POLICE CULTURE AND ORGANISATION

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THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD,

1991.

VOLUME 2

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE NEW MANGERIALISM

A. THE SEEDS OF AN ALTERNATIVE

In demonstrating how powerfully engrained are patterns of instrumental behaviour within the police organisation, the arguments in the previous chapter also serve to reinforce the more general proposition stated in chapter five, namely, that the tendency towards instrumentalism in intra-organisational relations increases in line with distance between ranks, as also with the institutional status of the more senior party. Thus, senior divisional officers are more likely to experience keenly the pressures and constraints involved in attempting to meet the demands of various external groups. And in their efforts to reconcile the irreconcilable, it is they who have the greater capacity to develop and apply dense patterns of bureaucratic rules and output standards, and who are, accordingly, the more likely to incur the displeasure of operational ranks left to cope with the ravages of regulatory overkill. Further, and relatedly, it is the senior divisional officers who are more likely to suffer the delusions of 'dinosaurs' and 'high-flyers' (or, at least, to have these disparaging labels foisted upon them) and - to mix metaphors - to be more deeply embedded in the 'mushroom patch'. Finally, underlining the empathy gap still further, the

greater the distance beteen divisional ranks, the more likely are these ranks to be afflicted with the myopia of partial insight in their mutual relations.

Dovetailing with these tendencies which actively encourage instrumentalism is the waning of a number of significant residual normative influences reported in chapter six. The small local forces of an earlier age which ensured a substantial network of personalized relationships across ranks have been overtaken by formal structures which are larger, more impersonal, more skewed in terms of their internal distribution of power and status, and whose alienating effects are accentuated by their functional division of labour. Changes in attitude amongst more recent recruits have led to the partial erosion of institutional authority and its stylistic representation through the military model, so weakening the most significant point of connection between normative and instrumental power circuits. Finally, other changes in background and work orientation amongst younger officers, in the social context within which policing is debated, and in the legal and political framework within which policework is enacted, have encouraged the development and articulation of divergent interests and practices within the police organisation - divergences which again tend to vary directly with status, distance between ranks and related matters such as age and length of service.

Alongside these trends however, there has been one apparently countervailing set of developments holding out the possibility of the reconstruction of a strong basis in normative relations between senior divisional staff and their junior colleagues. In our examination of the perceptions of senior divisional officers in chapter four we noted a strong emphasis upon the *managerial* nature of their work and, in particular, upon the importance of man-management. Relatedly, we observed a strong emphasis upon interpersonal skills, and upon motivating and tending to the welfare needs of junior officers. Overall then, despite the powerful drift towards instrumental relations in practice and the continuing emphasis upon instrumental techniques and traditional forms of authority within the perspective of senior divisional officers, much store is also set by a 'human relations' approach within their articulated belief systems, and indeed, with regard to its various dimensions listed above, this approach is markedly more pronounced in their case than in the case of inspectors.''

How is this alternative trend to be accounted for? To a large extent, this approach may be seen as a response to, or at least a reaction against the development of a more instrumental régime, and the erosion of previously solid normative foundations. In this respect positions held and initiatives contemplated at force and divisional levels cannot be viewed in isolation from more general institutional trends which embrace all British forces and which are deeply inscribed within the reform ethos of those policy-making

elites and institutions who are influential at this broader level. In particular, reforms in mamagement training at the central police colleges[2] and the wider movement towards police professionalism discussed below are of significance. However, by the same token, it would be wrong to perceive the impetus behind this approach in predominantly 'top-down' terms - as resting exclusively, or even mainly, with supra-force agencies, and to understand the significant expression of faith in a more normative approach within senior ranks as no more than received wisdom. Many senior officers interviewed - and there is no reason to suppose that their views, predicated as they are upon developments in police organisation which are of general application, are not typical of a wider trend - appeared to have concluded from their own experience that some refinement of the stock managerial profile of earlier vintage was required. Although, for reasons set out in the previous chapter, understanding of the root structural causes of tension in relations between ranks tended to be truncated, and the relentless nature of their role demands discouraged radical experimentation, there was nevertheless widespread recognition within the higher echelons of the symptoms of the problem, and an awareness that reliance upon the institutional authority of rank as the main normative support for the instrumental techniques made available through the formal bureaucratic structure tended to leave something of an authority vacuum. At the very least, most senior officers were agreed that a strategy of retrenchment - of increased reliance upon a narrowing and obsolescent base of normative resources - in the face of an

incipient crisis of legitimate authority, would be likely to backfire. Thus, if the three statements below are examined, many senior officers would echo the sentiments of the superintendent (third respondent), and would find some sympathy with the somewhat more candid assertions of the two sergeants who are quoted first:

"The inspector's got a helluva manner with some of the young lads. He's a bit of an old dinosaur; he does not realise times are changing, and that just makes things worse. He thinks that the more he bawls and shouts at them, the more they will respect him... Last week one of the young lads' shoes were a bit dusty, so to teach him a lesson, he had him down on the floor doing forty press-ups. These lads have been brought up in a different world from him. They have not been in national service; they have been taught to question and criticize, not to march and drill. They will just think he is a prat for doing that." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

"It's funny, but I knew our new inspector when I was in the CID as a cop, and he was a sergeant. He was great there, really close to the men, and supportive, and a great detective, well respected. Since he came here, he has been distant and a real stickler for the rules. At first I just thought that he was finding his feet, but he is still like that. None of the other lads would believe me if I told them he used to be like what he was in the CID. Maybe that is half the problem. We are such a big force now. Nobody knows anyone else. When someone like him comes along, he cannot rely on his reputation. So he retreats behind his pips, and relies on his rank. But although that is important he will not get the best out of the cops that way." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

"There's no doubt about it. Today's force makes more claims on the officer on the street, and today's officer on the street makes more claims on the force. Some of them expect to have more say in what they do, or at least to get more reasons, more explanations for why we do what we do. There was a tendency when I joined for unquestioned obedience... That didn't mean that some of the bosses didn't consult the men, but just that there was no general sense that they should. Now, there

> is, and its something I'm right behind. That is what managers are for, making the most of the human resources at their disposal. (superintendent, Riverside Division)

Viewed from this perspective, we may, adopting a notion of Holdaway's, talk of a new "managerialism"[3] within the more senior ranks. This may be conceived of as a loose alliance of interests and orientations which share the same broad diagnosis of an organisational problem and which endorse the same broad range of solutions. The problem is the potentially pathological predominance of instrumental relations, and in particular, its negative implications for inter-rank relations and the capacity of senior ranks to control and motivate junior officers. The solutions, which may be viewed not only as means to the fuller attainment of organisational objectives but also as contributing to the increased job satisfation of junior ranks, centre upon the generation of a more sympathetic understanding of the needs, interests, and capacities of junior ranks and, in particular, upon the development of an alternative authoritative style which emphasizes commitment to management by persuasion and consultation.[4]

In spite of this trend, it is argued, there are both structural and cultural factors which place limitations upon the intensity and success with which the new managerialist enterprise may be pursued generally, and was pursued in the particular divisions under analysis. In keeping with the theoretical approach adopted within

this thesis, it is not claimed that these two dimensions can be hermetically sealed off from one another, as they are in practice complexly interlocked. Nevertheless, in so far as they are analytically divisible, discussion of the deeper structural problems - concerning the inability of new managerialist strategies to transcend the ambiguities and tensions inherent in the root problem of indeterminacy - are held over till the final chapter where they are incorporated into the more general discussion of reform. Our concern here is thus primarily with the cultural dimension, with structural factors significant only to the extent that they necessarily contribute to the contemporary backdrop against which this cultural dimension operates. Exploration of the issues will proceed by reference, first, to general arguments and, secondly, to specific examples.

B. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE NEW MANAGERIALISM

(1) The general arguments

In the following, it is argued that the development and reception of new managerialist attitudes and initiatives within the police organization are impeded by a strong cultural headwind. This emanates from two sources. In the first place, the new managerialist orientation may have hidden implications and unintended consequences which are unpalatable to junior ranks, or it may be resisted by

junior ranks on its own terms. Secondly, the commitment to the new managerialist enterprise amongst more senior ranks is in any case frequently ambivalent and precarious. In turn, these two trends areclosely related. To begin with, the range of factors which account for the reservations of the two constituencies themselves overlap. Further, even to the extent that either constituency is genuinely committed or receptive to the new managerialism it may be wary on account of the attitude of the other. That is, the problems of the new managerialism may be reflected across ranks. Why, some senior officers ask themselves, adopt a managerialist approach if the junior ranks will only respond negatively? Likewise, why, some junior officers ask themselves, endorse the new approach when the commitment of senior officers itself appears false or dubious? With the closely-knit amd mutually reinforcing qualities of the relevant spectrum of arguments in mind, let us start by considering a number of factors whose major significance is in explaining the reservations of junior ranks.

First, and most obviously, there is the fact that new managerialist initiatives and orientations cannot be inscribed upon a blank page. Junior ranks are only too aware of the deep pattern of instrumental power relations which is the continuing legacy of the structural problems described in the previous chapter, and to which the new managerialism is offered as a solution or, at least, as a palliative. As an approach which recognizes the creative potential of human resources and demands empathy with the problems and aspirations of junior ranks, the new managerialism appears to be

radically at odds with an instrumentalist philosophy which is concerned only to harness the interests and capacities of the other efficiently to one's own predefined ends. Within a climate where such a philosophy is to the fore, an advocate of the new approach may simply be viewed as a cynical manipulator - as presenting a liberal facade in an attempt to legitimate a basically oppressive set of relations, or as naive, spitting against a powerful structural and cultural wind. This underlying scepticism is entangled with the various other factors considered below, and so should be borne in mind as providing general reinforcement for the arguments generated by reference to them.

In the second place, as they represent efforts at planned change *imposed* upon an organisational sub-group, managerialist initiatives, for just this reason, will inevitably encounter some degree of resistance from junior officers. This is a more substantial point than might initially appear to be the case. We are not here concerned with the suspicions of junior officers as to the underlying motives of the change agents, nor with any criticism that they might have of the substance of the proposals *per se*. Nor are we concerned with the specific strain of traditionalism within police occupational culture, still less with any more generalized and decontextualized notion of habitual action - of stubborn dedication to a routine for its own sake. Rather, what is at issue here is the fact that any superimposed programme of change, irrespective of its substance and aims, inevitably challenges those sensibilities, aptitudes and strategic relationships of actors which

have been honed or applied in a particular organizational context. As Crozier and Frieberg have argued, change alters "the game of power and influence in which the individual participates and through which, despite the constraints, he asserts his existence as a social being."[5] A package of skills and a sense of occupational identity suited to the old context may not be suited to the new one. It may be redundant or inadequate. Thus, to take one typical example of a new managerialist initiative - a new communicative structure which requires the formal participation of constable and sergeants in a policy-making or policy-review forum with senior divisional officers - this inevitably calls for the reappraisal of a role and the supplementation of a set of attributes geared to circumstances in which collective inter-rank analysis of policy options simply lay beyond contemplation. Perhaps even more importantly, such an initiative is strategically dangerous because, as the same authors argue, "it calls the conditions of an actor's game into question and modifies or eliminates the zones of certainty under his control".[6] Thus, a more transparent context of inter-rank relations threatens to eliminate some of the regions of low visibility which are such a vital resource for the operational officer in his or her 'game'. Therefore, even if the actor accepts the long-term goal of change "in all sincerity",[7] the short-term risks may be too great for the change to be fully endorsed. Indeed, at this strategic level, the choices and trade-offs which confront the actor are but another manifestation of the prisoner's dilemma, in whose terms, it will be recalled, the underlying paradox of trust is itself also explicable.

Now this game-theoretic approach, despite its insights, is incapable of telling the whole story about any process of change. Accordingly, direct exemplification of this dimension of resistance to the new mangerialism must await the elaboration of a more rounded explanatory context. For the moment, the following two quotes, drawn from reform scenarios outwith the ambit of the new managerialism, will suffice to provide general illustration of first, the cognitive and existential aspects, and, secondly, the strategic aspect of the problem of superimposed reform. As regards the first, let us return to the example of the area policing initiative in City Division, initially discussed in chapter six. The introduction within one sub-division of a large number of area officers whose main priority was no longer to be emergency response, and whose hours of work did not correspond to the traditional three-shift system of uniform cover, occurred more or less simultaneously with a number of other changes, including a new requirement for all officers to muster at sub-divisional headquarters rather than to report for duty on an individual basis at various police-boxes dispersed throughout the sub-division. The net effects of this combination of changes was described by one officer as follows:

> "Too much change in the police in too short a time always demoralizes the men, even if you can argue that all the changes are a good thing. They eventually lose their bearings. It's something the bosses forget, but it's hard to accept that all your old ways, sorting your own paperwork, starting at your own box, doing a full night cover, working as a shift team, are out the window. The whole atmosphere has changed, everyone is waiting for the next bright idea. It's no accident that there have been more men off recently than usual. It's very unsettling, and it doesn't make for a happy station." (sergeant, City Division)

As regards the strategic aspect of the problem, the following retrospective assessment of the implications of the demise of the old burgh forces is instructive:

> " I joined just a year or so before the old X burgh was wound up, and we went into the county. At the time, the gaffers did make some effort to keep men in the same place. They didn't have a complete overhaul at once. But there were still a lot of unhappy men about, and the gaffers had more problems with the new forces than they thought they would... I've talked to men from other burghs, they've said the same...It wasn't nostalgia for the old days, you were still working the same place, and, anyway, nobody could seriously defend such small forces - claustrophobic, the chief in the pocket of the local council, no promotion unless you went to the right school... but everyone still had their niche. Everyone had their dosses, their contacts, their man at headquaters they could trust, their dodges to get round doing paper because they knew the system like the back of their hand. All that disappeared overnight, and even with the best will in the world, it's hard to get used to."(sergeant, City Division)

A third reason why the new managerialist approach may not be conducive to the amelioration of relations with junior ranks has to do with the incompatibility of a new managerialist approach not, as in the first argument, with existing patterns of instrumental power, but with existing patterns of normative power. Although, as suggested above, a significant source of support for the new mangerialism lies in the awareness of promoted ranks of the shortcomings of extant authoritative resources, by the same token, the very attempt to invoke a new base of legitimacy may serve only to highlight these shortcoming still further, or at least, to expose the inability of particular officers to make the most of

them. In acquiring new accoutrements, the emperors risk exposing the threadbare quality of their existing garments. This point was made by an Oldtown constable in relation to his shift sergeants.

> Sergeant A and Sergeant B had been promoted simultaneously 3 months previously from a neighbouring division. Sergeant A had come immediately to the present shift, while Sergeant B had joined the shift within a month of his promotion. Sergeant A was 29 years old, had 11 years service, and had worked exclusively in the uniform branch. Sergeant B was 36 years old, had 8 years service, and had worked in the CID for 5 years prior to promotion. Constable C, discussed the initial impression that the two new sergeants had made in the following terms:
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> "They are entirely different sorts, the two of them. Sergeant B is a great guy - not in the sense that he does anything you want - but just that he doesn't cause you any hassle and he gets the work done without any hassle. He gives the impression of knowing what he is doing. You can tell he has CID experience, and all the boys respect that. He has an air of authority about him. He doesn't need to say anything, it just comes naturally. He gets things done just by looking at people. Sergeant B's a different kettle of fish. He's so unsure of himself, and he is so f...ing straight too. We call him "preacher Bob". That's because he stands there during the Daily Briefing Register and waves his arms about and gives you a sermon. He's full of all these new fangled ideas, always trying something smart with the beats or something, rather than just leaving things as they were. He gives the impression of always trying to impress. The boys can't be bothered with that. It just makes them think he lacks confidence and experience. He can't do the job off his own bat."

Similar sentiments were expressed by junior officers in relation to managerialist orientations adopted by senior divisional personnel.

The following comment is typical in this respect:

> "Since I joined the force, there has been a definite change in the attitudes of some senior officers. I've noticed it particularly in this division. There's definitely more talk about the welfare of the men, job satisfaction and all that.

There's less blood and thunder, it's as if they realize that that doesn't work so well in today's world, and they're scratching about for something new. For men with a bit of experience like me, you tend to take it with a wry smile. It's as if the are saying, all change, we're all going to be nice guys now. I'm not saying, they're not genuine, there's some good men among our bosses who get a lot of respect, but it's a bit like flavour of the month. It brings it home to you that the old approach left a lot to be desired, but sometimes you think that some of them are just scrabbling about looking for a new way of justifying their existence, and junping on the first bandwagon that comes along." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

There is a further, and more specific, element of incompatibility between the new approach and existing normative power bases. The more direct critique of the new managerialism which this encourages, as well as providing a fourth major factor in accounting for negative attitudes amongst junior ranks, also provides the mainspring for senior officers' own ambivalance towards the new approach. These more fundamental reservations of the two broad internal constituencies will be considered in turn.

As suggested in chapter five, an important basis of professional authority for senior officers rests on their accumulated experience in the operational ranks, and their capacity to display sustained expertise in operational matters and a continuing appreciation of operational predicaments. However, as Holdaway has pointed out, one of the effects of the new managerialism is to stress an alternative "dominant meaning to the work of the intermediate and senior ranks"[8], and so to accentuate the discontinuity of their work with that of the junior ranks. This

has a number of negative consequences. In the first place, it tends to marginalize the legacy of craft expertise and so diminish the plausibility of senior officers' invoking their past credentials:

> "Sometimes I wonder whether we need policeman in the top ranks. If it is all about management and being a good administrator, what does it matter if you've worked in the street or not?"
> (Sergeant, City Division)

If the expression of doubts as to the relevance of operational skills to the development of the type of managerial expertise valued within the terms of the new managerialism is one response of junior officers to the growth of distinctive managerialist orientations amongst their seniors, a related and more common reaction is to turn this reasoning upon its head and to doubt the relevance of these managerial skills to the task of developing operational skills and facilitating organizational performance.

In the eyes of many practitioners, the discourse of managerialism does not easily or particularly persuasively embrace the practical discipline of policework. There are a number of more or less general reasons for this. Most generally, the language of management and management science is seen as imperialist in nature, colonising divergent areas of experience and attempting to subject them all to its epistemic rule. The reaction of many police officers to this possibility, it has been observed, is "predictably to be both jarred and threatened by attempts to redefine what they are, in terms which appear divorced from the distinctive features of the business they are in." (3) Thus, as we saw in chapter four, acknowledgement of the relevance of a particular species of

management tasks to policework amongst lower supervisory ranks is frequently qualified by the view that the nature of police management distinguishes it from the mainstream of managerial theory and practice. More specifically, this sense of disjuncture is heightened by the fact that insofar as managerialist language is seen to be properly domiciled anywhere, it is in the domain of industrial and commercial organizations. This is partly because it is perceived, quite accurately, as having originated in industrial and commercial contexts and thus to have drawn its foundational premises from the distinct concerns which arise in such contexts.(10)

And if this in itself does not exclude the possibility of managerial concerns and managerialist language being satisfactorily transcribed into policing terms, the decisive factor, for many, lies in their conception of operational policework as craftwork.(11) As again discussed in chapter five, this view emphasizes the unique, action-orientated nature of the police officer's trade. In particular, it endorses the epistemology of common sense, a commitment to forms of understanding which, in the evocative terminology of Geertz, display the characteristics of "naturalness", "practicalness", "thinness", "immethodicalness", and "accessiblemess".(12) The craft perspective thus resists ways of thinking about policing which are counter-intuitive or 'unnatural', theoretical or 'impractical', non-literal or 'thick', systematic or 'methodical', and intellectualized or 'inaccessible'. Warrantable forms of knowledge are instead deemed to be home-grown, empiricist

and situationally contingent. From this viewpoint, any analytical tool which is not hewn from the rock-face of experience is viewed with suspicion, while an approach such as the new managerialism, which, whatever its substantive aims, is seen as harnessed to a rhetoric which is self-avowedly universalizing and reflective, may be viewed as representing the very antithesis of common sense.

This discordance between the language and presuppositions of the new managerialism and those of the craft-based approach, and the greater or lesser degree of acuteness with which it is sensed by different officers within the lower echelons of the divisional organisation, is illustrated in the following series of quotes:

> "I don't accept any of this crap about management. It comes from the text-books and from training courses. It's trying to turn the police into something they are not. We're not ICI or British Leyland, chasing profits and giving incentives. We're a disciplined body of men, each with a very special and difficult job to do. The cop's greatest assets are his common sense and his loyalty to the uniform. That's what keeps him right, not any new-fangled techniques." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

> "All this talk of management is all right as far as it goes, but there is much more to the beat officer than an ordinary shopfloor worker. The danger is that that gets lost." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

> "Management is a nothing-word. It means all things to all men. I always worry whether the bosses who talk about it know much about the real world of the police." (sergeant, City Division)

> "A lot of the bosses who talk about man management have got their hearts in the right place. If it makes them more interested in the man on the street and what he needs, I'll not knock it. But really, it doesn't seem to have a lot of bearing upon what we do every day." (constable, Oldtown Division)

> " All these buzz-words. The bossess are managers, so that makes us supervisors, and the men are just numbers on the shop-floor. I don't think it does justice to what we do - especially the sergeants, I don't think of myself as just a supervisor." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

This last statement points us to the source of the more specific disagreements reported in chapter four as to the appropriate labels to be attached to the more junior promoted ranks within a managerialist discourse. It thus alerts us to the additional fact that for some sergeants, as junior officers who have themselves attained the first rung on the promotion ladder, a managerialist approach, as well as obscuring the true nature of operational policework, may suffer the additional disadvantage of rhetorically demeaning the status of the 'under-manager'. Within managerialist discourse the specificity and separate significance of the various intermediate points on the hierarchy, so well established within the police organisation's own official nomenclature, tends to be lost. Through the monocular perspective of the new managerialism, there are only more or less significant managers, and by definition sergeants fall into the latter category.

Nevertheless, as intimated earlier, the more senior divisional ranks too, despite their more exalted status within the managerialist pantheon, retain strong reservations as to the general thrust of the new managerialism. Despite the general allure of the new approach for them, to a greater or lesser extent they too appreciate the dangers of investing their work with a meaning which is strongly at odds with the occupational perspectives of the lower

ranks. As documented in chapter four, considered as a body inspectors and more senior officers, while happy to view themselves as managers, are only marginally more willing than sergeants to equiparate the police managerial role with that performed in other organisations. Their similar cultural heritage entails that, its general attractions notwithstanding, they share some of the doubts of their junior colleagues as to the relevance of the general managerialist ethos to the cultural and material conditions of operational policework. They will also be aware that, there own reservations apart, the doubts of their junior officers are themselves a crucial factor in the equation. These may undermine the legitimacy of any attempts on the part of senior officers to pursue a managerialist approach.

In short, police managers may well be aware of the pitfalls of trying to sell the new managerialism to those under their command, particularly where they themselves are not prepared to buy without discount its rhetorical and mechanical artifacts. The following two comments, the first extracted from a written communication by an Inspector to a Divisional Commander as part of a management exercise, illustrate the awareness of senior officers of the twin problems of relevance and legitimacy:

"I have noticed a feverish desire to delete the word leadership from the police and to substitute it with management. Men work for leaders but comply to the minimum level with the wishes of managers. I would encourage supervisors to lead their men from the front rather than to manage them from the rear. Leaders can be helped with management problems." (Inspector, Riverside Division)

"It's all very well the system saying that we have all to be managers now. Motivation, job satisfaction, consultation, these are the in-words. But I don't know if they don't just confuse the issue. It's not as if we were never concerned with the men's welfare up till now. These things are all very well, but no two organisations are the same. We have to do things in our own way, and if it looks as if we are just borrowing things from industry or from a text-book, the first ones to suss that out will be the cops themselves."
(chief inspector, City Division)

While the above arguments concentrate upon the vulnerability of the new managerialism to directly countervailing themes within police culture, it may also be contended that the level and quality of articulated support for this perspective which nevertheless remains within more senior ranks is itself both insecurely anchored and artificially swollen on account of its connections with other, ostensibly more supportive cultural ideas. Consideration of these wider connotations of the new managerialism, which, as we shall see, also colour the perspective of junior officers, provides a fifth and final set of explanations as to the difficulties which impede the full reception of the new managerialism.

To begin with, as intimated in chapter six, the new managerialism has close symbolic connections with the new reformism. It will be recalled that the new reformist perspective consists of a cluster of attitudes and strategies born of the perception that the organisation must respond with the requisite efficiency and flexibility to an environment which is in some respects increasingly hostile and which is inhabited by client groups whose expectations of police peformance are greater and whose demands are increasingly

disparate. As with the new managerialism, the belief in a need for change provides a basic motif of this new reformism, and while the specific problem engaged with in the case of the new managerialism is the pathology of instrumental relations, the solution to this problem may be perceived to be intimately related to the solution to the problems of organisational performance to which the more general reformist perspective is dedicated. The attitudes and practices involved in generating a more normative climate within the organisation may be viewed as constituent elements or necessary preconditions of effective externally-directed reform. To this extent, some officers may seethe two programmes as mutually reinforcive, their joint espousal representing an indivisible normative commitment.

> "There's a lot of things need changing in this job. You've got to start with our management. The police must be the most difficult organization in the world to get new ideas through. It's so hard to get the ideas of people at my level and below accepted, but it's something we've got to do. But that's not all there is to it. We've got to change things out there as well. There's got to be something wrong with our policies, or with what the punter demands, or we would not get all the aggro that we do. They've started it in the Met with their target-hardening and their crime priorities and all that, and we've got these Community Projects, and Neighbourhood Watch and the rest. That's a start, but we've always got to be ready to adapt."
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> Q: "Do you think these two strategies are connected, that is, changes in management and changes in policy?"
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> A: "Of course they are to some extent, you've got to put your own house in order, you've got to run a happy ship, before you can change anything else. But there's more to it than that. Management's not a panacea." (inspector, Oldtown Division)

However, in terms of the integrity of the new managerialism, its interrelationship with the new reformism is a double-edged sword. While the new reformism may in some circumstances stimulate support for the new managerialism, to the extent that, for reasons set out in chapters six and seven, the former is the dominant perspective and represents the more immediate set of priorities, then the quality of commitment to the latter may become more tenuous and contingent. If the external reformer is primarily interested in changing the impact of policing policies and the impression made by policing institutions upon the environment, whether by target hardening, community participation projects such as Neighbourhood Watch or new deployment policies and priorities, then the new managerialism may be seen merely as a limited adjunct to the programme of reform, the creation of an internal structure of normative relations mildly lubricating the wheels of effective external initiatives. More tellingly, new managerial attitudes may be viewed as dispensible - to be be jettisoned if and as soon as they detract from the capacity of the organisation to implement its external reforms successfully. That just such a tension between external and internal reform may arise, and with just such a consequence, is forcefully brought home in the following quote:

> "You asked me about man management and all that stuff earlier. Obviously, I can see the point in trying to allow the men a bit of initiative, and trying to make them feel part of things, but this attitude that we are all pals together can be taken too far. There's so many out there waiting to jump down our throats, and there are so many things which you are now asking the men to do, not just walking their beat, that you can't afford to be slack. You've got to know .at the end of the day that orders will be obeyed, and followed promptly, and that if they are not then someone is

> in trouble... Yes, by all means let the men let off steam, but at the end of the day discipline and obedience are probably more important in this job than they have ever been." (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

The themes represented by the new managerialism and the new reformism within police culture and practice are further connected in an extended chain of signification to a third and wider notion, namely that of police professionalism. The idea of professionalism has very broad social significance. For those occupations who successfully define themselves in these terms, the professional label provides an "honorific title".[13] It is a term of approbation which affirms the exalted occupational standing of those groups to whom it is ascribed, and which facilitates, recognizes and legitimates a high degree of occupational autonomy on their part. Thus, professional groups tend to possess a "knowledge mandate" and a "moral authority"[14] which permits them an unusual degree of control over the substance of their work, including policy-making, definition of needs and problems, and client relations.[15] Professional power is therefore a precious resource in both cultural and material terms, and as Holdaway and others have argued, many of the substantive reforms and new styles of impression management initiated by British police élites in the past 30 years may be interpreted in terms of a striving to gain access to the scarce synbolic capital of professionalism.[16] Building upon the much older traditions of military-bureaucratic control and the powerful 'rational myths' that this encourages,[17] the pursuit of a professional identity may be seen as a more aggressive response to

the external legitimation problems and, in particular, the threat of political encroachment, which, as documented in chapters six and seven, have gained momentum in recent years. Accordingly, a number of the trends and tendencies noted in previous chapters, including the enthusiastic endorsement of sophisticated new technology, the greater accent on educational qualifications, and the cultivation of the idea of disinterested expertise by reference to "a body of knowledge intrinsic to the theory and practice of policing"[12], may be viewed as part of this wider programme. So also, the ideas of the new managerialism and the new reformism, with their respective emphases upon the development of a distinctive work methodology amongst the senior ranks and the pursuit of a responsible and flexible policy of self-regulation, thread neatly into the fabric of professionalism.

In this broadest sense, such is its scope of reference and symbolic centrality, the externally-directed concern with professional status may be conceived of as what Manning terms a "metatheme"[13] of police culture. It refers to, embraces and dramatizes a nunber of more specific themes, including those of the new managerialism and the new reformism. To this extent, it may be seen to bolster the connection between these two latter themes, and thus to underline the advantages and disadvantages which flow from this connection.

However, the idea of professionalism has an additional, and more specific object of reference of which we must take note. The

sense of the precariousness of occupational status and identity against which the theme of professionalism is invoked has not only an external strategic dimension but also an existential dimension. A professional self-image helps to stimulate a sense of social belonging and identity among senior officers within their occupational setting. It provides an important point of reference in the construction of an *esprit de corps* similar to that enjoyed by the junior ranks in the more propitious setting of the closely-knit operational shift. In turn, this permits an additional, and more specific, connection to be forged with the new managerialism, for the distinctive sense of meaning which it vests in the work of more senior ranks also has internal as well as external implications. The intertwining of the notions of professionalism and maanagerialism is well illustrated by the following exchange:

> "one of the things everyone misses when you get to this rank, especially when you were as long on the street as I was, is the group spirit - the laughs and the friendships you develop. It's more lonely up here.
>
> Q: You mean there is no group spirit amongst the more senior ranks in the division?
>
> A: No, that's not true. There is, but it's different. Once you are a manager you see it more in professional terms. You've made it, and you have got a lot more responsibilities... It's more of a profession than just a job...All the higher ranks have this professional sense, and I suppose you come to value the fact that the other top ranks treat you as a professional too, as a good manager of men and resources... That's our standard, that's what makes us pull together. (chief inspector, Riverside Division)

However, the association of the new managerialism with another potent cultural theme again has its downside. The aims, demands and attractions of the new professionalism - both external and internal

- may provide alternative reasons for harnessing oneself to the tenets of the new managerialism, reasons which may for some officers be at least as important as any genuine commitment to the normative ends of that enterprise. The capacity of the theme of profesionalism to infiltrate the core meaning of the new managerialism in this manner is well brought out in the following quotes:

> "We come across a lot of other professionals in this job, and I mean other professionals, because we are professionals too. The wooden top image dosn't fit anymore, particularly if you move up the ranks. We're basically the managers of a large commercial organisation, offering a variety of services to customers, with all the usual problems of motivating the staff and checking on quality control. You have to bring this home to some of them, the lawyers, the social workers - otherwise you don't get the respect which you deserve. We are really chief executives in all but name." (superintendent, Riverside Division)

> "It gets me annoyed sometimes, top police officers don't get the recognition they deserve. A chief superintendent is the equivalent of your professor, and the chief is on the same standing as your principal. Yet some of the characters who come in to talk to us, it's as if we still had hob-nailed boots on... Some of the men down below probably don't realise the responsibilities we have either. But police management is definitely a professional job nowadays. We're dealing with huge resources. We're dealing with sophisticated management information systems, we're looking to get the best out of hundreds of men and women, and to give them job satisfaction. I suppose it makes us a bit of a closed group really, like all professionals. Only we really appreciate what's involved, I suppose that's what being a professional is all about. (chief superintendent, Oldtown Division)

In summary, the new set of ideas, attitudes and practices falling under the rubric of the new managerialism and its symbolic associates, may be seen as a response to problems of occupational

standing and identity, and of external legitimacy, as well as of internal legitimacy. The commitment to the generation of a normative culture within the organization which is implicit in the last of these aims may on occasions be relegated to secondary status, liable to be marginalized or even sacrificed in the face of the other imperatives. If this argument is set beside the more intrinsic reservations that senior managers retain concerning the appropriateness of new managerialist initiatives, then the tentative nature of their collective endorsement of the new approach is underlined. Indeed, as the following two comments demonstrate, awareness that such tensions exist and hidden agendas prevail even within their own community of senior officers can cause some officers who are genuinely enthused of new managerialist initiatives to fear the dangers of isolation and overreaching, and others who are more sceptical to have their doubts reinforced:

> "You always have to remember that you can't run before you can walk. The boss and I have to temper our approach with caution. Trying to get people more involved, trying to break down the barriers which have been there for a long time, takes time. And you have to remember that it's not only the cops and sergeants you have to worry about. You have to bring some of the more senior ranks along with you as well. You see, they are as steeped in the old attitudes as some of the men, they tend to think that this whole new approach to management is just some sort of game. That's why it was important that we were sure we had all the senior ranks behind us before we started opening things up, bringing in more consultation. Otherwise we would have been left high and dry, with no credibility anywhere." (superintendent, Riverside Division)

> " A lot of it is just jargon. It's a way of selling yourself to the public. Plus it makes a lot of senior officers think they are something important. Maybe I'm too old and too cynical, but all this new management stuff leaves me cold. I'm

not sure who it's really in aid of." (chief inspector, Newtown Division)

Even more pertinently - and here the problem of reflected attitudes which was referred to at the beginning of this section is most pronounced - the ways in which the themes of managerialism, reformism, and professionalism interconnect underscores the reluctance of junior officers to take managerialist initiatives seriously. As suggested in chapter six, the connection which is made between the new managerialism and the new reformism in the cultural understandings of police officers, ramifies out into a wider connection between two oppositional themes. In terms of the binary 'sorting' framework which figures prominently within the police officer's cultural tool-kit, managerialism and reformism on the one hand, together with the umbrella theme of professionalism, are counterposed to craftsmanship - or artisanship - and traditionalism on the other hand. The cultural complexes which are identified on either side of the divide tend to be seen in unduly monolithic terms, as are the attitudes of organisational actors associated with such complexes. Thus, those constables and sergeants who are self-styled artisans and traditionalists tend to impute to managerialists reformist views, to reformists managerialist views, and to them both the conceits of professionalism. The 'sins' associated with each approach tend automatically to be visited upon the exponents of the other. Still more significantly for present purposes, such is the propensity

amongst those junior officers with a rigidly dichotomous world-viewto label the 'other' in monolithic terms that, insofar as the foredescribed complexities of the relationship betwen managerialism, reformism and professionalism are appreciated by them, they may - particularly if their understanding is coloured by their experience of an instrumental régime - view such complexities as providing a recipe for self-interested opportunism amongst their seniors rather than as requiring of them difficult choices and trade-offs. From this sceptical standpoint, too much may be read into the possibility that the pursuit of the normative ends of the new managerialism may be subordinated to its other existential and ideological ends, and to the fact that these normative ends may on occasions be sacrificed before the more pressing demands of reformism. By contrast, too little credit may be given to senior officers for genuine commitment to managerialist ideals, and scant attention paid to the recurrent problems involved in reconciling such commitment with competing demands and pressures. Ironically, therefore, an approach committed to the dismantling of communication barriers by senior officers and their building of more resilient normative relations between ranks, may in some instances serve only to fuel the sceptics' fires and so contribute instead to the widening of the empathy gap:

> "I don't really know what I think about applying management to policing, because it has never really been tried. The bosses go through the motions, but it is a way of giving them something to do, making them feel important, and the minute something goes wrong, the minute some councillor starts bleating and they're looking for a scapegoat, then its the same old story. Man management is all right when it suits them." (Sergeant, Oldtown Division)

"I'm not sure what to think about all this new craze with man management and human relations. Why should we believe that everything has changed all of a sudden. I'll believe it when I see it. I think it's just another bandwagon for them to jump on. " (constable, City Division)

(2) The new managerialism in practice

In this final subsection we will attempt to draw together some of the arguments presented above through a few brief illustrative examples of the new managerialism in action. Of course, one consequence of hesitant and limited reception of the new managerialism across the ranks is that the actual reforms promulgated under its name may themselves be of restricted ambit. Thus, as previously observed, the system of Policing by Objectives, which is seen by many as representing the vanguard of the new managerialism[29] had not been applied in any of our four divisions at the time of study, and, accordingly, its achievements and transformative potential are discussed on a necessarily more general footing in the final chapter. Nevertheless, some of the changes which had been introduced at the time of the research remain instructive, not least *because* their remit was limited. As we shall see, this very fact serves to reinforce some of the doubts and reservations expressed above. Accusations of minimalism, of irrelevance, and of hidden agendas, and fears of isolation, are more likely to thrive in a context where the concrete reform process is not itself well-advanced. Bearing these factors in mind, let us consider certain managerialist reforms, first, in the area of

training, and secondly, in the area of internal communications and consultation.

In the late 1970s a number of new training courses for promoted ranks were introduced at the Scottish Police College.[21] Besides the selected sergeants course and the newly-promoted inspectors course referred to earlier[22], the Scottish Command Course for officers of superintendent rank was also introduced during that period. Amongst the ideas and themes offered to officers on these various courses were a number of ways of looking at their managerial role and at the dynamics of the organisation within which they were located which, drawing upon management theory and practice across a variety of settings, stressed the limitations of an instrumental rationality situated within a rigidly maintained hierarchical structure and advocated a more human-centred approach. From discussions with senior divisional officers, it appeared that the Command Course, at least in terms of its management input, was viewed as a worthwhile experience,[23] and this reflects and underlines the fact that on account of experiences gained, present role pressures, and available opportunities, it is the highest divisional officers who perforce provide the major driving force behind the new managerialism. A similar, if somewhat less positive profile emerges with regard to inspectors and their experience of management training.[24] Further, both of these groups appeared to hold fairly positive views on the value of management training at sergeant rank, although this tended to be qualified by the argument, alluded to in chapter four[25], that at the stage of first-line

supervision practical experience and knowledge of standard operating procedures was felt by the more senior ranks to be at a greater premium than theoretical reflection, and thus that the former should not be sacrificed to the latter.

However, if we turn to the sergeants themselves, doubts as to the relevance of maangement training were much more prevalent. For many, their still strong commitment to policework as craftwork led them to view the teachings of management theory, particularly if not carefully directed to the specificities of policework, as utopian, overgeneralized, recondite - basically as an affront to common sense.[25] And for those who were initially enthused by their exposure to these new ideas and became ambitious to translate some of their recently acquired theories into practice, the transition back into the operational domain tended to mark the reawakening of disillusionment and cynicism. Indeed, and ironically, in some cases these sentiments were rendered more acute just because of their acquisition of a new critical standpoint from which to view the inadequacies of the norms and assumptions underpinning the practical context of inter-rank relations. These positions of prospective hostility and retrospective disillusionment are exemplified in turn in the following two quotes:

> "All that stuff at the college was just pure baloney. It bears no relation to the reality. It's just a bandwagon for a few careerists. It's not applied in the police. Ours is a disciplined organization, for better or worse. The cops are not encouraged to think, nor are the sergeants. No amount of spouting forth on courses is going to change that." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

"I found that course a frustrating experience. I came back full of ideas, then, bang, the same old story. The same old discipline, the same old treating the cops and us like we'd just crawled out of a drain. I was getting a transfer out into the County when I came back, and I remember calling in at Force Headquarters to see someone in personnel before I went. I bumped into this Chief Inspector - a right posing bastard who had spent most of his service in C.I.D. He said to me, 'I see you're going out to look after the swampy woollies. Rather you than me'."

Q: "What are swampy woolies?"

A: "Swampy means they come from the swamps - the country - the opposite of city slickers. Woollies because they have to wear woolly trousers, uniform rather than detective... That attitude, and the smarmy way he said it, really pissed me off. Here was a guy in a senior management position, mouthing off every day in his job about the importance of job satisfaction and all that, and this was what he really thought. It is absolutely typical of attitudes in the police to anyone who isn't in your own litle clique - pure contempt. I've come across that narrow-minded attitude hundreds of times, and it gets in the way of doing anything constructive."
(sergeant, Newtown Division)

In sum, while providing inspiration or support for the managerialist views of the more senior ranks, if considered in isolation, educational initiatives in this area have little impact on the more junior ranks. At best, they are seen to provide a somewhat fragile set of exhortations mounted against the prevailing current of organisational life. At worst, their purely academic status, as forms of knowledge articulated in the sanitized environment of the training college and untested in the "natural laboratory of the streets"[27], underlines for junior ranks their association with alien cultural themes, and thus with the demands of

impression management and élite self-interest rather than the mundane realities of operational policework.

To what extent, if at all, may these problems be overcome if we consider more substantive new managerialist initiatives in the area of inter-rank communications? Take, for example, the practice throughout Oldtown Division , and in at least some parts of the other research divisions, of holding 'greetin' meetin's' at the quiet time on a Sunday morning early shift, where the sub-divisional commander, or perhaps occasionally the divisional commander would address the shift *en masse* on questions of divisional policy. As reported in chapter four, the responses of sergeants to a question concerning ways of improving communications and consultation between the ranks[28] would seem to indicate the likelihood of a reasonable level of support for a policy such as this as a means of narrowing the empathy gap. However, despite the trend in reported aspirations, the concrete experience of this initiative appears to be less favourable. The perceived shortcomings of greetin' meetin's are well described in the following comments by a sergeant, a constable and a chief superintendent, each of whom had participated in or been otherwise involved in a number of them:

> "The problém now is that he talks and we listen. There is no real discussion. He simply tells us what is new, including new legal stuff and procedures and whatever is getting on his wick that month. He asks for comments and questions, and there usually aren't that many. It isn't helped by the new inspector. It used to be that the inspector and sergeant sat in the body of the kirk, but he thought that that was too informal. We now sit at the front with the boss, facing the kirk. It doesn't encourage debate. At the same time, it wasn't much better when it was more

informal. You see, a lot of the cops like being told what to do. They feel uncomfortable about being asked their opinion, they always think it is being clocked for future reference and that they are just being given enough rope to hang themselves." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

"The attitude of some of the boys on the shift would make you despair sometimes, especially some of the older boys. They are as suspicious as fuck about anything like this. The thing is, the Super comes down with some new policy about football details or something, and it is the first we have heard about it. It's a foregone conclusion, the boss wouldn't be telling us about it if he hadn't already made up his mind. There's really not a lot you can say except to try to be clear about the details. A lot of the boys think it is not our place to comment anyway but that is crap. It is us who are going to have to put it into operation and so I think that there is a case for consulting us at an earlier stage. The only reason why we cannot comment is because we are so bloody ignorant at the time we are consulted, not because we don't have anything to say... Some of the boys are just generally cynical about it. They see it as a PR exercise. They are not used to being treated as equals...and they can't switch off from the normal rank thing. They are scared of putting their foot in it and, in a way, you can't really blame them for not really believing in the worth of it when it all seems to have been decided before they get to us anyway. But it goes deeper than that. If they were genuinely asked their opinion, a lot of them would run a mile. It's just so against what they have been used to. And they make it hard for anyone else to say anything. If you do try to say something, you are seen as a crawler, as someone who is just trying to impress, to catch the boss's eye to get promotion or something like that. So at the end of the day no-one says bugger all and the bosses probably go away thinking we are a bunch of monkeys who cannot say anything anyway. You see, there is this thing amongst cops that you are either a talker or a doer. Because a lot of them can't or are scared to do both, they brand all of us as the same." (constable, Oldtown Division)

"You've really got to work at these things and be patient otherwise they end up a waste of time, and can even do more harm than good. There's some of my colleagues amongst senior officers who seriously think that because the men aren't

actually in armed revolt that everything in the garden is rosy. They sometimes forget how inhibiting the rank thing can be. I've heard some say after these meetings that there are no problems just because no-one has piped up. My view is that there are never no problems, and the minute people start saying that you start worrying! The other line you hear is that if one of the men or the sergeants starts complaining about something after the meeting then they are just dismissed as malcontents. They can't be taken seriously or they would have spoken up at the appropriate time. Obviously, I don't go along with that either." (chief superintendent, Riverside Division)

Thus, in the first place, we can see how, in line with the arguments presented in the previous subsection, the attempt to introduce a collective, inter-rank framework for the discussion of policy tends to be overshadowed and blighted by the instrumental backdrop against which it takes place and the powerful legacy of countervailing practices and attitudes which this sustains. The commitment of some senior officers to genuine dialogue is uncertain, and this only underlines the defensive ambivalence of junior officers already sceptical about the underlying rationale of the exercise. This defensive attitude is further entrenched on account of a more general fear of change amongst the lower ranks, which in turn derives from the more general tendency for superimposed reform to threaten vested interests and disturb entrenched world-views. Relatively open fora such as those described are viewed by junior officers as settings fraught with danger. As suggested earlier, their low visibility and control over key information which they generally regard as their most prized asset in instrumental exchanges may be seen to be challenged. And even for those individuals who may be less inclined to view the process in such a

light, they will perceive that their credibility amongst their peer group, which collectively is likely to be heavily influenced by instrumental attitudes and strongly committed to the rituals and redoubts of defensive solidarity, will be diminished if they attempt to exploit the opportunity provided in a constructive manner. And as a final consequential effect, this cautious reaction may, as the Riverside Divisional Commander noted, be interpreted by certain senior officers as providing grounds for complacency and/or for the dismissal of the capacity of juniors to intervene effectively in the managerial process.

Might this instrumental cycle be broken if the status of the consultative exercise is placed on a more secure and ambitious footing? What if junior officers can be sure that direct forms of communication are not intended merely to reinforce the message from on high, that there is instead a commitment to bilateral discussion, and, moreover, that this is intended not merely to provide a 'talking shop' but as a means for junior officers to exercise real influence on the policy-making process? This very challenge was addressed in Riverside Division through a more systematic managerialist initiative by the Divisional Commander. It involved seeking the written views of all divisional sergeants and inspectors on the topics of the public image of the police, communications within the organisation, and the efficient deployment of resources, and was followed by meetings amongst the interested parties to discuss the possible implementation of some of the suggestions made. Unlike the greetin' meetin' therefore, this scheme did not allow the

agenda of discussion to be entirely dictated by the senior officer, it endowed the thoughts of junior officers with the authority of the written word, it allowed all parties to prepare their arguments before the critical decision-making phase, and it promised the serious consideration of any proposals generated. A number of sergeants appeared to be impressed by the far-reaching potential of this approach:

> "I'm basically in favour of the chief super's approach. You feel that he genuinely wants your opinions. You feel that it has been properly worked out beforehand for once."(sergeant, Riverside Division)
>
> "I think the boss is a great guy. He's friendly and approachable, but there's a lot of bosses like that to your face. The difference with him is that he seems prepared to put his money where his mouth is. With this management project he has got a lot of us thinking... You feel that it's not just a talking shop anymore, that things are really changing and they're beginning to take notice of the views of the people that really know what's going on at last." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

However, even this initiative, despite tackling some of the specific cultural impediments to the new managerialism head-on, was by no means universally approved. For some officers, rather than assuaging their doubts as to the relevance and legitimacy of the new managerialism, it merely altered the terms in which such doubts were articulated. Thus, for those particularly concerned with the general propensity of organizational reform to threaten established positions and patterns of behaviour, radical change simply meant radical disruption of existing orientations and niches:

> "the management project got a lot of people nervous. You see, it's bad enough putting things down on paper when you are in control, where you know more than the bosses, but this was even

worse. A lot of people felt they were being given just enough rope to hang themselves. And our inspector got nervous too, he was wanting to know what we were going to say. He's used to things neat and tidy, the party line coming down from the top. None of the men contradict him, and he never contradicts any of the bosses. I'm sure all this consultation nearly gave him a heart-attack. (sergeant, Riverside Division)

In other cases, scepticism as to the motivations of champions of managerial reform was so deep-rooted that even a self-evidently succesful outcome could be viewed with a jaundiced eye:

> "The management project, that was something else! You know it was me who suggested the crime squad in this sub-division to deal with all the housebreakings. Ask any of the other sergeants, they'll tell you that it was me who brought it up at the meeting. Now it's been brought in and been a success it will be seen as another feather in the boss's cap. I won't get the credit for it, he will. Ask any of the sergeants, they will tell you. The whole point of the management exercise was just to milk the sergeants for ideas and steal them for the greater glory of the top brass." (Sergeant, Riverside Division)

When the authoritative endorsement of a suggestion from the lower ranks commissioned in a formal exercise is interpreted not as proof of the authenticity of that exercise but rather as *the theft* of an idea, then the difficulties involved in bridging the empathy gap through managerialist initiatives are seen in stark perspective.

