

Contrasting Legacies: Determinants of
Support for Incomplete Democracies in the
Republic of Korea and the Russian
Federation

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Doctor of Philosophy Thesis

2003

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Abstract

For a generation prior to democratic transition, South Korea combined a bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime and a developmental state, while the Soviet Union was a post-totalitarian party-state. Today both South Korea and Russia are incomplete democracies. Following the logic of selecting most different cases for analysis, this thesis compares and contrasts the influence of the legacies of the two prior undemocratic regimes on public support for the current system of government. Support is conceived here as having two dimensions, normative and empirical, and the determinants of support on each dimension are compared between Korea and Russia. The Soviet legacy is more negative than that of the Korean undemocratic regime in terms of supplying democratic institutions and it exerts a complex but ultimately negative set of effects on support. However, in each country differences amongst individuals are more important than the legacies of prior regimes in determining levels of support. When one compares support for current regimes in Russia and Korea with a range of post-communist democracies in Europe, the sharpest division is not between Korea on the one hand and the post-communist countries on the other, but within the post-communist category. The Soviet legacy as experienced by Russia, correlating with lack of political and economic freedom, failure to progress towards the rule of law and failure to achieve early financial stabilization, help explain why support for Russia's incomplete democratic regime is relatively low. Quantitative tests are used to show that in Russia normative support for the current regime is less widely dispersed and less resilient than in Korea.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Propositions Tested Through Statistical Analysis	ix
List of Tables	xi
List of Figures	xii
Chapter I. Basic Concepts about Regimes—Democratic and Undemocratic	1
I.A Democratic and Undemocratic Regimes	5
I.A.1 State, Regime, Legacy, Context	5
I.A.2 Statehood in Korea and Russia	13
I.A.3 The Logic of Choosing Most Different Regimes	17
I.A.4 Democratic and Incompletely Democratic Regimes	17
I.A.4.1 Democracy without Adjectives	17
I.A.4.2 Complete Democracy	20
I.A.4.2.1 Accountability	21
I.A.4.2.2 Rule of Law	23
I.A.4.2.3 Civil Society	24
I.A.4.3 Incomplete Democracy	28
I.A.5 Types of Undemocratic Regimes	28
I.A.5.1 Totalitarianism and Post-totalitarianism	29
I.A.5.2 Authoritarianism and Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarianism	34
I.A.6 Political Support, Legitimacy, Consolidation	39
I.B Extensions to the Undemocratic Regime Typology	43
I.B.1 Policy Orientation, Economic Freedom, Rule of Law	43
I.B.1.1 Definition of Policy Orientation	43
I.B.1.2 Definition of Economic Freedom	44
I.B.1.3 Rule of Law and Modernization	46
I.B.2 The Developmental State	48
I.B.2.1 The Developmental State and the Market	50
I.B.2.2 The Developmental State and the Rule of Law	52

I.B.2.3 The Developmental State's Policy Orientation	55
I.B.3 The Anti-modern Party-State	56
I.B.3.1 The Soviet Regime's Policy Orientation	59
I.B.3.2 The Soviet Economic System	60
I.B.3.3 Soviet Incompatibility with the Rule of Law	62
I.B.4 Dimensions of Undemocratic regimes	66
I.C Plan of Analysis	69

Chapter II. Two Generic Types of Undemocratic Regime 73

II.A Regime Structure 75

II.A.1 Prior Undemocratic Regimes 75

II.A.1.1 Functional Equivalents 75

II.A.1.2 The Military and Politics—Korea 79

II.A.1.3 The Military and Politics—USSR 82

II.A.1.4 Undemocratic Elections 83

II.A.2 Metamorphoses During Constitutional Change 89

II.A.2.1 Mechanics of Transition—Korea 89

II.A.2.2 Mechanics of Transition—Russia 92

II.A.2.3 Role of Parties 95

II.A.3 Regime Structure After Constitutional Change 97

II.A.3.1 Constitutional Provisions 97

II.A.3.2 Parties and Elections 100

II.B Freedom 106

II.B.1 Repression Under Undemocratic Regimes 106

II.B.1.1 Stalin's Legacy 106

II.B.1.2 Targeted Repression in Authoritarian Korea 110

II.B.2 Gain in Freedom During Constitutional Change 112

II.B.3 Freedom After Constitutional Change 115

II.B.3.1 Freedom in Korea 115

II.B.3.2 Lack of Freedom in Russia 118

II.C Towards the Rule of Law? 121

II.C.1	Obstacles to the Rule of Law under Undemocratic Regimes	121
II.C.1.1	The Soviet Anti-modern Party-State	121
II.C.1.2	Systemic Corruption in Korea	123
II.C.1.3	Distinctive Consequences of the Anti-Modern Party-State	124
II.C.2	Privatization of Coercion versus Business-as-Usual	126
II.C.3	Towards the Rule of Law After Constitutional Change?	128
II.D	Political Economy	133
II.D.1	Political Economy Under Undemocratic Regimes	133
II.D.1.1	Developmental State vs Non-market Command Economy	133
II.D.1.2	Political Consequences of Contrasting Economic Systems	137
II.D.2	Political Economy During Transition	142
II.D.2.1	Korea's Economic Adjustments of the 1980s	142
II.D.2.2	Russia's Revolutionary Transformation	143
II.D.3	Political Economy After Constitutional Change	149
II.D.3.1	Economic Freedom	149
II.D.3.2	Stabilization and Privatization	150
II.D.3.3	Apparent Similarities But More Differences	152
II.E	Towards Civil Society?	155
II.E.1	Social Organization Under Undemocratic Regimes	156
II.E.1.1	Conflicting Pressures in Korea	156
II.E.1.2	The Dead Hand of the Soviet Party-State	161
II.E.2	Motors for Change? Autonomous Social Movements	162
II.E.3	After Constitutional Change, Is Civil Society Emerging?	164
II.F	Implications of Contrasting Legacies for Political Attitudes	168
Chapter III. Comparing Support Across Contexts		173
III.A	Source of Data	173
III.B	Political Support for Incomplete Democracies	175
III.B.1	Public Understanding of the Meaning of Democratization	175
III.B.2	The Structure of Support: Disagreements in the Literature	182
III.B.2.1	Realist and Idealist Measures	183

III.B.2.2 Measures of Regime Evaluation	185
III.B.2.3 Functional and Direct Equivalence	187
III.B.2.4 Measures of Normative Commitment	189
III.B.2.5 Evidence about Structure	191
III.B.3 The Structure of Political Support: Statistical Tests	193
III.B.3.1 The Structure of Political Support in Korea	194
III.B.3.2 The Structure of Political Support in Russia	196
III.B.4 Levels of Political Support for Incomplete Democracies	199
III.B.4.1 Empirical Evaluations	200
III.B.4.2 Normative Commitment	204
III.C Summary	212
Chapter IV. Individual-level and Contextual Determinants	214
IV.A Aims, Method and Data	214
IV.A.1 Distributions of Dependent Variables	215
IV.A.2 Methodological Issues	219
IV.A.2.1 Comparing Determinants Across Countries	219
IV.A.2.2 Relations Between Dependent Variables	222
IV.A.2.3 Handling Data from Multiple Surveys in One Country	223
IV.A.2.4 Missing Data	224
IV.B Determinants in Korea	224
IV.B.1 Korean Social Determinants and Time	226
IV.B.1.1 Limited Time Effects	226
IV.B.1.2 Social Structural Effects	228
IV.B.1.3 Social Trust and Mobilization	229
IV.B.2 Korean Economic Determinants	232
IV.B.2.1 Micro-economic Influences	232
IV.B.2.2 Macro-economic Influences	233
IV.B.3 Korean Political Determinants	235
IV.B.3.1 Political Performance	235
IV.B.3.2 Political Values	238

IV.B.3.3 Trust in Representative Institutions	243
IV.B.4 Empirical and Normative Support as Korean Determinants	244
IV.C Determinants in Russia	247
IV.C.1 Russian Social Determinants and Time	248
IV.C.1.1 Time Effects	248
IV.C.1.2 Social Structure	249
IV.C.1.3 Social Trust and (De)Mobilization	250
IV.C.2 Russian Economic Determinants	254
IV.C.2.1 A Strong Macro-economic Influence	254
IV.C.2.2 Micro-economic Influences	255
IV.C.3 Russian Political Determinants	255
IV.C.3.1 Political Values	257
IV.C.3.2 Political Performance	261
IV.C.3.3 Trust in Representative Institutions	265
IV.C.4 Empirical and Normative Support as Russian Determinants	266
IV.D Common and Distinctive Influences	267
IV.E Direct and Interactive Contextual Effects	272
IV.F Simulating a Change of Context	282
IV.G Summary	288
Chapter V. Institutions, Structural Conditions, and Performance	290
V.A Concepts, Data and Method	290
V.A.1 Analytic Strategy	290
V.A.1.1 Level of Analysis	290
V.A.1.2 Categorizing Independent Variables	290
V.A.1.3 Choice of Countries	291
V.A.1.4 Similar Prior Research	293
V.A.2 Sources of Data	294
V.A.2.1 Dependent Variable Sources	294
V.A.2.2 Appropriate Statistical Techniques	295
V.A.2.3 Independent Variable Sources	296

V.B	Dependent Variable Distributions	297
V.B.1	Satisfaction with Democracy	297
V.B.2	Rejection of Undemocratic Rule	298
V.C	Independent Variable Distributions	301
V.C.1	Institutional Variables	301
V.C.1.1	Type of Prior Regime Legacy	301
V.C.1.2	Anti-Modern Core Legacy	302
V.C.1.3	Transition Paths	305
V.C.2	Initial Structural Conditions	307
V.C.2.1	Size of Private Sector	307
V.C.2.2	Wealth Per Capita	308
V.C.2.3	Urbanization	309
V.C.3	Generic Measures of Regime Performance	309
V.C.3.1	Growth Performance	309
V.C.3.2	Inflation	311
V.C.3.3	Political Freedom	315
V.C.3.4	Economic Freedom	317
V.C.3.5	Transparency	318
V.C.4	Relationships Among Independent Variables	319
V.D	Multiple Regression Analysis	323
V.D.1	Institutional Legacies	324
V.D.2	Testing the Performance of the Institutional Model	328
V.E	Summary	331
Chapter VI. Legacies of Prior Regimes and Consolidation of Democracy		333
VI.A	Review in Brief	333
VI.A.1	Contrasting Regime-Type Legacies	333
VI.A.2	Measuring the Impact of the Undemocratic Legacy	335
VI.A.3	Party-State versus Anti-modern Core Legacies	336
VI.B	Prior Undemocratic Regimes and Democratic Consolidation	338
VI.B.1	Defining Democratic Consolidation	338

VI.B.2 Two Behavioural Tests of Consolidation	341
VI.B.3 A Qualitative Evaluation of Consolidation	342
VI.B.4 Society-centred Tests of Consolidation	350
VI.B.4.1 Test 1: Levels	351
VI.B.4.2 Test 2: Trajectories	352
VI.B.4.3 Test 3: Dispersal of Support	353
VI.B.4.4 Test 4: Resilience of Normative Support	356
VI.C Implications for Further Study	358
VI.C.1 Differentiating Varieties of Undemocratic Legacy	358
VI.C.2 Sequencing: the Priority of the Rule of Law	359
References	362
Appendices	
I. Results of Post-transitional Korean Elections	406
II. Results of Post-transitional Russian Elections	411
III. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Micro-Level Analysis	417
IV. Survey Data Analysed at Macro-Level	434
V. Descriptive Statistics for Macro-level Variables	441

Propositions Tested Through Statistical Analysis

Chapter III

Proposition 1: Regardless of the prior regime legacy, citizens evaluate normative questions about what the regime should be differently from empirical questions about what the regime is (see pages 193-199).

Proposition 2: If a regime has a post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state legacy, it is likely to have significantly lower political support across both normative and empirical dimensions than a regime with a bureaucratic-military authoritarian, developmental legacy (pages 199-212).

Chapter IV

Proposition 3: Regardless of the type of undemocratic legacy, political, economic and social characteristics of individuals have the same relative amount of influence on both normative and empirical dimensions of support for an incomplete democracy (pages 225, 227 and 247f).

Proposition 4: Rejection of undemocratic rule is influenced primarily by characteristics of individuals and households and only to a lesser extent by the type of undemocratic legacy (pages 273-282).

Proposition 5: The overall effect of the legacy of the post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state, including both interactive and direct effects, on rejection of undemocratic rule is negative (pages 283-288).

Chapter V

Proposition 6: Post-communist regimes in Europe share the negative effect of the Russian party-state legacy on normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the current regime (pages 324ff).

Proposition 7: The path taken from undemocratic rule helps explain the distribution of support for incomplete democracies: a) collapse of the undemocratic elite along with the regime increases normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the new regime; b) revolution from above driven

by the undemocratic elite lowers normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the new regime (page 326).

Proposition 8: The anti-modern Soviet core legacy helps explain the distribution of support for post-communist regimes in Europe, and its effect on normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of an incomplete democracy is negative (page 327).

Chapter VI

Proposition 9: Korean rejection of undemocratic rule is widely dispersed, whereas Russian rejection of undemocratic rule is more dependent on individual differences (pages 347f).

Proposition 10: Korean rejection of undemocratic rule is resilient whereas Russian rejection of undemocratic rule is instrumental (pages 356f).

List of Tables

Table I.1	Comparison of Regime Types Along Six Dimensions	67
Table II.1	Parliamentary Elections under Korea's Authoritarian Regime	86
Table II.2	Presidential Elections under Korea's Authoritarian Regime	88
Table II.3	Supply-Side Legacies of Korean & Soviet Prior Regimes	169
Table III.1	Sample Sizes and Dates of Surveys	174
Table III.2	Demographic Details of Samples After Weighting	176
Table III.3	Meanings of Democracy in Korea and Russia	178
Table III.4A	Factor Analysis: Attitudes Towards Democracy in Korea	195A
Table III.4B	Factor Analysis: Attitudes Towards Democracy in Russia	195
Table III.5	Levels of Support for Four Propositions on Undemocratic Rule	205
Table IV.1A	Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works in Korea	216
Table IV.1B	Current Regime Evaluation in Russia	217
Table IV.2	Rejection of Undemocratic Rule in Korea and Russia	218
Table IV.3	Empirical Evaluations: Single-country Regressions	225
Table IV.4	Rejection of Undemocratic Rule: Single-country Regressions	227
Table IV.5	Two-Stage Least Squares Models: Korea	246
Table IV.6	Two-Stage Least Squares Models: Russia	268
Table IV.7	Direct Effect of Context on Rejection of Undemocratic Rule	276
Table IV.8	Direct and Indirect Effects of Context	280
Table IV.9	Simulating a Change of Context	284
Table V.1	Distribution: Satisfaction with Democratic Performance	299
Table V.2	Distribution: Rejection of Undemocratic Rule	300
Table V.3	Institutional Variables Affecting Democratization	302
Table V.4	Trajectories of Freedom 1987-2001	316
Table V.5	Factor Analysis of Independent Variables	320
Table V.6A	Macro-level Determinants—Satisfaction with Democracy	325A
Table V.6B	Macro-level Determinants—Rejection of Undemocratic Rule	325
Table VI.1	Process of Consolidation: A Demand-Side View	355
Appendix Table I.1	Korean Elections: List of Parties	406

Appendix Table I.2	Korean Presidential Vote: 16 December 1987	408
Appendix Table I.3	Korean Presidential Vote: 18 December 1992	408
Appendix Table I.4	Korean Presidential Vote: 18 December 1997	409
Appendix Table I.5	Korean Presidential Vote: 19 December 2002	409
Appendix Table I.6	Votes and Seats in the Korean National Assembly	410
Appendix Table II.1	Russian Elections: List of Parties	411
Appendix Table II.2	Russian Presidential Vote: 16 June, 3 July 1996	415
Appendix Table II.3	Russian Presidential Vote: 26 March 2000	415
Appendix Table II.4	Votes and Seats in the Russian State <i>Duma</i>	416A
Appendix Table III.1	Descriptive Statistics: Korea	417
Appendix Table III.2	Descriptive Statistics: Russia	425
Appendix Table IV.1	Details of Surveys Providing Macro-Level Data	434
Appendix Table IV.2	Dependent Variable Series at Macro-Level	436
Appendix Table V.	Descriptive Statistics for Macro-level Regressions	441

List of Figures

Figure II.1	Trust in Political Parties: a Cross-Regional Perspective	107
Figure II.2	Freedom in Korea and Russia, 1972-2001	113
Figure II.3	Corruption Perception Scores for Korea and Russia	130
Figure III.1	Empirical Evaluations of Current Regimes in Korea and Russia	202
Figure III.2	Rejection of Undemocratic Rule in Korea and Russia	210
Figure IV.1	Variance Explained by Common and Unique Influences	270
Figure IV.2	Possible Interactions of Context and Individual Differences	278
Figure IV.3	Context Affects the Relationship Between Variables	287
Figure V.1	Inflation Since 1990: Korea and Post-Communist Europe	314
Figure VI.1	Public Readiness to Use Corruption: Comparative Perspective	346

CHAPTER I. BASIC CONCEPTS ABOUT REGIMES—DEMOCRATIC AND UNDEMOCRATIC

The principal objects of this thesis are:

1. to compare and contrast the legacy of the Soviet post-totalitarian communist¹ regime (1956-1991) with that of South Korean² bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime (1961-1987) in relation to democratization in Korea and Russia;
2. to test the impact of the type of the prior-regime legacy on relative levels of political support for the current regimes in Russia and Korea, as against the influence of individual differences such as education, income, economic evaluations, etc.;
3. to test the impact of prior-regime legacies, initial structural conditions and generic measures of regime performance on political support for current regimes measured at the macro- (or country-) level.

The choice of these objectives is explained in the pages that follow in this chapter. Section I.A elaborates the basic conceptual framework of the study. Section I.A.1 defines four concepts treated as axiomatic: the state,

¹ Hereafter the author capitalizes the letter 'c' in 'Communist' when it refers to a specific party or institution, such as the CPSU, and at all other times uses a lower case letter 'c'.

² When referring to events after the establishment of separate states in North and South Korea in 1948, South Korea or the Republic of Korea is hereafter referred to as Korea, while North Korea, or the Democratic [sic] People's Republic of Korea is always referred to as North Korea. In discussions of events before 1948, the word Korea implies the whole of Korea, North and South, unless otherwise stated.

the regime, prior-regime legacies and context. The state is defined here in minimalist terms, while the regime is conceived in broad terms, following Easton's (1965) definition. Treated as an aspect of context, prior-regime legacies affect processes of regime transformation, and also the establishment and survival of states.

Section I.A.2 summarizes problems associated with Korean and Russian statehood, including relations between North and South Korea and centre-periphery relations in Russia. When the state is defined in minimalist terms, statehood problems are those which threaten to destroy the integrity of a state. Such issues are not central to the present study, except insofar as they overlap with and to some extent influence regime transformation in both countries.

Section I.A.3 explains the choice of countries for detailed analysis. The main reason to compare Korea and Russia is to explore the contrast between the legacies of their different undemocratic regimes, following the logic of choosing *most different* cases. The basic premise is that successes and failures in democratization of the current regimes in both countries can best be understood by reference to their preceding regimes.

Section I.A.4 is concerned with defining democratic and incompletely democratic regimes. This thesis uses both the minimalist, Schumpeterian definition for democracy and a fuller definition of 'complete democracy'. The section defines two concepts with long pedigrees which are essential ingredients of complete democracy: these are *civil society* and the *rule of law*. Incomplete democracy is defined in relation to complete democracy.

Based on a classic work by Linz (1975) as well as refinements introduced by Linz and Stepan (1996), Section I.A.5 establishes the definition and sub-types of undemocratic regimes, including totalitarianism,

post-totalitarianism, authoritarianism and bureaucratic-military authoritarianism. Note that 'post-totalitarian' is not the same thing as 'post-communist.' The word 'post-totalitarian' refers here to the lengthy stage in the evolution of the Soviet regime from about 1956 when it began to depart from the pure totalitarian model of Stalinism to its final collapse in 1991. The word post-communist refers, in the Russian context, to the stage after the collapse of the post-totalitarian regime. Thus post-totalitarianism is the successor type to totalitarianism. Bureaucratic-military authoritarianism, on the other hand, is a subtype of authoritarianism.

Section I.A.6 defines political support for incomplete democracies and its relation to the concept of legitimacy. The section briefly discusses the importance of political support and legitimacy in democratization, and the concept of democratic consolidation, which gives a prominent role to political support in democratic theory. The section also specifies the relationship of consolidation to the concept of complete democracy. A fuller discussion of democratic consolidation is left to Chapter Six.

Section I.B introduces extensions to the undemocratic regime typology introduced in Section I.A. In section I.B.1, the author defines two concepts neglected in the Linzian characterization of undemocratic regime types, but which are important to the contrast between Korea and Russia. These issues are economic freedom, and what the author has called 'policy orientation,' referring to the broad goals which states set for themselves. In addition, the author clarifies the relationship between the rule of law and various concepts of 'modernization.'

Building on the concepts introduced in Section I.B.1, Sections I.B.2 and I.B.3 describe the Korean and Soviet states in ways which enhance the Linzian typology of regimes, because they are complementary to it. Section I.B.2 discusses the developmental state, of which authoritarian Korea was a

paradigmatic example. Section I.B.3 introduces as a corresponding concept the 'anti-modern party-state.' The term party-state is familiar in Soviet studies, while the use of the term 'anti-modern', following Rose (1994; 2000d), evokes a critique of the communist system as antithetical to modernity in the Weberian sense. Although the terms developmental state and party-state suggest they belong to a typology of states, the definitions of both terms can be subsumed under the Eastonian concept of the regime. The author will therefore not attempt to present a typology of states. Rather the author uses these two 'state' terms to summarize features of both undemocratic regimes which do not fit into the Linzian definitions of post-totalitarianism and bureaucratic-military authoritarianism.

In section I.B.4, the author synthesizes political, economic and social differences between the Korean combination of bureaucratic-military authoritarianism and the developmental state, on the one hand, and the Soviet combination of post-totalitarianism and the anti-modern party-state on the other. The purpose is to provide an analytic schema which illustrates why authoritarian Korea and the Soviet Union left contrasting legacies whose differences are of broad significance.

In this study, the distribution and determinants of mass public opinion play a prominent role. The sources of public opinion data are: New Russia Barometers (NRB) I to X, conducted between January 1992 and June 2001; and five Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) surveys from 1994 to 1999 inclusive. Professor Doh C. Shin, Chair of Korean Studies at the University of Missouri, initiated the Korea Barometer surveys in 1988. Professor Richard Rose of the Centre for Study of Public Policy (CSPP), University of Strathclyde, began the New Russia Barometer in 1992. The thesis also presents some multi-country analysis using data from other post-communist countries in Europe. This involves the analysis of survey data aggregated at country level from the European Commission's Central and Eastern

Eurobarometer (for details, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ceeb_en.htm) and the New Europe Barometer, which includes the New Democracies Barometer and New Baltic Barometer (see <http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk>).

As with any survey-based study, there are some practical limitations. Firstly, when analysing a large body of data built up over several years through co-operative programmes such as KDB and NRB, the availability of questions in particular surveys does not always match the preferences of an author doing secondary analysis. Secondly, representative surveys always contain sampling error, typically in the region of plus or minus two to four percentage points. Finally, the employment of statistical techniques entails a great many choices which require theoretical justification.

I.A Democratic and Undemocratic Regimes

I.A.1 State, Regime, Legacy, Context

The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* defines a *state* as a 'geographically delimited segment of human society united by a common obedience to a single sovereign' (Watkins 1968: 150). The concept of sovereignty in this definition implies both coercive power and legal authority. The definition is minimalist in the sense that it encompasses a large number of cases, and it will be taken as the basic definition for the purposes of this thesis. Weber (1966: 156) defines a *modern state* as a compulsory association with a territorial basis, possessing an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, claiming binding authority over its territory and exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in that territory. This definition is compatible with that given above, although it contains an additional element, namely that the modern state's monopoly on the use of force is legitimate. Neither definition specifies exact boundaries between the state and the society over which it claims jurisdiction, as these

boundaries vary with the nature of the administrative and legal order of the state, but it is usually recognized that societies and states are theoretically separable.

The basis for administrative and legal order in a state is the *regime*. Easton (1965: 193) breaks down the regime into three components: values (by which Easton means goals and principles), norms (by which he means procedures), and a structure of authority. He differentiates them as follows:

The *values* serve as broad limits with regard to what can be taken for granted in the guidance of day-to-day policy without violating deep feelings of important segments of the community. The *norms* specify the kinds of procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of demands. The *structures of authority* designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organised with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of decisions [emphasis added].

An related concept is the *constitution*. Written or unwritten, its primary purpose is to specify the offices of state and their relationships, that is, the structures of authority (Aristotle 1947: Book III, ch.6). The regime is therefore a broader concept than that of the constitution.

A regime gives power into the hands of a *government* or set of *authorities*. Easton (1965: 212) identifies the characteristics of the authorities as follows: ‘...They must engage in the daily affairs of a political system; they must be recognised by most members of the system as having the responsibility for these matters; and their actions must be accepted as binding most of the time by most of the members as long as they act within the limits of their roles.’ When a regime falls, it usually entails a change of government, but not always. A leader can sometimes change the regime while remaining in office.

All three, state, regime and government, can, in principle, persist or fail independently of one another. But the regime plays a crucial role in politics, for it organizes the way in which the government controls the state. As regimes change, it is a reasonable assumption that the nature of a prior regime affects the evolution of the regime which follows it. The *legacy* of a given prior regime is conceived in this thesis as the aggregate of all features of the prior regime that linger on under the new regime for a period of time. Thus, the legacy of a prior regime cannot be understood except by comparing the current regime with its prior regime in order to identify the nature and depth of change.

The above definition is compatible with common usage of the term in the current literature. Jowitt (1992: chapter 8) was one of the first to attempt to define the 'legacy' of communist regimes for their successors; he emphasized the baleful influence of such features of 'Leninist' political culture³ as antagonism between public- and private-regarding norms of behaviour, fragmentation along ethnic lines, and the absence of an established elite sharing common values. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: 63-7) and also Linz and Stepan (1996: 57-60) conceive of the political legacy of a prior regime as a series of influences on current attitudes and behaviour, that is, as problems to be solved or gaps to filled before a new regime can free itself from its past. Lane (2002: 3) refers to the legacy as the 'footprint' of a prior regime. Insofar as they take an 'third person', overall perspective, that is to say, from outside the situation looking in, these usages view a prior regime legacy from the 'top down', or, to borrow a metaphor from economics, from the 'supply side'.

³ The term 'political culture' refers in this thesis to the sum total of values, beliefs and attitudes of the members of a society in relation to politics (Almond & Verba 1963). This thesis is a study in rather than about political culture, in the sense that it concentrates on a particular facet of Korean and Russian political cultures.

Another approach, closely related to the legacy approach, is to look for 'cultural continuities' between regimes. Some discussions of cultural continuity in the Russian and Soviet studies literature imply that Russians have always been 'undemocratic'. For example, Pipes (1974) made the continuity argument in his study of Russia's pre-revolutionary past, focussing in particular on Russian 'patrimonialism', which he defined in Weberian terms as personal authority based on traditions which do not recognize the property rights of subjects (1974: 22-4)⁴. A corresponding literature suggests that Koreans have always been 'undemocratic,' too. For example, Henderson (1968: chapters 7-9) identified extreme centralization of power, the fluidity of organizations and factionalism as the principal characteristics of Korean political culture. When the emphasis is on political culture, survey-based studies have particular relevance. The difficulty for the cultural continuity approach is that such evidence is usually of recent date. Early evidence for Russian cultural continuity arguments came from the Harvard Interview Project (Inkeles & Bauer 1959) and the Soviet Interview Project (Millar 1987). For Korea, a collection based on surveys in the early 1970s was C.L. Kim (1980c). Survey-based research during periods of undemocratic rule presented special methodological problems. For example, Soviet emigré interviews were not nationally representative, and so even where relevant indicators are available, their comparability with present data is in doubt.

From the 'bottom up' or the 'demand side' perspective, that is to say, from the point of view of the individual political actor in a society which has undergone regime change, the prior regime legacy is only one aspect of the

⁴ A contrary argument is provided by Petro (1995), who sees in Russian traditions an untapped resource for strengthening democracy. See Eckstein (1998) for a recent review of the arguments for and against cultural continuity as a barrier to democracy in Russia, and also Easter (2000) for a discussion built around the concept of state-building.

whole political situation. If one sets up a comparative framework in which the cases are individual political actors facing similar problems in different countries, or in the same country at different times, the legacy of a prior regime is an aspect of *context*. To put it differently, the legacy of a prior regime is an aspect of the institutional and temporal setting in which political action takes place. If one is comparing political actors in different countries, the legacy is just one aspect of *country-context*, that is the particular institutional setting associated with one country rather than another. If the comparison is between political actors at different times, the legacy is an aspect of *time-context*, that is the particular setting associated with one time rather than another. Chapter Five of this thesis addresses the special methodological problems in separating out the effects of the prior-regime legacy from other aspects of context.

The issue of how useful are comparisons between countries whose prior-regime legacies differ was at the heart of a heated debate in the pages of *Slavic Review* (Schmitter & Karl 1994; Bunce 1995b; Karl & Schmitter 1995; Bunce 1995a). Although the debate began in terms of the relative merits of comparative politics and area studies, that issue was later characterized by Karl and Schmitter (1995: 965f), themselves area specialists who focus on Latin America, as a 'red herring'. The root of the disagreement was that while Schmitter and Karl believed that concepts developed in the study of Latin American democratic transitions⁵ could and should be applied to post-communist countries, Bunce argued that the differences between the East European and Latin American experiences of undemocratic rule and of transition meant that the application of such concepts in Eastern Europe would yield only poor results. In particular, she

⁵ Transition means the interval between one regime and another (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 6). A democratic transition ends with an agreement on democratic rules (Di Palma 1990: chapter 6; Linz 1990: 157f)

emphasized the fact that East European countries are moving from non-market to market economies (see section I.B.1 for definitions), whereas most Latin American countries are not. Neither side entirely denied the validity of the other's point of view. For example, Schmitter and Karl (1994: 176) wrote: '[Political actors] inevitably experience the constraints imposed by deeply rooted material deficiencies and normative habits — most of which have not changed with the fall of the ancien regime.' Bunce (1995b: 119) wrote: '[Schmitter and Karl] are quite right in arguing that variety is the spice of comparative inquiry.' Yet the argument was in essence about the extent to which democratization may be understood in terms of general concepts or whether legacies of different prior regimes are so distinctive as to require different conceptual approaches in post-communist and in Latin American studies.

Crawford and Lijphart (1995) in their introduction to a special issue of *Comparative Political Studies* rehearse a similar argument. For them the legacy approach emphasizes political cultures, inherited social structures and the remnants of institutions from the past, while what they call 'the imperatives of liberalization' approach, emphasizes the power of new institutions to structure political behaviour. Hanson (1995) in the same issue, refines Jowitt's (1992) argument about the negative effect of the communist legacy in two ways: by suggesting that the proximity of post-communist countries to Western Europe be taken into account, and by proposing to break down the communist legacy into ideological, political, socio-economic and cultural components. Again in the same issue Geddes (1995) compares Latin American with post-communist party systems, noting in the post-communist countries the importance of new parties⁶, the weakness of prior

⁶ Instability of the party system is a persistent characteristic of post-communism (Rose & Munro 2003), and also of Korea. See section A of Chapter Two and Appendices I and II of this thesis.

interest group organization and the suddenness of extension of the political franchise. These issues are important aspects of the prior regime legacy and they are taken up and developed further in the remainder of this chapter or in Chapter Two below. For the moment it suffices to emphasize that the legacy of a prior regime ramifies in multiple directions. It is a complex phenomenon and there are different ways of breaking it down into analytically manageable units. The approach in this thesis starts from the question: 'legacy for what?' The answer is: for the consolidation of democracy in the successor regimes. The meaning of consolidation is taken up in Section 1.A.6 below, and the final chapter returns to the same theme.

The importance attached to prior-regime legacies aligns this thesis with Bunce's (1995b: 127) assertion that '...there are nonetheless some good reasons to engage in [east-south] comparisons. The most important reason [is]: the ways in which the addition of eastern Europe to comparative studies of democratization alerts us to fundamental problems in how transitologists have understood and analysed transitions from authoritarian rule — in the east and, one could argue, in the south as well.' By including an East Asian country, this study adds another region neglected by both Bunce and Schmitter/Karl in their debate on the pages of *Slavic Review* and by the authors in the special issue of *Comparative Political Studies* cited above. Rather than expanding geographical coverage for the sake of it, the aim is rather to see what the addition of an East Asian country can contribute to the 'transitological' literature on democratization. Although a number of cross-regional studies of democratization have appeared since that debate⁷, and there have been many more intra-regional studies focussing either on Eastern Europe or on East Asia, there have been few 'east-far east'

⁷ For reviews with cross-regional scope, see Shin (1994), Geddes (1999) and Bunce (2000).

comparisons, and very few dealing specifically with Korea and Russia⁸. Rose and Shin (2001) have attempted to redress this gap, but not at book length. They use the concept of 'incomplete democracy' (defined below) to illustrate that newly democratized countries such as Korea and Russia have acquired the building blocks of democracy in a different order from regimes which established the rule of law before holding free elections. Thus the problems faced by new democracies today differ from those faced by democracies which were new a hundred years ago. Ziegler (1999) applies O'Donnell's (1994) concept of 'delegative democracy' to Korea and Russia to argue that political culture must play a role in explaining different outcomes when current institutions appear similar.

The approach taken by this thesis is explicitly comparative. In other words, what is distinctive about a particular type of prior-regime legacy is clarified by comparison with a different type of prior-regime legacy. Comparison is impossible except on the basis of concepts. Thus the thesis relies, in part, on the conceptual apparatus developed by 'transitologists' such as Schmitter and Karl (1994), but more on that of Juan Linz (1975) and his collaborative work with Alfred Stepan (1996) and also Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998). The intention is to complement single-country works by scholars for whom a comparative perspective comes naturally (Rose & Munro 2002; Shin 1999).

Refining her earlier view, Bunce (2000) distinguishes between 'big' generalizations which apply regardless of regional context, and 'bounded' generalizations which are valid only within particular contexts. Bunce (2000: 722) underlines the connection between regions and historical legacies: 'At the most general level, region is a summary term for spatially distinctive but

⁸ For reviews centred on Eastern Europe, see Kopecky and Mudde (2000) and King (2000). For an overview on East Asia, see Friedman (1994).

generalizable historical experiences that shape economic structures and development and the character and continuity of political, social and cultural institutions.’ In other words, it is not geography itself which sets limits on generalizations, but rather geographically distributed differences in historical experience.

1.A.2 Statehood in Korea and Russia

It is impossible to undertake a study of regime change in Korea and Russia without mentioning their distinctive problems of statehood, although these are not the focus of this thesis. In this section, the author briefly explains why statehood is problematic in each country, and then explains why debates about Korean and Russian statehood do not figure prominently here.

Statehood is problematic in Korea for three reasons, each of which presents a challenge to Koreans and to their neighbours. Firstly, the Korean nation is divided between two states. The Republic of Korea or South Korea was created by American military authorities in 1948, while North Korea or the Democratic [sic] People’s Republic of Korea was established by communist authorities immediately afterward⁹. The two rival Korean states each claim sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula, and each proposes different formulae for reunification. Secondly, the two Korean states are ideologically opposed. Despite its long period of undemocratic rule and the

⁹ Soviet and American military authorities bisected Korea at the 38th parallel at the end of World War II. By the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, most Soviet and American forces had withdrawn from the two Koreas. Although the Soviet Union provided armaments and military assistance to North Korea to help it prepare for its invasion of the South, North Korea’s closest military links at the time were with the Chinese communist movement (Cumings 1997: 240f).

peculiarities of its own version of capitalism (more on this below), South Korea has always been the freer of the two states. Under Kim Jong Il, the son of its revolutionary founder, Kim Il Sung, North Korea remains politically, economically and socially a closed society, adhering to a home-grown version of Marxist-Leninist ideology known as 'self-reliance' (Cumings 1997: 402-5; Kim J.I. 1984). Thirdly, the Korean War (1950-53) ended with a truce, not a peace treaty. The war was costly to both sides: over two million civilians died and a substantial share of the infrastructure in both Koreas was destroyed (Cumings 1997: chapter 5). Despite the truce, North Korea has sought to undermine the Republic of Korea by various means. Competition between the two states, expressed in the military stand-off at the border and occasional gun-battles at sea, in espionage and counter-espionage, and in various attempts by the North to infiltrate and subvert the South Korean state, have long provided a stimulus to the latter to build up its military and industrial strength (Woo 1991: chapter 5), and also served as a pretext for political repression at home. For all these reasons, the long-term future of the South Korean state is inextricably tied up with that of the North Korean state.

However, this study treats the North/South divide in Korea as primarily an external problem for the South. There is a straightforward reason for this. The United States has bolstered the regime in the South with financial and military assistance, maintained a large military presence there, and assumed responsibility for controlling South Korean forces in the event of another North Korean invasion. The American role has not lessened with the end of the Cold War in Europe. On the contrary, since the United States suspects North Korea of links with international terrorism, as President Bush reminded the world during his State of the Union address in January 2002¹⁰,

¹⁰ A salient example of a terrorist attack of which North Korea was the organizer was a bombing in Rangoon in October 1983, which killed 21

and since North Korea seems to have acquired or be in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons, the American role in inter-Korean relations has in recent years been stepped up. The lead role played by the United States in inter-Korean relations provides South Korea with the opportunity to develop relatively independently from North Korea.

Russia's statehood problems stem from the way in which a new state defined itself within the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic¹¹ (RSFSR) of the USSR, and thereby contributed to the latter's disintegration (Fish 1995; Linz & Stepan 1996: chapter 19). There are three main problem areas. First, regions of the Russian Republic attempted or were encouraged to pursue claims for sovereignty (Solnick 1995), and in one, Chechnya, the resulting dispute over the boundaries of the Russian Federation turned into a regional civil war. Second, the disintegration of the USSR left substantial Russian irredenta in neighbouring states. Third, the economic and social problems of Russian society in the first transitional decade were so severe as to place in doubt the capacity of the state to govern (Bova 1999; Nagy 2000; Rose & Munro 2002).

However, despite failing to become a modern state in the Weberian sense, Russia continues to meet the minimal definition of statehood. The problems created by regional claims to sovereignty have not led to the carving out of any new states on the territory of the old Russian Republic, and Moscow has gradually re-asserted control over that territory, mainly through negotiation with regional elites, except in Chechnya, where it has

people, including four South Korean cabinet ministers, and narrowly missed killing President Chun Doo-hwan. See Bermudez (1990) for a general account of North Korean terrorist links, and pages 139-42 for the Rangoon bombing.

¹¹ Hereafter referred to as the Russian Republic of the USSR, or the RSFSR.

done so by force. Although the Russian state has made it its business to defend the interests of irredenta, notably in Latvia and Estonia, the irredenta have shown little interest in rejoining Russia, and Russia has not attempted to reincorporate them using coercive means. Finally, despite being severely weakened, the Russian state, and particularly its central institutions, retain sufficient capacity to pass laws and decrees, and ensure compliance at least in those areas which are vital to the security of the state. The collapse of the Russian state remains a possibility, but only if one projects recent trends into the long-term future. The pressing question in Russia today is not whether there will be a state, but rather what kind of regime will determine how the government controls the state.

There is a burgeoning literature on 'state-building' in Russia (Smith 1999b; Huskey 1999; Robinson 2002). To a large extent, the concerns of this literature and those of the democratization literature overlap: the rule of law, the stability and strength of institutions and the relationship of the state to society are all part and parcel of both 'state-building' and of building a democracy, and all are dealt with in this thesis. There is an equivalent literature about the state of the Republic of Korea (ROK), but it does not focus on overcoming the problems of state failure, but rather on taming the despotic tendencies of a state which has been eminently successful in achieving the developmental tasks it set for itself¹². Works from both literatures are cited below in discussing the legacies of prior regimes for democratization — see especially Sections I.B.2 and I.B.3.

¹² The author here uses the term 'despotic power' in a special sense, following Robinson (2002: 6ff). Despotic power is enjoyed by the leaders of highly centralized states to *the exclusion of* most of society. The opposite type of power is 'infrastructural': decisions are the outcome of a process of consensus-building between the state and society.

I.A.3 The Logic of Choosing Most Different Cases

On the basis of Linz's (1975) typology, the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1991 was post-totalitarian and Korea was bureaucratic-military authoritarian. Linz's typology of undemocratic regimes differentiates a vast range of different political systems. The logic of choosing these two particular countries is that they are *most different* cases in the special sense of being *different from one another and exemplary of their own type* (Dogan & Pelassy 1990: chapter 17). In other words, the two countries chosen for in-depth comparison had very different prior undemocratic regimes, and that is the reason for focussing on their legacies. Studies of very similar legacies often allow the explanation of quite narrow or specific differences. Comparative studies of very different legacies offer broad scope for generalization, and highlight the main features of each.

This is mainly but not entirely a binary study: Korea and Russia are the focus of attention. However, in order to explore the relationship between prior-regime legacies and generic differences in regime performance, in Chapter Five the author adduces macro-level data from other post-communist countries. This entails a certain amount of homogenization of the post-communist experience, which the author tempers by making use of sub-typologies of post-communist regimes and their transitions, such as those offered by Kitschelt (1995) and Linz and Stepan (1996). The aim is to find out how typical of post-communist countries are the demand-side effects of the Russian prior regime legacy.

I.A.4 Democratic and Incompletely Democratic Regimes

I.A.4.1 Democracy without Adjectives

Basing their discussion on recent debates about Latin American politics, Collier and Levitsky (1997) have summarized the variety of conceptual approaches used by scholars attempting to define, re-define and refine the concept of democracy in order to understand processes of regime

change. If one seeks a definition of democracy 'without adjectives', these authors advise to start with a minimalist definition encompassing the maximum number of cases. Schumpeter's minimalist definition of democracy (1976: 269) is: *an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote*. The definition implies two tests of democracy:

1. that the leaders chosen through the struggle for votes have effective political power;
2. that the struggle for votes should be competitive, that is, the outcome should depend, at least in part, on the efforts of the participants.

For the purpose of this study, Schumpeter's will be taken as the basic definition of democracy 'without adjectives,' that is democracy in the most general sense.

The guarantee of a 'competitive struggle for the people's vote' is the holding of *free and fair elections*. If the elections are not free or if they are unfair, their competitiveness is impinged. There is a large political science literature seeking to define the criteria of free and fair elections¹³. Without going into an exegesis on these criteria, the following principles now command widespread acceptance: 1) universal adult suffrage; 2) reasonable equality in the value of votes ('one person, one vote'); 3) secrecy of the ballot; 4) honest electoral administration, including accurate counting; 5) fair adjudication of disputes; 6) freedom of voters from violence and intimidation; 7) equitable access to the means of political campaigning; 8) regularity of elections; and 9) non-exclusion of effective political office from the elections. In practice, these principles have been recognized by international

¹³ Prominent contributions include those by Dahl (1956) and Mackenzie (1958), as well as the edited volumes by Butler, et al. (1981) and by Beetham (1994). Choe (1997: chapter 2) provides a review.

agreements, which have provided the basis for election observation missions in various parts of the world. For example, the OSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990 affirms 'free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure in practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the choice of their representatives' (OSCE 1990: Art. 5.1). Within the category of free and fair elections, there is a great deal of variation in the way in which votes are converted into seats by the electoral system.

Both Korea and Russia today are democracies 'without adjectives' in terms of the Schumpeterian definition. Both hold competitive elections to choose the president and the members of the national parliament. The OSCE has consistently rated Russia's elections as 'free' if not entirely fair, and, in its reports on the 2000 presidential and 1999 Duma elections noted consistent improvement in the standard of electoral administration (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a: 2; OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 2). Assessments of Korea's elections since 1988 have equalled or exceeded the Russian standard (Morriss 1996; Choe 1997; Jaung 2000). In neither country are there 'reserved domains' where the right to govern does not belong to the elected government.

However, many scholars regard free elections as a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. Russia today presents an example of a regime in which the competitive struggle for votes takes place in a context with only very poor provision of political rights and civil liberties. This leads some authors to ask whether Russia is a 'soft authoritarian' regime (Bova 1998: 181; Sautman 1995). Freedom House rates Russia as unfree (with a score of 5) but Korea as free (with a score of 2) (Freedom House 2001: 14). Scholars have criticized the use of the term 'democracy' to describe regimes without effective guarantees of political rights and civil liberties, using the pejorative labels 'electoralism' (Karl 1986) or 'the electoralist fallacy' (Linz &

Stepan 1996: 4). They prefer to use more general terms such as 'electoral regime' (Petras & Leiva 1994) for Schumpeter's minimalist concept of democracy. Nevertheless, in terms of the minimalist concept, Russia is democratic, whereas other countries in the Former Soviet Union such as Belarus and Uzbekistan are not.

Working from definitions of democracy advanced by Dahl (1971)¹⁴, Sartori (1962) and Schumpeter (1976), Linz (1975: 182f) defined democratic regimes as those in which citizens are able to formulate their political preferences through the use of basic freedoms of association, information and speech for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals and by non-violent means their claim to govern. While this definition narrows the range of cases called 'democratic' by requiring the provision of basic freedoms well as specifying that elections should be non-violent, the standards expected are unspecified. How much electoral violence is too much? When does uneven law enforcement or the harassment of particular activists shade in to the systematic denial of political rights? These are some of the issues which Linz's (1975) definition of democracy leaves unresolved.

I.A.4.2 Complete democracy

Working on post-communist regimes, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: 33) put forward additional criteria of 'complete' democracy in order to draw attention to three inter-related elements which earlier definitions take for granted but which are necessary for a regime to qualify as democratic in the fullest sense. These are: *accountability*, the *rule of law* and *civil society*. The addition of these three elements is a form of conceptual innovation

¹⁴ Dahl (1971) coined the term 'polyarchy' to describe real-world democracies, but other authors have reverted to the older term.

which Collier and Levitsky (1997: 442) call 'precising.' The aim of such innovation is to create a more useful concept in a context where democracy 'without adjectives' appears to encompass too many cases.

I.A.4.2.1 Accountability

Free and fair elections, combined with the non-exclusion of effective offices from electoral competition, provide a certain minimal level of *accountability* of the rulers to the ruled (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 35f). Accountability is a broad concept which embraces different institutions under different regimes, but it implies at a minimum one or more of the following: 'subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts' (Schedler 1999: 14). From this one may derive a definition of *electoral accountability* requiring the satisfaction of one or more of the following criteria: the elections offer the possibility of removing rulers from office and replacing them with alternative candidates; election campaigns force rulers to justify and explain their policies to voters; and electoral administration, in particular the vote count, is transparent.

The three elements of party systems, electoral systems, and voting patterns are in constant interaction and are sources of reciprocal influence each upon the other (Duverger 1964: 381; Mainwaring & Scully 1995a; Rose & Munro 2003; Sartori 1976). As Duverger (1964: 372f) pointed out, the articulation of public opinion to the authorities which classical doctrines of representation hold to be the job of elected deputies, is subject to a primary mediating influence from the party system, which provides the 'menu' of choices available to the voters. If the choices offered on the menu are unfamiliar, then voters have only a limited possibility of holding rulers to account through the ballot box. Unfamiliarity can result from discontinuity in the regime, as when free elections are reintroduced after a long gap, or when the pre-existing parties have been abolished. But it can also occur

when the regime is stable, but elites fail to supply a consistent menu of parties from one election to the next. Various criteria are available to measure the institutionalization of party systems¹⁵, but changing parties are only one source of uncertainty. Rose and Munro (2003: chapter five) equate *institutionalization of electoral competition* with the process of arriving at a stable equilibrium amongst the three elements of the supply of parties, the electoral system, and the behaviour of voters. *Stable equilibrium* implies a balance between supply and demand, in which the rules of the game change little over time, the same parties compete at successive elections and votes change only a few percentage points from one election to the next (Rose & Munro 2003: 71). An alternative scenario is *dynamic equilibrium*, where the rules and the supply of parties are stable but changing popular demands create a substantial change in votes between parties, signalling periodic 'shake-ups,' in which parties must adapt to remain competitive. A *structural disequilibrium* occurs when the supply of parties and/or the rules of the game change substantially from one election to the next, forcing voters to alter their behaviour. Electoral competition under conditions of structural disequilibrium is not institutionalized. Moving from structural disequilibrium to a dynamic equilibrium or to a stable equilibrium enhances the prospects of achieving genuine electoral accountability, since it maximizes the chances that citizens will face structured, comprehensible choices at election time, in which both incumbents and opposition parties may be punished or rewarded through the ballot box according to their performance in relation to voters' demands.

¹⁵ See, for example, Mainwaring and Scully (1995b: 1) whose criteria for democratic party system institutionalization emphasize stability in party competition, legitimacy of the electoral process, parties having 'roots' in society and stable rules and structures for party organizations. Randall and Svåsand (2002: 7f) have suggested the following criteria: continuity of parties, their mutual acceptance of each other as legitimate competitors, their autonomy from the state and a degree of public trust in them.

I.A.4.2.2 Rule of law

Discussions of the rule of law often start with the Weberian concepts of bureaucratic administration and 'modernity'. In the Weberian sense, 'becoming modern' means embracing the practices of rational-bureaucratic administration, defined as the exercise of control by means of technical knowledge (Weber 1966: 333-40). For Weber, the characteristics of modern bureaucracy are as follows. Firstly, officials are subject to impersonal discipline rather than owing personal loyalty to their superiors. Secondly, their duties are legally defined. Thirdly, officials enter into a free contract with their employer. Fourthly, initial appointment depends on technical qualifications, and advancement depends on seniority or achievement. Finally, remuneration is normally in the form of a fixed salary, and duties are sufficiently onerous to constitute a full-time career. According to Weber's theory of modernity, in large scale societies, bureaucratic administration is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the rule of law.

The rule of law facilitates the transparency of political processes. However, the idea, if not the practice, of the rule of law is much older than contemporary notions of transparency, and older, too, than modernity. It goes back at least as far as Aristotle¹⁶. While this is not the place for an excursus on the origins of the rule of law, it is worth recalling that the concept has Medieval roots, too, in Germanic laws, and in struggles by aristocrats and parliaments to limit the king's powers of arbitrary action. It finds expression in the writings of Enlightenment authors, and in the constitution of the United States. Following Friedrich (1968: 319), Franck (2001: 169), as well as scholars formulating definitions of democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996: 10, 14; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 32f), the present author defines the 'rule of law' as a situation in which:

¹⁶ See *The Politics* (Aristotle 1947: Book IV, ch.4).

1. an independent judiciary prevents unconstitutional, illegal and arbitrary actions by the executive and the legislature;
2. law establishes a hierarchy of norms, so that the constitution sets boundaries for the content of ordinary laws and these in turn limit legal statutes of lesser weight;
3. as a consequence of the establishment of order through laws, citizens benefit from a certain level of predictability in everyday life.

An ideal-type corresponding to the rule of law is the law-based state, the *Rechtstaat* (Linz 1975: 117; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 32f). In a *Rechtstaat*, the government grounds its actions in written laws rather than in arbitrary desires or ambitions of its personnel. Formal rules rather than informal norms control the activities of bureaucrats. Allocations of goods, services, or any other tradeable benefits by the government are effective. Because outcomes are predictable in terms of predetermined policy, it is possible to achieve incremental improvements. That is, by a process of trial and error it is possible to identify and to implement policies which benefit the state or the society as a whole. Thus, quite apart from facilitating the transparency of electoral administration, the rule of law is the *sine qua non* of an efficient feedback mechanism in the policy process. Without such a feedback mechanism, not only is the accountability of rulers to the citizens impaired by inaccurate signals, but also the government itself has only very approximate means of controlling the machinery of state.

I.A.4.2.3 Civil society

The term *civil society*, like rule of law, is venerable. The modern usage places civil society between the family and the state, and shares positive idealistic connotations with civilization and civility. Following Cohen and Arato (1992: ix), the present author defines civil society as: *a public sphere between official and private life in which a range of self-organizing autonomous associations pursue their interests within a framework of law*

*which guarantees personal and group liberties*¹⁷. It follows from this definition that a minimal standard in the rule of law, sufficient to guarantee personal and group liberties, is a *pre-requisite* for the existence of civil society. If all legal means of participating in public life are blocked, or if the state does not tolerate autonomous organizations, civil society ceases to exist as such. To some extent, autonomous social movements may replace an absent civil society¹⁸. However, social movements come in a variety of forms, not all of which belong in the realm of civil society. For example, Bolshevism began as a social movement, but having secured control of the state, Bolsheviks showed no respect for either personal or group liberties nor for the framework of existing Russian laws.

It also follows from the definition that the relationship between the state and civil society is of a particular kind, which Giugni and Passy (1998: 85ff) call 'conflictual co-operation'. This means that while the state and civil society organizations may at times have divergent interests, they seek to resolve their differences without attempting to destroy, overthrow or delegitimize one another. They have a shared interest in seeking compromises acceptable to both sides. Thus, while civil society organizations may pursue a non-violent campaign of 'civil disobedience', they do not resort to armed struggle. Similarly, civil society cannot exist if the state routinely resorts to illegal violence to overcome opposition to its policies.

¹⁷ Weigle's (2000) definition is similar; for her civil society is 'the self-organization of society in a public realm, bounded by a shared set of norms, whereby individuals and groups pursue personal and collective interests in freely constituted organizations in the context of a rule of law that regulates interactions and mediates interests.'

¹⁸ Gusfield (1968: 445) defined social movements as 'socially shared demands for change in some aspect of the social order'.

Civil society organizations serve two main functions in a democratic regime (Cohen & Arato 1992: 18-23; Linz & Stepan 1996: 14). Firstly, they help to organize the generation and regeneration of a political elite sharing a consensus on democratic procedures. Sometimes they do this by engaging directly in the formation of political parties, and sometimes they do it through indirect provision of support to political actors, for example, by providing finances, training, or information. Both activities are characteristic of the emergence of competitive party politics in Western Europe (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Secondly, civil society organizations provide continuous feedback to governments, usually through the legislature but also through other legal forms of influence and representation. In the process, citizens exercise political rights and generate new ideas through debate. Feedback from civil society includes both positive ideas *and* criticism, and may provide the authorities with necessary expertise in particular policy areas. The various forms of give-and-take between the authorities and civil society supplement the relatively crude accountability provided by periodic elections, and thus civil society is necessary to the completion of democracy.

Some authors prefer a broader definition of civil society, stripped of idealistic associations. Shlapentokh (1989: 6ff), for example, defines 'civil society' as a 'third level' in a four-level hierarchical model of society consisting of the individual at the bottom, primary groups such as the family second, civil society third and the state at the apex. While it is useful to break society into analytic categories, this author does not agree with Shlapentokh when he writes (1989: 6): 'Class struggle and civil war are elements of civil society...' Shlapentokh seeks to define civil society in a 'value-neutral' way so that it includes all group activities which are neither conducted by the state, nor at the level of primary groups. However, it is not clear how civil society then differs from society in the most general sense. In sum, it makes little sense to conceive of civil society as merely a sphere for autonomous organizations acting without regard to laws or liberties.

Because accountability, the rule of law and civil society are necessary to the 'completion' of democracy, this author follows Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: 33), in defining a 'complete democracy' as one in which:

1. there are free and fair elections to choose the government of the day;
2. the government is accountable to the populace through representative institutions such as political parties and a national parliament;
3. the government's powers are limited by the rule of law; and
4. civil society exists free of government control.

Other scholars, including Linz, have advanced similar definitions in recent years, though using a different vocabulary. In addition to the four elements listed above, Linz and Stepan (1996: 13-4) add another criterion to the definition of what they call 'modern consolidated' democracy¹⁹ — that there must be what they call an 'economic society' organized on the basis of an institutionalized market — on the grounds that without such an economic society the autonomy of civil society cannot exist. In the opinion of this author and others (Schmitter & Karl 1991: 86-7; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 32f) inserting 'market institutionalization' in the definition of democratization risks overloading the concept of democracy with too much cargo.

As argued below in Chapter Two, although both Korea and Russia hold free and inclusive elections, they exhibit weak representative institutions, and this renders the accountability of government problematic. Both countries have problems in ensuring the rule of law, though Russia's deficiencies are greater in this regard. In addition, Russia is distinguished by a very weak civil society.

¹⁹ As mentioned above, the concept of 'consolidated democracy' or 'democratic consolidation' is the subject of detailed discussion in Chapter Six of this thesis.

I.A.4.3 Incomplete democracy

This author uses the term 'incomplete democracy' to refer to *regimes holding free elections to choose the persons occupying effective political office but which do not show all of the three remaining characteristics of complete democracy, namely accountability of rulers to the ruled, the rule of law and a civil society free of government control*. These regimes are democracies 'without adjectives' in terms of the Schumpeterian definition, but they are not complete democracies.

In an incomplete democracy which has only recently come into existence, behaviours conducive to the rule of law, a civil society and the maintenance of democratic accountability often appear novel. The achievement of complete democracy requires changes in behaviour at both elite and mass level. Such change is not merely difficult, but an object of political contention. Concepts such as rule of law or civil society, which are part of the definition of complete democracy, do not always readily take root in a new context. The nature of that context depends in large part on the legacy of the prior regime.

I.A.5 Types of Undemocratic Regimes

Undemocratic regimes are, for the purpose of this study, those regimes which fail to meet the Schumpeter's (1976: 269) minimalist test of democracy: that is, they are those regimes in which leaders acquire the power to govern by means *other than* a competitive struggle for the people's vote. For example, government changes hands by coup d'état, or in a conclave of ruling party functionaries which ignores outside opinion. Alternatively, elections are held but the results are falsified. Yet another variant is where election results are tallied accurately, but opposition parties are subject to systematic harassment or discrimination which prevents them from competing effectively. The differences among undemocratic regimes are not just differences in degree but differences in type.

I.A.5.1 Totalitarianism and Post-totalitarianism

Linz (1975) offered the definitive political typology of undemocratic regimes. According to his definition (1975: 191-2; 1996: 40-2), *totalitarian* regimes exhibit:

1. a single central monopoly of power which excludes, by coercion, co-optation and infiltration, even a limited pluralism of institutions or groups;
2. an 'exclusive, autonomous and more or less intellectually elaborate' ideology with which the rulers exert domination over subjects;
3. continuous mobilization of citizens through a single party or its subsidiaries in efforts to achieve collective political, social and economic goals;
4. undefined limits on the top leader's power, which often has a charismatic basis, leading to unpredictability and insecurity amongst the ruling elite and society at large.

By pluralism, Linz means both plurality of and competition between representatives of divergent interests. Its opposite is 'monism', the absence of plurality of interests and competition amongst them. Thus he writes concerning totalitarian regimes: '...Whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy²⁰ from [the] centre, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the pre-existing society' (Linz 1975: 191). Fainsod (1963: chapters 6-7) and Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965: 9-10) also emphasize the centralized monopoly of power by a single party as a defining characteristic of totalitarianism. Arendt (1963: 395ff) emphasizes its 'dual authority, the party and the state' and a quality she described as 'shapelessness' (1963: 398f), or tendency to destroy structure.

²⁰ Linz's definition of legitimacy comes from Weber (Linz 1978a: 16). See further discussion of this concept below, in section I.A.6 of this chapter.

Linz (1975: 267ff) contrasts ideologies, which are intellectually elaborate, comprehensive in offering a world view and often written, with mentalities, which are simpler, less comprehensive, less elaborate and less likely to be written down. The use of an elaborate ideology to sustain a vision of the total transformation of society forms part of Friedrich and Brzezinski's (1965: 9-10) and Arendt's (1963: 471ff) descriptions of totalitarianism.

Mobilization in a totalitarian regime is usually accompanied by intense psychological pressure to express vociferous support for the regime and its goals. For true believers, expressions of support are genuine, while for others, they merely show a desire to conform or to 'avoid trouble.'

The top leader in a totalitarian regime, who has the power to do almost anything to those around him, often becomes the centre of a 'personality cult.' Stalin, Hitler and Mao Zedong used their personal charisma and unrestricted power to create this type of cult around themselves.

Linz (1975: 193, 217ff) argues that in totalitarian regimes, the commitment to ideology, the desire for monopolistic control, and the fear of losing power account for a proclivity towards terror, especially within the elite. He cites Dallin and Breslauer's (1970: 1) definition of terror as 'the arbitrary use by organs of the political authority of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups.' This definition of terror will serve the purposes of the present study.

However, contrary to the characterization of totalitarianism advanced by Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965: 9-10;), by Arendt (1963: 466f), and by Fainsod (1963: 421f), Linz does not consider that mass terror is *necessary*

for a regime to 'qualify' as totalitarian. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, terror has existed in non-totalitarian regimes also, and on a large scale²¹. Secondly, it is possible to conceive, at least hypothetically, of a regime having all the totalitarian characteristics listed in the definition above without terror. Such a situation would be possible if the totalitarian regime's goals commanded widespread support, obviating the need for coercion to ensure mass mobilization.

That said, given a regime that does use terror, if that regime is also totalitarian, Linz (1975: 218) argues that its terror is likely to take on certain characteristics, including: unprecedented scale, disregard for legal procedures, publicity accompanying terror, such as show trials, extension of terror even to the elite, punishment of relatives along with the accused, punishment according to the perceived intent or the characteristics of the accused, and continuation of terror long after the regime has consolidated. While one can exclude terror from the definition of totalitarianism, one cannot exclude totalitarianism from the history of terror.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, and, symbolically, after the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin's 'mistakes', the Soviet Union diverged from the totalitarian model as ideal-type, leading a new generation of scholars to seek to revise or replace the concept of totalitarianism to more accurately reflect the changed realities

²¹ The use of terror is common in regimes, which Linz and Stepan (Linz 1975: 259; Linz & Stepan 1996: 51f), following Weber (1966: 347), call 'sultanistic,' characterizing them in terms of the fusion of private and public activities by the ruler, the reliance for authority on personal relations with him (rarely her), a low level of political pluralism, the absence of guiding ideology, and little public mobilization in pursuit of regime goals. Linz's (1975: 217) example is Trujillo's regime in the Dominican Republic.

(Azrael 1968: 69–75; Cocks 1970; Hough & Fainsod 1979: 522-9; Kassof 1969; Linz 1975: 336-50; Skilling 1970: 223ff). Kassof (1969: 154), for example, coined the term ‘administrative totalitarianism’ to describe the total coordination of society’s activities in the name of ideology without reliance on the ‘gross irrationality’ of mass terror. Skilling (1970) called attention to the differentiation of communist systems according to the degree of official tolerance of the articulation of diverse or even conflicting interests by social groups. Hough (1977: 24ff) used the term ‘institutional pluralism’ to describe the direction in which Soviet politics was *moving* in the post-Stalin era, although the term ‘pluralism’ usually implies much more free articulation of interests than the Soviet regime was prepared to allow (Skilling 1970: 215). To describe Soviet-type systems after Stalin, Linz (1975: 336) coined the term ‘post-totalitarian’, not because it made these systems appear somehow more acceptable, but because he was explicitly concerned with the legacy of the totalitarian regime and with the dynamics of its successor-type.

Like other communists, Soviet leaders of the post-Stalin era were ideologically committed to the eventual transformation of society from a condition of socialism under one-party dictatorship into the ideal condition, communism, where the state would wither away and people would govern themselves. However they did not anticipate that this transformation would come any time soon. Society as a whole was not ‘worked up’ into a state of excitement in anticipation of the millennial change.

According to Linz (1975: 336ff; Linz & Stepan 1996: 42-51), a post-totalitarian regime is characterized by:

1. a single central monopoly of power, which nevertheless tolerates some internal debate amongst the party and technocrats and resorts to the use of formal structures and procedures in order to resolve

- conflicts²²;
2. the continued use of an exclusive and elaborate ideology to exert domination over subjects and to structure policy, but in a way which de-emphasizes literal interpretations of the ideology to allow rational consideration of a range of options limited by certain doctrinal orthodoxies²³;
 3. continued mobilization of citizens through a single party to achieve collective goals, but in a routinized way which emphasizes the need to achieve a minimum degree of conformity and compliance, not revolutionary transformation²⁴;
 4. Changes in leadership style characterized by the process which Weber (1966: 363-73) called the 'routinization of charisma,' including the substitution of established procedures for direct and personal relations with the leader as a basis for legitimation.

The post-totalitarian regime has transformed itself from a totalitarian regime into its successor type by resorting to bureaucratic or statutory procedures to settle conflicts. It has diversified the apparatus of coercion, perhaps so that one coercive group balances the power of another. To make decisions, it requires consultation amongst different leaders, even including non-political experts.

²² On interest groups and the regulation of conflict amongst them within the Soviet regime, see also Brown (1974: chapter 3), Skilling (1970) and the articles in Skilling & Griffiths (1971).

²³ On the role of ideology in the USSR, see also Barghoorn and Remington (1986: 54ff), Cocks (1970); and Kassof (1969).

²⁴ On mobilization and participation, see also Barghoorn & Remington (1986: chapter 4), Hough (1977: chapter 4), Hough and Fainsod (1979: chapter 8) and White (1979: 87-95).

In a post-totalitarian regime, politics has begun to be less ideologically-driven and more oriented towards meeting the need of the society for everyday government. The role of ideology is more and more to provide a formal rationale for the regime's existence, and less and less to provide practical guidance for state policy.

Some institutions and procedures of mass mobilization are still in place, but the former psychological intensity and urgency of mobilization is gone. If under the totalitarian regime, ordinary people put great energy into their participation in political meetings and discussions, whether out of genuine enthusiasm or out of fear of being seen not to be enthusiastic, in a post-totalitarian regime, while attendance at such meetings may still be obligatory, there is no need for ordinary people to exert themselves. Surreptitiously, they may feign participation or 'sneak off' from officially sanctioned events or gatherings.

The leadership of a post-totalitarian regime is often collective, and usually un-charismatic. The personality of the top leader does not become the object of a popular cult. If the leader assumes too much personal power, his henchmen are liable to cut him down to size, or depose him.

I.A.5.2 Authoritarianism and Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarianism

Authoritarian regimes are defined as political systems having (Linz 1975: 264; Linz & Stepan 1996: 44f):

1. 'limited, not responsible,' political pluralism;
2. no elaborate or comprehensive guiding ideology;
3. no continuous process of mobilization of citizens, that is, any mobilization is sporadic;
4. a leadership which exercises power within formally ill-defined limits which are nevertheless predictable, even if not always rule-bound.

By 'limited, not responsible, political pluralism' Linz (1975: 266) means

that although autonomous organizations, including political ones, may be tolerated in an authoritarian regime, rulers do not allow these groups to serve as channels for political accountability of the regime to citizens. For example, an opposition party may fight elections, but it is not allowed to win them.

The absence of an elaborate ideology means that rulers are more likely to make up the official state ideology 'as they go along' rather than adhering to a codified, written belief system setting out ultimate goals. Moreover, the leadership does not seek to impose its understanding of social reality on everyone else.

Although mobilization may take place from time to time, it is likely to serve particular purposes, such as national defence or rural development. It is also likely to be sporadic, as when a ruling party mobilizes its supporters in order to secure a majority of seats in parliament during an election. It is less likely to be comprehensive, as the regime does not seek to transform society as a whole.

The leadership may issue decrees and edicts on any matter, but since they see the preserve of government as possessing natural limits, there is some predictability in what they do. Once the public understands the leadership's goals and mentality, avoiding trouble with the authorities is relatively easy.

The type definition of authoritarianism takes its characteristics from undemocratic regimes in Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, and Latin America. An example of an authoritarian regime which was not military was Korea under Syngman Rhee (1948-1960). Rhee kept himself in power by holding manipulated elections and intimidating his opponents (Cumings 1997: 215ff, 223f; Croissant 2002: 237f;

Han 1974: chapter 2; Henderson 1968: 153-68). His was a corrupt regime which did not succeed in generating economic development. Its principal achievement was to carry through a programme of land reform, which it did so somewhat reluctantly²⁵. Following a student revolt partially inspired by blatant election rigging in 1960²⁶, Prime Minister Chang Myon²⁷ took charge of the government, establishing a parliamentary regime under the so-called Second Republic. The Chang Myon regime failed to consolidate (Han 1974), and was brought to an end by Major General Park Chung-hee's military coup on May 16, 1961.

According to Linz (1975: 285ff), a *bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime* is an authoritarian regime in which a coalition dominated by army officers and bureaucrats:

1. establishes control of government, co-opting or excluding other groups in a pragmatic way and;
2. makes no effort to either commit to a specific ideology or to mobilize the population through a mass single party.

²⁵ The National Assembly passed the main land reform legislation in 1949 under American pressure, but the government dragged its feet with implementation until North Korea overran most of the South in 1950, and began encouraging peasants to seize land for themselves. After UN and South Korean forces rolled back the Northern army, the Rhee regime found that the power of the landed class in the countryside was broken, and the Americans were not willing to restore it (Cumings 1997: 270f, 301f)

²⁶ Rhee ran unopposed in the presidential election that year, but the result was subsequently declared null and void.

²⁷ Following Korean convention, Chang's surname comes first, followed by his given name. Most Koreans have two given names, separated in this text by a hyphen, as in Chun Doo-hwan. Syngman Rhee is an exception to both rules. Korean authors are cited in their own preferred format.

The role, nature and number of tolerated political parties varies amongst bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes. The leadership sometimes creates a government-sponsored single party for the purpose of winning unfree elections, but the party tends not to play a powerful and autonomous role in politics. It sometimes dispenses with parties altogether, but more often it will create a 'ruling party' to control the legislature. It then allows some degree of competition amongst other 'acceptable' parties so long as such competition does not lead to changes in government. The mechanisms for controlling competition include manipulation of the electoral law to provide 'reserved' seats for appointed candidates, and varying combinations of intimidation, bribery and falsification of election results to provide government majorities in non-reserved seats.

Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes often seek to uphold their legitimacy by manipulating constitutional formulae modelled on liberal democracy. If external political pressures require them to appear democratic, they may partially civilianize the administration or require career officers to quit the military before taking government posts.

Park Chung-hee's Third Republic (1961-1971) has been described as 'quasi-military' (Cotton 1991: 207ff). In the first two years of Park's rule, government posts were almost entirely filled by military men, and government itself took the form of a junta (Cumings 1997: 347ff; Kang 2002: 86). However, domestic political opinion and the United States exerted pressure on Park to legitimize his rule by holding competitive elections, and to civilianize it by making serving officers quit the military. However, this process was only partial: former military officers continued to occupy the most important portfolios, such as defence and home affairs, and to hold around two-fifths of ministerial posts overall (Kang 2002: 86). Park won freely contested but not fair presidential elections in 1963 and 1967 and, after securing a constitutional change to allow him a third term, won narrowly

again in 1971, amidst widespread allegations of electoral fraud (Cotton 1991: 208; Croissant 2002: 236). The following year Park Chung-hee declared martial law and, through a referendum, introduced the so-called *Yushin* or 'Revitalization' constitution known in Korea as the Fourth Republic (1972-1980). With enhanced powers, the president was thereafter indirectly elected. Park's assassination in 1979 triggered another coup, led by General Chun Doo-hwan. The 1981 constitution, under the so-called Fifth Republic (1981-1987) reproduced most of the essential features of Park's *Yushin* constitution.

Although undergoing a number of metamorphoses from 1961 to 1987, the Korean regime under Park and Chun was basically under the control of the military. A succession of ruling parties assured the regime control of the legislature, and these parties remained the tool of the military establishment. Opposition parties failed to institutionalize themselves in a way which would allow them to aggregate the interests of social groups excluded by the ruling party (Croissant 2002: 249-52; Pae 1986: 194f; Yang 1992). Constitutional rules adopted democratic language, but the regime frequently violated human rights and basic freedoms, as well as economic and social rights guaranteed under the constitution (Pae 1986: 221). To deal with politicians, intellectuals, students, trade unionists, and members of the press who were unwilling to accept the regime, the government deployed an enormous security apparatus, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), later renamed the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). The KCIA engaged in political repression inside and outside Korea (Cumings 1997: 363-67). Finally, within the ruling party and within the armed forces itself, the leadership relied on personal followings based on regional loyalties, loyalty to graduating classes of military training college, and secret societies like the *Hanahoe* or One Society (Luckham 1996: 219). The military's continuous political role, the orientation of the leadership towards pragmatic policy goals, its lack of a coherent guiding ideology, and the one-sided competition

between the ruling party and weak opposition parties justify the classification of the Korean regime from the early 1960s to 1987 as bureaucratic-military authoritarian.

O'Donnell's (1973) 'bureaucratic-authoritarian thesis', relating processes of socio-economic modernization to politics in a way which posits explicit causal effects from the former to the latter, cannot be applied in Korea without substantial modifications (Im 1987; Cotton 1992). Korea embarked on a policy of intensive, vertically-integrated industrialization aimed at maximizing exports of capital goods to the developed world in the early 1960s, but the *Yushin* reforms of 1971-1972, which intensified authoritarian rule, were more a pre-emptive strike against working class mobilization than a reaction to it (Im 1987: 241). By contrast, in Argentina and Brazil, which are O'Donnell's primary examples of 'bureaucratic-authoritarianism', formally democratic regimes fell after economic development and concomitant sharpening of class conflicts provoked a backlash aimed at excluding the working class from politics (O'Donnell 1973: 89ff). Because of the strong differences between the Korean political economy and those of O'Donnell's South American examples, the term 'bureaucratic-military authoritarian' in this thesis invokes Linz's (1975) typology of undemocratic regimes rather than O'Donnell's (1973) perspective on a particular phase of South American development.

I.A.6 Political Support, Legitimacy, Consolidation

The notion that democratic ideals and practices have universal appeal and relevance in non-Western countries cannot be asserted, but must be proved. This is why the topic of political support for incomplete democracies holds interest for social scientists today. For the purposes of the present study *political support* is assumed to be *an aspect of mass public opinion involving favourable orientations towards a political object*. Theoretical definitions sometimes are broader than this. For example, Easton (1965:

159) suggested the following definition of support: 'A supports B when A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favourably towards B.' However, 'acting on behalf of' a political regime raises questions about motivation and context which are best dealt with under the heading of political behaviour rather than support. Undemocratic as well as democratic regimes may be the object of support, but in this study the object of support is an incomplete democracy.

Related to support is the concept of legitimacy. Weber defines the legitimacy of any social order as the probability that an individual will orient his or her actions towards its rules and regard those rules as binding (Weber 1966: 130-31). He distinguishes between the concept of authority and the concept of legitimacy (1966: 324-26). Authority is the probability that any given command will be obeyed, regardless of the motivation. Through its function of justification, legitimacy requires not that those subject to authority will obey, but rather that they will believe it right to do so. This belief exists over and above other possible motivations for obedience. Thus legitimacy results from support. Rose (1969: 604) uses the term 'compliance' to refer to the power of a regime to secure obedience and 'support' to refer to the enduring and diffuse basis for *voluntary* obedience. Although Rose gives the word 'authority' a broader meaning than Weber, both Rose and Weber would agree that it is possible to get compliance without support.

This author uses the term 'widely dispersed' to describe an attitude which is found throughout all sections of society. Widely dispersed support is not heavily influenced by concrete structures in society, that is, by those structures allowing in theory a physical separation of individuals of from

their fellows²⁸. This use of the word 'dispersed' should not be confused with Easton's term 'diffuse support.' Easton (1965: 249; 1975: 446ff) distinguished between 'specific support', which depends on contingent political circumstances, such as the satisfaction of some specific sets of demands, wants or expectations, and 'diffuse support', which depends on enduring values or beliefs as well as performance evaluations accumulated over a long time. Clarifying this famous distinction, Easton (1975: 446ff) refuses to equate 'specific support' with performance evaluation and 'diffuse support' with what he calls 'values.' Instead he insists that specific support is contingent on a particular set of political circumstances while diffuse support is enduring. Unlike Easton's term, 'widely dispersed support' refers here to how common support is, not to how resilient it is.

All incomplete democracies face the problem of securing legitimacy, since failure to achieve legitimacy, whether through wrong policy choices, ineffective policy implementation or other performance failures threatens to destabilize the regime, leaving it prone to break down in a crisis (Linz 1978a: chapter 2). To put it differently, legitimacy is among the essential conditions for the genesis of a complete democracy²⁹ (Rustow 1999: 35). In countries

²⁸ The distinction between concrete and analytic structures comes from Levy (1968: 26). Age is a concrete structure, since it could in principle be used as a basis for separation. By contrast, the political and economic aspects of an individual's worldview are analytic structures, since they cannot be separated.

