] (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Riley's comments emphasise the additional power granted to employers by the state and how it benefits them. At no cost to them, employers controlled the future mobility of LS-TFWs, who were clearly in a weak bargaining position if they were interested in PR. Workers were already hyper-dependent on employers due to the sponsorship that included their housing. The PNP process was the only route to PR for LS-TFWs, adding additional pressure to workers for the first six to nine months of their contract as they were 'sessed out'. However, employers' reputation for nominating all workers was known. Whether workers were successful or not, employers' willingness to support their nominations helped shape their perception of their employer: 'they're really nice in here cause in every temporary worker that they have here, they always nominate them into PNP' (Jules, Spv, Oasis).

At each of the four resorts active in the TFWP, there were workers at various stages of the process. Several interviewees were waiting to complete the [six to nine] months or preparing to challenge the language test, whilst others were waiting for PR or had received PR. This network of workers at various stages was evidence to new LS-TFWS of the strong likelihood of receiving PR in Beachside: 'I'm running six years here … I came here as a LS-TFW from the Philippines' (Ariel, Spv, Royal). Ariel had been promoted to supervisor and was a bridgehead migrant whose spouse had joined her, so she showed new workers the potential to meet their goals.

The PNP process also signalled a shift in the exchange bargain as employers sought to extend the employment relationship. Royal's requirement that LS-TFWs commit to an additional year of service in exchange for the nomination was but one of the strategies employers used to negotiate a new exchange bargain. Negotiating the PNP nomination is examined in detail in Chapter 8.

The findings discussed in this section demonstrate the complexity of assessing labour shortages given this study's geographical and sectoral contexts. The remote, rural locale, low population density, and the unique culture of Beachside intersected with the structural constraints of housekeeping shortages in a high-end, highly seasonal

resort destination. Employer control over workers' mobility offered some respite from the high levels of labour mobility, even though the structural constraints impeded some employers' ability or willingness to meet contract conditions. Employer control over workers' future mobility and their willingness to nominate all qualified workers to the PNP was unexpected, and whilst surprising given the temporal intentions of the programme, its value as a 'no cost' reward offered to workers allowed them to extend their control over workers' mobility. This section highlighted the distinctiveness of the LS-TFW employment relationship.

7.2 MOTIVATION OF TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKERS

A key focus of this research is understanding the motivation of migrant workers for engaging in a LS-TFWP in the hospitality sector in rural Canada. Regulatory controls that constrain mobility and workers' access to PR are two key mechanisms that are argued to marginalise low-skilled workers, rendering them more vulnerable to exploitation; however, little is known about the role TFWPs play in migrant workers' transnational trajectories nor how migrant workers' experience these regulatory controls in the labour process. The literature review highlighted complex and multi-faceted motivations of TFWs that extend beyond the economic to include personal, family, and professional goals and illuminate migrant workers as purposeful actors exercising agency and choosing vulnerabilities (Alberti, 2014). Neoclassical and new economics of labour migration theories and network theories offer a loose framework for examining the motivations of workers and the role of temporariness and labour mobility in their decision-making.

Three different categories of temporary international workers participated in this study: HS-TFWs, LS-TFWs, and WHV holders. Whilst the primary focus of the research was LS-TFWs, WHV holders and HS-TFWs provided a useful counterpoint for examining worker motivations. To clarify, WHVs are 'non-work' visas that are worker-driven; however, given their increased role as a reserve army in many states, they offered a useful contrast in mobility when framed against employer-driven

visas. Both HS-TFWs and LS-TFWs were employer-sponsored, however, high-skilled workers had moderate labour mobility in the Canadian labour market and PR was actively encouraged through various pathways. Table 4 highlights the primary motivations identified by each group and their age range, education level, and labour mobility associated with their visa.

Table 4. Temporary migrant worker motivation for migration

	HS-TFWs	WHV holders	LS-TFWs
Key Drivers	Advance career Learn new skills. Employer reputation Ability to travel	Travel and relax before or after Post-Secondary education. Experience Canada and Beachside Kinship connections/recommendations	Permanent Residency Secure future for self and family Wage differentials Remittances Equality, safety Network connections/recommendations Lack of opportunity in home country Gain experience
Mobility capability	Moderate	High	Low-none
Age-range	28 – 32	19 - 22	27 - 42
Education	Culinary certificates	High school to degree completion	Post secondary completion – Diplomas and degrees

Table 4 highlights the distinctiveness of the motivations between the three groups of migrant workers. High-skilled workers were driven by their career aspirations and were moderately mobile, whilst WHV holders were much younger, highly mobile, and driven by their aspirations to travel and experience new cultures. LS-TFWs were distinctive in that their motivations were driven by economic inequality in their origin country and the hope for PR and a better future in Canada. LS-TFWs were older and had low mobility capability. Table 4 highlights the distinctiveness but does

not reflect how migration status influences decision-making nor how these decisions intersect with employer demand and the geographical and sectoral contexts.

7.2.1 Motivation of HS-TFWs

The opportunity to advance their culinary careers and live internationally was the driving force for the HS-TFWs' decision to work in Beachside:

> When I realised the possibilities, when I realised how much my Mexican experience in Mexican cuisine could be an asset in other places and how much I really enjoy travelling ... it just took over my focus and I just really want to squeeze as much as I could' (Dayan, Cook, Royal).

Dayan's passion for cooking and desire to work in a top Canadian restaurant were the attractions at Royal and Beachside. Royal's reputation was the key driver for both workers' employment in Beachside, assisted by Royal's expertise in navigating the migration system. The HS-TFWs had moderate mobility capability and could move within the Canadian labour market to search for another employer to sponsor them. Dayan had worked in Canada on and off over several years under TFWP visas, and having experienced firsthand how the TFWP process was a barrier to accessing the 'right' job, had developed a strategy to try and overcome the process:

> So, I would just find the best place ... I will present myself ... let me try [the job], let me stay here for a day and see if you like me. And at the end of all of the stage [try-out] the chefs would also be like 'yes, okay, you are good enough we want to hire you' ... and then I will have to pull that card [employer-sponsored programme process] (Dayan, Cook, Royal).

Results were mixed, however, and both workers viewed the PR process as necessary to access full labour mobility capability in the Canadian labour market.

Both workers commented on the uniqueness of Beachside as a remote, rural destination but were adamant that their stay was temporary and that it was Royal's reputation and their ability to learn that kept them there. Whilst Beachside was simply a means to an end, and their intentions temporal, the experience offered some insight into the difference between working in an urban centre versus a remote destination:

> It's a very small community. I feel that people care here about different things. And it took me back to my original idea of Canada when I first got here. How warm people can be, and I thought it was like that in all Canada, but that wasn't the case in [city] for me anyway' (Dayan, Cook, Royal).

Interviewees frequently commented on the warmth and niceness of the people in the organisation and community.

7.2.2 Motivation of WHV holders

Personal development, a desire to experience a different culture, and honing English skills were the primary motivations for the WHV holders. All interviewed were from Germany, although employers and these interviewees indicated there were many Australians, Europeans, British, and Japanese working in Beachside and travelling on the same type of visa. These interviewees were the youngest workers, had limited to no work experience in any industry, and were enjoying a gap year before continuing with their studies. Each worker had a family network member who influenced their choice of Canada as a destination: 'My aunt has been to Canada a few times and she loved it so much. I've seen the pictures ... so I decided to go to Canada' (Edel, RA,

Wildwood). Beachside had bucket list appeal as a destination but also because short-term work was easily accessible in housekeeping departments and required no experience: 'I only wanted to stay for a month or something because I have to go back to Germany now, so I emailed them here, and the next day I got an email back, so I called them up, and the next day I was on a bus to Beachside' (Edel, RA, Wildwood).

The WHV holders had researched Beachside before arriving but were unprepared for how cool and unique the experience was. For these workers, the remoteness and access to the culture of the community was part of the adventure: 'When is this bus finally going to stop ahead Actually, I had no clue and yet it really felt like travelling at the end of the world' (Bodie, RA, Wildwood). They took full advantage of the community's free access to local activities and spent their discretionary time exploring the natural environment and water sports. The culture of Beachside and their immediate inclusion in the community because of their staff accommodation contributed to an 'awesome' experience where the hours working in housekeeping were just part of the fun:

> I've been here for two weeks and when I go to town I can say, "Hi How are you?" because I know people already … so you get to know people a lot and everyone's nice to each other, very nice and the atmosphere's awesome and because there are plenty of options around –you can go to the beach every day, and I think we're having beach fires almost every second day or something. So, you meet people from Beachside from staff accommodation, just hanging out together. It's a good place (Edel, RA, Wildwood).

Accommodation costs were minimal and refundable if no damage but considered good quality with many people under 25, many of whom were domestic seekers. Beachside's natural resources were attractive, but exposure to the unique culture of the community elevated the experience:

> We've got two girls from Montreal, they're vegan and dancing with hula hoops all day. Some people think they are crazy, but I think they're just open-minded, free … yeah hippies, [beaches] are really nice. I really realised here that it fits to be more like that (Baden, RA, Wildwood).

For these workers, the job in housekeeping was a means to an end, viewed positively because of the access to accommodation and the culture of the community and because it was temporary, but money was not a primary motivator. One WHV holder had volunteered for free on a farm for two months before coming to Beachside; another had volunteered at the FIFA World Cup in South Africa the year before. The workers were positive about their experience, but it was temporary. One worker reflected he might not feel the same about working 'this hard' for minimum wage if he lived in a city and was expected to live on a room attendant's wages, underscoring the privilege he enjoyed, particularly when compared to LS-TFWs.

7.2.3 Motivation of LS-TFWs

The motivations for the LS-TFWs to engage in a temporary contract in the hospitality sector in Beachside were multi-faceted; however, two key drivers predominated for all. The overarching goal or dream for each worker interviewed was to become a permanent resident, and the hope, or more accurately, calculated risk, was that a contract in Beachside would be a first step towards this. Unpicking how and why they found themselves in the hospitality industry in a remote, rural community and the choices and constraints they faced illuminates the role of the sectoral and geographical context in their decision-making and the agency of migrant workers as they navigated the global labour market. The second overarching theme was economic. Almost all workers had family members who relied on their remittances.

The LS-TFWs in this study were from the Philippines and Mexico, where economic inequality and socioeconomic and political instability challenged workers' ability to provide their families with a secure and stable future. Wage differentials, competitive labour markets, and a lack of opportunity in their origin countries were common underlying themes: 'Because there are more here [Beachside] than back home. As much as we love to stay back home, there is nowhere to go there. Not that much opportunity, so we go other countries to find that opportunity' (Jayme, RA, Royal). Access to quality education was seen as an important factor in accessing a good job but beyond the reach of most citizens; several transnational workers supported their siblings' access to higher quality institutions through their remittances: 'the reason why I also worked abroad because in Philippines … the government and the salary thing is not always as [good] – it's very expensive to send to school and universities, especially for a known university (Maya, RA, Royal). All of the LS-TFWs interviewed had post-secondary education, most at the degree level, but expressed frustration with a competitive labour market and the lack of job security: 'After I graduated, I worked back home for maybe two years. And then, I knew there and then that I don't have a future back home. That's when I started applying [to other countries]' (Azul, GS, Royal). Transnational work was an opportunity to bring financial stability to their precarious lives:

> When I was there [Philippines], I actually have a life. I'm only earning four hundred dollars, but I'm living in a two-storey, three-bedroom house with my cat happily. I'm able to shop, do whatever and then when I got here, it's just work, house, work, house. No shopping because there's nothing here but, ... I'm just happier in here, more secure in here. If I just work hard enough, I have a pension. Everything's planned out now. In the Philippines, you just die trying (Dani, Spv, Oasis).

Canada's social safety nets, access to public health and education, higher wages, and perceptions of fairness and equality were commonly cited by workers as pull factors.

PR was a key driver for all LS-TFWs, and Canada had a reputation for easier access than some other countries: 'I thought of that [PR] before I got here because I talked to other people and they said, "You know what In Canada it would be easier to be resident than in other countries"' (Rivera, RA, Royal). Workers relied on networks, including strong and weak ties, for accurate information as to which country offered the best working conditions and long-term opportunities:

> I looked for a place, read through blogs and suggestions from friends who are already in Canada and some other options for other countries. I found Canada, specifically, when I read the LMO [contract for the TFWP] here; I found that they're giving fair treatments to foreign workers ... so from people, realities that I know, from friends ... college friends that are already in Canada, that's when I focussed on looking for a job in Canada' (Azul, GS, Royal).

Mobility capital gained through years of experience in the cruise ship industry was evident as Azul detailed reading the TFWP contract and the government website and spoke about using family and labour networks to confirm perceptions that workers in Canada received fair treatment. Transnational experience was a clear mobility differential as workers discussed either offers or potential opportunities available to them. Azul rejected an opportunity in Singapore because of the cost: 'I had another option, which was Singapore because the economy in Singapore is also booming. Although in Singapore, they ask for a placement fee. So, I have to pay for them to look … which is different from here (Azul, GS, Royal). Maya (GS, Royal) had worked in Singapore but refused to renew the contract when it became clear PR would never be possible: 'Unless you married a Singaporean, but I'm not that kind just to marry … to be stable'. Several workers spoke of avoiding the Middle East in their migration decisions. Another worker recounted leaving an international contract after one year because working conditions were difficult and the wage was insufficient to justify being away from family: 'I left Dubai because the salary there is different from the salary I want' (Danso, DW/KH, Royal).

Permanent residency was an overarching goal, but wage differentials were also important. Most workers supported nuclear or extended family members in their origin country through remittances, so the ability to maximise utility figured prominently in decision-making. In Canada, room attendants were paid the prevailing wage and, on average, earned $420 per week (based on the required 35 hours per week). Wage differentials between origin and host country were significant; however, pay structure in Canada was also a consideration: 'In Mexico, they just pay you a week. The lower salary is like 700 pesos, that's like 70 dollars here. They don't pay you by hours there ... They pay you just for a week' (Valentin, RA, Shoreline). LS-TFWs were target earners, and hourly wages were an opportunity to maximise utility once you received PR: 'It is too easy to get money because … if you are residents here you can work any time and you can earn more money right ... as long as your back is good, you can work more' (Angel, RA, Shoreline).

Family strategies and PR

Family was a predominant theme as workers discussed the strategies and factors influencing their decision to undertake a TFWP contract in hospitality in rural Canada. All LS-TFWs were embedded in diverse family relationships, and those relationships reinforced, if not shaped, their migration trajectories and their ultimate goal of PR for themselves and their families. Married workers with dependants were focused on their children's future, and this goal was at the forefront of their mobility decisions. Marion (RA, Edgewater) had worked full-time in the Philippines as a health care worker whilst her husband worked in the Middle East: 'The level of income if just only me and my husband, we can stay in the Philippines, but we're looking forward the future of our kids … my second child since she was small and until now, she wants to become a doctor'. Marion had a choice between a health care job in the Caribbean and housekeeping in Beachside: 'I'm just balancing what is the heavy one and which is the easy one', but felt the hard one carried less risk because her cousin lived in Canada and knew the owner of Edgewater: 'I said no matter

what's hard as long as the people is good, as long as we have a relative there if every [anything] happened]. Edgewater sponsored Marion's husband sometime later, and the family was reunited in Beachside three years after she arrived. Several married workers with dependants shared similar stories, choosing housekeeping in Beachside in the hope of receiving PR for themselves and their families, although not all were successful. Ultimately, it was the employers' decision whether to sponsor a spouse.

Family goals of PR also shaped the mobility trajectories of single workers, although it intersected with hospitality experience and transnational experience, each factor influencing their mobility capability. Jayme (RA, Royal) had hospitality experience but had never worked internationally. A relative in Canada who had a 'good quality' life influenced his family's decision: 'It's my dream to work here in Canada and also my mom's dream for me. She wanted me to be here.' He was rejected three times by an agency before having the opportunity to interview for a housekeeping job 'They didn't say what place in Canada'. During the interview, he was told how isolated Beachside was but was undeterred: 'I would have the chance to work here in Canada, any place … I would really grab it'. He, like several others, hoped to have family members join them.

Single workers with transnational hospitality experience seemed more confident about their mobility capability when discussing options, and the potential for PR in Beachside was a deciding factor in accepting a contract. Maja (GS, Royal) had almost a decade of international hospitality experience in Macau, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, some at a supervisory level, and financially supported her siblings' post-secondary education and a house for her parents during that time. She wanted to 'settle down', and, with the help of her mother, researched the migration market, looking for a country where PR was possible:

> The other reasons why I accepted the job is when I asked them during the interview like ... is it okay or is it possible for me to apply for a permanent – because the only other reasons is like where I can bring my family … so

> when they said yes to me then I said, "yes, I'm fine then" … So, if they're helping me, I'll give my best as well It's a two-way, you know… And I'm enjoying here (Maya, GS, Royal).

Maya's comment underscores workers' agency in choosing vulnerabilities and reflects a sense of mutual gain in the exchange bargain that came across in some interviews. The word 'helping' was used by workers and employers in reference to each other. Workers knew they needed employers' help to sponsor them for PR. Azul had worked on cruise ships and wanted to settle down, but if a nomination from Royal didn't work out, there was always another opportunity 'to find another employer to help' (Azul, GS, Royal). Networks offered valuable insight into the likelihood of PR and helped workers choose where to sell their labour: 'Well, it's up to your employer; I heard like a lot of stories about [another province] also that they didn't do it [PNP]. And every 50 people or 50 employees that they have that are foreign workers; they only nominate one person' (Jules, Spv, Oasis). If workers were not aware before they arrived in Beachside, they quickly learned through community networks that employers nominated everyone. For other workers who were part of a migration chain, the potential for PR in Beachside was known and factored into their decision-making.

LS-TFWs without transnational or hospitality experience had much lower mobility capability; occupational mobility was sometimes the only pathway to Beachside. Edgewater, Shoreline, and Oasis engaged in family network recruitment and the potential for PR was known. In the Philippines, workers were required to have one year's housekeeping experience to qualify for sponsorship. In this study, some workers transitioned from professional careers in human resources, accounting, banking, and teaching to meet their origin countries' exit requirement to access a sponsorship opportunity in housekeeping in Beachside:

> Researcher: What is your goal in coming here? What do you want to do?

> Fran (RA): I hope to be, first of all, a permanent resident.

Fran (RA, Shoreline) was single, 31 years of age, had a degree in another field, was related to one of the early pioneer migrant workers, and had arrived in Beachside ten months before this interview. The first application to the TFWP was submitted years earlier; however, a processing problem resulted in a 5-year delay before the second application was processed and approved. As part of the process, Fran gave up an entry-level management position in a major corporation to gain experience as a room attendant at a hotel in the Philippines. Room attendant training and certification were organised by a recruitment agency in Manila and consisted of one year of on-the-job training at a hotel:

> Initially, we pay them ... the first one is six months, that's what you pay for ... and then they renew you so you would get your one year or another six months. You don't have to pay them, but they won't pay you either ... free labour exactly – just to get that (Fran, RA, Shoreline).

The exit requirement of housekeeping certification in the Philippines for workers without hospitality experience was a recent development, as earlier migrant workers were not required to have it. The need to sacrifice a professional career at least one year before being sponsored heightened the opportunity cost and risk for potential LS-TFWs. Lyn (RA, Oasis) was sponsored by Oasis, where she joined her fiancée: 'I worked before in a bank, private bank – a real bank for four years', which she left to do her one-year room certification. It was another [six to nine] months once hired before she could be nominated for PR, and there was no guarantee that PNP would still be available. Despite the risk, chain migration was in full force at Shoreline, Edgewater, and Oasis, where several interviewees referenced sisters, parents, or other members of networks 'one of the husbands that wants to come over is a lawyer that's doing his room attendant course in the Philippines right now' (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline). Risks of downturns in the economy and changes to government policy were considerations. However, there was a sense from this group that the risks of

their transnational occupational mobility were mitigated by the well-established pathway to PR in Beachside.

All LS-TFWs in this study were purposeful, and some displayed a high level of determination to meet their long-term goals. Labour networks and weak ties were also a pathway to Beachside. Two transnational workers decided to leave long-term work in Taiwan because of the potential for PR in Canada, not only for themselves but for their families:

> It's my big dream … it is easy to earn money [in Canada], and someday [we] become residents here, and your family you can bring it here because, for example, in Taiwan, you can't bring your own family there, [only] you can stay there' (Gabi, RA, Shoreline).

Gabi and Angel (RA, Shoreline) were single and had worked as factory workers in Taiwan for some years but wanted to move where they could settle permanently with their families. They used their occupational and geographical mobility power to navigate Canada's regulatory controls, hiring an international recruitment agent to find them a Canadian employer who would first sponsor them and then nominate them for PR. They worked as janitors in another province for an employer who refused to nominate them. Through a new Filipino network in [province], they connected with the recruitment agent for Shoreline, who promised them they would receive PR if they moved to Beachside: 'There's no pressure for me but for sure 'cause [MRA] told me if you go in hotel, there's an opportunity and assurance to permanent residency' (Angel, RA, Shoreline). The literature suggested moving between contracts almost never occurred because of the cost involved and the system's complexity. Both these workers moved across countries and then provinces and across jobs, albeit at a cost and with the help of an MRA. Other interviewees spoke of two LS-TFWs in Beachside who moved between employers because of insufficient hours. Their experience underscores the important role the MRA played

in facilitating LS-TFW worker mobility through their sector-specific network. Both Angel and Gabi received their PR.

Anticipating the future

Family dynamics and the potential for PR were central to workers' mobility decisions; however, workers' future goals also pointed to other potential work-family articulations. When discussing settling down, some workers spoke of their desire to marry and start a family: ' I hope I have in that time I get married, and I have my own happy time because I am getting old' (Gabi, RA, Shoreline). Settling down could be complicated by the small population and remote, rural locale. When comparing life in an urban environment to that of Beachside, one worker reflected he might 'date someone' if he lived in a city. The geographical context could trigger mobility decisions when workers receive their PR; however, it cannot be assumed: ‘Eventually, if I'm maybe settling down, we will move somewhere else, but for now, I don't think of that yet because my first goal would be my family' (Azul, GS, Royal). Azul's goal was 'if I get PR, to be able to help my brother or my sister to find a job here in the [Royal], or anywhere else in Canada if I can'. For married workers with dependants, future goals were tied to access to 'good' education for their children.

On a professional level, there was a range of secondary motivations that were contingent on being successful in receiving PR. Canadian work experience was understood to be key to future mobility in the labour market. Hospitality career professionals spoke of acquiring new skills, the potential for further education, and moving into supervisory roles in Beachside or elsewhere. Career converters seemed more uncertain about next steps: 'That's the first goal as of now [PR], and I don't know what to do after that … at least it will open the opportunities to other things’ (Fran, RA, Shoreline). This uncertainty was echoed by others who had sacrificed professional careers in other sectors but did not yet have PR. Workers who had received PR were grappling with how to return to earlier professions. Two interviewees were very emotional as they recounted their sacrifices as they left their careers, spouses, children, and country to start new lives as room attendants in

Beachside. Years later, after their families had joined them, they understood there would be no opportunity to return to former professions and looked for ways to move into entry-level positions in the same fields they had left.

Remote, rural context

The preceding discussion drew attention to Beachside as a destination node where labour demand and a pathway to permanence were catalysts for family networks. Labour demand was also the draw for transnational workers who may or may not have been aware of employers' strong track record for nominating employees, however, for some, Beachside was the only access to Canada. The process could be highly competitive, and workers may have to apply multiple times before being accepted: 'I passed, and here I am now. I mean, it's really unexpected and unbelievable. It's really difficult to be here [Canada]. There are a lot of people in the Philippines that really wanted to work here' (Jayme, RA, Royal). For others, as described earlier, the MRA, through their labour network, facilitated access to Beachside and the promise of PR. Even for workers with transnational experience, selling your labour overseas, particularly to an employer in an isolated location where you have no support, is a risk and can be intimidating: 'For a long time we drive, but we didn't see any houses, and I am saying God what's your plan for us and stuff like that but when I see ... oh it's a very nice place – it's amazing here' (Angel, RA, Shoreline).

Compared to WHV holders who engaged fully with activities and the natural environment, LS-TFWs expressed little interest in participating in Beachside's activities. Some did appreciate the natural beauty, lack of pollution, peace, and abundant space. Despite the warnings about the location, most workers were surprised: 'It was hard the first year because when we were driving here ... I was like "Ooh. This is Canada" passing cities and all that and then when we were almost in here, I was like "are we still in Canada" it was just trees and nothing more' (Jules, Spv, Oasis). A number expressed how intimidating the forests, mountains, and 'silence' felt.