In summary, whereas many managerialist programmes are compromised by their cosmetic appearance, or by their vague or limited remit, even more considered local initiatives which are sincerely and effectively dedicated to the establishment of a participative and pluralistic organisational culture and to the

generation of normative relations, may be unable to overcome the more broadly-based and more deeply-embedded obstacles discussed earlier. Whether, and in what form, a programme of internal change of a scale more closely matched to the dimensions of the problem would be more successful in transforming inter-rank relations, is a question which will be addressed in the final chapter.

CHAPTER NINE

THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTOR

A. INTRODUCTION.

If the new managerialist movement within senior ranks in general fails to provide a significant counter to the spread of instrumental relations, which in turn is responsible for the profound tensions in the role of the uniform patrol sergeant, does the inspector rank, considered separately, have a more positive contribution to make in this respect? After all, as the immediately adjacent senior rank, inspectors would seem to have the potential to provide a significant bulwark for sergeants against the instrumental strategies of other more senior ranks. Their support, sympathy and trust might provide sergeants with greater resources and allow them greater scope for independent action in responding to the challenge of reconciling operational and managerial demands. Furthermore, the general proposition outlined in chapter five, that the material sources of instrumental power tend to be less substantial and the preconditions of normative relations more often available where the status of the senior rank is more modest and their distance from the junior rank less great, suggests that the relationship of the inspector to the sergeant might be relatively amenable to normative influences. In sum, there would seem to be some theoretical basis for the view that the inspector is both strategically well

positioned and normatively inclined to alleviate the tensions in the role of the sergeant.

However, while the first of these propositions is undeniable, the empirical evidence presented in chapter four does not provide strong backing for the second. Although a relative majority (albeit an absolute minority) of the sergeant rank felt the inspector rank to be the most supportive,(1) significantly fewer sergeants felt closest to their inspectors than felt closest to their constables.(2) For their part, a far higher percentage of inspectors felt their chief inspectors to be the most supportive and closest rank than they did their sergeants.(3) Further, inspectors appeared to be markedly at odds with their sergeants in their conceptions of the problems and priorities attached to the latter role. Relatively speaking, inspectors emphasized administrative and disciplinary functions at the expense of the cultivation of close interpersonal relations with constables, and were less appreciative than the sergeants themselves of the logistical constraints and strategic dilemmas involved in balancing the demands of junior and senior ranks.(4) Inspectors also gave priority to administrative and disciplinary functions in their own role conceptions, and correspondingly, they gave less emphasis to man management problems and skills, rating these as less significant aspects of their job than did their juniors or, for that matter, their seniors in their respective self-analyses.(5)

Moreover, if we consider this evidence in the round, the one finding which appears to runs against the grain - the perception of a sizeable minority of the sergeant rank that the inspector rank is the most supportive - is arguably as much a recognition of the high degree of strategic dependence of the sergeant upon the inspector, as it is a positive evaluation of the normative commitment of particular inspectors. The tension between the actual and the ideal which this indicates is illustrated in the following supplementary answers from two sergeants who themselves numbered amongst this sizeable minority:

> "For a sergeant, a good inspector is a godsend. You need somebody who understands, who takes a lot to do with the shift, who isn't too worried about standing up for you, who supports you with the paperwork rather than picking holes in it, who takes joint responsibility with you for decisions."(sergeant, Riverside Division)
>
> Q: "What sorts of decisions?"
>
> A: "Like when you have to rearrange cover at short notice because someone reports sick at the beginning of a shift. A good inspector will put his mind to it with you, he'll know the men's strengths and weaknesses too, he'll help you out. A bad inspector will either take over completely, or let you get on with it and then hold you responsible when something goes wrong. Like when a pub fight blows up he'll be the first to criticize you for having such-and-such a probationer there even though he wasn't interested in the first place."

> "I've always thought that the only way the police works is if every rank backs up the one immediately below them. The chief inspector can't operate properly without the super and chief super's backing, the constables can't operate without our backing, and we certainly can't operate without the inspector's backing. It doesn't always happen - that's human nature - but it is what we should be aiming for."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

The broad picture of inspectors then, is of a rank the majority of members of which express only limited normative orientations towards their juniors - a state of affairs which appears to be reciprocated - and more closely align themselves with their immediate seniors. In the remainder of this chapter we explore the reasons for this, and then trace the implications of this situation for sergeants in their efforts to reconcile the various demands of their role.

B. THE INSPECTOR: A RANK APART

If this finding of a limited basis for normative relations between inspectors and their juniors does not sit entirely happily with the basic proposition set out in chapter five, perhaps the reasons for this may be found in some of the more detailed arguments which have been adduced in subsequent chapters. Thus, it should be emphasised that the factors contributing to the erosion of the various bases of normative power vis-a-vis juniors which we noted in respect of senior divisional ranks in the previous chapter(s) are general in nature and so pertain to the inspector rank as much as to any other. Moreover, with regard to institutional authority, quite apart form the broad factors bearing upon its decline and the fading resonance of the related military style, certain special considerations apply in respect of inspectors. Whereas twenty five years previously the vast majority of inspectors would have been situated outwith the shift system by which the work pattern of sergeants and constables is dictated and would have occupied an

elevated position within the divisional hierarchy - or, in the case of burgh forces, the force hierarchy - at the time of the research most operational inspectors within our four division were integrated within the basic shift structure and all were situated outwith the senior divisional and sub-divisional command structure.[7] Accordingly, in their particular circumstances, an attempt to adopt a posture in keeping with the distant authoritarian style is not merely vulnerable to the growing unpopularity of such an image, but is also increasingly less suited to their formal status and function. Against these factors, however, it must be noted that their relative propinquity to the operational ranks means that inspectors are less vulnerable than their seniors to many of the external pressures, delusions, informational strategies and myopic insights which are the stuff of the empathy gap, are relatively well positioned to generate interpersonal normative relations with their juniors, and are less well supported by an instrumental power base whose utilization - the example of the new managerialism notwithstanding - might be deemed to render the cultivation of a significant network of normative relations less urgent.

Thus, on the one hand, inspectors have not been impervious to the decline in certain traditional normative power bases whereas, on the other, certain cognitive and strategic factors appear to provide a substantial platform for a continuing endeavour to relate to their juniors in a normative manner. If these considerations tend to cancel each other out, there are other rank-specific factors bearing upon the role of the contemporary inspector in our four

divisions which suggest why this finely balanced set of pressures and influences is tilted in favour of a more instrumental régime in respect of juniors, and a closer alignment with senior ranks. Again, these factors may for heuristic purposes be divided into those which are structurally significant and those which are culturally significant. Again, however - to reiterate a now familiar caveat - too much should not be read into this distinction and, accordingly, the following arguments are presented and should be understood in a cumulative manner.

(1) The peculiarities of second-line supervision

The structural arguments derive from the formal position of the inspector as *second-line supervisor* in the contemporary police division. To begin with, we may consider the implications of the attenuation of the lines of formal responsibility linking inspectors, and their seniors, to the actions of their juniors.

We have already mentioned the reasons for the availability of displacement strategies on the part of all promoted ranks other than sergeant. The interpolation of an intermediate rank or ranks between senior ranks and the constable rank entails that the former may, by focusing on the accountability of these intermediaries, escape full responsibility for the perceived wrongs and inadequacies of the operational shift.(8) Previously we concentrated upon the opportunities which this permits for the disengagement from organizational objectives, and the pursuit of more self-interested

concerns on the part of senior officers, but there is a further, more significant, and, from the perspective of the organisational hierarchy, more functional set of implications which flows from this state of affairs. From this alternative point of view, partial displacement and devolution of responsibility operates, not as a gratuitous concession to senior ranks, but as a means of ensuring that the upwards communication function is carried out with at least a minimal degree of candour and effectiveness, and more generally, that senior officers will be encouraged to place their loyalties and occupational commitments with *their* seniors. In other words, their relative freedom from defensive concerns about the instrumental repercussions of their own revelations, diagnoses and strategic initiatives, inclines senior officers to co-operate in maximizing the information and knowledge base from which assessment of operational performance is possible, and in planning and implementing policies informed by such assessments. Furthermore, since control over the most significant positive instrumental resource, namely promotion, also lies largely within the community of senior officers, this provides an additional reason for the more junior ranks within this community to comply with the synergetic logic of this process.

As the most junior rank included within this mutually protective cocoon, inspectors have a crucial function to perform in the front-line enactment and monitoring of management strategies, and strong incentives to play this role effectively. And where relations between senior divisional staff and operational staff are

already strongly coloured by instrumental considerations, this front-line role itself inevitably takes on a strongly instrumental hue:

> "For us, the inspector is absolutely crucial. You hear all this talk about the sharp end, well he's on the sharp end of management. We absolutely rely on the inspectors to ensure that the right messages and attitudes are passed down, and that the right information comes back up again. You can't rely on the sergeant to the same extent, he's too close to the men, he's a bit vulnerable. It's the inspector who keeps the show on the road." (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

> "Once you reach inspector, things change. This sounds a bit clinical... but I think most inspectors would know what I mean. It's like once you reach inspector the balance swings, there's more people in the place have to look out for you than you have to look out for them. It's not a power kick, it's just the way things have got to be for the line of command to work." (inspector, Oldtown Division)

In and of itself, this structural integration with senior ranks which bequeaths to the inspector the role of front-line agent of the instrumental strategies of divisional management is not necessarily fatal to the success of a normative strategy vis-a-vis junior officers. Some of the tasks of information dissemination and monitoring and of policy negotiation and refinement which fall to the inspector in the process of policy implementation retain open-ended possibilities. Thus, the tasks of relaying and interpreting force, divisional or sub-divisional orders, of assessment within the staff appraisal system, of critical scrutiny of many items of paperwork including crime, offence and occurrence reports, and of initial inquiry in complaints against the police, provide aspects of the role of the inspector through which the operational support

function referred to at the beginning of the chapter may be pursued. So, for example, in the fulfilment of their dissemination role, inspectors may take time to explain carefully to members of the shift - whether individually or collectively - the meaning of new legislation, the function and value of new forms, the rationale and procedures for co-ordination with other departments in overlapping areas of work such as crime investigation, physical crime prevention and road accident inquiries; or in the fulfilment of their monitoring role they may 'back up their shift' against a tide of paperwork or "'lend a sympathetic ear' to shift members who are the subject of vexatious complaints from members of the public; or, finally, in their role as minor participant in divisional policy-making they may negotiate for more overtime or an extra mobile resource. In each case, they have the opportunity to earn both personal respect and trust from junior officers on account of their loyalty, and competent authority on account of their professional judgment and awareness of operational priorities.

By the same token, however, these normatively based initiatives can only qualify rather than transform the instrumental base. In the case of the monitoring and negotiating roles, the efficacy of the inspectors' techniques depends upon their acceptance of their basic agency function and the attainment of a standard of performance which impresses senior officers sufficiently to earn *their* respect and confidence, and their serious consideration of inspectors' pleas in mitigation, recommendations and resource bids. In turn, the impressiveness of the performance of inspectors is at

least partially dependent upon their willingness and capacity to make hard judgments of their juniors, to expose inadequacies, and to restrict their special pleading within limits which display a responsible awareness of wider divisional needs, all of which combine to dilute the very normative solution in whose pursuit they may be employed:

> " It's never an easy balance. I believe in backing up my shift as much as I can, I think they are a good shift. But you can't be seen to ask for special treatment. Sure, we can justify extra overtime if it's planned, football matches and the like, but you can't justify too much unplanned overtime. If the boys keep on making arrests at ten to elven on the backshift and getting an hour's overtime to process it, the bosses will start thinking they are at it. The fact that it might mean they are just more enthusiastic than other shifts won't come into it...
> It's the same with paperwork. If we're late getting the offence reports upstairs again we'll get compared to other shifts. It'll mean we're slackers rather than hard workers who generate a lot of paper. I've got to balance these things. I don't want to curb the men, but I don't want the boss to think we're out on a limb either, that's just asking for trouble. And let's face it, at my rank you should have a wider responsibility. I shouldn't just define success in terms of my shift... It's not a competiton between shifts. I've got to make hard decisions about the shift and people in it if I'm doing my job properly. I can't just be the cheer-leader."(inspector, Oldtown Division)

The in-built instrumental bias in the role of inspectors is further underlined if we consider a further, and related dimension of their position as second-line supervisors within the rank hierarchy. A recurrent theme in this thesis has been the difficulty which senior ranks experience in legitimizing their various roles in terms of the practices intrinsic to these roles. The essentially

secondary and derivative status of their work is firmly entrenched in the understandings of operational ranks, and, as the example of the new managerialism illustrates, any attempt to conceive of the dominant themes within the work of senior ranks in more distinctive terms may simply be seen as a vain attempt to challenge this incontrovertible truth. Nevertheless, in however modest terms the work profile of senior ranks is understood by junior ranks and however negatively the manner in which some aspects of it are undertaken is evaluated, for the most part it is conceded that they carry out certain indispensable administrative and managerial functions. With regard to inspectors however, even this residual approbation is not readily forthcoming. Despite their strategic importance as trusted agents of the policies and commands of senior management and despite the fact that constables and sergeants must also rely on them to defend shift interests, on a wider canvas - in terms of overall functional responsibilities - they are and are seen by many in the lower ranks to be perched somewhat uneasily between the two major divisional constituencies. Their contribution either to the broad range of administrative functions of senior divisional ranks or to the equally broad range of operational functions of junior ranks is seen to be somewhat marginal. This tends to expose inspectors to criticism from below as - in the words of one sergeant- "a superannuated rank", both because of the general impression of underemployment thus created and, in turn, because this encourages attention to be focused on on the narrow agency role and so places in sharper perspective certain negative and self-contradictory features of this role.

As this argument rests upon a judgement of the comparative responsibilities of different ranks, it is best elaborated and illustrated by reference to a categorical scheme which is geared to illuminate such comparisons. While it has a number of shortcomings, including a tendency to overgeneralize and decontextualize,(9) the typology developed by Mintzberg for understanding managerial work - or indeed any broadly-based organisational role - is a suitable candidate for this task.(10) As well as providing a valuable touchstone for comparative analysis, his approach offers two further advantages for present purposes. First, unlike the taxonomical schemes through which the priorities, problems and ideal attributes of various divisional ranks were elaborated in chapter four, Mintzberg's role-framework does not rest upon the value-judgements of participants and observers as to the most significant features of particular roles, but rather attempts to provide a rounded analysis of the functional responsibilities which attach to such roles. Accordingly, as is required here, it is sensitive to quantity rather than quality - to the overall weight of responsibility which attaches to a position rather than to the nuances of particular tasks within it. Secondly, it is an elementary scheme. The categories which it employs correspond closely to the categories through which the key constituency with which we are concerned - the operational ranks of sergeant and constable - perceive the workload of various ranks. Thus, its basic terminology can be used in the following discussion without doing violence to the views actually expressed by respondents on the relevant matters.(11)

Basically, Mintzberg distinguishes between three different types of managerial role, within each of which he identifies a number of sub-types. In their informational roles managers may be involved in monitoring, disseminating or acting as spokesmen. In their interpersonal roles, they may be figureheads, leaders or liaison officers. Finally, in their decision-making roles, they may be entrepreneurs, disturbance-handlers, resource-allocators or negotiators. If we look beyond the informational tasks of monitoring and disseminating, within which the narrow front-line agency role of the inspector tends to be concentrated, and which also account for a not inconsiderable proportion of the work of other ranks, we can identify distinct sets of interpersonal and decision-making roles which are attributable - and recognized by operational ranks as being attributable - to the two major occupational segments within the divisional hierachy, but which tend to offer limited scope for inspectors.

As regards the interpersonal roles, from the perspective of the operational ranks these are seen to play a significant part in their own work - both within and between the ranks of sergeant and constable. Motivation, on the job training, recognition of temporary or more enduring enabling or disabling traits of one's colleagues relevant to operational performance, and operational task co-ordination, are all seen to require skill and commitment in the areas of leadership and liaison, while under the rubric of the latter - sergeants are also of course centrally implicated in the effort to co-ordinate expectations and activities between junior and

senior ranks. The internally-directed interpersonal functions of senior divisional ranks are deemed by their juniors to be more sporadic but still of significance. They have a decisive role to play in certain crucial encounters which may affect the career opportunities of junior officers, such as counselling interviews and disciplinary interviews. Furthermore, these internally-directed functions are seen to be complemented by other externally-directed interpersonal functions. As the authoritative representative of the police within a distinct territorial unit, the senior officer has a responsibility for liaison, and relatedly, as a spokesman, vis-a-vis other groups and individuals in the area with regard to the explanation, evaluation and discussion of police actions and objectives. More reactively, the senior officer provides a figurehead for those who wish to initiate contact with the police in relation to more general police-relevant demands and complaints. For both lower and upper echelons therefore, we can point to distinct interpersonal role sets which are recognized amongst the lower echelons.

The same is true of decision-making functions. Within the operational ranks, there is a common and patently crucial involvement in disturbance-handling in dealing with the clients of the organisation, an involvement which only differs between the constable and sergeant rank in respect of matters of degree and timing. As to degree, sergeants tend to restrict their involvement at the front-line to these incidents which they deem to be of a particularly complex, serious or labour-intensive nature, such as

recurrent domestic disputes, seious crimes of violence or property crimes, and fights outside licensed premises.(12) As to timing, sergeants tend to become involved in the post-operational aspects of all non-trivial disturbances, being concerned to evaluate critically police actions contemporaneous with the incident with a view both to judging the intrinsic adequacy of the initial response and the necessity and appropriate direction of any subsequent corrective or consolidatory activity, and to assessing its adequacy in the eyes of crucial internal and external audiences and how, in the light of this, it might be best accounted for to those audiences.(13) Indeed, this retrospective involvement combines decision-making, interpersonal and informational functions in the one set of tasks. A further recognised decision-making function which is peculiar to the sergeant rank consists in a modest form of resource allocation. Within their shifts sergeants are engaged in a continual process of incremental adjustment, matching a precarious and unpredictable local capacity (rendered so by illness, paperwork duties, prisoner processing duties, mechanical failures etc.) to the exigencies of the policing environment with its fluid pressure points, according to a fluctuating set of specific priorities ordered and passed down by the organisational hierarchy from time to time.

It is the setting of such priorities which is recognised by junior ranks as the specifically innovatory - or entrepreneurial - aspect of the decision-making role of senior management. The size of plain clothes squads, the distribution of foot and mobile resources, the periodic re-emphasis of crime-fighting and offence-

containment priorities, these are the fluctuating notes of explicit policy-making which interrupt the steady rhythm provided by the routine spatio-temporal allocation of divisional strength, a rhythm which encapsulates a set of more permanent policy choices settled at force level. Resource allocation in the narrower sense of matching specific officers or types of officers to specific areas or functional responsibilities is another recognised task of senior officers. They may develop policies of sending probationers to busy stations, rotating supervisory or operational staff at periodical intervals, breaking up 'bad' shifts, and balancing the supervisory team on a particular shift in terms of length, type and location of previous experience, to name but a few examples. Indeed, this form of resource allocation - or "personnel brokerage" [14] - provides an example of a task which falls on all supervisory ranks within the hierarchy, but which gives rise to conflicting priorities and ensuing co-ordination problems on account of the differing scale of their respective responsibilities. In turn, the requirement of mutual accommodation to which this gives rise signals one final aspect of the decision-making role of all supervisory ranks, their negotiating role. For instance, a senior officer may agree not to rotate a particularly valued member of the personnel of a shift, in return for that shift accepting a refugee or refugees from a rogue shift. This negotiating role is also in evidence in the relationship of senior divisional officers with *their* seniors. Sub-divisional and divisional commanders are acknowledged to have a significant role in representing the interests of the distinct

territorial unit in question, in discussions over the allocation of manpower and resources within the division or the force as a whole.

As suggested, these cultural understandings on the part of junior ranks, which are reflected and regulated in a wide range of formal organisational rules and operating procedures, entail that no attempt is made to deny that senior officers are performing certain necessary organizational functions. To be sure, senior officers may be seen to be executing these interpersonal and decision-making functions in a manner not to their juniors' liking, to be carrying a comparatively light load, and to be inordinately concerned with their self-propagation as an élite professional cadre with a distinctive managerialist ideology. However, while this can and does lead to generalized jibes about 'too many chiefs' and a 'top-heavy' organisational structure, because a core of indispensable tasks is nevertheless seen to be distributed over the range of senior management ranks, for the most part no specific rank is singled out for particular critical attention.

However, due to its peculiar structural position, the rank of inspector may be an exception to this rule. As second-line shift manager, it is very difficult to attribute any of the above interpersonal and decision-making tasks to the inspector in terms of the formal organisational design, with the exception of the pervasive resource-allocation and negotiating roles. But even here the role of the inspector is somewhat narrowly circumscribed. While, as suggested in an earlier quote, some sergeants may

appreciate the intervention at an early stage of inspectors in difficult resource-allocation decisions, often sergeants will perceive these decisions to be of such an exigent nature at shift level as to be their own proper responsibility, particularly where the inspector's intervention may be interpreted as an encroachment on the sergeant's limited capacity to dispense 'small favours' or as a threat to a policy of even-handed and consistent treatment of the officers on the section:

> "An interfering inspector can mess things up for you. When we had the previous man here, you would try to rotate the men in cars and on foot, give them a bit of variety. Of course, it can't be perfect. Some officers are born to be drivers or footmen... so you have to bear that in mind, but for the others, if you allow for emergencies, it's important to be seen to give them a fair crack. Well, this man had his own ideas. If you had somebody new, he might decide off his own bat where he was going, and bugger everybody else... or you would come back from annual leave, and you would see that things had gone to pot, your system had just been completely disregarded" (sergeant, Oldtown Division)
>
> " A lot of decisions about the shift have to be made jointly, that goes without saying. But I feel that, if you have strong views about something which depends upon a close assessment of a man's abilities, the inspector should give the sergeant his head. After all, it's us that knows them best." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

By contrast, supra-shift resource-allocation decisions are of such broad scope as to be seen by all ranks - including inspectors themselves who may, as noted earlier, be wary of the dangers of special pleading - as the proper responsibility of the appropriate territorial representative from sub-divisional manager (chief inspector) upwards.

As suggested, the matching of any of the other forementioned interpersonal and decision-making tasks to the role of the inspector appears to be even more inappropriate. The major interpersonal and decision-making functions of sergeants - the ongoing process of motivation and education of the constables and the taking or refinement of operational decisions respectively - exist precisely because of their proximity to the constable rank. On the other hand, the major functions of senior managers that we have mentioned are again predicated upon their being in a position of overall responsibility for and control of all or most police functions within a territorial unit, in other words, a position *outwith* the shift system.

Further, any attempt by inspectors significantly to widen their remit in any of the above respects seem destined either to be frustrated or to have counterproductive consequences, a state of affairs of which junior ranks are again aware and to which they may indeed contribute. Given the unavoidable implication of inspectors in the pattern of instrumental relations between operational and senior ranks, too close an involvement by them in the recognised interpersonal or decision-making functions of the sergeant tends to give rise to suspicion and resentment, since these latter functions place a premium upon the mutual flow of information between the supervisor and the constable, the controlled dissemination of which is a crucial defensive resource. In addition, further to the problem of balanced loyalties in terms of which the dangers of special pleading are explicable (and anticipating an argument which

is of even more central significance in respect of the sergeant role), the *practical* pursuit of a strategy of such intimacy by inspectors may lead constables to surmise, perhaps accurately, that by conveying such an image inspectors are thereby detracting from their capacity to negotiate successfully on behalf of junior officers with senior management, since the strategy in question will lead the latter to doubt their inspectors' allegiance.

Nor is any attempt by the inspector to encroach upon the functions of their seniors any more likely to succeed. If we examine the significant externally-directed interpersonal functions of senior officers, the potential for inspectors in this sphere appears to be strictly limited. On account of their modest input into divisional policy-making, their responsibilities here are more likely to be delegated than original. The more passive role of figurehead or spokesman will prevail over the positive liaison role, and their limited entrepreneurial role will thus be underlined. In the eyes of external audiences too, their lack of internal authority will diminish the credibility of their figurehead/spokesman/liaison roles. Thus, while they may stand in for seniors at meetings of the local Rotary Club or Round Table, or at public functions within the locality, they are unlikely to perform a similar substitutional role in respect of meetings with the local MP or district and regional councillors, or with senior officials in local authority services - housing, social work, education, planning and the like. Nor, on account of their formal subordination to their seniors, are they in a strong position to aspire beyond their modest advisory brief in

respect of the entrepreneurial functions of the latter group. And even if they were given their head, they would not be well placed to carry off such a *coup* in a manner which would strike their internal audiences as coherent or legitimate, since the execution of universal responsibilities from a position of sectional commitment involves an irresoluble conflict of interests. These points are recognized, albeit with somewhat different tonal shadings, in the following comments by an inspector and a sergeant respectively:

> "You'll find in the police that very few try to overreach their position. I'm a great one for reading about politics, and it always amazes me how some of the most powerful figures are on the backbenches. Here, you would never get that, because here respect for rank is a great thing. Even if you could get away with it, it would upset too many applecarts. You would be amazed how much store some members of the public set by talking to the super, or the police chief... That's right, they don't necessarily know the titles, but the rank thing cuts a lot of ice with them, especially the councillors ...You can get a bit frustrated, but at least you know in ther police that if you wait long enough and mind your Ps and Qs you will be in a stronger position to do what you want some day. It's not like the army. Maybe that's why you get all these stories about sergeants just about running the regiment or platoon. If they don't take it upon themselves in the forces then they'll never do it through the official rank structure. It's a case of needs must." (inspector, Newtown Division)

> "You asked me earlier about management. In a way, inspectors are neither fish nor fowl. They've got that bit more clout than us, and not half the pressure, but they are not really in at the hub either. You can see that half the time they don't know any more about some new policy than we do, even though they might pretend otherwise. And it's funny, if a sergeant goes along to an incident *and* some member of the public decides he or she is too important to talk to the sergeant, sometimes they'll ask for the inspector, but as often or not it's one of the high ranks they want. Not that they'll get it but it says something

about how the inspector is seen." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Therefore, on the basis of their reading of the differing interpersonal and decision-making roles of the upper and lower echelons within the division, junior ranks may perceive the rank of inspector to be, at best, underexploited and, at worst, supernumerary. Furthermore, this background perception tends to colour the understanding of junior ranks of inspectors' core informational roles - the dissemination of information and instructions downwards and the provision of feedback to seniors - such as to reinforce the background perception and to accentuate its instrumental overtones.

To explain, the attenuated line organization which is found in large and complex bureaucracies such as the police tends to bring any role which centres on predominantly informational tasks into disrepute. The 'paper pusher' and monitor of the minutiae of organizational life figure prominently in the demonology of all such organisations, providing a focal point for a whole set of grievances relating to the time-wasting, depersonalizing and status-reducing consequences of the extensive network of reporting relationships which duplicate tasks and generate what is seen from below as an excessive range of higher ranks.[15] Within the police organisation, inspectors provide the archetype for this role on account of the structural factors reported above. Their informational functions, already prominent, tend to be given a disproportionate emphasis, and to be seen in an unduly negative

light. Even their capacity to negotiate marginal increases in shift resources, and to reconstruct events involving, and data relating to, their juniors in a selective and advantageous manner, are interpreted by many junior officers in a manner which is informed by this background impression and which fails to mitigate such an impression to any substantial extent.

Thus, from this sceptical perspective, recognition of these potential benefits may amount to no more than a grudging instrumentalism. The only problems to which inspectors may be recognized as capable of providing solutions may be deemed to be ones of which they themselves are a root or contributory cause. Junior officers may feel the need either to be represented by an authoritative advocate in the arena of organisational politics or to have a relatively elevated contact point for information exchange and passage - in both cases the role being suited to the inspector rank - on account of the relative lack of formal influence of their own ranks, their relative distance in the chain of command from the significant policy-making domains of organisational activity, and the vigilantly defensive posture which the predominantly instrumental culture demands of them. But the first two problems may be seen by many junior officers to be exacerbated by the very fact of the intermediation of the inspector rank - its very existence 'stretching' the rank structure and diminishing the relative status of junior ranks - and so as capable of being alleviated by its removal. The third problem also - and here the arguments as to the redundancy of the inspector rank and its

predominantly instrumental orientation are most closely joined - may be seen to be exacerbated by the inspector's role as agent of the instrumental strategies of senior officers. In this respect, the informational function is viewed as representing a double-edged sword whose lethal blade is pointing downwards towards the lower ranks, and therefore, in similar vein, this weapon may be viewed more clearly as a source of the junior officer's problems rather than a solution.

And the fact that inspectors work within the shift system makes them even more vulnerable to judgement that their role is both redundant and threatening to the interests of junior officers. Although, as explained shortly, the working environment of the sergeant and constable within the station is much more accessible to the inspector than is that of the inspector to the sergeant and constable, the pattern of daily contiguity imposes strict limits upon any benefits which inspectors may gain from the imbalance. Their juniors may build up a fair picture of the general nature if not the specific details of their role, and this renders it more difficult for inspectors than for more senior divisional officers to generate an image of their role - a general authoritative style - which is capable of retaining a significant element of mystique and which may credibly claim to involve, literally, more than meets the eye.

The following three quotes illustrate the problems and dissatisfactions, as perceived by an inspector and two representatives of the rank of sergeant respectively, which may arise through the uneasy articulation of the inspector's role with both administrative and operational roles and practices, and the consequential charges of redundancy and narrow unproductive instrumentalism which may be laid against the rank:

> "There's a lot of things you can't let on about in this job, sometimes, even to your sergeant. There might be a discipline matter which the boss asks you to investigate. Also, we push a hell of a lot of paper in this job and although we know what it's all for, the men might not. In a way, we are the eyes and ears of the boss, we've got to be, no-one else can do it. It makes it hard though, you can't afford to get to close to the men, yet you're working with them every day. Maybe they don't entirely appreciate the range of your job, but that's the way it's got to be, and they should be professional enough just to accept that". (inspector, Oldtown Division)

> "What the fuck does the inspector do all day? I'm being serious, ask anyone, nobody knows. It's the biggest mystery in this job. The other sergeants don't know, the men know even less. He seems to fill up his day all right, but when you ask me what he achieves or what his place is in the grand scheme of things, then I really don't know. He seems to do lot of double-checking and passes on a lot of things both ways, but he doesn't seem to have any distinctive job of his own. A lot think we could do without them." (sergeant, City division)

> "Inspectors aren't the most popular figures in the police... In the old days the inspector was God, he was even more distant, but at least you got the impression that he had some clout. Now there are so many ranks that the men get the impression that he is just another lacky too. He can do you a bad turn, but is less likely to be able to do you a good turn. There's a name for the inspector in the job. He's called a lemon, you know, nippy with pips. That just about sums it up."

(sergeant, Riverside division)

A final structural feature of the inspector's role as second-line supervisor which militates against the cultivation of normative relations with juniors concerns the ordering of spatial relations with juniors. In compensation for the unavoidable absence of such a régime in the wider divisional territory, the activities of junior officers within the four walls of the station are subject to a potentially intrusive system of monitoring which allows them little in the way of guaranteed private space. On the other hand, senior officers, including inspectors, are relatively inaccessible to their juniors. This asymmentry of access underlines the instrumental pattern of relations between senior and junior ranks in at least two respects. It ensures that the strategic advantage of senior officers which derives from the capacity to scrutinize closely the inside activities of their juniors is not nullified or blunted by the existence of a correspondingly clear channnel of information flowing in the opposite direction. That is, as senior officers are not theoretically accountable to their junior offices for their every action and as much of their work takes place within restricted regions, it is relatively more difficult for juniors to attain the degree of knowledge of the patterns of activities of their seniors which would allow them either to anticipate the latter's moves with confidence or, by exposing their vulnerable spots, to build up a healthy stock of bargaining chips with which to counter these moves.[16] Secondly, the sheer contrast which is evoked, the open and exposed domain of the muster hall, the writing room and the locker room, as opposed to the private and sheltered domain of the

inspector's office, or that of his/her seniors, carries with it a potent imagery of unilateral accountability and a constant if latent threat of exposure of the wrongs of the junior officer. These two complementary aspects of imbalance, and their instrumental consequences, provide the respective subject-matters of the following two comments by sergeants:

> "A big station can be a suffocating place. It must be hell to work at headquarters, and you can tell by the attitudes of some of them who come down. I notice it now more myself because I work in the control room. Out in the street as a sergeant you get some breathing space, in here it's like a goldfish bowl. Your every decision can be taken apart afterwards. With some bosses, even the inspectors, it's like a power thing. I don't know whether they try it or not, but it is as if they should know everything that makes you tick, but you are not allowed to know anything about what makes them tick. You must know what it's like yourself, I'm, sure it happens everywhere. You get asked why you sent two men to this incident, or why you sent a policewoman to that call. Like if you send a policewoman to a domestic, you don't know whether you'll get praised for initiative - the woman's touch and all that - or slagged off for sending a wee lassie to deal with people who are old enough to be her parents. Sometimes it seems as if the right answer depends upon what day of the week it is. But it seems as if you're always the one who has to do the explaining...The bosses have got all the comeback on you. If you think they are being inconsistent or they are going against the chief's policy, you can't say anything, you can't really come back at them... It's as if there are all these hush-hush decisions being made in higher places, which you never really get to know about till it's too late and you've put your foot in it... We were talking earlier about people keeping secrets in the police, well the bosses are every bit as secretive, and some of them seem to relish the power it gives them." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

> "The inspector is a man apart from his section, literally. He can descend at any time, he can interfere in anything you are doing, but he spends a lot of time sitting alone in his office. The

men will always knock before they go in, and even Bob [the other shift sergeant] and me can't just barge in. If you want to see him, it's got to be for a reason. I think most inspectors are like that. It might not seem much, but it's all about who's boss. And it makes the cops think that he's a management man. Ask any of them, and they don't really identify with the inspector... Anyone who keeps their distance in this job, they're suspicious of, and they're that wee bit suspicious of the inspector." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

(2) The cultural identity of inspectors

Quite apart from these structural factors, there are a number of cultural factors which influence inspectors to align themselves more readily with their seniors than with their juniors, so further contributing to an instrumental climate in their relations with juniors. In particular, we are here concerned with the existential problem of "world-openness"[17] - the sense of precariousness of identity which is implicit in the unpredictability and uncertainty of intra-organisational relations ((as, indeed, in social relations generally), and the attempt to resolve or cope with this problem through endorsement of a collective work ethos.[18] As wenoted in the previous chapter with regard to senior managers, even although the ideal precondition - the existence of a framework of work group solidarity tightly woven by circumstances of intimate task interdependence - is no longer present at their rank, the basic desire for social belonging and identity remains for many officers, and, indeed, may be sustained and reinforced by the example of past experience. If, then, inspectors decide in favour of the adoption

of an image associated with a significant sector within the organisation, they have three possibilities to choose from.

In the first place, the inspector may attempt to be 'one of the boys', adopting the style and demeanour of juniors. This approach is unlikely to be adopted and if adopted is even less likely to succeed, largely because of its sheer implausibility as a self-description of the inspector's role, bona fide membership of the operational workgroup being seen as certified by day-by-day practical demonstration of the requisite skills and work patterns, and being strongly contradicted by endorsement of, or implication in the various instrumental strategies and orientations depicted above.

A second option, the cultivation of an image which concentrates upon the distinctive features of the inspector's role, seems equally unpromising. To begin with, as noted earlier, in so far as inspectors stress the independence of their role, it leaves them vulnerable within a culture with strong instrumental overtones. Junior ranks, however sceptical about the solidity of the inspector as a bulwark against senior ranks, will in many cases also be aware that the inspector who does not retain the confidence of seniors will be still less effective in this respect. Paradoxically, therefore, in a manner which echoes certain tensions which are felt more acutely within the sergeant' role and which are discussed in the next chapter, independently-minded inspectors who suggest by their attitude, demeanour and actions something other than relatively passive acceptance of the agency role accorded them by

senior ranks, risk being labelled by their juniors as more dangerous and troublesome than their more acquiescent colleagues.

> "The inspectors are my lynchpin, but you can get these ones who get too big for their boots. The promotion goes to their head. Obviously, you have to give inspectors their head to some extent with their own section. They know the men better than we do, that's what we pay them for. But I've worked in some places where the whole sub-division can get messed up because the four inspectors are too independently minded... Basically, where I worked before, what you had was four different policing systems in the one sub-division. One believed in attending all the community groups, the other had a thing about paperwork, another one was a great one for putting men out in plain-clothes for this, that and the next thing. You can only tolerate that to some extent, otherwise the men and the public notice the difference and wonder why. Basically, you had four different inspectors trying to create their own mini-empires and pulling against one another...
> I was a sergeant at the time, but you got the strong sense that the inspectors thought they were the real bosses rather than the chief inspector, and he must have let them get on with it to some extent. You've got to understand that that's unsettling when you are a junior officer; you want to know where you are. Basically, although it is not always what you want to here, you want your bosses all to speak with one voice most of the time. It saves a lot of grief and uncertainty...when they fall out." (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)
>
> "When I was a young cop, I used to believe that all the gaffers agreed about everything. Believe me, it's a lot easier that way. If you're inspector is at loggerheads with your chief inspector or the superintendent, it's the men who suffer." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Furthermore, the anomalous position of inspectors in relation to the administrations/operations dichotomy - their marginal relationship to the major configurations of tasks and practices within the organisation - together with the disturbance of older

role specifications and expectations upon the relatively recent integration of the inspector into the shift system, entails that the symbolic resources from which a potently independent image might be spun are in short supply. For contemporary inspectors attempting to construct a rank-specific identity, or authoritative style which will be acceptable to themselves and will be accorded legitimacy by other significant internal audiences, there is a paucity of traditional and contemporary materials to draw upon. This lack was acutely depicted by one inspector:

> "You said your research was dealing mainly with sergeants. In a lot of ways, it is a more interesting rank than inspectors. In a way, it's got more of a tradition, more of a feel about it than the inspector's. Even the public know more what a sergeant is supposed to do than an inspector. You see, the sergeant's job, for all its difficulties, has stayed much the same as it ever was. As an inspector, you used to have more power, you used to stand above the shift. Now, you are still seen as one of the bosses, but very much the lower rung. I've noticed it since I became one. In this job, you've basically got to assert yourself *despite* your rank." (Inspector, Oldtown Division)

A final option, and one which is most favoured by inspectors, is to construct and disseminate a self-image which identifies them closely with senior officers. Given the downgrading of the status of inspectors, and, in particular, their incorporation into the shift system, the objective conditions for the successful forging of a sense of symbolic unity with their seniors are not obviously promising. Further, placed at the 'sharp-end' of senior management strategy, despite their general readiness to see themselves in a broad sense as managers, in their more detailed role conceptions inspectors seem less inclined than senior colleagues to endorse

strongly the more ambitious motif of the new managerialism,[19] and would appear to face even more formidable credibility problems if they so do. The sheer visibility of their instrumentally-orientated agency role, together with the relative freshness of their experience of policework as involving distinctive craft skills, entails that cynical understandings of the new managerialism are more likely both to be attributed to and held by inspectors than their seniors. Indeed, by reason of their particular vulnerability to the charge of redundancy, any élitest tendencies displayed by inspectors on this count may be highlighted as providing a significant independent contribution to the collectively self-interested perpetuation of a top-heavy management structure.

Against these factors, however, it may be noted that the basic structural cohesion of their role with that of their seniors which accounts for the limited potential of the other two alternatives, sets apart the option of alignment with one's seniors as much more attractive in relative terms. Further, certain other factors restrict the damaging potential of inspectors' shiftworker status and their uneasy relationship to the new managerialism. These considerations stem from the particular criteria of validity and the more elusive and less demanding conditions of verification which apply as regards the question of credible group membership amongst the more exalted company of senior officers.

As we have seen,[20] notwithstanding the various legitimacy problems which attach to the work of senior ranks in the eyes of

their juniors, insofar as their own socialization and their awareness of the perceptions of juniors encourages them in the belief that operational ability and understanding of operational matters remains an important indicator of competence even at their more senior ranks, the very fact of their elevated position is conveniently taken to be prima facie proof of operational accomplishment. Crucially, therefore, a fundamental aspect of the credibility of senior officers vis-a-vis one another is taken as given, and a strong presumption is raised as to the right of all senior ranks, from inspector upwards, to the membership of the one cultural community of 'seasoned professionals'.[21] And certain additional considerations entail that this presumption is not easily displaced. Thus, just as senior officers retain significant privileges of privacy vis-a-vis their juniors, which privileges are not reciprocally available, so too they retain significant privileges of privacy vis-a-vis one another. In part, this reflects the existence amongst senior ranks of these very foundations of commonly attributed professional respect referred to above, as well as the mutual trust and confidence deriving from the structurally-shaped homology of interests described earlier. It also arises from the fact that, by its nature, managerial work within police divisional organisation does not require and is not perceived by the actors in question to require the fulfilment of the imperative of functional co-ordination by means of relations of physical co-presence to anything like the same extent as with operational work. Instead, it is more often viewed as a matter of serial co-ordination of administrative tasks. Overall, then, although the awards and

rewards of *excellence* may still be keenly fought over, senior officers do not subject their peers to the same exacting and recurring tests of *competence* as they do their juniors.

Therefore, inspectors, who are already instrumentally inclined to side with their seniors, in so far as they seek a sense of identity with a cultural conmmunity within the organisation, are likely to find further reasons to nail their colours to this particular flagpole. Their substantive right to membership of the commumity of senior officers is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be sufficiently warranted by their formal position within the organisational structure. And any such contrary evidence is unlikely to be forthcoming within a communicative network where certain standards of privacy are reciprocally respected. Some of these points are well brought out in the following quote from one of our interviewees:

> "Remember, even though the super and the chief inspector are in charge here, they are only nine to five. I'm here twenty four hours and so for most of the time I'm fully in charge of the station. Don't get me wrong, even during day-hours, they don't interfere much. This is my shift and they respect that. This is my office and they respect that too. Most bosses I've had, unless it was something big, they wouldn't just come barging in here. They know I could be doing things in here, seeing members of the public or my men or something, and them coming in could be the worst thing to happen. In fact, most of them would always knock or ask if I was busy. You see, they recognise that I've got an agenda too, very like their own.
> That's only as it should be. You see, once you reach my rank, you've seen it all. I've proven I can do it, and in a lot harder places than here. I've proven I can do it, that's why I'm an inspector now. The bosses accept that, and unless you do something really stupid, they just let you

get on with it. It's a big difference from being a sergeant, you know. Once you are an inspector, you've made it. You're accepted as a colleague, not just as a whipping boy. Let's be honest, as a sergeant you get no respect at all, it's a dog's life in comparison." (inspector, Oldtown Division)

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SERGEANT

We began this chapter by suggesting that, *ceteris paribus*, certain positive benefits might accrue to sergeants if their inspectors were to adopt a consistently supportive stance. If instead, as has been argued, various structural and cultural factors combine to cause inspectors to align themselves more readily with the strategic imperatives and workstyles of their seniors, and, relatedly, to generate a strongly instrumental network of relations with their juniors, what are the implications of this set of findings for the contemporary role of the uniform patrol sergeant?

In strategic terms, the effects upon sergeants of the poverty of normative relations between inspectors and their juniors may be demonstrated and explained by examining three related propositions.

The lesser the emphasis placed on normative relations with their juniors by inspectors:

- the more they will require their sergeants to pursue instrumental relations on their behalf with the constable rank;
- the more likely are sergeants' actions to be interpreted by constables as instrumentally-oriented or as being

otherwise at odds with their interests, and consequently, the more likely they are to be resisted by constables and to diminish the reputation of sergeants in their eyes;

- and, finally, the more likely any observed departure from delegated duties on the part of sergeants will be interpreted as a betrayal and resisted by the inspectors.

To elaborate upon the first of these, the more instrumental is the overall complex of relations between inspectors and their juniors, the more likely are inspectors to employ sergeants as agents of their instrumental strategies, and, in particular, to depend upon the latter rank as theirs 'eyes and ears', providing them with the information concerning operational rank which is such an important currency within this species of power relations. In turn, these objective consequences feed into and contribute to the second set of outcomes mentioned, namely those referring to the attitudes of the constable rank.

Obviously, these attitudes in part result from an accurate reading of the objective predicament of the sergeant - an awareness that the overall instrumentalization of the profile of relations between inspectors and their juniors is bound to reflected in the hierarchically channelled pressures upon and resulting practices of the sergeant:

> "It's something you see in all divisions. It's not so bad here but in my previous division we had a real bastard of a chief inspector. He would get a bee in his bonnet about something. Cleaning cars at the end of every shift was a favourite one. You would get a piss awful night, where you knew

that the car was going to get dirty right away again, but because the chief inspector had nothing better to do and wanted to show who was boss, he would insist that the vehicle was spotless for ten minutes at the end of the shift, otherwise heads would roll. Everybody would jump to, the inspector would get the message, and then the sergeant would get it from him. There were times you could even hear them arguing about it, but then the sergeant would still come in and give you it with a straight face, as if he didn't know it was a bloody waste of time, when everybody's coming in from their beat, or trying to get last minute calls done, or a bit of paperwork done. That sort of thing can make you a bit cynical." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

As this example illustrates, a cynical perspective on the part of operational ranks in the face of instrumental strategies emanating from higher divisional ranks does not necessarily depend upon their inferring a motive on the part of the sergeant which is at one with that of their seniors. It may be recognized by constables that the options of sergeants in the face of the instrumental power of more senior officers are just as restricted as their own and that their compliance is just as much a defensive reaction, but this may be cold comfort when the end result is the same. Although a constable may be more sympathetic with the lot of a sergeant who is seen as merely impotent than with one who is seen as a zealous executor of instrumental strategies, in the last analysis it may be deemed expedient to treat both equally warily and keep both at arms-length.