²⁹ According to Rustow (1999: 35), there are other essential conditions, too, namely agreement on the boundaries of the state by an overwhelming majority of the population, entrenched and serious conflict within the state, the conscious adoption of democratic rules, and the habituation of both elites and the electorate to those rules. This author would accept all of Rustow's conditions, with the caveat that conflict should not be interpreted to mean

where important political parties disagree over whether to uphold the new regime if they gain power, popular support for the regime affects its functioning directly through the results of elections. Even where the new regime is not the subject of a major political cleavage, popular support for the regime can indirectly affect elite behaviour. In countries with a history of undemocratic take-overs, the effect of a crisis on the regime depends initially on whether elites choose to supply an alternative to democracy. If the elite is unable or unwilling to supply an undemocratic alternative, different outcomes are possible (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 200ff): if support for democracy is strong and elites are able to solve the pressing problems of the day within the democratic institutional framework, a complete democracy is likely to emerge. If support for democracy is weak or weakens in the face of performance failures, but elites offer no alternative institutional framework, a democracy can remain incomplete for decades.

The concept of 'democratic consolidation' implies the routinization of adherence to democratic rules both in the formal aspects of political behaviour and in informal practices (Schmitter 1994: 58; Gunther, et al. 1995: 7; Linz & Stepan 1996: 6; Przeworski 1991: 26). As the 'rules of the game' stabilize, actors orient their behaviour towards achieving their goals within the rules, and this enhances a democratic regime's chances of survival. In addition, scholars have sought to give the concept of consolidation an attitudinal dimension, including in the definition the deepened legitimacy of democratic rules and the rejection of possible alternative systems of government (Gunther, et al. 1995: 7; Linz & Stepan 1996: 6; Shin 1994: 150). Behavioural and attitudinal criteria of consolidation are sometimes presented in the literature as mutually exclusive alternatives (Schedler 1998; Di Palma 1990: chapter 7). However, there is no reason

violent conflict. The process of 'habituation' is dealt with under 'consolidation' below.

why the dimensions of behaviour and attitudes, which are complementary in real life, cannot be included in one concept. This author prefers a two-dimensional definition: consolidation including both the stabilization of democratic rules in behaviour, and, in terms of attitudes, to a deepening of the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The author returns to this theme in the discussion of 'democratic consolidation' in Chapter Six.

The relationship of the term 'consolidated democracy' to the term 'complete democracy' needs clarification. If one compares the elements of the definition of complete democracy with those of democratic consolidation, it is clear that they describe different phenomena. The definition of complete democracy breaks a democratic regime down into functional structures: the rule of law, civil society, free elections, accountability, and describes an end-state in which these four elements work together. The definition of democratic consolidation focusses on the *process* by which these functional structures become established, routine, and legitimate. The term 'consolidated democracy' thus refers to a regime which *has undergone* the process of democratic consolidation, and thereby has become 'complete.'

I.B Extensions to the Undemocratic Regime Typology

I.B.1 Policy Orientation, Economic Freedom, Rule of Law

I.B.1.1 Definition of Policy Orientation

The term 'policy orientation' is used in this thesis to refer to the broad goals which a state sets for itself. In the Korean case, it is reasonable to assert that the Korean state under the bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime oriented itself towards rapid economic development. In the Soviet case, although economic development was one of the regime's goals, it was far from an overriding goal. Foreign policy loomed large in Soviet minds as the rulers in the Kremlin sought to maintain military parity with the United

States. The 'Brezhnev doctrine' underlined the importance which the Soviet Union attached to maintaining a certain level of ideological cohesion and political control over its empire of communist satellite states. The broad goals of a state sometimes change when the regime changes, as would be the case with Russian foreign policy, and sometimes they do not, as would be the case with the Korean orientation towards economic growth. Korea and the Soviet Union had fundamentally different policy orientations.

I.B.1.2 Definition of Economic Freedom

A *market* is defined, following Weber (1966: 181f), as an opportunity to exchange goods for money. A *market economy* is one where prices are set by competition between market participants, acting on the basis of self interest (Weber 1966: 212ff). A *non-market economy* is one where prices are set by a central authority in order to satisfy the needs of the established order (Weber 1966: 212ff). Although in the real world there are few national economies which approach either ideal type, most economies combining some elements of both, the contrast is useful in identifying the dimension along which they differ: their degree of *economic freedom*.

Weber (1966: 182) defines *economic (or market) freedom* as the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the parties to market relationships in price determination and in competition. Economic individualism is the economic philosophy which maximizes economic freedom. Economic collectivism tends to restrict it.

The Soviet political system, reliant on the total and undivided power of the party-state and on Marxist-Leninist ideology, imposed an economic system in which state ownership of productive assets was overwhelmingly dominant. The dominance of state ownership, the lack of any institutionalized checks on the power of the party-state, and the nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology dictated that, for the most part, bureaucratic

coordination determined what was produced, when, how, for whom, by whom and in what quantities (Kornai 1992: chapter 6). This ubiquity of bureaucratic coordination, and the marginal role played by markets in production and exchange, led to certain economic phenomena, such as quantity-drives, soft-budget constraints, and labour hoarding, which are not unique to non-market command economies but which are characteristic of state-driven development in general. At the same time, it led to an important range of economic dysfunctions especially characteristic of communist systems, notably inefficiency in use of resources, a distorted incentive structure for workers and managers, technological backwardness, and isolation from the mainstream of the international market economy. These all contributed to a characteristic of the Soviet economic system which was to prove immensely important in political terms: its chronic inability to supply ordinary consumers with sufficient goods of an adequate quality.

Unlike the USSR, Korea's was a market economy: the bulk of enterprises were in private hands, and competition amongst self-interested economic actors determined most prices. Like the USSR, the Korean state guided and stimulated investment in the national economy (Amsden 1989; Cho 1997; Woo 1991). The state prepared national economic plans, which over several five-year planning cycles set quantitative goals for development of industry. The important role of state planning and state-allocated finance encouraged, as mentioned above, such phenomena as quantity drives, soft-budget constraints, and labour hoarding. However, the fulfilment of the plans was mostly in private hands. The state thus played the role of banker, offering selective subsidies and cheap loans, which proved effective instruments in helping to change Korea's structural position in the international economy (Amsden 1989: 16ff; Song 1990: chapter 7; Woo 1991). The fact that Korea had a functioning market economy helps to explain why, despite certain similarities with the non-market command economies, Korea did not experience chronic shortages of basic consumer

goods, unlike the USSR and, for that matter, North Korea. While Korea had a market economy, it was dissimilar to market economies in Western Europe, and also dissimilar to that of the United States. Moreover, although many other developing countries had market economies, few developed as fast as Korea. It is clear that Korea provided its citizens with more economic freedom than the Soviet Union, but less economic freedom than a *laissez-faire* liberal state.

I.B.1.3 Rule of Law and Modernization

In a state with no rule of law tradition, efforts to improve rational-bureaucratic administration are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rule of law. It requires also the establishment of a hierarchy of norms based on law; and the introduction of institutional guarantees of the independence of the judiciary. The consequence of a movement towards the rule of law is greater predictability in everyday life.

A movement towards the rule of law may be a by-product of wider processes of 'modernization', but such a relationship must be proven rather than assumed. Coleman (1968: 395) defines modernization in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* as follows: '...Changes in all institutional spheres of a society resulting from man's [sic] expanding knowledge of and control over his environment.' Lerner (1968: 387) lists four other characteristics of modernized societies: public participation in the polity; a diffusion of secular and rational norms in culture; increased social and physical mobility; and, for the modal personality, what Lerner calls 'empathy' — an increased ability to imagine oneself in a different role, time or place. The present author does not intend to improve on Coleman's definition, nor Lerner's description, of modernization. In general, the present author uses the term *socio-economic modernization* to describe the broad economic and social changes which accompany economic development,

including industrialization, urbanization, widening opportunities for education and increasing mass media consumption. Movement towards the rule of law is an analytically distinct process.

The concept of movement towards the rule of law partially overlaps with a term which has now gone out of fashion, *political modernization*. Apter (1965: 45f) associated political modernization with the introduction of rational bureaucratic administration and expansion of political participation. Eisenstadt (1966: 9) adds to these the expansion of market relations. Rustow (1967: 128ff) acknowledged the role of rational bureaucratic administration in political modernization, but saw it as consequential upon the emergence of national identity, the assertion of central political authority and growth in political equality (1967: chapters 2-3). Coleman (1968: 395) and Huntington (1968: 34) associate political modernization with differentiation of political structure, secularization of politics, as well as expansion of participation. Huntington and Dominguez (1975: 4) defined political modernization as 'the political aspects and consequences' of socio-economic modernization, identifying it with the term 'political development'. In short, the term 'political modernization' has a history of diverse usages.

However, not all the available meanings of the term political modernization are necessary elements in a movement towards the rule of law. Differentiation is particularly appropriate for the transition from a traditional patrimonial regime where one ruler performs multiple functions, but not in transitions from regimes where political roles were already highly differentiated. Similarly, secularization is not pertinent to societies which are already secular. Participation as a criterion of modernization raises the questions of whether participation is forced or voluntary, who organizes it and for what purpose. All this suggests that the broader concepts of political modernization which were current in the late 1960s and early 1970s are not useful for present purposes.

It would be a reasonable generalization to say that Korea and the Soviet Union under their respective undemocratic regimes had not achieved the rule of law. They were not exemplars of the *Rechtstaat*. But deciding which of the two was closer to the rule of law requires looking at each regime in more depth.

In the following two sections, the author introduces two terms from the literature on Korean and Russian economic and political development, the ‘developmental state’ and the ‘anti-modern party-state’. These terms summarize certain characteristics of the two countries’ undemocratic regimes which are important to the discussion of their legacies, but which are not encapsulated in the Linzian definition of their respective undemocratic regime types. The two concepts contrast with one another in relation to the three concepts defined above: rule of law, economic freedom, and policy orientation.

I.B.2 The Developmental State

The Japanese ‘invented’ the developmental state in the early 20th century, and though the ‘Japanese model’ has changed in some fundamental ways, other characteristics persist, and have been offered as partial explanations for the ‘miracle’ of post-war Japanese economic reconstruction (Johnson 1982). Johnson’s definition of the developmental state centres on what he calls the ‘plan-rational’ role of the state in the market economy, operated by means of a banking system essentially under the control of the government. He writes (1982: 19):

A regulatory, or market-rational, state concerns itself with forms and procedures — the rules, if you will — of economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive matters. For example, the United States government has many regulations concerning the antitrust implications of the size of firms, but it does not concern itself

with what industries ought to exist and what industries are no longer needed. The developmental, or plan-rational, state, by contrast, has as its dominant feature precisely the setting of such social and economic goals.

Johnson (1982: 18) calls Soviet-type economies plan-ideological rather than plan-rational, because the tenets of the command economy are dictated by ideology rather than being 'rational means to a developmental goal.' The essential characteristics of the Japanese developmental state concern its distinctive role in the economy and its orientation toward growth.

The Japanese influence on Korea, operating both through the colonial³⁰ and war-time legacy, and through demonstration effects, technology transfer and investment in the post-war era, is well documented (Woo 1991: chapter 2; Amsden 1989: chapter 3; Kohli 1999). The policy innovations leading to the creation of the Korean developmental state came from a generation who gained their formative professional experiences in the Japanese armed forces, civil service, and business. Park Chung-hee, for example, explicitly studied the Japanese model, had trained at an officers' school in Japan and had fought for the Imperial Army in Manchuria (Cumings 1997: 350ff). The basic outlines of the Korean developmental state were in place by the mid-1960s.

Since Johnson's seminal work on Japan, the developmental state has emerged as a key concept in discussions of East Asian economic growth, challenging both neoclassical and dependency theories based on experience of other continents³¹. Below, the author elaborates the concept with

³⁰ Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and ruled it for the next 35 years. See Cumings (1997: chapter 3) for an overview of the period.

³¹ Onis (1991) reviews some of the most prominent contributions to the literature on the developmental state, namely those by Amsden (1989),

reference to the literature on Korea. The discussion deals with three issues, corresponding to the three concepts defined in section I.B.1: 1) the relationship of the market economy to the development state; 2) the relationship in the developmental state of corruption³², a negative indicator of the rule of law, to economic growth and 3) the goals of the developmental state. Although a complete re-definition of the developmental state would require comparative study of a number of examples of the type, including countries outside the scope of this thesis, the author does attempt to elaborate the definition of the developmental state *as it existed in Korea*.

I.B.2.1 The Developmental State and the Market

Although some authors attempt to apply the concept of the developmental state to countries undergoing transition to a market economy (Leftwich 1995; White & Wade 1988), communist states are normally excluded from the category because of the absence of a market mechanism (Thompson 1996: 630), and because ideology rather than pragmatic concern with economic growth dictates the overall policy orientation. The countries to which the term 'developmental state' usually applies all have market economies.

Wade (1990) and Johnson (1982) amongst single-author works and Deyo (1987) amongst edited volumes. See also White (1988); Thompson (1996); Aoki, et al. (1997); Chan, et al. (1998), and Woo-Cumings (1999) (alias Jung-en Woo, cited below). For views which emphasize the role of the market in East Asian industrialization, see Hughes (1988), whose edited volume is criticized by Wade (1992: 270-85).

³² Following Nye (1989: 966), corruption is defined as 'behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence'.

The market in its essence consists of opportunities for development; through price signals it links supply and demand, and thereby stimulates entrepreneurship and provides finance for investment. The market is not just the national market economy, but the international market economy. Hence studies of Korean success feature discussions of comparative advantage in a changing international environment (Amsden 1989: chapter 10; Jones & SaKong 1980: chapter 6; Song 1990; World Bank 1993), and also emphasize the outward-looking nature of the Korean economic strategy (SaKong 1993: 37-43), its adaptability to changing external conditions (Deyo 1987; SaKong 1993: chapter 3) and the important role of finance (Woo 1991). The importance of having a market economy, with private property rights and wide economic freedom, is sometimes taken for granted by those whose field of study is restricted to countries with market economies.

The developmental state, by definition, plays an important role in economic development. This role consists primarily in generating and guiding investment and setting the options for industrial policy (Amsden 1989: chapter 6; Jones & SaKong 1980: chapters 3-4; Woo 1991: chapter 6; SaKong 1993: chapter 3). In Korea, for example, one of the earliest steps of the developmental state was to effectively nationalize all banks, through a law restricting private shareholders' voting rights (SaKong 1993: 33). Thereafter the state devised a variety of instruments to mobilize finance from within the country and abroad, to set priorities for investment, to reward enterprises who fulfilled government-set targets, and to punish those who failed to deliver. In Amsden's (1989: 8) words, the government 'exchanged loans for performance'. In addition, the Korean state had a substantial direct role in running public enterprises, and these enterprises were not 'dinosaurs' but played an important strategic role in the overall development plan (Jones & SaKong 1980: chapter 5; SaKong 1993: 27-30). These policies, although controversial in mainstream economics, proved to be successful in achieving rapid industrialization.

I.B.2.2 The Developmental State and Rule of Law

The question then arises why state-led development worked in Korea where similar state-led strategies produced only mediocre results elsewhere in the developing world. Jones and SaKong (1980: chapter 4) give credit to the Korean leadership's commitment to growth and to thorough implementation of its policies. In their view, the Korean state was 'hard', in the sense of being prepared to impose obligations on the population and to enforce them, using coercion if necessary³³ (Jones & SaKong 1980: 132-40). However, this is no more than a partial explanation, since although the Korean state was hard in this sense, it was differentially so. Thus it was hard on labour if they attempted to organize independent trade unions, and on students if they threatened political stability. Occasionally, the state was hard on small savers, as when in 1971 the state imposed a moratorium on corporate debt owed to the private, domestic financial market (Woo 1991: 113-15). At the same time, the state was soft on big business, the so-called *chaebol*³⁴, but it was not always equally soft on all big business. For example, during the big push into heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s, financial policy tools became 'industry-specific and sometimes even firm-specific' (SaKong 1993: 35). Thus the soft side of the differentially hard state generated corruption, but in Korea this did not degenerate into the type of 'predatory state' which stifles growth (Amsden 1989: 146f; Jones & SaKong 1980: 139; Wedeman 1997; Woo 1991: 9f). Both the state and big business perceived a shared interest in maximizing productive capacity.

The question then arises as whether or not such corruption as did occur was 'systemic,' that is, necessary to the operation of the developmental state, or whether it resulted from the behaviour of a 'few bad

³³ Their distinction between hard and soft states comes from Myrdal (1968: 67).

³⁴ Chaebol is the Korean word for corporate conglomerates.

apples.’ Recent scholarship supports the view that it was systemic (Cho 1997; Cumings 1997: chapter 6; Kang 2002; Kim, D. 1990; Morriss 1997; Park 1995; Wedeman 1997). In part this view reflects changed perceptions resulting from scandals emerging after democratic transition, but implicating prominent figures from the past regime, notably former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo³⁵ (Shim & Sherry 1995; West 1997). In part this view reflects a change of emphasis in studies of the way the economy worked in authoritarian Korea. Scholars have pointed out that under the developmental state, the allocation of credit by the state to business generated extensive and large-scale rents³⁶, for which corrupt officials charged a ‘commission’ in the form of bribes, kickbacks from profits and forced donations to the ruling party (Amsden 1989: 145ff; Cho 1997: 224ff; Cumings 1997: 314-20; Kang 2002: chapter 4; Wedeman 1997: 466ff; Woo 1991: 108f). Cho (1997: 211ff) provides such examples from the 1960s and 1970s as generous export credits, interest rate concessions and the granting of cheap credits to commercial banks. While it is true that rents were used to reward performance, especially in the 1960s, expansion into heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s saw increased discretionary allocations (Cho 1997: 220; SaKong 1993: 35). Such allocations were lubricated by personal, consanguineous and marital ties amongst political and business elites, which became increasingly dense and collusive as Korean business expanded (Cumings 1997: 314-18). Thus economic rents were the by-product of policies directed at stimulating growth, and the *quid pro quo* of rents were bribes. Government policies haemorrhaged finance into export-

³⁵ More on this in Chapter Two.

³⁶ Economists define rents as profits in excess of the competitive level (Åslund 2002: 3; Brealey & Myers 2000). Amsden (1989: 235) contrasts rent-seeking, which is the search for windfall gains through trading, the artificial creation of scarcity and speculation, with profit-maximizing, which is the search for the best possible return on capital investment.

oriented projects, co-insured private firms against risk, and allowed good performance to be rewarded quickly; private firms kicked back a percentage of their profits to the government officials who had helped them, and so rewarded strategic intervention by the state. In other words, corruption and economic growth went hand in hand³⁷.

While the existence of a negative relationship between corruption and economic performance is borne out by some quantitative studies using data from a great many countries³⁸, to assume that all corruption is the same³⁹ and that there is a linear, negative relationship between corruption and economic performance is an oversimplification of a complex subject. Such characteristics of patron-client networks as objectives and ideologies of their participants, the numbers of clients, their homogeneity, the characteristics of the institutions through which patrons and clients interact, as well as their relative political power can all alter the overall effect of corruption on economic performance (Khan 1998: 22-7; Kang 2002; Leff 1989; Nye 1989).

³⁷ This does not mean that the relationship between state-allocated help and economic growth in the Korean developmental state was not problematic. For example, it inhibited the development of financial markets and of small and medium-sized businesses; on occasions, when vast resources were ploughed into unsuccessful businesses, failure was rewarded by government bailouts; and economic power was concentrated in a very few hands (Cho 1997: 228f).

³⁸ See for example Mauro (1995).

³⁹ Mauro (1995) makes this assumption. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) take a more sensitive approach, since they consider different levels of competition in the corrupt sale of government goods, but they do not consider cases where corruption benefits growth.

Soon after his 1961 coup, Park Chung-hee arrested the chief Korean business leaders and marched them through the streets of Seoul in dunce's caps with placards round their necks reading 'I am a corrupt swine' and similar slogans; he then struck a deal with the same business leaders to cooperate in redesigning Korea's economic policy (Clifford 1998: 37ff; Cumings 1997: 312f). Concurrent purges and thousands of arrests put the country on notice that Park was in charge. With the success of Park's development strategy, the businessmen later became much more powerful. Kang (2002: 7, 15) calls the resulting balance of power between a strong state and a strong business sector a situation of 'mutual hostages', and Amsden (1989: 146f) treats corruption as an aspect of reciprocity between the state and business. But in the early 1960s, at the key juncture in which patterns of exchange between the state and business were being established, the state enjoyed enormous power relative to all social classes (Woo-Cumings 1997: 326-33). In part, this was the result of Korea's colonial and war-time experiences (both World War II and the Korean War), which had effectively destroyed the bureaucratic-agrarian class structure of pre-colonial Korea.

I.B.2.3 The Developmental State's Policy Orientation

In the early 1960s, Korea explicitly embraced an ideology of growth, and made rapid economic development a national goal (Amsden 1989: 62-76; Jones & SaKong 1980: 40-3; SaKong 1993: 44f; Woo 1991: 10f). Such commitment is not to be taken for granted, since other policy orientations are possible. Instead of pursuing redistribution of wealth, preservation of economic stability or foreign policy goals, the Korean state oriented its activities to making the country *as a whole* wealthy. It could be argued that every state seeks first to survive and second to make itself wealthy. Certainly, one cannot ignore security concerns, particularly after the fall of Vietnam, as additional motivations for Korea's industrialization drive (Woo 1991: chapter 5). A growth-first policy orientation is not incompatible with a focus on national security, nor with redistributive policies, such as

those used in Korea to support rural incomes (SaKong 1993: 44), but such concerns are not, in a developmental state, allowed to obstruct growth.

Like any other model, the developmental state is not static but has its own dynamic. Under external shocks and internal pressures, there has been a shift from Korea's growth-first policy orientation towards internal and external economic liberalization, policies promoting economic stability and towards the seeking of a consensus in favour of development rather than imposing it in an authoritarian way (SaKong 1993: chapter 4; Woo 1991: chapter 7; Kong 2000: chapter 4). The developmental state has thereby become a 'partial developmental state' (Kim, E.M. 1993). The author will leave further discussion of this dynamic, and in particular its relation to democratization, to Chapter Two.

In sum, the developmental state, for the purposes of this study, is an aspect of the general phenomenon of late industrialization characterized by:

1. a strategic role for the state in guiding and stimulating investment in a market economy;
2. a rent-seeking/bribe-demanding, collusive relationship between a strong state on the one hand and strong business on the other;
3. a policy orientation which places economic growth among the first priorities of the state.

1.B.3 The Anti-Modern Party-State

The Soviet Union was a 'party-state'. Definitions of the party-state focus on:

1. its dual structure, consisting of a state hierarchy and a party hierarchy, interwoven across institutional boundaries in such a way as to intensify party control over the state (Arendt 1963: 395ff; Djilas 1957: chapter 4); and

2. its 'ideocratic' policy orientation, reflecting the fact that the party-state justified its existence by an ideology in which the party-state played a crusading role, carrying the ideology forward, implementing and imposing it (Arendt 1963: chapter 13; Linden 1983).

The term 'party-state' describes a particular state structure which exists in order to impose a grand ideological design—hence Linden's use of the term 'ideocratic'⁴⁰. In principle, the party-state is not synonymous with any particular ideology.

The ideology of communist party-states required the imposition of a non-market command economy in the areas under their control. Lenin's Bolsheviks established two fundamental principles of the world's first communist state:

1. the new system of government would be based on the dictatorship of the communist party; and
2. the means of production, including all the most important physical capital, factories, land, infrastructure etc., would belong to 'the people,' that is, to the state.

The term communist party-state refers in this thesis to states meeting the criteria of the party-state and adhering in practice to the above two principles.

The establishment of the Soviet economic system was a complex, violent process, divided into separate phases each with their own character and dynamic⁴¹. The period of so-called War Communism (1918-1921) was

⁴⁰ According to Linden (1983: xii), the term 'ideocratic' was coined by Nicolas Berdyaev to describe the Soviet regime, in particular its reliance for legitimacy on an elaborate ideology. It suggests a secular analogue to theocracy.

⁴¹ Standard economic histories include Nove (1992) and Blackwell (1982). Davies, et al. (1994: 268-323) provide a compendium of relevant statistics on

marked by economic chaos, the breakdown of the state apparatus, civil war, nationalization of all land and most industry, and mass confiscations of peasant produce (Malle 1985). The threat of a nationwide revolt against the Bolsheviks forced Lenin in 1921 to introduce the so-called New Economic Policy, providing peasants with the right to work nationalized land for themselves, subject to a tax in kind, and also allowing the development of small scale private industry. The limited economic freedom which emerged in this period came to an end soon after Stalin emerged as overall leader in 1927. He mobilized the entire resources of the state to pursue two goals. The first of these was collectivization of agriculture, involving the forcible expropriation of land worked by peasants on a household or family basis, and its incorporation into state or collective 'factory' farms. The way in which collectivization was implemented caused mass starvation (Conquest 1986). The second goal was rapid industrialization of the economy under comprehensive state ownership and control. Accompanying the implementation of both policies, political repression intensified to an unprecedented level (Conquest 1968; Getty, et al. 1993; Getty & Manning 1993)⁴². It is not clear that either mass starvation or the accompanying political repression were necessary to the achievement of industrialization or collectivization; but these were certainly concurrent phenomena.

Although the term 'communist party-state' conveys a great deal about the suppression of markets and economic freedom, as well as about the overall policy orientation of the regime, it does not convey much about the Soviet regime's level of rule of law. Yet the latter is crucial to understanding the legacy of the Soviet regime for the current one. For this reason, the author seeks in this section to define a different term, the 'anti-modern party-

the pre-war period.

⁴² More on this in the discussion of the Soviet legacy for political freedom in Chapter Two.

state' . As in the discussion of the developmental state, above, the author focusses on three issues: policy orientation, the role of markets and rule of law.

I.B.3.1 The Soviet Regime's Policy Orientation

The author argued above for a definition of the developmental state which excludes by definition any country with a non-market command economy. However, even if such an exclusion is not granted, the Soviet Union would not qualify as a developmental state by virtue of what Linden (1983) calls its 'ideocratic' and Johnson (1982: 18) calls its 'plan-ideological' policy-orientation. In other words, the developmental state is oriented towards growth *in a pragmatic way*. Formally speaking, the communist party-state is oriented towards putting its ideology into practice. Rapid industrialization can become an overriding goal, as it was under Stalin, but the means to achieve that goal are constrained by ideology, even if adherence to the ideology makes achievement of the goal more costly than it would otherwise be.

In practical terms, the party-state and its ideology are inextricably intertwined. As Jowitt (1992: 18) puts it: 'The Leninist Party and regime constitute a novel package of charismatic, traditional and modern elements, a recasting of the definition and relation of these three elements in such a way that the Party combines impersonal and affective elements.' In other words, in the totalitarian party-state, the Party is a heroic figure deserving of love and sacrifice, even to the point of replacing traditional forms of affection, and at the same time a source of impersonal, stern authority, and the implementer of a grand design. In the post-totalitarian period, belief in this ideology wore thin, but the *nomenklatura*⁴³ had a vested interest in

⁴³ *The nomenklatura* consisted of lists of important positions and of personnel which were used to structure and to impose CPSU control over

preserving existing political structures, and preventing the emergence of unorthodox ideological currents. This blend of conservatism and insecurity dictated the huge importance Soviet leaders attached to foreign policy, and, in the shape of the Brezhnev Doctrine, to controlling its empire of communist satellite states. It also explains the maintenance of a strait jacket of economic and political controls at home. The obverse side of ideological conservatism was the preservation of the permanent economic privileges of the political leadership (Djilas 1957; Filtzer 1986; Voslensky 1984).

I.B.3.2 The Soviet Economic System

Rapid industrialization in non-market command economies was the result of *central planning* (Nove 1987: chapter 2; Kornai 1992: chapter 7). This meant in practice that the state planning agency, *Gosplan* in the USSR, had to draw up and manage a complex system of plans providing for the material needs of the entire economic system. Long-term objectives governed medium-term objectives, and these in turn dictated the orders issued to enterprises in the short-term. The central flaw in this system was the problem of information (Hayek 1935; Kornai 1992: 127-30; Nove 1987: 19f). Higher level decision-making relied on information provided by lower levels, but, unavoidably, given the complexity of the tasks involved, much of this information was either inaccurate or untimely or both, by comparison with the information provided by prices in a market economy. Central planning in command economies contrasts with planning in developmental states in that it aims to replace rather than to exploit market forces.

Within the constraints imposed by ideology and the system of central planning, the Soviet party-state pursued goals associated with *socio-economic modernization*. It was able to do this, despite the disadvantages of

appointments (Brown 1974: 68-9). It also refers to occupants of those positions, and, collectively, to the Soviet ruling class.

central planning, through 'extensive development,' that is through the mobilization of additional resources, notably labour 'freed' from rural occupations through collectivization (Nove 1992: 271-5)⁴⁴. Thus, concurrently with the privations associated with totalitarian mobilization, the USSR experienced a spurt of economic growth (Davies, et al. 1994: Tables 1-2, 269f). This was accompanied by high investment and measures to restrain consumption, characteristic of what Kornai (1992: 197f) calls 'forced growth.' Despite various setbacks and the devastation caused by the Second World War, extensive development improved living standards. Hospitals, schools and apartment blocks were built; secondary education and health care were provided free on a universal basis; literacy improved. Soviet propagandists boasted of these achievements and exaggerated them.

However, after a time economic expectations began to outstrip what the party-state could supply. Part of the reason for a growing gap between expectations and reality was that the non-market command economy was plagued by *chronic shortages*, which affected a vast range of goods from everyday foodstuffs such as sausage to materials required only in specialized industrial processes (Kornai 1992: chapter 11; Nove 1987: 189f). A second reason for the growing gap was the inferior *quality of goods and services* in the USSR as against what Soviet citizens knew or suspected to be available in the West (Kornai 1992: 310f). Technological development was slow by comparison with advanced capitalist societies, and resources were used less efficiently (Kornai 1992: 292-301; Nove 1987: 159-67). The end result of a gap between expectations and reality is a stressful society.

⁴⁴ Extensive mobilization of resources means increasing inputs, such as labour, raw materials and so on, whereas intensive mobilization means using the same inputs more efficiently. Equivalent terms from economics are factor growth (extensive) and factor productivity growth (intensive). See Kornai (1992: 180-6)

The imperfections of the official economy led to the emergence in the USSR of an important *second economy* (Katsenelinboigen 1977; Grossman 1977). Grossman (1977: 25) defined the latter as comprising production and exchange activity that was either private-regarding or illegal or both. The second economy emerged to fill in the gaps which the centrally planned economy could not fill, to connect buyers to sellers where central planning did not anticipate a need, misjudged quantities, or supplied goods of inadequate quality. In a mixed economy, it would be normal and legitimate for the private sector to take on this complementary role. But in a non-market command economy, private economic activity was incompatible with the communist party-state's ideological goal of making economic activity serve public rather than private interests. Therefore private economic activity took place in a furtive atmosphere; the party-state at best tolerated it, and often persecuted those who engaged in it. The central points about the second economy are that it was ubiquitous; systemic, in the sense of being necessary for the whole economy to function; and coloured by varying shades of illegality.

I.B.3.3 Soviet Incompatibility with the Rule of Law

Building on a variety of critiques of the Soviet regime (Shlapentokh 1989; Winiecki 1996; Z 1990: 312-16), Rose (1994; 2000d) has developed the concept of the 'anti-modern state', as a way of summarizing the essential features of the Soviet regime in relation to the rule of law. The anti-modern state contrasts with a modern state on three levels (Rose & Munro 2002: 49). Firstly, whereas the processes of a modern state are transparent and laws and rules are followed, the processes of an anti-modern state are opaque, and it is normal to bend or break rules. Secondly, whereas decision-making in a modern state is the product of rational calculation based on accurate signals such as votes or prices, in an anti-modern state, ideology dictates the nature of the decision and calculation serves to rationalize it after the fact.

Thirdly, whereas outcomes in a modern state are usually effective and efficient solutions to problems, effective outcomes in an anti-modern state are almost always inefficient in terms of the wastage of resources and human life. The concept of the 'anti-modern' state summarizes in stylized form critiques of the Soviet system focussing on its chaotic administrative processes, suppression of economic and political feedback (prices, protests) and inefficiency in use of resources.

Soviet-type societies forced an unusually sharp conflict between the public or official roles played by citizens as, for example producers and consumers, and their private behaviour, governed by informal norms (Ledeneva 1998; Shlapentokh 1989; Simis 1982). For the vast majority of people, the conflict was solved by adopting different and contradictory moral codes in the performance of official roles and in the performance of private roles⁴⁵. As Simis (1982: 209f) puts it: 'Entering into relations with representatives of the government, dealing with industry, commerce and services, the Soviet citizen, readily and without thinking about it, uses corruption to get what is necessary for him — most often what is vitally necessary...But this same citizen, in private dealings, will conduct himself in accordance with the precepts of common human morality.' Shlapentokh (1989: 14) calls this divergence between official and private roles, to the benefit of the latter, the 'privatization, or even more properly the destatization, of Soviet society'.

⁴⁵ It also generated characteristically Soviet forms of networking and informal exchange. Ledeneva (1998: 35) distinguishes the Russian concept of *blat* from ordinary networking on the basis of the primary bearer of the costs of the exchange. If an exchange of favours depends on the parties to the exchange using their private resources, it is ordinary networking. If it depends on the parties using the resources of the state or a third party formally entitled to these resources, it is *blat*.

The characteristics of pre-revolutionary Russian society with its absolutist monarchy, weak rational-bureaucratic administration, lack of an indigenous rule-of-law tradition, and relatively weak property rights offer only a partial explanation for the divergence between public norms and private behaviour in the Soviet Union (Keenan 1986; Pipes 1974). On top of these influences, the Soviet system produced unique incentives for corruption, underhand dealing and deliberate mismanagement (Kramer 1989: 461f; Harris 1989: 530f). Firstly, the fulfilment of plan targets and the observance of legality often conflicted with one another. Since law and Party policy had the same status and the culture of mobilization made the reaching of targets a strong norm, officials assumed that plan fulfilment had priority. Secondly, the nomenklatura system offered only the narrowest opportunities for advancement. Thirdly, the gap between ideology and reality, particularly concerning life in the non-communist world, was obvious to those at the top of the 'information food chain,' and, at least by the late 1980s, to those lower down in society as well. The gap between what individuals could say in public and what they knew or suspected to be the truth guaranteed psychological dissonance. Fourthly, the shortage economy placed controllers of desirable goods in a position to ration supplies. As a result, anyone wishing to purchase a valuable item found himself or herself in a 'seller's market'⁴⁶. Finally, diffusion of knowledge about consumer goods in the West produced a real hunger for material luxury. In other words, the reasons for a gap between official norms and actual behaviour on the part of Soviet citizens were built into the structure of the Soviet regime. As Sakwa

⁴⁶ The basic characteristic of such a market is that the seller has far more power than the buyer (Kornai 1992: 245-52). From this it follows that the buyer carries the main burdens of seeking information about products, adjusting his or her behaviour and expectations to the convenience of the seller, persuading the seller to agree to the exchange and dealing with uncertainties of supply.

(2002b: 82) puts it, the Soviet regime was one of 'metacorruption, that is, a system which is corrupt in its very essence.'

Central to the spread of 'metacorruption' in the Soviet Union is use and abuse of law as an instrument of state-building (Berman 1963: chapter 1). The early days of the Soviet regime were marked by attempt to do away with 'bourgeois' law, and to replace it with spontaneous, revolutionary justice. When this proved to be unworkable, the Soviet regime re-imported law, adapting Imperial Russian, French, Swiss, and German legal codes to its purposes. The process of codification and institutionalization of a new 'Soviet legality' accelerated under Stalin, culminating in the adoption of a new constitution in 1936, as the totalitarian leader saw the legal system as a means of bolstering the authority of the state and stabilizing society (Berman 1963: 33f, 46ff). At the same time, Stalin had ignored laws in the drive for collectivization of agriculture and industrialization, and his unprecedented expansion of political terror was also contrary to any notion of legal order. Thereby, the 'spontaneous, revolutionary' ways of doing things (summary execution, confiscation of property, punishment without crime) flourished in parallel with the reinstitutionalization of law's role as a means of controlling society. Ordinary people learned or re-learned two things: first, law applied to them but not to the party-state; second, political opposition of any kind put them outside the protection of law. At the mid- to bottom levels of society, one can interpret various forms of insubordination, deliberate inefficiency and misappropriation of resources as a kind of defensive behaviour in the face of an exploitative and oppressive state.

For the purposes of this study, the anti-modern party-state is defined as a party-state in which:

1. policy is formally oriented towards the fulfilment of an ideology but in practice toward the establishment and maintenance of the economic and political privileges of the elite;

2. economic freedom is completely or almost completely suppressed, leading to the creation of a non-market command economy;
3. the rule of law becomes systemically impossible as clientelist, corrupt relationships are pervasive in everyday life.

I.B.4 Dimensions of Undemocratic Regimes

There are three different dimensions which can be used to differentiate bureaucratic-military authoritarianism from post-totalitarianism (Linz 1975: 191-2, 278; Linz & Stepan 1996: 44f, Table 3.1). The different dimensions are summarized in the table below (Table I.1). The first dimension is a categoric scale reflecting the nature of the political competition which the regime chooses to allow. In a post-totalitarian regime, as in its totalitarian predecessor, one party holds a monopoly of power. There is no competitive party politics, only degrees of competition between different intra-regime interest groups. In a bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime, the ruling clique usually tolerates some degree of competition in party politics, and there is also competition amongst factions or interest groups within the regime. To retain overall control, the ruling clique makes judicious use of coercion and the manipulation of the constitution.

The second dimension is an ordinal scale from the comprehensive mobilization, which is characteristic of totalitarian regimes and which continues also in a post-totalitarian regime, albeit in a routinized way and with greater apathy, to the relatively low level of mobilization under a bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime. In the latter regime type, any mobilization, even if intensive, is sporadic and often aimed at narrowly defined regime goals.

Table I.1 Comparison of Regime Types Along Six Dimensions

	<u>Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarian</u>	<u>Post-totalitarian</u>
1. Extent of political pluralism	Military-bureaucratic dominance of multi-party system	One party holds monopoly on power
2. Degree of mobilization	Sporadic mobilization, with particular aims in view	Comprehensive mobilization, but routinized
3. Form of Ideology	Mentality, but no written ideology	Programmatic commitment to written ideology
	<u>Developmental State</u>	<u>Anti-Modern Party-State</u>
4. Economic freedom	Government guides and stimulates investment in a market economy	Non-market command economy
5. Rule of law	Collusive relationships between strong state and strong business	Clientelist relationships pervasive in everyday life, 'anti-modern'
6. Policy orientation	Growth first	Ideocratic; oriented to keeping the system and its ideology intact

The third dimension is the nature and degree of adherence to an ideology. Post-totalitarian and totalitarian regimes have a programmatic commitment to a written political creed which guides the rulers in designing policy. Even where adherence to doctrinal orthodoxy is merely formal, the ideology still purports to define ultimate meanings, to delineate a grand historical purpose or to circumscribe the interpretation of social reality. Thereby it serves as 'blinkers,' allowing the regime to reject feedback if it is inconsistent with the ideology (Rose 1999: 69). Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes usually have no written creed. If their leaders project a particular 'mentality' which guides and legitimates their political actions, this mentality does not extend to the definition of ultimate meanings.

Three further dimensions cut across the definitions of the 'anti-modern party-state' and the 'developmental state'. The first is the degree and nature of economic freedom, with corresponding differences in the state's role in the economy. The essential difference is that while the developmental state attempts to harness markets to achieve substantive goals, the anti-modern party-state suppresses markets. Because of the inadequacies of central planning in a non-market command economy, the suppression of markets is not total, since the anti-modern party-state 'lets them in the back door' through the illegal operations of a 'second economy.'

The second additional dimension is the degree to which the anti-modern party-state and the developmental state created conditions hostile to the rule of law. The developmental state has large-scale systemic corruption, especially but not exclusively at the level of the elite. However, such corruption is tempered by the autonomous power of business vis a vis the state. Since both share an interest in maximizing the productive capacity of the society, systemic corruption faces natural limits. The anti-modern party-state fosters all-pervasive systemic corruption, reaching from the elite down to the level of ordinary people. There is no countervailing power to the party-state, and therefore no natural limit to the damage which corruption can cause to the productive capacity of the society.

The third additional dimension concerns the policy orientation of the state. The developmental state pursues a 'growth first' policy orientation, often reliant on export of manufactured goods. The anti-modern party-state has an 'ideocratic' policy orientation. That is to say, keeping the system intact and preserving its ideological tenets is an objective which governs other objectives, both in foreign policy and domestically.

The six dimensions of the prior undemocratic legacies in Korea and Russia, the three pertaining to Linz's characterizations of undemocratic

regime types and the three pertaining to the contrast between the developmental state and the anti-modern party-state, have ramifications in multiple fields of interest for public policy scholars. This thesis concentrates on only one field, the legacy of prior regimes for currently incomplete democratic regimes. The *a priori* expectation is that legacies matter, and that the post-totalitarian/anti-modern legacy is the more difficult to overcome.

I.C Plan of Analysis

Chapter Two entitled *Two Generic Types of Undemocratic Regime*, describes features of the prior-regime legacy which are likely to influence the quality of the Korean and Russian incomplete democracies today. For the prior regime, the transitional phase, and the current regime, the chapter compares and contrasts institutional arrangements including the division of powers, electoral systems and the roles of political parties and the military. It addresses the amount of political freedom, the observance of the rule of law, and the political legacy of differing economic systems. Finally, it discusses progress toward a civil society. The chapter shows that the legacy of the prior undemocratic regime has a deleterious effect on the ability of new regimes to deliver such political goods as freedom, the rule of law and economic prosperity, and this impact is worse in Russia than in Korea.

The above elements of democracy are all on the supply side, and hence leave out democracy's most important component: the individual citizen. Quantitative, survey-based comparative studies are especially well suited to overcome the methodological problem of bench-marking, but owing to difficulties of data collection and the tendency for collaboration to proceed on a regional rather than cross-regional basis, there have been very few survey-based studies which compare across radically different regime types. Chapters Three to Five of this thesis partially address that lacuna.

Chapter Three entitled *Comparing Support Across Contexts* examines the structure of political support for the incomplete democratic regimes in the two countries. Since support for democracy is meaningless unless one has at least some understanding of the content of democracy as a political symbol, the chapter uses survey data to examine the meanings of democratization to the Korean and the Russian public. It then compares the structure of political attitudes to incomplete democratic regimes in the two countries, and finds that, in both, political support for an incomplete democratic regime is best understood in two dimensions. The first dimension is empirical — it is concerned with evaluations of how well the new regime is doing in meeting the expectations and demands placed on it. The second dimension is normative — it is concerned with considerations of whether the incomplete democratic regime should continue, or whether it should be replaced with one or another historically relevant form of undemocratic rule. The chapter compares levels of political support for current regimes using two pairs of indicators, one pair to tap each dimension. Russia has significantly lower levels of support across both dimensions. However, the gap is not so large as to imply that Russians are opposed to democracy: majorities reject undemocratic rule in both societies.

Chapter Four entitled *Individual-Level and Contextual Determinants* compares the determinants of both empirical and normative indicators of support. The analysis begins with the construction of parallel ordinary least squares regression models in separate data files. It finds that the determinants of empirical evaluations of new regimes appear to be quite different in the two countries, depending in the main on political performance in Korea and economic performance in Russia. The determinants of normative commitment to the new regimes are less different in the two countries, depending in part on social structure, in part on political attitudes, and in Russia also on economic evaluations and experiences. For the rejection of undemocratic rule, the chapter pools data from both countries in

a single file. This allows statistical testing of the impact of individual-level determinants against the impact of country and time context. It also allows a statistical analysis of the interaction of country context with individual-level variables. The results show that lower normative support for Russia's incomplete democracy is explicable in terms of a combination of direct contextual effects with effects resulting from the interaction of context with such characteristics as town size, support for private ownership, and trust in peers.

Introducing additional data from electorally democratic countries in post-communist Europe, *Chapter Five* entitled *Institutions, Structural Conditions, and Performance* moves to the macro level of analysis in which the cases are 'country-years' or survey observations rather than individual survey responses. The dependent variables are aggregate levels of normative and empirical support for incomplete democracies. The chapter examines the relationship of institutional history to structural variables and generic performance measures. A factor for poor regime performance separates Russia and Ukraine from the rest of the post-communist European democracies and Korea, and the author calls the common denominator of the Russian and Ukrainian contexts the 'anti-modern core legacy'. Through multiple regression analyses, the author determines that the 'anti-modern core legacy' adds considerable additional explanatory power and its effects are negative across both normative and empirical support.

Chapter Six, entitled *Legacies of Prior Regimes and the Consolidation of Democracy* considers the impact of the prior-regime legacies on the consolidation of democracy in Korea and Russia. It argues that by both supply-side and demand-side criteria, on the basis of both qualitative assessments and statistical tests, neither country is a consolidated democracy, but that Korea is close to this goal, whereas Russia is still distant from it. Methodologically, the classification of incomplete democracies in

terms of their prior-regime legacies is useful in qualitative analysis, because it helps to understand the nature of the obstacles to democratic consolidation in each country. In statistical analysis of survey data, common tests applicable across prior regime types are necessary, and the author suggests three survey-based tests for consolidation, focussing on levels of support, the degree of its dispersal, and on the resilience of normative support.

CHAPTER II. TWO GENERIC TYPES OF UNDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the supply-side legacies of the prior undemocratic regimes in Korea and the USSR for democratization of the Korean and Russian regimes today. The basic pattern in each section is the same: the author describes salient features of the situation under the prior undemocratic regime, during the process of regime change and then subsequent to regime change.

The period of undemocratic rule in Korea refers here to the period from Park Chung-hee's military coup in 1961 to the holding of free presidential elections in December 1987. This encompasses several phases in the evolution of the Korean constitution. After Park Chung-hee's military coup in 1961, an interim military junta held power till 1963, when the Third Republic was launched¹. The Fourth Republic began in 1972, when Park Chung-hee performed an 'auto-coup' by introducing significant constitutional changes while remaining in office. After Park Chung-hee's assassination in 1979, and another military coup led by Chun Doo-hwan, the Fifth Republic began with a new constitution in 1981. The period of regime change in Korea refers here to the period between the so-called June uprising of 1987 to the holding of parliamentary elections in 1988. This encompasses the October 1987 revision of the constitution, agreed in roundtable negotiations and then approved by referendum, as well as the December 1987 election, which saw the military-backed candidate Roh Tae-woo win against a divided opposition. The period after regime change in Korea refers to events after 1988, under the so-called Sixth Republic. It thus includes the presidential terms of Roh

¹ The First Republic was the period of authoritarian rule by President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960). The Second Republic was the short-lived parliamentary regime of 1960-1961. Both periods are outside the scope of this thesis.

Tae-woo (1988-1992), Kim Young-sam (1993-1997), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) and now, Roh Moo-hyun (2003-). The author makes an occasional exception of events during the Roh presidency (1988-1992) by treating them as transitional when they clearly mark an intermediate stage between the current regime and the authoritarian regime².

In Russia the 'prior regime' for the purposes of this Chapter is the post-totalitarian phase in the evolution of the Soviet Union (1956-1991), including the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and earlier Gorbachev periods³. The three years from December 1991 to 1993 are transitional, since the parliament (Russian Congress) and presidency of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) under Boris Yeltsin formed an interim system of government, albeit without being able to agree on a revised constitution. The forcible dissolution of the Congress in September 1993 followed by the adoption in December of a new constitution and the simultaneous election of a State Duma to replace the Congress mark the end of the period of regime change in Russia. The period after regime change thus includes part of Yeltsin's first term (1993-1996), all of his second (1996-1999) and the Putin presidency (2000-).

Thus, the period after regime change dates for each country from the adoption of a new constitution and holding of parliamentary elections under that constitution. In Korea such elections took place in April 1988, and in

² Eisenstadt (2000: 4) calls the Korean transition 'protracted'. 'In these protracted transitions,' he writes, 'it appears that democratization is a "war of attrition" of the authoritarian incumbents and opposition parties over the microinstitutional foundations of the transition.'

³ The later Gorbachev period, especially after the holding of semi-competitive elections to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989 was also transitional in the development of the Soviet political system, but the Soviet transition was aborted by the collapse of the USSR in December 1991.

Russia they took place in December 1993. This way of dividing time is for convenience only, although the cutoff points chosen do mark changed political realities.

The chapter deals with prior regime legacies under five headings. Section II.A concerns regime structure, or the basic institutional architecture. Section II.B is about the provision of freedom, or lack thereof. Section II.C concerns the rule of law. Section II.D is about political economy, or the ways in which the economic system and politics inter-relate. Section II.E concerns progress in the emergence of a civil society. The final section, Section II.F, summarizes what has gone before, and presents an overview of the hypotheses to be tested through quantitative analyses in the remainder of the thesis.

II.A Regime Structure

II.A.1 Prior Undemocratic Regimes

II.A.1.1 Functional Equivalentents

The Soviet regime structure was very different from the Korean regime structure. To understand why, one must grasp two principles which distinguished the Soviet model. First, every state institution was under the dual control of two overlapping and interwoven hierarchies, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the state (Arendt 1963: 395ff; Djilas 1957: chapter 4; Csanádi 1997: 305f). The role of the CPSU was to define policy and supervise its implementation, and the role of the state to implement it. State officials unhappy with Party instructions had the possibility of appealing to higher levels of the Party or state hierarchies, but ultimately the Party was the more powerful half of the party-state.

Thus, in the USSR, the most powerful political organ was not, formally speaking, a state organization, but the Politburo, composed of the 15 or so highest-ranking CPSU officials, under the leadership of a General Secretary

(Löwenhardt, et al. 1992: chapter 7). The Politburo was in effect the USSR's functional equivalent to a cabinet, and the General Secretary the functional equivalent of a president. The administrative arm of the Politburo was a Secretariat with partially overlapping membership. The Politburo and Secretariat controlled the Party, and the Party controlled the state. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, whose membership numbered over 30, including the 15 chairmen of the union-republic Supreme Soviets, was assigned a number of important functions which in other countries would be performed by the head-of-state. From Brezhnev onwards, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet exercised as a collective such powers as declaring emergency rule and martial law, appointing or dismissing the leadership of the armed forces and dissolving the Supreme Soviet. The fact that the Presidium was junior to the Politburo is indicated by the fact that it met only monthly, while the Politburo met weekly. It was normal for the General Secretary of the Party to simultaneously occupy the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Dual hierarchy in the USSR contrasts with a single hierarchy of state institutions in Korea. The most powerful person in Korea was the President, who headed a State Council of 15-25 ministers. The President was not only the chief executive of the state, but also had the power to issue decrees on matters delegated to him by law. He also wielded alone the power to declare emergency rule and martial law, to appoint or dismiss the leadership of the armed forces and to dissolve parliament. Political parties, including the ruling party, played a minor role, their main function being to organize limited political competition — more on this below.

The USSR's only significant legal party, the CPSU, was not really a 'party' in the same sense as parties in non-party-states. According to Article 6 of the 1977 constitution, it was 'the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and of all state and public

organizations'. With 19 million members, recruited through a process of socialization beginning in childhood, the CPSU was both the ruling bureaucracy and a vehicle for political mobilization (Azrael 1968; Sakwa 1989: chapter 7; Hazard 1980: chapter 2; Hough & Fainsod 1979: chapter 10). Soviet rhetoric about internal party democracy did not reflect reality — the principle of democratic centralism meant in practice top-down control (Fainsod 1963: 209f; Hazard 1980: 16-23; Hough & Fainsod 1979: chapter 12). The means of control included: direct participation of Party caucuses and cells in all public institutions, including work places; appointment to all important posts through the *nomenklatura*; extensive overlap of party and state hierarchies; final control over all policy decisions; and a supervisory role in policy implementation (Sakwa 1989: 140ff; Hough & Fainsod 1979: chapter 11). In addition, the CPSU's members were expected to master Marxist-Leninist theory and to serve as role models in society.

Another point of contrast between the Korean and Soviet regime structures concerns the separation of powers. The Soviet constitution stipulated the formal unification of all three branches of power. According to the Soviet constitution, all legislative, judicial and executive authority was vested in the bicameral 1,500-member USSR Supreme Soviet, consisting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities. Since the Supreme Soviet met only twice a year for two to three days at a time, and its membership was chosen in unfree elections controlled by the CPSU (more on this below), the Supreme Soviet was no more than a rubber stamp. Similarly, the USSR Supreme Court was not the interpreter of the constitution, and did not set legal precedents. The Korean constitution, unlike the Soviet one, recognized separate legislative, judicial and executive branches of power. Thus, Korea had a weak, unicameral legislature with 200-odd members⁴. The Korean Supreme Court had the power to interpret

⁴ During the authoritarian period the number of seats in parliament grew with the evolution of the regime and its electoral law. In the period 1963-

the constitution after taking advice from a Constitutional Commission. Although the separation of powers was by Western standards ineffective, the Korean President was only able to pass decrees outside the matters delegated to him by law by frequently resorting to emergency powers. The legislative and judicial branches of the Korean state, could, at least theoretically, check some of the actions of the President.

Because of these fundamental differences in regime structure — dual versus single hierarchies, the role of the Party in the party-state, and unification versus separation of powers — it is very hard to find functional equivalents in the two regimes below the highest levels of executive authority. Formal equivalents can always be found, but lead to absurd comparisons. For example, the USSR's Council of Ministers, the formal equivalent to Korea's State Council, had over a hundred members and met only once a quarter. A large number of these ministers were in fact the heads of particular branches of the command economy, such as the gas industry, mining, or metallurgy, and in this respect the Council of Ministers was more like a kind of committee of captains of industry than like a Cabinet. Its parallel organization in the Party was the Central Committee, composed of around 300 full members plus 150 or so non-voting candidate members. The Central Committee was formally in charge of the Party, but, like the Supreme Soviet it met only two days a year, and was therefore in practice under the control of the higher party organs. It constituted the highest level of the *nomenklatura* below the Politburo; although mostly functioning as a rubber stamp, the Central Committee sometimes played an important role in deciding the outcome of leadership challenges, or served as a forum for intra-elite policy debates (Mawdsley & White 2000: ix).

1967 there were 175 members, in 1971 this rose to 184, in 1973 to 219, and in 1978 to 231. The highest number, 276, was during the Fifth Republic (1981-1987). See below for a summary of changes in electoral systems.

Both countries had some acclamatory institutions whose job it was to approve what had already been decided. In Korea under the *Yushin* constitution of 1972-1979, the election of the President and the approval of his slate of ministers was the responsibility of a National Conference for Unification, consisting of 2,500-odd delegates⁵. Though directly elected, these delegates could decide nothing without the say-so of the President, who was their chairman. Similarly, the CPSU Party Congress, consisting of around 5,000 Party delegates, met once every five years to acclaim broad policies and major ideological decisions handed down from above.

II.A.1.2 The Military and Politics - Korea

As far as prospects for democratization are concerned, one of the most important features of regime structure under an undemocratic regime is the nature of the military's role in politics (Stepan 1986). In Korea the military and the civilian spheres of authority were not separate. Instead, military and civilian officials mixed together in a complex way, and the military was dominant overall. Prior to democratic transition, and in the years immediately following transition, military dominance was evident in the backgrounds of the top leadership of the Korean government. From Major-General Park Chung-hee's coup d'état in 1961, serving or retired military officers held the most important ministerial posts in the State Council. Park's successors, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, were generals. Although Korean military leaders usually resigned their commissions after taking power, the networks on which these leaders relied for support were based on graduating classes of the Korean Military Academy.

Instability is characteristic of military regimes in general, in part because they are vulnerable to splits within the officer corps (Nordlinger

⁵ The same system of indirect presidential election continued during the Fifth Republic (1981-1987), though with an electoral college of 5,277 members. See below for further discussion.

1977: 138-47). In Korea, there was little expectation of legal or constitutional succession (Han 1989: 276). Instead succession depended on the unpredictable outcomes of praetorian politics⁶. When Major General Park Chung-hee came to power by a coup d'état in 1961, he was not formally in charge of the military hierarchy. Most of his supporters belonged like him to the eighth graduating class of the Korean military academy, and the resulting junta drew on Park's personal coterie, establishing a pattern of informal client relationships cutting across the formal command structure (Cotton 1991: 205-8). In 1972, Park staged a 'coup in office' by suspending the constitution in order to institute the so-called *Yushin* or 'revitalizing' constitution. When in October 1979 the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Chae-gyu, shot Park to death during a violent argument over policy (Cumings 1997: 374), the care-taker government did not last long. In December 1979 a coalition of officers took power without regard to constitutional provisions, bypassing also the formal military command structure (Cumings 1997: 374-7; Clifford 1998: chapter 11). General Chun Doo-hwan emerged as the leader of this coalition and in 1980 he resorted to martial law in order to consolidate his authority. The imposition of martial law was a typical response to a crisis in Korean politics. Park had imposed it in 1964 in response to protests about a friendship treaty with Japan and in 1972 following a close-run presidential election the previous year.

The autonomy of the Korean military was constrained by a variety of external influences which tended to complicate the task of maintaining regime stability (Kang 2002: chapter 3; Cumings 1997: 347ff). These influences included: autonomous social organizations capable of mobilizing

⁶ Nordlinger (1977: 2) defines praetorianism as a situation in which military officers are important political actors owing to their threat or actual use of force. Huntington (1968: 195) defines it simply as intervention by the military in politics.

protest against the government; the government's close and collusive relationship to big business, since private political donations funded unfair election campaigns and favoured private firms were the recipients of large government loans; the developmental tasks which the government had set itself under the leadership of Park Chung-hee; and the foreign policy goals of the United States, which had a variety of levers of power over the Korean government, including its military contingent in South Korea and its aid budget. The role of autonomous social organizations is the subject of further discussion in section II.E below. The author returns to the government's relations to big business and to the developmental tasks of the state in section II.D below.

On the role of the United States, it is worth stressing that the historical context for the emergence of a military regime in Korea was the Cold War (Luckham 1991; Luckham 1996). On the eve of North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June 1950, American and Soviet troops had for the most part withdrawn from the peninsula (Cumings 1997: 237ff). The Korean War brought direct clashes between US forces under the auspices of the United Nations and mostly North Korean and Chinese communist forces. After the War, South Korea became a frontline 'garrison state', where the US engaged in the wholesale reconstruction of the Korean army, navy and air force. US military aid not only built one of the most powerful conventional military forces in Asia, but also fostered a 'sense of mission' amongst Korean officers. Anti-communism and the very real military threat from North Korea in part explains the reluctance of the South Korean army to serve civilian leaders leaning towards either non-alignment or toward any weakening of the US presence. Although US officials intervened at strategic points in Korean domestic politics⁷, the South Korean military regime was not under the control of the United States. As further discussed in Section II.D, the rapid

⁷ For example, American pressure prevented the execution of Kim Dae-jung by the military government in 1980 (Cumings 1997: 378).

industrialization of Korea reduced the economic dependence of Korea on US aid which had been a feature of the previous authoritarian regime of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960).

II.A.1.3 The Military and Politics - USSR

In contrast to Korea, in the USSR all the highest ranking leaders after Stalin, and most Politburo members, were civilians. However, rather than speaking of civilian control over the armed forces in the USSR, it is more accurate to speak of Party control, guaranteed by the quasi-military secret services, over all aspects of military life (Hazard 1980: chapter 10; Hough & Fainsod 1979: 393ff; Knight 1990: chapter 6; Wolfe 1968: 113-23). The KGB and its predecessors penetrated the Soviet army at all levels. Stalin's paranoia about the loyalty of the army led to purges of his general staff before World War II, and then, after the German invasion, to the reintroduction of a Civil-War era system of dual command requiring all orders to be countersigned by political commissars; although the system was impracticable in modern warfare, it was not finally abandoned until 1942 (Hazard 1980: 178ff). From that time on, the Party relied for its control of the army mainly on the extension of membership in Party organizations within the army and on internal surveillance by the secret police (Hazard 1980: 180-84). Within the armed forces, as in other state institutions, there was a dual hierarchy: each commanding officer had a deputy whose duties includes political education, and who was subordinate both to the commander and to the political commissar above him. All military units had CPSU and Komsomol branches. Virtually all career officers were CPSU members, and top military posts were part of the *nomenklatura* system. Through its system of political oversight, the Party controlled the military. This tight control ensured the emergence of a tradition of non-intervention by the military in leadership struggles.

The policies pursued by the Party made military preparedness an important regime goal. This was evident in the central role played by the 'military-industrial complex' and military strategy in the development of the economy, the enormous resources consumed by the military (Jacobsen 1987), in the dual use of civilian infrastructure for defence purposes, and in the participation of military personnel in the higher organs of the Party and the state. The USSR, like Korea, had its national security council where military leaders could influence non-military policy. From 1973, the Soviet defence minister, who was usually a professional soldier, was a member of the Politburo. These mechanisms ensured that the military could guard its corporate interests and influence policy.

II.A.1.4 Undemocratic Elections

In the USSR there was no competitive party politics. Elections served functions of ideological communication, education and legitimation, possibly also affecting the dynamics of internal competition within the CPSU hierarchy but in no sense offering a choice to voters (Hazard 1980: 57-61; Pravda 1978; White, et al. 1997: chapter 1). These elections were an unfree ritual, in which Party officials mobilized citizens to vote for a single slate of candidates chosen by the CPSU. From 1937 to 1984 the vote for the official slate in elections to the Supreme Soviet never fell below the 1937 result of 98 per cent (White, et al. 1997: 11). Voting against the slate was possible, but pointless and dangerous, since it required the voter to enter a booth and cross out all the names on the ballot while officials looked on. In keeping with communist ideology, CPSU selectors also operated a kind of demographic quota system, and regime spokespersons would proudly boast of the percentages of women, youth, industrial workers, collective farm workers etc. in the ranks of elected officials.

In authoritarian Korea elections were sometimes competitive but more often constituted a form of democratic window-dressing offering controlled

choices to the voters while excluding certain elements in the opposition from competition, providing huge electoral system and campaign advantages to government-supported candidates, and occasionally falsifying election results (Choe 1997: chapter 6; Croissant 2002; Kim, J-o. & Koh 1980; Pae 1986: chapter 6; Yang 1992).

Seats in parliament during the authoritarian era were filled by semi-competitive elections under electoral rules which were designed to give advantage to the ruling party (Choe 1997: chapter 6; Croissant 2002). The rules relied on a varying mix of single-member or two-member district seats filled by plurality vote, and a national pool of seats allocated by a distorted form of proportional representation (PR) or by presidential appointment. During the Third and Fifth Republics, PR was distorted because the national seats were allocated in such a way as to reward the party winning the most district seats with a bonus. Thus, during the Third Republic, there were 131 single-member seats and 44 national seats, of which the largest party was guaranteed 22 and the second largest 14, with the remaining 8 seats distributed to parties winning at least 3 single-member seats or five per cent of the national vote. During the Fifth Republic, there were 276 seats: 184 filled in two-member districts and 92 national seats, of which the largest party in the districts was guaranteed 61, and the remaining 31 were distributed amongst other parties winning at least five district seats in proportion to their share of the vote. Independent candidates were disallowed under the Third Republic but allowed thereafter.

During the Fourth Republic the 73 national seats were chosen by the electoral college on the basis of the president's recommendations, in effect allowing the president to appoint one third of the members of parliament. The Fourth Republic introduced two-member districts to fill the remaining 150-odd seats. In each district, two seats were awarded, one to the candidate winning the most votes and one to the runner-up. Although it did

not guarantee the ruling party any more of the competitively filled seats than the previous single-member system, the two-member system allowed the ruling party to take seats in urban districts where it usually did not win the most votes, and also had the effect of making the results of elections more predictable (Lee 1999: 58). The Fifth Republic retained the two-member district system.

The overall pattern of parliamentary elections in Korea showed that the ruling party could win on average just over 60 per cent of the seats in parliament with just under 40 per cent of the national vote, provided that the remainder was divided amongst two or more smaller parties (Table II.1). For example, in 1963, under the distorted PR/single-member system, Park Chung-hee's newly founded Democratic Republican Party (DRP) won 62.9 per cent of the 175 seats with 33.5 per cent of the vote; the next largest party, the Civil Rights Party, won 23.5 per cent of the seats with 20.1 per cent of the vote, and the third largest, the Democratic Party, won 7.4 per cent of the seats with 13.6 per cent of the vote. Faced with a united opposition, however, the same system delivered much more competitive results: in 1971 the DRP won 55.4 per cent of the seats with 48.8 per cent of the vote, and its rival the New Democratic Party won 43.6 per cent of the seats with 44.4 per cent of the vote. The nearness of the ruling party to defeat in the 1971 elections partially explains the 'auto-coup' of 1972. In 1973, under the new system of two-member districts combined with presidential appointments, the DRP won exactly half the competitively filled seats with 38.7 per cent of the vote, and the seats filled by appointment gave it a two-thirds majority in parliament.

During the Third Republic, there were three presidential elections, all held under the plurality system with universal suffrage and a direct and secret ballot (Table II.2). All were won by Park Chung-hee, and all were competitive, but marred by widespread allegations of campaign

Table II.1 Parliamentary Elections under Korea's Authoritarian Regime

	Third Republic ^a						Fourth Republic ^b						Fifth Republic ^c					
	1963		1967		1971		1973		1978		1981		1985					
	Per cent:	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat	Vote	Seat			
Dem. Republican Party (DRP)	33.5	62.9	50.6	73.7	48.8	55.4	38.7	66.6	31.7	62.7	—	—	—	—	—			
Civil Rights Party (CRP)	20.1	23.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Democratic Party	13.6	7.4	3.0	0.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Liberal Democratic Party	8.1	5.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
People's Party (PP)	8.8	1.1	1.7	0.0	1.4	0.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
New Democratic Party (NDP)	—	—	32.7	25.7	44.4	43.6	32.5	23.7	32.8	26.4	—	—	—	—	—			
Democratic Unification Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.2	0.9	7.4	1.3	—	—	—	—	—			
Democratic Justice Party (DJP)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	35.6	54.7	35.2	53.6	—			
Democratic Korea Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21.6	29.3	19.7	12.7	—			
Korea National Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13.2	9.1	9.2	7.2	—			
Civil Rights Party (revived)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.7	0.7	—	—	—			
New Politics Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.2	0.7	—	—	—			
Social Democratic Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.2	0.7	—	—	—			
New Korea Democratic Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	29.3	24.3	—			
Independents	—	—	—	—	—	—	18.6	8.7	28.1	9.5	10.7	4.0	3.3	1.4	—			
Others ^d	15.9	0.0	12.0	0.6	5.4	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.8	3.3	0.8	—			
Total number of seats:	175	175	175	204	219	231	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276			

Source: Croissant 2001: 429ff, 453ff. Parties with acronyms have presidential results reported in Table II.2

Notes: ^a Third Republic: plurality in SMDs + 44 national seats. ^b Fourth Republic: plurality in two-member districts+73 by appointment. ^c Fifth Republic: plurality in two-member districts+92 national seats. ^d Others: winning less than two seats.

irregularities (Pae 1986: 187). Park's candidacy in the 1971 election relied on his first securing a change in the constitution to allow himself a third term, and his victory that year is attributed by some authors to electoral fraud (Cotton 1991: 208; Croissant 2002: 236). After the latter election, Park instituted the *Yushin* reforms, replacing direct election with indirect election through an electoral college. The 2,500-odd delegates to the college during the Fourth Republic and the 5,277 delegates during the Fifth Republic were elected in single-member constituencies. The proceedings of the college were effectively under the control of the president: thus Park was able to claim unanimous support (Choe 1997: 72f; Croissant 2002: 266). Under the Fifth Republic, in 1981, Chun Doo-hwan claimed 90.2 per cent of electoral college votes to secure a single seven-year term.

In Korea, unlike in the Soviet Union, multiple parties were allowed to form. As long as they did not stray into positions that the regime would interpret as pro-communist or pro-North Korean — and it interpreted these terms broadly — they were free to carry out the normal activities of representation, lobbying and electoral competition. Nevertheless, despite their freedom, parties collectively failed to institutionalize a stable party system (Chon 2000; Croissant 2002: 260f; Han 1989: 276; Pae 1986: chapter 6; Park 1995). A clear symptom of this is the short life span of most parties. The ruling DRP lasted 17 years (1963-1980), but the fact that it did not long outlive Park signals its dependence on the president's patronage. It was reincarnated under Chun as the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which lasted nine years (1981-1990). Opposition parties survived a much smaller span: their median life-expectancy in the authoritarian period was about four years (Pae 1986: 156; Croissant 2002: 251). The causes of the party system's failure to institutionalize include, amongst exogenous factors, changes in the electoral system (as described above), and deliberate actions by the authoritarian regime, such as dissolving parties or depriving their leaders of political rights, as happened after the coups in 1961 and 1979

Table II.2 Presidential Elections under Korea's Authoritarian Regime

	Direct elections: Third Republic ^a			Indirect Elections: Fourth and Fifth Republics ^b				
	1963	1967	1971	1972	1978	1979	1980	1981
Electorate	12,985,051	13,935,093	15,552,236	2,359	2,581	2,560	2,540	5,277
Valid Votes (% electorate)	77.7	79.4	76.7	99.9	99.8	96.3	99.4	99.9
Invalid Votes (")	7.3	4.2	3.1	0.1	0	3.3	0	0
Total votes (")	85	83.6	79.8	100	99.8	99.6	99.4	99.9
	% of total valid votes							
Park Chung-hee, DRP	46.6	51.4	53.2	100	100	—	—	—
Yun Po-sun, CRP	45.1	40.9	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oh Chae-yong	4.1	2.4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pyon Yong-tae	2.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kim Chun-yon, PP	2	2.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chon Chin-han	—	2.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kim Dae-jung, NDP	—	—	45.3	—	—	—	—	—
Choi Kyu-hah, DRP	—	—	—	—	—	100	—	—
Chun Doo-hwan, DJP	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	90.2
Yu Chi-song	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.7
Kim Chong-chol	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.6
Others ^c	0	0.9	1.5	—	—	—	—	0.5

Source: Croissant 2002: 266; Croissant 2001: 465f. Party acronyms refer to parties in Table II.1.

Notes: ^a Third Republic: direct election by plurality with a secret ballot and universal suffrage. ^b Fourth and Fifth Republics: president confirmed in office by an electoral college whose members were chosen by plurality in managed elections from single-member districts. ^c All candidates winning only 1.0% of the vote or less.

and the auto-coup of 1972 (Pae 1986: 157). They also include such endogenous factors as intra-party factional strife, the lack of ideological differences between parties (Pae 1986: 178ff), and the corrosive role played by 'money politics' in financing their activities (Chon 2000; Croissant 2002: 251f; Kang 2002: 98-106; Pae 1986: 190f; Park 1995). On the latter, it is important to note that the ruling party had vast financial resources commandeered by the government through direct pressure on businesses, (more on this in sections II.C and II.D below), and also resorted to the sale of nominations for safe seats and places high on the national list in National Assembly elections (Chon 2000: 70). Opposition parties, deprived of access to large private donations by big firms' reluctance to risk government displeasure, were even more reliant on the sale of nominations for safe seats (Chon 2000: 72). The failure of the party system to become institutionalized thus reflected a lack of autonomy of parties from oligopolistic financial supporters.

II.A.2 Metamorphoses During Constitutional Change

II.A.2.1 Mechanics of Transition: Korea

Once the majority of the officer corps and its leadership have accepted the need for a democratic transfer of power, military regimes are usually good at organizing relatively peaceful and orderly transitions, in part because most officers have an attractive exit strategy in the return to barracks (Nordlinger 1977: 141ff). The Korean transition was 'protracted' – its beginnings can be traced to policies introduced by President Chun. Personally unpopular, as the leader of the 1979 coup d'état, he initiated moves towards political liberalization in 1985, with the aim of making his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) competitive in national elections. Chun was also responding to changing opinion within his own constituency: the officer corps of the Korean armed forces (Luckham 1996: 219).

In 1985, Korea's opposition parties were grouped around the New Korea Democratic Party, which had won 29 per cent of the vote in the National Assembly elections of that year. But the leadership of this party, under Lee Min-woo, had so moderated its demands that it appeared willing to accept the continuation of indirect presidential elections, favouring the incumbent (Cotton 1993: 30ff). The leading dissidents, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, were consequently in a position to lead the 'real' opposition, which, by 1987, had acquired the character of a mass movement. They formed the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) in April 1987.

In June 1987 a pro-democracy uprising took place in Korea, involving students, workers, religious groups and members of the urban middle class (more on this in section II.E below). Seoul was in the international spotlight in the lead up to the 1988 Olympics, and the street protests had reached a level and intensity where, failing some significant concessions by the leadership, nothing short of a bloody crackdown would bring them to an end. President Chun Doo-hwan resigned, handing on the leadership to his associate Roh Tae-woo. On 29 June Roh acceded to opposition demands for free presidential elections with citizens voting directly for the candidates rather than through an electoral college. In August the opposition parties and the government agreed in roundtable negotiations on constitutional amendments providing for a president directly elected by plurality for a single term only; and removing the president's power to dissolve the National Assembly. The amendment was adopted by referendum on 27 October, with 93 per cent of the voters in favour (Croissant 2001: 427).

The opposition then faced the urgent task of preparing for a presidential election on 16 December. Kim Dae-jung split with Kim Young-sam's Reunification Democratic Party and formed his own party, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). Kim Jong-pil, founder of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), formed the New Democratic Republican Party

(NDRP). Standing for the DJP, Roh Tae-woo won the election with only 35.9 per cent of the vote. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were the runners up with 27.5 and 26.5 per cent of the vote each, and Kim Jong-pil came in fourth with around 8 per cent (See Appendix I for Korean election results from 1987 onwards).

In the National Assembly elections of 26 April, 1988, the same parties contested again. The ruling DJP passed an electoral law which it believed would satisfy the requirements for free elections while also giving it a significant advantage (Brady & Mo 1992; Choe 1997: 79–83). Of the 299 seats, 224 were filled by plurality in single-member districts and 75 seats were allocated nationally; of the national seats, the largest party was guaranteed 38, and the remainder was distributed to parties winning at least 5 districts in proportion to district seats won. Contrary to its own expectations, the DJP did not win an absolute majority of seats, and the balance of power was given into the hands of Kim Jong-pil's NDRP. With the election of a new legislature in April 1988, Korea's transition had passed a decisive milestone.

In Korea, although the withdrawal of the military and the security apparatus from politics was slow under Roh Tae-woo, it was also steady (Luckham 1996: 216-22; Shin 1999: chapter 1). From April 1988 Roh came under strong pressure from the new legislature to purge his government of ministers closely connected with the previous regime: he did so in a cabinet reshuffle in December 1988. In 1990, Roh placed the armed services under a Chief of Staff responsible to the Minister of Defence. Senior promotion procedures were reformed to give priority to professional standards and reduce the influence of political factionalism.

The complete extrication of the military from politics did not take place until Kim Young-sam won the presidency in December 1992, becoming

Korea's first civilian president in over 30 years⁸. Kim Young-sam had merged his party with the DJP in 1990, forming the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), and the DLP included a number of individuals from previous administrations. Nevertheless, in early 1993 Kim Young-sam made a vigorous attack on the last vestiges of military dominance in politics. A corruption crackdown combined with a reshuffle of senior military staff led to the dissolution of the so-called *Hanahoe*, an informal association of officers who had dominated senior posts under Chun and Roh (Cumings 1997: 390ff; Lee 2000: 99ff; Cotton 1995: 1ff).

II.A.2.2 Mechanics of transition - Russia

Through the policies of *glasnost*' and *perestroika*, Gorbachev hoped to strengthen the Soviet regime through the partial liberalization of both Party and state (Brown 1996: chapter 6). The introduction in March 1989 of multi-candidate elections to a new Soviet representative institution, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, opened up a Pandora's box of political competition (White, et al. 1997: chapter 2). Two complementary factors facilitated Russia's transition to a new regime. First, although Gorbachev's own claim to power was based on his leadership of the CPSU, his agenda for political and economic reform divided the Party against itself; internal division and ingrained inflexibility prevented the CPSU from adapting to rapidly changing circumstances (Gill 1994). Second, the Soviet Union's complex structure of ethnically defined political units created opportunities for the politicization of ethnicity and the mobilization of resources against the centre, and these were taken up by Republic-level communist and soon-to-be ex-communist leaders as well as dissidents in their various national contexts (Lapidus, et al. 1992; Motyl 1990; Motyl 1992; Roeder 1991; Suny 1993).