Constraints on workers' mobility spilled into discretionary time as public transportation was only available during the summer. Resorts were located along beaches outside the town centre, so workers had to walk, hitchhike, or bike to shop for food, attend church and community events, or, for some, travel to work. Even to go the local bar: 'I have to bike for 30 minutes to be on the nightlife. But it's good I save money [staying home]' (Danso, DW, Royal]. For LS-TFWs, accessing basic necessities was challenging, even more so in winter conditions. One worker in their 30s lived four kilometres from town and had not ridden a bike since childhood:

> I didn't know how to ride the [a] bike. So, I'm just working here – going to town to send money to the Philippines and then go back and we walking to go back to Edgewater with the shopping bag which is very heavy on my back because of the foods … So, [manager] and [maintenance] teach me how to ride a bike, but it's not successful because I'm scared because I have experience from a long time ago. So, they make me a balancer [training wheels]… and then when I'm going into town, the people smile … I don't care if I'm riding with the balancer [training wheels] (Marion, RA, Edgewater).

Some workers eventually bought cars and helped others with transportation, but winters were difficult without a vehicle. The lack of amenities was an issue for most workers:

> And a lot of the foreign workers that are coming from Europe, they love hiking, they love fishing, yeah, so that part of [Beachside] works for them. Not for us because we just want to go to the Starbucks and just have my coffee … Because I grew up in Manila, I love my coffee and my McDonalds (Ariel, Spv, Royal).

Workers described a quiet life, watching movies and skyping with family, and only limited access to overtime work:

> Interviewer: What do you do in your free time?
>
> Fran: That's the thing. Nothing [Laughs] …Nothing … Maybe watch TV and watch movies. That's all I can do here. Because I am really not into [beach activities] and stuff like that.

Some workers viewed the isolation and lack of amenities as positive, however: 'It's convenient here because I save a lot of money. There's no mall. There's no gadgets to buy ... all I buy is a little stuff for my food, my everyday living' (Danso, DW/KH, Royal). The low cost of accommodation, lack of amenities, and distance to density enabled workers to maximise savings.

7.3 SEGMENTATION – SHAPING A WORKFORCE

The literature highlighted nationality, gender, hiring queues, and citizenship as potential mechanisms employers used to segment migrant workers into the lower echelons of the occupational hierarchy. Interlinking migration status with employment status offered employers an additional mechanism to shape the workforce, skirting employment law and using family status, qualifications, and nationality as criteria for acceptance. It is, therefore, essential to examine how employers' control over workers' migration and employment status shapes the LS-TFWP workforce.

7.3.1 Nationality and economic inequality

Unlike seasonal agricultural programmes where bilateral agreements between nations and established agencies facilitated recruitment for employers, employers in this study recruited internationally on their own or through an MRA. Whilst there didn't seem to be any limitations on the countries from which they could recruit, all interviewees were from the Philippines or Mexico. Managers at Shoreline and Royal commented that WHVs could transfer to the LS-TFWP but were generally not interested in PR: 'They never ask. They want to travel. They just want to travel and go everywhere' (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline). Europeans were also less likely to stay in staff accommodation, impacting their flexibility: 'Europeans specifically, Europeans because they want privacy. They want to have their own place. They don't want to share' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). European workers could be sponsored through the TFWP, but employers had less control over their mobility, flexibility, and whether they would complete the contract. The requirement to have a worker's name on the LMIA and the length of time to process also influenced who was targeted:

> If they aren't working when I meet them a year ago, will they have found jobs and found something better? … but the desire to come to Canada and the desire to have an employer that's they're ready to hire you … is incredibly high, and it's always shocking to me (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Filipino workers were target earners and highly motivated by PR, more likely to wait for the TFWP process to unfold and more likely to stay in on-site accommodation, but only if it met their needs: 'Filipinos will stay if they are permitted because it's less expensive and that allows them to send more money, but if they can then find a house for 12 people and rent, they will do that' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). Targeting poorer countries ensured workers would wait while the process unfolded, be willing to exchange their mobility for access to the Canadian labour market, be motivated to complete the contract, and be incentivised by the potential for PR. The predominance

of Filipino workers could also reflect family network hiring, the use of an MRA whose resources were limited to one or two countries, the cost of international hires, or the need to focus resources on limited markets.

7.3.2 Qualifications – skills mismatch

A shift in gender segmentation in housekeeping was evidenced by several male room attendants at each of the case study sites. Male room attendants were predominantly international and included WHV holders and LS-TFWs. WHV holders' stay was measured in weeks, and housekeeping was easily accessible. For LS-TFWs seeking PR, a position in housekeeping in Beachside may be the only gateway to the Canadian labour market. In the TFWP, employers skirted Canadian employment law and targeted a specific gender: 'I think the first time we had three females. The second time, we thought maybe we'll try it with males' (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

At all resorts, the qualifications demanded of LS-TFWs were higher than those of their Canadian counterparts, although the employer was not always complicit in this. Royal looked for previous hotel or cruise ship experience, which they did not require of a Canadian worker, but felt it demonstrated a 'real' commitment to a career in hospitality as opposed to many workers who saw hospitality as a stepping stone to PR. Shoreline, Oasis, and Edgewater reported that special qualifications were not needed in housekeeping:

> We're looking for someone that fits with our culture. It's not about the qualifications at all. Whether we're hiring a Canadian or non-Canadian, you really don't need any experience to work in housekeeping. So, when you know that they're going to be hard workers, you really are just hiring for personality (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

Brook's comment reflects the understanding by several managers that the LS-TFWs would be 'hard-working'. The LS-TFWs had post-secondary education, usually at the degree level, and were often hospitality-related. In the Philippines, government agencies such as IPAMS or TESDA required applicants to have post-secondary education. Any applicants without housekeeping experience were required to take mandatory 'certifications' ranging from one to two years before they could apply for international work. The disparity between qualifications required of Canadian workers and those from the Philippines, for example, was consistent at each resort and a source of tension for some workers. Workers seemed uncertain about who was responsible:

> One of the requirements is that you have to be a college graduate. You have to be able to communicate and all that, and then when we go here, we were basically working with high school undergraduates. I don't want to use the word 'potheads'. They expect lots from us, and then when we get here, you're basically ... I don't even know the word for it' (Dani, Spv, Oasis).

Overqualified workers and skills mismatch were evident in the findings, although not consistently at all resorts. Royal was distinctive as they targeted workers with long-term potential, so targeted hospitality professionals with 'real' hotel or cruise ship experience, as opposed to workers who used national certifications and hospitality as a pathway to PR:

> I'm looking for them to have worked abroad, ideally before, so they're used to being away from their family, so it's not going to be a challenge ... and I'm looking for that connection that they have some service, genuine service aspects (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Skills mismatches were prevalent at Edgewater, Shoreline, and to a lesser degree at Oasis. Family recruitment at these properties segmented professionals from diverse

backgrounds, including accounting, banking, human resource management and health care, into housekeeping, usually as a pathway to PR. Employers were clear the skills did not add value to their roles as room attendants.

7.3.3 Family Status

Regulatory controls segment workers, but some are more vulnerable than others (Alberti, 2014). Workers from poorer countries were more vulnerable than workers who were not, and in this study, family status also increased the vulnerability of some workers.

The processing time for PNP and PR was known to be longer for married or married with dependant applicants. From a workplace perspective, married workers' mobility was constrained for longer periods than single applicants. Married LS-TFWs with dependants were even more vulnerable. The income threshold they were required to meet to pass the nomination bar successfully was impossible based on entry-level wages. Employers in this study approached it in one of two ways. At Royal, being married with dependants could be a filter for ensuring sufficient turnover: 'If everyone was coming for a career, then we'd never have any positions available for anybody else' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). Royal supported all applications for PR, knowing that 'married with dependants' applicants would not meet the income threshold to be successful. Workers had the right to go through the process even if they had no chance of success: 'You feel terrible if they get denied. You know, they paid that [$$$] for the PNP application' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). The rejection is by the government agency, so it does not blemish the employers' reputation for sponsoring all qualified workers. Royal did sponsor some spouses of workers, but usually for workers on the supervisory or management track.

Edgewater and Shoreline, on the other hand, fully embraced sponsorship of families with dependants, first hiring one person and then sponsoring the spouse so the dual-income would qualify for PNP. A worker's mobility capacity could be constrained for years while spouses undergo the PNP-PR process. During this time, workers and their families became embedded in the community and school system, and the workers gained tenure in the workplace.

7.4 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to understand the motivations of LS-TFWs and their employers to engage in a distinctive TFWP employment relationship where regulatory controls constrain worker mobility and the right to PR. Employers rationalised that the density and distance to Beachside, as well as the unique culture of Beachside, contributed to recruitment and retention challenges and resulted in higher levels of labour mobility than would be experienced in an urban environment. Structural constraints of the hospitality sector, including seasonality and stochastic demand, further complicated labour market challenges; employers' ability to respond to these challenges was a function of their resort's size, amenities, and calibre. Labour shortages were evident even in low season; however, shortages would be of part-time workers. The quality of workers was an issue throughout the year, although the quality was often a proxy for reliability and flexibility. Despite the challenges in meeting the one-size-fits-all TFWP contract, employers felt strongly they 'needed' the programme to stabilise the workforce and deliver the high-quality service demanded of an international tourism destination.

Regulatory controls created an opportunity for employers to recruit internationally and target workers by nationality, family status, experience, and migration status, thereby shaping a more compliant, committed, and vulnerable workforce. Employers used their power over workers' future mobility through nominations to the PNP to nominate all workers if they qualified. This wholesale nomination of all workers for PR contradicts the TFWP's temporal intentions. It reflects the ongoing labour market

challenges employers experienced and employers' desire to extend the employment relationship of a workforce whose mobility was constrained.

Differences in motivation between the three groups of international workers were stark. HS-TFWs were career professionals, using their mobility power to explore new countries and cuisines. WHV holders were working tourists with high labour mobility and resources; work was secondary to the cultural experience, and wages were unimportant. Their privilege was evident when compared to LS-TFWs, who were driven by economic inequality and their families' dreams of a better future in Canada. Migrant agency was evident in the evaluation of migration markets and migration offers, as workers weighed costs and benefits against constraints and choices. The vulnerabilities imposed by the TFWP were known to workers, and the decision to exchange their mobility for access to the Canadian labour market was a conscious choice, in many cases influenced by workers' knowledge that PR was a strong possibility in Beachside.

CHAPTER 8 REGULATORY CONTROLS, LABOUR MOBILITY AND EFFORT BARGAIN

The findings in Chapter 7 highlighted how Beachside's remote, rural location, population density, and culture exacerbated labour and skill shortages and contributed to high levels of labour mobility without a quality reserve army as a buffer. Migration regulatory controls allowed employers to shape a well-educated, high-quality, and highly motivated labour pool whose economic inequality and dream of PR in Canada increased their vulnerability to exploitation in an employment relationship that constrained their mobility. Employer control over workers' labour mobility power, inter alia, stabilised the workforce and the labour process and nominating LS-TFWs to the PNP was an opportunity to extend control over workers' mobility. However, PR was a key motivation for workers' participation in the TFWP, so may be perceived by workers as an opportunity for mutual gain. LS-TFWs were deeply embedded in diverse family relationships and family goals of PR shaped migration trajectories and influenced labour practices.

Chapter 4 considered labour mobility and the effort bargain as two conceptual tools appropriate for examining the impact of migration regulatory controls on the labour process. Smith (2010) conceptualises labour mobility as a terrain of 'strategies and tactics' (p. 269) within the labour process, where worker mobility can be a source of power for the worker or employer, albeit contingent on context. LS-TFWs' loss of mobility power is a structural barrier to worker agency, rendering workers more vulnerable to exploitation. The second uncertainty in the labour process is the effort bargain, where the extraction of effort from the worker at the point of production is also a terrain of struggle between employers and workers. Effort is located in the labour power of workers, and extracting that effort requires workers' cooperation, which can be gained through cooperation, coercion, or consent (Thompson and Smith, 2010; Edwards, 2009). Chapter 3 considered the hyper-dependent and hyper-precarious nature of employer-sponsored employment relations (Zou, 2015), and the

limited studies available suggest that migrant workers as 'good workers' could be a consequence of the exploitive nature of LS-TFWPs. This chapter considers Research Question 2:

> How do regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs impact labour mobility power and the effort bargain?

First, the chapter considers how employer control over workers' mobility power shapes employee relations, highlighting how workers' dependence on employers is conditioned in their origin country long before the contract is signed. Employers engage in tactics to foster positive relations and ensure 'buy-in' from workers; however, the proximity of the working and living environment and the small size and remoteness of the community also shape more informal, personal employee relations. Examining the wage-hours bargain illuminates employer power and worker vulnerability despite the conditions set by the state. The next section considers the effort bargain and workers' vulnerability to employer demand for work intensification and flexibility. The link between workers' effort and their loss of mobility is highlighted. Workers positively impact the stabilisation and standardisation of the labour process and are viewed as a high-quality, core workforce by employers. Following on is a discussion of workers' effort power and the structural constraints of Beachside, two forms of structural power that favour workers as they move through the PNP process and negotiate a new exchange bargain. Employers seek to extend the employment relationship with LS-TFWs by utilising strategies such as nomination to the PNP, internal labour markets, and family network recruitment; strategies which may also align with LS-TFWs interests.

8.1 IMPLICATIONS OF LABOUR (IM)MOBILITY

Within labour process theory, labour mobility can be a source of power for the worker or the employer, and differentials can create a power imbalance (Scott, 2010).

In Chapter 7, employers rationalised that high levels of labour mobility negatively impacted the quality of service they could provide, and LS-TFWs were necessary to stabilise the workforce and labour process. For LS-TFWs, the loss of mobility is a structural barrier to their agency, rendering them more vulnerable to exploitation (Anderson, 2010); however, Edwards (1990) argues that employee relations have relative autonomy. External forces, such as regulatory controls, are mediated by internal forces, and the distinctiveness of a point of production can produce different outcomes (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). Despite the hyper-dependence of LS-TFWs on their employers, employee relations cannot be assumed (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). Before examining labour mobility and the effort bargain, it is essential to examine some conditions that influence how employee relations are shaped.

8.1.1 Shaping employee relations

The findings in Chapter 7 drew attention to the years, resources, and effort LS-TFWs invested in acquiring the migrant capital necessary to access a temporary contract in Canada. Workers' dependence on employers began long before their labour power was activated and was conditioned by their economic inequality, their families' long-term goals, and the intense competition to access global labour markets, particularly Canada's, where the potential for PR was known to be stronger. Some workers waited years for an opportunity and experienced rejection before success: 'I think I'm really blessed because it's my third time to apply in an agency and the last agency, IPAMS, took [me]' (Jayme, RA, Royal). Another worker's approved contract was subsequently cancelled: 'The first employer that I got was from [city in Canada] and then they stopped because of mismanagement so they cancelled all of their foreign workers' (Dani, Spv, Oasis). Precarious lives and shifting political landscapes conditioned workers to do whatever it took to retain a contract. Several workers reported quitting their jobs in their origin country when they signed a contract, an opportunity cost they were unlikely to recover if the contract failed to go forward.

Other workers sacrificed professional careers and incurred costs to access recruitment opportunities, inter alia, the time and cost of the room attendant certification. Workers were also shown to be embedded in diverse family relationships and carried with them the long-term goals of their families. Family networks were strong ties and identified opportunities but also carried obligations for the workers (and their children) to be successful: 'because my kids is here in Canada [now] … because here if you're not finished the study, you can still find a job or whatever, but I just want them to finish their college to show also my family that I'm successful' (Marion, RA, Edgewater). Marion had been recommended to Edgewater by an extended family member who knew the owner and who continued to be involved, looking next for someone to sponsor Marion's children's post-secondary education. Workers arrived in Beachside fully invested in making the employment relationship work, conditioned to be successful no matter the cost.

Employers were also invested in ensuring the employment relationship worked. Chapter 7 also highlighted the time and financial resources employers invested in the TFWP, first to apply through the LMIA, then to recruit and select workers, resources that were considered well spent because of the positive impact of the LS-TFW labour pool on the labour process. Employers were conditioned by workplace and labour market structural forces that negatively impacted the accumulation of capital. The geographical context exacerbated labour shortages endemic to the hospitality sector. In the case study organisations, labour shortages and high labour mobility were most challenging in the housekeeping department, where hard jobs prevailed. Targeting workers from poorer regions with long-term goals of PR ensured workers would remain committed to the contract and the organisation.

The selection and recruitment process conditioned workers, and in the space between signing the contract and the activation of labour power in Beachside, employers worked to shape positive relations with new hires. Workers were hyper-dependent, but employers used human relations strategies to build buy-in and cooperation

instead of the more coercive approaches in other studies. At Royal, a manager contacted new hires in their origin country to welcome them to the organisation and answer any questions they had. Meeting new workers at one of the two closest airports was a strategy used by each resort. At Oasis and Shoreline, the MRA facilitated the hiring process, met workers, and drove them to their new workplace. The role of this third-party actor is distinctive in this relationship as they represent the employer but also build their relationship with workers through the hiring process, the meet and greet, and delivery to the workplace, adding them to their labour network and Facebook page. Royal was strategic in meeting and greeting workers and spoke of learning from American competitors about workers' 'buy-in' when they are made to feel special before labour is activated. The strategy worked; however, it shaped a more dependent relationship than was comfortable for the staff manager involved:

> So, we ended up having them fly into [airport 3 hours away], and then pick them up and we took them to the grocery store and to the bank. We got social insurance numbers and what I found with that is they came to me more often with other things than any other international employees have, things that I can fix for them … "we need coat hangers" (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Meeting and greeting workers before labour power was activated set a tone for the relationship, and 'caring' for workers' well-being continued into the relationship: 'I'm always checking and if there's someone who's not happy … I feel that we do a good job of trying to see what we can do to make it better, not only in the work environment but in their home environment too' (Addison, Mgr, Royal). Workers from Oasis and Royal commented on employers' willingness and desire to help: 'They want you to be happy' (Azul, GS, Royal), although both had internal labour markets and long-term intentions for these workers. Some managers' concern for workers' well-being seemed genuine, but there was also a clear calculus on the part of employers:

> I'm sure there's a dark side of that too or a small portion of it, they're doing this because if they don't, it's not going to work well in their situation. So basically, they are going "if I do this, this and this for my group of workers, they're going to perform better for me at the end of the day," and sometimes it's unfortunate, but that is the motivation of why they're doing this (Kennedy, Mgr, Royal).

Caring was perhaps a strategy to foster buy-in, but a basic humanity came across as managers discussed getting to know the workers. Kennedy (Mgr, Royal) organised day trips to the nearest big town so workers could shop for groceries and invited workers home for dinner. All managers seemed to know workers' backgrounds and goals for being in Canada. Concern for workers' situations seemed genuine, particularly when focused on mothers and children:

> Like maybe in the Philippines - I think maybe my life was hard [in Africa] but there … so there's a lot of people that they would do whatever it takes even if they don't have to see their family … she told me she didn't see her family for two years and I started crying. It was more than two years, maybe three or four years and I started crying. How could this be? … It's their children, their husband, things like that and they would just endure it because they know of the reward, I guess in the end (Camille, Mgr, Royal).

Mothers without their children troubled several interviewees, evoking sympathy because of the LS-TFWs' sacrifice, but also because of the challenges of accessing PR. Several managers seemed embarrassed or uncomfortable with LS-TFWs' sacrifices and lack of mobility and rights:

> It's great to have them and it's great the work they do but you just feel like a douche bag at the end of the day because they're here for two years and they're going to be doing that job for two years and getting paid that way for

> two years … and they will go home or try for PR ... they just want to do good work. And they want you to be happy at the end of the day ... its yes, I'm cleaning floors but are you happy with how clean the floor is? They will clean for hours until it is spotless .... I appreciate the hard work and wonderful that they try for PR but hard not to feel bad for them sometimes (Kennedy, Mgr, Royal).

Managers generally spoke of their appreciation of the hard work; yet, even when asked directly, most did not acknowledge the coercive nature of the contract to the point where it was unclear if line managers were aware workers could be deported for non-performance. It could reflect senior management or simply a reluctance to speak about their control over workers, which would be consistent with the literature. One manager emphasised his concerns about underutilising workers' skills, questioning the system's structure. He seemed almost apologetic as if he was taking advantage of an unfair bargain.

8.1.2 Influence of rural and hospitality contexts

Rural settings are more likely to influence employee relations as points of contact between workers and employers are broadened because of small community size, community social events or, as in the case of Beachside, the one small grocery store and bank. Chapter 7 reported that employers considered their workplaces or departments 'families' and attributed this to their organisation's small size. However, the small size of the community also contributed to a feeling of belonging: 'Because we are such a remote community, there's much, much more of a family environment' (Blake, Mgr, Royal). Chapter 7 highlighted WHV holders' experiences of immediately becoming part of the community, in large part because of the culture of their staff accommodation: however, LS-TFWs also commented on the warmth of a small community where everyone greeted them when out in public: '"Hi, good morning" ... so friendly' (Marion, RA, Edgewater).

In addition to the small community, each case study organisation was a small to medium-sized business, which allowed for increased contact between managers and workers and fostered more informal relations. These smaller, more intimate work experiences were new to some workers and helped shape their experience as a LS-TFW:

> I think it has a big difference because for me on my own opinion this is a small organisation. So, some of the managers, the bosses can already see you or have a good relationship with you -- not like my workplace or my previous job, we're almost one hundred and eighty public area attendants and the relationship between someone is not that ... I love it very much. To be here in Royal, you will feel like it's already your second family. All of the people are very nice especially the owner. He's a very down to earth person … he even get – I remember when I was eating my lunch, he even grabbed me water "here drink your water" because I don't get my water that time [laughter] (Jayme, RA, Royal).

Several workers remarked how it felt 'to be seen' and recognised for their hard work. The opportunity to establish a relationship with someone from management after such a short time was even more important, given employers' control over the nomination to the PNP process and the long-term family goals of the workers. Employers were all aware of workers' circumstances and their goals:

> Performance. I mean, they just care so much. They've told us their stories. They're sending money back home. They want to work eighty hours a week overtime. They'll do whatever they can do work more and make more money to be able to send back home (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

Workers at Oasis, Royal, and Edgewater commented on the more informal relations they experienced in their workplaces compared to previous experiences. At each of these resorts, workers commented on managers jumping in to help out when things were busy:

> I'm surprised for the worker relationship. It's very good …. When I came here I said "Oh, [name] is the manager. Why he's working like us?" He's working … like a carpenter or something …. I can work with [name] on this painting. I said, "You are not my manager as of now because we work together [laughter]" (Marion, RA, Edgewater).

Marion reported feeling equal in her relationship with her manager: 'So, if you have something important matter … you can talk personally [to] the owner. You can talk personally the manager'. The need and expectation for managers to jump in and help out was, at least in part, a function of the small size of the organisation and an expectation of all managers: 'I don't have an army of people to do things for me. If someone's birthday is coming up … I go to the store and buy them a birthday card … if you're going to come here, I'm going to ask you to pick up that cigarette butt if it's there' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). Hiring workers from large organisations with well-defined divisions of labour was sometimes 'huge epic fails', and foreign managers learned quickly. Camille (Mgr, Royal) was a former TFW 'Initially it made me uncomfortable … Why is the manager doing this [sweeping]' but noted the positive impact on employees when her assistant jumped in to help out: 'it kind of made them have more respect for her'. Despite her discomfort, Camille decided she needed to help out, worried if she didn't: 'maybe if I didn't do that, I'm a foreign worker too. Let's say another manager of a department would do those things so they would feel equal. That's the big difference too'.

The proximity between workers and managers can also shape how relations evolve, and it was especially close at Shoreline and Edgewater, where a small front office reception and manager's office were together and located next to the housekeeping

building; workers and managers crossed paths frequently. The proximity between workers living and working in Beachside opened opportunities for social contact, and managers at each resort spoke about being invited to workers' parties, where food was the centrepiece. Comfort levels of managers socialising with workers varied and, to a degree, aligned with the feel of the workplace. Bailey (Mgr, Edgewater) seemed extremely comfortable socialising with staff and talked about the great parties and food, which seemed consistent with his contention that the resort was a big family. Other managers were less comfortable: 'I don't hang out socially with staff. Managers I will, but not staff. I don't go to parties specifically because I've never gone to any, so I don't want to go to one and hurt someone's feelings, and it's just not my thing' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). Her desire to maintain a professional distance was reinforced throughout the interview. For another manager, attending parties was challenging but an opportunity to make workers feel more comfortable in their jobs and the workplace:

> I make a point - where I used to be like, I don't want to crash their parties' now - if I'm invited to somebody's birthday party, I make a point that I go for a while and just make sure that I'm interacting well and let them know that I'm human too, because I am, I'm not this big machine that has to be big and scary all of the time. Showing that side of myself has probably been one of the hardest things to do because … to let them know that I'm human too … and it really does make a difference (Blake, Mgr, Royal).