"I've worked in four different stations in the city, and must have had about six inspectors. They are all different, but you're never as sure of your inspector as your sergeant. And it's the inspector who tends to set the tone. If he's down on you about wee things like appearance, or crossing the 't's on reports, then the sergeants tend to be too."(constable, City Division)

Furthermore, beyond this base of accurately grounded concerns, a further attitudinal consequence of an instrumentalization which is seen by constables to be driven by the attitudes of the inspector, may be to sully in their eyes other less instrumentally-informed activities on the part of sergeants. Thus, for example, genuine on-the-job training initiatives which involve closer interaction with certain constables may be interpreted as merely additional monitoring strategies designed for instrumental purposes; or requests for more exacting standards of paperwork may be similarly interpreted, even where these are motivated by a wish to attain objective valued by the constables themselves. This last point is illustrated in the contrasting viewpoints expressed by a sergeant and a constable working within the same shift:

> "Yes, paperwork is a bind, but some of the men don't realise how important some of it is...Take police reports to the Fiscal. I worked in the CID so I have probably got a better idea than most how important it is to get them right. You see, the Fiscals are under a lot of pressure. They are going to throw out anything which looks shoddy, as if it's not going to stand up. Or they're going to keep on asking for further reports and statements until they've got a decent case. A lot of their own time could be saved if the men got their act together more quickly, and got all the paperwork in as soon as they could. Moaning about it doesn't help. And a lot of them are the same ones who moan when some ned gets off. You might not like all the paperwork, but if you're going to get a conviction, then it's got to be done properly." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

> "The paperwork here's just over the top. Sometimes you can spend the whole of a Sunday dayshift writing things up. Some public service that is."
>
> Q. But isn't a lot of it necessary?
>
> " Necessary for who? It's only necessary so

> that the sergeant can keep the inspector off his back. He's so pernickety about things, and half the time the sergeant's running scared of him. 95% of paperwork in the police is about keeping people in jobs, that's about the size of it." (constable, Riverside Division)

A final consequence for sergeants of the perception by constables that shift management, at the behest of the inspector, exhibits an instrumental orientation, is that even if the sergeants' sincerity, integrity or resilience are not impugned by their actions in any of the ways recounted above, and they are instead seen to be 'fighting the end' of the constable rank, the very existence of a hostile inspector may seem to render this strategy implausible. Such an approach may be perceived to be doomed to failure, possibly resulting in an even more harshly instrumental régime being directed against the shift, the buffer of the sergeant having been discredited in the eyes of senior ranks. This parallels a predicament of the inspector outlined above, and its implications for the sergeant are more fully examined in the next chapter when we consider the nature and implications of the role of sergeant as 'artisan'.

Considerations in some respects similar to those which apply above, but referring in this case to the attitudes of inspectors, relate to our third set of practical consequences. As the pursuit of a predominantly instrumental set of relations with the constable rank involves making great demands on the strategic and interpersonal skills of sergeants and involves placing a great premium on their loyalty, ambiguous actions on the part of the

latter may be treated with a suspicion equal to that held by the constable as regards the categories of sergeants' actions which they consider to be of ambiguous significance. Although a degree of balancing of ostensible allegiances on the part of sergeants has to be countenanced in order that they can maximise their access to strategic information concerning the actions of constables, the boundaries of this discretion will be jealously policed by inspectors, as they seek constant reassurance that they retain the underlying loyalties of their sergeants within a predominantly instrumental and divisive climate. And on account of the strategic bargaining power which inspectors draw from their formal status, they are in a stronger position than junior colleagues to prevent their sergeants from acting in a manner which is deemed to threaten their interests in this respect. Thus, they may monitor radio calls independently, selecting incidents for personal supervision without prior warning either to constables or sergeants. They may hold the sergeant responsible for ensuring that all non-criminal occurrences are comprehensively committed to paper. They may discourage their sergeant from socializing with the men. They may deprive the sergeant of the power to grant small favours more closely associated with a normative régime, such as the power to reschedule time off at short notice, reserving such a prerogative for themselves:

"Forget the staff appraisal forms, I sometimes think the only job description for inspectors is being suspicious! Any of the sergeants at this station would say the same. When I worked in the city as a cop, we used to sometimes have a shift night out on the Thursday after the backshift finished, before the long weekend. The inspector there was so bad that he wouldn't leave without the sergeants, it's as if he was scared that we'd all be talking about him after he went. He wanted

> us to be all pals together up to a point, but there was no way he wanted the sergeants getting too pally with us if he wasn't there. It's as if he was scared that it was going to undermine his position in the shift or something."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Quite apart from placing the sergeant in a tight instrumental bind, many of the considerations cited above may also undermine the strong collegiate bonds from which the sergeant derives existential support within the organisation. An increasingly instrumental régime may contribute to the erosion of the standing of sergeants in the eyes of both adjacent ranks. The conflicting role demands of first-line supervisors may cast doubt upon their credentials as *bona fide* members of either operational or middle management peer groups, and so detract from their ability to identify with and become accepted by either of the major sectors within the organisation with whom they enjoy close working relations.

This process of alienation would appear to be accentuated by one additional feature of their relationship with the inspector. It was suggested earlier in this chapter that the availability of the strategy of displacement was one of the factors which accounted for the adoption of an instrumental approach on the part of the inspector. This points to a tendency which will be perceived as bitterly ironical by the sergeant. The more instrumental the approach of inspectors, the more this indicates their readiness to displace responsibility for the consequences of their actions onto their sergeants yet, by the same token, the more dependent will they be on the sergeant as the key agent of their instrumental

strategies. For sergeants who are reluctantly drawn into the instrumental networks of the inspector this will merely add insult to injury. For sergeants who endorse such a strategy more enthusiastically, and more readily align themselves with their seniors, an awareness of their dispensability in the eyes of these senior officers may cast a shadow over any endeavours on their part to achieve a secure sense of identity and solidarity with this constituency. These two types of response are illustrated in the following two quotes respectively:

> "If you'll excuse my French, I've always noticed that if you've got an inspector who is a bastard towards his sergeant, then the sergeant is more likely to be a bastard towards his men. You see, the heat gets put on, and in the long run he gets to be as sour as the inspector."(sergeant, City Division)

> "When I was a uniform sergeant over in X Division, there was a lot of promotion-conscious guys about. There was always a bit of tension in the air, it made you look out for yourself. Ther was one real tyrant of an inspector, but his sergeants tended to cow-tow to him, to keep in his good books. It was funny to see, because he obviously wasn't bothered what they thought of him. But they obviously thought this was the way to get on. At the end of the day, they were probably a bit isolated, because the cop wouldn't take too kindly to that attitude, and, take it from me, that inspector was more interested in becoming chief-inspector than anything else."(detective sergeant, Riverside Division)

Thus, in tracing the implications of the typical inspector's adoption of an orientation vis-a-vis junior ranks which carries significant instrumentalist overtones, we may begin to gain a more rounded understanding of the profound strategic and existential parodoxes within the role of the sergeant. In the next chapter we

examine how sergeants confront and deal with these problems and with what consequences both for their own sense of occupational well-being and for the organisation as a whole.

CHAPTER TEN

THE RESPONSES OF SERGEANTS

A. INTRODUCTION

In the previous four chapters we fleshed out the propositions presented in chapter five in order to situate the uniform shift sergeant more firmly within the context of intra-divisional relations. We argued that instrumental relations within the police organisation are accentuated by the cumulative effects of changes in formal organisation, task structure, occupational culture and the political and legal environment, by the reflection in patterns of bureaucratic organisation and information exchange of tensions caused by the indeterminacy and impossibility of the police mandate, by the limited and incongruous nature of new managerialist initiatives, and by the typical responses of inspectors to tensions within their own role. Considered together these factors place the organisational dimension of the paradox of trust in sharper perspective. Senior and junior ranks, in striving to advance and protect their positions by instrumental means, thereby set in motion a process which is viciously circular and which militates against the initiation by any rank of the very trust relations necessary to endow their various positions with greater security and ensure a more efficient and effective basis for co-ordination of organisational effort. Given their intermediary role, uniform

patrol sergeants may be well placed to observe that the instrumental techniques practised and self-justifying perspectives adopted on either side of the divide - from the various strands of regulatory overkill, to the use of disinformation techniques, to the levelling of charges of self-interest, manipulative impression management, inexperience, incompetence and undercommitment - are bound to limit the achievement of the organizational mandate as conceived of and pursued by either major constituency. However, although sergeants may be more aware than most of the insidious effects of this insrumental cycle, the objective impediemts to reform confront them no less stubbornly. Further, the gradual decline in their instrumental and authoritative power-base entails that sergeants have limited resources to deploy in their efforts to breach the deep instrumental trenches on either side and engineer a *rapprochement*.

Thus, from the perspective of sergeants, the paradox of trust is doubly institutionalized, and given the limited and contradiction-riven options for action available under such circumstances, it is a paradox which may seem to stretch out like some form of secular limbo before them. The springboard of any strategy on their part aimed at local harmony and minimization of the destructive effect of instrumental relations inevitably involves seeking the trust of both juniors and seniors, for it is only by displaying strong sympathy with their respective positions that sergeants may win the position of trusted representative of both sides, and so be in a position to blunt the edges and mitigate the

effects of the instrumental strategies of each vis-a-vis the other. And if the strategic dilemmas attendant upon this double-pronged strategy are examined more closely, they may be seen to give rise to an additional set of existential problems for the sergeant.

The generation of trust, while to some extent it presupposes and encourages a normative orientation - a commitment to the building of consensually-grounded relations with others - may nevertheless involve sergeants in a measure of duplicity. They may be required to dissemble, to create and manage an impression of trustworthiness while, as a matter of fact, acting in a manner which is palpably incompatible with the basis upon which that trust has been vested in them. This is so because the perceived division of interests between operational and managerial sectors is such that either side is liable to withdraw trust from the sergeant if it sees that trust being simultaneously sought by him/her from the other side. In the absence of full awareness of the structural conditions which prompt sergeants to pursue this strategy, or - even where these are well understood - in the absence of any guarantee available to one constituency that the motives of the other constituency in whom sergeants vest their trust are not stubbornly instrumental, the very fact that sergeants are seen to display empathy and to seek to win the confidence of one party may be sufficient to render them less trustworthy in the eyes of the other. Thus, in order to win the trust of both parties, the sergeant must initially betray each trust to some extent.

Further, this web of deception may become self-perpetuating. Trust may provide those who are party to the relationship with a moral education, as Luhmann says, but its self-contradictory and self-undermining dynamic in the context of the instrumentally-infused police organisation cannot be avoided. Thus the implications of this dynamic bear heavily upon the decision of the sergeant whether to apply in a selective manner rules or policies as to whose comprehensive enforcement he or she has been entrusted by senior officers, or whether to release to these senior officers certain information given by junior officers in confidence as to patterns of easing behaviour or rule infraction within the group, or as to the transgressions or limited competence of certain of its members. Howewer the situation may present itself, the ongoing process of acting on the basis of the various trusts which have been generated in order to mitigate the effect of instrumental strategies while continuing to protect the loyalty which has been invested, will involve a periodical betrayal of one or more of these trusts, and related and recurring problemes of fine judgement and subtle adjustment :

> "If you follow everything to the letter, you'll never get anything done. It used to be a big thing in the city, it's more or less died out now, that a sergeant was supposed to sign the men's notebooks -twice a shift. Even then, it was honoured more in the breach...I suppose it made more sense before you had cars and radios, but when I was a cop, and you got a sergeant who did that, it was as if he was checking up on you, just getting a pat on the back from the bosses. It was as if you were back at school with the attendance book, and you weren't trusted with anything. Of course, it din't mean anything except you were on your beat for two minutes out of eight hours."(sergeant, Riverside Division)

> "the biggest problem in this job - the thing that separates the good sergeant from the bad one, is knowing where to draw the line. Take drinking on the job. There used to be a lot of sergeants - there's still a few in CID, who might cover up for the men. I never would, that's absolutely basic. But if a man is ten minutes late, I'm not going to go running to the inspector if he does't already know. But, if he keeps on doing it, I'll have no hesitation. Apart from anything else, I'm putting myself on the line with the gaffers if I don't."
> (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

However, despite its limitations and dangers, the pursuit of this janus-faced strategy appears to be the only means available to the sergeant to exploit the benefits of the relationships of trust. Because of the strength of the instrumental dimension in relationships between the constable rank and ranks senior to the sergeant and the width of the empathy gap between them, any attempt by sergeants to rely on their various trust relationships in order to break this bind through the explict promotion of a more substantial strategy of reconciliation of the two constituencies will inevitably be fraught with danger and blessed with little chance of success. The accumulated capital of trust, in so far as it entails that the activities of sergeants will be less closely monitored and their motives less closely scrutinized, is likely to create more space for sergeants to utilize the double standards which they consider necessary to appease both audiences without either becoming privy to their overall strategy. What this same capital fund probably will not bear, are the risks involved in a candid effort by the sergeant to overcome differences and bridge the empathy gap. The trust is initially granted to the sergeant on the condition of exclusive loyalty to the truster, and given the

continued state of tension between the two categories of truster, any subsequent attempt by the sergeant to dispense with either condition will probably be considered *ultra vires* - to use a legal metaphor - on the part of the sergeant-trustee. In the last analysis, the goodwill created by a relationship of trust can only be used in a clandestine rather than a candid manner.

The vulnerable nature of the capital fund of trust and the limited purposes to which it can be put, even in the long run, are well illustrated in the following perceptive comment by a sergeant:

> "I think I've got the trust and respect of both the bosses and the men here, although don't let anyone tell you it is easy. I think it gives me a better insight than most, it allows me to see things from both sides. But it can be a bit frustrating. A lot of our hassles in the police are of our own making. If there was a bit more trust - a bit more give and take - *between* the bosses and the men, then we would get on better. You try to smooth the path, but there's only so much you can do.
>
> I remember I read somewhere about the Queen. Somebody was arguing that the only reason that the royal family get respect is that they are seen as being sort of above the struggle. That's why you hear people saying when there is some national crisis or other that the queen is the only person with the clout and authority to intervene, she is the only person who would be listened to by both sides. But that's the whole point, it's because she doesn't take sides in the first place that she is given that respect, and it disappears as soon as she tries to do anything practical. Being a sergeant is a bit like that. You can try to influence things in a quiet way. But you've got to be discreet about it. If you try and stand up on your pedestal and be totally honest and spout forth, you'll find that it suddenly isn't there anymore, you'll lose a lot of friends fast." (Sergeant, City Division)

Thus, the paradox of trust becomes interwoven into the role of

the sergeant, and assumes not only a strategic but also a parallel existential dimension in the eyes of the officer of this rank. How do sergeants respond to this cluster of role tensions, and with what implications both at a personal level and in terms of organisational harmony, effectiveness and efficiency? That they do so in ways which provide them with some degree of fulfilment is vouchsafed by the high percentage of our sergeants who register fairly high levels of job satisfacion, and whose experience in the rank had not blunted their ambition.[1] That they nevertheless experience profound difficulties in the process is equally evident from the generally high tariff-rating that their present role is accorded relative to that of other ranks.[2] In the remainder of this chapter, we attempt to answer the above question more fully, and thus to explore the contextual meanings behind these bare figures, by means of tracing four typical responses to the occupational predicaments of the uniform patrol sergeant. These are the balanced approach, the artisan approach, the aspirant executive approach, and, finally, the stripes-carrying approach.[3] As with all ideal-typical frameworks, there may be a degree of empirical overlap between these models. Nevertheless, this is limited in nature as the approaches described involve choices between options which, as will emerge, are in some cases mutually exclusive.

B. THE VARIETY OF RESPONSES CONSIDERED

(1) The Balanced Approach

Exponents of the balanced approach tackle the above problems head-on, attempting to secure a precarious toe-hold on the inter-rank tightrope by adjusting and reconciling the interests and aspirations of junior and senior ranks. As already suggested, two sets of searching questions are posed to the sergeant who wishes to carve out a long-term career as a high-wire artist. First, given the nature and constraints of their role, do they have the social capacity - the normative and instrumental resources and defences - and therefore the degree of authority and discretionary space for these strategic manoeuvres which are required to enable one to walk the tightrope with confidence? Secondly, even if they do possess the wherewithal, given the ways in which the strategy will test their sense of social identity and of the appropriate foundations of respect and intimacy with fellow officers, do they possess the moral equanimity to maintain their balance?

Within the interstices of the framework of constraints and risks which define the balanced approach, there is scope for some limited degree of affirmation and consolidation of this position by its exponents. To begin with, responses by other ranks to questions concerning the nature of the sergeant's task and the relative degree of difficulty of the tasks of the various ranks, did indicate a considerable amount of general sympathy with the tribulations of the

sergeant's intermediary role. Insofar as the organisation was conceptualized as consisting of two opposed constituencies, there appeared to be some recognition of the fact that sergeants were exposed to persistent and conflicting pressures from both directions. Nor did this judgement appear to be incompatible with a belief that what divided the two constituencies was fundamental in nature:

> "You always have to watch the bosses like a hawk in this job. It can't be easy for the sergeant either, he's always getting pulled both ways." (constable, Newtown Division)
>
> "We've got the shittiest job in the force, but the sergeant has got a pretty shitty job too. He gets all the flak from above, and, to be honest, he gets a lot of crap from our rank too, from people who do not really appreciate the presssure he is under."
>
> Q: "Is that not just something you have come to appreciate since you started acting up, and filling in for the sergeant when he is off? Would your colleagues who do not act up share your views?"
>
> A: " Oh yes, I think they would agree. There's no doubt that I have had my eyes opened wider since I started acting up, but I think I appreciated some of the problems before then." (constable, City Division)
>
> "I must admit, this job is hard, and with the standard of recruit we are getting in nowadays it is getting harder, but the hardest job is still the sergeant's... The hardest rank to get into and the hardest rank to get out of - I know it is an old cliché but it is still true." (inspector, City Division)
>
> "This job [staff officer] is a doddle, and it was not that hard when I was a deputy sub-divisional officer either. I was 10 years a sergeant before I got promoted, because - I think - the chief came out to inspect the division and I showed him round. Any job I have done since does not have anything like these pressures. Don't get me wrong, I'm as strict a disciplinarian as anyone. I'm not a romantic about some of the characters we have in the constable rank. You've got to keep a

firm hand on their shoulder all the time, and they've got to know who is boss. But that does not mean that I don't sympathize with the sergeant who seems a bit torn." (chief inspector, Riverside Division.)

"Being a sergeant, that's the real doghouse, not just in the division, but in the police generally. Everyone is throwing their crap at you, so that they can stay spotless, and you can't retaliate." (Sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Although some metaphors can be rather grandiose, as in the earlier reference to 'queens' and 'pedestals', while others are set at a more modest level, as typified in the above allusion to the 'doghouse', the messages do overlap. Whether they are above the battle or merely caught in the cross-fire, provided they are not perceived to be *of* the battle and occupying a hostile position, sergeants may retain some standing in the eyes of both junior and senior participants.

Further, the fundamentally pessimistically-inclined sympathy with the role of the sergeant which is indicated by these examples may shade into a more positive and pragmatic realization that the tension within the sergeant's role is born of a rationally defensible commitment to maintain a degree of equilibrium between competing loyalties. As suggested in the previous chapter, many officers of adjacent-ranks are aware that it cannot be in their own long-term interests that the sergeant should be seen to be pursuing their short-term interests in too slavish a manner. It may be brought home to them that given the instrumental division between the two major organisational segments, and regardless of the rights and wrongs of the case advanced by either side, any sergeants who

are seen by one side to be too malleable a figure in the hands of the opposition side will lose face with that first side, and thus their value as a weapon to the opposition side will be blunted.

However, this is not enough to unravel the paradox, but merely to loosen its grip. Some officers may recognize only the symptoms of the problem and not its causes. They may be unable to excavate the deep structural roots of the sergeant's predicament, or may be diverted from such a task by more pressing concerns.[4] Their awareness of the need for the sergeant to avoid a crudely partisan posture may be registered only as strategic information, adding a modicum of subtlety to a fundamentally instrumental understanding and orientation rather than providing a normative counter to such an understanding. Moreover, even where there is greater appreciation of the transformative and collectively beneficial potential of a more normative culture, and of the emolliative role of the sergeant within such a process, the prisoner's dilemma argument operates as a powerful counterthrust. Change, and unless substantial numbers within each of the major constituencies of the organisation - and not just the intermediary rank of the sergeant - change with you, you merely make yourself more vulnerable than your colleagues to the ravages of an instrumental climate. Finally, as the example of certain new managerialist initiatives demonstrates, even if some members of one major constituency can set aside such defensive misgivings - and, given their relative security against instrumental strategies and their stronger position in respect of the authorization of significant organizational change it is

unsurprising that such mould-breakers tend to be found in more senior ranks - the polyvalent nature of much police practice and discourse together with the cynicism which is the legacy of the instrumental backdrop entails that the other side is still unlikely to see the light through the cell bars, and to recognize that the sergeant may hold the keys which unlock the doors.

Thus, while junior and senior officer alike may make some allowances for sergeants, in the last analysis, the conviction of majority of each rank as to the rectitude, or at least the prudence of their own position remains. While appreciative of certain of its stresses, their empathy with the position of the sergeant is unlikely to be such as to encourage them to accept fully the essentially compromised views which a stance of enlightened neutrality demands of the sergeant. Both the constable and the officer of more senior managerial rank may accept that in sergeants they are dealing with a body of officers who are torn by internecine struggle and who in order to preserve their own standing and to provide a measure of concilation between ranks are required to take seriously the demands of the other group and to engage in elaborate displays of ideological shadow-boxing, but each of these constituencies would still wish to be the beneficiary of the ultimate loyalty of the sergeant. The exacting and mutually incompatible standards of alliegance which each constituency would ideally demand of the sergeant, and the consequentially limited nature of the trust that even sympathetically-minded senior and junior officers are inclined to place in the sergeant who is an

exponent of the balanced approach, are well depicted in the following two comments by an inspector and a constable respectively with regard to one subject-matter upon which their views contrast, namely that of appropriate supervisory responses to constables' individual welfare needs :

> "No sergeant is any good unless he has the trust of the men. But you always have to learn that your first loyalty is to the uniform, and that means to the force as a whole stopping at the chief constable. The sergeant can't have too many secrets with the men. We all have to turn a Nelson's eye some of the time, but , say, if a cop goes to the sergeant because he has marriage problems which might affect his work, I would expect the sergeant to keep me informed. If I thought the sergeant wasn't telling me these things, then I would think that he couldn't be trusted to do his duty.(inspector, Riverside Division)
>
> "You have to learn to keep your mouth shut in this job. Some people you can tell things to, others you can't. Like this is the worst job in the world for bust-up marriages, for obvious reasons. It's also a bad job for money problems. I've been in the job a long time and I've seen it happen to a lot of men. With some sergeants, you can tell them personal problems, they might give you time off, they might help you get help through the federation. With others, you wouldn't trust them, they'd go running to the inspector. You see you have watch that something doesn't go down as a bad mark against your name. You'll never get rid of it, the bosses have got long memories. There's lots of good men in this force who nobody knows why they never got promoted, and it might be something like that. So you have to size up people, especially your sergeants, give them your own personal character reference, before you take them into your confidence... The bad sergeant is the one who's got no problems, because the men would rather sit and stew than tell him anything."(constable, Riverside Division)[5]

If the sympathy available to sergeants is often blinkered and invariably limited by other considerations, it nevertheless allows

some latitude to sergeants who wish to maintain a balanced approach. In turn, the extent to which they may take advantage of this leeway in attempting to meet the strategic challenges and to overcome the existential vulnerabilities associated with walking the tightrope depends upon their capacity to exploit the limited instrumental and normative resources available to them.

Here sanctions, incentives, and the capacity to demand reciprocity in intercursive power relations are of some importance to sergeants, while, in the circumstances, the defensive capabilities involved in controlling access to information about self are even more crucial. Of equal and related significance is their ability to develop within inter-rank relations the various facets of authority, whether personal, competent or institutional. Through harnessing these normative power sources, sergeants may encourage seniors and juniors to relax the vigilance that they might otherwise exercise over the sergeants' actions and designs, so both extending the "back regions"[65] within which sergeants may privately prepare and construct the impressions and artifacts necessary to their strategy, and also enhancing their capacity to segregate their various internal audiences for whom, as we have seen, different frontstage performances may be required. Furthermore, over and above Goffmanesque strategies of impression management, by increasing their authoritative standing within the organisation sergeants may also be better placed to encourage others to question, suspend, modify or waive their own judgment in these crucial areas where the constraints of the paradox of trust remain

fluid. Such is their variety and the complexity of their interrelationship that the various concrete ways in which these possibilities may be nurtured to the advantage of sergeants defy easy classification. However, a number of examples will serve to illustrate the broad range of options available and pursued.

It was argued in earlier chapters that sergeants have limited control of staging in relation to their senior audiences, particularly within the confines of the station,(7) and also that, given the structurally-grounded arrogance of rank within the hierarchical police organisation, they can achieve only limited competent and institutional authority in the eyes of superior officers.(8) Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which the balance of power may tilt in their favour. For example, there may be occasions on which the strategies of displacement normally available to senior officers in their dealings with junior ranks may be curtailed and where, accordingly, the options open to sergeants in their intercursive power relations with senior officers may be extended. How such opportunities might arise and be exploited is illustrated in the recollections of one sergeant:

> "I suppose when you become a sergeant you try to learn from the guys you've had as sergeants. There was one sergeant I had when I was a cop in X division who seemed to have a lot more clout than the average. He seemed to be able to get things done, get guys moved, get you a shot on plain-clothes if you wanted it. The bosses seemed to listen to him, and he was certainly not scared to back you up. He got a lot of respect from the men and the bosses... He told me himself recently, the reason he got away with it was that the super had asked him to do a job on a particular shift. There had been all sorts of trouble on that shift, the sergeants and the inspector had gone off the

rails, there was no real discipline, there was more complaints against that shift than the rest of the division put together. They even looked slovenly, and there was one particular thing - a death in police custody... - that brought it all to a head. The problem had been going on so long that everyone was in the firing line... The super and chief inspector must have been feeling the heat because they more or less gave this guy his head to sort things out. They needed him as much as he needed them and the beauty of it for him was that he knew it." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

A more widely available technique whereby the limitations upon the instrumental control of senior officers may be exploited so as to secure the standing of the exponents of the balanced approach in the eyes of both seniors and juniors, involves the careful allocation by sergeants of their time, and that of their shift, between station-based duties and those pursued in the generally less restrictive environment of the wider sub-divisional territory. Still, as the following exchange indicates, in finding the proper equilibrium sergeants tread a fine line between neglect of their various audiences on the one hand, and overexposure on the other:

"some sergeants get stuck inside with the paperwork. I prefer to get out and about. That's what being in the police is all about. You can be yourself out in the street, do what you're good at."

Q: The paperwork won't go away, though, will it? And don't some of the men resent it if they feel you are breathing down their neck on their beat all the time?

A: When I was a constable the type of sergeant you got suspicious of was the one who you only saw on your beat twice a week. These were the ones you felt were checking up on you. If you're out and about a lot, the men accept it, they get used to it, and a lot of them appreciate a guiding hand. You can get closer to them on the street. You can work with them, and you can forget about administration for a while. As for the paperwork, it won't go away, but there's no need to get paranoid about it. I don't mind the men leaving a lot of it till they are on nights, or till a

sunday. On a freezing tuesday night the idea of writing up reports for the fiscal in a warm office can seem quite attractive, believe me. I leave the paperwork that can wait till nights and weekends myself. There's less bosses about then, there's a more relaxed atmosphere in the station. And as long as it's done on time, then there can be no complaints from them. (sergeant, City Division)

However, in line with the aggregate data on sergeants' perceptions of their problems,[9], many others are less sanguine about their capacity to achieve "dramaturgical success"[10] on indoor and outdoor stages simultaneously:

> "paperwork is a vicious circle. The more work you do, the more paper you have to fill in, the more mistakes you make, the more time you spend in the office trying to sort things out, the less time you have out in the street, then you have to spend even more time sorting things out on paper afterwards. (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

> "In this shift we simply look after our own men - ...our own section, and deal with their paperwork. On other shifts, I've seen the sergeants sometimes group together, one stays in and covers all the paperwork for the whole shift, the other goes out on the street, and then they change over on the next tour of duty... Both have their pluses, but both have thir minuses as well. Here we can both end up in here writing at the same time. You can end up losing touch that way, and it doesn't look good to the men, or the bosses for that matter. But if you are covering all the men and then changing about, it's a footer taking over somebody else's files... and the sergeant must lose contact with the men on his particular section. You can lose a wee bit of the personal touch, getting to know the finer points of an officer... Plus that can show to the bosses, because they will assume that you are right on top of your particular officers and can answer anything about their work. Basically, you can't be in two places at once, something's got to give. (sergeant, Riverside Division)

If, as indicated, there is restricted scope for sergeants to manipulate the terms of their relations with senior officers in

pursuit of a balanced approach, they would seem to start from a somewhat more promising baseline vis-a-vis their junior officers. The modest sanctions at their disposal,(11) their capacity - in linewith that of all senior parties in inter-rank relations(12) - to exercise some degree of control over the timing and setting of interaction with their juniors, and, in particular, their greater ability, relative to that which they possess vis-a-vis senior ranks, to generate and invoke personal, competent and institutional authority,(13) all suggest that it may be more productive for sergeants attempting to steer a middle course to concentrate their efforts more closely on their junior audiences. The key to success here lies in the skilful use of dramatic techniques and staging devices such as to avoid the opposite dangers of, on the one hand, merely appearing to be a more or less willing instrument of and apologist for the views and interests of senior officers, and on the other, merely settling for the complacent solidarity of the artisan role, which, as we argue in subsection 2 below, contains the seeds of its own undoing.

One dramatic technique which is commonly utilized to this end is to attempt to marginalize the tensions between junior and senior constituencies by emphasizing instead the degree of common cause that they hold. This may be done through invoking the powerful theme of uniformity(14) in a positive manner, and in particular, by playing upon collective rituals in order to "recoat moral bonds"(15) between ranks:

> "The inspector and I agree that the muster at the beginning of the shift should be treated as a

parade, that's what it was originally intended for. There should be no messing about with half your uniform on. Once you muster you should no longer be a member of the public but a police officer, part of a disciplined outfit. It's important that the men realize. Police officers don't start work, they go *on duty*. You can be the most sympathetic and popular sergeant in the world, but unless that's instilled in them, they'll never pull together."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Relatedly, sorting devices, which we have argued are endemic within policing discourse,[16] may be applied in a manner which insists that the most important divisions between insiders and outsiders in terms of the moral order of policework lie at the frontiers of the organisaton itself:

> "I hate moaners. I hate cops that go on about paperwork, or dirty jobs, or pernickety bosses. They'll get short shrift from me. I'll tell them to get their priorities right. The real enemy is out there, the housebreakers, the guys who beat up old ladies. That's what's important, and if you can get that across the rest doesn't matter" (sergeant, Newtown Division)

However, insofar as such aggressive attempts to displace inter-rank tensions may run counter to the experience of constables, they run the risk of being dismissed as ingenuous, or even as disingenuous, and as indicative of a sergeant's incapacity or unwillingness to sustain a more rounded and more sympathetic conception of the lot of the constable. In turn, they may encourage by way of response the invocation of oppositional themes which emphasize internal division rather than solidarity:

> "One of our sergeant's is all bluster. Every day is the charge of the light brigade. We're the ones that are in the front-line though, while the generals are sitting comfy at their desks back at headquarters with their pens at the ready. I prefer X [the other shift sergeant], he's a bit of a character too but he's more sympathetic, he's

> newer in the rank and he hasn't forgotten what it's like to chase up the same witness three nights on the trot, or to be called out halfway through writing a report and come back to it cold three hours later. He's a bit more understanding. (constable, Newtown Division)

A more subtle way of earning the trust and respect of junior ranks while remaining sensitive to the demands of senior ranks is by means of alternative role-playing before the one (junior) audience. Although such a strategy may betoken a continued appreciation of the value of collective ceremony, the less palatable consequences of this may be mitigated by the adoption of modifications of style in one-to-one encounters in order to suit individual tastes:

> "What is it the politicians say, tough but tender. That's what you have to be as a sergeant. I get on well with all the men, but there's times you've got to assert yourself and show them that you are boss. Like there's no way that I would ever let my authority be challenged when the men were there together, like when I'm doing the briefing at the beginning of the shift when they muster, or when they are all in my office for something, or when ther's a lot of us at a major incident. Any sergeant who did would be a fool to himself. You lose respect.. But that doesn't mean I can't be sympathetic... Like I might have reminded four or five of them publicly at the beginning of the shift that reports are due in and they better not be late, but that doesn't mean that if one of them comes to me on their own later on I won't help them out... That shows them that I'm not such a bad bastard after all. There's two sides to me, just like there's two sides to the job" (sergeant, Riverside Division)

If drawing a distinction between collective and individual settings provides one form of staging device which facilitates alternative role-playing, another lies in the recognition of the demarcation of worktime and playtime,[17] and in the appreciation of the appropriate cues for transfer from one mode to the other and

the adoption of the proper standards of decorum within each:

> "I sometimes play a game of snooker with the boys at lunchtime, it gives you a chance to relax. It's healthy for the shift as a whole pulling together. But I don't do it every day, that way they would get sick of the sight of me. (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

> "socializing with the men is something you have to watch. It's very natural after being a cop for so long, but you have to be a bit careful once you've got the stripes. I'll go for a pint or two, have a laugh, but I won't get pissed with them. You've got to keep a bit of a distance, you want to be on the same wave-length but familiarity breeds contempt."(sergeant, City Division)

And on occasions, as the following example illustrates, it can be all too easy to mistake the cues:

> "you've been at lunch with us every day this week. Sergeant X insists on sitting beside us, but it's bloody torture. It's as if he read it in the good sergeant manual, 'you must sit beside your men during meal breaks and bore the arse off them'. It's torture, the conversation is really stilted because you always feel he's on his guard. (constable, Oldtown Division)

One way in which such improprieties may be avoided, and playtime be used constructively by the sergeant attempting to strike the appropriate balance, is through participation in an exchange of narratives about policework. A number of writers have argued the importance of the narrative form in creating and sustaining the occupational culture of lower ranks.[18] Within a context of work, which, in the eyes of accredited insiders, is deemed to be craft-based and so incapable of reduction to general precepts, story-telling is seen as a way of preserving and relaying the authentic experience of the participant.[19] It may be at once entertaining,

educational, tradition-sustaining, and cathartic. To that extent, involvement in this creative interplay provides a means through which sergeants may both affirm their solidarity with their officers, bolstering their personal and competent authority through their demonstrated familiarity with the recurring refrains of operational experience, and also impart useful information in a contextally appropriate manner. As to the first of these points, one sergeants who was reported in an earlier chapter to have beem set a severe practical test of loyalty and authority by the more intemperate members of his new shift[20], indicated that his 'entrance examination' also included an oral aspect - a searching scrutiny of his competence in the 'canteen culture' of his colleagues:

"It's one of the things about getting stripes, the men are constantly trying to find out what you are really like - whether you are one of them - they know it and you know it. I noticed it a lot at first at mealbreaks. You would get all these stories and you had to chip in with one of your own. Like every cop has a story about some smart-arsed C.I.D. officer who got his come-uppance, where the cop fingered the ned before him. Community involvement is another one. You hear the same old stories about the community involvement man running a five-a-side football team full of neds who the C.I.D. ar looking for. It's all really a bit of a laugh, but if you are new I suppose it's all part of building up a relationship, it shows that you are basically on the same side."(sergeant, Riverside Division)

Another sergeant acknowledged the educational function of story-telling for officers of probationer status:

> "I'll sometimes spend half a shift with one of the young lads. If you get them on their own, you can be a lot more informal. You can go round the area pointing out places and addresses, telling them about the local neds and the shopkeepers. Sometimes it's better if you can teach them

something through experience...One day I arrived at a scene where this young guy was struggling to get the handcuffs on a ned, it was probably the first time he had ever done it. There was another cop there, so there wasn't really any big problem, but you could see that once he had one handcuff on the guy was still struggling a bit. I took him aside later and told him a story about a time where I got hurt in exactly the same situation. You see with two handcuffs on a prisoner is incapacitated, with only one he has a lethal weapon. You've got to know what you are doing whem you are in the thick of it. They take it better from you if you can relate it to your own experience."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Quite apart from its general usefulness in increasing intimacy with and influence over junior audiences, involvement of sergeants in the dramatization of folk narratives can bring to the fore the very themes and issues which are central to their dilemma in attempting to maintain a balance between the different organisational constituencies. Some writers have argued that the use of narratives - particularly humorous narratives - as representations or emblems of the perceptions of a situation from the point of view of participants, is often vividly at odds with the official discourse in terms of which that reality is more authoritatively depicted.[21] Humour, by emphasizing inconsistency, conflict and paradox, and by exposing the friable nature of any officialy constructed reality, challenges and so threatens to subvert the unitary knowledge-claims of that official version. Thus, jokes and other irreverant uses of the narrative form may amount to an exercise in deconstruction. They, may, as Douglas argues, juxtapose a form of control against that which is controlled such that the latter is seen to triumph.[22] Accordingly, within

the hierarchical setting of the police organisation, humour may be used to expose many of the uncertainties of organisational purpose, unrealistic demands and inter-rank conflicts which, as documented in earlier chapters, contradict the harmonious assumptions implicit in the idea of a well-oiled bureaucratic machine.

Nevertheless, if adroitly handled, this humorous exposure may be used to the advantage of sergeants in augmenting their standing with the shift while sustaining a degree of control in keeping with the expectations of their senior officers. Thus, the humorous mode provides a medium through which sergeants can be more candid than would otherwise be consistent with a stance of discrete neutrality in expressing awareness of the organisational pressures to which they and their shift are subjected. Sympathy and understanding may be both invited and demonstrated in unusually forthright terms. Yet just because they are not operating within the "serious interpretative mode",[23] sergeants may act in the confident expectation that they will not be compromised by their momentary act of complicity. Further, within the humorous mode the triumph of that which is controlled of which Douglas speaks can only be symbolic in nature.[24] Accordingly, humour may be applied by sergeants to deflect attention from the very underlying contradictions and grievances which trigger its use, and thus to defuse tensions in a situation:

> "A sense of humour can go a long way. The other day some of the men were having a bit of a moan at me about paperwork, and about one of the bosses going on about uniforms. I turned round and told them, "Christ lads, you don't know you're living. When I was in the city we had a chief inspector

> who would throw a fit if he saw a hat sitting on the table in the locker room. He used to sneak about ready to pounce. And here's you complaining about having to brush your shoes"...They had a laugh but I made my point."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Of course, humour transcends the narrative form. It may be communicated through gestural interchanges as well as through talk. Further, it may be impromptu - a reaction to the exigencies of the moment , rather than a carefully constructed allegory, or a reconstruction of past events. Such impromptu humour represents an extreme example of what Koestler calls "bisociation"[25] - the sudden movement from one frame of reference to another or the unexpected combination of the two. Yet the quick switch from serious to humorous mode within a setting normally associated with the former can be just as effective as more stylized performances in deflecting discontent and enhancing shift solidarity, as the following two examples - the second somewhat macabre - illustrate

> "Back in the city we had this sergeant, a real character, but a fair man. We had had this problem on the shift, somebody drinking. It had been dealt with, but the chief super took it upon himself to go round all the shifts delivering a lecture on the evils of drink. Now that was a real insult, totally uncalled for, but it was typical, treating us like weans, as if we weren't to be trusted. He went on and on about it, and at one point he turned away for something. Then suddenly you hear this whisper in the back row from the sergeant,"I wish he'd hurry up or the pubs will be shut, its nearly half-two". It just about summed it up, it was so ridiculous, even the sergeant had to recognize it."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

> "In this job, you sometimes either laugh or you cry. The last station I worked in, the main Heensburgh railway line ran through it. You got quite a lot of suicides on it, real grim stuff, it would turn your stomach... One morning we were clearing up this dead body, bits all over the

place. Your trudging about with gloves and plastic bags. I was about twenty yards further up the line than anyone else. I looked down and saw this hand. I thought, bloody hell... I picked it up and then... I had to get off the line for a train. It was going quite slowly, and I'm standing there with this plastic bag and this hand. Then I noticed a couple of people waving out the train. I thought, stupid buggers, do they think we're down here for the good of our health... And, then, I don't know what came into me, I started waving back, with this hand that I'd picked up. I know it must sound sick, but the other lads could see why I did it, in fact it probably did them good to realise that I couldn't handle the whole thing either. in a funny way that sort of thing brings you together. (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Despite these possibilities, the use of humour and of folk narratives in interaction with junior officers offers no panacea for the sergeant who adopts the balanced approach. While merely symbolic affirmation of the values of the occupational culture against various countervailing pressures will never amount to sedition, and so can within limits be safely practiced or tolerated by the sergeant, by the same token it means that underlying problems and dissatisfactions with the nature of operational work, and in particular, with intra-organizational relations, are glossed over rather than resolved, and will inevitably recur. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in subsection 4 when the stripes-carrying model is considered, if certain narrative themes become too prevalent, the boundaries between the serious mode and the "play-frame"[26] may become blurred, and audiences may become confused or misled in a manner which may gradually undermine certain generally accepted standards in internal and external relations.

More broadly, if we move away from the mixed virtues of the particular techniques adopted by sergeants in managing relations with juniors within a wider strategy of mediation between ranks, it bears re-emphasizing that in respect of their general power-base, while sergeants are relatively advantageously placed in their dealings with juniors in comparison with their dealings with seniors, in absolute terms their position is nevertheless vulnerable in many respects. In particular, their instrumental resources and institutional authority are insubstantial and, as documented in chapter six, have contracted further in recent years due to the general erosion of supervisory status. So also in these areas where they are generally better endowed - personal and competent authority - the development of a more impersonal and fractured culture within the lower ranks has diminished their potential. Moreover, while these problems of waning influence vis-a-vis junior officers, though pertinent to, are not exclusively relevant to the pursuit of the balanced approach, there is a final general dimension of power to which the balanced approach is peculiarly inimical, so further stacking the odds against its successful pursuit.

Here we refer to the overall authoritative style of sergeants - the issue of how the various disparate power resources available to them might best be blended within the general image of authority attached to the rank. The defining predicament of all promoted ranks in this respect, as intimated in chapter five, involves finding the optimal trade-off between, on the one hand, the

impersonal modalities of control represented in instrumental power and institutional authority, and on the other hand, the categories of personal and competent authority, which tend by contrast to emphasize the possibilities on which a reciprocal intimacy may be forged. Both power sets cannot be maximized simultaneously, since the value of the former may be obscured and so diminished by too enthusiastic an endorsement and an attempt to exploit the latter, and conversely, the plausibility and success of the latter is likely to be undermined by the attempt at a parallel reliance upon the former.

This suggests that the development of authoritative style will follow one of two main paths, depending upon which of the 'power clusters' identified above a particular actor is drawn towards, which in turn depends upon the structural opportunities available within and the cultural influences pertinent to a particular role. Indeed, just as with our wider discussion of power relations, the fundamental tension between the impersonal and the intimate in the cultivation of authoritative styles would appear to a feature of authority generally, and not just of its articulation within the setting of the police organisation. Thus, in treating this tension as axiomatic, Sennett has suggested that the two resulting paradigmatic styles in which authority is commonly legitimated are those of *autonomy* and *paternalism*[27]. The former relates to a distant, impersonal style of authority whose author proclaims indifference to those interests and concerns of the subject which are not directly related to the fulfilment of the authority's own

ends. The latter is in significant respects the mirror opposite of the first, its author purporting not merely to be in sympathy with the wider interests of the subject, but to be capable of defining what they in fact are and of nurturing the subject such that he or she may pursue them successfully.

If we narrow our focus to the specific context of inquiry, autonomy and paternalism do indeed provide appropriate conceptual devices through which the two generic authoritative styles most plausibly available within the promoted ranks of the police organization may be encapsulated. The autonomous style manifests itself in the form of the military model, already depicted in chapter five as the sense of authority which is created through the interweaving of institutional authority with an instrumental power orientation. For its part, the image of paternalism also threads neatly into the peculiar cultural tapestry of policework. In a type of work where craft knowledge remain stubbornly resistant to reduction to a form capable of formulaic articulation, and thus to a purely intellectual mode of transferrance and assimilation, yet where the pronounced rank hierarchy discourages a strong involvement of craftsmen in the policy-making process, a paternalistic approach in which 'on the job' exemplification of operational ability, teaching of tricks of the trade, and display of personal compassion by the senior ranking officer are accentuated, remains a primary vehicle through which competent and personal authority may be pursued.

In turn, as it reflects the binary opposition between autonomy and paternalism, the limited compatibility of the two 'power clusters' is thrown into sharper perspective. Thus, high residual levels of personal and competent authority may be generated within a profile in which institutional authority and instrumental forms of power predominate, only to the extent that the former do not challenge the image of relative indifference to the interests of particular individuals which is the hallmark of the autonomous style. For example, this may be possible with certain forms of charismatic authority, and with forms of work proficiency which do not depend upon the assiduous cultivation of interpersonal relations, such as the capacity to do paperwork efficiently, or to assimilate and disseminate information and commands quickly and accurately, or to apply rules dispassionately - *sine ira et studio*. [28] Equally, an intimate paternalistic style tends to detract attention from the more abstract set of rationales and subterranean power-supports which underpin institutional authority, [29] and to gel more easily with the use of incentives than of negative sanctions. The tensions between autonomy and paternalism, and the consequent difficulties involved in generating other credible authoritative styles which draw significantly upon elements of both, are further demonstrated by recalling the problems which confront one such hybrid enterprise - namely the new managerialism. As documented in chapter eight, although the new managerialism may involve genuine efforts to transcend such considerations and escape the zero-sum options described above (and while, for reasons set out in subsection 3 below, it retains a certain appeal for a minority

within the sergeant rank), given that it is restricted by precisely the configuration of structural and cultural forces which generates such tensions, it tends to fall between two stools. In attempting to fuse an autonomous managerial ideology with a set of substantive initiatives which take seriously the concerns and aspirations of individual officers of junior rank, it invites criticism as implausible and incoherent.

The propensity of this contrasting couple - autonomy and paternalism - to dominate the cultural space within which authoritative styles may be manufactured is graphically illustrated in the following quote:

> "You know that old trick they always play in the pictures, the nasty guy threatens the suspect and then the other one comes in and plays the nice guy, well that's what the bosses seem like to *the men down on the ground.* When I was a young cop, that was the first thing you got told about the bosses - who were the hard men, the disciplinarians, and who were nice guys, the favourite uncle types. It was part of your basic survival package. (sergeant, City Division)

It follows from our earlier arguments that the structural opportunities and cultural influences which attend the rank of sergeant incline them towards the paternalistic as opposed to the autonomous approach. Nevertheless, this tendency should not be overstated. First, although, as documented earlier, the foundations of the autonomous style have been subject to a general process of erosion within the police organisation, and although, in addition, sergeants are too modestly situated to benefit greatly from those of its attractions which remain, for some sergeants, as we shall see,

it still retains certain positive attributes, as indeed does its as yet even less easily legitimated recent variant - the new managerialist style. Secondly, the paternalistic style itself harbours certain tensions. It purports to signal a more altruistic approach - a recognition of the needs and aspirations of the individual rather an exclusive concern with systemic imperatives. But within a context where the definition and controlled pursuit of organisational ends, however problematical, continue to be viewed as the prerogative of the organizational hierarchy and the primary concern of supervisory practitioners, even the most persuasive paternalistic claim to 'know what's best' for one's junior will be unable to evade or obscure all clashes between the official mandate and individuals' perceptions of their needs. Further, subservience toa paternalistic authority structure may be rendered less likely in view of some of the changes set out in chapter six which have produced less malleable recruits and a more pluralistic intellectual environment within the organisation generally.(30) Thus we may speak only of a propensity, and not of a rigid predisposition on the part of sergeants, to favour the paternalistic approach.

