



A COMPARISON OF CIVIC AND
ETHNIC NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN
THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY
AND FRISIAN NATIONAL PARTY AND
THEIR IMPACT ON ATTITUDES
TOWARDS EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION, IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURALISM

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Summary

The civic versus ethnocultural dichotomy, used to distinguish between different types of nations and national identities, is in this thesis tested on two autonomist parties: the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Friesian National Party (FNP). Both parties are members of the European Free Alliance, ‘an alliance of regionalist and civic, democratic nationalist parties in Europe’ (EFA website). Each party’s position on issues pertinent to the dichotomy – European integration, immigration and multiculturalism – is analysed in order to test the value of the civic-ethnocultural dichotomy. A mixed methods approach is adopted, including quantitative analysis of surveys of both parties’ memberships and semi-structured interviews with party elites as well as documentary analysis. The conclusion is that a civic-ethnocultural framework is useful for analysing such parties but that it is conceptually unhelpful if conceived as a dichotomy and has greater value if understood in a more nuanced way. Instead, the framework can be conceptualised as multiple non-competitive continua with different dimensions that are related and whose association with the issues of European integration, immigration and multiculturalism is similar in direction, but diverges in strength.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Since the 1970s and 1980s autonomist parties have gained support and influence in Western Europe. Virtually all West European states now have autonomist parties in some shape or form (Türsan 1998: 1). These are often classified as being either civic or ethnic parties (De Winter *et al.* 2006). This classification relates to the whether the party is considered to have an inclusive or exclusive attitude, rhetoric and policies towards others.

The successes of autonomist parties in Europe have been heterogeneous and often come with peaks and troughs. Much of the comparative literature on autonomist parties has focussed on these successes and failures (De Winter and Türsan 1998; De Winter *et al.* 2006). Furthermore, the parties' relationship with the European integration process has received considerable academic interest (Lynch 1996; Elias 2009; De Winter and Cachafeiro: 2004; Ray 1999; Preston 2008; Lynch and de Winter 2008; Laible 2008; Healsy 2001; Jolly 2007; Darnadelli 2003). The modernist school presented a now somewhat dated view of this relationship between nationalism and European integration. They regarded the resurgence of what can be considered nationalist activity in the 1970s and 1980s as anachronistic (Hobsbawm 1992). The assumption was that modernity was heading towards further global integration and the new found salience of autonomist parties in Western Europe was considered incompatible with this process (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 10). McCrone stated that the attitude towards nationalism for most of the twentieth century has been that 'it is a virus left over from an older more vicious age' (McCrone 1998: vii).

However, it has become apparent that processes of further international integration are not necessarily incompatible with the policies, ideas and aims of autonomist movements and some scholars argue that international integration can reinforce

nationalism (Hutchinson 2005: 166). More recent analysis has focussed on the opportunity structures that European integration provides for autonomist parties with new opportunity structures to further their goals (for examples see Laible 2008; Elias 2009; also see chapter 6 for a further discussion). This particularly applies to civic autonomist parties and according to some, European integration has encouraged autonomist parties to adopt a more civic image and strategy (Hepburn and McLoughlin 2011).

Beside the literature that aims to explain the successes of autonomist parties and their relations with the European integration process, there is also extensive literature which focusses on the relation between the state wide identity and sub-state identity. Usually the scope of these projects take the whole sub-nation or region as the unit of analysis but the role of autonomist parties often forms a key part of the analysis (for examples see: Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Keating 1996; 1997; Mitchell 2010). However, there has been less focus on how autonomist parties conceptualise national identity. The autonomist party literature is not well integrated with the broader literature on national identity. In other words, although sub-nations and regions as a whole are often chosen as a unit of analysis in relation to how national identities are conceptualised, there has been little specific focus on how national identity is conceptualised within autonomist parties (exception Mitchell *et al.* 2011; Leith and Soule 2011). This is noteworthy as autonomist parties are often active actors in the process of identity formation. Their members and elites can reasonably be expected to have a deeper understanding of the issues involved and able to articulate positions more clearly than 'ordinary' fellow nationals.

A customary distinction in the theoretical literature on nationalism and national identity is that between civic and ethnocultural (ethnic) nationalism and national identities (for examples see: Kohn 2005; Plamenatz 1975; Smith 1991; Keating 1996; Brubaker 1996; 1998). The former is often thought to be based on subjective criteria, such as feeling a national identity or respecting values, laws and institutions and residence. These characteristics of a national identity are essentially voluntarist; a

person can choose to fulfil them. In the latter the criteria are objective. They can be considered ascriptive and include criteria such as birth, ancestry and race. They can also (but not necessarily) include cultural criteria such as language and religion. In these cases an individual has little to no choice whether they can fulfil such criteria. There have been many studies that have operationalised this dichotomy taking the nation-state as the unit of analysis (Brubaker 1996; Hjerm 1998; Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Björklund 2006; Greenfeld 1992) and even if the dichotomy has been considered problematic (for examples see: Shulman 2002; Kuzio 2002; Brown 1999, 2000; Kymlicka 1999; Nieguth 1999; Nielsen 1999) some have argued that with some adaptations the framework remains analytically useful (Hjerm 1998; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010).

This thesis attempts to integrate the broader literature on national identity with that of autonomist parties, by analysing how two civic autonomist parties in Western Europe, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Frisian National Party (FNP), conceptualise national identity and how differences relate to attitudes towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism. Both the SNP and FNP are self-styled civic national parties who are members of the European Free Alliance (EFA), 'an alliance of regionalist and civic, democratic nationalist parties in Europe' (EFA website 2011). These two parties have been selected because on the one hand they have positive policies towards the issues pertinent in this thesis, such as European integration, immigration and multiculturalism, but on the other hand they also represent the heterogeneity of civic autonomist parties. The FNP's main goals, policies and thinking are related to protection of the Frisian language and cultural issues whereas the SNP is more concerned with economic issues. One is a large governing party in Scotland whereas the other operates on the fringes of provincial politics in the Netherlands. The SNP seeks Scottish independence from the UK whereas the FNP has a constitutional agenda based on more limited forms of federalism and does not aim to detach Friesland from the Netherlands. These differences have an impact in terms of how the parties formulate policies and strategies in relation to European

integration, immigration and multiculturalism. In other words, although the outcome in terms of attitudes towards these issues may be similar, the underlying processes are not always parallel. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed overview of the civic nature of both parties and their differences and similarities.

The thesis draws from the autonomist party literature and literatures in which national identity is theorised and operationalised. A key goal of the thesis is to unpack the concept of national identity. It aims to go beyond a 'traditional' civic versus ethnocultural model whilst at the same time preserving the analytical strengths of the framework. Rather than conceptualising the framework as a single spectrum, it is envisaged as several non-competitive continua. Such a model is considered a more accurate representation of how national identity is conceptualised in autonomist parties and in general. In this sense, the thesis makes a contribution to the broader theoretical understanding of national identity.

But why is it important to understand how autonomist parties conceptualise national identity? One of the implications of the binary civic versus ethnocultural model is that civic conceptualisations are considered liberal, cosmopolitan and inclusive whereas ethnocultural conceptualisations are considered illiberal, particularistic and exclusive (Kohn 2005; Greenfeld 1992; Brown 2000; Brubaker 1996). Thus although all concepts of national identity create boundaries between an 'in' and 'out' group (Hjerm 1998), the civic versus ethnocultural categories relate to attitudes towards others. The orientation of the framework is that civic identities can accept others whereas ethnocultural conceptions of national identities are more antagonistic towards others. Who these 'others' are will differ but conceptually a distinction can be made between 'internal' and 'external' others. The former relates to attitudes towards those that live within the boundaries of a nation but who may not be considered part of the nation. External others relates to attitudes towards other countries and their citizens and the willingness to cooperate with them.

The relationship between autonomist parties and internal and external others makes Western European civic autonomist parties interesting case studies. Over the past five decades the presence of both internal and external others has been prominent. European integration has led to closer cooperation between countries and increased immigration means that Western European societies have become more pluralist. Attitudes towards European integration can be regarded as an example of external others whereas attitudes towards immigration and the broader concept of multiculturalism can be considered as internal others. Thus besides contributing to the theoretical understanding of national identity, this thesis also aims to contribute to further explore how attitudes towards others are formed within autonomist parties.

The two parties that are under examination in this thesis have both had to respond to the European integration process, immigration and multiculturalism. They have had to create a coherent set of responses which are in line with their main goals (i.e. cultural protection and constitutional change). Both SNP and FNP have generally positive policies towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism. However, attitudes within the parties are not uniform; not everybody holds the same attitude towards either external or internal others. This thesis explores whether more positive attitudes towards others can, as the civic versus ethnocultural framework suggests, be associated with civic conceptions of national identity and, vice versa, if ethnocultural conceptions of national identity can be associated with more negative attitudes towards others. Throughout this thesis it will be shown that the relation between civic and ethnocultural identities on the one hand and European integration, immigration and multiculturalism are neither theoretically nor empirically clear-cut, whilst at the same time showing that there is evidence that a civic versus ethnocultural binary model has some merit but only when the concepts are unpacked (see chapter 5).

Autonomist parties, like other political parties, consist of many layers. Conceptual models consisting of voters, supporters, members, activists, sub-elite and elite are drawn in the party literature (Ware 1996; Duverger 1967; Katz and Mair 1994) and these different strata in a party have been found to differ in terms of attitudes towards

issues. Furthermore, it has been suggested that they have different levels of radicalism (Kitschelt 1989; May 1972). It is not within the scope of this thesis to fully operationalise such comprehensive party structures. However, in any study of attitudinal structures in political parties care does need to be taken when analysing different party strata.

The analysis in this thesis is restricted to the party membership. Voters are not included in the analysis for two reasons. Although voters have an important influence on party attitudes, their support for the party is more fluid. Voters can reasonably be considered more volatile than party members and may support a party for many different reasons (for example for tactical purposes or protest voting). This is not to say that party members do not change parties. Studies show that membership numbers have declined and fluctuated considerably (for a debate see: Mair and Biezen 2001; Seyd and Whiteley 2004). However, 'signing up' to a political party is a greater sign of commitment than casting a vote. Therefore, members are a more constant part of political parties. Furthermore, the availability of data also constrains the scope of this thesis. Voters are a much more diverse and a more difficult to identify group than party members and therefore the data gathering process is more complex and expensive.

This thesis makes a distinction between two types of members: 'ordinary' members and 'party representatives'. The latter category is defined as any member who has at one point taken up a public or party office for the party. These people can be regarded as the 'public face' of the party. There is an established literature that identifies several layers within political parties. However, there is no consensus in terms of how these layers should be defined and what their exact impact is (May 1972; Kitschelt 1989; Norris 1995). In chapters 5 to 7 it is shown that in relation to the issues pertinent to this thesis (conceptualisations of national identities, European integration, immigration and multiculturalism) there are reasons to assume that there is some variation between party representatives and the grassroots membership. As part of the evidence presented in this thesis is based on interview data with selected party

representatives but not party members and the survey data that are used constitute the full membership (representatives and grassroots), it is necessary to highlight any differences between the two sources of evidence in order to test whether the interview data can be considered representative for the whole membership.

In summary, the study employs a two-step sequential design. In the first part the main research question is: how do the SNP and FNP conceptualise national identity. In the second part the results of the analysis of the first part are used to explore, how different conceptions of national identity relate to attitudes towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism, which is the second main research question. This thesis provides a 'focussed comparison' (Ragin 2007: 80). Naturally, as the focus is on two cases, specific factors can blur the observed outcomes. As Peters (1998: 65-9) notes, country specific factors can lead to over-determination of data. Too many factors may be identified which can explain the outcome. In order to counteract such drawbacks a strong theoretical framework is needed. Chapter 2 provides a framework which links theories of national identity and their relationship with 'others' to the specific context of autonomist parties in Western Europe. Subsequently, at the end of the chapter it will be possible to formulate more specific expectations in relation to the overall research questions.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodological framework. This thesis employs a mixed methods research design and includes evidence sources from two party membership surveys, 61 elite interviews and a wide range of documentary evidence. The SNP membership survey was conducted in 2007 under an ESRC research grant (RES-062-23-0722) (Mitchell *et al.* 2011). The researcher was granted early access to the data. The second FNP survey was conducted in 2009 by the researcher. The elite interviews involved 25 FNP representatives from the regional and local level and 36 SNP representatives from the European, regional and local level. Documentary analysis involved a wide range of sources including party manifestos, official press statements, party magazines and newspaper sources.

Traditionally, the study of nationalism and national identity has been the domain of research that is primarily driven by 'historical, theoretical and qualitative research agendas. A straw poll asking about the major figures in the field would doubtless nominate scholars like Anthony Smith, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson' (Jones and Smith 2001: 46). Considering the complexity of the concepts such an approach is understandable but it does have some implications. The analysis tends to be skewed towards the uniqueness of cases rather than similarities. This thesis aims to overcome this imbalance. The quantitative data tends to point out similarities between the cases whereas the qualitative evidence stresses differences. Combining the two in the same analysis leads to a more comprehensive account and a better understanding of national identities and their relationship with European integration, immigration and multiculturalism.

In chapter 4 the SNP and FNP are introduced, which are the cases for the empirical chapters. One of the great strengths of a focussed comparison is that the concepts that are of interest to the thesis are analysed whilst taking into account detailed contextual factors. In other words, focussing the comparison and placing firm boundaries should not mean that a wider range of contextual factors (that may interplay with those concepts that are of primary interest to the thesis) are not taken into account. In order to place the cases in context, it is necessary to include a broad overview of the parties and the politics in which they are situated so that details about their case specific circumstances can be taken into account. Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive justification for using the two parties as the basis of the analysis.

The fifth chapter aims to unpack the concept of national identity. It uncovers the different mechanisms that are at work in both the SNP and FNP's understanding of national identity. Specifically, the civic versus ethnocultural framework is operationalised and improvements to the framework are proposed. The results in chapter 5 have a direct impact on the two succeeding chapters. In chapter 6, the relation between different understandings of national identity and attitudes towards European integration are analysed (external others). Furthermore, both parties'

strategies towards European integration are unpacked by means of interview data and documentary evidence. In the seventh chapter, similar to the previous chapter, the relations between different understandings of national identity and attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism are analysed (internal others). This chapter also provides an overview of the parties' policies on immigration and multiculturalism whilst placing them in the state-wide and regional context.

In the final chapter, the key findings of the thesis are presented in three ways. Firstly, the findings are summarised and the general tendencies of the framework are evaluated. Secondly, the chapter briefly explores whether the findings are generalisable. Thirdly, the findings are placed within a broader body of literature.

Chapter 2 - Conceptual Framework

According to Özkirimli (2000: 1), interest in nationalism and national identities as concepts developed relatively late and a full-fledged literature was not established until the 1980s. However, the basis for many of the current debates on nationalism and national identity was laid by scholars in the early and mid twentieth century. These theories are taken as the starting point for this chapter in order to situate the concepts used in this thesis. The first part of this chapter provides a critical theoretical discussion of the literature in which the development and usage of the civic versus ethnocultural framework are discussed. In the second part of this chapter suggestions for adaptations of the civic versus ethnocultural framework are made, before linking the design specifically to the civic autonomist political parties in Western Europe. In conclusion, the empirical research questions as formulated in the introduction will be put into the context of the theoretical discussion. It is argued that theoretically the civic versus ethnocultural framework, operationalised in this thesis, should not be imagined as a dichotomy or a single spectrum but as two independent continua which are non-competitive.

Before setting out the conceptual framework, it is useful to explore some of the definitional problems in relation to nations and national identity, nationalism and nation-states, as these herald the theoretical models that have been developed in the literature. In the historiography on nationalism and national identity two types of definitions of the nation and national identities are often distinguished (Özkirimli 2005). Firstly, there are those definitions that stress subjective or voluntarist characteristics. Such definitions make membership of the nation a matter of choice which is considered inclusive. The second type of definition stresses objective criteria which imply an exclusive type of national identity. In such cases an individual cannot

choose membership of a nation as ascriptive criteria are a prerequisite (Keating 1997: 690; Jones and Smith 2001: 45; Bryant 1997: 164; Björklund 2006: 99). Evidently, there is a third possibility which involves using both objective and subjective criteria. Indeed, as will be shown, most if not all definitions use both. It is therefore a matter of emphasis on how definitions are categorised. The use of different definitions explains to a large extent the development of a civic versus ethnocultural framework, the basis for the conceptual framework used throughout this thesis.

An objective definition of the nation (and national identity) contains a set of 'given' or ascriptive criteria that an individual is required to possess in order to be able to claim a particular national identity (Keating 1997: 690; Jones and Smith 2001: 45). Connor (1994) defines the nation as 'a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties' (Connor 1994: 202). Kinship ties imply exclusivity and although these ties, in Anderson's (1996) terms, can be 'imagined' and therefore are subjective (i.e. they are what a group decides them to be and can be subject to change), they do impose real and objective restrictions on individuals in terms of their ability to claim a national identity. Stalin also defined the nation ascriptively; as 'a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin 1994: 18-21). He argued that only when all these characteristics exist can a group of people be called a nation (Ibid.). In other words, according to Stalin, a group of people cannot choose to be a nation without possessing certain ascriptive criteria. A non exhaustive list of objective criteria can include a common history, religion, language, culture, race, territory, ethnicity and kinship.

Objective definitions encounter difficulties when empirically tested as there are likely to be nations that do not conform to all the criteria in a definition. For example, Anderson (1996) regards a common language as a key criterion. However, a nation such as Switzerland which has four official languages would not be considered a nation if a common language is one of the prerequisites. McCrone asserts that ascriptive

criteria can never offer the definitive criteria of a nation. Just like race or ancestry cannot define nations, 'neither can the usual suspects of language, religion, physical or material interests' (McCrone 1998: 4). Whatever objective criteria are assigned to the nation, they can always be falsified in specific cases or in specific contexts.

Subjective definitions of a nation (and national identity) are regarded as inclusive. Membership of the nation requires an individual's commitment or choice to become a member of the nation (Keating 1996: 690; Jones and Smith 2001: 45; Björklund 2006: 99; Bryant 1997: 164). Renan famously articulated this position. He defined the nation as 'a large scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and those that one is prepared to make in the future' (Renan 1996: 49). In the same lecture Renan also refers to a nation as 'a daily plebiscite' (ibid.). Renan takes, according to Smith (2010: 40), 'a more political, and to a certain extent voluntary approach' than others.¹ This definition can be considered subjective; rather than stipulating objective criteria that form the basis of the nation, a group of people makes a subjective decision to be a nation.

Subjective definitions have important drawbacks. Conceptually, they allow a group of people to form a nation and be identified as such, on the basis of a set of criteria they decide to be appropriate. Hobsbawm warns that subjective definitions can lead if 'incautious into extremes of voluntarism which suggests that all that is needed to be or create or recreate a nation is the will to be one' (Hobsbawm 1992: 8). Hobsbawm criticises subjective definitions from a normative perspective in that they are undesirable and lead to what he calls 'Kleinstaaterei'. Smith (1986; 1991) has argued that subjective definitions do not represent findings from empirical case studies and that something more than the choice to be a nation binds people together as fellow nationals. Smith argues that the foundation of a national identity extends from an 'ethnic core' or 'dominant ethnies' (Smith 1991: 39) which he defines as a set of core characteristics of a group which consist of six components: a collective name, a

¹ Renan articulated his position in response to the German historian von Treischke who employed an ethno-linguistic definition of national identity. The debate between the two can be situated in the questions that surrounded the 'belonging' of Alsace-Lorraine.

common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity (Smith 1986: 22-30). Ethnies are 'exceptionally durable' (Smith 1986: 16), have often been developed in pre-modern times and are, according to Smith, the core-basis for a national identity. Although Renan rejects the idea that a nation is based on primordial bonds (race, ancestry or language), he does assert that a nation is 'historically situated' (also see Dieckhoff 2005: 2) and therefore is not completely voluntarist as it is connected to a cultural heritage.

The tension between subjective and objective definitions should not be overstated. Most scholars recognize that nations are based on both characteristics. Kellas (1998) for example explicitly refers to both in his definition:

a nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry. Nations have 'objective' characteristics that may include a territory, a language, a religion or common descent (though not all of these are always present), and 'subjective' characteristics, essentially a people's awareness of their nationality and affection for it (Kellas, 1998:3).

Smith also argues that a combination of both subjective and objective criteria is needed to define a nation or national identity. He defines the nation 'as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members' (Smith 1995: 1). However, this does not mean that there are no variations in how salient, or in what quantities and with what restrictions, objective or subjective criteria are included.

Scholars have attempted to operationalise the civic versus ethnocultural conceptualisations of nations and national identities by analysing differences in citizenship rules between states (Brubaker 1996; Habermas 1992, 1996). There are good reasons for this as the two are closely related but often wrongly equated. In

many cases a civic conceptualisation of national identity leads to an inclusive offer of citizenship. However, it is possible to acquire citizenship without being considered a fully equal national and a person can have a national identity without being a citizen. Although differences between inclusive and exclusive citizenship policies are an important piece of the puzzle and relate to the nature of national identities, they do not provide the complete story. Citizenship policies are not sufficient evidence for categorising different conceptions of national identity. It is important to distinguish between the two concepts. Guibernau makes the following distinction between national identity and citizenship: '[national identity is] a collective sentiment of belonging to the nation – understood primarily as a cultural community [whereas] citizenship basically refers to membership of the state – a political institution granting rights and imposing duties on its members' (Guibernau 2007: 7). It is how national identity rather than citizenship is defined that is operationalised in this thesis but some analysis of positions on citizenship will be able to provide insights into the civic and ethnocultural framework.

The differences in conceptions of nations and national identities are associated with different types of nationalism. Nationalism can be considered an 'empty ideology' which is inherently vague and able to absorb elements of other ideologies. This means nationalism as a concept is difficult to define. Gellner defines nationalism as 'primarily a principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1). According to him, nationalists believe that the nation and the state were destined for each other and that each one of them is incomplete if left on its own. Nationalists claim that 'a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but only as a result of some great disaster' (Gellner 1983: 6). Unlike nationalists Gellner does not think that men must have a national identity and argues that there was never such a predestined bond between states and nations. The two coming together is not a historic inevitability but is a modern development. The core of Gellner's argument is that 'nations like states are a contingency and not a universal

necessity' (Ibid.). Gellner is considered one of the main protagonists of that modernist position.

Other definitions identify nationalism as an ideology or a sentiment. Smith defines nationalism as 'an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population' (Smith 1995). Deutsch refers to nationalism as 'a state of mind which gives "national" messages, memories and images a preferred status in social communication and greater weight in decision making ... a purely vegetative group feeling' (Deutsch 1966: 208). Kohn also considers nationalism as 'first and foremost a state of mind' (Kohn 2005: 10). Such definitions are inherently vague and although defining nationalism as a set of ideas or a sentiment has its merits, it is the political expressions of these ideas are what can be empirically measured. However, that is not to say that nationalism as a political principle does not rely on sentiment and ideological foundations.

The traditional ultimate goal of nationalism is the creation of a nation-state, in which one nation is represented by one state. Anderson has referred to the nation-state as a marriage between the nation and the state. This marriage has not always been happy and in most instances it was a rather late marriage (Anderson 1999: 3). Similarly to Gellner, Anderson (1996) argues that the state is much older than the nation. Furthermore, in almost every instance the nation and the state do not overlap flawlessly which can be the cause of much disagreement and conflict. In many cases, it is difficult to pinpoint and separate the nation from the state. Although conceptually it is useful to distinguish between the two, in practice the nation and the state are often so intertwined that doing so is almost impossible (Billig 1995; Connor 1978).

National identity – a theoretical discussion

Binary models have dominated the literature of nationalism. Such dichotomies make a distinction between civic nations on the one hand, which are largely defined by subjective characteristics that can be acquired. This means ‘that national identity is a matter of choice’ (Björklund 2006: 99) and is based on ‘the political principles you share with other like-minded individuals’ (Yack 1999: 107). It is considered ‘open and inherently political’ (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010: 579). The other side of the framework refers to national identities that are based on ethnocultural criteria. Such an understanding of national identities is typified by valuing ascriptive characteristics (Keating 1997: 690; Jones and Smith 2001: 45). In these nations national identity is considered ‘a birth right’ (Björklund 2006: 99); it can imply that ‘ethnic status or ancestry determine who is accepted as a full member of the community’ (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010: 579) and that an individual has ‘no choice at all in making your national identity; you are your cultural inheritance and nothing else’ (Yack 1999: 107). Evidently, such dichotomies are simplifications or ‘myths’ (Yack 1999: 107). Most scholars recognise the complexities. Nevertheless, binary models have proven to be resilient analytical tools.

Numerous binary models have been developed (Table 2.1). And although these models differ from each other in important respects, which can lead to variation in categorisations of nations, the overall theoretical and analytical assumptions are reasonably consistent. The discussion below will outline these assumptions. The designations ‘civic and ethnocultural’ are used in this thesis for neither category unless a specific model is discussed. The term civic is commonly used as a designation for the more subjective and inclusive of nations or national identity. However, at this stage of the discussion the term ethnocultural is preferred to the more commonly used designation of ‘ethnic’, mainly because the binary models as presented in table 2.1 include ethnic as well as cultural characteristics when discussing more exclusive

conceptions of nationalism. It is only when the concept of national identity is further unpacked and the ethnic and cultural characteristics are not combined into a single concept (chapter 5) that it is clearly a more exclusive ethnic dimension of national identity, although even then there are limitations. Until then the hybrid term ethnocultural is used to denote the fact that the category includes both ethnic and cultural criteria.

Table 2.1: Different headings for civic and ethnocultural nationalism and their authors

CIVIC	ETHNOCULTURAL	Author
Western	Eastern	Kohn 2005; Plamenatz 1976; Hutchinson 1987
Staatsnation	Kulturnation	Meinecke 1970
Civic	Ethnic	Smith 2000, 2005; Ignatieff 1993; Keating 1996; Kohn 2005
Individualistic	Collectivistic	Greenfeld 1992
Jus Soli	Jus Sanguinis	Brubaker 1996, 1998
Voluntaristic	Cultural	Kohn 2005, 1955; Ignatieff 1993
Territorial based	Descent based	Brubaker 1996
Political	Cultural	Chatterjee 1993; Hutchinson 1987
Liberal	Illiberal	Kohn 2005
Inclusive	Exclusive	Kellas 1998
Benign	Nasty	Gellner 1983

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss every model presented in Table 2.1. Instead, the discussion is restricted to those models that have been most influential and that are most pertinent to the research questions. The German historian Meinecke (1970) is credited with establishing the first binary distinction in a study of nationalism. In 1907 he published *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*, in which he distinguished

between cultural and political based nationalism. He argued that there was a difference between nations that were based on a cultural heritage and those that were unified as a consequence of political and constitutional history. Meinecke, similarly to many later scholars, regarded the distinction as ideal types. Nations were seen as balancing in between the two extremes.

Kohn (2005) provides a more in-depth historical analysis of the development of nationalism. He distinguished between civic (American) and ethnic (German) nationalism (Kohn 2005). He used civic and ethnocultural concepts more rigidly than Meinecke and he regarded states as having fixed and stable characteristics (Kohn 2005). According to Wolf, Kohn can be considered as unusual in the mid-twentieth century as he insisted 'that enlightened [(civic)] nationalism and liberalism were compatible' (Wolf 1976: 651). He portrayed civic nationalism as superior to ethnocultural nationalism. Civic nationalism was, at least in its pure form, a liberal doctrine which guaranteed individual freedoms and maintained a universalistic outlook. Such themes have been incorporated in the works of authors such as Calhoun, who also stresses the universal and cosmopolitan nature of civic nationalism and national identities (Calhoun 2007). Kohn considered ethnocultural nationalism illiberal, collective and particularistic (Kohn 2005: 329-31). Kellas (1998) makes a similar distinction between inclusive (civic) and exclusive (ethnocultural) nationalism, but unlike Kohn he is more inclined to accept the non-competitive nature of both categories.

Greenfeld (1992) recognises the empirical problems of a rigid framework as proposed by Kohn. She distinguishes between individualistic and collectivistic nationalism. The former is liberal and regards individual rights as the ultimate basis of sovereignty. Collectivistic nationalism on the other hand is reactive, in the sense that it is a reaction against individualistic nationalism and it is no longer liberal but authoritarian. Where she differs from Kohn is that in her model civic nationalism can be individualistic and collectivistic:

Individualistic nationalism cannot be but civic, but civic nationalism can also be collectivistic. More often, though, collectivistic nationalism takes on the form of ethnic particularism, while ethnic nationalism is necessarily collectivistic (Ibid.: 11).

Greenfeld attempts to move away from a 'civic equals good versus ethnic equals bad' nationalism model, but the core of a dichotomous model remains in place. Greenfeld's model addresses those situations in which civic nationalism 'goes bad'.

Kohn famously associated civic nationalism with the West and ethnocultural nationalism with the East:

While western [civic] nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century, the later nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia easily tended towards a contrary development (Kohn 2005: 330).

According to Kohn, six countries – England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States and the British dominions – are classified as civic nations, whereas the rest of the world – and in particular Central and Eastern European countries, Russia and Asia – belonged to the ethnocultural category (Kohn 2005: 329-31). The origins of these differences are explained by the different stages of historical development in which the nations found themselves at the dawn of the nation building process. When nationalism arrived in the West it was embedded in civic institutions; middle classes were able to define the nation and secure individual freedoms and democracy. Furthermore, these western nations were already culturally united. In contrast, in the East civic institutions were not as established as in the West and there the nations were less culturally homogeneous. Therefore, the nation had to be created (Kohn 2005: 330). For these nations individual freedom and democratic values were no longer objectives. Instead national aspirations came into conflict with individual freedoms and democratic values (Kuzio 2002: 23).

These differences in historical development led to civic nationalism in the West, which is considered a modern, democratic, liberal and progressive type of nationalism. According to Kohn, it is this kind of nationalism that will unite the world and spread liberalism. It is essentially an outward looking cosmopolitan type of nationalism, the roots of which he identified in the ideals of the French revolution (Kohn 2005: 263, 322). Nationalism in the East 'tended towards a contrary development' (Kohn 2005: 330) and Kohn regards it as anti-modern, undemocratic, illiberal, excessive and militant (Kohn 1962: 24). It is inward looking, exclusive and particularistic. The 'depiction of ethnocultural as illiberal and civic nationalism as liberal' (Brown 2000) has become an important assumption of the framework and can be found in most political theory textbooks. Additionally, it has proved influential in more mainstream and journalistic accounts. Ignatief, in his widely read work, *Blood and Belonging*, described civic nationalism as 'necessarily democratic' and ethnic (ethnocultural) nationalist regimes as 'more authoritarian' (Ignatief 1993: 4-5) (for other examples see: Freedland 1998 and Pfaff 1993). The distinction has become part of the political rhetoric and is simplified as civic meaning 'good' and ethnocultural (ethnic) meaning 'bad'. It has also remained an important framework for academic analysis (Kiely *et al.* 2005: 150).

Similarly to Greenfeld, Smith is credited for moving the debate away from the normative sphere and developing a more sophisticated approach than the 'good' Western and 'bad' Eastern nationalism that Kohn represented (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004: 74). He defines civic nationalism as 'a historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture' (Smith, 2005: 179; Smith, 1986: 136-7). Subsequently, Smith recognises the influence this civic model has had in the world and similarly to Kohn he identifies a reaction against it, notably in Asia and Eastern Europe which he calls a non-western or ethnic/ethnocultural model. This model emphasises 'a community of birth and native culture' (Smith, 2005: 179). It stresses descent rather than territory. Additionally, it has 'strong popular or demotic elements' (Smith 2005: 180), meaning that on the ethnocultural side nationalists' visions, policies and aspirations can be justified by

referring to the collective will of the people. The people are ‘the final rhetorical court of appeal’ (Smith 2005: 180) for political leaders. In the civic model the people are ‘a political community subject to common laws and institutions’ (Smith 2005: 180). Smith concedes that ‘every nationalism contains civic and ethnocultural elements in varying degrees and different forms’ (Smith 2005: 180) and that the influence and impact of one side or the other can change over time. Furthermore, Smith recognises that certain civic characteristics have ethnocultural qualities, a point that is discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.

The American sociologist Roger Brubaker operationalises the civic and ethnocultural framework by applying it to citizenship traditions in Germany and France. As was noted earlier, there are important differences between the concepts of citizenship and national identity. In fact, Brubaker questions the analytical and conceptual usefulness of national identity (Brubaker 1998: 299) and therefore his discussion largely focusses on the more ‘solid’ legal concept of citizenship. However, Brubaker asserts that the distinctions between civic and ethnocultural go beyond the study of legal systems and are entrenched in the ‘social and historic characteristics of nation-state[s]’ (Brubaker 1996: 170). In other words, citizenship traditions are rooted in differences in conceptualisations of national identity; such characteristics are important determinants for citizens’ reasoning about communities and citizenship and provide a means for self-identification (Brubaker 1996: 170).

Brubaker is particularly interested in immigration policies and how these diverge as a result of dissimilarities in definitions of citizenship. Germany defines its citizenship as almost purely *jus sanguinis* whereas the attitude of France towards citizenship is a combination of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* (Brubaker 1996: 168-73):

In the French tradition, the nation has been conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial framework revolutionary and republican definitions of the national identity and citizenship - unitarist, universalist, and secular –

reinforced what was already in the ancien regime an essentially political understanding of national identity (Brubaker 1996: 168).

Whereas in the German case:

This pre-political German nation, this nation in search of a state was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular *volksgemeinschaft*. On this understanding, national identity is an ethnocultural, not a political fact (Brubaker 1996: 169).

Similarly to Smith, Brubaker recognises that *jus soli* on its own is not sufficient; a certain amount of *jus sanguinis* is necessary to unify the community. This point is further discussed in the next section.

In summary, the models above have three general implications. Firstly, the civic versus ethnocultural framework is a widely used analytical tool that categorises nations and different conceptualisations of national identity into two categories of opposing and seemingly theoretically irreconcilable types of nationalism whilst recognising that both categories are ideal types. Secondly, civic nationalism and national identities are associated with subjective or voluntaristic criteria; individuals theoretically have a choice as to whether they want a national identity or not. Conversely, ethnocultural nationalism and national identities are associated with objective criteria, meaning that individuals theoretically have no control over whether they can obtain membership of the nation. Thirdly, normative connotations are attached to either side of the dichotomy; these are sometimes summarised as civic nationalism being the ‘good’ type of nationalism and ethnocultural nationalism the ‘bad’ type of nationalism (Kohn 2005; Gellner 1983), but such distinctions are simplification and should be avoided (Greenfeld 1992; Smith 2005 and Brubaker 1996, 1998). Nevertheless, ethnocultural nationalism and national identities can be considered more exclusive and civic nationalism and national identities can be considered more inclusive. Furthermore, the normative connotations associated with each category imply that attitudes towards

'others' (those that do not belong to the group that is considered a nation) are different. In the next section a further critique of these three points is provided and subsequently some solutions are proposed.

A multi-dimensional, non-competitive framework

Much of the critique of the binary model relates to the supposed historical development of nations (Nieguth 1999; Brown 1999; Kuzio 2002; Greenfeld 1992; Spencer and Wollman 2005; Kaufmann 2000; Shulman 2002). This thesis is less concerned with the historical foundation of the model but focuses on its ability to help to explain and understand present day civic autonomist parties. In relation to the present day relevance of the model three conceptual complications are discussed in this section; (i) the 'ethnoculturalness' of civic nations and national identities and the civicness of ethnocultural nations and national identities; (ii) the ambiguous nature of objective and subjective criteria; and (iii) the normative connotations associated with ethnocultural and civic nations.

i) the 'ethnoculturalness' of civic nations and national identities and the civicness of ethnocultural nations and national identities

Part of the problem when operationalising national identity is that there is no common standard; unlike the concept of citizenship which is determined by law there is no set of rules that determines a national identity. Furthermore, belonging or not belonging to a nation, as opposed to a state, has fewer tangible consequences. Citizenship affords a person certain civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1950). Being or not being part of a national community has less tangible consequences. All of this makes the civic versus ethnocultural framework ambiguous; it is generally recognised that civic and ethnocultural conceptions of the nation are ideal types and that in practice a subtler combination of the two can be identified (Kiely *et al.* 2005: 152).

Kymlicka (1995) argues that civic nations must have ethnocultural elements. For example, 'immigrants to the United States must not only pledge allegiance to democratic principles; they also must learn the language and history of their new society' (Kymlicka 1995:24). Similarly, Lieven² recognises that ethnocultural elements are an important part of American national identity but that they are not always visible and that they 'have a tendency to rise to the surface in times of crisis and conflict' (Lieven 2004: 5). A civic commitment to political institutions alone is in most cases not enough to be considered a member of national community. In most cases a member of the nation is also required to embrace some of the cultural characteristics the civic nation holds, such as speaking the language or having knowledge of its history and traditions. People do not just accept anybody who swears loyalty to the political ethos and institutions as a fellow national. In certain countries, language skills and knowledge of cultural practices are also required for citizenship through citizenship tests.³ However, even in these cases it can be argued that if a new citizen wants to be considered a fellow national more knowledge and skills are required than those required to pass the test. Yack (1999) makes a similar point when he stresses that all nations in the West have their own 'cultural horizon'. Every nation has a set of shared historical myths and values that shape a common identity; this also applies to civic nations (Yack 1996: 201). Kuzio (2002) goes one step further and asserts that civic nations do not only have ethnocultural characteristics; they also actively impose them. All nations are 'guilty of nation building in which they try to culturally homogenise the community' (Kuzio 2002: 24). It seems that ascriptive criteria are required before a person can be considered a fellow national in a civic nation.

Some scholars attempt to solve the problem by arguing that a binary framework is inadequate and stress that the concept of national identity needs to be further unpacked; a distinction between civic, cultural and ethnic national identities is

² Lieven's thesis aims to explain the American response to the Twin Towers attack in 2001 by analysing the operationalisation of a more exclusive and ethnocultural American national identity.

³ For example the UK and the Netherlands and many other countries require new citizens to sit citizenship tests.

necessary (Kymlicka 1999; Nielsen 1999; Shulman 2002) or territory/residence should be taken as a distinctive dimension of national identity (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Björklund 2006). However, by adding a category the different dimensions of national identities may become more apparent but the conceptual overlap remains unresolved.

On the other hand, those nations that are classified as ethnocultural and are considered to be based on a single homogenised culture are in reality not as homogeneous as is sometimes suggested and have no real hope or desire to become homogeneous, especially in the 'advanced capitalist/late industrialist/post-industrial society [which] generates pressures for massive imports of immigrant labour' (Brubaker, 1998: 294). A completely culturally homogeneous society is unattainable as every nation is subjected to external forces.⁴ Nieguth argues that to categorise a nation as ethnocultural implies a degree of homogeneity which is non-existent. The dichotomy assigns certain objective criteria to the group members which, when examining the group closer, do not exist (Nieguth 1999: 161). Smith agrees: 'clearly, we should not overestimate the degree of cultural homogeneity even of modern nations' (Smith 1986: 73). Smith is not specifically referring to either ethnocultural or civic nations but is arguing that all nations in general are heterogeneous and that their members do not fulfil all the criteria that they are expected to fulfil. In other words, defining a group along cultural lines misrepresents the heterogeneity within that group.

A rigid distinction between civic and ethnocultural nationalism is also challenged when tested empirically. Shulman (2002) argues that civic nations have strong ethnocultural elements and ethnocultural nations have strong civic elements. In an analysis of data from 15 countries he shows that the distinction between civic and ethnocultural nationalism is overstated and that all countries appear to have both. Björklund (2006) comes to a similar conclusion when she analyses conceptions of the national identities in Latvia, Poland and Lithuania. Krejčí and Velímský (1996) completed a study of 73

⁴ Even often stated examples of culturally homogeneous nations like Japan, Iceland or Israel are influenced by other cultures and are not completely culturally uniform.

cultural groups in Europe in which they also questioned the validity and usability of a western/civic versus eastern/ethnocultural dichotomy. They concluded that England, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, all countries identified by Kohn (2005), Greenfeld (1992) and Plamenatz (1976) as civic nations, had both ethnocultural and civic characteristics (Krejči and Velímský 1996: 210).

There are three explanations as to why ethnocultural criteria are present in civic nations; none of these are mutually exclusive. Firstly, there are those that argue that the cultural core has always been present in these nations (Smith 1986) and has not disappeared. In fact the opposite is true; it is so strong in civic nations that these nations feel secure and do not have to reinforce cultural distinctiveness. The minority is expected to conform to the majority culture rather than be excluded from it (Kymlicka 1995: 24). Secondly, ethnocultural criteria are required to create a sufficiently strong bond between citizens. People need more than political institutions or sentiment that is based on choice to establish meaningful communities. Ethnocultural criteria are better able to create such bonds (Kymlicka 1995: 24; Shulman 2002: 280; Smith 1991: 40). Thirdly, nations need to be able to distinguish themselves from others. It is only ethnocultural criteria that allow them to do so effectively; a purely civic identity does not provide enough basis for distinction from other nations (Shulman 2002: 581).

As there seem to be good reasons to think that all conceptions of national identities contain a mix of ethnocultural and civic elements it is more fruitful to regard civic and ethnocultural measures as two independent continua rather than as a single spectrum with both representing opposite sides. Subsequently, characteristics associated with both sides are not mutually exclusive nor are they considered to compete with each other. From an empirical perspective such a model allows the operationalisation of the dichotomy without the rigidity that is imposed by applying a single spectrum where categorisation is inevitably dichotomous and more easily leads to exaggeration.

ii) The ambiguous nature of objective and subjective criteria

The second implication of this framework is that conceptualisations of national identity distinguish between a set of subjective criteria associated with civic conceptions of national identity and a set of objective criteria associated with ethnocultural conceptions of national identities. The list of criteria for either side is vast, but in relation to the subjective criteria it can be expected to include elements that do not impose restrictions on the individual's ability to choose or adopt a national identity and that can thus be acquired (Keating 1996, 1997; Jones and Smith 2001: 50; Björklund 2006: 99). Examples of such criteria may include the feeling of national identity and adhering to laws, values and mores of the country; however, criteria that involve residence are also often considered civic. When these predominate, a national identity can be considered inclusive and belonging to the civic category of the dichotomy. Objective/ethnocultural definitions can include a wide range of elements that are contextually and historically determined (Hechter and Levi 1979: 262-5). They are restrictive and involuntary (Keating 1996, 1997; Björklund 2006: 99). An individual has no, or very limited, control over whether they fulfil such criteria. Examples of such exclusive criteria are common ancestry, birth, religion, race and sometimes language.

However, criteria used to conceptualise national identity show ambiguity in terms of their objectivity and subjectivity and subsequently in terms of whether they can be considered inclusive or exclusive. They can be simultaneously inclusive and exclusive depending on the context (Kymlicka 1999; Nieguth 1999; Smith 2005; Jones and Smith 2001). This means that within the literature there is little agreement about which criteria specifically refer to the civic or ethnocultural concepts (Brubaker 2004: 137). Language as a criterion illustrates well how some criteria can theoretically belong to both sides of the dichotomy. An individual can choose to learn a language, which makes it an inclusive criterion as it is a personal choice and a vehicle for civic integration. But it depends on how language is defined. Eriksen (2004: 54-5) notes that 'the moment the children of immigrants begin to speak the vernacular language without a foreign accent, it becomes increasingly difficult for populist politicians to

brand them as “culturally alien” (Eriksen 2004: 54-5). In fact, cultural alienation becomes increasingly difficult as it is possible for anyone to speak a language fluently. In this sense language is a less restrictive criterion and can be associated with civic nationalism. However, when language is defined more broadly and includes an understanding of cultural contextual nuances (for examples see: Geertz 1973; Herder in Barnard 1983), it imposes certain restrictions for it implies that language cannot be learned but a person has to be brought up with it. Therefore, a person has no control over whether they can fulfil the criterion. Furthermore, as Hjerem asserts, ‘all modern national cultures are in some sense based on a single national language ... this domination puts pressure on cultural autonomy of immigrants’ (Hjerem 1998: 336).

Shulman (2002) groups religion and language together as cultural criteria for similar reasons as outlined above. Neither is fully inclusive nor exclusive. Religion can be used as an ethnocultural objective marker that excludes others (for example in Northern Ireland). However, religion is not objective in absolute terms. A person can change his or her religion (although not in all cases) and become a member of a ‘new’ religious community, whereas an individual cannot change their place of birth or ancestral lineage. Therefore religion, at least in certain situations, has the ability to be inclusive. However, religion may be more problematic than language. In many cases it does not simply constitute a choice by the individual to change a religion and consequences of changing can be severe. Furthermore, in comparison to language a person is in normal circumstances not able to practice more than one religion whereas languages can be learned accumulatively. For example, if control of a certain language is a criterion for national identity then that does not necessarily mean the individual is no longer allowed to speak any other language. However, the insistence of adherence to a certain religion in order to be considered a fellow national will almost always go hand in hand with the individual having to relinquish any other religious identity (should they have one). The overall ambiguity in relation to cultural criteria seems to be the reason why some scholars insist that these criteria should be considered as a separate category (Kymlicka 1999; Nieguth 1999; Shulman 2002).

Birth and ancestry at first seem more objective and more restrictive in terms of an individual's ability to choose them, but even these criteria have limitations as exclusive markers. Birth as a criterion for belonging to a nation can be interpreted differently in certain contexts. If the territory into which one is born incorporates a diverse range of cultures then the criterion of birth as a requirement for belonging to a nation can be interpreted as inclusive. Hence some scholars have regarded this criterion as belonging to the civic side of the dichotomy (Björklund 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009). However, when being born in a certain territory is a criterion for belonging to the nation it evidently excludes others; first generation immigrants will not be able to acquire a national identity of which birth is an ascriptive requirement. Additionally, birth is often considered a criterion for a national identity in combination with other criteria. A person who was born in a country but lived there for a very short time and has no ancestors from that country is less likely to be able to call him or herself a member of the nation. The combination with other criteria such as ancestral links or residence strengthens the claim. In other words, even in the case of a seemingly objective criteria such as birth the context is important in terms of how they are interpreted (Jones and Smith 2001: 47).

The same argument can be applied to the criterion of ancestry, as the definition of who can claim an ancestral lineage can change over time and national identity claims based on ancestry can be ambiguous (Bryant 2002). Additionally, ancestral lineage as a criterion on its own is often not considered sufficient for an individual to be considered a fellow national (even if it is considered enough to become a citizen). For example, although second or third generation immigrants in Canada, the USA and Australia may claim a link with their ancestors' home country, such links on their own are often not considered to be of sufficient weight to claim a national identity. Furthermore, ancestral conceptions of national identity are not necessarily exclusive and can be inclusive. For example, Germany considered Germans who lived in Eastern Europe and who were able to show ancestral links as fellow nationals (as such they were offered citizenship) (Brubaker 1996). From the perspective of Eastern European Germans, the

ancestral criterion of national identity can be considered inclusive. However, if ancestral lineage is the sole criterion of a national identity then it is also necessarily exclusive.

Even when race is a criterion for national identity it is not completely objective. It can be subject to change and racial perceptions can be redefined (Guibernau 2007: 15). Thus all such supposedly objective criteria should be analysed in their specific context in order to understand how they relate to national identity. On the other side, no matter how they are defined or in what context they are situated, an individual will never be able to make an unrestricted choice and thus they remain ascriptive.

These problems do not confine themselves to the sphere of culture or ethnicity. Territorial criteria can also be regarded as subjective and objective for national identity. Krejčí and Velímský (1996 [1981]) classify variables associated with residence and territory as ethnocultural and exclusive whereas Shulman (2002) and Smith (2005) regard residence and territory as civic and inclusive. If it is argued that anybody who lives in a certain territory can become a member of the nation and movement to that territory is unrestricted (as is for example the case in the EU) then this can be considered inclusive. However, as this is hardly ever the case the concept of national territory manifests itself through boundaries and frontiers and is therefore highly exclusive (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004: 73-4). Nevertheless, territorial criteria are often associated with civic conceptions of national identities despite their apparent exclusivity (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004: 73-4).

Respecting a country's political institutions, rules, mores and laws is in many cases considered inclusive and subjective, as an individual can choose to conform to such requirements and therefore it is associated with civic nations (Smith 1991). On the other hand, laws and institutions are set within a cultural context and require historical justification in order to create the necessary emotional attachment (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004: 73-4). If these laws and institutions are the results of cultural and historical processes it can be difficult for individuals from other backgrounds to accept

them. Thus the distinction between what is an inclusive/subjective criterion and what is exclusive/objective is also in this case somewhat blurred.

Deconstructing some of the components of the civic versus ethnocultural conceptions of national identity seems therefore to be a necessity for understanding national identity (Björklund 2006). Creating a hierarchy which identifies those characteristics that are more subjective and objective and those that are more ambiguous may counteract some of the problems associated with the inclusivity/subjectivity and exclusivity/objectivity of these criteria. There is a considerable onus on the researcher to decide which of these criteria can be considered exclusive and inclusive. Although the theoretical discussion above gives some inclination of which can be considered more subjective, objective and ambiguous, the details of this hierarchy are further discussed in chapter 5 where the concept of national identity is unpacked.

iii) The normative connotations associated with ethnocultural and civic nations

The dichotomy generalises a nation to a degree that all attitudes within the nation are classified under a single banner. Nations are considered a single entity encompassing one internally consistent set of values and attitudes. Instead, within any nation or any other group like an autonomous party national identity is conceptualised differently, some using ethnocultural characteristics, others using more civic elements.

The key problem, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, is that when classifying national identities as civic or ethnocultural it is stereotyped. This becomes particularly salient when normative values are attached to the different categories. The dichotomy presupposes intolerance, xenophobia and conflict in those nations that hold an ethnocultural definition of national identity, whereas civic nations are considered tolerant and peace loving (Kuzio 2002). Brubaker (1998) argues that it is neither the case that ethnocultural nationalism is a 'seething cauldron' waiting to boil over, nor is it the case that civic nationalism is a 'sea of tranquillity'. Supposedly civic nations like Belgium, the United Kingdom, France and Canada experience inter-ethnic conflict which is longstanding and can sometimes turn violent (Kuzio 2002: 25). Thus not only is

categorising nations as civic or ethnocultural problematic but to attach normative connotations to these categories is at best mistaken and possibly dangerous.

Furthermore, the histories of most civic nations are littered with examples of past ethnic conflict and aggression against other nations (Kuzio 2002: 24-26). For example the idealisation of the USA as a civic nation (Greenfeld 1992; Kohn 2005) bypasses the country's so-called WASP⁵ cultural domination (Kaufmann 2000: 3-4) which can be considered as the ethnocultural basis of the American nation and has been particularistic for most of its history (Kaufmann 2000: 9). Furthermore, the country's history of border conflicts with Mexico, the invasion of Canada in 1812 and the treatment of Afro-Americans and native Americans do not fit into this picture of a 'sea of tranquillity and peace'. France, often considered an archetypal example of a civic nation (Kohn 2005; Brubaker 1996) 'pursued aggressive, even violent cultural policies aimed at turning peasants into Frenchmen' (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004: 24). Furthermore, France's violent history against its neighbours during the Napoleonic wars also does not correspond with its civic credentials. By applying a civic versus ethnocultural dichotomy one risks that such histories that do not correspond with its civic classification are forgotten, excluded or even excused (Kuzio 2002: 24-6). This last criticism focuses on the implicit relation between civic and ethnocultural on the one hand and attitudes towards 'others' on the other.

Binary models not only make a distinction in terms of how different nations, groups and individuals conceptualise national identity but such models imply that they lead to different relations with others. As ethnocultural nationalism is considered to make use of more objective and exclusive criteria when conceptualising national identity, it is envisaged to be more inward looking and have a more negative attitude towards others than those that hold a civic understanding of national identity, which is considered more positive and inclusive of others. What is called for by critics (Kuzio 2002; Kaufmann 2000; Nieguth 1999) is not a simply presupposed 'good' versus 'bad' typology but a model that is able to test these relationships with others. Brubaker

⁵ White Anglo-Saxon Protestant

(1996) takes such an approach by analysing citizenship laws in France and Germany, but this only provides a limited insight into attitudinal relations towards others and types of national identity.

This thesis aims to test the relationship between different understandings of national identity and attitudes towards others. Two types of others can be identified: internal others and external others. Firstly, internal others are those that live within the borders of the nation but who are not considered to belong to the nation because they are not part of the majority/dominant culture (Tsuda 2010). Secondly, different conceptions of national identities lead to different attitudes towards other nations (external others). Civic national identities emphasise 'the universal similarities of nations' (Özkirimli 2000: 42). They are typified as liberal and cosmopolitan, leading to 'higher forms of integration' (Kohn 2005: 576). Ethnocultural national identities lead to demarcation of cultural groups and are not able to accommodate integration. Such national identities emphasise 'the diversity or self-sufficiency of nations' (Özkirimli 2000: 42). The implication is that those with ethnocultural national identities are less likely to cooperate with the outside world.

In chapters 6 and 7 the different attitudes to the two types of others are further developed by analysing attitudes towards European integration (external others) and immigration/ multiculturalism (internal others). Some scholars suggest that nationalism and European integration are incompatible. The modernist school of nationalism argues that the increased socio-economic prosperity provided by European integration will render nationalism obsolete (Hobsbawm 1992). However, others argue that European integration simply offers new ways of 'reproducing self-governing nations' (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004: 24, also see: Keating 1997; MacCormick 1999).

It is generally held that the relation between ethnocultural conceptions of national identity and European integration is negative. However, as will be argued in chapter 6, because of the unique nature of the European integration process certain caveats

need to be attached as the European project is also perceived to provide protection for ethnocultural groups. The proposition that civic nationalists are more inclusive, outward-looking and cosmopolitan (Kohn 2005) and therefore have a more positive attitude towards EU integration is too simplistic. There are considerable tensions within the framework caused by the heterogeneous interpretations of civic nationalism and national identity, as well as the different interpretations of the nature of European integration. As was argued on previous pages, civic nationalism and national identity are associated with liberalism (Brown 2000) and a liberal critique of European integration based on accusations of elitism and democratic deficits is far from uncommon (Siedentop 2001; Maedowcroft, J. 2002; Collignon 2007). Therefore, a civic conception of national identity would not be at odds with opposition against EU integration (or at least a certain type of EU integration). This adds an extra layer of complexity to the analysis in this thesis. Thus, it may be possible to establish a positive relationship between civic conceptions of national identity and European integration, but only if European integration is regarded as a liberal and inclusive process.