⁸ Excluding Choi Kyu-hah who held office briefly as interim president after Park Chung-hee's assassination in 1979.

Multi-candidate elections opened a route back into politics for Boris Yeltsin, a former candidate Politburo member sacked in 1988 who emerged as the champion of those demanding faster reforms (McFaul 2001b: chapter 3). In March 1990 he easily won a Moscow constituency seat in the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. At around the same time, the reformulation of Article 6 of the Soviet constitution formally ended the CPSU's monopoly on power. By securing election first to the position of Chairman of the RSFSR Congress, and then, through a competitive, direct election in June 1991, to the new post of president of the RSFSR, Yeltsin secured an institutional bridgehead against the Soviet regime.

Yeltsin's strategy in opposition was not simply to mobilize demands for democracy and markets. Rather it was to undermine the central institutions from within by asserting the sovereignty of the formally sub-federal RSFSR. There were two aspects to this strategy. Politically, Yeltsin tapped both demands for further liberalization and resurgent nationalism, as expressed by a plethora of new Russian proto-parties and movements (Fish 1995: chapter 4). Resurgent independence movements outside Russia, notably in the Baltics and Caucasus, provided the foil for Yeltsin's Russian nationalism while creating powerful centrifugal forces with which Gorbachev, not Yeltsin, had to battle. With hindsight, Gorbachev's fatal error was to allow competitive electoral politics to begin at republic and local level, while refusing to face the challenge of direct election himself (Linz & Stepan 1996: 370-86). Economically, Yeltsin undermined Soviet institutions by retaining tax revenues from the central government and by asserting control over enterprises on the territory of the RSFSR (Nagy 2000: chapter 5). The author returns to the political-economic dimensions of transition in Section II.D below.

With the Soviet Union verging on collapse, Russia came to the brink, in August 1991, of resolving its internal political conflicts by force: the

attempted putsch by Politburo hardliners against Gorbachev was intended to reverse Gorbachev's liberalization, and its failure was the catalyst for the final disintegration of the USSR and of the CPSU (Gill 1994: chapter 8; Reddaway & Glinski 2001: chapter 4). Partly, the massive public support which Yeltsin and the Russian Congress received on the streets of Moscow and in other cities caused the putsch leaders to lose their nerve. In addition, the putsch leaders were unwilling to contemplate a split in the Soviet military, since Yeltsin had secured promises of support from the commander in charge of troop deployments in the Moscow area (Reddaway & Glinski 2001: 218ff). Following the collapse of the coup, Yeltsin moved quickly to abolish the CPSU and nationalize its property. On 8 December 1991 at a meeting in Belavezh, Yeltsin and the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine agreed to abolish the USSR. When Gorbachev resigned on 25 December, he signalled his acknowledgement that the Soviet Union no longer existed.

Russia began its separate transition with a muddle of institutions inherited from the RSFSR. First among these in terms of political power was the recently created presidency. However, according to the much revised RSFSR constitution of 1978, supreme power was still formally vested in the Russian Congress. In September and October 1993, when the Russian Congress attempted to defy President Yeltsin's decree of its dissolution, the central issue was the type of institutions the new Russia would have, and in particular whether the president or parliament would be more powerful (Brown 1993; Brudny 1995; Clark 1995; Reddaway & Glinski 2001: chapter 7). Two points concerning these events are clear. First, both sides attempted to use force to achieve their goals, leading to violent clashes on 3-4 October in which police reported that 187 people were killed, including 76 non-combatants, and 437 were wounded (Reddaway & Glinski 2001: 427). Second, after the confrontation, both sides accepted the need for stable rules of the game. Initially, Yeltsin imposed dictatorial measures (see section II.B.2 below), but on 12 December 1993, he put his preferred draft

constitution to a vote and a majority of voters cast their ballots in favour of the new constitution. The result was 57 percent of voters in favour, 40 percent against, and 3 percent invalid ballots; turnout was 54.8 percent (White, et al. 1997: 99).

At the same time, Yeltsin allowed competitive, multi-party elections to a new parliament, the State Duma. The ultra-nationalist Liberal Democrats won 64 of the 450 seats with 21.4 per cent of the list vote; the revived Communist Party of the Russian Federation won 48 seats with 11.6 per cent of the list vote; the Agrarians, allied to the Communists, won 33 seats with 7.4 per cent of the list vote; Russia's Choice, favoured by Yeltsin won 70 seats but only 14.5 per cent of the list vote. The largest bloc of seats, 146, went to independents; and the remainder of seats and votes went to variety of other centrist and nominally democratic parties (See Appendix II for Russian election results from 1993 onwards). Subsequently, leaders of all of Russia's most significant political forces including the Communists, accepted the constitution as binding. Russia's transition was then over.

II.A.2.3 Role of Parties

A salient feature of the Korean transition was that the president had a continuing affiliation to a party represented in the National Assembly. Chun Doo-hwan abolished all Korean political parties in 1980, but allowed their recreation under a new law. As already mentioned, he imitated his predecessor by creating the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) to control the legislature. In the summer of 1987, at the same time as the regime gave in to opposition demands for direct presidential elections and an independent parliament, Roh Tae-woo assumed the mantle of DJP leader, while Chun resigned from that post in order to assume a 'supra-partisan' position during the transition. In the first free direct election in 1988, Roh ran as the DJP candidate, and voters judged him on the DJP's record. The 1990 merger of the DJP with two opposition parties, Kim Young-sam's RDP and Kim Jong-

pil's NDRP, was an attempt to create a 'catchall' ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), along the lines of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Kim Young-sam secured its nomination in a competitive contest in May 1992, and went on to win the presidential election in December. Although the DLP did not outlast Kim Young-sam's presidency, there was a continuing party organization associated with the president. In December 1995, the DLP renamed itself the New Korea Party, which two years later merged with the Democratic Party to form the Grand National Party (Croissant 2002: 251).

From the beginning of 1991 to the end of 1993, Yeltsin associated himself with a pro-market, pro-democratic position, but he did not adopt a political party, although pro-market and pro-democratic forces were attempting to organize. Even after the reformulation of Article 6 of the Soviet constitution in March 1990, the CPSU continued to enjoy *de facto* institutionalized advantages, even though splits within its ranks and its general disorganization made these advantages difficult to exploit (Gill 1994: chapter 7). Yeltsin's banning of the CPSU and nationalization of its property in late 1991 was, therefore, a pre-requisite for the emergence of any kind of party system, and a creatively destructive act. When conservative Communists re-organized in early 1993 in the form of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the party-state was no more, and the CPRF did not have the means of restoring it (March 2002: chapter 1). Yeltsin could have personally organized and led his own political party, but chose instead to delegate party-building to his prime minister, and not to hold parliamentary elections until more than two years after the collapse of the Soviet regime. This gave the proto-parties in the Russian Congress little to do except criticize Yeltsin's policies and argue over the shape of Russia's future constitution (Sakwa 2002b: 175f). The fact that the first democratically-elected President of Korea had a party allegiance, while the first democratically-elected Russian President did not, gave Korea a firmer basis for institutionalizing a party system.

II.A.3 Regime Structure After Constitutional Change

II.A.3.1 Constitutional Provisions

The basic structure of the regime in both countries is similar, consisting of separate executive, legislative and judicial branches of government along the French model. The executive branch consists of the president, his administrative staff, and a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the president. The Korean National Assembly is unicameral with 273 members. The Russian Federal Assembly is bicameral, consisting of a directly-elected lower house, the State Duma with 450 members, and an upper house, the Federation Council. The membership of the latter consists of two representatives from each of the 89 'subjects' or constituent territories of the Federation⁹. The judicial branch in each country includes a Supreme Court, which is the highest court of appeal, and a Constitutional Court which interprets the constitution. In both countries a national prosecutor's office is responsible for investigating violations of the law and bringing charges. Appointments to the higher courts and to the post of chief prosecutor are in the purvey of Korean and Russian presidents, subject to confirmation by the legislature. In each country, a national security council, presided over by the president, oversees defence policy and the military is subject to control by a civilian defence minister¹⁰. In both Korea and Russia, the combination of a strong president and a weak parliament means that the executive branch is dominant.

⁹ In 1993 the members of the Federation Council were directly elected. From December 1995 governors and speakers of regional legislatures were automatic *ex-officio* members. A law passed in July 2000 means that governors and regional legislatures now select full-time delegates to the Council, and the appointees are subject to recall.

¹⁰ Korea's constitution prohibits military personnel from occupying cabinet positions. However, the Korean Chief-of-Staff did not become responsible to the minister of defence until 1990. Russia appointed a civilian defence minister in March 2001, although the minister has a KGB background.

Both Russia's 1993 constitution and the October 1987 amendment to Korea's 1948 Basic Law provide a panoply of democratic rights consistent with international standards (Tschentscher 2000a; Tschentscher 2000b). Both constitutions provide for freedoms of speech, association, and of the mass media. Both provide for freedoms of conscience and the right to privacy, including the privacy of correspondence. Both place limits on the power of the authorities to detain without a court order and guarantee the right of legal representation. Both provide for freedom of movement and residence. Both recognize the right to own private property. Both give workers the right to organize, to engage in collective bargaining and to strike¹¹. In broad terms, the Korean and Russian constitutions are *on paper*, equally democratic, but, as argued below, the fulfilment of the democratic potential embodied in these documents differs in the two countries.

In Russia, the president has much greater constitutional sanctions and the legislature much weaker constitutional sanctions than in Korea. In both countries, the appointment of the prime minister requires the consent of the legislature, meaning the lower house in Russia. However, the Russian president dissolves the State Duma if it rejects his choice of prime minister three times, whereas in Korea the president must find a candidate acceptable to the legislature. In both countries, the lower house may pass a motion of no-confidence in the government by a simple majority. If the State Duma passes a no-confidence vote in the government, the Russian president either dissolves the Duma or appoints a new government. In Korea, the president has no right to dissolve the National Assembly, and if the legislature passes a no-confidence vote in the government, the president is obliged to appoint a new one. Both the Korean and Russian parliaments have the power to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president. In Korea, impeachment requires a majority of the total membership of the

¹¹ Public officials and certain categories of defence workers do not have this right in Korea

Assembly to initiate and a two-thirds majority to pass. In Russia, impeachment is far more difficult. It requires two-thirds of the members of the Duma to initiate and a two-thirds majority of the Federation Council to pass. In addition, the Supreme Court must have confirmed that the impeachment charges of the Duma have a basis in treason or some other grave crime, and the Constitutional Court must have confirmed that the procedures followed were correct.

If relations between the executive and legislature become difficult, the Russian executive can in theory rule without the legislature, whereas the Korean executive is bound to come to some kind of accommodation. Whereas the Russian constitution stipulates only that presidential decrees shall be within the constitution and federal laws, the Korean constitution stipulates that such decrees should cover matters delegated to the president by law, or serve to enforce laws. Similarly, while the president can initiate referendums in both countries, in Korea the subject matter of such referendums is restricted to foreign affairs, unification with North Korea or 'other matters of national destiny.' In both countries, the president has the right to assume emergency powers, but the Korean constitution stipulates that these powers should be the minimum necessary in the event that there is no time to convene the National Assembly. To override a presidential veto on legislation in Korea requires the votes of two-thirds of the members present in the Assembly, provided they are at least half the members. In Russia it requires two-thirds of the total membership of the Federal Assembly.

The procedural barriers to amending the Korean constitution are straightforward and in keeping with the norm of popular sovereignty, while in Russia the equivalent procedures are extremely complex, and ultimately inconsistent with the norm of popular sovereignty. In Korea a majority of the total membership of the National Assembly can propose an amendment, and

a two thirds majority is required to put it to a national referendum. In Russia, laws having constitutional effect, known as federal constitutional laws, require the approval of at least three quarters of the total number of deputies of the Federation Council and at least two thirds of the total number of deputies of the State Duma. However, the two houses of parliament cannot use these procedures to amend those chapters of the constitution dealing with fundamentals, with rights and liberties and with procedures for amendment. It requires three fifths of the total membership of the Federal Assembly to propose amendments to these chapters, and the formation of a Constitutional Assembly to pass them. Procedures for forming such an Assembly are unspecified, but the constitution stipulates that the Constitutional Assembly shall have the right to either confirm the inviolability of the present constitution or adopt a new one, either by referendum or by a two-thirds majority of its members. Thus in Russia constitutional changes are extremely difficult to make, but, given the necessary support at the level of political elites, a Constitutional Assembly may replace the constitution without reference to the people.

II.A.3.2 Parties and Elections

The Korean legislature sits for four-year term and the president has a five-year term. Elections of president and legislature are held at different times. A plurality of the vote is sufficient to win the presidency. Elections to the National Assembly continue to combine proportional representation (PR) and a plurality system in single-member districts (SMDs) (Choe 1997: 65, 79-83; Croissant 2001; Croissant 2002: 243-6). Voters mark only one ballot, but each vote is counted twice, once in the SMD and once in a national constituency for PR seats. In the first two parliamentary elections following transition, those of 1988 and 1992, Korea retained the practice of allocating the national pool of seats not in proportion to votes received but in proportion

to seats won in the single member contests¹². However, since 1996 the national seats have been allocated in proportion to votes received to parties winning at least 5 single-member seats or 5 per cent of the national vote; this distribution takes place after parties winning between 3 and 5 per cent of the national vote have been allocated one seat each. At the same time, the number of national seats as a proportion of the total has fallen from about a third under the Third and Fourth Republics to less than a sixth today. In 1996, 46 out of the 299 seats in parliament were allocated in the national pool; in 2000 there were 46 national seats out of a total of 273. (See Appendix I for election results since 1987).

The Russian president and legislature both have a four-year term. Again, elections are at different times. Winning the presidency requires an absolute majority of the total vote, a second round run-off election being held between the two leading candidates if no candidate achieves this in the first round. Russia has a two-ballot system, which has remained relatively stable since 1993 (Munro & Rose 2001; Rose & Munro 2003: chapter 16). In parliamentary elections, Russians cast two votes, one for a candidate in a first-past-the-post contest in their single-member district, and one vote for a party list in a nationwide PR contest. The numbers of PR and SMD seats are equal at 225. The PR seats are allocated to parties winning at least 5 per cent of the total vote in proportion to the votes received. (See Appendix II for election results since 1993).

In both countries, unfair and corrupt campaign practices have provoked international criticism, in Russia even in the most recent elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a; OSCE/ODIHR 2000b) and in Korea more so during the early years after transition (Park 1995; Yang 1992). Elections in Korea have lead to alternation of governments. In December 1997 Korea

¹² Moreover, as mentioned, the largest party in 1988 was guaranteed 38 of the 75 national seats.

witnessed a peaceful handover of power to an opposition presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung; his successor in December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun came from the same party. Russia has yet to pass the hand-over test at presidential level, as Vladimir Putin was President Yeltsin's hand-picked successor. However, there has been considerable turnover of seats in national parliaments in both countries, and the fact that in both countries parties opposed to the president have been able to win control of parliament (as in Russia in 1993 and 1995) is *prima facie* evidence of a genuine electoral competition independent of state control.

Given the strength of Korean civil society (see section II.E below), it is somewhat surprising to find that the Korean party system is still very unstable (Chon 2000; Croissant 2002: 246-54; Jaung 2000; Park 2000; Yang 1992). Croissant (2002: 251) presents data showing that in the democratic era, the median Korean political party winning at least 3 per cent of the vote has lasted little more than two years. Because parties change frequently, personal loyalty to one's own 'patron' in the party hierarchy is more important than local constituency support in determining a candidate's re-election prospects. Informally institutionalized intra-party factions command greater loyalty than the party itself, and a faction leader can often take his supporters with him into a new party if he (rarely she) so wishes. In four Korean National Assembly elections since 1988, out of 16 nominal parties which have won at least one per cent of the vote, only two have contested two successive elections under the same party label, and none has contested three or four. Even if one focuses not on the number of parties, but on their share of the vote, the picture is similar. Across all elections, the average share of the vote won by parties contesting only one election was 81 per cent; the average vote share of parties contesting two elections was 19 per cent; and there are no parties contesting three or four elections. This shows that in Korea, it is not the case that a few big parties remain stable, and a long tail of smaller parties change frequently. Rather, the big parties are unstable, changing

their names and composition frequently (for details, see Appendix Table I.1). Independents are a relatively minor force in Korean politics, at least by comparison to Russia, but the instability of the party system means that a lot of nominal partisans are in fact 'closet independents.'

The instability of the party system in Korea is the complement of a durable underlying cleavage structure which presents another type of barrier to genuine electoral accountability. Voters tend to split along regional lines in Korea¹³ (Bae 2001; Bae & Cotton 1993; Croissant 2001; Cumings 1997: 389f; Steinberg 1995: 387f). For example, in 1987 Kim Dae-jung won an average of 89.4 per cent of the vote in the regions of North and South Cholla and the city of Kwangju, as against a national total of 27.0 per cent; at the same election, Roh Tae-woo won 66.4 per cent in his home region of North Kyongsang as against a national total of 36.6 percent; and Kim Young-sam took 51.3 per cent of the vote in his home region of South Kyongsang, as against a national total of 28.0 per cent (Croissant 2001: 476). At three successive presidential elections which Kim Dae-jung contested in 1987, 1992 and 1997, the regional distribution of his vote remained fairly stable (Bae 2001: 486). In the 2000 National Assembly election, President Kim Dae-jung's Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) took 25 out of 29 SMD seats in the Cholla regions, while the Grand National Party (GNP), successor to the support networks of both Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam, took 64 out of 65 SMD seats in the Kyongsang regions (Croissant 2001: 463; Kang & Walker 2002).

The regional cleavages are partly a product of clientelism within parties: politicians cultivate networks of support within their home regions, requiring for this purpose vast sums of money, for which they are dependent on patrons higher up in the network (Chon 2000: 70f; Croissant 2002: 250f;

¹³ For a full regional breakdown of National Assembly and presidential election results from 1948 to 2000, see Croissant (2001: 432-63, 467-77).

Jaung 2000; Park 1995; Yang 1992). Regional and client-based loyalties do not aggregate at national level the appeal of different party programmes, but they do lend a familiar structure to the political playing field. The party based in the Kyongsang regions, currently the GNP, tends to be labelled 'conservative', to defend the institutions of the authoritarian past and big business, and to be hostile to any mollification of North Korea. The party based in the Cholla regions, currently the MDP, tends to be associated with trade unionism, with criticism of the authoritarian past and with attempts at reconciliation with North Korea. A third party whose support is strongest in the central regions tends to bargain for the support of the other two. (See Appendix Table I.1 for descriptions of all major Korean parties in the democratic era).

The most striking features of the Russian party system are: firstly, the large number of parties; secondly, the instability of most of them, and thirdly, the large number of candidates elected as independents (See Appendix Table II.4). All these characteristics present barriers to electoral accountability (Kullberg 2001; McFaul 2001a; Rose, Munro & White 2001; Rose, Tikhomirov & Mishler 1997; Rose & Munro 2002; Sakwa 2001). Russian elites have created a vast number of electoral organizations, very few of which enjoy any significant recognition amongst the electorate. For example, in 1999 there were 139 electoral organizations legally registered at federal level (Central Electoral Commission 1999). However, out of 34 parties which have won at least 1.0% of the list vote in Duma elections since 1993, only five have contested all three elections, six have contested two elections, and the remainder have only contested one election. This picture of instability is partly offset if one focuses on shares of the vote rather than the numbers of parties. The five parties which have contested each Duma election have together won an average share of the list vote for parties of 49 per cent; the parties which have contested two elections have won an average vote share of 22 per cent; and the parties contesting only one

election have averaged 29 per cent. Thus, there are important Russian parties which persist, including the Communists, Yabloko and the Liberal Democrats, but these persistent parties are still a long way from dominating the vote. Most parties do not nominate candidates nationwide, and, in terms of seats won, independents were the largest category in 1993 and 1999, and the second largest category in 1995 (See Appendix Table II.4). Since independents do not vote as a bloc, but rather split into whatever factions are most congenial to them after they get elected, there is a big disjunction between the distribution of seats in election returns and the factions which emerge in the Duma. Instead of an institutionalized party system, Russia has a 'floating party system' (Rose, Munro & White 2001).

As in Korea, the cleavage structure amongst the voters is quite stable: the most important cleavage is between those who support the transformation from a command to a market economy, and those who oppose it (Rose, Munro & White 2001: 433-6; Rose, Tikhomirov & Mishler 1997: 812-6). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has so far proved to be the strongest and best organized party, even though it is associated with a failed regime (March 2002; Sakwa 2002a). Russian liberals have been divided into two main camps: the more pro-market group, currently embodied by Union of Right Forces, is associated with Yeltsin and with the economic reforms of the early 1990s; the other liberal group is Yabloko, a party of the intelligentsia hostile to Yeltsin. In addition, there is the phenomenon of the so-called 'party of power,' a patronage-based party with close links to the president. In the 1999 election this was Unity (Colton & McFaul 2000) which in December 2001 became Unified Russia after merging with another patronage-based group, Fatherland-All Russia. Demagogic nationalism is represented by the so-called Liberal Democratic Party, maverick by reputation but in practice tending to support the government. (See Appendix Table II.1 for descriptions of all major Russian parties in the democratic era).

An 'external' indicator of the failure of the Korean and Russian party systems to institutionalize is that in both countries parties collectively suffer from low levels of public trust (Figure II.1). Data compiled by the author as part of an ongoing project comparing selected governance indicators on a global basis shows that Korean and Russian levels of trust in political parties are low by the standards of incomplete democracies in their respective regions. A mere 15 per cent of Koreans expressed some or a great deal of trust in political parties, as against a seven-country regional average of 29 per cent. Only 7 per cent of Russians expressed a comparable level of trust in political parties. Although low trust in political parties is characteristic of East Europe in general¹⁴, as shown by a skewed distribution, it is noteworthy that Russia is at the bottom of this distribution.

II.B Freedom

II.B.1 Repression under Undemocratic Regimes


II.B.1.1 Stalin's Legacy

The first and most obvious contrast between the supply of freedom under the Korean bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime and in the post-totalitarian Soviet Union is that the latter was the direct inheritor of Stalin's legacy and, despite Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress, the Soviet Union had neither publicly repudiated that legacy nor acknowledged the full extent of Stalin's genocidal crimes. The regime did not allow open discussion of such matters. Korea suffered totalitarian-style repression under the Japanese, who deported hundreds of thousands of Koreans for use as forced labourers and 'comfort women' during World War II (Cumings

¹⁴ Political parties are the least trusted of the panoply of intermediary and state institutions in post-communist Europe. See the sources cited in the figure and, for an explanation of individual-level variation in levels of trust combining micro-level and macro-level influences see Mishler & Rose (2001).

Figure II.1 TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES: A CROSS-REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Q (East Europe). To what extent do you trust each of these political institutions to look after your interests? **POLITICAL PARTIES**. A. No trust at all 1 ... Great trust 7. (Below: 5-7 = Trust). Q (East Asia). I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: **POLITICAL PARTIES**. A. A great deal of trust, Quite a lot of trust, Not very much trust, None at all (Below: A great deal, quite a lot = Trust)



Sources: East Europe: New Europe Barometer; New Russia Barometer; New Democracies Barometer. All surveys in 2001 except for those in Moldova and Ukraine which were in 2000. East Asia Barometer 2001-2002. Compiled by the author as part of the Global Governance Indicators Project, www.globalbarometer.org/governanceindicators/trustparties.htm, 25 June 2003.

1997: 176-81). However, no one could blame, even by association, the authoritarian regime of the 1960s and 1970s for those crimes.

Linz (1975: 218) lists a number of characteristics of totalitarian terror which apply to the Soviet case: enormous scale, the extension of terror even to the elite, the open use of the state apparatus for coercion, disregard for even the pretence of legality, and frequent persecution of entire social categories. After Stalin's death, the Soviet regime moderated the level of political repression which had existed in the preceding totalitarian period (Hazard 1980: chapter 5). In part one may attribute this moderation to the fear of popular anger. Inkeles & Bauer (1959: 332f) report widespread fear of and hostility to the secret police amongst émigrés who lived in the Soviet Union before and during World War II. In addition, the insecurity terror had created amongst the top leaders provided personal reasons for moderation. However, the potential for the reintroduction of terror and the continuing use of focussed political repression was sufficient to keep the population in fear for a long time after Stalin's death. Bahry (1987: 89-91) reports that majorities of Soviet émigrés interviewed in 1983 stated that in their last normal period before beginning emigration procedures it was difficult to avoid trouble with the KGB and there was political risk in criticizing government officials; this finding held across generations and education levels. The memory of Stalinist terror and the muted but continuing operation of the system of political repression in the post-totalitarian period had a diffuse effect throughout the population.

On the basis of newly available archive evidence, Getty and his co-authors (1993: 1022) produced estimates of the extent of political repression under Stalin considerably lower than those made by, for example, Robert Conquest (1968: Appendix A) before Soviet archives were made more open. The article stimulated renewed debate between those responsible for higher

and lower estimates¹⁵. According to Getty and co-authors, there were 799,000 'documentable' executions from 1921 to 1953, of which 682,000 occurred in the purges of 1937-38 (Getty, et al. 1993: 1023). Conquest (1968: 529) estimated one million executions in 1937-38. Getty and co-authors (1993: 1024) estimate a little less than two million camp deaths caused by disease, cold and hunger and other 'natural' causes in prisons and camps in the 1930s, whereas Conquest (1968: 532) estimated two million in 1937-38 alone. The discrepancy results in part from differing estimates of total prison and camp population. Getty and co-authors (1993: 1048-49) provide figures giving a total prison and camp population varying in the period 1934 to 1953 between one and three million. Conquest (1968: 533) estimated that the total prison and camp population reached as high as eight million. Nove (1993: 274) whose figures are much closer to those of Getty, and who published in a book co-edited by the latter, suggests that one source of Conquest's overestimate of the total camp population consists in citing too high a figure for the number of peasants deported, and then assuming that nearly all perished in the Gulag. Nove contends that, as the Gulag was only one of a number of forms of detention, exile and resettlement, behind wire and outside the wire, many of those whom Conquest assumed to have died in detention were merely in internal exile or otherwise displaced, which is not to say that the conditions of their displacement were favourable. To whatever total one has for executions and deaths in detention, one must add the total deaths for regime-caused famine and famine-related disease, for which Nove (1993: 266), in agreement with Conquest (1968: 533; 1986: 301) cites estimates in the order of seven million. Whether one accepts high or low figures, the fact that totalitarian terror and collectivization of agriculture cost millions of lives is not disputed.

¹⁵ For a recent review, see Ellmann (2002). For higher estimates, see also Conquest (1982; 1997; 1999) and Rosefielde (1981; 1983; 1996). For lower estimates, see also Wheatcroft (1981; 1983; 1984; 1999; 2000) and Anderson & Silver (1985).

In the USSR, post-totalitarian repression was mild only by comparison with the terror which had preceded it. In 1982, the CIA estimated of the total Soviet penal population of around 4 million, which corresponds to a little less than 1,500 per hundred thousand head of population, 10,000 people were serving sentences for political crimes (Barghoorn & Remington 1986: 417). In addition, the Soviet state imprisoned people for such 'economic' crimes as production of poor quality, failure to fulfil commands of the planned economy, and currency speculation (Barghoorn & Remington 1986: 349f; Knight 1990: appendix B). The authorities sometimes tried political offenders on spurious indictments such as 'hooliganism.' In addition, the post-totalitarian period witnessed the introduction of 'psychiatric' treatment for some political prisoners, from which a small number died each year (Bloch & Reddaway 1977; Bloch & Reddaway 1984). Juries and courts of appeal were absent in the USSR, and, between 1962 and 1989, executions were carried out at a rate of 750 per year, although in 95 per cent of cases the death penalty was for murder, not political activity (Sakwa 2002b: 76f).

Choice of place to live, like the place of work, was theoretically free for ordinary Soviet citizens, following the repeal of war-time labour draft decrees in 1955 and 1956, but it was restricted in practice by housing shortages, internal passport regulations affecting some categories of workers, the permit system for residence in Moscow, and the system of dispersal for university graduates (Barghoorn & Remington 1986: 350f; Sakwa 1989: 314; Åslund 2002: 31). In the USSR, labour was not free to strike and not free to engage in collective bargaining.

II.B.1.2 Targeted Repression in Authoritarian Korea

Repression by an authoritarian regime usually has a limited focus (Linz 1975: 287). If the regime aims to exclude from power the organized working class, then, as happened in authoritarian Korea, the government

bans the activities of independent trade unionists, or even persecutes them, but unorganized workers do not need to fear. If the regime sees the intelligentsia as a hotbed of revolt, as did the Korean authoritarian regime from time to time, then university teachers and students become the target of political surveillance. Since bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes aim to 'divide and rule,' all-pervasive fear does not serve their purposes. Rather, they offer different social groups different incentives to cooperate and different disincentives to rebel. Their reliance on legal authority for legitimacy sometimes leads to clandestine measures of repression. As a consequence of all these characteristics, political repression under a bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime has a relatively limited cultural impact on the society at large.


Political repression in authoritarian Korea was mild by Soviet standards. Using the *New York Times* Index, which presumably covers only incidents prominent enough to make international news, Pae (1986: 106) collated reports of arrests and other oppressive acts directed at people protesting against the Korean regime between 1968 and 1981. During that period, the Index reported 11,745 arrests, 204 cases of physical abuse and torture and 328 killings. However, over 90 per cent of the killings reported by the *New York Times* occurred in 1980, the year of the Kwangju massacre. The Kwangju massacre was an unprovoked attack by Korean paratroopers on civilians in a city mainly loyal to the democratic opposition (Cumings 1997: 377ff). As of 1988, the government had admitted to 191 deaths in the Kwangju incident but the death statistics of the city of Kwangju suggest there were well over 2000 unusual deaths (Article 19 1988: 150). After General Chun became president of Korea in February 1981, harassment of the opposition and of labour unions intensified (Cumings 1997: 379ff). The National Council of Churches in Korea put the number of political detainees at 1,515 between 1974 and 1979 and 1,451 between 1980 and 1985 (Chung 1997: 86).

A comparative measure of the intensity of repression under the Korean bureaucratic-military and Soviet regimes is provided by Freedom House scores, which rate political and civil liberties since 1972 (Figure II.2). The scores run from seven for the least freedom to one for the most freedom, and they divide countries into three categories: a score up to and including 2.5 means that a country is 'free'; countries with scores above 2.5 but below 5.5 are rated 'partly free' and those with scores of 5.5 and above are 'not free' (Freedom House 2000a). The scores show that Korea through most of the 1970s and 1980s was partly free, whereas the Soviet Union was consistently not free. The severity of repression in both countries varied with the political climate, as the leadership experimented with decompression, then, becoming alarmed by the activities of the regime's opponents, tightened their grip. The severest periods of repression in Korea were, according to Freedom House scores, 1974, 1976 and 1980-1983. For the Soviet Union, the severest periods were 1984-1986, and slightly less severe periods from 1975-1978 and 1980-1983. Thus, before democratic transition, the trajectories of freedom in the two countries were similar, oscillating around a low base-level, up until the mid-1980s, when freedom in both countries' began to rise sharply.

II.B.2 Gain in Freedom During Constitutional Change

Constitutional change and events leading up to it witnessed a substantial rise in freedom in both countries. In the Korean case, the gain in freedom was from a higher base and relatively sudden. From the middle of 1987 to the middle of 1988, Korea's Freedom House score moved 1.5 points from 4 to 2.5 (Figure II.2). The first year of Roh Tae-woo's presidency saw a reduction of interference by the executive in judicial proceedings, the repeal of laws on censorship and administrative measures used to control the media, the removal of some restrictions on foreign travel, the repeal of legislation allowing prosecution for possessing certain

Figure II.2 Freedom in Korea and Russia, 1972-2001



Source: Freedom House, 2000a; Karatnycky 2000:192-3; Piano & Puddington 2001:90; Freedom House 2001: 11. Scores for 1972-73 reported as 1972, for 1973-74 as 1973 and so on to 2001-2002.

kinds of literature, and a more tolerant attitude by the authorities to various kinds of political assembly and association (Cotton 1993; Kim, E.M. 1993; Shin 1999: 6). In the USSR the growth of freedom began in 1987 and 1988; the Freedom House score moved 3.5 points to reach a peak of 3 in 1991, but freedom fell half a point to 3.5 in 1992. Notable achievements of the late Gorbachev era included the introduction of multi-candidate elections, beginning with those of March 1989 to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (White, et al. 1997: chapter 2), and also glasnost. The latter represented an exponential expansion of the sphere of tolerated public discourse, leading to the *de facto* acquisition of freedom of expression and association as well as a multiplication of alternative sources of information (Brown 1996; Fish 1995). Yeltsin's historic contribution in the transitional period was to transform these *de facto* changes from policies into articles of the new Russian constitution, as well as to oversee a rapid expansion of economic freedom (more on this in section II.D below). However, his credentials as a liberator were marred by the tactics used in dealing with opposition from the Russian Congress, culminating in the crackdown of autumn 1993. Thus, from a lower base, Russia made a larger jump towards freedom, but ultimately still ended up less free than Korea.

In Korea, the principal barriers to the expansion of political freedom were security and trade union legislation carried over from the previous regime (Luckham 1996: 220; Cumings 1997: 390f). The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), formerly the KCIA, remained intact and continued to arrest dissidents and journalists critical of the regime under the terms of the National Security Law and laws against communism. In addition, repressive measures continued to be used to deal with labour unrest. As mandatory government arbitration in labour disputes came to an end, a wave of strikes between 1987 and 1989 met with violent suppression by armed police and by privately hired security forces (Kim, E.M. 1997: 205ff; Koo 2002: 114ff).

Disorganized in the immediate aftermath of the failed 1991 putsch, the Soviet-era KGB fractured under the new regime into a number of different institutions with different functions and uncertain political loyalties (Knight 1996: chapter 1). The directorates of the old KGB charged with internal surveillance, counter intelligence, anti-terrorism, and economic crime and corruption transformed themselves into a Ministry of Security. The Ministry did not play a prominent role in Yeltsin's struggle with parliament during the 1993 political crises; its chief was sacked in July 1993 and later sided with the parliament; his replacement tried to maintain a neutral position (Knight 1996: chapter 3). In December 1993 the Ministry was dissolved and replaced with a new Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK).

The chief factor working against the consolidation of a high level of freedom in the transitional period was the raw nature of the struggle between supporters and opponents of Yeltsin and his policies (Clark 1995; Reddaway & Glinski 2001: chapters 6-7). In October 1993, having broken up the parliament and suspended the Constitutional Court, Yeltsin ruled for the next three months by decree. He abolished local government councils and legislatures, outlawed a number of opposition organizations, albeit including some who were far from democratic themselves, briefly suspended the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia, and banned over a dozen opposition newspapers as well as TV programmes which had been critical of him. Although most of these dictatorial measures were temporary, and did not long outlast the establishment of a constitutional order in December 1993, they did mar Yeltsin's image and set a poor precedent.

II.B.3 Freedom After Constitutional Change

II.B.3.1 Freedom in Korea

Since regime change, freedom in Korea has stabilized at a high level (cf. Figure II.2), despite some remnants of previous authoritarian practices

which persisted under Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung (Lee 2000: 104ff; Freedom House 2000b; Freedom House 2002a; Amnesty International 2002; U.S. Department of State 2000a; U.S. Department of State 2002a). The 1996 KDB survey showed that large majorities of Koreans felt freer under the Kim Young-sam regime than under the previous Chun Doo-hwan regime¹⁶. For example, 82 per cent agreed that there had been an improvement in the extent to which: *Anyone can speak freely what he or she thinks*; 74 per cent agreed that there was more freedom in the extent to which: *People can join any organization of their choice*.

The principal remaining problem is the continuing use of the National Security Law to harass and detain dissidents engaged in peaceful political activities. The activities for which Koreans may be prosecuted under the law are vaguely defined, but in recent years have included travelling to North Korea without permission and praising North Korea, its leaders or its ideology (Amnesty International 2002; U.S. Department of State 2002a). In the year to August 2001, 86 people were detained under the National Security Law, compared to 154 in the previous 12-month period; by end of 2001, 52 people remained in custody under the law (U.S. Department of State 2002a: section 1d). Other problems include the jailing of a small number of journalists under criminal libel laws, the jailing of conscientious objectors, and physical and verbal abuse of suspects in custody. Korean courts continue to impose the death penalty although there is a de facto moratorium on executions.

As far as organized labour is concerned, Korea's position has improved significantly since the early 1990s (U.S. Department of State 2000a; U.S. Department of State 2002a). The rights to collective bargaining and collective action are guaranteed under the constitution, and independent

¹⁶ See Appendix III for full text of survey questions.

trade unions operate freely. A liberalization of trade union law in 1997 allowed trade unions to engage in political activities; but trade unions and other social organizations are not allowed to make donations to political parties or to field candidates. In recent years, the government has cultivated a more neutral position in labour disputes, and the use of private security firms to break up strikes has decreased. Strikes remain prohibited for employees of government agencies, state-run enterprises and in defence industries. Korean trade unions have demonstrated political muscle: a nationwide strike erupted in December 1996 in protest against a new labour law, which would have made it easier for companies to hire and fire workers and adjust working hours; in combination with protests by opposition politicians, student groups and religious activists, the strikes contributed to the repeal of this law a few months later (Koo 2002: 120ff). Korean Democracy Barometer data from 1998 show that around 19 per cent of Korean employees belong to a trade union.

As mentioned above, Kim Young-sam conducted a deep and wide-ranging purge of the military and security establishment soon after taking power in December 1993. He also restructured and reduced in size the ANSP, the Military Security Command and other agencies which together constituted an important reserved domain of military power; and in 1994 he banned the ANSP from involvement in domestic politics through investigation and surveillance of Korean citizens (Shin 1999: 10). In December 1996, the ANSP regained some of its powers: a new national security law allowed it to investigate, arrest and interrogate suspected sympathizers of North Korea. Although the law was repealed after a wave of protests from opposition politicians, students and trade unions and religious activists (Shin 1999: 10; Koo 2002), the intelligence agency retains the power to investigate suspected sympathizers of North Korea. The ANSP has since been renamed the National Intelligence Service.

II.B.3.2 Lack of Freedom in Russia

For ordinary Russians the gain in freedom by comparison with the Soviet period is palpable. In 2001, for example, 78 per cent of NRB respondents agreed that the current regime was better than the Soviet regime before perestroika in the extent to which: *Everyone has the right to say what they think*; 79 per cent agreed that there had been an improvement in the extent to which: *You can join any organization you like*; and 87 per cent agreed that there was more freedom insofar as: *Everybody has freedom of choice in religious matters*. However, according to external expert assessments (Freedom House 2000c; Freedom House 2002b; U.S. Department of State 2000b; U.S. Department of State 2002b) the level of political freedom in Russia since regime change has gradually declined (cf. Figure II.2).

The principal obstacle to the consolidation of freedom in Russia is the abuse of human rights, particularly but not only in Chechnya. Indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya has displaced up to 200,000 civilians, and an unknown number have been killed, imprisoned, or subjected to torture and other forms of degrading and inhumane treatment (U.S. Department of State 2000b: section 1g; U.S. Department of State 2002b: section 1g). Outside of Chechnya, despite constitutional provisions banning torture, Russian police frequently use it as a means of extracting confessions, and face minimal accountability for these actions (Sakwa 2002b: 76). Arbitrary arrest and detention are also common, in spite of provisions of the constitution and a new Criminal Procedure Code which came into force in 2002. The risk of police harassment and arbitrary detention is particularly acute for people from the Caucasus, partly because the government has accused Chechens of perpetrating terrorist attacks and engaging in criminal activities (Roman 2002). According to the Russian Ministry of Justice, the total number of persons in places of detention in Russia in 2002 was 935,300, which corresponds to 652 per hundred thousand head of population (Trud

International 2002: 7). The number of people dying in Russian places of detention in recent years has been between 10,000 and 20,000 annually; most die as a result of poor prison conditions and disease, but some die from beatings (U.S. Department of State 2000b: section 1a; U.S. Department of State 2002b: section 1a).

A second significant problem in Russia is intimidation of the mass media, both through selective enforcement of the law against media operations which have criticized the government, and through illegal acts of violence against individual journalists (Rose & Munro 2002: 199-203; U.S. Department of State 2000b: section 2a; U.S. Department of State 2002b: section 2a). Mechanisms for selective law enforcement against the media include the use of libel laws, commercial laws, licences and tax regulations to close down particular newspapers or TV programmes, to influence their editorial policy or appointments, or to punish individuals. After Vladimir Putin came to power, the government consolidated its control over Russia's major TV stations; the motives for these actions were disguised as commercial, since the government acted through the agency of enterprises in which it holds a controlling stake¹⁷. The Ministry of Communications, answerable directly to the president, also enjoys extensive legal powers to register and licence media operations, and to allocate broadcasting frequencies. As far as illegal attacks on the media are concerned, the picture is much more murky: police seldom identify the perpetrators of attacks against journalists. However, targeted killings and beatings of journalists are common.

Under Russian law workers have the right to form and join trade unions, to bargain collectively and to strike; however, in practice the exercise of these rights is severely constrained by varying combinations of administrative barriers, collusion of management with local authorities, the

¹⁷ See, for example, Belin 's (2002) account of the events leading to the government's effective seizure of control of the private TV channel NTV.

courts and with the remnants of Soviet-era trade unions, and intimidation of worker activists (Gill & Marwick 2000: 226-37; U.S. Department of State 2000b: section 6; U.S. Department of State 2002b: section 6). Administrative barriers to worker activism include the requirement to follow complex dispute resolution procedures, involving coordinated actions by both management and unions, failing which a strike is considered illegal. The most widespread grievance of Russian workers is the backlog of unpaid wages or wages paid late, but courts have ruled that disputes over such matters require resolution on an individual basis, and therefore any consequent collective action is technically not a strike and workers who refuse their labour can be dismissed (U.S. Department of State 2002a: section 6, 40). At its worst, in 1996, the problem of late or unpaid wages affected about 78 per cent of Russian employees; although the situation has steadily improved since then, in 2001 the problem continued to affect about 37 percent of the labour force (Rose 2001a: 23).

The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) is the successor to the Soviet-era nationwide trade union organization; its member organizations, like their Soviet predecessors, by and large serve the interests of management. At national level, they either act in consort with management to represent their particular industry, or they enter national politics in an ineffectual way by affiliating to parties which win few votes¹⁸. Data from the New Russia Barometer X survey of June-July 2001, show that although 77 per cent of Russian employees belong to a trade union, 34 per cent of union members don't trust their local trade union leaders to look after their interests and 59 per cent don't trust their national trade union leaders. Since officially recognized trade unions function at regional level as channels for the allocation of social benefits, high rates of membership are partially

¹⁸ For example, Arkady Volsky's Civic Union party won only 1.8 per cent of the list vote in 1993 and Union of Labour won only 1.6 per cent in 1995 (Munro & Rose 2001: 28)

explicable in terms of the desire of workers to retain access to these benefits.

An April 1995 law revamped the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) under a new name, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and also restored domestic and foreign spying functions lost by the FSK during transition (Knight 1996: chapter 9). The FSB is answerable directly to the president, the purposes its investigations should serve are defined in vague terms, and provisions for parliamentary oversight are no more than nominal. In addition, the FSB has regained control over investigative detention prisons and several elite troop units.

II.C Towards The Rule of Law?

II.C.1 Obstacles to the Rule of Law under Undemocratic Regimes

II.C.1.1 The Soviet Anti-Modern Party-State

The Soviet regime from its very beginning rejected the concept of the rule of law: the separation of judicial, executive and legislative authority did not exist, and courts could be and frequently were directly subject to instructions by the political authorities in the decisions they were to reach (Barghoorn & Remington 1986: chapter 9; Hazard 1980: chapter 11; Lipson 1968). At the time of the Great Terror (1937-38) the formal concept of 'law in a socialist society', embodied in the 1936 constitution, recognized two types of law, so-called 'prerogative law' to be used against dissidents by the security forces, and 'due process law' to be used for ordinary criminals and economic and social matters (Berman 1963: 46-65; Sakwa 1989: 120f). In the post-totalitarian period, the distinction between these two types of law gradually eroded, the security forces were brought under Party control, and discussions leading to the approval of the 1977 constitution led to the re-emergence of the notion of 'socialist (or Soviet) legality', although with little

clarity as to what it actually meant (Sharlet 1978: 36-44; Barghoorn & Remington 1986: 341-46). In practice, the court system remained underdeveloped: judges were poorly trained and paid relatively little; their low status is indicated by the fact that they were not even in charge of ensuring that correct procedures were followed in the court room, this duty falling to the prosecutor instead (Solomon & Foglesong 2000: 5-9).

In any important matter Party *diktat* trumped the law, and so underlined the continuing systemic impossibility of the rule of law under a communist regime (Ledeneva 1998; Shlapentokh 1989; Simis 1982; Voslensky 1984). Central directives to enforce laws could not ensure compliance where 'mutual involvement' made those managing particular resources the paymasters of those charged with surveillance over management. Covert influence over the implementation, not the direction of policy, became the speciality not of the poorer strata but of the educated elite (DiFranceisco & Gitelman 1984: 618f). Example effects, and the dysfunctional nature of the non-market command economy (see section II.D, below) eventually led to a situation where the exploitation of public position for private gain became not only all-pervasive, in the sense of being extremely common, but also necessary in many instances to the to the fulfilment of directives emanating from the state itself, and thus to the functioning of the entire society.

The term 'corruption' is inadequate to describe this situation. Rose (1994: Rose 2000d) coined the term 'anti-modern' to describe the Soviet state. The anti-modern state was characterized by rule-bending and rule-breaking as a matter of course, as necessary to get things done. An alternative concept is that of 'metacorruption, a system which is corrupt in its very essence' (Sakwa 2002b: 82). One can draw a conceptual distinction between a system which is anti-modern or 'metacorrupt' in the sense defined above and a system which is in principle modern but where in practice

corruption 'oils the wheels' of political and economic life. In the latter case, corruption may be systemic, in the sense that it is part of the way the system works in practice, but it is not 'built-in' or predetermined by the structure of the regime.

II.C.1.2 Systemic Corruption in Korea

Korea had a lot of 'common or garden' systemic corruption, but it was not anti-modern. Many of the instruments of policy influence over business activity were exercised by direct command on a discretionary basis rather than being defined by tight legal control (Jones & SaKong 1980: 119-27). Policies and laws were designed to promote growth rather than create a 'level playing field.' The evenness of their application was therefore tempered by the conjoined interests of the state and its personnel on the one hand and a limited range of large firms on the other (Amsden 1989: 63f; Jones & SaKong 1980: 66-77).

The systemic nature of corruption in authoritarian Korea has not been widely appreciated until recently. Jones and SaKong (1980: 132-40) argued that the secret of effectiveness of the Korean state bureaucracy lay in thorough implementation of policy. The developmental state was, in their view, 'hard' in Myrdal's (1968: 67) sense of being willing to impose obligations on society and to use compulsion to see them enforced. The Soviet state was also hard in this sense, but hardness is not the same as Weberian modernity. As mentioned in Chapter One, increasing awareness of the volume and extent of bribery and rent-seeking in authoritarian Korea has led a number of authors to seek a political explanation for policy outcomes, and such searches reveal an intense rent-seeking/bribe-demanding and collusive relationship between the state and business (Amsden 1989: 145f; Cho 1997; Cumings 1997: chapter 6; Kang 2002; Wedeman 1997). The narrowness of the elite, its homogeneity, the extreme centralization of power, and the prominence of rapid industrialization in the

state's ideology and core objectives produced a system that was at once systemically corrupt and effective in implementing a growth-oriented policy agenda (Khan 1998: 31f). Although there was a core of honest professionals in the Korean bureaucracy, the 'professional group' was not autonomous, and 'money politics' or the collusion of businessmen and mainly military politicians was the real driving force behind effective implementation (Kang 2002: 88ff).

II.C.1.3 Distinctive Consequences of the Anti-modern Party-State

Rational calculation in a modern state relies on accurate feedback in the form of prices, votes, and other forms of political and economic information moving from society to the state (Rose 1994; Rose 2000d). The Soviet regime promised the ultimate transformation of society into utopia, and routinely suppressed political and economic information suggesting that it wasn't working (Linden 1983). The economic system led to an accumulation of difficulties, including poor economic performance (see section II.D below), inability to maintain military parity with capitalist countries, public dissatisfaction with the standard of living and quality of life, and a loss of belief by officials in official ideology (Kornai 1992: 383-5). Because all of these problems were 'not supposed' to exist in a system which claimed to lead the way to utopia, suppression of political feedback was necessary to cover up for everything else. The Soviet system did incorporate some feedback mechanisms. For example, Soviet citizens wrote millions of letters to Party and state organizations and to the mass media in order to get redress for specific grievances and the authorities used these letters as a way of monitoring the population's concerns (Sakwa 1989: 167). However, a letter straying beyond the bounds of ideological orthodoxy could land its originator in trouble. The systematic suppression of unwelcome facts meant that Soviet officials, no matter what their personal qualities, found themselves leading a double life (Shlapentokh 1989; Simis 1982). They had to on the one hand mouth the Party line, and on the other manage as best

they could to produce real-world outcomes at least approximating the directives received from the centre. The comprehensive suppression of feedback made the Soviet system *in principle* incapable of establishing modern bureaucratic administration. Notwithstanding the restrictions on freedom imposed by the Korean authoritarian regime, it did not attempt anything like the comprehensive suppression of feedback of the Soviet system: there, prices were usually market prices, votes by and large expressed the preferences of voters, and there was a much freer market of ideas in officially tolerated public discourse (see sections II.D.1 and II.E.1 below).

Another consequential difference between the 'anti-modern' state and ordinary systemic corruption in authoritarian Korea concerns the nature of its beneficiaries. In Korea systemic corruption originated in consanguineous relationships, relationships by marriage as well as 'old school tie' and similar associations between the government and business elites (Cumings 1997: 317f). It was 'white collar' crime, with a sheen of respectability. In the USSR, there was certainly corruption based on horizontal ties within the elite, and pretensions to respectability, but in addition, one can identify a process by which a competing counter-elite, without privileged backgrounds, without higher education, began to buy its way into power and to corrupt the justice system and the police (Frisby 1998; Simis 1982: chapters 4,7). In simple terms, gangsters penetrated the Soviet state. OGPU, an early incarnation of the KGB, issued a directive in 1931 to prison camp administrators advising the employment of criminals to control political detainees (Frisby 1998: note 19, 43). Criminals who collaborated enjoyed the advantages of good connections to further their careers. The expansion of the black economy in the 1960s and 1970s provided incentives for the growth of protection rackets and extortion (Simis 1982: chapter 6). This created a network of partnerships amongst shadowy businessmen, criminals and officials. Penetration of the Soviet state by organized crime meant not just that laws

were being broken, but that criminal norms were replacing legitimate laws as the dominant mode of regulation of economic life. During the years of *perestroika*, the progressive loss of control by the Soviet state over political and economic life allowed quick-thinking officials to anticipate the advent of privately owned capital, and their attempts to convert political power into economic wealth hastened the regime's demise (Solnick 1998b).

II.C.2 *Privatization of Coercion versus Business-as-Usual*

Yeltsin's refusal to abide by the rulings of the Constitutional Court that his September 1993 decrees dissolving parliament were illegal represented not so much the laying down of a precedent, as conformity to established tradition. Yeltsin's opponents, by launching an armed insurrection, were scarcely more law-abiding. McFaul (1995: 226) and Shevtsova (1995: 9) have both argued that as the leader of a revolution, Yeltsin made a crucial failure of omission in not establishing a new constitutional basis for the rule of law in 1991 or early 1992. However, he faced constraints: the command economy had broken down, leading to fears of hunger in Russian cities, and the *nomenklatura* was in the process of 'stealing the state' using partial reforms of the Gorbachev era to prise off any fungible assets from state-owned industry (Solnick 1998b: 7). It was against this background that Yeltsin decided to privilege economic reform, and the measures Yeltsin took provoked a raw struggle for political power with parliament, with the Constitutional Court stuck in the middle. The power struggle led to what Linz and Stepan (1996: 397) called the 'mutual delegitimation' of the three branches of government.

While elites fought each other, the Russian state weakened, and criminal and corrupt elements in the state and in society at large became much more powerful (Klebnikov 2000; McCauley 2001; Nagy 2000). This was a complex process of economic and political change, but, concentrating

for the moment on its implications for the rule of law, one can discern that while a formal, legal basis for the rule of law was established by the adoption of the 1993 constitution, old operating procedures or 'unwritten rules' continued to apply, and some new unwritten rules came into effect (Ledeneva 2001). Salient among the new unwritten rules was the increased role of privately employed coercion concomitant with the decreased role of state coercion.

In the transitional period, everyone active in the economy or public life found that they needed 'protection' (Shlapentokh 1996)¹⁹ The source of protection could be a criminal gang, a group of moonlighting police officers or special agents, or a band of privately hired security guards. McCauley (2001: 225f) estimates that the gas monopoly Gazprom alone had a private army of 20,000. Usually those working in private security services had received special military or police training. Private justice or the settling of disputes by force became widespread. Shlapentokh (1996: 76) compares the new operating principles of Russian life established during transition to those of early feudalism in Western Europe. The state, with a weakened monopoly on the use of force, had found yet another imperfect substitute for the rule of law. It replaced Party *diktat* with protection in the criminal sense.

People needed protection not only because the state was anti-modern — it had been anti-modern for a long time — but because the transition had provoked a crime wave. Frisby (1998: 30ff, 46ff) presents some of the statistics. The official crime rate increased by 50 per cent from 1990 to 1992, stabilising at the level of around 2.7 million recorded crimes per year. Together with an increase in numbers, crimes became more serious. Between 1990 and 1993 there was a sixfold increase in the numbers of unidentified corpses found, and a 112 per cent increase in the number of

¹⁹ The Russian term for protection in this sense is *krysha*, literally meaning 'roof.'

crimes resulting in death (Frisby 1998: 31). Some increase in crime is to be expected during democratic transition, as the coercive forces of the state which are employed to repress political dissent presumably also deter criminals²⁰ However, Russia's level of serious crime is exceptional. In 1999 the homicide rate in Russia was more than ten times that in Korea (21 per 100,000 against 2 per 100,000) and the level of all categories of theft was about five times higher (1,089 as against 199 per 100,000) (Interpol 2002).

In Korea, corruption continued on a large scale at elite level and, as some evidence suggests, worsened after the introduction of free elections (Kang 2002: 160ff; Wedeman 1997: 467f). Kang (2002: 162f) provides estimates showing that quasi-taxes or 'voluntary' donations by business to the state in the period from 1994 to 1998 increased more than one-thousandfold by comparison with the period 1984 to 1987, while GDP in current prices increased in size only about fourfold over the first post-transitional decade (1987-1998). A number of scholars have attributed increased corruption to the combination of increased economic regulation and political decentralization with certain aspects of 'cultural continuity,' namely the habit of buying and selling influence and personalized concepts of power (Kang 2002: 159ff; Kong 2000: 203f; Mo & Moon 1998; Steinberg 1995: 395-402). Political decentralization and greater regulation both increase the number of persons requiring bribes to get something done.

II.C.3 Towards the Rule of Law After Constitutional Change?

An attempt to arrive at an independent measure of the degree of corruption in a country is the Transparency International (TI) Corruption


²⁰ When asked in the 1994 Korea Democracy Barometer survey to identify the best and the worst regimes at maintaining law and order, 62 per cent of respondents identified the Chun government as better than the Roh Tae-woo or Kim Young-sam governments.

Perception Index. TI compile the index on the basis of surveys of business people and others having regular dealings with the country concerned (for details see www.transparency.org). Although the index is not available for Korea and Russia in the undemocratic and transitional periods²¹, the index scores for both Korea and Russia are available from 1996 (Figure II.3). Because of changes in the methodology, the identification of a trend over time is problematic, but within years the figures are comparable. The index shows that Korea is in the middle range of countries as far as corruption is concerned, while Russia is currently one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

Another indicator of the extent of the rule of law in democracies is the willingness of governments to fight fair election campaigns in accordance with election laws. Russia routinely runs national election campaigns in which government-sponsored media outlets, which dominate national television, offer biased coverage, and officials deploy state resources to campaign for incumbents (OSCE/ODIHR 1996b; OSCE/ODIHR 1996a; OSCE/ODIHR 2000a; OSCE/ODIHR 2000b; White, et al. 1997: chapters 10, 12). A particular feature of the 1995 and 1996 elections was the more or less open flouting by the government-sponsored political party or candidate of campaign finance laws. Korea has experienced similar problems in the past (Kang 2002: 160ff; Park 1995: 169-72). Kang (2002: 160) presents data on total election expenditures from 1981 to 1997. In the 1981 and 1985 National Assembly elections, Korean political parties spent around \$300 million. In the 1988 National Assembly election they spent nearly \$600 million, and in each of the 1992 and 1996 National Assembly elections \$1.3 billion. Kim Young-sam's real-names decree, which made it impossible to

²¹ Mauro (1995: 708-10) reports a Business International survey of corruption in more than 60 countries in 1980-83 which gave Korea a score of 5.75 on a scale from one to ten, where ten is least corrupt. This placed it on a par with Brazil and Venezuela. The index did not include Russia or the USSR.

Figure II.3 Corruption Perception Scores for Korea and Russia



Source: CeGe Göttingen University & Transparency International, 2002, Internet Centre for Corruption Research, <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwww>. 28 August. Accessed 19 March 2003.

hold a bank account under an assumed name, made use of the corrupt campaign practices more difficult²² (Lee 2000: 104f). However, like the previous president, Kim Young-sam himself ended his term under suspicion of accepting improper political donations. Prior to succeeding Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung admitted that his nephew, a bank executive, had hidden secret funds for him, and prosecutors indicated that he could face charges (NAPSNET 1997). In sum, corrupt campaign practices are entrenched in both Korea and Russia.

²² Until Kim Young-sam banned the practice in 1993, it was permitted in Korea to hold a bank account under a false or borrowed name. Wedeman (1997: 477f) estimates that Koreans held around \$3 billion in such accounts at that time, much of it belonging to ordinary people seeking to evade taxes.

In Korea vigorous prosecution of corruption has targeted not only those associated with the previous regime, but also associates and relatives of incumbent officials, including presidents (Clifford 1998: chapters 21, 24; West 1997). Big political cases seem to be capable of acquiring an independent life of their own regardless of who is in power, as prosecutors respond to pressure from the media and public opinion. In Russia the prosecutor's office and judiciary are not independent: on occasions, bribes and instructions from above persuade them to use their powers selectively against the president's, or, at regional level, the governor's political opponents (Smith 1999: 109-13). Other factors contributing to judicial dependence are insecurity of tenure for judges, fears for their personal safety and inadequate funding of the court system (Solomon & Foglesong 2000: chapter 2). An instructive contrast is between the way in which scandals involving the sons of Korean presidents have played out and the Yeltsin regime's reaction to various investigations by Prosecutor General Skuratov. During the last year of Kim Young-sam's period in office, prosecution of the president's second son for accepting bribes and political donations from the Hanbo Steel Corporation led to conviction and a jail sentence. In similar circumstances five years later, two of the succeeding president Kim Dae-jung's sons landed in jail to await trial for bribery, influence peddling and tax evasion. Skuratov's investigations related to alleged money-laundering, misuse of IMF funds and bribery for awarding contracts to refurbish parts of the Kremlin. Having uncovered an unusual sale of hard currency by the Central Bank to commercial banks on the eve of the August 1998 crash, the investigation foundered when the Kremlin launched a campaign of sexual blackmail and intimidation against the prosecutor, eventually having him removed from his post (Shulakovskaya 1999; Remnick 2000: 41). While one cannot generalize from high-profile cases, these incidents typify what appears to be the much greater political dependency of the prosecutor's office in Russia.

The Constitutional Court, as the interpreter of the country's basic law, is the last line of defence of the hierarchy of norms based on the constitution. Reconstituted in early 1995 with a complement of judges acceptable to Yeltsin, the Russian Constitutional Court has demonstrated a certain amount of independence (Solomon & Foglesong 2000: 76-80). It ruled against the presidential administration in, for example, the matter of whether Yeltsin should be allowed to contest another election after 1996. It ruled against the Moscow City authorities in declaring illegal the system of permits giving established Muscovite citizens the right to stay in Moscow and excluding others (Constitution Watch 1998: 33). However, the fact that the city ignored the ruling, and the federal authorities did nothing to intervene, is illustrative of the Court's weakness. The Korean Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, which share powers of constitutional review, have faced no such direct challenges to their authority.

The prosecution of former presidents for crimes committed in office is an ambivalent indicator of the rule of law: while it demonstrates that punishment follows crime, the elite and public alike may perceive it as an act of political vengeance. The prosecution and conviction of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo during the Kim Young-sam presidency for their roles in the 1979 coup, the Kwangju massacre and corruption in office was popular with the Korean public (Shin 1999: 204). Although Kim Dae-jung liberated the two former presidents when he came to power, they still had to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in fines, corresponding to the amounts they had received in bribes whilst in office (Shim & Sherry 1995; West 1997: 137). No Russian regime has attempted to prosecute former leaders for crimes committed in the past. One of Putin's first acts when he came to power was to sign a decree giving Yeltsin and every future president, but not their family or close associates, immunity from prosecution, search or interrogation²³

²³ A subsequent law passed in February 2001 derogated immunity where the former president faced charges relating to a serious crime such as rape,

(Constitution Watch 2000: 36). The Korean solution: public trial and conviction followed by a pardon, demonstrates a notion of justice, while the Russian solution demonstrates a desire for stability at elite level.

II.D Political Economy

The way the economy works, and in whose interests, is an important part of the legacy of an undemocratic regime because it determines the distribution of economic resources. The latter affects not only the financial resources available to different parties in an election campaign, but also the strength of various lobby groups, the range of policies which political elites consider open to the state, and, under market conditions, ownership and control of the mass media.

II.D.1 Political Economy Under Undemocratic Regimes

In Chapter One the author described the basic features of the non-market command economy which existed in the Soviet Union and the market economy of the Korean developmental state. Rather than repeating those descriptions here, it makes more sense to recap the main points of contrast between the Korean and Soviet political economies in summarized form, and then to discuss the political legacy of these different economic systems.

II.D.1.1 Developmental State versus Non-Market Command Economy

The essential difference between market and non-market economies is in the degree of economic freedom they allow (Weber 1966: 212ff). The party-state restricted economic freedom through near total state ownership of most capital goods and the use of central planning rather than the price mechanism as a means of allocating resources (Kornai 1992). The twin

murder or large-scale theft.

institutions of dominant state ownership and central planning meant that bureaucratic coordination of supply and demand predominated, and this carried with it great disadvantage in the accuracy and timing of economic information (Hayek 1935), and engendered chronic shortages in the supply of most consumer goods (Kornai 1992: chapter 11). Aside from shortages the Soviet economic system suffered from endemic inefficiency in the use of resources, characteristic of its extensive pattern of development, distorted incentive structures for workers and managers, isolation from the international market economy, and, as a consequence of the former, technological backwardness (Kornai 1992; Nove 1987). Shortages and the inefficiency of bureaucratic coordination mechanisms conditioned the emergence of a substantial 'second economy' of illegal or quasi-legal exchanges (Grossman 1977; Katsenelinboigen 1977).

The Korean developmental state allowed greater economic freedom because the state did not attempt to assume comprehensive ownership of capital goods, but rather left most enterprises in private hands, although state-owned enterprises played an important role in the overall strategy of development (Jones & SaKong 1980: chapter 5; SaKong 1993: 27-30). The basic role of the state in the Korean model was not that of owner-manager but that of banker: the state allocated finance obtained from overseas aid and foreign borrowing to private Korean firms able and willing to fulfil the government's developmental plans (Woo 1991). Korea received substantial American aid, being, between 1946 and 1980, the third largest recipient of American aid after Vietnam and Israel, and this was virtually Korea's only source of foreign investment during the 1950s (Kang 2002: 43; SaKong 1993: 96-102). By the early 1960s aid flows were declining, but Korea found a new source of investment in foreign borrowing (SaKong 1993: 102-14). In order to 'guide' development, the state provided massive low interest loans to a limited number of large and politically well-connected Korean firms (Amsden 1989: 72-6; SaKong 1993: 30-7; Woo 1991). The large firms made

it their goal to expand as quickly as possible, acquire the status of being 'too big to fail', and thereby secure the promise of further loans (Kang 2002: 107-16; Kong 2000: 89f). In return, politicians received kickbacks from firms (Amsden 1989: 146f; Kang 2002: 98-106; Woo 1991: 9f). Expansion without regard to profitability generated a substantial foreign debt burden and vulnerability to downturns in the international market, but, despite periodic crises, the Korean government was able to respond flexibly to changing conditions (Amsden 1989: 93-106; SaKong 1993: chapter 3). The result was rapid expansion into a large number of markets, such as car production, ship building, steel production and electronics, in which Korea effectively bought market share. Although the state could 'get tough' with individual firms who fell from favour, by arresting their owners or putting them out of business, firms could influence individual officials and politicians directly through bribes, or indirectly by pointing to the destabilizing effect their failure would have on the economy (Kang 2002: 112ff). Thus, in Korea the state and business as a whole were mutually dependent, and their close relationship is an important part of the explanation of Korean growth.

Although state-driven development created certain economic phenomena associated with non-market command economies, such as quantity drives, soft budget constraints and labour hoarding, the extent of similarity of the Korean with the Soviet model should not be overstated. Koreans made their economic decisions in an environment where market coordination of supply and demand predominated, and the most important industries oriented themselves towards export competition in the international market economy. In the Soviet Union, bureaucratic coordination predominated. Korea pursued an intensive pattern of development, making efficient use of an initially poor stock of natural resources, rapidly adopting foreign technology, and adapting skilfully to changing international conditions. The Soviet Union is a textbook case of an extensive pattern of development, growth resulting from the mobilization of

labour and natural resources, and not from their more efficient use (Kornai 1992: 180-6).

As regards the measurement of overall development achievements, official statistics based on data from the Soviet period are unreliable and not fully comparable with data from market economies. Although Soviet managers had incentives to over-report production, so too did they have incentives to under-report, the surplus being sold in the second economy (Grossman 1977: 30f). Kang (2002: 109) claims that over-reporting of production was common in Korea, too²⁴, although the extent of inaccuracy is unlikely to be as great as in the Soviet statistics. In the absence of any other overall indicator of development achievements, one may turn to GDP figures for a rough comparative indicator of development achievements. In 1967 Korean GDP per capita at then current prices was only \$159 against \$1,184 for the USSR (World Economic Survey 1971: 178-9). By 1987, Korea and the Russian part of the USSR were near parity in levels of development: GDP per capita measured in then current prices was around \$3,300 for Korea and \$3,200 for Russia²⁵ (World Bank 1998). Thus, after two decades, Korean GDP per capita was more than 20 times its 1967 level, whereas the Russian part of the USSR had increased its GDP per capita by a factor of less than three. More concrete indicators of development are available to underline this point. For example, in 1979 Korea had 61 telephone mainlines per thousand people, whereas Russia was slightly ahead with 67 mainlines

²⁴ Kang (2002: 109)'s informant, who worked in the chairman's office of one of Korea's largest firms, claimed that numbers for the World Bank, Bank of Korea and *Fortune* magazine were routinely inflated.

²⁵ Using purchasing power parities (PPP) measure to measure GDP per capita makes little difference to the numbers: in 1987, Korea's GDP per capita in PPP was \$5,791 and Russia's was \$5,709 (World Bank 1998). Purchasing power parity statistics come with a caveat: shortages of high quality goods in the USSR imposed a supply-side limit on the purchasing power of roubles.

per thousand (World Bank 1998). By 1989, Korea had increased its provision more than four and a half times to 278 mainlines per thousand, whereas Russia had only 133 mainlines per thousand, meaning it had not quite doubled its provision over a decade. Throughout the 1980s, the mortality rate in Korea remained stable at around 6.2 deaths per thousand; the Soviet mortality rate climbed from 9.3 in 1975 to 9.7 in 1978 and 10.1 by 1988 (WHO 1978: 14; WHO 1988: 76; WHO 1991: 101f).

II.D.1.2 Political Consequences of Contrasting Economic Systems

The first political consequence of contrasting economic systems concerns the general morale of the labour force in each country. The distorted incentive structures of the non-market command economy were corrosive of labour ethics (Shlapentokh 1989: 52f). A comprehensive if not entirely satisfactory state welfare system provided a cushion for lazy, dishonest or incompetent workers. The Soviet state tried to impose labour discipline using criminal sanctions for poor performance and through laws imposing responsibility for achievement on teams of employees rather than on individuals (Barghoorn & Remington 1986: 350f). But imprisonment for poor performance was too drastic a measure to be used on an everyday basis, and the imposition of collective responsibility seems perversely designed to crush individual initiative. A general demoralization of the labour force was one unintentional output of the non-market command economy.

By contrast, the Korean combination of minimal state welfare and individual responsibility for work quality, combined with a tradition of long working hours, provided a framework in which labour discipline was tight. Korean labour was cheap by comparison with industrialized countries, and in some industries, such as textiles, electronics and footwear, Korean firms won market share by subjecting their workers to sweat shop conditions (Cumings 1997: 332ff; Lie 1998: 165-6). The upside for low-paid Korean workers was that, over time, as the economy grew and demand for skilled workers

increased, there was an increase in real wages across the board (Amsden 1989: 205ff). Across the whole economy, intensive development created an atmosphere of collective national achievement and pride.

The second political consequence of the two countries' respective economic systems is related to the first but concerns more the interests of different sections of society than questions of morale. Although the combination of state-driven development and heavily leveraged private companies made ownership of Korea's new industries somewhat murky at least to begin with, the creation and allocation of property rights was a clear consequence of economic development (Woo 1991: chapter 6). The industrialized economy of Korea also supported the creation of new jobs for educated professionals and managers of various kinds, as well as for skilled workers, and these groups fed into an emergent middle class (Han 1989: 277). As regards the working class, the author has already mentioned that political expression of working class interests was severely repressed by the authoritarian regime, but nevertheless an independent trade union movement emerged, and eventually forged an alliance with the new middle class to press for political change, including both political and economic and social rights (Koo 2002). The emergence of distinct social classes with convergent interests in political reform was one consequence of rapid economic development under market conditions.

Concerning Russia, there is some disagreement over the extent to which social stratification in the Soviet Union produced 'classes' with distinctive interests. Hough (1990: 100f) argued that perestroika represented a 'middle class' revolution as bureaucrats and professionals expected to benefit from perestroika and therefore supported it. Hahn (1993: 319f) hypothesized that education resulting from economic development facilitated perestroika. However, Fish (1995: 99f) argued that 'The Brezhnev-era policy of *uravnenie* (equalization) of wages, combined with the long-standing ban

on private property and entrepreneurship and near-total state control over employment, production, distribution, and services severely limited the social-structural effects of economic changes...[Moreover] neither the black market nor the corruption and privileges of the apparat induced genuine class formation and differentiation.' This interpretation is supported by Fleron and Ahl (1998) in a review of survey-based studies of Russian democratization²⁶. Shlapentokh (1989: 217f) asserts that Soviet society was divided into only two classes —'superiors and subordinates'. Authors searching for 'class consciousness' amongst the least well-paid strata in Soviet society find that, despite the inculcation of communist ideology, these groups had very little sense of themselves as 'classes' with clear political interests (Filtzer 1994: 115-22; Ost 1995). This is not to say that Soviet society was a homogenous mass. There were social groups differentiated by occupation, income and status, including skilled and unskilled workers, technological and scientific professionals, an urban intelligentsia, a rural intelligentsia, collective and state farm workers, and the nomenklatura. However, the status of each group did not rest on the firm foundation of well recognized property rights, but rather on their continuing control over specific resources formally belonging to the party-state. Hence, the non-market command economy vested different social groups with potentially conflicting stakes in economic and political reform. In the Soviet Union, the denial of private property rights created what one might call *latent or potential* conflict amongst social groups over the possession and control over major economic resources.

The third political consequence of contrasting economic systems concerns the degree of integration of the two countries into the mainstream of the international market economy. The Soviet Union pursued an autarkic course, making international economic relations subordinate to its political

²⁶ In Chapter Four of this thesis the extent to which social structure influences political attitudes in today's Russia comes under close scrutiny.

objective of creating a socialist commonwealth (Nove 1987: 278ff). Between 1973 and 1981 between 42 and 47 per cent of the value of the USSR's exports went to Eastern Europe, in most of which trade was dominated by the Soviet-controlled COMECON bloc (Yearbook 1984: 1023). Between 14 and 22 per cent of Soviet exports went to the European Community, while one per cent or less went to North America. Even though the Korean state protected domestic markets and prevented foreign capital from penetrating Korea, the Korean economic system had to be flexible because it was geared toward exports (Amsden 1989: 70ff; SaKong 1993: 37-43; Song 1990: chapter 6). In the 1970s between 40 to 60 per cent of Korea's exports went to the European Community or North America, and between 60 and 80 per cent went to these two developed regions plus Japan (Yearbook 1984: 582). Korea therefore became an important trading partner of the most developed industrial economies whereas the Soviet Union remained relatively isolated from the international market economy.

The fourth political consequence of contrasting economic systems is closely related to the third, but more explicitly geopolitical. The Soviet Union's obsessive pursuit of military competition with the United States imposed enormous costs on its own population. The USSR also needed a large army because of its extensive land borders, its domination of satellite states in Eastern Europe, and because of its ambition to project its power on other continents. South Korea also faced a military challenge, since it had good reason to fear a second invasion by North Korea, and because Japan, as a loser of the Second World War, was no longer in a position to guarantee regional security. Because there was a continuing debate in the United States about the rationale of its military presence in Northeast Asia (Cumings 1997: 359; Kang 2002: 37), the Republic of Korea sought to build up its own military capability. By the late 1980s South Korea was spending about six per cent of its GNP on defence annually, and had the fifth largest standing army in the world, with over 600,000 men (Song 1990: 43). The

Soviet Union in 1989 had a standing army of over four million men²⁷, but it was spending between 12 and 18 per cent of its GNP on defence, excluding indirect costs such as subsidies to defence-related industries and opportunity costs for civilian industries²⁸ (SIPRI 1991: 142, 145). Korea's market economy was thus better able to afford military expenditure than the Soviet Union's non-market command economy. Although the Soviet leadership had no idea where perestroika would lead them, one intended purpose of perestroika was to enhance the Soviet Union's strategic position by improving the functioning of its economy (Gorbachev 1987: 45-9).

In sum, the contrast between the Soviet economic system and that of the Korean developmental state reveals not only the inherent economic disadvantages of the former but also its negative and unintended political consequences. These weakened the Soviet party-state internally, through the low morale of the Soviet labour force, and the inherent potential for conflict amongst different Soviet social groups over control of major economic resources, resulting from the denial of property rights. In Korea, by contrast, the fast-growth economy engendered a national 'can-do' spirit against the background of which a configuration of social forces emerged with convergent interests in political reform. The deficiencies of the command economy also weakened the Soviet party-state externally, by isolating it from the mainstream of international economic relations, and by making the maintenance of adequate military strength extremely costly. Korea by contrast increasingly integrated with the global economy as an industrial power, and at the same time spent far less of its resources on the

²⁷ Standing armies in each country were similar in size on a per head of population basis: each had about 1,400 soldiers per hundred thousand people.

²⁸ If indirect costs were factored in, according to the SIPRI source cited above, the proportion of GNP spent on defence would be over 20 per cent. See Jacobsen (1987) for more detail.

military, despite maintaining an army almost as large as the Soviet one in proportion to its total population.

II.D.2 Political Economy During Transition

II.D.2.1 Korea's Economic Adjustments of the 1980s

Even before its transition, Korea had begun to modify the developmental state to take account of international and domestic political and economic pressures. By the late 1980s, the Korean state began to transform itself, as Japan had done in the 1970s, into a 'limited developmental' state, characterized by greater reliance on markets than on planning, a re-orientation to the regulation and stabilization rather than the development of the economy, and greater openness to foreign trade and investment (Kim, E.M. 1993: 242-3; Kim, E.M. 1997: chapter 6; Kong 2000: chapter 3; SaKong 1993: chapter 4). An eruption of trade union activity accompanied political transition in Korea as the policy of mandatory government arbitration in labour disputes came to an end: there were more than 3,600 strikes and lockouts in 1987 compared to only 276 the previous year; a high level of trade union activity continued until 1990, and there was consequent upward pressure on wages (Kim, E.M. 1997: 205ff).