Her efforts to ease tensions by attending parties were predicated on workers' fears about making mistakes and being sent home, which is addressed in a further section. Managers seemed to find their way of navigating the proximity with workers, whether at work or in the community. At Shoreline, there was evidence of a more paternalistic approach throughout the interview: 'If they don't feel comfortable with someone they like … want the mother around … Yeah, I'm kind of the mother' (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Staff accommodation also broadened the contact between workers and employers, although this cannot be assumed to be positive. Some workers spoke positively about the accommodation, often because of the low cost, the instant community it provided, or because it solved the transportation issue: 'Cause I don't see myself biking somewhere else just to go to work and it's raining. Another thing, it is cold' (Dani, Spv, Oasis). At Wildwood, staff accommodation offered WHV workers access to the culture of Beachside and the seekers it attracts, whilst LS-TFWs at Royal and Shoreline commented on the built-in support system from fellow countrymen and the ability to share food costs and cooking responsibilities as they adjusted to a new culture and workplace. Mixed-gender staff accommodation was uncomfortable for one of the married workers, but he was unwilling to complain. Managers were aware of LS-TFWs' reticence to speak openly or to be critical in the workplace, and staff housing was one avenue to bridge the gap and learn about issues:

> they're sharing those experiences with each other, and then you might have somebody who would actually steps forward to come and tell you and say, "Look, this is what someone told you," and you're like, "Oh my gosh, I can't believe that happened," but that person would never actually tell us (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Managers at three of the properties lived on-site, which increased proximity and at Oasis and Edgewater, contributed to a 'family' feeling: 'I think the diversity of the whole resort is really nice because we're a smaller resort and a little bit more family … feels like family and a lot of us live together (Brook, Mgr, Oasis). It cannot be assumed that workers would feel the same way, particularly as it was clear that on-site workers at three of the resorts were expected to jump in and help as needed. However, a worker from Oasis supported Brook's account: 'The way I see it since I live on-site, it's like living with your family or something because you know everyone and you're familiar with the place … it's like a family thing because it's such a small group' (Dani, Spv, Oasis). However, the proximity afforded by on-site

accommodation could also be a negative. One of the managers at Shoreline lived on-site and felt workers were 'fair game' if they lived on-site and would knock on a worker's door if they were late in the morning.

Displacement of domestic workers would result in a suspension from the programme, but as this study highlights, issues are complex given the geographical and sectoral contexts. A supervisor who was laid off each year shared that initially, she had some misgivings about international workers being offered year-round work but reflected that the culture of the community contributed to the need:

> But look at all the people [local] here ... they don't last as long ... So, I think it's great. It's a great thing for them [LS-TFW], especially to help them out. I mean, they can bring their families over to get the education. That's why they're here, you know. It's just so nice (Quinn, Spv, Edgewater).

Other interviewees echoed her empathy with workers' longer-term goals. Generally, employers were reluctant to talk about the potential displacement of domestic workers, irrespective of quality, but everyone related to the impact of high levels of labour mobility on operations and the reliability of seekers drawn to Beachside.

A less transient, more cohesive work group fostered opportunities to develop meaningful relationships between workers. At Edgewater, domestic workers were highly transient, either seekers saving for the next holiday or students, so relationships were transient. A positive outcome of LS-TFWs as a year-round workforce was highlighted by one worker: 'You bond with them because they're here year-round with you … you do different things (Quinn, Spv, Edgewater). A more inclusive workplace culture developed, and there were more social activities and food parties outside of work. In a small, isolated community, the opportunity to develop longer-term, meaningful relationships that transcended work was important.

8.2 LABOUR MOBILITY AND THE EFFORT BARGAIN

Within the labour process, effort stabilisation and manipulation of intensity are two types of regulations that employers utilise to gain control over the quality, quantity, and distribution of worker effort (Baldamus, 1961). The organisation of work and the types of controls that management uses to standardise outputs and ensure consistency of products and services are strongly influenced by the stability or variability of the workforce (Baldamus, 1961; Dunlop, 1958). Chapter 7 identified stabilisation of the workforce and labour process as a key outcome of employers' ability to immobilise low-skilled workers and a primary rationale for employers' persistence in accessing the TFWP. The following section explores the impact of regulatory controls on mobility power and the effort bargain.

A significant body of research attests that hospitality jobs, particularly housekeeping, are 'hard', low-quality jobs that are physically demanding (Dutton et al., 2008); this research does not examine targets and specifications in any detail but rather focuses on the role of LS-TFWs and their particular effort bargain.

8.2.1 Wage–hours bargain

Chapter 7 identified seasonality and guest check-in and check-out times as structural constraints that challenged employers' ability to meet the wage-hours bargain stipulated in the TFWP contract. Three of the four case study resorts had a guest check-out time of 11 a.m. and a guest check-in time of 4 p.m., thus a five-hour window to 'flip the rooms' in preparation for new guests. Royal had a guest check-out time of noon and guest check-in of 4 p.m., so only four hours to flip the rooms. Managers and staff were under tremendous pressure to meet the resorts' obligations to their guests within the timeframe specified:

> Nobody wants to check out at seven in the morning. It's not a business hotel … by 4 o'clock, people want to be in their rooms, so you've got five hours to clean that resort. By 4 o'clock, we're done. It's done, and the guests don't want to see them [RAs] … I mean, you just need to stand at the end of our driveway and watch the cars come down because they start coming at 3 o'clock, and they want their room and they're pissed if their room isn't ready (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline).

This constraint impacted the organisation of work, requiring more workers for shorter shifts, usually six hours per day. In low season, occupancy as low as 40 percent exacerbated the challenge of meeting the wage-hours bargain. Contract conditions were exploitable, but the degree to which employers pushed the boundaries varied by resort and was influenced by the size, calibre, amenities available, and the number of LMIA workers employed. At Oasis, LS-TFWs worked in housekeeping and had no cross-functional work opportunities. The manager was vague about the full-time work requirements of the TFWP contract: 'the only thing they tie you to is at what point is the over-time pay rate …. We don't ever, to any staff, we don't guarantee any hours …. I'm not going to over staff because that would be crazy' (Brook, Oasis). One former worker described as 'independent' and insisted on full-time hours was moved to a house attendant position: 'She never wanted to go home early. Well in the public space attendant it's an eight hour a day per day … so that really worked for her'. There seemed to be a gap in the wage hours bargain, but it was difficult to discern the size of that gap, and it was clear workers would have to push to get full-time hours: 'We're able to be flexible with them too and there's always something to do when they want extra hours [beyond the six hours]' (Brook, Mgr, Oasis). The role of the state in ensuring contract obligations were met could be a source of power for the workers: 'you don't want to piss them off because they are tied to a contract. So, the happier you can make those two years, it'll impact you and they'll do a better job if they're happy'.

At Royal, workers in the kitchen and guest services reported receiving full-time hours in both low and high season and perceived the wage-hours bargain as fair, particularly when compared to other international experiences:

> Here, I have a balance life because before (Macau), I always work like 12 hours … I have one day off, although I am supposed to have two, but I am always called to work 12 more hours on my day off. But here … I think because of the government here [Canada] and also it is stricter in people who work. So … you have 8 hours, and then if you have overtime, you're paid because in my previous (Macau), even though it's paid, they don't pay me (Maya, GS, Royal).

Workers were aware of their rights and the role of the government in mediating those rights. In the housekeeping department at Royal, workers were less likely to access full-time work as room attendants; however, the size and the amenities helped create multiple opportunities to ensure full-time hours were available. Labour mobility opportunities available vertically, horizontally, inter, and intra-departmentally were reported by workers. Whether the strategy was to fill hours across the seasons, fill in gaps of workers who left the organisation, or test workers' ability to assume more responsibility, workers perceived these opportunities as a demonstration of trust from the employer and opportunities to build labour and mobility capacity. Royal could be bending the rules to provide these opportunities, but workers indicated they could say no without feeling repercussions.

Shoreline seemed the most challenged to meet the wage-hours bargain. Their long history with the TFWP and sponsoring family members and their size meant they had higher levels of staff available for work. They might require between 40 and 60 room attendants in the summer; however, structural constraints and the lack of amenities challenged their ability to offer all workers full-time. The manager was very stressed when discussing the structural constraints and their inability to meet contract conditions.

> They did say, because I had this discussion with [MRA] many times like if everyone was getting lower hours because of occupancy, then it normally isn't a problem unless someone was very angry, and they went to like a tribunal' (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Workers' resistance to the contract breach is discussed in a further section; however, there was evidence of workers pushing back against the contract violation and demanding their hours 'So, you're trying to make the best of it [TFWP and low occupancy], but the expectation is that I find them a lot more demanding in terms of hours. They want their hours (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline). The state offered avenues for complaints about employers, but Corey (Mgr, Shoreline) acknowledged during the interview that sponsored workers were required to return to their origin country if there was insufficient work. Filing a complaint about insufficient work would bear considerable risk for the complainant and potentially all the LS-TFWs in that department.

The TFWP contract was exploitable; workers were vulnerable and likely at Shoreline and Edgewater bore the cost of their idle time. For LS-TFWs, their inability to sell their labour power elsewhere was the most consistent and frustrating challenge of the TFWP. LS-TFWs would work two jobs if given the opportunity, but working outside their contract was high risk:

> Right now, I still have my old visa and an old work permit, and it's restricting because I can only work here and I can only work at housekeeping and nothing more because if you work for somebody else, you get deported, and that's what I am trying to avoid. I don't want to get deported. I mean, I've been here for three years doing whatever I can to stay here and get my residency (Dani, Spv, Oasis).

Dani worked four years before he received PR and regained his mobility power. Employers' control over workers' accommodation was another source of vulnerability and could impact workers' ability to sell their labour power even after they received PR. Marion (RA, Edgewater) recounted being approached by someone else in the community about a nighttime office cleaning job. She asked the person: 'Can I apply [person]? "Yeah, that's why I tell you if you want" … Okay, I'm going to ask my manager if I can apply another …and I'm going to ask for a reference letter'. She already had PR and regained her mobility power. Her continued uncertainty and deference to her employer were likely linked to her employer's sponsorship of her husband and the provision of free accommodation for her and her family.

8.2.2 Impact of mobility constraints on stability-effort

A common finding across all case study sites was the positive impact LS-TFWs had on the stabilisation of the workforce and the labour process. Individual differences in effort or output can negatively impact productivity and profit. The high levels of labour mobility in Beachside challenged employers' ability to provide the quality and consistency of service demanded by consumers in a high-end resort destination. LS-TFWs evolved into a 'core' workforce at all four sites where they were employed, although 'how core' was influenced by the property size and total number of workers in the affected department. On a day-to-day basis, absenteeism negatively impacted productivity and consistency at each resort and contributed to a more chaotic labour process. LS-TFWs had no to low rates of absenteeism and were valued for their dependability: 'They [LS-TFWs] never call in sick' (Morgan, Mgr, Spr, Shoreline). On-site accommodation with managers living close by may have deterred LS-TFWs from calling in sick; however, LS-TFWs were target earners and worked whenever possible, which is consistent with the literature on migrant workers generally. The culture of Beachside tended towards a more party-like atmosphere, which managers and some workers felt contributed to the unreliability and high levels of absenteeism of domestic seekers: 'They call in sick when hungover, go to work hungover with

messy hair' (Dani, Spv, Oasis). Workers who could be relied on to show up were a reprieve from the chaos of high labour mobility; even though employers were challenged to meet the wage-hours bargain, they insisted that a minimum number of core workers was always needed: 'if the existing one's leave, I would like to have that anchor of having a couple of 2-year employees [LMIA] that guaranteed would be here' (Bailey, Mgr, Royal). The need for continued access to LS-TFWs was echoed at each case study site. Core workers helped stabilise the production process, but given the temporal nature of the TFWP, core workers needed to be constantly replenished. At each resort, workers were at various stages of the LMIA-PNP-PR process, but once workers received PR, their mobility was their own.

High levels of mobility had negatively impacted quality and service standards, but employers were also concerned with a contagion effect. The findings highlighted that each employer considered all international workers good workers, not just LS-TFWs, whose mobility was constrained. International workers had a positive impact on the workgroup and raised the bar for the rest of the team:

> I find now I have to adapt myself more to the people that are international. I actually have to; I hesitate to say I am harder on Canadians. I wouldn't say my expectations are very different. The international workers set a very high bar, and now that I've been working with them for so long, I tend -- I'm not willing to accept as much from other people now … the excuses and the not showing up for work and you don't let the team down, it's very much- it's a stronger team when you have the international workers on board (Blake, Mgr, Royal).

Migrant workers raising the bar for other workers is consistent with the literature, although not all workers were receptive in this study. When asked if other workers rose to the challenge, the response was 'sometimes they do, sometimes they don't' (Blake, Mgr, Royal). Employers had stories of behaviours they felt forced to tolerate because a 'warm body' was better than none but having LS-TFWs allowed them to

make different hiring decisions. Maintaining group cohesiveness became a priority when hiring:

> We had a really bad labour shortage starting mid-December, really bad, and I just went like, we're just going to suck it up and just be very slow about how we interview and get the right crew, and it's a benefit for not just hiring for legs because it does get that scary … I feel, it's like we have a really good group of people, everyone gets along, there's been no issues (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Concerned with the contagion effect of highly transient, low-quality workers on the team, Shoreline and Royal managers preferred to operate short-staffed rather than hire local seekers at the last minute. Given the structural constraints of housekeeping departments, this requires further interrogation. The impact of work intensification on the effort bargain is discussed in a further section.

Consistency is another manifestation of a stable labour process and one of the most common attributes of 'good workers' in the literature. In this study, Oasis and Royal, both higher-end properties, emphasised consistency as an important contribution of LS-TFWs:

> Yes, we're busy, yes, we were short staffed, yes, we all worked a lot of hours, but the team environment is - I've never seen it like this before. The skill set - the lack of guest complaints, the consistency - I mean part of that has been the supervisors in housekeeping are now doing the training for the new employees, which has really put on another spin on things (Blake, Mgr, Royal).

The stabilisation of the workforce impacted the organisation of work at both Shoreline and Royal. Both organisations had previously utilised a job shadowing approach to training new workers. With LS-TFWs on board, Shoreline assigned one person to train all new workers whilst Royal took a different approach: 'We changed our strategies last spring, … we were [are] dedicated to have a supervisor training each and every new employee that comes in (Blake, Mgr, Royal), which resulted in an additional supervisor being hired.

Employers' participation in the TFWP resulted in increased investment in training by employers, although sometimes reluctantly. One common strategy for four of the case sites was spending time during low season on enhanced training for workers. The frequent turnover of housekeeping managers at Shoreline was chaotic, but the new manager planned to use workers' guaranteed hours during the winter to train:

> [I] discovered the weaknesses and strengths of everybody' and have a plan for winter hours … the first three months of the year are going to be heavily focused on training so that when we do hit the really busy time, we can hit the ground running and go and then everybody will know what the expectations are (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline).

Morgan's comment 'to hit the ground running' and knowing 'expectations' reflects the dual role of training as a control mechanism to stabilise quality of outputs and to increase speed and productivity. Cross-training inter, and intra-departments were also strategies employers used to fill hours in the winter, enhance the skills of workers, and prepare for a busy season. At any of the resorts, it was unclear if all workers benefitted from the training or just the LS-TFWs. The guaranteed hours requirement also forced employers to be more creative in assessing how their resources were spent. Shoreline purchased carpet equipment so cleaning could be done in-house; during the winter, LS-TFWs were trained to clean carpets, which became part of their regular duties.

LS-TFWs also had a positive impact on staff planning and organisation:

> Planning and making sure that you're not having this mass exodus … every two years … you're timing your LMO so that … one or two people may leave … this quarter and another two may leave next quarter so you do not have to mass train a bunch of people (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater).

In planning for high season, LMIA workers were prioritised for work, and other, more transient labour pools were peripheral and part of a 'gap' management plan:

> I have my really good core people that I work with that are on 2-year [LMIA] contracts, and they all want their PNP, of course, all of them, and then I'll start looking at the international people [WHV, international students] to fill in the gaps (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Flexibilisation is a key feature of neoliberal market economies; however, what that means at the worksite can have different meanings. The findings in this study identify ways in which LS-TFW's loss of mobility power provided additional sources of flexibilisation for employers. On-site staff accommodation was one source of flexibility, although some workers saw benefits as well:

> They pick up any extra shifts when people call in sick or when you're struggling, you need that extra body, and you know, whereas North American workers are, specifically, you know, local workers its Monday to Friday, 9 to 5, you know, they won't necessarily jump in and help out where needed. For our resort, it's a little different because, like I said, we are a family. Most people will jump in and help out when needed (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater).

Staff accommodation increased flexibility for employers but also benefitted some LS-TFWs who were target earners: 'They [locals and seekers] not like us who are flexible … we work as long as we earn income "Okay. We can work until what time?" (Marion, RA, Edgewater). Her comments imply that workers were paid for their time, and it was viewed as a mutual gain. Flexibility could be a way to augment income; however, some workers identified it as an opportunity to position themselves more favourably with employers and demonstrate their dedication to the job and the workplace:

> It's like you have your dedication to the job and being there whenever they ask you to … the other day, we were already done outside … then apparently, there were still two cottages to do, and I was already home, napping, relaxing, the days' done and all that. Then you get the radio, "can you stay back?" because we still need to do … so those small things that you can contribute or whatever. Just whatever you can do, basically (Dani, Spv, Oasis).

Scheduling was another form of flexibility demanded from workers that benefited employers to the detriment of workers. All positions in this study required shift work, and LS-TFWs were perceived to be more flexible than seekers and locals in their willingness to accommodate shifts that were structured to minimise costs:

> They [TFWs] are flexible as well with their shifts. Our shifts are always changing, so generally, their days off aren't always the same, and sometimes, it is a split shift, and sometimes you are required to work in the am one week and the pm the next week. So, I also find that foreign workers are generally a bit more flexible in their work schedule as well because they're more committed and seem to be more focused on their jobs come first, life comes second where, domestically, it's the other way around (Addison, Mgr, Royal).

In this study, workers' flexibility is driven by the regulatory controls that prevent them from selling their labour power elsewhere, so being 'at the ready' for their employer could be necessary to get their full-time hours or access additional shifts. Housekeeping schedules were even more precarious, constraining workers mobility during discretionary time as they waited to be called upon. Schedules were driven by occupancy so were last minute, and then changed daily after being posted: 'We are dependent on occupancy …we post the schedule on Thursday (each week), and by Tuesday of the next week, the numbers have changed drastically (Blake, Mgr, Royal). Changes to schedules would impact their ability to earn, so workers had no choice but to be flexible until they regained their labour mobility power. Workers who received PR were noted to be less flexible: 'now that I [PR workers] have the ball, right, so I can do whatever I want. I can say no' (Ariel, Spv, Royal). Their reduced flexibility could also be a function of their enhanced labour market mobility power as most take on second jobs after PR.

8.2.3 Work intensification

Within the labour process, intensification of worker effort can manifest as either higher rates of productivity or speed or through the extension of labour power and longer worker days. There were similarities across the case studies in that effort intensity was focused on productivity and speed, although it was apparent that LS-TFWs would welcome longer hours and overtime. Employers rationalised work intensification in the form of productivity or speed as a function of the structural constraints of a seasonal resort destination and individual departments.

Targets and specifications, as well as distribution of work, varied at each of the resorts. At Royal, workers were assigned between 7 – 9 rooms each, depending on the size and number of amenities in each room. The small numbers reflect the extra work demanded by higher amenities in each room and the shorter work time available to service rooms. Shoreline favoured a team approach, and team size

ranged from 3-6 depending on the assigned unit size. At Oasis and Edgewater, work was assigned individually, and number of units assigned varied according to cabin size.

Whilst workloads cannot be compared across the cases because of the uniqueness of each accommodation, different service standards, and varied approaches to the organisation of work, tight targets were a common feature across the resorts. Workers were pressured to increase productivity and speed to meet target specifications:

> And you have to manage things to time because we only work at a certain time. So, we have to be fast. We have to move fast in order the flip a room in the most efficient manner in the soonest time possible. So, you have to manage what you do in a certain time … time management (Fran, RA, Shoreline).

LS-TFWs taking responsibility for managing their time and meeting target specifications were reinforced by workers at other resorts where time pressures prevailed. A manager at one resort commented that new workers' attention to detail was excellent, but it took new LS-TFWs some time to adjust to the faster pace demanded of them in Canada. The pressure to increase speed due to differences in work speed between countries was also reported by a worker at another resort, who felt pressured to take responsibility for being slower:

> Here is like, oh you have to work cause time is riding and we – we have to reach this time so we get done blah, blah, blah … if you are late they will tell it's Filipino time, and if you are on time they will say it's like American or Canadian time (Lyn, RA, Oasis).

In the hospitality sector, employment relationships are sometimes considered triadic because guests impact the labour process. LS-TFWs reported feeling pressured by managers and supervisors to perform, but also by the imperative to meet guests' needs: 'it's a fast-paced environment because every time the guest needs that one, so you have to do it … so when you're working so slow, you'd be so behind' (Lyn, RA, Oasis). Workers assumed responsibility for meeting guest needs and doing it within a pre-set timeline, whether it was reasonable or not. Lyn indicated she would 'stay' to finish her work (presumably without pay).

Several workers spoke about their role in helping others if they finished early but also if a worker was behind, a factor differentiating them from workers from other labour pools. There was not a sense that workers were forced to help others, although they might have felt pressure from managers or fellow workers. Employers' control over access to PR seemed to be a greater influence. Workers interviewed expressed helping others as an opportunity to show how they could benefit the organisation, a step important to them leading up to the PNP nominations:

> When I have free times, still I can help some of the room attendants to clear around some rooms, do the beds and the – I'm not boasting or making myself to be – because I'm doing my job very well, I wanted to contribute as much as possible because ... if you work you always need to give your best and exceed expectations from you. Like you're not just paid for this, but you can also show that sometimes you have to step up' (Jayme, RA, Royal).

The work was also physically demanding: 'you know it is like working out every day, get sweat[y]' (Jayme, RA, Royal). Physically demanding work at a fast pace required time to adjust to:

> Every time our break time, I always rush to eat, and then I have to take a nap because I'm very tired. And then in the afternoon, when I'm done from work,

> I have to sleep. I have to sleep because I'm very tired, and I'm not used to it [pace and work] (Jesse, RA, Edgewater).

Managers at Shoreline and Royal made decisions to operate short-staffed as opposed to hire low-quality, transient workers:

> Personally, what's changed with me is right in the interview. I don't chase people anymore. Yes, we might be desperate for workers, but I'm going to pick the people that are best for the team not, because I just need people. I think very much first of the team and the impact on the team when I'm interviewing somebody and actually it really helps (Blake, Mgr, Royal).

Blake indicated they operated with eight to ten fewer workers than normal in high season because expected workers did not arrive. Given the structural constraints of the housekeeping department, work would still need to be done in the short time frame, highlighting the speed and productivity demands put on workers. Employers could impose high target specifications on individual workers and rely on the individual and other team members to take responsibility for meeting those targets, even when they were unrealistic. This draws attention to the relationship between work intensification and labour mobility.

8.2.4 Effort power and mobility power

Effort intensity varies between the maximum effort a worker is willing to expend and the minimum effort intensity an employer is willing to accept. The findings draw attention to the link between workers' effort power and mobility power and how LS-TFWs' loss of mobility power diminished effort power as a negotiable resource for the worker. It is clear from earlier discussions on labour shortages, high levels of mobility, and the culture of Beachside that employers were challenged to establish a

minimum standard of effort they were willing to accept, often resorting to hiring 'warm bodies'. The findings thus far have also highlighted LS-TFWs as hard workers subject to high levels of work intensification.