In this thesis the relation between different conceptions of national identity and 'internal others' is tested through applying the model to issues of immigration and multiculturalism. The relation between nationalism on the one hand and immigration and multiculturalism on the other hand is often considered strenuous and by some even regarded as an apparent paradox; why would nationalists want a culturally pluralist society when they acclaim the need for more sovereignty on the basis of cultural uniqueness and wish to protect that culture? Some have stated that the whole idea of a multicultural nationalist almost seems an oxymoron (Hussein and Miller 2006: 2-3). This apparent paradox can partly be explained by the civic versus ethnocultural framework. Civic conceptions of national identities can accommodate cultural plurality whereas ethnocultural conceptions are unable to do so because of their exclusive nature. But also here there are similar tensions to that of the relation between different national identities and European integration. Civic nationalism and national identity are considered liberal and a liberal critique of accommodating cultural

plurality is well established (Barry 2001). This point particularly applies to the nature in which cultural plurality is achieved in a multiculturalist framework. Because multiculturalism treats certain rights as group rights instead of individual rights it challenges the liberal doctrine of the autonomous individual.

The theoretical relationship between civic and ethnocultural nationalism and multiculturalism, immigration and EU integration will be further explored in chapters 6 and 7 in which they will be connected to the case studies. The discussion presented above outlines the general direction of the framework and some of the complications that can be expected.

The problems with the framework can be summarised as follows; (i) civic and ethnocultural conceptualisations of national identity cannot be captured in a single spectrum; they are not mutually exclusive; (ii) it is not always clear if subjective and objective criteria associated with either side of the framework are wholly inclusive or exclusive; (iii) subjective and objective criteria do not simply map onto the civic versus ethnocultural framework in the sense that the latter is considered illiberal, authoritarian and exclusive and the former is considered liberal, democratic and inclusive.

Autonomist parties and the nation

The theoretical discussion that has been presented in this chapter so far is based on scholarship that takes the state or its citizenship rules as the unit of analysis. Scholarly research has focussed on whether states as a whole can be classified as civic or ethnocultural by assessing the citizenship rules of that state. Autonomist political parties, the unit of analysis in this thesis, have received little attention (exception Mitchell *et al.*, forthcoming). Commentators and academics have applied terms such as

civic and ethnocultural to certain autonomist political parties based on general perception, rather than providing reliable empirical evidence for such claims.

The limited interest in how autonomist parties conceptualise the nation can be considered remarkable for three reasons. Firstly, autonomist parties have played an increasingly important role in Western European Politics over the past 20 years (Elias, 2009: 1; De Winter *et al.* 2006: 31-32). Studies have so far focussed on the explanation of the successes and failures of these parties (Türsan and De Winter 1998). Particular attention has been paid to autonomist parties' relationships with the process of EU integration (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Reino-Gomez, 2002; Keating 2004; De Winter *et al.* 2006; Hepburn 2008; Elias 2009). It is therefore surprising that little attempt has been made to rigorously analyse these parties' supposed civic or ethnocultural credentials by applying theoretical models developed in scholarship on national identities. Secondly, autonomist parties and their members can be expected to be highly aware of their own national identity and therefore they form an interesting unit of analysis and add empirical evidence to existing theories on nationalism and national identities. Party representatives and members can reasonably be expected to have thought of what national identity means to them, or at least more so than others. Thirdly, the parties' attitude and policies can be better understood by applying existing theoretical frameworks of national identities, particularly when considering their relationship with others.

This thesis attempts to fill this lacuna, at least partially. It would be unrealistic and unfeasible to study all autonomist parties or even all types of autonomist party. Therefore the scope of the investigation is limited to the civic side of the dichotomy. This thesis compares two cases that are representative of 'perceived' civic autonomist parties in Western Europe. By focussing on perceived civic autonomist parties it can be established whether ethnocultural elements are included in their conceptions of national identity and, if they are, what the impact of their inclusion is. Furthermore, immigration, multiculturalism and international integration in the form of EU integration have had a major impact in Western Europe and have therefore influenced

civic autonomist parties' thinking. This makes these parties suitable candidates for an attitudinal assessment towards such issues. In the following chapter the case studies are introduced in more detail. However, before doing so the different levels in which attitudes are structured in political parties are discussed as issues of party stratification influence the direction and scope of investigation.

Similarly to nations, political parties cannot be considered unitary actors. There is a body of literature which argues that attitudes within political parties are structured according to different positions individuals have in a party. However, there is disagreement over the exact boundaries and the implications of each of the different party strata (May 1972; Kitschelt 1989; Norris 1995). It is not within the scope of this thesis to fully apply the framework of such research; the concern here is primarily the party membership defined as signed up members. Within that membership a distinction is made between those that are 'ordinary' members and those that are or have been party office holders or public office holders within the party either in the past or present (see chapter 3 for details). Party office holders and public office holders are broad categories; they include party representatives and administrators from the national/provincial, regional and municipal levels. The reason why this group is interesting is because it is the public face of the party. In this thesis the term 'party representatives' is used to designate this group. It is reiterated that an important layer of political parties, namely voters, is omitted from this research. Although this obviously has implications for the conclusions that can be made, as the mechanisms outlined above are often complex, a more focussed and therefore limited approach is merited. Voters do not have the same attachment to parties as members do and often vote for parties for a variety of reasons (tactical, personalities, etc). By focussing on the membership, this thesis analyses that part of a party's structure that has the strongest identification with the party. Although members can of course switch parties and vote for a party for a variety of reasons, being a signed up member does imply a greater commitment to the specific goals and aims of the party than being a voter.

Relating more specifically to issues of national identity, Condor (2010) and Bond *et al.* (2010: 464) point out that the differences between elites and members of the public exist in the relation to their understanding of national identity. Such distinctions are likely to be mirrored in an intra party context between members and party representatives. Thus when conceptions of national identities are operationalised within autonomist parties it is important to compare the two different strata, as attitudinal differences can be expected.

One of the reasons why differences can be expected between party strata is to do with socialisation. Giddens (1976) warns about how ideas and concepts, constructed by social scientists, are filtered back into the population and often simplified and re-interpreted. Subsequently, these concepts are reinterpreted by social scientists⁶ (also see: Della Porta and Keating 2008: 19-39). Both the concepts of civic and ethnocultural (ethnic) nationalism have undergone this process. Political actors (journalists included) are now very familiar with the 'popularised' meaning of these concepts and, most of all, what their normative connotations are thought to be. Therefore, political scientists run the risk of interpreting interpretations of concepts they have themselves created. Party representatives are more likely to be aware of the normative connotations associated with both civic and ethnocultural nationalism and will therefore be more inclined to give the 'right' answers. This should not be interpreted as an attempt on behalf of party representatives to mislead in terms of what their real thoughts are. It is partly an educational and socialisation process which has forced these representatives to think about what their answers mean within the political context in which they operate and use the concepts. Furthermore, it can also reasonably be argued that those members who become party representatives are better educated and are therefore perhaps more likely to hold a more civic understanding of national identity.

Furthermore, as party representatives have been socialised through their activism they will be more aware of what the party's 'official' position is and conform to it. This not only applies to the civic versus ethnocultural framework but also to attitudes towards

⁶ Giddens calls this the 'double hermeneutic' problem

the European integration and immigration issues. Party representatives are often less negative of these issues than most voters. This divergence can also be expected to appear in party memberships in terms of differences in attitudes between representatives and ordinary members. Gabel (2007) argues that many parties in the EU 'tend to combine support for the EU with a high level of intra-party dissent over the issue' (Gabel 2007: 37). Hence differences in opinions between party representatives and the membership on EU issues are to be expected. The same can be said for immigration issues where the divergence between party elites and the general public is well documented (Fetzer 2000; Freeman 1995; Hansen 2000; Lahav 2004: 1152). As autonomist parties are broad churches and nationalism is often regarded to be able to unify a diverse range of political views (Müller-Rommel 1990), it is likely that a wide range of attitudes can be identified and that these will be to a certain extent structured along different strata within the party. These differences between party strata add an extra layer of complexity to the analysis.

Conclusions and research questions

By means of conclusion, the research questions as formulated in the introduction are restated. In light of the exploratory nature of the research questions and the ambiguous nature of the theoretical framework it is unwise to formulate specific hypotheses. However, some tentative expectations can be formulated. The scope of the thesis is limited to civic autonomist parties in Western Europe. The first research question (how do SNP and FNP members conceptualise national identity) leads to several additional questions:

- What are the different components that are used to operationalise national identities?
- What is the relation between subjective and objective elements?

- How do they relate to each other?
- Are they competitive or mutually inclusive?
- How do these criteria relate to the context in which these parties operate?

The expectation is that variables are used non-competitively. The patterns of different characteristics are further explored in chapter 5.

It was also shown that the different party strata need to be taken into account in this analysis. Do different types of members/representatives relate differently to these criteria? Considering the normative connotations associated with the framework and the educational and socialisation processes that take place within parties variation can be expected; representatives could be more likely to identify civic characteristics and less likely to identify ethnocultural characteristics than 'ordinary' members.

The second research question (how do different conceptions of national identity relate to attitudes towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism) assumes heterogeneity in both parties in relation to the first research question, which considering the imperfection of the theoretical framework is not unreasonable. It also assumes that there are variations in relation to attitudes towards others; on the one hand, 'external others' in the form of attitudes to European integration and on the other hand, 'internal others' in the form of attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism. In order to understand party members' positions in relation to these topics it is also necessary to understand the context in which these parties operate, as well as the 'official' party policy on these issues. Subsequently, an association between those that stress ethnocultural and civic criteria on the one hand and attitudes towards others on the other hand is expected, but is complex due to the ambiguity in the civic versus ethnocultural framework as well as in terms of different interpretations of European Union, immigration and multiculturalism. Additionally, the attitudes in the different party strata are analysed here. It is expected that party representatives have a more positive attitude towards 'others'. It will also be necessary to outline the parties' 'official' positions on immigration, multiculturalism

and European integration. Thus the second research question leads to the following sub questions:

- What are the parties' official policies towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism?
- What are the contexts in which these are formed?
- How do different attitudes relate to different conceptions of national identity?
- How do different attitudes relate to the position an individual takes in the party strata?

Such questions are diverse and the concepts are complex. Therefore a mixed methods approach is required. The next chapter provides an overview of the methodological approach taken in order to answer these questions.

Chapter 3 - Methodology

The findings in this thesis are based on a variety of data sources. A range of 'official' documents were analysed which included party manifestos, policy documents, press releases, party magazines and newspaper communications. Furthermore, 61 party representatives (25 FNP and 36 SNP) were interviewed. Finally, evidence is provided from two full party membership surveys. The SNP survey was conducted by Mitchell *et al.* in 2007.

This thesis adopts a mixed methods (mixed research design) approach. As was seen in the previous chapter, the concepts under investigation and the research questions posed are of such complexity that a mixed methods research design is best able to address them. The evidence sources for this thesis each have a specific purpose, but at the same time they are intertwined. The methodological approach is determined by the research questions and goals of the thesis. In particular, when complex concepts such as nation, national identity and nationalism are studied a mixed methods approach is recommended as the concepts are often interpreted differently (Miller 1995). This is particularly applicable when the analysis involves cross-national comparisons. Bond and Rosie (2010: 83-87), for example, assert that survey data are helpful when studying national identity but only tell half of the story. A qualitative approach is needed to understand the underlying mechanisms and contextual aspects (also see: Bechhofer 2009).

Mixed methods research strategies can be chosen for a variety of reasons (Bryman 2008: 610). By adopting a mixed methods research strategy the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research methods are incorporated into the research project. This is less about offsetting the weaknesses of each method against another and more about providing a more complete answer. Each method can be used to investigate different aspects of the research question. There are scholars who have

expressed arguments against adopting a mixed methods approach – usually for epistemological reasons (e.g. quantitative equals positivism and qualitative equals interpretivism) (Smith 1999: 12-13). However, such a link between methods and epistemological position is problematic (Bryman 2008: 604). It is the interpretation and the conclusions derived from data that leads to epistemological questions, not the method of gathering data itself (Della Porta and Keating 2008).


A mixed methods approach offers a further advantage in this particular study. The cross-cultural nature of this study raises some specific problems as concepts can mean different things in different countries. Using a mixed methods approach such differences can be teased out through qualitative interviews which can subsequently be used in survey design.

Although a mixed methods approach is not primarily adopted in order to triangulate findings – that is, to identify corroboration of findings in interview data and in survey data or vice versa (Bryman 2008: 608) – when findings in different sources of data are discovered to corroborate or contradict during the course of the study, triangulation (or lack thereof) is reported. The key reason for adopting a mixed methods strategy is that national identities and attitudes towards European integration and immigration are complex social phenomena and in order to understand them a variety of tools are needed. It is not within the scope of this thesis to fully incorporate broader epistemological discussions for each method. Instead, the methodological choices are discussed from a more technical perspective (Bryman 2008: 606).

Morse and Niehaus (2009) argue that a mixed methods design should have a ‘core component’ and a ‘supplementary component’. The core component is that part of the study that addresses the major part of the research question (Morse and Niehaus 2009: 23) whereas the supplementary component ‘enhances the description, understanding or explanation of the phenomenon under investigation’ (Ibid.). The core component of this thesis aims to explore the relationship between different aspects of national identity and their relations to attitudes towards others. For measuring such

relations analysing quantitative survey data is the most appropriate method. The theoretical drive of this part of the research is deductive. However, in order to understand how these results relate to the contextual situation of the two parties and what the underlying mechanisms are, qualitative data in the form of documentary evidence and elite interviews are more appropriate. The theoretical drive of this component of the research is inductive. Thus when considering the questions as formulated at the end of chapter 2, the ‘what’ questions make up the supplementary component of this study whereas the ‘how’ questions are the core questions. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the research design which will be further explained throughout this chapter.

Figure 3.1: Mixed Methods Research Design (based on Morse and Niehaus 2009: 89)



Empirical data sources

The evidence presented is based on documentary analysis, elite interviews and survey data. Documentary analysis is used to uncover the SNP and FNP's position, strategies and attitudes in relation to national identity, European integration and immigration issues. Documentary sources provide context and can identify shifts over a prolonged period of time. Furthermore, they can be used to verify data from other sources. Elite interviews have three key functions in this thesis. Their primary function is to enable understanding of the underlying mechanisms that are employed in the parties concerning national identity, European integration and immigration. They serve to unpack the concepts used, uncover the processes that form attitudes and strategies and explore the mechanisms that determine them. Secondly, elite interviews allow for the exploration of alternative views within the parties. Although documentary analysis and also survey data can perform similar functions, it is particularly in interviews that such views can be expressed because of the intimate one to one setting. Views that go against the party's official position are often not expressed publicly because it would harm the party or individual and therefore cannot be found into any type of document. Survey results also allow respondents to express alternative views without having to make them public but these are more difficult to interpret. Mainstream views expressed in survey data can be explored using documentary analysis but, as mentioned, opposing views tend to be 'drowned out' in policy documents and manifestos for the sake of party unity. Therefore, the interview process is particularly helpful in uncovering and interpreting such views. Thirdly, in the case of the FNP five pilot interviews contributed to the survey design. Several questions in the FNP survey were based on findings in the pilot interviews. The third source of data used in this study is survey data and is used to uncover trends, make generalisations and, where possible, establish relations between variables. It is ideally suited to making generalisations and model building.

This chapter will briefly discuss the three sources of evidence used in this thesis; documentary, interviews and survey data. The advantages and disadvantages of each data source are discussed. The details concerning the data gathering process are explained and specifications about the particular place the evidence takes in this thesis' analysis are provided. In the first section of this chapter the documentary evidence used in this thesis is discussed. Secondly, details about the interview process are provided. Thirdly, survey details are provided together with an explanation of the statistical methods/techniques used in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In the final part of the chapter the methodological implications of the comparative nature of the research project are discussed.

Documentary evidence

Documentary evidence contributed to the analysis in four ways. Firstly, it is used to determine the parties' official positions and strategies towards the issues of national identity, European integration and immigration. Secondly, documentary data often provides contextual background information. Thirdly, the data can be used to determine the parties' official position, strategy and attitude towards the issues under investigation over a prolonged period of time and therefore put the parties' position into a historical context. Fourthly, documentary evidence can in some instances be used to verify evidence from other data sources (mainly interviews). It therefore helps with the interpretation process.

Using documentary evidence to determine party positions on issues has several advantages for this project. Firstly, the data are readily available. For example, party manifestos are important sources that are available in archives. The major advantage of party manifestos is that they provide the official party's position on key issues and are produced on a regular basis (Klingemann *et al.* 1994). However, they are often

based on compromises, presenting a uniform position and written to maximise public support. Therefore, they lack critical or alternative views that may exist in the party. Findings in this thesis are also based on other documentary sources such as minutes, newspaper articles and articles from party magazines. These are often able to provide more critical and nuanced positions than party manifestos.

There is a discrepancy between the SNP and the FNP in terms of using documentary evidence. The SNP as a party is relatively well researched. Therefore this thesis could rely on secondary analysis provided by established academic specialists on the SNP (Findlay 1994; Lynch 2002; Hassan 2010; Mitchell *et al.* 2011). Furthermore, many studies of Scottish nationalism, national movement and national identity provide valuable insights and the SNP is prominently included in their analysis (Keating 1996, 2009; Mitchell 1996; Harvie 2004; Hanham 1969; Brand 1978). For the FNP, secondary sources are not as readily available. Huisman (2002), an FNP activist, has written a thorough yet partial historical account of the party. Penrose's PhD thesis (1989) explores the social geography of the party. Hemminga (2006) gives a short overview of the party's political fortunes. Given the limited well-researched academic secondary sources for the FNP, archival research was carried out to fill the gaps. A key source was the party's quarterly magazine, the '*Frijbûtser*', but party documents, minutes, letters, briefing papers were also part of the analysis. In the SNP's case archival research was also carried out but was less extensive.

Documentary evidence is often inexpensive to collect and, in particular, with the increased availability of digital archives it is less time consuming to gather than interview data. For this thesis, the digital archives of newspaper organisation proved to be of considerable value and were easily accessible. Furthermore, documentary evidence can be considered 'non-reactive' (Webb *et al.* 1984: 114). Bailey (1982: 303) asserts that 'the data collection itself generally does not change the data being collected'. The researcher is unable to influence a subject's answers. Webb *et al.* (1984) and Stewart (1984) note the importance of documentary data in the process of

hypothesis and problem formulation. Much of the initial documentary analysis formed the basis for questions asked in the FNP survey and in the SNP and FNP interviews.

There are also considerable disadvantages to the use of documentary evidence (Bailey 1982; Stewart 1984; Webb *et al.* 1984). One of the key problems with documentary evidence is that it only tells part of the story. A historical record is almost always incomplete and cannot be probed or questioned beyond the available data. Webb *et al.* (1984: 114) also warn of 'selective survival' or 'selective deposit'; content that compromises the party or an individual can be omitted or partially omitted from historical records. A further limitation is that documents are often produced within a certain context and this context is lost in archives and newspapers. Therefore the archival data used in this thesis in relation to the FNP, in particular, was based on information from the FNP's party magazine. The advantage of this data source is that this source gives opportunity for discussion which often puts the evidence into context.

Interviews

The main purpose of the interview data is to reveal the underlying mechanisms for differences in attitudes, positions and strategies. The interviewing process provides the necessary context and clarifies interpretation of concepts. Broadly, there are three strands of interviews; the structured (formal or standardised) interview; the unstructured (unstandardised, informal nondirective) interview; and the semi-structured (guided, semi-standardised or focussed) interview (Berg 2004: 93). All interviews conducted for this thesis were semi-structured. Although structured interviews increase consistency of data (Berg 2004: 92-93) they were considered too rigid for the purpose of this thesis. Flexibility is necessary to answer questions about national identity but also to understand the mechanisms that determine attitudes

towards immigration and European integration. As Miller (1995) asserts, national identity is often interpreted in differing ways. Therefore, interviewees should be allowed to answer questions without unnecessary constraints. Furthermore, in structured interviews there is no opportunity for the interviewer to probe interesting avenues and therefore could lead to missing important insights.

In a structured interview the researcher is required to be an expert in order to ask valid questions. In fully unstructured interviews the interviewer takes on the role of a learner (Bevir and Rhodes 2006). This latter approach is particularly useful when 'the interviewer has limited knowledge of a topic and wants an insider perspective' (Leech 2002: 665). Such a structure is particularly suitable for hypothesis forming. In the early stages of research project preliminary interviews with FNP representatives were conducted. Although an interview schedule was developed for these interviews, the main purpose was to determine what the questions would be in later interviews and in the survey. At this stage of the research project, the interview process was least structured. Additionally, the interview schedule for SNP interviews developed and became more rigid towards later interviews, although it never resembled a structured form. There was always room for additional probing and interviewees were given considerable freedom in determining and structuring their answers.

The semi-structured approach, used in this research project, can be located somewhere in between the two interviewing methods outlined above. It involves drafting a set of questions or topics which are usually asked in the same order, but the interviewee is allowed to expand on issues and digress. In addition, the interviewer is free to probe topics that are considered valuable to the research project (Berg 2004: 95). Such freedom is particularly valuable when interviewees are experts in certain subject areas. A semi-structured approach is often used when interviewing elites (Leech 2002: 665) as it allows a structure that prevents respondents from fully determining the course of discussion whilst also allowing the flexibility to gain an understanding of their expert knowledge. To provide one practical example, this project involved interviews with a wide range of party representatives (see below). All

interviewees were asked questions about European integration. Some officials had a very limited knowledge of European issues but were able to convey a general attitude. Others were specialists representing the parties on a European stage or had taken up a role as spokesman on European related issues. Although these specialists were asked the same questions as other representatives, it would be a waste of their expert knowledge not to probe much deeper. These experts were able to explain trends in 'their' parties, identify opposing or conflicting attitudes and provide insight into how their party developed strategies on European issues.

One of the benefits of a semi-structured approach is that it provides 'the contextual nuance of response and probes beneath the surface of a response to the reasoning and premises that underlie it' (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). There are three reasons for choosing a semi-structured interview structure in this project. These largely correspond with the motivations identified by Aberbach and Rockman (2002). Firstly, the theories explored have not been operationalised to any great extent, at least not in relation to autonomous political parties. This means that a set of closed questions would be difficult to develop because there is limited previous literature to draw from. Secondly, a semi-structured format maximises response validity. It allows for respondents to organise answers in their own words and framework. Because the issues under investigation in this thesis are complex, the respondents will approach them as such. They often wish to discuss and clarify related matters to justify their position. Thirdly, a semi-structured approach allows for greater receptivity. Well educated elites, particularly when they are politicians as is the case in this project, like to be able to give nuances and context in their answers (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674.).

The main drawbacks of semi-structured interviews are the costs and the time required to do them. Organising, preparing, interviewing, transcribing, coding and analysing all require substantial resources. Additionally, the data collected are less analytically rigorous than a fully structured interview and this does on occasion cause problems with data comparison (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674).

An interview schedule was developed using the following general structure. On each issue under investigation subjects were asked a 'grand tour question' which allowed them to discuss what they saw as relevant to an issue. According to Leech, this is 'the single best question' (Leech 2004: 667) in the interview. Such questions allow a lot of room for interpretation. Most interviews included the three topics under investigation in this thesis; identity, European integration and immigration. The identity section (which was the first section of the interview) started with the grand tour question: 'What does it mean to be Scottish/Frisian?' This was followed by a second grand tour question: 'What makes somebody Scottish/Frisian?' Primary probes were subsequently used which directed the subject on to a more specific path in relation to the grand tour questions. Probe questions were only asked if the issue that was of interest to this thesis had not been tackled in the grand tour questions. An example of a primary probe could be: 'Does being born in Scotland make a person Scottish?' Sometimes these were followed by scheduled secondary probes which aimed to direct interviewees even further, for example: 'Is it important that a person was born from Scottish parents?' These questions were more specific and are more closely related to a structured interview style. Furthermore, as the interviews were semi-structured there was room for unscheduled probes which attempted to explore valuable topics introduced by the subject. Such unscheduled probes are particularly valuable when subjects are experts.

Some of the interviews focussed heavily on European integration or immigration because of the specialism of the interviewee. This 'extra' information was not so much used to understand the underlying mechanisms, but allowed more insight into how the parties' 'official' positions were explained and had been developed over the years.

In order to achieve a broad sample size of party representatives in both the FNP and SNP, three types of interviewees were selected. The first group of interviewees were those representatives of the party at the regional level. For the SNP these were Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Fourteen MSPs were interviewed between August 2009 and January 2010. For the FNP, regional representatives are state

provincial representatives and all five FNP representatives at the time of the research were interviewed between August 2008 and June 2009. As both parties have strong grassroots traditions it was important to include party representatives from the local level in the research project. A selection of local councillors was interviewed from both parties. Care was taken to ensure that councillors from both rural and urban municipalities were interviewed, as issues pertinent to this study often have different impacts at the rural and urban levels. Immigration and European integration can be expected to be experienced differently in urban and rural situations. For the SNP, nineteen councillors were interviewed from four different municipalities; Falkirk, Stirling, Glasgow and the Highlands, which are urban, semi rural, urban and rural districts respectively. For the FNP, fifteen councillors were interviewed (not including one state-provincial representative who is also a local councillor) from six different municipalities (Leeuwarden, Achtkarspelen, Tytsjerkstradiel, Gaasterlân-sleat, Boarnsterhim and Frensjerteradiel). As Friesland is a rural province and the FNP is more strongly represented in rural municipalities (see chapter 4) there are few urban councillors. Only one urban councillor was interviewed (although the previous councillor for the same seat was also interviewed in a specialist role). A final group of interviewees were those with specialist knowledge or experience in the specific areas of interest to this thesis. In all cases except two, these specialists were also public office holders at the time of interviewing. Specialists for the FNP and SNP included spokespeople on Europe and immigration. The total number of interviews was 36 for the SNP and 25 for the FNP. Interviews with SNP representatives were conducted and transcribed in English. Interviews with FNP representatives were conducted in Dutch and Frisian (depending on the preference of the interviewee). Subsequently, interviews were transcribed in English by the researcher.

Most interviews were face to face. However, due to limited resources and time restrictions, ten FNP interviews and three SNP interviews were conducted by telephone. A geographically dispersed sampling population determined relatively high costs for face to face interviews. Telephone interviews are a cheap way of gathering

data and they are less time consuming (Bryman 2008: 198, 457). Furthermore, it was found that respondents were more flexible in making appointments for telephone interviews. Interviewees were unlikely to want to meet outside office hours when it involved a face to face interview but telephone interviewees were more willing to commit to evening appointments. Frey (2004) notes that telephone interviews are unlikely to be sustainable for longer than 20-25 minutes. This was not apparent in this study. Telephone interviews were of equal length to face to face, with interviews usually ranging from 30-40 minutes. One telephone interview was considerably shorter (15 minutes). All telephone interview data were recorded using Skype, a software application that allows users to make voice calls over the Internet. Only the interviewer used Skype; the interviewees either used landlines or mobile connections. Skype allows for direct recording and is cost effective for international calls. There is no real reason to believe that telephone interviews are substantially different from face to face interviews (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004: 113) and indeed no differences were found in this study. Although there are studies that suggest that responses differ when posing repetitive questions (Holbrook *et al.* 2003), the interview schedule for this study incorporated relatively 'open questions' that allowed interviewees to expand on issues and covered a range of topics. Therefore it did not induce monotony.

There are certain drawbacks to telephone interviewing. Firstly, it is not possible to observe body language which can be a significant indicator of discomfort or confusion. Body language can also be used by the interviewer to encourage interviewees (a simple nod of the head usually suffices). It is also more difficult to establish a bond of trust between interviewer and interviewee through telephone interviews. Particularly when visiting interviewees' offices or homes, a quick conversation about a painting on the wall or a book on the shelves can establish trust. This is not possible or is inappropriate over the telephone. Furthermore, although Skype is a useful resource, technical difficulties did occur in three interviews which meant the interviewee had to be called back, though in all cases the connection was re-established within minutes. On the other hand, such interruptions also took place in face-to-face situations.

All SNP interviews were conducted after the distribution of the SNP survey (for dates of this survey see the next section). In the FNP's case, four pilot interviews were conducted before survey distribution. The data from these interviews contributed directly to the findings in this thesis, but these pilot interviews also shaped the survey design. A particular set of questions asked in these interviews were aimed to establish the relevance of the questions asked in the SNP survey (on which the FNP survey was based – see next section). For example, it was established that language is an important aspect of Frisianness for the interviewees but that a distinction is made between being able to speak and understand Frisian and to read and write Frisian. Therefore, FNP members were asked if it is important to speak and understand Frisian in one question and, in another, if it is considered important to read and write Frisian in order to be Frisian. In the SNP survey on which the FNP survey was based (see next section), members were only asked if speaking English, Gaelic or Scots is important.

To achieve a high level consistency in the analysis stage, the NVIVO software package has been used to transcribe data and organise answers. This was not an attempt to quantify interview responses, although NVIVO does allow this. Organising data in a programme like NVIVO allows the researcher to analyse the data consistently. A tree structure can be created where relations between different questions are specified and answers organised according to a positive or negative view of an issue, or a more complex understanding of the issue.

The interview data are not being used to complete an inaccurate set of survey data. Rather, they allow interpretation of the survey data and raise further questions. As the interviews are with parties' public office holders as opposed to 'ordinary' members, the interviews also add an extra layer of complexity as it is necessary to distinguish between different party strata. The semi-structured interviews were vital for establishing the impact of variables. The causal inferences between the variables are not always apparent from either party documents or survey data. Explicit questions in interviews about information gathered in these other sources can allow important

insight and assign validity to findings from other evidence sources (e.g. documentary and survey data).

Surveys

This thesis draws on two key survey data sources. The first is the 2007 ESRC (RES-062-23-0722) funded SNP membership survey conducted by Mitchell *et al.* (forthcoming). The second source is an FNP membership survey conducted by the author in spring 2009. The majority of questions in the FNP membership survey were based on the SNP 2007 membership survey, although several questions were edited to fit the specific Frisian context. Two historic FNP surveys were a second source on which several questions in the 2009 FNP survey were based⁷ and the data outputs from these historic surveys are also used in some parts of the analysis. The questionnaire also included questions which were specifically developed to apply to the current Frisian situation and that were of interest to this study (European integration and attitudes to immigration/multiculturalism). Several of these questions were developed by the author; other questions were drawn from specialised academic literature. In addition, the survey included a section with questions relating to environmental issues. These have not been used in this thesis. The full questionnaire including the reported results can be found in Appendix A.

Drafting the FNP survey involved many discussions with both party officials and academic colleagues. The survey was funded by the FNP and the researcher. Besides insisting that the survey included 3 questions that related to the FNP's participation in the Dutch general elections, there were no limitations imposed by the party. In the FNP's case the survey was distributed in the week of the 16th to 23rd March 2009. The total number of surveys distributed was 1,208, which was the full FNP membership at

⁷ A short survey was conducted in 2000. A more comprehensive survey was conducted in 1988 by the Canadian scholar Jane Penrose.

that time. The accompanying letter was drafted and signed by the researcher and the FNP chairperson.⁸ All surveys were distributed anonymously and return envelopes were provided. By 2nd April 2009 the response was 450. In that month, a reminder was published in the *Frijbûtsjer*, the FNP members magazine.⁹ On June 9th 2009 the final count of surveys returned was 579.

The SNP survey consisted of sixty four questions divided between six sections; party involvement, political interests, views on political issues, identity, views on the SNP, and socio-demographic information. The FNP survey was shorter but could be more focussed for the purposes of this study (although not all questions directly relate to this thesis). It had thirty two questions and included sections on; socio-demographic information, party politics, identity, FNP policies, constitutional issues, immigration, the European Union and environmental issues.¹⁰

The SNP questionnaire distribution involved three stages.¹¹ Between 16th and 19th November 2007 a questionnaire was sent to all SNP members. A reminder was sent to those who had not responded between 5th and 7th December 2007. This was followed up by a second mailing to all non-respondents, sent between 12th and 14th March 2008. The final count was taken in June 2008. The response rate for the SNP survey was 53.9 per cent (7,112 responses), representing roughly half of the total SNP membership (Mitchell *et al.* 2007). The response rate for the FNP survey was 47.9 per cent (579 responses).

As mentioned, the FNP survey was largely based on the SNP survey (ESRC-RES-062-23-0722) and therefore had to be translated from Dutch into Frisian by a certified translator. The translation from English to Dutch was completed by the author, a native Dutch speaker (the translator also held a copy of the English survey for reference). Certain difficulties arise in terms of survey comparability through

⁸ The full contents of the letter in Frisian are provided in Appendix B.

⁹ The contents of this message are provided in Appendix C (in Frisian).

¹⁰ Not all the questions of this survey are used in the thesis.

¹¹ Unlike the FNP survey, the author had no responsibility in the distribution process of the SNP survey which was managed by Mitchell, Bennie and Johns.

translation and broader cross-national cultural differences (Svallfors 1996: 129-130). The goal of translation is not simply to transfer words from one language to another (literal translation), but to achieve conceptual equivalence (Berry 1980). Furthermore, the cultural applicability of constructs has to be considered (McGorry 2000: 75). In cross-national comparative research designs there is a risk that questions become trivial if they do not fit the context (Svallfors 1996). In order to achieve a meaningful translation, close coordination between the translator and the author was imperative. An advantage was that the author is able to read and understand Frisian (not write) and lived in Friesland for 10 years during his childhood. Additional precautionary measures were taken by testing concepts in preliminary interviews with FNP politicians to determine whether they were suitable for cross-national operationalisation.

Conducting a mail survey has several advantages. Firstly, it involves enquiries across a large population at relatively low cost. Interviewing the complete membership of the SNP (around 15,000 at the time of the survey) or even the FNP (at the time of survey around 1,200) would be very time consuming, very expensive and extremely difficult. Secondly, standardised questions make measurements more precise and allow for statistical comparison. The interviews were conducted over a long period of time in which the context of questions can change and reliability of measurement had the potential to become inaccurate. In contrast, surveys are completed within a relatively short time frame. In the SNP's case there was clearly more room for variation as the time frame for completion was longer and 'events' could have changed the context in which questions were being answered. However, a comparison between the first and second batches showed little variation between the two. Interview data is susceptible to another related reliability problem; interviewers (even when they are the same person) can word questions differently or change the order of questions (especially in semi-structured interviews), which can change the meaning of questions somewhat; whereas in surveys all respondents answer questions that are exactly the same, which improves reliability. A third advantage of survey data is that statistical procedures can be performed which are a relatively objective way of analysing data.

There are also disadvantages in relation to survey data. Firstly, the researcher is not able to probe certain interesting avenues of research. A related second problem is that survey questions are by their very nature simplistic and standardised. They present a question with several options for the respondent to choose from. This means there is a risk that the respondent's preferred options are not included, in which case the researcher would miss important information. This is particularly relevant in this case; as the discussion in chapter 2 outlines, questions around national identity are complex and there are many aspects that a subject may consider important (see also chapter 5). Surveys are unlikely to accurately capture or measure all different attitudes and only tell part of the story (Bond and Rosie 2010: 83-87). Thirdly, surveys rely on a sufficiently large and representative respondent group. Both the SNP (N = 7,112 – 53.9 per cent) and FNP (N = 579 – 47.9 per cent) can be considered sufficiently large for statistically significant analysis. Furthermore, the sample should be representative in terms of social groups and demographics of the case under investigation. This can be difficult to test. In the FNP's case the party's headquarters held information on age and gender distribution in the party. The findings in the survey relating to gender matched those of the party. However, in relation to age it was found that the youngest members were underrepresented in the survey when compared to the party's own data. The 'under 35' age group is relatively small in the FNP according to headquarters data (8.1 per cent), but in the survey sample it is even smaller (3.4 per cent). It is well established that younger age groups are less likely to complete paper based surveys (Behr *et al.* 2005: 8; Kaplowitz *et al.* 2004: 97). Weighting the data would have been a possible option to rectify the problem but there were several reasons to refrain from doing so. As the sample size of 'under 35' group is so small, weighting its scores could have led to a misrepresentation of the views of a relatively small group. Furthermore, there is no certainty in terms of how accurate the FNP's headquarters data is. Although there are no reasons for assuming that it would be inaccurate, neither is there a way of testing its accuracy. Nevertheless, the possible under-representation of youngest age group in the FNP needs to be taken into account.

Fourthly, as noted earlier, survey data can seldom answer contextual questions and interpretation is therefore difficult. This is due to the inability of respondents to qualify their answers, which limits the researcher's ability to interpret the data (Bryman 2008: 159-160).

As noted, one of the key advantages of survey data is that relationships can be tested statistically. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 make use of several statistical techniques. In all of these chapters differences between binary data values are reported as percentage point differences and are accompanied by chi square (χ^2) and contingency coefficient (C) statistics that express the strength of and significance of association. Chi square is a commonly reported non-parametric statistic. However, one of the drawbacks of this measure is that it is influenced by the sample size and is therefore not easy to interpret when comparing different datasets. Therefore, the contingency coefficient is also reported, which is a standardised measurement of association. Both measurements can be calculated with confidence intervals determining whether or not statistical differences can be considered significant (i.e. not generated by chance).

In chapter 5 the concepts of civic and ethnocultural national identities are statistically operationalised by means of factor analysis. Two types of factor analysis, exploratory and confirmatory, are used. Factor analysis measures the relationship between variables, 'uncovering' (in the case of exploratory factor analysis (EFA)) or 'confirming' (in the case of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)) different dimensions. Factors are 'the pattern of correlations (or covariances) between observed measures' (DeCoster 1998: 1). The purpose of EFA is to discover meaningful factors in the data (Thompson 2004: 5). CFA requires that the researcher has specific expectations regarding 'the number of factors, which variables reflect given factors, and whether the factors are correlated' (Ibid.: 6). In CFA 'the researcher has some knowledge of the underlying latent variable structure' (Byrne 2001: 6). This means that CFA allows the researcher to test existing theories and quantify the degree to which the model fits. In other words, the model's stability can be tested.

CFA relies on two important assumptions; that the data are of a continuous scale and have a multivariate normal distribution. The data used in this thesis present a problem in terms of the second assumption. Some of the data is heavily skewed (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). A solution is to treat the data as categorical and use non-parametric statistics. However, a second often used solution is to bootstrap the sample data (Byrne 2001: 270). Bootstrapping is a resampling procedure whereby the original data is considered to represent the population. Multiple sub-samples are taken from the original data, creating averages which 'replace' the original population. The new population forms the basis of empirical investigation (Byrne 2001: 268-270; Diaconis and Efron 1983: 116-130). All of the CFA models presented in chapter 5 have been calculated with a bootstrap procedure of 1000 samples using a maximum likelihood estimator.

A key advantage of CFA is that it can assess how well the data fits a model overall, rather than just assessing the factors, as is the case with EFA. Cmin or chi square (χ^2) is commonly reported as a fit index for model fit; a low χ^2 suggests a better fit. CFA depends on relatively large sample sizes and therefore χ^2 is not regarded as a very accurate index (MacCallum *et al.* 1996: 132). Furthermore, χ^2 is difficult to interpret in comparative analysis because it heavily depends on the sample size and as the sample size increases χ^2 will increase. So, comparatively, the statistic is meaningless unless sample sizes are equal. As the SNP sample size is much larger the χ^2 can be expected to be higher than it is for the FNP. Hoyle and Panter (1995) recommend reporting the following indices; the goodness fit index (GFI) (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1981), the normed fit index (NFI) (Bentler and Bonnett 1980), the incremental fit index (IFI) (Bollen 1980) and the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler 1990). All of these indices range from 0 to 1 and a value close to 1 indicates a good fit. Hu and Bentler (1999 cited in Byrne 2001: 82) have suggested a cut-off point of 0.95 for a good fit score for NFI, IFI, CFI and GFI. The Root Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA)¹² is one of the most informative indices. It provides an assessment of goodness fit of a CFA model.

¹² RMSEA is calculated using the formula $\sqrt{[(\chi^2/df) - 1]/(N - 1)}$

Not only is it less affected by sample size and the number of parameters than some of the other indicators (notably χ^2), but besides testing the fit it gives an indication of the accurateness of this fit by computing confidence intervals. According to MacCullum *et al.* (1996: 135), a score below 0.05 is a good fit, a score between 0.06 and 0.08 can be considered a reasonable fit and between 0.08 and 0.1 a mediocre fit. All of these indices are reported for the models in chapter 5.¹³ The AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structures) software package is used to compute the models.

Comparative research methods

The research undertaken for this thesis is comparative. For a study to be considered a comparative, it has to 'set out to study particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries with the express intention of comparing their manifestations in different social-cultural settings using the same research instruments' (Hantrais and Mangen 1996: 1). The above discussion of methods illustrates that this research project falls within this definition. It aims to compare the manifestations of national identity within two different social-cultural settings in a systematic manner and explore their similarities and differences. The data on which the findings in the thesis are based have been generated from similar sources, using largely similar questions and exploring similar themes.

The main strength of comparative research is that its findings are based on identified patterns within more than one case and therefore comparative design provides a degree of reliability in the findings based on multiple observations. 'Comparison is treated as a 'controlled' approach to research whereby the researcher is said to systematically explore similarities and differences based on a predetermined

¹³ For a full discussion of global fit indices see Hoyle and Panter (1995); Jöreskog and Sörbom (1981); Bollen (1980); Bentler and Bonnett (1980); Bentler (1990) and Hu and Bentler (1999). For RMSEA global fit indices see MacCallum (1996); Browne and Cudeck (1993) and Hu and Bentler (1999).

classification of cases' (Yanow 2008: 6). The concept under investigation can be manipulated by evaluating its influence within different situations.

Besides inter-party comparison, which forms an important part of this thesis and helps to better explain trends and strategies in both parties by comparing and contrasting them, a large proportion of the findings are based on an intra-party comparison. As attitudes towards the concepts under investigation in this thesis are not uniform in both parties, the differences in attitudes are analysed to subsequently determine how they relate to each other. In short, the aim is to identify attitude structures in both parties and subsequently compare and contrast these structures in an inter-party analysis in order to generalise the findings.

The thesis provides a focussed comparison (Ragin 2007: 80) of the SNP and FNP. There are compelling reasons for selecting these cases. Firstly, the SNP is a relatively well researched party in the autonomist party literature whereas the FNP has – understandably - received less attention. By comparing the two, the findings of previous research on the SNP can be applied to the case of the FNP. This not only gives valuable insights in relation to the FNP but also tests to what extent previous findings can be generalised and what mechanisms influence them. In short, by comparing a 'usual' case with an 'unusual' case our understanding of both can be improved. Secondly, there are some practical reasons in relation to the case selection. The ESRC funded (RES-062-23-0722) SNP study makes available never before held data on the topics of interest to this study and because of the researcher's familiarity with Friesland and to some extent the FNP there is an opportunity to replicate this research and compare the two. In order to investigate any case a researcher needs certain skills and properties to enable her or him to carry out the research. These can include: language skills, knowledge of culture and contacts to gain access. In this case the researcher's background meant that in relation to the FNP access could be achieved and data could be gathered.

Imperative for a comparative research design is a thorough understanding of the similarities and differences of the cases involved. The next chapters will fully explore these but it is useful to highlight some of the key similarities and differences here. First, both parties are self-styled civic autonomist parties, both are democratic, both ideologically position themselves on the left of centre of the political spectrum as well as being able to attract voters from the centre and right, and both hold largely positive policies towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism. However, there are considerable differences between the two. The SNP is a large governing party with a large membership (around 15,000) and professional party machinery. The FNP operates on the fringes of provincial politics, represents a much smaller territory and is much smaller in size (between 1,200 – 1,300). As an organisation it is largely dependent on volunteers. The SNP constitutional goals are independence for Scotland whereas those of the FNP are far more limited and involve some form of federalism. The SNP is a catch all party which focuses on a broad spectrum of issues and has enjoyed considerable electoral successes in Scottish, UK and European elections (although more limited in the latter). The FNP is mostly associated with linguistic and cultural issues and as such has a more limited appeal; the party only stands in local and provincial elections and does not participate in state-wide or European elections. The full nature and impact of these similarities and differences are discussed in the next chapters.

Conclusion

This thesis draws from a broad range of data sources; two membership surveys, 61 interviews and documentary analysis of party literature. It applies a mixed methods research design. The key advantage of such a design is that different aspects of national identity and their impact can be explored. The general trends can be studied whilst at the same time the underlying mechanisms can be uncovered. The use of a

comparative design means that the findings are to a certain extent 'controlled' and can be generalised. However, this should not be exaggerated; the findings in this thesis are based on data sources related to two civic autonomist parties and making generalisation is therefore difficult.

Chapter 4 – the SNP and FNP; an Introduction


This chapter provides an overview of the two cases that form the basis of the empirical discussion in chapters 5, 6 and 7 – the SNP and the FNP. This discussion focusses on the territorial and political contexts in which both parties operate, their historical development, electoral performance, membership profile, organisational structure, and their understanding of nationalism. This last topic will be further explored in chapter 5, but some of the key features are introduced in this chapter. The two cases are discussed separately (firstly the SNP and subsequently the FNP) before their key features are contrasted in the conclusion of this chapter.

Scottish territorial politics

Scotland is one of the nations in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It has a population of around 5.2 million¹⁴ and the landmass has an area of 78,772 km². Land boundaries are well established and are generally accepted. Large parts of its land mass are sparsely populated and can be counted as some of the remotest areas in Europe. The bulk of the population lives in an area called the Central Belt, a flat plain stretching from Glasgow on the west coast to Edinburgh on the east coast (Figure 4.1). Scotland has 32 local authorities and, since 1999, a devolved parliament (Holyrood) situated in the capital Edinburgh.

¹⁴ A mid-2010 estimate – see: <http://www.scotland.org/facts/population/>

Figure 4.1: Population Density in Scotland by Local Authority Area (Persons per km²)



Source: Arup/ONS/General Register of Scotland

The debate on the Scottish constitutional position has to be placed in the historical context of Scotland's position in the UK. Scotland's union with England and Wales in 1707 ensured considerable autonomy for Scottish elites and institutions (Brand 1978; Paterson 1994; Mitchell 2003). Similarly to many other European states, the United Kingdom became a more centralised state over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but unlike most other states the national distinctiveness of the different nations within the UK state was maintained (Mitchell 2010; Bulpitt 1983; Paterson 1994).

Important Scottish institutions remained at least partially independent after the Union of 1707. Notably, Scotland had its own legal system; it retained a distinctive Presbyterian church (the Kirk), local government arrangements differed from England and it had its own educational/university system. Through these relatively autonomous institutions, Scottish elites were able to govern Scotland with a considerable level of autonomy (Brand 1978: 24; Paterson 1994; Hearn 2000). This arrangement meant that Scotland could manage its own affairs within the Union whilst the centre (Westminster) focussed on high politics. This 'dual polity' arrangement in which the centre was mainly concerned with high politics and the periphery concentrated on low politics was maintained and was successful until the 1970s (Bulpitt 1983: 144).

In the 1970s the constitutional arrangements were seriously challenged in Scotland for the first time since the 18th century. Bulpitt (1983: 144-146) provides three explanations for this change. Firstly, the British state seemed in a terminal state of decline, the most potent examples of which were the Suez crisis in 1956 and the weak economy (culminating in the IMF bailouts in 1976). This made the British identity less attractive (Parekh 1994: 493). Secondly, Scotland was less easy to control as 'the easy supremacy of the traditional collaborative elites had gone' (Bulpitt 1983: 145). The old Labour-Conservative hegemony seemed in decline and was challenged by other parties who were supported by a volatile electorate. Thirdly, increasing intervention by the central state in Scottish affairs broke with the traditional 'light touch' territorial management arrangement. The centre (London) became more inward looking, concerning itself more with the periphery. This process should not be overstated; it was slow and a complete loss of autonomy was never the end result (Bulpitt 1983: 112, 123 -128). The first wave of support for constitutional change withered away by the late 1970s and it would take a further three decades before significant constitutional changes would be implemented.

Under the Thatcher Government the dual polity arrangements that had existed broke down. On the one hand, the Thatcher government challenged the distinctive nature of

the Scottish polity and became more centrist. On the other hand, the Scottish elite were no longer willing to collaborate with the centre (Bulpitt 1983). Thatcher's perceived insensitive attitude towards Scotland and Scottish culture, combined with her 'Englishness', also made her deeply unpopular in Scotland (Torrance 2009). In particular, the retrenchment of the welfare state under the Thatcher government revived Scottish sub-state nationalism (McEwen 2006). The lack of a Scottish territorial dimension under Thatcher and the Government's perceived attacks on the welfare state may have reignited Scottish nationalism (Mitchell 1996: 54) and subsequently strengthened the calls of those that wanted a Scottish Parliament to represent and safeguard Scottish interests. This process resulted in a 'yes' vote in a referendum on the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1997. The Scotland Act was passed by Westminster in 1998 and in 1999 a Scottish Parliament was established.

The Scottish National Party

The SNP can be regarded as the political arm of modern Scottish nationalism. The party was founded in 1934 after a merger of two other parties; the National Party of Scotland (NPS), a more hardline and culturally orientated party (Mitchell 1996: 25, 121, 182), and the Scottish Party (SP), a more moderate party which included some well-known figures of the Scottish establishment (Mitchell 1996: 181; Findlay 1994: 126-164). Until the 1960s the party enjoyed very little electoral success (see Table 4.1) For much of the party's early history it remained divided in terms of 'ideology, goals and policies, tactics and strategies, and personalities ... What is most remarkable is that the party survived at all' (Mitchell 1996: 183).

By 1934 four 'fault lines' that were to persist throughout the SNP's history could already be identified. Perhaps the most profound one was between the pragmatists and fundamentalists (Mitchell 1988, 1990a, 1996). The tension stemmed from


preferences for differing strategies to achieve independence. Fundamentalists did not want a devolved arrangement under any circumstances. According to fundamentalists, any devolution scheme would undermine the party's end goal of independence. The pragmatists regarded devolution as a stepping stone to independence; any form of political power for Scotland should be welcomed, albeit not as a final settlement (Mitchell 1990a: 52-53).

Since the establishment of a Scottish Parliament this tension has largely disappeared, although to a certain extent it is mirrored in the debate of how independent Scotland should be. Hepburn (2010: 190) asserts that 'the SNP has refrained from advocating a nineteenth-century notion of statehood, based on the doctrine of indivisible, unitary internal sovereignty'. Instead, it has placed independence within larger political frameworks. In the past these were the British Empire and the Monarchy. Since the early nineties the SNP has placed independence within the context of the European Union. Alex Salmond (1998), party leader from 1990–2000 and 2004–present, has in the past argued for an independent Scotland that maintains close links with other parts of the British Isles in a 'Council of the British Isles' and more recently the party has used the term 'Social Union' to highlight a continuation of some form of Union should Scotland become independent (SNP 2010c). These discussions about placing Scottish independence within some form of continuing union have been referred to as 'Independence Lite' (Jeffrey 2010). The SNP's support for varying degrees of independence has allowed it to be successful in attracting votes from that part of the Scottish electorate that is not necessarily in favour of independence (McCrone 2009). These ideas and rhetoric seem to have largely been accepted by SNP members, but this could be partly due to the party's current electoral success. Until now the party has been relatively electorally successful since the establishment of Scottish Parliament. If, at some point in the future, it were to become electorally less successful a more 'fundamentalist' wing in relation to independence may re-emerge. Although the 2007 SNP survey (Mitchell *et al.* 2011 – also see Table 4.4) does not provide a definitive answer as to who these members are, there is a large minority of members

(around a fifth) who want an independent Scotland outwith Europe. Such figures suggest there are members that are in favour of independence with perhaps a more nineteenth century understanding of statehood.

A second tension in the SNP exists between the political left and right. One characteristic of nationalist movements is that they are often 'broad churches' that can transcend the left–right spectrum, attracting support from both sides: 'The party attempted to elevate itself above conventional politics and it was hoped that their unselfish pursuit of the nation's well-being would act as a cohesive force' (Finlay 1994: 163). However, the SNP has established itself as a social democratic, left of centre party. In particular, since the 1980s there has been considerable consensus with regards to policies of a social democratic nature. This was partly due to Thatcher's right wing conservative policies being deeply unpopular in Scotland (Torrance 2009) which made a more social democratic direction politically rewarding. However, even before the 1980s a left of centre position on many issues was recognisable, although not uncontested. The tension between left and right has not disappeared completely. Some commentators assert that the party has adopted and feels comfortable with certain aspects of neo-liberalism (Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2009: 105). Survey data confirms that the party can be considered a 'broad church'. Around half of all party members regard the SNP as a centre left party but almost a quarter of party members identify themselves as right wing (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Members' placement of themselves and the SNP on a left-right scale



Source: Mitchell *et al.* 2011: 99

The SNP's thinking has long included liberal policies such as anti-nuclearism, environmentalism and pacifism. During the Second World War many members opposed conscription, either out of conviction or on the basis of dubious legal arguments (Mitchell 1996: 124). This led to accusations of the SNP being unpatriotic from both within and outside the party. The party has maintained a strong pacifist element. It supported unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1970s (Mitchell *et al.* 2011: 18). More recently it has also opposed the renewal of the UK's nuclear deterrent (Trident) and the renewal of nuclear power stations (SNP 2010d).¹⁵ Green issues and tackling climate change are high on the party's agenda and it supports the development of a wide range of renewables (SNP 2009b). The party is committed to

¹⁵ A petition against the renewal of Trident can be found on the SNP's website: <http://www.snp.org/node/185>

internationalism and is considered to be pro-European integration (see chapter 6) and pro-immigration (see chapter 7).

A third tension exists between more culturally orientated nationalists and what can be described as more economically orientated nationalists. The cultural nationalists' 'aims are principally the maintenance of a sense of Scottish identity, not necessarily defined in terms of political institutions or citizenship' (Mitchell 1990a: 52). In the post-war SNP the influence and size of this group has been modest. At the 1946 conference a policy statement endorsing 'bread and butter' was adopted and 'cultural matters were largely ignored' (Mitchell 1996: 193). This approach would form the basis of SNP policy throughout the 1960s and was very similar to the social democratic message the party espoused in the 1990s (Mitchell 1996: 192–193).