Nevertheless, despite partial liberalization, economic restructuring to take account of a changing international environment, and the rise of union power, the Korean state was reluctant to change the basic features of an economic model which had worked well. The strategic role of the state in guiding and stimulating investment, its collusive relationship with business, and the policy orientation towards growth continued as before. What had changed, by the time of political transition, was that the relative power of the state to that of big business had declined (Amsden 1989: Chapter 5; Kong 2000: chapter 3). The rising power of Korea's big firms can be seen in the combined sales of the ten biggest as a percentage of GNP: in 1974 the sales

of the top ten accounted for 15 percent of GNP, but by 1984 they accounted for 67 percent (Amsden 1989: Table 5.1, 116). It can also be seen in the concentration of market share by a few big firms in various branches of industry (Amsden 1989: 120-25; Kong 2000: 85-8; SaKong 1993: 61-4). Finally, it can be seen in failed attempts by the government to force the big firms to concentrate on core industries rather than diversifying into more and more new areas (Kang 2002: 109ff; Kong 2000: 90ff). However, even during political transition itself, the basic outlines of the developmental model remained much as they had been in the previous two decades.

Political transition did not affect Korea's economic performance during the period of constitutional change: growth in 1987 and 1988 was around 12 per cent, the same as in 1986, against an average for the previous seven years of around six per cent (Song 1990: 60-1). In part, this strong performance reflected the continuing effectiveness of previous policies and of pragmatic adaptability. In part, it reflected favourable factors in the international environment, known in Korea as 'the three blessings': low oil prices, a high exchange rate value of the Yen, and low international interest rates (Kong 2000: 101f).

II.D.2.2 Russia's Revolutionary Transformation

During the period of constitutional change, Russia changed the fundamentals of its economic system, rapidly expanding in a few years private ownership of the means of production, market coordination of supply and demand and the convertibility of its currency. These changes may properly be described as revolutionary, and it is worth reviewing them briefly.

The new economic system did not replace a functioning non-market command economy, but rather a command economy which was in the process of collapse. In the *perestroika* era, the Soviet party-state attempted to introduce new forms of ownership, revitalize the labour market, de-

monopolize foreign trade and preserve the central planning system by introducing a system of state orders in place of output targets (Brown 1996: chapter 5; Rutland 1992: 209-14; Nove 1992: chapter 14). Growth in 'net material product', the Soviet equivalent of GDP, averaged one per cent per year in 1987 and 1988, against an average growth of around 2 per cent from 1981 to 1985 (Rutland 1992: 202). After 1988, the system of central planning broke down. As the socialist system collapsed, first across the other former COMECON countries, then throughout the USSR, the Russian economy suffered severe disruptions.

When Yeltsin stepped into the power vacuum in 1991, he placed in nominal charge of economic policy a group of reformers, led by Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, whose economic programme mirrored the Western consensus on liberalization, stabilization and privatization. Liberalization was intended to free the entrepreneurial energies of Russian citizens long repressed by the restrictions of a command economy. Stabilization was intended to create a predictable economic environment by bringing down inflation and government deficits. Privatization entailed the creation for the first time in seventy years of legitimate private titles. These three processes constituted the main dimensions of economic transformation in Russia.

Russian liberalization was partial, as monopolistic and bureaucratic interests fought to retain access to bribes and excess profits derived from over-regulation (Åslund 2002: chapter 5). The government freed consumer prices in January 1992, and these prices immediately soared. However, commodities including fuel remained subject to price controls, as the controls benefited the managers of commodity-exporting enterprises. A typical pattern was for enterprise managers with links to the government to use their personal accounts to buy domestically at controlled prices and sell abroad at market prices (Åslund 2002: 107, 172). The Russian national and regional governments continued to impose restrictions on all kinds of economic

activity, with the aim of extracting bribes from would-be entrepreneurs and shielding existing players from new competition.

High inflation is to be expected during the transition from a command economy to a market economy, for two main reasons (de Melo, et al. 1996: 401-2). Firstly, inflationary expectations and a flight from domestic financial assets are fuelled by the general sense of economic insecurity created by the transformation. Secondly, the freeing of previously controlled prices allows sellers take advantage of pent-up demand, especially if there is a so-called 'overhang' of unspent money saved under the command economy, as there was in the Soviet Union, since, during its last years, wages were allowed to increase faster than economic growth. Upward pressure on prices increases if the transitional monetary authorities attempt to maintain former levels of production by granting large credits to enterprises and banks. This can produce high inflation over several years, as happened in Russia and a number of other countries which adopted a piecemeal approach to economic reform (de Melo, et al. 1996: 415ff; Hedlund 1999: chapter 5). Where the economic system is not in transformation, as in Korea, inflation is much easier to control through fiscal and monetary policy.

Russia made an attempt at introducing stabilization policies in 1992, but failed because the Russian financial authorities remained under the control of anti-reformist officials (Åslund 2002: 249ff). They pursued lax monetary and fiscal policies and continued to offer cheap credits to enterprises, whose managers transferred these benefits to themselves (Åslund 2002: 237; Hedlund 1999: 162-65). The continuation of the rouble zone encouraged CIS central banks to compete in the issuing of credits (Åslund 2002: 204ff). The combined result was that inflation in Russia reached 1,526 per cent in 1992 before falling to 875 per cent in 1993 (EBRD 2001: 61). Russia's botched stabilization benefited a narrow section of the elite, while imposing severe costs on ordinary people.

Privatization became the most controversial element of the market reform blueprint, since it involved the redistribution of wealth in a concrete, easily observable form. During the latter stages of Gorbachev's period in office, a process began known as 'spontaneous privatization' (Boycko, et al. 1995: 60). State enterprise managers used a variety of quasi-legal and illegal schemes to divert cash and other assets from enterprises still formally under state ownership to private entities owned by the managers. The Yeltsin administration pushed through a programme of 'mass privatization' between 1992 and 1994. The most frequently adopted route to private ownership under this programme was for managers and workers to purchase by closed subscription a controlling stake in each firm at prices far below their market value, while the state auctioned the remaining stock (Åslund 1995b: 225ff; Boycko, et al. 1995: 78ff). Workers were only allowed to buy shares as individuals, not as a collective, and they were free to sell them at any time. For a nominal fee, the general public also received vouchers which they could sell, invest in voucher funds or use to purchase shares at auctions. Largely as a result of this programme, between 1992 and 1994 the Russian private sector's share in GDP jumped from 25 per cent to 50 per cent (EBRD 2001: 188).

Critics charge that the mass privatization programme swindled the public (Freeland 2000: chapter 3; Nelson & Kuzes 1995: 46ff; Reddaway & Glinski 2001: 248ff). Since price liberalization placed household budgets under stress, ordinary Russians had strong incentives to sell their vouchers cheaply. Most of the voucher funds did not pay any dividends, and some of them were pyramid schemes. Voucher auctions were organized at enterprise and local levels, which 'gave local officials some ability to discourage unwanted investors' (Boycko, et al. 1995: 84). Reddaway and Glinski (2001: 248) claim that fewer than 14 per cent of enterprises were privatized by public auction or public tender. Aside from grounds of fairness, critics also charge that mass privatization did not create effective property

owners, since the institutional environment, including the legal system and mechanisms of corporate governance, did not provide incentives to Russian managers to rationalize production and maximize profit (Oding 2001).

Åslund (Åslund 2002: 297ff) acknowledges these difficulties, but insists that the real choice Russia faced was to privatize in a 'quick and dirty' way on a large scale, or continue with dominant state ownership, which would have suppressed the emergence of markets.

The economic transformation in Russia, contrasted with a more gentle evolution in Korea, affected levels of growth and well-being. From 1992 to 1994 official GDP contracted by around 12 per cent per year (Goskomstat 1999: 31; EBRD 2001: 59). While there are good reasons to doubt the accuracy of Russian GDP statistics during the transitional period, and, as already mentioned, even better reasons to doubt the accuracy and comparability of Soviet-era statistics, the fact that there was a substantial decline in output during transition is not disputed. The transitional Russian political economic system discouraged domestic capital accumulation and encouraged capital flight. The comparison of household incomes with capital investment illustrates that enterprises did not invest the extra rents from transition in the domestic economy (Khanin & Suslov 1999: 1437-439). Real money incomes fell by almost half in 1992 to only 60 per cent of their 1990 level, rose by 10 per cent in 1993 and seven per cent in 1994, but in 1995 fell again by 12 per cent (*ibid.*, Table 3, 1438). Capital investment fell by 40 per cent in 1992, by 12 per cent in 1993, by 14 per cent in 1994, and by 10 per cent in 1995 (*ibid.*, Table 4, 1439). Export of hard currency was continuous. Because of the fear of having their new wealth confiscated or stolen in Russia, the instinct of new rich Russians was to invest personal wealth abroad. Transition thus brought Russia closer to unrestrained capital-exporting kleptocracy, or looting (Klebnikov 2000; McCauley 2001; Nagy 2000; Reddaway & Glinski 2001). Wedeman's (1997: 462-69) classic example of this type of political economic system is Mobutu's Zaire, now

Congo. Russia in transition found itself in the unenviable position of being compared to the most extreme historical examples of looting. The most unambiguous indicator of the stress which this manner of transformation imposed on the population is the Russian mortality rate, which rose from 11.4 deaths per thousand in 1991 to 15.6 deaths per thousand in 1994 (UNICEF 2002: 62).

Russian capital flight contrasts strongly with the Korean situation under its prior undemocratic regime, during transition and under the current regime. As discussed in Chapter One, whether corruption helps or harms a country's development varies according to a variety of factors, including the objectives and ideologies of participants in patron-client networks, the number of clients, whether they are culturally heterogenous, the institutions in which patrons and clients deal with one another and their relative power (Khan 1998: 22-7; Kang 2002; Leff 1989; Nye 1989). Accordingly, corruption can vary in whether or not it promotes capital accumulation and whether or not it promotes capital flight. The Korean political economic system created by Park Chung-hee was a rent-seeking/bribe-demanding one which nevertheless promoted domestic capital accumulation and discouraged capital flight²⁹. As already mentioned, cheap government credits encouraged productive investments in the formal economy. Also, 'black' money stayed in the country because corrupt officials and rent-seeking businessmen could invest their personal wealth in informal capital markets, known in Korea as 'the curb,' where interest rates were high (Kong 2000: Table 2.1, 30f; Wedeman 1997: 468f). These factors contributed to the promotion of investment in Korea.

²⁹ Amsden (1989: 17) mentions a Korean law passed in the 1960s imposing a minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of death for the illegal overseas transfer of one million dollars or more.

II.D.3 Political Economy After Constitutional Change

The legacy of contrasting economic systems under their respective undemocratic regimes and the way in which these economic systems changed or failed to change during political transition mean that today the seriousness of each country's economic difficulties differs by an order of magnitude. In the wake of its failed experiments with central planning and partial reforms, Russia has a damaged infrastructure: industrial capital, human capital and scientific-technological capacity have all significantly deteriorated since the Soviet era. Korea's infrastructure, by contrast, benefited from continuous fast growth throughout most of the past three decades. By 1996, when Korea joined the OECD, its GDP per capita in purchasing power parities had reached about US\$10,000 at 1987 prices. The equivalent figure for Russia was about US\$3,200 (World Bank 1998). In the seven years from 1995 to 2001, real GDP expanded in Russia by an average of just 1 per cent annually (EBRD 2001: 59), whereas in Korea over the same period real GDP expanded by an average of five per cent annually (OECD 2001: 231).

II.D.3.1 Economic Freedom

Liberalization has been a slow process in Russia after constitutional change. Domestic prices for major export commodities have been subject to heavy regulation (Åslund 2002: 172). Gazprom, a partially privatized former Soviet ministry whose chairman, Viktor Chernomyrdin, became prime minister in December 1992, has long enjoyed a monopoly on the production, distribution and export of domestic fuel. Another monopoly, Unified Energy Systems, now chaired by Anatoly Chubais, has controlled the market for electricity. Domestic prices for both gas and electricity have been far below world prices, and both companies have been deeply embedded in a web of subsidies, non-payments and political corruption (Åslund 2002: 184-5). There has been some recent progress with the liberalization of the Russian

economy, for instance, government proposals on trade reform, restructuring of Unified Energy systems and even some discussions about reforming Gazprom (EBRD 2001: 186-7). Nevertheless, this is slow progress: it was not until the summer of 2002 that the European Commission and the US Commerce Department officially recognized Russia as a market economy.

The Heritage Foundation has developed a global index of economic freedom. It is computed as an average of ten criteria of economic liberalization ranging from one (most freedom) to five (least freedom)³⁰. In 1999, the countries with greatest economic freedom, Singapore and Hong Kong both had scores of 1.3, whereas command economies such as North Korea and Cuba scored five. By the same measure, Korea had an economic freedom score of 2.4, and Russia had an economic freedom score of 3.5. Korea was in the top fifth of countries on economic freedom, on a par with the median country in the European Union, Denmark. Russia was on the borderline of the bottom third of countries, with more economic freedom than most of the former Soviet Union, but less than former COMECON partners in Central and Eastern Europe³¹.

II.D.3.2 Stabilization and Privatization

Through a combination of fiscal and monetary measures, as well as the breakup of the rouble zone, Russia achieved a degree of financial stabilization in about 1995 (Åslund 1995a: 212), but nevertheless remained far less stable than Korea. Inflation in Russia fell to 311 per cent in 1994

³⁰ See the section on generic measures of regime performance in Chapter Five for more discussion about this index, including its correlations with other similar indices measuring progress with economic transformation in post-communist Europe.

³¹ Systematic comparison with other post-communist states undergoing democratization appears in Chapter Five.

and 198 per cent in 1995. Between 1996 and 2001 it remained in double digits, ranging from 15 per cent in 1997 to 86 per cent in 1999, with a mean annual rate of 36 per cent (EBRD 2001: 61). By contrast in Korea inflation in the 1990s ranged from just one per cent in 1999 to 9 per cent in 1990 and 1991, the mean annual rate being six per cent (OECD 2001: 246). In terms of implementing a sound fiscal policy, Russia has structural disadvantages. Whereas the Korean state has little difficulty collecting taxes and spending its budget in accordance with centrally-determined policy, the Russian state faces chronic financial problems due to its double inability firstly to extract taxes from powerful business organizations and individuals and secondly to control how the money is spent by the state apparatus. The value of the welfare benefits provided by the state has eroded to the point where they no longer meet the needs of their recipients, but the old system of universal entitlements continues to operate, and this also affects financial stability (Cook 2002).

New controversy about privatization broke out after Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 presidential election. Under the so-called 'loans for shares' scheme, designed by Anatoly Chubais, fifteen companies, including three oil companies and one metal company worth around 2 billion dollars each, passed into private hands through closed auctions; the winners paying the Treasury in the form of loans (Åslund 2002: 299). Critics charged that the winners were pre-determined, the assets were undervalued, and the government itself provided some of the funds used to pay for them (Reddaway & Glinski 2001: 480; Freeland 2000). While acknowledging that these deals 'set a bad example,' Åslund (2002: 298-9) claims that 'the outcry was caused by the involvement of noble privatizer Chubais.' He also points out that these were not the worst scandals in Russia, the privatization of a majority stake in gas monopoly Gazprom, for example, being a much larger transaction of the early 1990s.

II.D.3.3 Apparent Similarities but More Differences

Korean and Russian business elites overlap with their countries' political elites to a far greater extent than would be permissible in a Western democracy. In Korea, such overlap is the organic legacy of several decades of strategic alliance building amongst elite families (Cumings 1997: 326ff; Kang 2002: 53-5). In Russia the business elite is still a new phenomenon, but for all that its relations with power are intense, to the point where the so-called oligarchs of Russian business owe their fortunes to political connections (Reddaway & Glinski 2001; Klebnikov 2000; McCauley 2001). Commentators have begun to use the word 'clan' to identify sub-groups in the Russian elite who by reason of common provenance or common economic interest act together on political issues.

Nevertheless, new financial industrial groups in Russia bear only a superficial resemblance to *chaebol*. Most are not capable of restructuring the enterprises under their control in order to turn them into profitable businesses (Johnson 1997: 361ff). Korean firms may buy influence when they deal with politicians, but they produce saleable goods for the international market. It is within their grasp to be competitive legitimate businesses without any assistance from the Korean state. In Russia after 1993, the main opportunities for profit-making were investing in government bonds and managing the funds of state institutions (Schröder 1999: 964). Very few Russian enterprises outside of the extractive industries of oil and gas exploitation are capable of producing world-class goods. In terms of their structural positions in the global economy, Korea is now an industrialized country, whereas Russia, like a number of Third World countries, relies on the export of natural resources. In 1996 99 per cent of the value of Korea's exports came from manufactured goods, whereas only 63 per cent of the value of Russia's exports came from manufacturing, and 35 per cent came from extractive industries (International Trade Statistics 1999: 538, 798). Korean *chaebol* are private companies operating in

competitive domestic and international markets, whereas Russian financial-industrial groups mostly rely on concessions granted in feudal style by the state. Where the state is a major shareholder, as in the oil, gas and electricity supply industries, it is sometimes difficult to tell where the Russian state ends and the private sector begins. Regional governments have engaged in 'creeping renationalization,' buying stakes in privatized enterprises, whose boards then pay regional taxes by issuing new stock to the regional government (Solnick 1998a: 72). If corporate governance in Korea suffers from a lack of transparency, Russian corporate governance is more frequently noticeable by its absence.

The transformation of the Korean and Russian political economies after democratic transition exhibit in common a weakening of the state, but the ways in which this weakening occurred could not have been more different. The fusion of the Korean state and private sector elites emerged gradually over decades as a result of a successful development strategy which had the effect of strengthening the private sector vis a vis the state (Amsden 1989: Chapter 5; Kim, E.M. 1993: 231-43; Kong 2000: chapter 3), and also encouraged to the emergence of a strong Korean labour movement (Kim, E.M. 1997: 203-10; Koo 2002). In Russia the fusion of the state and private sector elites took place suddenly during a privatization process controlled by the state elite. In Korea, the declining importance of the state as the central institution in economic and social life has been fairly gradual (Kong 2000). The weakening of the state during Russia's transformation, by contrast, was abrupt.

The financial crises in Korea in 1997 and in Russia in 1998 also bear only a superficial resemblance to one another (Choi 1998: 7-11; Howell 1998; Kong 2000: 160-64, 212f; Mo & Moon 1998; Hanson 1999: 1156-57; Hedlund 1999: 243-52; Khanin & Suslov 1999: 1452f). In late 1997 Korea found itself unable to pay its short-term foreign debt and was forced to

accept a \$21 billion bailout from the IMF with conditions on liberalizing the economy and increasing labour market flexibility. In July 1998 Russia in similar financial circumstances obtained a promise of around \$11 billion in new loans from the IMF, World Bank and Japanese investors, to be paid out in tranches and with policy conditions attached to each stage (Hanson 1999: 1152). As proximate causes of these crises there were common international pressures to liberalize financial markets, and the 'contagion' effect resulting from the herd behaviour of Western investors. However, the main causes were domestic, and, as described above, the two countries' domestic economic situations were quite different. Scholars and financial analysts attempting *ex post* diagnosis of the causes of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis point to the extensive over-capacity and over-indebtedness of Korean firms (Choi 1998: 12; Howell 1998; Mo & Moon 1998). In the Russian case it was not private firms that were over-indebted, but the state, and enterprises did not have excess capacity, they had the wrong capacity, because the command economy had disconnected production from markets. Korean firms pressed for fewer controls over their activities as they sought to expand into new markets, financing much of the expansion during the early 1990s by borrowing abroad. The influx of foreign money pushed up the value of the Korean currency, making Korean exports less competitive. Russia was not using foreign money to finance economic expansion. Instead, enterprises ran up tax arrears and arrears in payments to each other. Accounts were being settled by trade credit, tax credits, tax offsets and various forms of non-monetary payment. The total effect of this cycle was the continuation of soft budget constraints for enterprises, the continuation of a high federal government budget deficit and the forced expropriation of credit from employees who did not receive their wages. The Russian government financed its deficit by borrowing abroad, and thus exposed itself to financial meltdown when Western investors realized how reckless their investments had been. While the Korean crisis resulted from financial liberalization without adequate preparation, the Russian crisis reflected a

deeply dysfunctional political economy in which rent-seeking squeezed out productive activity.

Yet despite the qualitative differences, and the enormous performance gap between the two economies, the financial crises were illustrative of a common problem with roots in the undemocratic era. Choi (1998: 12), writing about Korea, calls this problem as a system of 'privatized gain and socialized loss,' institutionalized by the developmental state. In other words, the big Korean firms had gotten used to bailouts by the state, and therefore borrowed recklessly. Russian firms, including the major financial groups, are similarly dependent. Korea and Russia today share a corporate culture which encourages the belief that the state will pick up the tab for economic failures, but private individuals will pocket any economic gains.

II.E Towards Civil Society?

As discussed in Chapter One, civil society requires a diversity of self-organizing autonomous associations pursuing their interests within a framework of law which guarantees personal and group liberties (Cohen & Arato 1992: ix). States vary in the degree to which the authorities tolerate such organizations. Societies vary in the extent to which their members participate in voluntary, inter-locking multiple affiliations. Without the rule of law, and in the absence of liberty, autonomous organizations either leave 'reserved domains' of policy to the authorities, or they take on the character of resistance movements, actively demanding change but with no place at the negotiating table. One should avoid the assumption that once organizations outside an undemocratic regime succeed in toppling its leadership, then 'civil society' can assume power, because the undemocratic habits of previous rulers have ways of reproducing themselves in the new incumbents. As argued in Chapter One, civil society exists only when non-

state organizations pursue a relationship with the authorities based on cooperation and the regulation of conflicts through law (Giugni & Passy 1998: 85ff).

Mobilization refers to the degree and type of political participation, on a continuum from the most organized and active participation to total non-participation and apathy (Linz 1975: 278). Intense mobilization, as in a totalitarian state, may succeed in motivating the mass of people to pursue socially approved goals for a time. If there is a war, or the imminent threat of war, the patriotic feelings inspired by mobilization may energize the society as a whole. In the long term, however, the Soviet experience suggests that an excess of pressure placed on people to pursue national goals can be self-defeating (Shlapentokh 1989). The contrast between Korea and Russia under undemocratic rule, during constitutional change, and afterwards illuminates the processes by which one country can move rapidly towards civil society, whereas in another civil society remains very weak.

II.E.1 Social Organization under Undemocratic Regimes

II.E.1.1 Conflicting Pressures in Korea

As already mentioned, repression of autonomous non-state organizations was far less severe under Korea's bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime than in the USSR. The authoritarian regime tolerated most autonomous organizations as long as they did not interfere with the prerogatives of the leadership. The acceptance of the existence of such autonomous organizations contrasts strongly with the Soviet party-state's hostility to the idea that autonomous organizations should exist at all.

Moreover, a variety of social transformations caused by the Korean War and then by rapid industrialization indirectly contributed to the emergence and strengthening of autonomous organizations in Korea (Cumings 1997: chapter 6; Dalton & Cotton 1996: 275-80; Kim, E.M. 1993;

Kim, S. 2000; Kim, C.L. 1980c). On the basis of modernization theory, Chong Lim Kim (1980a: 6-12) advanced three 'models' of political participation in authoritarian Korea. According to the 'democratic' model, participation grows out of the social and demographic characteristics of the individual: those whose structural position in society gives them access to the means of expressing their political views become psychologically involved in politics and then participate in politics on a voluntary and self-assertive basis. The 'mobilized participation' model is the mirror image of the first: those whose social and demographic characteristics deprive them of the means of expressing their political views lack psychological involvement in politics and thereby become vulnerable to political mobilization³². The third model is dynamic. Rapid socio-economic changes, including rising levels of income, education, urbanization and media exposure, produce increasing demand for political participation, which collides with the unresponsiveness of authoritarian institutions and governing elites; this generates frustration and a sense of political alienation which is likely to express itself in protests, demonstrations, riots, etc. The key to understanding the emergence and strengthening of popular participation in politics in authoritarian Korea is that *all three* models help to explain the behaviour of some Koreans some of the time.

To begin with the 'democratic' model, it is noteworthy that urbanization was one of the driving forces of social change in Korea, and that greater urbanization correlated with increasing freedom in political participation (Choi & Lee 1980; Steinberg 1995: 402f). In 1961, the urban population was only 29 per cent of the total; by 1987 it was 68 per cent (World Bank 1998)³³.

³² The contrast between the two models is that 'political mobilization' is driven from the top, while 'social mobilization' is driven by social and economic change (Kim, C.L. 1980a: 2).

³³ By contrast, the Russian population was 55 per cent urban in 1961 and 73 per cent urban by 1987; from 1980 to 1987, the Korean rate of urban

Studies of voting behaviour in authoritarian Korea show that the vote for opposition parties and candidates in urban areas was typically in the order of seven to ten per cent higher than in rural areas, with little difference in turnout (Choi & Lee 1980: 166f, 170). Urban Koreans entered a rapidly modernizing industrial economy and at the same time acquired new independence from traditional means of social control. At the same time, economic development fostered, especially in the cities, an expansion of educational opportunities and the emergence and strengthening of range of autonomous associations (private universities, charitable groups, professional institutes, hobby groups, etc).

'Mobilized participation' resulted partly from the authoritarian regime's need to foster a 'democratic' image by holding elections, and partly from its perception that such participation could be useful for accomplishing developmental tasks and securing political control. Thus, elections became the occasions for mass mobilization, reliant on the direct participation of local officials in election campaigns³⁴, on the traditional culture of deference to authority, on the co-operation of local community notables³⁵, and on various means of influencing rural incomes (Chon 2000: 73-7; C.L. Kim, Kihl & Pai 1980; Kim, J-o. & Koh 1980; C.L. Kim 1980b; Steinberg 1995: 402). A study based on a 1973/1974 survey of legal political activities concluded that 'Both

population growth was about 4 per cent annually, as against one per cent in Russia (World Bank 1998).

³⁴ President Syngman Rhee abolished the election of leaders of local government in 1958; local democracy emerged again under the Second Republic; but in 1961 the military regime dismantled elected councils and placed local government under the control of centrally appointed officials. See Seong (2000) for further discussion.

³⁵ Kihl (1980) argues that 'community notables' performed roles of representation and brokerage in local communities' relations with the authorities. Conversely, the authorities could also call on them to perform tasks of mobilization.

social position and psychological orientation variables proved totally uncorrelated with voting and organizational activity. This suggests that citizen participation in voting and organizational activity derives from vulnerability to mobilization, not from political awareness or a sense of involvement³⁶ (C.L. Kim, Kihl & Pai 1980: 52). It should be noted that the fieldwork for this study took place during the *Yushin* period (1973-1979), one of relatively intense mobilization. The latter can be divided for analytic purposes into two categories: rural mobilization and security mobilization (Lee 1990). Especially under *Yushin*, but also in later and earlier periods, rural mobilization centred around a state-driven programme of voluntary labour, known as the Saemaul or New Village movement, whose activities were funded to a large extent by political donations from big business (Kang 2002: 103; Kihl 1980: 89). Security mobilization encompassed virtually all able-bodied men in a network of reserve military forces, and to some extent complemented mechanisms of political control. For example, the government abolished elected student organizations in May 1975, placing its functions in the hands of the military-controlled Student National Defence Corps.

The third, 'dynamic' model grew out of frustrated desires for genuine, non-mobilized participation and the fulfilment of the democratic potential of the constitution. The displacement of millions of people by the Korean War, following upon the prolonged trauma of Japanese occupation, and, as mentioned, by rapid urbanization, severely weakened the old agrarian social system characterized by rigid class stratification and parochial loyalties (Cumings 1997: 301ff). This was fertile ground for radicalism. By the end of the 1950s Korean student organizations were powerful enough to bring down President Syngman Rhee, inaugurating the short-lived Chang-Myon parliamentary regime in 1960; and they remained active throughout the following decade, threatening the stability of Park regime, especially in 1971

³⁶ 'Organizational activity' includes membership in government-sponsored social and community groups (Kihl 1980: 47).

on the eve of Park's autoup (Han 1980). Although the bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime sought to repress the activist student organizations and trade unions, especially in the early 1970s and early 1980s, these clampdowns had the unintended effect of radicalizing and encouraging alliances between these two groups (Kim, S. 2000: 58f; Koo 2002: 112ff; Lee 2002). Christianity meanwhile was becoming increasingly popular³⁷, and some Korean pastors imported Latin American ideas of liberation theology (Clark 2002). In the 1970s, students, trade unions, and Christian churches began to form a triple alliance, which became the backbone of an opposition movement, interacting with but not directed by opposition political parties (Kim, S. 2000: chapter 4; Koo 2002; Lee 2002). The assassination of Park Chung-hee in late 1979 and General Chun's coup d'état and subsequent crackdown caused the opposition movement to go underground, but it emerged with renewed strength after the partial relaxation of repression in 1983.

Thus, the bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime attempted sporadic political mobilization to achieve regime goals, but the resulting behaviour often amounted to no more than ritualized performance in expectation of a reward or in avoidance of punishment. At the same time, rapid economic development and urbanization, in large part a consequence of the regime's policies, encouraged 'social mobilization' as those with higher incomes, better education and greater status sought a role in politics commensurate with their degree of psychological involvement. The frustration experienced by the socially mobilized in confronting an unresponsive and unaccountable regime led to the emergence of an opposition movement.

³⁷ By the early 1990s, around one fifth of the Korean population claimed to be Christian, of which around four fifths were protestant and one fifth Catholic (Statesman's Yearbook 1996-1997: 790).

II.E.1.2 The Dead Hand of the Soviet Party-State

The Soviet regime attempted to monopolize the organization of social institutions and to forbid organizations independent of the state, using state-controlled social organizations to extract from citizens frequent expressions of political support (Hough & Fainsod 1979: chapter 8; Inkeles & Bauer 1959: chapter 12; Shlapentokh 1989: chapter 1; White 1979: chapter 4). In addition to the normal activities which an organization undertook, it had to organize lectures, discussions, meetings etc. on political themes chosen by the CPSU. The political embrace was all encompassing: all children aged 7-9 joined the Little Octobrists, before graduating to the Pioneers; to entertain any prospect of a career, a young person aged 14 or over had to join the Komsomol or Communist Youth League; and to achieve success he or she had to join the CPSU (Hazard 1980: 39-46). In addition, the Soviet Union practised universal conscription of males aged 18-20 to serve for two years in the Soviet armed forces, where political indoctrination formed part of their training³⁸. Trade unions, controlled by the CPSU, covering virtually all employees and students, provided another forum for political mobilization (Filtzer 1994: 115ff; Sakwa 1989: 165f). Formal participation in mass membership organizations was routinized; in return for acquiescence and the payment of nominal dues, organizations provided members with concrete benefits, such as the right participate in social events or to visit certain holiday resorts. The use of connections and other forms of manipulation to avoid the obligations of forced participation and/or to divert concrete benefits became increasingly common in the post-totalitarian era, particularly among the educated and privileged strata (DiFranceisco & Gitelman 1984: 613f; Zimmerman 1987: 346,351). Formal organizations under Party control provided Soviet citizens with a heavily politicized experience of social life. Shlapentokh (1989:154f) argues that politicization caused personal and

³⁸ In addition to formal training and political indoctrination, military service performed a 'dis-socializing' role in the brutal practice of 'hazing.' The practice continues to be widespread in the Russian army.

private life to bifurcate from public life as citizens sought refuge from the party-state in their own affairs.

To satisfy needs and curiosities which the formal or official society could not satisfy, informal organizations grew up in a social space known as 'the underground' (Shlapentokh 1989: chapter 8). Since people taking part in informal organizations exposed themselves to risk of persecution, the underground could not fully compensate for the distortion of social life in the formal or official social sphere. The majority of Soviet citizens restricted open and honest communication to the nuclear family and close friends.

II.E.2 Motors for Change? Autonomous Social Movements

The Korean democracy movement produced a revolution, which was the culmination of years of protest and other political action (Chung 1997; Cumings 1997: chapter 7; Han 1989: 285-92; Kim, S. 2000; Steinberg 1995: 384-8). In Korea in June 1987 there were a total of 3,362 demonstrations involving over one million participants (Chung 1997: 88-91). They were organized by a network of autonomous organizations including Christians, Buddhists, intellectuals, women, families of prisoners, farmers, workers, urban poor and youth, in addition to regional leaders and opposition politicians (Chung 1997; Kim, S. 2000: chapter 5). The core of the network, known as the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification, encompassed the triple sources of support for the pro-democracy movement — students, workers and religious leaders (Kim, S. 2000: 86ff). The Coalition had a wide geographic coverage, provided a regular stipend to its members and lasted more than three years before integrating into a larger national organization in 1989 (Chung 1997: 88). It did not include but sought alliance with the leading opposition politicians, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. It formed an effective spearhead of popular demand for democracy.

Since Russia unlike Korea had no strong autonomous social organizations during the period of undemocratic rule, new social and political organizations had to start from scratch, without established links to the population and to the new private sector, with very few resources, and with very little experience in popular mobilization and organization (Fish 1995: chapter 4). The Russian equivalent to the pro-democracy Coalition in Korea was the Democratic Russia movement, founded in October 1990. In March 1991, it launched huge demonstrations in Moscow and St Petersburg to coincide with the opening of the new Russian Congress. However, as a result of the specific features of the Russian transition, the movement played only a peripheral role in the process of constitutional change (Gill & Marwick 2000: chapter 6). The features of the Russian transition which explain this outcome may be summarized in four main points. Firstly, the executive branch under Yeltsin monopolized political decision-making at the expense of the legislature, which narrowed the scope for social movements to influence politics. Secondly, there emerged in Russia a generalized sense of disappointment with political reform, caused *inter alia* by the collapse of the economy and the associated crime and corruption³⁹. Thirdly, the leadership of trade unions and the new business class, both dominated by sections of the old *nomenklatura*, concentrated their efforts on extracting narrow economic advantage in their dealings with the executive. Finally, the intelligentsia, which might have formed the backbone of an emergent civil society, experienced deteriorating living conditions and strong income differentiation, contributing to their withdrawal from political activism (Gill & Marwick 2000: 240).

³⁹ Disapproval of the performance of the new regime peaked in 1992 when as many as 74 per cent of respondents in an NRB survey rated the current political system negatively and only 14 per cent rated it positively (Rose 2001a: 29). Chapter Three of this thesis provides a comparative discussion of measures and levels of support for the current regime using NRB data.

II.E.3 After Constitutional Change, Is Civil Society Emerging?

A very rough indicator of whether or not civil society is emerging is the level of participation in community groups and associations. In this regard, the contrast between Korea and Russia could hardly be more stark (Munro 1998: 42ff; Rose 1998: 60f; Shin 1999: 107-10). As many as 71 per cent of respondents to the Korea Democracy Barometer survey in 1994 claimed to belong to a 'fraternal, alumni or clan organization', 47 per cent claimed to belong to a neighbourhood or village association, 41 per cent said they belonged to a religious organization, 31 per cent said they participated in a hobby, sports or leisure group, 15 per cent in a professional association, 12 per cent in a charity, and 11 per cent in a business organization.

Corresponding data from the New Russia Barometer survey of 1998 showed that only around 4 per cent of Russians belong to a neighbourhood or village association, and the same number to a hobby, sports or leisure group, and only one per cent to a charity⁴⁰ (Munro 1998: 43). While around three quarters of Koreans belong to one or another form of community group or association, in Russia nine out ten don't belong to any such group or association. It is worth noting that high levels of membership in organizations don't necessarily indicate the level or nature of activity of the members. Shin (1999: 107f) contrasts high levels of membership by Koreans in groups 'reminiscent of pre-industrial or traditional' village life with low levels of membership in the more 'modern-style' organizations such as charities and business organizations. Civil society requires that the various types of associations be self-organizing and autonomous; and it requires that these associations orientate their actions to a framework of law which guarantees personal and group liberties.

⁴⁰ According to the same KDB and NRB data, about 44 per cent of Koreans say they have no religion, as against 26 per cent of Russians who say they have no religion and 20 per cent who are undecided. In terms of attendance, 58 per cent of Koreans who say they have a religion attend services at least once a month, as against only 12 per cent of Russians. See Munro (1998: 44f) for a brief discussion.

In Korea, the period after the adoption of the new constitution witnessed the organization of new autonomous social organizations focussing on particular issues such the environment, human rights, social justice, consumer rights and so on (Choi 2000; Dalton & Cotton 1996; Kim S. 2000: chapter 6). Meanwhile, existing groups which had fought for democracy had trouble adapting to new conditions now that most of their key demands had been met. Whether the new and old autonomous organizations contribute to a civil society depends not just on their existence, but on their behaviour, and also on the way in which the authorities interact with them. Recent experiences at election time suggest that, in spite of some incongruities between Korean political culture and democratic norms, a favourable climate for civil society is emerging (Chon 2000; Choi 2000). The 1997 presidential election marked something of a watershed in this regard (Chon 2000: 77f). Political scandals associated with the incumbent President Kim Young-sam led to stricter enforcement of rules governing campaign expenditures, including a mechanism for making donations anonymous, and also reduced the president's power to influence the outcome of the campaign; TV debates between the candidates assumed more importance than the expensive campaign rallies of the past, thus reducing the overall cost of the election; and the establishment of elected local government organs during Kim Young-sam's presidency meant that the campaign activities of the bureaucracy reflected diverse partisanship.

During the April 2000 elections to the Korean National Assembly, an alliance known as CAGE (Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Elections), consisting of around 500 civil organizations set about identifying corrupt or anti-reformist candidates and either preventing their nomination by political parties or ensuring their defeat if nominated (Choi 2000: 26-34). The fact that CAGE's activity was illegal under clauses of the election law forbidding campaigning by civic organizations did not act as a deterrent. President Kim Dae-jung expressed sympathy for CAGE, and law-makers then retroactively

legalized its activities. This points to a bandwagon effect, whereby an autonomous organization seized the initiative and made it politically difficult for elites to suppress their activities, even though those activities contravened the law (Ruling Parties 2000; Campaign Restrictions 2000).

Russian society's capacity for 'self-organization' has received a double battering — first by the experience of Soviet rule and then by the economic and political upheaval of transformation. As a result, autonomous organizations are weak partners in any dialogue with government (Gill & Marwick 2000: chapter 6; Sakwa 2002b: chapter 13). Scholars searching for evidence of Russian civil society have found energetic activity on the part of the would-be organizers of Russia's 'Third Sector' (Weigle 2000: chapter 6; Hudson 2003). Domrin (2003: 193) estimates that number of currently active social and non-commercial organizations 'directly or indirectly involved in charitable work' in Russia is currently around 70,000. As documented by the latter author, a notion of civil society has enjoyed intellectual vogue amongst Russian policy-makers since at least the mid-1990s, and it has been promoted by Russian state institutions at various levels, notably at a forum attended by President Putin in November 2001. In addition, there are a plethora of Western aid programmes working to make non-governmental organizations stronger in Russia (Henderson 2002). However, these accounts of the development of Russia's 'civil society' find little evidence that self-organization amongst Russians can have anything more than a marginal influence on the activities of government. Rose's (1995d) metaphor of the hour-glass, emphasizing the narrowness of links between society and the state, illustrates the difficulty which non-state organizations face in living up to a notion of civil society as a partner to the state. As pointed out above, the Russian state does not yet provide an adequate rule of law, nor does it effectively guarantee personal and group liberties. In the absence of these, attempts at the construction of civil society from the bottom up are constantly impeded by the particularistic interests which they seek to challenge. Top-

down attempts by government to create civil society are by definition contrary to the logic of self-organization.

An independent and politically engaged media is necessary for the creation of a civil society, because without it attempts by autonomous associations to criticize government policy and to mobilize popular support risk being excluded or suppressed by diverse pressures. These include direct government censorship or pressure on the media, 'self-censorship' by journalists seeking to avoid conflict with the powerful, and also the simple drowning out of alternative voices by professional propagandists working for the government or for big business. In Korea, despite the continuation of some corrupt practices left over from the authoritarian era, such the acceptance by journalists of cash payments for favourable news coverage, the media are under diverse ownership, and express diverse political views freely (Yang 2000). In Russia, the hindrances to the emergence of a genuine civil society are exacerbated by high profile threats to political independence in the media. Well-connected firms have recently consolidated ownership over the major national TV stations, and there is some evidence that they are using their proprietorial rights to silence voices which are critical of the government (Belin 2002).

The importance of civil society for a democracy lies in its function of providing vehicles for participation in the political process other than the formal institutional channels of voting in periodic elections or of legal action through the courts. Alternative vehicles are needed because of the propensity of elites to operate what might be referred to as political cartels. That is to say, supposedly competing or impartial elements in the elite collude to limit the range of policies subject to debate and conspire to exclude other groups from the political process. Cartel-forming behaviour makes official representative institutions a vehicle for the suppression of non-elite interests. Although in both Korea and Russia there now are a plurality

of autonomous social organizations purporting to represent the full gamut of societal interests, and diverse means by which these associations may communicate with the public, alternative vehicles for effective political participation are noticeable by their scarcity in Russia, and by their availability in Korea.

II.F Implications of Contrasting Legacies for Political Attitudes

This chapter has compared and contrasted the legacies of prior undemocratic regimes in Korea and Russia for the supply side of democratic regime change, that is, in terms of what the current incomplete democratic regimes provide citizens in the way of a regime structure, political freedom, the rule of law, political economy and civil society. The chapter has also compared current situations to those prevailing under previous regimes and during constitutional change. The table below summarizes the supply-side legacies of the previous regimes for incomplete democracies in Korea and Russia today (Table II.3).

In the remainder of the thesis it remains to develop and test hypotheses about the impact of the prior undemocratic regime type on political support for incomplete democracies. When comparing across countries, one cannot assume that a given indicator in one country has the same implications as the same indicator in another. Attitudes expressed in public opinion surveys become meaningless if one divorces them from the context in which they are expressed. The legacy of the prior regime, as described above, is likely to be an important part of that context. But how important? And if the legacy of the prior regime does affect attitudes to the current one, how does it do so? These are the questions which the remainder of this thesis seeks to address.

Chapter Three identifies indicators of political support and compares them across contexts. It addresses first a question about the structure of

Table II.3 Supply-Side Legacies of Korean & Soviet Prior Regimes

	<u>Korea</u>		<u>Russia</u>	
	<u>Before Transition</u>	<u>After Transition</u>	<u>Before Transition</u>	<u>After Transition</u>
1. state structure	president dominant, weak legislature	little change	party-state	president dominant, weak legislature
parties	multiple parties, weakly institutionalized	little change	single party	multiple parties, weakly institutionalized
elections	manipulated, mostly free but always unfair	free and fair	unfree, ritualistic	free but not fair
role of military	military dominant but constrained	civilian control	Party control over militarized society	civilian control
2. rule of law	collusive relations between state and business, ordinary systemic corruption	little change	clientelist relationships pervasive, anti-modern incompatibility with rule of law	Legal framework for rule of law exists, but in practice rule of law extremely deficient
3. freedom	partially free	free	unfree	partially free
4. progress towards civil society	some mobilization and exclusion, but autonomous organizations and modernization foster opposition	emergent civil society	autonomous organizations not tolerated, comprehensive mobilization by the party-state	legal basis for autonomous organizations exists, but little genuine self-organization
5. political economy	export-oriented, market economy in a developmental state	export-oriented, market economy in a partial developmental state	closed non-market economy, bureaucratic coordination	transitional market economy, mostly privatized, partially liberalized, unstable

Source: Based on this chapter

public attitudes towards the current regimes in the two countries. Factor analysis is used to test the following proposition.

Proposition 1: regardless of whether the regime suffers from the legacy of a post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state or that of a bureaucratic-military authoritarian, developmental state, citizens evaluate normative questions about what the regime should be in a different way from empirical questions about what the regime is.

Testing the above proposition allows the author to select indicators of political support. Having selected equivalent indicators, it is possible to compare levels, specifically in terms of the following proposition.

Proposition 2: If a regime has the legacy of a post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state, it is likely to have significantly lower political support across both normative and empirical dimensions than a regime with a bureaucratic-military authoritarian, developmental legacy.

Chapter Four is about the determinants of political support. It starts by investigating whether support for new regimes has primarily social, economic or political determinants. The null hypothesis is that the legacy of the prior regime makes no difference to the question of whether political, economic or social determinants are most important.

Proposition 3: Regardless of the type of undemocratic legacy, political, economic and social characteristics of individuals have the same relative amount of influence on both normative and empirical dimensions of support for an incomplete democracy.

Next the chapter investigates the importance of the characteristics of individuals and households against institutional context as determinants of political support. Because of restrictions imposed by the availability of data, only one indicator, the rejection of undemocratic rule, is used in statistical tests. The null hypothesis is that country context, and by implication, the direct effect of the legacy of the prior regime, makes little or no difference.

Proposition 4: Rejection of undemocratic rule is influenced primarily by characteristics of individuals and households and only to a lesser extent by the type of undemocratic legacy.

The legacy of a prior regime for public attitudes to a new regime may consist of direct effects on attitudes to the new regime, and also indirect effects, mediated through another variable. For example, the effects of the prior post-totalitarian regime in Russia on political support may be mediated by economic dissatisfaction. The author refers to such mediated effects as 'interactive effects' since they represent the interaction of two variables; in the example given, country context and economic evaluations interact to influence political attitudes. The proposition to be tested is the following.

Proposition 5: Including both interactive and direct effects, the overall effect of the legacy of the post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state on rejection of undemocratic rule is negative.

Chapter Five attempts to distinguish what effects of the Russian context are generic to post-communist countries in Europe, which broadly share Russia's party-state legacy, and what effects of the Russian context are uniquely Russian or proper to some sub-group of post-communist countries. To do this, additional data from post-communist Europe is needed, and the author makes use of aggregate-level data from 11 other post-communist countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. The null hypothesis is that in a Korean-post-communist comparison, Russia does not differ by much from the other post-communist countries in the effects of the prior regime on political attitudes. The proposition to be tested is as follows.

Proposition 6: Other post-communist regimes in Europe share the negative effect of the party-state legacy on normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the current regime.

There are systematic relationships between the characteristics of prior

communist regimes and the path taken by each country in the transition out of communism (Linz & Stepan 1996). It is therefore necessary to test whether any observed effects of the party-state legacy are independent of the transition path out of communism. The prior expectation is that the two variables do produce independent effects, and the proposition to be tested is as follows.

Proposition 7: The path taken from undemocratic rule differentiates support for incomplete democracies; a) replacement of the undemocratic elite enhances normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the current regime; b) pre-emptive reform by the undemocratic elite has the opposite effect.

The systematic relationships between transition path, the characteristics of prior communist regimes and a range of other independent variables reveal that there is a such a thing as an 'anti-modern core' or 'post-Soviet' syndrome, characteristic of Russia and Ukraine, but not of the other countries investigated in this thesis. The final proposition to be tested concerns whether or not the anti-modern core legacy has effects on political attitudes which are independent of both transition path and the party-state legacy taken as generic to all post-communist states.

Proposition 8: The Soviet (anti-modern core) legacy differentiates support for post-communist regimes in Europe, and its effect on normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of an incomplete democracy is negative.

Chapter Six of this thesis weaves together the concerns of all the previous chapters in a discussion of democratic consolidation in Korea and Russia. It attempts to assess the impact of the prior undemocratic regime types on democratic consolidation 'in the round' considering both supply-side and demand-side legacies. It proposes qualitative and quantitative tests of consolidation. Finally it assesses the implications of the thesis for further study.

CHAPTER III. COMPARING SUPPORT ACROSS CONTEXTS

The purpose of this chapter is to compare political support for the incomplete democracies in Korea and Russia firstly in terms of the structure of support, that is to say, the inter-relation amongst its constituent parts and its relationship to a wider system of variables, and secondly, in terms of absolute levels of support. Before proceeding to the first of these issues, the author puts the discussion in context by examining the meaning of democratization as understood by public opinion in these two countries. As a preliminary, it is necessary to summarize basic information about the sources of data, which are representative sample surveys.

III.A Source of Data

The Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) surveys were directed by Professor Doh C. Shin and conducted by Gallup Korea. The New Russia Barometer (NRB) surveys were organized by Professor Richard Rose and conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Research into Public Opinion (VCIOM). All surveys were conducted in the national language. Interviews were conducted face to face in Korea and in surveys III, VI and IX of the NRB. In other Russian surveys, questionnaires were self-administered at the home of respondent and, together with this, some sections of the questionnaire were filled in during face-to-face interviews. The sampling procedure in each country was to construct a multi-stage, random probability sample, in which the population of the whole country was stratified regionally and within regions according to urban/rural divisions and town size. The only exception was the first New Russia Barometer survey, which sampled urban Russians only. Within primary sampling units, individual respondents were selected on the basis of standard random procedures, such as interviewing the person whose birthday came

next. Respondents below the voting age, which is 18 in Russia and 20 in Korea, were routinely excluded from the samples. Further details on each barometer programme can be found on the web site of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (www.cspp.strath.ac.uk) and in Shin (1999: xxviii–xxx). Dates of surveys, sample sizes and citations to complete published results are given below (Table III.1).

Table III.1 SAMPLE SIZES AND DATES OF SURVEYS

Survey	Fieldwork dates	N	Published results
Korea Democracy Barometer			
1994	23 November-10 December	1,500	-
1996	16-27 January	1,000	-
1997	20 May-3 June	1,117	Shin & Rose 1997
1998	13-20 October	1,010	Shin & Rose 1998
1999	3-15 November	1,007	Shin & Rose 2000
New Russia Barometer			
1992 (I) ¹	26 January-22 February	2,106	Boeva & Shironin 1992
1993 (II)	26 June-22 July	1,975	Rose, Boeva & Shironin 1993
1994 (III)	26-28 February	3,535	Rose & Haerpfer 1994b
1995 (IV)	31 March-19 April	1,998	Rose 1995c
1996 (V)	12-31 January	2,426	Rose 1996a
1996 (VI)	25 July-2 August	1,599	Rose 1996b
1998 (VII)	6 March-13 April	2,002	Rose 1998
2000 (VIII)	13-29 January	1,940	Rose 2000b
2000 (IX)	14-18 April 2000	1,600	Rose 2000c
2001 (X)	17 June-3 July	2,000	Rose 2001b

VCIOM routinely weighted Russian survey data by comparing their distribution on age, gender and education with official *oblast* (region)-level census data. Gallup Korea followed similar procedures to match national census data. For all surveys in both countries, the author checked the representativeness of the samples by comparing distributions on age,

¹ NRB I was conducted in January and February 1992, and was restricted to urban Russians. Because it pre-dates the current constitution, and because it is not nationally representative, this survey is not included in the analysis.

gender, town size, and education with official national statistics. To ensure a consistent match with official data across succeeding years, the author introduced marginal adjustments to the weighting by age, gender, city size or education. Results of the weighting procedures are shown below (Table III.2).

Statistical procedures to be followed later in this study require merging data files from both countries and from multiple years. Since it is conventional in multi-year and multi-country data-sets to weight each country and each year equally, the author has also weighted the total number of cases in each survey to equal exactly 1,000. Such weighting does not affect distributions on demographic variables within country-years. It is a convenience for the purpose of handling a data-set with results from more than one survey.

III.B Political Support for Incomplete Democracies

III.B.1 Public Understanding of the Meaning of Democratization

To correctly interpret measures of political support for incomplete democracies, one needs some evidence of what democracy means to citizens on a conceptual level. Understandings of democracy in general are an aspect of the political cultural context of political support for a particular incomplete democratic regime. When asked 'What does democracy mean to you?', respondents tend to highlight a wide range of attributes of real and potential regimes.

When asked a question of the form *Which of the following meanings would you say is important to democracy?* both Korean and Russian respondents place great importance on economic and social values. Since the replies to questions asked in each country were coded differently, it does not make sense to compare the frequencies of individual responses

Table III.2 DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS OF SAMPLES AFTER WEIGHTING

	Korea										Russia					
	Census 1995	94	96	97	98	99	Official est. '98	93	94	95	96- Jan	96- Jul	98	00- Jan	00- Apr	2001
Women	50.7	48	50	51	51	52	54.4	56	55	55	55	56	55	55	55	54
Men	49.3	52	50	49	49	48	45.6	44	45	45	45	44	45	45	45	46
AGE																
20-29	27.7	26	23	28	25	25	19.1	19	19	20	18	20	20	21	20	21
30-39	27.5	27	31	27	26	24	21.5	22	21	21	25	24	21	18	20	20
40-49	18.2	21	21	18	19	19	21.6	18	20	21	19	19	18	20	18	18
50-59	13.1	13	13	13	14	16	13.5	17	14	15	15	16	15	14	14	16
60 plus	13.5	13	12	14	16	16	24.3	24	26	23	23	21	26	27	28	25
COMMUNITY SIZE ^a																
Rural villages	14.7	19	17	16	15	16	27	26	29	25	26	25	29	28	27	28
Small cities	37.3	37	36	36	40	38	55	54	53	55	56	65	53	54	54	53
Big cities	48.0	44	47	48	45	46	18	20	18	20	18	10 ^c	18	18	19	19
COMPLETED LEVELS OF EDUCATION ^b																
Primary or less	36.3	36	32	32	37	32	38.8	41	38	40	42	38	38	37	38	34
Secondary	39.2	41	42	43	41	43	46.9	43	48	46	43	47	47	47	47	51
Tertiary	24.5	23	26	25	22	25	14.3	16	14	14	15	15	15	16	15	15

Notes: ^a Big city = population over 1 million. ^b Primary includes incomplete secondary education (Middle School in Korea); Secondary is academic secondary (High School); Tertiary includes those who have passed at least 3 years of university studies in Russia, or in Korea at least College-level education. ^c Moscow and St Petersburg only.

Sources: Shin & Rose 1997:42; Goskomstat 1999:71; Statesman's Yearbook 1996-1997:1072-1073; Rose 2000c:58; as in Table III.1

directly between countries. Nevertheless, the replies and their rank order do give an idea of the importance attached to each aspect of democracy within each country (Table III.3).

Economic prosperity is the most important attribute of democracy in Korea, and the second most important in Russia². The fact that wealth and development are associated with democracy in people's minds is not easy to explain. Citizens may associate democracy with the prosperity of the Western world. But in terms of Russian experience, democratization has occurred simultaneously with a large fall in welfare (see Chapter Two, section D). In Korea, the credit for current prosperity cannot be given to democracy, since the policies which led to fast wealth creation were the invention of the authoritarian regime.

The provision of a guaranteed level of income is the second most important attribute of democracy in Korea, and the third most important in Russia. It is not surprising that Russians, all except the youngest of whom were brought up under socialism, place great importance on economic and social guarantees. Research on Russian political culture in the Soviet era (White 1979: 98–100; Inkeles & Bauer 1959: 246ff) suggested that the overwhelming majority of Russians, even those hostile to the Soviet system as a whole, were attached to state planning and control over the economy, the elimination of extreme but not all income inequalities and the provision by the state of a basic and satisfactory standard of living for all. What is surprising is the importance given to social welfare provision in Korean understandings of democracy, since Koreans have had far greater exposure to the American than to West European models of democracy.

² The questions asked in Russia in 2001 were also asked in April 2000, producing the same rank order: equality before the law was deemed essential by 87 per cent, prosperity by 81 per cent, income guarantees by 73 per cent, a choice of candidates at each election by 64 per cent, freedom to criticize the government by 56 per cent and freedom of action by 55 per cent.

Table III.3. MEANINGS OF DEMOCRACY IN KOREA AND RUSSIA

		Q.(Russia) Which of the following meanings would you say is important to democracy? (Essential, Important but not essential, Not very important, Not at all important, Don't know) Q.(Korea) People expect different things from democratic change. Please look over the statements listed on this card and identify all those you personally consider important to democratic political development in our country? (Important, Not important, Don't know)	
	Korea, 1993	Russia, 2001	% saying essential
	Economic development in the country	72	88
	Guarantees for people's economic livelihood	66	79
	Reducing the gap between rich and poor	64	-
	A system of justice that treats everyone fairly	62	91
	Free competition among political parties	42	60
	Participation of the mass public in politics	42	-
	Expansion of political freedom	40	54
	Achieving equality between the genders	39	-
	Freedom of action: you don't have to do what politicians say if you don't want to	-	51

Source: Shin 1999: 47-48; New Russia Barometer X (June-July, 2001).

Shin (1999: 49) interprets the data presented here as implying that Koreans have a 'maximal' concept of democratization, meaning that they 'tend to appreciate democratization as a movement to improve their human lot rather than merely a governmental reform that seeks to improve their prospects in the political market place.' In Korea during the late 1980s, rising economic prosperity raised expectations, and the pro-democracy movement — allied with trade unions — simultaneously made demands for 'social equity' and 'economic justice' (see Chapter Two, section E.2).

The most important attribute of democracy for Russians, according to NRB data, is equality of all citizens before the law. The importance Russians attach to equality before the law contrasts with the failure by the Russian state to enforce the rule of law. The resulting deprivation may help to explain the importance attached to law by Russians. Miller, Hesli and Reisinger (1997: 170) found in a 1992 survey that in popular Russian understandings of democracy, freedom was more important than the rule of law and both were much more important than opinions about social welfare and economic prosperity³. Commenting on Miller *et al.*'s results, Carnaghan (1999: 31–32) speculates that popular priorities may have changed during the transitional decade, as Russians have gotten used to freedom, and, in the atmosphere of lawlessness and insecurity pervading under Yeltsin, developed a stronger preference for the rule of law.

The fact that Russians connect democracy with a law-bound state contradicts the widely held opinion, articulated for Slavacists by Keenan (1986: 179) that Russians, at least at the elite level, have never developed a deep appreciation of the value of law in government. Miller *et al.* (1997: 170) found that the most commonly mentioned meaning of democracy amongst Russian and Ukrainian elites in 1992 was the rule of law.

³ They asked an open-ended question and coded responses according to the first two replies given.

Carnaghan (1999: 30–31) found in Russia that when asked to provide definitions of democracy, seven out of thirty participants in her in-depth interviews specifically mentioned the importance of law as a means of defending rights. They gave coherent explanations of their view, such as: 'I know that I can go out and there is order. Because of that, I respect the law. Because of that, I write my declaration and honestly pay my taxes. But the government at some point should protect me.'

Free and competitive elections are placed fourth in importance for democracy in Russia and fifth in Korea. Sixty per cent of Russians believe that competitive elections are 'essential' for democracy. Only 42 per cent of Koreans believed that such elections are important to democratic political development⁴. The relatively low priority given to free elections as a component of democracy in both countries is striking. However, according to the same NRB survey from which the Russian data comes, support for free multiparty elections in Russia stood at 78 per cent in June/July 2001⁵. In Korea in 1997, 78 per cent of respondents expressed support for free and competitive elections. Therefore, although the association of democracy with free and competitive elections in Korea and Russia is weak, the data does not suggest that the Korean and the Russian public believe that free elections should be dispensed with. Rather it suggests that citizens of these two countries do not accept the 'electoralist fallacy' that free and competitive elections are sufficient for democracy.

The expansion of political freedom is the seventh most important attribute of democratic development in Korea, rated as important by 40 per

⁴ Since the question asks about 'development' the perception that free elections are already accomplished may reduce the importance attached to them.

⁵ The corresponding figures from earlier surveys were 64 per cent in 1998, 78 per cent in January 2000 and 89 per cent in March 2000.

cent of KDB respondents. By 1993 many basic political freedoms had been granted in Korea, freedom continued at a high level thereafter, and the gain in freedom is appreciated by a large majority of Koreans (cf. Chapter Two, Section B.3, and Figure II.3). The perception that freedom has been accomplished may form part of the explanation of why less than half of Koreans believed the expansion of freedom to be an important aspect of further democratic development. An alternative explanation relies on political culture. Shin, Chey et al. (1989: 228) found that adherence to 'social prescription' that is, value attached to traditional social norms and obedience to superiors pre-disposes Koreans to place a low value on public competition, and on the freedom which is necessary for such competition. However, this view should be tempered by the understanding that Koreans clearly recognize their gain in freedom since transition.

Freedom to criticize the government is rated the fifth most important aspect of democracy in Russia, with 54 per cent of respondents saying it is 'essential' for democracy. Russians have less freedom today than Koreans, but they are aware of enjoying considerably more freedom than they had under the Soviet regime (cf. Chapter Two, Section B.3). The perception that freedom to criticize has been accomplished may depress the value attached to freedom as a component of democracy. Also, as mentioned above, the greater priority given by Russians to order rather than freedom in recent years may be a reaction to the perceived 'anarchy' of an excess of freedom during the past decade. As in Korea, it is possible to resort to political cultural explanations for the relatively low priority given to freedom in Russian understandings of democracy, but such arguments should be tempered by the evidence of survey data which shows widespread appreciation of acquired freedoms (Rose 1995a).

Political participation by the mass public is the sixth most important aspect of Korean concepts of democracy, rated as important by 42 per cent

of the sample. No Russian data is available for this item. Carnaghan (1999: 32–33) found that the Russians she interviewed were in general not willing to participate in politics beyond the minimal step of voting, because they did not believe any other political actions on their part would be effective. However, the right not to participate may be as highly valued by Russian citizens as the right to take part. According to KDB and NRB data from 1996, as many as 62 per cent of Russians and 67 per cent of Koreans feel freer under the current regime to decide not to participate in politics (Munro 1998: 25).

It is striking how much broader Korean and Russian understandings of democracy are from such classic formulations as Schumpeter's (1976: 269) 'institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.' Korean and Russian popular concepts of democracy are broader too than Dahl's (1971: 8) 'polyarchy' — a regime which encourages citizen participation and in which matters decided by government are open to public contestation. Political scientists are not obliged to adopt the same concepts as the people who are the subject of their research but in a study on political support for incomplete democracies it is useful to understand the breadth of meanings which democracy has for citizens.

III.B.2 The Structure of Support: Disagreements in the Literature

The purpose of the discussion below is to adjudicate between a number of current conceptualizations of political support for incomplete democracies in order to choose a perspective appropriate to the Korean and Russian comparison. The next sub-section (III.B.3) tests the chosen perspective against the data, to see whether the conceptual distinctions adopted reflect distinct dimensions of public opinion.

III.B.2.1 Realist and Idealist Measures

Mishler and Rose (2000) argue for 'realism' in survey measures, by which they mean that measures should focus on what citizens have actually experienced or could realistically expect to experience. They argue (2000: 4) that citizens of incomplete democracies have very little understanding of democratic ideals, but a strong appreciation of the features of the prior undemocratic regime, and therefore that 'idealist' measures of political support are less appropriate in incomplete democracies than simpler 'realist' measures. An example of an idealist question, from the Korea Democracy Barometer, is: *How much would you personally desire our country to be democratized?* The question is 'idealist' because it asks for an opinion in relation to a concept — democracy — of which respondents may have no direct experience but which carries ideological weight.

The data on which this thesis is based is derived from questionnaires written from both the 'idealist' position of Doh Chull Shin, the director of the Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB), and the 'realist' perspective of Richard Rose, director of the New Russia Barometer (NRB). Because they have borrowed questions from one another, there is a certain amount of overlap between the two barometers in the available indicators of political support, but there are differences of emphasis and approach.

The argument in favour of 'realism' rests in part on the notion that citizens in incomplete democracies have unformed understandings of democratic ideals. Therefore, when asked to express an attitude to democracy, they will express an opinion which is burdened by received ideas rather than reflecting real experience. Mishler and Rose (2000: 30) perform a systematic comparison across a range of regime types of the explanatory power of identical regression models using realist and idealist measures: realist measures of democratic support consistently produce higher R-squared. Without denying the technical validity of their analysis, it

seems to this author that the interpretation they give — that idealist measures of political support are tapping into attitudes towards democracy which reflect high levels of uncertainty as to what democracy is or might be — is over strong. Their results indicate (2000: 39) that there is much less variation in idealist measures than in the realist measures, which would lead one to expect lower R-squared for the former. At no point do Rose and Mishler argue that realist and idealist survey items measure fundamentally different attitudes. Their argument is about how to measure political support. However, as shown above, most Koreans and Russians are able to ascribe meaning to democracy, even if their understanding of the concept does not coincide with that of political theorists. Moreover, even if people have a vague or confused understanding of democracy, this does not mean that their attitudes towards democracy as a symbol are unimportant.

Using a pair of large surveys in Russia and Ukraine in 1990 and 1992, Gibson (1996: 404) found that the structure of democratic support by a variety of idealist measures was generally comparable in each year and that 'the various attitudes fit together in what might be loosely called a democratic belief system'. Since the data included a 700-respondent panel, Gibson could provide the correlation between measures of support over time, and he found a strong relationship: those who expressed support in one year tended to give similar responses two years later. The latter finding was important because it contradicted the notion that in a country such as Russia, people would have only a primitive understanding of democratic ideals, and that their responses to a variety of idealist measures would be inconsistent.

The distinction between realism and idealism drawn by Mishler and Rose serves as a framework for a critique of 'context free', facile or invidious comparisons where questions which make sense in an

established democracy are launched without alteration on the public in countries as diverse as Azerbaijan and Sweden. Whilst accepting the need for caution in the use of idealist measures in international comparisons, this author does not believe that such measures ought to be replaced with realist measures wherever possible. Rather, the idealist and realist approaches are complementary, since the idealist questions bring attention to ideological nuances while the realist questions focus on lived experiences. Whether or not idealist and realist questions may be equivalent is another issue, to which the author returns below.

III.B.2.2 Measures of Regime Evaluation

The NRB's 'realist' measures of regime evaluation are of the form: *Here is a scale from -100 to +100 where +100 means the best system of government and -100 means the worst. Where would you place our system of government before perestroika/ at present/ in five years?* These questions, using the so-called Heaven/Hell scales, are worded in a way which taps holistic evaluations of past, current and expected future regimes.

Questions using the Heaven/Hell scales were asked in Korea only once, in 1997, but were not repeated perhaps because in the Korean context they are far more ambiguous. They took the form: *As you know, Korea has been governed by different kinds of political systems in the past 15 years. Here is a scale ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 100. On this scale, 0 means the worst and 100 means the best. Where on this scale would you place the system of government under the presidency of Chun Doo-hwan/ under the presidency of Kim Young-sam/ in five years?* One problem with the wording of the question is that it includes named presidents; the system of government under Kim Young-sam, for example, can easily be confused with the performance of Kim Young-sam himself. Confusion between regime and incumbent president is exacerbated in Korea because changes in regime have often coincided with changes in the

incumbent president: the Chun Doo-hwan Regime was known as the Fifth Republic, the Roh Tae-woo regime initiated the Sixth Republic and the current regime is sometimes known as the Seventh Republic⁶. Finally, there is a practical problem with the Korean Heaven/Hell question: a shortage of observations. The Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) asked the question only once. Nevertheless, the Heaven/Hell question as asked in KDB is an appropriate one for the comparison within the Korean context of the perceived performance of successive regimes.

The KDB's standard regime evaluation question, which Mishler and Rose (2000: 8) classify as 'idealist', is: *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country these days?* This question presupposes that the current regime is in the understanding of the respondent a democracy. This is not the same thing as presupposing that the current regime is a complete democracy. But it does presuppose that the regime meets certain unspecified minimal requirements of democracy. In Korea, using the word 'democracy' to refer to the current regime does not raise eyebrows, notwithstanding the regime's continuing imperfections. Even in such a problematic democracy as Russia, Schumpeter's minimalist criterion is met. Nevertheless, one may have anxieties about the use of the word democracy in contexts just a little less democratic than Russia. One may also worry that the presence of the 'D-word' will bias responses in a positive or negative manner. The New Russia Barometer (NRB) has avoided asking the satisfaction with democracy question.

Interpreting regime evaluations — whether realist or idealist — is always problematic. Realist evaluations are made relative to the respondent's own experience. The researcher must be fully aware of the

⁶ For instance, Choe (1997: 58) talks about the Seventh Republic established with Kim Young-sam's election in 1992. As stated in the previous chapter, Kim Young-sam did not change the regime fundamentally.

nature of that experience in order to interpret the evaluation correctly. Interpreting idealist evaluations requires the researcher to appreciate the difference between his or her own subjective understanding of an abstract concept and the respondent's understanding. A third problem is whether citizens are able to distinguish between the regime and its incumbents. The solution adopted in the NRB is to use the contrast between past and present, and the expected contrast between present and future, to establish a benchmark for comparison in respondents' minds. Hence, NRB uses three scales for regime evaluation, one for the current regime in the light of a prior question about the previous regime and one which evaluates the expected regime in five years time. The KDB's satisfaction with democracy question compares the regime against a hypothetical absolute standard defined by the respondent's own expectations of the concept of democracy. While both satisfaction with the way democracy works and the Heaven/Hell scales tap regime evaluations, the difference between them is that the idealist wording of the former indicator imposes absolute criteria, while the realist wording of the latter, and its position after a similar question on the prior regime, imposes relative criteria.

III.B.2.3 Functional and Direct Equivalence

It is helpful at this point to introduce a distinction between *functional equivalence* and *direct equivalence*. The distinction is based on Merton's concept of functional equivalence, which referred to equivalent social phenomena rather than specifically to equivalent survey items. Merton's concept nevertheless transfers quite easily to a discussion of survey items. He writes (1968: 106): '...Once we abandon the gratuitous assumption of the functional indispensability of particular social structures, we immediately require some concept of functional alternatives, equivalents, or substitutes. This focuses attention on the *range of possible variation* in the items which can, in the case under examination, subserve a functional requirement' (italics in the original). If different social phenomenon may serve the same

function in different social systems, survey items tapping different attitudes may also serve as functional equivalents.

In the present study the author refers to two survey questions or indicators as functionally equivalent if they both tap the same underlying phenomenon and correlate with a wider system of theoretically relevant variables in much the same way. In order to be classed as directly equivalent, the two survey questions or indicators should pass the test for functional equivalence and in addition be of similar wording, disregarding trivial differences.

In practical terms, the author treats 'functionally equivalent' indicators as performing the same job in different data sets, but, because of differences in question wordings, the author does not use them for measurement on a common metric in a merged data set. The author treats 'directly equivalent' indicators as performing the same job in different data sets, and in addition, because the wordings of questions from which they are derived are very similar, the directly equivalent indicators can be used, after appropriate recoding, for measurement on a common metric in a merged data set.

Bearing in mind that different questions are appropriate to different contexts, the author proposes to test whether the KDB measure of evaluation of the current regime (satisfaction with the way democracy works) and the NRB measure of the same thing (the Heaven/Hell scale) are functionally equivalent within the context of a Korean-Russian comparison. Because they impose different criteria of assessment, the KDB criteria being idealist and absolute and the NRB criteria being realist and relative, it is clear that the two indicators are not directly equivalent. Yet both questions are concerned with evaluations of the current regime. In this sense they meet the first criterion of functional equivalence. Whether they

meet the second criterion, that of correlating with a wider system of variables in a similar way, is a matter for further investigation, to which the author returns in the next sub-section (III.B.3).

III.B.2.4 Measures of Normative Commitment

The word 'normative' is here used to refer to a judgment about what *should be*; its counterpart is the word 'empirical,' used to refer to an evaluation of what *is*. The assumption of the existence of separate normative and empirical dimensions to regime support requires theoretical justification and evidence-based proof. In terms of theoretical justification, one can begin by stating that normative attitudes and empirical evaluations of one and the same object are often treated as distinct in the literature. For example, Evans and Whitefield (1995: 488) distinguish between normative commitment to democracy and empirical evaluations of how well democracy works. They make the former their dependent measure of support and treat the latter as an independent variable⁷. The logic of distinguishing between normative and empirical attitudes suggests that asking how satisfied respondents are with their present regime does not presuppose that respondents *should be* satisfied. Dissatisfaction is a subjective response to a situation as the respondent perceives it empirically, but it is not a normative judgment. Additional data are required to determine whether a given level of satisfaction gives rise to particular normative opinions. In principle, various combinations of empirical regime evaluation and normative response are possible.

⁷ The question they use to tap normative commitment is: *How do you feel about the aim of introducing democracy in [respondent's country], in which parties compete for government? Are you a strong supporter,..., strong opponent, neither supporter nor opponent?* The measure for empirical evaluation is: *How would you evaluate the actual practice of democracy in [respondent's country] so far? Very positively,..., very negatively, Neither?* (Evans & Whitefield 1995: 488, 496).

Rose and Mishler (Rose & Mishler 1994: 159; Mishler & Rose 1996: 562) suggest new regimes, when contrasted with the old, are more likely to be perceived holistically and support for them is therefore likely to be indivisible. They emphasize that regimes 'come in wholes' — that is to say, for example, the Soviet system before perestroika functioned as a whole and its parts could not be reformed piecemeal. It could not function as a political system without the command economy and vice versa. Similarly, in a context of universal suffrage it would not make much sense to measure support for competitive elections separately from support for the right to vote in them. The argument that regimes 'come in wholes' does not, however, prove that attitudes to a regime are all of one kind. If one accepts that empirical evaluations and normative commitment constitute different kinds of political support, one does not need to discard the notion that regimes come in wholes.

In other work, following the logic of the 'Churchill hypothesis' that democracy is not perfect, but it is better than any other alternatives on offer, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998a: 103ff.) employ alongside the Heaven/Hell scale for current regime evaluation a different measure of political support. They argue that in countries with a history of undemocratic rule it makes sense to characterize support for democracy in terms of support for undemocratic alternatives. By asking respondents to evaluate more than one kind of undemocratic regime, it is possible to identify what might be called an undemocratic syndrome in people's attitudes. Their second measure of support, the rejection of undemocratic alternatives, taps a normative attitude. In other words, it taps a belief about *what should be*, rather than *what is*. Questions are of the form: *Some people say that our country should be governed differently. How much do you agree or disagree with the proposition that : a) the army should govern the country; b) we should return to communist rule; c) it would be better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide*

everything; or d) a tough dictatorship is the only way out our current situation. KDB included items (a) and (c) in three successive Korean surveys from 1997 to 1999. In contrast to the Heaven/Hell scales, and the satisfaction with democracy question, which both ask for empirical evaluations of the current regime, the questions about undemocratic alternatives demand a normative response.

The above discussion has argued from theoretical principles for a structure of political support for incomplete democracies having at least two dimensions — normative and empirical. Rather than imposing a schema derived from theoretical principles, it would be preferable to test the schema against correlations in the data.

III.B.2.5 Evidence about Structure

Gunther and Montero (2000) factor analyse⁸ comparable indicators from recent surveys in Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Chile, Uruguay and Hong Kong to support a multi-dimensional conceptualization of what they call 'attitudes toward democracy'. They are careful to avoid the use of the term 'support' to describe the multi-dimensional phenomenon to which they refer. Their findings are broadly in line with the theoretical expectation that normative attitudes and empirical evaluations comprise distinct dimensions. In addition, they found some evidence of a third dimension, which was concerned with the efficacy of the subject rather than with support for the regime as an external object. In their schema, Gunther and Montero (2000: 4) refer to the normative dimension as 'diffuse support' for democracy or 'legitimacy'; the empirical dimension is 'satisfaction with the performance of democracy', and the third dimension is 'political disaffection'.

⁸ This term is explained below in sub-section III.B.3.

Gunther and Montero (2000: 8) use as a measure of what they call 'diffuse support' or 'legitimacy' the preference for democracy over other alternative systems which might be available. Citing Linz (1988: 65; 1978a: 16) they define diffuse system support as: 'the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than others that might be established'. This is reminiscent of Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer's (1998) 'realist' measure of democratic support in terms of the 'Churchill hypothesis' that democracy is preferred as the least bad system when compared to alternatives. Gunther and Montero's main measure of diffuse support is agreement or disagreement with the statement that: *Democracy is the best political system for a country like ours*. Their measure of satisfaction with the performance of democracy is the question on how well democracy is working.