However - and this is the crux of the present argument - whichever of these two flawed but still prevalent authoritative styles is adopted, the balanced approach does not resonate particularly well with either or with its accompanying package of authoritative and instrumental power sources. The essence of the image of walking the tightrope is a supreme awareness and vulnerability in the face of what lies beyond. The image which it

encapsulates is quintessentially *heteronomous*, and so is directly at odds with the notion of autonomy which connotes an imperviousness to external contingencies. Its admission of the precarious and problematic nature of authority detracts from the institutional basis of authority and that residual basis of competent authority which rests upon an easy self-confidence in one's professional role, and so the ballast upon which the autonomous approach is sustained is rendered unstable. Similarly, in the case of paternalism, the promises of competence and of personal nurturance which sustain the legitimacy of this approach are compromised by the admission of the vulnerability of the sergeant's own position. What autonomy and paternalism have in common is an unquestioning belief in the virtue, value and institutional security of the position of their authors. It is this solidity - this sense of authority coterminous with responsibility - which the balanced style may threaten or even puncture:

> "Everybody spouts forth about the sergeant's job, how hard it is. But at the end of the day sometimes you feel that it's just words. I think what I'm trying to say is that you get a lot more sympathy in this job than you do respect. It was probably the other way around with the sergeant in my day. It's definitely lost something." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

> "What we need and what we lack in this job is authority, -it's as simple as that. The more you try to do this job properly - give the men a fair crack and keep the bosses happy - the more your lack of the proper back-up and status to do it is brought home to you - and the men." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

> "The sergeant isn't much different from us. A lot of time he's forced into playing both ends off against the middle, but he doesn't have much clout. Some of them try to put it on a bit, but at the end of the day, they are as likely to catch

it as we are. Even the good ones, they've got a hard job to keep the men going and the bosses happy. It used to be they were up on a pedestal, they were untouchable. Nowadays, I've noticed, you're much more aware of the hassle they get from the bosses, they don't have the say in matters that they once had, and they can only do so much to back you up". (constable, Newtown Division)

In conclusion, it has been argued that while many sergeants may perceive the balanced approach to be the optimal personal and organisational solution to the predicaments of their rank, many obstacles lie in their path. The understanding and support of adjacent ranks may be qualified in crucial respects. And while many sergeants may be adept at taking advantage of the element of 'slack' within the paradox of trust, whether through the robust pursuit of intercursive power relations, or through the segregation of audiences, or through assiduous use of the rhetoric of uniformity, or through quick costume-changes and alternative role-playing, or through the clever use of narratives and humour, or any combination of these, these devices are also risk-laden. Finally, exponents of the balanced approach may significantly disable themselves by sacrificing some of the pragmatic virtues of the dominant forms of authoritative style. Therefore, we should not become bewitched by the image of the sergeant as the ubiquitous circus-performer. They may be fine high-wire artists, they may display admirable poise and balance, but they can never entirely unravel the knotted bonds of the paradox of trust and become fully-fledged escape-artists to boot. The inherently limited nature of the opportunities and materials at hand restrict the capacity of even the most consummate

performer to generate authoritative solutions, and so curbs still further the potential of more modest operators.

(2) The Artisan Model

As suggested, the problems associated with the balanced approach are both strategic and existential. The desire to avoid these or the experience of having encountered them influences many sergeants in the direction of the artisan model. The basis of this approach is the adoption of the image of a superior workman, who defines his or her interests as being at one with the constable rank and who, accordingly, will actively and openly seek to defend the position of the most junior rank within the organisation. Apart from the desire to avoid or escape the difficulties of the balanced approach, there are other positive reasons - again both strategic and existential - for the adoption of the artisan approach.

In strategic terms, the arguments, already rehearsed,[31] which incline sergeants towards the adoption of a normative orientation in relation to their constables, suggest the appropriateness of the artisan model. On account of the high degree of correspondence of spatio-temporal work patterns between the two ranks within the shift system, the sergeant is strongly encouraged to develop the intimate lines of exchange involved in most forms of personal and competent authority relations. As we have seen, a powerful theme underpinning notions of competent authority within the police organisation, with its culturally reinforced emphasis upon the

primacy of craft skill, is that of operational expertise, while the context within which the affective bonds which underpin personal authority are most likely to be strengthened is that of the camaraderie of the operational workgroup. Furthermore, the structure of dependency upon the more intimate sources of authority which encourages many sergeants to view the artisan approach as strategically alluring is reinforced by their relative impotence vis-a-vis the constable rank within the instrumental domain. Not only is there a diminishing capital of instrumentally useful resources available to sergeants in their relations with the constable rank, but their capacity to exploit that which does remain is restricted. Partly, this a matter of the difficulty of reconciling elements of attribute-based authority and instrumental techniques within a single strategy referred to earlier, especially if, as is the case with sergeants, these techniques consist predominantly of 'sticks' rather than 'carrots'. Partly, also, it is due to the fact that, because of their position in the first line of supervisory responsibility, sergeants are deprived of the option of displacement of responsibility for operational results, yet are vulnerable to these same displacement strategies on the part of their senior officers. For the most part, a sergeant's reputation rises and falls together with that of his or her shift or section of constables, suggesting a strong *concurrence* of interests between the two ranks and the development of significant channels of intercursive power relations.

Certain techniques which the sergeant adopts to economize upon time in the face of competing demands, which our findings showed to be a pervasive and problematic concern for members of this rank,[32] can further tighten this bond. So, for instance, paperwork demands within certain procedures which function both as co-ordinative techniques and as indices of performance, such as occurrence reports and police reports to the Procurator-Fiscal, may restrict the time available for effective coaching and encouragement - equally necessary for the production of satisfactory results in relation to the various barometers of satisfactory performance. As Chatterton has observed, one way of resolving difficult choices between these competing priorities is through the cultivation of the method of "serial supervision"[33]. This involves engaging in the activities of exhortation and education of constables in the context of the staggered production of the appropriate paperwork for a particular case or incident. One of the implications of this approach, however, is that by juxtaposing the practice of institutional documentation with that of craft learning, it tends to highlight any conflict between the two - between that which is competent and practicable on the one hand and that which is legitimate on the other, and so also tends to heighten the sense of inter-rank collusion. The learning of craft skills may be seen to shade imperceptibly into the learning of techniques of impression management and, as one of the major influences in the production of this competently socialized policeman, it is difficult for the sergeant to escape implication in this process, and the sense of complicity which shared "guilty knowledge"[34] fosters :

"You can't help but act as a shield for the men in this job, otherwise it's your neck too. You're constantly crossing the 't's and dotting the 'i's of their reports, making sure they don't run into trouble, and trying to get it across to them not to do the same the next time. It's a hard job to keep your distance when you are doing that though. There's a fine line between teaching somebody to be a good cop with his head screwed on, or just to be a lazy bastard!" (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Secondly, in existential terms, given the strong *esprit de corps* within the constable rank, the foundations of which are found in shared patterns of organisational socialization and in the intimacy of operational task interdependence, acceptance within this cultural milieu might be perceived by sergeants to provide a sanctuary in which the problems of social belonging and social identity which are so sharply focussed within the balanced approach might recede or disappear. The thoughts of one confirmed artisan are instructive here:

"You're nothing if you forget your roots in this job. The sergeant rank is an operational rank. There's no point in pretending you're all high and mighty. You'll not get any respect from the men that way... Policing has been my life. I enjoyed my years on the beat, I like the atmosphere in the ranks. I'm not about to lose sight of that and cut myself away from it all. It's not about ambition, it's about being content, and this is where I'm content. I'm a cop's man and I'll stay that way." - (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Thus, we have traced the general roots of the artisan approach. The artisan yields more readily and comprehensively than most to the demands of intimacy with the operational cohort which are endemic to the role of the sergeant and, indeed, aspires to special category membership thereof. Can we identify any more specific variables

which may enhance the attractiveness of the artisan model in the eyes of particular groups of sergeants and which contribute to the explanation of why some sergeants are more willing to take the plunge than others?

First, there are sergeants with long service in the rank. Suitably buffeted by extensive experience of attempting to retain a balance and perhaps with their ambition spent,[35] the artisan approach might appear to hold great attractions. For some new sergeants also, the fact that, on the basis of their limited experience, membership of the operational cohort may be seen as the only plausible means of fulfilling existential needs, may encourage the adoption of the artisan model, although in their case the strategic costs of such an approach are likely to weigh more heavily in the balance. These parallel possibilities are illustrated in the following two quotes:

> "I've been a sergeant a long time, and your priorities change. I still get a lot of job satisfaction, but it's different now. I like bringing the young lads along, but with me, what you see is waht you get... I'm not trying to impress anyone, I'm not scared of what the bosses think. I don't try to do myself any favours with them, and the men appreciate that."(sergeant, City Division)

> "It's hard for some of the younger sergeants. You can't just do a magic trick, and be a boss overnight. There's some try to assert themselves rightaway, there's others who try to stay one of the lads. I think you can paint yourself into a corner that way, but I can see why they do it. I think I was lucky having a bit more service before I got the rank. (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Finally, there are sergeants, who in spatio-temporal terms, are particularly intimate with their constables, over whom they hold a particularly high degree of *de facto* responsibility and/or with whom they enjoy a particularly high level of task interdependence. Here we are talking about the sergeant who is in charge of an isolated section at some distance from the working base of the inspector and other seniors, as is the case in a number of the sub-stations within Newtown Division; or the sergeant who is involved in work which typically requires initiatives which cannot be catered for by routine deployment strategies and which require a high level of *ad hoc* collective co-ordination, as with the sergeant in charge of the temporary crime squad operating within Riverside Division, or the Support Unit sergeants who enjoy a roving commission in Force A. Further, responses from our limited sample of C.I.D. sergeants within the four divisions, suggest that their similar work patterns place them in the same general position as the uniform crime-squad sergeant.

While each of these groups is unusually attracted to the artisan approach in existential terms, one may further distinguish between those who are objectively more or less likely to experience strategic success with this approach. It is only as regards those groups for whom the corollary of unusual intimacy with the operational workgroup is an unusual degree of attenuation from the instrumental power strategies of senior ranks that the artisan approach is likely to be productive in the longer term. Thus, the work theatre of the geographically isolated sergeant is particularly

well adapted for audience segregation. He or she has an unusual opportunity to combine the artisan image with suitable impression mamagement vis-a-vis senior officers, so as to retain the rudiments of a strategic balance alongside the existential satisfaction of a dominant alignment with juniors. :

> "I'm lucky out here. I maybe see the inspector three times a week. He lets me get on with it. Basically, he's concerned with my results, not my methods. I get the most out of my men my way, which is basically to treat them like equals, give them their head, and to take my turn at the dirty jobs too. The inspector might not agree with every single one of my ideas, he might think that I get a bit close to the men but he's not on hand to check on me every moment of the day, and that lets me get on with it." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Although the restricted scope of our database renders this conclusion somewhat tentative, the C.I.D. sergeant appears to enjoy a similar latitude. In this case, however, the relative immunity of the sergeant from the instrumental strategies of seniors appears to owe more to deep-rooted subcultural factors tham to territorial considerations.[365] At its core, criminal investigation work has traditionally involved a greater degree of proactive teamwork than has the preventative brief of the uniform patrol. Accordingly, first-line leadership and supervisory functions have become closely interwoven with operational practice, and the image of the 'involved sergeant' has become deeply entrenched and attained a more legitimate standing within the organisation generally. This is not to say, however, that the C.I.D. as a whole escapes the inter-rank tensions of the uniform branch. Differences in the work priorities

and the significant audiences of managerial and operational sectors run parallel to those of the uniform branch, and are similarly exacerbated by the tensions which flow from an impossible mandate. Rather, the critical intermediary function is merely displaced upwards by the factors considered above. The rank of inspector, rather than that of sergeant, tends to become the main repository of the attendant problems of balance. These themes are well illustrated by this exchange with a C.I.D. sergeant who had previously enjoyed the rank of uniform sergeant:

> "In the C.I.D. having the stripes doesn't really make much difference, to tell you the truth. You're really just a glorified D.C. Okay, you've got more paperwork, and you allocate the jobs, and keep the hard ones yourself, but you don't get the same flak from the bosses as you do in the uniform branch."
>
> Q: "So you are one big happy family in the C.I.D."
>
> A: "I wouldn't go that far. You've still got a divide, more so since the C.I.D. has come more under the wing of the division. It's more the inspector who gets it. He's like the sergeant in uniform, he's piggy-in-the-middle, chasing you for results, paying more attention to procedures, and keeping his nose clean with the bosses." (C.I.D. sergeant, Newtown Division)

As for the other groups mentioned, the strategic balance is less favourable. For some, such as the crime-squad sergeant or the Support Unit sergeant, the intimacy of the workgroup which provokes the aspiration to be an artisan in the first place may be countered by an attitude within the senior rank hierarchy which, far from echoing the relatively permissive perspective of their C.I.D. counterparts as to the role of the sergeant, may be alert to the dangers of a myopic squad mentality. The consequent commitment of

senior ranks to a watchful instrumental régime may grip squad sergeants in a close and possibly claustrophobic embrace which, although perhaps insufficient to incline or enable sergeants to resist the imperatives of the practical professionalism of the operational squad members,[37] may exact a severe price for their purchase of artisan status:

> "I spent four years in the Support Unit before I was promoted. I don't really think we deserve the 'body-snatchers' tag, but it does tend to attract a certain sort of person who likes real policework. You've got to be a team member, and you have to be prepared to put yourself on the line. There's a lot of confrontations, and you're bound to attract a fair number of complaints. If you worried about it you would be paralysed.
> Q: Would you like to go back as a sergeant?
> A: No way. You see the bosses are very sensitive to the reputation of squads. You get some real disciplinarians in there as bosses. He can make it hell for the sergeants.... [The sergeant is] to blame if the workload isn't well up, and he's also to blame if there are too many complaints... And there's no way you can keep your distance from the men if you're in the unit, like you can here. It can be a thankless task. (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

For others, the young and old sergeants whose career position has attracted them to the artisan approach, while, unlike the squad sergeant, they are not apt to be smothered on either side, it is nevertheless difficult for them to avoid 'painting themselves into a corner'. They lack that crucial extra capacity to manipulate the timings and locations of exercises in impression management which is the prerogative of the isolated sergeant, or the discretion to identify closely with an operational role which is the privilege of the C.I.D. sergeant. In summary, for many categories of sergeants

who may be drawn to the artisan approach, there is no reason to suggest that they are any better equipped, and in some cases evidence to suggest that they may be worse equipped to avoid the general pitfalls of this approach than is the norm.

In our allusions to the vital significance of a flexibility which is granted either by territorial factors or the exceptional attitudes of senior officers within certain functional specialisms, we have already hinted at what these general pitfalls may be. Having chosen a level and quality of involvement with their juniors which signals considerable empathy, sergeants *qua* artisans may be subject to particularly intense scrutiny by their seniors, and may find it difficult to develop or implement successfully the janus-faced approach required to render themselves acceptable in their eyes. In other words, the factors which undermine the benefits of the artisan approach in the final analysis are the very same as those which make the balanced approach, however problematical, a most compelling option for sergeants. On account of the deeply etched instrumental backdrop, to identify too closely with the constable rank inevitably invites the judgement of senior officers that one's loyalties are defined in opposition to their own, and so involves sacrificing their trust. This leads to a greater emphasis upon instrumental relations on the part of senior officers which, as we saw in chapter seven, makes it even more difficult to meet the demands which underscore their instrumental strategies, so adding momentum to the vicious spiral of distrust and instrumental relations. With a cruel twist of irony, through sergeants'

endeavouring to throw the protective cloak of their authority around their juniors, that same authority will be undermined in the eyes of their seniors, so rendering it less useful to sergeants for strategic purposes, and tending to expose them and their juniors to such a battery of monitoring devices and sanctions as to produce regulatory overkill.

This strategic failure inevitably has repercussions at the existential level also. Paternalism, although it would appear to dovetail more closely with the artisan model than the balanced model, may in the final analysis be equally incapable of delivering its symbolic promise. Constables will become resentful of the artisan's patronage and, indeed, may attempt, publicly and symbolically, to reject it. The artisan's sense of privileged incorporation within the constabulary subculture is thus bound to be threatened:

> "You ask any of the cops, and their least favourite sergeant is the one who tries too hard to be one of the boys. Sergeant X is the classic example. You've talked to him, and I bet you he has given you the impression that he's the most popular guy in the world. But none of the cops like him at all. There's two young lads on the shift, both of them had parties recently, one was an engagement party and the other was a twenty first. They are two of his special favourites. Yet of the three sergeants on this shift, that's including Y, the station sergeant from downstairs he's the only one who didn't get an invite to either. They know that he's going to be trouble at the end of the day, you see. Our shift gets more hassle from the chief inspector than the other three put together, and it's all down to him. He's got all the subtlety of a dog on heat, he refuses to play along with the chief inspector like the rest of us, and is always giving it laldy for his section. The chief inspector just comes down all the harder, and the men end up pissed

> off with X as well as the chief inspector." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

In conclusion, therefore, while the dangers of the tightrope and the allure of a normative profile ostensibly more easily attuned to the demands and limitations of the sergeant role may lead some to ponder or adopt the artisan approach, the conundrums and conflicts which encourage the sergeant to contemplate walking the tightrope in the first place are not resolved by this approach and will return to haunt most who attempt such a strategy. Furthermore, just as we have described certain more contingent factors which make some groups peculiarly suited to, or at least attracted to the artisan approach, so, too, there are also factors which have the opposite effect on other groups. As these factors bear also upon the pursuit of the aspirant executive approach, we shall postpone consideration of them until the next subsection.

(3) The Aspirant Executive Approach

This represents the converse of the artisan model. Just as artisans identify with the operational cohort, aspirant executives nail their colours to the mast of their seniors. Once again, the attractions of this approach derive at source from the frustrations and uncertainties of attempting to maintain a position of informed neutrality within the Buffer State. But what are the factors and attributes, either endemic within the role of the sergeant, or more specific to the role of particular sergeants, which shape the merely

negative wish to escape the tightrope into a positive desire to do so by means of adopting this particular stance?

As argued above, the general experiences, opportunities and constraints which attend the work of sergeants incline their loyalties and interests in the direction of their juniors. Accordingly, in the light of the tendency of the paradox of trust to structure the choices available to sergeants in zero-sum terms, the adoption of the aspirant executive approach may be viewed by junior officers as tantamount to' throwing one's lot in with the bosses' - an explicit rejection of a more immediately compelling logic of role. It may be construed as a clear statement of disloyalty to the operational ranks, and amount to a forfeiture of the advantages in terms of personal and competent authority which attach to the artisan approach and its related paternalistic authoritative style:

> "You can always tell these sergeants who try to copy the bosses. You know they don't really give a toss for the troops. Their biggest ambition is to become a chief inspector as soon as possible, so that they can get to wear a pair of rubber-heels."
>
> Q: "Rubber heels?"
>
> A:" Yes, they help them creep up on the men without them knowing. In fact, that sort of sergeant will be getting good practice at that sort of thing already. If he has to sell a few down the river to get his promotion, he will do it." (constable, Oldtown Division)

Nor does the picture improve greatly if we look to the positive side of the balance sheet - to what may be gained by way alternative sources of influence and authority by sergeants who pursue the aspirant execurive approach. Basically, they may adopt either an autonomous or a new managerialist role style. As regards

the former, we have already noted that the instrumental resources and institutional authority necessary for success in such an approach are in ever scarcer supply at sergeant rank. As regards the latter, an even more formidable set of obstacles appears to confront the sergeant. Many of the general factors which militate against the successful adoption of the new managerialist approach appear to apply *a fortiori* in the case of the first-line supervisor. As they are wary of attempts to define competence at any rank in terms which seem to marginalise operational ability, the new managerialism may be viewed by operational officers as striking a discordant note irrespective of its source. But given their particularly modest position within the hierarchy, there is a particularly high tariff involved in any attempt by sergeants, to the satisfaction of the operational rank, to marry competence in a job so intimately intertwined with operational tasks to a discourse and set of practices apparently so divorced from these tasks. Furthermore, the general tendency of junior officers to view sceptically the motives of the adherents of the new managerialism, and to be suspicious of their claims to be harbingers of a more enlightened regime of control, is likely to be exacerbated in the case of sergeants, as an alternative rationale in terms of careerist ambition appears so persuasive and as the allegiances and sacrifices deemed to be required for the successful pursuit of such ambitions may be seen to run against the grain of any commitment to normative relations with one's juniors. These points are illustrated in the following quote:

> "There's a new breed of boss in the force who don't really believe in getting their hands dirty.

Okay, you can understand it more with the top brass, they do have to worry about the overall image, and although you sometimes wonder if they really know what it is like for us, some of the things they do, staff appraisals, giving younger officers more experience around the division, show that they do care in their own way. But there's a few sergeants who try to come over the same way. Christ, there's one you keep expecting to walk in with a clipboard. They are the ones who won't muck in with you. They are so busy thinking about the next rank, they forget what they are supposed to be doing as sergeants. I don't have much time for them." (constable, City Division)

Finally, if we broaden our focus beyond the particular reception accorded by their junior audience, there is, as noted in chapter eight, a wider problem of status for sergeants who seek a niche within the new managerialist pantheon. The institutional authority attaching to the sergant rank may be declining, but the sergeant *qua* 'undermanager', working at the margins of the managerialist enterprise, may encounter yet graver difficulties in forging a distinct authoritative identity:

> "We all have our moans, but I'm still very proud to be a sergeant. I wouldn't be so proud if I was thought of as some sort of management lackey."(sergeant, City Division)

On the other hand, however, despite their particular susceptibility to the problems of legitimacy attaching to the new managerialism, insofar as the new managerialist perspective represents a genuine effort to augment the influence and job satisfaction of lower ranks, some sergeants who are aspirant executives may have more reason than most promoted ranks to endorse this core aspiration for its own sake. On account of their relatively recent membership of and continuing involvement with the constable rank they are generally more likely than more senior

promoted ranks to possess a current understanding of the problems and frustrations of the constable rank, while their relatively brief experience in a promoted post means that they are less likely than their seniors to have imbibed the older traditions associated with the distant authoritarian style. Immediate experience and intellectual flexibility may on occasion combine to present the new managerialism in an attractive light:

> "I want to get on in this job. I don't deny it, but that doesn't mean I don't care about my mates - precisely the opposite. I know all about the petty school discipline, the treating the men as if they didn't exist. I want to change that, my outlook is ... fresh enough to know it has to be changed. Being a sergeant is an apprenticeship for that, but you can do more higher up. (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Nevertheless, the upshot of the above set of arguments is that, on balance, the aspirant executive approach - whether in its autonomous or its new managerialist mode - is likely to be a less attractive option to the generality of sergeants than is the artisan approach. However, there are two countervailing sets of considerations which suggest why for some sergeants, even if the more idealistic rationales were to be discounted, the aspirant executive approach offers a more attractive model than the artisan approach.

First, certain sergeants, by dint of their upwardly mobile career trajectory, their education, and/or their general pattern of socialization prior to joining the police, are likely, even in their relatively modest state of elevation, to be defined by colleagues and juniors alike as quintessential aspirant executives.

Accordingly, in their particular case the general rule which suggests a greater homology between the demands, limitations and strengths of the position of the sergeant and the artisan approach does not hold. Presumptively labelled as high-flyers, such officers have nothing to lose, and indeed may have something to gain in terms of the perceived honesty and consistency of their position, by displaying their ambition:

> "Some officers have 'Superintendent' stamped on their forehead the minute they walk into this job. There's one who worked in this shift, public school boy, father and uncle done well in the police, bit of a posh accent, and a bit too good to be true. Quite a nice guy in his own way and not a bad policeman, but he didn't really fit in, and he was obviously destined for greater things. He's a sergeant now. I haven't heard many reports, but I would have thought that he won't make a very good sergeant. If he makes it, he'll make a good chief inspector or superintendent though." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

> "Ambition is a funny thing in the police. a lot of people will tell you lies. I came in with good highers, nearly won the baton of honour at the college, got my exams quick, and got promoted after six years. Of course I'm ambitious, but the ony difference is that I admit it. People don't resent that as long as you are honest". (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

In certain circumstances, this process of labelling, or sorting, may be more precise. Thus, sergeants who have passed through the Accelerated Promotion Scheme and graduate entrants[38] provide paradigmatic instances of the exceptional tendency. Although, as demonstrated earlier,[39] such badges of distinction may be viewed in a somewhat jaundiced manner by junior ranks, there is again some evidence to suggest that they tend to respect their bearers more if these badges are candidly displayed. And in the

case of this particular sub-group, their special educational qualifications and their association with a relatively new managerial emphasis upon 'fast-streaming' is such that not only do they attract the general aspirant executive tag, but they also tend to be defined by colleagues and juniors along the more specific professional/reformer/new managerialist axis. In these special circumstances, therefore, it may be expedient as well as philosophicaly attractive to develop an authoritative style in line with the new managerialism.

> " AP sergeants are a bit apart from the rest, but maybe it's no bad thing. It's better than the old days in the CID when people got promoted superintendent a year before they retired - fat lot of use that was to anyone. Maybe some of these AP guys can change things. They're a new breed, they're educated, they get all sorts of courses. It's all part of this new emphasis on training and management, and if it means that one day we're going to have some new attitudes at the top, then we can't complain...But if that's what they want, they should be more honest about it, promote them even quicker. I once worked beside an AP man, and he spent most of his time trying to prove to men twice his service that he knew all the tricks they did. If you think about it, it's all a bit stupid. You make someone something special then he spends years trying to prove he's just one of the lads.
>
> Q: Who's fault is that/
>
> A: There's a[n]...attitude problem on both sides I suppose. You don't want the men resenting them, but you're more likely to get it if the sergeant tries to act it and pretend he's something he's not."(inspector, Oldtown Division)

A second set of arguments favouring the aspirant executive approach is of more general application. This involves the claim that for all sergeants, despite the short-term tribulations involved in such a course of action, the aspirant executive approach offers

more promise in the longer term than the artisan approach, at least in strategic if not in existential terms.

It should be emphasized that it is not meant to suggest that the aspirant executive model is any more capable of providing a resolution to the problems which are at the source of the paradox of trust, or a means of transcending them, than is the artisan model. Indeed, the strategic rigour of the aspirant executive approach may dissolve in the face of a set of tensions symmetrical to those which blight the artisan approach. Too close an identification with the interests of seniors will affect the standing of sergeants with the operational cohort, whose members are consequently less likely to respond positively to their efforts to instruct and motivate them, so leading to results which reflect badly upon the section, which in turn may cause a creeping dissatisfaction on the part of inspectors and their seniors with the performance of the sergeant in question. This general disaffection will have obvious existential consequences for sergeants, in that it may exclude them from the supportive networks provided by senior and junior officers alike. Further, certain factors exacerbate these dangers in respect of relations with senior ranks. Thus, in the previous chapter we noted the cruel irony entailed in the fact that it is those inspectors who adopt a predominantly instrumental approach towards their sergeants who are nevertheless most likely to be stringent and vigilant in their demands for exclusive loyalty from these same sergeants. In other words, certain of the factors which make sergeants more likely to be strategically drawn to the aspirant executive strategy make it less

likely that the embrace of their chosen accomplices will be existentially any more satisfying than that of their chosen antagonists.

Yet the aspirant executive is still provided with one window of opportunity which is not available to the artisan, and which may alleviate both the strategic problems, and to a certain extent, the existential problems. Although the logic of both positions suggests the eventual corrosion of normative relations with both junior and senior colleagues, in both cases the most immediate source of alienation is in relations with the group whose interests have been specifically subordinated. The implications of this for the aspirant executive approach are less conclusively damning than they are for the artisan approach. This is so for the simple but compelling reason that in the former case the group with whom sergeants enjoy provisionally healthy normative relations are in a position to effect their removal - by means of promotion or transfer - prior to any deterioration of relations with both major constituencies, whereas in the latter case the group upon whom sergeants concentrate their normative strategies are not in such a position. In other words, in the case of the former alliance only, sergeants write in an escape clause which offers them some prospect of movement, though by no means a guarantee, before their position is finally and irreversibly compromised.

> "I once heard one very senior officer say that his ambition was always to rise so quickly through the ranks that he was not corrupted by the system. He didn't make many friends by saying that, but I think that he was only saying in a funny kind of self-serving way what a lot of other people

> already think. If you are single-minded about it, and know who your friends are, then you can shoot through the ranks without touching the sides. If you move quickly enough, you don't need to give a shit about the people under your command, your sins will never catch up with you." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Of course, despite the pot of gold which gleams invitingly, this remains a high-risk strategy. For sergeants who fail to convince their seniors of their worth the prospect of an endless purgatory looms. However the risks involved do not necessarily appear disproportionate to all those who contemplate this strategy, not only because of the allure of possible success, but also on account of two related sets of considerations which will allow aspirant executives to 'buy time' at the rank to allow them to continue their machinations to move onwards and upwards with reasonable prospects of success.

In the first place, evidence of the success or failure of aspirant executives in the sergeant rank will not be immediately obvious to their seniors. As we saw in chapter seven, indices of successful attainment of objectives are inherently problematical and ambiguous. More particularly, one consequence of the development of a bureaucratic pathology in the attitudes of senior officers has been that bureaucratic rules, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, have come to be seen by them to be on equal standing with or even to predominate over output standards within the available network of regulatory mechanisms, and, indeed, the successful attainment of bureaucratic goals may often be regarded as the route to the achievement of output goals. Accordingly, as it is

also true by definition that bureaucratic measures are those which are most amenable to internal stipulation and control, it is their achievement which is most likely to satisfy the most immediate expectations of seniors officers, and so this latter group will be slow to criticize programmes of action which reflect those instructions and expectations. The charge of individual incompetence or deviance against the aspirant executive may be waiting in the wings but, provided there is no flagrant infraction of bureaucratic procedures, it is likely to remain in reserve for a considerable period until unequivocal evidence is available from other sources.

> "It's sad but true, some people in this force still get promoted just for keeping their nose clean. Keep the paperwork going, see that the men are tidy and punctual, and it doesn't seem to matter that all hell's breaking loose out there."(sergeant, Newtown Division)

Secondly, there is the phenomenon of acquiescence on the part of the constabulary rank. Faced with a régime of controls and expectations which they perceive to be indicative of a stubborn inability or refusal on the part of their seniors to comprehend the true problems and priorities of the job as defined by themselves, constables are apt to defer to the 'whims and delusions' of their seniors in the short term. Certainly, their patience and willingness to be accommodating in these respects is greater than that of senior officers as regards what they are prone to perceive, given their undue reliance upon pathological explanations of organizational underachievement[40] to be a correctable inability or intransigent unwillingness on the part of their juniors to tackle

the true problems and priorities of the job as they, the senior officers, define them. The explanation for this is twofold. First, members of ranks of inspector and above quite simply hold more telling instrumental cards than do members of the constable rank, and thus there are much more pressing reasons of self-interest for the latter to act against their own better judgement in the short-term. Furthermore, for the complex normative reasons set out earlier concerning constables' continuing loyalty to the mandate and residual attachment to their seniors even in the face of the onset of a more predominantly instrumental régime,[41] constables are also likely to collude in the drama of bureaucratic striving in order to 'keep the mushrooms well fertilized'. This may apply even if confronted with sergeants who make few reciprocal concessions and who favour their seniors' interpretation of organisational ends.

> "You'll have heard the term 'guided missiles'... People are usually talking about probationers, but, I'm telling you, when I worked on the beat in the city, the biggest guided missile was our superintendent. He liked going out in the cars on a saturday, but if he was there, something was always going to blow up. Let's put it this way, he knew how to start a fight. But he was a stickler for other things. like he used to get the sergeant to check up on all our sudden deaths, or reports on juveniles, things you would normally pass on to the other department without much fuss. And the sergeant was scared of him, he followed it to the letter. We went along with it, not because of the sergeant, but for the super's sake, because we basically liked him. That's one thing you have to remember when you are a sergeant, just because the shift is going along with things doesn't mean they are doing it because they love you. (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

All in all, these practices of collusion make it less likely that aspirant executives will swiftly incur the dissatisfaction of their

seniors, and this may buy them more invaluable time to invoke the escape clause.

Thus, notwithstanding its comparatively low take-up rate, the 'success' rate of those who adopt the aspirant executive approach compares favourably with that of those who adopt the artisan approach. Nevertheless, despite these cosmetic victories on the part of certain members of the aspirant executive class, the model in question is no more capable of overcoming the problems of balance than any of the others previously considered. It offers an individual rather than a structural solution. Nor is there any definitive promise of better things from the upwardly mobile in their new positions. Those who adopt the autonomous style may be ideationally incapable or strategically reluctant to bridge the empathy gap and promote the cause of demystification in their newly exalted positions, while the more enlightened new managerialists too may be limited by the structual and cultural tensions which handicap this approach.

(4) The stripes-carrying model

This is the last resort of the disillusioned cynic. He or she may once have been a committed tightrope-walker, an ambitious young executive, or a proud artisan. Indeed, the biographies of members of this group may contain episodes within more than one of these roles. They may well be experienced in the rank, the paradigm case of the "burned out cop"[444] - the supervisory equivalent of Reiner's

"uniform-carrier"[43], instrumentally and existentially unfulfilled. They are aware of their failure to resolve the paradox of trust, or even to forge more modest allegiances with either juniors or seniors. They no longer attempt any of these strategies, but harbour bitter thoughts about their failure in the past. Stripes-carriers nevertheless remain significant figures for three reasons.

First, numerically, their class is not insignificant.[44] To protect current earnings and pensions many sergeants, who are often not qualified to get work of similar value outwith the service, will not resign their job. Nor are they likely to be dismissed. They are both the beneficiaries of a boundary aspect of occupational solidarity which does not countenance dismissal except on the basis of evidence of specific and serious acts of deviance, and the victims of a cultural norm, by means of which, as we have seen, pathology is personalized, and which, in the immediate context, encourages the assimilation of all forms of burn-out to an individually contingent process of physiological and psychological deterioration rather than to a systemically induced moral disillusionment.

> "There's is a group of sergeants in this job which we all recognise, real awkward bastards, twisted by the system. If they feel like that, they should just get out. There's no need for it. If the pressures were that bad, everyone would end up like that, and they don't." (inspector, Oldtown Division)

Secondly, they may exert disproportionate influence as role-models. Despite widespread private disavowal of the stripes-carrying orientation their example may be publicly tolerated. The

buffer role of sergeants exposes their vulnerability to the power and vulnerabilities of others. The stripes-carrying model pretends and professes a denial of, or imperviousness to, these pressures. The public celebration or acceptance of many past and present exponents of such an approach, often in the form of highly stylized narratives, serves as a form of catharsis, a jocular or trivializing, but also cynically-edged response to theese problems concerning policing ends and methods and the pattern of relations within the organisation in which sergeants are so deeply implicated:

> "Everybody's got their favourite stories about the old sergeant. The one who went to the bookies every backshift, or the one who told the inspector to f...off in front of the men, or - my favourite one - the one about the sergeant who lost a prisoner out of the back of the van on the way to the station in the old X burgh force, so he jumped out at a corner where the neds hung out, pulled one in and got his new prisoner. The last one actually happened, but usually it's just a laugh. It helps you wind down."
>
> Q: Why the old *sergeant*?
>
> A: Oh it doesn't need to be... but I suppose he's the authority figure... We all like to have a laugh about our elders and better."(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

However, to develop a theme introduced in subsection 1, for those who are not entirely *au fait* with the ironic roots of this public discourse, there may be a tendency to take it at face-value. Thus, at particular times and places, inordinate respect may be accorded by the undersocialized at both constable and sergeant rank to the stripes-carrying approach as an actual guide to action. As such there may be both a long route and a short route to the attainment of the status of a stripes-carrier, either the winding path of gradual moral disillusionment, or the short-cut of

unreflective assimilation of the public postures of colleagues. The perceptive comments of one sergeant are instructive in this respect:

> "I was listening to a radio programme the other day, where they were going on about the 'canteen culture' in the police. This bod from the Federation was saying how you can't take seriously what gets said at tea-breaks. He was saying that when the cops start talking about the job being crap, or about giving prisoners a seeing-to, they are just letting off steam and it's all just harmless fun. But I think he's only half-right. Every sergeant in the force will tell you how they hate having these old-timers on the shift, because they can poison the younger men. You see, they're a lot more impressionable at that stage. And to be honest, it's not just the cops, some of the sergeants are like that as well. What an example to give. It's no wonder you hear all these stories about the Met, and shifts going completly off the rails. It's not so bad here, but there are still a few like that." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Thirdly, there are more general implications. The denial of conflict and of powerlessness signalled by the adoption of this model, both as a private workstyle for the few and as a meaningful public discourse for the many, further inhibits any possibility of dealing constructively, from within the organisation, with the structural problems of which the stripes-carrying model is only one of the least acceptable symptoms. In particular, the individualization of the issue allows the true issues to disappear beneath bland but powerful symbols of hero and anti-hero. For the lower ranks, the image of the stripes-carrier as an example of individual pathology or as a worthy whose idosyncracies compensate for or obscure the significance of more systemic problems, serves to deflect attention from and so to sustain underlying tensions. For their part also, the senior ranks may be content to endorse a

familiar rhetoric which allows them to subsume these problematic cases within the convenient and complacent catch-all explanatory category of individual deviance.

> "There's some in this job who admire the gung-ho, don't-give-a-fuck attitude of some of the old-timers. I think its a bit pathetic myself. In this job you can't be a loner, you are hemmed in by the system. Those who say otherwise are just talking romantic crap. They've been watching too many tele programmes, rather than looking at what happens in their shift everyday. You'll never change anything spouting that rubbish." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

C. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, therefore we may note that none of the four paradigmatic responses to the tensions implicit in the role of the uniform patrol sergeant is capable of resolving these tensions adequately. However, this is a matter of degree. Some strategies are more successful than others and appear to be compatible with high levels of job satisfaction and ambition within the rank, and thus with a continued commitment to address these problems with some degree of optimism and enthusiasm. Accordingly, it remains important to attempt to measure the relative popularity of the various approaches.

As suggested earlier, this is problematical to the extent that our categories are ideal-typical in nature, accentuating certain general tendencies in order to clarify the distinctive attributes of

different approaches. In practice, there is a degree of overlap at some of the categorical boundaries. Thus, some sergeants who display artisan or aspirant-executive tendencies nevertheless retain a degree of commitment to the balanced approach. This is largely because each of the first two perspectives shares with the third a degree of awareness of, susceptibility to and concern with, the implications of the paradox of trust. In either case the solution offered is partial and may be acknowledged as partial, thus encouraging a continuing receptiveness to the attractions and rigours of the balanced approach. On the other hand, some boundaries are more clearly demarcated. Thus, the strategic and symbolic properties of the artisan and the aspirant-executive approach preclude movements between the two and, although high-wire artists, artisans and aspirant-executives alike may in time become stripes-carriers, there is no return passage from the disillusioned depths occupied by the last group.

With these caveats in mind, we may offer some indication of the attractiveness of each option. An analysis of the interviews as a whole suggests that the best general indicator of commitment to a particular approach lies in the response given when the subject was asked which rank or ranks he or she felt closest to. The fifteen sergeants (15.8%) who nominated a number of different ranks, tended to be archetypal exponents of the balanced approach. The thirty six sergeants (37.9%) who nominated the constable rank, and the twenty eight sergeants (29.5%) who nominated ranks of inspector and above, were more likely to favour the artisan and aspirant-executive

approaches respectively, although in each case a significant number continued to display a varying degree of commitment to the attractions of the balanced approach. Finally, and less equivocally, the sixteen sergeants (16.8%) who professed not to feel particularly close to any other rank tended to fit the mould of stripes-carrier. Furthermore, high levels of job satisfaction and promotion ambitions were the exclusive preserve of the first three groups, although those who identified themselves most closely with the artisan approach tended to be less sanguine about their promotion prospects.(45)

Thus, we may conclude by noting that the variety and ingenuity of sergeants' responses to the paradox of trust serves to protect the majority against resignation and disillusionment. The culture of the uniform patrol sergeant remains a vibrant and creative one, and the various working strategies and career plans which provide sergeants with their sense of occupational identity and purpose, although they embrace elements of self-interest, for the most part remain genuinely engaged with the struggle to defend and advance organisational ends. On the one hand, profound structural problems remain unresolved, but on the other, the commitment to address these problems, although presently fragmented and dispersed amongst a number of partially conflicting endeavours, is unabated.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In chapter one we suggested that the development of an ongoing programme of rational and purposive reform of police institutions, aided by the products of systematic research and analysis, is impeded by a complex structure of problems which might be termed the policy trilemma. Within a pluralistic social and political culture it would be a fallacy to suppose that this structure of problems could ever be entirely resolved. Yet it should not be inferred from this, it was argued, that the only alternative scenarios are either the maintenance of the *status quo* by default or a haphazard process of change driven by the struggle between the narrow sectoral interests of powerful pressure groups. Rather, it it is possible to conceive of, and even to point to certain developments which suggest a modestly effective role for the research enterprise in reconciling differences amongst diverse constitutencies and fostering a common commitment towards cetain policy objectives. One important set of challenges which has to be tackled if such a project is to bear fruit, however, is that posed at the third level of the policy trilemma - the level of policy implementation. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether, and if so, to what extent the police organisation is susceptible to an effective system of top-down co-

ordination and control. It was to this question that the present thesis addressed itself.

In an attempt to overcome the analytical *impasse* which had been reached over this issue between, on the one hand, those who believed that the strength of the operational sub-culture, or sub-cultures, was such as to undermine attempts to reform the police organisation in ways which did not harmonize with the interests and values of the lower ranks, and on the other, those who believed that a more stringent framework of external regulation could overcome such resistance, a new theoretical starting-point was sought. This centred upon the nature of intra-organisational power relations and was subsequently developed and applied in the context of field research which, while examining a range of roles within the police organisation, focused in particular upon the role of the uniform patrol sergeant as a crucial mediator of influence and interests at divisional level. The basis thrust of the analysis presented in the main part of the study was to suggest that on account of the increasing prevalence of instrumental relations within the police organisation, profound difficulties did indeed attend the collective mobilization of effort in pursuit of ends endorsed within the policy-making machinery. For sergeants, these difficulties tended to manifest themselves in terms of the paradox of trust - a series of strategic and existential dilemmas borne of the requirement to meet the different and often opposed demands of higher and lower echelons and to reconcile competing loyalties and interests.

While cultural diversity within the police organization remained important, it was only one of a set of closely interconnected factors which accounted for the problem of policy implementation within this new perspective. The nature of the police mandate and the form of bureaucratic organisation peculiar to the police were also significant contributory factors. Moreover, the overall scenario was a fluid one, it being impossible to understand the precise impact of these interlocking forces without reference to various recent changes in the relationship between policing and its environment and their effects upon internal cultural allignments and structural patterns. Nevertheless, however complex the explanatory background, the net result was one which confirms both the depth and immediacy of the challenge posed to those concerned to subject police institutions and practices to effective review and reform through a rationally informed public discourse. What was exposed in our inquiry was not only the absence of the basic conditions for ensuring operational compliance with policy directives, but a number of related pathologies attendant upon an inadequately balanced instrumental regime. These include the propensity towards regulatory overkill - the generation of a wasteful excess of bureaucratic rules and procedures, the absence of candour and the dilution of collective learning potential which result from the cautious informational strategies and mutual scepticism of different ranks, and, for some officers, a sense of disillusionment and an ebbing of motivation arising from an unduly cynical perception of the organisation as split into a set of warring and self-interested factions.

The various publics of the police, although they may not be united in their conception of the ultimate aims of policing or of the definitive criteria of good performance, would express common dissatisfaction with a set of arrangements which, in the ways indicated, compromises the basic capacity of the organisation to respond effectively and efficiently to the demands of any mandate. Internal constituencies, too, it must be emphasized, do not view this state of affairs with equanimity. We have been at pains to stress that many individual actors are unhappy with the collective consequences of the patterns of power relations within which they and their colleagues are implicated. The strategic problems and existential insecurities of sergeants, although these have been most extensively documented, are but one - albeit particularly vivid - manifestation of a more general tendency for all ranks, despite a high level of genuine commitment to their own particular conceptions of organisational ends as opposed to narrow individual or sectional ends, to have their efforts thwarted, diluted or misconstrued on account of an unfavourable instrumental climate.[1] If, then, the present framework for the pursuit of organisational goals may be seen as unsatisfactory from both external and internal points of view, what, if anything, can be done to alleviate the situation?

B. A REFORM PACKAGE

The first point to be noted is that, just as the problems associated with policy implementation cannot be cordoned off from the other difficulties which are part and parcel of the policy

trilemma, so too any serious attempt to ovecome implementation problems must also countenance the possibility of reform at the other two levels - policy generation and policy content. In other words, coherent treatment of any particular problematical element within the policy trilemma, in this case internal co-ordination and control, cannot be contemplated except within an integrated *package* of measures which is adequate to the complexity of the overall set of relationships between the constituent parts of the trilemma.

A second basic imperative of a successful reform strategy relates to the form which such measures should take. Bearing in mind the fact that attempts by narrow internal constituencies to dismantle the structure of instrumental relations have been demonstrated to be at best of limited efficacy and at worst counterproductive, a more substantial reform initiative must be both broader in scope and grounded in an effective power source. That is, it must both purport to bear upon, and be capable of bearing upon, all significant actors within the organisation.

Consistent with the requirement of breadth, each element of the response requires to be anchored in rules - "general prescriptions guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation"[2]. This, it should be stressed at the outset, does not mean that cohesion of organisational effort can be achieved through a narrow strategy aimed at the detailed and comprehensive stipulation of the minutiae of organizational practice. Direct regulation has an important role to play, but, as we shall see,

other necessary components of the reform package are not predicated upon such a close nexus between rules and action.[3] Nevertheless, although these other reform initiatives may exert practical influence through quite different mechanisms, a background framework of rules remains indispensable to their generation and systematic operationalization. Further, and consistent with the requirement of capability, the various sub-types of rules must be promulgated at either of two levels of social organisation where control over the pattern and quality of policing may be effectively pursued. At the level of the state there are rules of law - common law, primary legislation and delegated legislation - together with a residuum of other general pronouncements conventionally attributed a greater or lesser degree of authority.[4] At the more modest institutional level there is an additional dense structure of organisational rules which bears upon the policing enterprise.

Combining these basic premises as to structure and form, we may identify three general categories of rules pertinent to our enterprise - *policy-generation rules*, *policy rules* and *policy-implementation rules*. Within each category a number of sub-categories, some of which were introduced earlier, may be identified and distinguished in terms both of their functions and their sources - whether organisational or extra-organisational. The policy-generation rules are concerned with what Greenwood and Hinings term "meta-policy making"[5] - the making of policy *about* policy. These include, first, external policy-making rules, which are mainly legal rules[6] defining the powers and responsibilities of various

constituencies in this field, the most significant being the rules which constitute and regulate the tripartite structure which embraces central government, local authorities and the police themselves.[7] They also include *rules of structural design* which are a mixture of legal rules and organisational rules,[8] and which, by means of specifying the hierarchical structure and system of specialization of the organisation itself and the nature, allocation and interrelationship of tasks within this formal edifice, provide for the distribution within the police organisation of that element of overall policy-making power accorded to it by the more general policy-making rules.