The final division is related to strategy. A tension has existed between those who argued that constitutional change was best achieved through fighting elections and those who favoured cross-party cooperation. In other words, should the SNP should be a conventional political party or a pressure group that establishes cross-party links to put forward the case for independence? In the formative years there was no clear strategy. The party did fight elections but also allowed dual membership, indicating it could also be perceived as a pressure group (Mitchell 1996: 188). Members who wanted to stand for office with other parties had to give up their membership (Finlay 1992: 180). As some SNP members came from different party backgrounds, many had long-established ties with other political organisations which they were unwilling to relinquish and become exclusive SNP members. In 1948 it was decided that dual membership would no longer be permitted. Although this decision was met with a considerable amount of resistance and some members left the party (Lynch 2002: 72), in the long run exclusive membership benefitted the political strategy of the SNP. However, cross party cooperation remained a contentious issue. For example, during the 1979 and 1997 referendum campaigns there were those in the party who wanted

to work together with other parties as well as those who resisted cross-party cooperation (Denver *et al.* 2000). The divisions over strategy mirrored the pragmatist versus fundamentalist division to a certain extent, with pragmatists more likely to support cross-party cooperation (Mitchell 1996).

SNP electoral performance

Since 1934 the SNP has participated in UK general elections and by-elections in Scotland. The UK electoral system is a simple plurality system. Until 2005 Scotland had 72 constituency seats; parties are able to put forward a candidate in each seat. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat and represents the constituency in Westminster. There is no requirement that the candidate should achieve an absolute majority. Simple plurality systems can produce large unrepresentative majorities and usually disadvantage smaller and outsider parties (Lijphart and Grofman 1984: 5). After the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1999, the SNP participated in Scottish elections as well as UK elections. It has been more successful in Scottish elections. In Scottish elections a Mixed Member Proportional System, also called the Additional Member System (AMS), is used which combines a simple plurality vote with a second party list vote to ensure greater proportionality (McGarvey and Cairney 2008: 61). 73 seats are elected using first past the post system.¹⁶ A second 'regional' vote is recorded using a party list system. 56 members of the Scottish Parliament are elected from 8 regional constituencies (based on EU elections constituencies) and seats are allocated using the combined constituency and regional vote. The list vote aims to reduce the disproportionality in the constituency vote.

¹⁶ The constituencies in the first past the post system are based on those that were existing in Scotland for the Westminster elections pre-1999 (1 more seat was created as a result of a split of the Orkney and Shetlands Seat. Since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, Scottish seats in Westminster were reduced to 59

From 1934 until the end of 1950s the SNP was confined to the fringes of Scottish politics. Its best general election performance in this period was in July 1945, when the SNP contested eight seats and won 1.2 per cent of the total vote in Scotland (see Table 4.1). In April that year Dr. Robert McIntyre had won a Motherwell by-election, making him the first SNP MP. During the Second World War the SNP had achieved some good results in by-elections, but this can largely be accredited to the fact that the major parties forming the war-time coalition agreed that that which held the seat would not be challenged by the other two (Mitchell 1996: 191). This agreement did not extend to minor parties who did contest seats. McIntyre was only able to hold on to his seat for two months and lost in the 1945 general election. In the following three general elections the SNP achieved very disappointing results. In 1950 the SNP contested three seats and lost all three deposits. Only 0.4 per cent of the Scottish public voted SNP.¹⁷ In 1951 the SNP had candidates in two constituencies. One lost his deposit and the total result was a meagre 0.3 per cent. 1955 was little better; the party contested just two seats in Scotland, lost one deposit and gained a total of 0.5 per cent. In 1959 the SNP was able to field five candidates of whom three lost their deposits; 0.8 per cent of the Scottish public voted SNP.

¹⁷ As the SNP only stood in three constituencies, the actual figure for electoral support is higher

Table 4.1: SNP general election results

Year	SNP Vote (%)	Seats won	Seats contested	Lost Deposits
1935	1.1	0	8	5
1945	1.2	0	8	6
1950	0.4	0	3	3
1951	0.3	0	2	1
1955	0.5	0	2	1
1959	0.8	0	5	3
1964	2.4	0	15	12
1966	5	0	23	10
1970	11.4	1	65	43
1974 (Feb.)	21.9	7	70	7
1974 (Oct)	30.4	11	71	-
1979	17.3	2	71	29
1983	11.7	2	72	53
1987	14	3	71	1
1992	21.5	3	72	-
1997	22.1	6	72	-
2001	20.1	5	72	-
2005*	17.7	6	59	-
2010	19.9	6	59	-

* Number of constituencies in Scotland were reduced from 72 to 59

Source: Lynch 2002 and Electoral Commission

Several reasons for the party's limited success have been suggested. Besides many internal problems such as limited funds and poorly organised campaigns (Lynch 2002: 48-50), a non-ideological position, a lack of clarity on the issue of self-government and a lack of policies (Findlay 1994: 163) are also possible explanations for the party's poor showing. Furthermore, events outwith the party's control such as the Second World War, the rise of fascism on the continent and the economic crisis of the 1930s can also be considered to have had a significant impact on the SNP's performance.

Nevertheless, the Scottish constitutional question never disappeared completely. The Scottish Covenant Association, a non-partisan organisation seeking to establish a Scottish Assembly in the late 1940s and 1950s, claimed it had collected over 2 million signatures in favour of the establishment of a Scottish Assembly.¹⁸ Despite the association relying heavily on SNP members for collecting signatures (Mitchell 1996: 144-149), constitutional change for Scotland was not sufficiently high on the political agenda for Scots to vote SNP.

In the 1960s the SNP experienced its first major electoral breakthrough. An overall result of 2.4 per cent in the 1964 general election was still very modest. However, it was a considerable improvement on previous years. In 1966 the SNP doubled its total support to 5 per cent of the Scottish vote. It was able to put candidates forward in 23 seats, losing 10 deposits. However, the party had yet to win a seat in a general election. In 1967 Winnie Ewing won a by-election in Hamilton which provided an enormous boost in confidence and increased the party's membership and media profile (Mitchell 1996: 204-205). In the 1970 general election the overall result doubled again to 11.4 per cent. More importantly, the SNP won its first seat, the Western Isles, in a general election. However, there were also disappointments. Of the 65 candidates the SNP was able to put forward, 43 lost their deposit. All of these lost deposits were an enormous drain on funds for a small grassroots funded party (Lynch 2002: 119). In addition, Ewing lost her seat in Hamilton, suggesting that her win had been no more than a protest vote against an unpopular Labour Government.

¹⁸ A claim which could not have been correct (see Mitchell 1996: 145).

The reasons for the increase in electoral success in the 1960s are numerous. The SNP had become a more modern party with a dynamic and professional organisation. Self-government was no longer the only issue; a more comprehensive set of socio-economic policies had been formulated (Lynch 2002: 111-113). Furthermore, the responses of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party to constitutional questions were important catalysts for SNP support. Despite both parties expressing some support for constitutional change, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party seemed to use delaying tactics when dealing with the Scottish question. Neither party managed to address the constitutional issue successfully which led to voters turning away from the mainstream parties and voting for the SNP (Mitchell 1996: 220).

The 1970s were boom years for the SNP, but the decade ended in disappointment. In the two general elections in 1974 the SNP won 21.9 per cent and 30.4 per cent of the vote respectively, becoming the second largest party in Scotland. In the February election the party won 7 seats and in October this increased to 11. These results are often accredited to credible economic policies backed by the discovery of vast oil reserves in the North Sea (Webb 1977; Mitchell 1996: 206). Furthermore, a focus on socio-economic issues allowed the party to present a plausible case for Scottish independence and made it appear less radical and hence more appealing to voters (Mitchell 1996: 207-8).

The SNP's electoral success in the 1970s did not lead to any constitutional changes. In 1979 Scots were asked in a referendum if they were in favour of or against the establishment of a Scottish Assembly. The Scotland Bill, which outlined the establishment and competencies of a Scottish Assembly and the rules of the referendum, included an amendment for a 40 per cent threshold (Cunningham amendment) meaning that at least 40 per cent of the Scottish electorate was to vote yes in a referendum for the bill to become act. This requirement would not be met. Although a majority of Scots, 51.6 per cent, voted in favour of a Scottish Assembly the turnout was too low for the Cunningham requirement to be fulfilled (Denver 2000: 15-

26).¹⁹ On 28th March 1979 a successful motion of no confidence was tabled against the sitting Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan. The motion needed the support of the SNP MPs to pass and triggered a general election. In the 1979 general election the SNP's vote share dropped to 17.3 per cent and the party was only able to retain 2 seats.

The SNP was unable to capitalise on its initial electoral success in 1974 for three reasons. Firstly, the party was internally divided over its ideological position. MPs thought that they had won their seats with the support of traditional Conservative voters. They were therefore reluctant to conform to the centre left policies set out by the party leadership. A key problem was that Wolfe, the party leader/convener was not an MP and this led to a division between the SNP parliamentary group and the party leadership (Mitchell 1996: 207-208). Secondly, the momentum for constitutional change had disappeared. By 1979 it was no longer top of the agenda; socio-economic issues took over, culminating in the Winter of Discontent in 1979. Thirdly, Labour and the Conservatives successfully neutralised the SNP challenge by supporting the establishment of an Assembly. In 1977 Conservative leader Ted Heath called for the establishment of an elected assembly and Labour was also committed to presenting a Scottish and Welsh Bill. However, both parties' support was not wholehearted, only weeks after Heath's Perth declaration the Scottish Conservatives reversed their policy and opposed a directly elected assembly (Mitchell 1996: 316).

The beginning of the 1980s were disappointing years for the SNP. The party's vote dropped to 11.7 per cent in 1983. Up until the 1983 election the SNP remained divided over strategy and policy. It also seemed to choose a more fundamentalist position concerning constitutional change, focussing on independence, which may have scared away voters who preferred more moderate constitutional solutions (Lynch 2002: 168-171). Additionally, the party was plagued by factionalism. The '79 group, a left wing and pragmatist group established after the lost referendum in 1979 (Mitchell 1996:

¹⁹ A majority of 51.6 per cent voted in favour but the turnout was low and only 32.9 per cent of the total electorate voted 'yes'.

226-9), was small but proved a nuisance to the party leadership and threatened unity. Many of its members were intelligent and talented politicians. Many of its members, including Roseanne Cunningham, Kenny MacAskill, Alex Salmond and Jim Sillars, would become influential members in the party and hold high public and party offices. A second group that was organised outwith the SNP but drew its members largely from the party was Siol Nan Gaidheal (SNG). The group belonged to the fringes of the SNP and upheld a much more cultural vision of Scotland. It was concerned with safeguarding the Scottish identity. Its members would parade wearing military style Highland dress and its rhetoric was much more inflammatory and militant (Mitchell: 1990a: 54-55). Unlike the '79 group, the SNG had little impact in terms of holding office or influencing policy. However, both the '79 Group and SNG caused considerable disquiet for the leadership. Wilson, the party convenor, put his position at stake in 1981 in order to have both groups proscribed. The groups were proscribed, with most of the '79 group members either receiving a suspension or being re-admitted to the party fairly soon afterwards (Mitchell 1996: 229).

After 1983 internal dissent dwindled and election results improved. In 1987 the party won 14 per cent of the Scottish vote. Thatcher's Conservative Government was deeply unpopular in Scotland and was perceived to support the dismantling and deregulating of the welfare state (McEwen 2006). Thatcher's portrayal of the Scots as 'subsidy junkies' (Mitchell 1990b) was considered insensitive. According to Thatcher, Scots were not pulling their weight; average public spending in Scotland per capita was higher than in the rest of Britain (Thatcher 1993). Thatcher's unpopularity and the Conservative Party's lack of a political mandate (Rifkind 2009) in Scotland, combined with the limited prospect of Labour being able to topple the Conservative Party, led to increased support for constitutional change and SNP support.²⁰ At the same time the SNP framed its independence strategy within the context of the European integration

²⁰ Thatcher's lack of a mandate is often presented as a lack of a constitutional mandate; however, her government was not constitutionally obliged to limit its policies to those parts of the countries that had voted conservative.

process. The 'independence in Europe' strategy would prove to be powerful and is further discussed in chapter 6.

In the 1992 general election the SNP won 21.5 per cent of the Scottish vote. Moreover, with the prospect of a New Labour government in 1997 in Westminster that appeared committed to devolution, constitutional change was back on the agenda. In 1997 the SNP joined the 'Yes' camp, campaigning for the establishment of a devolved parliament in Edinburgh. In 1997 74.3 per cent of Scots voted in favour of a Parliament (Brown 2001: 13) and in 1998 the Scotland Act was passed, which led to the establishment of a devolved Scottish Parliament.

The first Scottish parliamentary elections were held in 1999. Under the leadership of Salmond the SNP polled 28.7 per cent in the constituency vote share and received 27.5 per cent of the regional list vote share, taking second place behind the Scottish Labour Party (38.8 per cent of the constituency vote and 33.6 per cent of the regional vote). Subsequently, the SNP became the main opposition in a parliament where no party had achieved an overall majority. Because the SNP's vote share in Scotland had always been dispersed it had been less successful in terms of winning constituency seats (for which a concentrated vote is more successful). Under AMS the SNP was able to convert vote share into seats, something which had been (and remains) a key problem for the SNP in the Westminster first past the post system. Furthermore, the SNP seemed to be more successful in Scottish Parliamentary elections not only in terms of securing seats due to its proportional system, but also because voters were more likely to vote SNP in Scottish elections than UK elections.

The large SNP presence ensured beyond any doubt that the new parliament was not going to be a 'tame regional legislature' (Paterson 2001: 2). In 2000, Swinney took over from Salmond (who had led the party for over a decade) as party leader. After a somewhat disappointing result in 2003, the SNP became the largest party in Scotland in 2007 and formed a minority government, with Salmond, who had returned as party leader in 2004, becoming First Minister. The strong results in Scotland did not form a

springboard to Westminster where Labour remained the dominant party for Scotland with 42 seats and 42 per cent of the vote. Although Salmond had promised a 20 seats gain in the 2010 Westminster election (Telegraph 2008), the SNP erroneously equated successes in Scottish elections with success in Westminster (Mitchell and van der Zwet 2010). However, in the 2011 Scottish elections the SNP won an overall majority in terms of seats (69). Ironically, the Scottish Labour Party made the same mistake as the SNP had made in 2010. It had thought that it could take the 2010 Westminster result, in which the party had outperformed the SNP, as an indicator of success in the Scottish parliamentary elections.

Table 4.2: SNP Scottish election results

Year	SNP vote (%)	Seats*
1999 (Constituency)	28.7	7
1999 (Regional)	27.5	28
2003 (Constituency)	23.8	9
2003 (Regional)	20.9	18
2007 (Constituency)	32.9	21
2007 (Regional)	31	25
2011 (Constituency)	45.4	53
2011 (Regional)	44	16

*Scottish Parliament has a total of 129 elected seats (73 constituency and 56 regional list)

Source: www.parliament.uk (06 may 2011)

SNP membership profile

The 2011 study of the SNP membership by Mitchell *et al.* gives an insight into its members' profile. Some of the key findings of the study are that a majority of members are male (68 per cent). The party membership is slightly older (average 58.7 years) than most other British parties. Similarly to other parties the SNP membership can be considered middle class although there is some reluctance to accept class designations, perhaps explained by the party's focus on national identity rather than class identity. The annual income distribution is indicative of a middle class membership but not overwhelmingly so (Mitchell *et al.* 2011: 53–54). The religious background of SNP members mirrors that of Scotland with a slightly higher proportion having no religious affiliation (42.6 per cent against 33 per cent for Scotland) (Mitchell *et al.* 2011: 51). Regionally, SNP members are proportionally overrepresented in comparison with the SNP electorate's distribution in the North East, Lothians, Glasgow and West of Scotland and are underrepresented in South of Scotland, Central Scotland, and Mid Scotland and Fife (Mitchell *et al.* 2011: 57). The SNP is a fairly rural party with 68.8 per cent of its members living outside big cities or suburbs. Mitchell *et al.* conclude that '[t]he profile of SNP members in terms of age, social class, education, and religion is not dissimilar to the Scottish population, and quite similar to most other parties based on previous membership studies' (Mitchell *et al.* 2008: 10).

Where the membership does differ from the electorate and that of other parties is in its perception of Scottish identity and constitutional preferences, although in neither case are the relations straightforward and many authors have warned against equating exclusively Scottish identity and support for constitutional change with support for the SNP (McCrone and Paterson 2002; Denver *et al.* 2007; Bennie *et al.* 1997). Table 4.3 suggests that the vast majority of SNP members consider themselves to have an exclusively Scottish identity and rejecting a British identity (77 per cent) and a further 16 per cent prioritise their Scottish identity over their British identity. Around one in

five see themselves as British to some extent (Mitchell *et al.* 2008: 10). The Scottish electorate, including SNP voters, are more willing to accept a dual identity although the number of those who consider themselves exclusively as Scots has grown since 1992 from 19 to 24 per cent.

Table 4.3: Identity – Scottish or British

Which best describes how you see yourself?	% SNP membership	% Scottish electorate 1992	% Scottish electorate 2007	SNP electorate 2007*
Scottish not British	77	19	24	47
More Scottish than British	16	40	29	31
Equally Scottish and British	3	33	25	16
More British than Scottish	0	3	6	3
British not Scottish	0	3	8	2
Other	4	2	8	5

*Those that voted SNP in the constituency ballot.

Source: SNP membership (Mitchell *et al.* 2008), Scottish electorate 1992 (Bennie *et al.* 1997), Scottish electorate 2007 (Scottish Election Study 2007)

Most SNP members are in favour of an independent Scotland (87 per cent) with a majority of 65.4 per cent preferring independence within the EU (Table 4.4). However, 12 per cent of members prefer a Scottish parliament with more powers, but do not want an independent Scotland. SNP voters also prefer independence but less conclusively than its membership. The total support for independence from the Scottish electorate is much lower, but a majority does want to change the current constitutional settlement. Several authors (McCrone and Paterson 2002; McCrone 2001: 10; Denver *et al.* 2007) show that support for independence does not automatically equate support for the SNP and 31 per cent of SNP voters do not support independence.

Table 4.4: Constitutional 1st preferences

Constitutional option	SNP membership 2007 %	SNP voters 2007 %*	Scottish Electorate 2007 %
Abolish Scottish Parliament	0	4	16
Status quo	1	8	26
More powers	12	19	24
Independence within EU**	65	70	34
Independence outwith EU	22		

* Those that vote SNP in the constituency ballot

** No distinction between independence within and outwith the EU was made in the 2007 Scottish Election Study

Source: SNP membership (Mitchell *et al.* 2010) and Scottish Election Study

SNP organisation

Devolution and the prospect of an SNP government in Holyrood meant that the SNP had to reform its organisational structure. The party's organisational structure used to be highly decentralised. Members had considerable power in both policy decision making and the election of party officials. The annual conference held every autumn had a major influence on policy direction (Bennie *et al.* 1997: 79). The SNP's organisation was based on local branches which also held considerable power and autonomy. Lynch identifies the party's origins as a reason for its decentralised structure. The SNP 'was founded outwith parliament and major institutions' (Lynch 2002: 11) and was therefore able to establish and maintain a decentralised organisation. Delegates have defended the autonomous position of the local branches in the SNP constitution, which has made it very difficult to roll back the powers of local branches as a two third majority is needed to change it. In 2005 the SNP constitution was changed and has become more centralised. The party convener has become a modern party leader and has increased powers. The annual conference has become less of a decision making body and more of a forum for discussion and review (SNP 2007). It is also increasingly media focussed. It can be argued that the SNP has adopted a structure which is more similar to that of other political parties. It arguably provides

more stability and is therefore more suitable for a party which can expect to be in government regularly.

Nationalism in the SNP

Although there is considerable lack of alignment, the SNP's success is tied up with perceptions of Scottish identity and constitutional status. But what does Scottishness mean to the SNP? The official doctrine of the SNP is firmly civic (Hearn 2000: 59-66; Keating 1996: 694; Mitchell 2008; McCrone 1998: 22). The party is a member of the European Free Alliance (EFA), 'an alliance of regionalist and civic, democratic nationalist parties in Europe' (EFA website 2011). According to the SNP, blood and ancestry are not elements that define Scottishness.

However, as the discussion above shows, the party is a broad church and its membership base, as well as its voter base, do not always espouse the party's official civic doctrine. Certain individuals and groups have proclaimed a more ethnocultural definition of nationalism (Sìol Nàn Gàidheal for example, as was discussed earlier). However, when these individuals or groups offended the party mainstream they were expelled. This ban was partially the consequence of a period of heavy infighting in the SNP which led to a ban on all other groups within it (Mitchell 1996: 230) but it also reflected the SNP's mainstream commitment to a civic nationalism. Nevertheless, individuals such as Douglas Henderson, who had told an audience in the 1950s that any English people in the audience should 'get out of Scotland now while the going is still good... while they are still in one piece' (Henderson cited in Mitchell 1996: 202-203) were able to be elected into public office and party office (Mitchell 1996: 224).

Some authors have argued that the Scottish national movement has lacked a cultural dimension (Keating 1996: 188; McCrone 1992 as quoted in Haelsey 2005). The fact that Scottish nationalism is largely missing a linguistic element, which is one of the most

distinctive markers of cultural nationalism, is given as evidence of this lack of cultural focus. The civic credentials of the party are generally accepted.

Frisian territorial politics

The province of Friesland is a northern province in the Netherlands with a population of around 650,000 people. Its land area is around 3,349 km². Until 1815, the year in which the Kingdom of the Netherlands was formed, the province had been relatively autonomous. During the period of the Dutch Republic (1581–1792) the absence of a monarch meant that all provinces had a considerable level of autonomy (Daalder 1966: 190-192).

Figure 4.3: The province of Friesland in the Netherlands



Source: <http://www.worldatlas.com>

Friesland as a geographical and political territory has been recorded in history as far back as Roman times²¹ (Mahmood 1989: 16-17) and in the seventh century the polity of Greater Frisia, a territory with a shared common Frisian culture, is claimed to have stretched along the North Sea coastline from Southern Denmark to Northern Belgium (van der Schaaf 1977: 7). However, there was little political unity and the area existed more as an economic and culturally connected territory.

The Frisian language is the most distinctive cultural marker of present day Frisian culture. It is the main vernacular language in present day Friesland. 74 per cent of the inhabitants of Friesland speak Frisian on a daily basis and 94 per cent can understand it (Hemminga 2006: 143). Other typically Frisian cultural markers can be identified in the areas of sport, foods and literature. Although such cultural markers change over time, are often based on myths and can be invented they are nevertheless part of a present day Frisian cultural identity that is distinctive from other parts of the Netherlands despite the Province's full incorporation into the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815.

The modern Frisian political landscape is defined by a dominant and highly centralised Dutch national government in The Hague. *Fryslân*, which is the Frisian word for Friesland, has been the official name of the Province since 1997. The capital is Leeuwarden (*Ljouwert*), where the provincial parliament (*Provinciale Staten*) is situated, and the province has 31 municipalities. Within the Netherlands the province of Friesland has the same powers as the other eleven provinces. The province is the mid-tier of the Dutch administrative system, positioned between the central government and the municipalities. The main tasks of the province are implementing legislation from the central state and monitoring the performance of municipalities. However, provinces also have several autonomous responsibilities mainly related to spatial planning for infrastructure, housing and environment.²² The province is sometimes referred to as the 'administrative cartilage' in the Dutch system; as cartilage smoothens the functioning of joints so do provinces smoothen the process of

²¹ Tacitus makes mention of the Frisians and there are legends that 2 Frisian tribe heads visited the Roman senate.

²² For a comprehensive list of responsibilities see Peters (2007: 157-160).

translating central policy to local action (Peters 2007: 21). Although there are signs of increased support for decentralisation, 'there should be no misunderstanding about the fact that the Netherlands is still a highly centralised country' (Andeweg and Irwin 2009: 179) in which most of the political power lies in The Hague. The provinces and municipalities only have limited influence and are mainly responsible for policy implementation. Furthermore, there are those who question the legitimacy and necessity of a provincial tier in the Dutch system. Questions have been raised over whether provinces are the right size to carry out their tasks. Some argue that merging some provinces would improve their performance (Peters 2007: 8). The province of Friesland is already working closely together with the two other northern provinces²³ and there have been discussions about a full merger of these three northern provinces.²⁴ The FNP has been an opponent of such a merger.²⁵

The Frisian National Party

Although the Frisian movement had existed as a cultural and literary movement since the nineteenth century (van der Schaaf 1977), political activism had been limited. An autonomist political party representing Frisian culture was founded relatively late. The *Fryske Nasjonale Partij* was founded on 16th December 1962. The initiative was taken by two cousins, Pyt Kramer and Folkert Binnema. Kramer was reportedly frustrated with the limited amount of enthusiasm within the existing Frisian movement for political activism (Huisman 2003). In the 1960s the political, economic, social and cultural climate in the Netherlands had changed. A process of de-alignment (*ontzuiling*) increased opportunities for smaller parties in the national, provincial and municipal political arenas (Hemminga 2006). However, the two founders received

²³ See Samenwerkingsverband Noord Nederland (<http://www.SNN.eu>)

²⁴ For a discussion see <http://mens-en-samenleving.infonu.nl/sociaal-cultureel/46986-eeen-noordelijke-provincie-is-eeen-fusie-het-antwoord.html>

²⁵ For a discussion see article in: http://www.fnp.nl/cms/bijlagen/OSF_Nieuwsbrief_44_april_20103.pdf

considerable negative media attention. For a while it seemed the party had been disbanded before it had even contested an election. Its founders had not anticipated the initial barrage of criticism against the establishment of a national party from both the Frisian and Dutch press (Hemminga 2006: 146; Huisman 2003: 57-62). However, it survived the initial storm, although it had to postpone participation in elections until 1966. Since then the party has become a stable force in Frisian politics. Its membership has steadily grown and currently stands at around 1,300 signed up members (FNP 2010).

The party's slogan is 'Frisian and Federal', illustrating its main goals. First and foremost, the FNP is concerned with the protection of Frisian culture and in particular Frisian language. It has looked to promote Frisian-friendly policies. Although the FNP is an independent political organisation that participates in elections, it can also be regarded as a pressure group that raises awareness of what it perceives as the precarious situation of Frisian culture and pressurises other political parties to take action. The second goal, a federal Dutch state, serves its first goal of cultural protection. The FNP believes that a federal system will provide better protection not just for Frisian culture but also for Friesland's interests as a whole. The exact nature of this federal state is somewhat ambiguous:


The FNP aims at a democratic and federalistic polity in the Netherlands and Europe. ...The FNP takes the existence and the right to exist of Frisians for granted. Based upon this situation the party is in favour of autonomy for Friesland, either with other provinces, or in a special constitutional arrangement (Hemminga 2006: 149).

The party's federalism is not solely instrumental; it also reflects its strong commitment to local democracy. The FNP does not desire an independent Friesland (Huisman 2003: 145). Hemminga notes that the FNP adheres to the principles of subsidiarity. It wants decisions to be made at the lowest administrative level possible; higher administrative units would only be allowed to coordinate and co-regulate where lower units would be

unable to do so (Hemminga 2006: 149). The FNP proposes that policy areas such as housing, taxation, environment, schooling, industry, transport, energy, tourism, justice, media and health policies should be arranged from the bottom up rather than from the top down (Huisman 2003: 112).


According to the 2009 membership survey FNP members do not support federalism unanimously and when they do opinions diverge regarding what type of federalism. Figure 4.4 shows that 14 per cent of the membership do not believe that federalism is a good solution for Friesland and 32 per cent neither agree nor disagree on whether federalism is better for Friesland. This leaves 50 per cent who support federalism in principle, but when asked what constitutional arrangement would be their first preference, only 20 per cent support a federal arrangement. A much bigger group of 52 per cent support the less radical 'more powers for the current province' option (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.4: Preferences as to whether Friesland would be better represented with a federal system in the Netherlands



Source: FNP survey 2009


Figure 4.5: Preferences for constitutional options in the FNP



Source: FNP survey 2009

For many years the FNP has avoided identification with the left or the right of the political spectrum. Slogans such as ‘not left, not right, but Frisian national’ (for an example see: Frijbûtsjer 1973) indicated that the party aimed to transcend sectional interest and appeal to all Frisians. However, more recently the party’s policies can be described as centre left with a strong social dimension. The current party slogan ‘Frisian, Social and Green’ reflects this re-positioning. The largest group of members, 28 per cent, placed themselves on the centre left and 47 per cent on the left; 17.5 per cent considered themselves centrists and a quarter of the membership placed themselves on the right of the political spectrum. Ten percent of the members did not position themselves on a left–right spectrum, perhaps reflecting the party’s traditional refusal to identify itself as left or right (Figure 4.6). The party has long identified with liberal policies such as pacifism, active human rights, environmental issues, internationalism and inclusive policies on immigration (Huisman 2003: 140). Support for these policies has not been uniform and some of the more conservative members in the party have objected to them. However, the party’s focus on cultural issues, localism and concerns with rural life mean that it is also able to accommodate these more conservatively minded members.

Figure 4.6: FNP members' placements of themselves on a left–right spectrum



Source: FNP survey 2009

In recent years there has been considerable disagreement about the party's electoral strategy. To date, it has fought local and provincial elections but has never taken part in state-wide elections. There is considerable support in the party for participating in state-wide elections, either on its own or with a partner or partners. However, a majority opposes this and wants the FNP to focus on provincial and local elections in Friesland. There are those who argue that the FNP is a Frisian party and therefore has no business in Dutch parliament. Others do not think that the party can win a seat as the vote share it achieves in provincial elections is too low for the state-wide threshold.²⁶ Additionally, there are concerns about the limited funds available to the party. A state-wide campaign might eat into the provincial and local election campaign budget and would subsequently harm the party's performance in these elections. On the other hand, supporters of participation in state-wide elections argue that winning a seat would bring in a significant amount of funds. Participation in state-wide elections would also raise the party's profile, which would benefit it in provincial elections, even if it did not win. It is also argued that the FNP will be able to attract

²⁶ The party's best result in provincial elections was 36,871 votes in 2002. The threshold for state-wide elections has been between 59,000 and 66,000 since 1986.

votes from Frisians living outside Friesland – something it is unable to do in provincial elections (van der Zwet forthcoming).

FNP electoral performance

As stated earlier, the FNP participates in provincial and local elections in Friesland. Similarly to the state-wide electoral procedures, elections are held every 4 years (no longer simultaneously since 1982). The electoral system, an open party list system in which each voter can give her or his preference for a single candidate, is also identical to that of the general elections. The whole of the province (in the case of provincial elections) and the whole of the municipality (in the case of local elections) are considered as a single constituency and seats are distributed according to vote share. The number of seats available in provincial elections is dependent on the population of the province. For Friesland it currently stands at 43. The results are highly proportional and therefore small parties are more likely to win seats (Lijphart and Grofman 1984: 5).

The FNP first participated in provincial elections in 1966 where the party gained 2.4 per cent of the vote and the charismatic chairman Jan Bearn Singelsma took up the party's only seat in the provincial council. Since 1966 the FNP has become an established presence in most Frisian municipalities and at the provincial level. From 1970 until 1995 its electoral performance (see Table 4.5) in provincial elections was consistent, winning an average vote of between 4.5 and 7.4 per cent. Although the party was heavily associated with language issues, successful campaigns in the early 1970s often involved local issues and emphasised small scale development projects whilst opposing 'mega projects' (for example, large scale tourist developments, infrastructure projects or industrial development projects) which were deemed to have too great an impact on Frisian culture, society, economy landscape and/ or the

environment. In essence, the party took up a role as spokesman for small Frisian villages (Hemminga 2006: 148). The party's relatively narrow focus meant that it was able to fight elections on a platform against controversial issues.

Table 4.5: FNP election results

Year	Provincial Seats (# of votes)	%	Council seats
1966	1 (6.645)	2.4	5 in 5 councils
1970	2 (11.014)	4.5	20 in 15 councils
1974	4 (21.738)	7.4	32 in 22 councils
1978	2 (15.878)	4.8	29 in 22 councils
1982	3 (17.333)	5.5	36 in 26 councils
1987 – 1986*	2 (15.115)	4.5	21 in 16 councils
1991 – 1990	3(17.321)	6.1	27 in 17 councils
1995 – 1994	3 (17.046)	6.4	39 in 17 councils
1999 – 1998	4 (21.333)	8.4	42 in 19 councils
2003 – 2002	7 (36.871)	13.4	50 in 21 councils
2007** – 2006	5 (28.225)	10.7	54 in 21 Councils
2011 – 2010	4 (27.288)	9.2	62 in 20 Councils

* Council election are 1 year prior to Provincial elections after 1982

**In 2007 provincial seats were reduced from 55 to 43

Source: <http://www.nlverkiezingen.com> and Huisman 2003

This strategy had a downside. The party's focus on small-scale, mainly rural development and Frisian cultural protection reduced its appeal to people in other sectors and urban areas. The farming community in Friesland has changed substantially and although agriculture is still important to Friesland as a whole, only 7 per cent of the Frisian population is involved in the agricultural sector nowadays as opposed to 34 per cent in 1947 (Huisman 2003). That said, a large number of Frisians do live in rural areas which gives the FNP's political agenda relevance. All in all, the FNP has had limited electoral success in the cities (Penrose 1989).

The FNP's electoral successes were also influenced by the state-wide political context. In the late 1980s the state-wide parties' positions became increasingly polarised. This meant that voters were influenced by events at the state-wide level and voted accordingly in provincial and local elections, meaning that there was less opportunity

for regional parties such as the FNP to make gains (Hemminga 2006: 148). This may partially explain the somewhat disappointing results in the 1980s and early 1990s when the party polled between 4.5 and 6.9 per cent of the vote, consolidating its position but making no significant gains.

Since the late 1990s the party's campaigns have attempted to connect traditional topics such as small scale development and Frisian culture with broader socio-economic issues. The FNP's most successful election result was in 2003, when it achieved 13.4 per cent in a provincial election. The campaign in that year focussed on the plans to construct a magnetic high speed railway link from the Randstad to the north of the Netherlands. The FNP opposed this railway link, using its traditional opposition language against 'mega projects' and arguing that there were other cheaper options. Furthermore, the party framed the issue of a high speed railway link within cultural concerns by arguing that the rail link would lead to an influx of people from the west of the Netherlands who did not have any affinity with Frisian culture (FNP 2004). However, a large part of the campaign was based on concerns about the wider socio-economic impact of the railway link. It was argued that the link brought little to no economic benefit to Friesland in terms of job creation and that, if anything, house prices would rise and disadvantage the indigenous Frisian population (Huisman 2003: 260-261).

A tension in the party exists between those that support a widening of the party's scope and those that would like the party to remain focussed on cultural issues and small villages. Until now the FNP's performance has depended on its ability to exploit controversial issues such as large infrastructural projects. Furthermore, 'national political issues take away from regional political attractiveness' (Hemminga 2006: 148). Therefore, its electoral success in both provincial and municipal elections is affected by political context at state-wide level.

Results in local elections have broadly followed the trend seen in provincial elections. Municipal election campaigns are organised at grassroots level with very limited

central planning. Campaigns usually focus heavily on local issues. However, the party does not put up candidates in every municipality. The south east corner of Friesland and the Islands are both areas where Frisian is not spoken and subsequently the FNP has no representation in these areas. There are several municipalities in which the FNP has traditionally been strong and has been able to take up alderman positions.²⁷ Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the party's success in the cities is limited where it achieves a lower share of the vote in municipal elections.

FNP membership profile

Penrose (1989: 311, 1992) compared the FNP membership with the Frisian electorate and concludes that FNP members are:

- more likely to be from the central and south western parts of Friesland,
- more likely to be from a small village,
- more concerned about the survival of Frisian language and identity,
- more likely to support political decentralisation,
- in general, more left wing,
- more likely to be non-religious or Dutch reformed (protestant),
- from all social classes but tend to be higher educated,
- at the higher end of the income scale
- more likely to be married,
- more likely to be male,

Penrose also notes that there was no difference in terms of age. The 2009 membership survey (van der Zwet 2009) cannot confirm or disprove Penrose's conclusions as it did

²⁷ Alderman are those councillors that are elected by the council to form the executive team. Their role is comparable to that of ministers or executive councillors at the national/provincial levels respectively in terms of organisational structure.

not compare the FNP membership with the Frisian electorate.²⁸ However, some more general remarks about the socio-demographic characteristics of FNP members can be made. According to the survey, men were overrepresented (70:30), the income distribution is indicative of a middle class membership and a high proportion had a higher education degree. In terms of age distribution, the membership has aged since 1989 and young people are now underrepresented (van der Zwet 2009, also see chapter 3 – Methodology). The FNP's demographic may differ from that of the Frisian electorate, but it does not differ much from the memberships of other political parties. Hemminga notes that membership of all political parties is 'especially attractive for well-educated, middle-aged men' (Hemminga 2006: 153). It is the party membership's concerns about Frisian culture and identity that sets it apart from other parties, not its demographics.

As the FNP does not currently contest state-wide elections, most members will vote for other state-wide parties in those elections. The last state-wide elections held in the Netherlands were in 2010. The FNP members' 2009 voting intentions are compared to those elections in Table 4.6 both in the Netherlands and Friesland. Two caveats should be highlighted. Firstly, the FNP members were asked to state who they were most likely to vote for. It was possible for this to differ from who they actually voted for. Secondly, the FNP survey was conducted in April and May 2009 whereas the state-wide elections took place in May 2010. Therefore there are likely to be some disparities. However, these are the most accurate data available and some tentative conclusions can be made from them.

Firstly, FNP members are less likely to vote for parties on the right of the political spectrum. Both the VVD (a conservative liberal party) and the populist right wing PVV were big winners in the 2010 Dutch elections. These two parties received considerably fewer votes (proportionally) from FNP members than from the Frisian and Dutch electorate. The VVD received 20.5 per cent of the state-wide vote whereas they received only 7.3 per cent from FNP members. The PVV received 15.4 per cent of the

²⁸ Details of the Survey are provided in the methodology chapter

Dutch vote share but only 6.1 per cent amongst FNP members. In 2009 it was already apparent that these two parties would increase their vote share in 2010 as they performed well in the European election (6th June) at the time that the FNP survey was held. Therefore, it can be said with reasonable confidence that FNP party members are considerably less likely to vote right wing, which is in line with where most members placed themselves on the ideological spectrum (see Figure 4.6). Frisians in general are less likely to vote for the VVD and PVV but FNP members are even more reluctant to do so.

Table 4.6: Party membership electoral choices in national elections

Party	State-wide elections May 2010 (%)	State-wide elections Friesland 2009 (%)	FNP Spring 2009 (%)
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)	13.7	18.2	20.3
PvdA (Party of the Labour)	19.6	24.8	18.7
VVD (People's party for freedom and democracy)	20.5	15.5	7.3
D66 (Democrats 1966)	6.9	4.7	11.2
Groenlinks (Green Left)	6.7	6.2	14.0
SP (Socialist Party)	9.8	11.4	11.8
Christen Unie (Christian Union)	3.2	5.1	6.1
Partij voor de Dieren (Party for Animals)	1.3	1.1	2.2
PVV (Party for the Freedom) – formerly group Wilders	15.4	11.4	6.1
SGP (Reformed Political Party)	1.7	0.6	.2
Other	1.1	1.	2.1
Total	100	100	100

Source: <http://www.nlverkiezingen.com> (31/05/2010)

Source: FNP survey 2009

Secondly, the right of centre Christian Party (CDA) and the social democratic party (PvdA) are traditionally the biggest parties in Friesland. FNP members are less likely to vote for the PvdA but are more likely to vote for the CDA when compared to the

Frisian electorate as a whole. FNP members are also more likely to vote for the Christian Union (CU) – a largely protestant confessional party.

Thirdly, parties that are strong supporters of decentralisation (D66 and Groenlinks) receive a proportionally high percentage of the vote share from FNP membership when compared to state-wide or Frisian electorate. For D66 the difference was 4.3 per cent and for Groenlinks 7.3 per cent (compared with the state-wide result). Thus the eclectic nature of the FNP membership is also apparent when analysing which parties members support in state-wide elections. The members show a preference for left of centre and centrist parties whereas there is clearly less support for right wing parties.

FNP organisation

In line with the party's ideology, the structure of the FNP is highly decentralised. Local branches, which are organised according to municipal boundaries, have a considerable level of autonomy when it comes to campaigning, local policy formulation and fundraising. The party's highest executive organ is the central board at the provincial level. The annual party member conference is the highest decision making body. The central board is supported by several commissions which focus on specific policy areas or other issues. The party currently has four Provincial Council members who are supported by two employees. The party has municipal representatives in 20 of the 31 councils in Friesland, totalling 62 councillors, 10 aldermen and 1 mayor (FNP 2010). Since 2007 the party has had its own youth organisation, which has attempted to attract new young members.

In 1999 the FNP entered an alliance with other provincial parties in the Netherlands, called the Independent Senate Group (OSF). The OSF has one seat in the Dutch Senate (*Eerste Kamer*). The Senate members are appointed by the elected members of the Provincial Councils. The OSF does not participate in the state-wide Second Chamber

elections but with regards to the appointment of representatives in the Senate, this collective of provincial parties vote for the OSF candidate. Since 1999 the FNP has had a representative on the OSF board (Huisman 2003: 176) and in 2003 Hendrik ten Hoeve, former FNP chairman, won the seat. Thus, although technically the FNP is not represented in the Dutch Senate, it has very strong links through its OSF membership.

The party was one of the founding members of the European Free Alliance (EFA) and has one direct representative on the EFA executive board. The party's links with EFA and the wider European integration process is further discussed in chapter 6.

Nationalism in the FNP

In 1988 the FNP board defined FNP nationalism as follows:

[Friesland still is a] cultural and linguistic unit. It is a nationalism based on the historic development of our country, that is based on self-confidence, self-respect and self-awareness of the Frisian people, however that is influenced and based on indisputable rights to exist freely, to express opinion and to some form of territorial autonomy (FNP 1988 - on citation).

Language is the most distinct marker of 'Frisianness' and Frisian nationalism is closely linked to the Frisian language. However, the Frisian language is not the only attribute of 'Frisianness'. A distinct culture with its own traditions, sports and social structures can also be identified in Friesland (see chapter 5). The FNP recognises all these aspects of 'Frisianness' and its policies aim to preserve them. The FNP agenda regarding the preservation of 'Frisianness' can be summarised as follows: preserve the Frisian language and culture, protect the Frisian countryside, focus on agriculture and small scale development in industry, recreation and housing (Hemminga 2006: 152). The FNP

propagates an inclusive definition of 'Frisianness'. Its goal is to protect 'Frisianness', not to exclude outsiders. Of course, this does not mean that all Frisians living in Friesland would include the above mentioned criteria of what 'Frisianness' is within their definitions of Frisian. For many, the terms 'nationalism' or 'nationalist' are unsatisfactory and within the FNP there is a large minority that challenges the use of the term 'national' in the party's name, as it conjures up connotations of a negative exclusive type of nationalism. There have been proposals to change the party's name (see chapter 5 for details). This recognition of the negative connotations of nationalism and the eagerness of some members to remove the term 'national' from the name points towards a civic type of nationalism in itself.

The SNP and FNP compared

The SNP and FNP differ in important aspects. First of all, both parties operate in different contexts. Friesland is a relatively small province (3,349 km²) with a population of around 650,000 with little autonomy. Scotland on the other hand is much larger both in terms of population (5.2 million) and landmass (78,772 km²). Scotland has had considerable autonomy in the UK since 1707 and has had its own Parliament since 1999. Such disparities mean that the opportunity structures for these two parties are different. The SNP contests every election at every level (EU, state-wide, regional and local). The FNP does not contest EU and state-wide elections, although it does have links to the EU through EFA and on a state-wide level is represented in the Senate through the OSF.

The parties also exhibit considerable differences in terms of structure and membership. The SNP is a large party of around 15,000 members, has a professional organisation and employs personnel for policy research, communication and campaigning. Since 2007 the party has formed the Scottish Government and now

controls several councils in Scotland, either in coalition or on its own. The FNP is much smaller. Its membership stands at around 1,300. It largely depends on volunteers for campaigning and has limited resources when it comes to policy research. The FNP has never been part of the provincial government although it does have several alderman positions in local government.

However, there are also key similarities between the parties. Both are civic national parties. They have both been able to establish themselves as political parties in their polities since the 1960s. They are members of the European Free Alliance, a European group that includes civic, progressive sub-national and regionalist parties. Both parties demand constitutional change for the polities which they aim to represent. Both parties are able to attract voters from across the left–right political spectrum although have developed a distinctive centre left policy agenda. Furthermore, both parties are committed to policies such as anti-nuclearism (both in terms of weapons and energy), internationalism, environmentalism, pacifism and human rights issues.

The key difference between the parties is that the SNP does not have a strong cultural dimension and the FNP does. Although cultural matters do play some part in the SNP's thinking they are not a priority and it has focussed on socio-economic issues. The FNP, despite attempting to broaden its policy agenda to include socio-economic issues, is mostly recognised as a cultural party concerned with language and culturally-related matters such as education and broadcasting. A second key difference is that between the parties' constitutional goals. Although both parties wish to alter the constitutional structure of their respective state and change the power relations between the centre and their polity, the degree of change proposed differs considerably. The SNP's ultimate goal has been an independent Scotland, but recently it has opened up the possibility of an 'independence lite' option in which certain links with other parts of the UK are maintained. The FNP has no desire for Friesland to become independent. Instead, federalism has been one of its key goals. However, not all members support that policy. The most popular option amongst the membership is the less radical option of 'cultural autonomy'. These differences have an impact on the discussion in

the remainder of this thesis. For FNP members the importance of the cultural dimension and (in particular) language can be expected to have an impact on how national identity is understood. Similarly, the existing levels of political autonomy in the respective polities can be expected to have an impact on national identity (chapter 5). Furthermore, the differences in terms of constitutional goals change the dynamics of the discussion on the European integration process (chapter 6) which in the FNP's case has to be placed within the Dutch context. They also have an impact in relation to questions of immigration and multiculturalism (chapter 7). In particular, questions of citizenship and citizenship rights are discussed in different contexts. Nevertheless, the ideological similarities and the fact that both parties can be typified as civic make them interesting cases that afford opportunity to explore the effects of these differences.

Chapter 5 - National identity and nationalism in the SNP and the FNP

This chapter explores the manner in which SNP and FNP members understand their national identities and how this relates to a civic and an ethnocultural framework. Firstly, the contextual situation in relation to national identity is explored in both cases and the limits of the characteristics are analysed by means of elite interviews. Thereafter, survey data are used to show that a binary model which assigns cultural and residential variables into either the civic or ethnocultural dimensions is unsatisfactory. Instead, it is necessary to 'unpack' the concept of national identity and conceptualise a multi-dimensional model which includes separate dimensions for those characteristics which are ambiguous in terms of their inclusivity and exclusivity. Such a multi-dimensional model has a civic dimension consisting of the most inclusive criteria, an ethnic dimension consisting of the most exclusive characteristics and a territorial and cultural dimension which consists of the more ambiguous characteristics in terms of inclusivity and exclusivity. Subsequently, the 'unpacked' civic and ethnic dimensions which no longer include the more ambiguous characteristics can be used to test how they relate to inclusive and exclusive attitudes toward others (in chapters 6 and 7). As such this chapter provides the framework for the next two chapters, in which attitudes towards European integration and immigration are related to civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity.

The novelist Willie McIlvanney observed that national identity:

is like having an old insurance policy. You know you've got one somewhere but often you are not entirely sure where it is. And, if you're honest, you would have to admit you're pretty vague about what the small print means (The Herald, 6 March 1999, partially quoted in Bechhofer and McCrone 2009: 5).

The insurance policy is an accurate analogy for national identity for several reasons. Firstly, similarly to having insurance, almost all of us have a national identity. Gellner (1983: 6) asserts that if someone does not have a national identity many would regard this as a tragedy. However, not everybody would agree with such an assessment. From a cosmopolitan perspective, a national identity is not a prerequisite and survey evidence suggests that many people prioritise other identities, like regional, class or gender identities.

Secondly, most people seldom give much thought to what their national identity means, let alone who or what it covers. They do not give much consideration to the small print. They simply recognise that they are covered in case it is needed. In other words, national identity often becomes salient in crisis situations. However, Billig (1995) argues against such supposed temporary amnesia. According to him people are continuously made aware of their national identity by a process which he calls 'banal' nationalism. Nationalism is routinely 'flagged' and we are all constantly reminded of it; though exactly what we are reminded of is neither consistent nor entirely clear. People have different interpretations of national identity.

Thirdly, just as an insurance policy looks initially straightforward, once we start reading the small print things become significantly more complex. Numerous exemptions and special cases apply. The same applies to national identity. On the surface all looks reasonably uncomplicated; however, once we scratch the surface and identify criteria that constitute a national identity they do not seem to fit neatly into all the possible scenarios. Once national identity is operationalised, the empirical data do not neatly fit the theoretical models. It is this last point that is particularly relevant for this chapter as we look to unpack national identity.

As observed in chapter 2, the civic versus ethnocultural framework used to operationalise the concept of national identity contains a multitude of different characteristics, but the model contains these in a binary framework; one that is inclusive, based on subjective criteria which allows individuals to choose to become

part of the nation and one that is ethnocultural and considered exclusive, based on ascriptive criteria which predetermine accession to the nation.

One of the problems with this binary model is determining which criteria are inclusive and which are exclusive. Summarising the discussion in chapter 2, it is argued that criteria are evaluated according to the ability of an individual to influence/choose them. Criteria such as birth and ancestry cannot be changed; individuals have no control over them. However, as was seen in chapter 2, even here their exclusivity is not definitive and the context in which they are operationalised is important. For example, birth can be considered a more inclusive criterion if it allows the integration of 'newcomers' in societies, particularly in immigrant societies. Furthermore, to have ancestry as a criterion for citizenship can extend national identity beyond the territorial boundaries of a nation and therefore makes it more inclusive for some. Nevertheless, these criteria restrict individuals from adopting a national identity should they wish to do so and can therefore be considered exclusive.

Cultural criteria such as language and religion can and often are also interpreted as objective and exclusive. However, they have both subjective and inclusive dimensions; individuals can to a certain extent choose to change their language and culture. It may be difficult for someone to change their religion, but it is not impossible if required. Language can operate as a vehicle for civic integration. Adopting a language allows others/newcomers to become part of the nation. However, it can also be considered as a more objective and exclusive marker that distinguishes nationals from non-nationals in terms of difference in accents or ability. Therefore cultural criteria can be associated with objective ethnocultural conceptualisations of national identity but they are more ambiguous.

Feeling a national identity can be considered an almost fully subjective and therefore inclusive criterion. Additionally, respecting the laws, mores, rules and institutions of the land is a subjective choice of the individual and imposes few restrictions upon them. Such elements can therefore be associated with a civic conception of national

identity. Even though these criteria are subjective they can be measured objectively. Furthermore, territorial criteria involving residence in a certain area are often considered part of civic understanding of national identity (Bechofer and McCrone 2009; Shulman 2002) but they cannot simply be considered as an individual's choice. In almost all cases, restrictions on movement to a territory are imposed. There are also differences in relation to the length of residence. Therefore such territorial criteria are associated with civicism but are more ambiguous.²⁹

The characteristics of national identity and their limitations are explored in the first section of this chapter, wherein the concept of national identity is operationalised for both the SNP and FNP by means of analysing data from 'elite' interviews with party representatives. The data are diverse and whilst the aim is to uncover the mainstream attitudes towards certain characteristics of national identity, some 'extreme' cases are discussed with the intention of providing a contrast to mainstream attitudes which allows for a better understanding of the latter. In the cases of both the FNP and SNP, attitudes towards nationalism are also discussed because such attitudes, it will be argued, can be insightful in relation to notions of civic versus ethnocultural national identities.

In the second section of this chapter national identity in the parties' memberships is operationalised. The framework will take into account the difficulties identified in chapter 2 and; (i) recognise the different dimensions of national identity, (ii) treat criteria that are associated with civic and ethnocultural conceptions of national identity as two separate continua and (iii) create a hierarchy in terms of the strength of civic and ethnocultural criteria measured by their ability to be inclusive and exclusive.

In the third section, differences between party representatives and the 'ordinary' party membership are explored. Party representatives are a broad category and consist of party office holders and public office holders for both parties; these members can be

²⁹ For a full discussion of the criteria identified as inclusive and exclusive see chapter 2.

considered as their public face.³⁰ In chapter 2 it was noted that there are good reasons to suspect differences between party representatives and members in terms of their understanding of national identity. Firstly, civic and ethnocultural nationalism are concepts that are used within political discourse; political actors are aware of the normative connotations of such terms and therefore know the 'right' answers. Secondly, party representatives can be expected to have undergone a process of socialisation within the party which makes them more likely to have views about national identity that are in line with the image the party wishes to present of itself. If substantial differences between party representatives and 'ordinary' members are found then this will need to be taken into account in the analysis and will have an impact in terms of how conclusions can be generalised. This is particularly the case as the interview data is based on party representatives' views.

The SNP and Scottish national identity and nationalism

The Scottish national movement as a whole, including the SNP, is considered by most scholars to be civic (Hearn 2000: 59-66; Keating 1996: 694; Nairn 2000; Hepburn 2009). Mitchell states: 'the SNP is [...] self-consciously civic in its nationalism' (Mitchell 2008). It is often the SNP's inclusive offer of citizenship that leads commentators and scholars to conclude that the SNP is civic in its outlook. The 2003 party manifesto states: 'the SNP has an open and inclusive approach to Scottish citizenship. The automatic right of citizenship will be open to all those living in Scotland, all those born in Scotland and all those with a parent born in Scotland. All others are free to apply' (SNP 2003). Does this mean that the SNP's understanding of national identity is civic? It was already argued in chapter 2 that there is a difference between the concepts of national identity

³⁰ For the SNP this includes any member who has in the past or present have been an MSP, MPs, MEP, councillor, branch office bearer, constituency office bearer or committee member of the National Council. For the FNP no such categorisation can be made from the available data. In this case it includes any member who has been or is a party official or public official for the party.

and citizenship and that it is necessary to distinguish between the two. That said, the SNP's open and inclusive offer of citizenship is a good indicator of a civic national identity.