Gunther and Montero's third dimension, political disaffection, is 'a reflection of a distrusting and suspicious vision of political life, if not social life in general' (2000: 9). They measure this attitude with questions about the respondent's level of interest in and knowledge about politics, whether the respondent believes that the government cares about the opinions of ordinary people and questions about citizens' sense of political efficacy. While the expression of empirical evaluations or normative attitudes positions the respondent outside the political process as an observer, the question of efficacy positions the respondent as a participant in the process. Gunther and Montero (2000) found that their third dimension needed to be further broken down into 'internal' and 'external' disaffection. The former consists of a common factor uniting interest in politics, self-evaluated political competence, a test of political knowledge and whether or not the respondent reports ever trying to convince others of his or her political views. The latter consists of evaluations of the extent to which the government cares about ordinary people and is amenable to their influence. Gunther and Montero do not, however, treat political disaffection as an

aspect of 'support', but rather as a dimension in a system of attitudes towards democracy.

III.B.3 The Structure of Political Support: Statistical Tests

As far as Korea and Russia are concerned, the foregoing arguments are inconclusive without examination of the data⁹. In order to compare levels of political support for different regimes, it is important to establish that the structure of attitudes towards democracy, that is to say, the inter-relationship amongst these attitudes, is similar in the two countries. If it is not, one cannot proceed with direct comparison of similar indicators but must rather enquire into the reasons for structural difference.

Proposition 1: Regardless of the prior regime legacy, citizens evaluate normative questions about what the regime should be differently from empirical questions about what the regime is.

The test of the validity of this proposition is whether the two aspects of support — empirical evaluations and normative attitudes — appear to be distinct dimensions of both Korean and Russian public opinion. The normal statistical technique for analysing a system of correlations is factor analysis, the results of which indicate the relationship of each of a system of variables with one or more underlying 'latent' or hypothetical variables known as factors. The 'factor loading' for each variable on each factor tells one how closely the factor is related to the variable. However, factor analysis does not tell one why the factors relate to the variables in the way they do¹⁰. If two variables load on a single factor, two interpretations are

⁹ Appendix III gives means, standard deviations and full texts of the questions for all the KDB and NRB variables used in the following analyses.

¹⁰ The correlation between two variables can be worked out as the sum of the products of factor loadings on paths linking the two variables to their common factors. Factor loadings are equivalent to 'path coefficients' in

possible. The first is that they both tap into the same underlying attitude, that is, they both measure the same thing. The second is that the two variables are causally related in some way: either one affects the other or both are affected by some third, unmeasured variable. The technique is sensitive to the choice of variables which are put into the analysis. Even the addition of one variable to an analysis of five or six can change the factors which are produced by the analysis and consequently the interpretation given to it. For that reason, when comparing the results of two or more factor analyses across contexts, it is important to use as nearly as possible the same or equivalent variables in each analysis. The results of parallel analyses of KDB and NRB data from three years¹¹ suggest that the structure of political support for incomplete democracies in each country exhibits both similarities and differences (Tables III.4a and III.4b).

III.B.3.1 The Structure of Political Support in Korea

In Korea the evidence is quite clear. In 1997, support for a return to army rule, and for the proposition that a strong leader is better than parliament, which are both normative attitudes, load on the second factor (named 'Anti/Pro Dem' in the table), while satisfaction with the way democracy works and the current extent of democracy, which represent empirical evaluations, load on the first factor (named 'Dem Evaluation' in the table). In 1998, the 'Anti/Pro Dem' attitudes appear on the third factor, while 'Dem Evaluation' remains the first factor. In 1999, the structure of attitudes is almost identical: 'Anti/Pro Dem' is the third factor and 'Dem Evaluation' is the first factor. Analysis of a different combination of

causal modeling. However, factor analysis is not used here as a way of developing a causal model, but simply as a way of summarizing correlations.

¹¹ Data are available for more than three years, but the range of variables available for analysis is more limited in the early surveys. Therefore, only the later surveys are analyzed here. Factor analyses of the earlier surveys were done, and the results are referred to where relevant.

Table III 4A FACTOR ANALYSIS ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN KOREA

Factor loadings	1997					1998					1999				
	Dem Eval- uation	Anti/ Pro Dem	Effic- acy	Dem Eval- uation	Pro Anti Elec	Anti Pro Dem	Info/ Lack Info	Dem Eval- uation	Elec Inte- rest	Anti Pro Dem	Info/ Lack Info	Dem Eval- uation	Elec Inte- rest	Anti Pro Dem	Info/ Lack Info
Support return to army rule Strong leader more effective than parliament	.04	.77 ^a	-.14	-.19	.02	.76 ^a	-.13	-.03	-.09	.84 ^a	-.02	-.03	-.10	.81 ^a	-.05
Desired level of democracy	.42	-.54	-.20	.54	.11	.32	.16	.66 ^a	.02	-.27	.02	.66 ^a	.02	-.27	-.03
Satisfaction with the way democracy works	.74 ^a	-.04	.13	.76 ^a	.05	.06	-.08	.74 ^a	.15	.08	-.08	.74 ^a	.15	.08	.07
Extent of democracy now	.82 ^a	-.01	-.05	.77 ^a	-.04	.01	.09	.81 ^a	.06	.10	.09	.81 ^a	.06	.10	-.03
Identifies with political right	.36	.12	.28	.51	.21	-.01	-.17	.32	-.10	.11	-.17	.32	-.10	.11	.61 ^a
Elections are best to choose government	.09	-.08	.63 ^a	.09	.81 ^a	-.17	.01	.21	.63 ^a	-.22	.01	.21	.63 ^a	-.22	-.04
Voted in last election				.18	.36	.23	.22	.11	.42	.22	.22	.11	.42	.22	-.23
Interested in politics				-.08	-.08	-.08	.80 ^a	-.05	.63 ^a	.01	-.05	.63 ^a	.01	.33	.33
Reads national newspapers				.03	-.02	-.07	.81 ^a	-.13	.06	-.10	-.13	.06	-.10	.80 ^a	.80 ^a
Asked for opinion about politics															
Ordinary people can influence government	-.02	-.02	.77 ^a												
Voting influences the government				.02	.81 ^a	-.05	-.02	.01	.78 ^a	-.12	.01	.78 ^a	-.12	-.07	-.07
Eigen values:	1.70	1.37	1.11	2.27	1.52	1.29	1.15	2.12	1.61	1.30	1.15	1.61	1.30	1.15	1.15
% variance explained:	21	17	14	21	14	12	10	19	15	12	10	15	12	10	10

^a Loading at .60 or above; blank cell=question not asked

Source: as in Table III.1

Table III.4B. FACTOR ANALYSIS: ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

Factor loadings ^a :	1998				Apr 2000				2001		
	Anti/	Anti/	Info/	Anti/	Pro/	Anti	Voter	Effic-	Pro/	Vote	Dem
	Pro	Pro	Lack	Pro	Anti	Anti		acy	Anti	/Info	Eval-
Support return to Communism	-.68 ^a	.22	-.03	-.05	-.67 ^a	-.13	.07	-.27	-.76 ^a	.08	-.05
Dictatorship the only way out	-.19	.62 ^a	.12	-.33	-.51	-.22	.49	.18	-.62 ^a	.04	.20
Desired level of democracy	.16	-.76 ^a	.00	.04	.63 ^a	-.22	-.20	-.26	.59	.04	-.39
Identifies with pro-market political outlook ^b	.66 ^a	-.02	.09	.15	.66 ^a	.07	.30	.01	.60 ^a	.16	.15
Current regime evaluation	.65 ^a	-.01	-.03	.19	.52	-.05	.00	.21	.46	-.21	.49
Extent of democracy now	.34	.58	-.09	.48	-.10	.68 ^a	.22	-.16	-.05	.00	.78 ^a
Elections are best to choose government	.05	-.22	.28	.65 ^a	.11	.73 ^a	-.17	.16	.42	.24	.15
Voted in last election					.08	.08	.82 ^a	-.09	-.13	.67 ^a	.13
Reads national newspapers	.09	.00	.69 ^a	.20							
Knowledge about politics									-.11	.65 ^a	-.09
Asked for opinion about politics	-.05	.05	.77 ^a	-.06					.10	.62 ^a	-.11
Ordinary people can influence government ^c	.38	-.02	.40	-.45	.13	.00	-.04	.88 ^a			
Eigen values:	1.91	1.36	1.20	1.01	1.96	1.16	1.04	1.00	2.11	1.41	1.09
% variance explained:	19	14	12	10	22	13	12	11	21	14	11

^a=loading at .60 or above; blank cell=question not asked; ^b Question about political outlook not asked in 1998, so two questions on welfare values used as proxy, scored as 2=favours private ownership and individual responsibility for welfare, 1=favours one, 0=neither; ^c In April 2000, question asks for comparison with prior regime.

Source: as in Table III.1

variables, available for 1996, reinforced the separation of normative attitudes and empirical evaluations. The highest loadings in the 1996 factor analysis were: Factor 1: Desired level of democracy (.75), Suitability of democracy (.65), Desire for democratic expansion (.59); Factor 2: Extent of democracy now (.80) and satisfaction with democracy (.79).

However, the desired level of democracy, a normative attitude, cross-loads on both the first and second factors in 1997, and in 1998 and 1999 loads more strongly on the factors concerned with empirical evaluations. This runs against the expected behaviour of this variable. A possible explanation is that democracy functions as an extremely widely valued political symbol in Korea, producing an extremely skewed distribution, which may lead to reinforcement effects amongst the desired and achieved levels of democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy works. When asked to rate their personal desired level of democracy in Korea on a scale of one to ten, where one is completely undemocratic and ten is completely democratic, the median Korean respondent gives a score of nine, and the mean response is between eight and nine¹². Notwithstanding the behaviour of this particular variable, the overall pattern of correlations revealed by the analyses suggests that Korea exhibits a fairly stable separation in citizens' minds between empirical and normative attitudes to democracy. In this sense, Korea conforms to the pattern observed by Gunther and Montero (2000) in a wide range of other democratizing countries, including Spain, Greece, Uruguay, Bulgaria, Hungary and Hong Kong.

III.B.3.2 The Structure of Political Support in Russia

In Russia, normative attitudes and empirical evaluations appear to be separate, too, at least in the later years of survey. In the April 2000

¹² Russians are less enthusiastic, the median score being seven for all years, and there is also more variation in Russian responses (see Appendix III).

survey, desired level of democracy, pro-market political outlook and, with opposite sign, support for a return to Communism, all normative attitudes, load together on the first factor (named 'Pro/Anti Dem' in the Table III.4B). In the 2001 survey, the 'Pro/Anti Dem' attitudes — support for a return to Communism, belief that dictatorship is the only way out, the desired level of democracy and pro-market beliefs — again load together on the first factor. It is thus strongly normative. The third factor (named 'Dem Evaluation') is empirical, since the highest loading variables are the extent of democracy now and current regime evaluation, which cross-loads on the third factor.

However, evidence from 1998 suggests that, at that time, normative attitudes and empirical evaluations were closely correlated. In 1998, support for a return to Communism loaded on the first factor (named 'Anti/Pro Com' in the table), along with opposition to pro-market beliefs and negative evaluations of the current regime. The 'Anti/Pro Com' factor thus represents a conflation of normative attitudes and empirical evaluations. Looking for a common underlying dimension to these variables, one notices that they concern fundamental issues of political economy. Preference for dictatorship, and the desired level of democracy, both normative, loaded on the second factor (named 'Anti/Pro Dict' in the table) along with an empirical question, the extent of democracy now. Looking for a common underlying dimension here, one notices that the variables are concerned with politics but not political economy. The presence of normative attitudes and empirical evaluations on both factors implies that empirical evaluations of the current regime, far from being the objects of dispassionate assessments by citizens, provoke strong normative disagreements. Gunther and Montero (2000: 34) report a similar finding in their analysis of data from Chile, and suggest that this reflects a 'deep cleavage in the Chilean polity separating those on the centre and left with strongly pro-democratic attitudes from those on the right with sympathies for the Pinochet regime'. If a similar interpretation may be applied to Russia, then

the non-separation of normative attitudes and empirical evaluations in 1998 implies a deep and wide cleavage in Russian society over the current regime and the economic system. An explanation consistent with the analysis is that those who evaluated the current regime favourably tended to do so not on dispassionate grounds but because they were anti-communist, but not necessarily democrats, while those who gave the current regime a poor rating tended to do so because they were anti-market. Analysis of the January 2000 survey, not shown in the table, produces similar results to that of the 1998 survey¹³.

In April 2000, with the accession of Vladimir Putin to the presidency, there is some evidence of a shift in the structure of Russian public opinion about democracy, notably the stronger correlations of various normative attitudes to democracy with the first factor. One possible reason for such a shift is that Putin successfully commanded support from a broad spectrum of Russians with widely varying views on economic transformation, while at the same time publicly espousing democracy (Rose, Munro & White 2000). The 2001 analysis suggests a clearer separation of normative attitudes and empirical evaluations, the latter forming a separate factor for the first time. The factor analyses do not indicate that the structure of Russian attitudes to democracy is the same as the structure of such attitudes in Korea. Yet they do suggest that the structure of Russian attitudes has recently become somewhat more normal in the sense of conforming, like the Korean attitudes, to the broad patterns reported by Gunther and Montero (2000) for a wide range of other countries.

¹³ In January 2000, factor loadings close to or above .50 on the first factor were: desired level of democracy (−.76), dictatorship the only way out (.62), extent of democracy now (.51); on the second factor, ordinary people can influence government (.64), current regime evaluation (.55), support return to Communism (−.50); on the third factor, support for elections (.70) and voted in Duma election(.68) and on the fourth factor, reading national newspapers (.77) and extent of democracy now (−.56).

The behaviour of the variables measuring empirical evaluations of the current regime is a key difference between the Russian and Korean analyses. In the Korean surveys, satisfaction with the way democracy works loads on separate factors from questions concerning rejection of undemocratic rule, whereas in the Russian surveys, current regime evaluations on the Heaven/Hell scale have a much closer relationship to the equivalent indicators. However, differences in question wordings may play a role here, as the Russian current regime evaluation questions were worded in such a way as to elicit a 'holistic' response.

The foregoing factor analyses establish that:

1) the structure of opinions about incomplete democracies in the two countries shows an important difference in the degree of correlation in the two countries between empirical evaluations and normative commitment.

2) the Russian structure of opinion appears to have changed in recent years, coinciding with the election of Putin, and moved some way towards the Korean structure, which shows clear separation of empirical evaluation and normative commitment.

III.B.4 Levels of Political Support for Incomplete Democracies

On the basis of the foregoing arguments, it seems reasonable to proceed with paired comparisons of equivalent variables. In so doing, one must bear in mind the distinction drawn above between functional and direct equivalence. As argued in Chapter Two, Russia exhibits greater political tension, weaker enforcement of the rule of law, poorer provision of political freedom, a feebler potential for civil society and a worse economic situation. This gives a basis for expectations about relative levels of support in the two countries.

Proposition 2: If a regime has a post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state legacy, it is likely to have significantly lower political support across

both normative and empirical dimensions than a regime with a bureaucratic-military authoritarian, developmental legacy.

III.B.4.1 Empirical Evaluations

Directly equivalent measures of empirical evaluation of the current regime are not available in the KDB and NRB datasets. The question of satisfaction with the way democracy works, which in the KDB is the principal measure for evaluation of the current regime, is not available in NRB. However, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) surveys of the early 1990s included a directly comparable question about satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in Russia, and a similar question was included in the Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health survey of 2001 (see Appendix IV for details of these surveys)¹⁴.

To make numerical comparisons, it is necessary to place Korean and Russian regime evaluations on a common scale. To do this, the author adopts a scale from -9 to +9 as standard. This is of such a length that differences of one point may be treated as statistically significant. The CEEB answers are on a four point scale from one for 'very dissatisfied' to four for 'very satisfied'. These are recoded as follows: 1=-9; 2=-3, and so on in two further increments of six to reach +9. The Korean satisfaction with democracy scores on a one to ten scale are recoded in similar fashion: 1= -8.5, 2=-6.6, and so on in eight further increments of 1.89 to reach +8.5. For both Korean and Russian data, the mathematical midpoint of the scale has a value of zero, and the two codes on either side of it are equidistant, with the result that the recoding procedure introduces no statistical bias.

Looking at trends over time shows that current regime evaluations have remained fairly constant throughout the periods covered by the

14 The overlap of CEEB questions with KDB questions is too small to allow any attempt to repeat the factor analyses presented above using NRB data.


surveys in both countries (Figure III.1). In terms of satisfaction with the way democracy works, the highest regime evaluation for Korea (0.6) was in January 1996, after Kim Young-sam's government had announced its intention to prosecute the two preceding presidents. The lowest (-1.1) was in May the following year after Kim Young-sam himself became exposed to corruption allegations. In 1998 and 1999 Korean regime evaluations were just below zero. In Russia, the lowest mean score (-5.6) was in autumn 1995, and the highest of Yeltsin's presidency (-4) in November 1993, only a month after government forces stormed the Russian Congress.

The comparison of recoded mean scores in the two countries shows that, in accordance with Proposition 2, if Russians are asked to rate their satisfaction with the way democracy is developing, their evaluation of the regime is much lower than that of the Koreans (Figure III.1, cf. uppermost with lowest line). The Russian mean scores for the early to mid-1990s range from -4 in 1993 to -5.6 in 1995; the 2001 score of -2.5 is substantially higher. The Korean mean scores range from 0.6 in 1996 to -1.1 in 1997 (see Appendix Table IV.2 for standard deviations).

It can be objected on 'realist' grounds that the question about the way democracy is developing is not the best way to assess Russian evaluations of their current regime. The 'realist' argument is that Russians are better able to give an evaluation of the regime in comparison to their past regime than they are able to assess its performance in relation to abstract criteria of democracy. As mentioned above, the Heaven/Hell scale used for empirical evaluation in Russia is only available in one survey in Korea, and there are problems with the comparability of the Korean question. To confirm this point, it is worth comparing the Heaven/Hell scales with the satisfaction with democracy scale within each country, and then comparing between countries.

Figure III.1 EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS OF CURRENT REGIMES IN KOREA AND RUSSIA

Q. (Korea: satisfaction) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is complete dissatisfaction and 10 is complete satisfaction, where would you place the way democracy works in our country? Q. (Russia: satisfaction) On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Russia? Q. (Russia: Heaven/Hell scale) Here is a scale from -100 to +100 where the top +100 is the best and the bottom -100 is the worst. Where on this scale would you rate our current political system? (All scores approximately standardized on scale from -9 to +9 with notional midpoint of 0)



Source: Korea Democracy Barometer and New Russia Barometer as in Table III.1. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health survey, as in Appendix IV.

For Russia, the NRB Heaven/Hell scale from -100 to $+100$ is recoded as follows: $-100=-9$, $-90=-8.1$, and so on in 19 further increments of $.9$ to reach $+9$. The highest current regime evaluation (-0.2) was in June 2001, when Putin had been president for more than one year. The lowest current regime evaluation on the Heaven/Hell scale (-2.1) was in March/April 1995 eight months before the Duma election which saw the Communists become the largest parliamentary party for the first time. The recoded mean scores show that in Russia the realist Heaven/Hell question produces significantly more positive evaluations of the present regime than the CEEB questions about satisfaction with the way democracy is developing (Figure III.1, cf. middle with lowest line). Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe confirms that the realist question on a Heaven/Hell scale establishes a different metric for evaluation than questions about satisfaction with the way democracy works. In four countries of Central and Eastern Europe where both types of questions were asked in different surveys in 1993, ratings of satisfaction with democracy were significantly lower than approval ratings on the Heaven/Hell scales (Tóka 1995: 364–365; Rose & Haerpfer 1996a: 25).

The 1997 KDB survey asked Koreans to rate their regime under Kim Young-sam on a scale from 0 to 100. After recoding to match the $-9/+9$ scale, the Heaven/Hell question produced a mean of -2.2 , whereas the satisfaction with democracy question produced a mean of -1.1 . Thus, unlike in post-communist Europe, the Heaven/Hell question as asked in Korea produces a worse score than the question about satisfaction with the way democracy works. The worse evaluation may be partially attributed to the fact that the question wording named an unpopular president. Note that this score of -2.2 is lower also than all of the Russian scores on the Heaven/Hell scale, such as, for example, the spring 1998 score (-1.5). It stretches credibility to assert on the basis of these numbers that Koreans in

1997 were less happy with the performance of their regime than Russians in 1998. One can advance the relativist argument that Russians had lower standards, but it is worth recalling that at this time Yeltsin was near the nadir of his popularity (Mishler & Willerton 2000: 10). The context suggests a prima facie case that Russians had stronger reasons to be dissatisfied than Koreans. All this points to the conclusion that the Heaven/Hell questions as asked in Korea in 1997 and in Russia in all the NRB surveys did not produce directly equivalent indicators.

III.B.4.2 Normative Commitment

The Churchill hypothesis is that democracy is the worst form of government there is, except for all the other systems that have been tried (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998). The extent to which citizens of incomplete democracies disagree with Churchill is a negative measure of their political support for the regime. To begin with the most recent experience of undemocratic rule, in 1997 KDB data showed that only 15 per cent of Koreans agreed with the statement: *The army should govern the country* (Table III.5)¹⁵. If one looks at the same indicator measured over several years, no particular trend is evident in the KDB data. In 1998, support for army rule stood at 13 per cent, and in 1999 it had fallen to 9 per cent (Table III.5). However, Shin (2001b) reports that by 2001 support for army rule had risen back as high as 21 per cent¹⁶. To explain the rise in support for army rule over the previous two years, Shin (2001a: 197f) cites such factors as perceptions that economic reforms undertaken since the 1997/1998 financial crisis were not working, and also perceptions that the democratic system of government was in a state of crisis. For example, the

¹⁵ See Appendix III for full text of questions with means and standard deviations.

¹⁶ The 2001 KDB data is not available to the author. Its use is here restricted to citing works by Doh C. Shin.

Table III.5 LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR FOUR PROPOSITIONS ON UNDEMOCRATIC RULE

	Korea				Russia					
	1997	1998	1999	2001	1994	1995	1996	1998	2000	2001
(Per cent definitely or somewhat <u>AGREE</u>)										
Q. There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that:										
1) the army should govern the country	15	13	9	21	13	12	10	16	11	16
2) We should return to Communist rule					29	32	40	42	42	39
3) it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything	21	27	20	24	63					
4) a tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation					29	34	34	36	29	40
										32

Source: As in Table III.1; Shin 2001b.

2001 KDB asked: *In view of what the National Assembly and political parties have been doing in the past year, do you feel our democratic system of government is or is not in a state of crisis.* The results showed that 69 per cent believed the regime to be in crisis (Shin 2001a: 198).

When asked to react to the statement: *It would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything,* 21 per cent of Koreans in 1997 expressed agreement. Belief that a strongman is better than parliament to solve the problems facing the country rose to 27 per cent in 1998, fell to 20 per cent in 1999, before climbing again to 24 per cent in 2001. In 1997, when asked to react to the statement: *Parliament should be suspended and parties abolished,* 19 per cent of Koreans expressed agreement. In general, feeling against representative institutions is higher in Korea than support for a return to army rule, though support for the suspension of parliament is well below 50 per cent.

In 1994 according to NRB data, 29 per cent of Russians agreed that: *It would be better to restore the communist system.* Since then, support for a return to communism has risen somewhat unevenly. In spring 1995 the figure was almost unchanged at 32 per cent. However, by January 1996, in the aftermath of the Communist Party's strong showing in the Duma election the previous December, as many as 40 per cent supported a return to communism. Yeltsin's presidential campaign that year featured strong anti-communist messages in the mass media and by July 1996, following his victory in the election, support for returning to communism had fallen to 34 per cent. By 1998, 42 per cent of NRB respondents supported a return to communism. Two years later, in January 2000, the figure was unchanged. In April 2000, just after Putin's election, it stood at 39 per cent. By June 2001, support for a return to communism reached as high as 47 per cent.

By contrast, the trend in Russian support for rule by the army is flat. Between 1994 and 2001 between 10 and 16 per cent of respondents expressed support for this form of undemocratic rule. The NRB also asked about support for forms of undemocratic rule common in other countries. Agreement with the statement that *A tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation* stood at 29 per cent in spring 1995; it rose slightly to 34 per cent in January 1996, and remained fairly stable in July 1996 and in 1998. It fell to 29 per cent in January 2000, just after Yeltsin's resignation, but peaked at 40 per cent four months later, immediately following Putin's election victory in April 2000. One may conclude on this basis that Russian support for undemocratic rule fluctuates up and down with the changing political context, and there is no strong overall trend up or down.

A slightly anomalous datum in the NRB data set comes from the February 1994 survey. In that survey as many as 63 per cent of Russians expressed agreement with the proposition that: *It would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything.* This is far higher than the 20–27 per cent of Koreans agreeing with the same statement. Since the question was asked in NRB only in 1994 it is difficult to state with confidence whether time context or the nature of the question produced this result. NRB also asked respondents whether they would approve or disapprove if parliament were suspended. In early 1994 NRB survey, 37 per cent expressed approval for the suspension of the recently elected parliament. In 1995 39 per cent expressed the same opinion, and in the next four surveys the figure fluctuated between 34 and 39 per cent. In April 2000, as many as 42 per cent said they would approve the suspension of parliament and in 2001 as many as 51 per cent said they would approve the suspension of parliament.

The numbers supporting suspension of parliament were thus particularly high in Russia when the question asked about allowing a strong

leader to replace parliament, and following Putin's election as president. Putin has consistently commanded widespread support since rising to a position of national leadership (VCIOM & CSPP 2001b), but he has not so far shown any inclination either to dispense with parliament, or to suspend its activities. Recall from Chapter Two that in both countries the president and the parliament are separately elected and that in both countries, but especially in Russia, the government is mainly accountable to the president and less accountable to parliament.

Factor analyses restricted to questions about undemocratic alternatives tend to support the proposition that there is such a thing as an undemocratic syndrome of attitudes in both countries. The factor loadings for Korea in 1997 were: strong leader better than parliament (.75), army should rule (.69), dictator like Park more effective than democracy (.62), approval of suspension of parliament (.49). The factor loadings for Russia in January 1996 were: support for army rule (.75), a tough dictatorship the only way out (.74), return to Communism (.73) and approval of parliament's suspension (.25). Other years exhibited the same unidimensional structure with very similar loadings. The only exceptions were factor analyses of the July 1996 and 1998 surveys, in which support for a suspension of parliament formed a separate factor, which can be interpreted as dissatisfaction with the legislature as an institution rather than a demand for undemocratic rule¹⁷. The 1994 analysis also produced a two factor solution, but the results were not strictly comparable as the question on support for a tough dictatorship was not asked. On this basis, it seems reasonable to construct a single additive scale to measure the rejection of undemocratic rule in each country.


¹⁷ In 1998, 37 per cent of NRB respondents said they would approve if parliament were suspended. See Appendix III for the question wording with means and standard deviations.

The author treats as directly equivalent additive scales combining, for Russia, rejection of return to Communism, rejection of army rule, and rejection of the statement that a tough dictatorship is the only way out; and, for Korea, rejection of a return to army rule and of the statement that rule by a strongman is better than parliament. These are the highest loading variables on factors representing support for undemocratic rule in each country. Support for suspension of parliament is not included in the scale because of its relatively low loadings in the factor analyses and because it sometimes forms a separate factor. The Russian scale for rejection of undemocratic alternatives in its original form runs from three to 12, while the Korean scale runs from two to eight. To enable direct comparisons between the two countries, it is necessary to adopt a standard scale. The standard scale is computed by multiplying the Russian score by two and the Korean score by three to create a scale running from six to 24. This scale has 19 points ($=24-5$). Subtracting fifteen from the scale makes it run from -9 to $+9$ with a midpoint of zero, just like the scales for empirical regime evaluations given above (Figure III.1). The choice of this length of scale is arbitrary but convenient, since differences of one point or more are statistically significant. On the scale, a score of one or above in Korea means that the respondent must have been strongly against either army rule or the proposition that a strong man is better than parliament to solve the serious problems facing the country, or at least somewhat against both undemocratic options. A score of one or above in Russia means that the respondent must have been somewhat or definitely against at least two of the three undemocratic options offered to them: a return to Communism, army rule or the proposition that a dictatorship is the only way out. A score of minus one or below indicates that the respondent is inclined to support undemocratic rule.

The combined scales confirm that Russians are somewhat less likely than Koreans to reject undemocratic rule (Figure III.2). The trend in both

Figure III.2 REJECTION OF UNDEMOCRATIC RULE IN KOREA AND RUSSIA

Q. There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that: (Russia) We should return to Communist rule; a tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation; the army should govern the country? (Korea) it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything; the army should govern the country? (Definitely agree... Definitely disagree; Both scales standardized on a scale from -9 for least rejection of undemocratic rule to +9 for most rejection, with notional midpoint of zero)



Source: Korea Democracy Barometer and New Russia Barometer, as in Table III.1

countries over the period covered by the surveys is quite flat. In Korea, the highest rejection of undemocratic alternatives (score of 5.5) was in 1999, and the lowest in 1998 (score of 4.6). In Russia the highest rejection of undemocratic alternatives was in March 1995 (score 3.7), and the lowest in April 2000 (score 2.4), just after Putin's election as president.

Another way of presenting the same data is in terms of percentages. The number of Koreans supporting *one or another* of the two forms of undemocratic rule included in the scale was 29 per cent in 1997, 32 per cent in 1998 and 22 per cent in 1999. The percentage of Russians supporting one or another of the three forms of undemocratic rule included in the scale was 58 per cent in 1994, 51 per cent in 1995, 54 per cent in January 1996, 52 per cent in July 1996, 61 per cent in 1998, 55 per cent in January 2000, and 61 per cent in April 2000 and in 2001.

The difference between the two countries is in the expected direction (*Proposition 2*), and is statistically significant. It is not, however, so large as to imply a radical difference between the two political cultures in their rejection of undemocratic rule. The data do not imply, for instance, that Koreans are democrats, but Russians are authoritarian. Rather they show that in both countries there is both rejection of all forms of undemocratic rule and support for various undemocratic alternatives, with no single undemocratic alternative commanding majority support. Nevertheless, there is a greater rejection of undemocratic rule in Korea.

As Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: 31) point out 'There is not an infinite choice of regimes available; the public is restricted to making choices between a few alternatives that their governing elites can supply.' Following this logic, one should not assume that all forms of undemocratic rule would be equally easy to implement in practice. A return to full-blown communism in Russia, for example, would have very high 'start-up' costs,

since it would require the re-expropriation of privatized property, it would oblige the state to 'wear' the cost of an end to foreign financial flows and, since it is possible that the army would split, might demand on the part of Communist leaders a willingness to fight and win a civil war. Similarly, in Korea a return to army rule would impose severe costs on the Korean state, both because of the risk of a popular uprising and because of international displeasure.

III.C Summary

To sum up the discussion in this chapter so far, a fundamental issue for survey research on political support for incomplete democracies is the question: how many dependent variables are necessary to capture the phenomenon of interest? The argument that support is indivisible suggests that one needs to identify only one dependent variable. However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny for two reasons. Firstly, it rests on the non-sequitur that because regimes are indivisible support for them must be so too. Secondly, there are different ways of classifying support, other than in terms of the objects supported. The most basic distinction, encountered in the literature quite frequently, is between normative and empirical dimensions of support. On the level of empirical evaluations, the NRB approach is to rely on questions referring to regimes which citizens have actually experienced, while KDB asks about satisfaction with the functioning of democracy as understood by the respondent on an abstract level. In terms of normative attitudes, both the KDB and NRB include questions about support for undemocratic systems of government. Factor analysis of these and related variables suggests that the two theoretical dimensions, normative and empirical, do reflect different dimensions of public opinion in these two countries.

For the purpose of comparison of micro- or individual-level determinants of support for incomplete democracies in Korea and Russia,

the dependent variables, the determination of which will be further analysed using KDB and NRB data in Chapter Four, are as follows (see Appendix III for full questions, means and standard deviations):

a) Two functionally equivalent measures of empirical evaluation of the current regime, namely in Russia, current regime evaluation on the Heaven/Hell scale, and in Korea satisfaction with the way democracy works (see Figure III.1).

b) Two directly equivalent measures of normative commitment to democracy or the rejection of historically relevant undemocratic alternatives, namely, in Russia, communist rule, rule by the army or a dictatorship and in Korea, rule by the army or a strongman (see Figure III.2).

It is unfortunate that the KDB and NRB did not provide directly equivalent trend measures of empirical evaluation of the current regime. As shown in Figure III.1 a direct equivalent to the KDB question is available in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). However, the overlap of independent variables between the KDB and CEEB is too narrow to provide a sophisticated level of analysis at the micro-level. For this reason, the CEEB data is subject to macro-level analysis only, in Chapter Five.

The independent variable in country comparisons is country, which in the present context stands as a proxy for the type of legacy left by the prior undemocratic regime. Time has also been considered as an independent variable, but the largest differences are between countries rather than over time. The next chapter introduces micro- or individual-level determinants into the analysis, and also analyses how much difference institutional context, as well as time of survey make relative to the characteristics of individuals and households in the determination of the rejection of undemocratic rule. Finally, it examines the ways in which context interacts with individual-level variables.

CHAPTER IV. INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL AND CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS

IV.A Aims, Method and Data

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the comparative effects on political support for the Korean and Russian incomplete democracies of:

- 1) differences between individuals and households within countries;
- and
- 2) differences in previous undemocratic regime type.

This involves developing multiple regression models of the determination of political support for the regime in each country.

The dependent variables are the following:

- 1) Empirical evaluations of the current regime, for which two functionally equivalent measures are available, namely for Korea, satisfaction with the way democracy works and for Russia, current regime evaluations on the Heaven/Hell scale;
- 2) Normative commitment to the current regime, measured by two directly equivalent measures of rejection of undemocratic rule.

The author compares the determinants of functionally equivalent variables tapping empirical evaluations of the current regime using parallel single-country regressions, but not regressions in a merged data file. This is because the two functionally equivalent measures are of different type, the KDB measure tapping empirical regime evaluations on an absolute scale, and the NRB measure on a relative scale. The pair of variables measuring normative commitment to the Korean and Russian regimes are directly equivalent and the author analyses their determinants both in parallel single-country regressions and in a merged data file using data from both countries.

In sections IV.B and IV.C, the data for the two countries undergo separate but parallel analyses. In section IV.D, the author compares the determinants of political support in the two countries, identifying those individual-level influences which are common across contexts and those which are distinctive.

The word 'context' here is used as the generic term for a unique combination of a time and a country. Of primary interest is *country-context*, which in this chapter identifies the particular institutional setting associated with the legacy of the post-totalitarian party-state as against that of the bureaucratic-military authoritarian developmental state. Of secondary-interest, insofar as it interacts with country-context is *time context*, that is particular periods and events.

Merging data from both countries into a single file allows a quantitative investigation, in sections IV.E and IV.F, of the extent and ways in which context affects rejection of undemocratic rule. A distinction between *direct* and *interactive* contextual effects allows a breakdown of the total cumulative contextual influence into a number of smaller effects. The term *direct contextual effect* refers here to the unmediated effect of context on the dependent variable. The term *interactive contextual effect* refers here to the change, for a given independent variable, in the magnitude or sign of its effect as context changes.

IV.A.1 Distributions of Dependent Variables

Frequency distributions for the KDB measure of satisfaction with the way democracy works, available in four years of survey (Table IV.1A), show that Korean empirical evaluations of their current regime vary more or less normally. The scale originally ran from one to ten, but in order to facilitate comparison with the other dependent variables, the author has recoded it to

Table IV.1A SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS IN KOREA

Q. (Korea) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is complete dissatisfaction and 10 is complete satisfaction, where would you place the way democracy works in our country? (scores standardized, on scale from -8.5 (worst) to +8.5 (best), don't knows excluded)

	1996	1997	1998	1999
Value		Valid %		
-8.5	2	4	2	1
-6.6	2	5	2	4
-4.7	6	12	7	7
-2.8	8	15	12	10
-0.9	23	27	32	34
0.9	21	18	24	26
2.8	23	11	13	11
4.7	12	6	6	4
6.6	3	1	1	2
8.5	0	1	1	1
Total%	100	100	100	100
Mean	0.6	-1.1	-0.3	-0.4
Std. dev.	3.4	3.5	3.1	3.1
Valid N*	950	991	989	1000

*Valid N is unweighted; all other figures are weighted.

Source: Korea Democracy Barometer, as in Table III.1

run from -8.5 to +8.5 in increments of 1.89, this being the closest possible approximation to the -9 to +9 scale used elsewhere.

Frequency distributions of current regime evaluations in Russia on the Heaven/Hell scale (Table IV.1B) show that Russian empirical evaluations of their current regime tend to be skewed somewhat to the negative end of the scale. The scale originally ran from -100 to +100, but after recoding to match the other dependent variables, runs from -9 to +9 in increments of 0.9. The mean is close to minus one in most years, but falls to minus two in 1995 and early 1996. It rises to almost zero in 2001. The standard deviation is between four and five in all years. Recall from Chapter Three that the measures of current regime evaluations in Korea and Russia are not directly equivalent, and therefore direct numerical comparisons with the Korean

Table IV.1B CURRENT REGIME EVALUATION IN RUSSIA

Q. (Russia) Here is a scale from -100 to +100 where -100 is the worst system of government and +100 is the best. Where would you place our system of government at present? (201 point scale; scores standardized on scale from -9 (worst) to 9 (best), don't knows excluded)

Value	1993	1994	1995	Jan-96	Jul-96	1998	Jan-00	Apr-00	2001
-9	12	11	13	12	8	11	11	10	8
-8.1	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	1
-7.2	3	3	4	4	5	4	3	4	3
-6.3	4	3	4	3	3	3	5	2	2
-5.4	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	1
-4.5	8	16	8	8	9	7	8	9	6
-3.6	4	3	5	3	4	4	3	3	3
-2.7	6	3	5	4	4	4	4	5	4
-1.8	4	4	5	4	3	5	4	5	4
-0.9	4	4	4	3	4	4	2	5	4
0	14	17	20	26	16	15	16	14	17
0.9	8	5	6	7	6	7	6	7	8
1.8	6	5	4	5	7	7	6	7	7
2.7	5	4	5	5	5	7	6	5	7
3.6	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	7
4.5	9	11	5	4	8	8	7	8	9
5.4	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	3
6.3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	2	2
7.2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1
8.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
9	1	2	0	1	1	0	4	1	3
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mean	-1.5	-1.3	-2.1	-1.8	-1.1	-1.5	-1.0	-1.2	-0.2
Std.dev.	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.6	4.5	5.0	4.6	4.5
Valid N*	1839	3390	1951	2374	1560	1801	1907	1512	2000

*Valid N is unweighted; all other figures are weighted.

Source: New Russia Barometer, as in Table III.1

scores are inappropriate. One can, however, compare overall trends as well as the shape of the distributions.

Frequency distributions for rejection of undemocratic rule in both countries tend to be skewed towards the positive end of the scale (Table IV.2). The Russian scale in its original form combined three four point scales, and so ran from three to twelve. The Korean scale originally

Table IV.2 REJECTION OF UNDEMOCRATIC RULE IN KOREA AND RUSSIA

Q. *There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that: (Russia) We should return to Communist rule; a tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation); OR the army should govern the country? (Korea) it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything; OR the army should govern the country? (Definitely agree...Definitely disagree. Two additive scales, both standardized to run from -9 for least rejection of undemocratic rule to +9 for most rejection, don't knows excluded)*

Value range	Korea					Russia					
	1997	1998	1999	1994	1995	Jan-96	Jul-96	1998	Jan-00	Apr-00	2001
-9	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
-7				1	1	1	1	2	1	1	3
-6	1	2	1								
-5				4	3	4	3	3	3	3	4
-3	5	6	3	8	5	7	6	7	8	8	7
-1				11	8	13	11	11	10	14	12
0	11	15	10								
1				15	15	13	15	14	14	18	15
3	21	23	23	21	20	18	16	22	23	22	19
5				14	16	14	15	15	12	12	12
6	19	17	19								
7				13	13	12	16	11	11	10	11
9	42	36	43	12	19	17	17	14	17	11	16
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mean	5.3	4.6	5.5	2.8	3.7	3.1	3.5	2.8	3.1	2.4	2.7
Std. Dev.	4.1	4.3	3.8	4.2	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.2	4	4.5
Valid N	1097	1002	964	2514	1910	2289	1584	1834	1865	1555	1974

Sources: Korea Democracy Barometer, New Russia Barometer, as in Table III.1

combined two four point scales, and so ran from two to eight. Recoding both scales on a common metric, from -9 to +9, shows that Korean rejection of undemocratic rule, with a mean of around five in all three years from 1997 to 1999, is stronger than Russian rejection of undemocratic rule, which has a mean of around three in most years. Standard deviations in both countries in all years are close to four.

IV.A.2 Methodological Issues

IV.A.2.1 Comparing Determinants Across Countries

Section IV.B below builds initial multiple regression models for the determination of current regime evaluations and rejection of undemocratic rule in Korea. Section IV.C does the same for Russia. As far as possible, given limitations in the available data, the same independent variables are used to build models for each country. In order to facilitate comparison of models across countries, paired regression models for a single dependent variable are presented for both countries in one table (see below). However, the discussion deals with each country in turn before proceeding in section IV.D to a detailed comparison of determinants in the two countries. This order of presentation allows the reader to build up a picture of the determinants of political support in each country separately before coming to cross-country comparisons.

The independent variables, classified as social, economic, political and time effects, enter the models in stages. By adding independent variables in stages — in effect deliberately mis-specifying — the author tests how much variance is explainable in terms of a restricted set of independent variables¹. In this way, it is possible to determine what additional percentage

¹ Appendix III reports the full texts of survey questions, minimum and maximum values, means and standard deviations of all the variables.

of the variance is explained by each new category of independent variable. The author classifies independent variables according to the following convention. Social variables refer to attributes of individuals or households which structure the means available to the respondent. These include such ascriptive characteristics as age, gender, education, and social class. They also include the relation of the individual to social groups and social networks. Economic variables refer to economic evaluations, which are subjective, and also non-subjective micro-economic characteristics of individuals and households, such as income. Political variables refer to all variables tapping attitudes and opinions about the state. By treating time of survey as an additional category, the first sequence of regressions can also test whether dummies standing for time of survey have any significant effects on the dependent variables within each country.

The choice of independent variables reflects a variety of general perspectives current in research on the determinants of political support for incomplete democratic regimes, as well as the specific results of prior research on Korea and Russia. Amongst the general perspectives which deserve citation are socio-economic modernization models of support for democracy, associated with political scientists who rose to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Lipset (1959) argued that high levels of education, town size, wealth, and industrialization improve the prospects for a particular country to achieve stable democratic rule. To take the first of these, the conventional wisdom is that: 'Education ... broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices' (Lipset 1959: 79). Lipset and Rokkan's (1967: 14–15) cross-national study on party systems suggested that collective identities are additional social influences on political outlook.

More recently, a number of scholars have looked for the influence of social relationships and social networks on political life. Putnam (1993: 181–184) carried out a comparative study of governance Italy's regions on the basis of which he concluded that without norms of reciprocity and civic engagement, amoral familism, lawlessness, clientelism and ineffective government are likelier than successful democratization and economic development. Fukuyama (1995: 356–357) supports this argument, believing that social networks promote the functioning of a healthy capitalist economy and are necessary to make democratic political institutions work as well.

Also of general relevance are those strands of political science theory which concern the influence of subjective economic evaluations on politics. Fiorina (1981) emphasized the importance of distinguishing amongst retrospective, contemporaneous and prospective economic evaluations. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) used the analytical distinction between socio-tropic or 'macro-level' and egocentric or 'micro-level' economic evaluations to argue for a particular interpretation of the behaviour of American voters. These authors follow Weber (1966: 158) in assuming that the influence of subjective economic evaluations on political attitudes reflects judgments based on economic self-interest, whether that interest be in the general well-being of the nation or in the well-being of the household.

As far as political influences are concerned, a variety of perspectives are relevant. Rogowski (1974: 4) argues that political support is the aggregate result of calculations of self-interest — including political self-interest — by individuals in their social context. If calculations are rational then the strongest determinants of political support will be attitudes that are logically related to political support in the minds of citizens. Weber (1966: 130–31) posits tradition and affective attitudes alongside rational calculation as bases for political legitimacy. Easton (1965: 287ff) focuses on the interaction of outputs with demands. In this perspective, political support is

likely to reflect the supply of goods of near universal appeal, not restricted to economic prosperity, but also including such political 'goods' as honest government, social fairness, and so on. It may also reflect the congruence of the political system with the individual's own longstanding ideology and beliefs. The various political determinants of support can be divided for convenience into two groups: *political values*, which are parts of a more or less stable belief system about politics, and *political performance evaluations*, which reflect assessments of the regime's outputs.

IV.A.2.2 Relations Between Dependent Variables

If political support for an incomplete democracy is conceived as a two-dimensional phenomenon, it is necessary to determine some pattern of relations amongst its constituent parts. Statistical techniques such as factor analysis and multiple regression tell one how strong the relationships are amongst the variables, but they don't tell us in which causal order one should place them. It is usually necessary to rely on theoretical arguments to justify a particular causal ordering. On the basis of a review of literature on Southern Europe, Latin America and Post-communist Europe, Diamond (1999: 204) proposes a way of ordering the causation of more than a dozen variables, including both of those treated as dependent in this study. His schema suggests that satisfaction with the way democracy works is causally prior to legitimacy or normative support. Mishler and Rose (1999: 90) assume the reverse, on the grounds that since current evaluations form in the light of prior experience of undemocratic rule, pre-existing normative opinions modify current regime evaluations. They found evidence that the rejection of undemocratic rule was an important influence on current regime evaluations in 1991 (1999: 91). However, most of the data analysed in this chapter comes from a later stage in the transition process, when citizens have had more than enough time to form an experience-based evaluation of the new regime. People are likely to update their normative opinions on the basis of current as well as past experiences. Given that there are theoretical

justifications for both directions of causality, sub-sections IV.B.3 and IV.C.3 of this chapter investigate whether and how much evaluations of the current regime affect rejection of undemocratic rule and vice versa, controlling for other political influences as well as social and economic variables. The author uses two-stage least-squares regressions to determine the most likely direction of causality.

IV.A.2.3 Handling Data from Multiple Surveys In One Country

This chapter analyses multi-survey trend files for each country. When separate representative national surveys from one country are merged into a multi-survey trend file, the resulting data is not representative in the same sense that a single survey is representative. A single survey represents a snapshot or cross section of opinion in a given country at a particular moment in time. A multi-survey trend file represents a stack of such snapshots taken at different moments in time. No statistical information is lost in running regressions using a multi-survey trend file as long as two conditions are met: 1), the regressions are only run for those years for which the dependent variables is available; and 2) one includes a variable or sequence of dummy variables to control for the year of survey.

In addition, the author ran separate regressions for each survey. The single-survey regressions provide a useful check on the consistency of certain variables' behaviour in the multi-survey trend files, for example, where a variable is significant in one year but not the next. These single-survey regressions are not printed here, as such a large number of tables would become unwieldy, and would duplicate the information in the multi-survey regressions. Where pertinent to the discussion, to allow comparison with the multi-survey regressions, the author reports some unstandardized regression coefficients² (b's) from the single-survey regressions.

² Unstandardized regression coefficients, or b-coefficients, represent the change in the value of the dependent variable for a one unit change in the

IV.A.2.4 Missing Data

Missing data may present a problem if certain independent variables are not available for a large number of cases, for example, if the question was not asked in one or more of the years surveyed. The best solution to the problem is to collect more data. When that is impractical, as in the present study, a second best solution is to recode missing data to the mean value of the variable in the cases for which it is available. Since this has the effect of artificially lowering the amount of variation, it is a practice which works best when the variable is more often available than not, in order to keep the number of recodes to a minimum. Variables which are only available in one or two years of survey may be included in the regressions for the sake of complete model specification, but with the caveat that large amounts of missing data may artificially lower the significance of those variables. Where this risk is present, the author re-runs the same regressions using data from a single year, and draws the reader's attention to any observed change in the significance of the variable concerned.

IV.B Determinants in Korea

Single-country regression models using the Korean data produce a good fit for empirical evaluations of the current regime, explaining 36 per cent of the variance (Table IV.3). Time context variables on their own account for three per cent, social structure and social networks two per cent, economic attitudes an additional four per cent and political attitudes for the

independent variable. Beta-coefficients are the same but standardized in terms of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Using the conventional notation, if b = the unstandardized regression coefficient, S_x is the standard deviation of the independent variable, and S_y is the standard deviation of the dependent variable, $Beta = b (S_x / S_y)$. Beta-coefficients are only comparable within models, since their magnitude changes according to which other variables are included in the regression. Unstandardized coefficients, by contrast, are comparable between models.

Table IV.3 Empirical Evaluations: Single-country Regressions

		<u>Korea: Satisf.</u>		<u>Russia: Current</u>	
		<u>with democracy</u>		<u>regime eval.</u>	
		B	Beta	B	Beta
Time Context	Initial R²		3		1
Year 2 (1994 in Russia, 1997 in Korea)				.83**	.06
(Not shown: time dummies insignificant in both countries)					
Social structure/ networks	Additional R²		+2		+4
Gender: female					
Age					
Town size					
Education levels completed					
Trusts most people		.09**	.03		
Trusts trade unions				.10**	.03
Trusts private enterprise					
Self-assessed social class					
Belongs to largest Christian church ^a		.24**	.03		
Has a preferred party					
Resident of 'natural opposition' region ^a					
Economic experience	Additional R²		+4		+27
Family economic position in five years		.20**	.05	.19**	.04
Rating country's current economy		.003*	.05	.05**	.49
Income quintile		.08*	.04		
Political experience	Additional R²		+27		+3
Rating country's president		.64**	.39	.17**	.08
Extent of democracy in country now		.57**	.27		
Relative efficacy now					
Government cares about ordinary people		.33**	.06		
Corruption now compared prior regime		-.17*	-.03		
Extent of corruption in government ^a		-.11*	-.03	-.13**	-.03
Fairness now compared to prior regime				.25**	.04
Attention to politics ^a		.23*	.03	-.26*	-.02
Prefers private to state ownership		-.32*	-.03		
Perceives external threat ^a		.21*	.03	-.15**	-.03
Freedom now compared to prior regime				.11**	.06
Supports freedom of executive ^a				.26**	.05
Experts should decide on economic policy		-.14*	-.03	-.20**	-.03
Politically patient				.31**	.05
Past regime evaluation				-.006**	-.07
Constant		-9.31**		-2.83**	
			Total R²		36
					35

(**Regression coefficients sig at .01 level, * sig at .05 level; blank cells indicate variables in the models which are not significant)

^a. Functionally equivalent but different questions used. See Appendix III.

Source: KDB 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; weighted N=3930. NRB II (1993), III (1994), IV (1995), V (Jan 1996), VI (Jul 1996), VII (1998), VIII (Jan 2000), IX (Apr 2000), and X (2001); weighted N=8778.

remaining 27 per cent³. As far as empirical evaluations of current regime are concerned, politics is dominant, and social structure and economics much less important.

The regressions produce only a modest fit for normative commitment to the incomplete democracy, explaining 10 per cent of the variance (Table IV.4). Time context variables on their own account for one per cent, social structure and social networks for an additional six per cent, economic variables for none of the variance and political attitudes for an additional three per cent. Normative commitment to Korea's incomplete democracy depends primarily on social structure and social networks, has no relation to economic attitudes and micro-economic circumstances, and political determinants are of secondary importance. The fact that the R-squared is low conforms to the fact that rejection of undemocratic rule is in Korea a relatively widespread attitude. Relating these results to prior research requires a detailed examination of the model.

IV.B.1 Korean Social Determinants and Time

IV.B.1.1 Limited Time Effects

Turning first to the impact of time context, none of the year dummies from 1997 to 1999 have significant regression coefficients on satisfaction with the way democracy works⁴. As regards normative commitment to the

³ In the table the initial R-squared refers to the R-squared when only time context variables are included in the regression; additional R-squared refers to the additional R-squared produced as each group of variables is added to the regression in stages. Coefficients reported are for the complete regression, after all the variables have entered the equation. Note that these are not stepwise regressions. The criteria for entering variables at each stage are theoretical rather than based on statistical tests.

⁴ If political attitudes are allowed to vary freely then the year 1997 has a significant negative b-value on satisfaction with the way democracy works. This suggests that the dissatisfaction occurring in 1997 had political causes.

Table IV.4 Rejection of Undemocratic Rule: Single-country Regressions

		Korea		Russia	
		B	Beta	B	Beta
Time Context	Initial R²		1		1
Year 2 (1995 in Russia, 1998 in Korea)		-.47*	-.06	1.44**	.12
Year 3 (January 1996 in Russia, 1999 in Korea)		.49*	.06	.59**	.05
Year 4 (July 1996 in Russia)		na	na	.60**	.05
Year 5 (1998 in Russia)		na	na	.50**	.04
Year 6 (January 2000 in Russia)		na	na	.67**	.06
Social structure/ networks	Additional R²		+6		+11
Gender: female					
Age		-.02**	-.08	-.02**	-.10
Town size				.38**	.06
Education levels completed		.83**	.16	.66**	.11
Trusts most people		.25**	.07		
Trusts trade unions					
Trusts private enterprise					
Self-assessed social class					
Belongs to largest Christian church ^a					
Resident of 'natural opposition' region ^a		.91**	.06	-.27**	-.03
Has a preferred party					
Economic experience	Additional R²		+0		+5
Family economic position in five years				.34**	.08
Rating country's current economy		-.01*	-.05	.002*	.03
Income quintile				.19**	.06
Political experience	Additional R²		+3		+9
Rating country's president				.09**	.05
Extent of democracy in country now				-.07**	-.03
Government cares about ordinary people					
Citizen efficacy				-.43*	-.02
Corruption now compared prior regime		-.67**	-.10		
Fairness now compared to prior regime					
Attention to politics ^a				.25*	.02
Prefers private to state ownership		.51*	.04	1.03**	.08
Perceives external threat ^a				-.33**	-.08
Supports freedom of executive ^a		-.28*	-.04	-.21**	-.03
Experts should decide on economic policy		-.48**	-.10		
Politically patient		.51**	.06	.43**	.08
Past regime evaluation		-.01*	-.04	-.02**	-.23
Trusts representative institutions				-.05**	-.03
Empirical evaluation of present regime ^a				.08**	.09
Constant		3.80**		.516	
	Total R²		10		26

(**Regression coefficients sig at .01 level, * sig at .05 level; blank cells indicate variables in the models which are not significant; na means not available)

^a. Functionally equivalent but different questions used. See Appendix III.

Source: As in Table IV.3, except excludes KDB 1996 and NRB II. For Korea weighted valid N=2,904 and for Russia weighted valid N=7,558.

regime, 1998 showed considerably lower support than 1997, while in 1999 the trend was reversed. A plausible explanation for this fluctuation, which is of equal magnitude in both directions ($\text{Beta}=.06$) is that the financial crash of late 1997 and the ensuing economic crisis caused some Koreans to lose confidence in their incomplete democratic regime. Since this effect occurs over and above the influence of household and national economic evaluations, the loss of confidence cannot be reduced to economic dissatisfaction. The 1999 data show that Koreans regained their confidence in the regime once the shock of the financial crash was over.

IV.B.1.2 Social Structural Effects

Feminist theory predicts that gender will structure political attitudes. Korean men and women adhere to traditional gender roles much more closely than men and women in the West, and Korean political and business leaders are overwhelmingly male (Fukuyama 2000). However, the regressions identify no significant gender effects on satisfaction with the way democracy works, nor on the rejection of undemocratic rule.

It is sometimes argued that older people are hostile to political change, because conservatism is a feature of the latter stage of the life cycle. As argued by Rose and Carnaghan (1995) in the post-communist context⁵, explanations based on differences in socialization between generations are far more persuasive. The oldest Koreans remember the Japanese regime established after 1910, American military government (1945-1948), the Korean War, including about two years of occupation of most of South Korea by communist forces, as well as authoritarian and democratizing incarnations of the Republic of Korea, as embodied in the First to the Sixth Republics. Using data from 1998, Chu and his co-authors (2001: 31, 33) found that age exerted a negative influence on the desired

⁵ In post-communist Europe the oldest generation has lived under at least three radically different regimes.

level of democracy. Shin (1999: 89) reported no significant effects of age on either support for the transition from authoritarianism nor on support for further democratization. The regressions presented here show that age has little effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works, but it is a significant negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta = $-.08$). However, single year regressions show that this effect is not consistent, being strong only in 1998. These results offer only partial support to socialization theories about the effect of age on political attitudes.

In the 1960s and 1970s, it was widely recognized that the authoritarian regime enjoyed stronger support in rural than in urban areas (Choi & Lee 1980). KDB distributions on town size broadly match Korean census data (Table III.1): almost half the sample lives in big cities. The regressions here show that today town size has no effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works nor on the rejection of undemocratic rule.

Shin (1999: 89) and Chu and his co-authors (2001: 31, 33) reported that education has a significant positive impact on support for democratization in Korea. However, Rose, Shin and Munro (1999: 155, 160) reported that education did not affect the desired level of democracy amongst Koreans. Around a quarter of Koreans have tertiary education, two fifths have secondary education, and the remainder, a little less than two fifths, have primary education only. The regressions show that education has little impact on satisfaction with the way democracy works. It is, however, the strongest significant positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta = $.16$). The latter result conforms to expectations derived from Lipset (1959) and other democratic theorists.

IV.B.1.3 Social Trust and Networks

Rose, Shin and Munro (1999: 155) found that Koreans who expressed trust in most other people were more likely to desire a high level of

democracy. When asked in 1996 how much trust they were prepared to place in most other people, only five per cent of KDB respondents were prepared to extend total trust, 55 per cent said they somewhat trusted most people, 37 per cent said they would trust others a little, and three per cent expressed no readiness to trust. The regressions show that trust in peers has a significant, but small positive impact on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Beta=.03). It has a stronger positive influence on normative commitment to the regime (Beta=.07). These results are in line with expectations derived from Putnam's (1993) proposition that extensive social trust is good for democracy.

When asked in the 1996 KDB survey whether they trusted trade unions, 13 per cent of Koreans said they placed great trust in trade unions, 63 per cent said they placed some trust, 22 per cent said they placed little trust and only two per cent placed no trust in unions. When asked whether they trusted private enterprise, only two per cent expressed great trust, 9 per cent expressed some trust, 50 per cent expressed little trust and 39 per cent expressed no trust. Trust in these two categories of intermediary institutions has no significant effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works. The two independent variables were not available in the same year as the rejection of undemocratic rule.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the struggle against the Korean authoritarian regime had a class dimension: trade union movements formed part of the alliance campaigning for democracy. KDB data suggests that the average Korean ranks his or her social status as between two and three on a five-point scale, where one is the lowest and five is the highest (see Appendix III). The regressions show that self-assessed social status is not a consistent influence on attitudes towards the incomplete democratic regime. There is little evidence of a Marxist-style cleavage between the working class and the upper middle class over democratic institutions in Korea.

Accounts of the Korean transition to democracy (Cumings 1997: 371–372; Chung 1997: 88–91) sometimes mention the role of Christian churches in mobilizing resistance to the authoritarian regime. Around one fifth of KDB respondents claimed to be Protestant, corresponding roughly to their share of the Korean population. Protestants also account for around four fifths of the total Christian population in Korea. The regressions show that belonging to a Protestant denomination exerts a modest positive effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works (Beta=.03). It has no influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule. Protestants are no more committed to Korea's incomplete democracy than non-Protestants⁶.

Korea shows strong regional patterns of partisanship. The southwestern Cholla region of the country, traditionally loyal to Kim Dae-jung, has a history of relative economic deprivation. Pro-democratic opposition to the military regime was stronger there than in other parts of the country, particularly following the 1980 massacre in Kwangju, the region's largest city. Since parties supported by Cholla voters normally win a minority of seats in the National Assembly, Cholla may be described as the region of the 'natural opposition.' Around one tenth of Korea's population lives in Cholla. Cholla residence has no effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea. It does, however, exert a significant positive influence on normative commitment to the regime (Beta=.06). The support of Cholla residents for Korea's incomplete democracy is partly the result of the regional bias shown by the previous authoritarian regime.

Identification with a political party indicates a certain willingness to participate in politics, but is not necessarily an indicator of preferences regarding the regime. The analyses show that having a preferred party makes no difference to Korean attitudes towards their regime.

⁶ The number of Catholics in the sample is too small to provide a separate test of the influence of different Christian denominations.

IV.B.2 Korean Economic Determinants

IV.B.2.1 Micro-economic Influences

Shin (1999: 89, 236) found a modest positive relationship between evaluations of household economies and various measures of support for democracy in Korea, but his finding was not consistent across all his measures. Lee (1994: 34) found no relationship between household economic evaluations and support in Korea. Chu and his co-authors (Chu, et al. 2001: 31) found a modest relationship. The inter-correlation of retrospective, current and prospective measures of satisfaction with the household economic situation suggests the need to choose amongst them⁷. The author tested all three variables — retrospective, current and prospective — in Tables IV.3 and IV.4 regression models, but only one, prospective evaluations was consistently significant. In the 1994 KDB survey, a large majority expected improvement in their household economic situation: 13 per cent of respondents expected it to be much better in five years time, 57 per cent expected it to be somewhat better, 22 per cent expected it to be more or less the same as at present and only eight per cent expected it to be any worse. Repeat observations in 1996 and 1997, 1998 and 1999 produced very similar distributions — before and after the financial crash of December 1997 large majorities of Koreans expected their household economic situation to improve. The regressions in Table IV.3 show that prospective evaluations of household economies exert a significant but modest positive influence on Korean satisfaction with the way democracy works (Beta=.05, Table IV.3). They do not, however, affect normative commitment to the Korean regime (Table IV.4), except in the single-year regressions for 1999 where they emerge as a positive influence

⁷ In the Korean data-set, the correlation of retrospective evaluations and current evaluations of the household economy is $-.46$, the correlation of retrospective and prospective evaluations is $-.26$, and the correlation of current and prospective evaluations is $.19$. All correlations are significant at the $.01$ level.

($b=.36$). Most of the time, the rejection of undemocratic rule in Korea does not depend on an economic *quid pro quo*.

Chu and his co-authors (2001: 31, 33) found that higher income was a positive influence on preference for democracy. Income quintile is an approximate measure of relative household income which is comparable across national boundaries. The regressions show that household income by this measure exerts a modest positive impact on satisfaction with the way democracy works ($\text{Beta}=.04$) in Korea. Income quintile does not affect normative commitment to the regime. Although poorer people are more likely to feel dissatisfied when they assess the regime in empirical terms, the evidence contradicts the expectation derived from Marxist theory that income classes should differ in normative attitudes to a 'bourgeois' incomplete democracy.

IV.B.2.2 Macro-economic Influences

The influence of socio-tropic economic evaluations on attitudes to democracy in Korea runs somewhat contrary to the usual assumptions. Chu and co-authors (2001: 31), Rose, Shin and Munro (1999: 155) and Lee (1994: 32f) showed that socio-tropic evaluations of the current economy exerted a negative effect on various measures of support for democracy. Shin (1999: 89, 236) did not find any significant effect of assessments of the national economy on support for the transition from authoritarianism, nor on demand for further democratization, nor on the desired level of democracy. He did, however, find that evaluations of the national economy were a significant negative influence on the perceived suitability of democracy. As with household economic evaluations, the inter-correlations of various measures of satisfaction with the national economy suggest the need to choose amongst them⁸. The author tested both current and retrospective

⁸ Satisfaction with the national economy now correlates with retrospective evaluations at $-.42$, and with the expected state of the economy in five years

evaluations of the national economy, and of the two, current evaluations are far more significant. In order to build parallel models for the two countries, the author chose current evaluations of the national economy to test for socio-tropic economic influences.

The 1997 financial crisis had a profound effect on Korean perceptions of their national economy (Shin 2001b). In the 1996 KDB survey, an overwhelming majority of respondents professed themselves satisfied with the state of the national economy: 12 per cent of respondents rated the national economy as very good, 62 per cent thought it good, 22 per cent thought it not very good, while only four per cent thought it bad. In 1997, by contrast, in the lead up to the December 1997 financial crash, 57 per cent rated the economy as bad, 40 per cent it not very good, and only three per cent rated it as good or very good. The 1998 distribution was similar to 1997. By 1999, the number of KDB respondents rating the economy as bad had fallen to 13 per cent, 71 per cent still rated it as not very good, 16 per cent thought it was good, and none gave it a very good rating.

The regressions above show that satisfaction with the national economy exerts a marginal positive influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Beta=.05), and, consistent with previous findings cited above, it exerts a negative influence on normative commitment to the regime (Beta= -.05). The latter result appears puzzling at first, but can be interpreted in terms of Korea's high level of economic achievement under authoritarianism, and the fact that current economic policies have changed little since the collapse of the authoritarian regime. Fast economic growth appears to elicit amongst Koreans some kind of positive association with authoritarian rule. Because current economic policies are part of the legacy of authoritarianism, authoritarian rule wins credit in good times, and loses

at .15. The correlation of retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy is -.11. All correlations are significant at the .01 level.

some of its appeal in bad times. It should be noted, however, that the magnitude of the effect is quite weak.

IV.B.3 Korean Political Determinants

IV.B.3.1 Political Performance

Shin (1999: 240) showed that the perceived collective suitability of democracy is strongly dependent on assessments of government performance in Korea. This fits with Easton's (1965: 249) idea that support for the regime emerges as an 'added dividend' of support for incumbent politicians. An alternative explanation is that Koreans have difficulty distinguishing between the performance of the incumbent and evaluations of the political system. Performance of the incumbent and satisfaction with the way democracy works track each other closely, but the 1997 survey showed that they can diverge when the president runs into difficulties affecting his personal standing. In 1997 when the Kim Young-sam presidency had become embroiled in corruption scandals, on a ten point scale the mean rating of the president's performance was 3.6, whereas on the same scale mean satisfaction with the way democracy works stood at 4.9⁹. In the previous year the mean rating of the president stood at 5.9 and satisfaction with the way democracy works at 5.8. The models developed here show that rating of the incumbent president is the strongest single influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works (Beta=.39, Table IV.3). However, it has no influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Table IV.4). In other words, the popularity of the president helps Koreans believe that their incomplete democratic regime is working well, but it doesn't make their normative commitment to the regime any stronger.

Chu and co-authors (2001: 31,33, 35) found that the extent to which

⁹ On a ten point scale, differences of nearly half a point could be due to random variation, but larger differences are statistically significant.

the current regime was perceived as democratic exerted a strong influence on the perceived suitability and desirability of democracy in Korea in 1999. They found a similar but slightly weaker relationship in Korea in 1997. In 1994 and 1996 the mean rating given by Koreans to their regime on a ten point scale where one is complete dictatorship and ten is complete democracy was 6.8. In 1997 the mean rating fell to 6.3, and it stood at 6.1 in 1998 and 1999. The regressions show that the perceived extent of democracy now is the second strongest influence on Korean satisfaction with the way democracy works (Beta=.27). The extent of democracy is therefore an important criterion of regime assessment. The extent of perceived democracy now has no influence on normative commitment to the incomplete democratic regime. In other words, authoritarians as well as democrats perceive that a high level of democracy is a sign that the regime is working well, but that perception makes them neither more nor less likely to reject undemocratic rule.

Shin (1999: 89, 151–154) and Shin and McDonough (1999: 17) found that measures based on efficacy exerted a modest positive influences on various measures of support for democracy. In the 1996 KDB survey 19 per cent of the sample said that they had much more influence on the government at present than under the previous authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan, 42 per cent felt they had somewhat more influence, 34 per cent felt there had been no change, and only 5 per cent felt they had any less influence. The regressions show that relative efficacy has little effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea¹⁰. Nor does efficacy, measured on an absolute scale in 1997, have any influence on the rejection

¹⁰ On an absolute rather than a relative scale, Koreans distributed more or less normally on the efficacy question in 1997: 11 per cent said they had no influence on government, 44 per cent said they had little influence, 36 per cent said they had some influence, and nine per cent said had a lot of influence. By this absolute measure, efficacy was a marginal negative influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works.

of undemocratic rule. The implication is that the Korean regime does not acquire or lose legitimacy on the basis of its responsiveness to citizen demands.

The KDB asked Korean respondents whether they believed that the government cares about ordinary people. In the 1997 survey 23 per cent of the sample definitely disagreed with the proposition that the government cares about ordinary people, 49 per cent somewhat disagreed, 26 per cent somewhat agreed and an insignificant 2 per cent definitely agreed. The models developed here show that the perception that the government cares about ordinary people exerts a significant positive influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works (Beta=.06). However, the perception of such benevolence appears not to enhance rejection of undemocratic rule.

Rose, Shin and Munro (1999: 155) found that the perceived level of corruption was a positive influence on the desired level of democracy in Korea, suggesting that frustration with corruption may breed demand for further democratic reform. When asked in the 1998 KDB survey to compare the level of government corruption at present with the level of corruption under the previous undemocratic regime, 6 per cent of respondents said the situation had become much better, a 34 per cent thought it had become somewhat better, 32 per cent thought the situation was much the same, 20 per cent thought the situation was a little worse and 8 per cent thought that corruption had become much worse. When asked in 1996 how many out of ten public officials and politicians were likely to be corrupt, the median response was that between six and seven out of ten were corrupt. The analysis presented here shows that both indicators of perceived corruption are negative influences on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Beta= -.03). Both indicators are at the margin of significance, but

this may be due to missing data, since each is only available for one year¹¹. The perception of increased corruption compared to the previous regime is also a strong negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta = $-.10$)¹². Although only a minority of Koreans perceived that corruption had gotten worse under democracy, such a perception had a significant negative effect on normative commitment to the current regime.

The perception of corruption is likely to breed perceptions of unfairness. Lee (1994: 33) reports that diffuse system support suffers when Koreans perceive that their society is run on behalf of the privileged. When asked to compare the level of fairness which citizens could expect from the authorities now as compared to the level of fairness under the previous authoritarian regime, only seven per cent of KDB respondents in 1996 were prepared to say that the current regime was less fair, 39 per cent thought the situation was unchanged, and 54 per cent thought the regime was somewhat or much fairer. However, the regressions show that the increase in the perceived fairness of government exerts no influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works nor on normative commitment to the regime. Koreans appear to respond to questions about fairness in different ways depending on the political context, and overall the issue of fairness makes little difference to attitudes towards the current regime.

IV.B.3.2 Political Values

Shin (1999: 89) found no significant relationship between attention to TV news and support for democratization. When the KDB asked Korean

¹¹ Single-year regressions show these effects up more clearly: in 1996, the unstandardized regression coefficient, b is $-.13$ for extent of government corruption; in 1998, b is $-.19$ for corruption now compared to the past.

¹² The variable measuring the proportion of corrupt civil servants and politicians was not available in the same years as the rejection of undemocratic rule.

newspaper readers in 1999 how much attention they paid to politics, 13 per cent said they paid a lot of attention, 41 per cent said they paid some attention, 38 per cent paid a little attention, and only 8 per cent paid no attention at all. In the regressions reported in Table IV.3 the measure of attentiveness to politics amongst newspaper readers exerts a positive influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Beta=.03)¹³. The same measure has no impact on the rejection of undemocratic rule. Koreans who pay attention to politics may be more generous judges of how the regime is faring, but this type of stimulus doesn't make them democrats.

There is little disagreement among the leading Korean political parties about the virtues of private ownership of enterprises, and this reflects a fairly broad consensus among the population at large, too. In the 1997 and 1998 KDB surveys, around four fifths of respondents agreed with their elites that private ownership of enterprises is preferable to state ownership, while a fifth expressed the opposite view. The regressions presented above show that the preference for private over state enterprise ownership exerts a modest negative influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Beta= -.03). It is, however, a positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.04). Although welfare values are not at the centre of political debate in Korea, pro-market attitudes correlate, albeit weakly, with a positive normative attitude to the incomplete democratic regime and a more critical standard of empirical evaluation.

The real threat to South Korean security from its rival regime in North Korea has bedevilled South Korean politics for half a century. Perceptions of the severity of such a threat are also an indicator of an individual's position

¹³ The effect comes out more clearly when using the 1999 survey only (b=.24), since that eliminates missing data.

on an issue which is fundamental to the future of the state¹⁴. In the 1997 KDB survey, 14 per cent of respondents thought the North bore a lot of the responsibility for the Republic of Korea's political problems, 50 per cent thought the North bore some responsibility, 24 per cent thought it bore little responsibility and 12 per cent thought the North had nothing to do with South Korea's internal political problems. The regressions presented here show that blaming North Korea for the South's political problems, labelled 'perceives external threat' in the tables, exerts a modest positive impact on satisfaction with the way democracy works (Beta=.03). It has no effect on the rejection of undemocratic rule. While the North Korean threat may serve as an excuse for some problems experienced by South Korea's incomplete democracy, citizens of the southern state do not regard it as a sufficient threat to justify reversion to dictatorship.

Shin and Shyu (1997: 121) suggested Korean support for authoritarianism may reflect the fact that political repression under the prior authoritarian regime was targeted at only a narrow section of the population. The authoritarian regime did not interfere with social institutions so long as they respected more or less clear restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, association and so on. When asked in the 1996 KDB survey whether they felt freer than under the previous regime to express opinions, join any organization, decide whether or not to participate in politics and practise their religion of choice, the median respondent felt somewhat freer in all four respects¹⁵. However, the regressions presented above show that appreciation of increased freedom since transition exerts no effect on

¹⁴ That is why the issue is treated under 'political values' rather than political performance in these pages.

¹⁵ On a scale from four to 20, constructed by adding four five point scales, the median score was sixteen. Another way of saying this is that if the median respondent did not feel freer in any one respect, he or she felt much freer in another. See Appendix III for exact means on the scale.

satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea¹⁶. Koreans appreciate their freedom, but they do not on the basis of this freedom make special allowances when assessing their current regime.

To the extent that democracy introduces procedural barriers to unilateral decision making by the executive, one would expect support for a strong executive to have some influence on attitudes towards the new democratic regime. When asked in the 1997 KDB survey to assess the proposition that a government which is often restrained by parliament will be unable to achieve great things, 12 per cent definitely agreed, 49 per cent somewhat agreed, 31 per cent somewhat disagreed and 8 per cent strongly disagreed. By 1998, support for a strong executive had risen: 74 per cent agreed with the proposition that restraints on the executive prevent achievement of great things. The belief that government should not be restrained by parliament does not exert an influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea. It does, however, exert a modest negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=-.04). Under the autocratic leadership of Park Chung-hee, Korea certainly did achieve great things in the economy, and the memory of this is likely to serve in the minds of some Koreans as a continuing justification for dictatorship.

The authoritarian regime was widely credited with allowing 'technocrats' to make economic policy without interference from particularistic interests. Koreans value a 'technocratic' approach to policy-making: when asked in 1997 whether experts rather than the government and parliament should decide on economic policy, a large majority were in favour of the proposition: 27 per cent of KDB respondents strongly agreed, 49 per cent somewhat agreed, 17 per cent somewhat disagreed and only 7 per cent strongly disagreed. In 1998 and 1999 the distributions were similar:

¹⁶ The variables measuring increase in freedom were not available in the same years as rejection of undemocratic rule.

around three quarters expressed support for technocratic control. The regressions show that a preference for control over economic policy by experts exerts a modest negative impact on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Beta= $-.03$). It exerts a much larger negative influence on normative commitment to Korea's incomplete democracy (Beta= $-.10$). Koreans worry not only about the economic competence of their current rulers, but about whether the democratic system itself is capable of delivering economic competence in government. For some Koreans, the issue of economic competence is a strong argument in favour of undemocratic rule.

In Korea, political patience was found to be a positive influence on the desired level of democracy (Rose, Shin & Munro 1999: 155). When asked in 1997 whether they felt the regime should be given time to sort out its problems or whether it should be changed if it didn't make quick improvements, a large majority favoured patience: 28 per cent of KDB respondents expressed strong agreement with showing patience, 45 per cent somewhat agreed with showing patience, 20 per cent somewhat agreed with demanding quick results and only seven per cent definitely agreed with demands for quick results. The regressions show that political patience has no effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works. It does, however, exert a positive influence on normative commitment to the current regime (Beta= $.06$). Koreans draw on their reservoir of patience when assessing demands for a return to authoritarian rule: those who have more patience are more likely to reject undemocratic rule, while those who have less are more likely to support it.