For the purposes of the arguments developed in chapter seven, the various categories of policy rules and policy-implementation rules were for the most part collapsed into a binary framework of internally-directed and externally- directed bureaucratic rules. A more sensitive and complex categorization is required for present purposes.

The policy rules themselves again divide into distinctively extra-organisational and, for the most part, legal rules, on the one hand, and intra-organizational rules on the other, and they also differ in their degree of specificity. Externally there are four types: *mandate rules*, which consist of the legal aims of the police organisation[9] and of individual police officers together with those other aims defined by the Royal Commission in 1962, such as the befriending and assistance of people in need, which have become

institutionally enhshrined; *rules of substantive criminal law*, which by specifying the forms of conduct that uniformly attract the sanctions of the criminal justice system, provide both a more detailed elaboration of certain features of the mandate as well as a set of norms which police officers themselves must not infringe while seeking to apply that mandate; *procedural rules*, such as the law of arrest and the statutory detention framework considered in chapter six as well as the rules regulating the search of persons and premises and the questioning of suspects, which focus exclusively and in more detail upon the legitimate means available to and side-constrants upon police officers pursuing aspects of the mandate in particular situations and types of cases;[10] *disciplinary rules*, which provide an additional set of detailed standards constraining police conduct but which differ from the procedural rules and the self-referential dimension of the rules of substantive criminal law in that they are applied and adjudicated upon within the police organisation even although emanating from without.

Internally there are two types. At the more general level, there are *output standards*, discussed at length in chapter seven, which provide the most concrete internally endorsed indices of performance in accordance with the mandate rules. Although, as explained, these are not formally prescribed, they nevertheless exert a significant influence, backed by the formal authority of their promulgators and executors, and demand consideration for that reason alone. Furthermore, within these police organisations who

have recently adopted Policing By Objectives, they provide an integral part of the officially endorsed strategic framework, and so require to be assessed in terms of their potential efficacy within this more systematic framework also. Secondly, there are *stipulative rules*, standard operating procedures which regulate the minutiae of organisational action. As indicated in chapter seven, rules falling within this last category may be either internally-focused, stipulating the means by which the general ends contained in the mandate rules and the output measures may be pursued, or externally focused, elaborating upon the details of application of particular elements within the mandate rules and output measures. Furthermore, they tend to shadow closely the more detailed legal policy rules - the rules of substantive criminal law, the procedural rules and the discipline rules, being informed by and in some cases containing reference to the demands of the latter.

The policy-implementation rules provide a further set of mechanisms whereby the application of the policy rules may be facilitated. In so far as the categories of policy making and policy application shade into one another and the line between them becomes somewhat blurred and indistinct, the *rules of structural design* may be viewed as being applicable to this third stage as well as to the first stage, the ordered distribution of tasks within a collectivity being as relevant to the implementation of its objectives as to the structuring of the pattern of influence pertinent to their generation. However, there are two other sets of rules closely allied to the rules of structural design which fall

more specifically within the latter category. In the first place, there are *communicative rules*, aimed at the dissemination of information, knowledge and policy between and within ranks and departments. In the second place there are *rules of social technology*. In one sense, this latter is a residual category. It consists of all rules, other than the policy rules themselves and the rules in respect of the communication of these policies, which attempt to identify and influence acceptable standards of conduct on the part of individual officers and to encourage the achievement of worthwhile standards by them. In so doing, they may both facilitate performance in accordance with the policy rules and the communicative rules, and also provide a further gloss upon the aims contained within the policy rules. More specifically, this set will include the rules which provide for the selection, recruitment and training systems and the rules which provide for systems of performance appraisal and career development within the organisation.

It is apparent even from this formal analysis how these various sets of rules are, both within and between the various categories, locked into a complex structure of mutual support and sustenance. As indicated, any coherent programme of reform must recognize this and must contemplate an integrated package of these different types of rules. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs we shall attempt to piece together this integrated package, starting with the most concrete and, for us, most immediately relevant dimension - policy-implementation rules - and ending with the most general, but also

ultimately the most significant - policy-generation rules. At each stage, attempts to finesse the overall structure will be informed by our understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of contemporary orthodoxies and initiatives, drawn both from the present research and, where appropriate, from other sources.

(1) Policy-implementation rules

For the sake of ease and clarity of exposition, consideration of rules of structural design - which straddle the boundary between policy implementation and policy generation - will be held over until our general analysis of the set of rules relevant to the latter category. Let us presently consider the two sets of rules which fall squarely wihin the category of policy implementation - communicative rules and rules of social technology.

A number of the factors contributory to the predominantly instrumental régime which has been depicted, in particular the cluster of factors associated with the empathy gap,[11] would appear to be susceptible to amelioration by means of increasing the extent and improving the quality of direct communication between ranks. Indeed, this articulates closely with the findings of junior supervisory personnel reported in chapter four, when asked about possible improvements in the network of communications. However, as demonstrated in our discussion of new managerialist developments in chapter eight, initiatives in this area tend to be undermined by the very context in which they operate. The strong instrumental legacy

leads to ambivalence amongst senior ranks upon whom such initiatives rest and supplies a critical edge to the perspective of junior ranks. Informal fora such as 'greetin' meetin's' may be viewed as purely cosmetic, or as threats to the informational control and defensive solidarity of operational officers. Indeed, and paradoxically, where instrumental attiitudes prevail and where the practices of junior ranks have come to reflect strongly the limited role expectations which flow from such attitudes, more ambitious local initiatives which include firmer guarantees that the voice of the operational craftsmen will be taken seriously in policy-making and policy-review, although they may be welcomed by some lower participants, may be viewed by others with even greater disquiet. For them, the sharper the discontinuity with past practice the greater the sense of existential and strategic insecurity they may experience and the more tenaciouisly they may resist change, and even insofar as such initiatives do produce a greater degree of 'bottom-up' influence, it may be surmised that the credit for any resulting substantive policy improvements will simply be claimed by senior ranks concerned with their own self-aggrandisement.

It might be argued that what is required is for local initiatives in the regulation of internal communication to become more generally applicable, and in particular, for them to be supplemented by reforms in the system of structural design such that the institutional framework of role powers, responsibilities and relations is more generally recast in a manner which facilitates such communication. However, whether an institutionally-enshrined

organisational pluralism would itself be enthusiatically endorsed by many in the junior ranks is a question which remains counterfactual and whose answer is very much in doubt. We shall return to this highly pertinent question at the appropriate point in our discussion. For the moment, we may simply conclude that, although both our empirical evidence and our theoretical understanding indicate that strategies aimed at the breakdown of communication barriers represent an important element in any set of measures aiming to combat instrumental relations, in and of themelves they are not sufficent and, indeed, if introduced in isolation, may have counterproductive consequences.

What of rules of social technology? Can training programmes, new criteria of selection and recruitment, and staff appraisal systems provide the impetus for the development of a climate within which normative relations between ranks may thrive and a greater harmonization of effort become possible? In chapter eight, the reasons why formal educational reforms are of limited impact were rehearsed. As with changes in communicative rules and structures, it would be ingenuous to assume that the development of training courses which sponsor conceptions of management and interpersonal relations other than those implicit in the classic military/bureaucratic model would alone suffice to transform the prevailing instrumental climate. Even if the association of such initiatives with new managerialist values were not to colour such endeavours in the eyes of many officers, and even if the exhortations and insights provided were compelling enough to

encourage some to dismantle the powerful grid of defensive scepticism through which they viewed the actions of others and decided their own priorities and strategies - a tall order in itself - the holistic nature of the problem would remain. Well-intentioned potential reformers would fear isolation. Their dilemma, to settle for a cautious, suboptimal and self-protective solution or to attempt positive reform, placing the fate of such reform in the hands of myriad others in the hope that they too would be prepared to forego a safety-first approach - a particularly perilous prospect for promoted officers of lower rank - is not resolved by being cast in clearer terms and placed in a fuller explanatory context. Indeed, because more clearly elucidated, it may assume even more formidable dimensions in consequence.

If at best only modestly ameliorative results can be expected of educational reforms, more vigorous attempts to inculcate new values within managerial ranks through more profound transformations in systems of recruitment and selection would encounter equally formidable obstacles. In the past two years, debate within influential policy circles has succeeded in placing on the reform agenda the possibility of an increased concentration on 'fast streaming' - the early selection and development of officers of high potential.[12] And, pursuing the logic of this proposal a stage further, the principle of single-tier entry has itself been called into question through the resurrection of the idea of an officer class.[13] While such proposals might promise, *inter alia*, the generation of a new cadre of senior officers unaffected by the

conservative legacy of the operational culture and more receptive to alternative ways of conceiving of their managerial role, they might also significantly exacerbate the empathy gap between such officers and the rest. High-flyers who took advantage of the new machinery would be less likely to have a competent understanding of the working needs, and - just as importantly - the self-protective strategems of operational ranks, while their lack of street experience and their inevitable representation as totems of an alien managerialist ethos would undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the latter. Put simply, the increased attachment of the few to an alternative conception of management, despite holding the long-term possibility of widespread change in inter-rank relations, might well be heavily outweighed by the increased resistance of the many.(14)

So far we have considered the inadequacy of changes in the policy implementation rules in terms of their inability to challenge the climate of cynicism, suspicion and cautious self-preservation which is both cause and symptom of the disproportionately instrumental régime. Another significant and closely interrelated element which we identified in the aetiology of instrumentalism is the *strategic incoherence* involved in the attempt, for the purposes of co-ordination and control, to submit police practices which reflect an uncertain and internally conflicting manifesto to definitive and singular criteria of recognition and evaluation, and to impose a determinate order upon activities informed by an indeterminate mandate. As we saw in chapter seven, and as we shall

re-emphasize below, the most obvious pathological consequence of this structural tension is within the domain of policy rules, but it also has negative ramifications within the domain of the rules of social technology, particularly in respect of the criteria underpinning programmes of staff appraisal. An examination of innovations in the regulation of this particular field reveals how the negative consequences of this unfold, as well as providing a further demonstration of how underlying cultural impediments might frustrate genuine managerialist initiatives within the domain of the policy-implementation rules.

As already documented in chapter four, both of our research forces have for a number of years operated staff appraisal systems through which the performances of officers are evaluated by three senior ranks - the appraiser, the assessor and the counsellor - in accordance with a number of stipulated criteria. The counsellor, after consultation with the appraiser and assessor, and after interviewing the appraisee, makes an authoritative statement on the officer's overall progress, potential and readiness for promotion. As suggested, around half of the sergeants and a significant majority of more senior officers evaluated the system positively and expressed a preference for it over previous régimes of promotion which lacked any systematic guiding criteria and which were accordingly viewed as vulnerable to the capricious and inconsistent judgments of senior officers and the exercise of improper favouritism on their part. It was repeatedly contended that under the older arrangements, unless an officer had a 'wire', someone

committed to his advancement and prepared to 'pull him up' irrespective of his merits and suitability, then his prospects of advancement were non-existent.

The new system, by contrast, may be viewed as seeking to give substance and shape to some of the tenets of the new managerialism. The very commitment to independent and uniform criteria of evaluation suggests that the talents and aspirations of junior officers are to be taken seriously. Furthermore, the specific criteria which the appraiser must use reinforce this claim. We may illustrate this point with reference to the appraisal form for supervisory ranks which is substantially similar, in substance if not in form, to that which is used for the constable rank, differing only in the emphasis which it places upon certain exclusively or predominantly supervisory skills. Four of the key benchmarks which appear on the forms used - job knowledge, application, dependability and judgement, and initiative - suggest a concern to identify a universal set of qualities, to look at the attributes of police officers in the round. The other four criteria - disposition, management of subordinates, planning and personal presentation - are, at least partly, concerned with more specifically managerial skills of decision-making and, in particular, communication and interpersonal relations. Accordingly, they suggest a genuine commitment to encourage, sustain and reinforce the very normative managerialist ethos which underpins the staff appraisal system itself by promoting those who most closely orient themselves to its underlying philosophy.

Nevertheless, although, as suggested, there is a groundswell of support for the new system, such support does not involve the wholehearted endorsement of these underlying premisses. Instead, it is at best lukewarm and is couched in highly relative terms. It appears to rest largely upon the desire to avoid at all costs the anomalies of the previous régime rather than upon a recognition and positive endorsement of the intrinsic merits of the new. Consider the following typical comments by sergeants as both subjects and operators of the new system:

> "I definitely prefer it to the old system but I don't honestly know if it is all that much of an improvement. You see it's all a bit subjective and vague. They talk about job knowledge and application and initiative, but these can mean different things to different supevisors. For one job knowledge and application might mean being good at paperwork, for another it might mean being good on the street. Or initiative might mean nabbing a good ned for one, or getting involved in school liaison or community councils or something for somebody else. It's so wide that it can cover everybody's pet likes and dislikes. It doesn't give you much confidence. The cops don't really know whether they are coming or going, and neither do we for that matter." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)
>
> "You can't really tell what is wanted. Disposition and management of subordinates. It begs the question, doesn't it? Do they want an aggressive approach or a softly-softly approach, the hard man or the nice guy? No-one really knows." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Thus, we may conclude that the problems of indeterminacy which exist at the level of police policy percolate down into the staff appraisal rules with similarly unfortunate results. Confidence in the objectivity and coherence of the system is undermined by the absence of definitive organisational objectives which might have

allowed a more rigorous specification of the meaning and purpose of its key operating norms. This is not, of course, to deny the real problems of sensitive measurement of individual performance which might arise even if more determinate ultimate criteria were available, particularly since we are here concerned with subtle questions of qualitative judgement, but merely to suggest that in the absence thereof this problem is not even resoluble in principle. And the fact that the key operating norms are couched in such vague terms entails that they fail to resolve the endemic struggle for ascendancy between instrumental and normative approaches within this particular sphere of influence, but merely provide a vehicle for its continued propagation.

More specifically, this latitude of interpretation allows individual managers to infuse the operating norms - including those which themselves refer to interpersonal relations - with their own preferred meaning, and so the prevailing disproportionate influence of the instrumental approach may be directly reflected in their evaluation of particular qualities and workstyles. More broadly, since the rules do not offer definitive intruction, the system itself constitutes a flexible power resource for managers, its sticks and carrots providing significant counters in instrumental power relations; and from the point of view of those subject to staff appraisal, whether of constable or supervisory rank, their perception of the lack of direction and relatively unfettered discretion of those sitting in judgment of them may undermine their belief in the system and augment their sense of being participant in

an elaborate version of the same old instrumental game, even where their seniors are engaged in a genuine effort to apply the system consistently and in accordance with a normative ethos. Thus, this final sub-category within the rules of social technology is no better able, in isolation, to deliver a solution to our problems than are innovations in the various other elements of the overall structure of policy implementation rules.

(2) Policy rules

Turning specifically to the policy rules themselves, we have already elaborated their drawbacks and limitations in chapter seven. The indeterminacy of the mandate rules structures the remainder of the corpus of policy rules (and, indeed, the policy implementation rules also) in such a manner as to contribute significantly to the very set of problems which we are attempting to resolve. The deficiencies of the mandate rules cannot be cured through stipulative rules or initiatives in the cognate areas of procedural rules, disciplinary rules, and the rules of substantive criminal law. Such exercises merely beg a host of questions as to which spheres of bureaucratically finessed activity should be concentrated on and as to the ends towards which patterns of standard operating procedures should be directed. Furthermore, output standards fall foul of this very same set of conceptual problems, and for the same reasons.

Indeed, if the mandate rules construct an impossible and indeterminate scenario, then the compensatory efforts of managers and external reformers in the fields of detailed policy rules and output standards will merely come to operate and be seen to operate as a further stage in the cycle of oppression. Not only does preoccupation with these endeavours deflect attention from the underlying deficiencies of the mandate rules and so help to foreclose the possibility of a radical solution at that level, but it also tends to set in motion a self-propagating regulatory dynamic. The process of regulatory expansion is stimulated by the mistaken tendencies, first, to infer from the substantial overlap in the objects of reference of the two types of regulation, and their resulting degree of homology, a mutual corroboration of methodological validity and, secondly, to conceive of the continuing evident shortcomings in output controls as remediable problems of measurement. Regulatory overkill, by transcribing and amplifying the tensions of the indeterminate mandate at the operational level, thus merely compounds the problem of the instrumental culture rather than resolving it.

Of course, within limits, these various policy rules are indispensable. In any collective endeavour detailed policy guidance and output measures are necessary for achieving a certain level of co-ordination of disparate tasks, for reflexive self-regulation, and for guidance and education. Further, as argued in chapter seven, legal rules which are articulated at this level, while they do not provide a determinate and coherent manifesto, do provide a

significant if perennially contested boundary statement of the appropriate balance between policing objectives and other valued individual claims and public goods. However, as with the various rules of policy implementation, these policy rules are not sufficient in themselves to resolve problems of control and may even exacerbate the situation if pursued unrelentingly in isolation.

Is the missing element in our package, therefore, to be found in refocusing upon the more abstract element in the set of policy rules and, thus in elaborating a more determinate set of mandate rules or objectives? This focus, together with a set of complementary reforms in the rules of structural design, provides the core of the project envisaged by proponents of Policing By Objectives (PBO).[15] Tackling the problem of indeterminacy head-on, they suggest both an intellectual and a practical dimension to their enterprise. They contend that, provided at force level an explicit policy statement is articulated which is then rendered more concrete through the various stages of goal setting, objective setting, and (at sub-divisional level) through the formulation of action plans; and provided also that the entire process is enacted through a continuous management cycle of planning, organising, implementing and evaluating, then the problems of strategic incoherence outlined above may be avoided.

Thus, rather than exacerbating the tensions within an indeterminate mandate, detailed policy rules and output controls would instead, in a rational and informed manner, fill out the bare

bones of a more plausible and definitive set of aspirations. Rather than a process of regulatory overkill which exacerbates the empathy gap and underscores instrumental relations, the systematic working out of the precise implications of a determinate agenda would induce a series of informed exchanges between different organisational levels, each level with its separate sphere of decision-making and all levels sensitive to the demands, achievements and shortcomings of clearly delineated general policies and projects. In turn, this combination of undistorted communication and the allocation of precise and significant responsibilities to all ranks would provide the groundwork both for the creation of a more harmonious climate of internal relations and for the more effective pursuit of recognized ends.

PBO has been criticized for underestimating the symbolic dimension within policing, for laying too great an emphasis upon tangible objectives and measures, for its blindness to the unintended consequences of police action, for threatening to expose policing achievements (or underachievements) to an unduly harsh spotlight,[16] and more generally, for assuming that it is feasible to organize policing objectives into a "neat hierarchical system".[17] Insofar as such criticisms are predicated upon the view that it is merely difficult and perhaps potentially embarrassing to attempt to subject to a rational process of performance appraisal and development a set of activities which is as internally differentiated, as complexly ramified, and as significantly implicated in a network of 'sacred' beliefs and expectations as

policing,[18] then it is not easy to sympathize. Perhaps some exponents of PBO are overambitious in their attempts to render policing amenable to such a systematic process of internal critique and reconstruction, although the actual practice of PBO may differ in different places and may be modified in the light of such dangers[19]. In principle, however, precisely because police performance has traditionally proved resistant to such a searching analysis and to the measure of accountability which might flow from this, surely the basic thrust behind such efforts should be applauded rather than decried.[20]

However, there appear to be two additional and, in terms of the present argument, more directly pertinent criticisms which may be levelled against PBO. In the first place, a basic top-down model of policy-making is retained. Thus, although the processes of mediation between divergent values and perspectives may be improved, the differences of orientation which are a product of the different experiences, pressure and priorities of different ranks will remain. In the last analysis, PBO promises procedural reform in the face of substantive disagreements over methods and priorities and, although such procedural reform may narrow the range of substantive differences, it cannot guarantee to resolve them. Indeed, in so far as an impasse is reached, the more exacting régime of informational control which is part and parcel of PBO may further erode the platform from which junior ranks can defend their position through instrumental strategies, and thus may further encourage instrumental orientations on the part of senior ranks.

Secondly, and relatedly, as argued in chapter seven, the phenomenon of indeterminacy is not merely a conceptual problem. It raises questions which are not resolved simply by formal means, by imposing a determinate mandate where previously indeterminacy has reigned. Rather, the phenomenon of indeterminacy is the consequence of a heterogeneity of values and expectations of performance on the part of the various constituencies of the police and of actual or latent disagreement between these various groups over policy ends and priorities. In the final analysis, therefore, the acceptance of an impossible and indeterminate mandate is nothing other than a consequence and crystallization of other more fundamental patterns of political pluralism and conflict. It is these underlying factors which are ultimately causally significant as regards the diverse array of external pressures and the volatile framework of policy imperatives which impinge upon different sectors of the police organisation. It is these factors also , therefore, which, as the true determinants of the problem of indeterminacy, trigger the complex set of processes described in previous chapters which precipitates the drift towards instrumentalism within the organization. And, accordingly, these same underlying factors threaten to continue to 'break through' if a determinate solution is attempted merely by means of internal prescription. As PBO, in its recognized formulations, promises no more than consultation with external groups in the mandate-setting process, it remains vulnerable to such incursions.(21)

Thus, although the setting of a determinate mandate and, therefore, the PBO techniques associated with this exercise, may offer certain attractions from our analytical perspective, they by no means offer a comprehensive solution. By their very nature, the fundamental problems identified within the PBO approach require to be treated at the more rarified level of meta-policy-making and thus we are drawn to the conclusion that the problems of policy implementation upon which we have concentrated our attention can only be resolved, if capable of resolution at all, by including policy-generation rules as the centrepiece of our package.

(3) Policy-generation rules

Basically, there seem to be two courses of action available to us in terms of our double-edged critique of PBO, and these flow naturally along either side of the division that we introduced earlier within the category of policy-generation rules. On the one hand, the rules of structural design *within* the organisation might be further altered so as to endorse a genuine pluralism in the policy field. Hierarchies would have to be modified and be replaced or qualified by a network structure of control, authority and communication. The dominant axes of influence would be lateral rather than vertical. On the other hand, the *externally-focused* policy-making rules could be altered to augment the role of external groups whose presently conflicting and overexacting demands lie at the root of the problem of indeterminacy. In particular, this would, as argued below, involve increasing the influence over policy

exercised by the local democratic constitutency. It may be observed that these two possible channels of reform have in common a commitment to reduce the authority vested in Chief Constables within the policy-making arena. In the former case, authority would be siphoned downwards to the lower ranks, while in the latter case it would be siphoned outwards towards representatives of the wider community.

Now, before we proceed to examine in detail why each of these two options presents itself as a reckonable candidate to resolve the problems identified and to assess which is preferable, we must appreciate that, consistent with the logic of the policy trilemma, by venturing into the area of policy-making rules we inevitably intrude upon debates which have implications reaching beyond the issue of policy implementation. Accordingly, we must be able to defend our choice not only in terms of the matters most immediately at issue, but also in terms of its ramifications for these wider debates and the values which are involved in them. In particular, we must take account of the fact that, as observed in chapter one, the question of the balance of ultimate policy-making authority between internal and external constituencies has profound consequences not only in terms of organisational theory but also in terms of democratic theory.

Addressing this wider context of debate in brief, we would assert that, if it is conceded that policing involves choices as to the allocation of scarce resources - provided through the public

purse - in a manner which has profound and differential consequences for criminal victims and offenders and for the public in general, and if it is recognized that present constraints and guidelines are inadequate in instructing the police as to the precise choices to be made in this process, then purely democratic considerations would seem to demand that the specific public constituency most intimately affected, namely, the constituency comprising the local territorial community, should intervene to decide these questions.[22] The major qualification which needs be entertained in respect of this conclusion is one that is demanded by democratic theory itself, namely, that the external policy making constituency should not be entitled to interfere with the individual officer's judgment as to the procedures to be used, the investigative lines to be followed, and as to whether charges are to be brought, in those individual cases where a criminal act is suspected of having been committed, the relevant rule of substantive criminal law is unambiguous, and there is an identifiable complainer[23]. If this safeguard is not insisted upon, then we will be inviting a situation where an existing purportedly universally authoritative manifestation of democratic opinion - the criminal law - will be subordinated to a more contingent, capricious, and partial democratic pronouncement - local opinion - in an area in which the former is already capable of instructing the police officer and provides at least a formal endorsement of even-handed treatment of citizens.

This concession, together with a requirement that policy be settled generally rather than adopted on an *ad hoc* basis such as

would allow intervention or even necessitate endorsement by the policy making body from incident to incident, would also suffice to meet a second possible objection of a logistical nature, concerning the practical indispensability of a minimal floor of operational discretion.[24] Bearing these considerations in mind, we can outline what a democratic philosophy would demand of the policy-making rules. Local opinion, whether expressed through the existing police authority or a new specially constituted body,[25] should, adapting Lustgarten,[26] decide wider policy questions such as:

> 1. the most appropriate fundamental style of policing, including balance between proactive and reactive methods, whether minimal or community policing etc; [27]
>
> 2. patterns of territorial and functional deployment and crime-fighting priorities;
>
> 3. acquisition and use of non-labour resources such as new technology and weaponry.

For such control to be effective would also require a stricter delimitation of the powers of central government. Particularly through fiscal constraints and closer involvement in the appointment of senior officers, the scope of these powers has increased greatly in recent years.[28] While the centralizing tendency cannot be ignored, particularly if such ignorance were to lead to a failure to argue the case for some level of democratic scrutiny of operational functions which may gravitate towards the centre - as with the widely mooted idea of a national criminal intelligence unit[29] - this does not mean that such a tendency is irreversible. Even within the prevailing ideological climate of the present administration, developments in areas such as housing and

educational policy have indicated a continuing receptiveness to notions of local democratic involvement, especially if this falls outwith the traditional structures of generic local government.(30) In short, if supportable in principle, considerations of *realpolitik* need not be fatal to the idea of local democratic control of policing.(31) Accordingly, amongst the shifts in influence from the central to the local level which might facilitate the operation of the model outlined above would be a greater level of local financial independence,(32) the abolition of the power of central veto over local appointments,(33) and the removal of the powers of central government, in combination with the Chief Constable, to restrain the amount of information available to the local authority, or whichever other local democratic body might be settled upon as appropriate, concerning the policing of the area.(34)

Notwithstanding these adjustments, in accordance with its broad remit and more panoramic perspective, central government would retain a significant influence over the provision of minimum standards of administrative and operational efficiency, and thus would remain involved in the crafting of the more general rules of structural design and social technology. Finally, the more detailed rules within the latter two categories, together with the standard operating procedures or stipulative rules necessary for the detailed application of general policy guidelines, would continue to fall within the ambit of authority of the police themselves.

The arguments in favour of such an approach are further reinforced if we recall, again on account of the complex interlocking of the various levels of the policy trilemma, that the elaboration of a theory of democratic theory also has implications for questions of effectiveness at the second level, that of policy content. Over recent years various authors have suggested that confidence in the probity and competence of the police and understanding of policing demands are a necessary prerequisite of the public provision of that vital fund of information on crime-relevant matters without which the police are bound to be rendered impotent and unable to achieve any reasonable profile of objectives to a satisfactory level[35]. It is argued, counterfactually but persuasively, that democratic involvement would allow such confidence and understanding to be nurtured, particularly among those groups who are presently both most alienated from policing institutions yet most in need of police services - the young, ethnic minorities, residents of inner-cities and suburban public housing estates. Democracy and effectiveness would thus seem to be symbiotically linked.

Therefore, considered through the prism of democratic theory, the option of external reform is preferable to that of internal reform, which concedes nothing to the premisses set out above. But, for present purposes, it is in the domain of organisational theory rather than democratic theory that our two sets of reform proposals face their ultimate test, and accordingly, it is to organisational theory that we must finally return.

Do the internal reform proposals fare any better at this level? The case in favour of reform of the rules of structural design calculated to reduce the barriers of hierarchy and increase the influence of what are presently the lower ranks rests on the claim that it would equalize instrumental opportunities. At one fell swoop it would remove most or all of the means whereby instrumental bias could be mobilized in favour of particular internal groupings. The incentive to pursue instrumental power strategies would be removed, and the various pathological consequences of such strategies that we have noted would be eradicated. Normative orientations and techniques would be required to be developed instead in order to resolve internal problems and conflicts.

Apart from its repugnancy from the point of view of wider democratic theory, there would appear to be two objections to an initiative along these lines - one cultural and the other logistical. Culturally, as we observed earlier, there appears to be, at best, ambivalence and, at worst, antipathy to the very idea of greater power sharing among the junior ranks. In the last analysis, this is not simply borne of a suspicion as to the motivations of senior officers in offering such a carrot. It also has to do with the genuine pride which many officers take in their own craft skills. For them there are already 'too many chiefs and not enough Indians', and for the most part, what they want is not the opportunity to become chiefs themselves, but merely the provision of an environment within which they can ply their trade which is less shot through with ambiguity, which produces a lesser

number - of hostile and abrasive encounters with the public and a greater number of mutually satisfactory ones, and which is less overdetermined by distracting and destructive internecine strife.

A further reason for their reluctance to endorse organisational pluralism is their awareness of the profound logistical difficulties which would attend such a reform, as most clearly evinced in the range of generally conservative responses provided when asked about the inhibitory effects of the existing system of hierarchy.[36] We have already extolled the virtues of a bureaucratic system of regulation in ensuring a certain level of internal co-ordination and control within a large-scale collective enterprise, and in providing certain mechanisms for reflective self-regulation and collective learning. The hierarchical structure of power which is provided for in the present rules of structural design, provided it is not abused or narrowly pursued for self-interested instrumental purposes, is a necessary component of this regulatory system. Further, concentrating on the values of co-ordination and control, there are certain particular features of the policing enterprise which render this structure peculiarly attractive. The frequent need for a swift collective response to emergency situations places a significant premium on the prior stipulation of co-ordinated series of tasks and the provision of unambiguous and unimpeachable lines of authority. As a tool programmed to the achievement of collective goals, rather than simply a set of loaded counters in an instrumental power game, or an inert system sustained for its own sake, the basic pattern of bureaucracy remains well adapted to the

policing enterprise. To eradicate bureaucratic structures in the attempt to exorcise the scourge of a pervasive instrumentalism, would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Thus, we may reiterate and underline the point made in chapter three that the dangers of bureaucratic structures and the instrumental strategems which they facilitate lie not in their operation *per* se, but only in the possibility that they may not be sufficiently balanced by other structures and patterns of relations, namely those of a normative type.[37]

Of course, although a wholesale commitment to organisational pluralism provides too crude a response, this does not mean that more modest forms of participation and consultation are likewise undesirable. Indeed, just as too great an involvement in the policy process threatens to render the idea of craft status redundant, without any involvement operational officers are unhealthily reliant upon others to defend the integrity of their position. Despite their particular dangers and drawbacks in an instrumentally-orientated environment, it bears re-emphasizing that rights of consultation are still claimed and close interaction between ranks is still supported by lower participants in more general terms. Thus, provided other means can be found to remove the instrumental backdrop, communicative and consultative procedures in the form contemplated within PBO, and perhaps even systems of "negotiated rule-making "[38] of the type advocated by Goldsmith, may still have a role to play.

Finally, therefore, are those other means to be found in the democratic reform of external policy-making rules? Demonstration of the inappropriateness of any plan to introduce pluralism within the organization does not, of course, in itself vindicate this alternative approach. It may simply be that we have reached an impasse, where we are unable to deliver a solution to our problems through either of the options theoretically available at this highest level of rule-making. Indeed, that the option of external reform is not available is precisely the conclusion which flows from the culturalist position discussed in chapter two. This influential limb of the culturalist argument is most cogently expressed in the work of Reiner.[33] Although he accepts the thrust of the arguments from democracy and agrees that "there are no valid constitutional grounds *in principle* for exempting the police from democratically-elected policy-making authorities", he contends that the importance of the "co-optive function" of accountability - the need to gain the support of the internal operational community - entails that this "hairy chested" approach to reform should be eschewed in favour of a more modest programme of democratic change such as that encapsulated in the model of the local consultative committees which have been established in England and Wales by virtue of S106 of the Police (And Criminal Evidence) Act 1984. According to Reiner, this "softly-softly" style is to be preferred on account of the fact that certain aspects of the territorial pattern and cultural ambience of operational policework which we have already detailed at length, including its low visibility and the exclusive solidarity which flows from its close task

interdependence, entail that the external reformer must be even more wary of internal recalcitrance than in most other organizational milieux. Given that most operational police officers express a particular dislike for the specific type of external reform mooted, namely the extension of external policy control, a fact which is itself as much to do with the desire to protect their operational autonomy from any outside interference as with their apprehension concerning the likely content of any programme of external reform, it would appear that the lower ranks possess both the means and the motivation to frustrate any significant initiative in the external policy-making rules.

It would appear that Reiner has confronted us with a very powerful case to answer. Nevertheless, it is claimed that the antipathy to external reform which he persuasively argues for can be overcome in the longer term as certain benefits of reform percolate through the system and, accordingly, that a less instrumental culture both within the organisation and between the organisation and its various publics will ultimately follow from external democratic reform. While this entails rejection of the specific culturalist argument advanced above, it does not underestimate the significance of cultural forces as factors inhibiting change. Whereas the structuralist position, as also set out in chapter two, argues that it is the absence of a coherent regulatory framework for the promulgation of policing policy which accounts for the failure to control operational policework, and that once this omission is supplied then cultural resistance can be treated as a secondary

obstacle, this theoretical subordination is not here accepted. *Rather, it is contended that structural reform can succeed here, not in spite of cultural resistance, but precisely because it is capable of treating and ultimately eradicating the causes of such resistance.*

On what grounds is this view based? The crux of the argument is that the displacement of the responsibility for policy-making from the internal to the external constituency would relieve the pressures for the achievement of an impossible and internally inconsistent mandate and for police collusion in such a social aspiration, and thus would eradicate the strategic incoherences, the draconian forms of regulation, and the cycle of disillusionment and cynicism which flow from this flawed conception. The assumption by the new external policy-making constituencies of the mantle of the impossible mandate would begin to concentrate their minds upon the construction of a possible mandate.[40] Also, their enlightenment would be expedited by the new candour which, as we shall explain below, senior police management would feel able to display as to the practical limitations upon policing aspirations. Further, to return to the level of mandate rules, provided the political accountability of external constituencies was underpinned by a legal requirement periodically to articulate a specific policy statement and to take responsibility for its successful translation into practice,[41] additional encouragement would be provided towards the adoption of a more realistic agenda of policing goals, and the existence of any residual temptation to hide behind the vagaries of

an indeterminate and poorly understood mandate and thus to avoid responsibility for policy failure would be thereby rendered even more remote.

Having lost their hegemony police managers themselves would no longer be required to convey the image of omnicompetence upon which this hegemony rested. They would no longer be faced by the need to cope with the pressing and often incompatible demands of those who accepted these claims unreflectively, nor with the unhelpful and sometimes mischievous and destructive responses of those who resented and suspected their grandiose and imperialistic aspirations. In turn, they would no longer reflect these pressures onto junior ranks in the form of onerous and incompatible sets of regulations and expectations. Relatedly, having been relieved of the load of ultimate responsibility for an unrealistic mandate, they would no longer be required to contend with glaringly sub-optimal achievements, and thuswould no longer be inclined to construe these as evidence of the laziness, recalcitrance or incompetence of subordinates. Reinforcing and extending the intellectual element within this emancipatory process, through the production of externally specified mandate rules police management would be provided at last with at least the most rudimentary conceptual tools through which they might construct internally coherent methodologies of co-ordination and control. A rationally conducted process of performance review, akin to that of PBO but now fully incorporating the external constituency, might then become a more viable and stable prospect

As for the junior ranks themselves, as well as appreciating the release of pressure which the above changes would permit, they would have less scope generally to interpret cynically the actions of their seniors. As the opportunities of the latter group for empire-building and their temptation to impose unrealistic demands upon their juniors, whether in order to humour the unrealistic expectations of outside groups or as a result of the adoption of a genuine although methodologically incoherent regulatory strategem, both receded, so too would the circumstances in which their actions could plausibly be interpreted by junior officers as motivated by operational naivety, undue deference to outside interests, or self-interested instrumentalism. The instrumental climate would begin to disperse, the bonds of countless paradoxes of trust would loosen, and, in a self-propagating form, the embryo of a more normative culture might begin to take shape.

Thus, we may begin to glimpse how the existential and strategic problems of sergeants and their colleagues, both junior and senior, could be overcome, and how the public, too, might begin to benefit from the resolution of the motivation and rationality crises within the police organisation which these problems bring. Of course, even in the light of such a radical structural transformation, the entrenched attitudes of mutual suspicion within the organisation and between it and various of its publics would not disappear overnight. Progress would be slow and faltering, and accordingly, now underpinned by a broader reform base, the other elements of the package considered above would assume a vital facilitative role.

Finally, that a condition precedent of this revolution is the provision of a robustly democratic structure through the external policy-making rules might appear to invite even more formidable obstacles at the prior, and most fundamental stage of political debate and decision-making. By the same token, however, that such a condition requires to be satisfied makes the ultimate goal in question all the more worthy of pursuit.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Skolnick (1966), Westley (1970) and Rubinstein (1973) are three early American classics. More recent anthologies which demonstrate the range and volume of police research in America in the 1970s and before are Manning and Van Maanen (1978) and Klockars (1983).

2. Holdaway (1979) p. 1.

3. Reiner and Shapland (1987) p. 1.

4. See Reiner (1985b) ch. 2.

5. Two impressive recent attempts to provide an overview and synthesis of (predominantly) British research are Reiner (1985b) and Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988).

6. See Reiner (1989a) for an analysis of this trend. Recent examples of this practical orientation are the essays collected in Morgan and Smith (1989).

7. Giddens (1984) p. xvii.

8. *Ibid.* p. 348.

9. Probably the most commanding account of the relationship between Marxist theory and practice available in English is the three-volume study by Kolakowski (1981). An interesting account of the social and political resonance of Machiavelli's ideas is found in Giddens (1984) pp. 350-353.

10. See Friedrichs (1970) pp. 167-196.

11. In particular, the series of Reports and Papers produced by the Home Office Research and Planning Unit.

12. For example, the initiatives of the Economic and Social Research Council on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and on crowd behaviour. For the fruits of the latter see Gaskell and Benewick (1987).

13. For example, the research by the P.S.I. commissioned by the Metropolitan Police. See Policy Studies Institute (1983a), (1983b), (1983c), (1983d).

14. See for example Butler and Tharne (1983), Butler (1984) and Mervyn Jones (1980).

15. For an early development of a 'left realist' perspective see Young (1979). Applications of this perspective in the field of policing include Lea and Young (1984), Kinsey (1985b), Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986), Matthews and Young (1986) and Jones, Maclean and Young (1987).

16. Reiner (1989a) pp. 14-15.

17. See Reiner (1989d).

18. There is now a huge literature on the subject of police accountability in Britain. Notable contributions include Marshall (1965), Jefferson and Grimshaw (1982), Loveday (1983), Loveday (1984), Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a), Waddington (1984), Reiner (1985b) ch. 6, Spencer (1985), Oliver (1986), Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) ch. 4, Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) ch. 8, Lustgarten (1986), Baldwin (1987), Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 7, Marshall (1989), Reiner (1989d), McKenzie (1990).

19. The legal foundations of the tripartite structure lie in the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and, for England and Wales, in the Police Act 1964.

20. Downes and Ward (1986) p. 21.

21. See Oliver (1986), esp. ch. 17 and 18, where he tentatively suggests the adoption of the Northern Ireland model, with members of the local police authority nominated by central government, in place of the present structure. Others who, whilst advocating certain forms of institutional change, have strongly opposed the strengthening of the local democratic element, include Warren and Treddinick (1982) and Waddington (1984).

22. See for example Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a), Savage (1984), Spencer (1985), Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986), Downes and Ward (1986), Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986), Lustgarten (1986) Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988).

23. See Reiner (1989d) for a forceful statement of this position. Further, many commentators who have urged an increase in local democratic accountability have also stressed the need for greater accountability at the centre, both to complement suggested developments in local accountability and also to provide means whereby police functions and services which are or ought to be organized and provided centrally may be monitored. See for example Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) ch. 6, Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) pp. 181-183 Lustgarten (1986) pp. 177-179, McCabe and Wallington (1988) ch. 10. On the argument for new forms of accountability geared to initiatives in police co-operation across the European Community after 1992, see Loveday (1990) and the evidence of the National Coucil for Civil liberties before the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into 'Practical Police Co-operation in the

European Community', Home Affairs Committee (1990) Vol. 2 pp. 177-179.

24. See Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) ch. 6 for a rare attempt, centred upon the idea of locally elected public commissioners of police, to envisage a system of police-specific local democratic accountability outwith the existing framework of local government.

25. See for example Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) ch. 9 and Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 8.

26. See chapter 7 *infra*.

27. Reiner (1989a) p. 14, Horton (1989). Morison (1987) criticises the major opposition parties for a failure to concentrate upon concrete and feasible proposals for 'good practice' in their law and order strategies prior to the 1987 general election.

28. McKenzie and Irving (1987), Irving and McKenzie (1989).

29. Dixon, Bottomley, Coleman, Gill and Wall (1989), (1990).

30. Shapland and Vagg (1988), Shapland and Hobbs (1989).

31. Bull and Horncastle (1989).

32. Fielding, Kemp and Norris (1989).

33. Bennett (1989), Harvey, Grimshaw and Pease (1989).

34. Butler (1990).

35. See for example Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) esp, ch. 2, and Downes and Ward (1986).

36. See for example Oliver (1986) and McKenzie (1990).

37. Reiner (1989a) p. 15, Weatheritt (1986) esp. ch. 8.

38. These issues. together with the relevant literature, are addressed at length in chapter 2 *infra*.

39. See Savage (1984), Reiner (1985b) ch. 6, Smith (1988).

40. See Cain (1979) pp. 145-148, Reiner (1989a) pp. 11-12.

41. For example Butler (1984), Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987).

CHAPTER TWO

1. See in particular Reiner (1985b) ch. 6 and Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 7.

2. Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 168.

3. Reiner (1985b) p. 176.

4. Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 30.

5. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) ch. 1, Reiner (1985b) p. 176.

6. Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 167.

7. *Ibid* pp. 170-172, Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) chs. 5 and 6, Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) ch. 9.

8. Differences within each position are discussed in section B *infra*.

9. In particular, the tendency, for reasons of relative ease of access, to concentrate upon occupational sub-cultures at the base of the organisational pyramid to the neglect of questions of organisational structure (including the role of senior ranks within this structure) and of wider environmental influences has often be noted. See Cain (1979)p. 146, Jefferson and Grimshaw (1987) pp. 18-20, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 45-48. Similarly, some very illuminating studies of the nature and implications of policing have concentrated almost exclusively upon structural influences and effects within the wider social and political environment with scant regard to internal cultural processes. See in particular, Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts (1978).

10. Two particularly good examples of such an approach, the first of which accords ultimate priority to structural factors and the second to cultural factors, are Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) and Manning (1977). For discussion, see section B *infra*. See also Reiner (1985b) ch. 6 and Holdaway (1989), Brewer (1991) ch. 8.

11. Smith and Morgan (1989) p. 243.

12. Archer (1988) p. 1.

13. Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983).

14. Punch (1981) p. 26. See also Punch (1983b) and Punch (1985).

15. Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983).

16. Holdaway (1977). See also Holdaway (1983) ch. 11 amd Holdaway (1986).

17. Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) p. 258.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Manning (1979) p. 51. See also Manning (1977) ch. 7

20. For general discussion see Skolnick (1966), Cain (1973), Holdaway (1977), Manning (1977) ch. 6, Chatterton (1979), Manning (1979), James (1979), Brown (1981) ch. 4, Punch (1983b), Punch (1985) ch 3, Reiner (1985b) ch. 3, Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) ch. 6, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 3, Holdaway (1989).

21. See Skolnick (1975), Manning (1977) ch. 9 and Brown (1981) pp. 76-82 in particular, and the sources cited in note 20 *supra* more generally.

22. Bittner (1971) p. 46.

23. Bittner (1974) p. 33, Manning (1979) p. 53.

24. See for example Skolnick (1975) pp. 49-62, Reiner (1985b) pp. 92-97.

25. See for example Manning (1977) ch. 6, Policy Studies Institute pp. 169-241, Smith (1986). See also chapter 6 *infra*.

26. For an excellent synoptic analysis of these cultural traits and review of the relevant literature see Reiner (1985b) pp. 87-103.

27. Punch (1985) p. 203. See also Skolnick (1975) ch. 3 and Punch (1983b).

28. See Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) pp. 18-20, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 46-48.

29. See Lockwood (1964), Archer (1988) ch. 1.

30. Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) p. 134. The common entry system has applied in all British forces since the retiral of members of the officer class introduced under the pre-war Trenchard scheme, named after the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (Parker (1990) pp. 462-464). A differentiated entry system does not, however, apply in all police systems in respect of which the two cultures thesis has been advanced. See for example Punch's analysis of the Dutch position, Punch (1979a), (1983b), (1985).

31. Manning (1977) p. 148.

32. See for example Cain (1973) ch. 6, Manning (1977) pp. 144-145, Manning (1979) p. 50.

33. See for example James (1979) p. 67.

34. Lipsky (1980), Punch (1985) p. 195.

35. See esp. chs. 3 and 5 *infra*.

36. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) p. 19.

37. *Ibid* pp. 18-19. See also note 9 *supra*.

38. This concept is most systematically developed in Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984) pp. 66 *et seq.*, where the authors present a threefold distinction between legal audiences, democratic audiences and occupational audiences. It is also a pervasive theme in the work of Manning (1977) and Punch (1983b), (1985).

39. Punch (1983b) esp. pp. 228-232 and Punch (1985) ch. 3.

40. Punch (1983b) p. 229. Gouldner (1954) pp. 216-217.

41. *Ibid.*

42. Punch (1983b) p. 230 and (1985) pp. 59-62. Again, Gouldner is the source of this idea (Gouldner (1954a).

43. Manning (1977) pp. 188-189.

44. Punch (1985) p. 88.

45. Shearing (1981a)

46. *Ibid.* pp. 37-42.

47. *Ibid*, p. 37.

48. *Ibid.* p. 31.

49. Punch (1983b) p. 229.

50. ***Ibid.*** p. 230.

51. Punch (1985) pp. 28-39. See also Cox, Shirley and Scott (1977) and Mark (1988).

52. Holdaway (1986) p. 109

53. Ibid. pp. 106-112. See also ch. 8 *infra*.

54. Reiner (1985a) and (1985b) pp. 124-136 and Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 124-141 contain excellent discussions of recent British and American research on the significance of racial factors in explaining police practices, while Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 115-123 offers an equally good discussion of the importance of gender.

55. For race, see for example, Policy Studies Institute (1983b), (1983d), Lea and Young (1984), Kinsey (1985a), (1985b), Southgate and Ekblom(1986), Scraton(1987). For gender, see for example Box (1983), Christina and Carlen (1985).

56. For race, see for example Wilson, Holdaway and Spencer (1984), Benyon (1986). For gender, see for example Jones (1987).

57. Ehrlich-Martin(1980).

58. See the figures referred to in Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) P. 118 and pp. 125-126. At 31 December 1989, the regular strength of Scottish police forces was 13,814, of which 12,656 officers (91.6%) were male and 1,158 officers (8.4%) were female (Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1989)).