Although the SNP mainstream is considered civic, the party is a broad church and its members, voters and supporters do not have a uniform understanding of Scottish national identity. Other understandings do not always reflect the party's official civic doctrine. As has already been discussed in chapter 4, individuals and groups have proclaimed a more ethnocultural based definition of national identity. For example, in the early 1980s Siol Nan Gaidheal had a more ethnocultural understanding of the Scottish National identity. Although SNG was not part of the SNP, many SNG members were members of the SNP. SNG understanding of national identity clashed with the mainstream SNP's understanding of what it meant to be Scottish and the members of the group were expelled from the SNP (Mitchell 1996: 230). These events reflected the SNP's mainstream commitment to a civic national identity and its discomfort with those that were more ethnoculturally orientated.

In order to unpack the SNP's understanding of national identity, the interview responses of SNP representatives are assessed. The analysis will attempt to uncover any patterns whilst simultaneously identifying variables that are of overall importance. More exclusive and inclusive characteristics are identified and the relationship between them is determined.

Many SNP representatives state that birth and ancestry play an important role in their personal sense of 'Scottishness', but none recognise these as definitive criteria. The connection with the place of one's ancestors and place of upbringing are considered obvious: 'I do not know many people that grew up here that would not describe themselves as Scottish' (Interview SNP 03 – 8th September 2009). The following respondent also regarded birth as an important feature and considered 'anybody who has been born here' (Interview SNP 12 – 16th September 2009) to be Scottish. For

another interviewee ancestral links were important: 'I was born here, my parents were born here. It goes a few generations back' (Interview SNP 13 – 7th October 2009). As stated, none of the respondents regard ancestry and birth as necessary assets for Scottishness. In other words, they can make somebody Scottish but if a person does not fulfil these ascriptive criteria, they can still be considered as or consider themselves as Scottish, based on other criteria.

Some respondents rejected a claim to Scottish national identity in response to the question: 'Can people residing outside Scotland for more than a single generation claim Scottish national identity because of ancestral links?' For example, one response was: 'I do not really understand it and I would not classify it as Scottish. Their idea of Scottishness is about tartan and bagpipes and they have never been here. They have an unrepresentative idea of Scotland. They have an historic interest' (Interview SNP 04 – 28th September 2009). Others regard this as a particular type of Scottishness: 'If there is a connection [with foreigners who claim ancestral Scottish links], I am not saying they should be exploited, but if they want to spend money ok. But let's not kid ourselves about what that connection is' (Interview SNP 03 – 8th September 2009). Another opinion is that Scottishness claimed through ancestral links is something else, but includes recognition of the importance of the Scottish diaspora for the Scottish identity: 'That [emigrants of previous generations claiming a Scottish identity] is something different – it would expand the number [of Scots] to about 40 million. There is a diaspora; homecoming³¹ is about that. They are important for our identity' (Interview SNP 01 – 8th September 2009). According to this respondent, it is not the fact that there are 40 million Scots who could all claim Scottish national identity that is important, but that the 5 million Scots in Scotland are aware that there is a diaspora of Scots around the world that is important. Interestingly, the SNP and Scotland as a whole has historically not looked to establish close links with this Scottish diaspora – at least not to the same extent that Ireland has done. It is only since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament that the focus on such links has increased in order to advance

³¹ An event celebrated in the summer of 2009 for which immigrants and descendants of immigrants were invited to Scotland in a month long celebration of Scottish culture.

Scottish tourism. The SNP has willingly taken part in this strategy to exploit ancestral links, but other parties have done the same.

Birth and ancestry are recognised as important for a Scottish national identity but are quickly dismissed as definitive ascriptive markers of 'Scottishness'. All SNP representatives interviewed agree that people who were not born or brought up in Scotland, or have no Scottish ancestors, can become Scottish. Representatives identify several subjective criteria. Firstly, there were those who state that it was based on a feeling: 'You are Scottish when you feel Scottish. It is not something that is in the blood. I have met lots of people that have come here and described themselves as Scottish – nothing to do with background, race and creed. It is about an affinity' (Interview SNP 10 – 30th November 2009). Secondly, interviewees identify a connection with the place they inhabit as an important criterion: 'People have chosen Scotland to live whether their parents are Scottish or not; it shouldn't matter, they are still Scottish' (Interview SNP 18 – 15th April 2009). Thirdly, a willingness to contribute to Scottish society is regarded as important: '[a person can become Scottish] as long as you want to contribute towards a better Scotland' (Interview SNP 17 – 2nd September 2009). And finally, a willingness to adhere to Scottish values is deemed important: 'You don't have to be born and bred [in Scotland] to be Scottish. It is more an inheritance of mind than blood. People can adopt these values and culture as much as somebody who has been brought up here' (Interview SNP 06 - 16 September 2009). What these responses have in common is that they consider the Scottish national identity to be open and inclusive. No restrictions are imposed and anybody who wishes to fulfil these criteria can do so. It is a personal choice to become Scottish.

Interviewees also identify some cultural elements when defining Scottish national identity. Respondents would refer to a general cultural difference: 'Scotland and England are two countries divided by culture' (Interview SNP 33 – 2nd November 2009). History is also identified as an important marker for Scottish identity: 'There is a historical element – it did have its own government; a distinct nation-state until 1707' (Interview SNP 03 – 8th September 2009). Representatives identify language as an

important part of their Scottish identity but are equally aware of the limitations of language as a characteristic of Scottishness: 'I have gained an insight by learning Gaelic.... In some ways it makes me more Scottish and in some ways it makes me more foreign', and 'linguistic nationalism has never been central, cultural identity has been but [is] not focussed on language' (Interview SNP 01 – 8th September 2009). Language is often considered a marker for national identity, but in the Scottish case this is of limited use as the same language is spoken in Scotland as in its significant other – England. Nevertheless, Scottish accents are distinctive (although none of the interviewees alluded to this) and minority languages such as Gaelic and Scots can also be used as markers by some.

A final marker of Scottish identity that is worth mentioning is that some interviewees identify a connection with the landscape as an important marker of Scottish identity. This seems to be particularly strong with respondents representing Highland constituencies: '[The landscape] probably shapes your identity more than anything else – your immediate surroundings, rivers, mountains, lochs' (Interview SNP 21 – 7th April 2010).

From these responses, the following can be concluded; all respondents named both subjective and objective characteristics. That is, on the one hand, characteristics that allow individuals to *choose* a Scottish identity and on the other hand, characteristics in which personal choice is restricted. Both sets of criteria are considered non-competitively. Criteria which make somebody Scottish, according to SNP interviewees, are about birth, upbringing and ancestry (because these are factors that make most Scots Scottish). However, they are certainly not decisive. Feeling Scottish, living in Scotland, contributing to Scottish society and respecting Scottish values are all more or less subjective and inclusive criteria. Most respondents also value these elements.

SNP representatives use a multitude of characteristics to describe Scottish national identity and the relationship between these different characteristics has a considerable impact on how the civic versus ethnocultural framework should be

understood. But what are the party's attitudes towards nationalism? Nationalism is the idea that the nation, a group of people with a similar national identity, should be congruent with the state (Gellner 1983: 1). However, the words 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' have certain negative connotations for many people. Nationalism is often considered a 'virus left over from an older more vicious age, which, as if mutating itself against all known antidotes, comes back to wreak its havoc on hapless victims' (McCrone 1998: vii). Because of such negative connotations, the SNP has avoided using terms like nationalism and nationalists and given preference to the more neutral words 'national' (Johns *et al.* 2009) and independence. Terms like 'Nats' and Nationalists are often 'used [by the party's opponents] as a stick to beat' them with (Interview SNP 10 – 30th November 2009). A certain unease with the term 'nationalism' exists: 'You do have to fight against that word' (Interview SNP 31 – 27th August 2009). There have been proposals to change the party's name into something that 'stresses independence' (Interview SNP 07 – 15th September 2009), which would allow it to better distinguish itself from parties that use a more exclusive form of nationalism, particularly in Europe: 'In a European context we probably would not call ourselves the Scottish National Party if it was founded now' (Interview SNP 01 – 20th January 2009). Such a proposal was also made in 1969 when Billy Wolfe, a future party leader, canvassed a change in the party's name to the 'Democratic Party'; within the party there was a minority that felt that the word 'national' suggested right wing inclinations (Wilson 2009: 25-26). Wolfe had suggested on several occasions that he believed that 'the party need not be so obviously nationalist' (Wolfe 1973: 83) as he believed that '90 per cent of the people of Scotland were already nationalist and did not require to be made particularly conscious of the fact' (Wolfe 1973: 83). However, the idea to change the party's name was not supported then and most party representatives now regard the word national as something positive.

Interviewees employ different strategies to explain 'their nationalism'. Firstly, many are quick to classify the party and themselves as civic nationalist, highlighting the fact that the ethnocultural versus civic framework has entered the political discourse and

that they are aware of the normative connotations associated with these terms. There are representatives who do not employ the civic and ethnocultural terminology to explain their nationalism but are aware of different types of nationalism and subsequently state that they are comfortable with Scottish nationalism in general and the SNP's version of nationalism in particular. Secondly, an often used strategy to defend the term nationalist is to equate it with independence and to internationalise nationalism. Independence is presented as the normal state of affairs for any nation. Consequently, nationalism is presented as a basis of internationalism. Only by asserting independence can Scotland become part of the international community and play its part in the world. In answering the question: 'What does it mean to you to be a nationalist?', respondents assert that 'you cannot be an internationalist if you aren't a nationalist first and foremost' (Interview SNP 05 – 31st August 2009) and that 'independence is not about being parochial, it is about being out there in the world showing people what Scotland can offer' (Interview SNP 02 – 20th January 2010). Thirdly, a certain pragmatic attitude towards nationalism is evident from the following answer: 'Being a nationalist is a means to an end. Come independence, other political directions will take over' (Interview SNP 34 – 12th August 2009). All in all, the sometimes uncomfortable relationship that some SNP representatives have with the term nationalism demonstrates a high awareness of the importance of being seen as a civic national party. Many show considerable awareness of academic theory in this field and apply this to 'justify' their own and the party's nationalism.

The FNP and Frisian national identity and nationalism

The Canadian scholar Penrose (1989) identified a first phase of Frisian nationalism in the beginning of the nineteenth century. She regarded this phase as a negative reaction to Dutch centralisation politics. Penrose called this first phase 'linguistic nationalism' as it was mainly aimed at preserving the Frisian language. Several

philological associations were established to promote the Frisian language, but none of these objected to the political sovereignty of the Dutch state. The second 'cultural' phase of Frisian nationalism started, according to Penrose, in the first decade of the 20th century during which concerns for the Frisian language were broadened to include other aspects of Frisian culture. Subsequently, she identified political nationalism as the third phase which found its roots in the 1930s but only became clearly identifiable with the establishment of the FNP in 1962 (Penrose 1989: 153-175). Penrose asserted that in all three phases the Frisians have used nationalism in a defensive manner whereas the Dutch have used nationalism offensively: 'the Dutch used nationalism to create a new state, as opposed to the Frisians who attempted to use nationalism to protect an old nation' (Penrose 1989: 104).

As Penrose's analysis showed, the Frisian language is a key part of the Frisian identity and the FNP's programme and thinking are closely linked to issues concerning the Frisian language. Most interviewees recognise the importance of language for Frisian national identity: 'When speaking about characteristics, you tend to identify something of a national character/identity [*volkskarakter*] which is not easy to identify. The most real, most visible and tangible is the language' (Interview FNP 01 – 28th August 2008). However, an individual does not have to be fluent in Frisian to be Frisian. Most respondents make a distinction between speaking and understanding Frisian; the latter is more important for acquiring a Frisian identity: 'I think if you want to be part [of the Frisian nation/community], especially in small villages, you have to at least understand the language. Maybe also talk it a little bit' (Interview FNP 25 – 7th April 2010). The argument seems to be that Frisian as a language may not be essential for the Frisian identity, but that feeling Frisian is. Without speaking and understanding the language one can question whether a person can truly feel Frisian: 'It may be difficult to feel Frisian without the language but if they do then that is fine' (Interview FNP 13 – 1st March 2010).

However, language is not the only attribute of Frisian identity. Distinct Frisian traditions, sports and social structures can be identified in Friesland. As stated in chapter 4, the FNP recognises such aspects and its policies aim to preserve them. Aims regarding 'Frisianness' for the FNP can be summarised as follows; preserve the Frisian language and culture, protect the Frisian countryside, focus on agriculture and small scale development in industry, recreation and housing (Hemminga 2006: 152). For many FNP representatives, the landscape plays an important role in their understanding of 'Frisianness'. It is considered distinctive and of emotional value. Many of the cultural traditions, *fjierljeppen* (jumping over canals with a long pole), green plover egg searching, sailing and ice skating races (the Eleven City Tour) are closely associated with the land and therefore reinforce this bond with the landscape. Interviewees feel they 'are connected to the Frisian landscape' (Interview FNP 06 – 9th June 2009) and have an emotional connection with it: 'If something happens to the surroundings, that hurts' (Interview FNP 10 – 12th June 2009).

More exclusive characteristics also play a role when interviewees consider the Frisian identity, but they are mostly considered important on a personal level and not on a collective level. Most FNP representatives born in Friesland stress the importance of that characteristic to their sense of 'Frisianness': 'It is not that Frisians are superior, but you are proud that you were born here' (Interview 08 FNP 11th June 2009). Some representatives who were not born in Friesland sought to demonstrate their Frisian ancestral connection in interviews: 'I married a Frisian and my ancestors were Frisian. When I was little I used to go to Friesland – that always felt special' (Interview FNP 19 – 25th March 2010). Ancestral links are also recognised as a valid claim to Frisian identity for those that do not live in Friesland: 'It is about having Frisian parents and having been raised in Friesland. It does not matter whether you live here or not. People all over the Netherlands will look at their Frisian roots. When you grow older it always comes back to you' (Interview FNP 21 – 29th March 2010). In other cases, residence is considered an important criterion: 'You are a member of a community, the village, the city and the province and [in order to be considered a member] you are active in that

community' (Interview FNP 07 – 10th June 2009). In other words, one has to be a resident of the community and actively contribute to that community.

The vast majority of respondents consider the Frisian identity to be something subjective – essentially a feeling: 'Yes, I admire people who become Frisian and feel Frisian and act Frisian. Sometimes they are more Frisian than real Frisians' (Interview FNP 22 – 29th March 2010). The last part of this answer suggests that a distinction between newcomers and 'real' Frisians remains. Not all interviewees agree with the view that anybody can become Frisian: 'They [newcomers] become more Frisian but will never become real Frisians [because] it is a certain philosophy that you acquire from birth. It is a piece of culture that is passed on' (Interview FNP 23 – 30th March 2010).

Nevertheless, more subjective criteria such as adherence to certain values are considered important: '[Newcomers need to] adapt to Frisian life, we are somewhat reserved. We don't need to get to the top but want a comfortable life' (Interview FNP 13 – 1st March 2010). The suggestion that newcomers can become Frisian if they wish to do so is made. There is no ascriptive obligation to be fulfilled, although some efforts on the part of the individual are required, particularly in terms of learning Frisian as a language.

Similarly to the SNP, FNP interviewees use a whole battery of criteria which they consider to be important to their sense of national identity. In contrast to the SNP, language is considered a key criterion for Frisianness but in most cases it is not considered the definitive criterion. When asked if a person can be Frisian without speaking or understanding the language all but two respondents said this is possible. Other more objective or restrictive criteria, like birth and ancestry, are considered important but not essential. Only the subjective characteristics are definitive. A person has to feel Frisian in order to be considered Frisian. However, feeling Frisian is closely associated with language and adherence to values and certain social rules.

The FNP defines the party's nationalism as follows:

a nationalism based on the historic development of our country, that is based on self-confidence, self-respect and self-awareness of the Frisian people, however that is influenced and based on indisputable rights to exist freely, to express opinion and to some form of territorial autonomy (FNP 1988 [FNP translation]).

For many members, the terms 'nationalism', 'nationalist' or even 'national' are unsatisfactory and within the FNP there has always been a large minority that challenges the use of these terms. Since 1962 when the party was founded, the word 'national' in the party's name has caused controversy. In 1970 Kramer, one of the party founders, thought that the term 'national' overshadowed the party's federalist goals. It was not only Kramer who considered this to be eclipsing the party's aims. There are many present day party members and representatives who feel uncomfortable with the designation and express a desire to change the party's name. One interviewee had strong views on the issue: 'The N should be removed as soon as possible. It does not mean anything ... I would like Frisian Federal Party or Frisian Volk Party' (Interview FNP 18 – 15th March 2010). The N in the party's name is seen as a distraction that attracts unnecessary negative attention and requires constant explanation: 'I think the N can go. I always tell people that I am of the FP. I feel uncomfortable with the N. I don't promote it. I really don't like it. It should just be FP. You have to explain it and I find that difficult' (Interview FNP 22 – 29th March 2010). However, even if interviewees dislike the term, they do not always think it should be removed from the party's name. One of the reasons why there is reluctance to change the party's name has to do with brand recognition; changing the party's name may make the party less recognisable to voters. However, there are those that regard the term as positive and recognise the value of it as it places the FNP in a particular group: 'We do not find it [the issue of National in the name] that important, but it has positive

aspects. It gives us a clear place in politics' (Interview FNP 12 – 13 August 2008). It facilitates party identification and carves out political space for the party.

Table 5.2: Desire to change FNP name (n = 568)

	1991 ³² (%)	2000 (%)	2009 (%)
Absolutely keep the same name	32	18	24
Keep the same name	14	31	35
Don't care	29	23	19
Change name	19	22	17
Absolutely change name	6	6	4

Source: 1991 FNP survey

Source: 2000 FNP survey

Source 2009 FNP survey

A 1991 survey of FNP members addressed whether or not they wanted to keep the party's name and, where applicable, what they would have liked to change it to.³³ In 2000 the question was raised again and it was also included in the 2009 survey.³⁴ Table 5.1 shows that the overall trend is one of greater acceptance/satisfaction with the party's name. In 1991 46 per cent of respondents were satisfied with the party's name. In 2000, 49 per cent wanted to keep the party's name and in 2009 this had increased to 59 per cent. However, the results also show that in the middle category (those that do not care whether the name is changed or not) support has steadily decreased from 29 to 19 per cent, suggesting greater polarisation over the issue. This may be a result of increasing awareness of the issue through debates in the party.

³² The 1991 survey question was: 'Are you satisfied with the current name?', which does not mean members wanted to change the name. Further questions included: 'Would another name serve the party better?' 4.5% agreed with this and a huge 58.8% said it would depend on the name. 24% disagreed. Satisfaction with the name can be regarded as a good proxy variable for a desire to change it.

³³ Survey methodology not available.

³⁴ The 2000 survey was a full membership survey (1,200 individuals). 663 surveys were returned. The survey was conducted by two researchers, R. Jonkman and P. van der Plank, tasked by the FNP board. The main aim of the survey was to scope the possibility of FNP participation in national elections, although some other questions were included (socio-economic and policy preference).

There are several explanations for the overall trend of increasing acceptance of the name. Several interviewees expressed concern about the word 'national' because it had negative connotations associated with World War Two and Nazism: 'We always have to explain it and it is always being compared with National Socialism' (Interview FNP 13 – 1st March 2010). Hemminga (2006) is also of the opinion that for many people in the Netherlands and Friesland nationalism is strongly associated with National Socialism and World War Two. Therefore, many FNP members are of the opinion that the adjective 'national' is historically a negative concept and the term is counter-productive when it comes to attracting voters. It is felt that the use of the term 'national' or 'nationalism' frightens Frisian voters away. It may be the case that the impact of negative connotations has decreased as memories of the Second World War and Nazism are no longer as salient as they were in the 1960s. These memories play a lesser role in the politics of today and therefore it is more difficult to link Nazism to contemporary nationalism. The strong negative reaction from the press and other political parties against the FNP in the early 1960s when it was founded was possibly fuelled by the relatively recent experiences of extreme nationalism in Nazi Germany. Such sentiments have become less salient.

A second explanation could be that as time goes by the 'costs' of changing the party's name become more significant as it is better known. Based on this, respondents are more inclined to accept the party's name. Additionally, the younger generation in the party may be less concerned with its negative connotations. As the following respondent states, 'it is a Frisian party and national means you are part of a certain piece of land – either Dutch or Frisian. Here it is more Frisian. The FNP is becoming younger and they have a different attitude towards that word "national"' (Interview FNP 25 – 7th April 2010). The issue should not be overstated; most interview respondents expressed a fairly neutral opinion in relation to the meaning of the word national and the party's name. It was not regarded as a priority and little time was being spent on the intellectual conceptualisation of the term. Nevertheless, the issue

of name change has been put onto the party's agenda on several occasions, which shows that it is pertinent to at least some party members.

Thus in both the SNP and the FNP several dimensions of national identity can be identified. Some of these are ancestral or refer to birth and belonging. Others identify territory, the natural environment, history, values and social structures as important. However, in most cases none of these are considered definitive. They can all be used, but use is dependent on context. The only definitive criterion is considered to be 'feeling' a certain national identity, but this on its own is also not considered sufficient and needs to be related to some of the other criteria such as residence, language, ancestry, respect for institutions and birth. Exactly which of these criteria is considered important differs. National identity seems therefore to represent building blocks. Some form the foundation and are necessary. Others can apply in a certain context or are considered more important by certain individuals. In both the SNP and the FNP's case, the civic criterion of 'a national identity' seems to form the basis of national identity. In the FNP's case language also forms part of the basis, whereas this is not part of the basis in the SNP's case.

When both parties' attitudes towards the terms 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' are compared it can be said that the SNP is relatively at ease with these terms, whereas FNP representatives are more uncomfortable. This may be due to the fact that in Scotland the terms are less associated with Nazism and World War Two than is the case in the Netherlands and that the SNP was founded before the association between nationalism and Nazism was established. Another hypothesis is that the SNP has been better able to explain what the terms mean in relation to the Scottish nation. This is easier for the SNP because the party has never had to argue that Scotland is a nation, whereas for the FNP the Frisian nation may be more or less identifiable – their definition of it will not readily be accepted by the whole of the Frisian public. Thus the FNP not only has to manage the negative connotations of the term nationalism; it also

has to convince Frisians that there is a Frisian nation and then explain what and who it consists of.

Operationalising the civic versus ethnocultural dichotomy

It is not possible to measure ethnocultural or civic national identities within a group of party members by asking each whether they are an ethnocultural or civic nationalist. There are four reasons as to why such a question would lead to false, insufficient or inadequate data. Firstly, the participant may not know what the concept means. Civic and ethnocultural national identity are academic constructs and not every member of a political party can be expected to be familiar with these terms. Secondly, civic and ethnocultural national identity are contested concepts. Both in the academic literature and some journalistic accounts, these concepts are used interpretively and have different meanings for different authors. Therefore, it can be assumed that participants will have different understandings of the terms (if they have an understanding of them at all). Such differences would contaminate the data. They would have severe consequences for the reliability of the research. Thirdly, the subjects may be aware of some of the normative values that are attached to either civic or ethnocultural nationalism and will therefore choose one without considering whether the meaning of the term is matched by their actual understanding of national identity. Fourthly, since the purpose here is to test whether or not members of autonomist parties fall neatly into either category simply offering civic and ethnocultural nationalism as options does not suffice, as this presupposes a perfect fit into one or the other category.

For these reasons the ethnocultural and civic concepts have been broken down into variables which can be expected to correlate with civic or ethnocultural national identities. These variables are less contested, more value-free and are easier to

understand. As stated earlier, civic characteristics are subjective and inclusive, giving an individual a degree of choice whether they can adopt a national identity. Feeling a certain national identity, residence and respecting the institutions and laws of a country are often regarded as inclusive criteria for a national identity. Ethnocultural characteristics are objective and exclusive. These can include birth, ancestry and cultural criteria such as religion and language. From these proxy variables the latent civic and ethnocultural variables can be reconstructed. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show a battery of questions asked to SNP members in the 2007 membership survey and FNP members in the 2009 membership survey, in relation to Scottish and Frisian national identity. Members were asked what they considered to be important to be truly Scottish/Frisian.

Table 5.3: Responses to the question: ‘Some people say the following things are important for being truly Scottish. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?’

	Not at all important (%)	Not very Important (%)	Important (%)	Very Important (%)	Mean* 1-4
To have Scottish ancestry	17	27	32	24	2.64
To have been born in Scotland	15	22	30	33	2.81
To be a Christian	56	19	13	12	1.81
To be able to speak English, Gaelic or Scots	10	17	34	39	3.01
To live in Scotland now	6	15	32	48	3.2
To have lived in Scotland for most of one's life	9	26	37	28	2.85
To respect Scottish political institutions and laws	2	6	34	59	3.5
To feel Scottish national identity	1	3	18	78	3.73

* The mean is the average score for each category. If a respondent regarded a variable as ‘not at all important’ they received a score of 1, if they considered it not important they received a score of 2 and so on.

Source: SNP survey 2007

The frequencies in Table 5.2 confirm that typifying the SNP as a civic party is wholly justified. In the last column of Table 5.2 mean scores are reported. A mean score close to 1 indicates that the criterion is considered unimportant whereas a mean score close to 4 indicates that a criterion is considered very important. The categories ‘to feel Scottish’ and ‘respecting Scottish institutions’ are considered important by almost all respondents and receive high mean scores. 96 per cent of the members surveyed consider feeling Scottish to be important or very important and 93 per cent find

'respecting Scottish political institutions and laws' important or very important. 'Living in Scotland now' is also considered more important (80 per cent) than the ethnocultural criteria 'ancestry' (56 per cent), 'birth' (63 per cent) and 'religion' (25 per cent). 'To have lived in Scotland for most of one's life' (65 per cent) – a more restrictive territorial criterion – is also considered important, but not as important as language (73 per cent).

That language is considered important may seem quite surprising as most Scots speak English and English cannot be seen as a clear cultural marker because the Scottish 'significant other', the English, speak the same language. The importance of language may not be so much a consequence of ethnocultural demarcation, but may be regarded as a vehicle to civic integration for newcomers. The relatively high score could also be explained as an acknowledgment that speaking Gaelic or Scots is one way of defining Scottishness. Overall, according to SNP members, the Scottish national identity is multi-dimensional. Most criteria receive mean scores of above 2.5 the midpoint. Only the religious marker (25 per cent) is rejected by most as a basis for a Scottish identity. These overall scores make the distinction of a rigid civic versus ethnocultural dimensions doubtful.

Table 5.4: Responses to the question: ‘How important are each of the following aspects for being truly Frisian?’

	Not at all important (%)	Not very Important (%)	Important (%)	Very Important (%)	Mean* 1-4
To have Frisian ancestry	4	28	37	32	2.97
To have been born in Friesland	12	32	32	24	2.68
To speak and understand Frisian	0	0	20	80	3.78
To read and write Frisian	0	7	43	50	3.43
To live in Friesland now	7	27	31	34	2.92
To have lived in Friesland for most of one’s life	6	34	35	25	2.78
To respect Frisian political institutions and rules	3	16	47	34	3.11
To feel Frisian national identity	0	3	22	76	3.72

* The mean is the average score for each category. If a respondent regarded a variable as ‘not at all important’ they received a score of 1, if they considered it not important they received a score of 2 and so on.

Source: FNP survey 2009

The FNP members surveyed (Table 5.3) considered the two language criteria (to speak and understand Frisian and to read and write Frisian) important for the Frisian identity although to speak and understand Frisian was considered more important (100 per cent) than reading and writing skills (93 per cent). Additionally, ‘feeling Frisian’ (98 per cent) and ‘to respect rules and political institutions’ (81 per cent) received very high scores, although the latter criterion is considered less important than in the SNP’s case. A likely explanation is that the Scottish institutions have more autonomy and have remained autonomous (Mitchell 2009; Bulpitt 2006; Paterson 1994) whereas the

Netherlands is a highly centralised state in which provincial institutions have no law making powers³⁵ and enjoy little autonomy.

The more exclusive markers of ancestry (69 per cent) and birth (56 per cent) received higher scores than in the SNP's case; this is particularly the case for ancestry. This is in line with the interview findings, in which FNP representatives also seemed to consider ancestry more important than SNP members do. A possible explanation is that Friesland and its population are much smaller. In order to present Friesland as a viable nation, those that live outwith Friesland are included as part of the nation through ancestral links. Indeed, FNP members consider territorial criteria – residence in Friesland either now (65 per cent) or for a prolonged period (60 per cent) – to be slightly less important than in the SNP's case. The differences should not be overstated, as both territorial criteria are seen as important by most respondents. In fact, a similar pattern to that which was seen for the SNP emerges, although it is slightly more blurred in the FNP's case. Civic criteria in the form of 'feeling Frisian' and 'respecting Frisian rules and institutions' (to a lesser extent), together with linguistic criteria, are considered important by a vast majority of the membership. However, the other criteria also received high scores and all criteria received high mean scores.

One possible explanation for such high scores in all categories is that there is a positive bias. Since all subjects were members of autonomist parties, there is a strong incentive to define national identities in the broadest terms possible, including as many characteristics as possible. Even though there may be some positive bias, the scores are so high in all but one category that it may be concluded that most SNP and FNP members consider characteristics non-competitively. However, univariate statistics give little insights into the internal structure of these variables. Is it possible to identify two strands in how members of both parties understand and describe national identity, one using the more subjective/civic elements and the other using the more objective/ethnocultural characteristics to define national identity?

³⁵ Hence the word 'rules' in the question instead of 'laws' was used in the Frisian question. Although there are no Frisian laws, according to FNP interviewees there are distinct Frisian social rules or way of life.

When considering the internal relations it can be noted that a relatively high percentage does indeed find all variables important; 12 per cent of SNP members consider all variables important or very important and if the 'to be a Christian' variable is excluded which had the lowest score, then 25 per cent of members consider all 7 remaining variables important or very important. 30 per cent of all FNP members consider all characteristics very important. Although a relatively high proportion of members find all variables important, the scores suggest that there is considerable variation. In order to investigate wider patterns, the proportions of respondents that rate a variable as very important for each variable measured against the proportion that designated other variables also very important have been calculated (Tables 5.4 (SNP) and 5.5 (FNP)).

Table 5.5: SNP interrelationships between aspects of Scottishness designated as important

...% designating these reasons as 'very' important	Of those designating these reasons as 'very important' ...							
	To have Scottish ancestry	To have been born in Scotland	To live in Scotland now	To have lived in Scotland for most of one's life	To be a Christian	To respect Scottish political institutions and laws	To feel Scottish national identity	To be able to speak English, Gaelic or Scots
To have Scottish ancestry	-	56	32	48	59	28	26	35
To have been born in Scotland	77	-	44	64	73	36	35	45
To live in Scotland now	63	63	-	80	78	53	51	56
To have lived in Scotland for most of one's life	55	54	48	-	67	33	31	39
To be a Christian	29	26	20	29	-	17	13	19
To respect Scottish political institutions and laws	67	64	66	68	82	-	63	71
To feel Scottish National identity	84	81	83	86	86	83	-	84
To be able to speak English, Gaelic or Scots	56	51	45	53	61	46	42	-

Source: SNP survey 2007

Table 5.6: FNP Interrelationships between aspects of Frisianness designated as important

...% designating these reasons as 'very' important	Of those designating these reasons as 'very important'...							
	To have Frisian ancestors	To speak and understand Frisian	To read and write Frisian	To have been born in Friesland	To live in Friesland now	To have lived in Friesland for most of one's life	To respect Frisian rules and political institutions	To feel Frisian national identity
To have Frisian ancestors	-	37	41	75	53	64	49	38
To speak and understand Frisian	93	-	96	91	90	90	92	85
To read and write Frisian	65	61	-	74	63	65	70	55
To have been born in Friesland	56	27	35	-	55	64	41	27
To live in Friesland now	58	38	43	78	-	87	50	39
To have lived in Friesland for most of one's life	50	28	32	67	62	-	41	30
To respect Frisian rules and political institutions	51	39	47	57	48	55	-	39
To feel Frisian national identity	90	80	83	86	85	92	89	-

Source: FNP survey 2009

The relationship between variables provides, at least in the SNP's case, some evidence of a civic versus ethnocultural structure (Table 5.4). The more subjective variables – 'feeling Scottish', 'to live in Scotland now', and to 'respect Scottish political institutions and laws' – all show a strong relationship with each other. For example, of those

people that consider 'feeling Scottish' very important, 51 per cent also find 'living in Scotland now' very important and 63 per cent also find 'respecting institutions and laws' very important. On the other hand, only 26 per cent of those that find 'feeling a Scottish identity' very important also consider 'to have Scottish ancestry' very important. However, the main 'problem' is that those respondents who rate ethnocultural variables highly also find the civic criteria more important. So, somebody who regards 'to respect Scottish institutions and laws' as very important is proportionally less likely to find the 'to have Scottish ancestry' criterion very important (28 per cent) but those that find 'to have Scottish ancestry' important are proportionally more likely to find the criterion 'to respect Scottish institutions and laws' important (67 per cent).

In the FNP's case, a pattern between the two more restrictive criteria of ancestry and birth can be identified; of those that consider 'to be born in Friesland' very important, 75 per cent also find ancestry very important. Furthermore, a high percentage (67 per cent) also find 'to have lived in Friesland for most of one's life' very important. But similarly to the SNP, those that find the more restrictive criteria very important also find the 'feeling Frisian' and linguistic criteria very important. For example, of those members who find the ancestral criterion very important, 90 per cent also find the 'to feel Frisian national identity' criterion very important. The relationship between civic variables in the case of the FNP seems less strong than in the SNP's case. There is no strong linkage between 'feeling Frisian' and 'respecting Frisian institutions and rules' – at least no more so than with the other variables. For both parties certain variables can be identified that form the basis of the definition of national identity, which in the case of the SNP are civic. In the FNP's case it depends on how language is defined. In both cases, this basis of national identity can be 'topped up' with more objective variables such as birth and ancestry, as well as residence.

A civic and ethnocultural latent variable structure?

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the relations between individual variables. They do not show how these variables empirically group together. These interrelations can be statistically summarised using factor analysis.³⁶ In the next section, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is used to investigate the latent variable structure of the civic versus ethnocultural framework for both the SNP and FNP membership data. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is subsequently used to assess the stability of the EFA solution.


The purpose of EFA³⁷ is to test whether a civic versus ethnocultural dichotomous structure is identifiable. Figures 5.1 (SNP) and 5.2 (FNP) show how many factors can be extracted from the eight items. A two factor solution is merited. In both the SNP and FNP's case the eigenvalues of the first two factors exceed 1.00, an arbitrary but often used cut off point, although in the SNP's case a three factor solution is almost permitted.³⁸

³⁶ See chapter 3 for a methodological discussion on Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis

³⁷ For the EFA a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) – technically not a factor analysis but commonly referred to as such – was used with an oblique rotation (oblimin) method instead of an orthogonal rotation, as the expectation is that there are correlations between factors and we want to capture these in the model (Sharma 1996). An orthogonal rotation works from the assumption that factor axes do not correlate – hence the variables are modelled accordingly. The oblique rotation is not based on such an assumption and therefore can test the relationship between dimensions.


³⁸ In fact, if factors with an eigenvalue of .7 were allowed (Jolliffe(1986) cited in Field 2005: 633) five factors could be generated.

Figure 5.1: Scree plot of Eigenvalues, exploratory factor analysis (SNP)



Source: SNP survey 2007

Figure 5.2: Scree plot of the Eigenvalues, exploratory factor analysis (FNP)



Source: FNP survey 2009

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report the loadings on the factors that meet the Kaiser's Criterion of an eigenvalue greater than 1. As expected, the results do not generate two neat factor structures. In the SNP's case, the 'living in Scotland now' variable loads equally heavily onto both factors and, together with the 'language' variable, is quite weak. Nevertheless, a civic and an ethnocultural pattern seems to a certain extent to emerge from the data. The most exclusive variables – 'birth' and 'ancestry' – have the highest loading on the ethnocultural component and are complemented with variables (in

particular ‘to be a Christian’ and ‘to have lived in Scotland for most of one’s life’) that can also be considered restrictive and are therefore not out of place. The high score of the ‘to live in Scotland now variable’ may be explained by the fact that it correlates heavily with the ‘to have lived in Scotland for most of one’s life’ variable, as they both relate to territory. The civic component also seems relatively consistent with the theory. The main inclusive variables – ‘respect for institutions and law’ and ‘feeling national identity’ – load well on this factor. The ‘to live in Scotland’ now and ‘language’ variables can also be considered relatively inclusive, especially if language is considered to be a vehicle for civic integration and are therefore not out of place on the civic construct. Overall, the model explains 51% of the variance.

For the FNP the picture is similar but more complex (Table 5.7). The ethnocultural factor includes more exclusive variables, although the relatively inclusive variable ‘to live in Friesland now’ loads on the ethnocultural factor. The civic factor includes inclusive variables such as ‘to respect Frisian political institutions and rules’, but also includes language criteria. As in the SNP’s case, it is possible to interpret the language variables as inclusive criteria because it allows people to participate and integrate into Frisian society. The model explains 56% of the variance.³⁹

Table 5.6: Exploratory Factor Analysis SNP (PCA – Oblimin)⁴⁰

	Ethnocultural	Civic
To have been born in Scotland	.832	
To have Scottish ancestry	.808	
To have lived in Scotland for most of one’s life	.730	
To be a Christian	.663	
Live in Scotland now	.480	.478
Respect Scottish institutions and law		.730
Feeling Scottish		.694
Language		.472

Source: SNP survey 2007

³⁹ If we drop the threshold for factors to .7 we distinguish 4 factors explaining 70% of the variance. The ethnocultural factor would still be intact whereas the civic factor would be split in a ‘language factor’ and the other two variables would form independent factors.

⁴⁰ All loadings <.4 have been suppressed. KMO Barlett’s test is good at .745. The Cronbach Alpha for the first 5 item scale was impressive (0.76). For the civic factor it was lower at .43 due to having very much lower correlation scores between items (this does raise some concerns over the reliability of this item).

Table 5.7: Exploratory Factor Analysis FNP (PCA – Oblimin)⁴¹

	Ethnocultural	Civic
To have lived in Friesland for the greatest part of one's life	.865	
To have been born in Friesland	.834	
To live in Friesland now	.812	
To have Frisian ancestors	.710	
To speak and understand Frisian		.804
To write and read Frisian		.778
To feel Frisian		.579
Respect Frisian rules and institutions		.455

Source: FNP survey 2009

Although on first sight it may seem that a civic and an ethnocultural model is justified further analysis shows that the EFA is inconclusive in terms of whether a clear dichotomous civic versus ethnocultural latent variable structure can be uncovered. In both the FNP and SNP's case two factors can be extracted which broadly resemble the theoretical civic and ethnocultural concepts and some items do unambiguously relate to these concepts. However, there is considerable overlap; some variables load equally heavily on both sides or, as in the case of territorial criteria, loadings appear to be on the wrong side. Furthermore, 82 per cent of the residuals are non-redundant in the correlation matrix in the SNP's case and 50 per cent in the FNP's case. This suggests that the model fits badly. A more appropriate and rigorous test of the model can be provided with a Confirmatory Factor Analysis.⁴²


Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the results for a binary civic versus ethnocultural model for the SNP and FNP respectively, based on the results from the EFA above. The CFA structure consists of two latent variables (LVs) (represented by ovals) an 'ethnocultural' LV and a 'civic' LV. Both are constructed from observed variables (represented by rectangles) which consist of the items that loaded positively (> .4) on each factor in the EFA. The two LVs are intercorrelated, represented by the double

⁴¹ All Loadings <.4 have been suppressed. KMO is .74. The Cronbach Alpha for the ethnocultural construct is also impressive at .82. For the civic scale, Cronbach Alpha is .58.

⁴² For a detailed discussion on CFA see chapter 3

headed arrow. If the intercorrelation between the LVs is negative, it means that if a person achieves a high score on one LV that person is more likely to find the other LV less important. In other words, two distinctive groups can then be identified. However, if the intercorrelations have very high positive scores, both items are essentially identified as important by the same respondents and are considered non-competitively. As all items refer to criteria of national identity, some correlation between LVs is to be expected. If there are distinct groups in the parties, intercorrelation between both LVs should at least be low. The uniqueness associated with each observed variable (E1–E8) is uncorrelated. The model also includes the standardised regression scores for each item, which are included on the arrows which represent the loading paths. In order to calculate the regression weights, at least one parameter needs to be fixed. In this case it is the latent variable variance parameter that is fixed at 1. The models are recursive with a sample size of 7,112 (df 18) for the SNP and 579 (df 19) for the FNP.

Figure 5.3 CFA SNP – 2 dimensional based on EFA results (n=7,112)




* Model Fit: CMIN 2080.6 (df 18); GFI .929; NFI .825; IFI .826; CFI .826; RMSEA .127 (LO .122 – HI .132) P < .001

** Model calculated using bootstrap 1,000 samples, ML estimator.

Source: SNP survey 2007

Figure 5.4: CFA FNP – 2 dimensional based on EFA results (n=579)



* Model Fit: CMIN 139.23 (df 19); GFI .944; NFI .886; IFI .900; CFI .899; RMSEA .105 (LO .089 – HI .121) P < .001

** Model calculated using bootstrap 1,000 samples, ML estimator,
Source: FNP survey 2009

The results of a binary structure for items representing national identity proved to be unstable in both the SNP and the FNP's case. None of the global fit indices achieved the necessary scores. In the SNP's case a GFI of .929, an NFI of .825, an IFI of .826, a CFI of .826 and an RMSEA of .127 cannot be considered acceptable. For the FNP the scores are slightly better with a GFI of .944, an NFI of .886, an IFI of .900, a CFI of .899 and an RMSEA of .105 but remain unacceptable. Furthermore, some of the regression weights are worryingly low and cast the consistency of each construct into doubt. Finally, the high intercorrelation between factors both in the cases of both the FNP and the SNP makes it difficult to speak of distinguishable groups. All in all, a two dimensional model is unsatisfactory.

A multi-dimensional conceptualisation of national identity

As discussed in chapter 2, several authors recognise that there are more than two dimensions to national identity (Guibernau 2007; Shulman 2002; Bechofer and McCrone 2009; Smith 1991, 1995). Although opinions differ on the number and content of dimensions, they all include a civic and an ethnocultural dimension. In the battery of questions in the SNP and FNP survey four dimensions can be identified. Firstly, there is an ethnic dimension which contains the questions that exclude others using ascriptive criteria. The questions associated with this dimension are those about 'birth' and 'ancestry'.

Secondly, there are questions that can be captured in a cultural dimension. The characteristics of this dimension are not fully ascriptive and thus do not automatically exclude others without allowing a form of personal choice. However, the individual's choice is severely restricted and the criteria often exclude 'newcomers'. In the surveys within this thesis these are the questions that measure the importance of language and religion to a national identity.

Thirdly, there is a set of questions associated with a territorial dimension. Territorial criteria are often associated with a civic dimension (chapter 2). Yet they also can be considered more ambiguous because territory as a criterion will necessarily exclude individuals who do not live within the boundaries of a nation and do wish to be part of it. Thus although territorial criteria are often associated with a civic and inclusive definition of national identity, they are ambiguous. In the data the variables 'to live in Scotland now' and 'to have lived in Scotland for a long time' constitute this territorial dimension.


Lastly, a civic dimension of national identity can be identified. Criteria in this dimension allow the individual to choose more or less freely if he or she wishes to attain a

national identity. However, even in this case the choices are not completely unrestrictive as criteria can be culturally inspired. For example, in both surveys the 'to respect institutions and laws/rules' variable can be considered an inclusive criterion as anybody can freely choose to do so. However, political institutions and laws/rules have considerable 'cultural baggage' and therefore can limit a person's choice in some instances. For example, it may be difficult for somebody who grew up in a democracy to accept authoritarian institutions or laws when they move to a different country which has different values. Nevertheless, this criterion here together with 'feeling a national identity' which can be considered completely inclusive and subjective, are considered to be part of a civic dimension.

This multi-dimensional framework not only unpacks national identity conceptually and provides space to analyse the different dimensions and their impact but also attempts to create a hierarchy in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of criteria. The civic dimension is more or less inclusive, the ethnic dimension exclusive and the other two more ambiguous. Depending on the available data other dimensions can be added to the framework.

The reason for proposing a multi-dimensional framework is that the binary model proves unstable. The multi-dimensional model's stability can be tested using a CFA. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the shape of such a model with four dimensions (or latent variables). Each has two variables loading on to them. The standard errors are independent and the fixed parameters are the latent variable variance parameters. All dimensions are intercorrelated. Both models are recursive with a sample size of 7,112 (df 14) for the SNP and 579 (df 14) for the FNP.

Figure 5.5: SNP CFA– multi-dimensional




* Model Fit: CMIN 467.93(df 10), GFI .985, NFI .961, CFI .962, RMSEA .068 (LO .062 – HI .073) P <.001

** Model calculated using bootstrap 1,000 samples, ML estimator.

Source: SNP survey 2007

Figure 5.6: FNP CFA – multi-dimensional



* Model Fit CMIN 54.55 (14), GFI .977, NFI .955, CFI .966, RMSEA .071 (LO .052 – HI .091) $p < .05$

** Model calculated using bootstrap 1,000 samples, ML estimator.

Source: FNP survey 2009

Both in the SNP and FNP cases the model can be considered a good fit of the data (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). Although the model fits the SNP data slightly better than it does for the FNP, in both cases all global fit indices are considerably better for the multi-dimensional model than they are for the binary model. In fact, all indices indicate that the models are a good to excellent fit.⁴³

However, global fit indices alone are not enough to judge whether a theoretical model fits empirically. It is when the models are considered in more detail that the complex relations between latent variables and variables become apparent. There are two

⁴³ See chapter 3 for a discussion of global fit indices.

indicators that we have to consider. Firstly, how well do the variables load onto the dimensions (regression weights)? If regression weights are low the latent constructs are weak. Regression scores $> .6$ are generally considered good loading variables (Field 2005). Secondly, how much intercorrelation is there between dimensions? In the SNP's case the culture and civic dimensions are not very strong constructs and the variables that load on to them have low regression weights. The same can be said for the FNP's civic dimension. For the SNP the model only has one dimension that has two variables with regression scores $> .6$ (ethnic). The FNP provides a slightly clearer picture, with three dimensions that have variables with sufficient loadings. In the cases of both the SNP and FNP the civic dimension is the main problem with the model. In both cases the variables loading on to these dimensions show lower regression weights than any other dimension and can therefore be considered weaker.

Furthermore, the civic dimensions show high correlations with other dimensions. The intercorrelation scores reinforce the uncertainty about the strength and independence of these dimensions. As noted above, if different dimensions of national identity were prioritised by different groups the intercorrelation scores between these groups would be low or negative. The positive intercorrelation scores confirm that members use variables non-competitively. As already stated, some of this may be explained by a positive bias. Nevertheless, a clear distinction between the different dimensions of national identity cannot be made.

On the other hand, especially in a comparative context, an ethnocultural versus civic distinction does provide some benefit. In the SNP's case, it is in particular the 'ethnic', 'cultural' and 'territory' dimensions that intercorrelate. In other words, the more restrictive variables show high levels of intercorrelation. The civic construct only has a high intercorrelation score with culture. As the religion criterion receives low scores overall, language is likely to be the cultural variable that correlates with the civic construct. A closer inspection of the modification indices shows that allowing the language variable to load onto the civic construct would improve the model (though it would not do so for the religion variable). This can be explained by party members

seeing language as a minimum requirement for being part of the civic nation. The modification indices also show that despite the relatively low intercorrelation between the civic and territory construct (.29) allowing the 'to live in Scotland now' variable to correlate with the civic construct would also improve the overall model. It seems to be the 'to have lived in Scotland for most of one's life' variable that reduces the intercorrelation. This can be explained by the fact that the 'to live in Scotland now' variable is more inclusive and more subjective than the 'to have lived in Scotland for most of one's life' variable.

The relatively low intercorrelation scores between the ethnic and civic constructs are very significant, indicating that despite all the problems the model faces these dimensions are relatively distinctive constructs and that there is merit in distinguishing between these two different dimensions of national identity once the whole concept has been unpacked.

The FNP data show a more complex picture. Language (culture) exhibits a high intercorrelation with the civic construct, which has a similar explanation to the SNP's case; language is interpreted as the minimum requirement for civic participation. The intercorrelation between the ethnic and culture constructs is smaller than in the SNP case, which reinforces the case for interpreting language as a requirement for civic participation. The 'territory' dimension has a high intercorrelation with both civic and ethnic dimensions but the construct itself is strong. The intercorrelation between 'civic' and 'ethnic' dimensions is higher in the FNP than in the SNP, indicating that FNP members find the civic and ethnic dimensions more compatible than SNP members do. Closer inspection of the modification indices show that, were ancestry and feeling Frisian allowed to correlate, this would improve the model, which could be indicative of the following linkage; in order to feel Frisian one would need to have Frisian ancestors. A possible explanation for this could be that as many Frisians live outside Friesland and further afield, a stronger emphasis on ancestral links would include this Frisian diaspora as fellow nationals. This may be necessary in the Frisian case, as the 'indigenous' Frisian population is smaller than in the Scottish case and therefore the

inclusion of ancestry makes the nation more viable. Overall, there seems to be less ground to distinguish between groups of members that define national identity along inclusive/civic and exclusive/ethnic lines in the FNP than in the SNP. However, it is not completely without merit.

As the discussion above shows, a binary model in which a civic and ethnocultural dimension that include variables associated with culture and territory is problematic. However, when the model is 'unpacked' and separate dimensions for cultural and territory variables are created, it fits the data. The purpose of this thesis is to understand the impact of supposed exclusive and inclusive variables that can be used to operationalise national identity. Therefore, in the remainder of this thesis the focus will be on the most theoretically inclusive and exclusive dimensions of the multi-dimensional model. That is, the dimensions in which individuals have the most or least choice in terms of adopting a national identity. From this point forward the terms civic versus ethnocultural distinction will no longer be used instead the model will be referred to as civic and ethnic model. In this model the civic dimension has been unloaded of its territorial dimension and the ethnic dimension has been unloaded from cultural characteristics (hence the term ethnic instead of ethnocultural).

The factor scores obtained from the multi-dimensional models are used to determine a person's position on the civic and ethnic dimension separately. The median score of the total population is taken as the cut off point that determines whether an individual has a high civic or low civic, or high or low ethnocultural score. In the next section and in the analysis in the following chapters the civic and ethnic dimensions are not treated as a single spectrum or ideal types, but are treated as separate continua that can be measured non-competitively. Differences between groups are expressed in percentage points and statistics that indicate significance and strength of association are provided (χ^2 and CC).⁴⁴ Furthermore, the differences between groups are graphically represented in bar charts. These factor scores are used throughout chapters 6 and 7 to measure the association between civic and ethnic understandings of national identity

⁴⁴ See chapter 3 for a discussion

on the one hand and attitudes towards others on the other hand. In the next section the factor scores are used to determine if there are any differences between ordinary members and party representatives in terms of understanding national identity.

Party representatives and members' understanding of national identity

In this section the differences between 'ordinary' party members and party representatives are explored in terms of their understandings of a civic or ethnic national identity. Party representatives are defined as those members who have held public office or party office at any point. These members can be considered to be the public face of the party. As was discussed in chapter 2, there are reasons to believe that these representatives and ordinary members have different understandings in terms of the importance of characteristics associated with civic and ethnic dimensions. This could be for several reasons. Firstly, it could be the case that a socialisation process has taken place which makes members who become representatives more civic in order to be more in line with the official party doctrine. Secondly, it could also be the case that those members who are selected, or put themselves forward as party members, have characteristics which make them less likely to choose one or the other set of criteria as more important. It is not the intention here to fully explore which of the above hypotheses are valid; the aim is to identify if there are differences. The expectations are that party representatives are less likely to identify ethnic characteristics as more important than ordinary party members.

Table 5.8 (Figure 5.7) shows that members and party representatives (defined as those members who have taken up a party or public office position within the parties past or present) understand national identity slightly differently from members, at least in the SNP's case. In the FNP there was no significant difference between the two groups. But within the SNP members were more likely to report high ethnic construct scores when

they are compared with party representatives. Out of all party representatives, 41 per cent had high ethnic scores and 55 per cent of all members reported high ethnic scores – a significant difference of 14 percentage points. The numbers in brackets are the total n in each category. However, members were also slightly more likely to report high civic scores when compared with party representatives (3 per cent).

Such scores suggest that, at least within the SNP, there are slight disparities between different party strata which may be a consequence of party socialisation. Fewer party representatives associate with ethnic elements of national identity. As will be discussed in chapter 7, the SNP includes visible ethnic minority groups (such as Asian Scots for Independence); any member who becomes active in the SNP and subsequently takes up a position within the party strata will be aware of members of ethnic minorities in the SNP and may therefore be less likely to include exclusive criteria in their conception of national identity. Furthermore, party representatives are likely to be aware of civic and ethnic national identities as concepts used with certain normative connotations in party engagements. It may therefore be the case that they are more likely to give the ‘right’ answers. It could also be the case that those members who become representatives are less likely to value ethnic criteria because of their background. On the other hand, members’ scores are also slightly higher on the civic scale which can normatively be considered to contain the ‘right’ answers. It may therefore be the case that ordinary members are more likely to define national identity as strongly as possible, whereas party representatives take greater consideration and are more reserved in their answers. These hypotheses are beyond the scope of this thesis but the findings do open up an interesting area for future research.

Table 5.8: % Party representatives' and party members' understanding of national identity

SNP	High civic (n = 6,187)	High ethnic (6,187)
Party Representatives	48 (980)	41 (843)
Party members	51 (2,160)	55 (2,267)
χ^2 Contingency Coefficient, odds ratio	χ^2 (1) 4.01*; contingency coefficient .03*	χ^2 (1) 98.86**; contingency coefficient .12**
FNP	High civic (520)	High ethnic (524)
Party representatives	45 (61)	47 (65)
Party members	52 (199)	51 (196)
χ^2 and Contingency	χ^2 (1) 1.9; contingency coefficient .06	χ^2 (1) .7; contingency coefficient .04


* P < .05

** p < .001

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Figure 5.7: Party representatives' and party members' understanding of national identity



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Within the FNP there are no statistically significant differences between members and party representatives, although the trend is similar to that in the SNP. Ordinary members are more likely to regard both ethnic (4 per cent) and civic (7 per cent) criteria more important than party representatives. There are three explanations as to why differences in the FNP are not significant. Firstly, unlike the SNP, the FNP does not contain any individuals from ethnic minority groups (see chapter 7) and therefore a socialisation process such as that which was suggested to have happened in the SNP is not possible.