Managers, supervisors, and LS-TFWs raised the difference between the effort intensity of LS-TFWs and Canadian workers. Earlier discussions highlighted managers and workers alike attributing LS-TFWs' reputation as hard workers to the seriousness of their goals, and some Canadian workers' lack of seriousness was attributed to their focus on gaining personal experiences as opposed to work. However, some workers also highlighted Canadian workers' ability to strike a different effort bargain than that of the LS-TFWs: 'They [Canadians] don't really give out more of what is – this is my job description, and this is what I am going to do'(Azul, GS, Royal) whilst LS-TFWs were not in a position to say no: "this is my job description, and you have addition to do - are you going to do it" and the answer is always yes' (Azul, GS, Royal). Employer control over workers' mobility and ability to have them deported left LS-TFWs feeling powerless to resist demands for flexibilisation and work intensification. Although there was no evidence that workers were threatened with deportation, their power to do so weighed heavily on workers:

> That I am dispensable, that I can be disposed … I don't want to make mistakes … It's a worry, but as far as I have seen [the manager] is not like that kind of person who would say "okay you're out since you made mistake" if they think you are slower than others or not a fast learner … they always give you a chance to improve on your skills (Azul, GS, Royal).

Azul looked for cues as to how the employer would react to mistakes, and the network of workers who already moved through the PNP-PR process was a resource. Her fears were echoed by other workers, particularly in the early stages of the contract:

> I'm scared. Maybe I'm not qualified … or something like this because there is an evaluation here when you come three months after and if you qualify. I said, "Oh Lord, please help me … I have my family. I sent money for them (Marion, RA, Edgewater).

Whilst the loss of mobility weakened LS-TFWs' bargaining power, the low levels of unemployment and the structural constraints in Beachside strengthened Canadian workers' mobility power. LS-TFWs noted how the open labour market was a source of power in effort bargaining for Canadians 'I'm paid so I'll do this [Canadians] but ours is different ... and we're not from here. They can send us back anytime they want … Canadians say: "I can find another job if things doesn't work" (Rivera, RA, Royal).

Effort intensity is also shaped by the minimum effort intensity that managers are willing to accept, which, in turn, is influenced by labour market conditions and what employers can 'get'. When labour shortages were critical and labour mobility high, employers were not in a position to negotiate effort intensity, as evidenced in the preceding 'warm body' discussions. Employers were able to establish new standards of effort intensity with LS-TFWs however, new norms, like the workers themselves, could be temporary:

> In the housekeeping department, I think the foreign workers are much faster than some of the Canadian workers. In the previous summer, they decided not to bring in foreign workers; we had so many complaints in the hotel about housekeeping. The Canadian workers couldn't work as fast and, it's not that they couldn't work as fast, and it's not they were making them work fast … they have an attitude I can go work someone else ... it's not a passion … someone from the Philippines is coming to get their residency so they work and they work hard, and that's what they are used to, they work in cruise ships and countries where the job market is so competitive that there's always

> someone who can do your job faster so you better work (Camille, Mgr, Royal).

Camille's comments were a reminder that room attendants play a key role in the labour process, and high mobility or poor-quality or inconsistent output negatively impacts capital accumulation. Canadian workers were able to limit the amount of effort power they were willing to expend, and without access to foreign workers, managers were forced to accept it. Camille's comments underscore the power dynamics in mobility-effort bargaining and the importance of mobility capability in negotiating effort power. LS-TFWs' loss of mobility power allowed employers to extract higher levels of effort than was possible from other labour pools. The re-introduction of LS-TFWs a year later had a positive impact on outputs, as is evidenced in guest feedback:

> So, if we don't hear anything, no news is good news. It's kind of how I have to take that because we didn't, I mean [it is] a good example of the team and how well they work. Last year, at least once a week, we were having to send apology cards to guests and buying them beverages because the rooms weren't ready at 4 o'clock; not one this year. And that's the team; it's everybody helping, everybody else out at the end of the day. There's nobody wasting time because they want to get in and get the job done (Blake, Mgr, Royal).

With LS-TFWs on board, managers were able to establish new effort norms. Employers' willingness to operate short-staffed to protect team cohesiveness also protected the new norms or standards of output and the high levels of effort intensity that were established, at least in some part by the LS-TFS. Seekers or locals can disrupt the labour process by resisting work intensification and refusing to buy into the 'team' by simply leaving when the shift is over, a practice noted by several managers. Employer control over workers' mobility is temporary; however, sustained effort intensification requires constant replenishment of new 'core' workers and an

extension of the employment relationship with those workers who have established the higher norms.

Employers understood and valued the impact of workers' loss of mobility on the labour process but seemed reluctant to relate it to the coercive nature of the regulatory controls 'You would think that because someone's on a contract then they wouldn't be worried about being fired and that they wouldn't have to work as hard but they just ... I don't know. I don't know what it is' (Brook, Mgr, Oasis). Attributing workers' performance to their serious, long-term goals was common among employers, and several managers believed LS-TFWs' passion for their work or the hard labour processes in their origin countries contributed to their effort intensity.

8.3 MOBILITY EFFORT BARGAINING – SHIFTING POWER

A common and unusual finding across case study organisations was employers' willingness to nominate all workers who requested it to the PNP, assuming they passed their probation. Interrogating 'why' employers were willing to nominate all workers who requested it, even when they did not have full-time employment available, offers new insight into how workplace and marketplace structural power can be unexpected sources of power for workers in a hyper-dependent employment relationship.

8.3.1 Structural sources of power for workers

Chapter 7 identified population density, distance to density, and the culture of the community as factors exacerbating recruitment and retention issues endemic to the hospitality sector, as well as contributing to higher levels of labour mobility. The structural constraints of Beachside translated into a source of structural power for LS-TFWs. Employers needed them, even when they did not. The preceding

discussion highlighted LS-TFWs as a high-quality, well-trained, hard-working labour pool that was compliant and reliable. Nominating workers to the PNP extended workers' immobility until PR was approved, which at the time of this research ranged between six months and 3.5 years:

> For Beachside, for a housekeeper, two years minimum is a long time and we know that majority of them do want to get their permanent residency. So, they do actually stay almost three years because they have to stay with you through that process to get the permanent residency. So, we're lucky [usually] if we get someone for a year' (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

Brook's comments signal the workplace power of the LS-TFWs, filling jobs plagued by chronic shortages and high labour mobility that are material to the labour process and the accumulation of capital. For employers, LS-TFWs resolved both the effort and mobility indeterminacies of the labour process. The nomination of LS-TFWs to the PNP could be a source of mutual gain for both parties, depending on the timeframe of the process. Workers could meet their goals of PR, and employers continued to benefit from an immobilised workforce. Nominating a worker for PNP was one strategy to extend the employment relationship while the worker waited for PR approval; however, internal labour markets and family network recruitment were two other strategies used by employers.

8.3.2 Internal labour markets

Because of the geographical location, limited access to a quality labour force, and high levels of labour mobility, an internal labour market was an important mechanism to extend the employment relationship with an already well-trained, high-quality workforce; however, the opportunity varied according to the size of the property and amenities offered. Internal labour markets at Shoreline and Edgewater

were limited to the front desk or housekeeping. Although opportunities occasionally arose, there was no evidence that they were part of the PNP process. At Oasis, sponsorship of LS-TFW was limited to the housekeeping department, and two of the interviewees in this study were recently promoted to supervisor:

> Just having that stable work force, especially now that we've promoted three of them to supervisors to have that consistency for the manager to be able to keep up with cleaning standards. It's one thing to have the solid workers but if your supervisor team at least is that consistently solid it really filters down to your staff (Brook, Mgr, Oasis).

The overarching goal for each LS-TFW was PR, and the LS-TFWs at Oasis were all successful. A promotion to supervisor meant higher wages and more Canadian experience at a higher skill level. Workers with supervisory experience had greater labour market mobility power and increased chances of occupational and geographical mobility when they decided to leave Beachside:

> I want to stay a little bit more 'because I just got promoted, so I just want to get more experience ... I need to be more secure ... I can't just leave and start over again. If I end up moving somewhere, I don't want to go back to before [entry level] (Dani, Spv, Oasis).

Dani was married, so the PR process took much longer; he had been waiting almost four years and still had not received it. Despite the delay, Dani felt very positive about the promotion, his impending PR, and the decision to come to Beachside: 'it's worth it [a TFWP contract in Beachside].' He reported feeling more 'secure' and used his 'immobility' to strategise the next steps. He hoped to gain experience in another department and pursue another degree. The other two LS-TFWs who were promoted had received their PR the year before but were still immobilised, waiting for their family members to go through the PNP and PR process. Sponsorship of family

members as a strategy to extend the employment relationship of LS-TFWs is examined in a further section.

Royal had the strongest internal labour market of all of the case study sites and was strategic in targeting workers with supervisory potential who might stay after receiving PR: 'So obviously, the goal is to have people here for the long term, longevity is always the goal ... what can we do to keep them on? (Addison, Mgr, Royal). They were proud of their internal labour market and felt that the strategy was successful, an important consideration given the high calibre of their resort and the length of time needed to orient and train workers:

> What is fantastic is so many of our employees that come to us through the TFWP, and why it works for us is because they get their PR through PNP for the most part, and then they become permanent residents, but at that point, they're already very likely in supervisory or management positions. So, it's a talent pool for us whether it's from Southeast Asia or Europe (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Two managers interviewed in this research were former TFWs, which sent a strong message to new LS-TFWs about the potential for PR and a career in hospitality. The potential for promotion was also put forward to discipline underperforming workers and reinforce the effort required to advance in the organisation: 'I kind of put that out there … you know, you have to pull up your socks here because buddy boy here does a way better job than you. I think that because most people here are always vying for another position, the chance of promotion is really strong' (Riley, Mgr, Royal). LS-TFWs at Royal felt they had the same opportunities as other workers.

Their internal promotion strategy was part of Royal's recruitment and selection process, highlighted in Chapter 7, where the focus was on hiring LS-TFWs with 'real' hospitality and transnational experience. Promotions and expanded job opportunities

seemed commonplace, even for LS-TFWs. Workers reported feeling valued and trusted, building commitment to the organisation. Danso (DW/KH, Royal) was recruited as a dishwasher but invited to work some shifts in kitchen prep: 'I'm the third person in the dishwashing offered that kind of opportunity … I do both now … I have a vision that I can make it to be a cook'. The first two workers offered the opportunity refused it; Danso valued the opportunity to learn new skills, as did several other workers who were given intra and inter-departmental opportunities: 'They offered me another position in the same department … I'm very grateful with the company for choosing me' (Azul, GS, Royal). Azul was surprised and pleased to be given the opportunity, and the perceived trust in her eased her fears of 'being dispensable'. Whilst there was a sense of mutual gain, for at least some workers, the opportunities could also be part of a strategy of functional flexibility necessary to meet the wage-hours bargain during low season.

Another tactic used by Royal to extend the employment relationship that some workers considered coercive was their request that workers commit to an additional year of work after receiving their PR in exchange for the PNP nomination. One of the managers interviewed had come through the process and was currently working on their extra year 'I'm happy to do that, why you would want to screw yourself over with working this hard and then no one's going to give you a good reference if you leave halfway' (Camille, Mgr, Royal). The extension requested by Royal had no legal basis, and when workers received their PR, their labour mobility power was once again their own. Some workers who agreed to the extra year left as soon as they received their PR 'I have seen many people get their PR and leave which I feel disrespectful in a way. Like someone helped you and goodbye' (Camille, Mgr, Royal); she rationalised the jobs involved were entry-level and references were not important.

8.3.3 Family as a strategy for controlling worker labour mobility

Employers' ability to name and sponsor LS-TFWs' family members was another mechanism to extend the employment relationship and further control workers' mobility as they waited for their family members to go through the PNP and PR process. Jules (Spv, Oasis), who had received his PR and been promoted to supervisor, was more than ready to move on. Beachside was a means to an end, a temporary commitment to build mobility capacity in the Canadian labour market; however, he had to wait while his fiancée moved through the recruitment, PNP and PR process:

> I prefer to be in the city because it's quite boring here if you are going to stay for long ... I was planning to leave, but not for now because my girlfriend is here. So, I got her from the Philippines also last December and she has like, her working contract here, so I can't leave. So now I'll see (Jules, Spv, Oasis).

Jules's advocacy for his girlfriend further constrained his mobility by at least two or more years. He was in his fourth year, having received PR the year before; however, his girlfriend was just beginning the PNP process. He had regained his mobility power but was constrained by his family obligations and the limited labour market in Beachside. He purchased a vehicle and moved out of staff housing, which created some boundaries around his mobility capacity, but he was clear it was difficult for him to stay in Beachside.

LS-TFWs who were married with dependants were even more vulnerable to ongoing mobility constraints. They could only meet the income threshold required for PNP if the employer agreed to sponsor their spouse; once both were employed, the PNP-PR process could begin. Both Edgewater and Shoreline had sponsored spouses of workers. Edgewater offered free family accommodation: 'the most is they …provide us a home which is a trailer …so we have privacy with my whole family … that's the

number one that I am very thankful to the owner and the Edgewater's manager' (Marion, RA, Edgewater). Whilst there may be a humanitarian reason for supporting family reunification, supporting the spouse immobilised the worker and the family for an extended time. Moreover, family reunification offered another level of flexibilisation:

> One of our [worker's] younger daughters, she's 15. She works in there [coffee stand] on the weekends. And now for the summer … she'll be working there during the week, so again, another benefit of having a Filipino family. I've got four out of five kids [working], and they only reason I don't have the fifth kid is he's too young to work (Bailey, Mgr, Edgewater).

Edgewater, Royal, and Oasis each differed in their strategies to recruit and extend the employment relationship through family recruitment, and those strategies seemed to align with the organisation's culture, calibre, and size. Shoreline was the anomaly. They had years of experience in the TFWP and worked through an MRA; however, their strategy was unclear. Most year-round staff members were from the Philippines, and some were young mothers with dependants. The manager was visibly stressed and under pressure as a direct result of her control over workers' and their families future mobility. On a personal level, she empathised with the plight of the international workers, particularly when they were forced to leave their children behind in their origin country:

> I find that a really, really hard thing for me ... a lot of them hound me about the PNP. Hound me. And in some ways, I don't necessarily want to say no because I mean, I understand why they're here, but in other ways, I have to be very blunt. It's not like ... they should be here for that whole time, you know. I can refuse people, but I have a hard time doing it … I have a girl [RA] with two kids at home, it's like well, if it doesn't work out, it doesn't work out … they start sending me their families and resumes so there's that pressure too, right. I mean [worker] downstairs, she just got her mom over. Her mom is 65.

> She works for us now as a housekeeper. Now she wants to have her sister come over. I have said you bring that through [MRA], but I don't want to hire family members … because I mean her mom has diabetes. Her English isn't that good (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Managers at Oasis and Edgewater also spoke of stacks of resumes on their desks, but at Shoreline, there was an impression that the workers had captured the hiring process. The MRA was a buffer against workers advocating for family members, and a recent decision to switch recruitment to Mexico reflected a desire to regain control. However, the new worker from Mexico was married with children and hoped for PR, which would also require the spouse to be sponsored. During the interview, there were references to a husband arriving to start work, a lawyer doing his housekeeping certification so he could join his wife and stories of workers who had come and gone. Deciding a family's future would be challenging at any time, but more so when you worked closely with those affected. The manager's stance, 'if it doesn't work out, it doesn't work out' was inconsistent her actions and did not last for the length of the interview:

> They all want their PNPs. It is difficult with some of them. We have one girl that had some problems getting her work visa when she was here. She came from another property [Edgewater] also. They couldn't give her the hours, so she moved from there to here …. but it's hard for her because she has a husband and two children to be able to get her PNP because she needs so much money in the bank to be able to get everyone over. There's also a gentleman here that has three children, so the only thing that they could do is have their husbands trained as a room attendant, and we could get them over, and their combined incomes would work with two kids here ... but wow, what a sacrifice (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

Her empathy for the plight of the workers seemed genuine, and whatever pressures she felt, it seemed she used her power over workers' future mobility to facilitate

access to PR, even when it was not in the interests of the operation. Shoreline had no amenities and struggled the most with offering full-time work in low season. They were not meeting the wage-hours bargain of the TFWP contract and were worried about being reported to a tribunal. Complaints could result in them being suspended from the programme, so perhaps they felt compelled to keep sponsoring workers. When speaking of two new workers who had just transferred from another province, the manager commented: 'I'm like well there's another two that will want to stay. How do you say no?' (laughing) (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline).

The findings show that despite their loss of mobility and bargaining power, workers had resources and exercised agency in meeting their personal goals and those of their families. The small, remote, rural community and small business contexts shaped employee relations. Workers were seen and able to have more personal relationships with managers and other community members, share their stories and advocate for themselves and their families for a more permanent future. Workers also benefitted from two sources of structural power, which increased their bargaining power and weakened employers' bargaining position. High employment and chronic sectoral labour shortages were a source of mobility or marketplace power for workers. Within the labour process, the role of room attendants was crucial to meeting guest needs and the accumulation of capital but was shunned by many workers. LS-TFWs were hard-working and well-educated and demonstrated the positive impact they could have on quality, service standards, and the organisation's culture. Their role in the labour process was a source of structural power that they were aware of and used to negotiate the sponsorship of family members.

8.4 RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE

Discussions thus far have demonstrated that regulatory controls reduced workers' ability to resist difficult work intensification and flexibilisation, although this was not consistent across case study organisations. A change in leadership and leadership style at Shoreline led to fractious relations between workers and the new manager,

who adopted a hard HRM approach and implemented changes across the department. Workers engaged in a range of tactics to resist those changes. When hours were cut, workers, including LS-TFWs, slowed the pace of work to extend the hours. LS-TFWs tried to assert their rights by pushing for 'their' hours to the manager, who was frustrated by workers' behaviours: 'they don't understand what their role was and what they have to do … they trying to drag it out as much as possible because they want their hours' (Morgan, Mgr, Shoreline). Workers avoided the manager, not speaking when she was near and looking to other supervisors or managers for direction. Punctuality was an issue for one of the LS-TFWs, and the manager reported she would knock on his door when he was late and that it was 'fair game' if workers lived on-site. The worker was just starting the PNP process but was not concerned that his relationship with the manager would affect the process. Instead, he understood the MRA was responsible for PNP.

At Royal and Oasis, the coercive nature of the TFWP and workers' loss of mobility impacted workers' ability to express dissent or resist workplace pressures:

> I think sometimes people who have the right to work in other places and go freely wherever they want to they would be more verbal about their feelings and expressive whereas someone who knows this ... it's a compromise sometimes they would be more of like it's not worth the conflict for what the reward is, it's like you're going to pick your battles. I don't like the way, but it isn't worth it to fight about it. I think people are always a little bit scared because, if you're going to be the employee who would be creating troubles all the time, then as a temporary worker, they can say, "well you've done your three years now, thank you very much goodbye". No one's going to want to help you then, so kind of suck a little bit of things up that you maybe necessarily if you had the right to open your mouth ... not that you don't. (Camille, Mgr, Royal).

The loss of voice as a result of the regulatory controls was echoed by another worker: 'you already know what your job is, and you signed it so it's either you suck, or you play your game and be better at your job' (Dani, Spr, Oasis). This sense of being aware of what to expect in advance of signing the contract was echoed by several workers. Managers at each resort noted workers' reluctance to voice concerns but attributed it to cultural differences and working history in countries where the labour process was much harsher. Some workers also attributed their reticence to speak up or to voice concerns as cultural: 'We are not used to being frank … We don't really say what we want all the time … we just keep it to ourselves' (Fran, RA, Shoreline). Managers at Royal and Shoreline reported new workers were reserved; until they were comfortable, another worker would accompany them when they needed to discuss concerns with their employer: 'Probably about 6 months to a year [before being comfortable]. There's a big group of them. So, if one is not comfortable because usually two people come into my office … someone speaks' (Corey, Mgr, Shoreline). Staff housing was also a grapevine for learning about workers' issues, which would get back to management.

A worker who had received their PR highlighted the sense of being under constant pressure or evaluation because of employers' control over their future. Even if the employer is a good employer and the experience has been positive, the nature of the contract was oppressive:

> I can't express the feeling like this when one of the temporary workers, as soon as he got his residence, he said to me it's like being a dog on a chain and once you get the chain is taken off your neck and like you're free to go wherever you want to and I said to him "it's kind of like I can understand that". I feel like after I got it, I feel very free, whereas before that I didn't feel, you kind of felt that you were under evaluation the whole time. So now that you have it, it's of course you feel you that you have the freedom and that's a big achievement, not achievement, but a big life (Camille, Mgr, Royal).

Overt acts of resistance were not discernible, except at Shoreline, but examples of resilience came across during interviews. LS-TFWs looked to the collective, the local ethnic network, for guidance on workplace issues: 'Especially with the ones who are the pioneers here, you get advice from them on what to do in certain things because they have been there' (Fran, RA, Shoreline). Staff accommodation was also a source of sustenance 'It makes you feel somehow at home too because you have the same culture, same language, same whatever they're feeling …. those are my housemates …. my family for two years' (Azul, RA, Royal). Several workers reflected on self-talk as a coping mechanism: 'It's like family-focused because you're always thinking that you're doing this for your family, for their future, for the kids' future. So, focus on family and then you can do it' (Rivera, RA, Royal).

Most managers and some LS-TFWs referenced social gatherings usually centred around food that took place in workers' spaces but seemed inclusive. These cultural celebrations, workers' collective affiliation with the only church in Beachside, and acts of neighbouring or caring for new arrivals were all sustaining practices that came across in interviews:

> When we came… we didn't know anyone. Two people from our group know another family here, but the rest of us; we didn't know anyone. But when we came, all the Filipinos gathered in one house, they cooked something and shared food. Invited us over for our first day or first night because they know that we don't have food yet, we don't have groceries yet or anything. So, they took care of our dinner when we arrived then, introduced everyone (Azul, GS, Luxury Co).

Managers perceived LS-TFWs as reserved and self-sufficient because they looked within their network for support with transportation. Workers set up a communal emergency insurance fund through the church in case someone had to return home unexpectedly, or a car broke down. Workers with cars took groups to the nearest large town to shop where groceries were less expensive. Managers' perception of

workers as reserved or self-sustaining also manifested in workers' ownership of their mobility power once they received PR. Despite the family-type relations managers felt fostered, the Edgewater manager only heard about a long-term family's plan to leave through the grapevine. A manager at Royal spoke of a similar experience:

> you feel you have this wonderful relationship, and they're your friends, and they invite you to all sorts of things, but you will never really actually know what's going on. They might come the next day and present you with a resignation notice (Riley, Mgr, Royal).

Several interviewees commented that single workers tended to move to a city once they received PR; however, managers at Edgewater and Royal commented that single workers were out the door as soon as their PR arrived. A couple of line managers noted a difference in work ethic in the space between the approval and the actual paper arriving in the mail: 'Sometimes, once they get their PR - because they know they're free at that point, they're like, I'm not going to listen to you anymore. I'll do whatever I want' (Kennedy, Mgr, Royal). Kennedy was also surprised at the speed of workers' exit once it arrived '"there's my resignation, thank you my PR is here, yes that's my PR [showing the paper], there's my resignation, have a great day". And it is that cut and dried, that quick'. Workers exited, even at the peak of high season, which was an issue for employers; however, they no longer had control over workers' mobility. Keeping tabs on expected PR approvals was important to ensure a smooth transition.

8.4.1 Rewards and motivation

In this study, a nomination for PNP was the most significant motivator for LS-TFWs, a commonality across all case study organisations. Whilst workers' situations were less precarious once they received that nomination, they did not feel 'safe' until they

received their PR: 'I don't want to get deported. I mean I've been here for three years doing whatever I can to stay here and get my residency' (Dani, Spv, Oasis). At Shoreline, Oasis, and Edgewater, sponsorship of family members was also a strong motivator for workers.

There were other commonalities regarding strategies to motivate workers, however, the degree to which they were used varied across case study sites. Royal was the most strategic in its approach, using recognition programmes and events, department meetings to showcase work and workers, Christmas gifts, bonuses, time off, training programmes, and a strong internal labour market to keep workers engaged and aligned with company goals. Edgewater was lower key and reported that their most valuable tool was a suggestion box, and workers whose suggestion was used had their name entered into a draw for a flight anywhere in the world.