59. See for example Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate p. 118. Most recently, the successful action brought by P.C. Singh against Nottinghamshire Constabulary under the Race Relations Act 1976 and the action raised by a female ACC (Alison Harwood) against Merseyside Constabulary under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 have highlighted the extent of racial and sexual discrimination in respect of advancement within the service. See Campbell and Carvel (1991).

60. For race, see for example Lea and Young (1984) pp. 166-167, Reiner (1985b) pp. 133-136, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 135-141. For gender, see for example Jones (1987) esp. chs. 2 and 7. More generally, see Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 159-164.

61. Reiner (1985b) p. 106.

62. Punch (1979a), quoted in Fielding (1988b) p. 5. Of all who have carried out research in British forces Fielding probably lays greatest stress upon the degree of diversity within police occupational culture. See in particular, Fielding (1984), (1988a), (1988b), Fielding, Kemp and Norris (1989). While his emphasis upon the situationally-specific nature of criteria of occupational competence and upon the uniqueness of particular interactive contexts provides a rich source of insights, it is not necessarily at odds with the approach of members of the 'operational styles' school (see text *infra*), provided their categorical schemes are seen as providing broad indicators rather than exhaustive descriptions and explanatory criteria. Other interesting recent analyses which focus on the creative dimension within police occupational culture are provided by Shearing and Ericson (1989), Brewer (1990), (1991).

63. Reiner (1985b) p. 103.

64. *Ibid* p. 106. The taxonomies which Reiner discusses (pp. 103-106) are those provided by Broderick (1973), Muir (1977), Reiner (1978), Brown (1981) and Shearing (1981a)

65. Reiner (1985b) p. 106.

66. Reiner (1978) ch. 12, (1985b) pp. 105-106.

67. Reiner (1978) ch. 12, (1985b) p. 105.

68. Shearing (1981a) p. 32, Reiner(1978) ch. 12, (1985b) p. 105.

69. Reiner (1978) ch. 12. (1985b) p. 105.

70. Hughes (1971), quoted in Fielding (1988b) p. 10.

71. See in particular Reiner (1989b), (1989c). See also Reiner (1988a), (1989e).

72. Reiner (1989b) pp. 184-193.

73. *Ibid.* p. 193.

74. *Ibid.* p. 194.

75. *Ibid.* p. 193

76. *Ibid.* pp. 194-197.

77. *Ibid.* p. 195.

78. *Ibid.* pp. 195-196.

79. *Ibid.* p. 196.

80. *Ibid.* p. 197.

81. *Ibid.* p. 197.

82. *Ibid.* p. 196.

83. *Supra* p. 41.

84. See for example Etzioni (1964) p. 20, Jefferson and Grimshaw (1983) pp. 1-21, Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1985) p. 64, Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) pp. 6-7 and 197, Brogden, Jeffeson and Walklate (1988) pp. 164-166.

85. Grimshaw and Jeffeson (1987) p. 7. A good example of a mechanistic approach within the British context is Bunyard (1978).

86. Jefferson and Grimshaw (1981), Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984b), Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987), Jefferson (1990).

87. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) pp. 13-27. Their initial unpublished research report (Jefferson and Grimshaw (1981)) analyses these three major functional units witin a large

Metropolitan force, as well as its Special Patrol Group. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) is concerned only with Unit Beat and Resident Beat activities, while Jefferson (1990) concentrates on the role of the Special Patrol Group. Shapland and Vaag's study of the relationship between informal mechanisms for the maintenance of social order and the formal interventions of the police also argues strongly for a plurality of policing subcultures based upon the functional division of labour within the organisation. See Shapland and Vaag (1987) p. 25, (1988) ch. 9.

88. Jefferson and Grimshaw (1981) pp. 65-96.

89. Jefferson and Grimshaw (1981) pp. 22-44, Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) chs. 2 and 3.

90. Jefferson and Grimshaw (1981) pp. 45-64, Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) chs. 4 and 5.

91. Hobbs (1988).

92. *Ibid.* p. 196

93. *Ibid.* p. 211

94. *Ibid.* p. 212.

95. *Ibid.* p. 212

96. *Ibid* p. 215

97. *Ibid* p. 216.

98. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) p. 19.

99. *Ibid.* pp. 148 and 153-156.

100. *Ibid.* p. 19.

101 *Ibid.* pp. 269-282.

102. Saussure (1974), Lévi-Strauss (1968), Althusser (1969),

103. See for example Giddens (1987) p. 196.

104. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) pp. 272-273.

105. *Ibid.* pp. 13, 22-23, 27-31.

106. *Ibid.* p. 23.

107. *Ibid.* pp. 22-27.

108. *Ibid.* p. 24

109. *Ibid.* p. 263

110. *Ibid.* p. 22.

111. *Ibid.* p. 23

112. See for example Jones and Levi (1983), Kinsey (1985b) ch. 3.

113. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) p. 22.

114. *Ibid.* p. 15.

115 *Ibid.* p. 24.

116. *Ibid.* p. 24.

117. *Ibid.* p. 24.

118. *Ibid.* p. 23.

119. *Ibid.* pp. 15-18. Grace and Wilkinson (1978) and Cotterrell (1984) provide comprehensive overviews of the sociological approach to legal phenomena.

120. Ehrlich (1962)

121. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) p. 17.

122. *Ibid.* p. 18.

123. *Ibid.* pp. 15-18, 22-26.

124. *Ibid.* p. 26.

125. While Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) is primarily concerned to analyse the practical consequences of the permissive legal structure, the authors' critique of the key underlying doctrine of constabulary independence is for the most part contained in earlier work, in particular Jefferson and Grimshaw (1982), (1984a). Other detailed discussions of this doctrine include Marshall(1965), Lustgarten (1986), Marshall(1989).

126. See Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) *passim.* The key arguments underpinning this point are summarized at pp. 140-141.

127. Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) pp. 141-142.

128. *Ibid.* pp. 142-143. Case-law supporting this position includes *R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn* [1968] 2 Q.B. 118; *R. v. Metropolitan Police Commisssioner, ex p. Blackburn (NO. 3)* [1973] Q.B. 241; *R. v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, ex p. C.E.G.B.* [1981] 3 W.L.R. 961.

129. Grimshaw and Jeffeson (1987) p. 244.

130. *Ibid.* p. 244.

131. *Ibid.* p. 108.

132. *Ibid.* p. 235.

133. *Ibid.* pp. 196 and 235-237.

134. *Ibid.* pp. 196 and 237-239.

135. *Ibid.* p. 262.

136. Goldsmith (1990) p. 96.

137. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) p. 239.

138. *Ibid.* p. 238.

139. *Ibid.* p. 240.

140. *Ibid.* pp. 240-243.

141. *Ibid.* pp. 256-262. See also Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984b).

142. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) pp. 240-244 and 256-264.

143. *Ibid.* pp. 25-27 and 189-192. See also Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 7, Brogden (1989), Goldsmith (1990).

144. Cain (1979) p. 157, quoted in Holdaway (1989) p. 58.

145. Brogden (1989).

146. Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 170.

147. *Ibid.* p. 170, with reference to Reiner (1985b) p 180 *et seq.* For further discussion of Reiner's arguments see ch. 11 *infra.*

148. *Ibid.* p. 170. See also Brogden (1989) esp. pp. 22-26.

149. Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) ch. 1.

150. Ibid. pp. 204-206.

151. *Ibid.* pp. 204-206.

152. *Ibid.* pp. 207-210.

153. *Ibid.* chs. 7 and 8 generally.

154. *Ibid.* pp. 237-243.

155. *Ibid.* p. 204.

156. For discussion of Policing by Objectives see for example Butler (1984), Caulkin (1985), Allan (1989). For a more general analysis of the nature and implications of recent organisational reforms in the direction of decentralisation and participation see Jones (1990), For analysis of the recent Plus Programme launched by the Metropolitan Police, which incorporates many of the rationalist imperatives of Policing By Objectives, see Rose (1989), (1990). See also ch. 11 section B *infra*.

157. Report of Commissioner for Metropolitan Police (1985), (1989). The possibility that this initiative might make a difference to operational practice is acknowledged by Jefferson in Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 134.

158. For discussion of the idea of an indeterminate mandate see ch. 7 *infra*. For general critical discussion of Policing By Objectives see ch. 11 section B(2) *infra*.

159. Although, as is adumbrated in section C *infra* and more fully argued in ch. 11 *infra*, if structural and cultural factors are analysed in an integrated manner then it is possible to provide a more compelling case as to the indispensability of fundamental legal reform to the resolution of the implementation problem.

160. Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 170.

161. For a general critique of monism within contemporary organisational theory see Storey (1985).

162. See in particular Burns' distinction between the "collaborative system" - associated with the cultural dimension of organisational life, and the "managerial structure" - associated with its structural dimension (Burns (1981)). For discussion see Reid (1985) p. 128 *et seq*. See also ch. 3, note 24 *infra*.

163. Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) p. 168.

164. See for example the conceptions of organisation advanced by Barnard (1938) p. 28, Pfiffner and Sherwood (1960) p. 30, Chapple and Sayles (1961) p. 99, Simon (1961) p. xvi, Etzioni (1964) p. 4, Schein (1965) p. 8, Cyert and March (1966) p. 27.

165. See ch. 11 *infra*.

166. The notion of the ideal type is, of course, drawn from Weber (Weber (1949) pp. 90-93. On the advantages and dangers of using ideal types in the analysis of power see Wrong (1979) pp. 65-67.

167. The attempt to view cultural and structural elements within organised policework as analytically separable *so as to* illuminate understanding of their interrelationship extends not only to our

general theoretical scheme, but also to our substantive discussions of particular features of organisational practice and relations. See in particular chs. 7, 8 and 9. *infra*.

168. See for example Dalton (1959), Roy (1960), Crozier (1964), Child and Partridge (1982).

169. Van Maanen (1983b) p. 276. This is not to say that these wider studies have not generated illuminating analyses of the sergeant role, as is testified by the numerous references to the broader sociological literature on policing in the course of the present thesis. These studies, together with those cited in note 170- 172 *infra*, also provide the basis for the introductory analysis of the sergeant role provided in the present section.

170. Van Maanen (1983a), (1983b). Another useful American study is Tifft (1978), which, drawing upon the work of French and Raven (1960), attempts an analysis of the types of power and influence exercised by sergeants which is in certain respects similar to that advanced in the present study.

171. Chatterton (1976), (1981), (1983), (1985), (1987b), (1987c), (1989).

172. Policy Studies Institute (1983d), Kinsey (1984) ch. 4. See also Burrows and Lewis (1988) ch. 5.

173. See Grimshaw and Jefferson (1987) pp. 18-19, Holdaway (1989) p. 72.

174. Chatterton (1976), (1981), (1983)

175. Chatterton (1985), (1987b), (1987c), (1989).

176. Chatterton (1987b) p. 147.

177. These changes are well discussed in Holdaway (1977), Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) ch. 2, and - on a broader canvass, in Reiner (1985b) ch. 2, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 5. See also ch. 6 *infra*.

178. See ch. 6 *infra*.

179. See chs. 8 and 9 *infra*.

180. See Chatterton (1981), Van Maanen (1983a) esp. pp. 17-25. A similar taxonomical exercise in a non-police context is attempted by Child and Partridge (1982).

181. See ch. 10 *infra*.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Runciman (1989) p. 2.

2. The *locus classicus* of this view is Lukes (1974).

3. Gallie (1956). This idea is applied to the discussion of the concept of power in Lukes (1974).

4. Lukes' original contribution (1974) has proved to be a rich mine for later theorists, provoking intense debate as to the precise implications of the idea of power as an essentially contested concept. See for example Hollis (1977) pp. 173-179, Lukes (1977), Bloch, Heading and Lawrence (1979), Lukes (1979a), Lukes (1979b), Benton (1981), (1982).

5. Recent notable contributions include Goldman (1972), Poulantzas (1973), Lukes (1974), Wrong (1979), Debnam (1984), Barnes (1988). See also the anthology of writings on power edited by Lukes (1986) which includes the seminal analyses of Russell, Weber, Parsons and Dahl, as well as more recent discussions by prominent social theorists such as Foucault and Habermas.

6. The device is that of Dworkin and is employed within his jurisprudence to distinguish between the particular conceptions through which different theories of law are advanced and the common ground which is necessary between theorists in order for a meaningful exchange of views to take place. See for example Dworkin (1986) pp. 90-101.

7. Lukes (1974) p. 24.

8. Giddens (1984) p. 15. See also Giddens (1982) ch. 3.

9. Giddens (1984) p. 14.

10. This is a theme running through Lukes' critique of earlier attempts to theorize the notion of power Lukes (1974)).

11. Lukes (1974) ch. 2, referring to Dahl (1957), (1958), (1961).

12. See Lukes (1974) ch. 3 for critical discussion of the two-dimensional view, of which the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962), (1970) is seen as illustrative.

13. Lukes (1974) ch. 4 *et seq.*. A similar position is defended by Connolly (1974).

14. *Ibid.* p. 24.

15. *Ibid.* p. 24.

16. *Ibid.* p. 25.

17. The perils are acknowledged by Lukes himself (Lukes (1974) ch. 8. See also Hollis (1977) pp. 176-178, Bloch, Heading and Lawrence (1979) pp. 257-258, Benton (1982) pp 23-33. Lukes attempts to overcome these problems by suggesting that real interests are those which would emerge under conditions of "relative autonomy...e.g. through democratic participation". (Lukes (1974) p. 33). For Connolly, who pursues a similar tack of inquiry, real interests are identifiable as those which the actor would choose to pursue if allowed to experience the results of a number of different courses of action each of which is arguably in his or her interests. (Connolly (1974) p. 64) The problem with both approaches is that they fail to specify the counterfactual conditions for the discovery of real interests in a sufficiently compelling or precise manner. Why should 'autonomy' or 'experience' be priveliged as pathways to discovery? Does the choice of these routes not simply reflect the 'essentially contestable ' value-preferences of the authors? Further, what, in empirical terms, constitutes 'relative autonomy', and what is the appropriate range of 'experiences' required for true self-knowledge? Finally, even if these questions can be answered, with what degree of confidence can one predict just how the actor would act under the relevant 'ideal' conditions? The problems raised by these questions would seem to render implausible any project which attempts a counterfactual analysis of power constituted by reference to a 'objectively' verifiable conception of interests. (Benton (1982) pp. 23-26) Benton proceeds to argues persuasively that the "logical grammar" (p. 27) of the notion of 'interests' is quite distinct from that of 'wants', 'preferences' etc. Only the latter are empirically verifiable, and accordingly, only the latter can play a central conceptual role in the type of cognitive social and political inquiry required in the analysis of power and power relations. The idea of 'interests', on the other hand, fits more readily with a variety of discourses through which "ideological struggles"(p. 30) are pursued. The ascription of interests - understood by reference to valued end-states of actors of which they are not the immediate arbiters - is an inherently evaluative exercise, and should figure more prominently in political argument, persuasion and struggle than in empirical social analysis. (pp. 30-33) Respecting this conceptual division, in attempting in this chapter to lay the conceptual groundwork for the analysis of power and power relations, I avoid the notion of 'interests' and restrict myself to wants, preferences and other subjectivist terminology.

18. This criticism applies particularly to the one-dimensional view adopted by writers such as Dahl. See note 11 *supra*.

19. See Wrong (1979), p. 2, adapting the definition of Russell (1938) p. 25.

20. For an argument which suggests this distinction, see Benton (1982) pp. 23-33 and note 17 *supra*.

21. Giddens (1984) p. 374.

22. Debnam (1984) pp. 3. 82-83.

23. See ch. 2 section C *supra*.

24. See Habermas (1985), (1986). The distinction between 'life-world' and 'system', which is central to his work, is a device which, although in his case applied to the analysis of social relations generally, nevertheless resonates closely with our attempt to differentiate betweem cultural and structural dimensions within the more limited context of formal organisations. See also ch. 2 section C and note 162 *supra*.

25. Debnam (1984) p. 83.

26. For criticism of the dyadic framework of analysis see Debnam (1984) pp. 82-83, Simmel (1957) pp. 56-66.

27. The analyses of Wrong (1979) and Matheson (1987) have been particularly helpful, although the present analysis differs in important respects from both.

28. See subsection (2) *infra*

29. Wrong (1979) pp. 32-34.

30. The source is L. Stein, quoted in Wrong (1979) p. 35. See more generally the essays collected in Baine Harris (1976), and Wrong (1979) ch. 3, Sennett (1981), Raz (1979) ch. 1, (1986) chs 2-4.

31. Raz (1986) p. 35.

32. See for example Wrong (1979) pp. 60-64, Matheson (1987) pp. 204-205.

33. See for example Wrong (1979) pp. 52-59, Matheson (1987) pp. 202-203.

34. This categorization is my own, and as elaborated in the text below, refers to a number of distinct sub-categories of authority recognized in the literature. It is similar to Wrong's category of *legitimate authority* (Wrong (1979) p. 49-52) but broader in scope. Further, his term legitimate authority is confusing since it implies that the quality of legitimacy is lacking in other type of authority relations, which, as authority is used here, and indeed by Wrong himself (p. 35), is not the case.

35. The creative element in the development of institutional authority is bound up with the matter of *authoritative style*. See p. 130 *infra*.

36. Matheson (1987) pp. 204-205.

37. *Ibid.* p. 205.

38. Shils (1982) pp. 121-122 and chs. 5 and 6 generally. See also Weber (1968) vol. 1 p. 241.

39. See Wrong (1979) p. 52.

40. The most comprehensive analysis of the social significance of tradition is Shils (1981). For Weber's classic analysis of traditional authority see Weber (1968) vol. 1 pp. 226 *et seq.*.

41. See Matheson pp. 200-201, 207.

42. Thompson (1984) p. 131.

43. See for example Reiner (1985b) ch. 1. For analyses of the birth of the new police in Scotland see Gordon (1980) chs. 1 and 2, Carson (1984), (1985).

44. Durkheim (1965) pp. 53 *et seq.*.

45. Shils (1982) ch. 4-6, esp. ch. 4. See also Geertz (1983) ch. 6. It should be acknowledged, with Garland, that there is a significant shift in emphasis from the analysis of Durkheim to those of Shils and Geertz. While Durkheim stressed the importance of the individual's recognition of the claims of 'society' conceived of generally , for Shils and Geertz the phenomenon of sacred power has less abstract origins, deriving instead from the specific symbols and practices of leading social institutions. (Garland (1990) pp. 55-56)

46. Shils (1982) p. 131.

47. *Ibid.* p. 128.

48. This connection is apparent in Weber's own discussion of routinized or institutional charisma (Weber (1968) pp. 247-248). For comment see Bendix (1966) pp. 308-318, Giddens (1971) p. 162.

49. See in particular Manning (1977) ch. 1. See also Bittner (1971), Marenin (1982), Cohen (1985), Klockars (1985b), Berki (1986).

50. Manning (1977) p. 5. It should be noted that Manning distances himself from the use made of the 'center' metaphor in Silver's analysis of the origins of the British police (Silver (1967)), in as much as it suggests that the development of policing institutions in Britain has been characterized by broad social consensus. (Manning (1977) p. 46) While this reservation may be accepted with respect to the immediate subject-matter, (and is to some extent acknowledged on a more general basis by Shils himself, (Shils (1982)esp. p. 109)) the idea of the center remains appropriate in expressing the form and potency of the *ideological* claims of policing institutions.

51. Shils (1982) p. 131.

52. Weber (1968) vol. 1 pp. 217-226, vol. 2 pp. 956-1005.

53. *Ibid.* There is a huge secondary literature on this subject. The best discussions include Bendix (1966) pp. 417-457, Albrow (1970), Brown (1979), Thompson (1980), Beetham (1987).

54. Beetham (1987) pp. 11-12.

55. See for example Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 120-141, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 5.

56. See in particular chs 5 and 7 *infra.*

57. Thompson (1980) pp. 8-10.

58. The ideological value of the image of the police organisation as grounded in the wider system of legal authority is discussed in Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984) pp. 65-71, 143-145. See also chs 5, 6 section B(4)(ii), and 7 *infra.*

59. Wrong (1979) p. 75.

60. *Ibid.* p. 77.

61. The notion of authoritative style is further elaborated and applied in chs. 5, 8 and 10 *infra.*

62. See Section A *supra.*

63. See Wrong (1979) pp. 41-49.

64. Although implicitly covered by most definitions of power, this particular sub-type of power relations has received less systematic attention than many others. Marxist theory provides an exception to this general tendency, as its emphasis upon the control of the means of production, distribution and exchange within the analysis of class relations inevitably draws attention to questions of resource control. See for example Poulantzas (1973). See also the discussion of *allocative resources* in Giddens (1984) pp. 258-262.

65. See further ch. 5 section A(1) *infra.*

66. See for example Cain (1973) p. 37, Holdaway (1983) pp. 43, 52-53, 161.

67. See Wrong (1979) p. 11, where he traces the term to Geiger and Van Doorn (Van Doorn (1962)).

68. Giddens (1984) pp. 16, 374.

69. Giddens (1982) p. 39.

70. Crozier (1964) chs. 4 and 5.

71. See ch. 5 section A(1) and (3) *infra*.

72. For discussion of the latency of power and the importance of reputation, and for assessment of the advantages of conceptions of power which embrace such latent or dispositional factors over those which are exclusively episodic in focus, see Wrong (1979) pp. 6-10.

73. Friedrich (1937) pp. 16-18.

74. Easton (1958) p. 179, discussed in Wrong (1979) pp. 28-32.

75. Shils (1982) p. 121.

76. See for example Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) p. 125.

77. *Ibid.* pp. 125-129. For Weber's own reservations, see Weber (1968) vol. 3 pp. 956-1005. esp. 974-975.

78. See ch. 5 section A(3) and ch. 7 *infra*.

79. The term is Hegelian in origin. For an interesting discussion of how the process of double negation contributes towards the *habitus* - or routine pattern - of everyday life, see Bourdieu (1977) p. 77 and ch. 2 generally.

80. As for example with the 'affluent workers' of the engineering and motor car factories studied by Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechofer and Platt (1968), (1969).

CHAPTER FOUR

1. The quantitiative analyses presented in this chapter and in Appendix 2 are confined to the aggregate findings across the four divisions. There are two reasons for this. First, as the overall samples in each division were relatively small, it would have proven very difficult to provide reliable measures of significance in assessing inter-divisional differences. Secondly, the disaggregated divisional findings in any case suggested a remarkable uniformity of response between the four divisions. Given that the theoretical explanation of intra-organisational relations which is developed in the course of the thesis identifies general factors common to all British forces as most significant in causal terms, the absence of marked local variation is unsurprising, and indeed provides additional empirical backing for the theoretical position which is developed. Nevertheless, in certain respects local variations emerged which were pertinent to our analysis, and are pursued where appropriate in later chapters. See in particular chs. 6 and 8 *infra*.

2. The vast majority of uniform patrol sergeants in Riverside and Oldtown Divisions in Force A were section sergeants working the same shift cycle as a designated group of constables, with only one sergeant (in Oldtown Division) with an area responsibility within a Community Project. In Newtown Division too, the majority of sergeants operated within a shift system, although in a number of the outlying stations a single sergeant or a pair of sergeants were given overall responsibility for the area and worked overlapping shifts with the uniform constable strength. The area system was most fully developed in City Division, where as a result of recent organisational change (see further ch. 6 section B(3) *infra*) there were at the time of the research 8 area sergeants responsible for area constables within an overlapping shift system, as against 6 permament section sergeants. The balance of the uniform patrol sergeant strength was made up of 4 relief sergeants whose duties inmcluded the relief of duty inspectors, station sergeants, shift sergeants and the administration sergeant.

3. It is difficult to quantify the number of 'unwilling' sergeants, as there was some evidence to suggest that some who were 'inadvertently' unavailable were also amongst the most reluctant to participate. However, in the case of only four potential respondents was a general unwillingness to participate beyond doubt.

4. The mean age (44) and mean length of service (23 years) of the inspector sample corresponded with the relevant figures for the overall inspector population within the four divisions.

5. See in particular chs. 7 section C and 9 *infra*.

6. The mean length of service amongst constable within the sample and over the divisions as a whole was 9 years.

7. See further ch. 2 section D *supra*.

8. For discussion of the problems encountered across a variety of settings in gaining satisfactory access to police organisations and in developing and sustaining good working relations during the course of research see for example Holdaway (1983) ch. 1 (England), Van Maanen (1978), (1988) (United States), Punch (1985) pp. 209-220, (1989) (Holland), Brewer (1991) ch. 1 (Northern Ireland). See also the discussion of police attitudes to research in ch. 1 *supra*.

9. For discussion of the value of open-ended questions in such circumstances see Smith (1975) p. 171, and for broad analysis of the merits and demerits of different interview and questionnaire techniques see ch. 8 generally.

10. These included force and divisional standing orders and memoranda, correspondence between ranks on policy matters (see further ch. 8 section B(2) *infra*), and forms relating to operational matters (e.g. crime reports, occurrence reports, road accident reports) and to managerial matters (e.g. staff appraisal reports) (see further section B(2) and ch. 11 section B(1) *infra*).

11. For national figures on length of service in each rank during the period of research, see Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1985). Data on divisional and national average ages and divisional average length of service was derived from force annual reports and other internal documents.

12. At the end of 1985 female police officers in Scotland numbered 741, 6.1% of overall strength. 39(2%) of the 1,965 sergeants, 10(1.5%) of the 674 inspectors, 3(1.2%) of the 255 chief inspector, and none of the 137 superintendents or the 71 chief superintendents was female (Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1985)). For more recent figures see ch. 2 note 58 *supra*.

13. The 'acting-up' system applied in all the City-based divisions in Force B. Officers who had worked within the city at constable rank (10 out of the sample of 17 City Division sergeants) and so had personal experience of the system were unanimously in favour of it, although for that very reason their approval was not reflected in their answer to the question as to how the organisation could *better* prepare constables for the sergeant rank (see Appendix 1, schedule A *infra*). With only one exception, the remaining 7 sergeants within the City Division sample, who, although lacking personal experience, had been able to observe the 'acting-up' system at work, also expressed approval, and in their case this was reflected in the aggregate answer to the above question. Thus, the extent of overall support for 'acting-up' is somewhat greater than is indicated by the bare figure reported in the text.

14. A significant level of dissatisfaction with the amount and quality of in-service training, especially amongst supervisory ranks, is also reported by Kinsey in his survey of Merseyside Police Officers (Kinsey (1985a) pp. 30-33).

15. Indeed, substantially the same system was applied throughout all Scottish forces. These systems were first set up in response to the recommendations of the Working Party on Personnel Appraisal of the Police Advisory Board for Scotland in 1972, which advocated a common basic framework (Report of HM Chief Inspector for Scotland (1972) paras. 18-19).

16. This generally favourable atitude towards the prevailing promotion system echoes the findings of the PSI Report into the Metropolitan Police (Policy Studies Institute (1983c) pp. 67-70).

17. See further ch. 11 section B(1) *infra*.

18. See also Chatterton (1987b) esp, pp. 133 *et seq*..

19. Chatterton (1989, pp. 107-108) suggests that police officers and researchers alike are too ready to treat paperwork as a residual activity, and to ignore the various ways in which it cam be usefully applied by operational and supervisory officers. The point is well taken (see further ch. 10 section B(1) *infra*) and, accordingly, the dangers involved in collapsing all forms of documentary processing into a single discursive category should be appreciated. Nevertheless, I have continued to use the single, undifferentiated term in categorizing supervisory officers' priorities and problems, as this reflected the terminology of the respondents themselves. And even if the generally negative portrayal of paperwork by sergeants which this signalled and reinforced was to some extent at odds with respondents' broader experiences and practices, it nevertheless remains culturally significant as an indication of the extent to which lower participants in general define their craft in practical terms (see ch. 2 section B(1) *supra* and ch. 8 section B(1) *infra*), and sergeants in particular feel frustrated by administrative demands (see text *infra*). On this point, see also Manning (1980) pp. 220-224.

20. The categories of this basic 'job description' differ significantly from those used by Kinsey in Merseyside and the PSI in London. This is so because the concern here was, as indicated, to specify work *priorities* - a task which includes a significant evaluative component, whereas the primary aim in the earlier studies was to provide a basic activity analysis. See Kinsey (1985a) pp. 54-58, Policy Studies Institute (1983c) pp. 42-45. Within the present study, an elementary content analysis of police managerial work is provided in the context of the discussion of the inspector role in ch. 9 section B(2).

21. The significance of common sense within police culture is analysed in greater depth in ch. 8 section B(1) *infra*.

22. The various environmental and organisational factors which underpin this internal pressure for increased resources are discussed in chs. 6 and 7 *infra*.

23. See Chatterton (1987b) esp. pp. 141-146, (1989). See also ch. 10 section B *infra*.

24. See Mintzberg (1973). See also ch. 9 section B(2) *infra*.

25. The 'human relations' approach to management analysis and philosophy is associated with the work of Elton Mayo and his followers. See Mayo (1975).

26. The pressures on senior divisional officers to reconcile internal and external demands and their responses ae discussed at length in chs. 7 and 8 *infra*.

27. See Appendix 1 and text *infra*. The two exception are the normative technique of persuasion and the instrumental technique of control of allocation of resources. These techniques, which are are closely intertwined with the other sub-types of power, are nevertheless fully accommodated within our overall inquiry and analysis. See esp. ch. 3 *supra* and ch. 5 *infra*.

28. For example, Weber defines *herrschaft* (authority/domination) as any command-obedience relationship, and so does not differentiate between legitimate (normative) and coercive (instrumental) forms of 'authority'. See Weber (1968) vol. 3 p. 946. See also Wrong (1979) pp. 35-41.

29. For other attempts to analyse the nature and quality of communication between ranks within British forces, see Policy Studies Institute (1983c) ch. 7, Kinsey (1985b) pp. 79-89, Sanderson (1985) esp. 145-147, 205-206, 288, 308. See also notes 30 and 31 *infra*. Each of these studies uses a mix of questions in order to measure quality of communications. As well as general evaluative questions, each seeks to measure quality of communication indirectly, whether through asking respondents about the incidence of direct contact between ranks (PSI and Kinsey) or about frequency of access to important written communications (Sanderson). As the reliability of findings in respect of self-reporting questions on empirical patterns of communications cannot be guaranteed, it was decided that, although the value of such techniques should not for that reason be entirely discounted (particularly if, as in the other studies discussed, the self-reporting questions are integrated with and cross-tabulated with a wider set of questions) exclusive concentration would be placed upon general evaluative quesions in the present study.

30. The findings of the Policy Studies Institute (1983c) ch. 7, esp. pp. 135-138, Kinsey (1985a) pp. 79-81 and Sanderson (1985) p. 288 also indicate that the quality of understanding of senior officers of the work of junior officers diminishes the greater the distance between ranks.

31. Of the other studies, thses points are most clearly echoed in Sanderson's analysis, given his systematic concern not only with the

quality of 'upward communication' (i.e. the understanding of senior officers of the work of their juniors) but also the quality of 'downward communication' (i.e. the understanding of junior officers of the work of their seniors) (Sanderson (1985) p.308).

32. For a broader consideration of the attitudes of officers of different ranks to the Federation and their degree of trade union consciousness more generally see Reiner (1978), (1979).

33. This reflect's Kinsey's findings in Merseyside (Kinsey 1985a) pp.71-78. His study also indicates that level of morale - especially low morale - is closely associated with the attitudes of supervisory and senior officers (pp.72-73).

34. Senior divisional officers were not asked similar self-regarding questions as it was felt that, whereas promoted ranks would have had sufficient contact with and gained sufficient knowledge and understanding of the work of junior supervisory ranks prior to their own elevation to (or, as is the case may be, after their own elevation beyond) these ranks to be in a position to make meaningful comparisons between past and present work demands, this was not the case in respect of the more senior ranks.

35. See ch.6 section B(2) *infra*.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. See in particular ch. 9 *infra*.

2. See in particular ch. 6 section B(4)(ii) *infra* for evidence of such attitudes on the part of constables interviewed in the present study. For a review of the relevant literature, see ch. 2 section B(1) and (2) *supra*.

3. As noted in ch. 3 section B (1) *infra*, persuasion tends to be closely linked with the other personal types of authority, and, particularly in the case of competent authority, provides a significant means through which the latter is constituted.

4. See ch. 4 section B(4) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 22-30 *infra*.

5. This emerged particularly from the open-ended responses of sergeants and constables to questions concerning the significance of competent authority as a basis of power for promoted ranks. See Appendix 1 schedules A and D.

6. This point is developed at greater length in ch. 8 section B(1) *infra*.

7. See ch. 4 *section B(5) supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 39-40 *infra*.

8. See Ch. 4 section B(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 32-33 and 35-36 *infra*.

9. Although no closed-ended question was directed specifically to this point, a number of comments were made in more general discussion around other questions which supported the arguments here advanced (see text *infra*).

10. Thus, it was a constant theme amongst those respondents at constable, sergeant and inspector rank who chose to elaborate on their answers to the various questions concerning the importance of discipline as a basis of power for senior officers over juniors that the threat of discipline was of greater significance than its use. Many officers did, however, emphasize the traumatic consequences for an officer who was the subject of disciplinary proceedings - particularly if triggered by a complaint against the police. In some cases, an ironic contrast was drawn between, on the one hand, the rigorous process of investigation which officers were in practice exposed to, and on the other, the widespread public scepticism about the impartiality and effectiveness of the internal disciplinary machinery which nevertheless prevailed. The discipline and complaints system in Scotland is governed by the Police (Scotland) Act s26 and regulations made thereunder. The main regulations are the Police (Discipline) (Scotland) Regulations 1967 (S.I. 1967/1021) as amended. An important recent amendment, following the lead of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England and Wales and reflecting the concerns of serving officers, as intimated above, as

to the draconian nature of the overall procedure, has conferred upon those subject to disciplinary proceedings the right in certain circumstances to be represented by a lawyer(S.I. 1987/2226). For analysis of the Scottish system, see MacPherson (1987).

11. See ch. 3 section B(2) *supra*.

12. See further ch. 7 *infra*.

13. See ch. 4 section B(4) and(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 22, 32 and 42 *infra*.

14. Van Maanen (1983b) pp. 305-308.

15. See ch. 4 section B(6) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 56-57 *infra*.

16. See ch. 3 section B(2) *supra*.

17. See ch. 2 section B(2) *supra*.

18. See ch. 4 section B(4) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 22, 27 and 30 *infra*.

19. For the significance of tradition in police culture, see ch. 3 section B(1) *supra*, ch. 6 section B(3)(i) and ch. 8 section B(1) *infra*.

20. See ch. 4 section B(4) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 22-30 *infra*.

21. See ch. 4 section B(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 31-44.

22. See Bittner (1971) pp. 52-54.

23. While 'respect' is obviously a very broad concept, sociological analysis has tended to concentrate upon certain of its more specific manifestations. In particular, sociologists have emphasized the importance of respect *qua* status accorded to social groups , as in Weber's analyis of 'status groups' and 'honour' (Weber (1947) pp. 181-192) or the voluminous modern literature on professional groups, rather than, as is our present concern, as a quality bearing upon interpersonal relations. For its part, the concept of trust has been accorded more rounded treatment. Notable general analyses include Luhmann (1979), Barber (1983), Breton and Wintrobe (1982) ch. 4 Shapiro (1987b). There are also a number of interesting studies of the significance of trust in law enforcement strategies ((Reiss (1984), Stenning, Shearing and Addario (1986), Shapiro (1987a), although not - as here - of its significance in police intra-organisational relations.

24. Luhmann (1979) p. 30.

25. Manning (1980) p. 25, Chatterton (1987b) p. 138.

26. Luhmann (1979) p. 64.

27. Breton and Wintrobe (1982) p. 64.

28. Gouldner (1954a), (1954b). For discussion see Reed (1985) pp. 154-159.

29. See ch. 3 section C(2) *supra*.

30. See for example Bittner (1971), pp. 52-62, Klockars (1985) pp. 52-55, Jefferson (1987), (1990), Waddington (1987).

31. For further discussion and application of the idea of authoritative style see ch. 3 section B(1) *supra, ch. 8 section B(1) and ch. 10 section B(3) infra.*

32. See also Wrong (1979) pp. 79-80.

33. The theme of the prisoner's dilemma has been much discussed and elaborated within philosophy, political economy and social theory. Useful discussions include Elster (1978), Hardin (1982), Parfit (1984) esp. part one.

CHAPTER SIX

1. The dual categorization of A3 and A4 is due to the fact that respondents, in identifying changes under these two broad heads as pertinent to the changing role of the sergeant (ch. 4 section B(8) *supra and Appendix 2 Table 62 infra*) tended to understand such changes both as manifestations of the increased requirement to meet external demands and as factors contributing to a more hostile and difficult working environment. See further section B(4)(i) *infra*.

2. For each of the heads enumerated under Part A, as well as the evidence of respondents in the present study, there is considerable additional evidence of the relevant processes of change in the general socio-political context of the British police within the police studies literature, some of which is referred to in notes 3-10 *infra*. General analyses include Reiner (1985b) ch. 2 and Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 5.

3. On changes under A1 and A2 see for example Chibnall (1977), Reiner (1983), (1985b) ch. 5. The Scottish Council for Civil liberties was identified by many respondents as the paradigm case of an 'articulate interest group' which was instrumental in rallying critical public opinion about policing issues on a recurrent basis.

4. For the social backdrop to the accountability debate see for example Jefferson, Brogden and Walklate (1988), Jefferson, McLaughlin and Robertson (1988) chs. 7 and 8, Fielding (1991) ch. 6.

5. Of particular relevance to respondents in this context was the recent history of unpredictable government commitment to expenditure on police manpower and services, and its effect on police recruitment and morale. See also the discussion of head B3 of the model in section B(1) *infra*, and Reiner (1983).

6. Between 1967 (during which year the sergeant of average service within our sample joined the police) and 1985, recorded crime in Scotland rose from 140,141 to 461,970, an increase of 230%, while recorded offences rose from 224,260 to 338,410, an increase of 51%. During the same period, the clear-up rate for crimes and offences dropped from 71.8% to 60% (see Report of HM Chief Inspector of Consabulary for Scotland (1967), (1985)). For estimates of unrecorded crime in Scotland on the basis of the victimization study within the British Crime Survey (Scotland) see Chambers and Tombs (1984) ch. 2.

7. On the growth of 'organised crime' since the war see Jefferson, Brogden and Walklate (1988) pp. 84-88.

8. In particular, the growth of drugs offences and other marginal forms of deviance, and of road traffic offences, was remarked upon by a number of respondents, as was the relationship between these developments and declining middle-class supprt for the police. See also Waddington (1982). The organisational implications of such developments are discussed in section B(3) *infra*.

9. Apart from changes in technology (see section B(2) *infra*), a number of respondents also insisted that an overall decline in 'respect for authority' (i.e. institutional authority (chs. 3 and 5 *supra*)) had coloured police/public interactions generally and had led to a shift away from informally negotiated solutions and greater awareness of and reliance upon legal protections by members of the public. This resonates with the views of Reiner's respondents that as society becomes more highly-educated it becomes more difficult to police. (Reiner (1978) p. 222). For an interesting analysis of changing police/public relations in terms of the post-war decline of traditional working-class communities and associated networks of informal social control, and their replacement by individualist ideologies centred upon citizenship rights, see Clarke (1987). While his thesis is persuasive and offers some support to our respondents' own perceptions of the course of historical change, given the potency of traditionalist themes within police culture (see ch. 3 section b(1) *supra*) we should nevertheless remain wary of attempts on the part of police officers to draw too stark a contrast between an ideal past and the deficiencies of the present.

10. The inner-city disturbamces of the early-mid 1980s and the miner's strike of 1984-5 were the two events most closely focussed upon by respondents when articulating their worries under this head. For analysis of the former see for example the collections of essays by Cowell, Jones and Young (1982), Benyon (1984) and Benyon and Solomos (1987). On the latter see Fine and Millar (1985), McCabe and Wallington (1988).

11. See Reiner (1985b) ch. 1.

12. *Ibid.* pp. 32-47.

13. Marenin (1982) pp. 258-260.

14. *Ibid.* pp. 258-259.

15. Rawls (1987).

16. For a sophisticated attempt to retain some of the insights of pluralist theories of the state within a more critical analysis of trends in post-war Britain see Held (1987a) chs. 6 and 7, (1987b).

17. See Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) ch. 2.

18. Manning (1982) p. 124.

19. Giddens (1982) pp. 11-14.

20. Royal Commission on the Police (1962) paras. 40-69. See also Oliver (1987) chs. 1 and 4.

21. The authorized esstablishment rose from 7,200 in 1945 to 13,465 in 1985 (Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1985)).

22. At the end of 1967 sergeants accounted for 13.6% of the authorized establishment of the Scottish police, which increasd to 14,3% by the end of 1985. The ratio of all other promoted ranks to the sergeant rank was 1:1.99 in 1967, increasing to 1:1.7 by 1985. Whereas all promoted ranks accounted for 20.4% of the total regular strength in 1967, by 1985 they accounted for 22.4% (see Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1967),(1985). In Force A in 1985, sergeants accounted for 14.2% of the authorised establishment, the ratio of all other promoted ranks to sergeants was 1:1.61, and all promoted ranks accounted for 22.7% of the regular strength. In Force B in 1985, sergeants also accounted for 14.2% of the authorised establishment, the ratio of all other promoted ranks to sergeants was 1:1.75%, and all promoted ranks accounted for 22.3% of the regular strength.
For a comparative analysis of rank ratios across England and Wales, Scotland and several foreign jurisdictions, which demonstrates that there is a significantly higher than average proportion of officers in managerial ranks in both domestic jurisdictions, see Clarke and Greene (1987).

23. The authorised establishment of sergeants within Scottish forces increased from 1,523 in 1967 to to 1,930 at the end of 1985, while the authorised establishment of all other promoted ranks increased from 765 to 1,136. See Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1985) Table 4.

24. The trend since the two series of amalgamations, presumably on account of the greater intra-force mobility which the larger forces permit, has been towards fewer transfers between Scottish forces (only 9 in 1985 compared to 61 in 1967), but since the absolute numbers involved are marginal, this does not defeat the general proposition advanced in the text.(see Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1967), (1985)).

25. On the steady growth of central influence over the internal administration of forces in the 20th century see Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch.5, Reiner (1988a), Johnson(1988). See also note 20 *supra*.

26. See ch. 3 *supra*, esp. section C.

27. See in particular ch.2 section B and ch.5 section A(1) *supra*.

28. At the end of 1967 69% of the authorised regular establishment of Scottish forces were employed on 'general duties', whereas at the end of 1985 77% (77% in Force A and 78% in Force B) were employed on 'operational duties' - the nearest equivalent category within the official statistics. See Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1967),(1985).

29. The impression of an increasing propensity to make manpower available for operational duties which is conveyed by the figures cited in note 28 *supra* may be misleading. First, it is unclear whether the key categories used in the different statistical analyses are identical or closely equivalent, and thus whether meaningful comparisons can be made. Secondly, what counts as 'general' or 'operational' duties may in any case not match the perceptions of organisational members. For example, although senior and middle-ranking police officers within the direct 'line' command of divisional organisation, whose numbers have increased significantly over the relevant period (see notes 22 and 23 *supra*) are officially counted as operational officers , many lower participants would disagree (see ch.5 section A(1) *supra* and ch.8 section B(2) *infra*). Thirdly, theory and practice may differ, as exemplified in the 'manning-up' syndrome described by Mervyn Jones (1980)(see also section B(3) *infra*), and also noted in the present study (e.g. 'acting' posts at sergeant and inspector rank in Oldtown Division (ch.4 section B(2) *supra*)), whereby supervisory and specialist posts are kept at full strength, notwithstanding turnover and absenteeism, by perpetually drawing staff from uniform patrol shifts. For a broader discussion of the relationship between increase in organisational scale and the siphoning off of operational manpower see Loveday (1990).

30. In certain City forces in particular, C.I.D. offered what was effectively a separate career structure, while the same was true of a number of Traffic Departments in the County forces.

31. Although it was of only marginal relevance to the study, some attention was given to the subject of inter-departmental relations in each of the questionnaires (see Appendix 1 *infra*). A majority of sergeants, (70=73.7%), inspectors (15=83.3%) and senior divisional officers (13=100%) felt relations between departments to be at least fairly good, and when probed to explain why, again a majority in each case identified the integrated career strucure as the most significant factor.

32. Thus during 1976, the year before the Edmund-Davies Committee was appointed, the actual strength of the Scottish police dropped by 59 from 12,376 to 12,319. Personnel wastage numbered 1,143, of which 446 were resignations, and of these, 187 were on account of low remuneration and 72 on account of dislike of conditions of service (Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabular for Scotland (1976)).

33. In his annual report of 1976 the Chief Inpector of Constabulary for Scotland declared that "the thin blue line is weakening. In some areas it is dangerously near breaking point"(*para.* 18), and also noted that "never before have I sensed such bitterness and frustration about pay"(*para.* 63).

34. Committee of Inquiry on the Police, Report III (1979), Cmnd. 7633. See also Reiner (1983).

35. In 1976 of 1,084 new recruits, 14(1.3%) had degrees and 374(34.5%) had at least one 'H' Grade pass, whereas in 1985, of 676 new recruits, 69(10.2%) had degrees and 354(52.4%) had at least one 'H' Grade pass (Report of HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (1976), (1985)).

36. The AP Programme (see ch.4 section B(2) *supra*) was introduced in 1964, while the Graduate Entry Scheme, which exempts graduates from the initial selection procedure for the AP Programme, started in 1968. Other significant educational developments since the 1960s have included the introduction of the HNC in Police Studies, university secondments for serving officers, and the development of various management training initiatives at the Scottish Police College (see ch.8 section B(2) *infra*).

37. See for example Holdaway (1977), Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) chs. 2-3, Manwaring-White (1983), Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) ch.7, Stephens 91988) ch.3, Jefferson (1990).

38. See Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) pp.30-36, Weatheritt (1986) ch.6.

39. A sub-division of City Division. The divisional structure in Force B has been radically overhauled since the time of the research, with the four city-based divisions reduced to three from September 1989.

40. Although Force B has acquired its own Command and Control system since the time of the research. This new system became fully operationalin September 1989.

41. Indeed, the city force which was one of the predecessor forces of Force A had operated a Command and Control system since 1973, and was second only to the City of Birmingham police in initiating such a system within Britain. Around 80% of British forces now possess Command and Control systems.

42. See for example Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) chs. 2-3, Kinsey, Lea and Young (1886) ch.7.

43. See for example Holdaway (1977), (1983) ch.11. Police professionalism is discussed at greater depth in ch.8 section B(1) *infra*.

44. See also Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) pp.32-34.

45. Mervyn Jones (1980).

46. *Ibid.* ch.7.

47. In Force A, through the development of Community Projects, and in Force B through the extension of area policing systems.

48. See for example Holdaway (1977) and ch.2 section B(1) *supra*.

49. Reiner (1978) ch. 12, (1985b) p. 105.

50. Reiner (1985b) p. 90.

51. Niederhoffer (1967) is the classic study of police cynicism. Muir (1977) is particularly adept at analysing the existential problems associated with cynicism.

52. Brown (1981) p. 110.

53. See ch. 5 section A(1) *supra* and ch. 10 section B(1)-(2) *infra*.

54. Schur (1965).

55. See note 8 *supra* and Waddington(1982), Reiner (1985b) pp. 81-82.

56. In particular, in the social anthropology of Lévi-Strauss. See for example Lévi-Strauss (1987) esp. pt. II. See also Archer (1988) p. 44.

57. Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) p. 262.