Secondly, although national identity and citizenship are two different concepts (as was argued in chapter 2), the two are closely related. And when questions of citizenship are raised, the discussion about inclusivity and exclusivity becomes more pertinent, as it is no longer a question of simply belonging to a nation but to a state. The latter affords legal rights and protection to an individual. Discussions regarding who is to be included in the state can have greater practical implications than discussions about who is to be included in the nation. Within the FNP the relationship between citizenship and national identity has to be placed in the Dutch context as the party's constitutional goals are more limited, unlike in the SNP's case where the party's ambition for an independent Scotland automatically leads to questions of citizenship. Thus in the FNP questions about rights to be granted to people living in Friesland relate to questions about Dutch citizenship – not Frisian citizenship – as no differentiation between the two is proposed. This means that the FNP as a party has not had to focus on citizenship issues, as proposals for a Frisian form of citizenship are not part of its agenda. Therefore, within the FNP the debate about the normative connotations of certain national identities have not taken place to the same extent as they have within the SNP and therefore party representatives do not significantly diverge from members.

A third explanation is more technical; the sample size for the FNP is smaller and therefore does not attain statistical significance. The direction of the divergence between ordinary party members and party representatives in the FNP points in a

similar direction as it does in the SNP and may eliminate some of the above explanations of non-divergence in the FNP.

Conclusions

Both the survey data and the interview data in the comparison illustrate the multifaceted relationship between civic and ethnocultural aspects in understandings of national identity. Both parties regard themselves as civic autonomist parties and both are keen to stress an inclusive definition of national identity. A number of members (particularly in the FNP's case) feel uncomfortable with the terms 'nationalism' or 'nationalist' because of the negative connotations associated with them. This would suggest a preference for a civic nationalism. However, it does not mean that criteria such as birth and ancestry, which are often associated with an exclusive type of nationalism, are not important to understandings of national identity. These characteristics are what make many people feel connected to the nation and therefore form an integral part of any definition of national identity. This does not mean that other facets of national identity are less important. Indeed it is better to think of national identity as a multi-dimensional concept. The different dimensions are related to each other non-competitively. National identity can be considered to be constructed of building blocks, some of which form the foundation, but can be topped up with other characteristics in certain circumstances and depending on the context. In both parties the civic criterion 'feeling a national identity' and to a lesser extent 'respecting the values and institutions' form the foundation.

For the FNP, language can also be considered part of the foundation of the understanding of the Frisian national identity. This makes the party appear more ethnocultural. Additionally, the civic scores are somewhat lower than they are in the SNP's case. Nevertheless, the pattern in both parties seems similar; ethnocultural and

civic criteria are used non-competitively. In order to make a meaningful distinction between inclusive and exclusive criteria associated with national identity it is necessary to 'unpack' the concept and identify more than two dimensions. The 'traditional' two dimensional model has been proven to be unstable. The multi-dimensional model presented in this thesis includes civic, ethnic, territorial and cultural dimensions. In this thesis the focus is on the most 'extreme' dimensions of the model in terms of inclusivity and exclusivity, the civic and ethnic dimensions. Therefore, throughout the analysis in chapters 6 and 7 (which rely on the findings in this chapter) the factor scores obtained from the four dimensional CFA model for the civic and ethnic dimensions is used. These factor scores help to determine an individual's positions on each continuum separately and subsequently the relationship between this position and attitudes towards others can be analysed. As the ethnocultural concept of national identity has been unpacked, the term ethnocultural national identities is replaced with ethnic national identities, to illustrate this shift.

In the final part of this chapter the differences in understandings of civic and ethnic national identity between ordinary party members and party representatives were analysed. Party representatives and party members generally conflate national identity quite similarly. Although in the SNP's case party representatives were less willing to stress an ethnic dimension than party members, throughout the next two chapters the differences between representatives and members in survey data will continue to be measured in order to identify differences between the public face of the party and ordinary members on the one hand and to simultaneously assess to what extent findings from the interview data⁴⁵ can be generalised as representing the whole party membership.

⁴⁵ Interview data only included party representatives.

Chapter 6 - European Integration and National Identity in the SNP and the FNP

This chapter aims to explore the positions of the SNP and FNP towards 'external others' in the form of European integration. In the first part of this chapter, motivations for autonomist parties' support and opposition to European integration are examined, which are applied to the SNP and FNP in the second section. In the final section the manner in which different attitudes towards European integration relate to the civic and ethnic dimensions (as they were identified in the multi-dimensional model in the previous chapter) are examined. This chapter provides insight into the underlying mechanisms that determine support for or opposition to European integration. It also examines how differences in terms of conceptions of national identity relate to differences in attitudes.

Since the 1960s and 1970s autonomist parties in Western Europe have increasingly challenged the existing power structures of the central state and have demanded a redistribution of power to peripheral regions (Türsan 1998: 1). At the same time, state power has also been undermined from the top by the process of European integration (Keating 2004; Nagel 2004). Gellner argues that nationalism is 'primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1). The responses of some autonomist parties to European integration are therefore presented as a paradox – seeking autonomy from the state whilst supporting increased power for the European level (Keating 2004; Lynch 1996; Jolly 2007; Elias 2009). One explanation of this apparent paradox may be that the EU has provided autonomist parties with new solutions to their territorial demands (Keating 2004). What these solutions are and how autonomist parties have responded to European integration has become a growing area of research.

Autonomist parties' attitudes towards European integration are often taken as indicators of the types of nationalism these parties embrace. Some authors see support for European integration as a defining characteristic of modern civic autonomist parties (McCrone 1998: 125). In this chapter this connection is explored in relation to the SNP and FNP membership and party representative attitudes towards European integration. The framework set out in chapter 2 suggests that those with a more ethnic understanding of national identity can be expected to be more inward looking and exclusive and therefore more likely to take a protectionist and particularistic view of international integration (Kohn 2005; Greenfeld 1992). Therefore, the expectation is that 'ethnic' nationalists are less likely to have a positive attitude towards European integration. On the other hand, for civic national identities the relationship is more complex. One expectation could be that civic national identities are compatible with cosmopolitanism and favour cultural pluralism. Kohn, for example, argues that 'Western [civic] nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism... nationalism in Central and Eastern and Asia [ethnic] easily tended towards a contrary development' (Kohn 2005: 330). Civic identities are therefore considered more likely to support European integration.

However, civic identities are also closely associated with liberal attitudes (Kohn 2005; Brown 2000) and a liberal critique of the current state of the European integration process is far from uncommon. Such critics associate the current European integration process with centralisation, elitism and a democracy/legitimacy deficit (Siedentop 2001; Maedowcroft, J. 2002; Collignon 2007).

In popular literature a rather simplistic distinction between Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm is often made. However, people in general take far more complicated positions towards the EU, supporting certain aspects and opposing others (Elias 2009; Haesly 2001). It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a full account of the parties' positions on every issue related to European integration. The analysis of party representative interviews and party member survey data centres therefore on specific

aspects of European integration. The interviews focussed on three areas; i) respondents were asked questions that aimed to assess what they believe their party's role and strategy in relation to European integration should be, ii) respondents were asked what the benefits and drawbacks of EU membership are for Scotland and Friesland respectively and iii) their attitudes towards perceived European centralisation and expansion were assessed. The surveys included questions which assessed whether EU policies are regarded as a threat, whether members regard the EU as too centralised and – in the SNP's case – whether or not members want to remain part of the EU.

The analysis focusses on whether party members/representatives are in favour of European integration, whether they regard EU policies as positive or negative and whether or not they wish to be part of Europe. In order to distinguish between those that support a particular aspect of European integration and those that oppose it, the terms pro-European and anti-European are used. However, it is recognised that these terms can lead to exaggeration. Therefore, care is taken to ensure the terminology is applied to specific aspects of European integration and that alternative minority views within the parties, or nuances that interviewees expressed, are also reported.

The analysis provided in this chapter takes into account possible divergences between the attitudes of party members and party representatives towards European integration.⁴⁶ De Winter and Cachefeiro (2002: 492) argue that there can be a significant disconnect between the attitudes of party representatives and voters towards European integration. Party representatives are often considered to have a more favourable attitude towards Europe than their electorates. A possible reason as to why parties are in many cases 'allowed' to have a different opinion to the electorate is the low political salience of European issues for voters. In other words, according to De Winter and Cachefeiro (2002), the party's stand on the EU is not an important determinant for its electorate. It is not within the scope of this thesis to investigate

⁴⁶ Party representatives is defined as those that have held or are currently holding a public or party office for the party.

disparities between voters and party representatives, but the divergence that De Winter and Cachefeiro have noted between these two groups can also be expected to be replicated to a certain extent between the membership and party representatives. There is an established literature that explores such disparities between different layers in political parties (Kitschelt 1989; May 1972). These disparities will need to be taken into account in the analysis, particularly as the interview data is based on interviews with representatives and not members. Thus, if the survey data show a divergence between ordinary party members and party representatives then this imposes limitations on the findings from the interview data, in that the mechanisms and attitudes identified in these interviews may not be representative of the membership as a whole. However, if there is no significant difference between mechanisms and attitudes of members and representatives towards European integration in the survey data, this makes the findings in the interview data more reliable.

The purpose of this chapter is wider than simply investigating how attitudes towards European integration relate to civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity. The intention is to uncover the mechanisms in autonomist parties that determine attitudes toward European integration. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter an overview of the theoretical relationship between European integration and autonomist parties is provided. Next, such theoretical positions are tested in the contexts of the SNP and FNP's strategies towards European integration. In the final section of this chapter, the attitudes of those with civic and ethnic conceptualisations of national identities are analysed as well as the differences between party representatives and members.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Party representatives are defined as all those members that have taken up an party office or public office position for the party (see chapter 2).

Does European integration serve the interest of autonomist parties?

A number of scholars (Keating and Jones 1991; Healsy 2001; Elias 2009; Keating 2004) have provided several explanations for autonomist parties' enthusiasm for European integration. Firstly, autonomist parties regard the EU as more responsive to their demands than the central state. As the EU is a union of national states in which no one state has a majority it is more receptive to minorities and diversity. In other words, everybody is a minority in the EU and the whole political system and culture is accustomed to accommodating this. Within states, minorities can consider themselves oppressed by the majority, which are able to impose their will on them because of their numerical strength. Moreover the political culture and institutions are ill equipped to accommodate minority interests. The EU's slogan, '*in varietate concordia*', expresses this idea of a union of varieties/diversities in which no majority group has an absolute dominant position. Such an understanding of European integration implies that the EU itself is considered more responsive to autonomist regional demand and benefits minorities (Cram 2009; Mitchell and MacPhail 2007). Furthermore, its institutional framework allows for more regional influence even in policy areas that were previously considered the prerogative of central states. For example, Paquin argues that 'substate nationalist movements can now implement an international policy through their paradiplomacy' (Paquin 2002: 55). The perception is that European integration allows regional actors, including autonomist parties, to influence policy in areas that were previously considered inaccessible and the domain of the central state.

Secondly, the EU is seen as a partner in the project of dismantling the central state: 'it has undermined the functional purpose of the nation-state' (Elias 2009: 5). The 'old' state is no longer considered capable of dealing with policy issues in isolation and has been forced to transfer functions (initially economic functions, but other functions have also increasingly been reallocated) to the supranational level. The EU undermines

the functions of the 'old' states from the top. Regions/sub-states undermine it from the bottom by demanding more control over policy areas. According to some scholars this hollowing out of the central state will mean that it will increasingly resemble an empty shell (Beyers and Bursens 2006: 1,058). Of more immediate relevance is that within the EU new power structures can be imagined in which regions/sub-state nations play a much more important role and cooperate directly with supranational institutions. The notion that powers would be shared between the sub-state level and supra-state level, in which the role of the state would be significantly diminished, is seen as an attractive proposition for autonomists as it provides them with previously unimaginable decision making capabilities.

On a more philosophical level, European integration has fuelled new debates about definitions of statehood, nationhood and sovereignty (for an example see: MacCormick 1982: 264, 1999). The development of supranational institutions has allowed for new understandings of power and legitimacy. These can be identified as post-sovereign; sovereignty is not considered absolute but divided. Such an approach to sovereignty is appealing to autonomist parties as it opens up an array of possibilities concerning the sharing of competencies in policy areas. Sovereignty is no longer considered a zero sum game (Keating 2001a), but competencies can be shared. In other words, European integration has allowed autonomist parties to reconceptualise what sovereignty means. It has allowed them to think of new power structures both vertically and horizontally. The multi-level governance thesis, in which different levels of government (supranational, national, regional and local) interact and overlap with each other, is an example of a vertical re-conceptualisation of sovereignty. Different authority levels interact with each other and share competencies for public administration. Additionally, sovereignty is reconceptualised horizontally through increased cross-border cooperation and the construction of inter-regional power structures (Hooghe and Marks 2001).

Such new forms of cooperation are to a certain extent replicated in the relations between political parties across borders. European integration has enabled

cooperation between political movements throughout Europe which has led to knowledge sharing and policy development. Distinctive party families have created formal European parties which allow for better and closer cooperation and enable knowledge sharing (Lynch 1996). European integration has also led to the creation of an autonomist party family (DeWinter and Türsan 1998; DeWinter *et al.* 2006). It can be argued that European integration has impacted on all parties and created party families across the party system in Europe, but according to some it has been particularly important for the autonomist party family. De Winter and Cachafeiro (2002) argue that 'Europeanisation allowed the very constitution of a European party family [of autonomist parties] from scratch' (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002: 483) which had been difficult previously because of the diverse nature of this party family. These differences have not disappeared and the autonomist party family is only a party family in loose terms (see chapter 1). Nevertheless, the environment of international cooperation created by the process of European union has provided new opportunities for autonomist parties in the sense of policy learning, knowledge exchange and branding.

Thirdly, European integration provides a less radical framework for secession. The EU provides a continuation of economic and security structures which makes self-determination more feasible and lowers the costs of secession. (Keating and Jones 1991: 320; Keating and McGarry 2001: 7). Economic and monetary union mean that autonomist parties no longer have full responsibility for macroeconomic issues and can 'piggyback' on overarching supranational frameworks that provide stability and reduce the costs of having to develop such policies. Furthermore, the EU provides solutions for security issues. Essentially, the EU provides a framework that protects autonomist parties against accusations of 'Kleinstaaterei' (Hobsbawm 1992: 31). A claim for independence is no longer isolationist but can be presented as a desire to be a partner in an integrated international structure.

The arguments above present European integration as serving the interest of autonomist parties. It is therefore not surprising that autonomist parties have often

been characterised as pro-European. By means of expert surveys conducted amongst political scientists with expertise in 18 EU countries, Ray (1999) asserts that the autonomist party family is one of the most pro-European party families in the EU. Some scholars have gone as far as arguing that the pro-European stance and the 'exploitation' of the EU as a resource is a distinctive trait of the autonomist party family (McCrone 1998).

Recently, the idea that autonomist parties are 'Europeanist par excellence' (Elias 2009) – the idea that their goals are fully compatible with European integration – has come under scrutiny. Elias argues that:

whilst European integration has encouraged minority nationalist parties to imagine alternative solutions to their territorial demands, in other respects there have been major constraints on the ability of these actors to realise their long term constitutional goals within the EU (Elias 2009: 2).

There are areas in which European integration obstructs or frustrates the goals and interests of autonomist parties and hence their support for European integration has not been uniform. There are considerable intraparty and inter-party differences in terms of attitudes towards particular aspects of European integration (Elias 2009).

There are several reasons why autonomist parties may have a more negative attitude towards European integration. Firstly, the 'culture' of bargaining and compromise on which the EU decision making process is based can be perceived as not best serving the interests of autonomist parties. As member states are concerned with the interests of the whole state, it can be argued that there is an incentive to 'give in' on issues that affect a minority group in EU negotiations, in order to safeguard the interest of the majority. Hence the EU process of compromising and making concessions can be considered detrimental to minority interests. It is therefore not surprising that opposition to particular aspects of EU policy can be identified within autonomist parties. The question is, who do autonomist parties blame for what, in their eyes, is the neglect of their interests? Is it the central state that is willing to trade off areas of

particular interest to minorities, or is it the EU for providing a decision making framework which is perceived as not properly representative of minority interests?

Secondly, in the 1990s autonomist parties had high hopes for the perceived willingness of the EU to include a regional dimension in the supranational framework, most notably in the form of a Committee of the Regions (CoR) (Harvie 2004; Hooghe and Marks 1996; MacCormick 1999) which was thought to contribute the 'view from below' in Brussels and was, as such, an important part of the EU's multi-level governance structure (Piattoni 2008).⁴⁸ At the start of the new millennium it became clear that the initial expectations which regions had for CoR had not been matched. Although in some very limited instances regions are included in decision making processes, it is the member state that determines the level of influence, not the EU.⁴⁹ In other words, according to some, the multi-level governance thesis has not lived up to its potential and states remain the main actors in the EU (Jeffrey 2000; Nagel 2004). Attitudes within autonomist parties towards European integration can be expected to have changed accordingly. The wave of optimism amongst autonomist parties accompanying the creation of CoR in 1992 has passed and although the EU has kept a regional dimension, 'the rise and fall of the idea of a Europe of the regions' can be witnessed (Keating 2008: 629-630).

Additionally, the idea of the EU as the protector of minority rights has become less convincing. Initial moves to protect minority rights have been resisted by EU member states. The Copenhagen criteria laid down in 1993 provided regulations for the protection and treatment of minorities in new candidate member states – mainly from Eastern Europe. Minorities in existing member states had hoped that strict rules would be adopted and that these would be extended to existing member states. However, 'member states have resisted demands to recognise the cultural and linguistic specificities of minority nations' (Elias 2009: 11). Elias claims that states with language-based minorities have resisted change (Elias 2009: 1). Keating asserts that the

⁴⁸ The Committee of the regions is a consultative body and is the main channel through which local and regional authorities can act (Jeffrey 1997).

⁴⁹ The German Länder and the Belgian federal states.

optimism of minorities for strong group protection was unfounded and is 'ethnically dubious since it reifies the group and prevents evolution and change' (Keating 2001b: 147).

Thirdly, the claim that the European Union provides a more sympathetic and positive environment for secession is at best unproven as no independence movement has ever achieved this goal within the EU. Some autonomist party representatives argue that the EU, or rather its members, may oppose membership of the EU for a seceded region, especially those member states that have autonomist movements themselves. They would supposedly regard admission of a seceded region as a dangerous precedent (Lindsay 1991: 88). Furthermore, the market conditions of an EU economy and its strict monetary policies are not always advantageous to member states, in particular those that are economically underdeveloped (Elias 2009: 10). Therefore, the argument that European integration lowers the transaction costs of secession may not always be valid. From this it can be concluded that European integration may constrain constitutional change.

Considering the variety of arguments for and against European integration being in the interest of autonomist parties, it can be expected that a variety of attitudes towards European integration are held within these parties. Furthermore, as autonomist parties are considered heterogeneous, able to attract supporters from across the political spectrum (De Winter and Cachefeiro 2002: 484; also see chapter 4) it is reasonable to expect intra- and inter-party variations in terms of attitudes towards the EU (De Winter and Gomez-Cachafeiro 2002: 485; Lynch 1996). The following analysis looks at how the arguments presented above are used in the SNP and the FNP. Subsequently, the relationship between the different attitudes towards European integration and the civic and ethnic framework are explored.

The SNP and European integration

The SNP has defined independence for Scotland within an international framework. However, the SNP's position regarding independence has changed in accordance with international developments. In the 1930s and 1940s Scottish independence was placed within the framework of the British Empire: 'Scotland shall share with England the rights and responsibilities they, as mother nations, have jointly created and incurred within the British Empire' (SNP cited in Mitchell 1996: 182). Later in the 1950s the party argued that Scotland would become part of the Commonwealth. And despite some support for republicanism (Mitchell 1996: 285) the party has consistently maintained that Scottish independence meant the end of the Act of Union in 1707, not the end of the Union of the Crowns in 1603. In other words, the British monarch would remain the head of state (Mitchell 1996: 50; Dardanelli 2002: 273). Furthermore, throughout the party's history links with other parts of the UK have been stressed; propositions such as a 'Council of the British Isles' (Salmond 1998; SNP 2004) can be interpreted as a confederal constitutional solution (Morata 2004). Highlighting these overarching links with the other nations in the UK, Empire, Commonwealth and the Monarchy protected the party against accusations of 'Kleinstaaterei'.

The party's aim of 'independence in Europe', which was adopted in the 1980s, served a similar purpose. European integration added an extra dimension to the definition of independence. In the inter-war years and in the immediate post-war period, the SNP initially supported European integration (Mitchell 1998: 110; Lynch 1996: 29). The party argued that Scotland was a European nation which had many links and commonalities with other European nations. For example, it had a Roman based legal system in contrast with English common law (Mitchell 1998: 111). Some members argued that they did not wish to exchange a British government with a European one, but the prevailing view was that 'exchanging one controlling authority for that of a

whole set of nations was very different from that of subjection to a single and much greater nation' (Scots Independent 23rd April 1955 quoted in Mitchell 1998: 111).

However, the party became increasingly suspicious of European integration in the 1960s. The SNP campaigned against UK entry to the EEC in the 1975 referendum, arguing that the community reinforced the 'old' member states (Keating and Jones 1991: 319). This suspicion of European integration was partly related to the SNP's perception that the UK was unable to represent Scotland's interests in the EEC and that Scotland's interests had not been served well during the entry negotiations (Lynch 1996: 30). However, much opposition originated from the widely held view that the European community was elitist, centralist and undemocratic (Wilson 2009: 53-54, Mitchell 1996: 60; Mitchell 1998: 112; Lynch 1996: 30). Wolfe, SNP chairman at the time, argued that 'it is the aim of the Common Market to establish political domination of the whole of Western Europe and to tolerate no deviations from this line' (Wolfe 1973: 139). The party also argued against EEC entry because European market integration based on free trade and market liberalisation would allow Scotland to be exploited by external forces (Wolfe 1973). Moreover, some of the EEC's core policy areas – in particular, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) – were seen as harmful to Scottish interests (Criddle 1978: 57-58; Dardanelli 2003: 275). CFA would remain a grievance in Scotland and in the SNP.

Much of the opposition to EEC entry was strategic rather than fundamental or ideological. As both Labour and the Conservatives were divided on the issue (particularly Labour in Scotland), it was thought to be an issue where the SNP could gain votes by taking a clear anti-European stance (Mitchell 1998: 113). This strategy failed for two reasons. Firstly, the strategy would only work if Scotland voted 'No' and the rest of the UK (or at least England) voted 'Yes' in the 1975 referendum. Although polling data did suggest strong opposition to continued EEC membership in Scotland (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 148), the no campaign, of which the SNP was part, was unable to mobilise this vote (Harvie 1981: 162). Entry into the EEC was approved by both the UK (68.7 per cent) and Scotland (58.4 per cent) and therefore the SNP

became associated with the losing side (Mitchell 1996: 213). Secondly, even if Scotland had voted 'No', Labour's support for entry had not been uniform, particularly in Scotland. Many Labour MPs opposed entry (Lynch 1996: 33). Therefore, the SNP would not have been able to 'claim' the 'No' vote in Scotland.

Had EEC membership been at the heart of the SNP's thinking then such a result could have been perceived as disastrous, but this was never the case. Opposition to continued EEC membership was neither uniform nor full-hearted; much of it was political calculation. Although the party's National Assembly unanimously supported a 'No' campaign in 1975, the slogan 'No Voice, No Entry' was ambiguous in terms of support for Scottish EU membership and led to differing interpretations. The parliamentary leader Donald Stewart advocated an uncomplicated 'no means no' position. Others in the party stressed that they did wish Scotland to become part of the community, but on its own terms (Lynch 1996: 35). In other words, although the SNP would switch from an anti-European to a pro-European strategy in the 1980s (Keating 2004: 376), the party was not without supporters for a pro-European strategy before an official 'independence in Europe' stance was adopted.

In the early 1980s the SNP remained anti-EC, which mirrored public perception at the time that the EC suffered from Euro-sclerosis and inefficiency. However, the party's position did not strike a chord in terms of gaining votes. Gordon Wilson, then SNP leader, slowly started to shift the party's policy on Europe and by 1988 the leadership felt confident enough to make 'independence in Europe' the party's slogan (Lynch 1996: 37). A more pro-European attitude had several advantages and disadvantages which relate to the theoretical framework set out in the first section of this chapter.

Firstly, a pro-European position allowed the leadership to reconcile other more damaging divisions in the party. After the lost devolution referendum in 1979 and the disastrous election result in 1979, the party suffered from considerable infighting. Europe was one of the issues the party elite agreed on and therefore provided an overarching framework for a strategy that did not directly relate to other tensions in

the party, in particular those between the fundamentalists and pragmatists (Mitchell 1990, 1996). Furthermore, the party suffered from infighting in the early 1980s. The socialist and republican '79 Group caused much tension. Europe provided common ground: 'indeed many bitter opponents in the days of the '79 Group came to find common ground on the issue of Europe' (Mitchell 1998: 119).

Secondly, it was believed that the 'independence in Europe' strategy would remove criticism of the SNP as isolationist and end accusations of 'Kleinstaaterei'. Sillars, one of the protagonists of the 'independence in Europe' strategy, was aware of the power of emotive words such as 'break up, rupture, dismemberment, isolation' (Sillars 1986: 182) and argued that the party's position against EEC membership left it open to 'the charge of double separation: peeling off from England and the EEC' (Sillars 1986: 186). The 'independence in Europe' strategy provided a 'mechanism to avoid economic dislocation in the event of secession from the Union' (Lynch 1996: 39). The strategy reduced the perceived costs of independence and provided economic continuation (Keating and Jones 1991: 320). It would ensure access not only to the English market but also to other European markets.

Thirdly, the Conservative Party had changed its position on EC membership and became markedly more anti-European in its stance on integration. This meant it became politically advantageous for the SNP to adopt a more pro-European strategy. The Conservative Party under Thatcher had shifted to a hardline defence of British interest in Europe (Thatcher 1993). The SNP argued that Thatcher's treatment of Europe mirrored that of Scotland (Sillars 1988: 6-7). Her insensitive style of negotiating may have touched the same nerve in Europe as it did Scotland. At the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988 she declared:

We [the British government] have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels (Thatcher 1993: 745).

The SNP asserted that Scottish people were not interested in the narrow nationalistic views expressed by Thatcher. Sillars claimed:

when one tells someone from the South East that he or she is talking like a British nationalist the reply will be 'So, what's wrong with that?' Tell a Scot that he or she is narrowly nationalistic and we feel guilty (Sillars 1988: 6-7).

Thatcher's confrontational style, both at home and in Europe, allowed the SNP to exploit the Conservative Party's unpopularity in Scotland. By clearly distinguishing themselves from the Conservative government on the issue of Europe and by taking a more explicitly centre left policy direction, the SNP was able to position itself as a progressive force in Scotland which was forward looking and engaged with the outside world.

Fourthly, the SNP claimed historical continuity – that Scotland had always been part of Europe and that it was the Treaty of Union in 1707 that broke these links. Winnie Ewing had previously been an opponent of European integration but after she had become a member of European Parliament she became a strong supporter. Ewing's presidential address in 1995 started:

We are haunted by the ghost of our European past. Our European antecedents are of strong vintage. The first act of Bruce was to join the Hanseatic League and Scotland traded with European countries from every port. Our students studied in universities from Vallollidad to Bologna and from Paris to Leiden. Our ambassadors were in posts across the capitals. We have a European system of law. Then of course we had the Auld Alliance with France for over 700 years. Scots were citizens of France and the French were citizens of Scotland... In 1707 Scotland and England made a treaty. In this bargain we got England and lost Europe (Ewing 1995: 1-2).

The message is that Scotland has European roots and therefore it is only natural for Scotland to want to be at the heart of Europe. Scotland is, according to the SNP,

historically closely linked to Europe; trade alliances with the Baltic countries, the Hanseatic League and Scandinavian countries have always existed. Such arguments remain prevalent in the SNP. One party representative stated: '[I want Scotland to be party of Europe] the way we used to work with mainland Europe, I want that back again with the Baltic nations or France' (Interview SNP 08 – 16th September 2009). Being part of the UK has, according to the SNP, denied Scotland the chance to be a positive force in Europe.

SNP representatives are of the opinion that an independent Scotland has the potential to be a more constructive force in Europe for several reasons. Firstly, it is argued that Scotland does not have the historical baggage the UK has (Interview SNP 19 – 2nd September 2009). The UK suffers from imperial grandeur, or has an 'imperial relic' (Interview SNP 3 - 8th September 2009), which hampers constructive liaisons in Europe. Secondly, Scotland is a smaller country and will therefore be more cooperative: 'We would find common cause with other smaller countries. Britain wants to lead in Europe. That is outdated. No country should want to lead in Europe. Scotland would be in the mainstream of small countries' (Interview SNP 01 – 8th September 2009). Thirdly, a recurring theme amongst party representatives is that Scotland is a more open, less parochial country than the UK. As the following SNP representative states:

Scotland should play full part in Europe and British nationalism does not want that. It wants its own things. Anti-European feeling is more parochial. Scottish nationalism is outward looking, British nationalism is inward looking (Interview SNP 7 - 15th September 2009).

In other words, Scotland is considered a better partner in Europe; it is more in tune with European ideas. That said, the SNP is also keen to stress that working together and finding compromises does not mean giving in on key Scottish interests and that in many instances it will find common ground with other parts of the British Isles (Interview SNP 1 – 8th September 2009).

A potential fifth opportunity relating to European integration is that the SNP can cooperate with other autonomist European partners. However, the SNP's strategy in Europe has been historically haphazard. It has been a member of several parliamentary groups. A European parliamentary group requires 25 MEPs from at least a quarter of member states (European Parliament Website).⁵⁰ Although this requirement used to be less stringent (13 MEPS from 4 countries), at no point has a group of solely autonomist parties been feasible. From 1979 to 1989 the SNP sat in the European Progressive Democrats group, renamed the European Democratic Alliance in 1984. This group mainly consisted of French Gaullist, Rally for the Republic (RPR) and Republic of Ireland Fianna Fail MEPs and contained no other autonomist parties. The partnership was especially beneficial in the sense of being associated with large governing parties and receiving committee and debating time in parliament (Mitchell 1998: 127; Lynch 1995: 5). However, in the late 1980s when the SNP started to develop more explicitly left wing policies, the right wing RPR and Fianna Fail became a political liability. The party's association with the RPR was exploited domestically and was potentially politically damaging (Lynch 1995: 6).

Since 1983, the SNP had been an observer member of the European Free Alliance (EFA), a transnational federation of autonomist parties established in 1981 under the leadership of the Flemish Volksunie. The SNP did not become a full member until 1989. EFA is a group of like-minded civic democratic nationalist parties (EFA website).⁵¹ The parties differ considerably in their constitutional goals, ranging from independence to cultural autonomy. The SNP sought closer association with the EFA in the late 1980s. After the accession of Spain there was a possibility of the formation of a parliamentary group for which autonomist parties would supply the majority of MEPs (Mitchell 1998: 127; Lynch 1995: 9). This parliamentary group became known as the Rainbow Group.

⁵⁰ European Parliament Website, Political Groups, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=45&pageRank=4&language=en> [accessed on 7 February 2011].

⁵¹ EFA Website (2011) available on <http://www.e-f-a.org/home.php> [accessed on 7 February 2011].

The EFA has, at the time of writing, seven MEPs; two from Scotland (SNP), one from Latvia (For Human Rights in United Latvia), one from Flanders (New Flemish Alliance), one from Corsica (Party of the Corsican Nation), one from Wales (Plaid Cymru) and one from Catalonia (Republican Left of Catalonia) but its membership includes 40 autonomist parties from 16 member states (EFA 2011). Strict adherence to democratic principles is obligatory for membership to the EFA and therefore the group does not include all autonomist parties. Extreme right parties like Vlaams Belang in Belgium and radical left wing parties like Herri Batasuna in Spain are not allowed entry. The Lega Nord in Italy was a member but its membership was suspended in 1994 after it entered into a coalition with the National Alliance, a post-fascist party in Italy. The SNP's association with the Lega through the EFA caused 'considerable embarrassment', according to Lynch (1995: 10). This may have been the case within the political class with both Jim Devine (Scotland on Sunday 1994), chairman of the Scottish Labour Party and the future Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy (Scotsman 1994) commenting on the SNP's links with Lega Nord. However, the issue is unlikely to have found much resonance with the general public. The EFA only has a small number of MEPs and to be recognised as a Euro Party under European Parliament rules it has to cooperate with others. To meet these criteria the EFA formed an alliance with the European Greens in 1999.

SNP EFA membership is regarded with considerable scepticism by some SNP representatives. The SNP regards itself as out of place with many of the other autonomist parties that are part of the EFA, as it represents a large nation. One SNP representative stated:

'Scotland is an undisputed nation. The land boundary is not disputed – there are some issues about the sea. There is doubt that Flanders is [a nation], or Basque is divided over several countries with unclear boundaries. ... We start from the premise that this is the nation of Scotland, whereas the others start from; we believe this is the nation of Catalonia. Even unionists say Scotland is a nation' (Interview SNP 08 – 16th September 2009).

A distinction between a 'little EFA' and a 'big EFA' (Scotland, Flanders, Catalonia, the Basque Countries, Galicia and Wales) is made where the former are considered 'not to be in it for the politics but for identity and linguistic traditions' (Interview SNP 35 -29th October 2010). Furthermore, the EFA is considered a short to medium term solution for the SNP: 'I do not think EFA is a long term proposition for the party. Where we fit in the long term is that we are a centre left social democratic party' (Interview SNP 35 – 29th October 2010). EFA membership seems to be more born out of necessity than actual party affiliation.

As stated earlier during the 1970s when the party was considered anti-European, the SNP had pro-European members and representatives. Similarly, in the late 1980s, although the party as a whole adopted more positive policies towards Europe, not everybody was won over. Some members and representatives have not embraced the 'independence in Europe' strategy and favour independence outwith Europe (see Table 6.5). Furthermore, for most party representatives there is a clear limit to European integration. Although simplistic, a distinction that is often made is between those who support a supranational Europe in which the EU rises to a putative European federation and an intergovernmental Europe in which sovereignty remains with the member states (Dinan 1999: 3; Nugent 1999: 502-505). The SNP favours the latter (Keating 2010: 375). SNP interviewees are almost unanimously in favour of an intergovernmental option:

I like to see a confederal Europe, not federal. Countries contribute according to their means and gain according to their needs. ... It would not suit Scotland to go from being an adjunct of one power to becoming the adjunct of an even larger power [...] But ensure that we don't find ourselves by stealth, falling into the same position as we did by pressure in terms of Britain (Interview SNP 5 – 31st August 2009).

The pro-European strategy has not been without difficulties. The supranational tendencies of the EU sit uncomfortably with the SNP's preference for

intergovernmental cooperation (Keating, 2010). Many of the party's EFA partners have expressed a more post-sovereign attitude towards Europe, based on the idea of 'Europe of the regions' and, as will be shown in the FNP's case, have placed considerable emphasis on the idea of subsidiarity – a principle in which competencies are devolved to the lowest effective authority. The SNP's 'independence in Europe' strategy involves strong opposition to the idea of a Europe of the regions (Sillars 1989; Lynch 1995: 9). The SNP does not oppose the principle of subsidiarity but recognises its current limitations:

Long term, I think we do need to make subsidiarity work but as far as Brussels is concerned subsidiarity stops in the member state capital. I think that is a mistake but that is where it is. As a nationalist that suits me fine. I do not want Scotland to be a super region, I want a nation (Interview SNP 35 – 29th October 2010).

A second often-voiced criticism against the EU is that some policies are damaging to Scottish interests. SNP representatives certainly do not agree with every EU policy. In particular there is criticism of the CFP. But apart from blaming Brussels for the unfavourable conditions imposed on Scotland, it is the UK that receives most of the blame for failing to take the Scottish dimension into account. The following respondent expressed this view quite clearly: 'Everything we do has to go through London. That means we have lost out quite a lot in terms of fishing rights. A lot of foreign boats are taking away Scottish fish. Well ok, that is what has been agreed, but if we had a Scottish voice at the top table it might be a bit fairer' (Interview FNP 18 – 15th April 2009).

Some SNP respondents, although usually generally positive about European integration, expressed concerns about the bureaucratic structure of the EU, the democratic nature of EU institutions and what is perceived as centralisation. The following respondent described himself as a pro-European sceptic: 'I see the sense in the larger entity. I am concerned that the Europe that is currently constructed is

political. If the intention is for EU parliament to determine live for everyone, why would I move from UK to that?' (Interview SNP 24 – 19th September 2009). And the following interviewee was particularly concerned about the undemocratic nature of the EU: 'It [the EU] has flaws, administratively and the balance of power should shift to the MEPs rather than ministers and commissioners' (Interview SNP 22 – 27th August 2009).

Additionally, the process of EU enlargement is seen by some as problematic and is regarded as unsustainable: 'You have to wonder, how far does this expansion go? What does it cost; is it sustainable? If we concentrate on the East what is happening in the South?' (Interview SNP 24 – 19th September 2009). There are also concerns about the stability of the Union if it keeps on expanding: 'If you take in Turkey you pass over a point at which you cannot logically stop. Other people will become jealous and that will cause unhelpful tensions' (Interview SNP 3 – 8th September 2009). Most SNP interviewees regard expansion as appropriate if countries can fulfil the economic and human rights criteria set by the EU: 'I think as long as these countries can meet whatever criteria have been set down, particularly with regards to human rights' (Interview SNP 18 – 15th April 2009). Others see enlargement as a way to avoid further centralisation: 'I am quite happy about it [the EU] expanding. As it expands it becomes much harder to centralise' (Interview SNP 29 – 26th August 2009), and 'expansion helps [against centralisation] – a lot of small countries means you can form alliances on issues that can change all the time' (Interview SNP 6 – 16th September 2009).

A pro-European attitude raises some electoral difficulties. Keating asserts that the SNP 'face an electorate that shares much of the Euro-scepticism that has dominated public discourse in the United Kingdom since the 1980s' (Keating 2010: 375). Negative public perception of the European integration process means that the 'independence in Europe' strategy is potentially damaging as it links the party to that process. De Winter and Gomez argue that 'in Scotland the electorate of the SNP is more Euro-sceptical than that of the traditional parties.... The ideological profile and discourse of their leaders may be out of line with their electorates' (De Winter and Gomez-Rein 2002:

492). These findings are based on a comparison between an expert survey conducted by the author and the magnum Eurobarometer data from 1996, the only year that there is enough regional level data to make such a comparison (De Winter and Gomez-Rein 2002: 492). As the findings are based on one point in time, caution is required. What can be said is that the SNP has been firmly committed to its 'independence in Europe' strategy since the late 1980s. The 2010 party manifesto states: 'We believe that Scotland, like other similar nations, should have a seat at the top table of Europe and the SNP will continue to engage more extensively with the Commission and Council of Ministers' (SNP 2010).

It may be the case that in recent years there has been less focus on an 'independence in Europe' strategy. Instead the party linked independence (at least, up until the financial crisis in 2008) to a narrative of the 'arc of prosperity' comparing Scotland's position in particular to Ireland, Iceland and Norway (SNP 2006). Since Norway and Iceland are outside the EU it makes the party's commitment to European integration more ambiguous, but the Irish success story up until 2008 demonstrated the perils of being a smaller nation in the EU. Additionally, there has been less focus on the 'independence in Europe' strategy because the debate on Scotland's position in Europe, should independence be achieved, has been won by those in favour of Scottish independence within the EU (at least at the elite level). None of the interviewees expressed a desire for an independent Scotland outwith the EU. Simultaneously, all had considerable reservations and expressed criticism of certain aspects of European integration.

The FNP and European integration

During the 1960s and 1970s the FNP showed little direct interest in Friesland's place in the European Economic Community (EEC). The party was focused on local issues and

Brussels was politically distant. Nevertheless, the FNP has a long history of looking beyond its own borders to legitimise its cause. In the 1970s links with several other autonomist parties throughout Europe were established. Representatives would attend congresses and organise working holidays to visit other regions with autonomist parties, such as Scotland, Wales and Catalonia. Furthermore, the party was outspoken on global issues, showing strong support for pacifist solutions (Huisman 2002: 196). Moreover, throughout its history the FNP has proclaimed solidarity with other minorities in Europe and further afield (Huisman 2002: 196). The achievements of like-minded parties were followed with interest and communicated to party members. For instance, when the SNP won a seat in the House of Commons in the 1967 Hamilton by-election the FNP sent a letter congratulating the party and reported the win in its party paper; the party also ensured coverage in local newspapers (Leeuwarder Courant 1967). Internationalising the FNP's cause was part of a wider strategy to legitimise the party's goals; Europe was to become an important part of this strategy.

The European dimension was not completely neglected in the early years. Since the FNP is a federal movement, it saw Friesland's interests as best represented within a federalised Kingdom of the Netherlands and since the Netherlands was part of the EEC, Friesland would be as well. The first party programme in 1965 states, 'the FNP aims for a federal state in the Netherlands and Europe' (FNP 1965). This can be interpreted as a tentative attempt to link the party's aspirations at a regional level with European integration. However, the limited competences, the highly bureaucratic structure and the inaccessibility of the EEC are important factors explaining why the FNP showed little direct interest in what was happening in Brussels. Additionally, the party's small size and limited resources imposed considerable constraints on its ability to actively engage with events in Brussels on a regular basis. Moreover, the FNP was more concerned with local and regional issues and these were not (yet) linked to the process of European integration.

Europe has not become a key issue for the FNP but since the establishment of an elected European Parliament in 1979 the interest amongst FNP elites has increased. The FNP has since developed three strategies to attempt to ensure that Frisian interests in Europe are heard. Firstly, the FNP has advocated European party lists rather than the national party lists in European elections. As the party is too small to hope to win a seat on its own in the European Parliament under a national party list system, or even a regional party list system, European party lists would allow FNP voters to vote for other autonomist parties in other countries and would allow the establishment of an autonomist European party representing like-minded autonomist parties throughout Europe, for which FNP voters could vote (Interview FNP 12 – 13 August 2008).

Secondly, the party argues for direct Frisian representation in Europe. According to the FNP, the EU's current structure is a half-way house and only represents the majority states in Europe. This leads to a huge imbalance, as member states include states as large as Germany and as small as Malta (Interview FNP 01 – 28th August 2008). The FNP advocates the creation of a second chamber which represents cultural communities, or – if these are too large – smaller regions within cultural communities. This CoR was identified by some FNP party representatives as particularly suitable for this purpose. These members believe that Friesland should be represented directly in the CoR (Huisman 2002: 198-200). The 2007 election manifesto expresses the above strategy:

It should be possible to vote for transnational party lists in Europe. Besides that we want increased awareness of the diversity in Europe. Therefore the Committee of the Regions should be transformed into an elected senate of Europe. It should represent those European peoples without their own state – all 50 million of them (FNP 2007: 11 – author's translation).

The third strategy is more pragmatic. Rather than trying to shape Europe's institutional framework to ensure Frisian interests are represented, the FNP has sought to be part

of Europe without having elected representatives. The largest vote share achieved in provincial elections by the FNP is around 65,000 (see chapter 4, Table 4.5). With 250,000 votes required for a seat in European Parliament, there is little hope that the party can achieve this and therefore the FNP has looked for alternative ways to make its voice heard in Europe. The party has little confidence that it will be able to make its case through the Dutch government and therefore it has looked for partners in Brussels (FNP 2007: 11). The FNP was one of the founding members of the EFA. EFA membership has afforded the FNP a sense of belonging and sense of purpose in Europe: 'The FNP felt a connection with other representatives of parties that represented people that have fallen between the cracks of history' (Interview FNP 5 – 1st August 2008). Furthermore, EFA membership enabled the FNP to feel that it was 'jumping from the basement to the attic' (Interview FNP 5 – 1st August 2008). The FNP was able to claim direct links with representatives in Brussels, giving the party an opportunity to present Frisian nationalism within an international framework. It also allowed the party to claim some influence in the EU decision making process, although the extent of this influence is probably more symbolic than practical. EFA membership is considered important for the FNP, particularly by elites, but the membership is also kept up to date with EFA activities and regular updates in the party magazine keep members informed about conferences, meetings and declarations.

European integration and EFA membership in particular have been beneficial to the FNP in several ways. Firstly, the FNP has access to political representatives in Brussels, both in the EFA and the Greens, enabling it to vocalise its concerns in Europe without having to go through the Dutch central government. One example of such a case is when the Belgian Green/EFA MEP, Bart Staes, asked questions on behalf of the FNP in relation to the closure of the Frisian Department at the University of Amsterdam. The FNP presented the issue as a victory for the party by claiming that the Commission subsequently put pressure on the Dutch government to keep the course (Frijbûtser 2001). Even though it may seem unlikely that events indeed unfolded in this way, the

point is that the FNP attempts to use EFA connections to make its voice heard in Brussels.

Secondly, the FNP asserts that the party's international 'friends' increase its credibility in Friesland. EFA membership has made the party appear less radical and potentially more attractive to the mainstream Frisian public as its goals and aims are put into a European context and therefore no longer seem as idiosyncratic as they might do in the Dutch context. In 1987, the FNP hosted the EFA congress in Leeuwarden.

According to one commentator this gave the party 'new inspiration and a broad European-Federal perspective' (Leeuwarder Courant 1987 - author's translation). The FNP considered the event an opportunity to showcase their European associates. On the other hand, many EFA members have a more radical constitutional agenda than those of the FNP and by association the latter could be domestically stereotyped as equally radical. However, the FNP's European credentials should not be exaggerated. For voters and members the FNP will most likely remain a local party rather than one they associate with European issues. That said, the point remains that the Europeanisation of the FNP has made the party appear less peculiar. In the Netherlands the party is in the relatively unique position of representing a minority community, whereas in Europe the FNP 'shares something with representatives from other regions' (Interview FNP 01 – 28th August 2008). The FNP is better able to demonstrate to the electorate that there are other parties like it in Europe and that its goals are not extraordinary.

Thirdly, as Lynch (1998) notes, 'the development of a transnational federation such as the European Free Alliance is useful for small autonomist parties with few organisational resources at their disposal' (Lynch, 1998: 191) as it gives these parties an opportunity for policy learning. The FNP has been able to tap into the knowledge and policy development of other larger parties with much larger organisational structures and research capabilities than its own. This may have helped it to further develop its own policy goals. It has also led to increased Europeanisation of FNP policy. For example, European contacts have further developed the party's constitutional

thinking. The FNP's ideas on federalism are now closely linked to the concepts of multi-level governance and subsidiarity, in which competencies are devolved to the lowest effective authority, guaranteeing a degree of independence for lower authorities. Ideas such as post-sovereignty and subsidiarity fit well into the party's grassroots localism. Such post-sovereignty thinking is illustrated by one senior FNP official who stated:

Certain competencies like foreign affairs and defence are better taken care of in Europe. But education, language and culture have to be dealt with in the relevant cultural communities (*volksgemeenschappen*), not national states. National states have to give up power and communities, including Friesland, need to gain power and have to have more power in Europe (Interview FNP 06 – 9th June 2009).

The FNP envisages less of a role for the central state and more shared competences at the sub-state and supranational levels. Another senior FNP official highlights the drawbacks of the reliance of the FNP on the EFA to formulate European policies. The FNP has no European policies of its own and conforms to the EFA. This could be perceived as a top down approach, but as the FNP agrees with nearly every policy the EFA holds it is not considered a problem (Interview FNP 4 – 30th August 2008).

The FNP regards European integration as beneficial to Friesland in two ways. Firstly, it considers the EU to be economically beneficial for Friesland and wants to exploit economic opportunities in Europe. The 2007 party manifesto stressed how economically important Europe is to Friesland – especially Eastern Europe: 'We live in a globalised world. Friesland will need to be part of that. More export, especially to Eastern Europe and the new member states is of vital importance (*levensbelang*)' (FNP 2007 - author's translation). And under the heading 'active in Europe' the FNP 2011 manifesto stated:

The FNP also wants Friesland to be actively present at places that are important for Friesland, politically and economically - in The Hague, Brussels or further

afield. This does not only relate to cultural aspects. It also affects our ability to strengthen the structure of our economy through innovation, knowledge exchange and export enhancement (FNP 2011: 6 - author's translation).

Friesland has received structural funds from Brussels as it was classified as an economically weak area. Most FNP representatives are of the opinion that the EU regional funding has been beneficial for Friesland. One commented on local projects: 'A lot has been achieved with European economic funding. Here in Eastermar we have received € 8 million to upgrade a canal' (Interview FNP 14 – 5th January 2010). Another made a more general comment: 'I see lots of blue flags on things that have been subsidised by Europe' (Interview FNP 16 – 17th March 2010). It was also mentioned that the EU is more sympathetic towards Friesland than the Netherlands: 'To a certain extent [Friesland has benefitted from the EU], some funds from Brussels would not have been received in the Netherlands. In the EU we maybe achieve more than in the Netherlands. The Netherlands pays little attention to Friesland' (Interview FNP 19 – 25th March 2010).

However, not every representative regards the EU as economically beneficial, or at least not without some caveats. The following respondent questioned whether Friesland should be considered to be an economically weak area: 'I think Friesland has benefitted but I don't think we should be designated as an economically weak region. We have our own strengths and we need to exploit those' (FNP Interview 09 – 12th June 2009). There were also concerns about the impact of the CAP: 'The EU has maybe not benefitted the agricultural sector in Friesland. It has promoted enlargement and mechanisation of farms and that has had an impact on the landscape. Friesland has a tradition of small farming techniques' (Interview FNP 14 – 5th January 2010). Moreover, some representatives questioned whether the EU structural funding framework benefitted Friesland: 'We have received subsidies but the Netherlands is a net contributor to the EU. So we may have lost out by being in Europe' (Interview FNP 18 – 15th March 2011).

A further concern for many representatives is the increased quantity of detailed legislation coming from Brussels which, according to FNP representatives, does not take local circumstances into account. Furthermore, there is a strong sense that the Netherlands as a whole and Friesland as part of it always want to be the 'best behaved boy in the classroom' (FNP 25, 7th April 2010). In other words, there are concerns that legislation has not been followed in certain member states, particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe, whereas it has been enforced strictly in the Netherlands and this is detrimental to the Dutch economy. This problem, according to some FNP representatives, is particularly salient in Friesland as much of this legislation is related to agriculture (which is proportionally a bigger sector in Friesland).

Some representatives expressed concerns about what is perceived as increased centralisation: 'At the time of the EU Constitution referendum I voted against it. It became too centralised; I thought everything was decided from Brussels. An EU president is not good. I am afraid that Friesland will disappear in that' (Interview FNP 17 – 25th March 2010). Such tendencies towards increasingly centralised government are considered detrimental to Friesland and undermine the FNP's ideals on localism. However, these sentiments are not confined to the FNP or Friesland as the 'No' result of the 2005 EU constitutional referendum in the Netherlands illustrates.⁵²

Secondly, FNP representatives regard the EU as a protector of Frisian minority rights: 'The EU means more for minorities than the Dutch government. In the Netherlands there is no movement on including Frisian in the constitution as an official language because The Hague does not understand what we feel and what motivates us. So that has to come from the top [EU]' (Interview FNP 14 – 5th January 2010). A further response was: 'Because the Netherlands became aware that there were all sorts of minorities throughout Europe they have to recognise their own' (Interview FNP 15 – 5th January 2010). A third respondent stated that: 'Brussels has warned the Netherlands to treat Frisian language differently. On the back of that, Frisian has been accepted as a second official language in the Netherlands' (Interview FNP 20 – 30th

⁵² In 2005 61.5 per cent voted against the adoption of an EU constitution.

March 2010). According to these FNP representatives, the Dutch government has been influenced to recognise Frisian cultural demands by the EU. The argument is that only under the supervision of Brussels has the Netherlands been forced to formulate and implement meaningful policies that protect Frisian culture. This refers back to the idea that the EU is a polity in which no nation has a majority, whereas in the Netherlands one region (Holland or the West) is dominant. This means that in the EU no cultural group is dominant and minority views are therefore better taken into account, whereas in the Netherlands the views of cultural minorities are less well represented.

However, not all FNP representatives agree with this opinion. One respondent was of the opinion that 'within the larger EU there is no attention for minorities and minority languages' (Interview FNP 21 – 29th March 2010). Additionally, a number of representatives express concerns in relation to further EU expansion, stressing the need for new applicants to fulfil criteria: 'I can't help thinking what do they do on a practical level about the Copenhagen criteria with regards to rights of minorities' (Interview FNP 4 – 30th August 2008). However, most representatives are of the opinion that the EU has helped to protect minority rights.

Despite the criticism of the EU in some areas, the overall attitude towards European integration in the FNP is positive. It is seen as a force for peace and prosperity. The majority of FNP representatives look at the EU as an opportunity to further their cause both economically and culturally. Furthermore, the European integration process has provided the party with a structure in which it can cooperate with likeminded parties across Europe. The party wishes for the EU's institutional framework to develop in a way that better represents regional actors.

Overall, both SNP and FNP representatives have positive attitudes towards European integration. Both parties recognise certain aspect of European integration that can be instrumental to their goals (although both parties are also critical of certain aspects of European integration). For the SNP, support for European integration provides stability and continuity in relation to their aim of Scottish independence. It ensures open access

to markets and therefore minimises economic disruption. Furthermore, the proposition of an independent Scotland appears less radical within a European framework and subsequently makes the SNP's goal appear less risky. These points are less relevant in the FNP's case. Instead, the FNP stresses the post-sovereign nature of the EU and aligns this with its own localism. Furthermore, it regards the EU as the protector of minority rights. The SNP, although committed to the concept of multi-level government, has a more traditional understanding of sovereignty and wants an intergovernmental Europe in which Scotland has its own seat at the top table. Thus both parties are pro-European but have different understandings of what this means and align European issues to their broader goals. Furthermore, the degree of support for European integration varies within each party. In the next section of this chapter it is determined if these different levels of support can be related to different conceptions of national identity.