Verbal recognition was an important motivator mentioned by workers, either because it was effective, or its absence was demotivating. Again, Royal was strategic in giving feedback: 'we give mostly verbal recognition, and we are pretty big on that one. We would give them names like Speedy Gonzales and Housekeeping Superstar and Housekeeping Superman …. They love that' (Ariel, Spv, Royal). The strategy did seem effective. Jayme (RA, Royal) was very proud to report 'I have a good relationship with teams and from my supervisor. She said that I'm doing a great job here, they called me superstar ... I was really flattered about that ... I'm not boasting … but I like to contribute as much as possible'. Another worker expressed how verbal recognition inspired him to take more initiative to do things without being asked:

> So now, I'm doing by myself if the walk-in chiller is dirty, I organise if even if they don't ask me. So, they're like, who did this? Oh, I did. Oh, you're the best. I love you [Danso] something like that … they like me …that feels good (Danso, DW/KH, Royal).

Other strategies were more overtly manipulative. Room attendants were pushed to exceed the four-hour timeframe for flipping rooms and, when successful, were publicly acknowledged at meetings with senior management present 'You guys are doing a great job, this is what we faced yesterday, this is what time you guys got done ... they were done at 3:30' (Blake, Mgr, Royal). This recognition and ability 'to be seen' was an important motivator for the sponsored workers relying on the organisation to nominate them for PNP.

Verbal recognition was an effective tool at Royal. In contrast, at Oasis, the lack of verbal recognition from a newly hired Housekeeping Manager was a cultural shift: 'Before I've heard a lot of positive feedback from before but now, not really' (Jules, Spr, Oasis). He did not feel the lack of feedback was because of his new supervisory role but felt rather strongly that it was the shift in approach: 'I just really feel that I was appreciated by my housekeeping manager before ... because she likes giving compliments to her worker 'cause her workers are doing really good things. And it was her who promoted me or something'(Jules, Spv, Oasis). He seemed disgruntled by the lack of feedback, so it was an important motivator for him.

Shoreline offered verbal feedback and food once a week to recognise staff, but the new housekeeping manager favoured a hard HRM approach, and recognition seemed grudging. She did not see the value in performance evaluations and identified feedback as a weakness of hers 'I'm not really good on the 'atta boy kind of thing. I'll do it at the end of the day if it's been a really particularly rough day. "Rah, Rah team"' (Morgan, Mgr, Royal). She encountered a significant amount of resistance in the workplace.

The nomination for PNP was the strongest motivator for the LS-TFWs, followed by sponsorship of family members; however, workers at Royal and Oasis also highlighted verbal feedback as motivating.

8.5 WORKERS' PERSPECTIVES

Workers' motivations are understood to contribute to the amount of effort a worker is willing to expend. Chapter 7 offered insight into workers' desire for economic reward and PR, and this was reinforced across all case study organisations by all workers. Workers' ability to help their families through remittances was a source of pride and evidence of their success: 'Because we want to earn money. We want to save. We want to support our family in the Philippines. That's the way we used to be. We're helping each other … I'm proud --to help" (Marion, RA, Room attendant).

Workers' concept of output standards was, to some degree, shaped by their previous experiences in their origin country. The labour market in workers' origin country was highly competitive; therefore, workers were more likely to tolerate poor working conditions because it would be challenging to find another job: 'so you have to love your job because if they kick you out, it will be hard to find another job, especially if you're old like 30's' (Rivera, RA, Royal). Workers referenced difficult working conditions in their origin countries: 'The first year that I worked … as a room attendant in [hotel], they're really, really, really hard to their people because I was just a casual employee on-call. One year I was always crying every day, every night when I'm going back home' (Jayme, Ra, Royal). Long hours, low pay, and a hard labour process contributed to this worker's perception of effort and output as it did with many other workers. The 'you have to love your job' was repeated by workers from both Mexico and the Philippines, an indicator that labour mobility capability is low in their origin countries and exiting jobs with poor working conditions is not always an option. In interviews, workers identified their strengths as 'hard work' and flexibility and expressed pride in that reputation:

> We hate it when somebody comes to us and says you did not do this properly …. We always want people to see that we are here and we want to do our job

> properly, and either you commend us or you give us a pat on the back we don't really care as long as we know that we are doing our job properly and, we are earning enough money to be able …I think that's a good motivation because we send money home, and I think that's because that why we want to be here, we want to keep our jobs, we want to perform. (Ariel, Spv, Royal).

8.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed to offer insight into the impact of migration regulatory controls through a mobility and effort power lens. The chapter first considered how employee relations were shaped before workers' labour power was activated. Workers, particularly those without transnational experience, were conditioned by their economic inequality, precarious lives, and the competitive global labour market to be self-disciplined and ensure the employment relationship worked. Employers engaged in tactics to build positive employee relations, a function of the 'happy worker' but also because the structural constraints of Beachside were ongoing. Workers' loss of mobility and fear of deportation forced them to comply with increased work intensification and flexibilisation, contributing to higher and more consistent service levels for the employer. Workers' role in the labour process and the labour market challenges of Beachside were sources of structural power for workers; they were needed and in a better position to bargain for the nomination for the PNP, as well as the sponsorship and support for their family members. The small population and small size of organisations allowed workers to develop more informal and humane relations with some employers who understood their challenges. Workers were clear about employer expectations of them but also understood the value of their effort power when renegotiating the exchange bargain. Regulatory controls were exploitive, and workers were vulnerable; however, workers' agency was evident as they negotiated for PR for themselves and their families.

CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION

The thesis sought to investigate the impact of migration regulatory controls on the labour mobility power and effort bargains between LS-TFWs and their employers. An in-depth comparative case study situated in the hospitality sector in a remote rural community enabled the identification and explanation of generative mechanisms that propel migrant workers and their employers to enter this distinctive temporary employment relationship.

There is a growing interest in the intersection between international migration and employment as well as a heightened awareness of the role of state-imposed regulations in shaping labour markets in ways which further advantage the accumulation of capital (Bauder, 2006, p. 17; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017) whilst rendering low-waged migrant workers more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Anderson, 2010; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Regulations that tie LS-TFWs to one employer, restricting their mobility geographically and occupationally whilst ensuring their stay is only temporary, are criticised for creating a distinct type of actor, one who is framed as 'unfree' (Bauder, 2006; Sharma, 2006; Strauss and McGrath, 2017); however, with the exception of circulatory agricultural programmes, there is limited empirical research specific to this labour pool (Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007; Polanco, 2016). LS-TFWPs are controversial, but as global labour market supply and demand challenges grow, there is increased pressure to move beyond debates on the potential for exploitation to engage constructively in finding solutions that ensure fair representation of the origin and receiving countries as well as the interests of migrant workers (Bauböck and Ruhs, 2022).

The literature review in Chapters 2 to 5 highlighted gaps in research that informed two research questions:

1. To what extent does migration theory explain the motivations of temporary migrant workers and their employers for engaging in a LS-TFWP in the hospitality industry in rural Canada?

2. How do regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs impact labour mobility power and the effort bargain?

The literature review also highlighted the potential influence of geographical and sectoral contexts on outcomes, and this influence is acknowledged throughout the discussion chapter.

One of the unique strengths of this study is the adoption of a comparative case study design. Whilst a single case study can identify generative mechanisms, a comparative approach identifies common outcomes across case study sites, thereby strengthening generalisability. Moreover, a multiple case study design has the ability to distinguish the effects of context from common outcomes. Each of the case study sites attributed labour and skill shortages and high levels of labour mobility to the remote, rural location and culture of the community.

Table 5 provides an outline of the five case study organisations and key findings.

Table 5. Comparative case key findings

	Edgewater	**Shoreline**	**Oasis**	**Royal**	**Wildwood**
Size of Organisations	< 50	50 - 100	100 - 200	100 - 200	50 - 100
Calibre	2+*	3+*	4+*	4+*	3+*
Amenities	Front office includes small retail area, showers, laundry	Small retail at front desk	Food & Beverage, retail, activity centre	Food & beverage, retail, activity centre	Food and beverage, Small retail
Department with LS-TFWs	Housekeeping	Housekeeping	Housekeeping	Housekeeping, front desk, kitchen	N/A
Rationale for LS-TFWs	Density, distance to density, culture of community cause labour & skill shortages, high labour mobility	Density, distance to density, culture of community cause labour & skill shortages, high labour mobility	Density, distance to density, culture of community cause labour & skill shortages, high labour mobility	Density, distance to density, culture of community cause labour & skill shortages, high labour mobility	Density, distance to density, culture of community cause labour & skill shortages, high labour mobility
Strategies to extend the employment relationship	PR Family with dependant recruitment	PR Family with dependant recruitment	PR Internal labour market Family recruitment	PR Internal labour market Limited family recruitment	LMIA application rejected
Forms of flexibilisation	Family housing on-site Children employed Inter department	On-site staff housing Scheduling	On-site staff housing Scheduling	Scheduling Inter and intra department roles	Scheduling Overtime
Network recruitment	Family + family with dependants	Family + family with dependants Minimal labour	Family and labour network	Labour network Minimal family network	N/A
Evidence of skills mismatch	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Low	N/A
Staff Housing	On -site Family housing	On-site	On-site	Housing off-site	On-site

Each of the case study sites nominated all qualified LS-TFWs to the PNP, although, as Table 5 highlights, strategies for mobility-effort bargaining varied according to each site's size, calibre, and amenities.

9.1 RESEARCH QUESTION # 1

> *To what extent does migration theory explain the motivation of temporary migrant workers and their employers for engaging in a LS-TFWP in the hospitality industry in rural Canada?*

The literature review in Chapter 2 highlighted the challenges associated with understanding motivations to migrate through a theoretical lens. No single theory captures the full complexity of labour migration; instead, a range of theories is studied from the perspective of different disciplines and levels of analysis (Massey *et al.*, 1993). This study is broader in context than other migration labour/employment studies in that it encompasses the motivations for both low-skilled migrant workers and their employers; consequently, it requires a theoretical lens that addresses both supply and demand, recognises the role of migration regulatory controls on the constraints and choices of migrant workers and employers as well as offers insight into the temporary/permanent binary.

The new economics of labour migration theory provides a theoretical grounding for consideration of the role of families as a generative mechanism that shapes and informs the motivations of low-skilled migrant workers and influences their migration decisions. Dual labour market and segmentation theories have explanatory power for employers' demand for low-skilled migration labour and how geographical and sectoral structural constraints and political and economic forces influence labour markets and shape labour supplies. Network theory bridges the gap between the structural forces underpinning employer rationale and the human agency driving

individual and family decision-making, offering insight into how labour and family networks facilitate, support, and perpetuate labour migration.

An analysis of the motivation of the LS-TFWs, HS-TFWs, and WHV holders in this study highlights how distinctive each group's motivators are from the other and the role mobility power plays in workers' ability to meet their goals. WHV holders' decisions are driven by personal interest and a desire to travel and experience a new culture, whilst HS-TFWs are motivated by advancing their careers in transnational settings. LS-TFWs are driven by social and economic inequality in their origin country and the dream of a more secure future for themselves and their families in the host country.

9.1.1 Family as a generative mechanism

One of the more significant findings in this study was the extent to which families of LS-TFWs influenced their initial migration decisions and continued to inform workers' labour practices and future mobility trajectories. At a macro level, income and welfare disparities resulting from the 'uneven distribution of labour and capital' are well-established drivers of labour migration (Arango, 2000, p. 285), and this was reflected in the findings as workers discussed why they agreed to exchange their labour mobility power for an opportunity to work in the hospitality sector in a remote, rural tourism destination. Lack of opportunity, overpopulation, competitive labour markets, social and economic inequality, and an insecure future were common push factors cited by workers. Wage differentials and the ability to maximise their utility were key drivers for all workers; however, the potential for PR and long-term access to social safety nets, better education, health systems, increased economic opportunities, and a more secure future for themselves and their families were pull factors that differentiated Canada from other potential labour markets. The role of family as a generative mechanism underpinning worker motivations and decision-making was evident as workers discussed how and why they decided to accept their

positions in Beachside and how this continued to motivate them in the labour process. In a realist approach, identifying generative mechanisms buried in broader socio-economic and political contexts contributes to a fuller understanding of the empirical domain and the events being investigated (Ackroyd, 2004).

The role of families in workers' decisions to initiate migration is grounded in new economics of labour migration theory that posits families or households work collectively to maximise income and control risk through the allocation of family labour. In some households, a strategy might include a long-term plan where one or more family members work transnationally whilst others remain behind and invest remittances (Stark and Bloom, 1985). This strategy and its long-term nature were evident as some single workers discussed their extensive transnational experiences and contributions to their family resources through remittances. Wage differentials were important, but a more complex work-family mechanism was apparent as single workers identified PR for themselves and their parents or siblings as a primary goal. Guo (2021) argues that understanding family dynamics is crucial in analysing workers' labour practices. In this study, the causal power of family in workers' migration trajectories was evident in a worker's decision to leave a long-term contract in Taiwan and pay an exorbitant recruitment fee to access the Canadian labour market because of the potential for PR for the worker and their family. The potential for family reunification informed several workers' decisions but also intersected with another work-family articulation as some single workers spoke of the need to 'settle down' and start a family. This aligns with Guo's (2021, p. 425) identification of 'anticipation of marriage' as a mechanism that can influence single workers' labour practices. The 'guarantee' of PR in Beachside was important for workers in their late 20s who worried about becoming too old to start a family; however, the geographical context could be a countervailing force as suggested by one worker who reflected if he lived in an urban centre he would likely 'date' someone. These findings support the new economics of labour migration theory's position that family decisions are a 'calculated strategy' and represent an 'act of mutual interdependence' between family members (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p. 175).

A second type of family strategy that emerged from the empirical data was that of married workers with dependants, where a spouse undertook the initial TFWP contract whilst the other spouse remained in their origin country with the children and invested remittances. In new economics of labour migration theory, this is a well-established strategy to manage risk and improve quality of life (Bean and Brown, 2015) and permanent residency in another country could be an overarching goal. In Beachside, the high rate of LS-TFWs nominated to the PNP and some employers' known willingness to support family reunification through the sponsorship of spouses shifted the 'calculus of conversion' for some workers as they weighed choices and constraints (Smith, 2010, p. 281). Sponsorship of spouses was necessary for married workers with dependants if they were to qualify for the PNP, but for some workers in this study, sponsorship for a room attendant position required occupational mobility, leaving professional careers in banking, business, teaching, and health sciences to take yearlong room attendant 'certification' courses. Smith (2010) argues the conversion of labour power is increasingly required as international labour markets intensify; however, in this study, the occupational mobility necessary to build the mobility capital required for geographical mobility carries additional risk. Sponsorship and the PNP programmes are a just-in-time response to labour shortages and, therefore, sensitive to the political and economic climate. Policies and programmes can change quickly, as witnessed by some interviewees who waited years for the next opportunity. Family networks already in place can mitigate risk; however, they also have the potential to have the opposite effect. At Shoreline, the manager described being 'hounded' by workers to sponsor their family members and ultimately decided to switch recruitment to another country. Shoreline's large housekeeping staff and long history of family recruitment resulted in many workers from the same country advocating for their family members. The decision at Shoreline to hire a new worker from another country is a tactic employers use to manage social closure and take back power, and it has the added effect of disciplining other workers (Preibisch, 2007; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Directing workers to take their requests to hire family members to the MRA, a third-party actor, can be a buffer as the employer regains control over the hiring process but also signals the importance of the MRA in not only managing labour

flow in and out of the labour market and workplaces but also as a support system to the employment relationship between workers and employers.

The geographic and sectoral contexts can factor in workers' ability to simultaneously meet family, occupational, and personal goals. A remote, rural community and entry-level hospitality work can be a gateway to a national labour market; however, it can require two to three years before a worker regains mobility power and longer if family reunion is a goal. During this time, density and distance to density may hinder workers' ability to meet their personal and career goals. For workers who put previous experience or education to one side to access the transnational labour market, career goals or progression can be hampered by limited opportunities in a small, remote community. Most LS-TFWs in this study worked in housekeeping departments, where advancement into supervisory positions is known to be impeded by limited advancement opportunities, flat organisational structures, and a lack of training opportunities (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010) and, in this study, this is influenced by the size and calibre of the organisation. Royal had the strongest internal labour market; however, they targeted hospitality professionals through labour networks; opportunities for family recruitment seemed limited to those workers who advanced in the organisation. Single LS-TFWs could achieve PR and advance in the organisation or move elsewhere. Married LS-TFWs with dependants would likely have to return to their countries. Both groups would gain valuable occupational experience in the Canadian labour market, building their human capital and their labour mobility capability, whether in the Canadian labour market or the global labour market for workers with dependants.

Whilst family strategies align with new economic of labour migration theory regarding the distribution of family resources to manage risk, they diverge regarding long-term intentions and PR goals. New economics of labour migration theory implies temporality as workers are positioned as target earners who eventually return to their origin country (Bean and Brown, 2015; Budnik, 2011), although it also implies the importance of continuity of employment as part of the dynamic of labour

flows at the household level (Bean and Brown, 2015). Other studies have highlighted that some workers have permanent intentions; however, those studies may have included multiple labour pools, and intentions for permanence could have transitioned over the course of employment (Nakache and Dixon-Perera, 2015). LS-TFWs in Polanco's (2016) study based on the fast-food industry came to Canada with the hope of PR; however, a few, if any, received a nomination to the PNP. Workers' intentions for PR can become a source of precarity in the employment relationship if the pathway to PR is a mechanism under the employer's control; therefore, it is an important consideration in understanding the nexus between labour migration and employment. PR as a power mechanism for employers is discussed in a further section. Here, it is important to highlight the complexities of temporary labour migration and signal the importance of addressing temporariness theoretically in research that brings together labour migration and employment. Chapter 2 draws attention to the typology of Dustmann and Weiss (2007), which identifies different types of temporary labour migration. Chapter 2 concluded with a recommendation that the 'contract worker' category be broken into high and low-skilled categories reflecting policy mandates in most developed countries. Low-skilled labour shortages are a global issue, and understanding workers' motivations and intentions and how they inform their actions and behaviours in the labour process is essential to developing programmes that benefit all actors. It is, therefore, important to have a theoretical framework that captures migrant workers' motivations concerning temporariness.

The long-term planning, action, and resourcefulness of workers in this study demonstrate human agency, challenging common assumptions in the literature that migrant workers from poorer regions are passive, without choices or, importantly, without resources (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014; Strauss and McGrath, 2017). The concept of migrant workers as passive, reacting to external factors in a uniform and predictable manner, is central to neoclassical economic theory and the push and pull model, theories where worker agency is considered reactive and limited (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). New economics of labour migration theory frames migration decisions as pro-active, deliberate, and aspirational, acknowledging the

human agency of migrant workers and their awareness of their mobility capability, no matter how limited that may be. This was reflected in the interviews with workers in this study about how and why they chose the hospitality sector in Beachside and the strategies and tactics they used to build their mobility capacity. Workers' research, with their families' help or at their instigation, suggests they were clear about the contract conditions in Canada, including the loss of mobility, but were deliberate in their choice because of its reputation for security, opportunity, fairness, and because the stronger potential for PR aligned with families' long-term goals. The results of this study align with those critics who argue that low-skilled migrant workers are purposeful, choosing their vulnerabilities to meet their families short and long-term goals (Alberti, 2014; Ruhs, 2013; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013) and support Dauvergne and Marsden's (2013) argument that the context in which migrant workers are operating and the choices and constraints they face merit exploration and consideration. The findings address a gap in the literature identified by scholars interested in the nexus between migration and employment of LS-TFWs. The few existing studies identified the importance of understanding the motivations of LS-TFWs for engaging in a TFWP and the gains they hoped to achieve (Rogaly, 2008; Scott and Rye, 2023), as well as ascertaining if workers were aware of the regulatory controls and their decision was part of a calculated risk (it was), or if they were passive and unaware (Polanco, 2016).

Migrant worker labour mobility power is impacted by migration regulations of origin and host countries; however, mobility capability also intersects with other factors such as workers' age, gender, financial resources, profession, education, family status, life stage, social capital, and cultural capital (Alberti, 2014; Lundmark, 2020; Smith, 2010). Family status was a predominant theme as workers with dependants faced additional challenges of breaking through migration regulations, and several single workers wished to settle somewhere and start a family. Family networks and support were critical in supporting workers as they navigated the global labour market and the TFWP employment relationship.

Whilst studies specific to LS-TFWPs are limited (Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007; Polanco, 2016; Preibisch, 2010), they, and the literature, suggest that economic inequality is a driving force in workers' motivation to engage in temporary contracts as well as their willingness to tolerate exploitative working conditions. The realist approach adopted in this study emphasises the importance of understanding the generative mechanisms that link actors underlying social reality to the empirical domain where the study is situated (Ackroyd, 2004). In this study, understanding the causal power of families and how they shape and drive workers' motivations over a decade (s) offers a fresh perspective on how the commitment to family reunification not only shapes their labour migration trajectories but also informs workers' behaviour in the labour process. Moreover, the TFWP itself was a generative mechanism for the spouses or other family members who were motivated to migrate specifically to Beachside because of the potential for PR.

9.1.2 Rationalising employer demand

According to Piore (1979), labour migration is a demand phenomenon 'rooted in the productive system' (p. 13) and driven by capitalists' structural demand for cheap and flexible labour. Labour shortages are a key factor that contributes to this demand. During times of full employment, workers eschew jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and move to better-paying, higher-status jobs. Employers can respond to labour shortages by increasing wages, replacing labour with capital, or recruiting migrant workers (Piore, 1979). Chapter 5 considered the hospitality sector as an example of a sector with high levels of labour mobility and a well-established reliance on migrant labour as a cost-minimisation strategy (Baum, 2015). The findings in this study align with Piore's (1979) contention that the structural demand for migrant workers is permanent; however, the results diverge somewhat from much of the literature where migrant labour is framed as cheap and disposable (MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; Piore, 1979). LS-TFWs were an investment of resources and highly valued, so they were neither cheap nor disposable in the 'usual' sense. As one manager explained, 'they cost a bit more, but they are harder workers'. Cheap, in this

study, reflects LS-TFWs' higher levels of productivity, flexibility, and compliance, all of which occur over an extended timeframe, which accords with the findings of Polanco (2016). The findings demonstrated that employer access to a transnational, immobilised workforce as a factor of production facilitated higher levels of accumulation through work intensification and flexibilisation, which accords with the contention that LS-TFWPs are transnational mechanisms for furthering capital domination over labour and an effective accumulation strategy (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Bauder, 2006; Scott and Rye, 2023).

Employers were required to pay LS-TFWs the prevailing wage rate (based on job and region) to ensure demand was not an attempt to drive down wages and that migrant workers were treated fairly (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Most of the LS-TFWs in this study were room attendants, a job that consistently places them at the bottom of labour markets across many countries. Housekeeping positions are considered to be the least skilled and paid minimum wage or slightly above, irrespective of the size or calibre of the property (Vanselow et al., 2010). In this study, the minimum wage averaged $10, and the prevailing wage was $2 to $3 higher, meaning LS-TFWs were paid a higher rate than most room attendants; employers were left to decide whether to broaden the wage increase to include all housekeeping staff. The results were mixed; the largest employer chose to increase wages for all staff; however, in this instance, migrant workers drove wages up instead of down, at least at one property. The work of a room attendant is routine, physically challenging, subject to increasing work intensification, and with limited room for advancement (Knox *et al.*, 2015), which is reflected in the chronic labour shortages. In this study, the prevailing wage was a positive step for all room attendants at one case study site, suggesting that prevailing wages for all housekeeping staff as a 'condition of entry' to the TFWP could positively impact the sector. Sumption (2019) describes temporary migration programmes as shifts in the balance of power between the state, employer, and workers. States asserting more control over the requirement of the prevailing wage could be a first step in unblocking the minimum wage impasse employers have consistently imposed on

housekeeping departments (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010) and reinforce the state as a form of associational power for workers (McGrath and Strauss, 2015).

Remote, rural context

One of the more significant findings in this study is how the geographical context impacted labour shortages and high levels of labour mobility in the hospitality sector in Beachside. The Canadian Tourism Human Resource Council recognised rural communities experience labour shortages more acutely than their urban counterparts but did not distinguish between remote, rural communities and rural, 'close to urban' communities (CTRI and CBC, 2012). The density of the community and distance to density are two key factors that contribute to the degree of rurality of a community (Bollman and Reimer, 2018) and are important considerations in this study. Employers were adamant that labour shortages and challenges in recruitment and retention were exacerbated by the community's density and distance to density; migrant workers interviewed supported this contention. Retention was impacted by the limited public transportation and limited amenities available in the community and the challenges of accessing shopping and entertainment elsewhere, particularly in winter. Weak transportation and service infrastructure are understood to be significant issues facing remote, rural communities (Baum, 2012a; Lindsay, McCracken and McQuaid, 2003), as was evident in this study; how it impacted specific labour pools is discussed in a further section.