58. For discussion of the idea of convergence and of its operation within wider social processes see Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts (1978) pp. 223-225, Jefferson (1990) pp. 31, 37.

59. See for example Kettle (1980), Reiner (1983), (1985b) pp. 73-76, (1988a).

60. Reiner (1983).

61. See for example Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) chs. 5 and 6, Gordon (1987), Hope and Shaw (1988).

62. Reiss (1984) p. 29.

63. See for example Bittner (1971) pp. 52-62, Brown (1981) ch. 2, Klockars (1985b) pp. 52-55.

64. Punch (1983b), (1985). See also ch. 2 section B(2) *supra*.

65. Meyer and Rowan (1983) p. 28.

66. *Ibid.* p. 29.

67. Van Maanen (1983) p. 287.

68. For discussion of how the pattern of sergeants' work is often dictated by the timetables of others within and outwith the organisation see Chatterton (1985).

69. Manning (1977) p. 118.

70. For discussion of the issues raised by P.A.C.E. see for example the collections edited by Baxter and Koffman (1985) and Benyon and Bourn (1986). See also Reiner (1985b) ch.6. For analysis of how the new system has operated see for example McKenzie and Irving (1987), Brown (1989), Irving and McKenzie (1989), Dixon, Bottomley, Coleman, Gill and Wall (1989), (1990), Dixon, Coleman and Bottomley (1990), Mckenzie (1990b).

71. For the reasoning underpinning the Act see the Thomson Report ((2nd Report of the Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland (1985)). For general discussion of the political background to the Act see Baldwin and Kinsey (1980), (1982) ch.6, Curran and Carnie (1986) ch.1.

72. For textual analysis of ss.1-4 see Gordon (1981), Ewing and Finnie (1988) ch.3.

73. The earlier research is reported in Curran and Carnie (1986) (see esp. ch.10). The views of officers interviewed in the present study were expressed mainly in reponse (1) to a specific inquiry as to how changes in the law had affected the role of the sergeant, and(2) to a general inquiry as to whether their attitudes to the law and to the legal system had changed during the course of their service.

74. Indeed one of the research studies commissioned by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, whose report in 1981 laid the foundations for the extension of police powers in P.A.C.E., itself concludes that increases in police powers offer little hope of increased effectiveness in the detection of crime(Steer (1980) p.125 quoted in Reiner (1985b) p,173. For general reviews of the literature on the problematic relationship between effectiveness in law enforcement and variables such as manpower and police powers see Morris and Heal (1981), Clarke and Hough (1984), Reiner (1985b) ch.4, Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) chs. 1-4.

75. See for example the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 1974-89.

76. For discussion of the legal relationship between detention, arrest and voluntary attendance see Bates (1982), Ewing and Finnie (1988) pp.92-93, Finnie (1989), See also *Tonge, Jack and Gray v. H.M. Advocate* 1982 S.L.T. 506.

77. Curran and Carnie (1986) ch.3.

78. See in particular the landmark judgement of Lord Justice-General Cooper in *Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate* 1954 J.C. 66. The strict judicial attitude to the admissability of confession evidence under Scots law which this heralded has been considerably relaxed in recent years. See for example *Hartley v. H.M. Advocate* 1979 S.L.T. 26.

79. 2nd Report of the Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland (1975) ch. 3.

80. See in particular Dixon, Coleman and Bottomley (1990). See also Mckenzie (1990b).

81. Only pilot schemes had been attempted (in Falkirk and Dundee) at the time of the research. For analysis see Wozniak (1985).

82. The limited effectiveness of the sanctions available to the citizen in Scots law against unlawful arrest and detention (i.e. internal disciplinary proceedings or a civil action in damages) was commented upon by the Thomson Committee (2nd Report of the Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland (1975) *para.* 3.32).

83. *Cummings v. H.M. Advocate* 1982 S.L.T. 487, *Forbes v. H.M. Advocate* 1990 SCCR. 69.

84. See for example Chatterton (1983), Lustgarten (1987), Jefferson (1990) ch. 3

85. Manning (1982) p. 127.

86. For discussion of Lord Advocate's guidelines, see Curran and Carnie (1986) pp. 10-12. Under the Scottish system there is no equivalent to the situation under P.A.C.E. where a statutorily defined 'custody officer' (s36), who must be of at least sergeant rank (s36(3)), is responsible for the well being of suspects in the police station. For analysis see Zander (1986). For assessment, and qualified approval, of the custody officer system in practice see Dixon, Bottomley, Coleman, Gill and Wall (1990) esp. pp. 133-138.

87. See for example Manning (1977) pp. 161-207, Ericson (1981), Chatterton (1976), (1983), Fielding (1988a).

88. See for example McBarnett (1979), (1981), Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a), (1984b), Baldwin and Kinsey (1985).

89. Cohen (1989) p. 350, discussing broader tendencies within the sociology of deviance.

90. See for example the measured approach of Baldwin (1984), Baldwin and Kinsey (1985), Smith (1986) pp. 88-89, Brogden (1989) pp. 22-26. As Reiner points out, however, many other writers, while conceding that police officers operate in accordance with firmly held moral beliefs, emphasize the extent to which this moral code clashes with the legal code. See Reiner (1985b) p. 175. and the sources there cited.

91. See Policy Sudies Institute (1983d) ch. V. esp, pp. 169-172, Smith (1986), (1988).

92. Baldwin and Kinsey (1985) p. 91.

93. Policy Studies Institute (1983d) p. 171.

94. An interesting hybrid of internal and external sanctions is created under P.A.C.E., where breach of the Codes of Guidance promulgated under the Act may constitute an offence under the internal Discipline Code (s.67). For discussion see Baldwin (1989).

95. Klockars (1985a).

96. See Policy Studies Institute (1983d) ch.5 esp. pp. 224-228, Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 186-192.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. See ch. 4 section B(3) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 13-15.

2. For criticism of bureaucratic form of organisation in general see Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 125-129. See also ch. 3 section B(1), C(2), and sources cited in ch. 3 note 53 *supra*.

3. Although there are significant traditions within organisational theory which are explicitly mechanistic in nature, in particular Taylor's Scientific Management (Taylor 1911) and the school of Classical Management theory founded by Fayol(1949) (see Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 47-49), within police studies mechanistic assumptions are more commonly made on an implicit basis, as unarticulated premisses underpinning this or that theoretical position. See for example the discussion of the deficiencies of various perspectives on police accountability which flow from such implicit assumptions (and which thus exemplify failure to treat seriously the third, policy implementation stage of the 'policy trilemma' (see ch. 1 *supra*)) in Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 7 esp. pp. 164-165. One example of a police management textbook which is fairly explicit in its endorsement of the machine model is Bunyard (1978).

4. See ch. 6 section B(1) *supra*.

5. See for example Crozier (1964), Silverman (1971), Burns (1955). See also Manning (1979) p. 42.

6. Berlin (1980) p. 149.

7. See Weber (1947) p. 338, Michels (1959). See also the discussion of Weber's views in Bendix (1966) ch. 14 esp. pp. 464-468.

8. Burnham (1941), Rizzi (1985).

9. See for example Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) ch. 3, Chatterton (1987a), Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) ch. 7.

10. Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) p. 65.

11. See for example Mohr (1982) pp. 184-185.

12. See Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 65-73. The discussion which follows borrows to some extent from this earlier analysis, although no clear distinction is there drawn between the problems of *semantic imprecision* and *utopianism*, and relatedly, no systematic analysis of the constituent elements of the second type of problem is developed.

13. See Lustgarten (1987), Jefferson (1990) ch. 3.

14. Probably the most compelling analysis of the gap between ideal and achievement in law enforcement in the British context is Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) esp. chs. 1-4.

15. Punch (1979).

16. See Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 75-76. The need to focus more narrowly and more directly on law enforcement objectives is a central tenet of the theory of minimal policing advanced by Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986). See also text *infra*.

17. See Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 76-79.

18. *Ibid.* pp. 77-78. For broader .lysis of the urban disorders and the miners' strike, see the sources cited in ch. 6 note 10 *infra*.

19. Manning (1977) pp. 107-108.

20. See for example the review of research in Reiner (1985b) pp. 121-122.

21. The recent growth in crime surveys and the increasing sophistication of their methods has produced a wealth of evidence on this issue. The British Crime Survey (Mayhew, Elliot and Dowds (1989))and the British Crime Survey (Scotland)(Chambers and Tombs(1984)) asked victims why they did not report crimes to the police, while local crime surveys in London(Policy Studies Institue (1983d)), Merseyside (Kinsey (1984) (1985b)), Islington (Jones, MacLean and Young (1986)) and Edinburgh (Anderson, Smith, Kinsey and Wood (1990)) have also included such questions, together with additional (hypothetical) questions attempting to elicit reasons for reporting and non-reporting of witnesses. Reasons from non-reporting include the assessment of the crime as too trivial, the sense that the police would or could have done nothing, fear of reprisals, and, in a small minority of cases, fear or dislike of the police.

22. Golding (1984) p. 123-24 *et passim*. See also White (1984) p. 13, Stoljar (1984) ch. 9.

23. Golding (1984) p. 123.

24. *Ibid.* pp. 122-123 *et passim*. See also White (1984) p. 13.

25. Golding (1984) pp. 122-123.

26. For a discussion of how such option rights may come into conflict with one another, and an argument that the police should nevertheless act where possible to allow these rights to be exercised simultaneously, or where this is not possible, should favour collective rights (e.g. right to picket, rights of assembly and procession) over individual rights (e.g. right to work), see Gostin (1988a).

27. For discussion, see Hood (1986) p.5, Raz (1986) pp.198-203, Ranson and Stewart (1989) pp.7-8.

28. Ranson and Stewart (1989) p.7.

29. Raz (1986) p.198.

30. See for example the discussion of police powers under Scots law in ch.6 section B(4)(ii) *supra*. See also Ewing and Finnie (1988) ch.3. For the position under P.A.C.E. in English law see for example Benyon and Bourn (1986).

31. For the position in Scots law as regards assemblies and processions see in particular Civic Government (Scotland) Act ss 62-64; Public Order Act 1986 ss12 and 14-16. See also Ewing and Finnie (1986) ch.8. For the position in English law see in particular Public Order Act 1986 ss 11-16. See also Thornton (1987).

32. This model is discussed and criticized by Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) pp.163-164. While they can point to no theory of policing which explicitly endorses this model, the market model nevertheless remains significant as an inarticulate major premise of many police officers (see section B(2)(iii) *infra*), and in many of the development in 'private policing' which have recently taken place. See Shearing and Stenning (1987), South (1988).

33. Kinsey, Lea and Young pp.163-164.

34. As in Kinsey, Lea and Young's own model of minimal policing. See Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) esp. ch.9.

35. Alderson (1980) pp.7 and 39.

36. The best-known statement of community policing philosophy is Alderson (1979). See also Alderson (1980), (1985). For discussion of recent developments in the theory and practice of community policing see for example Willmott (1987), Hope and Shaw (1988).

37. For criticism of community policing programmes as potentially oppressive of minority rights and as ineffective in achieving core policing objectives see for example Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) pp.194-195, Gordon (1987), Weatheritt (1987).

38. Although Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) argue that, even if this ideal of community policing was attainable, a society in which the police were guardians of the *conscience collectif* "would be about as liveable-in as *Brave New World*" (p.195).

39. Manning (1978) p.12.

40. See ch.6 section B(4)(ii) *supra*.

41. Skolnick (1975) pp. 164-181, Bittner (1971) pp. 54-56, Jones (1980) ch. 5.

42. These two types of regulatory mechanism are identified and elaborated on the basis of general discussion with officers of all ranks in response to questions concerning the nature of inter-rank relations and the nature of police management. See ch. 4 section B(3), (4) and (6) *supra* and Appendix 1 *infra*.

43. See ch. 11 section B *infra*.

44. Child (1984) p. 159.

45. On nonlinearity see Mohr (1982) p. 184.

46. See Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 78-81.

47. This has been in response not only to the development and dissemination of the appropriate theoretical models (see Lubans and Edgar(1979), Butler (1984) but also to the strong encouragement towards a more systematic process of goal identification and review contained in central government circulars. See Home Office Circular 114/1983 (for England and Wales), SHHD Police Circular 3/1984 and 2/1985 (for Scotland). According to Ackroyd and Helliwell (forthcoming) all but 2 of the 43 forces in England and Wales demonstrated some commitment to PBO by 1988, while 18 forces had established a well-develoed PBO process. For discussion of the various forms of PBO established by 2 English forces (Northamptonshire and the Metropolitan Police)and 2 Scottish forces (Northern and Strathclyde Police) see Allan (1989) ch. 6.

48. Butler (1984) ch. 3.

49. At the time of the research a statement of force objectives was included in the annual report in Force B, but there was no integrated system of performance evcaluation and review. In Force A, athough there was no evidence of formal PBO initiatives at the time of the research, these began to be introduced in 1987.

50. See for example Lord Dunpark's definitionof breach of the peace in Scots law in *Wilson v. Brown* 1982 S.C.C.R. 49. For general discussion see Christie (1990).

51. See for example Newman (1984) esp. pp. 10-16.

52. Anderton (1981).

53. See Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984) esp. pp. 145-147 for analysis of this type of argument.

54. Kinsey (1985b) pp. 45-52.

55. See for example the review of the 'sorting' practices of operational police officers with regard to various public groups in Reiner (1985b) pp. 94-97, and his analysis of how categorical discrimination against racial and other minority groups may be amplified by the wider pattern of social discrimination, by institutionalized deployment policies, and by interactional processes(pp. 133-135). See also Reiner (1985a). See also the more general arguments of Lea and Young (1982), (1984) ch. 6, Kinsey, Lea andYoung (1986) chs. 2 and 3, Reiner (1985b) pp. 175-176, Downes and Ward (1986) p. 62., Jefferson (1990) ch. 7

56. Jock Wallace was a manager of Glasgow Rangers F.C. in the 1970s and 1980s notorious for his draconian management techniques.

57. Sinclair and Miller (1984) p. 12

58. Mele (1983) p. 369

59. There is a burgeoning literature on the problems of measuring police effectiveness. See for example Wolfle and Heaphy (1975), Clarke and Hough (1984), Jones and Silverman (1984), Sinclair and Miller (1984), Collins (1985), Southgate (1985), Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 144-152, Chatterton (1987a), Hough (1987), Horton and Smith (1988) ch. 1, Reiner (1988b), Abbotts (1989), Burrows (1989), Mathie (1989), Smith (1989), Wilkinson (1989). This literature has in large part been generated in response to a succession of government initiatives towards the rationalization and control of police expenditure. On the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) which was introduced in certain police forces between 1969-74 see Christian (1982). On the history of the present Value for Money approach, whose general origins lay in the Raynor report on Efficiency in the Civil Service (1981) and the ensuing series of government police circulars (in particular, Home Office Circular 114/1983) see Horton and Smith (1988) ch. 1.

60. See for example Sinclair and Millar (1984) p. 11.

61. See section B(2) *supra*.

62. Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts (1978) p. 9.

63. *Ibid* ch. 1.

64. Meyer (1987) p. 224.

65. Manning (1979) p. 45.

66. See section B(2) *supra*.

67. See also ch. 6 section B(4) (ii) *supra*.

68. See ch. 4 section B(5) and Appendix 2 Tables 35 and 36.

69. See ch. 5 section A(1) *supra*.

70. The reason being that the older officers started their service in the burgh and county forces, which were smaller and provided less scope for internal movement.

71. See ch. 6 section B(1) *supra*.

72. See for example Bittner (1965) and Silverman (1970) for discussion of formal organisation as a discursive resource for participants.

73. Cain (1973) p. 37

74. Quoted in Manning (1977) p. 149.

75. See for example Chatterton (1975), (1978), (1979), Fielding (1984), (1988b).

76. Chatterton (1975), (1979) p. 93.

77. Manning (1979) p. 59.

78. On traditionalism in the police see ch. 6 section B (3)-(4) (i).

79. See ch. 6 section B(4)(i) *supra*.

80. Mervyn Jones (1980) ch. 2.

81. Garland (1985) p. 172 , applying the term in the rather different context of ideologically-inspired developments in the history of the discipline of criminology.

82. Chatterton (1979) pp, 94 *et seq*..

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. See ch. 4 section B(3) and (6) *supra*, and Appendix 2 Tables 13-15 and 46.

2. At the Scottish Police Training College, the Newly Promoted Inspectors Course and the Selected Sergeants course introduced in 1976, and the Scottish Command Course (for officers of superintendent rank) introduced in 1978, have each provided significant vehicles for the development of management education. At present, there are plans to restructure the examination system for the lower promoted ranks - which has traditionally concentrated upon knowledge of criminal law, road traffic law and other general duties - by introducing modules on management theory and other social scientific subjects. For developments in the English context see Holdaway (1986) pp. 106-108. For recent assessment of the work of the Police Staff College at Bramshill and recommendations for change see Home Affairs Committee (3rd Report 1988-89) HC 110, and the responses by government (HM Government 1989) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO 1990).

3. Holdaway (1986) p. 109.

4. *Ibid.* p. 106 *et seq.*.

5. Crozier and Frieberg (1980) p. 217.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. Holdaway (1986) p. 110.

9. Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) p. 41.

10. Mouzelis (1975) and Rose (1976) provide good analyses of the social background to the development of management theory in the 20th century.

11. See also ch. 5 section A(1) *supra*.

12. Geertz (1973) pp. 73-93, esp. pp. 84-92.

13. Becker (1971) p. 92.

14. Halliday (1985) pp. 423 and 428.

15. See for example Wilding (1982) ch. 2.

16. See for example Holdaway (1977) pp. 120-123, (1983) ch. 11, (1986), Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 80-84.

17. See ch. 6 section B(4)(i) *supra*.

18. Holdaway (1977) p. 21

19. Manning (1989) p. 363.

20. See for example Holdaway (1986) pp. 108-110, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988) pp. 27-28.

21. See note 2 *supra*.

22. See ch. 4 section B(2) *supra*.

23. Although no questions were addressed directly to the nature and adequacy of preparation for senior divisional ranks, as distinct from the sergeant and inspector ranks, general approval of the Command Course by senior divisional officers was nevertheless expressed in discussion of broader themes - such as the nature of police managerial roles. See ch. 4 section B(6) *supra* and Appendix 1 *infra*.

24. See ch. 4 section B(2) *supra* and Appendix 2 Table 6 *infra*. The less enthusiastic tone of inspectors' endorsement of management training which was noted is bound up with their generally more ambivalent attitude towards new managerialist themes (see ch. 4 section B(3) and (6) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 13-15 and 46 *infra*. For possible explanations for this difference between inspectors and senior divisional officers see ch. 9 *infra*.

25. Ch. 4 section B(2) *supra*.

26. See subsection (1) *supra*.

27. Fielding (1988b) p. 65.

28. See ch. 4 section B(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Table 40 *infra*.

CHAPTER NINE

1. See ch. 4 section B(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Table 42 *infra*.

2. *Ibid.*

3. See ch. 4 section B(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Table 43 *infra*.

4. See ch. 4 section B(3)-(4) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 13-15 and 22-23 *infra*.

5. See ch. 4 section B (3)-(4) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 13-22, 25 and 28 *infra*.

6. See ch. 8 section A *supra*. See also ch. 6 section B(3) *supra*.

7. In Newtown Division - the largest of the four in territorial terms - the inspectors were responsible for an area generally rather than a particular shift. Further, in each of City and Oldtown Divisions one inspector was allocated a general area responsibility outwith the shift structure.

8. See ch. 3 section B(2), ch. 5 section A(1) and ch. 7 section A *supra*.

9. See for example Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) pp. 55-58.

10. Mintzberg (1973).

11. The analysis of policework in terms of Mintzberg's categories which folows is based not only upon the views of respondents expressed in discussion of basic features of rank roles (see ch. 4 *supra*, esp. section B (3) and (6) and Appendix 2 Tables 13-21 and 46 *infra*), but also upon observations in the field.

12. See also Chatterton (1987b) pp. 126-132, who accounts for the basic patttern of operational involvement of the patrol sergeant in terms of an *incident-focused orientation* rather than a *constable-focused orientation*.

13. *Ibid.* pp. 138-145.

14. Van Maanen (1983b) pp. 281-287.

15. Thus many critical analyses of bureaucracy focus, *inter alia*, upon the problems caused by the proliferation of files and forms and an excessive attention to procedural correctness. See for example Weber (1968) vol. 3 pp. 974-975, Albrow (1970) pp. 89-91, Beetham (1987) p. 29. See also ch. 3 section C(2) and ch. 7 section B (2)(iii) and (3) *supra*. On images of paperwork of police officers and researchers see Chatteron (1989) pp. 107-108 and ch. 4 note 19 *supra*.

16. On the importance of information control generally in organisational power relations see ch. 3 section B(2) *supra*. See also Crozier (1964) esp. pp. 1-9.

17. Knights and Willmott (1985) p. 26. Berger (1963) p. 124.

18. See Knights and Willmott (1985) esp. pp. 24-28.

19. See ch. 4 *supra*, esp. section B(6), and Appendix 2 Table 46 *infra*.

20. See ch. 5 section A(1) and ch. 8 section B(1) *supra*.

21. See ch. 8 section B(1) *supra*.

CHAPTER TEN

1. See ch. 4 section B(7) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 50-53 and 56-57 *infra*.

2. See ch. 4 section B(7) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 54-55 *infra*.

3. Some general parallels may be drawn beteeen this taxonomy and those applied by Chatterton (1981) and Van Maanen (1983a) in their discussions of different types of sergeants. Thus the artisan bears some resemblance to Van Maanen's 'street sergeant' and Chatterton's 'practical copper', while the aspirant executive bears some resemblance to Van Maanen's 'station house sergeant' as well as sharing traits in common both with Chatterton's 'oarsman' and with his 'administrator'. However, none of their categories provides an analogue either for the exponent of the 'balanced approach' or the 'stripes carrier'. More generally, the background theoretical model here presented is quite distinct from that of either Chatterton or Van Maanen, and accordingly, any exercise in comparison can be of only limited utility.

4. See Ch. 7 section B(3) *supra*.

5. See also Brewer (1991) pp. 232-233 on the tension between ranks in the RUC over the relevance of 'private' problems to work, and the relationship between this tension and the peculiar demands of police image management in an environment where legitimacy problems are deep-rooted.

6. Goffman (1959) p. 114 and ch. 3 generally.

7. See ch. 6 section B(2) and ch. 8 section B. (1) *supra*.

8. See ch. 5 section A(1) *supra*.

9. See ch. 4 section B(3) *supra* and Appendix 2 Table 14 *infra*.

10. Goffman (1959) p. 137.

11. See ch. 5 section A(1) *supra*.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. See also ch. 6 section B(1) and ch 7 section C(1) *supra*.

15. Manning (1977) p. 9.

16. See ch. 6 section B(3) and (4(1) and ch. 8 section B(1) *supra*.

17. See Fox (1990) p. 433.

18. See in particular Holdaway (1983) pp. 138-154, (1988) Shearing and Ericson (1988), Brewer (1991) pp. 143-145, 205-209.

19. See for example Fielding (1984), Shearing and Ericson (1988) esp. pp. 14-15, Bayley and Bittner (1984) pp. 53-55.

20. See ch. 6 section B(1) *supra*.

21. See for example Mulkay (1988), Fox (1990).

22. Douglas (1985) p. 96. See also Holdaway (1983) pp. 138-154, esp. p. 154.

23. Fox (1990) p. 432. See also Mulkay (1988). See also Brewer (1991) pp. 143-145 for a discussion of how humour provides the medium through which the otherwise taboo subject of religious bigotry may be broached in exchanges between Protestant and Catholic officers.

24. Mulkay (1988) p. 15.

25. Koestler (1964).

26. Fox (1990) p. 433. quoting from Bateson (1955).

27. Sennett (1980) esp. chs. 2 and 3.

28. These are all aspects of competent authority which are facilitated by a bureaucratic pattern of organisation. See for example Weber (1968) vol. 3 p. 973, Bendix (1966) pp. 426-430.

29. See ch. 3 section B(1) *supra*.

30. See ch. 6 section B(1), (3) and 4(i) *supra*.

31. See ch. 5 section A(1) *supra*.

32. See ch. 4 section B(3) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 13-15 *infra*.

33. Chatterton (1987b) p. 143.

34. Punch (1983b) p. 229.

35. One group who may fall into this category are 'one-ticket' sergeants, so called because while they possess the basic qualifications for sergeant rank they have not passed a second, more advanced set of examinations which is a prerequisite of further promotion.

36. On the differences in demographic characteristics, background socialization, work patterns and inter-rank relations between Uniform and C.I.D. branches see for example Kinsey (1984) chs. 2-4, Policy Studies Institute (1983b) chs. 2, 3 and7.

37. See for example James (1979), Jefferson (1990) ch. 4.

38. See ch. 4 section B(2) *supra* and ch. 6 section B(1) and note 36 *supra*.

39. See ch. 6 sectionB(1) *supra*.

40. See ch. 7 sections B and C *supra*.

41. See ch. 7 section C(2) *supra*.

42. Maslach and Jackson (1979) pp. 59-62.

43. Reiner (1978) ch. 12.

44. See Section C *infra*.

45. Of the 39 sergeants who professed themselves to be fairly or very ambitious for further advancement (see Appendix 2 Table 56 *infra*) only 5 were of the group of 36 (13.9%) whom we have presumptively classified as artisans, while - again using our presumptive classifications - 23 (of 28=81.1%) were aspirant executives and the other 11 (of 15=73.3%) were exponents of the balanced approach.

1. See in particular chs. 7-10 *supra*.

2. Twining and Miers (1976) p. 48.

3. In fact, only the various sub-categories of policy rules purport to regulate police activity in a direct manner. See text *infra*.

4. This residual category is fairly large. It includes not only the mandate rules as established by the Royal Commission in 1962 (see text *infra*), but also a broad range of what is known as quasi-legislation, (see Ganz (1987)). Such rules are not primary legislation, nor, unlike the various categories of delegated legislation, are they underpinned by primary legislation which authorises their status as rules of law. Nevertheless such rules may resemble legal rules in form and content and may also be recognized for some purposes by the courts. Examples in the policing context include the Codes of Guidance issued under P.A.C.E. relating to operational police powers (see further ch. 6 note 94 *supra*) and at a more general policy level, the series of Home Office and Scottish Office directive circulars, including the key recent circulars relating to efficiency and effectiveness (see ch. 7 note 47 *supra*). For general discussion of circulars, see Brogden (1982) pp. 114-116.

5. Greenwood and Hinings (1976) pp. 18-19.

6. But also include central government guidance contained in directive circulars. See note 4 *supra*.

7. These rules are for the most part contained in the Police Act 1964 (for England and Wales) and the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (for Scotland), both of which statutes incorporated a number of the recommendations made by the 1962 Royal Commission (Cmnd. 1728). The new system of consultative committees which provides an important adjunct to the tripartite structure in England and Wales is based on s106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. For analysis see Morgan (1989).

8. Thus while many detailed questions concerning task specification and the functional division of labour are decided internally through organisational prescriptions, general issues such as the number of ranks, the overall establishment, and the financial infrastructure are resolved under statutory authority. For Scotland see Police (Scotland) Act 1967 ss 7 (ranks), s 3 (establishment) and s32 (finance). Underlining the argument that the various categories of rules are complexly interwoven, these very provisions also fall within the category of external policy-making rules, as they allocate the various structural tasks and responsibilities in question between different constituencies.

9. Police (Scotland) Act 1967, s17.

10. Unlike the English position after P.A.C.E., in Scotland the general law of police powers, with the one significant exception of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 ss1-4 (see ch.6 section B(4) *supra*), is still based upon common law rather than statute. See Ewing and Finnie (1988) ch.2.

11. See ch.7 section C *supra*.

12. See for example the recommendations for change made by the Home Affairs Committee (3rd Report 1988-89) HC 110, in particular, the view that the Special Course (broadly equivalent to the Scottish AP programme) should become the principal means of identifying the future leaders of the police service (*para.*79). For qualified endorsement of this view see HM Government (1989) *para.* 37 and Appendix A. See also the recommendation by the Association of Police Officers that a more broadly-based "starred " system be introduced on a national basis for the identification of officers of high promotion potential (ACPO (1990) ch.10.

13. For general discussion, see *The Independent*, 26th January and 5th February 1990. For arguments in favour see Chessyre(1990); for arguments against see Reiner (1990).

14. See Reiner (1990). Reiner also makes the point that the officer-class idea could be detrimental to police-public relations as its adoption might signal endorsement of a more militaristic attitude within the police and a retreat from a more general service orientation. On the dangers of the adoption of 'paramilitary ' attitudes and practices more generally, see Jefferson (1990).

15. See ch.2 note 156 and ch.7 note 47 *supra* and the sources there referred to.

16. See in particularthe criticisms made by Waddington (1986a), (1986b). See also Walker, Bradley and Wilkie (1987), Reiner (1988b). For defence of PBO see Butler (1985), (1986).

17. Horton (1989) p.43.

18. See ch.3 section B(1) *supra*.

19. See Ackroyd and Helliwell (forthcoming), Allan (1989) ch.6. See also ch.7 note 47 *supra*.

20. See Butler (1986) esp. pp.165- 166.

21. The seeds of the arguments led in the last two paragraphs may be found in Walker, Bradley and Wilkie (1987) p.74.

22. See the sources cited at ch.1 note 22 *supra*.

23. See for example Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) pp.155-156 and ch.5 generally.

24. See in particular the cogent arguments of McKenzie (1990).

25. See Jeffeson and Grimshaw (1984a) ch. 6. See further ch. 1 note 24 *supra* and note 41 *infra*.

26. Lustgarten (1986) pp. 19-20.

27. For discussion of ideas of community policing and minimal policing see ch. 7 section B(2)(i) *supra*. See also Alderson (1979), Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) for statements of these respective philosophies.

28. See in particular Johnson (1988), Reiner (1989d), (1989e), Loveday (1990).

29. See for example Home Affairs Committee (1990) esp. *paras.* 141-144. On government indecision over this question see Loveday (1990) p. 654.

30. See, for example, reforms introduced by the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988 to allow choice of landlord by public sector tenants and to encourage the formation of housing co-operatives, and by the School Boards (Scotland) Act 1988 to allow parental involvement in the running of local authority schools.

31. At the time of writing two potentially significant developments are underfoot whose precise implications for the system of police accountability are as yet unclear. First, on 14th March 1991, the day of the release of the Birmingham Six, the Home Secretary announced the setting up of a Royal Commission - the first since 1977 when the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure was appointed - to evaluate all stages of the process of criminal investigation. Its terms of reference have not yet been precisely defined, but it would seem from these early developments that the Commission, which is to be chaired by the sociologist Lord Runciman of Doxford (see ch. 3 note 1 *supra*), will not be directly concerned with the question of police accountability at the widest level, although, if the arguments in respect of the policy trilemma set out in ch. 1 are recalled, it may prove difficult to cordon off these general issues from questions concerning the probity and legitimacy of police investigations in particular cases.
A second development was signalled by the announcement by the Secretary of State for the Environment on 21st March 1991, in the wake of the government's decision to phase out the poll tax, that a fundamental review and overhaul of the structure of local government is planned. The government's intention seems to be to move towards a unitary system of local authorities. In England and Wales, although a Local Government Commission will be appointed to take into account local views, the government's preference appears to be for the abolition of the county rather than the district level. If the organisational structure of the police is otherwise to remain intact, as appears likely given the recent waning of enthusiasm in Home Office circles for a new system of regional 'super-forces' (see

Guardian 22/3/91), the shire forces will require joint police boards made up of political representatives from the district level, along the lines of the joint boards which have overseen the metropolitan forces since the abolition of the metroplitan counties in 1985. In Scotland, by contrast, it would appear to be the government's intention, with the abolition of the larger regional authorities, to transfer their powers and responsibilities vis-a-vis the police to the Scottish Office (see Guardian 19/3/91). Although, on the face of it, this is a move towards centralization, in view of the goverment's reluctance to endorse this trend more widely within Britain, it is presumably intended to introduce a secondary structure of accountability in the Scottish context couched at the level of the new unitary system, which will be more localized than the present regional structure. Accordingly, these tentative developments, even if they survive the next general election, do not necessarily sound the deathknell for local police accountability.

32. For assessment of the present system see for example Loveday (1990) pp.650-651, Davies (1990).

33. For the present position in Scotland see Police (Scotland) Act 1967, ss 4 and 26, and regulations made thereunder. See also Magistrates of Kilmarnock v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1961 S.C. 350.

34. For the present position in Scotland see Police (Scotland) Act 1967 s15.

35. See for example Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) esp. chs.8 and 9.

36. See ch.4 section B(5) *supra* and Appendix 2 Tables 36-40 *infra*.

37. See ch.3 sectionC(2) *supra*. For a general defence of the virtues of bureaucracy provided it is supplemented by other models of decision-making in appropriate spheres - in particular by democratic decision-making in the sphere of political decisions - see Beetham (1987) ch. 3.

38. Goldsmith (1990) esp.p.104 *et seq.*.

39. Reiner (1985b) ch.6 esp. p.181.

40. For how such a shift in perception may take place even under present arrangements, see for example Simey's personal account of her changing perceptions of police problems during her 'activist' period as chair of Merseyside Police Authority (Simey (1988)).

41. For this reason - that accountability would be rendered more direct - Jefferson and Grimshaw's idea that political responsibility for policing should be hived off from other areas of local government is attractive (Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984a) pp.175-180. Their additional proposal, that such a body should be responsible for promulgating and securing an integrated conception of public

justice, (ch.5) is, however, perhaps too exacting. Provided that there was a requirement of the elected body to publish their mandate and to review it on a periodical basis, the demands of accountability could perhaps be better served in terms of a more pragmatic, and more realistic statement of policing goals which did not purport to subsume all policy preferences under a single grand design. See ch.7. section B(2)(i) *supra* for a discussion of the complexities and pitfalls which would inevitably attend any attempt to develop a normative theory of policing in holistic terms.

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APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SERGEANTS - SCHEDULE A

1. Could you provide me with a brief description of your career in the police service so far ?

2. What training have you received for and within the rank of sergeant ?

3. How hard did you find it to make the transition from constable to sergeant rank ?

(a) very easy
(b) fairly easy
(c) quite difficult
(d) very difficult

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

4. If you have done more than one job within the rank of sergeant, how difficult did you find the transition from your previous to your present job ?

(a) very easy
(b) fairly easy
(c) quite difficult
(d) very difficult

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

5. Generally speaking, how well do you think the police organisation prepares officers for the rank of sergeant ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well

6. In what ways, if any, do you believe that the police organisation could better prepare people for the rank of sergeant?

7. Could you provide me with a brief outline of your main priorities within your present job?

8. What is your biggest problem in your present job?

9. What other problems do you face in your present job?

10. Generally speaking, what proportion of your time is taken up with indoor administrative duties and what proportion of it is taken up with outdoor duties?

10(i) In your opinion, does this represent the right balance of priorities?

(a) about right
(b) too little outdoors
(c) too little indoors

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

11. What, in your view, are the attributes of a good constable?

12(i). How important are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - in making a good constable?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(ii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - in making a good sergeant ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(iii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - for more senior ranks?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

13. What do you think is the basis of your authority over the officers under your supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to your rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for you to know the officers under your supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for you to be an expert in the work of those under your supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which you have at your command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

13(a). What do you think is the basis of your inspector's authority over the sergeants and constables under his supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to his rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for him to know the officers under his supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for him to be an expert in the work of those officers under his supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which he has at his command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

13(b). What do you think is the basis of the authority of the more senior ranks in the division over the e sergeants and constables under their command?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the officers under their command personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for themm to be experts in the work of those officers under their command ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which he has at his command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

14. In what significant ways, if at all, do you believe that the role of the sergeant has changed since you joined the service ?

(General answers are requested to this question. This is followed by a nunber of specific probes in an effort to elicit whether particular developments have affected the role of the sergeant. Respondents are asked in turn whether and in what ways changes:
(i) in the structure of the organisation,
(ii) in the quality and aspirations of new recruits,
(iii) in the attitudes of senior officers,
(iv) in the types of technology available to the police service,
(v) in the relationship between the police and key outside groups sush as Procurators- Fiscal and defence lawyers,
(vi) in the attitudes and demands of the general public towards the police service,
(vii) in the law
have affected the job of the sergeant.)

15. Bearing in mind your answer to Question 14, how difficult do you think the role of the sergeant is now compared to what it was when you joined the service ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

16. Do you see the role of the sergeant becoming more or less difficult in the foreseeable future ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) stay much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

17(i). What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and more senior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

17(ii). What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and the constables in your section ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

18. How satisfied are you with the degree to which officers of your rank are consulted in the policy-making process at divisional level ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) very dissatisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

19. Looking at the senior ranks within the division, to which rank or ranks do those officers who have the greatest capacity to affect your job on a day-to-day basis belong ?

20. How well do you think your constables understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(i). How well do you think your inspector understands the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(ii). How well do you think your inspector understands the job that the constables under your command do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(iii). In general, how well do you think that the more senior officers in the division understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(iv) I have heard expressed the view that some members of senior ranks of this force are "out of touch" with the operational needs and difficulties of members of your rank and the constable rank. What truth do you think there is in this viewpoint ?

(a) a lot of truth
(b) some truth
(c) no truth
(d) don't know

(general probe in the case of each answer. Additionally, in the case of those officers who gave answers (a) or (b) a further question is posed as follows:)

20(v) Why do you believe this is so given that all have direct experience as members of junior ranks ?

21. Do you think that the very fact that you work in a ranked organisation, with all that that entails in terms of authority, discipline, dress etc., inhibits candid communication between members of the organisation as compared to other organisations ?

(a) to a great extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

22. How useful do you believe the Police Federation is as a vehicle for communication and consultation between ranks ?

(a) very useful
(b) fairly useful
(c) not very useful
(d) not at all useful

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

23. If you believe it to be desirable, how would you go about improving communication and consultation between the ranks in this division ?

24. What are your views on the merits of the staff appraisal system within this force ?

(a) a very good system
(b) a fairly good system
(c) not a very good system
(d) not a good system at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

25. What do you believe to be the true aims of the staff appraisal system ?

(a) career development
(b) more effective performance by police officers in their present jobs.
(c) a mixture of both

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

26. How important do you believe the counselling interview is as an aspect of the staff appraisal system

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

27. To what extent do you believe there to be a recognisable promotion policy within the force ?

(a) to a large extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask a supplementary question)

27(i) Do you think that the way that promotions are allocated is fair ?

(a) yes
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

28. What do you believe to be the qualities of a good sergeant?

29. Given its lack of straightforward performance measures, policing is a notoriously difficult task to evaluate. Bearing this in mind, how do you set about judging your own performance ?

(a) by reference to the needs and demands of the constables
(b) by reference to the needs and demands of more senior ranks (**specify**)
(c) by reference to your own criteria
(d) a mixture of the above (**specify**)

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

30. If one were to ask the senior officers within this Division to provide a shortlist of the highest quality sergeants, and then one were to ask the sergeants themselves to do the same, how do you think the two lists would compare ?

(a) significant difference
(b) some difference
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(if the answer is either (a) or (b), ask the following supplementary question.)

30(i) Why do you think this is the case ?

(a) due to pesonal differences of opinion
(b) due to different attitudes and priorities based on rank
(c) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

31. Which other rank do you feel closest to in your present job ?

(a) constable
(b) senior rank (**specify**)
(c) a mixture (**specify**)
(d) don't feel close to any other rank.

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

31. (i) Which other rank do you feel is most supportive of you in your present job ?

(a) constable
(b) senior rank (**specify**)
(c) **a mixture (specify)**
(d) don't feel any other rank is particularly supportive.

32. What are your views on the quality of relationships between different departments in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

33. How significant is the role of the sergeant in contributing to harmonious relationships beween departments ?

(a) very significant
(b) fairly significant
(c) not very significant
(d) not at all significant

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

34. Do you consider yourself to be a manager in your present job?

(a) yes
(b) no

35. If not, at what rank do you believe that management within the police service starts ?

36. What does the notion of management mean to you in the context of the police service ?

37. How do you think the job of a manager in the police service compares with the job of a manager in other large organisations?

(a) completely different
(b) fairly different
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

38. Do any other terms taken from the context of industrial and commercial management, such as foreman or supervisor, strike you as appropriate terms in which to desscribe your present job ?

39. If you had the power - and the responsibility - of the rank of chief constable for a short period of time, is there anything you would do, either as a one off measure or to initiate a long term course of change, which would improve the role of sergeant or facilitate its performance in any way ?

40. We have talked about relationships and differences between ranks. Do you believe that there are any attributes or traits or characteristics which tend to set police officers in general apart from other occupational groups ?

(a) yes (**specify**)
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer, with particular reference to implications for the job of sergeant)

41. Why did you join the police?

42. To what extent has your career in the police lived up to your expectations

(a) lived up to them
(b) exceeded them
(c) not lived up to them

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

43. How would you rate your level of job satisfaction in your present rank ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) not at all satisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask the following supplementary question)

43(i) How would you compare your job satisfaction in your previous rank with that which you have experienced as a constable

(a) higher
(b) lower
(c) much the same

44. Which is the most difficult rank that you have occupied up till now in your service ?

44(i) Which do you think is the most difficult rank to occupy in the police service ?

45. Are you ambitious for further advancement within the service?

(a) very ambitious
(b) fairly ambitious
(c) not very ambitious
(d) not at all anbitious

(**probe** in the case of each answer, Then ask the following supplementary question.)

45(i) How does your level of ambition now compare with your level of ambition in your previous rank ?

(a) more ambitious
(b) less ambitious
(c) much the same

46. How frequently do you socialize with your fellow officers now as compared to when you were a constable

(a) more often
(b) less often
(c) much the same

47. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to your fellow officers changed during the course of your service ?

48. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the law and to the legal system changed during the course of your service?

49. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the general public changed during the course of your service ?

50. In what ways, if any, have your views of the goals of the police service changed during the course of your service ?

51. We have talked about a nunber of different types of change In what other general ways has being a police officer changed your attitudes, priorities and character traits ?

(**probe** generally. More particularly, suggest that in so far as there are difficulties involved in answering this question solely on the basis of personal reflection and intuition, it might be helpful to consider the views and attitudes of other people who have known you at various points in your police career and even before you joined the police service.)

Note - In the case of all open-ended questions, probing techniques should be utilized as appropriate.

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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR INSPECTORS - SCHEDULE B

1. Could you provide me with a brief description of your career in the police service so far ?

2. What training have you received for and within the rank of inspector ?

3. How hard did you find it to make the transition from sergeant to inspector rank ?

(a) very easy
(b) fairly easy
(c) quite difficult
(d) very difficult

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

3(i) Did you find it more or less difficult than the transition from constable to sergeant rank ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) much the same

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

4. If you have done more than one job within the rank of inspector, how difficult did you find the transition from your previous to your present job ?

(a) very easy
(b) fairly easy
(c) quite difficult
(d) very difficult

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

5. Generally speaking, how well do you think the police organisation prepares officers for the rank of inspector ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well

6. Generally speaking, how well do you think the police organisation prepares officers for the rank of sergeant ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well

7. In what ways, if any, do you believe that the police organisation could better prepare people for the ranks of inspector or sergeant?

8. Could you provide me with a brief outline of your main priorities within your present job?

9. What is your biggest problem in your present job?

10. What other problems do you face in your present job?

11. What do you think are the main priorities of your sergeants in their present jobs

12. What do you think are the biggest problems which they face in their jobs ?

13. Generally speaking, what proportion of your time is taken up with indoor administrative duties and what proportion of it is taken up with outdoor duties?

13(i) In your opinion, is this the right balance ?

(a) about right
(b) too much indoors
(c) to much outdoors

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

14. Generally speaking, what proportion of your sergeants' time do you think is taken up with indoor administrative duties and what proportion with outdoor duties?

14(i) In your opinion, is this the right balance ?

(a) about right
(b) too much indoors
(c) to much outdoors

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

15. What, in your view, are the attributes of a good constable?

16(i). How important are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - in making a good constable?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(ii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - in making a good sergeant ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - for more senior ranks?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

17. What do you think is the basis of your authority over the officers under your supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to your rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for you to know the officers under your supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for you to be an expert in the work of those under your supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which you have at your command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

18. What do you think is the basis of the authority of your sergeants over the officers under their supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the officers under their supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for them to be experts in the work of the officers under their supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important to them is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which they have at their command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

18(i). What do you think is the basis of the authority of more senior officers in the division over the ranks under their command?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the officers under their supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for them to be experts in the work of the officers under their supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important to them is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which they have at their command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

19. In what significant ways, if at all, do you believe that the roles of the inspector and of the sergeant have changed since you joined the service ?

(General answers are requested to this question. This is followed by a nunber of specific probes in an effort to elicit whether particular developments have affected the role of the inspector and of the sergeant. Respondents are asked in turn whether and in what ways changes:
(i) in the structure of the organisation,
(ii) in the quality and aspirations of new recruits,
(iii) in the attitudes of senior officers,
(iv) in the types of technology available to the police service,
(v) in the relationship between the police and key outside groups sush as Procurators- fiscal and defence lawyers,
(vi) in the attitudes and demands of the general public towards the police service,
(vii) in the law
have affected the jobs of the inspector and of the sergeant.)

20. Bearing in mind your answer to Question 19, how difficult do you think the role of the inspector is now compared to what it was when you joined the service ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

21. Bearing in mind your answer to Question 19, how difficult do you think the role of the sergeant is now compared to what it was when you joined the service ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

22. Do you see the role of the inspector becoming more or less difficult in the foreseeable future ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) stay much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

23. Do you see the role of the sergeant becoming more or less difficult in the foreseeable future ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) stay much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

24. What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and more senior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

24(i). What are your views on the quality of communications between the sergeants and more senior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

25. What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and more junior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

26. How satisfied are you with the degree to which officers of your rank are consulted in the policy-making process at divisional level?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) very dissatisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

27. Looking at the senior ranks within the division, to which rank or ranks do those officers who have the greatest capacity to affect your job on a day-to-day basis belong ?

28. How well do you think your sergeants understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

28. (i) How well do you think that the constables under your command understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

28(ii). In general, how well do you think that the more senior officers in the division understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

28(iii). In general, how well do you think that the more senior officers in the division understand the job that the officers under your command do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

28(iv) I have heard expressed the view that some members of senior ranks of this force are "out of touch" with the operational needs and difficulties of members of your rank and the constable rank. What truth do you think there is in this viewpoint ?

(a) a lot of truth
(b) some truth
(c) no truth
(d) don't know

(general probe in the case of each answer. Additionally, in the case of those officers who gave answers (a) or (b) a further question is posed as follows:)

28(v) Why do you believe this is so given that all have direct experience as members of junior ranks ?

29. Do you think that the very fact that you work in a ranked organisation, with all that that entails in terms of authority, discipline, dress etc., inhibits candid communication between members of the organisation as compared to other organisations ?

(a) to a great extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all
(d) don't know

(probe in the case of each answer)

30. How useful do you believe the Police Federation is as a vehicle for communication and consultation between ranks ?

(a) very useful
(b) fairly useful
(c) not very useful
(d) not at all useful

(probe in the case of each answer)

31. If you believe it to be desirable, how would you go about improving communication and consultation between the ranks in this division ?