Shin (1999: 89, 239–241) and Chu and co-authors (2001: 31) showed that a positive evaluation of the old regime was a negative influence on various measures of support for democracy in Korea. When asked in 1997 to rate the Chun Doo-hwan regime on a scale from 0 to 100, 46 per cent of

KDB respondents gave a rating above the mid-point of the scale, 26 per cent gave a neutral rating and 28 percent gave a rating below the mid-point of the scale. The regressions show that ratings of the past regime do not exert any significant influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea. They do, however, exert a modest negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta= $-.04$). While some Koreans are nostalgic, the memory of the authoritarian system is not so influential as to colour empirical evaluations of the current regime.

IV.B.3.3 Trust in Representative Institutions

A limited number of political attitudes may be supposed to exert an influence on normative attitudes to democracy but not on satisfaction with the way democracy works. For example, in a study on post-communist Europe, Mishler and Rose (2001: 38) modelled political trust as a consequence of accumulated experiences of the regime. If their model is correct, then empirical regime evaluation, as conceptualized in this study, is a cause of political trust. Similarly, Diamond (1999: 204) places trust as an intervening variable between empirical evaluations and normative attitudes. Rose, Shin and Munro (1999: 155, 160) found that in Korea trust in the representative institutions of parliament and political parties and trust in non-representative state institutions expressed different factors¹⁷. The author concentrates here on trust in representative institutions, for two reasons: firstly, representative institutions are central to democratic politics; secondly, the Russian trust variables do not separate into two factors and there is a need to choose measures readily comparable across the two countries studied here.

¹⁷ Reproduction of their analysis confirms a two-factor solution for trust in Korea. The first factor, accounting for 46 per cent of the variance, loads on trust in parliament (at .90) and trust in political parties (.90). The second factor, accounting for 17 per cent of the variance, loads on trust in the army (.74) trust in courts (.70) and trust in police (.68). General trust in peers loads on neither factor.

In 1997, the median KDB respondent trusted both the National Assembly and political parties only a little. Combining these two trust measures into a single scale showed that, on a combined scale from two to fourteen, created by adding two seven point scales, the median score was eight¹⁸. Trust in representative institutions does not, however, exert any influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule in Korea. Koreans appear to be moderately cynical about representative institutions, but their cynicism does not lead to a demand for a return to authoritarian rule.

IV.B.4 Empirical and Normative Support as Korean Determinants

As mentioned above, the direction of any causality between empirical and normative support has provoked some disagreement in the literature. Shin (1999: 89) and Rose, Shin and Munro (1999: 155, 160) showed that empirical satisfaction with the current regime exerts a positive influence on various normative measures of support for democracy. The reverse relationship, hypothesized by Mishler and Rose (1999) is that normative commitment to the current regime affects empirical evaluations of the regime. Since the direction of causality between the dependent variables is difficult to resolve on the basis of theoretical arguments, further statistical analysis is helpful.

Ordinary least squares regression analysis suggests that satisfaction with the way democracy works does not affect normative commitment to the Korean regime, when one controls for ratings of the current president. However, if ratings of the incumbent president are excluded from the regression, satisfaction with the way democracy works exerts a weak positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.04, not shown in Table IV.4, but see below).

¹⁸ Another way of saying this is that if the respondent was inclined to trust one of these institutions somewhat, he or she was disinclined to trust the other. See Appendix III for means and standard deviations.

Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is a robust technique for testing whether two variables are in a relationship of reciprocal causation (Berry 1984: 65–71) or, if they are not, what is the direction of any causal relationship between them. In two-stage least squares, two parallel models are built up in which each dependent variable is regressed on all the independent variables which are significant determinants of either one but not on each other. These two equations are used to compute predicted values of each dependent variable. The predicted values are then entered as independent variables on the right hand side of a second pair of equations. The second stage of the analysis produces a model for each dependent variable in which the effect of the other dependent variable is estimated by the coefficient of its predicted value in the first stage. To identify the system of simultaneous equations, one or more variables which are significant influences on only one variable, and theoretically unlikely to be significant influences on the other, must be excluded from the model for the other variable at the second stage.

In the 2SLS regression on the rejection of undemocratic rule, the rating of the incumbent president is the excluded variable (Table IV.5). Evaluations of the performance of the incumbent may be presumed to impinge directly on empirical assessments of regime. However, because no single president has the monopolistic claim to be associated with the current regime, evaluations of the president do not require a normative judgment as to whether to reject undemocratic rule. Any effect that it has on the rejection of undemocratic rule is likely to be mediated by empirical evaluations of the regime. In the 2SLS regression on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea (Table IV.5), the excluded variable is residence in the Cholla region. Residence in the Cholla region *a priori* is an unlikely influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in Korea because, once one controls for a wide variety of potential sources of political and economic dissatisfaction, such as ratings of the household and national economies or

Table IV.5 Two-Stage Least Squares Models: Korea

	<u>Satisfaction with</u> <u>democracy</u>		<u>Reject undem-</u> <u>ocratic rule</u>	
	B	Beta	B	Beta
Year 1998			-.51**	-.06
Year 1999	-.35*	0.05	.44*	.05
Age			-.02**	-.07
Town size				
Education levels completed			.90**	.17
Trusts most people			.24**	.07
Belongs to largest Christian church				
Resident of natural opposition region		excluded	.91**	.06
Family economic position in five years	.20**	.05		
Rating country's current economy	.004*	.05	-.006*	-.05
Income quintile				
Rating country's president	.66**	.40		excluded
Extent of democracy in country now	.56**	.27		
Government cares for ordinary people	.33**	.07		
Experts should decide economic policy			-.45**	-.09
Perceives external threat	.21*	.03		
Corruption now compared prior regime			-.65**	-.10
Prefers private to state ownership			.57*	.05
Attention to politics	.28*	.04		
Fairness now compared to prior regime				
Past regime evaluation			-.006*	-.04
Supports freedom of executive			-.27*	-.04
Politically patient			.52**	.07
Trusts representative institutions				
Satisfaction with democracy		not applicable	.16*	.07
Rejection of undemocratic rule				not applicable
Constant		-8.74**		5.20**
		Total R²		35
				10

(**Regression coefficients sig at .01 level, * sig at .05 level; blank cells indicate variables in the model which are not significant)

Source: KDB 1997, 1998, 1999; weighted valid N=2896.

evaluations of the president, Cholla residents have no reason to be less satisfied than residents of other regions. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Cholla residents have different or more lenient criteria for assessing the regime in empirical terms.

The 2SLS analysis incorporates all independent variables which are significant determinants of either satisfaction with the way democracy works or rejection of undemocratic rule in Korea. It shows that satisfaction with the way democracy works is a significant determinant of the rejection of undemocratic rule, and that the rejection of undemocratic rule is not a significant determinant of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Normative commitment to the incomplete democratic regime in Korea is the consequence rather than the cause of satisfaction with the way democracy works.

IV.C Determinants in Russia

To compare the determinants of political support for regimes across country-contexts, one must run parallel regressions using equivalent social, economic, and political independent variables. The results of such regressions allow a test of the following proposition:

Proposition 3: Regardless of the type of undemocratic legacy, political, economic and social characteristics of individuals have the same relative amount of influence on both normative and empirical dimensions of support for an incomplete democracy.

The Russian regressions show a reasonably good fit with the data. They explain 35 per cent of the variance in evaluations of the current regime (Table IV.3). Time context accounts for only one per cent, social structure and social networks for an additional four per cent, economic influences an additional 27 per cent, and political influences a mere three per cent. Unlike in Korea, and contrary to Proposition 3, Russian evaluations of the current regime are not primarily determined by political attitudes. Instead, economic attitudes are overwhelmingly dominant, and social structure, social networks and politics are of secondary importance. However, economics is political in Russia, since the transformation from a command to a market economy is

the major political issue dividing Russian political parties and society (Rose, Munro & White 2001).

The regressions explain 26 per cent of the variance in the rejection of undemocratic rule (Table IV.4). As in Korea, and in accordance with Proposition 3, social structure and social networks are most important, accounting for 11 per cent of the variance, political attitudes are next in importance, accounting for nine per cent of the variance, economics accounts for five per cent and time dummies for an additional one per cent. The moderately high R-squared high is consistent with the fact that there is considerable variation in the extent of rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia. To relate these results to previous research, it is necessary to look at the models in detail.

IV.C.1 Russian Social Determinants

IV.C.1.1 Time Effects

Turning first to the time context variables, one can note that only one dummy variable, that for 1994, is a significant influence on evaluations of the current regime in Russia (Beta=.06 in Table IV.3)¹⁹. It is a positive influence, suggesting there was a certain willingness at that stage to give the new regime the benefit of the doubt. Five dummy variables, those for 1995 (Beta=.12), January and July 1996 (both Beta=.05), 1998 (Beta=.04) and January 2000 (Beta=.06), exert a significant positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule²⁰. Note that the regressions control for other influences, such as the state of the economy and opinions of the current president. For all the faults of Yeltsin's political performance, it is noteworthy that normative commitment to the regime was stronger during his period in office than it is under Putin, controlling for other influences.

¹⁹ The excluded dummy is 1993.

²⁰ The excluded dummy is 1994.

IV.C.1.2 Social Structure

Rose and Carnaghan (1995) argue that differences in political outlook between generations should be expected in post-communist Europe because of the vast differences in socialization between the youngest and oldest age cohorts. The oldest Russian adults alive today remember life before, during and after Stalin's forced collectivization, fast industrialization, political purges and in some parts of the country mass deportations; they remember the Second World War, the 'frozen totalitarianism' of late Stalinism, as well as various stages in the evolution of the post-totalitarian Soviet state. Middle-aged Russians had their first political experiences in the 'period of stagnation' under Brezhnev. Even the youngest Russian adults have some memories of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, although their formative experiences may have been during the years of transition. Waldron-Moore (1999: 49) found that age was a significant negative influence on commitment to democratic values. The regressions presented in Tables IV.3 and IV.4 show that in Russia, as in Korea, age exerts no influence on current regime evaluations, once one controls for economic and political attitudes. In Russia, as in Korea, age is a significant negative influence of normative commitment to the regime (Beta= $-.10$). It appears that differences in socialization between generations express themselves in the realm of normative beliefs more than in empirical evaluations.

The regressions show that in Russia, as in Korea, gender has no impact on current regime evaluations, nor on rejection of undemocratic rule. This is true regardless of whether or not one controls economic attitudes and circumstances. Although the genders may react differently to the same political circumstances, there is no basis for supposing a systematic relationship between gender and attitudes to the regime.

Rose and co-authors (1998: 139, 193) and Waldron-Moore (1999: 49) report modest positive impacts of larger town size on support for democracy

in Central and Eastern Europe. The regressions above show that in Russia, as in Korea, town size has no impact on current regime evaluations, whether or not one controls for economic attitudes and circumstances. Unlike in Korea, town size in Russia is a positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.06). In a vast country with a widely dispersed rural population, urban-rural differences in socialization and life experience are expected.

Previous research found that education was an important positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule in Central and Eastern Europe (Rose & Mishler 1996: 46; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 139, 193) but not on current regime evaluations (Mishler & Rose 1996: 574; Mishler & Rose 1999: 91). Waldron-Moore (1999: 49, 52) made a similar finding: education increased commitment to democratic values, but did not affect satisfaction with democracy. The regressions above show that education has no impact on current regime evaluations in Russia. As in Korea, it is a significant positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.11).

IV.C.1.3 Social Trust and (De)Mobilization

Waldron-Moore (1999: 49-50) found that people who expressed trust in most other people were more likely to express normative commitment to democratic values. Asked in 1995 to what extent they trusted most people, NRB respondents were inclined to be cautious: 26 per cent of the sample expressed no trust, 52 per cent said they trusted others a little, 14 per cent said they trusted others somewhat and only 8 per cent said they trusted others a lot. By 1998 trust had grown somewhat: 21 per cent expressed no trust, 45 per cent expressed little trust, 27 per cent expressed some trust and 7 per cent expressed a lot of trust. Repeat observations in January and March 2000 and 2001 produced a similar distribution²¹. Unlike in Korea,

²¹ Later observations were on a seven point scale. In 2001, 13 per cent expressed great trust, by choosing seven on the scale, whereas only six per

Russians' generalized trust in peers exerts no influence on current regime evaluations, nor does it affect normative commitment to the regime (Tables IV.3 and IV.4). As described by Rose (1995d), Russia is an 'hour glass society,' that is to say, one where trust does not 'spill upwards' into support for the regime, because popular interaction with the elite is minimal.

Trust in social institutions, such as trade unions and private businesses may vary independently of trust in political institutions in post-communist Europe (Mishler & Rose 2001: 43)²². When asked in 1994 to what extent they trusted private enterprise, 43 per cent of NRB respondents said they had no trust, an additional 45 per cent said they had little trust, eight per cent said they had some trust, and almost none expressed great trust. In subsequent years, the distributions were broadly similar. When asked in 1993 whether they trusted trade unions, again a majority gave a negative reply: 36 per cent expressed no trust, 40 per cent expressed little trust, 23 per cent expressed some trust, and again almost no one expressed great trust. Repeat observations in subsequent years showed broadly similar distributions. Unlike in Korea, feelings of trust in both types of intermediary institution, trade unions and private enterprise, exert a modest positive influence on Russian current regime evaluations (Beta=.02 and .03 respectively)²³. In sign at least, this conforms to Putnam's (1993) theory about the role of social capital in generating support for democracy, but these are very weak effects.

cent chose no trust by choosing one. The median Russian chose five on the scale.

²² Mishler and Rose (2001: 43–44) found that factor analyses of trust variables across post-communist Europe produced a two factor solution, one factor for political institutions and a second, weaker factor, for civil institutions. Because their primary interest was in political trust as a dependent variable, they discarded trust in civil institutions.

²³ Equivalent questions were not available for both countries in the same years as the rejection of undemocratic rule, but see Table IV.6 below.

Marxist theory predicts that self-assessed social status will affect political attitudes. Asked to rate their own social status, the median NRB respondent gives himself or herself a lower to middle ranking²⁴. In Russia, as in Korea, self-assessed social status in Russia has no effect on current regime evaluations, nor does it affect normative commitment to the regime. Exceptions emerge in the single-year regressions: status is a positive influence on current regime evaluations in the data for January 2000 ($b=.30$) and for 2001 ($b=.37$). This suggests that higher status individuals may sometimes be more satisfied with the current regime, but this is not a consistent finding.

The Russian church has a different history to churches further west in Europe. A study of the relationship of religion and politics in Russia found that although believers are somewhat more likely to adhere to authoritarian and traditional political values, the influence of religion on party politics is negligible (White & McAllister 1997: 247ff) . Around two fifths of Russians express a nominal commitment to the Orthodox church²⁵. In Russia, unlike in Korea, belonging to the largest Christian church has no impact on current regime evaluations, nor on rejection of undemocratic rule. The official church's role in political life is more ceremonial than substantive.

Russia exhibits regional variation in voting patterns. Inhabitants of those regions where the vote for the Communist candidate in two successive presidential elections was five per cent or more greater than the national

²⁴ See Appendix III for means.

²⁵ Comparable measures of church attendance were not available in the Korean data-set, which constrains this discussion to denomination rather than attendance. Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe suggests that church attendance raises current regime evaluations (Mishler & Rose 1999: 91), but not, controlling for political attitudes, the rejection of undemocratic rule (Rose & Mishler 1996: 46; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 139, 193)

average comprise about 30 per cent of each sample. Although Communists win more seats than other parties in Russian Duma elections, their share of seats is still a minority share, and their failure to win a presidential election reinforces their role as the 'natural opposition' of Russian politics. Residence in the so-called 'Red Belt' of 'natural opposition' regions has no effect on current regime evaluations. It has a negative effect, in the expected direction, on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta= $-.03$, Table IV.4). This effect is somewhat weaker than the main regional cleavage in Korea ($b = -.27$ in Russia as against $b = -.91$ in Korea).

Mishler and Rose (1999: 91) report that having a party identification raised current regime evaluations in Central and Eastern Europe, but had no effect on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 177,193). Evans and Whitefield (1995: 501) report that supporting a party had a positive influence on normative commitment to democracy in post-communist Europe²⁶. The variable of interest here measures the choice of any party rather than a particular party. Note that because the party system in both Korea and Russia is quite unstable, having a party identification is not the product of long-term socialization as it is in established democracies, but rather expresses whether or not the respondent's has a party they would vote for in an election (Rose, Munro & White 2001: 429). About half of Russians express a party preference. In Russia, as in Korea, having a preferred party exerts no influence on current regime evaluations, nor on the rejection of undemocratic rule. Overall, having a party identification makes little difference to Russian attitudes towards the current regime.

²⁶ A related finding reported by Evans and Whitefield (1995: 501) is that those who agree that there is 'no point voting' are significantly less likely to express normative commitment to democracy.

IV.C.2 Russian Economic Determinants

IV.C.2.1 A Strong Macro-economic Influence

Prior research on post-communist Europe suggests that evaluations of national economies influence current regime evaluations and also, to a lesser extent, normative commitment to the regime (Evans & Whitefield 1995: 500–501; Mishler & Rose 1996: 567–574; Mishler & Rose 1999: 91; Rose & Mishler 1996: 46; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 93; Waldron-Moore 1999: 49–52). The question NRB used to measure assessments of the national economy asked the respondent to rate the current economic system on a scale from +100 to –100 and followed a similar question about the economic system before perestroika (See Appendix III for exact wording). In 1993, around 18 months after the beginning of radical economic reform under acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, 57 per cent of NRB respondents gave a negative assessment of their current economic system, 14 per cent were neutral and 29 per cent were positive. In 1994, 76 per cent were negative, 11 per cent neutral and only 13 per cent were positive. The following years showed some improvement, and by 1996 assessments were back at their 1993 levels, where they remained — with minor fluctuations — until 2001. In the 2001 survey, nearly ten years after the start of economic reforms, the number of NRB respondents negative about the current economic system stood at 47 per cent, 12 per cent were neutral and the remaining 41 per cent positive.

In the Russian context, it makes little sense to interpret ratings of how well the economy is doing without reference to politics, because there has been a radical change of economic system since the transformation from undemocratic rule. Questions about the economic system tap not only assessments of how well the economy works, but also political attitudes towards the market.

Current, prospective and retrospective assessments of the economic system inter-correlate amongst themselves. Assessments of the current economic system correlate with evaluations of the economic system before perestroika at $-.19$ and with the expected economic system at $.55$, both correlations being significant at the $.01$ level. The inclusion of too many variables measuring economic assessments in the regression models would introduce additional statistical error. The concern to ensure comparability with the Korean regressions models constrains the choice of economic variables also, since the Korean economic variables correlate amongst themselves in a different way²⁷. In building the regression models presented here, all three time perspectives — current, retrospective and prospective — were tested using NRB data, and current evaluations of the economy were found to exert the strongest influence.

The regression model in Table IV.3 shows that assessments of the current economic system are the dominant influence on evaluations of the current regime in Russia (Beta= $.49$), and a far stronger influence than they are in Korea ($b=.50$ as against $b=.04$). Table IV.4 shows that they exert only a modest influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia (Beta= $.03$), and, unlike in Korea, the influence is positive. In contrast to empirical evaluations of the regime, normative commitment appears quite resistant to socio-tropic economic assessments.

IV.C.2.2 Micro-economic Influences

Previous research found that the strongest egocentric influence on empirical regime evaluation and rejection of undemocratic rule was expected future household circumstances (Evans & Whitefield 1995: 500f; Gibson 1996: 408; Mishler & Rose 1996: 574; Tóka 1995: 373f; Waldron-Moore

²⁷ See, however, Tables IV.5 and IV.6 for analyses using a range of variables whose choice is not constrained by the availability of variables in the other country.

1999: 49–52; Rose & Mishler 1996: 46; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 193). In Russia in 1993 NRB respondents distributed fairly evenly in their prospective evaluations of the household economy: 13 per cent of NRB respondents expected their household economic situation to be much worse in five years time, 11 per cent expected it to be somewhat worse, 46 per cent expected their household economic situation to be the same in five years, 23 per cent expected it to be somewhat better, and six per cent expected it to be much better. In 1994, optimism increased a little, as 50 per cent of respondents expected an improvement, but in subsequent years optimism fell back to around the 1993 level. As in Korea, expectations of the household economy exert a statistically significant but modest influence on evaluations of the current regime (Beta=.04, Table IV.3). Unlike in Korea, they also exert an influence on rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.08, Table IV.4). A household's economic prospects affect normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the Russian regime, but they are by no means the dominant factor.

As far as objective indicators of household prosperity are concerned, a variety of measures are available, but their comparability across country-contexts is problematic. For example, NRB asks respondents how often they have had to do without necessary food, clothing and heating or electricity, and combines the replies into a destitution scale. Since destitution affects only a tiny minority of Koreans, it doesn't make sense to treat this as the primary measure of household economic prosperity in Korea. A relative measure of prosperity — income quintile — avoids inappropriate comparisons between countries in very different economic circumstances. In conformity with previous findings in Central and Eastern Europe (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 193), the regressions presented here show that in Russia income quintile has no influence on current regime evaluations, but it does affect normative commitment to the regime (Beta=.06).

IV.C.3 Russian Political Determinants

IV.C.3.1 Political Values

Previous research on post-communist Europe suggests that support for the former communist political-economic system is a negative influence on current regime evaluations (Mishler & Rose 1996: 574; Mishler & Rose 1999: 91; Munro 2001: 26) and on rejection of undemocratic rule (Rose & Mishler 1996: 46). Opinions of the former communist political system are high in Russia and have been getting higher. In the 1993 NRB survey, 63 per cent of Russians gave a positive rating to the former communist regime, as against 12 per cent who were neutral and 25 per cent who were negative. In the 1994 NRB survey, the number of those positive about the Soviet regime dropped to 52 per cent, while as many as 35 per cent were negative. But by March 1995 opinions of the Soviet system had risen to around their 1993 levels, and they remained there throughout the 1995 and 1996 election season. Halfway through Yeltsin's second term, the seventh NRB survey in March 1998 showed that 72 per cent of respondents gave positive ratings of the Soviet regime, whereas only 18 per cent held a negative view of it. Repeat surveys in 2000 and 2001 suggested that the number of those positive about the Soviet regime appears to have stabilized at the 1998 level. In Russia, unlike in Korea, favourable assessments of the past exert a moderate negative influence on current regime evaluations (Beta= $-.07$, Table IV.3). Moreover, they exert a strong negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta= $-.23$, Table IV.4). The effect is about three times as strong as it is in Korea ($b = -.02$ as against $b = -.006$).

Previous research on post-communist Europe showed that perceptions of greater freedom than under the old regime increased rejection of undemocratic rule (Rose & Mishler 1996: 46) as well as current regime evaluations (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 193). During Yeltsin's period in

office, when NRB asked respondents whether they felt freer than under the previous regime to express opinions, join any organization, decide whether or not to participate in politics and practise their religion of choice, the median score, on a scale from four to 20, constructed by adding four five point scales, was around 15²⁸. Despite the anxiety voiced by human rights activists after the accession of President Putin and the decline in freedom noted by outside observers such as Freedom House (Figure II.2), the median NRB respondent reported actually feeling a little freer under Putin (see Appendix III). In Russia, unlike in Korea, the perceived increase in freedom exerts a modest positive influence on current regime evaluations (Beta=.06). The variable was not available in both Russia and Korea in the same years as the rejection of undemocratic rule, but it is a positive influence on normative commitment to democracy in Russia (see below, Table IV.6). Appreciation of increased freedom exerts more influence on empirical evaluations of the regime in Russia than in Korea, and this is congruent with the fact that the party-state interfered with citizens' everyday lives to a much greater extent than the authoritarian developmental state.

A widely noted feature of the Russian constitution is the extensive powers given to the president. When asked in 1993 whether they thought that the president should have the right to rule by decree if he thought it necessary, NRB respondents divided fairly evenly: 15 per cent definitely agreed, 34 per cent somewhat agreed, another 34 per cent somewhat disagreed and the remaining 17 per cent definitely disagreed. This distribution remained stable in March 1995 and during the 1995 and 1996 election season. With the accession of Putin to the post of acting president in January 2000, the percentage supporting rule by decree rose to 60 per

²⁸ Another way of saying this is that the median respondent felt freer in three respects and no less free in a fourth respect. Or if they felt less freedom in any one respect, they felt much more freedom in another. See Appendix III for means and standard deviations.

cent of respondents. After Putin's election, the ninth NRB survey in April 2000 showed that 67 per cent expressed the same opinion. Unlike in Korea, Russian support for the freedom of the executive exerts a modest positive influence on current regime evaluations (Beta=.05, Table IV.3). As in Korea, it exerts a slight negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta= -.03, Table IV.4). In both countries opponents of democracy support an autonomous executive.

An autonomous executive is able to make decisions based on technical criteria more easily than an executive bound by the obligation to consult representative institutions. The idea of giving economic policy into the hands of experts is popular in Russia: in the 1993 NRB survey, 28 per cent of respondents definitely agreed with the proposition that experts rather than the government or parliament should be responsible for economic policy, 50 per cent somewhat agreed, 18 per cent somewhat disagreed and only four per cent definitely disagreed. The distribution remained more or less unchanged through July 1996. As in Korea, the demand for technocratic control over the economy appears to be a modest negative influence on current regime evaluations in Russia (Beta= -.03), but unlike in Korea, it does not affect the rejection of undemocratic rule.

Rose and co-authors (1996: 46; 1998: 193) found that political patience with the new regime in post-communist Europe was a positive influence both on current regime evaluations and on the rejection of undemocratic rule. When asked whether the current political system should be given time to work or whether a new system should be tried if the current system did not bring results soon, NRB respondents distributed fairly evenly. In 1993, almost half were patient: 19 per cent strongly supported patience, 27 per cent somewhat supported it; 33 per cent somewhat supported the demand for quick results and 22 per cent strongly demanded quick results. Patience varies with the political climate: in the 1995 NRB survey only 32 per

cent were patient, but after Yeltsin's election victory, the July 1996 survey showed that politically patient respondents had risen to 53 per cent. Unlike in Korea, Russian political patience exerts a modest positive influence on current regime evaluations (Beta=.05). As in Korea, it exerts a positive influence on normative commitment to the regime (Beta=.08).

Being informed about politics may exert either a positive or negative influence on attitudes to the regime. When NRB asked respondents in 2001 to name their local district Duma representative, the governor of their region and the prime minister of Russia, 13 per cent could not name a single one, 32 per cent could name one only, 40 per cent could name two, and only around 16 per cent were able to name all three. Political knowledge, standing as a proxy for attention to politics, exerts a marginal negative influence on current regime evaluations in Russia (Beta= -.02) and a marginal positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.02). Restricting the analysis to the 2001 survey, which reduces missing data, suggests that neither result is consistent. Political knowledge appears to make little difference in attitudes towards the regime.

A perceived external threat sometimes helps to mobilize support for a political regime. Asked in 1993 whether the USA represented a threat to Russia, only 26 per cent were said it represented a threat. During the 1990s anxiety about the threat from the USA increased: the percent perceiving a threat in 1994 was 39 per cent, in January 1996, 32 percent, in July 1996, 37 per cent, and in 1998, 41 per cent. By January 2000, the numbers perceiving a threat had risen to 49 per cent; the following April 46 per cent expressed the same attitude; and 47 per cent saw a threat in summer 2001²⁹. The perceived threat from the USA exerts a modest negative

²⁹ In 2001, from a list of eight possible threats, including China, Iraq, the European Union, and Germany, only internal ethnic strife and NATO — which is led by the USA — seemed to present a danger comparable to the

influence on current regime evaluations in Russia (Beta= $-.03$). It exerts a much stronger negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta= $-.08$). Fear of America does not help the current regime in Russia, but rather plays into the hands of the regime's opponents.

Reisinger and co-authors (1994: 216) found that in Russia in 1992 hostile attitudes towards market economics were a significant negative influence on normative commitment to democratic values. Given their experience with '*nomenklatura* privatization' it is not surprising that Russians are now hostile to private ownership. In the 1993 NRB survey as many as 60 per cent of respondents expressed a preference for private ownership. However, by 1998 only 31 per cent favoured private ownership and 69 per cent favoured state ownership. The distribution in January 2000 was more or less the same. The April 2000 survey registered a significant decrease in support for private ownership: 20 per cent expressed this preference, although by summer 2001 support for private ownership had risen to around its 1998 level. Unlike in Korea, positions on this issue have no effect on Russian current regime evaluations. Again unlike in Korea, Russian support for private ownership exerts a significant positive impact on normative commitment to the current regime (Beta= $.08$). Despite the insecurity of property rights imposed by poor law enforcement and confusing legislation, and despite continuing state dominance in much of the economy, a minority of Russians still see private ownership as one of the most significant reasons to defend the current regime.

IV.C.3.2 Political Performance

Easton's (1965: 249) hypothesis concerning the relationship of what he calls 'specific' and 'diffuse' support predicts that ratings of the incumbent president will exert an influence on current regime evaluations. Russia has

USA: around half thought non-Russian nationalities living in Russia presented a threat, and a little less than half saw a threat from NATO.

had two presidents since the establishment of the current regime, and their performance ratings differ. When asked to rate the performance of Boris Yeltsin as President of Russia on a ten point scale, the mean score in March 1995 was 3.2. Repeat observations in January 1996 and March 1998 gave ratings of 3.5 and 3.4 respectively. When asked to rate acting president Vladimir Putin in January 2000, the score was 5.8. Repeat observations in April 2000 and in June 2001 gave scores of 5.9 and 6.1 respectively. As in Korea, evaluations of the performance of the incumbent president in Russia exert a significant influence on current regime evaluations (Beta=.08, Table IV.3), but their influence in Russia is much less than in Korea ($b=1.96$ in Russia as compared to $b=7.13$ for Korea). Unlike in Korea, ratings of the Russian president are a positive influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.05, Table IV.4).

Corruption has always been a feature of Russian political life, but the transformation to a new economic and political system together with the Soviet legacy has exacerbated the problem to the point where corruption in Russia is amongst the worst in the world (see Figure II.3). Russians are aware of political corruption. In 2001 NRB asked respondents to indicate on a four-point scale to what extent they believed officials belonging to five institutions — the police, the State Duma, local government, the army and the FSB — were corrupt. Combining the answers on all five institutions produces a scale from five to 20 where five means least corrupt and 20 is most corrupt. On this scale, the median NRB respondent gave a rating of 15³⁰. As in Korea, this absolute measure of perceived corruption in Russian state institutions exerts a modest negative influence on current regime

³⁰ Another way of saying this is that the median NRB respondent said that quite a lot of officials were corrupt in all five institutions, or if fewer than that were corrupt in any one institution, more were corrupt in another. See Appendix III for means and standard deviations.

evaluations (Beta= $-.03$)³¹. Missing data is extensive here, but restricting the analysis to 2001 data only does not make the measure much more significant ($b = -.08$).

Comparison between regimes tells us whether the current extent of corruption is a new phenomenon, or one which has been around for decades. When asked in 1998 to compare the extent of corruption under the current regime to that existing under the Soviet regime, 73 per cent of respondents agreed that the problem had gotten worse under the new regime. However, unlike in Korea, the relative measure of corruption does not affect current regime evaluations, nor does it affect the rejection of undemocratic rule. Russians appear to accept the relative corruption of the current regime with resignation: the regime does not suffer any loss of commitment as a result.

Rose and co-authors (1998: 193) found in post-communist Europe that a perceived increase in the fairness of the regime affected current regime evaluations but not the rejection of undemocratic rule. When asked in 1994 whether the government treated people more fairly under the current regime than previously, 41 per cent of NRB respondents said the regime treated people less fairly, 50 per cent said it treated people the same, and nine per cent thought fairness had increased. By 1998, the distribution had shifted a little: 50 per cent thought the current regime was less fair than the Soviet regime, 42 per cent thought it about the same, and only eight per cent thought it any fairer. Repeat observations in January and March 2000 registered little change. Unlike in Korea, Russian perceptions of an increase in fairness exert a modest positive influence on current regime evaluations (Beta= $.04$). Such perceptions do not affect normative commitment to the regime.

³¹ The measure is not available for both countries in the same years as rejection of undemocratic rule.

Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: 158, 193) found that the perception by citizens of being able to influence the government was a positive influence on evaluations of current regimes in post-communist Europe. Evans and Whitefield (1995: 501) found that citizen efficacy was a weak positive influence on normative commitment to democracy in the region. When asked in 1994 to compare the extent of popular influence on government now with the situation under the Soviet regime, 64 per cent of NRB respondents said they had only the same influence as previously, 29 per cent said they had less influence, and only seven per cent thought they had any more influence. Repeat observations in January and July 1996, in 1998 and in January and March 2000 yielded similar results. As in Korea, Russian citizen efficacy relative to that pertaining under the prior regime has no effect on evaluations of the current regime. On an absolute scale, 81 per cent of NRB respondents in 1998 said they had no influence on the government, 16 per cent said they had little influence and only an insignificant number said they had some or a lot of influence. In Russia, unlike in Korea, efficacy measured on an absolute scale exerts a small negative influence on the rejection of undemocratic rule³². Far from being stimulated by efficacy to support the current regime, those few Russians who feel efficacious appear to have indifferent commitment to the regime.

To the extent that Russians are concerned about a 'democratic deficit' in their society, one would expect the perceived extent of democracy now to exert an influence on attitudes to the regime. In March 1998 NRB asked Russians to rate the current regime on a ten point scale, where one means complete dictatorship and ten means complete democracy. The mean reply was 5.4. Repeat observations in January and March 2000 and in June 2001 gave similar scores. However, in marked contrast to Korea, Russian assessments of how democratic their regime is have no effect on current

³² The relative measure was not available in both countries in the same years as rejection of undemocratic rule.

regime evaluations. The same variable appears to exert a modest negative influence on rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta= $-.03$), but the single year regressions suggest this is not a consistent finding: it emerges as significant in 2001 ($b = -.13$), but not in 2000, and not in 1998. For Russians the perceived extent of democracy does not stimulate a unified response.

When asked in 1998 to react to proposition that the government cares about the interests of ordinary people, nearly all NRB respondents disagreed: 42 per cent definitely disagreed, 51 per cent somewhat disagreed, and only seven per cent expressed agreement. Unlike in Korea, Russian perceptions that the government does not care about ordinary people have no effect on current regime evaluations, nor on the rejection of undemocratic rule.

IV.C.3.3 Trust in Representative Institutions

Rose and co-authors (1998: 158, 193; 1996: 46) found that trust in social and political institutions correlated with rejection of undemocratic rule and with positive current regime evaluations. In a later article (Mishler & Rose 2001: 38) they argue that trust is a consequence of empirical evaluations of the current regime, and a cause of normative commitment to it. In other words, trust is an intervening variable between empirical evaluations and normative commitment. Factor analysis of trust in four state institutions – the police, courts, the army, and parliament – and in political parties and ordinary people produced unidimensional solutions in NRB data from April 2000, 2001 and from 1998³³. Since trust in representative institutions forms a separate factor in Korea, for the sake of comparability, the author treated trust in parliament and political parties as proxies for political trust in general. When seven-point scales for trust in political parties and parliament were combined, on a scale from two to fourteen, the median

³³ A two dimensional solution in data from January 2000 separated out trust in ordinary people and trust in the army as a separate factor.

score in 1998 was five³⁴. Repeat observations in January and April 2000 and 2001 produced similar distributions. Unlike in Korea, trust in representative institutions exerts a modest negative influence on normative commitment to the current regime (Beta=-.03, Table IV.4). The Russian parliament has been for much of the time a locus not only of support for the current incomplete democracy but also of opposition to it³⁵. Russians are even more cynical about representative institutions than Koreans, but that does not mean that they agree that parliament and parties can be done away with altogether³⁶. Rather they are divided about the value of representative institutions.

IV.C.4 Empirical and Normative Support as Russian Determinants

In post-communist Europe, prior research found that empirical regime evaluations were a positive influence on normative commitment to democracy (Evans & Whitefield 1995: 501; Rose & Mishler 1996: 46). Waldron-Moore (1999: 53) found no relationship between satisfaction with democracy and normative commitment to democratic values in Central Europe and only a weak relationship in Russia. Regressing one dependent variable on the other shows that, unlike in Korea, evaluations of the current regime are a significant positive influence on rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia (Beta=.09). Again, as with the Korean data, a two-stage least

³⁴ Another way of saying this is that the median NRB respondent expressed little trust in either parties or parliament. See Appendix III for means and standard deviations.

³⁵ In 1993 the xenophobic Liberal Democratic Party won 14 per cent of the seats, and the Communist Party 11 per cent. In 1995 the Communists won 35 per cent of the seats and the Liberal Democrats 11 per cent. In 1999, the Communists won 25 per cent and the Liberal Democrats four per cent. See Appendix Table II.4.

³⁶ In 1998 37 per cent of NRB respondents said they would approve of parliament's suspension; in January 2000, 39 per cent expressed the same view, in April 2000 41 per cent, and in 2001 51 per cent.

squares (2SLS) analysis is necessary to prove that this relationship is correctly specified, in other words, that normative commitment is the consequence of empirical evaluations, and not their cause.

In the 2SLS regression on current regime evaluations in Russia (Table IV.6), the excluded variable is residence in the so-called 'Red Belt' regions with above-average support for the communist candidate in the two most recent presidential elections. Residence in the Red Belt is unlikely to be a significant influence on current regime evaluations because, controlling for political and economic sources of dissatisfaction, Red Belt residents observe the same regime performance in the federal government as residents in other parts of Russia and have no reason to demand a higher standard. In the regressions on rejection of undemocratic rule, the excluded variable is the performance rating of the incumbent president. The latter is not likely to influence normative attitudes to the regime directly, but rather any effect it has is likely to be mediated by empirical evaluations of the regime.

The reverse relationship – that rejection of undemocratic rule affects current regime evaluations, as hypothesized by Mishler and Rose (1999), does not appear to apply in Russia. The two-stage least squares regressions show that the rejection of undemocratic rule is not a significant determinant of current regime evaluations. However, current regime evaluations are a strong and significant determinant of the rejection of undemocratic rule (Beta=.37, Table IV.6). In other words, in both Korea and Russia, empirical evaluations affect normative commitment but not vice versa. The ordinary least squares regressions presented in Table IV.4 correctly specify this relationship.

IV.D Common and Distinctive Influences

In order to compare the determinants of support in the two countries, it is helpful to distinguish two categories of independent variables, common

Table IV.6 Two-Stage Least Squares Models: Russia

	<u>Current regime</u>		<u>Reject undem-</u>	
	<u>evaluation</u>		<u>ocratic rule</u>	
	B	Beta	B	Beta
Year 1995			1.54**	.13
January 1996	-.94**	-.07	.82**	.07
July 1996	-.82**	-.06	.76**	.06
Year 1998	-.51*	-.04	.58**	.05
January 2000	-.61**	-.04	.69**	.06
April 2000	-.75**	-.05		
Year 2001	-.49*	-.04		
Age			-.02**	-.09
Town size			.43**	.07
Education levels completed			.63**	.11
Belongs to largest Christian church			.46*	.02
Trusts trade unions			-.13**	-.05
Trusts private enterprise			.13**	.03
Resident of natural opposition region		excluded	-.24*	-.03
Family economic position in five years			.24**	.06
Rating country's current economy	.04**	.47	-.02**	-.23
Income quintile			.14**	.05
Rating country's president	.17**	.08		excluded
Extent of democracy in country now			-.06*	-.02
Experts should decide economic policy	-.22*	-.03		
Perceives external threat			-.24**	-.06
Extent of corruption in government	-.13**	-.03	.09*	.02
Prefers private to state ownership			.86**	.07
Attention to politics	-.30*	-.02	.33**	.03
Citizen efficacy			-.53*	-.02
Fairness now compared to prior regime	.29**	.04		
Freedom now compared to prior regime			.10**	.06
Past regime evaluation			-.01**	-.18
Supports freedom of executive			-.30**	-.06
Politically patient			-.26**	-.05
Trusts representative institutions	.07**	.04	-.07**	-.04
Current regime evaluation		not applicable	.56**	.37
Rejection of undemocratic rule				not applicable
Constant			-1.23**	-1.20**
		Total R²	34	27

(**Regression coefficients sig at .01 level, * sig at .05 level; blank cells indicate variables in the model which are not significant)

Source: New Russia Barometer III (1994), IV (1995), V (Jan 1996), VI (Jul 1996), VII (1998), VIII (Jan 2000), IX (Apr 2000), and X (2001); weighted valid N=7408.

influences and distinctive influences. *Common influences* refer to those independent variables which are significant in both countries, with the same sign and with roughly the same size b-coefficients. *Distinctive influences* refer to those independent variables which are much more important in one country than in the other, or which are significant in opposite directions³⁷.

Entering these two categories of variables into the regression models in stages allows one to compute how much variance is explained by each (Figure IV.1). Note that in this procedure the completely specified models are unchanged from previous regressions (Tables IV.3 and IV.4). Only the way of subdividing independent variables is new. The greater the similarities between determinants of support in the two countries, the greater should be the percentage of variance explained by the common influences. If distinctive influences explain the most variance, then determinants in the two countries differ.

The regressions identified three common influences on empirical evaluations of the regime. The positive common influence is expectation of the future household economy. The negative common influences are the extent of perceived state corruption and the belief that experts rather than politicians should decide economic policy. For Korea, these common together account three per cent out of 36 per cent or one twelfth of the total variance explained in empirical evaluations. For Russia, these common influences account for four per cent out of the total of 35 per cent or about one ninth of the total variance explained in evaluations of the current regime. The common determinants have only a minor effect on evaluations of the current regime in each country. The dominant influences on evaluations of the current regime are distinctive or context-specific.

³⁷ The author here uses the word 'distinctive' to mean distinctive in the universe defined by the Korean-Russian comparison, not distinctive in the universe of all cases.

Figure IV.1 Variance Explained by Common and Unique Influences

EVALUATIONS OF CURRENT REGIME

Common influences: Extent of corruption in government (negative); Experts should decide on economic policy (negative); Family economic position in 5 years (positive).

Distinctive influences: all others in Table IV.3

**REJECTION OF UNDEMOCRATIC RULE**

Common influences: Age (negative), Education levels completed (positive), Supports freedom of the executive (negative), Prefers private to state ownership (positive), Politically patient (positive).

Distinctive influences: all others in Table IV.4



Source: Regressions as reported in Tables IV.3 and IV.4

In Russia, opinions of the current economic system are of greater importance in determining current regime evaluations than in Korea. This is consistent with the impact of Russia's simultaneous political and economic transformation. Other influences specific to Russia include, amongst positive influences, the level of trust in trade unions, the belief in freedom of the

executive, appreciation of increased freedoms, political patience and a time effect³⁸. Amongst the negative influences are concern about unfairness in government and evaluations of the past regime.

In Korea, the dominant determinants of satisfaction with the way democracy works are political rather than economic. Amongst positive influence, two political variables, ratings of the current president and the perceived extent of democracy in the country, stand out. Other statistically significant positive influences distinctive to Korea include the extent to which the government cares about ordinary people and membership in a Protestant church.

As far as normative commitment to the regime is concerned, common influences common account for 5 per cent out of the total of 10 per cent or one half of the total variance explained variance in Korea. They account for 13 per cent out of 26 per cent or one half of the total variance explained in Russia (Figure IV.1). Amongst the positive common influences are education, belief in private ownership of enterprises and political patience. Amongst negative influences are age and support for freedom of the executive. These common influences account for about the same amount of variation as the distinctive influences in each country.

Influences on the rejection of undemocratic rule distinctive to Russia include, amongst positive influences, income quartile, larger town size, prospective evaluations of the future household economy, ratings of the president and a number of significant time dummies. Amongst negative influences, they include evaluations of the past regime, the perception of an external threat, citizen efficacy, the extent of perceived democracy, trust in representative institutions and residence in the so-called Red Belt of

³⁸ Time context belongs amongst distinctive influences since the time dummies refer to a specific survey carried out in one country.

Communist-dominated regions. It is noteworthy that the extent of democracy and trust in parties and parliament are negative influences. This emphasizes that some Russians who trust representative institutions do not value democracy as a symbol.

In Korea, the distinctive influences on the rejection of undemocratic rule include, amongst positive influences, residence in the Cholla region and generalized social trust. Amongst negative influences are the perception of increased corruption, the belief that experts should control economic policy and a time dummy.

In summary, there are more differences than similarities in the determination of empirical evaluations of the current regime; and there are as many similarities as differences in the determination of rejection of undemocratic rule. These results suggest a possible role for context in the determination of support in a universe defined by both countries together. That is to say, if data from both countries is pooled, country attributes may affect attitudes to the regime alongside individual and household attributes. Although comparison of separate national models strongly suggests that context plays a role in the determination of political support for incomplete democratic regimes, it does not prove that it plays the dominant role. 'One-size-fits-all' sociological theories about democratic development may be unappealing to country specialists, but one cannot jettison them just yet. Comparisons of separate national models have allowed no more than a broad brush picture of the differences between the two countries.

IV.E Direct and Interactive Contextual Effects

This section builds a statistical model of the influence of context on one of the dependent variables, rejection of undemocratic rule, using a merged NRB/KDB dataset. A similar analysis using different Korean and

Russian measures of empirical evaluations of the current regime is not appropriate, as the questions asked in KDB and NRB were different, and the indicators are functionally but not directly equivalent.

Proposition 4: Rejection of undemocratic rule is influenced primarily by characteristics of individuals and households and only to a lesser extent by the type of undemocratic legacy.

As in the single-country multi-year regressions, year of survey must be controlled, and also one must control for the country in which the respondent lives. A simple way to introduce these controls is to set up a dummy for country and a series of dummies for each year of survey. To avoid the problem of perfect multicollinearity³⁹, one must omit one of the available dummies in the series. The coefficients on these dummy variables represent the direct effects of context — in the sense of time or institutional environment — on the dependent variables. Estimating the merged file regressions first without the country dummy and then with the country dummy provides a test of the nature and size of the impact of country differences on the dependent variable.

To create a balanced two-country data file, the last three years of the NRB data-set were matched with all three years of the Korean data-set for which the measure of rejection of undemocratic rule was available⁴⁰. For Russia the surveys used are: January 2000, April 2000 and 2001. For

³⁹ Perfect multicollinearity occurs when there is an exact linear relationship between two or more independent variables in a regression model. Such a relationship violates the statistical assumptions of multiple regression (Berry 1993: 11–12).

⁴⁰ The necessity for a balanced file arises because Russia had more surveys than Korea. In a file which included all the surveys, time context dummies for years in which there was a Russian survey but no corresponding Korean survey would correlate strongly with the dummy signifying the country-context, and thereby introduce unnecessary statistical error.

Korea, the surveys are from years 1997, 1998 and 1999. To control for time effects two dummy variables were created taking a value of one for the second and third year of survey in each country. The period covered by the merged data includes the first transition from one popularly elected civilian president to another in both countries. For Russia, the first survey was undertaken after the 1999 Duma election and Yeltsin's resignation but before Putin's election as president, the second after Putin's election and the last more than a year into Putin's first term. For Korea, the first survey was undertaken towards the end of Kim Young-sam's term, when he had become unpopular, the second early in Kim Dae-jung's term and the third two years into the latter's presidency. The data therefore cover political circumstances and changes which are broadly equivalent, and also are the most recent available to the author.

To determine the size and nature of the impact of context on the determination of a dependent variable measured in two different contexts, one can employ a two stage process. In the first stage, one runs regressions in the merged data file without a dummy variable for country-context. In the second stage, one adds the dummy variable for country context and compares the two regressions. There are three possible outcomes.

1. The unstandardized regression coefficients on individual level variables may get smaller once the dummy is added, and the overall R-squared increase by a large amount; this suggests that country context is a very important determinant and that the individual-level variables do not explain the differences between the countries.
2. The unstandardized regression coefficients and the overall R-squared may remain more or less the same while the country dummy is insignificant; this means that country context makes no difference.
3. The unstandardized regression coefficients and overall R-squared may remain more or less the same while the country dummy is significant; this means that country context is important, but that the

differences between countries are mostly explained by differences at individual-level.

The analyses suggest that the true situation is close to the third outcome described above (Table IV.7). The overall R-squared increases by a small amount, 2 per cent, and the country dummy is significant at the .01 level. The direct effect of the Russian context on rejection of undemocratic rule is negative. Eight of the nine individual-level variables significant at the first stage are significant at the second stage also, and their unstandardized regression coefficients are not much changed. Only one variable, city size, which is significant at the first stage loses its significance at the second. Four variables gain significance in the second stage only; these are: trusting most people, income quintile, ratings of the performance of the president and the extent of democracy now. As shown above, the behaviour of these four variables and city size differs in the two countries. Since individual-level differences account for 19 per cent of the total of 21 per cent of the variance explained, one can accept Proposition 4 as far as rejection of undemocratic rule is concerned: individual-level differences are dominant.

Context may also affect political support for an incomplete democratic regime through its interaction with individual characteristics⁴¹. Country-context interacts with individual-level variables in a variety of ways. To take a purely hypothetical example, owners of industrial enterprises in one country may tend to have anti-democratic attitudes because the prior authoritarian regime gave political power to industrialists. But in another country owners of industrial enterprises may tend to have pro-democratic attitudes, because the introduction of democracy coincided with privatization which gave the industrialists their wealth. Another hypothetical example

⁴¹ The author's analytic approach is inspired by Shi (2001). Professor William Mishler of the University of Arizona provided the author with advice on the statistical implementation of the approach.

Table IV.7 Direct Effect of Context on Rejection of Undemocratic Rule

	<u>Without Country</u>		<u>With Country</u>	
	<u>Dummy</u>		<u>Dummy</u>	
	B	Beta	B	Beta
Direct effect: Russia	na	na	-1.51**	-.18
Year 2	-.55**	-.06	-.60**	-.07
Year 3				
Gender: female	-.23*	-.03	-.24*	-.03
Age	-.02**	.10	-.02**	-.09
Town size	.26**	.05		
Education levels completed	.73**	.13	.73**	.13
Trusts most people			.10**	.03
Self-assessed social class				
Has a preferred party				
Family economic position in five years	.45**	.09	.29**	.06
Rating country's current economy				
Income quintile			.11*	.03
Empirical evaluations of present regime ^a	.11**	.10	.09**	.09
Trusts representative institutions				
Rating country's president			.07**	.04
Extent of democracy in country now			-.07*	-.03
Prefers private to state ownership	1.27**	.14	.70**	.08
Fairness now compared to prior regime	.21**	.04	.13*	.03
Past regime evaluation	-.02**	-.17	-.02**	-.16
Constant				
	Total R²		19	21

(**Regression coefficients sig at .01 level, * sig at .05 level; blank cells indicate variables in the models which are not significant; na means not available)

^a. Functionally equivalent but different questions used. See Appendix II.

Source: KDB 1997, 1998 & 1999, NRB VIII, IX & X; weighted valid N=5999.

might concern education: under one undemocratic regime, education entailed indoctrination in a set of norms hostile to democracy, whereas in another education inculcated liberal norms.

The interaction of country-context with individual-level variables can be measured by the inclusion of 'interactive terms' alongside other independent variables in the regressions (Aiken & West 1991). Interactive terms are the product of two independent variables whose interaction may affect the dependent variable. In this case, the interactive terms are the product of the 'country dummy' and other independent variables which are


significant in either country. The b-coefficient for each interactive term represents the change in the 'slope' of the graph of the dependent on the independent variable as country-context changes. The coefficients of the interactive terms tell one how the impacts of different individual-level variables vary between contexts.

A change in slope between contexts can be visualized on a two dimensional plot of dependent variable y on independent variable x , at a given time, t (Figure IV.2). As the context, measured by dummy variable c , changes its value, the slope of the line may also change. The change in slope is measured by the b-coefficient of the interactive term, xc . If the slope becomes steeper, the b-coefficient of the interactive term (b_3) is significant and positive. This means that the independent variable has a more positive effect in the second context than in the first (Interaction 1, in Figure IV.2). If the slope stays the same, the b-coefficient of the interactive term is close to zero. In this situation, context has no effect on the relationship between x and y (No interaction). If the slope decreases or, as in the figure, changes direction from positive to negative, the b-coefficient of the interactive term is significant and negative (Interaction 2). One can summarize the model in a mathematical equation. For dependent variable y there is an independent variable x , measured at the level of individuals, and a time context dummy t . Let c denote the country dummy taking a value of one for Russia and zero for Korea. Let a denote the intercept of the regression line on the y-axis and b_1, b_2, b_3 etc. denote unstandardized regression coefficients. Then

$$y=a+b_1(x)+b_2(c)+b_3(xc)+b_4(t).$$

It could be argued that such a model is over-elaborate. After all, the author has already compared the significant determinants of the dependent variables across the two countries. The implication of such a comparison is that the change in slope as context changes may be computed by simply subtracting unstandardized regression coefficients in one country from

Figure IV.2. Possible Interactions of Context and Individual Differences



Note: for equation $y=a+b_1(x)+b_2(c)+b_3(xc)+b_4(t)$, the graph shows three possible relationships between dependent variable y and individual-level independent variable x at a given time, t . In the equation, c denotes the contextual dummy, a denotes the intercept of the regression line on the y -axis and b_1 , b_2 , b_3 etc. denote unstandardized regression coefficients.

unstandardized regression coefficients in the other. However, this is unsatisfactory from a statistical point of view since the unstandardized regression coefficients are sensitive to the ratio of variance in the independent and dependent variables. Since the variance in both

independent and dependent variables is likely to be altered when data is pooled, as opposed to analysing the two countries separately, the change in slope computed by subtraction of regression coefficients from single-country analyses would differ from the change in slope computed as part of a two-country analysis. Moreover — and this is a more important reason for proceeding with the two-country analysis — the two-country analysis allows one to calculate the statistical significance of changes in slope. Statistical significance is of interest when one seeks to understand how context interacts with independent variables measured at the level of individuals or households.

How does one determine how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by context and its interaction with individual-level variables, and how much by individual-level variables which are significant across contexts? As with the previous regressions, one can enter different categories of variables into the equation one at a time to see how much additional variance is explained. What is of interest here is the amount of variance explained by on the one hand, differences between individuals and households, and on the other hand contextual effects, as measured by country dummies, year dummies, and the interactive terms for particular individual-level variables. The contextual effects must enter the equation last since interactive terms are only meaningful when individual-level variables have already entered the equation. The additional variance explained by the contextual effects therefore represents the minimum amount of variance that these variables may explain.

Regression analyses measuring direct and interactive effects of context produce a reasonable fit for the rejection of undemocratic rule, explaining a total of 22 per cent of the variance (Table IV.8), of which individual differences account for 19 per cent, and the effects of context account for an additional three per cent. Compared to the model showing

Table IV.8 Direct and Indirect Effects of Context

		B	Beta
Individual Differences	Initial R²		19
Gender: female			
Age		-.02**	-.08
Town size		-.21*	-.04
Education levels completed		.85**	.15
Trusts most people		.20**	.07
Self-assessed social class			
Trusts trade unions			
Has a preferred party			
Trusts private enterprise			
Family economic position in five years		.29**	.06
Rating country's current economy			
Income quintile			
Empirical evaluations of present regime ^a			
Trusts representative institutions			
Rating country's president		.12*	.06
Extent of democracy in country now			
Government cares about ordinary people			
Corruption now compared prior regime			
Prefers private to state ownership			
Relative efficacy now			
Fairness now compared to prior regime			
Past regime evaluation		-.008**	-.08
Contextual Effects	Additional R²		+3
Interaction: town size		.67**	.16
Interaction: trusts most people		-.15*	-.09
Interaction: has a preferred party		-.71**	-.06
Interaction: rating country's current economy		.007*	.06
Interaction: prefers private to state ownership		.89**	.14
Interaction: past regime evaluation		-.009**	-.09
Direct effect: Russia		-2.04**	-.24
Year 2		-.67**	-.08
(Not shown: contextual effects insignificant in fully specified model)			
Constant			
	Total R²		22

(**Regression coefficients sig at .01 level, * sig at .05 level; blank cells indicate variables in the models which are not significant)

^a. Functionally equivalent but different questions used. See Appendix III.

Source: For rejection undemocratic rule KDB 1997, 1998 & 1999, NRB VIII, IX & X; weighted valid N=5999.

direct effects of context only, this represents only a one percentage increase in the amount of variance explained by context (cf. Tables IV.7 and IV.8). The bulk of the explanatory power comes from individual differences rather than the effects of context. Context is important too, but secondary.

Individual differences which are significant in the model of direct and interactive effects of context (Table IV.8) are significant across both contexts, all other things being equal. The largest positive influences are education, trust in peers, prospective economic evaluations, and ratings of the current president. The largest negative individual-level influences are age, ratings of the past regime and city size. As one changes from the Korean to the Russian context, the slope of a number of independent variables changes, as indicated by the unstandardized regression coefficients on the interactive terms. Amongst positive changes are the increase in the slopes of preference for private over state ownership ($b=+.89$), city size ($b=+.67$), and evaluations of the current economy ($b=+.007$). Amongst negative changes are the decrease in the slopes of ratings of the past regime ($b= -.009$), trust in peers ($b= -.15$) and having a party preference ($b= -.71$). The positive changes indicate variables whose effects become more positive as one moves from Korea to Russia and the negative changes indicate variables whose effects become more negative. Note that a positive coefficient on one of the interactive terms can point to three situations: either a negative influence in Korea is insignificant in Russia, or a negative influence in Korea has an opposite effect in Russia, or a positive influence in Korea is even more positive in Russia. The same applies in reverse to negative coefficients on the interactive terms.

In addition to the interactive effects of context, there are two significant direct effects of context. One is measured by the unstandardized regression coefficient for the dummy standing for the second year of survey ($b= -.67$). This serves as a reminder that normative commitment to the

regime fluctuates over time in response to events. The second reflects the direct impact of institutional context. It is measured by the unstandardized regression coefficient for the country dummy for Russia, which is significant and negative ($b = -2.04$). The fact that Russians are somewhat less committed to their current regime than Koreans is, therefore, directly attributable to some unmeasured aspect of the Russian situation. A crude way of putting this is: Russians are less democratic. The magnitude of the b -coefficient shows that the direct effect of the Russian context is a loss of two points on a nineteen point scale.

IV.F Simulating a Change of Context

The regression combining direct and interactive contextual effects allows one to model the impact of a change of context on rejection of undemocratic rule. The impact of the differences between Korea and Russia, mediated by a particular independent variable, is the product of two categories of changes. The first category is the change in the average value of the independent variable. The second category is the change in the value of the b -coefficient for that variable. For instance, take the impact of town size. The Russian population is less urban than the Korean population, so the difference between Korea and Russia would have an impact on rejection of undemocratic rule equal to the change in urban concentration multiplied by the sum of the b -coefficient for town sizes in the merged regression and the b -coefficient of town size's interactive term⁴². To take another example, Russians are on average older than Koreans (see Appendix III). Since age is significant across contexts, and its interactive term is not significant, the

⁴² If the b -coefficient for a variable x_1 in the merged file regression is b_1 and the coefficient for the corresponding interactive term is b_{1c} , then the b -coefficient which results from the difference between one country and the other $b_1 + b_{1c}$. If x_1 changes by amount x_c as one moves from Korea to Russia, then the impact of the change of context mediated by x_1 on the dependent variable is $x_c(b_1 + b_{1c})$. Coefficients for insignificant variables can be assumed to have a value of zero.

impact of a change of context mediated by age is the product of the difference in average ages multiplied by the b-coefficient for age in the merged regression. Modelling the impact of a change of context in this way allows one to break down the total impact of a change of context into its component parts.

The overall effect of a change of institutional context consists of:

1. the effects of individual differences which are significant across contexts and whose mean values differ between the two contexts;
2. the direct effect of institutional context; and
3. the interactive effects of context and individual differences.

Proposition 5: The overall effect of the legacy of the post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state, including both interactive and direct effects, on rejection of undemocratic rule is negative.

To test this proposition, it is necessary to simulate the overall effect of a change of context on the merged sample. This involves multiplying the unstandardized regression coefficients of significant variables in the interactive model above (see Table IV.8) by the change in the mean value of the independent variables as one moves from one context to the other. Simulating the overall impact of a change of institutional context allows one to measure the effect of the interaction of individual differences and context in the determination of rejection of undemocratic rule (Table IV.9).

Recall that the measure of rejection of undemocratic rule is a nineteen-point scale where a score of -9 indicates maximum support for undemocratic forms of government, and a score of $+9$ indicates maximum rejection of undemocratic rule. On this scale, the mean rejection of undemocratic rule was close to five in the Korean surveys, with a standard deviation of around four, while the mean rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia was between two and three with a similar standard deviation. In the

Table IV.9 Simulating a Change of Context

	<u>Rejection of Undemocratic</u>	
	<u>Rule: merged file mean: 3.96</u>	
	Effect of	Resulting
	change	mean
<u>Individual Differences</u>		
Past regime evaluation	-.24	3.72
Family economic position in five years	-.15	3.57
Rating country's president	.14	3.71
Education levels completed	-.10	3.61
Town size	.08	3.69
Age	-.08	3.61
Trusts most people	.06	3.67
Individual differences total	-.29	
<u>Contextual Effects</u>		
Direct effect: Russia	-2.04	1.63
Interaction: town size	1.28	2.91
Interaction: prefers private to state ownership	1.12	4.03
Interaction: trusts most people	-.71	3.32
Interaction: has a preferred party	-.35	2.97
Interaction: past regime evaluation	-.31	2.66
Interaction: rating country's current economy	-.16	2.50
Interactive effects subtotal	.87	
Contextual effects total	-1.17	
All effects total		-1.46

Source: Regression reported in Table IV.8

merged dataset mean rejection of undemocratic rule is 3.96, with a standard deviation of 4.25.

Individual differences which are significant across contexts produce a mixture of positive and negative effects, which tend to cancel one another out. Ratings of the past regime have a negative regression coefficient in the merged file. Since Russia rates its past regime more highly than Korea, the result of the difference between Korea and Russia is negative, resulting in a loss of commitment to the regime worth .24 points. Prospective evaluations of the household economy have a positive regression coefficient. Since Russians are less optimistic about their household

prospects than Koreans, the net effect is again negative, worth .15 points. Ratings of the performance of the incumbent president are a positive influence, and since Russians in the years of survey were slightly happier with their president than Koreans, this boosts commitment to the Russian regime by .14 points. What these positive and negative effects represent is the change in commitment to the regime which occurs because Russia has worse or better indicators on a number of independent variables significant across both contexts, all other things being equal. In total there are more negative than positive direct effects from individual differences: the net impact of all individual differences is the loss of .29 points.

The largest impact of a change in context comes directly from the country dummy itself, lowering the rejection of undemocratic rule by 2.04 points on the $-9/+9$ scale. This direct effect of context lowers the mean score to 1.63 (Table IV.9). This quantifies the impact of all the otherwise unmeasured differences between Korea and Russia. One can refer to this impact as Russian 'undemocraticness.'

Interactive effects result from differences in the behaviour of independent variables between contexts. There are two positive interactive effects of the Russian context. The interactive term for city size pushes the mean score up by 1.28 points to 2.91. Urban concentration benefits rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia because of differences between urban and rural outlooks which are found in Russia but not in present-day Korea. The interactive term for belief in private ownership pushes it up another 1.12 points to 4.03. Belief in private ownership benefits rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia because of the strong association in Russia between democracy and the simultaneous transformation to a market economy. These are the most important positive interactive effects in the model: Russian rejection of undemocratic rule benefits from urban concentration and from support for private enterprise in a way which

Korean rejection of undemocratic rule does not because of the differences between the two contexts.


There are also negative interactive effects of the Russian context. The strongest is the interactive term for trust in peers, which pulls commitment to the regime down by .71 points to 3.32. Russian trust in peers is positive, but this doesn't benefit rejection of undemocratic rule as much as it would in Korea: the net result is a loss of commitment which would otherwise accrue to the regime. In other words, Russian trust in peers does not 'spill upwards' as much as in Korea, perhaps reflecting the weakness of Russian intermediary organizations (Mishler & Rose 2003). Note, however, that trust in peers is significant across contexts, and, in the years surveyed Russians expressed slightly greater trust than Koreans.

One can illustrate the difference in the behaviour of the independent variables which interact with context by comparing the mean rejection of undemocratic rule when tabulated against these variables in Korea and Russia separately (Figure IV.3). The mean rejection of undemocratic rule in the Russian data is 2.8 on the scale from -9 to +9, whereas the mean rejection of undemocratic rule for Koreans is 5.1. Big city Russians, with a mean score of 4.2, are 1.4 points above their national mean, whereas big city Koreans hardly differ from their national mean. Russians favouring private enterprise, having a mean score of 4.7, are 1.9 points above their national mean, whereas Koreans favouring private enterprise are little different from Koreans who prefer state ownership of enterprises. Distrusting Koreans are 0.8 points below their national mean, whereas distrusting Russians hardly differ from the national mean.

There are also weaker negative interactive effects of the Russian context. The interactive term for having a preferred party pulls rejection of undemocratic rule down by .35 points to 2.97 (Table IV.9). Of those

Figure IV.3 Context Affects the Relationships Between Variables

(mean rejection of undemocratic rule)



Source: Merged Korean-Russian dataset used in regressions of Table IV.8. Big city: over 1 million inhabitants. Preferring private: believes enterprises should be owned privately rather than by the state. Distrusting: scores 1-4 on 7-point scale or 1-2 on 4-point scale for trust in peers. See Appendix III for details of questions, scoring, means and standard deviations.

supporting one of Russia's six largest parties, approximately 30 per cent identify with the Communist Party and 8 per cent with the Liberal Democratic Party; both parties are at best ambivalent about the current regime (Rose & Munro 2002: 149; VCIOM & CSPP 2001a). The interactive term for past

regime evaluation pulls rejection of undemocratic rule down by .31 points to 2.66. As noted above, the effect of nostalgia on normative support for the regime is stronger in Russia than in Korea. The interactive term for rating the country's economy pulls rejection of undemocratic rule down another .16 points to 2.50. Ratings of the economy, which is in poor shape, assume greater importance in Russia, but the size of the effect is small.

The net effect of all contextual influences, both direct and interactive is negative: a loss of 1.17 points. This offers confirmation to *Proposition 5*, which predicted a negative overall impact from the Russian context. The negative net effect results from the direct effect of context rather than the interaction of context with individual differences. Overall, the interaction of context with individual differences in Russia has a positive effect, pulling the mean score up by .87 points. One way of interpreting this is to say that characteristics of individuals and households which would depress rejection of democratic rule in Korea do not do so in Russia. The absolute value of all contextual effects, both positive and negative, is six points on the nineteen point scale. Taking all effects together, both contextual and individual, direct and interactive, gives a total net loss of 1.46 points in Russia as compared to Korea. On a nineteen point-scale, this is a significant difference.

IV.G Summary

This chapter has shown that empirical evaluations and normative commitment to the regime have different determinants in each country. In Korea, empirical evaluations of the current regime are primarily influenced by political attitudes, and both economic evaluations and social variables are of secondary importance. In Russia, by contrast, empirical evaluations are primarily influenced by assessments of the current economic system, and political and social variables are secondary. This reflects the Russian experience of the simultaneous transformation of both economic and political

systems. As far as normative commitment to the regime is concerned, the determinants of support in the two countries are quite similar. In both countries, social variables play the most important role, although political attitudes are important, too. Economics plays only a secondary role in determining normative commitment.

Context matters in the determination of support for incomplete democratic regimes, but it is of less importance than differences between individuals and households. Time context — within the time frame chosen for analysis — is of fairly minor importance in both countries. In the case of normative commitment to the regime, the Russian context has an overall negative effect. This is mainly due to the direct effect of context rather than to its interaction with individual differences. Interactive contextual effects partly compensate in a positive way. If context is treated as a social category, then it is reasonable to conclude that Russians are less democratic than Koreans, although they also have some characteristics which make them less undemocratic than one might expect without the benefit of statistical analysis.

CHAPTER V. INSTITUTIONS, STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS, AND PERFORMANCE

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the importance of the type of prior undemocratic regime relative to other institutional variables, structural conditions and generic measures of regime performance as determinants of aggregate levels of political support measured at country-level. The dependent variables are two, as further detailed in section V.B below:

- satisfaction with democracy; and
- rejection of undemocratic rule.

Unlike in Chapter Four, the cases are not individuals, but 'country-years' or the combination of a country and a year in which the country was surveyed.

V.A Concepts, Data and Method

V.A.1 Analytic Strategy

V.A.1.1 Level of Analysis

There are two reasons for restricting the analysis in this chapter to the macro-level. The first is that there are some independent variables which can only be measured at macro-level. At a time when individual-level survey data is widely available, the macro-level approach is sometimes neglected when it should be complementary. The second is a practical reason. The intention here is to compare the effect of context not just in terms of the difference between Korea and Russia but in terms of the variation amongst 12 post-communist European countries. The analysis of data from 11 additional countries at micro-level would become unwieldy and extend this thesis far beyond its intended scope.

V.A.1.2 Categorizing Independent Variables

Determinants of political support at macro-level fall into three analytical categories. The first category includes *generic measures of regime performance*, which are attributes of a country at a particular time as measured by performance indicators. The word 'performance' is used because it implies that there are better and worse levels for the indicators, and that they may go up and down quite readily, and hence require regular measurement. An economic example would be the country's growth rate. The second category includes *institutions*, which are rules that structure incentives in political, social or economic exchange (North 1990: 3). The author treats the legacy of the prior regime, defined as the features of the prior regime which linger under the present regime, and the path taken in the transformation of both regimes, as part of the category of *institutional variables*. The third category is *structural conditions*, referring to states or conditions which are not institutions but which change little over time, or change only slowly. Examples include the level of urbanization, or the ratio of males to females. Unlike performance measures, institutional variables and structural conditions are not usually measured every month or every year.

V.A.1.3 Choice of Countries

It is worth noting that Mishler and Rose (2002) found very similar micro-level determinants of regime evaluations in seven post-communist EU applicants states, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and in the post-Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. This suggests that micro-level criteria of evaluation do not vary much across post-communist Europe as a whole. The author has independently carried out a study of the micro- and macro-level determinants of current regime evaluations and economic system evaluations in post-communist Europe, including Ukraine but not Russia and not Belarus (Munro 2002). This work

provided empirical confirmation that criteria of evaluation of regimes by individuals are similar across most of post-communist Europe. The post-communist countries therefore provide an ideal laboratory for studying the influence of macro-level characteristics on political attitudes.

In this chapter, confining the analysis to the macro-level in a universe defined by 12 post-communist European countries and Korea, the author explores the impact of a variety of generic measures of regime performance, institutional variables and structural conditions on international distributions of support for current regimes. The 12 post-communist countries are: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Russia. Belarus is not included because it has an authoritarian system of government¹. All these countries moved from undemocratic rule to an incomplete democracy at around the same time -- the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. They are all still in the process of adaptation to new institutions which Rustow (1999: 32–35) called the 'habituation phase.' They all meet the minimum condition that an overwhelming majority of the population accepts the boundaries of the political community.

By adducing macro-level data from other post-communist countries, the author separates the party-state legacy, present across the 12 post-communist countries named above, from something which the author has called, for reasons given below, the 'anti-modern core' legacy, present in Russia and in Ukraine.

¹ Although presidential and parliamentary elections are held in Belarus, the choice of candidates and parties is constrained, and campaigns are subject to undue government influence (OSCE/ODIHR 2001b; OSCE/ODIHR 2001a). This contrasts with the Russian situation where elections have been for the most part free even if campaigns have not always been fair (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a: 2; OSCE/ODIHR 2000b: 3).

V.A.1.4 Similar Prior Research

Most previous studies using multi-country or multi-year data sets treat individual-level variation as being of primary interest and introduce country dummies only as a way of acknowledging that context matters. For example, Evans and Whitefield (1995: 501), controlling for economic and political evaluations, report a significant negative beta for rejection of undemocratic rule in Estonia and a positive one in Romania. Such results don't tell us why one context has a negative effect and another context has a positive effect. All they allow us to do is map the effects of context geographically, and to speculate about the political-cultural causes of the differences.

Some studies concentrate on a particular type of macro-level independent variable while excluding others, without having justified the exclusion. For example, working on post-communist Europe, Broderick (2000) relies on economic performance measures, including economic growth and inflation in her analyses of the sources of political support in post-communist Europe. Her only 'political' indicator is a measure of progress with economic reform.

Other studies deploy a wide range of macro-level variables. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998a: 193) included macro-level variables in multiple regression analyses of micro-level data from nine countries of post-communist Europe. They found that rejection of undemocratic rule in post-communist Europe was responsive to whether or not the country had a democratic tradition before World War II, to the level of corruption in the country and to economic growth, but not to the increase in political freedom. Their measure of current regime evaluation was responsive to increased freedom, a democratic tradition before World War II and to growth.

There has also been a long tradition of research, beginning with

Lipset (1959), which attempts to identify the effects of macro-level characteristics across a large pool of countries. A recent example is Przeworski, et al. (1996), who tried to explain why democracies endure using data from 135 countries. With a tighter theoretical focus, Rose and Mishler (2002) treat between country variation as of primary interest in a study of regime support in 36 democratic and non-democratic countries. A similar example from the Korean literature is Lee (2000) who treats variation in country-level characteristics over time as of primary interest in an article seeking to explain the emergence of freedom in the Korean polity.

This chapter differs from all of the above studies in one crucial respect. It is part of a larger study whose focus is on Korea and Russia. The aim of introducing additional countries at this point is to elucidate the reasons for already observed effects of the Russian context as opposed to the Korean. The aim is not to develop a macro-level model which is generally applicable either across a region or across the world.

V.A.2 Sources of Data

V.A.2.1 Dependent Variable Sources

The dependent variable series in this chapter come from nationally representative sample surveys carried out between 1990 and 2001 as part of the Korea Democracy Barometer, the New Russia Barometer, the New Europe Barometer, and the Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer. The New Europe Barometer includes the New Democracies Barometer and the New Baltic Barometer². The latter covers Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and the

² The New Democracies Barometer surveys were organized by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna, under the direction of Professor Richard Rose and Dr Christian Haerpfer, and funded by the Austrian Ministry of Science and the Jubilee Fund of the Austrian National Bank. New Baltic Barometer surveys were funded by a variety of sources, including the Centre for the

New Democracies Barometer covers a dozen other post-communist countries in Europe, data from eight of which are included in this chapter³. The Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer⁴ covered a wider area but the author only uses data from those countries covered also by the New Europe Barometer plus Russia. The data set thus includes 13 countries and twelve years — from 1990 to 2001 inclusive. Since not all countries had surveys in all years, the matrix of countries and years is an irregular one (for details of surveys and which countries are covered in which years see Appendix IV).

Multi-country and multi-year data is used to derive series in which the cases are country-years, or combinations of a country and a year. One series measures mean levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works and the other series measures mean levels of the rejection of undemocratic rule. The number of cases in the first series is 100 and in the second series it is 53.

V.A.2.2 Appropriate Statistical Techniques

There is a good reason for not simply adding macro-level characteristics of countries and years into an analysis using individual-level data. The independent variables whose behaviour is analysed in this chapter are characteristics of countries, and not of individuals. Combining individual-level data with independent variables measured at country level

Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. The 2001 New Europe Barometer surveys received funding from the Swedish Tercentenary Foundation. See Appendix IV as well as www.cspp.strath.ac.uk for further details of the survey programmes.

³ These eight are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Ukraine.

⁴ These surveys were organized by George Cunningham and Karlheinz Reif at the European Commission. See Appendix IV for details.

presents a serious difficulty as standard errors of the variables measured at country level tend to be biased downward (Hayo 1999: 11). The alternative, which is the technique chosen here, is to extract aggregate scores from the individual-level data and then analyse the relationships of the series of aggregate scores with the independent variables. Since the data consists of a series of observations of 13 countries over 11 years, it is pooled time-series cross-sectional data. Models derived from such data must allow for temporally and spatially correlated errors and heteroscedasticity⁵, all of which violate the assumptions of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression (Berry 1993: 67-75). The appropriate statistical technique for dealing with these problems is a modified regression procedure which determines the significance of parameter estimates (i.e. b 's and $Betas$) using panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz 1995)⁶.

V.A.2.3 Independent Variable Sources

The independent variables in this chapter come from two sources. Qualitative evaluations and theoretical arguments provide the basis for constructing dummy variables to measure the impact of institutional context. The sources for generic measures of regime performance and structural conditions are, as detailed in the tables below, international governmental organizations, including the World Bank (1998), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999; 2001), and the OECD (2001), and non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House (2000a; 2001), Transparency International (Internet Centre for

⁵ Heteroscedasticity occurs when the conditional variance of the error term is not a constant, that is to say, when the probability of an estimate of the dependent variable reflecting its true value varies according to the value of an independent variable included in the model (Berry 1993: 67).