The remote, rural locale, small population and high levels of seasonality exacerbated labour shortages and labour mobility. The international reputation and popularity of the tourism destination combined with the low population density meant that in high season at least, employers relied primarily on seasonal workers to provide the high level of service demanded by an international clientele, which is consistent with the literature (Baum, 2012a). The culture of the community adds an additional layer of complexity. The culture of Beachside is described as 'chill', back to mother earth, beach-going, with 'hippy' type energy and work to live as opposed to living to work ethos. In the literature, employer complaints about labour shortages are known to be

a proxy for skill or quality shortages (Dench *et al.*, 2006); however, the culture of a resort destination and the seekers that it can attract are distinctive issues from rurality and the usual poor quality worker rhetoric. Employers insisted that seekers attracted to Beachside were more unreliable than seekers elsewhere, in some part due to the natural environment and amenities in Beachside. Seekers are known to be a primary labour supply in seasonal tourism destinations, and ski resorts are one of the better-known examples (Möller, Ericsson and Overvåg, 2014). However, in ski resorts, access to the activity of interest to seekers is often under the control of an employer and can be defined (hours of operation). Creative scheduling can be a strategy to ensure workers have access, to their leisure activity at least some of the time. Moreover, incentives such as a seasonal pass can be an additional form of control for the employer. In this study, the weather or the timing of the tides could significantly impact absenteeism, leaving employers scrambling but without a local reserve army to draw upon. Full employment and acute labour shortages in high season translated into increased labour power mobility for seekers who could walk away from an employer who challenged their reliability or wasn't flexible enough to accommodate their interests. Walking away from a job may seem appropriate to workers if they perceive that the work is temporary and high levels of mobility are a cultural norm. Employers in the hospitality sector have reinforced a 'turnover' culture as a cost minimisation strategy (Iverson and Deery, 1997), which can translate into a workplace or workgroup norm. Sponsored workers as a guaranteed workforce for extended periods created a buffer against the higher levels of mobility, potentially shifting the 'culture of mobility' (Lundmark, 2020) and contributing to a more cohesive group norm.

9.1.3 Shaping the ideal workforce

Anderson (2010) argues that regulatory controls are used to 'produce workers with particular types of relations to employers and to labour markets' (p. 306). The LS-TFWP is structured so employers control workers' labour mobility power and their only pathway to PR. Sumption (2019) frames these conditions as high dependence

with increased risk of abuse. Migration status was an important filter for employers, but other criteria also conditioned the workforce in a particular way.

One of the findings in this study is the affirmation of employers' preference for workers whose mobility power is constrained by their migration status. The literature review highlighted the challenges in ascertaining the impact of migration status on employee relations because, in many studies of migrant workers, workers' migration status is unknown by the employer or manager (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010). Advantages of constrained mobility on the effort bargain have surfaced in the literature; however, except for circulatory agricultural programmes, only in a limited way as employers are reluctant to discuss or acknowledge how the control benefits them (Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007; Polanco, 2016). There is broad support from international agencies for expanding temporary migration programmes that contribute to the global redistribution of wealth by increasing opportunities for low-skilled migrants from poorer regions to access labour markets in wealthy countries (Lenard and Straehle, 2012). Economic inequality is a key driver for temporary and permanent migration; therefore, programmes targeting workers from poorer regions are not surprising. But, whilst the alleviation of poverty can be an overarching goal, the truth is most of the jobs in the low-skilled sector are eschewed by those with any labour mobility power (Piore, 1979), as was evident in this study where seekers, both domestic and international frequently moved in and out of the labour market.

The findings support Anderson's (2010) contention that states empower employers' use of transnational recruitment to construct a disciplined, compliant workforce. In this study, job qualifications required of domestic and WHV workers were much lower than that required of LS-TFWs; however, managers and workers alike were vague as to whether the requirements of post-secondary education and years of room attendant experience were an employer requirement, a requirement for an entry visa, or an exit requirement of the sending state. Nationality was a proxy for economic disadvantage, an important criterion when targeting workers willing to exchange

their mobility power for access to a desirable labour market (Scott, 2013b) and for workers willing to deskill (Rydzik and Anitha, 2020). Employers' ability to skirt national employment law and target workers by family status and gender, as well as demanding higher qualifications, is contested (Preibisch, 2010; Scott and Rye, 2023) but evident in this study. Family status was an important tool in determining a worker's tenure at an organisation, with single workers likely to move through the PNP-PR process faster and more likely to move away from the small community; however, workers with dependants carried an additional layer of vulnerability. Royal hired LS-TFWs with dependants to ensure some controlled mobility in the labour process; married workers with dependants would not meet the PNP income threshold and would be forced to return to their origin country.

In contrast, Shoreline and Edgewater hired LS-TFWS with families to ensure continuity, knowing that sponsoring spouses would constrain workers' mobility for longer. Children would also negatively impact workers' mobility (Lundmark, 2020). The traditional gender segmentation in housekeeping departments, where room attendant roles are traditionally considered 'female' (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010), was disrupted by the number of male room attendants at each resort. Male WHV room attendants reflect the ease of access to housekeeping jobs in an attractive tourism destination. Male LS-TFWs reflected, to some degree, the employers' ability to skirt national laws and 'order' workers by gender when recruiting internationally. Moreover, housekeeping is an established gateway to desirable global labour markets and may be the only option for some workers (Wills *et al.*, 2010).

9.1.4 Network theory

Network theory provides a framework for understanding the importance of migration's economic and sociological underpinnings (Winters, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001). It also resolves the theoretical distinction between the initial causes of migration and its perpetuation (Fussell, 2012). In this study, PR and family

reunification were long-term goals of many interviewees, some having achieved their goals whilst others were still in the process and hopeful. This outcome aligns with Boyd and Nowak (2012) argument that temporary 'only' mobility restrictions tend to enhance the growth of family networks. Family networks are more likely to segment workers into bottom-end jobs, sometimes trapping workers and resulting in lower mobility and power capability (Smith, 2010; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). This reflects the experience of some workers at Shoreline and Edgewater, where there were no internal labour markets. Royal was the anomaly in this study in that they recruited LS-TFWs directly using labour networks they had developed. The higher investment in human resources and migration expertise reflected their longer-term intentions for workers, which they felt was necessary for a property of their calibre. The willingness of a luxury resort to invest more in the recruitment, selection, and training of workers to ensure the stabilisation of service and standards aligns with the literature (Baum, 2015; Christensen Hughes, 2018).

An unexpected finding in this study is how extensive and somewhat intimate the relationship of the MRA was with both the employer and the LS-TFWs. Labour demand is an important stimulus to labour migration; however, network theory research emphasises the supply side, which 'camouflages the activities of many network actors, including employers, recruitment agents, and other intermediaries' (Krissman, 2005, p. 4). The MRA actively represented two employers and seemed to wear multiple hats, recruiting new LS-TFWs from overseas, facilitating the movement of unhappy LS-TFWs between workplaces and regions, and facilitating the PNP and PR process for individual workers. Additional roles included confidante to the manager at Shoreline, acting as a sounding board on issues and as a buffer between the manager and workers for workers seeking family sponsorship. There was a sense from some workers that lines may be blurred, and workers perceived the MRA was responsible for nominating them; however, that may be an agreed-upon strategy with the employer. It was clear the MRA played an active role throughout the HR process and was critical in helping to establish Beachside as a destination node (Winters, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001).

Early migrants establish a 'node' in a destination, influencing future migration for strong and weak ties (Boyd and Nowak, 2012). It was evident that over the ten or more years that the LS-TFWP had been in place, Beachside had become an established destination node. For many, it was temporary; others settled more permanently. An established node eases the transition for future migrants, providing a sense of community and support for new migrants (Boyd and Nowak, 2012), as was evident in this study. The newer LS-TFWs interviewed highlighted the importance of having a built-in community available as a resource for adapting to the new community, socialising, and navigating the workplace.

This section positioned the findings against the literature and answered the research question, 'to what extent does migration theory explain the motivation of temporary migrant workers and their employers for engaging in a LS-TFWP in the hospitality industry in rural Canada?'. New economics of labour migration theory offered a theoretical grounding for considering the causal power of families in shaping workers' motivations and migration trajectories and informing workers' labour practices. LS-TFWs were deeply embedded in diverse family relationships, and long-term family goals of PR and family reunification helped shape workers' mobility decisions. Family obligations were sometimes prioritised over LS-TFWs' personal and career aspirations, reflecting the deep commitment to the family unit. The long-term nature of the commitment and its influence on workers' labour practices and the labour process is an important insight into understanding LS-TFWs' reputation as hard workers. Moreover, new economics of labour migration theory's focus on family strategies offers insight into migrant worker agency, positioning workers as pro-active, deliberate, and aspirational. The theory implies temporary intentions, an important theoretical gap when workers' intentions are permanent and access to PR is controlled by employers.

Dual labour market and segmentation theory offered insight into employer demand for access to LS-TFWs. Chronic sectoral labour shortages were exacerbated by the density and distance to density of the community; however, the community's unique

culture also contributed to high levels of labour mobility. Employer access to migrant workers as a 'cheap' and 'disposable' workforce is common in the literature. This study's findings signal the importance of distinguishing between low-skilled labour pools, as current research tends to conflate migrant workers into one labour pool. Segmentation theory was a useful lens to show how regulatory controls allowed employers to segment workers by their mobility, economic inequality, and family status and access a more educated and experienced workforce than would be available domestically. The role of the recruitment agent in facilitating access to sponsored programmes for both workers and employers merits further study.

9.2 RESEARCH QUESTION # 2

How do regulatory controls associated with LS-TFWPs impact labour mobility power and the effort bargain?

The second question in this thesis focuses on the impact of migration regulatory controls on mobility power and the effort bargain. In a standard employment relationship, labour mobility is a 'terrain of strategies and tactics' where a worker's labour mobility, or freedom to exit the relationship, can be a source of power for the employer or the worker, albeit contingent on context (Smith, 2010, p. 269). The effort bargain is the second terrain of struggle between employers and workers, as effort power is embodied in the worker, and the amount of effort extracted by the employer can only be achieved through cooperation, consent, or coercion (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). In a LS-TFWP employment relationship, workers have exchanged their labour mobility power to access the Canadian labour market. This section discusses how employers' control over LS-TFWs' mobility and access to PR impacts labour mobility power and the effort bargain.

9.2.1 Mobility differentials

In his conceptualisation of labour mobility power, Smith (2010) is critical of organisation-centric resource-based theories that view labour power as fixed and static and constraints on workers' mobility as a win-win because workers are guaranteed jobs and employers guaranteed access to labour. Instead, he conceptualises a flow perspective where the notion of labour power is not restricted to the labour process but is broadened to capture external events such as 'mobility, turnover, migration, employment contracts' (p. 290). Mobility power is dynamic, and a flow perspective is a useful reminder that the TFWP contract in Beachside is temporary, contractually, but also in terms of LS-TFWs' labour mobility trajectories. Mobility differentials such as transnational experience or family status can strengthen or hinder workers' labour mobility capability and influence how they navigate the regulatory constraints and other barriers they face (Alberti, 2014). These differentials can also contribute to how workers' are 'conditioned' to be compliant and subordinate years before TFWP contracts are signed (Polanco, 2016). In this study, LS-TFWs with transnational experience had higher mobility power capability, the cultural, human, and migration capital gains from previous international experiences evident as they discussed how they navigated the migration market searching for the best opportunity and evaluated choices and constraints. For these workers, regulatory controls that constrain mobility and enforce temporariness were common denominators in all of their transnational experiences, reinforcing the significance of mobility as a 'crucial terrain of agency and resistance for migrant workers' (Alberti, 2014, p. 869). One worker used his mobility power to exit work in Dubai because the wages didn't justify the time away from family, whilst others exercised agency and resisted contracts because of working conditions, recruitment costs or, most often because there was no potential for PR. Within Canada, and despite regulatory constraints, some workers used their occupational and geographical mobility to move between regions, jobs, and employers to optimise their chances of a nomination to the PNP. Other workers without transnational or hospitality industry experience had lower mobility power capability, and developing

the migrant capital needed to access the global labour market took time, resources, and sacrifice. Some workers waited years and experienced multiple rejections before accessing a TFWP contract. For others, the TFWP in Beachside itself was a generative mechanism, the potential for family sponsorship, or in some cases, the imperative of family reunification, compelling them to exit professional careers to undertake year-long certifications for room attendants before they could be sponsored. Smith (2010) emphasises the plasticity of labour power and the importance of occupational and geographical mobility as resources for workers competing to access global labour markets. Conversion of labour power into different skills, or downskilling in this case, to open up global mobility opportunities 'means that the calculus of conversion – the choice-constraint issue is changing' (Smith, 2010, p. 281). In this study, family status was a mobility differential. Single workers' family status strengthened their mobility capability, whilst married workers with dependants had lower mobility capability, increasing their vulnerability. Migrant workers' trajectories in this study were complex, dynamic, and non-linear.

Mobility differentials were also evident as LS-TFWs' quest for PR and ownership of their mobility power intersected with family obligations, age, family status, education, and financial resources, which aligns with the literature (Alberti, 2014). The mobility power of workers who prioritised preserving family ties through employer sponsorship of family members was regulated by those obligations (Ciupijus, Forde and MacKenzie, 2020), increasing the possibility that workers would be trapped at the bottom of the labour market (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). Family obligation intersected with family status, and the mobility power of married workers with dependants were more negatively impacted than their single counterparts, as children became embedded in schools and communities and mobility required more planning and resources. Married workers in this study faced additional barriers to their mobility. Transitions to earlier professions are difficult as credential recognition is low, so 'moving up' in the labour market from room attendant was difficult. Tenure in the organisation also negatively impacts mobility (Lundmark, 2020), posing an additional challenge for married workers with dependants, as sponsoring spouses requires additional years of mobility constraints. At Edgewater,

the manager reported that married workers with dependants stayed on average five years, although one worker was there for at least ten years. This worker felt trusted when offered part-time work in an administrative area where she could use some skills from her earlier career. This aligns with Lundmark's (2020) assertion that for workers who have been with an organisation for years, the cost of giving up social capital and trust earned encourages risk-averse behaviour (Lundmark, 2020, p. 296). Single workers without family obligations have higher mobility capability, as processing PR applications was much quicker.

In this study, mobility intersected with geographical and sectoral contexts and could either strengthen or hinder mobility capability. Fixity can be a resource for workers, an opportunity to enhance human, social, financial, and cultural capital and develop networks to help navigate the new labour market (Smith, 2006). However, remote, rural locales and low population density can make building labour networks more challenging. Family networks are known to segment workers in low-end work, increasing the likelihood of workers being trapped (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). High levels of seasonality and few alternative employment opportunities could force workers to exit the employer and the community, which aligns with some managers' comment that some workers exited 'as soon as they receive PR they are gone'. Younger workers with higher levels of education are more mobile (Lundmark, 2020); however, in this study, family obligations intersected with mobility, as evidenced by a worker who was bored and desperate to leave Beachside but trapped geographically and occupationally as he waited for his fiancée to move through the PNP-PR process.

Each resort's size, calibre, and amenities regulated workers' mobility capability. The small size and low calibre of Edgewater limited opportunities for interaction with guests and opportunities to hone English language skills, and the lack of an internal labour market meant workers were more likely to be trapped in housekeeping. Free accommodation could also increase tenure, negatively influencing mobility (Lundmark, 2020). Oasis and Royal's reputation, calibre, and internal labour markets

increased workers' mobility capability. A worker described the importance of gaining supervisory experience, even after he received PR. The promotion increased his labour power capacity and mobility capability, increasing his chances of not starting at the bottom again. Royal, with its international reputation and high service standards, bolstered the labour mobility power of all its workers. Training inter-and-intra departmentally also enhanced human capital and would ensure higher levels of labour market capability.

9.2.2 Dynamics shaping employee relations

The findings in Chapters 7 and 8 and the discussion earlier in this chapter offer insight into how economic inequality and precarious lives drive workers into the global labour market; and the years and resources that workers invest to build the migrant capital necessary to compete for an opportunity. The state's construction of the TFWP, whereby employers can recruit workers internationally, targeting more vulnerable workers who will agree to exchange their mobility power for an opportunity to access the Canadian labour market, supports Anderson's (2010) contention that migration regulatory controls are used to 'produce workers with particular types of relations to employers and to labour markets' (p. 306). Workers, particularly those without transnational experience, were conditioned to be compliant and subordinate long before they arrived in Beachside. The findings also support those of Polanco (2016), whereby the regulatory controls act as a form of 'manufactured consent', and LS-TFWs feel they must perform or risk deportation; workers in this study felt they had no choice but to comply with demands for work intensification and flexibilisation. Workers were vulnerable, their positions precarious, and they bore the weight of potential deportation throughout their contracts.

Social relations in this study were complex and contradictory. Edwards (1990a) argues that employee relations have relative autonomy; external forces, such as

regulatory controls, are mediated by internal forces, and the distinctiveness of a point of production can produce different outcomes (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). The geographical context in this study would be one such mediating factor. In Beachside, the density, distance to density, community culture, staff accommodation, and small size of the organisations helped shape more personalised and informal employee relations than might otherwise have occurred. This accords with Dunlop's (1958) contention that employee relations can be influenced by a rural context and the small size of an organisation where points of contact are broadened. Moreover, the hospitality sector tends towards more informal employee relations (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007a), a factor noted by multiple workers who commented on managers working alongside them, helping them with tasks, or an owner pouring them water at a meal they were sharing with managers. For LS-TFWs, the proximity of working and living with their employers and the nature of the hospitality sector contributed to informal and personalised social relations. This is consistent with Baum’s (2012b) finding that small hotel operations tend to offer more care and support for migrant workers. In this study, the informal, personalised relationship created space for workers to share their stories and dreams of PR and try to align employers' support in achieving their personal goals.

Employers in each case study site utilised various high-commitment strategies to foster positive relations and ensure workers aligned their goals with the organisations. This is contrary to other studies of low-skilled, sponsored workers where more coercive tactics predominated, and workers were told they could perform, leave, or be deported (Dundon, González-Pérez and McDonough, 2007; Preibisch, 2010). Employers' control over workers' future mobility through the PNP process also shaped relations differently in this study. In Polanco's (2016) study, employers utilised the PNP nomination as a competitive tool to incentivise workers to maximise their efforts, and few, if any workers', were nominated, ostensibly because of regulatory quotas. It was evident in this study that the PNP nomination was an implicit incentive to workers; however, employers' nomination of all workers who requested it seemed to be 'custom' and had a positive effect on social relations. Edwards (1990a) considers custom 'as a mode of regulation which has grown up

through time in an unplanned manner' (p. 45) and a means of establishing an understanding of aspects of the labour contract that might not be clearly defined. Here, the PNP nomination as 'custom' illuminates the complexity of employer-LS-TFWs' relations in this study. Employers' 'custom' of nominating all qualified LS-TFWs to the PNP was an incentive for workers to maximize effort and be compliant. This reward was at no cost to employers, and the process distanced employers from any rejections by Employment and Social Development Canada. Networks, including the MRA, ensured that all workers were aware of the wholesale nomination as soon as LS-TFWs arrived, if not before. Workers spoke positively about employers, framing them as 'nice' and 'helpful' because they nominated everyone. Workers were well-informed about low success rates in other provinces or with different employers, reinforcing positive feelings towards their employers.

Employers noted the importance of keeping workers happy, and a PNP nomination was an effective disciplinary tool for ensuring worker cooperation. In addition, a manager noted how difficult it was to say no to workers' requests for a PNP nomination, given the sacrifices LS-TFWs had made; it is easy to imagine this as a common sentiment across the case study sites.

9.2.3 Regulatory controls and structural constraints

Within the literature, wage theft is one of the more common forms of exploitation migrant workers experience (Berg and Farbenblu, 2017; Stringer, 2016), although wage theft often refers to workers not being compensated for work done. This study had no evidence or suggestion that workers were not being paid for work done; however, employers' inability to offer full-time employment and regulatory controls preventing workers from selling their labour elsewhere resulted in an opportunity cost to a labour pool wishing to maximise their utility. Seasonality and the structural constraints of check-in and check-in times in the housekeeping department hindered employers' ability to meet the full-time, 35 to 40 hours per week wage-hours bargain,

and, at least at Shoreline, workers were forced to bear the cost of their idle time. This illuminates one of the challenges in the nexus between labour and migration studies and their respective laws. In the productive system, capital is a fixed factor of production, and costs are borne by the owners of capital even when production is idle. Labour is a variable factor of production, and when demand lowers, labour power is released, leaving labour to bear the cost of its unemployment (Piore, 1979). In TFWP contracts, the need for and guarantee of full-time work is the price of constraining migrant workers' mobility, an exchange bargain with the potential for mutual gain if full-time work is available. There is an implied expectation that if work is not available, capital bears the cost of that time, an unlikely scenario given that the low-road industries such as construction, horticulture, and hospitality are the frequent users of LS-TFWPS (Anderson, 2010). The hospitality sector is characterised by unpredictable consumer demand and seasonality and historically relies on the flexibility of migrant workers to minimise costs (Lai, Soltani and Baum, 2008). The preponderance of LS-TFWs in this study were room attendants, which is reflective of chronic labour shortages in housekeeping departments in Beachside and across Canada and more broadly reflects the role of room attendants at the bottom of labour markets across North America and Europe (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010). Offering room attendants in urban environments 35 to 40 hours per week may be feasible for properties that cater to a business clientele who check out early in the day; however, it is reasonable to assume that housekeeping departments in other resort destinations may face similar challenges providing full-time hours.

Reducing the TFWP requirement of full-time work to a minimum of 30 hours per week, as is currently the case in Canada (ESDC, 2023), enables employers with shortages in housekeeping to meet the requirements for participation in the programme, at least in high season. However, reducing the hours employers are required to guarantee whilst still tying workers to one job and one employer undermines even further LS-TFWs' ability to maximise their utility. Labour power is the only commodity that LS-TFWs have to sell (World Bank Group, 2018) and, as target earners, they are motivated to work as many hours as possible. Workers in this study were frustrated by the constraints on their labour power and their inability to

maximise their utility until they received PR, which in some cases was four years after their arrival. Labour power is a perishable commodity. Underutilised labour power disadvantages migrant workers who are sacrificing time away from their families to earn, origin countries because of lower remittances, and the host state through lower productivity. The triple win advocated by Bauböck and Ruhs (2022) requires equal and fair representation of the interests of migrant workers, the origin country, and the host country. In this study, capital was a clear winner, benefitting from higher levels of accumulation from an immobilised workforce over an extended period of time. The findings support the contention that LS-TFWPs are a multi-scalar accumulation strategy that allows employers to circumvent the regulation of work and exploit the vulnerability of labour. Some, likely the majority, of LS-TFWs would argue that they too were winners, despite the work intensification, reduced earnings and coercive contract conditions. At a minimum, remittances were important to all workers, supporting the contention that 'mobility across economically differentiated space is both a source of profit for capital and a resource for labour' (Scott and Rye, 2023, p. 4). More importantly, most if not all LS-TFWs also achieved their long-term goal of PR for themselves, and their families.

In low season, in this study, employers engaged in a range of tactics, sometimes reluctantly, to meet the required TFWP hours. Training was one avenue that all employers used, potentially a positive outcome for an industry with a reputation for low to no investment in its workforce (Baum, 2015) and for workers who wanted to build labour market capacity and mobility. Other tactics included extended vacations, cross-training inter-and-intra departmentally, job sharing between positions, and promotions. Most managers were somewhat vague, or chose not to know, about the migration rules as to if and when workers could expand their duties or change jobs. Cross-training and job sharing were put forward as a win-win by both workers and managers, opportunities to broaden labour power capacity and ensure workers accessed as many hours as possible. In employment studies, some managers bend the rules if they perceive them as inefficient, do not make sense, or negatively impact production. When caught out, they stop until the next time (Edwards, 1990a). This type of rule-bending aligns with Ruhs and Anderson's (2010a) use of the term semi-

compliance to describe some employers' casual attitude towards some migration rules and whether they need to follow them. They rightly point out, however, that migration law does not recognise semi-compliance; rules are followed, or they are not. Immigration and Citizenship Canada posts a list of non-compliant employers on their website, many of whom have violated '#9 *The pay or working conditions didn't match, or were not better than, what was listed on the offer of employment, or the job was not the same as what was listed on the offer of employment'* (IRCC, 2023) with fines ranging from $1,000 to $50,000. In the hospitality sector, employers are more able to skirt regulations because of the informal employee relations that predominate (Matthews and Ruhs, 2007a); however, in the nexus between employment and migration law, LS-TFWs skirting the rules are vulnerable to deportation. Workers may not feel they can refuse an employer who asks or perhaps does not know or 'refuse to know' the rules; however, in the eyes of the law, they would be complicit (Zou, 2015).