32. What are your views on the merits of the staff appraisal system within this force ?

(a) a very good system
(b) a fairly good system
(c) not a very good system
(d) not a good system at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

33. What do you believe to be the true aims of the staff appraisal system ?

(a) career development
(b) more effective performance by police officers in their present jobs.
(c) a mixture of both

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

34. How important do you believe the counselling interview is as an aspect of the staff appraisal system

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

35. To what extent do you believe there to be a recognisable promotion policy within the force ?

(a) to a large extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask a supplementary question)

35(i) Do you think that the way that promotions are allocated is fair ?

(a) yes
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

36. What do you believe to be the qualities of a good inspector?

37. What do you believe to be the qualities of a good sergeant?

38. Given its lack of straightforward performance measures, policing is a notoriously difficult task to evaluate. Bearing this in mind, how do you set about judging your own performance ?

(a) by reference to the needs and demands of your juniors
(b) by reference to the needs and demands of more senior ranks
(**specify**)
(c) by reference to your own criteria
(d) a mixture of the above
(**specify**)

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

39. If one were to ask the senior officers within this Division to provide a shortlist of the highest quality inspectors, and then one were to ask the inspectors themselves to do the same, how do you think the two lists would compare ?

(a) significant difference
(b) some difference
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(if the answer is either (a) or (b), ask the following supplementary question.)

39(i) Why do you think this is the case ?

(a) due to pesonal differences of opinion
(b) due to different attitudes and priorities based on rank
(c) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

40. If one were to ask the senior officers within this Division to provide a shortlist of the highest quality sergeants, and then one were to ask the sergeants themselves to do the same, how do you think the two lists would compare ?

(a) significant difference
(b) some difference
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(if the answer is either (a) or (b), ask the following supplementary question.)

40(i) Why do you think this is the case ?

(a) due to pesonal differences of opinion
(b) due to different attitudes and priorities based on rank
(c) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

41. Which other rank do you feel closest to in your present job ?

(a) junior rank (**specify**)
(b) senior rank (**specify**)
(c) a mixture (**specify**)
(d) don't feel close to any other rank.

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

41.(i) Which other rank do you feel is most supportive of you in your present job ?

(a) junior rank (**specify**)
(b) senior rank (specify)
(c) a mixture (specify)
(d) don't feel particularly close to any other rank

42. What are your views on the quality of relationships between different departments in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

43. How significant is the role of the inspector in contributing to harmonious relationships beween departments ?

(a) very significant
(b) fairly significant
(c) not very significant
(d) not at all significant

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

44. How significant is the role of the sergeant in contributing to harmonious relationships beween departments ?

(a) very significant
(b) fairly significant
(c) not very significant
(d) not at all significant

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

45. Do you consider yourself to be a manager in your present job?

(a) yes
(b) no

46. At what rank do you believe that management within the police service starts ?

47. What does the notion of management mean to you in the context of the police service ?

48. How do you think the job of a manager in the police service compares with the job of a manager in other large organisations?

(a) completely different
(b) fairly different
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

49. Do any other terms taken from the context of industrial and commercial management, such as foreman or supervisor, strike you as appropriate terms in which to describe your present job or the job of your sergeants?

50. If you had the power - and the responsibility - of the rank of chief constable for a short period of time, is there anything you would do, either as a one off measure or to initiate a long term course of change, which would improve the role of the inspector or facilitate its performance in any way ?

51. If you had the power - and the responsibility - of the rank of chief constable for a short period of time, is there anything you would do, either as a one off measure or to initiate a long term course of change, which would improve the role of the sergeant or facilitate its performance in any way ?

52. We have talked about relationships and differences between ranks. Do you believe that there are any attributes or traits or characteristics which tend to set police officers in general apart from other occupational groups ?

(a) yes (**specify**)
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer, with particular reference to implications for the jobs of inspector and sergeant)

53. Why did you join the police?

54. To what extent has your career in the police lived up to your expectations

(a) lived up to them
(b) exceeded them
(c) not lived up to them

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

55. How would you rate your level of job satisfaction in your present rank ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) not at all satisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask the following supplementary question)

55(i) Which of the ranks that you have occupied until now have you found the most satisfying ?

56. Which of the ranks that you have occupied until now have you found the most difficult ?

56(i) What do you think is the most difficult rank to occupy in the police service?

57. Are you ambitious for further advancement within the service?

(a) very ambitious
(b) fairly ambitious
(c) not very ambitious
(d) not at all anbitious

(**probe** in the case of each answer, Then ask the following supplementary question.)

57(i) How does your level of ambition now compare with your level of ambition before you attained the rank of inspector ?

(a) more ambitious
(b) less ambitious
(c) much the same

58. How frequently do you socialize with your fellow officers now as compared to when you were of more junior rank

(a) more often
(b) less often
(c) much the same

59. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to your fellow officers changed during the course of your service ?

60. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the law and to the legal system changed during the course of your service?

61. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the general public changed during the course of your service ?

62. In what ways, if any, have your views of the goals of the police service changed during the course of your service ?

63. We have talked about a nunber of different types of change ? In what other general ways has being a police officer changed your attitudes, priorities and character traits ?

(**probe** generally. More particularly, suggest that in so far as there are difficulties involved in answering this question solely on the basis of personal reflection and intuition, it might be helpful to consider the views and attitudes of other people who have known you at various points in your police career and even before you joined the police service.)

Note - in the case of all open-ended questions, utilize probes as appropriate.

* * * * *

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CHIEF INSPECTORS AND ABOVE

SCHEDULE C

1. Could you provide me with a brief description of your career in the police service so far ?

2. Generally speaking, in terms of training and other methods, how well do you think the police organisation prepares officers for the rank of sergeant ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well

3. In what ways, if any, do you believe that the police organisation could better prepare people for the rank of sergeant?

4. Could you provide me with a brief outline of your main priorities within your present job?

5. What is your biggest problem in your present job?

6. What other problems do you face in your present job?

7. What do you think are the main priorities of your sergeants in their present jobs

8. What do yoy think are the biggest problems which they face in their jobs ?

9. Generally speaking, what proportion of your sergeants' time do you think is taken up with indoor administrative duties and what proportion with outdoor duties?

9(i) In your opinion, is this the right balance of priorities ?

(a) about righte
(b) too much indoors
(c) too much outdoors

10. What, in your view, are the attributes of a good constable?

11(i). How important are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - in making a good constable?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(ii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - inmaking a good sergeant?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(iii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - for more senior ranks?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

11. What do you think is the basis of your authority over the officers under your command?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to your rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for you to know the officers under your command personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for you to be an expert in the work of those under your command ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which you have at your command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

12. What do you think is the basis of the authority of your sergeants over the officers under their supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the officers under their supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for them to be experts in the work of the officers under their supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important to them is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which they have at their command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

12(i) What do you think is the basis of the authority of your inspectors over the officers under their supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the officers under their supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for them to be experts in the work of the officers under their supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important to them is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which they have at their command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

13. In what significant ways, if at all, do you believe that the roles of the sergeant has changed since you joined the service ?

(General answers are requested to this question. This is followed by a nunber of specific probes in an effort to elicit whether particular developments have affected the role of the sergeant. Respondents are asked in turn whether and in what ways changes:
(i) in the structure of the organisation,
(ii) in the quality and aspirations of new recruits,
(iii) in the attitudes of senior officers,
(iv) in the types of technology available to the police service,
(v) in the relationship between the police and key outside groups sush as Procurators- fiscal and defence lawyers,
(vi) in the attitudes and demands of the general public towards the police service,
(vii) in the law
have affected the job of the sergeant.)

14. Bearing in mind your answer to Question 13, how difficult do you think the role of the sergeant is now compared to what it was when you joined the service ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

15. Do you see the role of the sergeant becoming more or less difficult in the foreseeable future ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) stay much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(Chief Inspectors and Superintendents answer question 16, Chief Superintendents move directly on to question 17)

16. What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and more senior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

17. What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and more junior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

18. How satisfied are you with the degree to which officers of sergeant rank are consulted in the policy-making process at divisional level ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) very dissatisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

19. In general, how well do you think that the sergeants under your command understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

19.(i) How well do you think that the constables under your command understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

19(ii). In general, how well do you think that the inspectors under your command understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

19(iii) I have heard expressed the view that some members of senior ranks of this force are "out of touch" with the operational needs and difficulties of members of the junior ranks. What truth do you think there is in this viewpoint ?

(a) a lot of truth
(b) some truth
(c) no truth
(d) don't know

(general probe in the case of each answer. Additionally, in the case of those officers who gave answers (a) or (b) a further question is posed as follows:)

19(iv) Why do you believe this is so given that you all have direct experience as members of junior ranks ?

20. Do you think that the very fact that you work in a ranked organisation, with all that that entails in terms of authority, discipline, dress etc., inhibits candid communication between members of the organisation as compared to other organisations ?

(a) to a great extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

21. How useful do you believe the Police Federation is as a vehicle for communication and consultation between ranks ?

(a) very useful
(b) fairly useful
(c) not very useful
(d) not at all useful

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

22. If you believe it to be desirable, how would you go about improving communication and consultation between the ranks in this division ?

23. What are your views on the merits of the staff appraisal system within this force ?

(a) a very good system
(b) a fairly good system
(c) not a very good system
(d) not a good system at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

24. What do you believe to be the true aims of the staff appraisal system ?

(a) career development
(b) more effective performance by police officers in their present jobs.
(c) a mixture of both

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

25. How important do you believe the counselling interview is as an aspect of the staff appraisal system

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

26. To what extent do you believe there to be a recognisable promotion policy within the force ?

(a) to a large extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask a supplementary question)

26(i) Do you think that the way that promotions are allocated is fair ?

(a) yes
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

27. What do you believe to be the qualities necessary to be a good officer in your present rank?

28. What do you believe to be the qualities of a good sergeant?

29. Given its lack of straightforward performance measures, policing in general, and the job of the sergeant in particular, is a notoriously difficult task to evaluate. Bearing this in mind, how do you set about judging the performance of the sergeants under your command?

30. If one were to ask the senior officers within this Division to provide a shortlist of the highest quality sergeants, and then one were to ask the sergeants themselves to do the same, how do you think the two lists would compare ?

(a) significant difference
(b) some difference
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(if the answer is either (a) or (b), ask the following supplementary question.)

30(i) Why do you think this is the case ?

(a) due to pesonal differences of opinion
(b) due to different attitudes and priorities based on rank
(c) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

31. Which other rank do you feel closest to in your present job ?

(a) junior rank (**specify**)
(b) senior rank (**specify**)
(c) a mixture (**specify**)
(d) don't feel close to any other rank.

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

31. (1) Which other rank do you feel is most supportive of you in your present job ?

(a) junior rank (**specify**)
(b) **senior rank (specify)**
(c) **a mixture (specify)**
(d) don't feel that any other rank is particularly supportive

32. What are your views on the quality of relationships between different departments in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

33. How significant is the role of the sergeant in contributing to harmonious relationships beween departments ?

(a) very significant
(b) fairly significant
(c) not very significant
(d) not at all significant

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

34. Do you consider yourself to be a manager in your present job?

(a) yes
(b) no

34. At what rank do you believe that management within the police service starts ?

35. What does the notion of management mean to you in the context of the police service ?

36. How do you think the job of a manager in the police service compares with the job of a manager in other large organisations?

(a) completely different
(b) fairly different
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

37. Do any other terms taken from the context of industrial and commercial management, such as foreman or supervisor, strike you as appropriate terms in which to describe the jobs of the more junior promoted ranks?

38. If you had the power - and the responsibility - of the rank of chief constable for a short period of time, is there anything you would do, either as a one off measure or to initiate a long term course of change, which would improve the role of the sergeant or facilitate its performance in any way ?

39. We have talked about relationships and differences between ranks. Do you believe that there are any attributes or traits or characteristics which tend to set police officers in general apart from other occupational groups ?

(a) yes (**specify**)
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer, with particular reference to implications for the job of sergeant)

40. Why did you join the police?

41. To what extent has your career in the police lived up to your expectations

(a) lived up to them
(b) exceeded them
(c) not lived up to them

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

42. How would you rate your level of job satisfaction in your present rank ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) not at all satisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask the following supplementary question)

42(i) Which of the ranks that you have occupied have you found the most satisfying ?

43. Which of the ranks that you have occupied until now have you found the most difficult ?

43(i) Which do you think is the most difficult rank to occupy in the police service ?

44. Are you ambitious for further advancement within the service?

(a) very ambitious
(b) fairly ambitious
(c) not very ambitious
(d) not at all anbitious

(**probe** in the case of each answer, Then ask the following supplementary question.)

44(i) Have you become more or less ambitious as you have advance through the ranks ?

(a) more ambitious
(b) less ambitious
(c) much the same

45. How frequently do you socialize with your fellow officers now as compared to when you were of more junior rank

(a) more often
(b) less often
(c) much the same

46. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to your fellow officers changed during the course of your service ?

47. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the law and to the legal system changed during the course of your service?

48. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the general public changed during the course of your service ?

49. In what ways, if any, have your views of the goals of the police service changed during the course of your service ?

50. We have talked about a nunber of different types of change ? In what other general ways has being a police officer changed your attitudes, priorities and character traits ?

(**probe** generally. More particularly, suggest that in so far as there are difficulties involved in answering this question solely on the basis of personal reflection and intuition, it might be helpful to consider the views and attitudes of other people who have known you at various points in your police career and even before you joined the police service.)

Note - in the case of all open-ended questions, utilize probes as appropriate

* * * * *

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CONSTABLES - SCHEDULE D

1. Could you provide me with a brief description of your career in the police service so far ?

2. What training have you received for and within the rank of constable ?

3. In what ways, if at all, do you think that the police organisation could better prepare you for and within your present job.

4. Could you provide me with a brief outline of your main priorities within your present job?

5. What is your biggest problem in your present job?

6. What other problems do you face in your present job?

7. What do you think are the main priorities of your sergeants in their present jobs

8. What do yoy think are the biggest problems which they face in their jobs ?

9. Generally speaking, what proportion of your time is taken up with indoor administrative duties and what proportion of it is taken up with outdoor duties ?

9(i) In your opinion, is this the right balance of priorities?

(a) about right
(b) too little indoors
(c) too little outdoors

10. Generally speaking, what proportion of your sergeants' time do you think is taken up with indoor administrative duties and what proportion with outdoor supervisory duties?

10(i) In your opinion, is this the right balance of priorities?

(a) about right
(b) too little indoors
(c) too little outdoors

11. What, in your view, are the attributes of a good constable?

12(i). How important are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - in making a good constable?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(ii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - for sergeants?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

(iii) How inportant are formal qualifications - whether police related or academic - for more senior ranks?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

13. Generally speaking, what do you think is the basis of the authority of your sergeant(s) over the officers under their supervision?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the officers under their supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for them to be expert in the work of the officers under their supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which they have at their command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

14. Generally speaking, what do you think is the basis of the authority of your inspector over the constables under his command?

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to his rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for him to know the officers under his supervision personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for him to be expert in the work of the officers under his supervision ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which he has at his command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

15. Generally speaking, what do you think is the basis of the authority of more senior officers in the division over the constables.

(General answers to this question are requested, and then five subsidiary questions are asked in an attempt to prompt a more comprehensive response. The answer to each of these five questions is then subject to further probing)

(i) How important is the formal authority which attaches to their rank ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(ii) How important is it for them to know the constables personally ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iii) How important is it for them to be experts in the work of the constables ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(iv) How important to them is the use or threat of discipline, or of other visible forms of authority ?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(v) How important is the use of rewards and incentives which they have at their command?

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

16. Do you see the role of the sergeant becoming more or less difficult in the foreseeable future ?

(a) more difficult
(b) less difficult
(c) stay much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

17. What are your views on the quality of communications between your rank and more senior ranks in the division ?

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

18. How satisfied are you with the degree to which officers of your rank are consulted in the policy-making process at divisional level ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) very dissatisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

19. Looking at the senior ranks within the division, to which rank or ranks do those officers who have the greatest capacity to affect your job on a day-to-day basis belong ?

20. How well do you think your sergeants understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(i). How well do you think your inspector understands the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(ii) Generally speaking, how well do you think that the more senior officers in the division understand the job that you do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(iii). In general, how well do you think that the more senior officers in the division understand the job that your sergeants do ?

(a) very well
(b) fairly well
(c) not very well
(d) not at all well
(e) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

20(iv) I have heard expressed the view that some members of senior ranks of this force are "out of touch" with the operational needs and difficulties of members of your rank and the sergeant rank. What truth do you think there is in this viewpoint ?

(a) a lot of truth
(b) some truth
(c) no truth
(d) don't know

(general probe in the case of each answer. Additionally, in the case of those officers who gave answers (a) or (b) a further question is posed as follows:)

20(v) Why do you believe this is so given that all have direct experience as members of junior ranks ?

21. Do you think that the very fact that you work in a ranked organisation, with all that that entails in terms of authority, discipline, dress etc., inhibits candid communication between members of the organisation as compared to other organisations ?

(a) to a great extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

22 How useful do you believe the Police Federation is as a vehicle for communication and consultation between ranks ?

(a) very useful
(b) fairly useful
(c) not very useful
(d) not at all useful

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

23. If you believe it to be desirable, how would you go about improving communication and consultation between the ranks in this division ?

24. What are your views on the merits of the staff appraisal system within this force ?

(a) a very good system
(b) a fairly good system
(c) not a very good system
(d) not a good system at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

25. What do you believe to be the true aims of the staff appraisal system ?

(a) career development
(b) more effective performance by police officers in their present jobs.
(c) a mixture of both

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

26. How important do you believe the counselling interview is as an aspect of the staff appraisal system

(a) very important
(b) fairly important
(c) not very important
(d) not important at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

27. To what extent do you believe there to be a recognisable promotion policy within the force ?

(a) to a large extent
(b) to some extent
(c) not at all

(**probe** in the case of each answer. Then ask a supplementary question)

27(i) Do you think that the way that promotions are allocated is fair ?

(a) yes
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

28. What do you believe to be the qualities of a good sergeant?

29. If one were to ask the senior officers within this Division to provide a shortlist of the highest quality sergeants, and then one were to ask the constables to do the same, how do you think the two lists would compare ?

(a) significant difference
(b) some difference
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(if the answer is either (a) or (b), ask the following supplementary question.)

29(i) Why do you think this is the case ?

(a) due to pesonal differences of opinion
(b) due to different attitudes and priorities based on rank
(c) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

30. If one were to ask the senior officers within this Division to provide a shortlist of the highest quality constables, and then one were to ask the constables themselves to do the same, how do you think the two lists would compare ?

(a) significant difference
(b) some difference
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(if the answer is either (a) or (b), ask the following supplementary question.)

30(i) Why do you think this is the case ?

(a) due to pesonal differences of opinion
(b) due to different attitudes and priorities based on rank
(c) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

31. Which other rank do you feel closest to in your present job ?

(a) senior rank(s) (**specify**)
(b) don't feel close to any other rank

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

31(i) Which other rank do you feel is most supportive of you in your present job ?

(a) senior rank(s) (**specify**)
(b) don't feel any other rank particularly supportive

32. **What are your views on the quality of relationships between different departments in the division ?**

(a) very good
(b) fairly good
(c) not very good
(d) not at all good

(probe in the case of each answer)

33. How significant is the role of the sergeant in contributing to harmonious relationships beween departments ?

(a) very significant
(b) fairly significant
(c) not very significant
(d) not at all significant

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

34. Do you consider yourself to be a manager in your present job?

(a) yes
(b) no

35. At what rank do you believe that management within the police service starts ?

36. What does the notion of management mean to you in the context of the police service ?

37. How do you think the job of a manager in the police service compares with the job of a manager in other large organisations?

(a) completely different
(b) fairly different
(c) much the same
(d) don't know

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

38. Do any other terms taken from the context of industrial and commercial management, such as foreman or supervisor, strike you as appropriate terms in which to describe the job of your sergeant(s)?

39. If you had the power - and the responsibility - of the rank of chief constable for a short period of time, is there anything you would do, either as a one off measure or to initiate a long term course of change, which would improve the role of the constable or facilitate its performance in any way ?

40. If you had the power - and the responsibility - of the rank of chief constable for a short period of time, is there anything you would do, either as a one off measure or to initiate a long term course of change, which would improve the role of the sergeant or facilitate its performance in any way ?

41. We have talked about relationships and differences between ranks. Do you believe that there are any attributes or traits or characteristics which tend to set police officers in general apart from other occupational groups ?

(a) yes (**specify**)
(b) no

(**probe** in the case of each answer, with particular reference to implications for the jobs of inspector and sergeant)

42. Why did you join the police?

43. To what extent has your career in the police lived up to your expectations

(a) lived up to them
(b) exceeded them
(c) not lived up to them

(**probe** in the case of each answer)

44. How would you rate your level of job satisfaction in your present job ?

(a) very satisfied
(b) fairly satisfied
(c) not very satisfied
(d) not at all satisfied

(**probe** in the case of each answer.)

45. Are you ambitious for advancement within the service?

(a) very ambitious
(b) fairly ambitious
(c) not very ambitious
(d) not at all anbitious

(**probe** in the case of each answer, Then ask the following supplementary question.)

45(i) How does your level of ambition now compare with your level of ambition when you joined?

(a) more ambitious
(b) less ambitious
(c) much the same

46. Which do you think is the most difficult rank to occupy in the police service?

47. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to your fellow officers changed during the course of your service ?

48. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the law and to the legal system changed during the course of your service?

49. In what ways, if any, have your attitudes to the general public changed during the course of your service ?

50. In what ways, if any, have your views of the goals of the police service changed during the course of your service ?

51. We have talked about a nunber of different types of change ? In what other general ways has being a police officer changed your attitudes, priorities and character traits ?

(**probe** generally. More particularly, suggest that in so far as there are difficulties involved in answering this question solely on the basis of personal reflection and intuition, it might be helpful to consider the views and attitudes of other people who have known you at various points in your police career and even before you joined the police service.)

NOTE - in the case of all open-ended questions probing techniques to be utilizd as appropriate

* * * * *

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 1

Difficulty of transition from constable rank(sergeants).

very easy	5(5.3%)
fairly easy	28(29.5%)
quite difficult	51(53.7%)
very difficult	11(11.6%)
Base	95

TABLE 2

Adequacy of preparation by organisation for sergeant rank.

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
very well	5(5.3%)	4(22.2%)	4(30.8%)
fairly well	26(27.4%)	3(16.7%)	5(38.5%)
not very well	47(49.5%)	8(44.4%)	3(23.1%)
not at all well	17(17.9%)	3(16.7%)	1(7.7%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 3

Means of improving preparation for sergeant rank.

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
some improvement possible	61(64.2%)	10(55.6%)	6(46.2%)
more training	35(36.8%)	5(27.8%)	4(30.8%)
anticipatory experience	21(22.1%)	2(11.1%)	2(15.4%)
more experience as constable	20(21.1%)	6(33.3%)	5(38.5%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 4

Importance of formal qualifications for various ranks.

(a) sergeants

	sgts.	insps.	s. o. s
very important	3(3. 2%)	2(11. 1%)	3(23. 1%)
fairly important	34(35. 8%)	6(33. 3%)	4(30. 8%)
not very important	38(40%)	8(44. 4%)	5(38. 5%)
not important at all	20(21. 1%)	2(11. 1%)	1(7. 7%)
Base	95	18	13

(b) more senior ranks

	sgts.	insps	s. o. s
very important	10(10. 6%)	4(22. 2%)	4(30. 8%)
fairly important	41(43. 2%)	8(44. 4%)	7(53. 8%)
not very important	35(36. 8%)	4(22. 2%)	2(15. 4%)
not important at all	9(9. 5%)	2(11. 1%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 5

Adequacy of preparation for inspector rank(inspectors)

(i)Difficulty of transition from sergeant to inspector

very easy	2(11. 1%)
fairly easy	6(33. 3%)
quite difficult	8(44. 4%)
very difficult	2(11. 1%)
Base	18

(ii)Adequacy of preparation by organisation for inspector rank

very well	1(5. 6%)
fairly well	6(33. 3%)
not very well	9(50%)
not at all well	2(11. 1%)
Base	18

TABLE 6

Means of improving preparation for inspector rank(inspectors).

some improvement possible	12(66.7%)
more training	10(55.6%)
anticipatory experience	7(38.9%)
more experience as sergeant	1(5.6%)
Base	18

TABLE 7

Difficulty of transition to inspector rank as compared to sergeant rank(inspectors).

more difficult	5(27.8%)
less difficult	10(55.6%)
much the same	3(16,7%)
Base	18

TABLE 8

Merits of the staff appraisal system

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
very good	9(9.5%)	3(16.7%)	5(38.5%)
fairly good	38(40%)	7(38.9%)	5(38.5%)
not very good	31(32.6%)	7(38.9%)	3(23.1%)
not at all good	17(17.9%)	1(5.6%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 9

Aims of the staff appraisal system

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
individual career development	37(38.9%)	1(5.6%)	0(0%)
effective present performance	12(12.6%)	3(16.7%)	1(7.7%)
mixture of above	46(48.4%)	14(77.8%)	12(92.3%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 10

Importance of the counselling interview

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
very important	12(12.6%)	6(33.3%)	6(46.2%)
fairly important	40(42.1%)	9(50%)	7(53.8%)
not very important	34(35.8%)	2(11.1%)	0(0%)
not at all important	9(9.5%)	1(5.6%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 11

The extent to which a recognisable promotion policy exists.

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
to a large extent	17(17.9%)	6(33.3%)	8(61.5%)
to some extent	53(55.8%)	8(44.4%)	3(23.1%)
not at all	25(26.3%)	4(22.2%)	2(15.4%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 12

Are promotions allocated in a fair manner.

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
yes	54(56.8%)	14(77.8%)	12(92.3%)
no	41(43.2%)	4(22.2%)	1(7.7%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 13

Main priorities of sergeants.

	sgts.	insps.	s.o.s
general policy implementation	57(60%)	15(83.3%)	10(76.9%)
motivating constables'	43(45.3%)	5(27.8%)	7(53.8%)
linkman between ranks	40(42.1%)	9(50%)	6(46.2%)
meeting seniors' admin. demands	37(38.9%)	5(27.8%)	0(0%)
welfare of constables	37(38.9%)	5(27.8%)	7(53.8%)
paperwork	35(36.8%)	7(38,9%)	2(15.4%)
discipline of constables	26(27.4%)	11(61.1%)	8(61.5%)
training of constables	24(25.3%)	6(33.3%)	4(30.8%)
operational duties	23(24.2%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 14

Main problems of sergeants

	sgts.	insps.	s. o. s
lack of resources	63(66.3%)	7(38.9%)	5(38.5%)
paperwork	45(47.4%)	3(16.7%)	2(15.4%)
good relations with juns.&sens.	40(42.1%)	6(33.3%)	4(30.8%)
lack of time	38(40%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
meeting seniors' admin. demands	36(37.9%)	5(27.8%)	0(0%)
maint. discipline over consts.	28(29.5%)	7(38.9%)	6(46.2%)
motivating constables	19(20%)	3(16.7%)	6(46.2%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 15

Qualities of a good sergeant

	sgts.	insps.	s. o. s
can cope under pressure	**45(47.4%)**	10(55.6%)	7(53.8%)
interpersonal skills	37(38.9%)	8(44.4%)	10(76.9%)
organisational & admin. skills	33(34.7%)	8(44.4%)	7(53.8%)
command respect	33(34.7%)	8(44.4%)	6(46.2%)
win trust&confidence of consts.	**28(29.5%)**	4(22.2%)	4(30.8%)
knowledge of law & procedure	27(28.4%)	9(50%)	13(76.9%)
common sense	25(26.3%)	6(33.3%)	6(46.2%)
high motivation	20(21.1%)	5(27.8%)	7(53.8%)
loyalty & dedication to job	14(14.7%)	5(27.8%)	5((38.5%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 16

Main priorities of inspectors(inspectors)

policy implementation (running group)	14(77.8%)
discipline within the group	10(55.6%)
meeting seniors' admin. demands	7(38.9%)
paperwork	7(38.9%)
meeting external demands	7(38.9%)
training of constables	**6(33.3%)**
welfare of junior officers	**5(27.8%)**
linkman between ranks	3(16.7%)
motivation of junior officers	2(11.1%)
Base	18

TABLE 17

Problems of inspectors (inspectors)

lack of resources	12(66.7%)
meeting seniors' admin. demands	8(44.4%)
maint. discip. over juniors	6(33.3%)
meeting external demands	3(16.7%)
paperwork	3(16.7%)
lack of time	2(11.1%)
good relations with juns.& sens.	2(11.1%)
Base	18

TABLE 18

Qualities of a good inspector(inspectors)

organisational & admin skills	10(55.6%)
knowledge of law & procedure	8(44.4%)
command respect from juniors	6(33.3%)
cope under pressure	6(33.3%)
interpersonal skills	5(27.8%)
public relations skills	4(27.8%)
common-sense	4(22.2%)
win trust & confidence of juniors	2(11.1%)
Base	18

TABLE 19

Main priorities of s.o.s(s.o.s)

running division (sub-division)	12(92.3%)
welfare of junior officers	11(84.6%)
discipline of junior officers	10(76.9%)
meeting external demands	8(61.5%)
paperwork	8(61.5%)
meeting seniors' admin. demands	5(38.5%)
motivation of junior officers	2(15.4%)
Base	13

TABLE 20

Problems of s.o.s (s.o.s)

responding to external demands	8(61.5%)
lack of resources	8(61.5%)
lack of time	5(38.5%)
meeting seniors admin. demands	5(38.5%)
paperwork	3(23.1%)
good relations with juns. & sens.	2(15.4%)
discipline of junior officers	2(15.4%)
Base	13

TABLE 21

Qualities of a good s.o. (s.o.s)

interpersonal skills	11(84.6%)
organisational & admin. skills	9(69.2%)
public relations skills	8(61.1%)
command respect from juniors	7(53.8%)
cope under pressure	7(53.8%)
win trust & confidence of juniors	4(30.8%)
knowledge of law & procedure	2(15.4%)
common-sense	2(15.4%)
Base	13

TABLE 22

Basis of authority of sergeant over junior officers (sergeants)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	10(10.5%)	49(51.6%)	30(31.6%)	6(6.3%)	25(26.3%)
fairly imprtnt	29(30.5%)	28(29.5%)	52(54.7%)	26(27.4%	58(61.1%)
not v. imprtnt	49(51.6%)	18(18.9%)	11(11.6%)	59(62.1%)	12(12.6%)
not important	7(7.4%)	0(0%)	2(2.1%)	4(4.2%)	0(0%)
Base	95	95	95	95	95

TABLE 23

Basis of authority of sergeant over junior officers (inspectors)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	3(16.7%)	11(61.1%)	7(38.9%)	4(22.2%)	2(11.1%)
fairly imprtnt	5(27.8%)	4(22.2%)	8(44.4%)	10(55.6%)	7(38.9%)
not v. imprtnt	7(38.9%)	3(16.7%)	3(16.7%)	4(22.2%)	7(38.9%)
not important	3(16.7%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(11.1%)
Base	18	18	18	18	18

TABLE 24

Basis of authority of sergeant over junior officers (s.o.s)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	2(15.4%)	6(46.2%)	5(38.5%)	3(15.4%)	1(7.7%)
fairly imprtnt	5(38.5%)	5(38.5%)	5(38.5%)	8(61.5%)	4(30.8%)
not v. imprtnt	6(46.2%)	2(15.4%)	3(23.1%)	2(15.4%)	6(46.2%)
not important	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(15.4%)
Base	13	13	13	13	13

TABLE 25

Basis of authority of inspector over junior officers (inspectors)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	4(22.2%)	9(50%)	6(33.3%)	4(22.2%)	3(16.7%)
fairly imprtnt	7(38.9%)	3(16.7%)	8(44.4%)	12(66.7%)	8(44.4%)
not v. imprtnt	5(27.8%)	4(22.2%)	4(22.2%)	2(11.1%)	5(27.8%)
not important	2(11.1%)	2(11.1%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(11.1%)
Base	13	13	13	13	13

TABLE 26

Basis of authority of inspector over junior officers (s.o.s)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	2(15.4%)	6(46.2%)	5(38.5%)	4(30.8%)	2(15.4%)
fairly imprtnt	6(46.2%)	4(30.8%)	5(38.5%)	8(61.6%)	6(46.2%)
not v. imprtnt	5(38.5%)	3(23.1%)	3(23.1%)	1(7.7%)	4(30.8%)
not important	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(7.7%)
Base	13	13	13	13	13

TABLE 27

Basis of authority of inspector over junior officers (sergeant)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	13(13.7%)	30(31.6%)	29(30.5%)	18(18.9%)	27(28.4%)
fairly imprtnt	35(36.8%)	44(46.3%)	51(53.7%)	35(36.8%)	59(62.1%)
not v. imprtnt	44(46,3%)	20(21.1%)	9(9.5%)	41(43.2%)	9(9.5%)
not important	3(3.2%)	1(1.1%)	6(6.3%)	1(1.1%)	0(0%)
Base	95	95	95	95	95

TABLE 28

Basis of authority of senior officer over junior officers (s.o.s)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	3(15.4%)	1(7.7%)	5(38.5%)	2(15.4%)	3(23.1%)
fairly imprtnt	6(46.2%)	6(46.2%)	3(23.1%)	10(76.9%)	8(61.5%)
not v. imprtnt	4(30.8%)	4(30.8%)	5(38.5%)	1(7.7%)	2(15.4%)
not important	0(0%)	2(15.4%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Base	13	13	13	13	13

TABLE 29

Basis of authority of senior officer over junior officers (insps.)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	4(22.2%)	3(16.7%)	4(22.2%)	4(22.2%)	6(33.3%)
fairly imprtnt	9(50%)	5(27.8%)	5(27.8%)	11(61.1%)	10(55.6%)
not v. imprtnt	3(16.7%)	7(38.9%)	6(33.3%)	3(16.7%)	2(11.1%)
not important	2(11.1%)	1(5.6%)	3(16.7%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Base	18	18	18	18	18

TABLE 30

Basis of authority of senior officer over junior officers (sgts.)

	formal authority	personal knowledge	expertise	discipline	incentives
v. important	25(26,3%)	7(7.4%)	16(16.8%)	36(37.9%)	31(32.6%)
fairly imprtnt	55(57.9%)	17(17.9%)	47(49.5%)	60(63,2%)	57(60%)
not v. imprtnt	15(15.8%)	58(61.1%)	23(24,2%)	6(6,3%)	4(4.2%)
not important	0(0%)	13(13.7%)	9(9.5%)	3(3.2%)	0(0%)
Base	95	95	95	95	95

TABLE 31

Quality of communications between ranks

(i) With senior ranks

	sgts.	insps.	s. o. s
very good	26(27, 4%)	6(33. 3%)	9(69. 2%)
fairly good	34(35. 8%)	8(44. 4%)	3(23. 1%)
not very good	28(19. 5%)	4(22. 2%)	1(7. 7%)
not at all good	7(7, 4%)	0(0%)	0(0%)

(ii) With junior ranks

very good	50(52. 6%)	6(33. 3%)	7(53. 8%)
fairly good	35(36, 8%)	6(33. 3%)	3(23. 1%)
not very good	10(10. 5%)	6(33. 3%)	3(23. 1%)
not at all good	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 32

Understanding of job(sergeants)

	of sgt. by const.	of sgt. by insp.	of sgt. by S. O. s	of const. by insp.
very well	8(8. 4%)	26(27, 4%)	11(11. 6%)	16(16. 8%)
fairly well	43(45. 3%)	40(42, 1%)	29(30, 5%)	33(34. 7%)
not very well	25(26. 3%)	15(15. 8%)	23(24, 2%)	26(27. 4%)
not at all well	10(10, 5%)	9(9. 5%)	15(15. 8%)	10(10, 5%)
don't know	9(9. 5%)	5(5. 3%)	17(17. 9%)	10(10, 5%)
Base	95	95	95	95

TABLE 33

Understanding of job (inspectors)

	of inst. by const.	of inst. by sgt	of inst. by S. O. s	of jun off. by S. O. s
very well	1(5. 6%)	3(16. 7%)	6(33. 3%)	4(22. 2%)
fairly well	6(33. 3%)	6(33, 3%)	6(33. 3%)	8(44. 4%)
not very well	4(22. 2%)	7(38. 9%)	5(27. 8%)	4(22. 2%)
not at all well	7(38. 9%)	2(11. 1%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
don't know	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(5. 6%)	2(11. 1%)
Base	18	18	18	18

TABLE 34

Understanding of job of senior officers (S.O.s)

	by const.	by sgt.	by insp.
very well	0(0%)	1(7.7%)	5(38.5%)
fairly well	4(30.8%)	6(46.2%)	4(30.8%)
not very well	5(38.5%)	5(38.5%)	4(30.8%)
not at all well	4(30.8%)	1(7.7%)	0(0%)
don't know	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Base	13	13	13

TABLE 35

Senior ranks 'out of touch'

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
a lot of truth	20(21.1%)	3(16.7%)	0(0%)
some truth	58(61.1%)	6(33.3%)	5(38.5%)
no truth	6(6.3%)	7(38.9%)	8(61.5%)
don't know	11(11,6%)	2(11.1%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 36

Reasons for senior officers being 'out of touch'

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
outdated oper. experience	46(48.4%)	5(27.8%)	1(7.7%)
oper. experience too brief	30(31.6%)	2(11.1%)	0(0%)
preoccupied by external demands	18(18.9%)	2(11.1%)	5(38.5)
preccupied by internal demands	17(17.8%)	2(11.1%)	4(30.8%)
Base	78	9	5

TABLE 37

Does hiearchical structure inhibit communication?

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
to a great extent	9(9.5%)	3(16.7%)	0(0%)
to some extent	48(50.5%)	5(27.8%)	4(30.8%)
not at all	20(21.1%)	8(44.4%)	9(69.2%)
don't know	18(18.9%)	2(11.1%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 38

Utility of Police Fed. as vehicle of communication

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
very useful	10(10.5%)	3(16.7%)	2(15.4%)
fairly useful	37(38,9%)	4(22.2%)	4(30.8%)
not very useful	32(33.7%)	7(38.9%)	6(46.2%)
not at all useful	16(16.8%)	4(22.2%)	1(7.7%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 39

Satisfaction with degree of consultation

	sgts. of sgts.	insps. of sgts.	S.O.s of sgts.	insps. of insps.
very sat.	20(21.1%)	5(27.8%)	7(53.8%)	6(33.3%)
fairly sat.	46(48.4%)	9(50%)	5(38.5%)	8(44.4%)
not very sat.	21(22.1%)	4(22.2%)	1(7.7%)	4(22.2%)
very dissat.	8(8.5%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13	18

TABLE 40

Means of improving communications and consultation between ranks

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
more visits to 'shop floor'	68(71.6%)	5(27.8%)	0(0%)
more meetings	28(29.5%)	3(16.7%)	2(15.4%)
better downward flow of info.	30(31.6%)	3(16.7%)	0(0%)
better upward flow of info.&ideas	0(0%)	0(0%)	4(30.8%)
no specific improvements	27(28.4%)	9(50%)	8(61.5%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 41

Senior rank(s) with greatest capacity to affect day-to-day job.
(aggregated responses)

	sgts.	insps.
inspector	67(70.5%)	-
chief inspector	13(13.7%)	15(83.3%)
superintendent	8(8.4%)	6(33.3%)
Div. Commander	32(33.7%)	10(55.6%)
Base	95	18

TABLE 42

Rank(s) feel closest to and best supported by (sergeants)

	closest to	most supportive
constable	36(37.9%)	13(13.7%)
inspector	21(22.1%)	25(26.3%)
chief inspector	5(5.3%)	7(7.4%)
superintendent	2(2.1%)	4(4.2%)
Div. Commander	0(0%)	8(8.4%)
mixture of above	15(15.8%)	15(15.8%)
not paticularly close to/well supported by any other	16(16.8%)	23(24.2%)
Base	95	95

TABLE 43

Rank(s) feel closest to and best supported by (inspectors)

	closest to	most supportive
constable	-	-
sergeant	3(16.7%)	2(11.1%)
chief inspector	9(50%)	9(50%)
superintendent	-	-
Div. Commander	-	-
mixture of above	2(11.1%)	4(22.2%)
not particulary close to/well supported by any other	4(22.2%)	3(16.7%)
Base	18	18

TABLE 44

Ranks feel closet to and best supported by (S.O.s)
(figures for chief inspectors in square brackets)

	closest to	most supportive
constable	-	-
sergeant	-	-
inspector	1(7.7%)[1]	-
chief inspector	2(15.4%)	2(15.4%)
superintendent	3(23.1%)[3]	4(23.1%)[4]
Div. Commander	1(7.7%)	3(23.1%)[2]
mixture of last three	6(46.2%)[4]	4(30.8%)[2]
not particularly close to/well supported by any other	-	-
Base	13(8 c.insp+5 sup)	13(8 c.insp+ 5 sup)

TABLE 45

Managerial status by rank

	sgt.	insp.	S.O.s
attained at present rank	66(69.5%)	15(83.3%)	13(100%)
not attained at present rank	29(30.5%)	3(16.7%)	-
first attained at inspector rank	20(21.1%)	-	-
first attained at c. insp. rank	9(9.5%)	3(16.7%)	-
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 46

Meaning of management in the context of the police service

	sgt.	insp	S.O.s
man management	52(54.7%)	9(50%)	12(92.3%)
resp. for efficiency of juns.	38(40%)	10(55.6%)	11(84.6%)
organisational & admin. skills	29(30.5%)	9(50%)	6(46.2%)
public image and demand management	-	2(11.1%)	6(46.2%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 47

Difference between management in the police and elsewhere

	sgt.	insp.	S.O.s
completely different	23(24.2%)	4(22.2%)	1(7.7%)
fairly different	29(30.5%)	4(22.2%)	6(46.2%)
much the same	30(31.6%)	7(38.9%)	5(38.5%)
don't know	13(13.7%)	3(16.7%)	1(7.7%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 48

Most appropriate label drawn from other work (sgt. and insp.)

	sgt. for sgt.	insp. for insp.	insp. for sgt.
foreman	77(81.1%)	6(33.3%)	13(72.3%)
'gaffer' or 'boss'	25(26.3%)	15(83.3%)	-
charge-hand	23(24.2%)		7(38.9%)
supervisor	-	-	-
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 49

Most appropriate label drawn from other work (S.O.s)

	for sgts.	for insps.
foreman	6(46.2%)	8((61.5%)
'gaffer' or 'boss'	2(15.4%)	6(46.2%)
charge-hand	6(46.4%)	-
supevisor	5(38.5%)	-
Base	13	13

TABLE 50

Whether police career has lived up to expectations

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
lived up to	48(50.5%)	7(38.9%)	4(30.8%)
exceeded	33(34.7%)	8(44.4%)	9(69.2%)
not lived up to	14(14.7%)	2(11.1%)	0(0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 51

Job satisfaction in present role

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
very satisfied	24(25.3%)	4(22.2%)	5(38.9%)
fairly satisfied	37(38.9%)	7(38.9%)	7(53.8%)
not very satisfied24	7(7.4%)	7(38.9%)	1(7.7%)
not at all satisfied	10(10.5%)	0(0%)	0)0%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 52

Job satisfaction at sgt. rank compared to const. rank.

	sgts.
higher	45(47.4%)
lower	33(34.7%)
much the same	17(17.9%)
Base	95

TABLE 53

Rank at which greatest satisfaction attained

	insps.	c. insps.	supers.
constable	4(22.2%)	2(25%)	1(20%)
sergeant	7(38.9%)	1(12.5%)	1(20%)
inspector	7(38.9%)	-	-
chief inspector	-	5(62.5%)	-
superintendent	-	-	3(60%)
Base	18	8	5

TABLE 54

Most difficult rank experienced

	sgts.	insps.	c. insps.	supers.
constable	30(31.6%)	2(11.1%)	1(12.5%)	-
sergeant	65(68.4%)	8(44.4%)	3(37.5%)	1(20%)
inspector	-	8(44.4%)	-	-
chief inspector	-	-	4(50%)	-
superintendent	-	-	-	4(80%)
Base	95	18	8	5

TABLE 55

	sgts.	insps.	c. insps.	supers.
constable	23(24.3%)	1(5.6%)	-	-
sergeant	44(46.3%)	5(27.8%)	2(25%)	1(20%)
inspector	-	5(27.8%)		- -
chief inspector	-		1(12.5%)	-
superintendent	-	-	-	2(40%)
chief super. (div. comm.)	9(9.5%)	3(16.7%)	3(16.7%)	2(25%)
Chief constable	19(20%)	4(22.2%)	3(37.5%	1(20%)
Base	95	18	8	5

TABLE 56

Ambition for further promotion within service

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
very ambitious	9(9.5%)	4(22.2%)	4(30.8%)
fairly ambitious	30(31.6%)	7(38.9%)	5(38.5%)
not very ambitious	31(32.6%)	5(27.8%)	2(15.4%)
not at all ambitious	25(26.3%)	2(11.1%)	2(15.4%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 57

Level of ambition compared to previous rank

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
more ambitious	60(63.2%)	10(55.6%)	8(61.5%)
less ambitious	9(9.5%)	3(16.7%)	2(15.4%)
much the same	26(27.4%)	5(27.8%)	3_23.1%_
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 58

Change in the degree of difficulty of sgt. role since joined service

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
more difficult	55(57.9%)	9(50%)	6(46.2%)
less difficult	21(22.1%)	2(11.1%)	2(15.4%)
much the same	20(21.1%)	5(27.8%)	4(30.8%)
don't know	12(12.6%)	2(11.1%)	1(7.7%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 59

Change in difficulty of sgt. role since joined service

	insps.
more difficult	11(61.1%)
less difficult	2(11.2%)
much the same	3(16.7%)
don't know	2(11.2%)
Base	18

TABLE 60

Change in difficulty of sgt. role in future

	sgts.	insp.	S.O.s
more difficult	50(52.6%)	10(55.6%)	6(46.2%)
less difficult	6(6.3%)	2(11.1%)	2(15.4%)
stay much the same	25(26.2%)	5(27.8%)	4(30.8%)
don't know	14(14.7%)	1(5.6%)	1(7.7%)
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 61

Change in difficulty of insp. role in future

	insps.
more difficult	11(61.1%)
less difficult	1(5.6%)
stay much the same	3(16.7%)
don't know	3(16.7%)
Base	18

TABLE 62

Types of change in sergeant role

	sgts.	insps.	S.O.s
external changes			
hostile work environment	35(36.8%)	10(55.6%)	10(77.9%)
demands of diverse groups	26(27.4%)	2(11.1%)	6(46.2%)
organisational changes			
downgrading of rank	32(33.7%)	10(55.6%)	3(23.1%)
new technology	24(25.3%)	8(44.4%)	6(46.2%)
more administrative demands	22(23.2%)	5(27.8%)	3(23.1%)
changing recruits	20(21.1%)	6(33.3%)	1(7.7%)
no significant changes	10(10.5%)	3(16.7%)	-
don't know	15(15.8%)	2(11.1%)	-
Base	95	18	13

TABLE 63

Types of change in inspector role

	insps.
external changes	
hostile work environment	8(44.4%)
demands of diverse groups	8(44.4%)
organisational changes	
downgrading of rank	8(44.4%)
new technology	3(16.7%)
more administrative demands	4(22.2%)
changing recruits	7(38.9%)
no significant changes	3(16.7%)
don't know	4(22.2%)
Base	18

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN APPENDIX 2

sgt. = sergeant, insp. =inspector,
S.O. = senior divisional officer [chief inspector or superintendent]
c. insp. = chief inspector, super. = superintendent.