⁶ I am grateful to Professor William Mishler for pointing out the importance of using panel corrected standard errors and to Gregg Johnson for providing computer time to carry out the analysis. Both are at the University of Arizona.

Corruption Research 2001; Transparency International 2001) and the Heritage Foundation (2002).

V.B. Dependent Variable Distributions

V.B.1 *Satisfaction with Democracy*

The Korean question on satisfaction with democracy is, as in previous chapters, the following: *On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is complete dissatisfaction and 10 is complete satisfaction, where would you place the way democracy works in our country?* The Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer (CEEB) surveys include a question which is directly equivalent⁷ to the Korean one: *On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in [respondent's country]*⁸. The New Europe Barometer (NEB) of autumn 2001 included an equivalent question on satisfaction with the way democracy works in 10 post-communist countries. The Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health (LLH) survey of autumn 2001 repeated the CEEB question in Russia and Ukraine. Standardizing the scores on a scale from -9 to +9⁹, the author combines aggregate country scores from the CEEB, NEB and LLH surveys with the Korean Democracy Barometer to produce a cross-time and cross-national distribution of satisfaction with the way

⁷ The term 'directly equivalent' is defined in Chapter Three.

⁸ The 1997 Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer survey split respondents into two equal groups, substituting for one group the phrase 'with the way democracy works' for 'with the way democracy is developing'. Since the distributions in all countries were very similar for the two alternative ways of phrasing, it appears that the two phrasings had very similar meanings for respondents in all countries.

⁹ As detailed in Chapter Three, the CEEB and LLH answers are on a four point scale from one for 'very dissatisfied' to four for 'very satisfied'. These are recoded as follows: 1=-9; 2=-3, and so on in two further increments of six to reach +9. The Korean satisfaction with democracy scores on a one to ten scale are recoded in similar fashion: 1= -8.5, 2=-6.6, and so on in eight further increments of 1.89 to reach +8.5.

democracy works from 1990 to 2001 (see Appendix Table IV.1 for details of the surveys).

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, Russia ranked in the lowest twenty per cent of the distribution from 1991 to 1996, but had close to the median score, minus two, in 2001 (cf. Table V.1, Appendix Table IV.2). Korea ranked in the top ten per cent of the distribution in all years from 1996 to 1999, except 1997 when its score fell to minus one. The highest scores, above minus one, are from Korea and a mixture of post-communist European countries at different stages in transition. They include Korea in 1996, 1998 and 1999, the Czech Republic in 2001, Lithuania in 1991 and 1992, Poland in 1990, 1995 and 1997, Romania in 1996, and Slovenia in 1992 and 2001. As argued in Chapter Three, satisfaction with the way democracy works or is developing reflects empirical evaluations of the regime's functioning rather than normative opinions about what the regime should be.

V.B.2 Rejection of Undemocratic Rule

The survey questions used to measure rejection of undemocratic rule use almost identical wording across all the surveys in the New Europe Barometer, the New Russia Barometer and in the Korea Democracy Barometer. The most important difference is that in Korea the alternatives asked about can only include rule by the army and rule by a strongman, whereas in post-communist Europe, the surveys asked about an additional alternative, return to communism. The periodicity of surveys for this question was irregular¹⁰ (see Appendix Table IV.2 for exact question

¹⁰ Reporting of generic measures of regime performance is, by convention, annual. To measure the relationship between a generic performance measure and a survey-based measure, it is often unavoidable to make the assumption that the exact time of year in which the survey took place was immaterial, and that conditions during that year were more or less constant.

Table V.1 DISTRIBUTION: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Q. (post-communist Europe) On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing* in (OUR COUNTRY)? (four point scale; scores standardized on scale from -9 for worst to 9 for best, don't knows excluded) Q. (Korea) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is complete dissatisfaction and 10 is complete satisfaction, where would you place the way democracy works in our country? (standardized, on scale from -8.5 for worst to +8.5 for best)

Value range	Frequency	Cumulative %
-9 to -6.5	0	
-6.49 to -5.5	3	3
-5.49 to -4.5	6	9
-4.49 to -3.5	11	20
-3.49 to -2.5	19	39
-2.49 to -1.5	28	67
-1.49 to -0.5	21	88
-0.49 to 0.49	8	96
0.5 to 1.49	4	100
1.5 to 9	0	
Total N country-years:	100	

* New Europe Barometer asked about satisfaction with the way democracy works. In 1997 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer was a split file, with half the respondents being asked about satisfaction with the way democracy works, and half about the way it is developing. Comparing the two halves of the split file revealed almost identical distributions in all countries.

Sources: Korea Democracy Barometer, Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, New Europe Barometer and Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health survey. For details see Appendix IV.

wordings, plus a matrix of mean scores by country and year). The scales whose mean scores are used as dependent variables in this chapter are the same scales from -9 to +9 used as dependent variables in Chapter Four¹¹.

¹¹ As detailed in Chapter Three, the Russian scale for rejection of undemocratic alternatives in its original form runs from three to 12, while the Korean scale runs from two to eight. The standard scale is computed by multiplying the Russian score by two and the Korean score by three to create a scale running from six to 24. This scale has 19 points (=24-5). Subtracting fifteen from the scale makes it run from -9 to +9 with a midpoint of zero, just like the scales for empirical regime evaluations given above.

In terms of the rejection of undemocratic rule, Russia ranked consistently in the lowest quartile of the 53 country-years for which an observation was available (cf. Table V.2, Appendix Table IV.2). Korea ranked in the second quartile in 1998, and the third quartile in 1997 and 1999. The median score for all countries on the scale from -9 to +9 was five. The highest quartile included data from Central European post-communist countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary in all years, and also Estonia in 1995 and Latvia in 2000. As argued in Chapter Three, the rejection of undemocratic rule reflects normative opinions about what should be the nature of the regime rather than empirical evaluations of what it is.

Table V.2 DISTRIBUTION: REJECTION OF UNDEMOCRATIC RULE

Q. There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that: (post-communist countries) We should return to Communist rule; it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything (Russia only: a tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation); OR the army should govern the country? (Korea) it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything; OR the army should govern the country? (Definitely agree...Definitely disagree; additive scales standardized from -9 for least rejection of undemocratic rule to +9 for most rejection)

Value range	Frequency	Valid %	Cumulative %
-9 to 1.49	0	0	0
1.5 to 2.49	3	6	6
2.5 to 3.49	6	11	17
3.5 to 4.49	8	15	32
4.5 to 5.49	20	38	70
5.5 to 6.49	12	23	92
6.5 to 7.49	4	8	100
7.5 to 9	0		
Total N country years:	53		

Sources: Korea Democracy Barometer, New Russia Barometer, New Baltic Barometer, New Democracies Barometer, New Europe Barometer. For details see Appendix IV.

V.C Independent Variable Distributions

V.C.1 Institutional Variables

Faced with an array of unique cultures and national histories, it is tempting to say that each country can only be understood on its own terms, but the job of the political scientist is to test generalizations rather than offer potted histories. In order to operationalize the various institutional variables for purposes of statistical analysis, it is necessary to make some subjective decisions. Following Dahl's (1971: 203) example, it makes sense to divide the institutional variables into conditions favourable to democratization and conditions unfavourable to democratization, and to score the values of the variables in accordance with how strong the effect is likely to be. In other words, one can summarize various institutional conditions affecting democratization using a simple series of dummy variables and schematic scales (Table V.3).

V.C.1.1 Type of Prior Regime Legacy

As argued in Chapter Two, there are important differences between the legacies of a bureaucratic-military authoritarian developmental state such as that of Korea and the legacies of party-states such as the USSR and its former satellite regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. In the first column of the table, the type of prior undemocratic regime is signified by a dummy variable, which takes a value of one for ex-party-state countries and zero otherwise. In all of the party-state regimes there were no free elections and no genuine multi-party competition; governments were intolerant of most private economic activity, prices being set by bureaucratic fiat within the framework of a command economy; autonomous social organizations, if they existed, were usually weak and confined to the 'underground'; and constitutionalism and the rule of law were systemically impossible owing to the undivided power of the party-state. In Korea, by contrast, elections to the

Table V.3 INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES AFFECTING DEMOCRATIZATION

	Party-state legacy ^a	Soviet legacy ^b	Transition Path ^c
Korea	0	0	0
Czech Republic	1	0	1
Hungary	1	0	0
Poland	1	0	0
Estonia	1	0	0
Latvia	1	0	0
Lithuania	1	0	0
Slovenia	1	0	0
Slovakia	1	0	1
Bulgaria	1	0	-1
Romania	1	0	-1
Russia	1	1	-1
Ukraine	1	1	-1

^a. Type of prior undemocratic regime, whether Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarian (=0) or Party-state (=1)

^b. Continuously part of Soviet Union from 1918 to 1991: Russia, Ukraine (=1), all others (=0).

^c. Ordinal scale: mode of democratic transition: pre-emptive reform by undemocratic elite (= -1), bargaining between old and new elites (=0), or implosion of the old elite and its replacement by a new elite (=1).

Sources: Author's own schematic coding on the basis of sources cited in the text, especially Linz & Stepan (1996).

National Assembly were competitive, if manipulated and unfair; the economy, though subject to heavy government intervention, was based on market principles; autonomous social organizations were free to pursue non-political activities; and there was, formally, though not in always practice, constitutional separation of powers.

V.C.1.2 Anti-Modern Core Legacy

The second column in Table V.3 draws attention to the fact that Russia and the Ukraine endured a full generation of totalitarian rule before the Soviet Union imposed communism on most of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. Although only Czechoslovakia had a continuous period of democratic rule between the wars, all of the other Central and East European states had at least experimented with democratic constitutional

forms, and their pre-communist undemocratic regimes were authoritarian not totalitarian (Crampton 1994). Overall, Russia and the Ukraine had 74 years of communism as against an average of 44 years for the remaining countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus by the time of communism's collapse only the very oldest Russians and Ukrainians had any memories of pre-communist times¹². In 1991 Russians and Ukrainians in their forties were a post-Stalin generation who had benefited from the fruits of post-War reconstruction and a long period of political stability; by contrast, their peers in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, for example, would have remembered anti-Soviet revolts of the 1950s and later, which were suppressed by force.

The differences between the two groups of countries reflect also the fact that before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia had a centuries-old tradition of autocratic rule, and that most of Ukraine had been a part of the Russian state since the early 18th century. Pipes (1974) and also Keenan (1986) argued that there were substantial continuities between the pre-revolutionary Russian political tradition and the regime imposed by the Bolsheviks, and later modified by Stalin. Continuity between the pre-revolutionary and the communist regimes implies the possibility of international differences in the degree to which communism was 'congruent' with the native culture. Outside the 'Slavic core' of the Soviet Union, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe were more distant from Russia in geography, culture and language, and, as victims of external domination, also less responsible for their own political condition. In other words, the fact that the Soviet Union was an Empire under Russian domination implies different levels of complicity in the communist system.

¹² A good study of generational effects on political attitudes is Rose and Carnaghan (1995).

Aside from the 'cultural continuity' thesis, there is the 'backwardness thesis' which provides another strong theoretical reason to place the Ukraine and Russia in a different category from Central and East European countries further west. At one extreme are the Czechs. Stokes (1989: 217) writes: 'At the moment when national consciousness arose in Bohemia, industrial development with its concurrent social differentiation was already well under way. When the intelligentsia necessary for political action began to consider the Czech situation, it had at its disposal a growing class of persons economically outside the lord-serf nexus.' A favourable geographic situation, Austrian government policies favouring the development of domestic industry, involvement in the complex ecclesiastical history of Western Christendom, and the presence of German-speaking entrepreneurs helped the Czechs develop the skills and ethos required for socio-economic modernization (Stokes 1989: 215–18). At the other extreme are Russia and the Balkan states. Janos (1989: 338) argues that the establishment of modern-style bureaucracies in these peripheral countries of Europe was driven both by the desire of elites to conform to international standards and by 'the desire of the educated classes to find dignified salaried employment.' This led to an expansion in public employment incommensurate with existing levels of social complexity, and also to the establishment of economic expectations amongst the bureaucrats which were 'incongruous with the underlying economic base' (ibid). To support this argument, Janos (1989: 339) presents figures showing that circa 1890 such peripheral countries as Bulgaria, Russia and Romania had on average a third of the per capita income of advanced Western countries but state expenditure was about two thirds as much per capita. Thus, countries in a peripheral geographic situation vis à vis Western Europe experienced a syndrome of backwardness characterized by failure to achieve the rule of law, the persistence or intensification of obligations tying peasants to the land, the overburdening of state budgets, the lack of a domestic entrepreneurial class and low levels of economic development (Janos 1989; Stokes 1989).

Therefore, in terms of the nature, intensity and duration of the legacy of the prior regimes for current regime support, it is worth considering the possibility that Russia and Ukraine are different. In Chapter One, the author characterized the Soviet Union as an 'anti-modern' party-state, that is, one burdened by an ideologically-driven policy orientation, a non-market command economy, and the systemic impossibility of the rule of law (Shlapentokh 1989; Winiecki 1996; Z 1990: 312–16; Rose & Munro 2002: 49). All the communist party-states shared the 'anti-modern' characteristics, but they did so to differing extents. The Slavic core of the Soviet Union stands out for its longer and more intense experience of totalitarian rule, the congruence of its pre-communist culture with Soviet communism, its greater complicity in the imposition of communist rule across Europe, and a history of pre-communist backwardness. Therefore, it is possible that the Slavic core of the Soviet Union experiences today a more severe variant of the anti-modern party-state legacy. The author calls this, for clarity, the anti-modern core legacy.

V.C.1.3 Transition Paths

Based on the work by 'transitologists,' one may generalize that the previous undemocratic regime affects the paths available to democratization (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Stepan 1986; Linz & Stepan 1996; Geddes 1999). A basic distinction between transition paths is between those initiated by elements in society outside the ruling elite and those initiated by elements within the ruling elite (Huntington 1991: chapter 3). The transitions out of communism in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine followed upon a pre-emptive reform by the former party-state elite (Kitschelt 1995: 457; Linz & Stepan 1996: chapters 17, 18; Kuzio & Wilson 1994: 173ff). A further distinction is between those transitions which come about as a result of negotiation between the undemocratic government and opposition forces and those which come about as a result of the collapse of the regime without much negotiation, often as a result of the government's unwillingness or

inability to continue to impose its rule by force. Collapse of the party-state occurred as a result of the 'Velvet Revolution' in Czechoslovakia in 1989 (Linz & Stepan 1996: 316–333). Negotiation between the communist elite and representatives of an opposition movement took place in Hungary and Poland (Linz & Stepan 1996: 264–269, 296–316). Although Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were part of the USSR, their transition paths began to diverge from Russia's after the Republic level elections of 1990 (Taagepera 1990). Notwithstanding rearguard actions directed from Moscow, the process of transition was negotiated between pro-independence leaders from within the Soviet-era Republic-level elite and pro-independence leaders from outside that elite (Lieven 1993: chapter 8). Similar to the Baltic states, Slovenia was part of a multi-ethnic state which broke up, leading to independence of a former national minority. In circumstances of much greater ethnic homogeneity than the Baltic states, transition in Slovenia proceeded on the basis of negotiations amongst republic-level elites (Toš & Miheljak 2002).

The same distinctions between transition paths can be applied to non-party-state regimes¹³. Geddes (1999) reviews the extensive literature about transition paths in mostly non-post-communist countries of the developing world. Her argument, based on an analysis of 163 regime transitions in the period 1946–1990 (excluding those resulting from the Soviet breakup) is that single-party regimes, 'personalist' dictatorships and military regimes differ in stability and in terms of the most likely transition path. Military regimes are, according to her results, both less stable than the other types and also better able to organize negotiated transitions to democratic rule¹⁴. As discussed in Chapter Two, Korea's transition to democratic rule came about through a protracted process of negotiation and accommodation between the military-

¹³ Such distinctions between transition paths drew in the first instance on analyses of Latin American transitions -- see Stepan (1986).

¹⁴ See also Nordlinger (1977: chapter 2)

dominated authoritarian elite and representatives of a burgeoning civil society.

The different transition paths are summarized in the third column of Table V.3. Linz and Stepan (1996: 57ff) hypothesize that the various possible transition paths differ in their favourableness to democratization even if the nature of the prior undemocratic regime is held constant. Most favourable to democratization, according to their schema, is the implosion of the old regime, and the replacement of the former ruling elite by a new, pro-democratic elite drawn from the society. The basic logic of this hypothesis is that a new elite is able to replace the informal norms and operating procedures by which the old elite governed, bringing fresh faces and ideas to the processes of government. This pattern may therefore have a score of one on a schematic scale¹⁵. Next most favourable to democratization is transition that comes about through a process of bargaining between the elite of the undemocratic regime and the pro-democratic representatives of society at large. This pattern has a score of zero. Least favourable to democratization is pre-emptive reform by the undemocratic elite, whose members remain in a position to dictate the terms under which the new regime may be established, are able to retain key positions under the new regime, and are therefore in a position to perpetuate the old style of governing and its 'unwritten rules' (Ledeneva 2001), even under new formal rules of the game. This pattern has a score of minus one.

V.C.2 Initial Structural Conditions

V.C.2.1 Size of Private Sector

Differing institutional legacies from prior regimes meant that before transition countries faced different initial structural conditions. The size of

¹⁵ The schematic scale for classifying transition paths is based on that proposed by Kitschelt (1995: 457).

the private sector, measured by the contribution of private activity to official GDP, distinguishes the less completely socialized economies from that of the USSR, where nearly all private sector activity was driven underground. Notwithstanding the measurement problems and the fact that by definition official statistics do not capture illegal activity, World Bank (1998) estimates of the size of the private sector provide a starting point for discussion. According to these data, in 1988, the private sector accounted for no more than five per cent of GDP in Russia, compared to as much as 30 per cent in Poland, 25 per cent in Hungary and 15 per cent in Romania and Slovenia. Higher levels of private sector activity reflect 'market socialist' policies in some countries and also incomplete collectivization of agriculture. The median contribution of the private sector to GDP in 1988 amongst the 12 communist countries was 10 per cent. In non-communist Korea, by contrast, the private sector accounted for 90 per cent of GDP.

V.C.2.2 Wealth Per Capita

On the eve of transition, the countries studied here also enjoyed different mean levels of wealth per capita. According to World Bank (1998) estimates¹⁶, in 1988 the wealthiest country was the Czech Republic, with a GDP per capita measured in purchasing power parities (PPP) of \$8,653. The poorest countries were Ukraine (\$4,189), Romania (\$4,401) and Poland (\$4,471). The GDP per capita of Russia in 1988 was \$5,960 in PPP. The median GDP per capita was \$5,226, half-way between the Estonian and Latvian levels, compared to \$6,521 for Korea. These aggregate wealth figures are a snap shot, and as such they do not take into account that Korea was moving on a fast growth trajectory, whereas the Soviet-type economies were growing only slowly, if at all. If one anticipates the cost of transforming

¹⁶ As mentioned in Chapter Two, GDP statistics for Soviet-type economies come with caveats about accuracy, since these economies, even more than the developmental state, offered incentives for both over-reporting and under-reporting of production.

command economies to market economies, the position of the communist states looks worse.

V.C.2.3 Urbanization

Urbanization is a common indicator of socio-economic modernization. However, in communist states the building of cities and resettlement of rural populations often proceeded according to 'forced pace' modernization, on the basis of economic plans rather than historic patterns of development. According to World Bank (1998) data¹⁷, the most urbanized country of those studied here was Russia, with 73 per cent of its population living in cities in 1988. The least urbanized were Slovenia, where 50 per cent of the population was urban, Romania, where the figure was 53 per cent and Slovakia, with 56 per cent. The median communist country was about 65 per cent urban. Korea was about 70 per cent urban in 1988.

V.C.3 *Generic Measures of Regime Performance*

V.C.3.1 Growth Performance

Lipset (1959) was among the first to seek empirical support for the theory that economic development and associated processes such as urbanization and rising education levels increase the likelihood of democracy emerging. The accumulated evidence also shows that in the middle range of countries in terms of levels of development, which includes most of those studied here¹⁸, once a transition to democratic rule has taken place, the relationship between development and the endurance of democracy is

¹⁷ The World Bank (1998) definition of urban residents is based on national definitions of urban areas.

¹⁸ Przeworski and co-authors (1996: 41) suggested the middle range consists of countries with GDP per capita between \$2000 and \$6000 measured in purchasing power parities. For the countries studied here, the median GDP per capita in PPP at 1987 prices was \$5,226 in 1988, and \$3,527 in 1996.

positive and approximately linear; in other words, higher levels of development help the regime to persist (Jackman 1973; Przeworski, et al. 1996). The breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin American countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s proved that the positive impact of development does not operate as a law in any mechanical sense (Huntington 1968: chapter 4; O'Donnell 1973; Linz 1978b). Korea at around the same time provides another case in point--fast development did not coincide with democratization but in fact with a sharp movement towards dictatorship. Similarly, within the constraints imposed by Marxism-Leninism, the USSR and other communist states in Europe saw a rise in living standards in the 1960s and 1970s, which was not matched by movement towards democracy. Nevertheless, once a democratic constitutional framework is in place, and once political elites have accepted this framework, modernization theory predicts that economic development will increase demands for further democratization, and that such demands will, in time, be satisfied. Economic performance, then, is a possible source of support for incomplete democratic regimes.

In assessing the economic achievements of a new political regime, people are likely to refer back to the memories of what the economy was like at the time the new regime came into being. In order to compare the economic performance of a number of incomplete democratic regimes, all of which made the transition to free elections within a few years of one another, the author follows the practice of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in using cumulative economic growth since the start of the new regime as an appropriate measure. The year 1989 is chosen as a fixed reference point for calculating cumulative economic growth in all countries under discussion¹⁹.

¹⁹ The choice of reference year makes little difference in Korea since the economic system underwent little change as a result of transition in 1987-1988. The choice of 1989 as reference year for post-communist Europe

Korea grew throughout most of the 1990s at a fast pace, as in the previous three decades. The 'Asian flu' financial crisis, which forced Korea to go to the IMF for loans to meet short-term debt repayments, caused a recession in 1998, manifested in a drop of 11 points in cumulative economic growth. However, growth quickly resumed and by 2001 Korean GDP was double what it had been in 1989. Burdened with the problems of transforming a command economy into a market economy, post-communist Europe performed much worse over the same decade. By 2001, only five post-communist economies, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary had grown beyond their 1989 size. Estonia had achieved nearly nine tenths of its 1989 GDP. Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania had recovered around seven tenths their 1989 GDP. Russia had regained 66 per cent of its 1989 GDP, while Ukraine had regained just 45 per cent. The 'big picture' for the 1990s -- the context in which support for current political systems has formed in post-communist Europe -- is one of multiple growth trajectories -- Central Europe leading, Estonia lagging behind but still on the same type of trajectory as Central Europe, the Balkan states, Latvia and Lithuania zig-zagging and Russia and Ukraine bumping along the bottom. Przeworski (1991: 162f) predicted that a radical economic reform strategy produces a sharp fall in consumption early on, but consumption then rises, and if the reform is successful, rises above the pre-reform level and stays there. This describes the cumulative growth trajectory to date of Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia, but not of Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia.

V.C.3.2 Inflation

Inflation affects citizens even more directly than cumulative economic growth, since everyone pays higher prices as a result of inflation, whereas

follows the practice of the EBRD, and it makes sense as 1989 was the last year in which communism held sway across the region. All growth figures cited here come from either EBRD (2001) or, for Korea, OECD (2001).

economic growth affects unevenly different sectors. A reasonable *a priori* assumption is that inflation reduces support for incomplete democratic regimes²⁰. Prior research points in different directions. Hayo (1999) found that inflation in post-communist Europe reduced support for reforms associated with the introduction of a market economy. Rose and Mishler (1996: 46) found that the rejection of undemocratic rule was relatively resilient to inflation.

Unlike cumulative economic growth, which is hard to change beyond historically defined limits²¹, inflation can vary rapidly in response to monetary and fiscal policies. A couple of years in which the government relies on the printing press to cover a revenue shortfall can shoot inflation up into the hundreds or thousands of per cent. The introduction of tough monetary and fiscal policies can knock it back down to nearly zero in a subsequent year. Moreover, if prices double, that does not necessarily mean that what people can buy on their income halves, since in times of high inflation wages and pensions also go up, although usually at a slower rate than prices²².

Various measures of inflation are available. The author rejects a simple annual rate of inflation since it is based on the previous year's prices, and thus fails to capture the effect on a population of sustained annual

²⁰ A 2001 survey carried out by VCIOM showed that rising prices are the most widespread grievance of Russians against their government, as they were mentioned by 46 per cent of respondents in a list of more than a dozen grievances (VCIOM & CSPP 2001c).

²¹ For example, Korea's doubling of real GDP over twelve years reflects a very high rate of growth by world standards. Ukraine's losing more than half its GDP over the same period is also very unusual.


²² In addition, as Rose and co-authors (Rose & Haerpfer 1998: 37-8; Rose 1997a: 5-6; Rose 2001a: 17-8) have documented, in times of high inflation people in post-communist Europe also turned to non-monetary sources to supplement their income.

increases in prices over several years, as well as the lingering effect of sudden burst of high inflation which is quickly overcome. At the other extreme, the author rejects cumulative inflation from a base year since it implies exponential price changes while ignoring the mitigating effects of wage increases, adaption by consumers and so on²³. This author's preferred measure of inflation for the purpose of comparing incomplete democracies is an average annual rate since transition. Although, like the cumulative rate, it doesn't provide a measure of how inflation affects buying power²⁴, this annual average does have the virtue of smoothing out the exponential differences produced by the cumulative rate while continuing to distinguish between countries which have never had high inflation, those which had a few years of high inflation which policy measures subsequently quelled, and those which have had recurring bouts of high inflation. To put all countries on an even footing, and to match the growth figures above, the author takes 1989 prices as the starting point, meaning that inflation is calculated as an annual average since 1990 (Figure V.1). Amongst the 13 countries examined here, the worst inflation occurred in Ukraine, where from 1990 to 2001 prices rose by an average of 624 per cent annually. Russia in 2001 had the second worst record, with an annual average inflation since 1990 of 269 per cent. The post-communist European country with the lowest inflation was the Czech Republic, where in 2001 the annual average inflation rate since 1990 was 13 per cent. The median post-communist European country had an annual average inflation rate of just over 100 per cent.

²³ Thus, inflation of 100 per cent every year for five years implies by the cumulative measure that an item which costs 1 currency unit at the beginning of the period costs 32 (2⁵) currency units at the end. If earnings stayed the same as at the beginning of the period, the currency would eventually become useless as a measure of value since only a tiny minority of consumers would be able to buy goods offered for sale.

²⁴ Exact measurement of changes in buying power attributable to inflation is a subject for specialist econometric research which lies outside the scope of this thesis.

Figure V.1. INFLATION SINCE 1990: KOREA AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE



* average for 10 post-communist countries applying for membership of the European Union: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Source: EBRD 2001; OECD 2001

Among the 10 post-communist countries being considered as potential members of the European Union, a category which excludes Ukraine and Russia, the average annual level of inflation since 1990 was 85 per cent. The contrast with Korea, where in 2001 the annual average inflation rate since 1990 stood at only 5 per cent, is clear.

V.C.3.3 Political Freedom

Freedom House scores are a consistent measure of the observance by the authorities of political rights and civil liberties. The scores range from one for completely free to seven for completely unfree. They are available for almost all countries in a time series going back to 1972 (Freedom House 2000a). As discussed in Chapter Two, authoritarian Korea was somewhat freer than the USSR, and since transition Korea has achieved a high standard of freedom, comparable with that of Western countries, while Russia has drifted from the ranks of the partly free to the ranks of the unfree. Russia's performance is not typical of post-communist European countries. All these countries experienced a big gain in freedom in the early 1990s by comparison with the previous forty years (Table V.4). In 2000, the mean Freedom House score across twelve countries in post-communist Europe was 2.1. This represents a 3.7 point gain from the position in 1988. Although Russia is currently ranked as the worst performer, it is not the only post-communist European country which failed to supply freedom during the 1990s. Romania was not free in 1990 and 1991 and only partially free from 1992 to 1995. Ukraine has never been more than partially free. Slovakia was only partially free in 1993. Korea is slightly less free than the median post-communist European country in the table. Its freedom ranking matches that of Greece, the least free country in the European Union.

The degree of unfreedom in 1987 is important because it indicates the intensity of political control which citizens experienced before the old regime fell. The median Freedom House score for the 12 post-communist countries

Table V.4 TRAJECTORIES OF FREEDOM 1987-2001

	Year																Change
	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Change	
	1987-															1987-	
	2001															2001	
Korea	4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Hungary	4.5	4.5	3.5	2	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	3	
Poland	5	5	3.5	2	2	2	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	3.5	
Czech Rep. ^a	6.5	6.5	6	2	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	5	
Slovenia ^b	5.5	5	4.5	4.5	2.5	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	4	
Lithuania ^c	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	2.5	2.5	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	5	
Estonia ^c	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	2.5	3	2.5	2.5	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	5	
Latvia ^c	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	2.5	3	3	2.5	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	5	
Slovakia ^a	6.5	6.5	6	2	2	2	3.5	2.5	2.5	3	3	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	5	
Romania	7	7	7	5.5	5	4	4	3.5	3.5	2.5	2	2	2	2	2	5	
Bulgaria	7	7	7	3.5	2.5	2.5	2	2	2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2	5	
Ukraine ^c	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	3	3	4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4	2.5	
Russia^c	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.8	4	4.5	5	5	1.5	

Freedom House scores for 1987-88 reported as 1987, for 1988-89 reported as 1988 and so on up to 2001-2002. ^aprior to 1992 Czechoslovakia; ^b prior to 1990 Yugoslavia; ^c prior to 1990: USSR.

Source: Freedom House, 2000a; Karatnycky 2000:192-3; Piano & Puddington 2001:90; Freedom House 2001: 11.

was 6.5 in 1987. The most unfree countries, having a score of seven were Bulgaria and Romania. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were on a par with scores of 6.5. The least unfree country, having a score of 4.5 in 1987 was Hungary, followed by Poland with a score of five and Slovenia with a score of 5.5 as part of Yugoslavia. Korea in 1987 was freer than all of them, having a score of four.

V.C.3.4 Economic Freedom

In a comparison of a country having a developed market economy with countries at varying stages in transition to a market economy, it is also important to consider economic freedom as a performance measure. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Heritage Foundation has developed a global index of economic freedom, varying from one for most free to five for least free²⁵. The index based on expert assessments of ten criteria concerning government policies and conditions that affect personal economic choices. These are: trade policy, taxation, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking, wage and price controls, property rights, extent of regulation, and black market activity. The index is available for over 150 countries in a trend series going back to 1995. Although expert assessments are necessarily subjective, the index aims to achieve empirical objectivity in comparisons. A test of the objectivity of the scores is to correlate them with scores developed by other independent organizations. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has a similar index to measure 'progress in transition' by post-communist economies. In 1999, the EBRD's indices of progress in the area of 'Markets and Trade' correlated at $-.70$ with Heritage Foundation scores for economic freedom. The EBRD's scores were based on expert assessments of price liberalization, liberalization of trade and foreign exchange and standards of competition policy. De Melo and co-authors

²⁵ See Beach & O'Driscoll (2002) for more detail.

(1996: 403–405) developed another such index to measure progress with economic liberalization in post-communist countries up to the end of 1994. Their index correlated with 1995 Heritage Foundation scores at $-.63$. It was based on liberalization of internal markets, external markets and development of the private sector. Freedom House publishes an index of economic liberalization in post-communist countries, based on privatization and macro-economic and micro-economic policies as part of its *Nations in Transit* series (Karatnycky, et al. 2001: 25); the 2001 scores correlate at $.89$ with the Heritage Foundation scores for the same year.

By 1999, according to the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom, two post-communist European countries, Estonia, with a score of 2.2, and the Czech Republic, with 2.1, had slightly better scores than Korea, whose score was 2.4. Post-communist European countries were for the most part in the middle rank of countries on economic freedom. Amongst the 12 countries studied here, the median score was three. Russia and Bulgaria had scores of 3.5. The post-communist European country with the least economic freedom was Ukraine, with a score of 3.8. Ukraine was more than one point freer than countries still operating under a non-market command economy, such as North Korea and Cuba. These last were the only two countries scoring five on the scale.

V.C.3.5 Transparency

A final criterion of political performance of interest is the extent of the establishment of the pre-eminent position of legal authority, or the rule of law. The Transparency International corruption perception index provides an indirect measure of the rule of law: it measures the degree of transparency or freedom from corruption in a country on the basis of a combination of surveys of business people, the general public and country analysts²⁶.

²⁶ See Lambsdorff (2001) for more details.

Transparency International bases its scores largely on several elite polls conducted over a period of three years by different organizations, including for 2001 the World Economic Forum, the Institute for Management and Development, PricewaterhouseCoopers, the World Bank, the Economic Intelligence Unit, Freedom House (Karatnycky, et al. 2001), and Political and Economic Risk Consultancy. The use of polls over three years helps to iron out fluctuations in the perception of corruption caused by particular scandals or the introduction of particular anti-corruption reforms. Precise comparisons between years are problematic, but within years the scores provide a basis for comparison between countries. They range from one for most corrupt to 10 for least corrupt. The first year for which a complete set of scores is available for the countries studied here is 1999. In that year, Korea scored 3.8, which placed it in the middle rank of countries on the rule of law, more than six points below Denmark, which scored ten out of ten. The median of the 12 post-communist European countries studied here scored the same as Korea. The post-communist European country with the best performance in the rule of law was Estonia, with a score of 5.7, surpassing the scores of Belgium, Greece and Italy. Russia and Ukraine had far worse scores, 2.4 and 2.6 respectively. By global standards, these two are in the bottom rank of countries on the rule of law, on a par with such developing countries as Ecuador, Pakistan and Nigeria.

V.C.4 Relationships Amongst Independent Variables

The easiest way of summarizing a system of inter-correlations is through factor analysis. Factor analysis of eleven independent variables, including three institutional variables, five generic measures of regime performance observed in the period 1990 to 2001 and three initial structural conditions observed in 1988 produces a four-factor solution (Table V.5).

The first factor, explaining 41 per cent of the variance, correlates at an absolute value above .60 with three generic measures of regime

Table V.5 Factor Analysis of Independent Variables

(Factors extracted from a rotated varimax factor analysis)

	F1	F2	F3	F4
Transparency Intl. corruption perception index	.85	.13	.04	-.04
Freedom House score for political freedom	.76	.07	.21	-.30
Heritage Foundation score for economic freedom	.74	.27	.39	.22
Anti-modern core legacy	-.66	-.10	-.10	.61
Party-state legacy	-.02	-.96	-.05	-.14
Private sector share in GDP, 1988	.17	.95	-.07	-.08
Cumulative economic growth since 1989	.25	.82	.27	-.27
Gross domestic product per capita in 1988, \$ppp	.05	.08	.95	-.10
Transition path favourable to freedom	.46	.00	.76	-.18
Urban % of population in 1988	.02	.03	-.07	.88
Annual average inflation since 1990	-.32	-.22	-.41	.56
% of variance explained:	41	19	11	10
Eigen values	4.55	2.12	1.24	1.11

(Boxed loadings: strongest correlation with each factor at .60 or above)

Sources: Table V.3; EBRD 1999; EBRD 2001; Freedom House 2000a; Freedom House 2001; Heritage Foundation 2002; Internet Centre for Corruption Research 2001; Karatnycky 2000; OECD 2001; Piano & Puddington 2001; Transparency International 2001; World Bank 1998.

performance: the Transparency International corruption perception index; Freedom House scores for political freedom, and the Heritage Foundation score for economic freedom. It also correlates negatively with an institutional variable, the dummy variable for the anti-modern core legacy of Russia and Ukraine. As discussed in Chapter One, economic liberalization, political freedom and rule of law are closely related. A low level of rational-bureaucratic administration allows officials to use discretionary power to extract bribes. The absence of economic freedom forces entrepreneurs to seek official permission to carry out their activities, and also creates rents for those entrepreneurs who are successful in obtaining permission. Rule of law is necessary, too, for the achievement of high standards of political freedom, since without the rule of law, enforcement agencies may simply abuse their coercive power (Rose & Shin 2001). Governments may also enforce the law selectively to intimidate political opponents, as illustrated by the recent consolidation of media ownership and control in Russia (Belin 2002; Rose &

Munro 2002: 199–203). It is striking that the anti-modern core legacy has its strongest correlation, which is negative, with the factor for rule of law, political freedom and economic freedom. This suggests that the anti-modern core legacy is more debilitating than the party-state legacy which Russia and Ukraine share with the rest of post-communist Europe.

The second factor in the analysis (Table V.5), explaining 19 per cent of the variance, correlates at an absolute value above .60 with three variables: a dummy variable for the party-state legacy, private sector of share of GDP in 1988, and cumulative economic growth since 1989. The share of the private sector in GDP in 1988 has a strong negative correlation with the party-state legacy ($r=-.89$), since communist regimes forbade most if not all private economic activity. The fall in production associated with the transformation from command to market economies helps to explain the negative correlation between growth and the legacy of the party-state. Also, amongst post-communist countries, those which had the largest private sectors before transition were also better at recovering and sustaining growth after transition. Finally, Korea, the only non-post-communist country in the data set also happens to be an exceptional economic performer.

The third factor, explaining 11 per cent of the variance, correlates at above the .60 level with an initial structural condition, GDP per capita in 1988 and the schematic scale indicating the path taken out of undemocratic rule. As discussed above, countries which historically enjoyed a higher level of socio-economic modernization tended to take the more favourable transition paths. At one extreme is Czechoslovakia, one of the wealthiest countries in 1988, which also proved to have the most brittle communist regime. This allowed pro-democratic social movements to seize control of the state. At the other extreme are Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania, poorer countries in 1988 in which the undemocratic elite was able to launch a pre-emptive reform to retain control of the transition process. The transition path variable

also has a moderate cross-loading on the first factor, concerned with rule of law, freedom and the anti-modern core legacy.

The fourth factor, explaining ten per cent of the variance, correlates most strongly with one initial structural condition, proportion of the population in urban areas in 1988. Inflation, a performance measure, has its highest correlation with the fourth factor, and also moderate correlations with the first and third factors. The anti-modern core legacy cross-loads on the first and the fourth factors. The fourth factor is an artifact of large cities in Russia and the Ukraine, which also had high inflation. As argued by De Melo and co-authors (de Melo, et al. 1996) a burst of high inflation was the inevitable consequence of transition to a market economy. Russia and Ukraine liberalized their economies in a slow and/or piecemeal fashion, and therefore high inflation persisted for longer than elsewhere.

Additional factor analysis were run to check that correlations of independent variables for the surveyed years follow the same patterns as correlations of these independent variables in the entire period under study. It is re-assuring that the 'surveyed years' factor analyses and the 'all years' factor analysis in Table V.5 produce the same or almost the same factors, as it shows that the surveyed years represent a wide enough range of observations to be representative of the whole period under consideration. The first 'surveyed years' analysis included only data for the country-years in which the question was available on satisfaction with the way democracy works. Here the first factor loaded on the party-state legacy (at $-.96$), private sector share in GDP (at $.96$) and cumulative economic growth since 1990 (at $.86$); the second factor loaded on GDP per capita in 1988 ($.94$) and transition path ($.81$); the third factor concerned the Transparency International index ($.84$), the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom ($.65$) and the Freedom House score ($.63$); while the fourth factor concerned urbanization ($.83$) and inflation ($.64$). The anti-modern core legacy cross-loaded on the

third (–.55) and the fourth (–.70) factors. The second ‘surveyed years’ factor analysis used only the country-years in which the question was available on rejection of undemocratic rule. Here the first factor loaded on the Transparency International index (.85), Freedom House score (.84), Heritage Foundation score for economic freedom (.77), and the anti-modern core legacy (–.73); the second factor loaded on private sector share in GDP in 1988 (.97), party-state legacy (–.96), and cumulative economic growth since 1989 (.84), while the remaining factors loaded on the same variables as in Table V.5.

V.D Multiple Regression Analysis

Since Korea is the only non-post-communist country in the data set, one cannot generalize about countries which don't share the legacies of communism. But the data do allow one to test generalizations about institutions, structural conditions and performance in a comparative framework which goes beyond the boundaries of post-communist Europe. To do this, the author considers a sequence of multiple regression models with panel-corrected standard errors for each independent variable²⁷. The models are not meant to be of general applicability outside the universe of cases considered in this chapter. Instead, they are meant to test the impact of different institutional variables, and of structural conditions and performance measures net of institutional effects. The sequence begins with institutional variables, since these are of primary interest in this study, and then proceeds to test the behaviour of various correlated performance measures and structural conditions. In the light of the findings in the preceding chapters, the prior expectation is that the gross impact of the party-state legacy will be to weaken support for current regimes.

²⁷ See Appendix V for coding with means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables used in the regressions.

V.D.1 Institutional Legacies

As shown by the factor analyses discussed above, there are three dimensions to the legacies of the prior regimes. The first dimension is the common experience of post-communist countries, which correlates most with low private sector share in GDP before transition and poor economic performance in the first decade of systemic transformation. The second dimension correlates most with the way in which the transition to democracy came about, and with the initial level of economic development before transition. The third dimension is the 'anti-modern core legacy', identifying those countries subjected to Stalinist rule between the Wars. It correlates most with low economic and political freedom, low levels of rule of law, and high inflation.

Proposition 6: Post-communist regimes in Europe share the negative effect of the Russian party-state legacy on normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the current regime.

The first model in a sequence of multiple regressions (Tables V.6A-B) takes as its only independent variable the dummy variable for whether or not the prior regime was a communist party-state. The model explains one per cent of the variance in satisfaction with democracy under the present regime, and the party-state legacy is a significant negative influence with a Beta of $-.24$ (model 1 in Table V.6.A). The party-state legacy explains 49 per cent of the variance in the rejection of undemocratic rule, but it does not have a significant Beta²⁸ (model 1 in Table V.6.B). In other words, the party-state legacy has a gross negative impact on empirical evaluations of the current regime, but its impact on normative commitment is statistically insignificant. Proposition 6 appears to be only partially correct.

²⁸ In these analyses, significance tests are based on panel-corrected standard errors in order to take account of auto-correlation in the dependent variable series and heteroscedasticity. The analysis was performed using STATA and the R-squared reported comes from the STATA output.

Table V.6A MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS—SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Model Number:									
Party-state legacy	-1.98*	-1.88*	-1.65*	-	-	-1.82*	-1.80	-1.42#	-1.55	-1.63
	(-.24)	(-.22)	(-.20)			(-.22)	(-.21)	(-.17)	(-.18)	(-.19)
Transition path favourable to freedom	-	.71*	n.s.	-	-	-	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.48#
		(.32)								(.22)
Anti-modern core legacy	-	-	-2.16*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			(-.51)							
Private sector share in GDP, 1988	-	-	-	.03*	-	-	-	-	-	-
				(.34)						
Cumulative economic growth since 1989	-	-	-	-	.03*	-	-	-	-	-
					(.48)					
GDP per capita in 1988, thousand \$ ppp	-	-	-	-	-	.21	-	-	-	-
						(.18)				
Freedom House: political freedom	-	-	-	-	-	-	.44	-	-	-
							(.27)			
Heritage Foundation: economic freedom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n.s.	-	-
Transparency International index	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.73*	-
									(.54)	
Annual average inflation since 1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.001
										(-.24)
Constant	-.17	-.18	-.20	-2.61*	-4.66*	-1.57	.70	1.78	-3.43	-.16
	1	8	22	5	15	3	12	33	43	13
	Total R² %									

Source: Dependent variable as in Table V.1, independent variables as in Table V.5. Valid N=100 country-years.

Notes: Scoring, means, and standard deviations for all variables in the regressions are detailed in Appendix V. All coefficients shown are significant at .05 level, except those marked *, significant at .01 level, and #, significant at .10 level; n.s. means not significant and a hyphen (-) marks variables not included in the model. Models 8 and 9 rely on measures available from 1996.

are significant at .05 level, except those marked with a hyphen (-) marks variables not included in the model. Models 8 and 9 are

Table V.6B MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS—REJECTION OF UNDEMOCRATIC RULE

	Model Number:									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	b (Beta)									
Party-state legacy	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	-	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Transition path favourable to freedom	-	1.25* (.67)	.74* (.40)	-	-	-	.87* (.47)	.58# (.41)	.78* (.48)	.83* (.52)
Anti-modern core legacy	-	-	-1.87* (-.60)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Private sector share in GDP, 1988	-	-	-	n.s.	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cumulative economic growth since 1989	-	-	-	-	.02* (.56)	-	-	-	-	-
GDP per capita in 1988, thousand \$ ppp	-	-	-	-	.61* (.57)	-	-	-	-	-
Freedom House: political freedom	-	-	-	-	-	-	.53* (.44)	-	-	-
Heritage Foundation: economic freedom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.12* (.46)	-	-
Transparency International index	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.52* (.40)	-
Annual average inflation since 1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.002* (-.44)
Constant	5.21*	5.20*	5.14*	4.84*	2.98*	1.28	6.18*	7.92*	3.06*	5.23*
	49	72	79	61	75	76	66	79	78	81
	Total R² %									

Source: Dependent variables as in Table V.2, independent variables as in Table V.5. Valid N= 53 country-years.

Notes: Scoring, means, and standard deviations for all variables in the regressions are detailed in Appendix V. All coefficients shown are significant at .05 level, except those marked *, significant at .01 level, and #, significant at .10 level; n.s. means not significant and a hyphen (-) marks variables not included in the model. Models 8 and 9 rely on measures available from 1996.

The second model adds the next broadest institutional category, which is the schematic scale indicating the path taken out of undemocratic rule. This varies from the most favourable path, collapse of the undemocratic regime and replacement of the undemocratic elite by a new elite from outside the former ruling circles, as in Czechoslovakia, through negotiated transition between actors inside and outside the undemocratic elite, as in Hungary, Poland and Korea, to the least favourable path, pre-emptive reforms by the undemocratic elite, as in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and the Ukraine. As mentioned above, this is the institutional correlate of an initial structural condition, high GDP per capita in 1988 ($r=.69$).

Proposition 7: The path taken from undemocratic rule helps explain the distribution of support for incomplete democracies: a) collapse of the undemocratic elite along with the regime increases normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the new regime; b) revolution from above driven by the undemocratic elite lowers normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of the new regime.

The second model accounts for an additional seven per cent of the variance in satisfaction with democracy, and the transition path variable registers as a positive influence with a Beta of .32 (model 2 in Table V.6.A). The second model accounts for an additional 23 per cent of the variance in rejection of undemocratic rule, and again the transition path variable is a positive influence with a Beta of .67 (model 2 in Table V.6.B). In other words, the transition path, or its correlates, makes a significant contribution to satisfaction with democracy and to rejection of undemocratic rule. It is a stronger influence than the party-state legacy on both dependent variables. This suggests that how transition comes about is more important, in this context, than whether or not the prior regime was a communist party-state. The second regression model supports Proposition 7.

The third model adds the narrowest institutional category to be considered here, the anti-modern core legacy, that is, in the specific context associated with Russia and Ukraine. The anti-modern core legacy and the transition path variable correlate at $-.52$, but since non-former-Soviet countries have also followed unfavourable transition paths, the latter correlation, while high, does not suggest that transition path is a linear function of the anti-modern core legacy or vice versa²⁹. Since the party-state lasted longest in these two countries, the prior expectation is that the anti-modern core legacy exerts a negative impact.

Proposition 8: The anti-modern Soviet core legacy helps explain the distribution of support for post-communist regimes in Europe, and its effect on normative commitment to and empirical evaluations of an incomplete democracy is negative.

The anti-modern core legacy explains an additional 14 per cent of the variance in satisfaction with democracy, it has a negative Beta of $-.51$, and it causes the transition path variable to lose its significance in relation to empirical support. The anti-modern core legacy explains an additional seven per cent of the variance in the rejection of undemocratic rule, it has a negative beta of $-.60$, and it reduces but does not entirely eliminate the impact of the transition path variable. As expected it is a strong negative influence on both dependent variables, and this confirms Proposition 8. The fact that the anti-modern core legacy takes away from the impact of the transition path variable (cf. b-values in models 2 and 3) is not surprising, since Russia and Ukraine both followed the least favourable transition path.

²⁹ If two or more variables are in a perfect linear relationship, their combined use in a multiple regression model violates the assumptions of multiple regression.

V.D.2 Testing the Performance of the Institutional Model

The author tested additional models in to establish whether correlated generic measures of regime performance and initial structural conditions are more successful than the institutional variables at explaining variance. In a data set with observations from only 13 countries taken over a decade, the potential for elaborate model specifications is constrained by the high degree of inter-correlation amongst the independent variables. None of the generic measures of regime performance and initial structural conditions discussed above are sufficiently uncorrelated with all three institutional variables to add a fourth explanatory variable to the third model above. Therefore, the author restricts the fourth and subsequent models to three variables or less.

Whether or not the prior regime was a communist party-state correlates with the private sector share of 1988 GDP at $-.89$. If substituted for the party-state legacy, private sector share in GDP does a little better than the former in explaining rejection of undemocratic rule, since it explains 61 per cent of the variance, but its Beta is insignificant. On its own it explains four per cent more of the variance in satisfaction with democracy than the party-state legacy (cf. model 4, model 1, Table V.6.A), and it has a positive Beta of $.34$. Those party-states which initially had large private sectors tend also to have greater satisfaction with democracy now than those which had smaller private sectors before the beginning of transformation.

The party-state legacy correlates with cumulative economic growth since 1990 at $-.70$, reflecting Korea's strong growth during most of the decade, and the economic problems of post-communist Europe. If substituted for the party-state legacy, cumulative economic growth explains 14 per cent more of the variance in satisfaction with democracy (cf. model 5 and model 1 in Table V.6.A) and it has a positive Beta of $.48$. Cumulative growth explains 26 per cent more of the variance in rejection of undemocratic rule than the party-state legacy (cf. model 5, model 1, Table

V.6.B), and it has a positive Beta of .56. Economic growth not only sets Korea apart from the post-communist world, but also discriminates amongst post-communist countries. The countries with the best economic performance tend to have stronger normative commitment to the current regime and more favourable empirical evaluations of democracy.

The transition path variable correlates with GDP per capita in 1988 at .69. Those countries with a higher initial level of development tended to follow more favourable paths out of undemocratic rule. If one substitutes GDP per capita in 1988 for the transition path variable, it makes little difference to the explanatory power of the models. Compared to the model combining transition path with party-state legacy, GDP per capita and the party-state legacy together explain five per cent less of the variance in satisfaction with democracy and four per cent more of the variance in rejection of undemocratic rule (cf. models 6 and 2). Initial levels of development help to distinguish between different sub-types of prior regime and do as good a job at explaining the distribution of support as transition paths.

The anti-modern core legacy has its strongest correlation, which is negative, with political freedom, as measured by Freedom House scores³⁰ ($r=-.68$). As expected, current freedom is a significant positive influence on both dependent variables (model 7). However, substituting the Freedom House scores for the anti-modern core legacy results in a loss of explanatory power. Compared to the model combining party-state legacy, transition path and the anti-modern core legacy, the model with Freedom House scores explains 10 per cent less of the variance in satisfaction with democracy and 13 per cent less of the variance in rejection of undemocratic rule (cf. models 7 and 3). Although political freedom is a positive influence on both

³⁰ Note that the Freedom House scores have been recoded so that higher values mean more political freedom. The same applies to Heritage Foundation scores for economic freedom.

dependent variables, the anti-modern core legacy is more than a lack of political freedom.

The anti-modern core legacy correlates negatively with the Heritage Foundation scores for economic freedom at $-.42$. Unlike political freedom, economic freedom has no significant effect on satisfaction with democracy, but it does affect rejection of undemocratic rule with a Beta of $.46$ (model 8 in Table V.6.B). Since the Heritage Foundation scores do not cover the early 1990s, in order to eliminate missing data, the regression uses data from 1996 and later, and the smaller number of cases explains the relatively high share of variance explained. To compare the substantive impact of economic freedom with that of the anti-modern core legacy, consider the effect of a two-standard deviation increase in economic freedom, equal to 1.08 points in this dataset (see Appendix V). This would cause an increase in rejection of undemocratic rule worth 1.21 points ($=1.12 \times 1.08$, according to b-value in model 8), which in absolute terms is still two thirds of a point less than the 1.87 point decrease from the anti-modern core legacy (cf. b-value in model 3). Although economic freedom appears to be a positive influence on rejection of undemocratic rule, the anti-modern core legacy does not reduce to low economic freedom.

The anti-modern core legacy is the strongest institutional correlate of rule of law, as measured by Transparency International corruption perception scores ($r=-.49$). As with political freedom, transparency is a positive influence on both normative and empirical measures of support (model 9). Again, to compare the substantive impact of transparency with that of the anti-modern core legacy, consider the effect of a two standard deviation improvement in transparency, equal to 2.24 points on the ten-point scale (see Appendix V). This would cause an increase in satisfaction with democracy worth 1.64 points ($=2.24 \times .73$, according to b-value in model 9), which in absolute terms is still more than half a point less than the 2.16 point

decrease caused by the anti-modern core legacy (model 3). The anti-modern core legacy includes but does not reduce to low levels of rule of law.

The anti-modern core legacy correlates with annual average inflation since 1990 at .67. Since inflation affects what citizens can afford, and Russians and Ukrainians have experienced it simultaneously with the transformation to new economic and political systems, it is worth testing inflation in the model. As expected, inflation is a significant negative influence on both dependent variables (model 10). Using inflation instead of the anti-modern core legacy reduces the variance explained in satisfaction with democracy by nine per cent, but it adds two per cent to the variance explained in rejection of undemocratic rule (cf. models 10 and 3). High inflation is characteristic of the anti-modern core legacy, even though the latter does not reduce to it.

V.E Summary

Compared to Russia and the other post-communist states, Korea began democratic transition with an initial structural advantage in the form of its fast-developing market economy. This was an advantage not only because economic growth was faster under the Korean undemocratic regime, but because Korea did not have to complete the total transformation of its economic system. The 'opportunity cost' of the socialist experiment was counted not only in the sharp transitional slump of the 1990s, but also in the inferior pace and quality of communist economic development in the entire post-War era (Rose 1997b). Reviewing the evidence of all ten models discussed above, one may conclude that, at least in comparison with Korea, the legacy of the communist party-state is negative as far as empirical evaluations of the current regime are concerned, but statistically insignificant in regard to normative commitment. In study designs where the differentiation provided by continuous measures is valuable, initial private sector share of GDP may serve as a proxy for the initial conditions

established by the party-state, and cumulative growth since transition for the ongoing performance effect of the legacy.

The way in which transition came about significantly affects the evaluation of new regimes and the extent of normative commitment to them. Support is least in those countries in which the 'same old faces' of the former undemocratic elite managed to preserve or enhance their positions of privilege under the new regime. It is greatest in countries where a challenging elite evicted the old elite from power and was thus able to replace its informal norms and operating procedures with new ones more in tune with democratic rules of the game. The path taken out of undemocratic rule exerts an influence on both dependent variables which is independent of the party-state legacy. Its closest correlate, the initial GDP per capita before transition, provides a continuous measure with which to tap the complex set of effects of the level of socio-economic development of a country on the transition paths available to it.

The post-Soviet states of Russia and Ukraine carry the burden of what this author has called the anti-modern core legacy, which contributes to worse empirical evaluations and lower normative support for the current regimes in these states. One can 'unpack' the anti-modern core legacy into several different performance effects and an institutional effect. The institutional effect is the correlation of the anti-modern core legacy with an unfavourable transition path. As regards performance effects, the anti-modern core legacy associates with high inflation, low economic and political freedom, and low levels of the rule of law. None of these performance measures on its own captures the anti-modern core legacy in its entirety. Rather it is the combination and concentration of all of these in the anti-modern core legacy which gives the latter variable its explanatory power. In Russia and Ukraine, the complex of adverse performance effects comprise a syndrome of failure.

CHAPTER VI. LEGACIES OF PRIOR REGIMES AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

VI.A Review in Brief

VI.A.1 Contrasting Regime-Type Legacies

A complete democracy is a system of government characterized by four things: accountability of governors to the governed; a civil society free of government control; the rule of law; and free and fair elections to choose the government of the day (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998: 33). Authoritarian Korea and the Soviet Union embodied contrasting undemocratic regime types. Korea exemplified the combination of a bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime and the developmental state. The Soviet Union was a post-totalitarian, anti-modern party-state. Their legacies, conceived as institutional contexts, exert a complex set of effects on the incomplete democratic regimes of today.

Korea's bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime offered a far more favourable starting point for democratization than the post-totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union (cf. Tables I.1, II.3). Despite the dominant role of the military in politics, and the political chicanery associated with managed elections under an authoritarian regime, Korea had organized opposition parties, the formal basis for legal separation of executive, judicial and legislative powers, and autonomous social movements with a proven capacity for sustained political mobilization. The Soviet Union had none of these things. Instead, it had a tradition of undivided political authority, guaranteed by a massive apparatus for internal surveillance and coercion. Political participation took the form of mass mobilization from the top down. There were no major political organizations outside the CPSU, and the only opposition took the form of various dissident groups confined to the 'underground'.

Korea's undemocratic regime also placed it on a much more favourable trajectory of development than the Soviet Union. Although the nature of the developmental state and the extent to which it was responsible for Korean economic growth is still a matter of scholarly controversy (Amsden 1989; Kang 2002; Song 1990), there are glaring contrasts with the Soviet model. Whereas the developmental state engaged in strategic intervention in a market economy, the Soviet party-state had a non-market command economy. Whereas Korea oriented itself toward exports in an international political economy, the Soviet party-state operated a closed, autarkic economic system. Whereas in Korea collusive relationships developed between state and business, the Soviet party-state was anti-modern, forcing everyone to rely on clientelist relationships to get by in everyday life. The anti-modern party-state achieved mediocre growth, intermediate technological capacity, and low integration with the international economic environment. It also fostered a corrupt ruling class, the *nomenklatura*. Although the Korean developmental state created structural economic problems of over-capacity and over-diversification and influence-peddling was an integral part of the way the system worked, against these problems one must set Korean achievements under the developmental state: a record of strong growth, competitive value-added exports, and significant market share in the international industrial economy. In both countries, the problems of the current political economy reflect a mismatch between the democratic constitutional framework and the inherited, informal norms governing the relationship of power and wealth under the old regime. However, the mismatch is not on the same grand scale in Korea as in Russia.

The enormous gap in Russia between formal and informal norms, between public life and private morality, and between legality and practical ways of getting things done cannot be understood except with reference to the perverse dynamic of the Soviet regime. Scholars have pointed out that

the gap was characteristic of pre-revolutionary Russian society (Keenan 1986; Pipes 1974). However, continuity of 'Russian-ness' is not the full explanation for the gap because it doesn't tell us why Korean society, for instance, which was also patrimonial with an absolutist monarchy before the 20th century (Cumings 1997: chapters 1–2), does not have as large a gap today, though it does have systemic corruption. One can only understand the gap between public and private morality in the Soviet Union if one conceives of it as a process of deterioration: as the Soviet system 'mal-socialized' succeeding generations, it corroded whatever norms against corruption existed in the pre-Soviet society (Winiecki 1996). If under totalitarian mobilization, the demands of public life taught ordinary people that the law is mighty but the party-state is mightier, in the post-totalitarian period, ordinary people got their revenge for this unfairness by progressively subverting public life (Shlapentokh 1989: 154ff).

VI.A.2 Measuring the Impact of the Undemocratic Legacy

The legacy of the prior regime is a contextual determinant of political attitudes. Context here refers to a unique combination of a time and a country. In a comparison of two countries with contrasting types of prior undemocratic regimes, the legacy of the prior regime is measurable in terms of the impact of *country-context*, that is the particular institutional settings associated with one prior regime type rather than another. The results of analyses using a two-country merged data set confirmed that rejection of undemocratic rule is primarily a function of individual differences, and the direct effect of context adds only a few percentage points to the variance explained (cf. Proposition 4 and Table IV.7). The direct effect of the Russian context on rejection of undemocratic rule is significant and negative.

However, the direct effect of context is not its only effect. Since the ways in which people react to the same objective circumstances can differ

between countries, individual-level variation interacts with country-context. The analyses showed that significant interactive effects are present and they partially mitigate the negative direct effect of the Russian context (Tables IV.8, IV.9). The interactive effects support the argument that prior undemocratic regimes leave a legacy on the demand-side as well as the supply-side. Support for private ownership of enterprises is a significantly more positive influence on rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia than in Korea, reflecting a close relationship between pro-market and pro-democratic feeling, and inversely between anti-market and anti-democratic feeling. Because the systemic economic transformation of Russia is a 'larger turn' than the reform of the developmental state, approval of the current economic system is likewise a more positive influence in Russia than in Korea. Larger town size is a more positive influence in Russia, reflecting persistent urban-rural differences which intense urbanization in Korea has eroded. Consistent with the notion that the legacy of the past is stronger in Russia, evaluations of the past regime are a more negative influence in Russia. Interpersonal trust, a positive influence in Korea, matters little for Russian attitudes to the regime, and this is consistent with the argument that Russia is an 'hour-glass society' with narrow vertical links between mass and elite (Rose 1995d). Finally, while in Korea having a political party preference it tends to encourage rejection of undemocratic rule, in Russia the effect of having party preference is more negative. This reflects the strength and persistence of the Communist Party (more on this below). Aggregating both the direct effects of context and the interactive effects confirmed that, as far as the rejection of undemocratic rule is concerned, the overall legacy of the Russian as opposed to the Korean context is negative (cf. Proposition 5 and Table IV.9).

VI.A.3 Party-State versus Anti-modern Core Legacies

Are the impacts of the Russian context characteristic of post-communist countries in general, or are they due to specific characteristics

of Russia? Russia and its nearest neighbours, Belarus and Ukraine, differ from other post-communist states in Europe because of their longer experience of communist rule. The Soviet regime lasted over seventy years, while the other communist regimes of Europe lasted around forty years. Totalitarianism was more brutal in the USSR, having directly or indirectly caused the deaths of millions of Russians, and non-Russians too. Even before the imposition of communist rule, Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians were the inheritors of a centuries-old tradition of autocratic rule, and they were 'backward' from the point of view of socio-economic development and politics when compared to countries further west. Finally, the Soviet regime was homegrown, while in other parts of Europe Soviet-type regimes were an imposition from without. These are strong *prima facie* reasons why the legacy of the prior regime in Russia and Ukraine may be more severe than in the other post-communist countries considered in this thesis.

Countries sharing Russia's communist past and the minimal criterion of holding free elections, but not other characteristics of the anti-modern core legacy, provided a test of whether the observed impact of the Russian context was due to generic features of the party-state legacy or to the anti-modern core legacy conceived as an extreme variant of the former. Factor analysis of a range of institutional variables, generic measures of regime performance and initial structural conditions revealed three main factors, correlating with three corresponding institutional variables (Table V.5). First, correlating negatively with the anti-modern core legacy, there was a factor for political and economic freedom and rule-of-law. Second, correlating negatively with the party-state legacy, there was a market economic factor concerned with economic growth since transition and private sector share of GDP before transition. Third, correlating with the path taken out of undemocratic rule there were initial levels of socio-economic development. Inflation correlated with all of these factors to

some extent, but, of the three institutional variables, had its strongest correlation with the anti-modern core legacy.

Regression analysis showed that the gross effect of the party-state legacy on a cross-time and cross-national distribution of normative commitment to current regimes is insignificant (cf. Proposition 6 and Table V.6B). The gross effect of the party-state legacy on satisfaction with democratic performance is negative (Table V.6A). The path taken out of undemocratic rule, measured on a schematic scale from the most favourable path, replacement of the undemocratic elite, to the least favourable path, pre-emptive reform by the undemocratic elite, is a significant influence on both dependent variables in the expected direction (Proposition 7). The anti-modern core legacy exerts an additional negative influence on both dependent variables (cf. Proposition 8). Although the anti-modern core legacy correlates with low economic and political freedom, low levels of rule of law and high inflation, none of these performance measures on its own accounts for the full impact of the anti-modern core legacy. Rather the anti-modern core legacy is the combination and concentration of all these performance effects, suggesting a syndrome of failure in the former Soviet states.

VI.B Prior Undemocratic Regimes and Democratic Consolidation

VI.B.1 Defining Democratic Consolidation

Compliance with rules and/or instructions from above is the behavioural foundation of authority under any regime, democratic or otherwise, and is the natural complement of attitudinal support for the regime (Rose 1969; Weber 1966: 324ff). When compliance with the rules, norms and operating procedures of a regime is high, and support for it is strong, the regime is likely to enjoy great resilience. When compliance is low and support is low, the regime is likely to be unstable. Concern with the stability of new regimes has given rise to extensive discussion of the

concept of regime consolidation, and in particular to democratic consolidation¹.

There is broad agreement that democratic consolidation is a process which follows upon democratic transition, that is, it pre-supposes an agreement on democratic rules after the end of an undemocratic regime (Di Palma 1990: chapter 6; Linz 1990: 157f)². Thus, at the level of political behaviour, consolidation implies the stabilization or routinization of adherence to democratic rules both in the formal aspects of political behaviour and in informal practices (Gunther, et al. 1995: 7; Linz 1990: 158; Linz & Stepan 1996: 6; Przeworski 1991: 26; Schmitter 1994: 58). As a consequence, the rules influence the behaviour of the actors rather than vice versa, and internal attempts to overthrow the regime are therefore unlikely to succeed. Minimalist definitions of democratic consolidation make adherence to formal rules the only criterion, focussing on regime continuity, or on the stabilization of democratic procedures (Di Palma 1990: chapter 7; Schedler 1998: 103). Adherents of this view prefer other words such as *deepening* or *organizing* of democracy to describe broader changes in informal behaviour and attitudes.

However, other discussions of the meaning of democratic consolidation emphasize the importance of mass attitudes: for these scholars, consolidation implies the deepening of the legitimacy of democratic rules and the rejection of possible alternative systems of government (Gunther, et al. 1995: 7; Linz & Stepan 1996: 6; Shin 1994: 150). Behavioural and attitudinal criteria of consolidation are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. Therefore, this author prefers a two-

¹ For reviews of the literature about democratic consolidation see Kopecky and Mudde (2000) and Shin (1994).

² The end of transition usually but not always includes constitutional changes and the holding of free elections (Kopecky & Mudde 2000: 519).

dimensional definition: consolidation refers, in formal and informal behaviour, to *the stabilization of democratic rules and procedures, and in terms of attitudes, to a deepening of the legitimacy of democratic institutions.*

Rules and procedures, as well as attitudes, differ in the extent to which they allow the regime to approximate a complete democracy. The term 'consolidation' refers here to the process of moving towards such standards and 'complete democracy' to the result of achieving them. In the remainder of this section, the author discusses standards or 'tests' of democratic consolidation in more detail.

Methodologically, one can evaluate at what stage the process of consolidation is and in what direction it is moving either by looking at elite behaviour and attitudes, or through an evaluation of public opinion and mass behaviour, or, given available data, using both methods³. Notwithstanding the importance which 'consolidologists' give to legitimacy, there is very little precision in the literature about how to use public opinion data to assess progress with consolidation, or to decide whether democratic consolidation is occurring at all. Shin (1999) makes a sophisticated attempt to assess progress with consolidation using Korean public opinion data, but shies away from a precise and empirically testable definition of consolidation, preferring to focus on democratization as a process of improvement in the quality of governance⁴.

Yet the definition of consolidation implies the existence of certain tests for establishing whether consolidation is occurring and when it is

³ Kaldor and Vejvoda (2002) argue for the combination of both methods in assessing progress to what they call 'substantive democracy.' However, they do not make use of public opinion data in their assessment of ten post-communist countries, excluding Russia.

⁴ Shin (1999: 201-3) also introduces the concept of 'negative democratic consolidation,' which appears to equate to lustration or the purging of elites from the former undemocratic regime.

complete. Although this thesis has focussed on the legitimacy of democratic institutions amongst the general populace, it has also explicitly acknowledged that the study of mass attitudes is not the only way to assess progress and prospects for democratic consolidation. Before returning to the impact of the prior regime on measures of legitimacy, the author reviews two common elite-centred behavioural tests of consolidation, and assesses the impact of the Korean and Russian prior regimes in terms of them.

VI.B.2 Two Behavioural Tests of Consolidation

The least demanding behavioural test of consolidation is whether significant political actors seriously attempt to overthrow the regime or to break away to form their own state (Linz & Stepan 1996: 6). Both Korea and Russia pass this least-demanding test. In both countries, the main actors in both the opposition and the government all accept some version of democracy as 'the only game in town'. Although anti-regime in its origins, the CPRF is, to borrow a term from Eisenstadt (2000: 8), at least as much a 'patronage-seeking' opposition party as it is a party seeking to undermine the regime from within. The CPRF, and its allies and sympathizers in the Russian defence and security establishment, continue to fight a rear-guard action against the introduction of further market reforms in Russia, but nevertheless accept the parameters of the 1993 constitution. Similarly, the Korean military has foresworn any attempt to interfere with the outcomes of free and fair elections in Korea. The security apparatus acquiesced when Kim Dae-jung, a man whom they had once persecuted, won the presidency in a close-fought election. The least demanding test, therefore, suggests that the impact of the prior regime type on the process of consolidation has been minimal.

Huntington's (1991: 266-7) two-turnover test provides another behavioural indicator of consolidation: if the ruling party loses an election

and hands over power to the opposition, and then the opposition loses an election and hands it back again, then democracy is, by the two-turnover criterion, consolidated. Kim Dae-jung, the first candidate elected to the presidency without the support of the former ruling party of the authoritarian era, did not contest the December 2002 Korean presidential election, and the winner, Roh Moo-hyun, was from Kim Dae-jung's own party, so Korea has yet to pass this test. Yet there was little speculation that Kim Dae-jung's party would refuse to give up the reins of power if the conservative Lee Hoi-chang won in 2002. Russia still appears to be some way away from passing the two-turnover test, because it is difficult at the moment to imagine where a successful opposition challenge could come from. The CPRF adheres to an ideology which repels uncommitted voters while appealing to a hard core comprising no more than 25 per cent of the electorate (Rose, Munro & White 2001; VCIOM & CSPP 2001a). Nevertheless, Russia has had two presidents, the constitution limits each president to two terms, and there has been considerable turnover of seats in the Duma. Huntington's two-turnover test is a rather inflexible way of assessing progress with democratic consolidation.

Between these two simple behavioural tests, there is room for a wide range of interpretations about the impact of the prior undemocratic regime. Yet behavioural tests do not need to be simple; instead, they can be qualitative (Rose & Shin 2001). Such qualitative assessments reinforce the view that the gap between Korea and Russia is large. To establish this point, it is worthwhile to compare both countries to the 'ideal type' of a complete democracy.

VI.B.3 A Qualitative Evaluation of Consolidation

On the first electoral criterion -- that elections should be free -- both Russia and Korea pass the test of consolidation. Each country has held

three rounds of such elections to choose both the president and parliament, voter turnout is usually high (see Appendices I and II), and elites operate under the assumption that the government secures its mandate through a free and competitive election. However, by the second electoral criterion – that election campaigns should be fair, Russia does not meet international standards, because of government pressure on the media, the role played by civil servants in elections, and large-scale violations of Russia's laws on campaign financing (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a; OSCE/ODIHR 2000b). Korea, by contrast, has held election campaigns without the heavy-handed mobilization and bribery of voters which marked the authoritarian and early transitional periods (Choe 1997: chapter 12; Park 1995).

A complete democracy has a civil society, that is, a public sphere between official and private life in which a range of autonomous organizations pursue their interests within a framework of law which guarantees personal and group liberties (Cohen & Arato 1992: ix). Civil society is a more difficult achievement than merely allowing diverse autonomous social organizations to exist, since it requires a redistribution of political power from the state to society in order to allow autonomous social organizations to operate as partners in the political process. Under the authoritarian regime, Korea enjoyed a blossoming of autonomous social organizations, but because of the hostile attitude of the regime towards personal and group liberties, those autonomous organizations which took an interest in politics frequently found themselves in conflict with the state. Now that the state has given in to demands for free and fair elections, Korea has an emergent civil society, which has shown itself capable of mobilizing support for further reform (Kim, S. 2000: chapter 6). By contrast, totalitarian regimes do not tolerate autonomous social organizations, and the Soviet Union under Stalin attempted to obliterate them. In the post-totalitarian era, they re-emerged in the shadows of Soviet public life, but remained immature, inchoate and usually illegal. Transition generated a

vast proliferation of new autonomous organizations as repressive controls were lifted. Yet today Russian civil society is still very weak. Excessive state regulation, the activities of so-called 'clans' of associates mixing business, politics and crime in defence of gains made early in transition, and popular apathy and indifference conspire to stymie its emergence (Gill & Marwick 2000). This appears to be one of the most difficult legacies of the prior undemocratic regime.

Civil society cannot flourish without the rule of law. The latter establishes the pre-eminent position of legal authority, and, in a modern state, requires a certain level of rational-bureaucratic administration. While both authoritarian Korea and the USSR experienced endemic corruption, in Korea politicians and big business, both being powerful, were each able to act as a check on the other. Thus, although they colluded, neither could steal to the point of damaging the productivity of their combined assets (Kang 2002: chapter 4). By contrast, the absence of a legal private sector in the USSR progressively criminalized the ruling class and eroded bureaucratic administration (Simis 1982; Shlapentokh 1989: chapter 9; Voslensky 1984). When the system became unstable, and the possibility of legal private property emerged, a free-for-all struggle took place to seize the best state assets, contributing to the collapse of the regime (Solnick 1998b).


Today Korean bureaucratic administration, while leaving much to be desired, does not fall short of the standards of some existing and aspiring members of the European Union. If one divides the ninety odd countries for which Transparency International has provided a corruption perception index into three groups, the top thirty may be characterized as rule-of-law states, the middle thirty as having an incomplete rule of law, and the bottom group as lacking the rule of law. Korea is now in the middle group, but Russia's record on corruption places it firmly in the bottom group. Despite

Putin's rhetoric about establishing a 'dictatorship of law', the rule of law under his presidency has improved little compared to the Yeltsin period: in September 2002, when asked to assess the *level of stealing and corruption in the country since Putin was elected president by comparison with what it was during Yeltsin's rule*, 59 per cent of Russian survey respondents believed it was 'about the same', 15 per cent thought there was more corruption, 20 per cent thought there was less and the remainder were don't knows (VCIOM & CSPP 2002). All Korean governments since transition have become bogged down in corruption scandals of one sort or another. Yet even these scandals are in some sense a healthy sign, since they show that an independent media is doing its job. By contrast, the Putin administration in Russia has used selective law enforcement to increase state control over independent broadcast media, and to intimidate journalists and businessmen who question its policies or investigate corruption too deeply (Belin 2002). Russia's failure to modernize politically points to a network of pathologies, some of which have their roots in the Soviet era, and others in the manner of the Soviet system's collapse.

Achieving the rule of law is not just a matter of changing elite behaviour, but also requires improved compliance with the law by ordinary citizens in everyday life. When Korean, Russian, and Czech mass publics are compared in relation to their readiness to use corruption to get things done, Russians emerge as far more 'corrupting' than their counterparts either in Korea or in a relatively modern post-communist country (Figure V1.1). When asked what course of action they would recommend to obtain a government permit, Russians were more than six-times more likely than Koreans to recommend using bribery, twice as likely to recommend using connections, and only half as likely to simply accept the official's decision. Czechs were more inclined to rely on the rational-bureaucratic method of writing a letter to head office than either Koreans or Russians. The Korean profile is mixed. Very few Koreans are willing to bribe, but they almost

Figure VI.1 Public Readiness to Use Corruption: Comparative Perspective

Q. What should a person who needs a governmental permit do if an official says: just be patient, wait? A. Offer a bribe; Use connections; Write a letter to the head office; Do what you want without a permit; Nothing can be done.