9.2.4 Regulatory controls and the effort bargain

Smith (2010) draws attention to the importance of the social construction of the labour market in shaping what is possible in the labour process. In this study, introducing a new, high-quality, compliant, and immobilised labour pool at the point of production resolved, to some degree, the two uncertainties of the labour process – labour mobility and effort power. Externally, employers' ability to guarantee the 'immobility' of a percentage of their workforce strengthened their position in the labour market when recruiting and selecting new workers, allowing them to move away from the previous 'warm body' syndrome and establish higher selection barriers. Royal and Shoreline reported a decision to operate short-staffed rather than hire low-quality, highly transient workers, disrupting the team's cohesion. Moreover, when cohesion is a workplace norm, it can have a contagion effect and lead to lower levels of mobility among all workers (Hinkin, Holtom and Liu, 2012). This could be a significant change for hospitality organisations, where temporality and high levels of mobility are well-established norms (Iverson and Deery, 1997).

In addition to stabilising the workforce, regulatory controls over LS-TFWs' mobility also stabilised the labour process. Baldamus (1961) argues that the regulation of effort stability is fundamental to an organisation's ability to standardise outputs and ensure consistency in the quality of products and services. Employers consider 'output per man, quality of output, frequency of absence, level of discipline, etc.' (p. 36) objective measures of effort stability. In the literature, employers responded to tight labour markets and labour cost pressures with strict absence control measures, signalling the importance of absenteeism as a frontier of control (Taylor *et al.*, 2010). Because of this study's tight labour market, seasonality, and geographic context, employers had little control over the high levels of absenteeism of locals and seekers attracted to the Beachside 'party' lifestyle. LS-TFWs were rarely, if ever, absent. Low absenteeism could reflect the coercive nature of their contract or on-site accommodations; however, LS-TFWs were target earners and sought opportunities for more work. Low levels of absenteeism of migrant workers are consistent with the literature (Hopkins, 2017; MacKenzie and Forde, 2009), where migrant workers have better participation rates than their domestic counterparts for the first two to four years of work (Dawson, Veliziotis and Hopkins, 2018). It is essential to note that employers framed all international migrant workers as 'good workers' and considered both LS-TFWs and WHVs as reliable based on low absenteeism; however, WHVs owned their mobility and were highly transient, thus considered less reliable than LS-TFWs whose mobility was constrained. This accords with Sumption's (2019) suspicions that employers prefer workers with fewer mobility rights.

The larger, higher calibre properties reported fewer complaints and more consistency in delivering a higher quality of service when LS-TFWs were on board. Beachside was a high-end, expensive resort destination; employers reported negative guest feedback if service quality was not as expected or, in the case of Royal, workers' training was perceived as insufficient. High service levels are difficult to maintain when operations depend on temporary, untrained staff, as is the case in seasonal resort destinations (Baum and Hagen, 1999). LS-TFWs not only delivered quality

service but did so more consistently, which could reflect the duration and coercive nature of their contract. Employers also noted LS-TFWs' positive impact on the workgroup, where they raised the bar for some other workers, which is consistent with the literature (Dench *et al.*, 2006).

As noted earlier, protecting the cohesiveness of a strong team allowed higher standards of quality and output to become established effort-stability norms (Baldamus, 1961). These norms were supported by changes in the organisation of work and increased training regimes, with more time in the winter standardising effort and expected outputs. The enhanced training likely happened as a result of state intervention; contract conditions demanding full-time hours for workers resulted in higher levels of training than is the norm in the sector. Training is also a control to increase productivity, speed, and surplus value (Baldamus, 1961).

Capital demand for flexibilisation of labour is central to the accumulation of capital and one of the more significant impacts of neoliberalism in the workplace (Herod and Lambert, 2016). Ostensibly, LS-TFWs' right to full-time work should minimise hospitality employers' traditional reliance on workers' flexibility to minimise costs; however, employers' inability to meet the wage-hour bargain and last-minute scheduling demanded a higher level of flexibility from LS-TFWs as they were forced to wait and be available for any potential hours. The structural constraints of the sector and cost minimisation orientation of employers discouraged overtime, which is consistent with the literature (Baum, 2015); however, the unreliability and high levels of absenteeism and mobility of the seekers created opportunities for extra hours. LS-TFWs living on-site and willingness to jump in as needed offered an additional level of flexibility for employers, and some workers perceived the access to extra work as a benefit of living on-site. LS-TFWs flexibility is another accumulation strategy for capital, which is consistent with the literature (McCollum and Findlay, 2018). Regulatory constraints prevented workers from seeking work elsewhere, and the flexibility demanded by employers posed additional mobility constraints on workers' discretionary time as they waited for work.

Work intensification and effort power

Intensification of worker effort can manifest as either higher rates of productivity and speed or through the extension of labour power and longer working days (Baldamus, 1961; Thompson, 1989). This study showed similarities across the case study organisations of effort intensity manifesting as productivity and speed. The structural constraints in the housekeeping department are a likely explanation for workers' inability to work longer days or overtime; however, effort intensity manifesting as increased productivity and speed is consistent with other studies where workers' mobility is constrained (Polanco, 2016), and Canadian studies of seasonal agricultural work where productivity, speed and long hours were all demanded of workers (Basok, Bélanger and Rivas, 2014; Preibisch, 2007). In the United Kingdom, Dench *et al.'s* (2006) study linked work ethic with longer hours, except for a few mentions in construction and agriculture where productivity or speed were noted. Other studies in the United Kingdom linked worker effort intensity to a willingness to work longer hours and overtime (Hopkins, 2017; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010b; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013); however, those studies were based on A8 workers who owned their mobility. This finding reinforces the contention that constraints on workers' mobility are an effective strategy for creating surplus value (Edwards, 1990b; Thompson, 1989).

The work environment was fast-paced, targets were tight, and workers felt pressured by managers and guest expectations to perform. Employers benefited from an additional form of flexibilisation as LS-TFWs assumed responsibility for completing targets by staying behind or relying on colleagues to help them finish, resolving the issue for employers. Variations in labour pools, contracts, and disciplinary tactics were evident as workers and managers described time-bound Canadian workers who would walk out the door at the end of their shift and were more likely to resist work intensification. This is consistent with Smith's (2010) contention that labour mobility can be a source of power for the employer or the worker, depending on context. LS-TFWs' loss of mobility power left them feeling powerless, and the potential for

deportation was an effective control mechanism for employers that ensured workers acquiesced to whatever effort was demanded of them.

On the other hand, seekers owned their mobility power, and managers and LS-TFWs noted they would quit and find work elsewhere if working conditions were poor or felt pressured to do more than the wages warranted or if work interfered with their personal goals. Effort intensity varies between the maximum effort a worker is willing to expend and the minimum effort an employer is willing to accept (Behrend, 1988). In this study, employers had little control over seekers' mobility power, so were forced to accept what seekers were willing to give. Employers' control over LS-TFWs' mobility power, present and future, allowed them to extract higher levels of effort power.

PNP nomination and the effort bargain

One of the more interesting findings in this study is how the second powerful mechanism, employers' control over the nomination of workers to the PNP, interacted with the first mechanism, employers' control over workers' mobility power. The preceding discussion of regulatory controls and the effort bargain highlighted how employers' control over workers' mobility and accommodation left workers hyper-dependent and subject to exploitation, a finding consistent with the literature (Zou, 2015). Workers felt threatened by the possibility of deportation; they were particularly vulnerable in the early months of their contract when they worried about passing their probation and securing their employer's nomination to the PNP. Employers' control over the second mechanism, from Zou's (2015) legal perspective, leads to hyper-precarity when workers' rights and social protections are tenuous, and employers control the extension or renewal of work permits or, in this case, workers' access to PR. In studies of circular agricultural programmes, the renewal or non-renewal of workers' invitation to return disciplined workers and their countries. In Polanco's (2016) study, employers used their control over a 'potential' nomination to incentivise workers to compete on the shop floor and use their discretionary time to

engage in extra activities to demonstrate their worthiness of a nomination, that few, if any, received.

Nomination of all LS-TFWs to the PNP was common across case study sites. One manager explained that employer control over this mechanism allowed them to 'sess' out new workers 'at no cost' to them. Employers' ability to offer LS-TFWs access to PR as a 'reward' in exchange for increased commitment and effort without requiring employers to improve working conditions or provide additional training is contested (Fudge and Tham, 2017). It is clear in this study that a nomination to PNP was available to anyone who qualified and asked, and workers at various stages of PNP-PR at each resort were evidence that it was 'custom'. These factors increased workers' willingness to comply with work intensification and flexibilisation demands. It also offers explanatory power as to why workers did not challenge breaches of the wage-hours bargain, especially at Shoreline. However, whilst the outcome of intensified work effort might be the same whether employers used coercive, competitive, or reward strategies, the impact on employee relations was very different.

9.2.5 The good worker

Workers' perspectives on their effort power and reputation as good workers are more limited in studies (Baxter-Reid, 2016; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). In this study, workers described themselves as 'hard workers', were clear they were 'here to work', framing it as a 'responsibility', and were clear about their value in the labour process and the effort bargain. When asked about their strengths, workers identified flexibility, adaptability, compliance, patience, and a willingness to stay until work was complete as key contributions to their organisations. Some workers expressed pride in their reputation as consistently hard workers, particularly compared to the more variable, time-bound Canadians. This positive comparison to differentiate themselves from other workers aligns with the findings of (Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). The findings in this study also support Baxter-

Reid's (2016) contention that verbal recognition is an important factor in workers' perception of themselves as 'good workers'; in her study, it was the lack of verbal recognition that contributed to workers' lack of buy-in to the good worker rhetoric. In this study, verbal recognition was important to sponsored workers as a source of motivation and a sense of security, given the precarity of their migration status. Royal had the most organised approach to verbal feedback as a motivator and using terms such as 'superman' and 'superstar' was highly effective. A lack of feedback at Oasis had the opposite effect, leaving a discernibly negative impact on a worker who missed his previous manager's verbal praise.

Employers' perception of LS-TFWs was based on their reliability, consistency, positive orientation to work, and flexibility, which is consistent with the literature (Dench *et al.*, 2006; Markova *et al.*, 2016). As noted above, LS-TFWs' effort power and compliance were key attributes; however, employers perceived workers' effort power as a result of socialisation early in their lives, prior experiences in harsh labour processes, and their family goals.

What motivates workers to work as hard as they do is the subject of much debate (Baldamus, 1961; Behrend, 1957; Burawoy, 1979; Thompson, 1989). Burawoy's (1979) argument that worker effort is a function of the labour process and not influenced by external socialisation is criticised. It could be argued that the coercive nature of the contracts for sponsored workers, where vulnerable workers from poorer countries are targeted, supports Baldamus's contention. In this study, workers' loss of mobility power and employer control over their migration status directly impacted workers' effort power. However, workers in this study were self-motivated and self-disciplined by the contract and their and their families' long-term PR goals. Thompson (1989, p. 175) contends that external factors such as geography, gender, nationality, and cultural differences can contribute to workers' responses to control and coercion in the labour process. This thesis considers families a causal power that propels workers into the transnational labour market and contributes to workers' motivation and behaviour in the labour process. Workers' desire for PR contributed to their work effort; however, their goal of family reunification was also a factor

which may explain some workers' continued high effort levels even after PR was received.

9.2.6 Mobility effort bargaining

McGrath and Strauss (2015) argue that power relations between capital and labour are dynamic and 'sources of power are continually identified and/or constructed' (p. 307). It is evident from discussions to date that the geographical and sectoral structural constraints and a tight labour market posed ongoing labour supply challenges for employers, weakening their bargaining power in the labour market and the labour process. Wright (2000) argues that individual workers can acquire structural power from their positions in the economy and labour market if their actions impact capital. LS-TFWs who received or were about to receive PR acquired two types of structural power. First, regaining their mobility power during full employment gave them what Silver (2003) frames as marketplace bargaining power; they could exit the employment relationship or negotiate a new effort-mobility bargain. Their second source of structural power is derived from 'the strategic location of a particular group of workers within a key industrial sector' (Wright, 2000, p. 962), which Silver (2003) frames as workplace bargaining power and which McGrath and Strauss (2015) contend is analogous to Smith's (2006) work-effort power. The findings demonstrated that the role of room attendants was essential to the labour process and their organisations' ability to meet guest quality service standards and expectations. The findings also demonstrated LS-TFWs' value to employers as good workers with high levels of effort power and positive stabilising impacts on the workforce and the labour process.

It could be argued that the permanent structural constraints of Beachside and the high effort power of LS-TFWs explain why employers nominated all LS-TFWs to the PNP. But the reality was more complex; employers' ability to offer full-time work was influenced by their size, calibre, amenities available, and seasonality. It was

unclear whether any resort could meet the regulatory contract conditions without bending or breaking the rules. One important common outcome, however, was that the nomination process automatically extended the employment relationship and employers' control over workers' mobility until they received PR, which varied between one and three and a half years; and this, in and of itself, was sufficient reason to nominate all workers. Workers' loss of mobility power was central to the accumulation of capital and the generation of surplus value. Sponsorship of family members could extend the relationship even further, an additional vulnerability for LS-TFWs with dependants.

In his conceptualisation of effort mobility bargaining, Smith (2006) points to the importance of agency and the potential for mutual gain in how bargaining unfolds. He argues there is potential for mutual gain for employers and workers if the exchange bargain is perceived as fair. Workers and their families were highly motivated by the potential for PR, and a nomination by their employer was needed to achieve this, even though full-time work may not be a reality. The findings demonstrate that employers were interested in extending the employment relationship with workers at LMIA status until PR arrived, even though full-time work was not always available. For the longer term, negotiation over LS-TFWs labour mobility was a 'terrain of strategies and tactics' (Smith, 2010, p. 269).

Smith (2010, p. 270) affirms the bargaining power available when workers regain their labour mobility power:

> The individual ownership of mobility power by the worker ensures any stay with a particular employer or occupation or skill is always dependent on an exchange bargain – over work effort and mobility opportunities (that is opportunities to increase the value of labour power, through training, development, career progression, etc.) that the exchange facilitates.

Workers' agency was evident in some of the decisions made while workers were still under LMIA. Royal asked LS-TFWs workers for an extra year of commitment after they received their PR in exchange for the nomination. Workers agreed to the terms, although it was reported some LS-TFWs left as soon as they received PR despite the agreement. Other workers completed the extra year, viewing a positive resume and extended experience as important to build labour mobility capacity. Royal and Oasis were the two larger properties with amenities, and both actively sought long-term relationships with workers through their internal labour markets. Internal labour markets are an effective strategy in managing 'the relationship between turnover and cost' (Smith, 2006, p. 298), and in this study, was a source of mutual benefits for workers and employers. Employers continued to stabilise their work organisations and reap the benefits of well-trained staff whilst LS-TFWs gained Canadian work experience at a supervisory level, an important factor in moving forward and building labour mobility capacity.

Recruitment and subsequent nomination of family members was another strategy to extend the employment relationship, one which workers actively solicited despite the fact it would extend the constraints on their mobility. In the case of family recruitment, constraints on workers' mobility were more diffuse, tied to family goals and an implicit commitment to the employer. Shoreline and Edgewater, the two properties without amenities, both actively recruited married with dependant workers, a strategy requiring more coordination and support from employers who were required to employ the spouse. In discussing the cost of high levels of labour mobility to an organisation, Smith (2010, p. 271) emphasises 'the incentives to regularise labour capture and retention for capital and employment security and 'fixity' for workers exist because of the cost of movement for both'. The tenure of married workers with dependants tended to be much longer because of the PNP-PR process for the spouse, but also because workers with dependants were risk averse, engaged in longer-term planning where most decisions were focused on what was best for the children, which is consistent with the literature (Lundmark, 2020). The agency of LS-TFWs was evident even in the early months of their contract when they were at their most vulnerable. As a resource, they had relational power

developed by the proximity of their living and working conditions, employers' stated desire to build 'families within families', and the widely shared yet intimate knowledge of their struggles on behalf of their families. Sisson (2008) draws attention to the role that learning, socialisation, and experience play in shaping an employment relationship and the 'more or less constant pressures on and opportunities for the parties to seek to adjust the exchange in their favour' (p. 15). Managers felt this pressure with stacks of family members' resumes on their desks; one manager spoke of feeling 'hounded' to support workers' nominations for the PNP and sponsor family members. There was genuine empathy for the plight of the workers, which seemed to impact the smaller organisations where interactions were more frequent and closer, and all managers were line managers.

9.2.7 Resilience as a form of resistance

'Resistance is a tall order' (McGrath and Strauss, 2015, p. 306) is an apt statement for workers whose mobility power and access to permanent residency is legally controlled by their employer (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Zou's (2015) conceptualisation of hyper-dependent and hyper-precarity illuminates the power of these regulatory mechanisms over workers' voices and agency and their ability to resist work intensification and other forms of exploitation. In this study, fear of deportation had the greatest disciplinary effect on Edgewater, Oasis, and Royal workers. Workers seemed most vulnerable in the first months of the contract as they became accustomed to the workplace and culture, were required to pass their three-month probation, and sought a nomination to the PNP. However, employer control over the potential for deportation weighed on workers until they received their permanent residency.

Evidence of overt resistance was limited to one organisation where workers seemed to have captured the hiring process, the MRA was actively engaged with workers and management, and a new housekeeping manager, though disruptive, was not

perceived to be a threat to the PNP-PR process. Social closure, where one or two groups capture the hiring process, influences relations on the shop floor (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003) and could account for overt resistance. Despite not having any amenities, Shoreline had a large year-round housekeeping staff who were primarily from one country, some of whom were related, and family sponsorship had been ongoing for some years. Worker resistance could also reflect the role of the state as a form of associational power for workers. Wright (2000) conceptualised associational power as 'the various forms of power that result from the collective organisations of workers' (p. 962), acknowledging that this power could take many forms, but his focus was on ways in which this form of power could impact capital. TFWP employment relationships are distinctive in that the State's role is to balance the interests of capital and labour and ensure workers' rights are respected. Oversight of the conditions of the employment contract and avenues for redress for workers who have been exploited are available although considered ineffective because of the vulnerability of individual workers acting against employers (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009). Whilst actual action may not be realistic for LS-TFWs, the potential for action, afforded by the State in its role of protector of rights, may offer a source of associational power for workers. The findings highlighted workers researched their contract conditions in advance, and as a worker at Royal pointed out, employment law in Canada ensured fairness, highlighting workers' awareness of their rights. This was reinforced by a worker at Shoreline, who stated they could look to 'pioneer workers' for advice in certain situations. At Shoreline, where the wage-hour bargain was clearly exploited, the manager was stressed by the potential for workers to complain to a tribunal about their missing hours. Workers' complaints of a shortage of work would likely result in the deportation of all affected workers, which could be the rationale for the lack of workers' complaints. However, employers' broad support for PR and sponsorship of families with dependants, including the sponsorship of a 65-year-old worker with health issues despite the lack of available full-time work, could reflect workers' associational power.

McGrath and Strauss (2015) argue that 'unfree' workers are not in a position to resist in the traditional form but can 'confront exploitation through disciplined, creative,

spontaneous or obstructive forms of agency' (p. 307), of which acts of resilience are one manifestation. In this study, a disciplined approach was evident as workers spoke of conscious decisions to be compliant, to choose when to speak, to 'suck it up' and 'play your own game'. Consideration of compliance as a form of agency helps understand the shifting power dynamics in a 'temporary' contract. A conscious decision to be compliant can be considered a short-term survival tactic whereby workers maintain a sense of control (Datta *et al.*, 2007); however, it is also rightly argued to reinforce existing power relations (Rydzik and Anitha, 2020). A broader but more nuanced view illuminates the instrumentality of compliance as part of a longer-term strategy to achieve meaningful, long-term goals. In this study, the temporary nature of the contract and the potential for PR reinforced the fluidity of power relations for workers. It is argued that compliance was more likely self-discipline and self-regulation, tactics which can be considered forms of resilience as workers strive to meet their long-term goals.

Mutual relations of caregiving were evident as workers greeted and cooked for new arrivals to the community, helped each other with transportation and trips to the next city, and offered information and support. Cultural practices were reinforced through the many social gatherings that many managers and workers referenced in interviews. Filipino parties were known to have excellent food supplied by the hosts (as opposed to Canadian potluck, one interviewee remarked) and were inclusive. Including managers and co-workers in cultural gatherings can be a way of 'gaining recognition and shifting perceptions' for migrant workers, exercising agency and building resilience (McGrath and Strauss, 2015). All of these mutually reinforcing practices rejuvenate individuals and contribute to the collective, and as Katz (2004) (2004) argues, can lay the groundwork for future oppositional forces. The strength of the collective may offer some explanatory power for the overt acts of resistance at Shoreline.

9.3 IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXT

The influence of both geographical and sectoral contexts on key actors' decisions to engage in a TFWP and the impact of regulatory controls on mobility power and the effort bargain have been integrated throughout the discussion chapter, but it is important to capture some key elements and consider generalisability.

The findings emphasise the importance of distinguishing between types of rurality when examining how geographical context influences labour supply and demand in a community. Density and distance to density are recognised as important factors impacting the scope and diversity of socio-economic development in rural economies (CRRF, 2015; OECD, 2018), highlighting the importance of a rural lens in policy development. In this study, density and distance to density were critical factors in determining potential labour supplies available on both a temporary and permanent basis. Beachside's population was too small to support the labour demand resulting from a huge influx of international visitors each summer, forcing operators to rely primarily on seasonal workers drawn to the community by its reputation and natural attractions. The density of a community influences, and is influenced by, the characteristics of a place, the people that live there and are attracted to it and the types of businesses and amenities available (Bollman and Reimer, 2018). One unexpected finding in this study was the extent to which the culture of the community and the seekers it attracted contributed to higher levels of labour mobility. Resort destinations typically attract seekers, drawn by whatever the activity is and balancing a job with access to that activity. Ski resorts are a prime example of tourism destinations that attract tourists/workers who are enthusiastic about skiing and free passes and schedules that accommodate both employer and worker incentivise workers (Möller, Ericsson and Overvåg, 2014). However, ski resorts control access to their activities for the most part, and well-defined hours determine when and how seekers can access those leisure activities. Access is also a benefit offered by employers. Seekers attracted to Beachside were more likely to be influenced by the ebb and flow of tides and communal activities than the formal

structure of workplaces. Beachside attracted hippies and others who were more interested in 'being' than 'doing'; work was a means to an end, and they were considered a low-quality, unreliable workforce given higher-than-normal levels of mobility. LS-TFWs were considered the antithesis of Beachside seekers: high-quality, reliable workers who were serious about work and focused on long-term goals, with little to no interest in the natural amenities of the community. For employers, LS-TFWs with no interest in local attractions are less likely to disrupt the labour process, a finding which is consistent with the literature (Brinklow, Liyun and Qinhong, 2019).

The lack of amenities and high cost of food and housing challenged employers' ability to attract and retain quality workers, particularly those interested in building a career and a family (Adler and Adler, 2004; Baum, 2012a). In Beachside, the small population limited the amenities that were available to residents on a year-round basis to a few small shops, whilst the international appeal of the destination resulted in a large number of expensive restaurants, resorts, and tour companies. The distance to density, at least two or more hours to another community still considered rural, exacerbated the effect of density. International and domestic students, locals, seekers, WHVs, and TFWs were key labour pools for employers, although pools varied in size, availability, and mobility levels.

Structural constraints such as seasonality and a limited transportation system also exacerbated employers' ability to recruit and retain quality workers and posed additional challenges for those who lived there, although the impact varied by labour pool. Transportation was an issue for WHVs, other transient labour pools, and the LS-TFWs. WHVs were younger, highly transient, and were comfortable taking the bus, riding a bike if one was available, or hitchhiking. HS-TFWs were more likely to live off-site and have their own transportation. LS-TFWs were the most challenged by the lack of reliable transportation. As year-round employees on the outskirts of the community, they either walked, rode a bike, or carpooled with someone. A worker in her late 30s described the challenges of walking four kilometres to the

resort with groceries on her back, emphasising that even buying groceries demanded more effort power from LS-TFWs. The lack of transportation was an additional restraint on LS-TFWs' mobility, limiting their ability to shop, dictating what they could buy (carry it on their back), and forcing them to spend the higher prices demanded in the community.