Members' attitudes towards European integration and relations to national identity

The next section provides an analysis of SNP and FNP membership attitudes towards European integration by means of survey data. The data give insight into; (i) the overall attitudes of SNP and FNP members towards European integration, (ii) the differences between party representatives and members on these issues and (iii) whether different conceptions of national identity are related to different attitudes towards European integration. In chapter 2 it was argued that ethnocultural nationalism and national identity can be typified as more inward looking and particularistic. Subsequently, in chapter 5 it was shown that a binary model is not valid but when the two concepts of civic and ethnocultural nationalism are 'unpacked' and a 4 dimensional model is created, which includes an inclusive civic dimension and an exclusive ethnic dimension, it does have merit. The exclusive ethnic dimension is assumed to be less compatible with European integration as it requires considerable

sharing of power. The civic nationalism/national identities are considered outward looking and more compatible with cosmopolitan ideas. From this perspective it is not unreasonable to consider such an understanding of national identity as being more compatible with European integration. It is expected that members scoring higher on the ethnic dimension of national identity, as calculated in chapter 5, are more likely to regard EU policies as a threat than those with low ethnic scores. However, the expectations in relation to the civic dimension are more ambiguous. The factor scores for the civic and ethnic dimensions, as presented in the two 4 dimensional models in chapter 5 (Figures 5.11 and 5.12), are used to determine each individual's position on independent continua. Frequency tables are provided in conjunction with χ^2 and the contingency coefficient statistics to determine the strength of association.

One means of assessing whether party members have positive or negative attitudes towards European integration is by asking if they perceive European policies as a threat. In both FNP and SNP membership surveys, respondents were presented with a list of possible threats and asked to choose which they considered to be the three most serious for Friesland and Scotland respectively. There were no open ended options and therefore subjects' choices were limited.⁵³ SNP and FNP members were presented with a list of threats that were contextually relevant to Scotland and Friesland and included known issues in both parties. Therefore, options that were presented to members are different. Both surveys asked if respondents regarded EU policies as a threat. The results are presented in Table 6.1. In the SNP's case, 9 per cent of members include EU policies as one of their top three threats (ranked at number 10). In the FNP this was low – 4 per cent (the lowest score of all categories). Care is required as the lists of options available to the members differed between the two surveys. Furthermore, the design of the questions prevents measurement of how many members regard EU policies as a threat (members can regard more than 3

⁵³ It should be noted that as members were only allowed to choose three options the results are only indicative. It could evidently be the case that one member of the SNP finds European policies more of a threat than an FNP member, but three of the other perceived threats are considered more salient whereas for the FNP member they are not. Nevertheless, it does give an idea of how important European issues are perceived.

options as a threat); all it measures is how many regard it as a significant threat. From these data it can be concluded that European policies are not regarded as a major concern in either party.

In the FNP's case, a clear pattern can be identified. Those issues that are perceived as a threat by most are all internal to Friesland (Table 6.1 'Threat FNP' 1–5). They include language, culture, lack of self-confidence, the migration of young Frisians and large scale developments. A second tier of threats that are considered important threats to Friesland originate from within the Netherlands (Table 6.1, 'Threat FNP' 6-7). These include the government in The Hague and immigration to Friesland from other parts of the Netherlands. The final set of threats originate outwith the Netherlands and are of an international nature (Table 6.1 'Threat FNP' 8-13).⁵⁴ These are considered to be of less importance and include globalisation, foreign ownership, immigration from outside the Netherlands and climate change. For the SNP this pattern is less clear, partly because the threats are different. That said, for the SNP international threats are also located towards the lower end of the ranking (EU policies and immigration from outside the UK). Nuclear issues can be interpreted as a local issue as well as an international issue. Many SNP members oppose the presence of nuclear weapons on Scottish soil and oppose nuclear energy in Scotland. From this evidence it might be concluded that both parties do not particularly see the outside world as a threat, something that is associated with an ethnic type of nationalism.

⁵⁴ The questions were not presented in this order but have been rearranged for easy interpretation.

Table 6.1: Perceived threats for Scotland/Friesland

	Threat – SNP	%	Threat – FNP	%
1	Being denied North Sea oil revenues	59	Disappearance of the Frisian language	70
2	London government	49	Destruction of Frisian culture	47
3	Lack of self-confidence as a nation	45	A lack of confidence amongst Frisians	33
4	Nuclear weapons	25	Migration of young Frisians	33
5	Thatcherism	25	Large scale developments	28
6	Foreign ownership of Scottish businesses	16	The government in The Hague	25
7	Nuclear waste	15	Immigration from other parts of the Netherlands	17
8	Mass media	14	Globalisation	9
9	Emigration	11	Foreign ownership of Frisian business	9
10	European Union policies	9	Immigration from outside the Netherlands	5
11	Immigration from outside the UK	8	Other	5
12	Immigration from England	7	Climate change	4
13	English nationalism	3	European Union policies	4

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

As few party members in either party regard EU policies as a threat, it is difficult to achieve statistically significant results when measuring differences between these groups. Nevertheless, in the SNP there is a significant difference between party representatives and members; within the party representatives' group 7 per cent consider EU policies to be one of their top three threats, whereas for members this proportion was 10 per cent (Table 6.2 columns 2 and 3 – Figure 6.1 block 1).⁵⁵ In the FNP, 2 per cent of representatives see EU policies as a threat. This figure is 3 per cent for FNP members. However, for the FNP the result is not statistically significant. Based on this evidence it would be an exaggeration to speak of a disconnect between party members and representatives, but there do seem to be slight differences in attitude when considering whether EU policies are a threat or not, with members slightly more likely to regard EU policies as a threat when compared to party representatives.

⁵⁵ The scores in brackets are the total *n* of that group.

Table 6.2: % EU Policies are a threat to Scotland/ Friesland

	Repre- sentative	Member	Low Civic	High Civic	Low ethnic	High ethnic
SNP	7 (156)	10 (482)	8 (256)	11 (327)	7 (205)	12 (378)
χ^2 ; C; OR***	χ^2 (1) 17.2**; C .05**		χ^2 (1) 9.9*; C .04*		χ^2 (1) 54.6** ; C .09**	
FNP	2 (3)	3 (15)	3 (7)	3 (7)	2 (6)	4 (9)
χ^2 ; C; OR	χ^2 (1) .3; C .02		χ^2 (1) .0 ; C .0		χ^2 (1) .6; C .03	

* p < .05


** P < .001

*** χ^2 = chi square; C= contingency coefficient; OR = Odds ratio.

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Figure 6.1: policies are a threat to Scotland/Friesland



Source: SNP survey 2007


Source: FNP survey 2009

The results do indeed show a significant association between low or high ethnic scores and attitudes to European integration as a threat (Table 6.2 columns 6 and 7; Figure 6.1 block 3). Of the SNP members who are higher ethnic scorers, 12 per cent regard EU policies as a threat, whereas low ethnic scorers recorded a score of 7 per cent. In the FNP's case 4 per cent of all high ethnic scorers regard EU policies a threat against 2 per cent in the low ethnic group. The FNP result is not significant. This could be caused by the overall low number of members who regard European integration as a threat. As noted in chapter 2, the relationship between low and high civic understandings of national identity and European integration is theoretically more ambiguous. In the SNP's case, the results indicate that those with high scores on the civic dimension are slightly more likely to regard EU policies as a threat than low civic scorers. Of all the high civic scorers, 11 per cent regard EU policies as a threat whereas of the low civic scorers, 8 per cent did so (Table 6.2 columns 4 and 5; Figure 6.1 block 2). In the FNP there was no difference at all between low and high civic scorers. All in all, in the SNP's case there does seem to be a relation between ethnic scores and regarding EU policies as a threat, but for the civic dimensions the results are inconclusive. In the FNP the results were not significant. The *n* of the groups are too small and therefore it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions from the data.

An often-voiced criticism of the EU is that it is too centralised. The attitudes of party members toward European integration were further surveyed by asking them if the European Union had become too centralised. Although the results cannot be interpreted as a definitive measure of pro- and anti-European attitudes, they do function as a reasonable proxy measure of such attitudes. In other words, opining that the EU is too centralised does not make a person anti-European, but if a person has such an opinion she or he is more likely to have a negative attitude towards European integration. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (column 2) report the scores for both parties and Figure 6.2 is the graphical representation of the overall results for both parties. Several conclusions can be derived from the overall scores; (i) a majority in both parties agree with this statement, which could be interpreted as at least some concern in relation to

European integration as a process, (ii) a greater proportion of SNP members disagree when compared to the FNP; however, the difference is largely explained by the greater tendency for FNP members to opt for the middle category and (iii) attitudes seem to be more polarised on the issue in the SNP than in the FNP.

Figure 6.2: is the EU too centralised? (overall scores SNP and FNP)



Source: SNP survey 2007
Source: FNP survey 2009

Table 6.3: % Is the EU too centralised? (SNP)

	Total	Repr.	Mem Ber	Low Civic	High Civic	Low Ethnic	High Ethnic
Strongly agree	24	75	80	73	82	69	86
Agree	36	(1260)	(2760)	(1628)	(1947)	(1526)	(2049)
Neither agree nor disagree	24	-	-	-	-	-	-
Disagree	14	25	20	27	18	31	14
Strongly disagree	2	(416)	(697)	(603)	(421)	(685)	(339)
N; χ^2 ; C; OR	6724	χ^2 (1) 14.4** ; C .05**		χ^2 (1) 56.7** ; C .1**		χ^2 (1) 186.9** ; C .2**	

Source: SNP survey 2007
Source: FNP survey 2009


Table 6.4: % Is the EU too centralised? (FNP)

	Total	Repr.	Mem Ber	Low Civic	High Civic	Low Ethnic	High Ethnic
Strongly agree	16	87	86	81	90	82	90
Agree	39	(71)	(220)	(119)	(146)	(124)	(145)
Neither agree nor disagree	37	-	-	-	-	-	-
Disagree	7	13	14	19	10	18	10
Strongly disagree	1	(11)	(36)	(28)	(17)	(27)	(16)
N; χ^2 ; C; OR	541	χ^2 (1) .02 ; C .01		χ^2 (1) 4.6* ; C .1*		χ^2 (1) 4.1* ; C .1*	

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Figure 6.3: % EU too centralised? (dichotomised)



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

In Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (columns 3–8) and Figure 6.3 the answers to the question ‘Is the EU is too centralised?’ have been dichotomised into respondents that agreed and those that disagreed. The middle category has been omitted from the analysis for ease of interpretation. The scores for party representatives and members are presented in

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (columns 3 and 4) and Figure 6.3 block 1. In the SNP there is a significant association between whether respondents are representatives or ordinary members and whether or not they regard the EU as too centralised. Members are slightly more likely to regard the EU as too centralised compared with representatives. However, there is only a 5 percentage point difference between the groups. For the FNP, the 1 percentage point difference between representatives and members is not statistically significant. All in all, in the FNP's case there is no evidence of any difference between representatives and ordinary members. For the SNP there is some difference, but it would be too much to speak of a disconnect between party representatives and members when it comes to the question of whether or not the EU is too centralised.

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (columns 5–8) and Figure 6.3 (blocks 2 and 3) report the results for those that have different conceptions of national identity. In the SNP's case there is a significant association between whether members have high or low scores on the ethnic dimension of national identity and whether or not they regard the EU as too centralised. Low ethnic scorers are less likely to regard the EU as too centralised by a difference of 17 per cent. For the FNP a similar association was recorded although it is less strong. There was an 8 per cent difference between low and high ethnic scorers.

In terms of civic scores, the direction of the association is similar but less strong. In the SNP there is a 9 percentage point difference between high and low civic scorers. For the FNP the pattern is similar; those with high civic scores are more likely to find the EU too centralised than those with low civic scores. The FNP survey reported a 9 percentage point difference between low and high civic scorers. In the SNP, high ethnic scorers are most likely to regard the EU as too centralised in comparison to high civic scorers (4 per cent difference). In the FNP there is no difference between high civic and high ethnic scorers. Thus, from these results, it can be concluded that having high civic

or high ethnic scores matters in terms of attitudes towards EU centralisation. However, it matters less which one.

The above analysis demonstrates that not all aspects of European integration are supported and that many members are concerned about EU centralisation. It also shows that there is an association between ethnic and civic understandings of national identity and attitudes toward these aspects of European integration. However, this does not mean that members do not wish to be part of the European Union. In the SNP's case the survey contained a good proxy measure of members that wish to leave the EU. Members were asked what constitutional settlement for Scotland they prefer (Table 6.5). They were presented with 5 options; abolition of the Scottish Parliament, the status quo, more powers, independence in the EU and independence outwith the EU. Supporters of the category 'independence outwith EU' can reasonably be regarded as having a negative attitude towards Europe. However, the category can only be regarded a proxy measure as some of those who will have chosen the 'independence outwith Europe' preference may wish Scotland to be part of the EU, though not under the current arrangements which were negotiated on behalf of the UK government and which Scotland would inherit. It should also be taken into account that some members who do not wish Scotland to be part of the EU may be found in the first three categories; there could be members who want Scotland to remain part of the UK, but want the UK to leave the EU. However, considering the relatively low number of respondents in the first three categories, for the purposes of this analysis the last 'independence outwith Europe' category can be considered a reasonable strong proxy measure for a negative attitude towards Europe. Although the FNP survey did include a question that was similar, about Friesland's constitutional status, the data cannot be used in the same way as most FNP members do not want an independent Friesland either within or outwith the EU.

Table 6.5 (column 2) shows that, as is to be expected, an overwhelming majority of SNP members support an independent Scotland (87 per cent). However, more than a fifth consider independence outwith Europe the most favourable constitutional solution for Scotland. This position is at odds with the party's official position and also seems at odds with interview findings in which such views were not expressed. It is therefore important to explore any differences between members and representatives in the survey data. Table 6.5 (columns 3 and 4) and Figure 6.4 show that there is a significant 4 per cent difference between party representatives and members, with representatives being slightly more favourable towards the independence in Europe category. Although the difference is significant, it is too small to confirm a disconnect between members and representatives.

The civic and ethnic dimensions show a similar pattern to that in previous questions (Table 6.5 columns 5–8; Figure 6.4 blocks 2 and 3). Those with high ethnic scores are more likely to support independence outwith the European Union compared to members with low ethnic scores – a difference of 14 percentage points. The civic dimension shows a similar pattern to the ethnic dimension; those that score highly are more likely to support independence outwith Europe, but the difference was considerably less, only 5 percentage points. Overall, high ethnic scorers are most likely to opt for independence outwith Europe.


Table 6.5: % Constitutional preferences SNP members

	Total	Repr	Mem	Low Civic	High Civic	Low Ethnic	High Ethnic
Abolish Scottish Parliament	0						
Status quo	1						
More powers	12						
Independence within EU	65	78 (1413)	74 (2593)	78 (1926)	73 (1748)	82 (2098)	68 (1576)
Independence outwith EU	22	22 (404)	21 (661)	22 (547)	27 (647)	18 (467)	32 (727)
N; χ^2 ; C; OR	6122	χ^2 (1) 10.8**; C 0.05**; OR 1.3*		χ^2 (1) 15.7**; C .06; OR 1.3*		χ^2 (1) 117**; C .15**; OR 2.0*	

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Figure 6.4: Independence outwith EU (SNP)



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Conclusion

For the past three decades both the SNP and FNP have adopted largely positive policies towards the European Union and European integration. Besides stressing that the EU has provided peace and stability, both parties perceive it as a means for economic prosperity and stress the importance of cross border cooperation. Moreover, both parties regard the European Union as more responsive to their goals than the central state, as it represents a community of minorities and is not dominated by a large majority. FNP representatives in particular stress the positive aspects of European integration for cultural minorities. But SNP interviewees also point towards states such as Denmark and Ireland as examples of 'smaller' ones that had benefitted from European integration, stressing the community's focus on cooperation between states in which no single member is able to take a dominant majority position.

On the other hand, there are concerns that the EU is too bureaucratic, too centralised and is undemocratic. Furthermore, both parties view the current situation regarding member state representation as unsatisfactory. According to the SNP and FNP, Scotland and Friesland respectively are not well represented in Brussels. Furthermore, certain policies are considered harmful to the regional economy, particularly CFP and CAP. However, SNP and FNP representatives do not simply hold Brussels to account when it comes to these issues. The UK and Dutch Governments are considered equally culpable, if not more so, as they are perceived to misrepresent Scottish and Frisian interests.

Concepts of post-sovereign power structures have been met with considerable enthusiasm by the FNP and they fit in well with the party's philosophy of small scale development and localism. The FNP envisages a CoR that is transformed into a European Senate representing the different European regions. The party also supports pan-European party lists which enable the establishment of 'truly' European parties. There is considerable support for a supranational European state which would replace

national governments. However, most FNP representatives do not desire a European federal state and favour a Europe based on intra-governmental cooperation with a greater role for regional actors. This enthusiasm for a post-sovereign power structure is mirrored in the party's enthusiasm for EFA. Although the FNP has little hope of winning a seat in the European Parliament, EFA is regarded as a vehicle through which it can establish contact with other autonomist parties and influence policy in Europe.

In comparison with other British parties, the SNP can be considered to have embraced post-sovereign ideas. However, compared with many of its EFA partners, including the FNP, it is less radical in this respect. Without exception, all representatives interviewed consider a federal European state highly undesirable and stress the need for cooperation between member states. Intergovernmentalism is the preferred option for all interviewees. SNP representatives stress that they want Scotland to be part of Europe with a seat at the top table, where it has direct influence rather than having to go through London. Although the SNP is also sympathetic towards ideas such as subsidiarity, ultimate sovereignty, according to the SNP, should remain with the member states.

SNP representatives regard Scotland to be in a different situation to many of its other EFA partners. They assert that Scotland is unequivocally regarded as a nation and that even their political opponents would agree that this is the case, whereas most of Scotland's EFA partners represent regions. These partners may believe their regions to be nations, but many of the inhabitants of these regions, in common with the parties' political opponents, do not. The prospect of an independent Scottish state is more viable and realistic in Scotland whereas in Friesland such prospects are hopeless and most FNP members do not desire Friesland to be independent. Hence, for the SNP a more traditional understanding of sovereignty is a viable option to change power structures in Scotland. In the FNP a more pluralist understanding of the concept of sovereignty is required if it wishes to change power structures in Friesland.

A pro-European strategy has two other key benefits for the SNP, which apply to a lesser degree to the FNP. Firstly, as Keating and Jones (1991) argue, it is undoubtedly the case that European integration lowers the cost of secession. The EU provides a framework for continuity, in particular in areas concerning management of the macro-economy and security issues. The FNP does not support an independence strategy for Friesland, but similarly to the SNP's case – in which the party's main goal can be placed within an EU framework which makes an independent Scotland appear less radical and mitigates against apparent risks of discontinuity – the FNP's main goal of Frisian cultural protection also appears less radical in an EU framework, in which there are many minorities that make such demands.

Secondly, respondents in the SNP are conscious of the benefits that a pro-European strategy provides in relation to accusations of 'Kleinstaterei'. Many are keen to stress international cooperation as a strategy to avoid accusations of 'narrow nationalism' and related this directly to the party's EU strategy. This last point also applies in the FNP's case. The party is keen to stress its international credentials, in particular in relation to EFA, in order to avoid being seen as treating Friesland as an island. Through EFA, the FNP has been able to forge relationships with other autonomist parties in Europe and engage in knowledge and policy exchange activities. Such benefits have been less apparent for the SNP as it is often the senior partner within EFA.

Not every SNP and FNP party representative or party member considers themselves pro-European integration and many voice criticisms of aspects of European integration. However, when ordinary members and party representatives are compared, there is only limited evidence in support of attitudinal differences between these groups.

Support for or opposition to European integration does seem to relate to civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity. The association for the ethnic continuum is relatively straightforward and confirms the normative connotations of the framework (see chapter 2). In short, those members with high ethnic scores are more likely to

regard EU policies as a threat, they are more likely to find the EU too centralised and in the SNP's case they are more likely to want an independent Scotland outwith the European Union. All in all, this corresponds with the assumption that ethnic identities are more exclusive and particularistic. Consequently, people with such conceptions of national identity are less accommodating towards external others. On the other hand, the differences should not be exaggerated. In many cases scores were based on minority views held within the parties and differences were relatively small.

For the civic dimensions the results are more complex. In most cases, the direction of the association seems to be similar to that of the ethnic dimension; high civic scores lead to greater dissatisfaction or less connection to the European integration process. Therefore the assumption that civic identities lead to a more cosmopolitan type of nationalism which looks to cooperate with others is more complex than the framework suggests. Nevertheless, even though the direction of association is similar to that of the ethnic dimension, it is less strong, suggesting that when compared to the ethnic dimension the civic dimension is indeed more inclusive and favourable for cooperation with 'others'. Furthermore, much of the opposition of those with high civic understanding of national identity may be generated by the perceived undemocratic, elitist and centralising nature of the EU. Such explanations resonate with the idea that the civic dimension is essentially liberal. Another explanation can be found in that, as was shown in chapter 5, the variables from which the civic and ethnic dimensions have been constructed are considered non-competitively and there are significant intercorrelations between the two, particularly in the FNP's case. Therefore, high civic scorers are likely, to a certain extent, to be the same party members as high ethnic scorers.

Overall it can be said that the evidence presented in this chapter shows that there is a relationship between different conceptions of national identity and attitudes towards external others. However, the relationship is not as straightforward as the literature appears to suggest. Such relationship complexities become apparent when both dimensions are considered non-competitively. Nevertheless those members who

conceptualise national identity using the exclusive characteristics of birth and ancestry are more likely to have a negative attitude towards European integration than those who have a civic understanding.

Chapter 7 - Immigration and multiculturalism in the SNP and the FNP

In this chapter, the strategies, positions and attitudes of both parties towards internal others are examined. It will be argued that both the SNP and the FNP can be considered as inclusive parties which generally have positive policies towards immigration and multiculturalism (internal outsiders). However, within the party membership a wide range of views are held which range from those who have preference for cultural plurality to those who prefer cultural uniformity. As outlined in chapter 5, different conceptions of national identity show a relationship with these different attitudes. Those members who have an ethnic conception of national identity are more likely to show a preference for cultural uniformity and are anti-immigration.

Multiculturalism, politics of differences, identity politics and the politics of recognition all stress the need for groups, rather than individuals, to be recognised in politics (Kymlicka, 2002: 327). They stress the need for differentiated citizenship for minorities that allows them to express and maintain their culture within a majority society (Ibid.: 329-330). Although multiculturalism is mainly concerned with the rights of minorities as groups (Kymlicka 1995, 2002; Taylor 1994; Modood 2007; Barry 2001), in general terms it is also related to attitudes towards others; whether a person accepts the benefits of a pluralist society (a society in which many cultures can live side by side and learn from each other), or whether a person affords preference to a uniform society in which minorities are expected to integrate in to the dominant culture. However, a supporter of multiculturalism has a favourable attitude towards cultural pluralism, whereas an opponent of multiculturalism does not necessarily need to be an opponent of cultural pluralism and be in favour of cultural uniformity. This can also be argued from a liberal and/or universalists perspective. Barry (2001), for instance, holds that cultural diversity and minority rights are best maintained by the basic rights

guaranteed to the individual rather than group rights. However, attitudes towards multiculturalism are not only associated with rights of minority groups but also by the acceptance of immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and minority groups in general. Although there are important distinctions between economic migrants and political migrants (and within these groups further distinctions can be made), past research has shown that the public often does not make a distinction between refugees, asylum seekers and economic immigrants (McLaren and Johnson 2007: 713).

It is the wider definition of multiculturalism – the attitudes towards different cultures and immigrants – that is under investigation in this chapter. A distinction is made between those who favour cultural pluralism, a general acceptance and valuing of cultural diversity and those who prefer cultural uniformity, which can be defined as a preference for one singular dominant culture in a society. The latter implies the need for ‘newcomers’ to integrate into the dominant culture, whereas the former is willing to accept a wide range of cultural influences.

Attitudes towards these issues are investigated in both the SNP and the FNP. It is argued that issues around multiculturalism and immigration are framed differently in each party. The SNP focusses largely on the economic relationship with immigration whereas the FNP is more concerned with the cultural consequences of immigration. Similarly to previous chapters, the positions of members in the party strata are taken into account in the analysis and a distinction between party representatives on the one hand and the general membership on the other hand is made.⁵⁶ It is argued that party representatives are more supportive of cultural pluralism and that this is partly explained by the awareness of how important it is to be seen as inclusive when the aspiration is to be a civic nationalist party.

In chapter 2 it was argued that an ethnocultural national identity is more exclusive and particularistic. Subsequently, was demonstrated in chapter 5 that that the civic and ethnocultural dimensions should be ‘unpacked’ and that a model with 4 dimensions –

⁵⁶ Party representatives are defined as all those members that have taken up an party office or public office position for the party (see chapter 2).

which includes ethnic dimensions consisting of those criteria over which an individual has no influence (birth and ancestry) as well as a cultural, territorial and a civic dimension – is a better representation of how national identity is constructed. It is this ethnic dimension which can be considered most exclusive and therefore can be hypothesised to encompass negative attitudes towards ‘internal others’. Attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism are expected to show an association with such ethnic conceptions of national identity. It is argued that those members with high ethnic scores are more likely to prefer cultural uniformity. Civic understandings of national identity are thought to be inclusive and universalistic and are therefore expected to be associated with positive attitudes towards cultural pluralism. Although this chapter shows evidence supporting this, it also considers the complexities of this relationship.

The outline of the chapter is as follows; firstly, the theoretical connections between multiculturalism, immigration, issues of nationalism and sub-state identities are discussed. Secondly, although the main interest is attitudes of party representatives and members of the SNP and FNP, in order to understand these attitudes it is useful to provide background information regarding issues of immigration and multiculturalism both at the state-wide level (e.g. for the UK and the Netherlands) and at the sub-state level. In the third part of this chapter, the strategic positions of the parties on these issues and how they relate to understandings of national identity are discussed by means of analysing interview data from party representatives. In the final part, the attitudes of the wider memberships towards issues of immigration and multiculturalism are compared and contrasted in relation to different positions in the party strata and different conceptualisations of national identity.

Multiculturalism, immigration, nationalism and sub-state nationalism

The relationship between nationalism and national identity on the one side and immigration issues and multiculturalism on the other is uneasy (Hussain and Miller 2006) and relations between these issues have been left partially unexplored (McCrone 2002: 301). Sniderman and Hagendoorn assert that 'valuing a collective identity increases the likelihood of seeing it threatened; seeing it threatened increases the likelihood the majority will reject the minority' (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007:6). As autonomist parties and their members have by definition an increased awareness of their own collective (national) identity and value this collective identity, then following Sniderman and Hagendoorn's assertion, members and representatives of these parties would prefer culturally uniform societies. Moreover, Hussein and Miller (2006: 2) argue that the relationship between sub-state nationalism and multiculturalism is more complicated than within the 'existing' state, as 'an existing state can rise above ethnic and cultural diversity relatively easily' (Ibid.). But Heath and Smith assert that for sub-state nationalism this is more difficult, as 'it is usually seen to have an ethnic base' (Heath and Smith 2005: 133). Following Heath and Smith, Hussain and Miller state:

neither a multinational nor a multi-ethnic nor a multicultural state is a contradiction in terms. Indeed the idea of a nation-state is far more of a contradiction in terms. But a 'multinational nationalist' is certainly an oxymoron; and a 'multicultural nationalist' movement comes very close to being one (Hussein and Miller 2006: 2-3).

Theoretically, there does indeed seem to be ambiguity between claiming rights of self-determination for a certain group on the basis that the group is distinctive and the idea of a pluralist society. The argument seems to be; why fight for self-determination for a group in a territory based on the distinctiveness of that group, whilst permitting this distinctiveness to be eroded by allowing cultural plurality? However, such an

assumption is based on an ethnic understanding of nationalism and not a civic type of nationalism.

But even when ethnic nationalism is considered, the relationship is not straightforward. This type of nationalism can also theoretically be squared with culturally pluralist attitudes, particularly when it concerns sub-state nationalism. Sub-state nationalism and valuing one's own collective identity may be more compatible with multiculturalism than state-wide nationalism. Sub-state nationalists are minorities themselves. Therefore, the argument can be made that the experience of being part of a minority leads to an increased awareness of and empathy towards the position of minorities and immigrants. Multicultural nationalism is therefore not necessarily an oxymoron.

However, as has been argued throughout this thesis, it is important to distinguish between different conceptions of national identity (Kohn 2005; Greenfeld 1992; Kellas 1998; Shulman 2002; Brubaker 1996; Brown 1999). Some types of nationalism are better equipped than others to accommodate and treat minorities according to multiculturalist principles. As is stated in chapter 2, civic nationalism is considered more inclusive (Kellas 1998) and outward-looking (Kohn 2005; Greenfeld 1992) and is therefore more compatible with ideas of cultural pluralism. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is regarded as exclusive (Kellas 1998) and inward looking (Kohn 2005; Greenfeld 1992) and therefore it could be expected to be more compatible with ideas of cultural uniformity. Brown argues that:

while civic nationalism can accommodate the diversity of ethnic values, attributes and origins of its members who have all committed themselves to the homeland, ethnocultural nationalism cannot... it focusses on the belief that the community shares some distinctive racial, religious or linguistic attributes, which are then seen as the 'proof' of common ancestry (Brown 2000: 128).

In chapter 5 it was argued that the distinction between the two is not as sharp as Brown suggests, but nevertheless it can be expected that civic nationalists are more

willing and able to accommodate cultural pluralism in a society than ethnic nationalists. The more positive attitude of civic nationalism towards cultural pluralism is strengthened by an awareness of the negative connotations of the more ethnic nationalism. Therefore, politically, autonomist parties that proclaim to be civic will realise they need to be more careful than other political parties when it comes to issues of immigration and multiculturalism, because they need to avoid all association with an exclusive/ethnic type of nationalism. Thus, there are positive and negative incentives to support cultural pluralism. It may be in line with the party's ideals and protect the party from the negative connotations associated with ethnic nationalism.

There are further considerations in terms of the relationship between nationalism and national identity on the one hand and immigration issues and multiculturalism on the other. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007: 6) assert that valuing one's own collective identity can lead to perceiving minorities and other cultures as a threat. However, this is only the case under particular circumstances, namely when there are minorities and immigrants that can be perceived as a threat to the collective identity. This may seem obvious; if there are no other minorities or there are only low levels of immigration then there is no reason to feel threatened. But this can be particularly relevant in the case of sub-state nationalism, as it may be the case that in the sub-state nation the pressures and impacts of immigration are very different from those at the state-wide level and therefore attitudes will be shaped accordingly. Furthermore, immigration requirements may be different to what it is at the state-wide level. Therefore, attitudes toward these issues may differ according to such differences in pressures and needs.

Thus, it is not just a sense of collective identity which drives attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism, but is also the perceived differences in migration requirements and/or pressures in the sub-state region. Such differences in migration requirements and pressures can be framed in economic terms. If there is an economic case for pro-immigration policies then autonomist parties might be strong advocates of such policies, especially since 'control over immigration (and immigrants) is closely

associated with ideas of national sovereignty and national identity' (Skilling 2007: 102). Linking calls for control of immigration policies and the economic benefits of immigration can be a salient tactic for autonomist parties. The tactic also works in terms of anti-immigration policies. An autonomist party can argue accordingly that the central state's immigration policies are harmful to the region/sub-nation as they allow the latter to be overrun by immigrants, which has negative economic consequences. Hence the region requires control over immigration policies to halt immigration. Such a tactic would present civic nationalists with difficulties as they would consequently be associated with an exclusive, ethnocultural type of nationalism. In short, immigration policies and their associated attitudes regarding multiculturalism are not simply outcomes of parties' 'civicness' or 'ethnicness', or the awareness of a collective identity; the situation on the ground (i.e. the pressures and needs that the sub-state nation/region is experiencing) plays an important role.

Besides framing immigration policies in economic terms, the ideological position of parties needs to be taken into account. It is often asserted that pro-immigration and pro-multicultural policies are more closely associated with the political left, whereas stricter immigration controls and policies that promote the integration of minorities are more closely associated with the political right (Jupp 2003). Thus, the ideological positions of parties, party representatives and party members play an important role in the analysis of immigration and multicultural attitudes. However, political and social attitudes are not only structured on a left versus right spectrum; they are also structured on an authoritarian versus libertarian spectrum (Eysenck 1956; Ray 1982; Evans *et al.* 1996). On the basis of these dimensions, authoritarianism is often associated with cultural uniformity and libertarianism is related to cultural pluralism. Such dimensions need to take into account the party political context. If statist parties are more right wing or authoritarian it can be advantageous for autonomist parties to exaggerate differences by associating themselves with left wing libertarian attitudes and vice versa.

When discussing issues of immigration and newcomers in relation to sub-state nationalism, a conceptual distinction between external and internal immigration is useful. The former is immigration that originates from outwith the 'existing' state and the latter is immigration that originates from within the 'existing' state. If an autonomist party perceives its culture to be under threat from the majority state-wide culture then large numbers of immigrants from other parts of the state to the sub-nation/region's territory is more likely to be perceived as negative by the autonomist party. Furthermore, these internal immigrants may not find it necessary to culturally adjust to the minority culture, either because they perceive the two cultures as relatively similar or they perceive the state-wide culture as dominant and more important. In terms of external immigration, the dynamics are somewhat different as immigrants from outwith the state are unlikely to be perceived as a direct threat to the minority culture. In other words, they are unlikely to become culturally dominant. On the other hand, external immigrants from different backgrounds are likely to have greater cultural differences to the sub-state's culture (in comparison with the state-wide culture). This can cause greater tensions and difficulties. It may be easier to accept internal immigrants than external immigrants because the cultural differences are less profound. Conversely, it may be easier to accept external immigration than internal immigration because the former do not have a 'perceived' cultural hegemony and therefore do not challenge the minority culture.

Although the focus of this thesis is on attitudes in autonomist parties towards other cultures and immigration issues which are not necessarily based on accurate factual evidence but based on perceptions, it is useful to first consider some of the immigration trends from the state-wide and sub-state level, as these will likely have an impact on the attitudes of party representatives and members. The data presented in the next section do not represent an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the situation at the state-wide and sub-state level in terms of immigration and multiculturalism, as this goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, it serves as

background information in order to understand some of the attitudes of representatives and members towards immigration and minority issues.

The state-wide context: immigration issues and multiculturalism in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Immigration issues and associated attitudes to multiculturalism are increasingly important at the start of the twenty first century in the Netherlands and the UK. Traditionally both have been countries of emigration, exporting their people across the world, a process facilitated by a history of colonial empire and being the primary immigrants into white settler countries like the United States, Canada, South Africa and Australia. This started to change in the 1960s and 1970s when both the UK and the Netherlands became the destination for many economic migrants to fill gaps in the labour market. These immigrants were largely unskilled workers. In the UK's case they tended to come from former colonies, like India, Pakistan, and the West Indies (McLaren and Johnson 2007: 710-711). In the Netherlands they also came from former colonies like Surinam, but large numbers also came from Turkey and Morocco (CBS 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). From the 1980s onwards there also was a sharp increase in refugee applications in both countries caused by an increase in the number of conflict areas in the world and modernised transport, but also the attempts of states to curtail economic migration (Kelly 2000). Furthermore, internal migration (immigration within the state) increased significantly, mainly due to modernised transport and flexible labour markets. All in all, the second half of the twentieth century saw large groups of immigrants from different cultural backgrounds settle in both the UK and the Netherlands.

It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full analysis of the state response to immigration but until the turn of the millennium in both the UK and the Netherlands

there existed an elite consensus that multicultural policies were not only preferred, but necessary, to maintain societal harmony (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). This elite commitment to multiculturalism can be explained by three factors. Firstly, a philosophical and ideological commitment to the ideas of tolerance amongst 'liberal' elites and society in the post war era facilitated the acceptance of cultural differences and group rights (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 1, 11; McClaren and Johnson 2007: 712). The second argument is of a pragmatic nature. In the Dutch case, immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s were expected to fill the gaps in the job market for a relatively short period and it was assumed that many would eventually move back to their home countries (Knippenberg 2005: 102). In these circumstances it made little sense for immigrants to integrate in majority society and therefore multicultural policies seemed the best way to accommodate the groups' short term needs. In the UK a third argument can be added; namely that multiculturalism and a pro-immigration attitude were thought to be necessary to keep links with the Commonwealth alive (McLaren and Johnson 2007: 710; Kelly 2000). At the turn of the millennium the multicultural consensus amongst elite and public opinion started to break down (Joppke 2004).

In the light of the Twin Towers attacks in 2001 and the London bombings in 2007 the backlash against multiculturalism and migrant populations, particularly in the case of Muslims, has been significant in both the Netherlands and the UK. The events in the Netherlands have been dramatic, particularly in light of traditional Dutch consociationalism and tolerant traditions (Lijphart 1969). The murder of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician with anti-multiculturalist – and according to some – anti-immigrant ideas, the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Muslim extremist, the death threats to and polarisation around Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a Somali refugee who became a member of Dutch Parliament in 2003 – and the popularity of anti-Islamic populist politician Geert Wilders, have challenged the idea of a multicultural society in the Netherlands and have had an enormous impact on public and elite attitudes

towards issues of immigration (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). They have led to a hardening of the language on immigration and multiculturalism in the Netherlands.

McLaren and Johnson (2004: 172) argue that British uneasiness with increased immigration patterns date to before the turn of the millennium. Kelly (2000: 28) traces the development of more restrictive immigration legislation back to the 1960s. The Nationality Act of 1948 allowed Commonwealth citizens free entry into the UK but in the 1960s this legislation was changed and became more restrictive (Kelly 2000: 29). Additionally, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) argue that the signs of the backlash were already visible in the Netherlands before the dramatic events in the first decade of the new millennium. They argue that there was a clash between the values of traditional Muslim societies and Western liberal societies that caused people to question multiculturalism (for a popular account also see: Ali 2007; Buruma 2007). Furthermore, in many countries there is a public perception that immigrants (particularly those from poorer countries) are associated with poverty, state welfare, low levels of education, high crime rates and high unemployment rates (Guiradon and Joppke 2001; Esses *et al.* 1998; Citrin *et al.* 1998; Simon and Lynch 1999; Mulvey 2010). Although such perceptions are often not based on evidence they do lead to stigmatisation of these communities, which results in increasingly negative attitudes towards immigrants.

The assumption is often made that negative attitudes towards immigrants are greatest in those areas where they are present in high numbers. However, there is considerable evidence that personal contact with people from ethnic minorities makes a person more positive towards these groups and that prejudice against minorities is higher in those areas that have relatively few minorities. Such concerns can be summarised as fear of the unknown (Sim and Bowes 2007: 741). Although the relationship between high numbers of immigrants and anti-immigration attitudes is complex, increased pressure on local services and communities due to immigration are an important cause of the backlash – not just a clash of values.

In conclusion, both in the UK and in the Netherlands, levels of immigration have increased in the latter half of the twentieth century. In both cases, governments and elites formed a consensus in favour of multicultural policies; that consensus came under pressure at the start of the new millennium which meant that multicultural policies had to be re-evaluated and immigration restrictions were put in place. The analysis given above is far from complete but it does provide part of the context in which the SNP and FNP can be placed. In the next section the situations in both Scotland and Friesland are assessed before moving on to analysing both parties.


Immigration and multiculturalism in Scotland

Scotland has been a net emigration country; Devine estimates that some 2 million Scots emigrated to North America and Australia in the past two centuries. About one third of these emigrants returned (Devine 1999: 468). Scotland has also welcomed substantial numbers of immigrants in the past couple of centuries: Irish, Italians, Poles, Lithuanians, Chinese, Pakistanis and many others have settled in Scotland (Kelly, 2000: 26) which has meant importing different cultural practices. As migration has played such an important part in Scottish history, Kelly (2000: 27) argues that migration issues are deeply ingrained in Scottish national culture.

Since 1945, Scotland has experienced negative net migration in most years. However, since the 1990s there has been a step change and immigration has been higher than emigration in most years (Wright 2006: 7). As Scottish population growth has been negative for large parts of the last 50 years, immigration is considered a necessary supplement to achieve population growth (Wright 2006). Despite an increase in immigration, population prognoses show a decline with estimates of between 4.8 and 4.4 million in 2050 (the current population is around 5.1 million) (Wright 2006: 7). Wright (2004 cited in Davis 2008) has suggested that Scotland requires 50,000

additional inward immigrants annually to sustain its population. In 2004 First Minister Jack McConnell identified Scotland’s falling population as its ‘single biggest challenge’ (BBC 2004). Figure 7.1 compares the population growth in percentage terms between England and Scotland. In every year the total growth in Scotland has been lower than that of England, suggesting that Scotland may have different migration requirements.

Figure 7.1: Population Growth (as % change) in England and Scotland




Source: General Registry Office for Scotland and National Statistics Office (percentage change for 1961 is from 1951); Davis 2008.

In addition to the fact that Scotland’s immigration requirements are different to those of the rest of the UK (Wright 2006), which may affect differences in attitude, Scotland also has not experienced the same pressures from immigration as some other areas in the UK. The number of immigrants settling in Scotland has been relatively low.

However, the pattern of immigrant settlement has come more in line with general population distribution in the UK in recent years. In 2008, Scotland received around 7 per cent of the total number of immigrants (Office for National Statistics 2008). Figure 7.2 illustrates that the total number of immigrants per year as a proportion of the total Scottish population has steadily increased since 2001. Nevertheless, the pressure of immigration on services in Scotland is considerably less than in some parts of England. Glasgow contains the largest number of ethnic minorities; however, the total ethnic minority population in Glasgow is 5.5 per cent of its population. This is considerably less when compared with some cities in England. For example, 29.6 per cent of

Birmingham's and 19 per cent of Manchester's populations are of an ethnic minority background (Sim and Bowes 2007: 730). The UK government's decision in 1997 to disperse asylum seekers across the UK in order to reduce the impact on the South East of England, where until then most asylum seekers were housed, meant that Glasgow was chosen as the only city in Scotland to accommodate these asylum seekers. This has led to a large increase in ethnic minorities in the Glasgow area. In 2004 Glasgow had the largest asylum seeker population in the UK (5,790) (Sim and Bowes 2007).

Figure 7.2: proportion of immigrants against total Scottish population per year



Source: General Registry Office for Scotland

All in all, the supposed pressures that immigrants can place on services may not have been felt to the same extent in Scotland as it has in parts of England and therefore immigration issues are not polarised and radicalised (Audrey 2000: 10). The extreme right British National Party (BNP) has been unable to gain a foothold in Scotland and there is elite consensus in terms of the Scottish Government's anti-racism campaign (the 'One Scotland, Many Cultures' campaign) and pro-immigration strategies (the 'Fresh Talent' initiative) (Skilling 2007). Furthermore, Hussein and Miller (2006) suggest that Scotland's awareness of multiple identities and in particular cultural identities facilitates the integration of ethnic minorities, who have similar concerns in relation to their identity as Scots. Scots may be more able and willing to accommodate multiple identities because of their own awareness of dual Scottish and British identity which facilitates multicultural integration of ethnic minorities (Audrey 2000: 237-238).

It has been suggested that Scotland is more tolerant of immigrants and does not have the same problems with racism as in other parts of the UK (Cant and Kelly 1995).

Furthermore, there is evidence that ethnic minorities find it easier to adopt a Scottish identity than ethnic minorities in England find adopting an English or British identity (Saeed *et al.* 1999). Similarly, Hussein and Miller (2006) have shown that Pakistani immigrants in Scotland regard Scotland as a friendlier place to live than England. On the other hand, research has repeatedly shown that there are negative attitudes towards immigration and ethnic minorities in Scotland and that there is no reason for complacency (Audrey 2000: 10). Cant and Kelly (1995: 19) report that the number of racially motivated attacks in Scotland more than doubled between 1988 and 1993 and Bromley *et al.* (2006: v) show that concerns about Muslim culture increased between 2002 and 2005 in Scotland, similar to the situation in England.

This apparent paradox between the existence of racism and the perceived Scottish tolerance of minorities can be partly explained by the absence of radical nationalism. The discourse of nationalism in Scotland has mainly focussed on economic and political disadvantages and this has resulted in an absence of focus on race related issues (Audrey 2000: 236-237). In England, English identity, symbols and nationalism are often associated with radicalism and English nationalism is considered more ethnic (Heath and Smith 2005) and therefore lends itself better to rhetoric of cultural exclusivity. This is not to say that the English are more negative towards immigration and minority cultures; it means that to a certain extent the English identity has been more associated with extremism and is therefore less appealing to ethnic minorities. For example, Hussein and Miller (2006) show that ethnic minorities in Scotland are mostly comfortable adopting a Scottish Pakistani identity whereas in England they rarely adopt an English Pakistani identity but prefer a British Pakistani identity.

The devolution settlement outlined in the 1998 Scotland Act identifies immigration policy as a reserved policy area. Despite not having control over immigration the Scottish Government has attempted to increase immigration to Scotland by initiating programmes such as the 'New Scots: Fresh Talent' initiative which actively promotes Scotland as a destination for skilled immigrants (Skilling 2007; Sim and Bowes 2007: 743). However, the Scottish Government has been able to exert only limited influence

over immigration issues and the Home Office has been effective in curtailing the Scottish Government's ambition to influence immigration policy for Scotland (Davis 2008).

In conclusion, Scottish attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants differ from English attitudes less than is sometimes suggested. Where they do differ, they do not so because of a more tolerant attitude of the Scottish people or elite but because; (i) the perceived pressures that migrant populations pose to societies may have been less significant in Scotland, (ii) Scotland has different needs (or is perceived to have different needs) than the rest of the UK when it comes to immigration, (iii) sub-state nationalism in Scotland has made people more aware of the existence of variation and the co-existence of multiple identities, which enables empathy towards other cultural minorities and (iv) the Scottish identity and nationalism has been less associated with extremism than has English identity and nationalism. Political nationalism in Scotland has been dominated by a civic nationalism that mainly uses economic arguments; this has left little room for a nationalism based on race related issues.

Immigration and multiculturalism in Friesland

Since the 1950s Frisians have emigrated to Canada, the United States of America and Australia in particular. It is difficult to estimate numbers of Frisian emigrants as hard data are lacking and academic research has been limited. Bakker (2005) asserts that many Frisian emigrants have maintained their links with Friesland and Frisian culture more so than other Dutch migrants without a strong sub-state identity (Bakker 2005). In short, there is a diaspora of Frisian emigrants (and their descendents) across the world which still values its Frisian identity.


Friesland has also welcomed many immigrants throughout its history. Up until the nineteenth century, seasonal workers from Germany would provide much needed

agricultural labour in the summer and autumn. These workers would usually not settle in Friesland but would return to Germany.⁵⁷ Other groups included Italian workers, Belgian refugees from the First World War, Maluku refugees after the Second World War and Hungarian refugees in 1956. Since the 1960s Turkish and Moroccan guest workers have also settled in Friesland, although in much smaller numbers than in some other parts of the Netherlands (mainly the Randstad). Since the 1980s Friesland has accommodated political refugees as part of the Dutch dispersal policy (Vriesema and van der Groot 2006). More recently, European enlargement has provided opportunities for migrant workers (especially Polish workers) to work in the agricultural sector as seasonal workers.

Overall, Friesland has attracted fewer immigrants than some other parts of the Netherlands; in particular there have been fewer guest workers of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Friesland when compared to the West of the Netherlands. Figure 7.3 shows that there is roughly a 10 per cent difference between the Netherlands as a whole and Friesland in terms of proportion of the population that is considered to be immigrants or descendants of immigrants (2nd and 3rd generation). The highest concentration of immigrants in Friesland can be found in the capital, Leeuwarden, which accounts for about 25 per cent of the total immigrant population in Friesland (CBS 2009). When the yearly influx of immigrants is compared against the total population, it is noticeable first of all that Friesland has received a lower proportion of the immigrant population than the whole of the Netherlands, with the exception of 1999 when they were on a par (Figure 7.4). However, Friesland has largely followed the Dutch trend; when immigration in the Netherlands goes up it does so too in Friesland. There is no regionally distinct pattern. In the year 2008–2009 the patterns do diverge. However, one year is not enough to speak of a regionally distinct pattern.


⁵⁷ Some did remain in the Netherlands. The brothers Clement and August Brenninkmeijer were German immigrants who established C&A, a textiles shop in Sneek which would become a global brand.

Figure 7.3: Proportion of Dutch and Frisian population comprised of immigrants



Source: CBS (05/01/2011)

Figure 7.4: Proportion of yearly immigration against total population



Source: CBS (05/01/2011)

The provincial administration in the Netherlands has little influence over immigration policy. It only plays a role when it comes to implementing centrally determined government policies. However, it is able to take some initiatives in relation to improving the integration of newcomers in Frisian society. For example, it has attempted to make immigrants more aware of Frisian culture. Since 2008 Friesland's provincial government has provided newcomers with an extensive information pack (*welkomspakket*). The intention is to welcome newcomers and to make them aware of the bi-lingual situation in Friesland. It also aims to promote Frisian by offering courses and access to cultural events (Province Friesland (undated)). Local authorities have been able to influence the influx of newcomers to their municipalities to a certain extent. In the 1990s the Dutch Government implemented a policy of dispersing asylum seekers and refugees throughout the Netherlands. Councils were able to volunteer to accommodate asylum seekers. Several councils in Friesland took up the offer. There were three benefits for local authorities. Firstly, it was an attractive way to secure

extra funding as central government provided money for housing and infrastructure. Secondly, because many councils were experiencing low occupation rates and had housing available, accommodating asylum seekers was relatively straightforward. Thirdly, other local services like education and health were able to continue to provide services in areas with low population densities due to an increase in demand (Vriesema and van der Groot 2006: 120-137).


The central government's dispersal policy introduced relatively large numbers of minorities, often into rural municipalities which had little experience with immigration and integration issues. In the vast majority of cases this did not cause many problems and the newcomers were welcomed into the communities. However, there were incidents, such as in October 1999 when a locally organised information evening in Kollum about the relocation of a refugee centre ended in chaos. Tensions between ethnic minorities and local youth had been building since May that year when a young girl was found raped and murdered. An Iraqi refugee was an initial suspect but the murder has never been solved (NRC 1999). However, tensions between local communities and ethnic minorities were rare and in most cases 'newcomers' were welcomed.

Friesland's population has been in relative decline when compared to the Netherlands as a whole (Graph 7.5). Emigration of young Frisians in particular to other parts of the country or further afield is often considered a key problem for Friesland. Additionally, there is some evidence of lower birthrates in Friesland compared to other parts of the Netherlands (CBS 2003: 15). From this perspective it could be argued that Friesland requires more immigrants than some other parts of the Netherlands. However, unemployment has been relatively high in Friesland and there are also concerns in terms of the impact of large numbers of immigrants on the Frisian culture/language.

Leeuwarden contains the largest number of immigrants but it only constitutes only around 3.5 per cent as a proportion of the total immigrant population of the Netherlands. When this is compared with cities in the West such as Amsterdam and

Rotterdam, where more than 30 per cent are immigrants or of immigrant descent (CBS 2002), the disparities are evident. However, it should also be noted that as part of the Dutch government dispersal policies for asylum seekers, asylum seeker centres were built in small villages, which meant a substantial influx of people from different cultural backgrounds into relatively culturally homogenous white Frisian communities.

Figure 7.5: Proportional population growth in Friesland and the Netherlands



Source: CBS (05/01/2011)

Thus the number of immigrants from outwith the Netherlands in Friesland is proportionally lower than in the Netherlands as a whole; Frisians have not experienced the same pressures as some of the more densely populated areas in the West where many immigrants have settled. This may mean that attitudes are more positive because there is less competition from immigrants for services. On the other hand, attitudes could be more negative as a consequence of limited contact with other cultures, leading to a fear of the unknown (Sim and Bowes 2007). Assessing attitudes towards immigrants in Friesland is problematic due to a lack of data. One proxy for attitudes towards immigrants is support for anti-immigration parties in Friesland. The Party for Freedom (PVV), led by the controversial politician Geert Wilders, fought the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections on an anti-immigration and anti-establishment ticket. The PVV made a big breakthrough in 2010, becoming the third largest party in the Netherlands with 15.5 per cent of the vote. The party received stronger support in the West and South of the country. In Friesland the party was relatively unsuccessful, receiving 11.4 per cent of the vote; together with the neighbouring province Groningen it was the worst result for the PVV in any of the Dutch provinces. Although empirical evidence as to the strength of the Frisian identity is not available, Friesland

is considered to have its own cultural identity (Hemminga 2006). This identity is in most cases not exclusive and most Frisians consider themselves Dutch (Hemminga 2006). However, Frisians are accustomed to being considered a cultural minority in the Netherlands and recognise themselves to be so even though they also consider themselves Dutch. This awareness of being a cultural minority may create some empathy towards other cultural minorities.

A comparison of Friesland and Scotland in relation to immigration issues is difficult. There are similarities in that both have experienced relatively low levels of immigration, especially in comparison with other parts of the states which they are part of, meaning there have been fewer pressures. Both have a strong sense of regional/sub-national identity, which means they have experience of being a minority. Both have declining populations (either in real or relative terms) for which immigration could be regarded as a viable solution.

In the next section considers how immigration issues are used by the SNP and FNP. The positions of the parties towards immigration will be considered by first assessing the economic arguments that are being used in relation to immigration. Subsequently, it will be determined how being a civic nationalist party affects strategies and rhetoric on immigration. Then cultural differences between the region/sub-nation and the state as perceived by party representatives are analysed in order to assess if SNP and FNP representatives regard them as determinants for differences. Finally, attitudes to and interpretations of the concept of multiculturalism amongst party representatives are further explored; can immigrants maintain their own cultures and under what circumstances? What is the role of the state in these matters? The SNP is considered first. In the FNP's case, the role of Frisian as a language is also considered as this plays such an important role in the party's thinking.

Immigration and multiculturalism and the SNP

On the subject of immigration, the SNP 2005 Manifesto stated:

With independence, Scotland will have control of policy relating to immigration, asylum and refugees.... Our vision is of a tolerant and inclusive Scotland, in which everyone who lives here can participate and prosper (SNP 2005: 30).

And in 2007:

We will seek an enhanced role for the Scottish Parliament in the Shortage Occupation List. We will press the case for a Scottish green-card that is awarded to eager, qualified immigrants, who want to come to Scotland for five years or longer (SNP 2007).