Sources: Korea Democracy Barometer 1997; New Russia Barometer 1998; New Democracies Barometer 1998. * NB: Russia: more than one possible answer for each question; the figures above are obtained by combining responses in such a way that corruption overrides more legal responses, and then standardizing the scores on a per cent basis.

match Czechs in using connections, and exceed them in being willing to do without a permit or take no action. Russians stand out for their willingness to use bribery and connections, and are also relatively hesitant about trying to get by without a permit, which suggests that officials in charge of enforcement are not to be lightly ignored⁵.

⁵ See Rose (1998) for survey data on strategies used by Russians to get things done in a variety of situations.

The transition from a command economy to a market economy has occasioned an increase in corruption in Russia as officials try to convert political power into private wealth, and private businessmen operating in an improperly regulated environment try to secure their interests by forming associations with officials (Freeland 2000; Ledeneva 2001; Reddaway & Glinski 2001). Sakwa (2002b: 82) calls this 'a new form of metacorruption, ... rooted in the transition from a state-owned economy to a market-based system.' Although economic and political transformation has changed Russian economic and political life in some fundamental ways, the continuation or even worsening of corruption in the transitional regime, the regime's inefficiency in dealing with the challenges of transformation, and the unfairness of its treatment of the Russian public suggest that regime change has not changed the nature of the state. As pointed out by Ledeneva (2001), the gap between formal and informal, between public and private morality, between written rules and the 'unwritten rules' which determine how things are done in practice, persist. Thus the Russian state remains, in some respects, anti-modern to this day.

The implications of calling the Russian state 'anti-modern' extend far beyond merely noting that corruption is endemic. Vladimir Pastukhov (2002), a Moscow lawyer and academic, offers a critique of concepts of the Russian state and law in which corruption plays the defining role. Acknowledging that corruption and law-breaking are widespread in Russia, Pastukhov argues that to make corruption the explanation for everything wrong with the Russian state is an over-simplification of a complex phenomenon. As Soviet-era writers emphasized, formal and informal behavioural norms operate side by side. The state, operating on the assumption that everyone in Russia is guilty of trying to break the law, over-regulates, creating legal contradictions and administrative bottlenecks which leave citizens with no choice but to avoid or break the law in order to get simple things done. Pastukhov (2002: 68) writes: 'The main problem

with the Russian administrative system is not greed, as is often claimed, but inefficiency'. The thrust of this argument sits well with Rose's (1994) concept of the 'anti-modern state': one characterized by opaque processes, the absence of accurate feedback mechanisms in the decision-making process and monumental waste of resources. It is not just systemic corruption, but also inefficiency, a suspicious attitude toward citizens by state personnel, and a callous disregard for the impact of bureaucratic regulations on the lives of ordinary people which characterize the 'anti-modern state' in Russia today.

The features of the anti-modern state would also seem to preclude its conversion to a developmental state, as some Russian policy-makers have wished. The role of the Russian state in the new market economy precludes a developmental state, not because it plays too large a role, but because it plays the wrong role: the Russian state has far too many liabilities and does not control financial flows into and out of its own territory. Therefore, it is unable to guide and stimulate investment in the economy. Although communism has been jettisoned as the official ideology, it remains influential through the Duma, and this, together with the fear that any reform of the welfare system will encourage more misuse of state funds by officials inhibit the state from reducing its liabilities (Cook 2002). On top of all this, as Pastukhov (2002) suggests, the inefficiency of the anti-modern state, its self-contradictory legislation, and the moral 'double-think' which allows chaotic legislation and irrational administration to continue unchecked prevent a 'growth first' policy orientation in Russia. Some degree of opacity, and even of systemic corruption, is compatible with a developmental state, as the Korean case shows, as long as corruption encourages rather than undermines investment in productive economic activity. Corruption cannot play this role in a system where the distribution of spoils is extremely decentralized (Khan 1998), as it is in Russia, where the initial winners from the transitional process at regional

level have no interest in recentralization (Hellman 1998; Stoner-Weiss 2001: 20-5; Solnick 1995).

Accountability of governors to the governed presupposes a party system in which the largest parties compete nationwide and persist from one election to the next, in which the persisting nationwide parties win a huge majority of the seats and votes in an election and do not change their names, re-configure their alliances or change their policies too radically once in office (Rose, Munro & White 2001: 420-1). Korean parties rename themselves, fall apart and merge frequently. The ideological differences between them are narrow, and they appeal for support on the basis of personal loyalties and regional prejudice rather than policy positions (Jaung 2000). Moreover, the legislature is weak, its sessions are short and the behaviour of deputies sometimes indicates a poor understanding of their role (Park 2000). Russia also has an unstable party system, and a weak legislature. Independent deputies, whose allegiances are at best dimly visible to voters, win half the seats in the Duma, and then form new Duma factions whose names never appeared on the ballot. The structure of the Russian party system reflects deep cleavages in society over basic questions of political economy. But only one party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), appears to have an effective grassroots organization, one which it inherited from the CPSU (March 2002: chapter 5). No party enjoys popular trust, and no Russian president has ever stood for election as a political party member. This failure to provide a stable party system may also be interpreted as a successful strategy to avoid electoral accountability (Rose, Munro & White 2001: 439). Russia's weak party system is a reflection of the absence of a vigorous civil society, capable of aggregating the interests of large social groups. Korea's weak party system reflects a disjuncture between civil society and political society, as well as native Korean causes such as regionalism.

In sum, comparison of Korea and Russia in relation to three criteria of a complete democracy point to a severe impact of the anti-modern core legacy. These are: Russia's failure to progress towards the rule of law, the persistence there of unfair election campaign practices and the weakness of Russian civil society. Two criteria, the success in both countries in establishing free elections, and the failure in both countries to establish accountability of government through a stable party system, suggest the legacy of the prior undemocratic regime hasn't made much difference.

VI.B.4 Society-centred Tests of Consolidation

Society-centred tests of consolidation usually focus on political support for the incomplete democratic regime. For example, Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) define an 'attitudinal' test according to which: 'a democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces'. The test raises a great many methodological questions. For example, what is a 'strong majority?' Is strength defined by the size of the majority, or by the power it wields? How does one determine when support for undemocratic rule is 'isolated' from pro-democratic forces? Is such isolation physical? Or does it refer, as Shin (1999: chapter 3) argues, to the mental separation of support for undemocratic procedures from support for democratic institutions? Since the methodology employed by Linz and Stepan is non-statistical and elite-centred, the imprecision of their 'attitudinal' test does not affect their conclusions.

Shin (1994: 145) argues that consolidation cannot be achieved without converting 'expedient' or 'superfluous' democrats among both elites

and masses into “authentic” believers in democracy.’ (double quotation marks in original). Yet the methods he employs to test whether ‘conversion’ has taken place (Shin 1999) involve the development of an idiosyncratic array of idealist measures of democratic support, not reproduced in the available datasets from other countries. Establishing a precise test for democratic consolidation using available survey data is a pre-requisite for determining the impact of the prior undemocratic regime on prospects for consolidation along the attitudinal dimension.

A regime acquires legitimacy through public support. There is little agreement amongst democratization scholars on what support is, whether it is all of one piece, or composed of different parts, and how to measure it. On the basis of a review of the literature and factor analyses, Chapter Three opted for a two-dimensional conceptualization of support, consisting of normative and empirical dimensions (cf. Proposition 1 and Tables III.4A and B). The normative dimension concerns questions about whether the regime should persist, while the empirical dimension concerns questions about how well the regime is functioning. As a result of differences in survey questions, the KDB and NRB variables measuring empirical evaluations could not be treated as direct equivalents. Russian data from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health surveys partially filled this gap. By both normative and empirical measures, Chapter Three showed that support for the regime in Russia was lower than in Korea, by a statistically significant but not large margin (cf. Proposition 2, and Figures III.1 and III.2).

VI.B.4.1 Test 1: Levels

Large majorities of Russians and Koreans reject undemocratic rule. But as Mishler and Rose (2002: 320) point out, ‘the level of popular support needed to establish and sustain democracy is contingent and context-

specific.' In other words, there is no fixed level of support at which one can say that, by the demand-side criteria, a given society has achieved democratic consolidation. At a minimum, a majority of citizens should support democratic institutions, so that they don't elect an anti-regime party into government. But anti-regime parties have in various times and places won power through elections without majority support in the electorate. All one can say about levels of support is the higher the level of support for democracy, the better for democratic consolidation.

VI.B.4.2 Test 2: Trajectories

Rose and Mishler (1994) argue that instead of concentrating on levels, scholars should focus on the trajectory of support -- stable or rising levels of support benefit an incomplete democratic regime, whereas falling levels of support undermine it. They also pay attention to evaluations of the past authoritarian regime, and to expectations of the future regime. If the 'trajectory' of support rises from past to present to future, the regime is a 'leader'. If it follows a V-pattern where the past is rated higher than the present, and the future is also higher than the present, the regime is a 'laggard' (Rose & Mishler 1994: 180). Although the Korea Democracy Barometer included appropriate measures in only one year, 1997, and question wording tended to encourage conflation of the regime with specific presidents, the data suggest that in these terms Korea and Russia both are laggards. Rose and Mishler do not, however, argue that if the trajectory of support rises steadily from past to present to future then the regime is a 'consolidated democracy.'

Contemporary evaluations of the past are not as important as attitudes to the current regime or to possible realistic alternatives. By looking at trends both in empirical evaluations of the current regime and rejection of undemocratic rule, it is possible to establish that support for the

incomplete democracies in Korea and Russia is fairly stable (Figures III.1 and III.2). Such trend data tracing the trajectory of support over time amounts to no more than a simple diagnostic tool. Stability over time suggests an equilibrium, but that is not what most scholars mean by consolidation of democracy. The trends on their own do not tell one whether consolidation is near or still far off.

VI.B.4.3 Test 3: Dispersal of Support

Linz and Stepan's (1996: 6) test of consolidation requires that a 'strong majority' support democratic procedures and support for alternative systems should be 'isolated' from pro-democratic supporters. These criteria suggest that normative commitment to the democratic regime should be widely dispersed. Widely dispersed attitudes are resistant to explanation in terms of social structure or in terms of other attitudes and beliefs. When an attitude is widely dispersed, wherever you go, whomever you talk to, the attitude is usually the same. The explanatory power of regressions on empirical evaluations of the regime is a sign that there are differing assessments of how well the regime is doing rather than differing opinions about whether the regime should continue. Thus, Korean satisfaction with the way democracy works is influenced by political performance, especially that of the country's president, while Russian current regime evaluations depend on evaluations of the current economic system (Table IV.3). However, normative commitment to the regime is different, since it reflects conclusions about what should happen, rather than what is happening. The explanatory power of regressions on normative commitment is a sign of the existence of cleavages about the type of regime which is best for the country. Multiple regression equations with high R-squared point to sharp cleavages, and, correspondingly to the failure to achieve widespread normative commitment to the regime. Multiple regression equations with low R-squared point to few sharp cleavages about the regime, and widespread consensus.

Proposition 9: Korean rejection of undemocratic rule is widely dispersed, whereas Russian rejection of undemocratic rule is more dependent on individual differences.

On the basis of multiple regression models including a wide variety of political, social and economic influences, Korea appears to have achieved widely dispersed rejection of undemocratic rule, while the Russian regime has not achieved such a wide dispersal of support (Table IV.4). This suggests a qualitative difference in support for democracy in the two countries. To support the above conclusion, and to check whether there is any change over time in the R-squared obtained using pooled trend data, the author ran some additional regressions separating out the individual years of survey. To do this on a comparative basis, the author chose independent variables which are consistently available in Korea and Russia in all the years. The Korea Democracy Barometer and the New Russia Barometer provide such variables, although they constitute a restricted set of all the influences on normative attitudes to the regime. The variables are eight: gender, age, town size, education, the expected family economic situation in five years time, income quintile, ratings of the current national economy and empirical evaluations of the current regime (Table VI.1).

In the Russian regressions, R-squared is above ten per cent in all years, and above 20 per cent in both 1996 surveys and in 2001. In the Korean regressions, R-squared is below ten per cent in all years bar one, 1998. This was the year in which Korea experienced an economic crisis caused by excess bad corporate governance. In Korea the rejection of undemocratic rule is a widely dispersed attitude, whereas in Russia it is not. If the dispersal of commitment is a test of consolidation, then the results of these regressions support the view that the prior undemocratic regime strongly affects prospects for consolidation of democracy.

Table VI.1 Process of Consolidation: A Demand-Side View

	Korea		Russia								
	1997	1998	1999	1994	1995	1996-I	1996-II	1998	2000-I	2000-II	2001
Gender: female											
Age											
Town size											
Education levels completed											
Family economy in 5 years											
Income quintile											
Rating current economy											
Empirical eval. current regime ^a											
Constant											
Total R²	3	10	4	14	11	21	25	16	16	17	23

(all coefficients shown are b-values significant at least on .05 level; * indicates significant at .01 level; blank cells indicate variables in the models which are not significant)

^a. Functionally equivalent but different questions used in the two countries. See Appendix III.

Source: Korea Democracy Barometer, New Russia Barometer; For Korea weighted valid N=2,905 and for Russia weighted valid N=7,557.

VI.B.4.4 Test 4: Resilience of Normative Support

Shin's (1994: 145) test of consolidation, quoted above, requires the 'conversion' of expedient or 'fair weather' democrats into committed democrats. Aside from being widely dispersed, Shin (1999: 243) argues that in a consolidated democracy support for democratic institutions should not be *instrumental*, that is, it should not be dependent on the *quid pro quo* of economic or political performance. Another way of saying this is that normative commitment to the regime should be *resilient* to the short-term impact of particular events, personalities or policies. Shin (2001a: 200) concludes that the Korean economic crisis of 1998 has provoked unfavourable comparisons of the performance of the current regime with the performance of authoritarianism and thereby 'rekindled' instrumental views of democracy. The present study finds little evidence that economic attitudes and experiences strongly affected normative commitment to the current Korean regime, even in 1998. By contrast, the role of economic experience in determining the commitment of Russians to their regime shows that acceptance of and adaptation to market institutions is still an impediment to acceptance of the current regime in Russia. Around 50 per cent of Russians claim to have adapted to the big changes which took place in Russia over the past ten years, around 30 per cent say they will never adapt, and the remaining 20 per cent expect to adapt in the next few years (VCIOM & CSPP 2001a). This means that Russia is still a long way away from the 'normal' situation of Korea, in which the vast majority of citizens have adapted to the economic system of their society. Nevertheless, economic evaluations are not the only evaluations which matter. Political criteria of assessment give rise to empirical evaluations of the current regime.

Proposition 10: Korean rejection of undemocratic rule is resilient whereas Russian rejection of undemocratic rule is instrumental.

If rejection of undemocratic rule is not subject to influence from empirical evaluations, nor from economic assessments, then, provided that the frequency distributions show that a majority rejects undemocratic rule, the lack of strong influence from these independent variables suggests that support for democracy is in the main resilient, that is, non-instrumental or in some sense wholehearted. Conversely, if empirical evaluations and economic assessments do influence normative commitment, then a substantial proportion of citizens are 'fair weather democrats.' The Russian regressions show that rejection of undemocratic rule is subject to influence by empirical evaluations of the current regime, and this is a consistent finding (Table VI.1). In only one year, 1995, out of eight surveyed do empirical evaluations of the regime not play a significant role. Expectations of the household economy and income are also fairly consistent influences, which reinforces the notion that the rejection of undemocratic rule depends on instrumental considerations. In accordance with Proposition 10, the regressions imply that rejection of undemocratic rule in Russia is not resilient, but rather instrumental and that this situation has not improved over the first decade of democratization.

In Korea, empirical evaluations of the current regime are a significant influence on rejection of undemocratic rule in only one year, 1998, out of three surveyed. In the other years, empirical evaluations of the present regime do not affect the rejection of undemocratic rule. Expectations of the future household economy are statistically significant in 1999 only, with a fairly modest b-value, and evaluations of the macro-economy are significant only in 1997. On the grounds of both the wide dispersal of Korean rejection of undemocratic rule and its resilience or freedom from instrumental considerations, the evidence implies that Korea is close to the consolidation of democracy along the attitudinal dimension.

VI.C Implications for Further Study

VI.C.1 Differentiating Varieties of Undemocratic Legacy

Charles King (2000) suggests that the concept of 'post-communism' may soon reach its sell-by date, since there appears to be increasing variation within the category of post-communist regimes. Variation is great even if one restricts the field to those post-communist states, about half the total number, which have conducted free elections. This study has shown that generalizing about the impact of the party-state legacy on prospects for democratic consolidation is difficult. Differences amongst individuals and households, which cut across prior regime types, are more important than prior regime type in explaining political attitudes. Even so, this study found significant interaction between prior regime type and individual-level characteristics in the determination of support for current regimes. This serves as a reminder that people in different contexts behave and think differently.

A possible avenue for further study would be to examine the interaction of individual differences with institutional contexts within post-communist Europe. Such a study could, for example, test the extent to which citizens of different post-communist states are likely to link support for democracy with support for market reform. One possibility is that in the more economically advanced post-communist states, the link would be stronger. It could also test whether the relationship between interpersonal trust and support for democracy varies between contexts. It could thereby address the broad question of differential progress in the emergence of civil society across the post-communist space. Such a study should also take into its ambit the differences between contexts in the effects of social structure. In short, by adapting the methods of Chapter Four of this thesis, it would be possible to obtain a much more nuanced picture of the varying

relationship between context and the determinants of support for democracy in post-communist Europe.

Beyond Europe's boundaries, there is scope for a statistically robust assessment of the significance of the post-communist legacy for democratic legitimacy drawing on a wider pool of survey data. Given data from a similar number of non-post-communist and post-communist countries, it would be possible to test the impact of the party-state legacy against the legacy of other types of prior undemocratic regimes, transition path variables, and also generic measures of regime performance and initial structural conditions. It could thereby build on the central finding of Chapter Five of this thesis that the anti-modern core legacy and the party-state legacy have distinct implications for the legitimacy of an incomplete democracy. It could test whether the party-state legacy is indeed no bar to democratic consolidation, and whether the anti-modern core legacy has its equivalent outside the post-communist world. Such a study would be of broad theoretical importance to the classification of incomplete democracies and the organization of cross-regional collaboration in the field.

VI.C.2 Sequencing: the Priority of Rule of Law

For scholars and practitioners of democratization, the careful analysis of the characteristics of prior undemocratic regimes is useful, because it helps to understand *why* some countries perform better than others. Rose and Shin (2001) argue that conducting free elections with universal suffrage before the establishment of a modern state capable of providing horizontal political accountability and the rule of law amounts to 'democratization backwards.' Western democracies all achieved a high level of the rule of law before extending the franchise, and having a modern state in place before conducting free elections makes democratization easier. Levels of rule of law deserve special attention in the characterization of prior undemocratic regimes.

The Korean bureaucratic-authoritarian regime demonstrated an extraordinary ability to coordinate and mobilize society for the achievement of collective economic goals. It did so without the tremendous cost in human suffering which Stalinism imposed, and without destroying the autonomous social institutions forming the basis of a civil society. Does this mean that it was a modernizing regime in the Weberian sense? Korean economic development did not suffer from the crippling pathologies of a socialist command economy, while at the same time it relied on the state as its key planner, coordinator and enforcer. It was also a regime in which a collusive relationship between state and business relied on the exchange of bribes for loans and other policy favours. This was not an East Asian *Rechtstaat*. The achievement of the Korean bureaucratic-authoritarian regime was to maintain a balance between the interests of politicians and the interests of private business, and to allow the dynamic between the two to profit the country economically. The Korean case illustrates that the relationship between rule of law and economic development is complex. Theories which postulate a universal positive relationship between the two stumble against the fact that one of the most successful East Asian developmental states was not a modern state, but rather one where rule of law was incomplete. The fact that rule of law has risen up the Korean reform agenda, taken together with the strength its civil society and its economic dynamism, mean that the country has a good chance of becoming a consolidated democracy.

The Soviet regime tried to solve the collective action problems facing society by mobilizing the population to achieve military, economic and political goals. Instead of inspiring support, it forced people to show manifestations of support, to conceal their grievances and mimic belief in the regime's ideology. When the Soviet bureaucracy finally lost control over its own staff, they began to carry what Shlapentokh (1989: 14) calls 'privatization of public life' to its logical extreme. In the words of Steven

Solnick (1998b: 7), 'Soviet institutions did not simply atrophy or dissolve but were actively pulled apart by officials at all levels seeking to extract assets that were in any way fungible'. Restoring control creates the foundation for political stability, but whether the current regime will begin to establish the rule of law remains an open question. The emergence of a strong civil society is unlikely without this prior step.

If consolidation is not occurring, how can one describe the predicament of Russian democracy? Rose and Munro (2002: 238) call it a 'low-level equilibrium trap,' in which 'elections give people a choice of who rules but rulers fail to produce a modern state.' Symptoms of the trap include an inadequate rule of law, an hour-glass not a civil society, little accountability through the party system and weak demand for further democratization (Rose & Munro 2002: chapter 10). Does this mean Russian democracy is dead? There are many ways of undermining democracy, from violent revolution through bloodless coups, 'coups in office,' which change the regime but not the leadership, to falsification of the expression of popular will through plebiscites, and cancelling, postponing or unfairly manipulating scheduled elections (Linz 1978a). Though the electoral process in Russia leaves much to be desired, there is little evidence that falsification has proved decisive in federal elections, and no one has yet made a serious attempt at destroying Russia's electoral regime by violent means. Notwithstanding the sycophantic voices calling for President Putin to be made 'president for life', and without denying the potential for crisis, this thesis found no evidence that Russia is presently witnessing the breakdown of democracy. Instead of washing one's hands of Russia as if democratic breakdown were inevitable, it would be better to concentrate on evaluating progress with intermediate goals, such as the systematic weeding out of contradictory laws and the exercise of constitutionally defined political rights and civil liberties.

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APPENDIX I. RESULTS OF POST-TRANSITIONAL KOREAN ELECTIONS

The tables below summarize results of Korean presidential and parliamentary elections following the adoption of the present democratic constitutional framework. Except as otherwise indicated, the source is the compendium of election results based on primary sources by Croissant (2001).

Note the following conventions in the tables.

- 1) Parties winning less than 1.0% of the vote are subsumed into the Others category.
- 2) Total number of votes, valid and invalid votes are given as percentages of the electorate. Vote percentages for individual parties and candidates are given as percentages of the total valid votes.
- 3) A long dash (—) indicates that the party or candidate did not contest an election.
- 4) In Appendix Tables I.1, the dates in parentheses listed after each party description refer to the parliamentary elections contested.

Appendix Table I.1 Korean Elections: List of Parties

- 1 Democratic Justice Party, DJP (Minjujongui-dang). Founded in 1981 by Chun Doo-hwan, president (1981-1987), and led by his successor Roh Tae-woo (1988-1992) during the 1987/1988 elections. (1981-1988).
- 2 Reunification Democratic Party, RDP (T'ongilminju-dang). Formed April 1987 by Kim Young-sam, former dissident and later president (1993-1997), and by Kim Dae-jung to press demands for free and direct presidential elections. Kim Dae-jung's supporters left before the 1987 election to form PPD. (1988).
- 3 Party for Peace and Democracy, PPD (P'yonghwaminju-dang). Party formed by Kim Dae-jung, former dissident and later president (1998-2002), to contest the 1987 presidential election. (1988).

- 4 New Democratic Republican Party, NDRP (Shinminjukonghwa-dang). Formed October 1987 as a vehicle for former KCIA director Kim Jong-pil's presidential bid. (1988).
- 5 Hangyore Democratic Party, HDP (Hangyore-minju-dang). (1988).
- 6 Democratic Liberal Party, DLP (Minjujayu-dang). Formed in 1990 by the merger of the DJP with the RDP and NDRP. Intended as a Korean equivalent to long-time Japanese ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party. Supported Kim Young-sam's successful presidential bid in 1992. (1992).
- 7 Democratic Party, DP (T'onghapminju-dang). Formed 1990 by dissident RDP members disagreeing with the merger leading to the formation of the DLP. Expanded by a 1991 merger with Kim Dae-jung's New Democratic Party. (1992–1996).
- 8 Unification National Party, UNP (T'ongilminjok-dang). Formed less than 2 months before the 1992 parliamentary election by Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai. In mid 1992 renamed itself the United People's Party, UPP (T'ongilkukmin-dang). (1992).
- 9 New Political Reform Party, NPRP (Shinjong-dang). Led by Park Chan-jong, a 1992 presidential candidate. (1992).
- 10 People's Party, PP (Minju-dang). A left-wing party formed in 1990. (1992).
- 11 New Korea Party, NKP (Shinhanguk-dang). Successor to the DLP formed in 1995 under the auspices of President Kim Young-sam in order to distance the ruling party from corruption scandals surrounding the indicted former president Roh Tae-woo. (1996).
- 12 National Congress for New Politics, NCNP (Shaejongch'ikukminhoe'ui). Launched by Kim Dae-jung in 1995 after splits within the Democratic Party. (1996).
- 13 United Liberal Democrats, ULD (Jayu Minju Yongmaeng). Formed in 1995 by supporters of Kim Jong-il after the latter's withdrawal from the DLP. (1996).
- 14 Grand National Party, GNP (Hanara-dang). Formed two days before the 1997 presidential election by the merger of the NKP with the DP. (2000).

15 Millennium Democratic Party, MDP (Saecheonnyeonminju-dang).
 Launched by President Kim Dae-jung in January 2000. Supported Roh Moo-hyun's successful presidential bid in 2002. Currently also known as the Democratic Party (Minju-dang). (2000).

16 Democratic People's Party, DPP (Minkuk-dang) (2000).

Appendix Table I.2 KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 16 December 1987

		%
Electorate	25,873,624	
Valid Votes	22,603,411	87.4
Invalid Votes	463,008	1.8
Total Votes	23,066,419	89.2
Roh Tae-woo, DJP	8,282,738	36.6
Kim Young-sam, RDP	6,337,581	28
Kim Dae-jung, PPD	6,113,375	27
Kim Jong-pil, NDRP	1,823,067	8.1
Shin Jeong-yil, KUP	46,650	0.2

Note: KUP: Korea Unification Party.

Appendix Table I.3 KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 18 December, 1992

		%
Electorate	29,422,658	
Valid Votes	23,775,409	80.8
Invalid Votes	319,761	1.1
Total Votes	24,095,170	81.9
Kim Young-sam, DLP	9,977,332	42
Kim Dae-jung, DP	8,041,284	33.8
Chung Ju-yung, UNP	3,880,067	16.3
Park Chan-jong, NPRP	1,516,047	6.4
Paek Ki-won, Ind.	238,648	1.0
Kim Ok-sun, Ind.	86,292	0.4
Lee Pyong-ho, TJP	35,739	0.2

Note: TJP: Taehan Justice Party

Appendix Table I.4 KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 18 December, 1997

		%
Electorate	32,290,416	
Valid Votes	25,642,438	79.4
Invalid Votes	400,195	1.2
Total Votes	26,042,633	80.7
Kim Dae-jung, NCNP	10,326,275	40.3
Lee Hoi-chang, GNP	9,935,718	38.7
Rhee In-je , NPP	4,925,591	19.2
Kwon Young-kil, PV21	306,026	1.2
Shin Jeong-yil, Ind.	61,056	0.2
Kim Han-shik, Ind.	48,717	0.2
Huh Kyoung-young, Ind.	39,055	0.2

Notes: NPP: New People's Party; PV21: People's Victory 21.

Appendix Table I.5 KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 19 December, 2002

		%
Electorate	34,991,529	
Valid Votes	24,561,916	70.2
Invalid Votes	223,047	0.6
Total Votes	24,784,963	70.8
Roh Moo-hyun, MDP	12,014,277	48.9
Lee Hoi-chang, GNP	11,443,297	46.6
Kwon Young-kil, DLaP	957,148	3.9
Lee Han-dong, HNP	74,027	0.3
Kim Kil-su, DNP	51,104	0.2
Kim Yeong-kyu, SP	22,063	0.1

Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2003. 'South Korea 2002 Presidential Election Results'. [Http://www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/south_korea_pres02.htm](http://www.ifes.org/eguide/resultsum/south_korea_pres02.htm). Accessed 28 May.

Notes: DLaP: Democratic Labour Party; DNP: Defense of the Nation Party; HNP: Hanaro National Party; SP: Socialist Party

Appendix Table I.6 Votes and Seats in the Korean National Assembly

	26 April 1988				24 March 1992				11 April 1996				13 April 2000			
	Votes		N Seats		Votes		N Seats		Votes		N Seats		Votes		N Seats	
	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total	%	SMD List Total
Valid Votes ¹	74.9		71		62.4		56.5									
Invalid Votes	0.8		0.9		1.5		0.8									
Total Votes	75.8		71.9		63.9		57.2									
1 DJP	34	87 38 41.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2 RDP	23.8	46 13 19.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3 PPD	19.3	54 16 23.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4 NDRP	15.6	27 8 11.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 Hangyore DP	1.3	1 0 0.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6 DLP	—	—	38.5	116 33 49.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7 DP	—	—	29.2	75 22 32.4	11.2	9 6 5.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8 UNP	—	—	17.4	24 7 10.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9 NPRP	—	—	1.8	1 0 0.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10 PP	—	—	1.5	0 0 0.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11 NKP	—	—	—	—	34.5	121 18 46.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12 NCNP	—	—	—	—	25.3	66 13 26.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13 ULD	—	—	—	—	16.2	41 9 16.7	9.8	12 5 6.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14 GNP	—	—	—	—	—	—	39	112 21 48.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15 MDP	—	—	—	—	—	—	35.9	96 19 42.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16 DPP	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.7	1 1 0.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17 Independents	4.8	9 0 3.0	11.5	21 0 7.0	11.8	16 0 5.3	9.4	5 0 1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others ²	1.2	0 0 0	1.6	0 0 0	1	0 0 0	2.3	1 0 0.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	224 75 100	100	237 62 100	100	253 46 100	100	227 46 100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

¹ As % of electorate. Votes for individual parties are reported as % of the valid vote. ² 1988: 9 parties with less than 1.0% of the valid vote; in 1992, 1 party; in 1996, 4 parties; and in 2000, 2 parties.

APPENDIX II. RESULTS OF POST-TRANSITIONAL RUSSIAN ELECTIONS

The tables below summarize results of Russian presidential and parliamentary elections following the adoption of the present democratic constitutional framework. Except as otherwise indicated, the source is the compendium of election results based on primary sources compiled by Rose and Munro (2003: chapter 16).

Note the following conventions in the tables.

- 1) Parties winning less than 1.0% of the vote are subsumed into the Others category.
- 2) Total number of votes, valid and invalid votes are given as percentages of the electorate. As per official practice, vote percentages for individual parties and candidates are given as percentages of the total number of votes, including invalid votes.
- 3) A long dash (—) indicates that the party or candidate did not contest an election.
- 4) In Appendix Table II.1, the dates in parentheses listed after each party description refer to the parliamentary elections contested.

Appendix Table II.1 Russian Elections: List of Parties

- 1 *Liberal Democratic Party of Russia* (Liberalno-Demokraticeskaya Partiya Rossii, LDPR). Party of maverick nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. (1993—)
- 2 *Russia's Choice* (Vybor Rossii). Pro-market bloc founded October 1993. Contested 1995 election as Democratic Choice of Russia—United Democrats. (1993–95).
- 3 *Communist Party of the Russian Federation* (Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, KPRF). Founded late 1992 as successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Led by Gennady Zyuganov. 1993—
- 4 *Women of Russia* (Zhenshchiny Rossii, ZR). Founded October 1993 by a variety of women's organizations. (1993—).

- 5 *Agrarian Party of Russia* (Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii, APR). Founded February 1993 by collective and state farm workers and managers. (1993–)
- 6 *Yabloko*. Founded October 1993 as *Yavlinsky/Boldyrev/Lukin Bloc*, which has the Russian acronym Yabloko (*Apple*). Led by anti-Yeltsin liberal Grigory Yavlinsky. (1993–).
- 7 *Party of Russian Unity and Concord* (Partiya Rossiiskogo Edinstva i Soglasiya, PRES). Regionalist party, founded in October 1993 under the leadership of Sergei Shakhrai. (1993–95).
- 8 *Democratic Party of Russia* (Demokraticeskaya Partiya Rossii, DPR). Founded December 1990 under Nikolai Travkin. Part of pre-1992 Democratic Russia movement. (1993).
- 9 *Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms* (Rossiiskoe Dvizhenie Demokraticeskikh Reform, RDDR). Founded 1992 by former Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov, St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and eye-surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov. (1993).
- 10 *Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress* (Grazhdanskii Soyuz Stabilnosti, Spravedlivosti i Progresa, GSSSP). Merger of several minor parties with industrial groups led by Arkady Volsky. In 1995 succeeded by Union of Labor. (1993).
- 11 *Future of Russia–New Names* (Budushchee Rossii–Novye Imena, BR/NI). Bloc formed October 1993 by the Youth Movement of the People's Party of Free Russia and Civic Union. (1993).
- 12 *Cedar* (Kedr). Full name: *Constructive Ecological Movement* (Konstruktivnoe Ekologicheskoe Dvizhenie). An environmentalist party founded in March 1993. (1993–).
- 13 *Dignity and Charity* (Dostoinstvo i Miloserdie, DM). Bloc formed in October 1993 by organizations representing pensioners, veterans, invalids, and victims of Chernobyl. (1993).
- 14 *Our Home Is Russia* (Nash Dom – Rossiya, NDR). Launched April 1995 on the initiative of President Yeltsin and led by Viktor Chernomyrdin, prime minister, 1992–1998. (1995–99).

- 15 *Communists of the USSR* (Kommunisty SSSR). Full name: *Communists: Working Russia: for the Soviet Union* (Kommunisty: Trudovaya Rossii: za Sovetskii Soyuz). Hardline communist group formed in November 1991 by Viktor Anpilov. (1995–).
- 16 *Congress of Russian Communities* (Kongres Russkikh Obshchin, KRO). Nationalist group formed March 1993 to promote interests of Russians in ex-Soviet states. (1995–).
- 17 *Party of Workers' Self-government* (Partiya Samoupravleniya Trudyashchikhsya, PST). Founded January 1995 by Svyatoslav Fedorov, formerly of the RDDR. (1995).
- 18 *Great Power* (Derzhava). Full name: *Social Patriotic Movement Great Power* (Sotsialno-Patrioticheskoe Dvizhenie Derzhava). Nationalist party founded in May 1994, under Aleksandr Rutskoi, former vice president. (1995)
- 19 *Forward Russia!* (Vpered, Rossiya!). Founded February 1995 by Boris Fedorov, former finance minister. (1995).
- 20 *Power to the People!* (Vlast Narodu!). Led by Sergei Baburin, a prominent nationalist, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, former USSR prime minister and 1991 presidential candidate. (1995).
- 21 *Union of Labor* (Soyuz Truda). Outgrowth of Civic Union. Founded June 1995 by industrialist Vladimir Shcherbakov to represent industry and trade unions. (1995).
- 22 *Pamfilova–Gurov–Lysenko Bloc*. Led by Ella Pamfilova, Aleksandr Gurov, former head of the Organized Crime Department in the Interior Ministry; and Vladimir Lysenko, a former member of Yabloko. (1995)
- 23 *Ivan Rybkin Bloc*. Created April 1995 on the initiative of President Yeltsin to balance Our Home Is Russia. Eponymous leader was speaker of Russian Duma (1994–1995) and formerly in the Agrarian Party. (1995).
- 24 *Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc*. Eponymous leader formerly headed the parliamentary faction of Democratic Party of Russia. (1995).
- 25 *Unity* (Edinstvo). Full name: *Inter-Regional Movement Unity* (Mezhregionalnoe Dvizhenie Edinstvo; acronym Medved, *Bear*). Formed in

October 1999 under leadership of Sergei Shoigu, a minister in both Yeltsin and Putin cabinets. Endorsed by Putin in 1999. (1999–).

26 *Fatherland–All Russia* (Otechestvo–Vsyā Rossiya, OVR). Alliance of the Fatherland and All-Russia movements, led respectively by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan¹. (1999–).

27 *Union of Right Forces* (Soyuz Pravykh Sil, SPS). Pro-market bloc led by Boris Nemtsov, former first deputy prime minister. Putin expressed guarded support for SPS before the 1999 election. (1999–).

28 *Party of Pensioners* (Partiya Pensionerov). Founded in November 1997 and led by Sergei Atroshenko. (1999–).

29 *For Citizens' Dignity* (Za Grazhdanskoe Dostoinstvo, ZGD). Founded October 1998 and led by Ella Pamfilova. (1999–).

30 *Movement in Support of the Army, Defence Industry, and Military Science* (Obshcherossiiskoe Politicheskoe Dvizhenie v Podderzhku Armii, Oboronnoi Promyshlennosti i VoЕННОi Nauki, DPA). Founded September 1997 under Viktor Ilyukhin. (1999–).

31 *Nikolaev–Fedorov Bloc*. Full name: *Bloc of General Andrei Nikolaev and Academician Svyatoslav Fedorov* (Blok Generala Andreyā Nikolaeva i Akademika Svyatoslava Fedorova). (1999–).

32 *Russian People's Union* (Rossiiskii Obshchenarodnyi Soyuz, ROS). Based on Russian National Union, banned from contesting the 1993 election for supporting Congress during its conflict with the president. Led by Sergei Baburin. (1999–).

33 *Russian Socialist Party* (Russkaya Sotsialisticheskaya Partiya, RSP). Founded by entrepreneur Vladimir Bryntsalov. (1999–).

34 *Spiritual Heritage Movement* (Vserossiiskoe Obshchestvenno-Politcheskoe Dvizhenie Dukhovnoe Nasledie, DN). Nationalist group led by Aleksei Podberezkin, ex-KPRF. (1999–).

¹ In December 2001, Unity and Fatherland–All Russia merged into *Unity and Fatherland/Unified Russia* (Edinstvo i Otechestvo/Edinaya Rossiya).

Appendix Table II.2 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 16 June, 3 July 1996

	1st Round	%	2nd Round	%
Electorate	108,495,023		108,589,050	
Valid Votes	74,515,019	68.7	73,910,698	68.1
Invalid Votes	1,072,120	1	780,592	0.7
Total Votes	75,587,139	69.7	74,691,290	68.8
Boris Yeltsin, Ind.	26,665,495	35.3	40,203,948	53.8
Gennady Zyuganov, KPRF	24,211,686	32.0	30,102,288	40.3
Aleksandr Lebed, KRO	10,974,736	14.5	—	—
Grigory Yavlinsky, Yabloko	5,550,752	7.3	—	—
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, LDPR	4,311,479	5.7	—	—
Svyatoslav Fedorov, PST	699,158	0.9	—	—
Mikhail Gorbachev, Ind.	386,069	0.5	—	—
Martin Shakkum, Ind.	277,068	0.4	—	—
Yuri Vlasov, Ind.	235,797	0.2	—	—
Vladimir Bryntsalov, RSP	123,065	0.2	—	—
Aman-Geldy Tuleev, KPRF ^a	308	0	—	—
Against all candidates	1,163,921	1.5	3,604,462	4.8

^a Withdrew at last minute in favour of Zyuganov. Votes reported are those cast early

Appendix Table II.3 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: 26 March 2000

		%
Electorate	109,372,043	
Valid Votes	74,369,754	68.0
Invalid Votes	701,016	0.6
Total Votes	75,070,770	68.6
Vladimir Putin, Ind.	39,740,467	52.9
Gennady Zyuganov, KPRF	21,928,468	29.2
Grigory Yavlinsky, Yabloko	4,351,450	5.8
Aman-Geldy Tuleev, Ind.	2,217,364	3.0
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, LDPR	2,026,509	2.7
Konstantin Titov, Ind.	1,107,269	1.5
Ella Pamfilova, ZGD	758,967	1.0
Stanislav Govorukhin, Ind.	328,723	0.4
Yuri Skuratov, Ind.	319,189	0.4
Aleksei Podberezkin, DN	98,177	0.1
Umar Dzhabrailov, Ind.	78,498	0.1
Against all candidates	1,414,673	1.9

Appendix Table II 4 Votes and Seats in the Russian State Duma

	12 December 1993			17 December 1995			19 December 1999			
	Votes %	N Seats	%	Votes %	N Seats	%	Votes %	N Seats	%	
	List SMD	List SMD	Total	List SMD	List SMD	Total	List SMD	List SMD	Total	
Valid Votes	50.6	50.6		64.4	62.9		61.7	60.3		
Invalid Votes	3.7	4.0		1.3	1.4		1.2	1.3		
Total Votes	54.3	54.6		65.7	64.3		62.9	61.6		
1 Liberal Democratic Party	21.4	2.7	59	5	14.3	50	1	11.3	17	3.8
2 Russia's Choice	14.5	6.3	40	30	15.6	0	9	2.0		
3 Communist Party	11.6	3.2	32	16	10.7	99	58	34.9	67	25.1
4 Women of Russia	7.6	0.5	21	2	5.1	0	3	0.7	0	0
5 Agrarian Party of Russia	7.4	5.0	21	12	7.3	0	20	4.4		
6 Yabloko	7.3	3.2	20	3	5.1	31	14	10.0	16	4.4
7 Russian Unity and Concord	6.3	2.5	18	1	4.2	0	1	0.2		
8 Democratic Party of Russia	5.1	1.9	14	1	3.3					
9 Movement for Democratic Reforms	3.8	1.9	0	4	0.9					
10 Civic Union	1.8	2.7	0	1	0.2					
11 Future of Russia	1.2	0.7	0	1	0.2					
12 Cedar	0.7	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13 Dignity and Charity	0.7	0.8	0	2	0.4					
14 Our Home Is Russia						45	10	12.2	26	7.1
15 Communists of the USSR						0	1	0.2	0.7	0
16 Congress Russian Communities						0	5	1.1	0.7	0.2
17 Workers' Self-Government						0	1	0.2		
18 Great Power						0	0	0		
19 Forward Russia!						0	3	0.7		

/Appendix Table II.4 continued

	12 December 1993			17 December 1995			19 December 1999		
	Votes %		N Seats	Votes %		N Seats	Votes %		N Seats
	List SMD	List SMD Total	List SMD	List SMD Total	List SMD	List SMD Total	List SMD	List SMD Total	
20 Power to the People!	—	—	1.6	1.9	0	9	2.0	—	—
21 Union of Labor	—	—	1.6	0.9	0	1	0.2	—	—
22 Pamfilova—Gurov—Lysenko Bloc	—	—	1.6	0.7	0	2	0.4	—	—
23 Ivan Rybkin Bloc	—	—	1.1	1.5	0	3	0.7	—	—
24 Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc	—	—	1.0	0.7	0	1	0.2	—	—
25 Unity	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	23.3	2.1
26 Fatherland—All Russia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13.3	8.6
27 Union of Right Forces	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.5	3.0
28 Party of Pensioners	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.9	0.7
29 For Citizens' Dignity	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	0.2
30 Movement in Support of Army	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	0.7
31 Nikolaev—Fedorov Bloc	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	1.0
32 Russian People's Union	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	1.1
33 Russian Socialist Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	1.0
34 Spiritual Heritage	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1	0.9
35 Independents	—	45.2	—	146	—	146	32.5	—	31.2
36 Against all	3.9	14.8	—	—	—	—	—	2.8	9.6
Others	0.0	0.7	0	0	0	0	0	6.6	6.6
Invalid ballots	6.8	7.4	—	—	—	—	—	1.9	2.3
Total	100	100	225	224 ³	100	100	100	225	225
	100	100	225	225	100	100	100	225	225

¹ As % of electorate. Votes for individual parties are reported as % of the total vote. ² Six small parties winning one single-member seat each. ³ One seat left vacant in Chechnya due to political situation.

APPENDIX III. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS

	1994		1996		1997		1998		1999	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
APPENDIX TABLE III.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: KOREA										
DEPENDENT VARIABLES										
EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS										
Satisfaction with the way democracy works										
Q. On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is complete dissatisfaction and 10 is complete satisfaction, where would you place the way democracy works in our country?										
			.57	3.26	-1.11	3.35	-.32	2.94	-.42	2.96
NORMATIVE ATTITUDES										
Undemocratic alternatives										
Q. There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that: 1=Completely disagree, 4=Completely agree										
The army should govern the country										
					1.52	.79	1.59	.78	1.46	.70
A strong leader who can make decisions quickly would be better than parliament to solve the serious problems facing the country now										
					1.73	.87	1.88	.93	1.70	.81
Rejection of undemocratic rule										
Additive scale combining for Korea: rejection army rule+strong leader; scales standardized on scale from -9 to +9										
					5.25	4.09	4.58	4.32	5.50	3.82
-9=Least rejection +9=Most rejection										
(for regressions: collapsed values -9 to -6)										
					5.28	4.03	4.61	4.24	5.52	3.78
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES										
SOCIAL STRUCTURE										
Gender										
			.48	.50	.51	.50	.51	.50	.52	.50
0=Male, 1=Female										

Korea - Appendix Table III.1

	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.
Age in years					
Min=20 in Korea, Max=90	40	40	40	42	42
Town size					
1=Rural, 3=Big city	2.25	2.31	2.32	2.31	2.31
	.75	.74	.74	.71	.73
Education levels completed					
1=Primary, 3=Tertiary	1.87	1.93	1.94	1.85	1.93
	.76	.76	.75	.75	.75
Trust most people					
Q. Generally speaking, how much do you think the majority of people can be trusted?					
1=Least trust, 7=Most trust	4.22	4.22	4.75	4.22	4.22
	1.28	1.28	1.22	1.38	1.38
Belongs to largest Christian church (Korea)					
Q. Do you have a religion? If so, which? (Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Others, None)					
0=Not Protestant, 1=Protestant	.20	.24	.22	.20	.22
	.40	.42	.41	.40	.41
Self-assessed social class					
Q. Do you think of yourself as belonging to upper, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle or lower class?					
1=Lower, 4=Upper middle+	2.56	2.56	3.24	2.26	2.29
	.84	.84	.65	.88	.84
Q. How much do you trust each of the following listed institutions (...Trade Unions, Private enterprise...)?					
Trust trade unions					
1=Least trust, 7=Most trust	4.73	4.73	1.31		
Trust private enterprise					
1=Least trust, 7=Most trust	3.87	3.87	1.28		

Korea - Appendix Table III.1		1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
		Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
		Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.
Has a preferred party						
Q. Do you have a political party close to you? If so, which political party do you prefer?						
0=Has no preference, 1=Prefers a party.						
		.52	.50	.56	.58	.49
Resident of 'natural opposition' region (Korea)						
1=Resident of Cholla region (Chonnam, Chonbuk, Kwangju), 0=Not resident of Cholla						
		.12	.33	.12	.13	.33
ECONOMICS						
Family economic position in five years						
Q. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be in five years?						
1=Much worse, 5=Much better						
		3.75	.80	3.78	.75	3.69
					.78	.73
Ratings country's current economy						
Q. (Korea) How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? 1=Very bad; 4=Very good; standardized on scale where						
-100=Worst, +100=Best						
		16.92	35.72	-54.34	-57.07	-24.37
					29.86	27.61
Income quintile						
1=Lowest, 5=Highest						
		3.12	1.24	2.76	1.34	3.00
					1.38	1.36
POLITICS						
Trusts representative institutions						
Q. How much do you trust each of the following listed institutions? ...Parliament...Political parties						
Additive scale 2=Least trust, 14=Most trust (codes 12 to 14 collapsed because of skewed distribution)						
		7.52	2.46	5.57	2.84	
Rating country's president						
Q. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the government of President [name] handles problems facing our society?						
1=Worst, 10=Best						
		5.72	1.63	5.91	1.83	3.62
					1.69	1.70
					5.46	5.22
					1.75	1.75

Korea - Appendix Table III.1		1994		1996		1997		1998		1999	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Extent of democracy in country now											
Q. Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. The closer to 1 the score is, the more dictatorial our country is; the closer to 10 the score is, the more democratic our country is. Where would you place our country at the present time?											
1=Complete dictatorship, 10=Complete democracy		6.81	1.57	6.77	1.52	6.25	1.43	6.13	1.47	6.06	1.47
Government cares about ordinary people											
Q. To what extent do you think the government takes the interests of people like yourself into account when making important decisions?											
1=None, 4=A lot.						2.07	.75	2.12	.74		
Experts should decide on economic policy											
Q. Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had, and some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. How much do you agree or disagree that the most important decisions about the economy should be made by experts and not the government and Parliament?											
1=Disagree strongly, 4=Agree strongly						2.96	.85	2.93	.82	3.00	.78
Perceive external threat (Korea)											
Q. Who is to be blamed for our country's political problems and how much? (...North Korea...)											
1=None, 4=A lot						2.66	.87				
Extent of corruption in government (Korea)											
Q. Out of ten established politicians in our country these days, how many do you think are corrupt? Then out of ten public employees how many do you think are corrupt? (Average of the two scores)											
0=None, 10=Ten out of ten				6.44	1.87						
Corruption now compared to prior regime											
Q. Compared to the situation under the Chun regime, how would you compare conditions today as regards political corruption?											
1=Much better than before, 5=Much worse than before				2.91	1.06						

Korea - Appendix Table III.1

	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.
Prefers private to state ownership					
Q. On this card you will find contrasting statements. For each pair, please choose one statement which comes closest to your view ... The state is best at running enterprises OR An enterprise is best run by private entrepreneurs.					
			1.82	1.82	
			.39	.38	
Attention to politics (Korea)					
Q. (Asked if reads a daily newspaper) How much attention do you pay to news about politics in the newspaper?					
					2.59
					.82
Relative efficacy now					
Q. Compared to the old regime, would you say that today: People like me can have an influence on government.					
		3.73			
		.84			
Citizen efficacy					
Q. How much influence do you think people like you have on what the government does?					
			2.43		
			.81		
Fairness now compared to prior regime					
Q. How different do you think things are under the [current regime] compared to the Chun regime in relation to whether or not...Everyone, no matter who he or she is, is treated equally by the government?					
		2.41			
		.81			
		2.23			
		.81			
Freedom now compared to prior regime					
Q. How different do you think things are under the [current regime] compared to the Chun regime in relation to whether or not...Anyone can speak freely what he or she thinks/ People can join any organization of their choice/ People can decide whether or not they want to participate in politics/ People can follow the religion of their choice?					
		3.63		3.28	
		.85		.89	
4=Much worse all four, 20=Much better all four (codes 4 through 10 collapsed because of skewed distribution)					
		15.96		2.57	

Korea - Appendix Table III.1

	1994		1996		1997		1998		1999	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.

Past regime evaluation

Q. Here is a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 is the worst system of government and 100 is the best. Where would you place our system of government a) under the Chun regime? (recoded to -100/+100 scale to match Russia)
 -100=Worst possible, 100=Best possible

	4	47								
--	---	----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Supports freedom of executive (Korea)

Q. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If a government is often restrained by an assembly, it will be unable to achieve great things?
 1=Disagree strongly, 4=Agree strongly

	2.65	.79	2.89	.75						
--	------	-----	------	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--

Politically patient

Q. Some people say that it will take years for government to deal with the problems inherited from the days of undemocratic governance. Others say that our democratic regime ought to be able to deal with problems right now. With which view do you agree and how strongly?
 1=Definitely should be able to deal with problems now, 4=Definitely take years

	2.94	.87								
--	------	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

VARIABLES USED IN FACTOR ANALYSES

Votes of ordinary people influence gov't

Q. How much influence do you think the votes of people like yourself have on the way this country is governed?

1=None, 4=A lot

	2.90	.82	3.01	.77	3.06	.76
--	------	-----	------	-----	------	-----

Dictator more effective 1

Q. How much do you agree with the statement that dictatorial rule like that of a strong leader like Park Chung-hee would be much better than democracy to handle the serious problems facing the country these days?

1=Completely disagree, 4=Completely agree

	2.84	.96				
--	------	-----	--	--	--	--

Dictator more effective 2

Q. Some people say that rule by a dictator like Park Chung-hee is the best way to sort out the economic problems facing the country; others say that a democratically elected president is better. What do you think?

1=Democracy better 2=Dictator better

	1.67	.47	1.46	.50		
--	------	-----	------	-----	--	--

Korea - Appendix Table III.1		1994		1996		1997		1998		1999	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Desired level of democracy											
Q. Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. The closer to 1 the score is, the more dictatorial our country is; the closer to 10 the score is, the more democratic our country is. To what extent would you personally desire our country to be democratized?											
1=Complete dictatorship, 10=Complete democracy		8.62	1.40	8.57	1.61	8.39	1.45	7.88	1.76	8.01	1.71
Expected future regime evaluation											
Q. Here is a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 is the worst system of government and 100 is the best. Where would you place our system of government in five years time? (recoded to -100/+100 scale to match Russia)											
-100=Worst possible, 100=Best possible						22	40				
Public life now											
Q. Rate the quality of public life in the current situation.											
1=Worst, 10=Best		6.12	1.47								
Elections best for choosing govt											
Q. How much do you agree with the following statement: the best way of choosing our government is an election that gives every voter a choice of candidates and parties?											
1=Completely disagree, 4=Completely agree						3.14	.74	3.20	.73	3.26	.69
Voted in last presidential election											
Q. In the 1997 presidential election, did you vote?											
0=No, 1=Yes								.89	.31	.89	.31
Asked opinion about politics											
Q. How often do other people ask your opinion about political affairs?											
1=Never, 4=Often								2.39	.84		
Interested in politics											
Q. How much are you interested in politics?											
1=Not at all, 4=A lot		2.67	.85	2.77	.83			2.47	.86	2.54	.82

Korea - Appendix Table III.1		1994		1996		1997		1998		1999	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number of newspapers read each day											
Q. How many different newspapers do you read each day?											
	1=None, 4=More than two			1.96	.85						
Days read newspaper											
Q. How many days a week do you read a daily newspaper?											
	0=Never, 7=Seven days a week							3.95	2.82		
Influence of government on your life											
Q. How much effect do you think the activities of the national government in Seoul have on your day-to-day life?											
	1=None, 4=A lot	2.17	.82			2.40	.79			2.58	.72
Identifies with the political right											
Q. Here is a scale measuring political attitudes from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Where on this scale would you put yourself?											
	1=Extreme left, 10=Extreme right	6.07	1.82	6.25	1.86	6.25	1.74	5.73	1.79	5.25	1.76

Russia - Appendix Table III.2		1993		1994		1995		Jan 1996		Jul 1996		1998		Jan 2000		Apr 2000		2001		
Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
		4.61	-1.31	4.61	-2.14	4.38	-1.75	4.31	-1.08	4.63	-1.45	4.50	-1.04	4.97	-1.20	4.60	-0.17	4.51		

APPENDIX TABLE III.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: RUSSIA

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS

Current regime evaluations

Q. Here is a scale from -100 to +100 where -100 is the worst system of government and +100 is the best. Where would you place our system of government at present?

Standardized on scale where -9=Worst possible, +9=Best possible

-1.48 4.61 -1.31 4.61 -2.14 4.38 -1.75 4.31 -1.08 4.63 -1.45 4.50 -1.04 4.97 -1.20 4.60 -0.17 4.51

NORMATIVE ATTITUDES

Undemocratic alternatives

Q. There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that:

1=Completely disagree, 4=Completely agree

The army should govern the country

1.56 .82 1.60 .77 1.61 .76 1.57 .78 1.68 .83 1.61 .76 1.78 .79 1.69 .82

We should return to Communist rule

2.03 1.02 2.09 1.01 2.24 1.06 2.16 1.05 2.34 1.06 2.32 1.09 2.28 1.05 2.45 1.13

A tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation

1.98 1.00 2.08 1.03 2.02 1.01 2.11 1.08 2.01 1.02 2.25 .96 2.04 1.03

A strong leader who can make decisions quickly would be better than parliament to solve the serious problems facing the country now

2.60 1.11

Rejection of undemocratic rule

Additive scale combining return to Communism+army rule +dictatorship the only way out; scales standardized on -9 to +9 scale

-9=Least rejection +9=Most rejection

2.80 4.18 3.69 4.06 3.14 4.27 3.50 4.11 2.78 4.24 3.14 4.24 2.42 4.00 2.67 4.48
 (for regressions: collapsed values -9 to -6) 2.84 4.07 3.72 3.98 3.18 4.18 3.52 4.05 2.83 4.13 3.19 4.12 2.46 3.91 2.74 4.33

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1996	1998	2000	2001
	Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean
	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.

Russia - Appendix Table III.2

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Gender
0=Male, 1=Female

	.55	.50	.55	.50	.55	.50	.54	.50
--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Age in years

Min=18 in Russia, 20 in Korea, Max=90

	44	16	44	16	43	16	45	17
--	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Town size

1=Rural, 3=Big city

	1.93	.68	1.89	.67	1.94	.66	1.93	.66
--	------	-----	------	-----	------	-----	------	-----

Education levels completed

1=Primary, 3=Tertiary

	1.72	.70	1.77	.67	1.75	.68	1.73	.70
--	------	-----	------	-----	------	-----	------	-----

Trust most people

Q. Generally speaking, how much do you think the majority of people can be trusted?

1=Least trust, 7=Most trust

			3.12	1.72		3.40	1.71	4.73
--	--	--	------	------	--	------	------	------

Belongs to largest Christian church (Russia)

Q. As for religion, do you consider yourself...? (Atheist, Russian Orthodox, Other Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Other, Believer without particular church, Difficult to answer)

	0=Not Orthodox, 1=Russian Orthodox	.44	.50	.43	.49		4.99	1.56
--	------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	--	------	------

Russia - Appendix Table III.2		1993		1994		1995		1996		1998		2000		2001	
Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.

Self-assessed social class

Q. In our society, there are people of high social position and people of low social position. On this scale where 1 is the highest position and 10 is the lowest, what position do you have now? Recoded to 4 point scale where

1=Lower, 4=Upper middle+

2.31 .98 2.54 .90 2.18 .95 2.20 .98 2.67 .99

Q. How much do you trust each of the following listed institutions (...Trade Unions, Private enterprise...)?

Trust trade unions

1=Least trust, 7=Most trust

2.83 1.62 2.89 1.58 2.89 1.50 2.62 1.65 3.08 1.85 2.87 1.71

Trust private enterprise

1=Least trust, 7=Most trust

2.43 1.51 2.50 1.45 2.87 1.43 2.63 1.55 2.85 1.67 2.96 1.53

Has a preferred party

Q. Do you have a political party close to you? If so, which political party do you prefer?

0=Has no preference, 1=Prefers a party.

.45 .50 .54 .50

Resident of 'natural opposition' region (Russia)

1=Resident of 'Communist voting' region (region where oblast vote for Communist candidate in two presidential elections is more than five per cent above the national average), 0=Not resident in such a region.

.30 .46 .23 .42 .34 .47 .29 .46 .32 .46 .29 .45 .32 .47

ECONOMICS

Family economic position in five years

Q. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be in five years?

1=Much worse, 5=Much better

2.97 1.05 3.23 1.18 2.82 1.04 2.98 .93 3.13 1.05 2.91 1.02 3.14 .93 3.31 .88 3.14 .97

Russia - Appendix Table III.2		1993		1994		1995		Jan 1996		Jul 1996		Jan 2000		Apr 2000		2001		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Ratings country's current economy																		
Q. Here is a scale ranking how well the economy works. The top, plus 100, is the best and the bottom, minus 100 is the worst. Where on this scale would you put our current economic system?																		
-100=Worst, +100=Best	-25	48	-46	46	-39	46	-29	48	-26	51	-26	50	-28	54	-30	51	-12	51
Income quintile																		
1=Lowest, 5=Highest	2.82	1.32	2.88	1.18	2.97	1.41	2.99	1.41	3.01	1.41	2.91	1.40	2.86	1.34	2.83	1.31	2.94	1.38

Ratings country's current economy

Q. Here is a scale ranking how well the economy works. The top, plus 100, is the best and the bottom, minus 100 is the worst. Where on this scale would you put our current economic system?

-100=Worst, +100=Best

Income quintile

1=Lowest, 5=Highest

POLITICS

Trusts representative institutions

Q. How much do you trust each of the following listed institutions? ...Parliament...Political parties

Additive scale 2=Least trust, 14=Most trust (codes 12 to 14 collapsed because of skewed distribution)

4.92 2.54 5.26 2.58 5.35 2.40 4.30 2.43

Rating country's president

Q. What assessment would you give to [name] as President if 1 is very bad and 10 is the best mark?

1=Worst, 10=Best

3.23 1.76 3.53 1.90 3.41 2.19 5.81 2.48 5.93 2.25 6.10 2.24

Extent of democracy in country now

Q. Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. The closer to 1 the score is, the more dictatorial our country is; the closer to 10 the score is, the more democratic our country is. Where would you place our country at the present time?

1=Complete dictatorship, 10=Complete democracy

5.35 2.07 5.31 2.12 5.31 1.89 5.50 2.01

Russia - Appendix Table III.2

	1993	1994	1995	1996	Jan	Jul	1998	2000	2001
	Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	Std. Mean	2000	1996	1998	2000	2001
	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Dev.	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
					Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.	Std. Dev.

Attention to politics (Russia)

Q. Do you happen to know the name of...? The deputy who represents this single-member district in the Duma? The governor of this region? The prime minister of Russia today?

0=No correct answers, 3=3 correct answers

1.58 .90

Relative efficacy now

Q. Compared to the old regime, would you say that today: People like me can have an influence on government.

1= Much worse now, 5=Much better now

2.80 .56 2.70 .92 2.93 1.05 2.40 .98 2.73 1.10 2.85 1.05

Citizen efficacy

Q. How much influence do you think people like you have on what the government does?

1=None, 4=A lot

1.23 .51

Fairness now compared to prior regime

Q. Compared to the old regime before perestroika, would you say that today...Everyone, no matter who he or she is, is treated equally by the government?

1=Much worse now, 5=Much better now

2.68 .64 2.38 .95 2.31 1.15 2.48 1.13

Freedom now compared to prior regime

Q. Compared to the old regime before perestroika, would you say that today...Anyone has the right to say what he or she thinks/ You can join any organization of your choice/ Everyone can decide individually whether or not they want to participate in politics/ Everybody has freedom of choice in religious matters?

4=Much worse all four, 20=Much better all four (codes 4 through 10 collapsed because of skewed distribution)

14.35 1.71 14.80 1.50 16.35 2.52 16.56 2.58 15.87 2.65 16.87 2.69 16.99 2.59 17.22 2.74

Russia - Appendix Table III.2		1993		1994		1995		Jan 1996		Jul 1996		1998		Jan 2000		Apr 2001	
Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
19	57	5	58	29	51	23	55	16	58	32	53	36	52	31	55		

Past regime evaluation

Q. Here is a scale from -100 to +100 where -100 is the worst system of government and +100 is the best. Where would you place our system of government before perestroika?

-100=Worst possible, 100=Best possible

19 57 5 58 29 51 23 55 16 58 32 53 36 52 31 55

Supports freedom of executive (Russia)

Q. Do you think that the President should have the right to suspend the Duma and introduce presidential rule by decree if he considers that necessary?

1=Disagree strongly, 4=Agree strongly

2.52 .94 2.44 .91 2.44 .92 2.55 .96 2.72 .96 2.84 .91

Politically patient

Q. Some people say that it will take years for government to deal with the problems inherited from the days of undemocratic governance. Others say that our democratic regime ought to be able to deal with problems right now. With which view do you agree and how strongly?

1=Definitely should be able to deal with problems now, 4=Definitely take years

2.42 1.03 2.18 .95 2.26 1.08 2.52 1.16

VARIABLES USED IN FACTOR ANALYSIS

Desired level of democracy

Q. Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. The closer to 1 the score is, the more dictatorial our country is; the closer to 10 the score is, the more democratic our country is. To what extent would you personally desire our country to be democratized?

1=Complete dictatorship, 10=Complete democracy

7.36 2.75 7.56 2.60 7.35 2.46 7.03 2.67

Expected future regime evaluation

Q. Here is a scale from -100 to +100 where -100 is the worst system of government and +100 is the best. Where would you place our system of government in five years time?

-100=Worst possible, 100=Best possible

10 53 14 48 0 49 8 45 14 54 6 51 25 50 26 44 20 50

Russia - Appendix Table III.2		1993		1994		1995		1996		1996		1998		2000		2001	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Duty to vote during federal elections																	
Q. What do you think people like yourself should do when there is a national election?																	
1=No sense to vote, 3=Make every effort																	
Elections best for choosing govt																	
Q. How much do you agree with the following statement: the best way of choosing our government is an election that gives every voter a choice of candidates and parties?																	
1=Completely disagree, 4=Completely agree																	
Voted in last presidential election																	
Q. In the [year] presidential election, did you vote?																	
0=No, 1=Yes																	
Voted in last Duma election: Russia																	
Q. In the [year] election to the State Duma did you vote?																	
0=No, 1=Yes																	
Asked opinion about politics																	
Q. How often do other people ask your opinion about political affairs?																	
1=Never, 4=Often																	
Interested in politics																	
Q. How much are you interested in politics?																	
1=Not at all, 4=A lot																	

Russia - Appendix Table III.2		1993		1994		1995		Jan 1996		Jul 1996		1998		Jan 2000		Apr 2000		2001		
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Reading national newspapers																				
Q. How often do you usually read national newspapers?																				
1=Never, 4=Often																				
Influence of government on your life																				
Q. How much effect do you think the activities of the federal government in Moscow have on your day-to-day life?																				
1=None, 4=A lot																				
Identifies with pro-market political outlook																				
Q. What broad political outlook are you most inclined to favour?																				
(choice of support a market economy, Communist, great power patriot, green, other or none; here coded 0 for not pro-market and 1 for pro-market)																				

Appendix IV. SURVEY DATA ANALYSED USING MACRO-LEVEL DATA

Appendix Table IV.1 Details of Surveys Providing Macro-Level Data ^a

All surveys are nationally representative and based on multi-stage random probability samples; with few exceptions^b, the number of respondents in each survey in each country is close to 1000; in some cases survey institutes have marginally weighted the sample by age, gender or education to provide a better fit to national census data.

Name/Time of Survey	Countries	Published Results
<u>Central and Eastern Eurobarometer^c</u>		
Autumn 1990 (I)	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia ^d , Hungary, Poland	Reif & Cunningham 1992
Autumn 1991 (II)	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia ^d , Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia ^e	Reif & Cunningham 1994
Autumn 1992 (III)	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia ^e , Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine	Reif & Cunningham 1996a
Autumn 1993 (IV)	“ ”	Reif & Cunningham 1995a
Autumn 1994 (V)	as IV but all Russia, not just European Russia	Reif & Cunningham 1995b
Autumn 1995 (VI)	“ ”	Reif & Cunningham 1996b
Autumn 1996 (VII)	“ ”	Cunningham 1997
Autumn 1997 (VIII)	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia	Cunningham 1998; European Commission 2002
<u>Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health</u>		
Autumn 2001	Russia, Ukraine	Haerpfer, et al. 2002
<u>New Baltic Barometer^f</u>		
Autumn 1993 (I)	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Rose & Maley 1994
Spring 1995(II)	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Rose 1995b
Autumn 1996(III)	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Rose, Vilmorus et al. 1997
Spring 2000 (IV)	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Rose 2000a

New Democracies Barometer

Autumn 1991 (I)	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia ^d , Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia	Rose & Haerpfer 1992
Winter 1992/1993 (II)	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine	Rose & Haerpfer 1993
Winter 1993/1994 (III)	“ ”	Rose & Haerpfer 1994a
Autumn 1995 (IV)	“ ”	Rose & Haerpfer 1996b
Spring 1998 (V)	“ ”	Rose & Haerpfer 1998

New Europe Barometer

Autumn 2001 (I)	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine	Rose 2002
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Notes to Appendix Table IV.1

^a For details of Korean and Russian surveys, which are analysed also at micro-level, see Table III.1 in the text;

^b Larger N's in the New Russia Barometer surveys were weighted downward in the merged Korean-Russian data files to give approximately equal numbers of respondents per country.

^c Sample included respondents aged 15 and over, but 15-17 year-olds were excluded from the analyses reported here.

^d Single sample in what was then a single state, but results subdivided in this study to provide separate Czech and Slovak observations; Czech respondents outnumber Slovak respondents by two to one.

^e Sample covered European Russia only

^f Russian-speaking population over-sampled, but for this study the number of Russian-speaking respondents weighted down to reflect their proportion in population of the entire country;

Appendix Table IV.2 Dependent Variable Series at Macro-Level

Satisfaction with the way democracy works

Q. (post-communist Europe) On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing^a in (OUR COUNTRY)? (four point scale; scores standardized on scale from -9 for worst to 9 for best), don't knows excluded) Q. (Korea) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is complete dissatisfaction and 10 is complete satisfaction, where would you place the way democracy works in our country? (standardized, on scale from -8.5, worst, to +8.5, best).

Country /Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	N ^b
BULGARIA			
1990	-2.2	5.0	1246
1991	-0.9	5.1	793
1992	-1.9	5.4	1124
1993	-4.3	5.1	1075
1994	-5.8	3.8	959
1995	-4.5	4.5	957
1996	-5.6	4.2	913
1997	-3.2	4.9	929
2001	-3.0	4.8	993
CZECH R.			
1990	-0.9	4.6	808
1991	-1.6	4.4	655
1992	-1.2	4.4	845
1993	-0.7	4.5	699
1994	-1.1	4.8	965
1995	-0.8	4.6	971
1996	-1.3	4.6	927
1997	-2.1	4.8	873
2001	-0.3	4.5	970
ESTONIA			
1991	-1.8	4.6	794
1992	-2.8	4.9	847
1993	-1.4	4.7	825
1994	-2.1	4.8	878
1995	-1.5	4.7	884
1996	-1.2	4.4	989
1997	-1.1	4.5	925
2001	-1.9	4.4	966
HUNGARY			
1990	-3.7	4.8	871
1991	-2.3	5.0	867
1992	-3.3	4.8	908
1993	-3.6	4.9	878
1994	-3.2	4.8	837

1995	-3.7	4.9	904
1996	-3.8	4.9	909
1997	-2.3	4.8	970
2001	-0.9	4.2	921
KOREA			
1996	0.6	3.4	950
1997	-1.1	3.5	991
1998	-0.3	3.1	989
1999	-0.4	3.1	1000
LATVIA			
1991	-1.0	4.6	875
1992	-3.3	4.2	934
1993	-2.1	4.7	886
1994	-2.7	4.7	916
1995	-2.3	4.6	957
1996	-2.7	4.8	950
1997	-2.6	4.4	958
2001	-1.7	4.3	954
LITHUANIA			
1991	0.6	4.5	814
1992	0.0	4.2	883
1993	-1.5	4.7	879
1994	-2.1	4.5	897
1995	-2.8	4.6	871
1996	-2.0	4.3	884
1997	-1.2	4.1	892
2001	-1.3	4.4	981
POLAND			
1990	-0.1	4.5	702
1991	-2.0	5.0	737
1992	-1.9	4.9	880
1993	-0.9	4.5	818
1994	-2.6	4.4	844
1995	0.2	4.8	865
1996	-0.6	4.9	885
1997	0.6	4.6	893
2001	-1.8	4.9	944
ROMANIA			
1991	-0.8	4.1	961
1992	-2.6	5.2	921
1993	-1.8	4.6	955
1994	-2.3	4.7	1185
1995	-1.3	4.1	1010
1996	0.3	4.0	1116
1997	-0.7	4.7	960
2001	-2.2	4.4	989

RUSSIA			
1991	-3.9	4.6	747
1992	-4.6	4.4	826
1993	-4.0	4.7	1115
1994	-5.4	4.0	847
1995	-5.6	3.9	1017
1996	-5.1	4.0	924
2001	-2.5	5.3	3363
SLOVAKIA			
1990	-2.8	4.8	387
1991	-3.4	4.0	313
1992	-2.5	4.2	669
1993	-3.1	4.3	603
1994	-3.6	4.3	889
1995	-2.5	4.7	983
1996	-3.3	4.7	943
1997	-5.1	4.9	1019
2001	-3.5	4.4	970
SLOVENIA			
1992	-0.2	4.2	992
1993	-1.5	4.5	828
1994	-1.9	4.7	932
1995	-1.6	4.5	1040
1996	-0.8	4.5	1024
1997	-1.5	4.4	973
2001	0.6	4.1	962
UKRAINE			
1992	-3.6	4.7	1203
1993	-4.9	4.9	948
1994	-4.7	4.9	945
1995	-5.0	5.0	946
1996	-4.0	5.1	1002
2001	-3.9	5.1	2108

^a CEEB and LLH surveys asked about way democracy is developing while NEB asked about the way democracy works. A split file in the CEEB survey of 1997 showed that responses to the two question wordings produced almost identical distributions across all countries surveyed.

^b In some cases marginally weighted within country to achieve national representativeness.

Sources: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer; Korea Democracy Barometer; New Europe Barometer; Living Conditions, Lifestyles and Health Survey.

Rejection of undemocratic rule

Q. *There are different opinions about what should be the nature of the state. To what extent do you think that: (post-communist countries) We should return to Communist rule; it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything (Russia only: a tough dictatorship is the only way out of the current situation); OR the army should govern the country?*

(Korea) it would be better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything; OR the army should govern the country?

(Definitely agree...Definitely disagree; Both scales standardized on a scale from -9 for least rejection of undemocratic rule to +9 for most rejection)

Country/Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	N ^a
BULGARIA			
1993	3.5	4.3	1102
1995	4.0	4.3	1167
1998	4.7	4.2	962
2001	4.4	4.5	1127
CZECH R.			
1993	6.9	3.0	1096
1995	6.8	3.2	908
1998	6.4	3.3	956
2001	6.9	2.9	1013
ESTONIA			
1995	5.8	2.9	1138
1996	5.5	3.0	924
2001	5.2	3.0	843
HUNGARY			
1993	5.9	3.4	940
1995	5.8	3.5	991
1998	6.0	3.5	968
2001	6.4	3.4	1401
KOREA			
1997	5.3	4.1	1097
1998	4.6	4.3	1002
1999	5.5	3.8	964
LATVIA			
1995	5.5	3.1	926
1996	5.3	3.1	785
2000	5.7	3.0	838
2001	5.4	3.2	826
LITHUANIA			
1995	4.4	3.0	751
1996	5.0	3.1	836
2000	4.4	3.4	1103
2001	4.8	3.5	1113

POLAND			
1993	4.1	3.9	947
1995	5.1	3.4	940
1998	5.1	3.9	1120
2001	4.7	4.0	832
ROMANIA			
1993	4.8	4.2	992
1995	5.6	3.9	983
1998	4.9	4.5	1172
2001	4.8	4.2	893
RUSSIA			
1994	2.8	4.2	2514
1995	3.7	4.1	1910
1996 January	3.1	4.3	2289
1996 July	3.5	4.1	1584
1998	2.8	4.2	1834
2000 January	3.1	4.2	1865
2000 April	2.4	4.0	1555
2001	2.7	4.5	1974
SLOVAKIA			
1993	5.5	3.5	526
1995	5.9	3.2	1008
1998	5.4	3.9	923
2001	4.9	3.6	852
SLOVENIA			
1993	5.3	4.2	822
1995	6.1	3.7	829
1998	7.1	3.1	954
2001	5.6	3.5	919
UKRAINE			
1993	3.0	4.1	931
1995	1.9	4.4	973
1998	2.1	4.3	1114

^a Unweighted N.

Sources: Korea Democracy Barometer, New Russia Barometer, New Baltic Barometer, New Democracies Barometer, New Europe Barometer.

APPENDIX V. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MACRO-LEVEL VARIABLES

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
Satisfaction with democracy	-9=worst	9=best	-2.2	1.51
Rejection of undemocratic rule	-9=least rejection	9=most rejection	4.83	1.29
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES				
<u>Institutional variables</u>				
Party-state legacy	0=No	1=Yes	0.97	0.18
Transition path favourable to freedom	-1=Pre-emptive reform	1=Implosion of old elite	-0.14	0.68
Anti-modern core legacy: in USSR between 1918 and 1939 (Russia, Ukraine)	0=No	1=Yes	0.15	0.36
<u>Structural conditions</u>				
Private sector share in GDP, 1988, %	5	90	16	16
Gross domestic product per capita in 1988, \$PPP	4189	8653	5830	1239
<u>Generic measures of regime performance</u>				
Cumulative economic growth since 1989, %	40	179	82	24
Freedom House: political freedom	1=unfree	7=free	5.68	0.91
Heritage Foundation: economic freedom	1=unfree	5=free	3.01	0.54
Transparency International corruption perception index	1=totally corrupt	10=totally uncorrupt	3.97	1.12
Annual average inflation since 1990, %	6	1512	203	252