High mobility negatively impacts hotels, particularly chain or luxury hotels, that compete on service standards, and the remoteness of a destination does not alter consumer expectations about quality and service (Baum and Lundtorp, 2001; Baum, 2012). The findings highlighted the pressure on managers to meet high guest expectations, and higher-end properties are more impacted than others. Smith (2006) draws attention to the negative effect of 'a constant flow of different individuals' on the labour process when 'individual differences have a material effect on productivity or profitability for the employer' (p. 408). In this study, room attendants, cooks, and guest service workers were material to the labour process; employers reported the negative impacts of labour shortages and poor-quality workers on productivity, service, and guest expectations.

A key finding in this study was employers' contention that LS-TFWs stabilised the labour process and workforce. The size and calibre of a case study resort influenced its ability to tolerate both high levels of labour mobility and poor-quality workers. Adler and Adler (2004) argue that workforce stability is critical to competing effectively internationally; however, seasonality, as well as the size and calibre of the property, dictate who invests the resources to ensure workforce stability. Baum and Hagen (1999) extend this argument to include remote, rural destinations as another factor influencing an organisation's ability to stabilise its workforce. Luxury resorts are more aware of the impact of labour mobility on the quality and consistency of service and are more willing to invest the resources needed to stabilise the labour supply. They are also more likely to have established training standards and internal labour market opportunities for growth and development (Baum, 2012; Christensen Hughes, 2018). The findings support this as the Royal invested heavily in overseas

recruitment, orientation, training, and retention strategies to recruit and retain WHV and LS-TFWS. It could be argued that the opportunity to constrain the labour mobility of a high-quality labour pool for a period also reinforced the importance of a stabilised workforce for the other resorts in this study. Certainly, the higher cost of accessing this labour pool was not a deterrent, nor was smaller employers' inability to meet the wage-hours bargain year-round.

Chapter 6 considered the importance of establishing causal relationships between entities. (Easton, 2010, p. 121) argues a critical realist approach is more direct in asking 'in what ways may the external contingency affect the events that have occurred'. In this study, density and distance to density were found to exacerbate the chronic labour shortages that the hospitality sector experiences across Canada, resulting in the demand for access to LS-TFWs. In this sense, geographic context is interwoven with the sectoral context. It was evident in this study that density and distance to density were core to recruitment and retention challenges, particularly in high season when labour demand was high. For all case study sites, the most chronic shortages were in housekeeping. This is unsurprising as housekeeping is at the bottom of the labour market across North America and Europe. They are hard, physical jobs that are poorly paid, subject to work intensification, and primarily filled by migrant workers (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010). It would be reasonable to expect, therefore, that hospitality employers in other remote, rural communities may experience similar labour market challenges, particularly in low-skilled jobs, so they would also be in a weakened position when bargaining for labour. The effect of the culture of the community on higher levels of mobility may be less apparent in other communities with a different culture.

CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION

10.1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

This study fills an empirical gap in the research of LS-TFWPs, which to date is limited and primarily focused on circulatory agricultural programmes (Wright, Knox and Constantin, 2019). There is empirical support for the argument that capital's control over migrant workers' mobility and access to permanent residency in a host country are transnational control mechanisms that enhance the extraction of surplus value and the process of flexible accumulation (Anderson, 2010; McGrath and Strauss, 2015; Polanco, 2016). There is also empirical support for Anderson's (2010) contention that migration regulatory controls and the resultant transnational recruitment can shape and mould a more vulnerable, dependent workforce. Exchanging labour mobility for access to a labour market and the potential for permanent residency is attractive to workers conditioned by economic equality and precarity with demographics such as family status and experience, adding additional layers of vulnerability (Alberti, 2014; Rydzik and Anitha, 2020). These findings reflect the power dimension of transnational mobility and its importance and complexity as a terrain of struggle crucially linked to the labour process (Alberti, 2014; Smith, 2010).

This study builds on a growing body of research that recognises the agency of low-skilled migrant workers in evaluating their choices and constraints and choosing vulnerabilities to achieve long-term goals (Rogaly, 2008; Ruhs, 2013; Thompson, Newsome and Commander, 2013). The study fills a gap in the literature by empirically investigating the motivations of LS-TFWs, offering insight into the long-term goals of individual workers and their families and the agency they demonstrate in achieving those goals (Polanco, 2016; Scott and Rye, 2023). LS-TFWs were proactive, deliberate, and aspirational. The conceptualisation of a migration market

(Borjas, 1989) illuminated workers' agency as they researched the global labour market, evaluating transnational offers and opportunities against their personal and family goals and constraints and utilising family and labour networks to gather information and assess risks. Long-term planning and agency were evident as workers used occupational and geographical mobility to build the mobility capacity and migrant capital necessary to access a transnational labour market that offered permanent residency for themselves and their families. Despite the constraints on their agency, workers were resourceful and persistent in navigating the regulatory controls and the labour process, using relational power and the value of their effort power to advocate for permanent access to a labour market for themselves and their family members.

This study contributes detailed empirical knowledge regarding families as a generative mechanism in migrant workers' decisions to engage in a TFWP. It identifies the desire for family reunification as a key motivator for LS-TFWs actions and behaviours in the labour process. Research on the motivations of LS-TFWs and their employers for engaging in LS-TFWPs is limited (Polanco, 2016; Rogaly, 2008; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017); however, economic inequality is known to be a key driver for migrant workers from poorer areas (Massey *et al.*, 1993). New economics of labour migration theory offers a theoretical foundation for consideration of the causal power of families in the transnational migration trajectories of LS-TFWs. The allocation of family labour and the long-term family goals of PR is a 'calculated strategy' and forms an implied contract based on mutual interdependence (Stark and Bloom, 1985, p. 175). The findings support Guo's (2021) contention that understanding family dynamics is crucial in analysing workers' labour practices. New economics of labour migration theory does not specifically address temporality, although the underlying motives of remittances and relative deprivation seem to imply temporary movement and thus return (Budnik, 2011). This thesis points to the importance of understanding LS-TFWs' temporal or permanent intentions as they inform their actions and behaviours in the labour process, rendering them more vulnerable to exploitation if employers control access to PR.

This study contributes empirical knowledge of mobility-effort bargaining and the interplay between mobility power and effort power. Smith's (2006) conceptualisation of mobility power and effort power as two key indeterminacies in the labour process that can be a source of power for workers or employers is relatively new and under-researched. The findings illuminate the importance of structural forces, internal and external, to the labour process as dynamic sources of power that can shift between actors, depending on context. Employer control over workers' mobility was a loss of agency for workers but resolved the uncertainty of labour mobility in the labour process for employers. Employer control over workers' migration status left workers vulnerable to work intensification and other forms of exploitation and effectively removed effort power as a source of bargaining for the worker. The empirical findings show how context can mediate exploitation and offer workers additional resources and sources of power. Workers' role as material to the labour process and conditions such as a tight labour market and labour shortages are sources of structural power for workers (Silver, 2003; Smith, 2010; Wright, 2000), and the proximity of working and living with employers shapes more personal and informal employee relations, an additional resource for workers. The permanent structural constraints of a remote, rural locale with low population density weakened employers' bargaining position and reinforced the need to extend the employment relationship with 'good workers'. In this sense, workers' effort power was a source of power for them to acquire mobility power in a new labour market. Whilst contentious, employer control over workers' future mobility was perceived by workers as a source of mutual gain for both actors and an opportunity for new mobility-effort bargaining. Permanent residency, sponsorship of family members, mobility within the organisation, and continued access to staff housing were strategies and rewards that shaped the new effort bargain.

This study builds on the work of Baum (2012a, 2015) by including geographical and sectoral contexts. The empirical findings highlight density, distance to density, and the culture of the community as factors that can exacerbate labour market challenges

and contribute to labour and skill shortages and/or high levels of labour mobility. Remote, rural destinations are known to face additional barriers to accessing specific or alternative labour market pools (Baum and Hagen, 1999). However, the characteristics of the community also influence the labour supplies available to it. This study extends the understanding of how labour pools vary in their ability or desire to adapt to the unique culture of a community, as well as how they are impacted by structural constraints such as transportation. The quality and mobility of a labour pool intersect with a hospitality organisation's size, calibre, and amenities, with larger, higher-end hospitality organisations less able to tolerate high levels of mobility and low-quality workers.

10.2 PRACTICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Whilst the focus of this study is Canada, the findings have a much wider significance given the global growth in employer-sponsored Temporary Migration Programmes, particularly for low-skilled workers (Bauböck and Ruhs, 2022; Wright, Groutsis and van den Broek, 2017). Regulatory controls determine how power is shared between the state, capital and labour. LS-TFWPs, where workers' mobility is constrained and migrant workers do not have the right to switch employers, are framed as highly dependent and, therefore, more at risk for exploitation. Allowing workers to switch employers reduces their dependence so that they are less vulnerable; although it is understood this may not be practical or realistic, may not be geographically possible or may threaten workers' access to permanent residency (Sumption, 2019). This study highlights that loss of mobility is only one piece of the puzzle. Workers in this study exercised agency in exchanging their mobility power for access to the desired labour market. They understood employers would have expectations of effort power and most perceived gains from the exchange bargain. However, it is important to distinguish between constraints on labour power mobility and employers' perceived ability to deport workers in the immediate. On the shop floor, these two separate mechanisms are conflated, and it is argued that workers' fear of deportation was the most effective disciplinary tool in muting resistance to work intensification and

flexibilisation. This fear persisted until PR was received. The potential for employers to trigger deportation, whether perceived or real, is oppressive and leaves workers under 'continuous practical threat'. Reducing dependence by allowing workers to switch employers or expediting access to migrant workers for 'good employers' ignores that it is the structure of the regulatory control that creates oppression. There were good employers in this study, and there was no evidence that workers were implicitly or explicitly threatened with deportation if they resisted work intensification; however, workers' fears of deportation were palpable. It is recommended that an additional step, process, or regulation be created that separates employers' temporary control over mobility from the state's role in managing workers' exit from the country. Employers in this study could fire at will, without more than 'it didn't work out'. More regulatory controls are required to ensure employers are held to employment standards when recruiting overseas and when terminating the employment relationship with a LS-TFW, and that there is a space that requires a worker's input into the process. Communicating to all that employers cannot deport workers is important, but clarifying who can and under what circumstances is also essential.

Open sectoral/regional work permits are an option, although it is less clear how this would work in remote, rural destinations that experience high levels of seasonality. Seasonal, circulatory permits can offset some strain employers experience but do not address the longer-term family settlement goals some workers seek, and some communities need.

The second regulatory control examined in this study is employer control over workers' only pathway to PR, which is problematic on several levels. This study highlighted employers' utilisation of the nomination of workers to the PNP process as a reward to incentivise workers to increase effort and contributions to the organisation or mitigate the damage done by breaches to the wage-hours bargain and other forms of exploitation. Employers' control over this mechanism is contested (Fudge and Tham, 2017) as it allows employers to reward or coerce workers with no

cost to the organisation and without having to improve wages or working conditions. Employers' ability to utilise this mechanism to extend control over workers' mobility while the PNP-PR process unfolds, even when full-time work is unavailable, and knowing employees will leave as soon as PR arrives could be likened to indentured servitude. Workers must serve out their time, unable to maximize their utility with their employer or any other in exchange for employers' 'paper' support for their long-term settlement. Employers benefit from an extreme form of flexibilisation at no cost to them. Employers' ability to sponsor and nominate family members benefitted employers by extending the employment relationship with immobilised workers whilst, at the same time, establishing migration chains of overqualified workers and their families who would not likely have migrated otherwise. The lengthy timelines of the process exacerbate workers' segmentation into low-skill jobs and underutilisation of their skills.

Employers' control over workers' access to PR and citizenship implies employers' interests align with those of the nation; however, this cannot be assumed. Family reunification may be a shared value and goal, as is building capacity in rural areas; however, employers' control over workers' future mobility risks further exacerbating the segmentation of skilled migrant workers into low-end work. It also plays into the space between employers' legitimate, low-skill labour 'needs' and what they want or think they can get (Anderson, 2010; Fudge and Tham, 2017). A policy that addresses employers' short-term needs or wants may not align with the long-term needs of the nation. It is recommended that employer nominations of low-skilled workers to the PNP be eliminated as an avenue to PR. A separate process should be created that assesses workers' experience (pay stubs) and qualifications, the region where they will reside, or other criteria.

Hospitality sector context

This study's focus on the hospitality sector also has widespread significance as low wages, high mobility, and high reliance on migrant workers are sectoral characteristics across many countries; housekeeping jobs, in particular, continue to

be among the lowest paid (usually minimum wage), 'hard' jobs across North America and Europe (Vanselow *et al.*, 2010) and Australia (Knox *et al.*, 2015). Fudge and Tham (2017) point to the importance of the sector's weak regulatory framework in reinforcing a business model based upon precarious work' (p. 6); housekeeping jobs are 'bad' jobs that domestic workers shun, thus creating the demand for migrant workers. They rightly argue against the naturalising of bad jobs:

> The quality of jobs and the consequences of labour migration are fundamentally shaped by social, political and economic processes in which not only workers make choices, but so, too, do employers, governments and other actors such as unions and regulators (p. 6).

Jobs may be framed as objectively bad based on low wages, organisation of work, lack of training and development, poor opportunities for progression, and low wages and benefits; however, there is also a subjective element; an objectively bad job can be subjectively good if it meets the needs of the worker in a meaningful way (Knox *et al.*, 2015). For instance, room attendants in Alder and Alder's (2004) research on Hawaiian hotels reported pride and job satisfaction in these jobs. Institutional actors such as unions positively impact job quality by negotiating higher earnings, benefits, and security, resulting in stability, as evidenced by the longevity of workers' tenure (Watt, 2007). TFWPs require employers to pay prevailing wages, travel costs, and benefits, offer low-cost housing and guarantee full-time work; employers do so willingly, suggesting that cost is less of an issue than assumed. Institutional actors can and should influence the quality of housekeeping jobs. Given the persistently low wages are argued to be a function of the job's low skill and feminisation (Dutton *et al.*, 2008), it is recommended that federal and provincial government agencies intercede in the regulation of work for room attendants/light duty cleaners as a first step in establishing the conditions necessary to attract and stabilise a committed workforce. A sectoral modification is already in place at a provincial level, as wage rates for servers are frequently lower than the provincial minimum wage rate. Placing room attendants/light duty cleaners at a higher than minimum wage rate, using the

prevailing wage or living wage as a guideline, would maintain the sectoral focus and be a positive step to addressing chronic labour shortages and the feminisation of work. At the federal level, an employer's established history of paying prevailing wage rates or living wages to all housekeeping staff should be a minimum requirement for any LMIA applications for room attendants.

Rural sector context

The results of this study point to the importance of geographical context in designing and implementing TFWPs. Density and distance to density challenged the recruitment and retention of workers, but the intersection between geographical and sectoral contexts is also an important consideration. Structural constraints such as seasonality and check-out times in tourism destinations exacerbate geographical constraints and underscore the need for a more nuanced approach to constructing labour supplies. The calibre of a hospitality organisation is yet another layer to consider, as luxury properties require more extensive orientation and training regimes to meet international standards and are less able to tolerate high levels of labour mobility or poor-quality workers.

10.3 PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS

Several limitations to this study need to be acknowledged. One limitation was the vulnerability of the LS-TFWs who participated in the study. Their livelihoods and their families were precarious and dependent on the employer's goodwill. This high level of vulnerability could influence their willingness to be explicit about their experiences. Moreover, international workers may also have cultural influences where speaking negatively about their workplace or employer is inappropriate. These factors must be considered when analysing the positive experiences of the workers. The limitation was mitigated somewhat by including LS-TFWs with PR, who were theoretically less vulnerable. A study for former LS-TFWs no longer connected with

employers could confirm the findings or offer additional insight into the impact of regulatory controls.

A second limitation of this study is that research participants and data collection were limited to international and low-skilled workers. In doing this, the perspectives of other workers, namely domestic workers, are missing. Domestic workers were the subject of discussion but did not have an opportunity to provide their insights into the labour process, motivations, mobility, effort, or perspective on the role of sponsored workers in their organisation. Moreover, domestic workers are more likely to be explicit, shedding light on hidden issues or agendas.

A potential source of bias in the results could be the employer's role in setting up interviews with the LS-TFWs. Employers were more likely to invite positive employees to participate. However, as discussed earlier, accessing entry-level workers in a small community was challenging without the help of a more formal organisation such as a union or migrant worker collective. As neither of these institutions existed in the community, employer participation in organising interviews was necessary.

Limitations can be mitigated with a strong research design. In this study, the comparative case design, utilising 5 case study sites that varied in size, calibre, and number of employees, established a valuable foundation for answering the research questions. Within each site, the inclusion of low-skilled migrant workers at varying stages in the process of PR, as well as supervisors and managers who recruited or worked directly with the migrant workers, was useful in triangulating the rich data that was collected.

The last limitation of the study was the English language levels of the LS-TFWs. Language levels were variable, but several interviews were less robust because of

challenges associated with understanding the questions posed, despite attempts by the researcher to reframe.

10.4 FURTHER RESEARCH

The findings highlighted LS-TFWs' perceptions of working conditions in Beachside and ways in which they felt valued or appreciated. Several workers noted perceptions of equality based on their proximity to working and living with their employers and when managers engaged in work alongside them. Verbal recognition was important to some workers' well-being, offering reassurance and motivation. Sayer (2007) emphasises the relationship between dignity and workers' vulnerability and dependence, underscoring the need to understand how dignity is achieved or challenged for low-skilled sponsored workers. Lucas (2015) argues that workplace dignity is distinctive from human dignity and identifies three sources of workplace dignity: 'messages of competence and contribution' are a source of earned dignity, being treated with respect is a source of inherent dignity, and 'organisational practices that conceal the instrumental and unequal nature of work' are a source of remediated dignity (p. 621). This could be a fruitful avenue for further research.

More research is needed to understand the longer-term impact of migration regulatory controls on workers' migration trajectories and mobility capability. A longitudinal study encompassing workers' experience during a TFWP and their geographical and occupation mobility before and after the TFWP could offer valuable insights into the longer-term segmentation effects of the regulatory controls. A longitudinal study could also provide insight into work-family articulations and their influence on workers' labour practices.

This study fills an empirical gap in the research of LS-TFWPs which to date is limited and primarily focused on circulatory agricultural programmes (Wright, Knox and Constantin, 2019). There is empirical support for the argument that capitals’

control over migrant workers' mobility and access to permanent residency in a host country are transnational control mechanisms that enhance the extraction of surplus value and the process of flexible accumulation (Anderson, 2010; McGrath and Strauss, 2015; Polanco, 2016). There is also empirical support for Anderson's (2010) contention that migration regulatory controls and the resultant transnational recruitment can shape and mould a more vulnerable, dependent workforce. Exchanging labour mobility for access to a labour market and the potential for permanent residency is attractive to workers conditioned by economic equality and precarity with demographics such as family status and experience adding additional layers of vulnerability (Alberti, 2014; Rydzik and Anitha, 2020). These findings reflect the power dimension of transnational mobility and its' importance and complexity as a terrain of struggle that is crucially linked to the labour process (Alberti, 2014; Smith, 2010).

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR ENTRY LEVEL EMPLOYEES

1. Can you talk a little bit about how you ended up in Canada, and in Beachside?

2. Can you talk about how or why you chose to work in the hospitality industry and in this job?

3. Where do you see yourself in 2 years? in 5 years?

4. If permanent residency is your goal, how do you see this happening?

5. Can you tell me about your experience in the workplace so far? How does the Canadian workplace differ from workplaces in your home country?

6. What do you feel are the skills/qualifications/experience you feel are necessary to do your
job well and why?

7. Can you talk about your strengths; the skills, experience and/or qualifications that you have and how they contribute to your workplace?

8. Can you describe any areas where you feel overqualified? Where you feel you require more experience or training?

9. How are your qualifications/skills valued and/or rewarded in the workplace?

10. How does your temporary status impact you in your job? How would things be different if you were a permanent employee?

11. How does the location of your workplace impact your experience and your relationship with your employer?

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR MANAGEMENT

1. Can you talk about your experience, past and present, working with Temporary Foreign Workers.

2. What skills, experience, qualifications do you require of Temporary Foreign Workers? Is it different than that of domestic workers in the same job?

3. How do you orient and integrate TFWs into their jobs and the workplace? How is this different than the process for domestic employees?

4. Can you describe any areas in which TFWs exceed expectations? Do not meet expectations? How does this impact the workplace?

5. What factors might contribute to differences in performance and skills?

6. How does the TFW's temporary status impact your department? The employment relationship? Would anything be different if they were permanent employees?

7. How do you or can you value and reward performance and skills, particularly if it is above expectations?

8. How does the rural setting impact the employment relationship?

APPENDIX 3: TABLE OF CODES – FIRST CYCLE

Geographical context (GC) ▪ Implications of density ▪ Distance to density ▪ Culture of community ▪ Transportation ▪ Amenities ▪ Supports ▪ Reason for leaving ▪ Receptiveness to outsiders ▪ Perception of community		**Hospitality context (HC)** ▪ Seasonality ▪ Wages ▪ Structural constraints ▪ High levels of mobility ▪ Size of operation ▪ Calibre of operation ▪ Amenities ▪ Tight labour market
WORKER PERSPECTIVE		**EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE**
Motivation of WHV & HS-TFWs ▪ Career ▪ Travel/experiential ▪ Push/pull family ▪ Push/pull other		**Employer rationale** • Labour shortages (GC, HC) • Cost/benefit • Quality of worker • Access to reserve army • High rates of mobility • Stabilising effect of LS-TFWs
Motivation of LS-TFWs ▪ Access to permanent residency ▪ Economic inequality ▪ Wage differentials ▪ Access to social supports ▪ Network connections		**Recruitment** ▪ Labour market challenges ▪ Strategies local, regional, national ▪ Labour supplies - seekers ▪ Gap management strategy(Core-peripheral)
Motivation of LS-TFWs (family related) • Family push and pull • Family reunification • Role of family in decision making • Remittances • Settling down		**Family Network Recruitment** ▪ Reconnecting families, support ▪ Creating obligation ▪ Managing risk ▪ Extending the employment relationship ▪ Family status as a vulnerability
Navigating global migration market ▪ Weighing opportunities and constraints ▪ Role of networks ▪ Role of destination community and country in decision making ▪ Importance of PR in motivation ▪ Long-term strategies ▪ Origin country exit requirements ▪ Challenges		**International recruitment** • Rationale for preferring int'l workers • Strategies to access international workers • Role of MRA • Regulations and Oversight ▪ Segmenting workers

Worker perspectives (external to labour process) • Perception of remote, rural context • Perception of workplace • Sources of support • PR as ‘custom’ • Equality and informality • Accommodation – opportunities and constraints		**Shaping employee relations** ▪ Strategies to build buy-in ▪ Demonstrating concern for well-being ▪ Negotiating proximity and space ▪ Points of contact – work, community, and accommodation ▪ Commitment to making it work ▪ Rewards
Workers’ perceptions of strengths • Work ethic • Team contribution • Citizenship behaviours • Values • Attitude towards work		**Human resource development** • Orientation • Training • Promotion • Job expansion and enlargement
Impact of temporary migration status ▪ Fear of deportation ▪ Types of work intensification ▪ Physicality of work ▪ Same job, different expectations ▪ Loss of voice, agency ▪ Resistance ▪ Constraints on maximising utility		**Wage-hour bargain** ▪ Structural constraints ▪ Semi and non-compliance ▪ Strategies to meet contract conditions ▪ Implications of size & calibre ▪ Exploitation
Impact of employer control – access to PR • PR as an incentive • Potential to influence decisions • Role of family sponsorship - reunification • Perception of mutual gain (reward-effort) • Uncertainty and duration of timelines		**Impact of LS-TFWs on labour process:** • Stabilisation of production • Organisation of work • Service quality • Flexibilisation • Work intensification • Influence on team • Perception of power • Understanding the rules
		Employer perception of LS=TFWs • Work ethic • Consistently exceeding expectations • Motivated by family – serious goals • Cultural influences on work ethic
		Impact of employer control – access to PR • Nomination as ‘custom’ - a reward mechanism • Extending the employment relationship • Implications for family and labour recruitment • Intersection with family status • Internal labour markets