And in 2010:

Scotland [has] to take responsibility for immigration so that we can develop a system here at home that more closely meets our needs. An 'earned citizenship' system, similar to those in Canada or Australia, would allow Scotland to attract high-skill immigrants who can add to the strength of our economy and help deliver growing prosperity for the whole nation (SNP 2010a).

As immigration has increased in the UK and attitudes have hardened (Mulvey 2010; McClaren and Johnson 2004: 172), Westminster has adopted stricter measures to control immigration – especially since the start of the new millennium (McLaren and Johnson 2007; Kelly 2000) – which has in turn reinforced such attitudes (Mulvey 2010). The SNP has been critical of stricter immigration policies. The reasons the SNP has had more positive attitudes and policies towards immigration and foreigners are analysed

in this section using interviews with party representatives, analysis of policy documents and press statements.

The SNP opposes stricter immigration policies as, according to the SNP, restrictive immigration policies harm Scotland's economy; immigration controls may be economically beneficial to the UK as a whole but the SNP argue they are not for Scotland. For the SNP, Scotland's population decline has been a key concern. Emigration of talented, often young Scots to the south to find better employment opportunities is also considered a major problem. The SNP stated its intention to reverse this process by 'turn[ing] Scotland into the science and innovation capital of Europe and [reversing] the brain drain of qualified people from the country which had been a problem since the war' (PA News 1995). Commentators describe the SNP's immigration policy as an 'open door' policy (Sunday Herald 2009b). Although this is an inaccurate depiction of the party's immigration policy, the party is of the opinion that Scottish population predictions suggest that even if the so-called 'brain-drain' could be halted this would not be enough to reverse the overall population decrease caused by low birth rates (Davis 2008 and Wright 2006). The SNP argues that it is in Scotland's best interests, not just demographically but also economically, to have a less restrictive policy towards immigrants, with a particular focus on highly skilled immigrants.

Such a focus on immigration issues became particularly beneficial when the New Labour UK Government implemented more restrictive immigration policies at the start of its second term (2001). Initially the New Labour Government was largely pro-immigration, aiming to accommodate business requirements (Davis 2008). Labour's immigration policies were largely in line with what the SNP supported and considered positive for Scotland. There was little need for the SNP to challenge UK immigration policy. However, as New Labour adopted more restrictive immigration policies, the SNP did not change position and was able to argue that Scotland required different policies from the UK. From 2002 onwards, the SNP has challenged Westminster's stricter immigration rules. In response to an emergency immigration summit organised by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2004, Annabel Ewing stated:

as the only part of the UK - and virtually the only nation in Europe - with a declining population, Scotland has the biggest interest in attracting new talent to our country ... Instead of being sidelined in a London-based summit that does not reflect Scotland's needs, it would be far better for the Scottish Parliament to gain control over immigration policy from the Home Office (SNP 2004).

When the UK government announced a new point based immigration system in 2009, Peter Wishart, SNP MP and immigration spokesman, argued for a Scotland-specific point system. The SNP did not disagree with the policy of a point based system but stressed the different requirements for Scotland: 'Scotland's population and immigration requirements are completely different from the rest of the UK, and this has to be recognised when points are added up' (Sunday Herald 2009a). This line of argument was continued when the UK government changed in 2010 to a Conservative - Liberal Democrats coalition. The Conservatives made a strong case for further restrictions on immigration in the election campaign by arguing for an overall immigration cap. The SNP again stressed Scotland's different demographic and economic requirements: 'Scotland has very different population concerns from the rest of the UK and we need an immigration system that recognises these needs... Migrant workers fill an important gap in Scotland's labour market, and this cap will leave many employers struggling to recruit' (SNP 2010b). The statement above shows that it would be too simplistic to call SNP immigration policies 'open door', but the overall attitude and rhetoric towards immigration has been positive, certainly in comparison to UK government.

The vast majority of party representatives interviewed concur with the party's stance and have a positive attitude towards immigration, recognising the demographic and economic need for immigration in Scotland: 'At the moment, immigration is small scale, we have an aging population, East Europeans are going back. We need to think

about demographics' (SNP 01 – 8th September 2009), 'the population has been in decline, so we need immigration for growth' (SNP 09 – 28th November 2009) and 'we do need more people, I do not care where they are from' (SNP 5 – 31st August 2009). Party representatives are positive about the economic contributions immigrants can make to Scottish society: 'People who emigrate are very motivated to make the best of it which will also help Scotland. They may put in more effort. They can be powerful to develop economies' (SNP 6 – 16th September 2009). All in all, there is agreement that immigration is economically and demographically not only beneficial but necessary for Scotland.

SNP representatives do see the need for restrictions. Although some interviewees are in favour of scrapping controls altogether, they recognise this is not in line with general party policy: 'We need more people – I may have a more extreme view on immigration. I don't distinguish between economic and political migrants. Anybody who wants to come here [can come here]. I would be interested in looking at an open border policy' (SNP 04 – 28th September 2009). Most interviewees recognise a necessity for restrictions but believe that controls should be less strict than those proposed by the UK government and that different criteria for Scotland should apply. The restrictions are considered necessary to maintain a Scottish identity: 'Scotland isn't full up [but] you have to manage immigration to ensure that people have a shared identity. This is where Scottish identity is very valuable but we are not full up' (SNP 01 – 8th September 2009). Requirements for restrictions are also deemed necessary as there are economic limits as to how many immigrants Scotland can absorb. As the number of immigrants needs to be restricted, it is particularly the skills that immigrants possess which are considered important: 'Scotland needs more people, workers, people with skills. Not just tradesmen but professionals and intellectuals. If they contribute to society then they are welcome. If people simply come to take advantage of a system, they are not welcome' (SNP 28 – 27th August 2009). Furthermore, party representatives recognise the possible backlash of increased immigration and therefore that it should be controlled: 'You cannot go too far if the

population goes against it. At the moment it is ok about immigration. We could increase it... but we have to avoid the situation that has happened in parts of England. I can sympathise as they feel pressure of immigrants in some areas. We are not full' (SNP 10 – 30th November 2010). Economic and demographic considerations are important but party representatives recognise the limits of these arguments. Nevertheless, it can be said that the SNP advocates a pro-immigration policy as it is asserted to be in Scotland's economic and demographic interests. However, this is not the only reason why the SNP has had a pro-immigration stance.

The SNP proclaims itself to be a civic national party. This means the party perceives itself as open and welcoming to immigrants and other newcomers. But as the terms 'nationalist' and 'nationalism' have many negative connotations often associated with xenophobia and even racism, the party has to guard itself against any accusations of narrow nationalism as it may taint the its image. Adopting pro-immigration policies shows that the SNP is inclusive and counteracts any association with ethnic and exclusive nationalism. For similar reasons the party has actively developed links with ethnic minorities in Scotland. Bashir Ahmad, the first elected MSP from an ethnic minority background in 2007, was an important symbolic figure in the SNP. He had founded the SNP-affiliated group Asian Scots for Independence in 1995. The group was established to attract more Asian Scots, comprising the largest ethnic group in Scotland, to the party. Appealing to ethnic minorities has two advantages. Firstly, as stated above, it allows the SNP to present itself as an inclusive party that does not just serve the interests of 'ethnic Scots' but of all groups living in Scotland. However, the strategy of associating oneself closely with a minority also brings its difficulties. Not everybody in the SNP is fully sympathetic towards the Asian Scots for Independence group; some regard the group as too exclusive and narrow as it consists almost solely of members from a very specific section of the ethnic minority community in Scotland. The following interviewee highlights this: 'You may as well call it Scots Pakistani Muslim Men for independence' (SNP 15 – 18th January 2010). Efforts are being made to make the group more accessible to women, other religions and other ethnic

backgrounds. There are 'younger [members] who are more liberal but they are constrained by the patronage of the older generation' (SNP 15 – 18th January 2010). The second benefit of close association with ethnic minorities is that ethnic minorities traditionally voted for Labour in Scotland, the SNP's main competition. Most ethnic minorities live in Glasgow, an area which was historically dominated by the Scottish Labour Party. The SNP was therefore keen to make inroads into both the ethnic communities and simultaneously the Glasgow area (Economist 2009; Times 2010). Both aims, appealing to immigrant populations and establishing dominance in the Glasgow area, were achieved in the 2011 landslide SNP victory.

The SNP's inclusive attitude towards external immigrants also applies to internal immigrants (English). The affiliated group 'New Scots for Independence' consists primarily of migrants from south of the border. Hussein and Miller (2006) argue that Scotland has been more negative about internal immigration (Anglophobic) than it has been about external immigration (xenophobic), and in particular in relation to Muslims (Islamophobic). However, Watson asserts that there is little anti-English sentiment in Scotland (Watson 2003). Certainly within the SNP there is little appetite for an explicit anti-English sentiment (Mitchell *et al.* 2011). The SNP has not associated itself with extreme anti-English movements like Settler's Watch, a group dedicated to driving the English out of Scotland. In fact the SNP expelled several party members who were found to be Watch members (Independent 1993). In the distant past Scottish nationalism had been associated with some famous anti-English figures such as one of Scotland's most famous poets Hugh MacDiarmid, who was associated with the National Party of Scotland (NPS), but was expelled in the 1930s (Finlay 1994).⁵⁸ Later on, the '55 Group could be identified as an Anglophobe group in the SNP. They published a pamphlet entitled 'The English: Are They Human?' – such anti-English attitudes were not compatible with the party's mainstream and the group members were expelled (Lynch 2002). Anti-English attitudes are now virtually non-existent in the SNP and are certainly not expressed by its leadership. None of the interviewees

⁵⁸ MacDiarmid explained in an interview with Nancy Gish how he had been influenced by other anti-English poets (Gish 1979: 147).

expressed any anti-English views, although it may be unlikely that such views would be expressed by those that hold them in an interview setting. However, as shall be shown further on in this chapter, survey data (Table 7.1) which is completely anonymous also shows little evidence of anti-English attitudes in the SNP. All in all, the party has portrayed itself as an inclusive party and has invited and been open to people from different backgrounds. Such association has been of considerable symbolic and political importance. It sends out a message that the SNP's conception of Scottishness is inclusive.

Some research suggests that left wing parties have been historically more supportive of pro-immigration policies and a multicultural society (Jupp 2003). Although autonomist parties do not easily map onto a left-right spectrum (Hepburn 2009) the SNP regards itself as a predominantly social democratic, left of centre party, but is also able to attract support from the right (see chapter 4). Not only does the SNP regard itself as centre left but it also argues that Scotland is more left of centre than England: 'Scotland leans more to social democratic political culture than England as a nation – not all of England – but it is a bit more Conservative' (Interview 5 – 31st August 2009). It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to assess whether such a claim is correct, but what can be said here is that the SNP regards Scotland as more social democratic and that a pro-immigration position fits in with a more compassionate and socially aware collective self-image.

When asked if there are differences between Scotland and England in terms of attitudes towards immigration, one interviewee argued that Scottish control of asylum and immigration policies was necessary as Scotland has not only different needs but also a different attitude towards immigration issues: 'We need our own policy on asylum and immigration. On asylum there is a different attitude in Scotland' (SNP 01 – 8th September 2009). The following respondent stressed Scotland's historic experience with immigration from which it had learned and developed a different attitude: 'Yes [we do have a different attitude], but we need to be careful, we cannot be complacent. It must be because of our experience with immigration, Irish and

European integration' (Interview 11 – 19th September 2009). Others also argue that Scotland is more left wing and does not face extremism as evident in England: 'The fact that the BNP have no presence in Scotland is significant, the obsession with immigration in much of the English press is unhealthy – the right wing press' (SNP 9 – 28th November 2010). However, many party representatives qualified their answers. They recognise that Scotland has not faced the same immigration pressures as some parts of England: 'If half of Glasgow became Bangladeshi we would have the same problems. Different cultural norms living among you can be unsettling. We are no better than England but we have not had the same problems' (SNP 07 – 15th September 2009).

The SNP has been very critical of the UK Home Office and its treatment of failed refugees has come under particular scrutiny. The party argues that many of the methods used by the UK Home Office are unacceptable. Some commentators have noted that the UK Home Office tactics and policies were seen as un-Scottish across the Scottish political spectrum (Skilling 2007: 115). The SNP has publicly raised concerns about the deportation of asylum seekers and their families and has opposed the incarceration and criminalisation of asylum seekers by the UK Home Office. In particular, 'dawn raids' and the imprisonment of children of failed asylum seekers in Dungavel detention centre have been deeply unpopular, not just within the SNP but also with other Scottish parties. The SNP has strongly opposed such practices both in Government and opposition (SNP 2008). The SNP has not been the only political party in Scotland that opposes the Home Office's practices but it has been very vocal on the issue. On many occasions, SNP MSPs and MPs have pleaded with the UK Home Office to halt the practice. In 2008 an agreement with the UK Border Agency was reached, meaning that families with children would no longer be held in detention centres (Scotland Office 2008). This did not lead to a total ban on the practice and in 2009 the SNP reacted strongly when it became clear that the practices were continuing (SNP 2009a).

Supporting pro- immigration policies is not the same as having a positive attitude towards multiculturalism. How does the SNP regard other cultures and what are their rights and responsibilities? As was seen, a distinction can be made between those that stress cultural uniformity and cultural plurality. These are not mutually exclusive and are therefore difficult to measure – it is a matter of emphasis. There are party representatives who stress the importance of different cultures and believe that the facilities and opportunities to maintain these cultures have to be provided, such as allowing for specific educational needs to maintain a culture: ‘Maintaining [one’s] culture is fine as long as you are not harming anybody else. Muslim schools are fine – I would have a problem if they were extremist’ (SNP 08 – 16th September 2009). Some also stressed the importance of cultural diversity for the host society: ‘It would be crude if they could not retain their own culture. Ethnic diversity is valuable.... It makes for a richer environment’ (SNP 03 – 8th September 2009). However, the same respondent highlighted the limits of cultural diversity: ‘You can’t change the apparatus of the state to accommodate other people that are coming in. For example you can’t start changing the education system, to teach history of the subcontinent because a lot of people come from there’ (SNP 03 – 8th September 2009).

When it comes to the issue of providing state funding to maintain cultural diversity there were few party representatives in favour because it was too expensive; ‘you can’t financially support every culture. Keeping languages alive is very expensive’ (SNP 26 – 26th August 2006). The following respondent did not regard it as a task of government: ‘Opening a Mosque [is ok], I would help raise funds but would not use tax money. You have to support culture without throwing money at it’ (SNP 27 – 15th September 2009), ‘I don’t think there is a role for the state. If you come from another country it is up to you and the other expats’ (SNP 30 – 5th April 2010) and ‘if a group of people from Mozambique want to get together and form a Mozambique cultural collective that is fine but what does it have to do with the taxpayer’ (SNP 10 – 30th November 2010). It was also pointed out that there were problems with supporting specific cultural groups: ‘Specifically supporting any community because it is that

community is not right that causes discontent amongst other communities' (SNP 5 – 31st August 2009).

There are those who do see room for state support for minority cultures: 'If we support Scottish culture you should support a whole of variety of cultures' (SNP 11 – 19th September 2009). The following party representative stressed the importance of maintaining one's cultural identity, not just for the individual but for society as a whole: 'If they feel that their own culture is valued, they are much more likely to feel loyal to the country' (SNP 01 – 8th September 2009). The overriding attitude is that the state should provide facilities to allow access to services, but party representatives stress the need for immigrants to integrate in their host society. The following statement can be considered representative of the overall sentiment in the party: '[The government has] a limited role in fairness. [It is] responsible for providing access to services when there is a language barrier. Ultimately I hope people would try to learn English. [The] state role is limited in supporting heritage. That is up to the people to do themselves' (SNP 13 – 7th October 2009).

In conclusion, the benefits of SNP representatives adopting pro-immigration policies and generally having positive attitudes towards ethnic minority cultures, are varied. Firstly, it is deemed to be in Scotland's economic and demographic interest to be open to different cultures. Secondly, it is considered 'un-Scottish' to not welcome immigrants. This is particularly linked to a more left wing self image of Scotland. Thirdly, it protects the party from accusations of being exclusive and ethnic nationalist. Fourthly, as immigration issues have moved up the agenda and Westminster parties have reached a consensus on more restrictive policies, it has become politically rewarding for the SNP to stress its pro-immigration attitude. It allows the party to differentiate itself from London based parties and stress specific Scottish needs. The argument can be presented in a constitutional framework, supporting a case for more control, at least, over immigration policies. This is only effective if the SNP can convince the Scottish population that there are differences in needs and that the UK government is not taking these into account. However, this is not a strategy without

risks if Scottish public opinion towards immigrants and immigration hardens as it has done in England recent years (Bromley *et al.* 2007).

Immigration and multiculturalism and the FNP

The FNP's 2007 provincial election manifesto addresses the issue of immigration and immigrants under the heading 'mutual respect':

The FNP promotes an open society which shows hospitality and respect to other cultures and ways of living. Immigrants should adapt to our culture while being able to be themselves. They must get the possibilities and the respect to do so. The authorities must provide an active contribution (FNP 2007).

Immigration issues are not a priority for the FNP and the party has not developed a comprehensive set of policies on these issues for two reasons. As stated before, the Provincial Councils and local councils in the Netherlands have little influence over immigration policies and since the FNP mainly participates politically at these levels it has not been necessary to develop a comprehensive set of policies in relation to these issues. In addition, immigration issues in Friesland are less prominent than they are in some other parts of the Netherlands, as the numbers of immigrants are low. However, as immigration has become a salient issue in Dutch politics, the FNP has had to react to issues, rather than develop a comprehensive strategy. In this section, possible economic reasons to support or oppose immigration are discussed. Secondly, the impact of being a 'national' party in relation to immigration is analysed. Thirdly, whether the FNP regards Frisian attitudes towards immigration as different from those of other parts in the Netherlands will be assessed, as will the reasons why if so. Finally, the FNP's views on multiculturalism, focussing on language issues, are addressed. Besides the party's official statements and press releases on such issues, attitudes are assessed by means of interviews with a wide range of party representatives.

The FNP does not use immigration to make an economic or demographic case for Frisian divergence from Dutch immigration policy. Even though the Frisian population is in relative decline compared to that of the Netherlands as a whole (Figure 7.5), the party sees no need to attract immigrants. However, neither can it be considered to have an anti-immigration attitude. There were few party representatives interviewed who are concerned with 'external' immigration. FNP representatives do not believe that there are problems with immigrants in Friesland at the moment: 'In Friesland that problem is much smaller than in the Randstad. It [immigration] is much more visible [in the Randstad]. There you can see an enormous influx of foreigners and also an enormous need of foreigners' (FNP 01 – 28th August 2008). Since there was no problem it is far easier to be positive: 'In Friesland we do not have the same problems with immigrants as they have in The Hague and Amsterdam and the rest of the Netherlands. That is an essential difference. It is very easy to say here [in Friesland] that they overreact in The Hague but they really have a problem and we don't. So for us it is a lot easier to talk about it' (FNP 03 – 29th August 2008).

There are party representatives who did identify some local problems: 'In Leeuwarden there are some problems' (FNP 18 – 15th March 2010) and 'some small incidents in Dokkum' (FNP 13 – 1st March 2010), but 'not in rural communities, there they are a minority' (FNP 22 – 29th March 2010). However, the impact of immigration was a consideration for the following interviewee: 'We are not an Island, we have Polish [immigrants] but they leave again. There have been numerous asylum seekers, people are a bit wary initially but very accepting after a while' (FNP 20 – 24th March 2010). All in all, the impact of external immigration is considered small and 'the FNP manifesto does not include these themes' (FNP 2 – 29th August 2008). Another representative stated that 'practically, these issues are discussed at a local level' (FNP 4 – 30th August 2008). Concerns about the number of internal immigrants (from other parts of the Netherlands, in particular the Randstad) seem to be more mainstream, although most interviewees did not raise this as a specific concern. In 2003 the party achieved its best result to date in the provincial elections (13.4 per cent). The campaign for that election

was dominated by the issue of the construction of a magnetic high speed railway link from the Randstad to the north, a project the FNP opposed. In addition to arguments that the rail project would be expensive, unable to provide economic benefits and would have a negative impact on the Frisian landscape, it was also argued that the fast link would lead to an 'influx of commuters who have no social, cultural and economic connection with the region' (FNP 2003a). The party questioned whether the link would lead to higher house prices, which would have a negative effect on the 'indigenous' population. Furthermore, the party expressed cultural concerns; Friesland would become even more like the Randstad (FNP 2003b). In other words, it would become more Dutch and less Frisian.

Since Dutch culture has a hegemonic position throughout the Netherlands and in Friesland (Penrose 1989) the concern is that further 'internal immigration' may erode Frisian culture. Such views were also expressed in some interviews with party representatives and, on occasions, clearly topped economic considerations: 'I don't think we need more immigrants because then it will put pressure on Frisian. Especially Dutch culture has that impact. Now it is confined to the cities but if rural areas are starting to feel these pressures it is a threat. Small villages with large non Frisian minorities are dangerous as it is always the Frisians that adapt to the Dutch' (FNP 11 – 5th January 2010).

Attitudes towards 'incomers' from further afield are seen as less threatening. Most party representatives are willing to accommodate asylum seekers: 'The FNP is in favour of asylum seekers' support and think money should be made available to support them' (FNP 12 – 13th August 2008). In 2000 the party ensured that money was made available for illegal foreigners (Leeuwarder Courant 2000) and in 2002 the FNP members of the council in Boarnsterhim resisted the extradition of several failed asylum seekers in the locality, as these members had lived there for over five years and were well integrated (Leeuwarder Courant 2002). Further to humanitarian considerations when considering issues around asylum, 'newcomers' from outwith the Netherlands do not threaten Frisian culture in the same way as Dutch 'internal

immigrants' do, as they are not perceived as culturally dominant and therefore pose less of a threat.

Most party representatives do not see the need to increase immigration for economic purposes despite a declining and ageing population: 'In general the advantage of immigration is that during good economic times, we can fill the gaps in the labour market with these new people. I have to say that I am not an advocate of solving the situation of an ageing population with allowing people to settle here. As such, it does not matter, our population is large enough and the country is densely populated; we do not really need any more people. Even when our labour force is ageing it should be possible to keep going, also economically' (FNP 03 – 28th August 2008). Another representative stated that 'it is ridiculous to say that an ageing population is a problem. Why would it be a problem? As a society we have always wanted economic growth and otherwise there is a problem. But in fact, the problem is that we need economic growth. We are never satisfied and want more and more' (FNP 06 – 9th June 2009). In short, demographic and economic considerations do not always take priority in the FNP's thinking, especially when they are at odds with cultural concerns. Therefore, immigration is not regarded as a solution for negative demographic trends or lack of economic growth by some respondents, because these are not considered to be problems.

The FNP proclaims itself to be a civic national party. Negative attitudes towards immigration can lead to accusations of narrow exclusive nationalism. Therefore, the party has to be more careful than other parties when it comes to the use of language in relation to immigrants. There have been sporadic occasions on which the party has had to distance itself from more 'exclusive' language used by some of its members. In 1985 Jan Bearn Singelsma, the FNP's first member of the Provincial Council in 1966, was accused of making alleged racist remarks. In a radio programme in 1985 he had argued that foreigners who had only been in the Netherlands for a short time should not be allowed to vote. He was quoted to have said 'this country is already a heaven (el Dorado) for foreigners' (Leeuwarder Courant 1985a – author's translation).

Singelsma claimed that his comments had been taken out of context, that the interviewer had asked leading questions and that he was speaking in personal capacity (Leeuwarder Courant 1985c). The FNP was quick to disassociate itself from their former leader. The FNP programme at the time stated: 'Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation and disability has to be actively fought against' (Leeuwarder Courant 1985b). Therefore, if Singelsma's arguments were of an anti-immigrant nature, there is no indication that such views were held within the FNP mainstream.

A similar scenario was played out in 2007 when a local councillor, after hearing that a family of Congolese or Burundi asylum seekers was to be housed in his street, declared that 'such a family does not belong here... it will become a mess, these people have never been taught in Africa how to cut the hedges' (Leeuwarder Courant 2007a). The story was picked up by the national newspapers (NRC 2007) and led to considerable negative press reports for the FNP. However, within the party there was no support for the councillor's opinion and the party dealt with the situation decisively by distancing itself from the remarks. The councillor resigned a few days later, although he was allowed to remain an FNP member.

Party representatives were quick to dismiss the events as unfortunate and stressed that 'there are no factions in the FNP. In a very distant past there may have been some but that was in a different context when the nuances were somewhat different. But we have never really had people that were in the danger zone' (FNP 03 – 29th August 2008). Another representative stated that 'there has never been a problem within the FNP. Xenophobia has never played a part in the FNP' (FNP 01 – 28th August 2008). These two accounts highlight three points. Firstly, not all those associated with the FNP have the same ideas when it comes to attitudes towards foreigners, but anti-immigration attitudes are held at the personal level and do not constitute an organised faction in the party. Secondly, the FNP mainstream has always distanced itself from anti-immigration overtones and has taken a clear position that it does not wish to be associated with anti-immigration ideas or rhetoric. Thirdly, the party seems fully aware

of the dangers of association with extremist views. The following response to events surrounding the anti-immigrant remarks made by the FNP councillor in 2007 illustrates this point:

It is very easy for people to associate us with such statements. At the moment if an FNP member says something like this [the remarks of the councillor in 2007], that confirms it to Dutch people; narrow nationalism, fascism, Nazism. Dutch people have the tendency to overreact to nationalism. You are almost immediately labelled as a right wing extremist. So when somebody says something like that it reinforces the images for the whole FNP (FNP 03 – 29th August 2008).

There is an awareness that the FNP has to be more careful than others in relation to their rhetoric on immigration: 'For us as FNP we have to be very careful. We can't afford [to use tougher language towards immigrants], like the CDA and VVD can. We don't really have a need to but we have to be very careful because the image is very sensitive' (FNP 03 – 29th August 2008). Therefore, whereas other parties and politicians may be able to express more critical views towards immigrants, for the FNP this is more difficult without being labelled extremist.

One of the ways of countering accusations of exclusivity is by associating oneself with minority groups. The FNP does include members from other parts of the Netherlands, but there are few non-Dutch members. There have been attempts to establish closer links with minority communities. In Leeuwarden, contact was established with a relatively large Kurdish community in the city. The party argued that there were similarities between the Frisian minorities' situation and the Kurdish position in Turkey as they both fought for more rights for their respective cultural group (Leeuwarder Courant 2005). The party attempted to get one of the Kurdish representatives on the FNP party list in the local municipal elections in Leeuwarden. However, this failed due to resistance within the Kurdish community (Interview 9 – 12th June 2009). The FNP could potentially have benefited from closer links with ethnic communities in two

ways. Firstly, forging links with local minority groups allows the party to present itself as inclusive and civic. Secondly, there are also votes to be won; although the Kurdish community in Leeuwarden is relatively small, the FNP can make electoral inroads in Leeuwarden, a city where it has historically had limited success. All in all, the party has been relatively unsuccessful in forging official links with minorities.

The FNP has long declared ideological neutrality and wished not just to appeal to the left or right orientated electorate, but to all Frisians. Nevertheless, the majority of FNP members place themselves on the centre left of the political spectrum (see chapter 4 – Figure 4.4). Furthermore, the party is generally recognised as centre left. Additionally, the party's programme has a lot in common with a 'leftist' policy agenda, prioritising social policies, the environment and pacifism. However, the party does not assert that Friesland is more left wing than other parts of the Netherlands. In chapter 4 it was shown that most members vote for left wing or centrist parties in state-wide elections (the FNP does not participate in these elections), but also that there is support for centre right wing parties such as the VVD and the CDA. However, whereas parties like the VVD and the CDA are perceived by the FNP to have adopted more anti-immigration rhetoric and policies over the past decade, the FNP has refrained from doing so: 'You can also see that people and especially in CDA and VVD clearly speak more openly and tougher about foreigners than 10–15 years ago. We don't. We have remained the same' (FNP 3 – 29th August 2008). Furthermore we see that only a relatively small proportion of FNP members intend to vote for the PVV (see chapter 4 – Table 4.6), the most anti-immigration party in the Netherlands.

It was noted earlier in this chapter that attitudes towards immigration in the Netherlands have changed. FNP representatives' opinions on whether attitudes towards immigrants in Friesland are different from other parts of the Netherlands diverge. The following respondent argued that Frisians are different: 'Foreigners are more easily accepted. Maybe because we are Frisians, maybe we have a different attitude towards foreigners' (FNP 22 – 29th March 2010). In addition, awareness of Frisian identity is regarded as important as it creates empathy towards immigrants:

‘We are also proud of our own culture and that allows us to respect other cultures and understand them. People who feel more Dutch than Frisian will have more problems with that ability to empathise’ (FNP 19 – 25th March 2010).

Others agree that attitudes are different in Friesland but do not think this is because Frisian society is different, but because Friesland is under less pressure and therefore immigrants are more easily absorbed: ‘If you live in a big city with a lot of disturbance then you may think differently’ (FNP 25 – 7th April 2010). Another interviewee stated: ‘In Friesland that problem is much smaller than in the Randstad. There, it is much more visible that there is an enormous influx of foreigners and also an enormous need of foreigners (FNP 01 – 28th August 2008). However, a further opinion expressed was that attitudes are ‘not so different from the rest of Netherlands’ (FNP 18 – 15th March 2010) and a diverse range of attitudes in Friesland were identified: ‘Within Friesland you do indeed see that sometimes things go wrong. The problems in Kollum⁵⁹ have given Friesland a bad name. But it is a mixed image. On the other side, Friesland has a reputation for treating refugees very well. In Witmarsum people that had been extradited by the government, have been given shelter for a long time... So Friesland has shown its best side’ (FNP 01 – 28th August 2008).

Multiculturalism has become a widely debated topic in the Netherlands and views have become polarised. Interestingly the opinions within the FNP on a multicultural society diverge to both extremities. Firstly, there are those who regard it as very negative. They find multicultural society ‘dramatic, you lose a certain identity and certain structures of values and norms’ (FNP 11 – 5th January 2010). Another representative stated that ‘I find it [multicultural society] horrible. Supporters of multiculturalism want to mix cultures and that is what I am afraid of. They should adapt but we should realise we have something which is unique, worth saving’ (FNP 18 – 15th March 2010). In contrast, the following respondent did not think immigrants should be able to maintain their cultures: ‘If you like your own culture so much you should remain in your own country’ (FNP 24 – 1st April 2010). It should be stressed that

⁵⁹ See page 223.

such extremist views were only expressed by a minority of FNP representatives. The following statements were made by interviewees who do see a place for cultural differences, but only in the private sphere: 'I would not be able to live in it [a multicultural society]. I'd find it difficult. ... In the private sphere you can keep your own culture. ... I don't think there should be foreign churches for people that come and live here' (FNP 21 29th March 2010) and 'I don't want to hear a call for prayer. Church bells are nicer and that is somewhat hypocritical because they may not like those church bells. But those bells play an important part in Frisian life' (FNP 10 12th June 2009). Others reject the existence of multiculturalism: 'I don't think that it [a multicultural society] exists... There is always one culture that wins and others will accept that' (FNP 15 – 5th January 2010).

However, the following FNP representatives had a far more positive attitude towards multiculturalism: 'I regard multiculturalism positively; I find it incredibly annoying when things are dictated. We cannot dictate things' (FNP 08 – 11th June 2009) and 'we can't say that we find the Frisian identity important and then tell other people that they have to adapt' (FNP 9 – 12th June 2009). Furthermore, FNP representatives, including some of those who are generally negative towards multiculturalism, can see the benefits of such a society: 'Frisian culture is very stable and set in its ways. So introducing new perspectives can be beneficial, to see if things are still going well. That gives a village a boost' (FNP 11 – 5th January 2010). However, they also stress the limits of a multicultural society and the clash of culture it can produce. Representatives who find multiculturalism positive would qualify their answer. Some female respondents would use an example that received much press coverage in the Netherlands; Muslim men who refuse to shake hands with women are regarded as being disrespectful to women. One respondent who was very positive in relation to different cultures identified this issue as an example of a situation in which value patterns clashed: 'This man [a Muslim imam] refuses to give women a handshake because they are women. I

find Rita Verdonk⁶⁰ a horrible person but then I do sometimes think that we go too far with being tolerant. We do live in the Netherlands. It is ok for people to keep their own language and culture but they do have to adapt to what we consider decent and correct in the Netherlands' (FNP 2 – 28th August 2008).

The opinions of party representatives are also divided when considering state support for immigrant and minority cultures. There are those who fiercely oppose state support: 'No, certainly not. They come here. We should not help them maintain their culture or finance mosques' (FNP 24 – 1st April 2010). Others regard it simply as not being a function of the state: 'I am a liberal so I am not in favour of subsidies' (FNP 18 – 15th March 2010). Another interviewee stated: 'I don't think that a culture should be forced upon one from the outside. I think it should come from the people' (FNP 25 – 7th April 2010). However, when linking the concepts of multiculturalism and education, on the topic of language teaching in particular, there are many in the party who advocate a multiculturalist perspective in which education would not only be available in Dutch and Frisian, but also in immigrant languages: 'I find it a shame that education in the native language for foreign children has been cancelled because it gives a certain perspective on their own culture. And the more cultures people absorb the richer they are' (FNP 03 – 29th August 2008) and 'multilingual skills are a benefit to children, as is proven by lots of research. When they grow up they will be able to learn other languages more quickly. So I think that foreigners should be educated in their native language; Berber, Kurdish or Turkish or Arabic. They should get their education in that language or two languages. And also primary education in native language, which has been stopped in the time of Fortuyn⁶¹, [but] should be reinstated' (FNP 4 – 30th August 2008). The position of those in favour of multilingual education can be explained not

⁶⁰ Rita Verdonk is a former member of the Dutch Liberal Conservative party (VVD) who served as minister of immigration and integration from 2003 to 2007. In 2007 she resigned and left the party after a scandal. She became leader of the TON Party (Proud of the Netherlands). Her views are considered anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalist by many. In 2005 she was famously refused a handshake by a Muslim Imam in front of the cameras (Youtube 2009 available on: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMq5iMUy07s>)

⁶¹ A Dutch academic and politician who was known for his anti-multiculturalist ideas. He was assassinated in May 2002.

just by the benefits it provides to the learning skills of the children of immigrants, but also in that it provides protection for Frisian as a language. Arguing that immigrants should be allowed to be taught in their mother tongue is similar to arguing that Frisian children should be allowed to be taught in Frisian.

To summarise, FNP representatives do not frame immigration issues in economic terms and representatives' attitude towards immigration are influenced by cultural considerations. Party representatives are not particularly concerned about 'external' immigration but there are some concerns about 'internal' immigration. However, FNP representatives do want to portray the FNP as an inclusive party and are aware of the dangers of negative language in relation to immigrants. However, despite the fact that the party's official programme contains what can be described as pro-multiculturalism policies and a majority of party representatives have a positive attitude towards immigration issues and multiculturalism, there are interviewees that did not refrain from what can be considered extremist language. More significantly, few party representatives would like to see immigration levels increase. This is partly a consequence of the party's focus on small scale communities and cultural protection. There is some recognition amongst representatives that attitudes towards immigration may be different in Friesland from other parts of the Netherlands, but only a few representatives see this as culturally rooted. Most regard it as a consequence of the limited pressures of immigration in Friesland. The opinions of many representatives on language can be closely associated with multiculturalist policies. They favour a multilingual society of not just Frisian and Dutch, but one where there is also room for other languages. On the other hand, the concept of multiculturalism in general evoked a range of responses that stretched from representatives who regard the term with scepticism or disdain to others who were positive.

Both the FNP and SNP have positive policies towards immigration issues and people from other cultural backgrounds. However, in the FNP there are considerably fewer party representatives who would like to see immigration levels rise. One explanation is that cultural concerns play a more important role in the FNP's thinking than economic

considerations. In the SNP an opposite trend exists. Arguments are embedded in greater concerns about Scotland's economic and demographic position, whereas in the FNP this is less of a consideration. However, neither party is of the opinion that either Frisian or Scottish society and culture are inherently more welcoming towards immigrants. Interviewees who are of the opinion that there are different attitudes towards immigrants in Scotland and Friesland, in comparison with the UK and the Netherlands as a whole, believe that such differences originate from different pressures in Scotland and Friesland in comparison to those faced at the state-wide level.

Multiculturalism as a concept evokes a wide range of responses in the FNP, from complete rejection to vehement support. In the SNP the responses are more limited to a centrist position (i.e. acceptance of cultural pluralism but also a stressing of the need for integration). In both parties there were interviewees who display awareness of the 'delicate' position of national parties in relation to negative rhetoric about immigration and ethnic minorities. The SNP has been relatively successfully in attracting support from ethnic minority groups in Scotland. The FNP has been less successful in this but has made similar efforts. For representatives in both parties, it is important to be perceived as pro-immigration/ multiculturalism as this undermines accusations of being exclusive and ethnic nationalist. However, FNP representatives in particular show a considerable range of attitudes towards multiculturalism.

Civic and ethnic national identities and relationships with immigration and multiculturalism

Similarly to topics discussed in previous chapters, it is not possible to assess all attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism in the entire memberships of both parties. It is necessary to be content with a more general assessment of these attitudes

by means of survey data. Before assessing attitudes of the wider membership, it is useful to look at the presence of 'newcomers' in both parties. The SNP's membership study contained several questions that allow the analysis of the 'origins' of party members. 10.6 per cent of SNP members, the largest group, were born outside Scotland whereas 6.7 per cent was born in England; this is fairly representative of Scotland's population (Scotland's Census 2001). However, birth alone does not determine origin; one's place of origin can also be determined through ancestral links. Mitchell *et al.* (2011: 55) show that around 7 per cent of the SNP members were not born to Scottish parents. When considering ethnic origins, 1.1 per cent of SNP party members were of non-white or mixed race origin. The 2001 census data recorded that 1.8 per cent of the Scottish population was of non-white ethnic or mixed race origin. This can be considered indicative of ethnic minorities being fairly proportionally represented in the SNP. This does not necessarily mean that SNP membership is representative of all ethnic minorities. It may be, as was suggested by one interviewee, an over-representation of one particular minority – Asian Scots and more specifically Pakistani Scots. However, considering that other ethnic minorities in Scotland are small this is hardly surprising.

In the FNP's case none of the interviewees were able to identify non-white members as party members. However, many were aware of (non-Frisian) Dutch members and in some cases the interviewees themselves were of Dutch (non-Frisian) origin. The FNP survey does provide some information in terms of where members were born. 10.8 per cent were born outside Friesland in the Netherlands and 1 per cent of members were born outwith the Netherlands. In neither party did any of the interviewees express any reservations about non-white or non-Scottish/Frisian people joining. The open membership of both parties can be considered indicative of an inclusive and civic type of nationalism.

In the following analysis the factor scores for the civic and ethnic dimensions as operationalised in chapter 5 (Figures 5.11 and 5.12) are used to determine the positions of individual party members on both dimensions. These dimensions are

considered non-competitively. Frequency tables, together with bar charts, are provided as well as the statistical measures χ^2 and contingency coefficients to measure the strength of association (for details see chapter 3).

One way of assessing attitudes towards immigration in the memberships of the parties is by analysing how many members regard immigration as a threat to their polity. Table 7.1 is the same table as Table 6.1 in the previous chapter and shows the issues which party members consider to be the biggest threats to Scotland and Friesland. Members were able to choose from a list of options and were asked to rank which threats they regard as the three greatest threats for their respective country. The scores presented are an accumulation of threat ratings (the largest, second largest and third largest) by the party members. In both the SNP and FNP, immigration issues are relatively low down the list. In the FNP's case, members are more concerned about internal immigration (17 per cent) than external immigration (5 per cent). This difference between perceiving internal and external immigration is in line with the findings in interviews. For the SNP the scores are fairly even; external immigration is regarded as a slightly bigger threat (8 per cent) than immigration from England (7 per cent).⁶² Immigration from England is of lesser concern to SNP members than Dutch immigration in the FNP's case. However, FNP members are somewhat less concerned about external immigration. Care is required when comparing inter-party percentages, as the list presented and the contexts in which they were presented are different.

⁶² Note the statement was worded as immigration from England rather than the UK as a whole. This is different in the case of the FNP. It could be hypothesised that scores would be different had the threat of immigration been from The Netherlands.

Table 7.1: Perceived threats for Scotland/Friesland

	Threat – SNP	%	Threat – FNP	%
1	Being denied North Sea oil revenues	59	Disappearance of the Frisian language	70
2	London government	49	Destruction of Frisian culture	47
3	Lack of self-confidence as a nation	45	A lack of confidence amongst Frisians	33
4	Nuclear weapons	25	Migration of young Frisians	33
5	Thatcherism	25	Large Scale Developments	28
6	Foreign ownership of Scottish businesses	16	The government in The Hague	25
7	Nuclear waste	15	Immigration from other parts of the Netherlands	17
8	Mass media	14	Globalisation	9
9	Emigration	11	Foreign ownership of Frisian business	9
10	European Union policies	9	Immigration from outside the Netherlands	5
11	Immigration from outside the UK	8	Other	5
12	Immigration from England	7	Climate change	4
13	English nationalism	3	European Union policies	4

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

SNP representatives⁶³ and the wider SNP membership are both equally (un)concerned about English immigration. The scores reported in Table 7.2 row 2 (Figure 7.6 – SNP) represent the percentages of each group that regards English immigration as one of the top three threats to Scotland. The numbers in brackets are the total *n* of the grouping that regards immigration as a threat. Thus, 7 per cent of party members regards internal immigration (English) in the top three threats for Scotland and 7 per cent of party representatives do so (Table 7.2 row 2 columns 3 and 4; Figure 7.6 block 1, SNP). There is no significant association between whether an individual is an ‘ordinary’ member or is or had been a party representative and whether they regard English immigration as a threat to Scotland.⁶⁴ However, SNP representatives are significantly less concerned about immigration from outwith the UK than SNP

⁶³ Those members that are have either now or in past held public or party office.

⁶⁴ This is represented by the chi square (χ^2) and the contingency coefficient (C) reported below the frequency scores in the table for each category which are in this case statistically not significant

members; 9 per cent of party members regard this as a threat whilst only 5 per cent of party representatives do so (Table 7.2 row 3 columns 2 and 3; Figure 7.7 Block 1 - SNP).

FNP members are slightly more concerned about external immigrations than party representatives. 5 per cent of members regard external immigration as being within the top three threats, whereas 3 per cent of party representatives do so.

Representatives are slightly more likely to regard internal immigration as a threat; 16 per cent of members regard Dutch immigration as a threat whereas 18 per cent of representatives do so. However, in both cases there are no significant associations between either regarding immigration from outwith or within the Netherlands and being or having been a party representative (Table 7.2 columns 2 and 3; Figure 7.7 - Block 1 FNP).

In the SNP's case a small disparity exists between party members and party representatives' attitudes. In the FNP the scores are similar in orientation but not statistically significant. Furthermore, only a relatively small part of the membership regards internal or external immigration as a threat; therefore any differences that do exist between party representatives and the overall membership should not be exaggerated.

As stated throughout this thesis, one of the expectations of the civic versus ethnocultural/ ethnic framework is that those members who regard ethnic elements as important for their sense of 'Scottishness' or 'Frisianness' are more likely to be inward looking and particularistic. Those that are civic are more likely to be outward looking and pluralistic. Therefore, it would be expected that those members with an ethnic understanding of national identity would regard immigration issues to be a greater threat. Ethnic and civic dimensions are those as calculated in the confirmatory factor analysis in chapter 5. There does indeed seem to be evidence of this being the case (Table 7.2 columns 7 and 8; Figures 7.6 and 7.7 Block 3 - SNP). Respondents are more likely to regard English immigration a threat when they have high ethnic scores compared with low ethnic scores – a difference of 6 percentage points. There is also a

significant association between respondents' ethnic score and whether they regard immigration from outwith the UK as a threat, representing a difference of 8 percentage points. A similar pattern of association can be found in the FNP, but it is less strong and the results are not statistically significant (Table 7.2 columns 7 and 8; Figures 7.6 and 7.7 Block 3). FNP members are more likely to regard Dutch immigration as a threat when compared to representatives, with a difference of 5 per cent. They are also more likely to regard immigration from outwith the Netherlands as a threat if they have high ethnic scores compared with low ethnic scores. This represents a frequency difference of 3 per cent. However, neither score is statistically significant.

Table 7.2: % perceiving Internal external immigration as a threat per group

Threats	Overall scores	Party Member	Party Representative	Low Civic	High Civic	Low Ethnic	High Ethnic
Immigration from England	7 (525)	7 (361)	7 (164)	7 (228)	9 (263)	5 (156)	11 (335)
		$\chi^2 .07$; C .003		$\chi^2 (1) 2.90$; C .02		$\chi^2 (1) 68.82^{**}$; C .1 ^{**} .	
Immigration from outwith UK	8 (566)	9 (446)	5 (120)	7 (226)	9 (288)	4 (135)	12 (379)
		$\chi^2 31.57^{**}$; C 0.07 ^{**}		$\chi^2 (1) 8.49^*$; C .04 [*]		$\chi^2 (1) 123.50^{**}$; C .14 ^{**}	
Immigration from NL	17 (97)	16 (70)	18 (27)	16 (42)	18 (47)	14 (38)	20 (52)
		$\chi^2 .28$, p > .05; C .02, p > .05		$\chi^2 (1) .34$, p > .05; C 0.03, p > .05.		$\chi^2 (1) 2.67$; C 0.07	
Immigration from outwith NL	5 (27)	5 (22)	3 (5)	3 (8)	6 (15)	3 (8)	6 (16)
		$\chi^2 .76$; C .04		$\chi^2 (1) 2.23$; C 0.07		$\chi^2 (1) 2.79$; C .07	


* P < 0.05

** p < 0.001

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009


Figure 7.6: Internal immigration selected as a top three threat



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Figure 7.7: Perceptions of external immigration as a threat



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

A comparison of those members with high and low civic scores indicates that SNP members with high civic scores are less likely overall to regard immigration as a threat to Scotland than those with high ethnic scores. A comparison of columns 6 and 8 in Table 7.2 (Figures 7.6 and 7.7) shows that both the internal and external immigration

scores in the high ethnic category are higher than the scores in the civic category (two per cent and three per cent differences respectively). Table 7.2 also illustrates that those in the high civic group outscore the low civic group in terms of regarding immigration as a threat (columns 5 and 6). SNP members are more likely to regard English immigration to Scotland as a threat if they have high civic scores when compared to low civic scores, reporting a 2 per cent difference. However, there is no statistically significant association between regarding English immigration as a threat and low or high civic scores. There is a significant association between regarding immigration outwith the UK as a threat and low or high civic scores. Members are more likely to regard immigration as a threat if they have high civic scores compared with low civic scores, reporting a 2 per cent difference.

Additionally, in the FNP's case, those with high ethnic scores are slightly more likely to regard internal immigration as a threat than high civic scorers, reporting a 2 per cent difference (Table 7.2 columns 6 and 8). There is no difference in relation to external immigration. FNP members are more likely to regard immigration from within the Netherlands as a threat, reporting a 2 per cent difference. They are also more likely to regard immigration from outwith the Netherlands as a threat if they have high civic scores compared to low civic scores, reporting a 3 per cent difference. Although these results are not statistically significant the direction of association appears to be similar to that in the SNP's case.

It should be stressed that only a small percentage of the membership regards immigration as a threat. None of the categories (see Table 7.2) achieves scores higher than 20 per cent. Thus caution is needed when forming conclusions. Firstly, it should be noted that the vast majority of members of both parties do not regard immigration as a key threat to the polity. FNP members are somewhat more concerned about immigration from within the Netherlands, whereas SNP members are equally (un)concerned about internal and external immigration. Secondly, SNP representatives regard external immigration as a lesser threat than the overall membership. In the FNP such a distinction is not significant. Thirdly, for most high ethnic scorers and high civic

scorers, immigration is not regarded as being in the top three threats. However, those with high ethnic scores are more likely to consider immigration to be a threat than those with low ethnic scores and those with high civic scores. A more tentative conclusion can be made in relation to civic scorers; those with high civic scores are more likely to be concerned about immigration than those with low civic scores, suggesting that it is in fact those with lower ethnic and lower civic scores that can be considered most inclusive. This supports Sniderman and Hagendoorn's (2007) argument that concerns about immigration are linked to valuing one's own identity. It seems less important whether civic or ethnic elements of this identity are considered important. Once more it should be stressed that both parties exhibit very few concerns toward immigration and this mirrors their 'civicness'. Differences that are found here are in the margins of both parties. However, it is those differences that afford opportunity to test theoretical assumptions in relation to the civic versus ethnic framework.

The FNP membership survey included an additional measure which assessed the opinions of FNP members on external immigration. The same measure for the SNP membership is not available so an intra-party comparison can only be made. FNP members were asked if non-Dutch immigration to Friesland should increase, remain the same or decrease in the future. The overall results are presented in the second column of Table 7.3. External immigration is not regarded as one of the top three threats to Friesland by most members, but this does not mean that members believe that immigration numbers should increase. A large majority does not see the need for an increase in immigration levels (84 per cent) and just over 35 per cent would like to see levels of immigration decrease. Table 7.3 also reports the scores for the different categories of low and high ethnic or civic scorers. There is a significant association between those that have high ethnic scores and support for an increase or decrease in immigration levels (columns 5 and 6); when those members that have high ethnic scores are compared with low ethnic scores there is a 17 per cent difference. A similar pattern is identifiable when those with high civic scores are compared with low civic

scores (columns 3 and 4). There is a significant association between those that have high civic scores and support for an increase or decrease of immigration levels – an 8 per cent difference between the two groups. Overall, a similar pattern to that in the previous question emerges. It is both high ethnic and high civic scores that lead to a more restrictive view of immigration, but the association is stronger for the ethnic dimension.

Table 7.3: Do you think that the number of foreign (non-Dutch) immigrants in Friesland in the future should?

	Overall	Low Civic	High Civic	Low ethnic	High ethnic
Increase a lot	1	20 (51)	12 (30)	20 (51)	13 (33)
Increase a little	15				
Remain the same	48	49 (123)	51 (128)	54 (137)	45 (113)
Decrease a little	18	30 (75)	38 (96)	26 (66)	42 (107)
Decrease a lot	17				
N	550	249	254	254	253
		$\chi^2 (1) 8^{**};$ C .18**		$\chi^2 (1) 15.88^{**};$ C .17**	


* P < 0.05

** p < 0.001

Source: FNP survey 2009

Party membership attitudes towards multiculturalism also serve as good indicators of a link between civic and ethnic nationalism on the one hand and positive and negative attitudes towards immigration on the other. Both FNP and SNP members were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: 'It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions'. The overall scores are reported in Figure 7.8. FNP members are slightly more likely to disagree with the statement than SNP members but the overall pattern is similar. In both parties, a majority of party members disagree with the statement, suggesting a considerable appreciation and tolerance of other cultures.

Figure 7.8: Responses to the statement: ‘It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions’



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

In order to compare the attitudes of party representatives and members, the statement above has been dichotomised into those that agreed and those that disagreed, for ease of interpretation. Those that agreed with the statement have been labelled as ‘cultural uniformist’ and those that disagreed with the statement have been labelled as ‘cultural pluralists’ (Table 7.4 – Figure 7.9). The ‘neither agree nor disagree category’ showed no significant difference between party representatives and members in both parties and has therefore been omitted from the analyses. Broad categories such as cultural plurality and uniformity are of course generalisations and, as the interview data in the previous section of this chapter suggested, there are many nuances to be taken into account. However, these ‘sweeping’ categories make comparisons possible. When comparing attitudes of party representatives with members a statistically significant association between the attitudes and the position in the SNP party strata is found. Party representatives are more likely to choose the cultural plurality option than ordinary party representatives. The survey reported a 12 per cent difference between the two groups. In the FNP there is no significant

association between being a party representative and supporting either cultural plurality or uniformity. However, in the FNP party representatives are also more likely to have a culturally pluralist view. The survey reported a 4 per cent difference. The direction of association in both the SNP and FNP is similar – party representatives are more likely to have a pluralist attitude towards other cultures. However, the strength of association is different and in the FNP's case the findings are not significant.

Similarly to previous questions, it is expected that those members who have a more ethnic understanding of national identity are more inward looking and less tolerant of other cultures and therefore prefer cultural uniformity. Such a pattern does indeed seem to emerge from the data. There is a significant association between supporting either cultural uniformity or plurality and low or high ethnic scores in the SNP. SNP members are more likely to support cultural uniformity when they have high ethnic scores compared with low ethnic scores. The survey recorded a large difference of 30 per cent. In the FNP's case the association is also statistically significant. FNP members are also more likely to support cultural uniformity if they have high ethnic scores compared with low ethnic scores. Again, the difference was relatively large (19 per cent).

When high civic and high ethnic scorers are compared it can be noted that high civic scorers are more likely to be cultural pluralists than high ethnic scorers, by a margin of 6 per cent in the SNP's case and 4 per cent in the FNP's case (Table 7.4 columns 6 and 8; Figure 7.9). Furthermore, Table 7.4 (columns 5 and 6; Figure 7.9 Block 2) shows that there is a significant association between low and high civic scores and support for cultural plurality and uniformity. SNP and FNP members are more likely to support cultural plurality when they have low civic scores. In the former case a 17 per cent difference is recorded and in the latter a 13 per cent difference. In conclusion, there is a significant association between support for a cultural uniformity in Scotland/Friesland and having a more ethnic understanding of national identity, but at the same time high civic scores also lead to a preference for culturally uniform attitudes in the FNP.

Table 7.4: Responses to the statement: 'It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions' (dichotomised answers)


1	2	3 Party Member	4 Party Represent	5 Low Civic	6 High Civic	7 Low Ethnic	8 High Ethnic
Cultural Plurality	SNP	59 (2089)	71 (1233)	72 (1738)	55 (1283)	78 (1900)	48 (1121)
Cultural Uniformists		41 (1439)	29 (506)	28 (667)	45 (1060)	22 (531)	52 (1196)
		$\chi^2 (1) 68.35^{**};$ C .11**		$\chi^2 (1) 157.2^{**};$ C .18**		$\chi^2 (1) 454^{**};$ C .3**	
Cultural Plurality	FNP	77 (241)	81 (91)	86 (165)	72 (140)	87 (173)	68 (131)
Cultural Uniformists		24 (74)	20 (22)	15 (28)	28 (55)	13 (25)	32 (62)
		$\chi^2 (1) .77;$ C .04		$\chi^2 (1) 10.82^{**};$ C .17**		$\chi^2 (1) 21.48^{**};$ C .23**	

** p < .001

Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

Figure 7.9: Support for cultural pluralism



Source: SNP survey 2007

Source: FNP survey 2009

The FNP survey contained three more questions along the same theme. Similarly to the other questions, FNP representatives have no statistically different attitudes in relation to the ordinary members and therefore these are not reported. FNP members were asked if they think it is better for ethnic minorities to integrate into majority society, or to keep their own traditions and culture. Members were given an 'opt out' option that allowed them to specify that both were important. This option was included for two reasons. Firstly, it is reasonable to argue (at least from a multicultural perspective) that a member of an ethnic minority can integrate into majority society without giving up their own traditions and culture. Therefore the options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Secondly, by providing an 'opt out' option those members that feel particularly strongly about the issue can be identified. Most FNP members did indeed take the 'opt out' but a significant number chose one of the exclusive options (Table 7.5). By comparing those that believe that ethnic minorities can keep their traditions (pluralists) and those that want ethnic minorities to integrate (uniformists), it can be seen that there is a significant association between high and low ethnic scorers and the pluralist and uniformist options. FNP members are more likely to support the uniformist option when they have high ethnic scores, with an 11 per cent difference. The pattern that was identified in relation to civic scores in the previous question was also repeated. There is a statistically significant association between high civic scores and giving preference to a cultural uniformist or pluralist option. FNP members are more likely to choose the uniformist option than the pluralist option if they have high civic scores – a 9 per cent difference.

Table 7.5: Some people find it better that ethnic minorities in a country keep their own traditions and others say it is better that these groups integrate in the majority in society

	Total	Low Civic	High Civic	Low Ethnic	High Ethnic
It is better that ethnic minorities keep their own traditions and culture	14	15 (39)	13 (32)	19 (49)	10 (26)
It is better that ethnic minorities integrate with society at larger	26	21 (52)	30 (77)	20 (50)	31 (78)
Both are equally important	60	64 (163)	57 (145)	61 (157)	59 (152)
N / χ^2 and C	560	χ^2 (1) 13.26**; C .16**		χ^2 (1) 6.59*; C .11*	

* P < 0.05

** p < 0.001

Source: FNP survey 2009

As language plays such an integral part in the FNP's thinking and the party argues that being able to speak one's mother tongue is a prerequisite for a cultural group to maintain its culture and sense of identity, members were asked for their reactions to the statement: 'It is important for immigrants to be able to speak their own language amongst each other'. 68 per cent of FNP members agree that immigrants should be able to speak their own language amongst each other (Table 7.6). A minority of 11.6 per cent does not believe that it is important for ethnic minorities to speak their own language amongst each other. Interestingly, there is no statistically significant association between those that have low or high ethnic scores and agreement or disagreement with the statement (Table 7.7.) Neither is there a statistically significant association between low and high civic scores and agreement or disagreement with the proposition. In fact, those with high civic and high ethnic scores are slightly more likely to support a cultural pluralist position. In other words, when FNP members consider personal language usage, ethnic or civic attitudes do not predict the results. Language considerations seem to override the civic-ethnic pattern noted in the previous questions.

One of the ways in which ethnic minorities are able to maintain their culture is by receiving government funding for cultural support. Such a policy is closely associated

with multiculturalist thinking. FNP members were asked if ethnic minorities should receive funding to assure the survival of their culture. Nearly half of all FNP members reject the idea that ethnic minorities should receive such funding (Table 7.7). The interview data show that this does not necessarily mean that these members do not want ethnic minorities to maintain their own cultures; they may simply not regard it to be a government's task to provide support for these cultures. These results also show no significant statistical association between ethnic and civic scores and responses to the question (Table 7.7). Because some of the other questions showed a strong association between ethnic scores and support for cultural uniformity and plurality, it is somewhat surprising that in this case the answers were not associated with these dimensions. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to fully investigate the mechanism at work here – it is necessary to confine this investigation to civic versus ethnic understandings of national identity – but it could be the case that members' opinions are influenced by other considerations when it comes to spending taxpayers' money.

Table 7.6: Multiculturalist attitudes in the FNP

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
It is important for immigrants to be able to speak their own language amongst each other (n=571)	12	56	21	7	4
Ethnic minorities should receive more government funding to assure the survival of their culture (n = 569)	1	16	32	35	15

Source: FNP survey 2009

Table 7.7: Multiculturalist attitudes in the FNP dichotomised

		Low Civic	High Civic	Low Ethnic	High Ethnic
It is important for immigrants to be able to speak their own language amongst each other	Cultural plurality	84 (166)	88 (186)	86 (174)	87 (182)
	Cultural uniformity	16 (31)	12 (26)	14 (28)	13 (28)
			$\chi^2 (1) 1.02; C 0.05,$		$\chi^2 (1) .02; C 0.01$
Ethnic minorities should receive more government funding to assure the survival of their culture	Cultural plurality	24 (42)	27.4 (49)	29 (53)	22.9 (39)
	Cultural uniformity	76 (133)	72.6 (130)	71 (130)	77.1 (131)
			$\chi^2 (1) 1.66; C .07$		$\chi^2 (1) .52; C .04$

* Differences in n represent exclusions from categories (i.e. respondents who have not answered questions)

** C = contingency coefficient

Source: FNP survey 2009

Conclusion

Both the FNP and SNP are self-styled civic autonomist parties. Neither party ascriptively excludes anybody from becoming a member on grounds of religion, ethnicity, place of birth, ancestral links or cultural background, whether as a party member or a member of the nation. Both parties conceptualise the nation in such a manner that there are no definitive objective criteria for 'outsiders' or 'newcomers' to become members of the nation. However, in the FNP's case this view is somewhat more complex. As the party is mainly concerned with language, it would be difficult (but not impossible) to imagine party members who have no affiliation with Frisian as a language (see chapter 5). This does not mean that the FNP argues that membership of the Frisian nation is exclusively reserved for Frisian speakers; there are many Frisians who do not speak Frisian but do regard themselves as Frisian. Newcomers,

whether from outwith or within the Netherlands, are therefore free to join the Frisian nation and the party.

Both parties are aware of the potential harm anti-immigration policies and rhetoric can do to their 'civic' images. Both parties have to be more careful, when it comes to rhetoric and policies towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, than other political parties as association with anti-immigration attitudes can damage their overall image. This has been more of an issue in the FNP than in SNP, which has a more established and recognised civic image. In the FNP, the leadership has had to act very decisively when members have made anti-immigration remarks. This does not necessarily mean that some FNP individuals are more extreme than individuals in the SNP. Some of the scores in the survey would suggest that the SNP has a larger section of its membership acting as supporters of cultural uniformity or regarding external immigration as a threat. What it means is that the association is more damaging for the FNP than the SNP. The terms 'nationalism' and 'national' are more contested in the Netherlands than they are in Scotland; part of this has to do with history (e.g. the experiences of radical nationalism of Nazi Germany) and part of it is explained by the differences in size and success of the party. The FNP can more easily be regarded as an outsider party than the SNP, which is a large governing party. Furthermore, the SNP has been more successful than the FNP in portraying itself as inclusive, by establishing strong links with ethnic minority communities in Scotland. Additionally, party representatives are significantly more likely to have a pro-immigration attitude in the SNP than the overall membership is, whereas in the FNP such a disparity is less apparent.

As the two parties under investigation here have different *raison d'être*s (i.e. constitutional independence and cultural protection respectively), the framing of immigration issues is different. In the SNP's case, the debate is largely considered from an economic perspective where it is argued that Scotland has different needs in terms of immigration policy. This means that immigrants are welcomed as they benefit Scotland economically. In the FNP, the debate is framed culturally. This means that immigrants are welcomed as long as they do not threaten Frisian culture or – more

precisely – language. Hence internal immigration is considered a greater threat than external immigration as Dutch culture is able to threaten Frisian culture but Turkish, Kurdish, Moroccan or Somali culture is not.

In both the SNP and FNP there are party representatives who regard their polity (Scotland or Friesland) as more open and inclusive than other parts of the state of which they are part (the UK and the Netherlands). Some argue that this is because of their own 'minority experience'. However, most party representatives who argue that there are different attitudes in Friesland and Scotland recognise that this is not a result of higher moral values, but is the result of fewer immigrants in their polity, which means less pressure on services. Hence, attitudes are more positive.

In both the SNP and FNP similar trends are detected in relation to immigration issues and civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity. It is those members with high ethnic scores who are most likely to have anti-immigration attitudes and who are supporters of cultural uniformity. However, even though high civic scorers are less likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes than high ethnic scorers, this does not mean that high civic scorers are the most likely to be supportive of cultural pluralism and hold pro-immigration attitudes. In fact, when low civic and high civic scores are compared it is noted that high scorers are more likely to hold culturally uniformist and anti-immigration attitudes than the low scorers. On the one hand there is evidence to suggest that a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is merited when attitudes towards immigration issues are considered, as high ethnic scorers are less inclusive than high civic scorers. On the other hand, the position that an increased awareness of one's national identity leads to more exclusive views (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) is also vindicated to a certain extent, as both high civic and high ethnic scorers are more likely to be more exclusive than low ethnic and low civic scorers

Thus it can be concluded that the overall attitudes, rhetoric and policies of the parties are inclusive, pro-immigration and supportive of cultural pluralism, justifying their civic

credentials. Party representatives are more likely to support this attitude than the wider membership in the SNP's case, but not in the FNP's case. Those with high ethnic scores are more likely to be culturally uniformist and have anti-immigration attitudes than low ethnic scorers. Those with high civic scores are also more likely to be cultural uniformists and have anti-immigration attitudes compared with low civic scorers, although the association is less strong than in the ethnic case.

Chapter 8 - Conclusions

This thesis aimed to answer two questions; i) how do SNP and FNP members understand their own national identity and ii) how do different understandings of national identity relate to attitudes toward others? These 'others' were operationalised through attitudes towards European integration (external others) on the one hand and, on the other hand, through attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism (internal others). The discussion of the theoretical literature in chapter 2 led to the formulation of certain expectations in relation to the evidence presented in later empirical chapters (chapters 5, 6 and 7), which – broadly speaking – were that ethnocultural model conceptions of national identity were more exclusive than civic conceptions. In this concluding chapter the theoretical framework is summarised and the main findings of the thesis are presented in line with this framework. Subsequently, the extent to which the findings can be generalised are also discussed. In the last section, the conclusions are placed within the broader literature.

Two important issues were highlighted in relation to the first research question in chapter 2. Firstly, the literature on national identities shows that there are complex theoretical relations between civic and ethnocultural/ethnic components of national identity. Such tensions were already apparent in earlier work (Kohn 2005; Plamenatz 1975; Meinecke 1970) but more recent work has further highlighted such complexities (Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002; Nieguth 1999; Brown 1999, 2000; Kaufmann 2000; Brubaker 1996, 1998; Smith 1991). Additionally, the complex nature of the framework has been confirmed in several empirical studies (Janmaat 2006; Björklund 2006; Krejčí and Velímský 1981; Shulman 2002; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Abdelal *et al.* 2009). These authors warn that characteristics which measure an exclusive, ethnocultural/ethnic type of national identity based on characteristics such as ancestry or birth and an inclusive civic type of national identity, which includes characteristics such as feeling a national identity or respecting a

country's institutions, can be considered non-competitively. If the framework is used as a single continuum it represents a see-saw; items on either side can weigh equal amounts and create an equilibrium, but if one side is heavier than the other (even if only slightly), the balance tips, the other criteria are outweighed and everything slides to one side. Instead, it is better to think of the different elements of national identities as blocks that can be stacked up. Certain blocks form the base and others can be placed on top of them. The foundations are essential but they can be 'topped up' with other criteria. A framework that takes into account the non-competitive nature of different types of national identity avoids overly simplistic categorisation.

Secondly, not all characteristics that are important when considering national identity fit into a dichotomous civic versus ethnocultural/ethnic framework, by which one set of variables are considered inclusive and the other exclusive. In fact, most characteristics show a considerable level of ambiguity in terms of their inclusiveness and exclusiveness. Therefore, unpacking these two dimensions of national identity by recognising several other dimensions is merited. This thesis stresses that the inclusion of cultural criteria in an ethnocultural/ethnic dimension and territorial criteria in the civic dimension is problematic. Once a model which includes 4 dimensions (civic, territorial, cultural and ethnic) has been created, the two most 'extreme' dimensions in terms of their inclusivity (civic – without territorial criteria) and exclusivity (ethnic) can be used to further explore their relationships with attitudes towards others.

The civic and ethnic dimensions are considered the most definite, because the characteristics that define them are the least ambiguous in terms of the ability of an individual to choose whether or not to fulfil them. But even considering these criteria, interpretations of these characteristics are heavily dependent on contextual factors. Criteria can be interpreted as inclusive or exclusive based on how dependent they are on an individual's choice (if no choice is involved they are ascriptive). The most inclusive criteria are those in which individuals have free choice to fulfil them, such as 'respecting institutions and laws' or 'feeling a national identity'. If these criteria form the basis of a national identity then individuals will be able to adopt that national

identity should they wish to do so. The most exclusive criteria are those over which the individual has no control, such as birth and ancestry.

More ambiguous are those criteria which are related to culture, such as language and religion, in which cases individuals can choose to adopt them although their ability to do so is context dependent. As was noted in chapter 5, the level of restrictiveness that a language criterion imposes varies in accordance with the technical skills that have to be acquired by an individual. Additionally, the obligation placed on an individual regarding whether or not they should speak the language changes the level of restrictiveness. If an individual is expected not only to acquire a certain level of linguistic skill for use in the public sphere but is also expected to use the acquired language in the private sphere in order to be considered a fellow national, then the criterion imposes far greater restrictions and therefore becomes more exclusive. Furthermore, even when language skills have been acquired a distinction between native speakers and non-native speakers remains in the form of an accent which can be used to exclude others.

The ambiguous nature of religion, in terms of its inclusivity or exclusivity, is less apparent than the case of language. Religion is by definition regarded as an integral part of one's self and changing religion can be considered less open to choice than changing a language.⁶⁵ There is of course a key difference between language and religion, considered as cultural factors. Languages can be adopted non-competitively; one can adopt a new language without losing the old one. In the case of religion this is in many cases not feasible and can therefore be considered more exclusive than language as a criterion.

Additionally, territorial criteria such as 'living in a country' are more ambiguous and depend on whether access to territory is restrictive. On the one hand, territorial

⁶⁵ In many cases language is also considered an integratal part of one's self and is not something that a person would want to give up easily. For instance, many immigrants teach their children their native language, not because the parents do not speak the second adopted language but because they see it as an important cultural heritage that defines who they are and allows their children to be part of that community.

criteria such as residence in a geographical space associated with a country can be considered inclusive if they allow all residents of that space to become part of the nation and assume a national identity. On the other hand, this necessarily excludes people from outwith that space. Here there are also different levels of restrictiveness. If a person requires a long period of residence in order to adopt a national identity then the criterion is more restrictive than when that period is short.

In conclusion, any framework that hopes to analyse national identity should be able to accommodate different levels of subjective/inclusive and objective/exclusive criteria in a flexible manner. The framework presented in this thesis does not include all dimensions of national identity. However, it has the flexibility to accommodate other dimensions.

One of the implications of the framework adopted in this thesis is that if civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity equal certain levels of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, it is necessary to ensure that these dimensions include those criteria which are least ambiguous. Many authors identify a civic dimension, but this usually includes territorial criteria which cannot be considered completely inclusive under all circumstances. Even more problematic is that authors such as Kohn (2005), Plamenatz (1975) and Ignatieff (1993) identify an ethnic dimension which includes cultural criteria and hence should be labelled as ethnocultural. This has been considered problematic by some scholars (Kymlicka 1999) and this thesis supports that argument. An ethnic dimension should include only those criteria that are most ascriptive.

The set of criteria used in this thesis is not exhaustive; race, ethnicity, historical awareness, accents, specific cultural practices and ideological commitment are but a few of the variables through which this research can be expanded. However, the variables used in this thesis allow the uncovering of relations between inclusive and exclusive variables and therefore enable an understanding what the implications are in relation to the second research question.

Operationalising the civic versus ethnic theoretical model using the SNP and FNP as cases requires some considerations. The model has not been operationalised in relation to members of autonomous political parties before but previous research on national identity makes it possible to formulate some expectations. One such expectation is that those members who conceptualise national identity using inclusive civic characteristics have more favourable attitudes towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism. However, the operationalisation of attitudes towards 'others' in relation to civic and ethnic national identities is not unproblematic either. The literature shows that civic identities are associated with liberalism (Kohn 2005; Brown 2000) and liberal critiques of European integration and multiculturalism are common (for examples of European integration see: Siedentop 2001; Maedowcroft, J. 2002; Collignon 2007; for examples of multiculturalism see: Barry 2001).

The relationship between ethnic identities and attitudes towards 'others' in the form of European integration, immigration and multiculturalism is less complex; those members who have high ethnic scores are more critical of European integration, immigration and multiculturalism.

Operationalising the civic versus ethnocultural framework in relation to two autonomist parties provides valuable insights into the complexities of the model. As members and representatives of parties such as the SNP and FNP are likely to have strong views on what their national identity means, they make compelling cases. Furthermore, both parties have increasingly had to deal – firstly – with issues in relation to internal 'others', because of high levels of immigration in their respective states (although these pressures have been lower in the areas they aim to represent) and – secondly – external 'others', because of European integration. As such, both parties have had to actively engage with these processes and adopt policies, ideas and narratives to fit them into their broader objectives.

Both research questions aimed to take into account the differences between different party strata. A distinction between party members on the one hand and party representatives on the other is made, with the latter being defined as those members that had or at one point in the past had been either party office holders or public office holders. This group can be regarded as the public face of the party. Differences between the two different party strata could be expected in all areas of interest relating to the questions posed in this thesis; understandings of national identities, attitudes towards European integration and attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism. There seem good reasons to expect that party representatives are more likely to stress civic inclusive criteria. Through their political activism and increased interactions within the party they become more aware of the civic versus ethnic framework than 'ordinary' members. In other words, party activism has an educational impact. At the same time, a certain level of socialisation within the party can also be expected to take place, which make representatives more aware of the party's civic nature and credentials. However most importantly, it is to be expected that parties contain members who do not always agree with the mainstream and certain issues. Such members are more likely to remain ordinary members than they are to become representatives.

As was shown in chapter 6 and 7, there is considerable evidence that 'elites' often take more positive attitudes towards European integration, immigration and multiculturalism than the general public. Although this evidence is based on differences between the electorate and political elites such disparities can be expected to be mirrored between party representatives and 'ordinary' members and seem particularly applicable to autonomist parties, which have some of the highest levels of difference between elites and voters in terms of attitudes towards European integration (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002) .

Making a distinction between party representative perceptions and ordinary members' perceptions of the issues at hand is particularly important as one source of evidence used in this thesis – interviews – is based on party representatives, whereas another

evidence source for this thesis – survey data – includes both party members and representatives.

Limitations of research

Before the main findings from the evidence as presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 (that will answer the research questions) are summed up, some limitations of the research should be stressed as these will restrict the ability to make generalisations in certain areas.

Firstly, the two parties selected as the cases in this thesis are generally perceived as civic autonomist parties. Although ethnic variables were discussed in order to establish their presence in civic autonomist parties, there has been no discussion of perceived ethnic autonomist parties and their use of both civic and ethnic elements. This does not mean that nothing can be said about the nature of ethnic criteria, but these should be discussed in the context of what are, in general, clearly civic parties. Thus when it was noted that criteria such as birth and ancestry are part of how members of civic autonomist parties understand their national identity, it should be recognised that members of civic parties may mean something different than, for example, members of autonomist parties which are considered ethnic and exclusive may do.

Secondly, this also means that care should be taken over how to express the conclusions in normative terms. Neither the cases under investigation nor the scope of data justify the use of terminology such as 'liberal' and 'illiberal' (Kohn 2005) or 'collectivistic' and 'individualistic' (Greenfeld 1992) and certainly not 'Western' and 'Eastern' (Kohn 2005; Plamenatz 1975) or 'benign' and 'nasty' (Gellner 1983). Instead, terms that relate to the inclusivity and exclusivity of conceptions of national identity without value judgements are preferable. These are expressed through attitudes that members hold towards policy areas that involve 'others'.

There is a further limitation which relates to the organisational structure of political parties in general. In this thesis a distinction was made between 'ordinary' members and party representatives who were considered the public face of the party. Different sources of evidence were used to analyse their attitudes. The analysis highlights any potential differences between these two party strands, which can be expected. However, according to the literature, the representative category can be divided up into multiple groups (elite – sub-elites) which according to some hold different attitudes (May 1972). It was not within the scope of this thesis to fully apply this framework. Instead, a more limited approach was taken which distinguishes between ordinary members and party representatives.

Key findings: different conceptions and attitudes

As stated above, there is reason to assume differences in attitudes between party representatives and party members, not only in relation to their understandings of national identity, but also in terms of attitudes towards European integration as well as immigration and multiculturalism. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that there is indeed some divergence between the two. In the SNP, members are more likely to have higher ethnic scores but also higher civic scores when compared to representatives. In the FNP the pattern is similar. Representatives also appear to hold more positive attitudes towards European integration and cultural pluralism. Although this raises interesting questions about how attitudes are structured in autonomist parties, this was not the key focus of this thesis. It does, however, have a direct impact on the results. As stated, care needs to be taken, particularly in relation to interview data, to avoid generalising without highlighting that these data are based on representatives attitudes only and that therefore there may be differences in relation to the overall membership of these parties. On the other hand, differences between members and representatives should not be overstated as they were usually small.

Furthermore, what seems to be the case is that the underlying mechanisms were similar in direction but were less apparent in the case of party representatives in comparison to members.

The evidence presented in chapter 5 shows that national identity is understood to have multiple dimensions which are not necessarily competitive. It was first of all shown that there is considerable evidence that both parties can be considered civic autonomist parties. Both are highly aware of the importance of being perceived as civic and inclusive. In the FNP's case a relatively high number of members and representatives felt uncomfortable with the term 'national' in the party's name and wanted to change that name. Additionally, in the SNP there was an awareness of negative connotations of terms such as national and nationalism but interview evidence suggests that party representatives were overall more comfortable with the term 'national' and there have been no serious attempts to change the party's name.

The SNP has been able to stress its civic and inclusive nature by actively recruiting minorities to be part of the party – and of Scotland – and by linking questions of national identity and sovereignty to economic issues rather than focussing on cultural and emotionally-laden concepts of national identity. The FNP has made similar attempts but has been less successful. Unlike the SNP there is no meaningful minority representation in the FNP and even though its programme stresses its inclusive nature. Crucially, the party is identified as representing themes such as language and culture. This makes the FNP more susceptible to being portrayed as exclusive.

Despite their civic credentials, other facets of national identity including those associated with more ethnic conceptions are also salient in both parties. Almost all SNP members recognise civic criteria as important but a majority would 'top up' these criteria with more exclusive ethnic and cultural criteria. The only marker that was clearly rejected by most SNP members as a criterion for national identity was to be of a Christian faith. In the FNP's case, the basis for a Frisian national identity was language

and some civic criteria, but these could also be topped up with others including more exclusive ethnic criteria.

It does not come as a surprise that a wider range, which include ascriptive criteria such as birth and ancestry and voluntaristic criteria such as feeling a certain national identity and respecting institutions and rules, are considered part of Frisian and Scottish national identity in both the FNP and SNP. Birth and ancestry are compelling criteria which can be used to form communal bonds whether they are considered imagined or not. Most people will simply regard themselves as part of a nation because they were born into it (MacCormick 1982: 249-250). However, most of those born into a nation will recognise they are part of that nation because they feel connected to it and may recognise that others (who have not been born into the nation) can also acquire that feeling. This does not mean that birth and ancestry are no longer considered to be important criteria for national identity – they still form part of national identity for the vast majority of members. Only when the possibility of adopting a national identity through voluntarist or open criteria is denied can a conception of national identity be considered truly exclusive. Within inclusive conceptions of national identity, ancestry and birth remain important. Based on the findings from the interview data, it can be said that in the SNP's case such a truly exclusive understanding of national identity is non-existent and that in the FNP's case it is very rare.

It was also argued that different criteria should be considered within their contexts. For FNP members, Frisianness is closely associated with the Frisian language. Language as a criterion for national identity has both exclusive and inclusive characteristics. On the one hand, it may be difficult for at least some FNP members to understand how somebody can feel Frisian without understanding the language. On the other hand, language becomes a vehicle to civic integration; if affinity with Frisian as a language is a pertinent criterion for feeling Frisian, then anybody can choose to become Frisian by learning the language. However, in the Dutch context Frisian is not a necessity for civic integration, as Dutch is also a requirement. Almost all Frisian speakers also speak

Dutch fluently and therefore Frisian is not uniformly regarded as a requirement for civic integration. In fact, if Dutch language skills are considered a necessity for civic integration throughout the Netherlands, including Friesland, then the ability of newcomers from outwith the Netherlands to learn Frisian is restricted (as a newcomer from outside the Netherlands would have to learn two languages), but its necessity also becomes less apparent.

In the SNP such mechanisms are far less prominent because of the supremacy of English in almost all areas in Scotland. Furthermore, the SNP is not particularly associated with language and cultural issues; at least, they are less prominent than in the FNP's case. It is almost implicitly accepted that if one wishes to adopt the Scottish national identity one should speak English as a vehicle for civic integration. However, in Scotland language can also hypothetically impose restrictions. These can be based around accents. Nevertheless, in Scotland, English language monopolises one's ability civic integration ability whereas in Friesland the position of Frisian is more ambiguous *vis-à-vis* Dutch.

The empirical evidence suggests that religion as a measure is empirically closer to other exclusive markers (birth and ancestry). SNP members who believe Christianity to be important for the Scottish national identity are also likely to find birth and ancestry important. However, only relatively few SNP members consider religion a marker for Scottishness. None of the interviewees identified religious characteristics as important for the Scottish national identity and within the party's rhetoric and programmes religious identities are not considered to map onto national identities.

Both the FNP and the SNP membership surveys contained two territorial criteria, one stressing the importance of current residence, the other stressing the importance of elongated residence. Both are considered important in both parties. In neither party is there evidence of a competitive relation between current residence and elongated residence. In fact, correlations between the two were high, suggesting that residence overall is considered important.

Despite the fact that the different dimensions of national identity are intercorrelated, the data presented in chapter 5 does show that an inclusive civic dimension and exclusive ethnocultural dimension can be identified (Figure 5.3 and 5.4). However, the model overall only becomes stable when other dimensions, one based on territorial criteria and one based on cultural criteria, are recognised separately in the framework (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). In other words, the civic and ethnocultural dimensions first need to be unpacked and other dimensions have to be added in order to achieve a stable empirical model of national identity. A four dimensional model that includes civic, territorial, cultural and ethnic dimensions proves to be stable. One of the major implications of this framework is that it is no longer possible to identify an inclusive civic dimension that includes a territorial element and an exclusive ethnocultural dimension that includes a cultural element. Once the framework has been unpacked it is possible to identify a civic inclusive dimension (without territorial criteria) based on feeling a national identity and respecting the values and institutions of a nation and an exclusive ethnic dimension based on ancestry and birth. However, within this framework all of the dimensions are intercorrelated and are considered non-competitively.

SNP and FNP members' relations to others

The relationship between inclusive civic conceptions of national identity and exclusive ethnic national identities on the one hand and attitudes towards others on the other was tested by analysing attitudes towards the European integration process and towards immigrants and multiculturalism. Both parties can generally be considered pro-European and have looked for ways to incorporate a European dimension within their policies and strategies and align them with their goals. However, there are considerable differences in terms of how both parties frame European integration. Although within the context of Scotland and the UK the SNP may have a more post-

sovereign understanding of European integration than most other Scottish and UK parties, in comparison to the FNP it holds a more traditional understanding of sovereignty. The SNP considers the EU helpful to its goal of Scottish independence as it ensures continuity and lowers the costs of secession (Keating and Jones 1991). However, the SNP favours an EU which is based on inter-governmentalism in which member states would cooperate but remain sovereign. The FNP would like to see the EU develop into an EU of the regions, in which regional representation could counter-balance the member states. The party is in favour of a developing the Committee of the Regions into a second chamber in which regions are directly represented. The EU is regarded as less of an aid in relation to the party's constitutional goals, but the FNP does consider the EU more susceptible to the demands of minorities. Although both parties include members with more negative attitudes, they are regarded as pro-European and they aim to present themselves as such. In both parties there is room for a broad range of opinions about European integration, but the position is clearly pro-European. Such divergences in comparison with the party membership are related to different understandings of national identity amongst members.

The data for both parties show associations between those that hold negative views of certain aspects of the European integration process and members that achieve higher scores on the ethnic dimension of national identity. Additionally in the SNP's case those members that want Scotland to be independent outwith the EU are more likely to have higher ethnic scores. Therefore, the conclusion that a more ethnic understanding of national identity leads to a more negative view of external others (e.g. in the context of European integration) is not without merit.

However, such a conclusion would only tell part of the story. It is equally significant that those with high civic scores also appear to hold more negative positions towards European integration in comparison with low civic scorers. This finding leads to several further considerations. Firstly, it could be the case that the theoretical link between those criteria that are associated with civic identities being presented as more inclusive on the one hand and those criteria associated with ethnic identities

presented as more exclusive on the other hand, is less apparent than expected. Instead, those members who find civic or ethnic criteria important for their national identity appear to have less positive views on the EU than those that find either civic or ethnocultural criteria less important. Secondly, those members with high civic scores could view European integration as undemocratic and elitist, or in other words regard EU integration as non-inclusive and therefore have negative views. Thirdly, it should be considered that the civic and ethnic dimensions are considered to be non-competitive by many members. Therefore, to at least some extent, a similar direction in terms of attitudes towards aspects of European integration can be expected. Nevertheless, the framework does confirm that high ethnic scorers are more likely to have a negative view of European integration than high civic scorers. A finding that concurs with the theoretical framework as discussed in chapter 2.

A similar pattern can be identified in relation to attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism. Both parties favour cultural plurality and have positive policies towards immigration, but these are framed according to the goals of their respective parties. In the SNP economic considerations play an important role. Immigration is linked to positive economic benefits and demographical necessity. In the FNP, cultural considerations are used to frame immigration issues. Immigration is regarded positively as long as it does not threaten Frisian culture. This helps to explain why FNP members are more likely to regard internal immigration (from within the Netherlands) as a bigger threat than external immigration (from outwith the Netherlands). Internal immigration is considered a greater threat to Frisian culture. External immigrants are less likely to put pressure on Frisian communities. Unlike the Dutch they do not hold culturally dominant positions. According to some interviewees, external immigrants are also more likely to adapt to Frisian culture than the Dutch are, as the Dutch consider their own culture dominant and it is unnecessary for them to learn Frisian.

However, attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism diverge considerably within both parties. In line with the civic versus ethnic framework, those with high ethnic scores are most likely to support cultural uniformity, but high civic scores do not

necessarily lead to support for cultural pluralism. However, there is greater support for cultural pluralism amongst high civic scorers than ethnic scorers in both parties. When members with high civic scores are compared to those with low civic scores then the former are more likely to support cultural uniformity.

In other words, in relation to attitudes towards European integration as well as immigration and multiculturalism, there is evidence that the civic versus ethnic framework can be justified in the sense that the first is more inclusive and the second is more exclusive. Those with high civic scores are more inclusive than those with high ethnic scores. But when it is considered that many of these criteria are used non-competitively and therefore should not be regarded as a single spectrum, then such a conclusion only tells part of the story as it highlights the fact that high scores on either dimension lead to more negative attitudes towards European integration, as well as immigration and multiculturalism.

Implications of the thesis and contribution to knowledge

The conclusions presented above contribute to an existing body of literature which has identified peoples' understanding of national identity as multi-dimensional (Shulman 2002; Kymlicka 1999; Björklund 2006; Kiely *et al.* 2005). Similarly to Reeskens and Hooghe (2010), the empirical data presented in this thesis show the non-competitive nature of these different dimensions. Firstly, the thesis offers an innovative framework for analysing national identities and their characteristics. The framework is flexible whilst maintaining the analytical rigour of the established models. The model is no longer considered dichotomous or as a single spectrum. Instead, it is conceptualised as several interrelated non-competitive continua. Such an approach avoids simplification and affords better insights in how different conceptions of national identity relate to each other.

Secondly, by drawing from a broad range of data sources (interviews, literature, archival and survey) the thesis places the importance of the different criteria into the contexts in which each party operates. This research makes use of never previously available empirical data in the form of a full FNP membership survey and 61 interviews with party representatives.

Thirdly, the thesis fills a gap in the existing body of literature in terms of empirically analysing the concept of national identity in autonomist political parties and what the implications of such differences are. The research contributes to the understanding of attitudinal structures within autonomist parties. It provides some evidence of 'elite' socialisation in political parties and provides evidence that this also has an impact on peoples' understanding of national identities. The research also provides valuable insights into attitudes towards immigration and European integration in these parties and how mechanisms related to national identities relate to these attitudes.

Appendix A: FNP survey results

Personal Information

1. Are you:		(Please
Cross)		
Male		70.3%
Female		29.7

2. In which year were you born:	Average : 1949.01
	Missing 2.8%

3. Which of the categories represents the total annual income of your household (Before tax)?			
(Please cross one box)			
less than € 20000	9.7%	€ 60001 – €80000	13.1%
€ 20001 – €40000	37.5%	€ 80001 – €100000	4.3%
€ 41000 – €60000	27.3%	More than € 100000	2.9%
Missing	5.2%		

4. Which is your highest educational qualification? PLEASE CROSS ONE BOX			
Lagere School (Primary School)	3.5%	Beroeps onderwijs (vocational)	9.7%
Middelbare School (Secondary School)	34.9%	HBO / Universiteit (College University)	49.9%
Other	1.6%	Missing	0.4%

5. Where were you born?	
(Please Cross)	
Friesland	88.6%
An other province in the Netherlands	10.5%
Somewhere else, namely: (Please state)	0.7%
Missing	0.2%

Political Parties

6. Have you held a position or office in the FNP (Councillor, Commission member, Board member, elected representative)	
Yes	25.6%
No	73.9%
Missing	0.5%

7. I have been an FNP member since: (Please Cross)	
0 – 5 jaar	18.5%
6 – 10 Jaar	22.8%
11 – 20 Jaar	23.3%
Langer dan 20 Jaar	32.8%
Don't know	1.2%
Missing	1.4%

8. What were the main reasons for you to join the party pick your top 3. (Pick 3 answers, 1 meaning the most important, 2 meaning the second most important and three meaning the third most important)											
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref. ⁶⁶	Missing		1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref.	Missing
I want more political autonomy for Friesland	18.7%	10.4%	9.2%	8.5%	53.4%	My friends/family persuaded me	2.9%	0.5%	3.5%	2.1%	91%
I worry about non Frisians having too much influence in Friesland	9.8%	8.1%	10.7%	6.4%	64.9%	I am disappointed with other political parties	1.2%	3.6%	3.6%	1.9%	89.6%
I am worried about the Frisian language	22.6%	21.6%	10.4%	9.8%	35.6%	I was impressed with the FNP representatives	7.3%	6.6%	7.1%	5%	74.1%
I worried about the Frisian identity	12.6%	16.9%	15.4%	7.9%	47.2%	Other reason (s) (please state)	3.1%	0.2%	1.4%	0.7%	94.6%
I am worried about the Frisian landscape	5.4%	6.9%	11.9%	4.8%	71%						

⁶⁶ Instead of giving a rated top 3 (1st preference, 2nd preference and 3rd preference) some members gave their top 3 choices without preferences. These scores have been coded under the banner 'no pref.

9. Do you vote FNP during the provincial or municipal elections? PLEASE TICK BOX	
In both	88.4%
Only the provincial elections	3.8%
Only in the municipal elections	2.8%
Don't vote FNP	2.6%
Missing	2.4%

10. In the national elections I will probably vote: (PLEASE TICK BOX)			
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)	17.8%	Christen Unie (Christian Union)	5.4%
PvdA (Party of Labour)	16.4%	Partij voor de dieren (Party for the Animals)	1.9%
VVD (People's party for Freedom and democracy)	6.4%	TON (Proud of Netherlands)	0.3%
D66 (Democrats '66)	9.8%	PVV (Party for Freedom)	5.4%
Groenlinks (Green left)	12.3%	SGP (Political reformed party)	0.2%
SP (Socialist Party)	10.4%	I don't vote	2.8%
Other namely...	1.6%	Unclear	2.9%
Missing	2.2%	Don't know	4.3

11. Do you agree with the following statements: (PLEASE TICK BOX)						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Missing
11.1 The FNP must, without reservations, participate in national election even if the chance of a seat is very small.	13%	11.4%	16.6%	35.1%	16.6%	7.4%
11.2 The FNP must only participate in national elections if a seat is a realistic prospect	13.3%	33.7%	16.8%	15.2%	10.5%	10.5%
11.3 It is acceptable for the FNP to cooperate with other political parties in order to gain a seat in the national elections	17.1%	41.5%	14.3%	11.6%	8.1%	7.4%

12. If the FNP would participate in national elections I would vote (PLEASE TICK BOX):	
FNP	75.1%
Another party	18%
I would not vote at all	1.4%
Don't know	1.7%
Missing	3.8%

13. I think that the word national in the party's name should be	
Absolutely removed	4.0%
Removed	17.4%
Either removed or stays, I don't really mind	18.5%
Stay	34.7%
Absolutely stay	23.5%
Missing	1.9%

14. If you were to place yourself on the left to right political spectrum which position fits you best? (Please circle one number from 1 - 7)										
Left	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right		
	4.8%	13.3%	26.9%	16.8%	14.3%	7.1%	2.4%		I don't know	10%
									Missing	4.3%

Identity

15. Which are according to you to biggest threats to Friesland? (Pick 3 answers, 1 meaning the most important, 2 meaning the second most important and three meaning the third most important)											
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref	Missing		1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref	Missing
Dissapearance of the Frisian language	37.1%	14.3%	8.8%	10%	29.7%	Destruction of Frisian culture	9.7%	20.4%	10.9%	5.7%	53.4%
Immigration from other parts of the Netherlands	4.3%	6.6%	4.3%	1.6%	83.2%	Foreign ownership of Frisian business	0.5%	3.1%	3.8%	1.6%	91%
Migration of young Frisians	7.3%	10.7%	10.2%	4.7%	67.2%	Globalisation	1.9%	3.3%	3.3%	0.7%	90.8%
Climate Change	1.7%	1.4%	0.2%	0.9%	95.9%	The government in The Hague	5.5%	5.2%	10.5%	3.8%	75.0%
European Union policies	0.7%	0.3%	1.6%	1.2%	96.2%	Immigration from outside the Netherlands	0.2%	1.9%	1.4%	1.2%	95.3%
A lack of confidence amongst Frisians	7.3%	9.5%	12.1%	4.1%	67%	Big building projects	6.7%	6.4%	11.9%	3.3%	71.7%
Other	2.4%	0.2%	1.6%	0.3%	95.5%						

16. In general how proud are you of your Frisian identity	
Very Proud	58.7%
Proud	33.2%
Not very proud	4.3%
Not at all proud	1.6%
I do not feel Frisian	0.5%
Missing	1.7%

17. Which of the statements below best describe your identity	
Frisian not Dutch	26.3%
More Frisian than Dutch	58.7%
Just as much Frisian as Dutch	12.1%
More Dutch than Frisian	0.3%
Dutch, not Frisian	0.3%
None of the above (please state your identity)	1.0%
Missing	1.2%

18. How important are each of the following aspects for being truly Frisian?					
	Very Important	Important	Not very Important	Not at all important	Mean
To have Frisian ancestors	31.9	36.5	27.8	3.8	2.03
To speak and understand Frisian	80.1	19.7	0.2	0	1.20
To read and write Frisian	50	43.2	6.7	0.2	1.57
To have been born in Friesland	24	31.9	32.3	11.7	2.32
To live in Friesland now	34.4	31.3	27.3	7.1	2.07
To have lived in Friesland for most of one's life	24.7	34.8	34.1	6.3	2.22
To respect Frisian rules and political institutions	33.6	47.4	15.7	3.3	1.89
To feel Frisian	75.5	21.6	2.5	0.4	1.28

19. Being Frisian has lots of different aspects, some of which are listed below. Which, if any, of these is important to you personally when you think about being Frisian (Pick 3 answers, 1 meaning the most important, 2 meaning the second most important and three meaning the third most important)

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref	Missing		1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref	Missing
Frisian language	51.6%	15.2%	7.1%	7.1%	19.0%	Frisian sport achievements		1.2%	1.7%	0.7%	96.4%
Frisian concept of freedom (Frysk and Fry)	10.0%	6.7%	4.1%	1.6%	77.5%	Frisian agriculture	0.9%	1.4%	1.9%	0.5%	95.3%
Frisian countryside and scenery	4.0%	10.9%	7.8%	2.6%	74.8%	Frisian people	9.5%	9.3%	10.4%	1.6%	69.3%
Frisian history	2.4%	8.1%	12.3%	1.9%	75.3%	Frisians are a minority	1.0%	2.1%	2.1%	0.7%	94.1%
Frisian political institutions	0.3%	2.2%	4.1%	0.7%	92.6%	Frisian art, literature and music	1.4%	7.6%	9.3%	1.0%	80.7%
Frisian traditions	2.6%	9.5%	12.3%	1.4%	74.3%	Frisian education	3.8%	11.7%	12.4%	3.6%	68.4%
Other	1.0%				99.0%						

20. Who we are and where we live may be expressed in terms of our Home Street, Area, Town, County, Nation, State, Europe, The World. Thinking in this way about where you live now, which of the options below are the most important to you generally in your every day life? (Pick 3 answers, 1 meaning the most important, 2 meaning the second most important and three meaning the third most important)

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref	Missing		1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref	Missing
The street in which you live	7.1%	3.8%	6.2%	2.8%	80.1%	The municipality	1.7%	8.1%	7.6%	1.0%	81.5%
City or village	21.6%	22.6%	12.8%	3.3%	39.7%	The province	38.0%	21.1%	16.2%	5.7%	19.0%
A region (Walden, Klei)	16.2%	17.8%	9.8%	3.3%	52.8%	The Netherlands	1.9%	7.1%	11.2%	2.1%	77.7%
Europe	1.2%	2.8%	9.7%	1.0%	85.3%	The world	2.8%	2.2%	10.9%	1.0%	83.1%
Other	0.7%	0.5%	0.2%		98.6%						

21. People differ in how they think of or describe themselves. Which of the following list are most important to you in describing who you are? (Pick 3 answers, 1 meaning the most important, 2 meaning the second most important and three meaning the third most important)											
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref.	Missing		1 st	2 nd	3 rd	No pref.	Missing
Your social class	9.7%	8.8%	9.8%	2.4%	69.3%	Your national identity	22.6%	13.0%	9.5%	4.0%	50.9%
Your age group / generation	8.8%	9.7%	10.9%	2.6%	68.0%	Your gender	7.3%	4.0%	3.5%	0.9%	84.5%
Your religion	7.6%	5.5%	6.4%	1.9%	78.6%	The place (village or town) where you live)	8.3%	17.3%	14.2%	2.8%	57.5%
Your ethnic group	5.4%	3.3%	1.2%	0.3%	89.8%	The job that you do or did	13.1%	14.0%	17.8%	2.8%	52.3%
Your political allegiances	2.1%	7.4%	8.1%	1.9%	80.5%	Other	3.1%	0.3%	0.9%	0.2%	95.5%

22. Do you agree with the following statements						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Missing
22.1 In other parts of the Netherlands they look down at Frisians	4.1%	19.0%	30.2%	35.1%	8.1%	3.5%
22.2 You can be equally proud of being Dutch and of being Frisian; it is not a matter of choosing between them	24.9%	36.4%	12.1%	15.9%	7.4%	3.3%
22.3 Sometimes it is more appropriate to say you are Dutch and sometimes it is more appropriate to say you are Frisian.	4.3%	19.0%	15.5%	33.0%	24.2%	4.0%
22.4 When someone criticises Friesland, it feels like a personal insult	18.5%	42.3%	19.2%	13.0%	3.5%	3.6%
22.5 Frisians criticise Friesland too much.	13.5%	35.1%	26.9%	18.0%	2.1%	4.5%

FNP Policies

23. On a scale of 0 to 10 I find it important that the FNP focus more on: (0 meaning not important at all 10 meaning very important)												
23.1 Ethnic minorities in Friesland (circle your answer)												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	5.5%	5.9%	14.3%	10.4%	15.7%	17.4%	4.8 %	10.9%	4.1%	6.12
23.2 More cooperation with other European regions												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
0.5%	1.0%	2.8%	2.1%	4.1%	9.8%	9.5%	19.0%	26.8%	10.0%	10.5%	3.8%	7.05
23.3 A desire for more political decentralisation for Friesland												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
0.9%	2.4%	1.9%	6.0%	4.8%	18.0%	10.4%	13.0%	18.3%	5.7%	10.4%	8.3%	6.41
23.4 More protection for the Frisian Language												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
	0.3%	0.5%	0.7%		2.6%	2.6%	7.6%	22.3%	20.0%	40.9%	2.4%	8.74
23.5 Cooperation with other countries/regions to combat climate change												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
2.2%	3.3%	3.3%	3.3%	3.5%	10.9%	8.3%	12.6%	18.8%	13.1%	17.4%	3.3%	6.92
23.6 More protection for the Frisian landscape												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
	0.9%	0.3%	0.7%	0.7%	2.4%	4.0%	13.3%	25.2%	19.5%	30.4%	2.6%	8.38
23.7 More control for Friesland in the European Union												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
1.0%	1.6%	1.0%	3.5%	2.1%	5.2%	10.9%	14.3%	21.9%	16.2%	19.3%	2.9%	7.51
23.8 More investment in environmentally friendly projects												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
0.3%	1.2%	1.2%	2.2%	1.9%	6.4%	10.2%	15.9%	27.1%	14.9%	16.1%	2.6%	7.53
23.9 A multicultural society and Friesland												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
5.0%	5.0%	4.3%	6.2%	6.6%	16.2%	13.8%	18.0%	13.6%	3.8%	4.1%	3.3%	5.51
23.10 Further European integration												

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
3.3%	5.0%	5.4%	8.8%	8.6%	17.3%	13.8%	14.0%	11.9%	4.3%	3.8%	3.8%	5.36
23.11 More protection of the Frisian identity												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
	0.5%	0.7%	0.7%	0.9%	3.3%	4.3%	12.4%	25.7%	19.7%	29.0%	2.8%	8.33
23.12 Industrialisation and infrastructure												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
2.6%	3.3%	6.4%	5.9%	7.1%	16.9%	13.8%	16.1%	15.4%	4.3%	4.3%	4.0%	5.7
23.13 Creation of jobs												
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Missing	mean
0.2%	0.3%	1.0%	1.2%	3.1%	6.7%	5.4%	14.5%	33.5%	15.0%	16.6%	2.4%	7.74

Constitutional questions

24. Do you agree with the following statements						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Missing
24.1 Friesland should become an independent nation	8.1%	11.2%	18.7%	33.7%	26.4%	1.9%
24.2 The Dutch state is very able to protect the Frisian identity	4.0%	18.1%	18.7%	36.6%	20.6%	2.1%
24.3 Cultural autonomy for Friesland in very important	36.4%	42.7%	14.0%	3.8%	1.0%	2.1%
24.4 Friesland would be better represented in a Netherlands with a federal system	19.7%	30.2%	32.0%	9.5%	5.2%	3.5%

25. Here are various options for governing Friesland which one is the best option according to you	
Friesland should be independent outwith Europe	1.9%
Friesland should be independent in EU	6.6%
Friesland should be part of a federalist state in the Netherlands	17.1%
The current Frisian provincial parliament (states-provincial) should have more power	45.3%
The current situation is satisfactory	16.4%
Inconclusive (more than one option chosen)	9.5%
Missing	3.3%

Immigration

26. Some people find it better that ethnic minorities in a country keep their own traditions and others say it is better that these groups integrate with the majority in society. Which of these 2 options is closest to your own opinion?	
It is better that ethnic minorities keep their own traditions and culture	13.8%
It is better that ethnic minorities integrate with society at larger	25.0%
Both are equally important	57.9%
Missing	3.3%

27. Do you agree with the following statements						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Missing
27.1 Frisians should have control over Friesland	26.3%	38.0%	20.4%	10.9%	1.2%	3.3%
27.2 There are too many non Frisian influences in Friesland	25.0%	47.3%	19.0%	5.7%	0.5%	2.4%
27.3 Non Frisians should speak and understand Frisian when living in Friesland	37.8%	46.6%	8.5%	4.8%	0.5%	1.7%
27.4 It is important for immigrants to be able to speak their own language amongst each other.	12.1%	54.9%	20.2%	7.1%	4.3%	1.4%
27.5 In Friesland, the Royal Commissioner and Mayors should be of Frisian background	24.0%	34.0%	23.0%	14.9%	2.6%	1.5%
27.6 Ethnic minorities should receive more government funding to assure the survival of their culture.	1.4%	15.5%	31.6%	34.7%	15.0%	1.7%
27.7 It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions	4.5%	12.4%	24.0%	42.3%	15.0%	1.8%

28. Do you think that the number of foreign (non-Dutch) immigrants in Friesland in the future should:	
Increase a lot	1.0%
Increase a little	14.5%
Remain the same	46.1%
Decrease a little	16.8%
Decrease a lot	16.6%
Missing	5.0%

European Union

29. Do you agree with the following statements						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Missing
29.1 Friesland should have more control in the EU in order to defend its own interests	25.7%	45.8%	19.7%	5.2%	1.0%	2.6%
29.2 The European Union is too centralised	14.7%	36.1%	34.5%	6.9%	1.2%	6.6%
29.3 Cooperation with other minority regions in Europe is important for Friesland	39.6%	50.6%	5.0%	1.9%	0.9%	2.1%

30. Some people are of the opinion that the European Union should have more power and should become a federal state, others are of the opinion that the EU should be based on cooperation between national states. Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion?	
EU should become a federal state	27.5%
EU should be based on cooperation between national states	45.3%
Neither	17.6%
Missing	9.7%

Environment

31 Do you agree with the following statements						
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Missing
31.1 Friesland should invest more in environmentally friendly projects to become a leader in the world with regards to environmental practices.	30.2%	44.9%	15.7%	5.0%	0.7%	3.5%
31.2 Other countries can learn a lot from Friesland when it comes to environmental practices	4.5%	27.5%	53.0%	9.8%	1.0%	4.1%
31.3 We worry too much about the environment and not enough about prices and jobs	4.7%	18.8%	28.0%	35.8%	9.5%	3.2%
31.4 For the sake of the environment, car users should pay higher taxes.	5.9%	19.9%	27.1%	34.5%	9.8%	2.8%
31.5 Nuclear energy is essential for future prosperity	6.7%	20.0%	21.6%	25.0%	23.3%	3.3%

32 What is good for the environment is not always good for tourism, agriculture and employment. When such contradictions appear I am more likely	
To pick the side of the tourism, agricultural and employment	56.3%
To pick the side of the environmentalists	36.8%
Inconclusive	2.1%
Missing	4.8%

Appendix B – FNP survey letter

01/03/2009

Achte FNP'er

Ik skriuw jo om jo te freegjen my te helpen by myn promoasje-ûndersyk oer de FNP dat ik doch oan de Universiteit fan Strathclyde yn Glasgow, Skotlân. Jo hawwe faaks oer dat ûndersyk lêzen yn de Ljouwerter Krante of de Frijbûtser. It ûndersyk wurdt folslein stipe troch it Haadbestjoer fan de FNP.

Ik sil jo tige tankber wêze as jo de ynsletten fragelist ynfolje en weromstjoere wolle yn de portfrije antwurdslyf. De measte antwurden kinne jo jaan troch in krúske te setten of in sifer te omsirkeljen. Yn sommige gefallen wurdt frege jo top trije of jo foarkar oan te jaan. Ta beslút binne der in pear fragen dêr't jo frege wurdt om in eigen antwurd op te jaan. Ik tink dat it ynfolgen jo net mear as 30 minuten kostje sil. As jo leaver in beskate fraach net beäntwurdzje, dan kinne jo dy gewoan oerslaan en mei de folgjende fierder gean. Alle antwurden en alle ynformaasje dy't bewarre bliuwe foar takomstich ûndersyk, wurde folslein anonym behannele. De resultaten fan de enkête wurde bekend makke oan it Haadbestjoer fan de FNP, mar sille gjin details befetsje dy't it mooglik meitsje kinne soene dy werom te fieren op in yndividu.

Dielname oan dit ûndersyk bart fansels op frijwillige basis. Mar dochs wol ik tige graach dat de enkête ynfolle wurdt troch in goede trochsneed fan de FNP-leden om sa in sekuer byld fan de opfettings binnen de FNP te krijen. Mochten jo noch fragen ha oer de enkête, wachtsje dan net en nim kontakt mei my op fia ûndersteand adres.

Mei freonlike groetnis,

Drs. Arno van der Zwet

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Dit ûndersyk is goedkard troch de Universiteit fan Strathclyde ûnder syn Gedrachsregels foar de Útfiering fan Ûndersyk ûnder Minsken. Mochten jo beswieren hawwe oangeande dit ûndersyk, dan kinne jo kontakt opnimme mei Prof. J. Mitchell, Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 16 Richmond St., Glasgow G1 1XQ, United Kingdom Tel: 0044 (0)1415482219 email: j.mitchell@strath.co.uk

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Appendix C - FNP survey reminder

Achte FNP'er

It haadbestjoer achtet de enkête fan Arno van der Zwet fan grut belang foar de FNP. Wy trune der dan ek tige by jim op oan dy enkête yn te foljen en oan ús werom te stjoeren. Fia de Frijbûtser hâlde we jim op de hichte fan de resultaten. Alfêst tige tank foar jim meiwurking!

Út namme fan it haadbestjoer,
Nynke Beetstra
(foarsitter)

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